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**IDEOLOGY AS POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY
OF PRINT MEDIA DISCOURSES ON
*GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA***

VOLUME I

by

Nuran Erol

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Abstract

IDEOLOGY AS POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY OF PRINT MEDIA DISCOURSES ON *GLASNOST* AND *PERESTROIKA*

by

NURAN EROL

In this study I claim that the print media discourses on *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* are incomplete and inadequate by attempting to disclose the ways in which the discourses fail to preserve a democratic realm in American polity. In order to discover the position of the print media discourses among undemocratic and democratic discourses, a series of analytical procedures are developed based on the critical theory of J. Habermas.

In order to examine the inadequacy in the discursive practices of the print media, I focus on the way the New York Times employs the WE - THEY dichotomy as an ideological filter, the way it excludes the voices who represent various different ideological positions in the political realm examined, and the way it constructs an image of the reforms based on the perceptions on major issues in American society. Each of these themes, it is argued, are interpreted in the pages of the New York Times, by complementing the official discourse uttered by the US Administration. These themes are examined by employing

documentary and historical research methods.

It is disclosed that the newspaper discourses analyzed in this study do not offer a wide variety interpretations on the reforms; that the discourses do not question the US foreign policy premises; that the characterization of the reforms is based on simplifications which do not consider the complexities of the historical period in question; that the discourses constantly emphasize US solutions for the social, political, and economical ailments of a non-US political culture. In this context, the New York Times are ideological because of the absence of various standpoints which is complemented by the domination of a Manichean world view.

It is concluded that the New York Times does not offer a debate on the reforms which is a requisite of the American political sphere. Further, it is suggested that the critical theory of Habermas is useful in terms of questioning and analyzing the contemporary political spheres.

***To my brother Yücel
who taught me the basics of critical thinking.***

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

Society is produced through meaning. The complex of meaning production functions to constitute a set of social relations in which human beings act, communicate, and live. The nature of these social processes shapes the nature of means of communication in general. Human beings tend to set up social relationships through which they reproduce meaning. The following study is an attempt to disclose the way a means of communication, the print media discourses, implement relations of ideology and power in the context of the constructing news.

A series of historical and political events has been observed in the Soviet Union since the leadership change in 1985. The historical significance of the events has reached its peak in 1989, especially after the fall of a social order called Communism. What has happened in the Soviet Union opened a wide variety of discussions including the possibility of socialist practices, norms and institutions of liberal democracy, the capitalism democracy linkage, and the debate on 'the end of the history.' As Poster succinctly notes, the demise of the Soviet and Eastern European Communisms, the Tiananmen Square massacre "heightened the sense that the world is undergoing a fundamental reordering and that the perspectives of the past may not suffice to grasp or serve as a point of critical judgement in relation to it" (Poster, 1993).

The transformation of social orders not only reproduced new macro-intellectual questions, it also created a new opportunity to answer theoretical questions which was never dealt before.

When history displays unexpected turns and zigzags which cannot be explained with the help of old paradigms, the question of finding the meaning of the historical moment emerges. Instead, new paradigms and theoretical frameworks are reproduced in a dialectic way. Knowledge, as the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School noted long time ago, becomes social power. The culture industry develops a series of mechanisms to manipulate the individuality and personality so as to monopolize the creative thinking processes which play a significant role on the question of meaning. Social institutions also contribute to the construction of images and concepts during such historical moments as the ones we are still witnessing today in the so-called "ex" Soviet Union. While a major historical transformation as an ongoing process continues to shape both micro-policies within Russia and other republics, the images and pictures used to describe the process of social change still remains to be dependent on a series of myths and conceptions. The interpretations about what is "really" happening in the Soviet republics provides a very colorful sociological laboratory to follow a query on the question of meaning.

Describing what happened in the Soviet Union and what is happening there now provides outlets of certain voices representing a series of ideologies. It also helps clarify construction of meanings via

the process of communication. As an intellectual opportunity to understand the ways in which the communicative processes are exposed to power relations through textual politics, the following study will concentrate on the ways in which the means of communication implement relations of ideology and power. The sociological significance of labeling the Soviet peoples as inferior, employing a simplistic perspective in portraying social and historical events of complex nature, and the lack of useful concepts in defining the societal and political problems which have been shaped by a unique history all offer us an opportunity to analyze the processes of discourse as power in capitalist society.

Analyzing such a process of discourse formation would help clarify a universal phenomenon, that is, using texts to construct power relations. The same discursive processes described here are also used in many U.S. papers such as the coverage of the Tiananmen Square which neglected the human rights violations in China; or, the minimal press coverage during the massacre of a third of the population in East Timor by the Indonesian army in the mid-1970's. As Orwell once wrote:

"... political language has to consist largely euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenseless villagers are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called 'pacification.' Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called 'transfer of population' or 'rectification of frontiers.' Such phraseology is needed if one

wants to name things without calling up mental images of them" (1974; pp. 111).

Describing events by a 'loaded' language, e.g., which does not acknowledge different voices in describing a situation and which uses unattributed assertions and politically charged labels in the portrayal of situations are among the few characteristics of the discursive processes important in perpetuating power relations. Most importantly, the choices and selection of the words, sentences, utterances, quotes, and other discursive units can display whether or not social relations are actually becoming asymmetrical. In other words, the relations that are reflected in the texts serve as a mirror by which one can understand the nature of social relations in a society.

Thus, by following Habermas's theory of communicative action, it is possible to explore the representation of facts in a critical analysis so as to question whether or not political discourse excludes all discussions of the ends of public policy. Since the representation of the world has to do with power struggles among different social institutions such as media, economy, polity and democracy; the end product of the discourses used in the texts ought to be political. Accordingly, the significance of focusing only on the Soviet leaders as though there is no other institutional mechanism does not exist in representing the Soviet politics, or, neglecting the unique nature of historical events in the Soviet Union convey a simplistic view of politics. The simplicity emphasized here does not stem from the literal

or journalistic quality of discourse itself. Rather it is directly related to the message about the nature of social relations. If the social relations in the Soviet realm are viewed only from the perspective of the Soviet elite by ignoring the other “associational” groups that exist in civil society, we can deduce that the social relations are seen from an asymmetrical point of view. Whereas, if the texts are including all possible voices within the same realm to which different segments of population, classes, groups, and individuals can have equal access, a symmetrical point of view of social relations would be held. In other words, representation of facts itself is directly related to the ways in which the power relations are defined.

Therefore, the study question, that is, the ways in which the Soviet Union represented especially in the era of Glasnost and Perestroika in the newspaper texts, aims at analyzing both the points of view on the Soviet realm and the definitions of major concepts in the American public sphere. It is assumed that through using a documentary research methods, it is possible to document the textual characteristics of a major American newspaper in representing the Soviet Union. It is also presumed that the question of meaning cannot be analyzed by simply listing the frequency of discursive units. Instead, the ways in which creating textual features are used in choosing important political concepts are sociologically more relevant to the objectives of this study. Several assumptions on the major conceptual dimensions of the study will help clarify the lack of completeness in terms of the coverage of political ideologies and policy choices in the

political discourses analyzed. These assumptions will help us “test” the relevancy of the data in order to come up with a consistency between the data analysis and the methodological analysis used in this study.

Background Assumptions

Apart from discussing the major theoretical works, one needs to clearly formulate these concepts such that the definition of these concepts would construct a complementary theoretical linkage between the descriptive analysis of the data and these concepts. The background assumptions about the following concepts are assumed to have stemmed from the theoretical framework of this study.

A. DEMOCRACY

Democracy is a core value in the political cultures of the Western tradition. However, each nation understands democracy in a different way, invoking a fundamentally different image of good political and social regime. A conflict of interpretations is inherent in the fact that each of the Great Traditions has had to come to terms with democracy; each of them had to search for reasons latent in their tradition as to why democracy was a good thing.

As is emphasized in the theoretical chapter of this study, the closest we will probably ever come to the formulation of a specifically democratic ideology is Habermas’s theory of domination-free communication which will be the focus in the chapter on the literature review. Democracy is a manifestation of more fundamental cultural and philosophical ideals, which are largely shaped within the political

sphere.

Accordingly, the assumption in this study is that democracy is a communal concept of democracy which privileges the community. Its medium is those virtues and identifications linking the individual to a larger whole, as is formulated the theories of Rousseau, Marx, and Habermas. It is about *security* – i.e. securing society against the multitudinous threats. It is also about the notion of social objective which is grounded in the value of life. The realization of social security or social objective depends on the existence of an administrative rule. Democratic sovereignty is the only institution which can enable people to form such an administrative rule. In short, democracy is the most favourable political ground on which social objectives in society are formed.

De Tocqueville came to grips with the emergence of European social democracy, different from American civic democracy, or, for that matter, from English liberal democracy. Civic democracy emphasizes public participation, public appearance, public debate, parliamentary discussion. It regards speaking, acting, and associating in public as valuable in its own right. In this context, Habermas's communicative action theory seems to offer a complementary approach to the civic kind of democracy that presumes an efficient use of *talking*, *debating*, and *discussion* as an indicator of a healthy political sphere. Accordingly, the actions of figures 'participating' in this public debate can erode the continuance of the political sphere in which opposing

parties are given equal chances. This may lead to the destruction of civic democracy.

Although Habermas's overall conception does not include the idea of institutionalizing a democratic discourse, he locates rational will formation outside of formal organizations of every sort. It is the multiplicity of formed publics engaged in informal discussions of issues of public interest that is the core of the democratic public sphere. In this view of discourse-centered concept of democracy, the mass media should be examined due to their power in neutralizing the voices that actually form the public realm.

B. MEDIA

The most significant assumptions about the media is that mass media are institutions which play significant roles in economic, political, and cultural realms of societies. On the one hand, media produce meaning and create social consciousness; on the other hand, they are profit-making businesses. The role of media transcends being a producer of cultural meanings. Cultural products constructed by the media are always vulnerable to the economic and political constraints. Media operate within the framework of other institutions in the process of ideological construction, which is a point heavily emphasized in Habermas's systemic approach.

Our assumptions about the media are closely related to the assumptions about democracy. A democratic media system ought to represent all significant interests in society. It also ought to facilitate the

participation of all interests in the public domain, enable them to contribute to public debate and have an input in the framing of public policy. If the democracy is based on the idea of “undistorted” free communication, then the media should serve to preserve the public discussion and civic values. This type of conception about the media is also based on the critical theory perspective, in general, and Habermasian conception of communication, in particular. For Habermas does not only try to be concerned with communication in terms of deep structure or abstract possibility, he provides a way to assess social and political action, by considering it social. Additionally, according to Habermas, capitalism tends to universalize the standards of discourse and knowledge corresponding to it. All questions come to be framed as essentially technical or strategic questions, questions of the most effective means by which a given end can be attained. As a part of the communicative processes, the news tells us not only what happened in the world today, but who we are in relation to that world.

C. THE SOVIET UNION

The most significant assumption for this study is that the Soviet Union is not a totalitarian system where the state politicizes every feature of everyday life, leaving no social or political space for autonomous activity. The theorizing of totalitarianism as a stable social model is the result of the ‘ideological’ contraposition of an idealized open society (the capitalist West) of rational citizens freely interacting for the common good to a closed society (the Soviet Union) controlled in every detail by a political apparatus pursuing unattainable goals and

justifying the deployment of any means. In this study, it will be assumed that while it might be correct in its reading of new class relations in Soviet-type societies, this Cold War formulation generated one-sided analyses and ungrounded expectations concerning the eventual consequences of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*.

The second assertion about the Soviet Union concerns an institutional structure of public policy making. The failures of the body of institutions are seen as the origins of social problems, not individual leaders. This is related to another point about how to view the Soviet political sphere; that is, the social contract between the Soviet people and the state. In other words, the Soviet system rests on a social contract between rulers and the ruled –some basic promises and expectations fulfilled, or at worst deferred. It seems plausible to suggest that the system alienated Soviet citizens to the point of indifference or even rebellion as well as claiming that government has no consensual relationship with the people. Additionally, it is questionable to assume that some selected or predefined factors will erode the government's social contract with the people and its stability.

Description of the Study

In Chapter II, the major theoretical debates on the media texts will be reviewed in order to provide a background to the thesis of the study. The theoretical review will cover an overall assessment of Habermas's theory on communicative action (Habermas, 1975, 1979, 1984) as well as the posture of the theoretical stand of this study among

the critical studies of the media (Foucault, 1972, 1977; Grossberg, 1984; Habermas, 1979; Hall 1978; McCarthy, 1978; Poulantzas, 1980; Williams, 1987). In this chapter, the relevance of Habermas's theory to the analysis of newspaper discourses will be explained as well.

In Chapter III, the major methodological strategies used in this study will be discussed by emphasizing the methodological debates concerning analyzing texts critically (Bourque & Duchastel, 1984; Davis, 1985; Scott, 1990; van Dijk, 1990). The creation of the corpus of the text to be analyzed for the study and the sampling procedures used to select the newspaper texts from the New York Times will be described. According to the methodological approach utilized in this study, in order to systematically study a discourse, one ought to include the following steps: A) the participants in the discourse, B) the utterances made by the participants, and C) the meaning of what is said in the discourses. The description of the texts is the first step to analyze the newspaper discourses, which will be followed by a critical analysis. The methodological approach developed in this study is *not* based on a content analysis which requires the frequency of occurrences of certain words and phrases. Instead, it will be argued, the context within which the utterances and discourse units are used is a sociological importance in this study. In this chapter, the criteria which will be utilized in the critical analysis will be outlined so as to compare the ideal speech situation and the characteristics of the discourses analyzed in this study. The methodological chapter will also evaluate the ways in

which the major themes selected on the Soviet Union are characterized in the newspaper texts.

Following the methodological procedures, the descriptive and the critical analysis of the newspaper texts will help clarify the characterization of the Soviet reforms. The descriptive analysis in Chapter IV will utilize the methodological steps and criteria developed in the previous chapter. In describing the newspaper texts, the claims and utterances made by the participants will be summarized on the basis of three major themes: A) the claims about the Soviet Reforms, B) the claims about the Soviet state, C) the claims about the Soviet leaders, D) the claims about the policy making processes. These major themes will be examined by especially differentiating the claims of the following participants in the discourses: A) the U.S. Administration, B) the Soviet voices, C) the journalists D) experts. The newspaper texts will be classified as: A) news articles, B) commentaries, C) feature articles, D) review articles, E) editorials.

Following the descriptive analysis, the critical analysis of the selected texts in Chapter V will discuss the critical assessment of the newspaper texts on the selected themes. The criteria to analyze the selected discourses will be applied at this point in order to question the information conveyed in the newspaper texts on the basis of A) completeness in covering all the social points of view in the Soviet society in interpreting the reforms, B) adequacy in covering the issues, C) availability of alternative positions in the New York Times in covering the Soviet reforms. Examination of the newspaper texts

through these criteria will provide an assessment of the ideological position on a continuum of ideologies which ranges between undemocratic discourses and democratic discourses. The ideal speech situation will help position the texts analyzed in this study among a series of ideological positions.

Finally, the conclusive assessment of the study in Chapter VI will relate the findings of this study to a whole range of issues concerning the ideological and political implications of findings. Also, the contributions and the limitations of this study will be assessed by emphasizing the new research questions for future research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Studying a specific group of texts with respect to a coverage of another society, if the purpose is to read ideology, requires articulating a series of theories which have their own philosophical characteristics. The sociological problem that is selected here is closely related to the newspaper texts as having characteristics of historical events. Textuality as part of power relations, discourse as ideology, and transformation of language along with the legitimation crises, all define the theoretical background of this study. Such themes, in the history of social thought, have been directly or indirectly looked at by various paradigms, approaches, and schools of thought.

The problem of theorizing about texts has been an important issue in various philosophical and sociological discussions. Theories conceptualizing texts as historical events in general especially as reproduced by the institutions of the media emerged in recent decade and established a body of methodological literature.

Categorizing or classifying the studies dealing with texts used in media would require an extensive survey which will not be included in this chapter¹. Instead, the following analysis, by using both

¹There are various ways of classifying the theories on textuality of media, one of which is noted by L. Grossberg in his essay, "Strategies of Marxist Cultural Interpretation." He separates the research field into three approaches: The Classical Approach emphasizes relations between mass media texts and social/economic realities. The Hermeneutic Approach gives cultural and signifying practices a more active role as a representation theory. The Discursive Approach defines textuality itself as a productive practice. See L. Grossberg, "Strategies in Marxist Cultural Interpretation," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 1, pp. 392-421.

descriptive and analytical means, will shed light on possible ways of theorizing the question we are interested in. In other words, the most significant presuppositions and arguments of theories as well as the studies whose assumptions are based on these theoretical schemas will be shortly discussed. This attempt will allow us to follow the interconnections between objects of study, concepts and themes of each theory. Therefore, the following literature review will provide us the theoretical tools with which we can treat the issue of texts as part of ideological reproduction and the legitimizing process in advanced capitalism. Habermas's theory of communicative action will carry a central significance in this account.

The classification of theories relevant to our study is listed as follows²: *Classical Marxism* which emphasize a direct relations between cultural texts and economic realities, *Cultural Marxism* which sees social totality and lived experience as the mediation between culture and society, *Structuralist-Marxism* which focuses on a multiplicity of structural determinations, and *Critical Theory* which gives the conceptions such as production of culture, technical rationality, and distorted communication a more active role in explaining the media-power linkage.

I. MAJOR DEBATES ON TEXTS IN MEDIA

Classical Marxism

The Classical Marxist approach emphasizes the direct

²The classification of the theoretical approaches which will be usedd in this study is borrowed from Sholle (1986) and Thompson (1984) and (1990).

relationship between texts and socio-economic realities conceived with the base/superstructure model. The economy, or, the mode of production, is seen as the primary determinant of cultural reality within which texts are produced.

Marxism views ideology as a barrier to valid knowledge. Ideologies reflect the interests of various classes. Experience and practical activity, or, social praxis, is considered as central to the production of knowledge; and these real conditions, it is argued, can be distorted or denied by ideology. Ideology is the production and dissemination of erroneous beliefs whose inadequacies are socially motivated.

In general, in Classical Marxism the term "ideology" has a significant position. In Anti-Duhring it's used simply as a well-known philological fact; but if we look at more closely, it can also be seen as the source of a false understanding played out in all contemporaneous discourses on Marxism. The concept of ideology has actually been formulated twice, in disparate historical contexts and within problematics that precluded any immediate conflation: first, in the *German Ideology* by Marx and Engels (1970), an unpublished text whose influence can be traced throughout the entire history of Marxism. Second, in the group of historical and philosophical texts, mostly by Engels, designed to point out the ways in which that system could be applied.

Marx, in *The German Ideology*, does not develop the concept of

ideology in isolation but situates it within the framework of a general social theory called historical materialism, the most explicit formulation of which appears in the text. The *German Ideology* shifts away from: consciousness, self-consciousness, species being, and other concepts belonging to the Feuerbachian mode of thought and the Hegelian tradition in German philosophy. These concepts are replaced by such entities as modes of production, forces of production, relations of production, and classes.

Moreover, classes and all other collective entities are not considered to be the ultimate basis but rather only the basis for an objective science. The concept of real life is given a central position. The epistemological break in Marx occurs not between the world of consciousness as ideological and some collective, anonymous entities but within the notion of humanity itself (Taylor, 1986). The distinction is said to be between the young Hegelians' emphasis on humanity as consciousness and Marx's emphasis in the *German Ideology* on humanity as real, living individuals. This dividing line shapes the interpretation of the whole meaning of Marxism. Interpretations on the Classical Marxist concept of ideology which arises from a commitment to the base/superstructure model vary to a large extent.

When it comes to analyzing especially media practices, Classical Marxism can be separated into three major sub-areas: political economy approach, which emphasizes the economic determination of media; false consciousness approach, which deals with media texts as collections of illusory ideas and images reflecting class interests; and an

institutional approach, which looks at organization of media (rooted in economic and in class or national interests). For a better grasp of theorizing about media practices, one needs to look at specific studies which articulate these approaches.

The political economy of mass communication stresses that the media are principally ideological institutions. As Garnham (1979) points out, one of the key features of mass media within monopoly capitalism has been the exercise the political and ideological domination through the economic. He claims that one needs to look especially at the monetary relationships between the major institutions of mass communication such as the press and broadcasting in order to examine the production of cultural products. In his study on the political economy of British mass media, he attempts to analyze the way in which the means of production of our consciousness are controlled, so that they can be brought under full control (Garnham, 1978). In another study employing the political economy approach, Golding and Middleton (1982) investigate the ways in which the welfare and social security apparatus is portrayed in the mass media by relating the issue to the political economy of relevant areas of social policy. By following the same approach, Smythe (1981) redirects the attention away from the mass media as ideological apparatuses and back to their economic function within capitalism. For Smythe, any political economy of mass media must be based on an analysis of its commodity form. In a study on the relationships between the New

York Times and major institutions W. Victor concludes that while the Times seems less subservient to wealth than it was, it remains the organ of a section of the community rather than the mouthpiece of progress, of social advance, or of the aspirations of masses of the plain people. It is not a tribune of people. "Its democracy still has a strongly capitalistic tinge. It still has a tendency – and that is to take the side of the status quo" (Victor, 1946: 5). Although the methodological devices the media studies utilizing the political economy approach may differ, they all concentrate on the way relationships between institutions structures the operation of the mass media economically.

The second conceptualization of media studies is based on the false consciousness approach. As Grossberg (1984: 394) notes, in this position texts are collections of images that can be extracted from the text and treated as isolated, ideological representations of reality: they are motivated by and function to protect class interests already structured into the economic relations of capital. Gitlin (1980) also agrees with this approach by assuming an ideological function for media practice. This function is simply to reproduce the system; thus, the media's content reflects capital. Ultimately, the production and reception of the text is inessential, for it is tied to the recreation of the capitalist mode of production. For instance, Dorfman and Mattelart (1984), in their study *How to Read Donald Duck*, examine the imperialist ideology articulated in the Disney cartoons by emphasizing the imaginative world pictured in the comic texts as the political utopia

of the ruling class. In another study, Mattelart (1979) studies the ways in which the multinational corporations impose on people forms of communications which correspond to a particular mode of producing life. The role of mass media in shaping the consciousness of American people is examined in a study by Ewen (1988) by attempting to plumb the social history that stands behind the apparent immortality of a consumer society, its universe of commodities, its properties, and its social forms in a critique of commodity culture.

The third approach for studying mass media is an institutional viewpoint which looks at organization of media and determines its output. Schiller (1976) analyzes the impact of market forces on mass media and describes the process of cultural domination by claiming that the messages of the dominating system are corporately organized and commercially disseminated. Turow (1981) aims at questioning the ways in which the organization of entertainment industries shape children's television. In another study he explores the way powerful forces within the media try to guide TV's fictional images of the institution of medicine (Turow, 1981).

In sum, the classical Marxist arguments do not pay attention to the significance of discursive relations, for the notion of totalization separates material practice and signification. The end result is the absence of a theoretical dynamism which would enable us to see whether or not transformative practices exist in the realm of discourse.

Cultural Marxism

Cultural Marxism has an uneasy and ambiguous position

compared to the theoretical concerns of classical Marxism and structuralism. It is an attempt to think through a theory or vocabulary of communications that is simultaneously a theory of vocabulary of culture. Cultural Marxism attempts to think about the mass media not in relation to this or that isolated problem or institution or practice, but as elements "in a whole way of life" (Carey, 1983). In this model the base/superstructure of Classical Marxism is criticized, with a heavy emphasis on the notion of determination of superstructure by base. Societies, in this view, are complex, differentiated, contradictory, and interacting wholes. They are threaded throughout by culture: by production and reproduction of systems of symbols and messages.

Culturalist Marxism seeks to place the media and other practices within society conceived of as a complex expressive totality. Stuart Hall (1978) , for example, aims at formulating a way of relating texts to practices and texts to social formations. He argues that these relationships can be thought of as the outcome of the class struggle in the field of culture through which the social relations structuring the field reinforce and maintain the hegemony of the ruling alliance of class fractions. The text, for the cultural Marxist approach, cannot be considered as an inert artefact, but must instead be understood as a specific and constitutive social production of meaning with its own autonomy.

One of the theorists whom we may call as a cultural Marxist is Raymond Williams who criticizes the Marxist theory of determination

from base/superstructure model. For Williams, society is conceived as a complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures which are expressed in political, economic, and cultural formations and internalized in "individual wills" (Williams, 1977: 87). He rejects the notion of determinacy by abstract structures of technology or economy. Williams notes that structures should be conceived as enablers of social life instead of mere constraints. In other words, Williams suggests a complex interaction between structure (economic, social determinants) and agency (cultural autonomy). This attempt to define and analyze the realm between structure and agency leads him to the assessment of "culture" which has been the core concept of analysis among theorists representing the Cultural Marxism.

Emphasizing culture would overcome Cultural Marxism's misuse of culture. For it should not be only defined as imaginative and intellectual products of society. "The culture is those patterns of organization, those characteristic forms of human energy which can be discovered as revealing themselves -- in 'unexpected identities and correspondences' as well as in 'discontinuities of an unexpected kind' -- within or underlying all social practices. And the purpose of the analysis is to grasp how the interactions between all these practices and patterns are lived and experienced as a whole" (Hall: 1980: 60).

To Williams, the cultural whole is an inclusive concept and media practices should be analyzed within the realm of culture. Nevertheless, he does not neglect the role individuals play in terms of

intervening the media practices. Thus, media practices, as part of 'totality' of hegemonic cultural realm cannot be analyzed as objects. Media practices should be conceived as a set of practices or activities which are subject to conditioning of other practices in society.

Although the Cultural Marxism cannot be limited to the works of R. Williams and there are variations between them in terms of analyzing structure and agency, their attempt to see texts as arising from the complex interests of individuals do not offer a coherent picture to analyze textuality and power relations. For instance, S. Hall combines culturalist and structuralist views in his study called *Policing the Crisis* (Hall et al, 1978) to explain the production of news. It is argued that the media play their part in combination of other institutional definers (politicians, the courts, etc.) in 'representing' the crisis. Schudson (1984) looks at the practice of advertising and the ways in which it manufactures the cultural products called advertisements and commercials. He defines advertising as a totality of symbolic forms, a pervasive and bald propaganda for consumer culture in his quest to examine the role of this medium in shaping American values and patterns of life.

The totality of culture which is presumed in the cultural Marxism carries the problems of applying grand narrative into research questions. Since the cultural Marxism are not based on a single philosophical paradigm, the end result of the studies may be interpreted as eclectic.

Structural Marxist Approach

While the culturalist Marxist approach emphasizes the role of active human agent in implementing hegemonic relations, structural Marxism reverses this emphasis and minimizes on the concept of agency. Instead, structuralist Marxists argue that textuality is a practice itself and it should be related to practices. It must be noted that structuralist accounts of the media incorporate many diverse contributions, including Saussurean linguistics, the structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss, the semiotics of Barthes and Lacan's psychoanalysis. The common denominator of all of them is the focus on the processes of signification and representation.

Structural Marxism assumes that textuality is a price that produces 'experience'. Experience is the product of cultural practices. For Structural Marxists, particularly Althusser, texts are not made by subjects (agents); instead subjects are made by texts.

There are two elements of Althusser's essay that have influenced all subsequent discussions about ideology: (1) his theory of the microstructure of ideology based on the "creation of subjects" and (2) his analysis of the "Ideological State Apparatuses" (ISAs).

In Althusser's account, the state acts specifically as a condition of existence, differently in each mode of production. However, it also has the general function of relating men to their conditions of existence and, in this sense, it is a necessary component of society: "Ideology (as a system of mass representations) is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and equipped to respond to the demands

of their conditions of existence" (Althusser, 1969: 235). Ideology is a *lived relation* between men and their world, not merely a system of beliefs. It achieves its effect by placing and adapting men to their roles as bearers of the structures of social relations by constituting individuals as subjects. For Althusser, ideology works by constituting individuals as subjects of the social structure, while apparently giving a unique individuality to each subject: the individual is *interpellated as a free (subject) in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e., in order that he shall freely accept his subjection* (Althusser, 1977: 169). In sum, ideology functions by moulding individuals as particular subjects and placing them in the structure, while at the same time concealing from them their role as agents of the structure. As such, ideology is necessarily an illusionary representation of the world.

Althusser denies the anthropological approach which assumes the notion of real life or real individuals placed under certain circumstances. Since this approach is ideological, it remains floating without basis. However, ideology does have a material existence. As Poulantzas (1980) states, "ideology does not consist merely in the system of ideas or representations; it also involves a series of material practices, embracing the customs and life-style of the agents and setting like cement in the totality of social practices." Ultimately, Althusser's theory of ideology refers to the notion of *structure in dominance* and the predominance of the mode of production.

According to Foucault, Althusser still wishes to retain a realm of knowledge (scientific Marxism) which is theoretically untainted by ideology (AK, p.187). Similar to Habermas, for Althusser the problem of analyzing ideology is bound up with the status of valid knowledge. Whereas, Foucault's notion of discourse requires that we interpret ideology, seeing it not as a strictly negative term, but as in some sense positive, i.e., productive. Ideology and knowledge, according to Foucault, cannot be separated. It is the use of ideology which determines its positivity–negativity for social purposes.

Structuralist studies, however, move beyond the Althusserian angle by attempting to combine the analysis of media-signifying practices with psychoanalysis. For example, the work of Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Foucault Lacan and Derrida creates an object for analysis that is relevant to the empirical tasks of sociology of knowledge. This object, discourse, is an empirical phenomenon recognizable without a particular theory, and at the same time a theoretical object that is amenable to analysis (Dant, 1991).

The theoretical attempts to transcend the classical structuralist critique of society and agency are examined under the title of post-structuralism, which regards truth as multiplicity by redefining the position of subject and its relation to politics. Truth is inunciated in discourses which are coordinated with power. Accordingly, domination is not seen as a question of action but concerns discursive forms through which the subject is positioned in cultural realm.

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In this context, structuralism can be seen as a response to Marxism. Structuralism is insightful, because it analyzes cultural forms without relying on a pregiven set of cultural values. The problem, however, stems from the inadequacy in articulating causal relationship in their analysis. The tyranny of signifier leads to dismissing the significance of human action as well as the operation of power. Also, structuralism assumes that there is one original structure without explaining what constitutes the elements of a structure and its units in a historical framework. Despite these limitations, nevertheless, structuralism contributes to the cultural studies by providing inspired accounts of the hidden meanings of cultural forms which have been taken for granted.

Critical Theory Approach

Critical Theory has a unique position on the role of texts which stems from the approach of theorists on the critique of 'culture industry' in general. Frankfurt School theorists all argue that culture has evolved into an industry; and the superstructure becomes industrialized and is part of the base. The culture industry, as a rationalized structure, creates products which reproduces the structure of dominant relations. As a result, cultural sphere becomes commodified and its products take the general form of categories of the capitalist relations of production.

Media texts, according to Critical Theory, impose forms of consumption which reflect their industrialized modes of production (Grossberg, 1984). The media impose the categories of mass production

on the consciousness of the consumer. This angle may be accepted as leading to the same type of characterizations as to how to contextualize the discursive realm in society. For it also results from an approach for which 'totalization' carries a great deal of significance in terms of assuming that capitalist societies all have the identical characteristics. However, Critical Theory starts with the critique of classical Marxism which reduces the superstructure and its institutions to a reflection of political economy. For example, Adorno rejects determination and totality — "the whole is the false" (Jay, 1984: 43). It can be claimed that for the critical theorists material relations include all those non-discursive practices which can be historically specified as deriving their force from sensuous activity. And there can be no strict division between "culture" as ideal and "the economic" as material. Material practices include the economic as well as other forms of activity and various forms of everyday behaviour. In this context, the critical theorists attempt to analyze how society becomes administered. For the current condition of human existence as being exposed to a complex web of hegemonic relations, according to the Critical Theory, requires differentiating the subjectification of the individual. The domination of individual through communication cannot be explained in terms of class conflicts. Explaining discursive relations within which ideology, beliefs and values are defined requires relying on the presumption of an enlightened society which can be reached with the help of a unified rationality.

Accordingly, for Critical Theory, ideology is analyzed within the concept of dialogical communication in the public sphere, as is focused in Habermas's communicative action theory. According to the critical theorists, the difficulties of a capitalist production, particularly in advanced capitalism, give rise to a need to maintain the status quo. In this process the likelihood for the areas of cultural life to become commodities increase. Habermas (1975) examines the characteristics of this process in his study the *Legitimation Crisis*.

Ideology, as Gouldner emphasizes, is "part of consciousness which is focused on public projects" (Gouldner, 1979: 81). The operation of media projects is a public sphere whereby the reproduction of ideology could be observed, because media works reflect the production of ideologies. Adorno, for example, conceives ideology as the concealment of real conditions (Johnson, 1984). He argues that "the more the machinery functions only for the sake of profit, the more individual must be convinced that it is functioning for him and for his sake only, as it is put as a public service." He also suggests that ideology is "true because it is (a) rational, scientific expression of the established state of affairs, false because it is not the whole truth of that state of affairs" (Adorno, 1972: 198).

The theory of communicative action developed by Habermas is a worthy framework to utilize in this study due to his attempts to reformulate the Marxist critique of ideology as a practical-pragmatic critique of all systematically distorted communications. Habermas

prefers to use “distorted communication” and “knowledge-based interests” rather than ideology. He shifts critique from the surface structures and material interests to the formative influence of communication and language. The primary ideological functioning of the means of communication occurs in the use of distorted language. Mass communication is distorted in that it represses the intentional and normative aspects of discourse in favor of content. Groups in society who are unable to articulate their interests due to linguistic constraints tend to adopt contents of the means of communication as given. This creation of distorted language is not primarily intentional in the sense that ruling classes imposes coercive propaganda on the audience. Rather, the distortion stems from the structuring of communication based on commitment of society to an instrumental cognitive interest (Sholle, 1988).

Habermas's early work on the structural transformation of the public sphere focuses on the critique of the culture industry in a different fashion than Adorno and Horkheimer. He retraces the emergence of the ‘public sphere’ by paying attention to the development of media institutions from the seventeenth century to the present. He interprets the bourgeois public sphere within the framework of the development of the state and non-state institutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The growth of the state had been so influential that the critical potential inherent in the public sphere could not keep itself as an institutional reality (Habermas,

1979).

In short, critical theory helps us to understand the role of institutions of the public sphere, which is an arena formed as the liberal political order. Critical theorists offer two types of explanation for the distortion of political dialogue in liberal capitalist societies. The first is the structure of power whose unequal distribution of political and economic power gives to some members of society greater access to control over the institutions of political communication than others. The second explanation is summed by Habermas's phrase the "scientization of politics," concerns the type of social action and discourse characteristics of capitalist society (Hallin, 1985). Capitalism, Habermas argues, develops the capacity for purposive-rational action to a degree never approached by any previous social order. But it also tends to universalize that form of action and the standards of discourse and knowledge that correspond to it. All questions come to be framed as essentially technical or strategic questions, questions of the most effective means by which a given end can be attained. As a result, society is unable to develop a capacity for communicative action through which it could resolve practical questions, which have to do with standards of human conduct.

The debates on ideology cannot be limited the major approaches outlined here. Eagleton (1991) argues that it is possible to define ideology roughly six different ways. First, the general material process of production of ideas, beliefs, and values in social life. This definition of ideology is close to the broader meaning of the term "culture."

Ideology would denote the whole complex of signifying practices and symbolic processes in a particular society. A second less general meaning of ideology turns on ideas and beliefs (whether true or false) symbolizing the conditions and life experiences of a specific, socially significant group or class. Ideology is here very close to the idea of a "world view."

The third meaning of ideology refers to the promotion and legitimation of interests of social groups in the face of opposing interests. Ideology can here be seen as a discursive field in which self-promoting social powers conflict and collide over questions central to the reproduction of social power as a whole. This definition of ideology appears rhetorical | appears rhetorical, | which is concerned with the production of certain useful effects for political purposes rather than the situation 'as it is.'

A fourth meaning of ideology would retain the emphasis on the promotion and legitimation of sectoral interests, but confine it to the activities of a dominant social power. This meaning of ideology is epistemologically neutral.

Another meaning of ideology signifies ideas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interests of a ruling group or class specifically by distortion and dissimulation. The last two definitions of ideology refer to the ideas of a ruling group which are not necessarily ideological. Some of the ideas may not represent the interests of certain social classes.

The last definition of ideology emphasize false or deceptive beliefs but regards such beliefs as arising not from the interests of a dominant class but from the material structure of society as a whole.

These definitions of ideology shed light on some problematical issues such as the dilemma of pejorative neutral meaning. An argument cannot be regarded as erroneous because of its factual error. Instead, an 'ideological error' refers to an error with particular kinds of causes and functions. It seems questionable to claim that ideology is inherently erroneous or illusory. The opposite of ideology, as Habermas notes, is not exactly truth or knowledge. In other words, the analysis of ideology offers an emancipatory critique which brings the institutional constraints to our awareness, and this can be achieved only by the practice of collective self-reflection. Ideology becomes erroneous when a totality of causes and functions operate in the sphere of power relations (McCarthy, 1978). In this study, a Habermasian notion of "distorted communication in public sphere" will be employed to refer to ideology . This type of notion on ideology naturally assumes the inseparable character of "fact" and "value." The study itself will carry its own ideological characterizations. The act of interpreting ideology as discourse in a text would mean translating them into other terms, but reconstructing their conditions of possibility. The strength of the term ideology relies on its ability to question as to whether the repetitions, elisions, and equivocations of discourses are meaningful in public sphere.

II. THE POSTURE OF THE STUDY AMONG THE THEORETICAL DEBATES

Although the objective here is not to discuss the differences and similarities between the theoretical approaches outlined above, the relevancies of these theories to this study must be explained. The politics of textuality, which is at the core of the agenda of each theory, is interpreted in terms of reproduction of ideology. Texts are defined as messages that have a physical existence of their own. Ideology, in this regard, refers to the realm whereby the messages are exchanged and transformed.

The Classical Marxist theory in general does not distinguish determination and textuality or discursive relations in society. Reproduction of textuality is treated as the reflection of material practices. This approach examines the relationship between what is going on in any discursive realm and the social processes. In other words, meaning is traced to social processes. In this framework, textual matters are not treated separately from its concern with determination. Thus, interpretive analysis conducted by Marxism in general treat ideological messages embedded in texts as embodiments of social reality.

The Classical Marxist approach treats ideology as false consciousness and texts are collections of representations that can be isolated and looked at as ideological interpretations of reality. One of the weak points in this approach is that it does not explain how the dominant class produces a homogeneous ideology. As Golding and

Murdock (1979) imply, the media are ideological to the extent that they are large corporate structures tied to the dominant economic mode of production. Thus, the only way to explain the ideological character of the text is to presume the function of media as big business whose main role is to legitimate wealth and power in society. Texts are ideological so long as their reproduction takes place in a commercial sphere.

Although the major theoretical approaches are classified into separate groups so as to grasp the core of their arguments more clearly, there are overlapping theoretical questions asked in their query about textuality and media. For instance, the Cultural Marxism links textuality and social reality by recognizing the theory of ideology within more comprehensive terms as hegemony and culture. By following an interdisciplinary angle, Cultural Marxism argues that structuralism is too deterministic and too comprehensive in terms of defining ideology. Culturalism in general retains a stronger sense of the power of human agency against history and ideology. Structural Marxism disagrees with the cultural Marxism on the issue of experience and agency. As Althusser writes, texts are not made by subjects, instead subjects are made by texts (Grossberg, 1984). In this approach, the structuralist Marxism sees culture as the primary object of study, and approaches it most often by the way of analyzing textual forms.

None of these approaches, except critical theory, offers a coherent understanding of how discursive practices play a significant part in

constructing and reproducing power relations. At this point, one might suggest that Foucault points out the “positive” dimensions of power as expressed in textuality. There is no doubt that one of the major ambitions of Foucault, especially in his ‘structuralist’ writings, is to find out the ways in which discourses are used and the role they play in society (Foucault, 1972). He wishes to examine individuals in society – as subjects fashioned by strategies of power, knowledge and discourse. Although Foucault is interested in the evolution of madness, medicine, the archaeology of human sciences, instead of in mass communication; his method appears applicable the textuality of media in society. He deals with analyzing a historical period or a discipline by taking what was said, not what flowed underneath (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Foucault attempts to incorporate not only the dynamics of domination, but classification and subjectification as well. However, Foucault dismisses every possibility which leads to the notion of emancipation which relies on the concept of subject.

Due to the overlapping presumptions and conceptualizations employed in theorizing the media practices in the theoretical approaches covered above, the question of ‘applying’ these grand narratives into specific problems may seem plausible. Additionally, each of these theoretical angles seems to omit studying one aspect of the media practices and ideology linkage. One way or the other, there are shortcomings of each of them in terms of the ways in which ideology is employed, which is a worthy topic for another study. The

important point here is that theorizing a sociological question is not a mechanical process by which a 'selection' can be made among several different approaches developed in cultural studies. The major function of introducing these theories is to relate conceptual advances to their context in order to provide what F. Jameson called a "cognitive mapping" of society.

Therefore, the weak theoretical dimensions of the approaches outlined above on the issue of ideology, knowledge, discourse and power lead us to draw from critical theory for the following analysis. As is summarized below, it offers us the most complete conception for treating the problem of analyzing a text in the context of a certain historical and social period of time.

The Critical Theory of J. Habermas

In his attempt to criticize the earlier critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, Habermas offers a theory which aims to restore critical theory's political dimension. Habermas locates the moral basis of this dimension in the very structure of human communication. Turning the traditional Marxist relation between forces and relations of production upside down, Habermas argues that the motor of social change is to be found in the development of levels of normative consciousness taking place in the sphere of social integration or interaction. In order to formulate a theory of human action, he points out a framework of social action which would consist of a theory of communicative action. In this framework, the point of reference would be the potential of rationality embedded in speech act and

linguistic communication. The following section on Habermas's work will be based on the most general themes of his theory in general, and the communicative action theory (1975, 1979, 1984) as well as on his analysis on the degeneration of public sphere in special.

Habermas organizes his discussion of historical materialism around the concepts of social labor and symbolic interaction as they figure in the history of human species. His theory of rationality is a project which aims at disclosing the ways in which the human species evolves within social institutions. According to Habermas, the basic sphere of society, the institutional nucleus around which the relations of production are organized, need not belong to the economic subsystem in the narrow sense. Whatever the particular form of these relations – kinship, political, economic – they embody the form of social integration. For Habermas, more clearly, work and interaction belong to two different spheres each of which operates on different developmental logic: work develops through productive forces and interaction is related to forms of social integration.

Habermas's project is based on the possibility of providing an account of communication that is both theoretical and normative. The task of communicative competence theory is to articulate and ground an expanded conception of rationality, which would enable us to explain under what social and historical conditions undistorted communication is possible. Rationality is the quality that makes action defensible against criticism. To be rational, acts must rest on

criticizable validity claims. It would also provide an opportunity to construct a linkage between interests of social classes and discourse by which their interests are legitimized. For the aim of discourse, which is one of the ways of communication, is to come to a consensus about which interests are generalizable. The objective of analyzing consensual speech leads Habermas to deciphering strategic and defective modes of speech by which one can have a general notion of 'communicative action.' In this context, it is the function of discourse to test which interests are capable of being 'communicatively shared' and which are not.

The most relevant points of Habermas's theory in terms of explaining the social phenomenon formulated in this study are his communicative action theory and the conception of public sphere as the *sine qua non* of a democracy. Habermas is not only concerned with communication in terms of deep structure or abstract possibility; he provides a way to assess social and political action, by considering it not simply as instrumental but more fundamentally communicative, intersubjective, and fully social. His theory based on communicative action marks an analytical shift from concentrating various forms of 'consciousness' to "concrete constellations of action, to specifically situated patterns and instances of claim-making performances (Forester, 1985: xi).

According to Habermas, it is the paradigm of language which would help us to understand the management of political consent and

will formation in advanced capitalist societies. For the crises that occur in advanced capitalist societies can not be understood via a Marxist critique of political economy. According to Habermas, the relationship between the state and the economy is no longer that of nineteenth century. As the economic and political-administrative subsystems have been changed dramatically, the classical Marxist crisis arguments no longer hold true. In advanced capitalist societies, the state apparatus is supposed to steer the economic system. If it fails achieving this task it would constitute a threat to social integration. Core components of bourgeois ideology are undermined by social change; achievement ideology becomes problematic. More succinctly, in advanced capitalism normative structures change in such a way that the complementarity between the requirements of the political economic system and the legitimate expectations of society's members seem to be breaking down. Thus, crises in advanced capitalism should be attributed to sociocultural rather than to economic or administrative crisis tendencies.

One of the important studies of Habermas (1989) which is devoted to the analysis of the roots of the degeneration of public sphere is his work *The Structural Transformation of Public Sphere*. If the causes of the legitimation crisis is sociocultural, the social and historical evolution of the public sphere must be deciphered. This effort would enable us to discover the discourse strategies to be developed in advanced capitalism. Legitimation would be possible

through valid claims, or, discourses on which a consensus is shared by citizens who actively participate to the reproduction of this discourse. Accordingly, this study asks important questions about democratic theory as well. For example, Habermas asks about the social conditions for a rational-critical debate about public issues conducted by private persons willing to let arguments determine their decisions. In his quest to formulate the ideal speech situation, Habermas focuses on the bourgeois political life of the seventeenth through mid twentieth centuries. The historical investigation of these centuries leads Habermas to locate practical reason in public affairs by concentrating themes of crucial importance in the history of sociological thought: political functions, social structure, ideology, and degeneration of public sphere.

Habermas's task in *Structural Transformation* is to develop a critique of bourgeois society showing both (1) its internal tensions and the factors that led to its transformation and partial degeneration and (2) the element of truth and emancipatory potential that it contained despite its ideological misrepresentation and contradictions. In a nutshell, a public sphere adequate to a democratic polity depends on both quality of discourse and quantity of participation. Habermas develops the first requirement in elaborating how the classical bourgeois public sphere of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was constituted around rational critical argument (Calhoun, 1992). Habermas also sets out to establish what the category of public meant in bourgeois society and how its meaning and material operation were

transformed in the centuries after its constitution. While other critical theorists are in search of a historical subject, Habermas develops an explanation of intersubjective communicative processes and their emancipatory potential in place of any philosophy of the subject.

For Habermas, the significance of the public sphere lies in its potential as a mode of social integration. Public discourse is a possible mode of coordination of human life, as are state power and market economies. But money and power are nondiscursive modes of coordination. They offer no intrinsic openings to the identification of reason and will. The bourgeois public sphere is defined as the public of private individuals who join in debate of issues bearing on state authority. The participants in debates include agents of the state as well as private citizens.

The bourgeois public sphere institutionalized, according to Habermas, not just a set of interests and an opposition between state and society but a practice of rational-critical discourse on political matters. The idea of the public was based on the notion of a general interest sufficiently basic that discourse about it need not be distorted by particular interests and could be a matter of a rational approach to an objective order, that is to say, of truth. In other words, rational argument was accepted as the sole arbiter, no matter what the social status of the person uttering the argument was. Public discourse was open to everybody and the agenda of debates were determined on the basis of all matters of common matters. Thus, in most parts of the

Europe some degree of institutional basis for a public sphere was established. Education and property ownership were the main criteria for the admission to the public debate. Especially private ownership was so central this phenomenon that Habermas sees in it the origin of ideology itself:

“If ideologies are not only manifestations of the socially necessary consciousness in its essential falsity, if there is an aspect to them that can lay a claim to truth inasmuch as it transcend the status quo in utopian fashion, even if only for purposes of justification, then ideology exists at all only from this period on. Its origin would be the identification of ‘private owner’ with ‘human being as such’ in the role accruing to private people as members of the public in the political public sphere of the bourgeois constitutional state” (pp. 88).

The undermining of the foundations of the public sphere came about, according to Habermas, through a “refeudalization” of society. “The model of the bourgeois public sphere presupposed strict separation of the public from the private realm in such a way that the public sphere, made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state, was itself considered part of the private realm” (pp, 175-176). Structural transformation came about as private organizations began increasingly to assume public power, on the one hand, while the state penetrated the private realm on the other. State and society became interlocked. The public sphere was necessarily transformed as the distinction between public and private realms blurred, the equation between the intimate sphere and private life broke down with a polarization of family and economic

society, rational-critical debate gave way to the consumption of culture. Since the notion of an objective general interest was replaced with one of a fairly negotiated compromise among interests, the functioning of the public sphere shifted from rational critical debate to negotiation. For example, where works of literature had previously been appropriated through group discussion and the critical discourse of literary publications, the modern media and the modern style of appropriation "removed the ground for a communication about what has been appropriated" (pp. 163). Thus, "the world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only." (pp. 171).

Habermas's analysis on the structural transformation of the public sphere enables us to disclose how the meaning of participation is transformed into consumption, although members of society have access to various numbers of media outlets. Habermas outlines the depoliticization of public sphere and its impoverishment by removal of critical discourse. He also discloses the ways in which rational-critical argument becomes more difficult. "Sentimentality toward persons and corresponding cynicism toward institutions" (pp. 172) become significant characteristics of the discourse of newspapers. Public sphere becomes more an arena for advertising than a setting for a rational-critical debate.

Therefore, in his analysis on the public sphere as the kernel of a democratic society, Habermas calls for social integration to be based on rational-critical discourse. Integration ought to be based on communication rather than domination. "Communication" in this

context means not merely sharing what people already think or know but also process of potential transformation in which reason is advanced by debate itself (Calhoun, 1992).

One might argue that Habermas's theory is at odds with explaining an institutional basis for an effective political public sphere corresponding to that of later capitalism and states. Habermas's answer in his study called *Legitimation Crisis* to this type of critiques is that advanced capitalist society cannot be conceptualized as a social totality, because it is split into separate realms integrated on different bases. The lifeworld is the realm of personal relationships and communicative action. The lifeworld should be defended against the encroachment of media, because it is the locus for basic human values.

The communicative action theory is based on the idea of universal validity claims which are implicit in all speech. Habermas argues that the validity claims form the basis for a progressive rationalization of communication and the capacity for noninstrumental organization of interpersonal relationships. Communicative action serves social integration as an alternative to money and power. In short, the public sphere becomes a product of the evolution of communicative action.

Implications of Habermas's Theory for the Study of Newspaper Discourses

In *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas outlines the conditions within which public speech can be structured properly, thereby achieving human emancipation. He introduces a shift from a problematic of consciousness to one of language by rethinking critical theory from a perspective rooted in language theory. Communicative rationality, according to Habermas, requires a democratic context in which anyone may question the argumentative claims of anyone else, so long as each party aims at consensus and agrees to concur with positions that he or she cannot refute.

Although Habermas judges the eighteenth century by Locke and Kant, nineteenth century by Marx and Mill, and the twentieth century by the typical suburban television viewer (Calhoun, 1992) without systematically documenting, e.g., the evolution of political discourse as it is reflected in the press and other outlets, the communicative action theory does offer us a coherent analytical framework by which a discourse can be assessed in terms of its inclusiveness about a wide variety of voices. For him, the ideal speech situation functions as a political strategy which aims at social change. The deviations from this formal idealization might be usefully identified so as to define, e.g., which utterances could have been included or not. One should note that an ideal speech situation is never practically realized. In other

words, communication we get involved in is always imperfect. However, this does not mean that the analytical and normative concept has no practical importance. As Forester notes, it is as irrelevant and ultimately conservative a criticism of Habermas to argue that "communication is always imperfect" as it would be a tragically and literally fatalistic step to resign oneself to exposure to chemical hazards in the workplace because one might think that 'work places are never pollution free.' As McCarthy (1985) explains, a notion of an ideal speech situation helps us to give an account of how we might claim a position to be true or false, right or wrong, in the first place. Lacking that, the analysis of ideology dissolves into relativist babble.

The very act of participating in a discourse carries with it the supposition that a genuine agreement is possible. If we did not suppose that a justified consensus were possible and would in some way be distinguished from a false consensus, then the very meaning of discourse would be called into question (Forester, 1985). Thus, analyzing discourse would have to bear its own validity rules, if the end result of the analysis is the question of meaning. The ideal speech situation serves as a standard for evaluating speech acts.

Habermas notes that there are four major validity claims used in every speech act: what is said is *intelligible*; what is said is *true* according to the knowledge; what is said is *right* according to general normative standards of society; and what is said corresponds to the

sincere intentions of the speaker. These validity claims, which are implicit in every speech act, provide us an analytical tool to disclose whether or not the conversations, utterances, discourses are based on asymmetrical relations. In communicative action, the participants negotiate over the definitions of their situations with the help of these formal world concepts (Korthals, 1988). When the participants stress the subjective aspects, they take an expressive attitude, and when they stress the social aspects of their situation, they take a norm-governed attitude. In freely passing from one attitude to the other, they take a performative attitude. What Habermas calls 'communicative ethics' is grounded in the 'fundamental norms of rational speech.' Whether a norm is universalizable, capable of rational consensus, can be ascertained only dialogically in unrestricted and unconstrained discourse. The aim of discourse is to come to a consensus about which interests are generalizable. Thus, he constructs an undeniable relationship between discourse and interests which are shaped and discovered in processes of communication (McCarthy, 1978).

Accordingly, undistorted communication produced by the application of *communicative ethics* would carry the following features:

- "(1) Expressions, actions, and gestures are non-contradictory;
- (2) Communication is public and conforms to cultural standards of what is appropriate;
- (3) Actors can distinguish between the properties of language, per se, and the events and processes that are described by language,

(4) Communication leads to, and is the product of, intersubjectivity, or the capacity of actors to understand each others' subjective states and to develop a sense of shared collective meanings;

(5) Conceptualizations of time and space are understood by actors to mean different things when externally observed and when subjectively experiences in the process of interaction"
(Turner, 1986: 196).

Thus, undistorted communication is the cure that Habermas offers for the "decline of the paradigm of consciousness" and the "loss of meaning" (Habermas, 1981: ix). If the human species do not want the unity of the world to fall to pieces, they ought to develop and enrich the lifeworld through a concept of rationality that is no longer tied to subjectivistic and individualistic premises of modern philosophy and social theory. For a rationalized world is not only one in which different spheres of value can be distinguished but also are in which each actor's critical communicative capacities play an expanded role in the ongoing process of reproducing that lifeworld.

Thus, the critical theory of Habermas offers a clear cut picture about the way human beings could establish a process of dialogue in which the role of social institutions cannot be denied. One of these institutions which contributes to the formation of a healthy public sphere is the press. Marx called the fledling press "the omnipresent open eye of the sprit of the people the ruthless confession of a people to itself the mind of the state that can be peddled in every cottage, cheaper than natural gas" (Marx,1842). Marx expected the newspaper to assist in the birth of a fundamentally new political order, to enable the

society as a whole, for the first time in human history, to open a dialogue about itself and decide in a public way the direction of public life. But, this, according to the critical theory, is not how it has turned out. The public sphere has given way to the "consciousness industry," the press as a potential medium of public dialogue to the "mass media," deeply embedded in a structure of domination.

Critical theorists in general offer two types of explanation for the distortion of political dialogue in liberal capitalist societies:

The first explanation is related to the structure of power: Unequal distribution of political and economic power gives to some members of society greater access to control over the institutions of political communication and organization than others. Power intrudes upon discourse, and the outcome of debate can neither be considered a genuine consensus or compromise, nor can be expected to reflect an assessment of all the information or insight potentially available.

The second explanation, outlined in Habermas's phrase "the scientization of politics," is concerns the type of social action and discourse characteristics of capitalist society. There are two types of action fundamental to human life: The first one is that human beings must interact with nature. This type of action, involving the manipulation of nature and of human beings as 'forces of production' to achieve established purposes, is called purposive-rational action. The other type of action stems from the fact that human beings must interact with one another to produce the frameworks of reciprocal

expectation that make it possible for them to live as members of collective social institutions: communicative action is the outcome of this condition.

Capitalism, Habermas argues, develops the capacity for purposive-rational action to a degree never approached by any previous social order. But it also tends to universalize that form of action and the standards of discourse and knowledge that correspond to it. All questions come to be framed as essentially technical as strategic questions, questions of the most effective means by which a given end can be attained. As a result society is unable to develop a capacity for communicative action through which it could resolve practical questions, those that have to do not with means but ends, not with techniques but standards of human conduct (Hallin, 1985).

Therefore, the strength of Habermas's theory stems from its explanatory power to disclose the ways in which communicative action theory as well as his conception about the degeneration of the public sphere shed light on our understanding on the news as a discursive and historical event. Degeneration of public discourse through technical angle in news reporting enables us to explicate the tendency to frame and analyze events in terms of strategy and tactics, success and failure. Technical angle, which tends to dominate the coverage of political issues, serves well to illustrate what is distinctive about contemporary journalism as a form of political communication. As Hallin (1985) notes, this model of journalism has the effect that Marcuse decried; it tends to exclude from all political discourse all

discussion of the ends of public policy. It conveys, along with the news of particular events, a general conception of politics more or less compatible with the prevailing low level of popular mobilization. It portrays politics either as a matter of administration or as a more or less sordid, personal struggle for power, and not, to use Habermas's phrase, as a process of "collective will-formation" and therefore as a process in which the average citizen need be involved. It conveys to citizens a message about their own role in politics, and that message is essentially one of exclusion.

Accordingly, the construction of news discourse as a speech act is a worthy problematic to systematically study. News discourses which include various units such as statements, propositions, definitions, etc. serve to convey a web of meanings with respect to many areas of social and economic life. One ought to decipher the way the construction of news contributes to the legitimation process in society. How does the press contribute to the justification of social decisions which may not serve the public interest? How do the media fill the legitimations gap? Such questions require a comprehensive analysis of discourse as ideology which goes beyond the dominant claims of classical Marxism. Ideologies cannot be explained on the basis of such characterizations, because in today's world we are witnessed a complex group of ideologies which are fraught with contradictions. In other words, the character of ideologies, reflected in a wide variety of discursive practices such as the evening news, the language of film making, advertising,

cartoons, children books, political speeches, soap operas, postcards and the totality of signs we are exposed to, necessitates articulating a new theoretical approach. This approach ought to question if there is a democratic relationship and reciprocity embedded in these discursive practices. One of the most significant assumptions about a democratic society is based on the idea of the people as citizens, not as consumers, being able to debate politics through a plurality of languages in reproducing the “superstructural” elements.

If the Marxist paradigm which emphasizes the social and political conditions leads to unexplained areas in social theory in terms of “other” hegemonic practices, one ought to deal with the problem of hegemonic practices exercised through language. As Connolly argues, “the language of politics is an institutionalized structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain directions” (1974: 1). The effort to “decode” hegemonic language ought to indicate who the subject or the historical agent employing or manipulating the language. If we only use language in the analysis we not only ignore the significance of subject, we also make quick generalizations about the utterances. This would lead us to Foucault’s theory which uses an “agent-less” angle to explain the power relations imbedded in the use of language. As Ricoeur succinctly notes, discourse is realized temporally and in the present, whereas the system of language is virtual and outside of time. Whereas language has no subject insofar as the question “who speaks?” does not apply at this level, discourse

refers back to its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators. Discourse also refers to a world which it claims to describe, express or represent. The event is the advent of a world in language by means of discourse. It is in discourse that all messages are exchanged. Therefore, discourse not only has a world, but it has an other, another person, an interlocutor to whom it is addressed (Thompson, 1981).

One conclusion of the discussion on the concept of discourse can be related to Habermas's theory on the public sphere which is based on the relationship between texts and contexts. The relations between textual phenomena and social and political processes can be adequately theorized only by placing in suspension the text as it appears to be given to us in our own reading formation so as to analyze the functioning of that apparently same but different text within different reading formations. The aim of such analysis would not be to reveal meaning or effects of textual phenomena but rather to make them hum reverberate to (ideally) the full range of meanings and effects which they have furnished a site for (Bennett, 1987). In other words, if analyzing texts aims at revealing the extent to which they include various voices representing different classes and interests and the ways in which they contribute to the existence of public sphere whereby debates are not transformed into another consumer activity, this effort relies on the assumption that texts are material phenomena. The social and ideological articulations of texts may be discursively re-ordered, since discursive processes produced within specifiable institutional

conditions, not in “agent-less” environments. The only way of fixing a text as the source of a specifiable range of meanings or effects is by means of such analytical standards as Habermas’s theory of communicative action which enables us to point out the way we can construct an “undistorted communication.” Such an analysis of discourse does not mean that there is somehow and somewhere an ideal text – the “text itself” – which it is the purpose of analysis to reach and reveal. The argument is not that the text is somewhere “there” but unknowable, but there is no “there” in which its existence might be posited other than the varying reading formations such as newspaper discourse through which the actual history of its functioning is modulated. In sum, the efforts to analyze what is written about past constitute part of historical reality.

Thesis

So far, we have outlined the theories related to the social phenomenon in question in this study; we compared the significant differences in terms of explaining the problem of discourse as ideology; we argued that Habermas’s theory offers a powerful understanding on the degeneration of public sphere and communicative action. At this point, we ought to clarify the relationship between the relevance of Habermas and the thesis of this study.

It is implied that the “public sphere” speaks for itself as an important social and political value. It would not be a quick conclusion if one proposes that the public sphere in the classical sense does not exist anymore. In other words, late capitalism is currently experiencing a

decline in public discourse. However, our expectations about a democratic society first rest on the existence of a public sphere:

Public discourse is expected to be cultivated by the newspapers, magazines, producers, TV studios, advertising agencies, universities. In other words, such outlets of civic culture as media and other institutions play an undeniable role in the conservation of the public sphere. The voices heard in the public sphere would indicate the development of civil society. In other words, within both of these spheres one needs to see an absence of coercion and control, if it is to assume Habermasian concept of "undistorted communication." Given the totality of presuppositions and arguments about the democratic theory, discourses on varying issues would contribute to the ways in which the task of democratic institutions are defined in the public sphere. They would also shed light on how we see ourselves, as part of historical reality.

Thus, given the expectations and assumptions about a democratic society, the major thesis and questions of this study can be defined in the following way:

If the ideal speech situation constitutes an important criterion to assess the opportunities to freely participate in the public sphere, the New York Times as the major newspaper in the US is expected to contribute to the preservation of a democratic realm whereby a wide variety of ideologies, opinions, and policies could be heard. In this study, it will be primarily argued that the New York Times fails to

perform its function in the American public sphere due to the absence of a diverse group of discourses in its newspaper texts about the Soviet Union.

Given the general thesis about the absence of diverse ideological standpoints in the New York Times discourses, the following arguments will be examined:

1) The NYT discourses covering the reform period called *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* in the Soviet Union are dominated by the ideological filter, WE vs. THEM conceptualization which is one way of perpetuating the official discourse of the US Administration in the NYT.

2) The NYT discourses about the Soviet reforms are dominated by the exclusion of the totality Soviet voices in the political sphere and a series of alternative views and ideological positions on the Soviet reforms, which leads to a distorted, incomplete, and an inadequate coverage about the Soviet society. The same process of distortion in making news about another society suppresses elements of debate and dialogue and imposes the same definition of politics upon us.

3) The NYT discourses about the Soviet Union are dominated by a tendency to present the Soviet reforms as an immature attempt to transplant in the Soviet Union the forms and functions that public opinion have assumed in the West. The presentation of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*, which actually mirrors the perceptions about major issues in American politics, is reduced into a single framework, that is, "the

free market reforms.”

The NYT discourses will be analyzed so as to systematically analyze the character of the political discourse on the Soviet Union by selecting four major themes: *the reforms, the Soviet state, the political leaders, and policy making processes*. In light of the objectives of the study, the way the newspaper discourses reproduce an ideology will be attributed to the production of means of communication. In short, the study seeks to address the neglected dimension of the problem of ideology, that is, its impact on political discourses in general and the major characteristics of discourses on the Soviet Union in particular.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This chapter will outline such research procedures as sampling, criteria for the presentation of the media discourses on the issue. There are two major steps of the analytical procedures in this study: *descriptive* and *critical*. First, one needs to present the debates, arguments, and claims that constituted the news discourses which are to be analyzed. Second, there should be a critical analysis where the possible relationships between the claims and the theoretical arguments of this study will be articulated. Thus, in this chapter, descriptive and critical analysis and the sampling procedures will be outlined. The criteria for the assessment of the claims will also be presented.

I. The Relevant Methodological Debates and The Analytical Procedures

Our problem in this study is to explicate the nature of media discourses covering a certain period of time. Thus, it seems inevitable to shortly review the relevant methodological debates with respect to the interpretation of media discourses.

Although the major theoretical accounts of ideology and discourse are covered in the previous chapter, questions of methodological details are not addressed. It should be noted here that the theoretical accounts outlined above may require employing different methodological devices such as content analysis, statistical

analysis, or interpretive analysis of different kind. However, the research questions that are posed in this study can only be answered within the limits of the methodology of interpretation which complement the formal methodological analysis. Additionally, different types of methods should not be seen as recipes for social research. Instead, they help us developing a framework within which some of these methods can be situated and linked together.³

The methodology of interpretation is a broad framework which comprises various ways of trying to grasp the symbolic forms in general. One way of analyzing the symbolic forms is to use a *formal* or *discursive analysis* which is especially concerned with the structural patterns, features and relations. This type of analysis may become misleading when it is removed from the methodological framework of interpretive analysis and pursued in isolation from social-historical analysis. There are various ways in which formal or discursive analysis can be carried out, depending on the particular circumstances of the inquiry.

Among the most widely known and widely practiced types of formal analysis is called *semiotic analysis*, which aims at studying relations between the elements composing a symbolic form or sign. Semiological analysis in general involves a methodological abstraction from the social-historical conditions of the production and reception of social forms. Advertisements offer a rich field of analysis, for much

³For a full analysis of methodological approaches used in analyzing symbolic forms, see: J. Thompson, *Ideology and Modern Culture* (Stanford, 1990).

advertising is based on a logic of symbolic association, in which goods are promoted by being associated with desirable objects, authoritative persons, etc.

Another way of examining discursive forms is *conversation analysis* which has been concerned with studying the systematic properties of various forms of linguistic interaction. It aims at studying instances of linguistic interaction in the actual settings in which they occur. Instances of discourse can also be studied by virtue of a *syntactic analysis*, which is concerned with practical syntax used in everyday discourse. Or, one may study discursive practices through an *argumentative analysis*, which examines the chains of reasoning in claims by reconstructing the patterns of inference in a discourse. The common denominator of all these methodological frameworks is the way they exclude social and historical analysis in examining discourses, which leads to partial explanations.

The formal analyses not only offer incomplete understanding of discourses, they also ignore the necessity to tie discursive practices to the social phenomena. As Thompson (1990) notes, "however rigorous and systematic the methods of formal or discursive analysis may be, they cannot abolish the need for a creative construction of meaning, that is, for an interpretative explication of what is represented or what is said" (pp. 289). Therefore, the referential aspect of discourses which represent something should be grasped in the process of interpretation in order to examine meanings implied in a discourse.

Interpretation of ideology involves not only the projection of

possible meaning, but also the claim that such meaning serves perpetuating power relations in society. If we are to differentiate possible meanings of these discourses referring to *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*, what is to be discovered in the texts is assumed to have a certain mode of operation in sustaining relations of domination. In other words, texts which have different moments of analysis can be meaningful, only if patterns constructing and determining the nature of texts can be differentiated as they intervene in the very social relations legitimized by the object of interpretation. Since the meaning of a symbolic form, a discourse, a text is not given or determinate; analyzing ideology implied in a cultural product is a risky and a complex process. Different meanings of discourse may conflict or overlap with one another due to the multiplicity of meaning a discourse may carry. Accordingly, the methodological steps which should be utilized to study symbolic forms should take into account these difficulties.

According to Scott (1990), there are three aspects of the meaning of a text. These aspects, which have a sociological significance, also refer to three 'moments' in the movement of the text from author to audience: One meaning is the *intended content* of a text, the meaning which the author of the text intended to produce. Second is the *received content*, the meaning constructed by its audience, and intervening between the intended and received meanings is the *transient and ephemeral internal meaning*. This internal meaning

cannot be known independently of its reception by an audience. As soon as a researcher approaches a text to interpret its meaning, he or she becomes a part of its audience. The most that can be achieved by a researcher is an analysis which shows how the inferred internal meaning of the text opens up some possibilities for interpretation by its audience and closes off others.

Accordingly, the inferred internal meaning of media discourses on *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* can be discovered with the help of some rhetorical devices such as a thematic classification of major problems followed by the media. In other words, targeting the objective, which is the ephemeral meaning, and the tools of discovering it require employing a formal procedure. More clearly, the area within which the discourses on the reforms operate is wide and it necessitates employing some explorations to be able to argue what the selected units of analysis refer to. For example, our claims about the possible ephemeral meanings of the discourse on the Soviet Union may overlap extensively. While a specific discourse operates at one level such as political discourse in public sphere, it may also reveal itself, let's say, on the informational level. In other words, the transformation of the *original content* of an argument and *received contents* of the same argument is significant especially in terms of interested parties playing the role in this process. The original content is first received by the representatives of public and private institutions. Within the realm of public institutions, there are subdivisions such as official and unofficial

interpreters of media texts. For instance, the representatives of the government, journalists, and authors are among significant interpreters of an original content of a text in the transformation process within which an original content of a text is interpreted for the masses being exposed to the information.

If one needs to decipher a selected discourse, the microstructures of this discourse (claims, arguments, sentences, and so on) should be examined through a simple documentation. For instance, it is inevitable to select, analyze and interpret the sentences in which the words *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* were used, even though the whole context of the selected articles is more significant for our study. The overall assessment of the selected discourse could be called an informal analysis which supports our interpretive approach.

Our theoretical position on this problem, as is emphasized above, questions the nature of news discourses by arguing that there are strong echoings between the official discourses and the language used in the news reports. Also, the ways in which *The New York Times* portray the Soviet reform period and power relations in the Soviet society contradict with the characteristics of a possible democratic discourse. This opposition between official discourses and democratic discourses, the lack of a thorough coverage of the possible participants in a discourse will be our key categorization on the nature of news discourses.

Our view on what discourse is, a social and historical practice,

suggests that one may develop different methodological strategies in order to analyze a specific discourse. In other words, while one approach to the analysis of media practices may look at the ways in which institutional and non-institutional discourse on the media defines and refines its function, another angle could develop a research procedure to analyze the functions media perform (exclusion, resistance, simulation, subjectification, and so on). For instance, the situational perspective of Goffman (1974) refers to the variety of “structures” or “frames” among which one might attempt to differentiate only one frame. Different frames, or, definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization governing events and our subjective involvement in them. Since incoherence is forced by several situational factors, the basic strategy is the normal condition in which the speaker or discourse are intended to be coherent and to be interpreted as such. As a result, one ought to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in society to make sense out of events.

Thus, the methodological procedure followed in this study will attempt to, first of all, isolate some “structures” by describing particular constructions (e.g., formats, genres) in order to analyze this work's position (media discourses on a particular historical period of the U.S.S.R) within a domain of knowledge interconnected with power relations, interests, desires, forms of resistance, etc. This will lead us to the description of a common discursive pattern across “texts” as well as the techniques and strategies that spread across media practice and

become embodied in its modes of “communication” and “information.” In implementing the latter attempt, the rhetorical devices can be utilized so as to buttress our theoretical approach. As is emphasized before, this type of approach is not so much concerned with the *real* meanings of these media constructions, but with the manner in which they become places and the manner in which meanings can be inserted. What this interpretive angle would allow us to discover is how our discourse structures our problematization of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* and how this stance leads us to primary methods of interpreting history. We are lead to see how the manner in which we produce discourse gives form to our interpretations of *what is*. This, further, allows us to retrieve other interpretations of *what is* e.g., *Glasnost*; those interpretations that have been lost, but which might, if salvaged, lead us to both understand the inadequacies of our present practice of the U.S. print media concerning the issue and allow us to develop alternatives that might help us avoid some of the dangers of those practices.

Thus, the analytical procedures of this study will aim at displaying whether or not our problematization is rooted in certain discursive rules (e.g., in terms of formulating the definitions of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*) which serve to produce a discourse in representations of print media.

A method for the study of political discourse may employ qualitative techniques. The critical paradigm followed in this study

requires developing a qualitative analysis rather than only engaging in a mechanical activity of counting words or phrases. In other words, examining possible meanings of a text concerning a certain historical period requires us to employ a broader methodological tool than the content analysis technique. Various kinds of formal and statistical analysis may be utilized in a social analysis in general. Nevertheless, these kinds of analysis comprise at best a partial approach to the study of social phenomena and symbolic forms. The methodological philosophy of the study would aim to overcome the limitation of content analysis by its holistic focus on the meaning of the whole text.

The method should involve some major steps such as: (1) the creation of a corpus of the text, (2) the description of the text, (3) its exploration, (4) intertextual comparison (Bourque & Duchastel, 1984). These steps will help us throughout the methodology of this study. According to these steps, the type of texts to be analyzed will be selected through a sampling procedure and the units of analysis as well as categories of these units within these texts will be defined. A short description of the texts will follow a comparison between the units of analysis.

II. The Creation of the Corpus of Text: Sampling Procedures

The study will be limited to the coverage of The New York Times as a representative example of the print media in the U.S. The coverage period is planned to be the years between 1989 which marks a historical moment because of the first populist election held in the

Soviet Union and August Coup in 1991. Thus, the corpus of texts will be selected among those covering the events in the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. Using the news texts over this period of time as our units of analysis as a full sample should suffice our aims in this analysis.

The units of analysis to be selected through a sampling procedure in this study constitute a very significant point of the methodological outline. A unit is an element to be categorized. It might be an element such as an individual word, a duration of talk measured in seconds, a string of words identified by their function (e.g., a newspaper headline, a picture), a syntactic unit (e.g., a sentence, a paragraph, an adjective), a speech act, and so on. In addition, these units of analysis can become elements in a qualitative analysis of news texts. They also have a role in relating macrostructures to microstructures in a news discourse, because the meanings of whole text parts or entire texts are derived from the local meanings. Deciding what our units and 'categories' within which the units of analysis categorized depends on the research question to be answered. Our objective, that is, deciphering the nature of American discourses on a specific period of time in the history of the Soviet Union, would lead us to sort out the newspaper texts concerning this problem. Our view on discourse necessitates to relate micro and macro-structure of a text. Accordingly, our units of analysis should be news articles as a whole rather than analyzing some elements of microstructures such as propositions about the Soviet Union per se, although the propositions

within the newstories will be selected, summarized, and analyzed.

The format of New York Times seems to have different characteristics than other newspapers. There are six types of news texts which can be analyzed: *news articles, feature articles, review articles, commentaries, editorials, and miscellaneous articles*. It is found out that during the period between April 1989 and August 1991, The New York Times published 212 news texts whereby the terms Glasnost and Perestroika were used. The distribution of these texts displays that a large proportion of these news texts (49.7 %) are news articles and commentaries (25.8 %). The rest of the news texts are distributed among review articles (7.5 %); miscellaneous articles (excerpts from speeches made by the leaders, excerpts from the decrees signed by the leaders, etc.) (6.1 %), feature articles (5.6 %), and editorials (5.1 %). In short, this study will examine the whole body of articles published in different journalistic formats between April 1989 and August 1991.

If this analysis will presume that newspaper language forms its own unique discursive characteristics, defining the major characteristics of such a genre seems inevitable in order to provide a set of criteria for the descriptive and the critical analysis of this study.

A qualitative analysis of news texts, first of all, could include a description of thematic structures, news schemata, local coherence, style and rhetoric and other topics (van Dijk, 1988) which have significant roles in terms of diagnosing the relationship between the format of news articles and their semantic connotations. Describing

and critically analyzing the thematic structures, in other words a group of claims which refer to the same theme in a discourse, will suffice the purpose of this study.

CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF CLAIMS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE SELECTED DISCOURSES

There are three sets of question which may be asked in the analysis of media discourse (Davis, 1985) : 1) *who is speaking ?* or, the participants of discourse; 2) *what are they saying ?* or, the claims made by the participants and the way they use of evidence and argumentative procedures ; 3) *what do they mean ?* or, what must we assume for their talk to be *intelligible* in its context ? These questions, which are formulated in light of our selected themes and the hypotheses in this study, will guide us to describe and critically assess the descriptive characteristics of the selected discourses on *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*.

I. Descriptive Analysis

The descriptive steps of the analytical procedure in this study will aim at differentiating *the four themes* argued to be dominant in the news discourses during the reforms period. Documenting and classifying the newspaper articles on the basis of the selected themes will help us to discover whether or not our assumptions about the basic thematic structures and news discourses could be 'verified.'

Additionally, the descriptive analysis aims at exploring the major themes in the newstexts by describing the claims made about the

four themes we assumed that the printed media use in portraying the reforms (claims about the reforms, claims about the Soviet leaders, claims about the policy and policy makers, claims about the Soviet state and Soviet society linkage). In other words, the descriptive analysis will have to include the first two steps of the three major dimensions of a discourse: participants, what they are saying, and meaning. Thus, the descriptive analysis would follow documenting the claims of the following participants:

- 1) Administration claims refer to the utterances of the Administration officials,
- 2) Soviet voices refers to the utterances made by the Soviet citizens,
- 3) Other participants refers to the non-Soviet 'experts,' scholars, writers making claims about the Soviet Union,
- 4) The portrayal of all claims will examine the claims made by the journalists or the newspaper people apart from the comments of the three other participants. Their claims about the themes outlined above will shed light on the representation of the reforms and provide us an opportunity to analyze the 'interpretation' of the claims made by different participants.

In order to decipher what the participants are saying, one need to examine the argumentative procedures, the use of evidence to support the claims in a discourse. The purpose of the descriptive analysis is to offer a documentation of the major themes uttered by different voices.

Thus, the description of the articles will necessitate using the

news texts of the articles which include the claims made by various participants. The selected four different types of news articles will be decoded according to the four themes which follows the discussion of the previous chapters (the reforms, the Soviet state, leaders, and policy making) by differentiating the claims made by administration, the Soviet people, other participants, and the newspaper personnel, although the claims made about these themes are intertwined. The articles will be divided in terms of the themes as well as the voices who uttered certain claims.

Although the selected themes and the claims which represent these themes might overlap, in general, the thematic structure will follow the following sequence: The claims about the reforms will include the general arguments about the reforms and the nature of the reforms as seen by participants. The claims about the Soviet state will cover the arguments, sentences, claims and opinions which are about the mechanisms working within the Soviet state which is assumed to be a political institution constituted by various bureaucratic organizations and which is based on a set of checks and balances. The typical generalization about the Soviet state as a totalitarian state and the bifurcated world of the Soviet state and the Soviet society as a homogeneous group of people exemplify the theoretical range of the quest on this issue. The theme of the leaders will be used to explicate the "leaderology" syndrome which is constantly used in the coverage of the Soviet Union. Interpreting events of historical and political nature as simply consequences of the actions of the leaders or the

psychological conditions of the leaders constitute a good example of the leaders theme in this study. And lastly, the policy making processes will be analysed through the examination of the political mechanisms in general. The coverage about the specific reform policies, law making, the debates about the policy making processes will form a theoretical ground for the descriptive and the critical analysis of this study.

As is emphasized above, there will be overlapping claims that will be covered in the descriptive analysis. For instance, the policy making processes directly result from the political processes within the government and other state institutions. However, the descriptive analysis will provide an opportunity to comprehend the totality of the discourses, especially when the portrayal of the themes by the newspaper people is articulated into the descriptive analysis.

In short, the descriptive analysis of the articles will provide an opportunity to form an analytical base for the next step, which is, the critical analysis of the selected discourses which will be based on the criteria which are theoretically linked with the rationale of this study. The first step of our analysis will consist of the descriptive analysis of the discourses on the basis of the themes described above. In these descriptions, the most important objective is to thematically differentiate who is speaking or the participants of the selected discourses. In other words, the representatives of the administration, the Soviet voices, other participants and the newspaper people will be presumed to be the major participants of these discourses. Their claims

will document the overall picture about the participants whose claims form the kernel of the discourses about the Soviet Union.

II. Critical Analysis

The critical analysis of the utterances on the reforms, the Soviet state, leadership and policy making aims at disclosing the *semantic inferences* which may result from certain claims made by the voices being heard in the newspaper discourses.

According to the theoretical framework of this study, which is based on Habermas's ideal speech situation in communicative action, in order to attribute a 'democratic' characteristic to the discursive practices one needs to question if the totality of discourses is inclusive enough so as to offer a spectrum whereby a wide variety voices, ideological preferences, claims, etc. can be heard. Therefore, it seems necessary to develop a set of criteria to define the requirement of "inclusiveness." The following criteria, then, will help us to articulate an analytical tool by which the spectrum of discourses in terms of the variety of ideologies it includes can be assessed.

III. The Criteria For the Critical Analysis of the Selected Discourses

The criteria, which is articulated here can be used to scrutinize the discourses of the NYT analytically and systematically, ought to stem from a critical understanding about the news as discourse. The news tells us not only what happened in the world but who are we in relation to that world. The news conveys messages about the nature of politics, and citizens' relation to it. Therefore, the set of criteria

developed here must be focused on these characteristics of the news as discourses which are presumed to imply antagonistic relations with what a democratic forum necessitates to include. *The theoretical standpoint of this study requires developing an analytical framework which would enable us to examine the voices and points of view being heard in the discourses, issues emphasized regarding the Soviet society, and ideological standpoints being used to represent the Soviet society.*

The following criteria concerning the requirements of a democratic paper will be used as an analytical tool in the critical analysis in order to position the findings of the study on a continuum which ranges between democratic discourses and undemocratic discourses:

- 1) *Completeness of Information:* A paper portrayal should represent diversity of social positions. The adequacy of the voices or points of view being heard signifies efforts made by the newspaper to equally represent the social positions.
- 2) *Adequacy:* A paper should present an adequate account of society. A democratic paper would presume that newsmaking in a democratic society should help make possible an informed citizenry by writing on the controversial issues of public importance from a variety of positions. It should intend to include, not exclude, all discussion of the ends of public policy in political discourse. It should portray politics not as a matter of administration or as a more or less sordid political struggle for

power; it should also convey to citizens a message about their own role in politics.

- 3) *Availability of Alternative Positions:* A paper should provide explicit articulation of political positions being heard; it should articulate diverse political positions in this society. The news discourse should include all possible ideological standpoints on crucial issues.

Thus, these criteria would enable us to critically assess the selected themes described in the descriptive analysis chapter. They would also help us to develop a series of questions by which one can specifically apply the theoretical concerns of the study to the discourses on the Soviet Union.

The results of descriptive and critical analysis will help us to compare the ideological speech situation and the discourses used in the NYT by providing a schemata to propose a 'democratic' language in covering the Soviet affairs.

CHAPTER IV

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter will explain the way the news articles, commentaries, feature articles, review articles, and miscellaneous articles in the news texts are categorized so as to analyze the major themes discussed in the theoretical chapter of this work.

I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SELECTED DISCOURSES

The news discourses selected for this study will be analyzed according to the methodological steps outlined in the previous chapter. Accordingly, our analysis will focus on what the claims of the participants are in the discourses and the portrayal of these claims by the journalists, authors, and so on⁴.

A) NEWS ARTICLES

The claims made by the different participants in the news discourses will be deciphered on the basis of the administration claims, the Soviet voices, other participants, and the claims of the journalists.

The voices which utter the relevant claims to be analyzed in this study are defined as follows:

1. THE ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

The administration claims can be diagnosed through the statements made by the U.S. officials including diplomats, government spokespersons, state department officials, etc. There seems to have been several different occasions whereby the U.S. officials have made claims

⁴See the appendix for a full documentation of the newspaper texts analyzed.

about the Soviet state, the Soviet society, the reforms, and the future of the Soviet society.

Our first look at the newspaper articles displays that the U.S. Administration claims in the news articles are concerned with the economic aid to the Soviet Union, the need to support the economic changes in the Soviet Union, the economic potential and the need for the market reforms, the integration of the Soviet economy into the world market, and so on. These themes are expressed in the various members of the Administration, senators, and so on.

Although the members of the Administration may differ in terms of the theme they use about the Soviet Union, the formation of their arguments are shaped with the US – THEM distinction.

The claims about the Soviet state are based on an image of the unstable society that needs to be helped financially.

II. SOVIET VOICES

The Soviet claims on the reforms are formulated in a spectrum that covers the claims about the economic and political changes in the Soviet Union, as is exemplified below. The Soviet voices on the reforms have been covered in the Times extensively. The most outstanding characteristic of the Soviet claims is that they criticize the reforms; the Soviet people cited in the articles refer to the economic conditions, social problems; and the crises are claimed to have been stemmed from the reforms. The participants also make negative predictions about the Soviet society. The Soviet people are categorized into “optimists” whose voices almost seem to be absent in the news

discoursed and the "skeptics" who represent the majority of the Soviet voices in the selected news discourses. The Soviet voices are selected from the bureaucrats, the members of the Supreme Soviet, 'career Communists,' liberal deputies, professionals, and other Soviet citizens.

Similarly, the Soviet claims about the Soviet state indicate an idea of a state which monopolizes the whole area of the public and private spheres; an idea of a Government which is assumed to be identical with the Communist Party; an oppressive state run by the Supreme Soviet; and an authoritarian state.

The Soviet claims about the leaders seem to be concentrated especially on M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin. They are both connected with the reform movements. While M.S. Gorbachev is connected with the reform movement, the social problems brought by Glasnost and Perestroika, the Communist Party, and conservatism; B.N. Yeltsin is connected with the democratic movement, liberalism and change.

The policy making processes, in this study, are accepted as the political mechanisms through which various different bodies of the Government operate. Accordingly, the selected discourses are selected among those which are about the processes operating in various different organizations. Thus, the Soviet voices on this issue consist of the conflicts between the members of the K.G.B., the Politburo, the Supreme Soviet and so on. The discourses seem to be concentrated on the personal fights among the leaders. The absent discourse is the

various different ideologies these leaders might hold in terms of implementing the policies.

III. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

The other participants' claims about the reforms can be inferred from their opinions about the Western aid to the Soviet Union, the economic changes, market reforms, democratization, and their interpretation on the regulations. These themes are expressed in the comments of experts, members of the universities, foreign diplomats, representatives of the international corporations, authors, and son on. They are classified as pro-Gorbachev participants, pro-Glasnost experts, and those who criticize the way the reforms have been implemented. In general the other participants and their discourses can be defined as a supportive of the reforms with cautionary statements.

The other participants' claims about the Soviet leaders are mostly about characterization of M.S. Gorbachev. Their arguments focus on the policies of Gorbachev and the consequences of his policies which are extensively connected with the power of the presidency in the Soviet Union.

The policy making processes interpreted by the other participants are based on the themes such as the decisions made by the Soviet Congress, the policy plans to implement the reforms and the interpretations of these plans, the significance of the market reforms, the specific details of the economic changes, and so on.

V. THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS (The Claims of the Newspaper

People)

This section will include the claims, interpretations, and arguments made by the journalists who wrote the news articles.

In general, the claims of the newspaper people are more extensive compared to the other three groups of participants. The journalists and other professionals who wrote the news texts seem to have formulated long interpretations along with the news texts and they offer us a key to decipher the nature of the portrayal of the claims by the newspaper other than the participants in the discourses.

The claims about reforms made by the newspaper staff range between the general characterization of the reforms and the specific details or consequences of the reform movement in terms of the social and economic changes in the Soviet society. In general, there are two types of portrayal of the reforms in the news texts: one type of interpretation characterizes Glasnost and Perestroika as positive, a necessary step for the future of the Soviet Union. The other interpretation seems to focus on the social problems resulting from the reforms, the crises in the economic and the political system and the negative consequences of the reforms. These two opposite discourses about Glasnost and Perestroika result in the formulation of the two different argumentation processes.

The claims about the Soviet state are similar to those made by the Soviet voices and the members of the Administration. The Soviet state is described as a secret, Communist, authoritarian tyranny which

monopolizes public and the private spheres. The social problems and crises are directly connected with this image of the state and the political mechanisms which shape the ways in which the state and the bureaucratic organizations operate seem to be absent in the discourses.

The portrayal of the leaders indicate that the leaders are attached great significance in the news texts. To a large extent, the social and economic problems are connected with the personalities of the leaders. The Soviet leader is the major figure covered in these news texts and his failures and successes are interpreted many different ways. The economic problems are argued to be resulting from his actions and the direct linkage between M.S. Gorbachev's actions, proposals, personal beliefs, mood changes, his extraordinary powers, etc. and the problems experienced in implementing the reforms leads to a completely negative portrayal of the Soviet leader.

The portrayal of the policy making in the news articles are based on the coverage of the political discussions in the Soviet congress, the specific details in the policies, the legislation processes, and so on. The policy making processes are assumed to have been taking place as a result of the actions of the hardliners and the liberals as well as the personal conflicts among the leaders. The arguments about the policy making are only based on the two major political groups represented by M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin.

B) COMMENTARIES

The journalistic format of the commentaries is different than the news articles and this leads to a different use of the argumentative

processes, as is summarized as follows.

I. ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

The Administration claims on the news articles seems to cover few participants such as President Bush, the 'hawks' and 'doves' and unidentified bureaucrats. The Administration' position on the reforms has two basic dimensions that shaped the argumentative procedures: supporting the reforms via the financial aid and an apathetic approach towards the reforms.

II. SOVIET VOICES

The Commentaries also offer the Soviet voices' opinions about the reforms and the leaders. The cited participants such as the university students, Gorbachev supporters, and 'democrats' relate their ideas about reforms to M.S. Gorbachev's actions. And the claims about leaders expressed by the Soviet voices include remarks about the unpopularity of M.S. Gorbachev.

III. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

The other participants cited in the commentaries focus on the themes of reforms and the leaders. The claims of the other participants include interpretations that assume that the transformation in the Soviet Union might be seen as a democratic revolution; that glasnost might result in the end of the anti-Communism; and that perestroika did not change anything in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

Other participants' claims about the leaders are quite few which criticize President Gorbachev.

IV. PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS

The commentaries include extensive amount of claims about the reforms, the Soviet state, and policy making. The argumentations about the reforms are in general based on quotes from the books on the Soviet Union, historical anecdotes, various metaphors, the interpretations of what leaders said about Glasnost and Perestroika, the description economic conditions and social problems, the impact of the reforms on the U.S. foreign policy, the predictions about the reforms and so on. The commentaries include a wide variety of articles in terms of the ideological content of the claims such as Glasnost as an instrument of mobilizing the nation for reform and Glasnost as a half-baked reform.

The claims about the Soviet state in the commentaries define the Soviet state as an institution monopolized by the Communist Party, a totalitarian state, the sick man, and a repressive state.

The argumentative processes about characterizing leaders in the commentaries tend to focus on the personalities of the leaders and a strong linkage between the fate of the reforms and the personal decisions of the leaders is indicated. The absent is the position of leaders on the reforms who make decisions at the Congress level other than B.N. Yeltsin and M.S. Gorbachev.

The policy making processes are characterized in the commentaries are based on the political issues discussed in the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Society, and so on. The

most significant feature about the policy making processes is that the policy making through various bodies of the state is portrayed as a “fight” rather than a political forum. Additionally, the commentaries do include foreign policy recommendations for the Soviet Union.

C) FEATURE ARTICLES

The feature articles do not include claims made by the Administration.

I. SOVIET VOICES

The Soviet voices included in the feature articles are specialized persons and their claims about the reforms are based on their expertise

II. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

There is only one participant cited in the feature article and it is cited as ‘Western specialists’ who criticize the policies of M.S. Gorbachev.

III. THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS

The claims of the newspaper staff on the reforms are based on the economic results of perestroika, the impact of Glasnost on the Soviet arts and mass media.

The claim about the Soviet state made by the newspaper persons in the feature articles is not as extensive as the news articles and it is based on a concept of state which monopolizes every sphere in social life such as the arts.

The claims about the Soviet leaders cover M.S. Gorbachev, his policies and its critique. And the claims about the policy making concentrate on M.S. Gorbachev only.

D) REVIEW ARTICLES

I. ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

The review articles shortly include the Administration claims which are based on based on the claims of one person who supports the idea of supporting the Soviet Union into the world order.

II. SOVIET VOICES

The claims about the Soviet voices in the review articles are based on the differences in the lifestyles under the old system and the new system.

III. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

The argumentative procedures and the use of evidence by the other participants in the review articles include the interpretations about the reforms, M.S. Gorbachev's role in implementing the reforms, and the future predictions about the Soviet Union; whereas the claims about the Soviet state questions the legacy of Stalin, the possibility of another authoritarian-bureaucratic rule, and the secret Soviet state notion.

IV) THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS

The reforms in the review articles are narrated more extensively by the authors of the articles compared to the other articles due to the content of the review articles, that is, the interpretation of books about the Soviet Union. The argumentative procedures generally are constructed around the themes such as the economic problems stemming from the reforms, the dilemma between the

democratization of social and political life and the monopoly of power by one party, predictions about the future Soviet Union, the causes behind the delay of the reforms in the history of the Soviet Union, and the positive impact of the reform on the Soviet society in general. The whole body of argumentations about these themes are based on the opinions of the authors of the review articles.

The claims about the Soviet state are centered around the notion of a totalitarian state and the monopoly of the Communist party over the political sphere.

The argumentative procedures about the Soviet leaders in the review articles are concerned with the Soviet leader, M.S. Gorbachev.

The claims about policy making refer to the positive aspects of the policies implemented in the Soviet Union.

E) EDITORIALS

I. . SOVIET VOICES

The Soviet voices in the editorials use argumentations which focus on the 'outside forces' in interpreting the reforms.

II. THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS

The editorials are concerned with the themes such as openness, economic problems, perestroika and its consequences (price reform), 500-days plan which is interpreted as a watershed, glasnost as the first casualty of repression and the necessity for the Western aid. There seems to be contradictory claims in the characterization of the reforms which carries a suspicion about the outcomes of the reforms and the

necessity to support the change in the Soviet Union.

The claims about the Soviet state focus on the obedient citizens which are offered absolute economic security. The leaders are characterized with an emphasis on M.S. Gorbachev whose acts are interpreted as shaky and undetermined.

The editorials also include many claims about policy making. The policy makers are portrayed as Moscow and M.S. Gorbachev. The major policies which should be recommended by the West, according to the editorials, are political democratization, economic stabilization, price reform, convertible ruble, privatization, and elimination of most subsidies to inefficient businesses.

II. ANALYTICAL DIFFERENTIATION

The analytical differentiation will include a reshuffling of the data so as to reveal the voices included in the utterances or news articles, commentaries, editorials, and so on. The theoretical objective of this study, which is differentiating the voices or participants directly or indirectly included in the newspaper discourses and the ways in which these voices are quoted in a group of themes. Listing the themes in which these voices are talked about as well as the voices themselves will enable us to define the forum within which debates, discussions, and interpretations about the Soviet Union occur.

III. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA

The list of unquoted and quoted voices characterized above enable us to reconstruct the data so as to offer an inventory of the voices and the themes and subjects they are talking about. The

inventory listed in this part of the descriptive analysis, then, will differentiate 'who is talking about whom' as well as 'who is talking about what' in the newspaper discourses.

A) QUOTED VOICES

Given the classification of the participants made earlier, the directly quoted voices about the Soviet Union in the Times can be listed as follows:

- 1 U.S. Officials: This category will include the Bush Administration officials, the former officials.
2. Soviet Voices: This category includes the following sub-categories:
 - 2.1. Soviet officials: This group of people consists of the party officials, the Supreme Soviet members, Congress of People's Deputies, and so on.
 - 2.2. Soviet Military
 - 2.3. Soviet media people (journalists, editors, etc.)
 - 2.4. Intelligentsia (academicians, artists, authors, etc.)
 - 2.5. Soviet citizens (professionals, workers, and other groups)
 - 2.6. Soviet businessmen
 - 2.7. Dissidents
3. Others (experts, specialists on the Soviet Union, and foreign diplomats)
4. Businessmen (foreign investors).

Accordingly, the themes, political figures, groups the discourses

of the *directly quoted voices* (The name of the participants and the themes) are concentrating on will be differentiated.

B) UNQUOTED VOICES

The unquoted voices will be grouped on the basis of the labeling of the journalists who wrote the texts. The unquoted voices the Times included in the texts covering the Soviet Union can be listed as follows:

1. U.S. Voices: This category will include all the U.S. voices such as the Administration officials, former officials except the specialists and the experts on the Soviet Union.
2. Soviet Voices:
 - 2.1. Soviet Officials (Members of the Government at every level)
 - 2.2. Deputies (members of the Congress of People's Deputies)
 - 2.3 Soviet Economists (economists working for the Government and independent economists)
 - 2.4. Other Groups (This category will include the groups that were claimed to have been active in the political arena during the period studied)
 - 2.5. Soviet Media (journalists, commentators, editors, etc.)
 - 2.6. Intelligentsia (academicians, artists, poets, authors, etc.)
 - 2.7. Soviet Citizens (workers, professionals and other groups)
3. Experts and Specialists (on the Soviet Union)
4. Other Unspecified Groups: This category will include the

3. Experts and Specialists (on the Soviet Union)
4. Other Unspecified Groups: This category will include the groups that cannot be included in the categories listed above.

Thus, the unquoted voices and the themes to which they were related are listed in the appendix.

According to the data analyzed, the distribution of the frequency of unquoted and quoted voices can be summarized as follows⁵:

QUOTED VOICES	N	%
1. <u>U.S. Officials</u> :	16	6.7
2. <u>Soviet Voices</u> :		
2.1. Soviet officials	89	37.3
2.2. Soviet Military	2	8.0
2.3. Soviet media	25	10.5
2.4. Intelligentsia	14	5.8
2.5. Soviet citizens	20	8.4
2.6. Soviet businessmen	8	3.3
2.7. Dissidents	3	1.2
3. <u>Others</u>	56	23.5
4. <u>Businessmen</u>	5	2.1
TOTAL	238	99.6

⁵These frequencies of the voices refer to the occurrences of the claims made by the voices in the newspaper texts, not the number of people quoted in the Times.

UNQUOTED VOICES

1. <u>U.S. Voices</u>	14	5.7
2. <u>Soviet Voices</u>		
2.1. Soviet Officials	63	25.8
2.2. Deputies	11	4.5
2.3. Soviet Economists	7	2.8
2.4. Other Soviet Groups	60	24.5
2.5. Soviet Media	8	3.2
2.6. Intelligentsia	6	2.4
2.7. Soviet Citizens	8	3.2
3. <u>Experts and Specialists</u>	27	11.0
4. <u>Other Unspecified Groups</u>	40	16.3
TOTAL	244	99.8

In other words, the distribution of these occurrences regarding the voices indicate that the Times included 236 quoted and 244 unquoted utterances made by voices listed above in the coverage of the Soviet reforms. The unquoted voices and the quoted voices and the utterances included in these voices carry a great deal of importance as a result of one of the theoretical objectives, which is to assess the nature of discourse used in the Times. Thus, one need to summarize the findings of this chapter which dealt with the data descriptively.

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter described the data by differentiating the themes used in the newspaper texts and analytically differentiating the voices

as well as utterances. One of the major objectives, in this chapter, was to formulate the voices being heard in the Times and the themes or problems uttered by these voices. In other words, discovering 'who is talking about what' directed our efforts to utilize the data so as to ask and answer the sociological questions in the following chapter. The theoretical focus of this study, which is to question the nature of the public sphere constructed by the times as part of the American public sphere, requires employing a social analysis on the degree of how democratic the discourses of the New York Times are. Therefore, the social analysis of the discourses on the Soviet Union, it is assumed, ought to display: the ways in which different social forces acknowledge voices in a situation, the significant social conflicts constructed and narrated in a discourse, the kind of voices that are included/excluded in a discourse, the ambiguity between the labels [of the social forces] and the actual content of the voices, and the ways in which the labels such as 'liberals' represent the voices. These focuses of analysis would enable us to systematically argue about the unequal distribution of speech opportunities and its sociological significance of power conflicts portrayed in the Times.

Accordingly, the descriptive analysis enables us to make the following conclusions about the discourses concerning the Soviet Union. The main characteristics of the voices covered in the newspaper texts can be formulated as :

- The New York Times coverage of the Soviet Union included or

acknowledged the quoted voices of social forces such as the US officials, Soviet officials, Soviet military, Soviet media, intelligentsia, Soviet citizens, Soviet businessmen, dissidents, experts and specialists on the Soviet Union, and US businessmen.

QUOTED VOICES

- The US officials concentrate on the following problems: the financial aid, joint-ventures in the Soviet Union, dissidents and opposition, neo-conservatives, political crisis, integration of the Soviet Union to the world economy. The major issue uttered by the US officials revolve around the financial aid to the Soviets and the US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.
- The quoted Soviet officials' utterances, which were mostly quoted from the debates in the Congress, can be grouped as follows: glasnost and perestroika, democratization, the Party, the power relations between M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, the conflicts between the Russian Governments and the Central Government, the economic reform plans, the Western aid, the relationship between the central Government and the free market reforms.
- The quoted Soviet military focus on the social problems.
- The utterances of the quoted Soviet media people range between various themes such as the changes in the Union, M.S. Gorbachev's role in the reform process, privatization, economic structure, the Western aid, freedom and the Party.
- Intelligentsia focus on the problems such as freedom of the press,

the political events in the Congress, democracy, economic problems, the conflict between the Russian government and M.S. Gorbachev.

- The Soviet citizens quoted in the discourses talk about openness, social and economic conditions, democrats and B.N. Yeltsin, the Kremlin and M.S. Gorbachev, and privatization.
- Soviet businessmen's utterances are about the new joint ventures, the need to free the economy, M.S. Gorbachev and his economic programs, and privatization.
- Dissident groups seem to associate the social problems with the Communist Party and M.S. Gorbachev reforms.
- The experts and specialists on the Soviet Union especially focus on the specific problems regarding the economic reform programs, free market, the lack of an entrepreneurial culture, pluralism, the Western aid, and the Communist monopoly on power, M.S. Gorbachev, and old guard as the main causes of the economic crisis.
- The US businessmen also focus on the issues such as more liberalization in the Soviet economy.

UNQUOTED VOICES:

- The other group of voices that were argued to have uttered claims on issues consist of US voices, Soviet voices, experts and specialists, and other groups.
- Unquoted US voices used in the newspaper texts are concerned with the issues such as the financial assistance and conservative policies of M.S. Gorbachev. This category includes unidentified groups (officials, American officials) who juxtapose the financial aid

and the nature of the Soviet reforms.

- The unquoted Soviet officials are characterized via the rivalry between M.S. Gorbachev (who is argued to have symbolized 'conservatism,' crisis, dicta) and B.N. Yeltsin (who is portrayed as the proponent of freedom and market reforms), debates about different economic programs, and the conflicts between 'hardliners,' 'conservatives' and 'democrats.'
- Soviet voices also include another group which can be called as other groups due to the lack of definition about labeling these groups, ambiguity between the labels and the contents of their utterances, and the arbitrariness in using these labels such as 'Gorbachev-watchers,' 'Soviet skeptics,' 'pro-Kremlin groups' and so on. In other words, the discourses do not indicate any linkage between the institutions these groups can be associated with and the labels by which they are identified.
- The nations is argued to ask for market economy reforms; the advocates of the radical change are claimed to oppose M.S. Gorbachev; the Communist Party radicals want to end the Party's monopoly on power; hardliners blame M.S. Gorbachev for change; liberals are dismayed at Gorbachev's drift to the right; democrats believe that the hard facts should compel M.S. Gorbachev to continue the hard path to democracy and free markets; and so on.
- The Soviet media include both the state-owned agencies and independent organizations. They both concentrate on the social and

economic hardship and political power relations in the Congress. There are undefined groups in this category. For instance, Soviet newspapers and TV are argued to have presented an exercise in the nostalgia of Communist censorship. The names of the newspapers are not specified.

- Unquoted experts included in the newspaper texts can be categorized into undefined groups of experts such as Western analysts, American experts and the experts who are members of institutions such as think-tanks, government agencies and so on. The unidentified experts pay attention to: modernization efforts of Gorbachev, the K.G.B., the Kremlin's efforts to rejuvenate the economy being too little, M.S. Gorbachev's economic programs being a trick, the involvement of the West in the reform programs, the lack of a legal concept of ownership, pluralism which should be saluted, and political conflicts as a hindrance for the reforms. The individual experts, on the other hand, mention about the policy of openness, specific problems caused by the economic programs, and democratization.
- The last group included in the unquoted voices is labeled as others which comprise groups which cannot be grouped under the other categories listed above. This category of unidentified groups are argued to have represented, e.g., the Westerners, scientists, Americans, Western embassies and so on. The range of problems uttered by these groups varies.

- The social forces characterized in these discourses, then, are disproportionately centered around the Soviet officials, the Party members, members of the Congress, the media, intelligentsia, the Soviet citizens and experts. The discourses about the Soviet Union in the Times exclude voices of significant social forces such as: voices from republics other than Russia, trade union representatives, worker groups, strike committees, groups in factories, churches, the media other than the media, members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Soviets (councils), and the political parties that had begun to be formed in February 1990 after the removal of the Communist Party's constitutional monopoly in Soviet society.
- Other than the voices heard in the Times, the journalists also made claims of their own. The Soviet reforms are directly associated with M.S. Gorbachev in the newspaper articles. The major social conflicts were juxtaposed between the M.S. Gorbachev, hardliners, the Communist Party, the central Government, the Supreme Soviet and B.N. Yeltsin, liberals, the Soviet citizens, as the voices acknowledged in the newspaper texts. The reforms are defined as part of the process which caused an economic decline, although glasnost and perestroika has been acknowledged as social phenomena which brought openness and new freedoms to Soviet society.

Apart from the characteristics of the voices described above, the newspaper texts are written within the framework of the following

tendencies:

The most significant claims made in the selected discourses with respect to the reforms and other themes that are directly related to Glasnost and Perestroika can be summarized as follows:

- 1) There are two major dimensions about the reforms in the selected discourses: On the one hand, the reform movement in the Soviet Union is buttressed by the discourses and it is presented as a necessary historical step towards capitalism. On the other hand, there constructed a close linkage between the whole body of the social, economic and political problems in the Soviet Union and Glasnost and Perestroika. The latter argument is followed by several predictions about the future of the reforms which is diagnosed to fail.
- 2) The discourses on the Soviet Union present the Soviet state as a totalitarian, authoritarian, repressive, oppressive power which controls every activity in the private and public spheres.
- 3) The discourses on the Soviet Union present the Soviet leaders on the basis of their personalities, their personal relations with other leaders, mood changes, rather than their ideological orientations and their political agendas. There constructed a close linkage between the leaders as individuals and the operation of the political mechanisms.
- 4) The discourses on the Soviet Union present policy making as an outcome of the power games between a few leaders such as M.S.

Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin.

- 5) The discourses on the Soviet Union are dominated by dual characterizations of the reforms (optimists and skeptics about Glasnost and Perestroika), the Soviet state (the evil empire the democratic Western governments), and the absence of 'secondary' organizations between the Soviet state and the Soviet society.

CHAPTER V

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The previous chapter included the thematic classification of the themes in each format of the newspaper texts as well as differentiating the voices being heard in the discourses of the New York Times regarding the Soviet Union. We differentiated what the voices included uttered on the selected themes; we based the the signification of distribution of voices as well as the nature of utterances on Habermas's communicative action theory in general and ideal speech situation in special. Ideal speech situation constituted an analytical tool which enabled us to use it as a standard by which democratic and undemocratic discourses used in newspaper articles could be diagnosed.

Accordingly, in the critical analysis chapter, the analytically differentiated discourses will be analyzed through a set of criteria, which will enable us to make a critical evaluation of the discourses and the semantic inferences from the discourses. These inferences would also shed light on the sociological meaning of discourses as historical event in light of the communicative action theory. Therefore, the critical analysis can be accepted as an analytical step by which the "data" as texts could be related to a systematic theory. The critical analysis chapter is where the question of meaning and its hermeneutic significance would arise. In this context, Habermas's theory enables us

to critically and systematically read the texts which are a part of political discourse. The critical analysis of this study will analyze the newspaper texts as deviations from the ideal speech situation. How is Habermas's model related to the critical understanding of a text?

The ideal speech situation and the discourse ethics propounded by Habermas allows us to understand a text in terms of the continuum of a democratic and undemocratic discourses. Habermas's main concern is to formulate a theory to assess social and political action by considering it as communicative, intersubjective, and social; since the task of his theory is to articulate an expanded conception of rationality. Habermas's concern about the 'rationality crisis' in the politico-administrative sphere in advanced capitalist societies leads him to question the public realm which is increasingly depoliticized. The breakdown of the complementarity between the requirements of the political-economic system and the legitimate expectations of society's members ought to be resolved through communicative ethics.

The use of language, which gains a clear significance in Habermas's theory, marks a shift from 'consciousness' to action, to patterns and instances of claim-making performances. In his quest, Habermas attempts to decipher the relationship between the formation of a public sphere and civil society. The erosion of a public sphere along with the evolution of capitalism, according to Habermas, could be resolved via "rational will formation." The ideal speech situation as a rational effort as well as an integrative factor would serve the

continuation of a democratic society.

Additionally, ideal speech situation, in Habermas's theory, refers to a political strategy. Possible deviations from that formal idealization might be identified and assessed. The ideal speech situation, which is not presumed to be a utopia, provides a set of criteria by which one can distinguish illegitimate and legitimate norms. One group of discourse can be analyzed without proposing an 'alternative' to the discourses scrutinized. Instead, the communicative action theory enables us to develop a set of criteria about what a democratic discourse ought to include and exclude. The important point is that ideal speech situation embodied as a form of communication is always imperfect and it is never practically realized. However, this does not mean that the analytic concept has no practical importance. In some sense, this is the point where the practical importance of the ideal speech situation can be tested.

Habermas reformulates the Marxist critique of ideology as a practical-pragmatic critique of all systematically distorted communications, including asymmetrical conversations and all social relations characterized by the elite monopoly of symbolic codes. If a discourse can be decoded in terms of the asymmetrical power relations it indicates, it would serve as a critique of society. This idea can also be related to the new Marxism which suggests that the monopoly of capital is now reinforced by the monopoly of information and dialogue chances.

Thus, participating in a forum or dialogue chances becomes

significant in assessing how democratic a sphere is, because a rationalized world is one in which each actor's critical communicative capacities play an expanded role in the process of reproducing the lifeworld. The arena called the "public sphere" would be possible through citizens who have equal chances to participate in a political order.

The act of participating in a discourse, or attempting to form an agreement about the truth of a statement or the correctness of a problematic norm implies a supposition which claims that a genuine agreement is possible. As a matter of fact, Habermas wishes to understand the ways in which the 'consent management' is realized in advanced industrialized societies.

Moreover, knowledge as power in Foucaultian sense and discourse as ideology are part of the processes of legitimatization in society. The critique of discourse refers to constructing a set of criteria and analyze the correspondence between the discourses. These criteria constitute the skeleton of a personal ideal speech situation. In other words, the critique of news as discourse does not necessarily mean that one has to search for the factual 'truths' about the historical events, because what is said is part of the 'truth.' This study may look like an esoteric effort because of its focus on texts per se. Nevertheless, analyzing news as discourse would contribute to our understanding of democracy and equality due to one of the significant characteristic of the news, that is, the way they contribute to historical events.

In sum, the critical reading of the NYT texts in the critical chapter will allow us to apply the ideal speech situation as a principle of rational validation. The ideal speech situation will help us to analyze the discourses about the Soviet Union so as to assess what the features of an 'undistorted communication' are in a democratic society. The criteria of a democratic criticism as a requirement of a democratic discourse in terms of the needs of citizens to have equal chances to be exposed to a wide variety of ideologies and world views will guide us in the following analysis.

The Criteria For the Critical Analysis of the Selected Discourses

The criteria of democratic criticism, then, to be used to analytically and systematically scrutinize the discourses of the NYT ought to stem from a critical understanding about the news as discourse. The news tells us not only what happened in the world but who are we in relation to that world, that is, it defines a world view for us. The news conveys messages about the nature of politics, and citizens' relation to it. Therefore, the set of criteria developed here must be focused on these characteristics of the news as discourses. And such discourses are presumed to imply antagonistic relations with what a democratic forum necessitates to include. *The theoretical standpoint of this study requires developing an analytical framework which would enable us to examine the voices and points of view being heard in the discourses, issues emphasized regarding the Soviet society, and ideological standpoints being used to represent the Soviet*

society.

The following criteria concerning the requirements of a democratic paper will be used as an analytical tool in the critical analysis in order to position the findings of the study on a continuum which ranges between democratic discourses and undemocratic discourses:

- 1) *Completeness of Information:* A portrayal should represent diversity of social positions. The adequacy of the voices or points of view being heard signifies efforts made by the newspaper to equally represent the social positions.
- 2) *Adequacy:* An adequate account of society should be presented in the news discourses. A democratic paper would presume that newsmaking in a democratic society should help make possible an informed citizenry by writing on the controversial issues of public importance from a variety of positions. It should intend to include, not exclude, all discussion of the ends of public policy in political discourse. It should portray politics not as a matter of administration or as a more or less sordid political struggle for power; it should also convey to citizens a message about their own role in politics.
- 3) *Availability of Alternative Positions:* A paper should provide explicit articulation of political positions being heard; it should articulate diverse political positions in this society. The news discourse should include all possible ideological standpoints on

crucial issues.

These criteria which function as heuristic concepts in this study overlap complement one another. In order to apply these criteria on the data described in the previous section, one ought to identify issues for the critical analysis. In other words, in light of these criteria what can be made of the data should be clarified. The issues and questions covered at this point of the study can be listed as follows:

Completeness of Information:

The completeness of information refers to how well the newspaper attempts to represent all of the social positions and points of view in the Soviet society. Do the participants or voices in discourses described above thoroughly represent the social positions in the Soviet society? Do the discourses express a great reverence for political authority in terms of interpreting political crises? Do the focus and the organization of the coverage revolve around the center of political power? Are power relations symmetrical or asymmetrical? Do the discourses rely heavily on binary oppositions in the characterization of the Soviet Union? What kind of juxtapositions does the New York Times use? What are the differences between the characteristics of quoted voices and unquoted voices? What does the coverage of unquoted voices signify in terms of the concept of politics? What is the relationship between the Soviet society and the Soviet state? What contribution does the New York Time's portrayal make for the concept of democracy?

Adequacy:

The adequacy of representation will question whether or not the New York Times raised issues of public interest in the coverage of Soviet Union. It is assumed in this study that the reading the newspaper texts would also indicate the presumptions made about significant issues regarding the American society. Public interest should be determined by the extent to which narrating news stories promotes a robust democracy and helps produce a democratic public sphere.

Thus, the representation with respect to the significant issues of public importance will be analyzed critically. These issues will be selected from the themes of this study such as the reform process, the Soviet state, and so on. For example: What issues are glasnost and perestroika related to? How often are significant problems (the economic budget) related to the reform process posed? Do the discourses examine issues of public interest such as privatization, liberalization, freedom and democracy? Is there any attempt to specifically define the 'Western aid' to the Soviet Union? Is there any historical reference regarding the reform movements in the Soviet society? What are different approaches found in the discourses? What are the 'buzzwords' used to characterize the leaders, the reforms, the Soviet state and policy making?

The adequacy of the representation can be examined through

other analytical devices as well. For example: How is the 'expert knowledge' being used? What role do journalists play in portraying the crises? And finally, interpreting projections made by the journalists on the American society carry an important point sociologically; that is, studying ideology from a sociology of knowledge perspective is a worthy effort in this regard.

Availability of Alternative Positions:

The variety of positions on significant issues emphasized above should be examined in terms of journalists, commentators own political standpoints. This criterion deals with the ways in which the discourses are narrated by journalists. Are there contradictory claims in the coverage? To what extent do journalists question the Administration foreign policy? What role do editorials play in the coverage of the Soviet Union? What are the main differences between the official discourse and the discourse of the Times? What are the specific points of view on the significant issues in terms of the discourses used in the news articles, commentaries, review articles and so on? What standpoints are defined as 'normal' or 'taken-for-granted?' An intertextual comparison of the news texts would answer these and similar questions.

Accordingly, the following analysis will question whether the NYT meet the criteria developed above:

I) COMPLETENESS OF INFORMATION:

i) Voices:

The discourses described in this study reveal the voices acknowledged by the NYT. As the analytical differentiation indicates, the discourses constructed in this study include directly quoted voices, unquoted voices and the claims of the journalists themselves. It is found that **37.3 %** of all the occurrences of the quoted voices were uttered by the Soviet officials, whereas **8.4 %** of all the occurrences of the quoted voices were made by the Soviet citizens. The unequal distribution of the number of quotations indicates that the discourses on the Soviet Union concentrate on the political discussions between the Soviet officials whom are given access to the debates on the selected issues.

The unequal distribution of the voices being heard in the NYT results from the assumption which suggests that the Soviet state dominates the Soviet society as well as the political sphere. This assumption results in quoting more Soviet officials than worker groups, more media people than trade unionists, and so on. In other words, the construction of the news about the Soviet Union on the basis of an unequal representation of groups in the Soviet society is a result of the assumed idea about the absence of dialogue in different aspects, classes and groupings in Soviet society. The NYT projects the assumption about the lack of public opinion in the Soviet Union on

the news discourses about a different society. This projection itself, then, creates an incomplete representation of the Soviet society in the news discourses because of the lack of an attempt to create a balanced distribution of voices representing all types of social classes and groups other than the officials and pro-Gorbachev and pro-Yeltsin deputies in the Soviet Parliament.

The unequal distribution of the quoted and unquoted voices also suggests that the leaders, not political groups, are the units of representation, so to speak, in a news discourse. It is indicated that the political processes are consequences of the personal preferences of the leaders, psychological conditioning of political figures.

As is emphasized in the following pages, the portrayal of political events as part of personal fights of leaders complements the assumption about the absence of public opinion in the Soviet society. Although one might respond by an argument based on a representation of the Soviet state as a repressive, totalitarian. The point is that a newspaper, especially the one that has become an institution in American political sphere, ought to attempt to give access to a wide variety of voices representing different groups. In the case of the discourses on the Soviet Union, a complete information requires equally quoting a diverse group of people such as the representatives of churches, universities, students, local officials, trade unionists, and the groups of people living in the Soviet republics other than Russia.

The official discourse represented via the newspaper discourses

does not allow readers to differentiate between the organizational structure of the Soviet state due to the lack of positioning the Soviet officials into the institutional sites they represent. The newspaper discourses selected for this study do not make references to the ways in which the popularly elected councils at all levels of the government (soviets) operate. Nor do they include utterances of voices who represent, for example, the Supreme Soviets of the Fifteen Republics or the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics. Although the newspaper discourses include voices who represent the City Council of Moscow, the Committee on Economic Reform and Property of the Russian Republic's Parliament, the USSR Union of Cooperatives; the relationship between these positions within these institutions and social forces they might have represented is unclear, due to the lack of information regarding the mechanisms by which the different levels of the Soviet government operate.

One of the incomplete aspects of the NYT discourses is that it only focuses on the Russia with a heavy emphasis on the events occurring in Moscow. As the analytical differentiation indicates there are only few references about the voices who represent the other republics. There are only four quoted Soviet officials who come from the republics other than Russia. There is none among the unquoted voices except the voices labeled as "deputies from all the regions of the Union" whose definition is unclear. Although covering the parliamentary debates, political events in Moscow is significant, the

heavy emphasis on these debates reinforces the idea that the public sphere is defined by the political sphere. In other words, it gives the message that the Soviet state dominates every sphere of the Soviet society which is incapable of reproducing or constructing different groupings, cliques, political parties which might have roles in determining the discourses about the Soviet reforms, the policy making processes and so on. As the following analysis indicates, the Soviet officials in the newspaper discourses are separated into two groups, that is, those who support democracy and reform (democrats) and those who criticize the reforms (hardliners or conservatives). This division among the Soviet officials is projected upon the characterization of the Soviet society whereby the only prominent social forces are the conservatives and democrats. The political parties except the Communist Party of Soviet Union are not quoted in the NYT news articles. According to a poll conducted by Public Opinion Studies department of Russian Parliament in mid-January of 1991, there were eight parties and associations other than the Communist Party: Communist Party of Russia, Democratic platform, Social Democrats, Russian Democratic Party, Christian Democrats, Pamyat, Liberal Democrats, Monarchist Party. The poll, which aimed at determining the attitude changes between November 1990 and January 1991 (Pozner, 1992), is significant in this context in terms of the presence of a pluralist development reflected by the formation of political parties and associations in the Soviet Union.

The assumption about a totalitarian state reveals itself in the

lengthy coverage of the discussions in the parliaments rather than paying the equal amount of attention to other political groups. There is no journalistic effort to differentiate between the political agendas of groups except the conservatives and democrats, which results in constructing a two-tiered world. Although the NYT discourses acknowledge several groups and cliques in the Parliament, the absence of the acknowledgement of the social forces by documenting their agendas leads to an obscure web of choruses whose political identity is unclear⁶.

As Roy Medvedev (1992) points out, the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union left Russia virtually without national political organizations. And by July 1991 about fifty different political parties existed, although their political influence did not extend beyond Moscow and Leningrad. It is found that The NYT discourses for the selected period of time to study do not directly or indirectly quote or refer to any attempt to establish a political party, neither they pay attention to the strikers whose numbers involved increased from about six hundred thousand in 1989 to over three million in the first half of 1991 (Werth, 1992). In another study coproduced by the Independent Russian Press agency, Postfactum, and the research center Interlegal, both based in Moscow, the material about political parties and organizations was gathered directly from the

⁶J. Chisea, the Moscow correspondent for the Italian newspaper *Unita*, conducted a study of the Soviet Parliament and discerned seven political families among its deputies (Lewin, 1991).

political groups themselves and from interviews with their leaders, as well as from reports in the Russian press. The results of this research showed that there were three political blocks in the political spectrum: the Democratic Party of Russia, the People's Party of Free Russia, and the Renewal Union, each of which were consisted of various different political organizations. The same study concluded that there were about 120 parties and movements that have emerged across the Russian political spectrum since 1987. Democrats, as well as Marxists, bolsheviks, socialists, labor activists, ecologists, feminists, separatists, anarchists, nationalists, and monarchists have all organized themselves in one way or another, ranging from small regional groups with a handful of members to large nationwide organizations such as the Democratic Russia Movement with three thousand members (Pribylovskii, 1992). NYT discourses never allow including utterances of representatives of these political organizations and movements. The absence of voices representing social movements organized by the thousands of worker groups, work committees, workers' clubs perpetuates the idea of an inferior political culture with no democracy tradition. This 'image' about a country experiencing historical moments of its own is redefined, refined, repackaged and projected upon the readers of the NYT.

The second often quoted voices in the NYT are the members of the Soviet media. As is noted in the following pages, their analysis or comments quoted in the NYT discourses reinforce the idea of leaderology due to a heavy emphasis on the actions of political leaders

such as M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin rather than the mechanisms by which the political processes operate, their first hand observations about the Soviet people and their opinions on the Soviet reforms.

The third group often quoted in the NYT discourses is the international experts who are the members of the universities, 'think-tank' institutions, and so on. One of the significant functions of using the expertise knowledge is to legitimize the claims of the journalists. There are 48 expert voices directly quoted in the NYT during the period selected for this study.

The unquoted voices, on the other hand, reveal similar characteristics with the quoted discourses, except the three major groups whose utterances have been frequently used in the news discourses. These groups are the Soviet officials, other Soviet groups, and other unspecified groups which have been indirectly quoted. The Soviet officials, similar to the quoted voices, consist of the party members, deputies, ministers, and so on. Again, concentrating heavily on these officials indicates the significance of political authority and political power which seem to have been separated from the citizens of the Soviet Union. This heavy emphasis on the political authority and conflicts for political power contributes to an incomplete picture about the Soviet Union, because news discourses should narrate and utilize the official discourses and unofficial discourses equally.

One of the significant points about the unquoted voices is the extent of references with respect to the undefined or unspecified groups

such as “liberals,” “democrats,” “hardliners,” “radicals,” “Kremlin watchers,” and so on. The utterances of these groups constitute 40.8 % of the total number of utterances heard from the unquoted voices. Making references to these groups seems to have been arbitrary in the sense that the social and historical context of the labels was not described or specified. These labels in the news discourses are also used interchangeably. For instance, it is unclear how “party radicals” are distinguishable from “liberals” or “democrats” who all claimed that the Communist Party monopoly should be ended. Also, it is ambiguous to understand or predict who are the members of, let’s say, the “Western diplomats,” “US analysts,” etc. As Lee and Solomon (1990) point out, these phrases are broad and pliable enough and they obscure the sources and motives behind the words. The equivocal character of these phrases allow journalists to use them as springboards for the opinions of certain groups or voices given access to the news discourses.

ii) Social Points of View:

The voices given access to a discourse and the positions these voices take up on the selected issues are the two dimensions which complement one another on the completeness of information. The standpoints of voices heard in the NYT carry a great deal of importance due to the one of the objectives of this study, that is, to examine the newspaper discourses from the point of view of power and discourse linkage.

Accordingly, in order to scrutinize whether the information about the Soviet reforms is thorough and complete one ought to examine the diversity in terms of the standpoints uttered by the voices covered in this study. More specifically the positions of these voices on *the Soviet reforms, the Soviet state and policy making* would enable us to understand whether or not the newspaper discourses ensured that all significant groups and ideological tendencies are allowed access to the NYT texts.

Therefore, the specific issues regarding the three major ones can be examined through the following questions:

Given the complexity of these concepts, there is room for diversity: What are the interpretations about the future of the Soviet reforms that the NYT discourses give access to? A free-market economy or not? An intact Soviet Union or several states linked constitutionally or otherwise? A Western style polity? A Western style economy and a Western style polity?

What are the perceptions about the Soviet state? Back to authoritarianism? Totalitarianism?

Perceptions about the role of the Communist Party, the bureaucracy, and the economic system will also indicate the standpoints of the voices. Is the economic system immobile or rigid?

These and similar questions will enable us to the ways in which the voices utter their ideological standpoints.

As the descriptive analysis reveals, the quoted and unquoted voices in the NYT discourses are the members of the US officials, the

Soviet officials, the Soviet media, Soviet intelligentsia, Soviet economists, Soviet businessmen, dissidents, US businessmen, experts and other groups. Consequently, with the help of the analytical discrimination and the descriptive analysis of the news articles, the following analysis can be made.

-- VOICES OF THE US ADMINISTRATION:

The Administration assertions about the Soviet reforms indicate that the Soviet reforms are interpreted in the claims about more freedom and openness, economic aid to the Union, and political crisis. The Administration claims about the reforms deal with the issue of solving the crisis in the Union by relating the feasibility of economic aid to a 'real' reform process which has not been defined in the official discourse. US officials acknowledge Soviet politicians, M.S. Gorbachev, intellectuals, the Soviet foreign minister, and "those who opposed reform" among the Soviet people. In these claims openness is related to such themes as the emergency assistance, the flow of information coming from the Union a full fledged political crisis, the vast economic potential of the Soviet Union, and the possibility of destruction of the reform process by the groups who oppose the reforms.

The claims of the US officials focus on the precondition of real market based reforms to consider the economic aid. The voices who represent the US Administration all have a position which reinforces a US versus THEM distinction. The THEM is defined as a people asking for an aid from US. For example, according to Senator B. Kasten,

openness would lead the world towards peace (June 21, 1989), implying that before the reform process started the world peace has been threatened by the Soviets. The US officials are quoted as “prodding Moscow to use the assistance to speed up economic changes” (January 14, 1990), or, it is argued by the officials that “blending” the emergency assistance with efforts to promote economic reform is necessary which will make the reform process successful. The NYT gives access to the US officials speaking about the reforms and the economic aid linkage. The official discourse, then, is shaped by the issues of the economic aid and the integration of the Soviet economy into the world markets. There is an absence of possible official discourses on the problem of the Soviet reforms and foreign policy options. Although the US official position depends on theme of the economic aid, there is not a clear definition of what the feasibilities of a financial aid are, except the figure of \$100 billion (July 18, 1991) which is described as an unrealistic request. Despite the variety of opinions on the economic aid to the Soviet Union, the issue remains ambiguous as Mr. Bush indicates that he wishes to “keep all options open” with respect to the economic aid (May 24, 1991).

The Administration claims about the Soviet state are based on increasing potential for destabilization across the Eastern block as a consequence of M.S. Gorbachev’s quest for modernization, detente period and openness and its political implications, M.S. Gorbachev’s political structuring and ‘regime.’ Thus, openness, it is argued, would

lead to a destabilization in Eastern Europe; which indicates a similarity with the Cold War rhetoric complemented with phrases such as regime, detente and so on.

-- *SOVIET VOICES*:

The social positions of the Soviet voices are characterized by a division between the "reformers" and "conservatives," or, another division between "skeptics" and "optimists." As the descriptive analysis and the analytical reconstruction show, the quoted and unquoted voices are situated among those who oppose the reform process, "conservatives" and those groups who support the idea of reform and change, "reformers."

The Soviet voices narrate reforms and especially Glasnost vis-à-vis the worsening economic conditions, social problems, the lack of consumer supplies, problems caused by the central planning, anti-Semitism as a result of openness, the continuation of the limitation on individual freedoms, growing opposition against the reforms, the opposition of the Party apparatus, conservatism and totalitarianism, the lack of acceleration for the reforms and the necessity to speed up the market reforms, noisy reforms of M.S. Gorbachev, a plot by the Westerners, anarchy, fear, and crisis. The so-called skeptics among the Soviet voices are represented to have focused on this theme.

Reforms are also interpreted as the cause of dramatic social changes which led to more openness, independence to the new republics, salvation of socialism, democracy and freedom, liberalization, privatization, economic innovations such as legalizing

small group businesses. The so-called *optimists* among the Soviet voices are represented to mention about the positive side of the reforms.

This distinction between the “optimists” and “skeptics,” although it is used in one news article, seems to have been reflected in the general characterization of the attitudes on the reform process in the Soviet Union. It does not reflect the political conflicts and ideological struggles among the Soviet people due to its contradictory and ambiguous character.

Perestroika refers to the following themes: ‘restructuring’ of the old system; the old times, that is the politics of purge of the recent Communist past; a concept which brought a halfhearted reshuffling of the party Central Committee and an ugly fake election system and free debate.

These themes which are used by the Soviet voices are covered by the excerpts about the Soviet voices. The majority of the participants concentrate the social and economic problems caused by the reforms. There is a juxtaposition of democracy and free enterprise, although the word capitalism is not used by the Soviet people in the selected discourses. The problems are interpreted as an outcome of the central planning and the old system. There is also emphasis on the combination of market reforms and socialism. The newspaper discourses, again, do not include voices uttering a wide variety of interpretations about the future of the Soviet Union. The problems

boil down to the simple questioning of the Soviet officials, media people and citizens in an unbalanced way. As the editor in chief of the *Commersant*, a business weekly correctly points out, "the main problem with the Soviet economy is that it's in a condition that allows the NYT to ask what's wrong with the economy, expecting a two-word answer. The biggest mistake is to tackle the problem this way, asking what's wrong and trying to find just one recipe. The question should be more specific. ... We are talking about a complicated economic structure that is developing quickly and in the right direction." In other words, the complexity of the issues requires asking questions which do not perpetuate the simplification of the problems.

The tendency to trivialize the reform process disregards the complexities of issues of public importance and reduces a characterization of the Soviet people as "reformists" versus "conservatives." Hence it does not meet the criterion of complete information outlined above. As the analytical construction reveals, the groups labeled as party hardliners (Soyuz members, detractors to Mr. Gorbachev's right, the old Soviet bureaucrats) refer to "conservatives," whereas groups called party radicals (liberals, democrats, detractors to Mr. Gorbachev's left) refer to "reformers" in terms of their position about the reforms and change in the Soviet society. In between, as is emphasized above, there seems to have been few groups (a coalition of hardliners, insurgents) whose political agendas remained unclear because there were only a few quotations from the representatives of

these groups. In other words, the ideology of consensus – the assumption that everybody has an agreement on certain concepts – dominates the discourses on the Soviet Union projecting certain phrases on the Soviet society. Does everybody agree on the meaning of “conservatism?”

As S.F. Cohen argues, the rival forces of “innovation and tradition,” major concepts of the official press, have become “two poles” in interpreting the Soviet politics and society. The lack of historical dimension characterizes this treatment which is couched in a jargon-ridden or value-laden language. The “reformist” and “conservative” do not embrace the full diversity of political outlook, ranging from far left to far right in the Soviet society. These terms designate only mainstream, not extremist, attitudes toward the status quo and toward change. Even a spectrum of political outlook inside the Soviet Communist Party would require at least four categories: authentic democrats, reformers, conservatives, and neo-Stalinist reactionaries.⁷ But full-fledged democrats and neo-Stalinists may respectively share many reformist and conservative attitudes, the policies of either would mean radicalism in the Soviet context, not reform and conservatism. In the times of crisis, reformism and conservatism everywhere usually give rise to extremist trends and may even grow into their most extreme manifestations – revolution and counterrevolution. But reformers and conservatives represent the

⁷These categories derive from: R.A. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy* (New York, 1975), ch. 3.

majority of mainstream antagonists – the friends and foes of change – in the Soviet Union. In short, reformism and conservatism are the tendencies which take on certain characteristics in different countries because they are expressed in the different idioms of those political cultures. (Cohen, 1980).

The claims of the Soviet voices also include references about the Soviet state and polity. They especially concentrate on: democratization in the congress, the K.G.B. being a threat to democracy, the 'absolute evil' nature of Communism, corruption in the local affairs, M.S. Gorbachev's ruling by consensus, the quotes from the Party's platform, the necessity for more executive power, suspending the work of locally elected officials, the monopoly of central bureaucracy on power, immorality of political games, the possibility of dictatorship and so on.

Thus, the Soviet voices talking about the Soviet polity in general seem to have been quoted as ranging between the two ends of a spectrum, that is democratization and authoritarianism.

The NYT gives access to the high ranking officials and the groups of people organizing politically whom are acknowledged by some of the Soviet officials. The future of the Soviet polity are evaluated by the Soviet officials, which result in a domination of these discourses by the official Soviet language. The important point here is that the qualitative difference between the Soviet voices in terms of the chances of having access to the debate about, let's say, the future of the Soviet state perpetuate the presumed difference between the Soviet state and the Soviet society. One wonders if the NYT journalists had

asked the Soviet citizens, the media, the university professors questions to evaluate the Soviet state and institutions within the state. The lack of claims or comments of several different groups about the Soviet polity allows us to conclude that it is assumed that the "people" are not a group to reproduce ideas about the Soviet polity.

The issue of policy making is uttered through the debates about the political conflicts within the institutions (the K.G.B., the Government, the Politburo, the Party). The Party, the bureaucracy and the economic system which play the major roles in policy making (Lewin, 1991) and the representatives from these institutions are not given equal chances to assess the intricate the relationships between the Soviet polity and the economy in the NYT.

– *EXPERT VOICES*

At this point, the social points of view of the experts will be assessed. The so called experts in the NYT, unlike the US Administration officials, utter a wide variety of issues ranging from policy making to the impact of the reforms on the Soviet society. Their utterances are mostly based on their proposals to solve the "crisis" in the Soviet Union. In their discourse units, they base their assumptions on: destabilization, the probability of an upheaval and civil war, decentralization, the US foreign policy on the Soviet Union, the social and economic problems which stem from the reforms, and the necessity of market reforms and the economic aid. Their position, in short, focuses on the heavy emphasis on the market reforms, the

necessity of deregulation and the potential for a crisis in the Soviet Union. As the following analysis emphasizes, the expert claims about the reforms are far from representative of the totality of possible claims in a spectrum, because of the lack of points of view which might claim, for instance, that the Soviet Union ought to find its own way of reforming and restructuring. The expert claims are based on the assumption that the external forces such as the "West" have solutions ready at their disposal to propose the Soviet people. However, the implications of these policy options in terms of the interests of the classes in the Union are left unexplained and unanswered.

One may wonder whether an "alternative" mode of expertise interpretation would include themes other than the ones included in the NYT. The problem regarding how to interpret the complex web of events is that there is an American habit of interpreting the Soviet Union through the prism of American ideology – of finding there only what Americans seek, and seeking only what Americans find comforting (Cohen, 1992). As expert the claims about the Soviet Union reveal, the concepts such as "totalitarianism," "Communism," "free-market democracy," are used inadvertently and it is almost impossible to distinguish the difference between "black markets" and "free markets" due to the frequent and careless use of the words and the lack of context in the discourses of the expertise explanations.

iii) The Absence of Issues:

The last and the most significant step with respect to analyzing

the completeness of information is concerned with the ways in which the voices utter their claims. By doing this, one should be able to find out the issues omitted or disregarded in a discourse, especially the significant issues which ought to be included in a democratic discourse. The point here is to question whether the NYT attempts to articulate a spectrum of issues and voices whose chances of being heard are fair and equal, not only in terms of the number of times they're being heard, but also in terms of the context within which they are heard and the modes of expression by which they are heard.

-- *VOICES OF THE US ADMINISTRATION*

The solutions regarding the 'crisis' the Soviet Union is going through that the US Administration officials propose are the economic aid for 'real' market reforms. In order to understand the rationale of their claims about the reforms one ought to look at the specific modes of expressions used in specific contexts.

The Administration officials state that the country can be given a vibrant economy through the "right" market reforms (12 December, 1990), if the Soviets want to eliminate "the full-fledged political crisis" (October 18, 1990). Although the conservative Republicans are doubtful about the prospects for change, the Soviet Union must be "re-engaged in the world economy" (December 14, 1990). President Bush kept "all options" open. However, he reacted coolly to President Gorbachev's suggestion that the industrialized democracies should help the Soviet Union (May 14, 1991). In other words, the Administration discourse is a reflection of the vague US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

The solution is economic aid. However, the precondition, which is the real market reforms, must be implemented first⁸.

The US Administration acknowledges the efforts of the American economists, e.g., Harvard scholars, although “they may given the Soviets an exaggerated sense of what Washington is able and willing to do,” according to an Administration official (May 30, 1991).

In short, the US Administration discourses about the Soviet Union utter a foreign policy based on a conditional one. The Administration presumes that the US foreign policy ought to be and intrusive policy, because a political-economic-social system can be artificially and firmly implanted in a different system. The US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union lacks the discussion about the social and political consequences of such an implantation of the “real market reforms” which might bring about massive unemployment and hardship among the Soviet people. Such issues are among the few significant problems a the Government of a “pluralistic” might have included in its foreign policy as well as a massive humanitarian relief to citizens most likely to be imperiled by marketization – the very young and very old; a very large, long term credit program for the

⁸At this point, I want to note that the NYT published the same utterance from the Secretary of State J.A. Baker both on the 12/12/90 and on 5/30/91. This journalistic preference indicates that the level of the manipulation of the policy making by the NYT ideologically, because of the absence of some quotes other than the same one Mr. Baker did during the period of six months. Another example of the same pattern reveals itself in the same indirect quotation of the Mayor G.K. Popov of Moscow when he urged people to demonstrate to press for the resignation of the Prime Minister. The NYT published the same quote both on 9/4/90 and 9/16/90. The first news story was about the request of the Prime Minister about tight central management control, the other one covered the emergency economic plan. See the descriptive analysis.

Soviet Union to import essential goods and technology, and so on (Cohen, 1992).

-- *SOVIET VOICES*

In general, the directly and indirectly quoted Soviet voices are represented to have uttered different solutions to the economic and political implications of the reforms. However, the end result of their analysis can be argued to focus on the two major notions: democracy which is possible vis-a-vis market reforms supported by the 'reformers' and fascism which is the ultimate possibility in the absence of the market reforms. How do they reach such conclusions? The following analysis attempts to answer this question in light of the portrayal of voices as 'reformers' and 'conservatives' as the major conflicting groups vis-à-vis the selection and the usage of the utterances.

The Soviet officials who support openness express their claims on the issue in different ways, for instance, the K.G.B. chief promises for more information about the major operations (May 7, 1989), M.S. Gorbachev reassures the Estonian deputies about the independency (June 2, 1989), and so on. The perception about the reforms differ among the Soviet voices, however. The miners are argued to have been "taking things into their hands," (July 24, 1989) because of the loss of faith in the possibility of change. While the Soviet citizens are quoted as uttering critical opinions about the reforms which brought about empty shelves, the solutions the Soviet officials offer vary. According to the officials ("reform" economists), for example, the

major successful economic innovations of M.S. Gorbachev are the legalizing cooperatives, small group businesses that are as close as the society has yet come to private enterprise (May 13, 1990). Although there are some officials quoted as criticizing the system (March 15, 1990), the conflict here is constructed as one between the Soviet citizens and the Soviet officials. For example when the Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov urges that the President sign an emergency order, the Mayor of Moscow urges people to take the streets to press for the Prime Minister's resignation. A great majority of the Soviet voices other than the Soviet officials are portrayed as being critical of the reforms.

The solutions about the problems which have been argued to be consequences of the Soviet reforms vary between the optimists and skeptics. While the former views the present course as a necessary consolidation of stability, the latter is concerned that the Government wants to back away from the structural transformation, that is required to decentralize decision-making and the allocation of capital. Skeptics argue that the system must be further freed to stimulate the production of consumer goods (August 4, 1989).

The skeptics' views are reflected by the utterances of the Soviet citizens. As a reflection of the idea of the representative democracy, the NYT asks questions to the Soviet citizens who do not have any outlet in the political system. The NYT, in that sense, is assumed to be serving an important role by giving these citizens access to a major newspaper of the US. This is a part of the trend to quote individuals,

not individuals within groups whose interviews could have been done during meetings. Although there are few attempts to indirectly refer to people who "have shown readiness to join in loosely knit coalitions or movements" (July 7, 1991), identifying these movements is totally absent in the NYT discourses. The reforms are seen as the major cause of many social, political and economical problems by the Soviet citizens who are quoted individually. The lack of the tradition of democracy (February 19, 1990) is one cause of these problems. The Soviet citizens who invest in businesses, on the other hand, see the problem as of the central Government which does not allow for freer market reforms (March 5, 1991). Others see the following themes as possible solutions to the wide variety of social and economic problems: privatization, the need to work harder, the need to consolidate the forces, an anti-crisis program, the "democrats," political solutions, freedom of enterprise, new legislations on private property (July 11, 1991), the need to eliminate the Party (April 21-22, 1989), new ideas for change (June 11, 1989).

One of the issues on which major debates are quoted as uttered in the Soviet Parliament is the economic plans offered by the different politicians. The 500-day economic plan which was developed by the economic advisers of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin propose slashing budgets for foreign aid, the military and the K.G.B., selling state property, and so on. The Prime Minister rejects the plan insisting that the country is too enfeebled to risk enacting the more radical free-market economic plans. The critique of the Prime Minister is situated

as the Mayor of Moscow who claims that the central Government is the major cause of the shrinking consumer supplies and a collapsing ruble (September 16, 1990). The conflict here is constructed as one between free market reformers and proponents of the central Government. In another article, the conflicting relations are constructed between M.S. Gorbachev and regulated market, since he argued about dropping the word "regulated" (October 17, 1990). The forces which support the 500-day plan support preserving the right of Soviet republics to work out the details; while the opponents of the plan (e.g., B.N. Yeltsin) criticize the autocracy of the central Government, its power to control banks, the army and the police (October 19, 1990). The array and the selection of the quotations are constructed as though the mere social forces in the Soviet Union are the "reformers" or the proponents of the free market reforms and the members of the Government who wish to preserve the central Government's control on major institutions.

These conflicts are at the same time intertwined with the political conflicts in the Soviet political sphere. The utterances of the Soviet voices tell us that while the reformers wish to end the monopoly of the Communist Party over the polity, the conservatives resist change. The voices which utter political comments as part of the solutions as policy making for the ongoing problems of the Soviet society range from those who accuse the Soviet Government of starting the Cold War (June 21, 1989), giving the Soviet republics more

freedoms (July 2, 1989), selecting between the democratic methods of M.S. Gorbachev and the old methods of the 1950's (September 22, 1989), unnecessary for a dictatorship or the power of a management bureaucracy (February 19, 1990), the need to use for a Communist administration (May 14, 1990), the necessity for using more executive power (September 25, 1990), more freedom for privatization (February 3, 1991), the need to create an infrastructure (May 14, 1990) and so on. These themes used by the Soviet voices, especially during the debates in the Parliament, indicate that the conflict is between the Soviet President, the central Government which resist the change and keep the Union together and the social forces who advocate for more openness and change, and who advocate giving independence to the Soviet republics.

It can be argued that the voices of the Soviet media represent different social forces in their utterances. They construct the problems as between bread and order or freedom and democracy; and solutions as strong rule (February 3, 1991). The absence of the a wide variety of voices from the Soviet media does not enable one to make assessments about the attitudes about the Soviet reforms among the Soviet journalists. Again the assumption about a totalitarian state with repressive institutions does not allow the NYT journalists to investigate whether the Izvestia or Pravda publish articles on the Soviet reforms which might indicate an ideological diversity on the social causes and solutions regarding the social problems of the Soviet

society. Although the NYT gives access to journalists such as the editor of a neo-conservative journal, members of *Izvestia*, the editor of *Argumenty i Fakty*, these voices are heard in the context of articles which simply interpret the Soviet reforms as good or bad social events. Although the NYT is a newspaper which tends to publish documents and excerpts of officials as it did in the case of the speeches made by the Soviet President, it neglects publishing, for instance, a translated article of a Soviet journalist.

The major Soviet dissident, A. Solzhenitsyn criticizes the reforms (October 17, 1990). He argues that perestroika has not even touched industry nor agriculture. Although the NYT does not quote very often the claims of the dissidents (only 1.2 % of all directly quoted utterances belong to dissidents), the claims of Mr. Solzhenitsyn are printed in the context of criticizing the Soviet reforms to enforce the critique of the Soviet reforms. If one attempts to conceptualize an ideological spectrum which cover the most proponent dissidents, it would be the one which include R. Medvedev, historian and sociologist, on the left who support the idea of "socialism with a human face," A. Sakharov, physicist and human rights activist, in the middle, who is known as defending democratization and human rights with an appeal to the Western liberalism, and on the right, the most well-known Russian dissident in the West, A. Solzhenitsyn who speaks for a traditional Russian culture and religion (Daniels, 1988). These three tendencies of dissent in the Soviet Union, except for Solzhenitsyn, are not given equal chance to be heard so as to provide a

thorough idea of what the dissidents claim about the Soviet reforms.

Therefore, the reformers and conservatives characterize the solutions to the 'crisis' the Soviet Union differently in the NYT discourses. The proponents of the reforms base their arguments on the creation of a market economy, privatization, destatization and political decentralization. These selected arguments do not allow for questioning the possibility of other social forces, ideologies, traditions which might have a role in the evolution of the Soviet society, because in the case of not implementing the reforms the country would find itself in a colossal 'crisis.' This crisis is identified with the "hardliners" and the Party. The "hardliners" argue that the major cause of the social problems is M.S. Gorbachev's reforms. The conflict here is constructed as between the hardliners and the Soviet president. The end result of the selection of these quotations is the conflict between the Party and the reforms.

The arguments about the free market reforms are always followed by anarchy, crisis, or civil war, which brings a closure to the discussion itself due to the lack of examination about the whole spectrum of Soviet voices and the tendency to see the Soviet society form a black-and-white world view, their ideological orientations about the "free-market reforms" which became a euphemism in the NYT discourses. As the analysis of the expert arguments show, the free market reforms is a conception that can be molded, utilized in different contexts as the key to a wide variety of social problems the Soviet people

experience. The Soviet voices who might have uttered opinions about the consequences of these free-market reforms are not given access to the discussion about the Soviet reforms in the NYT. The free-market reforms, however, is a notion used by the 'experts,' as is analyzed in the following assessment.

– *EXPERT VOICES*

The expert voices that are quoted in the NYT suggest various solutions in terms of the Soviet reforms, the policy making vis-a-vis their comments about the bureaucracy, the Communist Party, and economic problems. The polity and economy, in other words, are the main areas on which they offer their opinions about the crisis the Soviet Union is assumed to be going through as well as the social problems caused by the reforms.

The main argument the experts in general emphasize is that the free-market reforms must be implemented, otherwise the hardliners, the military, conservatives might takeover which would lead to upheaval and chaos (April 2, 1989; June 21 1989; April 29, 1990). Accordingly, a large majority of expert voices support the Soviet reforms, while others doubt its success, because of a strong possibility of a military intervention by the hardliners.

Perestroika In Question

Perestroika is a theme which is related to decentralization (May 25, 1989), unrealistic expectations of the American investors about the joint-ventures (June 11, 1989); "old boy" network of officials who

undermine the reforms (May 26, 1990), especially efforts to reduce Government subsidy of enterprises (July 8, 1990). Perestroika is seen as a barrier to more careful reforms in Poland and Yugoslavia (July 27, 1990). Restructuring, the literal translation of perestroika, which refers to the de-Stalinization of the Soviet language in the "official" Soviet language basically is a conception of polity. However, in the NYT expert claims as well as in the journalistic interpretations, it is discussed within the framework of the free market reforms and the ways in which these reforms could be implemented in an economy which is going through a significant transformation. The expert claims tend to relate perestroika to the reduction of the Government subsidies which would make a complete transformation into the market reforms possible. This leads to the domination of juxtaposing the concepts of "free-market reforms" and "regulation" in the expert discourses, as their argumentations on other themes reveal as well.

The expert discourses the NYT quoted lack a thorough understanding of the Soviet reforms because of simplifications which do not allow a debate about crucial issues such as predicting the future Soviet order, even *à la russe*: a Western style democracy? a Western-style economy *and* a Western-style polity? The questions as such could create all types of various arguments, which is not the case in the expert claims. In other words, an adequate interpretation of the Soviet reforms is expected to cover possible social, economic and political outcomes resulting from a restructuring movement of such magnitude

by the “experts” representing a wide ideological spectrum. Having this ‘expectation’ of a wide variety of voices concerning the NYT expert discourses on the Soviet Union, one may conclude that the experts would not utter arguments and solutions that are not dominated by binary oppositions or simplified juxtapositions such as free market vs. regulation, M.S. Gorbachev vs. B.N. Yeltsin, reformers vs. conservatives, and so on. To what extent the NYT goes beyond articulating an inclusive attitude about all types of argumentations?

One of the main characteristics of the expert claims is that they base their assumption on the idea of an immobile society in which the social transformations is impossible. For example, a group of experts express their opinions about the reforms concluding that the reform efforts of the Soviet president will not lead to a substantial change. Another group of experts advocate speeding up the market reforms to eliminate the economic crisis. It is argued that the reforms are half-hearted, and the entrepreneurs must be given the full authority, prices must not be fixed (March 15, 1990) when almost 50 million people get less than 70 rubles a month (May 26, 1990). In order to apply “market orientation,” it is argued, “negative forces” must be controlled (March 15, 1990), democratization must be implemented (May 26, 1991), the “regulated economy” must be freed, because it does not bring about any economic gain. Also a decentralized system of incentives, markets to generate signals of costs and value must be created (May 26, 1990), a Western-style monetary control must be implemented (October 21, 1990), the central bank must be decentralized because the command-

economy structure which subsidizes the losses of the large state-owned enterprises is a barrier for the reform (January 20, 1991). Or, some argue, the Union is on the verge of a civil war. The situation is in the same position as they were just before the Bolshevik revolution (January 20, 1991), no solution seems possible. There are few expert voices who emphasize the necessity of forming an infrastructure "to protect those hurt by loss of jobs and loss of income" as a result of a change toward a market economy (March 15, 1990).

These suggestions rely on the idea that the command economy and planning do not work and there ought to be a "market." One may even argue that any interpretation on such colossal transformation to open the Soviet society would naturally include the role of the free-markets as well. However, this is not what this analysis reveals. Rather the discourses of the experts, whose claims cannot be separated from the interests of the institutions they represent, tend to carry an "ideological colouring: the market equals capitalism and it works; the plan equals socialism and it does not work" (Ali, 1988: 71). This argument about the identification of market with capitalism not only dominates the interpretive discourses on the Soviet Union, it also implies preferences given by the experts about the way in which a capitalist economy must be freed from 'regulation' due to the assumption about a 'perfect market' and 'perfect planning.' The applicability of these abstract concepts in today's world, let alone the Soviet Union, is totally left unexamined in the expert claims. The neo-

liberal and neo-conservative claims, as is examined below, attempt to compare a non-existent perfect market with the actually existing Soviet planning mechanism. What is also missing from the so called expert claims is a thorough analysis of the disadvantages and advantages of the 'free-market' and 'planning' and the democratic and undemocratic practices of corporatism as well as statism as two major ideologies.

Economic Plans

The main focus of the experts is the economic plans developed by different groups in the parliament. There is not a consensus on the possibility of the success of the plans among the experts. However, the accepted common denominator is the "free-market reforms," which would accelerate the process of integrating the Soviets into "the world's free-market economy" (December 14, 1990).

M.S. Gorbachev's economic plans, according to these experts, will not be successful because of the failure in the Soviet economy and revolution in the republics (October 21, 1990). In the absence of the failure of the economy and the representation of the republican governments, it is concluded, free markets, private property and fiscal federalism would have been possible without specifying what these failures are.

It is implied that the "real problem" is a political one and there must be a political solution. The 500-day plan embraced by B.N. Yeltsin is a bolder one, "it is more in tune with the anti-establishment mood of this fractured nation" and "what is needed is a deal between the two

leaders.” The expert opinions construct the leadership conflict between M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin as a rivalry. The economic plan of B.N. Yeltsin, it is argued, must be supported, because “he supports the Baltics, he has cards to play,” because the Soviet president is “making liberalization harder” (January 20, 1991). Or, making V.S. Pavlov the Prime Minister is seen as a “good sign for business,” because he is a “trained financial person, knows Western markets and is a proponent of the market system” (January 20, 1991). The emphasis on the leadership rather than social forces, economic conflicts between classes and groups leads to the creating celebrities as leaders in these discourses. The real reformer, accordingly, is B.N. Yeltsin who knows liberalization better.

These and similar arguments make the debate about the reforms and free markets incomplete because of the lack of examination of what these economic plans require implementing in terms of policy making. The expert claims attempt to resolve the economic issues which have their own dynamic and nature shaped by social forces by using a terminology developed as a result of problems of American society. Here we question to what extent it is feasible to apply the markets vs. planning duality into the Soviet context, because this duality is a actually problem about the fiscal crisis of the state in American context. The experts analyze the Soviet command-economy and the economic problems caused by this economic order as though the Soviets also experience the same type of economic impasse to resolve the fiscal crisis of the state, that is, the tendency for government

expenditures to outrace revenues.

These expert voices result from the same argument which theorizes and questions the problem of the volume and composition of government expenditures in the US. The same group of experts, whose roles in terms of constructing knowledge could be studied more systematically in another study, would utter the argument about the government expenditures as determined by the laws of the market. The so called experts single out reformers and conservatives as the major conflict among the groups in the Soviet Union. The single theme, market, spelled out as 'the' solution to the complex economic problems in the Soviet society, should be taken into account as a theme to be analyzed within which the laws of market are seen as reflections of social and economic conflicts between classes and groups.

Polity

The expert claims on the political issues are closely related on their standpoint on the economic problems. They stress the necessity of implementing reforms, because of the threat of dictatorship is real. The complexity of the problem is acknowledged by some of them, by concluding that "our response needs to be comprehensive. The fundamental issue has been, and still is, freedom of choice vs. coercive ideological orthodoxy" (April 2, 1989). As a result of the presumed conflict between reformers and conservatives, the problem, so argued, will not be solved unless the Communist monopoly on power is removed (May 26, 1991). The arguments concerned with the polity

result from the constructed, but not examined, opposition between the markets and the central planning.

The debate, political discussion, and making concessions, and so on, are seen as unhealthy or wasting time by the expertise knowledge and usually escorted by a mockery about the internal affairs: "The Russians really bash each other around in their internal debates. But then they seem to kiss and make up and go about their business. .. You are not sure how [the invention of pluralism] is going to come out" (April 17, 1989). The assumption is here of a society which resists change with an immobile "system" and "secretive" institutions. Parliamentary debates, which are the core of the "democratic order," are interpreted as "bashing," or "kiss and make up" in the Russian context and its institutions.

Moreover, these institutions are used as the major cause of the social and economic problems in the expert argumentations. The vice president of industrial affairs for the Pan Am Corporation relates the economic problems Aeroflot is experiencing to secrecy (September 5, 1989); while an expert on conventional forces who works for a consulting company attaches the problem to the ambiguity of the future Soviet society to the "traditional mania for secrecy" (August 28, 1989). These claims, let alone reflecting a thorough analysis about the concept of information or conventional forces, are mere reflections of the Cold War rhetoric which is based on Us vs. Them opposition.

Leaderology

The leaderology, the tendency to overemphasize the role of the leaders, plays a significant role in interpreting the Soviet affairs among the experts. On the other hand, according to an expert of the Brookings Institution, Mr. Gorbachev made "the Soviet economy safe for bureaucrats" (February 20, 1991). In short, M.S. Gorbachev is associated with the conservatives, the military and the K.G.B., the dictator which leads to an argument that the reforms will not be successful under his "rule."

Apart from the rivalry between the Soviet president and the Russian president, the polity is analyzed in terms of the personal preferences, moods, attitudes of the Soviet leaders. For example, M.S. Gorbachev, in his approach to Chinese-Soviet relations is interpreted as acting like a "time-tested Machiavelli" (June 13, 1989). Or, one of the economic plans developed by the Soviet president is a Machiavellian maneuver (May 26, 1990), according to another expertise interpretation. One expert uses the Moses metaphor (January 20, 1991) claiming that the Soviet president is not able to lead the Soviet people into the promised land. Amazingly, there is also a blatant discussion among the experts about the similarities between the Soviet president and A. Pinochet, the Chilean dictator with a conclusion about the successes of A. Pinochet in making the Chilean economy safe for capitalists. It seems like a capitalist ruler, who is famous because of his crimes for violating human rights more than his 'capitalist' successes, is valued more than a statesman who tried to carry out a full-scale political, social, and economic reformation in one of the world's largest, most

authoritarian, most conservative countries.

Economic Aid

Western economic aid is an inevitable key to the success of the market reforms, according to the majority of the experts. However, there is a group among them who claim that the Soviet president should not take for granted the economic aid (March 15, 1990), because it may be used as an excuse to postpone the economic change (December 14, 1990), or it would be "like throwing cash down a bottomless well: the old nomenklatura is still clogging the wheels of reform" (May 26, 1991). After all, it is argued, the credits would provide a temporary solution to the need for foreign purchases. The choices of the Soviets will not depend on the aid. "[The] West cannot sit on the sidelines if it's interested in genuine reforms" (April 18, 1991). The amount of aid discussed on one occasion in the NYT, when the former dean of the J.F.K School of Government at Harvard University said that the aid, which should be a 'Marshall Plan Scale aid,' may range from 15\$ to 30\$ billion a year for several years. He said that the aid would be "grand bargain" (May 21, 1991). However, the discussion did not include the feasibility of the aid in terms of the problems of American economy.

The issue of the Western aid is discussed by the experts without examining the policy implications of the financial aid. The expert arguments about the financial aid are either debated within the framework of American politics, by concluding that the aid would be a

“waste,” or it remains as part of the discourse which does not take a wide variety of possibilities into account regarding the financial aid.

II. ADEQUACY OF INTERPRETATION:

At this point of the critical analysis the claims and the argumentations of the journalists writing on the selected issues will be examined from the adequacy of information point of view. In this analysis, three major points, which are closely interrelated, will be deciphered: the ways in which journalists attempt to raise issues of public importance, the solution they imply in covering social problems, and the implications of the whole coverage in terms of the American polity and society. These interpretive dimensions in the discourses of journalists will shed light on how adequate the interpretative discourses are in the NYT.

Glasnost and Perestroika

The journalists' comments to describe the news stories, events, the conclusion and other components of a language used in the case of the Soviet reforms generally refer to Glasnost and Perestroika without differentiating the difference between the two. Glasnost means openness , while Perestroika is labeled as restructuring in the journalistic jargon. The key component of Glasnost, that is, greater freedom to make suggestions in the policy process (Hough, 1988) seems to be ignored in the news stories by the journalists who do seem to have acknowledged the openness in various areas of the Soviet life in various news articles. For example, the official publication of the

speech of N. Khrushchev is seen as a step in Gorbachev's campaign to galvanize the public toward political and economic change (April 6, 1989); the public awareness about the management of the space program is described within the context of a the new policy of increased openness (April 17, 1989); the normalization of the relationships with China is attached to "opening" (May 21, 1989); democratization is interpreted as an instrument to be used cautiously (February 3, 1991) and so on. Nevertheless, such acknowledgements are loaded with a dubious attitude of the Cold War and the Evil Empire rhetoric. The Soviet athletes who participate in sports activities in the US are seen as a "friendly invasion" as a result of an "expansion" of the Soviets (April 30, 1989); it is argued that the Soviet society resembles "the bad old days more than the promised good new times (April 8, 1990); the discussion about openness in international politics ends with a remark suggesting that the "old slogans are dangerously confusing" (May 21, 1989); M.S. Gorbachev's remarks about an editor of a paper is characterized as "purging" (October 23, 1989); perestroika is described as the cause of the economic decline (February 19, 1990) in this "bedraggled giant" (May 26, 1991); it is identified with communism (February 9, 1990); the Soviet officialdom is described as a "collection of mean individuals" (April 8, 1990) and so on. Or, glasnost does not go beyond a trivial portraiture: it is translated into the children of Soviet diplomats biting their first hamburgers (December 24, 1989). In other words, although the journalistic interpretations do include the openness and its impact on

some areas of social life, the end result of the argumentations is suspicion and closure of the discussion by inadvertent conclusions. As Cohen (1991) notes, the main impact of glasnost and perestroika and the leadership of Gorbachev has been to confuse and disorient the American mass media because of the break of stereotypes. This leads to a confusion about how to assess what is happening in the Soviet Union.

An American Prism

As the following analysis has shown, on the one hand the ambiguous concepts used to describe the news stories; on the other hand, Soviet reforms are judged by only the standard of a totally free market. The social change in every society would encompass a wide variety of people, social classes and groups. Yet the journalists' interpretations dismiss the ways in which the reforms might influence such groups. The tendency of interpreting these events by using an American prism continues to resurface in the journalistic interpretations as well. For instance, the issue of the management of the space program, it is argued, "asks for a decrease in the amount of spending" (April 17, 1989). It is questionable to use the discourse of "tax and spending," which is a reflection of US space program which is largely financed by the government, in interpreting a program financed by the state as a matter of "spending" largely because the concept itself is a result of the simplistic assumption that the government budget should be increased or lowered to compensate for reduced or increased private spending. In other words, "spending" can be basically used in

describing an economy where a fully developed private economy and its institutions are transparent.

Evaluating the Soviet reforms from an American prism with an overemphasis on free-market reforms is accompanied by a tendency to raise issues which are worthy to investigate in terms of the social and ideological significance of these issues for the Soviet people. For example, in the article covering the Soviet citizens desperate for state housing, it is argued that they start "taking the solution into their own hands" by seizing Government land and creating vast new urban squatter settlements (November 18, 1989). The article criticizes the policies of officials which do not respond to the new demands for housing which is one of the government programs the NYT keep portraying as the real reason behind social problems. As a matter of fact, "taking into their hands" is a phrase which implies government vs. people juxtaposition, which reinforces the politically dubious characterization of perestroika as well as the idea of a Soviet society whereby the only significant conflict is the one between repressive state and restive people. Moreover, such a characterization between the centralized state and people implies the liberal idea of individuality freed from external constraints one of which is the state. Anti-statism as a hegemonic theme, one of the bases of American 'individualism' at his point, is regarded as a source of economic strength.

US Solutions to Soviet Problems

The representation of the reforms in journalistic discourses

point out various issues with respect to economic, social, and political problems of the Soviet Union. The characterization of the economic affairs rely on a significant precondition in the journalists' writings: the democracy and capitalism linkage. Democratization and destatization are accepted as the two prerequisites of the transformation to capitalist order. General concepts as such are treated without specifying the required procedures to implement them. For example, it is claimed that to overhaul the monetary system and to strengthen the purchasing power of the ruble is a difficult task, because the fundamental cause of the collapsing economy is hidden inflation, with enormous budget deficits and price controls distorting resource use forcing goods into black markets (February 9, 1990) which are also acknowledged by the Soviet politicians; or the problems result from the plans of economic managers (October 22, 1990), the contents of which is unexplained. In order to implement the free-market reforms, it is argued, various obstacles must be eliminated: primitive infrastructure, corruption, foreign debt, a non-convertible currency, the absence of legal structure, political instability, underdeveloped banking, a massive military-industrial complex, distrusting business, and so on (May 26, 1991). The key is the experience of free enterprise (July 14, 1991), it is concluded. These and similar claims about implementing the market reforms boil down to the idea of completely negating the role of state in the economic sphere. As the analysis on policy making shows, constructing a relationship between economic problems, solutions, and

'statism' and regulation leads to an incoherent argumentations about the Soviet economy. This conclusion is drawn on the feasibility of privatization, legalization, and democratization which are among the main components of the Soviet reforms (Cohen, 1989). The journalistic assumptions as such do not enable the reader to 'judge,' for instance, to what extent M.S. Gorbachev's program about economic marketization would lead to competition between state enterprises.

One of the important characterizations of the economic scene is the constant emphasis on empty shelves in stores, as narrated by many Soviet citizens. The reason for this, according to indirectly quoted "friends" is that nobody sees much point in working hard anymore (February 19, 1990; September 16, 1990; May 26, 1991; July 9, 1991). This constitutes a 'distortion,' as well as a method to influence the perceptions of audiences about the Soviet Union. As Moshe Lewin clearly notes, there is a common tendency followed by the Western media regarding overemphasizing the social calamities of the Soviet society:

the Soviets are a people genuinely overwhelmed, and strained, by the unprecedented novelty of daily events. Their initial euphoria and exhilaration have been dampened by revelations of their country's long-hidden problems and ailments. ... [The second source of distortion arises from] Western media coverage which overdramatizes each novelty. Soon, people inside and outside the USSR will take it for granted that ... each month may bring news of protests, strikes, and demonstrations, of organized crime, ethnic violence .. and other ugly bigotries. By treating such incidents as enormous calamities, the Western media interfere with their audiences realistic perception of both the real problems facing the USSR and the

ongoing activities of healthy forces for change and remediation (Lewin,1991: 170-171).

The role of the NYT in this context, as the data reveal, cannot be ignored due to the repetitive usage of comments about crisis and chaos in covering the reforms. The reforms are narrated through a picture whose major actors are dissatisfied and confused citizens 'afraid of capitalism,' a repressive state and leadership which is not willing to make concessions for the free market reforms, and a decisive crew of Harvard economists whose agenda does not go beyond injecting a conservative 'free market' into a society, in which the historical and social evolution of institutions are quite different than those of the 'West'⁹. Within this complex picture, the position journalists find themselves in is perpetuating the old American media habit: "when in doubt, always assume that the Soviet Union is wrong" (Cohen, 1984), despite the tremendous changes brought by the reforms. Given the general picture drawn here, the journalistic interpretations of the reforms also include a series of opinions as suggestions to resolve the 'chaos' the Soviet society is exposed to.

For example, there is a heavy concentration of various themes: selling state property into private hands, lifting Government price controls, and handing over economic decisions to the governments of fifteen republics. They become the focus of the analysis by which

⁹As of March 1992, 95 % of the economy remained in the hands of the state in Russia. The old authorities are still largely in place, having fled from the party to other power structures. These movements and the newly emerging 'entrepreneurs' are left unexamined. See: S.F. Cohen, "What's Really Happening in Russia?", *The Nation*, March 2, 1992.

journalists construct a group of suggestions the most significant of which is based on the critique of the state-run economy. Almost every economic phenomenon is explained in terms of the problems created by the state-run industries, the lack of sufficient liberalization which would create the lack of a system of "motivations and interests" (February 3, 1991).

The journalists also make claims about the Soviet solutions to the economic problems such its economic programs. The characterization of the economic programs resembles the command-economy vs. free-market trivialization. For example, the economic program prepared by the prime minister is a "gradualist" program and the economic program developed by a panel of economists is a "radical" plan (October 17, 1990); M.S. Gorbachev's plan is "vague about the economic powers of republics and local governments," while B.N. Yeltsin claims that the republics dominate economic decision-making; Mr. Gorbachev prefers to lead from the middle because of the clubby, consensus-oriented world of the Communist Party (October 18, 1990) according to the terminology of the journalists. The journalists tend not to give clear-cut analysis on the specific contents and requirements of the economic programs; after all, the reforms are "backfiring," and creating a situation of anarchy (October 22, 1990), that is, there is no need to explain the chaos and ongoing possibility of civil war.

As is claimed in one of the news articles, "the epic process launched by Mr. Gorbachev went from giddy euphoria to dark gloom"

(May 26, 1991). This gloomy characterization of the Soviet society is reinforced by the notions of crisis, empty shelves, the lack of consumer supplies, grim future, the possibility of a dictatorship of a Chilean kind, and so on. Interestingly, the journalist attitudes about the Soviet reforms characterized by the critique of regulation, command-economy, and statism is contradictory with such claims as "the economy can be saved only by top-down change" (February 20, 1991) and the democracy & capitalism couple. The NYT seems to have been fascinated by the Chilean dictator to a such extent that someone in uniform, it is claimed, could institute a "market economy" (February 3, 1991). This preference about the Chilean dictator is also made by certain ideologues like J. Kirkpatrick, who is also one of the spokespersons of the Cold War. There are two critical points: First is the image of an inferior Soviet society. "They" are used to dictators. Or, "They" can be only cured by a Latin American dictator. These ideas are embedded in the ideology of the Cold War and applied here for interpreting the Soviet reforms. Second, the journalistic mentality which dominates here is not an effort "to teach them" democracy, rather it is an intrusive attitude which is a result of a confusing capitalism with so called "aggression." In short, between these two poles, democracy and dictatorship, the discussion about a wide range of possibilities about "a large spectrum of authoritarian outcomes" (Cohen, 1992: 264) specific to the Soviets is simply ignored.

The tendency to simplify issues also dominates the issue of economic aid. Western aid is argued to be a political game of M.S.

Gorbachev (December 14, 1990); along with the economic plans developed with the help of a group of economists from the Harvard University. There is no reference about what specific plans and procedures are developed to help certain sectors and social classes in the Soviet economy. Moreover, less mentioned are the implications of these free market reform plans for the Soviet class structure which is a 'no-no' of American journalism. Instead, the unquestioned approval of the economic plans drafted by the US economists is portrayed as a significant program "in the transition to a real democracy and free market" (May 26, 1991). The free markets and black markets are inadvertently juxtaposed in the discourses. People, it is argued, are used to the security of the system and "free market" means black marketeers, unemployment, exploitation and worse (July 11, 1991). Or, it is emphasized, people are afraid of capitalism (August 16, 1991) which is traditional and portrayed as a barrier for restructuring. Less frequently mentioned are the impact of the transformation into the market reforms on workers, students, government employees, retired people; and a possibility of a Western private capital to stabilize the economic 'crisis.'

In sum, the journalists' discourses about the Soviet reforms are based on an emphasis on the constructed opposition between *free market reforms vs. de-statization and de-regulation*. This characterization is followed by the absence of discussions or interpretations about the social and economic scene of the Soviet

society. For example, it is concluded that, according to interviews conducted with [indirectly quoted] Muscovites, the Soviet people do not accept a "third way" (July 11, 1991), which is an indication of not attempting to quote debates or discussions about a "third" or "fourth" way concerning the future Soviet society. Discussing or referring to these "other" ways as alternative 'models' for the Soviet economy are absent from the discourses. For instance, M. Drach notes the view that there are three possible 'models' for reform of the Soviet economy, in other words, three possible outcomes for perestroika: a decentralized model à la Hungary; a dual model, which juxtaposes a rationalized state sector and a limited private sector, à la East Germany; a coercive model, à la Czechoslovakia (Mandel, 1989). None of these possibilities is included in the NYT.

Also, the discussions end with a summary of social and economic problems in many articles which does not allow for a delineation of the way the Soviet people live, their perceptions about the Soviet reforms, their daily struggles except their comments about the empty shelves in stores the implications of which are analyzed above. American pluralism does not exist in these journalistic discourses about Soviet society.

The Soviet State

The journalists' claims about the Soviet state can be understood via the attitudes about institutions, the portrayal of the ways in which these institutions operate, the impact of the Soviet reforms on these

institutions, and other important issues regarding the Soviet polity. Such analysis would help us to understand whether the journalists prefer to offer a series of arguments by which the reader could have a chance to have access to a 'pluralist' approach or various interpretations about the Soviet society. The point is not about questioning whether the Soviet polity is a pluralist one, rather the issue here is the willingness of the NYT to cover the Soviet affairs by giving the participants fair and equal chances which goes beyond a simplistic approach based on developing corporatist solutions for a statist society.

As a follow up of the interpretations on the Soviet reforms, the transformation of the Soviet polity is interpreted in terms of the "transition of the Soviet state from a Communist to a market economy" (October 19, 1990). The major cause of political problems, along with the economic consequences, is the Soviet state, especially the role of the Government in economic affairs. According to the news articles: the state assumes the single wholesaler (October 22, 1990); the Government control dominates the economy (July 14, 1991); the state tightens its control in bureaucracy (June 20, 1991); a centralized economic system serves to redistribute scarcity; nomenklatura runs all industry; the Communist gentry dominates the economy, the army, and the state police (February 3, 1991); Kremlin's only currency in international commerce is balkanizing the economy and depriving Moscow of the fuel and gold (February 20, 1991); state bureaucrats still

set prices and quotas for state-owned enterprises (July 14, 1991); Russia is a totalitarian monster (April 23, 1989) and so on and so forth. Such a representation results from the concept of totalitarian state, which has been used Sovietologists, journalists and others writing about the Soviet Union. Before we examine the concept of totalitarianism as the only filter by which the Soviet affairs are assessed, let's look at other dimensions of the Soviet state which are referred to in the news articles by the journalists.

The claims about the Soviet state acknowledge the openness in the institutions such as K.G.B. (May 7, 1989). However, the arguments tend to end with suspicious and negative conclusions about these institutions. In the example of the K.G.B., for instance, it is added that although the K.G.B. is theoretically accountable to the Council of Ministers, in practice it has been an independent entity (June 2, 1989) without referring to the specific activities of this institution constitute "practice." A summary of these activities would help the reader to contextualize them as an independent agency of the state. This attitude is partially related to the attempt or habit to understand the Soviet society at this specific current moment by referring to past events that took place in the history of the Soviet Union. Similar to the tendency to identify the Soviet affairs with the Communist Party, this tendency, too, stems from the habit of describing the Soviet polity in terms of elite-mass relations, which would lead to dubious representations in covering any society. As the following discourse units reveal, the journalistic interpretations are based on a proclivity to talk about the

party, the system, and the ideology when it comes to covering the Soviet affairs.

The NYT does acknowledge the transformation of the polity by a coverage of: "newly emerging political factions" (September 25, 1990) by excluding a note on what the ideological and political agendas of these factions might be. Instead, such characterizations, as is pointed out on the issue of using general labels (liberals, reformers, etc.), enables the reader to mold the meaning of the labels or persons and events they symbolize.

The issue of democracy is a concept which is another dimension of the discourses on the Soviet polity especially in terms of questioning perestroika and its consequences in political arena. The attempts to interpret the reforms in terms of democracy is coloured by the concept of totalitarianism in such a way that the very structure of the new Soviet democracy, it is argued, "is self-defeating." The organizations at local levels, "the federate legislature, neighborhood councils" are all accepted as "amateur parliaments" by arguing that members of these organizations at different levels are "unwilling to delegate the decision to executive bodies" (February 3, 1991). The negative descriptions continue in other news stories. In a coverage about the Soviet Writers' Union, it is claimed, that the Writers Union is, according to a journalist, an "odd institution," and the members of this organization "tell us great about organizational and political struggles within the union that has 'represented' Soviet writers for over 50 years..." (March

18, 1990). The quoted word, represented, questions the representation issue. The same pattern of sarcasm and dubiousness accompanies this argument about the Writers' Union. In sum, the word 'democracy' is deployed regularly, but never in a positive way in the journalistic discourses.

Additionally, it is argued that "the ideology of collectivism has not been supplanted by any compelling new sense of purpose. ... a totalitarian system has been disavowed, but democracy and the rule of law have not yet succeeded in replacing it." The critique of totalitarianism as such is not followed by a systematic analysis of the deficiencies of the 'system,' so to speak, or social, historical and political causes behind this impasse in terms of democracy. Instead, as the following sentence shows the argument is based on a series of arbitrary clichés about the Soviet society: "It is tempting to blame the society itself for failing to make the most of its opportunity, for being lazy, too ignorant, too envious, too dependent, too impatient, too set in its ways" (February 3, 1991). It can be concluded here that "the society" actually refers to an individualistic attitude, due to the characterization of such factors as laziness, ignorance, dependency as the facets of the Soviet society. The "temptation" seems to have inhibited the writer of this representation to go beyond using these assumed characteristics of the Soviet people as evidence in interpreting the question of democracy in the Soviet polity.

In another news article, it is suggested that "dropping the word

'socialist' would be a remarkable step in the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union ... since it would reflect the revised federal structure and would allow the constituents vast freedom in choosing their own forms of government .." (May 26, 1991). This claim reinforces the intrusive attitude discussed earlier and it is based on an idea of political spectrum which should not include a socialist voice in the recommended 'democratic' polity. Although the announcement of a new political movement in July 1991 is acknowledged as a "notable milestone on the Soviet Union's tortuous road to democracy," forming a socialist party is not one of these achievements, according to the NYT journalists. After all, there is no attempt to understand the political agenda of the indirectly quoted movement as well as its political rhetoric which might not fit the asserted political ideologies for the Soviet Union in the NYT.

Thus, the claims and the argumentative procedures on the Soviet state that are used by the journalistic interpretations of the Soviet state lack a wide variety of discourses which are not dominated by the concept of 'totalitarian' state. The totalitarian model assumes a passive society dominated by an elite that is determined to maximize its own power and to transform society on the basis of its ideological perceptions (Hough, 1977). This model has been one of the major theoretical frameworks used by so called Sovietologists who are presented as 'experts' in newspaper discourses, one of which is the NYT. The problem we pose here is concerned with the adequacy of these discursive practices in attempting to acknowledge the social

inputs by the Soviet citizens, or, to offer a comprehensive view on the Soviet polity so that the reader could surmise the political developments as a step towards: a Western polity, a Western-style democracy, a parliamentary system, authoritarianism, and other possibilities of developments that may might have taken place in the Soviet political sphere. Instead of narrating what the political developments towards an "open" society are, the labeling and negative portrayal of events preclude an adequate coverage.

The problem of using various models, other than the 'totalitarian' one, has been a significant problematic in studying the Soviet society. The "totalitarian school," so to speak, continued to dominate the discourses on the Soviet Union. As Cohen notes, "the sovietological profession was not ready for Gorbachev." As the analysis on the policy making and leaderology illustrates, "the idea of a terroristic government seeking total control of the population by massive use of indoctrination, police and ideological brainwashing, monopoly of sources of information and exercise of power as well as direct control over the economy" (Lewin, 1991: 2-3) still dominates the NYT discourses despite the remarkable changes inside the Soviet society since 1985. The term totalitarian is a useless conceptual category, because it does not have much about where the 'system' comes from, where it is heading, what kind of changes it is undergoing, if any, and how to study it critically and seriously. It does not recognize any mechanism of change in the Soviet society and have no use for even a

shadow of some historical process (Lewin, 1991). It does not acknowledge complex relationships between the state and its governmental and non-governmental institutions. In sum, it lacks both social history and political sociology (Cohen, 1985). Whereas an adequate coverage ought to go beyond a "state" versus "society" angle which assumes that the Soviet society, in this case, is 'frozen.' It also ought to grasp the connections between the political and other areas of social life. If it is a coverage about the unemployment in the United Kingdom, it would tell the reader, for example, the rising unemployment figures result from the specific policies of Thatcherism which used mass unemployment to restrain wages. Such an attitude would allow the reader to comprehend the a welter of institutions which serve to legitimize the state. In the Soviet context, one wonders whether such institutions as churches, trade unions, the student associations, the press play a role in the political system. One also wonders how the Soviet people actually live: the kinds of newspapers they read, the education system, Soviet women's rights, workers' rights, the black market shopping in Moscow, urban problems, the problems of different professions, perceptions about different ethnic groups, religious practices, intellectuals, artistic practices, various lifestyles, and many other relevant dimensions to the civil society within the context of the reforms from above.

If an adequate coverage of a polity requires looking at the relationship between the state, and its governmental and non-

governmental institutions, then, an alternative model to a 'totalitarian' model based on a state – society distinction can be articulated¹⁰. In other words, there is a group of Sovietologists who denounce the claims of the totalitarian theorists by challenging the notion of the Soviet Union as a passive, inert society dominated by an all-powerful elite. For example, J.F. Hough in *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory* writes that:

even the form of participation that is thought to be the most exclusive – membership of the Communist Party – engages approximately 22 percent of all men between the ages of thirty and sixty, a broader group than the 'attentive public' as usually defined in the US on the basis of survey research. Participation in various commissions and committees at the place of work (groups that deal with housing distribution, passes to resorts, dismissal of personnel, planning of social and cultural affairs, and so forth) is even wider (Hough, 1977).

Hough's description of pluralistic features of the Soviet polity does not simply point to diversity in Soviet society or to the existence of societal inputs into Soviet political decision making. It hypothesizes that the power relationships between the party and society in the Soviet Union have some things in common with the power relationships more usually associated with a political system (Hough, 1977).

Of the absent discourses in the news stories of the NYT on the Soviet polity, apart from a news discourse which would attempt to look into pluralistic practices in the Soviet society, the most significant one is concerned with the authoritarian model, which presupposes a

¹⁰For a brief history of Sovietology in the US, see: S.F. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985.

system in which any signs of initiative or criticism from below are ignored or suppressed; power is exclusively exercised from above (Medvedev, 1975). The authoritarian features of the Soviet system are interconnected with the role of bureaucracy, which will be examined in the framework of policy making. In sum, the discourses of the newspaper articles on the Soviet polity are far from offering openness in its approach both in terms of the standpoints used and the interpretations narrated. As the following analysis on leaderology suggests, what is needed for the NYT journalists is to separate their distaste of the Soviet society and its system from their descriptions in the news texts.

Leaderology

Understanding the Soviet polity cannot be separated from the Western perceptions about the Soviet leadership. Apart from the dominance of the totalitarian model in news discourses, the Soviet polity coverage also heavily devalues the actual leadership system that has evolved over the decades in the Soviet Union. Any coverage on the leadership ought to take the relationships between institutions of the state and political bosses.

The tendency to underline the personalities of the leaders is one of the important features of the representation of the leadership. As the distribution of voices displays, the most quoted Soviet leader is M.S. Gorbachev with a heavy emphasis on his political activities, his speeches and so on. Mr. Gorbachev is portrayed as unpopular in his

own country; because the problems facing the Soviet society cannot be resolved by his "personal talent." He is popular abroad because of the unilateral concessions (on arms control, etc.), but similar type of "concessions" cannot be made at home. The concessions require the cooperation of the rival groups, according to the article. After all, what Gorbachev is selling (greater liberty, and long-range hope of a better life) is less appealing. M.S. Gorbachev is an "ambiguous figure" at home whereas B.N. Yeltsin is a "challenger." Moreover, the same article continues, M.S. Gorbachev is "a man of cool logic who straddles the roles of reformer and pontiff" (September 25, 1989). The point here is to attempt to relate the complex political problems of a society to the "personal talents" or "the tempers" (October 19, 1989), "personal frustrations" (December 26, 1989) of a leader without ignoring a complex web of power relations among the institutions of the Soviet state. Although the article acknowledges rival groups, without identifying them, and points out that success of the reforms would depend on possible developments between societal units, the success of the reforms, it implied, would depend on a strong leader such as Yeltsin rather than a leader who is indecisive leader. This rivalry between the two leaders is overrepresented in the discourses, which is another way to undervalue the institutional structure.

Thus, the arguments of the journalists on the Soviet leadership do not go beyond overtures of leaders, critique of every political action of M.S. Gorbachev almost to the extent that the social and political

problems of the society are attributed to his personality, mood changes, psychology, and so on. In one article he resembles Luther and the Pope (September 25, 1989), in another one he is the Henry II of England (October 19, 1989); and above all, the similarities with General Pinochet, the Chilean tyrant constitutes a significant part of the discourses about the Soviet leader (February 20, 1991). All these characterizations, after all, are made on behalf of understanding the reasons behind the "period of crisis" (October 23, 1989). Market reforms do not work, it is argued, because of Gorbachev's indecisiveness (May 13, 1990), marked by his efforts to accommodate opposing views (September 25, 1990) especially about the economic plans developed by conflicting groups in the parliament.

One might wonder, at this point, the inadequacy of covering leaders, even if it is overemphasized, and so on. The nature of covering leaders, is what we are interested in this study, because the characterization of leaders results in the tendency to discuss the fate of the Soviet Union in terms of the leaders' personal chances in the political sphere. Characterizing B.N. Yeltsin as a 'winner' and M.S. Gorbachev as a 'loser,' or, "a master manipulator, a judicious reader of the public mood, a hostage to conservative forces, or a wimp" who are "on a collision course" (October 18, 1990) is a common simplification which does not comprehend the complexities of the Soviet political system. There is, of course, a "Gorbachev phenomenon" which had a major impact on the world history acknowledged by many scholars.

However, as Ernest Mandel succinctly explains, Gorbachev is the product of an already existing social ferment in Soviet society who, in turn, will accentuate that social ferment. The analysis of a leadership, in any political sphere, requires to integrating into our analysis the social forces at work in the selection of leaders, recognizing them as social forces, even if the mechanisms at work are not the same in every society (Mandel, 1989). The NYT coverage of the leadership does not give the reader an adequate picture about these social and political forces at work. For example, it is not clear how the upper echelons of the bureaucracy handle the nominations for key posts. Or, the political debates are not narrated within the context of the Soviet political culture (December 28, 1990). Instead, these debates are linked to the personal struggles or “deals” (February 3, 1991) among the leaders. The social forces (the technocratic-modernizing wing of the bureaucracy, military industrial complex, etc.) these leaders represent are not mentioned in the discourses about the leaders. In sum, although there are attempts to portray the leaders within the context of reforms, this acknowledgement does not go beyond picturing them as celebrities who are in personal conflict, not as political figures whose represent interests of social forces. Labeling the leaders from the reformers vs. hardliners is an arbitrary process which does not cover the political speeches they make, as a result of judging their actions by the standards of a total revolution against the Soviet system.

As the following analysis on the claims about policy making discloses, reformers are always opposed by powerful forces of

counterreformation, as Cohen (1991) notes. The struggle over the reforms, in any political system, would be waged at every level of the political system – not just between the officialdom and people but within different political forces; in the case of the Soviet Union, within the party officials and state bureaucracies and society itself. This is one of the relevant elements to understand as to why M.S. Gorbachev is portrayed as fluctuating between his ‘consolidation of power’ and predicting his downfall, which is a simplistic approach articulated by the journalists of the NYT. The opposition to M.S. Gorbachev’s reforms initiative could be interpreted in terms of social forces (e.g, fractions within the Communist Party such as neo-Stalinists, conservatives, liberals, and so on) which aim at emasculating his radical policies, not him as a person, which is another angle absent in the discourses of the journalists. This issue leads to questioning the policy making in journalistic interpretations, which is the subject matter of the next element in the critical analysis.

Policy Making

The process of policy making cannot be separated from the other issues examined above. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to take a look at the coverage of the NYT about the perceptions about the most significant Soviet institutions which are most likely influenced by the reform process through policy making: the state (especially the bureaucracy), the party, and the economic system, and the like. Our questions on the policy making processes seek to ascertain the

implications of the journalistic language in terms of the reforms and the policies to be implemented in economic and social areas.

Our expectancy of an adequate coverage on this theme is that Gorbachev's reforms have led to major social changes in the Soviet society not as a result of a series of 'technocratic measures,' rather they are produced by the social and economic fabric of the Soviet society that has been evolving for centuries. And the policy making – domestic or foreign – takes place in a political sphere in which many different groups, vested interests, and perspectives exist.

The most visible areas which can be differentiated in the newspaper discourses about the policy making is the clash of Government vs. free market reforms in every subject matter. In this context, the policies of the Government are identified with "crisis," while the free market reforms are raised as an issue of a phenomenon which would bring "stability" to the Soviet Union. Does the NYT attempt to examine the inefficiencies of the two social forces which are acknowledged as "the" major social forces in the Soviet society?

The journalists, in the extensive interpretations on the 'market reforms,' do not pay equal amount of attention to the possible implications of the free market reforms and the policies of the Government, in other words, in this case, Gorbachev's plans. For instance, in the article which examines the reform process in light of the policies implemented after 1987, it is argued that the reform programs were killed by the "state weapon," and the economy began to

get worse. Beginning in 1988, the article claims, "the money the Government had pumped into economy outstripped the production of goods to buy with it. Inflation soared. ... That is one reason that Mr. Gorbachev has not taken clear sides over how to subject the country to the turmoil of the market place" (May 13, 1990). Such considerations as 'inflation' and purchasing power of people are never discussed in the context of the "real market reforms." In other words, the economic policies of the Government are usually contextualized within the implications they bring about. In the same article about one of the Government agencies, 'gospriompka,' a state quality control agency, it is argued that forming the agency "caused a sharp drop in production." The word "market" used in quotes in the same article, with a sarcastic critique about "a planned market" and "a socialist market." The groups of people on this issue are defined as those who "contend that a great leap to the market place would create chaos and possibly bring down the Government, and those who argue that these dangers will only grow with delay" (May 14, 1990). This division also reinforces the market vs. planned economy opposition.

Thus, it can be understood from the characterizations that eliminating the planned economy is among the "musts" in the newspaper discourses. In the case of loans asked for by M.S. Gorbachev, it is argued that the loans, even for the purposes to spur the output of consumer goods, would not help the economy; because "the experience of Eastern Europe suggests that, in the market incentives, much of the capital is likely to be wasted" (July 27, 1990). This argument is based on

the assumption that the Eastern European societies as well as the Soviet Union have gone through the same type of historical path.

Although the NYT gives an extensive coverage the political events, the content of the economic programs in a systematic way, there seems to be inconsistencies about the implications of these reforms. For instance, on different occasions, the 500 -day plan is characterized as the "most sweeping reformation of the Soviet economy in six decades; it envisions phasing out price controls;" (October 19, 1990) "it would delay deregulation until 1993; it has plenty of holes;" (October 21, 1990); and "it would be death blow to the state-owned economy" (February 3, 1991). The prediction of the role of the state in economy seems to be ambiguous and contradictory. On the one hand, the plan is praised for its potential to make positive changes in the system. On the other hand, the popular discontent (April 22, 1991) is left unexplained. If the plan is promising for the people, what are the reasons for such discontent? These and similar questions are always explained through how conservatives orchestrate the reform efforts, not through the vested interests of people and the implications of these policies for different groups of people, though there are a few references about "unemployment and social tension that might follow the switch to market vagaries" (April 29, 1990).

Similar to the claims of the experts, the information is always coloured by the reformists vs. conservatives opposition. In other words, the emphasis on "liberating private business" (October 18, 1990)

does not constitute a "distortion." However, the inability to apply a sensible admonition is what constitutes a dogmatic and burlesque approach which dominate the discourses about the economic issues, the political system and the Soviet society. The US prism that is outlined above is also relevant about the coverage of the economic reforms. Writing about a society in transition whereby all the economic activities had been controlled by the state requires new concepts and ideas rather than the applications of the "tax and spending" rhetoric. The largest spending categories are argued to be subsidies to enterprises and consumers (October 21, 1990). It seems unreasonable to characterize a "command-economy" which is still dominant in today's Soviet society from the perspective of "spending," because of the lack of a fully developed 'free market' and the legal structure which supports it. And the journalists have no other suggestions to the complexity of economic problems except the unexplored theme on implementing the "free market reforms."

The same tendency of not exploring issues so that the reader could have a sophisticated idea about the Soviet society can be observed when it comes to portraying the institutions other than the economy. For example, in the article which covered the Supreme Soviet decisions to turn down nominees for top positions, which was originally approved by the Party (July 5, 1989). If the 'system' is completely dominated by the Communist Party, why has this happened? The reader is left with an interpretation which focuses on

the new rules allowing confirmation by a simple majority of deputies, instead of the legislatures full membership.

These and similar arguments about the Party, the bureaucracy, and so on are used to utterly negate the possibility of democratic practices in the Soviet context. As Medvedev (1975) notes, there are two diametrically opposed views on the question of democracy. On one hand, it is frequently asserted that Soviet citizens have all democratic rights without exception, that the Soviet society is the most democratic one in the world, etc. On the other extreme, one often hears that there is no democracy whatsoever in the Soviet society, that Soviet citizens lack all, or at least the most important, democratic rights. Both opinions are equally mistaken. The proponent of these two extremes buttress their ideological positions by comparing the 'West' with the 'East.' Or, as Hough (1977) writes, when it comes to the Soviet Union, there is a tendency to compare noncomparable phenomena and naturally finding major differences in the political systems. Policy making, as an important part of these systems, are represented through these filters as well. In the course of the analysis of, let's say, "policy initiative," the word "policy" shifts its meaning from that of "any governmental decision" to that of "major decisions by the top officials," or that of "old boy's network," as the word "government" shifts its meaning from "democratic process" to that of "regime." In the Soviet context, policy making becomes an issue of technical decisions made by the "top officials."

Moreover, the construction of ideas in the relevant news discourses are so carefully designed that one may conclude that the voices representing the conservatives and the reformers are not aware of what they are saying to one another. For example, the speeches made in the parliament are treated as though the participants always disagree with another. Or, the interpretations about a claim made by a politician are based on the assumption that people are not aware of what the opponents are claiming.

In sum, the discourses found to be relevant to what is called policy making carry the colour of the two-tiered world between the conservatives and reformists symbolized by the paradigms of dictatorship and democracy. The issue of significance here is not about employing such characterizations as binary opposition of reformists vs. conservatives, democracy vs. fascism, and so on; or, pointing out worsening economic conditions in the newspaper discourses; instead, it is to disclose to what extent the NYT attempts to explore and question the totalitarian prism, the planning vs. corporatism opposition and the Manichean world view to look to the Soviet society in its discourses.

The voices representing the 'liberal' and 'conservative' ideologies are transformed into their messages about the American society in the end. Neo-liberalism which presupposes autonomous property and anti-statism; and neo-conservatism which assumes a confident capitalist class with few social barriers to its development are translated into a reforming society where statism-corporatism serves

as a catch-all term. None of the populist and localist practices and movements are explored. The most relevant issues for the Soviet society in this regard, that is, ideological, social and political barriers to the “corporatist” solutions proposed for the ongoing Soviet reforms in the newspaper discourses as part of the hegemonic reality remain unanswered.

The expectancy about reading a fair and an adequate discourse in the most influential newspaper in the US is far from being realized, as the above analysis on the interpretative discursive practices found in the news articles, feature articles, and review articles reveal. In sum:

- 1) The claims made by the NYT journalists on the Soviet reforms do not attempt questioning or exploring the US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Instead, the journalists’ interpretation on this issue complement the US foreign policy which associates the Soviet reforms to the totality of social and economic problems which can be resolved with the help of an ambiguous concept of financial aid and a series of pre-prepared economic programs orchestrated by the Harvard economists (e.g., J. Sachs).
- 2) The interpretation of the Soviet reforms, made by an American prism, are judged on the basis of de-statization and deregulation by excluding the implications of openness and restructuring in other areas of the Soviet life, that is, the civil society.
- 3) The Soviet polity is totally characterized as a totalitarian one in the news discourses, which leads to a concept of an immobile

society identified with “the” party. The existence of newly emerging political movements, political parties, ideologies are excluded in the NYT news articles; instead conservatives and reformers are acknowledged as the major rival groups in the Soviet society.

- 4) The role of the Soviet leaders in polity are overemphasized so as to devalue the role of social conditions and the history of the Soviet society.
- 5) The policy making is a technical issue, not an ongoing process influenced by various social and economic forces as well as institutions.
- 6) The discourses are profoundly shaped by binary oppositions (dictatorship vs. democracy; fascism vs. capitalism; hardliners vs. reformers; free market reforms vs. statism) which precludes interpreting the pluralist tendencies in the Soviet society and leads to a notion of an immobile ‘system.’
- 7) The discourses about the Soviet society are reduced into the technical discussions about how to provide THEM an answer for the transition to capitalism which would benefit US most.

III. AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS

At this point of analysis one ought to explore the intertextual comparison between the commentaries, feature articles and other texts to examine the consistency problem in the NYT discourses.

The Intertextual Comparison

i) Feature Articles: As the descriptive analysis indicates, the feature articles and in the NYT do not carry distinctive characteristics, compared to the news articles. They are news texts which are specialized in a specific issue (the joint ventures in the Soviet Union, an interview with a Soviet expert on the economic problems, and so on). The positions of the voices and the analysis of the themes complement the overall characteristics of the news articles deciphered above.

ii) Review Articles: The review articles, in contrast, are concerned with the book reviews written by various persons (academicians, journalists, experts, and so on). The format and the content of these texts are different than the news articles and the feature articles and therefore requires an examination so as to delineate the positions of the authors on the selected issues, the issues they raise in reviewing the books on the Soviet Union, and their assumptions about the reforms, the Soviet state, the leadership, and policy making¹¹.

The reviewers of the books seem to have articulated a view on the reforms which acknowledges the impact of Glasnost on the Soviet society especially in terms of the new freedoms and liberties.

¹¹The analysis of the review articles and commentaries will not include the examination of the voices quoted. It will only decipher the interpretations of the reviewers.

Nonetheless, the cautiousness about the reforms pervades the review articles as well. The separation of “freedom” and “food supply” as different categories to be resolved is one characteristic that refers to the argumentation about liberalization and privatization. It is implied that although the reforms have brought freedoms of great significance, they will not make any sense unless they are supported by the free market reforms (May 28, 1989). Such arguments result from the artificial separation between the economy and the polity and it dominates the expert claims as well. Most specialists argue that in order to implement the free market reforms more efficiently, one ought to “move boldly” and give priority to the economic troubles rather than committing to “democratic principles,” which M.S. Gorbachev ignores doing so (August 13, 1989). Such a distinction between the political and economic spheres do not enable us to understand the transformation of a society whereby the two spheres actually have been integrated into one for decades. The reason for separating the economy and the polity from one another is based on the assumption that the political arena in the Soviet Union totally belongs to the state. And as an axiom of the liberal theory, the economic arena is assumed to be designed to maximize the private economic activities.

Then, it can be concluded that the real separation is made between the private and the public when the experts and journalists overemphasize the necessity to ‘boldly’ implement the real free market reforms. The private arena is defined as the one the development of which signifies liberties, freedoms, and so on; whereas the public

sphere is an arena which would have no 'control' over the former one. Thus, as Bowles and Gintis (1987) note, liberal social theory's arbitrarily asymmetric treatment of state and economy stems from the notion that the capitalist economy is a private sphere – in other words, that its operation does not involve the socially consequential exercise of power. In their insistence of the "free market reforms," the experts, journalists and other voices go on to argue that the economy should remain private. Such dichotomies as well as other binary oppositions are dominant in the discourses about the book reviews, although there is talk about "many varied forces" whose political positions are unclear.

Nevertheless, the discourses used in the book reviews, compared to the news articles, acknowledge "common sense taking place in the Soviet Union" and the historical dimensions of interpreting the Soviet society. They explore the details about, e.g., the economic problems (a balanced economy, a noninflated ruble, etc.), pictures from the daily lives of people, progresses toward pluralism; although some of them reduce the complexity of problems into the monopoly of power by bringing the debate on this issue to a closure. They attempt to question the Western myths about the Soviet political culture (April 23, 1989), the clichés such as the political struggle between conservatives and reformers (April 8, 1990). The book reviews also include the critique of the "American militarism" which continues despite the era of Glasnost and Perestroika (May 18, 1989).

The claims about the state and polity in the book reviews are

consistent with the dichotomy and an anti-totalitarian ideology outlined above. However, the transformation in the polity is more of an authoritarian-bureaucratic rule (May 28, 1989; September 10, 1989), which is an absent model in the news articles. The polity is generally defined through historical references in the discourses on the book reviews. In sum, the review articles, although they include the characteristics of the news articles in terms of a totalitarian state which dominates the Soviet society, they do include discourses about the pluralist tendencies caused by the Soviet reforms. In other words, the ideological dullness carried in the news articles does not prevail the review articles, possibly due to the reviewers scholarly orientation.

iii) Commentaries: The commentaries include a wide variety of claims ranging from the economic issues related to the reforms to the social problems in the Soviet society. The common denominator of the commentaries is that the reforms have failed.

What makes the commentaries different from the news articles is their use of historical references with an attempt to explain the present through past. The Cold War language predominates the commentaries and concludes that the reforms will not be successful, although a few authors do make an attempt not to "bury glasnost" too early (May 13, 1989). While the news articles heavily judge the reforms on the basis of the "free market reforms," the commentaries deal with the political issues more extensively by bringing up the question of reforms as a plot by the regime (January 14, 1991), the impact of the

reforms on minorities, etc. However, similar to the news articles, the absence of discussions about the future Soviet "model" other than "the genius of Capitalism" leads to a one-dimensional discourse of anti-totalitarianism whose precondition for the acknowledgement of the reforms is to impose the Soviets the lifestyles of privileged Americans, although the commentaries are written by different experts, scholars, authors, and so on. When they describe the American companies profiting from the "imagery of glasnost" (December 27, 1989), actually the discourses used in the commentaries exclude from the scene profound structures of inequality, defined on class, gender, and race which is contained in the new utopia (Halliday, 1991) about the frenzy on the so-called free-market reforms as part of the empty rhetoric of G. Bush's "new world order." Described discourses as such would prove that the prevalence of these constructs rely on a hostile exclusion of alternative discourses in the political sphere.

The conceptions used to describe or analyze the political sphere socially construct the market reforms vs. statism opposition. Similar types of claims boil down to the closure of the debate on the ongoing political developments in the political sphere. The identification of socialism and communism (May 13, 1989), the equation between tyranny or a political dikta and a concentration of economic resources in the hands of the state (May 27, 1989), a totalitarian Soviet state which lacks a true basis for legacy (August 27, 1989; December 11, 1989; December 14, 1989; January 28, 1991), the refusal to acknowledge the

Soviet constitution (February 1, 1990), and the possibility of a Pinochet-style dictatorship (November 20, 1990).

The representation of the political sphere is accompanied with a heavy emphasis on leaderology, as is analyzed in the news articles. The future of the Soviet society is attached to M.S. Gorbachev, and the rivalry between the President of Russia and the Soviet President is covered extensively in favor of B.N. Yeltsin who is symbolized as the hero of the market reforms. Also, the commentators' claims about the policy making result in the same concentration of the actions of the political leaders, instead of attempting to differentiate what the possible social forces whose interests could shape the institutions.

iv) Editorials: The editorials printed in the NYT acknowledge the openness brought by the reforms. In the condemnation of the "greater political economy" instead of a "more open economy," the editors of the NYT seem to have engaged in a 'politically correct' language, to differ the editorials from the news articles. Nevertheless, all the ideological preferences about the reforms are based on the requirements of a "more open economy." Implementing the price reform; empowering managers, not bureaucrats are among the few recommendations for a successful reform policy.

Unlike the newspaper articles which are based on the conservatives vs. reformers opposition, the editorials pick up the "bureaucrats" and the "central control" as the enemy of the reforms. The 500-day plan of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin is 'approved' as a solution to the "gravity of the problem" and characterized as a

“watershed” (December 18, 1990). The transition to capitalism is equated with eliminating central control, and possible consequences of this transformation are attached to the reforms. The Shatalin plan, on the other hand, is criticized of being ambiguous in terms of privatization policies (September 30, 1990). “Its architects do not know its consequences,” write the editors of the NYT. The same inquisitiveness is not applied into the other plans, however. On 1/17/1991, the NYT editors write that “glasnost is the first casualty of Soviet repression,” by concluding that the presence of an “Orwellian propaganda spews forth.”

The Western aid is promoted in the editorials, arguing that waiting for the real reforms would be a mistake. The wait-and-see approach is criticized, if the Soviets are expected to develop “all the way to the markets.”

The political sphere is described through the obedient citizenship and police state control, instead of using totalitarianism. The leader to be supported is B.N. Yeltsin, not M.S. Gorbachev (September 30, 1990). However, M.S. Gorbachev is recommended to follow a series of policy implementations (June 2, 1991). The editorials, in short, are not based on the reformers vs. conservatives distinction, as the newspaper articles constantly emphasize. The preconditions for the market reforms are argued to be democratization, stabilization, price reform, convertible ruble, and privatization. Although the major consequence of price control, inflation, is acknowledged in one

editorial (December 18, 1989), the NYT changes its position about some of the policy recommendations later (June 2, 1991). Although the editorials are not based on the cliches discussed above, the absence of discussing a possible third way, fourth way for the future Soviet society, noted by E. Mandel above; reducing the causes of social, political, and economic ailments into one single group of people, the bureaucrats; the simplification of market reforms as a matter of a series of technical measures lead to the intrusive, single-minded and unexplored angle about the Soviet society.

***The Position of the NYT on the Democratic and Undemocratic
Discourses Continuum***

The analysis offered above discloses that the critique of the NYT discourses on the Soviet Union enables us to articulate alternative discourses. As the theoretical angle used in this study, that is, the ideal speech situation, indicates, it is feasible to assess and critique a series of discourses on the basis of a continuum of democratic and undemocratic discourses. In other words, what has been happening in the Soviet Union in this analysis is attributed to a set of discursive codes shaped by American political culture. These discursive patterns is analyzed by positioning them across an ideal speech situation and democratic criticism.

The different texts included in the NYT have one common denominator, that is, the anti-totalitarian ideology which precludes the possibility of identifying changing practices, due to its assumption on

an unchanging society. As the analysis discloses, the NYT does not include a public discussion on a changing society which is assumed to “cease to exist” because of the transition to capitalism. The ‘distortion’ here is not the word capitalism, but the ways in which the discursive practices of the NYT reduce the discussion about a complex social process into a series of catch-all phrases. The more the NYT echoes back to the Cold War ideology, which was announced to have come to an end in 1989 in the same newspaper, the more it supports the application of undemocratic discursive practices. The spectrum of opinions allowed expression in the NYT do not enable us to conclude that the discourses are democratic. The NYT does not serve public sphere due to the lack of effort to include a series of different angles to the Soviet affairs, despite the op-ed articles written by scholars, experts representing different institutions whose vested interests in the Soviet affairs constitute a worthy problem for another study.

The critical analysis helps us to understand that the themes on the Soviet Union uttered by the voices are not do not indicate symmetrical discursive relations when it comes to giving participants equal chances to be heard in the newspaper discourses. The Administration officials quoted in the NYT mostly pay attention to the issue of the economic aid, assuming that the social and historical path which will be followed by the Soviet Union will be an American one. The expert claims do not differ much in the sense that they perpetuate the binary opposition of capitalism or fascism. The absence of discussion about a ‘third way’ the Soviet Union might follow is not

questioned by the journalists whose interpretive practices serve the either-or world view. Apart from constant negative portrayal of the Soviet society, the tendency to simplify the issues of undeniable significance is accompanied by an ignorance of 'other' voices such as members of civil society. Thus, the discourses on the reforms are interpreted through dubious comments which remind the Cold War rhetoric; overemphasizing the Soviet leaders, not the institutional mechanisms leads to the constant emphasis on the totalitarian state and its inferior people. The themes that we selected for the study are all narrated via a one-dimensional characterization which does not allow the reader to assess who the "all" Soviet participants including people living in the republics and "non-official" voices who might debate on these issues; and what are the "other" ways of interpreting the transformation in the Soviet Union. The ideal speech situation, in this context, enables us to assess different levels of discourse; that is a democratic discourse defined by the ideal speech situation and the findings of the critical analysis or the actual discourses that we critically read in this study.

One may argue that the assessment of the Soviet society other than the one described above, because of the long lasting Cold War ideology, the positions of the US and USSR as the two major rivals at one point in history and so on so forth. However, if the press is one of the major contributor of a healthy public sphere, it should offer a wide variety of discourses about the issues of public significance. The

attempts to publish the full excerpts of the speeches of the leaders made in the Soviet Parliament, to quote the Soviet citizens, the Soviet politicians, businessmen and others may seem to be a sufficient effort towards offering a wide variety voices. The end result in the discourses, which is the enforcement of the statist versus corporatist opposition, does not allow the reader to assess the events of historical importance by reading alternative positions, along with the anti-totalitarian ideology.

One ought to systematically compare the discourses on other issues and the coverage of the Soviet society in order to make a conclusion about the similarities and disparities about discourses on other issues such as the way discourses on the welfare state, budget crisis define the statism versus corporatism, and the coverage of the Soviet reforms, in order to explicate to what extent the NYT allows 'alternative' discourses to be expressed. Nevertheless, the ways in which the words, the concepts, the phrases, in other words other discourse units are used in the texts allow us to differentiate that the being part of a democratic sphere is not one of the significant agendas of the NYT. After all, "all the news that's fit to print," it is declared in the front page of the paper everyday, leading to the presumption that a set of criteria are used to decide what is publishable for the American readers.

In sum, the discursive rules that define the ideological position of the NYT are based on the WE – THEY dichotomy. The newspaper

assumptions do not question the presumptions about the Soviet Union one of which defines the Soviets as the enemy. Also, the analysis articulated in this study indicates that the discourses about the Soviet reforms are based on the series of binary oppositions which obfuscate the readers perceptions about the complexity of the issues.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the conclusion of this study will be discussed by pointing out the specific summaries of each chapter, the limitations of the study, and the implications of the study for further work.

Summary

This study was born out of a query on democracy. From a sociology of knowledge point of view, it was assumed, words did matter in understanding power relations. It was also assumed that adopting without revision the concepts prevailing in a polity meant accepting terms of discourse loaded in favor of established practices (Connolly, 1974). It was observed that the NYT discourses, as an established practice, must be questioned in order to shed light on the way the American polity legitimizes itself. Analyzing the discourses used in characterizing another society, in this context, provided an intellectual opportunity for assessing the question of democracy, the basic presumption of which is a civil society where participants are able to talk and debate without constraints.

Thus, the characterization of the Soviet Union in the newspaper discourses constitutes the 'empirical' ground of this study. Although the Soviet Union has been the major rival of the US for a long time, our expectations about a democratic discourse which should be used in a newspaper cannot be easily ignored. In a free society, the democratic public sphere should be preserved by institutions which create the

realm of flexibility for social actions of individuals. Accordingly, an adequate representation of a society would require a thorough coverage of voices coming from various social classes, groups, and institutions; no matter what type of social and political order exists in a society has.

Unlike these expectations about using a democratic discourse in a democratic polity and society, our firsthand observations showed that the NYT would not acknowledge the representatives of various voices whose ideological positions might differ on the important issues such as a reform movement. This idea of inadequate representation also stemmed from the basic comparison of the coverage of the NYT and other publications such as the Nation, and the Guardian. While these alternative texts showed some effort to include 'expert' voices whose interpretations symbolized various different ideological positions, the NYT texts seemed to have excluded such a diversity by constantly echoing similar standpoints with the US Administration position on the Soviet Union.

There were two phenomena to be compared: the complexity of the Soviet society, let alone the Soviet reforms, Glasnost and Perestroika, which made a tremendous impact on the world social history in the Soviet Union and the one dimensional view of the Soviet Union which is determined by what public opinion assumed in the 'West.' Our expectations about the 'musts' of a coverage in a democratic society, the unfair and inadequate coverage of the Soviet people and the Soviet society, the implications of different levels of the

newspaper discourses in terms of the American politics all led to formulating a sociological problem about the politics of textuality.

Thus, in the first Chapter of the study, a background of the study helped to clarify the significance of studying a phenomena such as the politics of textuality. It was also argued that by using Habermas's theory on the communicative ethics, one can develop a set of criteria by which we can separate democratic discourses from undemocratic discourses. Since the study was based on the idea of understanding the ways in which power relations were perpetuated by the print media in a capitalist social order, the assumptions of a series of sociological concepts (democracy and media) which constitute the theoretical framework of this study were defined in the first chapter. Apart from these concepts, our basic assumptions about the Soviet Union are also outlined. The first chapter also described the general characteristics of each chapter in the study.

The Chapter II covered the major theoretical viewpoints on the question of textuality in media as well as the major thesis of the study. After the problem was defined, a short assessment of the four major theoretical perspectives provided an opportunity to point out continuities and discontinuities of the theories: Classical Marxism, the Cultural Marxism, the Structuralist-Marxist, and the Critical Theory. It was concluded that Classical Marxism did not develop a thorough analysis on textuality due to the overemphasis on the social and economic conditions which created class stratification. Texts are part of

superstructural elements, and they ought to be analyzed as a totality. Marx did not go beyond claiming that anything which belongs to the superstructural realm serves to legitimize the interests of dominant classes. An attempt is made to transform classical Marxism by Critical Theory and cultural Marxists. Some of these attempts resulted in eclectic frameworks; some, like those of the Frankfurt School, offered a more dynamic Marxism in the sense that they attempted to attribute the problem of textuality and ideology to the changing structure of capitalism. While structuralist-Marxism was emphasizing a theory of structures without agents, critical theorists were interested in analyzing how the new modes of production created a vacuum in the way political and social institutions legitimize the 'class interests.' In this context, Habermas attempted to theorize the legitimation crises caused by the transformation of capitalism. He claimed that this vacuum must be filled, that is, new institutions must be legitimate in the eyes of people so that social integration would be possible.

Thus, the thesis outlined in this study largely borrowed from Habermas's communicative action theory. It enabled us to form a normative standard about understanding the way a democratic society institutionally operates. Habermas's theory also offered a critical framework based on the ideal speech situation from which specific instances of deviations could be critically assessed. Moreover, the communicative action theory, it was argued, was utilized to analyze the hegemonic relationships exercised in the texts since Habermas accounted for the degeneration of public sphere along with the

transformation of capitalism. As a result, the Chapter II the relevance of the major theories as well as the thesis of this study based on the following points were outlined: the dependency on the WE versus THEM opposition in characterizing the Soviet reforms Glasnost and Perestroika, exclusion of all Soviet voices in the New York Times discourses, and the way the selected discourses reflect the American politics.

The potential of the communicative action theory, in general, and the ideal speech situation, in particular, employed in a 'qualitative' study was explained in the Chapter III. This chapter outlined the criteria by which the specific instances of newspaper discourses could be analyzed. Since the question of meaning in this study was attributed to deviations from the ideal speech situation, instead of a quantitative sum of selected words or phrases, the position of the NYT discourses on the continuum ranging between democratic and undemocratic discourses gained more analytical significance. The criteria developed with the help of the ideal speech situation helped us to determine to what extent the NYT discourses met these criteria to judge instances of newspaper texts.

It was argued in the methodological chapter (Chapter III) that the precondition for an analysis based on 'qualitative' features of discourse instances requires answering questions related to *the voices heard in a discourse, the claims made in discourses, and the meaning of what is said*. These three points formed the analytical basis of the descriptive

and the critical analysis of this study. The voices which were given access to the specific instances of discourse, and the groups of claims were documented so as to form a basis for the critical analysis.

The Chapter IV, which offered a descriptive analysis of the selected discourses, therefore, consisted of classifying all the claims published in the NYT texts about the Soviet Union on the basis of the selected themes for this study, which are *the Soviet reforms, the Soviet state, the Soviet leaders, and policy making processes*. The summary of general characteristics of the descriptive analysis offered an answer for the question, what is said, while the critical analysis concentrated on the search for the question of meaning.

The critical analysis chapter (Chapter V) borrowed from Habermas's communicative action theory and the notion of ideal speech situation. It was assumed that the ideal speech situation constitutes a criterion to assess deviations of specific instances of discourses. In other words, Habermas's conception of 'undistorted communication' offered an analytical tool to point out the necessary requirements of a 'democratic discourse.' It was also assumed that in democratic societies the existence of institutions is related to the preservation of a public sphere whereby private individuals discuss public matters freely and openly; that is, institutions provide outlets for individuals to express their opinions.

Thus, the criteria for the analysis of the selected discourses were determined as *the completeness of information, the adequacy of*

information, and the availability of alternative positions. For each criterion a group of issues were defined as the subject of analysis in the critical analysis. Accordingly, these criteria were used to question if the participants in the newspaper discourses were complete in terms of the voices that they acknowledge, the social points of views they represent, and the absent issues. The utterances made by the representatives of the US Administration, the Soviet voices, the expert voices, other voices, and the journalists were analyzed on the basis of the criteria selected for the critical analysis.

Application of the criterion of completeness of information in the specific instances of newspaper discourses helped to disclose the way the way in which the NYT quotes characterizes and employs the Soviet voices in the news texts. It also disclosed the social points of view, the ideological positions of voices, and the issues which were not discussed in the newspaper discourses. It was founded that: the NYT gives access to various voices unequal access; that the utterances which belong to the US Administration, the Soviet peoples, and expert voices were not selected among of a full spectrum of voices; that the issues the NYT chose to discuss in the context of news texts did not give equal access to all ideological positions about 'interpreting' the historical events in the Soviet Union; that the instances of discourses did not meet the criteria of the democratic discourse. The criteria about the completeness of information helped clarify the ways in which reform-related issues such as economic aid, the perception of leaders, economic plans were portrayed in the NYT.

When the adequacy of information in the NYT was questioned, it was especially concentrated on the ways in which the NYT raises issues of public importance, the solutions or policy options implied in covering social problems, and the implications of the whole coverage in terms of American polity and society. It was critically revealed that the perceptions about many themes such as the Soviet reforms, economic programs, and policy options were largely characterized by an American prism in the instances of discourses. Questioning the availability of alternative positions in the NYT resulted in an intertextual comparison of the newspaper texts (feature articles, review articles, commentaries, and editorials) written in different formats. The last point in the critical analysis chapter was to assess the position of the newspaper articles on the democratic and undemocratic discourses continuum.

The critical analysis revealed that the NYT texts did not offer a variety of interpretations about the Soviet Union. It was found out that the NYT did not offer newspaper articles which questioned the US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. A great majority of newspaper articles selected for the study did not include voices which questioned the US Administration and its policy towards the Soviet Union. The way the NYT complemented the language of the Administration was perpetuated by the standpoints articulated in the newspaper articles.

Additionally, the critical analysis disclosed that the

characterization of the Soviet society and polity was based on cliches and simplifications enforced by the idea of inferior Soviet people. The newspaper texts analyzed in the study did not prefer to presume that a public opinion which was constantly changing existed in the Soviet society; that there were social movements whose actors were different than reformers and conservatives; that the institutions rather than individuals might play significant role roles in the ongoing events; that the economic problems of the Soviet Union could be resolved by Soviet solutions; that reforming the Soviet Union was a complex social and historical process; that Glasnost and Perestroika ought to be understood as a part of a social transformation; that the Soviet reforms could not be identified only with free marketization; that de-statization and de-regulation were only part of a process, not the process itself; that freedom might not mean free marketization; that, maybe, when we attempt to understand the world we could articulate another approach which was not utterly based on the prism of US versus THEM. The critical analysis documented the ways in which the NYT neglected diversity in thinking, openness in interpreting, and inclusiveness in writing about the Soviet Union.

The critical analysis did not achieve a 'mechanical' methodological procedure by comparing a wide variety of interpretations on the question of the Soviet reforms and the instances of discourses selected for this study. Similarly, the core of the critical analysis in this study was not about analyzing the events from a

different perspective. Instead, the point was to analyze the analysis of the NYT as a discursive indicator by which one could deduce a series of ideologically charged meanings about the perceptions of *non-US political cultures*. In doing so, as Foucault writes in *L'Ordre du Discours* (1971: 55), one could also conceive a specific set of discourses as a practice that we impose on the world. The discourses imposed on the American readers, in this case, were only explored from the perspective of the ideal speech situation, which could only shed light on possible meanings of 'intended' content of the discourses used in the NYT. There were no attempt to discover the received meaning of these discourses.

In Chapter VI, what the study has accomplished in each chapter was summarized along with the limitations and the implications of the study for further work. It was argued that the research results led us to consider three types of implications of the study: the implications of this study in terms of future research; implications of the study for rethinking the major political issues, and the theoretical implications of the study.

An analysis of newspaper discourses as such might be questioned due to the limitations of the study. The questions might seem too general, the analysis might be interpreted as too arbitrary. At this point, the limitations of this study as well as what is not accomplished here will be briefly outlined so that the context of this work, its results, controversial questions could be understood more

succinctly.

Limitations of the Study

In this part of the study, I will review the major limitations of this study which stem from the following points:

- i) the lack of systematically analyzing the selected discourses within the framework of a totality of ideologies, myths, and historical traditions such as the foreign policies of the US government and the impact of the Cold War era on the American perceptions of the Soviet Union;
- ii) the time period covered in this study and the representativeness of the selected sample of the newspaper texts;
- iii) the exclusion of the audience from the analysis;
- iv) the validity of the normative standard based on the ideal speech situation.

By following the *first* point outlined above, it can be claimed that a thorough analysis on the discourses about the Soviet Union requires taking into account the problem of multiple layers of discourses in question. It can be also claimed that analyzing the totality of discourses necessitates attributing a group of texts selected for the study to a wide variety of political, historical, and social issues of great significance in the American public sphere. What are these issues that might be extremely relevant to studying discourses about the Soviet Union? Or, what are the political–economical conditions which lead to the decline of discourse? How do powerful interests control the cultural productions? What are the sociological mechanisms causing

the processes in which intellectuality is channeled to serve dominant institutions?

Most importantly, such a study would have to take interpretations of the Soviet Union in a historical fashion, because perceptions about a society could not be explained without pointing out historical traditions and myths which shape today's thinking. The scarcity of such studies dealing with American perceptions about the Soviet Union did not enable the researcher to question whether or not there were similarities, continuities, and discontinuities in conceptualizing ideologies about the Soviet Union. Most importantly, studying discourses about the Soviet Union would also necessitate taking the phenomenon of the Cold War into account, since the most significant ideological construction which determined the perceptions about the Soviet society is the Cold War era. The Cold War is also significant, because it denotes "the underlying rivalry of 'Communism' and capitalism itself, which began in 1917 and which, as a result of World War Two, became the dominant, constitutive divide in world affairs" (Halliday, 1991: 79). The Cold War does not only denotes a rivalry between the two superpowers, it also serves the construction of dogmatic ideologies in the East and the West: the anti-Communist 'freedom' versus 'totalitarianism' form as it is used in the West, and 'socialism' versus 'imperialism' variant praised in the Soviet bloc. Thus, it might seem inevitable to consider the Cold War ideology and its social and philosophical origins as one component of the discourses

on the Soviet Union.

The first answer to such questions would be based on the methodological philosophy followed in this study. It was already argued in this study that the analysis done here did disclose only one of the ways in which the US Administration policy towards the Soviet Union was perpetuated by the NYT. In other words, the multiplicity of meanings implied by the totality of discourses about the Soviet Union was decoded in this study so as to analyze *one* way of legitimating the US Administration language along with a series of themes which were presumed to be significant in studying this issue.

Moreover, analyzing the ideological messages implied in these discourses would require encompassing political and economic structures that might control or influence journalistic practices through organizations of media which tend to include "alternative" worldviews and ideologies in portraying other societies and cultures. The analysis would also call for including other significant sociological factors in studying politics of textuality. For example: the hegemonic relations perpetuated by ideologies such as neo-conservatism; the impact of Reaganism on the foreign policy-making processes; the ways in which major ideologies (neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism, Reaganism, etc.) are being treated by media practices; the evolution of Sovietology in the academic circles and its impact in the journalistic discourses; the differences, if there are any, between the discourses used in the European newspapers and the American newspapers; the

ideological character of American think-tanks which study the Soviet Union; the mechanisms at work in the newspapers which might limit journalists' reports; and the relationship between the foreign policy changes towards the Soviet Union and the character of newspaper discourses. Each of these thematic dimensions, relevant to analyzing the issue of understanding the way textuality, constitutes a topic to be studied separately, though they overlap with the problematic of this study.

The second answer to the limitation about neglecting other historical traditions and ideologies can be formulated on the basis of the definition of the discourse. The problem with respect to including various thematic dimensions (e.g., the impact of ideologies and the myths on the selected discourses) stems from the difficult effort of studying the discourses which function as historical events as a whole. Such an effort would have to be bracketed into different projects, if the objective of a critical research is to disclose the influence of conflicts and inequalities. The research question posed in this study could enable one to contextualize various sociological problems so as to form a starting point for the totality of the different dimensions of the problem, especially the lack of studies on the problem of discourse as ideology.

The *second* limitations of the study concerns a methodological problem, that is, the time period covered for the analysis. The representativeness of the study is limited to the texts published in the NYT during the period between April 1989 and August 1991, which is

only a short segment in the history of the Soviet reforms. Although the Soviet reforms called Glasnost and Perestroika started in 1985, the study did not attempt to analyze every piece of article published after 1985 due to the comprehensiveness of such an attempt. In this context, the representativeness of the study might be questioned because of the number of articles studied. However, as is noted in the methodology chapter, the objectives of this work are not based on relating the meaning of texts to how frequently we read a patterning. Instead, the significance of analyzing the context within which partial and distorted claims in a text is at the core of this study. As long as the texts are defined as having sociological significance in terms of determining people's consciousness, ideologies, worldviews, and thinking, the abundance of texts should not be the main concern of a critical thinker. One might object to this point when reminded that this study does utilize a quantitative summary of the occurrences of different voices in the newspaper articles. The quantitative summary, nevertheless, only serves to complement the results of the qualitative analysis. Studying the selected period of time offers an insight about the American political culture, a set of pre-defined macro-assertions about the American society and concepts such as democracy, freedom, capitalism, socialism, for the audience to 'consume.' The texts we analyzed in this study disclose how the NYT, as an institution in American society, serves alienation in the public sphere, one indicator of which is existence of variety and diversity in terms of the voices and ideologies

quoted.

The *third* limitation of the study is the exclusion of the question of audience from the research project. Any analysis on media texts would have to include various levels such as content, meaning and audience, if the objective is to investigate what the texts mean to the audience. Nevertheless, the major objective of this study is to discover the implications of what is said. In other words, the priority of this study is defined as disclosing the ways in which the texts are manipulated so as to create a multiple levels of discourse each of which serves a different function in enforcing hegemonic discursive relationships. The words, it is assumed, do matter, no matter who reads them. And understanding the way the audience receives the words and interprets them would be the legitimate concern of another study. After all, discourse must be analyzed in isolation, but instead in its relation to other aspects of social life: culture, economics, politics, and so on.

The *fourth* limitation of the study concerns the ways in which the normative standard based on Habermas's communicative ethics are utilized in this study. This limitation of the study is related to the "judging" whether or not the diversity in opinions is sufficient by using a theoretical angle which relies on the principles of liberal democratic theory. The assessment of the discourses through the ideal speech situation raises theoretical and methodological problems. The most significant point of this study is to discover the discursive

practices by which power relations become the part of the legitimation process by acknowledging the players and agents who determine, let's say, the agenda of the NYT Op-Ed articles. This study also acknowledges that these 'acting agents' are part of discursive formations and their practices cannot be separated from the end result of their actions. Thus, it is assumed that there is a group of norms and standards which are at work; and these rules are not relative as is outlined in the theoretical chapter. Ideologies can be explained on the basis of ideal speech situation which functions as a standard for analyzing 'distorted communication.' In this context, it is accepted that the NYT contributes to the preservation of an alienated society through its practices. One of the neglected points about this study is the way the NYT bars a dynamic debate process on the Soviet Union from the American political sphere. At this point, we must turn to explaining the consequences of constructing discourses as a one-dimensional interpretation which has dire implications about the American political culture.

Implications of the Study

The results of the critical analysis and the implications of this study can be assessed at three levels:

- i) the theoretical implications of the study,
- ii) the implications of the study for further research,
- iii) political implications of the study.

In this study, the newspaper texts which operate as discursive practices are analyzed by using the normative standards for

communicative processes developed by J. Habermas. The subject matter of this study, ideology as discourse, includes various levels of analysis. One level of this study deals with the issue of ideology which is a matter of discourse. Ideology is not defined as a technical mode of discourse; instead it is accepted as an analytical device which discloses something of the relations between an utterance and its material conditions of possibility (Eagleton, 1991) which are viewed in the light of power-struggles central to the reproduction of a whole form of social life.

Theoretical Implications: One of the difficulties to analyze different levels of ideology theoretically, as is mentioned earlier, stems from the complexity of the concept. In this study, there is no attempt to synthesize the theoretical angles on ideology to formulate a 'new' concept of ideology. Instead, the research questions used in this study leads us to employ a notion of ideology as symbolic forms (utterances, texts, images and so on) which serve sustaining relations of domination. Such a formulation of ideology can be examined several ways by employing different methodological frameworks.

Implications for Further Research: The studies related to mass communication require to take into account three aspects of research: first, the production and transmission or diffusion of mass-mediated symbolic forms; second, the construction of media messages; and third, the reception and appropriation of media messages. The study described above only covers one of the dimensions of this tripartite approach, which is the construction of knowledge in the print media.

And the results of this study, which were obtained only by examining the theme of constructing knowledge, should be complemented future research projects which analyze the production of news as well as the appropriation and interpretation of news and ideologies.

In this context, the results of this study lead us to rethink about the concept of ideology in light of new theoretical and methodological approaches especially on the politics of textuality and critical studies of the media. This study reveals that critical studies must develop empirical research guidelines to study the linkage between power and discursive practices. Critical studies must also formulate methodological tools by which one can systematically study factors, relations, and practices that determine the nature of media practice as well as the institutional mechanisms by which ideal speech situation can be reinforced in various realms of society. By doing that one can outline and explain the ways in which different political discourses in the US influence and shape one another. How did the Cold War ideology shape the American definitions of capitalism, socialism, and democracy? How are the discourses on domestic policies constructed in different historical periods? How does the official discourse perpetuate relations of domination? These kinds of questions, which stem from the necessity to study different levels of discourse, suggest that research problems regarding people's perceptions, political positions, ideologies cover a wide range of problems only one of which is answered in this study by displaying the limitations of an adequate debate in the NYT.

Political Implications: When it comes to understanding the political implications of the study, one ought to look at the ways in which one of the major newspapers in the U.S.A., the most pragmatic and technocratic society in the world, contributes to the process of reproduction of social life through its own discursive practices which impose an idea of politics as technical management and manipulation. Analyzing such practices provides an opportunity to question the social order within which discourses are constructed. It is argued in the major theses of this study that the discursive practice, which is defined as perceptions about another society, enables us to translate the way the American social order is argued to be operating. Thus the discourse analysis outlined in this study bears a set of implications concerning the major elements of social order and politics. The following analysis will outline these implications along with the major conceptions used regarding the social and political order proposed within the framework of the objectives of this study.

In this study, discourse is presumed to be a sociolinguistic phenomenon over which social struggles of different groups and classes involve what constitutes the sociological dimension of interest in this study. It is also assumed that discourses as historical events are influenced by historical moments which characterize to what extent we can accept the ideal speech situation as 'democratic.' By borrowing from Habermas, one conclusion about the problem of ideology as discourse is that the extent of the WE versus THEM dichotomy is

ideological is determined by the way it provides legitimation. Additionally, the legitimacy of the binary discourse of WE versus THEM as well as the simplification of social processes narrated in the NYT constitute one of our sociological interests in this study. If these discourses accept a democracy versus dictatorship dichotomy without questioning to what extent the capitalist mode of production produces a democratic social order, then the problem is how to interpret different realms in a capitalist order, which has its own dynamics in each society. The NYT not only uses these dichotomies to narrate a preconceived picture about the Soviet society, but it also complements the language of the Administration which perpetuates the Cold War discourse.

The discourses are also painted with an American prism whose implications might differ according to the way one reads these discourses. Since the scope of these discourses determined by an either-or angle is our major interest in this study, the interpretations on possible implications will be limited to the consequences of discourses on the reforms, the polity, and the policy making processes.

The most significant presumption on which the majority of arguments is based is that the complex realities of the Soviet Union in the discourses studied are in conflict with simplistic expectations of the US shaped by the Cold War ideology. In this context, one of the often used conceptions in the discourses on the Soviet reforms is de-statization or deregulation and free-marketization. Implementing the reforms is identified with eliminating the state enterprises and the

involvement of the state in the Soviet economy. Articulating such dualisms as *corporatist versus statist* or *markets versus planning* does not clarify the complex web of structural problems of social orders. This type of dichotomies neither help to understand long-run crises of capitalism, nor they explain social, political and ideological barriers for implementing corporatist solutions to economic spheres dominated by statist policies. Moreover, the way the discourses formulate the economic problems leads to an angle which disassociates economic problems from political decisions. The general arguments are made without, e.g., investigating what "eliminating state-enterprises." Therefore, the discourses used in the NYT are far from shedding light on several significant questions by going through significant historical possibilities to which the Soviet society might be exposed.

Similarly, the new market system and its problems cannot be understood without questioning the idea of "liberal and free" or "social and regulated" market systems. Argumentations centered around such dualities are doomed to exhaust themselves without reproducing a discourse, no matter what the labels of ideologies are. Is the magic word, "free market" reforms, applicable in every social and political context to understand the reforms? By using the "free market" as the only mechanism by which a social order can transform itself, the NYT discourses not only simplify the complex realities, but also close the debate and talk on the issue.

As one of the these of this study argues, the characterization of

the Soviet society can be seen as a mirror of the American perceptions on the important political issues. For instance, free market reforms is used very often in these discourses which actually reflects an antinomy which either opts for a policy of "more statism, or, the free market and/or the refurbishing of authoritarian social and political forms of organization" (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 14) by both neo-conservatives and the pundits of neo-laissez-faire philosophy. The antistatism imposed on the characterization of the Soviet Union is a reflection of an American debate on welfare state and fiscal crises. It is equally problematic to project statist/corporatist ideologies on depicting another society, since both of them presuppose an undemocratic state administration.

Moreover, instead of observing whether or not a consensus-building process is taking place in the political realm in the Soviet civil society, the discourses of the New York Times draw a simplistic picture which is actually a sociological tool to understand the ways in which American political sphere is characterized in the newspaper texts. Also, the discourses analyzed above serve to translate the current economic and political crises of American society by legitimizing a discourse consisting of clichés. When the discourses contribute to the legitimation of the "missionary rhetoric" (Cohen, 1993) imposed on the Soviet Union, they perpetuate an undemocratic political realm by articulating economic, political, and social presumptions which are clearly relevant to explaining the dynamics of the American society. In

this sense, the ways in which political discourses reflect different political issues in different contexts seem to be a worthy questions of significance for further research.

Moreover, the discourses in the NYT constantly emphasize that the Soviets should return to “laissez-faire” and eliminate state control mechanisms. By doing that the NYT constructs an antistatist ideology as the key solution to the transformation of the Soviet society. Moreover it perpetuates the decline of discourse by using the false dichotomy of *plan versus market* which does not grasp the broad range of possible institutional structures for organizing the economic dimension of society. As a matter of fact, such a dichotomy presumes that the state sector grows at the expense of private industry; and that power relationships within the private economy has no significance in determining public expenditures and programs. Such a characterization totally dismisses basic economic and political facts of a society. It outlines a model of capitalism whereby the state should have no involvement in the capital accumulation process. After all, the market, as a guide to economic efficiency and effectiveness, would solve the problems of complex phenomena overnight, even if the subject matter involves years of central planning and statism.

Therefore, the triumph of capitalism over socialism is celebrated through a language which denigrates alternatives in the discourses. The *fin de siècle* (the end of the history) of Fukuyama (1992), which is the newest version of Bell’s end-of-ideology perspective and Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality, as a political message, is

constantly used in the pages of the New York Times. Moreover, the ideological construction on the complexities of the world shuts off the reproduction of a discourse, dialogue, and debate that should actually formulate questions and social policy making. The end of history is glorified in the discourses on amenities of the world capitalism and corporate culture as well as in the ad pages of the NYT which complement the celebration of corporatism in the publication of designer lifestyles. This façade scheme of the New York Times discourses does not point out social costs of becoming a capitalist society and the necessity of recognizing the transformation going on in the Soviets as a unique social and historical phenomenon. This is omitted on behalf of exemplifying *the end of the history* as a narrative on a postmodernist discourse¹².

The postmodernist politics as an *ideology*, not as a 'meta-theory,' in the New York Times are revealed on many other instances. For instance: the negation of articulating a democratic discourse which would analyze inequalities and class structures; a constant endorsement of the market versus planning theme which is an analytical obstacle for reproducing an ongoing debate on the transformation of 'modes of production' or large scale social structures;

¹²The end of the history thesis is here presumed to be a new version of the end of the ideology thesis. The latter characterizes the way rationalization of the lifeworld has stripped everyday communicative practice of the synthetic and totalizing tendencies inherent in traditional world-views, and has thereby eliminated the basis for the formation of ideologies. It is also presumed that in contemporary societies the processes of enlightenment may still be manipulated; not because of the operation of ideology, but rather because the basis for the operation of ideology has been destroyed. See: J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, p. 355.

the lack of acknowledgement of the voices which refuse consumer capitalism; and the lack of offering a radical cultural critique which would play a significant role as a social force in American society. Instead, the New York Times discourses exemplify voices of an institution whose political affiliations identify the spectacularization of the “end of communism” (Agger, 1992) with “the end of history” and “the end of debate.” When they are written as news stories about another society, these discourses serve to manipulate the historical moments towards a series of predefined political destinies and a situation of meaninglessness. The Manichean¹³ world view is integrated into a postmodernist discourse in the New York Times texts and the result is the denigration of social criticism.

As the analysis reveals in this study, a historical phenomenon which is a result of unique dynamic forces is not contextualized historically, politically and sociologically. On the other hand, these discourses not only reflect a manipulated moment in history, they also translate themselves into another dimension by which we could understand the meaning behind the meaninglessness. That is, the American socio-political realm is frozen into a form of capitalism which is not capable of serving human beings. Freedom is confined to consumer choice which leads to an inadequate understanding of

¹³Manicheanism, a postpagan sect in a larger constellation called gnosticism that itself moved ambiguously within and against the hegemony of Christianity, responded to the problem of evil by positing a duality in divinity itself. The Manichees denied omnipotence of god and believed in a divine dualism. For further information see W.E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1991.

human morality in the discourses.

Finally, the notion of *the end of the history* opens a series of questions for those of us who are interested in formulating new questions for human emancipation. The victory the Cold War, which actually signifies the victory of depoliticization, is used as a metaphor employed in describing a neo-Hegelian evolutionary interpretation of history in the pages of the NYT. The market-based consumer economies, the economies just like those of the West, are conceived as the end of historical development.

In this study, I have attempted to analyze the ways in which power relations are reflected in the printed media. The question, however, remains unanswered: if the newspaper discourses analyzed here do not provide an adequate depiction of a society as a requisite of an institution in a civil society, what would be the alternative ways of doing so? The answer to this question is concerned with the capability of reproducing new axioms for ideologies which are transformed along with the 'material conditions.' Habermas defines the necessity to create new ideological frameworks of social integration in his thesis about legitimization crisis. If our purpose is to define the ways in which democratic institutions should operate, the "solution" does not rely on the steering mechanisms criticized above. Instead, our efforts should concentrate on re-developing an ideology or framework which would define civil society as an autonomous institution in terms of being separated from the state and the economy. For, one can develop grey

areas between, let's say, responsibility and rights, universality and particularity, by refusing to insist constructing hierarchies of values or principles of modernity. Whereas as this study discloses, the discourses of the current era construct ideologies by totally eliminating a set of principles of modernity and result in an odd combination of postmodernism, neo-conservatism, and neo-liberalism. Fabricating hierarchies of principles which would only serve imposition of hegemonic values, narrating tales such as a happily-after-ever-living Soviet people, and defining new parameters for the politics of desire and politics of fear all lead us to give up civic virtues once digested by the Athenians. Re-inventing an ethic for politics was never as urgent as it is at the crossroads of crises at this historical moment, if we do not wish the Visigoths to solemnize 'the beginning of the end' on behalf of those who ardently think vice versa.

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**IDEOLOGY AS POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY
OF PRINT MEDIA DISCOURSES ON
*GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA***

VOLUME II

by

Nuran Erol

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APPENDIX

The claims made by different voices are grouped according to the types of news texts which are described earlier.

The Claims

A) NEWS ARTICLES

The claims made by the different participants in the news discourses will be deciphered on the basis of the administration claims, the Soviet voices, other participants, and the claims of the newspaper personnel.

I. THE ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

Claims About the Reforms¹⁴

N.A.#1/(21 June, 1989): "Senator B. Kasten, the Wisconsin Republican claims that '.... American politicians and intellectuals – speaking directly to the Soviet public is impressive,' during a meeting between a group of American neo-conservatives and Soviet intellectuals. He also adds that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are 'leading the world' toward peace."

N.A.#2/(14 January, 1990): In the article which is concerned with the American intelligence analysts who are experiencing problems to deal with "the cascade of information and the data on the Soviet Union, an official said that it became apparent to analysts in 1987, when M.S. Gorbachev began pressing his plan of political structuring, that 'all the props were getting knocked out from under the regime,' and that basic changes were inevitable. 'Anyone who would have written about East Germany's disintegration a year ago would have been laughed out of the Government,'" another senior expert on Kremlin said, echoing many others' comments about the Soviet Union. 'We were totally surprised.' W.H. Webster, the Director of the C.I.A. said in an interview

¹⁴The articles are chronologically organized by the following categories: Newspaper articles - N.A.; Commentaries - C; Feature Articles - F.A.; Review Articles -R; and Editorials - E. The excerpts are categorized according to the themes of this study. The numbers refers to the number of excerpts rather than the number of the articles.

there was 'no question' that the 'open side of the business has become more and more important' than the secret side as the flow of public data increases."

N.A.#3/(October 18, 1990): During a meeting between the senior American and Soviet officials, "a senior official in D. Cheney's delegation sighed, 'The only thing that was clear about the economic picture is that they have a full-fledged political crisis.'"

N.A.#4/(December 12, 1990): In another article, "Secretary of State J.A. Baker prods Moscow to use the assistance to speed up economic changes in the Soviet Union. Administration officials say that it is likely that Mr. Bush will announce a provision of emergency medical assistance to the Soviets, after he meets at the White House on Wednesday with Mr. Shevardnadze.

Mr. Baker adds that he and the Soviet foreign minister discussed the importance of 'blending' any short term emergency assistance 'with efforts to promote medium or long term economic reform in the Soviet Union.'

Mr. Baker also adds that while he did not want to 'minimize the current possible short term needs of the Soviet Union, it is a country with tremendous resource potential and capabilities and the right market reform can tap this potential in a manner to give that country a vibrant economy.'"

N.A.#5 /(December 14, 1990): In an article which covers the role agencies such as the I.M.F. and the World Bankplay in providing economic aid to the Soviet Union, a senior American trade official argues that "'the situation could evolve full membership [of the Soviet Union.]' President Bush had argued that the money might be wasted if it were disbursed before the Soviet reforms were much further along. President Bush was also sensitive to criticism from conservative Republicans who are doubtful about the prospects for change in the Soviet Union and have been hostile to the idea of international assistance to Moscow. A senior official added: 'It reflects the unique

circumstances we find today, a Soviet Union that clearly is struggling to move down the path of political and economic reform, a country that has a vast economic potential, but at this time has vast economic problems, and a country that is interested in re-engaging in the broader world economy. We want to help them find a pragmatic way forward in that re-engagement.”

N.A.#6/(20 January, 1991): In the article which is concerned with the democratic reforms and economic liberalization, various participants made claims about the reforms. “The problem, according to A. Hartman, a former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, is that those opposed to reform have deliberately brought about the disintegration of the society.”

N.A.#7/(May 24, 91): “President Bush said that he was keeping ‘all options’ open in his desire to spur Soviet economic reform, but he reacted coolly to President Gorbachev’s suggestion that the industrialized democracies should help the Soviet Union financially.”

N.A.#8/(May 30, 1991): “Three advisers to the Soviet President were told by Washington that they would have to make concrete steps – not just promises – before any American aid would be considered. ‘The U.S. is very interested in supporting both political and economic reform in the Soviet Union,’ Secretary of State J.A. Baker said after meeting the Soviet delegation. ‘The first step is to undertake real market-based reforms, to use incentives to tap the very great potential that exists in the Soviet Union and the considerable resources and skilled people that exist in the Soviet Union.’ American officials said they wanted to study the Soviets’ proposals and would be giving some formal response in the coming weeks. Some American officials say they believe that the American economists from Harvard and other universities who have been advising the Soviets in preparing their proposal may have given them an exaggerated sense of what Washington is able and willing to do. ‘We want to inject a little realism into their expectations,’ an Administration official said. ‘.. Gorbachev may have decided that no economic reform is possible without

massive Western assistance. Our message is that reform is necessary no matter what, and that as they take steps down that road, the conditions for Western aid and private investment will change as well. But if the Soviets think they are going to get a \$100 billion up front, there is just not going to be that kind of safety net. It is going to have to be an evolutionary thing.”

N.A.#9/(July 18, 1991): In the article concerned with “the meeting of G7 Mr. Gorbachev’s presentation left the G7 leaders with many questions, but in later remarks Mr. Major and President Bush said they were persuaded that the Soviet leader was trying to move to a market economy.”

The Claims About the Soviet State

N.A.#10/(April 2, 1989): In the article, which claimed that “American experts on Eastern Europe were in broad agreement that M.S. Gorbachev’s quest for modernization increased the potential for destabilization across the Eastern bloc, Mark Palmer, the U.S. Ambassador to Hungary contented that there were many points of engagement that lay ‘between the extremes of passivity and force.’ He listed a number of economic measures ranging from increasing the numbers of commercial attachés to reducing the barriers on trade. He also backed support by Americans for dissident and opposition groups active in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. He noted that the U.S. was more popular in this region than in any other.”

N.A.#11/(April 30, 1989): In the article with respect to the presence of Soviet athletes in American sports, “Ed Salazar of the State Department’s Bureau of Soviet Affairs said, ‘I’m sure people there who made these decisions gave this a lot of thought, but decided to attempt it despite the risks. It opens the door to the West that detente never did. And because it is so important in the Soviet Union, has such a high profile, the sports exchange can be an indication of how things are going politically.’

N.A.#12/ (14 January, 1990): “An official said that it became apparent to

analysts in 1987, when M.S. Gorbachev began pressing his plan of political structuring, that "all the props were getting knocked out from under the regime," and that basic changes were inevitable."

The Soviet Leaders

N.A.#13/(May 24, 91): "President Bush said that he personally 'never believed that President Gorbachev had given up on reform.'"

N.A.#14/ (Jul 18, 91): "President Bush said they were persuaded that the Soviet leader was trying to move to a market economy."

II. SOVIET VOICES

The Soviet claims on the reforms are formulated in a spectrum that covers the claims about the economic and political changes in the Soviet Union, as is exemplified below.

Claims About the Reforms

N.A.#15/(April 21, 1989): In the article titled: 'Restlessness in the Soviet Ranks' "The first Lieut. Viktor M. Gursky and a fellow officer tried to explain their complaints about poor conditions, scandalous health care, and army political indoctrination, and getting in exchange a disdainful dressing down. 'We never thought that it would go to such a high level,' said the astonished lieutenant, who was bucked to private and discharged from the army shortly after what he described as a bizarre audience with the Defence Minister."

N.A.#16/(April 30, 1989): In the article which covered the presence of the Soviet athletes in American sports, "a senior Soviet tennis trainer, S. Terpicshev said 'in sport, as all spheres of our life, it is time for serious changes.' V. Yegorov, a senior coordinator for the state radio network said 'for the Soviet Union, this is like a new flow of blood in old arteries, it is new blood for the U.S. too.'"

N.A.#17/(May 7, 1989): In the article where the openness policy of the K.G.B. was examined, "the K.G.B. chief, V.A. Kryuchkov said 'the activity of our offices won't be so secret as it has been until now.' The

interview was filled with fervor of glasnost, the policy of openness decreed by Gorbachev. Without providing details, Mr. Kryuchkov promised to inform the public about 'all major and important operations carried out by our service. Our workers act within the framework of the law.'"

N.A.#18/(May 23, 1989): In the article titled "Soviet Pollution Hurts Finnish Wilderness," it is claimed, "environmentalists on the Soviet side of the border have been among the vociferous people taking advantage of Mr.Gorbachev's call for public debate about the country's problems."

N.A.#19/ (June 2, 1989): "Present M.S. Gorbachev privately reassured the Estonian deputies to the new national congress that their insurgent call for independent self-management of their economy fitted in with his reform plans, one of the deputies said."

In the article which covered the meeting held by the Estonian leaders and M.S. Gorbachev, "Present M.S. Gorbachev privately reassured the Estonian deputies to the new national congress that their insurgent call for independent self-management of their economy fitted in with his reform plans, one of the deputies said."

N.A.#20/ (June 2, 1989): In the article that was concerned with the K.G.B's involvement in domestic affairs, "the K.G.B. chief said 'I have not been chairman of the Committee for State Security for a long time, only since last October, and I can tell you with full responsibility that we understand the goals and the tasks of perestroika perfectly well. We are active supporters of perestroika.'"

N.A.#21/ (June 11, 1989): In the context of the Russian enterprises, "V. Krotov, an engineer and the president of the A.E.S. said 'what we are doing is controversial and dangerous There are people in the Soviet Union who want to joint ventures to fail.' 'The critics ask what we need all these new ideas for. I tell them we need new ideas to survive.' [About workers] 'Many times they received threats against their lives,' 'People do not budge without instructions from the top, without the

political protection.”

N.A.#22/(June 21, 1989): During a meeting between a group of American neo-conservatives and Soviet intellectuals, “Mr. Podhoretz, the editor of the neo-conservative journal *Commentary*, conceded that undeniable changes had taken place in the Soviet Union, so much so that he was ‘astonished.’ ‘I feel uncertain about this,’ he said. ‘Glasnost, as we are providing right this minute, is a reality. I have friends who spent many years in the gulag for saying a lot less than what we’re saying today,’ he continued. Y. Zamoshkin, a Soviet sociologist said ‘there are cycles,’ Professor Zamoshkin ‘You [Americans] are in a cycle of national pride,’ he said. ‘And we,’ he said, surveying the eager Soviet audience, ‘are in a cycle of national self-criticism.’

N.A.#23/(July 24, 1989): “Gorbachev told the striking coal miners that he was greatly ‘inspired’ that they were ‘taking things into their hands’ to force the sort of change that he says is necessary for his troubled program of national restructuring to succeed. He rebuked party critics alarmed that perestroika, or restructuring, might be destabilizing the nation. He said that the strike action was understandable because ‘people have lost faith in the possibility of change.’ ‘Many apparently still operate with old, outdated categories and have not come to feel that time has changed and that the people are demanding a dialogue, discussion and solution to vital issues.’ Many miners have complained they felt badly neglected by the Government and decided to take perestroika into their own hands.”

N.A.#24/(August 15, 1989): In the article titled “Soviet Economic Bureaucrats Are Not About to Fade Away,” the participants about “the economic problems in the Soviet Union seem to be separated into two major groups: Soviet optimists and skeptics. Soviet optimists view the present course as a necessary consolidation, laying a foundation of stability and building public confidence before proceeding with more far-reaching economic reforms. But skeptics are concerned that the Government wants to back away from the wrenching structural transformation, with all the attendant political risks, that is required to

decentralize decision-making and the allocation of capital. And without changing the system, they warn, the underlying problems of a centrally planned economy will persist. 'My fear is that they want to remove the notion of perestroika – a true restructuring – by taking a series of special measures,' said G.K. Popov, a senior economist at the Institute of Economics, a state research organization, who is also a deputy in the new Soviet congress. 'But it's still the same whip and fist, the same system administered by the same bosses.' V.V. Kadannikov, general director of the Volga Automotive Plant Association, one of the largest industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union: 'It's as though they abolished the serfdom, and then abolished the decision to abolish the serfdom. There are new freedoms, but also limitations on those same freedoms.' He believes that unless the economy is further freed to stimulate the production of consumer goods, the Soviet Union faces a serious crisis of worsening shortages, public dissatisfaction and strikes."

N.A.#25/(August 20, 1989): In the article which describes an American graduate who is interning in the New York bureau of Tass, "the Soviet Press agency, V. Mostovets, the agency's chief New York correspondent said 'before glasnost it would be impossible to have interns. But with better relations we felt it would be a good experiment for American students to learn about journalism and to see how we worked.'"

N.A.#26/(September 22, 1989): About the economic hardships experienced by the citizens, "Mr. Daskal, who is a construction worker, a family man and one of the horde of Soviet citizens said 'we've had four years of perestroika and glasnost and things have only gotten worse. The only thing we have is more glasnost and perestroika.' 'The changes mean nothing,' said a man holding his daughter's hand and standing angrily outside the latest emporium that is taboo for hard-pressed Soviet shoppers, a new supermarket stocked with delectable Western goods."

N.A.#27/(December, 26, 1989): In the article titled "Enough' for Glasnost?" "President M.S. Gorbachev 'today we have the perestroika, the salvation of socialism, giving it a second breath, revealing everything good which is in this system,' told the congress in a tone

that, as ever, displayed his formidable self-assurance but also had an edge of pleading."

N.A.#28/ (February 4, 1990): In the article that covers the Soviet emigres to Israel, "M. Nekterman, a 60-year-old electrician who left behind everyone he knew to take a gamble on a new life in Israel with his family said 'it's because of glasnost. There was always anti-Semitism. But before, people were a little afraid to say what they really thought. Now they can come forward and say exactly what they want. There's no longer any room in the Soviet Union for Jews.'"

N.A.#29/(February 9, 1990): In the article titled "Economic Scene," "M.S. Gorbachev argued that the first task is to reform agriculture by ending the ruinous system of collective farms."

N.A.#30/(February 19, 1990): In the article titled "Moscow a Year Later: Rutted Streets and Despair," "a Communist functionary said of a rumored demonstration 'I hear a million people could be on the streets on February 25.' 'We do not have a tradition of democracy in this country,' said the writer A.N. Rybakov, one of the earliest beneficiaries of Mr. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost. 'People don't understand that in a democracy, you can lose elections, and when you lose, you have to submit to the rule of the majority until your turn comes again.'"

N.A.#31/(March 15, 1990): "During an international conference on the economic crisis in the Soviet Union, delegates to the conference got a dim view of the results of perestroika. V.A. Tikhonov, president of the U.S.S.R Union of Cooperatives, said the Soviet economy was 'falling apart.'"

N.A.#32/(May 13, 1990): In another article concerned with the Soviet economy, it was argued that "the Soviet 'reform' economists generally cited only the major success among Mr. Gorbachev's economic innovations : the legalizing of cooperatives, small group businesses that are as close as the society has yet come to private enterprise."

N.A.#33/(June 20, 1990): On the reform program included in a speech delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, "hardline speakers blamed the

Gorbachev program of accelerated change and openness for the nation's array of problems. 'Many things in perestroika now are hampered by the fact that the public consciousness is unprepared and marked by conservatism and narrow-minded attitudes, which formed for decades within a totalitarian ideology,' Mr. Gorbachev said, while concluding that nonetheless an array of 'profound' and 'most encouraging' social changes are underway and irreversible. The Soviet leader pleaded for the public to see the five years of perestroika as a relatively small period in human history. But within that time, he said, global nuclear disarmament has been begun."

N.A.#34/(September 4, 1990): "Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov took to national television and vowed a spirited fight to keep for another year, rather than change, the central Government's existing economic controls. He demonstrated the current struggle in the Kremlin by disclosing that despite Mr. Gorbachev's stated preference for swifter free-market reforms, Mr. Ryzhkov has urged that the President sign an emergency order existing economic structure of tight central management through 1991. One of his principal critics, Mayor G.K. Popov of Moscow, was given an unusual opportunity of a minute on the main TV news show to urge the people to take peacefully to the streets to press for the Prime Minister's resignation and adoption of rapid free-market reforms."

N.A.#35/(September 16, 1990): "An emergency economic plan was devised by the economic advisers of President M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic. The plan called for slashing budgets for foreign aid, the military and the K.G.B., selling state property, and so on. In the context of the debate about the 500-day plan, 'we will not stop at anything,' Mr. Ryzhkov declared, insisting that the national economic situation was too enfeebled to risk enacting the more radical free-market economic plans offered by his critics. 'This pursuit of perestroika reminds me of the old times,' he said, referring to the politics of purge of the recent Communist past. At the same time Mayor G.K. Popov of Moscow urged the people to take peacefully to the streets to press for the Prime Minister's resignation and the adoption of

rapid free-market reforms. Accusing the Prime Minister of mainly planning to protect the status quo, Mr. Popov, a free-market economist, said Mr. Ryzhkov 'has never had and will never have a plan to go over to the free market.' Most of the present economic crisis over shrinking consumer supplies and a collapsing rouble have been caused and aggravated by the central Government, Mr. Popov said."

N.A.#36/(September 19, 1990): "Alexander Solzhenitsyn broke his silence with a call for a separate Slavic state and a scathing indictment of Soviet history, including the 'noisy' reforms of President M.S. Gorbachev. His message to 'our nation,' took advantage of the country's separatist political demands to present a prescription for dismembering most of the Soviet Union and making a single nation of the Slavic republics of Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia. He gave little credit to President Gorbachev for introducing democratic forces into the nation. He added: 'What has five or six years of perestroika brought us but a halfhearted reshuffling of the party Central Committee and an ugly, fake election system with only one goal: for the Communist Party not to lose power?' 'Soon it will be six years,' he wrote measuring the Gorbachev era. 'But the noisy perestroika has not yet even touched industry nor agriculture with its medicinal powers. This procrastination means years more of suffering for the people, years crossed out of their lives.' 'Out of every four troubadours of today's glasnost, there are three recent toadies of Brezhnev. and who of them has ever pronounced a word of his own repentance?'"

N.A.#37/ (October, 17, 1990): "S.S. Shatalin, asked if the [500-day] plan would lead to a real market economy, he said simply, 'No.' B.N. Yeltsin said like earlier Government economic plans, it was bound to fail in a matter of months. Mr. Gorbachev dropped his earlier reference to a 'regulated' market, and he uses the word 'socialist' only once, saying 'the transition to the market does not contradict the socialist choice of our people.' Mr. Gorbachev said in September that he favored Mr. Shatalin's radical alternative. Critics said the Shatalin plan would lead to rocketing inflation and large-scale unemployment, economic chaos and political anarchy. A.N. Boiko, chairman of a key economic subcommittee in Parliament, said 'the mood is changing in

Gorbachev's direction,' 'people are beginning to see what happens when economic links are broken, supplies are disrupted, economic wars break out. When republics began declaring that their laws take precedence over the union, they sowed the seeds of anarchy. Now things must be brought back under control.'"

N.A.#38/(October 18, 1990): In the article covering the conditions in terms of consuming in the markets and the economic hardship the people are experiencing, "a Muscovite, I. Remikaite said 'we know what is really going on. There is no future prospect and I want my children to migrate from this,' she said as legislators in the Kremlin began poring over the latest compromise version of 'the plan,' the often delayed, always shifting raft of promises for economic change from President M.S. Gorbachev.

N.A.#39/(October 18, 1990): In the article that was concerned with the consequences of the economic program, "Mr. Yeltsin denounced the plan as an attempt to retain 'a system the people have come to hate.'"

N.A.#40/(October 19, 1990): "Defending the 500-day plan, Mr. Aganbegyan said it was impossible to spell out a uniform program for the whole country. 'The program dictates the basic direction of reform, preserving the right of Soviet republics to work out the details.' But many in the radical camp were skeptical of Mr. Aganbenyan's promise of a free hand. S.N. Krasavchenko, chairman of the Committee on Economic Reform and Property of the Russian Republic's Parliament, said: 'They say, go ahead, we'll give every republic the chance to carry out its own program. But the power remains with us, the banks remains with us, the army and police remain with us. Ryzhkov remains with us.'

Even many radicals who said the program did not move decisively enough to break up the central economy's autocracy ended up supporting it, eager to take at least the first steps toward a free market.

The combative Mr. Yeltsin denounced the plan within hours of its

publication as a catastrophe doomed to failure. He insisted that economic reform should be in the hands of the republics' leaders who have popular trust to lead the country through hard times.

Mr. Gorbachev admitted that 'the worst mistake in the years of perestroika' was losing control of spending and the money supply."

N.A.#41/(October 22, 1990): "Mr. Yeltsin proclaimed that that Russia would embark on a radical transition to free markets and he did not intend that his people set off on his journey with empty stomachs."

N.A.#42/(December 28, 1990): "M.S. Gorbachev: '.... Every man for himself. This would mean the breakup not only of the economy, but of the Soviet Union."

N.A.#43/(February 3, 1991): "A. Borovik, a journalist said: 'if you ask people now whether they want bread and order or freedom and democracy, they will say we want bread and order,' he said. 'The nation is ready for strong rule.'"

N.A.#44/(March 5, 1991): "Mr. Klyamkin, a political scientist said 'going back is impossible, because the old ideologized system will never be revived and will not work; to stop is also impossible because no one has ever managed to stop the process of collapse and disintegration.'

[When M.S. Gorbachev first opened the door to market-oriented economic restructuring programs several years ago] 'There was energy,' said A. Tarasov, who became famous for earning millions of rubles and dollars by brokering trade deals between Soviet enterprises and foreign partners. 'There was competition. There was a feeling that new worlds were opening up.' Now there is fear, he says. Soviet citizens involved in business fret that as President Gorbachev curtails the country's move toward a market economy, entrepreneurs are becoming targets of a central Government that will not easily yield to market pressures."

N.A.#45/ (May 21, 1991): "Mr. Yavlinsky said the talks had the support

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of President M.S. Gorbachev. Many of the changes, including the creation of a market economy, privatization and political decentralization, have been proposed over the last two years, only to be rejected by Mr. Gorbachev or to fall victim to opposition from hard-line Communists. He stressed that there is now both a greater sense of crisis in the Soviet Union and a greater opportunity for change.

G.A. Yavlinsky, a Russian economist, said many of the changes, including the creation of a market economy, privatization and political decentralization, have been proposed over the last two years, only to be rejected by Mr. Gorbachev or to fall victim to opposition from hard-line Communists. He stressed that there is now both a greater sense of crisis in the Soviet Union and a greater opportunity for change."

N.A.#46/(May 26, 1991): "Mr. Yavlinsky claimed that it is in the deepest national interest of the Western world to bring the Soviet giant into the fold of civilised nations. The transition to genuine democracy and free enterprise would open a free market of 270 million souls in a land of rich resources, relatively skilled labourers and low wages. To many Russians, the very notion that there is some question about Western involvement comes as a rude shock. 'I work from the premise that sooner or later the Soviet Union must return to the global community,' said Mr. Yavlinsky, 'and that it is better done sooner than by force. We cannot achieve this on our own. The West has the huge experience of its own transformation, and now is the moment when it must be used.'"

N.A.#47/(May 30, 1991): "Y.M. Primakov, the member of Gorbachev's national security council responsible for economics, said 'What the [revised anti-crisis] program calls for is primarily liberalization, privatization, destatization, and getting away from the policies of the administrative structure that had been existent previous.'"

N.A.#48/(June 5, 1991): "'Our voluminous programs,' said L.I. Piyasheva, an economist, 'are just some kind of game, far from real economics, just like the planning game we played for more than 70

years.”

N.A.#49/(June 6, 1991): “M.S. Gorbachev warned that the failure of his campaign to restructure the broken Soviet economy would cost the world its best chance yet for a new era of peace [during his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize]. ‘If perestroika fails, the prospect of entering a new peaceful period in history will vanish, at least for the foreseeable future,’ Mr. Gorbachev said. He used the forum as a kind of summing up of his often tumultuous six-year struggle to change what he described as a system on the edge of disaster, ‘a misinformed society under the spell of propaganda’ where ‘the slightest manifestations of protest were suppressed.’ He criticized those within the S. Union who ‘would like to reverse course altogether’ and anguished over the separatists, ethnic groups and private interests who, ‘even though they also have the right to exist and to be represented in the political process,’ must learn to put their interests below those of society as a whole. He acknowledged that his shifting agenda has led to confusion, but said that ‘jumping to conclusions after every step taken by the Soviet leadership, after every decree by the President, trying to figure out whether he is moving left or right, backward or forward, would be an exercise in futility, and would not lead to an understanding. Nothing and no one, no pressure, either from the right or from left, will make me abandon the position of perestroika and new thinking,’ Mr. Gorbachev declared. ‘I do not intend to change my views or convictions. My choice is a final one.’”

N.A.#50/(July 3, 1991): “A career Communist, Mr. Yakovlev, wrote in an article: ‘The party apparatus at all levels is rushing to mobilize party members against democratic reforms, against economic and political freedoms.’”

N.A.#51/(July 8, 1991): In the article that was concerned with “the young people in the city of Astrakhan who persuaded one of the new insurgent city councilmen to propose that the city build a special youth hotel, the councilman, V. Karpov, touched one of the sorest spots of Communism – the inhibitions of communal apartment living – with one of the sharper issues of glasnost : how libertine should the new

freedoms and candor be allowed to become. Mr. Karpov's supporters say he is what true perestroika reforms need, someone speak his mind and push the limits of free debate, even if the specifics of his proposals can be too strong."

N.A.#52/(July 9, 1991): "'We're fed up with our planned economy,' said B.M. Glukhman, deputy chairman of the City Council of Astrakhan and a staunch Communist who is jaded nevertheless. 'We are possessed with the idea of privatization. Where is it?'"

N.A.#53/(July 11, 1991): "The voices of a group of Muscovites coming from various social backgrounds, their claims about the economic crisis can be summarized as follows:

G.N. Yezhola (Architect, 58):

'We need time if we are going to turn the economy around 180 degrees. People will do what they have to do, but we need time.'

N.I. Vlasov (Retired Construction Worker, 70):

'People have to be made to work. There is a poor organization of labor now – we don't put any value on people's work. In the West, people get paid for what they do. Here it's not that way. To make people work, you have to pay them so their work is valued.'

A. Kislarov (Accountant, 33):

'First of all, we need privatization. Now there are no owners. Nothing belongs to anybody. And from that simple fact come all the problems. No one is interested in preserving materials, in looking after people's needs.'

T. Trofimova (Worker, 55):

'In my view, we can do whatever it is we need to do and without outside help if we have to. This country has lived through so much, we can make it through this period too. What we have to do is to

consolidate our forces and our resources.'

A.V. Yablokov (Plumber, 24):

'We have to privatize everything more quickly. We have to develop private property. We have to get rid of this nightmarish structure, and do it quickly.'

L.I. Tsegankova (Black-marketeer selling cosmetics and frying pans on a Moscow street, 69):

'I can tell you what's wrong with the Soviet economy in one word: liars. The whole lot of them over there in the Kremlin are just a pack of liars, and the worst of them is sitting at the top, and you know who I mean. People are all against Gorbachev. He should be ashamed of himself, making all these promises and then delivering nothing, to us. For the next century our lives won't be as good as in third-world countries in Africa.

Gorbachev did perestroika all wrong. He should have started on the farms. Then there would have been more food in the stores. If people's stomachs are full, they are more willing to work harder. Instead, the only people who have benefited so far from perestroika are apparatchiks, who are turning their official positions into money-making machines.'

I.N. Mogucheva (Cashier, 51):

'I don't know much about economics. I have six children to look after. All I know is we Muscovites are constantly amazed. We work, we see all sorts of goods come into the city, the prices go up – and still the shelves are empty.'

V.Y. Gulyayev (Law Professor, 57):

'What's wrong? Everything is wrong. We have to move to a market

economy. We have to be less afraid, to risk more. The problem is that our market will be a wild one, because it'll combine existing monopolies and a real market system. But there is simply no other way.'

A.I. Levikov (Economic editor, *Business in the U.S.S.R.* magazine):

'An absolute drop in production is taking place, and the problem is that because of political considerations, differences among the republics, lack of a union treaty, etc., we still do not have an efficient or reliable anticrisis program. This is the kind of economy that needs Western capital badly, including investments, but this is impossible for two reasons: on the one hand the inconvertibility of the ruble, which stops investors, and on the other hand Soviet organizations are too much in debt to Western businessmen and banks and so have exhausted the credit of trust.'

Z. Sergeyevna (Farm worker selling wild strawberries, 57):

'We need hard-working people. Everybody has become lazy. Young people don't want to do jobs they should be doing. The Government should take these young people in hand and make them work.'

V. Yakovlev (Editor in Chief, *Kommersant*, a business weekly):

'The main problem with the Soviet economy is that it's in a condition that allows the Times to ask what's wrong with the economy, expecting a two-word answer. The biggest mistake is to tackle the problem this way – which is exactly what the government has been doing – asking what's wrong and trying to find just one recipe. The question should be more specific. The Soviet economy is no longer in a state, no matter what's wrong with it, when you can ask what's wrong with the Soviet economy. We are talking about a complicated economic structure that is developing quickly and in the right direction.'

A.A. Kovalova (Cashier, 55):

'What's wrong? Our system. The old structure won't give up, and the new one is still struggling. They have to give the "democrats" and Yeltsin a chance to take charge, and the Communist Party has to disappear. We need the West to teach us how to work and to help us with technology. We have a lot. Look at how rich our country is.'

S.P. Zalygin (Editor in chief, N. Mir, a monthly literary journal):

'A correct decision has been found – privatization – but the direction it took is not correct. Privatization had to start and be accompanied with a legal basis. But the privatization we have had for about a year or even more is not regulated by any rules.'

V. Vasilyev (Ballet dancer and director):

'It's necessary to adopt the Western system, the system of the developed Western countries. And that's it. And no exceptions. We need to start living as they do, to reach their standards.'

G. Y. Baklanov (Editor in chief, Znamya magazine):

'Everything is wrong and everything must be corrected. In the first place, political solutions are required. Political courage is needed. I think that the Yavlinsky program provides a good basis for it.'

V. A. Starkov (Editor in chief, Argumenty i Fakty, weekly paper):

'The key word is freedom. The absence of freedom gives no chance for progress. Freedom includes human rights, freedom of enterprise.'

A.A. Fyodorov (Owner of private restaurant):

'Everything is wrong. Legislation on private property must be adopted, including the right to sell land to private owners. The process can start with small business enterprises, like small tailors' shops, small shops, restaurants, etc.'

It was probably L.I Tsegankova, 69-year-old peddler of cosmetics and frying pans, who offered the most vivid version of a common thought: 'The only thing to do now is to let it all loose, like a big typhoon. Set free all the market forces on every level. Only a huge storm like that can have a chance of success.'

Not many would disagree with G.Y. Baklanov, the editor of Znamya, when he declares that 'everything is wrong, and everything must be corrected.'"

N.A.#54/(August 16, 1991): In the article which covered the largest Soviet-American venture, "Mr. Shevardnadze said that he found political and business leaders pointing to the proposed Chevron deal as a test of Soviet resolve to move toward market capitalism."

Claims About the Soviet State

N.A.#55/(April 17, 1989): An article in Izvestia complained that "the costs of a major space projects were still a 'state secret.'"

N.A.#56/(April 21, 1989): "An army doctor stationed with an engineering division near the city of Kirov, Mr. Gursky said his grievances with the military were a mix of political disenchantment and personal dissatisfaction. He joined a dissident political group called the Democratic Union, which advocates an end to the Communist Party's monopoly on political life. 'I said literally that I was against the fact that it is the Communist Party that administers the army and the Government, that the party was even responsible for crimes and that it did not have the moral right to lead the Government,' he recalled."

N.A.#57/(April 22, 1989): "The first Lieut. Viktor M. Gursky, an army doctor stationed with an engineering division near the city of Kirov, and a fellow officer tried to explain their complaints about poor conditions, scandalous health care, and army political indoctrination, and getting in exchange a disdainful dressing down. Mr. Gursky said his grievances with the military were a mix of political

disenchantment and personal dissatisfaction. He joined a dissident political group called the Democratic Union, which advocates an end to the Communist Party's monopoly on political life. 'I said literally that I was against the fact that it is the Communist Party that administers the army and the Government, that the party was even responsible for crimes and that it did not have the moral right to lead the Government,' he recalled."

N.A.#58/(April 30, 1989): In the article that covered the presence of the Soviet athletes in American sports, "G. Kasparov, the world chess champion, told the A.P. in a recent interview: 'I think what is happening now in sports is very important. It is connected to people's rights in our country, a fight to be able to make decisions for yourself.' Referring to the Soviet sports establishment, he said: 'Of course they don't like it. They are afraid it could become like a chain reaction.'"

N.A.#59/ (May 30, 1989): "In the face of mounting public indignation, the four-day-old Soviet congress reversed itself and voted to give B.N. Yeltsin, the maverick communist, a seat in a new legislature. Mr. Yeltsin said the decision to admit him was a reaction to an outpouring of anger. 'I think it shows the growth of the level of democratization in the congress itself step by step, from the first day, people have begun to figure out the atmosphere.'"

N.A.#60/(June 2, 1989): "In the context of the recent changes in K.G.B., Mr. Medvedev said that he favored giving the Supreme Soviet control over the appointment of the K.G.B. chief. 'Why should we make exception for the chairman of the K.G.B.?' he told reporters. 'He's a member of the Government, and the Government should be formed in accordance with the Constitution. Why should we make an exception?' Mr. Vlasov, whose father disappeared after being summoned by the security police in 1953, told the congress that the K.G.B. was a threat to democracy. He called for bringing the budget, the personnel and the operations of the agency under the control of the Supreme Soviet."

N.A.#61/(June 2, 1989): "Y. Yevtushenko (a poet) called for an end to

the consumer privileges of the governing hierarchy, and the rooting out of pathological secrecy once and for all by 'giving every citizen a Xerox machine.'"

N.A.#62/(June 11, 1989): In the article covering the new joint ventures in the Soviet Union, "V. Krotov, an engineer, said: 'What we are doing is controversial and dangerous There are people in the Soviet Union who want to joint ventures to fail.' 'The critics ask what we need all these new ideas for. I tell them we need new ideas to survive.' About workers 'Many times they received threats against their lives,' 'People do not budge without instructions from the top, without the political protection.'"

N.A.#63/(June 21, 1989): "During a meeting between a group of American neo-conservatives and Soviet intellectuals, Mr. Podhoretz, the editor of the neo-conservative journal Commentary told his Soviet audience at the Kinocenter that their Government, not the U.S., was solely responsible for starting and stoking the Cold War. Mr. Podhoretz was ready for the opportunity to tell the Soviets directly about the 'absolute evil' nature of Communism and his concern at how easily Mr. Gorbachev was getting the Western alliance to disarm".

N.A.#64/(July 2, 1989): During a television address "Mr. Gorbachev endorsed 'free development of language and culture' by ethnic minorities and 'conversation and rational utilization of the environment in which their forefathers lived for centuries.' He promised a 'profound transformation of the Soviet federation' to give people more control over their local affairs. He blamed the discontent on economic hardship, historical efforts to stamp out local cultures and the forced relocation of groups, all of which has sometimes been exploited by corrupt local officials to protect their power."

N.A.#65/(September 22, 1989): "A Muscovite, who is a construction worker, said: 'the situation gets more and more tense in our country, and our problems will be solved by either democratic methods of Gorbachev or by the old methods of the 1950's.'"

N.A.#66/(February 4, 1990): In the article titled "Gorbachev Backs Multiparty State, Some in Party Say," it is argued that "Mr. Gorbachev has pulled back from a climatic confrontation with party conservatives, either because he was unsure of prevailing or because he was raised in a system of ruling by consensus."

N.A.#67/(February 9, 1990): "Mr. Gorbachev has attacked that power at its core – in the dark heart of the Communist Party, which has had a stranglehold on the Soviet economy."

N.A.#68/(February 19, 1990): In the article which characterized Moscow and economic hardships the Muscovites has been experiencing, it is argued, "'a rule-of-law state has no room for dictatorship by any class, and even less so for the power of a management bureaucracy,' said the party's draft platform that the Central Committee approved last week. But it only recognized a state of affairs that already exists. The party is no longer 'the' party."

N.A.#69/(May 14, 1990): "The Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov: 'It may be that we need a non-Communist administration' said. 'Only such a government can persuade the country to pay the price of introducing a real market, because they can say: We're not guilty of where the Communist system brought you. We don't answer for their mistakes.'"

N.A.#70/(September 19, 1990): The article titled "How to Revitalize Russia" by Alexander Solzhenitsyn "was studded with mocking denunciations of various Communist figures, from Lenin to Brezhnev and the gangs of selfish 'looters' who ruled the nation. He warned the nation 'the death knell has sounded for Communism. But the concrete structure has not yet toppled and we face the danger of being crushed by the debris instead of reaching the freedom.'"

N.A.#71/(September 25, 1990): "M.S. Gorbachev: 'Everybody agrees that a more effective functioning of a government, especially of executive power, is needed. The fact that this hasn't happened has given rise to distress and much criticism. No single plan can be finally adopted. It is my deepest conviction that we have to unite forces at this decisive moment. If we split up, if we clash, we will ruin this historic turning

point.'

Mr. Gorbachev and his supporters insisted that he was not usurping the powers of either the Supreme Soviet or the republics. Nor, they said, does he plan to suspend the work of locally elected institutions – though the Soviet leader last Friday said such action might be necessary 'in some cases.'

Mr. Gorbachev's request for extra powers overshadowed the debate over the economy. G. Filshin, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian republic, called the move 'an attempt to discredit the Parliament,' while others, like the Soviet Interior Minister, Vadim V. Bakatin, looked at it as an attempt to resolve a mounting legal crisis, 'to draw up new rules of the game.'"

N.A.#72/(October 17, 1990): "President M.S. Gorbachev sent the Soviet Parliament a compromise economic reform program that calls for dismantling the state's economic monopoly. B.N. Yeltsin denounced the Gorbachev plan as a tactical plan retreat that would allow central bureaucracy to retain its monopoly on power indefinitely."

N.A.#73/(October 19, 1990): "I have the impression that the leadership of Russia is retreating from difficulties, and that it wants to lay the full responsibility for possible difficulties and consequences on the central authorities,' Mr. Gorbachev said. 'They are keeping their path clear for retreat. We must realize that in the current explosive situation, the program of stabilizing the economy touches upon vital interests of the country, and it is immoral to turn it into a subject of political games.'"

N.A.#74/(December 1, 1990): "The Commersant, a new Soviet business weekly, was selling out at kiosks by 8:00 a.m. within months of its debut. It takes its name from a pre-Revolutionary Russian business journal 'to show that the history of a private economy here is much longer than the history of a socialist economy,' V. Yakovlev, the editor of the paper, said."

N.A.#75/(December 14, 1990): "In a forthcoming book called 'The Anti-

Communist Manifesto: Whom to Help in Russia,' six Soviet scholars urged the West to withhold any aid to the Soviet Union that might prop up the existing industrial and farm monopolies and thus postpone the development of truly private enterprise. 'Even the grain sales to the U.S.S.R. contribute to the preservation of this parasitic system,' wrote L. Piyasheva, an independent market economist."

N.A.#76/(December 28, 1990): "'If the state doesn't have a budget, if it does not know where it is going, then it means things are really falling apart,' said A.A. Sobchak, Mayor of Leningrad and a member of the Congress. 'If there is no budget, it invalidates the entire Congress, and means we have been sitting here in vain.' Mr. Gorbachev accused Russia of arrogant 'economic populism' that could set off a chain reaction among the republics and throw the country deeper into chaos. 'What is Russia?' he said. 'It is the union. What is the union? It is mostly Russia. Do you think you are more Russian than we are?'

N.A.#77/(January 20, 1991): "E.A. Schevardnadze resigned, expressing fears that the country was moving toward dictatorship."

N.A.#78/(February 3, 1991): "'The apparat would never permit a really deep land reform, would never permit the infringement of the economic monopoly of the collective and state farms,' I. Klyamkin, a political scientist who predicted the authoritarian turn now under way, said. 'That was possible only under public pressure and for that society itself had to be awakened.' He added that the opposition operates in conditions of 'post-totalitarian democracy,' which gave them only a mandate to protect their share of the wealth by declaring local 'sovereignty,' not to impose sacrifice. 'This is democracy in a society without private property and a market, or, what is the same thing, in a society where democracy has no economic roots,' Mr. Klyamkin said. 'In such a society, strictly speaking there are no producers, only consumers.'

Col. V. Alksnis, a hardliner, contended that unrest in the army is comparable to that in 1917. 'It will begin as an inter-ethnic conflict,' the

Colonel told the weekly Argumenty i Fakty. 'But that is only its outward form. Today everyone already understands that it is essentially a political conflict.'"

N.A.#79/(April 22, 1991): "'The Russian empire has come to abuse its folly,' said N.Petrakov, former chief economic adviser to Mr. Gorbachev, quoting Bismarck and criticizing the Soviet President's attempt at dealing with the latest Government statistics in his latest anti-crisis program as a reflection of an 'imperialist mentality' entrenched in the Kremlin."

N.A.#80/(May 26, 1991): "During a meeting at a dacha, Mr. Gorbachev and the republic leaders agreed in principle to drop the word 'socialist' from the name of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and to insert the word 'sovereign' in its place, the B.N. Yeltsin told. The new name would be the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics, retaining the familiar U.S.S.R. abbreviation in English.

'What is going on is stimulating the centripetal forces of our multinational state,' Mr. Gorbachev said. Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin both said that the new union treaty could be completed as early as June. A question that remains unanswered is what happens to those republics who refuse to sign the union treaty."

N.A.#81/(June 20, 1991): "'Our central Government talked about a market economy, but was afraid to introduce it before,' said S.B. Stankevich, first vice chairman of the Moscow City Council."

N.A.#82/(July 3, 1991): "'Such a threat [of dictatorship] exists in reality and one purpose of our movement is not to allow a return to that past,' said Former Minister E.A. Shevardnadze."

N.A.#83/(July 7, 1991): "For many Soviet citizens, however, 'party' still smacks of the secretive, elitist and corrupt Communist Party. Opposition politicians have shown a readiness to join in loosely knit coalitions or movements, but they have been wary of anything tagged a party."

Leaders

N.A.#84/(May 25, 1989): In the article titled 'New Soviet Congress Set For Opening Debates' it was argued that "with Communist Party members making up nearly 90 percent of the congress and with Mr. Gorbachev clearly willing to assert party discipline, there is no question that the party will maintain control on major policy issues. It was also argued that the deputies from all regions of the country approved the nomination of a single candidate to be president of the new body, though deputies said it was possible that a 'symbolic' alternative candidate would be nominated to establish the principle of competition; and that one member of the new congress who might have posed a challenge to Gorbachev for the top position, Yeltsin, told the reporters that he did not want to be nominated; and that he appeared to be flirting with an alternative candidacy; and that he was warned that that would be regarded as a major breach of party loyalty; and that though most of the independent deputies support Gorbachev as the architect of political change, some assert that his coronation-style election as president and the orchestration of the new congress are reminiscent of traditional legislatures."

N.A.#85/(May 30, 1989): In the article it is argued that "in the face of mounting public indignation, the four-day-old Soviet congress reversed itself and voted to give B.N. Yeltsin, the maverick communist, a seat in a new legislature. The election of Mr. Yeltsin, it is argued, was the most dramatic of several indications that the Congress of People's Deputies was feeling the impact of public opinion.

'I think we had a rapprochement,' Mr. Yeltsin said of Mr. Gorbachev. 'We have always had good, normal relations, maybe with the exception of a year ago when some members of the leadership helped relations grow colder I think there is a warming, without a doubt. I always supported the strategic line of Comrade Gorbachev, and moreover fought for it.'

As for Mr. Yeltsin, G.I. Kolbin, the Kazakhstan Communist Party

chief said, 'I wouldn't let demagogues like that come near the rostrum.'"

N.A.#86/(June 2, 1989): "On the seventh day of the new Congress of People's Deputies, speakers offered the nation fresh bouts of pugnaciousness for a score of different reforms. Y.D. Chernichenko used his talents as a TV commentator to mock Mr. Ligachev as a bureaucrat failing equally well at his new executive portfolio, national agriculture. Mr. Ligachev was singled out when N. Ivanov, a former state prosecutor complained about a commission appointed to look into the charges of high-level official corruption.

Y. Chernichenko: (About Ligachev) 'He knows nothing.'

Mr. Ivanov: 'Let's think about removing Comrade Ligachev and some other persons.'"

N.A.#87/(June 2, 1989): "V.A. Medvedev, the chief ideologist of the Communist Party, appeared shortly after a television commentator who used the congress as a forum to ridicule Mr. Ligachev. Mr. Medvedev made no effort to defend Mr. Ligachev, distancing himself from the Politburo's conservative wing."

N.A.#88/(June 21, 1989): "Mr. Podhoretz, the editor of the neo-conservative journal Commentary: 'I feel uncertain about this' [changes in the Soviet Union] he said. 'Perhaps, I too am being seduced by Gorbachev's smile.' He wondered aloud how Mr. Gorbachev manages to fit the roles of 'benign czar' and 'the leader of the opposition' into one mandate. His summary of the last four decades ended with a kind of tribute to Gorbachev: 'He seems to have convinced even R. Reagan that Lenin was a democrat.' The problem with Gorbachev is that he still seemed to believe in a power monopoly for the Communist Party and a spread of Communist revolution in the world."

N.A.#89/(September 22, 1989): "Mr. Daskal, who is a construction worker, a family man and one of the horde of Soviet citizens said he appreciated Mr. Gorbachev's frustration, but he nevertheless kept his place in line (to apply to get visa from the American Consulate)."

N.A.#90/ (September 25, 1989): In the article titled 'Gorbachev's Anti-Magic' several participants made claims about the Soviet leader. 'What is Gorbachev up to?' a Ukrainian legislator asked. Democratization? No. Merely 'liberalization of a totalitarian regime.'

Another legislator from the Russian city of Sverdlovsk, gesturing at beaming figure of Mr. Gorbachev's popular opponent Boris N. Yeltsin, proclaimed, 'I consider that there is an alternative to Gorbachev.'

R.N. Nishanov, a former diplomat and a Gorbachev loyalist, was sputtering with indignation: 'For 15 years I worked abroad, took part in many parliamentary events, had contacts with legislators I've never seen any place where people publicly expressed such doubts and distrust toward a legally and democratically head of state.'"

N.A.#91/(October 19, 1989): "A.D. Sakharov, the human rights campaigner: 'Evidently he (Gorbachev) was not prepared for such a free press as this. Since the situation in the country is very grave, he's nervous. But in my mind that's not grounds to curtail the freedom of the press.'"

N.A.#92 (December 26, 1989): "Mr. Gorbachev: 'I am a Communist, a convinced Communist. For some that may be a fantasy. But for me it's my main goal.

'I am convinced that nowadays to exercise my self-determination through secession is to blow apart the union, to pit peoples against one another and to sow discord, bloodshed and death,' he declared, once again denying the already existing constitutional right to secession guaranteed to the Soviet republics.'"

N.A.#93/(February 4, 1990): "Many party officials believe that if the congress approves a Central Committee and platform sympathetic to the

program of Mr. Gorbachev, he will step down from the party leadership post and concentrate all his attention on the nation's presidency.

'I think the President should be more free of political pressures,' Mr. Brazauskas, the leader of the Communist party in Lithuania said, but he added that Mr. Gorbachev could not forfeit the party post until he had a Central Committee he could trust.

Advocates of accelerated change argue that Mr. Gorbachev – who seems torn between his instinct for reform and his fear of instability – must move quickly to neutralize party conservatives and move the party ahead of public opinion. 'We are still hostages to a few dozen dogmatic members of the Central Committee who represent no one,' said A.S. Tsipko, a former Central Committee adviser. 'Having no skills but primitive political demagoguery, they have intimidated everyone, slowed down the tempo of the changes we needed so much, and compromised the party and its leaders in the eyes of a fatigued population,' he wrote in a recent article in an issue of Moscow news."

N.A.#94/ (May 13, 1990): "'For the first two years, Gorbachev continued the course that Andropov had started,' said G.N. Zoteyev, a market-oriented economist based in the Economic Research Institute run by Gosplan, the state planning committee. 'He just tried to improve things by bringing in order, strengthening discipline, holding the bureaucratic apparatus more accountable, forming the plan better. He understood that Stalin's command system wasn't working anymore, and he had great ambitions to break this system. But at the same time, he understood that the Western market system, including the institution of private property was also unacceptable to him, politically. Not only from the point of view of ideology, but also because this would lead to unemployment, to inflation, and the social and political instability in society would grow. There's been a great shift in consciousness in recent years, and that's the main service Gorbachev performed,' he said. 'By learning himself, he teaches the people. He made it possible to widely discuss these issues, and that's a kind of

mental revolution.”

N.A.#95/(September 25, 1990): In the article that covered “the Soviet Parliament which granted Gorbachev emergency power by an overwhelming vote of 305 to 36, Mr. Shatalin compared Mr. Gorbachev to the captain of a football team, who tries to fix the game so that both sides win. Mr. Ryzhkov, emerging from the Parliament chamber, echoed the same thought by declaring that today’s vote had left ‘no winners, and no losers.’”

N.A.#96/(October 18, 1990): In the article which covered “the consequences of the economic program devised by M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, it is argued, an opposition-oriented newspaper, the Moscow neighborhood weekly Karenty Ryad, noted that while M. Yazov and Mr. Kryuchkov are more conservative than Mr. Gorbachev, they were raised in a tradition of party discipline that tends to keep them loyal to the leader as long as he does nothing too wild.”

N.A.#97/(October 18, 1990): “Analysts in the independent Soviet press have pointed out that Mr. Gorbachev would have strong incentives to protect the three.

‘Responsibility for the crisis situation in the country lies first of all with Gorbachev,’ said the independent weekly Karyera. ‘To agree to dismissing Ryzhkov would mean admitting it. And without the army and the K.G.B., Gorbachev’s power will become entirely ephemeral.’

Another opposition-oriented newspaper, the Moscow neighborhood weekly Karenty Ryad, noted that while M. Yazov and Mr. Kryuchkov are more conservative than Mr. Gorbachev, they were raised in a tradition of party discipline that tends to keep them loyal to the leader as long as he does nothing too wild.”

N.A.#98/(October 19, 1990): “N.Y. Petrakov, Mr. Gorbachev’s personal economic adviser and a free-market advocate, asserted that Mr. Yeltsin had repeatedly rebuffed Mr. Gorbachev’s overtures, including refusing invitation to meet in recent days. ‘His popularity is a great force, but it

needs to be used properly,' he said. 'It is time to get to work, not to lead people out to demonstrations.'"

N.A.#99/(March 5, 1991): "'One day it was 100 % support,' [about the market reforms] recalled B.G. Fyodorov, a young market economist who as the Russian Finance Minister played a key intermediary role between Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Gorbachev. 'The next day Gorbachev was again speaking about 'the socialist choice' and things like that. It looked like he was going with the strongest power of the moment.'

Y. Burtin, a commentator for the Independent Gazette: 'After beginning with criticism of Stalin and Brezhnev, Gorbachev ended with the restoration – at the federal level – of a command system of the Stalin-Brezhnev type, which after all was nothing but a dictatorship of the party oligarchy.'

A. Tarasov, a Soviet businessman: 'Gorbachev used us Soviet businessmen to gain credibility in the West, and now that the world has come to believe that the Soviet Union is doomed without Gorbachev, he can afford to cast us off and return the old way of doing things.'"

N.A.#100/(April 22, 1991): "Some Soyuz members demanded that Mr. Gorbachev declare a state of emergency and 'show he is a man' as Y. Blokhin, a spokesman, put it."

N.A.#101/(July 3, 1991): "'Gorbachev will remain leader of the Communist Party as long as he consider its necessary,' Mr. Ignatenko, the spokesman of the new Democratic Reform Movement, said that Mr. Gorbachev, who has ties to several of the movements' founders, was aware of the progress of the opposition plan in recent weeks. 'He knew what ideas these comrades had because he had regular business dealings with the people,' Mr. Ignatenko said. 'But he could not be an adviser.' The organizers of the new group began their task of building a nation-wide challenge to the long-entrenched Communist Party."

N.A.#102/(August 1, 1991): "President Bush was denounced by the Ukraine's leading independence movement as having been 'hypnotized by Gorbachev' at the summit meeting. The Ukrainian popular movement known as Rukh offered Mr. Bush an advance sample of the sharp-edged politics that await him in this rich, sprawling republic.

I. Drach, the Rukh chairman, said Mr. Bush was so supportive and uncritical of President Gorbachev that Mr. Bush would arrive here as the Soviet leader's 'messenger,' with no real appreciation of the suffering that the Ukrainian republic has seen under the Kremlin because of its yearning for independence."

The Policy Making

N.A.#103/(May 25, 1989): "A. Uza, a reporter for the official Lithuanian press agency Elta, said that 'drivers said that Lithuania should not be obliged to pay for the rotten roads in Russia.'"

N.A.#104/(June 2, 1989): [About the meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and the Estonians] "Gorbachev sought out the Estonians for an unusual private meeting and offered surprisingly conciliatory comments, according to I. Grazin, a member of the delegation."

N.A.#105/(June 2, 1989): "The chief of the K.G.B. said that the newly elected Soviet legislature should have full authority over the state security agency. The K.G.B. chief, V.A. Kryuchkov, predicted that the new Soviet legislature, or Supreme Soviet, would create a commission similar to the congressional committees that are charged with overseeing intelligence activities in the U.S. He also announced that the agency had 'several contacts' with American intelligence agencies about cooperation in anti-terrorist activities. He made himself available to reporters a day after a member of the new congress shocked his colleagues and people by charging that the K.G.B. exercises all embracing control over society.

Mr. Medvedev told the reporters that he favored giving the

Supreme Soviet control over the appointment of the K.G.B. chief.

Mr. Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo and a principle theorist of Mr. Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies, said Mr. Vlasov was wrong about the K.G.B.'s role in domestic affairs. 'Where did he learn that?' Mr. Yakovlev said in an interview. 'I know better than he does, and I know that it does not play a great role in domestic life – at least not since 1985.'"

N.A.#106/(July 2, 1989): "M.S. Gorbachev used a rare television address to warn that a chain reaction of ethnic conflict threatens to tear the country apart and stifle economic and political change. He called for a policy combining greater tolerance of ethnic aspirations and more local autonomy with a 'the most decisive measures' against those who promote separatism, territorial disputes or ethnic conflict. He offered no concrete new program to stem the spread of ethnic conflict, but the unusual decision to address the nation and the imploring tone of his appeal for unity underlined the potential catastrophe he sees in the unrest that has broken out in almost every Soviet republic."

N.A.#107/(December 26, 1989): In the article that covered the problem facing Glasnost, the debates in the Congress are quoted :

"'Enough,' Mr. Gorbachev snapped at one dissident deputy who sought on Saturday to resurrect the issue of the party's monopoly. 'We know well whose motive, whose tune this is,' he fairly sneered.

'This is relevant,' the deputy, V.I. Karasyov, attempted to continue, and as the Gorbachevian majority resorted to handclaps of disapproval, he objected, 'It's for the people to applaud. Doesn't Rumania teach us anything?'

'O.K., enough,' Mr. Gorbachev countered, waving him from the microphone. 'You will get many thanks at the closed session tonight of the Inter-Regional Group.'

'I'll be very proud,' Mr. Karasyov replied in retreat.

'Good for you, be proud,' said the Soviet leader, who remained so nettled through his ensuing monologue on his commitment to Communism that one of his aides had to caution him to calm down.

'The Inter-Regional Group is constantly trying to spread the idea that our society is falling apart,' he said, his face stressed with disagreement as he warned of their 'eclectic fragments' in comparison with the perestroika program. 'We can maintain our union,' he insisted as the Congress stayed mute, backstage, Kremlin aides gathered the latest news of Rumania's rebellion."

N.A.#108/(February 4, 1990): The article covering the decision of Mr. Gorbachev to endorse proposals to end the Communist Party's monopoly on power included "the statements of the party members supporting the changes who cautioned that the draft still faced strong opposition from hardliners. 'It was presented as the platform that Gorbachev would finalize this weekend and read to the plenum,' said M.M. Malyutin, a senior professor at the Moscow Higher Party School, who was present when the draft was read to Moscow party leaders. 'It was not a final text.'"

N.A.#109/(February 9, 1990): In his address to the Central Committee, "Mr. Gorbachev called for the destruction of the Communist Party but for it to renounce absolute power: 'We should abandon everything that led to the isolation of socialist countries from the mainstream of world civilization.'"

N.A.#110/(February 19, 1990): "The legislature, several deputies said, talks and talks, just as freely and openly as the House of Commons or the United States Senate does, but unlike them it gets little done. The country needs a strong executive, Mr. Gorbachev told them, because an elected president ought to replace the Communist Party Politburo, which in a democracy should not have such executive powers anyway."

N.A.#111/(March 15, 1990): "A. Aganbegyan, a Soviet economist who is discredited with being a leading pioneer of perestroika, said he welcomed the transition to an executive presidency, in which Mr. Gorbachev would have greater powers, 'especially if he will pay attention to the economy.'"

N.A.#112/(May 15, 1990). In the article that covered the way Gorbachev has been trying to develop a radical economic program, "The Tass press agency offered no hint of how quickly or firmly the Government might seek to introduce free-market programs."

N.A.#113/(May 13, 1990): Regarding the economic problems facing the Soviet Union, "Mr. Shatalin, the newest addition to M.S. Gorbachev's team of economic pitchmen: 'No need to fear the market, it won't hurt you. Now everyone agrees that we have to introduce a market system.'"

V.L. Selyunin, an economics writer, said the most damning indictment of the Soviet economy is the huge disproportion of money and energy poured into heavy industry while consumer goods get by on the leftovers. 'This kind of democracy cannot work for man; it can only work for itself,' he said. 'It produces more and more means of production, that is machines, equipment, electricity, fuel in order to use all this in the next cycle for still more production of nonconsumable goods. That's, things that people cannot eat.'"

N.A.#114/(May 14, 1990): "Mr. Gorbachev: 'They want to take a gamble,' said of the market enthusiasts. 'Let everything be thrown open tomorrow. Let market conditions be put in place everywhere. Let's have free enterprise and give the green light to all forms of ownership, private ownership. Let everything be private. Let us sell the land, everything. I cannot support such ideas, no matter how decisive and revolutionary they might appear. These are irresponsible ideas, irresponsible.'"

In a television interview, Mr. Ryzhkov gave a glimpse of the transition program, which he said would include price increases for

goods next year. But he also assured viewers that prices on food would remain fixed by the Government, and that wages would be indexed to protect those on fixed incomes. He said 'it'll take many years' because most prices are freed from Government control and allowed to fluctuate with supply and demand. 'The transition to a regulated market economy will be long-term,' he said. 'This will not happen overnight.'

V.L. Selyunin, an economics writer and market advocate, estimated that the gross national product fell 5 % in the first quarter.

'It was clear that we weren't getting anywhere,' said S.S. Shatalin, an economist and member of Mr. Gorbachev's presidential Council, as the Cabinet is called.

'We need to be utterly frank,' Mr. Gorbachev said in an inaugural speech. He promised 'a full-blooded domestic market.'

'The implementation of large-scale measures will place society in new conditions and initially may be accompanied by painful phenomena and may encroach upon the interests of some,' he said.

A.A. Sergeyev, a trade-union economist, insists the free market proposals were 'pregnant with social riot' and would lead to the overthrow of the Government. 'I can imagine how powerful the wrath of the people will be when instead of the country houses of Politburo and Government officials they see even more luxuriously owned private country houses. The people will be in rage.'

G.N. Zoteyev, a scholar at the economics research institute run by the state planning agency, speculates that another powerful fear caused Mr. Gorbachev to pause at the idea of shock therapy – the fear that freeing the market would speed up the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

'As I see it, at the beginning Gorbachev thought that the transition to a market economy would consolidate a united national market and

would help the union withstand separatist pressures. But in fact it's going to be the just the other way around,' he said. 'Gorbachev needs a lightening rod,' he said. 'And the only one is Ryzhkov.' The question, he says, is whether it is too late for any Communist government to move the country.

R. Simonyan, an economist at the institute of the World Economy and International Relations, said, 'We should not free prices when almost 50 million people get less than 70 rubles a month.'

'Public consciousness should be prepared for the changes and a certain infrastructure created,' he said. 'By infrastructure I mean joint-stock enterprises, a financial system, consulting firms, a stock exchange, and so on.'

He predicted that the Government would try to put these measures into effect this year, along with proposals to sop up money that would otherwise contribute to inflation – including the sale of land. While this may not be shock therapy, he said, it is a radical turnabout in the Kremlin's economic course."

N.A.#115/(June 20, 1990): "M.S. Gorbachev conceded shortcomings in program and party before a gathering of Communist from the Russian federated republic. Sounding like a barely apologetic politician starting a fresh campaign, Mr. Gorbachev said: 'The notion of 'social democracy' is no longer a mere propaganda phrase. It is a reality;' that 'There is no clear choice,' he declared in his speech in which he offered his blessing on the creation of a separate branch of the party for the Russian republic as a concession to the increasing assertiveness by the nation's 15 republics in the face of central authority."

N.A.#116/(Oct 18, 1990): "The sponsors of a radical plan contend the breakup of the union is already under way, and can only be arrested by mutual agreement. They argue that the public is more likely to bear the disorder and discomfort that are sure to come as the country gives up the threadbare security blanket of central planning if they have faith in the leaders' executing it.

Another theory is that Mr. Gorbachev might have preferred a more radical plan, but was held back by more conservative figures around him such as Mr. Ryzhkov, the Defense Minister Mr. Yazov, and the K.G.B. chairman V.A. Kryuchkov. All three men have argued publicly for strong central control of the economy and the political order. A partnership with the radical would mean replacing the current Government with a coalition, and those three men would be high on the opposition hit list."

N.A.#117/(October 19, 1990): "A. Aganbegyan told legislators that even the 500-year program for abolishing Communism, already adopted by the Russian republic under its President B.N. Yeltsin, might be compatible with the Soviet leader's plan. After the endorsement of four committees dealing with economic affairs, several legislators predicted that the full Parliament, weary of inaction, would approve the plan quickly after Mr. Gorbachev formally presented it."

N.A.#118/(October 19, 1990): "Mr. Gorbachev can overcome his two biggest obstacles – the threat of inflation rising out of control and the political resistance of the nation's restive republics – and achieve his broadly stated goals, it would mean the most sweeping reformation of the Soviet economy in six decades; that the plan retains the central authorities' control over export of natural riches like oil and gold; that it envisions phasing out price controls, so that within two years only essential consumer goods will be priced by the state; that broad latitude is offered to the republics and local governments; that the Soviet deficit is about 10 times as severe as the United States deficit.

Mr. Gorbachev and his aides said the transition would begin with a period of draconian budget discipline, and would reverse the decline in supplies of consumer goods within two years. But they warned that it would be years before a 'full blooded' market economy is in place.

Aides said he would rely heavily on the extraordinary powers of decree given to him to bring the economy under control and create conditions for a marketplace. That means tightening the budget and

money supply, creating stock markets, clearing the way for more foreign investment, and protecting private entrepreneurs from state meddling. S.S Shatalin, a co-author of the 500-day crash program favored by Mr. Yeltsin, showed up to urge a consolidation of forces. While saying he still preferred his own, more drastic and detailed economic plan, he said he would remain on Mr. Gorbachev's Presidential Council to push for rapid expansion of private enterprise. 'Now we have to calm down and look at what can be done, what should be added to the program to speed up privatization,' he said.

To succeed, his aides said, Mr. Gorbachev must assert control over inflation, which has undermined public confidence and diminished the incentive to produce, and win the political cooperation of the 15 republics, most of which have asserted their sovereignty."

N.A.#119/(December 14, 1990): "One group of hard-liners, a political alliance called the Centrist Bloc, tried this week to use the aid against Mr. Gorbachev, condemning the Soviet leader for 'presenting the Soviet Union as a beggar country.'

'The real humiliation of our country comes from the people who reduced things to such a state that what we produce is either destroyed or rots in the fields,' the Government daily Izvestia said."

N.A.#120/(December 18, 1990): "Mr. Gorbachev survived a call for a vote of no confidence by a member of Parliament who charged that the President had allowed discipline to collapse and had shamed the country by soliciting foreign aid. 'Having disrupted the country and divided people, he goes to the world with outstretched hands,' said a member. No one seconded the proposal, which could have led to Mr. Gorbachev's impeachment, and the Congress voted 1,288 to 428, not to include the issue on the agenda for debate.

Liberal deputies speculated afterward that Communist Party hardliners had instigated the attack on Mr. Gorbachev as a warning, but Mrs. Umalatova said she had not consulted with anyone before taking

the podium. Given the discontent in the conservative Congress over Mr. Gorbachev's inability to keep order, the outcome could have been more embarrassing. But Mr. Gorbachev has begun taking tough law-and-order positions and catering to the army and K.G.B., and his shift has defused for now any organized opposition by hard-liners in the Congress.

Accusing republic leaders of 'guerilla style' behavior, Mr. Gorbachev announced: 'I submit a proposal to hold a nationwide referendum, which will allow every citizen to say yes or no to the union of sovereign states build on federal lines. Results of referendums in every republic will provide the final verdict.'

Deputies from the several republics rejected the idea of a referendum as federal meddling with their prerogatives, and said the outcome would be stacked against them by the participation of Soviet troops based in their republics.

Mr. Gorbachev said : 'If we have strong government, tight discipline and control over the fulfillment of decisions, then we will be able to normalize food supplies, rein in crime and stop ethnic strife. If we fail, greater discord, the rampage of dark forces and a collapse of statehood are inevitable.' He chided intellectuals for 'squandering their energies on bickering about the past,' and he denounced farm regions that have refused to yield their grain for central distribution while they continue to consume state oil and other resources.

'We are again returning to a hard diktat of the center,' said Mr. Yeltsin, the Russian republic's President. He said he nonetheless voted against the no-confidence issue on the agenda because the public still hopes for a rapprochement between himself and Mr. Gorbachev."

N.A.#121/(April 22, 1991): "Mr. Fyodorov, who quit in frustration as Mr. Yeltsin's Finance Minister in December, said that the Russian government behaved as if it were in a bidding war with Mr. Gorbachev for public support. Mr. Yeltsin, he said, was preoccupied by laying claim to Russia's sovereignty and its share of the existing wealth, especially

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the oil, gold, and diamonds beneath Russia's vast tundra. 'The idea of sovereignty is not enough,' Mr. Fyodorov said. N. Petrakov, a market economist, said the new Government had no idea how to introduce a market.

'At first I was proud example of the successful Soviet businessman,' said Mr. Tarasov, a businessman. 'An now I am being made an example of what happens if you become too successful.'

'The Russian empire has come to abuse its folly,' said N.Petrakov, former chief economic adviser to Mr. Gorbachev, quoting Bismarck and criticizing the Soviet President's attempt at dealing with the latest Government statistics in his latest anti-crisis program as a reflection of an 'imperialist mentality' entrenched in the Kremlin.

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N.A.#122/(July 3, 1991): "President M.S. Gorbachev offered words of welcome to the new opposition political movement founded by some veterans of his Kremlin team; with his spokesman saying that 'it inspires cooperation' from supporters of his liberalization program.

The new Democratic Reform Movement 'can only be welcomed' provided it lives up to its premise of avoiding divisiveness, said the spokesman, V.N. Ignatenko. He added that by stressing cooperation and social accord rather than confrontation, the movement was 'a positive fact.'

Mayor A. Sobchak of Leningrad stressed that this troubled nation can afford no further delay in constructing a party to stand against the Communists nationwide and prevent a return to dictatorship.

'Such a threat exists in reality and one purpose of our movement is not to allow a return to that past,' said Former Minister E.A.

Shevardnadze. The announced strategy of the new opposition movement is to unite insurgents and others, wooing wayward Communist Party members by not being confrontational."

N.A.#123/(July 7, 1991): "A.N. Yakovlev, the close Gorbachev aid said 'the restructuring in the country has run up against a solid wall of hatred, rejection, hostility, and actual resistance from the side of extreme conservatism and reaction – from all that is greedy, reactionary, malicious, lazy, which is trying by any means to cling to past practices.'"

N.A.#124/(July 9, 1991): "L.A. Glaskov, a meat pie seller-become-millionaire, says the economic freedoms granted by President B.N. Yeltsin's government in the Russian republic have finally trickled down, breaking some of the hobbies of the Communist economy, so that he has built a payroll of 800 of some of the best former state farmers."

N.A.#125/(July 18, 1991): [About the Western aid] "Mr. Gorbachev said 'Whether you help us or not, that is not the point. We are talking about a new quality of cooperation, when we are an organic part of the world economic space.'"

III. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Claims About the Reforms

N.A.#126/(April 2, 1989): "American experts on Eastern Europe are in broad agreement that M. S. Gorbachev's quest for modernization and his calls for change have paradoxically increased the potential for destabilization across the Eastern bloc.

Prof. C. Gati of Union College in New York, said in an article in an issue of the Foreign Affairs that 'While Moscow seeks peace and quiet in Eastern Europe, the Eastern European peoples feel encouraged by Gorbachev's domestic policies and rhetoric to seek change.' 'Using its limited influence, could the U.S. help steer the region gradually over unknown terrain, toward a more pluralist and autonomous future?'

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the director of the National Security Council in the Carter Administration, noted that 'if the viewpoint that a Soviet military intervention is in fact unlikely becomes more widespread this perception might take a revolutionary upheaval more probable.' Mr. Brzezinski's view of the most desirable options rests heavily on his belief that what Mr. Gorbachev truly wants is not so much perestroika as 'perdyshka,' a Russian word meaning breather."

N.A.#127/(May 25, 1989): "One New York banker said of the Soviet plans: 'They have been talking about opening an office here since the previous period of detente in the early 1970's. Those plans were derailed when relations between the two countries deteriorated. But they are probably better equipped now to deal in this market because of perestroika and the moves to decentralization in the Soviet Union.'"

N.A.#128/(June 11, 1989): "An American diplomat: 'There's a big crack between the poor fool who is really here trying to create a joint venture and the board of directors back in the States who read all these pro-perestroika stories with dollar signs in their eyes.'"

N.A.#129/(June 13, 1989): "A pro-Gorbachev diplomat commented that 'President Bush has been no less strategic in his approach.' He also added that the White House criticism could have been more sweeping, considering public outrage in the U.S., and that the White House also stopped short of altering commercial and ambassadorial ties to China. The diplomat said the defensible denominator in both glasnost and Soviet policy in China was Mr. Gorbachev's overriding need to do anything it takes to rouse the Soviet economy."

N.A.#130/(June 21, 1989): "A group of American neo-conservatives have been busy facing Soviet intellectuals asking about topics from A. de Tocqueville to the role of extramarital sex in contemporary politics. Some of these intellectuals, according to the article, have doubted that real change would ever overtake the Kremlin."

N.A.#131/(July 27, 1990): In one of the articles it is claimed that "Mr.

Gorbachev has acknowledged that perestroika will not work without help from foreign friends, and Western economic analysts do not agree. But they say they believe Mr. Gorbachev is putting the cart before the horse."

N.A.#132/(September 3, 1989): "Some American and Israeli officials say persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union has abated in the Gorbachev era, but many members of the Congress and American Jewish groups say Mr. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost has allowed freer expression of virulent anti-Semitic sentiments by grass-roots organizations."

N.A.#133/(September 29, 1989): In his own article, the author of the novel, 'The Russia House,' John le Carre noted: "Who is the enemy now? And who are we, the Western alliance, and who is America, if we can no longer unite against the Great Satan of Communism? And who is the Soviet Union aligned against, if aligned at all? 'Why, against America!' say the tough guys. 'Forget the cosmetics. They're still out there. Even if Gorby is on the side of the angels, what about those hardliners, those Stalinists waiting to step into his boots? Give'em a couple years, glasnost will be dead as the Charleston.'

But their argument runs deeper. And darker: 'Even if we could help the Soviet Union with its reforms, why do it? Why should we, in the very hour where our adversary of 40 years is reaping the whirlwind for his wicked ways, lift a finger to help him up? So the Soviets are fragmenting? Let them fragment! Took us 40 years to get them there!'

The tough guys are not impressed that a Soviet leader is conducting a hair-raising and perhaps impossible crusade to implement reforms we have been urging upon his predecessors for decades: 'He's still a Communist. He's still a Russian,' they say. They add that it fails to us and not to our defeated enemies to decide when the war is over. ... Are they right? Or is it possible that after 40 years of being locked into the ice of the cold war, some of us in the West have lost the will, even the energy, to climb out and face a more hopeful future? Do we want a return to Stalinist levels of arms production? Not only the Soviet people would be enslaved, we, too, would be locked back inside the

iron-walls of an ever-mounting military budget and the ever-mounting risk of war. Naive I may be, though I doubt it. But I am not naive enough to believe that the backlash is over. The aggressive passivity of the Soviet people could still make them accomplices in their own destruction.

Have we now entered a new time, where we need the old divisions to justify our galloping materialism? If so, it is no wonder that half of the Western Europe, and sections of America look to Gorbachev for their dreams.

What are our Western dreams? Shall we go on dreaming about more refined ways to kill each other? I do not believe that the millennium is upon us. But I do believe we are witnessing an hour in history as momentous as 1917, and that we have yet fully to wake from the morbid confinement of cold war belligerence and seize the brave opportunities waiting on us – though for how long?

So no, not the millennium. Not yet. Just a unique moment in history – perhaps no longer than the blink of a star – when to be a realist it is necessary also to be an idealist, when the improbable is happening everyday and the impossible every week, and where imagination and creativity may yet sweep us above the slough of hopelessness to which we have been condemned too long. That sounds like a pretty American dream."

N.A.#134/(October 7, 1989): "Glasnost will come, the Bulgarian officials promise, using a word that is the same in Bulgarian and Russian. But in Bulgaria's view, the Soviets have reshaped themselves at an unsafe speed, not to mention the fast pace of the Poles and Hungarians. Bulgaria is not about to follow the same course, officials say."

N.A.#135/(December 31, 1989): "E. Mickiewicz, author of 'Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union,' and the director of a Soviet media program at the Carter Center of Emory University, assesses the the recent changes in television programs since Gorbachev came to power in 1985. She claims that television is proving a powerful

tool in the ongoing campaign to change the face of Communism in the Soviet society; that during the upheavals in Eastern Europe, Soviet television correspondents on location provided some commentary and pictures that were very much like reports seen on American newscasts; the sense of television's impact is inescapable in the Soviet Union; that the revolutionary events in Eastern Europe pose a dilemma for Soviet newscasters, as they try to move from being an instrument of official policy to active inquiry; that while the Soviet coverage of the events in Eastern Europe sees them as victories in the process that Mr. Gorbachev has set in motion, American network newscasts focus on the breakdowns occurring throughout Eastern Europe, using such words as the 'crumbling' of the system or describing a situation sliding 'to the brink of chaos;' that glasnost has revolutionized coverage of Soviet domestic politics, which now features impassioned debates, nasty polemics and riveting parliamentary confrontations, and so on."

N.A.#136/(March 15, 1990): "Trying to convert the Soviet Union to a market-oriented economy in slow stages, said A.W. Clausen, former president of the World Bank and now the chairman of Bank America, is 'like trying to extract a tooth slowly.'

A. Aslaund, a Swedish economist who is the director of the Stockholm Institute of Soviet and Eastern European economies, said that despite Soviet estimates of continued slow growth, the economy was in 'a very serious crisis.'

E.A. Hewett of the Brookings Institution, a leading American expert on Soviet data, said that the Soviet economy was 'deteriorating at an alarming pace.' There is no sign of improvement in the quality of goods and no gain in productivity; the money supply is out of control, and the Soviet credit rating is at its lowest ebb, he said. The 'reforms' made thus far, he added, are 'half-hearted,' and entrepreneurs have still not been given authority to run their enterprises efficiently. 'Prices remain fixed, and fixed wrong,' he said.

Mr. Clausen saw some positive factors in the Soviet situation,

especially the increased stress placed by Mr. Gorbachev and his key supporters on the need for a 'market orientation' and a 'pluralistic society,' which, he said, held hope for the future. But he warned that these positive elements were in danger of being overwhelmed by some strongly negative forces."

N.A.#137/(May 26, 1990): "Western analysts viewed the new proposals about the economy as too little, too late. They argue that the Government's concept of a 'regulated economy' will exact much of the political pain of more radical approaches without generating much economic gain; that the authority of the 'old boy' network of officials has been seriously undermined by perestroika; that no decentralized system of incentives, no markets to generate signals of cost and value have been created in their place."

N.A.#138/(July 8, 1990): "C. Dillingham, the president of the Entertainment Corporation said: '.... under perestroika, the essence of the economic restructuring is to reduce Government subsidy of enterprises.'"

N.A.#139/(October 21, 1990): "According to the Western analysts, if M.S. Gorbachev presented his latest economic plan a year ago it would have been hailed as a daring commitment to free markets, private property and fiscal federalism, today with the Soviet economy in free fall and a half-dozen of the 15 republican governments in open revolt, the new plan is being widely derided as a scheme for saving the bureaucrats and party hacks who led the economy to ruin.

E.A. Hewett, a Soviet specialist at the Brookings Institution said that 'the real problem is the political problem.' For while the bolder '500-day plan' already embraced by the Russian Republic and its populist president, B.N. Yeltsin, is more in tune with the anti-establishment mood of this fractured nation, the Gorbachev approach is in many ways more realistic. What is needed now, Mr. Hewett believes, is not formal plan cast in capitalist concrete, but a deal between the two leaders – one that allows the Kremlin to survive years of ethnic conflict and depressed living standards.

P. Desai, a Columbia University economist, said the compromise does share the 'ultimate vision' of the 500-day plan. Most state-owned enterprises, along with farms and housing, would be sold to individuals and cooperatives; foreigners could control businesses on Soviet soil. Unlike the Ryzhkov plan, moreover, the compromise accepts the inevitability of economic federalism."

N.A.#140/(December 14, 1990): "According to the Western analysts the economic aid may provide an excuse to postpone needed economic change. A senior Western diplomat countered that credits like those offered by Mr. Bush would give Moscow temporary flexibility in its foreign purchases, but would have to be paid back within three years. 'If they don't make the hard choices, it's not going to be because of aid,' the diplomat add. 'There is not that much aid.'"

N.A.#141/(December 14, 1990): "Despite the differing views that were expressed, most foreign officials said they could support a new approach. 'Every move to bring the Soviet Union closer to these international banking organizations, accelerating the process of integrating the Soviets into the world's free -market economy, is very welcome,' said H.H. Horstmann, spokesman at the German Embassy."

N.A.#142/(January 13, 1991): "'Why are we seeing so many groups in the U.S.?' asked S. Boulay, the vice president of the Space Agency. 'The answer is simple – greed. They want dollars, dollars, dollars.'"

N.A.#143/(January 20, 1991): "J. Shelton, research fellow, the Hoover Institution, author of 'The Coming Soviet Crash' said : 'The Soviet Union is now on the verge of civil war and Western investors will get burned. They are in the same position as they were just before the Bolshevik revolution. Countries that are now overinvested in the Soviet Union could be in a similar situation. We 'll continue to see more sporadic incidents of violence in Lithuania, Georgia and the Ukraine and more people will get killed. It'll be calculated violence that will be used in an attempt to quash the independence movement. But

there is no way Gorbachev can cow the people back into the old system.

In eight to 10 years, there'll be a federation of republics. In terms of a model, Canada would be a good choice. But this will come after the republics really understand what they've to gain by coming together.'

A.M. Solomon, Institute for East-West Security Studies, in New York Studies said: 'From now on, the only way there will be any meaningful reform is from Mr. Yeltsin and the heads of other republics as they confront Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Yeltsin is supporting the Baltics. He could even call for civil disobedience. He has cards he can play, and he may be able to organize the other republics to go along with him.

If you look at economic reform in the Soviet Union, you see that much of it has been divorced from reality anyway. For example, there has been a big bank reform, which looks reasonable on paper. Although there is now a central bank, reform cannot be meaningfully implemented as long as there is still a command-economy structure that subsidizes the losses of the large state-owned enterprises.'

V. Kvint, U.S.S.R. Professor of Political Economy; former professor in Moscow said: 'March will bring a drastic worsening of the economic situation in the Soviet Union because the last reserves of food will have been eaten.'

C. Hugel, National Foreign Trade Council; formerly with Asea Brown Boveri Inc. : 'The trend towards anarchy is what Mr. Gorbachev is trying to deal with now. Making V.S. Pavlov the Prime Minister is a good sign for business. He's a trained financial person, knows Western markets and is a proponent of the market system. I think this says that the reforms are still on course; that the Soviet Union is still moving to become a market economy.'"

N.A.#144/(January 20, 1991): "But even if it is possible to reform the economy without reforming the polity – and the experience of both Chile and China suggest that it might – there is little reason to believe

that M.S. Gorbachev knows how. 'The kinds of things he is doing,' argues R. Ericson, an economist at Columbia University's Harriman Institute, 'will make economic liberalization harder.'"

N.A.#145/(April 18, 1991): "President Bush demonstrated a renewed interest in assisting Mr. Gorbachev. In addition, many Western experts have come to say that the West cannot sit on the sidelines if it is interested in genuine reforms in the Soviet Union. G. Allison, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, helped Mr. Yavlinsky shape the proposal. Mr. Yavlinsky is considered by many Western experts to be the most competent of Soviet economists."

N.A.#146/(May 21, 1991): "G. Allison, a former dean of the J.F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University said the group was looking for 'Marshall Plan scale aid,' ranging from \$15 billion to \$30 billion a year for several years. Mr. Allison said and the others envisioned the trade of economic and political change in the Soviet Union for Western aid as 'a grand bargain.'

Several specialists at Harvard who are not participating in the talks expressed skepticism over where money would come from at a time of economic difficulty in the United States and Europe. They also questioned whether any real reform program could be carried out in the Soviet Union, as both the political and economic systems face paralysis. S. Fischer, a professor of economics at the M.I.T., said that the Soviet team for the first time had shown evidence that it was prepared to do serious economic analysis, which he said had been missing from a series of earlier Soviet reform plans and is a precondition for any Western aid. 'If we can get this right, then the grand bargain makes sense,' said Mr. Fischer, a former chief economist for the World Bank.

The Americans taking part in the discussions besides Mr. Allison and Mr. Fischer are J.D. Sacks, a professor of economics at Harvard who helped draw up the blueprint for transforming Poland's economy, and R.D. Blackwill, a professor at the Kennedy School who was President Bush's special assistant on the National Security Council for the Soviet Union and Western Europe.

Some other specialists at Harvard expressed doubt about the outcome. 'The odds of this working out without the collapse of the Soviet Union are unlikely,' said M. Goldman, a professor of economics at Wellesley College and deputy director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. 'I give them credit for trying,' he said. 'But even if we could come up with our part of the deal, there is no guarantee the Soviets can do theirs. I'm not sure anyone is in control in the Soviet Union.'"

N.A.#147/(May 26, 1991): "Western officials argued privately, sending money to the Soviet Union as it exists would be like throwing cash down a bottomless well: the old nomenklatura is still clogging the wheels of reform, and the basic conditions for a free market have yet to be created.

J. Sacks, the Harvard professor said: 'It's only with democratization that comprehensive and truly radical reform could get started.'"

N.A.#148/(June 20, 1991): "Though rival Soviet leaders are competing with each other to plead for help from the Western industrial democracies to build a market economy, many Soviet business people, foreign diplomats and other experts here agree that it'll take years if not decades to make the change.

Foreign diplomats representing three of the countries attending the seven-nation meeting in London say they believe the tide of Soviet domestic politics turned early in the spring in favor of continuing change. Last winter, those diplomats were saying that Mr. Gorbachev appeared to have caved in to the forces supporting a move back to Communist-style coercion, culminating in a bloody attempt to impose martial law on Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital. Now, they believe, he is serious about moving back toward reform. In the past, Mr. Gorbachev has considered and rejected more ambitious plans to introduce a market economy in 400 days, and last year, 500 days, as Mr. Pavlov reminded the Soviet Parliament the other day.

'A Presidential decree on November 2 and later regulations take away from all business enterprises except joint ventures almost all the foreign currency they earn,' said A. Papachristou, an American lawyer who specializes in investing in advising foreign clients in the Soviet Union. 'This is a country with a thousand year history that has never had an entrepreneurial culture,' a Western envoy said. 'They're overwhelmed by the problems and Gorbachev is not an economic expert. But recognition that the old system is completely bankrupt is sinking in.'

N.A.#149/(July 18, 1991): "Mr. Major and President Bush said they were persuaded that the Soviet leader was trying to move to a market economy."

N.A.#150/(July 29, 1991): "A Western diplomat said he found Mr. Yakovlev's remarks [he made when he was endorsing Mr. Yeltsin's ban on the party's privileged position in factories and farm collectives] particularly puzzling because Mr. Gorbachev succeeded so well at the Central Committee meeting in wrenching the party hierarchy from its Marxist-Leninist dogma and winning approval of a proposed new charter for a party of "democratic reforms."

N.A.#151/(August 16, 1991): "One Western official familiar with the largest Soviet-American venture proposal said: 'The Soviets' learning requirements about capitalism is an enormous task after all the decades of fear and ignorance, and this is being amplified by the press demanding to know details of ongoing business negotiations.'"

The Claims About the Soviet State

N.A.#152/(April 2, 1989): "American experts agree that a loosening of the ties to Moscow and the relaxation, if not revocation, of the Brezhnev doctrine asserting Moscow's right to intervene militarily on behalf of threatened satellite regimes has raised the possibility of national or even Communist upheavals. They also say that such orders, fanned by hopes of liberalization, would in turn threaten Mr.

Gorbachev's rule and policies just as the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 reversed a ripple of liberalization under N.S. Khrushchev. These experts who are monitoring the political and economic changes debate what Washington should do to case or exploit the situation. There is a common understanding of the situation among the U.S. specialists, no single set of solutions has emerged from their debates. Thorny questions remain unanswered as to whether the U.S. should modify its adversarial stance to make it easier for the Soviet Government to retreat from Stalinist patterns of control. Specifically, should the West reduce rhetorical support of dissident and nationalist movements to limit the risk of political upheavals? These questions are not merely theoretical.

In a speech Mr. Brzezinski wrote: 'We are dealing with a complex web of issues – some symbolic, some political, some economic, some military and even strategic. Our response needs to be equally comprehensive. The fundamental issue has been, and still is, freedom of choice vs. coercive ideological orthodoxy.'"

N.A.#153/(April 17, 1989): "B.C. Murray, a platenary geologist at the California Institute of Technology, said: 'The Russians really bash each other around in their internal debates. But then they seem to kiss and make up and go about their business. What's different is, they're doing this in public now. The whole society is inventing the structure for pluralism, without any tradition for it. You're not sure how it's going to come out.'"

N.A.#154/(April 30, 1989): "Some cynics say that the Soviet Union is using sports as propaganda, a means of improving the country's image."

N.A.#155/(June 2, 1989): "While some Western analysts say the K.G.B. is shifting emphasis from domestic police work to foreign intelligence, others doubt that the agency will release its grip on Soviet society."

N.A.#156/(June 13, 1989): "In the view of a Western expert on Chinese-Soviet relations, Gorbachev's approach seems like basic, time-tested

Machiavelli."

N.A.#157/(August 20, 1989): "M. Georgianis, a Flushing, Queens, senior majoring in journalism and English at N.Y.U. who had been a news clerk at the Times: 'The image of a Tass reporter as someone working for the K.G.B. is something out of a spy novel.'"

N.A.#158/(August 28, 1989): "E.L. Warner, a Rand Corporation specialist who traveled with the House Armed Services Committee to the Soviet Union said: 'In light of their traditional mania for secrecy, the Soviets have come an extraordinary distance in allowing the Congressional delegation to visit selected portions of its military research establishment and active units.'

'The optimistic explanation is that they still don't know exactly what the new structure is going to look like. The pessimistic explanation is that they do not want us to know,' said P.A. Karber, an expert on conventional forces who works for a consulting company that does a lot of work for the Pentagon."

N.A.#159/(September 5, 1989): "M. Billig, editor of Business Travel: 'They [the Soviet national airline] are really going to have to put on a Western-style campaign to win the hearts, minds and pocketbooks of Western business travelers. Executives feel better flying an American airline than one in semi-shrouded in secrecy,' he added.

J.P. McCaffrey, vice president of industrial affairs for the Pan Am Corp.: 'Aeroflot is on the cutting edge of glasnost and perestroika.' P. Davidoff, president-elect of the American Society of Travel Agents: 'The biggest problem with Aeroflot is that we know very little about them.'"

N.A.#160/(December 24, 1989): "M. Frazer, an 11-year-old sixth grader : 'The typical stereotype of a Russian was a K.G.B. agent who would send you to Siberia. Now when I see something about the Soviet Union on television, I think of the kids at school.'"

N.A.#161/(March 15, 1990): "A. W. Clausen, former president of the World Bank, said it was of the greatest importance that the people trust their Government, and that 'one essential underlies all issues: transparency, gaining the support of the people.' Insisting that he was 'not pessimistic about the future of the U.S.S.R.'"

N.A.#162/(May 26, 1990): "The Western analysts argued that the latest plan's obvious political weaknesses has led some observers to suspect that it is a straw man – a Machiavellian maneuver to discredit the idea of a 'third way' between socialism and capitalism and to legitimize a rapid Polish-style drive toward free markets."

N.A.#163/(January 20, 1991): "V. Kvint, U.S.S.R. Professor of Political Economy; former professor in Moscow said : 'The truth is that Mr. Gorbachev did not want to move to a market economy while the old economic system was still alive. Now the old system is dead, but there is no new one. The economy just cannot produce. The army might force the people go to work, but it cannot get them to do anything once there.'

C. Hugel, National Foreign Trade Council; formerly with Asea Brown Boveri Inc. said: 'It has been evident in the last year that the country has lost its command structure, so it is possible that the troops could have killed the demonstrators in Lithuania without President Gorbachev's knowledge. The country is moving to a state of anarchy. But although people are concerned about civil war, I cannot see it happening. The people there are not armed. They have no organization and nothing to pull them together. They just don't have the ability to wage war. I also don't think starvation will occur.'

A. Hartman, Apco Associates, Washington; former Ambassador to the S. Union said: 'The events in Lithuania signal quite a reactionary step backwards. The picture emerging is one of a reassertion of authority by the old elements that have been against change, those who have been in charge of the command system have now returned to stop all moves toward reform.'

The Soviet Union may be on the brink of civil war with the military authorities who have attempted to set up nonexistent reasons for intervention similar to the reasons they gave for intervening in Hungary and Czechoslovakia a generation ago. This is not a static situation, however. The bureaucrats have been entrenched since before the Bolshevik revolution. It was too much hope they would be driven out in one leap."

N.A.#164/(May 26, 1991): "The overriding problem, argued J. Sacks, the Harvard professor, is the Communist monopoly on power. 'I do not believe in the feasibility of reforms undertaken exclusively by Communist power,' he said."

N.A.#165/(July 14, 1991): "Getting rid of a Communist Soviet Union is something Western leaders have been saying they wanted for so long that now they are not sure whether it would be a dream come true, or a nightmare."

The Claims About the Leaders:

N.A.#166/(June 13, 1989): "An Asian ambassador commented about M.S. Gorbachev: 'He will stick to his policy, without a doubt He's worked too long and too hard to rebuild the China tie to risk it now with a critical remark.'"

N.A.#167/(May 26, 1990): "I. Birman, an economic consultant to the Pentagon, agrees, saying of L.I. Abalkin, one of the Kremlin's chief economists, that he 'had made a career teaching Marxism.' Ed Hewett of the Brookings Institution thinks Soviet leaders understand some aspects of economics only too well: Frightened by the risk of hyperinflation and massive unemployment in free markets, they punted."

N.A.#168/(January 20, 1991): "J. Shelton, research fellow, the Hoover Institution, author of 'The Coming Soviet Crash' said : 'Mr. Gorbachev

is like Moses – able to lead people out of Egypt but not into the promised land. Unlike Moses, he won't step down voluntarily. But he can't remain. I would not say that there'll be anything as dramatic as an assassination, but perhaps the People's Deputies will remove him. In any event, he'll be phased out.'

A.M. Solomon, Institute for East-West Security Studies, in New York Studies said: 'I am convinced that President Gorbachev has lost his maneuvering room because of the actions in Vilnius. He can no longer go back and forth between the economic reformers and the conservatives. He is now locked into the conservatives, the military and the K.G.B. The implications are that there will not be any more economic reform from Mr. Gorbachev.'

V. Kvint, U.S.S.R. Professor of Political Economy; former professor in Moscow said: 'What makes me angry is that so many people are asking if Mr. Gorbachev gave the order to use tanks in Lithuania. he said he did not know about it, but who else in the Soviet Union can give orders now?'

C. Hugel, National Foreign Trade Council; formerly with Asea Brown Boveri Inc. said: 'Mr. Schevernadze's replacement as Foreign Minister, A. Bessmertnykh, is also a positive sign. He knows the United States, because he was Ambassador here and has lived here. His appointment says to me that Mr. Gorbachev is concerned with the way the United States views him. I think Mr. Gorbachev will remain in power.'

A. Hartman, Apco Associates, Washington; former Ambassador to the S. Union said: 'The reason for the poor performance of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms and for the disintegration of the economic system is that the old guard – the bureaucrats – fought back deliberately against the reforms in an alliance with the K.G.B. and the military.'"

N.A.#169/(February 20, 1991): [About the similarities between M.S. Gorbachev and A. Pinochet] "Kremlin watchers point to one big difference. 'Pinochet made the Chilean economy safe for capitalists,'

says E. Hewett, a Soviet specialist at the Brookings Institution. 'Gorbachev is making the Soviet economy safe for bureaucrats.'

Serious people, notes the Harvard economist M. Goldman, do not take charge seriously. No prudent investor would plow billions of dollars into Soviet factories or real estate without iron-clad guarantees that the income could be repatriated. 'Gorbachev has the power and he has the troops,' Mr. Goldman concludes. 'But he doesn't know where to go.'"

The Claims About Policy Making

N.A.#170/(April 17, 1989): "American experts estimate that Soviet spending on the space program, both military and civilian, runs to at least \$30 billion a year, which is slightly more than American spending. J.E. Oberg, an American specialist on the Soviet program said that 'they are facing a profound budgetary crisis.' The director of space policy for the Federation of American Scientists, J.E. Pike said that 'clearly, their space program is consuming a frightening amount of money. And Russians, like Americans, are wondering what they have to show for it.'"

N.A.#171/ (April 30, 1989): "Alamo Rent A Car is helping to underwrite the dual swimming meet between the Soviets and Americans, according to C. Platt, Alamo's executive vice president. 'Americans have a fascination for the Soviet Union,' he said. 'We want them to love us.'"

N.A.#172/(June 11, 1989): "F. Euriack, Combustion's market development manager for process-control systems: 'We Americans tend to be more rebellious toward structure when we don't agree with it There is still some fear here when a worker confronts his boss about the real problems.'"

N.A.#173/(June 13, 1989): "A diplomat stressed 'the glass house' caution of Mr. Gorbachev. His full domestic realm, whatever the excitement over free-wheeling declarations in the congress, includes

persistent, explosive mixes of civil demonstrations, grass-roots violence and martial-law standoffs in outlying republics and among ethnic groups."

N.A.#174/(June 28, 1989): "The Soviet Union has agreed for the first time to allow representatives of an indigenous Arctic people to attend an international gathering in Greenland. Canadian experts see the Soviet shift as reflecting President M.S. Gorbachev's recent call for Arctic countries to devise a comprehensive plan for protecting the region's environment and its indigenous peoples as well as for a substantial reduction in military forces stationed there and the creation of an Arctic nuclear-free zone."

N.A.#175/(February 4, 1990): "Just as M.S. Gorbachev's program has freed many Soviet Jews to observe their faith, they [the Soviet Jews] say, so has it also allowed the country's neo-fascist and anti-Semitic organizations to come into open. As new separatist nationalist movements sprout across the Soviet Union almost by the day, ethnic peoples crying out for their own homelands, tens of thousands of Jews are coming to two conclusions. They are deciding there may be no future for them in nationalist Armenia, Latvia or the Ukraine. At the same time, Soviet Jews by the thousand seem to be coming to the realization that they already have an ethnic homeland of their own: Israel. The Soviet officials issued a warning that fanning racial and religious hatred is a crime punishable by imprisonment."

N.A.#176/(March 15, 1990): "The former president to the World Bank and now the chairman of Bank America, A.W. Clausen, urged the Soviet leaders to 'move faster,' and to concern themselves more with the social welfare. 'There is no social infrastructure in place,' he said, to protect those hurt by loss of jobs and loss of income that could be expected to result from a radical change toward a market economy."

N.A.#177/(April 15, 1990): "'These guys are frightened to death they're losing their grip on the economy,' said one visiting Western specialist, who has been consulted by the Kremlin's economic brain trust. 'I've

told them this Government doesn't know what it's doing; it's on the verge of collapse and hyperinflation.' One positive change in the current stage of the economic crisis, according to this expert, is that President Gorbachev is showing signs that 'he's finally developing a real appetite' for the task."

N.A.#178/(May 13, 1990): "R. Simonyan, an economist at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, contends that Soviet life has been so grim for so long that the recent decline has barely felt. The main effect, he said, is psychological. 'People go to work everyday and some do something there, maybe not as well as before, but the system operates,' he said. He added, 'we should not free prices when almost 50 million people get less than 70 rubles a month.'"

N.A.#179/(May 26, 1990): "According to the Western analystst, Soviet leaders have watched their economy slide toward stagnation since the mid-1970's and it was President Gorbachev's efforts to shake up the system rather than the system's internal contradictions that precipitated the current crisis."

N.A.#180/(July 27, 1990): "L. Summers at Harvard University said 'When the shopkeeper is selling what you want, you don't worry how he spends the proceeds.' Mr. Summers and other experts do worry. And many who just a few years ago believed that foreign capital could be used fairly easily to grease the transition to market economies have been chastened by both the piecemeal failure of perestroika, or restructuring, and the barriers to more careful reforms in Poland and Yugoslavia.

Ed A. Hewett, an economist at the Brookings Institution, estimates that a third of all Soviet products come from enterprises that control 100 percent of their markets. R. McKinnon, an economist at Stanford, cites another striking consequence of finances in the Soviet Union. Enterprises that do manage to accumulate rubles – through efficiency or simply monopoly pricing – are buying everything, anything, to get rid of rubles before they become worthless. A radical economist. N.A. Shmelev suggests what is arguably most radical use of foreign currency.

If the Soviet Union would import tens of billions dollars in unavailable goods and then sell them at high market prices for rubles, workers would get a taste of what they might expect in a world in which hard work is rewarded with material success, perhaps coaxing greater effort from a notoriously inefficient work force. He suggests that the sale would bleed off some of the pent-up purchasing power, making it possible to unfreeze shop prices without experiencing a dramatic inflation in the price of staples.

The same end might be achieved, suggests P. Desai at Columbia University's Harriman Institute, by auctioning borrowed foreign currency to the highest bidders. But these proposals, suggests Mr. McKinnon, all suffer from the same flaw. Soaking up excess rubles will not do much good unless measures are also taken to stop inflation. And that is not possible, he contends, without Western-style monetary controls."

N.A.#181/(October 21, 1990): "'You need control over hard currency earnings if you are going to service the foreign debt,' E.A. Hewett, a Soviet specialist, noted. What counts, analysts say, is establishing the Government's right to make painful choices."

N.A.#182/(December 14, 1990): "'If the central Government says it wants to use its police to make sure Western aid doesn't get stolen, it's kind of hard to object to that,' a diplomat said. Another diplomat said 'if this spiral of deterioration continues, by next winter the wolf may really be at the door. One hopes that if that is the case, they haven't cried 'wolf' too often.'"

N.A.#183/(January 20, 1991): "V. Kvint, U.S.S.R. Professor of Political Economy; former professor in Moscow: 'Hunger will make the political situation worse. President Gorbachev is now astride two beasts, the K.G.B. and the military. Western food aid only go to feed those two beasts. It will not get to the people. I fear President Gorbachev's revolution will turn into a civil war. ... There is not a lot of hope for Western investment. The big Chevron joint venture is largely in

Kazakhstan, which is unstable. The Combustion Engineering and Occidental Petroleum projects were oriented to the decisions of the old centralized system and did not sufficiently take account of the independence movements of the individual republics.'"

IV. THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS (*The Claims of the Newspaper People*)

This section will include the claims, interpretations, and arguments made by the journalists who wrote the news articles.

Claims About the Reforms

N.A.#184/(April 6, 1989): "Official publication of the speech of N. Khrushchev is another step in Mr. Gorbachev's campaign to galvanize the Soviet public toward political and economic change. Extracts from Khrushchev's memoirs were printed in this week in a leading journal in the glasnost movement."

N.A.#185/(April 17, 1989): "'The conflicts over the expense and management of the Soviet space program', it is argued, 'are erupting in public in another manifestation of the new policy of increased openness and the deep concern for the country's economy.' It is argued that the popular demand about the space program asks for a decrease in the amount of spending. Scientists are criticizing the way the program is being run. Public criticism of the Soviet program is argued to be familiar to Americans."

N.A.#186/(April 21, 1989): "On top of cutbacks, a shrinking budget, the leadership of the armed services is coping with brushfires of unrest within the ranks that once would have been at least invisible."

N.A.#187/(April 30, 1989): "The Soviet athletes are arriving in the U.S. in increasing numbers and participating in a wider variety of sports, they are doing their part to make perestroika a success. It is a friendly invasion and one of the more visible signs of the political and economic reforms initiated by the leader, M. S. Gorbachev. Although there is speculation about the future course of these reforms and how

much real change has occurred in the S. Union, it appears that Soviet officials are capitalizing on a period of harmonious relations with the U.S. to make a permanent commitment to sports expansion on the international level."

N.A.#188/(May 21, 1989): It is claimed that "some important but subtle changes are going on behind spectacular developments in international affairs; and that M. Gorbachev achieved Moscow's longstanding aim of 'normalization' with China, and that the relationship between the two countries will influence his ideas on how to go ahead 'opening' the S. Union; and that reform is the hardest task of power.

The article deals with the concept of 'opening' by looking at some dimensions of the international politics, and the hardness of reform movements is emphasized. It is argued that Beijing and Moscow look to the U.S. to keep some global stability while they attend to troubles at home; and that neither shows any interest in trying to push the U.S. military out of Asia where American forces are keeping the peace between two Koreas. It is also claimed that the Berlin wall is the most potent symbol of how much opening is available and desired as the world transforms itself; and that there needs to be some new openness, new candor in the West as well if we are to deal with contradictory new trends; and that the old slogans are dangerously confusing."

N.A.#189/(May 23, 1989): It is argued that "the Finns criticize their neighbor to the east on a problem they did not even suspect until last year: damage to northern Finnish wilderness areas from Soviet air pollution; and that Gorbachev's policy of 'glasnost' led to a disclosure that several hundred thousand tons of air pollution from the S.Union was threatening the forests in the far north. Environmentalists on the Soviet side of the border have been among the vociferous people taking advantage of Mr.Gorbachev's call for public debate about the country's problems."

N.A.#190/(May 25, 1989): Another article opens with a sentence which informs the reader that Lithuania has become the first republic to defy

Moscow's taxing authority. It is argued that "the decision was followed by the protests by residents of the rebellious Baltic republic who complained that the tax increase on motor vehicles would go to repair decrepit roads in the backward regions of the S. Union; and that the authorities in Moscow have not conceded that republics should have the right to reject laws by Moscow."

N.A.#191/(July 9, 1989): In the article which describes the visit of a group of Americans who were allowed inside the laser research center to view what the Soviets have always maintained was an innocent research program; it is argued that "the tour was perhaps the most remarkable development in a Soviet campaign of 'military glasnost,' that the visiting Americans were the first outsiders to set foot in the complex where the Soviet Union has produced plutonium for its nuclear weapons since 1948. Y.P. Velikhov, a vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences organized the tour. The article describes the characteristics of the research complex."

N.A.#192/(October 23, 1989): It is claimed that "as the Soviet press has become a daily riot of sensationalism Westerners and even many Soviet readers have come to mistake glasnost for freedom of the press; that M.S. Gorbachev, by purging one editor, threatening another, reminded the world that he sees glasnost, not as a right but as a tool, is not working the way he wants; that during the five years of Gorbachev's rule, glasnost served a series of purposes; that it has helped win over Soviet intellectuals and the West to Mr. Gorbachev's causes, which has adopted the word glasnost and put it on T-shirts."

N.A.#193/(November 18, 1989): In the article concerned with the thousands of Soviet citizens desperate for state housing, it is argued that "they have begun taking the solution into their own hands. They are seizing Government land and creating vast new urban squatter settlements. As democratization is hesitantly tested, some of the policemen sent to tear down the shanties have joined the squatters. Most of the huts and houses have been built since the summer, when large number of people sensed they could do something outrageous

about their housing frustration under the cover of Gorbachev's program of perestroika: rebuild." The article continues with several examples about the conflicts between the officials who did not respond to the demands for new housing and people.

N.A.#194/ (December 24, 1989): Another article describes the impact of glasnost on the education of Soviet diplomats living in New York: "Glasnost translates into M. Kirsanov (one of the children) biting into his first hamburger and N. Barabanov watching soap operas. In the new openness ushered in by Gorbachev, they are joining the children the children of other Soviet diplomats in venturing beyond their compounds to attend American schools in cities across the nation."

N.A.#195/(February 9, 1990): According to the article which covered the economic scene in the Soviet Union, it is argued, 'taking measures to overhaul the monetary system' and 'to strengthen the purchasing power of the ruble' is a 'herculean task, because the fundamental cause of the collapsing Soviet economy is a worsening but hidden inflation, with enormous budget deficits causing the billions of rubles in the public's hands to lose their value, and with price controls distorting resource use and forcing goods into black markets.'"

N.A.#196/(February 19, 1990): One of the articles covered the city of Moscow described the economic hardships as follows:

"The rutted streets and cluttered courtyards of the city center speak of a marked deterioration in the economy, friends speak of empty shelves in the stores, which seem about as empty as they were a year ago, and say the reason for this is that nobody sees much point in working hard anymore.

And there is a sense of despair about the process of change that was evident a year ago. Although the Central Committee of the Communist Party voted to give up its constitutional guarantee of the leading role, it will not collapse like the Communist parties of East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

'Perestroika,' which has brought a new openness and freedom of debate, seems to have gone seriously wrong as a policy of pulling the country out of economic decline, and Mr. Gorbachev told the elected legislature this week that it was in a critical stage."

N.A.#197/(February 9, 1990): In the article concerned with the aftermath of the overthrow of the dictatorship in Romania, the following description used:

"'No perestroika,' said a man who gave his name as Adrian, using the phrase for reform that has become a dirty word here, summing up the mood on the streets. 'No communists.'"

N.A.#198/ (April 8, 1990): Another article described the reforms as follows: "Proof that glasnost is real – not just the careful and orderly openness sought by President M.S. Gorbachev but a gutsy freedom of expression directed at the Government and Communism's sacred cows – can be found in the new Soviet political cartoons."

It is claimed that "the Soviet cartoonists are breaking loose with wit and visual invective; that there is a great deal to attack in a society that, in many respects, resembles the bad old days more than the promised good new times; that under Mr. Gorbachev, the mixture of paralysis and reform seems to have produced a worsening of corruption; that the Soviet cartoonists bring to their work a melancholy that can be called Russian, an anger stored up from the years of suffering; that they do not know yet what perestroika is or will become; that they have come to understand Soviet officialdom as a collection of mean individuals; that they see the bureaucrats as burdens to be carried, and one day to be dumped, a view shared by Soviet and Western economists; that some Soviet cartoons go far beyond politics to describe the plight of the individual, an unheroic, sad and often grungy individual, trying to cope; that in the cartoons there is concern about the special problems of women and devastated relations between men and women; that some of these artists have lent a hand to Mr. Gorbachev in his various campaigns – against alcohol, drugs,

prostitution. But they go on their own crusades – for honesty and decency, for nature, for people over machines, for the mind and spirit over production statistics. Mr. Gorbachev said he wants all that, too.”

N.A.#199/(April 30, 1990): In the article which is about the new Eastern and the Soviet movies shown in the Los Angeles film festival, this event is described as ‘Hollywood Glasnost.’ It’s claimed that “many of the movies reflect the search for new forms of artistic expression that has come with the turmoil in Communism. The article continues with the short descriptions of the movies.”

N.A.#200/ (July 8, 1990): In the article which covered the Bolshoi, it is claimed that “there are significant – and controversial – differences, which are in large measure the product of perestroika, the restructuring of Soviet society and its economy; that this year the Bolshoi is being presented by a new team: the Entertainment Corporation USA and a Broadway producer; that the Corporation, a British corporation, offered something extra: a business partnership with the Bolshoi that has raised cries of commercialism in the Soviet Union; that the agreement helped to stir a recent one-day hunger strike in Moscow by six Bolshoi artists in response to ‘an atmosphere of money making.’”

N.A.#201/(September 16, 1990): “Moscow consumers faced a new and ultimate insult, a bread shortage, as the city’s bakeries failed before the appetites of residents flooding back into the city from their annual vacations. The empty bread shelves prompted ominous reports on the main evening news television news program which treated the shortage not as a seasonal fluke but as a sign of the continuing breakdown of the state-run economy. Izvestia deftly alluded to the fact that bread shortages set off the revolution that ousted the Russian monarchy in 1917.”

N.A.#202/(October 17, 1990): “President M.S. Gorbachev sent the Soviet Parliament a compromise economic reform program that calls for dismantling the state’s economic monopoly, but set no timetable; that

the document embraced the broad principles of a revolutionary program devised by a team of radical economists: selling state property into private hands, lifting Government price controls and handing over many economic decisions to the governments of the country's 15 republics."

"Mr. Gorbachev's plan, competed in a final brainstorming session that ended was billed as a synthesis of two rival proposals – a gradualist draft by the Government of Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov and the more radical plan, devised by a panel of economists representing Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin, chaired by Mr. Shatalin."

N.A.#203/(October 18, 1990): "Redoubtable Muscovites bored with the Kremlin's agonizing over economic reform are taking their forbidden dollars out of hiding and openly putting their money on the free market at hard currency stores long restricted to the city's Western residents."

N.A.#204/(October 18, 1990): In the article which is concerned with the consequences of the economic program devised by M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, it is claimed that "in developing the economic program, by combining the enormous popular support of Mr. Yeltsin with the Kremlin savvy and world stature of Mr. Gorbachev, the hope was, this coalition might bring the public through the painful transition to free markets and a new national confederation. The article continues to claim that Mr. Gorbachev's plan is also vague about the economic powers of republics and local governments, while Yeltsin insists that the republics dominate economic decision-making and decide what powers to delegate up to the Kremlin; that by instinct, and by his political upbringing in the clubby, consensus-oriented world of the Communist Party, Mr. Gorbachev prefers to lead from the middle."

N.A.#205/(October 22, 1990): In the article which is about the Soviet marketplace to be built on the wreckage of Communism, it is argued that "no matter how neat the logic of an economic program, it's anarchy out there; that communism seems to decay the way uranium does, splitting off unruly practices that carom into the surrounding

environment with devastating consequences for the plans of economic managers."

N.A.#206/ (December 1, 1990): "In a country where it was once crime to publish official statistics without state permission, *Commersant*, a Soviet business weekly, capitalizes on glasnost to dig up useful data from all economic sectors, including the black market."

N.A.#207/ (December 14, 1990): In the article concerned with the economic aid the Soviet Union receives from the other countries, it is argued that "Mr. Gorbachev's generosity has caused considerable division at the receiving end among economists and politicians, foreign diplomats and ordinary citizens; that by most accounts the flow of foreign aid is more political than humanitarian, a gesture of support from Western governments and publics for the winter of the Nobel Prize and for his promises of democracy and free markets; that for Mr. Gorbachev, the ability to deliver Western food aid is a chance to justify his diplomatic globetrotting, which some of his constituents have come to see as a distraction from their own hurts; that it is also an answer to critics who complain he has traded away Soviet military might for little return."

N.A.#208/(January 13, 1991): The impact of glasnost on arts is the theme of a group of articles. In one of these articles it is argued that "while M.S. Gorbachev battles a sagging economy in the Soviet Union, glasnost has become one of the hottest trends of the American arts scene; that since the restoration of cultural relations between the two superpowers six years ago, the flow of artists from East to West has achieved near flood-tide proportions; that glasnost can also mean boffo box office; that Americans have more recently been entranced by Mr. Gorbachev's media triumphs involving the changes in Soviet society; that the origins of the glasnost industry may have been based more on the capitalistic needs of the Soviet Union than on any fascination by Americans for Soviet culture."

N.A.#209/(January 20, 1991): "The Soviet Union continues to unravel

both politically and economically. After five years, the democratic reforms and economic liberalization initiated by President M.S. Gorbachev seem to be backfiring, threatening, among other things, the future of thousands of joint venture plans between Western and Soviet enterprises, only a small fraction of which are in place."

N.A.#210/(February 3, 1991): It is claimed that "the trajectory of hope inspired by M.S. Gorbachev began and ended, in the minds of many citizens, with two telephone calls, four tumultuous years apart; that the first, in December 1986, was Mr. Gorbachev's call to A.D. Sakharov, to inform the dissident and physicist that he was being freed from his exile in the closed city of Gorky; that optimism was exhausted by the time of the second phone call, made by V. Landsbergis, the President of Lithuania; that it was an appeal to Mr. Gorbachev for help from a man considered an heir to the uncompromising anti-Stalinist resolve of Dr. Sakharov; that in the first years of his reform, when perestroika and glasnost were presented as a mere streamlining and humanizing of the one-party, one-owner state, Mr. Gorbachev seemed to think he could goad the public into a more efficient socialism. Where terror had failed, he would inspire them with new idealism.

'Acceleration!' – his first, quickly abandoned economic slogan – was essentially a call for everyone to run faster on the same old treadmill.

But gradually Mr. Gorbachev himself recognized – of seemed to – that for the people to change, the system of motivations and interests had to be changed to encourage competition and individual initiative. 'A house can be put in order only by a person who feels he is the owner,' he said at a Communist Party leadership meeting in 1987, where he introduced the idea of 'democratization.'"

The article continues depicting the Soviet Union as follows: "A bit of democracy would shake the old system and give his mandate. It would also disarm the suspicions of the West, allowing him divert resources from the cold war and to attract foreign investment. Operating with boldness, imagination and a freer hand in policy, Mr. Gorbachev extracted Soviet forces from Afghanistan, negotiated

cutbacks in his military arsenal, the disavowed the Brezhnev Doctrine that had propped up Communist Governments in Eastern Europe. There were several signs along the way that Mr. Gorbachev viewed democracy as an instrument rather than an ideal, and an instrument to be used cautiously. Even after Mr. Gorbachev spurned the coalition, there still seemed to be hope that the democratic opposition could built its own islands of democracy and capitalism. and yet the insurgents have proved almost as incapable of delivering sweeping change as Mr. Gorbachev. ... In Moscow, each day's newspapers brings a new and usually grim scenario for the future. ... The most dire prognosis is genuine civil war, the center against the republics, a vision shared by people on opposite political poles. ... Another forecast that has circulated is a market dictatorship like the one Gen. A. Pinochet imposed in Chile, in which Mr. Gorbachev, or alternatively someone in uniform, uses force to suppress dissent and preserve the union while instituting a market economy. ... A few years of a freer press and freer travel have taught the Soviet public, especially the young, the inadequacy of their system and the allure of Western values. Even if their isolation could be reimposed, these lessons cannot be easily unlearned."

N.A.#211/(February 8, 1991): "For the majority of Soviet citizens, the shift in official winds has been most evident on the 87 million television screens spread to the far corners of the Soviet Union. Over the five years that glasnost reigned, the mammoth Government-owned radio and television network became the most far reaching harbinger of the new openness, riveting viewers with once-forbidden treasures of sights and sounds – dissidents, banned writers, priests, political debate, uncensored art and honest news."

N.A.#212/(February 20, 1991): " ... democracy is a luxury the Soviet Union cannot afford. The economy can be saved only by top-down change – and a tight muzzle on bottom-up dissent. Those committed to democracy would turn this proposition on its head; free markets would simply not work, they argue, without the support of free people. How many Russians, after all, would be prepared to invest

their energy or capital without the protection of the rule of law?"

N.A.#213/(March 5, 1991): "When M.S. Gorbachev first opened the **door** to cooperatives, joint ventures and other market-oriented **economic** restructuring programs several years ago, every day was **hustling**: meetings with Soviet industry officials, lunches with **chairmen** of foreign companies."

N.A. #214/(April 18, 1991): "The Kremlin has begun an initiative to get **major** Western countries to join in drafting and financing a far-reaching plan for economic and political reform, including creation of a **market** economy, political decentralization and privatization. ... In **Moscow**, the initiative is thought to come at a propitious time. On the **Soviet** side, Mr. Gorbachev has struck a promising truce with M.N. **Yeltsin**, the primary champion of radical economic reform, in which the **President** finally recognized the sovereignty of the republics and their **right** to secede.

There is also a growing sense in the Soviet Union that the 'crisis program' produced by the government of Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov can **only** be a stopgap measure without extensive Western assistance. Mr. **Pavlov** himself appealed to the West not to be bystanders to the Soviet **crisis**.

The basic principles of the new initiation are included in an "Appeal to the Group of Seven" signed by Mr. Yavlinsky and Mr. **Primakov**. It calls on the Soviet Union to draft a comprehensive **reform** plan and asks the Group of Seven to prepare a parallel plan of **economic** cooperation. The major objective of the plan have been cited in **most** previous reform plans. The difference is that this is the first to **propose** an active role for the West."

N.A.#215/(May 21, 1991): "Reflecting a sense of desperation in the Soviet **Union**, a team of Soviet economists began meetings with **American** professors to draw up a plan that they hope could save the **Russian** economy by offering sweeping reforms in exchange for a huge

program of Western aid."

N.A.#216/(May 26, 1991): "What should the West do about the Soviet Union? That question has welled up anew before the industrialized democracies as the Soviet giant lumbers to the end of what is coming to be known as the first phase of perestroika, battered out wiser and a bit more receptive to the bitter medicine of real change.

In the first six years, the epic process launched by M.S. Gorbachev went from giddy euphoria to dark gloom, and for several months last winter the future of the entire process seemed to totter as the embattled President tried one last fling with the Old Guard Communists. But following the old Marxist scheme, the 'thesis' of excitement and the 'antithesis' of reaction finally seemed to produce something of a synthesis. In a series of conciliatory actions and signals, Mr. Gorbachev has let it be known that he may be ready to return to the path of reform and to approach the West for help in reviving his bedraggled giant.

The strongest signal has been Mr. Gorbachev's renewed readiness to listen to G. Yavlinsky, a young economist who has teamed up with scholars at Harvard Kennedy School of Government to draft a joint action program that could guide the Soviet Union in the transition to a real democracy and free market.

So far, most in the West, would probably agree. The next question is: What compelling reasons do Western governments or industry have to plunge into the Soviet mess, especially after what they have seen in the first years of perestroika? Why not let the giant slumber? The first signal from the West is expected at the summit meeting of the G7, at which Gorbachev has aimed his lobbying. So far the West has not displayed great enthusiasm. The industrial powers have their own problems, the bills from the Persian Gulf war are coming in, and the Soviet Union is not as formidable a threat as it once was.

They did, sort of. The first blush of perestroika brought swarms of Western horse-dealers who rushed to set up 'joint ventures.' Most of these, however, proved to be no more than short-term gimmicks to

make quick profit, often with a corrupt Soviet official as the partner.

The Klondike phase of perestroika, however, at least served to **demonstrate** to the Soviets that a lot more goes into a free market than **wheeling** and dealing, and to identify the obstacles in their path. They **make** an impressive list: primitive infrastructure, gross corruption, **massive** red tape, shortage of trained personnel, a non-convertible **currency**, a huge foreign debt, resistance to privatization, absence of a **legal** structure, popular distrust of business and the free market, **political** instability, ethnic and social conflicts, run-down agriculture, **rampant** shortages, erratic supplies, underdeveloped banking, a **massive** military-industrial complex – to name only a few."

N.A. # 217/ (June 6, 1991): "Mr. Gorbachev did not explain how a failure of **Western** economic support for his reforms could doom the chances for **world** peace. He argued only that such aid would benefit all by **enabling** Moscow to make even more "constructive and significant" **contributions** to the emerging new order. Already, he said, perestroika has **benefited** mankind, as evidenced by disarmament accords and an **end to the cold war.**"

N.A. #218/ (June 20, 1991): "In a country that never knew a capitalist **industrial** age, many people raised on the generations of Communist **propaganda** since the revolution distrust "biznes" as the black market writ **large**, a shady world where only crooks make money, profiting at **everybody** else's expense from shortages of everything from potatoes to **petrochemicals**.

Western banks hesitate to invest large sums to develop business or **property**, those experts said, because despite the current discussion about '**privatization**' and '**destatization**,' there is still no clear Soviet **legal concept** of ownership.

Part of the Government's reform plan, and the regulations drafted by the **Soviet** Central Bank to support it, appear on paper to be intended to **discourage** rather than encourage Soviet citizens and enterprises

from engaging in foreign trade."

N.A.#219/(July 9, 1991): In the article which describes the city of Astrakhan, along the Banks of the Volga and the characteristics of the city such as the economic conditions, food shortages and so on; it is argued that "a look at Astrakhan's economy shows the problems of the Soviet consumer and entrepreneur after six years of President M.S. Gorbachev's program of perestroika, or economic and political restructuring; that to enter the main food market is to traverse the two extremes of this city's economic life – the strange landlocked ship with its exotic sense of bootleg capitalism, and the city's gasping market of shortage and despair."

N.A. #220 (July 11, 1991): "On the eve of perestroika, there was a popular notion in the liberal Soviet intelligentsia that once restraints on free thought were lifted, reform and prosperity would surely follow.

Then came glasnost, M.S. Gorbachev's policy of openness, and taboos fell like rain. Every blemish of Soviet life and history was exposed and scrutinized.

These days, foreigners who stop a passerby and ask about daily life create instant crowds of Soviet people competing to describe their lot. The law against anti-Soviet propaganda is still somewhere on the books, to be sure, but if it were applied as it used to be, the lines outside prisons would quickly dwarf those at vodka stores.

Yet for all the freedom, for all the analyses of what was wrong and what should be done, the economy continued to disintegrate and has now approached collapse. Nobody may be starving yet, but nobody, not the most hardened Communist, denies any longer that the quality of life has plummeted to levels unmatched in decades.

As long as the Government could still keep some goods in the shops, most people were simply unprepared to risk the cradle-to-grave security of the system they were reared in for a blind plunge into the "free market," a concept they had been taught to associate with black

marketeers, unemployment, exploitation and worse.

Harsh as it was, it probably required economic crisis as well as **glasnost** for the Soviet people to accept that there was no "third way," **no** alternative but to take the plunge. That, at least, is the sense that **emerges** from interviews conducted with Muscovites, both known and **unknown**.

Six years ago, Mrs. Tsegankova might have ben prosecuted for **saying** that. Three years ago she probably did not believe it. Now she **joined** people ranging from a cashier to a prominent economics **journalist** in declaring that the time had come to take the bitter **medicine**."

N.A. #221/(July 14, 1991): "The country has been without a national **budget** for months, but vast state bureaucracies lumber on.

All across the Soviet land, there is a bewildering sense of a **wounded** monolith surviving through sheer inertia, beyond the laws of **economics**, politics or common sense. There's a widespread sense that **something** fundamental has to change. But in the absence of any **experience** of free enterprise, all the talk of free markets, ruble **convertibility** and privatization raises only vague and ominous images for most Soviet citizens.

The **economy** should be near collapse, but in a system manipulated so long **from** a secretive center, nobody really knows what that means. There **is** no stock market to collapse, no savings and loan institutions to go **under**, no middle class to panic.

Statistics show a precipitous decline in every major area. The police **estimate** that there are about 5,000 criminal groupings in the nation. **Corruption** has become endemic. Illegal earnings have risen from 59 **billion rubles** in 1989 to 68.8 billion in 1990, Government estimates **indicate**. The wheeling and dealing has created a wealthy new caste for whom **virtually** anything is available in Moscow.

It can also be argued that the transformation can only move at its own pace. While bold new programs are regularly introduced, most disappear in the tangle of competing jurisdictions or founder in a legal system utterly inadequate for its new tasks. By most prognoses, things will get far worse before they get better. Whatever reforms Mr. Gorbachev adopts will hurt, forcing mass layoffs at obsolete industries, raising prices still further, disrupting familiar patterns and fostering more crime."

N.A.#222/(July 18, 1991): "To do that the Soviet Union would have to become a fully fledged capitalist market economy, something not everybody is convinced that Mr. Gorbachev could do if he wanted to do.

The cold war, grim as it was, also provided a bedrock of stability for more than 40 years. With everything frozen in place by the threat of nuclear war, the Western world could prosper without worrying much about what economic conditions were like in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

But now, as Mr. Gorbachev put it, 'The ice has started moving,' and the world has become very much smaller. This is both reassuring and disturbing. After Mr. Gorbachev agreed to a treaty mandating the most significant cuts ever in the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, he then asked Western leaders what the Western terms were for helping him building a market economy."

N.A.#223/(August 1, 1991): "Nowadays, with politics opened up by the reforms of Mr. Gorbachev, the Ukraine seethes with outspoken ethnic groups and dozens of political parties that broadcast every variety of independence and sovereignty demands."

N.A.#224/(August 16, 1991): "The largest Soviet-American venture ever, a Chevron Corporation plan to develop huge oilfields in Kazakhstan, has become enmeshed in this nation's traditional fear of capitalism and the new muckraking of its free press, leaving President M.S. Gorbachev pressing to get the deal back on track to reassure skeptical foreign investors.

The proposed 25-year venture between Chevron and its Soviet partners in the rich Tengiz oilfields is being restudied and renegotiated at the highest levels of Gorbachev Government after a series of critical newspaper articles that warn of capitalist greed exploiting Soviet resources under the guise of perestroika, Mr. Gorbachev's program of economic restructuring."

The Claims About the Soviet State

N.A. #225/ (May 7, 1989): The article argues that "the K.G.B., the Soviet security force once synonymous with state terror, has become the latest convert to glasnost, promising the public that it plans 'an expansion of democracy' in its operations. This new openness, it is argued, is a considerable vow, since the K.G.B. runs both the foreign intelligence and domestic security operations through a mammoth network of uniformed troops and undercover agents who keep an eye on everything from dissident cafes to world capitals. The article continues describing the the history of the K.G.B. as the modern successor of the cheka, or counterrevolutionary police, of the Bolshevik founders: 'Even before the new decree, 'The K.G.B. and Glasnost,' the service was working hard toward a more positive image. The effort has not gone unnoticed by the public. In a public opinion poll, 23 institutions were rated on a scale from 1 to 5, and the K.G.B. drew the highest average with a favorable rating of 4.2. higher than the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Despite Mr. Kryuchkov's comments, many dissidents exiled, arrested, harassed over the years. Psychiatric interment of dissidents was a modern state technique. The K.G.B.'s pursuit of all political beliefs and activity beyond the party dictates remains legendary."

N.A.#226/(Jun 2, 1989): "The K.G.B. is theoretically accountable to the Council of Ministers, but in practice it has virtually been an independent entity. Mr. Kryuchkov appeared in the lobby of the Palace of Congress at the Kremlin in a remarkable show of what American

politicians call 'spin control.'"

N.A.#227/(December 31, 1989): It is argued that "M.S. Gorbachev has **hailed** the right of each of what used to be called the Soviet satellite **nations** to reshape a distinctive multiparty future after the de facto **seizure** of that right, while angrily denying a similar extent of self-**determination** and pluralism to the Baltic republics and to other **nationalist** movements within his own borders."

N.A. #228/(September 25, 1990): "As the Soviet Union heads into a **period** of wrenching economic change, it also faces unresolved **questions** about the redistribution of power – between the central **Government** and the republics, between the presidency and the **legislature**, among newly emerging political factions."

N.A. #229/(October 19, 1990): It is argued that "M.S. Gorbachev won an **overwhelming** parliamentary mandate to transform the destitute **Soviet** state from a Communist to a market economy."

N.A. #230/(October 22, 1990): "The Soviet meat business used to be **simple** in the days before Mr. Gorbachev. One producer, the state. One **wholesaler**, the state. One price, the state price."

N.A.#231/(December 18, 1990): "The Congress that is the highest **constitutional** authority is scheduled to meet to consider remaking the **government** to enhance Mr. Gorbachev's powers, and to debate the **general** concept of a new union treaty spelling out the balance of **powers** between the center and the republics."

N.A.#232/(February 3, 1991): "In the independent Soviet press and in the **gloomy** parlors of this wintry capital, the cold splash of **disillusionment** has provoked savage introspection and dire prognosis: Why **has** freedom not become democracy? Who is to blame? Is it over?"

In the years between those phone calls, the Soviet Union has **undergone** half a revolution, and it now seems that it was the easy half.

A centralized economic system that served mainly to redistribute scarcity has broken down, but a new one has not grown up in its place. An empire has surrendered its outer colonies and brought its armies home, but cannot come to equilibrium within its own borders. An ideology of collectivism has been discredited, but not supplanted by any compelling new sense of purpose. Most important, a totalitarian system has been disavowed, but democracy and the rule of law have not yet succeeded in replacing it. It is tempting to blame the society itself for failing to make the most of its opportunity, for being lazy, too ignorant, too envious, too dependent, too impatient, too set in its ways.

In the Soviet Union, the nomenklatura, the patronage apparatus that ran all soviet industry and agriculture like a vast, mega-monopoly, was too solidly entrenched to be disbanded by command.

While the federal elections in March 1989 produced a Parliament Mr. Gorbachev could usually control, elections in the republics and localities a year later had just the opposite result.

The potential economic bargain alarmed at the Communist gentry that still dominated the economy, the army and the state police. They may have seen it as the final surrender of the center to separatism and chaos. They surely saw it as injurious to their careers.

The nomenklatura retained a majority in the Gorbachev-designed Parliament, the only institution with the power to remove him. The army, pulled back from Eastern Europe was angry. He could not afford to antagonize the K.G.B. whose loyalty he inherited from his political patron, Y. Andropov, the late K.G.B. chief and party leader.

The very structure of the new Soviet democracy is self-defeating. At all levels, from the federal legislature to neighborhood councils, the lawmaking power is made up of huge, unwieldy, amateur parliaments, hundreds of members each, incapable of making hard decisions but unwilling to delegate the decisions to executive bodies.

The best assurance against a return to the full-fledged tyranny of old is that the Soviet Union is already not what it was when Mr. Gorbachev began. The constituency for change no longer consists of a brave dissidents. In the press, in the church, in the universities, in the republics, in the coal mines, there is less fear of the Kremlin, and fewer illusions.

'Many people, moreover, have a financial stake in freedom. Among the young, polls show, working outside the state system is considered by far the most desirable employment.'

N.A.#233/(February 20, 1991): "Indeed, many Soviet citizens are apparently unwilling to make any sacrifice at all to reconstruct the Soviet state. They would rather retreat to ethnic homelands. Balkanizing the economy and depriving Moscow of the fuel, gold that serve as the Kremlin's only currency in international commerce."

N.A.#234/(May 26, 1991): "Dropping the word 'socialist' would be a remarkable step in the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that goes far beyond symbolic semantics, since it would reflect the revised federal structure and would allow the constituents vast freedom in choosing their own forms of government and in controlling their own wealth. The Friday meeting is significant because it shows that the Kremlin and the republics are making progress in forging a new form of power-sharing, a step that seemed elusive two months ago when Moscow was threatening clampdowns on republics demanding greater local control."

N.A.#235/(June 20, 1991): "The still-vast state bureaucracy is writing regulations that seem intended to preserve or tighten state control rather than loosen it, some entrepreneurs have said."

N.A.#236/(July 7, 1991): "The announcement of the new political movement marks a notable milestone on the Soviet Union's tortuous road to democracy. Mr. Shevardnadze's decision to quit Communist

ranks and raise the banner of the Democratic Reform Movement dramatizes the crumbling of the once-monolithic party."

N.A.#237/(July 11, 1991): "In those dark days [before the perestroika], Soviet citizens who publicly complained about their lives, especially to foreigners, risked being jailed for 'anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.'

These days, foreigners who stop a passerby and ask about daily life create instant crowds of Soviet people competing to describe their lot. The law against anti-Soviet propaganda is still somewhere on the books, to be sure, but if it were applied as it used to be, the lines outside prisons would quickly dwarf those at vodka stores."

N.A.#238/(July 14, 1991): "The dual system of free-wheeling enterprise and Government control extends throughout the economy. State bureaucrats still set prices and quotas for state-owned enterprises, while the "shadow economy" grows fat on the discrepancies in price and the greed of the bureaucrats."

N.A.#239/(July 18, 1991): "After Communism's end, capitalism would bring new problems to the Kremlin before it solved the old ones, which is what Western leaders were trying to make clear to Mr. Gorbachev."

The Claims About the Leaders

N.A.#240/(June 13, 1989): "Gorbachev shunned a garrulousness over China, as if glasnost were not for export."

N.A.#241/(September 25, 1989): The article titled 'Gorbachev's Anti-Magic' covered the Soviet leader as follows:

"One of the great contradictions of M.S. Gorbachev is that while the outside world grows more and more captivated by his skill and charm, much of his own country seems increasingly immune to the magic."

The article continues to claim that "Mr. Gorbachev has been embraced anew; that he has been hailed as a bold visionary who will bring prosperity to his people by M. Thatcher, yet at home, peace, stability and plenty seem beyond the reach of Mr. Gorbachev's personal talent, even before his political power; that the Baltic republics are defiant, Armenia and Azerbaijan are reported close to civil warfare, consumers look ahead to winter with something near panic, and Mr. Gorbachev is openly blamed for not waving a wand and making the hard times go away. Mr. Gorbachev was subjected to sarcastic gibes by some members of a militant parliamentary group."

"How can Mr. Gorbachev be perceived abroad as a master of affairs and yet seem so ineffectual to many of his own citizens?" According to the article, "one reason is that much of his success consists of unilateral concessions – on arms control, on human rights, on the war in Afghanistan. Those concessions are less costly than they seem and especially one concession, which clears a major obstacle to an agreement reducing long-range nuclear weapons, was something that Mr. Gorbachev could deliver on his own initiative. It is argued that that there is no unilateral concession that will bring economic recovery or ethnic peace at home; that those concessions require the cooperation of many rival groups who regard their interests as matters of principle and social justice.

The second reason about that many Westerners consider Gorbachev a marvel is that his endeavors abroad have brought quick gratification. Treaties have been signed and weapons demolished. Families have been reunited. Troops have come home. Surveys suggest that people feel safer.

It is argued that what Gorbachev is selling at home is a less appealing commodity – greater liberty and the long-range hope of a better life in exchange for years of hard work, patience and sacrifice; that he compounded his domestic problems when he implied quick results, raising what may be impossible expectations and producing

today's wide disillusionment.

The third explanation is that the Soviet Union is by tradition a conservative society, one where change has been associated with upheaval. It is argued that many Soviet citizens have been elated by the chance to speak freely, but liberty has also been unsettling and in some ways demoralizing; that comforting myths have been demolished, political rivalries are being played out, and nothing seems familiar; that even those who yearn for something different doubt their countrymen's capacity for polite debate and parliamentary compromise."

"The last reason," according to the article, "is that there is Mr. Gorbachev, who is viewed in the West as the instrument of change, but seen at home as a more ambiguous figure – both Luther and the Pope, as one critic wrote recently. It is claimed that the Soviet people might follow a tyrant out of fear, or an angry challenger – a man like Mr. Yeltsin – out of devotion, but they often seem uncertain what to make of Mr. Gorbachev, a man of cool logic who straddles the roles of reformer and pontiff."

"Of course," it is argued, "Mr. Gorbachev's success abroad helps him at home, and not only by lowering world tension so that he can redirect attention from defense to domestic modernization. His summitry has won him genuine respect in the Soviet Union, a feeling being encouraged by some press accounts of Mrs. Thatcher's near-euphoria over perestroika, his program of economic and political restructuring. Even Soviet citizens unhappy with other aspects of his performance might pause before replacing a man who has established the Soviet images as benign, even chic. In addition, Western Europeans and even some Americans – transformed into something of a perestroika cheering section – have begun to repay Mr. Gorbachev with financial and moral support."

"Good will abroad does pay off at home. But it does not necessarily buy hope, patience or loyalty from the Soviet public. That will take a harder, scarcer currency."

N.A.#242/(October 19, 1989): In the article, which evaluates the consequences of glasnost, it is argued that "the country's tenuous liberties still depend on the tempers of one man, M.S. Gorbachev: "Piqued by a survey that cast doubt on his popularity, Mr. Gorbachev – like Henry II of England wishing aloud for someone to rid him of Thomas a Becket – suggested that the editor who published the offending poll was unworthy of his job, and the Communist Party apparatus has dutifully set about fulfilling Mr. Gorbachev's wish. The editor of the enormously popular weekly tabloid, which became a scapegoat for a genuine distress, has refused to go, and the situation remained in an uneasy stalemate today. The episode has already raised questions about Mr. Gorbachev's tolerance for the pluralism he has sponsored, about his relations with intellectuals who deem themselves his most devoted supporters, and about the thickness of his political skin. Some legislators wonder whether Gorbachev will support a law which will guarantee broader legal rights to the press and outlawing censorship. He seems to be increasingly squeamish about the consequences of glasnost. He has assembled Soviet editors for paternal lectures, singling out the articles he found shallow or unfair. His performance might have been written off as tactical maneuver, intended to show conservatives in the leadership that he is not tolerating permiseveness."

N.A.#243/(October 23, 1989): It is argued that "the press has exposed to public view the breadth of the problems confronting the country, thus creating the rationale for major changes; that it has brought a wide range of people into the search for solutions by giving them first fundamental requirement of citizenship, a voice; to Mr. Gorbachev's great frustration, however, glasnost is not delivering what he wants now: a sense of common purpose to hold the country together, calm it down and move it through its period of crisis; that in the competition for readers' attention, editors seek out commentators with the most daring and procovative opinions."

N.A.#244/(December 26, 1989): It is claimed that "as East-block

Communism relentlessly collapses, President M.S. Gorbachev, the man whose policies of reconstruction are presumed by many to have inspired the wave of popular rebellions, has been declaiming lately like the last Communist on earth; that the Soviet leader has had to make an art form of accommodation lately; that as he works to adjust to the turn of the events in Eastern Europe, Mr. Gorbachev more and more has been focusing his personal frustrations on a relatively miniscule target within the nation, the nebulous opposition caucus in the national Congress; that even after an imperious disposal of this challenge, Mr. Gorbachev still has several times felt the need to belittle this unofficial opposition; that as the figure who has steered his nation in a radical about-face toward demilitarization and democratization, he evidently feels entitled to peevishness and more."

N.A.#245/(February 4, 1990): "President M.S. Gorbachev has endorsed proposals to end the Communist Party's monopoly on power and to accept rival parties and private property ..."

N.A.#246/(May 13, 1990): It is argued that "Mr. Gorbachev has not made it clear how and how soon he wants the country to be on the market economy; that whether the fascination with the market will mean a breakthrough in practice and whether Mr. Gorbachev has the nerve to let free prices and competition run riot in his backward society are the gravest questions confronting the Soviet Union in coming months."

N.A.#247/(September 25, 1990): "The Soviet Parliament granted President M.S. Gorbachev emergency economic powers, but put off, at his request, answering the critical question of how to move to a free market.

Mr. Gorbachev has put his political skills to the test by trying to accommodate opposing views. In the economic debate, he managed to back both sides, defending Mr. Ryzhkov's beleaguered Government while seeming to push for the more radical program proposed by one of his top economic advisers, S. Shatalin.

But in his bid for additional powers, Mr. Gorbachev also showed impatience for opposing views. In a scathing speech, he scorned his critics, dismissing their objections as 'juridical' and their concern about his accumulation of power as 'political speculation.'"

N.A.#248/(October 17, 1990): It is argued that that "the Soviet leader called for a more gradual transition, dropping the 500-day timetable that the radicals said was necessary to ram the plan past Government bureaucrats' resistance; that Mr. Gorbachev was also vague in spelling out his increasingly assertive republic and local governments in setting economic policy; that under his plan, many important sectors would remain under the control of the central Government, with its accompanying bureaucracy."

"Mr. Gorbachev said in September that he favored Mr. Shatalin's radical alternative, but in the end he evidently decided he was not prepared to risk the degree of shock therapy and the surrender of central economic control embodied in that plan."

N.A.#249/(October 18, 1990): It is claimed that "Mr. Gorbachev sharply diminished the prospects of an alliance with the democratic opposition [B.N. Yeltsin], and left the two leaders once again on a collision course; that the explanations for Mr. Gorbachev's decision range from psychological to conspirational, from power politics to simple prudence. 'Is he a master manipulator, a judicious reader of the public mood, a hostage to the conservative forces around him or simply a wimp? There is probably some truth in each of those explanations.'

'A somewhat more Machiavellian theory is that Mr. Gorbachev never really intended to join forces with Mr. Yeltsin, but used him as a foil.'"

N.A.#250/(October 19, 1990): [On the economic plan proposed by M.S. Gorbachev] "While Mr. Gorbachev and the radicals agree on the general goals, the Soviet leader's plan is vague about exactly when, how and by whom this will be accomplished."

N.A.#251/(October 19, 1990): In the article that covered the economic plan proposed by M.S. Gorbachev and its acceptance by the Soviet congress, it is argued that "the vote came after the Soviet leader challenged his radical critics with an urgent appeal for national discipline and a scorching attack on his chief political rival, B.N. Yeltsin whom Mr. Gorbachev portrayed as a destructive opportunist; that while Mr. Gorbachev concentrated his ire on Mr. Yeltsin, his program was also intended to head off opposition from those fearful of encroaching capitalism and from those nervous about higher prices and unemployment."

N.A.#252/(December 18, 1990): "Under growing pressure from hard-liners to bring his freewheeling republics under tighter control, President M.S. Gorbachev demanded a popular referendum in every Soviet republic on his new treaty to preserve the union.

With his attacks on naysaying intellectuals and his emphasis on restoring central economic leverage, Mr. Gorbachev sounded at times like his former hard-line Communist Party nemesis, Y.K. Ligachev, rather than the instigator of ever more revolutionary changes."

N.A.#253/(December 28, 1990): "The clash with the nation's largest republic was the latest in a series of political trials for the Soviet leader, beginning with the departure of his invaluable Foreign Minister; and continuing today with an embarrassing first round defeat on his candidate to be the country's first Vice President, G.I. Yanayev, who was confirmed in a second round of voting.

Mr. Gorbachev, arriving unexpectedly and in an angry mood, accused Russia of arrogant 'economic populism.' He snapped at Mr. Filshin, asserting that he showed incompetence, and at one point shouted at the Russian Agriculture Minister to 'take your seat.' Mr. Yeltsin, the obvious target of Mr. Gorbachev's fury, showed his contempt for the debate by leaving on a business trip to Siberia. Today Mr. Gorbachev did not sound as though he was in a mood to haggle with Mr. Yeltsin."

N.A.#254/(February 3, 1991): "M.S. Gorbachev informed the dissident and physicist A.D. Sakharov that he was being freed from his exile in the closed city of Gorky; that here at last was a Soviet leader who sought the approval not only of Stalinists.

In the Lithuanian Republic, the dark Bolshevik past was reasserting itself. The Soviet Military had sent tanks against unarmed civilians to punish the victorious independence movement. Mr. Gorbachev refused to come to the phone, and thus confirmed that whether or not he ordered the use of force against democracy, he sanctioned it. The principles of a Sakharov could not be reconciled with the expedience of power.

... Indeed, Mr. Gorbachev inherited a people more famous for their poetry than their industry. In the Russian psyche, Asia is at war with Europe, and seven decades of Communism have only reinforced the idea that individual initiative is not only unseemly but dangerous.

Mr. Gorbachev was a triumph abroad. With his concessions to such traditional Western human rights concerns, he succeeded in extinguishing the menacing Soviet image that had made his country a pariah state. ... For a man who had literally transformed the world, the West was willing to forgive his failings at home, and even to side with him against the democratic and separatist upstarts who demanded more, faster.

His insistence on combining the posts of Communist Party leader and President, his fashioning of a constitutional Parliament in which a third of the seats were automatically reserved for the party and other established institutions, his long resistance to tampering with Article 6 of the Constitution enshrining the one-party monopoly, and his refusal to submit himself at any time to a vote of the public – all were signs of a man unwilling to saw off the branch on which he sat.

Fired by discontent with Mr. Gorbachev's economic failures, by ethnic pride and the populist appeals of outsider candidates, the public

turned its affection to new leaders who wanted the old order not just reformed, but dismantled. The non-Russian republics of the Baltics and the Caucasus Mountains, the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, and most important the huge Russian Republic fell into the hands of those who challenged the right of the center to rule. Stranded in a shrinking political middle, Mr. Gorbachev last summer flirted with the democratic insurgents. Mr. Gorbachev's evident embrace of the deal [with B.N. Yeltsin] was the last great beat of the democrats' euphoria. And then he balked.

Since the deal with Mr. Yeltsin collapsed, Mr. Gorbachev's behavior has been more and more chilling. He has appointed a Cabinet stripped of market reformers and dominated by graduates of the military-industrial complex, and enlarged the role of the K.G.B. in policing the work of private entrepreneurs, including foreign joint ventures.

Mr. Yeltsin, the dominant opposition figure, operates with serious constraints. Narrowly promoted to the presidency of the Russian Republic by a divided Parliament, he has been unable to win agreement for his most radical moves. The Russian Parliament watered down his land reform, and refused to join him in condemning the violence in the Baltics.

And many of the democrats are, like Mr. Gorbachev, products of the system they hope to change.

In Moscow, each day's newspapers brings a new and usually grim scenario for the future. The most optimistic is that Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin will rise above their operatic rivalry and find an accommodation between the center and the republics."

N.A.#255/(February 20, 1991): "Could M. Gorbachev become another A. Pinochet, the Chilean tyrant who rebuilt the Chilean economy with blood and iron?

Like General Pinochet, President Gorbachev rose to power on the

insecurities of a ruling class that had made hash of the economy and feared retribution from a long-suffering proletariat. Like General Pinochet, President Gorbachev has divided the interests that might have been expected to check his ascent. And like General Pinochet, President Gorbachev seems not to have the slightest doubt that the right end justifies any means.

The best case for Gorbachev-as-Pinochet would go something like this: The Soviet Union's centrally planned economy lies in the ruin. But the transition to free markets is bound to generate great hardship as prices soar, state-owned enterprises fail and millions lose their jobs. Selling such sacrifice in Poland has been hard enough; selling it in the S. Union would be next impossible."

N.A.#256/(March 30, 1991): "More than 100,000 Muscovites defied a strong show of military force and M.S. Gorbachev's nab on public meetings to rally behind his rival, B.N. Yeltsin. Chanting 'Yeltsin! Yeltsin!' and 'Gorbachev, go away !' withing sight of the cordons of military vehicles, water cannon and troops in riot gear, the throng demonstrated the embattled Soviet President's inability to suppress the growing shift of allegiance to Mr. Yeltsin.

The consensus was that Mr. Gorbachev had suffered a serious political setback. The evening rallies had an almost festive air as Mr. Yeltsin's supporters realized that they had defied Mr. Gorbachev's most aggressive effort to curb their movement and to rout their leader.

Mr. Yeltsin's political success was sweetened by the fact that the special session of the Russian Parliament was called by Communist members of Parliament to censure him for his demand last month that Mr. Gorbachev resign. The deputies had evidently hoped to portray Mr. Yeltsin as a politician wagging, a personal vendetta at a time of crisis.

Instead, the session turned into a show of strength for Mr. Yeltsin as the deputies voted to reject Mr. Gorbachev's ban on rallies and then suspended its session until Friday, after the promised withdrawal of the troops. Mr. Yeltsin, who did not attend the rallies, said he was

pleased with the outcome of the vote."

N.A.#257/(April 22, 1991): "Amid the bleakest economic readouts in six years of promised reform, President M.S. Gorbachev faced a demand from rebellious hard-line deputies that he defend his record at an emergency session of the national Congress."

N.A.#258/(June 5, 1991): [About the economic problems of the Soviet Union] "Part of the problem is Mr. Gorbachev's strategy of playing both sides against the middle, promising to move toward a market economy and to preserve socialism. Balancing over the contradiction has kept him in power, but it hasn't helped the economy."

The need to keep conflicting political constituencies happy may also explain why his peacemaking image has also faded since he received the Peace Prize last fall.

Whatever Mr. Gorbachev's own personal beliefs about the need for introducing a real market economy to the S. Union, he has to appear serious about it to get support from leaders of the major industrial countries, to whom he hopes to appeal around the time economic summit meeting in London on July 15-17."

N.A.#259/(June 20, 1991): [About the Western aid] "This society sometimes seems ambivalent about the idea. Its leaders pay lip service to the market economy in speeches and ambitious-sounding decrees, but have done little put them into effect."

President Gorbachev has been hesitant or unable to unleash the forces of change, and has played to the hard-liners who play to popular fears by hedging his political bets. B.N. Yeltsin may push Mr. Gorbachev to resolve the contradictions and move faster toward change as Soviet republics acquire more autonomy from the center."

N.A.#260/(July 7, 1991): "The formal declaration of opposition to the Communist Party by Mr. Shevardnadze and A.N. Yakovlev, the close

Gorbachev aide who joined in forming the new movement, is certain to send potent tremors through the Kremlin. These are not inveterate mavericks like Mr. Yeltsin, who built his politics on a radical populism. They are two of Mr. Gorbachev's original comrades-in-arms, men with whom he conceived and launched perestroika.

Publicly, Mr. Gorbachev had little choice but to welcome the new movement. Under attack from Communist conservatives, facing a fateful meeting with leaders of the industrialized world, he was in no opposition to openly condemn the formation of an eminently democratic opposition. For now, the new opposition could even bolster Mr. Gorbachev against reactionaries, allowing him once again to bully the reactionaries into submission by pointing to the threat from the left.

Yet in the larger political scheme, the new movement amounted to another in a series of blows that have battered Mr. Gorbachev's once-impregnable position in the Kremlin. If he entered perestroika as the man of all seasons, arm-in-arm with the likes of Y.K. Ligachev on the right and the sainted A.D. Sakharov on the left, he has emerged as an increasingly solitary figure, popular neither in the party nor in the nation, accepted as useful and even indispensable by both left and right, but distrusted by both.

It was noteworthy that Mr. Yeltsin was not among the movement's founders. He has shaped his image as a leader above the party politics, and the fact that he was not yet prepared to shed that posture suggested that the public was not entirely ready for a party, either."

N.A.#261/(July 11, 1991): "The Soviet leader has been criticized in recent months for delaying radical reform, and in hindsight it seems evident that putting off a transition to a free market only worsened the economic plight."

N.A.#262/(July 18, 1991): [About M.S. Gorbachev's comments on the Soviet Union as becoming a part of the world economy]: "What he was saying, in effect, is that if he does what they want him to do, his

nation's vast economic problems will become, to some extent, theirs as well."

The Claims About Policy Making:

N.A.#263/(May 30, 1989): In the article it is argued that "in the face of mounting public indignation, the four-day-old Soviet congress reversed itself and voted to give B.N. Yeltsin, the maverick communist, a seat in a new legislature. The election of Mr. Yeltsin, it is argued, was the most dramatic of several indications that the Congress of People's Deputies was feeling the impact of public opinion:

The congress is to rule on important issues and set the general policy. It elects from its ranks the smaller organization, the Supreme Soviet, which is to be the lawmaking body. The congress approved President Gorbachev's choice as Vice President, A.I. Lukyanov."

The article also claims that "the Soviet tradition of faceless, collective rule was giving way to new standard of personal accountability; and that before giving an approval to Mr. Lukyanov, who is a friend of Mr. Gorbachev, members subjected him to intense questioning; and that pressed, Mr. Lukyanov said he had personally supported a decree that provided up to three years in prison for statements, but he said that he believed the decree should be revised. The mute reverence for authority customary in official gatherings has disappeared.

In a secret ballot, the congress eliminated from the legislative ranks Mr. Yeltsin whose exclusion was a satisfying victory for Communist Party regulars. But the congress quickly felt the sting of public anger."

N.A.#264/(July 2, 1989): "On a TV address M.S. Gorbachev offered no concrete new program to stem the spread of ethnic conflict, but the unusual decision to address the nation and the imploring tone of his appeal for unity underlined the potential catastrophe he sees in the

unrest that has broken out in almost every Soviet republic.

For the first time, the Soviet legislature rejected a candidate for a ministerial post today, demonstrating in another bold precedent the legislators' intent to be independent and critical. The nominee, V.M. Kamentsev, a Deputy Prime Minister and chairman of the Foreign Economic Commission, was voted out of both posts, with one deputy charging that he did not have the 'moral and professional right to occupy this high position.'"

N.A.#265/(July 5, 1989): The article argues that "the revamped legislature, the Supreme Soviet, gave notice that it intended to turn down nominees when its legislative committees blocked the appointment of eight top officials whose candidacies had been approved by the Communist Party. Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov dropped six ministers' nominations after the choices failed to win the approval of the committees, and two nominees withdrew. The new rules allow confirmation by a simple majority of the deputies present instead of the legislature's full membership."

N.A.#266/(August 10, 1989): In the article describing the auto industry in general and the Volga Automotive Plant Association in special, it is argued that "it was a leader in putting into effective perestroika, the restructuring that Gorbachev is counting on to revive the Soviet Union's stagnant economy. It is noted that the managers of the plant need to develop car models that do not generate bad jokes in export markets, and they must provide better living conditions for workers if they are to avoid the unrest that has erupted in other parts of the country. The self-financing program that the Volga plant experiment with in 1985 is a centerpiece in Mr. Gorbachev's program of economic change, intended to make enterprises more self-reliant and responsive to market forces. Although this is a standard in the West, it was a significant change in the tightly planned Soviet economy. Most of Mr. Gorbachev's industrial changes move Soviet practices in the direction of Western businesses."

N.A.#267/(February 4, 1990): In the article which covers the

endorsement of M.S. Gorbachev to end the Communist Party's monopoly on power, it is argued that "the meeting of the party's governing Central Committee opens after a series of political upheavals and scandals; that the first details of the draft platform were reported by Interfax which said the document would be 'submitted on Monday for discussion' at the meeting; that party hardliners have made a symbolic cause of preserving Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which enshrines the party's role as the 'leading and guiding force' of society; that the draft platform would be an important victory for critics who say the party should have to earn its leadership at the ballot box; little detail was available on the private property proposal; that the document approved by the meeting would be the centerpiece of a nationwide party congress scheduled for October, where new members would be inducted into the Central Committee for the first time since March 1986; that Mr. Gorbachev has managed to purge scores of hard-liners from the party, but the conservative bloc in the Central Committee remains large enough that Mr. Gorbachev has often been forced to modify his economic and political proposals; that in the last month, the Communist old guard has been battered by a storm of popular resentment sweeping across the Russian heartland, most of it focused on the privileges and powers of local party bosses; that angry crowds have forced the ouster of party chieftains in several cities after they were caught enjoying special housing, private cars, scarce food and other privileges; that the uprisings in Russia have created disarray in the party leadership; that in anticipation of the Central Committee meeting, self described radical reformers have opened a fresh assault including the boldest published attack to date on the leading pillar of Soviet conservatism, the Politburo member Y.K. Ligachev; that the publication of attacks on a member of the Politburo reflects the sense among party critics that the internal conflict is building to a climax; that party hard-liners have tried to shore up their position by appealing to blue-collar workers and Russian nationalists, constituencies that fear the economic uncertainty and Western values seeping into the country under Mr. Gorbachev's leadership; that the past months have seen an unusual alliance in some cities between overt Russian nationalists and local party leaders

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trying to find a marketable new populist formula; that the working draft, calling for 'humane, democratic socialism,' would fall short of the changes that some party radicals say are necessary to stop the hemorrhage of the party's authority, but it would still represent Moscow's sharpest break with Communist orthodoxy since the founding of the Soviet state."

N.A.#268/(May 13, 1990): In the article covering the Soviet economy, it is argued that "after five years of failed economic nostrums the Kremlin is turning in desperation to the very idea that Communism was intended to replace – an economy driven by self-interest of buyers and sellers rather than by the dictates of state planners; that what has forced the Kremlin toward a market policy is the realization that the more conventional reforms of the collapsing economy have all failed to remedy the technological backwardness that endangers its superpower status; that the impact of the economic collapse on consumers has been a combination of insult and injury." The article offers some statistical figures about the economic measures in the Soviet Union. The article describes the economic problems and the policies implemented as follows:

"The first economic measures introduced after Mr. Gorbachev became the party leader in March 1985 were conventional attempts to tighten the bolts of the central planning machine. The slogan was 'acceleration' meaning the same old plan, but with gusto. Prodded by more orthodox disciplinarians in the Politburo, Mr. Gorbachev waged war on slack discipline, and lost.

Another moralistic crusade (apart from the draconian anti-alcohol campaign introduced in May 1985) was a set of decrees limiting 'unearned' income. It was aimed at bribery and embezzlement, but local authorities used it to shot down dealers in greenhouse vegetables and private landlords.

In industry, the Government introduced 'gospriomka,' a new state quality control agency that set inspectors loose in factories to reject

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defective products. The measure fizzled after it caused a sharp drop in production and they pay bonuses that workers had come to take for granted.

By February 1987, Mr. Gorbachev concluded had evidently concluded that the problem was not merely slack discipline or the organizational chart, but the centralized system itself, and the political hierarchy of Communist overseers who ruled everything from the money supply to potato-planting time.

Two years into his tenure, he turned his attention to breaking the back of this bureaucracy, by devolving economic power to individual factories and by introducing a measure of democracy, at first in the form of workplace elections.

In June 1987, Mr. Gorbachev with great fanfare introduced his first 'comprehensive reform.' The so-called 'law on enterprises' proclaimed that each factory and farm was to be accountable for its profits and losses, giving managers and workers an incentive to cut waste and improve quality. The program moved well beyond what previous Soviet economic 'reformers' had attempted. But once again, Mr. Gorbachev had underestimated the ability of the system to kill change. In this case, the murder weapon was something called the state order. Under the law on enterprises, the state could still place an order with a factory, and to insure that its orders got top priority the state kept control of raw materials.

The Soviet economy is essentially a farflung network of monopolies, connected by railroads, and run by the Communist Party patronage network. For one thing, this means the system is unusually vulnerable. Everything depends on everything else, and there are few redundancies. Over the decades, the system has imprinted itself on the psychology of the country.

A make-do, why-bother work ethic permeates the labour force. This is a society where people feel entitled to take the afternoon to shop, joining a line when a new shipment of dinner plates arrives. Because

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the state's property belongs to everyone, and therefore to no one, it is considered perfectly normal to make off with the company dump truck to take the family to the countryside.

For the first couple of years, the economy failed to respond to Mr. Gorbachev's schemes. And then it began to get worse. Beginning in 1988, the money the Government had pumped into economy far outstripped the production of goods to buy with it. Inflation soared and shortages became a constant annoyance. The failed economic promises have devalued the authority of the Kremlin leadership. That is surely one reason that Mr. Gorbachev has not taken clear sides in the raging debate within his Government over how, and how soon, to subject the country to the turmoil of the marketplace.

Over the last year, the Soviet leader's speeches on the economy have edged closer to open advocacy. Suddenly this year 'the market' has permeated the economic debate. Even hardliners like Mr. Ligachev use the word, carefully qualified as 'a planned market' or 'a socialist market.'"

N.A.#269/(May 14, 1990): In the article with respect to the problems of perestroika, it is argued that "fevered rumors spread through Moscow that M.S. Gorbachev was planning a form of shock therapy to jolt the country out of its economic doldrums; that it seemed that the Kremlin had lost its nerve; that in mid-April Mr. Gorbachev and his advisers announced that the transition to a market would come gradually.

The Kremlin's whirlwind affair with free markets has set off the most intense debate in five years of fighting over the Soviet economy, between those who contend that a great leap to the marketplace would create chaos and possibly bring down the Government, and those who argue that these dangers will only grow with delay."

N.A.#270/(July 27, 1990): In the article covering the Western aid to the Soviet Union it is claimed that "Mr. Gorbachev wants loans to help spur the output of consumer goods; that the experience of Eastern

Europe suggests that, in the market incentives, much of the capital is likely to be wasted; that the failure in Poland and Hungary was caused in part by a lack of competition; that protected from imports, domestic enterprises were never forced to make what consumers valued most at costs comparable to those in other countries.

And what was true of Eastern Europe in the 1970's is even truer of the Soviet Union today. The problem extends beyond monopolies; in market economies, businesses raise capital by selling shares to profit-minded investors or by borrowing at market interest rates. Failure is felt directly by those making investment decisions. But in planned-economies, no such market test disciplines the use of capital and the consequences are often dismal.

Mr. Gorbachev focuses on the problems of pushing more and better consumer goods out of factory gates.

The Soviet Union has never used fiscal or monetary controls to make the overall supply of goods correspond with overall demand. Instead, ministries have simply added up available resources and then refused to allocate more than the total supply to the enterprises or shops. But that system began to fall with the weakening of central authority in the mid-1980's."

N.A.#271/(September 16, 1990): "The breadless days seemed certain give a fresh sense of urgency to an emergency economic plan devised by the economic advisers of President M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian republic.

The plan calls for slashing budgets for foreign aid, the military and the K.G.B., selling state property, and freeing peasants to become private farmers, among first steps in a 500-day march to free markets. Mr. Gorbachev has not given his public blessing to the plan, saying that details remain to be worked out, but leaders of the Russian republic said the Soviet leader has endorsed the program. It was prepared under the supervision of one of his economic advisers, S.S. Shatalin. The 500-day plan would attack inflation with sharp cuts in government

spending, including 10 percent of the military budget, and 75 percent of non-economic foreign aid. State property would be sold, beginning with cars and trucks, unfinished construction projects and some military equipment with civilian uses. Any member of a state farm would be given the legal right to leave the collective farm, taking with him a plot of land and a share of the common wealth.

There were no reports of problems with bread in other cities, although there have been periodic reports of problems with the bread supply, including a brief run that emptied bakeries in June after the Government announced plans to triple bread prices."

N.A.#272/(September 25, 1990): "The Supreme Soviet granted Mr. Gorbachev his request for additional authority by an overwhelming vote of 305 to 36, despite warnings from the giant Russian republic that it will not tolerate any infringement of its sovereign rights. The vote in the parliament reflecting the country's vacillating and uncertain political mood, seemed to defy the trend that in recent months has drained power from Moscow toward republic and regional centers.

In an angry, impatient speech, Mr. Gorbachev challenged the lawmakers to give him special powers over the next 18 months to pull the country out of its mounting crisis. The resolution approved by the national Parliament would give the Soviet President authority to put into effect policies on wages, prices, finances and the budget and also the 'strengthening of law and order.' The Supreme Court would have the right to challenge the President's directives, but its approval in advance would not be required.

In a debate of sometimes bitter legislative debate, members of the national Parliament attacked the leadership of the Russian republic for its hasty reaction to Mr. Gorbachev's bid for special powers. B.N. Yeltsin had signed a statement calling Mr. Gorbachev's request 'inadmissible,' and had warned that any attempts to undermine the republic's sovereignty would be met by counter-measures."

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N.A.#273/(October 17, 1990): In the article concerned with the economic plan offered by M.S. Gorbachev, it is argued that "the Government would continue to regulate the prices of certain goods and services; that representatives of the republics would take part in a joint 'interregional economic committee,' that as a declaration of intentions, the Gorbachev plan is a sharp departure from the values and mechanics on which the Soviet economy was built; that it is uncertain whether Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Ryzhkov have the political influence to win public compliance with the decrees and laws needed to make plan work; that its success will depend on the cooperation of such popular elected figures as Mr. Yeltsin and the radical majors of Moscow and Leningrad.

N.A.#274/(October 18, 1990): It is claimed that "the Soviet leader called for an economy based on free enterprise, private ownership, the phasing out of state controls on prices, and an open door for foreign investors – in short, a repudiation of the economic boot camp that has operated since Stalin's day; that one of the first steps would be cuts in Government spending; that Mr. Gorbachev, unlike Mr. Yeltsin, set no timetable for dismantling the central economic ministries and liberating private business."

N.A.#275/(October 19, 1990): The article titled 'Proposal by Gorbachev Wins Committee Votes' claims that "President M.S. Gorbachev's economic plan sailed through parliamentary committees after a presidential adviser insisted that it would not inhibit individual republics from creating free markets at their own pace; that the far more difficult task will be fleshing out the Gorbachev guidelines with a series of decrees, laws and constitutional amendments at the federal and republican levels, reconciling competing claims to power and property, and making the whole thing work; that already one of the crucial first steps in the plan, a drastic tightening of the federal budget designed to curb spiraling inflation, has been undermined by Government promises of expensive new payments to meat farmers and coal miners."

N.A.#276/(October 19, 1990): In the article is concerned with the

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economic plan proposed by M.S. Gorbachev and its acceptance by the Soviet congress; it is argued that "Mr. Gorbachev can overcome his two biggest obstacles – the threat of inflation rising out of control and the political resistance of the nation's restive republics – and achieve his broadly stated goals, it would mean the most sweeping reformation of the Soviet economy in six decades; that the plan retains the central authorities' control over export of natural riches like oil and gold; that it envisions phasing out price controls, so that within two years only essential consumer goods will be priced by the state; that broad latitude is offered to the republics and local governments; that the Soviet deficit is about 10 times as severe as the United States deficit."

N.A.#277/(October 21, 1990): It is argued that "the Soviet Parliament approved the plan, but like Mr. Gorbachev's earlier economic initiatives it may lose momentum even as it becomes law, and vanish into perestroika's black hole of good intentions; that the new plan would scrap the 500-day timetable, delaying the deregulation until 1993; that it would be far more circumspect in devolving control over natural resources to individual republics; that it would reaffirm Moscow's authority to tax and to control the money supply; that the new plan has plenty of holes; that everyone agrees that taming inflation requires slashing the elephantine budget deficit, but the plan does not call for massive cuts in two of the largest spending categories: subsidies to enterprises and consumers; that it does not even give enterprises leeway to cut dependence on Government handouts: Wages would be indexed to living costs."

N.A.#278/(October 22, 1990): "The story begins in May, when the Government of Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov announced plans to raise the price it pays farmers for meat, beginning in January.

The Soviet meat business used to be simple in the days before Mr. Gorbachev. One producer, the state. One wholesaler, the state. One price, the state price.

The system of guaranteed prices and no competition produced

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indifferent farmers, who in turn produced inedible meat supplies and huge-scale Government deficits. But as Mr. Gorbachev has loosened central discipline over the economy, reorganizing bureaucracy, more and more meat has been diverted to other channels. In May, Mr. Ryzhkov's Cabinet promised more generous prices in for livestock farms that contracted with the state in 1991. The decision produced the opposite of the intended effect. It was clear that farmers were holding back even more of their livestock, saving it for January when the prices would go up."

N.A.#279/(December 18, 1990): "Under growing pressure from hard-liners to bring his freewheeling republics under tighter control, President M.S. Gorbachev demanded a popular referendum in every Soviet republic on his new treaty to preserve the union.

The referendum proposal, contained in a tough-sounding state of the union address to the Congress of People's Deputies, was an attempt to bypass President B.N. Yeltsin of the Russian Republic and other republics' leaders who have been struggling with Moscow over political and economic sovereignty.

Declaring that "law and order" is now his top priority, Mr. Gorbachev also called on the Congress to give final approval to a government reorganization that would remove some of the remaining limits on the powers of the President.

Mr. Gorbachev's draft treaty would give the republics greater power than they have under the current Constitution, but less than many have already asserted for themselves. The central authorities would control military and foreign affairs, etc. and the republics would regulate land and mineral wealth. Most of the 15 republics have objected that Mr. Gorbachev's version keeps too much power in Moscow. The legislatures of five – the three Baltic republics, Georgia and Moldavia – have ruled out signing any treaty.

Moreover, under Mr. Gorbachev's proposal it was not clear what

would happen to republics that did not ratify the treaty. The Soviet leader said rejection would not automatically entitle the republic to go its own way. To secede from the union they would still be obliged to follow a daunting legal procedure that includes satisfying all financial claims of the center and giving minority enclaves in the republic a chance to opt out.

The tone of the speech left liberals dismayed at Mr. Gorbachev's continuing drift to the right, while hard-liners complained that the tough tone was not backed up by any specific new measures to combat crime, speculation and the headstrong behavior of republic and local governments.

Gorbachev-watchers are divided about the reasons and likely outcome of the Soviet leader's shift, which has so far not been translated into a crackdown on civil liberties. Some maintain that he is being forced to take a tougher line by pressure from the military and the K.G.B., while others say he seems to have exhausted his own patience for the disorder of democracy."

N.A.#280/(December 28, 1990): In the the article carries the title 'Gorbachev's New Crisis,' it is argued that "M.S. Gorbachev faced a major new political crisis after the huge Russian republic voted to slash its payments to the federal budget; that Mr. Gorbachev told the Congress of People's Deputies that the confrontation left the country without a budget four days before the start of the fiscal year and threatened the nation with economic collapse; that the Russian republic's parliament voted to contribute only 23.4 billion rubles to the Soviet budget for 1991, less than a 10th of the total the Kremlin has sought to keep the state-run economy functioning. As the Congress adjourned after 10 days, the budget impasse cast serious doubt on its main accomplishments, the reorganization of the Government to confer expanded constitutional powers on Mr. Gorbachev and the endorsement of a new union treaty to hold the federation together.

Mr. Fyodorov is the second economic policy maker to quit Mr. Yeltsin's team in a month, complaining that Mr. Yeltsin is more

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interested in his grudge match with the Kremlin than in taking bold economic initiatives.

The showdown with Russia over the budget is the most serious conflict in months of feuding over sovereignty, wealth and power. The republic has passed many laws that contradict Soviet law, and that Mr. Gorbachev has declared invalid."

N.A.#281/(February 3, 1991): "Mr. Gorbachev entered negotiations with B.N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic, on a 500-day crash economic program that would be a death blow to the state-owned economy. It called for selling off state factories and farms, rapidly freeing prices and fostering private enterprise on a broad scale, and for a wholesale devolution of power to the republics in exchange for their participation in a kind of economic commonwealth.

Many of those who fought outside for a reformist platform have to quit – 2.3 million of 19.2 million party members have left in the last year – abandoning it to the hard-liners. Moreover, the power in the party has shifted from the center, Moscow, to party leaders in the republics, who are the most embittered by the threat to their power and, especially in Russia and the Baltics, the most reactionary.

It was the party that inspired the creation of so-called National Salvation Committees, pro-Kremlin front groups trying to supplant the more independent popularly elected officials. The tactic caught the public eye in Lithuania, but the idea was first proposed in public in November by the leader of the Russian Communist Party, I.K. Polozkov.

The democrats correctly point out that their power is somewhat illusory: They are up against formidable blocs of orthodox Communists or instinctive conservatives in their own parliaments, and an old boy network throughout government and industry which is capable of resistance and outright sabotage.

It is not clear why Mr. Gorbachev, having rejected this kind of power-sharing would reverse himself and betray the system, or whether he could survive if he tried, or what trust he could command in the republics, now more alienated than ever. But it is the one scenario that seems to promise reform without bloodshed."

N.A.#282/(March 5, 1991): "People involved in business say that the authorities cannot recognize the difference between a capitalist and a crook and that well-intentioned deals and dealers are becoming the victims of ever changing laws and ideologies."

N.A.#283/(April 22, 1991): "M.S. Gorbachev's latest anticrisis program was dismissed by his former free-market economic reformers as a ruse to fool the West and an attempt at warmed-over Communism for the struggling Soviet consumer.

Most parts of the political spectrum were displaying their lost faith as Mr. Gorbachev returned home from an Asian visit facing a combative week with both national Parliament and the communist Party leadership.

The plan is certain to further stir popular discontent when it comes up Monday in Parliament. The Central Committee of the Communist Party also is expected to focus on the plan in a closed meeting.

Beyond that, Soyuz or Union, the hard-line bloc of deputies who claim about one-third of the membership in the larger national Congress, voted to demand a special Congress session to consider Mr. Gorbachev's attempts to deal with the eight-week-old coal miners' strike and the deepening struggle with the republics over self-rule."

N.A.#284/ (June 5, 1991): "Soviet domestic politics may explain some of the ambivalence of Mr. Gorbachev's policies over the last six months, with popular discontent about the failures of the Soviet consumer economy running as high as passions about who or what is to blame.

It certainly isn't the market economy. Privately owned businesses have popped up in Prague and Poznan over the last year and a half, but not here. State-run stores still offer the same absurd collection of state-controlled prices, with an glut of quail eggs nobody was buying today."

N.A.#285/(July 3, 1991): "The brief comments of oblique blessing at the Foreign Ministry only further teased the question of where Mr. Gorbachev stands in regard to the new movement's attempt to build a counterbalance to the Communists and whether he might even some day carry out his oft-repeated threat to quit as leader of the Communist Party."

N.A.#286/(July 7, 1991): "With momentum gathering toward a fundamental transformation of the Soviet system, possibly including new national elections next year, Communists not blinded by ideology were forced to see that their party was fast becoming a serious political handicap, because it could hurt their chances to win an election. And Mr. Shevardnadze's letter of resignation from the party, with its suggestion that no advocate of perestroika could survive in its ranks, was also likely to prove devastating.

In the larger political scheme, the new movement amounted to another in a series of blows that have battered Mr. Gorbachev's once-impregnable position in the Kremlin. If he entered perestroika as the man of all seasons, arm-in-arm with the likes of Y.K. Ligachev on the right and the sainted A.D. Sakharov on the left, he has emerged as an increasingly solitary figure, popular neither in the party nor in the nation, accepted as useful and even indispensable by both left and right, but distrusted by both. The new movement was not yet the grand opposition party that performers have frequently called for. In their manifesto, Mr. Shevardnadze and his allies declared that their intention was to found a party, but only if that proved to be the will of a founding congress sometime next fall."

N.A.#287/(July 29, 1991): "President M.S. Gorbachev's closest confidant in drawing up the perestroika reform program, A.N. Yakovlev, has

abruptly resigned, apparently because of a deepening rift over the need to force change upon the Communist Party.

The timing of Mr. Yakovlev's move was being seen as his protest against Mr. Gorbachev's handling of a growing conflict over the party's clinging to patronage and privilege in Soviet life."

B) COMMENTARIES

1. THE ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

The Claims About the Reforms

C.#1/(September 21, 1989): "'The key point is, does the Soviet Union understand we want to see their perestroika succeed and see them move forward with more liberties? And I think they do understand that. So I don't think there's any chance of a disconnect there,' Mr. Bush said."

C.#2/(October 31, 1989): "Bush administration people have said something like that before. But that was in the old days – a few weeks ago.

Since then, the Bush Administration and the Baker State Department have become enthusiastic about the American commitment to perestroika – reforming and preserving Soviet Communism through Soviet Communism and Western help."

C.#3/(December 14, 1989): "Hawks have been saying we should let the Soviet system sink, because only desperation and deprivation will force the sort of radical economic change – private property, market prices, individual decision-making – that will insure the implantation of political freedom.

Doves, contrawise, have declared the cold war; they consider the continued occupation by the half-million Soviet troops, as well as continued support of warlike outposts of empire, to be mere vestigial remnants of a wished-away era. They want perestroika to success, lest its failure lead to reaction or Bonapartism.

G. Bush, fearful of a potential 'who-lost-Gorbachev?' charge, has sided with the doves. At Malta, he handed Mr. Gorbachev all the economic openings the Soviets have long desired, asking nothing."

C.#4/(June 2, 1991): "Bush Administration bureaucrats are not enthusiastic about grand plans for big Western bucks to aid Soviet reforms. They say they need more details. There's a surprise.

The bureaucrats – diplomats, political appointees or civil servants – are pessimistic about the Soviet capacity to reform. Aren't we all?"

II. SOVIET VOICES

Claims About the Reforms

C.#5/ (October 19, 1989): "A Leningrad University student was less impressed: 'you can criticize everything now,' she said, 'but you cannot change anything.'"

C.#6/(February 10, 1991): "The consensus among the sidetracked 'democrats' – the collective label for the broad opposition of liberal, pro-democracy, pro-market, anti-Communist and anti-center forces – is that Mr. Gorbachev can do no more than buy some time by reinstituting a hard line. Three, maybe four years. at the end, the "democrats" believe, the hard facts of economic crisis and the social momentum he himself set loose should compel him or his successor to continue the hard path to democracy and free markets. 'The whole reform was wrong,' Y. Orlov, the prominent dissident who left for the U.S. in 1986 and returned for a visit, said. 'Gorbachev should have begun with agriculture. Once people were eating, then he could have given them glasnost. He did too little, too late – and in the wrong order.'"

C.#7/(February 26, 1991): "A Gorbachev supporter, F. Bulatsky, chairman of the Soviet Parliament's human rights commission, says that "the revolution of the dilettantes is over." He has not decided which side he is on, but he acknowledges that the revolution will not be won by trying to be all things to all people."

Claims About Leaders

C.#8/(October 19, 1989): "According to an elected official who has seen him recently, 'Gorbachev is upset, unstable, unlike himself of a year ago.' How does this manifest itself? 'He shouts at his friends as well as his enemies, openly, in meetings.'"

C.#9/(February 1, 1990): "One erstwhile Gorbachev supporter, the historian Y. Afanasyev, says Mr. Gorbachev 'must choose whether he is the leader of perestroika or of the nomenklatura' – the party elite."

C.#10/(July 14, 1991): "Mr. Gorbachev's the latest plan includes a role for the West. But it has evoked severe criticism in – and out – of the Soviet Union. As O. Bogomolov, once one of Mr. Gorbachev's closest advisers, put it, why help 'the Soviet Union's most unpopular politician?' 'Such help', he warned, 'was essentially support for the Communist party, the military-industrial complex and the K.G.B.'"

III. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Claims About Reforms

C.#11/(May 14, 1989): "'The Soviet Union has entered the era of its decline and dissolution,' said J. Kis, a Hungarian writer, reflecting a common view in Eastern Europe and Poland, Hungary and even Czechoslovakia are moving toward democracy.

The words emerging to describe all this is 'the democratic revolution,' said V. Precan, a Czechoslovak history professor, 'a system based on spiritual, political and economic pluralism and mutual tolerance.' Its goal, he continued, apparently referring to what he sees as the flawed intentions behind the Soviet policy of glasnost, is not 'to modernize the Communist system and make it more efficient while retaining its essence.'"

C.#12/(May 27, 1989): "The Guardian, a leftist weekly, reported that most organizations of the American left share Mr. Ligachev's apprehensions. They all agree in disliking of domestic market reforms, seeing in them the restoration of capitalism.

There appears to be no broad-based support for Mr. Gorbachev's reforms on the American left. Even B. Denitch, one of the leaders of the Democratic Socialists of America cautions against 'an excessive faith in the new philosopher's stone – the free market in labor and capital.' The present police management of Soviet workers does not seem to produce similar revulsion in him.

M. Parenti, author of many so-called anti-imperialist books, has written: 'If this is glasnost, who needs anti-Communism? Socialism is too important to be left in the hands of revisionists.'"

C.#13/ (September 21, 1989): "Just about everyone agrees now, as J. Kirkpatrick wrote the other day, that Mr. Gorbachev 'seriously seeks broad reform of his own society.'"

C.#14/(February 1, 1990): "As the extremes of the political spectrum have widened, according to the British Sovietologist P. Frank, 'the center ground became depopulated, leaving Gorbachev satisfying neither the reformist radicals nor the traditionalist conservatives.'"

C.#15/(September 30, 1990): "While blinding us with perestroika, insisted Mr. Brzezinski, the Soviets were actually pursuing peredyshka – a breathing spell. R. Nixon rehabilitated himself in the Establishment's eyes with the view that 'under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's foreign policy has been more aggressive, not less.'"

Claims About the Leaders

C.#16/(September 30, 1990): "It'll be 'two to four years' before he can consolidate his power, noted H. Kissinger.

'He has no new ideas,' assured Carnegie Endowment Sovietologist D. Simes when Mr. Gorbachev was named General Secretary.

The Harvard Sovietologist and frequently televised expert M. Goldman was consistent in predicting Mr. Gorbachev's demise."

IV. THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS

Claims About the Reforms

C.#17/(April 30, 1989): "Even glasnost, now taken to mean 'openness' and seemingly the most innocent of terms, has its sinister roots. Drawing on the work of M. Heller in 'The Formation of the Soviet Man,' Epstein notes that glasnost – 'public airing' – has been an instrument of Soviet policy since long before the Gorbachev era.

Lenin used the term at least 46 times in his writings. His object was to make local officials vulnerable to periodic purges, and he forced them to confess to mistakes and to point to errors of others. In so doing, he strengthened the dictatorial hold of the men at the top while appealing to the West with the appearance of free speech. Lenin's nicely turned description of this: 'Glasnost is a sword which itself heals the wound it inflicts.'"

C.#18/(May 13, 1989): "It is still too early to bury glasnost. But neither is this a good moment to praise it. Above all, the West should guard against the bizarre belief that the best way to encourage democratization in the Soviet Union is to look the other way when democracy is trampled."

C.#19/(May 14, 1989): "In Latin America, in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, in China and in several African countries the trend is toward more freedom, less control."

C.#20/(July 2, 1989): "Soviet athletes are spreading the image of a kinder, gentler nation and ... in doing so they are generating hard currency to support the difficult struggle for perestroika. In the new

Soviet Union, most institutions will have to be self-financing. State subsidies will disappear, and organizations will have to generate their own revenues."

C.#21/(August 27, 1989): "Of all the changes made by M.S. Gorbachev in the name of glasnost, the most important may be his steps toward truth in history. Important, and unsettling in their consequences."

C.#22/(September 21, 1989): "The changes in the Soviet Union, Hungary and Poland have been breathtaking. Just now, it is said, Mr. Gorbachev approved Hungary's decision to keep its border open as E. Germans streamed through."

C.#23/(October 12, 1989): "If you were a racketeer seeking huge monetary reward with little potential of getting caught, what racket would you choose and where would you go? The racket and place with real growth potential is in speculating in the interstices of perestroika in today's Soviet Union.

The Italian word 'mafia' does not signify the Italian crime organization. To Soviet citizens, the mafia is the spreading underground organization of speculators and corrupt apparatchicks. This economic cancer has long been growing, but with the advent of the first stage of perestroika – 1 % of whoopee capitalism in an otherwise rigidly controlled economy – the cancer has metastasized.

The genius of capitalism, Western-style, is in the way government levels the field of competition, making it possible for natural greed to drive the engine of economic and social progress. The venality of capitalism perestroika-style is that it joins political and economic power to gouge the public."

C.#24/(October 19, 1989): "Yeltsin warned that the Soviet President was running out of time, and could not long put off a 'revolution from below.' Criticism was being directed at the man presently at the top.

I was stunned; this appeared to be a whole new stage of glasnost. A Leningrad University student was less impressed: 'you can criticize everything now,' she said, 'but you cannot change anything.'

Consider the great mistake that is at the root of his testiness today: To reorganize the decaying system, Gorbachev had to destroy the Communist Party and replace it with a government hierarchy under his personal control.

To retain power during this transition, Gorbachev had to rely on the Red Army; accordingly, while promising the West arms reduction, he has increased the Soviet military budget in each of his five years.

My guess is that Gorbachev and the K.G.B. will make a deal with the younger Communists, squelch the radicals and dissidents and separatists, and betray the Red Army leaders – forming a new power coalition to muster out millions, put bread on the table and reassert social control.

The high-water mark of freedom of speech in the Soviet Union may turn out to be the night they let the tape be shown of Yeltsin challenging the benevolent dictator."

C.#25/(November 11, 1989): "It's too early to say whether there are plans to further limit glasnost, although a goal to keep within some sort of framework exists. This was clear from a recent speech by Gorbachev at the offices of Pravda.

He spoke not about glasnost in general but about 'constructive' glasnost – 'not destructive' but rather 'creative' glasnost. I agree with this in principle. Only, I consider that any outspoken criticism is constructive, although it may not please everyone all the time. Of course, full glasnost would not reflect an ideal image leader, but who needs such an image? The country is tired of infallible leaders."

C.#26/(November 27, 1989): "In recent months, the Soviet performance has acquired a new dimension that would justify bolder arrangements

with Moscow. The most dramatic break with past Soviet tradition has come in Eastern Europe. Although Mr. Gorbachev has encouraged his Warsaw Pact clients to proceed with reforms, he was clearly as surprised as everyone else by both the pace and the scope of the transition from monolithic Communist rule in the region.

With the Soviet Union's internal situation rapidly deteriorating, many uncertainties exist concerning Mr. Gorbachev's personal fate, about the future of perestroika and even about the very survival of the S. Union as a centralized state within its current borders. Prudence dictates that the Bush Administration avoid expensive long-term investments that would be lost if perestroika goes sour."

C.#27/(December 9, 1989): "Soviet Jews are leaving in unprecedented numbersThis is not due to the born-again liberals of perestroika who fought Zionism tooth and nail, but to those who sacrificed life and liberty for the right to be Jews....

..... With so much progress, are we not duty bound to help M. Gorbachev so that he will survive his opponents and continue with his reforms? The answer is: Only if we keep our goals firmly in mind.

The Soviet dissidents and their Western supporters – who are credited as the midwives of perestroika and glasnost – have succeeded only because they have not permitted the temptation of tactical triumphs to divert them from their ultimate goal.

What we see behind the crumbling Berlin wall is a whole universe: people, nations yearning to be free. They are our allies. They are our hope. We must not fail them – or ourselves."

C.#28/(December 11, 1989): "It's always that way: Empires fall, and sacred symbols become collector's items. ... Glasnost has run out of its surprised. The Soviets learned their standard of living is far from the best

Liberalism is noticeable – but there is no reforms. ... Perestroika has

already gone too far to be reversible, but its chances for success diminish with each day."

C.#29/(December 14, 1989): "Do we want perestroika to succeed?"

Yes, we want perestroika to success – if, and only is, that means wresting power from a kakistocracy and vesting sovereignty in the people. If it means making the Soviet Union safe for cosmeticized Communism – if it means delaying and denying the worldwide surge for freedom that has so surprised the men who set it in train – we want perestroika to fail."

C.#30/(December 27, 1989): "It is that the Schering-Plough Corporation is joining a growing list of American companies, including the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Pepsi Cola Company, that are trying to profit from the imagery of glasnost."

C.#31/(December 28, 1989): "..... economic restructuring on the continent is not accompanied by political reforms. Perestroika without glasnost characterizes the policies being implemented with the stamp of approval of the I.M.F. and the World Bank."

C.#32/(December 31, 1989): "The last 45 years have been good ones for the West, and the Soviet threat has been very useful in promoting stability. Thus, we instinctively resist change that Mr. Gorbachev has made all but inevitable."

C.#33/(January 23, 1990): "Surely, sex in the Soviet Union predates perestroika. But eroticization of popular culture now afoot has glasnost written all over it.

Is there anything the West can do to help this hidden front in the battle for perestroika? I think so. Forget about exports of advanced technology. Send condoms, not computers, so that Soviet women can rely less on abortion; donate anesthetics for abortions; deliver disposable syringes to ally fears of AIDS infection."

C.#34/ (April 10, 1990): "'Pasisvilpk,' ... literally, the word means 'go whistle.' Idiomatically, it means 'buzz off,' 'go fly a kite.' It seems the perfect response to 'perestroika.'"

C.#35/(April 19, 1990): "Even though M.S. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost seemed to be opening things up, I was still skeptical. I knew the Berlin wall was down, but what if they were just remodeling?

.... Glasnost seemed intact, as a stern looking guard helped by picking up the dancing flower I had brought as a present for my niece.

Upon my arrival in Odessa, I mentioned my fears to one of my colleagues. He responded that things had opened up tremendously, pointing out that glasnost had helped change the slogan 'We will bury you' to 'Do you want fries with what?' He continued, 'You'll see what I mean tonight at the show.'

.... if glasnost holds up, they will continue to have freedom after they speak – a freedom we are so used here.

I hope glasnost continues, for the seed of humor is pushing up through the hard crust of repression, and I find that exciting."

C.#36/(April 22, 1990): "If M. Gorbachev's perestroika had succeeded, the strong secessionist forces .. in the Soviet Union by glasnost might have been tempered. Unfortunately, .. perestroika has failed.

Instead of acting as a unifying force, perestroika is heightening and even generating pressure for disintegration. Economic as well as political Balkanization is beginning, not only in the Baltic states but all over the country, including within the Russian republic itself.

The Soviet economy was never tightly integrated. Unable to rely on outside suppliers for crucial parts and materials, Soviet enterprises and regions have tended to be more self-sufficient than companies and nations in the capitalist world.

... economic disintegration will continue unless Mr. Gorbachev can halt the decline in the ruble and increase supplies.... To do that, he'll have to introduce far reaching changes. To introduce a new round of reforms and to make them work at a time of increasing economic autarky seems all but impossible."

C.#37/(August 17, 1990): "Before glasnost, Western historians and economists could never be sure whether articles by Soviet colleagues had already been shaped to insure their publication and to avoid the intervening hand of a zealous commissar."

C.#38/(September 16, 1990): "It may be that even a good economic reform plan under a popular leader is something that cannot be accomplished in 500 or even 5,000 days."

C.#39/ (October 17, 1990): "The road from here to there is heavily mined. Republics with the bitterest memories of the bullies in Moscow might prefer to go it alone, even it that meant going hungry. ... But there are practical alternatives. S. Shatalin is not talking about them. Neither, it seems, it anyone else."

C.#40/(October 19, 1990): "M. Gorbachev's new economic reform plan is destined to fail. At the crucial moment he flinched; it is not clear why. For the moment, a historic opportunity to reform the economy, with far-reaching renovation of Soviet society, has been lost. But that opportunity may come again, for it is certain that even worse political and economic chaos may follow. And that may force Mr. Gorbachev to accept what he now rejects – unless a military coup removes him from the scene.

The Shatalin plan ... risked runaway inflation and unemployment. But the authors argued that before removing consumer subsidies and asking the populace to make sacrifices, the central authorities must sell off state assets to private citizens. Mr. Gorbachev sided with the plan. At the last minute, the bureaucracy prevailed. The bureaucracy argued that Mr. Gorbachev would have become too dependent on his rival

B.N. Yeltsin for popular support. That argument was false because Mr. Gorbachev would have become a new focus for popular backing. But the idea of a new power center was intolerable to those who would lose their jobs, and with the probable help of the army and K.G.B., they persuaded Mr. Gorbachev to entrust the old guard with execution of the old plan.

This means the centerpiece of the plan, the inter-regional committee, will not be implemented, because the republics will not delegate the necessary powers to the old discredited hands. The rift between the center and the republics will continue and the measures introduced by the Government will lack public support.

The nation wants to move toward a market economy and may yet be given chance after the Gorbachev plan fizzles. Only after the market option has been fully played out and has failed will public opinion swing in the opposite direction. At that point the fed-up nation people may be ready for a hardline dictatorship.

... the West can only wait for the political situation to evolve. In the meantime, it ought to provide technical assistance and training to prepare for the day when a new version of the Shatalin plan may yet be implemented."

C.#41/(November 20, 1990): "Morale is at an all time low. ... the reforms in economic and political life carried out in the name of perestroika."

C.#42/ (December 19, 1990): "The dramatic relations between M. Thatcher and Thatcherism, and between M. Gorbachev and perestroika, quite vividly illustrate this painful process."

C.#43/(December 24, 1990): "In a country where a Government ministry has fixed all the prices for seven decades, the concept of a market with legal fluctuating prices is hard for the people to grasp."

C.#44/ (January 14, 1991): "Glasnost has finished, having served this regime's purpose."

C.#45/(January 20, 1991): "From the outset, M.S. Gorbachev had launched his glasnost – literally 'giving voice' – as an instrument of mobilizing the nation for reform, not as an end itself. Already then, for years ago, he had challenged the intellectuals."

C.#46/(January 21, 1991): "While Mr. Gorbachev and his central Government hesitate in adopting even half-baked market reforms, the Baltic countries have expressed unequivocally the intention of adopting full-fledged market reforms, including the restoration of private property and free-market prices. ... a new system based on consent requires transformation of the country into a loose confederation, and acceptance of the inevitability that some republics will choose to secede."

C.#47/(January 28, 1991): "The Soviet right fears economic reform, private enterprise and foreign investment. It denounces 'bourgeois' ideology and demands a return to 'Socialist' central control."

C.#48/(February 26, 1991): "Mr. Gorbachev assaulted liberal strongholds in the media. ...Yet salvaging the freedom to criticize, organize and agitate may be the easy half of the liberal's problem. The tougher half is to devise a strategy that enables them to shape the Soviet Union's future."

C.#49/(March 11, 1991): "Six years after M. Gorbachev came to power many commentators say his reform efforts failed miserably. They conclude he is no longer worthy of our support."

This view is based on false assumptions. The first is that Mr. Gorbachev has had time to carry out his reforms and thus demonstrate his real intentions. In reality, he has undertaken the most ambitious changes in modern history. Their goal is to 'dismantle' the state controls Stalin imposed and to achieve an 'emancipation of society'

through privatization, democratization, and federalization of the republics. Such proposals were bound to face old traditions, social obstacles and political opposition. They could not have unfolded quickly or smoothly. Even if successful, they will need decades to sink roots, with traumatic setbacks along the way.

The second assumption is that the persistent economic problems and continuing absence of a market economy prove that Mr. Gorbachev already has failed. Perestroika is in crisis, but its achievements are remarkable."

C.#50/(April 19, 1991): "The collapse of the Soviet economy is well under way. ...

This crisis is a natural consequence of the disastrous economic policies of the Gorbachev administration. The only good news is that such a steep decline cannot last long. Something dramatic must happen."

C.#51/(May 21, 1991): "The heart of the issue is whether money spent now for Mr. Gorbachev's Government will solve or perpetuate the Soviet crisis. The problem is that Mr. Gorbachev's Government cannot get food from the Soviet field to the Soviet stomach any better than could Stalin's. It's not just money credit but political credit Mr. Gorbachev wants – economic help now against economic change tomorrow."

C.#52/(June 7, 1991): "Glasnost exposed all this some two years ago, but now the crucial element has been forgotten."

C.#53/(July 14, 1991): "Offering billions a year in aid to Mr. Gorbachev would probably hamper market reform because the Soviet Union cannot absorb such large sums productively. Investment from the foreign private sector would be more productive. ... unless the Soviet Union takes several steps, even limited support would be wasted."

The Claims About the Soviet State

C.#54/(May 13, 1989): "The broad definition of the offense clears the way for prosecuting anyone who questions such constitutional principles as the role of the Communist Party as 'the leading and guiding force of Soviet society' or the socialist nature of the Soviet state.

Why have these people suddenly become so interested in these workers' rights? Mr. Gorbachev's market reforms strike at the heart of the absurd, modern socialist notion that the state is the wellspring of social justice. Many socialists in the West see private property as an unmitigated regulations or to be abolished."

C.#55/(May 27, 1989): "Thus many overlook the fact that a concentration of economic resources in the hands of the state inevitably leads to tyranny. It is the easiest thing in the world to impose a political diktat on an economically dependent people. Also they often forget the initial promise of socialism: not to make everyone a hired employee of the state but to provide each person with the resources to make a living on his own in free association with others."

C.#56/(August 27, 1989): "Lies about history are essential to totalitarianism. Lacking a true basis for political legitimacy, the tyrannical state invents and reinvents a past to justify its existence and demonize its opponents.

A state that begins their best to face the truth about its past signals that it's turning away from totalitarianism. That is why experts on the Soviet Union have found Mr. Gorbachev's steps to open the historical record convincing evidence that he is serious about change."

C.#57/(November 11, 1989): "Asked how I see the development of our current political system, I would answer that I maintain an optimistic outlook. The situation is complicated and unpredictable. The apparat is not going to give up without a fight I believe Mr. Gorbachev

understands all of this, and is therefore pursuing a middle course. I do not see any alternative that could replace this structure. Popular fronts, various types of organizations, inter-regional groups – all these are too fragmented, too split by internal contradictions and too small.”

C.#58/(December 9, 1989): “The free world’s goal today must be not to help this or that person but rather to stimulate the process of dismantling totalitarianism.

Those who do business with the Soviet Union must aim at deals that encourage economic freedom and private initiative, not those that help the Government restore its full control over the economy.

Above all, we must all realize that what is happening in the Soviet Union is no longer a struggle for power between one political faction and another.”

C.#59/(December 11, 1989): “It has been more than 100 years since Marx and Engels wrote ‘A specter is haunting Europe, the specter of Communism.’ That specter has returned – not portending the onset of Communism but the end of it.

If the Soviet system is the sick man, the illness is progressive. Resolute steps have been taken against the illness, but practically none has gone the distance.”

C.#60/(December 14, 1989): “We will not be propping up the Communist system, the dovish argument goes, but by offering trade and credit we’ll be weaning it away from totalitarianism. This is the tactic called pre-emptive concession, part of the grand strategy of aggressive acquiescence.

The Supreme Court has acquired considerable influence since its creation last year, but it does not yet have the real power. It is thus doubtful whether this Parliament is yet strong enough to function independently and to allow Mr. Gorbachev to govern without the party.”

C.#61/(February 1, 1990): "Whatever the Constitution says, it is the party and its Politburo that today make policy, control the state budget and give orders to the armed forces. Mr. Gorbachev occupies a dominant position as head of both structures; he has exploited his ability to play one institution off against the other. He would lose this advantage if he quits the party leadership."

C.#62/(September 16, 1990): "No matter how popular Mr. Yeltsin may be, he, like Mr. Gorbachev, will have to deal with the underlying resistance of the Soviet bureaucracy and the Soviet people to creating a market economy. To them, the idea of market brings fears of inflation, unemployment and income inequality."

C.#63/(October 5, 1990): "In the Soviet Union, long synonymous with tough central control, the surge toward democracy raises tormenting questions of how to devolve power while maintaining order."

C.#64/(October 19, 1990): "Mr. Gorbachev's dodges the key point. The plan would have destroyed the old power center and replaced it with a new one that could have gained popular allegiance. This was to be accomplished by transferring economic powers to the republics and delegating those powers to a newly created central organ: the inter-regional economic committee."

C.#65/(November 20, 1990): "M. Gorbachev's effort to deprive the party of a monopoly over politics has met with furious resistance from the upper echelons of the officer corps. To them, the party's monopoly safeguards the military against the divisive political activities that undermined discipline and led to the army's demise in 1917.

Could a military coup succeed? The yearning for law and order, for a strong hand, is prevalent in the population, and the conservatives could exploit it to introduce a Pinochet-style military dictatorship."

C.#66/(November 22, 1990): "What's to be done? The Soviet

problem is not that Yeltsin will take away my power, or that Yeltsin will take away my power, or that the republics will take the power from the center; my problem is that there is no legitimate political power.

What I really need to save the union is the system has U.S. has – a Presidency with real power. Bush's Congress consults but goes along, his Army wants fancy arms but obeys, his people make noise but follow.

That executive power comes from a popular election. But there is my dilemma: I cannot generate that power by turning to the Soviet peoples, because they would never entrust their power to me."

C.#67/(December 19, 1990): "In a society of laws, this kind of political romanticism would not be dangerous. It would be checked by the countervailing powers and by the high political culture of its citizens and their long democratic traditions. But in a society just emerging from dictatorship, this kind of attachment to a brainchild can be fatal for the creator and the creation."

C.#68/ (January 20, 1991): "It seemed that Russia had returned once again to her timeless pattern – the reformer driven to authoritarianism and force by frustration, resistance, fragmentation, by the inexorable conservatism of the society, by a sense of messianic mission, by popular demand, by the whole system."

C.#69/(January 28, 1991): "In Moscow and Vilnius and Riga, the hopes of democracy and freedom are slipping away. The S. Union is moving rapidly back toward repression: a militarized form of the totalitarian state."

C.#70/(February 10, 1991): "Practical debate seems to have fallen by the wayside in the political polarization and economic disintegration that have set in the sixth year of Mr. Gorbachev's reign."

C.#71/(February 26, 1991): "What kind of crackdown is this, then? ... Mr. Gorbachev's campaign of repression has been carried out in the

same slow motion he used as a reformer. The opposition is making progress in three crucial areas. The first concerns the structure of political institutions. The local, republic and national soviets or legislative councils have never had any real power. The emerging line of division in Soviet politics is between those who understand this and those who do not."

C.#72/(April 19, 1991): "Democratization is a necessary condition for true systemic change. .. By contrast, the Communist establishment – the army, K.G.B., party and enterprise directors – remains organized and wants to stay in power. The center of power seems to revolve around the directors of big industry. They are formidable While they advocate privatization, marketization and business links with the West, all of which may sound progressive, a crucial belief in democracy is missing and they understand nothing of nationalist problems."

C.#73/(May 14, 1991): "Washington should also spread its bets among the contending forces – not abandoning President Gorbachev but moving to expand parallel connections at all levels of the fragmented Soviet power structure."

C.#74/(June 2, 1991): "Two intellectual entrepreneurs, G. Yavlinsky, a Soviet economist and former Minister of the Russian Republic; and G. Allison, a Harvard political scientist and former dean of its Kennedy school have been germinating a plan. It starts with the premise that a complete fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the reversion of its parts to authoritarianism could have catastrophic consequences: several Soviet republics with nuclear arms locked in power relations."

Claims About the Leaders

C.#75/ (April 24, 1989): "At a session last September M. Gorbachev ringed the capital with Red Army divisions loyal to him and staged what amounted to a coup. His not-so-fast, anti-personality-cult opposition was shunted aside as the Gorbachev faction took complete charge of the Soviet Union. ... Gorbachev is to blame for the unrest and

the threat to the very integrity of the Soviet Union. He urges a cessation of glasnostic party-bashing and a crackdown on those taking advantage of glasnost to whip up nationalism.

Whatever the outcome of this week's meeting, the Gorbachev miscalculation has become apparent: He thought he could use a limited glasnost to help the new powercrats push out the old party apparatchis and thereby pave the way for the efficiency of perestroika."

C.#76/(May 30, 1989): "The politicians never get their money's worth because what the Gorbachevs have cannot be taught – rhythm, finger-snapping political rhythm.

By the time that session of the Congress of People's Deputies was over, Mr. Gorbachev showed he had more than rhythm – he had his political apparatus. Insurgents giddy with dreams of the future found themselves staring at a bit of the past. The apparatus rolled over them, and they found themselves outside looking in – without seats in the new legislature."

C.#77/(August 27, 1989): "Mr. Gorbachev has gone far beyond N. Khrushchev in rehabilitating the victims of Stalin. Even Trotsky is making his way back into print. Lenin is open to question in the Soviet press."

C.#78/(September 21, 1989): "We have hardly dared dream of such changes in the Soviet system. And their continuation depends on the fate of Mr. Gorbachev. Without him, the Soviet Union could easily slide into dangerous chaos or slip back into tyranny."

C.#79/(October 12, 1989): "The reason the pilot project of a taste of capitalism is failing is that it was not ambitious enough; Mr. Gorbachev did not have the nerve or the power needed to make it all free all at once. Instead, he created the conditions for rampant corruption."

C.#80/(October 19, 1989): "Not so fast; the test was soon flunked.

Gorbachev henchmen in the Supreme Soviet and in the lapdog press orchestrated a campaign to destroy Yeltsin's reputation, rehashing the charges of drunkenness and publicizing a midnight spree after his return.

Too many of Yeltsin's supporters like their vodka for this smearing to destroy their hero.

Is he cracking up or will he crack down? If his past is prelude, the man who replaced the collective leadership with his own cult of personality will harden and darken his persona, clinging to his position as the Soviet Union's first un-Communist President.

The man likeliest to come after the Good Gorbachev will neither be the flaky Yeltsin nor the grim Ligachev, but the Bad Gorbachev: out of patience, out of sorts, but not out of power. Then we would see what A. Sakharov feared: a leader with too much authority abandoning the promises that put him in place."

C.#81/(December 11, 1989): "Mr. Gorbachev says society's full potential can be reached only under full freedom and democracy. What he does not say is how such fidelity can coincide with freedom and democracy."

C.#82/(December 31, 1989): "Gorbachev ... is presiding over an economy and domestic empire in shambles, and that we can demand concessions in return for our assistance in helping him stabilize his economy and E. Europe."

C.#83/(September 16, 1990): "Finally there is someone in the Soviet Union who seems to know what he [B.N. Yeltsin] wants to do – and when. By contrast, Mr. Gorbachev has hesitated, temporized and reversed himself. ... He is blamed for the collapse of the Soviet distribution system and the shortages of such basic products as tea, cigarettes

.. while Mr. Yeltsin is popular now, there is reason to wonder how

successful his 500-day economic plan will ultimately be. He and his advisers have tried to address most of the important issues, but that alone does not guarantee that they'll succeed. ... Without a monetary reform there will still be a problem of inflation.

Mr. Yeltsin and his plan seem to be the S. Union's best hope for a solution to the Soviet economic crisis."

C.#84/(December 19, 1990): "Mr. Gorbachev ... unleashed a new offensive against his rivals. He did not resign. He just apologized for the sorry state of the country. But is that enough? I don't think so. Nor were those apologies were accepted. ...

Mr. Gorbachev has already secured his place in history as a great statesman, even grater than Lenin. After all, Lenin removed one-sixth of the world from the civilised world while Mr. Gorbachev is trying to restore it. He demolished the prison but he failed to build a house. ... In demolishing the prison – which was a Herculean task – Mr. Gorbachev overspent his positive historical dynamics. There is no wind left in his sails, and the promised land is as far away as before.

I can sympathize with him. But I do not accept the idea that he is irreplaceable and indispensable to perestroika. Objectively, this idea implies that perestroika will never survive without his father. But the best proof of its bright future, would be its independent existence from its creator. it's understandably the desire of a statesman to see his life's work done in his lifetime. But his political romanticism has a distinctively reactionary coloration.

For every great actor, the most challenging part is how to leave the limelight. How many great careers were destroyed because actors couldn't withdraw gracefully! ... It takes the ultimate vision to relinquish power. Only by doing so may one show that power hasn't corrupted him."

C.#85/(January 19, 1991): "Great men tend to have had it nowadays. ...

President Gorbachev has had it with glasnost. Glasnost was his own baby, too. 'Gorbachev is the father of glasnost,' everybody used to say.

Gorbachev ... proposed to undo his famous glasnost policy. 'Glasnost' is an old Russian word meaning. 'Let's quit kidding ourselves and be honest about what's going on here.'

The Soviets look hellbent for the bad old days that the good old Gorbachev hoped to put behind them, .. we'll soon see either a bad new Gorbachev or a new bad old Brezhnev."

C.#86/(January 20, 1991): "Now, as the rate of deterioration in the economy quickened, fanning frustrations, nationalism and anger, Mr. Gorbachev looked elsewhere for obstacles to clear."

C.#87/(January 28, 1991): "M. Gorbachev's position is still mystery. He has not so far imposed presidential rule on the Baltics. But what is clear is that Mr. Gorbachev is more and more relying on the new Soviet right, and deferring to it."

C.#88/(February 10, 1991): "Gorbachev ... no Russian leader since Czar Nicholas II has had such powers – or so little authority."

C.#89/(February 26, 1991): "M.S. Gorbachev tries never to give opponents a clear target, and if he meets unexpected resistance, he retreats to fight another day."

C.#90/(March 11, 1991): [About the factors that caused the failure of the reforms] "Despite opposition, Mr. Gorbachev legislated most of his radical proposals aimed at virtually replacing the existing system with a democratic and market system. No American President with such a record would be considered a failure.

More important, Russia has come closer to democracy than ever before. Though democratization remains fragile, how can it be dismissed as a failure? Mr. Gorbachev's economic policies have also

made gains. Many conservatives have given up dogmatic opposition to a market economy, and five million people now work in the private cooperative sector.

The third assumption: Mr. Gorbachev has betrayed his professed goals by not allying himself with 'radical democrats' led by B. Yeltsin on the basis of a 500-day leap to a market economy; instead, he has turned to the military, K.G.B. and party to save himself.

In fact, radical democrats are a few in number, weak in power and deeply divided. Moreover, their plan asked Mr. Gorbachev to inflict on tens of millions of citizens extreme anti-welfare and inflationary measures.

The fourth assumption is that all democratic-minded Soviet citizens oppose Mr. Gorbachev and support Mr. Yeltsin, and so must we. This generalization applies mainly to Moscow-based liberal intellectuals, from whom our media get most of their political perspectives. Many pro-democracy intellectuals in the provinces are far less radical, and large segments of the populace remain allergic to all the reforms.

Nor is it true that Moscow democrats have fully repudiated Mr. Gorbachev. They have rightly denounced the bloodshed in the Baltics. but some have urged him to resort to other authoritarian measures to save the reform process. ... Are the radicals continuing the intelligentsia's tradition of maximalism and previously undermined reform in Russian history?

None of this means Mr. Gorbachev has been a faultless leader – only that he has entered history as a great reformer and liberator. If reform is to succeed, another and different kind of leader eventually will be needed. But for now there is no persuasive evidence that one has approached center stage or that his time has come."

C.#91/(April 19, 1991): "These men are technocrats without ideological hang-ups, possibly prepared for necessary compromises. They are not

brutes. But their choice of role models illustrates how poorly they understand world economic and political realities. ... Their assumption is that these countries went through a gradual transition to a market economy. In fact, the market and private ownership were already prevalent.

These technocrats are waiting in the wings. M.S. Gorbachev's current aides have shown such a dismal understanding of economics that is hard to imagine they'll be able to hold power for long."

C.#92/(May 14, 1991): "To sort out Soviet politics, Americans need seasonally adjusted method for interpreting the zigzags of M. Gorbachev. In fall and winter, he aligns himself with reactionary forces. But in spring and summer, he turns toward reform and compromise with progressive forces.

In sum, the moment has come for bolder American actions. The object should be encourage Mr. Gorbachev to stay on progressive track – and to strengthen democratic institutions in case he follows his seasonal pattern and swerves back toward a hard line next fall."

The Claims About Policy Making

C.#93/(April 24, 1989): "Nor is the Kremlin meeting primarily about the news troubling to Moscow powercrats that has been covered in the Western Press: (1) the bloody crushing of demonstrations in the Soviet republic of Georgia, and (2) the open call for independence in the Baltic states.

Topic A in the Moscow Central Committees is the trouble brewing in the Ukraine. The feeling of nationalist Ukrainians toward Russians is fairly described as hatred, and is not shallow-rooted.

The fight in the Central Committee is probably along these lines: Gorbachev charges Shcherbitsky with failure to perestroika – with loosing control because he represents the old thinking and cannot

identify with the intelligentsia's wavers of the future. He moves to have the insufficiently charismatic Ukrainian assigned to limbo, as he did Ligachev in September."

C.#94/(May 13, 1989): "Is the West, in its eagerness to end the cold war, turning a blind eye to Soviet domestic policies that contradict M.S. Gorbachev's engaging rhetoric of democratic renovation?"

On April 8, the Presidium of the Supreme Society issued a decree, effective immediately, amending Soviet legislation on 'crimes against the state.' Imminent reform of penal statutes including the articles used in Brezhnev-era political cases."

C.#95/(May 27, 1989): "So when Mr. Ligachev attacked Mr. Gorbachev again, calling his market reforms in agriculture a violation of 'social justice,' I looked to see what had happened to his confused friends here. ... I found that there is now a whole swarm of them.

Mr. Gorbachev's policies are far from beyond criticism. Yet in the hesitant-to-hostile attitude expressed by the American left, one thing is clear: Once again, many of its members have sided with the oppressors of the Soviet people. They should be ashamed of themselves."

C.#96/(May 30, 1989): "M. Gorbachev was astonished. Give and take, yes, debate – they would be good for Mr. Gorbachev and his goals. But this – this impertinence from ingrates – was this the reward for all he had done?"

C.#97/(October 12, 1989): "To introduce a productive market system, M.S. Gorbachev permitted the creation of a relatively few 'cooperatives' – markets and restaurants operated for profit, often in real Western money. As intended, this created a class of entrepreneurs. Perhaps not as intended, the new capitalists were given monopolies by bureaucrats in charge of scarce goods. Result: a combination of business and politics that has perfected the kickback economy."

C.#98/ (October 19, 1989): "If the Soviet Union were a democracy, Yeltsin would probably beat Gorbachev in a free election. When a Moscow editor published a poll last week that made this plain, Gorbachev railed at the press generally and told the editor to quit. Farewell, free speech."

C.#99/(October 31, 1989): "Gorbachev zealots in the U.S. keep telling President Bush and Mr. Baker they better hurry up and build an American "consensus" about foreign policy in support of the Soviet leader, his present and his future. Otherwise, they say, watch out – we'll call you a wimp again."

C.#100/(November 27, 1989): "The Bush Administration was right to display caution until the nature of Mr. Gorbachev's much-advertised but vague new foreign policy thinking became clearer. Premature American concessions would have reduced pressure on the Kremlin for change and could have been the kiss of death to those very reforms the U.S. wished to promote."

C.#101/(December 31, 1989): "To correctly anticipate Mr. Gorbachev's next moves, we need to understand the basic considerations that are driving his policy.

First, he seems to have absorbed a simple lesson that Western powers learned earlier: Colonies are burdensome.

Second, he understands that his economy will have to be integrated into the global economy if its performance is to rise to world levels. There is more to this than buying western technology.

Third, Mr. Gorbachev and his military aides are talking about the revival of the wartime alliance. This is the real meaning of Mr. Gorbachev's 'common European home.'

Finally, he sees the German reunification a possible answer to his Baltic problem."

C.#102/(March 17, 1990): "The idea of a central committee putting together a five-year plan for agriculture production seems archaic in the age of perestroika. But that's exactly what we are about to see in Congress."

C.#103/(October 5, 1990): "Before this lousy socialism, the planners faced a very different sort of obstacle. ... There seems to be wide recognition of the need for a special law to regulate development in ways benefiting the city as a whole."

C.#104/(October 19, 1990): "On Oct. 1, Mr. Gorbachev was given emergency economic powers. If the republics voted similar powers to their representatives, the inter-regional committee would be able to create an economic federation on a new basis. ... It would have curtailed the Government budget and spearheaded privatization. ... With the establishment of firm fiscal and monetary policies, the ruble would have been turned into convertible currency: the essential first step toward a market economy."

C.#105/(January 19, 1991): "He [President Gorbachev] wants to return to the old policy 'shutupnost.' This policy takes its name from old Russian meaning, 'Shut up if you know what's good for you, O.K.?"

C.#106/(January 20, 1991): "And from the outset, in his [President Gorbachev's] fiery crackdown against alcoholism and his purge of the party, he had demonstrated a readiness to use force against perceived obstacles."

C.#107/(January 21, 1991): "Since U.S. economic aid and other manifestations of improving U.S.-Soviet relations have been based on the Soviet reform, President Bush needs to do more than reproach M. Gorbachev.

First, the U.S. should adopt a Baltic relations act which governs relations in the absence of diplomatic relations. Second, the U.S. should sponsor the Baltic states as members of international economic

groups."

C) FEATURE ARTICLES

I. SOVIET VOICES

F.A.#1/(April 30, 1989): [Excerpts from an interview with N.P. Shmelyov, the head of the economics department at the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada in Moscow]:

"Mr. Shmelyov: There is still a lot of vested interest in the status quo. E.g., there are three million professional bureaucrats in our Ministry of Agriculture. Think of it. These are people who know nothing except how to carry their briefcases. All of them are afraid of losing their jobs and they are anathema to a healthy economy. They are not top-level bureaucrats. Resistance to perestroika reforms no longer comes from the top levels of our bureaucratic pyramids. It does not even come from the middle level bureaucracies anymore. It's concentrated on the bottom level. ...

Q. How confident are you about the success of perestroika?

Mr. Shmelyov: There will be success for perestroika in the long run. We are doomed to be successful. Never can a great nation perish from its own stupidity. But in our economy, life is getting easier. There are problems, interruptions of supply, increasing shortages of consumer goods. ... Of course, these national quarrels can harm our future. But in the final analysis, these national quarrels are more under control than our economic problems."

F.A.#2/(October 1, 1989): "A.I. Ovechkin, the chief political reporter on Kommunar said: 'In the past, there were only stereotypes; It did not matter whether the voters responded to campaigning, because there was only one candidate. Now the party is discovering how ridiculous that was.'

'Perestroika requires that the quality of Soviet specialists' training must be sharply increased, as well as the level of education in general,' said L.M. Tereshchenko, a high-ranking Soviet education official, at the New York press conference."

F.A.#3/(April 29, 1990): "N.Y. Petrakov, Mr. Gorbachev's personal economic adviser, admitted last week to worrying over the lack of a 'social consensus' similar to the one in Poland that allows a popularly elected government to administer the bitter medicine of free-market reforms. 'The situation in our society is completely different,' he said, referring in part to the fact that Mr. Gorbachev has five years before he will ever have to face the risk and reward of popular election. He wanted it finessed this way himself, ignoring advice from the Congress's democratic minority that he would gain strength for the truly painful issue of the economy if he first sought a popular mandate."

II. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Claims About Reforms

F.A.#4/(April 29, 1990): "As ever, Western specialists are speculating that Mr. Gorbachev is juggling too much and pulling back on the economy because of his concern for protecting his back from Communist Party hard-liners and military leaders alarmed at public unrest. But Mr. Gorbachev appears thus far to be winning the war of nerves with Lithuania as the U.S. and other democracies decline to get involved against him."

III. THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS

Claims About Reforms

F.A.#5/ (April 30, 1989): "After nearly four years, perestroika has failed

to produce tangible economic results in the Soviet Union. By some accounts, life for the average citizen is worse than it was before M.S. Gorbachev came to power."

F.A.#6 (June 10, 1989): "In one of the obscure outposts for one of the world's most traveled peoples, 60 Irish workers are living near the brooding woodlands beyond Moscow on two floors of a dim airport hotel. Mercantile missionaries, they are teaching Soviet citizens how to be good shopkeepers, a lost art, if it ever existed here at all. ... in the new co-op shops, clerks can be found standing and frowning behind their state retail counters, as if they were at the ramparts of Marxism suffering a collective migraine. ... Perestroika is it?"

F.A.#7/(July 2, 1989): "In the early years of administration of President M.S. Gorbachev, while many of the other creative artists in the Soviet Union were scrambling to take advantage of the new freedoms possible under the leadership's policies of openness and restructuring and the resumption of cultural exchanges between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the ballet world seemed to be waiting in the wings.

All of the arts were stifled in the Soviet Union during the lean years of stagnation. ... Ballet stars were among the most dramatic and visible defectors then, embarrassing the dance world on the international stage in their pleas to be freed of these conservative constraints and allowed to find artistic freedom in the West. So when glasnost began to be introduced into the arts more than five years ago, the authorities were most hesitant to allow the ballet world to experiment with the previously forbidden for fear it would only encourage more discontent."

F.A.#8/(September 7, 1989): "Imagine the gods of television had made G. Rivera a Russian ...

The result would probably resemble '600 seconds' (a popular TV program), where glasnost meets gonzo and where much of Soviet television may be headed in excited imitation. The thaw of M.S.

Gorbachev has made way for much intelligent television in the Soviet Union. Uninhibited discussion, compelling documentaries, wicked satire ... are now mixed with less highbrow offerings like European pop festivals, silly game shows, beauty contests and potbroiler serials."

F.A.#9/(October 1, 1989): [About a little-known company which won the biggest Soviet computer contract]:

"The deal appears to be the largest by far of several East-West joint ventures in computers signed since the advent of perestroika. ...

... Perestroika has earned President M.S. Gorbachev more popularity abroad than at home. If the Russian retreat from restructuring their economy and cooperating with foreign businesses, the computer could be a casualty."

The Claims About the Soviet State

F.A.#10/(May 21, 1989): "With all due respect to M.S. Gorbachev, doing business with the Soviets, whether the product be ballet or ball bearings, can evoke Dostoyevsky and the Marx Brothers in equal measure. Just ask the American impresarios who import Soviet dancers and musicians. Their horror stories of the tangled bureaucracy at Goskontsert (the Soviet state entertainment agency), their woeful tales of lost Telexes, lost visas, ignored artists, wild goose chases..."

The Claims About the Leaders

F.A.#11/(April 29, 1990): "M.S. Gorbachev never seemed more the master of his nation's opaque and treacherous political process than when he dealt with objections in the national congress and had himself upgraded earlier this year to what was lightly termed the 'super president.' He assumed executive emergency powers the czars might have envied, and all without the bother of going to the people for popular election.

But now that very lack of a direct social contract with the people has his principal aides worried as he once more tries to confront the crippled Soviet economy. As much as he needs a workable plan to rebuild the economy, he needs even more the support of the Soviet public, which remains fearful, bewildered and cynical.

The economy is the ultimate Soviet crisis, the one that has always been waiting for Mr. Gorbachev through his world-beguiling preoccupation with other priorities. After bravura political performances in moving to demilitarize Europe and democratize his nation, he may finally be flinching. There is an uncharacteristic hesitancy to him these days as he tries to repair what even his advisers concede has been the dangerous economic procrastination of his first five years in his office. His own appetite and resources for delving into the economy morass are under question as much as that of the Soviet public.

Last week the Soviet leader moved from inconclusive, doubt-filled Kremlin talks on finalizing his long promised economic rehabilitation plan and turned to the public. The fact that this was not a President with a direct mandate from the people showed, and his performance reflected an edge of contradiction. On the one hand, he offered apocalyptic warnings, saying the nation would not survive unless the people rushed to join him in resurrecting the economy; on the other hand, he himself was not so full-hearted as first anticipated, for he had decided to accede to pressures not to change the economy too much, too soon, too drastically."

The Claims About Policy Making

F.A.#12/(April 29, 1990): "Most important, he decided against quick changes in strict Government price controls, which have lent Communism one of its few popular strengths in 72 years of monopolizing the economy. The people fear the hyperinflation, unemployment and social tension that might follow the switch to market vagaries, and so Mr. Gorbachev postponed the introduction of

free prices until the next year.”

D) REVIEW ARTICLES

I. ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

Claims About the Reforms

R.#1/(October 8, 1989): “R.S. McNamara, the Secretary of State during the J.F. Kennedy administration, would like the West to respond to Soviet initiatives on arms control ... in order to integrate the Soviet Union more fully into an interdependent world order.

... Now is the moment, he argues, to seize the chance for a durable peace and to banish forever the ghost of the cold war. Some would find his very American blend of impatient idealism, practicality and optimism an attractive but somewhat oversimplified view of the problem.”

II. SOVIET VOICES

The Claims About Reforms

R.#2/(October 8, 1989): “As V.M. Falin, a journalist and diplomat, pathetically writes, ‘Under the old way, people were calm partly because they were ignorant.’ Well, the new ways have made them much less inhibited about expressing their feelings and grievances, and this certainly makes the Soviet Government’s call for economic sacrifice quite difficult.

... T.I. Zaslavskaya, a sociologist and one of the earliest and most effective pioneers of reform, lists the forces opposed to perestroika. The Government and party apparatus, she notes, are still largely staffed by conservatives bent on arresting or sabotaging reforms. Then there is

the problem of unrest among Russia's ethnic minorities." (April 2, 1989).

III. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

The Claims About the Reforms

R.#3/(May 28, 1989): "W. Laqueur, the chairman of the international Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, recognizes that glasnost draws on authentic elements in the Russian tradition and that glasnost 'has proved that the spirit of liberty is not dead in Russia.'

Mr. Laqueur is mainly interested in glasnost. 'For the Russian intelligentsia,' he writes, it 'is a spiritual event of enormous importance, a breath of fresh air after decades of censorship.' For others, he sees glasnost as a device to let off steam, and he finds that the majority of Russians are more interested in the food supply and housing than in cultural freedom.

... he traces the battles between the bold explorers of glasnost and the old-line conservatives in the arts, as well as in the press and on TV. ... he cautions the West against glasnost chic and against expecting too much. He concludes that "the farther limits of glasnost have been reached and that in the years to come there will be no major progress beyond them. There could well be a partial retreat, a more narrow redefinition of these limits.' He reminds us that glasnost unleashed many varied forces in the Soviet Union. The new permiseveness has allowed the articulation of liberal democratic ideas, but it has also given life to the expression of the precepts of neo-Stalinism and Russian nationalism."

R.#4/(August 13, 1989): "A. Aslund, an economics analyst at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow from 1984 to 1987, and P. Desai, a prof. of economics at Columbia University, both specialists on the Soviet

economy, give Mr. Gorbachev credit for recognizing the weaknesses in the Soviet system and moving more boldly than his predecessors to deal with them. Their books serve as a useful reminder that economic troubles, rather than a philosophical commitment to democratic principles, are driving the changes initiated by Mr. Gorbachev. The opening of intellectual and cultural life and the reordering of the political system to enhance the power of popularly elected legislative bodies have dazzled Westerners, stirring visions of a Soviet Union inspired by J. Locke instead of K. Marx. But for Gorbachev, the changes reflect the more limited realization that the economy cannot be rejuvenated in isolation, that he cannot expect plant managers and workers to take advantage of greater autonomy until they learn to think for themselves, and until the Communist Party and Government encourage rather than stifle initiative.

Like many Western experts, Mr. Desai is not optimistic about his chances of turning around the economy. Perestroika, she concludes, is fundamentally flawed because it "lacks the essential ingredients necessary to create workable markets," such as private ownership of the means of production and a stock market where assets can be traded."

The Claims About the Soviet State

R.#5/ May 28, 1989): "W. Laqueur, the chairman of the international Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, realizes that Western influences have helped to stimulate the revolt against Stalin's legacy. But the author is skeptical that Western political ideas and institutions can be transferred to the Soviet Union and believes that the uprooting of authoritarian traditions there will require a cultural revolution, a change in the people's nature. He sees no sign of that happening in the foreseeable future. 'Does the Soviet Union face another long period of authoritarian-bureaucratic rule based on some kind of nationalist-socialist ideology, with a minority of intellectuals valiantly raising the banner of freedom?' he asks. And the weight of his account points toward an affirmative answer)."

R.#6/(September 10, 1989): "As a political economist and economic historian, A. Nove, the author of the book titled: 'Glasnost in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia,' concentrates on a prominent feature of the two-steps-forward, one-step-backward process of glasnost: the rewriting of Russian and Soviet history. Correctly describing the Soviet population as – at least until recently – a 'people without a past;' Mr. Nove stresses that the Soviet Union can transform itself into a more democratic and modern society only if the Russian people are allowed to know the truth about the Russian Revolution, collectivization, the Stalinist purges, the repression of cultural figures and many other formerly blank pages in their bloody history.

IV. THE PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS

Claims About the Reforms

R.#7/(April 2, 1989): "... we should not be churlish in evaluating perestroika and its spokesmen. It could not have been easy for many of them to break away from the stereotypes of the West and to own up to the deficiencies of their own system and the errors of their past policies. Certainly we ought to welcome the spirit and practice of glasnost, even though the achievement of some of the Soviet leaders' goals may seem impossible to us. How can the Russians achieve a balanced economy and a noninflated ruble that is convertible ... without going through a painful period of higher food prices and rents? And will Russian people accept such hardships?

What to a Western observer must be a basic question about perestroika still awaits an answer: How can one reconcile the democratization of social and political life with the retention of a monopoly of power by one party? Nevertheless, it is not too early to acknowledge the courage and enterprise of those who have led the seeming revolution of common sense talking place in the Soviet Union."

R.#8/(April 23, 1989): "It was not until 1987 that M. Gorbachev's policies began to galvanize Soviet society. Taubmans [the authors of the book reviewed] spent endless hours talking with journalists, economists, writers, historians, artists and politicians, reading the press, attending lectures they write not for the specialist but rather for the uninitiated reader, covering in the process an impressive array of subjects. ...

They recognize the changes for what they are – a veritable revolution that is nevertheless proceeding apace. They vividly illustrate its dynamic character. ... They take full cognizance of the dogged opposition to the reforms mounted by heterogeneous forces, 'from entrenched bureaucrats to self-righteous intellectuals to the untutored, anarchic, potentially explosive masses.' They call attention to the defects in the current economic reforms, to the hypocrisy of many erstwhile time-servers who jumped on the perestroika bandwagon and to the problems the reformers must overcome ... And they note that thus far perestroika has been a revolution from above, though this, too, is apt to change as the country becomes politically more active and defiant. By the same token, they effectively bury two Western myths – that the Soviet people are not ready for democracy, and that all the changes have taken place in Moscow, and not in the provinces."

R.#9/(May 18, 1989): "So begins 'The Russia House,' J. le Carre's latest espionage thriller, which one would have called a cold war thriller except that it's the time of perestroika now, and many of his characters believe the Iron Curtain is rusting.

..... there remain in it the assumptions that perestroika represents a genuine effort on the Soviet Union's part to reduce its rivalry with the West and that only American militarism stands in the way of world peace. ... the book has an ideological slant that every reader will agree with.

.... Mr. le Carre seems to share the views of dissident physicist as

Barley describes them: "... Says the English understand the relationship between words and action whereas in Russia nobody believes in action anymore ... or maybe they don't know *how* to change it. Says the Russians' misfortune is that they long to be European but their destiny is to become American, and that the Americans have poisoned the world with materialistic logic."

R.#10/(August 13, 1989): "The Soviet Union's economy is sputtering. Crippled by backward technology, bureaucratic gridlock, an almost total absence of incentives for workers and managers, and Stalin's legacy of central management, the economy the N.S. Khrushchev once boasted would overtake America's has become a rusty relic of the precomputer age. Making the Soviet Union a modern economic power is the central challenge facing M.S. Gorbachev. After four years as Soviet leader, he has made little progress."

R.#11/(September 10, 1989): "In Moscow ... thanks to President M.S. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, you cannot get anyone to stop. On Pushkin Square large crowds gather daily under the seemingly indifferent gaze of policemen for loud public discussion of the burning issues of the day: nationalism, racism, industrial inefficiency, corruption, pollution, the gulag, Newspapers and magazines bulge with historical confessions and rehabilitations. ... The cacophony of political, moral, economic, cultural and historical soul searching now resounding in the capital resembles nothing so much as one of those knock-down, drag-out scandal scenes from a Dostoyevsky novel.

Under glasnost, thick magazines have led the way in revising, recasting and rehabilitating. ... Indeed, one of the strange side effects of glasnost has been a decline in attendance at the theaters and concert halls; people are just too busy trying to keep up with all that reading.

A. Nove realizes that if perestroika is to succeed, glasnost must go beyond individual cases to a critique of the entire system. ... Mr. Gorbachev and his reform policies have risen to political favor because of a general climate of dissatisfaction with the stagnant, authoritarian

legacy of Brezhnev. ... where Mr. Gorbachev' can take his people's dissatisfaction depends to a large degree on his personality, intelligence and forcefulness.

Mr. Nove is cautious about whether perestroika will succeed. One can be heartened by the striking new freedoms of expression and discussion."

R.#12/(November 26, 1989): "The publication of 'Voices of Glasnost' is itself testimony to the astonishing speed and range of glasnost and perestroika. Though nearly all of the people interviewed stressed that the ideas and policies that M.S. Gorbachev is now putting into practice and their roots as far back as the Khrushchev era, the fact remains that only a couple years ago few Soviet public figures, however progressive their opinions, would have felt comfortable contributing to such a project or being found in such company.

Yet here they are – Government officials, journalists, etc. – accepting at least part of the blame for the arms race, squabbling over whether true socialism can be said to exist in the Soviet Union today."

R.#13/(April 8, 1990): "This book .. by G. Hosking, a professor of Russian history at the University of London is a departure from the excessively Gorbachev-dominated discussions. All in all, this thin volume is among the most enlightening and informative accounts of what has already been one of the most amazing peaceful revolutions in modern times.

By placing perestroika in a historical perspective, Mr. Hosking provides a useful corrective to those who see its success or failure solely in terms of the balance of power between the reformers and the conservatives on the Central Committee. ... the ultimate fate of Mr. Gorbachev's efforts rests on matters far deeper than what the newspapers are able to tell us."

R.#14/(April 8, 1990): "... most of the changes in the Soviet Union over the past few years were predictable. ... The specialists who cover these

subjects offer no single view and have different preferences, but they salute the explosion of pluralism in the S. Union today."

R.#15/(July 28, 1990): "Western (especially American) observers have tended to assume that the recent infusion of freedom and capitalism into the Soviet cultural scene is an absolute good for both artists and audiences. ... he realizes that glasnost also presents Soviet artists with complexities and dangers. They have gained many things : the right to greater personal choice, artistic self-expression, travel and economic independence. But they have also lost a certain emotional and cultural security. Having become producers of commodities with fluctuating and inflated value on the Western market, "unofficial" artists have sacrificed something else: their traditional role on Russian society as martyrs and holy fools, indifferent to money and conventional success. All this has led to the identity crisis that is the subject of 'The Irony Tower.'"

The Claims About the Soviet State

R.#16 (April 23, 1989): "[The authors of the "Moscow Spring"] have never assumed that Russia is doomed to remain a totalitarian monster, wicked in its treatment of its own citizens and predatory in its relations with the outside world."

R.#17/(March 18, 1990): "In 'Inside the Soviet Writers' Union,' the authors paint an odd portrait of an odd institution. They tell us a great deal about organizational and political struggles within the union that has "represented" Soviet writers for over 50 years, and relate these struggles to general Soviet history. They show us that unlike legitimate labor unions as we know them, the Writers' Union is not an instrument of its membership but of ultimate authority, the Communist Party."

The Claims About Leaders

R.#18/(August 13 1989) "The opening of intellectual and cultural life and the reordering of the political system to enhance the power of popularly elected legislative bodies have dazzled Westerners, stirring visions of a Soviet Union inspired by J. Locke instead of K. Marx. But for Gorbachev, the changes reflect the more limited realization that the economy cannot be rejuvenated in isolation, that he cannot expect plant managers and workers to take advantage of greater autonomy until they learn to think for themselves, and until the Communist Party and Government encourage rather than stifle initiative."

R.#19/(April 8, 1990): "A student of contemporary affairs might groan at the appearance of yet another volume of perestroika. ... the majority of the books on the subject are quite repetitive, with the writers belaboring the question of whether M.S. Gorbachev will survive politically. (It's somewhat ironic that while the Soviet people are learning to view their leaders soberly, there has emerged in the West a cult of personality around the man whose name is usually assumed to be synonymous with the Kremlin's 'new thinking.'"

The Claims About Policy Making

R.#20/(April 2, 1989): "This is a collection of a dozen of essays by as many Russians, most of whom are members of what might be called the perestroika establishment and strong proponents of the reforms being carried out by the current Soviet regime. all of the contributors strain to accentuate the positive aspects of the policies that the Soviet Union has followed since Mr. Gorbachev's ascent to power in 1985."

E) EDITORIALS

I. SOVIET VOICES

Claims About Reforms

E.#1/(January 17, 1991): "The head of the K.G.B. accused 'outside forces'

of trying to impose 'doubtful ideas and plans to pull the country out of the difficult situation.' Economic reform is a plot by Westerners to strengthen their position in our country."

II. PORTRAYAL OF THE CLAIMS

E.#2/(April 19, 1989): "Glasnost opened the Soviet Union to the public exchange of information and long-suppressed opinion. Look for the printed word to spread even wider now: Moscow has its first American style quick-copy shops."

E.#3/(April 22, 1989): "Today's reformers propose to improve economic performance by a shock treatment that includes the re-introduction of unemployment and bankruptcy and encouragement of wide disparities in income and wealth."

That makes many students uneasy. But what especially galls them is being asked to assume the risks of a more open economy without enjoying the rewards of greater political economy."

E.#4/(December 18, 1989): "The Soviet Government's brand new economic plan leaves unanswered whether perestroika – economic restructuring – is moving backward or is just on hold. At first glance, the plan looks disappointing indeed. It preserves strangulating central control and postpones perestroika's critical ingredients, decontrol of prices. ...

To restructure the Soviet economy, Mr. Gorbachev must empower plant managers, not Moscow bureaucrats, to make decisions. ...

Either Moscow must direct production or the market must be allowed to set prices. As long as the price of children's shoes is kept artificially low, no factory manager would choose to make them

Perestroika requires price reform. But Mr. Gorbachev cannot take that risk yet. The problem is that Soviet citizens are hoarding billions

of rubles. They cannot spend these rubles because there's nothing in the stores ... If prices were decontrolled, consumers would engage in a ferocious bidding war for scarce consumer goods, driving prices to levels that would run poor families.

... If Mr. Gorbachev pushes these reforms, perestroika will stay on track. ...

Economic obstacles are not the only ones that perestroika must clear. They are magnified by the opposition of millions of privileged bureaucrats who run the system and will not gladly relinquish that power. Mr. Gorbachev's decision to go slow reflects a cautious patience, not a fatal failure of nerve."

E.#5/(December 18, 1989): "The Communist Revolution of 1917 changed the 20th century. This week's reported agreement on radical economic reform between the Soviet Union's two leaders could be every bit as momentous for the 21st.

M. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin have agreed to a '500 days' plan that calls for an economy ruled by markets, not bureaucrats. This plan would kill Socialism; the Soviet Union would be as capitalist as Sweden, and recognized as a part of, not enemy of, the free world.

The Soviet economy is sliding downhill, and fast. .. Prospects are bleak for any reform no matter how radical. But the 500 days plan at least faces up the gravity of the problem.

The heart of price reform is to give individual consumers and producers proper signals and incentives. This means allowing efficient companies to profit and inefficient ones to fail. ..

The 500 days plan contains all the right principles: privatization, currency reform, price decontrol and a safety net. What's lacking so far are the all-important details. For instance, even if Moscow's bureaucrats are eliminated, how would bureaucrats in each republic be

prevented from taking over?

No matter how Yeltsin and Gorbachev answer these questions, their plan is a watershed. It commits the Soviets to capitalism. If this plan succeeds, it'll bring 500 days that shake the world."

E.#6/(September 16, 1990): "The Soviet Mission to the U.N. is a squarish, white-brick building that looks like just another squarish except for police standing watch at its door day and night. Until last week, the door was shrouded by curtains – not iron, but they might as well have been. ... The curtains have now disappeared. The door and the walls that flank it on both sides are clear glass ... the symbolism of opening up the entryway shouts that times have changed."

E.#7/(September 30, 1990): "Privatization. It's a simple enough idea. Let Soviet citizens, rather than state, own the factories and farms. That way they'll have a stake in working hard. And that way the Soviets can finally break the chains of centralized control and race toward capitalism.

Privatization is difficult. No one knows how to privatize a centralized economy because it has never been done. One way or another, Mr. Gorbachev is about to launch nearly 300 million Soviet citizens into uncharted waters toward an uncertain destination. No wonder he is vacillating. It's scary.

The Soviet President is juggling two contradictory plans. The Ryzhkov plan, backed by his prime minister, would keep the Moscow ministries firmly in charge during a period of gradual reform. The plan offers hope that the transition need not bring trauma. Yet it won't work because it leaves power in the hands of the very bureaucrats who have subordinated every other reform Mr. Gorbachev proposed in the name of perestroika.

The Shatalin plan is more radical, It would convert state property into private property, close the Government deficit, control the money supply and then decontrol prices. The problem with this plan is that it's

no plan at all. It provides few details and no road map. It is popular because it sounds a trumpet call for private property and markets. That's important, even necessary. But it's only a declaration of intention. Its architects do not know its consequences. If the Shatalin plan were adopted, property would be privatized even before prices were decontrolled, But how? This plan would soak up the excess rubles by turning ordinary citizens into capitalists. Sounds shrewd. But how can the state sell property when there are no market prices to guide choices? ... This method of privatization would be a nightmare and an open invitation for exploitation by the only people in a position to control the process: the bureaucrats. ..."

E.#8/(January 17, 1991): "Glasnost was M. Gorbachev's way to criticize the past in order to reform the present. But glasnost opened newspapers and airwaves to many voices he could not control, and apparently cannot abide. Now glasnost is the first casualty of Soviet repression. Perestroika, or reform, could be next.

Now, instead of openness, Orwellian propaganda spews forth. A faceless Committee of National Salvation emerges from the shadows to denounce the elected government of Lithuania as servants of 'the interests of rich people, fraudulent people, corrupt elements.'"

E.#9/(May 24, 1991): "After a brief but bloody bow to reaction, M.S. Gorbachev seems to be reviving radical reform. He has struck an agreement with 9 of the 15 republics to decentralize political and economic power. He's giving licence to reformers who want to move to markets. And now he wants to press his case for Western aid on a doubtful G7 nations."

E.#10/(June 9, 1991): "The Soviet Union stands at the turning point of the century; careful injections of Western assistance could lead it decisively toward the free market and a free society. Yet a harsh chorus in the West now proclaims: 'No aid before reform.' what the slogan means is no promise of aid until *after* reform. That would mean no aid at all. And that would be a mistake as monumental as is the

moment.

The Soviet path to markets will be painful and frightening – especially in the early stages when citizens face ranging inflation and unemployment for the first time in their lives. ... The alternative is to sit back and watch the Soviet economy implode ... That's the reason enough to engage the Soviets before their economy collapses.

American and Soviet analysts propose a so-called Grand Bargain. The first step would be price decontrol and elimination of most subsidies to inefficient businesses. ... The sequence would proceed along these lines: Currency stabilization, balance-of-payment relief, infrastructure, and technical advice and privatization ...

This program is realistic; it has been used in other underdeveloped countries. And it's financially feasible. ... What's missing are commitments on both sides. The Soviets have repeatedly promised radical reform, only to shrink back at every decisive moment. Perhaps this time, the West can push them to take the plunge – all the way to markets."

E.#11/(June 23, 1991): "... a closer look reveals a deeper truth. The progression of advisers represents a breathtaking evolution in economic sophistication. ... Mr. Gorbachev's advisers had progressed from rambling discourses on markets to a complex plan of unprecedented sophistication.

.... For the Soviets to move to markets they need political will and an economic way. The traverse from Mr. Aganbegyan to Mr. Yavlinsky has given them the way."

Claims About the Soviet State

E.#12/(April 22, 1989): "Traditional Communism's social contract offered obedient citizens absolute economic security in exchange for police state controls and, until recently, minimal economic growth."

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Claims About the Leaders

E.#13/(September 30, 1990): "No wonder Mr. Gorbachev wobbles. It's one thing to pronounce support for radical reforms. It's quite another to pull it off.

... B. Yeltsin said it would be like 'trying to mate a hedgehog and a snake,' when asked about Mr. Gorbachev's promise to combine Ryzhkov and Shatalin plans.

The stakes are immense. And Mr. Gorbachev is flying blind."

E.#14/(January 17, 1991): "The head of the K.G.B. accused 'outside forces' of trying to impose 'doubtful ideas and plans to pull the country out of the difficult situation.' Economic reform is a plot by Westerners to strengthen "their position in our country."

The Claims About Policy Making

E.#15/(December 18, 1989): "The proposal [of the 500 days plan] would bring monetary and price reform. For years, Moscow has run huge Government deficits financed by pumping money into the economy. ... The combination of excess money and low, controlled prices has created severe shortages of consumer goods. If Moscow tried to decontrol prices swiftly, Soviet citizens would take their bushels of rubles and chase after scarce goods. Prices would skyrocket.

... The heart of price reform is to give individual consumers and producers proper signals and incentives. This means allowing efficient companies to profit and inefficient ones to fail."

E.#16/(May 24, 1991): "The fierce Soviet struggle over reform presents a precious opportunity for President Bush. ... The West can lend Mr. Gorbachev a hand, so long as he irreversibly commits the country to

the essential reforms

Political Democratization. Progress toward pluralism must be assured, based on the rule of law and fundamental freedoms. ... no government can claim the mandate it needs to sustain economic freedom.

Economic Stabilization. Moscow cannot head off-hyperinflation and move to markets unless it stops printing mountains of rubles to finance huge deficits. That requires slashing subsidies for inefficient enterprises.

Price Reform. Markets cannot work unless individuals can calculate costs using prices that reflect scarcity. That requires quick decontrol of prices, also key to breaking bureaucratic control over the economy.

Convertible Ruble. Soviet consumers will be prey to monopolies set free from bureaucratic controls. One protection is available foreign imports....

Private Property. Markets cannot work if the individuals making economic decisions have no stake in the property, factories and stores they control. Privatizing small shops can be rapid; privatizing everything else takes time ...

If Moscow and key republics sign on to these reforms, the West should pitch in with economic aid. How much money will it take? Prof. J. Sachs of Harvard estimates \$150 billion over five years. Mr. Gorbachev may be ready to head the Soviet Union towards markets. But that path is too treacherous to navigate alone. If he tries to, he'll risk reaction from those who want to roll back reform.

Western aid won't guarantee a Soviet move to markets. But it might suffice to sway wavering forces in favor of reform. That tantalizing prospect calls out for a bold response by Mr. Bush and Western allies."

E.#17/(June 2, 1991): "American and Soviet analysts propose a so-called Grand Bargain. The first step would be price decontrol and elimination of most subsidies to inefficient businesses. ... The sequence would proceed along these lines: Currency stabilization, balance-of-payment relief, infrastructure, and technical advice and privatization ...

This program is realistic; it has been used in other underdeveloped countries. And it's financially feasible. ... What's missing are commitments on both sides. The Soviets have repeatedly promised radical reform, only to shrink back at every decisive moment. Perhaps this time, the West can push them to take the plunge – all the way to markets."

ANALYTICAL DIFFERENTIATION¹⁵

Newspaper Articles:

N.A.#1 : The Changes in Eastern Europe

V2: American experts on Eastern Europe

T: M.S. Gorbachev's quest for modernization and his calls for change; loosening of the ties to Moscow and the relaxation of the Brezhnev doctrine raised the possibility of Communist upheavals. Such orders would threaten Gorbachev's rule and policies. (Changes in the Eastern Europe)

V₁: American officials and the U.S. Ambassador to Hungary

T: support by Americans for dissident and opposition groups active in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia

V₁: Prof. Gati of Union College in New York

T: The Eastern European people encouraged by Gorbachev's domestic policies and rhetoric to seek change.

V₁: Z. Brzezinski, the director of the National Security Council in the Carter Administration

¹⁵The following keys will be used to denote the concepts important for this study: Voice(s) directly quoted: V₁; Voice(s) indirectly quoted: V₂; Theme(s): T. The keys for the newspaper texts remain the same. The numbers refer to the actual numbers of the newspaper texts in the original list and there is no correspondence between these numbers and the numerical figures used in the previous section.

T: What Mr. Gorbachev truly wants is not so much perestroika. Our response needs to be comprehensive. The fundamental issue has been freedom of choice vs. coercive ideological orthodoxy.

N.A.#2: Soviets Publish Khrushchev's Anti-Stalin Speech

N.A.#4: Space Rockets vs, Butter is the Talk of Russia

V2: Scientists

T: They are criticizing the space program is being run.

V2: American experts

T: Soviet spending on the space program

V1: J.E. Oberg, an American specialist on the Soviet program

T: Budgetary crisis the Soviets are facing

V1: J.E. Pike, the director of space policy for the Federation of American Scientists

T: The Soviet space program consuming a large amount of money

V2: Russians

T: They are awondering what they have to show for the amount of money they spend for the space program.

V1: B.C. Murray, a platenary geologist at the California Institute of Technology

T: The conflicts in the space program. The whole society is inventing the structure of pluralism.

V2: An article in Izvestia

T: The costs of the space program being a 'state secret.'

V1: B. Chertok, a corresponding member of Izvestia

T: Space research program being a locomotive which blazed the way for other sectors.

V1: B.N. Yeltsin

T: Space program should not be abandoned.

N.A.#5: Restlessness in the Soviet Ranks

V1: The first Lieutenant V.M. Gursky and a fellow officer

T: Poor conditions, scandalous health care, and army political indoctrination.

V1: An army doctor who joined a dissident political group

advocating an end to the Communist Party's monopoly over power

T: The Communist Party is responsible for the crimes.

V2: Izvestia

T: General Yazov met with one deserter who said he had been beaten by older soldiers.

N.A.#7: For Soviet Athletes, a Greater Presence in American Sports

V2: Soviet officials

T: The Soviet-American relations on sports.

V2: Cynics

T: Soviets are using sports as propoganda.

V1: E. Salazar of the State Department's Bureau of Soviet Affairs

T: Openness in the Soviet sports

V1: C. Platt, Alamo's executive vice president

T: The fascination of Americans about the S. Union.

V2: Soviet officials

T: Profit making in sports

V1: S. Terpishev, a senior Soviet tennis trainer

T: Changes in sports

V1: V. Yegorov, a senior coordinator for the state radio

T: Americans and Soviets cannot be rivals in the battlefield.

V1: G. Kasparov, the world tennis champion

T: Change in sports is not approved by the Soviet sports establishment.

N.A.#8: K.G.B. Is Seeking a Friendlier, More Upbear Image

V1: V.A. Kryuchkov, the K.G.B. chief

T: The activities of the K.G.B. will not be secretive.

N.A.#9: All Sides Need 'Opening'

V2: An international group of physicists

T: They are not sure what 'open' means.

N.A.#11: Soviet Pollution Hurts Finnish Wilderness

V2: The Finns

T: They criticize the S. Union on the environmental damage to Finnish wilderness.

V2: Soviet environmentalists

T: They have been vociferous in terms of taking advantage of Gorbachev's call for public debate.

N.A.#12: Lithuania Declares a Moscow Tax Law to Be Non-Binding

V2: The authorities in Moscow

T: They did not concede that the Baltic republics should have right to reject laws by Moscow.

V1: A. Uza, a reporter for the official Lithuanian press agency Elta

T: Lithuanians should not be obliged to pay for the rotten roads in Russia.

N.A.#13: New Soviet Congress Set For Opening Debates

V2: A congressional working group chaired by Gorbachev

T: New deputies expected to advance into the standing legislature

V2: Deputies from all regions of the S. Union

T: It was possible to nominate a 'symbolic' alternative to establish the principle of competition.

V2: B.N. Yeltsin

T: He did not want to be nominated.

V2: Most of the independent deputies

T: Gorbachev's coronation-style election as president and the orchestration of the new congress are reminiscent of traditional legislatures.

V1: K. Motieka, a deputy from Lithuania

T: Deputies should have a chance to hear Gorbachev's political and economic platform before voting on the president.

N.A.#14: First Soviet Bank Office in U.S. is to Open

V1: One New York banker

T: The Soviet Plans about opening an office of a Soviet bank.

V1: E.V. Uljanov, who will head the office

T: The office insurance being complicated.

N.A.#15: Moscow Maverick, in Shift, Is Seated in Supreme Soviet

V2: A.I. Lukyanov

T: A decree that provided up to three years in prison for statements.

V2: Members of the Soviet parliament

T: Mr. Gorbachev was exerting too much power.

V2: A.I. Kazannik, a university lecturer

T: He said he would forfeit his seat in the legislature if the congress would give it to Mr. Yeltsin.

V2: G.K. Shakhnazarov, a top Gorbachev aid

T: Gorbachev has been distressed at Mr. Yeltsin's exclusion.

V1: B.N. Yeltsin

T: The decision to admit him being the growth of the level of democratization in the congress; his personal relation with Gorbachev progressing.

V1: G.I. Kolbin, the Kazakhstan Communist Party Chief

T: Muscovites should not be allowed speak so often.

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: Propositions of deputies about the live television broadcasts of the proceedings.

N.A.#16: Estonians Meet Gorbachev and Report He is Open to Their Plans

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: The soviet position on the Baltic republics.

V1: J. Grazin, a member of the Estonian delegation

T: Gorbachev's conciliatory comments about the Estonian and perestroika.

V2: Speakers at the Congress of People's Deputies

T: Soviet reforms

V2: Y.D. Chernichenko

T: Mr. Lighachev as a bureaucrat failing at his new executive portfolio (national agriculture).

V1: Y. Yevtushenko, a poet

T: He called an end to the consumer privileges of the governing hierarchy and the pathological secrecy.

N.A.#17: K.G.B. Chief Says New Legislature Should Ride Herd on His Agency V2: V.A. Kryuchkov, the chief of the K.G.B.

T: The Newly elected Soviet legislature should have the full authority over the K.G.B.

V2: V.A. Medyedev, the chief ideologist of the Communist Party

T: He ridicule Mr. Ligachev.

V2: Some Western analysts

T: The K.G.B. is shifting emphasis from domestic police work to foreign intelligence.

V1: V.A. Medyedev

T: He favors giving the Supreme Soviet over the appointment of the K.G.B. chief.

V2: Mr. Vlasov, a citizen whose father disappeared after being summoned by the security police in 1953.

T: K.G.B. being a threat to democracy

V1: Mr. Yakovlev. a member of the Politburo and a principle theorist of Mr. Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies

T: K.G.B.'s role in domestic affairs.

N.A.#18: Perestroika's Yankee Partner

V1: F. Eurieck, Combustion's market development manager for process-control systems

T: The new joint-ventures in Russia

V1: An American diplomat

T: The new joint ventures will bring dollars to American investors.

V1: V. Krotov, an engineer and the president of the A.E.S.

T: Joint ventures are controversial.

N.A.#19: Gorbachev Mutes His Voice on China

V2: Soviet newspapers and television

T: They presented an exercise in the nostalgia of Communist censorship.

V1: A Western expert on Chinese-Soviet relations

T: Soviet-Chinese relations

V1: An Asian ambassador

T: Gorbachev's policy on China

V2: A diplomat

T: Gorbachev's problematic domestic policies

V1: A pro-Gorbachev diplomat

T: President Bush's policy on China was not consistent either.

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: He asked for the congress's support for the foreign policy on China.

N.A.#20: New-Conservatives Taunt 'Evil' in Soviet Habitat

V1: Mr. Podhoretz, the editor of a neo-conservative journal

T: Changes in the Soviet Union; Gorbachev being a czar; glasnost is a reality.

V1: Senator B. Kasten, the Wisconsin republican

T: Neo-Conservatives in the Soviet Union are impressive.

V1: Y. Zamoshkin, a Soviet sociologist

T: Soviets are in a cycle of national self-criticism.

N.A.#21: Soviets to Let Arctic People Attend July Parley

V2: M.Simon, president of the Canadian branch of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference

T: A conference about the indigenous Arctic people

V2: Canadian experts

T: The Soviet shift reflects Gorbachev's call for Arctic countries to devise a plan to protect the region's environment.

N.A.#22: Gorbachev Warns on Ethnic Unrest

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: He called for a policy combining tolerance of ethnic aspirations and local autonomy.

N.A.#23: Supreme Soviets Ousts Official

N.A.#24: American Team Gets Close Look at Soviet Secret

V2: Soviet officials

T: Soviet secret weaponry

V2: Y.P. Velikhov, a vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences

T: The laser research center in the S. Union as a major space weapons development complex.

N.A.#25: Gorbachev Hails Striking Miners as Aiding Change

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: The strike of coal miners; perestroika might be destabilizing the nation.

V2: Miners

T: The Government neglected them.

N.A.#26: A Lada in Perestroika's Vanguard

N.A.#27: Soviet Economic Bureaucrats Are Not About to Fade Away

V2: Soviet optimists

T: The present course of the economy is a necessary consolidation.

V2: Soviet skeptics

T: The government wants to back away from the wrenching structural transformation.

V1: G.K. Popov, a senior economist at the Institute of Economics, a state research organization

T: The notion of perestroika must not be removed.

V1: V.V. Kadannikov, general director of the Volga Automotive Plant Association

T: Limitations on the new freedoms; further need to free the economy

N.A.#28: American Interns Are Glasnost's Gift to Journalism

V1: V. Mostovets, the Soviet press agency's chief New York correspondent

T: Glasnost

V1: M. Georgianis, a senior majoring in journalism at N.Y.U.

T: The image of a Tass reporter

N.A.#29: U.S. Visitors Learn Limits of Glasnost

V2: A Soviet admiral

T: Glasnost

V1: E.L. Warner, a Rand Corporation specialist

T: The visit of a Congressional delegation

V1: P.A. Karber, an expert on conventional forces

T: Soviets don't know what the new structure is going to look like.

V2: Representative Les Aspin who chairs the Committee

T: Opennes

N.A.#30: U.S. Drafts Plans to Curb Admission of Soviet Jews

V2: Some American and Israeli officials

T: Persecution of Jews abated in the Gorbachev era.

V2: Many members of the Congress and American Jewish groups

T: Glasnost allowed freer expression of virulent anti-Semitic sentiments.

N.A.#31: Offering 'Perestroika Perks,' Aeroflot Beckons U.S. Fliers

V1: M. Billig, editor of Business Travel

T: New changes in the Soviet airlines

V1: J.P. McCaffrey, vice president of industrial affairs for the PanAm Corp.

T: Glasnost & perestroika and Aeroflot

V1: P. Davidoff, president-elect of the American Society of Travel Agents

T: Aeroflot

N.A.#32: Politburo Shuffle? Muscovites Shrug

V2: Muscovites

T: Gorbachev may have been mastering some desk-top executive game in the Kremlin.

V1: Mr. Daskal, a construction worker

T: The worsening economic conditions in the S. Union.

N.A.#33: Gorbachev's Anti-Magic

V2: Many Westerners

T: Gorbachev's endeavors abroad brought quick gratification.

V1: A Ukrania legislator

T: Gorbachev is up to liberalization of a totalitarian regime.

V1: A legislator from the Russian city of Sverdlovsk

T: B.N. Yeltsin is an alternative to Gorbachev.

V1: R.N. Nishanov, a former diplomat and a Gorbachev loyalist

T: He's never seen any place where people expressed such distrust toward a head of state.

N.A.#35: Why I Came in From the Cold?

V1: A distinguished reviewer [of the novel 'The Russia House']

T: The book has an ideological slant.

V1: Another reviewer

T: Americans should not care whether Russians like the book or not.

N.A.#36: Bulgarian Change Barely Plods Along

V2: Bulgarian officials

T: Glasnost will come to Bulgaria.

N.A.#37: The Limits of Glasnost

V2: Soviet legislators

T: They wonder whether Gorbachev will support a law which will guarantee legal rights to the press and outlawing censorship.

V1: A. Bovin, an influential commentator for Izvestia

T: Liberties in the Soviet Union

V1: Y. Yakovlev, the editor of the Moscow News

T: Gorbachev's contradictory attitudes toward democracy

V1: A.D. Sakharov, the human rights campaigner

T: Gorbachev and the freedom of the press

N.A.#38: Gorbachev and the Wayward Press

V2: Westerners

T: They came to mistake glasnost for freedom.

V2: Soviet readers

T: They mistake glasnost for freedom.

V1: V.V. Bakatin, the Minister of Internal Affairs

T: Chaos in the press

V2: Authors

T: Lenin was a terrorist.

V2: Editors

T: They subscribe to Lenin's view of the press (a collective agitator).

N.A.#39: Off the List, Into Lean-To: A Hammer Beckons

V1: A militiaman, I. Nurat

T: Housing problem

V1: A. Igumnov, a schoolteacher

T: Housing problem

N.A.#40: In Riverdale, Glasnost Goes to School

V1: M. Frazer, an 11-year-old sixth grader

T: Stereotypes about Russians

V1: M. Soloviev, a Soviet student

T: Stereotypes about Russians

N.A.#41: 'Enough' For Glasnost

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: A debate in the Congress

V2: V.I. Karasyov

T: A debate in the Congress

N.A.#42: How Soviet T.V. Focuses Its Cameras on Eastern Europe

V2: E. Mickiewicz, the director of a Soviet media program at the Carter Center of Emory University

T: The recent changes in the TV programs

N.A.#43: Kremlin Watchers Cope With Data Glut

V1: A senior Bush Administration official

T: The abundance of information coming out of the S. Union.

V2: Officials

T: Their insights into Soviet society were sharp even before the new avalanche of information began in the mid-1980's.

V1: R.J. Kerr, the Deputy Director of the C.I.A.

T: Ground-work studies the C.I.A. has done.

V2: An official

T: Changes in the information coming out of the S. Union.

V1: A senior expert on Kremlin

T: The changes in the East Germany could not be predicted.

V1: W.H. Webster, the Director of the C.I.A.

T: Open side of the business became more important.

N.A.#44: Will Perestroika Cost Us More At the Pump?

V1: V. Filanovsky, First Deputy Minister

T: The oil sector in the S. Union

N.A.#45: Soviet Emigres to Israel Tell of Hate Back Home

V2: Most of the Jewish immigrants

T: Anti-Semitism in the S. Union

V1: M. Nekterman, an electrician

T: Anti-Semitism in the S. Union

V1: O. Roythman, who directed a computer software company

T: Anti-Semitism in the S. Union

N.A.#46: Gorbachev Backs Multiparty State, Some in Party Say

V2: Members of the congress

T: Gorbachev's endorsement to end the Communist Party's monopoly on power.

V2: Advocates of more radical change

T: They urged Gorbachev to seize the opportunity for a showdown on the party's course.

V2: Party hardliners

T: They wanted to preserve Article 6 of the Constitution which enshrines the party's role as the 'leading and guiding force' of society.

V2: The party members supporting the changes

T: The draft still faced opposition from hardliners.

V2: Some party radicals

T: The necessity to end the Party's monopoly.

V1: Interfax. a reliable daily bulletin

T: The draft proposed by Gorbachev

V1: M.M. Malyutin, a senior professor at the Moscow Higher Party School

T: The draft was not the final text.

V2: Party officials

T: M.S. Gorbachev will step down if the congress approves a

platform sympathetic to the program of Gorbachev.

V1: Mr. Brazauskas, the leader of the Communist party in Lithuania

T: Gorbachev should be more free of political pressures.

V2: Advocates of accelerated change

T: Gorbachev must move quickly to neutralize party conservatives.

V1: A.S. Tsipko, a former Central Committee adviser

T: Dogmatic members of the Central Committee

N.A.#47: Economic Scene

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: His address to the Central Committee; reforming agriculture; monetary system; the Communist party.

N.A.#48: Moscow a Year Later: Rutted Streets and Despair

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: Economic decline

V2: Deputies

T: Gorbachev is asking for new powers.

V1: A.N. Rybakov, a writer

T: The Soviets do not have the tradition of democracy.

V1: A Central Committee official

T: The idea of social justice in the U.S.S.R. is different.

V2: Many people

T: Gorbachev has wrecked the system.

V1: A Communist functionary

T: A coming demonstration in Moscow

N.A.#49: Fed Up With Lies, Romanians Are Faced With Harsh Truths

V1: A citizen

T: No perestroika

N.A.#50: Soviet Crisis Worse, Economic Declare

V2: Western and Soviet economists

T: The economic crisis in the Soviet Union

V1: A.W. Clausen, former president of the World Bank

T: Converting the Soviet economy to a market-economy

V1: V.A. Tikhonov, president of the U.S.S.R. Union of

Cooperatives

T: The Soviet economy is falling apart.

V1: A. Aslaund, a Swedish economist

T: The Soviet economy is in a serious crisis.

V1: E.A. Hewett of the Brookings Institution

T: The Soviet economy is deteriorating.

V2: The Soviet economists

T: They did not dispute these assessments.

V1: A. Aganbegyan, a Soviet economist who is discredited with being a leading pioneer of perestroika

T: He welcomed the transition to an executive presidency.

N.A.#51: Soviet Cartoons: They Cry So Hard You Could Laugh

V2: Soviet and Western economists

T: Bureaucrats are burdens to be carried.

N.A.#52: Gorbachev Tries to Develop Radical Economic Program

V2: The Tass Press agency

T: They offered no hint of how quickly the Government might seek to introduce free-market programs.

V1: A visiting Western specialist

T: The Soviets are losing their grip on the economy.

N.A.#54: Soviet Economy: A Shattered Dream

V1: S. Shatalin, the newest addition to M.S. Gorbachev's team of economic pitchmen

T: No need to fear market.

V1: R. Simonyan, an economist at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations

T: Soviet life has been grim.

V1: G.N. Zoteyev, a market-oriented economist

T: Gorbachev tried to improve things by bringing order, strengthening discipline, holding the bureaucratic apparatus more accountable.

V1: V.L. Selyunin, an economics writer

T: The most damning indictment of the Soviet economy is the huge

disproportion of money and energy poured into heavy industry while consumer goods get by on the leftovers.

N.A.#55: How Gorbachev Rejected Plan to 'Shock Treat' the Economy
Perestroika in Crisis

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: Market enthusiasts want to take a gamble.

V1: Mr. Ryzhkov, the Prime Minister

T: The price reform will take many years.

V1: V.L. Selyunin, an economics writer and market advocate

T: The G.N.P. fell 5%.

V1: S.S. Shatalin, an economist and member of Gorbachev's
presidential Council

T: Worsening economic conditions

V1: A.A. Sergeyev, a trade-union economist

T: The free market proposals may cause riots.

V1: G.N. Zoteyev, a scholar at the economics research institute run
by the state planning agency

T: We need a non-Communist administration. There is a fear about
freeing the market.

V1: R. Simonyan, an economist at the Institute of the World
Economy and International Relations

T: We should not free prices; an infrastructure should be created
before freeing the prices.

N.A.#56: The Kremlin Takes a Shot: An Economic Gamble And a
Chance to Vote

V2: Western analysts

T: The Kremlin's proposals to rejuvenate the economy are too little,
too late.

V2: Western economists

T: The latest plan will not work.

V1: R. Ericson, an economist at Columbia University's Harriman
Institute

T: Kremlin misunderstands the market economy.

V1: I. Birman, an economic consultant to the Pentagon

T: One of the Kremlin economists had made a career teaching

Marxism.

V1: E. Hewett of the Brookings Institution

T: Soviet leaders are frightened by the risk of hyperinflation.

N.A.#57: Gorbachev, Pressed by Foes, Assails the 'Narrow Minded'

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: Democracy is reality; hardliners are defending the party's old centrist authoritarian structure; market economy will give boost to all kinds of dealers, corrupting and sponging elements.

V2: Hardline speakers

T: They blamed Gorbachev for accelerated change.

N.A.#58: Presenting the Bolshoi

V1: C. Dillingham, the president of the Entertainment Corporation

T: The essence of perestroika is to reduce Government subsidy.

N.A.#59: A Moscow Puzzle: Reforms First or Foreign Aid?

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: Perestroika will not work without help from foreign friends.

V2: Western analysts

T: They do not agree with Gorbachev.

V1: L. Summers at Harvard University

T: He believed that foreign capital can be used fairly to grease the transition to market economies.

V2: E.A. Hewett, an economist at the Brookings Institution

T: A third of all Soviet products come from enterprises that control 100% of their markets.

V2: R.McKinnon, an economist at Stanford

T: Consequences of finances in the Soviet Union.

V2: N.A. Shemelev, a radical economist

T: Foreign currency

V2: P. Desai at Columbia University

T: Foreign currency

N.A.#60: The Bread Shelves in Moscow Shops Suddenly Go Bare

V2: N.I. Ryzhkov, Prime Minister

T: He vowed a fight to keep the central Government's existing economic controls.

V2: G.K. Popov, the Mayor of Moscow, a free-market economist

T: He urged people for demonstrating.

N.A.#61: Kremlin's Premier Criticizes Change

V2: Izvestia

T: Bread shortages set off the revolution that ousted the monarchy in 1917.

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: 500-day economic plan

V2: Economists

T: Bread industry has not been modernized.

V2: Muscovites

T: Bread shortage is very serious.

V1: Mr. Ryzhkov, Prime Minister

T: It's risky to enact more free-market reform.

V1: G.K. Popov, The Mayor of Moscow

T: The problems are caused by the central Government.

N.A.#62: Russian Gets Call By Solzhenitsyn for Slavic State

V1: A. Solzhenitsyn

T: 'Noisy' reforms of Gorbachev; the need to strenght the nation around the Slavic peoples; perestroika did not bring anything but a fake elections system; etc.

N.A.#63: Soviet Parliament Grants Gorbachev Emergency Power

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: Executive power is needed for a more effective government.

V1: S.S. Shatalin

T: Today's vote left no winners, and no losers.

V2: B.N. Yeltsin

T: Gorbachev's request [for new powers] was inadmissible.

V1: Y. Golik, chairman of a Parliament legal committee

T: Russians are misinterpreting the nature of resolution to expand the President's powers.

V2: Supporters of M.S. Gorbachev

T: Gorbachev was not usurping the powers of either the Supreme Soviet or the republics.

V1: G. Filshin, a deputy prime minister of the Russian republic

T: Gorbachev's attempt is based on discrediting the Parliament.

V1: V.V. Bakatin, the Soviet Interior Minister

T: Gorbachev's attempt is to resolving a legal crisis.

N.A.#64: Gorbachev Offers His Plan to Remake Soviet Economy

V1: S.S. Shatalin

T: The economic plan would not lead to a real market economy.

V2: Legislators

T: Gorbachev's plan was likely to be approved by the Soviet Parliament.

V2: B.N. Yeltsin

T: Gorbachev plan is a tactical plan; Turning over full power to the republics can win the public support.

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: The transition to the market does not contradict the socialist choice of our people.

V2: Critics

T: The Shatalin plan would lead to inflation.

V1: A.N. Boiko, chairman of a key economic subcommittee in Parliament

T: The legislators are increasingly supporting Gorbachev.

N.A.#65: Hard Cash Talks Loudly in Land of Grumbles

V2: Muscovites

T: They are bored with the Kremlin's agonizing over economic reform.

V1: I. Remikaite, a citizen

T: There is no future prospect in the Soviet Union.

V1: I. Averina, deputy manager at one of the state's special hard-currency stores

T: The ruble is worthless.

N.A.#66: Soviet Plan in the Middle

V1: B.N. Yeltsin

T: The plan [developed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin] is an attempt to retain a system people come to hate.

V1: A senior official in D. Cheney's delegation

T: They have a full-fledged political crisis.

V2: Analysts in the independent Soviet press

T: Gorbachev would have strong incentives to protect the three [Mr. Ryzhkov, Mr. Yazov, and Mr. Kryuchkov].

V1: Independent weekly Karyera

T: Gorbachev is responsible for the crisis.

V2: Karentu Ryad, an opposition-oriented newspaper in Moscow

T: Mr. Yazov and Mr. Kryuchkov are more conservative than Gorbachev.

V1: T.I. Koryagina, an economist active in the democratic opposition

T: She is skeptical about the plan.

V2: G.A. Yavlinsky, one of the original authors of the 500-day plan

T: The plan to put into effect the radical free-market program was hopeless.

N.A.#67: Proposal by Gorbachev Wins Committee Votes

V2: Legislators

T: The Parliament would approve the plan.

V1: A. Aganbegyan

T: It was impossible to spell out a uniform program for the whole country.

V2: Many in the radical camp

T: They were skeptical of Mr. Aganbegyan's promise of a free hand.

V1: S.N. Krasavchenko, chairman of the Committee on Economic Reform and Property of the Russian Republic's Parliament

T: The central Government still has the power.

V1: A. Orlov, a commentator for the Tass press agency

T: He questioned whether Mr. Gorbachev's program would really lead to a market economy.

V2: Acquaintances

T: Mr. Aganbegyan might resign from Mr. Gorbachev's presidential council.

N.A.#68: Gorbachev's Economic Plan Approved

V2: Mr. Gorbachev and his aides

T: The transition would begin with a period of budget discipline.

V2: Aides

T: Gorbachev would rely on the powers of decree.

V2: Many radicals

T: The program did not move decisively.

V1: S.S. Shatalin, a co-author of the 500-day crash program

T: He would remain on Mr. Gorbachev's Presidential Council to push rapid expansion of private enterprise.

V2: B.N. Yeltsin

T: He denounced the plan.

V1: N.Y. Petrakov, Mr. Gorbachev's personal economic adviser and free-market advocate

T: Mr. Yeltsin had rebuffed Mr. Gorbachev's overtures.

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: The crisis of the consumer market cannot be eliminated until the machines that produce goods begin faster.

N.A.#69: Gorbachev Counsels a Prudent Revolution

V2: Western analysts

T: The new plan is a scheme to save the bureaucrats and party hacks who led the economy to ruin.

V1: E.A. Hewett, a Soviet specialist at the Brookings Institution

T: The real problem is a political problem.

V1: P. Desai, a Columbia University economist

T: The compromise shares the ultimate vision of the 500-day plan.

V1: S. Islam, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

T: The politics and power relations are not clear.

N.A.#70: Malevolent Boomerang Rules Soviet Economy

V1: M. Berger, the economics correspondent for Izvestia

T: The plan was a domino effect.

V2: Ukrainian officials

T: Russia retaliated by cutting off oil supplies.

V1: N.Y. Petrakov, Gorbachev's personal economic adviser

T: No one knows the real figure of the budget deficit.

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: The central Government desatbilized the economy.

V2: G.A. Yavlinsky, the young economist who helped design the 500-day plan for Mr. Yeltsin

T: We will have to return to the 500-day plan.

N.A.#71: The Paper That Covers the Soviet Union's Business Beat

V1: V. Yakovlev, the editor of the Commersant, the Soviet business weekly

T: The history of a private economy here is much longer than the history of a socialist economy.

N.A.#72: Soviets Are Urged to Change Faster

V2: Administration officials

T: It was likely that Mr. Bush would announce a provision of emergency medical assistance to the Soviets.

V2: E. Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister

T: He made a public appeal for economic assistance from Washington.

V1: J.A. Baker, the Secretary of State

T: The assistance would be forthcoming.

N.A.#73: Sustaining the Soviets

V2: Supporters (of the economic aid)

T: Deliveries of food is largely symbolic.

V2: Skeptics

T: The relief will provide fleeting comfort to a few of the poor.

V2: India's Ambassador to Moscow

T: S(h)e announced gifts to the Soviets of food and medicines.

V2: L.A. Voronin, who heads a central Government commision on aid distribution

T: The food delivery is not sufficient.

V1: Tass press agency

T: The economic and political significance of the aid must not be underestimated.

V2: Many Soviets

T: They see the reports of charity food as the latest indictment of the system that led food supplies decline.

V2: Some critics

T: Aid may provide an excuse to postpone needed economic change.

V2: Six Soviet scholars

T: The aid may postpone the development of private enterprise.

V1: L. Piyasheva, an independent market economist

T: The grain sales to the S. Union contribute to the preservation of this parasitic system.

V1: A senior Western diplomat

T: If they don't make the hard choices, it's not going to be because of aid.

V2: Insurgents

T: They worry that Western largesse will become the personal patronage of Mr. Gorbachev.

V2: Western embassies

T: The assistance should be channeled through popularly elected officials rather than the party.

V1: A diplomat

T: The assistance

V1: One group of hardliners, a political alliance called the Centrist Bloc

T: Gorbachev is presenting the S. Union as a beggar country.

V2: Most consumers

T: They are ready to accept the aid.

V1: The Government daily Izvestia

T: Our country is humiliated.

V1: A diplomat

T: Next winter the wolf may be at the door.

N.A.#74: U.S. and Partners in Accord on Aid to Soviet Economy

V1: A senior American trade official

T: The S. Union may become a full member of the I.M.F.

V2: President Bush

T: The money might be wasted if it were disbursed before the Soviet reforms were much further along.

V1: The senior American Treasury officials

T: The plan as a calibrated way forward to integrate the Soviet economy

V1: H.H. Horstmann, spokesman at the German Embassy

T: Integrating the Soviet economy to the world's free-market economy.

V1: A.F. Dobrynin, a consultant to the M.S. Gorbachev and the Soviet Ambassador to Washington

T: His Government is in favor of cooperation.

V2: American officials

T: The international aid should help President Gorbachev politically.

N.A.#75: Gorbachev Asks Votes on Unity in the Republics

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: He demanded a popular referendum in every republic; he attacked intellectuals; he sounded like Y.K. Ligachev, his former hard-line Communist party nemesis.

V1: Mr. Ligachev

T: He hailed the speech as evidence that his views and those of Gorbachev 'are coming together.'

V1: The member who called for the vote [of confidence]

T: Gorbachev goes to the world with outstretched hands.

V2: Liberal deputies

T: They speculated that hardliners had instigated the attack on Mr. Gorbachev as a warning.

V2: Mrs. Umalatova

T: She had not consulted with anyone before taking the podium.

V1: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He submits a proposal to hold a nationwide referendum about the union of sovereign lines.

V2: Deputies from the several republics

T: They rejected the idea of a referendum as federal meddling with their prerogatives.

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: The rejection would not entitle the republic to go its own way.

V2: Liberals

T: They were dismayed at Gorbachev's drift to the right.

V2: Hard-liners

T: They complained that Gorbachev's tone was not backed up by any specific new measures to combat crime.

V2: Gorbachev-watchers

T: They are divided: Some maintain that he is being forced to take a tougher line by pressure from the military and the K.G.B.; while the others say he seems to have exhausted his own patience for the disorder of democracy.

V1: B.N. Yeltsin

T: We are returnign to a hard diktat of the center.

N.A.#76: Russia Cuts Share of Soviet Budget by More Than 90 %

V1: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He told the Congress that the confrontation left the country without a budget and threatened the nation with economic collapse.

V1: A.A. Sobchak, Mayor of Leningrad and a member of the Congress

T: If there is no budget, it invalidates the entire Congress.

V1: G. Fyodorov, the finance minister

T: He complained that the Russian Government is too preoccupied with political confrontation and incompetent to carry out its promised transition to a market economy.

V1: G.I. Filshin, chairman of the Russian republic's State Economic Committee

T: He told the members of federal Parliament that Russia had been forced to take drastic measures because the Kremlin refused to give an honest account of where the money was going.

V2: Mr. Yeltsin

T: If we continue debating in this way all people will be out in the streets.

V2: Soviet and Russian officials

T: Gorbachev has two choices: negotiate or attempt to seize the money.

V2: V. Ignatenko, Gorbachev's spokesman

T: Negotiations would be easier after Gorbachev appointed a new Cabinet.

V2: Some members

T: Seizing money would deepen the confrontation between Gorbachev and Russia.

N.A.#78: For Glasnost in the Arts, Blues in the Night

V2: Americans

T: They've been entranced by Gorbachev's media triumphs.

V2: Some critics and artistic directors

T: The interest in Soviet cultural presentations have a lot to do with real American appetite for all things Russian.

V1: M. Kahn, artistic director of the Shalespeare Theater at the Folger in Washington

T: These appearences have more to do with awakening American audiences.

V1: S. Boulay, a concert presenter that produced a tour of the Red Army Chorus

T: They [Russians] want dollars, dollars, dollars.

N.A.#79: Food Shortages, Now Violence Make Soviet Investing Dicier

V2: E.A. Schevardnadze

T: The country was moving toward dictatorship.

V2: The White House

T: The Soviet Army's actions threatened next months summit meeting.

V2: B.N. Yeltsin

T: He continues to challenge Mr. Gorbachev's leadership.

V2: A. Hartman. a former Ambassador to the S. Union,

T: Those who opposed to reform have deliberately brought about the disintegration of the society.

V1: J. Shelton, research fellow, the Hoover Institution

T: The Soviet Union is on the verge of civil war. Gorbachev is like Moses – able to lead people out of Egypt but not into the promised land. He'll be phased out. There'll be federation of republics.

V1: A.M. Solomon, Institute For East-West Security Studies

T: Gorbachev lost his maneuvering room. There'll not be economic reforms from him. The only way there will be any meaningful

reform is from Mr. Yeltsin. He has cards he can play. The economic reform in the S.U. has been divorced from reality. A command-economy structure cannot achieve reform.

V1: V. Kvint, Professor of Political Economy

T: Gorbachev is now astride two beasts, the K.G.B. and the military. Western food aid only go to feed them. Gorbachev's revolution will turn into a civil war. There's not a lot of hope for Western investment.

V1: C. Hugel, National Foreign Trade Council

T: The country is moving to a state of anarchy. Making V.S. Pavlov the Prime Minister is a good sign for business. This says that the reforms are still on course. Mr. Gorbachev will remain in power.

V1: A. Hartman, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union

T: The events in Lithuania signal a reactionary step backwards. The reason for the disintegration of the economic system is that the old guard – the bureaucrats – fought back against the reforms in an alliance with the K.G.B. and the military.

N.A.#80: In Soviet Life, Thaw Becomes Chill

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: Democratization; for the people change, the system of motivations and interests had to be changed to encourage competition.

V1: I. Klyamkin, a political scientist who predicted the authoritarian turn under way

T: The apparat would never allow a land reform; this is a society, there are no producers only consumers.

V1: B.G. Fyodorov, a young market economist

T: One day it was 100% support; the next day Gorbachev was again speaking about the socialist choice; the Russian government behaved as if it were in a war with Gorbachev for public support; the idea of sovereignty is not enough.

V2: Pro-Kremlin groups

T: They tried to supplant the more independent popularly elected officials.

V1: Y. Burtin, a commentator for the Independent Gazette

T: After beginning with criticism of Stalin and Brezhnev, Gorbachev ended with the restoration of a command system of the Stalin-Brezhnev type which was dictatorship of the party oligarchy.

V2: Democrats

T: They point out that their power is illusiory.

V1: A. Borovik, a journalist

T: People want bread and order. The nation is ready for strong rule.

V1: Col. V. Alksnis, a hardliner

T: Unrest in the army is comparable to that in 1917. We have a political conflict.

V2: N. Petrakov, a market economist

T: The Government had no idea how to introduce a market.

N.A.#81: Soviet TV Reflects the Kremlin's Grimmer Picture

V2: The majority of Soviet citizens

T: The shift in official winds has been most evident on TV screens.

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: He proposed that the Parliament suspend the law on the press and take control over media to insure that they included all points of view.

V2: A coalition of hard-liners and liberals

T: They refused Gorbachev's proposal.

V2: Independent forces

T: They are included in many local stations.

N.A.#82: Economic Scene: Perestroika with Tears

V2: Kremlin watchers

T: [About Gorbachev – Pinochet resemblance] There is a difference.

V1: E. Hewett, a Soviet specialist at the Brookings Institution

T: Pinochet made the Chilean economy safe for capitalists.

V2: Many Soviet citizens

T: They are unwilling to make any sacrifice to reconstruct the Soviet state.

V1: R. Ericson, an economist at Columbia University

T: Gorbachev's actions will make liberalization harder.

V1: M. Goldman, a Harvard economist

T: Gorbachev does not know where to go.

N.A.#83: Millionaire's Bad FortuneL Why Is K.G.B. Calling?

V1: A. Tarasov, a Soviet businessman

T: There was energy when Gorbachev opened the door new economic programs. Now there is fear.

V2: Authorities

T: The measure [investigating businesses] is necessary, because U.S.S.R. has been turned into a hunting ground for people looking to exploit the weak economy.

V2: People involved in business

T: The authorities cannot recognize the difference between a capitalist and a crook and that deals and dealers are becoming the victims of changing laws and ideologies.

N.A.#84: Yeltsin Assails Gorbachev Rule for 'Stagnation'

V2: More than 100,000 Muscovites

T: They chanted for B.N. Yeltsin.

V2: Communist members of Parliament

T: They called a special session of the Russian Parliament.

V2: Deputies

T: They hoped to portray Yeltsin as a political wagging a personal vendetta.

N.A.#85: As Economy Sags, Gorbachev Faces New Demands

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: He faced a demand from hard-line deputies that he defend his record at an emergency session of the national Congress.

V2: Gorbachev's former free-market reformers

T: They dismissed his anticrisis program.

V1: N. Petrakov, former chief economic adviser to Mr. Gorbachev

T: The Russian empire has come to abuse its folly. He quoted Bismarck by criticizing Gorbachev's attempt at dealing with the latest statistics in his anti-crisis program as a reflection of an imperialist mentality.

V2: Soyuz or Union, the hard-line bloc of deputies who claim about

one-third of the membership in the national Congress

T: They demanded a special Congress session to consider Gorbachev's attempts to deal with coal miners' strike.

V2: Some Soyuz members

T: They demanded that Mr. Gorbachev declare a state of emergency.

V1: Y. Blokhin, a spokesman of the Soyuz members

T: Gorbachev should show that he is a man.

V2: Mr. Petrakov and a dozen of other economists

T: Gorbachev retreated from the free-market plan and paid lip service to market economics while protecting the national Government.

V1: A. Yemelyanov, an economist, a member of the Congress

T: They are using the idea of the 'free market' to justify their outrages the way they used to say 'We are building Communism.'

V1: S. Shatalin, once a leading free-market theorizer for Gorbachev

T: All programs in essence will be mimicking the system.

N.A.#86: Moscow to Ask Help From West on Reform Plan

V2: The Kremlin

T: The Kremlin started an initiative to get major Western countries to join in drafting and financing a plan for economic and political reform.

V2: M.S. Gorbachev the Group of 7 industrialized powers

T: They endorsed the initiative.

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: He rejected the 500-day plan of radical economic reforms developed by G.A. Yavlinsky. He recognized the sovereignty of the republics.

V2: M. Yavlinsky's aides

T: He and Mr. Primakov are to fly to Boston to discuss the economic plan with economists at Harvard University.

V2: Mr. Pavlov

T: He appealed to the West not to be bystanders to the crisis.

V2: President Bush

T: He demonstrated a renewed interest in assisting Mr. Gorbachev.

V2: Many Western experts

T: The West cannot sit on the sidelines if it is interested in reforms.

V2: G. Allison, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard

T: He helped Mr. Yavlinsky shape the proposal.

V1: Mr. Yavlinsky

T: Nobody can win.

N.A.#87: Soviet Economists in Harvard Talks

V1: G. Allison, a former dean of the J.F.K. School of Government

T: The group was looking for 'Marshall Plan scale aid.'

V2: Specialists at Harvard who are not participating un the talks

T: They expressed skepticism over where money would come from.

V1: S. Fischer, a professor of economics at the M.I.T.

T: The Soviet team is prepared to do serious economic analysis.

V2: G.A. Yavlinsky, the head of the Russian delegate

T: The talks had the support of President Gorbachev.

V2: Some other specialists at Harvard

T: They expressed doubt about the outcome of the talks.

V1: M. Goldman, a professor of economics at Wellesley College

T: He is not sure anyone is control in the S. Union.

N.A.#88: President is Reacting Cooly to Aid Plea by Gorbachev

V1: President Bush

T: He is keeping all options open. Gorbachev had not given up on reform. He reacted cooly to Gorbachev's suggestion that the industrialized democracies should help the S. Union financially.

V2: Administration officials

T: The momory of Gorbachev's shift last year to more conservative policies and authoritarian methods remain fresh in Washington.

N.A.#89: U.S.S.R. Without 'Socialist' is Discussed

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: 9 of the 15 republics were close to an agreement that would change the structure and the formal name of the S. Union.

V2: M.S. Gorbachev and the republic leaders

T: They agreed to drop the word 'socialist' from the name of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and to insert 'sovereign' in its place.

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: What is going on is stimulating the centripetal forces of our multinational state.

V2: Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin

T: The union treaty could be completed as early as June.

N.A.#90: What Role for the West in Russia's Revolution

V2: The authors of the economic program

T: This is the moment for those who want a renewed S. Union to take action.

V2: Most in the West

T: They would agree with the authors of the economic program.

V2: Mr. Yavlinsky and like-minded Western analysts

T: It is in the national interest of the Western world bring the Soviet giant into the fold of civilised nations.

V2: Many Russians

T: The very notion that there is some question about Western involvement comes true as a shock.

V2: Liberals

T: They presumed in the dark ages of Communism that the East need only open its doors a crack, and the capitalists would come flooding in.

V1: J. Sacks, the Harvard professor

T: The problem is the Communist monopoly on power.

V2: The advocates of Western assistance

T: There is no alternative model to democracy and the free market. The only question is when.

V1: Mr. Yavlinsky

T: The S. Union must return to the global economy.

N.A.#91: Soviets Propose New Economic Changes

V2: Washinton

T: Washington told the three economic advisers to Gorbachev that they would have to make concrete steps before any American aid would be considered.

V1: Secretary of State J.A. Baker

T: The U.S. is interested in supporting both political and economic

reform in the Soviet Union. The first step is to undertake real market-based reforms, to tap the potential and the resources that exist in the Soviet Union.

V2: G.A. Yavlinsky and Y.M Primakov

T: They presented a revised anti-crisis program to Mr. Baker.

V1: Mr. Primakov, the member of Gorbachev's national security council responsible for economics

T: The program calls for liberalization, privatization, destatization, and getting away from the policies of the administrative structure existed in the past.

V2: American officials

T: They wanted to study the Soviet's proposals and would be giving a formal response in the coming weeks.

V2: Some American officials

T: They believe that the American economists from Harvard may have given them an exaggerated sense of what Washington is able to do.

V1: An administration official

T: We want to inject a little realism into their expectations.

N.A.#92: More Pleas By Soviets

V1: L.I. Piyasheva

T: Our programs are some kind of game, far from real economics.

N.A.#93: Gorbachev, in Oslo, Links World Peace to Perestroika

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: If perestroika fails, the prospect of entering a new peaceful period will vanish.

N.A.#94: Soviet Snail's Pace

V1: S.B. Stankevich, first vice chairman of the Moscow city council

T: The central Government talked about a market economy, but was afraid to introduce it before.

V1: T. Golenpolsky, a Muscovite who is trying to interest Western investors in joint real-estate ventures

T: American businesses all wanted to know what guarantee they

had of making profits and getting the money out.

V2: Experts

T: Western banks hesitate to invest large sums to develop business, because there is still no clear Soviet legal concept of ownership.

V2: Foreign diplomats

T: The tide of Soviet domestic politics turned in favor of continuing change. Gorbachev is serious about moving back toward reform.

V1: A. Papachristou, an American lawyer specializing in investing

T: Regulations take away from all business enterprises except joint ventures.

V1: A Western envoy

T: This is a country with a thousand year history that has never had an entrepreneurial culture.

N.A.#95: Gorbahcev Welcomes New Opposition Movement

V1: M.S. Gorbachev

T: He offered words of welcome to the new opposition political movement.

V2: V.N. Ignatenko, spokesman

T: The new movement can only be welcomed.

V2: A. Sobchak, The Mayor of Leningrad

T: This troubled nation can afford no further delay in constructing a party to stand against the Communist nationwide and [revent a return to dictatorship.

V1: E.A. Shevardnadze, Former Minister

T: One purpose of our movement is not to allow a return to the past.

V2: Mr. Yakovlev, a career Communist

T: The party apparatus is rushing to mobilize party members against democratic reforms.

N.A.#96: Has Pluralism Really Come To Moscow

V2: Many reasonable and liberal members

T: They stayed in the Party, believing that the locomotive for change must still be a revamped Communist Party.

V1: Mr. Yakovlev

T: The restructuring in the country has run up against a solid wall

of hatred, rejection, hostility, and actual resistance from the side of extreme conservatism and reaction.

V2: E.A. Shevardnadze and his allies

T: They declared that their intention was to found a party.

V2: Many Soviet citizens

T: Party still smacks of the secretive, elitist and corrupt Communist Party.

V2: Opposition politicians

T: They have shown a readiness to join in coalitions or movements.

N.A.#97: Hotel For Young Lovers? Perestroika Turns Pale

V2: V. Karpov, the councilman

T: He touched one of the sorest spots of Communism – the inhibitions of communal apartment living – with one of the sharper issues of glasnost: how libertine should the new freedoms be allowed to become.

N.A.#99: Along The Banks of Volga, A City With No Fish

V1: B.M. Glukhman, deputy chairman of the City Council

T: We are fed up with the planned economy.

V2: L.A. Glaskov, a meat pie seller-become-millionaire

T: The economic freedoms granted by President B.N. Yeltsin's government in the Russian republic have trickled down.

N.A.#100: Soviet Voices Cry Out For Drastic Solutions to the Economic Crisis

V2: Soviet citizens

T: They publicly complained about their lives.

V1: L.I. Tsegankova, a 69-year-old peddler of cosmetics and pans

T: Set free all the market forces on every level.

V1: G.Y. Baklanov, the editor of Znamya

T: Everything is wrong, and everything must be corrected.

V1: Z. Sergeyevna, farm worker

T: We need hard-working people. The Government should take the young people in hand and make them work.

V1: V. Yakovlev

T: Editor in Chief, Komersant, a business weekly

T: The biggest mistake is to tackle the problem this way – which is exactly what the government has been doing – asking what's wrong and trying to find just one recipe. We are talking about a complicated economic structure that is developing quickly and in the right direction.

V1: A.A. Kovalova, Cashier

T: What's wrong? Our system. They have to give the democrats and Yeltsin a chance to take charge, and the Communist Party has to disappear.

V1: S.P. Zalygin, Editor in chief, N. Mir, a monthly literary journal

T: A correct decision has been found – privatization – but the direction it took is not correct.

V1: V. Vasilyev, Black marketeer selling cosmetics

T: The whole lot of them over there in Kremlin are liars. Gorbachev should be ashamed of himself.

V1: I.N. Mogucheva, Cashier

T: We work, we see all sorts of goods come into the city, the prices go up – and still the shelves are empty.

V1: V.Y. Gulyayev, law professor

T: Everything is wrong. We have to move to a market economy.

V1: A.I. Levikov, economic editor, Business in the U.S.S.R. magazine

T: We don't have an efficient reliable anticrisis program.

V1: G.N. Yezhola, architect

T: We need time if we'll turn the economy around 180 degrees.

V1: N.I. Vlasov, retired construction worker

T: People have to be made to work.

V1: A. Kislarov, accountant

T: We need privatization.

V1: T. Trofimova, worker

T: What we have to do is to consolidate our forces and our resources.

V1: A.V. Yablokov, plumber

T: We have to privatize everything.

V1: L.I. Tsegankova, ballet dancer

T: It's necessary to adopt the Western system.

V1: G.Y. Baklanov, editor in chief, Znamya magazine

T: Everything must be corrected.

V1: V.A. Starkov, editor in chief, Argumenty i Fakty

T: The key word is freedom.

V1: A.A. Fyodorov, owner of private restaurant

T: Legislation on private property must be adopted.

N.A.#101: As Soviets Wait Tremulously, Ailing Economy Struggles On

V2: Detractors to Mr. Gorbachev's right, including the chiefs of the K.G.B., the military and the police

T: They accused Gorbachev of dismantling the old order.

V2: Detractors to Mr. Gorbachev's left, including Yeltsin and Yavlinsky, the liberal economist who helped draft a reform plan proposed to Gorbachev

T: They accused Gorbachev of moving far too slowly and letting the state founder half measures.

N.A.#101: Toward a Smaller World

V2: Mr. Major and President Bush

T: They were persuaded that the Soviet leader was trying to move to a market economy.

V1: Mr. Gorbachev

T: We are talking about a new quality of cooperation.

V2: Western leaders

T: They waited for so long that now they are not sure whether it would be a dream come true, or a nightmare.

N.A.#103: Reformer Resigns from Gorbachev Staff

V2: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He promised party officials that he would fight to overturn an order by Yeltsin to evict party organizers from workplaces in the republic.

V2: Mr. Yakovlev

T: He sided against Mr. Gorbachev. He made a point of endorsing Mr. Yeltsin's ban on the party's privileged position in collectives.

V2: A Western diplomat

T: He found Mr. Yakovlev's remarks puzzling because Gorbachev

succeeded so well at the Central Committee meeting in wrenching the party hierarchy from its Marxist-Leninist dogma.

N.A.#104: Ukranians Await Bush with Staff

V2: The Ukraine's leading independence movement, Rukh

T: They denounced President Bush as having been hypnotized by Gorbachev.

V2: I. Drach, the Rukh chairman

T: Mr. Bush was so supportive and uncritical of President Gorbachev. Mr. Bush has snubbed the democratic movement.

V1: A. Burakovsky, chairman of Rukh's council of nationalities

T: The biggest mistake President Bush can make is if he does not pay full attention democratic movements in republics and supports only Gorbachev.

N.A.#106: Soviet-Chevron Oil Venture Mired in Fears of Capitalist Exploitation

V1: Mr. Shevardnadze

T: It's no secret that the U.S. will judge our readiness to cooperate by the success or failure of the project [the largest Soviet-American venture].

V1: One Western official with the Chevron proposal

T: The Soviets' learning requirements about capitalism is an enormous task.

Commentaries:

C.#1: Gorby's Miscalculation

V2: Gorbachev

T: He charges Shcherbitsky with failure to perestroika.

V2: Shcherbitsky countercharges that glasnost has got out of hand.

C.#2: New Template for the Hundred Days

V2: Epstein

T: He notes that glasnost has been an instrument of Soviet policy since long before the Gorbachev era.

V2: Lenin

T: He used the term (glasnost) at least 46 times in his writings.

V2: Lenin

T: He tried to make local officials vulnerable to periodic purges; and he forced them to confess to mistakes and to point to errors of others.

C.#3: Let's Not Praise Glasnost, Just Now

V2: Dissident critics of perestroika

T: They warned that penal code reform would amount to mere window dressing.

C.#4: A Debate About the Inevitability and the Fragility of Democracy

V2: Karl Marx

T: He proclaimed the inevitability of world socialism.

V2: Tocqueville

T: He asserted that democracy would surely replace rule by the few.

V2: Marx

T: He proved to be wrong.

V1: J. Kis, a Hungarian writer

T: The Soviet Union has entered the era of its decline and dissolution.

V1: V. Precan, a Czechoslovak history professor

T: The words emerging to describe all this is the democratic revolution, a system based on spiritual political and economic pluralism and mutual tolerance. Glasnost's goal is to make the Communist system more efficient while retaining its essence.

C.#6: Confused Puppies

V2: Mr. Ligachev

T: He attacked Mr. Gorbachev calling his market reforms in agriculture a violation of 'social injustice.'

V2: The Guardian, a leftist weekly

T: Reported that most organizations of the American left share Mr. Ligachev's apprehensions.

V1: B. Denitch, one of the leaders of the Democratic Socialists of America

T: He cautions against an excessive faith in the new philosopher's stone – the free market in labor and capital.

V1: M. Parenti, author of many so-called anti-imperialist books

T: If this is glasnost, who needs anti-Communism?

C.#7: Heroes of the Kremlin

V2: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He showed he had more than rhythm – he had political apparatus.

V2: Insurgents

T: They found themselves staring at a bit of the past.

V2: The politicians

T: They never get their money's worth because what the Gorbachevs have cannot be taught – rhythm, finger-snapping political rhythm.

C.#8: Bush is Right About Moscow

V1: Mr. Bush

T: He spoke of integrating the Soviet Union into the community of nations.

V1: F. Mitterrand, the French President

T: Reform means difficulties.

V1: Some

T: 'Don't help, don't hurt' looks reasonable.

C.#11: The Power of History

V2: Experts on the Soviet Union

T: They have found Mr. Gorbachev's steps to open the historical record convincing evidence that he is serious about change.

C.#12: What Are We Waiting For?

V1: Mr. Bush

T: The Soviet Union understands that we want to see their perestroika succeed.

V1: J. Kirkpatrick

T: Mr. Gorbachev seeks broad reform of his own society.

C.#13: The New Soviet Mafia

V2: Soviet citizens

T: The mafia is the underground organization of speculators and corrupt apparatchicks.

V2: M.S. Gorbachev

T: He permitted the creation of a few 'cooperatives' operated for profit.

C.#14: Goodbye to Glasnost

V2: B.N. Yeltsin

T: He warned that the Soviet President was running out of time and could not long put off a 'revolution from below.'

V1: A Leningrad University student

T: You can criticize everything now but you cannot change anything.

C.#15: Gag That Man!

V2: The U.S. Deputy director of the NATIONAL Security Council

T: He concluded that perestroika would work.

V2: Bush administration people

T: They said something like before.

V2: The Bush Administration and the Baker State Department

T: They became enthusiastic about the American commitment to perestroika.

V2: J. Baker, the Secretary of State

T: He was irritated when he heard that Mr. Gates made a speech that might dampen the euphoria about the perestroika the Administration is promoting.

V2: Gorbachev zealots in the U.S.

T: They keep telling President Bush and Mr. Baker they better build an American 'consensus' about foreign policy in support of Gorbachev.

C.#16: Why I'm Fighting Gorbachev for My Job

V2: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He spoke not about glasnost in general but about 'constructive' glasnost.

C.#20: Through Glasnost, Darkly

V1: Marx and Engels

T: A specter is haunting Europe, the specter of Communism.

V2: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He says society's full potential can be reached only under full freedom and democracy.

C.#21: Dithering in Moscow

V2: Hawks

T: We should let the Soviet system sink, because only desperation and deprivation will force the sort of radical economic change.

V2: Doves

T: They want perestroika to success, lest its failure lead to Bonapartism.

V2: G. Bush

T: He sided with the doves.

C. #24: Gorbachev's Agenda for the 90's

V2: Mr. Gorbachev and his military aides

T: They are talking about the revival of the wartime alliance.

C.#26: Why Gorbachev Might Quit

V2: Western journalists in Moscow

T: They are reporting rumors that Gorbachev may resign as General Secretary of the Party.

V2: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He has exploited his ability to play one institution off against the other.

V1: P. Frank, the British Sovietologist

T: As the extremes of the political spectrum widened, the center ground became depopulated.

V1: Y. Afanasyev, the historian, one erstwhile Gorbachev supporter

T: Mr. Gorbachev must choose whether he is the leader of perestroika or of the nomenklatura – the party elite.

C.#29: Under Glasnost, Comic Relief

V2: One of Y. Smirnoff's colleagues

T: Glasnost helped change slogan 'we'll burry you' to 'do you want fries with that?'

C.#33: B.N. Yeltsin: At Least He Has a Plan

V2: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He has hesitated and reversed himself.

V2: Mr. Yeltsin and his advisers

T: They tried to address most of the important issues.

C.#34: Wrong on the Berlin Wal — and Most Else

V1: D. Simes, Carnegie Endowment Sovietologist

T: [About Gorbachev being named General Secretary] He has no new ideas.

V2: Z. Brzezinski

T: While blinding us with perestroika, the Soviets were actually pursuing peredyshka – a breathing spell.

V1: H. Kissinger

T: It'll be two to four years before he can consolidate his power.

V1: R. Nixon

T: Under Mr. Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's foreign policy has been more aggressive, not less.

V2: M. Goldman, the Harvard Sovietologist

T: He was consisting in predicting Mr. Gorbachev's demise.

C.#37: Gorbachev's Economic Reform Plan is a Bust

V2: The nation

T: The nation wants to move forward a market economy.

C.#40: Say Goodnight, Gorby

V2: Mr. Gorbachev

T: He just apologized for the sorry state of the country.

C.#43: Sure, But Also

V2: Everybody

T: They used to say that Gorbachev is the father of glasnost.

V2: The old Soviet bureaucrats

T: They are maneuvering back into control in Moscow.

C.#47: More Bolts from the Blue Man in Moscow

V2: Democrats

T: They believe that three maybe four years the hard facts of economic crisis and the social momentum should compel him or his successor to continue the hard path to democracy and free markets.

V1: Y. Orlov, the prominent dissident who left for the U.S. in 1986

T: Gorbachev should have begun with agriculture. He did too little, too late.

C.#48: Soviet Liberals Get Smart

V2: Liberals

T: They say no formula imposed from the top down will prove workable.

V2: The opposition

T: It's rethinking its view of Mr. Gorbachev.

V1: F. Bulatsky, chairman of the Soviet Parliament's human rights commission

T: The revolution of the dilettantes is over.

C.#49: Gorbachev the Great

V2: Many commentators

T: Gorbachev's reform efforts failed miserably.

V2: All democratic-minded Soviet citizens

T: They oppose Mr. Gorbachev and support Mr. Yeltsin.

C.#50: Moscow's New Power Center

V2: The Communist establishment – the army, K.G.B., party and enterprise directors

T: They advocate privatization.

C.#53: Idea Gunsliders

V2: The bureaucrats – diplomats, political appointees or civil servants

T: They are pessimistic about the Soviet capacity to reform.

C.#55: ... But Don't Toss Money At Problems

V1: O. Bogomolov, once one of Mr. Gorbachev's closest advisers

T: The Western aid was essentially support for the Communist party, the military-industrial complex and the K.G.B.

Review Articles:

R.#1: The View from Glasnost

V2: V.N. Kudryavtsev, a legal scholar

T: Stalinism as the period of the cult of the personality.

V1: V.M. Falin, a journalist and diplomat

T: Under the old way, people were calm partly because they were ignorant.

V2: T.I. Zaslavskaya, a sociologist and one of the earliest and most effective pioneers of reform

T: The Government and party apparatus are staffed by conservatives sabotaging reforms.

R.#2: They've Seen the Present; It Seems to Work

V1: An American woman

T: How many good restaurants are there in Moscow?

V2: A respectable social scientist [American]

T: H(S)e called to inquire whether the Party has a "parliamentary whip" capable of delivering the votes on crucial issues.

R.#3: Le Carre Takes Espionage into the Age of Perestroika

V1: Mr. le Carre

T: In Russia nobody believes in action anymore. ... or maybe they don't know how to change it.

R.#4: Beware of the Moscow Chic

V1: W. Laqueur, the chairman of the international Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

T: Glasnost draws on authentic elements in the Russian tradition.

The uprooting of authoritarian traditions will require a cultural revolution. The Soviet Union may face another period of authoritarian-bureaucratic rule. Glasnost is a device to let off steam.

R.#5: The Almighty Rule

V2: A. Aslund, specialist on the Soviet economy

T: He gives Mr. Gorbachev credit for recognizing the weaknesses in the Soviet system.

V2: Westerners

T: They were dazzled by the opening of intellectual and cultural life and the reordering of the political system to enhance power of popularly elective legislative bodies.

V1: P. Desai, specialist on the Soviet economy

T: He is not optimistic about Gorbachev's chances of turning around the economy.

R.#6: Chaos, Excitement and Raw Emotion

V2: A. Nove, the author of the book titled 'Glasnost in Action'

T: The Soviet Union can transform itself into a more democratic and modern society only if the Russian people are allowed to know the truth about the Russian Revolution, collectivization, the Stalinist purges, the repression of cultural figures and so on.

R.#7: Giving Perestroika a Chance

V2: R.S. McNamara, the Secretary of State during the J.F.K. administ.

T: Now is the moment to banish forever the ghost of the cold war.

R.#9: Across the Kremlin's Back Fence

V2: Government officials, journalists

T: They accept part of the blame for the arms race.

R.#12: Nonfiction

V2: Specialists

T: They offer no single view and have different preferences; but they salute the explosion of pluralism in the Soviet Union today.

R.#16: Young, Hip and Well Heeled

V2: Western (especially American) observers

T: They assumed that the recent infusion of freedom and capitalism into the Soviet cultural scene is an absolute good for artists and audiences.

Feature Articles:

F.#1: Perestroika: the View from Moscow

V1: N.P. Shmelyov, the head of the economics department at the Institute of the U.S.A.

T: We are doomed to be successful.

F.#3: New Candor Tranfixes a Soviet City

V1: A.I. Ovechkin, the chief political reporter on Kommunar

T: In the past it did not matter whether the voters responded to campaigning, because there was only one candidate. Now the party is discovering how ridiculous that was.

F.#4: Moscow Journal

V1: P.E. Gaskin, an Irish marketing consultant

T: There is no concept of service here (S. Union).

F.#7: Soviet Plant, U.S. Managers

V1: L.M. Tereshchenko, a high-ranking Soviet education official

T: Perestroika requires that the quality of Soviet specialists' training must be increased.

V1: C. Missler, a former Air Force captain

T: M.S. Gorbachev has brought about changes that were impossible to forecast.

F.#10: A Man With no Mandate Yearns For Consensus

V1: N.Y. Petrakov, Mr. Gorbachev's personal economic adviser

T: The situation in our society is completely different.

V2: Western specialists

T: They speculate that Mr. Gorbachev is juggling too much and pulling back on the economy because of his concern for protecting his

back from Communist Party hard-liners and military leaders.

Editorials:

E.#2: What's Glasnost in Chinese

V2: Today's reformers

T: They propose to improve economic performance by a shock treatment.

E.#3: 500 Days that Can Shake the World

V2: M.S. Gorbachev & B.N. Yeltsin

T: 500 day plan

E.#9: How to Crush Communism

V2: A harsh chorus in the West

T: No aid before reform

V2: American and Soviet analysts

T: They propose a so-called Grand Bargain.

E.#11: Broken Glasnost

V2: A faceless Committee of National Salvation

T: It denounce the elected government of Lithuania as servants of the interests of rich people, fraudulent people, corrupt elements.

V1: The head of the K.G.B.

T: He accused outside forces of trying to impose doubtful ideas and plans.

III. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA

The themes, political figures, groups the discourses of the directly quoted voices (The name of the participants and the themes) are concentrating on can be listed as follows:

1. U.S. Officials:

-- American officials and the U.S. Ambassador to Hungary: Support by

Americans for dissidents and opposition.

-- E. Salazar of the State Department's Bureau of Soviet Affairs: Openness in the Soviet sports.

-- An American diplomat: The new joint-ventures in Russia

-- Senator B. Kasten, the Wisconsin republican: Neo-Conservatives in the Soviet Union are impressive.

-- A senior Bush Administration officials: The information coming out of the Soviet Union.

-- W.H. Webster, the Director of the C.I.A.: Open side of the business being important.

-- R.J. Kerr, the Deputy Director of the C.I.A.: Ground-work studies the C.I.A. has done.

-- A senior official: The Soviets have a full-fledged political crisis.

-- J. Baker, the Secretary of State: The aid would be forthcoming; the U.S. is supporting the Soviet reforms.

-- A senior American trade official: The Soviet Union may become a full member of the I.M.F.

-- The senior American Treasury officials: The plan as a way forward to integrate the Soviet economy.

-- President Bush: Gorbachev had not given up on reform. The industrialized democracies should help the Soviet Union financially. It should be integrated to the world economy. We want to see their perestroika.

-- An Administration official: The Soviets' expectations must be realistic.

2. Soviet Voices:

2.1. Soviet officials:

-- President Gorbachev: The Soviet position on the Baltics; The congress's support for the policy on China is necessary; a policy of tolerance of ethnic aspirations; perestroika might be destabilizing the nation; debates in the Congress; reforming agriculture; monetary system; the Communist party; market enthusiasts want to take a gamble; democracy is reality; hardliners are defending the party's old centrist authoritarian structure; market economy will give boost to all kinds of corrupting and sponging elements; executive power is needed for a more effective government; the transition to the market does not contradict the socialist choice of people; the crisis of the consumer market cannot be eliminated until the machines that produce goods begin faster; the central Government destabilized the economy; a proposal to hold a nationwide referendum about the union of sovereign lines; the confrontation [of Russia and the Soviet budget] left the country without a budget; democratization; the system of motivations and interests must be change; the Parliament should suspend the law on the press and take control over media to insure that they included all points of view; what is going on is stimulating the centripetal forces of our multinational state; and a new quality of cooperation with the West.

-- B.N. Yeltsin, the President of Russia: Space program; democratization in the Congress; his personal relation with Gorbachev; the economic plan [developed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin] is an attempt to retain a system people come to hate; the returning to a hard diktat of the center.

-- V.A. Kryuchkov, the K.G.B. chief: Openness in the K.G.B.; outside forces are trying to impose doubtful ideas and plans.

-- Y. Ryzhkov, the Prime Minister: the price reform will take many years; it's risky to enact more free-market reform.

-- G. Fyodorov, the finance minister: The Russian Government is too

preoccupied with political confrontation and incompetent to carry out its promised transition to a market economy.

-- V.V. Bakatin, the Minister of Internal affairs: Chaos in the press; Gorbachev attempts to resolve a legal crisis;

-- E.A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs: One purpose of the new opposition movement is not to allow a return to the past; the largest Soviet-American venture;

-- S. Shatalin, an economist and member of Gorbachev's presidential Council and a co-author of the 500-day program: Worsening economic conditions; no need to fear market; the economic plan would not lead to a real market economy; he would remain on Gorbachev's Presidential Council to push rapid expansion of private enterprise; all programs in essence will be mimicking the system.

-- Mr. Ligachev: Gorbachev's speech is an evidence that his views and those of Gorbachev are coming together.

-- Mr. Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo: The restructuring has gun up against a wall of rejection and resistance from the side of conservatism; K.G.B.'s role in domestic affairs.

-- N.Y. Petrakov, Mr. Gorbachev's personal economic adviser and a free-market advocate: Yeltsin rebuffed Gorbachev's overtures; no one knows the real figures of the budget deficit; the Russian empire has come to abuse its folly; the situation in Russia is changing.

-- A. Aganbegyan, economist and a Gorbachev adviser: The transition to an executive presidency as positive; it was impossible to spell out a uniform program for the whole country.

-- O. Bogomolov, once one of Mr. Gorbachev's closest advisers: The Western aid was support for the Communist party, the military-industrial complex and the K.G.B.

--A.F. Dobrynin, a consultant to Gorbachev and the Soviet Ambassador to Washington: The Soviet Government is in favor of cooperation.

-- G.A. Yavlinsky, a co-author of the economic program: Nobody can win; the necessity to return to the global economy;

-- Y.M. Primakov, the member of Gorbachev's national security council responsible for economics: the anti-crisis program calls for liberalization, privatization, and getting away from the policies of the administrative structure existed in the past.

-- F. Bulatsky, chairman of the Soviet Parliament's human rights commission: The revolution of the dilettantes is over.

-- G.K. Popov, the Mayor of Moscow: The problems are caused by the central Government; the notion of perestroika must be removed.

-- S.B. Stankevich, first vice chairman of the Moscow city council: the central Government talked about a market economy, but was afraid to introduce it before.

-- B.M. Glukhman, deputy chairman of the City Council: We are fed up with the planned economy.

-- A.A. Sobchak, Mayor of Leningrad and a member of the Congress: If there is no budget, it invalidates the entire Congress.

-- S.N. Krasavchenko, chairman of the Committee on Economic Reform and Property of the Russian Republic's Parliament: The central government has the power.

-- V. Filanovsky, First Deputy Minister: The oil sector in the Union.

-- G. Filshin, a deputy prime minister of the Russian republic: Gorbachev's attempt is based on discrediting the Parliament; Russia had been forced to take drastic measures because the Kremlin refused

to give an honest account of where the money was going.

-- Mr. Brazauskas, the leader of the Communist Party in Lithuania: Gorbachev should be more free of political pressures.

-- A.S. Tsipko, a former Central Committee adviser: Dogmatic members of the Central Committee.

-- A Central Committee official: The idea of social justice in the Union is different.

-- A Communist functionary: A coming demonstration in Moscow.

-- V.A. Tikhonov, president of the U.S.S.R. Union of Cooperatives: The economy is falling apart.

-- Y. Golik, chairman of a Parliament legal committee: Russians are misinterpreting the nature of resolution to expand the President's powers.

-- A.N. Boiko, chairman of a key economic subcommittee in Parliament: the legislators are supporting Gorbachev.

-- T.I. Koryagina, an economist active in the democratic opposition: She is skeptical about the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan.

-- A. Yemelyanov, an economist, a member of the Congress: They are using the idea of the 'free market' to justify their outrages the way they used to say 'we are building Communism.'

-- J. Grazin, a member of the Estonian delegation: Gorbachev's comments about Estonia and perestroika.

-- R.N. Nishanov, a former diplomat and a Gorbachev loyalist: People express distrust toward Gorbachev.

-- I. Averina, deputy manager at a state special hard-currency store: The ruble is worthless.

-- A. Burakovsky, chairman of Rukh's [the Ukraine's independence movement] council of nationalities: The biggest mistake President Bush can make is if he does not pay attention democratic movements in republics.

-- L.M. Tereshchenko, a high-ranking Soviet education official: Perestorika requires an increase in the quality of Soviet specialists' training.

-- Legislators: Gorbachev is up to liberalization of a totalitarian regime; Yeltsin is an alternative to Gorbachev

Deputies:

- K. Motieka, a deputy from Lithuania: Deputies should hear Gorbachev's economic and political platform before voting on the president.

- The member who called for the vote of confidence for Gorbachev: Gorbachev goes to the world with outstretched hands.

--Hardliners

- One group of hardliners, a political alliance (Centrist Bloc): Gorbachev is presenting the Union as a beggar country.

- Col.V. Alksnis, a hardliner: Unrest in the army is comparable to that in 1917. We have a political conflict.

- Y. Blokhin, a spokesman of the Soyuz members: Gorbachev should show that he is a man.

-- A Pro-Gorbachev diplomat: Bush's policy on China was not consistent.

-- G.N. Zoteyev, a scholar at the economics research institute run by the state planning agency: We need a non-Communist administration. There is a fear about freeing the market.

2.2. Soviet Military

-- The first Lieutenant V.M. Gursky and a fellow officer: Poor conditions, health care problems, and army political indoctrination.

-- I. Nurat, a militaman: Housing problem in Moscow.

2.3. Soviet media

-- B. Chertok, a member of Izvestia: Space program being a locomotive that blazed the way for other sector.

-- V. Yegorov, a senior coordinator for the state radio: Americans and Soviets cannot be rivals in the battlefield.

-- A. Uza, a reporter for the official Lithuanian press agency: Lithuanians should not be obliged to pay for the rotten roads in Russia.

-- Mr. Podhoretz, the editor of a neo-conservative journal: Changes in the Soviet Union; Gorbachev is a czar; glasnost is a reality.

-- V. Mostovets, the Soviet press agency's chief New York correspondent: Glasnost.

-- Y. Yakovlev, the editor of the Moscow news: Gorbachev's contradictory attitudes toward democracy.

-- V. Yakovlev, the editor of the Kommersant, the Soviet business weekly: The history of a private economy is much longer than the history of a socialist economy; we are talking about a complicated economic structure that is developing quickly and in the right direction.

- S.P. Zalygin, editor in chief, N. Mir, a monthly literary journal: A correct decision is privatization, but the direction it took is not correct.
- A.I. Levikov, economic editor, Business in the U.S.S.R. Magazine: We don't have an efficient reliable anticrisis program.
- Tass press agency: The significance of the Western aid must not be underestimated.
- Interfax, a daily bulletin: The draft proposed by Gorbachev
- Karyera, independent weekly: Gorbachev is responsible for the crisis.
- A. Bovin, a commentator for Izvestia: Liberties on the Soviet Union
- A. Orlov, a commentator for the Tass press agency: Gorbachev's program may not lead to a market economy.
- M. Berger, the economics correspondent for Izvestia: The plan was a domino effect.
- Izvestia, the government daily: The country is humiliated.
- A. Borovik, a journalist: People want bread and order.
- Y. Burtin, a commentator for the Independent Gazette: Gorbachev ended with the restoration of a command system of the Stalin-Brezhnev type which was a dictatorship of the party oligarchy.
- G.Y. Baklanov, the editor of Znamya: Everything is wrong and must be corrected.
- V.A. Starkov, editor in chief, Argumenty i Fakty: The key word is freedom.
- V.M. Falin, a journalist: Under the old way people were ignorant.

-- A.I. Ovechkin, the chief political reporter on Kommunar: In the past it did not matter whether the voters responded to campaigning, because there was only one candidate. Now the party is discovering how ridiculous that was.

2.4. Intelligentsia

-- A.D. Sakharov, the human rights campaigner: Gorbachev and the freedom of the press.

-- Y. Yevtushenko, a poet: An end to the consumer privileges of the governing hierarchy and the pathological secrecy.

-- V.A. Medvedev, historian and sociologist: He favors giving the Supreme Soviet over the appointment of the K.G.B. chief.

-- Y. Zamoshkin, a Soviet sociologist: Soviets are in a cycle of self-criticism.

-- A reviewer of the novel 'The Russia House': The book has an ideological slat.

-- Another reviewer: Americans should not care whether Russians like the book or not.

-- M.M. Malyutin, a senior proffesor at the Moscow Higher Party School: Gorbachev's draft was not the final text.

-- A.N. Rybakov, a writer: The Soviets do not have the tradition of democracy.

-- V.L. Selyunin, an economics writer: The indictment of the economy is the huge disproportion of money and energy poured into heavy industry; The G.N.P. fell 5%.

-- L. Piyasheva, an independent market economist: The grain sales to

the Union contribute to the preservation of this parasitic system.

-- I. Klyamkin, a political scientist: The apparat would never allow a 1nd reform; this is a society, there are no producers only costumers.

-- B.G. Fyodorov, a market economist: Gorbachev was talking about the socialist choice; the Russian government behaved as if it were in a war with Gorbachev for public support.

-- V.Y. Gulyayev, law professor: Everything is wrong. We have to move to a market economy.

2.5. Soviet citizens

-- S. Terpishev, a tennis trainer: Openness in sports

-- G. Kasparov, the world chess champion: Openness in sports

-- Mr. Daskal, a construction worker: The worsening economic conditions.

-- A. Igumnov, a schoolteacher: Housing problem.

-- M. Soloviev, a Soviet student: Stereotypes about Russians

-- M. Nekterman, an electrician: Anti-Semitism

-- A citizen: No perestroika

-- I. Remikaite, a citizen: No future prospect in the Union.

-- L.I. Tsegankova, peddler of cosmetics and pans: Set free all the market forces.

-- Z. Sergeyevna, farm worker: We need hard-working people. The Government should take the young people and make them work.

-- A.A. Kovalova, cashier: They have to give the democrats and Yeltsin a chance to take charge, and the Party has to disappear.

-- V. Vasilyev, black marketeer: People in the Kremlin are liars. Gorbachev should be ashamed of himself.

-- I.N. Mogucheva, cashier: The prices go up and the shelves are empty.

-- G.N. Yezhola, architect: We need time if we'll turn the economy around 180 degrees.

-- N.I. Vlasov, retired construction worker: People have to be made to work.

-- A. Kislarov, accountant: We need privatization.

-- T. Trofimova, worker: What we have to do is to consolidate our forces and our resources.

-- A.V. Yablokov, plumber: We have to privatize everything.

-- L.I. Tsegankova, ballet dancer: It's necessary to adopt the Western system.

-- A Leningrad University student: You can criticize everything but you cannot change anything.

2.6. Soviet businessmen

-- E.V. Uljanov, the head of the first Soviet Bank office in U.S.: The office insurance is complicated.

-- V. Krotov, an engineer and the president of a new joint-venture: Joint ventures are controversial.

-- V.V. Kadannikov, general director of the Volga Automotive Plant

Association: Limitations on the new freedoms; further need to free economy.

-- O. Roythman, director of a software company: Anti-Semitism

-- P. Davidoff, president-elect of the American Society of Travel Agents: Aeroflot

-- A. Tarasov, a Soviet businessman: There was energy when Gorbachev opened the door new economic programs. Now there is fear.

-- T. Golenpolsky, a Muscovite trying to interest Western investors in joint real-estate ventures: American businesses wanted to know what guarantee they had of making profits and getting the money out.

-- A.A. Fyodorov, owner of private restaurant: Legislation on private property must be adopted.

2.7. Dissidents

-- An army doctor who joined political dissident group: The Party is responsible for the crimes.

-- A. Solzhenitsyn: Noisy reforms of Gorbachev; the need to strenght the nation around the Slavic peoples; perestroika did not bring anything but a fake elections system; etc.

-- Y. Orlov, a dissident who left for the U.S. in 1986: Gorbachev did too little, too late.

3. Others

-- A Western envoy: This is a country that has never had an entrepreneurial culture.

- Prof. Gati of Union College: The Eastern European people are encouraged by Gorbachev's domestic policies and rhetoric to seek change.
- Z. Brzezinski, the director of the National Security Council in the Carter Administration: Gorbachev does not truly want perestroika; the U.S. response must be comprehensive; the issue has been freedom of choice vs. ideological orthodoxy.
- J.E. Oberg, an American specialist on the Soviet space program: The Soviets are facing a budgetary crisis.
- J.E. Pike, the director of space policy for the Federation of American Scientists: The space program consuming a large amount of money.
- B.C. Murray, a planetary geologist at the California Institute of Technology: The conflicts in the space program. The whole society is inventing the structure of pluralism.
- A Western expert on Chinese-Soviet relations: Soviet-Chinese relations
- An Asian ambassador: Gorbachev's policy on China
- E.L. Warner, a Rand Corporation specialist: The visit of a Congressional delegation.
- P.A. Karber, an expert on conventional forces: Soviets don't know what the new structure is going to look like.
- M. Billig, editor of Business Travel: New changes in the Soviet airlines.
- A senior expert on Kremlin: The changes in the East Germany could not be predicted.

- A.W. Clausen, former president of the World Bank: Converting the Soviet economy to a market economy.
- R. Simonyan, an economist at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations: Soviet life has been grim; we should not free prices; an infrastructure should be created before freeing the prices.
- G.N. Zoteyev, a market-oriented economist: Gorbachev tried to improve things by bringing order, discipline.
- A.A. Sergeyev, a trade-union economist: The free market proposals may cause riots.
- R. Ericson, an economist at Harriman Institute: Kremlin misunderstands the market economy; Gorbachev makes liberalization harder.
- I. Birman, an economic consultant to the Pentagon: One of the Kremlin economists had made a career teaching Marxism.
- E. Hewett of the Brookings Institution: Soviet leaders are frightened by the risk of hyperinflation; the real problem is a political one; Pinochet made the Chilean economy safe for capitalists.
- P. Desai, a Columbia University economist: The compromise shares the ultimate vision of the 500-day plan; He is not optimistic about Gorbachev's chances of turning around the economy.
- S. Islam, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations: The politics and power relations are not clear.
- L. Summers, Harvard University: Foreign capital can be used to grease the transition to market economies.
- A senior Western diplomat: If they don't make the hard choices, it's not going to be because of aid.

- A diplomat: The Western aid
- A diplomat: Next winter the wolf may be at the door.
- H.H. Horstmann, spokesman at the German Embassy: Integrating the Soviet economy to the world's free-market economy.
- M. Goldman, a Harvard economist: Gorbachev does not know where to go; Nobody is in control in the Union.
- S. Fischer, M.I.T.: The Soviet team is prepared to do serious economic analysis.
- G. Allison, a former dean of the J.F.K. School of Government: The group [Soviet economists] was looking for Marshall Plan scale aid.
- J. Sacks, the Harvard economist: The problem is the Communist monopoly on power.
- J. Shelton, research fellow, the Hoover Inst.: The Union is on the verge of civil war. Gorbachev is like Moses – able to lead people out of Egypt but not into the promised land. He'll be phased out. There'll be a federation of republics.
- A.M. Solomon, Institute For East-West Security Studies: Gorbachev lost his maneuvering room. There'll not be economic reforms from him. The only way there will be any meaningful reform is from Mr. Yeltsin. He has cards he can play. The economic reform in the S.U. has been divorced from reality. A common-economy structure cannot achieve reform.
- V. Kvint, Professor of Political Economy: Gorbachev is now astride two beasts, the K.G.B. and the military. Western food aid only go to feed them. Gorbachev's revolution will turn into a civil war. There's not a lot of hope for Western investment.

-- C. Hugel, National Foreign Trade Council: The country is moving to a state of anarchy. Making V.S. Pavlov the Prime Minister is a good sign for business. This says that the reforms are still on course. Mr. Gorbachev will remain in power.

-- A. Hartman, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union: The events in Lithuania signal a reactionary step backwards. The reason for the disintegration of the economic system is that the old guard--the bureaucrats -- fought back against the reforms in an alliance with the K.G.B. and the military.

-- One Western official with the Chevron proposal: The Soviets' learning requirements about capitalism is an enormous task.

-- J. Kis, a Hungarian writer: The Union has entered the era of its decline.

-- V. Precan, a Czechoslovak history professor: Glasnost's goal is to make the Communist sysyem more efficient while retaining the essence.

-- B. Denitch, one of the leaders of the Democratic Socialists of America: He cautions against an excessive faith in the new philosopher's stone -- the free market in labor and capital.

-- M. Parenti, author: If this is glasnost, who needs anti-Communism?

-- F. Mitterand, the French President: Reform means difficulties.

-- Some: 'Don't help, don't hurt' looks reasonable.

-- J. Kirkpatrick: Mr. Gorbachev seeks broad reform on his own society.

-- K. Marx & F.Engels: A specter is haunting Europe, the specter of Communism.

-- P. Frank, the British Sovietologist: As the extremes of the political

specturum widened, the center ground became depopulated.

-- D. Simes, Carnegie Endowment Sovietologist: Gorbachev has no new ideas.

-- R. Nixon: Under Mr. Gorbachev, the Union's foreign policy has been more aggressive, not less.

-- W. Laqueur, the chairman of the International Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies: Glasnost draws on authentic elements in the Russian tradition. The Union may face another period of authoritarian-bureaucratic rule. Glasnost is a device to let off steam.

4. Businessmen

-- C. Platt, Alamo's executive vice president: The fascination of Americans about the S. Union: The fascination of Americans about the S. Union.

-- One New York banker: The Soviet plans about opening an office of a Soviet bank.

-- J.P. McCaffrey, vice president of industrial affairs for PanAm Corp.: Glasnost and perestorika and Aeroflot

-- C. Dillingham, the president of the Entertainment Corporation: The essence of perestroika is to reduce Government subsidy.

-- A. Papachristou, an American lawyer specializing in investing: Regulations take away from all business enterprises except joint ventures.

B) UNQUOTED VOICES

The unquoted voices will be grouped on the basis of the labeling of the

journalists who wrote the texts. The unquoted voices the Times included in the texts covering the Soviet Union can be listed as follows:

1. U.S. Voices: This category will include all the U.S. voices such as the Administration officials, former officials except the specialists and the experts on the Soviet Union.

2. Soviet Voices:

2.1. Soviet Officials (Members of the Government at every level)

2.2. Deputies (members of the Congress of People's Deputies)

2.3 Soviet Economists (economists working for the Government and independent economists)

2.4. Other Groups (This category will include the groups that were claimed to have been active in the political arena during the period studied)

2.5. Soviet Media (journalists, commentators, editors, etc.)

2.6. Intelligentsia (academicians, artists, poets, authors, etc.)

2.7. Soviet Citizens (workers, professionals and other groups)

3. Experts and Specialists (on the Soviet Union)

4. Other Unspecified Groups: This category will include the groups that cannot be included in the categories listed above.

Accordingly, the unquoted voices and the themes they were related to can be listed as follows:

1. U.S.Voices:

-- Representative Les Aspin: Openness

-- Administration officials: It was likely that Mr. Bush would announce a provision emergency medical assistance to the Soviets; the memory of Gorbachev's shift last year to more conservative policies and authoritarian methods remain fresh in Washington; they became enthusiastic about the American commitment to perestroika.

-- Officials: Their insights into Soviet society were sharp even before the new avalanche of information began in the mid-1980's; the international aid should help Gorbachev politically.

-- An official: Changes in the information coming out of the Union.

-- President Bush: The money might be wasted if it were disbursed before the Soviet reforms were much further along; he demonstrated a renewed interest in assisting Mr. Gorbachev; he wants perestroika to success.

-- J. Baker, the Secretary of State: He was irritated when he heard that Mr. Gates made a speech that might dampen the euphoria about the perestroika the Administration is promoting.

-- American officials: They wanted to study the Soviet's proposals and would be giving a formal response in the coming weeks.

-- Some American officials: They believe that the American economists from Harvard may have given them an exaggerated sense of what Washington is able to do.

-- The U.S. Deputy director of the National Security Council: Perestroika would work.

2. Soviet Voices

Soviet Officials:

-- Soviet Officials: The Soviet-American relations on sports; profit

making in sports; Soviet secret weaponry.

-- Government officials: They accept part of the blame for the arms race.

-- M.S. Gorbachev: Propositions of deputies about the live television broadcasts of the proceedings; economic decline; perestroika will not work without help from foreign friends; 500-day economic plan; a popular referendum should be held; he attacked intellectuals; he sounded like Y.K. Ligachev, his former hard-line Communist party nemesis; the rejection [of the idea of a referendum] would not entitle the republic to go its own way; he faced a demand from hard-line deputies that he defend his record at an emergency session of the national congress; he rejected the 500-day plan of radical economic reforms developed by G.A. Yavlinsky; he recognized the sovereignty of the republics; nine of fifteen republics were close to an agreement that would change the structure and the formal name of the Union; he offered words of welcome to the new opposition political movement; he promised party officials that he would fight to overturn an order by Yeltsin to evict party organizers from workplaces in the republic; he talked about constructive glasnost; the Soviet society's full potential can be reached only under full freedom and democracy; he apologized for the sorry state of the country.

-- Mr. Gorbachev and the republic leaders: They agreed to drop the word 'socialist' from the name of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and to insert 'sovereign' in its place.

-- Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin: The union treaty could be completed as early as June.

-- M.S. Gorbachev and his aides: The transition would begin with a period of budget discipline; they are talking about the revival of the wartime alliance.

-- Aides: Gorbachev would rely on the powers of decree.

-- Mr. Gorbachev and his advisers: They tried to address most of the important issues.

-- B.N. Yeltsin: He did not want to be nominated; Gorbachev's request for new powers was inadmissible; Gorbachev plan is a tactical plan; he denounced Gorbachev's economic plan; if we continue debating this way all people will be out in the streets; he continues to challenge Gorbachev's leadership; Gorbachev was running out of time and could not long put off a revolution from below.

-- E. Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister: He made a public appeal for economic assistance from Washington; the country was moving toward dictatorship.

-- E. Shevardnadze and his allies: They declared that their intention was to found a party.

-- N.I. Ryzhkov, Prime Minister: He vowed a fight to keep the central Government's existing economic controls.

-- A Congressional working group chaired by Gorbachev: New deputies expected to advance into the standing legislature.

-- V. Ignatenko, Gorbachev's spokesman: Negotiations would be easier after Gorbachev appointed a new Cabinet; the new opposition movement can only be welcomed.

-- A.I. Lukyanov: A decree that provided up to three years in prison for statemnets.

-- G.K. Shakhnazarov, a top Gorbachev aid: Gorbachev has been distressed at Mr. Yeltsin's exclusion.

-- Y.D. Chernichenko: Mr. Ligachev as a bureaucrat failing at his new executive portfoilo (national agriculture).

-- Mr. Ligachev: He called Gorbachev's market reforms in agriculture a

violation of social injustice.

-- V.A. Kryuchkov, the chief of the K.G.B.: The newly elected Soviet legislature should have the full authority over the K.G.B.

-- Y.P. Velikhov, a vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences: The laser research center in the Union as a major space weapons development complex

-- G.A. Yavlinsky, one of the authors of the 500-day plan: The plan to put into effect the radical free-market program was hopeless.

-- Mr. Yakovlev, a career Communist: The party apparatus is rushing to mobilize party members against democratic reforms; he sided against Gorbachev; he made a point of endorsing Yeltsin's ban on the party's privileged position in collectives.

-- Mr. Pavlov: He appealed to the West not to be bystanders to the crisis.

-- A Soviet admiral: Glasnost

-- L.A. Voronin, who heads a central Government commission on aid distribution: The food delivery is not sufficient.

-- A. Sobchak, the mayor of Leningrad: This troubled nation can afford no further delay in constructing a party to stand against the Communist nationwide and [prevent a return to dictatorship].

-- V. Karpov, the councilman: He touched one of the sorest spots of Communism -- the inhibitions of communal apartment living -- with one of the sharper issues of glasnost: how libertine should the new freedoms be allowed to become.

-- Soviet legislators: They wonder whether Gorbachev will support a law which will guarantee legal rights to the press and outlawing censorship; Gorbachev's plan was likely to be approved by the Soviet

Parliament; the parliament would approve the [500-day] plan.

-- Party officials: Gorbachev will step down if the congress approves a platform symphatetic to the program of Gorbachev.

-- Ukranian officials: Russia retailed by cutting off oil supplies.

-- Rukh, the Ukraine's independence movement: They denounced President Bush as having been hypnotized by Gorbachev.

-- A faceless Committee of National Salvation: It denoune the elected government of Lithuania as servants of the interests of rich people, fraudulent people, corrupt elements.

Deputies:

-- Deputies from all regions of the Union: It was possible to nominate a symbolic alternative to establish the principle of competition; Gorbachev is asking for new power; they hoped to portray Yeltsin as a political wagging a personal vendetta.

-- Most of the deputies: Gorbachev's coronation-style election as president and the orchestration of the new congress are reminiscent of traditional legislatures; they rejected the idea of a referandum as federal meddling with their prerogatives.

-- Liberal deputies: They speculated that hardliners had instigated the attack on Mr. Gorbachev as a warning.

-- Speakers at the Congress of People's Deputies: Soviet reforms

-- Members of the Soviet parliament: Mr. Gorbachev was exerting too much power; Gorbachev's endorsement to end the Communist Party's monopoly on power; seizing money would deepen the confrontation between Gorbachev and Russia.

-- Communist members of the Parliament: They called a special session

of the Russian Parliament.

Soviet economists:

- N.A. Shemelev, a radical economist: Foreign currency
- G.K. Popov, a free-market economist and the Mayor of Moscow: He urged people for demonstrating.
- G.A. Yavlinsky, the young economist who helped design the 500-day plan for Mr. Yelsin: We'll have to return to the 500-day plan.
- N. Petrakov, a market economist: The government had no idea how to introduce a market.
- Mr. Petrakov and a dozen of other economists: Gorbachev retreated from the free-market plan and paid lip service.
- The authors of the economic program: This is the moment for those who want a renewed Union to take action.

Other Groups:

- The nation: The nation wants to move forward a market economy.
- Advocates of more radical change: They urged Gorbachev to seize the opportunity for a showdown on the party's course.
- Gorbachev's former free-market reformers: They dismissed Gorbachev's anti-crisis program.
- Some party radicals: The necessity to end the Party's monopoly.
- Many in the radical camp: They were skeptical of Mr. Aganbegyan's promise of free hand; Gorbachev's economic program rely on the powers of decree.

- Acquaintances: Mr. Aganbegyan might resign from Mr. Gorbachev's presidential council.
- Party hardliners: They wanted to preserve Article 6 of the Constitution which enshrines the party's role as the leading and guiding force of society.
- Hardline speakers: They blamed Gorbachev for accelerated change; they complained that Gorbachev's tone was not backed up by any specific new measures to combat crime.
- Soyuz or Union, the hard-line bloc of deputies who claim about one-third of the membership in the national congress: They demanded a special Congress session to consider Gorbachev's attempts to deal with coal miners strike.
- Some Soyuz members: They demanded that Gorbachev declare a state of emergency.
- Gorbachev-watchers: Some maintain that he is being forced to take a tougher line by pressure from the military and the K.G.B.; while the others say he seems to have exhausted his own patience for the disorder of democracy.
- Kremlin watchers: [About Gorbachev-Pinochet resemblance] There is a difference.
- The party members supporting the changes: The draft still faced opposition from hardliners.
- Advocates of accelerated change: Gorbachev must move quickly to neutralize party conservatives.
- Today's reformers: They propose to improve economic performance by a shock treatment.

- Most of the Jewish immigrants: Anti-Semitism in the Union
- Soviet optimists: The present course of the economy is a necessary consolidation.
- Soviet skeptics: The Government wants to go back away from the wrenching structural transformation.
- Russians: They are wondering what they have to show for the amount of money they spend for the space program; the very notion that there is some question about Western involvement comes true as a shock.
- Soviet environmentalists: They have been vociferous in terms of taking advantage of Gorbachev's call for public debate.
- Miners: The Government reflected them.
- The authorities in Moscow: They did not concede that the Baltic republics should have right to reject laws by Moscow.
- Muscovites: Gorbachev may have been mastering some desk-top executive game in the Kremlin; bread shortage is very serious; they are bored with the Kremlin's agonizing over economic reform.
- More than 100,000 Muscovites: They chanted for Yeltsin.
- Many people: Gorbachev has wrecked the system.
- Supporters of Gorbachev: He was not usurping the powers of either the Supreme Soviet or the republics.
- Critics: The Shatalin plan would lead to inflation.
- Many Soviets: They see the reports of charity as the latest indictment of the system that led food supplies decline.

- Insurgents: They worry that Western largesse will become the personal patronage of Mr. Gorbachev; they found themselves staring at a bit of the past.
- Politicians: They never get their money's worth because what the Gorbachevs cannot be taught – rhythm, finger-snapping, political rhythm.
- Most consumers: They are ready to accept the aid.
- Liberals: They were dismayed at Gorbachev's drift to the right; they presumed in the dark ages of Communism that the East need only open its doors a crack, and the capitalists would come flooding in; they say no formula imposed from the top down will prove workable.
- Many reasonable and liberal members: They stayed in the Party, believing that the locomotive for change must still be a revamped Communist Party.
- Democrats: They point out that their power is illusory; they believe that three maybe four years the hard facts of economic crisis and the social momentum should compel him or his successor to continue the hard path to democracy and free markets.
- Pro-Kremlin groups: They tried to supplant the more independent popularly elected officials.
- The Kremlin: It started an initiative to get major Western countries to join in drafting and financing a plan for economic and political reform.
- A coalition of hardliners and liberals: They refused Gorbachev's proposal [about suspending the law on the press].
- Independent forces: They are included in many local stations.

- People involved in business: The authorities cannot recognize the difference between a capitalist and a crook and that deals and dealers are becoming the victims of changing laws and ideologies.
- L.A. Glaskov, self made millionaire: The economic freedoms granted by President Yeltsin's government in the Russian republic have trickled down.
- Opposition politicians: They have shown a readiness to join in coalition or movements.
- Detractors to Mr. Gorbachev's right, including the chiefs of the K.G.B., the military and the police: They accused Gorbachev of dismantling the old order.
- Detractors to Mr. Gorbachev's left, including Yeltsin and Yavlinsky, the liberal economist who helped draft a reform plan proposed to Gorbachev: They accused Gorbachev of moving far too slowly and letting the state founder half measures.
- Disident critics of perestroika: They warned that penal code reform would amount to mere window dressing.
- Everybody: They used to say that Gorbachev is the father of glasnost.
- The old Soviet bureaucrats: They are maneuvering back into control in Moscow.
- The opposition: It's rethinking its view of Mr. Gorbachev.
- Many commentators: Gorbachev's reform efforts failed miserably.
- The Communist establishment: They advocate privatization.
- The bureaucrats – diplomats, political appointees or civil servants: They are pessimistic about the Soviet capacity to reform.

Soviet Media:

- An Article in Izvestia: The costs of the space program being a state secret.
- Izvestia: General Yazov met with one deserter who said he had been beaten by older soldiers; bread shortages set off the revolution that ousted the monarchy in 1917.
- Soviet newspapers and television: They presented an exercise in the nostalgia of Communist censorship.
- Editors: They subscribe to Lenin's view of the press (collective agitator).
- The Tass press agency: They offered no hint of how quickly the Government might seek to introduce free-market program.
- Analysts in the independent Soviet press: Gorbachev would have strong incentives to protect the three [Mr. Ryzhkov, Mr. Yazov, and Mr. Kryuchkov].
- Karentu Ryad, an opposition-oriented newspaper in Moscow: Mr. Yazov and Mr. Kryuchkov are more conservative than Gorbachev.

Intelligentsia:

- A.I. Kazannik, a university lecturer: He said he would forfeit high seat in the legislature if the congress would give it to Mr. Yeltsin.
- V.A. Medvedev: He ridiculed Mr. Ligachev.
- Authors: Lenin was a terrorist.
- Six Soviet scholars: The aid may postpone the development of

private enterprise.

-- V.N. Kudryavtsev, a legal scholar: Stalinism as the period of the cult of the personality.

-- T.I. Zaslavskaya, a sociologist: The Government and the party apparatus are staffed by conservatives sabotaging reforms.

Soviet Citizens:

-- Mr. Vlasov, a citizen whose fatehr disappeared after being summoned by the security police in 1953.

-- Soviet readers: They mistake glasnost for freedom.

-- The majority of Soviet citizens: The shift in official winds has been most evident on TV screens; they are unwilling to make any sacrifice to reconstruct the Soviet state.

-- Many Soviet citizens: Part still smacks of the secretive, elitist and corrupt Communist party.

-- Soviet citizens: They publicly complained about their lives; the mafia is the underground organization of speculators and corrupt apparatchicks.

-- All democratic-minded Soviet citizens: They oppose Gorbachev and support Yeltsin.

3. Experts

-- American experts on Eastern Europe: Gorbachev's quest for modernization and his calls for change; the relaxation of the Brezhnev doctrine raising the possibility of Communist upheavals.

-- American experts: Soviet spending on the space program.

-- Western analysts: The K.G.B. is shifting emphasis from domestic

police work to foreign intelligence; the Kremlin's proposals to rejuvenate the economy are too little, too late; they don't agree with Gorbachev; Gorbachev's economic plan is a scheme to save bureaucrats and party hacks who led the economy to ruin.

-- Many Western experts: The West cannot sit on the sidelines if it is interested in reforms.

-- Experts: Western banks hesitate to invest large sums to develop business, because there is still no clear Soviet legal concept of ownership; they have found Mr. Gorbachev's steps to open the historical record convincing evidence that he is serious about change.

-- Z. Brzezinski: While blinding us with perestroika, the Soviets were actually pursuing a breathing spell.

-- M. Goldman, the Harvard Sovietologist: He was consistent in predicting Gorbachev's demise.

-- M. Simon, president of the Canadian branch of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference: A conference about the indigenous Arctic people.

-- Canadian experts: The Soviet shift reflects Gorbachev's call for Arctic countries to devise a plan to protect the region's environment.

-- E. Mickiewicz, the director of a Soviet media program at the Carter Center of Emory University: The recent changes in the TV programs.

-- Western economists: The latest plan will not work.

-- E.A. Hewett, an economist at the Brookings Institution: A third of all Soviet products come from enterprises that control 100% of their markets.

-- R. McKinnon, an economist at Stanford: Consequences of finances in the Union.

- P. Desai at Columbia University: Foreign currency
- A. Hartman, a former Ambassador to the Soviet Union: Reform opponents have deliberately brought about the disintegration of the society.
- G. Allison, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard: He helped Mr. Yavlinsky shape the proposal.
- A. Aslund, specialist on the Soviet economy: He gives Gorbachev credit for recognizing the weaknesses in the Soviet system.
- A. Nove, the author of the book titled 'Glasnost in Action': The Union can transform itself into a more democratic society only if the Russian people are allowed to know the truth about the Russian Revolution, the Stalinist purges, the repression of cultural figures and so on.
- R.S. McNamara, the Secretary of State during the J.F.K. administration: Now is the moment to banish forever the ghost of the cold war.
- Specialists: They offer no single view and have different preferences; but they salute the explosion of pluralism in the Union today; they speculate that Gorbachev is juggling too much and pulling back on the economy because of his concern for protecting his back from Communist Party hard-lines and military leaders.

4. Others (Unspecified)

- Scientists: They are criticizing the space program.
- An international group of physicists: They are not sure what 'open' means.

- The Finns: They criticize the Union on the environmental damage to Finnish wilderness.
- A diplomat: Gorbachev's problematic domestic policies.
- Some American and Israeli officials: Persecution of Jews abated in the Gorbachev era.
- Many Westerners: Gorbachev's endeavors abroad brought quick gratification.
- Most in the West: They would agree with the authors of the economic program.
- Western (especially American) observers: They assumed that the recent infusion of freedom and capitalism into the Soviet cultural scene in an absolute fgood for artists and audiences.
- Westerners: They came to mistake glasnost for freedom; they were dazzled by the opening of intellectual and cultural life and the reordering o the political system to enhance power of popularly elective bodies.
- A harsh chorus in the West: No aid before reform
- American and Soviet analysts: They propose a so-called Grand Bargain.
- Western and Soviet economists: The economic crisis in the Soviet Union; bureaucrats are burdens to be carried.
- Economists: Bread industry has not been modernized.
- Supporters [of the economic aid]: Deliveries of food is largely symbolic.

- Skeptics [of the economic aid]: The relief will provide fleeting comfort to a few of the poor.
- Some critics [of the economic aid]: Aid may provide an excuse to postpone needed economic change.
- India's Ambassador to Moscow: She announced gifts to the Soviets of food and medicines.
- Bulgarian officials: Glasnost will come to Bulgaria.
- Western embassies: The assistance should be channeled through popularly elected officials rather than the party.
- Soviet and Russian officials: Gorbachev has two choices: negotiate or attempt to seize the money.
- Americans: They have been entranced by Gorbachev's media triumphs.
- Some critics and artistic directors: The interest in Soviet cultural presentations have a lot to do with real American appetite for all things Russian.
- The White House: The Soviet Army's actions threatened next months summit meeting.
- Authorities: The measure [investigating businesses] is necessary, because U.S.S.R. has been turned into a hunting ground for people looking to exploit the weak economy.
- M.S. Gorbachev and the Group Seven industrialized power: They endorsed the initiative of the Kremlin to get the Western countries to join in financing a reform plan.
- Mr. Yavlinsky and like-minded Western analysts: It is in the national interest of the Western world bring the Soviet giant into the fold of

civilised nations.

-- The advocates of Western assistance: There is no alternative model to democracy and the free market. The only question is when.

-- Washington: The three advisers to Gorbachev were told by Washington that they would have to make concrete steps before any American aid would be considered.

-- Foreign diplomats: The tide of Soviet domestic politics turned in favor of continuing change. Gorbachev is serious about moving back toward reform.

-- A Western diplomat: Gorbachev succeeded so well at the Central Committee meeting in wrenching the party hierarchy from its Marxist-Leninist dogma.

-- Mr. Major and President Bush: They were persuaded that the Soviet leader was trying to move to a market economy.

-- Western leaders: They wanted for so long that now they are not sure whether it would be a dream come true, or a nightmare.

-- K. Marx: He proclaimed the inevitability of world socialism.

-- A. Tocqueville: He asserted that democracy would surely replace rule by the few.

-- The Guardian, a leftist weekly: Most organizations of the American left share Mr. Ligachev's apprehensions.

-- Gorbachev zealots in the U.S.: They keep telling Bush and Baker they better build an American consensus about foreign policy in support of Gorbachev.


-- Hawks: We should let the Soviet system sink, because only

desperation and deprivation will force the sort of radical economic change.

-- Doves: They want perestroika to success.

-- Western journalists in Moscow: They are reposting rumors that Gorbachev may resign as General Secretary of the Party.

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