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THE PRINCIPLES AND OUTCOMES OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN

Volume I

By

Tsung Chi

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ABSTRACT

THE PRINCIPLES AND OUTCOMES OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN

By

Tsung Chi

Throughout history, societies have wrestled with the problem of how to allocate goods and services, benefits and burdens. This issue of distributive justice is not only basic in political philosophy, but also an underlying concern in public administration, sociology, and comparative economics and government. Using China and Taiwan as cases, I use the comparative method to examine the patterns that can be distinguished in the principles and outcomes of resource allocation. This examination consists of descriptive, comparative, and theoretical components.

In the descriptive section, the allocations of two scarce resources, higher education and public offices, in contemporary China and Taiwan are delineated. Focusing on each resource in each society, I first studied its level of scarcity, then the mechanisms and principles employed to allocate the targeted resource, and finally the outcomes of its allocation.

Based upon the comparisons between the two allocation systems of China and Taiwan, it is observed that in the past forty years the allocative principles used by the two Chinas diverged from the same starting point and went along different paths, and then began converging back to

approximately the same point.

Finally, the theoretical section of this study contrasts a variety of distributive theories with the Chinese allocative practices. Theories surveyed in this study include global theories, local theories, and causal chains of distributive outcomes. There are three major contemporary global theories: John Rawls's theory of justice, Robert Nozick's libertarian theory, and utilitarianism. Elements of all three theories surface in one form or the other in Chinese allocative practices. There are two competing local theories: whether distributive principles are system-specific or good-specific. On the basis of the research findings, I conclude that neither explanation is fully supported by the allocative practices.

As for distributive outcomes, the research findings suggest that domains of allocation are, indeed, causally linked. The outcomes of one allocation is affected not only by the principles being employed, but also by many inborn personal characteristics, and by the antecedent allocations of other resources. Thus, I conclude that resource allocations are "prisoner of the existing social context".

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have been interested in Chinese politics since I became a political science student in my sophomore year at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. Over the years, there have been many crucial issues in the field of Chinese politics that attract my research attention. Focusing on Chinese resource allocation, the issue that interests me most, this doctoral dissertation is my first research attempt at the studies of Chinese politics.

I am very grateful to my advisers at Michigan State University, Professors Brian Silver, Jack Knott, Scott Gates, Jeffrey Hill, and Brian Humes (now teaching at University of Nebraska) for their guidance and suggestions on the proposal and drafts of my dissertation.

I owe particular debts of gratitude to Professor James Tong of UCLA, who was my adviser at Michigan State University between 1985 and 1989. Dr. Tong first pointed me in the direction of resource allocation in 1988, and later on he contributed a great deal to my understanding of this subject. He spent countless hours in reading through several drafts of my dissertation and made many valuable comments and suggestions to guide me in my revisions. In addition to the dissertation, I am also very grateful to him

for his continuous support, help, and encouragement in my academic as well as non-academic life over the years.

Three other persons also contributed in many important ways to the completion of this dissertation. Chin-lung Chang helped me collect data concerning Taiwan's higher education and civil service system. Richard Siao provided library assistance in the East Asian Library of UCLA. Lastly, I like to thank Yuan-lin Chao for her editing assistance.

Finally, I am especially indebted to my wife, Suchen, for her patience and support throughout the years. Without her help, the completion of this dissertation would have been impossible.

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A WADE-GILES/HANYU PINYIN CONVERSION TABLE

(The Wade-Giles system of romanization is used throughout this study for the transliteration of Chinese words.)

Wade-Giles System	Hanyu Pinyin System
Ch'angsha	Changsha
Chao Tung-wan	Zhao Dongwan
Chao Tzu-yang	Zhao Ziyang
Chekiang (Chechiang)	Zhejiang
Ch'ên Yün	Chen Yun
chêng-chih kan-pu	zhengzhi ganbu
chêng-wu kung-wu-yuan	zhengwu gongwuyuan
ch'êng-fen	chengfen
Ch'êngtu	Chengdu
Chiang Tse-min	Jiang Zemin
Chiang Ch'ing	Jiang Qing
chien	jian
chih-shih-hua	zhishihua
Chilin (Kirin)	Jilin
Chin-chi Jih-pao	Jinji Ribao
Ch'inghua	Qinghua
ch'u-shen	Chushen
chün-fu	junfu
chuan-yeh chiang-hsüeh chin	zhuanye jiangxuejin
chuan-yeh-hua	zhuanyehua
Chuang	Zhuang
Chung-yang Jih-pao	Zhongyang Ribao
Ch'ungking (Chungching)	Chongqing
fen-ch'ü ting-ê	fenchu dinge
fen-p'ei	fenpei
Fukien (Fuchien)	Fujian
Haerhpin	Harbin
Hopei	Hebei
Hu Yao-pang	Hu Yaobang
i-pan kan-pu	yiban ganbu
Jen-min Jih-pao	Renmin Ribao
jen-ming	renming
kan-pu	ganbu
kan-pu-chü	ganbuju
k'ao-ch'a	kaocha
kao-chi kan-pu	gaoji ganbu
Kaohsiung	Gaoxiong
kao-kan	gaogan
ke-ming-hua	geminghua

Kiangsu (Chiangsu)	Jiangsu
kung-nung-ping	gong-nong-bing
kuo-chia kan-pu	guojia ganbu
kuo-chia kung-wu-yuan	guojia gongwuyuan
Kuomintang	Guomindang
Kwangtung (Canton)	Guangdong
Li P'êng	Li Peng
ling-tao kan-pu	lingdao ganbu
Liu Shao-ch'i	Liu Shaoqi
Lü Fêng	Lu Feng
Mao Tse-tung	Mao Zedong
Matsu	Mazu
nien-ch'ing-hua	nianqinghua
p'ing-jen	pingren
Quemoy (Kinmen, Chinmen)	Jinmen
San-min Chu-i	Sanmin Zhuyi
she-hui kuan-hsi	shehui guanxi
Shenchen	Shenzhen
shih	shi
Shih-chieh Jih-pao	Shijie Ribao
Sian (Hsian)	Xian
Sinkiang (Hsinchiang)	Xinjiang
Sung P'ing	Song Ping
Szechwan (Szuchuan)	Sichuan
tan-wei	danwei
Teng Hsiao-p'ing	Deng Xiaoping
ti-fang kan-pu	difang ganbu
T'ienanmen	Tiananmen
ting-hsiang chiang-hsüeh chin	dingxiang jiangxuejin
Tsingtao (Ch'ingtao)	Qingdao
yeh-wu kan-pu	yewu ganbu
yeh-wu kung-wu-yuan	yewu gongwuyuan
yu-hsiu hsüeh-sheng chiang-hsüeh chin	yuxiu xuesheng jiangxuejin

THE PRINCIPLES AND OUTCOMES OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN[1]

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, societies have wrestled with the problem of how to allocate goods and services, benefits and burdens. In any given society, a set of institutions and practices has been developed to deal with the allocation question of who gets what, when, and how.[2] This question is not only basic in political philosophy which, from Aristotle to Hume and Marx, has been preoccupied with the issue of distributive justice, it is also an underlying concern in public administration, public policy, sociology, and

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[1] In this study the terms "allocation" and "distribution", "allocative" and "distributive", and "allocating" and "distributing" are used synonymously. According to Richard and Peggy Musgrave (see Public Finance in Theory and Practice. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980, pp. 6-13), allocation involves the provision of social goods, while distribution pertains to the provision of wealth and income. The usual expressions are resource allocation but income distribution, allocative efficiency but distributive equity. But, in my opinion, both social goods and wealth can be regarded as desirable resources for individuals' consumption. Therefore, it is difficult and unnecessary to determine, for instance, whether we are "allocating" or "distributing" resources by "allocative" or "distributive" principles when we study the problem of "allocation" or "distribution".

[2] Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How, New York: P. Smith, 1950.

comparative economics and government. It pertains to how a society defines "justice", "rightfulness", "equality" and other pivotal social values that are viewed as foundations of society. Although political leaders may be unconscious of or unconcerned with a variety of allocative strategies, the practice of resource allocation has much to do with the cultivation of legitimacy as well as the stability of the regime. Therefore, the problem of allocation has become one of the core concerns in many disciplines.

In political science, the Eastonian definition of politics as the authoritative allocation of values is probably the most well-known one. But, ironically, despite this well-known definition, and the universality of the allocation problem in all societies and many major fields of human inquiry, there is almost no systematic empirical study of the principles, criteria, and mechanisms of how governments allocate scarce resources in social sciences.[3]

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[3] The existing literature on the subject is not large. Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983) studies principles of resource allocation, but the way he examines real cases in the light of his distributive principles is not systematic. Douglas Rae's Equalities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press, 1981) primarily proposes a taxonomic and conceptual framework without referring to any concrete cases. Gerald Winslow's Triage and Justice (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1982) is more systematic, but he concerns himself mainly with the problem of triage in modern medicine. In his book After the Revolution (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), Robert Dahl studies "inequality of resources" and its relation to political inequality, but he does not explicitly examine the principles behind resource allocation. Aaron Wildavsky's Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes (Boston MA: Little Brown, 1975) is concerned with the issues of resource allocation, but its main focus is exclusively on "financial"

Its absence is particularly conspicuous in political science. This is the primary reason why the allocation problem has been selected as the research subject. Hopefully, this study will fill in some of the blanks in the existing literature of political science on this subject, and provide a conceptual framework for the study of resource allocation in the social sciences.

1.1 Research Purposes

More specifically, using China and Taiwan as cases, I intend to study the patterns that can be distinguished in the principles for allocating goods, and their outcomes. These patterns consist of explicit, as well as implicit, principles of distributive justice that can be studied and evaluated by the theories of justice developed by philosophers. This study, therefore, has three main purposes.

The first purpose is to raise and answer descriptive

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resources. Alexander Groth and Larry Wade's Comparative Resource Allocation: Politics, Performance, and Policy Priorities (Beverly Hill, CA: Sage Publications, 1987) investigates the allocation problem of three types of political systems (Marxist-Leninist, oligarchy, and polyarchy), but these allocations are assessed in terms of their "consequences" rather than the allocative principles behind them. In sum, these works study different aspects of the allocation problem, but they are far from systematic or exhaustive.

questions on various systems of resource allocation of the two Chinese societies. That is, what principles are employed to allocate which type of resources in which political system, which ones are used more frequently than others, and what are the allocative outcomes?

Secondly, going beyond the descriptive questions, I would like to address more comparative and theoretical questions. On the basis of comparisons between the allocative practices of the two Chinese societies, I plan to study whether allocative principles are problem-specific, society-specific, or both, or neither.[4] In other words, whether the principles employed are dependent on the nature of the goods in question, or that each political system has developed a general principle from its unique "ethos" and political ideologies by which all types of goods, despite their differences in nature, are allocated uniformly, or whether some other factors are in play in shaping these principles.

In addition to explaining the distributive principles, I will also address the questions as to why some principles and mechanisms are used in China and Taiwan in certain allocation systems, and why they do not use other alternative principles that are employed in other societies. As for the outcomes of allocations, I would like to see

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[4] See Michael Walzer, ibid., and Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992.

whether or not the allocative outcomes of one resource are influenced by prior allocations of other resources correlated with the resource in question.

Thirdly, I hope that this study can illustrate the contrast between the "empirical" and the "normative" aspects of resource allocation. The need to answer the question as to "on what basis should social goods be distributed" has led contemporary philosophers to develop systematic theories of distributive justice. Such global theories of justice provide a normative aspect of resource allocation, expounding ideal principles that ought to be adopted in order to have a just allocation. This is different from what is actually occurring in practice in resource allocation. Using China and Taiwan as cases, I hope, on the one hand, to enhance our understanding of the allocative ideals of these global theories by examining the allocative practices of the two Chinese societies, and, on the other hand, the Chinese practices can be evaluated in the light of these theories.

However, this study is not going to be a statistical testing of empirical evidence which conclusively demonstrates the superiority of one theory over the other through a deductive, hypothesis-testing process. What I intend to do is simply to conduct a comparative study on some actual problems of allocation in order to obtain theoretical insight into the nature of a variety of distributive theories.

1.2 Research Design

In this section the research design of this study will be specified and justified. The key research question in this study is what kinds of distributive principles and mechanisms are employed to allocate what kinds of resources at what times and places. Thus, the research design includes the methodological choices of the societies, and the goods and the time period to be covered in the study. In addition, the data sources of this study will be introduced before we turn to the comparative method.

Generally speaking, the empirical study of resource allocation can be pursued along three dimensions.[5] First, we can list various principles of allocation. Second, we can enumerate societies in which scarce goods have been allocated formally by institutions. Along the last dimension we can examine a variety of goods to be allocated. The selection of societies and goods to be studied presents a main methodological choice for the project. To permit full scope for comparative research, a larger research framework, ideally, will consider a wide range of societies and a great number of allocative problems with each of the selected societies. However, this is infeasible in practice. In order to do in-depth studies of various

[5] Jon Elster, Local Justice. Unpublished manuscript (Talk at University of Cambridge, March 13, 1989), p. 16.

allocative problems one has to limit the number of societies and problem areas. In this study I intend to study two allocative problems within two societies.

1.2.1 The Two Societies

This study will investigate resource allocation in China and Taiwan. The pattern of resource allocation in China, as a whole, will make a special contribution to the subject of resource allocation for the following reason: being the most populous agrarian society (with one-fifth of the world's population) and one of the oldest civilizations on earth, China has had to deal with the problem of allocating scarce resources more actively and formally than most societies. It is hoped that selecting China as the society to be studied would provide a more exhaustive picture of this global problem.

Moreover, as a divided nation, China provides a sound basis for a comparative study of the allocation problem. Since 1949 China has split into two political entities: People's Republic of China on the Mainland and Republic of China on Taiwan. The former is a Marxist-Leninist regime with a command economy, while the latter is a nationalist oligarchy with state capitalism. Hopefully, the comparisons of allocative practices between the two Chinas would exemplify the differences in allocating resources between regimes of these two types. Hence, not only can China as a whole offer a sound case for studying this subject, but

China as a divided nation also provides the basis for a comparative study. It would be reasonable to expect research findings obtained from the two Chinas to shed more light on the allocation problem than findings from research of other societies.

1.2.2 The Goods

There are many crucial allocative problems that request our research attentions, namely, educational opportunity, public offices, land, housing, military service, tax, medical goods, social welfare, and so on. These policy areas are important because they are the sectors in which contemporary national governments (socialist as well as non-socialist) have carved out important functions. Throughout history, the market has been one of the most important mechanisms for the distribution of social goods, but it has never been a complete distribution system. Since some goods are often regarded as vital social goods for individuals' social life, besides allowing them to be allocated through the market place, governments, especially socialist ones, have played key roles in allocation to ensure the basic provisions of these vital social goods.

Distinguished from other types of policies (e.g., regulatory policies), the policy areas mentioned above can be categorized as distributive policies involving the distribution of services or benefits to particular segments of the population--individuals, groups, classes, and

communities.[6] Although the tax and military service policies distribute burdens instead of goods,[7] since the exemption from such burdens can always be viewed as a good,[8] I presume they also belong to the family of distributive policies.

Ideally, all important policy areas should be studied to permit full scope for systematic research, but due to resource constraints, my study would concentrate on two policy areas that I think are of greater importance. They are allocations of higher educational resources and public offices. Why are these two policy areas more important than others? To quote T. H. Marshall on the importance of education: "The man with the third-class ticket who later feels entitled to claim a seat in the first-class carriage will not be admitted, even if he is prepared to pay the difference".[9] As the ticket to a life-time journey, a

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[6] James E. Anderson, Public Policymaking. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990, p. 11. Though Anderson labels American policies of income tax, Medicare and Medicaid, War on Poverty as "redistributive" policies, in my opinion they are merely a special sort of distributive policies, so long as they are concerned with the distributions of goods by governments.

[7] But, in countries with professional armed forces, the military service policy is not to distribute burdens to the citizens, but is implemented on a voluntary basis. It is interesting to note that the military service policy in China is to distribute goods to qualified citizens while in Taiwan it is a compulsory policy distributing burden to the eligible.

[8] See Jon Elster, op. cit., p. 19.

[9] T. H. Marshall, Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays, London, U.K.: Heinemann, 1963, p. 113, cited from Arnold J. Heidenheimer; Hugh Heclo; and Carolyn Teich Adams,

school diploma can decide not only where but also when one can sit. A college diploma is undoubtedly of greater influence when the seating arrangement is made.

In addition to symbolizing one's social status, higher education is also an important instrument for socio-economic mobility, enabling a person to continuously upgrade his/her seat during the long journey to the top. This is because that in terms of resource allocation, higher educational resources would have a positive effect on the consequent allocations of many other desirable resources.

The primary higher educational resource investigated in this study is spaces in colleges and universities and, therefore, the admission policy of higher education in both China and Taiwan is the first targeted policy area in this study. However, there are other resource allocation issues in the system of higher education that also involve applications of various principles of allocation. Focusing on each school as the unit of analysis, we can study the allocation of higher education budget, resources of faculty (e.g., faculty/student ratio) among various levels, types and fields in higher education. Focusing on each student as the unit of analysis, we can examine not only who gets admitted, but also who receives fellowships and other types of financial aid. These allocation issues are not less interesting than the college admission policy, but, in

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Comparative Public Policy, New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 23.

addition to the admission policy, the only data available after a systematic search are on the allocation of fellowships.[10] In other words, in the following chapter on Chinese higher education, we will only study two allocation issues, admission and fellowship, both of which concentrate on individuals (students) as the unit of analysis, whereas, for lack of data, other allocation issues with schools being the unit of analysis will not be examined.[11]

The allocation of public offices is vital in that people often gain access to scarce resources, mostly economic ones, because of their formal political influences and informal connections. Both of these are attached to public offices, especially to high-ranking positions. In China, for example, cadres are always preferentially treated in the allocation of scarce consumer goods, medical goods, housing, education, and the like. In short, if the causally linked domains of allocation could be regarded as a pyramid-

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[10] Only China, not Taiwan, has a nationwide, unified fellowship system, administrated by the State Commission of Education, for which all college students are eligible to apply. There is no comparable counterpart in Taiwan where the fellowships, except for the fellowship granted to all students in the normal colleges and universities, are neither unified nor administrated by the government but provided by the private sector. Since Taiwan's allocation of fellowships is basically not a public policy issue, it will not be researched in this study.

[11] Actually, the data on faculty/student ratio of various types of colleges and universities are available, and I have tried to run some statistical tests on it. Nonetheless, the association is statistically insignificant ($p=.22099$, $n=60$). If all the data are available, we should run school budget rather than faculty/student ratio against school type because the ratio is profoundly affected by the budget.

like structure, both higher education and public offices are resources atop the pyramid. Interestingly, these two allocative problems are also interrelated, especially in China, in a way that parental political status may affect children's access to educational resources, and one's educational background is decisive when he/she is competing for public offices.

Furthermore, we can discuss the importance of the two allocative issues of higher educational spaces and public offices in the light of Jon Elster's theoretical framework of local justice. He contends that allocative issues may be classified according to the presence or absence of scarcity, indivisibility, and homogeneity. A good is scarce if there is not enough of it to satisfy all individuals, indivisible if it is impossible for more than one person to receive it, and heterogeneous if its units are distinguishable. He further notes that the above three dichotomous distinctions yield a total of eight possible cases, of which only scarce and non-scarce but heterogeneous goods pose allocative problems,[12] In other words, the presence of either scarcity or heterogeneity is strong enough to suggest the allocation issue of the good in question is a critical problem of allocation.

Unquestionably, the two resources targeted in this study are scarce, indivisible, and heterogeneous. The fact

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[12] For a complete account of the three distinctions and eight possible combinations, see Jon Elster (1992), pp. 21-24.

that both higher education spaces and public offices are scarce in quantity requires no further discussion. They are also indivisible because it is impossible for more than one person to receive either resource. We cannot imagine a case in which one person participates in courses in the first half of the semester while another person participates in the second half, nor a case in which two or more persons can occupy one single position in the government.

The heterogeneous nature of the two resources requires some discussions. The spaces in colleges and universities are heterogeneous because they may be equal in quantity but their units are distinguishable in quality. The quality of the education students receive from a elitist university (e.g., Peking University or National Taiwan University) is definitely superior to that from a third-class regional college, and even the education offered by two elitist universities (or two third-class colleges) may not be indistinguishable. This heterogeneous nature can be also found in the resource of public offices, whose units are also distinguishable because applicants are recruited to serve in different levels and types of governmental agencies.

From the above discussions, we recognize that these two resources are not only scarce but also heterogeneous. Therefore, the issues of their allocation pose the core

cases of local justice, or local justice stricto sensu.[13] Undoubtedly, it is more useful to consider core cases than peripheral cases in which resources in question are either non-scarce (e.g., suffrage) or homogeneous (e.g., energy).

Aside from being socially and theoretically important, the two resources are chosen also because they are the ones with relatively easily accessible data. In both China and Taiwan, also true in other societies, data sources of higher education and public offices are more systematically recorded than that of most other resources such as medical goods and housing.

1.2.3 Time Period

This study will examine resource allocation in China and Taiwan from 1949 to the present. The choice of this time period is apparent for China because the People's Republic of China was not established until October 1949. However, the choice of the period for Taiwan requires some justification because the Nationalist rule in Taiwan is regarded as a continuation of the Republican China regime between 1911 and 1949.

Defeated in the Chinese civil war by the Communists on the mainland, the Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan in 1949. Since then, the Nationalist regime has been known de jure as the Republic of China, which is the same national title as

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[13] Taken from Jon Elster's words, see ibid., p. 27.

used during the Republican period. But the Republic of China on Taiwan is de facto different from the Republic of China on the mainland (between 1911 and 1949) in many respects, including the people and territory under its ruling, the sovereignty it previously enjoyed in the international system, and even the composition of the nationalist ruling class itself. Thus, although the regime in Taiwan is not necessary a brand new one, the year 1949 definitely served as a watershed separating two distinctive periods of the Nationalist rule in modern Chinese history. In addition, for comparative purposes, the choice of the same period of time is methodologically sound.

1.2.4 Data Sources

The primary data sources we will be drawing upon are 1) original legal and administrative documents published by the governments for detailed descriptions of the allocative issues (most of which were published only in Chinese); 2) secondary reports and commentaries in Chinese newspapers based in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong; 3) relevant studies and commentaries published in Chinese or English for institutional history; and 4) various statistical yearbooks published by both governments for distributive outcomes. The data chapters of China's higher education and Taiwan's higher education and public offices are primarily based upon first-hand, original documents. Whereas, for lack of accessible first-hand documents, the China's cadre chapter

is written with primary reference to newspaper clippings and secondary sources. This unfortunate data source problem will not affect the overall credibility of this chapter but will affect its originality.

In sum, there will be four data chapters in this study, dealing with the two allocation issues in both China and Taiwan. These data chapters are valuable in terms of their contributions not only to the theories of distributive justice but also to the fields of Chinese and Taiwanese studies. This is because there has been no systematic study of the distributive principles, mechanisms and, to a certain degree, outcomes involved in China's cadre system, Taiwan's civil service system, and the higher educational systems in both China and Taiwan. Studies on the two Taiwanese allocation systems and the Chinese fellowship system are conspicuously absent. Thus, even without linking these data chapters to the distributive theories, they may be still valuable to themselves.

1.3 Comparative Method

Using China and Taiwan as case studies, we intend to use the comparative method to explore the allocative problems in this study. Like other research approaches, the comparative method is not without problems. As Arend Lijphart observes, the principal problems facing this

research method are: "many variables, small number of cases".[14] He also argues that "if at all possible one should generally use the statistical method instead of the weaker comparative method."[15] But, he further contends, "given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial resources, the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases."[16]

From the above arises one of the principal methodological questions concerning this study: that is whether or not it is possible to conduct a statistical analysis, superficial or otherwise, on the allocative problems. This question can be answered by examining whether we could have "the cases" required for a statistical analysis.

If we choose a variety of societies as cases for a cross-cultural, inter-system analysis, given the scarcity of any close research precedents (especially, the descriptive ones) on other societies, we can hardly do any statistical analysis, at least at the present stage, on the research development of this subject.

If we turn to intra-system units as the cases for a

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[14] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." American Political Science Review. 65 (Sept. 1971): p. 685.

[15] Idem.

[16] Idem.

statistical analysis, we could focus on the recipients to which the resources in question are allocated within a particular society. Scarce resources could be allocated to either individuals or non-individuals (e.g., institutions, schools, administrative districts, and so on). In the system of higher education, the recipients could be either individuals who get admitted into colleges, or colleges and academic fields that receive educational funding. Whereas in the system of public offices, perhaps the recipients have to be individuals who are recruited into the cadre system in China or the civil service system in Taiwan. In both systems of allocation in both societies, it is conceivable that data sources on individual recipients are only available at the macro level (e.g., 45% of admitted students are females). As a result, it is very unlikely to conduct an individual-based, intra-system statistical analysis at this moment. In the system of higher education, focusing on each school or academic field as the unit of analysis, we can study the allocation of higher education budget, per student spending, faculty/student ratio among various levels, types and fields in higher education. However, after a systematic search, the only data sources available are faculty/student ratios of various types of colleges and universities.[17]

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[17] As indicated in note #11 of this chapter, I have tried to run some statistical tests on it. Nonetheless, the association is statistically insignificant (p=.22099, n=60).

Given the data constraints discussed above, it is, therefore, very difficult, if not impossible, to do a statistical analysis of the subject at this moment. Moreover, even if there is no data problem, it is likely that our statistical data analysis would not be well theory-informed for lack of a strong theoretical construction on the subject of resource allocation.

Regardless of how my choice of using the comparative method instead of the statistical method can be justified, this study will not be as promising as the one Lijphart refers to, because only two cases--China and Taiwan-are selected. However, the selection of China and Taiwan is very much consistent with the "most similar systems" design.[18] In this regard, the two Chinese societies may constitute an optimal sample for comparative inquiry.

According to Przeworski and Teune, if any difference is found among the most similar systems, there are two theoretical implications: "1) the factors that are common to the countries are irrelevant in determining the behavior being explained....." and "2) any set of variables that differentiates these systems in a manner corresponding to the observed differences of behavior can be considered as explaining these patterns of behavior."[19] Applying these

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[18] Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970, pp. 32-34.

[19] Ibid., p. 34.

implications to this study, once any difference in allocative principles is found between China and Taiwan, one may assert that 1) the common historical, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds shared by China and Taiwan are irrelevant in determining the different principles being used, and 2) the difference in political ideologies and economic institutions between the two can be considered as explaining the observed differences in allocative principles. This is the advantage of selecting China and Taiwan, though the two cases are a small sample for comparative inquiry.

In sum, the comparative analysis in this research will serve as the first stage of research of this subject, in which possible hypotheses with more or less vague notions could be formulated. In this sense, the two case studies in this comparative analysis can be viewed as "hypothesis-generating case studies".[20] Any future statistical analysis of this subject will serve as the second stage, in which the formulated hypotheses can be empirically tested in a much larger sample of cases.

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[20] For various types of case studies, see Arend Lijphart, op. cit., p. 692.

1.4 Research Organization

In the following chapters, I will study the patterns that can be distinguished in the mechanisms and principles employed by the governments of China and Taiwan to allocate resources of higher education and public offices. These patterns consist of explicit, as well as implicit, principles of distributive justice that can be used to enhance our understanding of a variety of theories of distributive justice developed by social philosophers.

Chapter two begins with a discussion of two kinds of distributive theories: global and local theories. Global theories contain three major contemporary theories of distributive justice, all attempting to provide theoretical justifications to any distribution system from a global perspective; they are John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, Nozick's libertarian theory, and utilitarianism. Local theories consist of two competing models of allocative principles (i.e., they are system- or resource-specific) and a variety of local principles of justice that aim to solve specific distributive problems. This will be followed by a presentation of a series of research questions, including descriptive, comparative, analytical and theoretical questions.

Chapters three through six are four data chapters of this paper, examining the allocative practices of resources of higher education and public offices in contemporary China

and Taiwan. In each of these data chapters the level of scarcity of the targeted resource will first be discussed, followed by discussions on the mechanisms and principles used to allocate this particular resource over time.

Specifically, chapter three discusses the Chinese allocation system of higher educational resources. The mechanisms and principles employed in the admission system will be first investigated during three period of time, namely, the pre-Cultural Revolution period between 1949-1966, the decade of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, and during the post-Cultural Revolution period from 1976 to the present. The key mechanism employed in allocating Chinese higher educational spaces has been the college entrance examination, except for the period of the Cultural Revolution when the examination system was abolished and replaced by a mechanism of recommendation system favoring the proletarian class. In this chapter both mechanisms will be explored. In addition, preferential policies in favor of five groups of people who possess special performance and/or background will also be studied in this chapter. It will investigate the extent to which the principles involved in these preferential policies deviate from the mainstream principles that prevailed during the post-Cultural Revolution period.

Next, the allocation issue in the Chinese system of fellowships will also be explored in this chapter to see how the distributive principles used in the system evolved

through time.

Chapter four analyzes how the government in Taiwan allocates higher educational resources. Since the chief mechanism used over the past 40 years has always been the college entrance examination, the main focus of this chapter is on a variety of preferential policies behind the examination system. In total, eight groups of applicants are eligible to receive preferential treatment. The detailed background and socio-political consequences of these eight policies will be closely examined in this chapter.

Chapter five deals with the Chinese allocation system of cadre positions. It begins with a thorough introduction to the Chinese cadre system, focusing on the scarcity of the resource of cadreship. This will be followed by an examination of six distinctive mechanisms used to allocate this resource, including an appointment system, investigation, invitation, advertising, examination, and election. The principles involved will also be studied for the periods before, during, and after the Cultural Revolution.

Chapter six focuses on Taiwan's civil service system. It first introduces and assesses Taiwan's complicated civil service examination system and, then, examines numerous preferential policies that favor applicants such as mainlanders, overseas Chinese, and veterans.

In the above four chapters (three through six), the

distributive outcomes of each allocation system (two in China and two in Taiwan) will be examined in terms of its distribution among various socio-economic, ethnic, and sexual groups.

Chapter seven is a comparative one, in which China's higher educational and cadre systems will be compared to its counterparts in Taiwan in terms of mechanisms, principles, and outcomes of allocation. Also, historical, cultural, and political roots of the similarities and differences between China and Taiwan will be examined in this comparative chapter.

Chapter eight contrasts a variety of global and local theories of distributive justice with the allocative practices of the two Chinese societies. While focusing on the global theories, this chapter will demonstrate the contrast between the "empirical" and the "normative" aspects of resource allocation. While concentrating on the local theories, it will investigate whether the principles employed are a function of the specific nature of the resource in question, or the unique ethos of the society in which the allocation takes place, or some other decisive factors.

Chapter nine will be a brief concluding chapter, including a summary of the results of this study, and a discussion of prospects and directions for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTION

Theories of distribution that are commonly accepted or implemented can be global or local,[1] procedural or substantive.[2] The first distinction is particularly relevant to this study, for it represents different levels of generality of the allocation problem. On the one hand, global theories of distribution deal with the overall design of society, with special emphasis on developing a single set of criteria for all distributions across all moral and material worlds. On the other hand, local theories of distribution are concerned with the allocative solution of specific problems, contending that the distributive justice is a function of political systems, the goods in question,

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[1] See Wojciech Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985; Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992; and Bruce Landesman, "Justice: Cosmic or Communal?" in Kenneth Kipnis and Diana Meyers, Economic Justice: Private Rights and Public Responsibilities. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985.

[2] See Wojciech Sadurski, ibid. There are some other typologies similar to the procedural-versus-substantive one, namely, Alan Gewirth's antecedentalist versus consequentialist criteria ("Economic Justice: Concepts and Criteria", in Kenneth Kipnis & Diana Meyers, 1985); John Arthur and William Shaw's deontological versus consequentialist types (Justice and Economic Distribution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978); Allen Buchanan and Deborah Mathieu's deontological versus teleological theories ("Philosophy and Justice", chapter II in Ronald Cohen, ed., Justice. New York: Plenum Press, 1986); and Morris Silver's process oriented versus end-state oriented rules (Foundations of Economic Justice. Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1989).

or other factors.

Secondly, distributive theories can be either substantive or procedural. Simply put, substantive justice is the justice of outcome while procedural justice is the justice of the process which brings about this outcome. The former answers the question of distributive justice by referring to the consequences of the distribution, including the fulfillment of needs, the maximization of benefits, or the achievement of equality.[3] The latter, rather than justifying a distributive pattern by appealing to its consequence, takes the adherence to certain moral rules as essential.[4] This distinction of substantive versus procedural may not be so important as the first one of global versus local. However, while surveying several global and local theories of distribution in the following pages, I would like to return to this distinction in an attempt to distinguish substantive theories from procedural ones.

In addition to discussions of several theories of distribution, some research questions derived from these theories and some methodological considerations of this study will be addressed at the end of this chapter.

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[3] Kenneth Kipnis and Diana Meyers, op. cit., p. 13.

[4] John Arthur and William Shaw, op. cit., p. 9.

2.1 Theories of Distribution

2.1.1 Global Theories

A recognition of the need to discover principles of distributive justice and to relate these principles in a consistent structure of values has led contemporary philosophers to develop systematic theories of distributive justice. There are three major contemporary theories of distributive justice, all attempting to provide theoretical justifications to any distribution from a global perspective: John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, Nozick's libertarian theory, and utilitarianism.[5]

2.1.1.1 John Rawls's Theory of Justice

Among them, the Rawlsian theory of justice has received the greatest attention. In his well-known work, A Theory of Justice,[6] John Rawls is concerned with what principles free and rational persons would choose to manage their distributions of social goods, if they found themselves in an imaginary "original position" for this purpose.[7] One

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[5] Utilitarianism received its classic formulation by Jeremy Bentham in the early nineteenth century and was developed further by John Stuart Mill. Today utilitarianism remains an underlying assumption of many political programs.

[6] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. It is an amplification of a renowned paper of his: "Distributive Justice" in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics, and Society. 3rd series, Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1967.

[7] For details of the "original position", see ibid., pp. 17-22, and Chapter III.

crucial feature of the original position is that its participants (or social contractors) are ignorant (behind a "veil of ignorance"[8]) of their personal characteristics and endowments, and their social positions. Therefore, in Rawls's view, they do not have class biases or particular philosophical perspectives. Nor do they know how any of the proposed alternatives of distribution will affect their own interests. His concept of the original position intends to insure the impartiality of distributive decisions. Rawls further contends that the conditions of the original position are fair, and, therefore, the allocative principles chosen under these conditions have a certain justification. According to Rawls, the principles that would be chosen are as follows:

1. The principle of equal liberty: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."[9]

2. The principle of equality of opportunity: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all."[10] Part (b) means that offices and positions are to be open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity;

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[8] For details, see ibid., pp. 136-142.

[9] Ibid., p. 60.

[10] Idem.

that is, individuals should have equal access to these offices and positions. It would be unjust if these offices and positions are handed out without publicly known and approved reasons.

3. The difference principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they achieve the greatest benefit for the least advantaged.[11] This principle can be regarded as an extension of the second principle.

To be distinguished from the third one, the first two principles are often referred as Rawls's "two principles of justice" or simply the "equality principle".

Three points with respect to Rawls's principles of justice need to be addressed. First of all, in his theory of justice, there is a presumption in favor of equality. When these principles are in conflict, according to Rawls, the first principle (of equal liberty) should have priority over the second, which, in turn, have priority over the third. Foremost, liberty should be equally distributed among members of a society, he argues, because liberty is necessary for the full enjoyment of other goods.[12]

Secondly, equal opportunity is not a concept without ambiguity. According to Douglas Rae, it obscures at least two conceptions: prospect-regarding and means-regarding

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[11] Ibid., pp. 75-80.

[12] Ibid., pp. 243-251.

equalities of opportunity.[13] The former refers to the notion that each individual has the same probability of attaining the resource in question. It can be exemplified in the settings of lottery, bingo, flipping coins, and so on. The latter refers to the idea that each individual has the same instruments for attaining the desirable resource, exemplified in the settings of I.Q. tests, poker games, boxing matches, etc. When lottery, bingo and flipping coins are used, people's talents and other attributes have nothing to do with the allocative results. Whereas the means-regarding practices of I.Q. tests, poker games and boxing matches all provide the same rules and equipment to each contender. Due to the unequal talents of the contenders, it is expected that the allocative results would be unequal.[14]

Between the two conceptions of equal opportunity, it is noted that Rawls's principle of equality in opportunity

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[13] See Douglas Rae, op. cit., pp. 65-68. The following discussions in this paragraph is also based upon Rae's arguments.

[14] In addition to the two versions of equality of opportunity, there is another interpretation of this ambiguous concept. That is, under the assumption that equality entitles people to equal opportunities to compete with others, a variety of governmental programs are required to ensure that all individuals start on equal footing before the race for the goals that they seek in life. These programs include educational assistance, vocational training, and affirmative action programs. (see Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Linda J. Medcalf, American Ideologies Today: Shaping the New Politics of the 1990s. second edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993, p. 21.) This version of equality of opportunity is not very different from equality in outcome, which is consequential rather than procedural, while Rae's prospect- and means-regarding equalities of opportunity focus on equality in process.

approximates the means-regarding equality of opportunity because people should have the same instruments for attaining offices and positions. In practice, we cannot imagine the allocation of offices and positions being determined by, for instance, lottery rather than by people's talents and other attributes. As Rae says, prospect-regarding equal opportunity is rare in practice.[15]

Lastly, when discussing the reasoning for the principles, Rawls thinks of the principles as the maximin solution to the problem of social justice.[16] According to him, the term "maximin" refers to the "maximum minimorum"; it directs our attention to the worst possible outcomes under any proposed course of action, and we should make decisions in this light.[17]

2.1.1.2 Robert Nozick's Libertarian Theory

John Rawls has indeed provided a theoretical foundation for contemporary liberalism, which is committed to personal liberty and to reducing social inequalities. It is not surprising that he confronts many strong critics from philosophers outside this political tradition, but, among his most vigorous opponents has been Robert Nozick, a libertarian.

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[15] Douglas Rae, op. cit., p. 66.

[16] Ibid., pp. 150-161.

[17] Ibid., p. 154.

In his Anarchy, State, and Utopia,[18] Nozick presents perhaps the most important recent account of libertarianism. As a libertarian, Nozick puts individual liberty at the center of his theory of justice, but he challenges the assumption, common to liberal thought, that justice demands extensive redistribution of social and economic goods. Nozick contends, in his "entitlement theory",[19] that an individual is entitled to his personal talents and characteristics and to whatever goods he can obtain by using them, so long as the rights of others are not violated in the process. In other words, he argues, a distribution is just if it came about by a process in which goods or properties were acquired through actions that conform to 1) "the principle of justice in acquisition" and 2) "the principle of justice in transfer."[20]

The first principle specifies the ways in which an individual obtains unowned things without violating anyone else's rights, while the second principle states that one may justly transfer one's holdings to another through sale, exchange, or gift and that one is entitled to whatever one receives, so long as the person from whom one receives it was entitled to that good. According to his principles of justice, Nozick is absolutely anti-redistributive so that

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[18] Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974.

[19] Ibid., pp. 150-153.

[20] Ibid., p. 151.

one can expect, for instance, he would deny that the state may legitimately tax its citizens to accomplish redistribution of wealth.

Because of their appeal to follow a set of rules, both Rawls's and Nozick's theories are procedural global theories of justice, as opposed to substantive theories.[21] The best known substantive global theory is utilitarianism, which will be introduced next.

2.1.1.3 Utilitarianism

In the standard version of utilitarianism associated with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, alternative distributions of objects among individuals are evaluated entirely in terms of the utility or happiness of the members of the society.[22] For utilitarians a just distribution will be the one which results in the most happiness for society as a whole--the one maximizing total social utility or happiness, or, more simply, the one that would do the most good for the most people. Accordingly, the rightness of a distributive action or social policy is determined by its total consequences for all concerned. This makes utilitarianism a substantive theory of distributive justice.

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[21] Although Nozick calls Rawls's theory "end-result" (Nozick, ibid., pp. 198-204), Rawls's concept of justice is a process view. Deborah Stone provides two good reasons for this point in her Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Boston, MA: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988, p. 43.

[22] See Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam, Holland: North-Holland, 1985, pp. 157-158, cited from Morris Silver, Foundations of Economic Justice. Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 135.

Aside from this difference (of substantive versus procedural), utilitarianism differs from Rawlsian theory in that it is ready to allow some sacrifice to certain individuals for the sake of the greater good of all, and may also allow certain limitations of personal freedom which would be ruled out by Rawlsian principles.[23] An utilitarianist view differs from Nozick's in that, among other reasons, an utilitarian would hold that a redistribution of the means to produce happiness is right if it maximizes total social happiness, which is against Nozick's libertarian theory.[24]

2.1.2 Local Theories

Global theories of distribution are concerned with the overall design of human society, with special emphasis on developing a single set of criteria for all distribution. But, any one with a practical sense may argue that it is difficult and also impractical for us to accurately perceive a complex whole and, therefore, there is no need for us to derive our distributive principles from attempts to view society as a whole. Rather, the distribution of social goods should be examined in the light of principles solidly founded at the micro level. This is the reasoning behind

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[23] See J. J. C. Smart, "Distributive Justice and Utilitarianism." in John Arthur and William Shaw, op. cit., pp. 103-115.

[24] Ibid, p. 113.

local theories of distribution.

In his Local Justice,[25] Jon Elster provides a theoretical foundation for the idea of "local" justice. He contends that the term "local" has three meanings. First of all, "the word refers to the fact that different institutional sectors use different substantive principles of allocation."[26] Later, he suggests a different meaning: "allocative principles and practices can differ across countries, as well as across arenas."[27] At this point, he further argues that "Thus we can ask questions such as the following: is the allocation of medical resources in France (or China) more similar to the allocation of medical resources in the United States (or Taiwan) or to the allocation of university places in France (or China)? More generally, to what extent is allocation goods-specific and to what extent is it country-specific?"[28] Next, he proposes the third sense of "local": the allocative practices within a given arena in a given country are not uniform because local centers may "apply their own variants of the general scheme."[29]

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[25] Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens. 1992. Also see his Solomonic Judgements. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 67-92.

[26] Jon Elster, Local Justice. p. 3.

[27] Idem.

[28] Idem.

[29] Idem.

Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice introduces a conception of local justice similar to that of Elster. He contends that "there has never been a single criterion, or a single set of interconnected criteria, for all distribution".[30] He further argues, "it is the meaning of goods that determines their movement. Distributive criteria and arrangements are intrinsic not to the good-in-itself but to the social good. ... All distribution is just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at stake."[31]

Based on Elster and Walzer's ideas of local justice, we can develop two competing models of local principles of allocation:

(1) Principle is system-specific: each political system has developed one general principle from its "ethos" by which all types of goods, despite their differences in nature, are allocated uniformly. That is, ethos is the determinant of the principle of allocation. One of the logical derivations of this model is that the distributive justice would be more global than local if most political systems share the same ethos.

This model would be weakened if it is observed that various goods of a given society are allocated by different principles.

(2) Principle is goods-specific: it is the nature of

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[30] Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983, p. 4.

[31] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

the good in question that determines the principle of allocation. Therefore, any given political system would operate several, rather than one, principles to allocate goods with various natures, and for a given good the distributive principle would be universal across time and places (systems). The principle would be as well system-specific if, though impossible in reality, all goods in one system share the same nature.

This model would be discredited if it is found that a given good is allocated by different principles in different settings.

Lastly, according to local theories, a variety of local principles of justice have evolved to solve specific distributive problems. They are principles of:[32]

(1) need: resources are often given to those who need them most;

(2) productivity: goods are allocated to those who can produce the greatest benefit;

(3) absolute equality: goods that can be divided without losing their values are often divided equally among all

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[32] The following list of distributive principles is primarily based upon Jon Elster, Local Justice. the book, 1992, chapter III; and Local Justice. Unpublished manuscript, 1987, pp. 3-4. Two other books also contribute to this list: Nicholas Rescher, Distributive Justice: A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966 (esp. chapter IV), and Douglas Rae, Equalities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. There are many other complicated principles introduced in Elster's book; for details of these principles and their meanings, see chapter III.

applicants;

(4) lotteries: goods that can not be divided without losing values are often allocated by a lottery which gives all applicants an equal chance;

(5) rotation: goods are sometimes allocated by having everyone take turns, according to a predetermined order;

(6) queuing: scarce goods are often allocated on a first-come, first-served basis;

(7) seniority: allocation gives importance to the passing of time;

(8) merit: good is allocated to those who deserve it;

(9) contribution: allocated according to earlier contributions;

(10) status: allocated according to one's age, gender, sexual orientation, race, mental features, nobility, caste, occupation, religion, literacy, civil status, family status, residence status, and so on;

(11) market: resources are left to be allocated by private sectors through the market place;

(12) influence: sometimes, scarce goods are distributed to those who have political power or informal connection;

(13) correct thinking: some times, people are awarded for their ideological or religious attitudes; and

(14) mixed principles: in many actual cases several principles can be combined and mixed in numerous ways.

2.1.3 Causal Chains of Distributive Outcomes

Any theory of distribution will be incomplete without considering the outcomes of allocation. For this sake, Douglas Rae proposes a model of causally linked domains of allocation, which states that the outcome of one allocation is affected not only by the principle being applied but also the antecedent allocations of other resources (e.g., wealth, political influence, connection, and genetic advantages) and/or some fixed individuals' characteristics (e.g., loyalty to the regime, race, and gender.)[33] Thus, the application of the principle of equality does not necessarily lead to equal outcomes, because previous allocations of other goods could make the outcomes less equal.

One can derive several hypotheses from Rae's causal strings of allocation:

(a). Resource allocation is discriminating against those people who are economically poor and/or politically uninfluential.

(b). Resource allocation is discriminating against those people who are minority and/or female.

These outcome-related hypotheses and both theories of distribution will be examined in the light of allocative practices of the two Chinas.

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[33] Douglas Rae, ibid., pp. 61-62. Michael Walzer has similar discussions on the causal strings of allocation in his Spheres of Justice, pp. 10-13.

2.2 Research Query

More specifically, this study attempts to answer one set of questions on how the two Chinese governments allocate resources, and another set of questions on how the Chinese allocative practices correspond to the theories of distributive justice.

2.2.1 Descriptive Questions

The first set contains descriptive questions on the two systems of resource allocation. That is, what principles are employed to allocate what types of resources in the two Chinese regimes in the past four decades, and which ones are used more frequently than others over time? Would we find, for instance, that the Nationalist government employs the principles of equality and need in some cases, but merit, efficiency, and productivity in other cases? Moreover, does the principle change not only from case to case, but also over time? In allocating these resources, how often are the "consequentialist" principles of need, public utility, and productivity being used, compared to the principle of equality, and mixed principles? In addition to allocation by the principles of distributive justice, we also want to know whether any resource is left to be allocated through the market place, or the more political process of bargaining.

2.2.2 Comparative and Theoretical Questions

Going beyond the descriptive questions, this study will also address more theoretical questions. It will contrast the theories of distribution with Chinese practices of allocation.

Since the normative arguments of the global theories attempt to prescribe, rather than describe, the distributive problems, they are untestable in form. What I would like to do is to study how the Chinese allocative experiences theoretically correspond to them. In so doing, I will ask the following questions: can we identify a single or a fixed set of allocative principles (which is the common ground shared by the three global theories) from the Chinese practices, if any, what are they, and which of the three normative theories is theoretically more congruent with the practices and why?

There are three questions concerning the local principles of allocation. First, why is a particular principle employed by a particular institution in a particular society at a particular time and place to allocate a particular good?[34] Can we identify the historical, cultural, and socio-political roots of these principles? Are they part of the legacies of China's imperial past, or are they products of conscious borrowing from the West, or are they an unintended mixture? Second,

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[34] This question is derived from Jon Elster (1992) , op. cit., p. 135.

focusing on one political system at a time, I will ask a related question of whether there is a specific "ethos" of allocation in this society; and if so, whether it is based upon a confucian hierarchical order and benevolent paternalism in the two Chinese societies, or Communist egalitarianism in China, or Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People" in Taiwan, or the more growth-oriented state capitalism of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), and why this is the case? That is, whether or not the principles are system-specific. Third, I will also ask whether there is a specific principle (e.g., merit) used to allocate a particular type of resource (e.g., educational resources and civil service recruitment) in both China and Taiwan in the past forty years; that is, whether the principles are problem-specific. Finally, if the principles are neither society-specific nor problem-specific, then I will see whether or not there are other allocative patterns that can be identified, and how they correspond to the theory of distributive justice.

Focusing on the comparisons between China and Taiwan, this project will, more specifically, investigate the following sets of questions.

(1) If the principles are system-specific, given that China has become a divided country for four decades, do China and Taiwan share the same principles that have dominated their allocative practices? If the answer is yes, then I will further inquire whether this is due to the fact

that the divergence in political ideologies is overwhelmed by cultural similarities or because of other reasons (e.g., foreign influences, and socialist ingredients in the "Three Principles of People"). If the answer is no (i.e., each of the two regimes has its own distinctive, society-specific principles), then I want to investigate whether that is because the common historical and cultural backgrounds shared by the two Chinese societies have been overwhelmed by their divergent political ideologies, or because they have very specific practical political considerations upon which their allocative decisions have been based. If their common backgrounds are indeed outweighed by their divergent political ideologies, I would like to examine the extent to which their political ideologies have guided the allocative practices.

(2) If the principles are not society-specific, are they problem-specific? If so, are there any significant differences between China and Taiwan? That is, are the same allocative problems in China and Taiwan solved in different ways? Can these differences, if there are any, be attributed to the ideological confrontation which existed between the two Chinese governments in the past forty years?

(3) If the principles are neither society-specific nor problem-specific, are there any identifiable patterns of resource allocations of the two Chinas?

As for the outcome of allocation, I would like to inquire whether the outcomes of one allocation is affected

by the previous allocations of other resources and in what way (for example, whether or not one's chance to be recruited as a civil servant is affected by one's family and educational background). Furthermore, I will identify the beneficiaries and victims of the uneven distribution of resources (caused by Rae's causal chains of allocation), and also explore the political consequences of this inequality and the governments' responses to it.

To mitigate unequal distribution of resources, governments often adopt some remedial policies (e.g., affirmative action in the United States) which are against the principle of meritocratic equality. But these preferential policies may generate more equal distribution of outcomes. The effects and political implications of these preferential policies will also be investigated in this study.

Finally, on the basis of the above comparative and theoretical questions, we can specify the hypotheses and variables involved in the study. Actually, the following discussion is a methodological note that should be included in the research design section in chapter one. We choose to discuss these hypotheses and variables here simply because they would be better specified after the introduction of the above research questions.

Briefly put, this study is expected to throw light on the following three theoretical queries derived from theories of distributive justice: 1) whether the principles

of distributive justice are "global" or "local" in the cases examined; 2) whether the principles are system-specific or goods-specific; and 3) whether or not Douglas Rae's causally linked domains of allocation has any empirical credibility. Clearly, the key variables are the two explained variables of allocative principle and outcome, and several explanatory variables such as political system, good, social class, race, and gender.

Before we proceed to discuss the variables, it should be noted that, as mentioned in chapter one, this study is not going to be a statistical testing which conclusively proves the supremacy of one theory over the other through a deductive, hypothesis-testing process. Rather, it merely seeks to shed some light on the theories through a comparative examination on the practices of allocation.

Among the variables mentioned above, the variable of principle deserves closer attention. As indicated earlier, there are various local principles of allocation; each principle emphasizes one aspect of the distributive justice. One question that arises is how we will know which principle is used in a certain allocative problem? The main sources we rely on for examination are 1) legal and administrative documents published by the governments in which the principle to be used is sometimes self-proclaimed; and 2) policy-related studies and commentaries of the institutional history of the researched policy area for not only its historical background, evolution, but also its outcome and

impact. The second type of sources can help us identify the involved principles from a large context.

Another related question is how we know the self-proclaimed principles in legal documents (policy outputs) match the allocative practices (policy outcomes)? To find out whether this indeed is the case, we plan to look through relevant case studies for actual administrative practice (policy implementation) and outcomes to make sure the proclaimed principles have been applied, or to determine the real principles involved.

Outcomes of allocation (or who gets what), the second explained variable, can be analyzed through statistical reports and relevant studies on the researched policy areas.

The explanatory variables of the types of system and good have been specified earlier in chapter one. These two variables plus the variable of principle constitute a three-dimensional research matrix for this study.

As for other explanatory variables, social class is both politically and economically defined in China, while it has mainly economical meaning in Taiwan. In both societies, social class and two other variables--race and gender--are quite concrete and they are often specified in administrative documents, relevant studies, and statistical reports. When referring to these sources, though examples from subnational levels of governments will also be drawn upon, the primary focus will be on the central governments.

CHAPTER THREE

HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA

As one of the vital social goods for social life, education has always been the policy area in which contemporary governments have carved out important functions. Governments of all kinds, democratic and non-democratic alike, play a key role in allocating educational resources to insure their basic provisions to the people. China is no exception.

Throughout the history of the People's Republic of China, education has always been of the most important policy areas that receive priority attention from the top leaders. Before the late 1970s, especially during the period of the Cultural Revolution, education was viewed as a redistributive mechanism that favored the proletarian classes (of workers, peasants, and soldiers).

With the death of Mao Tse-tung and the fall of the Gang of Four (four radical leaders led by Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife) in 1976, and the dramatic return to power of Teng Hsiao-p'ing in 1978, Chinese politics embarked upon a new era. These political changes have brought about drastic and significant changes in a variety of Chinese policies in the drive toward the "four modernizations" (in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense). Perhaps the most dramatic changes have taken place in China's educational policy, especially in higher education. Not

many other issues drew comparable attention in the 1977-78 campaign to rebuke the "Gang of Four", and few other sphere of public policies since Mao's death was so quick to be overhauled. In the post-Mao era higher education has been seen as vital to economic success; it is viewed more as a developmental tool than as a redistributive mechanism that favored the proletarian classes during the Cultural Revolution.

To explore the Chinese allocation system of the higher educational resources, this chapter will study the scarcity of the resources in China, the mechanisms and principles employed by the state to allocate them, and the allocation outcomes.

As indicated in chapter one, the resources analyzed in this chapter primarily refer to spaces in colleges and universities, but our analysis of higher educational resources should not be limited to only general college admission policy. After investigating the allocation of college spaces in the first four sections, we will turn to another resource that is allocated to students who have won the spaces: college fellowships.

3.1 Scarcity of Higher Educational Resources

For the entire Maoist period in China, college students enjoyed free tuition, and even free room and board during

their study. Moreover, they were guaranteed jobs after graduation. Usually, college graduates were recruited as low-ranking cadres through an appointment system (the details of which will be discussed in chapter five). Therefore, higher education has become so attractive and desirable that almost every high school graduate wishes to get into colleges and universities after graduation. However, like in most other societies, higher educational resources in China are always scarce.

Before discussing the degree of scarcity of the higher educational resources, we must first give a brief introduction to the Chinese higher education system. Before 1949, when the People's Republic of China was established, the higher education system was composed of both private and public institutions. After 1949, all institutions of higher learning were nationalized and reorganized in order to adjust higher education to China's socialist goals of development and modernization.[1]

Since the early 1950s, there have been three levels of higher educational institutions in China.[2] At the top level are the key (or "keypoint") colleges and universities, such as Peking (Beijing) University and Ch'inghua University,

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[1] See John N. Hawkins, "The People's Republic of China" in R. Murray Thomas and T. Neville Postlethwaite, eds., Schooling in East Asia: Forces of Change. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983, pp. 153-154.

[2] The following discussions of the three levels of Chinese institutions of higher learning are based on ibid., p. 154.

which are under direct control of the Ministry of Education. These universities are extremely selective in student recruitment, and are much better off in terms of facilities and faculty quality. Currently, there are 97 keypoint universities.[3]

The middle level is made up of many regular composite and polytechnical colleges and universities managed at the provincial level. Compared with the keypoint schools, they are less selective but still very prestigious. They offer the same curriculum and degrees as the keypoint schools. Each year candidates with the highest entrance examination's scores are admitted to the keypoint institutions; those with the next highest scores are admitted to these regular institutions.

The bottom level consists of numerous district colleges in the cities and various post-secondary institutions in the rural areas. The district colleges are similar in many respects to community colleges in the United States.

Higher educational resources discussed in this chapter refer to the resources provided by institutions at the first two levels. In 1991 there were 1,075 colleges and universities at these two levels, enrolling more than two

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[3] For a complete list of these keypoint universities, see Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 222-223. Twenty-six of these universities have been specially designated as "keypoints among the keypoints", which are identical with twenty-six universities singled out as the recipients of the first World Bank loan to China.

million students. (see Table 3.1 below)

Since 1949 higher education in China has grown more rapidly than any other levels of education. As shown in Table 3.1, there were only 205 colleges and universities enrolling 117,000 students in 1949. Four decades later, the number of institutions had grown to more than 1,000, with about 2 million students. However, the increases in both categories did not proceed smoothly but was accomplished with many twists and turns over the years. The number of institutions of 1983 was even lower than that of 1959, while the number of enrollment of 1977 was also lower than that of 1959. Moreover, the decrease in enrollment was quite conspicuous during the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976). Between 1966 and 1969 Higher education was completely suspended. When colleges and universities resumed operations in 1970, enrollment fell to the lowest level. There were only 83,000 students in 1971, 34,000 students fewer than in 1949. Since 1977, the year after the end of the Cultural Revolution, higher education has grown rapidly in terms of both enrollment and number of institutions.

There are four ratios we can use to demonstrate the level of scarcity of higher education, namely, enrollment per 10,000 population, acceptance rate of total applicants, ratio of accepted students to high school graduates, and enrollment percentage of college-age population. First of all, even after a constant expansion in enrollment during

TABLE 3.1

Growth of Higher Education in China, 1949-1991:
Institutions and Student Enrollment
(in thousands)

Year	Number of Institutions	Total Enrollment	Enrollment per 10,000 Population
1949	205	117	2.2
1953	181	212	3.6
1956	227	403	6.4
1959	841	812	12.1
1962	610	830	12.3
1965	434	674	9.3
1968	434	259	3.3
1971	328	83	1.0
1974	378	430	4.7
1977	404	625	6.6
1980	675	1,144	11.6
1983	805	1,207	11.7
1986	1,054	1,880	17.5
1987	1,063	1,959	17.9
1988	1,075	2,066	18.6
1989	1,075	2,082	18.5
1990	1,075	2,063	18.0
1991	1,075	2,044	17.7

Sources:

1) The 1949-1983 figures are cited from Department of Planning, Ministry of Education, People's Republic of China, Achievement of Education in China, 1949-1983. Beijing, China: People's Education press, 1984, pp. 20-23.

2) The 1986-1991 numbers are extracted from Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Kuo-chia T'ung-chi Chü [State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China], Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992 [Statistical Yearbook of China, 1992]. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press, 1992, pp. 699 & 702.

3) The calculation of the enrollment per 10,000 population is based on the total population figures in Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 77.

the post-Mao era, there were only 17.7 colleges students per 10,000 population in 1991 (see Table 3.1). As for the acceptance rate, Table 3.2 indicates that when the first post-Cultural Revolution entrance examination took place in December 1977, only 4.79% of the candidates passed the examination, and in 1993 28.57%, or about one out of every four participants was accepted. The ratio of accepted students to high school graduates parallels the acceptance rate: in 1991 the ratio was .28 to 1.[4] The last ratio is the enrollment percentage of college-age population. In 1977 this ratio was 1%, which is much lower than the average ratio of middle-income developing countries (11%) and also slightly lower than that of low-income developing countries (3%).[5] Although the ratio went up to 1.6% in 1987,[6] it is still behind the 1977 average ratio of the poorest countries in the world.

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[4] There were 2.23 million high school graduates in 1991. See Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Kuo-chia T'ung-chi Chu [State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China], Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992 [Statistical Yearbook of China, 1992]. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press, 1992, p. 731.

[5] See Susan Shirk, "The Evolution of Chinese Education: Stratification and Meritocracy in the 1980s." in Norton Ginsbury and Bernard A. Lalor, China: The 80s Era. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, p. 254.

[6] It is estimated that there were 121.5 million people between 20 to 24 years old in 1987. This estimation is based on information from Chung-kuo Ta-lu Wen-t'i Yen-chiu Chung-hsin [Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems], Chung-kung Nien-pao, 1990 [Yearbook on Chinese Communism, 1990]. Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Communism Study Magazine House, 1990, p. 1-77. In the same year, there were 1.96 million college students (see Table 3.1).

TABLE 3.2

Scarcity of Higher Educational Resources in China, 1977-1993: Number of Applicants, Number of Applicants Accepted, and Acceptance Rate

Year	Number of Applicants	Number of Applicants Accepted	Acceptance Rate
1977	5,700,000	272,971	4.79%
1978	6,000,000	401,521	6.69%
1979	4,684,000	275,099	5.87%
1980	3,320,000	281,230	8.47%
1981	2,589,000	278,777	10.77%
1982	1,860,000	315,135	16.94%
1983	1,670,000	390,800	23.40%
1984	1,643,000	475,171	28.92%
1985	n.a.	619,235	n.a.
1986	n.a.	572,055	n.a.
1987	n.a.	616,822	n.a.
1988	n.a.	669,731	n.a.
1989	n.a.	597,113	n.a.
1990	n.a.	608,850	n.a.
1991	n.a.	619,874	n.a.
1992	n.a.	625,000*	n.a.
1993	2,800,000	800,000	28.57%

* estimated number.

Sources: The 1977-1984 numbers of applicants are based from Stanley Rosen, "Recentralization, Decentralization, and Rationalization: Deng Xiaoping's Bifurcated Educational Policy." Modern China. vol. 11, no. 3 (July 1985): p. 312. The 1977-1991 numbers of accepted applicants are cited from Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 709. The 1992 figure is from China Daily. Beijing, China, November 7, 1991. The figures of 1993 are based on Shih-chieh Jih-pao [World Journal]. New York, July 30, 1993, D16.

In sum, though higher education in China has expanded rapidly since 1949, especially since the late 1970s, it is still a very scarce resource. Compared with other countries, it may not be very scarce in terms of the acceptance ratio, but in terms of either the enrollment ratio per 10,000 population or the enrollment percentage of college-age population, China's higher education is probably at the highest level of scarcity in the world.

3.2 Distributive Mechanisms

There have been several changes in the evolution of Chinese higher education since 1949. The mechanisms used to distribute the higher education resources varied from one period of time to another, depending upon the political situation in that particular period. In general, the fluctuations in the employment of mechanisms can be examined in the following three periods: the beginning of the development of higher education under communist rule from 1949 to 1966; the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period from 1966 to 1976; and lastly, the post-Cultural Revolution era from 1976 to the present.

3.2.1 Pre-Cultural Revolution Period (1949-1966)

In the years before the Cultural Revolution, the system of higher education in China was greatly influenced by the

Soviet experience, and was seen in terms of its importance to the national economic development. During this early period, selection of college students was based upon highly competitive entrance examinations. They were conventional closed-book, written examinations which emphasized general knowledge in the areas of Chinese, foreign languages, politics, mathematics, history, geography, physics, chemistry, and biology.[7]

The examination system was supposed to be open to all, but in fact in 1953 and again in 1958 the Ministry of Higher Education required applicants to be politically acceptable. "Anti-revolutionaries", "anti-Party and anti-socialism elements", "elements with inferior quality", and "other bad elements" were barred from sitting for the examinations.[8]

As a whole, the system of higher education during this period had been amended from time to time. Each college was first permitted to recruit new students independently, but,

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[7] Initially, only the first seven disciplines were designated as tested areas; see excerpts of Regulations on Admitting New Students into Institutions of Higher Education in Summer 1950 in Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Chiao-yu Pu [Ministry of Education, People's Republic of China], Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982 [Major Events in Chinese Education, 1949-1982]. Beijing, China: Educational Science Press, 1983, p. 18. The Regulations have been promulgated by the Ministry of Education (State Commission of Education after 1982) every year since 1950. Biology was added to the list of tested areas in 1953; see excerpts of the 1953 Regulations in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982. p. 80.

[8] See Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien Pien-chi Pu [Editing Department of China Educational Yearbook], Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1949-1981 [China Educational Yearbook, 1949-1981], Beijing, China: China Great Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1982, p. 337.

a few years later, all colleges were required to admit students collectively and simultaneously.[9] Despite these changes, one element that persisted in the system during this seventeen-year period was the use of college entrance examinations.

3.2.2 During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)

At the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, formal education at all levels were suspended (between 1966-1969). The entrance examinations, which put a premium on academic knowledge, were abolished in 1966, since it was thought to run against the class line of the proletariat and constituted a profound discrimination against students from worker-peasant-soldier (kung-nung-ping) families.[10] When colleges and universities resumed operations in 1970, they were ordered to apply Mao's policy of "education serving proletarian politics and education being combined with

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[9] For original documents concerning the pre-Cultural Revolution policy fluctuations, see excerpts of the 1950-1966 regulations on admissions of institutions of higher education in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982. pp. 18-400. For useful secondary analysis, see Hsüeh-wen Wang, Higher Education on China Mainland Since Cultural Revolution, Taipei, Taiwan: Asian People's Anti-Communist League, 1980, pp. 51-53.

[10] For official criticisms to and abolition of the entrance examination system, see excerpts of the 1966's Notice on Reforming the Method of Entrance Examinations of Institutions of Higher Education (June 13) and Notice on Reforming Admission Work of Institutions of Higher Education (July 24) in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982, pp. 401 & 404, respectively.

productive labor."[11] There were four steps in the process of application for admission: 1) application by the worker, peasant, or soldier with two or more years of practical work experience; 2) recommendation by the masses (referring to the workers-peasants-soldiers of the production unit in which the candidate had labor experience); 3) approval of the local "leading body" (which means the party organization and the revolutionary committee of the locality); and 4) final acceptance by the school authority.[12] Therefore, admission decision was made on a selective, rather than competitive, basis.

When admitting students on this selective basis, authorities focused, almost exclusively, on class origin, ideological-political qualification and labor experience. For instance, the 1970's Peking and Ch'inghua Universities' Report on Admission, which was ratified by the central

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[11] Quoted from Shi Ming Hu and Eli Seifman, eds., Education and Socialist Modernization, New York: AMS Press, 1987, p. 30.

[12] For more of this process, see Theodore Hsi-en Chen, The Maoist Educational Revolution. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974, p. 140; and ibid., p. 31. Theodore Chen's book is one of the most authoritative studies on the education of Maoist China; chapter 7 of his book details the radical changes in higher education in Maoist China.

Steps 2, 3, and 4 of the application process were first mentioned in the 1970's Peking and Ch'inghua Universities' Report on Admission (Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982, p. 433). The report stated that three years after all universities and colleges were suspended, these two prestigious universities had been equipped with new conditions for admission and, therefore, ready to admit new students in the second half of 1970. This report was later ratified by the authority of the Party and sent to all areas for implementation.

authority and sent to all local areas for their reference, specified the kinds of students to be admitted: workers, poor-lower-middle peasants, soldiers and young cadres who possess good political thoughts, healthy body, three or more years of practical experience, an age of 20 years or so, and having at least junior high education.[13] From the above, it is clear that very little consideration was given to one's academic, intellectual achievements and, therefore, the children of nonproletarian families (e.g., intellectual and bourgeois families) had little chance of being admitted.

Due to the chaotic state of the Cultural Revolution period, many cadres had abused their authority to send their children into colleges through the "backdoor".[14] In sum, the result of this new system was a drastic decline in both the quality and the quantity of Chinese higher education.[15]

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[13] See Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982, p. 433.

[14] For details of the backdoor problem, see excerpts of the Notice on Eliminating the Phenomenon of Walking through Backdoor in the Admission Work of Institutions of Higher Education in ibid., pp. 442-443.

[15] As shown is Table 3.1, the enrollment dropped from 674,000 in 1965 to 83,000 in 1971. This decrease is largely due to the fact that many professors were purged and facilities were damaged during the first several years of the Cultural Revolution.

3.2.3 Post-Cultural Revolution Period (1976 to the present)

The first significant change in higher education policy came in August 1977, after the downfall of the "Gang of Four", when Teng Hsiao-p'ing, then Vice Chair of the Party, proposed a reform on the admission policy.[16] In October, it was formally announced by the State Council that entrance examinations will be the primary mechanism used to select college students in the future.[17] As a vital step toward restoring educational quality, the implementation of examinations ensures that only the most academically capable students will be admitted into the colleges.

The first post-Cultural Revolution examination took place in December 1977, when the examinations were set and administered by individual provinces. Since 1978, as before the Cultural Revolution, the examinations have been unified on a national base, administered and given out by the Ministry of education (State Commission of Education after

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[16] See Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1949-1981 [China Educational Yearbook, 1949-1981], Beijing, China: China Great Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1982, p. 338.

[17] On October 12, 1977, the State Council approved the Ministry of Education's Opinions on the 1977's Admission Work of the Institutions of Higher Education, which clearly proposed the resumption of the entrance examinations. For details, see Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982, p. 499.

1982) every July throughout the country.[18] Competition has been very keen. According to the information in Table 3.2, the 1977 examinations attracted 5.7 million applicants, and only one in every twenty was accepted. As mentioned earlier, candidates with the highest entrance examination's scores are admitted to the keypoint universities; those with the next highest scores are admitted to the regular, mostly provincial colleges and universities.

Eligibility requirements to take the examinations have limited the number of prospective applicants. According to the 1977 policy, applicants should have a high school diploma to participate in the examinations.[19] It seems like a reasonable requirement, but in reality not everyone with a high school diploma is free to take the examination. For instance, employees of state and collective enterprises (even though they may have graduated from high school for only one year) must first have permission from their work unit leaders, and graduates of middle professional and technical schools are not allowed to take the examination unless they have two or more years of working experience after graduation and also permission from unit leaders. Without being granted permission, these potential students

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[18] See Opinions on the 1977's Admission Work of the Institutions of Higher Education and Opinions on the 1978's Admission Work of the Institutions of Higher Education and Middle Professional Schools in ibid., pp. 499 & 519, respectively.

[19] Idem.

who may be academically eligible to compete are deprived of their educational rights and eliminated from the competition before it begins.[20]

The 1977 regulations also required that applicants be single, healthy and not older than 25. But the age requirement was flexible. The maximum age limit was extended to 30 for those applicants who had demonstrated "good work performance and superior learning".[21] These relatively older applicants were among the so-called "lost generation" of the Cultural Revolution, who had been deprived of opportunities to go on to higher education as a result of the school closing at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.[22]

In the next few years, the age requirement underwent several changes. In 1979 the age limit was extended only up to 28 for those who had good political performances. In 1982 the limit returned to 25 with no extension.[23] However, in 1983 it was once again extended up to 28 for politically

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[20] According to the regulations, school teachers can only apply for normal universities and colleges when taking the examination. This also limits the number of prospective applicants. For detailed description of the eligibility requirements, see Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1949-1981, p. 339.

[21] Idem.

[22] For commentaries on the entire 1977-79 eligibility requirements, see Shi Ming Hu and Eli Seifman, op. cit., p. 32; Theodore Hsi-en Chen, Chinese Education Since 1949. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981, p. 181; and Susan Pepper, op. cit., p. 16.

[23] Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1949-1981, p. 339.

qualified applicants, and the rule on the marital status was also flexible for these applicants.[24]

The two-year work experience prior to college has been dropped since 1977, but other qualifications are still being considered. The post-Mao emphasis on merit does not mean that political criteria in selecting college students have vanished. In fact, applicants for admission still need to pass political evaluations conducted by the Party organizations within their schools, factories, enterprises, or neighborhoods. But the political evaluations are supposed to be based upon the applicants' own political performances rather than their family backgrounds.[25]

The Ministry of Education has regularly issued a report (or opinion) on college admission each year after 1977. These official documents only provide us with the general rules and practices of admission work in one particular year, rather than a set of legal provisions that systematically and continuously regulate the operations of college admission. This much needed legal document was not made until 1987. On April 27, the Provisional Regulations on Admissions in Ordinary Institutions of Higher Educational was promulgated by the State Commission of Education.[26]

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[24] Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1982-1984, p. 145.

[25] For more about the political evaluations, see Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1949-1981, p. 340.

[26] For the complete contents (including 12 chapters and 62 articles) of the regulation, see Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien Pien-chi Pu [Editing Department of China Educational

This official document reconfirms the previous requirements of high school diploma, health, marital status, and age.[27] More importantly, the overall political evaluations of the applicants are still essential in this legal document. The political evaluations will be provided by the applicant's school or work unit which keeps files on all students or employees.[28] Little concrete information is available regarding the political criteria, except that to be eligible to take the examination, a candidate must support the "four cardinal principles"[29], love the country, observe discipline, and study hard for the socialist modernization.[30] The 1987 regulation specifically rules

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Yearbook], Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1988 [China Educational Yearbook, 1988]. Beijing, China: People's Education Press, 1988, pp. 464-470.

[27] Article 9 of the 1987 regulation, see ibid., p. 465.

[28] Article 16 of the 1987 regulation, see ibid., p. 466.

[29] The "four cardinal principles", as the most important political guidelines in the post-Mao China, call for adherence to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought, to the people's democratic dictatorship, and to the socialist road. These principles were first proposed by Teng Hsiao-ping in the spring of 1979 and since then they have been frequently reemphasized by all Party leaders. In addition, there is a similar definition of the "four cardinal principle"; that is "upholding the leadership of the Communist Party, preserving the general structure of the Chinese state, following a socialist course in economic development, and maintaining Marxism as the official ideology of the nation." (see Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987, pp. 182-83.) Compared with the first definition, this one has been infrequently referred to.

[30] Article 9 of the 1987 regulation, see Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1988, p. 465.

that those candidates who have opposed the "four cardinal principles" should not be admitted.[31]

Both the 1977 and 1987 regulations, two of the most important documents regarding post-Mao higher education, state that the political evaluations for college admissions are supposed to pertain only to the applicant's own political attitude and general character.[32] Officially, an applicant's class background, and family criminal and political history are no longer relevant in determining college admissions.[33] However, one article of the 1987 regulation still stresses the importance of investigating the political problems of the candidate's parents or major "social connections", which refer to those who have direct political and economic relations to the candidate.[34]

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[31] Article 17, see ibid., p. 466.

[32] Article 15 of the 1987 regulation, see ibid., p. 466.

[33] In 1979 the Central committee of Chinese Communist Party determined to eliminate almost entirely the categories and class designations that had been discriminated against, not just in college admissions but in all kinds of social activities. The practice of discriminating against the children of political "bad elements" in such as admission to school, job assignment, joining the army, Party and Young League, was denounced as abnormal and imperfect. For details, see Suzanne Pepper, op. cit., p. 19.

[34] Article 16 of the 1987 regulation, see ibid., p. 466.

3.2.4 Preferential Policies during the Post-Cultural Revolution Period

A number of preferential policies are currently implemented in favor of candidates with certain special performance and background. In fact, these policies were first adopted as early as 1950. According to the 1950 regulation on college admission, special preference would be given to those candidates with special performance and background, including workers, revolutionary cadres and soldiers with three or more years of work experience, minority students, and overseas students.[35] One year later, the 1951 regulation added that cadres with peasant-worker background were also eligible to receive favorable treatment if they had participated in the revolution for more than five years.[36] After 1951, this kind of special background was continuously emphasized in the college admission regulations promulgated in 1955, 1958, 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1965.[37]

Also in 1955, the Ministry of Education issued The Guidelines on Enrollment in the Institutions of Higher Education, according to which the following five categories of candidates were to be preferentially accepted when they

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[35] See Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982. 1983, p. 18.

[36] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[37] For regulations made in these six particular years, see ibid., pp. 132, 226, 292, 310, 333. and 380, respectively.

completed the examinations: 1) production workers; 2) children of workers and peasants, and cadres of worker and peasant origin; 3) retired soldiers; 4) students from minority peoples; and 5) overseas Chinese students.[38]

Compared with the admission policies of the two previous periods, the entire post-Cultural Revolution system of higher education seems to profess a stronger adherence to a specific principle of equality, according to which, the examinations should be open to all and everyone is essentially equal before marks. However, special preference has been given to those candidates with special performance and background, including politically excellent students, distinguished athletes, minority students, Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and other overseas areas, demobilized soldiers, children of martyrs, and children of diplomats. Similar to these groups of candidates, severely disadvantaged rural children face lower standards when taking the examinations.

The details of each of these preferential policies will be discussed in the following pages. Most preferential treatments are depicted in the 1987 Regulations and several other documents promulgated earlier.

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[38] Robert Taylor, China's Intellectual Dilemma: Politics and University Enrollment, 1949-1978. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1981, p. 33.

3.2.4.1 Politically Excellent Students

According to the 1987 regulation, the following types of students will be given preferential treatment when they take the examinations: the "three good" students,[39] distinguished student cadres, and those students with outstanding performances in areas of political thoughts and virtues.[40] The preferential treatment could be either that the acceptance threshold of the entrance examination will be lowered for these politically excellent students or that they will be given priority only when they have basically the same academic and physical qualifications as others. It is up to the province-level admission committees to decide which treatment should be adopted.[41]

It appears that in provinces where the second type of treatment is adopted, one's political qualifications carry not much weight, but in reality it could be a crucial,

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[39] "Three good students" refer to students good in labor, academic work, and attitude. The status of "three good student" has been a honorary reward not just for studies, but also for the student's politics. These kinds of students are to serve as models for their classmates to emulate. For details, see Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, pp. 72-73.

[40] See Article 35 of the 1987 regulation in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1988. p. 468. This preferential policy was frequently addressed in many previous regulations, such as the 1981, 1982 (see Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982, pp. 606 & 650) and 1983 regulations (see Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily]. Beijing, China, March 17, 1983).

[41] Idem. The 1987 Regulation on Admissions does not specify how to lower the threshold; it is also within the discretion of the province-level admission committees.

determining factor because many applicants might share the same test score when taking this highly competitive examination. In situations like this, the politically excellent students are more likely, if not always, to win the places.

In addition, a lower acceptance threshold is also applicable to outstanding youths with much working experience and to those citizens who have made special contributions.[42]

3.2.4.2 Distinguished Athletes

Student athletes who performed well in regional competitions could be admitted 20 points lower than the general applicant pool. The mark will be lowered by as many as 50 points if the competition was at the national and international levels.[43]

3.2.4.3 Minority Students

Depending upon local situations, minority students from frontier areas, mountainous areas, pastoral areas, and minority autonomous regions can be accepted with lower thresholds when taking the examinations. As for minority students from regular areas, the official policy is that they will be given priority if they have basically the same academic and physical qualifications as regular students.[44]

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[42] Article 40 of the 1987 regulation, ibid., p. 468.

[43] Article 36 of the 1987 regulation, idem.

[44] Article 37 of the 1987 regulation, idem.

In addition, some higher education institutions hold one-year preparatory program for minority students who have narrowly failed the entrance examinations. In these institutions, fixed quota places are reserved for the them, no matter how poorly they perform in the examinations. This one-year program aims to prepare them for the formal four-year study. To be formally admitted, they have to pass the examinations (or other qualifying examinations) after one year's study.[45]

3.2.4.4 Overseas Chinese

According to the 1987 regulation, overseas Chinese and Mainland students of Taiwan origin are eligible for lower admission thresholds.[46] Although this legal document fails to specify any preferential treatment to students from Taiwan (who are different from students of Taiwan origin), Hong Kong, and Macao, it is evident that students from these three areas have also benefited from certain preferential policies.[47]

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[45] See Regulations on the 1981 Admission Work of the Institutions of Higher Education in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Ta-shih-chi, 1949-1982, p. 606. For detailed examples of this preparatory program, see Peter Mauger, "Changing Policy and Practice in Chinese Rural Education." The China Quarterly no. 93 (March 1981): p. 143.

[46] Article 38 of the 1987 regulation in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1988, p. 468.

[47] See Suzanne Pepper op. cit., p. 22, and Shi Ming Hu and Eli Seifman op. cit., pp. 31-32.

3.2.4.5 Demobilized Soldiers and Children of Martyrs

Ordinary demobilized soldiers will be given priority when they have basically the same academic and physical qualifications as regular students. Meritorious demobilized soldiers and children of martyrs (those who died for the communist revolution) are qualified to be judged by lower thresholds.[48]

3.2.4.6 Other Special Candidates

According to one study, preference is also given to the children of diplomats working abroad and in Hong Kong.[49] However, this preferential policy can not be identified in the above-quoted official documents.

In addition, there are three other categories of candidates who are subject to some preferential treatment. They are different from the above five types of special candidates in that they do not have any special background, nor any prior contribution and performance. They are special because of the reasons to be discussed next.

1) There has been an admission program called "fixed admission, fixed distribution" in China's higher educational policy, according to which a fixed number of spaces in colleges and universities can be given to those candidates who willingly agree, after graduation, to be distributed by the government to work in one of the designated backward

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[48] Article 39 of the 1987 regulation in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1988, p. 468.

[49] See Suzanne Pepper, ibid., p. 22.

areas. Participants of this program can enjoy a 20-point-lower threshold.[50] It is clear that the purpose of this program is to encourage college graduates to work in those underdeveloped areas in order to reduce the degree of polarization in national development.

2) In accordance with one study, students from areas with a weak educational development can be given priority.[51] Similar to this, one article of the 1987 regulation stipulates that students from areas with difficult living conditions have a 20-point-lower acceptance threshold.[52]

3) Most college students in China are publicly supported. They enjoy free tuition, and even free room and board during their studies. However, they are subject to the national system of job assignment after graduation. Since 1985, students have been allowed to pursue their own career after graduation on the condition that they are supported by themselves or by their families through the four years of studies.[53] According to the 1987 regulation, students who indicate that they, once being admitted, will

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[50] Article 42 of the 1987 regulation in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1988, pp. 468-469.

[51] Suzanne Pepper, ibid., p. 22.

[52] Article 43 in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1988, p. 469.

[53] For examples of self-supported students, see Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Kuang-ming Daily]. Beijing, China, February 3, 1989, included in Chung-kuo Jen-min Ta-hsüeh Shu-pao Tzu-liao Chung-hsin [Books and Newspapers Data Center, People's University of China], Fu-yin Pao-k'an Tzu-liao [Reprinted Data of Newspapers and Periodicals]. March, 1989, pp. 49-51.

be self-supported will enjoy a lower acceptance threshold.[54] Students are encouraged to do so in order to lessen the government's financial burden. In recent years, as more Chinese families benefit from the economic reforms and become rich, more and more students choose to be self-supported in order to have the freedom to pursue non-governmental careers later on.[55] As a result, the State Commission of Education and four other Ministries in 1990 jointly promulgated Provisional Regulations on Admitting Self-supported Students into Institutions of Higher Education to govern the admission of this particular group of students.[56]

In sum, the general picture of the post-cultural revolution admission system of higher education suggests a stronger adherence to the "principle of equality", according to which everyone is essentially equal based upon their performances in the entrance examination. But, as indicated above, there have been many preferential policies implemented against this specific principle of equality in

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[54] Article 44 in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu Nien-chien, 1988, p. 469.

[55] It was estimated that in 1988 one of every seven college students was self-supported (see Kuang-ming Jih-pao. February 3, 1989). In 1991, 10,672 self-supported college students were admitted (see Chung-kuo Chiao-yu-pao [Chinese Education News]. March 2 & 5, 1991, cited in Hsin-hua Yueh-pao She [New China Monthly News Agency], ed., Hsin-hua Yueh-pao [New China Monthly Bulletin]. Beijing, China: People's Press, March, 1991, p. 178.)

[56] See Kuang-ming Jih-pao. July 20, 1990, included in Hsin-hua Yueh-pao. July, 1990, p. 96.

order to promote socialist "egalitarianism", according to which the higher educational resources should be "equally" distributed to take care of those underprivileged children. Here, obviously, we are talking about two different aspects of equality, both of which will be discussed in the section that follows.

3.3 Distributive Principles

The changes in the Chinese higher education policy clearly demonstrate the extent to which the government can manipulate the educational system so as to redistribute social resources among individuals, strata and classes in favor of formerly disadvantaged groups. The key questions that we are concerned here are: what principles are employed to allocate higher educational resources in Maoist as well as post-Mao China? Why these principles, rather than other alternative ones, are used in China to allocate this particular resource? What are the differences between the distributive principles employed during these two periods? And what are the theoretical implications of these differences to the post-Mao reforms undertaken since 1979?

3.3.1 Pre-Cultural Revolution Period (1949-1966)

Before the Cultural Revolution, the principles used in the system of entrance examinations seemed to be a combination of the principles of equal opportunity and of merit, plus some political considerations. The former principle requires that the examinations be open to all and everyone be equal, while the latter demands that higher educational resources should be allocated to those who most deserve it. But these two principles, especially the first one, were not thoroughly realized during this period of time. The examination was supposedly open to all, but, in fact, only open to all applicants who were politically acceptable. People considered as "anti-revolutionaries" and "anti-Party and anti-socialism elements", regardless of however academically qualified they might be, were deprived of the right to take the examinations. (see section 3.2.1)

3.3.2 During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)

Along with the abolition of the entrance examinations in 1966, Chinese higher education was completely suspended between 1966 and 1969. When colleges and universities reopened in 1970, the distributive principles used to select new students were a mixture of status and correct thinking. Before the entrance examinations were reinstated in 1977, these principles had been persistently employed for as long as six years. As a result, higher educational resources were allocated according to one's class origin and

ideological-political qualification, while very little consideration was given to one's academic-intellectual records. Therefore, political activists who possessed high ideological correctness and a "good-background" status were favored.

The above principle of class status can be further understood in more theoretical terms. Jon Elster enumerates in his study on local justice 15 status-related principles that are frequently found in actual cases, namely, age, gender, ethnicity, nobility, caste, family status, occupational status, religion, and so on.[57] It seems that the principle of class status used in China to allocate the higher educational spaces between 1970 and 1976 was not exactly one of the status-related principles in Elster's inventory of local principles. It might be the case of a combination of caste and family status, because 1) just like the Indian caste system that governs one's entry into certain professions, the Chinese system of class regulates one's entry into higher educational institutions and 2) sons and daughters of peasants, workers, soldiers and cadres were exclusively given priority in the decisions of admission.

No matter whether it is closer to caste or family status, the class status used in this context is quite unique in that drawing upon various actual examples from Elster's study, we find that all of the status-related

[57] For a complete list, see Jon Elster (1992), op. cit., pp. 76-84.

principles are conventionally employed to allocate a variety of scarce resources, but not college admission. Why was this particular principle adopted in China in the early 1970s to allocate this particular type of resource? This question can be answered only by reference to the historical context (as the one depicted in section 3.2.2). This case also demonstrates the complexity of local justice, which is nothing but "messy business".[58]

3.3.3 Post-Cultural Revolution Period (1976 to the present)

The principles used to allocate college admissions are more perplexing during this period. There have been two status-related requirements for participating in the entrance examinations: being single and not older than 25.[59] The distributive principles involved here are age (an upper bound on age) and marital status. One may argue that both principles serve as proxies for other properties correlated to age and marriage, such as energy devoted to study and immunity from burdens brought about by marriage and children.[60] However, given the degree of scarcity of Chinese higher education resource, it is more likely that

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[58] Jon Elster's words, ibid., p. 15.

[59] These two requirements might have been there before the cultural revolution, but there is no supporting evidence in the surveyed official documents and secondary commentaries.

[60] For instance, Jon Elster makes an argument like this, see ibid., p. 76.

the authority imposed the two requirements to reduce the number of applicants.

As for the restored entrance examination itself, similar to the ones adopted before the Cultural Revolution, the principles of equal opportunity and merit are once again employed.

However, the overall physical and political evaluations of the applicants are still essential. Both kinds of evaluations are against the principle of equality, because they are discriminatory against those who are physically or politically handicapped, both of who supposedly also have the constitutional right to take the examinations.

Under the current policy, those who have better political evaluations would be given priority if they have basically the same academic qualifications as the others. The political evaluations pertain to one's own political attitude and general character as well as to oneself's and one's family criminal and political history. Thus, the distributive principles involved here are one's correct thinking and class status, which are not so much different from the principles used during the radical period of the Cultural Revolution.

In addition to the above political principles, principles such as contribution, racial status, need, and special status are also employed when special preference is given to excellent athletes, veterans, children of martyrs, children of diplomats, minority, rural children and Chinese

from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and other overseas areas. Since each of these secondary principles refers to some specific properties of the recipients, it is difficult to compare their relative importance. It would be interesting to consider a case in which an applicant possesses two or more sets of favored properties, say an excellent athlete whose father is a diplomat, to see which principle will outshine the other. Or whether this lucky applicant will receive double preferential treatment? Unfortunately, the official documents surveyed in this study are not specific enough to account for these relatively rare but possible cases.

3.3.4 General Discussions

Since this is the first, perhaps also the most complicated, data chapter of this study, we shall discuss the distributive principles in this separate section to lay a foundation for similar (therefore, shorter) discussions in the next three data chapters. After separately discussing the principles identified in each data chapter, we will revisit all of them more systematically in chapter 8: Theory and Practice.

In this section, the distributive principles depicted above will be further analyzed in two ways: in terms of theories of distributive justice and in terms of an intra-Party controversy in Chinese politics.

First of all, we can examine equality, the dominant

principle behind the entrance examinations, in general terms of distributive theories. Many social philosophers view equality as the baseline for distribution, which means that goods ought to be divided equally to all individuals. This principle of equality, similar to Rawls's first principle of equal liberty, actually approximates the principle of absolute equality.[61] This kind of egalitarian principle can also be supported by utilitarianism on one condition: "if the recipients have equal utility functions with respect to the good, total utility is maximized by dividing it equally."[62] However, this popular aspect of equality is not the principle of equality employed behind the entrance examinations: the form refers to equality in result (or substantive equality), while the latter points to equality in process (or procedural equality), which is largely sustained by both Rawls's second principle of equality of opportunity and Nozick's libertarian theory.[63]

After addressing the divergence between the two versions of equality, we shall ask the question, an easy but fundamental one, as to why the principle of absolute equality, so-called the baseline for distribution, is not used to allocate college spaces in China and most other

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[61] For details of this principle, see Jon Elster (1992), pp. 70-71.

[62] Quoted from ibid., p. 70.

[63] This argument will be further explored later in chapter 8.

societies? The answer can be found in the nature of the resource. As noted in chapter 1 (section 1.2.2), college spaces are scarce, indivisible, and heterogeneous, so that it cannot be divided equally among all individuals. However, according to the principle of absolute equality, if a good cannot be equally divided without losing its value, it should not be given to anyone.[64] This solution to this particular allocative issue is absurd and certainly against utilitarianism.

To avoid the waste of scarce resources, the allocative authority can use many mechanisms to allocate an indivisible resource, but why does China's authority choose the entrance examination over other alternative distributive mechanisms? Why does China not use mechanisms such as lotteries and rotation that are used in allocating other indivisible resources (e.g., allocating immigration and jury service by lotteries, and political positions and joint custody by rotation[65]) and, at the same time, also respect the principle of procedural equality? It is obvious to see why college spaces cannot be allocated by having millions of applicants take turns. As for the absence of the use of lotteries, in addition to being explained with reference to historical heritage from the traditional China, it can be also explained by a typical utilitarian argument that scarce

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[64] Jon Elster (1992), op. cit., p. 71.

[65] For more examples of the use of the two mechanisms, see ibid., p. 72-73.

resources should be allocated to individuals with certain qualifications to maximize the total utility for society as a whole. In the allocative issue of college spaces, the required qualifications are surely academic merits.[66]

Furthermore, speaking of the distributive mechanisms, we may wonder that since rationing was extensively used in socialist China to distribute many forms of scarce public goods (such as food, energy, cloth and consumer goods), why not higher education as well? The primary reason behind this practice may be that most goods allocated through rationing are basic needs that are indispensable to one's physical survival; thereby, rationing had to be used to ensure the basic provisions of these goods to everyone. Whereas, higher education has nothing to do with one's survival but is related to one's chance to advance in life. Also, given the indivisible nature of higher educational resources, it is technically impossible to use rationing to supply "a certain portion" of the resources to everyone in China.

Secondly, the distributive principles can be analyzed within the specific context of Chinese politics. The principles used to allocate college admissions shifted from a combination of class status and correct thinking during

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[66] According to Elster, the distributive principles fall into two categories: those that do not make any reference to properties of the potential recipients and those that do (see ibid., p. 68). Egalitarian principles such as absolute equality and lotteries belong to the former, while the principle of merit is among the latter.

the last six years of the Cultural Revolution (1970-1976) to a more complex post-Mao system of principles with heavy emphasis on merit. Though one's status and political qualification are still important in the post-Mao era, they are considerably different from the Maoist principles in two respects. First, the principle of class status has become less important since 1977, largely being replaced by considerations of other statuses (i.e., age, marital status and race). Second, the current preferential treatment for politically excellent students could be either lowering the acceptance threshold of the entrance examination or giving them priority when they have basically the same academic qualifications as others. There is no doubt that political qualification (or correct thinking) is still important for admission, but it is definitely no longer the most important one. Especially in provinces where the second type of treatment is adopted, the political qualifications would be used only after the principle of merit is applied to ensure that those with preferred political qualifications should at least have the same academic qualifications as others.

Moreover, faced with a variety of trivial principles, we may need to step back to get a larger picture of this allocative system. A larger picture can be drawn in the light of a forty-year-old ideological controversy among different factions within the Chinese Communist Party.

The Chinese revolution rose to power in 1949 on the strength of two appeals that had won support from the

masses: a nationalist promise to restore Chinese pride and prosperity, and a socialist revolutionary pledge to increase the opportunities available to the majority of disadvantaged classes in China. In terms of national goals, the former refers to development, while the latter lays emphasis on redistribution. Basically, all Party leaders supported both goals. But, whenever public policies were to be determined, there was controversy over how to strike a balance between the two goals. The moderates have defined the revolution more in terms of its development goal; Mao and the radicals, on the other hand, seemed to prefer by the mid 1960s to sacrifice development if it ruined the goal of redistribution favoring the proletarian classes.[67] Like in other policy areas, there has clearly been an underlying tension in higher educational policy between the goals of redistributive equality and developmental efficiency.[68] In periods when the class line affected educational policy, academic qualifications were neglected and the quality of education declined. Conversely, in periods when academic standards were dominant, the percentage of worker-peasant-soldier students dropped considerably, sacrificing distributive equality.

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[67] For details of the controversy, see Jonathan Unger, "The Chinese Controversy Over Higher Education." Pacific Affairs. vol. 53, no.1 (Spring 1980): p. 29.

[68] For details of the tradeoff of equality versus efficiency, see Arther, M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.

In fact, the academic and political criteria represent different aspects of the concept of "egalitarianism". As suggested by Gordon White, selection on the intellectual basis is in theory egalitarian since the norm is universalistic; in practice, however, it may produce inegalitarian outcomes since certain sectors of the population are in better positions to succeed in academic competition.[69] He calls this meritocratic egalitarianism, which approximates the principle of equality in process. The political criteria represent an alternative principle which he names redistributive egalitarianism (which is different from absolute equality but still emphasizes the equality in result), reflecting the Party's fundamental commitment to improve the well-being of disadvantaged classes and their offspring.

Several conclusions can be drawn at this point. First, the post-Mao higher education reform indicates a shift of distributive principle from redistributive egalitarianism emphasizing equality in outcome to meritocratic egalitarianism stressing equality in process. This shift is also noticeable in other policy areas in post-Mao China, such as in cadre recruitment policy (which will be discussed in chapter 5), and in economic policy. Second, these competing principles and their effects on resource

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[69] Gordon White, "Higher Education and Social Redistribution in a Socialist Society: The Chinese Case." World Development. 9 (February 1981): pp. 149-166.

allocation have been a source of social tension and political conflict among different social strata, which has been reflected in leadership struggle within the Party. In this regard, the process of Chinese reforms in public policies can be interpreted in terms of intra-party elite conflicts (between the moderates and the radicals) over the principles that should be employed to allocate scarce resources. Third, the issue of reforms in China can be approached by studying the continuous oscillation between the principles of development and redistribution, which is also very common in many other socialist regimes.

3.4 Distributive Outcomes

After examining various mechanisms and principles involved in the Chinese allocation system of higher educational resources, we shall answer a relevant question as to whether or not these mechanisms and principles are discriminatory against people with a particular socio-economic, ethnic, or sexual status. The answer to this question is dependent upon a careful, detailed examination of the distributive outcomes of the resources.

3.4.1 Social Origin

Calling their revolution the proletarian revolution and their party the vanguard of the proletariat, the Chinese

Communists laid great emphasis on the ideology of the proletarian leadership. However, workers and peasants, the backbone of the proletarian class, were mainly unschooled and illiterate. Even though some of them received high school education, they had fewer chances of passing the entrance examinations. Traditionally, children from worker-peasant background needed to take time away from school to help in productive work, whereas children of bourgeois background had better living conditions to study for the examinations.

To enhance the status of the proletariat in national politics, it had been the Party's intention since 1949 that colleges and universities should be equally accessible to the children of the proletarian class. In the 1950s special schools were set up to help these "good-background" people surmount the disadvantage of insufficient early education.[70] As a result, there was a steady rise in the percentage of this group in colleges and universities in the 1950s. Table 3.3 indicates that the percentage of students of proletarian background increased from 19% in 1951 to 50% in 1959. However, all these preferential measures failed to bring about enough students from workers-peasants background that were proportional to the group in the Chinese population in

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[70] R. F. Price, Education in Modern China. London, U.K.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, p. 168.

the 1960s.[71] As a result, the issue of "inequality" in the allocation of educational resources was hotly debated on the eve of the Cultural Revolution when the problem of inequality was intensifying.[72]

The national data about the changes in the early 1960s are not available. However, the inequality problem can be partially demonstrated in the admission data of the department of geophysics at Peking University. As shown in Table 3.4, the percentage of good-background students dropped from 41% to 18% between 1960 and 1963.

After a 4-year closure during the early years of the Cultural Revolution, colleges and universities reopened in 1970. In the same year the academic criteria in admission policy were replaced by political criteria that favored workers-peasants-soldiers. Consequently, the new student population of higher education consisted of more and more workers and peasants, displacing many students from intellectual background.

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[71] It is difficult to measure the exact number of Chinese peasants. However, we know that in 1991 246.93 million (or 21.3%) out of 1,158.23 million Chinese were "non-agriculture population, which means 78.7% were "agriculture population". See Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992, p. 669.

[72] See Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978, p. 79.

Table 3.3

Students of Proletarian Background
As a Percentage of Total College Students, 1951-1959

Year	% of students of worker/peasant origin
1951	19
1952	20
1953	22
1954	n.a.
1955	29
1956	34
1957	36
1958	48
1959	50

Source: Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978, p. 79.

Table 3.4

Students of Good and Bad Backgrounds
As a Percentage of Total Admitted Students in
Peking University's Geophysics Department, 1960-1963

Inherited "Class"	1960	1961	1962	1963
Good-background working class	41%	30%	27%	18%
Bad-background*	8%	12%	23%	n.a.

* Including landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists.

Source: Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, p. 235.

According to one study, 63% of the new students in 1971 were workers-peasants prior to the recruitment to higher education, and this percentage was increased to 90% in 1975.[73] The change in class composition of students was also conspicuous in the two best Chinese universities. In September 1970, 45% of the new students in Ch'inghua University were workers, 40% were peasants, and 15% were soldiers, while in Peking University 90% were from peasant families and 10% were children of cadres in 1970, 90%-100% from worker-peasant-soldier-cadre classes in 1973, and 90% from worker-peasant-soldiers background in 1974.[74] These data are consistent with the egalitarian preference for increasing the access of workers and peasants to higher education. In addition, another dramatic outcome of the new policy is displayed in the percentage of Party members in the entire population of college students. In 1964 only 2.2% of the college students were Party members, while the percentage went up to 26.5% in 1975.[75] In sum, the class

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[73] See C. Montgomery Broaded, "Higher Education Policy Changes and Stratification in China." The China Quarterly 93 (March 1981): p. 131.

[74] The figures of 1970 are based upon Shih-wen Wong, Lun Chung-kung Te Chiao-yu Kai-ke [On Education Reforms in the Communist China]. Taipei, Taiwan: Li-min Publications, 1978. The 1973-74 percentages are cited from Gordon White, op. cit., p. 161.

[75] Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Kuo-chia T'ung-chi Chu, [State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China], Chung-kuo She-hui T'ung-chi Tzu-liao, 1987 [China Social Statistical Data, 1987]. Beijing, China: China Statistics House, 1987, p. 157.

composition of college students prior to the Cultural Revolution was dramatically reversed in the early 1970s.

With the death of Mao and the downfall of the "Gang of Four" in 1976, reforms in many areas were initiated. The college entrance examinations, which were abrogated in 1966, were reinstated in 1977, and the admission policy of workers-peasants-soldiers students on the strength of their class status, production experience, and political record was terminated.

No clear-cut statistical profiles of the 1977 freshman classes have been issued to display the effect of the new admission policy.[76] However, as shown in one study, only 6% of the new students were from workers-peasant background (in comparison to the 1975 percentage of 90%).[77] The data of another study indicates that workers, cadres and demobilized soldiers together made up only 3.4% and 2.4% of the total students admitted in 1980 and 1981, respectively.[78] The share of Party members in higher educational resources was also affected; 26.5% of the college students were Party members in 1975, 10.8% in 1978, and only 4.4% in 1980.[79]

In conclusion, the restoration of the college entrance

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[76] There are some statistical data with pretty misleading categories. See Suzanne Pepper, op. cit., p. 23.

[77] C. Montgomery Broaded, op. cit., p. 131.

[78] Ruth Hayhoe, Contemporary Chinese Education. London, U.K.: Croom Helm 1984, p. 146.

[79] See Chung-kuo She-hui T'ung-chi Tzu-liao, 1987. p. 157.

examinations has had tremendous impact on the class composition of the newly admitted students. In general, the use of universalistic measures of academic achievement before and after the Cultural Revolution has admitted a high proportion of children from intellectual families, whereas laying greater emphasis on class background or political position during the Cultural Revolution had favored children from proletarian backgrounds.

3.4.2 Ethnicity

The Chinese government has recognized 56 nationalities within its territory, including the majority Han nationality and 55 minority nationalities, of which the largest are Chuang, Manchus, Hui, Tibetans, and Mongolians.[80] Compared with many other ethnically heterogeneous countries, such as Russia (or the former USSR), China's minority problem is much less significant in that all 55 minority nationalities together represent a very small fraction of the total population. As shown in Table 3.5, only 6.06% (or 35.3 million) of the total Chinese population belonged to the minority groups in 1953, and the percentage increased to 8.08% (or 91.3 million) in 1990. However, this 8% of the total population occupies about 60% of China's territory,[81] including all sensitive border areas; therefore, China's

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[80] Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke, op. cit., p. 205.

[81] Idem.

minorities have received much attention from Peking despite of their small size.

TABLE 3.5

Population Representation of the Majority Han and the Minority Nationalities, 1953-1990

Year	Majority Han	Minority
1953	93.94%	6.06%
1964	94.22%	5.78%
1982	93.30%	6.70%
1990	91.92%	8.08%

Source: Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Kuo-chia T'ung-chi Chu [State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China], Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992 [Statistical Yearbook of China, 1992]. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press, 1992, p. 83.

No matter how great the attention (paid by Peking authority) to the minority has been, both the State and the Party constitutions do not include articles that specify any preferential policy to the minority nationalities. The only reference about minorities is Article 4 of the current PRC Constitution (promulgated in 1982): "All nationalities in the PRC are equal. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China's nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are

prohibited. ..."[82] Clearly, in this legal document the sole principle handling minority affairs is simply "equality".

In reality, both the state and the Party has recognized the underrepresentation of minorities in many spheres of Chinese society, especially in the higher educational system. Throughout the years, China has adopted several preferential policies to promote higher education among its minorities. The key policy, as discussed earlier in this chapter, has been the one that lowers the entrance examination acceptance threshold for minority students. Table 3.6 below display the positive, but not very impressive, impact of this policy on the minority enrolment.

There were only 1,285 minority college students in 1950, occupying less than 1% of the total enrollment. Given the fact that minorities made up about 6% of the total population in the early 1950s, they were severely underrepresented during this early period of the PRC history. In 1991 the minority enrollment increased to 141,800, which represented 6.94% of the total enrollment. The increase has been impressive in terms of the absolute numbers as well as the percentages, but the minority nationalities were still underrepresented because in 1990

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[82] Foreign Language Press, Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Beijing, China: Foreign Language Press, 1987, p. 12.

Table 3.6

Students of Minority Background
As a Percentage of Total College Students, 1950-1991

Year	Number of Minority Students	Percentage
1950	1,285	0.93%
1951	2,117	1.36%
1952	2,948	1.52%
1953	5,536	2.56%
1954	7,999	3.10%
1955	8,883	3.04%
1956	14,159	3.47%
1957	16,101	3.62%
1958	22,421	3.39%
1959	28,163	3.47%
1960	n.a.	n.a.
1961	29,921	3.16%
1962	28,729	3.45%
1963	24,825	3.31%
1964	20,076	2.93%
1965	21,870	3.24%
****	******	*****
1975	30,607	6.11%
1976	36,578	6.48%
1977	34,460	5.51%
1978	36,030	4.21%
1979	37,423	3.67%
1980	42,944	3.75%
1981	51,220	4.00%
1982	53,739	4.66%
1983	59,600	4.94%
1984	69,300	4.94%
1985	94,098	5.52%
1986	99,462	5.29%
1990	136,700	6.63%
1991	141,800	6.94%

**** Data about the decade of the Cultural Revolution are not available.

Table 3.6 (cont'd)

Sources:

1) The 1950-1983 figures are based on Department of Planning, Ministry of Education, People's Republic of China, Achievement of Education in China, 1949-1983. Beijing, China: People's Education press, 1984, p. 107.

2) The 1984 number of minority students is cited from State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China, Statistical Yearbook of China, 1985. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 45.

3) The 1985-1986 numbers are calculated from Hsin-hua Shu-tien [New China Bookstore], Chung-kuo Nien-chien, 1987 [People's Republic of China Yearbook, 1987]. Beijing, China: New China Bookstore, 1987, p. 519.

4) The 1990-1991 numbers are extracted from Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 69.

5) The calculation of the 1984-1991 percentages is based upon the total enrollment figures provided in Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 702.

they constituted 8.08% of the Chinese total population. (see Table 3.5) Moreover, data shown in Table 3.6 fail to display a continuous trend of improvement in minority's share of the higher educational resources.

3.4.3 Gender

In traditional China women were completely subject to male domination. In Communist China today there is no doubt that women's status has been greatly improved, but, despite Mao's famous quotation of "women holding up half the sky", women are still underrepresented in many areas of Chinese society.[83]

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[83] For details of the status of Chinese women, see Marc Blecher, China: Politics, Economics and Society. London, U.K.: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1986, pp. 151-57. For the status of Chinese women in comparison to women in other societies, see Martin King Whyte, "Sexual Inequality Under Socialism: The Chinese Case in Perspective." in James Watson, ed., Class and

Both the State and the Party constitutions specify no preferential policy toward minority nationalities, nor to female citizens. The only woman-related article in the State constitution is as follows: "Women in the PRC enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, in political, economic, cultural, social and family life. ..."[84] In the following, we will investigate the extent to which this official claim that women are equals of men has been realized in the system of higher education.

As presented in Table 3.7, as the number of female college students steadily increased over the years, from 23,157 in 1949 to 682,000 in 1991, the female percentage fluctuated between 20% and 33%. Through visual inspection, we can make different interpretations by focusing on different periods of time. If we compare the figure of 1953 with that of 1986 there was virtually no improvement at all in women representation during this 33-year period (25.28% in 1953 and 25.50% in 1986). On the contrary, we can also conclude that the gender gap has been closed rather quickly if we compare the 1949 and 1988 figures: the 1949 ratio of 4 to 1 (in favor of men) was reduced to 2 to 1 in 1991.

Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 198-238.

[84] Article 48 of the PRC Constitution. See Foreign Language Press, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

Table 3.7

Female Participation in Higher Education
As a Percentage of Total College Students, 1949-1991

Year	Number of Female Students	Percentage
1949	23,157	19.77%
1950	29,411	21.20%
1951	35,050	22.53%
1952	45,356	23.39%
1953	54,714	25.28%
1954	67,716	26.27%
1955	75,755	25.90%
1956	100,374	24.60%
1957	103,324	23.35%
1958	153,712	23.30%
1959	183,348	22.58%
1960	235,598	24.50%
1961	233,488	24.65%
1962	210,283	25.34%
1963	193,837	25.84%
1964	176,343	25.73%
1965	181,281	26.88%
*	*	*
1973	96,500	30.77%
1974	145,159	33.76%
1975	163,290	32.59%
1976	186,470	33.02%
1977	181,623	29.04%
1978	206,472	24.11%
1979	245,704	24.09%
1980	268,137	23.44%
1981	312,390	24.42%
1982	305,374	26.46%
1983	324,926	26.92%
1984	399,256**	28.60%
1985	511,000	30.00%
1986	479,000	25.50%
1987	647,000	33.00%
1988	681,780**	33.00%
1989	702,000	33.70%
1990	695,000	33.70%
1991	682,000	33.40%

* No data available during the first seven years of the Cultural Revolution.

** Estimated numbers on the basis of the total enrollment figures from Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 702.

Table 3.7 (cont'd)

Sources:
1) The 1949-1983 figures are based on Department of Planning, Ministry of Education, People's Republic of China, Achievement of Education in China, 1949-1983. Beijing, China: People's Education press, 1984.
2) The 1984 percentage is cited from Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Kuo-chia T'ung-chi Chü, [State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China], Chung-kuo She-hui T'ung-chi Tzu-liao, 1987 [China Social Statistical Data, 1987]. Beijing, China: China Statistics House, 1987, p. 158.
3) The 1985-1987 figures are from Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China. p. 226.
4) The 1988 percentage is from Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu Pu [Ministry of Education, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu T'ung-chi Chih-piao, 1990 [Indicators of Educational Statistics of the Republic of China, 1990]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1991, p. 68.
5) The 1989-1991 figures are extracted from Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992, p. 719.

Regardless of how we interpret the data by comparison, the bottom line is that Chinese women are still underrepresented in higher educational system with respect to their representation in the national population, which has remained between 48% to 49% throughout the past 42 years.[85] However, given the general trend of increasing female representation in the 1980s (except for 1986), we may expect that this gender gap will be further closed in the years to come.

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[85] For a complete survey of the male/female population ratio between 1949 and 1991, see Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 77.

3.5 The Distribution of College Fellowships

The fellowship system has existed in Chinese colleges and universities since the establishment of the PRC in 1949.[86] For lack of an unified guideline, individual colleges and universities adopted divergent measures to manage the fellowships. After experiencing this divergence for three years, the central authority finally issued an official document in 1952 to unify the provision of the fellowships among hundreds of colleges and universities.[87]

3.5.1 The 1952 Document

This document regulated the allocation of two kinds of fellowships: fellowships for food expense and for other living expenses. The former should be "equally and universally" allocated to each college student, while the allocation of the latter depended upon the economic conditions of each individual student.[88] When making judgements on students' economic needs, the school authority should "take care of the practical difficulties of children of martyrs, revolutionary soldiers, worker-peasant cadres,

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[86] See Political Affairs Council's Notice on Adjusting People's Fellowships for the Students of Higher Educational Institutions and Middle Schools in Jih-pen Hsüeh-shu Chên-hsing Hui [Japanese Association of Academic Promotion], Chin-tai Chung-kuo Chiao-yu-shih Tzu-liao [The Data of Modern China's History of education]. Japanese Association of Academic Promotion, 1976, p. 225.

[87] See idem.

[88] Article 2, idem.

industrial workers, minority people, and sons and daughters of overseas Chinese."[89]

From the above, we can conclude that during these early years the primary distributive principles employed to allocate fellowships were equality (or even absolute equality) and need, while the secondary principles (those behind the preferential treatment) were contribution, political qualification, and racial and special statuses.

The above 1952 document specified the de jure distribution. The de facto distribution since then had been somewhat different. In fact, the distribution before the mid-1980s was nothing but egalitarian: all students, regardless of their differences in economic conditions and other qualifications, received the fellowships.[90] It is mainly this egalitarianism that triggered a reform on the entire fellowship system in the mid-1980s.

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[89] Article 3, idem.

[90] For egalitarianism in the allocation of fellowships, see Report on Reforming Current People's Fellowship System in the Ordinary Higher Educational Institutions in Chung-kuo Chiao-yu-pao [The Chinese Education News]. July 12, 1986, included in Hsin-hua Yueh-pao She [New China Monthly News Agency], ed., Hsin-hua Yueh-pao [New China Monthly Bulletin]. Beijing, China: People's Press, July, 1986, pp. 120-121.

Even though the report did not discuss whether or not students received the same amount of fellowship, based upon criticisms such as the lack of incentives in the report as well as upon conversations with Chinese students in the United States, we can speculate that students in the same school received pretty much the same amount.

3.5.2 The 1986 Reform

In 1986 the State Commission of Education and the Ministry of Finance together decided to overhaul the college fellowship system. According to the report (Report on Reforming Current People's Fellowship System in the Ordinary Higher Educational Institutions) jointly issued by the two agencies, there were three reasons why the reform was necessary: 1) to lessen the financial burden of the state; 2) to eliminate egalitarianism in order to provide incentives for students to study hard; and 3) to relate the provision of the fellowships to students' political performance and moral character.[91]

The essences of the 1986 report were completely embodied in a legal document promulgated one year later: Rules on Implementing the Fellowship System among Students of Ordinary Higher Educational Institutions.[92] The 1987 Rules stipulates three types of fellowships for college students having various qualifications, namely, distinguished students fellowship (yu-hsiu hsüeh-sheng chiang-hsüeh chin), special fields fellowship (chuan-yeh chiang-hsüeh chin), and fixed direction fellowship (ting-hsiang chian-hsüeh chin).

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[91] Ibid, p. 121.

[92] The Rules consist of thirteen articles in five chapters, see Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she [People's Press], Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fa-lü Hui-pien [Selections from Compendium of Laws of the People's Republic of China]. Beijing, China: People's Press, 1987, pp. 866-869.

3.5.2.1 Distinguished Students Fellowship

The distinguished students fellowship is designed to encourage students' overall development in morality, academic learning, physical education, arts and labor. The fellowship recipients must fulfill the following requirements: 1) love the socialist motherland, uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, have high-quality morality, and carry out students rules and other university regulations; 2) love one's own academic fields, study hard, and have excellent learning achievements; and 3) actively participate in social work, physical exercise, and literature and arts-related activities.[93] The fellowship is classified into three levels: 350, 250, and 150 yuans per year, in order to stimulate competition among distinguished students. Moreover, the number of fellowship recipients in each school every year should not exceed 35% of the total enrolled students.[94]

3.5.2.2 Special Fields Fellowship

The special fields fellowship is awarded to students in the fields of normal education, agriculture and forestry, minority affairs, physical education, and navigation in order to encourage students to major in these less popular but important fields. Different from the distinguished students fellowship is that all of the students in the above

[93] Article 2, idem.

[94] Article 3, idem.

five fields, even the ones with the worst academic performance, receive this fellowship every year.[95] However, this fellowship is also composed of three levels, awarding level-I fellowship (400 yuans) to the most distinguished students. Of these special-field students, 5%, 10% and 85% receive level-I, level-II and level-III fellowships respectively each year.[96]

3.5.2.3 Fixed Direction Fellowship

The third type is the fixed direction fellowship, which is granted to students who agree, after graduation, to work in the frontier areas and economically backward areas or to take jobs in so-called "hardship" professions such as mining, petroleum, geology and water conservancy.[97] Just like the special-field students, all of the fixed-direction students are eligible to receive the fellowship, which also consists of three different levels: 500, 450, and 400 yuans every year.[98] But the 1987 Rules set no limit to the number of recipients at each level of the fellowship.

3.5.3 Distributive Principles since 1986

Obviously, the distributive principles used to allocate the above three types of fellowships are quite different.

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[95] Article 5, idem.

[96] Article 6, idem.

[97] Article 8, idem.

[98] Article 9, idem.

The principle of equality (in result), used to allocate fellowships in the past, has no longer been used to allocate the distinguished students fellowship, which is now awarded to truly distinguished students who excel in both political performance and academic learning. Hence, the principles used here are political principle and merit.

The distributive principles utilized to allocate the special fields and fixed direction fellowships are not as straightforward as the ones above. Out of hundreds of thousands of college students in China, only those who major in normal education and other special fields and those who are willing to work in backward areas and hardship professions are qualified to receive these fellowships, owing to their specific contributions in the future. Thus, the primary principle involved here is contribution. In the meantime, the principle of equality in result still prevails for all of these special-field and fixed-direction students, regardless of how they perform academically, are able to receive the fellowships. Nevertheless, the principle of merit is also applied because only the most distinguished special-field and fixed-direction students can receive the level-I fellowships. In sum, focusing on Chinese college students as a whole, we see that the distributive principle involved in these two fellowships is undoubtedly contribution; but if only focusing on these special students themselves, the primary principle becomes equality, while the secondary principle is merit.

Even though the school officials may still consider the political performance of the special-field, fixed-direction students when they decide who gets what level of fellowships, it is noteworthy that the importance of political principle is significantly downplayed in these two subsystems of fellowships. This is probably due to the urgent need of advanced manpower in those special fields and areas. (This need of manpower is evidenced by the fact that the amounts of these two fellowships are greater than that of the distinguished students fellowship.) Moreover, it is also noteworthy that the principle of merit is utilized one way or the other throughout the three subsystems of fellowships.

3.5.4 Comparisons Before and After 1986

The post-1986 fellowship system is in sharp contrast with the previous one. First of all, the previously de jure principle of need and de facto principle of equality are no longer important. In the current fellowship system, especially the system for distinguished students, the principle of merit outshines all other principles. Second, the new system fails to take care of students with racial and other special statuses. Third, the political principle never dies throughout the years. People with high loyalty to the Party (such as workers, peasants, soldiers, and cadres) were receiving preferential treatment in the past, while in the current system being politically qualified is

one of the required quality of being "distinguished". Lastly, the principle of contribution is still valued in the current system, but this principle now refers to future contributions of the recipients, while in the past it referred to previous or parental contributions.

After investigating various detailed principles involved in the Chinese college fellowship system, we need, once again, to step back to get a larger picture of this allocation system. As a scarce resource, fellowships are not as vital as college spaces, but the distributive principles used in the fellowship system are not less complicated than the ones employed in the admission system. These principles are need, equality, future and past contribution, merit, race, special statuses, and political principle. By and large, the dominant principles have been shifted from need and equality during the 1949-1986 period to merit after 1986. To a large degree, this shift is congruent with the general trend of changes in the distributive principles of the college admission system. Also, the non-egalitarian, meritocratic nature of the current fellowship system is found compatible with the spirit of the post-Mao reform.

CHAPTER FOUR
HIGHER EDUCATION IN TAIWAN

Education in Taiwan, same as in China and many other societies, has always been highly valued and viewed as an important vehicle for socio-economic mobility. Among various educational levels, undoubtedly, higher education is of the greatest importance. For most people in Taiwan, receiving higher education is not only of symbolic value but also of utilitarian use, meaning that the attainment of higher education is used to symbolize one's high social status as well as a means of achieving one's social goals.

This chapter analyzes the scarcity of higher educational resources in Taiwan, the mechanisms and principles employed by the government to allocate these resources, and lastly the outcomes of the allocation. The resources studied in the chapter are restricted to spaces in colleges and universities. As indicated in chapter one, since the allocation of college fellowships is basically not a public policy issue in Taiwan, it will not be investigated in this chapter.

4.1 Scarcity of Higher Educational Resources

Higher education in Taiwan consists of two types of institutions which have been established to meet the

national goals. The junior college system is the first type, consisting of five-year, three-year, and two-year junior colleges. A diploma, not a bachelor degree, is awarded at junior colleges. The second type of institutions, also the mainstream institutions of higher learning, include four-year colleges and universities, which admit high school graduates who have passed the highly competitive Joint College and University Entrance Examination. They are awarded a bachelor degree if they successfully complete the four-year undergraduate program. It is undeniable that junior college education also constitutes a resource, but it is much less so than four-year college education in terms of the level of resource scarcity and the prestige attached to the graduates. Therefore, the four-year college education is the only type of higher education that is studied in this chapter.

Since 1950s the growth of higher education in Taiwan has had the highest quantitative record among all levels of education. As Table 4.1 indicates, there were only one university and three four-year colleges enrolling 5,379 students in 1950, while the number of colleges and universities increased to 50 with 280,249 students in 1991. This represents a 52-fold increase in 41 years. But, does this dramatic increase in the amount of schools and students indicate that Taiwan's higher educational resources have become less scarce? Or they have become more scarce because the increase in resources cannot match an even faster

TABLE 4.1

Growth of Four-Year Colleges and Universities in Taiwan: 1950-1991

Year	Number of Institutions	Total Enrollment
1950	4	5,379
1955	10	13,629
1960	15	27,172
1965	21	55,812
1970	22	95,145
1975	25	140,630
1980	27	159,871
1985	28	174,311
1988	39	224,820
1991	50	280,249

Sources: Figures from 1950 to 1985 are based on Kenneth C. S. Gai, "The Development of Higher Education in the Republic of China." Asian Thought & Society. vol. 10, no. 30 (November 1985): p. 158. The 1988 figure is calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsing-chêng Yuan [Executive Yuan, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988 [Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1988]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1989, pp. 194-195. The 1991 figure is cited from Chung-yang Jih-pao [Central Daily News]. International Edition, Inglewood, california, February 18, 1993.

growing number of applicants? The answers to these questions can be found in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 suggests that, on the average, only about 3 out of 10 applicants each year are able to pass the highly competitive entrance examination and get admitted into colleges or universities. In July of 1989, for example, only 37,579 out of 109,400 high school graduates, or 34.35% of the total, won places in colleges and universities. It is needless to say how much more difficult it is for them to enter into the more prestigious national universities. Although the higher educational resources--or the number of applicants accepted--have been steadily increased, the rise in the acceptance rate is not all encouraging, at least not so before 1990. They are two obvious reasons for that: (1) the growth in resources had been slow between 1975 and 1985 (with a ten-year growth rate of 20%), and (2) though it has grown faster since 1985, the public demand for it has been going up as well.

In sum, the expanding enrollment in Taiwan's system of higher education has not been adequate. Prestige attached to a college degree leads too many parents to, some of them hysterically, force their children to continue their studies as far upwards as possible. Even though the Ministry of Education has promised that there will be 14 more four-year colleges and universities in the next three years,[1] it is

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[1] Shih-chieh Jih-pao [World Journal], New York, December 28, 1990, 9.

TABLE 4.2

Scarcity of Higher Educational Resources in Taiwan, 1975-1991: Number of Applicants, Number of Applicants Accepted, and Acceptance Rate

Year	Number of Applicants	Number of Applicants Accepted	Acceptance Rate
1975	97,859	25,797	26.36%
1976	94,807	26,197	27.63%
1977	91,907	26,603	28.95%
1978	94,850	26,847	28.30%
1979	94,697	27,704	29.29%
1980	97,182	28,426	29.25%
1981	97,963	29,260	29.87%
1982	95,906	29,938	31.22%
1983	96,421	30,803	31.95%
1984	98,236	31,535	32.10%
1985	102,004	32,473	31.84%
1986	110,384	33,848	30.66%
1987	108,656	35,651	32.81%
1988	112,327	37,929	33.76%
1989	109,400	37,579	34.35%
1990	....	......	37.28%
1991	120,000*	46,400	39.00%*

* Estimated numbers.

Sources: Figures from 1975 to 1988 are based on Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu Pu [Ministry of Education, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu T'ung-chi, 1988 [Educational Statistics of the Republic of China, 1988]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1989, pp. 34-37. The 1989 acceptance rate is taken from Shih-chieh Jih-pao [World Journal], New York, July 3, 1990, 9. The 1989 numbers of applicants and applicants accepted are calculated from the figures provided in Chung-yang Jih-pao [Central Daily News]. International Edition, Inglewood, California, July 22, 1989, 7. The 1990-91 figures are from Shih-chieh Jih-pao February 26, 1991, 11.

foreseeable that, with a growing number of applicants each year, the higher education resources will continue to be one of the most scare resources in Taiwan and their fair allocation will remain the center of public concerns.

4.2 Distributive Mechanism: the Entrance Examination

The primary mechanism used in Taiwan to allocate higher educational resources has been the Joint College and University Entrance Examination system set up since 1954. The system has undergone many revisions in the past 38 years, but the basic principle has remained the same: only those high school graduates who have done exceptionally well on the entrance examination are admitted to the four-year institutions of higher learning. This entrance examination is highly competitive. As Table 4.2 indicates, approximately 100,000 applicants take the examination each summer, of whom only about 30% to 40% are accepted.

The examination system has caused many teaching and learning problems in high school education and the social cost of a large number of unsuccessful applicants each year is very high. However, even in the eyes of those who are against it, the examination system is regarded as a fairly objective means of student recruitment because it is open to all and fairly graded.

Indeed, great care is exercised in making the

examination questions and in grading the answers, and it appears that there is no evidence of favoritism and dishonesty throughout this process. But if we closely examine the entire admission process, it will be difficult for anyone to conclude that the examination system has kept favoritism completely out of the process. The reason will be provided in the next section.

4.3 Behind the Entrance Examination

Behind the examination system is hidden a very complicated program which, over so many years in Taiwan, has given special preference to applicants with special status or background. According to several rules and regulations announced by the Ministry of Education, there are eight types of special applicants, namely, veterans, children of diplomats, overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Macao, overseas Chinese from other areas, Mongolian, Tibetan and other minorities, Aborigines, students from Mainland China, and outstanding athletes. These policies have been overhauled since 1987 when the 53-year-old martial law was lifted and Taiwan's society began the transition toward political liberalization.[2] As a consequence, some of them have already been revised, some currently under review, and

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[2] Martial law was initially declared in the mainland in 1934 to protect the country from Communist infiltration.

some left untouched. So far, none of them have been abolished. In this section each of these eight policies will be introduced and discussed.[3] Among them, the policy concerning veteran applicants deserves elaborate discussion since the potential beneficiaries under this policy include almost every adult male in Taiwan.[4]

4.3.1 Veterans

According to the regulations enacted by the Ministry of Education in 1960, the admission cut-off point could be lowered by 25% for those veterans who had served in the armed forces for at least five years and by 10% for those who had served for 2 to 5 years.[5] For instance, if the admission threshold for the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University was 400 last year, the mark would be lowered to either 300 or 360 for those eligible

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[3] No research (in Chinese or English) on these policies has ever been done. The only mention of these policies in the existing literature consists of four lines in Douglas C. Smith, An Island of Learning: Academeocracy in Taiwan. Taipei, Taiwan: the Pacific Cultural Foundation, 1981, p. 66.

[4] It has been a citizen obligation for every physically qualified male in Taiwan to serve in the armed forces for 2 or 3 years, depending upon which branches of the armed forces he is serving. Since 1990 the period of serving has changed to 2 years only, regardless of the difference in branches.

[5] See "Regulations on Special Treatments of the Veterans Who Apply for Colleges and Universities (enacted on June 22, 1960 and amended three times in 1960, 1976, and 1977)." in Chung-hua Min-kuo Fa-kui Pien-chi Wei-yuan Hui [Committee for Compilation of Laws and Regulations of the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-kui Hui-pien [Selections from Compendium of Current Laws and Regulations of the Republic of China, vols. 1-37]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1981, pp. 9843-9845.

veterans. This preferential treatment is important because the keen competition among applicants has made even one point of the test score very decisive. While a test core of 300 or 360 can lead a veteran applicant to a national university, for regular applicants a test score of 300 will lead them to nothing but being labeled as a "loser" for at least one year (depending upon their luck next year), and a score of 360 will only lead them to second-class private colleges or universities where, in most cases, students face higher tuition but poorer facilities than they would otherwise have in national universities.

Veteran applicants represent the largest group of special applicants. In 1989 alone 92 veteran applicants were eligible for the 25%-lower admission threshold and 4,708 veterans for the 10%-lower threshold. In total, 4,800 veterans were given preference that year, which accounts for 87.8% of all types of special applicants or 4.4% of all applicants.[6]

When this veteran-related policy was promulgated in 1960, its purpose was to award retired soldiers for their efforts in defending Taiwan from the invasion of the Chinese communists in the 1950s. These veterans did not receive formal, complete secondary education except for a few informal courses taught by senior officers in the armed forces. Therefore, without being given preference they

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[6] Chung-yang Jih-pao [Central Daily News]. International Edition, Inglewood, California, July 22, 1989, 7.

would have had very little chance to succeed in such highly competitive entrance examinations.

This policy becomes less meaningful in the 1990s than it was 30 years ago because of the fact that today's beneficiaries of this policy are either young men in their early 20's who had just completed 2 to 3 years of mandatory military service, or professional officers in their 30's who had just retired after serving at least 10 years in the armed forces. Ironically, the veterans who were supposed to be the chief beneficiaries of this policy in the 1960s are a little too old today for college education. Thus, this policy seems to be outmoded and needs to be modified substantially.

A year-long battle between the Ministry of education and the Ministry of Defense began in 1990 when the former initiated a modified version of this policy. The original proposal of the Ministry of education was the following: those who served 5 to 10 years are eligible to obtain bonus points of 10% of their total test scores, those who served at least 10 years obtain bonus points of 20% of their scores, and no preference whatsoever will be given to those who served less than 5 years.[7] This proposal was specifically aimed to terminate the awarding of preference to those non-professional soldiers who only completed 2 to 3 years of mandatory military service. Another notable change

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[7] Shih-chieh Jih-pao. April 26, 1990, 7.

in this proposal is the use of bonus points which replaced the previous method of lowering admission marks.

Understandably, the proposal outlined above met with strong resistance from the Ministry of Defense for its adverse effects on thousands of veterans each year. Under tremendous pressure from the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of education proposed a new version in July 1990 which resumed the awarding of preference to those who served less than 5 years by giving them bonus points of 5%. This new proposal also granted bonus points of 15%, rather than 10% in the original proposal, of the test scores to those who served 5 to 10 years.[8] However, the new proposal did not satisfy the hard-liners in the Ministry of Defense who resisted any changes to the 1960 regulations. Finally, the two ministries reached an agreement in January 1991, according to which those who served 5 years or more are eligible to obtain bonus points of 25% of the test scores and those who served 2 to 5 years obtain bonus points of 8% of the scores.[9] Compared with the 1960 regulations, the final version of the proposal does not contain significant changes except for replacing the method of the lower admission marks by a new method of bonus points. The effect of this change can be demonstrated in the following example. If the admission mark for the Department of Political

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[8] Ibid., July 17, 1990, 9.

[9] Chung-yang Jih-pao. January 24, 1991, 7.

Science at National Taiwan University was 400 last year, according to the 1960 regulations, the mark would be lowered to 300 for those veterans who served at least 5 years. Now, under the 1991 regulations, the same veterans need to score at least 320 points to be admitted into that department.[10]

4.3.2 Children of Diplomats

According to the regulations passed in 1965, and amended in 1981 by the Ministry of Education, children of diplomats who returned to Taiwan in the past 3 years are eligible to obtain bonus points of 25% of their scores when taking the entrance examination, and those who have returned for more than 3 but less than 4 years are able to receive bonus points of 10% of the scores.[11]

The purpose of this policy is to take special care of children of diplomats for they did not receive a formal Chinese education. Without being given preference, they, like many veterans, would have had a minimal chance of competing with regular applicants in the highly competitive examinations.

This policy has also been criticized since the late 1980s. To respond to the public resentment toward it, the

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[10] 320 points * (1 + 25%) = 400 points. In this example the veterans receive 80 bonus points.

[11] See "Regulations on Attending Schools of the Children of Government Officials Who Work abroad (enacted on March 2, 1965 and amended on January 27, 1981)." in Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-kui Hui-pien. pp. 9857-9858.

Ministry of Education decided to modify it in 1990. In this modified version, as opposed to the method of bonus points, a fixed number of points would be given to those who have returned to Taiwan for less than 3 years (i.e., regardless of the total points they score in the examination, 30, 20, and 10 bonus points will be given to those who have returned for less than one year, less than 2 years, and less than 3 years, respectively), and no preference will be given if they have returned for more than three years.[12] This new proposal was not immune from resistance. This time it was the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that came to resist the changes. They did not oppose the abrogation of the preferential treatment granted to those who have returned for more than 3 years, but they strongly disagreed with the new method of a fixed number of points. After another one-year-long process of negotiation, both Ministries finally agreed to amend the old regulations in the following way: bonus points of 25%, 20%, 15%, 10%, and 0% of the test scores will be bestowed to those who have returned for less than 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and more than 3 years, respectively.[13]

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[12] See Chung-kuo Shih-pao [China Times]. Taipei, Taiwan, January 10, 1990. Since a period of 3 years is thought long enough to complete native high school education, there is no need to give any preference to this group of applicants.

[13] Chung-yang Jih-pao. April 5, 1991, 7.

4.3.3 Overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Macao

According to the regulations proclaimed in 1954 by the Ministry of Education, Chinese who have stayed in the areas of Hong kong and Macao for at least 5 consecutive years before their departure for Taiwan, and who have not received high school education in Taiwan are eligible to take a special test held in Hong Kong every year by the Ministry and, depending on the test results and the spaces available in universities, they will be directly assigned to one of the universities on their wish list without taking the entrance examination.[14] For those who have received Taiwan's high school education (in either ordinary high schools or the specially designed Overseas Chinese High School in Taipei), there is a short-cut they can take: when they take the entrance examination, the admission threshold could be lowered by 10% for them. Since for many years Hong Kong and Macao have been colonies of United Kingdom and Portugal respectively, the kind of high school education offered in these areas is quite different from its counterpart in Taiwan. Therefore, when taking the entrance examination, students from these areas are given preference to enhance their chance of getting admitted.

This policy has also been under attack lately. Due to

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[14] See "Regulations on Attending Schools of the Chinese from Hong Kong and Macao in Taiwan (enacted on October 15, 1954 and amended four times in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1980)." in <u>Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-kui Hui-pien</u>. pp. 9829-9831.

the pressure from parents of tens of thousands of native applicants, the Ministry of Education began to modify it in 1990. There are three key modifications: (1) eligible applicants should have stayed in the areas of Hong Kong and Macao for at least eight, instead of five, consecutive years before their departure for Taiwan; (2) only applicants who are graduates from the Overseas Chinese High School are qualified to obtain the preferential treatments when taking the examination; and (3) the method of lowering the admission threshold by 10% is replaced by the awarding of bonus points of 10% of the test scores.[15] The first two new measures are taken to reduce the number of eligible applicants, while the third one downgrades the preferential treatment.

It is worth noting that in the original regulations there are two short-cut mechanisms, of which only one mechanism is changed while the mechanism of direct assignment remains intact. Therefore, it is imaginable that more students from these two areas will choose not to receive high school education in Taiwan, but to stay in Hong Kong and Macao and wait to be directly assigned.

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[15] Chung-yang Jih-pao. January 24, 1991, 7, and May 12, 1991, 8. The third measure works in the following way. If the admission threshold is 300 and a particular applicant scores 270, he/she will be admitted according to the previous method, because the threshold is lowered to 270. But this applicant will not be admitted under the new method, because after being added with the 10% bonus points his/her score becomes 297 only, while the threshold is still 300.

4.3.4 Overseas Chinese from Other Areas

Similar to the above regulations, the regulations concerning Chinese from other overseas areas decree that Chinese who have lived abroad for at least 5 years and have not received high school education in Taiwan are eligible to be directly assigned to one of Taiwan's institutions of higher learning.[16] Similarly, those who have received Taiwan's high school education will be given preference when taking the entrance examination. But what kind of preferential treatment will be granted is not specified in the regulations; it is entirely within the discretion of the Ministry of Education. Before the Ministry decided to modify the regulations in 1989, each year the acceptance rate of all regular applicants (ranging from 29% to 34%) was applied to admit this type of overseas applicants.[17] In 1989 the Ministry clearly specified that the admission threshold could be lowered by 25% for them.[18] Two years later, in a newly revised regulation, this treatment was replaced by the awarding of bonus points of 20% of the total

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[16] See "Regulations on Attending Schools and Counselling of the Overseas Chinese in Taiwan (enacted on May 24, 1958 and amended four times in 1962, 1964, 1968, and 1973)." in Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-kui Hui-pien. pp. 10367-10369.

[17] See Shih-chieh Jih-pao. August 29, 1989, 7. The following example shows how this policy works: if the acceptance rate of all applicants was 30% in one particular year and there were 300 overseas applicants, then, in spite of their examination scores, 90 of them would be admitted.

[18] Idem.

test scores.[19]

Due to the fact that the above two overseas Chinese preferential policies have encountered massive criticisms in Taiwan, we may need to discuss more on the mechanisms, outcomes and rationale of these policies even though some of these discussions are not directly related to the allocative principles.

The most significant difference between the above two overseas Chinese-related regulations and other preferential regulations is the adoption of two, instead of one, distributive mechanisms--the entrance examinations and the direct assignment of college spaces. The operation of the latter mechanism had not been known to the public until 1989 when, in response to a great deal of pressure from the media, the Ministry of Education decided to open one corner of the black box. According to the Ministry, in addition to Hong Kong and Macao, the areas where overseas Chinese reside are classified into (1) areas without a test, including the United States and European countries where applicants are judged only by their academic scores in high school; (2) areas with a locally sponsored test, such as Malaysia where applicants need to take a test sponsored by local Chinese associations because of the adequate number of Chinese High Schools; and (3) areas with a minor test, consisting of

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[19] Chung-yang Jih-pao. May 8, 1991, 7. Note # 15 provides an example to show the difference between the two methods of lowering the admission threshold and the awarding of bonus points.

Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines, where applicants are required to take a test given by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.[20] Relying upon either high school grades or the results of these tests, rather than upon the standard entrance examination scores, the Ministry allocates scare higher educational resources to thousands of overseas Chinese each year.

It is also conceivable that most overseas applicants prefer to be directly assigned rather than to take the highly competitive entrance examinations. In 1989 alone, according to Minister Mao's report in the Executive Yuan, more than 4,000 overseas Chinese were directly assigned to colleges and universities without taking the entrance examination, while only 300 overseas applicants took the examination.[21] According to information in Table 4.2, in total 37,579 applicants were accepted in 1989. Therefore, approximately 10% of the Taiwan's higher education resources were allocated to thousands of overseas Chinese through the two "back door" policies in that particular year.

Furthermore, most overseas Chinese have been assigned to a few prestigious national universities rather than to small, private colleges. Minister Mao reported that in the school year of 1990 there were about 2,500 assigned overseas Chinese studying at the National Taiwan University, Taiwan's

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[20] Ibid., July 12, 1989, 7.

[21] See Shih-chieh Jih-pao. April 10, 1990, 2, and August 29, 1989, 7.

most prominent university, which accounted for 18.2% of the total university enrollment.[22] The more striking percentage is in the fact that these overseas students occupied more than 50% of the spaces in departments of medicine, electrical engineering, and business in the National Taiwan University.[23] For native applicants, the chance of getting into these highly distinguished departments is absolutely less than 1%.[24]

These two "back door" policies share the same historical root. In the 1950s when Taiwan still relied upon U.S. aid for development, Taiwan was requested by the Eisenhower administration to accept overseas Chinese students for study in Taiwan in order to resist the expansion of Chinese communism among overseas Chinese. Under this U.S. policy, Taiwan would receive $15,000 to 20,000 more in aids for each admitted overseas Chinese student.[25] The U.S. aid ended in 1965,[26] but the two policies, especially the mechanism of direct assignment, remained untouched until the late 1980s when it became more

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[22] Ibid., April 10, 1990, 2.

[23] Idem.

[24] Each of these three departments admits about 100-150 students each year, but the number of applicants is at least 100,000 in recent years.

[25] See Chung-yang Jih-pao. July 12, 1989, 7, and Shih-chieh Jih-pao. April 10, 1990, 2.

[26] See Alan P. L. Liu, Phoenix and the Lame Lion. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p. 9.

grotesque and insufferable in the eyes of hundreds of thousands of native students and their parents. Since then, like other preferential policies, they have come under scrutiny and changed.

Not surprisingly, the resistance to any possible unfavorable changes in the existing mechanism of direct assignment was massive. Disappointed overseas Chinese all over the world publicly expressed their resentment against Taiwan's government, primarily against the Ministry of Education. After a prolonged debate, the Minister of Education announced his new policy in March 1991, according to which the current percentage of overseas students in each department will be adjusted in the following ways: 30% and above will be reduced to 20%; 20% and above to 15%; and the percentages in all departments of all universities will be reduced to less than 10% in five years.[27] Clearly, this new policy aims to adjust the distribution of overseas students among universities and colleges at different levels rather than to reduce the size of them, because those overseas students who fail to enter into national universities can still be admitted into private colleges. Also, it is interesting to note that giving away 10% of the higher educational spaces to overseas Chinese is just maintaining the status quo. The Ministry wishes to satisfy overseas Chinese by not reducing the total number of overseas

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[27] Chung-yang Jih-pao. March 3, 1991, 7.

students, while lessening the discontent among native students by assigning fewer overseas students to those prestigious departments at the national universities.

The new policy depicted above indicates the degree of influence 40 million overseas Chinese has on Taiwan's domestic policies. However, there are two factors that are detrimental to the their influence on Taiwan's domestic policies: (1) the importance of Hong Kong and Macao to Taiwan is decreasing because of the planned return of Hong Kong to China after 1997; and (2) the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, a Ministry-equivalent organ under the Executive Yuan devoted to the interests of Chinese nationals in foreign countries and areas, has become less and less powerful in comparison with, say, the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs in Taiwan's policy-making process.

4.3.5 Mongolian, Tibetan and Other Minorities

In Taiwan all matters concerning Tibet and Mongolia are handled by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission under the Executive Yuan. In 1955 the Commission and the Ministry of Education jointly promulgated provisional regulations concerning students of Mongolian and Tibetan origins. According to the regulations, these students, including those born in Taiwan, can be directly assigned to one of the colleges and universities on their wish list

without taking the entrance examinations.[28] The only criterion used in this process of assignment is their academic scores during high school years.

For many years the nationalist government in Taiwan has claimed itself as the only legitimate Chinese government that has sovereignty over mainland China, including Mongolia. Therefore, the reasoning behind the above preferential policy is to generate human resources for the future development of Mongolia and Tibet.[29]

Looking at the rationale behind the policy, one may wonder if only Mongolians and Tibetans, and not other minorities, receive the preferential treatment? Is the future development of Sinkiang (Hsinchiang) and other minority areas less important than that of Mongolia and Tibet? Actually, there is a preferential policy that gives priority to other minority students as well. In 1944, the Ministry of Education promulgated a Method Concerning the Treatment of Frontier Students, which provides similar preferential treatment to Mongolian, Tibetan and other minority students.[30] This preferential policy has not been abrogated, but it has rarely been referred to in any

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[28] See "Provisional Regulations on Attending Schools of the Mongolian and Tibetan Students in Taiwan (enacted on May 30, 1955 and amended on June 16, 1972)." Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-kui Hui-pien. p. 10365.

[29] Chung-yang Jih-pao. January 25, 1989, editorial.

[30] See Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-kui Hui-pien. op. cit., p. 10365.

official documents, statistical yearbooks and relevant studies. This is probably because minorities other than Mongolians, Tibetans and the Taiwanese Aborigines in Taiwan are too few to be identifiable.[31] Therefore, this preferential policy toward all minorities has always been referred to as the Mongolian and Tibetan students policy.

Since the late 1980s this policy has been severely criticized for two reasons.[32] First, Taiwan's leaders have become more realistic toward the issue of sovereignty, and the idea of the status quo of two co-existing Chinas has become more acceptable. This sort of view greatly undermines the importance of Mongolia and Tibetan to Taiwan. Secondly, most of the Mongolian and Tibetan students who have benefited by this policy were born in Taiwan, and received the same type of education as the native students. Thus, there is no academic reason to treat them any differently. The key distributive principle involved here seems to be the principle of race, but it is unjustifiable by the reality.

The Ministry of Education began to revise this policy in 1990. During the process of revision the Ministry once considered to completely eradicate this preferential policy.

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[31] For instance, in Taiwan there were only 728 persons of Mongolian and Tibetan origins in 1991 (see Shih-chieh Jih-pao. May 15, 1991). The number of other minorities, except the Aborigines, should be much fewer than that.

[32] For criticisms of this policy, see Shih-chieh Jih-pao. January 25, 1989, editorial, and February 5, 1990, editorial.

But, in order to be in line with the constitutional principle of aiding minorities,[33] the Ministry later decided to replace it by awarding bonus points of 25% of the test scores.[34]

4.3.6 Aborigines

Nearly 99% of Taiwan's 20 million people are of Chinese origin. The rest of the population are Aborigines (or High Mountain People), descendants of the earliest inhabitants of the island. They and most natives of islands in the Pacific Ocean are offspring of Austronesian who lived in southern China in the Neolithic Age. In Taiwan today, the 330,000 Aborigines belong to nine tribes with distinct languages and cultures.[35]

According to the same constitutional principle of assisting minority peoples, the Aborigines are also eligible to receive preferential treatments when taking the entrance examinations. Even so, the regulations concerning this matter were not enacted by the Ministry of Education until

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[33] Article 169 of the Constitution of the Republic of China (adopted in the mainland in 1946) states that "The state should undertake and foster the development of education, culture ... of the various racial groups in the frontier regions." See Pai-ch'uan T'ao and others, eds., Liu-fa Ch'üan-shu [Compilation of Six Basic Laws]. Taipei, Taiwan: Sanmin Bookstore, 1988, p. 12.

[34] Shih-chieh Jih-pao. May 29, 1991, 9.

[35] Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, Republic of China 1988: A Reference Book. Taipei, Taiwan: Hilit Publishing Company, Ltd., 1988, p. 35.

1987, according to which the admission threshold could be lowered by 25% for Aboriginal students.[36] This policy was also under fire in the late 1980s and, like the policy toward Mongolian and Tibetan, it was modified in 1990 by replacing the lowered admission mark with the awarding of bonus points of 25% of the test scores.[37]

4.3.7 Students from Mainland China

According to the regulations announced in 1959 by the Ministry of Education, students who received education in mainland China after 1949 (the year when the Communist revolution triumphed in China) will be given preference when taking the entrance examinations.[38] What kind of preferential treatment will be granted is not specified in the regulations; it is entirely within the discretion of the Ministry of Education. The present policy of the Ministry is as follows: those mainland students who have stayed in Taiwan for less than two years could receive bonus points of 10% of their test scores; no preference whatsoever would be

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[36] See "Regulations on Preferential Treatments to Taiwan's Aboriginal Students in Attending Schools (enacted on January 5, 1987)." in <u>Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-kui Hui-pien</u>. pp. 9908.25-9908.26.

[37] <u>Shih-chieh Jih-pao</u>. April 29, 1990, 9.

[38] See "Regulations on the Management of the Student Status of Students from Mainland China and on Assisting them in Attending Schools (enacted on August 27, 1959 and amended twice in 1970 and 1972)" in Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu Pu [Ministry of Education, Republic of China], <u>Chiao-yu Fa-kui Hui-pien</u> [Selections from Compendium of Educational Laws and Regulations]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1975, pp. 959-961.

given to those who have stayed for more than two years.[39] This policy is currently under review by the Ministry.

4.3.8 Outstanding Athletes

In the past the admission mark could be lowered by 10% for those students who were judged by the Ministry of Education as outstanding athletes. This preferential policy was completely abolished in 1990.[40]

In sum, the eight preferential policies mentioned above have provoked much resentment in Taiwan's society in recent years because they run counter to the principle of equality purported by the entrance examination system. Although the government has been aware of this problem and has started revising these policies, the revisions, so far, have not been impressive. Hence, it is foreseeable that these policies and their effects will continue to be one of the problems the government needs to solve in the 1990s.

4.4 Distributive Principles

The use of the entrance examination in Taiwan as the distributive mechanism of higher educational resources displays how the government allocates these valuable

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[39] Shih-chieh Jih-pao. April 29, 1990, 9.

[40] See Chung-yang Jih-pao. July 22, 1989, 7, and Shih-chieh Jih-pao. April 29, 1990, 9.

resources to its people. The next fundamental question is that, behind the distributive mechanism, what kinds of primary and secondary principles of distribution have been employed by the government in this policy area? The constitution states that everyone should be guaranteed an equal opportunity to receive an education.[41] But the question remains that whether or not the government has complied with this constitutional ideal and to what extent?

4.4.1 Primary Principles

For many years the entrance examination system has been regarded as one of the fundamental problems in Taiwan's higher educational system, because it has created an examination hell which exerts a heavy psychological burden on young students and their families each year. The main reason why this system has been able to persist for so long is that it is acknowledged as the fairest device to select applicants into institutions of higher learning. To ensure that the entrance examination is fair, it is administered and graded with extreme care. Hence, an applicant's chance of being admitted is not affected by his/her social status, family background, age, race, gender, wealth, and religion. Leaving aside those eight preferential categories for a moment, we can say that everyone in Taiwan has an equal

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[41] Article 159 of the Constitution of the Republic of China: "all citizens shall have equal opportunity to receive an education." See Pai-ch'uan T'ao and others, op. cit., p. 11.

opportunity to get access to the higher educational resources. Therefore, there is little doubt that the principle involved in the use of the entrance examination is the principle of equal opportunity, very similar to Rawls's second principle. As noted in the previous chapter, this version of equality is quite divergent from the principle of absolute equality.

In the light of the principle of equal opportunity, one's chance of being admitted should be affected by nothing but one's examination score. Therefore, the principle of merit has also been applied in Taiwan to allocate higher educational resources to those who most deserve it. The combination of these two principles is equivalent to the idea of meritocratic egalitarianism, which was first discussed in chapter 3. As opposed to the idea of redistributive egalitarianism, the meritocratic egalitarianism accentuates the equality in the process rather than in the outcome of resource allocation. That is, a distributive principle, despite of its effects on the outcome of distribution, is meritocratic so long as it assures that every resource contender is treated identically in all respects when the resource is allocated. Obviously, the distributive principle behind the entrance examination system of Taiwan is meritocratic.

The above discussions of the primary principles employed in the Taiwanese case are quite similar to the ones deliberated in the previous chapter because the resources in

question, and the primary principles and mechanisms adopted in the two allocation systems dealt with in chapters 3 and 4 are almost identical (except for the principles used between 1970-1976 in China). Hence, we do not need to repeat ourselves on these primary principles.

4.4.2 Secondary Principles

Next, we shall discuss the secondary principles behind the eight preferential categories. If we consider the implementation of these preferential policies, we can easily see that the aforementioned constitutional ideal of equal opportunity is not fully achieved and the distributive principle is no longer meritocratic.

In fact, a variety of principles are employed in these preferential policies. In the policies concerning veterans, children of diplomats, and outstanding athletes, the principle of contribution has been used, according to which the resources should be allocated in accordance with prior contributions. Sometimes, the goods to be allocated has been "contributed" by these prior contributions. But, at other times, as when veterans and children of diplomats receive preferential treatment in college admission, there is no connection whatsoever between the goods and the prior contributions.[42]

In the policy of Taiwan's Aborigines, clearly, the

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[42] For these two categories of the principle of contribution, see Jon Elster (1992), op. cit., p. 98.

distributive principle of <u>racial status</u> is applied to benefit those previously underprivileged groups. This principle is often used to allocate resources to minority groups in many societies, but it is not necessarily always so. Sometimes, resources are allocated to benefit majority groups and minorities are denied access to them. This issue will be further explored later in chapter 8.

As for the policies toward Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao, mainland China, and other overseas areas, the principle employed here is nothing but a <u>political</u> principle, by which the resources should be allocated according to certain political considerations (as described above).

Finally, the policy pertaining to Mongolian and Tibetan appears to comply with the principle of racial status, but, in reality, it has little to do with this principle. The reason is that, currently, almost all beneficiaries of this policy are Taiwan-born Mongolians or Tibetans who resemble other people in Taiwan in nearly all aspects of social life; therefore, it would be inappropriate to say that they are still "underprivileged people" deserving preferential treatment (as they were more than four decades ago when the nationalist government still controlled the mainland). As previously noted, this policy, in fact, originated from the political consideration that the existence of this policy can symbolize the sovereignty of the Taiwan's nationalist government over mainland China.

Despite of the fact that the principles used in the above preferential policies may vary from one policy to the other, all three of them are against the idea of meritocratic egalitarianism. Since they are not meritocratic, we would like to know if they are congruent with the idea of redistributive egalitarianism, the other side of egalitarianism the goal of which is to improve the opportunities of disadvantaged classes and their offspring. But, interestingly, the principle of racial status is found to be the only one among the three that is redistributive. The other two principles (contribution and politics) are neither meritocratic nor redistributive.

Public opinion toward these preferential policies has varied greatly from one policy area to another. For instance, the policies giving preferences to Chinese outside Taiwan have been severely criticized by many as unjust in recent years. The popular view holds that since the overseas Chinese did not assume the obligations of a citizen they are not qualified for the privilege of receiving better chances in sharing the educational resources. In contrast, public resistance toward the Aborigines policy is almost nonexistent. In spite of the variation in public opinion, all eight preferential policies have been overhauled and modified by the Ministry of Education in many different ways as discussed earlier in this chapter. Although the modifications made so far to these policies are less than satisfactory, they demonstrate a general tendency of moving

away from other principles toward the meritocratic principle. In other words, the "back door" (offered by these policies) to the resources is not as wide as it was before.

4.4.3 The Market Mechanism

As for distributive mechanisms, in the previous chapter we discussed the reasons why mechanisms such as lotteries, rotation and rationing are not, and cannot be, used to allocate Chinese higher educational resources. How about the market mechanism? If it is easier to be admitted into some Oxford colleges if your father is a large benefactor,[43] does this mean that college spaces can be allocated according to one's ability to pay or contribute? In Taiwan there are also private colleges and universities, while in China public universities have been allowed since the mid-1980s to admit self-supporting students on a lower admission threshold. Does this mean that some form of market mechanism has been introduced in both China's and Taiwan's systems of higher education? The answer is both yes and no.

The answer is no, because though the public sector does not have the monopoly of providing higher education in Taiwan, the governments of both China and Taiwan monopolize the admission process in higher education. Taiwan's universities and colleges, public and private alike, and the

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[43] This is Elster's example, see op. cit., p. 100.

public universities in China all have no voice in the admission process, which is strictly regulated by the central authority (i.e., the State Commission of Education in China and the Ministry of Education in Taiwan).

This question can be answered in more theoretical terms. Jon Elster uses purchasing power instead of market mechanism, and distinguishes between several roles of purchasing power in local justice contexts: 1) wealthy individuals can bribe the allocators; 2) if the rich cannot obtain the good through regular channels, they can purchase it from those who do; and 3) the institution that allocates the good may decide to do so through an administrated market, such as an auction.[44] The first one is technically feasible in China and Taiwan, but the wealthy individuals need to bribe not one but, perhaps, hundreds of "allocators" working at various levels of the institution in charge. The second one is impossible, for the trade of admission spaces is as illegal as the trade of citizenship. The last one is just not applicable in China and Taiwan. All in all, the bottom line is that even if purchasing power is somewhat able to function in the two Chinese higher educational systems, the successful cases should be extremely few.

However, to a lesser degree, the answer could be a yes because the ability to pay for tuition and fees can really affect one's chance of receiving a higher education. In

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[44] Ibid., p. 101.

Taiwan the poor may not be able to pay the tuition if admitted into a private college or university. In China the rich have a greater chance of getting into universities because the admission threshold is lower for self-paying applicants. Therefore, we can say that the purchasing power, rather than the market mechanism, does provide an allocative mechanism, albeit secondary to the mechanism of the entrance examination.

The final issue that is worth discussing here pertains to the contents of Taiwan's entrance examinations. The fair process through which the examination system is administered and graded, indeed, assures that an applicant's chance of being admitted is not affected by his/her social status, family background, age, race, gender, wealth, and religion. But, do the contents and the entire establishment of the examination also assure fairness and not favor any particular groups? In other words, is the examination system truly meritocratic in terms of its process as well as its contents or it is meritocratic only on the surface? The answer to this question rests upon a thorough exploration of the distributive outcomes among different social groups.

4.5 Distributive Outcomes

The claim that the entrance examination system is not truly meritocratic but inherently discriminatory against those applicants of disadvantaged socioeconomic, ethnic, or sexual background parallels an argument that schools serve as mechanisms of status inheritance. The following paragraph presents the general ideas of the argument:

"... because educational institutions tend to mirror the norms and values of dominant elites, their chief effect is to maintain and reproduce a system of structured social inequality. Far from affording equalized opportunity, as the conventional wisdom has it, schooling actually works to stabilize or confirm the prevailing system of socioeconomic stratification. ... Schools exist first and foremost to protect--and to some extent legitimate--an antecedent distribution of power, status, and wealth within the social order."[45]

In light of this argument, we can speculate whether or not the examination system has served as a mechanism of status inheritance, only admitting those of specific economic, ethnic, or sexual status. Confirming evidence for this speculation would rest upon the findings that one's social class, ethnicity, and gender have a decisive

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[45] See, Christopher J. Lucas, "The Politics of National Development and Education in Taiwan." Comparative Politics. vol. 14, no. 2, (January 1982): pp. 213-214. When referring to the examination system of the traditional China, a Chinese scholar expresses a similar view that the establishment of the system was in favor of those from higher-status families, For details, see Yao-chi Chin, Tsung Ch'uan-t'ung Tao Hsien-Tai [From Tradition to Modernity]. Taipei, Taiwan: Times Culture Publishing Company, 1978, pp. 72-73. For more discussions on this issue, see Christopher Jencks, Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972, chapters II ("Inequality in the Schools") and V ("Inequality in Educational Attainment").

influence on one's chance to pass the entrance examination. In the following pages we will examine if such findings can be obtained in Taiwan.

4.5.1 Social Class

In social sciences the social inequality which received the most serious attention is probably the one among different social classes. The question concerned here is whether or not one's chance to pass Taiwan's entrance examination is affected by one's social class. But, unfortunately, empirical evidence for this inquiry is very limited because relevant statistical figures are not provided in any official statistical yearbooks.[46] The first empirical study with respect to this topic was not accomplished until 1976 by Kun-huei Huang on the socioeconomic background of 94,807 participants in 1976 entrance examination. Using Huang's dataset, several Chinese and American scholars continued to study this topic.[47] The accumulated research results are presented in

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[46] The Ministry of Education publishes six kinds of educational statistics every year, but none of them provides information about applicants' social background. My guess is that the Ministry does not think this kind of statistics is worth publishing.

[47] Such as Shu-k'un Chen, "Ta-hsüeh Lien-k'ao Te Kung-p'ing Hsing" [Equality in the College and University Joint Entrance Examination]. in Chung-kuo Lun-t'an [China Tribute]. vol. 7, No. 9 (February 1979): pp. 38-41 (the information about Kun-huei Huang's pioneer study is also extracted from this short article); and Christopher J. Lucas, op. cit. In fact, Lucas's analysis is built upon Chen's study rather than upon the original one. One problem of Lucas's study is that

Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 shows how various income-level households were represented by examination participation rate and acceptance rate in the entrance examination held in 1976. Comparisons between the these two rates suggest that participants from the bottom two income groups were underrepresented because 18.5% of the participants were from these two income groups, while only 12.84% of those who passed the examination were from the same groups. In other words, almost 1 in every 5.5 participants came from economically disadvantaged families, but only 1 in every 7.8 admitted students were from these families. On the contrary, the top two income groups were overrepresented; 35.62% of the participants were from the highest two income groups, while 41.77% of those who passed were from these two groups. Participants from the middle income group were evenly represented.

So far, it seems that Taiwan's examination system is moderately discriminatory against lower-class students. This finding exhibits that Taiwan's case is not anomalous when compared to other nations.[48] However, Chen suggests that the story will be different if we include the

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because he, on several occasions, misinterprets and also misquotes Chen's dataset, an elaborated version of the dataset developed by Huang, the relevant section (pp. 212-217) of his study is somewhat confusing.

[48] Many scholars have proposed reasons to explain this seemingly common phenomenon. For example, see Christopher Jencks, op. cit., p. 138.

TABLE 4.3

Participation and Acceptance of Entrance Examination Applicants by Income Levels, 1976

Annual Household Income*	No. of Households	% of Total Households	Participation Rate	Success Rate
Lowest: $599 and below	45,065	1.44%	3.10%	2.03%
Lower Middle: $600-$1,499	351,175	11.26%	15.40%	10.81%
Middle: $1,500-$2,999	1,588,602	50.99%	45.96%	45.40%
Upper Middle: $3,000-$5,999	991,668	31.81%	28.22%	33.23%
Highest: $6,000 and above	140,517	4.50%	7.40%	8.54%
Total	3,117,027	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

* U.S.$ equivalents, based upon an exchange rate of U.S.$1 to N.T. (New Taiwan dollars) $40.

Source: Shu-k'un Chen, "Ta-hsüeh Lien-k'ao Te Kung-p'ing Hsing" [Equality in the College and University Joint Entrance Examination]. Chung-kuo Lun-t'an [China Tribute]. vol. 7, no. 9 (February 1979), p. 40.

percentage of households at various income-levels and compare it with the acceptance rate. As noted in Table 4.3, 12.70% of Taiwan's households were either lowest or lower -middle income households, while 12.84% of those who passed the examination were from these two groups. This is the basis upon which Chen builds his argument that students from poorer families were not underrepresented.[49]

Chen's argument is not without problems. First of all, he uses the percentage of, for example, the lowest income households rather than the percentage of the lowest income population. The problem here is that these two percentages can be considered equal only if we assume that family size (or number of children) is not related to family income level, which may or may not be true. Secondly, looking at the figures of the lowest income households, we find that the reason why the acceptance rate, 2.03%, is greater than the percentage of household, 1.44%, (i.e., students from this income group are slightly overrepresented) is not because the examination is in favor of the poor, but because more lower-income students are willing to take the examination. This phenomenon, as shown in the comparison between the participation rate (3.10%) and the household percentage (1.44%), exists either because students from lower-income families are more likely to be motivated by the opportunity of upward mobility provided by the examination

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[49] Chen, Op. cit., p. 40.

system, or simply because lower-income families produce more children, or both. What would happen if the participation rate of the lower-income students drops to 1.44% (similar to the household rate)? The answer is very likely that the acceptance rate will drop proportionally to a rate probably below 1%; that is, the lower-income students would become underrepresented.

A simple example helps to illuminate this problem. Suppose there are 20,000 students applying for admission into Michigan State University this year, 90% of the applicants are female students, and 50% of those admitted are female students. Examining the distributive outcome of 50%, one may argue that M.S.U.'s admission policy is not discriminating against female applicants. But, the fact is that the chance for male applicants to get admitted is nine times higher than that of female applicants.[50] This hypothetical example illustrates the controversy over the relationship between social class and access to higher educational resources in Taiwan.

The picture of the above controversy will become clearer if relevant longitudinal data are furnished by official educational statistics. The currently available evidence seems to indicate that though access to higher

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[50] In this example, there are 2,000 male applicants (10%) and 18,000 female applicants (90%). If 1000 students are admitted this year, 500 of them are males and the other 500 are females. The acceptance ratio for males is thus 500/2,000 or 1/4, while the ratio for females is 500/18,000 or 1/36.

education is related to socioeconomic status in Taiwan, the relation is not very strong.

Table 4.4 provides a basis for comparing Taiwan's situation with that of the United States. It shows that, in states of California, Florida, and Hawaii, the percentage of the lower-income families uniformly exceeded the acceptance rate of students from these families. Compared with these three U.S. states, the inequality among social classes in Taiwan's allocation of higher education is thus almost negligible.

4.5.2 Ethnicity

Taiwan's twenty million population consists of four ethnic groups. About 14% or close to three million are called "Mainlanders", referring to those who went to Taiwan from mainland China after 1945 (when the island was returned to China by Japan) and their Taiwan-born descendants.[51] Most of them came over with the Chinese nationalist government from 1948 to 1950 after the Chinese civil war. The rest of the population is called "native Taiwanese" whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan before 1895, the

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[51] There were 2,743,998 mainlanders (or 13.78% of the total population) in 1988. See Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsing-chêng Yuan [Executive Yuan, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988 [Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1988]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1989, pp. 76-77. But the percentage of Taiwan's population born in Mainland China had dropped from about 15% in 1950 to 5.7% in 1985. See Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Changes in the Republic of China. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989, p. 36.

TABLE 4.4

Representation of Students in State Universities in California, Florida, and Hawaii, by Income Levels (percentage; population percentage in parentheses)

Family Income	California	Florida	Hawaii
3,999 and below	9.7 (22.2)	12.5 (28.1)	6.2 (26.4)
4,000-5,999	15.3 (14.2)	16.1 (18.7)	8.6 (15.4)
6,000-8,999	28.4 (21.7)	25.8 (22.6)	22.2 (18.3)
9,000-14,999	31.5 (28.0)	31.0 (21.4)	40.4 (26.3)
15,000-19,999	8.0 (8.1)	8.7 (4.7)	13.0 (8.2)
20,000 and above	6.9 (5.8)	5.8 (4.4)	9.6 (5.2)
Total	100.0(100.0)	100.0(100.0)	100.0(100.0)

Source: Joseph E. Hight and Richard Pollock, "Income Distribution Effects of Higher Education Expenditures in California, Florida, and Hawaii." *Journal of Higher Educational Resources*. vol.8 (Summer 1973): p. 322. Adapted after Shu-k'un Chen, "Ta-hsüeh Lien-k'ao Te Kung-p'ing Hsing" [Equality in the College and University Joint Entrance Examination]. in *Chung-kuo Lun-t'an* [China Tribute]. vol. 7, no. 9 (February 1979): p. 39.

beginning year of the Japanese occupation.[52] Among them, the largest group are "Minnan" (or "Hoklo") Taiwanese who are descendants of immigrants from south Fukien (Fuchien) Province in China. They accounts for about 70% of the total population. Another group, occupying about 15%, are "Hakka" Taiwanese whose ancestors migrated from east Kwangtung (Canton) Province. All three groups are considered Han Chinese, the dominate ethnic group in China as a whole, accounting for about 92% of the Chinese population. The fourth group are Aborigines who are descendants of the earliest inhabitants of the island (as described earlier in section 4.3.6). At present, there are only 330,000 Aborigines in Taiwan.[53]

In the past four decades the ethnic difference between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders has been a notable, if not the most significant, factor in all aspects of Taiwan's society, especially in Taiwan's politics. In fact, these two groups of Han Chinese are different politically and historically rather than ethnically and culturally, since there are very few distinctive cultural differences between them. One scholar argues that Taiwan's ethnic relations are almost

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[52] There were 17,159,814 "native Taiwanese" (or 86.22% of the total population) in 1988. Calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988. pp. 76-77.

[53] The description of Taiwan's four ethnic groups is based on the following sources: Republic of China 1988: A Reference Book. 1988, pp. 33-35; Marc J. Cohen, Taiwan at the Crossroads. Washington D.C.: Asia Resource Center, 1988; Hung-mao Tien, op. cit., pp. 35-36; and Douglas C. Smith, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

solely the result of the political, social, and the economic interaction of Taiwanese and Mainlanders since 1945.[54] On the one hand, a small portion of the Mainlanders have virtually monopolized political power (as shown later in chapter six), creating inequality against the Taiwanese in the political arena. On the other hand, through the ownership of land, the Taiwanese have absolutely gained the upper hand in economic affairs. Consequently, a strong sense of ethnic division has been developed and felt by both groups. Over the years the tension between them has become one of the vital forces that underlie the dynamic process of Taiwan's politics.[55]

Given the ethnic situation in Taiwan, one may wonder that whether or not the political and economic inequalities between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders have been projected onto the allocation of higher educational resources. A problem arises, when we try to answer this question; that is, ethnic-related statistics has been either unpublished or have been published incompletely, sometimes vaguely, in official statistical yearbooks because of the political sensitivity involved in such statistical figures. Although one's ethnic background is required in preparing almost all

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[54] Hill Gates, "Ethnicity and Social Class." in Emily Martin Ahern and Hill Gates, The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981, p. 252. Cited after Hung-mao Tien, ibid., p. 36.

[55] For political and historical events that shaped the ethnic relations between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders, see Hung-mao Tien, ibid., pp. 36-41.

formal or informal documents in Taiwan, ironically, government officials tend to conceal the ethnic divergences.[56] However, based upon data that are currently available, Table 4.5 provides a fragmentary picture of the allocation of higher education resources between the Taiwanese and Mainland students.[57]

Table 4.5 displays Taiwan's ethnicity ratio of university and college students from 1961 to 1970. The percentage of the Mainland students was decreasing from 31.6% in 1961 to 20.5% in 1970, while the population percentage of Mainlanders was increasing from 12.2% to 15.9% during the same period.[58] The decrease in the percentage of the Mainland students signifies that the allocation of

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[56] There are several political reasons behind this irony. On the one hand, the Taiwan's government requests the Mainlanders (including their offspring) to keep their ethnic consciousness in order to symbolize its ties to the Mainland. On the other hand, the government deemphasizes the ethnic division to avoid any political frictions between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders. According to recent information, the Legislature Yuan is attempting to modify some articles of the Household Registration Act in such a way that one's place of birth will be used to replace his/her ethnic origin (or place of original registration); that is, about 2.5 million Taiwan-born "Mainlanders" (or 95% of the total Mainlander population) will become, at least legally, Taiwanese. For details, see Shih-chieh Jih-pao. June 24, 1991, 1.

[57] Even fragmentary, it still constitutes a pioneer empirical study of this allocation problem. The only empirical study in the existing literature that touches upon this issue is a brief commentary by Lih-wu Han in his book Taiwan Today (Taipei, Taiwan: Hwa-kuo Publishing Company, 1951), in which he depicts the allocation situation of the late 1940s.

[58] The Mainlander population percentages are calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988. pp. 76-77.

TABLE 4.5

University and College Students by Ethnicity, 1961-1970

Year	Taiwanese		Mainlanders	
	Number*	Percentage	Number*	Percentage
1961	22,267	68.4	10,294	31.6
1962	......	....	......	....
1963	27,454	68.2	12,787	31.8
1964	39,292	67.2	19,181	32.8
1965	55,368	69.5	24,313	30.5
1966	75,159	69.5	32,931	30.5
1967	......	....	......	....
1968	78,530	78.1	22,053	21.9
1969	93,772	79.4	24,295	20.6
1970	105,083	79.5	27,132	20.5

* Figures including junior college students.

Sources: Numbers of Taiwanese students are based on Chung-hua Min-kuo Tai-wan Shêng-chêng-fu [Provincial Government of Taiwan, Republic of China], _Tai-wan Chiao-yu T'ung-chi_ [Taiwan Educational Statistics]. 10 volumes (1961-1970), Taipei, Taiwan, 1962-1971. The numbers of Mainlander students are not directly from the above statistics, since in this source these numbers are inflated by including overseas Chinese students. Thus, we subtract the numbers of overseas students from these numbers to obtain the "genuine" numbers of Mainlander students. The figures of overseas students are based on the Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu Pu [Ministry of Education, Republic of China], _Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu T'ung-chi_ [Educational Statistics of the Republic of China]. 10 volumns (1961-1970), Taipei, Taiwan, 1962-1971.

higher educational resources between the two ethnic groups became more equal over the course of this decade. This process of equalization would become more salient if compared to an earlier figure: 40.7% of Taiwan's university and college students were Mainlanders in 1949.[59] However, despite of this equalizing trend, Mainland students were still overrepresented at the end of the 1960s.

Over the years there has been no preferential policy in favor of either the Taiwanese or Mainland students in university and college admission, except the one temporarily adopted before 1950. According to Lih-wu Han, because the levels of the Mainlander students in Chinese and English were, on the whole, higher than those of Taiwanese in the late 1940's, there was a danger that higher educational opportunities for the Taiwanese students would be restricted. As a result, the Taiwanese students were admitted on a preferential basis and a quota of 70% for them was fixed in the universities and colleges. Han states that the quota system was abolished in 1950 since the Taiwanese students began to perform as well or even better than theMainland students in the examinations.[60] Since there was no preferential policy in the following years, the aforementioned process of equalization was solely due to the

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[59] Calculated from figures collected by Lih-wu Han, see Fred Warren Riggs, Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule. New York: MacMillan, 1952, pp. 140-141.

[60] Lih-wu Han's statements are quoted from ibid., p. 141.

fact that the Taiwanese students had a better command of Chinese, English, and other tested disciplines, such as Chinese history and geography, than they had earlier.

Another possible reason why the Mainland students were substantially overrepresented in the earlier years is related to parental occupations. A great number of Mainlanders were government officials, teachers, or military personnel (otherwise, they had little chance to escape to Taiwan), while most Taiwanese were farmers, workers, or small businessmen. Therefore, it is conceivable that sons and daughters of Mainlanders had better chances of getting admitted than that of Taiwanese, due to a higher socio-economic status. As time goes by, the occupational distinctiveness between the two groups has been gradually obfuscated, so that, even without recent data, we can expect that the overrepresentation of the Mainland students would have continued to decrease in the 1970s and 1980s.

4.5.3 Gender

Since the end of the World War II the status of women throughout the world has been changing. In many countries governments are taking measures to improve women's status by guaranteeing constitutional equality and eliminating discrimination against them. In Taiwan, a hierarchical Chinese society where women have traditionally held a very subordinate status, women have been granted equal rights under the law; they have been, accordingly, granted equal

opportunity to participate in politics as well as other opportunities such as education and employment. Over the last three decades, with Taiwan's rapid economic development, the status of women in many aspects of social life has indeed been improved, but have they achieved equality with men? In this section we will find out whether or not women have achieved equity with men in sharing Taiwan's scarce higher educational resources.

Table 4.6 demonstrates the gender ratio of Taiwan's university and college students. According to the figures shown, there is a 25-fold increase in the percentage of female college students over the course of 46 years (between 1946-1992). Taiwan has had so many preferential policies in favor of various groups of college applicants, but there has not been one for women. Hence, the 25-fold increase is solely attributable to other factors. Some of these factors are closely relevant, such as the expanding enrollment of women in secondary and elementary schools, while some factors are remotely related, like women's improving status in the family and workplace. In any case, Taiwan's rapid economic growth is the fundamental reason for all of these happenings.

Evidently, women's share in higher education has substantially grown, but has the growth been satisfactory, with respect to the percentage of women population? According to statistics, women accounted for 49.7% and 48.2% of Taiwan's total population in 1945 and 1988, respectively.

TABLE 4.6

University and College Students by Gender, 1946-1992

Year	Male		Female	
	Number*	Percentage	Number*	Percentage
1946	2,929	98.2	54	1.8
1951	7,107	86.6	1,102	13.4
1956	18,710	82.8	3,896	17.2
1961	29,421	76.6	8,982	23.4
1966	77,278	67.9	36,577	32.1
1971	140,431	63.1	82,074	36.9
1976	188,095	62.8	111,319	37.2
1981	210,330	58.7	148,107	41.3
1986	250,353	56.6	192,295	43.4
1988	274,595	55.3	221,935	44.7
1990	n.a.	54.0	n.a.	46.0
1992	n.a.	54.7	n.a.	45.3

* Figures including junior college students.

Sources: Figures of 1946-1988 are cited from Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988. pp. 194-195. The 1990 percentages are from Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu Pu [Ministry of Education, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu T'ung-chi Chih-piao, 1990 [Indicators of Educational Statistics of the Republic of China, 1990]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1991, p. 68. The 1992 figures are taken from Shih-chieh Jih-pao. February 19, 1993.

During intervening years, the percentage fluctuated between 47% to 49%.[61] Therefore, women's representation in higher education has almost reached the point they deserve, and, considering its continuously increasing trend, we can expect that women's share will reach that point very soon.

In the light of the above analyses of the distributive outcomes of Taiwan's higher educational resources, we can conclude that one's social class is more or less related to one's opportunity to access to these resources, and that there have been uneven allocations among different ethnic and gender groups but the gaps have gradually narrowed over the years.

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[61] These figures are calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988. p. 76.

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THE PRINCIPLES AND OUTCOMES OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN

Volume II

By

Tsung Chi

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CHAPTER FIVE

CADRE SYSTEM IN CHINA

The next allocation system that we will consider in this study pertains to the allocation of public offices, which are very much desirable resources in almost every society because of the privileges and prestige attached to them. The high social status enjoyed by public officials is exceptionally conspicuous in China. Traditional Chinese society was divided into four large occupational groups: scholar-officials (shih), farmers, artisans, and merchants, with the scholar-officials at the top of this hierarchial relationship. They functioned as leaders, or perhaps rulers, in every sphere of Chinese social life, including politics, economy, justice, education, religion, and even art. This legacy still remains noticeable in contemporary China and Taiwan. However, thousands of years of experience in operating a sophisticated civil service system has had a salient impact on Taiwan's civil service system, but less so on Communist China's cadre system.

Since the dramatic return to power of Teng Hsiao-p'ing in 1978, the Chinese national leaders have embarked on a series of reforms to facilitate the implementation of the modernization programs. Essential to the success of all the reform measures is the devoted efforts of millions of energetic and educated cadres working within a variety of state and party structures. Therefore, the importance of

studying the Chinese cadres becomes obvious. Moreover, if we can hypothesize that the importance of the political elite is inversely related to the degree of institutionalization of political offices,[1] then, given the lower degree of political institutionalization in China, the Chinese cadre corps is too important to be ignored in any serious study of contemporary Chinese politics.

There have been many studies on the political elite in China, but most of them tend to focus exclusively on the changing profile of the top leaders as largely defined by the memberships of the communist party's central committee and politburo (the core of the Party structure), and of the government's state council (the highest executive organ).[2] Some of these elite studies have focused on China's cadre system, but only a few specifically touch upon the issue of cadre recruitment.[3] As for the mechanisms and principles

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[1] For details of the hypothesis, see Hong Yung Lee (a), "From Revolutionary Cadres to Bureaucratic Technocrats." in Brantly Womack, ed., Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 180.

[2] Hong Yung Lee (b), From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991, p. 5.

[3] The following studies have a focus on Chinese cadre system: A. Doak Barnett, Cadre, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967; Ezra F. Vogel, "From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The Regularization of Cadres." The China Quarterly. no. 29 (January-March 1967): pp. 36-60; Michel Oksenberg, "Local Leaders in Rural China, 1962-65: Individual Attributes, Bureaucratic Positions, and political Recruitment." in A. Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 155-215; Maria

used to recruit new Chinese cadres, it appears that they have been largely, if not completely, neglected in the existing studies.

Thus, this chapter will study the scarcity of offices in the cadre system, the mechanisms and principles employed by the Party to allocate these offices, and finally the outcomes of this allocation system in terms of social class, race and gender.

Chan Morgan, "Controlling the Bureaucracy in Post-Mao China." Asian Survey. vol.xxi, no. 12 (December 1981): pp. 1223-1236; Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central committee." Asian Survey. vol. xxxiii, no. 6 (June 1983): pp. 673-691; Lee (1991a), op. cit., Lee (1991b), ibid.; John P. Burns, "Reforming China's Bureaucracy, 1979-82." Asian Survey. vol. xxiii, no. 6 (June 1983): pp. 692-722; Burns (1989a), "Civil Service Reform in Post-Mao China." in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., China: Modernization in the 1980s. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1989, pp. 95-129; Melanie Manion, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders." The China Quarterly. no. 102 (June 1985): pp. 203-233; Alan P. L. Liu, "The Dragon's Teeth of Mao Tse-tung: Cadres in Mainland China." Issues and Studies. vol. 21, no. 8 (August 1985): pp. 12-33; Yung-sheng Chen, "Reform of Mainland China's Cadre System." Issues and Studies. vol. 21, no. 12 (December 1985): pp. 93-110; Tony Saich, "Cadres: From Bureaucrats to Managerial Modernizers?" in Birthe Arendrup; Carsten Boyer Thogersen; and Anne Wedell-Wedellsborg, eds., China in the 1980s and Beyond. London, U.K.: Curzon Press Ltd., 1986, pp. 119-142; King W. Chow, "Political Succession in the People's Republic of China: Politics and Implication of Cadre Assessment (1949-1984)." Asian Profile. vol. 15, no. 5 (October 1987): pp. 395-405; and Graham Young, "Party Reforms." in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., China: Modernization in 1980s. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1989, pp. 76-80. Among the above, only Barnett, Oksenburg, Lee (1983 & 1991b); Burns (1983 & 1989); and Chow specifically investigate the issue of cadre recruitment.

5.1 Scarcity of Cadreship

Before discussing the degree of scarcity of the Chinese cadre offices, we must start by analyzing the term "cadre" (or kan-pu in Chinese), for the term used in China today has multiple meanings. Many scholars who focus their research on the Chinese cadre system begin their discussions with some sort of introduction to the term "cadre".[4] But, probably reflecting the confusing meanings used in reality, there is no consensus on the meaning and the scope of the Chinese cadre corps.

The term "cadre" has different meanings before and after the communist revolution. Originally, "the term cadre referred to the backbone force of the revolution movement--people whose high level of political consciousness qualified them to assume responsibility for specific political tasks."[5] In this original sense, a cadre was not an ordinary peasant or worker but a leader who moved among the

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[4] Such as A. Doak Barnett, ibid., pp. 38-47; Hong Yung Lee (1991b), ibid., pp. 3-6; Ezra F. Vogel, ibid., pp. 36-60; John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963, pp. 185-195; Alan P. L. Liu, How China Is Ruled. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1986, pp. 159-161; Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China. new, enlarged edition, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 162-67; D. J. Waller, The Government and Politics of Communist China. London, U.K.: Hutchinson University Library, 1970, pp. 47-50; and James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980, pp. 118-121. The discussions in this section draw heavily on these studies.

[5] Hong Yung Lee (1991b), ibid., pp. 3-4.

masses to build a revolutionary organization. Therefore, before the communist revolution triumphed in China in 1949, to become a cadre was more like having a commitment to the cause of communist revolution rather than to undertake a specific job or career, and virtually all cadres were Party members. After 1949, the meaning of cadre broadened, including all those who staffed the huge party-state apparatus. Thus, the cadre, who had been a leader in a revolutionary cause, became an official in a formal bureaucratic organization. Technically speaking, at the bottom level, the leader of a rural village in a remote province is a cadre, and so are the high-ranking leaders such as the late Mao Tse-tung or Chiang Tse-min, the present Secretary-General of the Party.

In this research "cadres" refer to both Party members and non-Party members who hold formal, responsible positions as functionaries and wield authority over others from top down in the Chinese bureaucratic hierarchies. The bureaucratic hierarchies include the Party, state, army, communes and any other local organizations.

There are many different types of cadres in China today. They shall be introduced here because many of them will be referred to in the following sections. On the basis of their employment, the cadres are divided into three general categories: Party, government, and military. Each group has its own classification system with ranks and grades which are similar to the nomenklatura in the former

Soviet Union.[6] Within the Party, of course, all cadres (such as Party secretaries) are Party members, whereas cadres in the governmental and military structures (such as government officials and military officers) could be either Party members or non-Party members. Hence, it should be kept in mind that not every cadre in China is a Party member, nor is every party member a cadre. However, a cadre with significant authority and responsibility is almost always a Party member.

In terms of party seniority, which largely determines a cadre's position in the bureaucracy, cadres are divided into those who joined the revolution before the Anti-Japanese War (1937-45), those who joined during the War, those who took part in the revolution during the Civil War against the Nationalists (1946-49), and those who joined after 1949.[7]

On the basis of power, cadres are generally classified into senior cadres (kao-kan or kao-chi kan-pu), leading cadres (ling-tao kan-pu), and ordinary cadres (i-pan kan-pu).[8] The senior cadres are generally national and provincial Party-state leaders; the leading cadres are party

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[6] There are 30 grades in both party and government cadre systems, and 24 grades in the military cadre system. For details of the cadre rank system, see Monte R. Bullard, China's Political-Military Evolution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 157-63.

[7] Alan P. L. Liu (1986), op. cit., p. 160.

[8] There is another power-based distinction between state cadres (kuo-chia kan-pu) and local cadres (ti-fang kan-pu). For details of the two classifications, see idem., and A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

secretaries of sub-provincial or institutional party committees, or government leaders at the sub-provincial level; and lastly the ordinary cadres are ordinary in relation to the senior and leading cadres. Apparently, these three ranks are closely related to party seniority.

On the basis of work, there are political cadres (chêng-chih kan-pu) and professional cadres (yeh-wu kan-pu).[9] The former refers to those who deal with political, ideological work, such as propaganda, while the latter refers to professional bureaucrats (or technocrats) who are in charge of specific tasks of the bureaucracy.

In terms of its classification system with ranks and grades, it appears that the Chinese cadre system is similar to the civil service system in non-communist countries, but in reality they are not the same. The most fundamental factor that sets Chinese cadres apart from Western civil servants is that, like in other communist countries, cadres in China serve as the vanguard of the proletariat whose power over the masses is titanic and unregulated by law, whereas Western civil servants are only professional functionaries with power limited by their technical specialty and the law.[10] This difference has important implications to the criteria used to recruit Chinese cadres, which will be discussed later in this study.

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[9] See Alan P. L. Liu (1986), op. cit., p. 161.

[10] See ibid., p. 159.

It is difficult to obtain precise figures for the total number of Party, government and military cadres in China today. However, several studies on Chinese cadres, along with several newspaper reports, have provided us some figures. Table 5.1 is largely based upon the data collected by Hong Yung Lee, one of the leading scholars on this subject. It shows that since 1949 the size of the Chinese cadre system has been steadily increasing. Based upon this table, the number of cadres in 1990 (33 million) was more than 11 times the 1949 figure (2.99 million), while the

TABLE 5.1

Growth of the Cadre System and Number of Governmental Employees in Administrative Organs in China, 1949-1990 (in millions)

Year	Cadres	Number of Civil Servants
1949	2.99	.....
1959	9.66	273.0
1969	9.20	291.0
1979	.....	451.0
1980	18.00	477.1
1981	.....	506.7
1982	20.30	562.7
1987	27.00	.....
1988	29.03	.....
1989	30.00	.....
1990	33.00	.....

Sources: Figures from 1949 to 1988 are based on Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991, p. 208. The 1989 figure is cited from Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily]. Beijing, China, September 16, 1989, while the 1990 figure is from Chung-kuo News Agency [China News Agency]. October 11, 1991, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao [World Journal], New York, October 12, 1991, A12.

population only doubled during the same period.[11] Moreover, the ratio of cadres to citizens was 1 to 181 in 1949, but it reached 1 to 34 (or 3.0%) in 1990.

Using other sources, another scholar provides us with figures different from Lee's. While Lee's table suggests there were 20.3 million cadres in 1982, John Burns in his book about the Chinese nomenklatura system points out that the estimated size of China's nomenklatura was only about 8.1 million in the same year.[12] When using a much broader definition in another relevant work, Burns estimates that there were at least 35 million cadres in 1982 and thus he contends that the claim that the cadres numbered 20 million substantially understates the picture.[13]

Despite the confusion over the number of cadres, two things are certain. First, apparently the resource of cadre

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[11] China had a total population of 541.67 and 1,143.33 million in 1949 and 1990, respectively. See Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Kuo-chia T'ung-chi Chü [State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China], Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992 [Statistical Yearbook of China, 1992]. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press, 1992, p. 77.

[12] According to John Burns, these 8.1 million cadres were "responsible people" or leaders who were employed by party and government organizations, service units, and economic enterprises. See, John P. Burns (1989b), ed., The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System: A Documentary Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979-1984. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989, xxiv in introduction.

[13] In other Burns's works, civil servants or cadres include all those who employed by government organizations and those who employed by service units, such as in hospitals, schools and the post offices. See John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., note 2 in p. 120. For more details about the 1982 figures, also see John P. Burns (1983), op. cit., p. 695.

offices in China has become less scarce since 1949. Secondly, because those offices were taken by only 2% (if using Lee's figure) or 3.5% (using Burns's) of the population in 1982, and 3% (using Lee's) of the population in 1990, this resource is still considered extremely scarce in China. This is a common characteristic shared by personnel systems in many other countries.

Cadre positions in China are always scarce and desirable. For most of the past 43 years, a career in the Chinese cadre system was very attractive. Cadres enjoy plenty of privileges; many of them, especially those with significant authority, have considerable access to power, high social status, security of tenure, high salaries, access to other scarce resources such as higher education for family members, and other rewards granted by society. Cadre privilege is the most salient exception to general egalitarian practice in Chinese society. Therefore, demand for cadre offices is always very high in China. However, as a result of economic reforms undertaken since 1979, a career in the cadre system may be less attractive today than it was in the past.

The following figures display the general profile of China's cadre corps in 1982. Two-thirds of the 20 million cadres were educated and 21% of them were college

graduates.[14] The average age of cadres was 62 years at the provincial level, and 49 at the county level.[15] Women accounted for only 10% of the total.[16] The most intriguing statistics is that of the 20 million cadres in 1982, 17 million (or 85%) were Party members.[17]

As mentioned earlier, although not every cadre in China is a Party member, a cadre with significant authority and responsibility is almost always a Party member. This assertion is backed up by the following dramatic statistics: in 1990 the (largest possible) percentage of the total leading cadres who were non-Party-members was .00021% (only 18 persons) at and above the provincial level,[18] and .00087%

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[14] Laszlo Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism, 1921-1985. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1988, pp. 494-495.

[15] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily]. Beijing, China, June 6, 1991.

[16] Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., pp. 212-213.

[17] Laszlo Ladany, op. cit., p. 515. In the same year there were 40 million Party members; that is, 42.5% of the Party members were cadres.

[18] This note is to explain how to calculate the percentage and why it is the largest possible one. In 1990 only 18 central and provincial leading cadres were non-Party members. (see Hsin-hua News Agency [New China News Agency]. September 30, 1990, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao [World Journal]. New York, October 1, 1990.) In 1982 there were 86,117 leading cadres at the same levels (see Hong Yung Lee, 1991b, op. cit., p. 212). Looking at the increasing trend of the total number of cadres between 1982 and 1990, it is conceivable that the 1990 figure should be considerably greater than 86,117.

(781 persons) at and above the county level.[19] These few non-Party cadres are mainly political decorations used as symbols of the supposed democratic character of the socialist system.

Examining the above infinitesimal percentages, we can easily conclude that although it is not exactly a necessary condition, party membership is an extremely important qualification for a Chinese citizen to become a leading cadre. Since there is a huge overlap between the party membership and the cadreship, we shall discuss more about the former.

Like members of other Communist parties in power, the Chinese Communist Party members have enjoyed great status, prestige and authority. The membership alone means a life-long political career with enormous opportunities for political power. They dominate most of the leading posts in the governmental hierarchy where even many lower-ranking Party members have greater political authority than higher-ranking non-Party-member cadres, because the latter all realize that the former have a special channel to

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[19] In 1990 only 781 leading cadres at and above the county level were non-Party members (see Shih-chieh Jih-pao. March 22, 1990), whereas in 1982 there were 894,910 leading cadres at the same levels (see Hong Yung Lee 1991b, op. cit., p. 212). In view of the increasing trend of the total number of cadres between 1982 and 1990, we can estimate that the 1990 figure should be considerably greater than 894,910.

communicate with higher authority.[20]

Furthermore, members and non-members are not equal before the law. When Party members commit crimes, they are not prosecuted by judicial organs, but punished by the Party's discipline inspection commissions.[21]

As indicated in Table 5.2, the number of party members have steadily increased since the Party was founded in 1921. The ratio of party members to citizens was 1 to 50 in 1971,

TABLE 5.2

Growth of the Chinese Communist Party Membership, 1921-1991

Year	Party Members
1921	57
1931	68,000
1941	763,447
1951	5,762,293
1961	17,000,000
1971	17,000,000
1981	38,923,569
1989	48,000,000
1990	49,000,000
1991	50,320,000

Sources: Figures from 1921 to 1981 are based on Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. 1991, pp. 16-17. The 1989 figure is from Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China. 1991, p. 63. The 1990 figure is cited from Jen-min Jih-pao. June 25, 1990. The 1991 figure is from Hsin-hua News Agency. June 17, 1991, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao. June 18, 1991, A10.

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[20] For details of the relation between Party members cadres and non-Party cadres in Chinese bureaucracy, see A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., pp. 27-37.

[21] See Chu-yuan Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 28-29.

1 to 26 in 1981, and 1 to 23 in 1991.[22] Although the resource of party membership has become more available over the years, it is still relatively scarce because only 4.3% of 1.13 billion Chinese were Party members in 1990. However, probably as a result of the Tienanmen Massacre in June 1989, party membership is less desirable today than it was in the past four decades.

5.2 Distributive Mechanisms: The Appointment System and Other New Methods

Although many experimental measures to reform the system of cadre recruitment have been proposed and implemented in some areas, in China today there is still no organized system of bureaucratic examinations similar to the system of civil service examination adopted in U.S.A., Taiwan, and many other countries. Instead, China has adopted an appointment (jen-ming) system through which most cadres are appointed by superior Party and state organs. In addition to the system, since the mid-1980s authorities have begun to recruit cadres through other methods.[23]

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[22] China had a total population of 852.29, 1,000.72, and 1,158.23 million in 1971, 1981, and 1991, respectively. See Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 77.

[23] The appointment system and other methods discussed here refer to mechanisms used to recruit new cadres. For the appointment of leading cadres, see Melanie Manion, op. cit., the entire article.

5.2.1 Responsible Organs of the Appointment System

Several Party and state institutions have had authority to manage all aspects of the cadre system, including training, appraising, compensating, disciplining, retiring, and, most importantly, the appointment system. At the central level are the Party's Central Committee and its Organization Department, and the government's State Council and its Ministry of Personnel; at and below the provincial level are provincial and local Central Committees of the Party, and many government organs such as Personnel Bureaus at every levels.[24]

Although these central and local Party and state institutions are de facto the responsible organs for managing the cadre system, according to the 1982 constitution of the PRC, the State Council is the de jure organ in charge.[25] Within the State Council, major responsibility is conferred in the Ministry of Labor and personnel, which is composed of several agencies, including the Cadre Bureau (kan-pu-chü). The Bureau is the major organ responsible for cadre management. Since 1988 the

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[24] For more details of the Party and state organs in charge of managing the cadre system, see A Doak Barnett, op. cit., pp. 48-63, and John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., pp. 98-102.

[25] For the specific constitutional article and the details of the cadre management organs within the government, see John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., p. 98. The discussion in this paragraph draws heavily upon his work.

Cadre Bureau, along with other bureaus, has been transferred to the newly established Ministry of Personnel.

Despite the constitutional provision on the responsible organs, it is clear to those who are familiar with the Party-state relations in Communist regimes that the Chinese Party institutions are more important in managing the cadre system than their counterparts in the government. This statement is supported by one report in Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily]: "the procedure of cadre recruitment consists of recommendation of qualified candidates by the method of mass line, investigation of recommended candidates by organizational departments (of the Party), and finally, collective discussion, decision, and approval by leading party cadres."[26] It is therefore the party committees at each level of the governmental bureaucracy (including, for example, the party committees of the Ministry of Personnel and other Ministries within the State Council) that are actually responsible for cadre recruitment.

5.2.2 Main Sources of Cadres

After surveying the responsible organs for cadre recruitment, one question arises as to what kind of citizens are recruited into the cadre system through the appointment system? Over the years, there have been two main sources of cadres.

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[26] Jen-min Jih-pao. March 11, 1986.

The most important source of new cadres consists of graduates of middle schools and colleges. Every year the State Education Commission collects information on the number of graduates and their education specialization, while the State Planning Commission collects information on current vacancies and possible future demand of the cadre system. Both Commissions function under the authority of the State Council where a national manpower plan is produced. Based upon the plan, every year fresh graduates are assigned to their first job in the cadre system through this allocation (fen-p'ei) system, which constitutes the backbone of the cadre appointment (jen-ming) system.[27]

This allocation system is crucial to the regime in that it has been a major channel for the infusion of the ablest young people into the massive Chinese bureaucracy. Also, assignments to the cadre jobs have been viewed as desirable by many graduates. However, as a result of economic reforms undertaken since 1979, a career in the cadre system is less attractive today than it was in the past. In recent years some college graduates, usually the ablest one, even refuse to be assigned to work within the cadre system. This will be detrimental to the Chinese bureaucracy in the future when the modernizing China marches into the 21st century.

The second source of cadres is composed of demobilized

[27] The discussions on the allocation system are based upon A Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 53, and Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., p. 102.

soldiers. Every year the Central Military Commission (a party organ elected by the Central Committee of the Party) and the State Planning Commission coordinate their efforts in producing another manpower plan by matching the vacancies in the cadre system with the number of military personnel to be demobilized.[28]

This allocation system is not without problems. Recently, the number of demobilized soldiers and armed policemen has been much greater than the cadre system's demand for them. The primary reason is because many government and Party organs have been freezing their personnel recruitment since 1987 when Chinese leaders called for economic retrenchment and consolidation after the 1984-1985 overheating.[29] Besides the cadre system, many industrial enterprises and business units are also reluctant to accept the demobilized soldiers, primarily due to the notorious image of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) during and after the 1989 Tienanmen Massacre.[30] The foregoing is one of the reasons, if not the most important one, why the current morale level of the military is very low and many well-trained officers are seeking early retirement. In the

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[28] See John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., pp. 102-103.

[29] Reported in South China Morning Post. Hong Kong, April 12, 1990. For details of the Chinese economic development since 1979, see Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987, the entire book.

[30] South China Morning Post. April 12, 1990.

eyes of Chinese leaders, this is definitely a very unhealthy development that will have a negative impact on the future of the PLA. As a consequence, in 1989 the central authority put pressure on all enterprises and government organs to provide jobs for the .6 million soldiers and armed policemen who retired in that particular year.[31]

5.2.3 Other Methods of Cadre Recruitment

One of the problems associated with the above appointment system is that many cadres are "appointed" through family ties and personal connection networks. Many of them are neither graduates of high schools or colleges nor demobilized soldiers, and thus they do not possess the expertise and professional attitude to become a useful cadre. For instance, the city of Ch'angsha of Hunan Province in 1981 offered public security jobs to sons of 14 cadres at and above the bureau chief level. This is a case of "recruitment through the backdoor".[32] Or, we may call it a case of hereditary appointment.

In order to end nepotism and favoritism in cadre recruitment, since the mid-1980s the central authority has embarked on a reform of the recruitment methods.[33] In

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[31] Idem.

[32] See Benedict Stavis, China's Political Reform: An Interim Report. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, p. 49.

[33] For example, in 1991 the Ministry of Personnel ruled that leading cadres should be prohibited from having their relatives working under their authorities. See Wen-hui-pao.

addition to the planned appointment of graduates and demobilized soldiers into the cadre system, many other methods have been introduced. The primary beneficiaries of these new methods are those who are outside of the appointment system such as workers, peasants, and early school dropouts.

Generally speaking, all the new methods can be named as methods of open recruitment, which means that cadre vacancies should be opened up for public application, as opposed to the appointment system that is close to the general public. These methods are far from being uniformly used: methods used have varied from one locality to another, as well as from one administrative organ to another, and some methods are similar to, or different from, other methods in one respect or another. Some recruiters even use more than one method simultaneously to staff their organizations. Basically, there have been five new methods used in China today.

5.2.3.1 Investigation (K'ao-ch'a)

Investigation is not so much a new method as it is a remedy to the appointment system. What is new in this method is that appointments are made after soliciting recommendations from the masses and after investigation by party organizations. The masses, low-ranking cadres, and

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Hong Kong, February 20, 1991, cited in Chung-yang Jih-pao [Central daily News]. International Edition, Inglewood, California, February 22, 1991, p. 4.

retired cadres are now encouraged to recommend qualified persons for cadre positions.[34] Qualified persons in theory could be persons with any educational, professional, and family background, so that this method broadens the pool of candidates for the party committees to make their final selections.

5.2.3.2 Invitation (P'ing-jen)

Invitation is a method used by some units to recruit specialist cadres. Both recruiters and individual applicants bargain, negotiate, and, more importantly, make a contract that specifies terms on tenure, salary, and type of work, so that, in those units adopting this method, the previous life-tenure system has been replaced by the new fixed-term contracts of employment.[35] For example, in Ch'ungking (Chungching) and Ch'êngtu of Szechwan (Szuchuan) Province and Liaoyuan of Chilin (Kirin) Province, cadres have signed three to five-year contracts, which are renewable on condition of good performance.[36]

The labor market involved in the new system of invitation is a limited version of the capitalist labor market. The regime tolerates it in order to recruit more productive specialists. According to one source, in 1984 three provinces, two municipalities, and three scientific

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[34] See Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., p. 361.

[35] Ibid., pp. 361-362, and John J. Burns (1989a), op. cit., p. 105.

[36] John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., p. 105.

organizations were authorized to experiment with this new method.[37] According to another source, by October 1984, more than 60,000 township cadres had been employed on contract terms.[38] Though the invitation system has been primarily employed to select local cadres, some leading cadres at the provincial level were also recruited on contracts.

It is unclear as to how people know there are vacancies available and what kind of citizens can apply and be "invited" into the cadre system. It appears that vacancies are publicly advertised and available to anyone so long as he or she possesses the needed skills and expertise. Undoubtedly, this western-style recruiting method will be more widely accepted in the future when China continues to embark on its current economic reforms.

5.2.3.3 Advertising

In a study conducted by King W. Chow in Beijing during 1983-1984, the recruitment process in which a new method of advertising was used is clearly depicted: "Whenever a danwei (unit) is in need of additional manpower, either due to expansion of operation or retirement of veterans, its leading cadres submit a request to the personnel bureau which assesses, and, as a common practice, approves the

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[37] Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., p. 362.

[38] John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., p. 107.

request. Next, the danwei announces the openings by placing an advertisement in provincial or local newspapers. After the completion of a review of all applicants, leading cadres of the danwei prepare a list of preferred candidates. ... Other cadres (within the danwei) ... make recommendations. After compiling a ranking of candidates, leading cadres pass it to the Party committee. ... Eventually they submit the final list to the POD (Party Organization Department)"[39] for final approval.

The method of advertising is similar to the methods of investigation and invitation in some respects but also different in some other respects. First of all, it is similar to the method of investigation in that, both methods are subject to strict, careful investigations by Party organizations; they are different in that the former allows anyone who saw the newspaper advertisements to apply, while the latter is simply a system of appointment by recommendations which, very likely, prevents some qualified citizens from applying.

On the one hand, the methods of advertising and invitation are similar to each other because both methods assure that vacancies are publicly advertised and available to all. On the other hand, a major difference is that the

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[39] See King W. Chow, op. cit., pp. 402-403. In addition to Beijing, authorities of other areas, such as Chilin Province and the city of Shenyang (in Liaolin Province), reportedly have begun to advertise vacancies. See John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., p. 105.

core of the invitation system is a contract signed between the recruiters and the recruited specialists, while such a contract is absent in the method of advertising.

5.2.3.4 Examination

In 1982 the Ministry of Labor and Personnel issued several cadre recruitment regulations, according to which vacancies must be publicly advertised, individuals must be permitted to recommend themselves for posts, and recruiters must rely upon examinations as a select techniques.[40] Since then, however, only in a few places have examinations been used to recruit cadres. For example, provinces of Chilin and Chekiang (Chechiang), and cities of Ch'êngtu and Shenyang have reportedly recruited cadres by using examinations.[41]

A more recent development was that in 1989 the Ministry of Personnel and the Party's Department of Organization jointly announced a regulation regarding the application of examinations as the method of recruiting new cadres.[42] Afterwards, it has been reported that 20 Ministries under the State Council will use examinations as a major mode of recruiting cadres in 1991.[43]

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[40] See John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., p. 105.

[41] John P. Burns (1989a), op. cit., p. 105; and Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., p. 262. According to Lee, by 1987, Chekiang Province reportedly recruited 13,900 cadres through the use of examinations.

[42] Jen-min Jih-pao. February 14, 1989.

[43] Shih-chieh Jih-pao. March 13, 1991, A10.

In sum, since the early 1980s the regime has determined to adopt the method of examinations, similar to the U.S. system of civil service examinations, to select new cadres, but it has been adopted sporadically, regionally, and in an unsystematic way, rather than constantly, nationally, and in a precisely organized manner.

5.2.3.5 Election

The last method of cadre recruitment is about competitive elections. So far there has not been many examples of recruiting cadres through elections. Experiments were reportedly conducted in Kwangtung (Canton) Province only, a southern frontier province and also the leading edge of Chinese reform since 1979. In Kwangtung, elections have been mainly used to select administrative heads for small enterprises and business units. However, even in this most "reformed" province of China, the actual power to make final decisions is not delegated to electors, but is still retained by the Party committee.[44] Thus, this Chinese style of election resembles a public opinion poll rather than a genuine election realizing the idea of representative democracy.

Among the above five new methods of recruitment, the examination method is probably the one that will be used more frequently in the future. Since the mid-1980, the Party leaders have planned to establish a civil service

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[44] See Benedict Stavis, op. cit., 1988, p. 49, and Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., p. 261.

system, similar to the one in the west, to manage the millions of state cadres working in the government. In accordance to their plans, state cadres will be divided into two types of state civil servants (kuo-chia kung-wu-yuan): political affairs officers (chêng-wu kung-wu-yuan), and professional officers (yeh-wu kung-wu-yuan). The former, who will be recommended by the Party and approved by the People's Congress, are on fixed tenure appointments; the latter, who will be openly recruited through examinations, are on permanent appointments.[45]

To further the cadre reform undertaken since the mid-1980s, the central authorities since 1984 have planned to draft a number of provisional regulations to guide the reform. On June 29, 1988, the fifteenth draft of these regulations on the proposed civil service system was produced by the Ministry of Personnel.[46] These regulations uniformly stress the importance of adopting new recruiting methods. For example, the 1988 draft includes the following article: "In recruiting civil servants, the state

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[45] See John P. Burns (1989b), op. cit., p. xxxiv.

[46] These provisional regulations include detailed regulations on state civil servants in general, and on the recruitment and examination, the performance appraisal, the reward and punishment, the promotion and demotion, and the discipline in particular. See John P. Burns and Jean-Pierre Cabestan, eds., "Provisional Chinese Civil Service Regulations." in Chinese Law and Government vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1990): pp. 3-98 (the entire issue). According to the editors, the fifteenth draft, along with all the previous drafts, were produced by the Ministry of Personnel in consultation with the Party's Organization Department and these regulations have not yet to be finally approved.

administrative organs must implement the principle of openness, equality, and competition and employ the best qualified after examination and assessment."[47]

To test the feasibility of the Provisional Regulations, a number of central and local government organs have been designated as "experimental points" of the proposed civil service system since 1988. A variety of experiments, including the adoption of competitive examinations, will be implemented in the next few years. At the central level, six bureaus (e.g., Auditing Administration, State statistical Bureau, and State Bureau of Taxation) within the State Council have become the experimental points. At the local level, one province (Hopei), four cites (Haerhpin, Tsingtao, Wuhan, and Shenchen), and nine counties (such as Paoan in Kwangtung Province) were reportedly earmarked as such pioneers in experimenting the new system, in which needed experiences have been learned and accumulated.[48]

In 1991, faced with the rumor that the proposed civil service reform had stagnated, Chinese leaders established a Central Reorganization Commission, led by Premier Li P'êng of the State Council, to deepen the three-year-old reform. Also, the Vice Minister of Personnel reassured in October

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[47] Article 10. See ibid., p. 12.

[48] Jen-min Jih-pao. December 24, 1990. For experimental measures in Haerhpin, see Hsin-hua News Agency [New China News Agency]. October 26, 1990, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao. October 26, 1990, A11. For experimental plans in Shenchen, see Shih-chieh Jih-pao. December 5, 1990, A10.

1991 that more Chinese cities will experiment with the new system, and hopefully a nation-wide civil service system will be initially established in the next five or more years.[49] From the above, it is clear that new methods, such as invitation and examination, will become the dominant, if not the only, mechanisms to recruit civil servants into the future civil service system.

5.3 Distributive Principles

Every year hundreds of thousands of the most able young citizens are recruited into the Chinese cadres system through either the mainstream appointment system or other new mechanisms of open recruitment. In view of these mechanisms, one question arises as to what types of principles (or criteria) are employed by the central authorities when they utilize these mechanisms? For instance, when Chinese leaders use the appointment system to recruit the most able candidates, what do they mean by the "most able"? On what basis are the candidates' abilities judged? Are the candidates judged on their intellectual accomplishments, professional expertise, or only on their level of political activism? In addition to the principle of ability, are there other principles (such as merit,

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[49] Chung-kuo News Agency. October 11, 1991, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao. October 12, 1991, A12.

contribution, and equality) being used? To answer these principle-related questions is more meaningful than to identify the mechanisms used, because it is the recruiting principles, rather than the mechanisms, that really determine what kind of candidates would be recruited. This statement can be elaborated by the following two cases.

Sometimes, the top leaders can use one single set of principles to recruit the kind of cadres they desire through many different mechanisms. For instance, if the leaders are determined to use political criteria to recruit politically reliable candidates, they can appoint that kind of candidates through the appointment system, recommend them through the investigation method, or select them through a specially designed examination system. In other words, the leaders' selection of mechanism is not at all limited by their selection of principle.

At other times, many different principles are used when only one single mechanism is adopted. For instance, the authority of Beijing may use technical criteria to recruit professionally skilled candidates through the appointment mechanism, while the authority of Shanghai may use political criteria to select politically qualified candidates through the same mechanism.

All of the above simply show that it is the recruiting principles, rather than the mechanisms, that determine the kind of candidates recruited. This is the main reason why the focus of this section is on the types of distributive

principles used in China to allocate scarce cadre positions.

In the current Chinese constitution (promulgated in 1982) no guideline is provided with respect to the mechanisms and principles of recruiting cadres. In practice, two major principles have been employed throughout the seventy-year history of the Chinese communist Party: political and professional principles. Over the years, the most serious problem in Chinese cadre recruitment has been the tension between the two principles, the so called "red-expert" contradiction. In the following pages the tension between the two will be closely examined over four periods of time in the Party's history. The three dividing years are 1949, 1966, and 1976; that is, when the PRC was established, when the Cultural Revolution was launched, and when Chairman Mao Tse-tung died.

5.3.1 Before 1949

Before 1949, especially during the periods of the anti-Japanese War and the Civil War, a cadre was basically regarded as a combat leader with the ability to mobilize people for the specific task of fighting a guerrilla war. Based upon its experience in recruiting cadres during the Civil War, the Party stressed the following four principles: 1) family background (ch'u-shen); 2) class status (ch'êng-fen); 3) social connection (she-hui kuan-hsi); and 4)

seniority in the Party.[50] According to these closely related principles, cadres were largely recruited from peasants, workers, sons and daughters of cadres, and Party members. Simply put, the two primary principles before 1949 were family background and party membership, both of which indicate the Party's overwhelming stress on "political reliability" (or "political integrity") of its cadres. In other words, these two principles serve as proxies for political qualities desired by the Party.

Since then, the Communist regime has been very consistent in its use of the principle of political reliability, which was then vaguely defined as acceptance of the Communist Party as the ruling party, commitment to the development of a socialist China, and dedication to the Communist cause.[51]

But it would be wrong to say that before 1949 there was no other but the political principles for cadre recruitment. Mostly, cadres were required to be "red" to ensure the success of the communist revolution, but during the Civil War period cadres were also recruited from professionals in industry and business management and intellectuals.[52] Thus, the professional/ technical principles were not ignored

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[50] See Alan P. L. Liu (1986), op. cit., p. 162.

[51] See King W. Chow, op. cit., p. 397.

[52] Tai-chiao Lin, ed., Chung-kuo Chin Hsien-tai Jen-shih Chih-tu [The Chinese Modern Personnel System]. Beijing, China: Labor Personnel Press, 1989, pp. 498-500.

before 1949, which required cadres to be "expert" as well.

5.3.2 Between 1949 and 1966

After the regime was established in 1949, the political criteria still persisted in cadre recruitment. Though the new Communist China was in great need of competent administrators, rather than guerrilla fighters, for the national development, cadres were still valued for their political reliability. However, the need for competency in government after 1949 greatly compromised the Party's recruiting principles. Many capable cadres with job-related skills but "bad" family background (such as bourgeois and intellectual background) were recruited.[53]

In sum, during the 1949-1966 period, especially the early 1950s, the cadre recruitment policy required that cadres be both "red and expert" with a much stronger emphasis on the "red". The consequences of adopting both principles were significant. Along with the new "expert" requirement came the tension between the two principles, because there were simply not enough red-experts to staff the ever-expanding state-party institutions. The tension has always been there throughout the Party's history because those who are considered politically reliable tend to be

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[53] For more details of the cadre recruitment policy during 1949-66, see Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., chapter 3; James Townsend and Brantly Womack, Politics in China. 3rd edition, Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1986, pp. 279-310; and Alan P. L. Liu (1986), op. cit., pp. 162-165.

lacking in technical competence, whereas those with needed skills tend to be judged as politically unreliable. If cadres with both qualities could not be found, then, faced with the dilemma between choosing professionally unqualified reds or politically unqualified experts, the leaders usually decided to strike a balance by recruiting some reds and some experts.[54] Conceivably, the more sensitive and significant the job, the more important was the criterion of political reliability to the Party; therefore, this job was more likely to be given to someone red, usually by a party member. This is why non-party experts have always occupied low-ranking positions throughout the Party's history.

Starting in the late 1950s, the relative weight of the expert principle gradually declined, whereas the red principle became increasingly important. It is largely because of the reinforcement of Mao Tse-tung's personal view of cadres as the vanguard of the continuous revolution, as Mao launched several radical movements attempting to totally transform society in the late 1950s. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, as the intra-party resistance to Mao himself kept mounting, the political principle desired by Mao became more important than ever before. At this moment, the vaguely-defined political principle was thus reinterpreted as one's dedication to Mao's ideology.

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[54] Townsend and Womack, ibid., pp. 281-282.

5.3.3 Between 1966 and 1976

During the Cultural Revolution, the criteria advocated by the radicals, who rallied around Chairman Mao against the so-called "capitalist roaders" group led by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, consisted of "daring to struggle against the bourgeois reactionary line", "being willing to go against the tide", having a "clear standpoint", being "familiar with leadership" or "being supported by the masses", and "cherishing deep feelings."[55] All of these were political criteria, according to which cadres were predominantly selected from party members and candidates with good family backgrounds (soldier, worker, peasant, and cadre backgrounds). Only these groups of citizens, however unqualified in terms of expertise, were thought to be loyal to the cause of the Cultural Revolution.

5.3.4 After 1976

After the death of Mao and the subsequent downfall of the "Gang of Four" in 1976, a large number of expert cadres who were from "bad" family backgrounds and thus purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Post-Mao China was in great need of competent administrators, rather than radical revolutionaries, for the economic reforms undertaken since 1979. Therefore, professional principles, such as technical skills, specialized knowledge, competence,

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[55] See Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., p. 124.

ability and productivity, were reemphasized by the central authorities. This shift in emphasis is evidenced in the 1982 Party Constitution, according to which the duty of party members are related to both ideological and professional works.[56] Also, to reflect this new emphasis, several new recruitment mechanisms (as discussed earlier in section 5.2.3) have been developed since the early 1980s. Generally speaking, the post-Mao leadership is willing to recruit non-party experts so long as party-member cadres either hold the key positions or retain the de facto power in the system.

However, this shift in emphasis did not imply that the political criteria had become unimportant. Rather, these criteria have never vanished in the eyes of the top leaders. In general, when using the political criteria, the post-Mao leadership values the importance of the "present, individual performance", as opposed to "past, family record", of the candidates.

To be specific, the post-Mao criteria for cadre recruitment can be summarized by the "four transformations", which was first proposed in 1981 and later incorporated into the 1982 Party Constitution in the 14th National Congress of the Party:[57] the new cadre force should be "younger, better educated, more specialized, and revolutionized" (nien-

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[56] See Tony Saich, op. cit., p. 121.

[57] <u>Jen-min Jih-pao</u>. October 16, 1992.

ch'ing-hua, chih-shih-hua, chuan-yeh-hua, and ke-ming-hua, respectively).[58] Accordingly, very firm age limits were imposed on recruiting new cadres. For example, a newly appointed county head should not be older than 45. A college degree or diploma and a certain level of specialized skills are also required for new cadres.[59]

The last criterion of "revolutionized" is an ambiguous term with a range of meanings. This term has been used by the authorities as the chief criterion of selecting cadres. Its meaning depends upon the time, the context, and the kind of leaders who have authority to interpret it. One official source suggests that "revolutionized" is simply the political standard of cadre recruitment, which was further interpreted by Teng Hsiao-p'ing as "the development of productivity" and "insistence on the four cardinal principles".[60] It can be also interpreted as professional expertise promoting reforms (which is the present "revolutionary" goal), as commitment to the current

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[58] For details of the "four transformations of the cadres" or "the cadres' four modernizations", see David S. G. Goodman, "Modernization and the Search for Political Order in the P.R.C." in Yuming Shaw, ed., Chinese Modernization. San Francisco, CA: Chinese Materials Center Publications, 1985, pp. 260-263; Hong Yung Lee (1983), op. cit., pp. 673-691; and Graham Young, op. cit., pp. 76-80.

[59] See David Goodman, ibid., p. 261.

[60] Jen-min Jih-pao. March 13, 1986. The "four cardinal principles", as the most important political guidelines in the post-Mao China, call for adherence to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought, to the people's democratic dictatorship, and to the socialist road.

ideological orthodoxies, or simply as support of the Marxist and Maoist doctrines.[61] In the next section we will see how its ambiguous meaning has been recently exploited by different groups within the Party.

5.3.5 Recent Developments

Before the pro-democracy demonstration in the spring of 1989, the reform-mined leaders, such as Hu Yao-pang (former Secretary-General of the Party during 1982-1987) and Chao Tzu-yang (former Secretary-General during 1987-1989), had downplayed the importance of the "revolutionized" criterion. But after the demonstration was brutally cracked down on June 4, 1989, conservative leaders found their chance to strike back: Ch'ên Yün, the top conservative leader, also the Chairman of the Party's Central Advisory Commission, reemphasized the importance of the Party's ideology, and Chao Tung-wan, the Minister of Personnel, stressed "political positions" as the primary requirement for new cadres.[62] Furthermore, in March 1991, Premier Li P'êng also underscored the importance of the insistence on the four cardinal principles,[63] and Sung P'ing, the Head of the Party's Organization Department, reemphasized the requirement of "revolutionary blood" in order to recruit

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[61] See Graham Young, op. cit., p. 80.

[62] Shih-chieh Jih-pao. April 19, 1990, A11.

[63] Jen-min Jih Pao. March 12 & 14, 1991.

more "excellent workers and peasants".[64] Whether it is ideology, political position, or revolutionary blood, the bottom line is that professional criteria such as "productivity" (the one most valued by Chao Tzu-yang) was almost completely disregarded during this period of time.

After the Tienanmen Massacre, the most important political event in China was the fourteenth Party Congress held in October 1992. Long before October, the criteria of cadre recruitment once again became a crucial issue under intensive debate among Party's leaders. The debate was centered on an old principle proposed by Ch'ên Yün in the 1950s: "both virtue and ability are required, but with virtue being the primary". Clearly, virtue refers to political morality, while ability refers to professional competence. In the early 1980s, virtue was interpreted as "performance during the Cultural Revolution"[65] and "insistence on socialist road and the leadership of the Party".[66] In the early 1990s, Lü Fêng, the new Head of the Party's Organization Department, was the first conservative leader who readdressed the principle. He also stressed the importance of the "performance at the critical moment".[67]

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[64] South China Morning Post. cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao. March 14, 1991, A10.

[65] Jen-min Jih-pao. April 21, 1982.

[66] Jen-min Jih-Pao. October 2, 1982.

[67] Chung-kuo News Agency. December 9, 1991, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao. December 10, 1991, A12.

Everyone in China knows that "the critical moment" simply refers to the 1989 pro-democracy movement.

To counter-balance the conservative view, in early June 1992 Teng Hsiao-p'ing spoke as the paramount leader of China that "rather expert than red" should be the principle of recruiting cadres during the period of the fourteenth Party Congress.[68] But, amazingly, the conservative group quickly struck back a few weeks later. One article published on June 23 in Chin-chi Jih-pao [Economy Daily News], the official newspaper of the State Council, pointed out that both virtue and ability are required and, among the "four transformations", "revolutionized" should be the primary requirement. According to the author, "revolutionized" obviously means being loyal to the Marxism.[69]

On the eve of the Party Congress, both the reform-minded Teng Hsiao-p'ing and the conservative Ch'ên Yün reemphasized that both virtue and ability are important, but Teng interpreted "virtue" only as support to the policies of reforms and openness, while Ch'ên not only considered "virtue" as the highest standard but also explained it as "insistence of the four cardinal principles".[70] The difference between them is quite salient.

When the fourteenth Party Congress adjourned in late

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[68] Chung-yang Jih-pao. June 6, 1992, 4.

[69] Chin-chi Jih-pao. June 23, 1992, cited in Chung-yang Jih-pao. June 25, 1992, 4.

[70] Shih-chieh Jih-pao. August 1, 1992, A10.

October 1992, Teng's opinions on cadre recruitment, along with his newly proposed idea of "socialist market economy", prevailed. In one Politburo meeting held on November 6, 1992, Chiang Tse-min, the current Secretary-General, deliberately delivered a speech on cadres recruitment to further realize Teng's ideas. He expressed that only cadres below 52 years of age can be recommended to be leading cadres in the future. He also emphasized that the following four types of persons cannot be recruited: 1) those who were radical leftists during the Cultural Revolution years; 2) those who made serious mistakes in the ways handling economic affairs; 3) those who actively participated in the 1989 political turmoil (referring to the pro-democracy demonstration); and 4) those leftists who have opposed the post-Mao reforms undertaken since 1979.[71] So far, Chiang's speech has been the most recent cadre-related guideline. It is clear that political qualifications are also of great importance to Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his followers, but their interpretation of the qualifications is very different from that of the conservative group. From the above, we can see that the future of Teng's reforms will largely depend upon how "revolutionized" and "virtue" will be interpreted in the future intra-Party struggles.

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[71] Chung-yang Jih-pao. December 6, 1992, 4.

5.3.6 Discussions

As indicated earlier, since the establishment of the PRC, the appointment system has been the primary distributive mechanism of cadre positions. By and large, the dominant principles behind the appointment system are political (red) and professional (expert) principles. Throughout the years after 1949 (except during the period of the Cultural Revolution when political principle was exclusively employed), both types of principles have been emphasized. Sometimes, depending upon the political situations, both of them were almost equally weighed; at other times, one received more weight than another.

Analyzing the two principles in more theoretical terms, we find that they both are against the two aspects of equality: the principles of absolute equality and the equal opportunity.

Since cadre (or civil service) positions, just like colleges spaces, are also scarce, indivisible and heterogeneous, one can easily see the reason why absolute equality cannot be used to allocate them in China as well as in other societies. But why are the two principles inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity? Furthermore, are they consistent with other aspects of equality and other principles of local justice? To answer these questions, we will first examine the political principle in the next section, followed by discussions on the professional one.

5.3.6.1 Political Principle

Despite its varying meanings, the political principle is absolutely against equal opportunity because politically disqualified candidates have less, if any, chances to get access to the resources attached to cadre positions. The principle of merit is also violated by such a political principle for the recruitment is not based on one's professional merits, but on one's ideological loyalty (perhaps it is a "political merit").

This principle can also be investigated in the light of another distinction of egalitarianism: meritocratic vs. redistributive egalitarianism, which was first introduced in chapter 3. This distinction differs from the distinction between equal opportunity and absolute equality in that the former is more practical than the latter; thus, it would be more meaningful to use it to discuss actual cases.

Meritocratic egalitarianism is conspicuously overlooked when only politically qualified candidates are selected, but can the idea of redistributive egalitarianism be realized by the use of the political principle? To a large degree, the answer is yes, because candidates from some underprivileged groups, such as workers and peasants, can be recruited into the cadre system due to their assumed ideological purity by the authorities. But, very often, many candidates from cadre families, rather than from worker or peasant ones, are recruited. It is worth noting that although both principles of absolute equality and redistributive egalitarianism refer

to equality in result, the political principle in this context only conform to the latter.

5.3.6.2 Professional Principle

In contrast, the professional principle per se is not necessarily against the principle of equal opportunity; it is the mechanism of appointment, when it implements the professional principle, that fails to assure everyone an equal opportunity to gain access to the resources. This principle would be in agreement with equality in opportunity if other distributive mechanisms such as lotteries, rotation, and examination are employed to implement it.

In regard to whether or not this principle (of professional ability, achievement and expertise) complies with other aspects of equality, we see that it serves very well the idea of meritocratic, but not redistributive, egalitarianism. Nonetheless, since those who lack formal higher or secondary education are not eligible to become cadres through the appointment system, the principle of equal opportunity is only realized for those college and high school graduates.

Finally, after investigating the two primary principles behind the closed-to-the-public appointment system, we should turn to those new mechanisms of "open recruitment" (e.g., investigation, invitation, advertising, examination, and election) that are specially designed to recruit those who have needed skills and knowledge. Clearly, the dominant principle involved in these new, open mechanisms is a

professional one, but the political principle has far from being vanished. For example, the omnipresent Party still can set up political rules to determine who are eligible to be recommended, investigated, invited, examined and elected.

Moreover, especially in a vast country like China, we should not expect uniformity in all localities in the implementation of these new recruiting mechanisms and the appointment mechanism. Local authorities may apply their own variants of the general scheme of these mechanisms.[72] This is one of the reasons why local justice is such a complicated issue. Its complexity can be also demonstrated by the fact that due to differences in the nature of the resources to be allocated, as well as the ever-changing historical contexts in which the allocations were taking place, various distributive principles and mechanisms were chosen over many others at a particular time and place. More complicated is that those chosen principles and mechanisms may change not only in quantity (the number of principles employed) but also in quality (the contents of principles) over time and places.

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[72] This is Elster's third sense of "local" in local justice, see op. cit., p. 3.

5.4 Distributive Outcomes

After we have discussed a variety of principles and mechanisms of allocating cadre offices, one relevant question arises as to whether or not these distributive principles and mechanisms are inherently discriminatory against those of certain socio-economic, ethnic, or sexual status. The answer to this question rests upon a thorough examination of the distributive outcomes of cadres offices. Unfortunately, since the Chinese government has published little information about the background of its cadres as a whole, the following analysis of the distributive outcomes will only provide a fragmentary picture of the allocation system. One way to enhance our understanding of the overall picture of the Chinese cadre force is to rely on the statistics about the background of the party members because, as indicated earlier, there has been a sizable overlap between Party membership and cadreship.

Before examining the cadres' socio-economic, ethnic, and gender background, it is equally important to investigate their changing profile in terms of their age, education, and specialization, because all of these three qualifications have been the targets of the policy of "four transformations" (to establish a younger, better educated, more specialized, and revolutionized cadre corps).

5.4.1 Age

After an organizational readjustment in 1982, the average age of 505 leading cadres at the ministerial level in the State Council was reduced from 64 to 58. The average age dropped to 56.6 in 1985.[73] Based on the biographical information compiled by Hong Yung Lee and shown in Table 5.3, the average age of about 30 to 35 ministers was 67 and 59 in 1982 and 1987, respectively. At the sub-national level, the average age of provincial governors also dropped from 66 to 56 between 1982 and 1987. The average age of leading cadres was 62 years at the provincial level, and 49 at the county level in 1982, while in 1991 the number further dropped to 54.9 and 45.5, respectively.

TABLE 5.3

Average Age of Chinese Cadres

Levels	1982	1987	1991
Ministers under the State Council	67	59	....
Provincial Governors	66	56	....
Provincial-level Leading Cadres	62	..	54.9
County-level Leading Cadres	49	..	45.5

Sources: Information about the Ministers and Provincial Governors is from Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. p. 267. The average ages of leading cadres at sub-national levels are based on Jen-min Jih-pao. June 6, 1991.

[73] See Tony Saich, op. cit., p. 133; and Yung-sheng Chen, op. cit., p. 100.

From the above, we see that Chinese cadres in general have become much younger than before. This is a clear result of the strict age limits imposed on newly recruited cadres under the policy of "four transformations".

5.4.2 Education

As for the educational background, Chinese cadres in general are better educated today than they were ten years ago. Table 5.4 demonstrates that the percentage of college-educated Ministers increased from 38% to 50% in only three years between 1982 and 1985, while the percentage of Provincial Governors and Vice Governors in 1985 had more than doubled that of 1982. The increase at the sub-national levels was as dramatic as that at the national level. The percentage of provincial leading cadres who received college education was 74% in 1991, more than five times as much as that of 1982. During the same period, the percentage of college-educated cadres at the county level was doubled from 31% to 64%. As for the cadre corps as a whole, this percentage steadily increased from 18% in 1980 to 23.6% in 1986, 25.2% in 1987, and 28% in 1988.[74] The fact that Chinese cadres have become much better educated is also a direct outcome of the policy of the "four transformations" of the cadre corps undertaken since 1982.

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[74] See Jen-min Jih-pao. April 25, 1987; June 16, 1988; and September 16, 1989.

TABLE 5.4

The Percentage of Cadres at All Levels
Who Received College Education

Levels	1982	1985	1991
Ministers under the State Council	38%	50%	...
Provincial Governors and Vice Governors*	20%	43%	...
Provincial-level Leading Cadres	14%	44%	74%
County-level Leading Cadres	31%	45%	64%

* Including standing committee members of the provincial Party committees.

Sources: The percentages of 1982 and 1985 are from Yung-sheng Chen, "Reform of Mainland China's Cadre System." in Issues and Studies vol. 21, no. 12 (December 1985): p. 102. The 1991 percentage is based on Jen-min Jih-pao. June 6, 1991.

5.4.3 Specialties

As for the third transformation of "specialization", we have seen that a large portion of the post-Mao cadres are bureaucratic technocrats with specific skills rather than merely revolutionary generalists with little else but ideological mastery. At the national level, in 1987, 45% of the Ministers and 33% of the Provincial Governors were engineers, and 70% of the Ministers and 50% of the Governors had specialties related to production.[75] The percentages are lower at the sub-national levels. In 1991, 31% of the province-level and 15.6% of the county-level leading cadres

[75] Hong Yung Lee (1991a), op. cit., pp. 194-195.

were specialists.[76] Although we lack data of previous years for comparisons, there should be a sizable increase in the percentage of specialists over the 1980s because cadres today are more educated than they were ten years ago.

5.4.4 Social Origin

The Chinese government has published little information about the social composition of its cadres. The only information we have about the cadres on this issue is that 8% of the newly recruited cadres were intellectuals in 1979, the beginning year of Teng's reforms, while 40% of them were intellectuals in 1984.[77] Since there has been an enormous overlap between the cadre position and Party membership (for instance, 85% of the cadres were party members in 1982), what we can do here is to rely on the statistics about the social origin of the party members as a close approximation of the overall picture of the cadre corps.

The most dramatic change in the social origin of Party members as well as of cadres probably took place at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), because during this period workers and peasants were recruited through the "shock" method--a whole group of workers and peasants were selected at one time.[78] Unfortunately, we do

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[76] Jen-min Jih-pao. June 6, 1991.

[77] Hong Yung Lee (1991b), op. cit., p. 308.

[78] See Alan P. L. Liu (1986), op. cit., p. 163.

not possess data to show the national picture of these changes. Nevertheless, one local example (of the Province of Anhui) showed that 2,796 (or 82.2%) of the 3,403 newly appointed cadres in 1976 were selected directly from workers and peasants.[79]

We also expect to see some changes in the social composition of Party members, reflecting the general shift of recruitment criteria from political to professional ones since the reforms started in 1979. According to the available data shown in Table 5.5, it is clear that there have been some changes over time, with a significant decline in the percentage of the peasant members and a minor increase in the workers' percentage. Because the categories used between 1961 and 1981/1991 are different, we do not know the exact changes in the percentage of intellectuals over the years. But we can presume that the representation of intellectual members have largely increased, especially in the late 1980s, for two reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, compared with 8% in 1979, 40% of the newly recruited cadres in 1984 were intellectuals. This increasing trend may very well persist as reforms, that need the participation of intellectuals, continue to gain momentum in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, 28.8% and 29.6% of the members were either specialists or administrative cadres in 1981 and 1991, respectively.

[79] Idem.

TABLE 5.5

Social Origin of Party Membership

	1956	1961	1981	1991
Workers	14.0%	14.0%	18.7%	16.4%
Peasants	69.1%	69.0%	45.3%	37.0%
Intellectuals	11.7%	11.0%		
Specialists			7.9%	12.7%
Administrative Cadres			20.9%	16.9%
Others	5.2%	6.0%	7.2%*	17.0%**
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	00.0%

* Including military and service personnel.
** Including retired workers, military, students, and self-employed individuals.

Sources: The 1956 figures are calculated from Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China. 2nd edition, enlarged, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968, p. 132. The 1961 figures are based on Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, p. 69. The 1981 figures are calculated from Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. p. 291. The 1991 figures are based on Hsin-hua News Agency. June 17, 1991, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao. June 18, 1991, A10.

A large portion of them were college-educated intellectual. Compared with the intellectual percentage of 11% in 1961, it is safe to assume that the percentage of intellectual members has increased.

Both the proportional decline in peasants and the increase in intellectuals within the Party may be well reflected in the composition of the cadre force. Perhaps this pattern of change has been more salient in the cadre system than in the Party because many non-party intellectuals have been recruited as professional, administrative cadres.

5.4.5 Ethnicity

As introduced in chapter three, there are 55 minority nationalities in China, with a combined population of 91.2 million in 1990, representing about 8% of the total population. Throughout the years, the Party has recognized the underrepresentation of minorities in many spheres of Chinese society, especially in the cadre forces in the minority areas.

One article of the drafted "Provisional Regulations on the Recruitment and Examination of State Civil Servants" (drafted in 1988) states that "When departments of nationalities affairs of the government, and governments at various levels in the minority areas recruit civil servants, they should give appropriate preferential treatment to

examinees of minority background."[80] This article is related to the Party's long-time minority policy that cadres in minority areas should be recruited from the relevant minorities, which has had a positive impact on the selection of minority citizens into the cadres system.

Table 5.6 presents the number and percentage of minority cadres in some selected years. There were only about 50-60 thousand cadres of minority background in 1950, immediately after the establishment of the PRC, representing less than 2% of the total number of cadres. Given the fact that about 6% of the total Chinese population belonged to minority nationalities in the early 1950s, minorities were extremely underrepresented during this early period. Under the Party's minority policy, more and more minorities were recruited into the cadre system. Forty years later, in 1990 the number of minority cadres increased to 2 million, almost 36 times greater than that of 1950. This increase also represents a proportional gain of 4.19%, from 1.87% to 6.06%. However, even though minority cadres in 1990 constituted 6.06% of the cadre corps, they were still largely underrepresented because in the same year they made up 8.04% (see Table 3.5 in chapter three) of the national population. Furthermore, the fragmentary data shown in Table 5.6 fail to suggest any clear trend of improvement in this problem of underrepresentation.

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[80] Article 34. See John P. Burns and Jean-Pierre Cabestan, eds., op. cit., p. 29.

TABLE 5.6

Cadres of Minority Background
as a Percentage of Total Number of Cadres
(numbers of cadres in millions)

Year	Number of Cadres	Number of Minority Cadres	Percentage
1950	2.99*	.056	1.87%
1982	20.30	1.030	5.07%
1988	29.03	1.840	6.34%
1990	33.00	2.000	6.06%

* This is the cadre number of 1949.

Sources: The figures of total cadre number are from Table 5.1. The numbers of minority cadres in 1950, 1982, and 1988 are based on Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China. p. 211. The percentage and number of minority cadres in 1990 are based on Chung-yang Jih-pao. September 12, 1991, 4.

Before we conclude this section about minority cadres, it would be interesting to see how the minorities are represented in the Party system. In 1961 minorities only made up 1% of the Party members,[81] while in 1989 they occupied 5.5%.[82] Both percentages are lower than the minorities population percentages in their respective years.

[81] See Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, p. 69.

[82] See Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke, op. cit., p. 64.

5.4.6 Gender

In China today women are still underrepresented in many areas of Chinese society.[83] Both the State and the Party constitutions fail to mention any specific policy toward female citizens except the following article in the State constitution: "Women in the PRC enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, in political, economic, cultural, social and family life. ..."[84] Next, we will investigate the degree to which this official claim has been realized in the political sphere.

As indicated in Table 5.7, women were uniformly underrepresented among the leading cadres at various levels. On the average, women only made up 6% of the total leading cadres. Even the highest percentage of 16% at the central level is in disproportion to the women population percentage of 48.5% in 1982.[85] However, it is interesting to note that in Table 5.7 the higher the level, the higher representation of women. This is probably because that top leaders at the central level have been more aware of the issue of female representation.

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[83] For details of the status of Chinese women, see Marc Blecher, China: Politics, Economics and Society. London, U.K.: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1986, pp. 151-57.

[84] Article 48. See Foreign Language Press, The Constitution of People's Republic of China. Beijing, China: Foreign Language Press, 1987, pp. 32-33.

[85] For a complete survey of the male/female population ratio between 1949 and 1991, see Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 77.

TABLE 5.7

Gender Distribution of Leading Cadres in 1982

Levels	Male	Female
Central	84%	16%
Provincial	90%	10%
County	95%	5%
Total	94%	6%

Source: Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. p. 212.

Moreover, only 3 (or 7.3%) of 41 Ministers in the State Council were females in 1991.[86] At the city level, one source reveals that of 2,700 or so mayors and vice mayors in 1991 only 150 (or 5.56%) were women, and only 3 of these 150 women were mayors.[87] As for the female representation in the cadre system as a whole, there were 4.47, 8.70, and 10.04 million female cadres who made up 24.8%, 29.0%, and 30.26% of the total cadre corps in 1978, 1989, and 1991, respectively.[88] The 1991 number of female cadres presents a

[86] Usually women hold the top positions in those Ministries and Commissions that have fewer power, such as Ministry of Chemical Industry and State Family Planning Commission. See New York Times. July 27, 1992. There have been 41 Ministries and Commissions within the State Council since December 30, 1987 (see Yu-shuo Cheng and Ching-kuei Shieh, eds., Tang-tai Chung-kuo Chêng-fu [Contemporary Chinese Government]. Hong Kong: T'ien-ti Books, Ltd., 1992, p. 193).

[87] There were 479 cities in China in 1991. See Chung-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1992. p. 669.

[88] The 1978 and 1989 numbers of female cadres are cited from Jen-min Jih-pao. March 7, 1989. (The 1978 number was derived from the 1989 number.) The calculation of 1978 and 1989 percentages are based upon information provided in Table 5.1. (1980 number of cadres was used to compute the 1978

26 times increase in comparison to that of 1951.[89]

In addition to the cadre system, Chinese women are also underrepresented in the legislative organs and the Party structure. In the present (7th) National People's Congress (1988-93), the highest legislative organ in China, 634 (or 21.3%) of 2,970 deputies are females, while only 147 (or 12%) of 1,226 were females in the first Congress (1954-59). However impressive the progress appears to be, women are still seriously underrepresented in the Congress.

In the Communist Party today, there is no female member in the Politburo and its Standing Committee; 5.7% of the Central Committee members are females, while the percentage was 6.3% in 1978.[90] As for the total membership, in 1961 women made up 10% of the members,[91] while the figure went up to 14.2% in 1989.[92]

In sum, though Chinese women are legal equals of men and, undoubtedly, women's status has greatly improved over the past four decades, their representation in the political sphere, as well as in many other areas of the society, has not reached the extent of which they really deserve.

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percentage.) The 1991 figures are exacted from Hsin-hua News Agency. March 9, 1993, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao. March 10, 1993, A13.

[89] Chung-kuo News Agency. October 9, 1991, cited in Shih-chieh Jih-pao. October 12, 1991, A13.

[90] New York Times. July 27, 1992.

[91] See Jurgen Domes, op. cit., p. 69.

[92] See Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke, op. cit., p. 64.

CHAPTER SIX

CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM IN TAIWAN

Relatively a few studies on post-1949 Taiwanese politics have ever been done. They analyze Taiwan's political development in general, and while some of them touch upon the issue of the distribution of public offices, their primary foci are on positions within the cabinet, the Legislative Yuan, the Provincial Assembly and Government, and the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), rather than on the civil service system.[1]

To fill in the gap, the focus of this chapter is on Taiwan's civil service system. We will study the scarcity of public offices in the system, the mechanisms and principles employed by the government to allocate these offices, and finally the outcomes of allocation in terms of race and gender.

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[1] For examples, see Kuo-Wei Lee, "Taiwan Provincial and Local Political Decision-Makers: Taiwanization." Asian Profile. vol. 15, no. 2 (April 1987): pp. 179-195 and "After Chiang, The "Lee Teng-hui Era"-Political Development in Taiwan." Asian Profile. vol. 17, no. 4 (August 1989): pp. 297-303; Ya-li Lu, "Future Domestic Developments in the Republic of China on Taiwan." Asian Survey. vol. 25, no. 11 (November 1985): pp. 1075-1095; and Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan." in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., Taiwan in a Time of Transition, New York: Paragon House, 1988, pp. 1-37. But the distribution of public offices is not the key concern of any of these studies.

6.1 Scarcity of Public Offices

According to the Implementation Regulations of the Civil Service Examination Law, civil servants in Taiwan consist of five types of public officials in terms of hierarchial levels and functions, namely, officials working in the central government, in the local governments, in central and local legislatures, in public schools at all levels, and in enterprises and organizations operated by the central and local governments.[2]

In the early 1950s the civil service personnel was basically composed of two groups. First, the middle- and high-ranking positions were occupied by those Mainlanders who moved to Taiwan with the nationalist government in 1949. The second group were mostly indigenous Taiwanese who entered the service system during the Japanese Occupation period (1895-1945) and occupied the low-ranking positions particularly at local levels.[3] No matter which group they belonged to, the majority of the civil servants in the early 1950s did not participate in any civil service examinations prior to joining the government.

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[2] See article 2 of "The Implementation Regulation of the Civil Service Examination Law." in Pai-ch'uan T'ao and others, eds., Liu-fa Ch'üan-shu [Compilation of Six Basic Laws]. Taipei, Taiwan: San-min Bookstore, 1988.

[3] See Ya-li Lu, "Political Development in the R.O.C. on Taiwan." in Yu-ming Shaw, ed., Chinese Modernization. San Francisco, CA: Chinese Materials Center Publications, 1985, p. 145.

Since the 1950s Taiwan's civil service system has been continuously expanding. As indicated in Table 6.1, the number of civil servants in 1990 was almost 3.5 times as many as the 1957 figure, while the population only doubled during the same period. Moreover, the civil servant/population ratio was 1 to 62 in 1957, and the ratio became 1 to 37 (or 2.7%) in 1990. Although this ratio is much higher than before, it is still lower than that of many developed countries.[4]

TABLE 6.1

Growth of the Civil Service System in Taiwan, 1957-1990

Year	Number of Civil Servants
1957	157,656
1961	209,144
1966	245,321
1971	302,019
1976	371,871
1981	442,991
1986	498,909
1990	544,000

Sources: Figures from 1957 to 1986 are based on Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsing-chêng Yuan [Executive Yuan, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988 [Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1988]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1989, p. 928. The 1990 figure is from Shih-chieh Jih-pao [World Journal]. New York, January 3, 1992, A6. All these figures include officials with foreign nationalities.

From the figures in Table 6.1, it appears that the resource of public offices in Taiwan has become less and less scarce since the 1950, but, given the fact that those

[4] Shih-chieh Jih-pao [World Journal]. New York, January 3, 1992, A6.

offices are occupied by only 2.7% of the population, it still remains one of the most scarce resources in today's Taiwan.

The following figures show the profile of Taiwan's civil servants. By the end of 1989, there were 539,940 civil servants in Taiwan, of which 58.47% were college graduates. Their average age was 39.62 years, and women accounted for 33.1% of the total. A total of 76.06% of them were natives of Taiwan province.[5]

6.2 Distributive Mechanism: the Civil Service Examinations

The sole mechanism used in Taiwan to allocate public offices has been the civil service examination system since 1950.[6] The system was established in accordance with one of the constitutional article: "In the selection of public officials, a system of open competitive examination should be put into operation, ... No person should be appointed to a public office unless he is qualified through

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[5] Government Information Office, the Executive Yuan, the Republic of China, R.O.C. Yearbook, 1990-91. Taipei, Taiwan, 1990, p. 126.

[6] Although the basic of Chinese civil service examination system currently in use in Taiwan was set down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1906, the first examination was not held until 1950. See R.O.C. Yearbook, 1990-91. p. 125.

examinations."[7] In theory, the system has the following features: 1) the examination function is exercised by a fourth branch of government--the Examination Yuan, which is separated from the executive power; 2) it is free from partisan influence; and 3) it is applicable to all government officials.[8] The basic spirit of the examination system is that everyone, regardless of his/her race, sex, social status, family and educational backgrounds, has to pass the examination in order to enter the civil service system.

As a recruiting mechanism, civil service examinations are composed of: 1) higher examinations; 2) ordinary examinations; 3) special examinations; and 4) screening of qualifications.[9] All applicants must pass a physical examination, which means that handicapped people are ineligible to participate in the examinations. Applicants who have prior convictions are also ineligible. But there is no age limitation as long as the applicants have completed the education required by the rules of each

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[7] Article 85 of "the Constitution of the Republic of China." See Pai-ch'uan T'ao, op. cit., p. 7.

[8] R.O.C. Yearbook 1990-91. p. 125.

[9] Article 3 of "The Civil Service Examination Law." See Pai-ch'uan T'ao, op. cit., p. 42, and Government Information Office, the Executive Yuan, the Republic of China, The Republic of China 1988: A Reference Book. Taipei, Taiwan: Hilit Publishing Company, Ltd., 1988, p. 140.

examination system.[10] In the past four decades these open competitive examinations, widely regarded as a fair and objective means of recruitment, helped recruit tens of thousands of successful candidates for Taiwan's civil service system. But, just like in the system of college entrance examinations, some special preferences have been given to applicants with special status or background. In the following sections, we will first introduce each of these types of examinations and then discuss the special preferential policies involved.

6.2.1 Higher Examinations

Higher civil service examinations are held annually to select officials with advanced degrees for government service. It is divided into level 1 for holders of Ph.D. and Master degrees; and level 2 for holders of Bachelor degrees and those who have passed the higher qualifying examinations or those who have passed the ordinary examinations at least three years prior to taking the examination.[11] From 1950 to 1989, a series of 40 higher examinations were held with a total of 25,800 successful

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[10] For details of these qualifications, see articles 5 & 6 of "The Civil Service Examination Law", see Pai-ch'uan T'ao, op. cit., p. 42, and R.O.C. Yearbook 1990-91. p. 140.

[11] R.O.C. Yearbook, 1990-91. p. 126.

candidates.[12]

Table 6.2 shows that the number of applicants increased by more than 50 times in the past four decades, while the number of applicants who passed the examinations only increased by 5 times. This is the reason why the passing rate fell from 25.9% to 2.56% in 1992,[13] reflecting the fact that only one out of every 40 examination participants passed to become civil servants.

TABLE 6.2

Higher Examinations in Taiwan, 1951-1992:
Number of Applicants, Number of Applicants who passed, and Passing Rate

Year	Number of Applicants	Number of Applicants Who Passed	Passing Rate
1951	1,224	317	25.90%
1956	2,848	520	18.26%
1961	3,461	307	8.87%
1966	4,035	338	8.38%
1971	8,098	522	6.45%
1976	13,594	494	3.63%
1981	22,129	1,306	5.90%
1986	19,849	1,304	6.57%
1992	62,326	1,593	2.56%

Sources: Figures from 1951 to 1986 are based on Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988. p. 926. The 1992 figure is from Chung-yang Jih-pao [Central Daily News]. International Edition, Inglewood, California, July 18, 1992, p. 7.

[12] Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan [Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1989 [Examination Statistics of the Republic of China, 1989]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1990, p. 16.

[13] It seems that a record number (62,326) of applicants in 1992 was largely attributed to the economic recession in the early 1990s.

6.2.2 Ordinary Examinations

Ordinary civil service examinations are also held annually in order to select high school graduates for government service. From 1950 to 1989, a series of 40 ordinary examinations were held with a total of 39,386 successful candidates.[14] Table 6.3 depicts the development of these examinations in the period of 1951-1992 in terms of numbers of persons who participated and passed. Apparently, the passing rate also sharply decreased in the past four decades. The 1992 passing rates of 2.56% and 3.86% (higher and ordinary examinations, respectively) once again demonstrate the degree of scarcity of public offices in Taiwan.

TABLE 6.3

Ordinary Examinations in Taiwan, 1951-1992:
Number of Applicants, Number of Applicants who passed, and Passing Rate

Year	Number of Applicants	Number of Applicants Who Passed	Passing Rate
1951	1,182	265	22.42%
1956	2,999	331	11.04%
1961	4,120	363	8.81%
1966	6,124	585	9.55%
1971	15,721	2,121	13.49%
1976	26,840	669	2.49%
1981	42,193	4,063	9.63%
1986	44,558	1,621	3.64%
1992	83,525	3,278	3.86%

Sources: Figures from 1951 to 1986 are based on _Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988_. p. 927. The 1992 figure is from _Chung-yang Jih-pao_. July 18, 1992, 7.

[14] _Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1989_. p. 17.

6.2.3 Special Examinations

Special civil service examinations are held whenever there is an inadequate number of successful candidates in the higher and ordinary examinations, or when they fail to meet the demands of the government agencies. There are four different levels of special examinations.

Special examination A is an examination above the higher examination. It is designed for applicants who hold Ph.D. and Master degrees; for those who hold academic positions as professors or associate professors; and for those who have passed the higher examination. Normally, those who pass this examination are qualified to serve as high-ranking officials.

Special examinations B and C are equivalent to respectively the higher examination and the ordinary examination. Lastly, special examination D is lower than the ordinary examination; it is designed for such candidates as low-ranking social workers and policemen.[15]

In addition to being classified as levels A, B, C, and D, special examinations can also be classified according to the type of public officials to be selected. For instance, there are special examinations for diplomats, state journalists working abroad, social workers, etc. In addition, there is one special examination specially

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[15] For details of special examinations, see articles 17-19 of "The Civil Service Examination Law." in Pai-ch'uan T'ao, op. cit., p. 42, and The Republic of China 1988: A Reference Book. p. 140.

designed for recruiting veterans. All of these special examinations, except the one for veterans, are open to the general public.

The one for veterans is a closed examination specially designed to help the transition of veterans from the military system into the civil service system.[16] It is clearly against the constitutional principle of "a system of open competitive examination". Moreover, this type of examinations have been made very easy to pass. Between 1958 and 1983, there were 12 special examinations held for veterans. Approximately, 1,000-2,000 veterans passed the examination held every other year. The average passing rate was 48.93%. Thè passing rate even reached 79.58% in 1971 and 100% in several examinations held in the 1980s.[17] Comparing it with the less-than-10% passing rates of the higher and ordinary examinations, and about 10%-25% rates of other special examinations, one can quickly conclude that this type of examinations are truly unfair for non-veteran applicants who have to take the other examinations each year. Therefore, the Ministry of Examination (under the

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[16] For detailed of "the special examinations for transferring veterans into civil servants", see Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan K'ao-ch'üan Ts'ung-shu Chih-tao Wei-yuan Hui [Guidance Committee of Examination and Personnel Collections, the Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-chung K'ao-shih Chih-tu [The Special Examination System of the Republic of China]. Taipei, Taiwan: Chêng-chung Book Company, 1984, pp. 117-124.

[17] See Ibid., pp. 122-123, and Chung-yang Jih-pao [Central Daily News]. International Edition, Inglewood, California, May 6, 1992, 6.

Examination Yuan) in 1990 decided that these special examinations will be abolished by the end of 1995 and the examinations held before 1995 will be made more difficult to pass.[18] But, after encountering a year-long heavy attack by the Defense Ministry and various veteran organizations, the Ministry of Examination finally withdrew its previous decision in 1992 and decided only to lower the passing rates instead.

In sum, a total of 328,704 applicants from 1950 to 1989 entered the civil service system by passing a variety of special examinations, including the ones for veterans.[19] Table 6.4 presents the numbers of applicants who participated and passed in selective years between 1951 and 1988. Obviously, the passing rates of these special examinations as a whole were much higher than those of higher and ordinary examinations.[20] This is due to the fact that in addition to the high passing rates of the veteran examinations, the special examination D has been made easier to pass in order to recruit a large number of low-ranking civil servants demanded each year by the government.

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[18] For the details of this decision, see Chung-yang Jih-pao. July 24, 1990, 7. As a result of this decision, the 1991 veteran examination only had a 9.24% passing rate (also see Chung-yang Jih-pao. May 22, 1992, 7).

[19] Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1989. p. 17.

[20] In total, 483 special examinations were held during this period, of which 17 had a passing rate of 95% or above. See Chung-yang Jih-pao. May 6, 1992, 2.

TABLE 6.4

Special Examinations in Taiwan, 1951-1988:
Number of Applicants, Number of Applicants who passed, and Passing Rate

Year	Number of Applicants	Number of Applicants Who Passed	Passing Rate
1951	693	355	51.23%
1956	9,449	3,221	34.09%
1961	9,233	1,755	19.01%
1966	15,365	7,758	50.49%
1971	59,428	11,024	18.55%
1976	51,733	10,880	21.03%
1981	127,708	18,587	14.55%
1986	76,934	9,389	12.20%
1988	51,001	11,876	23.29%

Source: Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988. p. 927.

6.2.4 Screening of Qualifications

The mechanism of screening of qualifications is applied in the following three cases.[21] First, according to the examination law, certain professional and technical workers may be qualified by submitting their personal credentials to the Ministry of Examination for screening on a non-competitive basis. Second, candidates campaigning for elected posts at all levels need to submit their credentials for screening. Third, in accordance with "the Regulations Governing the Examination and Employment of Reserve Officers Transferring to Civil Service System", officers in the military service holding a rank of colonel and above can be appointed to public offices through a conversion procedure handled by a screening committee within the Ministry. Among

[21] See Republic of China, 1988: A Reference Book. p. 140.

these three cases, only the last one presents a mechanism of recruiting civil servants---another unfair, closed mechanism specially designed to benefit retired high-ranking military personnel.

According to one member (belonging to the opposition party) of the Legislative Yuan, between 1968 and 1991, a total of 1,660 colonels and generals, without taking any examinations, were pronounced qualified to become civil servants.[22] All of them became high-ranking, senior (Chien) level officials, while, during the same period, only 500 or so civilians became senior level officials through passing the level A special examinations, the highest level of civil service examinations.[23]

For many reform-oriented officials in the Ministry of Examination, this recruiting mechanism is so unfair that it damages the integrity of the civil service system much more than what the veteran examinations have done. But, once again under great pressure from the Defense Ministry, instead of completely eradicating it, the only action the Ministry of Examinations could take was to add a written examination onto the screening procedure. Not until 1988

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[22] It was extremely easy to pass the screening before certain reform measures were taken in 1988. For instance, 87 (or 93.5%) of 93 applicants passed the screening in 1983 (see Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsing-chêng Yuan [Executive Yuan, Republic of China] Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien, 1983 [The Yearbook of Republic of China, 1983]. Taipei, Taiwan: Chêng-chung Bookstore, 1984, p. 359).

[23] T'ien-t'ien Jih-pao [Everyday Daily News]. Los Angeles, May 21, 1992, 3.

was the written examination implemented, and since then, the number of military personnel who passed the screening has dramatically decreased.[24]

6.3 Behind the Civil Service Examinations

Ever since the time when the examination system was designed and implemented in ancient China, it has become a tradition that some applicants with special status or background are eligible to receive special preferences when taking the examinations. Clearly, the civil service examination system in contemporary Taiwan is not an exception. Just like the preferential policies behind the previously discussed college entrance examinations, there are policies taking care of three types of special applicants within the system of civil service examinations. According to the constitution and several other laws and regulations, these special applicants are Mainlanders, overseas Chinese, and veterans. Unlike the preferential policies involved in the college entrance examinations, these policies have not been thoroughly overhauled and amended since the late 1980s when the martial law was lifted, and Taiwan's society embarked on a healthy

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[24] 19, 51, 49, and only 1 applicant passed the screening in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992, respectively. See Tzu-yu Shih-pao [Chinese Free Daily News], Los Angeles, May 22, 1992, A6.

transition toward socio-political liberalization.

6.3.1 Mainlanders

As explained in chapter four, Mainlanders in Taiwan refer to those who came to Taiwan from mainland China after 1945 and their Taiwan-born descendants. The preferential policy with regard to Mainlanders has its root in the Constitution of the Republic of China, which was promulgated in 1947 in mainland China when the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) still controlled all the 35 provinces in the mainland.

Article 85 of the Constitution stipulates: "In the selection of public officials, a system of open competitive examination should be put into operation, and examinations should be held in different areas, with prescribed numbers of persons to be selected according to various provinces and areas..."[25] On the basis of the above constitutional principle of "different areas with prescribed quota of persons selected" (the principle of "fen-ch'ü ting-ê"), one article of the 1948 Civil Servant Examination Law expresses that "National civil service examinations should be held separately in one province or several provinces combined, with prescribed quota of persons to be selected according to various provinces and areas. The quota is decided by the following criteria: five persons to be selected from provinces and areas with less than three million population;

[25] Article 85 of "the Constitution of the Republic of China." See Pai-ch'uan T'ao, op. cit., p. 7.

one additional person to be selected for every additional million population from provinces and areas with more than three million population..."[26]

The principle of "fen-ch'ü ting-ê" is not a new design to help recruit civil servants from remote, backward provinces and areas. It can be traced back to Han dynasty (206 BC-222 AD) and many of the dynasties that followed.[27] Without the implementation of this principle in national civil service examinations, many applicants from those culturally and socially less developed inland provinces and areas (e.g., Sinkiang and Tibet) might have very little chance when competing with those from coastal provinces (e.g., Kwangtung and Kiangsu). Based upon this principle and the population distribution among provinces, the Examination Yuan in 1948 published "a standard table" to specify the prescribed quota of persons selected from each province and area, according to which, given the fact that Taiwan was then only a remote island province in comparison to the other 34 mainland provinces, only the top 15 applicants from the Province of Taiwan would be selected each year, while the other 570 would be selected from other provinces, areas, and overseas Chinese communities.

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[26] Article 21 of "the Civil Service Examination Law." See Yu-shou Hsü, Chung-wai K'ao-shih Chih-tu chih Pi-chiao [Comparisons between Chinese and Foreign Examination Systems]. Taipei, Taiwan: Central Cultural Products Supplying House, 1984, p. 127.

[27] Ibid., p. 125.

Only one year after the "standard table" was announced, the Nationalist government led by KMT was defeated on the mainland and fled to Taiwan. Since 1949, the KMT government de jure is still the government of the Republic of China, but de facto has only control over the Province of Taiwan (plus two small islands of Quemoy and Matsu of Fuchien Province). Therefore, problems often arise when the government applies certain articles of the Constitution, which was designed to govern a vast country with 35 provinces, to situations in the tiny Province of Taiwan. The quota assignment system of the national civil service examinations is clearly one example in point.

In 1949 about 85% of Taiwan's population were native Taiwanese, who, if according to the quota system, were supposed to occupy only 15 government positions each year through the examinations, while Mainlanders, occupying only 15% of the population, were supposed to take 570 positions. Since the quota system was getting ridiculous and unfair, to remedy this problem the government in 1950 decided to hold a provincial civil service examination every year, parallel to the national examinations.[28] Only native Taiwanese could take provincial examinations, and their chances of being admitted were unrestricted by the quota system so long as

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[28] See Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan K'ao-ch'üan Ts'ung-shu Chih-tao Wei-yuan Hui [Guidance Committee of Examination and Personnel Collections, the Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], <u>Chung-hua Min-kuo Kao-hsüan Chih-tu</u> [The Examination System of the Republic of China]. Taipei, Taiwan: Cheng-chung Book Company, 1983, p. 87.

they passed the examinations. In the meantime, applicants from other provinces were still limited by the quota system.

In addition to the provincial examinations (which was later abolished in 1968), the Examination Law was amended in 1962 to include a new section in article 21, which stipulates that all native Taiwanese applicants who pass the national examinations will be admitted and the quota assigned to applicants from other provinces will be inflated in proportion to the ratio of the number of admitted native applicants to their original quota.[29] For instance, the original quota of 28 of the Province of Kwangtung will be inflated to 2,800, if 1,500 Taiwanese applicants, whose original quota is 15, pass the examinations in one particular year. Since there is no quota to limit the number of admitted native Taiwanese and since the enlarged quota for other provinces, such as Kwangtung, is always too large to be used up, the constitutional principle of "different areas with prescribed quota of persons selected" and the "standard table" of the quota system are now virtually inoperative.

But the same article (article 21) of the Examination Law also expresses that the admission criterion could be lowered to select one applicant from those provinces without any applicants passing the examinations, though the

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[29] See idem, and Yu-shou Hsü, op. cit., p. 129.

criterion can only be lowered by a maximum of 10 points.[30] This preferential treatment, parallel to the spirit of article 85 of the constitution, is to help recruit civil servants from every province, especially those culturally and economically backward provinces, in order to ensure a balanced regional development in the future when China becomes reunited. This policy received extensive criticisms in the late 1980s because in Taiwan today almost all Mainlander applicants are Taiwan-born second or even third generations who resemble native Taiwanese in nearly all aspects and, therefore, there would be no reason to lower the admission criterion for them. As a result, the Ministry of Examination announced in 1990 the termination of this policy.[31]

The reason behind the fact that the government implemented this unfair policy in the past and still refuses to amend article 85 of the Constitution even now in the 1990s is more symbolic than substantive. These policies have symbolized the claimed sovereignty of the KMT government over China as a whole, though the expression of such a claim among KMT leaders is getting weaker in the 1990s.

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[30] Yu-shou Hsü, op. cit., p. 132.

[31] Chung-yang Jih-pao. June 12, 1990, 7.

6.3.2 Overseas Chinese

The "standard table" made by the Examination Yuan in 1948 specifies the prescribed quota of persons selected from each province and area, in which overseas areas is regarded as one of the 39 provinces and areas and 19 applicants from overseas would be selected each year. Since then, the quota has been increased to 27 for the approximately 25 million overseas Chinese.[32]

According to one regulation, overseas Chinese who have stayed abroad for at least 5 consecutive years are eligible to receive up to 10 additional points when taking the examinations.[33] Moreover, the admission criterion could also be lowered by a maximum of 10 points to select one overseas applicant if none of them passes the examinations. However, these overseas applicants can only receive one of the two preferential treatments. In addition, if necessary, they can use foreign languages to answer the examinations.

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[32] See Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan K'ao-ch'üan Ts'ung-shu Chih-tao Wei-yuan Hui [Guidance Committee of Examination and Personnel Collections, the Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo Kao-p'u K'ao-shih Chih-tu [The Higher and Ordinary Examination Systems of the Republic of China]. Taipei, Taiwan: Chêng-chung Book Company, 1984, p. 147.

[33] "Encouraging Regulation on Participating Civil Service Examinations of Overseas Chinese" (enacted on August 19, 1987). See Chung-hua Min-kuo Fa-kui Pien-chi Wei-yuan Hui [Committee for Compilation of Laws and Regulations of the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-kui Hui-pien [Selections from Compendium of Current Laws and Regulations of the Republic of China, volumes 1-37]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1981, pp. 20590-12--20590-13.

In sum, this preferential policy once again shows the degree to which the nationalist government on Taiwan, in competition with the Communist government on the mainland, strives for support from overseas Chinese communities.

6.3.3 Veterans

To award veterans for their past contributions, a special regulation was enacted in 1967 to give preferences to those veterans who need to get a government job through passing the examinations.[34] The preferential treatment is fourfold.[35] First, veterans without formal education are allowed to use either their military training or ranks to apply for taking the examinations. For instance, those veterans who had carried the rank of captain for at least three years can take the higher examinations, and those who were warrant officer can take the ordinary examinations. Second, they pay only 50% of the application fees. Third, the criteria of the physical examination have been relaxed for them. Therefore, slightly handicapped veterans still have a chance to participate. Lastly, depending upon their military merits, they can receive 3 to 10 points in addition to their test scores. The rationale of this policy is that without being given preferential treatment veterans would

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[34] "Regulations on Participating the Civil Service Examinations of Veterans" (enacted on June 22, 1967). For detailed of this regulation, see Chung-hua Min-kuo Kao-p'u K'ao-shih Chih-tu. pp. 144-147.

[35] Idem.

have very little chance when competing with those regular applicants who are better-prepared and usually with a stronger educational background.

6.4 Distributive Principles

The next concerned issue in this chapter is the types of distributive principles employed by Taiwan's government to allocate public offices through the civil service examinations. Given the complexity of the examination system, it is apparent that there must have been several, rather than one, distributive principles in action.

Several articles of the Constitution detail that "no person should be appointed to a public office unless he is qualified through examinations", "people shall have the right of taking public examinations and holding public offices", and the examination system shall be "open and competitive".[36] That is, every citizen, regardless his or her race, gender, social status, family and educational backgrounds, has an equal opportunity to gain access to the resources of public offices, and, when taking these examinations, one's chances should be affected by nothing but one's examination scores. Therefore, at least in theory, the distributive principles involved here consist of

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[36] Articles 18 and 85 of "the Constitution of the Republic of China". See Pai-ch'uan T'ao, op. cit., pp. 2 & 7.

once again the principle of <u>equal opportunity</u>, and the principle of <u>merit</u>. Since many of the mechanisms and primary principles employed in this context are already analyzed in the previous chapters, the comments and discussions made earlier can be immediately transferred to this allocation issue. What we will do next is to investigate how these two principles have been severely undermined by some practical and expedient considerations.

6.4.1 Principle of Equal Opportunity

In general, civil service examinations are not open to those who fail to pass a physical examination. Hence, the examination system is discriminatory against handicapped citizens who supposedly also have the constitutional right to take any examinations.

Moreover, civilians have been excluded from taking those easy-to-pass examinations specially designed for military personnel or veterans. Therefore, it is safe to say that people in Taiwan do not have an equal opportunity to gain access to the resources of public offices through participating in the examinations.

6.4.2 Principle of Merit

Even when taking those open-to-the-public examinations, one's chances of passing has been affected not only by one's test scores, but also by one's racial/regional, residential, and prior occupational statuses. According to the principle

of merit, the resources of public offices should be allocated to those who most deserve them. But, under the influence of the three preferential policies behind the examination system, this distributive principle has not been fully enforced in reality. Actually, various principles are employed within these preferential policies.

First, according to the original spirit of the constitutional principle of "different areas with prescribed quota of persons selected" (or the principle of "fen-ch'ü ting-ê"), the distributive principle of region (or regional representation) is employed to ensure a proper allocation of public offices to people from culturally and economically underprivileged provinces and areas. This principle is still congruent with the idea of redistributive egalitarianism, because it is aimed to achieve regional equality.

This principle of region is also applied in other societies. For instance, in the United States, state universities give priority to students residing in the state.[37] But there is a dramatic difference between the two actual cases: in the United States the priority is given to applicants from within the state, whereas in Taiwan the preference is granted to those applicants who or whose

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[37] This example is taken from Jon Elster, Local Justice. 1992, p. 82. Elster calls it the principle of residence status. Actually, unlike state universities, some private colleges and universities in the United States would like to consider a geographical balance among their students. This practice is closer to the Taiwanese case.

parents came from provinces other than the Province of Taiwan. Despite the above difference, the two cases share one thing in common: in both cases the principle of region serves as a proxy for other qualities associated with region. In the American case, the quality associated with region is the parental contribution (service rendered or tax paid) of the in-state applicants to the state, while in Taiwan it is the socio-economic development of all regions in the country. These two cases exhibit the degree to which the practical application of the same principle of local justice can vary in different contexts.

Secondly, after the national government fled to Taiwan in 1949, the same principle of "fen-ch'ü ting-ê" had become the core of the preferential policy in which the principle of racial status was in operation to benefit Mainlanders. This principle is compatible with neither meritocratic nor redistributive egalitarianism for the following reasons: 1) by lowering the passing criterion for Mainlanders, it failed to provide an equal opportunity for native Taiwanese to compete; and 2) since the allocation of public offices is already highly favorable to Mainlanders, not only did this principle of racial status fail to redistribute political resources to Taiwanese, but it intensified an already unequal situation.

Thirdly, the principle used in the policy favoring overseas Chinese appears to be the residence status of the applicants; however, what is considered here is not the

place of residence within a country but the place of residence within or without Taiwan. In fact, the rationale behind this principle is merely a political one because it has been one of the methods adopted by Taiwan's authorities to prevent overseas Chinese from getting closer to the Communist Mainland.

Lastly, involved in the policies that have benefited veterans and retired high-ranking officers is the principle of contribution, according to which the resources should be allocated in accordance with one's prior contributions to the society.

In sum, all of the four principles (of region, race, residence and contribution) are against the principle of merit of the civil service examinations. More importantly, all of them except the principle of region are also against the principle of redistributive egalitarianism. Usually, distributive principles that are accepted as "just" principles in a society are either meritocratic or redistributive or both (which is rare). Otherwise, they constitute sources of social injustice that may generate troubles.

6.5 Distributive Outcomes

In chapter four, we examined whether the college entrance examinations are truly meritocratic or inherently

discriminatory against those of disadvantaged socio-economic, ethnic, or sexual background. Now, the same question arises as to whether or not Taiwan's civil service examinations (also the civil service system as a whole) have served as mechanisms of status inheritance in favor of those of specific economic, ethnic, or sexual status. The answer to this question rests upon a thorough examination of the distributive outcomes among different groups of people. However, since the government has published few statistics about the socio-economic background of its civil servants and the examinations applicants, the focus of the following section will be on how the resources of public office have been distributed between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, and between male and female citizens.

As for the distribution among different socio-economic groups, we can probably assume (on the basis of the conclusion we drew previously with respect to the college entrance examinations) that one's socio-economic background has a certain impact on one's opportunity to get access to the positions in the civil service system. This is because one's socio-economic background could have an effect on one's chance of being admitted into colleges, and because one's educational attainment definitely has a decisive influence on one's chance of being admitted into the civil service system.

6.5.1 Ethnicity

As discussed previously in chapter four, Taiwan's twenty million population consists of two major ethnic groups: three million Mainlanders (about 14% of the population) being more active and influential in the political, rather than economic, sphere, and seventeen million Taiwanese who, through the ownership of the land, get the upper hand in economic affairs. Given the ethnic situation in Taiwan, one may wonder whether or not the political and economic inequalities between the two groups have been projected onto the allocation of public offices.

Wishing to reduce ethnic tensions, the government usually publishes very little statistics giving Mainlanders-Taiwanese breakdowns. But, fortunately enough, the ethnic background of civil servants and of those who pass the examinations each year have been systematically and continuously published in several official statistical yearbooks.

Table 6.5 displays the ethnic composition of Taiwan's hundreds of thousands civil servants. From the table, we see that the disproportional representation of Mainlanders in public office was extremely marked in the early years. For instance, 42.8% of the civil servants were Mainlanders in 1962, while only about 12% of Taiwan's population were Mainlanders during the same period. This overrepresentation of Mainlanders was largely attributed to the fact that a great amount of public offices were occupied by those

Mainlander civil servants who moved to Taiwan with the nationalist government in 1949. As time progressed, the ratio between Mainlanders and Taiwanese in the system has changed dramatically: in 1989 only about 24% of them were Mainlanders, which is moving closer to their population percentage. Two factors may explain the dramatic change: 1) many first-generation Mainlanders have retired from the civil service, and 2) more and more, in terms of both absolute numbers and percentages, Taiwanese have passed the civil service examinations.

TABLE 6.5

Civil Servants by Ethnicity, 1962-1989

	Taiwanese		Mainlanders	
Year	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1962	124,163	57.2	92,816	42.8
1965	140,230	59.0	97,383	41.0
1968	160,145	60.3	105,503	39.7
1971	184,772	61.2	117,175	38.8
1974	228,640	65.1	122,528	34.9
1977	256,528	67.0	126,130	33.0
1980	291,006	69.2	129,338	30.8
1983	330,628	71.4	132,473	28.6
1986	368,460	73.9	130,346	26.1
1989	410,649	76.1	129,170	23.9

Source: Calculated from the Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan [Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], K'ao-shih Yuan T'ung-chi T'i-yao [Statistical Abstract of the Examination Yuan]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1990, p. 82.

The second factor is evident in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. As depicted in Table 6.6, only about one of every four (25.8%) passing the higher and ordinary examinations were Taiwanese in 1950, but eight of every ten of them (81.4%) were

TABLE 6.6

Applicants Who Passed the Higher and Ordinary Examinations by Ethnicity, 1950-1989

Year	Taiwanese		Mainlanders	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1950	11	25.8	320	74.2
1953	336	40.7	489	59.3
1956	392	47.8	428	52.2
1959	339	61.4	213	38.6
1962	492	80.4	120	19.6
1965	670	85.8	111	14.2
1968	547	82.9	113	17.1
1971	2,109	82.1	460	17.9
1974	1,539	69.7	668	30.3
1977	1,027	68.9	464	31.1
1980	3,767	73.9	1,331	26.1
1983	2,451	75.7	786	24.3
1986	2,249	76.9	676	23.1
1989	7,699	81.4	1,758	18.6

Sources: Figures of 1950-1971 are calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan [Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1979 [Examination Statistics of the Republic of China, 1979]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1980, pp. 54-56 & 82-84. Figures of 1974-1989 are based on Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1989. pp. 36-38.

TABLE 6.7

Applicants Who Passed the Special Examinations by Ethnicity, 1974-1989

Year	Taiwanese		Mainlanders	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1974	9,431	77.6	2,719	22.4
1977	7,119	47.9	7,751	52.1
1980	9,959	74.3	3,446	25.7
1983	13,572	66.1	6,953	33.9
1986	7,811	83.2	1,578	16.8
1989	22,459	82.0	4,932	18.0

Sources: Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan [Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1989 [Examination Statistics of the Republic of China, 1989]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1990, pp. 36-38.

Taiwanese forty years later. Though there were fluctuations in the ratios in Table 6.7, the percentage of Taiwanese passing the special examinations also reached the same level of 80% by the end of 1980s.

In view of the above statistics, one important question arises as to how these figures were influenced by the three preferential policies we previously discussed. According to those policies, Mainlanders, overseas Chinese, and veterans are able to receive various preferential treatments while taking the examinations. Obviously, the first two policies have benefited Mainlanders, for most overseas Chinese are Cantonese, a subgroup of Mainlanders. The beneficiaries of the veteran-related policy (and of the special examinations designed for veterans) have not been exclusively Mainlanders, especially after the 1960s when Taiwanese population became the backbone of the armed forces. However, the majority of those veterans who are senior and meritorious enough to be given preferences are still Mainlanders. Therefore, all these preferential policies appear to have a certain effect on the ethnic ratios.

But, in reality, the first two preferential policies did not have any salient adverse impact on Taiwanese. The reason is straightforward. Only a very small number of Mainlander and overseas Chinese applicants benefited from these policies each year. For instance, only four Mainlanders passed the higher examination and one passed the ordinary one in 1981 by receiving the preferential

treatments.[38] Also, throughout the entire 1980s, only twenty overseas Chinese passed the higher examinations and another twenty passed the ordinary ones.[39] On the average, only two of them passed per examination per year. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that, although against the principle of egalitarianism, the first two preferential policies have had very little impact on the ratio between Mainlanders and Taiwanese in the civil service system.

As for the veteran-related policy, though its beneficiaries are not exclusively Mainlanders, as mentioned earlier, the majority of those veterans who are senior and meritorious enough to receive preferences are Mainlanders. Moreover, the screening policy that converts colonels and generals into high-ranking civil servants is mainly beneficial to the Mainlanders. Table 6.8 provides strong evidence. Although the table displays an increasing trend of Taiwanese's share in all categories of military rank between 1950 and 1987, the majority of generals and colonels were Mainlanders. Therefore, we can estimate that, among those 1,660 colonels and generals who were pronounced qualified to become high-ranking senior level officials between 1968 and 1991, at least 1,000-1,200 were Mainlanders. As a consequence, this screening policy indeed has had an adverse impact on the ratio of Taiwanese in the

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[38] Yu-shou Hsü, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

[39] See Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1989. pp. 66-67 & 120-121.

civil service system.

TABLE 6.8

Mainlander-Taiwanese Composition in the Military, 1950-1987 (percentage)

	Generals		Colonels		Lieutenants		Soldiers	
	M	T	M	T	M	T	M	T
1950-65	97.7*	1.3*	90.4	9.6	86.2	13.8	47.2	52.8
1965-78	92.6	7.4	81.2	18.8	65.3	34.7	31.6	68.4
1978-87	84.2	15.8	67.4	32.6	51.7	48.3	21.3	78.7

M = Mainlanders
T = Taiwanese
* Numbers do not add up to 100.00.

Source: Liang-jen Chian, "Tai-wan-jen Ti Erh Ke Shang-Chiang" [The Second Military General of Taiwanese Origin]. Hsin hsin-wen [New News] 39 (December 7, 1987), p. 9. Adopted after Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan." in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., Taiwan in a Time of Transition. New York: Paragon House, 1988, p. 14.

Even without the screening policy converting so many Mainlanders from the military into high-ranking officials, the Mainlanders are still heavily overrepresented at the higher levels of Taiwan's civil service system. As Table 6.9 shows, they were highly overrepresented in 1950, and this was still the case in 1989 only to a lesser degree. Even though in the late 1980s Taiwanese were well represented, at least at the lower levels, in the civil service system, more than half of the senior level civil servants were Mainlanders.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that both Table 6.8 and 6.9 illustrate the same pattern that the higher the level (in the military as well as the civil service), the

more the Mainlanders are overrepresented (i.e., the more the Taiwanese are underrepresented). However, the gap has been closing very quickly over the years.

TABLE 6.9

Mainlander-Taiwanese Composition at Different Levels in the Civil Service System, 1950 & 1989 (percentage)

	1950		1989	
	M	T	M	T
Senior Level*	83.0	17.0	57.8	42.2
Intermediate Level**	75.0	25.0	39.1	60.9
Junior Level***	37.0	63.0	26.2	73.8

M = Mainlanders
T = Taiwanese
* Senior Level in Chinese is "Chien[3]" [Authorized]; grades 10-14.
** Intermediate Level is "Chien[4]" [Recommended]; grades 6-9.
***Junior Level is "Wei" [Commissioned]; grades 1-5.

Sources: The 1950 figures are cited from Cal Clark _Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms_. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, p. 126. The 1989 figures are based upon _Tzu-yu Shih-pao_ [Chinese Free Daily News]. April 14, 1992, A2.

Although Taiwanese have been underrepresented in the civil service system, they have a much better chance of gaining entry to public offices and legislative organs at all levels through elections simply because they constitute more than 80% of Taiwan's electorates. The clear advantage enjoyed by Taiwanese during elections is shown in the following statistics. 94% of the county magistrates and city mayors elected between 1950 and 1985 were Taiwanese, and no Mainlanders have been elected at these two levels

since 1972.[40] During the same period, more than 90% of the provincial assemblymen were Taiwanese, the figures ranging from a low of 91% in 1957 to a high of 99% in 1981. In the county and city councils, the highest percentage of Taiwanese during 1950-1982 was 96% in 1950, and the lowest, 87% in 1964.[41] The same pattern can be found in the legislative Yuan, the national legislature in Taiwan. In one recent election (in 1989), 82% of the newly elected legislators were Taiwanese, which is very close their population percentage of 86%.[42] Also in 1989, only two (or 0.6%) of the 309 elected heads of villages and townships were Mainlanders.[43]

Furthermore, both the President (elected by the National Assembly) and the Prime Minister (nominated by the President and approved by the Legislative Yuan) are currently Taiwanese. All in all, though Mainlanders have been overrepresented in the civil service system, they have only a very small chance in winning elections at all levels, especially at the grass-root level.

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[40] Kuo-wei Lee, "Taiwan Provincial and Local Political Decision-Makers: Taiwanization." Asian Profile. vol. 15, no. 2 (April 1987): p. 185.

[41] Ibid., p. 182.

[42] Hsiu-Wen Chiu, "Hi-k'uo T'ien-k'ung Lun T'ai-wan Chêng-ch'ing" [Broad Commends on Taiwan's Politics]. China Times Weekly. no. 267 (April 7-13, 1990): pp. 32-33.

[43] Shih-chieh Jih-pao. January 21, 1990, A9.

6.5.2 Gender

Women in Taiwan have been granted equal rights under the laws. They have equal opportunities to participate in politics and to take the civil service examinations, but, without any preferential policies in favor of them, have they achieved equity with men in sharing the scarce resources of public offices?

Table 6.10 displays the gender composition of Taiwan's civil servants. The disproportional representation of men in public office was conspicuous. For instance, in 1972 only one of every four government officials was female, while in the same year women accounted for 47.3% of the total population.[44]

The overrepresentation of male has been caused by two factors. First, public offices were predominantly and traditionally occupied by men before 1949 in both mainland China and Japan-occupied Taiwan, two hierarchial Chinese societies where women traditionally held a very subordinate status. Second, although women had equal opportunities to compete with men in taking the civil service examinations after 1949, they, nonetheless, were less likely to participate in the examinations than their male counterparts. Definitely, this has much to do with women's inadequate educational attainments in the past.

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[44] Calculated from the Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsing-chêng Yuan [Executive Yuan, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien, 1988 [Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1988]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1989, p. 76.

TABLE 6.10

Civil Servants by Gender
(Percentage)

Year	Male	Female
1969	78.6	21.4
1972	75.5	24.5
1981	70.3	29.7
1989	66.9	33.1
1992	65.1	34.9

Sources: The figures of 1972 and 1981 are from the Executive Yuan, the Republic of China, Annual Review of Government Administration, ROC, 1982-1983. Taipei, Taiwan, 1984, p. 51. The 1989 figure is calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan [Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], K'ao-shih Yuan T'ung-chi T'i-yao [Statistical Abstract of the Examination Yuan]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1990, p. 83. The 1969 and 1992 figures are cited from Shih-Chieh Jih-pao [World Journal]. January 27, 1993, A11.

However, the gender gap has been closed rather quickly. The 1969 ratio of 3.6 to 1 (in favor of men) was reduced to 1.8 to 1 in 1992. And, the gap is almost nonexistent in Taipei and Kaohsiung, the two largest cities of Taiwan. In 1992, 49.58% of Taipei's civil servants were females, while the female percentage was 47.6% in Kaohsiung.[45] The reason for this can be found in the following two tables (6.11 and 6.12), which exhibit the gender distribution of those who passed the higher and the ordinary examinations.

As indicated in Table 6.11, throughout the 1950s and the early and mid-1960s, less than 5% of those who succeeded in higher examinations were women. This could probably be attributed to the fact that only a small number of women

[45] Chung-yang Jih-pao. February 16, 1993, 7.

TABLE 6.11

Applicants Who Passed the Higher Examinations by Gender, 1950-1989

Year	Male Number	Male Percentage	Female Number	Female Percentage
1950	208	96.3	8	3.7
1953	446	98.2	8	1.8
1956	448	97.0	14	3.0
1959	248	98.4	4	1.6
1962	205	95.8	9	4.2
1965	264	98.1	5	1.9
1968	280	94.9	15	5.1
1971	413	89.6	48	10.4
1974	504	81.0	118	19.0
1977	379	78.6	103	21.4
1980	1,249	73.3	456	26.7
1983	688	69.4	303	30.6
1986	643	62.4	387	37.6
1989	1,683	56.5	1,296	43.5

Source: Calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan [Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1989 [Examination Statistics of the Republic of China, 1989]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1990, p. 64.

attained enough education to be qualified to take the examinations, and not because women had less chance of passing the examinations in competition with their male counterparts. But women have closed the gap rapidly since the beginning of 1970s. In 1989, the percentage of women reached 43.5%, which is equivalent to the percentage of female college students in the 1980s. Obviously, this is not a coincidence.

The same pattern of increasing female representation can be found in the gender distribution of successful applicants in the ordinary examinations. As Table 6.12 indicates, only about 1% of who succeeded in the 1950s were

TABLE 6.12

Applicants Who Passed the Ordinary Examinations by Gender, 1950-1989

Year	Male		Female	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1950	213	99.1	2	0.9
1953	370	99.7	1	0.3
1956	316	99.4	2	0.6
1959	299	99.7	1	0.3
1962	391	98.2	7	1.8
1965	498	97.3	14	2.7
1968	342	93.7	23	6.3
1971	1,603	76.0	505	24.0
1974	673	50.9	650	49.1
1977	508	57.5	376	42.5
1980	1,472	44.8	1,817	55.2
1983	230	26.0	655	74.0
1986	366	35.8	657	64.2
1989	798	32.8	1,639	67.2

Source: Calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-shih Yuan [Examination Yuan, the Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo K'ao-hsüan T'ung-chi, 1989 [Examination Statistics of the Republic of China, 1989]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1990, p. 117.

women, but ever since 1980 more women than men have passed the examinations and, quite dramatically, the percentage of women skyrocketed to 74% in 1983 and 67.2% in 1989. In view of the increasing patterns in both tables, it appears that the female representation among successful examinees will continue to increase in the future.

But, despite the constant increase in the number of female officials, they occupy lower positions than their male counterparts. The 1985 statistics shows that among all female officials, 0.5% were at senior level, 9.3% at the intermediate and 90.2% at the junior level, while 3.8% of the men were at the senior, 25% at the intermediate and

72.3% at the low levels.[46]

The above analyses reveal that the allocations of public offices have been asymmetrical between Mainlanders and Taiwanese as well as between men and women. Though the gaps between these ethnic and gender groups have been substantially narrowed, Taiwanese and women are still heavily underrepresented at the higher levels of the civil service system. We wonder whether this asymmetry is the direct result of government's policies or simply how things turn out. In other words, we need to make a distinction between de jure and de facto distribution, which is of great importance in cases of sexual and racial discrimination. The two cases above are not exactly the same in this regard.

In the case of men versus women, it is not the government's current allocative policies per se that discriminate against women, but that the asymmetry is merely how things naturally turn out. In the case of Mainlanders versus Taiwanese, the asymmetry is definitely related to the three preferential policies that directly and indirectly favor Mainlanders. However, we should keep in mind that Taiwan's public offices were predominantly occupied by men and Mainlanders in the 1950s and 1960s. The current asymmetrical representations between men and women, and

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[46] Yenlin Ku, "The Changing Status of Women in Taiwan: A Conscious and Collective Struggle Toward Equality." Women's Studies International Forum. vol. 11, no. 3 (1988): p. 185. It should be noted that the men's percentages do not add up to 100%.

Mainlanders and Taiwanese can partly be attributed to this practices in the early years.

CHAPTER SEVEN

COMPARISONS BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN

In the preceding four chapters (three through six), the detailed examinations of the allocative practices in China and Taiwan begin in the late 1940s, when China split into two societies that have ever since marched towards the future along divergent paths. Chapters concerning each society are written without specifically referring to the other because in doing so, we can concentrate on thoroughly discussing the complicated practices of allocations in one society without compounding the complexity with references to the other one. But such a non-comparative approach obviously fails to take advantage of the "most similar systems" design. Since the two Chinas share so many systemic (e.g., cultural, historical, and ethnic) similarities, it would be particularly interesting to compare and contrast the allocative practices in the two societies.

The comparisons to be made in this chapter are in the following two areas: 1) between Chinese and Taiwanese higher educational systems; and 2) between China's cadres system and Taiwan's civil service system. However, we will lay more emphasis on the analysis of the comparative results rather than on the comparisons themselves, because many comparisons are straightforward, tedious, and somewhat irrelevant to our theoretical concerns of distributive

justice. In other words, the backbone of this chapter shall be examinations of the roots of the similarities and differences between the two Chinas' allocative practices (especially the allocative principles).

7.1 Two Higher Educational Systems

In this section, the Chinese and Taiwanese allocation systems of higher education will be compared in terms of the level of scarcity of the resources, the distributive mechanisms and principles, the preferential policies, and lastly the outcomes of allocation.

7.1.1 Scarcity of the Resources

Higher educational resources are universally scarce in the developing world. From chapters three and four, we know that although higher educational systems in both China and Taiwan have rapidly expanded in the past four decades, the resources they have provided are still very scarce. Comparatively, the resources provided in China are more scarce than those in Taiwan. The comparison can be made by examining two statistical figures, the calculations of which are based upon total enrollments and admitted applicants in four-year colleges and universities. In China, there were 18.9 college students per 10,000 population in 1989, and 27.41% of all the applicants in 1992 passed the entrance

examination.[1] Taiwan has larger quantity in both accounts: there were 113 and 136 college students per 10,000 population in 1988 and 1991, respectively,[2] and, according to a very recent report by the president of the National Taiwan University, 43.76% of all the applicants in 1992 passed the entrance examination.[3] Clearly, the higher educational resources are much more scarce in China than in Taiwan. However, Taiwan's figures become less impressive if compared with some other Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) such as South Korea.[4]

7.1.2 Distributive Mechanisms and Principles

The entrance examination was adopted by the Republic of China long before 1949 on the mainland as the primary mechanism to allocate higher educational resources. After

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[1] These figures are from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in chapter three.

[2] The calculation of the 1988 figure is based upon Table 4.1 in chapter four and the population figure from Chung-hua Min-kuo Nei-chêng Pu [Ministry of Interior Affairs, Republic of China], Nei-chêng T'ung-chi T'i-yao, 1988 [Statistical Abstract of Interior Affairs, 1988]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1989, p. 21. The 1991 figure is cited from Chung-yang Jih-pao [Central Daily News]. International Edition, Inglewood, California, February 18, 1993, 3.

[3] For details of the report, see Chung-yang Jih-pao. ibid.

[4] See ibid. But, according to Los Angeles Times (March 5, 1993, A-18), normally, 45% of all the applicants are admitted to higher educational institutions, including two-year junior colleges, in South Korea. We can safely estimate that the Korean acceptance rate of four-year institutions would be much lower than Taiwan's rate of 43.76%.

the separation into two Chinas in 1949, the entrance examinations continued to be employed by both sides of the Taiwan Strait to select college students. But, in the following four decades, China and Taiwan diverged from the same starting point and took different paths in the 1960s, and then converged back to approximately the same point in the late 1970s.

The adoption of the entrance examinations by Taiwan's Nationalist government has been very consistent throughout the post-1949 period. It is an obvious continuation of the previous policy implemented in the pre-1949 Republican China. Whereas in China there have been several twists and turns in the employment of mechanism. It was consistently used before 1966 and after 1976. During the Cultural Revolution era (1966-1976), the examinations were abolished and replaced by a recommendation method. Since 1977, the examinations have been restored as the key selection mechanism.

The entrance examination system is an "universalistic" mechanism through which everyone is judged by a common, universal standard, while the recommendation method that favored children from proletarian backgrounds during the Cultural Revolution is a "particularistic" mechanism through which people is judged by a particular background, relationship or experience. This universalistic-particularistic distinction has been widely used by comparativists as one of the dichotomies that contrast

modern and traditional societies as ideal types.[5] An interesting logical extension of this is that Maoist China during the Cultural Revolution was more traditional than the "traditional" China in which the examination system was adopted centuries ago in 622 A.D.[6]

As for comparing the distributive principles between China and Taiwan, because of the complexity of allocative practices in both societies, the best strategy to compare is to step back and focus on the large, overall picture rather than on the details of the principles being employed.[7] Otherwise, we would be unable to see the wood for the trees.

Before and after the Cultural Revolution, the central principle used in China to allocate higher educational spaces was, by and large, the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism (behind the mechanism of entrance examinations), which is a combination of the principle of merit and the principle of equal opportunity. The beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 marked a dramatic shift

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[5] For details of other modernity-tradition distinctions (dichotomies) and relevant discussions, see James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1981, pp. 50-57.

[6] For details of the Chinese examination system, see Johanna M. Menzel, ed., The Chinese Civil System: Career Open to Talent? Boston, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1963.

[7] As discussed previously in chapters three and four, China and Taiwan have used numerous trivial principles, including principles of equal opportunity, merit, class status, correct thinking, age, marital status, contribution, racial status, need and some political principles. For details, see sections 3.3 and 4.4.

of the distributive principle from meritocratic egalitarianism stressing equality in process to redistributive egalitarianism emphasizing equality in outcome. The latter plainly reflects China's socialist commitment to redistribute scarce resources to disadvantaged classes.

The oscillation in China's use of principles is conspicuously absent in Taiwan. As a result of the continuous employment of the entrance examinations, the dominant principle used to allocate Taiwan's college spaces has invariably been the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism. However, it is necessary to stress that if we take into account those preferential policies behind the entrance examinations, this principle is only the dominant one, not the only one, being used in Taiwan.

7.1.3 Preferential Policies

Since preferential policies exist, in one form or the other, in many countries, we have a good opportunity for comparative analysis. But we rarely have a chance to study and then compare the preferential policies implemented in two "most similar systems" such as China and Taiwan.[8]

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[8] For instance, Myron Weiner studies preferential policies adopted in the United States and India in his "Preferential Policies." in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings. sixth edition, Chicago, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1986, pp. 397-419; and economist Thomas Sowell examines preferential policies with special attention to programs in India, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the United States in his

However, the comparisons to be made next will be rather brief because the comparative focus of this chapter is more on general distributive policies than on specific, behind-the-scene preferential policies.

As extensively discussed in chapter four, there are totally eight preferential policies in operation in Taiwan's higher education system. Some of them (such as the one taking care of Aborigines), indeed, attempt to lessen the problem of unequal distribution of resources, but some others are merely formulated to achieve certain political goals (such as the one in favor of overseas Chinese). The latter is against either meritocratic or redistributive egalitarianism.

As shown in chapter three, China has also adopted several preferential policies to supplement its examination system during the post-Mao era, and, just like their counterparts in Taiwan, many of these policies do not aim to realize the idea of redistributive egalitarianism (such as the one for overseas Chinese).

There are more similarities than dissimilarities between China's and Taiwan's preferential policies. Among them, the most intriguing similarity is that, although divergent in many other aspects in public policies, both Chinas give preferences to the groups of veterans, children of diplomats, overseas Chinese, ethnic minority, outstanding

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Preferential Policies: An International Perspective. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1990.

athletes, and, most interestingly, applicants from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. This list actually covers the entire domain of Taiwan's preferential policies and a very large portion of China's. The key dissimilarities are in China's policies toward students who are politically excellent, who participate in the "fixed admission, fixed distribution" program, who are from areas with weak educational foundation, and who are privately supported. These policies are absent in Taiwan because of the facts that 1) political criteria in selecting college students are much less important in Taiwan than in China; 2) Taiwan, an island society, does not have a huge territory with many underdeveloped, backward areas as they are in China; and 3) the majority of college students in Taiwan, a capitalist society, are privately supported.

7.1.4 Distributive Outcomes

The last area in which we can compare China's and Taiwan's allocations of higher educational resources is the distributive outcomes among people with different socio-economic classes, ethnicity, and gender. In other words, we are concerned with the beneficiaries and the victims of these implemented distributive policies.

7.1.4.1 Social Class

Social class in Taiwan, as in many other capitalist societies, is predominantly defined in terms of material

wealth,[9] while in China, like in many other socialist regimes, class is defined not only in terms of the ownership of the means of production, but also in terms of the degree of loyalty to the regime and its top leaders. People in Taiwan are generally classified into high-, middle-, and low-income classes, whereas people in China are categorized as people with "bad" background including landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements (criminals) and rightists, and people with "good" background consisting of workers, poor peasants, soldiers, and cadres.

These different categories of social classes between China and Taiwan prevent us from making truly meaningful comparisons. Nonetheless, we can still compare the extent to which China's and Taiwan's distributive policies affected their respective underprivileged classes.

As shown in section 3.4.1, the oscillation in Chinese admission policy had a dramatic impact on the representation of the underprivileged worker/peasant/soldier classes. When the entrance examinations were employed during the periods before and after the Cultural Revolution, these groups were underrepresented in the higher educational system, moderately in the 1950s and the early 1960s, but severely in

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[9] However, class can also be defined as power, authority, status, and prestige. But in Taiwan social class is primarily defined in terms of income. For details of the class concept, see James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1981, chapter 6.

the early 1980s. When the examinations were abolished during the radical decade of the Cultural Revolution, as a result of the new recommendation method, they were not only equally- but over-represented. In many cases 100% of the selected students were exclusively from these groups.[10]

Compared with China, Taiwan's problem of unequal distribution of higher educational resources is a minor one. Though the analysis in section 4.5.1 suggests that the entrance examination system in Taiwan is more or less discriminatory against lower-income classes, the degree of inequality is much less in Taiwan than in China. (However, we should keep in mind that China and Taiwan have different definitions and categories of "social class".) This is probably one of the reasons why there was no radical measure (such as the abolishment of the examinations in China in the late 1960s) taken, nor preferential policies (such as China's preferential policy toward students from areas with "a weak educational foundation") implemented in Taiwan for its underprivileged class.

7.1.4.2 Ethnicity

About 8% of China's population and 1.7% of Taiwan's population are non-Han minority people. Both governments have recognized the underrepresentation of their respective minority groups in the higher educational system, and have accordingly implemented certain preferential policies to

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[10] Peking and Ch'inghua Universities could serve as examples, see section 3.4.1.

alleviate this ethnic inequality.

From the preceding section, we know that China's social class structure is more complex than that of Taiwan. However, Taiwan's ethnic structure is more complex. China's ethnic distinction is mainly between the Han majority and the non-Han minority, whereas in Taiwan ethnic tension is not so much between the Han majority and the Aborigines as it is between two Han groups: the Taiwanese majority and the Mainlanders minority. These two groups are ethnically homogeneous, but different in their unique political experiences and historical memory.

As previously discussed in section 4.5.2, in the early years Taiwanese did not get their fair share of the higher educational resources. Their underrepresentation was very severe in the 1950s and moderate in the 1960s. Since then, without any preferential policies in favor of them since 1950 (when a quota system was abolished in that year), they have closed the gap very rapidly.

In China, the non-Han minority nationalities were severely underrepresented in higher education in the beginning of the 1950s. In the past forty years, even though there have been salient increases in minority representation in both absolute numbers and percentages, minority groups still do not have what they proportionally deserve. Moreover, compared with Taiwan's Taiwanese (as opposed to Taiwan's Mainlanders), China's minority nationalities (as opposed to the Han majority in China) have

closed the ethnic gap in higher education at a much slower pace. One reason for this difference is that Taiwanese is actually the majority group with a firm control of Taiwan's economic resources, while China's minorities are economically disadvantaged and mostly live in remote and backward frontiers.

Finally, we should examine and compare the relations of preferential policies to ethnic inequality in China and Taiwan in the light of a larger framework.

Throughout the world, the designated groups of preferential policies are mainly the groups who are ethnically distinctive from non-designated groups.[11] The following are four ideally possible cases where ethnicity-oriented preferential policies are given: 1) to minority by majority society; 2) to minority by minority society; 3) to majority by majority society; and 4) to majority by minority society.[12] Among them, the first one is probably the most popular case, as exemplified by the United States, where preferences are given to minority by a majority-dominated

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[11] Certainly, there are plenty exceptions, such as Taiwan's policy in favor of veterans and China's policy toward politically excellent students. But the majority of the preferential policies in our world are ethnicity-oriented, such as "affirmation action" in the United States.

[12] These four categories are inspired by Thomas Sowell's three categories of "majority preferences in majority economies", "majority preferences in minority economies", and "minority preferences in majority economies". See Thomas Sowell, op. cit., chapters 2, 3, and 4. But, as shown in the text that follows, my categories and subsequent discussions on these categories are different from Sowell's in many ways.

society. The second one is demonstrated by South Africa where preferences are given to the white minority by the white-dominated society. The third case can be typified by Malaysia where preferences are given to majority Malays over minority Chinese by the Malay-dominated society. The last one is a rare case where preferences are given to majority by a minority-dominated society. The example in point could be the quota system in favor of Taiwanese majority by the minority Mainlander-dominated society in Taiwan in the late 1940s.

Between cases #1 and #3, clearly giving preferences to minority is more justifiable than to majority in a majority-dominated society. However, societies that matches case #3 may have unique socio-economic reasons to do so. For instance, Malaysia is demographically and politically dominated by Malays, but Malaysian economy is dominated by minority Chinese. This is the reason why, instead of giving preferences to the minority Chinese, preferences are given to the majority Malays .

As for cases #2 and #4, owing to the decolonization movement after World War II, societies that are dominated by an ethnic minority are very scarce today. Moreover, societies that match case #4 are more scarce that those that match case #2 because it is conceivable that the ruling minority group is more likely to give preferences to themselves than to their domestic foe who has numerical superiority.

Now, we should go back to the two Chinese societies. The preferential policies given by the Han-dominated China and Taiwan to their respective non-Han minority are clear examples of case #1. Besides this similarity which they share, China and Taiwan are different in other aspects of ethnicity-oriented preferential policies, largely due to the complexity of the changing ethnic structure in Taiwan in the past one hundred years.

During the Japanese occupation period (1895-1945), Taiwanese society can be best described by case #2, where preferences in many public policy areas were given to Japanese-minority in Taiwan by the Japanese colonial government. After being returned to China in 1945, Taiwan's society was still dominated by a minority group, this time the Mainlanders. Although there are no preferential policies explicitly in favor of Mainlanders in Taiwan in college admission, the preferential policies for overseas and mainland Chinese (the latter referring to those who received education in the mainland after 1949) do benefit "Mainlanders" (from areas outside Taiwan) because almost 100% of overseas and mainland Chinese are non-Taiwanese "Mainlanders". In this sense, the Taiwanese society still matches case #2 where preferences are given to the minority Mainlanders by the Mainlander-dominated government. However, we should keep in mind that Taiwan's economy has been dominated by majority Taiwanese over the past forty years. In this regard, Taiwan is in sharp contrast with

Malaysia and South Africa.

In recent years Taiwan has been transformed into a majority Taiwanese-dominated society in which not only economic but also political spheres are under Taiwanese control (since March 1, 1993 the posts of President and Prime Minister have both been occupied by Taiwanese.) It is interesting to see whether or not there will be new preferential policies implemented by the majority Taiwanese in the future and, if there are any, who the beneficiaries will be.

7.1.4.3 Gender

In traditional China women were subject to male domination. In both contemporary China and Taiwan women have been granted equal rights under the law, but they are still underrepresented in many areas in both societies.

As demonstrated in sections 3.4.3 and 4.3.3, females made up 33% of Chinese college students in 1988, while in Taiwan 45% of them were females in the same year. Many factors could explain this difference. One factor is immediately relevant, which is the enrollment of women in secondary and elementary schools. In China 41% of the high school students and 46% of the elementary school students were females in 1988, while in Taiwan the female percentages in 1989 were 47% and 49%, respectively.[13] Another key

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[13] The Chinese percentages are cited from Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu Pu [Ministry of Education, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu T'ung-chi Chih-piao, 1990 [Indicators of Educational Statistics of the Republic of

factor is less directly relevant: women's social status. Women's status has, indeed, improved in both Chinese societies, but it seems that in a society that has been categorized as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, Taiwanese women have enjoyed higher status than their counterparts across the Taiwan Strait. Apparently, both factors are related to Taiwan's rapid economic growth.

There is one gender-related similarity between China and Taiwan that deserves our attention. In both societies, the gender gap in the allocation of higher education resources has been closed significantly in recent years. This is evident in that, as shown in previous chapters, China's female percentage increased from 23% in 1980 to 33% in 1988, while Taiwan's increased from 41% in 1981 to 46% in 1990.

7.2 Cadre System and Civil Service System

In this section, the Chinese cadre system and the Taiwanese civil service system will be compared in terms of the level of scarcity of public offices, the mechanisms and principles adopted to allocate these offices, the

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China, 1990]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1991, p. 68, while the Taiwanese percentages are calculated from Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu Pu [Ministry of Education, Republic of China], Chung-hua Min-kuo Chiao-yu T'ung-chi, 1989 [Educational Statistics of the Republic of China, 1989]. Taipei, Taiwan, 1990, pp. 64 & 76.

preferential policies, and finally the outcomes of allocation.

7.2.1 Scarcity of Public Offices

In 1990 there were 33 million cadres in the Chinese cadre system, while the Taiwan's civil service system had about half a million civil servants. Regardless of whether the term "cadres" or "civil servants" is used, they are basically people who staff the bureaucratic apparatus of their respective society. However, there are two key differences between Chinese cadres and Taiwanese civil servants. First, the latter can be simply equated as governmental employees (those who on the government's payroll), while the former merely refers to those who hold more or less responsible positions in the bureaucratic hierarchies. In fact, given the socialist nature of its regime, China had close to 600 million "governmental employees", about half of the entire Chinese population.[14] The second difference is that the bureaucratic hierarchies in which China's cadres serve include both the state and the Communist Party, whereas the KMT party workers are excluded from the category of civil servants in Taiwan.

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[14] There were 576 million employees in state and mass organizations (see Hong Yung Lee From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. 1991, p. 208). However, it is doubtful whether China still has this many "governmental employees" right now, because 14 years after the beginning of the post-Mao reform, many Chinese workers and peasants at present work for their own.

It is a common phenomenon in most societies where public offices are scarce and desirable. China and Taiwan are no exceptions. The level of scarcity is slightly higher in Taiwan where in 1990 2.7% of the population were civil servants, while 3.0% of the entire China's population were cadres in the same year. But it is recently reported that, according to a newly proposed program of cadre reform in the beginning of 1993, about one-third of the Chinese cadre contingent will be cut in the very near future, which means about 10 million cadres are about to lose their jobs. Undoubtedly, this new wave of cadre reform will make cadre places more scarce in China, but it does not necessarily mean that they will become more desirable because, as a result of the economic reforms undertaken since 1979, a career in the cadre system has become less attractive in recent years than it was in the past.

7.2.2 Distributive Mechanisms and Principles

Similar to the college entrance examinations, the civil service examinations were adopted long before 1949 as the sole mechanism to recruit civil servants in Republican China on the mainland. After the separation into two Chinas in 1949, the system of civil service examinations have continued to be employed by the nationalist government on Taiwan, but not by the Communist government on the mainland. Instead, China has adopted an appointment (jen-ming) system through which each year graduates of middle schools and

colleges, and demobilized soldiers are recommended and appointed to be cadres by superior party and state organs. The key objective of this appointment system is to guarantee a certain professional quality and, more importantly, political quality of the recruited cadres.

Besides the appointment system, since the mid-1980 the central authority has embarked on a reform of the cadre recruitment mechanisms, adopting several so-called "open recruitment" methods, namely, investigation, invitation, advertising, examination, and election. However, these new methods are far from being systematically used; many of them are currently implemented on a temporary and experimental basis. In China today, the appointment system is still the mainstream mechanism used to recruit new blood into the cadre corps.

From the above, we know that China and Taiwan have used distinctively divergent mechanisms for bureaucrat recruitment. Does that mean the recruiting principles they have used are also as divergent? To answer it is simply to compare. This comparison is more meaningful than the above comparison between mechanisms because it is the recruiting principles rather than the mechanisms that really determine the kind of candidates to be recruited.

The dominant principles involved in the appointment system and other new recruiting methods are political (red) and professional (expert). Except for the period of the Cultural Revolution, both principles have been emphasized

throughout the PRC history (even throughout the Party history since 1921). Depending upon political situations, sometimes, one principle was stressed more than another, while at other times, both of them were almost equally weighed. Whatever the situation was, the tension between the two principles has presented a dilemma in cadre recruitment.

This tension is apparently a reflection of the previously addressed dissonance between meritocratic and redistributive egalitarianisms in Chinese public policies. While the idea of redistributive egalitarianism is realized by the use of the political principle (for candidates from underprivileged groups have been recruited due to their assumed ideological purity), the use of the professional principle serves very well the idea of meritocratic egalitarianism.

The tension between the two versions of egalitarianism is conspicuously absent in Taiwan. As a result of the continuous use of the civil service examinations, the dominant principle used to recruit Taiwan's civil servants has invariably been the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism. However, it is necessary to stress that this principle is only the dominant, not the only one being used in Taiwan, especially when we take into account those preferential policies behind the civil service examinations.

There are totally three preferential policies in operation in Taiwan to help recruit candidates with special

backgrounds. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make a comparison between Taiwan and China on this issue, simply because there are no preferential treatments given in China's cadre recruitment policy. Or, we may say that China's mainstream appointment mechanism itself is a colossal preferential policy that benefits those who have special political background.

7.2.3 Distributive Outcomes

Distributive outcomes constitute the last area of comparisons between China's and Taiwan's allocations of public offices. Generally speaking, we will compare and contrast the beneficiaries and victims of the distributive policies in the two societies. Since little information about the socio-economic background of Taiwan's civil servants is published, our comparisons will only focus on ethnic and gender inequalities in the distributive results.

7.2.3.1 Ethnicity

Both governments have recognized the underrepresentation of their minority groups in bureaucratic hierarchies, but implemented no preferential policies to alleviate this ethnic inequality, except that minority candidates in China are given preferences to be recruited to serve in minority areas. It is always harder to explain the absence of certain phenomena rather than to explain their presence. Therefore, it is not easy to explain why minority-oriented preferential policies are absent in

personnel recruitment in both Chinas. One possible reason is that since preferences are already given to the minority candidates in both Chinas to increase their chances to be admitted into colleges and universities, with increased chances to receive higher education, they are supposed to stand on approximately the same starting point to compete with majority candidates for public offices. It is more so in China because, instead of using examinations, Chinese government directly appoints college graduates as new cadres through the appointment mechanism.

China's ethnic distinction is mainly between the Han majority and the non-Han minority. The latter was extremely underrepresented in the Chinese cadre system in the 1950s. Forty years later, even though increases of minority cadres in both absolute number and percentage are impressive, they still are greatly underrepresented.

As noted before, Taiwan's ethnic problem is mainly between two Han groups: the Taiwanese majority and the Mainlanders minority. In the early years Taiwanese did not get their fair share of the resources of public offices. As time progressed, they have dramatically closed the gap, but they are at present still underrepresented.

From the above, it appears that China and Taiwan have a similar problem of ethnic inequality in their cadre and civil service systems, but they differ in one aspect: while the increase in Taiwanese representation continues to gain momentum in Taiwan, the increase in the representation of

the Chinese minorities not only fails to continue, but there is a reverse in the increasing trend in the late 1980s.

7.2.3.2 Gender

As discussed earlier, Chinese women are still underrepresented in higher educational systems, and their underrepresentation is more severe in China than in Taiwan. Since one's chance to be recruited as public officials is closely related to one's higher educational attainment, it would be interesting to see whether or not gender inequality is also existent in the two Chinese personnel systems, and to see if the gender gap is similarly wider in China than in Taiwan.

As demonstrated in sections 5.4.6 and 6.5.2, females made up 30.26% of the Chinese cadre forces in 1991, while 34.9% of Taiwan's civil servants were females in 1992. China lags behind by only 4.64%. As for female representation in higher education, China lags behind by 12% (33% in China and 45% in Taiwan in 1988). On the surface, it appears that the connection between female's higher educational attainment and their chance of being public officials is clearer in China. It is largely due to the fact that both female and male college graduates in China are "automatically" recruited into the cadres system (it is their right as well as obligation) through the appointment system, while in Taiwan female graduates are less likely to be willing to pursue a civil service career than their male counterparts. It is possible that China's females are also

less likely than males to be willing to pursue a cadre career, but they did not have too much choice until recent years when both male and female college graduates are granted more freedom to choose their own careers.

7.3 Differences of Kind or of Degree?

China split into two political entities in 1949, and since then they have taken divergent paths into the future. From comparisons made above, we see that there are many similarities and differences in the use of distributive mechanisms and principles between Chinese and Taiwanese civil service and higher education allocation systems. These comparative results are crucial for further understanding the allocative practices of both Chinas. But it would be theoretically more meaningful to examine the roots of these similarities and differences.

With respect to similarities, one question immediately arises as to why the two political Chinas which have been taking divergent paths since 1949 still share these similarities. Is it because there is still one cultural China?

With respect to differences, we can take advantage of the "most similar systems" design used in this research. Since the two Chinas share so many systemic (e.g., cultural, historical, and ethnic) similarities, we can examine why

these similarities are irrelevant in determining the mechanisms and principles being used; in other words, why they have failed to work? What happened to those factors shared by both Chinas, factors such as the Confucian ideas, the historical heritage from the imperial past, the character of the Han people, and so on? Is it because there are already two or more cultural Chinas--one is a product of conscious borrowing from the former Soviet Union stressing socialist egalitarianism, while the other is an outcome of learning from the West emphasizing growth-oriented state capitalism? Also, since there are very few systemic (such as political, ideological) differences between the two Chinas, one question arises as to: can these differences be considered as variables explaining the observed differences in the distributive mechanisms and principles?

The above questions sound interesting and, perhaps, useful. But, after answering them, can we fully explain the similarities and differences between the two Chinas? Probably not. If the two Chinas have employed very similar or very different mechanisms and principles throughout the entire post-1949 period, we may be able to provide some explanations by answering the above questions. But how do we explain it if the mechanisms and principles they have used are similar at one time, but different at another time? Actually, this is very much what have happened between China and Taiwan since 1949. This has been mainly caused by constant policy oscillation in China, in which changes in

distributive mechanisms and principles occurred not only from one case to another, but also over time. Therefore, answering the above questions is inadequate to account for the complexity of this issue. We are in need of a larger, more comprehensive analytical framework.

To facilitate the use of this analytical framework, before proposing it, we need to first have a quick and general reintroduction to the key divergences between China's and Taiwan's distributive principles, and then examine two predominant ideologies in twentieth century's China that are germane to these divergences.

7.3.1 Differences in Distributive Principles

In the past forty years, the distributive principles used in China's and Taiwan's civil service and higher education systems first diverged from the same starting point and took different paths, and then began converging back to the same point. Such dynamic divergence and convergence center around the rise and fall of two opposing principles--meritocratic egalitarianism and redistributive egalitarianism.

As a continuation of the policies implemented by the KMT government on the Mainland before 1949, the dominant distributive principle used in Taiwan has invariably been the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism. In contrast, as reflected in her distributive policies, China has oscillated between meritocratic egalitarianism and

redistributive egalitarianism. Since both societies adopted meritocracy as the central principle in early 1950s, we may then use Taiwan's invariation as a reference point to illuminate how China deviated from and converged to it over the years.

The beginning of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland in 1966 marked the most dramatic deviation from the distributive principle of meritocratic egalitarianism. Reflecting their socialist revolutionary pledge to redistribute scarce resources to disadvantaged classes, Mao and his followers stressed the importance of the principle of redistributive egalitarianism in many policy areas, including cadre recruitment and higher educational admission policy.

Mao died in 1976. Since then, especially since 1979 when Teng Hsiao-p'ing launched the current reforms, we have observed a growing convergence between China and Taiwan in the use of the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism, which in China reflects Teng's nationalist commitment to modernize China into a country with pride and prosperity.

Two fundamental questions arise from the end of the above historical descriptions. First, why did the KMT government continuously adhere to the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism on the mainland before 1949 and on Taiwan after 1949? Second, why did the Communist regime on the mainland shift from meritocracy to redistributive egalitarianism during the heyday of the Maoist era? In

order to answer these two questions, we shall discuss two seemingly opposing political ideologies, Sunism and Maoism, both of which have played vital roles in contemporary Chinese politics.

7.3.2 Differences in Political Ideologies

While discussing Sunism and Maoism, emphasis will be placed on the distributive elements of them, rather than on other elements that are not immediately relevant. And, Sunism will be introduced more thoroughly than Maoism because the former is much less known than the latter to the world.

7.3.2.1 Sunist Egalitarianism

The official doctrine of the Nationalist government led by the Kuomintang party on the mainland before 1949 and on Taiwan after 1949 has consistently been the "Three Principles of the People" (San-min Chu-i) by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China; that is, the Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood, all of which have provided ideological guidelines for the ruling Kuomintang party to formulate public policies.[15]

Dr. Sun's Principle of the People's Livelihood is relevant to distributive policies. On the one hand, it

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[15] For details of the "Three Principles of the People", see Ramon H. Myers, ed., Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's republic of China After Forty Years. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991, pp. 11-16.

accepts private ownership of the means of production and the free market mechanism. On the other hand, it permits government ownership of key enterprises (such as water, electricity and public transportation) and economic regulation by the government. According to Sun himself, this principle aims to take the advantages of capitalism (e.g., incentives and free market economy) and to avoid the disadvantages (e.g., inequitable allocation of resources). His principle has provided a national goal of "growth with equity" for the KMT government to achieve. As evidenced in Taiwan's developmental success, this goal has been largely achieved.[16]

Moreover, in his "Three Principles of the People", Sun lays specific emphasis on the concept of equality. There are three essential components in his ideas of equality, which have had a direct impact on the distributive principles employed in Taiwan for the past forty years. There are "inequality", "pseudo equality", and "genuine equality".[17]

The idea of inequality, according to Sun, have two meanings: inborn inequality and artificial inequality. The

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[16] Discussions on the Principle of the Livelihood are based upon K. T. Li, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan's Development Success. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988, p. 151.

[17] For details of Sun's theory of equality, see Ming-t'ang Cheng, Chung-kuo Hsien-hsing Fa-chih Chih Ching-shen Chi Fa-chan [The Spirit and Development of the Current Laws in China]. Taipei, Taiwan: San-min Bookstore, 1982, pp. 206-211.

former refers to unequal inborn abilities of human beings, while the latter refers to unequal treatments imposed by all kinds of evil authorities. While Sun contends that the artificial inequality can be simply corrected by revolutionary means, the cure for inborn inequality leads him to discuss two kinds of equality: pseudo equality and genuine equality.

If the inborn inequality is "compressed" by artificial means into a state of equality, then, according to Sunism, it is pseudo equality, which corresponds to the principle of absolute equality. He also calls it "straight-head equality", because it is just like asking tall persons to bend their legs to be at an "equal" level with short persons. Obviously, the straight-head equality is compatible with the most radical version of redistributive egalitarianism.

Opposing both artificial inequality and pseudo equality, Sun adhered to the idea of genuine equality, referring to "equality in starting point", or "equality of equal opportunity", which is parallel to the idea of meritocratic egalitarianism and Rawls's second principle of equality. Chiang Kai-shek, Sun's pupil and the paramount KMT leader between 1924 and 1975, also elaborated on the concept of equality in several occasions. His idea is, basically, similar to Sun's equality of equal opportunity.

Owing to inborn inequality, even though people are granted equal opportunity to compete for scarce resources,

the allocative results are always unequal. Sun recognized this problem and resorted to altruistic morality to solve it. Simply put, Sun's idea is that those who with superior inborn abilities should take care of those who with inferior abilities. It parallels the idea of social welfare in many respects.

After considering the above ingredients of Sunism, we are not surprised that the KMT government continuously adheres to the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism on the mainland before 1949 and on Taiwan after 1949 to formulate its distributive policies, supplemented by certain moderate redistributive principles (or preferential policies in some policy areas) to take care of the underprivileged classes.

7.3.2.2 Maoist Egalitarianism

Different from but not entirely opposing to Sunism is the thought of Mao Tse-tung, or the Maoism. The Chinese communist ideology consists of two major components: Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung. According to Franz Schurmann, the former is regarded by the Chinese Communists as theory (pure ideology), while the latter as "thought" (practical ideology).[18] Of the two elements, Mao's practical thought probably has greater impact on Chinese society, especially during the period of Cultural

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[18] For details of the two components, see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China. new, enlarged edition, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 17-104.

Revolution.

Mao's thought consists of many elements, such as mass line, theory and practice, contradiction, and so on.[19] What will be studied next is merely Mao's idea about the distributive principle of egalitarianism.

Although Mao ideally favored an egalitarian society in which every member would have an equal share of the resources, it is questionable whether Mao really wanted to create an absolute egalitarian millennium in the real-world China.[20] Therefore, his attitude toward absolute egalitarianism or straight-head equality (that resources should be completely equally distributed) is rather ambivalent,[21] which is largely due to the fact that absolute equality is too idealistic to achieve because resources are always scarce and most of them cannot be indefinitely

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[19] For systematic introduction to Mao's thought, see Stuart Schram's two books: The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963; and The Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

[20] Comparatively speaking, Chinese egalitarianism seems to have achieved remarkable equalization, but it would be a mistake to assume that inequalities of all sorts have been abolished in China. As Martin Whyte contends, "The distinctiveness of Chinese egalitarianism is to be found ... in its attempt to mute the consequences ... of the inequalities that do exist." Quoted from Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 274.

[21] For Mao's ambivalent attitude, see Alexander J. Groth; Larry L. Wade; and Alvin D. Wiggis, eds., Comparative Resource Allocation: Politics, Performance, and Policy Priorities. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1987, pp. 128-129.

divided. Nonetheless, as demonstrated in his policies, we are, at least, sure about one thing: Mao was deeply obsessed with the socialist revolutionary pledge to redistribute scarce resources to disadvantaged classes, and thus he always stressed the importance of the principle of redistributive egalitarianism.

After the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, Mao's egalitarianism was not successfully realized in Chinese society until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, the heyday of Maoist era, when Chinese society was completely transformed to embrace Mao's ideas. Since his death in 1976, many of his thoughts, including his version of egalitarianism, have been deemphasized, challenged or even replaced by principles (e.g., Teng Hsiao-p'ing's capitalist tendency) that would have been considered anti-revolutionary during the Cultural Revolution.

As a socialist, Mao's ideas are supposed to be in perfect harmony with socialism. Certainly, there is a huge overlapping between Maoism and socialism in general. But, paradoxically, Mao's egalitarianism is not compatible with socialist principles of distribution. In the ultimate communist society, the economy should be, in Marx's own famous words, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."[22] This idealistic principle

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[22] See John McMurtry, The Structure of Marx's World-View. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 98. Also see James C. F. Wang, op. cit., p. 46.

appears to be somewhat compatible with Mao's egalitarianism of redistribution which emphasizes the needs of the disadvantaged classes. However, it is only an ideal principle that exists in a prescribed communist Utopia where there would be no government and no class distinction, and, therefore, no (re)distribution to disadvantaged "classes".

Mao's egalitarianism is more incompatible with the socialist principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work (or labor)", according to which, during the socialist, not the final communist, stage of socialist development, resources (e.g., wage) should be allocated according to individual's labor contribution instead of being indiscriminately distributed. This principle is even incorporated into the current Constitution of the People's Republic of China (promulgated in 1982).[23]

Even though Mao's egalitarianism is not really compatible with the socialist principle of distribution, we cannot rule out any possible influence of western social welfarism on his redistributive egalitarianism. But, given the fact that Mao never left China in his whole life, is it possible that his ideas were indigenously formulated under the influence of Chinese traditional culture? If it is so, how about those ideologies, such as Sunism and Tengism, that

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[23] Article 6: "The system of public ownership ... applies the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." See Foreign Language Press, Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Beijing, China: Foreign Language Press, 1987, pp. 13-14.

have challenged and opposed to Mao's ideas within and without the Communist Party? Were they also formulated under the influence of Chinese culture? The last question we shall ask is that: if traces of influence of indigenous culture abound in all these opposing ideologies, are we talking about one coherent Chinese culture or two (or even more) opposing cultures? In other words, we know that there are two political Chinas in our world, but how many cultural Chinas are there? The final section of this chapter attempts to answer these arduous but interesting questions.

7.3.3 A Cultural Explanation: China's Two Political Cultures

Many theoretical frameworks (or models) have been developed to deal with policy making and policy change in the People's Republic of China.[24] Among them, the policy circle model has gained dominance in the research literature on the PRC. This model interprets Chinese policy and politics as oscillating between two goals of national development and revolutionary redistribution, with one or the other gaining superiority as different intra-party

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[24] Only to name a few, Richard Petrick summaries and discusses three models in his "Policy Cycles and Policy Learning in the People's Republic of China." in Comparative Political Studies. vol. 14, no. 1 (April 1981): pp. 101-122; they are "policy cycle", "policy learning", and "problem-solving models". Also, in addition to "rationality model" and "power model", Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg propose a third model, a "bureaucratic model", in their Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 9-19.

fractions come to power.[25] This model is useful in that the dynamics of the policy changes can be explained by the alternation in power of leaders backing alternative political ideologies, but it fails to explain why Chinese leaders, who are all self-proclaimed socialists, are holding not one but two opposing ideologies? To answer it, we shall study China's traditional cultures.

Are there really two opposing elements in China's traditional cultures? Several scholars have given answers to this question. Impressed by the speed and the ease of dramatic changes in post-Mao China, Lucian W. Pye in one of his recent books suggests that there must be "two Chinas", or "one China with two opposing political cultures".[26] Otherwise, it would not be possible for China to go so easily and rapidly from one extreme to its polar opposite. At one extreme is an orthodox, elitist "Confucian culture that glorified the established authority of the better educated and rationalized their claims of superiority on the basis of processing specialized wisdom".[27] At the other extreme is a heterodox, populist "culture that glorified the rebel and trusted magical formulas to transform economic and

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[25] See Richard Petrick, ibid. pp. 101-104.

[26] Pye, Lucian W., The Mandarin and the Cadre. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988, p. 37.

[27] Ibid., p. 39,

social reality."[28] Indeed, Pye's orthodox, elitist-heterodox, populist polarity of Chinese cultures sounds very attractive. However, this dichotomy is more applicable to explain phenomena such as the contradiction between order and chaos, between conformity and rebel in Chinese history, rather than to explain variations in distributive principles.

Using George C. Lodge's general framework of two ideal-type ideologies, Edwin A. Winckler states that Chinese cultures can be viewed as mixtures and variations of two opposing ideologies: "individualism" and "communitarianism".[29] Individualism suggests that the individuals is the ultimate source of value and meaning, and the interests of community are achieved by competition among individuals for private interest. The individualistic conception of equality is closely tied to the principle of equal opportunity. Taking a more organic view, communitarianism regards the community as more than the sum of individuals and requires a genuine commitment to public conformity. The communitarian principle of equality is characterized by equality of result.[30] Compared to Pye,

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[28] Idem.

[29] See Edwin A. Winckler, "Statism and Familism on Taiwan." in George C. Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel, Ideology and National Competitiveness. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1987, pp. 173-206.

[30] Discussions on the two ideal types of ideologies are based upon George C. Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel, ibid, pp. 9-23.

Winckler's dichotomy is much more relevant to our concern about distributive principles.

Winckler also compares China with other societies in terms of the weights assigned to the two opposing ideologies. As he quotes another scholar in the beginning of his study:

> "Americans' primary values are individualistic and underneath, most of their secondary values are individualistic as well. The primary values of Japanese are communitarian and underneath, so are most of their secondary values. However, the primary values of Chinese are communitarian but, underneath, most of their secondary values are highly individualistic."[31]

Hence, the tension between the two ideal-type ideologies is more salient in Chinese cultures than in her counterparts in other societies such as America and Japan.

Lodge's and Winckler's model is neither the first nor the last one that suggests two opposing cultures in China. Parallel to their individualism-communitarianism distinction is the distinction proposed by Gustav Ranis between egalitarianism and nationalism.[32] Ranis's "egalitarianism" suggests that social privileges are expected to be awarded to those who choose to perform with distinction, which implies meritocratic egalitarianism, while nationalism refers to a claim of the community of feeling grounded in

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[31] Ibid., p. 173.

[32] See Gustav Ranis, "The Evolution of Policy in a Comparative Perspective: An Introductory Essay." in K. T. Li, op. cit., pp. 4-9.

common historical and cultural heritage.[33] He does not explicitly discuss the distributive principle of nationalism, but, while emphasizing the social obligation to take care of the poor, he implicitly points to socialist redistribution.[34]

In the light of the above, we can see that both Sunist and Maoist egalitarianisms have their roots in Chinese cultures. To be specific, Sunist egalitarianism of meritocracy is similar to the above defined individualism and egalitarianism, while Maoist egalitarianism of redistribution is compatible to the above interpreted communitarianism and nationalism. Thus, the tension between them can be largely regarded as a reflection of the tension between individualism and communitarianism, or between egalitarianism and nationalism, in Chinese cultures. (These observations imply that Maoist egalitarianism, along with Sunism, is rather an indigenous product, which is a typical argument of the so-called "Chinese model"[35].)

It is important to note that all of the above opposing cultures are ideal types. In the real world, cultures or

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[33] Ibid., p. 4.

[34] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[35] Some scholars argue that China is so unique to itself so that no model can adequately explain Chinese politics except the "Chinese model", according to which, China is not bureaucratic, socialist, totalitarian, or developing, but simply "Chinese". See James Townsend and Brantly Womack, Politics in China. third edition, Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1986, chapter one.

ideologies merely take positions along, for example, the individualism-communitarianism continuum (or spectrum), instead of falling into either extreme. In other words, cultures in reality are always mixtures and variations of two ideal-type extremes. Sunism and Maoism are no exceptions.

Even though Sunist egalitarianism is primarily meritocratic and individualistic, it still has redistributive, communitarian elements. This is evident in one of the Sunist popular slogans, "equally distributed wealth" (chün-fu), which implies a sequence that wealth should be first produced and accumulated, and then be equally distributed. Therefore, it is fair to say that the primary values of Sunism are meritocratic and individualistic but, underneath, some of its secondary values are redistributive and communitarian.[36] It may be appropriate in this context to note that Confucianism suggests that social conflicts are due more to inequality than to poverty (Confucius once said that the leader should

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[36] Thus, we should not be surprised by the fact that the KMT government of Taiwan not only adheres to the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism to formulate its distributive policies, but also adopts certain redistributive principles (or preferential policies in some policy areas) as supplements to take care of the underprivileged classes. Although this seems a common practice in both the United States and West Europe where there has been increasing concern that the individualistic idea of equality of opportunity was not assuring adequate, acceptable allocations of resources, the idea of "growth with equity", as one of the national goals set by the KMT government, has been much more fulfilled in Taiwan than in most western countries.

worry about inequality instead of scarcity.) This implies a communitarian principle of redistribution. Both of this Confucian teaching and the western social welfarism may contribute to the redistributive elements of the Sunist egalitarianism.

In contrast, the primary values of Maoism are highly redistributive and communitarian, and so are most of its secondary values. Indeed, Mao, just like a Confucian mandarin, worried about inequality instead of scarcity. But he worried about inequality so intensely that he almost pushed his egalitarian ideas to the extreme of the continuum. In contrast to the Sunist idea of "growth with equity", Mao definitely valued so much about equity over growth. However, although Mao's egalitarianism is almost exclusively redistributive and communitarian, it still possesses a few meritocratic elements; otherwise, there would not have been any "red vs. expert" dilemma in cadre recruitment throughout the Maoist era and any "work points" system employed as incentives in people's communes even during the heyday of the collectivization movement.

After lengthy discussions on the cultural, ideological backgrounds of the dominant distributive ideologies of China and Taiwan, we shall confront the most fundamental question of this comparative chapter; that is, China and Taiwan are, indeed, different in many respects (including distributive principles), but are they different in kind or in degree?

Due to obvious technical and methodological reasons, it

has been popular to compare divided countries such as two Koreas and two Chinas in comparative social sciences. Referring to comparisons between China and Taiwan, most of us would agree that they are different, but disagree with each other about whether their differences are of kind or of degree. This disagreement is well demonstrated in the debate between Thomas A. Metzger and Ramon H. Myers on the one side, and Paul A. Cohen on the other.[37] Concentrating on systemic ideological and institutional differences, Metzger and Myers argue that the post-1949 China and Taiwan are different in kind rather than in degree; for instance, as opposed to an authoritarian, capitalist Taiwan, China is a totalitarian, socialist regime. They are simply two societies in opposition. In their judgement, it is these systemic factors that determine the "kind" of system a country has, and it is the kind of system, in turn, which plays the key role in determining the kinds of policies to pursue.[38]

Placing overriding emphasis on situational factors instead, Cohen contends that Taiwan is distinctive from China only by factors such as "the island's small scale, the positive legacy of a half century of Japanese colonial rule,

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[37] For details of the debate, see Thomas A. Metzger and Ramon H. Myers, "Introduction: Two Divergent Societies." and Paul A. Cohen, "Response to Introduction: Situational versus Systemic Factor in Societal Evolution." Both are in Roman H. Myers, ed., op. cit., pp. xiii-liv.

[38] This sentence is Cohen's comment; see ibid., p. xlix.

a high per capita level of U.S. aid" that China has not enjoyed.[39] In his opinion, these situational factors are more consequential than systemic factors in determining the differences in policy outcomes in China and Taiwan. Therefore, China and Taiwan are different in degree rather than in kind.

Our comparisons between China's and Taiwan's distributive principles can be examined in the light of the above debate. In our case, systemic, ideological factors (such as Maoist and Sunist egalitarianisms) are, indeed, more consequential than situational factors in determining the kind of distributive policies China and Taiwan are likely to pursue, but, more important, in terms of the natures of these ideologies, China and Taiwan are different in degree rather than in kind. As intensively discussed throughout this chapter, Sunist and Maoist egalitarianisms differ only in their relative positions on the meritocratic, individualistic- redistributive, communitarian continuum, with one ideology assigning more weights on one extreme than the other. They would be different in kind only if they take exact positions at the two opposing extremes.

Although they are not different in kind, they are different in a substantial degree. As noted earlier, Mao almost pushed his egalitarian ideas to the communitarian redistributive extreme of the continuum, which is very far

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[39] Idem.

away from Sunist egalitarianism. Nonetheless, since 1979 when Teng Hsiao-p'ing launched the current reforms, we have observed a growing convergence between China and Taiwan in the use of the principle of meritocratic, individualistic egalitarianism, which means that Teng's China has been moving, away from the romantic ideals of Maoist egalitarianism, towards the other, more pragmatic end of the continuum. In this regard, China and Taiwan today are much less different than they were in the past. This has immense implications for the future reunification of the two Chinas.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THEORY AND PRACTICE

Various theories of distributive justice were introduced earlier in Chapter two, followed by five chapters of extensive and also intensive descriptions, discussions, analyses and comparisons of the allocative practices of China and Taiwan. Instead of conducting a statistical testing of the empirical credibility of these theories, this study seeks to explore the qualitative relation between these theoretical and practical aspects of the allocative issues. Their relation can be characterized as a two-way traffic. When studying how Chinese practices are congruent with a variety of theories of distributive justice, on the one hand, the practical applicability of these theories can be evaluated; on the other hand, the allocative practices of the two Chinese societies can be judged in light of these theories.

Theories to be studied in this chapter include global theories, local theories, and causal chains of distributive outcomes. They also represent different levels of generality of the allocation problem, with the global theories focusing on a set of general principles of allocation, the local theories on specific principles, and the last one on the concrete outcomes of allocations.

8.1 Global Theories

Theories of distributive justice can be global or local. Global theories have the overall design of society, with special emphasis on developing a set of general, universalistic principles for all allocations across all moral and material worlds, while local theories are concerned with specific solutions for specific allocative problems, contending that the distributive principles are not universalistic, but a function of local situations. Given the complexity of various allocative issues, the latter is always closer to the reality than the former.

However local the distributive principles might be, it is still necessary to use global theories to provide theoretical justifications to practices of allocation from a universalistic perspective. As mentioned in Chapter two, there are three major global theories: John Rawls's theory of justice, Robert Nozick's libertarian theory, and utilitarianism.

8.1.1 Rawls's Theory of Justice

John Rawls's first principle (of equal liberty) represents an idea close to absolute equality, according to which civil liberties are to be equally granted to each person. For Rawls, this principle pertains to the granting of rights and liberties, which are neither scarce nor indivisible. For social and economic resources, it is

impossible to apply the principle of absolute equality unless the resources at stake can be infinitely, thus equally, divided among all applicants.

Rawls's second principle (of equality of opportunity) and third principle (of difference) are associated with social and economic inequalities and, therefore, more relevant to our study. To elaborate on these two principles, two kinds of primary goods are discussed by Rawls. He distinguishes social primary goods (e.g., power, income, and wealth) from natural primary goods (e.g., intelligence, imagination, and health),[1] and contends that most rational people would want social primary goods to be distributed equally. However, due to the unequal distribution of natural primary goods among people, social and economic inequalities are tolerated if they are arranged to everyone's advantages and attached to positions and offices open to all. This is Rawls's second principle (of equality of opportunity). The best example to demonstrate this principle is furnished by Deborah A. Stone as follows: "we might allow doctors to receive much higher pay than others if we thought high pay was necessary to motivate people to endure medical training, but we would insist that the opportunity to go to medical school be open to everyone."[2] His third principle (of difference), as an

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[1] See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. p. 62.

[2] Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason. p. 43.

extension of the second one, goes one step further to state that inequalities are allowed if they are arranged to achieve the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.

Thus, the primary values of Rawlsian theory of distribution adhere to the equality of opportunity (or equality of process) but underneath, some of its secondary values, as suggested by his difference principle, are more in line with the equality of outcome (or equality of end-result). This is somewhat similar to the Sunist egalitarianism, whose primary values are meritocratic and individualistic but underneath, some of its secondary values are redistributive and communitarian. According to Sunism, due to inborn inequality (in the distribution of "natural primary goods"), "social primary goods" are not equally distributed and, instead of pseudo (or straight-head) equality, the idea of genuine equality should be equal opportunity to pursue social primary goods. But there is a major difference between Sunist and Rawlsian egalitarianism: according to the former, a distribution guided by equality of opportunity is a just distribution, whereas according to the latter, it is not necessarily so unless it maximizes the welfare of the worst-off individuals in the society. Given the above similarities and difference, it would be interesting to see how Taiwan's Sunism-guided allocative practices are congruent with the Rawlsian theory.

It is obvious that Rawls's principle of equality of opportunity, which means people are to have equal

opportunity to compete for resources, is exemplified by the use of both the college entrance examinations and the civil service examinations in Taiwan. However, social inequality may result from the use of the examinations. According to Rawls's principles, this inequality is just and thus acceptable if it is to everyone's advantage, or, more than this, it is maximizing the benefits of the least advantaged. Probably, Rawls would agree that Taiwan's allocation systems of civil service and higher education are just, because the worse-off individuals at least have an equal opportunity to gain access to these scarce resources. Without the examination systems, and if, say, the principle of market--resources are left to be allocated through market place--is adopted to allocate these resources, these individuals could have little chance of getting a higher education or of being civil servants. Also, it might be to everyone's advantage if the most able citizens can be admitted or recruited into colleges or the civil service system because society definitely needs the most well-trained persons to serve. Nonetheless, it remains a question as to who can determine whether the welfare of the underprivileged has been maximized under a certain allocation, and how to determine whether or not that it is the case.

Rawlsian principles of distribution are not compatible with Maoist egalitarianism whose primary values and also secondary values are redistributive and communitarian. Moreover, as noted earlier, Rawlsian principles of equal

opportunity are basically principles of process, while Maoist ideas are almost exclusively principles of outcomes. For Mao, resources of all kinds, including positions and offices, should be open to the proletarian class, not to the bourgeois class. In the eyes of Mao, regardless of whether they are to everyone's advantage or not, social and economic inequalities resulting from the idea of equality of opportunity are intolerable and unjust. Apparently, Mao's redistributive egalitarianism (or equality of result) and the resulting radical redistributive measures taken during the Cultural Revolution are in conflict with Rawls's procedural justice. However, Mao's idea of redistribution is not completely alien to Rawls's for there is also a redistributive element in Rawls's libertarian commitment to personal liberty and to reducing social inequalities.[3]

In contrast with the radical practices of allocation during the Cultural Revolution, resource allocation in post-Mao China, with more emphasis on meritocratic criteria and equality of opportunity, can be regarded as a move closer to Rawls's idea of distributive justice.

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[3] This is the primary reason why Robert Nozick calls Rawls's theory "end-result justice". However, Deborah Stone offers two reasons to explain why Rawls's idea of justice is a process view. For details of both arguments, see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. pp. 198-204; and Deborah Stone, ibid., pp. 42-43.

8.1.2 Nozick's Libertarian Theory

Rawlsian theory of justice, indeed, provides a theoretical foundation for modern liberalism, which is committed to personal liberty and to conditionally reducing social inequalities (i.e., social inequalities should be corrected if they are not to everyone's advantage). It would not be surprising if Rawls's theory is attacked by the radical left, but among his most vigorous opponents has been a libertarian, Robert Nozick.

As a libertarian, perhaps a classic one, Nozick puts individual liberty at the center of his theory of justice, but he challenges the assumption that justice demands extensive redistribution of social and economic goods. In his "entitlement theory", he contends that an individual is entitled to his personal talents and characteristics and to whatever goods he can obtain by using them, so long as the rights of others are not violated in the process.

According to his principles of justice, we can expect Nozick to be in favor of the meritocratic egalitarianism involved in Taiwan's two examination systems for their congruity with his entitlement theory. In the process of examinations, individuals, faced with equal opportunity, use their personal talents and characteristics to obtain colleges spaces or civil service positions so that they are entitled to enjoy these resources. In the eyes of Nozick, any inequality resulting from this process is still just and acceptable, as long as nobody's rights are violated in the

process. He is not concerned with whether or not such inequalities are to "everyone's advantage" or "achieve the greatest benefit for the least advantage".

Also, we can expect that Nozick would be opposed to all kinds of preferential policies, including those policies for overseas Chinese and those for non-Han minority in both Chinas. For Nozick, the former policy is unjust and thus intolerable because it violates the rights of domestic applicants, while the latter policy, aiming at redistributing resources to the disadvantaged, is not necessarily unjust but perhaps unnecessary since no individual has the right to expect others to provide him or her goods (that is, no one is entitled to the resources which he or she has not used personal talents to obtain). By the same token, Nozick, as a defender of laissez-faire capitalism and a critic of governmental intervention, would be absolutely opposed with the Maoist principle of redistributive egalitarianism.

Nozick's pro-laissez-faire, anti-redistribution mentality makes him stand in the tradition of classic liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith. Apparently, his theory of justice is not exactly compatible with the reality in today's world where many societies adopt redistributive, compensatory, or preferential policies to achieve equality of results.

8.1.3 Utilitarianism

Finally, for utilitarians a just distribution will be the one which results in maximizing total social utility or happiness, or, simply put, the one that would do the most good for the most people. It is clear that the utilitarian idea takes into account the potential expected gain for the society as a whole, which is congruent with the principle of meritocratic egalitarianism used in both post-Mao China and Taiwan. Assigning more weight on developmental efficiency than on distributive equality, the allocative practices in post-Mao China's and Taiwan's higher education and civil service systems are to achieve the goal of recruiting the most able citizens for national development, designed to produce the most benefits for the most members of the societies. However, there is always a nagging question asked by critics of utilitarianism: who and how to determine whether or not an action can maximize happiness for the most people.

In view of the above utilitarian arguments, one relevant question arises as to whether or not redistributive policies are utilitarian? The answer is not straightforward. Although utilitarian justice is substantive (justice of end-result) rather than procedural (justice of process), it is not necessarily in agreement with the idea of redistributive justice. Utilitarianism can often emerge as a redistributive theory with equal results. (Here is the key difference between utilitarianism and

Nozick's libertarian theory.) If it does so, it is because of the empirical situations that make utilitarians believe that it is to achieve the most happiness "for society as a whole" (not for Rawls's "the least advantaged"), not because of any moral commitment to redistributive egalitarianism. In other words, although utilitarians have no moral commitment to egalitarianism, an equal distribution of resources in many situations will be the right utilitarian action. However, given its disastrous effects on Chinese higher education and cadre system, Mao's radical egalitarianism is hardly utilitarian, even though we may have problems in determining what are "the greatest happiness for the most people".

In sum, traces of all the above global theories of justice emerge in one way or another in Chinese allocative practices. In the light of these theories, by and large, the allocative practices guided by meritocratic egalitarianism in post-Mao China and Taiwan shall be judged, in varying degrees, as just actions, whereas the practices directed by the radical egalitarianism in Maoist China shall be considered against all three theories of justice. As for preferential policies adopted in both Chinas to take care of the least advantaged, it seems that Nozick and utilitarians would be more resistant to these policies than Rawls, because, among the three, Rawls is most sympathetic to the least advantaged.

8.2 Local Theories

While global theories advocate a set of universalistic principles for all allocations across time and places, local theories contend that the distributive principles are not universalistic but vary with local situations.[4] Given the allocative practices of China and Taiwan, we have already concluded that distributive principles are primarily local. The remaining question for us to answer is: what local situations inform distributive principles? There are two competing explanations in this regard; that is, whether principles are system-specific, or good-specific.

8.2.1 System-specific Explanation

System-specific explanation means that each political system has developed one general principle from its "ethos" by which all types of goods, despite of their differences in nature, are allocated uniformly across time and space within the system. To successfully evaluate the credibility of this explanation, we should observe allocations of at least

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[4] One of the best examples to demonstrate that distributive principles are local is Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver's study on former Soviet Union's bilingual education policy, in which they conclude that the bilingual policy has long differentiated among the non-Russian nationalities on the basis of their population size, their geographic concentration, or their political status. For details, see Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Equality, Efficiency, and Politics in Soviet Bilingual Education Policy, 1934-1980." American Political Science Review. vol. 78, no. 4 (December 1984): pp. 1019-1039.

two goods and see whether the principles used are similar or different.

It seems that this explanation is supported by the practices of Taiwan where two scarce resources, higher education and civil service offices, are allocated in accordance with one general principle--meritocratic egalitarianism, which is largely derived from Taiwan's Sunist "ethos". However, we should not rush to conclude that the distributive principles are system-specific. There are two reasons for this. First of all, these two resources (both of which are scarce, indivisible and heterogeneous) are not distinctively different from each other. In traditional China, both educational resources and public offices were attached to the same bureaucratic system. In modern China and Taiwan, as demonstrated later in the study, these two domains of allocation are also causally linked; that is, they are not independent of each other. Thus, we may very well expect that these two systems would have to use very similar principles for college admission and civil service recruitment. This does not mean, however, that the principles used in other allocation systems would be the same.

The second reason pertains to the fact that the general principle of meritocratic egalitarianism has been compromised by many secondary principles used in a variety of preferential policies. Since most of these secondary principles vary not only with respect to time but also from

one allocation issue to the other, we can at least conclude that these principles are not system-specific.

Nor is this theoretical explanation sustained by events on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Even though the Chinese higher education and cadre positions are similar in many respects, China has witnessed a great deal of differences in the principles used to allocate them. In China even the dominant distributive principle employed in the same allocation system has changed from one time period to the other.

Therefore, on the basis of our limited findings from allocative practices of two similar resources in two societies, we can hardly conclude that the principles of allocation are system-specific.

8.2.2 Good-specific Explanation

Good-specific explanation suggests that it is the nature of the good in question that determines the principle of allocation. Therefore, for a given good the distributive principles should be universal across time and societies. To examine the credibility of this explanation, we should study at least two societies and see whether the distributive principles are similar or different for a particular type of good.

This explanation is apparently weakened by our findings that at many points in time the principles used by China and Taiwan to allocate particular resources (higher education or

public offices) are quite different. Moreover, if principles are truly good-specific, then not only that the same principle is used to allocate a given resource across the Taiwan Strait but also that the same principle is used across time within each society. Unfortunately, focusing on China alone, we have seen that different principles have been used to allocate the same resource at different points in time.

From the above, we see that neither theoretical explanation is fully supported by the allocative practices of China and Taiwan. While we can conclude that it is not the nature of the good in question that determines the distributive principles, our evidence shows that the prevailing ideology or ethos of the society can explain the primary principles used in Taiwan's two systems, but it is not strong enough to make it a general conclusion. Again, we should keep in mind that the observations and discussions we made above are limited by the fact that only two resources are studied in two societies. More sophisticated research findings require empirical investigation on more resources in many other societies.

Even so, our inquiry about the principles of allocation should not come to an end here. We should go beyond to look for other explanations of the distributive principles.

Inspired by Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, we may find a clue to this inquiry. Walzer contends that it is the social meanings of goods, rather than the goods themselves,

that determine the distributive principles, and that social meanings of goods are mainly shaped by ideologies, tradition, and culture of societies.[5] If in one given society the same ideologies, tradition, and culture prevail over a certain period of time, we can expect little change in the social meanings of goods. Therefore, the same principles may continue to be used in this society. Taiwan's case is an example in point. In contrast, if the prevailing ideologies have changed, social meanings of the goods would be reinterpreted accordingly, which leads to changes in the principles used to allocate these goods. China is the case in point.

Apparently, Walzer's theory challenges the explanation that principles are good-specific because, even though the nature of a given good is universally identical, it carries different social meanings in different societies, depending upon each society's culture, tradition, and ideologies.[6]

His theory also defies the system-specific explanation because in one given society it is very unlikely that social meanings of all scarce resources, despite of their differences in nature, are aggregately shaped by the dominant ideologies and thus homogeneous in contents.

Compared with Walzer's theory of social meanings, the

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[5] Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice. pp. 8-9.

[6] For example, according to Walzer, food carries different meanings in different places. Bread is the staff of life, the body of Christ, the symbol of the Sabbath, the means of hospitality, and so on. See ibid., p. 8.

explanatory scheme proposed by Elster in his Local Justice is less abstract but more complicated.[7] To explain why a particular principle is adopted by a particular institution at a particular time and place to allocate a particular good, Elster begins with the preferences developed by the actors (authority, allocators, recipients and public opinion) of the allocation system toward the allocative principles. He states that there are totally eight factors that may affect the formation of the preferences of the actors involved: structural variables, professional norms, national culture, institutional politics, organized interest groups, public opinion, incentive problems, and information problems. Finally, these developed preferences are aggregated through coalition-building, bargaining, and accretion among various actors to yield the final allocative scheme.

Compared with Elster's scheme, both the goods- and system-specific explanations are too simplistic. To sum it up, Elster's explanation is that distributive principles are nothing but local; they are subject to various local situations involving four actors, eight factors in the actors' preference formation, and three possible patterns of preference aggregation. It seems that his explanatory scheme sheds some light on a few allocative cases covered in

[7] The following summary of his explanatory scheme of distributive principles is based upon chapter 5 of his Local Justice (1992).

the study,[8] but some of these actors, factors, and aggregation patterns are either absent or less functional in many non-western societies.

8.3 Causal Chains of Distributive Outcomes

In his model of causally linked domains of allocation, Douglas Rae proposes that the outcome of one allocation is affected not only by the principles being applied, but also by certain inborn personal characteristics (e.g., genetic intelligence, ethnicity and gender) and the antecedent allocations of other resources (e.g., wealth, education, political influence, and connection). In other words, resource allocation is a process of accumulation: the acquisition of one resource (especially the vital one) would lead to those of others in a snow-balling fashion. Hence, we can very well expect that there always exist (proportional) inequalities in resource allocation, even if the principle of equal opportunity is applied.

It is a common practice in every society for inborn inequality in intelligence to have a definite impact on

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[8] For instance, his scheme does shed light on the controversies surrounding the preferential policies in Taiwan's allocation system of higher education, in which we see how the formation (or transformation) of the distributive principles was influenced by various actors (allocators, recipients, and public opinion) through coalition-building and bargaining.

distributive outcomes of resources, especially of higher educational resources. As for one's ethnicity and gender, our research findings from the two Chinese societies indicate that minority nationalities and female citizens are, indeed, underrepresented in the spheres of higher education and civil service, which is not unique to Chinese, but rather a universal phenomenon.

The backbone of Rae's model of causally linked domains of allocation centers on the effects of antecedent allocations of other resources rather than the effects of inborn characteristics. As shown in China's and Taiwan's allocative practices, previous allocations of political influence and economic wealth to an individual or his/her family have more or less an effect on one's chance to be admitted into higher educational institutions or civil service system.

The causal linkage is particularly salient between the two researched domains of allocation in our study. On the one hand, earlier allocation of higher educational resources apparently would affect the later allocation of public offices. This linkage is evidenced by the fact that a great number of Chinese cadres are recruited from college graduates through the appointment system, and college diploma is required to take several civil service examinations in Taiwan. On the other hand, we can, in turn, expect that the allocation of higher education resources would be influenced by the antecedent allocation of public

offices. For example, the sons and daughters of Chinese cadres and Taiwanese diplomats may have a better chance to receive higher education. In sum, two kinds of causal linkages are discussed above. The former is between one's own higher educational attainment and one's chance of holding public offices, while the latter is between one's parental (or familial) positions in the cadre or civil service system and one's chance to receive higher education.

Due to the causal linkages among different domains of allocation, we may argue that resource allocations are, by and large, "prisoner of the existing social context".[9] Without, and often despite of, strong governmental countermeasures (such as preferential, compensatory, and redistributive policies), these linkages continue to reinforce the existing structure of social inequality.

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[9] See Gordon White, "Higher Education and Social Redistribution in a Socialist Society: The Chinese Case." World Development. 9 (February 1981): p. 149. However, the causal linkage may be stronger between some domains of allocation, and weaker between others. For instance, the distribution of burdens in Taiwan's universal military service system is, in general, not dependent upon antecedent allocations of other resources. But, still, handicapped males are exempt from military service. Also, since this burden is not homogeneous (i.e., some military positions requires less hard work than the other), it is very possible for high-ranking generals to use their influence to assign their sons to take positions associated with light work. The former situation shows that the distribution of military burden is dependent upon personal characteristics, while the latter displays the causal linkage existing between parental influence and the allocation of military burden.

CHAPTER NINE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Three Components of the Study

Using China and Taiwan as cases, this study examines the patterns that can be distinguished in the principles and outcomes of resource allocation. Its examination consists of three components: descriptive, comparative, and theoretical, representing different levels of generality of the problem of resource allocation. Starting from the end of the discussions on a variety of distributive theories in chapter two, we have been climbing up the ladder of generality from describing and identifying allocative practices of China and Taiwan (chapters three through six), comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences between them (chapter seven), finally reaching up to examine the qualitative relation between Chinese practices and distributive theories (chapter eight).

9.1.1 Descriptive Component

In the descriptive section, the allocations of two scarce resources, higher education and public offices, in contemporary China and Taiwan are delineated. Focusing on each resource in each society, we first studied its level of scarcity, then the mechanisms and principles employed to allocate the targeted resource, and finally the outcomes of

its allocation. Generally speaking, both resources in both societies are relatively scarce in proportion to the numbers of applicants and the entire population. As a consequence, the competitions for them are always keen in both Chinas.

Since 1949, China has experienced several twists and turns in the use of mechanisms and principles in both allocation systems. In the higher education system, allocative mechanisms have oscillated between entrance examinations and a recommendation system, with the primary principles swinging between meritocratic egalitarianism and redistributive egalitarianism. In the cadre system, the predominate allocative mechanism used is an appointment system, but in recent years it has been gradually replaced by several new "open mechanisms", such as examination, invitation, advertising, and so on. Reflecting this shift in mechanisms, the recruiting principles are changing from political (red) criteria to professional (expert) criteria.

The oscillations in China's use of mechanisms and principles are absent in Taiwan. As a continuation of the policies implemented by the KMT government on the mainland before 1949, the primary mechanisms employed in both allocation systems have invariably been examinations. As for the allocative principles, the meritocratic egalitarianism has been the principles in action.

Adopted by both Chinese and Taiwanese governments are some preferential policies in favor of people with a variety of special background, such as veterans, minority

nationalities, overseas Chinese, and so on. Some of these policies are, indeed, designed to reduce inequalities in resource allocations and therefore increase the welfare of the worse-off individuals of societies, but others are merely formulated under political considerations, which are against either meritocratic or redistributive egalitarianism.

9.1.2 Comparative Component

In the comparative section, two allocation systems of China and Taiwan are compared and contrasted in terms of their levels of scarcity, mechanisms, principles, and outcomes of allocation. The study found many similarities and differences between the two Chinese societies, the most noteworthy of which is that in the past forty years the allocative principles used by the two Chinas diverged from the same starting point and went along different paths, and then began converging back to approximately the same point.

On the whole, the similarities and differences between China and Taiwan can be largely attributed to the ways in which the Chinese traditional culture was embodied in their respective official ideologies (Maoism in China and Sunism in Taiwan). After examining the ingredients of Maoist and Sunist egalitarianisms, this study suggests that, generally speaking, both ideologies are composed of two opposing elements in China's traditional cultures, communitarianism and individualism. However, we should keep in mind that the

two opposing elements represent two ideal-type extremes of a continuum, and cultures and ideologies in the real world merely take positions along the continuum. In other words, ideologies, such as Maoist and Sunist egalitarianisms, are only mixtures and variations of the two ideal-type extremes. Therefore, the two versions of egalitarianism differ not exactly in kind, but in their relative positions on the continuum, with one ideology assigning more weights on one extreme than the other.

However, since 1979 when Teng Hsiao-ping launched the current reforms, we have witnessed a growing convergence between China and Taiwan in the use of the principle of meritocratic, individualistic egalitarianism, which means that Teng's China has been moving away from the romantic ideals of Maoist egalitarianism towards the more pragmatic end of the continuum. It appears that both Chinas are converging back to where they were before their split in 1949. Therefore, China and Taiwan today are much less different than they were in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, which has immense implications for the reunification of the two Chinas in the future. The momentum behind this convergence is more likely to be the need to be economically competitive in the global system rather than the influence of the legacy of traditional China.

9.1.3 Theoretical Component

Finally, the theoretical section of this study contrasts a variety of distributive theories with the Chinese allocative practices. Once again, it should be noted that, instead of conducting a statistical testing of the empirical credibility of these theories through a deductive, hypothesis-testing process, this study seeks to explore the qualitative, non-statistical relation between the theoretical and practical aspects of the allocative issues.

Theories surveyed in this study include global theories, local theories, and causal chains of distributive outcomes. They represent different levels of generality of distributive theories, with the global theories focusing on a set of general principles of allocation, the local theories on specific principles, and the last one on the concrete outcomes of allocations.

There are three major contemporary global theories: John Rawls's theory of justice, Robert Nozick's libertarian theory, and utilitarianism. Elements of all three theories surface in one form or another in Chinese allocative practices. Under the influence of meritocratic egalitarianism, the allocative practices of post-Mao China and Taiwan shall be, by and large, ruled as just actions in the light of these global theories. Whereas the practices guided by the radical egalitarianism in Maoist China shall be considered as against all of them. In regard to

preferential policies that benefit the underprivileged in both Chinas, it appears that compared with Rawls, Nozick and utilitarians would be more resistant to these policies because, among the three, Rawls is most sympathetic to the least advantaged.

We have introduced two competing local theories to explain how distributive principles are determined by what local situations: principles are system-specific or good-specific. On the basis of our limited findings from allocative practices of two resources in two similar societies, we conclude that neither theoretical explanation is fully supported by the allocative practices. While we can conclude that it is not the nature of the good in question that determines the distributive principles, our evidence shows that the prevailing ideology or ethos of the society can explain the primary principles used in Taiwan's two systems, but it is not strong enough to make it a general conclusion.

In accordance with Elster's explanatory scheme of distributive principles, distributive principles are nothing but local, subject to various local situations involving many actors and factors that may influence the formation of the allocative principles.

As for distributive outcomes, our research findings suggest that domains of allocation are, indeed, causally linked. The outcomes of one allocation is affected not only by the principles being employed, but also by such inborn

personal characteristics as genetic intelligence, ethnicity and gender, and by the antecedent allocations of other resources such as education, political influence and economic wealth. We conclude that resource allocations are "prisoner of the existing social context".

9.2 Implications of the Study

After climbing up to the top ladder of generality, we should pause for a while to think about the implications of this journey to the studies of Chinese and Taiwanese politics in particular, and the field of comparative politics in general.

9.2.1 Implication to Chinese Politics

For the studies of Chinese and Taiwanese politics, the implication is threefold. First of all, the descriptive section of this study, indeed, fill in the blanks in the existing literature on the subject of Chinese resource allocation. There is no systematic study of the principles, mechanisms, and outcomes of the PRC's cadre, higher education, and other allocation systems. This research vacuum is more conspicuous in Taiwan, whose higher education and civil service allocation systems remain completely untouched.

Secondly, this study provides a different analytical

approach to explore Chinese public policies. Furthermore, the dynamics of Chinese politics and reforms can also be examined in terms of the adoption of and the oscillation among different principles and mechanisms to allocate scarce political, social, and economic resources, as well as in terms of the impact of the use of different principles on policy outcomes.

Thirdly, the comparative section advances our understanding about the similarities and differences between the two Chinese societies. Comparisons made in this study are focused not only on their specific allocation systems but also on the natures of the two societies in general. This larger focus greatly enhances our ability to comprehend the relations between the two rivals across the Taiwan Strait, including their split in the 1940s, confrontation in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, competition and cooperation in the 1980s and 1990s, and possibly reunification in the next century.

9.2.2 Implication to Comparative Politics

For the field of comparative politics as a whole, this study suggests a different analytical framework to study politics comparatively. There are many tools in the arsenal of comparativists to study politics comparatively, viz, political development, culture, class, group, elite, system, collective action, and so on. Focusing on different aspects of politics, these approaches have their own definitional,

conceptual, methodological, and even theoretical constructions. As the writing of this study progresses, we have also worked on these constructions for the "approach" of resource allocation. For instance, this study provides a clear example of the research framework for future applications of this approach. As demonstrated throughout the descriptive chapters, empirical studies of resource allocation can be pursued along three dimensions. Along one dimension we can list various principles of allocation, including both primary and secondary principles. Along the second dimension we can enumerate societies in which scarce resources have been allocated formally by institutions. Along the last one we can examine a variety of resources to be allocated. Since every society wrestles with the problem of resource allocation, this approach has the broadest possible applicability.

As for theoretical constructions, however, this approach, as developed by this study, is still in its infancy. Even though a variety of distributive justice theories have been deliberated in the study, they fail to generate sound hypotheses for various reasons. First of all, this study communicates the normative ideas of justice prescribed by the global theories to the empirical aspects of the practices of resource allocation, but those global theories remain normative in nature. No empirical hypotheses can be generated from them, because normative ideas are not subject to empirical verification. As for the

local theories and the causal chain of allocation, although we confirm that principles of allocation are local rather than global, and that causal chain of allocation, indeed, exists, we should keep in mind that these findings are so much limited by the fact that only two resources are studied in two similar societies. Generating more sophisticated hypotheses requires empirical investigation on more resources in many other societies.

In fact, we have generated several hypotheses with more or less vague notions from comparisons between China and Taiwan. For instance, relationships may be found to exist between political ideologies, regime types and principles of resource allocation, and between the principles of allocation and developmental performance. However, once again, we need to expand two dimensions of our research framework--studying more societies and more resources--in order to formulate theoretically more sophisticated hypotheses.

Since studying resource allocation in many societies demands a great deal of information and data, we should continue to study through a detailed and in-depth analysis of other societies (such as two Koreas and Germany before 1990, or studying other resources in two Chinas) as the beginning stage of research of this subject. This permits us to refine our conceptual and theoretical framework for future analyses. From here, we may be able to move into truly comparative or even statistical research.

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