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Reconceptualization of Constructs, Measurement
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Ph.D. degree in Psychology

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RACISM AND COGNITIVE STRUCTURE: RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTS, MEASUREMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARADIGMATIC FIT

By

Shelley John Stokes

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
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1980

ABSTRACT

RACISM AND COGNITIVE STRUCTURE: RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTS, MEASUREMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARADIGMATIC FIT

By

Shelley John Stokes

This study was intended to test a set of generalizations which repeatedly emerges from previous research on the relation between prejudice, racism and ethnocentrism, on the one hand, and a particular type of cognitive structural characteristic (that of cognitive simplicity-complexity), on the other: (a) that cognitive simplicity is an inherent characteristic of prejudiced, racist and/or ethnocentric thinking and (b) that such simplicity may generalize across the individual's habitual modes of thinking and perceiving (even in non-social domains--a finding stated in terms of greater tendencies toward intolerance of ambiguity, concreteness in thinking, premature closure in perceptual process, distortion in memory, rigidity in problem solving behavior, and so on, in prejudiced as compared with "non-prejudiced" subjects).

It is hypothesized that racism does not always involve the same simplistic thinking as does prejudice (suggesting that perhaps the tendency to extrapolate analyses of racism from theories and research on racial and/or ethnic prejudice

may be misleading and insufficient). Through factor analysis of multiple measures of racism, prejudice, and simplicity-complexity in cognitive style it was predicted that the following data pattern would emerge: (1) traditional measures of racism would correlate highly with measures of cognitive and evaluative simplicity in racial and non-racial domains; and (2) near zero correlations would obtain between measures of racism (constructed and validated in the present study) and measures of simplicity-complexity. Specific interest was in four types of groups which were expected to emerge: (a) individuals with complex cognitive style in racial and in non-racial attitudes toward specific ethnic and racial groups: (b) individuals with simplistic attitude and opinion structure within racial and non-racial domains having an ethnocentric orientation and racist attitudes toward specific ethnic and racial groups: (c) individuals with complex structure in racial and in non-racial domains who score low on indices of ethnocentrism, racism and prejudice, and (d) individuals with simplistic structure in racial and in non-racial domains who also score low on indices of prejudice, racism and ethnocentrism.

The design for the present study was to involve three distinct stages. Stage 1 involved: (a) the construction of multiple indices of racism, (b) intercorrelation of these indices with previously establised inventories which appeared to measure similar phenomena for convergent

validation, and (c) a test of the hypothesis that the measures of racism developed and validated would be distinguishable from traditional measures of prejudice. Stage 2 involved the construction and selection of multiple measures of complexity-simplicity of cognitive and evaluative structure in racial and in non-racial domains. With successful completion of stages 1 and 2 would come stage 3, the intercorrelation and factor analysis of the prejudice, racism ethnocentrism and cognitive style measures.

Difficulties in constructing an adequate measure of racism as conceptualized at the point at which the empirical work took place lead to abandonment of our efforts to proceed to stage 3. Suggestions for remedying some of the problems encountered and directions for future research are suggested in the context of methods for achieving greater paradigmatic fit between theories and concepts, on the one hand, and the variables to be investigated, on the other.

It is pointed out that much of the present work (largely because of the difficulties involved) served to sharpen and clarify our emerging concepts and in this sense was valuable. This occurence is consistent with our notion that research may also be regarded as a <u>discovery</u> process (in addition to a hypothesis testing endeavor). An identity-based model of racism (as opposed to a simplicity-based model) is presented as an outgrowth of

the present work.

Approved:

Date:

Dissertation Committee:

Joel Aronoff, Chairman

William D. Crano

Lawrence A. Messe

Gary Stollak

DEDICATION

Regarding peoples of the world, however divided--
along ethnicity, age, race, sex, etc., these are

ESSENTIALS:

HUMAN FREEDOM AND DIGNITY

LIBERATION OF THE MIND

AND SPIRIT

"con los pobres de la tierra

quiero yo mi suerte echar"

to my daughter

Myisha

to Genie, to Leatha, to Sara, to Charles, to Silverio,

to Steve, to Rona and to the windhover

FOREWARD

So many Black, Asian, Chicano, Latino, and Native American scholars have argued for alternative paradigms apart from the inadequate ones of ethnocentric science reflected in the work of White theoreticians and scholars. In many ways, it is unfortunate to pit groups against one another in this manner and to put things in these terms. But reality (as we each perceive it) dictates our behavior. Thus, I find I must be concerned with atavistic concepts of race when I am really concerned with the preeginations of culture--so the arguments of deficits based on nature or nurture inform us.

Somehow we have to learn the very very basic lessons of cross-cultural communication, of protocol--as it were. The question of intra-cultural respect is no longer at issue. We all hopefully love ourselves. What is at issue is the respect necessitated in communication with others whose perspectives and backgrounds may be different from our own.

My interest, then, is in cross-cultural communication because I feel that it is the only thing that has potential for supporting human survival. (At least it provides the parameters of a chance). The racism, narrowmindedness and parochialism inherent in much of what has historically been perceived as the human condition is (and always has been) an intolerable

condition. Thus my concern with the variable of paradigmatic fit as a basis for cross-cultural understanding and my immediate interest in the analysis of racism as something more than "simple-minded bigotry." We may hopefully see the problem of cross-cultural communication and racism in a much broader scope than this.

The basic dimension underlying racism is insensitivity whether it be to one's basic humanity or to the cultural context of one's existence. The simplicity of this statement belies its analytic power. It raises the question of personal identity and cross-cultural efficacy--a question of knowledge-based humanism versus liberality or tolerance. In this tenor and spirit the present, as well as other work proceeds.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special personal thanks must be expressed to Professor Joel Aronoff for extraordinary degree of assistance and support, the persistent confidence he maintained over an extended course of work on this dissertation, and for his consistent model of excellence and demand that one should become not only a competent scholar but an interesing psychologist. Professor William D. Crano and Professor James L. Phillips must also be thanked for their contributions to my training and also for their confidence and persistent support. Much appreciation is also to be expressed to Professors Lawrence A. Messe and Garry Sollak. Such acknowledgements extend beyond the present case with this dissertation and reflects the unique quality of this group of men, a fact which many of us have come to increasingly appreciate and recognize again and again.

I also thank two contemporaries and friends, one of long standing, Dr. Alonzo B. Anderson, and one of recent acquaintance, Dr. Richard Mendoza for their comments and contributions. I must also acknowledge the resource support of the Lavoratory of Comparative Human Cognition at the University of California, San Diego, without which completion of this work would have taken many more months.

Thanks must also be expressed to Alma Salcido, a kind human being who patiently agreed to type the final draft of this dissertation in the face of impending deadlines.

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Other thanks and expressions of appreciation are due for many reasons too numerous to be offered here but nonetheless felt. Still others are personal and hopefully constantly expressed.

PREFACE

The present research is predicated on the observation that central psychological aspects of individual racism have been neglected in the empirical and theoretical literature of psychology. In reading the present work one will be immediately struct by the fact that theories of racism, as such, are generally embodied within "broader" theories of prejudice and/or ethnocentrism or within "narrower" theories of its component processes (theories of stereotypy, projection, compensatory efforts toward self esteem, etc.). Such theories, however, appear to have a poor fit with the actual phenomenon of racism itself. At one extreme are theories which offer broad abstractions which could equally apply to any antagonistic or hostile attitude or any form of group conflict or any form of aggressive behavior. At the other extreme are theories which equate some subprocess with the whole reducing racism to a simple problem of belief congruence, stereotypy and the like. Few formulations offer a broad range of postulates which are critically applicable to the investigation of racism as such. Most lack appropriate historical and socio-cultural referents which should serve as orienting pints for study. Most are derived from a rather tenuous and liberalistic paradigm as opposed to a more soundly pluralistic and scientific one. Thus the underlying paradigm of much of the traditional work focuses

on "tolerance of differences" and on the "basic sameness of all people" as opposed to focusing on "the appreciation of differences" and "knowledge and understanding of the functional equivalences in human behavior," and so on.

Most importantly, however, it is stressed that racism (and specifically individual racism) is not synonymous with race prejudice. More than a terminological difference is being suggested here. We believe that the tendency to extrapolate analyses of racism from theories and research on racial and/or ethnic prejudice is insufficient and often misleading. This is most clear in regards to the traditional tendency to extrapolate analyses of individual racism from the literature on prejudice and cognitive psychology. Much of the failure in adequately conceptualizing individual racism revolves around the nature of its cognitive component--i.e., around the assumption that racism always involves the same simplistic thinking as does prejudice. Such an assumption is supported neither by history nor experience. Simple-minded bigotry is not all there is to individual racism though psychologists have asserted this notion for at least 30 years. Racism exists in an enculturated context and is expressed in terms based in different identity configurations within that context and has little to do with complexity or simplicity of thought. It is, in fact, this latter assertion which we intend to test in the empirical work presented here.

Some re-evaluation of theories and paradigms is

apparently needed. The question becomes "On what basis are the various contemporary theories and their underlying paradigms to be evaluated?" A starting point in answering this question emerges from basic epistemological and meta-epistemological considerations about what a theory should be and do and particularly about criteria for judging how a theory stands in relation to phenomena it attempts to predict, explain and describe. Begging the questions of what a theory is and should do (for the sake of parsimony and brevity and because these questions are addressed extensively in the chapters which follow), we may note some important aspects of how a theory should stand in relation to the phenomena addressed by it. Since theories are <u>not</u> merely arbitrary productions awaiting empirical test, and since theories must not only be "supported by the data" but must also fit the facts and fundaments of the universe of interest (two assumptions on which our current work is based), a great deal of attention is given to the necessity of <u>comprehensiveness</u>, <u>semantic consistency</u> and <u>precise representational qualities</u> in the model; a theory should define its intended universe clearly and cohere respectably with it, its postulates being distributed over its range and not confined to some narrow subuniverse. Theories should be developed and tested within a broad-based empirical and meta-empirical context from the very early stages of their conception and throughout their more formal stages of constuction and

modification.

Given what appears to be major conceptual insufficiency and, in many instances, definitional confounding not only at the level of empirical work but also in the core of basic theories, the present work was intended to offer some palliative solutions by: (1) introducing a method for achieving better fit of theory to the facts and fundaments of individual racism as broadly defined from within a pluralistic meta-context; (2) applying this method to the construction of our theory; (3) distinguishing our construct of individual racism conceptually and empirically from previous constructs of prejudice; (4) testing the hypothesized independence of individual racism (as presently redefined) from simplicity-complexity in cognitive style; and (5) revising, as necessary, theory and/or method as facts and data from the empirical and meta-contextual work came in.

The organization of this work is divided into three chapters. Chapter I develops the concept of pardigmatic fit and explicates the basic principles of theory evaluation, construction and testing as these relate to achieving greater fit of theoretical concepts to the facts and fundaments of experience. The concepts discussed in this chapter are a product of continued rethinking and redevelopment occurring as our empirical work progressed. The entire method suggested for achieving better paradigmatic fit has yet to be fully implemented or applied,

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Many of the concepts central to the notion of "fit" developed as a result of difficulties encountered in the empirical work--in effect, they are "reflections after the fact." For purposes of coherence and clarity, however, the concept of paradigmatic fit is presented at its present (as opposed to its earlier, or stage by stage) level of development. The reader will therefore be alerted when divergences in our actual method from that suggested in this first chapter emerge. This results directly from the fact that different stages of the empirical work were already underway before some of the concepts of fit were defined and/or more fully developed. Given the complexity of the concept of "fit" we find it useful to present the concept in one coherent presentation in its "entirety."

In Chapter 2 we attempt to provide the theoretical groundwork for analysis of individual racism. One main purpose here was to present an alternative conceptualization of racism based within a divergent theoretical paradigm from that of the traditional work on prejudice and ethnocentrism. From this alternative conception, structural predictions are derived concerning the cognitive components of racism which help to differentiate it as a broader phenomenon from the subcategory of racial and ethnic prejudice. It is specifically suggested that prejudice may be demonstrated to involve simplistic stereotypic thinking in regards to race and race related issues whereas racism involves no such necessary identification with simplicity

in the racial (or in non-racial) domain(s). Broader dimensions of individual racism are also discussed in the context of ideas about "self," "others," "humanism," and "whiteness." These latter notions serve as the rudiments of a hopefully more adequate theory of racism.

Chapter III constitutes the major empirical work. It sets out to test our predictions concerning the pattern of relations which should exit (if the present theory is correct and measurement operations sound) among indices of prejudice, racism, ethnocentrism and complexity of cognitive structure. Three major stages of the research were planned in the investigation of this problem, the first two being carried out concurrently, and the third being contingent on successful completion of the first two. The first two stages involved the selection, construction (and in the latter case, validation) of multiple indices of racism, prejudice, ethnocentrism and coplexity. The third stage was to involve intercorrelation of and factor analysis of the various measures selected and/or developed to determined if the predicted pattern of relationships emerged. Extensive description, data analyses and conclusions from the work in the first two stages is presented. Based on these it was decided not to proceed to stage three in our analysis. (Difficulties in constructing an adequate measure of racism as conceptualized at the point at which the empirical work took place, lead to this decision). Suggestions for remedying some of the problems encountered

and directions for future research are discussed. It is stressed that much of this work (largely because of the difficulties involved) served to subsequently sharpen and clarify emerging definitions and in this sense was highly valuable. This continued process of refinement in the total investigative effort is consistent with our notion that research may also be regarded as a discovery process (in addition to a hypothesis testing endeavor). Appropriate refinements were made as these were suggested by our empirical work. The material in Chapter II on concepts and theory represents a result of some of our revisions and our concluding discussion a further refinement.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The guiding principle for the present research is the notion developed here of "paradigmatic fit." This notion refers to a theory's fit with the facts and data of its intended universe. "Paradigmatic fit" is conceived to be a meta-empirical concept applicable to the initial phases of theory construction, to principles of hypthesis derivation and testing, and to subsequent interpretation and evaluation of both theory and data. Our intent is to later use the concept as the organizing principle to evaluate contemporary theories of prejudices and racism, to extrapolate a conception of racism at the cognitive level of analysis, and to provide the basis for the experimental design and data analysis.

Development of this concept will begin with a discussion of the parameters of a theory's nearness-to truth (verisimilitude). While there is no evidence to indicate that failure to define tha peregínations of truth handicaps, in any way, the conduct of scientific inquiry, the various constructions of truth do relate to implicit and basic epistemological notions which underlie the procedures and methods by which we evaluate

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psychological theories. A focus on the specific property of "coherence" will derive from this and the basic notions of paradigmatic fit will emerge. We will then explore the parameters of theory construction, hypothesis testing, construct validation, data interpretation, and theory analysis and reconstruction within the newly developed context of paradigmatic fit.

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THEORY CONSTRUCTION AND ASSESSMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF PARADIGMATIC FIT

Few reflective psychologists will doubt that some notion of "nearness to truth" is unavoidable when we evaluate theories. Paul Meehl views this an an ontological problem rather than an epistemological one, asserting that we should not conflate "truth-likeness" of a theory with "confirmation, probability, evidence, proof, corroboration, belief, support, or plausibility" (Meehl, 1978, p. 818).

Overview of the Argument

For the reader's convenience an overview of the argument which preceeds (and serves ad the basis for) our discussions of coherence and of paradigmatic fit is provided here. The intent is to give the reader maximum flexibility in considering the entire argument in its developmental sequence, to focus on specific areas of interest to him or her, or after getting a basic feel for the argument to move directly into the sections on coherence and pardigmatic fit, perhaps later returning to these earlier sections out of interest or need for clarity.

For this reason, the format chosen for this overview is basically one of enumerating main point without presenting them in more fully integrated and

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developed fashion (as do the sections which follow).

In summary we may say that:

While some notion of "nearness-to-truth" is unavoidable when we evaluate theories, little is said about the truth-like quality of a theory prior to its empirical test. There ought to be, as Cattell suggests, some better and more objective ways of ensuring, prior to empirical test, an early and sensitive adaptation of the model to the indications to facts and data.

The prevalent notion that theories are arbitrary productions stands in direct contradiction to the notion that the validity of theories may only be judged in terms of their comparative outcomes is misleading. Clear comparative outcomes are seldom obtainable and it is important to judge the validity of a theory on several grounds.

Substantial gains in both generating and selecting ideas are obtainable by considering the actual relations possible among persons, responses, background conditions and so forth within the domain of investigation before theory construction. These relations constitute the anchoring points for theoretical concepts and the basis of relevant experimental design.

The stand taken here is that a requisite refinement of theory can proceed only on checks against quantitative observations and on a broader style and base of empiricism

than is usually indicative of strictly data-based approaches, embracing historical (developmental or evolutional), contemporaneous and comparative (cross-cultural or infra-human) perspectives in multivariate as well as bivariate and non-interfering as well as manipulative designs.

The general design of a theory-generating-and-checking investigation includes the succession of (a) an initial set of pre-theoretical conjectures, (b) their projection into the relational matrix defined by the relations and anchoring points considered above, (c) the setting up of an experimental design to involve those relations in testable form, and (d) the examination of the results by a statistical evaluative design appropriate for the model.

It is stressed that theories cannot be constructed by some elementary operational process or from simple induction from singular statments to universal ones. Rather they are derived by the "method of hypothesis." Thus in no strict sense are theories derived from observed facts but rather are invented to account for them. Further, it is suggested that it is the investigator's total conceptual environment, not just the concepts he or she acquires during scientific training that structures observations. These universal and idiosyncratic implicit theoretical frameworks could be useful to the investigator if explicated.

The theoretical concepts generated should not be bound to the data but should be disciplined by it such that in the

early stages we modify our conceptions as the data refuse to fit. Detailed studies should serve as checkpoints to larger constructions. However, the process of seeking postulated relations in the data should not inhibit further investigation once the data is collected. Speculations regarding unexpected relations found in the data become part of the stuff from which subsequent theories derive. Such pre-theoretical speculation, however, should not be conflated with the substantive theory itself for such speculation embodies little in the way of formal properties demanded of a substantive theory, per se.

1. Above all, "theory" has to do with paying close attention to the words one is using especially their degree of generality and their logical relations. Attention should be given to inherent correctness in the model, that is: (a) Theories must have consistency in their internal logical syntactical structure and in their external semantic reference to facts and data, and (b) the investigator should be attuned to the necessity for precise representational qualities in the model. Theoretical models that are sound in these respects may still vary on a number of other dimensions including testability, complexity, range and comprehensiveness, level of abstraction, and clarity and explicitness of assumptive premises.
2. Testability is a minimal requirement which must be satisfied; however, test conditions need not be

realizable when the theory is contemplated or propounded. Assessment of the explanatory power of a theory is not based on its empirical (data based) support alone. A theory which is clinically powerful is unlikely to be abandoned because it is comprised of elements not currently testable.

3. The necessity of complexity in models will vary appreciably for a variety of internal and external reasons, some theories being more difficult in their abstractness than simpler theories but having the advantage of broader negotiability and better fit to the level of complexity of naturally occurring phenomena. One should accept in principle, however, that an unnecessary number of assumptions does damage to the coherence of a theory. Those assumptions which are employed should be explicit, clear and inter-consistent; they should bear upon the phenomena of concern, and they should be predictive of events in the theories substantive domain.
4. Tying together seemingly remote observations is structurally more significant than combining more obvious features of the data. This capacity is referred to as a theory's importance, two features of which are its range (or breadth) and its comprehensiveness (or completeness). A theory should lead to accurate predictions which deal very generally or inclusively with the events which the theory purports to embrace. In order to do this, it must possess relevance and

explicitness, i.e., it must be relevant to the situation at hand, and must be explicit enough to suggest implications for behavior. Thus, a given theory successful within its intended range may be expected to possess limited predictive value when operating outside of that range.

5. Decisions as to whether one should work with simple isolated hypotheses, grand theoretical systems, or "middle-range" theories structures the entire investigative process. The individual psychologist's preference for one type of approach over others will be mitigated or supported by his or her skill at combining the elements of (a) a schema's testability and explanatory power with (b) its importance and scope. In moving to increasingly broader areas of generalization one must be careful to develop concepts having "extra meaning" rather than "surplus meaning"--often the temptation is to introduce the grand theory too soon.
6. Apart from intrinsic merits, theories and theory building are subject to distortions and disorders arising from the human and social setting of science. Tendencies to over-simplify the principle of "objectivity," however, are misplaced. The question is not one of whether human values and common sense are to be involved in the scientific process, but rather when, how, and to what extent in various stages of the process. As mentioned earlier, clarification and explication of underlying

assumptions, generalizations, intent and purpose could be useful to the investigator.

7. All theories should ultimately be verifiable in either a practical or an empirical sense.

The position that theories cannot be judged in terms of their truth-likeness but only in terms of their comparative outcomes is misleading. The truth-likeness of a theory is reflected in its representational qualities expressed in its semantic consistency, range, completeness, explanatory power and goodness of fit. These qualities are related to but are distinguishable from a theory's more formal properties of clarity, explicitness and logical consistency, particularly as these latter qualities relate to testability (as distinct from truth-value). Over-reliance on the latter through emphasis on comparative outcome (to the neglect of the former) ignores the fact that empirical evidence when it provides support is always inferential and also that because of the formal deficiencies in most theories and the factors affecting the quality of the evidence (including the insulating function of theoretical auxiliaries and conditions which we have defined as the distance of the test from the core of the theory) strong evidence in the form of clear comparative outcomes is seldom available. Other factors contributing variations in evidential quality include the number or extent of confirming results, the degree of evidential variety, favorable versus unfavorable efidence, dual effects of experimental precision, and the

weight of past empirical results. These factors frequently combine to make assessment of degree of confirmation of a given theory difficult, a fact which contributes to the lack of cumulative character of many areas in the psychology field and the lack of power in paradigm replacement.

The quality of a theory may be assessed at many different levels and in many different ways. Steps to increase, insure, and check a theory's verifiability should begin early in the theory building process. Such procedures help us to ensure a sensitive adaptation of the theory to data and to the facts and fundaments of the real world. Testing comparative outcomes where possible is an important aspect of this process but does not effectively supplant it. (See Maddi's 1968, 1972, and 1976 work on a comparative analysis of personality theories).

Part of the problem, however, relates to inherent difficulties in the subject matter itself reflected in the complex interdependencies, highly contingent relationships and context dependencies which characterize so much of individual functioning, interpersonal, group and wider social and cultural dimensions of human behavior.

However, stronger support for theories is attainable by making high-risk predictions. It seems clear, especially, that an increase in experimental precision should be accompanied by stronger demands on theories in terms of the types of predictions put to test.

Unfortunately it is more the case that theories tend

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neither to be refuted nor corroborated. As Meehl charmingly admonishes, more typically, "There is a period of enthusiasm about a new theory, a period of attempted application to several fact domains, a period of disillusionment as the negative data come in, a growing babblement about inconsistent and unreplicable empirical results, multiple resort to ad hoc excuses, and then finally people just sort of lose interest in the thing and pursue other endeavors" (1978, p. 807).

Thus comparative test comes rather late in the investigative process.

> When...theories battle in the courtroom, the ancient legalistic game of guilty versus not guilty prevails over the more tentative and sensitive spirit of exploration. Admittedly, there is a time, quite late in the process of a scientific investigation... for such legalistic right-or-wrong examination. But the detective and the explorer, deftly balancing in their imaginations many alternative hypotheses, and free of the straight jacket of one pair of alternatives, offer, in general, better ideals of performance for the scientist than does the lawyer. (Cattell, 1977, pp. 11-12)

This in no way negates the significance of comparative test but, perhaps, puts it in better perspective.

It seems clear, however, that the results of numerous studies must in some way be fitted together into a coherent system which adequately reflects the substantive, methodological and empirical dimensions of investigative efforts. Without careful scrutiny of interaction of these three epistemic dimensions in accumulated outcomes, we may neglect the fact that our "evidence" may be much weaker than it seems. Claims for empirical support or refutation

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of a theory must be based on judgments concerning the quantity, variety and precision of the evidence, strength of predictive demands made on the theory, and the closeness of our tests to the theory's intended predictive-explanatory universe.

But since theories do not stand or fall on the results of empiricism alone, other criteria of a theory's explanatory power must also be assessed. We have already indicated that its clinical relevance may be one aspect of this assessment. These involve broader assessment principles having to do with coherence and paradigmatic fit.

Divergence with Past Positions

It is important to note that the position being described here is quite divergent from that of Wiggins (1973) who, in common with most practitioners, argues against the relevance of the verisimilitude concept or of any analysis of a theory's "truth value." According to Wiggins, it is important to note that at no level of the theory is the 'truth' of the model or analogue at issue. The validity of a theoretical model cannot be determined independently of the consequences of adopting that particular model as compared with the consequences of adopting a different model (cf., Wiggins, 1973, p. 452).

Two implications of Wiggin's position are misleading: (a) that this is the only way that we may reasonably proceed, and (b) that clear comparative outcomes are usually

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obtainable. As will become increasingly apparent, many characteristics (other than a theory's comparative consequence) need to be considered in our efforts at theory validation. Second, we will see that theories most frecuently are rather well insulated against comparative test.

A related position from which the present work is also divergent is that of construing theories as "creative and arbitrary productions" which have unspecifiable constructive parameters. Calvin Hall and Gardner Lindzey are advocates of this position. According to these authors, there can be no "formula" for fruitful theory construction because a theory is a conventional choice, rather than something inevitable or prescribed by known empirical relations. Truth or falsity are not attributes to be ascribed to a theory. A theory is only <u>useful</u> or <u>not</u> <u>useful</u> and these qualities are defined "primarily in terms of how efficiently the theory can generally predictions or propositions concerning relevant events which turn out to be verified" (Hall and Lindzey, 1970, pp. 10-11). Note that one would, indeed, be hard pressed to reconcile this position with, say, Cattell's notion that "sound theory construction is the heart of science" (1977, p. 10).

<u>Parameters and Principles of Theory Construction</u>

Unfortunately, Hall and Lindzey miss an important distinction between the "context of discovery" in theory <u>generation</u> (a psychological process) and the "context of

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justification" in which the theory is explicated, elaborated and tested (cf., Reichenbach, 1938). While it is true that one should not constrain the unusual, idiosyncratic or unconventional types of divergent thinking that may occur during the generative phase of theory construction, it is also true that the investigator is not totally free to argue for any invented model that takes his or her fancy. The theorist must also check his or her conceptions against realities (both phenomenologic and epistemic) and, in a "convergent" fashion, articulate the theory in terms which can be understood by others (cf., Guilford, 1950, 1959, 1963, 1967).

One might concur in part with Hall and Lindzey that the context of theoretical discovery (in which the rudimentary elements of the theory are generated) may be one in which the principles of construction are largely unspecifiable. Perhaps the only type of principle which could be applied to this generative phase is some specification of the most likely context in which a theory best fitting the facts and data of the real world could emerge. Cattell (1977) suggests that one must acquire an intimate aquaintance with the data through emersion in research and laboratory experience, rather than to play the game of model construction for its own sake. Others might argue for an intimate aquaintance with the variety of facts and data of the "field" (from the organism and its relations in situ), or perhaps (most appropriately I think) for both. The success of the

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generative effort is likely to increase with a thorough familiarity with the phenomenon as well as with knowledge of established theories and facts concerning it.

Within the context of justification, however, it is more possible and desirable to specify some general criteria (or at least some strategic aids) for enhancing theoretical adequacy and relevance prior to empirical test. Cattell has suggested that substantial gains, both in generating and selecting ideas, are obtainable from considering, before theory construction, the actual relations available to express the theory in the "Data Box" itself. That is to say, in principle, one looks at the totality of relations possible among persons, responses, background conditions, and so forth within the domain of investigation. This ultimately leads to a choice within the relational matrix of a particular set of relations among real objects or events. These expected relationships constitute the anchoring point for theoretical concepts and the basis of relevant experimental design.

Thus, to construct (or reshape) a broad theoretical conception, one must have realistic and detailed expositions, but detailed expositions cannot necessarily be put together to constitute a broad conception. "What should be selected for detailed exposition? What are the criteria for selection? And what does 'put together' mean?" (Mills, 1959, p. 66). Clearly, we cannot simply induce theories from some straightforward "upward seepage" of observed facts and data.

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Another way to ask these questions is to ask: For what level of verification ought the investigator be willing to settle? This question has to do with the relationship between "factual precision" (i.e., exactitude) and "comprehensiveness" (i.e., importance) or the tension, as it were, between what is "factually precise but unimportant" versus what is "important but vaguely true." In some fashion the problem of speculative grandiosity must be balanced against mere description of data which of necessity must have limited range and generality.

The Inductive-Hypothetico-Deductive Solution

Cattell's inductive-hypothetico-deductive approach offers a rather sound "solution" here. At least I am in agreement with his observation that if the relation of theory to data is to be seen in true perspective, it is important to abandon the misleading philosophy of science concept for scientific investigation: namely the hypothetic-deductive method. A term more accurately descriptive of what actually occurs, Cattell suggests, is the inductive-hypothetico-deductive method. For the former wrongly suggests that the theory (or hypothesis) springs from nowhere, whereas in fact it is reached by more or less intensive and organized induction from experience and/or data (or by borrowing from someone else's experience).

Cattell, however, can only be partially right about this. Numerous discussions (e.g., Popper, 1962; Hempel,

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1965, 1966; Hanson, 1958; Polanyi, 1958; Von Wright, 1951; Zananiecki, 1934) have, at the very least, made it difficult to accept the notion that knowledge can be generated by some elementary operational process or that scientists reason inductively (in any simple fashion) from singular statements to universal ones. In an admirable argument Hempel (1966) has pointed out that scientific knowledge is not arrived at by applying some inductive inference procedure to antecedently collected data, but rather by what is often called "the method of hypotheses"--i.e., by inventing hypotheses as tentative answers to a problem under study. The investigator is said to begin with a conjecture or set of guesses about the connections that might obtain between the phenomena under study (i.e., at the uniformities and patterns that might underlie their occurrence). These conjectures are then subjected to empirical test and new test implications are derived from the results of these early guesses. The new implications then also are checked by suitable observations or experiment. Thus in no strict sense are theories derived from observed facts, rather they are invented to account for them.

Investigators who argue for a simple and direct inductive basis for theory construction often fail to discern the many universal or idiosyncratic generalizations from which they deduce their specific hypotheses. This is true of simpler operations, such as the initial conjectures involved in factor naming, or of more complex retroductive

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reasoning in which the investigator seeks to find a set of possible explanations for a given set of phenomena. In both instances, the investigator works within an implicit theoretical framework, one which, if explicated, could be useful to him/her. (This, in part, relates to the basic nature of perception. That is, parts of a phenomenon immediately given are influenced by, or reconstructed on the basis of, past experience, other contextual stimuli, one's personal construct system and so forth.) (See pages in the present work for further discussion.)

Inductive and deductive processes are interactively involved in both the construction and the testing process. Inductive inferences are the various probability statements we make during the many phases of our work. Deductive inferences are the logical conclusions reached which are derived with certainty from our stated premises (cf., Hempel, 1966, pp. 10-18).

(It is interesting to speculate--in contradiction of philosophers of method like Popper who argue that induction is non-scientific--that scientific inquiry may be said to be inductive in a fairly broad sense,

> ...in as much as it involves the acceptance of hypotheses on the bases of data that afford no deductively conclusive evidence for it, but lend it only more or less strong 'inductive support' or confirmation. (Hempel, 1966, p. 18).

Popper would, of course reject this as he is concerned only with "falsifiability." From this perspective no theory can ever be proven "true" with finality, but it can be proven

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"false" with finality. Popper thus equates the scientific method with negation of a particular type of logico-deductive system and its reconstitution in light of negative evidence or else the recourse to some entirely new theory. Popper's emphasis on the logic-deductive method has much to commend it. He appears to be incorrect, however, in his views concerning discovery (see Hanson, 1958).

The inductive basis of Cattell's work rests on the use of empirical procedures for both theory (or hypothesis) creation and for theory (or hypothesis) testing. An important difference in experimental designs lies in their relative potency for each.

In regards to creation, the advantage lies with multivariate (as opposed to simpler "manipulative" or bivariate) designs because of their capacity to present comprehensively total patterns of covariation, richer and more suggestive of wellborn theory, than is a mere difference of means on two or more variables. Multivariate methods may be used to reach underlying functional unities in whole patterns of variables in a manner that almost trivalizes the slower and more random approach of bivariate designs. Moving ahead with a more manageable number of "identified" variables, one may then subsequently employ manipulative designs to obtain more integratible results. This approach has obviously greater power than that of relying on simpler block-building endeavors of conducting a large number of small-scale studies which at some future point can be "added up" or

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"fitted together" to build up a reliable and verified image of some whole. As we will see in our section on theory and hypothesis testing, the process of putting such studies together to yield an integrated picture is often quite problematic.

It should be acknowledged, however, that any style of empiricism involves a metaphysical choice as to what is most real. The multivariate approach is not without its own attendant problems. Cattell can make the statement of support for a multivariate empirical basis for theory construction as strongly as he does only because of the near isomorphism in his approach between the concept and the method of its assessment. In Cattell's personality theory this is expressed in the relationship between the "factor" and a "trait." The factors that emerge from multivariate analyses of the covariation among surface traits are construed to be quantitative expressions of traits and not "operational definitions" of traits. And while uniquely rotated factors are not construed to be identical with source traits, they are seen as "phenotypic representations" of source traits. Thus, the substantive implications of Cattell's personality theory may be said to stand or fall on the appropriateness of the factor-analytic procedures that have been employed in the identification of his principle constructs. (See appendix 1.) We need not assume such isomorphism, however, in order to recognize multivariate analysis as a highly viable method for theory construction

and testing. A more basic question is whether theory should be constructed as Cattell suggests, that is, largely from empirical data.

Criticisms and Praise for Cattell's Approach

Empirically data-based approaches to theory construction have been criticized on the basis of their general character (e.g., Mills, 1959; Wrigley, 1960). Five such criticisms are obtained here through integration of present concerns with earlier ones of Mills regarding the limits of what he defined as "abstracted empiricism" (Mills, 1959, pp. 50-75). (1) First, as an approach, "abstracted empiricism" tends to be ahistorical and non-comparative, shifting emphasis from the developmental or evolutional history of a phenomenon and its various expressions across cultures (as orienting points in its study) to its more immediate expression in contemporaneous intra- or uni-cultural events. This might be taken as simply an epistemological choice except that there is a tendency to extrapolate results to the level of the broader phenomenon itself.

(2) Second, inspite of its limits in scope (i.e., all possible relations cannot be represented in the data), there is a tendency to equate the statistical relations among variables (as expressed in the given data) with the "relations" between the interactive phenomena of the real world irrespective of how narrow or unrepresentative the

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data may be. (Cattell is certainly less guilty of this than others.)

(3) There is, third, a preference for studying phenomena which repeat themselves rather than those which occur infrequently under the assumption that investigation of repetitive phenomena will point to structural considerations. Little attention, however, tends to be given to the need to search for the anchoring points of such regularities (or, for that matter, for their structural relations with less frequently occurring phenomena). (Again, Cattell's work is unrepresenative in this regard. The amount of care and "artistry" Cattell has invested in determing the underlying structure of traits, rather than to simply reduce a number of variables to a more simplified mathematical form, is indicative of his concern with the search for structural variables.)

(4) Fourth, there is either little recognition of the need for balance between "comprehensiveness" of a theory and its degree of "exactitude" in the inductive process of formulating empirical laws or

(5) The concepts used to interpret "the data" employ structural concepts above the level made available by the research design or infer factors below the depth investigated. Particular observations are explicated by appealing ad hoc to general conceptions, and minute variables whose meanings are stretched and used to explain broad questions when conceptions neither of structure nor of depth have

been among the considerations within which the research has been formulated and the data collected.

To become aware of problems of structure and of their significance requres a much broader style (and base) of empiricism than is indicative of the strictly data-based approach. The variety of factors which must be taken into account in coming to a real sense of understanding structure becomes increasingly available when we broaden our view to include both historical and comparative perspectives. Thus while we should work as carefully and exactly as we can our theoretical conceptions should not be bound to the data, rather they should be "disciplined" by it. The data serves as a check on our broader conceptions derived from historical, comparative and contemporaneous perspective, such that we modify our conceptions as the data refuse to fit them.

The selection for detailed study ought to be made in accordance with problems of structural signficance. The kinds of variables to be isolated and observed ought to be those that have been found to be important by our examination of structure. It seems foolish to undertake any detailed studies of smaller-scale areas before we have good reason to believe that, whatever the results, they will permit us to draw inferences useful in solving or clarifying problems of structural significance. What one gets from empirical research as such is information, and what one can do with this information depends a great deal upon whether

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or not in the course of his or her work, the investigator has selected specific empirical studies as check points of larger constructions.

The Role of Pre-theoretical Speculation

The process of seeking postulated relations in the data in no way inhibits further investigation once the data is collected. Perhaps the most vital feature of the investigator's procedure is "to do the utmost with his mind, no holds barred" (cf., Bridgman, cited by Mills, 1959, p. 58). But such inductive speculation concerning unexpected relations discovered in the data becomes part of the "stuff" from which subsequent theories derive. This latter point is quite important for many investigators confuse the speculative pre-theoretical conjectures of this stage with the actual theory itself. Cattell, for example, inconsistently argues that:

> ...the term theory has...(a)...wide range of reference...At one extreme it could be nothing more than the scientist's assumption that "significant, lawful relations exist in this data," together, perhaps, with a hunch about which relations to analyze first. In this sense it may be true that "one always has a theory," but often the theory is scarcely more than "this curious bit of Nature in which I expect any explorations to reveal some order."

Multivariate analyses serve the function of allowing us to test our pre-theoretical conjectures at the formative stage of analysis. Thus the verification process should begin prior to empirical test of the theory. It should begin in the early stages of construction (i.e., with our speculations

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Internal and External Criteria of "Good" Theory

In addition to the above considerations for combining and extrapolating from "detailed expositions," one must not forget that a theory should have the outer properties and internal consistencies of a good model as such. A theory is not simply "On the one hand...a system of information-packed descriptions of what we know; and on the other...a system of general explanations" through which we interpret easily observable facts (cf., Zetterberg, 1965, p. 1). Nor is it the set of "variables useful in interpreting statistical findings" with the empirical data being "the statistically determined facts and relations--numerous, measured and replicated" (cf., Lazarsfeld, 1955). Put concisely by Cattell,

> A theory...(is)... an integrated set of explicit definitions and explanations. It satidfies the conditions of (a) maintaining internal, syntactical, and logical consistency; (b) bringing about external consistency, in that it bridges more than one set of data, introducing a single coherent explanatory framework; and (c) permitting deduction and extrapolation to several new testable hypotheses applicable to as yet uninvestigated phenomena. (1977, p. 5)

A theory analyzes the underlying structure of events, broadens understanding and leads to other observations which would not be expected on the basis of current observation alone. It seems remarkable, in a sense, that it we limited ourselves to a study of the more or less

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observable or measurable aspects of our world and tried to explain these by means of laws couched in terms of observables, our efforts would have only limited success. For the laws that are formulated at the observational level generally turn out to hold only approximately and within a limited range (cf., Hempel, 1966). A good theory shows us that previously formulated empirical uniformities which it explains do not hold strictly and unexceptionally, but within a certain limited range of application. The insight that a theory gives us is much deeper than that afforded by empirical laws.

Syntactic-Semantic Consistency, Testability and Explanatory Power

Above all, "theory" has to do with paying close attention to the words one is using, especially their degree of generality and their logical relations. The investigator must pay close attention to syntax and also be attuned to the necessity for precise representational qualities in the model. In regards to syntax, assumptions and embedded concepts should be clearly stated and explicitly combined and related to each other in internally consistent ways. In fact, without such internal, syntactical (or "logical") consistency it would be difficult or impossible to extract empirical consequences from the theory.

The argument for the importance of extracting empirical consequences, however, must be realistically qualified by

the recognition that this principle (commonly called "testability") is a minimal necessary condition that a scientific theory must satisfy. Most generally it may be said that no statement or set of statements can be significantly proposed as a scientific hypothesis or theory unless it is at least testable-in-principle. That is to say that it must be possible (in a broad sense) to derive from a theoretical conjecture certain test implications of the form: "If test conditions C are realized, then outcome E will occur" (Hempel, 1966). The test conditions, however, need not be realizable when the conjecture is contemplated or propounded.

Meehl (1978), for one, is strongly partisan on this issue, asserting that there are many areas of practical and theoretical inference in which nobody knows how to state the manner in which various lines of evidence converge to support a theoretical conjecture (or perhaps even the degree to which they do so). For Meehl,

> it becomes..a fuzzy open question...just when a mass of nonquantitative converging evidence can be said to have made a stronger case for a conjecture than the weak kind of non-converging quantitative evidence usually represented by the significance testing tradition...sometimes qualitative evidence of certain sorts is superior in its empirical weight to what a typical social, personality, or clinical psychologist gets in support of a substantive theory by the mere refutation of the null hypothesis. (1978, p. 830)

Thus, assessment of the explanatory relevance of a theory is not based on its empirical (data based) support alone. A clinically powerful theory is not likely to be rejected on the basis that it includes many elements that are not

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presently testable. Conversely, a theory that is highly testable but has little explanatory relevance will hold little interest. Thus, testability, while it must be incorporated into an overall assessment of a theory's explanatory power, is not in itself the definitive factor.

Any model (whether empirically supported or clinically relevant) is likely to omit important features of a "full-bodied reality." The most syntactically consistent (or "logical") model may fail, to some degree, in the semantic step from symbols to phenomena. For example, the mathematical model (necessarily sound in syntax) is lacking in representational sufficiency and requires an appreciable subsystem of "semantic enlargements" or "extra-body" as it were to meet the test of theoretical adequacy (cf., Cattell, 1977). This would be true of attempts to induce "causality" into a mathematical model which by definitional structure contains only dependent and independent variables disregarding of any time sequence. It would be necessary to bring in a special analysis with respect to the time variable (Cattell, 1977, p. 6).

For Cattell, representational sufficiency is a function of the inductive development of empirical constructs (involving descriptive properties close to the data) into theoretical concepts more broadly applicable to causal and structural laws. More broadly, for us, this representational quality has to do not only with the finding of relations (and empirical laws) and the development of empirical

constructs (based on inductions from the data) into theoretical entities but also with the theory's fit to the facts and "fundaments," as it were, of real world experience. As we will see, this requires clear definition of the intended universe and consenual agreement regarding the theory's coherence with it, as well as developmentally data-based verificational support.

Intricacy or Complexity

While we should not forget that what we are after is the "minimum complexity necessary to fit the facts" (Cattell, 1977, p. 9), arguments for "parsimony," economy," and "simplicity" (as opposed to "complexity" and "intricacy") are generally unconvincing.

What is sought is an economical or parsimonious description of the world and from this perspective it would seem reasonable to select the simplest among competing theories. Rarely, however, do theories deal with one and the same set of facts, or generate the same predictions (arriving at the same conclusions from different terms). Comparing theories on the basis of economy thus becomes problematic. But more centrally important, in regards to both theory testing and construction, is the problem of specifying clear criteria for defining these terms and of justifying their desirability (e.g., the number of basic concepts and assumptions of a given theory can be combined and divided in various ways, different assumptions

themselves may vary in complexity--requiring differential weighting, or the real relations between phenomena may not lend themselves to simple explication, and so on--cf., Barker, 1957; Quine, 1963).

One interesting "solution" has been offered by Popper (1959). Briefly, he construes the simpler of two hypotheses as the one that has greater empirical content. Thus, the simpler hypothesis can more readily be subjected to empirical test (i.e., "is falsifiable" in Popper's terms, meaning "found out to be false if indeed it is false"). For Popper, "Simple statements, if knowledge is our object, are to be prized more highly than less simple ones because they tell us more; because their empirical content is greater; and hence they are better testable (1959, p. 142). However, Popper goes on to suggest that one hypothesis is more testable than another if it implies the alternative hypothesis (i.e., has greater content in a deductive sense), and here his argument breaks down. A strong theory may be regarded as simpler than others implied by it (as is sometimes the case when it replaces an array of smaller and unrelated ones of more limited scope). But greater content need not be linked to greater simplicity. It is often the case that the increased complexity of a theory gives it its greater range (e.g., compare Freudian Theory to most other theories of personality).

We may expect that the necessity of complexity will vary appreciably among theories for a variety of internal

and external reasons, some being more difficult in their abstractness than simpler theories but having the advantage of broader negotiability (generalizability across many areas) and fit to the level of complexity of naturally occurring phenomena. However, one should accept, in principle, that an unnecessary number of assumptions does damage to the coherence of a theory. And that other criteria including syntactic and semantic consistency, testability, and comprehensiveness are at least indirectly related to (or affect) the number, range, and depth of concepts and assumptions necessitated by a theory. Perhaps the investigator should strive harder for these than for simplicity for its own sake.

The investigator may help to insure the minimum complexity necessary by avoiding the use of unnecessary assumptions. Those assumptions which are employed in a theory should be explicit, clear and consistent with one another, they should be relevant in that they bear upon the phenomena with which the theory is concerned, and they should be predictive concerning events within the theory's substantive domain.

Range, Completeness and level of Abstraction

Considerations having to do with a theory's range, completeness and level of abstractness have already been briefly introduced but are important enough to deserve expansion.

The range (or "breadth") of a theory refers to "the number of data areas...(a theory)...attempts to interconnect" (Cattell, 1977, p. 8-9) or how many areas the theory may generalize across. This needs no explanation, though it would demand some discussion to advance its precise operational definition. Often this is referred to as the importance of a theory in that tying together of seemingly remote observations is more structurally significant than combining more obvious features of the data. Another way of defining this property, as suggesed by Cattell, is in terms of the negotiability of a model, that is, "How far are its terms and concepts acceptable as possible formulations across fields that were formerly sustained by local theories only?" (1977, p. 9). (The multivariate character of Cattell's work is an attempt at high breadth).

A related dimension is that of the completeness (or "scope") of a theory and its derivatives. A theory may, for example, generate predictions which are often confirmed but which deal with only a few aspects of the phenomena of interest. Ideally a theory should lead to accurate predictions which deal very generally or inclusively with the events which the theory purports to embrace. This has also been referred to as the "comprehensiveness" of a theory (cf., Hall and Lindzey, 1970, pp. 12-13).

We may usefully think of these two dimensions of completeness and range in parallel with Kelly's (1955)

distinction between the range- and the focus- of convenience of constructs and construct systems. A construct's focus-of-convenience is defined as the points within a broader realm of events where it tends to work best. These points usually comprise the special areas for which the construct has been designed. By limiting the realm of facts, it is thus possible to develop a detailed system of constructs without concern for the inconsistencies which other peripheral facts would reveal.

It is always tempting, however (as Kelly asserts), once a system of constructs has proved itself useful within a limited realm to try to extend its range-of-convenience. This is problematic only when we fail to recognize that what is reasonably true within a limited range is not necessarily quite so true outside of that range.

Thus, a given theory extremely successful within its intended range may possess extremely limited predictive value when operating outside of its customary "focus-of-convenience. In order for a theory to facilitate prediction, it must possess the characteristics of relevance and explicitness, i.e., it must be relevant to the situation at hand, and must be explicit enough to suggest implications for behavior.

Finally, it follows directly from this that a theories range and completeness must inevitably be affected by its level of abstractness. Decision as to whether one should work with simple isolated hypotheses, grand theoretical

systems, or "middle-range" theory structures the entire investigative process.

In a broad sense, the split between those investigators who stress the priority of theory over those who emphasize observation (or data) reflect the cleavage between investigators who are committed to a logico-deductive approach of continual modification and refinement of existing theoretical knowledge, and those who are oriented toward more radical discovery (sometimes guided only by vague questions and hunches which serve as the basis of the "generative" process).

This statement, however, should be qualified by the recognition that most research in psychology involves both "building up from the facts" and "deducing down" from conceptual elaborations. As Mills puts it,

> For the classic social scientist, to practice such a policy...is to state...problems in terms appropriate to them, and then...in the end of each completed act of study to state the solution in the macroscopic terms of the problem. (Mills, 1959, p. 128)

For Cattell, "The primary function of the scientist is to develop verified systematic theory" (Camilleri, 1962).

> Surveying facts, performing crucial experiments, trial-and-error forays with concepts and hypotheses--these are but...chores either loved or merely tolerated, by the participant scientist. Their aim is finally the production of a dependable comprehensive scheme for understanding. (Cattell, 1977, p. 10)

However, Cattell further notes that,

> Between this true vision of theory as the queen of science, and the view of theory entertained

> by the contemporary social academic...set, there is often sharp discord. Currently in psychology, for instance, several serious, outstanding psychologists (e.g., B.F. Skinner) have become critics of theory per se. The critics of too much self-conscious attention to methodology and philosophy of science to the point of degeneration of active research into scholarly posturing...and the prostitution of true scholarly aims to sophistry. The result has been that...(the study and teaching of)...pure theory...(devoid of empirical referents has)...come to be mistrusted. (1977, p. 11)

Still, regardless of the lamentations of their reprehensively inadequate past or present state, one is easily reminded of Mills' humorous admonition:

> ...neither method nor theory is an autonomous domain; methods are methods for some range of problems; theories are theories of some range of phenomena. They are like the language of the country you live in: it is nothing to brag about that you can speak it, but it is a disgrace and inconvenience if you cannot. (1959, p. 121)

Unfortunately, in considering the question of whether, and to what extent, human judgment should be guided by explicit theoretical considerations at each step in the investigative process, an inaccurate conception of the "objectifying" quality of both theory and scientific method gets dragged in.

It is frequently argued that "since human judgment cannot be avoided <u>in some</u> steps of the investigative process, the issue becomes one that pits 'common sense' against 'explicit theoretical orientations'."

> Abstract and simplify he will (this argument goes) whether the investigator uses a theory or not, but if he does not follow the guidelines of an explicit theory the principle determining his view will be

> hidden in implicit assumptions and attitudes of which he is unaware. (Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 14)

But such a view is too simplistic. While providing an overall guiding framework for organizing data, theories by their very nature, tend to focus on certain relevant aspects of behavior to the exclusion of others and in both positive and in negative ways bias perception. In this sense, distinctions provided by a theory (or arguments concerning a method) are merely promises (Mills, 1957). Elaborations of theories promise to alert us to distinctions in what we may see, or what we may make of what we see when we come to interpret it. (Statements of method promise better ways of studying phenomena and of answering the questions we wish to ask). But whether one employs a theory or not, a number of non-scientific assumptions affect and mold the formulation of the investigator's problem and structures the findings.

A major deterent to "objective" inquiry lies in the selective quality of the senses and in the biasing operations of one's conceptual system. This is both a strength and a weakness for in the face of some human affairs "objectivity" simply reflects "indifference" (the lack of human involvement), and, in others, it reflects "over-involvement" and lack of appropriate perspective. Such selective and organizational tendencies and habits involve (among other properties) the values of the investigator.

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not just the concepts he or she acquires during scientific training, that structures observations. These involve assumptions that are not necessarily associated with any specific substantive research area but which more generally affect the choice of areas to be investigated, the nature of the questions the investigator asks, and the techniques he or she employs in gathering data. These assumptions are different from (though they may be related to) those logical-theoretical paradigms (e.g., positivism, symbolic interactionism, structural functionalism and so on) in which the investigator formulates or tests his or her substantive generalizations. Thus, the investigator is not only affected by theoretical assumptions but also by the ideas, beliefs and values which he or she has acquired as a functioning member of society. Although this point may appear obvious, it is often overlooked.

As was indicated previously, many investigators often fail to discern many of the universal and idiosyncratic generalizations which shape their work. These constitute implicit theoretical frameworks which if explicated could be useful to the investigator in more actively determining the nature of and appropriateness of their role in a given body of research as regards its <u>intent</u> and <u>purpose</u> (which need not always be dispassionate analysis).

The question is not one of whether values and common sense should be involved in the scientific process, but rather it is a question of choice of analytic strategies.

In this regard it should be noted that there has been an increasing trend in the integrative areas of psychology (e.g., personality theory and general behavior theory) away from grand-scale theorizing toward an emphasis on investigation within limited behavioral domains. Despite such cyclical trends and the many substantial reasons for them, the individual psychologist's preference for one type of approach over others will be mitigated or supported by his or her skill at combining the elements of (a) a schema's testability and explanatory power with (b) its importance and scope. The models most likely to be of greatest value are those whose principle constructs are most successful in prediction within their specific focus-of-convenience and which, to some extent generalize to broader areas.

While Cattell does not formally identify level of abstractness as a descriptive dimension, his clear preference is for the multivariate development and testing of models. For Cattell this has to do with the transition from description of the immediate relations given in the data to explanation based on abstract concepts capable of leading to deductive checks in experiment. Through added experiment and reasoning the empirical construct makes progress toward a theoretical concept. Thus, the empirical construct gains "extra meaning," as it were, through induction and subsequent deductive check.

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speculativeness "if in broadening the empirical construct, we have unfortunately imported not extra meaning but surplus meaning, that is meaning not checked or checkable empirically..." (Cattell, 1977, p. 8). Concepts which embody a great deal of such surplus meaning may in some instances have high esthetic appeal and contain features that are peculiarly apt. This is particularly true of concepts developed from remote theoretical metaphors borrowed from other sciences to account for psychological data. Such metaphors can so easily intoxicate the imagination. But these imported intellectual goods have often "led many psychologists...to speculative and even grandiose explanatory models where a modest empirical construct, close to the data, would have served steady scientific advance better." (Cattell, 1977, p. 8).

If the metaphor succeeds it may well enrich the developing concept and the result is striking and enlighting. The important point, says Cattell, is that it usually does not. Often it is better to operationally define certain empirical constructs in a model (based on local properties which inhere in the phenomena) rather than to rely on over-abstracted untestable speculation or to import theoretical concepts from other sciences. The importation of surplus meaning is a danger to be set against the increased explanatory power of the enriched concept. "The temptation...is to introduce the grand theory too soon." (Cattell, 1977, p. 20).

Verifiability and Criteria of Confirmation

The central organizing questions (for the present work) concerning verifiability are simply: What kind of evidence and how much of it is required to reject or confirm a theory? It may be noted that this concern is somewhat different from those more frequently involved in considerations of verifiability. More typically, the theory is simply "assumed" and its verifiability is defined as its "capacity to generate predictions which are confirmed when relevant empirical data are collected" (Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 12). The latter position focuses narrowly on the success of predictions (or hypotheses) generated by the theory. The former focuses more broadly on several characteristics of the theory itself, its auxiliaries and operational derivatives.

The over-reliance of the pragmatic (or "pragmatic-correspondence") approach on the singular importance of "verifiability" as "ability to generate confirmed predictions" is inherently misleading. In most instances a theory does not stand or fall on the results of empirical studies alone--if for no other reason (though there are several) than that it is unusual for such results to provide unambiguous support (or clear disconfirmation) for a theory.

The degree to which a theory is supported by empirical evidence if complicated by the presence of several factors

including the quality, variety and precision of the evidence. The number (or extent) of confirming results, the degree of evidential variety, favorable versus unfavorable evidence, dual effects of experimental precision, the weight of past empirical results, and the role of auxiliary theories in subjecting the substantive theory to empirical test may be listed among the factors affecting the extent to which a theory is verified.

Verification is, then, an inductive process involving a number of evaluative dimensions. And efforts to increase a theory's chances of verification should begin in the early stages of the theory construction process. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish verifiability from testability, both being qualties we wish to build into a theory at early stages. For analytic purposes it is assumed here that a theory's verifiability is directly related to its degree of verisimilitude (or truth-likeness). In this sense a theory's verifiability relates to its representational qualities of semantic consistency, rage, completeness, explanatory power and goodness of fit and is distinguishable from its testability which relates more closely to its formal properties of clarity, explicitness, and logical consistency.

Characteristics of the Evidence

Before the design of relevant experiment, any theory must be translated into statements of expected

relationships. We may note that Cattell's preference in this regard is to utilize a Basic Data Relation Matrix (BDRM) composed of 10 Cartesian Coordinates involving five sets of entities: persons, situations, responses, environmental conditions and observers--or 11 coordinates with time added.

The purpose of this matrix is to help the investigator gain more adequate perspective on his or her area of concern and we have suggested some additional factors to be included. (See pages 11, 12 and 15-17). But regardless of whether some kind of Data Matrix is used for perspective, the theme of an investigation (which is itself affected by a number of epistemological and idiosyncratic factors) ultimately leads to a choice within the relational matrix of the theory of a particular set of relations to be empirically investigated. This choice also decides the experimental design of data gathering, which in turn, indicates in what manner the observations are to be recorded (cf., Cattell, 1977, p. 19).

A major element of problem selection which deserves further elaboration has to do with judgment concerning the nature and amount of support past research has given both to the specific postulates of interest and to the theory as a whole. It would seem unnecessary (but perhaps it is prudent) to note that this stage of the research process is quite crucial. Meehl (1978) has criticized the tendency of investigators to short-ciruit this stage of the

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investigative process by "counting-noses" in review tables which summarize the outcomes of various bodies of research in terms of statistically significant findings. To wit: A theory with seven facts for it and three facts against it is not a theory in good shape and it makes no logical sense to assert in such instances that the theory seems to be well supported, "although further research is needed to explain discrepancies" (cf., Meehl, 1978, p. 822). The reason that such a statement can make no logical sense, as Meehl points out, is that it totally neglects the crucial asymmetry between confirmation and refutation. That is, while we can only inductively infer that a theory (or hypothesis) has been supported by a variety of positive evidence, we deductively disconfirm the derivatives of a theory with much greater certainty. Thus, if our operations have been adequate and our bridging concepts or auxiliaries close to the intent of the theory, disconfirming evidence does far more damage to a theory than confirming evidence does it good (cf. Meehl, 1978, p. 822). One must especially assume this to be the case when only "counting noses." As Meehl notes, tables summarizing research in terms of patterns of "significant differences" based on null hypothesis testing (which is quasi-always false, Meehl, 1967, 1970, 1978) are little more than complex, causally uninterpretable outcomes of statistical power functions. Of course, "counting noses" or engaging in other allied activities such as "blindly" using tests validated in previous

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(context-situation-and population specific) studies is a poor way of doing science.

> ...when a reviewer tries to "make theoretical sense" out of such a table of favorable and adverse significance test results, what the reviewer is actually engaged in, willy-nilly or unwittingly, is meaningless substantive constructions on the properties of the statistical power function, and almost nothing else.
>
> This feckless activity is made worse by the almost universal practice of what I call step-wise low validation. By this I mean that we rely on one investigator to "validate" a particular instrument and some other study to validate another instrument, and then we correlate the two instruments and claim to have validated the substantive theory. I do not argue that this is a scientific nothing, but it is about as close to a nothing as you can get without intending to. (Meehl, 1978, p. 823)


Clearly, how strongly a hypothesis or a theory is supported depends on various characteristics of the evidence. (See Figure 1).

Quantity, Variety and Precision

At the simplest level we may consider the effect of the number of positive findings. In the absence of unfavorable evidence, confirmation of a hypothesis or a theory increases with the number of favorable findings--the increase in confirmation as a result of one new favorable finding becoming smaller as the number of previously established favorable results grows.

We may now qualify this with the recognition that a new finding which results from a different kind of test than those of the earlier findings will significantly enhance

Figure 1 Theory Testing: Factors influencing strength (weakness) of empirical support.



NOTE: P.I.A.W. refers to "Potential Interactions With"

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confirmation. Thus, confirmation of a hypothesis or a theory depends not only on the quantity of favorable evidence, but also on its variety--the greater the variety of favorable evidence, the greater the confirmation.

Usually, however, findings are not consistently positive. The impact of negative evidence complicates this basic theory of evidence considerably. It thus seems a little closer to reality to assert that the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis or a theory varies with the quantity, variety, comprehensiveness and precision of both positive and negative evidence.

We may also argue further that all of the factors mentioned above are affected by both epistemological and idiosyncratic choices. That is, decisions about how to vary the evidence (i.e., the qualification of certain ways of varying the evidence as "important" and other ways as "irrelevant" or "pointless") are based on the background assumptions which investigators entertain. Thus substantial bodies of negative evidence may not appear which might otherwise be available if these background assumptions were questioned and experimental variations accordingly introduced. In some cases, such changes amount to modifications in the total research paradigm and lead to scientific revolutions a la Kuhn, 1962. Though some have argued that psychology is in a pre-paradigmatic state (e.g., Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 15, as essentially does Kuhn, 1970, p. 15), the present writer disagrees. The paradigms in

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psychology may be less apparent than those in the hard sciences, but they are nonetheless irrevocably there. We will return to this issue when we discuss research on prejudice and cognitive styles. (That Kuhn would question whether paradigms exist in the social sciences is interesting since he also feels that without commitment to a paradigm there could be no normal science).

Finally, as implied in the above, a test can sometimes be made more stringent and its results more weighty by increasing the precision of the procedures of observation and measurement which it involves (cf., Hempel, 1966). But an improvement in instrumentation or other sources of experimental accuracy does not <u>necessarily</u> lead to better test of the substantive theory or its derivatives (Meehl, 1967, 1970, 1978; but see criticism by Oakes, 1975; Keuth, 1973; and rebuttal by Swoyer & Monson, 1975). Meehl, in fact, argues that

> ...an improvement in instrumentation or other sources of experimental accuracy tends, in physics or astronomy, or chemistry or genetics, to subject the theory to greater risk of refutation...whereas improved precision in null hypothesis testing usually decreases this risk. A successful significance test of a substantive theory in soft psychology provides a feeble corroboration of the theory because the procedure has subjected the theory to a feeble risk. (Meehl, 1978, p. 822)

This methodological caveat is indeed a cause for pause, because Meehl is directly asserting that the almost universal reliance on refuting the null hypothesis as a standard method for corroborating substantive theories <u>not</u>

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only has inadequacies (as many proponents of multivariate technique have asserted in the recent past[1]) but that it is clearly a mistake. In a broad sense, Meehl questions the efficacy of dependence on verbal precision in operational definitions and on the assessment of probabilities that a simple mean difference exists between groups. He argues, instead, for high-risk predictions (i.e., precise predictions which select narrow intervals or point values out of the range of experimental possibilities) which, ideally, enable the investigator to generate an expected curve for his/her experimental results. S/he could then plot the observed points, look at the agreement and conclude "The results are in reasonably good accord with theory."

When we cannot generate numerical point predictions,

1Cattell, for example, has offered four major dimensions of experimental analysis from which 16 types of statistical designs may be generated. These are: (a) extent of measurement--extended to vacant, (b) built in complexity--jejune to high structuring, (c) number of simultaneous relationships--one alone to general or group, and (d) information utilization--plenary to limited. These dimensions can be followed up elsewhere (see Cattell, 1966). But for present purposes, the second dimension of built in complexity of the model directly statistically examined is an important one. This dimension separates, for example, the results of a significance test by analysis of variance from a statistical test by factor analysis. The former involving a hypothesized simple difference of means. The latter involving analysis of a hypothesis that (a) a certain number of factors exist, (b) each is defined by a certain loading pattern, (c) that mutual correlations exist among them according to a defined matrix, and (d) that a certain super structure of higher strata factors exists.

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argues Meehl, it may be that we can at least predict the order of numberical values or the rank order of the first-order numerical differences. Sometimes it may even be possible to offer a "middling weak theory" that, while encapable of generating numerical point values, entails a certain function form such "a graph should be on ogive" or that it should have three peaks and that these peaks should be increasingly high, and that the distance from the abscissa between the first two peaks should be less than the distance between the second two (cf., Meehl, 1978, p. 825).

> Following the general line of reasoning (presented by myself and several others over the last decade), from the fact that the null hypothesis (taken literally) is always false in soft psychology, it follows that the probability of refuting it depends wholly on the sensitivity of the experiment--the logical design, the net (attenuated) construct validity of the measures, and, most importantly, the sample size, which determines where we are on the statistical power function. Putting it crudely, if you have enough cases and your measures are not totally unreliable, the null hypothesis will always be falsified, regardless of the truth of the substantive theory. Of course, it could be falsified in the wrong direction, which means that as the power improves, the probability of a corroborative result approaches one-half. However, if the theory has no verisimilitude--such that we can imagine, so to speak, picking our empirical results randomly out of a directional hat apart from any theory--the probability of refuting by getting a significant difference in the wrong direction also approaches one-half. (Meehl, 1978, p. 822)

Thus, for Meehl, the cooroboration yielded by "success" in refuting the null hypothesis is very weak and becomes weaker with increased precision, a problem worsened by what Meehl (1967) has identified as "experimental 'cuteness' and a free reliance upon ad hoc explanations to avoid refutation"

(p. 103).

It seems clear, therefore, that an increase in experimental precision should be accompanied also by stronger demands on the theory (i.e., in terms of the types of predictions put to test). One is reminded easily here of Popper's rather seductive admonition that "Science does not aim, premarily, at high probabilities. It aims at high informative content, well backed by experience...a hypothesis may be very probable simply because it tells us nothing or very little." (Popper, 1959, p. 146)

Obviously Meehl is correct in asserting that a theory which makes precise predictions and correctly picks out narrow intervals or point values out of the range of experimental possibilities is a pretty strong theory. But whether it is possible to develop such theories in the social sciences is difficult to assess. The current prognosis is rather poor.

It seems almost ironic in a sense that although many intrinsic subject matter difficulties contribute to this (including some 20 listed by Meehl, e.g., problems of adequate categorization of stimuli and responses, unit of measurement, nuisance variables, divergent and idiographic causality, unknown critical events, autocatalytic processes, random walk, the sheer number of variables both on the organismic and on the stimulus and response sides, cultural factors, context-dependent stochastologicals, feedback loops, and so on--see Meehl, 1978, pp. 808-817), that Meehl still

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feels the excessive reliance on significance testing to be partially responsible for the lack of theoretical power in social sciencing and the non-cumulative character of the enterprise as a whole. More ironic still is the point that Meehl may indeed be right. His point is well taken and difficult to avoid.

The Weight of Past Empirical Results

Meehl's observation that disconfirming results do a theory more damage than confirming results do it good is not only mitigated by the quality of the evidence on both sides (positive and negative) but also by the weight of past empirical results. Findings that are to dislodge a well-established theory or hypothesis have to be weighty and replicable. The greater the weight of past confirming evidence, the more difficult the theory is to dislodge. Consider, for example, a series of experiments. The first set of experiments may be said to test more specifically a hypothesis h_1, only a small part of the broader conjecture H. Hence, if h_1 should be true, but H false, the first kind of test will never disclose this. Similarly, the second set of experiments test a hypothesis h_2, which asserts H more distinctly than h_1 but still not nearly as much as H. Hence, if h_2 should be true, but H false, a test set of the second kind would never disclose this. Thus, the third set of experiments might be said to test H more thoroughly than the other two (cf., Hempel, 1966).. In this manner

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continual favorable evidence of a more varied and comprehensive sort lends increasing support to the conjecture H. It follows, the, that the credibility of a hypothesis would be adversely affected if it conflicted with a well-established theory and disconfirming results would be seriously questioned. Even when a "useful" theory has been found to conflict with an experimentally replicable "effect," it may still continue to be used in contexts where it is not expected to lead to difficulties (cf., Hempel, 1966). Few such "well-established" theories or hypotheses, however, exist in psychology.

The Role of Auxiliary Theories in Subjecting the Substantive Theory to Empirical Test

Although Popper's analysis (of which only a bare skeleton has been suggested here) is difficult to apply to the realm of social science, it has served to objectify the logical steps of the scientific method. Very briefly, the notion of falsifiability is central to Popper's argument. No theory, according to Popper, can ever be proven "true" with finality, but it can be proven "false" with finality. Popper thus equates the scientific method with negation of a particular type of logico-deductive system and its reconstruction in light of negative evidence, s/he must proceed as if the theory were true. Of the nature of this logico-deductive system Meehl notes:

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> Briefly and simplistically, the position of Popper and the neo-Popperians is that...all we can do is to subject theories to grave danger of refutation, in accordance with the formally valid fourth figure of the implicative syllogism...(if p then q; not q therefore not p)...Popper's famous modus tollens. (1978, p. 817)

A theory is "corroborated" to the extent that we have subjected it to risky tests, the more dangerous tests it has survived, the better corroborated it is--i.e., in Popper's language, it begins to look as if the theory has considerable verisimilitude or "truth-likeness." However (as Meehl reports) Feyerabend (1962, 1965, 1970, 1971), Lakatos (1970, 1974a, 1974b) and others have adjoined an important caveat to Popper's falsifiability requirement concerning the crucial role of auxiliary theories in subjecting the main substantive theory of interest to empirical test. Very simply,

> ...when we spell out in detail the logical structure of what purports to be an observational test of a theoretical conjecture T, we normally find that we cannot get to an observational statement from T alone. We require further a set of often complex and problematic auxiliaries A, plus the empirical realization of certain conditions describing the experimental particulars, commonly labeled collectively as C. So that the derivation of an observation from a substantive theory T amounts always to the longer formula $(R.A.C.)\supset O$, rather than the simplified schema $(T\supset O)$. The modus tollens now reads: Since $(T.A.C.)\supset O$, and we have falsified O observationally, we have the consequence (not (T.A.C.)). Unfortunately, this does not entail the falsity of T, the substantive theory of interest but only the falsity of the conjunction (T.A.C.)...so that the failure to get the expected observation O proves that (not T or not A or not C), which is not quite what we would like to show. (Meehl, 2978, p. 818)

The auxiliary propositions act as a protective belt, as it

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were, inhibiting disconfirmation of the theory. And even more vexing, is the recognition that the auxiliaries and conditions are frequently as problematic as the theory itself. Thus, as Meehl points out, one would normally say that the failure to be clobbered modus tollens by the outcome of the emirical study provides a moderate to strong cooroboration of the theory. That is, one would assume that (T.A.C.) is doing well. However, the classical Popperian requirement on playing the scientific game fairly involves the theoretician's saying, before doing the research, what would count as a strong basis for rejecting the theory. One will be commiting what amounts in spirit to a Popperian sin against falsification as a method if when the empirical research does not pan out as predicted, one does not abandon T but instead tells us that either T is incorrect, A is incorrect, or the conditions C were untrustworthy.

The stipulation beforehand that one will be pleased about substantive theory T when the numerical results come out as predicted, but will not necessarily abandon it when they do not, seems on the face of it to be about as blatant a violation of the Popperian requirement as one could commit. As Meehl points out, in a way the investigator is playing "heads I win, tails you lose."

But it does (also as Meehl suggests) seem in accordance with much scientific practice and common sense or intuition to say that if the combination (T.A.C.) generates

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a high risk numerical point prediction, such a result really does support all three of the components. (Note that the key here is the specification of a high-risk prediction. Otherwise, the argument does not hold as numerous experimental results which have been later found to be artifacts of instruments and testing conditions have shown). Thus, Meehl argues, because of the lack of intimate inner connection in the inexact sciences between the components of these conjunctions, it would strike us as a very strange coincidence indeed if the substantive theory T should have low verisimilitude and yet the two "wrongs" of T and A somehow systematically balance so as to generate a correct high-risk prediction (i.e., the same prediction generated from T and A both having relatively high verisimilitude).

> Such a delicate quantitative counterbalance of theoretical errors is not impossible, but it seems quite implausible, assuming that nature is (as Einstein says) 'subtle but not malicious.' So I think we are not being unreasonable to congratulate ourselves on arriving at a successful prediction of high-risk point values or other antecedently improbable observational patterns from the conjunction (T.A.C.), despite the fact that we seem to be hedging when we say before the fact that we will not consider our substantive theory T falsified by a bad result if it does not pan out. (Meehl, 1978, p. 821)

We may also, of course, conclude from this that (when it is possible) a test directed at the core of a theory (e.g., perhaps when T is clear, explicit and mathematically stark) will be more influential than tests directed at its auxiliaries. Along somewhat parallel

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lines, Zetterberg (1965) suggests that an impressive way of testing a theory is to use its component propositions to make one joint prediction and to demonstrate that this is an accurate prediction. But, however convincing this method may appear, it contains some problematic features. One is never quite sure of the solidity of theories confirmed in this way.

PRINCIPLES AND PROPERTIES OF COHERENCE

A central task of epistemology is to construct a systematic account of the principles by which the validity of statements may be peroperly assessed, as well as to provide the rationale for the principles on which statements, hypotheses, propositions, arguments or cognitive claims of any sort can be judged to be warranted either as cases of knowledge or in instances of brobable belief (cf., Nagel and Brandt, 1965).

However, adequate construction of the metapistemological problem of verisimilitude has yet to be provided (see Popper, 1976,1966; Tichy, 1974, 1976; Harris, 1974; Miller, 1972, 1974a, 1974b) as has been the case with the more traditional problem of defining criteria for judging the "truth value" of statements, propositions, hypotheses and the like. In regards to the latter, much debate exists as to whether statements are "true" based on their correspondence with some aspect of reality, their coherence with the totality of experience, their pragmatic value, some combination thereof, or whether the word "true" simply signalizes assent, endorsement, concession and the like.

Still, few social scientists would disagree with the notion that a theory which offers propositions which are consistent with each other and with the body of scientific knowledge and broadly defined experience, which correspond well to specified segments of reality, and, which, when

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called upon to meet the test of pragmatism, work is a pretty good theory, likely having a high degree warrant, probability or "truth-likeness." Few theories, however, would meet such stringent criteria. Further such composite criteria yield logical contradictions and lead to difficult decisions regarding the relative weight (or importance) of each of the components.

Clearly, we can never establish with certainty that a theory is true (or for that matter that the entities it posits are real). But to say this is not to disclose any peculiar flaw in our concern with a theory's "truth-likeness" (verisimilitude). Rather it notes a pervasive charactheristic of all empirical knowledge. At worst we are making guesses about the nature of reality. But it is not true that all guesses have an equal chance of being correct. It may be said that we attempt to improve the chances that our guesses about matters important to us may be right.

We may have no insight into the causal laws governing behavior, but nevertheless in deciding what these laws are we can be swayed by only two considerations. Either we must see the laws accepted to be those which can be reconciled easiest with our knowledge and experience, i.e., cohere best with it. Or we must see that the laws increase the coherence of our experience and knowledge by bringing together different elements of it under the same generalization, instead of several separate unconnected ones. We

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may, however, set stipulations regarding the breadth and the structural nature of what would appear to be sufficient knowledge. For example we have suggested the importance of cross-cultural and historical (and in other instances developmental and infra-human) perspectives. This latter point is crucial to the argument for coherence in a broad based psychology of human behavior.

Meehl has noted in his discussion of context-dependent stochastological factors which make prediction and interpretation difficult that the statistical dependencies we observe are always somewhat, and often strongly, dependent on the institution-cum-populations setting in which the the measurements were obtained. Thus,

> Lacking a "complete theory" of what influences what and how much, we simply cannot compute expected numerical changes in stochastic dependencies when moving from one population or setting to another. (1978, p. 814)

Without knowledge of other cultures in their own terms and appreciation of cultural differences what sensible psychologist upon encountering differences in behavior between culturally different groups as measured by mono-cultural tests and operations can do more than shrug? As we indicated earlier, we should expect that complex interdependencies, highly contingent relationships and context dependencies will characterize the relationships among the aspects of culture, personality and behavior. And we should find this comprehensible in scientific terms.

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device (see Kerlinger, 1973, pp. 216, 656) in presenting Herskovits' notion of the unlikely validity of every simple law regarding cultural human nature Campbell(1973) suggests that,

> For the social and psychological issues that concern the students of culture, higher-order interactions are the rule, and main effects, ceteris paribus generalizations, the rare exception. (introduction, p. xi)
>
> Interactions where they occur in the absence of main effects represent highly limited and qualified generalizations...(and) Even where we get main effects, it is certainly often due to the failure to include dimensions E, F, G, etc., which would have produced interactions. (introduction, p. xi)

In effect, both Herskovits and Campbell are making a generalization about the kind of generalizations that will be found tenable, a general law about specific laws, "a metascientific induction based upon firsthand experience and the anthropological literature" (Campbell, 1973, introduction, p. xi).

In this context the epistemic concept of coherence is particularly interesting since it implies much more than the usual textbook notion of logical consistency, is a much more specific (though broader ranging) concept than the loosely and idiosyncratically defined notion of "cognitive satisfaction," and it is both pre- and post- (not anti-) empirical. Clearly, in order to know the meaning of empirical data, we must have fitted them into some kind of system. We cannot know them, still less communicate our knowledge without classifying them and bringing them under universal concepts,

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and this already presupposes a conceptual system in the light of which we make all our judgments and which is tested by its ability to give a coherent interpretation of our empirical data. Although it seems obvious, it is important to point out that we must remember (with the exception of proper names) almost every word we use stands for a universal concept of one sort or another, and this means that it is part of a conceptual system which people have gradually built up in order to describe their experience to each other and interpret it to themselves. We cannot, for example (as some still argue we can) extend the principle of operationalism to its logical extreme and assert that concepts mean whatever we want them to mean, nothing more and nothing less. In doing so we assume the concept is nothing more than an arbitrary symbol. (The worse use of operationalism in this regard employs measurement operations to define the concept, rather than first defining the concept and then choosing the measurement operations most relevant for it). Words acquire fairly consistent meanings as conventions of usage for them develop. These conventions are not merely <u>syntactic</u>; distinctions between words generally coincide with perceived differences between events in experience. As Maddi (1976) suggests, "Denying this 'real' meaning of a concept...and defining it merely in terms of a set of measurement operations would lead us into...blind alleys" (p. 600).

<u>Coherence</u> implies that a true statement (or a good

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theory) must not only correspond (empirically) to some given segment of reality but that it must not only correspond (empirically) to some given segment of reality but that it must agree (cohere) with broadly defined experience. By analogy: In water an oar appears bent, but to assume that it is really bent would not agree--i.e., cohere well--with our experience of reality irrespective of whether we are actually rowing a boat or not.

"Coherence" describes an ideal. In a perfectly coherent system every proposition would entail all others, if only for the reason that its meaning could never be fully understood without apprehension of the system in its entirety. Since no system can be all inclusive and fully integrated, coherence admits of degrees--i.e., some statements, propositions, generalizations, conjectures, theories or cognitive claims of any sort are more coherent than others because they are closer to the ideal.

Certainly, something that we may describe as a coherence test would be used in deciding (when possible) between rival scientific theories. To be successful a theory must not only be consistent with empirical facts but must connect them in such a way as to bring them together into a coherent system whose rejection would be difficult (i.e., would entail the denial or contradiction of a number of other systems, theories, facts, and experience).

Thus, from a coherence point of view, explanation is the purpose and function of a theory. More narrowly,

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coherence also relates to the criteria by which we judge the adequacy, utility and validity of data used to support (or negate) a particular set of substantive generalizations.

Those social scientists who align themselves primarily with the correspondence and pragmatic points of view (more typical of the positivist tradition) contend that prediction is the key criterion for adequate explanation, and that the adequacy of one's data relative to one's hypotheses or theory lies in the resulting ability to predict patterns in a given realm. The positivist defends such a view through analogical alliance with the methods of the natural scientists, arguing for an exptensibly common method in the work of all sciences (natural and social). The pragmatist defends such a view on the ground that we cannot attain absolute truth and therefore must be content with what works--what is important is not theoretical truth but practical success. An extension or element of this position is the ability to control. If one is to control events, he or she must do more than predict; He or she must also be able to isolate some of the strategic variables that determine events and to detail the conditions under which these events occur (e.g., there is a vast difference between predicting that certain bonds of clouds will bring rain and preventing rain or bringing it about, Sjoberg & Nett, 1968). However, the nature of social reality, the social scientist's relation to his or her data, and ethical constraints impose functional limits upon both prediction and control (i.e.,

scientific knowledge and judgment or their application should not be equated with wisdom).

A broader (and more adequate) framework comes from a special variant of the coherence point of view. From this perspective, the major function of social science theory and research is to promote understanding. Thus to be adequate, social science must provide for the scientist and the laymen an orderly and integrated interpretation of the facts, data and fundaments of real world experience. (Psychoanalysis, for example, offers a dramatic illustration of the relationship of understanding to explanation, although it is difficult to empirically test, see Meehl, 1978). An on-going dialogue is a minimal essential condition for the attainment of this objective.

Further, coherence requires extension of knowledge to the maximum range of understanding. We have argued here, for example, that an increase (theoretical, methodological, and data-based) in understanding the range and variety of human experience, broadly defined to include cultural context is necessary; that social scientists must constantly strive against becoming captives of narrow enculturated perspectives and ethnocentric frameworks: that social scientists whose aim is to study human behavior in its broad sense must constantly strive to place their work in some broader crosscultural context. We will also argue that other social scientists with more limited ambitions should clearly specify their intended universe of generalization,

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and make only limited, non-comparative extrapolations beyond it. The practical demands of coherence (in this framework) is in part a function of the intended universe of generalization--the larger the intended universe, the more difficult (i.e., stringent) its demands. Still, we may gain better perspective on our own behavior (even when our generalizations are to be limited) through consideration of the behavior of others.

But most importantly, in our viewpoint, the activities of predicting, controlling (i.e., within ethical and cultural constraints) and understanding the wide range of human behavior can be subsumed under the framework of explanation (i.e., of increasing coherence). Such an emphasis suggests that:

> The theory construction process progresses in accordance with the theorist's purpose, providing three outcomes; (1) one may describe the what of the data and/or note relationships between "bits" of data; (2) one may predict a result based on an assumed relation between "bits" of data (and test the prediction); and/or (3) one may attempt to explain why the relationships exist as they do and how the lead to the results observed. Only the third outcome can be labelled a "theory." (Notestine, 1980)

To be successful, a theory must be consistent with empirical facts and predict subsequent events (indeed some degree of coherence is necessary to accomplish this) but it must also cohere with the broad range of scientific knowledge and human experience, not simply enumerating logically compatible facts but providing understanding of their underlying structure by bringing them together into a

coherent system whose rejection would be difficult (i.e., would require rejection of substantial portions of other knowledge and experience).

Having stated our alliance with a particular type of coherence point of view containing the specified elements of understanding, prediction and control within a broad based context of human behavior constrained by both cultural and ethical factors, we may now proceed to our discussion of the formal parameters and principles of paradigmatic fit. The central focus of paradigmatic fit is on a theory's explanatory power within specified universe of generalization--as expressed in its fit with the facts, fundaments and data of experience.

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PARADIGMATIC FIT

The concern here is with whether theories and their derivatives (in the form of postulates, hypotheses, operational definitions, and so forth) stand in certain relation to the phenomenon mentioned by them. Thus, we are not only concerned with whether theories "are supported by the data," per se, but also with whether there is a "paradigmatic fit" (to coin a phrase using the Kuhnian sense of the concept "paradigm") between the theory and the domain of study.

On reflection, this is very similar to the notion of content validation in the construction of tests. One difficulty in establishing such validation is that of adequately sampling the item universe. The behavior domain to be tested must in some manner be systematically analyzed to make certain that all major aspects are covered by the test items and in the correct proportions. Other difficulties arise from the possible inclusion of irrelevant factors in the test scores and their interpretation. Further, it is important to guard against any tendency to overgeneralize regarding the domain sampled by the test.

A theory should not only define its intended universe clearly, but should cohere respectably with it. Readers of the theory should agree that the postulates of the theory fit within the universe intended and that they are

reasonably distributed over its whole range, not confined to some narrow subuniverse. This must in eluctably be the case, unless theoretical concepts are to be considered merely nominal in nature.

I am not being anti-empirical when I say this. Clearly no statment or set of statments can be significantly proposed as a scientific hypothesis or theory unless it is testable, at least in principle, and can demonstrate some degree of predictive (if not practical and heuristic)utility. I am simply saying that it can be doubted whether there is a single accepted proposition of science which could be established by observation alone, a fact unaltered by the addition of deductive logic and mathematics (see for example Ewings discussion criteria of truth, 2965, p. 129).

Nor am I ignoring the place and significance of construct validation (see, especially, Roseboom, 1966, who thinks quite highly of construct interpretations and of construct validity as a scientific rationale; or Lovevinger, 1965, who is noted for her advocacy of construct validation tests). But construct validation in its strictest sense (i.e., the determination of the extent to which an operation or test may be said to measure a theoretical construct or trait, usually established through the gradual accumulation of information from a variety of sources and confirming the predictions of a given theory) does not insure paradigmatic fit. A theory's

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potency and survival value in terms of inherent adequacy of fit is only partically incured by construct validation procedures. While construct validation is significantly approximated (or supported by a potentially amazing variety of findings) the qualification (or choice) of certain ways of varying the evidence is truly problematic. What to consider as "important" in some ways or "pointless" in others is often based on background knowledge, assumptions, and/or previous research concerning the probable influence of the factors to be varied on the phenomenon with which the the theory and its hypotheses are concerned. As we have already noted, scientific revolutions (a la Kuhn, 1962, 1970) sometimes occur with the discovery that such assumptions, knowledge and so forth are incorrect.

Paradigmatic fit is conceived to involve an early match between facts and theory and continual check for such a match throughout the investigative, interpretive and revisional process. Construct validation would be subsumed under this process.

The first two criteria of paradigmatic fit:

1. Before selecting the units from or about which data are to be collected, the investigator should have a clear conception of the ultimate range of his or her generalizations. He or she must decide which groups (or kinds of groups) of persons and events are to be the basis of his or her generalizations. This is to

be accomplished by generation of a clearly elaborated and defined relational matrix of persons, responses, background conditions, environmental conditions and observers which includes both historical and comparative perspectives and selecting from this relational matrix what appear to be problems of structural significance.

2. An essential step in conceptual clarification of the selection procedure is distinguishing between the special, or working universe and the general one. We may, in effect, define the general universe as the abstract universe to which the investigator assumes, however, tentatively, that his or her findings apply. Earlier we implied this in our discussion of Cattell's notion of expanding empirical constructs such that they gain "extra-meaning," as it were, while avoiding importation of "surplus meaning" unchecked and uncheckable within the domain of either present or extended investigation. The special or working universe, then, may be defined as the more concrete system of relations from which one is to select his or her data.

Practical and theoretical Basis for Selecting a Special Universe

In the main we can say that the investigator's broad orientation (including scientific and nonscientific,

universal and idiosyncratic assumptions that are not necessarily associated with any specific substantive research area but which more generally affect the choice of areas to be investigated, the nature of the questions to be asked, the techniques employed in data gathering, and so forth) and the logico-theoretical paradigms (e.g., positivism, naive realism, etc.) in which the investigator formulates or tests his or her substantive generalizations faciliate both selection and generalization when these are made explicit. For example, investigators committed to discovery are likely to approach the selection process quite differently than those seeking to test existing hypotheses or theories by searching for confirmatory evidence or by attempting to disprove the theory or some of its elements. (Given our present orientation of systematic development of theory, we have incorporated aspects of both discovery and check by adopting with modifications what Cattell has labelled an "inductive-hypothetico-deductive" spiral).

Thus, one compelling reason for selecting a particular universe is the hope of uncovering new factual data or the germ of a new theory. Here the investigator may enter the "field" (i.e., the broad relational matrix) with various alternative hypotheses, even hunches, none of them clearly formulated, but with the expectation that new ideas may emerge from this effort at discovery. However, as we have indicated earlier, the success of the generative (or

"discovery") effort is likely to increase with a thorough familiarity with the phenomena of interest as well as with knowledge of established theories and facts concerning it.

But whereas some researchers are seekers, others are believers and skeptics more deductively oriented in their scientific approach who wish to test the limits of existing theory (with the agnostics and benevolent eclectics waiting to respectively crticize or give general credence to at least the intent of the results). Since these particular issues have been of central concern in the present work, we will also indicate that it is interesting that in actual practice few researchers explicitly seek a working universe with the intention of disproving a particular hypothesis, especially given the importance of "negative evidence" in the scientific method (see the earlier discussion of Popper, pp. 14, 39-42; and comments by Meehl, pp. 32, 39-42) in comparison to the necessity for accumulative confirmatory inductive support.

Finally, other investigators may be more interested in checking the validity of earlier findings or interpretations. In these instances, the investigator stresses the need for replicative research. Principles of universe selection in regard to such research is well understood and needs no further explication here.

These activities of discovery, testing for confirmatory or disconfirming results, and application of findings may (and to some extent, if the research has any importance, will)

be followed up in others work. The ideal investigative schema, of course, involves all three.

The preceding analysis also applies to work both within a specified socio-cultural context as well as to broader work outside by including it. As the social scientist, seeking to encompass other sociocultural systems within his or her general and/or working universe, vaults the boundaries of his or her own culture, the route to success, however, becomes still more precipitous. One will remember that the present work has argued for, at least, the inclusion of a cross-cultural comparative component in the Data Relations Matrix from which one gains perspective on the phenomena of interest. Whether one chooses to generalize cross-culturally, however, is a function not only of attaining adequate perspective but also of direct inclusion of cross-cultural samples in the working universe). In this context, I have argued elsewhere (Stokes, 1978, "The neglect and misuse of ethnic variables in psychology: the future of an illusion") that we don't yet have a psychology of "human" behavior, in the broad (or intended) sense of that term, and have suggested alternative ways in which we might proceed if we were about the business of developing one.

In whatever decision domains we isolate this issue (or locate it), investigators are, in an epistemological (or if one prefers, a scientific, or ethical) sense, obigated to specify and define the universe to which they would like to

generalize their observations. To the extent that such obligations are honored in the future, we can anticipate advances in clarity and rigor of conceptualization (Stokes, 1978) and in behavioral observation (see, for example, Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972, also their earlier work referred to in this 1972 publication and criticisms especially by Loevinger, 1965, and Thorndike, 1967).

We have not noted (but should note) a somewhat obvious fact; that is, the investigator's selection of a special universe is also constrained by availability of data, resources, convenience, concern with practical ends, chance or fortuitous factors, and other pragmatic and social factors stemming largely from the context of the broader social matrix in which the scientist works. Although there is little hope for eliminating some of these factors, the investigator should, when evaluating his or her findings, objectify the role these variables play and thus achieve some measure of control over them.

It is significant, by the way, that we speak of expert selection of the special universe and not of random sampling. The latter refers only to a technique for selection of units within the special universe once it has been selected. (The selection of a working universe is sometimes conflated with the determination of procedures for selecting units within it--the most widely employed procedure being random sampling).

Extrapolation to the General Universe

Clearly, what is to be explicitly represented in the definition of the universe of generalization is a matter of judgment and an expression of the current state of substantive knowledge. Loose inferences will undoubtedly continue to be made and it appears less profitable to discuss the inquities of loose inference than to ask what rigourous inference regarding universes could be like. As the possibility of rigor becomes clearer, it will be increasingly possible to formulate statements and investigations that permit better inference.

As we have mentioned earlier, we cannot simply induce theories from some straightforward upward seepage of "clearly observed facts" or data. What is more broadly required are methods closer to a "Millsian" sense of scientific investigation: "a developed carefulness and attention to detail, a habit of being clear, a skeptical persual of alleged facts, and a tireless curiousity about their possible meanings, their bearing on other facts and notions" (Mills, 1959, pp. 126-127).

The investigator should be emersed in the immediate data, have sensitivity to good syntactical and precise representational qualities in the model, and have a well rounded historical and comparative perspective. He or she should explicate his or her theory with "a constant eye" on the basic data relations matrix to bring out the necessary

parts and implications of the model in a way that might permit rejection of many false proposals at an early stage. Further, the investigator should attempt to verify his or her conceptions at the early stages of analysis through empirical and non-empirical consensual means.

Verification through Non-empirical Means: The Meta Framework for Paradigmatic Fit

The dialectic process is perhaps the major means of insuring fit, of clarifying hidden issues, and of objectifying the scientific and non-scientific premises that guide social scientists in the collection and analysis of their data. What it potentially provides is a widespread, formal and informal interchange--a review, as it were, of one's work, a discussion of the elements and interrelationships postulated by one's developing theory.

Apart from drawing on one's own knowledge and experience and the information available in one's own field, the investigator should talk with others who have had experience with (and others who have thought about) the issue and problems with which the investigator is concerned. (Ideally these interactions should become cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary depending on the kinds of generalizations the investigator wishes to make). Such interaction should concern (1) the clarity and representativeness of elements and definitions of the developing theory, (2) the logical relations between these definitions

and elements, (3) the elimination of false views due to omission of needed elements, improper terms, or undue emphasis on some part of the range of the given phenomena of interest, (4) contrasting or discriminant phenomena which serve to sharpen and clarify meanings, and (5) statement and re-statement of the questions and propositions that remain. The third step, especially, is a very necessary but often neglected part of any adequate formulation of the area of investigation. The danger of this process, of course, is that one can drown in it. There must also be time for thinking and re-integration. One must know when to talk and when not to. Just as one must know when to read and when not to--there are points when reading is essential, points when one ought not to, and times when one needs to go back and re-read more specifically, or in more concentrated fashion, areas covered before.

If one wishes to generalize to some small subpopulation of persons, this task is much more easily manageable than if one wishes to generalize to "human" <u>behavior</u>. This point is crucially important.

Herskovits asks a question which should cause no little perturbation among psychologists and other students of <u>human</u> behavior:

> How was it possible for the earliest anthropologists, the evolutionists, and so many of those who have come after them, to disregard what would seem to be the crucial, and at the same time the very obvious point that any study of man which does not

> originate in the study of men is a contradiction in scientific terms? (1960, in Herskovits, 1973, p. 243)

Unless one chooses to dispute the humanity of many diverse peoples or else assume that they are all basically Americans in diverse national-cultural garb, whites in black, red, yellow and brown skins, and so on, the point becomes quite obvious. One cannot develop a legitimate psychology of human behavior from a non-representative sample, nor can one legitimately use the average or modal behaviors of an unrepresentative sample as a criterion on whcih to judge the behaviors of others unrepresented in the formulation of the concept being investigated and unrepresented in its associated validation.

Studying comparative crosscultural samples, however, is no assurance for obtaining greater scientific range, import and power. It is, however, a prerequisite. Social scientists who analyze other social systems may become as ethnocentric as those whose interests are confined to their own culture and social order. A.L. Epstein's remarks are pertinent here:

> There are always certain dangers inherent, I think, in the approach of the anthropologist. Caught up in the minutiae of events which make up the social life of the community he is studying, he sometimes finds it difficult to avoid over-emphasizing the unique features of "his" community at the expense of features held in common with similar communities in less "exotic" regions. (Epstein, 1958, p. 224, cited by Sjoberg & Nett, 1968, p. 230)

The scientists' immersion in a sociocultural system may

lead him or her to exaggerate the uniqueness of particular patterns within that system. It may lead to a failure to notice significant aspects of another culture, misinterpretation of behavior, inappropriate attributive projection and so on.

Herskovits, with introduction by D.T. Campell, Cultural Relativism, 1973) come as no surprise in this regard. Herskovits (like most anthropologists since Boas and Malinowski) believed that extended and thorough participation in another culture was the most available therapy for the natural ethnocentrism of the ethnographer. He believed that in this experience sensitive anthropologists regularly discover themselves to be much more ethnocentric than they had anticipated--even those who went into the field with prior feeling of alienation from their own culture. Such experience, plus an intellectual understanding of enculturation and ethnocentrism and analysis of one's own cultural experience (which I have argued should also be personal, see Stokes, 1979) were the methodological curbs he recommended to increase the objectivity of anthropology.

> It must well seem paradoxical to those whose thinking dichotomous, that is was precisely through following the dictates of science that we were enabled to proceed from the study of men to the study of Man... The unicultural nature of humanistic scholarship has served to restrict the outlook of scholars precisely where the greatest breadth of vision is called for. With some feeling for the cross-cultural point of view, we would have been spared the ethnocentric distortions of a T.S. Elliot, whose concept of culture is limited by the horizon

> not only of his own way of life and of his time, but even by his particular sub-culture. We would be spared equally the ethnocentric pretentiousness of a Spengler or a toynbee, whose views of history have been limited by their commitment to the value of their own historic stream. (Herskovits, 1960, in Herskovits, 1973, pp. 242, 261, 262)

Earlier we mention that in deciding what laws govern behavior we can be swayed by only two considerations. Either we must see the laws accepted to be those which can be be reconciled easiest with our knowledge and experience, i.e., cohere best with it. Or we must see that the laws increase the coherence of our experience and knowledge by bringing together different elements of it under the same generalization, instead of several separate unconnected ones. We may now integrate these considerations more firmly into our conception of paradigmatic fit.

In the former instance since we have defined knowledge and experience in a broad-based fashion (e.g., to include historical and comparative elements), we may suggest that descriptions of reality from the perspective of the enculturated historical actor are essential to the development of broad-based structural concepts of human behavior. (Further, concepts developed from such perspectives give us a better basis for understanding our own enculturated behavior).

In one sense, the willingness to recognize the centrality of the actor's perspective relativizes the scientist's viewpoint, and provides opportunities for the latter to be redefined. That is, if social scientists

are to comprehend behavior in the broad sense of the term, they must learn better how "to take the role of the other" (to use Mead's terminology). They must understand the enculturated actor's view of social reality, his or her symbols, attitudes and values (cf., Weber, 1964).

But it is also true that the actor looks to the social scientist to provide structure and explanation (synthesis rather than amalgamation)--a larger, more comprehensive understanding of individual, group, social, national and cross-cultural motivation and behavior--explanations unbounded by (but applicable to) the private orbits of everyday life. The social scientist too seeks explanations below the level of the "generally known." Here we move to the second point, that we should see the laws of behavior derived as increasing the coherence of our knowledge and experience by bringing together different elements of it under the same generalization. Here the focus is on synthesis and structure. The task of the scientist here is to understand, compare and synthesize data. We should not be scientists if we were content with the description, or even the analysis, of discrete blocks of facts, without relating them to a larger whole.

Thus, it is important to recognize that in the present framework there is no necessary contradiction between the scientist's and the actor's frame of reference. Testing of specific, relatively limited hypotheses (through dialogue) and coming to understand reality from

the viewpoint of the actor, relying on the actor's own categories to capture his or her world of meaning do not stand in contradiction in the present model. Rather these two (usually divergent) approaches can be encorporated nicely in an interactive inductive-hypothetico-deductive spiral.

It should be made clear that we are not proposing that the social scientist begin with the actor's orientation and then impose the scientific categories of the investigator on these for the purpose of analysis, just as we are not proposing that we begin with the actor's categories and impose these on social reality for the purpose of analysis. We are describing an interactive, comparative process which of necessity entails respect for both systems. As the reader may remember, we have argued that the actor's perceptions provide opportunities for the scientist's viewpoint to be redefined.

Unfortunately, we have not taken full advantage of our access to cultural, historical, and subjective aspects of human experience--factors which many positivists look upon as handicaps to scientific inquiry, but which in fact may be regarded as distinctive advantages which we have over the natural scientists--i.e., we can "get inside," "ask questions," "check conceptions," and generally "talk with" our subject matter. Too frequently we underestimate the value of our subjects and are reluctant to discuss our "complex," " not easily understandable," or "superior"

knowledge with them for comparative purposes or for purposes of assessing coherence with everyday reality. The demand characteristics which we fear so much in such situations I am convinced are artifacts of the way we "do" experiments as well as byproducts of unskillful interviewing and artificial and mechanistic questioning (or something other than sincere interest in the way the subject sees his or her world). One is reminded of the anthropological caveat that psychologists ought to know more about the people they study.

It is not always clear that we need to lament the complexity of our task in comparison to that of the natural scientists. The complexity should be what draws us to it. (A disinclination for such complexities, by his own admission, led Einstein away from the social sciences and toward physics. By conscious choice or through lack of such insight, the student of human behavior has made the other choice). It is clear, however, that

> ...to come to an orderly understanding of men and societies requires a set of viewpoints that are simple enough to make understanding possible, yet comprehensive enough to permit us to include in our views the range and depth of the human variety. (Mills, 1959, p. 133)

Verification through Empirical Means: Multivariate and Bi-variate Designs within Inductive and Deductive Strategies

The following strategies derive from the considerations discussed in this chapter and seem to be consistent with our major premises.

During the information assimilation phase (just described in the foregoing section) some initial conjectures will be formulated concerning the definitions and interrelationships of concepts to comprise our theory. Beginning with a tentative definiton of each concept at a relatively descriptive level, demarcating some of its main properties, we proceed to carefully select and/or develop multiple measures and operations which appear (on face) to index the concept. In addition, measures and operations should be selected from which the concept should be clearly discriminated.

Once having decided on the appropriate measurement operations for each pretheoretical concept, the task of assessing the adequacy of these measurements and operations may proceed. Evidence for the contention that our measures get at some entity (i.e., have empirical reality) is provided by demonstration of internal consistency and stability in measures constructed and measures selected (if, in considering the proposed context and population sample, sufficient reliability, has not been previously demonstrated).

The next step is to test our structural hypotheses about the nature and organization of and the interrelationships among our concepts as operationalized through factor analysis of data obtained from new testing using measures having demonstrated reliability (internal consistency and stability) only. If our past work has been done well (and

likely with some degree of luck!), our factor clusters will correspond to our pre-empirical conjectures concerning the nature of and relationships among concepts. If predictions fail, we will (hopefully) find some patterns of covariation in the data which, more than any others, give hope of support and the beginnings of reality to our concepts and their interrelations. We may then wish to "mark" factors by selecting saliently loaded variables, and use the pattern of interrelationships observed as new hypotheses about the nature and structure of the phenomenon indexed. We will then proceed to design new measures to test these hypotheses, subject the resultant data again to factor analysis to determine if predicted structures emerge. In this manner, we reform our concepts in light of the evidence, re-enter experiment for another empirical check in an iterative process until predicted relationships emerge. Except for some exceptional instances, a continuing intellectual adjustment of initial hypotheses to the verdict of the data is necessary. Rarely do investigators define their pre-theoretical conjectures about concepts and their interrelationships in all their polished elaborations.

We must consider, however, that in attempting to clarify the nature and structure of each concept, there is always the danger of psychometric drift as a result of refinement of measures and theoretical reflection on the matrix of convergent and discriminant validities (the

latter to be encorporated subsequently). This also generates, via our reliance on contextual definitions of concepts, an associated conceptual drift, a meaning shift (Meehl, 1978). Drastic revision, in effect, constitutes change in the definition of the concept especially if we have selected our measures carefully from the beginning and have defined them in a relatively "descriptive" manner. Difficult interpretive and research strategy problems arise here: On the one hand we encounter the danger that the resulting conceptual drift has pulled us away from what we started out to measure. But we also recognize that part of the research aim is precisely that of bringing about revisions of concepts on the basis of revisions in the "nomological" network that defines them (Meehl, 1978).

There is, in effect, the problem of "openness" in developing theoretical constructs. (Three kinds of openness have been identified by Meehl, 1977, 1978--any or all of which may be present in a theoretical construct). There is

> ...(a) openness arising from the indefinite extensibility of our provisional list of operational indicators of the construct; (b) openness associated with each indicator singly, because of the empirical fact that indicators are only probabilistically, rather than nomologically, linked to the inferred theoretical construct; and (c) openness due to the fact that most of our theoretical entities are introduced by an implicit or contextual definition, that is, by their role in the accepted nomological network (rather than by their ontological structure or composition). (Meehl, 1978, p. 815)

This becomes a problem since few psychologists believe in

strict operationalism--i.e., that the "meaning" of a concept is determined by the measurement operations associated with it. But measurement operations usually do add a shade of meaning of their own and reconsideration of the "meaning" of a concept after measurement operations have been accomplished is likely to obtain.

In defense of the method offered here we will argue that the contribution of measurement operations is subordinate to the substantive contributions of defining the concept in a meta-framework of consensual validation and the initial selection of measurement operations on this basis. The need for extensive revision, however, is an early clue that one needs to rethink concepts (perhaps at both descriptive and abstract levels). One characteristic of a good measure is that it helps to clarify the concept to which it refers (Scott, 1966).

The next step in our empirical anlysis is to check the validity of our measure through convergent and discriminant methods (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). Bivariate and other manipulative designs may then be used to test more specific hypothese. The preference in the present approach is for heavy reliance on our meta-framework for substantive development of our intial conjectures about concepts and their interrelationships. Factor analysis is employed to check and further revise and reconstruct our conceptions--our conjectures, in effect, being "disciplined" by the data before preceding to manipulative designs.

Attenuating Considerations

We have recognized the importance of internal consistency of measures, but as Maddi (1976) has pointed out, exactly how internally consistent a measure should be before one may conclude that it reflects something real is a ticklish question. For some concepts one might expect a high degree of internal consistency because, conceptually, the range of behaviors comprising it could be small and very similar to each other. But other concepts may be inherently more heterogeneous. It is clear, then, that the degree of internal consistency expected depends partially on their postulated nature. Nonetheless, unless measures have at least moderate internal consistency there is little empirical ground for considering it to reflect a genuine entity. Liekwise, how stable we expect a measure to be is once again a partially theoretical question depending on the nature of the concept assessed by the measure--but as with internal consistency, there must be at least moderate stability before one has grounds for considering the measure to reflect a genuine entity.

A common problem is that the tentative concept may not be as basic (or irreducible) as it might have seemed, in which case when we attempt to measure it, we will find a lack of internal consistency because the measure incorporated disparate parts (again see Maddi, 1976). (On the

other hand, if our concept is conceived to be multi-dimensional, we will wish to assess internal consistency within factors instead).

In addition to these considerations we should also be aware that the problem of locating factor patterns (or unities) for complex concepts can be a somewhat subtle process (see, for example, Gorsuch and Cattell, 1977). One may wish to retain (i.e., give trial acceptance) to factors having less than desirable loadings or homogeneity when complex concepts are suspected. While in such instances one may increase the risk of over-extracting factors are insufficient they can be identified as such on further rotation. An unextracted factor is lost forever. Again, at least a moderately high loading on what appears to be a reasonable pattern of interrelationships of measures and a low (near zero)loading on other factors should be required before giving trial identity to the factor. Such problems require, of necessity, some degree of judgment.

Thus our next four principles of paradigmatic fit:

3. The meta context of paradigmatic fit requires dialogue as a structured part of the investigative process to enhance coherence of the developing theory not only with established knowledge (scientific, historical and/or literary) but also with the facts and fundaments of experience. The investigator should seek persons who have had varying degrees of

experience with (and others who have consistently thought about) the issues and problems with which the investigator is concerned. Such interactions should concern the clarity and representativeness of definitions, the logical relations among them, elimination of false views due to omission of needed elements, improper terms, or undue emphasis on some part of the range of the problem being investigated, contrasting or discriminant analysis to clarify definitions, statement and restatement.

4. Because the selection of content and the relative stress on different types of content to be addressed in a theory usually involves values (and since values may differ among people, and hence they may differ on what constitutes proper coverage), the values behind the construction of a theory should be made explicit. Further, it should be indicated how those values guided formulation of the theoretical matrix and its content. (The reader is also referred back to page 74.)

5. A broad historical and cultural perspective should be included during the early stages of the formulation process to provide an adequate basis for interpretation irrespective of whether the investigator intends to generalize to all of human behavior or to cross-cultural populations. When such generalizations as the latter two are to be made, culturally

representative sampling at the data collection level is also required.

6. As the investigator gradually clarifies his or her concepts and their interrelationships, he or she should carefully check on predicted structural relations (i.e., the nature, organization and interrelationships among concepts through multivariate methods before preceding to bivariate or other manipulative designs. Unfortunately, in seeking to clarify concepts through empirical means, there is often some conceptual drift based on psychometric properties of the measuring instruments and the procedure used to combine and compare the data obtained from them. Such drift at times threatens to pull the investigator away from what he or she started out to measure. In defense of the methods proposed here, we have argued that (a) the contribution of measurement operations to the meaning of the concept is subordinate to substantive considerations developed earlier in the meta context of fit which served as the basis of concept definition and of selection and development of instrumentation to index such definitions, (b) that a good measure helps to clarify the concept to which it refers, and (c) that part of the research aim is precisely to bring about revisions of concepts on the basis of empirical evidence. The need for substantial (i.e., extensive revision, however, is

an early clue that one needs to rethink concepts perhaps at both descriptive and abstract levels.

Formal Principles for Theory Construction: Nexus with Paradigmatic Fit

Early in the construction process we should strive to build in the characteristics of good theory. Above all, "theory" has to do with paying close attention to the words one is using, especially their degree of generality, their logical relations and their representational quality (which we have earlier described in terms of syntactics, semantics, range and comprehensiveness).

We should not forget that what we are after is the minimum complexity necessary to fit the facts and that an unnecessary number of assumptions does damage to the coherence of a theory. Those assumptions which are employed should be explicit, clear and consistent with one another; they should be relevant in that they bear upon the phenomena with which the theory is concerned, and they should be predictive concerning events within the theory's substantive domain.

The theory should begin at relatively descriptive levels, gradually tying togther (more firmly) structurally significant elements, avoiding the tendency to introduce the "grand theory" too soon. (The use of "grand theory" in this rather loose sense expands the range of applicability of this basic principle from elaborated abstractions

concerning large systems such as self-concept, personality, and behavor--for which the appelation of "grand theory" most correctly fits--to elaborated abstractions concerning specific psychological processes and subsystems, e.g., concerns with sex-role functioning, competence motivation, field sensitivity, or ethnocentrism and racism).

We would avoid generation of gradiose and untestable assumptions on the one hand, but we should not limit our explications to only the "clearly observed facts" or data on the other. Data should be used to check structural conjectures derived from our meta empirical context and to generate further conjectures previously unconsidered. The argument for strict and immediate testability of all postulates, judgment of their other internal and external properties will have to suffice until some difficult issues of method and assessment are resolved. Other elements in the theory's nomological network may not be subjectible to test. Externally, the meta context of fit provides a good non-empirical testing ground for these hypothetical dimensions. Internally, these elements of a theory must meet the other criteria ascribed as characteristic of good theory. (To avoid unnecessary redundancy the reader is referred back to pages 23-38).

In the final analysis, any model is likely to omit important features of a "full-bodied reality." However, representational sufficiency in a model is essential. This representational quality has to do not only with the

finding of relations (and empirical laws) and the development of empirical constructs into theoretical entities but also with the theory's fit to the facts and "fundaments" of real world experience. This requires clear definition of the intended universe of generalization and consensual agreement regarding the theory's coherence with it, as well as developmentally data-based verificational support.

Clearly, then, it takes much more than a few commonplace phrases to specify the domain of investigation with any useful precision and definitions of universe which determine exactly what variables do or do not fall within their scope. However, such specification should operate ultimately to increase the accuracy of theoretical predictions. It will make the application of theory more cautious and will encourage the development of concepts more suitable for generalized application. This and the establishment of a working meta context, multidimensional check on developing concepts prior to test of the theory, and encorporation at the early stages of development considerations of characteristics of good theory (characteristics on which the theroy is to be subsequently evaluated) constitute at present the basic organizing principles of paradigmatic fit (with more detailed and important specification within each of these four areas provided).

Paradigmatic Fit as a Basis of Theory Evaluation: A Forward

Many of the theories to be reviewed in the present context lack this quality of fit because the theories themselves have failed to incorporate so mudh of the phenomena that they have attempted to describe, predict and explain. In what seems to be an apparent ignorance of this problem, theorists have intended to over-extend their concepts and researchers to misinterpret results and over-generalize their constructs and conclusions. Many empirical studies which are not strictly comparable but related only in gross fashion are typically combined to give "support" to theoretical tenants or as a basis for generation of subsequent research problems--a practice that commits one to some kind of methodology wherein conceptual modes of analysis devoid of considerations regarding empirical procedures serve to organize available data. Statements of the following form are typical though one may question their generality and meaning. One author (who we will leave anonymous here) reports:

> In recent years there have appeared a number of investigations on the relation between social attitudes and cognitive functioning (thinking, memory, and perception)...the great majority of these...(has focused on)...ethnic prejudice, or the authoritarianism conceived to underlie it (Adorno et al., 1950). Some of the major findings that come out of such studies are that persons who are high in ethnic prejudice and/or authoritarianism, as compared with persons who are low, are more rigid in their problem-solving behavior, more concrete in their thinking, and more narrow in their grasp of a particular subject; they also have a greater

tendency to be intolerant of ambiguity. (1960, p. 16)

Upon close inspection, however, a reviewer can make no theoretical sense out of this framwork, for (in truth) the results are mixed and many of the concepts confusing. Conceptual limits, test limits, contextual limits, and the nature of the smaples investigated all enter in to render this mass of results limited at best and ambiguous at worst. Put very simply, the question remains: What about the variety of prejudiced people who do not fit into this framework?

Taking the defined relationship between prejudice and problem-solving rigidity alone generates a morass of confusion in attempting to empirically define the rigidity factor. Luchins' (1942) Water-Jar test on which the measures of rigidity in the cited studies were based depends on the persistence of an experimentally induced set. Subjects are taught, through repeated performance on a series of trials, to solve some arithmetical problems according to a rather complex procedure; then they are given problems which can be solved more directly. Persistence with the complex solution is commonly taken as a measure of rigidity. Variants of this Einstellung task have been developed for other kinds of behavior: object sorting, mazes (Cowen et al., 1953; Luchins and Luchins, 1959), word definitions (Pitcher and Stacey, 1954), anagrams (Goodstein, 1953). Scott (1966) has seen only two cases in which tests of this kind were administered to the same group of subjects in order to determine the degree

to which "rigid" performance on one predicted "rigid" performance on the other. Cowen, Wiener, and Hess (1953) report a significant correlation of the Water-Jar test and an anagrams variant, but not with a structurally similar "motor maze." Goodstein (1953) found no correlation between the Water-Jar Test and an anagrams variant. Such studies themselves may be inconclusive, since (as Scott points out) the Einstellung effect is normally overcome through insight, which could very well transferfrom one problem to another. It is hard to tell, therefore, whether susceptibility to problem-solving set is a general trait, or a response disposition that is specific to a particular measure.

Unfortunately, the work of Luchins and Luchins (1959) was built almost exclusively around a single measure, the Water-Jar test. Scott (1966) argues that were it not for its provocative critique of the problem and wide-ranging attention to many central empirical considerations, this work could almost be dismissed as misspent effort, for there is no way of determining the degree to which the obtained correlates depended on the intended attribute, "rigidity," and the degree to which they depended on extraneous characteristics of the particular measure used. This criticism is especially apt given some psychometric deficiencies of the Water Jar Test (Levitt, 1956).

In spite of some early provocative results by Rokeach

(1948) concerning the correlation between Water-Jar performance and ethnocentrism, and a subsequent refinement by Brown (1953) to the effect that this relationship appears best under conditions of ego involvement, later studies have failed to replicate either of these findings consistently (French, 1955; Levitt, 1956). Scores on the Water-Jar Test evidently do not correlate consistently with other tests intended to measure "rigididty" (French, 1955; Levitt, 1956; Oliver and Ferguson, 1951; Goodstein, 1953; Guilford et al., 1957). It may be that "rigidity" is not germane to ethnocentrism and "authoritarianism"; it may be that different kinds of rigidity have to be specified, depending on the kind of task involved. But settling for such interpretation on the basis of the evidence underlying the 1960 quote cited, would presuppose the validity of the Water-Jar Test which is hardly established. Compound this uncertainty with the possibilty on the other side of this paradigmatic coin (i.e., the measurement of prejudice) that concepts and measures of prejudice are suffused (and potentially confounded) with notions of cognitive simplicity when cognitive simplicity may reflect the style of only certain types of prejudiced individuals and not others (e.g., the variety of prejudiced, racist, or ethnocentric persons who are not just "simple-minded bigots" and who have elaborate justifications for their attitudes) and a major source of the present confusion becomes more evident. The entire area of prejudice, ethnocentrism,

racism and their relations to numerous dimensions of cognitive functioning needs to be re-investigated and better fit obtained.

On a broader level, however, most theories, concepts and operational definitions of racism, in particular, lack good paradigmatic fit. Further discussion of this problem will be part of the focus of chapter two in which we will critique current concepts and theory's of racism and contrast them to some alternative conceptions developed in the context of achieving better fit.

CHAPTER II

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PARADIGMATIC FIT TO THE ANALYSIS OF RACISM AND ITS RELATION TO COGNITIVE STRUCTURE

Overview: Scope and Rationale of the Present Research

In explaining the origin and meaning of racism, it has become almost ritualistic to invoke psychiatric (as opposed to more generally "psychological") concepts. The roots of prejudice and racism are frequently sought in the "sick personality," the "sick white psyche," in frustration-aggression, projection, anxiety, and guilt--suggesting (in most instances) that racism necessarily reflects psychopathology. At one extreme, for example, Horheimer in his preface to The Authoritarian Personality speaks of an "authoritarian type" or "spedies" who "In contrast to the (old style) bigot...seems to combine the ideas and skills which are typical of a highly industrialized society with irrational or anti-rational beliefs. He is at the same time enlightened and superstitious, proud to be an individual and in constant fear of not being like all the others, jealous of his independence and inclined to submit blindly to power and authority" (Adorno et al., 1950, preface, ix).

While some bigoted individuals may be painted in such

a fashion, making the equation between indiyidual racism and psychological aberration a tempting one, this depiction appears both limited and flawed when taken to represent the broad spectrum of racism in the individual domain (not to mention, of course, the institutional and cultural domains which intentionally were not the focus of Adorno et al.s work).

An apparently important source of past limitations has paradoxically been a sincere concern with understanding the personality of the "bigot" who becomes the instrument of violence, resists enlightened argument, and harbors feelings of avoidance, dislike or pathological hatred. But another, and perhaps less defensible source of limitation, stems for a tradition in contemporary social science which suggests that brighter individualized are naturally repelled by racist ideas and by antihumanistic values, naturally gravitating toward more broadly humanistic and non-racist perspectives. This "liberalistic" paradigm is insufficient for understanding racism, conceiving as it does "tolerance" and ethnocentric "equality" as the basic for healthy human relationships. Appreciation of variety and difference and greater sensitivity to the functional equivalence of culturally diverse behaviors and knowledge-based indentification are the bases from which more broadly pluralistic and non-racist functioning must emanate. Neither the idea of intellectual enlightenment as the progenitor of anti-racist values, nor of the

bigot being the central problematic individual figure is borne out by history or experience. In the former instance many social analysts, including Hamilton (1971) have incisively demonstrated that several intellectuals have have historically been quite sympathetic to racism, facism, colonialism, and a host of other ideologis, behaviors and behavior systems destructive of human survival and integrity (also see, Jacobs, Landau, and Pell, 1971; Schwartz and Disch, 1970; Silberman, 1964; Thomas and sillen, 1972; Ladner, 1973; Guthrie, 1976). The habit of considering racism as a mental quirk or as a psychological flaw should be abandoned. Racism, although unhealthy individually and socially (in a broad sense) has historically been "normal" and continues to be a normative influence. It is stressed that the persistence of racism is rooted in its normative character and in the instrumental significance it acquires for the individual.

As will become apparent from the material which follows, racism, far from being only the product of a bigoted and ignorant minoriy is conceivec to be a product of individual, group and institutionalized activity within history and culture through which races are identified or "created," oppressed, dehumanized, derrogated, aggressed against, and suppressed. It is, in part, a set of beliefs whose structure arises from the encultured and normative assumptions made aobut the world, oneself and others who are racially different, and from patterns of one's social,

political and personal activities. A basic dimension underlying racism is insensitivity to one's basic humanity and/ or to the cultural context of one's existence. In contrast to prejudice, racism is not limited to simplistic stereotypic thinking, unjust practices, discrimination and intolerance. Its fabric arises from a racially ethnocentric normativity in the culture and in the congruence between the individual ego and the broader culture, i.e., in the adoption of its broader assumptions and norms. (Bigotry is taken to be one personal need-centered manifestation of individual racism the dynamics of which have been thoroughly explored in the traditional literature of the field).

The switch in focus from a highly specified set of norm-violating attitudes to a highly generalized set of normative opinions, beliefs, attitudes, and ideas about other people in the world is an important conceptual shift. As opposed to simple race and ethnic prejudice which by virtue of its nature requries anachronistic violation of ideal social norms, racism requires only conformity with the prevailing zietgiest of the times. One might easily expect a wider range of conceptual differentiation among systems of racist thinking, than among systems of "narrowminded" prejudice. Prejudice conceived to be non-normative and structurally simplistic whereas racism is far more normative and has greater structural variability.

From a broader psycho-politico-cultural perspective, Fanon (1967) has cautioned against the habit of considering racism as a mental quirk or as a psychological flaw. Racism although unhealthy individually and socially (in a broad sense) has historically been "normal" and continues to be a normative influence. In fact, it would seem that the very persistence of racism is rooted in this normative character and in the instrumental significance it acquires for the average enculturated individual. (The reader is referred to the subsequent sections on "The Problem of Whiteness and the Search for an Authentic Identity," and on "Racism, History and Identity."

Unfortunately limited efforts toward a more broadly psychological (as opposed to narrowly "psychiatric") approaches have not served us well either. The traditional psychological approaches have not quite grasped the meaning of individual racism because they typically have not developed terms for conceptualizing its socio-cultural context. Habits of designating the socio-cultural environment in terms of "situational factors," "group psychological phenomena," or even "institutional behavior" cannot take account of the socio-cultural environment as a pervasive actuality. In a limited sense, this observation is nothing new. Pettigrew (1958b) argued for the inclusion of "psychological" and "sociological" facors in the analysis of prejudice observing that,

> ...it becomes increasingly apparent that the psychological and sociological correlates of prejudice are elaborately intertwined and that both are essential to provide an adequate theoretical framework... (p. 29)

For Pettigrew, exclusive focus on the personality of the bigot to the neglect of his or her culural milieu or on cultural norms to the negledt of individual differneces is insufficient. Studying authoritarian tendencies in two cultures (South Africa and the Southern United States), as Pettigrew (1958b) proceeded to do, however, hardly seems paliative.

Cronbach (1957) in a much broader sense has called for an integration of personalistic and situational approaches to the study of human behavior in general. Extending this line of reasoning further and applying it to our present concerns we may not that the absence of a true socio-cultural perspective on most psychological variables still remains to be the case. In this regard the work on prejudice, racism and ethnocentrism remains unexceptional. As Notestine (1980) has noted,

> The interaction of the situational context, the entire sociocultural milieu, and the individual..,becomes an extremely complex and multidimensional focus of inquiry, requiring...far more sophisticated means of determining the relevance, interrelationships, and result of the factors involved. Although more recent theoretical positions in personality theory...have recognized and begun to clarify some of these factors...their focus on person and situation variables is a focus of convenience, neglecting the more difficult and problematic inquiry of the determinants and influence of broader social/ institutional structures and systems. (p. 9)

The focus of psychological approaches to analysis,

understanding and explanation of racism, ethnocentrism and prejudice must shift their narrow concern situational factors, inter-group behavior and the intra psychic dynamics of the individual to an analysis of the structure of the social organization and cultural settings in which the person develops and behaves, and to the interpsychic relationship between the person and the cultural milieu its structure and dynamics. This is very close to a Millsian sense of social analysis. For Mills,

> It is the...task of the social scientist...continually to translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into terms of their human meaning for a variety of individuals. (1959, p. 187)

At the individual level, racism, ethnocentrism and prejudice occur within the range of the individual's immediate relations with others. Accordingly analysis of individual racism, ethnocentrism and prejudice lies with the individual within the scope of his or her social and cultural milieu. On the other hand, the "issue" of racism (using Mills sense of the word) transcends the local environment of the individual and range of his or her inner life. It has to do, instead, with the organization of many such immediate individual social mileux into the "institutions of an historical society as a whole." Altering of prejudiced, racist, and ethnocentric responses and presumptions which often sets up conflicts not easy to resolve--identity conflicts of self in relation to socio-cultural systems and to to others within those systems.

In the latter instance, presumptions are held by more nebulously defined "publics" with which the individual identifies, feels indifferent to or alienated from. Altering of prejudiced, racist and ethnocentrism institutional arrangements, depending on the individual's relation to and understanding of the scope of these arrangments and how s/he and diverse others are broadly affected, produces threat of a different sort which may also be addressed at the individual level of analysis (through both idiographic and nomothetic techniques), but nonetheless reducible to a question of identity (in a psycho-social-cultural sense).

In total, the present research is predicated on the observation that central psychological aspects of individual racism have been neglected and/or ignored in the empirical and theoretical literature of psychology. It is suggested that because psychologists have limited themselves to studying only overt and simple forms of racism apart from a larger socio-cultural context, they have also limited their potential for developing more comprehensive and usable theories of racism. In all it appears that the content and structure of individual racism, the phenomenological base from which it emanates, and its relation to the broader social morphology of its institutionalized forms are poorly, if at all, understood by most contemporary theoreticiams and researchers in psychology.

With such a perspective in mind, a more formal critique of the varying positions and major theories which offer postulates about racism and/or ethnocentrism and/or prejudice is in order. In the following sections we shall explore and critique various major theoretical formulations of racism, prejudice and ethnocentrism extant in the contemporary field. Following this we shall offer the beginnings of an alternative formulation--an organized body of "pre-theoretical conjectures" established in the meta-contextual framework (see section in chapter I on paradigmatic fit) employed in the present research. The reader, however, should not misconstrue the term "pre-theoretical conjecture" to mean armchair speculation or idiosyncratic, idle or poorly formulated propositions. The term reflects the fact of the stage-like progression of empirical deductive and inductive work in the construction of theory, and the fact that empirical support for these conjectures becomes part of the "stuff" from which subsequent theories derive.

The reader is reminded that the criteria outlined in chapter I for achieving "good" theory are quite stringent and include the establishment of empirical and meta-empirical suport from the early stages of construction to help insure that theories fit the facts and data of their intended universe (i.e., domain of study).

CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF RACISM, ETHNOCENTRISM AND PREJUDICE

The task of critiquing the various theories of prejudice, racism and ethnocentrism is not as simple as it might seem from the standpoint of deductive logic. Psychological theories of prejudice, racism and ethnocentrism encompass a wide variety of viewpoints reflecting the divergence of psychoanalytic, behavioristic, and cognitive positions and their numerous descendents. Some have remained within the specific shcools from which they developed, others have crossed the conceptual boundaries, but the most influential have been amalgams of schools of psychological thought.

It appears advisable to approach this diversity by critiquing what appear to be distinctive approaches to conceptualizing the nature and dynamics of these variables. Some theorists in the context of a much grander theory have applied some small aspect of it to the analysis prejudice, ethnocentrism or by implication and inference to racism. Some of these analyses will be mentioned only in the context of developing specific concepts or in talking about postulated relationships (see, for example, the discussion of the Freudian concept of "group narcissism" and the neo-Freudian construct of "self-esteem" in the subsequent discussion of the nexus of ethnocentrism with racism).

Under the heading of frustration-aggression-displacement

theory, we will borrow primarily from the version developed by Dollard (Dollard, 1938; Dolard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) although the theory has no doubt been independently invented, part by part, elsewhere (cf., Levine and Campbell, 1972).

The theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950) overlaps frustration-displacement-aggression theory and is of central interest in our present analysis since it concerns itself with individual differences and makes important statements with regard to cognitive and emotional processes involved in ethnic and racial prejudice. As developed by Adorno et al. (1950) the authoritarian personality approach represents a complex precipitate of psychoanalytic ego and self-esteem theories, frustration-aggression-displacement theory and cognitive psychology. It has been the most singularly important theory regarding individual, need-centered prejudice and has represented for many the personality approach to prejudice and racism, providing hypothetical links between "prejudice" as a cluster of attitudes toward outgroups and (a) attitudes toward sociopolitical structures and relationships, (b) cognitive styles, (c) child rearing practices, and (d) family structures as it impinges on the developing child.

Apart from the authoritarian personality theory, the frustration-aggression hypothesis and the concept of displacement of aggression, there have been numerous

theoretical developments by Freudian, neo-Freudian, and behavioral psychologists to employ or reformulate psychoanalytic concepts in the investigation of prejudice and racism. Many of these formulations overlap others encompassed by frustration-aggression-displacement theory and authoritarian personality theory but have the considerable advantage of being less ambitious in scope, providing greater specificity and testing the limits of their respective concepts.

Cognitive psychologists have offered some clear alternatives to psychoanalytic and behavioristic approaches to the study of prejudice and racism (although as mentioned cognitive factors have been integrated into some of the more amlgamated theories). This is most clear in the study of stereotypes (e.g., Allport, 1954; Allport and Kramer, 1946; Cambell, 1963, 1967 and many others--see for example the review by Gardner, Rodensky, and Kirby, 1970) as a clear alternative to the psychoanalytic orientation to view stereotypes, the objective realities of group characteristics, and intergroup contact. Cognitive structure theorists have also made important contributions to the study of racism and prejudice. Rokeach's work on belief-systems theory (1960) and the organization of values (1973) are well-known examples. Numerous applications of cognitive consistency theory (balance, congruity and dissonance) and a great deal of work on cognitive simplicity, narrowmindedness and the like has been done in the context

of racism and prejudice.

The importance of frustration-aggression-displacement theory, authoritarianism and more purely cognitive orientations reflected in the work on dogmatism and belief systems theory and on stereotypy warrant some explication of their premises and predictions. Under the assumption that the reader is familiar with these theoretical orientations, a brief critique is offered and the relative merits of each for our analysis of racism is considered. Unfortunately, the fit between these theories and the racisim in its broad psycho-social-cultural manifestations leaves much to be desired.

The Mechanisms of Frustration-Aggression-Displacement

Given our present orientation toward the importance of socio-cultural context in the analysis of individual racism it is important to note that frustration-aggression-displacement theory is not a purely psychological theory but represents an integration of psychoanalytic and behavioristic premises with sociological considerations. As we have indicated, under the heading of frustration-agression-displacement theory we may place the bulk of theories since 1930 that explain prejudice through psychological factors operating in a social context (see for example, Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1939; Dollard, 1938; and also reviews of its status by Berkowitz, 1962, McNeil, 1959, Buss, 1961, Yates, 1962, and

Levine and Cambell, 1972). The most characteristic predicitons of the theory come from the application of the displacement principle: more specifically, the postulate that retaliatory aggression (the response) generated by frustrations of the ingroup (the stimulus) are generalized onto the outgroup. This postulate, more conventionally called "scapegoating," best epitomizes the central focus around which this body of theory moves.

As stated concisely by MacCrone (1937):

> The greater the discipline of group life, its repressions, privations and exactions, either in the form of moral, religious, or ceconomic sanction, the greater we can expect its aggressiveness to become at the expense of some other group or groups. (p. 251)

Social life is seen as requiring a partial restraint, inhibition, suppression, repression and hence frustration of individual impulses and desires. (Group discipline, self-denial, postponement of gratification, hard work, self-sacrifice are all frustrating). Frustration and restraint on impulse are said to generate hostile, retaliatory, aggressive tendencies normally directed at the perceived source of restraint. However, the expression of aggression against the direct sources of restraint reduces societal coordination, interferes with collective action, is encompatible with authority systems (i.e., is societally maladaptive) and therefore (in successful societies) is selected out.

Learned anticipatory pain from aggressive acts comes

to inhibit the aggressive act from being directed toward the instigating source and so generalizes to other objects which are in some ways similar to the source but have less retaliatory power. This shift in aggressiveness away from the instigating stimulus onto some other object constitutes displacement. The best displacement object is one which can be readily distinguished from the instigating source (person, authority, or group). Such an object then becomes the target for aggression. Displaced aggression produces guilt, and since guilt is painful the object contiguous with guilt arousal becomes a target of hostility. (One now becomes hostile toward the displacement object because one has aggressed against it!) Thus aggression is seen as both a response (resulting from frustration) and as a stimulus (to subsequent feelings of hostility).

Displacement may also, of course, be facilitated by provocation from the displacement stimulus. Thus if an outgroup is also in its own right a source of frustration, the displacement mechanism is facilitated--or as Dollard (1938) suggests, "Justifiable aggressive responses seem to break the way for irrational and unjustifiable hostilities." Finally, it is added that groups institutionalize the displacement of hostility and aggression onto specific outgroups a process which is facilitated if (a) the expression of hostility and aggression has cathartic value, (b) it does not lead to more frustration

and pain, (c) tradition leads ingroup members to perceive the target outgroup as cause of their frustration, and (d) the outgroup is portrayed as a threat and a danger such that the ingroup dare not be weakened by internal strife (Levine and Campbell, 1972).

But where is racism and predudice in all of this? The dynamic interrelationship of displaced aggressions, the formation of hostility and guilt, and the process of institutionalizing such hostile tendencies and aggressions toward specific outgroups are no doubt important in the development of many hostile social attitudes and behaviors, including those allied with racism and prejudice. The theory does not lack relevance but rather it lacks specificity. A related problem has been the inability of this theory's proponents to explain the selection of a target for displaced hostile and aggressive impulse in unencumbered terms! Williams (1974) suggested that the target must be visible and that it must have little power to retaliate. The displacement principle calls for a clear distinction between objects agains which one cannot aggress and objects against which aggression may be expressed. The best displacement object has visibility (Young, 1932, Williams, 1947) and can readily be distinguished from instigating and powerful sources. Many objects, however, may have visibility and little power to retaliate. To explain why some particular object becomes the target of intense hostility it becomes

necessary to invoke additional hypotheses--e.g., the symbolization of that which the person or ingroup detests (Dollard, 1938), such as fraud (Ichheiser, 1944), paternal authority (Levinger, 1936), successful conconformity (Tarachow, 1946), urbanism (Rose, 1948), capitalism (Beard, 1942), capitialism and communism (Reisman, 1942), the devil (Trachtenberg, 1943), and Christ and christian morality (Maritain, 1939). Others have suggested the dislike of a group for its differences (e.g., Berkowitz and Green, 1962), and more specifically for those dislikes differences unconsciously recognized and rejected as potential characteristics of the self (Ackerman and Jahoda, 1950; Fenichel, 1946). Thus terms foreign to the theory are frequently added in (also see, for further example, Levine and Campbell's 1972, discussion of the role of imitiation and conformity in the institutionalization of cathartic and hedonistic displaced aggressive response), Such formulations however appear to derive from a mechnaical application of *a priori* theory rather than painstaking study of the facts. Prejudice and racism become lost in a morass of theoretical derivatives.

Further, the psychoanalytically based concept of aggression (as it appears in this body of theory) is too global, covering too many different kinds of behavioral acts, carried out for different kinds of reasons and with different consequences. In addition, as Allport

(1954) observed, the theory fails to supply many needed differentials such as why some people respond to frustration in an aggressive manner, why some types of frustration are more likely to induce displacement upon outgroups, and why some people hold the displacement tendency in check.

This entire body of theory sees, in effect, the complete explanation of racism and prejudice in a single mechanism. That displacement (or "scapegoating") is involved is tenable but that this process should hold the "key" to racism and prejudice is highly doubtful. Again, the abstractions offered by frustration-aggression-displacement theory are too broad to be critically applicable to the study of racism and prejudice. They could easily refer to more general forms of group-conflict, outgroup hostility, interpersonal strife or negativity in any from of evaluation (i.e., we find the theory most frustrating in this regard and, hence, a likely target of aggressive and hostile criticsm and being powerless to defend itself such criticism can be made explicitly direct).

Authoritarianism

Under the more individualistic, need-centered approaches to the study of prejudice is the singularly important theory of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno

Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, 1950). Few concepts have received so much attention in the literature of the social sciences. "First, because the concept represents an attempt to link deep seared personality dispositions with socially significant forms of belief and social behavior involved in adhering to a rigid and dogmatic ideology and in discriminating against outgroups. Second, in The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno et al. (1950) provide a set of scales to measure it that could be employed in a wide variety of laboratory and field settings" (Shaver, 1969, p. 211). This work foreshadowed much later work on rigidity and simplistic information processing and still remains a theory rich in testable hypotheses.

The authors of The Authoritarian Personality (also see the extensive and richly descriptive work of Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948a, 1948b, 1951, and Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford, 1945) interpreted "authoritarianism" as an outgrowth of early childhood experience where parents use harsh and rigid forms of discipline and make their love and approval contingent on an unquestioning obedience from the child. Submission to authority is based on fear of punishment and retaliation and the repression of resentment (i.e., to avoid retaliation or deprivation of benefits). Thus fear and dependency not only prevent the child from any conscious criticism of the parents but even lead to an acceptance of punishment and to an

"identification with the aggressor." As Frenkel-Brunswik (1948a) outs it, "The fact that the negative feelings against the parents have to be excluded from consciousness may be considered as contributing to the general lack of insight, rigidity of defense,, and 'narrowness of the ego'" (p. 301). The "anti-weakness" attitude found seems thus to be related to the fearful submisison to authority: The child responds to rigid parental discipline by developing a strong hostility toward the parents which is too dangerous to express; rigid repression of hostility toward the parents leads to an identification and idealization of authority, and it is this repressed resentment toward authority whcin is displaced upon "inferior" or "foreign" groups.

The parents of authoritarian children are said to show an exaggerated concern with social status, based on rigid and externalized sets of values. What is socially accepted and what is helpful in climbing the social ladder is considered good. What deviates, what is different, and what is socially "inferior" is considered bad. Often being socially marginal, and finding this difficult to accept, the parents of authoritarian children wish to belong to socially preivileged groups. The less they can accept their marginality, the more urgent becomes the wish to belong to such groups. "This leads to the development of a kind of collective ego which is very different from genuine group identification and which must be

assumed to contribute to ethnocentrism. With this narrow and steep path in mind such parents are likely to be intolerant of any manifestation on the part of the children which seems to deter from, or to oppose, the goal decided upon. The more urgent the social needs of the parents, the more they are apt to view the child's behavior in terms of their own instead of the child's needs" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948a, p. 302). Since the values of the parents are outside the child's scope, yet are rigorously enforced, only a superficial identification with the parents and society can be achieved.

The parents' concern with social status and with rigid rules and discipline is said to be at least a contributing factor to the tendency of the child to expect (and give) social approval on the basis of external moreal values. He or she comes to condemn others for their non-conformity to such values and conformity is seen as an all or none affair. "...conformity to approved social values is based on fear of retaliation by society for disobedience rather than on a real incorporation of those values. In order to conform, (the individual)...demands a set of inflexible rules which he can follow, and he is most at ease when he can categorize and make value judgments in terms of good or bad" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948a, p. 303).

This "inflexibility" of the authoritarian child is part of a broader texture of rigidity and incapacity to face

ambiguous situations. Intolerance of ambiguity comes to be found in the individual's conception of parents and in his or her conception of sex roles. The other sex is conceived as an outgroup to be segregated. Sex roles are rigidly dichotomized. Masculinity (versus femininity) is associated with strength (versus weakness) and the individual is intolerant of passive manifestations in males or aggressiveness in females. This intolerance toward the manifestation of "opposite sexed traits" in himself/herself or in others makes for poor heterosexual adjustment and strained relation to one's sex role. But intolerance of ambiguity is also present in the general organization of the perceptual and cognitive field and represents a more generalized approach to the solving of problems even in fields where there is not social or emotional involvement (see disseration by Rokeach later published, 1948). Ideas and tendencies which are non-conforming and which do not agree with rigid, simple and prescribed solutions have to be repressed and displaced. When displaced with the social sphere, this is expressed in an overly moralizing authoritarian or generalized manner. The choice of simple solutions reduces some repressed anxietyies and obviates the possibility of seeing (or admitting) weakness or shorcoming in the self.

The anxieties and insecurities of the authoritarian child also are expressed indirectly (e.g., in a greater readiness to conceive of dangers and catastrophies in

the outside world, to feel helplessly exposed to external powers and to subscribe to bizarre and superstitious beliefs). Thus, the personality structure of the authoritarian child is similar to that of the authoritarian adult. But while this personality pattern seems quite firmly established in the adult, it appears in the child as incipient, or as a potential direction for development.

Thus, as elaborated by Adorno et al. (1950), individuals who are high in atuhoritarianism are rigid, extraceptive, repressed, conforming, stereotypic in their thinking and intolerant of ambiguity. As adults, authoritarians tend to exhibit conservative attitudes although showing few signs of having developed an organized socio-political outlook. They tend to automatically support the status quo. Their approach to social issues is characterized by ehtnocentrism, that is, by a tendency to hold in high esteem one's own ethnic or social group and to reject everything that is different. Their behavior is conventional. They seem to have little familiarity, however, with their inner lives. Instead there is a rather generally externalized orientation. There is an aversion agains emotionality as well as against expression of certain basic needs (which are projected onto others) particularly in regards to sexual and aggressive themes. There is a compulsive adherence to rigid prejudices.

In a descriptive sense, there may be much validity to this formulation of a certain constellation of personality attributes for which the term "authoritarian" is quite apt. It is also not unlikely that individuals with this personality pattern may show more extreme forms of prejudice as well as other forms of bigotry (religious, anti-foreign, etc.) and that such personalities may gravitate more than others toward ideologies that preach hatred and contempt for groups perceived as "alien." One would be hard pressed, however, to argue that prejudice is confined to authoritarians or that prejudice is produced (as in the manner the theory derives it) by authoritarianism.

It is quite plausible to assert that if prejudice manifests itself in the behavior, language and attitudes of individuals then its roots may lie in infantile stages of psychological development but the case for prejudice being rooted in the organization of particular personality types would be a difficult and likely specious case to make. While the authoritarian personality theory has much greater relevance and specificity to the analysis of prejudice and ethnocentrism than most (if not all) of the theories to be discussed, its focus on personality alone is too narrow neglecting the broader socio-cultural mileux and investigating, for the most part, solely the personality of the "bigot."

Since the publication of The Authoritarian Personality

several criticisms have been leveled both at the theory advanced to explain authoritarianism and the methods used to identify it (summarized in Christie and Jahoda, 1954; and in Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967). All of these criticisms, however, remain within the "liberalistic paradigm" (see pages - in the present work) defining the lack of prejudice in terms of tolerance and rationality. Frequently, prejudice and racism are almost totally lost within an alternative framework such as thoughmindedness-tendermindedness (Eysenck, 1954), dogmatism and opinionation (Rokeach, 1960), machiavellianism (Christie, 1954) and so on. Others have argued that to date it is still impossible to offer a concise, coherent picture of the authoritarian personality and that much more fruitful work could be done using only parts of the syndrome rather than the range represented in the original (1950) work (Robinson and Shaver, 1969). Some studies attest to the validity of the original conception of the authoritarian "syndrome," while others contribute further questions or add to confusion (see the excellent and comprehensive review and summary of "the dimensions of authoritarianism" by Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967). Methodological questions regarding the Anti-Semantism, Ethnocentrism, and F scales of the California study, as well as Rokeack's Dogmatism Scale have also been raised such as those of acquiescence set (see Cronbach, 1956; ouch and Kenniston, 1960; Rorer, 1965; Block, 1965;

Campbell et al., 1967; Rokeach, 1967; Samelson and Yates, 1967; Bock et al., 1969) and in the case of the former measures of confounding of authoritarianism with level of education and socioeconomic status (Christie, 1954). Clearly, however, with this pardigmatic context--whatever conceptual scheme ultimately accounts for the relations among bigotry, rigidity, dogmatism, ambiguity intolerance and the liek will probably not be unrelated to the richly descriptive work of Frenkel-Brunswik and her colleagues on The Authoritarian Personality.

Stereotypy and Simplistic Information Processing

In his explications of the nature of prejudice Gordon Allport has noted that, "Whatever our values may be, prejudice is a fact of mental organization and a mode of mental functioning" (Allport, 1950) among whose characteristics are fallacious overgeneralization, prejudgment, misjudgment, stereotyping, perseverative mental sets, categorical thinking, and a need for certainty (Allport, 1954). Some clear alternatives to psychoanalytically and behaviorally oriented theories have been offered by cognitive psychologists. Much of this work has been concerned with the nature of stereotypy and with the nature and the organization of the attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and values of prejudiced (as compared with "unprededuiced") persons and has concentrated on differences in the way prejudice people (as opposed to

unprejudiced or "tolerant" ones) handle information at their disposal and on how characteristics of prejudiced thinking may be related to larger systems of personality. Many investigators have observed differences in "cognitive style" between "individuals who are highly tolerant and those who generally reject members of other ethnic groups," and have argued that such differences play an important role as determinants of individual differences in overall level of prejudice. It has been reasoned that "To the extent that prejudice is defined as a failure of rationality, it follows necessarily that there will be some differences in the characteristic modes of thinking of prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals" (Harding et al., 1969, pp. 36-37).

From this perspective, the beliefs, perceptions and expectations that the individual holds in regards to various (or specific) persons and groups may potentially vary along a number of structural dimensions. They may be simple (or undifferentiated) to complex (or differentiated), central (or salient in consciousness) to peripheral (or embedded), certain (or believed with assurance) to uncertain (or believed tentatively), inadequately grounded to grounded on approprate evidence, accurate to inaccurate, and flexible (readily modified) to rigid (resistent to change). Beliefs, perceptions or expectations that are "simple, inadequately grounded, at least partially inaccurate, and held with considerable

assurance by many people" are typically called stereotypes (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein, 1969; cf., Lippmann, 1922). (The term "stereotypes" is also used in a broader context connoting the attenuated categories through which the individual must inevitably use to sucessfully function in the face of "the ubiquitious complexities, uncertainties, and inconsistencies...in our personal, social, and political worlds" (Bieri, 1971). Such stereotypes need not represent prejudices if they are open to new information and modification, and not used singly in isolation to make predictions about others and the world (but instead using multiple cues and pooling categorical information)).

Although Campbell presents a formulation concerning the relations between group stereotypes and the objective realities of group characteristics and intergroup contacts it is hardly a major work in the field. A major preoccupation for Campbell in his work on stereotypes, ethnocentrism and the perception of group differences has been the integration of Hullian behaviorsm with Asch's "phenomenological social psychology" (Cambell, 1963; Campbell, Miller, Lubetsky, and O'Connell, 1964; Segall, Cambell and Herskovits, 1966; Cambell, 1967; Levine and Cambell, 1972). Within this framework, perceptions of behavior are predicted to be such as to make appropriate or to justify actions. Campbell suggests that where customs or social roles differ between groups these differences

tend to become reflected in the mutual stereotypes that groups hold for each other; differences between ingroup and outgroup will be exaggerated in the mutual stereotypes each holds of the other; there will be latent agreement in the reciprocal stereotypes of the groups; the outgroup will be accused of being ethnocentric. The most interesting predictions from this work are at least five: The more opportunities for observation and the longer the exposure to the outgroup, the larger the role of real differences in the stereotypes; the nearer outgroups will be more accurately sterotyped; the more remote and less well known the outgroup, the more purely projective the content of the stereotype and the less accurate it is; among trait differences of approximately equal contrast, those which are drive and incentive relevant are most apt to be noticed and represented in stereotyped imagery; and once a stereotype or perception of difference is established, less real difference is required to maintain or revoke it. Allport (1954) also dealt with these problems and much of the present thought in this area owes much to his work on them. But while such work does much to clarify the dynamics and structure of group stereotypes and perhaps has greatest relevance for common ethnocentric tendencies conceived to be present in all ethnocultural groups and the development of group prejudices, racism gets lost in its leveling effect. Undoubtedly stereotypy is a component of racism. However,

stereotypy (in its traditional sense) does not provide a framework broad enough to encompass the naivete, ignorance, and faulty though rational inference processes involved in racism at the cultural and the individual level. The "colorblind" individual who believes in the "equality" (i.e., sameness) of all the peoples to the exclusion of any experiential, cultural, historical or social differences makes the same racist interpretation of observed differences in the behavior of others as does the individual who expects and derrogates the differences. In the first instance since everyone is expected to be like one's own group or like oneself difference becomes deviance. In the latter instance, since differences are expected, devalued and found, they become--a priori--deficits. Stereotypy is not the sole determinant of racism any other more than projection is the key to prejudice..

Cognitive Structure and Prejudice

"What the individual consistently says in public, what he says when he feels safe from criticism, what he thinks but will not say at all, what he thinks but will not admit to himself, what he is disposed to think or to do when various kinds of appeal are made to him--all these phenomena may be conceived of as constituting a single structure. The structure may not be integrated, it may

contain contradictions as well as consistencies, but it is organized in the sense that the constituent parts are related in psychologically meaningful ways" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 5).

Cognitive theorists share the opinion that in attempting to explain and predict behavior it will be fruitful to look at the structure or pattern of, or relationships among cognitive elements (opionions, beliefs, attitudes, etc.) in addition to the content of the elements (Cox, 1970).

> An examination of the theories based on the cognitive approach reveals several common interests. Many writers, for example, concern themselves with questions of input flow--in Lewinian terms, the permeability of boundaries. This is an old issue, dealt with in the past through such concepts as the defense mechanisms of avoidance and denial (A. Freud, 1936; Hartmann, 1939) and, from a somewhat different theoretical standpoint, perceptual defense (McGinnies, 1949). It is also treated in a great deal of work on attitude change, in relation to source and message credibility, information search, etc. (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Hovland and Janis, 1959; Insko, 1967). Piagent's (1936) discussion of assimilation and accommodation is liewise relevant to the understanding of how and why certain information is rejected or "unnoticed." The work of Stroop (1935), followed by others (see Jensen & Rohwer, 1966), has emphasized individual differences in keeping our irrelevant information--i.e., proneness to interference. Satiability, the amount of information which can be processed before the boundary hardens, has also been used as a personality variable (Petrie et al., 1958; Wertheimer, 1955).
>
> Once information does enter the system, it is subject to various transformations. There are two major ways of dealing with transforming mechanisms as personality characteristics: one is to classify them according to their general ability to differentiate and integrate information, the other is to emphasize specific structural tendencies. The first

> of these approaches is typified by theorists which deal with information processing complexity. How well the individual can discriminate along and across stimuls dimensions (Berkowitz, 1957; Bruner & Tajfel, 1961; Fillenbaum, 1959; Gardner, 1953; Gardner et al., 1959; Marrs, 1955; Pettigrew, 1958; Tajfel et al., 1964), and/or how rich he is in ways of organizing and patterning information (Barron, 1953; Bieri, 1961; Harvey et al., 1961; Kelly, 1955; Schroder et al., 1967) is viewed as a basic aspect of personality. Among the second group of theories are those that distinguish...constriction and flexibility (Klein, 1954),...leveling sharpening (Gardner et al., 1959; Holzman, 1954), repression and sensitization (Byrne, 1961)...and various "conceptual styles" (Kagan et al,, 1963)...
>
> Another common focus is on rigidity. The ease with which cognitive organization can be altered appears to be one of basic dimensions used by contemporary personality theorists. As usual, Lewin (1935) anticipated this interest three decades ago, in the proposition that psychological restructuring is affected by the firmness of boundaries and the fluidity of regions...Rigidity was a central concepts in the theories of Adorno et al. (1950), Fenichel (1945), Frenkel Brunswik (1949), and Rokeach (1960) and is, of course, linked to the psychoanalytic consideration of perserveration and fixation. (Suedfeld, 1971, pp. 6-7)

With the exception of the early work culminating in the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950), the literature on stereotypy, and work by Rokeach on The Open and Closed Mind (1960) applications of cognitive theory as such are rather rare. It is almost as if these theorists have accepted a large but hardly definitive body of evidence which suggests that prejudice and simplistic cognitive functioning go hand in hand. Certainly the generalization which repeatedly emerges from a large body of previous research is that prejudice is simply a special case of a more general rigidity in thought

and perception (e.g., see chapter 1, pp. 94-98). Another reason for this derth has been the tendency of many cognitive theorists to move toward more purely structural conceptions, less content bound and dealing with a a wider range of behavioral, attitudinal and intellectual contexts. To some extent, an exception to this trend is found in recent years in the work of Rokeach in the context of belief systems theory and his work on the nature of human values (Rokeach, 1960; Rokeach and Rothman, 1965; Rokeach, 1973). Some direct applications of cognitive consistency-congruity theories have been explicity made as well (Harary, 1962; Jaspers, van de Greer, Tajfel, and Johnson, 1965) but no major theories to compete with The Authoritarian Personality (adorno et al., 1950) or belief systems theory (Rokeach, 1960, Rokeach and Rothman, 1965) have emerged.

Intolerance, Opinionation and Prejudice

Based on his analysis of Belief Systems in The Open and Closed Mind (Rokeach, 1960), Rokeach and his associates have argued for the importance of a variable called "belief congruence" as a determinant of "ethnic prejudice" (e.g., Rokeach and Rothman, 1965, Rokeach, 1966). As Harding et al. (1960) have noted, in discussing this concept it is important to distinguish between a narrower claim made by Rokeach and a much broader claim advanced at the same time (e.g., see especially the chapter by

Rokeach, Smith and Evans, "Two Kinds of Prejudice or One?," in The Open and Closed Mind, 1960).

The narrower claim is that for certain types of individuals perceived similarity or dissimilarity of beliefs is more important than ethnic differences in willingness to associate with other individuals on friendly terms (social distance). In other words, perceived belief congruence is construed to be more important a determinant of social distance tahn are ethnic differences.

Rokeach's broader claim continues from this with two additional assertions: (1) that members of a particular ethnic group typically believe that most members of groups toward whom they feel great social distance hold beliefs on topics of fundamental importance that are greatly divergent from their oen; and (2) that this perceived dissimilarity of beliefs is the major determinant of the actual degree of social distance expressed by members of one ethnic group toward another.

In this formulation, Rokeach clearly makes ethnic and racial prejudice a special case of belief prejudice and therefore a sub-category (or instance) of closed-mindedness--i.e., in effect, an ignorance of the actual variety of beliefs (among which one should find similarity with one's own) among diverse members of different ethnic and racial groups. (Perhaps even the bigot find delight in the self-hating object of his bigotry but this of course is not what Rokeach has in mind. Much evidence for belief

and value similarity between various ethnic groups have typically been found in the social science literature--perhaps in part because of the nature and level of the questions asked--suggested that one remedy to the problem of prejudice, if Rokeach's formulation is correct, is to make the individual--or the group--aware of such similarities in beliefs and values). In actuality, however, Rokeach does not maintain his broader proposition in its extreme form (i.e., that prejudice can be accounted for entirely on the basis of perceived incongruence in beliefs). It is doubtful that such a claim could be taken seriously (cf., Harding et al., 1969).

Perhaps the most central limitation in Rokeach's formulations derived from his orientation toward ahistorical and non-contextual analysis. A Rokeach notes within the context of his study of dogmatism: "It is not within the scope of this paper to inquire into the social or personal conditions which give rise to dogmatism. This is considered to be an independent theoretical preoblem" (Rokeach, 1954, p. 194). While other theorists have also been victims of this neglect, for example neglect the socio-cultural-historical backdrop of the phenomena being investigated, most have given some attention to context and development. The approach suggested in the present work diverges considerably from Rokeach's position. For us, without use of history and without an historical sense of psychological matters, the investigator cannot

adequately state the kinds of problems that ought to be the orienting points of his or her studies. From such a perspective it would seem to be difficult to argue that *just* beliefs and ideology are involved in the formation and maintenance of racism and prejudice.

Inspite of the many differences among "theories" both in substance and in emphasism their approaches are sufficiently related that some general conclusions may be drawn. Many of these conclusions are of a critical nature but this appears appropriate especially given our present concern with racism and the current state theoretical knowledge. Unfortunately, most of the major theories of prejudice, racism, and/or ethnocentrism offer abstractions too broad to be critically applicable to the investigation of these phenomena. Some formulations (e.g., belief systems theory) reduce racism and prejudice to some form of broader process simply more amenable to the premises of a given theoretical position. Others (as in the case of frustration-aggression-displacement theory) appear to derive from a mechanical application of *a priori* theory, rather than a painstaking study of the facts. Many of these theories could as easily apply to any hostile or aggressive attitudes or behaviors including racism, ethnocentrism, territorialism, international conflict and war). Still other formulations manage to loose prejudice and/or racism in a narrow focus on a given type of "prejudiced" person or on some specific sub-process

thought to be central (e.g., stereotypy, projection, compensatory efforts toward self-esteem, etc.). Such formulations might offer the advantage of critically focusing on aspects of racism prejudice or ethnocentrism (to an extent that grander theory cannot). However, many tend to overextend their limits treating for example racial prejudice as racism, stereotypy as prejudice and so on. None of these theories isolate the specific nature, the development, and/or the dynamics of racism as distinct from other broader forms of anti-group phenomena. It is not that the theories themselves are irrelevant ot the analysis of racism but rather that they lack any specific relevance. Add to these problems an additional one of terminological confusion and a lack of historical and sociocultural referent, then major sources of ambiguities and theoretical oversight become clear.

The Prevailing Paradigm

Unfortunately, the prevailing paradigm for the study of prejudice anf related phenomena is based on liberalism as opposed to a well founded and scientific pluralism--a fact which becomes intensely disturbing for those of us who do not wish to base the scientific study of most phenomena on anything as insubstantial as liberal tendency. This basis is clear, however, in most major works on prejudice and is reflected in Harding et al.'s review of

work in this area. For these reviewers:

> Careful examination of writings on prejudice disclose three different ideal norms from which a prejudiced attitude may be said to depart. Each of these has been emphasized by a different group of writers. We shall refer to them as the norm of rationality, the norm of justice, and the norm of human-heartedness.
>
> The norm of rationality is basic for the definitions of prejudice proposed by Powdermaker (1944), Lippitt and Radke (1946), Allport (1954), Kelmman and Pettigrew (1959), and Simpson and Yinger (1965). This norm enjoins a persistent attempt to secure accurate information, to correct misinformation, to make appropriate differentiations and qualifications, to be logical in deduction and cautious inference. Prejudice in the sense of deviation from the norm of rationality may occur in the form of hasty judgment or prejudgment, overgeneralization, thinking in stereotypes, refusal to modify an opinion in the face of new evidence, and refusal to admit or take account of individual differences.
>
> The norm of justice is crucial for the definitions of prejudice advanced by Myrdal (1944). The standard of justice here is one of equal treatment. It was included in what Myrdal called "the American Creed" and was later embodied in the report on discrimination by the United Nations Commission on Human rights (1949). The norm of justice requires that in all areas of public concern individuals be treated equally except insofar as unequal treatment is based on abilities or achievements functionally relevant to the requirements of the situation. Action which violates this norm is called discrimination. The norm of justice enjoins an individual to avoid discrimination himself and to recognize and oppose it when he sees it directed by others against a third party.
>
> The third ideal norm involved in definitions of prejudice is less easy to explicate than the other two. We call it "human-hearedness," following a suggestion of Gordon Allport's..,It is the major norm involved in the definition of prejudice offered by Harley (1946) and in the opposed concept of "tolerance for nations and races" studied by Murphy and Likert (1938). A somewhat different concept involving the same norm is that of "sympathetic identification with the underdog" (Schuman and Harding, 1963). The norm of human-heartedness enjoins the acceptance of other individuals in terms of their common humanity, no matter how different they

> may be from oneself. This acceptance is a direct personal response, in either feeling or action, and includes the area of "private" as well as "public" relationships. Prejudice in the sense of deviation from the norm of human-hearedness ranges from indifference through rejection to active hostility. This form of prejudice is often called "intolerance." (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein, 1969, pp. 5-6)

Later qualifying this paradigm, the authors add that while such ideal norms do exist on the societal level,

> We do not have a full understanding of the normative determination of ethnic prejudice until we see that for most people conflicting norms are involved. This insight is the great achievement of Myrdal's An American Dilemma (1944). Myrdal showed that in situation after situation the attitudes of while Americans could be understood as comprises between the universalistic demands of what he called "The American Creed" and the particularistic requirements of solidarity with one's class, kin, and color...
>
> The normative character of ethnic prejudice involves far more than the fact that attitudes are shared by members of a majority or minority group. Each member is expected to hold such attitudes, and on those who fail to conform in this regard, pressures in a variety of forms are brought to bear (for example, loss of status, verbal condemnation, group rejection). (Harding et al., 1969, pp. 26-27)

Paternalism, tolerance, condescension and the like are also forms of racism, implying inferiority (as opposed to functional equivalence) in other groups. Such orientations lack the quality of mutuality necessary to understand the nature of real differences in enculturated strengths of differing human populations. A liberalistic paradigm admits a kind of condescension and makes an uneasy compromise with "ideal" ill-defined notions of rationality, tolerance, and (what appears to us to be) an unspecified "sameness" (frequently translated by the enculturated

individual in naive and ethnocentric terms) which allows for no real understanding of differences. Concepts relating to real understanding, knowledge-based identification and informed divergence, or pluralism, in any concrete, pragmatic sense are absent.

Requirements of an Alternative Framework

Simple race prejudice is not individual racism and the tendency to study and extrapolate analyses of individual racism from theories and research on racial prejudice is insufficient and misdirected. This is most clear in regard to the literature on prejudice and cognitive psychology. Much of the failure in adequately conceptualizing racism revolves around the nature of its cognitive component--i.e., around the assumption that racism always involves the same simplistic thinking as does prejudice. Complex, elaborated and sophisticated arguments for why non-white peoples are "inferior" to whites still prevail in theories and concepts ranging from genetic inferiority, through pathogenic family structure, to cultural deprivation--all returning to the same basic tenant--that non-white peoples (defined conglomerately and conveniently as "minorities") are to be understood in terms of pathology--that along cognitive, perceptual and motivational lines there is not only difference but also a priori deficit. To say that individual racism is merely an idiosyncratic

reflection of such forms of ingrained racism within the larger cultural and historical society does not ameliorate the problem but makes it more disturbing, more subtle, more intractible, and more variable in form. (In fact, it may be observed that the illusion of color-blindness, e.g., endemic to those who actively avoid recognition of one's color (and culture), while appearing to start from the opposed to looking for differences and deficit) is in reality committed to the same postulate: non-white peoples are to be understood in terms of intra-psychic pathology. In the latter case failure to appreciate difference and real functional equivalence in varying forms of human behavior and a lack of awareness that one can learn from cultural, historical and para-cultural differences leads to interpretation of manifest differences in terms of deviance, or intra-psychic or intra-cultural pathology. (Black people are not simply white people in black skins. Health or pathology, therefore, may not be gaged in terms of divergencies from modal white behavior).

The culturally racist assumptions (in this instance we may define cultural racism in parallel with White ehnocentrism) that the standards of the white middle-class culture represent norms by which all other cultures may be appropriately measured and that deviations from such ethnocentric norms constitute individual deprivations and cultural (or group) deficits pervades much of the thinking of white middle-class America. As Clark (1965)

notes (underscoring this point in discussing what he calls "the cult of 'cultural inferiority'"):

> Just as those who proposed the earlier racial inferiority theories were invariably members of the dominant racial groups who presumed themselves and their groups to be superior, those who at present propose the cultural deprivation theory are, in fact, members of the privileged group who inevitably associate their privileged status with their own innate intellect and its related educational success. (p. 131)

In the past three decades the cultural deprivation thesis has proliferated to the extent that it has reached into almost every aspect of psychological functioning from simple perception to complex personality traits producing a catalogue of incapacities that is virtually limitless (Thomas and Sillen, 1974). As Thomas and Sillen point out, "The job of remedying these deficits, as now defined, would make the labors of Hercules a holiday relaxation, especially in view of the 'critical periods' theory which holds that intervention may be too late to do any good after the child has reached a certain age" (1974, p. 71).

It becomes inescapably clear how pervasive is the assumption that the behavior language and thought of non-white middle-class. But such a viewpoint is not only narrowly racist and broadly ethnocentric, it is also lacking in basic principles of understanding human behavior of any sort. Behavior must always be viewed in terms of its adaptive function in a given life setting. (When Hunt, 1971, and others talk about the poor lacking

initiative, motivation, self-control, and so on, they are clearly evaluating these attributes according to the way they are able to be manifested in white middle-class adaptations. Poor people have a narrow range of choice as to how they will live. Often what appears to be limited accomplishement, taken for granted by white middle-class persons with a broader range of options, requires extraordinary effort and motivation on the part of the poor. The same personal characteristics of initiative, motivation, self-control and the like may appear very differently in youngsters growing up in the slums. Moreover, the preoccupation with psychological "deprivation" has dulled the concern for those deficits which undoubtedly do plague the life of the poor and urgently require rectificaiton--health and nutrition, housing, schools and job opportunity).

Apart from establishing the independence of racism from specific cognition styles, a theory of racism should facilitate distinctions between present concepts of non-prejudiced funcitoning (e.g., "tolerance," "equality," and "liberalism") and concepts which are more broadly humanistic and non-racist (e.g., informed and knowledge-based identification with other human groups, appreciation of difference, and recognition of functional equivalence in human behavior). It should for example distinguish between (a) <u>varying levels of identification with others versus varying degrees of tolerance of others</u> (for example,

the difference between understanding one's relation to the issues and problems facing others and adopting an effective stance on these as one's own versus limited acceptance through paternalism, benevolence, indifference, or condescension); (b) varying levels of appreciation of difference versus varying levels of deficit model or color-blind thinking (for example, the difference between the tendency to see the enculturated behaviors of one's own group in perspective and the seeking out of human variety versus using one's own group as the normative basis of judgment for all human behavior and failing to understand the lack of its inherent "correctness" or refusal to admit any differences at all); (c) varying levels of understanding in terms of functional equivalence versus varying levels of understanding of others only in terms of "equality" with ones own self and group (note that in the latter inferiority to equality are the usual parameters of this judgment, superiority of other groups to one's own is rarely considered except in terms of threat) (for example, the difference between understanding of commonalities and and differences in behavior among groups in terms of internal phenomenologies versus conception of others in terms of being "less than" or "equal to" one's own cultural or paracultural group; and (d) humanism versus liberalism (for example, the difference between informed and knowledge-based identity with other human groups versus naive and rather tenuous support).

Appreciation of variety and difference and greater sensitivity to the functional equivalence of culturally diverse behaviors as these are expressed by different racial and ethnic groups comprise much of the basis from which more broadly non-racist functioning must emanate. An important distinction is made, however, between the "blessings" of benevolent relativism and the "celebration" of difference--the latter of which is being supported here. Groups do behave in pathological ways as do entire cultures or single individuals. An absolute relativistic position ignores this fact. Racism, in fact, reflects such an individual, social, and cultural pathology.

The type of sensitivity suggested here is knowledge-based identification. It focuses both on the positive aspects of human experience (i.e., appreciation of variety and difference and greater sensitivity to the functional equivalence of differing forms of human behavior), and on regressive elements in human groups which prevent such identification. (The subsequent analysis of individual racism in terms of inadequacies in modal white identity structure reflect a focus on such a regressive element).

It is further suggested that a new theory of individual racism must more clearly define the relationship between personal functioning and institutional and enculturated racism. Avoiding the more polemic issue of how personality

systems and cultural systems interrelate, it may be pointed out that the individual may fit into the prevailing context of his or her times in a variety of ways. At this level of analysis we can speak of the more manageable concept of psycho-social identity. At this level, analysis of individual racism should effectively involve an attempt to understand the individual not as an isolated fragment or as an intelligible field or system in and of him or herself but as an individual actor in a socio-cultural context. At this nexus we can address the issue of understanding oneself in terms of prevailing institutions, in terms of the total culture, in terms of one's own group(s), and in terms of other groups of people in the culture and in the world. Further, we can address the interactive mechanisms of anxiety, guilt and hostility, unresolved identity issues, and differences within and among racial and ethnic groups as these relate to the problem of individual racism.

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STRUCTURAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE META CONTEXT: ANALYSIS OF RACISM THROUGH PRINCIPLES OF PARADIGMATIC FIT

Three basic requirements of paradigmatic fit developed in chapter I are that we should begin at a relatively descriptive level extracting variables of structural significance in formulating our concepts, and explore contrasting or discriminant phenomena which serve to sharpen and clarify meanings. The reader will have the advantage of being at an end point of the application of these principles in that we will discuss (in this section) only those descriptive aspects which appear to have the most central structural significance and contrast other phenomena on this basis, thereby avoiding various non-productive constructions and reconstructions which were unclear, unrepresentative or inconsistent. (For further explication see appendix II). Through its various stages of formulation, the concepts of the present model were discussed and reviewed by numerous colleagues and students in psychology, sociology, anthropology, Black studies, Chicano studies, child and family studies at Wahington State University. Many of these concepts served as the basis for some major professional staff training programs at two of three large community mental health centers in the Washington area and as the basis of various discussion groups, seminars and workshops involving various ethnic communities, public school personnel, community leaders and various mental health personnel providing meta context of

Asian, Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Native American and various White ethnic samples from various socio-economic and occupational levels.

Racism and Its Discriminants-Prejudice and Ethnocentrism

The first major problem in constructing a theory of racism is a definitional one (especially in view of past syntactic-semantic-and operational inconsistency in this area). It will come as no surprise that apart from the more common range of insulating features inhibiting direct empirical confrontation between competing theories (see pp. 8-12 and 51-55), a number of additional obstacles may be found in attempting to make comparisons within and among theories of prejudice, racism and ethnocentrism. The problem of definition (while usually difficult in any field of social science) is unusually difficult in the area of "prejudice and ethnic relations."

Most terms (although there are only a few very widely used ones) are used in somewhat different senses by different authors. There is no general concensus on what such terms as racism, prejudice and ethnocentrism mean, nor on how they may be operationalized in empirical research. To take these terms at face value as if they represented identical concepts within each category or across syntactic boundaries would create spurious contradictions in abudance. The meanings of such terms are often effectively restricted to the context in which

they are used by a particular theorist or investigator. And while most of the major writers have tried hard to be consistent in their own usage, they have shown little interest in distinguishing their particular usage, they have shown little interest in distinguishing their particular usage of terms like "prejudice" from that of other authors (see Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein, 1969, pp. 3-6).

Terms such as "prejudice," "ethnocentrism," "outgroup hostility," and "racism" are often used often interchangeably in some of the literature and can refer to individual cognition and emotion, to cultural ideology and stereotype, to collective action and institutional policy, or to all of them as a syndrome (Campbell and Levine, 1972). Behavioral dispositions involving hatred, desire to agress, retaliate or avoid, bellicose or derrogatory ideologies, actual aggression, distruction, extermination and war are among the phenomena addressed by these concepts. Theoretical formulations seldom clearly specify the form of action, attitude, or ideology to which its reference is restricted. More typically restrictions are implied by the research content in which the theorist tries to test his or her theory, by the theoretical context in which the investigator tries to test a particular theory, or by the theorist's usual frame of reference, rather than by explicit statement.

> By far the most serious problem is the lack of correspondence between conceptual definitions of prejudice advanced by theoretical writers and


> authors of textbooks and the operational definitions embodied in the measurement procedures used in empirical studies. This lack of correspondence is the main reason why few major "theories of prejudice" survive unmodified decade after decade while unrelated measurement procedures go on proliferating without any apparent limit. (Harding et al., 1969, p. 3)

In the present research racism, prejudice and ethnocentrism are taken to be partially independent but interacting phenomena. Thus if the investigator's intent is to study racism, then prejudice and ethnocentrism become subcategories (i.e., they are conceived of as parts within the broader manifestations of racism). In the traditional literature racism is more typically equated with racial and ethnic prejudice and subsumed under a broader semantically confounded category of ethnocentrism or more general prejudice which includes negative cognitive behavioral and conative tendencies toward religious, racial and other (e.g., national, cultural, political, etc.) outgroups. (See Figure 2).

Nexus of Ethnocentrism with Racism

The problem of cultural values, long implicit in anthropology, has been precipitated out as a question in our analysis of racism by the very fact of its enculturated nature. The question of cultural values in its undifferentiated state is really nothing new. Many years ago Boas, for example, writing to the problems of his day could say,

Figure 2: Contrast in Paradigms - Present Paradigm and focus versus traditional Paradigm and focus



(Note that in the present focus racism is much more than simple ethnic and racial prejudice and ethnocentrism)

> It is somewhat difficult for us to recognize that the value that we attribute to our own civilization is due to the fact that we participate in this civilization, and that it has been controlling all our actions since the time of our birth; but it is certainly conceivable that there may be other civilizations, based perhaps on different equilibrium of emotion and reason, which are of no less value than ours, although it may be impossible for us to appreciate their values without having grown up under their influence. (1911, p. 208)

Or, in 1943 Ruth Benedict could write:

> No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. Even in his philosophical probing he cannot go vehind these stereotypes; his very concepts of the true and the false will still have reference to his particular traditional customs. (p. 2)

This is the more common form of ethnocentrism that occurs among many peoples--for some this is expressed as only a rather gentle insistence on the good qualities of one's own group, without any drive to extend this attitude into the field of action (Herskovits, 1955). Such ethnocentrism may be illustrated in myths, folk tales, proverbs and linguistic habits. A myth of the origin of human races from the Cherokee of the Smoky Mountains gives an example of a non-harmful ethnocentrism:

> The Creator fashioned man by first making and firing an oven and then, from dough he has prepared, shaping three figures in human form. He placed the figures in the oven and waited for them to get done. But his impatience to see the result of this, his crowning experiment in the work of creation, was so great that he removed the first figure too soon. It was sadly underdone--pale, an unlovely color, and from it descended the white people. His second figure had fared well. The timing was accurate, the form, richly browned, that was to be the ancestor of the Indians, pleased him in every way. He so admired it, indeed, that he neglected to take out of the oven the thired forem, until he smelled it burning. He threw open the door, only to find this last one charred and black. It was regretable, but there

> was nothing to be done; and this was the first Negro. (Herskovits, 1955, cited in Herskovits, 1973, p. 22)

It is when ethnocentrism is rationalized and made the basis of programs of action detrimental to the well-being of others (Herskovits, 1955) that the destructive nexus of ethnocentric tendency with racism may (and has historically) occur(red). The assumption that non-white peoples and their cultures are inferior is the end product of a long series of developments in the social, eocnomic and intellectual history of EuroAmerican culture reflecting such a nexus.

This distinction between a rather common ethnocentrism fostering group solidarity and positive feelings of self and group and the "seduction" into an enculturated <u>way</u> in which things are done and a unique nexus of a more extreme form of ethnocentrism with dehumanization and racism is all the more important given not only the terminological confusion of psychological work in this area but also because of fundamental differences in concept that this analysis implies. Freud himself, saw group narcissism as the basis of anti-pathy and hostility toward others and saw the social function of group narcissism as the facilitation of the displacement of aggression from ingroup to outgroup. In his perspective:

> The advantage which a comparative small cultural group offers of providing an outlet for a basic inclination to aggression in the form of hostility against intruders is not to be despised. It is always possible to bind together a considerable

> number of peole in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness...it is a convenient... satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, by means of which cohesion between members of the community is made easier. (1961, pp. 114-115)

For Freud antipathy and hostility toward others is a group level analogue to individual self-love. Other writers in the Freudian tradition suggests that the relationship may be more instrinsic: that such antipathies and hostilities may be redirected expression of individual narcissism, and may provide individual group members with narcissistic gratification (MacCrone, 1937; Alexander, 1941, pp. 514-516; Fromm, 1964, pp. 62-94). For example, Macrone suggests that,

> Finally, the apparently paradoxical behavior of the individual who sacraficies his own interests for that of the group or who may even go so far as to offer up his own life so that the group may live, becomes less mysterious when we recall that the group itself has become part of the individual, through his identification with it. He dies that the group may live, that is, he dies for that which embodies his ideal self, whether in the abstract form of a social or moral ideal of a society, or in the mere concrete form of a tribe, community, or nation, fatherland, or a motherland. His own physical death, and the extinction of his own egoistic gratifications, is not too great a price to pay for gratifying the demands of the very real self which is the group ideal or the embodied and personified group, the father or mtoerh surrogate. (1937, p. 249)

The equation of a more common "ethnocentrism" with "out-group hostility" though made frequently in many contexts does not appear to be support by the anthropological evidence (see Herskovits, 1955, 1956, 1958, 1961). The identification of racism as a form of natural ethnocentrism

(and hence, as traditionally conceived, "outgroup hostility") makes the traditional paradigm all the more confusing. Racism has not been a universal phenomenon but has instead specific historic roots. Its nexus with ethnocentrism is described by Herskovits (1958) as "militant ethnocentrism" characteristic of the historical-cultural development of Europe and America. In his assessment:

> We are not the most ethnocentrically oriented society the world has known, but we certainly possess one of the most powerful ethnocentrisms in the experience of mankind. This is one of the reasons why the spread of Euroamerican culture over the world has given rise to so many examples of the social demoralization that develops when a more powerful group not only imposes its rule on another, but acticely deprecates the things they hold to be of value. (p. 103)

Racism is not all there is to this but it is certainly the crudest element.

A related position to that of equating group narcissism with a natural hostility toward outgroups is a substantial body of theoretical formulation stemming from NeoFreudian concepts of adaptation, defense mechanisms, and social character that cneters around the construct of self-esteem. Variations of this body of thought appear in the the works of Karen Horney (1937), Harry Stack Sullivan (1955), Carl Rogers (1951), Erich Fromm (1941), Daniel Miller (1959) and others. This more personalistic analysis does not seem to be incompatible with the anthropological evidence. Basically, it is argued that

self esteem is a prerequisite for mental health in general and a prerequisite for esteem from others in particular. A low level of self esteem is conceived to lead to some degree of mental pathology in general and to negative attitudes (hostility, distrust, contempt) toward others in particular. Low levels of unconscious self-esteem lead to the use of one or more distortions of information concerning the self that maintain the minimum of conscious self-esteem required for healthy functioning in most interpersonal environments. Since conscious self-esteem is usually based on a comparative evaluation of the self with others, the distortions of information about the self (defense mechanisms) often involve distortions of information about others. Projection, the attribution to others of unacceptable behavior characteristic of one's own motives or action, is one example of such a comparative distortion. Another example is the conscious (and exaggerated) belief in one's own superiority to others with a concomitant tendency to belittle them; this is compensation for the low level of unconscious self-esteem. Thus, a high level of unconscious self esteem is seen as leading to the acceptance and positive evaluation of others, while a compensatory conscious sense of superiority (based on a low level of unconscious self-esteem) is said to require hostility toward and belittling of others. The mentally healthy person perceives the attributes of others with relative accuracy, evaluates

evaluates them in a selective way related to their actual attributes, and reacts to others differently based on their behavior. In this sense, high self-esteem leads to selective behavior towards others based on more accurate perception of their attributes. Low self-esteem leads to generalized negative attitudes that are applied to others in many ways that distort their actual attributes.

While this analysis is closer to our requirement for a model which is, in part, individually centered, without broader historical and socio-cultural components this model remains vacuous for the analysis of racism and its dynamics unclear and too pliable. For example, no explanation is structurally available for why low self-esteem in one group would lead to exaggerated belief in one's superiority while in another group lead to feelings of inferiority.

Application of the "self-esteem" analysis to the group level is somewhat cumbersome unless as with narcissism theory we find analogues at the group level or see self-esteem as an instrinsic by-product of group functioning. Clearly, in any case a natural tendency toward racism (devoid of socio-cultural and historical determinants, irrespective of level of self-esteem or other personalistic variable) would be difficult to derive.

Racism, however, is also distinguishable from ethnocentrism in that it does not appear to be a universal

phenomenon. Many forms of racism have arisen out of the conditions of colonialism and conquest, out of the justification of Black slavery and its aftermath in the physical and cultural distruction of non-white peoples indigenous to the West and throughout other parts of the world, and out of blame (displacement and misplaced frustration) for the problems and crises met by societies; however, slavery, conquestion and frustration have not always engendered racism. In this sense, racism is a specific social and historical phenomenon. Ethnocentrism is seen as a fairly universal tendency to favor one's own group over others and to see one's values as essentially correct. (One may still, however, speak of ethnocentrism in degrees). In its nexus with racism, ethnocentrism becomes phenomenologically more similar to Levine and Campbell's (1972) notion of an "attitude or outlook in which values derived from one's own cultural background are applied to other cultural contexts where different values are operative":

> In the most naive form of ethnocentrism ... a person unreflectively takes his own culture's values as objective reality and automatically uses them as the context within which he judges less familiar objects and events. As in Piaget's stage of egocentric thought, it does not occur to such a person that there is more than one point of view. At a more complex level is the ethnocentric attitude or outlook that that takes acount of multiple points of view but regards those of other cultures as incorrect, inferior or immoral. (Levine and Campbell, 1972, p. 1)

This is different from the natural ethnocentrism referred to above and when applied to the domain of race, and specifically when such orientations develop into programs of action (individual or institutionalized) such uncommon

ethnocentrisms may be described as racism. Even within cultural anthropology we may sketch a history of this distructive nexus, i.e., first there is affirmed the existence of non-white human groups having no culture; then of a hierarchy of cultures; and finally an unsteady and questioned philosophical, methodological and practical relativism -- the whole range from overall negation to singular and specific (though still in many ways ethnocentric) recognition. Psychologists have lagged even further behind, white researchers knowing very little about the non-white subjects they study, utilizing highly enculturated instruments, tests, and biased normative samples for cross-cultural comparison. What social science as a whole is properly about is the human variety, and while it may not be reflected in the methods and epistemology of psychology, the domain of human life is certainly pluralistic.

The question of racism is in part a question of psychosocial identity. At the individual level, racism occurs within the range of the individual's immediate relations with others in the local interactions of daily life. At a broader sociocultural level, the "issue" of racism transcends the local environment of the individual and the range of his or her inner life and has to do with the nexus between many such immediate interactions between individual and social mileux which form the institutions of a historical, cultural society as a whole. From either perspective (and most adequately from the nexus of both)

the "problem" of individual racism and the "issue" of racism at the cultural level the question of psycho-social identity may be raised. At the level of individual identity these levels of analysis are most effective conjoined.

Once one has begun to recognize who one is in a broader context of one's historical, social, political and cultural worlds (see subsequent section, for example, on the problem of whiteness and the search for an authentic identity), one may begin to recognize who others are. In the case of the average enculturated white individual this will involve rejecting the larger myths and fantasies about others who are not of the same color and the restructuring of ideas about social structure, ethnicity, cross-cultural difference and socio-political goals. Much of the confusion about who one is, what one is, what types of social goals are desirable, or how social issues are related to specific programs of action can be traced to avoid in knowledge of growth referent behaviors within a pluralistic context. Terry (1970) in struggling with this identity problem suggests that "new-conscious whites" must: (a) become conscious agents of change -- recognize that new directions are possible, (b) seek ethical clarity -- "know what we ought to stand for and why," (c) identify the multiple forms and expressions of white racism -- know who we are and have been, and why, (d) develop social strategies for change to eliminate and move beyond racism --

experience what our society might be, (e) discern the appropriate tactics -- assess our power for change, and (f) experiment, test, and refine personal styles of life congruent with our newly affirmed values -- experience who we might be (Terry, 1970, pp. 20-21).

Racism, History and Identity

Historical analysis of psychological phenomena requires more than a simple recounting of historical facts. It must involve a search for patterns of continuity, a searching for the impact of the past on the present in an evolving and continuing process of influence. Recounting the facts of racism in a brutal process of oppression, dispossession and physical and cultural distruction in movements to "civilize and christianize" to achieve "manifest destiny" ignoring the validity and integrity of "alien" peoples and cultures distroyed (and today one may still question the type of thinking which produces such notions as "illegal aliens" to discribe human beings), and in the victimization of peoples to achieve socio-economic and political ends is insufficient if left at the level of recounting. Tracing racism through its early expressions in the justification of extermination of Indians or the enslavement of Blacks, through the rationalizations of Social Darwinism and pseudo-science, to contemporary notions of cultural deprivation and psychological deficit while having greater relevance still does not fully describe the impact of this

history on the present. The impact of history on the present is most startling understood in the context of the lives of individual human beings. Analyses based solely on institutional parameters may be disturbing to the individual but these are also more easily dissociated from (i.e., the individual see no connection between self and the broader working of the social system and understands no role he or she may play in the total personal-social-cultural context forming its base). What is being suggested here, asserted by Mills (1959), "is the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself within his period" (p. 5). Yet as Mills points out "men do not usually define the troubles they endure in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction... Seldom aware of the intricate connections between the patterns of their own lives and the course of world history, ordinary men do not usually know what this connection means for the kinds of men they are becoming and for the kinds of history-making in which they might take part...What they need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves...the capacity to shift from one perspective to another -- from the political to the psychological...It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote

transformations to the most intimate features of the human self -- and to see the relations between the two. Back of its use there is always the urge to know the social and historical meaning of the individual in the society and in the period in which he has his quality and his being" (pp. 3-7). Eric Erikson understands this all too well, yet his analysis of race relations and identity (1966) and of "race and wider identity" (1968) present only a onesided and somewhat narrow (though compassionate) analysis of the negative identity of Blacks (an identity better than having no identity at all), the creative burst of redefinition(a cultural feat of the first magnitude), and of the crisis of largely white youth in rebellion against older generations. Focusing his analysis on the impact of racism, Erikson neglects its causes. Is this an issue of identity?, the reader may ask. Yes. It is a question of how the individual comes to be "seduced" by his or her culture into the normative ways of thinking and functioning that contribute to and cause the devaluation, dehumanization, and oppression of others (not only with malice but also with naivete and impunity). In the context of an enculturated racism, there are positive and negative identity of all side, the real questions of race must inevitably come down to crises in identity. Such crises are characteristically painful. Whites frequently avoid them, because they can, reject them and at times become angry when questions of whiteness are raised. They do not want to be "white"

but rather they want to be "human" often misunderstanding or neglecting the ways in which they are making equations between the two -- i.e., in effect saying that one must be white to be human (in terms of the way they understand humanity). Yet for people of color, ethnic and racial identity are important (racial because of oppression and ethnic due to an appreciation and reification of culture and cultural difference). Strange that the later is seen as reactionary and at times pathological and the former as "normal." Why? Unfortunately much of American history has been a celebration of a past that merits severe criticism. The ideals of equality and freedom touted as a national heritage were born on the same soil where slavery and racism already existed. A democracy restricted to white Americans was shaped in wars against the "Indians" and Mexicans, the identuring of Asian workers, the importation of Filipinos and Puerto Ricans as cheap laborers, cooptation of life, land and wealth of Hawaians and Eskimos, and the dehumanization of Black slaves. This linking of racism and democracy has made the basis for much of the contradiction and hypocracy that has been transmitted down through the various generations of American past and contemporary history. In the face of such brutal reality, American history has been distorted into a glorious example of freedom and democracy for all peoples.

Many children come to live in the mythical land "discovered by Columbus." It is almost as if Native Americans did not exist until white Europeans found them; or as if the injustices committed by frontier Americans against Indians and Mexicans were regrettable but necessary; or as if the reservation system was a genuine effort to redress wrongs; or as if, in more contemporary times, the internment of Japanese American citizens was appropriate due to a justified fear of "the yellow peril;" or as if Asian, Black, Latino, and Native Americans (conglomerately and conveniently defined as "minorities," a term which does incredible violence to cultural differences) are acculturating and assimilating into white America as did the later arriving European immigrant groups; and so on, and on and on.

Stalvey (1970) notes,

> In elementary school, nothing challenged the impressions I had been gathering. Instead, I was conditioned not to notice who wasn't there. My school books, from Dick and Jane through eighth grade geography, showed people who looked just like me. Little Black Sambo didn't, but he lived in Africa amont tigers.
>
> In...high school, American history, economics, and sociology were the names of courses I was exposed to, but when we studied the Civil War I came away with the impression that Abraham Lincoln had taken care of things nicely. In economics, I learned about the free enterprise system and I liked it. With this ystem there was no excuse for being poor, I decided, unless you were too lazy to work -- or not very smart. I loved the compassion with which America had opened its arms to "all the huddled masses yearning to be free." We were not only the refuge for homeless people, but the beneficiaries of all of the world-wide

talents each group contributed.

> In high school I enjoyed visiting the homes of my Greek, Polish, or Serbian friends... I liked the food, the cadence of the foreign language, and the fun of trying to say foreign words to the amusement of my friends' parents.
>
> If my sociology teacher tried to tell us anything about feelings between groups, I missed the point. I expect I was more concerned with the important issues of boys, clothes, and hairdos. And nothing penetrated those hairdos to shake my belief that this was a wonderful world, full of opportunities, built by whites but operated with fairness to all.
>
> World War II began in my early high school years...the rumored treatment of American citizens of Japanese descent passed me literally unnoticed. The war only increased the intense patriotism I absorbed from my immigrant grandparents sing "American, the Beautiful" always made me cry and I recited the Pledge of Allegiance with proud fervor, sure that "with liberty and justice for all" was true then and always would be. (pp. 16-17)

And continuing,

> In later years I was to explain over and over again how I could have been so incredibly naive. I was not, after all, an inexperienced girl who had married right out of school. For seven years before marriage I had successfully operated my own advertising agency. In business, I considered myself realistic and aware of all sides of human nature. Yet...I was absolutely ignorant of the complex relations between blacks and whites.
> ...The barrier behind which I was raised may have been more soundproof than some. After my parents were divorced my brother, mother, and I lived with my maternal grandparents, immigrants from Germany, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin... I suspect that my family was so secure in what they believed was their obvious superior heritage that they needed no scapegoats. My immigrant grandparents were also unschooled in the traditional American racial myths and so I was never told about Negro people. Instead, my grandfather has imported his prejudices from Europe. I remember him telling me in his

unique accent (acquired through having learned his English in Brooklyn) about the lazy, dirty, sneaky British. They had loose morals and should never be trusted. I neither believed nor disbelieved. I was aware only that I had never met enough Englishmen to find out for myself.

I grew up in a neighborhood at the opposite end of the city from Milwaukee's Negro section. Our neighbors, who were mostly railroad workers, clerks, and city employees, did not employ servants in their small houses and so there was no reason for Negro people to come into our area. The only place I could see brown-skinned people was downtown. I must have asked, as most children do, why their skins were dark and knowing my family's approach to such things, I was probably told, "God made them that way." Generations of us were told that, and I think we assumed He knew what He was doing and it was no business of ours.

I know that the first black face I saw was in a picture that hung at the front of our sunday school room. It showed Jesus looking lovingly at a group of children, one of whom was brown-skinned. During the eight years of Sunday mornings that I faced this picture, my child's mind slowly absorved the idea that if Jesus loved all these children, then we must all be the same. But I never asked why the only brown face in our church was the one in that picture.

My Saturday afternoons taught me no more about Negroes than my Sunday mornings. At the neighborhood movie I watched Bill Robinson happily tap dancing with Shirley Temple. His only problem seemed to be whatever dimmed Shirley's dimple. "Our Gang" was integrated, Steppin Fetchit was funny, and Jeannette MacDonald had a procession of loyal, loving Mammys.

But the beautiful dancing girls were all white and mostly blond. The cowboys, the soldiers, and even the gansters were white. Now watching these movies on TV, with the all-white crowd scenes, parades, and chorus lines, I realize how black people could begin to wonder if they really existed in America. For me, those Saturday afternoon movies emphasized what I had already absorbed -- that my all-white

world was natural and normal.

> Later and for only a short time, an aunt lived in an area beyond the Negro section, and to visit her we rode a trolley through blocks where I saw only people with varying shades of brown skin. But through those same trolley windows, I also saw blocks where all the store signs were in Italian or Polish or strange letters that must have been Hebrew. When I asked questions I was told that people wanted to live with their own kind. I never got off the trolley to ask. (pp. 13-15)

A more contemporary and less individually personalistic analysis is given in Knowles and Prewitt's (1969) analysis of the miseducation of children as a predominant factor in white ethnocentrism. Even with the inclusion of black, brown, red and yellow figures in contemporary texts, children still are not taught the real parameters of cultural differences, how they may come to understand, handle and negotiate these differences, or their importance. Further new texts still fail to mention any socio-cultural-political forces that have asserted a cultural identity of their own directed away from the goal of assimilating into an ethnocentrically white America. Analyzing the history text adopted by the State of California in response to a 1964 study of California public school texts which addressed the distortion and omissions regarding peoples of color in these texts, Knowles and Prewitt can still observe:

> Even the history text Land of the Free, which commended by the AFT pamphlet for its treatment of the civil rights movement, exaggerates the role of whites, particularly the federal government. The text implies that the "important advances" which have

theoretically been made came about through action by the federal government which would have occurred without the demonstrations:

> Nowhere does it [the Constitution] call for demonstrations. Yet without the demonstrations, President Kennedy and Johnson might not have called so effectively for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or President Johnson so eloquently for the Voting Act of 1965. [Caughey, Franklin and May, Land of the Free, 1967, p. 615]

In fact, fifty years of pressure by the NAACP, SCLC, SNCC, CORE, and other organizations through legal suits, speeches, and demonstrations were necessary to put their stamp of approval on any such legislation.

When giving coverage to a demonstration such as the 1963 March on Washington, Land of the Free gives credit only to Martin Luther King, although CORE and SNCC were the major organizers. Again and again texts play down those organizations whose views or methods are outside the bounds of that which the dominant white community judges to be an acceptable means of dissent. Land of the Free also assumes that the federal government is actively enforcing the legislation. Yet nonenforcement of integration laws has been the government's de facto policy since the end of Reconstruction.

No mention is made in any of the texts of the deeply imbedded Jim Crow system which originated and developed in the North while Southern blacks were still slaves. Most important, none of the new texts recognize the racism imbedded in the institutions of American society today. The texts treat black people as though they were one of the immigrant groups [!] [emphasis mine] (Knowles and Prewitt, 1969, pp. 50-51)

(Note: The AFT pamphlet referred to is a study produced by the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, of junior and senir high texts published up to December, 1967 -- Irving Sloan, The Negro in Modern American History Textbooks, 2nd ed., 1967.)

> Not only do the new texts present assimilation into white society as presently feasible for blacks, but they also imply that assimilation has been the goal of all black politics and culture. The books mention only those trends in black thought and action which can be readily accepted by whites, those which fit into the "mainstream" of American life. Even Land of the Free, a book attacked in some quarters for its "excessive" coverage of Negro history, illustrates this white-washing of black politics and culture.
>
> In dealing with the civil rights movement, Land of the Free emphasizes the Supreme Court decision on school integration in 1954 and the work of Martin Luther King (the only black named as a leader of demonstrations). There is considerable space devoted to the programs of Booker T. Washington, but only passing reference to W. E. B. DuBois, a founder of the NAACP, who came much closer to demanding full human rights for black people. DuBois' demands were unacceptable to the whites in power. His forthright attack on American racism is as repugnant to the whites in control of textbooks today as it was during his lifetime. Militant organizations such as CORE and SNCC and the black separatist movements of Marcus Garvey, the Black Muslims, and Malcom X are entirely ignored. Thus the text brings the struggle for black liberation into the American system by stressing white participation and government support, while failing to recognize any leaders or groups which asserted black identity or demanded more than white America was ready to allow.
>
> Coverage of the culture of black people is negligible [presumably to avoid stereotypy but] Stereotypy is not remedied by reducing the amount of information but by increasing its volume and scope. (Knowles and Prewitt, 1969, pp. 52-53)

Such an education, rather than preparing the child to recognize, understand and deal with cultural differences, recognize the contradiction and deal with diversity in an adequate and open fashion, glosses over such variety and contradictions as though they did not

exist or were not of major importance. Children are not taught how to handle cultural diversity, even when provided with the meager information currently available in school curriculums, and learn no sense of "protocol," as it were, for interacting with others different from themselves in a mutual fashion. Children are instead brought up and "educated" (i.e., socialized) to accept unspoken contradictions and to rationalize the society's racism while believing that freedom and justice exist equally for all.

New texts, although less overtly racist than the old, are marked by the same characteristic inability, reticence and unwillingness to acknowledge the historical and the present disparity between stated societal ideals and actual institutional practices. Thus one may predict that we will continue to encounter such conceptual distortions as: "The indians lived a much simpler life then, before the white man moved further West" [emphasis mine] (from a newscast on an international festival of several Native American tribes held in Omaha, Nebraska, August, 1980). The white man did not simply move West and the "Indians" did not just evolve from a simpler state into one of current confusion in attempting to adjust to a modern more advanced society which surrounds them. This "great lie of silence," as Twain puts it, (though not pathological as it is often tempting to suggest) is insidious and serves to

perpetuate naivete, ethnocentrism, inadequacy and inefficacy in dealing with others, at best, and racism, antagonism and white "mythology" at worst.

For the most part, the new multi-ethnic texts are limited to a self-conscious correction of past mistakes (a positive step toward rectification of invisibility, stereotypy, lack of depth, inaccuracy, insufficiency and racism) rather than presenting a coherent reinterpretation of American History (significantly, the very thing which is most basically needed).

Further types and levels of distortion symptomatically occur. When racism is recognized it is in the context of its effects (see pages 155-1956) or only abstractly in terms of its causes. Seen narrowly as "victims," non-white peoples appear in the learned journals as patients, paroless, petitioners for aid, and rarely (within or outside of such contexts) as rounded human beings.

It is one thing to recognize that social disengagement (Thomas, 1969) and oppression of which these peoples and their cultures have been objects. impedes the fulfillment of potential. It is quite another thing to assert that all individuals who have suffered oppession have been crippled by it. This lopsided emphasis on pathology, irrespective of motive of the investigator(s) results in dehumanization.

> When a white psychologist indulges in sweeping generalizations about the Negro's 'basic

> personality' as characterized by 'self-hatred' or 'fascination with feces' or 'undirected hostility' the preoccupation with abnormality takes on overtones that are unmistakably racist, regardless of intentions. (Thomas and Sillen, 1972)

Kardiner and Ovesy's (1951) well known work, The Mark of Oppression, is a monumental example of preoccupation with pathology in understanding the lives and personalities of black people, as is Oscar Lewis' (1966, 1967) works on The Children of Sanchez and La Vida in deprecating the lives of Chicanos, Blacks and the poor. Such sociological and psychological work produce characatures of human life, reflecting the great distance from which the objects of their analyses are viewed.

> Studies of the black person usually focus on what is abnormal in his life. He is viewed as a package of problems. "When we pick up a social science book," notes black historian Benjamin Quarles (1967), "we look under 'Negro;' it will read, 'see Slavery,' 'see Crime,' 'see Juvenile Delinquency,' perhaps 'see Commission of Civil Disorders;' perhaps see anything except Negro. So when we try to get a perspective on the Negro, we get a distorted perspective. (Thomas and Sillen, 1972, p. 45)

Certainly the white ethnocentric literature on the deficits and deficiencies of nonwhite peoples (as voluminous as it is) needs no recounting here. One easily gets the impression that whether color-blind (assuming that everyone is and should be the same as they) or color conscious (assuming that others are scarred or otherwise less than they), the average enculturated white individual will have difficulty in recognizing the

necessary tension between "sameness" and "difference" as these are applied to broader understanding of others (a fact not endemic to racist but to enculturation). Baldwin is instructive here:

> "Caleb," I asked, "are white people people?"
>
> "What are you taling about, Leo?"
>
> "I mean -- are white people -- people? People like us?"
>
> He looked down at me. His face was very strange and sad. It was a face I had never seen before.
>
> We climbed a few more stairs, very slowly. Then,
>
> "All I can tell you Leo, is -- well, they don't think they are."
>
> (James Baldwin, Tell Me How Long the Train's Been Gone)

Clearly the problem of adequately understanding others is in part a function of the degree to which one understands oneself. Understanding oneself within one's socio-cultural context (involving other peoples, real institutions histories and social structures) is prerequisite to any real sense of pluralistic functioning. As will become increasingly apparent, this contextual basis of identity formation involves active self-discovery rather than an exclusively external focus on understanding others and involves the discovery of functionally equivalent and functionally divergent processes among culturally diverse groups. One cannot hope to understand struggles and processes that occur within other

groups that one avoids and/or misinterprets in respect to the self. Thus one cannot begin to understand the struggle for a healthy sense of identification within the context of a racially oppressive society unless one has attempted to develop a healthy self-conception within this context as well--in this context no groups are exempt (though the white middle-class has been characteristically naive and negligent in this regard). In the next two sections these issues are further explored. Though the major models presented in the section immediately following on "Growth Models for Ethnic Identity" focus on Black and Asian American psycho-cultural identity formation within a context of psycho-social oppression, these models have important implications for the white middle-class (implications reflected in the later section on "The Problem of Whiteness and the Search for an Authentic Identity." In these two major sections theoretical work is presented which identifies the nature and development of those behaviors that serve as discriminators against which racist behaviors may be judged -- the clearest discriminant category being pluralistic functioning; a category within which a well stabilized and increasingly adequate self concept (non-exclusive and less distorting of others) emerges. As indicated at the end of the discussion in the second of these two sections, with such stabilization one may expect (a) a widening of one's socio-cultural radius, (b) an expanding of the number and kinds of people to whom one can respond meaningfully and authentically on the basis of (c) ever more highly differentiated capacities, (d) the necessity

to manage new encounters, (e) a lessened feeling of estrangement supported by the awareness of new dependencies and new familiarities, and (f) new psychosocial strength.

The section on "Growth Models for Ethnic Identify" should provide a clear and vivid sense of the necessity for contextual development of personal identity in a broad socio-cultural sense and the section on "The Problems of Whiteness and the Search for an Authentic Identity" should provide some explication of the problem involved both in achieving such an identity and in neglecting the struggle, especially in regards to the white middle-class. These two sections should round out our concern with racism and its discriminants at the level of personal (individual) functioning.

Growth Models for Ethnic Identity: Contextual "Basis" for Pluralistic Functioning

Thomas (1973) has pointed out to advance toward a science of human behavior there must be well-defined constructs. This aspect of theory building has been lacking in regard to growth referent behaviors for Afro-Americans and other people of color. This deficit has been reflected both in the research conducted and in the services provided with respect to this broad range of human populations. In those instances where studies are available the emphasis is almost entirely on pathology or deficiency. "While some might say that this condition holds because the behavioral

sciences are not positive in approach, that explanation is hardly defensible in terms of the cost to humanity" (p. 1).

"In recent times", Thomas points out, "large numbers of Afro-Americans have engaged in self-directed shifts in personal social behavior. These changes in role behavior have been indicative of the search for an authentic identity"...i.e., that authority of self to define "what we have been, what we are, and what we will be as people"..."in a society which depicts us as less-than-human." ... a society which "has not permitted easy access to our authority as human beings." This condition, according to Thomas, has evolved four modes of adaptation: conformity, marginility, hybridization, and rebellion.

In the conformist role (which Thomas labels the "Negro" role), the Afro-American conforms to expected behavior as defined by white society at the expense of self. In this role Afro-Americans never develop self-reliance. In a related context, Cross (1971) describes this existential state in terms of a person "programmed to view and think of thw world as being non-Black, anti-Black, or the opposite of Black. The person's world-view is dominated by Euro-American determinants" ... irrespective of class status, that is the specific content of behaviors, the person thinks, acts and behaves in a manner that degrades Blackness. The person's historical perspective distorts Black history. "It is believed," Cross suggests, "that Black people come from a strange, uncivilized, 'dark' continent, and that the

search for Black history begins in 1865 -- that slavery was a civilizing experience." The person is "politically naive and is programmed to have faith in the Protestant ethic. There is an extreme dependency on White leadership, and the assimilation-integration paradigm is thought to be the only model for cohesive race relations. Under the dictates of the assimilation-integration paradigm the development of an 'American' identity involves affirmation of "White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant" characteristics, and negation, dilution, or even denial of non-WASP behavior. As western standards are inherently anti-Black and anti-African...emphasis is on the individual seeking to get 'ahead'; the advancement of the race is gauged by how far 'I' progress in the system as opposed to how the system related to the 'group'" (Cross, 1971, p. 270-272).

In the marginality role ("The White-Middle-Class-Negro Role"), Thomas suggests that, the Afro-American adapts by imitating the lifestyle of Anglo-Americans in a refusal to recognize defeat. "This role is characterized by the rejection of Anglo stereotypes of Negroness. K.B. Clark (1965) described White middle class Negroes as dedicating 'their lives to the task of becoming walking refutations of negative racial stereotypes' ... This individual goes out of his way to show that a set of behavioral expectations held for him are the very ones which do not apply to him. This attitude also leads to a total rejection of ethnocentrism." (p. 4). According to Thomas, the rational

approach is especially characteristic of the White middle class Negro, and rejection of his/her cultural heritage is typical. As Essein-Udom (1962) pointed out: "In their anxiety not to appear racist in their thinking, they are repudiated all racially conscious movements and organizations..." The dilemma in this instance, as Thomas points out, is that "while repudiating identity with Afro-American culture, the White middle class Negro is in turn not fully accepted by the Anglo group in which membership is sought. Yet, having accepted that particular value system, one is forced to compete with Anglos at the risk of personal conflict. The antagonism resulting from marginality and alienation develops out of the self-definition based on conception of counter-contrasts. One becomes the very opposite of what is expected or even encouraged as acceptable conduct. Such an individual is in conflict with himself, with his fellow Afro-Americans and with other ethnic groups. The person is neither what he wants to be nor what others say is or should be the predetermined personal-social role. Ironically, it is this group that the largest number of professionally trained and technically skilled Afro-Americans hold membership...The paradoxical failure of these alienated marginal individuals is the psychological mobility to be advocates of the Black movement. At the same time they tend to suffer from feelings of guild because they have personally benefitted from an effort which does not have their support." (Thomas, 1973, p. 4-6)

Regressive patterns of behavior are evidenced "using fear over rage as the basis for emotional control." There is a strong need for White approval (i.e., a "desire for security through social over-dependence) and a traditional pride in self-realization ("I made it on my own." "No one gave me anything." "With plenty of hard work anybody can make it in this country"). None of these role behaviors resolve the ambiguity which places those Afro-Americans in a defective social system where being worthwhile, self-reliant, autonomous, responsible and the like are granted only when it is politically expedient for those who control the power structure.

Along similar lines, in his examination of identity conflict, consolidation, and particularly the regressive choice of marginality, Suhr (1976), notes "The necessity of some degree of economic integration brings with it the necessity of acquiring the education, language skills, and modes of social intercourse that go with such integration. This being the case, it is rare that an Asian American individual experiences this integration of the Asian and American aspects of his existence without encountering some of the tensions, conflicts, and discomforts inherent in it. For those of a more traditional background the conflict may present itself as the need to neglect one's culture for the sake of earning money; the desertion of the more valuable part of oneself for the sake of baser needs. For those who find in their work a

creative and meaningful activity, there is in most cases little hope of unifying this meaning with traditional Asian culture. For all, there is a persistent feeling of playing in a rigged game from which it is impossible to withdraw.

The damage goes even deeper. Since this dividion of the personality is both necessary and all-pervasive, it puts all Asian Americans on tenterhooks with respect to their identity...both in relations with other Asians and in their self-conception. But this identity vulnerability also represents a barrier to examining one's own conscience and feelings. Those who attempt to question the worth and meaning of their lives most closely will be the most disturbed and confused.

The Asian American, like all racial minorities in the U.S., is like a man on a tight-wire drawn between the two halves of himself. Some lean closer to one half or the other, but most live greater or lesser portions of their lives on the wires, a project which usually absorbs most of one's energies and reflective powers. Too close an examination of the reasons for the wire and the nature of one side or the other threatens a loss of footing. It is not surprising that some Asian Americans prefer to deaden their curiosity, stifle their conflicts, and remain... absorbed with the immediacies of life.

The price exacted by this adjustment to one's situation is the surrender of insight into it. Not only can the Asian American not attain an authentic self-pride...he is also

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severely hampered from attaining even self-knowledge.

Yet there are those, Asian Americans and others, who think of assimilation as a viable solution to the race problem. The falseness of that position can be appreciated only by a full consideration of its most ardent practitioner and advocate, the Marginal Man. This doubly necessary because he normally not only misunderstands the nature of assimilation, he is also himself misunderstood.

Before all else, assimilation represents the sin of turning one's back on one's origins and birthright. Everyone hates a turncoat, not least of all the turncoat himself. This deep and undeniable feeling leads members of groups which suffer prejudice to harbor prejudices of their own toward the Marginal Man...The Marginal Man's hatred of himself is thus compounded and confirmed by the resentment he feels from other Asians. The view that his self-hate as a personal problem is thus assured by the absence of opportunities for mediating his feelings through social contact with other Asians. Assimilation in a racist society inverts the normal relation among members of the rejected minority, replacing trust with mistrust and fellow-feeling with hostility...At base, the Marginal Man does not turn his back on his own kind out of malice or evil intent, but as a mode of survival. Through a combination of circumstances such as family background and upbringing, education, interests, work, and the amount of contact with other Asians these things permit, he comes to view his identity as other than Asian. He avoids other Asians and

denies the Asian in himself in order to hold together this identity. This becomes a full time occupation precisely because whatever else he is to those he encounters, he is always and inevitably also an Asian. His constant concern is to prove to them how mistaken they really are in regarding him as an Asian at all. This may be done with self-consciousness, and the Marginal Man may even think that he is contributing to the eradication of racism by showing that all Asians do not fit into the stereotyped images of them held by the dominant society. Thus, he or she may not only try to date and marry outside his or her race, but also choose occupations, lifestyles, tastes and social contacts which deliberately contradict what society expects of Asians. These choices serve the double function of establishing the Marginal Man's identity as non-Asian and keeping him out of contact with other Asians, whose presence is an embarrassment and threat to him.

The logic of his situation leads him to deny or minimize the existence of racism...even though the very nature of his identity is a silent and unacknowledged confirmation of it. Some of the resentment that should properly be directed toward the circumstances making for racism is redirected against other Asians and toward the repression of his own Asian characteristics. The Marginal Man tends to believe that there is more than a little justification for thinking that Asians are, say, meek, unassertive, and clannish, and that the situation would

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markedly improve if only they would follow his example and cease behaving that way. In this manner, he meets racism halfway and while not justifying it, learns to co-exist with it." (Suhr, 1975, p. 154-158).

It is interesting to note that his regressive pattern of self-destructive conformity could not exist without the support of White liberals, who join the Marginal Man in a pathology of unresolved identity. As Suhr describes it:

> "The lonliness and roothlessness of the Marginal Man could not survive without external support. This he finds in White liberals whose views of racism closely approximate his own. In fact, their outlooks coincide on several points. The Marginal Man's isolation from other Asians leads him to think of himself above all as an invividual, one who has cut his ties with the specific, ethnic determinants of his personality and seeks to develop his universal, human essence; he leaves behind what is Asian in his make-up in order to discover and develop that which he shares with other men. In this respect, the Marginal Man may even regard this detribalization as an act of liberation, which, of course, it is in an old-fashion sense .
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> The White liberal welcomes and applauds the kind of adjustment the Marginal Man makes to his ethnicity. It confirms his view of society as a group of free individuals striving to live in harmony. It reassures him that it is possible to win over some members of out-groups to existence on the plane of pure humanity; and it helps him discount as simply 'backward' those who do not desire that level of existence.
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> The Marginal Man in turn finds in this liberal view a meaning to his existence, a way of regarding his isolation, and the rejection of his ethnicity in elevated and dignified terms. He finds in White liberals proof that it is possible to live among Whites and encouragement in ignoring and suppressing his own Asianness. Liberalism provides his world view and underpins the legitimacy and viability of his feelings.

> Only his feelings are not really viable. This may be judged by his gnawing dislike for himself and other Asians, the result of an identity conflict that has been repressed rather than resolved. This dislike is forever renewed in the presence of other Asians, especially those who remain to some degree traditional, but also other Asian Marginal Men, whose uneasiness and unstable identity mirror his own. Other Asians represent the most corrosive threat to this identity as a man without an ethnic dimension; they beg all questions of his own existence; he thinks, 'There but for the accident of family and upbringing go I.' These feelings also represent a standing reproach to his liberalism, which teaches that one must harbor prejudices, whatever their causes may be...The Marginal Man is...not at home with himself, even among those who share his view of race relations. He is inevitably and simultaneously both a living confirmation of the liberal view and the incipient breakdown of that view. The usual response of this unhappy consciousness is avoidance and repression: avoidance of other Asians and racist Whites, repression of the Asian within and of his own sensitivity of racist insults.
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> ...The Marginal Man is not to be pitied; neither is he to be blamed. He votes "yes" to a set of circumstances mostly beyond his control. It is the election that is rigged, and that is where the blame should be placed." (Suhr, 1975, p. 158-159).

In a similar vein, E. Franklin Frazer has criticized such a marginal state in which many Black intellectuals were historically arrested in his assessment that:

> Many educated Negroes or Negro intellectuals have failed to achieve any intellectual freedom. In fact, with the few exceptions of literary man, it appears that the Negro intellectual is unconscious of the extent to which his thinking is restricted to sterile repetition of the safe and conventional ideas current in American society.
>
> ...One of the most important results of the lack of freedom on the part of Negro intellectuals has been their failure to produce men of high intellectual stature

who are respected by the world at large.

We have no philosophers or thinkers who command the respect of the intellectual community at large. I am not talking about the few teachers of philosophy who have read Hegel or Kent or James and memorized their thoughts. I am talking about men who have reflected upon the fundamental problems which have always concerned philosophers such as the nature of human knowledge and the meaning or lack of meaning of human existence.

We have no philosophers who have dealt with these and other problems from the standpoint of the Negro's unique experience in this world. I am not talking about the puerile opportunistic rationalizations of the Negro's effort to survive in a hostile world. The philosophy implicit in the Negro's folklore is infinitely superior to the opportunistic philosophy of Negro intellectuals who want to save their jobs and enjoy material comforts.

...This brings me to something of what Negro intellectuals or scholars have failed to accomplish as the intellectual leaders of Negroes.

They have failed to study the problems of Negro life in America in a manner which would place the fate of the Negro in the broad framework of man's experience in this world. They have engaged in petty defenses of the Negro's social failures. But more often they have been so imbued with the prospect of integration and eventual assimilation that they have thought that they could prove themselves true Americans by not studying the Negro.

Since integration has become the official policy of the country they have shunned more than ever the study of the Negro. They have remained intellectually sterile while propounding such meaningless questions as: Should Negro scholars study the Negro? Should Negro painters paint Negro subjects? Should Negro writers and playwrights write Negro novels and plays about Negroes?

This is indicative of the confusion among Negro intellectuals. But more important still, it has meant that Negro intellectuals have cut

> themselves off from a vastly rich source of human experience to which they had access." (Frazier, 1962).

One may sense clearly the importance of Fanon's observation as applicable to our present discussion of marginality: "There is a fact: White men consider themselves superior to Black men. There is another fact: Black men want to prove to White men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect...How do we extricate ourselves?" (Fanon, 1976, p. 10).

Other reactions to psychosocial oppressions are those of hybridization and rebellion (Thomas, 1973). The hybrid role (the "nigger" role) "is a mixture of psychological rebellion and social over-dependence, which develops the self-harming pattern of defiance for the sake of defiance... even when one is aware that the behavior is inappropriate, self-destructive, or futile, one tends not to stop the activities. In self-harming defiance, the individual makes the false connection between being defiant and being worthwhile and strong. So he stops being defiant about issues but defies for the sake of defying, thinking erroneously that it is a good thing...The pattern of activity moves from one impulse to the next. From 'good nigger' to 'bad nigger,' for example. ...Many individuals in the Black or rebel role use the hybrid or nigger mode of adaptation to deal with momentary feelings of rejection and failure or as a way to sustain a fleeting sense of inadequacy.

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This behavior grows out of the idealized "bad nigger" which represents an attempt to obtain emotional security through a pattern of defiance as psychological strength. It is also reflective of the need for adalation from all Afro-Americans ...As one brother said:

> 'To show them who is the baddest motha f---a in these parts gives me the feeling I need to go on. You got to expect to fight Charlie. That's a way of life. But, you got niggers to deal with too. And can't get no help, no time, on nothing.'

Frustrations over feelings of disgust appear to be a primary reason for getting into the nigger role for 'relief' from the pressures. The difficulty with this type of adjustment pattern is that one can be destroyed by it. On the other hand, a denial of frustration is not to be encouraged. One has to master the dislocating agitations through a critical examination of what he is doing; with whom he is doing it; and for what reasons he is doing it... The fight to gain control over the nigger and to sustain the existential death of the Negro is endless. Without periodic evaluations of thoughts, feelings, actions and their compatibility with Black values regression can occur which evokes acute anxiety, depression, withdrawal or even a sudden impulsive reentry into periods of self-harming defiance or disordered conformity" (Thomas, 1973, p. 3-13).

"The only role which affirms a positive Afro-American identity is the Black one. The mood of the Black role is tinted with existentialism. Bad faith in self for example, is the organizing principle of the other roles. Sincerity,

the opposite of bad faith, however can be used to understand the Black role. Sincerity, as the principle factor in personality consolidation, is defined as 'man be for himself what he must be." This need for an authentic sense of self has been stressed by many writers. An Afro-American in complete negritude, according to Fanon (1967) is in the state of "I am wholly what I am"...Endurance and socially productive aggression are among the basic tools for people in this role. Self-determined action within the limits of life is also stressed...the Black role assumes all of the socio-cultural patterns of non-conformists. As such Black people have become aggressively independent; and at the same time hostile in dealing with groups and institutional failings that would maintain us as a passively dependent and self-defeating people (Thomas, 1971)... 'Blackness is a master of being decidedly free as far as appreciating the probability of one's total being...personal and social freedom and blackness are inseparable (Thomas, 1971)...This Afro-American personality consolidation is fortified by a support system which upholds and demands ethnocentric values rather than to suppress such standards of conduct.

The thrust toward self-esteem, environmental mastery and self-definition flows out of Blackness as a behavioral science paradigm with mental health implications. Psychosocial intervention or prevention of pathological minds sets is used to promote the enlargement of potential and

to enhance the socialization process of Afro-Americans as a people who grow and develop. Behaviorally, blackness becomes manifested through outlooks, feelings, and thoughts which guide actions to enable Afro-Americans to become captives of our own humanity...Goal directed behavior is fully attended to in terms of "well to humanness" in one's own ethnicity and by one's ethnocentrism. There is a change from disordered behavior patterns of manifest helplessness, hopelessness, powerlessness and/or under-achievement to personal-social adequacy through cultural self-realization as a performance criteria. Blackness is the essential adaptive process that (1) facilitates environmental mastery; (2) promotes self-esteem; (3) allows for growth motivation; (4) combats the neurotic compromise of apathy and passive aggression; and (5) incorporates narcissism and ethnocentrism not only as positive motivating influences but as the organizing drive for completion as a human...self-reliance, achievement, pride and pleasure are based upon realistic self-appraisals. Blackness is experienced as intrinsic self-validating, self-justifying value. The process is self-fulfilling. The content promotes self-improvement. These phenomena are dynamic in their handling of interpersonal relations as the expansion in self-confidence makes for dependable, trustworthy actions.

Becoming or the constantly evolving, forever unfolding character is a vital feature of blackness because it

nurtures a mind set which shapes and selects self-actualization as the core of full humanness (Thomas, 1973). In this alliance rituals and symbols peculiar to the Black value system are necessary. These referent sources provide not only a consistent, reliable grasp of concern, but they also enhance the authentic sense of social reality. In short, the adaptational organization provides safeguards against identity diffusion or dislocation from an upheaval due to inappropriate modeling...self-assertiveness as the emotional component of this role does not emerge until dependence...on old patterns of self-defeating, inappropriate, self-destructive, and self-contemptuous behavior have been confronted. The corrective emotional experience demands an understanding of arrested personal-social development.

Blackness changes the Afro-American's view of himself in a positive, personal growth direction. There is also a change in the Black person's view of, and relations with people in other roles...i.e., an expanding level of frustration tolerance for ingroup members (Cross, 1971; Thomas, 1973).

The Psychodynamics of Healthy Ethnic Identity: Integration of Models of Thomas and Cross

The development and maintenance of a healthy ethnic identity seems to involve a number of factors. Confrontation with self and with "external forces that have limited the development of an authentic self or facilitated a distorted

significance of self," catharsis, personal and cultural reexamination, testing, and actualization (Thomas, 1973) appear to be among the central elements in achieving a healthy identity. Fixation in stages of conformism to anti-ethnic or culturally destructive concepts (e.g. the Negro role to White Middle Class Negro role of avoiding cultural ties, dependence on White leadership, focus on individualism, being a good "American citizen," equation of humanism with whiteness, political naivety, and faith in the Protestant ethnic), fixation in stages of emersion in guilt, rage, and hatred; fixation in nihilistic, hopeless, or even an "anti-people" world view; fixation and stagnation in arrogant and uniformed intellectual, political, and/or social stance are potential hazards on the development process.

On the positive side of the continuum, (beginning with Thomas' model of confrontation, catharsis, personal and cultural examination, testing and self-actualization) the psychological impact of <u>confrontation with self and with external forces</u> can be dramatic. For it potentially creates a sense of being stronger than was previously thought possible (Thomas, 1973). "Each individual asks himself very personal questions" (e.g., What is this ominous thing called 'Blackness', 'Black Power,' or 'Black History'?...Maybe things are different than I thought. Have I been unaware of the Black experience? Have I been socialized to avoid it? Do I date White women, or am I avoiding Black women?

What does it mean to be a Black woman or a Black man?") cf. Cross, 1971, p. 272-273). Cross suggests that during the process of self-confrontation, guilt becomes a tremendous factor as does anger which combines to give motivation to the search for Black identity. Confrontation with external forces which limit and distort development is expressed in early forms of self-expressiveness and assertive behavior . As Thomas notes, however, such behavior is not without impact on anti-Black or liberal and naive Whites: reaction to this new assertion on the part of Blacks frequently produces self-doubt in Whites. "The outcome is (frequently) a defensive reaction (on the part of Whites) where many proclaim feelings of guilt...supported by loss of control over those thought to be child-like, inferior or less than human" (Thomas, 1973). Thomas suggests that, "Paradoxically, it is almost always the liberal or radical Anglos who, in giving vent to their latent whiteness, become benevolent dictators. With bold openness, arrangements are made to control the behavior of those Afro-Americans who confront them."

The confrontation phase is precarious and focus must be on the creative use of conflict (Thomas, 1973). "Afro-Americans may be drawn into---counter-control behavior because they do not understand what is happening. However, it is the use of confrontation as a tool which allows Afro-Americans to have a possession of self and to direct their behavior into a self-expressive and actualizing stream of

behaviors. ...Furthermore, the risk-taking aspects of confrontation become satisfying in and of themselves. These actions are quite important because they are critical factors in the maintenance of subsequent, impressions, feelings, and ideas of social reality" (Thomas, 1973, p. 16).

Focus, however, may not only be an actualizing oneself and concretizing one's Blackness, but focus may potentially be on "dramatizing" or "proving" one's Blackness as well (cf. Cross, 1971, p. 275). Carried to its extreme, the impulse to confront White people may be expressed in confrontation with police, or engagement in idle rhetoric or fantasy. Cross suggests that "Persons who fixate on stagnate at this point in their development are likely to maintain a 'pseudo' Black identity because it is based on the hatred and negation of White people rather than on the affirmation of a pro-Black perspective"...(p. 275-276)... Confrontation can be the primary basis for communication with other people, Black or White.

Catharsis in an emotionally supportive climate appears to be an essential stage in this process of developing a new more consonant identity. "This is a time of...release from...one's former life style and value system. Though the assistance of a group structure one may begin to verbalize apprehensions about becoming Black. Among the more common concerns are: What shall I do? How should I behave? What does it feel like to be Black? What is expected of me? Who is going to help me? How long will

the change take? What do I say to family members and friends who do not believe that Blackness is very positive? , and Do I have to hate White people? These issues reflect a concern for the need to assemble a self which would match the personality to societal opportunities that will promote growth which includes characteristics...previously considered bad?

During such a period, Cross suggests that the person "immerse himself in the world of Blackness." The person attends political meetings...goes to rapping sessions, attends seminars, reads literature, and/or investigates art that focuses on Blackness. Thomas (1973) describes this stage as "I've got to know about me!" "It is an information processing stage with emphasis on insight into the person and his heritage. The need to know Afro-American culture becomes a significant concern. Information processing is important for further growth motivation, cultural contributions as well as anti-social patterns must be examined. How well one masters this stage becomes the critical factor in the transformation of awareness and in making the transition to Blackness. It is at this point in the conversion process that denial, a sense of loss, and depression-like states take place. While negative in appearance or symptomatology, these personal indicators are hopeful signs for positive change. In a philosophical sense, these observed reactions are in response to the existential death which is necessary before a change in identity can take place. This existential death of

of the Negro in Afro-Americans is a necessary development before one can be committed to Blackness. Among the more important concepts to be examined are ethnocentrism, denial of achievement, exploitation, conformity-proneness, narcissism, endurance, courage and personal-social security" (p. 17). Potentially everything of value must be Black or relevant to Blackness. The experience is an immersion into Blackness and a liberation from Whiteness. Regardless of the opinions of others, the person actually feels that he is being drawn toward qualitatively different experiences as he is being torn from his former orientations. The immersion is a...dominating sensation constantly being oversized by...rage, guilt, and...developing sense of pride... In this context ... The much discussed 'Blacker than thou' syndrome may come into play. Potentially, other Black people may be classified in such neat and stereotypic .... categories as 'Uncle Tom', 'militant', 'together', 'soulful', 'middle class', 'intellectual snob'... etc. This labelling of others helps the person clarify his own identity, but is often destructive --e.g. not revealing of underlying psychosocial dynamics, continuity and/or growth, but instead tend to be self-aggrandizing, critical and negativistic in function. Not only does this person stereotype people, but his view of cosmology is greatly simplified and tends to be racist... The person is concerned that his Blackness be pure or acceptable, and the purification rites are energized as previously mentioned by a mixture of guilt, rage and

growing sense of pride" (Cross, 1971, p. 273-286).

At one extreme, "The white world, White culture, and White person are dehumanized...and become...inferior, as the Black person and Black world are dic fied...Everything that is Black is good and romantic" (Cross, 1971, p. 274). For many this process is a necessaty prerequisite to self-determination and healthy self-expression. As Cross notes, there also occurs a creative burst based in vitalization and revitalization of Blackness, Black culture, and self.

The positive development from this orientation toward hatred and negation of White people is the emergence from "the dead-end, either/or racist, oversimplified aspects of the immersion experience. The person begins to 'level off' and control his experiences. In fact many persons annot continue to handle such an intense and concentrated affect level characteristic of this period of identity development and must find a plateau...One is able to discard or seriously question the simplistic components of the 'Black is beautiful' philosophy...Such terms as power, control of one's mind, educational process, economic systems, institutions, programs, and process are considered. The white person is humanized (painfully, White people are recognized as equal to Black people at birth) and synthesizing...rage with reason becomes the emphasis. The individual is now at least receptive to...critical analysis of the Afro-American condition from a cultural, political and socioeconomic view. Accepted factors of the Black

experience are incorporated, and the person focuses on, or at least he is highly receptive to, presentations and plans for action for the development (liberation) of the Black community or the necessary transformations of Black lifestyles. The rage is still evident, however, but guilt sensations are replaced by feelings of price" (Cross, 1971, o. 277). However, as Cross notes, "The events that occur during the immersion-emersion stage may frustrate or inspire an individual...During the immersion-emersion stage, the individual develops an idealistic...level of expectancy toward anything 'Black', in which case minimal reinforcement may carry the person into continued involvement...Yet prolonged or traumatic frustration...of these high expectancy levels may produce a Black person more deeply rooted in nihilistic and hopeless expectancies... Other individuals who experience particularly painful perceptions and confrontations will be overwhelmed with hate for White people and fixate at that affective level ...Others internalize and incorporate aspects of the immersion-emersion experience into their self-concept. They achieve a feeling of inner security and are more satisfied with themselves. There is receptivity to discussions or plans of action; however, receptiveness is as far as it goes. The person is not committed to a plan of action. He or she becomes the 'nice' Black person with an Afro hairstyle and an attachment to Black things. Thus, it is possible for persons to progress to a state of psychological Blackness and then stop

developing! Fixation and Stagnation at the internalization stage is reflected in the arrogant anti-intellectual attitudes of some Black high school and college students. These students seem to believe that having experienced the Negro-to-Black conversion is tantamount to having sompleted an intensive intellectual analysis of the Black experience! 'I am Black so why should I study Black experience?'... Feeling 'Black and beautiful' becomes an end in itself rather than the source of motivation for improving one's skills or for a deeper understanding of the Black condition. Furthermore, his world view remains the same --still very American. Cosmologically the person is unchanged, yet psychologically and spirtually the person is significantly different. However, the self-concept modifications may make the person receptive to meaningful change in his world view...Assuming that the person is able to continue his development...he or she will eventually <u>become</u> the new identity. The shift is from concern about how your friends see your anxiety over Blackness to confidence in one's personal standards of Blackness; from uncontrolled rage toward White people to controlled, felt and conscious anger toward oppressive and racist institutions; from symbolic rhetoric to...dedicated, long-term commitment; from unrealistic urgency to a sense of destiny; from anxious, insecure, rigid, inferiority feelings to Black pride, self-love and a deep sense of Black communalism. As inter0 nalization and incorporation increase, attitudes toward White people become less hostile, or at least realistically

contained... anxiety over Blackness diminishes, and pro-Black attitudes become more expansive, open, and less defensive" (Cross, 1971, p. 277-281). During such a process, Thomas (1973) suggests that a partnership of an actualized Black person with the emerging Black person is important. This is a period which Thomas characterizes as "I've got to do it in order to be me." "It is a time for testing out the new concepts of self. This is the action sequence where partnerships formed through the matching of a confirmed Black person with the emerging Black person... attention is given to seeing that projects assigned will design out dysfunctional features in the old life style or design in social stimuli which will enhance the new value system" (p. 17-18). Thomas notes that "It is especially critical during this time to ensure that the emerging Black person does not get into situations beyond his capacities. Mixing-up priorities, messing up programs, and trying to do too much in general can create serious personal-social problems...Key issues during this phase often involve social competence, situational determinism, safeguards against permissiveness, and a productive use of conformity" (p. 17-18). Thomas notes that "There must first be an awareness of what one has and can have going for oneself in terms of personal resources: How real are the limitations imposed by one-self as the person views himself in his environment? In facing these and related issues one becomes able to define goals which will permit greater personal satisfaction as

well as...pinpoint the existence of self-deceptive activities. Goals set tend to be more realistic but are also higher than most set before ...

A second condition of being involves an understanding of where one wants to go based on his resources. Such knowledge facilitates the setting of appropriate goal priorities. In this regard the Black person "doing his thing" is less caught up in denial, conflict, anxieties or other feelings that would interfere with the realization of his potential...

Setbacks in personal acts or group endeavors are not the sources of distress and anxiety that once seemed so characteristic. Unsatisfactory experiences are evaluated increasingly in terms of enhancing the chances of success. Consequently, there are significant numbers of Black people from all walks of life committed to making distinctions between their values and those imposed upon them by the social structure. It is from this situation that the Black person vigorously resists interference by those who would think for him, plan for him, or do for him. He maintains this independent position as well of basic moral principle and as an essential psycho-social need. To perform in a different way would be inconsistent with necessary guidelines for goals by which he conducts his life. In spite of considerable opposition, it is emotionally necessary that he commit all forces to his sense of self so that changes have authenticity for his total being.

Something beyond mere protest or physical factors provides access to positive goals: 'I will be me as I must be.'

The final basic condition to have particular application to being involves how well one has made out...individually and collectively, self-evaluation is most important because it fosters a sense of productiveness" (Thomas, 1971, p . 123-124).

As the person continues to develop he becomes "committed to a plan. He is actively trying to change his community... He is going beyond rhetoric and into action and he defines change in terms of the masses of Black people rather than the advancements of a few. His values may still have a decidedly western overtone" (Cross, 1971, p. 208).

In making a similar observation to the earlier cited one here by E. Franklin Frazier, Cross notes that "The significance of non-western insights is dramatized when considering the problem of liberating Black scholars. The "Negro" scholar hesitates to become involved in the Black experience because his perspective is distorted by the limitations of the philosophy and epistemology of Western science. Cross suggests that at least six factors define the constraints that prevent the Black scholar from attaining personal liberation: (1) Western thought relies primarily on <u>intellectual</u> factors as it concomitantly suppresses affective inputs; (2) The behavioral sciences, which have evolved from the rational referent, also defy cognitive functions and minimize the value of emotionally energized

behavior; (3) The western science rhetoric suggests non-violent, rational-intellectual solutions and emphatically rejects violent resolutions as irrational and even 'immoral'; (4) Racism permeates Western thought to the extent that the social sciences have maintained racism rather than produced models for human liberation; (5) Social scientists have traditionally been content with a statistical, categorical, static, descriptive analysis of the Black community with minimal time and effort spent on prescriptive analysis for rectifying the Black condition; and (6) A Negro trained in a Western university sees the Black experience as a study in gross pathology or cultural deprivation" (p. 281-282). Should the person develop a comparative referent (Western and non-Western insights), then the identity process moves more closely toward crystallization (Cross, 1971, p. 281).

Crystallization of the identity process (in adopting a broader philosophical and intellectual referent, being committed to and involved in actions to change the condition of masses of Black people), involves "the critical decision to be Black and the person moves unhesitatingly to act upon the decision made. Through the heightened self-confidence, self-respect and trust of self...one is able to deal with others in an authentic human way. One is able to perceive himself and others realistically and behave accordingly." (Thomas, 1973, p. 18-19).

"One of the most striking qualities of many people at the level of self-actualization is the compassion they exhibit toward others who have not completed the developmental process i.e. who are at different stages of psychosocial-"political" identity development. They tend to watch over others who are developing, helping them conquer reactionary White hatred, showing them the pitfalls of Black pride without competency and skills, prodding the potential Black scholar, artist, or community organizer to have faith in Black perspectives or firmly but warmly urging the rhetorical scientific communalistic anti-religious super-Black 'revolutionary' to recapture his Black humanism (etc.) ...He or she understands and accepts the necessity of all phases of the Negro-to-Black transition, including the rage, anger, and anxiety over Blackness (Cross, 1971, p. 282).

He or she understands, for example, that "when a person is in the early phases of his transformation, ... his new identity has not been incorporated, in which case he will feel insecure with his new frame of reference. That he will be preoccupied with rejection of his old ideas, values and behavior while romanticizing and oversimplifying his new ideal self. That his first encounter with Black pride may really be based on the negation of his past and hatred of White people, along with a simplistic rigid code of Blackness <u>rather than</u> the affirmation of pro-Black ideas, values and actions. That the person's uneasiness with this new home of reference will be demonstrated by

the level of the person's anxiety over blackness, degree of anger and lack of control over anger toward White people, and the limited internalization of a Black perspective. All of these factors in part characterize a restricted withdrawn ego that is protecting itself while "inside" it tries to reshape, redefine, and rebuild those personality components related to the ego-ideal" (Cross, 1971 , p. 280).

He or she understands that many Afro-Americans in transition will distrust Blackness "because self-consciousness often becomes more outstanding than self-esteem, and self-control tends often to be of an impulsive quality. That under such circumstances it is extremely difficult to establish a footing in self-determination. However, once this struggle has been unraveled and feelings and activities reflect positive goals, it then becomes possible to consider more realistic relationships with Whites particularly, with other Blacks and with others generally. (Thomas, 1971, p. 121).

Blackness As A Personality Construct (Thomas)

"As a process the various stages of identity development have to be repeated in order to use the feedback in maintaining one's Blackness." (Thomas, 1973, p. 19). Dependent upon situational context, experience, stabilization of levels of identity development, etc., a given individual may function at differing points in time in many of the existential modes described. At times the individual may

be creatively and constructively non-conformist, self-destructively rebellious, overly conformist, or marginal in their behavior and/or existential stage. With repeated experience comes crystallization of the individuals' identity state.

Some Extrapolations from the Cross, Thomas and Suhr Models

A common denominator within each of the three models is the notion that transitory identification is difficult, inconsistent and uncertain. This should prove true for anyone struggle to formulate and develop an adequate and healthy sense of identity within a pervasively unhealthy socio-cultural context. Anderson (1976) explicates this state well and it is from him that we borrow the label "transitory identification." As described by Anderson (1976), in this state

> .... the person sometimes strongly identifies with his group and other times attempts to completely reject identification with that gtoup. This may not be a conscious process. Ideologically .... the individual may favor .... a pluralistic society in which he can identify with several ethnic groups. Practically, he .... may .... make some effort to avoid a particular ethnic identity when he is in groups or situations in which this identity might limit his acceptance .... In such a state, the .... person can be characterized as being "other directed" in the process of identifying himself to his group and, as we would add, to other groups as well. The person is likely to be frequently conscious of the problem of deciding which identity is most appropriate to promote for himself in a given time and place, and he may have guilt feelings and fears as a result of duplicity and inconsistency in relating himself to his or other ethnic group/groups. (p.3)

Although Anderson intended this description to apply to transitory identification in Blacks, this description has clear and important structural significance for anyone going through such a period of transitory identification which appears to be a necessity in the development of an adequate sense of identity within the prevailing socio-cultural context. Such an analysis applies equally as well to whites who are not sure that they want to be white in the prevailing context as to blacks who are not sure they want to be black, and so on. Rejection of whiteness has not been a major focus of investigation, however, and deserves considerably greater attention in our present consideration of racism and pluralism.

A particularly significant observation of Anderson (1976) is that people who are not aware of their ethnic origin are often found in the stage he describes as transitory identification but nonetheless they can be related to an ethnic origin as a function of the predominant rituals, beliefs and values they ascribe to in daily practice. Our concern is the present work has largely been with the white middle-class as a real (although at times not recognized as such) cultural group and our analysis of the psychosocial identity dilemma fostered by an enculturated, historical racism has focused on the nature of the congruence (or lack of it) with prevailing white ethnocentric norms. The problem of establishing a well founded psychosocial identity which allows for consolidation with and divergence from one's own group and for increasingly

pluralistic growth in identification with others is a common problem for all groups (though the white middle-class has been negligent in their recognition of their place or "sameness" in this).

The Problem of Whiteness and the Search for an Authentic Identity

Underlying much cross-cultural interaction is a certain historical and social relativity which calls for clarification of different identity configurations. The identity of being "human" is too wide and is insufficient as a personal base of self definition and for understanding the personal and collective identifications of others. The assumption of being "human" as one's only identity takes all specificity out of human relations and ignores basic social, institutional, cultural, historical and interpersonal realities. Before one can develop a more inclusive identity one must begin from a more adequate and realistic psycho-social base.

The a-historic, a-cultural, and solipsistic stance of "individualism" is insufficient as well. From this identity base, the person wants to be taken solely as an individual, as if the rest of the world and the reservoir of personal and group present and historical did not exist. Such a sense of individualism would require the negation of the existence of cultural, social and historical realities. One lacks, in effect and in actuality, an adequate understanding of oneself in the context of the culture, of others,

and one's times. The person participates in thes realities but does not recognize his or her part. Such an identification, however vaive, frequently develops in closed environmental contexts which provide little cross-cultural experience and (with the dominant socialization pattern) a cross-culturally dysfunctional view of reality, the enculturated parameters of which the individual finds difficult to see. If "transplanted" into contexts in which other express freely their feelings or are in control an inevitable inadequacy comes to surface. Guilt, anxiety, or personal growth, regression, hostility or determination and openness may characterize the individual's response to such a situation dependent upon many personal-contextual factors including the nature and strength of confrontations and the person's characteristic ways of handling personal anxiety and self doubt. Such experiences may become the crucible in which a more adequate identity is molded or is abandoned. In this context the true burden of whiteness (in contrast to that which has historically been perceived as the "white man's burden") is to understand and integrate personal, social, historical and contemporary experience in a realistic context of these actualities which inevitably involves the historical enculturated self with historical enculturated others. Frequently, the "unbigoted" white individual does not want to be white and escapes whiteness and its negative connotations through an ethnocentric escape into humanism or a solipsistic flight

into individualism. The modal identity crisis in circumstances of confrontation is centered in seeking a way in which neither to disown those aspects of self and society which have been distructive and have prevented healthy interaction with others (broadly defined) while at the same time not being crippled by them. It also involves identifying and owning those constructive and positive aspects of self instrumental to the maintenance of self-esteem and personal integrity -- an active coming to terms with a hierarchy of positive and negative elements of identity, a better organization which a realistic and healthy identity involves. Negative elements, otherwise, become all the more defensive and determining of interpersonal relations the more they are avoided or denied. One must wonder at the irony of so much literature on the identity deficits of non-white peoples, the voluminous literature asserting that those who must consider others in their process of self identification are abnormal, deficient, or scarred, anything but whole, such are the crises of "marginality" and "lack of power." Such an orientation distorts the health and the significance of realistic psycho-social identification in the context of others. Oftentimes, the second level communications which occurs (which are generally though to be the product of the shared experience of oppression) are more firmly based in the issue of identity than in the mere fact of shared

oppression. One must also begin to view the apparently vested interest on the part of white culture in the negative identities of non-white people as, in part, an index of projection of a larger negative and "unconscious" white identity -- a projection which up to a point allows a feeling of superiority and in a brittle way (which frequently succumbs in confrontation) whole. In point of fact, the irony of the very designation frequently used to describe the non-white or poor -- i.e., "culturally deprived" -- becomes apparent when we consider that the term is not only inaccurate (reflecting the distance from which its referents are "understood") but also that the white middle-class culture of which Black, Asian, Chicano, Native American, Latino, and poor slum children are deprived also deprives white middle-class children of an incredible range of human experience and fosters (through miseducation and lack of experience) maladjustment in respect to others.

A broader identity is pluralistic in nature. It involves an identification with others based in an understanding of the same or functionally equivalent process in oneself. One cannot hope to understand processes in others which one avoids or denies in oneself. This is one reason why I have come to feel that course and workshops in "race relations" are such a waste of time. The focus of these is typically on understanding and getting along with others before the individual has begun introspectively

to understand and to get along with self. The wrong "subject" is typically under the mycroscopic lens. It is also why I refuse to "teach" white therapists "helpful hints" for working with black clients. Such is an exercise in the generation of stereotypes. These therapists must come to terms with the human problems involved in working with broad ranges of people and must begin with confronting "whiteness" and "self."

With the stabilization of a broader based identity comes (a) a widening of one's socio-cultural radius, (b) an expanding of the number and kinds of people to whom one can respond meaningfully and authentically on the basis of (c) ever more highly differentiated capacities, (d) the necessity to manange new encounters, (e) a lessend feeling of estrangement supported by the awareness of new dependencies and new familiarities, and (f) new psychosocial strength.

HYPOTHESES

From the foregoing one may conclude that individual racism has little to do with the simplicity or complexity or one's cognitive structure or style and a lot to do with the processes of enculturation and psycho-cultural identity development. Such is clearly not the case with simple prejudice which by definition involves simple-minded and stereotypic thinking which violates at least ideal norms of societal fuctioning. The lack of its isomorphy with simple stereotypy and its enculturated nature appear to contribute to the pervasiveness and tenacity of racism within the culture. It is important, therefore, to provide some evidence for the validity of the basic claim that racism is a broader phenomenon than prejudice in that it is not limited to the realm of cognitive simplicity.

THe major hypothesis emerges from the present discussion is that a very weak relationship (if any) exists between racisim and cognitive complexity-simplicity measures. This hypothesis will be tested by means of a factor analysis of multiple indices of racism, prejudice and ethnocentrism and multiple measures of complexity in cognitive style. Specifically, it is predicted that the following data pattern will emerge:

(1) Traditional measures of racism will correlate highly with measures of simplicity in the racial and race-related attitudinal and congitive

domain (as reflected in frequently reported correlations between high scores on the F scale and high scores on measures of rigidity, simplicity, narrowness and dogmatism).

(2) Near zero correlations will obtain between validated measures of racism constructed for the present research and measures of cognitive style.

More specifically, based on the results of factor analysis, it is expected that four types of groups will emerge: (a) a group of individuals with complex cognitive ogranization in racial and nonracial domains having an ethnocentric orientation and racist attitudes toward specific ethnic and racial groups; (b) a group of individuals with simplistic structure within racial and nonracial domains having an ehtnocentric orientation and racist attitudes toward specific ethnic and racial groups; (c) a group of individuals with complex structure in racial and non-racial domains who score low on indices of ethnocentricism, racism and prejudice, and (4) a group of individuals with simplistic structure in racial and non-racial domains who also score low on indices of prejudice, racism and ethnocentrism.

Specific predictions concerning complexity in one domain (e.g., non-racial) and simplicity in the other (e.g., racial) were not made although the same pattern of independence from racism was expected (simplicity in

racial and race-related domains frequently, though not always, being characteristic of prejudice, with racism being a ptential factor across complexity-simplicity in either race-related or non-race related domains).

While confirmation of these predictions does not provide definitive support for our hypothesis of the independence of racism from cognitive simplicity-complexity (i.e., as it would involve, in effect, acceptance of the "null hypothesis" that no relation exists between these two sets of variables), the successful demnstration of the pattern of relationships described and near othogonality of validated measures of racism and simplicity-complexity in cognitive style would lend substantial support to the argument.

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CHAPTER 3

EMPIRICAL STUDY

The present research was to involve three distinct stages, stages one and two carried out concurrently and stage three being contingent upon successful completion of stages one and two. Stage 1 involved: (a) the construction of multiple indices of racism (see subsequent discussion of the GEO scale and the ATCB inventory); (b) intercorrelation of these racism indices with previously established inventories which appeared to measure similar phenomena to provide some evidence for convergent validation (see subsequent discussion of the rational for selection and use of the modified MRAI, Rokeach's Value Survey Rankings, and the Social Welfare subscale of the Perloe's Social Values Questionnaire), and (c) a test of the hypothesis that the measures of racism developed and validated are distinguishable from traditional measures of prejudice (discriminant validation to be provided by a shortened version of the F scale).

Stage 2 involved the construction and selection of multiple measures of complexity to assess level of cognitive organization (complexity of structure) within racial and non-racial domains (see discussion of semantic differential measures and the sentence completion inventories). A composite complexity score was to be

derived from multiple complexity ratings derived from the semantic differential data for each subject and this composite score compared with independent complexity scores based on sentence completion data. We would thus have greater confidence in our assertion that complexity was indeed being measured. In this context we would also test of theory about the relationship among particular complexity measures.

With successful completion of stages 1 and 2 would come stage 3 which would then involve the intercorrelation and factor analysis of scores from a new subject sample on potentially six indices of prejudice and/or racism (GEO scale, ATCB inventory, modified MRAI questionnaire, Rokeach's Value Survey, the Social Welfare subscale, and the Fillmore, 1950, and Janowitz and Marvick, 1953, Shortened F Scale), and two sets of measures of complexity (a composite index based on five potential measures from the semantic differential questionnaires; and a composite index developed from two scoring procedures on the sentence completion inventories).

For purposes of clarity the results and conclusions regarding the selection and data obtained for the complexity measures will be presented first. The results and conclusions regarding our construction and selection of indices of prejudice and racism will follow this. As will become apparent, difficulties in constructing an

adequate measure of racism as conceptualized at the point in which the empirical study took place, lead to an abandonment of our efforts to proceed to stage 3 (to test the pattern of predicted interrelations amont these multiple indices of complexity and of racism). Directions and suggestions for remedying some of the problems encountered and for future research are provided in the discussion. Much of this work (largely because of the difficulties involved) served to subsequently sharpen and clarify our emerging definition of the phenomena we were attempted to measure and in this sense was valuable providing, as it were, partial success. This occurence is consistent with our notion that research may also be regarded as a discovery process (in addition to a hypothesis testing endeavor), both processes are seen as contributing valuable information.

MEASURES OF COMPLEXITY

There are a number of ways available for the characterization of something that might be called the complexity of cognitive structure. One might think of complexity as the dimensionality of interattribute space; it might be explicated in terms of the "depth" of the cognitive hierarchy; or as some configurational property of the cognitive relational system. Generally, complexity is regarded as being a function of differentiation, articulation or discrimination, and/or integration of elements (opinions, beliefs, attitudes, ideas, concepts, etc.) in a given cognitive space (begging the issue of its generality across cognitive realms). For example, differentiation (a component of complexity) has been defined in terms of dimensions (e.g., Bieri, 1961; Schroder, Driver, and Streufert, 1967; Scott, 1969)--although some measures appear to tap more of a quality which might be referred to as "attributality" rather than true dimensionality of cognitive space -- or in terms of categories (e.g. Gardner, 1953), in either case referring to the number of stable, unique and important units for the individual within a particular cognitive realm (content area), Articulation (Bieri, 1961, and Schoder el at., 1967, prefer the term "discrimination") refers to the number of distinctions one makes along a particular dimension and does not appear to be a categorical characteristic (with the possible exception of Pettigrew's,

1958, conception of the variable of "category width"). Integration, although mentioned by many theorists has been difficult to operationalize within a dimensional framework (although Scott's effort seem quite notable in this regard, see Scott, 1969), categorical concepts of integration seem to make more conceptual sense.

A major problem, in part an artifact of the lack of a conceptual model which specifies the interrelationship among the various concepts of complexity, is the lack of comparability of different measures used to index it. As Bieri (1971) has pointed out, the student of cognitive structures in personality (in this instance complexity), runs afoul of many methodological thorns. First, the investigator must decide upon a specific task with which to obtain the judgments or perceptions considered central to the organization of the cognitive realm. This choice may involve one of a number of methods, including object sorting, concept formation, interpersonal judgment and so on. Generally theories are too vague to form the basis for selecting a specific assessment tast (Brieri's work providing a notable exception) and to date we still have all too little evidence on the comparability of alternative methods.

Having selected a particular measurement format, the second decision entails selecting an analytic method or mode of empirical analysis for arriving at scores or indices of complexity. Given the same task (for example,

semantic differential response or object sorting tasks) a number of different analytic procedures can be applied. Thus measuring dimensionality within a given cognitive realm using a particular judgment task may involve several alternative procedures. These varying analytic methods do not necessarily result in comparable measures of cognitive structure and caution is required in equating differing approaches without adequate empirical scrutiny. The optimal strategy would seem to be to compare at least two different task- and analytic procedures in the same study both in terms of equivalence and in terms of their ability to predict a criterion.

In the present study two types of tasks (two sentence completion tasks and three semantic differential-type judgment tasks) were used to index complexity within both racial and non-racial domains. Four analytic procedures provided by Phillips (1977) for arriving at complexity scores on the semantic differential tasks within the evaluative (i.e., attitudinal) dimension for both racial and non-racial domains and two for the racial "non-evaluative" (activity-potency) dimensions were used. Data based on the performance of 110 undergraduate psychology students at Washington State University is reported in the pages which follow the descriptions of the semantic-differential tasks. Description and scoring of sentence completion tasks follows our presentation of this initial data. If the scores on these

various measures of complexity proved empirically adequate (i.e., tended to intercorrelate) these inventories and accompanying analytic procedures were to be used to index complexity in subsequent administration with the various indices of racism.

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL MEASURES

Two semantic differential measures were developed in order to assess level of evaluative (attitudinal) and "non-evaluative" complexity within race-related and non-race related domains. The "Meaning of Controversial Issues Survey" utilized 10 concepts selected from issues identified by a sample of Michigan State University introductory psychology as "being important." The "Meaning of Social Movements Survey" utilized concepts which were experimenter generated. Two different sets of seven-point semantic differential scales (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957) were selected for these surveys. Scales were selected primarily on their appropriateness for the concepts used and for their very high or very low loadings on the evaluative dimension (as reported the Osgood et al., 1957, work).

For the "Meaning of Controversial Issues Survey" this approach generated 10 concepts (Euthanasia, Gun Control, Population Control, Interracial Marriage, Socialized Medicine, Neighborhood Integration, U.S. Policy of Detente, ERA Equal Rights (For Women) Movement, Court-ordered Bussing, Legalization of Marijuana) and 10 scales on which these concepts were to be rated (beneficial-harmful, dangerous-safe*, simple-complex*, healthy-sick, progressive-regressive, foolish-wise*, positive-negative, private-public*, productive-destructive, sane-insane -- scales with asterisks were reverse scored). From this

inventory 4 separate analyses are generated:

	RACIAL DOMAIN	NON-RACIAL DOMAIN
EVALUATIVE	Concepts: 4,6,9 (Interrac. Mar., Neigh. integr., bussing) Scales: 1,2,4,5, 6,7,9,10 (all other scales excluding two below)	Concepts: 1,2,3,5, 7,8,10 (Euth. Gov. Contr., Populat. Contr., Soc. Med., U.S. Detente, ERA, Marijuana) Scales: 1,2.4,5,6, 7,9,10 (all other scales excluding two below)
NON-EVALUATIVE	Concepts: 4,6,9 (Interrac. Mar., Neigh. Integr., bussing) Scales: 3,8 (simple-complex, private-public)	Concepts: 1,2,3,5,7, 8,10 (Euth, Gov. Contr., Populat. Contr., Soc. Med., U.S. Detente, ERA, Marijuana) Scales: 3,8 (simple-complex, private-public)

For the "Meaning of Social Movements Survey" this approach generated 11 concepts (Gay Liberation, Civil Rights Movement, Ecology Movement, Women's Liberation Movement, Anti-Abortion Movement, Black Power Movement, Anti-Vietnam War Movement, Urban Unrest, Movement for Majority Rule in Rhodesia, AIM (American Indian Movement), LA RAZA (Chicano REcognition Movement) and 10 scales on which these concepts were to be rated (strong-weak, active-passive, regressive-progressive*, healthy-sick,

meaningless-meaningful*, aggressive-defensive, positive-negative, changeable-stable*, rash-cautious*, timely-untimely -- scales with asterisks were reversed scored). From this inventory 4 separate analyses are also generated:

	RACIAL DOMAIN	NON-RACIAL DOMAIN
EVALUATIVE	Concepts: 2,6,8,9,10 11 (Civil Rts.,Blk. Pwr., Urb. Unr., Rhodesia, AIM, LA RAZA) Scales: 3,4,5,7,10 (regr.-progr.,healthy-sick,meaningful-meaningless, pos.-neg., timely-untimely)	Concepts: 1,3,4,5,7 (Gay Lib.,Ecology, Women,Anti-Abortion, Vietman) Scales: 3,4,5,7,10 (regr.-progr.,healthy-sick,meaningful-meaningless, pos.-neg., timely-untimely)
NON-EVALUATIVE	Concepts: 2,6,8,9,10, 11 (Civil Rts.,Blk. Pwr., Urb. Unr.,Rhodesia, AIM, LA RAZA Scales: 1,2,6,8,9 (str.-wk.,act.-pass,, aggr.-defens., changeable-stable, rash-cautious)	Concepts: 1,3,4,5,7 (Gay Lib.,Ecology, Women,Anti-Abortion, Vietnam) Scales: 1,2,6,8,9 (str-wk.,act.-pass., aggr.-defens., changeable-stable, rach-cautious)

These two inventories were admistered to 110 introductory psychology students at Washington State University and for purposes of analysis the data from the two inventories were combined yielding one 2 X 2 table for assessment of complexity in racial and non-racial domains on evaluative and non-evaluative dimensions across the

two inventories.

Five analytic procedures were explored in analyzing the sentence completion data; two factor analytic methods (PROP 75 and PROP 95), measures of dimensionality which result from idiographic analysis of the inter-scale correlation matrix (PROP 75 is the minimum number of factors in the unrotated principle axis solution needed to account for 75% of the variance in the matrix; PROP is the minimum number needed to account for 90% of the variance); the SCOTT measure 1 in "The structure of natural cognitions," 1969) which was expected to correlate highly with the PROP measures since the three appear to index dimensionality; the CAM measure which is a variation of the Crano and Bettinghaus (1970) measure and appears related to articulation; and the Bieri (1966) measure which appears to be a mixed measure combining dimensionality and articulation.

To test for concurrent validation of complexity measures, six factor analyses were employed. These six factor analyses focused on the "clustering" of five measures of complexity (PROP 74, SCOTT, BIERI, CAM, PROP 75) within each of the following partitions: (1) complexity scores within the racial domain; (2) complexity scores within the non-racial domain; (3) complexity scores within the racial - evaluative domain; (4) complexity scores within the non-racial - evaluative domain; (5) complexity scores within the racial - non-evaluative domain; and (6) complexity scores within

the non-racial - non-evaluative domain. For analytic purposes partitions 3 and 4 are referred to as "evaluative complexity" (within the racial and non-racial domains, respectively). Partitions 5 and 6 are referred to as "nonevaluative or cognitive complexity" (within the racial and non-racial domains respectively). One hundred and ten cases were included in each of the six factor analyses.

The principal factoring method without iterations was utilized to extract the initial factors from the intercorrelations among the five variables (PROP 75, SCOTT, BIERI, CAM PROP 90) in each analysis. Since the number of factors to be extracted was set at five in order to look at the interrelations among all the variables (i.e., the number of factors and of variables being the same), communalities for each of the variables in any of the factor matrices is 1.00. The factors in each analysis were subsequently rotated (orthogonally) into terminal factors to facilitate interpretation. Eigenvalues and proportions of variance were then calculated for the rotated matrix since with rotation the eigenvalues should change while the communalities remain the same.

Complexity within the Racial Domain

As can be seen from Table 1, the eigenvalues for the first four rotated factors account for greater than 98% of the variance; eigen values being 1.69421 (factor 1),

1.14284 (factor 2), 1.06840 (factor 3), and 1.01557 (factor 4), accounting for 33.8%, 22.9%, 21.4%, and 20.3% of the variance, respectively. As depicted by Table 2 two of these four factors are confounded by variables that have a complexity level of two -- that is, PROP 75 loads moderately high on factor 1 and high on factor 2; whereas, SCOTT loads moderately high on factor 2 and high on factor 1. The PROP 90 and BIERI measures load uniquely on factors 3 and 4 respectively. From Table 2 it would appear that <u>within the racial domain</u> three theoretical dimensions emerge with respect to the measures of complexity employed. Dimension 1 is complex and appears to be composed of CAM, PROP 75 and SCOTT; dimension 2 is composed of the PROP 90 measure; and dimension 3, the BIERI index.

Table 1

Estimated Eigenvalues and Proportions of Variance for Complexity in the Racial Domain after Rotation

Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentage of Variance	Cumulative Percentage
1	1.69421	33.8	33.8
2	1.14284	22.9	56.7
3	1.06840	21.4	78.1
4	1.01557	20.3	98.4
5	.07898	1.6	100.0

Table 2

Factor Matrix for Complexity in the Racial Domain after Rotation

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
PROP 75	0.43490	0.89518	0.08546	-0.04658	0.00651
SCOTT	0.77993	0.48096	0.27061	-0.131021	0.26495
BIERI	-0.08683	-0.04541	-0.03336	0.99459	-0.00890
CAM	0.91690	0.31684	0.21076	-0.07781	-0.09179
PROP 90	0.22030	0.08785	0.97074	-0.03442	0.01523

Complexity Scores within the Non-racial Domain

As can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, five factors appear to emerge from the rotated matrix, although factor five (eigenvalue .42560) accounts for only 8.5% of the variance. From Table 4, five theoretical dimensions appear to emerge, four of which are confounded by variables having complexity levels greater than 1. Interestingly, the BIERI measure loads uniquely on factor 4 and again distinguishes itself from the other measures of complexity. Apart from the BIERI measure, the other indices of complexity (PROP 75, SCOTT, CAM, and PROP 90) "behave" quite differently in this (the non-racial) domain than in the racial domain -- that is more dimensions emerge and greater factorial complexity is evidenced in this (the non-racial) domain as compared to the racial domain.

Table 3

Estimated Eigenvalues and Proportions of Variance for Complexity in the Non-racial Domain after Rotation

Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentage of Variance	Cumulative Percentage
1	1.23612	24.7	24.7
2	1.16851	23.4	48.1
3	1.15135	23.0	71.1
4	1.01958	20.4	91.5
5	.42560	8.5	100.0

Table 4

Factor Matrix for Complexity in the Non-racial Domain after Rotation

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
PROP 75	0.12365	0.36392	0.90650	-0.09041	0.14949
SCOTT	0.49264	0.43478	0.43602	-0.11529	0.60404
BIERI	-0.12023	0.04531	-0.07006	0.98837	-0.04124
CAM	0.10369	0.91532	0.35328	0.07481	0.14505
PROP 90	0.97618	0.08469	0.09890	-0.12506	0.12032

Evaluative Complexity Scores within the Racial Domain

Four distinct factors appear to emerge from Table 5 and 6 in respect to evaluative complexity in the racial domain, with factors 1 through 4 accounting for 98.3% of

the variance, eigenvalues being 1.73522 (factor 1), 1.11895 (factor 2), 1.03339 (factor 3), and 1.02463 (factor 4) accounting for 34.7%, 22.4%, 20.7%, and 20.5% of the variance respectively. Factor 1 demonstrates high loadings for the SCOTT and CAM measures. On factor 2 PROP 75 loads highly. PROP 90 loads highly on factor 3 and BIERI loads highly on factor 4. Notably, each of these measures (variables) with the exception of the PROP 90 index appears to have a complexity level 1 -- PROP 75 and BIERI, especially, load highly on each of their respective factors and low on the remaining factors. Again, the BIERI measure distinguishes itself -- loading highly and uniquely on factor 4.

Table 5

Estimated Eigenvalues and Proportions of Variance for Evaluative Complexity in the Racial Domain after Rotation

Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentage of Variance	Cumulative Percentage
1	1.73522	34.7	34.7
2	1.11895	22.4	57.1
3	1.03339	20.7	77.8
4	1.02463	20.5	98.3
5	.08779	1.7	100.0

Table 6

Factor Matrix for Evaluative Complexity in the Racial Domain after Rotation

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
PROP 75	0.26924	0.96926	0.06053	0.05892	0.01363
SCOTT	0.80797	0.35020	0.35020	-0.10162	0.26898
BIERI	-0.01900	0.047337	-0.11029	0.99254	-0.01017
CAM	0.90514	0.22419	0.33816	0.03612	-0.12165
PROP 90	0.43621	0.06632	0.88350	-0.15619	0.01866

Evaluative Complexity within the Non-racial Domain

As can be seen from Tables 7 and 8, five factors appear to emerge on rotation of the principal factor matrix for evaluative complexity within the non-racial domain. Again, the BIERI index distinguishes itself from other measures, loading uniquely (.98781) on factor 4. The SCOTT measure attains a factorial complexity of three and is the only measure with a high loading on factor 5. The PROP 75, PROP 90 and CAM measures load highly on factors 1, 2, and 3, respectively and low on other factors. As in the case of overall complexity within the non-racial domain, the present analysis of evaluative complexity within the non-racial domain evidences greater dimensionality and greater factorial complexity that is evidenced thus far in complexity measures in the racial domain. The SCOTT index appears to be the most effected by shift from

the racial to the non-racial domain (at least in regards to its factorial complexity).

Table 7

Estimated Eigenvalues and Proportions of Variance for Evaluative Complexity in the Non-racial Domain after Rotation

Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentage of Variance	Cumulative Percentage
1	1.24409	24.9	24.9
2	1.15532	23.1	48.0
3	1.15454	23.1	71.1
4	1.02852	20.6	91.7
5	.45654	9.1	100.0

Table 8

Factor Matrix for Evaluative Complexity in the Non-racial Domain after Rotation

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
PROP 75	0.95467	0.16821	0.17815	-0.08970	0.14325
SCOTT	0.49609	0.44381	0.38210	-0.16501	0.61938
BIERI	-0.09789	-0.09789	-0.05507	0.98781	-0.06298
CAM	0.20461	0.30540	0.91583	-0.06011	0.15003
PROP 90	0.19256	0.90951	0.30974	-0.11773	0.16097

Cognitive (Nonevaluative) Complexity in the Racial Domain

It appears from Tables 9 and 10 that four factors are derived from the rotated matrix of "cognitive" complexity in the racial domain, although factor 4 accounts for only 8.1% of the variance. Factor 1 is comprised of the SCOTT, CAM, and PROP 90 measures; factor 2, the BIERI measure; factor 3, PROP 75; and factor 4, again PROP 90. All variables (measures) except PROP 90 appear to have a complexity level of 1, PROP 90 loading .78002 on Factor 1 and .6430 on factor 2.

Table 9

Estimated Eigenvalues and Proportions of Variance for Cognitive (Non-evaluative) Complexity in the Racial Domain after Rotation

Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentage of Variance	Cumulative Percentage
1	2.47638	49.5	49.5
2	1.02089	20.4	69.9
3	1.01801	20.4	90.3
4	.40617	8.1	98.4
5	.07854	1.6	100.00

Table 10

Factor Matrix for Cognitive (Non-evaluative) Complexity in the Racial Domain after Rotation (continued)

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5

Table 10 (continued)

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
PROP 75	0.08619	-0.01800	0.99599	0.01345	0.00784
SCOTT	0.94060	-0.13135	0.15467	0.15649	0.22271
BIERI	-0.12549	0.99092	-0.01839	-0.04437	-0.00456
CAM	0.97982	-0.08998	0.03167	0.04653	-0.16940
PROP 90	0.78002	-0.11528	0.02737	0.61430	0.01281

Cognitive (Non-evaluative) Complexity within the Non-racial Domain

Rotation of the factor matrix for cognitive (non-evaluative) complexity in the non-racial domain produces five distinct factors, each of the variables (or measures) loading uniquely on each factor with the exception of factor 1 on which the SCOTT index and PROP 90 measures load highly. The SCOTT index is the only variable having a complexity level greater than 1 (loading highly on factors 1 and 5) (see Table 12). As can be seen from Table 11, the final factor (factor 5) accounts for 10.1% of the variance, with the other factors each ranging from 20.4 to 27.2% of the variance.

Table 11

Estimated Eigenvalues and Proportions of Variance for Cognitive (Non-evaluative) Complexity in the Non-racial Domain after Rotation (continued)

Table 11 (continued)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentage of Variance	Cumulative Percentage
1	1.35713	27.2	27.2
2	1.07475	21.5	48.7
3	1.04187	20.8	69.5
4	1.02057	20.4	89.9
5	.50566	10.1	100.0

Table 12

Factor Matrix for Cognitive (Non-evaluative) Complexity the Non-racial Domain after Rotation

Variables	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
PROP 75	0.06589	0.08157	0.01655	0.99253	0.06006
SCOTT	0.60941	0.37592	-0.18287	0.14423	0.65807
BIERI	-0.15901	-0.13465	0.97436	0.01840	0.08288
CAM	0.35780	0.89653	-0.16241	0.10323	0.17658
PROP 90	0.91000	0.32386	-0.18005	0.06047	0.17591

Conclusions

In total these data suggest that it is necessary to distinguish between evaluative and "non-evaluative" responses (i.e., between types of judgments required) as well as between race related and "non-race related" domains (i.e., the domains in which evaluative and

non-evaluative judgments are to be made). For instance, if we rank order the factor analyses performed from those matrices evidencing simple-structure to those if which factorial complexity is demonstrated we find that; (1) factor analysis of indices of complexity in the racial domain produces fewer factor and less factorial complexity than is produced by any of the other factor analyses performed; (2) indices of non-evaluative complexity in the racial domain is next best on the basis of the same criteria (i.e., fewer number of factors and less factorial complexity) followed by: (3) indices of evaluative and non-racial domain; (4) indices of overall complexity (combined evaluative and non-evaluative complexity) in the racial domain; (5) indices of non-evaluative complexity in the non-racial domain; and (6) indices of overall complexity in the non-racial domain. It appears that the measures "cluster" best when they are measures of attitudes (i.e., when they elicit evaluative responses) and when they are domain specific (e.g., the racial domain). They "cluster" worse, on the other hand when they are measures of undifferentiated types of cognitions (e.g., opinions, ideas, etc. which we classified here as being simply "non-evaluative" response) and when the domain is varied or diffuse (i.e., when the stimuli <u>in aggregrate</u> are non-domain specific). Thus the "non-evaluative dimension" and the "non-racial domain" employed as analytic categories from which to

obtain complexity measures seem to be inadequate in that they appear to introduce considerable "noise" (refected in a large number of factors and having greater factorial complexity) into the analytic system.

Intuitively this makes a great deal of sense as it seems likely that peoples opinions, ideas, etc. about a range of things would have less commonality in structure than their attitudes about this range of things, or their opinions and ideas about specific things, and certainly less commonality in structure than their attitudes about specific things. This notion is also supported by a great deal of empirical evidence which suggests that complexity is domain specific -- i.e., that its generality across stimulus domains is severely limited (see, for example, Bieri, 1971).

A number of interesting comparisons can also be made from the data obtained such as t-test comparisons between overall mean scores within the racial and non-racial domains on each measure of complexity (i.e., on each variable in the factor analysis). Visual inspection of the means and standard deviations of each of the variables (tables not presented here) appear to indicate that the greatest difference would occur on the BIERI measure, showing subjects generally more simplistic in the racial than in the non-racial" domain. Mean differences on the other variables do not appear to be unsubstantial with little likelihood of approaching

significance. This is an interesting speculation as the BIERI measure consistently distinguished itself from other "indices of complexity" in every factor matrix.

In general, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the PROP 75, SCOTT, CAM, and PROP 90 indices evidence enough overlap to indicate that they are measuring components of the same underlying variable (with some degree of divergence between these measures depending on the type of judgment required and the specificity of the stimulus domain). It was decided that perhaps the best index of complexity might be obtained from a weighted linear combination of the PROP 75, SCOTT, CAM, and PROP 90 measures, the weights determined by the factor loadings of each of the variables on each factor -- that is, a complexity score for each subject could be derived by multiplying each cell in the factor matrix by the subject's score on the corresponding variable and then summing across all resultant "factor scores" in the matrix. This weighted composite index of complexity could then be compared with indices derived form independent measures of complexity obtained from the sentence completion tasks. Such a procedure should lead to greater confidence in our assertion that complexity is being measured.

SENTENCE COMPLETION MEASURES

Two sentence completion inventories were developed for the present study as supplimentary measures for the assessment of complexity within race-related and non-race-related domains. These also were used in pilot work to obtain students attitudes and opinions concerning race-related issues within a projective as opposed to structured inventory format. The construction of sentence stems was based on three considerations: (1) variation in level of knowledge required in respond to sentence stems in the race-related domain, (2) variation in familiar versus unfamiliar concepts in the race-related domain, (3) inclusion of random non-race-related items. It was suggested that complexity with the race-related domain would be reflected in greater knowledge in that area; better ability to consider, deal with and respond to novel concepts in the race-related area; in addition it was expected that complex responses in race-related and non-race-related domains would (a) imply that social, personal, and political realities are the products of complex interactions, subject to alternative interpretations, and developing over time (vs. the implication of absolute, invariant interpretation especially involving the imposition of some external standar); (b) imply ability to deal with ambiguity (vs. the implication of fast and unambiguous resolution); and (c) imply an absence of overgeneralization (vs. the implication of stereotypy

and overgeneralized response) (cf., Schroder, Driver, and Streufert, 1967).

The original sentence completion manual (used in the Michigan State sample described below) contained 15 sentence fragments or stems: (1) Race ..., (2) Racists ..., (3) Black culture ..., (4) White consciousness ..., (5) Black power ..., (6) Blacks who think they understand whites ..., (7) White power ..., (8) Most blacks have never ..., (9) Whites who think they understand blacks ..., (10) Most whites have never ..., (11) The history of ..., (12) Being ..., (13) It does little good to ..., (14) People can't always ..., (15) ...is the fundamental cause of racial up heaval in America.

Based on administration to a pilot sample of 51 undergraduate psychology students at Michigan State University, a shortened version of the manual containing 10 sentence stems (Race, Racists, Black culture, White consciousness, Black power, White power, The history of, Being, It does little good to, People can't always) was adopted. (One artifact of this sequence of presentation is that for some subjects all the items become race related, a problem easily solved by rearrangement of stems.)

The shortened version of the original manual has administered to several groups of introductory psychology students at Michigan State University in additional

pilot work to assess the range of student attitudes and opinions concerning race-related issues within a projective as opposed to a structured inventory format (as mentioned earlier in this section). The sentence completion inventory was retained however to serve as a supplimental index of level of complexity.

An additional sentence completion inventory designed to more specifically tap attitudes and opinions within race-related areas was constructed and administered to a pilot sample of introductory psychology students at Washington State University. Again, the intent was to subsequently employ this instrument in the same manner as the first: (a) as an exploratory instrument to determine the range of attitudes toward race-related issues among students, and (b) to serve as a supplimental measure of complexity

A concurrent step in this process of instrument slection and construction was the development also of instruments to assess racism, prejudice and ethnocentrism (as these are conceptualized in the foregoing analyses presented in Chapter 2).

MEASURES OF RACISM, PREJUDICE AND ETHNOCENTRISM

Theoretical Backdrop of the General Ethnocentric Orientation (GEO) Scale

The "theoretical" backdrop for the construction of the General Ethnocentric Orientation (GEO) Scale was based on Levine and Campbell's (1972), Herskovits' (1972), and Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits' (1966) conceptions of cultural relativism, ethnocentrism, and phenomenal absolutism as the current writer applied these to the area of race and racism. According to these authors,

> Ethnocentrism is...most generally understood, in parallel with "egocentrism," as an attitude or outlook in which values derived from one's own cultural background are applied to other cultural contexts where different values are operative. (Levine and Campbell, 1972, p. 1)

In the most naive from of ethnocentrism, termed "phenomenal absolutism" (Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits (1965) a person unreflectedly takes his own culture's values as objective reality and automatically uses them as the context within which he judges less familiar objects and events.

> As in Piaget's stage of egocentric thought, it does not occur to such a person that there are more than one point of view. (Levine and Campbell, 1972, p. 1)

At a more complex level is the ethnocentric attitude or outlook that takes account of multiple points of view but regards those of other cultures as incorrect,

inferior or immoral (Levine and Campbell, 1972, p. 1; Herskovits, 1972).

It was intended that the GEO Scale tap a correlate of racism (i.e., an ethnocentric orientation) although the relationship of ethnocentrism to racism (in retrospect) was not well conceptualized in these early stages. It should be noted that Levine and Campbell (1972) also indicated that the term ethnocentrism refers to individual attitudes and emotions, cultural symbols, and ideologies -- a position quite compatible with later conceptions of "white ethnocentrism" as cultural component of racism with which individuals may to varying degree identify. From our present perspective we may note that (unfortunately) items to tap "white ethnocentrism" are absent from the GEO Scale. Such an ommission is difficult to justify, especially since our aim in the early stages was to tap a general enculturated tendency. The ethnocentric tendency presumably tapped by the GEO Scale as constructed is much too general to be even a good indirect index of white ethnocentrism.

Dimensions encorporated in the General Ethnocentric Scale (from our my initial description of this work):

A. Ethnocentric Self-Acceptance (derived from the berger, 1952 Self-Acceptance Scale). Berger (1952) defined self-acceptance in accordance with an intensive behavior guided by internalized values (rather than external pressure), "a faith in his capacity to cope with life," responsibility, objective acceptance of criticism, sense of self-worth, and an absence of shyness or self-consciousness.
In examining the items which constitute Berger's

scale, the present writer came to the conclusion that at least five of the sixty-four items appeared to represent more than a sense of self worth and a behavioral orientation guided by internalized values but instead appeared to approach a more ethnocentric orientation (Levine and Campbell, 1972, Herskovits, 1972, Segall, Campbell and Herskovitz, in which the inherent and universal goodness of one's own values are imposed on others in contexts where they may not be appropriate.
These five items and their original scoring on the Berger variable of self-acceptance are given below. (The numbering of the items is as it appears in the Berger scale.)

21. There is no sense in compromising. When people have values I don't like, I just don't care to have much to do with them. ("Not at all true" indicates self-acceptance.) (note: shortened--see present item 11.)

30. Sometimes people misunderstand me when I try to keep them from making mistakes that could have important effects on their lives. ("Not at all true" indicates acceptance of others.)

42. I feel confident that I can do something about the problems that may arise in the future. ("True of myself" indicates self-acceptance.)*

48. I do not worry or condemn myself if other people pass judgment against me. ("True of myself" indicates self-acceptance.)**

49. I don't hesitate to urge people to live by the same high set of values which I have for myself. ("True of myself" indicates self-acceptance.)**

For two of these five items the scoring was reversed (**) to tap the variable of ethnocentric self-acceptance. The remaining three appeared to represent this variable in accordance with their original scoring.
Item 42 (*) was, perhaps, a more dubious one in terms of "fit" into the construct of an ethnocentric orientation as Herskovits, Campbell and others defined it. But it appeared to tap an unrealistic, overconfident

feeling about one's capabilities which might frequently (though not always) be accompanied by the feeling that one perceives all situations accurately, sees the world as it is, and makes accurate judgments based on these perceptions. Such feeling would certainly be the basis for ethnocentric judgment (see SEgall, Campbell, and Herskovits, 1966).

B. Other dimensions (if any) were to be empirically determined.

The basis for scale construction was rational based in Levine and Campbell's (1972), Herskovits' (1972), and Segall, Campbell and Herskovits' explication of the ethnocentrism variable with some items being borrowed (as they appeared conceptually to fit our initial conceptions) from Berger's (1952) Self-Acceptance Scale (see p. 184).

If scaled in the direction of ethnocentric tendency items 1, 2, 6, 8, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 are scored in the reversed direction, high scores indicative of ethnocentric tendency.

Empirical Results

Based on a sample of 286 subjects (approximately 9 subjects per item for purposes of statistical analysis) composed of white (male and female) undergraduate freshmen taking one of several introductory courses in psychology at Washington State University, item-total correlations were obtained ranging from .001 (lowest item, #3) to .40 (highest item, #20). Items 24 (r_{tt}.03), 25 (r_{tt}.09), 31 (r_{tt}.08), 21 (r_{tt}.08), 5 (r_{tt}.11), 19 (r_{tt}.13), 15 (r_{tt}.19), 30 (r_{tt}.18) and 3 (r_{tt}.001)

were to be dropped from the scale and new items constructed. Cronbach's Alpha for this sample yielded a modest correlation, r_{tt}, of .49. Remaining items correlated in a range from .20 to .40 with the total score with an average magnitude of ,31.

The low item-total correlations among the nine items to be dropped from the scale were taken as a possible indication of multi-dimensionality. Factor analysis of the data obtained from this sample using varimax rotation revealed however a humber of "factors" in which only one, two or three items loaded respectably (e.g., factor loadings for items 1 and 26 on "factor" 6 were .41 and .57 respectively) however some of these items also loaded moderately on other "factors" as well (e.g., item 1 loaded .32 on "factor" 1). In retrospect, with only 32 items included in the factor analysis this result is not surprising.

The mean, variance, range, standard error, kurtosis, standard deviation, and akewness of the remaining 23 item was also inspected. If a general enculturated "ethnocentric" tendency was being tapped it could reasonably be expected that items reflecting such a tendency would produce relatively high mean scores (in the ethnocentric direction), show small variability and produce highly skewed distributions. As might be expected, subjects tended to respond in the non-ethnocentric (and for some items perhaps in the "socially desireable")

direction -- with a slight skew among most items (i.e., ranging from .06, to 2.7, item 27). Items 13, 20, and 27 ("I can be friendly with people who do things I consider wrong even though though their values may be very different from my own." "I believe that there is a good deal of variability in human nature." "I believe that respect is important in most relationships among people.") were skewed heavily in the non-ethnocentric direction. Mean responses on the 23 items ranged from 2.4 to 4.6 with standard deviations ranging from .78 to 1.20.

Table 13

Estimated Communalities, Eigenvalues and Proportions of Variance for items on the GEO Scale

Item	Estimated Communality	Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentage of Variance	Cumulative Percentage
1	0.26839	1	3.17686	9.9	9.9
2	0.21354	2	3.38185	7.4	17.4
3	0.17703	3	3.19022	6.8	24.2
4	0.12000	4	1.66001	5.2	29.4
5	0.26940	5	1.44354	4.5	33.9
6	0.21770	6	1.41204	4.4	38.3
7	0.27297	7	1.31744	4.1	42.4
8	0.20943	8	1.28617	4.0	46.5
9	0.33613	9	1.17541	3.7	50.1
10	0.31823	10	1.10237	3.4	53.6
11	0.23274	11	1.05130	3.3	56.9
12	0.34153	12	0.99759	3.1	60.0
13	0.23376	13	0.96688	3.0	63.0
14	0.13085	14	0.89579	2.8	65.8
15	0.23265	15	0.84329	2.6	68.4
16	0.18455	16	0.82704	2.6	71.0
17	0.20066	17	0.80124	2.5	73.5
18	0.25873	18	0.79069	2.5	76.0
19	0.18357	19	0.77187	2.4	78.4
20	0.26660	20	0.71933	2.2	80.7
21	0.35505	21	0.68831	2.2	82.8
22	0.27442	22	0.65943	2.1	84.9
23	0.21389	23	0.63308	2.0	86.8
24	0.19336	24	0.56520	1.8	88.6
25	0.23261	25	0.54277	1.7	90.3
26	0.21963	26	0.52215	1.6	91.9
27	0.19600	27	0.48247	1.5	93.5
28	0.34492	28	0.47550	1.5	94.9
29	0.21539	29	0.45147	1.4	96.3
30	0.24221	30	0.43127	1.3	97.7
31	0.24877	31	0.39983	1.2	98.9
32	0.31947	32	0.33742	1.1	100.0

Table 14

Factor Matrix Using Principal Factoring with Iterations (Before Rotation) for Items on the GEO Scale

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
1	0.07329	-0.31479	-0.24537	-0.09652	-0.32770	0.22006
2	0.24579	-0.15054	0.20372	-0.26481	-0.09431	0.00203
3	0.01598	0.26160	0.07624	-0.17115	0.13734	-0.22619
4	0.19743	0.01276	0.19506	0.16018	-0.05085	-0.00664
5	0.33750	0.34309	-0.08358	-0.02333	-0.02658	-0.08285
6	0.24399	-0.30585	-0.02801	-0.09791	0.17967	0.14767
7	0.37411	0.01392	-0.18693	-0.15777	0.07331	-0.18049
8	0.16573	-0.30774	0.07165	0.31768	0.12867	0.03192
9	0.14728	-0.25423	-0.53058	0.34059	-0.10844	-0.16703
10	0.47837	-0.01799	-0.21157	0.05709	0.10611	0.25132
11	0.31943	-0.14251	-0.20655	0.03731	0.17836	-0.09929
12	0.17821	-0.23074	-0.51381	0.18190	0.01307	0.00913
13	0.28587	-0.25920	-0.14592	-0.07034	-0.13023	-0.21520
14	0.07789	-0.16823	0.01249	-0.08580	-0.19474	-0.09704
15	0.19753	0.20825	0.33654	0.22628	-0.02879	-0.03654
16	0.38710	-0.06739	0.04603	0.08458	-0.10269	0.00221
17	0.14858	-0.02845	0.22036	0.37742	-0.12843	-0.04678
18	0.33289	-0.20526	-0.18051	-0.17767	0.08311	0.14361
19	-0.02482	-0.10501	-0.32233	-0.07119	0.05907	0.26911
20	0.28348	-0.32622	0.28653	-0.08834	-0.06840	-0.10848
21	-0.46742	-0.09627	0.38757	0.07254	-0.07254	0.13620
22	-0.08174	-0.47852	-0.03376	-0.14898	0.15778	-0.32476
23	0.37122	0.11136	0.04399	0.14427	-0.07253	-0.09146
24	-0.21143	-0.13142	0.23174	-0.06646	0.04016	-0.09299
25	-0.32023	-0.25809	0.01263	-0.02794	0.09510	0.10432
26	-0.12280	-0.31757	0.04523	-0.04226	-0.48190	0.20635
27	0.23162	-0.31738	0.17523	-0.01760	0.04591	-0.04799
28	0.48758	0.19341	-0.21519	-0.08515	-0.21513	-0.09467
29	0.06146	-0.20650	0.05840	0.52135	0.33567	0.17300
30	-0.20364	-0.30019	0.13843	0.13480	0.14879	-0.31530
31	-0.34747	-0.31269	-0.02102	0.02929	0.22467	-0.06595
32	0.49715	-0.03852	-0.25020	0.07211	0.17445	0.22098

Item	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10	Factor 11
1	-0.19107	-0.03987	-0.02938	0.22063	-0.06143
2	-0.00759	0.21365	-0.04798	0.11616	0.00846
3	-0.10460	0.02573	0.19363	-0.06750	0.01793
4	0.07483	-0.08600	0.13812	0.03803	0.09094
5	-0.18204	-0.14114	-0.10244	0.26760	0.02462
6	0.03628	0.19800	0.04575	-0.13145	0.00590

Table 14 (continued)

Item	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10	Factor 11
7	0.20852	-0.32234	0.08570	0.01192	0.18504
8	0.31327	-0.11511	0.21711	0.01238	-0.23946
9	-0.01227	-0.11200	0.12819	0.23017	-0.06810
10	-0.15221	-0.03811	-0.07783	-0.09353	0.06491
11	0.22746	0.31745	-0.02478	0.12054	0.14257
12	-0.06345	-0.00223	0.12215	0.08018	0.06443
13	0.08489	0.13585	-0.14642	-0.14441	-0.07390
14	-0.07279	-0.14876	-0.14876	-0.09162	-0.02167
15	-0.03654	-0.14021	-0.10421	-0.11651	-0.02037
16	-0.08688	0.09909	-0.08079	0.11047	-0.14139
17	0.02061	-0.13741	0.12582	-0.03509	-0.08847
18	-0.09002	0.12365	0.10605	-0.00888	-0.05399
19	0.08103	-0.22422	0.09229	-0.00234	-0.06861
20	0.00975	-0.18827	-0.08684	-0.03154	-0.02464
21	-0.07098	0.05499	-0.15891	-0.03714	-0.11505
22	-0.24920	-0.14136	-0.05860	-0.05835	0.00668
23	0.06544	0.14117	0.10814	-0.09108	0.21485
24	0.23342	0.01284	-0.20231	0.22007	0.22380
25	0.06040	0.02653	0.16164	0.08468	0.09468
26	-0.18135	-0.10320	0.14619	-0.20097	0.26834
27	0.09053	0.05616	-0.01641	-0.02066	-0.14383
28	-0.31700	0.09859	0.18468	-0.06770	-0.02527
29	-0.25333	-0.04772	-0.01057	0.22271	0.15225
30	-0.21353	0.04806	-0.05134	-0.05534	0.02309
31	0.03599	0.04173	0.03700	-0.09453	0.116441
32	0.13358	-0.15903	-0.29408	-0.14813	0.08937

Conclusions regarding the General Ethnocentric Orientation Scale

Apparently the initial conjectures were wrong, or the items I was constructing were not measuring what I wanted to get at, or both. Thus the GEO scale was left for later reconstruction after concepts had been more adequately formulated. Some exploratory work was later done, however, correlating responses to items on this scale with responses to the Attitudes Toward Black Culture Inventory to see that might emerge from the data. Results, however, were inconclusive. It was initially intended after successful construction of the GEO scale -- with some evidence of its validity obtained through correlation with such measures as Rokeach's Value Survey rankings and with discriminant measures such as E and F scale ratings -- to obtain point biserial correlations between total scores on the GEO scale with each item on the Attitudes Toward Black Culture Inventory constructed from open ended sentence completion data from white, black, and other (ethnicity indeterminant) subjects.

Rationale and Purpose of the Attitudes Toward Black Culture (ATBC) Inventory

The Attitudes Toward Black Culture (ATBC) was developed from sentence completion data which was to be used in the assessment of complexity within race related domains. (Two hundred and five undergraduate freshman taking one of several introductory psychology courses at Michigan State University were asked to complete 7 sentence fragments in a seven page questionnaire: Race ..., Racists ..., Black Culture ..., White consciousness ..., Black Power ..., Blacks who think they understand whites ..., and White power ... -- see Appendix IV.) While obtained sentence completion data was served as a supplimental measure of complexity, with the failure of the GEO scale it was decided to employ the sentence completion questionnaire to obtain subject generated items more likely representative of the thinking of the general student population (race undifferentiated) from which anti-black items could be selected. Attitudes toward (or opinions about) Black culture was selected as the stimulus category from which to obtain items on the basis of its being more subtle a category than say "attitudes toward Blacks" and because of its importance in the non-empirical literature on racism as reflected in opinions that "Blacks are exagerated Americans only, with no culture of their own;" that "Black culture is a culture of poverty;" that "Blacks have no culture, or are culturally deprived" and so on.

Ninety-three items for the ATCB Inventory were selected from a pool of 191 responses to the stimulus category (or sentence stem) "Black Culture" on the rational basis of their potential relavance (positive and negative) as indices of racism. These 93 items were then reduced to a small pool of 43 items on a rational basis of their "subtlety" (with some neutral items included which would not likely contribute to the scale score). These 43 items (appearing on the subsequent seven pages) were administered to 165 subjects at Washington State University who were asked to respond to each item on a three point scale as a check on item subtlety: tribute to the scale score). As a check on both subtlety (assuming that we might initially rely on rational judgment as an initial indicator of racism in attitudinal response) these 43 items (appearing on the subsequent pages in this section) were administered to 165 subjects at Washington State University (again freshman introductory psychology students) who were asked to respond to each item on the basis of whether "the statement is 'fair' (1) or 'prejudiced' (2)." In analysis the data particular attention was paid to items 1, 6, 14, 16, 17, 20, 25, 29, 45, 53, 56 and 71 which were rationally believed to be the better among the subtle items directly reflecting the racism and items 5, 11, 22, 30, 33, 36, 42, 58, 60, 63, 74, 81 and 82 which seemed to reflect more direct bigotry.

Table 15

Frequency Data ATBC Inventory

Item	Score 0	1	2
1.	6	133	26
6.	1	28	136
14.	2	57	107
16.	1	54	110
17.	0	119	46
20.	1	81	83
25.	4	96	65
29.	1	8	156
45.	3	81	83

(Subtle items for which the investigator would score "2" but for which subjects were expected to score "1"; "0" indicates no response). Thus, only five of the items which were rationally considered subtle (out of the 9) were considered usuable as subtle items of the basis of the data. Items 1 and 17 faired as expected, items 20, 25, and 45 were more evenly divided among the judgment of subjects so were not definitely rejected.

The other set of items (i.e., which seemed "obviously bigoted" from a rational standpoint) behaved as expected with the exceptions of item 5 and 63 (to our surprise). Perhaps these may be good indicators of a more enculturated racism:

5. Black culture tends to be something talked about by the "hard core" blacks. They often tend to be overly involved in their own problems.

Frequency		
0	1	2
2	81	82

63. Black culture is fine for whomever wants to be part of it. It should'nt be forced on anyone who doesn't wish to be part of it, though.

Frequency		
0	1	2
3	151	11

(In retrospect it seems likely to be the case that item 63 confounds a negative sentiment toward Black culture with an anti-democratic tendency to force people to take part in something which they may not wish, though this is frequently done in other contexts, e.g., Blacks learning EuroAmerican history whether they wish to or not; or statistics required for all psychology majors irrespective of area; etc. In any case item 63 should really be divided into two separate items.)

In actuality this attitude inventory has greater relevance for our current identity based configurational analysis of racism than it had for our earlier conceptions and remains quite interesting. In the early stages, however, with the ATBC scale we still had not found what we were looking for although some questions about initial conceptions were beginning at this point to be raised.

Data on attitudes toward other cultures such as that obtained from the "Awareness of Indian Survey" (labelled Opinion Scale A), and attitudes toward "new white consciousness" (as analyzed by Terry, 1970) were also obtained with inspection of the data leading to a greater need for clarification and change in conceptions initially offered and postponement of further data analysis.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Our initial formulations began with the conjecture that two basic assumptions underlying racism in both its simplistic and its complex forms are those of superiority and of normativity. More specifically these were defined as (1) the assumption that the psycho-cultural traits and capacities of one racial group are superior to those of another racial group, and (2) the assumption that differences between the psycho-social functioning of one's own racial group and another connote (in an a priori fashion) either deficit or pathology in the functioning of the latter group. This definition does not constrain racism to the explicit assumption of biological superiority, but simply requires that feelings of superiority and normativity partition themselves along racial lines. These elements in the definition were intended to reflect what has been consistently reported in the non-empirical literature (see for example, Kovel, 1970; Schwartz and Disch, 1970; Jacobs, Landau, and Pell, 1971) as variations on two basic themes: first, is the more primitive assumption that peoples of color (i.e., black, yellow, red, and brown) are born with inferior brains and a limited capacity for mental growth; and second, is its more contemporary variation that their personality tends to be abnormal (whether by nature or nuture).

Further, our initial assumptions reflected the belief in the active quality of racism at the individual level (quite a different conception from a more multi-dimensional focus involving insensitivity, indifference, apathy, naievety, condescension, tolerance, paternalism, hostility, and bigotry which develop later). From this initial perspective it was postulated that a fundamental correlate (or aspect) of racism at the cognitive-perceptual level is the perception, belief or expectation of the right to dominate peoples socially defined as inferior or abnormal -- that whether intended or unintentional, the specific or diffuse aim of this perception, belief or expectation is to suppress the collective and individual action, potential, esteem and development of the object racial groups.

It was further conjectured that racism operates within a dynamic gestalt of power and perceived power, and control and perceived control and early attempts were made to tap both of these factors in inventories being developed to measure racism. Due to what I believe was an early rather heavy-handed handling of rather delicate psycho-social concepts no data could be obtained to support either the dominance or the perceived power variable. Initial formulations were too simplistic, lacking in subtlety and appreciation of variety. Although it was felt that degrees of racism existed at the individual level, that racism was endemic to EuroAmerican

history and culture but transcendable -- hence "not all whites are racist"--no attempt to encorporate these assumptions into the development of early measures was evident. At one level this is defensible since the early work focused on tapping a general racism factor. It was felt that although one must speak of a society's racism in a different way than one speaks of individual racism, that the two systems are interrelated and reinforcing (and hence that a general racism factor may be obtained). Current conceptions consistent along these lines, but are developed more fully in the context of identity, in the congruence or "mutuality" (to use Erickson's term) between the individualized ego and the collective society in which he or she lives. It seems likely to be the case that in the last analysis, the content of a human being's behavior depends not only on personality factors, socialization practices and the immediate context in which the individual behaves, but also depends on the general conditions of the culture in which he or she lives. Issues of racism thus become translated into psycho-social-cultural problems -- a conception not unrelated to our initial thesis of interrelationship and reinforecement of individual and social systems.

Other components of the "superiority factor" incorporated in our developing conceptions of psychological aspects of individual racism included perceptions,

beliefs and expectations of determination, will, self-control, higher esthetic functioning and reasoning powers on the part of one's own racial group while others are seen in the converse. Such concepts might have been much better defined in terms of the ethos of the white middle-class and more specific elaboration made regarding the relationship of the individual to this ethos. Again the same observation made earlier in regards to dominance and percieved power are applicable here as well.

Our first attempt to explore and explicate (in some hopefully coherent fashion) the stylistic factors involved in expression of what we were trying to conceptualize as "normative" tendencies involve only conceptions of the negative aspects. Discriminating behaviors which would have helped to better clarify some of these concepts were not considered in our initial work (although in later work this became crucially important). The nexus of racism with gradualism, moderation, lack of empathy; pro status quo, "individualistic assimilation," and anti-pluralistic orientations; ethnocentrism; and more remote factors of intellectual sophtry, cynicism, obscurantism, pessimism, moral relativism, moral nihilism (and other factors discussed frequently by Clark as reflecting the "pathos of power," "lack of social sensitivity," and the like -- see for example, Clark, 1974) was conceptually explicated in clarifying the dimensions of our construct. Our explications of

anti-pluralistic orientation and ethnocentrism survived to become central conceptual points around which much of the body of our present conjectures moves.

The scales developed out of this conceptual context with information regarding their construction, scoring procedures developed and results of internal consistency tests and factor analysis have already been presented. Measures of internal consistency were generally low and no clear factors emerged from our work on the General Ethnocentrism Scale (GEO Scale), other work on attitudes toward black culture (Opinion Inventory I), attitudes toward race, about racists, integration, intermarriage, and the like (as reflected in sentence completion measures) produced no clarifying results in regards to our concept of racism. Much exploratory not reported here work was also done using open ended questions, multi-racial pictures as stimulus materials, and in debriefing and feedback sessions among subjected tested in large and in small groups. It is clear now that greater structure was needed in these early phases. The clearest conceptions to develop out of these phases were those of the means by which to determine levels of structural complexity within racial and non-racial domains using a "Meaning of Social Movements" and a "Meaning of Controversial Issues" questionnaire designed on a semantic differential format from which multiple measures of dimensionality could be obtained.

It was finally decided to do more extensive work in better structuring concepts and in formulating measures within the context of a multi-ethnic research group whose focus would be the development of behavioral indicies of racism consistent with the pre-theoretical formulations developed, to foster further clarification, and ultimately to assist in the item generation process in constructing a racism inventory. In this context, procedures developed by Jackson (1967) were adopted with modification (e.g., Jackson could begin his initial selections of concepts on the basis of pre-existing empirical support, whereas the concepts to be investigated in the present effort were not formerly researched.

The prodecure outlined by Jackson provides a fairly complex and comprehensive program of item generation and selection which takes into account the necessity for suppressing response-style variance, enhancing scale homogeneity, and fostering convergent and discriminat validation at the early stages of inventory construction (see Appendix 2).

The research group attempted to generate an initial pool of variables (or factors) conceived to comprise or underlie racism as conceptualized in my intial efforts (with suggested modifications and additional conceptions generated by the research group members themselves). Next we attempted to construct a set of behavioral descriptions of each of the variables discussed as

each variable would be conceived to operate in dynamic situations (see an example using the "right to dominate" variable, also in Appendix 2), and discriminated these behaviors from those not considered as the given type of behavior. From these behavioral descriptions an item pool was to be generated which was to serve as an tentative index of racism for which we would seek behavioral correlates.

This technique was also abandoned for a broader and more representative context in which to explore concepts of racism (in this sense the application of Jackson's strategy appeared to be premature) and the task of reformulations was again begun.

In all, a great deal of attention was given to the fact that methods should reflect in concrete representational ways the variable in question. Because of this, as conceptions changed so did the measures employed to assess them. Methods were tried and abandoned. More enlightened conceptions (as a result of this experience) were formulated and new ways of quantifying racism were tried. As a result, the basis for our later conceptions of racism emerged.

In these early stages of the present work, many conceptions needed greater structure and much of the empirical work ocurred too soon. The reader should note that at the early stages at which this part of the research was carried out not all of the ideas of paradigmatic

fit had emerged or become more fully developed. Rather they were in the early stages of formulation. Thus, for example -- prior to having developed a context for our meta formulations for "fit," a series of scales through which we hoped to assess behavioral dimentions of racism were developed. Many of the conceptions involved in the generation of these scales as well as the methods employed in their construction are inconsistent with later developed concepts obtained in the initial phases of meta contextual match. Some (such as the use of Jackson's (1967) method of inventory construction) remain consistent and appear to be quite useful. Current efforts to establish an empirical foundation for our conjectures and to modify elements of the conceptions presented in chapter 2 center around the more positive and (i.e., non-racist) of the racism continuun. The development of cross-culturality is the focus of our further work, an emphasis that will undoutedly lead to investigation of the developmental aspects of pluralism in children, and of the parameters of protocol in cross-cultural communication.

APPENDIX I

CATTELL'S APPROACH

CATTELL'S APPROACH

The most distinctive feature of Cattell's approach to the study of personality is the central role of multivariate analysis, and particularly that of factor analysis in defining trait constructs. Traits, for Cattell, are those entities whose organization and dynamic interrelationships determine the behaviors we observe and the behaviors we wish to predict. Surface traits are clusters of observable attributes that are said to constitute the "language personality sphere" (Cattell, 1946). Source traits, on the other hand, are the underlying entities that literally cause the surface manifestations observable in behavior. Surface traits are easily identified by noting the correlations or clustering among the terms ordinarily used to describe others. Source traits can be discovered within Cattell's framework only by an appropriate mutivariate analysis of the dimensions which underlie surface clusterings.

In personality descriptions for Cattell's factor analysis is the method which both discovers and provides measurements of underlying source traits that are not detectable by other procedures. In an initial taxonomy for organizing psychological phenomena, Cattell distinguishes among ability, temperament, and dynamic traits (see Cattell, 1966). Other, somewhat less enduring aspects of personality organization include states and roles.

The nature and organization of traits may be discovered through empirical investigations conducted in three different data media: Life-record data (L-data) obtained from naturalistic observations of subjects in everyday situations by direct behavioral observations, the analysis of biographies or life-history documents, or retrospectively from peer ratings; Questionnaire data (Q data) obtained from the self-reports of subjects (behavioral in nature); and Objective test data (T-data) obtained from the behavioral responses of subjects to controlled stimulus situations involving either verbal, pictoral, or physical stimuli and motoric, verbal, or physiological responses measured in such a way that the subject cannot perceive the relationship between his/her responses and the trait being assessed.

In Cattell's view, factor analysis (when properly implemented) permits the direct identification and measurement of the fundamental source traits that account for the observed covariation among surface traits in L-, Q-, or T-Data. Thus, for Cattell, surface traits are manifestations of source traits and not manifestations of constructs about source traits. Further, the factors that emerge from multivariate analysis of the covariation among surface traits are taken to be quantifiable expressions of traits and not "operational definitions" of traits. Mathematical factors, however, are not considered to be identical to source traits (rather they

are considered phenotypic representations, physical, physiological, psychological, or social in nature).

In the design of a factor analytic study, Cattell advocates the inclusion of as large a number of variables as possible. These variables should include (a) a representative sample of variables from the substantive domain under investigation, (b) a set of "marker variables" which will serve to relate the present findings to those of earlier studies in similar or related domains, and (c) a set of variables which are known or thought to be unrelated to the substantive domain under investigation and which will provide a reference background of "hyperplane stuff" that is independent of the specific domain under study.

Although he follows statistical guidelines for extracting the "proper" number of factors, Cattell tends to err, if at all, in the direction of over-extraction rather than underextraction (i.e., whereas an unnecessary factor may be identified as such on rotation, an unextracted factor is lost forever). The fine point of factor analysis about which Cattell (1966) is most adamant concerns the rotation of the obtained factors to "general scientific meaningfulness." That is, in the first place, the final relatioship among factors should be allowed to become oblique (correlated) rather than forced to orthogonality (independence) as a means of "recognizing the right of the data to its own inherent

structure" (Cattell, 1957, p. 309). Second, Cattell's interpretation of the concept of "simple structure" emphasizes high loadings of a very small number of fariables on each factor and near zero loadings of all other variables on each factor the latter being assessed by "hyperplane count." The actual procedures employed by Cattell for factor rotation are extraordinarily complex and time consuming, and they have not been widely employed by others outside his laboratory until recently (see Cattell and Dreger, 1977).

Without exceeding space limits (or competence) we may indicate briefly the nature of the progression from trait construct to personality concept and theory: the experimentally obtained simple structure factor leads to a description of an empirical construct. This is done by abstracting "inductively" what is common to the highly loaded variables (and absent from the unloaded). The resultant trait "construct " is determined through the factor analysis to have features matching other constructs which establish its validity. Multiscale test batteries which provide measurement of those traits are developed and behavior in criterion situations is subsequently predicted by means of behavior as conceived within Cattell's model. These relations are then sought in a variety of areas which serve to "enrich" the concept (trait-situation relation) described.

The goal of Cattell's basic research strategy is the

identification of virtually all significant source traits in the ability, termperament, and dynamic realms. This extraordinarily broad-band design has been vigorously implemented by Cattell and his collaborators over a period of more than 30 years, and the sheer volume of empirical results defies comprehensive summary.

The substantive implications of Cattel's work, however, may be said to stand or fall on the appropriateness of the factor-analytic procedures employed in the identification of his principle constructs. Cattell has made numerous contributions to this methodological field, however, as Wiggins (1973) has noted:

> ...there is still less than unanimous agreement among factor-analysts on several important technical issues as: (a) the basic data matrix to be analyzed (e.g., correlations versus covariances), (b) the method of estimating variable communality (e.g., squared multiple-correlation versus unity), (c) the method of factor extraction (e.g., principal component versus maximum likelihood), (d) the number of factors to be extracted (many versus few), (e) the method of facror rotation (e.g., analytic versus visual), and (f) the relationship among rotated factors (orthogonal versus oblique). (p. 497)

Elaborate rationales are provided by Cattell for the use of his particular techniques. The amount of care and "artistry" Cattell has invested in determing the underlying structure of traits are remarkable and unique in the field and his present work even more substantial. While we need not share many of Cattell's proclivities, we recognize the importance of his work.

APPENDIX II

INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE DIMENSIONS OF RACISM USING JACKSON'S TECHNIQUE

i. Rationale to Research Group

ii. Sample of Analyses Derived

INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE DIMENSIONS OF RACISM USING JACKSON'S TECHNIQUE

As a part of my work on my dissertation, I constructed an attitude inventory to measure racism which I felt would not be confounded with cognitive style (in this isntance, level of cognition complexity). This intial attempt at scale construction resulted in a multidimensional (i.e., multiple factor) scale of relatively low consistency within the items comprising each facor (i.e., the items in each factor appeared to be measuring the same thing). I had hoped to be able to construct an undimensional scale (one factor--racism) with items in the scale correlating highly with the total test score, using coefficinet alpha (Cronbach, 1951) as an estimate of reliability. Unfortunately, constructing scales by this rather standard method (i.e., the correspondence or rational point of view with statistical refinement of scale items) is subject to many problems. For example, in order for accurate measurement to occur, it must hold that (1) the item have a common "meaning" among subjects and between the subject and the examiner, (2) the subject by able to accurately assess his or her own internal states, (3) the subject honestly (and without fear of repercussion or induction) report these internal states to the examiner, and (4) the items in the inventory be related to the concept used by the researcher. These

problems are not unique to my own efforts toward scale construction, but rather have been some characteristic problems of inventory construction.

Recently, Jackson (1970) has developed and outlined a technique of intentory construction that is a great deal more sophisticated than the usual rational (or correspondence), empirical (or instrumental), or construct (or substance) methods (cf., Wiggins, 1973, pp. 380-440). He has explored this technique further in a series of articles (Jackson, 1967a, 1967c, 1969, 1971; Jackson and Guthrie, 1968; Jackson and Lay, 1968; Jackson and Messick, 1961, 1962a, 1962b, 1967). (I have spoken with a colleague, Gary Galbraith, about this techique--as he teaches, and has interest in, the area of personality assessment--and he is also impressed with it).

In the context of his own work, Jackson has used his techique to develop a personality inventory called the PRF (Personality Research Form, Jackson, 1967b). Briefly outlining this technique: Jackson maintains that a system of variables, broadly covering--if not exhaustively covering--the spectrum of relevant states, needs, and dispositions with carefully worked out publised definitions (having a good deal of theoretical and empirical underpinning) be isolated. After reviewing the available research and theoretical literature on the variables isolated, a set of mutually exclusive, substantive definitions of each variable is to be developed. From these

definitions a large pool of items is to be generated. (Even the process of item generation is more sophisticated than is usual. It would be difficult to describe here all the considerations which Jackson outlines in regards to the content and phrasing of each item--but to provide an idea: (1) an attempt was made to delineate the potential universe of content by a grid of situations and behavior sequences considered relevant to each substantive domain, (2) a heterogeneous tem of item writers generated more than a hundred items for each trait, (3) an attempt was made to generate an approximately equal number of items reflecting the positive (having the trait) and negative (not having the trait)pole of each of the variables. Hence a concern for both convergent and discriminant validities (i.e., a determination of which behaviors were included and which were not to be included) was present at the stage of item writing). Further discussion of Jackson's procedure becomes more technical and concerns subtle items, content saturation and so on.

In our present work a modified form of Jackson's procedure will be used to construct a racism inventory, I might have made it more clear that I am not intending to use Jackson's inventory. Jackson was concerned with the construction of an instrument for personality assessment. He used, or perhaps emphasized is a better characterization, Murray's (1938) personality theory as a conceptual source for definitions of relevant personality variables. Among

the 20 Murray "need" variables which Jackson employed, there were a number that had been the foci of considerable research (such as, achievement, McClelland et al., 1953; affiliation, Schachter, 1959; and aggression, Buss, 1961). Modifications on Jackson's procedure for present purposes stems from the fact that some of his concerns in constructing a set of representative items to measure broad tendencies in personality are simply not relevant for a considerably more modest objective--to measure tendencies toward racism. His approach may be taken as a set of guidelines.

Given the sensitivities involved (subject located, conceptual, and methodological) in the examination of racism, clearly a rather sophisticated and sensitive way of measuring it is needed. Problems that afflict research in other areas, such as acquiescence, response style, and social desirability, more seiously affect research in such sensitive areas as racism. I suspect that this will become an increasingly important problem for research on sexism also as the populace becomes more sophisticated but not necessarily more humanistic in its attitudes toward women. Jackson's approach may perhaps contribute significantly toward ameliorating some of the more serious methodological problems which are currently apparent.

DISCUSSION # II: Racism: Right to Dominance Variable

Summarizing, encapsulating, and otherwise condensing (smile) what we seemed to be saying at our last meeting, I come up with the following composite.

COMPOSITE:

Appeared to be saying that the "right to dominance" is a feeling of a natural responsibility following from being "better," a responsibility to guide the situation (Genie's contribution), which leads to talking more, dominating and/or monopolizing the discussion, the feeling also that others have little to offer (i.e., would learn little from those who are "inferior"...nonwhite persons being devalued in this context as culturally inferior, having nothing or little to contribute on dimensions culturally and personally defined as important...) and hence a lack of symmetry in communication.

The racist (at least according to our initial discussion of him/her in regards to this dominance variable) talks alot or says nothing (withdraws) in unstructured interracial situations. When not withdrawing he/she tends to structure the situation (i.e., assumes authority to do so); is arrogant, paternalistic, or falsely innocent instead (although often truely naive in regards to knowledge of self, others, role in society, etc.); expects and reinforces communication in terms with which he/she is familiar (standard English) and feels that he/she is better at speaking it (and perhaps better at conceptualizing in it) than persons of color (unless, of course, those present violate that assumption, probably assertively). He or she resists restructuring of his or her ideas and of the situation as he or she has structured it (we'll have to talk more about this one). He/she does not focus on authentic communication, clarificaiton, and interdependence. In these and in other ways he/she rejects the basic assumption of his/her "right" to dominate in such situations (which in some ways is likely reflective of a cognitive orientation and in some ways reflective of a need).

COMMENT:

Need reactions to this composit. Statements taken individually should include a lot of error (although not too much error), but taken collectively they should represent the expression of racism vis-a-vis this single dimension in the given situational context. We may want to work on this and also broaden the context to make it more broadly representative.

We need to do this for each of the dimensions we find (or think) to be salient, e.g., "superiority" "ego-centrism," "ethnocentrism," (in the seminar various other potential dimensions relating to affiliation, power--perceived and real--indirect expression of aggression, self-est-em, and realistic group conflict were mentioned, discussed or implied). We should generate situational grids for each of these which clearly as possible describe racist response in the situation and non-racist response in the same situation. We need not worry too much at this point about measurement (although discussion and thoughts along these lines will certainly be welcomed). It probably isn't necessary at this stage to generate a comparison group (i.e., the argument that the person responds in these ways towards whites also as a general and characteristic style of functioning).
If the modal personality notion is true, then whites responding to eahc other in enculturated paradigms which predominate in the culture may be quite appropriate. Responding to culturally different persons in these same ways, within the same paradigms may be quite racist and appropriate. We want a composite picture of the racist as we see him or her. That is the first most centrally important task.

PROCESS

In constructing these composites through discussion, we should generate positive and negative instances of racism (the first step in approximating some degree of convergent and discriminant validity at the item level--with the idea in mind that an inventory which measures racism as we see it can be generated using subtle items--even if we move toward more behavioral measures either concurrently or later this process should be useful).

This would result in a grid (like the one on the next page) which should be added to, subtracted from, or otherwise revised until we are satisfied with it. From the statements in the grid (e.g., high verbalization or low verbalization in interracial situations versus moderate verbalization in those situations) we can construct many items which reflect the tendencies described, refining them later on both rational and empirical bases--this stage is easy-- again what is most important and difficult is the generation of situation in which racism is expressed and providing the positive and negative instances...In fact I doubt that any of us can do it well alone.

IMMEDIATE TASKS:

1. Refining this first grid

2. Generating more info. from other situations (e.g., "structured" ones) where the "right to dominance" is expressed and expanded on this first grid.

3. Reaching consensus that we have adequately described the right to dominance variable (i.e., how it is expressed; how it is not expressed).

4. Generating other dimensions and distinguishing those from ones previously isolated to the extent that this is possible--perhaps these all "hang together" (i.e., perhaps racism is unideminesional) in which case we simply need to be imaginative and prolific in generating a variety of types of situations in which racism is expressed and enlarge this first grid (in other words it may be possible to clearly separate say power orientation, from attitude of superiority, from right to dominative, from feeling of "normativity because they are interlinked). The best way, I think, to find this out is to generate sitations whcih reflect these and see). If on the other hand, we end up with multiple dimensions of racism, we would have to clearly distinguish one from another. This would argue that a person may be high on one racist dimension, for example, but not on some other dimension of racism (messy but perhaps true).

5. Generation of a pool of items (and if you wish, potential behavioral measures) based on the grid.

6. Elimination of items which should not be included through rational consideration.

7. Administration to some provisional population, factor analysis (if unidimensional, get item-total correlations, and Alpha as measure of internal consistency; if multidimensional selection of items based on factor loadings--i.e. items which correlate highly with other items in that factor as opposed to items in other factors). Administration of revised test, same statistics as above, repeat as necessary (would predict 3-4 times). Get test-retest reliability. Rely on behavioral correlates for validity.

--RESULTANT GRID--

DISCUSSION # II: Racism: Right to Dominance Variable

Situation: Communication in unstructured interracial groups--response toward Asian, Black, Chicano, or Native American group members indicative of racism/indicative non-racism.

(Note that each observation below should bear an imperfect though close relationship with racism; combined they should reflect a truer picture of racist response and non-racist responce (based at least on our perceptions). The idea is to clearly describe thos behaviors from which we would infer racism or a lack thereof. From a clear description of this type we can generate a set of items to measure each of the observations we make--if you like, or are interested, we can also speculate about specific behavioral measures. The primary focus however is to generate a grid of situations which clearly reflect racism and nonracism to serve as a conceptual basis for generating items for a racism inventory...I could ramble on but I'll stop here).

RACISM (i.e., Racist)	NON-RACISM (i.e., Non-racist)	CONCEPTUAL FACTOR
Formation of Structure (i.e., responsibility assumed	May or may not structure (variability dependent on situational constraints	WHO STRUCTURES THE SITUATION?
High amount of verbalization (i.e., dominance or withdrawal)	Moderate amount of verbalization (i.e., interdependence)	INTERDEPENDENCE, vs. DOMINANCE OR WITHDRAWAL (VERBAL)
Linguistic superiority:	Linguistic equality:	LINGUISTIC PLURALISM vs. LINGUISTIC ETHNOCENTRICITY
a) focus on language or dialect to the exclusion of real communication	a) focus on real communication irrespective of dialect	
b) reinforcement contingencies based on degree of linguitic acculturation (i.e., negatively reinforcing through ignoring, saying	b) reinforcement contingencies not based on degree of linguistic acculturation	LINGUISTIC PLURALISM vs. LINGUISTIC ETHNOCENTRICITY

RESULTANT GRID Page 2

RACISM	NON RACISM	CONCEPTUAL FACTOR
"I can't relate to you," avoiding in terms of seating, eye contact, and so forth individuals who speak in "non-standard" terms, and positively reinforcing those who speak in "standard terms")		
c) lack of authenticity through focus on ethnic language and in attempt to use it.	c) authenticity through use or non-use of ethnic expressions	
d) superiority of standard dialect assumed superior proficiency in using it (i.e., demand to speak "my" language because it is better than Asian, Black, Chicano, or Native American dialect/language; and even if you do I'm better at it than you are)	d) differential efficacy of varying forms of language assumed for communication of specific meanings and/or equity of varying forms in the communication process, respect for varying forms of language	
Style: Arrogance, paternalism, naivety (i.e., false innocence)--any of these	Style: Self and other respect, openness to questioning of self and other...	AUTHENTICITY vs. SUPERFICIALITY IN INTERPERSONAL STYLE
Egocentric orientation toward ongoing process (e.g., interrupting process when late, etc.)	Respect for ongoing process (e.g., fitting in when late, etc.)	RECIPROCITY vs. EGOCENTRISM

RESULTANT GRID Page 3

RACISM	NON RACISM	CONCEPTUAL FACTOR
Pseudo-concern for cultural differences which are not understood or lack of concern with such differences	Legitimate concern for clarification (i.e., as reflected in intonation, facial expression, type of interventions in process, etc.	SINCERITY vs. INSINCERITY OR INDIFFERENCE
Resistance to restructure (i.e., of ideas and perhaps of situations	Openness to restructure based on situational constraints	FLEXIBILITY vs. RIGIDITY

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APPENDIX III

RATIONALE, CONSTRUCTION AND SCORING FOR RACISM AND ETHNOCENTRISM MEASURES

i. General Ethnocentrism (GEO) Scale

ii. Attitude Inventory C

iii. Opinion Inventory

(GENERAL ETHNOCENTRIC ORIENTATION SCALE)

ATTITUDE INVENTORY B

PLEASE DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET. (THE HIGHER THE SCORE THE GREATER THE ETHNOCENTRISM)

This is a study of some of your attitudes. Of course, there is no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true of yourself.

You should respond to each question of the answer sheet according to the following scheme:

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all true of myself	Mostly untrue of myself	About half-true and half- un-true of myself	Mostly true of myself	True of myself

Remmember, no answer is objectively better than another. The best answer is the one which applies to you.

*1. Others opinions are important to me.

*2. I feel that I am the person most responsible for my failures.

3. I believe that people who are weak and inefficient should be protected and helped.

4. I think it is wise to do things in a conventional way.

5. I feel that things have become so complicated in the world today that I really don't understand what is going on.

*6. I feel that cooperation and coexistende are more important than personal success.

7. There is not much that I can do about most of the important problems that we face today, in my opinion.

*8. I believe that it is almost impossible to judge what is right for other people's lives.

9. Generally, I feel that most of a person's misfortunes result from the mistakes the person makes.

10. I believe that in order to get ahead in the world today, you are almost forced to do some things which are not right.

11. When people have values I don't like, I just don't care to have much to do with them.

12. I believe that many people don't use the breaks in life that come their way, and if they fail its often their own fault.

*13. I can be friendly with people who do things I consider wrong even though their values may be very different from my own.

14. People are basically similar in their personalities.

15. Sometimes people misunderstand me when I try to keep them from making mistakes that could have important effects on their lives.

16. I feel that because of other people, I haven't been able to achieve as much as I sould have.

17. I don't hesitate to urge people to live by the same high set of values which I have for myself.

*18. I feel that I'm on the same level as other people and that helps to establish good relations with them.

*19. In regards to social problems of today, I feel that if one is not a part of the solution, then one is part of the problem.

*20. I believe that there is a good deal of variability in human nature.

21. I feel confident that I can do something about the problems that may arise in the future.

*22. I believe that people who have many problems in life often work hard but are limited by external factors which they cannot control.

23. It is difficult for me to understand many people who whose values differ from my own.

*24. I believe that everything today is unstable; we should be prepared for a period of constant change, conflict, and upheaval.

*25. I feel that it is difficult to see the world as

it really is; this makes accurate judgments about it difficult to make.

26. I do not worry or condemn myself if other people pass judgment against me.

*27. I believe that respect is important in most relationships among people.

*28. I believe that the world is complex but understandable.

*29. I am reluctant to tell people what is right for them.

*30. I feel that many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to factors beyond their control.

*31. I fell that an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he or she tries.

32. I feel that for the most part one has to fight one's way through life. Unfortunately that means that people who stand in teh way will be hurt.

*Reverse scored items (subtract score from 6)

ATTITUDE INVENTORY C

Attitude Inventory C was constructed as a supplimental measure of racism in attitudes toward Blacks from modified items taken from the Multi-racial Attitude Inventory (MRAI) (OPINION INVENTORY, Form C-3, Woodmansee and Cook, 1965).

Items from the MRAI

20. Some blacks are so touchy about getting their rights that it is difficult to get along with them.

31. We should not integrate schools until the black raises his standards of living.

34. Although social equality of the races may be the democratic way, a good may blacks are not yet ready to practice the self-control that goes with it.

50. Even if there were complete equality of opportunity tomorrow, it would still take a long time for blacks to show themselves equal to whites in some areas of life.

72. Most blacks really think and feel the same way most whites do.

94. I have as much respect for some blacks as I do for some white persons, but the average black and I share little in common.

76. If the blacks of the same social class level as I am, I'd just as soon move into a black neighborhood as a white one.

27. Suffering and trouble have made blacks better able to withstand the stresses and strains of modern life than most whites.

30. There is no basis in fact for the idea that vlacks withstand misfortune more courageously than do most whites.

41. I would not mind at all if my only friends were blacks.

52. There is no reason to believe that what blacks have suffered in the past has made them a more noble people than are whites,

ATTITUDE INVENTORY C - Page 2

61. There is nothing to the idea that blacks have more sympathy for other minorities than most whites do.

73. In this day of rush and hurry, the black has met the problems of society in a much calmer manner than the white man.

82. There is no basis in fact for the idea that the black's misfortunes have made him a more understanding person than the average white.

87. The black's own experience with unfair treatment has given him a sensitivity and understanding that will make him an excellent supervisor of white people.

95. It makes no difference to me whether I'm black or white.

54. I think that blacks have a sense of dignity that you see in few white people.

18. I think that vlacks have a kind of quiet courage which few white people have.

The items from the MRAI are quite interesting in light of present conception of racism and identity, though the items appear to tap a number of different things. The intent of Woodmansee and Cook (1965, 1967) was to delineate a number of different dimensions of variation in attitudes of "white Americans toward Negroes." They set the requirement that each dimension be represented by at least 10 items that would "cluster" empirically, and they went through a long process of item selection and revision in orderto develop subscales with maximum internal consistency and minimum interscales correlations. An additional requirement was that each subscale differentiate clearly among groups that were known (on other grounds) to differ in their attitudes toward "Negroes." Subjects in "pro-Negro" criterion groups were members of prointegration organizations such as CORE or NAACP; subjects in "anti-Negro" criterion groups were members of right-wing political clubls or racially exclusive fraternities or sororities. In a cross-geographic sample of 1832 college students, the authors succeeded in identifying 12 different item clusters that met the criterion of internal consistency. Ten also met the criterion of systematic differentiation among the criterion groups, the most differentiating of these being clusters labelled private rights, derogatory beliefs, local autonomy, gradualism, acceptance in close personal relationships, and ease in interracial contacts.

Still, it is difficult to know what some of the items on the MRAI are assessing. Item 41, for example, "I would not mind at all if my only friends were black," or item 87, "The black's own experience with unfair treatment has given him a sensitivity and understanding that will make him an excellent supervisor of white people" present as a sort of enigma especially for us since they appear to argue against (a) a healthy cross-culturality which includes one's own and other groups, and (b) an acknowledgement of the complexity and variety of human behavior. As indices of differing ways of resolving the issues of race and of establishing a particular identity configuration in relation to it, however, such responses are quite interesting though one questions whether they are healthy.

OPINION INVENTORY

Here are some statements made by students who were members of small group discussion sections. The topic of the discussion was "black culture." Many probably had differing definitions of what black culture is. Some groups discussed definitions; others did not. At the end of the discussion period, each group member was asked to write a one or two sentence statement in response to the sentence stem: "Black culture..."

This booklet contains statements the students of these small groups made. Some of these statements may be fair statements which represent truths about very complex social realities. Some statements may indicate prejudice. After reading a statement, we would like you to indicate whether the statement is "fair: (1) or "prejudiced" (2). If you feel that it is more fair than prejudiced check under "1" (fair) on the answer sheet. If you feel that it is more prejudiced than fair check under "2" (prejudiced). Some statements may be flattering; otherw will not be. This is alright. We are concerned with fairness of each statement.

Please do not leave any blanks. You should indicate either (1) or (2). The most important thing is your opinion. Responses will be completely private and anonymous. Please answer frankly and honestly.

O.K., you may begin now.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET

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1. Black culture does not especially interest me. I feel that blacks are right in wanting to know and appreciate their heritage.

2. Black culture is very artistic. However it lacks written records of the past.

3. Black culture is beautiful.

4. Black culture should be taught in schools. People need to know more about each other.

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5. Black culture tends to be something talked about by the "hard core" blacks. They often tend to be overly involved in their own problems.

6. Black culture is really cool. They've got some really cool clothes like them African shirts.

7. Black sulture is something that black people are searching for. The black to African style is temporary; in the future blacks will acknowledge something more contemporary and closer to home.

8. Black culture is in a lot of stores now. SOme of those clothes are really pretty, especially the really colorful ones.

9. Black culture is a good thing. It could really be helpful in the future of this country.

---

10. Black culture is a new-founded culture that has existed as long as any other so called "culture." I haven't studied about it but would like to take a course concerning it.

11. Black culture is all those Afro hair cuts and stuff those blacks have. It's some new word some black though up.

12. Is increasingly more evident today than 10 years ago. There are great feelings of unity involved with black culture.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET

---

13. Black culture has grown in recent years and is in some ways more accepted by whites. But whites are not aware of it for the most part.

14. Black culture is unimportant to me and my life style

15. Black culture is important to me for a sense of identity.

16. Black culture has no relation to me.

---

17. Black culture, for some reason, is being carefully studied and integrated into our college and even high-school curriculums. Black culture doesn't have to be studied any different than another culture.

18. Black culture is no better than the white culture. The blacks, however, feel they aren't noticed enough in American society, so they are trying to let the whites know that they have culture too. I mean--you can't blame them.

19. Black culture is the thing of today to study man!

20. Black culture is being stressed a bit too much.

---

21. Black culture is just that and should be shared with all. People are ecclectic and have both good and bad. Black culture can make positive contributions and should not be restrained from doing so.

22. Black culture is a slogan. It really doesn't exist.

23. Black culture is something to enrich yourself by. Something that was almost forgotten.

24. Black culture is the way and means of a peoples history. It shows strenghts and weaknesses.

25. Black culture is something I don't know about. I guess it's good.

26. Black culture is something I would like to learn. I guess I should know more.

27. Black culture--I am not very familiar with it. I would like to study it.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET

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28. Black culture gives black people a common interest and an identity of their own. Carried to an extreme it makes blacks just as racist as the white racists.

29. Black culture is good for black people. If one is not black, one need have no interest in it.

30. Black culture means black people are dressing like Africans and playing funny music and trying to learn Swahili. Most of them haven't had relatives in Africa for 100 years. They are Americans like all other Americans. Other ethnic groups don't dress in ethnic costume.

31. Black culture is black people being proud of themselves and their heritage. They are tired of feeling second class, trying to fit into a square white mold.

---

32. Black culture is now in the limelight as a means of allowing the children of the black race to understand and take pride in their heritage.

33. Black culture does not concern me.

34. Black culture has the same precendence in my world as other cultures have.

---

35. Black culture is a very integrated one. By this I mean they (blacks) are united among themselves and have a strong identity.

36. Black culture--as long as it stays in the ghettos and doesn't make trouble, I'm happy.

37. Black culture is a subculture of American culture. I don't know if it will ever be integrated into the American culture.

38. Black culture is struggling very hard to unite blacks. It is only through unity that anything can be accomplished.

---

39. Black culture is important for the blacks and whites. It should be made available to anyone who is interested, especially in educational institutions.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET

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40. Black culture should be made a required subject at this university. We should propose it to the administration.

41. Black culture is interesting. We need more exposure to it.

42. Black culture is a bunch of hogwash. Who cares?

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43. Black culture was in vogue a few years back. Now, it is everyday event, and a new way of life.

44. Black culture is just wonderful. It's about blacks got some recognition.

45. Is unknown to me.

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46. Black culture is a confusing term for me. I think it is the culture from Africa or the origin of the black race. Jazz comes from black culture.

47. Black culture helps the blacks to find an identity. Everyone needs to feel where they're from in order to know where they're going.

48. Black culture is a lingo, a way of talking jive so that whites can't understand what's coming off.

49. Black culture, like all other cultures, should be studied by all Americans. We are all a part of the American culture.

50. Black culture gives identity to blacks.

---

51. Black culture has a lot to offer but unfortunately a lot of previous black culture has been lost. There is also an attempt to cram more culture into each year in order to make up for past loss.

51. Black culture has a lot of beauty and should be further explored. There is a lot to appreciate in the methods and history of black culture, but very few actual examples are studied.

52. Black culture today is becoming a more recognized separate culture. But today the blacks have become so much a part of American culture that they don't really have much of a separate culture.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET

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53. Black culture today is becoming a more recognized separate culture. But today the blacks have become so much a part of American culture that they don't really have much of a separate culture.

54. Black culture has degenerated from what it once was.

55. Black culture has created some beautiful fashions. Very unique.

---

56. Black culture is very interesting although sometimes blacks are haughty about themselves.

57. Black culture--many times power is expressed in relation to black culture, yet black can be beautiful probably depending mostly on the individual.

58. Black culture is going down the drain, I hope.

59. Black culture is a very educational and enriching subject, more psych. majors chould study it.

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60. Black culture has to do with people who call themselves "black," (some really aren't though but a mixture and that's why its really not correct to say "black.") and want a different life than others ("white").

61. Black culture is a good thing for black people who want to be different and find their own way of life other than the all-American stereotype.

62. Black culture is black people getting together and doing stuff.

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63. Black culture is fine for whomever wants to be part of it. It shouldn't be forced on anyone who doexn't wish to be part of it, though.

64. Black culture is a way of life which should be open to and accept anyone interested in ti.

65. Black culture is a way of life and no one should be criticized for their lifestyle if its right for them.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET

---

66. Black culture is a strong culture which gives meaning to some people's lives.

---

67. Black culture is good for this country.

68. Black culture wasn't and still isn't understood by whites. Only recently has the white man been exposed to it.

69. Black culture is very important to me. I strive to learn more about it.

70. Black culture is a very refined culture. I am interested in learning more about it. Sometimes, though, when I try to, I feel like an outsider. We should be proud of our cultures but don't let them separate us.

71. Black culture is okay. I've learned a little about it but I don't care to learn anything more.

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72. Black culture has a definite place in the American society. It should be developed and extended as a part of the rest of the American culture.

73. Black culture is a society all its own.

74. Black culture can grow as much as it wants as long as it doen't cause any trouble.

---

75. Black culture is equally as valid and important to the history of the world as American, German, Japanese, etc. The problem with integration is that many of these beautiful cultures will be lost.

76. Black culture--I'm glad to see so many schools teaching it. My children will be better for it.

77. Black culture is a very interesting and exciting culture. There is so much it has to offer, if only the world would accept it.

78. Black culture must remain a very vital part of the world for it is the soul of many people, just as any culture is the soul of its people.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET

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79. Black culture is as unexplored by most non-blacks as the Artic Circle. It represents fear for many people, a threat of the unknown.

80, Black culture is something to be proud of, something to be accepted as if you were a member. It has its heritage and should be accepted as such.

81. Black culture means trouble.

82. Black culture is against the white culture.

83. Black culture has a very deeply rooted background, and is someting that should be studied and analyzed.

---

84. Black culture is something which needs to be entered into all school textbooks at all levels. It has been denied and repressed and now needs to be celebrated equally, or more, with "white" culture.

85. Black culture is seen in African tribes and countries. Blacks are a part of our culture, and do not have a separate one of their own.

86. Black culture is cool. Blacks (guys and chicks) have gotten into their own hair styles, and clothes and jewelry and things.

87. Black culture is very serious. It's an expression of one people's newly founded society.

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88. Black culture is for the birds. If blacks want to know about their past, send them all back to Africa.

89. Black culture is great. It has made me more aware of myself and my role in society as a citizen and a person.

90. Black culture is good. Why should blacks only learn about whites and why should whites only learn about themselves. Everybody should learn something about everybody else.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS BOOKLET

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91. Black culture should be allowed to thrive. The whites have tried to assimilate everyone, but should let the Blacks, Indians, and other minorities retain and enrich their separate lifestyles.

92. Black culture is something I find quite fascinating. Of course there is a lot black friends don't let others in on--I gues its sacret to them.

93. Black culture doesn't seem to be too big a thing. One can buy African clothes, but Africa doesn't have much to offer.

APPENDIX IV

RATIONALE, CONSTRUCTION AND SCORING PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEXITY MEASURES

i. Meaning of Controversial Issues Questionnaire

ii. Meaning of Social Movements Survey

iii. Sentence Completion Measures

MEANING OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES SURVEY

The purpose of this questionnaire is to measure the meanings of controversial issues to various people. On each page which follows you will find a concept which describes some issue along with a series of ten scales below it. Please rate each issue on the ten scales provided. The scales are similar to the other rating scales you have used. You should place an "X" closes to the end of the scale which represents your opinion. If you are neutral on a particular scale, you would place an "X" in the center of the scale.

Again, don't worry about right or wrong answers. On the scales which follow there are no right or wrong answers. Work quickly and don't worry or puzzle over individual scales. Your first impressions and immediate feelings are what we would like.

Please do not leave any scales blank. "X"s should be placed in the middle of spaces:

This _____:__X__:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____

Not This _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____
X

EUTHANASIA (MERCY KILLING)

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

POPULATION CONTROL

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____;____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

GUN CONTROL

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

SOCIALIZED MEDICINE

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressige____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

U.S. POLICY OF DETENTE

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

(ERA) EQUAL RIGHTS (FOR WOMEN) AMENDMENT

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

COURT-ORDERED BUSSING

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ destructive

sane____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA

beneficial____:____:____:____:____:____:____ harmful

dangerous____:____:____:____:____:____:____ safe

simple____:____:____:____:____:____:____ complex

healthy____:____:____:____:____:____:____ sick

progressive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ regressive

foolish____:____:____:____:____:____:____ wise

positive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ negative

private____:____:____:____:____:____:____ public

productive____:____:____:____:____:____:____ insane

MEANING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SURVEY

The purpose of this questionnaire is to measure the meanings of different movements to various people. On each page which follows you will find a concept which describes some social movement along with a series of ten scales below it. Please rate each movement on the ten scales provided. The scales are in the form:

fast ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ slow

new ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ old

To rate a movement against a scale you should place an "X" closest to the end of the scale which represents your opinion. If you feel that a movement is neutral on a particular scale, you would place an "X" in the center of the scale (for example a movement that is neither new or old). If, on the other hand, you felt it was, say, more new than old, you would place an "X" toward the new end of the scale. If more old than new, then you would place an "X" near the old end of the scale.

Don't worry about right or wrong answers. On the scales which follow there are no right or wrong answers. Work quickly and don't worry or puzzle over individual scales. Your first impressions and immediate feelings are what we would like.

Please mark in the middle of spaces:

This____:____:____:____:____:____: X ___

Not This____:____:____:____:____:____:____
X

THE GAY LIBERATION MOVEMENT

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

THE WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

THE ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MOVEMENT

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

URBAN UNREST

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaninful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

MOVEMENT FOR MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

(AIM) AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ proggessive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

LA RAZA (CHICANO CULTURAL RECOGNITION MOVEMENT)

strong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ weak

active _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ passive

regressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ progressive

healthy _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ sick

meaningless _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ meaningful

aggressive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ defensive

positive _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ negative

changeable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ stable

rash _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ cautious

timely _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ untimely

Sentence Completions:

Washington Sample

Interracial Marriage is...

up to the individual's personally, and they should be supported if that's what they want.

alright. More power to the couple because love is love no matter what color you are.

up to the individual--one thing important in my mind to consider though is the children. Will they be accepted by society?

great if the two know and understand what society will do to them. Society can be very cruel to those who don't follow the norm.

good. The only problem is society's attitude toward the couple but the only way that will change is if more people do it.

up to individuals to decide. It should not be looked down upon but treated as normal cause it is.

not the same as a marriage of the same race for one reason--society and its attitudes can make interracial marriages and the offspring suffer.

perfectly fine. No matter what race you are you're still human and have human feelings.

a hard thing to write about. There is nothing wrong with interracial marriage and no one should be put down because of it. Who you marry is your own business as long as you are happy.

not a good idea because it causes many unnecessary problems.

o.k. by me. What's the hassle: People have to forget racial discrepancies if the world is going to exist in peace. Black and white babies are cute anyway!

up to the individuals involved; I would not personally marry of another race.

don't know.

a personal issue--each person has the freedom to decide who to marry. This includes religion, race, and sex.

a decision made by 2 people, that is very personal.

O.k. between some races, not in others. Generally, People that personally fit each other are meant for each.

Interracial marriage (continued)

alright for anyone. It is entirely up to the people who want to get married. Those that oppose it really don't have any right to interfere.

too hard on the child.

a difficult thing to endure but is definely acceptable.

If it can work it could be great. One problem that could arise--majority of population obtaining sycle cell anemia.

fine it that's what they want. For me, I doubt it. A couple shouldn't let peer pressure interfere.

a way of relieving tension between races.

I believe that neighborhood integration...

should be left where people can live wherever they please, without being told who they can live by.

Yes, I believe in neighborhood integration. I think everyone has the right to choose where they are to live.

is good in some areas and bad in others. Each neighborhood should be "felt out" before integrating it.

is good if both (or multiple etc.) races don't fight it. It shouldn't be forced on people--that will only cause problems.

is important in making everyone see equality between races.

is a must! We all must learn to get along and living together is the best way.

is no problem; people are people no matter what race or color.

should be enhanced when possible. People could learn from one another how to cope with racial problems.

should be left to the individual, I live in a very integrated neighborhood and find nothing wrong with it. People should be allowed to live where they want to and where they can afford to as long as no one is forced.

is a good step toward interracial relations. Its good for children to grow up unsheltered--prepares them for ugly things later in life.

is great if it's voluntary. I know it doesn't work sometimes when there are overly-prejudiced residents in the neighborhood.

o.k.

is not necessary. It is an issue within a neighborhood if they want different types of races living among them. It should not be pushed though.

would benefit some communities.

is simply bullshit.

its alright and should be done so that others will know what other cultures are like.

is something that should not be pushed. If it happens it happens.

should happen naturally and not be forced.

will always end up in social unrest.

is good -- it would let children become unprejudiced young instead of being faced with racial problems when older. It would create a better understanding.

is also a way of relieving racial tensions.

Court-ordered bussing....

ridiculous, because it teaches the kids to believe that they are very different from each to begin with.

Undecided.

a waste of time. Neither those bussed or living in the area like it and its only working out bad.

dangerous but necessary. Many people have been hurt but they need to see each other as equals.

not a very good approach to the problem. It causes resentment by both parties which affects the kids so nothing is accomplished.

a loaded subject -- in this matter we are dealing with emotions, and just because a court order is passed does not mean troubles will end.

a bunch of bull. If parents want their kids someplace else, fine but don't force them.

negative. Let everyone go to whatever school they want to (like in the Tacoma school district) and make all schools basically equal in programs offered.

ridiculous.

crap! Live where you are and go to school where you live. Things will come around on their own. Can't force people to do anything for too long.

wrong! Nobody should be ordered what to do on a controversial issue.

wrong -- integration that is pushed is wrong and can become dangerous.

a drastic step to take, in order to provide for better schooling, for those who need it.

crap. Leave the neighborhoods "ethnically pure."

a good idea for those that need it.

should not be pushed. Integration should happen naturally, if at all.

wrong and unnecessary.

bad for everyone.

stupid. Leave the kids where they are. If the concern is quality -- then bus better teachers. Its ridiculous to bus a child across town to an unfamiliar neighborhood.

not a good idea, integration would be better.

The Black Power Movement....

is alright, but I thought the idea used to be that we should all be equal, instead of everyone trying to be on top.

Know nothing about it.

Don't think much about it.

has helped Blacks but only slightly which is unfortunate. It will have to be a government powered movement.

is sometimes too violent and radical.

is too militant for me. They have helped in getting blacks recognized but not always for good things.

is great.

is a bit (or was) extreme. It did have an effect that was good however. It made people recognize the Black race as being equal to everyone else.

sort of obsolete today.

never crossed my mind.

is good for Blacks. As soon as equality is achieved though it should be slowed down. That will probably be a while for all the red necks in Pullman goes a bit far.

I think its great.

don't know much on it.

has become stronger over the years.

is run by uppity niggers. Let um put up some basketball courts.

expresses the feelings of Blacks.

has been overdone.

is helpfull to Whites and Blacks in reaching some sort of understanding of each other.

has gone too far.

is pretty quiet too. Thank goodness.

no opinion.

The Civil Rights Movement....

has helped to make people more aware of their rights.

I don't have any feelings on this.

has a great deal of both good and bad points in it.

good, but sometimes they go too far.

is necessary. Anything that helps create a more equal balance in our society is good.

should be carried further.

positive.

should be titled on equality to all people movement.

is far behind where it should be. Lets follow what our country stands for.

is great as long as there's no violence. People tend to get carried away with it.

don't know much about.

has many good ideas.

is cool, but none of this Black Superiority Bullshit. Christ!

is a good idea. Everyone should have the same rights as others as long as they don't abuse them.

don't know.

was tremendously good for the country and perhaps needs to be revived again.

its good.

is pretty quiet now -- I haven't heard anything about them in a while.

no opinion.

Urban Unrest has....

caused a lot of problems, but has also brought a lot of social problems that used to be concealed out into the open.

I don't know enough about it.

to me has not been that big of a deal. The cities need to take steps to make cities better to live in.

No opinion.

been blown up by the media too much. Why can't people just get together instead of Bitch, Bitch, Bitch?

gotten out of hand -- makes people afraid to live in cities.

nothing.

don't know what it means.

been the cause of many riots.

turned into a cancer and must be solved.

reflected the feelings of people.

don't know.

had little effect on me. I know really very little about it.

been going on for too long and will be going on until the world ends.

not made much noise either.

not enough information on my part.

The Movement for Majority Rule in Rhodesia....

is the best way to achieve true democracy.

Don't know.

Am unaware about and therefore have no opinion.

should go over.

I don't know.

Democracy is always the best government policy.

am not familiar w/ movement.

know nothing about.

I'm uninformed on this subject.

not informed on issue.

don't know the issue.

is something, I know little about.

sounds cool, but I haven't really read much lately.

Don't know anything about it.

don't know.

is something I know nothing about.

will help the country but not immediately.

SENTENCE COMPLETIONS

Michigan Sample

Race....

is a man made distinction that shouldn't exist. We don't separate animals on the basis of color, for example alley cats come in all colors but are placed in one category.

dominates too much of American thought. It isn't a person's race that matters, but the fact that he is human.

is still a determining factor in employment possibilities. While White people still get special consideration, Blacks and other minorities are making further inroads.

is a barrier to some people. People should look at a persons qualifications and not his race, creed or color.

is a concept of much importance. Our society is a composite of different races trying to establish a place for themselves.

is an issue of too much importance. It is unfortunate that all people cannot view everyone as an individual, each with personal merits or his or her own.

is a group of people. They have been brought up in different parts of the world.

is an inportant factor in determining socio-economic status in the United States in the early twentieth century.

is a group of people with many major physical characteristics alike. Such as shape of head, color, facial.

is what every person belongs to. You as individuals have no choice of your race.

is the difference in color of skin and is often used as a measurement for social class. In the United States the Black race is often considered lower class.

is what each one of us belongs to whether its White, Black, Yellow, etc. Race is something that we are born with and becomes a part of us. Something we should accept as part of oneself.

is an ambiguous word in that it can mean a people, a game or a more serious sort of competition. But where all events are weighted the most important word is competitor.

should be unimportant as to who a person is and what he's like.

isn't really that significant. Somehow it reminds me of a herd of cows, some spotted, some black, some brown, but

when it comes down to it, they all give the same kind of milk.

is of little difference to me. I think a person is what he is and that his racial background influences this but is not the only factor which makes a man a man.

is something you're born with. My first thought was of a race you would run through. Race, color, whatever is not something that is high in my thoughts. I suppose your race is important, but more in heritage or history factors than anything else.

is a hard to define term. Usually I think of race as a group of people with something in common.

is a issue that has become quite controversial since the mid 60's. The break down between Black and White is still not understood.

is a needless category. The day will come when there will be no dominant or superior race.

is an ambiguous word. Lately it has come primarily to mean to differences, between people and connotates prejudice, hatred, riots, etc.

is a biological difference. In human, racial color is a result of production of melinen.

is a subdivision of the species homo sapiens. Races are the evolutionary products of the past.

does not determine an individual's personality. People are all human beings regardless of ones origin.

is what nationality you take on when you're born, from your parents.

is becoming less important. Integration is slowly beginning to occur and discrimination may someday be eliminated. Though much discrimination still exists, hopefully to a lesser degree.

is basically a difference in skin color. It sometimes includes different values and cultures.

is a word describing a group of people who have similar characteristics. For example, Black people are one race, Chinese are another.

is an undefinable, non-existing word. There is no such thing as race.

consists of people. Race does not only include color.

is a matter of nationality and usually country of origin. The United States has probably the most races of all countries; the great melting pot.

is an important issue in the United States. We claim to be a melting pot and yet we are so divided.

is a division of a specific group of peopel. It is an initial division of people we meet or hear of due to our need to categorize people.

is a topic of great importance in today's world. Why don't we have just <u>one</u> race?

is of major concern today but has gotten out of proportion. People of all groups (races) are calling themselves minorities and expecting special retroactive compensations.

is the word used to identify groups of people by color and physical or facial qualities. We commonly say that people are of the White, Black or Yellow races. This is

Racists....

are found more the the Black Americans. They have strong feelings about their brothers and sisters and seem to think they deserve special consideration.

are the worst problem the world faces. In fascist fashion, they pit one race against another, destroying unity.

exist in both Black and White cultures and do neither any good. If they could channel their energies into useful friendship perhaps changes could be made.

are people afraid to face facts that all people are created equal. Racists are the ones that cause problems not just a certain race.

are people dissatisfied with themselves. They place the blame for their mistakes and misfortunes on another race or group, though the problem is their own.

are extremely stubborn and unjust people. Too many people judge whole groups of people by their experience, or the exaggerated experience of another person, with one member of a particular racial group.

are people who do not try to get along with people of a different race. Racists try to bring about damage to other groups.

are people who hold beliefs that this particular race is superior to other races in particular ways.

are people who consider their race as the superior race and are quick to point out the good qualities of theirs and the bad ones of others.

try to bring peoples attention to their own race. Occurs in all races.

are people who are so nearsighted or biased, that they believe their race should overpower another. Whites for a long time wanted power over Blacks. Blacks now want power over Whites.

are people who are prejudiced against one race or another. These people are part of our society.

are those of us who place too much emphasis on racial characteristics. Sure, there are differences, but they really are petty.

can be super crude sometimes, and it's upsetting to hear the heartless talk going about you.

are the most stubborn people I have ever come in contact with. Somehow, other people just don't add up to their qualities.

make me sick. They make generalized assumptions and pigeon-hole people. People should be accepting of people because they are people.

are people who don't like other peoples, people whose skin color is different mostly. They are anti-Black here as Blacks stand out so much, but they can also be anti-Semitic, anti-Oriental, anti-Indian, anti-Mexican.

are people who feel their race is better for some reason. These people seem very narrow-minded and are going about things in the wrong way.

are people that are very prejudiced. We have too much racism in our society from all ethnic groups. It would be a more harmonious society without racists.

are narrow-minded. They are products of their environment.

are people who are generally bigots. They have no human sympathy for the plight of people who are downtrodden or discriminated against. They can be any race, color, creed, etc.

in the strictest sense of the word, are people who make an immediate judgment of other people on the basis of race. This judgment is not, as some tend to assume, always a bad judgment.

are abominable in character, imperialistic in attitudes and uncompromising. They usually have very little education.

are a group of probably the most heartless, self-concerned, conceited people in existence. Understanding conquers racism.

Racists believe their race is the dominant and most important race whether they're Black, Red, Yellow or White.

are also bigots and sexists to a large degree. They are difficult to contend with and are often propogated by the preceding generation. They can only be eliminated through knowledge.

have a hate for a different race other than their own. George Wallace, who is White, can be called a racist because he is prejudiced against Blacks.

are people who believe the race they belong to is superior to any other race. Racists are one of the main causes of racial disputes.

people are those who are caught in a dilemma mostly by their upbringing to feel that some people are better than others. Mostly they use color as a basis but it is so undefinable.

are people who are fighting for certain rights for a certain race. Racists may obtain their rights either peacable or with violence.

are bigoted and tend to judge people in unfair ways. Racists judge people by skin color and seem to forget other more important qualities.

are people who are very one-sided. They will stick and fight for the value of their group and refuse to listen to others.

separate people from themselves, and put other races than their own on a lower level than themselves.

are of little importance to me. In fact, I don't care one way or another about them. Some of them are ok, others just troublemakers.

are like fanatics. They are wrong but often times they can't understand why, not because of pig-headedness but because of fear.

are people who have extreme feelings about people or conditions purely based on color discrimination. Racists are frequently activists.

Black culture....

should be allowed to thrive. The Whites have tried to assimilate everyone, but should let the Blacks, Indians, and other minorities retain and enrich their separate lifestyles.

is a topic I know little about. Cripus Attucks is about the only Negro I'm familiar with in American history, with the exception of the likes of G.W. Carver and current Black American leaders.

is long past due. I'm White and I would be pissed off if the history books and other information was only keyed to Blacks. It is good to know both sides, however.

is probably very beautiful, just like any other races culture. I'm not that familiar with a lot of Black culture but would be interested in learning more.

and Black studies is an area recently introduced on campus. Black culture as well as White culture should be studied side by side.

is something which needs to be entered into all school textbooks at all levels. It has been denied and repressed and now needs to be celebrated equally, or more, with "White" culture.

is learning about what the Black people have done around. It is probably told through schools and teachers.

is interesting in that it is beginning to assert itself more (particularly) in the United States.

refers to the social characteristics that are peculiar to the Black race. That is what makes them stand apart from other races.

is stressed very much by Blacks. They are trying to tell the people in this country that they belong here too.

a culture of the Black people that extends back to their heritage in Africa. Black culture I believe is making Blacks prouder of their ancestors and heritage today. It is also helping in uniting them.

is something to be proud of, something to be accepted as if you are a member. It has its heritage and should be accepted as such.

is the long overdue emergence of Black history and art. That is really a limiting sentence, because Black culture is now, just as White culture is now.

is a different thing to me. It's not too familiar and I am not all that sure what all is involved in the total phrase "black culture".

is something that I myself don't know too much about. And to tell you the truth, I feel sort of guilty about it.

is a very refined culture. I am interested in learning more about it. Sometimes, though, when I do try I feel like an outsider. We should be proud of our cultures but don't let it separate us.

is a way to improve Black self-image. It's not my field, but I'd fear hassle if I investigated now. Of course, I don't know that much about White culture either, just history and history book garbage. They're not the same.

is fine for whoever wants to be part of it. It shouldn't be forced on anyone who doesn't wish to be part of it, though.

is something I don't really understand because I am White. The Blacks it seems are searching for their own culture and showing the Whites that they don't need White culture.

is a relatively "new" subject. Only recently has any importance been claimed of its value and pride.

is something that seems to be suddenly coming to the surface of the public. Black people now are feeling pride in their heritage and culture. This is goood to the extent it doesn't block out other cultures.

in the relation to the whole American culture is a sub-culture. Lately, there has been a healthy recognition of the fact that all sub-cultures have something to contribute to the whole society.

was and still isn't understood by Whites. Only recently has the White man been exposed to it.

has a definite place in the American society. It should be developed and extended as a part of the rest of the American culture.

is part history and life of the Black people. Their society where Blacks originated, their heritage and customs.

is equally as valid and important to the history of the world as American, German or Japanese. The problem with integration is that many of these beautiful cultures will be lost.

is influenced by African heritage. It is different in some aspects from the so-called "American" culture.

is something I don't know much about. I would like to learn more about it -- I like people -- all types and am interested in all types of culture.

is something I know little about but I think it has to do with people who call themselves "black" (some really aren't though but a mixture and that why I hate to say "black") and want a different life than others ("white").

is derived from African culture. Black culture includes things such as literature, clothing, art work, dance, and even hair styles.

is very interesting although sometimes haughty about themselves. Many times power is expressed yet Black can be beautiful probably depending mostly on the individual.

is a very integrated one. By this I mean they, Blacks, are united among themselves and have a strong identity.

refers to the history of Blacks. It is a history of positive things from the past.

for some reason is being carefully studied & integrated into our college -- even high school curriculum. Black culture doesn't have to be studied any different than another culture.

has a lot to offer but unfortunately a lot of previous Black culture has been lost. There is also an attempt to cram more culture into each year now in order to make up for past loss.

is Black culture .... the culture of Blacks in the U.S. derived from the cultures they brought with them from Africa and from those conditions imposed on them in the U.S.

White consciousness....

is found everywhere. It's nice to see more television programs, ads, and job opportunities are opening up to minorities. Maybe white consciousness will decrease as a result of this.

of black problems is increasing. Whites must go beyond consciousness to action, for they wield the power in this country.

is just as prevalent as Black. Both races should be proud of their heritage and should examine it to make a better heritage in the future combing both aspects.

is at times disillusioning at times. Some white people say they are concerned but in reality "don't give a damn."

is understanding the other racial groups of the world. It is excepting the different races on their individual merit overlooking the factors of color and language and nationality.

of the toll our oppression has taken on Blacks as a whole will be a long time in coming. Whites are not willing to be found guilty of oppressing & repressing a whole people.

is white people being very aware about different people being around them.

is when the white perceives or doesn't perceive a threat from some Blacks, at least so when we discuss the racial issues of today. Consciousness may mean a realization of the unjustness of the American ethnic of justice.

sounds like it refers to the ability of whites to perceive that they have been prejudiced in their relations.

is what some people (mostly Blacks) think the people are trying to advocate to keep in power.

is the acknowledgement by whites that Blacks are equals to us, not superior nor inferior. Because of this, acceptance of Balcks into predominantly white concepts etc. has increased.

is awareness of the world around you. What the problems are that society must deal with & their solutions.

is not a familiar term to me, unless it means being aware of oneself and those around. It is very important to be aware.

is very much a part of the world I was raised in. In a strictly WASP comunity a day doesn't go by without white consciousness.

is another thing I don't think about too often. Race is of so little importance. It just doesn't matter.

is a hard sentence to finish because I'm not sure what it all implies. I didn't know you could color consciousness. I don't understand the phrase so I couldn't finish the sentence.

is, I don't know. Maybe the idea that we're different. Maybe that we're better. Maybe just a sense of identity with & pride in all the white achievers we've been taught to honor. It really rings no bells with me; it's a foreign concept.

if this refers to whites being conscious of other cultures then that is good. Everyone should be aware of differences.

is what middle-class white Americans are into. The so called status quo of our society is based on white-consciousness.

is a value judgement. It shows desire to be something that you aren't.

is something that I suppose white racists have. I'm not sure exactly if this means a feeling that "white is right" or not.

is an important awareness by the white population that theirs is also a viable culture. Too many whites, along with most racial groups, have tended in recent years to underrate themselves.

has been stimulated because of their shame for past abuses towards others. It is progress.

must truly develop especially throughout the older generations if we are to live in harmony. It is a necessary fact for love of one another.

is awareness of what is happening around them. Their everyday thoughts and realizations of living today.

is still alive, but is becoming a lesser issue in the university and large population centers. I'm no longer sure it should exist, but maybe as a cultural identification.

is pride in the white race as a whole. White consciousness is being aware of the cultural aspects of the white race different from other races.

is not too good. Too many white people are not conscious of what other races are like -- they don't have the interest or just consider themselves the best.

is something I've never heard before but I'd take a guess it has something to do with caucasian people being conscious that they are white and therefore feeling superior. It's a bad thing.

are thoughts concerning the white race. I am really not sure on the correct meaning of this term.

is hardly ever heard of, yet probably varies in great degrees from one person to the next. Whites think of superiority and some seem to be aware of nothing else.

is being overconcerned with being white. Must have white values.

is the abilities of whites to see others in their own culture, rather than as out of place in white culture.

Never heard much about it. No opinion.

Never heard the expression before. I assume it means differentiating between being white or "something else."

? Wish I knew what this term means. I'm white but not conspicuously conscious of being so.

Black power....

is a mixed bag. Ability to control your own destiny's a good part. Wanting to treat others as you've been treated is a bummer. I'm not sure anyone knows where it's going now, even Blacks.

is something that should equal white power and go no further. There are many groups that have less power than Blacks.

is an ambiguous term. Black power can be a positive as well as a negative thing.

is something absurd. People are people & no one color should have the entire control of a society. Power should be based on abilities & individuals -- not color!

is a healthy aspect of the awareness of the importance of Black culture.

is usually associated with the unity of Black people. Sometimes it is associated with political movements.

is essential to the Black movement. Although I feel that Black militant power is accomplishing more bad than good.

is when blacks believe they have power or control of the race. They are proud and have power and control of their thoughts.

is not such a great movement. It is white racism in reverse. One mistake in bigotry is enough in the world. The solution is living together with "people power."

is a political movement emphasizing the legal and political rights of Blacks. Many whites fear the idea of Black power because they view it as a "Black takeover."

has really grown. The Blacks seem closer together than ever -- they're a lot closer group than the whites.

is something I hear a lot of "Black" people shouting for. They feel that they are discriminated against and want to get together and become powerful enough to change discrimination. Its bad sometimes.

is a feeling of people fighting for the rights of alienated Blacks. It is symbolized by a clenched fist raised in the air.

is okay, but why be so separatist? Whites have had the power now Blacks want it -- maybe rightfully so.

is a very uniting factor in the Black culture. It is essential if Blacks are to stick together and obtain their rights.

is the idea that Blacks have power due to their majority in an area or ability to succeed.

is for the birds. Why all of the sudden do we have to differentiate Black power from any other power? Anything for attention!

was a radical movement needed a few years ago to draw attention to the fact that Blacks have a separate culture and shouldn't be forced into a White culture. I think "Black Power" has died down in it's radicalism.

brings a picture of the Black Panthers to mind. It is feared as destructive, rather than being seen as constructive.

is not desirable. You don't have to be militant to make changes. The late Dr. Martin Luther King proved that fact.

is just as relevant as white power. No one race should be in complete charge over another race.

seems vague and undefined. It appears as a vocal encouragement for upheaval and revolt.

is a recent outcome of the expression of Blacks as a distinct group desirous of the rights & freedoms previously denied them. It is a form of unity for Black people & a way of defining themselves.

is Black people getting together to form a group to get better conditions for Black people. Black people want to be recognized as regular people.

would seem to imply a political power that is related to economic interests. Blacks are realizing that they have a role in society and that in order to achieve it they have to exercise some form of clout, either political, economic, religious, or violence -- man.

refers to the power of the Black race as a whole in terms of social, political things.

is a group of Black people who are organized to try to change the life of today's Blacks.

a movement by blacks to gain more say & power in government & management of their cities, jobs, etc. In radical Blacks

--a movement to overthrow white supremacy & establish Black supremacy.

denotes strength & force, not necessarily Black but the word power shows force, something that most people dislike. Of course society puts labels especially on Black power as being frowned upon.

is a bunch of crap. We cannot go about emphasizing power when we should be working together not against one another.

scares me. The whole idea of such total involvement in this world.

is something, I think, that is associated with being the "bad part" of the Black Race. It is something, when mentioned, that stirs up the racists to an unbelievable degree.

is some pretty might power. Just the phrase itself implies segregation of people. I think people power would be more effective.

seems to have dropped into the background, but it's still there. After initial changes were made the steam power of the movement seems to have dropped off, but it will probably build up again.

is an ugly term. It represents violence to me. I don't want violence or ugliness or discrimination anywhere for any reason. Don't know why we've ever had discrimination at all.

Blacks who think they understand whites....

probably know a lot more than whtes that try to understand Blacks. They were forced to learn white ways of living in white schools, using white books and white tests.

probably understand them as well as whites understand Blacks. Inidividuals may understand individuals, but broad generalizations often don't work.

may or may not be correct. When you think you finally know someone completely, then the relationship dies.

may or may not truly understand them. They may say the do, but it could be only in the way they see whites.

as being dominant and repressive are both right and wrong. White upbringing has placed in the minds the idea of superiority, but ideas can change.

probably do to a far greater degree than whites understand Blacks. They have been forced to understand the whims & whiles of whites in the past to survive by presenting a "simple" face for whites to think they understand.

probably do understand them to a certain extent. It is hard to completely understand a race unless you are part of that race.

may understand them perfectly, if they perceive the whites as the whites perceive themselves.

might be making judgments in the same blind way that whites are making judgments of Blacks.

are usually or sometimes looked down on by other Blacks -- mostly the Black power group trying to change the system.

may not necessarily really understand at all. Neither race in my opinion understands the other very well.

are at least making a concerted effort to get along. This is also true fro whites who think they understand whites. First we have to accept oneself before we can accept others for who or what they are.

are just as wrong as whites who say they uderstand Blacks. No person understands another and to profess to know a group of people is really an absurd generalization.

probably understand better than whites understand whites. There's a lack of communication among ourselves.

probably do. It's not that hard. I don't see why understanding someone from a different racial background in the same country is harder than understanding someone of a different sex or age. Especially if they were both of the same basic culture.

as one group are feeling toward each indiviual white the same way they feel toward the group. This is wrong.

possibly do. It is hard to determine if & how different cultures can understand one another. I think it depends on the environment a person comes from.

show ignorance. The same can be said of whites who think they understand Blacks. "Think" is the key word.

might only be looking at something that they feel is threatening them. Hopefully, they mean they understand in general.

are as foolish as whites sho think they understand Blacks. They are racist in that they are making a personal judgment on race alone. No one can completely understand another, especially when they come form varying cultures.

cannot understand all aspects of being white. Likewise whites can never fully understand Blacks.

may indeed understand them. By the same token I feel whites have the capabilities to understand Blacks.

may really understand them. Color shouldn't make that much difference and you can understand another person if you try no matter what color you are.

probably do if they think whites are no better or worse than Indians or Asians or Blacks. Those who can accept all races as their equals are the ones who will lead the country out of discrimination and hate.

probably do. Some Blacks have been assimilated into the white culture, and have become a part of it, and understand.

really don't. No person in one race can understand another person in a different race -- until he's lived in his shoes.

could be telling the truth unless they are stereotyping. How do I know what most people think about other people unless I listen and I usually don't care to.

are trying to break the racial barrier. Both races should reach out towards each other and form an understanding.

just might understand whites although with Black background and culture maybe they are just reacting. Perhaps they will never understand whites and maybe they have never understood all along.

could be ignorant and classify all whites as prejudiced and bad or could be intelligent and see people as they are.

may, or may not understand certain whites -- they probably understand an individual, but not all whites.

are just like whites who think they understand Blacks.

are probably about as right as the whites who think they understand Blacks. There is too much different cultural history behind the two for one to totally understand the other -- like in individuals.

may understand whites. I used to think I understood Blacks but the more of them I meet and get to know the less I guess I know them.

White power....

I have never heard anyone use this term, because the whites have power. I'm not saying all whites have power, because they don't, but they can still relate to the white culture.

is a vague term. It probably means more to a Black person than it does for me. The realization in me is not complete.

is another absurd phrase. As I said before -- no one color or race should dominate a society made up of several races.

obviously the opposite of Black pwer, when thought of constructively can have an important effect in increasing racial tolerance just as black power can.

the slogan, although not as popular as Balck power, has meaning. This is due to the fact that whites have had power due to numbers.

in America has existed since the first settlers came to this country. This is mainly due, I feel, to the fact that for the same amount of time whites have been the majority.

is the same as Black power, but each race thinks they have it over the other race. If you believe in our race you have power of your mind.

is just as ridiculous as black power. It has existed strongly in the past and has shown the tragedy of discrimination and lack of love.

is a political movement emphasizing the political power of whites. It is a counteractive movement, as a reaction to the Black Power movement.

is strongest. There are more whites (not strictly American) in power than any other color.

is what most people think this society is about but then what is a white person? Many "negroes" are lighter than I, does that make them white or me Black?

are people who are striving to achieve certain rights for alienated whites. White power does not have a symbol like Black power does.

is getting old yet has existed unfought for quite a while. Whites like to act superior to make up for other qualities lacking.

is really not significant. Whites are so diverse that such a term has no meaning. It is an overreaction to the term "Black Power."

is the power of a controlling group of whites, through majority or other means.

never hear much about this. It's no better than Black power. I don't think it is stressed as much as the Black power though.

Again, I'm not sure what it means, but have an idea. Black power is kinetic, a threat, growing while white power is a constant, a known, a solid, long time, assurance.

is also a rebellion in answer to Black Power. There are more whites in America so they will naturally have a stronger voice in the goings on, but now Black Power will be considered more.

is monetary: K. Galbraith wrote that he who holds the money, holds the power. Whites in America have monopoliz5d most of the money.

is the same as Black power -- not desirable. Nobody has to have the power over others.

is not the supreme power. All powers should live in peace.

What is it? It's a concept like that of Black power -- hard to define and accept.

is not is not a particular definitive expression and not a symbol of unification and definition as is Black power. Actually, it is not very verbalized.

is the way they use their power to achieve their own aims. In respect to the race situation, it may manifest itself in terms of anti-busing.

is something that has existed in the terms of Blacks since slavery has begun.

is white people getting together to block the forward movement of Black power. White people in white power feel superior.

a word not heard as much as black power. White people trying to control the country.

a movement by white supremists to control or obliterate all other races including yellow, red & etc. Unfortunately,

the movement is involved in political issues but it has little effect.

Again, denotes a form of power. Is a word that shows domineering tendency. Controlling may be a better word.

does that have something to do with the gas company? Facetious? No, firstof all what is a white? Wasp? Wasc?

doesn't mean anything to me.

is evident everywhere in the country. And it's a shame that balck power is something that has to be bellowed out before it is noticed. This is what is so sickening about racism.

sounds like a good soap commercial. I still like the statement People Power. People have to work together because we enhance one another. We have a lot to learn from each other.

is what is. It's not good, but it's not bad. It's not totally anything. Some should be changed, some not. Mjaority or minority rules can be good or bad. It's not a term I use or relate well to.

should be the same as any other power. Any group that has power should use it for the betterment of all others.

is ridiculous, same as Balck power. And ugly. Nothing and no one should be judged on the basis of color or religion or .... Judgment should be on personality traits.

APPENDIX V

RATIONALE AND SELECTION OF SUPPLIMENTARY MEASURES

i. F Scale (shortened form)

ii. Value Survey

iii. Social Values Questionnaire

iv. Social Desirability Scale

CONVERGENT AND DISCRIMINANT VALIDATION AND METHODOLOGICAL SCALES

It was hoped that some degree of convergent validation for the General Ethnocentric Orientaiton (GEO) Scale would be provided through correlations with measures derived from Rokeach's (1968) Value Survey and Perloe's (1967) Social Values Questionnaire. Discriminant validation was expected to be provided through correlation with the F Scale (Adorno et al., 1950) in one of its many shortened forms. Crowne and Marlowe's (1964) Social Desirability Scale was selected to control for acquiescence (or social desirability) set rather than simply to measure the variable itself.

Further discussion the selection and nature of these scales and measures derived from them and the rationale for their inclusion in the total research effort is provided in the pages which follow.

SHORTENED F FOR POLITICAL SURVEYS
(Fillmore 1950; Janowitz and Marvick 1953)

This shortened form of the F scale was selected on the basis on its appearing to a more subtle instrument than many other version of the F scale and because it appears to have greater contemporary relevance. This shortened F Scale emphasizes two of the several components of the authoritarian syndrome, chosen because they seemed relevant to politcial attitudes and behavior: (1) authoritarian submission, "a tendency in an individual to adopt an uncritical and submissive attitude toward the moral authorities that are idealized by his in-group;" and (2) power and toughness, "a preoccupation with considerations of strength and weakness, domination and subservience, superiority and inferiority."

No direct information on reliability is given (in regards to either test-retest or item-total correlations) in the work of Fillmore (1050) or of Janowitz and Marvick (1953). However, several of the research findings reported by these authors support the conception of authoritatianism put forward by Adorno et al. (1950). For example, three variables (education, age, and income) interact to predict "authoritarianism." The highest scores were obtained by older, poorly educated persons in the lower half and of the middle lower classes. Presumably these are the most frustrated. Moreover, authoritarianism as measured by this scale predicts a number of voters'

conservative attitudes as well as non-voting behavior--also presumed to be signs of frustration.

ITEMS (Note: Only the last is reverse-scored).

1. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.

2. A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk.

3. Women should stay out of politics.

4. Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.

5. An insult ot your honor should not be forgotten.

6. People can be trusted.

VALUE SURVEY (Rokeach, 1968)

Rokeach's (1968) Value Survey was constructed to assess a responden't hierarchical arrangement of two kinds of values: instrumental and terminal. Instrumenal values refer to preferable modes of conduct; terminal values refer to preferable end states of existence.

Subjects rank order 18 alphabetically listed terminal values along a dimension of the relative importance of each of these values to themselves. On the next page, they then rank order 18 alphabetically listed instrumental values, again in terms of realtive personal importance.

Rokeach's ongoing research in this area has included diverse samples of lay persons, professionals and students. Test-retest reliabilities, after seven weeks, are reported in the .60's for form A, the initial form composed of 12 instrumental and 12 terminal values. Test-retest reliabilities, after seven weeks, are reported in the .70's for form D, the final version of 18 instrumental and 18 terminal values.

How the values were initially selected and modified is not reported. Only predictive validity is noted: the rack order of the terminal value <u>salvation</u> highly predicts church attendance. The relationship between the average relative positions of the vlaues <u>equality</u> and <u>freedom</u> differentiates among those who are "sympathetic and have

participated" (freedom ranked #1, equality #3), "sympathetic but have not participated" (freedom ranked #1, equality #6) and "unsympathetic" (freedom ranked #2, equality #11) to civil rights demonstrations.

Rokeach (1973) reports that two out of every three adults in his national sample rank freedom ahead of equality. For adult white Americans, 69.5 percent are reported to rank freedom above equality and 30.5 percent ranked freedom as more important. For adult black Americans, 48 percent ranked freedom ahead of equality, and 52 percent ranked equality ahead of freedom. Sixty percent of adult Americans rank freedom in the upper third of their terminal value hierarchy, but only about a third rank freedom in the upper third. Conversely, less than 10 percent of adult Americans rank freedom in the bottom third of their terminal value hierarchy, whereas three times as many (30 percent) rank equality in the bottom third.

Here Rokeach is interested in whether a particular equality-freedom orientation represents a predisposition to given political ideologies which result in ideological positions that are mediated by accuracy of perception of the equality-freedom orientation of others. Positing that individuals strive for consistency both within and among the several subsystems of their values, Rokeach suggests that change may be induced by exposing an individual to the states of inconsistency already existing

in his or her own value system. Thus a subject who ranks freedom first and equality last "may be revealing something about himself that others interpret as anti-democratic or logically inconsistnet or, even, as hypocritical" (Rokeach, 1968). Rokeach offers some empirical evidence to support the claim that when this inconsistency is pointed out, subjects tend to change their rank ordering of these and other values and has demonstrated also some behavioral change.

Although it is difficult to tell what this relative ranking is indeed measuring, Rokeach's Value Survey does provide an index of varying kinds of value orientations, including prejudice (if we take Rokeach's claim seriously), which are not a priori conceptually and operationally conflated with simplictic cognitive style. It was felt that the relative rankings of the two values, freedom and equality, might provide some evidence for convergent validation of the GEO scale being developed in the present study.

SOCIAL VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE (Perloe, 1967)

Perloe (1967) designated the SOCIAL VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE (SVQ) to study the impact of varying kind of college environments on students' orientations relevant to participation in a democratic sociaty. Two orientations were of major interest: social responsibility and participation in secondary groups.

Several steps were involved in developing the SVQ. First, a large number of like-type items were devised and administered to male college freshmen (N = 120) at the beginning and end of their first year in college. A factor analysis was performed using pooled ratings from the two administrations. Ambiguous items and items with low communalities were then eliminated. Separate factor analyses were performed using the remaining item pool and several other college samples. In these analyses considerable redundancy appeared; this was overcome by moving from factor analysis of individual items to analysis of parcels of items.

To avoid capitalizing on chance, parcels were assembled on the basis of only one sample and were cross-validated on the other samples. Intra-parcel correlations ranged from .11 to .67, with 88% falling between .20 and .55. The median was .38. Parcel scores were obtained by summing individual item scores within the parcel. After several separate factor analyses of parcel scores, it

was found that a consistent four-factor structure could be obtained by omitting two parcels. The four factors accounted for 58% of the total variance and seemed to Perloe "to provide a fairly concise description of the major dimensions or variation present in response to the SVQ."

The parcels yielding loadings of .30 or greater on each of the four oblique factors comprise the final questionnaire. Factor 1 (social welfare) accounted for 24.8% of the total variance, Factor 2 (ccoperation toward Group Goals) accounted for 13.75% of variance, factor 3 (identification with groups) accounted for 16.4%, and factor 4 (moral pressure) 9.2%. In Perloe's samples, the first three factors intercorrelated in the low or middle twenties, while the fourth correlated with the other three from .11 to .16.

Since the aouthor grouped items into parcels before proceding with the correlational and factor analysis, it is difficult to assess the homogeneity of the scales agains the usual standards. The factor loadings do indicate fairly high homogeneity however. No figures are given, but the author indicates considerable stability in factor scores over a nine month period.

Two sources of evidence for validity were reported. A sample of 50 students was given a two hour interview by a psychiatric social worker. Responses were coded into categories based on questionnair items, and these

used to estimate factor scores. Inter-observer correlations ranged from .87 to .90. Correlations were computed between scores on the SVQ and on the interviews; these were .46, .25, .47, and .49 for the respective factors. All were significant at the .05 level.

As a measure of discriminant validity a sample of Peace Corps Volunteers was compared to a sample of students from a science and engineering college. These groups differen on all four factors, the Volunteers being more social welfare oriented, less conforming and cooperative, more affiliative, and more moral support oriented.

Several interesting relationships were found between SVQ factor scores and MMPI, F Scale, and other questionnaire item scores in a longitudinal study of men's college samples.

For purposes of the present research 33 items comprising the social welfare factor on the SQV were selected for use in validating the racism inventory. It was suspected that high scores on the Racism Inventory (GEO scale to be revised) would be inversely correlated with high scores on the social welfare factor of the Perloe questionnaire.

The items comprising this factor and their scoring is presented on the following page. The various "parcels" within this factor are separated by horizontal lines.

SOCIAL VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE
SOCIAL WELFARE FACTOR

Scoring

+	1.	Individuals should be ready to inhibit their pleasures if these inconvenience others.
+	2.	People who try but are unable to provide for their own welfare have a right to expect help from others.
+	3.	People should give up activities which bring them pleasure if these activities cause serious discomfort to others.
-	4.	Whether an individual acts to protect the welfare of persons beyond his circle of friends and relatives is a matter of personal preference, not moral obligation.
-	5.	The mere fact that one group or nation is prosperous and another is not places no moral obligation on the "have" group to improve the lot of the "have not" group.
+	6.	Not only does everyone have an inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, he also has an equality inalienable moral obligation to protect others from having these rights taken from them.
-	7.	An individual who has not caused another person's misfortune has no moral obligation to help the other person.
+	8.	It is wrong for a person to choose to pay little or no attention to the welfare of persons with whom he has no personal connection.
-	9.	Acting to protect the rights and interests of other members of one's community is a major obligation for all persons.
-	10.	An individual's responsibility for the welfare of others extends no further than the boundaries of his immediate circle of friends and relatives.

+ 11. A man should not be respected for his achievements if they were obtained by interfering with the welfare and development of others.

+ 12. Although others may equal it in importance, there is no value more important than compassion for others.

+ 13. It is sympathetic love among persons which along gives significance to life.

- 14. Although altruism and feelings of responsibility for the welfare of others are generally thought to be admirable qualities, a person should not be required to have them in order to be respected by himself or others.

- 15. Except for one's immediate family and closest friends, people have a perfect right to pursue their own goals without regard to the convenience or comfort of others.

- 16. People cannot be considered moral if they are indifferent to the welfare of the members of the community in which they live and work.

+ 17. All mean have an obligation to promote not only the welfare of their immediate circle of relatives but also to work for the well being of all them members of the community in which they live.

- 18. Things work best when people concern themselves with their own welfare and let others take care of themselves.

- 19. One's major obligation to other men is to let them alone so that they may sink or swim by their own efforts.

+ 20. Minor conflicts between one's own comfort and convenience and that of a neighbor should be resolved in favor of the neighbor more often than not.

+ 21. An individual most deserves the feeling of satisfaction with himslef after he has done something to help someone else.

+ 22. The typical law abiding person who avoids situations in which transgressions occur rather than acting in such situations to protect those who are being injured, does not deserve the respect of his fellow citizens.

+ 23. A person who witnesses an unlawful or immoral act, such as physical assault or sadistic taunting and teasing, and who does not try to do what he can to stop its occurrence shares part of the guilt with the transgressor.

- 24. The only people guilty o immoral acts are those who commit them or directly cause them to be committed; others who might have prevented the acts, but did not, should bear no blame.

+ 25. Individuals should feel responsible for fostering the improvement of moral as well as the physical well being of others.

+ 26. Every person should be his brother's keeper-in the physical and moral sense.

- 27. People should leave the prevention of immoral acts up to those whose jobs are specifically concerned with such prevention.

- 28. One should avoid trying to make people more moral and considerate than they generally age.

- 29. It is better for a person to ignore the larger social concerns of the community in which he lives than to force himself to take part in these concerns merely from a sense of moral obligation.

- 30. It is better to ignore a person in need when one feels no personal compassion for him than to act compassionately out of a sense of obligation or guilt.

+ 31. People cannot rely solely upon ministers, policemen and judges to insure moral behavior among the citizens of a community; they must each act to dissuade others from anti-social acts.

- 32. When one individual behaves unjustly toward another, it is wrong for a third person to intervene to correct the injustice unless he has been asked to do so.

- 33. We intrude unjustifiably into the privacy of other persons when we try to get them to abide more closely to a moral code which they accept as a vague ideal, but which they do not follow in their behavior.

SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE (Crowne and Marlowe 1964)

This scale attempts to locate individuals who describe themselves in favorable, socially desirable terms in order to achieve the approval of others. According to Crowne and Marlowe (1964) the items in the scale were modelled so as to achieve a balance of two types of statements: half culturally acceptable but probably untrue, the other half true by undesirable. Personality iventories were consulted to find items of this type which had minimal abnormal implications. A set of 50 such items were selcected and reduced to 33 by ratings of experienced judges and by item analyses with psychology students. Of these 18 are keyed in the true direction (items 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33) and the remaining 15 in the false direction. One point is scored for each response in the socially desirable direction with scores therefore varying between (no social desirability) to 33 (highest social desirability).

The items retained in the scale were those that had originally correlated at the .05 level with total scale scores. Internal consistency (Kuder-Richardson 20) was .88. A test-retest correlation over a one-month interval with 57 college students was also .88. Less encouraging data however is reported on homogeneity. Out of a total of 465 inter-item correlations, only 15 exceeded .20 (for a random subset of 778) males, and about half of

all inter-item correlations were not significant at the .01 level (.10 being the point at which significance would be attained).

The validity of the scale was supported by the confirmation of several hypotheses in experimental settings from which the authors were able to conclude that: "The greater amenability to social influence of persons who characterize themselves in very desirable terms is seen in (a) the favorability of their attitudes toward an extremely dull and boring task: (b) their greater verbal conditionability, both directly and vicariously; (c) social conformity; (d) a tendency to give popular word associations; (e) the cautious setting of goals in a risk-taking situation: (f) their greater reactivity, depending on their expectancies about the evaluative consequences of their behavior, in a "dirty word" perceptual-denfense task; and (g) susceptibility to persuasion."

A comprehensive review of mainly positive results using the Crowne-Marlowe Scale through mid-1967 is provided by Wiggins (1968, pp. 305-308). The specific application of the Crowne-Marlowe scale to the control for social desirability response sets in opinion-attitude survey research is provided by Smith (1967). Few scales in this area have their validity as well established through experimentation as this one and the amount of normative data that the authors provide is also notable.

The inclusion of this scale in the present research

for the purpose of methodological check on confounding of item content with social desirably in the construction of the various inventories to measure racism. Item-total correlations between the total score on the crown and Marlowe and each of the items comprising the racism inventories were to be obtained after achieving sufficient levels of internal consistency within each racism index. Items having significant correlations with the total score on the Crowne-Marlowe Scale would be revised or dropped.

In the early stages of research the entire scale (labelled Attitude Inventory E) of 33 items was administered with both the GEO and with subsequent inventories. For longer testing formats in which subjects would be responding to numerous inventory items it was planned that at least five to ten items from the Crowne-Marlowe would be selected.

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