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


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THE CHURCH AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS:
BRAZIL, THE PHILIPPINES, AND KENYA COMPARED

Volume I

By

Thomas Hofman

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

THE CHURCH AND ITS INFLUENCE ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: BRAZIL, THE PHILIPPINES, AND KENYA COMPARED

By

Thomas Hofman

Generalizations about transitions and democratization often contrast the roles of elite interests in controlling political change with the ability of civil society to foster and even force regime change. This thesis examines one institutional actor from within civil society, the church, to determine what influence was realized in three countries' transitions from authoritarian rule: Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya. In particular, the thesis examines church influence during the initiation of the transition and during two transitional events: constitutional reform and presidential elections. I conclude that the churches in these cases had considerable influence on the transition at its initiation because political space was severely constrained by the authoritarian regime. Under these conditions, the churches became the primary channels of political opposition and became a surrogate of the interests of broader civil society.

As political space opened up during the regime change, political discourse moved to the sphere of political society, and church influence was more selective. In the more open political atmosphere, church resources, moral

authority, and sense of mission were better suited to some types of political activity than others. The churches in each case were better able to affect constitutional reform rather than presidential elections because the process was more contained, political space was more restricted, and the setting was less partisan and politicized. Because presidential elections were partisan and highly politicized, the churches had difficulty maintaining a sense of unity and were only as successful as other groups within civil society at achieving their own institutional interests. In election settings, the political space that is opened is more conducive to actors within political society, such as parties and other overtly political groups.

*This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Wendy.
I thank her for the infinite patience, steady support,
and tender love that she gave me while
this thesis was being completed.*

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Chapter 1

The Church and its Influence on Democratic Transitions

Generalizations about transitions and democratization often contrast the roles of elite interests in controlling political change with the ability of civil society to foster and even force regime change. This thesis examines one institutional actor from within civil society, the church, to determine what influence was realized in three countries' transitions from authoritarian rule: Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya. In particular, the thesis examines church influence during the initiation of the transition and during two transitional events: constitutional reform and presidential elections. I conclude that the churches in these cases had considerable influence on the transition at its initiation because political space was severely constrained by the authoritarian regime. Under these conditions, the churches became the primary channels of political opposition and became a surrogate of the interests of broader civil society.

As political space opened up during the regime change, political discourse moved to the sphere of political society, and church influence was more selective. In the more open political atmosphere, church resources, moral authority, and sense of mission were better suited to some types of political activity than others. The churches in each case were better able to affect constitutional reform

rather than presidential elections because the process was more contained, political space was more restricted, and the setting was less partisan and politicized. Because presidential elections were partisan and highly politicized, the churches had difficulty maintaining a sense of unity and were only as successful as other groups within civil society at achieving their own institutional interests. In election settings, the political space that is opened is more conducive to actors within political society, such as parties and other overtly political groups.

The Church

The role of the church as a political actor during transitions to democracy has received much attention from scholars. Huntington considers the realignment of the Catholic Church toward greater political activity the second most important reason after economic change for the "wave" of democratization in the 1970's and 1980's (Huntington 1991, 85).

Two Catholic countries, Portugal and Spain, led the third wave of democratization, followed by Catholic nations in Latin and Central America, the Philippines in East Asia, and finally the Catholic nations in Eastern Europe. In each of these cases, Huntington claims the churches went from a relationship of staunch support of the authoritarian regime, to one of ambivalence, and finally, to opposition. The church became the institutional arena for political dissent,

the base of human rights activity, and the launching point of direct opposition to authoritarian regimes (Huntington 1991, 74, 79).

According to Huntington, this opposition occurred for two reasons: theological changes in the global church, and rising popular church activism. The theological writings and teachings of the Second Vatican Council (held from 1962 to 1965) and the papal encyclicals that followed emphasized the church's need for social relevance and the legitimacy of moral and social critique. Vatican II also encouraged greater collegiality among bishops and clergy rather than strict hierarchy, and greater involvement of the laity in the life of the church. Coupled with these global changes were national churches whose politically active clergy and grass-roots lay organizations began to oppose the authoritarian regimes (Huntington 1991, 77-79).

Although Huntington examines the church in a broad context of democratization around the globe, most of the work has been country-specific. Cross-national analysis of the role of the church in democratization is limited to several collections on the Latin American church (Levine 1986, Mainwaring and Wilde 1989, Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1992). These collections note the radical change in the church's perception of its social role toward a "preferential option for the poor," the constraints born out of institutional interests and internal struggles to define the role of the church, and the neo-conservative pressure

from both national hierarchies and the international church to decrease the political role of the church once authoritarian regimes are gone. The Cleary and Stewart-Gambino volume also makes the religious challenge of Protestant and Pentecostal groups a primary part of understanding the churches' behavior (Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1992, 2).

Each of the cross-national collections, as well as the individual case studies contained therein, approach the church as not only a religious organization, but also as an institution with interests of preservation and influence like any other. This leads to the study of both the social doctrines of the church and the diverse contexts in which these doctrines are applied. As Stewart-Gambino reminds the reader,

these contexts include realities as diverse as the type of political system in a country; the nature of the social, economic, or political ills facing an individual country; and the availability of church resources, either tangible or symbolic (Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1992, 2).

Throughout I approach the church as having a combined set of interests: institutional interests of self-preservation, membership, and increased resources, and also theologically-oriented goals. In order to set these interests in their proper contexts, I consider such influences as the political system, the traditional position of the church in society, the level of church resources, the strength of progressive

movements within the church, pressure from the international church, and competition from other religious movements.

In order to understand the nature and influence of the churches' political activity, I ask the following questions:

1. What theological sense of mission was embraced by each of the churches before and during the phases of the transitions?
2. How did the theological sense of mission affect the goals and interests of the churches at each phase of the transition?
3. What strategies and resources did the churches employ to realize their interests at each phase of the transition?
4. What constraints did the churches face in the pursuit of their interests?
5. How effective were the churches in influencing the transitions?

Civil Society

The church's role in democratization is often placed in the broader context of the role civil society plays in transitions to democracy. Civil society is a concept that has a long history in political inquiry, spanning the works of Hobbes and Locke, Hegel and Toqueville, and Marx and Gramsci (for a discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of current definitions of civil society see among others Rau 1991, Arato 1993, Seligman 1992, Cohen 1992, Harbeson 1984,

Bratton 1994). Civil society is an arena of political activity which occupies the space between the activities of the state and the activities of families or kinship groups (Bratton 1994, 56, Stepan 1988, 3,4, Bayart 1986, 111-12, Arato 1993, 314, Rau 1991, 4-5). Within this broad arena lies groups of many sorts.

Stepan's definition serves as an outline of what or who makes up civil society in this thesis. Civil society is an

arena where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, women's groups, religious groupings, and intellectual currents) and civic organizations from all classes (such as lawyers, journalists, trade unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests (Stepan 1988, 3-4).

Diamond, Linz, and Lipset concur, using the term "autonomous associational life" to identify civil society with groups such as voluntary associations, interest groups, ethnic, women's, and students' groups, trade unions and business groups, and religious organizations (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, 22-23).

These lists of groups have an important distinction, however, from groups which Stepan associates with political society. Political society is

that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus (stepan 1988, 4).

Civil society is conceptually distinct from political society in that the interests that make up civil society are not contesting state power through partisan means (Bratton 1994, 56).

Likewise, civil society must be contrasted with the state, which Stepan defines in Hegelian fashion as

the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive system that attempts not only to manage the state apparatus but to structure relations between civil and public power and to structure many critical relationships within civil and political society (Stepan 1988, 4).

In this definition, groups comprising civil society are conceptually autonomous from both the state apparatus and from groups in political society which actively seek political control of the state. This autonomous and intermediary position of civil society is described by Arato as a "sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of associations and publics" (Arato 1993, 314).

Noteworthy in the definitions of civil society are the descriptions of civil society as an "arena" or "sphere". It is useful to conceptualize civil society as a space outside the state, and distinct from political groups which seek control of the state. References to civil society as a single entity are therefore flawed; civil society is made up of a multiplicity of associational voices articulating interests. Bratton goes so far as to suggest that civil society itself is not an empirical concept, but exists as a

theoretical construct which is useful in understanding collective action in the public realm (Bratton 1994, 57).

In the cases that will be considered in this thesis, the church became a "surrogate" space for civil society in each of the cases considered, since the authoritarian regimes effectively closed the space for most interests to be articulated. For these reasons, I speak of the church as a representative of civil society. This helps the thesis to contribute to the theoretical, cross-national analysis of civil society during times of democratic transition. The relative difficulty the church had in maintaining influence in more open political space also points to the tendency of political actors to turn toward the arena of political society during times of open contestation, such as the presidential elections examined in this thesis (Bratton 1994, 57).

Civil Society and Democratic Transition

The role of civil society has become integral to the study of democratic transitions. Schmitter speculated that Southern Europe's transition to democracy progressed farther than others in part because more "resilient" and "viable" civil societies as represented by unions, technocrats, and pressure groups, were ready to fill political space opened by the authoritarian regimes (Schmitter 1986). For Latin America, scholars credit actors within civil societies with

forcing political openings. Cardoso rather confidently suggested that the

exemplary action of people and groups linked to what in Latin America became known as 'civil society' was, indeed, decisive in the Sisyphean task of extending the frontiers of what could or could not be done under authoritarian regimes (Cardoso 1986-87, 33).

Scholars of Africa also came to emphasize the role of African civil society and associational life in pressing for democratic change (Azarya and Chazan 1987, Bratton 1990, Bratton and van de Walle 1992). Diamond contends that a

rich and vibrant associational life has developed in many African countries independent of the state, and this pluralism in civil society has been one of the most significant forces for democracy (Diamond 1989, 23).

Finally, a renewed interest in civil society has been integral to the study of democratization in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Arato 1993, Rau 1991). Though much of western social science in the 1970's and 1980's had counted out the role of autonomous actors within civil society in the socialist regimes, they were proven wrong. Associational groups such as trade unions, churches, and reformist intellectuals played key roles in the dissolution of the socialist states (Rau 1991, 1-3).

The roles of individual actors within civil society have been examined in specific countries during many transitions from authoritarian rule (Payne 1991, Mainwaring 1986, Gay 1990, Jackson 1989, Fatton 1990, Stepan 1989). Cross-country comparison of individual actors within civil society has been more limited, focusing on grass-roots

associational groups, such as Eckstein's (1989) discussion of popular organizations in Latin America, or religious organizations such as Levine's (1986) discussions of the Latin American Church.

More typical of the approach toward civil society in the early literature of transitions, especially that of Latin America, was to examine the sector as a whole, an approach which I have already suggested is false. This approach tended to identify organizations and institutions of civil society as a whole, inherently democratic, participatory, and politically conscious (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988, 35, Mainwaring and Viola 1984, Moreira Alves 1984). This bias failed to examine more closely the goals, strategies, and resources of associational groups within the arena of civil society.

In other cross-national approaches that examine the general processes of transitions, actors within civil society are seen in relation to political elites. In probably the most ambitious attempt to generalize transitions, O'Donnell and Schmitter suggest that if civil society can effectively mobilize at key times, elites can be forced to open political space more widely than intended (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 26). While asserting the importance of civil society's strength, this study also tends to downplay the goals and strategies of groups within civil society during specific political situations. This is

left to the individual case studies to discuss for specific sectors within single countries.

This thesis neither idealizes the nature of civil society and the church in democratization nor subordinates the interests of the church and civil society to political and economic elites. Rather, the thesis takes a cross-regional comparative approach to the role, interests, and behavior of the church in order to better understand the impact the civil society "arena" has on democratization.

Churches and Democratization

The three cases I have chosen reflect situations where the churches were active and often the only organizations with the ability to articulate opposition to the authoritarian regime without being shut down. As such, they became the focal point of opposition to the authoritarian regime and the major representative of civil society. In Brazil and the Philippines, the institutional church refers to the Catholic Church and in particular its main governing bodies, the National Bishops' Councils. In Kenya, the Catholic Church is an important if more recent critic of the Moi regime. Since the Catholic Church was not as dominant a religious body as in Brazil and the Philippines, and since mainstream Protestant churches were more actively opposed to authoritarian rule in Kenya than in the other two cases, the Anglican Church and an umbrella group called the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCKC) will also be examined.

This will assist our understanding of the role the churches have played in promoting democratic rule.

Why did the churches in each of these countries come to take roles in opposition to the authoritarian regimes? First of all, the churches began to adopt theological senses of mission which emphasized engagement in social action and greater ties with groups within civil society. In Brazil, the institutional church moved toward social activism in the 1950's and 1960's through the creation of a progressive central bishops' council, several pastoral organizations which took on the defense of the marginalized, and by the formation of active lay groups known as *comunidades eclesiais de base* (CEBs). CEBs had formed links to other social actors such as workers and rural movements, and were well supported by the hierarchy during Brazil's period of political opening (Bruneau 1982, Mainwaring 1986). In the Philippines, the Catholic Church began to take on development activities in the 1960's after the Second Vatican Council began urging greater relevance of the church to the people. Basic Christian Communities (BCCs) also were formed, as were activist church and religious-order sponsored groups (Fabros 1988, Youngblood 1990). In Kenya, ties between the churches and civil society arose out of rural educational and development programs sponsored by many Protestant churches and the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK) (Okullu 1987, NCCCK 1984) and later through the

work of the parish councils and Small Christian Communities in the Catholic parishes (Gichuhi 1985, Bauer 1990).

Secondly, the churches in each of these cases were the only organizations with the ability to independently articulate opposition to the authoritarian regime without being shut down. Because the churches' presence was so pervasive through sheer numbers as well as control of important resources, the regimes could not or chose not to apply harsher sanctions to the churches. As other social groups experienced increased repression, the churches became the only independent source of opposition to the authoritarian regimes. The church used this position to lead the push to initiate regime change and to attempt to realize church interests during the transitional period.

The church was also able to represent social interests because of the stature and resources at the churches' command, including broad membership that spanned ethnic, regional, and socioeconomic boundaries, means of communication such as sermons, pastoral letters, and church media, traditional social presence in schools and hospitals, a national-level organization linking the entire country, and the moral authority the churches commanded.

Defining Political Transitions and Democracy

Before it is possible to understand if political transitions are under way or if the transition is democratic in nature, it is important to keep several concepts

distinct. The state can be defined in the tradition of Weber as the continuous institutionalized structure of political dominance (Chazan et. al. 1988, 37, Hyden 1992, 7). As Stepan suggested, this "bureaucratic and coercive system" seeks more than the management of its own apparatus, but also to "structure relations between civil and public power and to structure many critical relationships within civil and political society" (Stepan 1988, 4).

A regime, by contrast, "embod[ies] the norms and principles of the political organization of the state" (Lawson 1993, 187), and becomes the "mode of interaction between social groups and state organs" (Chazan et. al. 1988, 37). These rules and norms are less permanent than the state. A government is the "specific occupants of public office who are in a position to make binding decisions at any given time" (Chazan et. al. 1988, 37). Governments are even more transient than regimes, since governments may come and go with neither changes in the norms and principles of the state, nor in the position of the state toward society.

To suggest that a political transition is underway, and in particular, a democratic transition, is to imply a change of regime is underway. True regime change requires more than changes of government; it requires a change of the norms and principles of the political organization in the state.

Democratization, too, must be kept distinct from liberalization. Liberalization occurs when civil and political rights of individuals and groups are restored (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 7). Democratization is, as defined by Dahl, the process by which citizens obtain opportunities for political contestation and political participation (Dahl 1971, Huntington 1991).

Democratization, then, is not simply a part of a continuum of liberalization. Democratization does not occur until political contestation and participation is guaranteed through a constitutionally granted free and fair elections of representation in conditions free of arbitrary state action against dissent (Reuschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992, 43, Lawson 1993, 193). This implies that a free opposition must be present in some form for regime change to be democratic.

I define the beginning of the transition as the initiation of change in the normative rules governing the authoritarian regime. For the three cases chosen, these changes in normative rules involved the liberalization of civil and political rights by the elite leadership. The transition is complete when a new regime, that is, new normative rules are in place. Consolidation is a process that begins when the transition is complete, and "can only be said to have occurred after significant threats of regime reversal have been effectively eliminated or contained"

(Global Coalition for Africa 1992, 3). This thesis does not directly take up the issue of regime consolidation.

Constitutional opposition is also necessary for regime change to be democratic. Constitutional opposition becomes viable through the open competition and contestation for positions of power, guaranteed oppositional rights, political participation through regular, open, and competitive elections, and guarantees of certain civil and political liberties (Schumpeter 1942, Dahl 1971, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988). For the cases examined here, I define the end of the democratic transition period as the completion of the first freely contested and fair election of the executive after the adoption of constitutional reform and the acceptance of the results by all parties. I am not arguing that freely contested elections represent a consolidation of democratic rule or preclude any backslide into authoritarian politics. However, national elections do represent the culmination of a process of rule changes in which members of civil society have opportunity to influence the outcome.

The churches' influence will be examined during three phases of the transitional period: the initiation of regime change, the contestation of political rules (constitutional reform process), and during the mobilization under the new regime rules which represent the culmination of the transition (presidential elections).

Brazil

The time period that will be investigated for Brazil is 1974-1990, from the beginning of the abertura (opening) until the first freely contested presidential election in 1989 and the inauguration in 1990. In 1974, General Ernesto Geisel ascended to the presidency by electoral college vote. Though hailed as a potential reformer, Geisel's changes were cautious, in part due to the unexpected strong showing of the opposition *Movimento Democratico Brasileiro* (MDB) in the lower house and Senate in 1974. Geisel did take the first steps toward reform, however, by using the power of decree with much less frequency and decreasing the extent of government censorship.

After sanitized elections in 1978 turned out favorably for the ruling party, more extensive reforms were allowed, including the return of rights of habeas corpus and the abolition of AI-5, the act that introduced decree powers. It became clear that a period of regime change, albeit cautious, had begun under Geisel.

Geisel's successors continued the elite-controlled liberalization. Geisel's immediate successor, Figuerdo, began to feel more intense pressure for political change from labor and church activists and from middle class groups who were feeling the effects of a stalling economy, high inflation, and a soaring debt (Skidmore 1989, 21). Federal and state representatives were elected in 1982 under the Party Reform of 1979, which had abolished the two-party

system in the hopes of fragmenting the opposition. The composition of the electoral college, which would select the next president, was also contested in the 1982 elections.

The movement for direct presidential elections in 1984 and 1985 galvanized the opposition in a fashion never before seen in Brazil. Though the electoral college was retained, not only was a civilian president chosen (Tancredo Neves), but also many changes in electoral rules were passed by the now-majority opposition after mass defections from the ruling party.

The congressional election of 1986 was important as a test for the reforms of 1985 and also because the legislature took responsibility for convening a Constituent Assembly in 1987 and 1988. The new constitution became the basis of Brazilian law and government. The first freely contested election of the president took place in 1989 and the results were accepted by all parties involved. The beginning of the abertura to the inauguration of the new president in 1990 constitutes the transitional period in which church behavior will be examined.

The Philippines

In the Philippines, the transition was more reliant on the explosive events of late 1985 and early 1986 to push it in the direction of democratic change. However, using the

period of elite-led changes in regime values leading to a democratic transition.

In 1978, five years into the period of martial law, Marcos announced the beginning of "normalization" of Philippine politics. Political parties were no longer outlawed and the first legislative elections under martial law were held. The interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) was to take on legislative duties, while Marcos was to give up the practice of ruling by decree. Soon after its convening in June of 1978, however, it became apparent that the IBP was to be little more than decoration (Wurfel 1988, 234). In 1981, Marcos suspended martial law and subjected his administration to a plebiscite vote in an attempt to boost his legitimacy. Though these cautious openings always left much room for Marcos to maneuver, they did mark a liberalization in the way in which Marcos had ruled during martial law.

Marcos' opposition did have a chance to oppose his rule in the 1981 plebiscite, but the opposition leadership was divided about how to approach such an "opportunity." Some entertained the possibility of opposing Marcos, but in the end, those proposing boycott prevailed, and Marcos had to scare up an opposition from among his former allies.

After the dramatic overthrow of Marcos in February 1986, the Aquino government called for the drafting of a new constitution. The drawing up of the new constitution in 1986 and the subsequent national referendum on the

constitution in 1987 represent an important part of the transitional period. I define the conclusion of the transition to be the freely contested and generally accepted presidential election of 1992. Because the "election" of 1986 was not free and fair, and because Cory Aquino was placed into power by the cooperation of the military and civilian elites, 1986 does not represent a true transition to democratic rule. Aquino restored constitutional rule in 1986, but democratization as I define it did not occur until the presidential elections of 1992.

Kenya

In Kenya, it is less certain that a full-fledged move toward democratization has taken place. The beginning of an elite-sponsored opening by the Moi regime occurred in 1990. Opposition to Moi had been building for several years prior to 1990. In 1986, Moi replaced the secret ballot with "queue voting" in which voters lined up behind pictures of the candidates. Instead of acquiescing to this change, church leaders and a few other organizations such as the Law Society of Kenya, condemned the changes (Bratton 1992, 14). These same leaders also opposed attempts by Moi to break the courts' independence from the executive and to rig elections (Bratton 1992, 15).

In response to popular pressure, Moi scheduled a national conference for mid-1990 to discuss the liberalizations of Kenya's single-party system. This marks the beginning of the period of regime change, since the rules of opposition to the regime began to change. The high level of response from Kenyans to the review committee served notice to Moi that opposition was mounting.

The opposition to Moi coalesced in 1991 around the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy in Kenya (FORD). Leaders of this group and other opposition groups were periodically detained as tensions surrounding the calls for multipartism increased. Moi promised multipartism in June of 1991 and again in November of 1991, after Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was defeated in that country's first free election. Finally, in December of 1991, Moi's regime declared Kenya a multiparty state. As 1992 progressed, many political parties registered with the government, and FORD split into several factions, each registered as its own party (*Weekly Review* October 9, 1992, 3-6). After earlier presidential election polls were successfully contested in the Kenyan courts as called too quickly to ensure opposition parties a chance to campaign, elections were held on December 29, 1992. Moi was sworn in as president on January 4, 1993, after the opposition vote was split. Despite cries of election rigging and threats from the opposition to boycott the legislature, the results have been generally accepted as true to the will of the Kenyan people.

Research Methodology

Comparative case study is the methodology I use to create theoretical propositions concerning the political behavior of churches and to draw conclusions about the influence churches can realize in periods of democratic transition. It is useful to consider the strengths and weaknesses of case studies in order to understand why the comparative case study is best suited to the research task that I undertake.

Case studies help to generate theory by identifying key concepts and variables where little formal theorizing has been done or where little understanding of behavior in a specific setting exists. Case studies in these instances perform the function of theory generation by helping to answer basic descriptive questions concerning the situation under investigation. Once these sorts of questions have been answered, further questions such as "does case X suggest any behavior that is more generally applicable to other settings?" might be asked in the hopes of building theory that can be tested in comparative settings.

Case studies may also help to refine existing theory by reexamining key theoretical concepts within a single case and by functioning as a single confirmation or disconfirmation of existing theory. "Does theory Y apply within case X?" or "Given that theory Y does not seem to fit in case X, what is the reason for that?" might be questions

that further refine theoretical generalizations or confirm and disconfirm theories.

However, case studies cannot provide a probabilistic test of theoretical hypotheses because there is no variation in a single case. Inferences about causality have little support in a study with one N; it is only through comparison and replicability that researchers can begin to theorize causal relationships.

These advantages and disadvantages of the single case point out the strength of using a comparative case study methodology. First, as Reuschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens suggest

Analytically oriented comparative history builds on a series of case analyses. It seeks to establish satisfactory explanatory accounts that do justice to each case and at the same time are theoretically coherent and consistent with each other (1992, 4).

Though several single case studies and a few regional comparisons concerning the church's political behavior during democratic transitions exist, there are still concepts and variables that have yet to be specified. In-depth comparative case study is needed to understand and isolate key variables and generate propositions and explanatory accounts that can be used to theorize. Second, comparative case study introduces some variation with which to begin to test hypothetical statements, refine existing theory, and strengthen theoretical claims. Finally, comparative case study allows the required detail by focusing on only several cases, while allowing broader scope

of investigation within each case than cross-national research can attain. Reuschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens say it this way:

For one (or a few) cases it is possible to match analytical intent and empirical observations much more precisely than in an analysis covering many cases with the help of standardized indicators (1992, 32).

The comparative case study method has been used in much comparative politics research, from the classic study of political development by Barrington Moore (1966) to research on the role of the state (Migdal 1988), the breakdown of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1978), democratic transitions (Stepan 1989, O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Reuschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992), and popular organizations (Eckstein 1989). Research on the church has also been done using comparative case study, but this has been primarily regional in nature (Levine 1986, Mainwaring and Wilde 1989, Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1992). Because this study undertakes cross-regional comparison, it introduces further variation from which to generate plausible theoretical propositions.

I utilize primary documents from the churches and other religious organizations, daily and weekly news outlets, informal news outlets such as occasional newsletters or publications of activist church organizations, and secondary literature to ascertain the goals and interests, organizational and material resources of the churches, and behavior of the churches during the

initiation of the transition and the periods of constitutional reform and presidential elections.

These sources have several strengths and weaknesses that require careful consideration. Church statements tend to overstate church unity and represent only the ideological positions of the hierarchy. Care must be taken to use other sources, such as independent media outlets or publications of the "progressive" church as a counterbalance to this information. Similarly, news weeklies and dailies have certain biases which must be understood, as do the written communications of the progressive church organizations. Taken together, a fairly accurate picture of the church's goals and behavior are possible. In Brazil and the Philippines much more so than in Kenya, secondary literature also exists which serves to test the accuracy of the story being told and the conclusions drawn from it.

Format of this Thesis

In the second chapter, I review the literature concerning transitions from authoritarian rule, and in particular, the phases of transition -- its initiation, the struggle over rules governing the transition, the role of elites and civil society, and the key events leading to regime change. In Chapter 3, the transition in each of the three country cases is examined and evaluated. In the fourth chapter, I cover the history of church-state relations leading up to the constitutional process and

presidential elections. Chapters 5 through 7 examine the goals and interests, and resources and constraints that were brought to bear during constitutional reform and the presidential elections. Chapter 5 examines the Brazilian Church during the constitutional convention of 1987 and 1988 and the presidential election of 1989, Chapter 6 investigates the church role in the Philippines' constitutional process in 1986 and 1987 and the 1992 Presidential election, and Chapter 7 examines the role of the Kenyan churches during the constitutional reform process in 1991 and the presidential election of December 1992. Finally, in the concluding chapter I summarize the generalizations that can be made about church influence on the outcomes of transition in the three cases that I have examined.

Chapter 2 Transitions and Democratization

This chapter examines the theoretical and cross-national research on transitions from authoritarian rule and research on the role of specific actors within civil society during the process of democratization.

Cross-national Theoretical Research on Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

The literature of transitions and democratization attempts to answer the following questions: what prompts transition, what is the process of transition, and what are the outcomes of transition?

What Prompts Transition?

In the introduction to an edited volume which compares transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, Diane Ethier proposes three origins of regime transition: external force, internal violent intervention, and evolutionary internal crisis (Ethier 1990, 5).

Transitions involving external force were evident after World War II. These sorts of direct imposition of democratic institutions by an external power Stepan breaks into three types: 1) internal restoration after external reconquest, as in the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Denmark, 2) internal reformulation of institutions to reflect greater democratic participation, as in Italy and

Greece, and 3) externally monitored installation of democratic rule as in Germany and Japan (Stepan 1986, 66-72). None of the prominent examples of democratization in the 1970's and 1980's was externally imposed.

Because most of the recent cross-national studies of democratization have not involved revolutionary overthrow (Nicaragua being the exception), most analyses of democratizing and transitional processes fit Ethier's third category, that of internal crisis leading to elite-led transition. Though some researchers may focus on different sets of elites, most agree that

the crisis follows from a conflict between the actors occupying a dominant position within the regime. This implies that the transition to democracy is controlled by the state rather than by the forces of civil society (Ethier 1990, 7).

In each of the cases examined in this thesis, civil society did play a role, though elites did retain most control of the process. It is the "elite" literature that will be examined more closely as an introduction to the transitions that occurred in Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya.

What are the Processes of Transition?

Most of the cross-national research which emphasizes elite-led, internal processes can be examined in terms of phases or stages of transitions. Cross-national research as well as the individual case studies tend to relate similar phases of regime change after a period of crisis in the authoritarian regime.:

1. Initiation of regime change
2. Contestation over political rules
3. Mobilization and struggle under new rules
4. Transition to a new regime

Initiation of Regime Change

As noted in the previous chapter, researchers have proposed several ways of defining when transitions begin and end. O'Donnell and Schmitter contend that a transition begins when a regime undergoes change, that is, when "rules of the political game are ... in constant flux" and "arduously contested" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 6). Once regime change has begun, processes of liberalization (the guarantee of individual and group freedoms) and democratization (institutionalized accountability) must be kept distinct (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 8-9). Liberalization can occur with or without democratization, the two processes can occur at different paces or at the same time (although liberalization tends to precede democratization), and both can be thought of as a matter of degree. That is, transitions can be more or less liberalizing and more or less democratizing. Successful transitions, which the authors term viable political democracy, occur when both liberalization and democratization are well advanced (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 10).

Diamond, Linz, and Lipset speak of the "emergence, instauration, and consolidation" of democracy but with less conceptual clarity as to what constitutes the beginning of democratic regime change (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, 3). Using Dahl's definition of polyarchy (competition, political participation, and civil and political liberties) as their definition of democracy, the authors point to the diversity of experience in countries undergoing transitions and the gradations of democratic experience. Between freely competitive democracies and controlled authoritarian regimes, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset define semi-democratic regimes as those who are competitive but not very free and fair, and hegemonic party systems as those where competition is legal but smothered, such as Mexico (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, 8). Authoritarian regimes also vary considerably, with some staging democratic practices, such as elections, with no real meaning (pseudodemocracies) while others attempt both the total control and transformation of politics and society (totalitarian regimes) (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, 8-9). Despite the diversity of political configurations that can result from transitions, it is clear that the beginning of regime change involves an initiation of changes in the rules of the regime.

Ethier provides two major explanations for why authoritarian elites may decide to initiate regime liberalization: internal political loss of legitimacy and the monopoly of coercion, and external economic pressures.

Though I will devote most of this review to internal forces, a brief examination of external pressures provides additional insight into democratic transitions.

External Pressures

Huntington makes the broadest claims about the role of external factors in transitions. One of the major external factors he labels the "snowball effect." Huntington cites as an example the crumbling of one socialist regime after another in Eastern Europe as people became emboldened to challenge the communist party's control of the state and the economy. Huntington also believes that the dissolution of socialist one-party states in Eastern Europe discredited the one-party states of Africa, and may have led to the push toward multipartism on the continent in the 1990's (Huntington 1991a, 14). Another external impact was the changing policies of the European Community toward the countries of Southern Europe and later Eastern Europe. The external economic incentives that joining the union represented helped to strengthen internal movements toward more democratic regimes (Huntington 1991a, 13). Schmitter argues similarly that Southern Europe's proximity to the European Community and desire to be integrated in the European Community both helped to initiate the changes in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and to sustain the consolidation of democratization there (Schmitter 1986, 6-10).

Despite these external influences, Huntington concludes that "if a country lacks favorable internal conditions ... snowballing alone is unlikely to bring about democratization" (14). Indeed, this might be said of all external forces -- alone they cannot instigate liberalization or democratization. Internal movements are critical to the success of democratization.

In each of the cases addressed in this thesis, external factors played a role in pushing internal elites to consider liberalization. This happened, according to Huntington, when the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes was weakened by their failure to deliver economic progress.

As their [the regime's] performance legitimacy declined, they came under increased pressure to deliver on that promise [to restore democracy] and they had increasing pressures to relegitimze themselves through elections (Huntington 1991b, 57).

In Brazil, the military regime expressly tied the legitimacy of the authoritarian state to economic progress. When the debt crisis hit in Brazil, combined with the recession of the early 1980's, the authoritarian regime's claim to legitimacy was weakened. Geisel's decision to liberalize in the mid 1970's was an attempt to regain political legitimacy while retaining most of the means of coercion needed for continued elite rule (Skidmore 1989, 21).

The Philippine's debt and recessionary economy both reduced Marcos's legitimacy and strained relations with their primary economic supports, the United States and

multilaterals like the World Bank (Huntington 1991b, 50-1). When American administrations in the 1970's and 1980's perceived Marcos to be losing credibility, he was pushed to pledge greater liberalization in the economy and in politics. His response was controlled reform, until the United States strongly supported the snap election in 1986 and helped to facilitate Marcos' departure soon thereafter.

In Kenya, the suspension of foreign assistance in late 1991 is believed to have prompted Moi to abandon single-party rule (Mair 1994, 140). Part of the conditionality placed on further multilateral and unilateral aid was the abolishing of the single-party state. It is not coincidental that Moi did not announce any liberalization of the party system until after this ultimatum, despite the mounting internal pressure that had been building for years.

Internal Political Loss of Legitimacy and the Monopoly of Coercion

Ethier believes that internal political causes of transitions stem from conflicts within the repressive bodies of the regime, such as the military and the state apparatus, and from the mobilization and declining fear of opposition forces (Ethier 1990, 7). Many authors contend that the role of elites is primary in the transition process (Baloyra 1987, Chilcote 1990, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, Giner 1986, Przeworski 1986, Stepan 1988, Schmitter 1986). The most detailed examination of the internal calculations of

political elite and the mobilization of opposition in the literature of transitions is O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead's ambitious work *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (1986). Throughout the case studies, as well as in the summary volume titled "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," the authors discuss the role of political elites, the military, and civil society in the initiation of the transition.

Regime Elites

In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (1986), O'Donnell and Schmitter focus much of their analysis on the position of the regime in society, the level and coherence of the opposition, and the relationship of competing elites within the authoritarian regime. If the regime remains self-confident in its ability to successfully run the economy, maintain internal cohesion, and use coercive power, movement toward democratization is more unlikely. However, crisis in the form of economic or political failure tends to force elites to embark on a process of liberalization. A crisis is more likely to be perceived if opposition to the regime grows and where internal cleavages become more acute (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19). If regime elites are confident that the regime is able to control the pace and extent of liberalization, they will more readily enter into reform, while still retaining a large role for incumbents in any future political arrangement (21-22).

Softliners, or those within the regime who are most open to liberalization, must decide how much they are willing or able to push increased opening. They are opposed by hardliners, who threaten to increase their presence, either through repression or military coup, if the liberalization goes too far. However, if softliners can be convinced that returning to greater authoritarian rule would be too damaging to their interests, and that joining the opposition would give them enough power to control the transition, then the softliners will be active in pushing greater openings (24-25). This decision is conditioned by the perception of the strength of the hard-liners, the alignment within the military, and the strength of the opposition.

The military will support regime change only if non-prosecution and a credible role for the military is guaranteed in the future regime. This is more likely to be true if the internal repression of the authoritarian regime was carried out by non-military forces and lies in the distant past rather than the immediate consciousness of the opposition (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 30, 32). Stepan adds that a more institutionalized military is more likely to bargain political positions if its autonomous institutional interests are maintained (Stepan 1986, 75-78). However, if the military is highly politicized and closely tied to governing, any loss in power is more likely to be perceived as zero-sum, and liberalization will be

threatened. Further, if the military is more directly involved in repression, it will tend to oppose liberalization for fear of reprisal (Stepan 1986, 73).

Civil Society

Despite the elite emphasis, the literature of transitions recognizes the important role of groups within civil society in altering the plans of elites or forcing more radical change. The strength of civil society lies both in what sort of pressure can be placed on the regime and what sort of support can be mustered for reformers. O'Donnell and Schmitter note a number of key concepts in understanding the relative strength of opposition from civil society. The longer the rule of authoritarianism, the more difficult the revival of opposition institutions such as parties, social movements, interest associations, autonomous agencies, and local governments (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 21-22). If the authoritarian regime aggressively dismantled such institutions without replacing them with alternatives, the more difficult it will be for the revival of representative institutions and actors of the opposition (22).

A critical element of any push toward democracy is the strength of intermediate institutions within civil society such as parties, unions, professional groups, the press, universities, and churches. In Southern Europe, among the actors often cited as important in opening and filling

political space were the unions and technocrats whose fates were closely tied to the integration of Southern Europe into the world market, as well as political parties and pressure groups tied to class, ethnic, linguistic, and regional interests. Because these groups were well tied to economic or publicly identified interests, rather than broad-based populism or narrow paternalistic and clan-like interests, they were better able to act autonomously in defense of these interests and to organize collective action when the opportunity demanded it (Schmitter 1986, 6). This more autonomous civil society in turn contributed to two important pushes to liberalization in Southern European societies: because these actors were viable when liberalization began, it was more difficult for state elites to stop the process of liberalization when and where they wished; because these actors were organized around clear interests and not playing a zero-sum game of political ascendancy or defeat, they were better able to form the flexible coalitions needed to counter hard-line interests from the authoritarian period (8).

Widner argues that for Africa, the nature of colonial rule impacts the ability of actors within civil society to effectively push for liberalization. In Francophone Africa, due to the nature of French colonial administration and economic development, civil society was more centralized and tied to urban and bureaucratic interests. The civil society arena was both unified by this tendency and poorly connected

to the grass roots. During times of regime change initiation, groups within civil society were both more threatening since their mobilization around common interests was more easily accomplished, and more controllable, since centralized interests are prone to regime cooptation (Widner 1992b, 74). In Anglo Africa, with Kenya the primary example, associational life was both more wide-spread and more fragmented. Under these conditions, mobilization of civil society proves more difficult, but actors within civil society pose a greater political threat because they are more closely tied to grass-roots, political interests (Widner 1992b, 71).

Contestation over Political Rules

Once the initiation of the transition has occurred, the contestation over the rules of the regime begins. Ethier suggests that this contestation involves different levels of elite control and oppositional strength. She suggests that in Greece, Portugal, and Argentina, the popular opposition had the ability to mobilize and became a vocal opponent of the regime. In these cases, political elites basically abandoned attempts to control the rules of any new regime. In Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, and the Philippines, elite control of the transition was more tenuous, but still existed. In Spain and Brazil, Ethier contends, elites most effectively controlled the negotiation of new rules of the regime (Ethier 1990, 7-8). Even in situations where the

opposition organized and became vocal, Ethier believes that "the limits of the democratic reforms adopted during the transition seem to indicate that these processes were more or less controlled 'from above' (Ethier 1990, 8)."

One of the foremost ways in which the negotiation of new political rules takes place is through pact-making. Pacts are generally of two sorts: agreements, either formal or informal, between elites where civil society and the political parties are weak, or pacts between elites and populist parties which represent a more strengthened civil society (O'Donnell 1986, 13). The availability of credible actors to make pacts with the regime on behalf of either elitist or popular interests depends on the degree of suppression of such interests under authoritarian rule as well as the length of time the potential bargaining organization was dismantled or crippled (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 40).

It is during this pacting and rule-making period that political parties become most critical in shaping the new regime. In exchange for being allowed to openly engage in electoral competition, new parties tend to agree to a careful demobilization. That is, pacting actors create limits on the scope of the policy agenda, agree to share in the distribution of benefits, and restrict participation of outsiders, or in many cases, coopt outsiders (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 41). The indicators of such pacts are

numerous: shared executive powers, discriminatory election laws, and preferential distribution of districts and seats (41).

A key way in which these pacts are maintained is the tendency to deal with any conflict by a renegotiation of the pact rather than opening it up to other actors and interests. These sorts of pacts, where civilian parties bargain and elections are regular and guaranteed, yet policy is seldom contested, O'Donnell and Schmitter call "democraduras". Democraduras represent regimes which have adopted policies of democratization without corresponding liberalization. These arrangements are more likely to last than those pacted between elites or between military elites and civilian parties or actors (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 41). Authoritarian regimes are more likely to result in democraduras if regime elites are somewhat confident of their electoral success (O'Donnell 1986, 13).

Mobilization and Struggle within New Rules

O'Donnell and Schmitter speak of a "popular upsurge" which occurs when intermediate institutions and the grass-roots organizations within civil society coalesce their interests to form a unified opposition to the authoritarian regime. The character and influence this upsurge brings depends on the nature of the transition and the strength of the institutions of civil society. The authors suggest that "the shorter and more unexpected the transition from

authoritarian rule, the greater the likelihood of popular upsurge and of its producing a lasting effect on the outcome of the transition" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 54).

Oppositional unity is more likely to be maintained and a quick move to change the rules of governance is more likely where change is rapid. Conversely, if regime incumbents draw out the transition, the opposition will tend to be more fragmented by class, status, gender, ethnicity, and partisanship, and there will be lower levels of liberalization, greater tendency to oligarchic rule, and greater institutionalized inequality in participation and accountability (55).

Concerning the strength of civil society, Schmitter (1986) at one point suggests that for Southern Europe, the survival of intermediate institutions during authoritarian rule allowed them to become key actors in the democratization process. He and O'Donnell hypothesize that where a network of preexisting associations survives somewhat intact despite authoritarian rule, a popular upsurge against the authoritarian regime is more likely (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 55).

However, the authors also suggest that if civil society is weak and has been effectively controlled, a strong upsurge may still be likely. Weaker associational groups within civil society may be more easily unified on issues of mobilization and less likely to fragment on previous lines of differentiation when opportunities for more open

political space arise. It appears that two aspects of the civil society arena are actually being discussed: the institutional strength of organizations within civil society and the likelihood of unity during periods of "upsurge" against the regime. While the latter may be important if transition will be forced or bargained, the former seems more likely to dictate the lasting impact of associational groups on the future of democratic rule.

Despite O'Donnell and Schmitter's conclusions that groups within civil society are important in the transition of an authoritarian regime, most of the criticism of their efforts is that civil society is glossed over or not approached in depth. Levine says of O'Donnell and Schmitter that "their treatment is too quick and schematic to do more than give a rough overview and broach the subject in general terms" (Levine 1988, 389). Levine argues for "incorporating civil society into analysis in more specific and systematic ways" by examining the workings of such groups as neighborhood associations, churches, ecological groups, peasant groups and trade unions (Levine 1988, 389). He proposes understanding the leadership and motivations of groups within civil society and their connections with elite leadership of the state.

The Role of Independent Elements of Civil Society

Though Levine calls for the examination of groups within civil society and their relations to transition, the

cross-national literature on specific actors such as political parties, labor unions, and grass-roots organizations, and their role during times of democratization is only beginning to emerge. Some similarity of behavior and strategies can be noted from the many individual studies that have been done. Far less has been written which provides a specifically cross-national analysis of the role of civil society in democratization processes. Most generalizations about the behavior of organizations within civil society can be found in summary chapters of edited books on regional democratization such as Eckstein's (1989) examination of popular movements in Latin America, Levine (1986), Mainwaring and Wilde (1989) and Cleary and Stewart-Gambino's (1992) treatments of the continuing role of the churches in Latin American democratization, and of the role of civil society as an arena of African political liberalization and governance (Hyden and Bratton 1992, Bratton and van de Walle 1992, Bratton 1994, Widner 1992b). I examine briefly here some of the work that has been done and its implications for the cases covered in this thesis.

Political Parties

Most of the literature devoted to the role of political parties in bringing about democratization contrast independent, programmatic parties with patronage-oriented parties. The implication in most general discussions of

transition and democratization is that only independent and programmatic parties are able to break free from the coopting control of the regime and bring the sort of public policy desired by the opposition. However, the record of political change shows mixed results -- broad-based, non-ideological opposition parties were fairly successful in pushing out the old regime, while disciplined parties have had mixed results in obtaining their goals.

In Brazil, the *Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro* (PMDB) was not particularly ideological in 1985, except that it wished to defeat the authoritarian party and usher in civilian rule. When the opposition remained united under the broad goal of kicking out the regime, the party was successful. Likewise, in the Philippines, Cory's broad coalition remained united in opposition to Marcos and managed to sweep her to power (if not officially win an election). The political opposition in Kenya failed to remain united when FORD organized as a party. The subsequent splintering of the parties and failure to turn out Daniel Arap Moi is evidence that broad-based parties may be needed to oust authoritarian leadership. I will examine the role of parties in each of these countries in more detail in Chapter 3.

Labor and Grass-roots Organizations

The literature on labor and grass roots organizations tends to focus on the types of interest calculations and

behavior that are common to these groups when political rules are changing during transitions. Labor movements in Brazil and Latin America often diverged in their goals, with some favoring broad political goals tied to the ousting of the authoritarian elite and some having membership-specific goals such as collective bargaining (Payne 1991, 234, Keck 1989, 287-8). Where intermediate organizations such as political parties and organized labor were weak, grass-roots movements were perceived as instrumental in changing the nature of society and the regime. Some see in the emergence of base communities, neighborhood associations, human and women's rights movements, nongovernmental organizations, and rural workers movements the very basis of the challenge to authoritarian legitimacy and the critical mass of opposition that was needed to force opening in authoritarian regimes. This thesis takes a similar view as Mainwaring toward these groups. While labor and grass-roots organizations have been plagued by problems of class and political differentiation, they have managed to importantly alter the nature of political discourse and create a new sense of political consciousness in the population as well as effectively fend for their own organizational interests (Mainwaring 1987).

Philip Oxhorn's evaluation of shantytown organizations in Chile illustrates that groups within Chilean civil society were able to "resurrect" themselves in the absence of open political space (Oxhorn 1989, 50). Shantytown organizations effectively pushed their own interests through

local action during the period of constricted political space, but also perceived that linking to other actors would be necessary to further democratization:

there appears to be at least an implicit recognition that if a process of democratization of civil society is to proceed, political parties can facilitate this by serving as an essential bridge between the level of civil society and the political regime (70).

Despite the recognition of the need for the grassroots to join with intermediate organizations, Oxhorn notes the dilemma that local movements face: should interests and efforts remain local or is a broadening of strategies necessary for further democratization? Oxhorn found that leaders of the shantytown organizations held very pessimistic views of links with political parties, due to fear of cooptation and neglect of local needs. However, he believes that mitigating factors can help to avoid the cooptation of grassroots organizations by either parties or the state: decentralized and participatory parties, civil organizations that are relatively autonomous from the party structures, and decentralized political systems that insure a voice from civil organizations and political parties (Oxhorn 1989, 75-78).

Other examples of grass-roots organizations point to similar kinds of dilemmas and interest calculations. Grzybowski believes that rural organizations in Brazil and the Philippines lack influence due to poor ties with intermediate institutions such as unions and political parties, but is cautious about links to such groups

(Grzybowski 1991, 19). Some analyses of rural movements show them focusing more on autonomous interest organizations in the absence of much political influence through traditional political channels (Lara and Morales 1990, 152). In each of the cases examined in this thesis, the organizations of civil society, including the church, had similar questions to ask about what goals and interests to pursue during the transition. Chapter 3 focuses on groups within civil society in each of these countries, while chapters 5-7 examine the churches' goals and behaviors in greater detail.

The Church

Of course, the other institution of civil society that has received a great amount of attention is the church. Since I wish to take up the role of the church in greater detail in Chapter 4, I only note here that the various churches' responses to authoritarian rule and the democratization process have varied widely. While some institutional churches have shown a strong commitment to political activation and strong support of social change in their own societies, many others have been more circumspect about change or entirely against it (Levine 1986). Even in the cases taken up in this thesis, in which the churches were quite politically active, there is great divergence in the roles and strategies the churches chose. This diversity will help us to better describe and explain the impact

decisions have on the outcomes of transitional processes and the role civil society plays in transitions. Much as has been noted in the above analysis of other organizations of civil society, the churches' behaviors reflect a combination of institutional and member interests and broader concerns for political and social transformation.

Transition to a New Regime

The transition is complete when a new regime, that is, new normative rules of the political game are in place and at least tentatively accepted by all protagonists. The question that needs to be answered, however, is what is the outcome of transition?

As eluded to in chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter, transitional outcomes are dependent on the configuration of influence during the transition. O'Donnell and Schmitter's democraduras have formal election procedures and regular contestation of power, but are closely controlled by elites. This fairly closely resembles the Brazilian transition, since elites continued to hold significant power. But because organizations within civil society were able to exert considerable influence, Brazil has experienced greater political openness and competition than in the model of democraduras.

Where civil society was better able to exert influence on the process of transition, as in Southern Europe, the resulting political system has been more open and amenable

to societal interests (Schmitter 1986, 6-8). This would appear to have been the case for the Philippines, since the civil society arena forced greater change on Marcos than he desired. But because the societal interests were not well organized or resilient, the interests of civil society did not carry forward into the new regime. What developed was a system of personalistic rule and non-programmatic political parties.

Where the state elite were able to closely control the transition, and where the opposition from civil society was most weak and fragmented, the resulting regime was the least open and showed greatest continuity with the authoritarian past. This most closely resembles Kenya, where despite the mobilization of the church and limited elements of civil society, the Moi regime was able to prevail in slightly altered form.

These results lead one to question what influence the nature of the regime has on the ability of actors within civil society, such as the church, to effectively alter transitional outcomes. The literature of transitions does not speak extensively about regime type. Most of the literature begins with the premise that the regime is fairly well bureaucratized along military or civilian lines, and therefore focuses on internal actors such as military and civilian elites (this is especially true of the O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead volumes). In part, this may be due to the fact that much of the transitions literature is

focused on Southern European countries, with their well-bureaucratized and impersonal authoritarian regimes, or on Latin America, where bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes which were more or less controlled by the military prevailed.

Indeed, the Brazilian case with its military oligarchy tends to best fit the major literature which examines elite bargaining and control of the transition process. This elite control over a long period of time created a political setting where personalistic ties to leadership were not as effective a strategy as broader populist pressure to bring on the "upsurge." Snyder points out that in cases where regimes are not well-bureaucratized, but instead, more closely tied to personalistic rule, results of transitional processes are much more closely tied to the patronage relations between regime and other elites (Snyder 1992, 395). This conclusion has much more resonance with the cases of the Philippines under Marcos and Kenya under Moi. In these cases, more concentrated efforts directed at the personal rule of the dictators were either quite effective (as with the ousting of Marcos) or ended up fragmenting along personalistic lines (as with the ethnic and personality splits which allowed Moi to retain his rule).

In this thesis, I have not chosen to focus on regime type as a variable itself. While regime type remains an interesting consideration in transitions research, this thesis focuses on the political conditions that prevailed

within the regimes during the phases of transition. Chapter 3 turns toward these specific political contexts of transition in Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya.

Chapter 3

The History of Political Transition in Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya

Before being able to ascertain the influence the church was able to have on the transitions in each country, it is necessary to understand the significant events in the transition and the key actors and their influence. This chapter examines the initiation of the transition as I have defined it as well as the outcomes of the transitions. Key to the analysis is the role groups within civil society played in pressuring change in the regime and the degree to which these changes led to more or less democratic transition.

In all the cases, elites were able to direct change enough to reflect their own interests. But civil society did significantly alter the plans of elites and even force changes that otherwise would not have occurred. The interests of groups in civil society were realized to the degree that such groups retained a unity of purpose. In all cases this was difficult because as the transition progressed, the unified goal of throwing out the authoritarian regime was diluted by the myriad societal groups which fought to realize their interests in the more open political space. Interests also became more politicized and partisan during the constitutional reform

process and the elections. This also tended to be divisive, which allowed elites to retain their own interests in the face of more fractious opposition from civil society.

The Brazilian Transition

The Brazilian transition was drawn out and substantially controlled by civilian and military elites. Changes were careful and gradual, with political pacts among elites, and control and cooptation of traditional political parties and much of the labor movement. The result was a democracy which continued to reflect the interests of political and economic elite, and a political arena which tended toward non-programmatic parties and personalistic leadership.

The political actors within civil society, however, were able to both pressure the regime to initiate transition and alter the course of changes at several points, especially with the 1984 movement to directly elect the president. Organizations within civil society, such as the church, were also able to bring interests of the disenfranchised and marginalized groups to the political discussion. Because of their efforts, the constitution became a more progressive document, and mobilization, education, and monitoring efforts at the elections gave the non-elite candidacy of Lula near electoral success and the electoral process its greatest (though by no means non-tainted) level of credibility. The fact that groups within

civil society looked to the electoral process for political change also contributed to the peaceful nature of the transition.

History of the Transition

Brazil was ruled by a military government from 1964 to 1985. Though always a strong influence in Brazil's on-again off-again democratic era in the first half of this century, the military stepped up to depose civilian president Goulart in March of 1964 and assumed full authoritarian control of the government. While retaining a presidential system, the military abandoned its support for multipartism (Vargas had been deposed by the military in 1945 in favor of a competitive election system) and instead, chose the president directly from the military. Three generals assumed the office of president from 1964 to 1974, introducing economic austerity, purging opposition from within the bureaucracy, unions, and universities, liquidating leftist guerilla movements, eroding constitutional rule by passing decree powers (Institutional Act AI-5), and also achieving record average annual economic growth rates of 11% from 1968 to 1974 (Skidmore 1989, 6-7).

Despite impressive economic performance, opposition to the military's role in the new regime came from both without and within. 1968 saw student demonstrations and industrial strikes; groups of military officers kept alive the push to return to constitutional rule. The presidential succession

of 1973 brought Ernesto Geisel to the presidency by electoral college vote. Hopes were placed on Geisel as a reformer. Though reform efforts were complicated by the unexpected strong showing of the opposition *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB) in the lower house and Senate in 1974, a period of liberalization or *abertura* (opening) began in 1974 under Geisel. Although Geisel retained power by decree, he tended to use it with less frequency. Censorship by the military government also had a time of reprieve in 1974 and 1975, and this reprieve led to gradual improvements in "openness" for several years.

The cautious optimism about Geisel's presidency was eroded, however, by what became known as the "April Package." Fearing further embarrassing losses to the opposition in the 1978 elections, in April of 1977, Geisel declared constitutional changes in the way in which the Congress and Senate was elected. The changes strengthened the government party National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) by making more governors and senators elected indirectly through the electoral college, and by easing the requirements for making constitutional changes (Lamounier 1989). The April Package allowed ARENA to retain its Congressional and Senate majority over the MDB in the 1978 elections.

After the sanitized elections turned out favorably for his party, Geisel appeared to be comfortable enough to proceed to push for more extensive reforms, including the

return of habeas corpus and the abolition of AI-5. Though the military retained a considerable amount of arbitrary power by the end of 1978, it was clear that a period of *abertura* had begun in 1974.

The push for political reforms under Figueredo's regime (Geisel's successor in 1978) was fueled by a stalling economy, high inflation, and a soaring debt. Without the economic miracle to bolster his government, Figueredo began to feel more intense pressure for change from labor and church activists and broader pressure from middle class groups who were feeling the economic pinch (Skidmore 1989, 21). Despite this increased pressure, it was still necessary to cooperate with the military if any changes were to take place. This tended to mean that amnesty for political repression initiated by the military had to be given, although military hardliners were also taking considerable criticism for repression of pro-*abertura* forces (Skidmore 1989, 22, 27).

In 1982, a full slate of representatives from the federal and state governments were elected. This was an important election for a number of reasons. It was the first test of the effects of the Party Reform of 1979 which had abolished the two-party system. Designed to fragment the opposition after embarrassing losses of regime support in 1974 and lack of true electoral clout in 1978, the Reform Act was written in such a way that the renamed regime party, the *Partido Democratico Social* (PDS), hoped to water down

the influence of the main opposition group, *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB), the MDB's successor. The composition of the electoral college, which would select the next president, would also be contested in the 1982 elections, and therefore the PDS wished to increase its influence.

The PMDB and other opposition parties gained the majority of governorships and House seats in the 1982 election, but the PDS remained in control of the Senate and the electoral college. PDS control of the executive also gave it much power over the states, since power and resources had been greatly centralized since 1964 (Skidmore 1989, 30).

The movement in 1984 and 1985 to abolish the indirect elections via the electoral college and the subsequent vote in the electoral college were also important opportunities for democratic opposition. The push to abolish the electoral college galvanized the opposition in a fashion never before seen in Brazil. But despite the mobilization of millions of people to rallies for direct elections, the vote to alter the constitution and abolish the electoral college failed. The mobilized opposition sent a message nevertheless, and in the elections of the college, not only was a civilian president chosen (Tancredo Neves), but also many changes in electoral rules were passed by the now-majority opposition after mass defections from the PDS. Despite the death of Neves soon after his election, the

Sarney administration did not radically alter the results of the election. The winners of changed rules and electoral contests at this juncture were sure to have broader influence in the future.

The congressional election of 1986 was an important test for the new parties after the reforms of 1985. The national legislature that was elected was responsible for writing the new constitution, so much was at stake. The Constitutional Assembly was held in 1987 and 1988 and demonstrated the ideologically distinct positions of the parties as well as the contention of different views of what Brazil's problems were and what solutions would be helpful (Mainwaring 1990, 11). This process provided an interesting early test of the influence of the parties, social groups from civil society, and the church.

Finally, the Presidential election of 1989 showed how the electoral process and the political parties had changed, and what influence parties, traditional elite, and actors within civil society could have on the presidential system of Brazil. Despite international pressure from the Vatican and internal pressure from conservative clergy and the hierarchy, the church had a considerable presence in the presidential election of 1989. Though some argue that in general, the church's activism decreased after 1985 (Mainwaring 1986), the ties of the church to labor unions, the Workers' Party (PT), and the candidacy of Lula, were perhaps the most overtly political activities of the church

since the *abertura* began. The Workers' Party, which thrived in the primaries and lost a rather close race in the general election, was also widely supported by other members of civil society such as the unions and grassroots organizations.

Regime Elite Influence on the Transition

Most analyses of the Brazilian transition suggest that the military and civilian elite were able to retain enough of the mechanisms of power during the transition to continue to realize elite interests over those of the working class and poor. Alves goes so far as to say

at each particular point [in the opposition to the military governments] the hegemonic control of the overall alliance was held by elite groups. Working-class interests were systematically bypassed and laid aside in the interest of maintaining unity on the more important issue of defeating the military governments (Alves 1989, 278).

How did elite groups manage to control the transition despite the wide mobilization of social groups in Brazil? Elites traditionally controlled unions, parties, and workers' movements before military rule began in 1964 through restrictive legislation on labor rights and partisan activity. This traditional corporatist control of intermediate institutions was further advanced by the military's rule by decree and legislation designed to curb independent articulation of interests from labor, dissident parties, or social movements (Alves 1989, 282). When

economic growth was high, there was civilian-elite support for these military policies.

However, the military's repression of interests began to impinge upon civilian elites as well, who in particular did not approve of the military regimes' favorable policies toward foreign capital (Alves 1989, 286). This provided an opportunity for an "interclass alliance" to form in opposition to the state. Parties, professional organizations, unions, human rights groups, and other civic organizations formed a broad opposition to the military state. This was enhanced, and sometimes created by the involvement of the church, which not only helped to organize at the grass roots, but also mobilized middle and upper-class opposition to the military government (Alves 1989, 286-7). Interclass conflict was avoided by focusing on "the larger goal of lessening the power of the repressive forces of the state" (285).

Despite the unity of the interclass alliance, which culminated in the Campaign for Direct Elections for President in 1984, Alves claims that the transition itself was controlled by elite interests. She cites three reasons for this result:

- 1) Trade unions and other movements were new and weak.
- 2) Military elites gave up just enough space to negotiate with the elite opposition, who were essentially coopted.
- 3) Opposition elites became alarmed by the mobilization of working-class movements, and so decided to close ranks (Alves 1989, 296).

In the process of negotiating the move toward democracy, the interests of working classes and grass roots groups have been largely ignored.

Frances Hagopian looks more closely at the critical bargaining period between the military and civilian elites at the times of political opening in 1984. Hagopian asks

why a civilian regime born of widespread frustration with both authoritarianism and military policies, and enjoying broad mass and elite support, has thus far failed to develop strong democratic institutions? (Hagopian 1990, 148).

She answers her question by suggesting that the way in which civilian rule was consolidated -- by political pacts between the military, which wanted amnesty and a guaranteed future role, and the "old regime elite," who were increasingly concerned about the strengthened working class and grassroots -- resulted in less democratic institutions. What remained after the pacts were promulgated was a state clientelistic system which kept party, union, and other organized interests dependent on the central government and those who controlled it (Hagopian 1990, 149).

Among the concessions given to the military were complete control of its own affairs without any civilian interruption, strong participation in the cabinet (6 of 22 members were uniformed officers in 1990), and vague constitutional rights to intervene in domestic affairs in the protection of "constitutional power, and law and order" (Hagopian 1990, 156). In return for these concessions, traditional political elites bargained for control of a vast

system of state clientelism. The centralization of resources and their tactical distribution had been an ongoing process during the military regime. In the crucial pacts that were being negotiated as Neves and the PMDB secured adequate support in the electoral college in 1984, traditional elites were promised access to political posts, and positions in public enterprises, federal government agencies, and state government organs (Hagopian 1990, 158). The PMDB also split with the Liberal Front (PFL) over sources of state patronage such as federal jobs in regional coffee institutes and railroad commissions. These moves prohibited more democratic changes in Brazil by making government responsive to clientelistic demands rather than the democratic movements.

The political parties, too, were "prevented from becoming genuine transmission belts of non-elite interests as a result of political pacts struck with traditional political elites during the regime transition" (Hagopian 1990, 159). This was demonstrated by the mass exodus from the PDS to the PMDB when the PMDB became the majority party and the primary controller of state resources. Ideological positions in favor of more democratic practices were diluted in the mass influx of PDS members, so that the PMDB became the new patronage machine (Mainwaring 1990, 29).

Civil Society and the Transition

The analyses so far seem to indicate that elite control of the transition was so extensive as to make actions of those within civil society unimportant. This assumption would be misdirected, however. The actions of intermediate and grassroots organizations pushed the elite-initiated liberalization farther than elites intended, and were critical to the success of Brazil's transition.

Political Parties

Brazilian political parties were non-programmatic and tied to patronage even before the military take-over in 1964. One of the complaints of the military upon seizing power was the corruption born out of such patronage systems, and yet the military governments further centralized state resources and brought clientelistic resources under the control of the state party, ARENA. The military government declared a two-party system in the hopes of controlling the opposition, not realizing the unintended results of unifying the opposition under a single party. The MDB did not create much threat to ARENA until in the late sixties, MDB leadership joined the unions, human rights groups, and the Catholic Church in a broad opposition movement to the military government. With the outlawing and demise of this movement, the MDB was also kept under close control.

However, in the 1974 elections, the MDB was allowed limited campaigning, and managed to win a striking victory

at the polls. This electoral victory of the opposition party was effectively watered down by the April Package, and in 1979, multipartism was introduced in the effort to diffuse the electoral support of the opposition. The PMDB did well in the 1982 elections because there were key unifying issues of opposition to the regime. When Neves was elected by the electoral college and the defections from the PDS made the PMDB the majority party, it lost its focus and unifying issues and became instead a "catch-all" party geared toward patronage.

Up to 1985, the existence of a clear electoral alternative to the military regime was key in pushing the regime's liberalization and democratization program forward. Events since 1985 suggest that while the Brazilian population does not blindly accept clientelistic practices, few alternatives to catch-all parties exist. Von Mettenheim suggests that since the transition to civilian rule in Brazil, parties that stressed ideological themes of democratization were unsuccessful compared to those that used the approaches of professional clientelistic politics (von Mettenheim 1989, 283). This may be true for the period directly after the transfer of power to a civilian president in 1985, but these results did not last long, as parties with high levels of clientelistic resources did very poorly in the 1988 and 1989 elections. In the process of obtaining needed resources, parties may become "state parties" which are not responsive to the broader interests of those they

represent (Mainwaring 1990, 28). In so doing, they risk losing the support of the electorate and losing elections, as is seen in the quick demise of the major opposition party in Brazil, the PMDB. Even after the PMDB's embarrassment, later electoral results from Brazil show that clientelism brought scorn and electoral losses to those who tried to use it exclusively.

Despite the rejection of the PMDB's tactics, there are few programmatic party alternatives to choose from in Brazil; heterogeneous catch-all parties remain "for rent" as a saying in Brazil goes. No where was this more evident than in the election of Collor in 1989. Though Collor was elected directly, there was very little need to use strong party backing. Collor created his own party to circumvent the opposition parties whom he ostensibly did not wish to be tainted with. The strategy of shunning the party's position is enhanced when the presidential elections are not tied to legislative elections, either. Collor had no need to defend his party's record or to run on his party's platform.

Electoral rules, too, have discouraged strong programmatic parties. Seats are awarded proportionally, there are no or very low minimal levels of support a candidate must attain to receive a seat, alliances are allowed to achieve adequate votes to gain a seat, the districts are whole states and candidates run at-large, and ballots are open and poorly controlled by the party apparatus (Mainwaring 1990, 10). Very little party

discipline is created by these rules, and instead, candidates run on the basis of populist messages or clientelistic deals (Mainwaring 1990, 33-34).

There has been only one true alternative to the catch-all parties in the last elections -- the Workers' Party, or PT. Mainwaring contrasts the PT with the catch-all parties in regards to the selection of candidates. The PT has open primaries that are run by the party and yet receive the input of the members at the grass roots. A candidate who is chosen by the membership must agree to the "imperative mandate," that is, that he or she will vote the party line on issues that come before him or her. The party disciplines those who fail to live up to the mandate, yet it is not only the leadership that makes such a decision (Mainwaring 1990, 15). Despite having clear programs, the PT has had mixed successes since its creation. It captured key positions in state governments, but did poorly at the national level. The narrow defeat of Lula in 1989 was the greatest success the PT has shown, but this success was tied to the personal popularity of the candidate as much as to the party.

Unions

Brazilian labor unions had been tightly controlled since Vargas initiated the Consolidation of Labor Laws in 1943. In return for state recognition and tax support, the unions agreed to such restrictions on their autonomy as

state interference into their organization, a ban on strikes, and compulsory arbitration during disputes (Keck 1989, 253). The military government further tightened control on the unions, banning central union organizations that might provide organization for broad populist opposition and generally intervening with a heavy hand in labor disputes, and not to the benefit of the workers. Under the Geisel regime, a bit more room to maneuver was realized, including liberalization in the uses of the government funding and some direct bargaining with employers.

Dramatic changes did not occur until the late seventies in a movement outside of the Vargas-created system known as "new unionism." New unionists were both more confrontational than any previous labor movement, and more focused on the interests and demands of the rank and file. Metal workers in Sao Paulo and rural unions became increasingly militant in 1978 and 1979, and a wave of strikes arose that spread to other industries. As Payne has suggested

The Brazilian labor movement played an instrumental role in the demise of Brazil's authoritarian regime. As one of the few highly organized and institutionalized social actors in Brazil in the late 1970's, the labor movement led massive strikes, demonstrations, and rallies protesting the military government's policies and demanding a return to democracy (Payne 1991, 221).

While true that the labor movement was a part of the massive protests against the state, the degree to which the unions

pursued strategies to further their own institutional interests instead of the more general goal of democratization provides an interesting look at what strategies are most successful for actors in civil society.

Payne calls the new unionists "democratic recalcitrants," that is, they desired democratic change, but their goals would fall short of demanding radical change if labor's interests were taken care of. Payne examines two opportunities where this held true, the response of labor to the constitutional assembly and to the government austerity program. In both cases, the unionists used the political channels that had been opened through the reforms of the civilian government, and yet limited their political demands because of the complications posed by the poor economy, poor organizational strength within the unions, and the fragmentation of positions within the labor movement (Payne 1991, 234). When push came to shove, the successful strategies were those that secured immediate organizational and rank and file interests rather than those that pushed more radical political realignment.

Keck expands on the differing strategies of the factions in the union movement. The "authentic" unions supported total independence from state control or finance, and pursued rank and file interests through direct bargaining and strikes, when necessary. The other major faction of the labor movement pursued broader structural changes in governance, but was neither as confrontational

nor as successful (Keck 1989, 277-8). Because of this, and for the reasons Payne notes above, union behavior since the transition to a civilian presidency has focused on organizational interests. New labor legislation has helped the working class to some degree, but much of the union movement still remains dependent on the government tax and deeply divided about what role to take in the further push for democratic practices in Brazil (Keck 1989, 283-9).

Grass-roots Organizations

Early evaluations of grass-roots organizations in Brazil were almost uniformly positive. Here were groups that were themselves democratic and taking this ethic into their demands on the Brazilian government for liberalization and democratization. Mainwaring and Viola traced base communities, neighborhood associations, the feminist movement, and ecological associations in Brazil during the transitional period and concluded that "these social movements have contributed to the erosion of military rule, and they may also play a role as bearers of a more democratic political culture" (Mainwaring and Viola 1984, 17).

As further research on the role of grassroots organizations has been done, both the strengths and the limits of these groups became clear. Gay believes that some

neighborhood associations in Rio de Janeiro were able to break the hold of clientelism and promote more democratic politics.

The transformation of local politics ... helps erode the political constituency of traditional actors. In doing so, it creates a potential constituency for those who do not rely on such methods (Gay 1990, 115).

He qualifies this conclusion, however, by reminding the reader that clientelistic control of neighborhood associations is very prevalent, and may even be desirable to no association at all (Gay 1990, 116). Likewise, Grzybowski believes that rural social movements

contribute to democratization in two respects: as counterweights to authoritarian agrarian elites and the state at the local and regional levels, and as vehicles for transforming and strengthening the political identities of rural workers themselves (Grzybowski 1991, 19).

Grzybowski believes, however, that the political capacity of rural organizations is limited because of lack of strong ties to intermediate institutions such as unions and political parties (Grzybowski 1991, 19).

In a broader examination of the entire grassroots movement during the *abertura*, Ruth Cardoso suggests that social movements and civil associations in Brazil

made their demands in ways that showed their ability to bypass traditional mechanisms of political cooptation [and] ... created a new scenario whereby previously neglected sectors demanded recognition of their presence (Cardoso 1989, 2).

Popular associations created a participatory ethic and a new collective identity that furthered their autonomy from the state and the parties.

But local successes remained limited. Cardoso claims that

the hope that the various popular groups would unite and expand throughout urban areas can no longer be sustained. Hence, the assumption that these organizations act as a single agent capable of renewing the entire political system has also become untenable (Cardoso 1989, 2).

The author believes that the internal, partisan divisions that had been easy to cover up before the multiparty system in 1982, were exposed when local associations took a more political role. Cardoso concludes that these organizations must learn to masterfully balance effective contacts with political organizations, individuals, and the parties while still maintaining ideological autonomy.

Finally, Kurt von Mettenheim, in his doctoral dissertation on party formation in Brazil, challenges the assumptions of many researchers that the political alignment of the Brazilian populace during the recent transition was the result of an empowered civil society. Instead, he asserts that now Brazilian "democracy" reflects the continued practices of patronage and the influence of professional politicians (von Mettenheim 1990, 10-11). Von Mettenheim suggests that while transitions are about confrontation between the state and civil society, "the consolidation of these new types of politics ... will occur in the day to day tasks of competitive mass electoral and party politics" (von Mettenheim 1990, 8).

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the transition from the perspective of one major actor within Brazilian civil society, the church. The church represented broader social opposition to the authoritarian regime, but like the groups here, also was confronted with the pressures to preserve institutional interests during times of political change. Chapter 5 examines the church's goals and motivations as well as the church's behavior during two parts of the transition: constitutional change in 1986 and the presidential elections of 1989.

The Philippine Transition

The transition in the Philippines was under the control of Marcos after martial law, and may never have progressed past limited political liberalization had organizations within civil society not mobilized before the snap election and overthrow. The church was a key mobilizer of support and broker of power during these events.

The results of the transition -- a constitutional, populist regime with non-ideological and non-programmatic parties -- reflected the nature of civil society's mobilization during the transition. Middle class and elite business and military interests had strong connections to the new regime, which they used to retain economic and political benefits. These groups also supported electoral means of political change, and opposed more radical political change. The interests of the marginalized were

championed by grass-roots church and non-governmental groups, but when political space was broadened after Aquino came to power, dedication to these causes was largely abandoned in the scramble to realize individual interests.

History of the Transition

The transition to democratic rule played out quite differently in the Philippines. Carl Landé characterizes the Philippines in which Ferdinand Marcos came to power as controlled primarily by patronage networks, with weak parties, centralized hierarchical political power, a poor record of land reform, and a long history of authoritarian culture (Landé 1987, 9-11).

Marcos used existing patronage networks well to get elected to his first term of office in 1965. During this time, the Philippines was facing lagging economic performance, continued American economic influence, increasing nationalism, and agrarian unrest. Wurfel calls this period a time of "increasing frustration with existing political institutions" (Wurfel 1988, 16-17). Given these sorts of problems, Marcos next campaign in 1969 was won with "guns, goons, and gold." Marcos used a large part of the domestic budget in securing votes from the countryside and from prominent local political leaders in order to be reelected (Youngblood 1990, 25, Anderson 1988, 18).

Marcos declaration of martial law in September of 1972 was influenced by his desire to stay in power. Marcos

sought to alter the constitutional two term limit by proposing a parliamentary system without term limits, but the Constitutional Convention convened to consider this proposal did not complete their work in a timely manner, and Marcos decided not to wait (Wurfel 1988, 19). The ostensible reasons for the declaration, according to Landé, were rural lawlessness, hampered economic programs, and rebellions from the New People's Army and the Moro National Liberation Front (Landé 1987, 11).

Despite the Philippines' history of partial democratic experience during the previous years, Jackson notes that Marcos had very little opposition to his suspension of democratic rule at first (Jackson 1989). This may have been for any number of reasons, mostly centered around the crisis and lawless atmosphere that pervaded the Philippines at the time. Marcos centralized control of the military by appointing loyalists to key positions and also created a presidential security force in order to assure his continued power.

The key policy directive of the early martial law era was Marcos' "New Society." The New Society was based rather explicitly on the notion that the successful economic performance and expanded economic opportunity that "rational" authoritarian policy would bring was well worth the trade-off of the suspension of democratic practices. Powerful technocratic agencies such as the National Economic Development Authority and the Board of Investment would

assure that economic growth would pick up and that the poor would have the full power of the state as an advocate (Youngblood 1990, 37-38). A program of land reform was instituted that made small, but significant steps, by Philippine standards, in distributing land to landless peasants (Landé 1987, 11). But even the progress made here came mostly in areas where Marcos was intent on stripping the agricultural holdings of political rivals or pacifying nascent revolutionary movements (Lara and Morales 1990, 146).

Marcos also promised, as a part of his new society, the return of rule to the grass roots through "citizens' assemblies," or barangays. These local bodies were to give their input on the new constitution and on Marcos' rule through periodic referenda or plebiscites.

The New Society delivered something much different than it promised. The technocratic agencies in charge of the vast amounts of capital from foreign investment and borrowing spent these resources on questionable projects that further centralized Marcos' control of patronage networks throughout the country. Soaring government expenditures created deeper and deeper debt, and fueled inflationary pressures in the country. Barangay government became a new channel for clientelistic practices, and a channel more closely tied to the central Marcos administration than before (Youngblood 1990, 51, Wurfel 1988, 118). Marcos also expanded the role of the military,

created "civilian defense forces" which acted as his thugs in the countryside, and took further control of the media (Youngblood 1990, 51). The rational government that Marcos promised under "constitutional authoritarianism" became the government of centralized clientelism that Wurfel calls "patrimonial authoritarianism" (Wurfel 1988, 153).

Leftist Opposition

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its affiliated New People's Army (NPA) were formed in 1968, but became elevated in status because of the declaration of martial law in 1972. The leftist Christians for National Liberation (CNL) joined with the broader leftist movement National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1972. This represented a significant block of radical opposition to the state.

The NDF, NPA, and CPP realized strong growth when the oppressive nature of the Marcos authoritarian regime and the failure of the New Society became clear. By 1977, the NDF had released a "Ten Point Program" of overthrow of the Marcos regime and became targets of the Marcos regime (Wurfel 1988, 226). Many in leadership were killed or captured, such as charismatic CPP leader Jose Sison in November 1977. Despite the repression of the revolutionary left, the left grew in influence especially on the island of Samar, but also in Davao and Mindanao. Though there was dissension among the CPP, the old guard within the party,

and the Marxist Christians, the leftist opposition became a prominent block agitating for regime change.

In 1978, five years into the period of martial law, Marcos announced the beginning of "normalization" of Philippine politics. Political parties were no longer outlawed and the first legislative elections under martial law were held. The interim *Batasang Pambansa* (IBP) was to take on legislative duties, while Marcos gave up the practice of ruling by decree. The elections were so fraudulent and the role of the IBP so marginal that it quickly became apparent that Marcos "liberalization" was shallow and firmly under his control (Wurfel 1988, 234).

Marcos continued to make only small movements towards greater political opening after 1978, such as a slightly more independent role of the judiciary and elections for mayor and governorships in 1980 (Wurfel 1990, 114). In 1981, Marcos suspended martial law and subjected his administration to a plebiscite vote in an attempt to boost his legitimacy (in part because his health showed signs of failing). Marcos' opposition did have a chance to oppose his rule in the presidential plebiscite, but the opposition leadership was divided about how to approach such an opportunity. Some entertained the possibility of opposing Marcos, but in the end, those proposing boycott prevailed, and Marcos had to scare up an opposition from among his former allies. Once again, the electoral process was so fraudulent as to make it illegitimate (Wurfel 1990, 114).

While the origins of elite-led liberalization can be found in 1978, the political openings were narrow and the corruption and control by Marcos encompassing.

When Benigno Aquino was slain in 1983 as he arrived in the Philippines, the opposition to Marcos grew. The openness and clumsiness of the assassination eroded what sense of legitimacy the regime may have had and mobilized a broader opposition to the Marcos regime. Among those groups that were activated by the assassination were the business class, of which Benigno Aquino had been a member. Previous to the assassination, organizations such as the Makati Business Club had already begun to voice their dissent to Marcos economic policies, as the Philippines economy deteriorated and capital fled (Overholt 1986, 1153). Another source of opposition emerged from a segment of the military that resented the prominence that the "palace guard" under Fabian Ver had achieved. After the assassination and trial, the acquittal of Ver, who was behind the assassination, only fueled this opposition movement within the military. In 1985, this group formally organized as the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). Even the staunch ally of Marcos, Ronald Reagan, pressured Marcos to find and punish the assassin and also to consider early presidential elections in order to shore up his regime's legitimacy (Wurfel 1990, 115).

It was the Catholic Church, and especially its moderate leadership, which took on the most important oppositional

role after 1983 (see Chapter 4). The Catholic Bishops' Council of the Philippines (CBCP) on several occasions issued pastoral letters critical of the regime and its policies, and Cardinal Sin became increasingly vocal in his opposition to Marcos rule. Shortly after the assassination, the Catholic Church initiated publication of two newspapers to disseminate information the government was quashing (Overholt 1986, 1153). In 1984, Cardinal Sin and several grass roots organizations of the church (with financial backing from the business community and the United States) supported the revival of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) (Wurfel 1990, 116). This group was to become very important as a monitor of the snap election of 1986. The church used this combination of media sources, grassroots organizations, and pastoral exhortation to organize broad opposition and unify a fractious opposition to Marcos' continued rule.

Marcos' call for a snap election in February 1986 caved in on him. Marcos support was so thin and the opposition so emboldened with the help of institutions such as the church, that it took blatant and open electoral fraud in front of an international audience for Marcos to claim victory. The church, grass-roots organizations, a reform movement in the military, and the American government combined efforts to force Marcos to accept the American offer of asylum. The courage of many on the streets of Manila, and the brokering of the church which unified the rebel officers and Cory

Aquino, brought a new administration and from the looks of things, a clean slate from which the new coalition of forces could rule. Mrs. Aquino chose at first to suspend the Marcos constitution and rule by executive decree, but she also quickly appointed a Constitutional Commission in May of 1986 who drafted a constitution by the fall of 1986. By popular referendum, the constitution was approved by the Philippine public in February of 1987. It appeared that President Aquino had achieved her primary goal of reestablishing constitutional democracy.

National and local elections were held in 1987 and 1988 under the new constitution, but Filipino politics appeared to be returning to a period of oligarchism and decentralized influence that had characterized the pre-martial law period. Both the lower and upper chambers of the Congress, while full of Aquino supporters, were also full of the traditional elite (Wurfel 1990, 125-126).

The Aquino administration was also caught between a revolutionary movement that had regained its feet after a period of drift following the regime change in 1986, and an increasingly assertive conservative movement in the armed forces. After initial conciliatory talks with the NDF broke down, the Aquino administration took a hard line against the insurgents. This was prompted in large part by the pressure placed on her regime by conservative elements of the military which sponsored several coup attempts between 1987 and 1989. Much of the political currency that Aquino had

gained in the heady days of the People Power movement was spent dealing with the leftist and rightist opponents of her regime. Economic progress was slow, and the promises of social justice in programs such as land reform and improvements in human rights were put off or abandoned altogether.

The period of transition culminated in the 1992 presidential election that was the first opportunity since 1969 for Filipinos to choose a president in freely contested elections. This latest election occurred in an atmosphere quite unlike that of 1986. The optimism of EDSA had given way in a climate of continued economic problems, political instability, broken promises of land reform, and the reinstatement of the pre-Marcos system of patronage and cronyism. Seven candidates emerged in the battle for the presidency, including Imelda Marcos and a former Marcos' crony, Eduardo Cojuangco, each with their small niches of cacique support. Salvador Laurel, Aquino's estranged vice president, ran under the old *Nationalista* Party, with very little success, and Jovita Salonga tried to revive some zeal for a revamped Liberal Party, but also with little success. The three candidates that polls suggested were potential contenders were Miriam Defensor Santiago, a populist who presented herself as a graft and corruption-buster, Fidel Ramos, who had Aquino's endorsement and a sense of continuity, and Ramon Mitra, congressional leader and at the top of the largest patronage party, the *Laban ng*

Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). Pundits picked Mitra, given the breadth and depth of his political organization, but his campaign went poorly, and he polled fourth when the counting was done. Santiago showed surprising strength with hardly any of the traditional means of influence, including no patronage backing. She came in behind Fidel Ramos, who with the power of Aquino's endorsement and bureaucratic machine, and the funding of the business community, won with only 24% of the vote. Several assumptions about the Philippine political system were proved false, but the Filipinos did not end up with a strongly supported regime.

Elite Influence on the Transition

Political elites emerged in the Philippines from several directions. The primary elite networks were tied to powerful landed families. These families dominated politics through use of patronage in their "fiefs," and influenced national partisan activity as well (Wurfel 1988, 11). The feudal image is picked up by Anderson as well, who describes in detail the development of "caciques" or bases of political power that key families accumulated during the Spanish and American colonial periods (Anderson 1988). Despite some efforts to introduce land reform during the American colonial period and in the 1950's and 1960's, the gap of income, living conditions, and political influence between landed elite families who dominated export agriculture and the rural poor, increased (Landé 1987, 10).

Riedinger notes the shallow support for land reform from the United States after World War II and the anti-communist sentiment in the United States and the Philippines which empowered local landed elites to crush any attempts at reform (Riedinger 1991, 131-34).

Traditional patronage networks underwent a number of changes during Marcos rule. Marcos managed to centralize the distribution of resources necessary to keep clientelistic networks alive (Jackson 1989, 259-60). This alienated the traditionally powerful local patrons, but they had little recourse but to try to become a part of the new channel of funds as Marcos' power increased. The increased pressure to deliver patronage benefits to an ever-larger set of constituents forced Marcos into a difficult position, however. Economic decline in the early 1980's led Marcos to borrow heavily for projects and capital to sustain the patron-client network. As the economy grew worse, and political pressures were stepped up internally and from abroad, Marcos found himself going back to the more decentralized and traditional patronage networks of the pre-martial law era in order to ensure that the vote got out in February of 1986. This failed him, as clients smelled the impending doom of their patron and the movement of forces against Marcos increased in intensity. Jackson claims that in the last days of his regime, Marcos could count on only a small elite circle, and had no broader support from the

traditional patronage system or any legitimacy when he turned to the snap election (Jackson 1989, 260).

After Marcos' demise, Aquino failed to challenge the traditional bosses and landed families and has shown little commitment to strengthening the ideological nature of the parties. Congressional elections in 1987 were noted for the failure of the progressive left, poor enhancement of ideological parties, and the reemergence of elite interests (Magno 1987, Simbulan 1987). Most analyses of the political system during the Aquino years points to their resemblance to the pre-Marcos era of familial interests and

A similar pattern of shrinking support played itself out in the military. Unable to both ensure the sort of intense personal loyalty Marcos wanted in the early 1980's and after the Aquino assassination, and promote the interests of the professional military, Marcos faced opposition from the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). Disgruntled officers resented the ascendancy of loyalists over professionals, and pledged to root out corruption in the armed forces and oppose any military coup attempts from the loyalist officers such as Security Advisor Ver (Wurfel 1988, 291). After the fraudulent snap election of February 1986, RAM and Defense Minister Ponce Enrile convinced Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos, who earlier had been passed over for promotion to security advisor, to join them in opposition to Marcos. What had been planned as a palace coup by Enrile was turned into a military "imposition" of a civilian

regime, thanks to the intervention of church leadership. Cardinal Sin managed to bring Mrs. Aquino and the military officers together and mobilize the mass of people who turned out in the streets to protect Ramos and Enrile's military forces.

Civil Society and the Transition

Most traditional institutions emerged from Marcos' authoritarian rule too "hollowed out" to provide much representation of the interests of the population. Marcos' undoing of all but coercive institutions weakened independent bases in society, and these weakened institutions persisted, despite the hopefulness of the early Aquino administration.

Political Parties

Political parties have long been programmatically and ideologically weak in the Philippines, and primarily mechanisms of patronage. Open parties were organized and elections were held early in the American colonial period that began in 1898. Elections began with a single representative body and expanded to nearly all offices, including those of the president. However, patronage relationships were carried over to the political parties during their creation in this colonial period. Though franchise was liberalized during the 1920's and 1930's, the perception of parties as mechanisms of patronage and debt-

paying continued well into the period of independence. During Magsaysay's administration, clientelism in the parties was tied more closely to the central government, instead of the far-flung reaches of local politics or the legislature as had been the case before and immediately after the Japanese occupation (Doronila 1989, 103).

Landé describes the period from American colonialism to 1972 (with the interruption of the Japanese occupation from 1941-1945) as a time of fairly competitive two-party politics, and he cites as evidence the turnover of the presidency from the Nationalist to the Liberal Party about every eight years (Landé 1987, 9). However, most would not describe this period or the parties as truly competitive. Riedinger concludes that the two parties in power from 1946 to 1972 were "built primarily upon vertically linked patron-client networks," and were "noted more for their personalities than for ideological or issue orientation" (Riedinger 1991, 63). Immediately prior to martial law, there was some indication that the parties were moving away from clientelistic practices in favor of normative decision-making (Kessler 1987, 371). This may have been due to the increase in urban middle class voters and new associational groupings (Kessler 1987, 371).

But after martial rule was declared, Marcos sought to increase the clientelistic nature of the parties by making them directly dependent on him and the resources from the central government (Kessler 1987, 372). Marcos'

authoritarian rule perpetuated the use of parties for particularistic rewards for clientele, and despite the occasional plebiscite, and even the encouragement of "opposition parties" after 1978, no strong ideological opposition party emerged from the transition to democratic rule.

Cory Aquino did little to encourage the emergence of strong political parties. Her electoral coalition was a combination of progressives under the Philippine Democratic Party-Laban (PDP-Laban), and the party of her vice-president, the United Democratic Opposition, or UNIDO. This coalition proved to be primarily an expedient mechanism for unified opposition to the Marcos regime. The ideological basis for rule that appeared to be emerging out of the people power movement was not carried through to an organized party which could serve as a political base of power for Aquino. This not only hurt her political support, but also allowed the interests of the entrenched elite to reemerge and prevail in Filipino politics (Villanueva 1992). Evidence of this comes from the decision of Aquino's followers to allow Marcos' *Kilusan Bagong Lipunan* (KBL) members to jump to Aquino's PDP-Laban party in a number of local races in 1987 (Magno 1987, Institute for Popular Democracy 1987).

The non-ideological orientation of the parties made cooptation by Marcos easier during martial rule, and their continued non-ideological nature has weakened the voice of

the populace since. With no disciplined party to bring the power of the people to the policy process, and with no clear agenda to challenge the continued interests of the elite, the Aquino regime showed much continuity with the Marcos regime.

Unions

There is a long history of labor organization in the Philippines, but not much of a history of autonomous labor strength. Groups such as the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) and the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) were organized in the 1950's, though with a conservative perspective and as a response to alleged communist influence on peasants and workers in specific regions.

This conservative nature of the union movement was furthered during the years of Marcos rule. Marcos sought control of the unions in two ways. The first of these could be called corporatist control, imposed through government sponsorship of single unions to represent single industries. Most of the groups that fell into this category were organized under the umbrella of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) or the rural National Congress of Farmer's Organizations (NCFO). These corporatist bodies gave the government control of crucial sectors of the labor force, and were touted as anti-communist counterweights to potential leftist labor groups (Lara and Morales 1990).

Marcos also used repressive labor laws to control organized unions. In 1975, Marcos issued Presidential Decree 823, which banned all strikes, and later Presidential Decree 848, which "loosened up" the law to ban strikes only in those industries deemed vital to national interests (of course, this had wide interpretations, and the government used the law to keep nearly all industries, especially those in the Export Promoting Zones, strike-free). Other laws restricting the right to organize and weakening the positions of workers in collective bargaining situations were issued, either through presidential decree or the post-martial law equivalent.

Beginning in 1980, labor movements began to show more militancy, but still little organizational strength. The *Kilusang Mayo Uno* (KMU), or First of May Movement was formed in 1980 in protest of the controlled unions of the TUCP, and "sealed the collapse of the government attempt at corporatism in the trade union field" (Wurfel 1988, 332). This leftist movement called for higher minimum wages and greater opportunities for legal strikes, and even managed to stage illegal strikes throughout the country. The militancy of the labor movement increased upon the assassination of Benigno Aquino, as the number of strikes escalated in 1984 and 1985, and strikes spread to even the closely controlled Export Promoting Zones (Sibal, Penilla, and Valte 1987, 5).

But despite greater militancy, the labor organizations did not form a unified opposition to the authoritarian

regime nor a high degree of influence on the transition toward democratic rule. In the period surrounding Marcos ouster, the TUCP did refuse to endorse Marcos (realizing that their patron was faltering) but had little positive role in influencing change. The KMU decided to boycott the snap election of 1986, and though the KMU soon realized that it had missed an opportunity for influencing Marcos downfall (they later supported the general strikes called for during the days of the EDSA standoff), they remained too fragmented and unsure of their direction to have much influence (Wurfel 1990, 301).

When Mrs. Aquino came to power in 1986, she loosened up some restrictions on union organization and the right to strike. Consequently, union membership boomed, as did the number of strikes (Sibal, Penilla, and Valte 1987, 5). Further promises were made to the labor movement, and a progressive secretary of labor, Augusto Sanchez, pushed hard for improvements in the lot of workers. However, as conservative opposition to the new regime mounted, Mrs. Aquino backed off on many of her promises in the face of political realities. In the May 1987 Senate elections, Mrs. Aquino failed to support labor demands for a higher minimum wage, and after the coup attempt in November 1987, Aquino replaced Labor Secretary Sanchez with the more low-key and conservative Franklin Drilon (Sibal, Penilla, and Valte 1987, 6-7).

The labor unions remain weak and unable to alter political outcomes. An example of this ineffectiveness during the Aquino administration is the writing of the new constitution. Though labor won strong pro-worker language in the constitution, very little of the language has enforced (Villa 1988, 29-30). There continued to be striking continuity of labor laws with the Marcos era, as Aquino retained, through legislation, the legal right to ban strikes in the interests of the nation and to water down agreements achieved through collective bargaining (Villa 1988, 35). Aquino also supported continued low minimum wages and sub-minimum wages.

In the face of these difficulties, labor remained fragmented and unsure of its direction. While the New Unionist movement in Brazil achieved its greatest successes by concentrating on the interests of workers in collective bargaining situations, the direct successes of this sort of advocacy in the Philippines are far and few between. The level of unionization in the work force remains low, and the unity of its organizations poor (Villa 1988, 21). The creation of an umbrella group in 1987, the Labor Advisory and Consultative Council (LACC), did not result in a unified and powerful labor movement with influence on worker issues (Sibal, Penilla, and Valte 1987, 9). Given these conditions, some observers of the labor movement called for increased politicization of the labor movement, rather than the pursuit of more narrow worker interests (Sibal, Penilla,

and Valte 1987, 10). They claimed that only when the political clout of the labor movement is realized will positive legislation and worker benefits follow.

Grass-roots Organizations

There are both revolutionary and non-revolutionary branches of the grassroots movement in the Philippines, though the organization of each have overlapped from time to time. Each had different influences on the transition toward democratic rule. The revolutionary left, headed by the National Democratic Front (NDF) and its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA), made what turned out to be a very critical error in the period surrounding Marcos' ouster. In the period of Marcos' liberalization, the NDF, through patient work with local communities, had grown in influence, especially in the countryside (Hawes 1990). Rather than become involved through these grass roots in the snap election in 1986 and the policy debate that surrounded it, the NDF chose to boycott the elections and discourage "mainstream" political activity. With the overthrow of Marcos, the left became engaged in a contentious internal debate about its boycott decision and the relationship it should cultivate with the new Aquino regime (Magno 1987). An early cooperative relationship with the Aquino government concerning the military conflict and rural reform broke down with Aquino's turn toward greater conservatism.

Many of the activists sympathetic to the concerns of the NDF but unwilling to use violence became involved in the non-revolutionary "branch" of the grassroots movement. Christian base communities, which had their origins in Christian activism in the 1950's and 1960's, were formed, as were peasant organizations, neighborhood associations, and development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which had begun to assert more politicized goals. Also active toward the end of the Marcos era were social movements tied to ethnic interests (Moro National Liberation Front), feminist interests (Gabriella), and ecological interests (Haribon).

While Marcos' attempts to destroy the leftist opposition focused primarily on the revolutionary left, the "little left," as the non-revolutionary grass-roots movements were sometimes called, increased its efforts to mobilize opposition to Marcos. Attempts to unify the revolutionary and little left in the New Nationalist Alliance faltered in 1985, and the little left's support of Cory Aquino's campaign further distinguished it from the radical left (Thompson 1989-90, 3). This same coalition of grassroots opposition was also highly active in the "people power" movement which jammed the streets of Manila in support of the military coup and transfer of power to Mrs. Aquino in February 1986.

The non-revolutionary grassroots movement used several mechanisms to exert its political influence. Trade organizations began to take on more progressive and

politicized activities. The little left also gave support to opposition parties in the early eighties (Philippine Democratic Party (PDP) in 1982 and the PDP-Laban coalition after Aquino's assassination in 1983). Though parties have not been very powerful tools of change in the Philippines, the little left did back a winner when Mrs. Aquino ran under the PDP-Laban banner in the snap election.

Connections to a winner were important during the beginning of the Aquino administration. The grassroots movement was rewarded by Aquino, who appointed progressive cabinet members, including human rights lawyers Jose Diokno, Joker Arroyo, Augusto Sanchez, and Rene Saguisag, and progressives such as Aquillino Pimentel. Church leadership, too, had unprecedented influence with the Aquino government (though the voices of more progressive clergy were often filtered out by the more moderate leadership under Cardinal Sin).

However, as noted earlier for Sanchez, many of the progressives were forced out of office in the aftermath of the coup attempts and under pressure from military and other conservative voices. Parties' alliances also proved to have less than desired results, as elections in 1987 and 1988 resulted in the continued influence of political machines and traditional politics. The grassroots movements began to focus more on autonomous interest organizations and umbrella groups such as the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) and the National Peasant Movement (KMP). These

groups and others, including church-based organizations, formed a coalition called Congress for a People's Agrarian Reform (CPAR) to press for land reform.

The legislation that eventually passed in 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), was a watered down version of CPAR's policy goals (Lara and Morales 1990, 152). Such disappointments in land reform were duplicated in the push for reform of debt repayment. Citing the tremendous burden the debt repayment schedule had placed on the economy and public spending on social programs, the coalitions pushed for debt rescheduling and a reprioritization of budget spending. This, too, met little success, as Aquino maintained a high level of repayment of debt (Lara and Morales 1990, 152-3). Only the removal of the American military bases, for which the grassroots organizations and the Church lobbied heavily, concluded favorably for the coalition of grassroots groups, though the eruption of Mount Pinatubo may have had more effect on the outcome than the grassroots pressure.

Since influence on the national agenda was minimal, some supporters of grassroots activity believe that such organizations should focus primary attention on local activities. As Thompson notes, "riceroots" organizing continued to expand in economic and cause organizations such as the PRRM and the environmental group *Haribon* (Thompson 1989-90, 7). Boudreau examined a peasant organization in Santa Cruz, Laguna and concluded that the group has

prospered precisely because the members have focused on local issues. The National Association of Workers, or KASAMA participated in national umbrella organizations such as CPAR and electoral politics only so far as their participation has immediate benefits for KASAMA members. This has allowed them to retain their autonomy and empowered members to realize their own local interests (Boudreau 1987, 53-55).

The Kenyan Transition

Kenya's transition was the least far-reaching, and remains the most tenuous. The regime that replaced the one-party state of the former Moi regime is still controlled by Moi, and despite the legality of multiple parties, Moi's KANU party and the political elite tied to it retain their position and interests. Some of the most blatant civil rights violations were improved with the advent of the multiparty electoral process, but ethnic violence and abuse of human rights remains a problem in Kenya. Because the mobilization of civil society was dominated by mostly elite-led groups (Law Society of Kenya, clerical leadership of church, defected KANU leadership), the transition has been tilted toward elite interests. Grass-roots groups were not that well represented by either the personalistic parties or the churches, although the churches have expanded their efforts to organize among average Kenyans. Civil society's effectiveness was also hampered by the poor sense of unity

which prevailed throughout the opposition to Moi. This occurred both in the church, and in the parties that split from FORD.

History of the Transition

To understand why Kenya is currently undergoing a transition away from authoritarian rule, it is vital to see the way in which Daniel arap Moi has changed the nature of power and politics in Kenya. Kenyatta's generally accepted post-colonial rule gave way to an increasingly centralized and personalized control by Moi. By 1983, Moi had dismantled the regime he inherited from Kenyatta and had established a one-party state tied to his person and patronage. Unlike Kenyatta, however, this personal control was not tempered by adequate delivery of social goods, and the society, led by the Kenyan churches, began to reject his rule.

Transition to Independence

Opposition to colonial rule centered around two ethnically based political movements: the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU represented major ethnic groups and was dominated by the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu. Representing over 60% of the population, KANU was considered the party of the "haves" in economic and power relations. In contrast, KADU was a minority movement ethnically and in

the exercise of power. Made up of primarily rural and poor ethnic groups, KADU was economically and politically more marginalized. Daniel Arap Moi, who was of Kalenjin ethnicity, was the leader of KADU.

Beginning in 1957, Great Britain proposed a gradual turnover of parliamentary government through progressive elections. Upon Kenyatta's release in 1961, he and KANU became a formidable political power. Kenyatta was elected prime minister in 1963 after KANU secured victory in the parliamentary elections. KADU was folded into KANU after the elections, creating a de facto single party state in Kenya. Kenyatta allowed considerable local autonomy to former KADU leaders and brought Moi in as the vice president of KANU. Kenyatta further consolidated the rule of his regime by creating a presidential system with himself as the president and Moi as the vice president.

Kenyatta's Rule

Despite the obvious power of the center that Kenyatta achieved surrounding Kenya's move to independence, some accountability was achieved through Kenyatta's creation of a clientelistic system which allocated state resources to the populace in exchange for political mobilization and support (Mair 1994, 139). Kenyatta decided not to challenge powerful local politicians that had been important to his electoral coalition. Although an opposition party was banned in 1969 (Kenya People's Union), Kenyatta encouraged considerable

competition within KANU itself. By pursuing this strategy, Kenyatta both suppressed challenges to KANU's rule and coopted local power by encouraging some autonomy. Kenyatta used the patronage of the party to consolidate his power. Patronage was based on two things: loyalty to Kenyatta and delivery of goods to localities through the self-help movement known as *harambee*. Regular and fair elections within the party pressured those local recipients of the regime's largesse to come through with the delivery of goods to local voting districts. This form of accountability, while not very democratic, helped to create legitimacy for Kenyatta's regime. "In sum, the basis of Kenyatta's system of patronage was not mere loyalty to the regime, but loyalty coupled with a demonstrated ability to represent a public constituency and renew one's electoral mandate" (Barkan 1992, 173).

A number of other features of Kenyatta's rule contributed to its legitimacy. The civil service and judiciary were relatively autonomous of the regime, and were characterized by high levels of professionalism. The press was relatively free, so long as it did not make direct challenges to Kenyatta's rule. And finally, autonomous associational life thrived under Kenyatta. Groups such as the Law Society of Kenya, Kenya Farmers and Manufacturers Associations, the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), NGOs such as the NCKK and Women's Development

Association, and ethnic associations made their presence felt in Kenyan society.

Harambee also enjoyed growth and support under Kenyatta's leadership. Designed to provide social welfare services and infrastructure that the government could not afford, harambee also became the center of local politics. In this way, development groups played a key role in linking the Kenyan state with especially rural society. As Barkan notes,

On the one hand these organizations broadened the social base of the Kenyatta regime. On the other, they served as counterweights to the state and fostered a process of bargaining and mutual accommodation between the regime and civil society (Barkan 1992, 175).

Though Daniel arap Moi promised to follow in Kenyatta's footsteps when he assumed the office of president, the path that Moi took soon deviated from the relatively accountable and legitimate rule of his predecessor.

Moi's Personal Rule

In the initial consolidation of his rule after Kenyatta's death in 1978, Moi propagated a populist message called *nyayo* (peace, unity, and love) in the hopes of creating wide support for his regime among the common people, or *wananchi*. Despite this outward message of reconciliation, Moi's first concern was to break the primarily Kikuyu base of power in the state through use of an anti-corruption campaign (Barkan 1992, 179). In Moi's early years, prominent members of KANU such as Oginga

Odinga, Charles Njonjo, Kenneth Matiba, and Charles Rubia were expelled from the party. Moi also moved away from Kenyatta's inclusive patronage base and chose instead to enforce personal loyalty through patronage.

The tendency for patronage to be tied to personal loyalty was no more apparent than in Moi's manipulation of harambee. No longer was harambee a means of holding local leaders accountable to the people, but rather, the movement became a showcase for Moi's personal contributions, and a means of securing personal loyalty from local elites (Widner 1992a, 214).

Following an attempted air force coup in 1982, the Moi regime began to seek a broader consolidation of state power and control over Kenyan society. By constitutional amendment, extracted from the National Assembly by the ruling party KANU, Moi declared Kenya a one-party state. The independence of a number of political positions was also compromised, as Moi removed the secured tenure of the Attorney General, Auditor General, and High Court and Court of Appeal judges. In 1988, the Public Service Commission also lost its autonomy as Moi retained the right to dismiss the office holder at any time (Widner 1992a, 214).

The civil service became closely tied to the patronage of Moi under the guise of decentralization and participation. While Kenyatta had supported powerful and somewhat autonomous provincial commissioners in the administration of governmental development programs, Moi

moved the locus of authority in development to more decentralized district commissioners. While this looked like a devolution of power, instead Moi made these district officials more dependent on the central regime for their monies and project plans, and therefore increased the power of Moi's patronage (Barkan and Chege 1989, 433).

Other developments signaled the erosion of legitimate rule during the Moi regime. The rights of habeas corpus were severely strained when the state was given additional powers to detain without trial and used these powers to quell opposition. Moi brought more and more of the state under his direct control through such devices as ruling by decree and bringing independent elements of civil society, such as trade unions and NGOs, under state corporatist control (AAPS 1987, 2).

In 1986, controversial electoral changes were made which required queuing behind pictures of the candidates and the automatic election without runoff of anyone receiving 70% of this vote. Widespread outrage followed, led by the leadership of the church who refused to vote in front of their congregants. In the 1988 general elections, the queuing system was used after 30 new constituencies were created immediately before the election. Vote fraud and rigging were noted throughout the country, creating even greater outrage.

In 1990, an attempt was made by Moi to address the anger. Moi agreed to form a review committee, whose role was

to discuss a move to multipartism. Unfortunately, violence erupted on July 7, 1990, following attempts by opposition politicians Matiba and Rubia to address a multiparty rally. After this civil unrest, the role of the review committee was limited to discussions of internal KANU party reform. Nevertheless, there was more response from Kenyans than Moi expected. Despite the limited role the review committee ended up playing, some progress was made on issues of the independence of the courts and the attorney and auditor generals. On others issues such as habeas corpus and multipartism, Moi did not budge. Opposition to the state moved toward a new political coalition called Forum for the Restoration of Democracy in Kenya (Ford).

After the KANU conference, political changes occurred rapidly in Kenya. In December of 1991, Moi allowed multiple parties to form after pressure from foreign donors and in the wake of Zambia's multiparty elections. Much of the opposition to the regime moved to political groups such as Ford, and the many fractious parties which formed from Ford in 1992 (*Weekly Review* October 9, 1992). Though most opposition activity was focused away from the churches, they and their leadership remained active. When ethnic violence erupted (and some say was helped along by the Moi regime) in 1992, the church took on an active role in mediating ethnic disputes, called for an open and fair investigation, and helped to deal with those people displaced by the ethnic violence (*New York Times* May 24, 1992). As elections

approached, the churches joined with other social groups to form an independent monitoring group known as the National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU). The churches also attempted to keep the political opposition from splintering (*The Standard* October 16 & 18, 1992, 1, *Daily Nation* October 5, 1992, 1). On December 29, 1992, elections were finally held. Moi retained the presidency in a vote that was split by the fractious opposition parties. The churches' behaviors surrounding the election will be further discussed in Chapter 7.

Elite Influence on the Transition

Throughout the process of liberalization that led to Moi's presidential victory in December of 1992, the regime elite's control of the process was extensive, and the elite opposition's fragmentation devastating to change. Many accusations of unfair campaign tactics were launched against Moi and KANU from independent organizations and the opposition alike. In the months leading to the election, official state functions became defacto KANU election rallies for Moi, despite the fact that elections had not officially begun (*Weekly Review* October 30, 1992). The Law Society of Kenya, the churches, and the opposition parties called on KANU to allow fair and equal time for opposition in the state-controlled media (*Weekly Review* October 30, 1992, 8). KANU came under severe criticism for the Electoral Commission's manipulation of the electoral process

by such means as announcing short deadlines for party registration and failing to inform the opposition of the electoral procedures adopted by the Electoral Commission (*The Standard* November 23, 1992, 15). The opposition did win one battle when a court ruling declared the first poll date of December 9 unfair since it did not allow the opposition parties adequate time to meet registration deadlines.

The leadership of the opposition was passed from the churches to more traditional political figures in 1990. Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia represented primarily the interests of the business community, and tended to criticize Moi for poor economic performance, cronyism, and corruption within the parastatals (Widner 1992a, 215). The interests that the political opposition took up were much more typical of the business elite, and did not focus on political liberalization and democracy nor the rights of the marginalized in Kenyan society.

The political opposition that coalesced around FORD in 1991 was also typical of the traditional political elite in Kenya. Oginga Odinga was a professional politician of long standing, as were other leaders within FORD such as Martin Shikuku and Masinde Muliro. These senior politicians had earlier demonstrated their abilities to deliver the majority of popular votes in the KANU elections in the 1970's to Moi's advantage (Widner 1992b, 69). As the political campaign progressed in 1992, leaders of the different

opposition parties took a similar non-programmatic approach in an effort to secure large blocks of voters. These leaders were criticized for excessive personalism in their struggle for opposition leadership and lack of commitment to programmatic party platforms (*Weekly Review* November 6, 1992, 3-7). Odinga's FORD-Kenya party made few programmatic promises beyond criticism of Moi and KANU in an open letter to the Kenyan public (*The Standard* October 15, 1992, 14).

Civil Society and the Transition

Political Parties

As already mentioned, Kenya was a de facto single-party state under Kenyatta, a de jure single-party state under Moi after 1982, and after December 1991, a fragmented multiparty state. For many years, KANU was the sole party, since other parties were outlawed or only tolerated. KANU served not as an ideological party, but as a party of patronage -- first with some competition under Kenyatta, but later as a personal tool of Moi. Party politics and regime politics were one.

While in Brazil and the Philippines, broad-based patronage parties played a role in unifying the opposition to the authoritarian regime, the Kenyan case suggests that the incentive of patronage rewards for the victor of electoral politics may not be enough to maintain unity. In the Kenyan setting, patronage and privilege fall along ethnic lines. This is true for the ruling regime, which has

used its position to disproportionately reward Moi's ethnic group, the Kalenjins, as well as the opposition (Mair 1994, 141-2). Widner claims that under conditions of single-party rule, local patronage machines and networks were spawned under influential political leaders who would become the opposition to Moi's rule. This proved to be threatening to Moi as he contemplated multiparty reform, since he realized the ability of opposing politicians to mobilize and cut deals needed for broader political success (Widner 1992b, 69).

The original configuration of FORD was filled with those who had shown the ability to use patronage for political success, but personalities and ethnic ties of members of the opposition precluded the unity that would be necessary to forge a broader party that may have had a chance of defeating Moi. Shortly after the announcement of multipartism in December 1991, open conflict in FORD between Odinga and Martin Shikuku began, and numerous other parties were organized (*Africa Research Bulletin* January 1992, 10420-1). No strong ideological party emerged as the election drew near, but instead, the parties were organized around specific leaders such as Odinga, Kibacki, Matiba and their ethnic groups (*Weekly Review* October 9, 1992, 3-5; November 13, 1992, 3-5). Though there were some indications that opposition parties were crossing ethnic boundaries and seeking broader mandates (*Christian Science Monitor* December 28, 1992, 11), the parties could not unify to defeat Moi.

In the period leading up to the elections in late 1992, party switching was endemic as local politicians tried to determine where their best bet for political success and spoils lie (*Weekly Review* November 6, 1992). Switching to the opposition and then back to KANU again was common. This discredited claims that the parties were changing and made attempts to exercise greater discipline or promote a more democratic program difficult. Since the election, there has also been little indication that the parties are serious about taking up programmatic stances and behaving in a manner consistent with majority and minority parties.

Labor Organizations and the Grass Roots

In Kenya, labor was more dispersed and less centrally organized. The sectors that did have some central organization and played a critical part in the national economy, such as the growers of export crops, were largely coopted by Moi's regime. In 1989, the Congress of Trade Unions (COTU), an umbrella group including most of the organized unions within Kenya, was incorporated directly into KANU itself (Bratton 1992, 11). Both tea and coffee growers were largely diffused as a potential threat to Moi's government when their cooperatives were either taken over or precluded by new parastatals in charge of commodity marketing (Widner 1992b, 67). The Coffee Board, Tea Authority, and Kenyan Farmers' Association were effectively stripped of autonomy and controlled by KANU (Widner 1992a,

215). For example, Moi formed the Nyayao Tea Zones, which flooded the market with government-controlled tea leaves until smallholders were forced to the government-controlled organization (Widner 1992b, 67). Only the transportation industry staged an effective work protest by shutting down bus service from routes around Nairobi. Although the Moi regime initially conceded to the private carriers, within months, Moi's ruling party KANU began running alternate vehicle routes to undermine the private interests (Widner 1992b, 66).

Moi sought as well the cooptation and control of rural development groups through the program called District Focus on Rural Development in which Moi decentralized the administration of rural development projects only to bring their control more firmly under the central government (Barkan and Chege 1989). Accompanying this tightened control of labor groups and rural development was the manipulation of harambee so that harambee became Moi's personal showcase and litmus test for personal loyalty.

Given a seemingly tightly controlled civil society within Kenya, it might be asked what organizations other than the churches were able to challenge Moi's rule. Developmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have flourished in Africa to fill in gaps in needed services and development that African governments have been unable or unwilling to provide (Bratton 1990, 88). However, as development activities progressed, NGOs attempted to

influence the policy context in which they work to further the success of their activities. Bratton claims that where NGOs are relatively homogeneous, federated in structure, well focused and funded, and informally linked to political leaders, they can have impact on policy outcomes (Bratton 1990, 87).

In Kenya, this had been the case for several NGOs, although their direct influence on the transitional process is unclear. Bratton illustrates efforts made by an umbrella organization set up by 23 Kenyan NGOs called Voluntary Agencies Development Assistance (VADA) to "engage government in a policy dialogue on behalf of the voluntary sector" (Bratton 1990, 103). Though VADA did not have the success its members envisioned for it, policy influence remained important for the NGOs in Kenya.

Calls to regulate the NGO sector began in 1989, after Moi and the environmental organization Green Belt Movement clashed over plans to build a high-rise structure over Uhuru Park in Nairobi (*Weekly Review* October 2, 1992, 27). After that time, the Moi regime pushed on with plans to force NGOs operating in Kenya to register with the government and be overseen by an NGO coordinating board (*Weekly Review* October 11, 1991, 36). The Non-Governmental Organisations (Co-Ordination) Act of 1990 required government registration of NGOs and formed a council to coopt the independent lobbying efforts of the NGO Network. Because the NGO Network was extensive throughout Kenya (400 groups and up to 40 percent

of rural health, education and development activities), it stood as a potential threat to Moi (Post Election Action Programme 1992, 252).

During the heat of the election year of 1992, Moi sought to fully implement the NGO act by setting up the Non-Governmental Organisations (Co-Ordination) Board which was to be made up of members of the NGOs themselves as well as Moi's appointees (*Weekly Review* October 2, 1992, 26-7). Though ostensibly created to coordinate the activities of the NGO sector, many leaders of the NGOs perceived the board as a means of regime control over NGO activity, and refused to join the board or register the organization (*The Standard* October 24, 1992, 5). The location of the coordinating board in the president's office rather than in the ministry of planning and development belied the sort of control Moi sought over NGOs (*The Standard* October 24, 1992, 5). Moi also attempted to interfere with the elections of the Law Society of Kenya, and to establish central control over the women's movement in Kenya by absorbing the social movement into KANU (Widner 1992b, 67).

Conclusion

In Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya, considerable progress was made in moving the countries away from authoritarian rule toward democratization. While elite political actors retained many of their interests, the mobilization of civil society did have an effect on the

transitions in each of the countries. When the transitions moved from the initiation phase to the contestation of regime rules, groups from civil society were forced to assert their interests within the opened political space. Those elements of civil society that were better organized were better able to alter "traditional politics" and realize social interests.

In each of the countries, the contestation over rules had the tendency to fragment civil society. However, civil groups that were well prepared were well placed to press some changes. In general, Brazil's mobilized actors within civil society were able to achieve greater influence, despite the continuity of influence elites achieved over the transitional period. The progressive tone of the constitution in Brazil attests to the influence of these sectors.

In the Philippines, civil society was less organized and had fewer resources as it moved out of the Marcos era. Within the continuing personalistic politics of the Philippines, popular groups have been less organized and effective. For this reason, the Philippine transition has been disappointing to many who thought that it would usher in greater changes and more benefits for the average Filipino. Despite the disappointments, a multiparty electoral process is in place to choose political leadership.

As mentioned earlier, Kenya's transition was the least far-reaching, and the most tenuous. Moi continued to hold power, and the fractious nature of the opposition to Moi further sealed the inability of civil society to make significant changes to the benefit of social interests. Though the political system that emerged was multiparty and utilized an electoral process to determine political power, traditional political interests of the ruling elite still dominate. Civil society's effectiveness was hampered by the poor sense of unity which prevailed throughout the transition. Politicized and partisan interests prevailed, which allowed elites to retain their own interests.

Chapter 4 Church-State Relations and a Changing Sense of Mission: Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya

The political behavior of the churches in Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya has varied according to the theology, or religious paradigm, that each hold. By examining the histories of the churches in Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya, it can be discovered to what degree various theological paradigms existed in the churches and what influence the holders of these paradigms had on national-level politics. The differences of paradigm will also be examined across the three cases in order to understand if and how the churches exercised influence on democratic transitions. Though each church's history was unique, the emergence of a theology tied to social and political action (often termed "progressive" theology) was apparent in each and led to new roles for the churches in initiating and supporting political change.

But despite the general tendency in each case to move toward the progressive paradigm, more traditional theological paradigms persisted. Individual parishes and base communities tended to reflect traditional pietistic models as often as progressive ones. National leadership, too, was often divided by the paradigms of the church that these historical tendencies represent. This chapter will examine both the general historical tendency toward a

theology emphasizing greater political activity and the continued presence of the traditional pietistic paradigm in the three cases.

The Church in Brazil

Three Paradigms of the Church in Brazil

Leonard Martin, a Catholic priest and scholar of the Brazilian Catholic Church, has suggested that there have been three distinct paradigmatic shifts in the Brazilian church since its beginning in 1500 (Martin 1990, 299-300). The first paradigm emphasized traditional church ritual and popular piety, as well as acquiescence to and dependence on the state (Martin 1990, 301). This model of the church evolved in the 1800's into a bureaucratized and hierarchical church with clear lines of authority, but despite these structural changes, the church remained essentially unchanged in its religious practice and in its relationship with the state (Martin 1990, 301-302).

Two paradigms evolved in the 20th Century in Brazil and much of Latin America. In the 1940's and 1950's, rationalism from Europe and modernization and developmentalist thought from western social science began to influence the church. Social action groups such Catholic Action were formed to actively combat the perceived threats from materialism and communism. Along with this change in the sense of mission came the basis of social and political involvement of the church.

Finally, in the 1960's and 1970's, a new paradigm Martin calls the "liberating church" began to emerge in Brazil and Latin America. Distilled through the work of liberation theologians, grass roots church groups, regional bishops' councils, and the social and moral teachings of the Second Vatican Council of 1962-65, this paradigm asserted a more active role of the church in political and social issues. It gave to the laity the power to set the course of the church, its tone of worship, and its ties to the social and political reality of the people (Martin 1990, 308-9). It is from this paradigm that open political opposition to the state by the church became a reality.

Traditional Piety and Acquiescence to the State

The first model of the church in Brazil reflected its medieval, Portuguese heritage. The church was concerned primarily with the sacramental duties of the priests -- baptisms, weddings, funerals, Eucharist, and confessions when the priest made it to the parishes. Religious practice was strongly dominated by mystical tradition, including devotion to the saints and pilgrimages, and by concerns of personal piety, including penitential exercises (Martin 1990, 301).

During this time, ties to the state were close and critical for the church, which became highly dependent on the colonial state for its survival. Seminaries were run by the state, and the opening of new dioceses or other

episcopal divisions was left to the state (Bruneau 1974, 16). This subordination of the institutional church ran all the way down to the rural and urban parish priests, who became dependent on the colonial elite for nearly everything, including salary and the construction of churches (Todaro 1971, 20).

In the mid-eighteenth century in Portugal, the Marquess de Pombal, a minister in King Joseph I's court and virtual ruler of Portugal, further exerted state control over the church. While the hierarchical church in Brazil had remained weak and in the control of the state, the spread of the religious orders had provided some religious leadership outside the control of the state. This was especially true of the Jesuits, who were disciplined, doctrinally pure, obedient to the order and the Pope, and hierarchically structured (Bruneau 1972, 19). In consonance with the anti-clerical spirit of the age, Pombal suppressed the Jesuit order in Portugal and removed them from Brazil (Todaro 1972, 20-21). Papal documents were controlled, the papal nuncio was forced out of Portugal, and relations with the Vatican were cut off by Pombal (Bruneau 1972, 20).

The dependent situation of the church continued into the period of the independent Empire of Brazil. The Constitution of 1824 declared Catholicism the official religion of the Empire, but also made the Emperor the "first ecclesiastical authority of the country (Bruneau 1972, 22)." The state continued to hold powers of patronage and fought

the influence of the Vatican by restricting the religious orders and controlling papal policies in Brazil. During the reign of Dom Pedro II from 1840-89, the state control of the church was nearly complete, as illustrated by this passage from Thomas Bruneau's work on the church.

During Pedro's long reign the Church was nothing more than an ordinary bureau of government. Through the patronage, he nominated bishops and other important members, interpreting the extent of his jurisdiction as he wished. Also through the patronage, he collected the tithes and paid the clergy; they were treated no differently than any other group of public functionaries. The lack of regulations from the Holy See on Church affairs combined with placet meant that the Emperor could decide what to allow through; the state passed legislation and did this in a very thorough manner indeed (Bruneau 1972, 23).

The church remained in this subordinate position for many years. It was noted that during this time the

notorious laxity of the clergy, the vast extension of the land, the isolation of population clusters, and the lack of priests augmented the Church's lack of cohesion (Todaro 1971, 22).

The Republic and neo-Christendom

The pope and Vatican began to re-exert papal authority over the national churches in the mid 1800's. This movement toward papal control, known as "ultramontanism," was considered very threatening by the civil authorities in Brazil. Conflict broke out in Brazil when the influential Masonic movement, which included Brazilian Catholic lay groups and many priests and government figures, was condemned by Pope Pius IX. In 1874, two Brazilian bishops instructed members of the lay Catholic organizations in

their parishes to abjure their lodge membership. The bishops sanctioned the Masons by refusing them the benefits of church membership, including the sacraments (Todaro 1971, 25-26).

The imperial government imprisoned and sentenced the unrepentant clerics to hard labor, and despite the eventual commutation of their sentence, the government was widely condemned for its prosecution of the bishops. The cause of the bishops became a rallying point for the reexertion of church influence (Bruneau 1974, 28-9).

The declaration of the Republic of Brazil in 1891 disestablished the church, ended patronage, and stopped all subsidies for religious functions, including church-run schools and the salaries of church personnel (Bruneau 1974, 30). Church leadership tried to continue a church-government coalition in order to sustain the hierarchical privileges granted by the state and continue the church's monopoly position as an unofficial state church (Todaro 1971, 30-31). State elites, who were influenced by the liberal and positivist philosophy of the era, had little desire to return to an era of state-church partnership, however.

In a 1916 pastoral letter, Archbishop (and later Cardinal) Leme called for the reestablishment of the Catholic Church in Brazil to return Brazil to its status as a "Catholic nation." Several organizations were created which involved the laity and were specifically political in

nature. The groups were largely middle class and focused on the conservative political and moral agenda of Leme and the Vatican (Della Cava 1976, 12).

The Catholic Church was never reestablished as the official state church. However, Leme and the conservatives centralized the church's rather autonomous ecclesiastical order and gave the hierarchy increased influence over the church (Della Cava 1976, 12). Despite extensive involvement in the lay political organizations, participation "remained under total submission to the institutional concerns of the episcopal authorities" (Todaro 1971, 497). Rome also aggressively staffed the many openings with its own appointees, set up seminaries, and used its own funding (Bruneau 1974, 33). Brazil's church became increasingly tied to the interests of the international church and the conservative hierarchy.

When the Vargas regime came to power in 1930, the church largely overlooked the authoritarian nature of the regime in order to secure church interests and preserve the conservative social milieu the church desired. In 1935, Cardinal Leme organized Catholic Action and a politically active wing called the Catholic Electoral League (LEC). Catholic Action was composed primarily of middle and upper class communicants. Its issues were traditional ones of family preservation, and its structure was hierarchical and controlled by the institutional church (Todaro 1971, 497-9). The LEC's mission was to "assist in the election of

politicians sworn to preserve certain Church principles," and the group had great success in promoting legislative candidates (Todaro 1971, 499).

Though the church and its organizations became more activist in this period, they continued to be controlled by the hierarchy, protective of traditional conservative interests, and supportive of authoritarian rule. The church was also generally irrelevant to the majority of Brazilians and their problems. In the parish, the priest was the supreme authority and carried out all the religious sacraments, despite the extreme shortage of priests. Though it enjoyed increased organizational strength, the church appeared "incapable of change" (Todaro 1971, 507).

Social Activism

The Brazilian church experienced decreasing influence in Brazilian society with the advent of the democratic republic in 1945 (Della Cava 1976, 19-20). The church was unable to recruit enough priests to have a concrete presence throughout the country, and Catholic religiosity, which was highly flexible and not very disciplined, led to decreased traditional religious practice. In the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo attendance at weekly mass hovered between only 3 and 8 percent (Della Cava 1976, 25).

Another challenge to the church's influence in the 1940's and 1950's was the growth of Pentecostalism and Spiritist movements. Pentecostal Christian churches, with

their emphasis on individual conversion, laity, egalitarianism, and spirit-filled worship, had much appeal to especially the lower class in the time of social upheaval after World War II (Della Cava 1976, 27). Spiritism, too, in the forms of the Afro-Brazilian cult of Umbanda, and Kardecism, was growing in influence both within the practice of folk Catholicism and in actual group membership (Della Cava 1976, 28).

In order to combat these trends and win more influence within society, conservative elements of the hierarchy were willing to allow some innovation to occur. Key to the move toward a more activist agenda in the church was the formation of the *Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil* (CNBB) in 1952. Under Dom Helder Camara's leadership, the CNBB began to promote active involvement in several development enterprises. Camara argued that the church needed to respond to the extreme poverty and powerlessness of much of the Brazilian population which had occurred in the rapid post-war modernization of Brazil and the accompanying social upheaval of urbanization and the spread of the market economy (Hewitt 1991, 15-16).

The church responded organizationally by founding the *Movimento de Educação de Base* (MEB), a program of basic education in literacy training and social conscientization. Begun by the bishop of Natal in 1958, the MEB promoted radio schools, in which local communities with a receiver would set up a "school" with the radio curriculum and local

monitors at each school. The CNBB expanded the MEB to many of the dioceses, and by 1963, there were 7,353 schools and 180,000 students (Bruneau 1974, 80).

Catholic Action was also reorganized in 1950, and new ideas about how to serve the church's interests through a more progressive and pro-development agenda began to emerge. Under the leadership of young, European-trained priests who were influenced by modernization and developmentalist thought, Catholic Action established four youth divisions which made social change their explicit goal. As Bruneau noted,

the movement's new purpose was to humanize before attempting to evangelize; to promote structural change so that evangelization would be possible and realistic. The new self-identity was inseparable from action and at times it invaded the temporal sphere of politics (Bruneau 1974, 97).

The secondary and university divisions (*Juventude Estudantil Católica* (JEC) and *Juventude Universitária Católica* (JUC)) led not only protests against the educational system in Brazil, but also government protests and militant labor action (Bruneau 1974, 98-9). The other youth branches of Catholic Action were ostensibly for rural and urban working youth, but never had that much presence.

Much of the church's influence was turned toward the organization of rural labor movements. Brazil's countryside was dominated by a landed elite class who held considerable local political power, and when the church began to organize workers in several areas, parish priests came into direct

political competition with local landowners. By 1964, there were 50 church-sponsored rural union movements in half of the Brazilian states, which the government reluctantly agreed to recognize before the military took power in 1964 (Bruneau 1974, 89).

There was considerable church unity behind the rural movements, with both the CNBB and local parishes supporting the organization of workers. While clearly influenced by the needs expressed by the local parishes for peasant organization, the national hierarchy was also concerned about the influence of communist ideals in the countryside. In order to counter this influence, the church supported the rural movements so long as they did not clash too much with the government's development policies (Bruneau 1974, 76).

In summary, though the conservative elements of the church never really went away, they were tolerant of the innovations of Helder Camara, the progressive organizations of Catholic Action, and the rural unions, so long as the influence of the church increased. However, when the organizations became too radical in their approach, as in militant labor actions of the JUC and JEC, the hierarchy quieted the groups' leadership and distanced themselves (Della Cava 1976, 36). This activist and developmental model of the church broke from some of the conservative tendencies of the past, yet did not challenge to any degree the conditions of injustice in Brazilian society nor the political milieu which supported them. When the military

coup came in 1964, much of the church was either supportive or fell silent for a time. Three generals assumed the office of president from 1964 to 1974, introducing economic austerity, purging opposition from within the bureaucracy, unions, and universities, liquidating leftist guerilla movements, and eroding constitutional rule by passing decree powers (Skidmore 1989, 6-7).

The Liberating Paradigm

Retrenchment

There were three developments in the initial years of the military regime that served to fragment the church for a period of time: the radicalization and repression of the left, splits in the hierarchy and the ascendancy of the conservatives, and church accommodation to the regime.

Almost immediately after the coup d'état occurred in April 1964, the progressive elements of the church were repressed and forced to alter themselves, or be disbanded. The special targets of the new regime were the Catholic Action movement and the MEB. Several progressive priests tied to these organizations were arrested, deported, and tortured (Antoine 1973, 27-8). The regime attempted to consolidate the JUC into its own organization, the National Union of Students, which was a direct challenge to the leadership of the church which created the movement. The

MEB had its transmitters seized and stations closed down. The popular press which ventured to defend these programs were censored or shut down as well (Antoine 1973, 27-8).

The CNBB initially made supportive statements concerning the military action, which "delivered us from the communist peril" and "in the name of the supreme interests of the nation ... liberated the nation from the imminent abyss" (Bruneau 1974, 121). Bitter divisions within the leadership became apparent, however. Dom Helder Camara and other progressives clashed with the conservative bishops, and in the elections for the CNBB's leadership in late 1964, progressives were dumped for moderates and novices in key leadership positions (Bruneau 1974, 124). The nature of the CNBB changed from being a fairly centralized, autonomous and progressive group within the greater church to being much more decentralized by diocese, tied to the traditional interests of the church, and essentially apolitical. Tensions arose, too, over the direction church programs such as Catholic Action would take. Instead of defending the programs, the conservative elements of the church hierarchy blamed the organizations for being used by Communists (Bruneau 1974, 82-3). The CNBB voted in 1965 to cut off funding for the JUC when it would not accept greater hierarchical control (Bruneau 1974, 126). Church-supported rural labor organizations were also undercut by the new leadership. Rural unionism virtually disappeared after the

coup, and what presence the church maintained in its rural organizations was fairly benign and supportive of the developmental policies of the regime.

There were some pockets of more radicalized rural organization in the Northeast, however. The Workers' Catholic Action of Recife issued a manifesto in March 1966 condemning the conditions of rural Brazil and the exploitation of peasant workers. Seen as a direct challenge to the military regime, the manifesto was nevertheless supported by the bishops of the northeast, led by Helder Camara. The manifesto stirred up great controversy within the church and with the military regime, which threatened to have progressive clergy removed from their seats (Antoine 1973, 87). Though efforts were made by the regime to smooth over the storm that had resulted from the northeast bishops controversy, by the time the dust settled a bit, two things had become clear: the state was willing to actively oppose the church, even with repression, and the church hierarchy under the new conservative leadership would essentially accommodate the military regime. As one observer of the Brazilian church at that time wrote,

confronted by a choice between defending a religious institution and risking itself in the defense of human values which were threatened, [the church] chose survival (Shaul 1973, 4).

Changes in the International Church

While the internal wrangling within the Brazilian church were going on in the years after the military takeover of power, the international church was making profound changes that would keep alive the progressive churches in many countries. Three movements that changed the nature of the broader Catholic Church had profound effects on the Brazilian church: the second Vatican Council and the papal encyclicals written after, the emergence of liberation theology, and the creation of base communities.

Vatican II and the Papal Encyclicals

The changes proposed by Vatican II and the encyclicals were directed to two main areas: an attempt to have more relevance in the everyday lives of members, and a relaxation of the hierarchical structure and control of the international church. In order to promote relevance and achieve a more credible and active witness in everyday life, the church was urged to actively promote human rights and dignity and encourage lay people to participate in sub-parish organizations by bringing worship to their own languages (Mainwaring 1986, 9).

Vatican II softened the hierarchical control of the universal church by promoting an international Synod of Bishops to meet with the pope and episcopal conferences at regional and national levels (Smith 1982, 17). A Latin American regional council of bishops was convened in 1968 at

Medellin. The "preferential option for the poor" that these bishops adopted at Medellin, represented a new alignment away from elite interests toward the interests of the poor.

The 150 bishops

dedicated themselves "to educate the Christian conscience" in matters of social responsibilities, "to denounce everything which, opposing justice, destroys peace," "to defend the rights of the poor and oppressed," and "to encourage and favor efforts of the people to create and develop their own grass-roots organizations for the consolidation of their rights" (Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM), quoted in Smith 1982, 19).

The Vatican's new direction, combined with the decentralization of ecclesiastical power as represented by the regional bishops' councils, were important pieces in the change in Latin American churches and in particular, Brazil.

Liberation Theology

Liberation theology emerged from both the experiences of the poor and oppressed within the indigenous churches of Latin America and the universal changes called for by Vatican II. Levine suggests four major concepts at the heart of the theology of liberation as it began in Latin America: emphasis on history and historical change, a return to Biblical sources, stress on the poor, and structural, class analysis borrowed from Marxism (Levine 1992, 40-1).

As a response to the call from Vatican II to respond to the "signs of the times," liberation theology sought to understand the process of historical change and to find historical relevance in the situation of the church on a day to day basis. Theological reflection should not be limited to the religious affairs of the church and its members, but to daily social, economic, and political concerns. As a commentary on the impact of liberation theology on social change suggests,

Salvation, then, is not simply "spiritual" or the guarantee of supernatural bliss in "heaven," but the outcome of the historical process for attaining political, economic and social well-being (Flinn 1987, 318).

The historical analysis adopted by liberation theologians shares with Marxist analysis the structural, class-based approach to understanding contemporary reality in the world. Leonardo and Clodovis Boff proposed a "new way of being church" where

each member of the Church is considered to be a living, active "ecclesial subject" (active agent of being-Church), actively sharing and participating in what it means to be Church. Pastors and clergy, here, come second. They are in a subordinate position; they are the servants of the people of God and the inspirers of their faith, hope, and love (Boff and Boff 1988, 28).

The new church was to be participatory, that is, to encourage lay involvement in worship, liturgy, and parish activities. Not only would the laity participate, but also the church was to take concrete action on the behalf of the laity, the majority of whom were poor. This is sometimes called the church's "prophetic" role, akin to the Old Testament prophets who decried injustice and the trampling of the poor. The use of the Biblical prophets and the promotion of shared Bible study were further promoted in the base communities that began to form in the late 1960's in Brazil (Levine 1992, 40).

Base Communities

The emergence of base communities in Latin America had both a practical as well as spiritual side. The first Basic Ecclesial Community or *Comunidade Ecclesial de Base* (CEB) is said to have been formed in Brazil in 1963 as a response to the shortage of clergy. The CEB movement in Brazil began to emerge in earnest in the early 1970's as an alternative organization to the traditional parish (Mainwaring b, 158-160). The CEBs of Brazil have been the most active of those in Latin America, with estimates of the numbers of CEBs ranging from 80,000 to 100,000 with participation of over

two million people (though not necessarily members) (Mainwaring b, 151, Hewitt 1991, 1). Base communities are typically made up of 20 to 50 people who meet for activities as varied as Bible study and worship preparation to consciousness raising (Hewitt 1991, 2).

Hewitt's empirical study of several Brazilian dioceses posits several different types of CEBs with differing agendas. Some CEBs are dominated by middle and upper class participants and their activities focus on traditional sacramental and worship activities or on pietistic activities such as Bible study and prayer (Hewitt 1991, 69). Other CEBs also engage in community-based developmental projects or charitable projects, but rarely venture into more politicized behavior (Hewitt 1991, 93). Not that many have pursued consistent political conscientization activities, and nearly all depend heavily on the centralized organization of the diocese for extensive support (Hewitt 1991, 59). These findings contrast with portrayals of CEBs as independent, highly democratic, activist, and tied to a progressive political agenda.

In the bigger picture, Levine places the Brazilian CEB movement of the 1970's and 1980's in a middle category of his typology of base communities. While Brazil's CEBs might not fit the "radical ideal" of confrontational politics (such as the El Salvadoran church of the 1970's), neither are the Brazilian CEBs the "conservative ideal" of apolitical, pietistic groups under the control of the

central hierarchy (as in Columbia). Levine believes that the Brazilian CEB movement effectively called for "sociocultural transformation" in Brazil and moved the church toward a pro-poor agenda. Most of its social and political activity was local and did not achieve the national scope some had envisioned, and though the ties to the hierarchical church were quite strong, the movement was not entirely controlled (Levine 1992, 48). Levine concludes that the base communities

developed in ways that responded to the needs of the popular sectors for participatory experiences that could provide meaning, structure, and support as they faced a difficult and changing world (Levine 1992, 50).

The CNBB and the Progressive Agenda

The earlier acquiescence to the military regime gave way to a much more combative relationship between the church and state. This occurred for several reasons. A more progressive leadership ascended in the CNBB in 1970 and was instrumental in the creation of several organizations tied to the interests of the marginalized population. Because the military regime's economic growth and anti-leftist policies were particularly oppressive to these marginalized groups, the CNBB increasingly came into contention with the regime. The vehicle the bishops used to decry the military regime's policies were increasingly politicized pastoral letters.

The CNBB became the umbrella organization for several groups who were facing economic difficulty and violent repression from the military regime in the early 1970's. The Indians' Missionary Council (CIMI) was formed in 1972 as a church response to the difficult plight of the indigenous population especially in the Amazon region. Because the military regime's Indian Protection Service (later reformulated into the National Indian Foundation) was corrupt and did not serve the native population's interests, the church felt a need to intervene on the indigenous population's behalf (Bruneau 1982, 86). CIMI trained church personnel to work with the native population, mobilized and organized the Indian population to form a unified front against oppressive government policies, and went to the defense of the Indians in specific cases of loss of land (Bruneau 1982, 87).

The Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) played a role similar to CIMI with the rural peasant population. The military's land tenure policies encouraged the commercialization of agriculture (especially for export-oriented agriculture) and forced more and more peasants from their land. In response, the CNBB's Justice and Peace Commission formed the CPT in 1975 and began an aggressive campaign for land reform. The CPT, like CIMI, organized peasants, disseminated information, and defended individual cases against eviction. As violence increased in the

countryside in the 1970's, the CPT found itself increasingly defending the rights and lives of peasants, and coming under attack itself (Bruneau 1982, 85).

Several other groups tied to the interests of the marginalized were sponsored by the church at this time. The Pastoral Workers' Commission (CPO) was to play a similar role as the CPT for the urban working class (Mainwaring b, 155). The Inter-Ecclesial National Encounter was formed in 1974 to oversee the diverse CEB movement and to promote sharing of experiences (Della Cava 1989, 151).

Though the CNBB began formal criticism of military repression as early as a May 1970 pastoral letter, a more comprehensive and systematic flow of critical political pastoral letters did not begin until 1975 (Mainwaring b, 161). Before the central body of the CNBB began its criticism, several regional bishops' groups in 1973 wrote influential letters. The northeastern bishops' *I Have Heard the Cry of my People* and the center-west bishops' *Marginalization of the People* fully committed the church to solidarity with the poor and oppressed and action on their behalf (Hewitt 1991, 18).

Despite the *abertura*, or political opening that began in 1974 under Geisel, between 1975 and 1985, the CNBB made progressively critical statements of the regime and committed the central hierarchy to the preferential option for the poor. While the regime reforms focused primarily on state censorship and decree rule, the church pushed for more

far-reaching reform. A November 1975 statement of the Representative Commission of the CNBB reaffirmed the church's prophetic role by condemning social inequity, oppression of human rights, and national abuses carried out by the military regime (Bruneau 1982, 76). A 1977 CNBB letter entitled *Christian Requirements for a Just Political Order* insisted that the regime could be held to higher moral principles and that the church must appropriately assume responsibility in defining these principles (Bruneau 1982, 76-7). The document criticized the security state imposed by the military regime and called instead for open representation of the people's interests, and the suspension of human and civic rights violations. It condemned not only the oppressive use of force, but also the socioeconomic marginalization of the population due to governmental economic policies (Bruneau 1985, 275).

Geisel's successor, João Batista Figuerdo, felt more intense pressure for change from labor and church activists, as well as middle class groups since the economic miracle was fading (Skidmore 1989, 21). A statement written around the time of the 1979 Puebla conference of the Latin American regional bishops called attention to the plight of rural peasants and the indigenous population, and condemned their systematic repression by the regime (Bruneau 1985, 175-6). Similarly, a 1980 letter focused on the problems of land tenure and increased violence against peasants in the rural sectors. The church at large was called on to mobilize and

organize the peasantry toward genuine land reform. A similar analysis of urban land problems was released in 1982 (Bruneau 1985, 276-7).

Perhaps the most politicized letter was issued in August 1981 by the CNBB's permanent council. The letter, *Christian Reflections on the Political Situation*, was written with the election of November 1982 in mind. These elections would not only form a congress under new electoral rules, but would also determine the composition of the electoral college, an important component of the future direction of national leadership. The letter stated the church's clear preference for open democracy. According to the bishops, this was to include the improvement of not only political rights, but also social and economic conditions (CNBB 1981, Bruneau 1985, 277).

However, the church realized little influence in the 1982 elections. Despite the majority election of the opposition party in the governorships and the House, the party of the authoritarian regime remained in control of the Senate and the electoral college. Control of the executive also gave the regime party much power over the states, since power and resources had been greatly centralized since 1964 (Skidmore 1989, 30). Given the questionable effectiveness of church efforts as well as a resurgence of conservatism in the international and Brazilian church, the hierarchy appeared to tone down the political content of the letters for a while (Mainwaring 1986, 242-3, Della Cava 1989, 153).

However, as the movement for direct elections for the presidency gathered steam in 1985, the church became reinvigorated. The CNBB overwhelmingly supported direct elections and encouraged the Congress to adopt the amendment that would make direct elections possible (Bruneau 1985, 278). The church also took on an important role in mobilizing the public in favor of the direct elections. Though the amendment failed to pass, the overwhelming mobilization of the people in support of it had an impact. The presidency was turned over to civilian rule and many democratic reforms were instituted by the newly empowered opposition party.

Since 1985, the church's social and political role has changed in several ways. Increasing conservative pressure from the Vatican, religious competition, and a more open political environment "reduced the need for the church to remain actively involved with the cause for social change" (Bruneau and Hewitt 1992, 51). Chapter 5 examines the church in this period of in two specific times after the initiation of regime change: the writing of the constitution in 1987 and the presidential elections of 1989.

The Church in the Philippines

The three paradigms that Martin proposed for the Brazilian church can also be used to understand the change of mission which occurred in the Philippine church and the

relationship of church to the state before the initiation of democratic transition.

The Traditional Pietist Paradigm and Acquiescence to the State

During Spanish colonialism, traditional religiosity and close ties between the church and state were prevalent. This relationship, though altered somewhat, continued into the period of American colonialism, despite the backlash against the church during the nationalist movement and brief period of the Republic.

The Spanish Colonial Period

The Catholic Church has been a presence in the Philippines since Spanish conquest of the islands in the 16th Century. The first Catholic mass and baptisms in the Philippines were led by Magellan's entourage in 1521, and after the conquest of the islands in the 1560's, the Catholic faith became the dominant religious force (Sitoy 1985, 50, 118-9). The religious orders, which included the Order of St. Augustine, the Franciscans and the Dominicans, carved up their own distinct areas of influence both religiously and politically (de la Costa 1969a, 44-45). From 1565 to 1578, there was no ecclesiastical order of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, but as the Christianization efforts of the religious orders prospered, the Spanish king and the Pope ordered a bishopric erected in

Manila in 1579. This began the formal organization of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, which did not change in any significant way until the 20th Century (Schumacher 1979, 18).

The Spanish colonial state and the church had what Youngblood calls a "symbiotic" relationship in which civil, military, and ecclesiastical authority were blended in a number of ways (Youngblood 1990, 1). The Spanish state was required to support the evangelizing work of the church while the governor-general of the islands had appointive power over the clergy. The archbishop assumed the office of lieutenant governor in the regime, and a highly centralized civil bureaucracy under the dual control of the state and the institutional church was formed to protect the interests of both (Wurfel 1988, 4-5).

In the mid-16th Century, schools for religious instruction were established in order to train candidates for the priesthood and "to keep the youth occupied so as to preserve them from many dangers" (Schumacher 1979, 142). The Spanish civil authorities gave over the educational task to the church completely. Economically, the church, and especially the religious orders, were the largest landowners during the Spanish colonial period, and the feudal-style management of the "friar lands" amassed much wealth for the church, gave it additional power over economic and political policies of the state, and also made it a very conservative

force, given the church's interest in the maintenance of economic and political structures (Ofreneo 1987, 321).

The church-state relationship and economic and political power of the church were not challenged until the nineteenth century. As the economic power of the friars increased, opposition formed mostly from hispanized local elites, who resented the economic and political competition from the church (Ofreneo 1987, 321). The Catholic Church and the religious orders had also failed to take on a truly indigenous character. Training of Filipino priests lagged seriously and turnover of ecclesiastical control to native Filipinos was almost non-existent. Of the 967 parishes that existed in 1898, only 150 were under Filipino leadership (Deats 1967, 31). Conflict between the religious orders and the bishops, not to mention the racist and disparaging attitude of many Spanish clergy to the Filipinos, made it very difficult for the church to take on a Philippine identity (de la Costa 1969b, 92-3). Instead, the church began to represent a target for the growing nationalist movement.

The resentment against the wealthy and European church leadership was key to the formation of nationalist sentiments leading up to the revolution (Schumacher 1990, 151). The nationalist movement in the Philippines and the movement to create a truly Filipino church were both brutally crushed by the Spanish political leadership.

Filipino clergy who were sympathetic or supportive of the nationalist movement were exiled or murdered, often with the support of the powerful friars (Deats 1967, 37).

The American Colonial Period

The revolution and brief period of the independent Republic directed much fervor against the clerics and the religious orders for their role in maintaining and perpetuating colonial rule. When the American military took control of the Philippines from 1898 to 1946 (with the interruption of Japanese occupation), there was a separation of ecclesiastic and civil administration and greater pluralization of religious influence, but still strong church support of the regime (Coquia 1950, 13). The United States Congress disestablished the Roman Catholic Church in 1902, and the legal principles of American common law replaced the Spanish civil law which had long upheld a special place for the church in the political order (Tano 1981, 22, Coquia 1950, 14-5).

The American occupation government assumed control of the vast agricultural holdings of some of the religious orders and redistributed them to non-church entities. Roughly 430,000 acres were purchased from the religious orders and sold to estate owners (Tano 1981, 22). However, the American administration did maintain guaranteed land rights for the church in return for what Ofreneo calls a cooptation of church leaders and local elites (Ofreneo 1987,

321). American-style public education dominated primary and secondary schools, but colleges and seminaries remained in the hands of Spanish clerics until the 1950's.

The church was particularly supportive of the American administration's anti-communist policies. Groups such as the Catholic Welfare Organization, the Institute of Social Order, the Young Christian Workers, the Social Justice Crusade and Catholic Action of the Philippines were formed in the 1930's as welfare and workers' organizations, but also were clearly seen as counterbalances to communist organizations (Youngblood 1990, 3-4, Ofreneo 1987, 322, Fabros 1988, 19). Some clerics later built on this involvement by founding the Federation of Free Workers in 1950 and the Federation of Free Farmers in 1952. These groups were formed to address issues of justice for workers and peasants, but also to counter the increasing influence of the Huk Rebellion in Central Luzon in the mid 1950's (Ofreneo 1987, 321). Though primarily conservative, from many of these groups would later come the basis for more progressive church policies.

The American colonial period also witnessed the growth of independent Philippine churches and Protestant mission efforts. Although they were to become an important religious and political force later in the 20th century, at first the growth of independent and Protestant churches was slow. The Philippine Independent Church (Anglipayan or PIC) broke off from the Catholic Church in 1902, motivated by the

broader nationalist movement of the revolutionary period, the desire for Filipino clergy to run their own church, and the climate of religious openness that the American occupation had fostered (Clifford 1969, 225-6). The *Iglesia ni Christo* (Church of Christ) was formed as a Filipino response to the Seventh Day Adventist movement in 1914 (Tano 1981, 23, Elwood 1969, 370). These largest of the independents constituted only a small portion of the religious population.

Protestant missionaries and mission societies were formed between 1899 and 1902 for many of the major American Protestant denominations, but only a few percent of the population became Protestant at first (Arcilla 1988, 106). Protestant missionaries did become involved in other civic activities, such as education in the public school systems, and in this way, had some influence independent of their religious activities (Arcilla 1988, 111, Barrett 1982, 565).

The period of Japanese occupation was one of outward statements of support for the Japanese combined with fierce resistance to Japanese attempts to win over the Christian population (Parpan 1989, 451-53). While promising cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration, church leaders and lay persons resisted and showed disdain for Japanese efforts to legitimize their rule. The Catholic leadership refused to endorse Japanese rule or call for open

support of the occupation government, citing the "historical" separation of clergy from political matters (Parpan 1989, 456-7).

The Emergence of Social Activism and the Beginnings of Challenge to the Authoritarian State

The Catholic Church in the period after Philippine independence was primarily controlled by a conservative hierarchy and institutional interests. As Wurfel writes,

During the 1950's and the early 1960's the church seemed to enter politics only to protect or expand its institutional interests, not to change or preserve politically significant values (Wurfel 1988, 49).

Fabros concurs that before Vatican II's opening to the laity, any official social action program of the church was sponsored and overseen by the conservative national hierarchy (Fabros 1988, 60). Numerous organizations centered on social action were formed in the 1950's and 1960's, such as the Priest's Institute of Social Action, the Lay Institute of Social Action, and the Asian Social Institute. However, the organization of these groups tended to be "focused primarily on charitable works, reflecting a continued paternalism within the church" (Youngblood 1990, 5). This paternalism was illustrated by the extreme skittishness on the part of the hierarchy to support worker or peasant movements when issues were pressed to the point of labor or peasant unrest or strikes (Fabros 1988, 77).

Instead, the Catholic Church emphasized local community development projects because they were not as conflictual as the labor movement (Fabros 1988, 168).

Despite the prevailing conservatism, this period was also a time in which a greater emphasis on social justice began to edge its way into both a dissident minority within the church and the organizations of the traditional church. The first evidence of this change in thought came in two pastoral letters in 1948 and 1949 from the Catholic Welfare Organization, the forerunner of the CBCP, that condemned the social and economic inequality in the Philippines and called for the upholding of basic human rights to organize, vote, earn a wage, and own property (Fabros 1988, 53-9, Youngblood 1990, 4). The emphasis on community development, though begun with rather conservative intentions of combating "Communist" organization among the poor, appears to have conscientized the church and allowed it to form more critical assessments of the Filipino experience at the grass roots (Fabros 1988, 169). The growth of a more critical position toward the government was enhanced when the Philippine government announced its intention to promote family planning in the later 1960's. With this direct challenge to church moral teachings, traditionally conservative members of the church hierarchy also began to support a vision of politics that challenged the regime (Wurfel 1988, 49).

The Liberating Paradigm and Opposition to the Marcos Regime

1965 was the year that the international Catholic Church began to change its social teachings with the dissemination of the new theology of Vatican II, and also the year that the Philippine Catholic Church celebrated 400 years of existence. On the occasion of this anniversary, the Philippine leadership of the church pledged itself to carrying out the directives of Vatican II (Kroeger 1987, 7-8). It is interesting to note that this also was the year that Ferdinand Marcos was first elected, and the relationship of the Marcos regime to the church played a critical role in shaping the church's sense of mission.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Philippine church's commitment to evangelization expanded

from a concern for social change to include the need for structural change. It became clear that efforts which painstakingly had improved the conditions of farming and working classes could not be long sustained without corresponding political clout. Church involvement in broader socio-political economic questions became imperative (Kroeger 1988, 15).

Several organizations tied to the hierarchical church were formed. The National Secretariat for Social Action, Justice, and Peace (NASA) was formed as a social welfare arm of the Catholic bishops in 1965. Social Action Centers were organized throughout the country to administer programs of social welfare, create awareness of social justice issues among clergy and laity, and to counter the influence of communist-inspired groups (Giordano 1988, 22, KSP 1984, 20). NASA became increasingly committed to the agenda of the

progressive church several years into the martial law regime, as, for example, it worked to raise workers' consciousness and organizing capabilities through a series of worker seminars (Genato-Rebullida 1991, 80-1, KSP 1984, 20-1). Though the institutional church tried to clip the wings of the progressive movement in NASA by stacking its board with conservative bishops in 1981, the regional bodies of NASA continued the progressive agenda at local levels (KSP 1984, 21).

Priests and nuns were represented by two bodies, the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) and the Philippine Priests Incorporated (PPI), as well as the major religious orders. Though established in 1955, the AMRSP did not take on a more social-gospel emphasis until the middle 1970's when the group became a leading and often outspoken proponent of change, especially through an offshoot called the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TDFP) (Youngblood 1990, 84). TDFP arose in response to the increasing oppression of the church during Marcos' martial rule. The group documented and kept alive the memory of human rights abuses of those both inside and outside the church. PPI, through its publication, *Philippine Priests' Forum*, became a leader in promoting church reform, despite intimidation from the Marcos regime (Youngblood 1990, 74). A number of the religious orders, the most recognized of which was the Maryknoll Fathers, also

promoted a social gospel which emphasized a broad concept of liberation (Youngblood 1990, 73).

The testing grounds for many of the ideas of the progressive church was the south, where the strong Moslem presence in Mindanao and Sulu had been a contentious issue for the Catholic Church for many years. Attempts at proselytization in the Moslem strongholds created conflict not only between the Catholic Church and the Moslem population, but also with the Philippine government, which historically supported the church's efforts. The Moslem independence movement in Mindanao (the Moro National Liberation Front) further created tensions between the Marcos regime and the Moslem population (Youngblood 1990, 154-156).

The church's response to this situation took several forms. To increase the church's influence in the South, where the shortage of clerics was particularly severe, much focus was placed on lay leadership training. The Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference (MSPC) was established in 1971 to increase Catholic presence in the South and to promote conscientization and empowerment of local peoples (Youngblood 1990, 88). Key to this work was the formation of Basic Christian Communities (BCCS), whose role paralleled the CEBs of Brazil and other base communities in Latin America. Several conferences organizing BCCs were held in the seventies under the auspices of the MSPC (KSP 1984, 21).

Because of the progressive nature of the church's presence in the South, this area became the scene of some of the most contentious struggles of the church with the Marcos regime.

The Basic Christian Communities

The Philippines has historically had an acute shortage of clergy throughout the country, as few as one priest for 50,000 communicants in some areas (Giordano 1988, 12). The Philippines has only approximately 4,500 priests and 7,500 nuns in the entire country (Wurfel 1988, 215). Base communities were organized through much of the Philippines in the 1970's as a means of organizing the laity in the absence of clergy (Mendoza 1988, preface). BCCs began as a rural phenomena, centered on liturgy, Bible study, and prayer. At nearly the same time as the BCCs' organization, Community Organizations (COs) were forming in the squatter areas of urban centers. Their agendas were tied more closely to organizing neighborhood groups to deal with forced relocations of squatter populations and other urban issues (KSP 1984, 21). At an annual convention in 1977, NASA merged the BCC and CO approaches as the BCC-CO program, and made the organization of these communities a key part of its social agenda (KSP 1984, 22). The AMRSP also began to promote the organization of BCC-COs as a means of raising consciousness, improving the lives of the poor and oppressed, and "restructuring the present unjust social order in our country" (AMRSP statement of December 1971, in

Youngblood 1990, 84-5). By the 1980's, Youngblood reports that "thousands" of BCCs (as BCC-COs are commonly called) had come into existence (1990, 92).

Philippine BCCs have focused primarily on group Bible studies, prayer, and other internal group activities. Research conducted by Bishops Carroll and Claver in 1986 indicate that most BCCs were not associated with the goal of consciousness raising, but focused primarily on the spiritual life of their members and mutual assistance among their members. Very few were involved in political activities, despite the verbal support progressive bishops gave to a "prophetic role" of the BCCs (Carroll and Claver 1986, 31, 39).

Research done in conjunction with Ateneo de Manila University on 17 case study BCCs supports the Bishops' findings. While the base communities had been very successful in recruiting and using volunteer lay leadership and in creating a sense of belonging and spiritual growth in the lives of their members, they were not very political in nature. Only in Mindanao, where the participation rate was rather high (up to 50% of the parish were members of BCCs) and conflict with the government, military, and Muslim groups was also high, did the BCCs actively and consistently pursue political action (Mendoza 1988, 7-8). In Luzon, where there were fewer BCCs and less people involved (less than 10% of the parish were members of a BCC), the primary functions of the BCCs were spiritual, health-related, and

some mutual assistance (Mendoza 1988, 7). Licuanan noted that even when economic projects are attempted by the BCCs, they often fail (1988, 34). She goes on to conclude that

in general, BCCs have not yet uniformly succeeded in increasing in their members an awareness of social, economic, and political issues... [however], by building people and by organizing groups, BCCs are indirect as well as a direct force for social change in the country (Licuanan 1988, 31, 33).

Liberation Theology

Liberation theologians in the Philippines have had several external influences, including Vatican II and the papal encyclicals, and the Latin American liberationists. These theologians have tried to apply these influences to the concrete situation of the Philippines and their own lives. Carlos Abesamis, a Filipino Jesuit priest, articulated a concept of "Total Salvation" in which he advocated a theology based in solidarity with the poor Filipino's hunger for justice and desire for freedom (Tano 1981, 90). In Abesamis' conception, theology should be the reflection on the concrete conditions of Filipino reality. Salvation should not be interpreted as only spiritual but rather, as salvation from all human evils such as poverty, suffering, and lack of dignity (Tano 1981, 94).

Father Catalino Arevalo speaks of a theology of the "Signs of the Times," a phrase borrowed from Pope John's 1965 encyclical *Pacem in Terris*. Like Abesamis, Arevalo believes that theology must be done in the concrete

situation of the current "times," and that the church must respond actively to the current situation (Tano 1981, 100). The cleric's theology pushes the church to take an active role in economic and social development, and to be the servant of the poor (Tano 1981, 107).

Father Edicio de la Torre supports a marxist interpretation of the social situation in the Philippines. Father de la Torre was the founder of the Christians for National Liberation (CNL) in 1972, which joined with the NDF and went underground. De la Torre was imprisoned by Marcos in 1974 until his release in 1986. He has more recently become involved with the NGO movement. Though de la Torre shares with the other theologians the rootedness in the concrete situation of poverty and underdevelopment in the Philippines, he advocates revolutionary action to alleviate those conditions (de la Torre 1986, 100-102). De la Torre criticizes the institutional church as bound by its middle class values and interests and wrote in a 1972 treatise

we cannot locate the center of any liberation efforts in the institution of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. In fact, the Church is still basically a sacristan of the existing order (1986, 102).

The church became much more than the cup-bearer of the Marcos regime, and de la Torre's analysis of revolutionary change and the need for the church to move away from its middle class sensibilities was instrumental in pushing the

institutional church in the more active direction that it took.

The CBCP

The traditional institutional church represented by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) was far less outspoken on issues of social justice during martial rule and took much smaller steps toward a message of liberation. Pastoral letters on social action and social awareness in 1967 and 1968 began to involve the church in the concrete social problems of Filipinos (Kroeger 1987, 8). In 1970, the CBCP endorsed the movement for a non-partisan Constitutional Convention to ensure the people's "total welfare - moral, spiritual, economic, social, cultural, and political" (quoted in Kroeger 1987, 9), and in a 1971 letter, the CBCP urged all Filipinos to a deeper involvement in solving the country's problems (Giordano 1988, 42). Aside from the statements and the work of NASA, the CBCP provided few means or structures to implement these ideals (Giordano 1988, 42).

Upon the declaration of martial law, the CBCP decided not to make a statement. Six months after the declaration, the council issued only a careful statement about the possible abuses of martial law (Kroeger 1987, 10). As Youngblood asserts, many Catholic and Protestant bishops and pastors

agreed with the President's analysis of the dire threat to the Republic posed by the Communists, the Muslim secessionists, radical students and workers, and 'rightist' oligarchs, and they applauded his pronouncements on socioeconomic and political reform (1980, 19).

The CBCP adopted a position of "critical collaboration," which meant both selected cooperation and selected opposition to government policies as they influenced the church and society. (Genato-Rebullida 1991, 74). The CBCP encouraged participation in Marcos' referendums during martial law, and in 1973, joined a collaborative effort called the Church-Military Liaison Committee. This committee was formed for the purpose of easing tensions between the church and state and protecting institutional interests (KSP 1984, 16). The CBCP did continue to evolve an ethic in support of the poor with pastoral letters such as "On Evangelization and Development," which was released in 1973 and criticized the gross economic inequalities in Filipino society (Hardy 1984, 52-77). However, it was left to other organizations such as AMRSP and NASA to more directly confront the regime about the abuses of martial law, thus allowing the hierarchical church to continue to maintain its institutional interests.

As the government stepped up oppression against the church and society, the CBCP began to change. In 1976 in Mindanao and Sulu, the regime identified six bishops and numerous priests and nuns as members of the radical left. This usually meant that the priests were active in a Basic

Christian Community (BCC) program and were pursuing goals of political conscientization among the laity. The military arrested 69 clerics, religious, and lay leaders in November 1976, and shut down two religious radio stations (Youngblood 1990, 95). Shortly after the arrests, the military also closed several publications, including the AMRSP's *Signs of the Times*, a Jesuit publication called the *Communicator*, and a newsletter of the Malaybalay prelate, *Ang Bandilyo*. All were accused of producing material that was anti-government and subversive (Youngblood 1990, 119-120).

In January 1977, the bishops' letter strongly rebuked government repression and policies on national minorities and called for the ending of martial law (Hardy 1984, 145-8). After several less contentious years, in 1979, Cardinal Jaime Sin, the archbishop of Manila and the head of the Philippine Church weighed in on the side of striking workers and pressed Marcos to repeal the Presidential Decree which gave the president power to outlaw all strikes. Several pastoral letters written by individual clergy and groups of clergy in 1979 were critical of Marcos economic and human rights records (Youngblood 1987, 1241). Giordano points to a group of 17 Mindanao bishops out of the 106 which make up the council, who struck out on their own with several pastoral letters which stressed human liberation and political conscientization (1988, 45-7). The church was becoming more politically activated, but also more divided.

Instead of responding positively to the critiques of the bishops, the Marcos government began a campaign of discrediting the church (Youngblood 1987, 1241). More than a dozen church-state clashes occurred in 1982 "involving raids on Church institutions and arrests of socially involved religious and lay workers" (Kroeger 1987, 12). Youngblood documented 22 raids which spanned the martial law period. The offices of the Catholic Church's Task Force Detainees of the Philippines' were raided in September 1982, as were several other social action branches of local dioceses. Several bishops also had their residences broken into, in search of subversive materials (Youngblood 1990, 115). Two foreign priests, Brian Gore from Australia and Niall O'Brien from Ireland, were arrested for the assassination of a mayor on Negros, despite there being no evidence linking them to the murder. The two clergy had been active in setting up BCCs and encouraging programs of conscientization, which the local elites had found threatening (Youngblood 1990, 99).

Though Marcos' desire in part was to divide the church through the oppression of the progressive branches, the persecution had the opposite effect. In February 1983, the CBCP issued a position paper entitled *Basic Issues in Philippine Church-State Relations* in which the hierarchy proposed combining both the interests of the church and social justice in the church's relationship with the state (Ofreneo 1987, 326). This served to unify the agendas of

the progressive and traditional churches, and create a powerful bloc of opposition to the Marcos regime. As repression against the church escalated in the early 1980's, the institutional church stepped up its criticism of the Marcos regime and began to challenge its very basis. The blatant assassination of oppositional presidential candidate and former senator Benigno Aquino in 1983 increased public criticism of the Marcos regime, which combined with church opposition to form a considerable bloc of opposition to Marcos.

Leftists and Conservatives

The leftist opposition within the church emerged about the time of martial rule. In 1972, the Christians for National Liberation (CNL) was formed by liberationist Father Edicio de la Torre for the purpose of promoting revolutionary change in the social and economic lives of Filipinos. The CNL joined with the National Democratic Front (NDF) and went underground when it experienced extensive oppression from the Marcos regime. Priests such as de la Torre and lay persons were imprisoned; many were also murdered. Throughout this period, the work of the BCCs was continuously equated with support of the NDF, New People's Army (NPA), and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

There was reason to believe that some of the BCCs had been targeted as potential bases of support by the NDF and NPA, as Mindanao Bishop Claver noted in a report on the diocese in 1981 (Youngblood 1990, 99). However, it appears that the Marcos regime did not make much distinction between religious and political motivations, preferring instead to use the rather crude instrument of the military to quiet or shut down any vocal opposition from the churches. This was especially true of the southern areas of Mindanao and Sulu, where the lay leadership and BCC movement had begun and where the military was actively combatting Muslim separatists (Youngblood 1990, 95-97).

The conservative elements of the church included not only conservative clergy, but also conservative alliances with social groups. One of these groups was the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference, which was formed in 1971 to discuss church-state and economic matters. The conference brought together several hundred bishops, business people, and members of professional organizations, the military, government, and media and has held considerable influence within Philippine society (KSP 1984, 15).

Challenges to the Marcos Regime

There are four major areas in which the church directly challenged the Marcos regime after the death of Benigno Aquino: the mobilization of previously inactive moderate forces in protest of the assassination, the involvement of

the church surrounding the elections in 1984, the defense of the church after intensified criticism of the leftist church from the Marcos regime, and the involvement of the church surrounding the snap elections in 1986.

The assassination of Benigno Aquino in July 1983 did not begin the opposition to Marcos, but did provide a major impetus for the mobilization of inactive groups that would eventually bring down Marcos. The highly suspicious nature of the assassination and the government's explanation that a leftist renegade had single-handedly committed the crime mobilized opposition to the Marcos regime. The regime, which received early support for authoritarian policies designed to create stability and increase growth, failed to deliver the promised economic prosperity (Youngblood 1990). The church, along with disenchanted business leaders, labor, and the civil service, staged massive demonstrations against the regime (Overholt 1986, 1157). As Giordano has suggested, many of those who participated in the mass action after the assassination were educated Catholics who had never before been involved (Giordano 1988, 242). Church media, including Radio Veritas, became the only source of information about the assassination, given the blackout of news from the government-controlled media (Bolasco 1988, 60). When asked, Cardinal Sin refused to participate in an investigation of the assassination, and the generally suspect investigation that did proceed was widely condemned inside and outside the church (Youngblood 1987, 84-86).

The mobilization of the educated and middle class Catholics gave the moderate branch of the church opposition additional influence. After the assassination, many of these groups associated with the church began to pursue the idea of non-violent protest against the regime. In 1984, Jean and Hildegard Goss, who had organized non-violent protest in Latin America for 15 years, came to the Philippines to organize workshops on the use of boycotts, peaceful protest, and other forms of pressure on the state (Giordano 1988, 251-2). The church was preparing itself for a long and protracted struggle with the state.

A second form of political involvement was the participation of the church in the electoral process. A decision that later was to become key to the ousting of Marcos was the support given to the formation of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in late 1983. The church committed funding, personnel, and moral support to the alternative election watchdog group. NAMFREL proved its worth in the January 1984 plebiscite and the May 1984 elections for the National Assembly, when it admirably carried out its work of watching over and documenting the election procedures, including the widespread use of electoral fraud by the regime. The CBCP issued a pastoral letter calling on the government to carry out the elections without intimidation or force, and to respect and uphold the integrity of the people's ballots (Hardy 1984, 243). The CBCP also condoned those of the progressive church who could

not in good conscience participate in Marcos' controlled election (Youngblood 1987, 1242). The opposition parties captured 50 of 179 seats in the assembly, which in the tainted elections was larger than many expected. The level of involvement of the church was greater than it had ever been and the church achieved a unity it had not had so far.

The third way in which the church became directly involved in the opposition to Marcos was in the defense of the leftist church. Both 1984 and 1985 saw a rise in violence against the leftist church. Father Geremia of the Kidapawan diocese in the southern Philippines reported 28 murders of parish lay workers and their families, and members of BCCs and their families by the Civil Home Defense Forces (CHDF) between June 1984 and December 1985 (Geremia 1988, 2-3). By the end of 1985, 15 people with direct ties to the progressive church, including two priests, were murdered, while 21 people were arrested and imprisoned (Ofreneo 1987, 328).

The brutality of these attacks against the progressive church forced the institutional church to come to the defense of its more progressive branches, despite the differences between conservatives and progressives within the church. In July 1984, a major pastoral letter further condemned the "salvagings" and "liquidations" being carried out by "secret marshals" of the government. The CBCP rejected Amendment 6 of the 1973 Constitution which suspended habeas corpus and legitimized government

repression (CBCP 1984, 19). In July 1985, the Council issued another letter, in which the bishops decried the murder of lay workers, priests, and other citizens, and specifically named the government-organized CHDF units to blame (CBCP 1985, 333-35). By the time of the snap election, the institutional church had become a major source of criticism of Marcos.

The Snap Election

Marcos' decision to hold early elections for the president may have been reasonably based on the assumption that success was probable. The moderate opposition to Marcos had been trying without much success to unify earlier in 1985, and the leftist opposition could be counted on to boycott any election. The church, however, became the element which upset Marcos' political calculations and turned the election into a means of ousting the president.

There are several ways in which the church became involved in the snap election. Once the election was declared in November 1985, it was Cardinal Sin who managed to bring the leading opposition candidates Salvador Laurel and Cory Aquino together in a coalition just hours before the deadline for filing candidacy (Youngblood 1987, 1244). Through pastoral letters, sermons in the pulpit, and the media, the church also became a primary critic of Marcos and an important mobilizer of political thought leading up to the polls. In December 1985 and January 1986, Cardinal Sin

issued pastoral letters which encouraged Filipinos to vote as an "exercise of Christian faith" and to elect those "who embody the Gospel values of humility, truth, honesty, and respect for human rights and life" (quoted in Youngblood 1987, 1244). Several other individual bishops issued letters, and the CBCP, at its January 1986 meeting, also issued a strongly worded letter. Fearing that widespread fraud was again probable, the bishops stated that "banding together, we can become a massive force that will assure relatively clean and honest elections, expressive of the people's genuine will" (CBCP 1986a, 264). The bishops urged that Filipinos vote their own conscience, without influence of family, region, money, intimidation, or threat of cheating. The bishops made special appeals to public school teachers, military and CHDF forces, and members of COMELEC to respect the people's will and refrain from violence and cheating (CBCP 1986a, 265-6). The CBCP also gave its full support to NAMFREL and commended the courageous forms of independent information that were available. Church-controlled Radio Veritas coordinated the actions of protestors and shared information through three daily broadcasts, which became the primary source of non-government-controlled information throughout the entire archipelago (Youngblood 1987, 1245).

The church's presence was heavy as the polling took place in February. NAMFREL was well supported by the church through funding, use of church properties, and personnel.

Twenty percent of NAMFREL's regional coordinators were bishops or priests, and over 600 priests and nuns were dispatched around Manila's precincts as deterrents to fraud and intimidation. Of the 500,000 citizens NAMFREL mobilized to monitor the ballots nationwide, the church was very well represented. In some rural areas, the local clergy ran the entire operation of NAMFREL (Youngblood 1987, 1245).

The official count of the election results were in sharp contrast to the church-supported NAMFREL figures. After it became apparent that the Marcos regime would not relinquish power voluntarily, the Catholic Bishops issued what may have been the most important political statement the church ever made. In their post-election statement made public on February 13, 1986, the bishops declared the polls "unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct" and condemned the systematic disenfranchisement of voters, massive vote buying, deliberate tampering with election returns, and intimidation, harassment, terrorism, and murder (CBCP 1986b, 268-9). The statement went on to say that "a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis," and urged Filipinos to engage in a "nonviolent struggle for justice (269)." The bishops lauded the courage of the thousands of NAMFREL workers, the COMELEC computer technicians whom refused to commit fraud, the votes of those who refused to be intimidated, and the fearlessness and truth seeking of Radio Veritas (270).

Finally, Cardinal Sin was the key figure in uniting Cory Aquino with the military revolt led by Ramos and Enrile. He personally brokered the deal that changed a coup attempt by disgruntled members of the armed forces into the imposition of the civilian government under Corazon Aquino. The events in the streets of EDSA that are sometimes considered to be miraculous were the result of the church's media resources (especially Radio Veritas), and Cardinal Sin's decision to use these resources to call people out to the streets to protect Ramos and Enrile. The church had changed from a position of support and reticence to a position of critique and outspokenness. Its opposition to the Marcos regime took place at the grass roots and in the cardinals' halls. Through a unity of purpose and the use of resources at its command, the church became an important broker of political power in the Philippines.

The Church in Kenya

The three paradigms that Martin proposed for the Brazilian church can also be used to understand the change of mission which occurred in the Kenyan churches and the relationship of church to the state before the initiation of democratic transition.

Traditional Pietist Paradigm

Christianity was introduced to Africa and East Africa along with the migration and trade routes from the Roman

empire in the early centuries after Christ. By the 4th Century, the Axum Empire of Ethiopia, in political pacts with the Roman Empire, declared Christianity the official state religion (Mugambi 1989, 24). However, except in areas of present-day Ethiopia, Christianity did not begin to have a permanent influence in East Africa until the trade and colonization of the Portuguese in the late 15th Century. The Portuguese were less committed to the "civilizing and Christianizing" goals of early colonialism, however, and so, the breadth and depth of Christian conversion was rather limited (Mugambi 1989, 28). Missionary contacts from Portuguese Catholic priests were sporadic through the 1500's, though there was some proselytization along the Mombasa coast of Kenya by the beginning of the 17th century (Anderson and Clements 1973, 29). When Arab control of Mombasa was reestablished in 1729, very little Christian influence existed. It was not until Protestant missionaries began trickling in during the middle of the 19th century that Christian influence reasserted itself.

The first Protestant groups to reach Kenya were from the Christian Missionary Society (CMS), which was run by the British Anglican Church, and from the Methodist Church, also from Great Britain. Though the mission societies arrived as early as 1844, it was not until the Anglicans and Methodists took up the cause of abolition and set up towns of refuge for fleeing slaves, that the churches enjoyed much growth (Anderson and Clements 1973, 30-31). In 1890 and the years

that followed, when East Africa came fully under the influence of British and German colonial powers, Catholic missions were reestablished in Kenya, and the Protestant missionary societies expanded their activities rapidly.

The Church, Western Culture, and the Colonial State

The missionary churches that evolved in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries were closely tied to the colonizing powers. It was the mission societies that urged their home governments to take greater political control in Kenya, at first in opposition to slave trade, but also in the effort to better spread the gospel (Nthamburi 1991, 26-27). Some of the missionaries acted as administrators for the colonial governments and were complimented for making "great progress" in representing European influence (Nthamburi 1991, 27). In this way, the churches played an intermediate role between the culture and political administration of the colonial power and the indigenous population. Missionary churches became the centers of westernization and acculturation into European agriculture, education, and medicine, not to mention religion (Mugambi 1989, 32).

Only in this century did the mission societies begin to promote non-evangelistic activities such as training in vocational skills and primary, secondary, and advanced education through mission-run schools (Anderson and Clements 1973, 33). Protestant church and school attendance began to soar, and Catholic missions were also prospering. Though

several proposals were made throughout the 1910's and 1920's to form a united Protestant church in Kenya, this was never realized. The proliferation of denominations and other religious bodies that today characterizes Kenya, stems from missionary activities early in this century.

The formation of indigenous Christian Kenyan churches, as well as non-Christian sects, reflected some rejection of the European acculturation process. One of the examples of this rejection was the clash over the traditional Kenyan practice of female circumcision. When the European mother churches refused to change their opposition to this practice, despite considerable political pressure from the British government, large numbers of Kenyan Protestants left to form their own independent churches, the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa (AIPC) and the African Orthodox Church of Kenya (AOC) (Anderson and Clements 1973, 36). Some independents continued to reflect the character of their mother churches in religious practice, while others integrated African cultural and musical styles into the churches' liturgical life (Perrin Jassy 1973, 90).

The churches did not support all of the colonial policies of the British government, however. When a policy of forced labor was adopted by the colonial government in 1919, the missionary societies opposed it as cruel to Africans (Nthamburi 1991, 27). The churches also opposed oppressive taxes and low wages forced on the Africans by the

colonial power (Nthamburi 1991, 28). The bulk of missionary church activities, however, were supportive of the colonial presence and culture.

Independence and the Emergence of Social Activism

The independence movement after World War II caused a great dilemma for many of the missionary churches, which had to take a stand on their relationship to the colonial power and the European churches from which they came. For much of the independence movement, the missionary churches opposed Kenyatta and the Kenya Land Freedom Army (KLFA) which was agitating for independence. The movement was deemed anti-Christian because of its advocacy of violent overthrow (Chepkwony 1987, 79-81). This created antagonism between mission churches and the independents, who were very active in opposing the colonial state (Perrin Jassy 1973, 80-89). Many of the independent churches supported the KLFA and prominent church leaders of the independents joined the armed struggle against the colonial state (Chepkwony 1987, 78).

However, upon Kenyatta's release in 1961 and with the transfer of rule from Britain to Kenya underway, churches of the Christian Council of Kenya, an ecumenical organization which was the forerunner of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), began forming quiet ties to the emerging independence leadership. The ecumenical body also began to articulate an evolving sense of mission tied to relief work

and development projects (Chepkwony 1987, 86). In urban centers such as Nairobi, community centers were established to deal with broadening problems of economic and social displacement experienced by the large numbers of Kenyans migrating from rural areas (Anderson and Clements 1973, 38).

But despite the flush of nationalist pride at the dawn of independence, several voices of caution regarding the power of the state could be heard in the church. In the first Protestant ecumenical conference held after independence, Mr. S.H. Amissah of the All African Council of Churches warned that

there is also an ominous appropriation or concentration of power which while it may ensure law and order on the surface, may at the deeper level mitigate against man's basic right to think and express himself freely according to his convictions, and live his life freely and happily within the limits of his competence and means (Amissah 1964, 7).

And regarding the relationship between church and state in Kenya, Reverend Elliot Kendall of the Methodist Church suggested that

Many politicians may ignore the Church, but the Church is the seed-bed out of which true freedom for the people may grow. All States tend to diminish human liberty. Profound spiritual beliefs lead to an increase in true freedom (Kendall 1964, 12).

As tensions escalated between church and state in Kenya in the later 1980's, several clergy noted that the church had from early in independent Kenya's history seen as one of its tasks the contestation of unlimited political power by the state.

Despite the warnings from church leaders to keep separate church and state, Kenyatta realized the potential of the churches as agents of development, and tried to tie their considerable resources to the task of nation-building. While in the past, the churches' ties to their European founders had made them centers of European acculturation and supporters of the colonial regime, upon independence, these ties brought considerable monetary and personnel resources to Kenya. The state called upon the churches to join in participation with the state in two main areas: education and the government-sponsored self-help movement called *harambee*.

The church sponsorship of schools that had been a part of the colonial period continued into the Kenyatta era, with church personnel and other resources supporting the government's role in education (Ndingi 1973, 44). J. T. Otiendo, the Minister of Education upon independence, insisted that

public schools must be for all-comers and the service of the Church in the schools must place no group under special disabilities. The Church must look upon its service as a public service, not as a service of Church members (Otiendo 1964, 24).

Despite this call for a greater separation of religious and civil functions of education, Otiendo also realized that such resources as primary and secondary schools and youth centers "in rural areas are a great need, and the State has neither the resources nor the intimate connection with the local communities enjoyed by the Church necessary for such

work" (Otiendo 1964, 25). In 1968, the government took over the management of mission-run primary schools, but promoted a new relationship called "sponsorship" of primary schools by churches. The government also condoned church-generated religion courses within the general curriculum of the schools (Anderson 1982, 434).

In the area of development, the churches also took on a vital role. Most of the churches' and NCK's development activities in the 1960's were relief oriented, but upon evaluation in the 1970's, the NCK committed itself to the goal of helping people become "self-reliant in meeting their needs" (NCK 1987, 7-8). Mother churches and ecumenical bodies such as the World Council of Churches (WCC), to which the NCK belonged, also stressed development instead of relief (Chepkwony 1987, 342-344).

The NCK became the unified body of the mainline Protestant churches in carrying out this role, as development projects and foreign funding for them poured in (Chepkwony 1987, 347). The ecumenical group set up a permanent bureaucracy with an executive committee, general secretary, and several permanent departments concentrating on such issues as Christian education and training, broadcasting, youth ministries, refugee resettlement, agriculture, and development (Kamau 1964, 48). The NCK's village polytechnic program of rural development in the

early 1970's combined educational and vocational training with other technical expertise, to great benefit of the communities in which it worked (Ndingi 1973, 46).

The government of Kenyatta fully supported such programs and provided assistance in various ways, but did not desire involvement of churches in politics. The 1970's were a period of much church activity, but the involvement of the churches did not challenge the political status quo, nor was it very "prophetic." Chepkwony notes that "the Council functioned as a platform for ecumenical ventures in social work and not for doctrinal and church unity purposes" (Chepkwony 1987, 346).

The Liberating Paradigm and the Basis of Church Opposition to the State

Despite the limited politicization of the activities of the NCCK, a changing sense of mission was evolving in Kenyan churches. The African identity of the churches became more important, first emerging among the independent African churches in Kenya, and later, even in the former missionary churches who began to take on a more distinctly African character in their worship and theology (Perrin Jassy 1973, 174). Calls for exclusive African leadership of the missionary churches were heard again and again through the early years of independence, and some churches, such as the CPK, moved quite quickly to turn leadership over to Kenyans (Kendall 1964, 11).

Liberation Theology

The emergence of African identity was one cause of the churches' turn toward greater involvement of the laity at the grass roots. Theologians in Kenya, such as Father John Mbinda, began to articulate theologies tied to the grass roots. In his theology of Harambee, Mbinda binds religious concepts of community with the political task of "cooperation, development, and nation-building (quoted in Ukpong 1984, 53)." This approach, while seeking to apply theology to everyday reality, did not pose a political challenge to the regime of Kenyatta in any way.

Those theologians who were more closely tied to a Latin American approach tended to use a Marxist analysis of liberation to interpret the conditions of poverty, hunger, and powerlessness as results of colonial imperialism and racial discrimination. Kenyan Zablon Nthamburi writes:

The struggle of the developing nations of Africa to escape the economic, political, social, cultural, and technological exploitation of the great powers are seen as an attempt to build a new, just and humane society, a brotherhood among men (quoted in Ukpong 1984, 54).

Liberation for Nthamburi is embodied in the resurrection of Christ, which is viewed as

a radical liberation from every form of oppression. By death and resurrection, he redeems us from social, economic, and political realities that deny justice and brotherhood which all humanity seeks (quoted in Ukpong 1984, 55).

This societal analysis and broad interpretation of salvation and liberation clearly places Nthamburi with Latin American liberationists. However, as Ukpong notes, this theology

remained fairly powerless, because it had not been historically articulated in the churches until very recently (Ukpong 1984, 57-58).

Among the politically active clergy in Kenya today, Bishop Henry Okullu of the Church of the Province of Kenya is among the most articulate and outspoken critics of the Moi regime and advocates of a new sense of mission in the churches. Okullu writes

The Christian's first task is to discover how the churches can arrive at a common understanding of historical reality. The second task would be to try to help the churches arrive at a biblical understanding of the nature and way the people of God can participate in the creation of a new society. They must be helped to new insights through study, fellowship and the sharing of experiences with others involved in the struggle for newness of life and justice in society. In this way they may come to renew their own lives, and to readjust their understanding of the church's mission in the light of the present historical understanding (1984, 5).

This sounds very much like the methodology of the activist church in such places as Brazil or the Philippines: first a conscientization process among people in the church community, and then a development of a broader understanding of the church's mission and role within society.

Base Communities and Lay Groups

The liberation theologians' calls for lay involvement notwithstanding, most lay Protestant activities at the grass roots were at first centered in development projects. The CPK Archbishop of Eastern Africa in 1964 noted the need in the NCKK for a Christian Lay Action Department and a

department of Social Responsibility (Beecher 1964, 69). The nonpolitical nature of church involvement changed, however, during Moi's regime. As in Brazil and the Philippines, Moi's constriction of political space left the church as the only open arena of political criticism. This oppression served to unify the church around an agenda of greater political involvement. Most of the opposition, however, came from key outspoken clergy, who represented neither church hierarchy nor the grass roots.

An example of the growth of lay groups and the gradual movement toward greater politicization is the Catholic base communities. Evolving from the Vatican II admonition for Catholicism to become more meaningful to the laity, Catholic "parish councils" were formed in the later 1960's and early 1970's in Kenya with the purpose of involving lay members in the life of the parishes. The parish councils gave lay leaders a voice in the administration of the parish, and in parish activities in the community (Bauer 1990, 198).

However, Catholic leaders felt that a richer lay involvement and spirituality could only be cultivated in small group settings. Between 1973 and 1976, several meetings of East African Bishops gave emphasis to the formation of Small Christian Communities (SCCs), which were purposely patterned after Latin American base communities (Bauer 1990, 199, Gichuhi 1985, 47-48). These groups were to build on the community life of the African people and help to deepen the faith of Christians at the grass roots

(Gichuhi 1985, 48). The first step in the activities of the SCCs was to include prayer, the celebration of Eucharist, and group Bible study. The second step involved more conscious efforts to broaden the scope of activities to include self-help programs and other community projects. A third and final step was also articulated: open social and political critique and social action (Bauer 1990, 200).

Most of the activities of Catholic SCCs have involved the first two steps outlined above. Gichuhi reports that in the Kenyan diocese of Eldoret, prayer meetings and Bible discussion characterize most SCC activities. Matunda Parish, which is located in the Eldoret diocese is reported to have 62 SCCs which engage in prayer and Bible study meetings before undertaking some sort of community action such as providing clothing for the poor or larger projects such as the construction of a house for a member of the community (Gichuhi 1985, 54). A 1991 report from the Apostolate for Human Development of the Diocese of Nairobi lists several activities that SCCs were becoming involved in, including 200 self-help groups, savings and credit organizations, youth organizations, vocational and leadership training, and other community development activities (Archdiocese of Nairobi 1991, 1-15).

Social and political critique and social action were not emphasized until later in the 1980's, and were not the bulk of SCC activities (Bauer 1990, 199). In 1988, the Episcopal Conference of Kenya (the name given to the

organization of Kenyan bishops and archbishop) set up the Justice and Peace Commission to further address issues of political and economic justice. The Commission had several objectives: "education of people... toward a stronger sense of justice... fostering justice and peace within the Church and in the social, economic, and political life of the country"... eradication of injustice in such areas as "land distribution, violation of human rights, unfair practices in agriculture, education, media, tourism, housing and habitat, " and "support to all those involved in the promotion of justice and in opposition to injustice" (Pastoral letter of the Bishops of Kenya 1988).

Despite the very conscious effort of the Catholic Bishops to cultivate within the church the sort of political critique and awareness of social injustice mentioned above, Bauer notes in 1990 that lay activities of this sort were still very limited. Some called on the church to practice these principles internally first, before expecting society to respond to them as well (Bauer 1990, 247).

The Church and Initiation of Regime Change

A new relationship between church and state developed in the 1980's, and can be divided into two periods: 1982 through 1989, in which the churches broke their silence about political matters and became initiators of regime change, and 1990 to the present, in which the church became actively involved in the contestation of new rules of

governance (I am indebted to Kabiru Kinyanjui of the University of Nairobi for this time construct and for several insights which follow). I reserve the discussion of the second period, from 1990 to 1993, for Chapter 7.

State Repression and the Constriction of Political Space

Beginning in 1982, the Moi regime began to seek a broader consolidation of state power and control over Kenyan society. By constitutional amendment, extracted from the National Assembly by the ruling party KANU, Moi declared Kenya a one-party state. The rights of habeas corpus were severely eroded when the state was given additional powers to detain without trial and used these powers to quell opposition. Moi brought more and more of the state under his direct control through such devices as ruling by decree and bringing independent elements of civil society, such as trade unions and NGOs, under state corporatist control. (See Chapter 3 for more description of this period).

These actions did not escape the attention of the churches. In the 1983 NCKC publication *A Christian View of Politics in Kenya*, the authors pointed out the problems of venerating presidential leadership (NCKC 1983, 42), of disallowing debate about the single-party system (44), of poorly distributed development and educational opportunities (45, 49), and of the failure to promote justice as part of the national ethic. Bishop Okullu of the CPK protested economic inequality and detention without trial (*Weekly*

Review June 22, 1984, 13) and Timothy Njoya of the PCEA, over a live radio broadcast, also protested detention practices and ruffled political feathers by calling for prayer for a national politician whom had fallen out of the regime's good graces (*Weekly Review* July 27, 1984, 5-9).

The Catholic Church, too, voiced concern over political matters when in 1982, after a failed coup attempt against Moi's regime, the bishops pledged loyalty but warned that the church must be the "conscience of the nation" (Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter 1982). Before the 1983 elections, the Catholic bishops called for the election of those who showed "honesty, commitment, and a sense of justice" (*Weekly Review* August 19, 1983, 16). The bishops also urged parishioners to choose candidates who supported the church's role in education, who opposed abortion, and who would weed out corrupting use of funds and forced Harambees (17).

The reaction to the increased (though quite benign) involvement of clergy members in political issues was quite severe. KANU politicians lashed out at Okullu and Njoya for their statements and claimed that the churches had no business discussing politics at all (*Weekly Review* June 22, 1984, 13). Religious broadcasts on state radio were suspended for a time until Moi intervened to restore them, but soon he too began to call for clergy members to join politics and quit the church if they desired to comment on political issues (*Weekly Review* September 21, 1984, 11). At local levels, outspoken clergy such as Alexander Muge of the

CPK were tangling with district politicians over the appropriate level of political comment from the pulpit (*Weekly Review* April 5, 1985, 11-12). Throughout, key church leaders, including CPK Archbishop Kuria asserted that the church had full right to comment on political issues (*Weekly Review* May 3, 1985, 10).

Open Church Opposition to the Moi Regime

Two political events in 1985 and 1986 escalated church-state tensions and placed the church at the front of demands to initiate regime change. In 1985, when Moi suggested that the secret ballot for KANU nominations be replaced with "queue voting" in which voters lined up behind pictures of the candidates, several groups within Kenyan society objected. Despite protest, queue voting was approved as was a controversial rule eliminating run-off votes for those who received 70% of the queue vote in the primary. Clergy members took a stand against the rules, and refused to vote under them (*Weekly Review* August 29, 1986, 1-2, *Beyond* September 1986, 7). Though members of the Law Society of Kenya and some of the political establishment, including Masinde Muliro and Charles Rubia, stood up against these changes as well, the churches were the only organizations able to escape Moi's attempts to quiet all opposition (APS November 10, 1986, 1-4).

In response, the Moi regime encouraged denominations to split from the NCKK over their condemnation of the queuing system. Several denominations did, including the African Inland Church (AIC) of which Moi was a member. The AIC joined with several others in forming the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (EFK) as an alternative body (*Weekly Review* August 29, 1986, 2-3 and December 5, 1986, 7-8). Moi also began a campaign to discredit church leaders and the NCKK itself (*Weekly Review* September 5, 12, 19, 1986). Moi and KANU claimed that the NCKK and several of its member churches and prominent clergy had links with an underground radical political movement called Mwakenya and had distributed subversive pamphlets (APS October 27, 1986, 2).

Though these links were never fully characterized or proven to exist, their revelation put the church on the defensive. Archbishop Kuria of the CPK and 80 other CPK pastors and bishops issued statements supporting Moi and single-party rule. They denied the links and the claim of involvement in subversive tactics (*Weekly Review* October 17, 1986, 1-3). Many denominations of the NCKK threatened to pull out if the evidence of ties to Mwakenya could be substantiated. Though the NCKK was able to assure member churches that there was no need to overreact, the rather direct attacks by the state widened the conflict between the church and Moi regime.

Moi also consolidated his regime's control over the mechanisms of the state when in November of 1986, he removed the secured tenure of the Attorney General, Auditor General, and High Court and Court of Appeal judges. Such was the control of the Moi regime that little debate arose within Parliament or the party over these constitutional changes (*Weekly Review* November 28, 1986, 1-2). Both the NCKK, through a statement, and the Catholic bishops, through a memorandum delivered to Moi, condemned the ease in which the Constitution was altered and the lack of debate on the matters of autonomy (*Weekly Review* November 28, 1986, 4-6). Both called for an increased dialogue with the people and the party, and questioned the lack of checks and balances in a system where the party has assumed "totalitarian control" (Catholic bishops' memorandum 1986, *Weekly Review* November 28, 1986, 6). The Law Society of Kenya also condemned the constitutional changes and the way in which they were accomplished.

Sabar-Friedman credits the church with taking on the "role of flagbearer for democratization in Kenya" during this time (Sabar-Friedman 1994, 9). By influencing public discourse both on the legitimacy of church involvement in political life and the need for greater openness in Kenya's political system, the church was able to carve out a niche for itself that other sectors of society could not. Not

only did the church use words to keep debate alive, but church leaders took concrete actions which clearly stated where the church stood.

Elections

The defense of political activity was followed by concrete political action from the churches. In September of 1987, newly elected general secretary of the NCCK, Reverend Sam Kobia, suggested the following:

Considering that Christians are at the same time citizens, and taking into account that churches are social institutions functioning alongside others within the nation, it follows that political issues are an integral part of our ministry and therefore cannot be separated from the centrality of Christian witness and mission (Kobia 1987, 13).

In February of 1988, before national elections were held, the Catholic leadership urged its members to choose candidates "concerned with the increasing gap between those who have and those who have not" (APS February 29, 1988, 3). The NCCK, too, issued a brief statement urging voters not to be intimidated in their choice of candidates (APS February 29, 1988, 3).

After the elections were held, the churches and their leaders were very vocal critics of the queuing system that was implemented, and accused the regime of massive vote fraud and election rigging (see Chapter 3). The Moi regime and KANU shot back with further condemnations of church leaders and the banning of the NCCK publication *Beyond* for reporting events of voter coercion and fraud (APS March 21,

1988). The editor of *Beyond* was later imprisoned in a move considered linked to the controversial last issue of *Beyond* (APS August 22, 1988, 1).

The church and the Moi regime continued to play a back and forth game of antagonism and rapprochement for several years after the queuing controversy. Most of the antagonism was centered around local clashes between key clergy and local politicians. Alexander Muge was barred from holding a church service and briefly detained (APS July 25, 1988, 2). Bishop Gitari's life was threatened by unknown assailants widely believed to have been connected to local KANU leadership when the bishop became entangled with local politicians over controversial sermons (*Weekly Review* April 28, 1989, 14-15). Moi's energy minister, Nicolas Biwott, called on church leaders to be silent concerning political matters, and the CPK's activist trio, Gitari, Muge, and Okullu, harshly condemned Biwott's words while contending that the church had full reason to comment on political matters (*Weekly Review* February 10, 1989, 10-11, APS February 13, 1989, 1).

Despite these local brush fires that occasionally ignited, the churches' political activity slowed for a while when the churches turned inwardly to several crises in especially the CPK. In June of 1989, a controversy over the formation of a diocese in the region of Katakwa boiled over into an ugly and open dispute within the church. Parishioners from Katakwa who had felt slighted by the way

in which the boundaries of a new diocese had been formed several years earlier marched to the residence of Archbishop Kuria and camped out for several days. This occurred during a meeting of the standing committee of the CPK bishops, and caused not only embarrassment to the church leadership, but much wrangling among bishops, who lashed out at each others' positions on the proposed diocese. Accusations of tribalism in the church leadership were made not only from outside the church, but also from within (*Weekly Review* June 30, 1989, 4-10). Though some promises were eventually made to the parishioners (who were not particularly well taken care of by the archbishop during their sit-in), much bitterness was stirred up and the matter remained contentious for several years more.

It was not until an NCKC December 1989 condemnation of the government on queuing and several other issues, that the church-state conflict was reopened (*Weekly Review* December 8, 1989, 8-10, APS December 18, 1989, 1). Chapter 7 will take up the discussion of the period from 1990 to 1993, in which the church pushed the regime toward democratization. In particular, two sets of events will help to ascertain the role the church took on during the Kenyan transition: the fight in 1990 and 1991 for constitutional changes allowing multipartism, and the presidential (and parliamentary) elections that were held in December 1992. Chapter 7 will also explicitly discuss the nature of the churches' goals and interests, their capabilities, and the constraints

placed on them by the political and social settings in which they operated.

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THE CHURCH AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS:
BRAZIL, THE PHILIPPINES, AND KENYA COMPARED

Volume II

By

Thomas Hofman

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Chapter 5

The Church and Political Transition in Brazil: 1985-1990

Chapter 4 dealt with the historical nature of church-state relations, especially in the period of the *abertura*. Elite-led liberalization of the Brazilian military regime began in 1974 and culminated in the establishment of the civilian presidency in 1985 (see Chapter 3). This was not a freely elected president, however, and the rules of political participation were not spelled out specifically until the new constitution was drafted and approved in 1988. Presidential elections under these new rules occurred in 1989.

This chapter does two things: 1) it elaborates on the goals, resources, and constraints of the churches in the period leading up to the constitution and elections, and 2) it examines the strategies of the church during the constitutional process that began in 1985 and concluded in 1988 and leading up to the presidential election of December 1989.

Goals and Interests

To explain the level of political activity that the church engaged in and the political influence that the church wielded, it is important to understand both what the church wanted and what resources it could use to achieve these goals. Because the Brazilian church took on political and social justice goals in the 1970's, it was ready to lead

societal debate concerning Brazil's move toward democratization. I posit four categories of goals to help examine the motivations of church activity: institutional and autonomy interests, the preservation of traditional moral issues, the promotion of political liberalization, and action toward social justice. The strength of commitment to these goals varies with the different elements examined within the church; for the most part I focus on the goals of the hierarchical church.

Institutional and autonomy goals

The Brazilian church experienced an erosion of its institutional and autonomy interests in the years before civilian rule in two major ways: the traditionally privileged church-state relationship crumbled as repression against society and the church escalated, and church interests were negatively impacted as the church's religious influence in society became weaker.

Chapter 4 illustrated the erosion of the close church-state relationship in the early years of the military regime. When first encountering the direct challenge of military repression and intrusion into such programs as Catholic Action, church leadership opted for accommodation and the protection of institutional interests and prerogatives. However, as the political and economic repression of the population escalated, and as activist organizations of the church such as MEB, CIMI and the CPT

came into direct conflict with regime policy, the relationship changed. Even conservative church leaders could not stand idly by as the state intervened in the programs of the church. As violence against the population and the church escalated, many church leaders came to the conclusion that the church could no longer realize its interests in collaboration with the state. At this point, the church began vigorous opposition to the military government and a redirection of its mission to society. As Hewitt suggested

such conflict not only challenged the clergy to come forward *en bloc* in aid of the Church, but also helped clarify and underline the differences between its own newfound goals of social justice and the "national security" goals of the state (Hewitt 1989, 122).

Another contributing factor to the reassertion of institutional interests was the decline in the church's religious influence throughout the country. For the sake of the institution, the church sought to shore up its support at the base of society by committing to a preferential option for the poor.

Several issues of institutional interest to the church were evident in the period leading up to and including the constitutional writing. The church was pressuring the state to ease restrictions on foreign clergy entering the country. As many as 40% of Brazilian clerics were foreign-born, and given the shortage of priests the country had experienced for many years, state restrictions would only add to the difficulty of maintaining an institutional presence in some

areas of the country (Veja July 9, 1986, 23). The church was also contesting a law which would limit the number of radio stations controlled by a single entity. Given that the church through its dioceses possessed over 120 stations, the threat to institutional interests was again very clear (Veja July 9, 1986, 23). Finally, church-run schools were experiencing financial difficulties in the mid-1980's, and made approaches to the Sarney regime in 1986 for increased state funding. The government could only meet a portion of the church's request, despite high-level lobbying from CNBB president Mendes de Almeida and Cardinal Ivo Lorscheider (Veja July 9, 1986, 23).

Traditional moral issues

As political liberalization advanced in the late 1970's and 1980's, traditional moral issues became an area of greater interest for the church. The military regime did not challenge traditional moral teaching by promoting such policies as family-planning, and thereby avoided conflict with traditional elements of the church. Most proposals to liberalize divorce laws were also fought off by the conservative elements of the church (Lustosa 1991, 84).

As Hewitt has noted

Whereas Brazil's former military leaders were moral purists, with democracy has come a tendency for political leaders to cater to liberalized tastes and desires which are often in conflict with official Church teaching (Hewitt 1989, 132).

In the period of liberalization, the church began to commit greater resources to upholding traditional church teaching and remained inflexible on the issues of contraception and family planning. Church leadership also voiced support for controls on what the media was allowed to disseminate to Brazilians (Veja July 9, 1986, 22-3). Even progressive Cardinal Arns of Sao Paulo committed great energy to the fight against the showing of French film maker Godard's film on the life of the Virgin Mary in the spring of 1986 (Hewitt 1989, 129). As the discussion of the constitutional process will show, traditional moral issues continued to increase in importance and in motivating clergy to political action.

Political liberalization

The political goals of the church evolved from delegitimizing the military state to supporting the restoration of democratic rule. This progression can be seen in the pastoral letters of the church as well as the mobilization of political opposition to the state.

In the face of increased political repression and constriction of political opportunities, the church at first made the restoration of human rights its rallying cry. As noted in Chapter 4, the church condemned the torture and violence used by the regime to shut down and intimidate societal opposition. Pastoral letters were written in several regions and the church spearheaded a drive against torture in Brazil. The pastoral letter of 1977 titled

Christian Requirements for a Just Political Order claimed the right of the church to participate in political discussions and set the parameters of political behavior (CNBB 1977). The church called for the rule of law, including non-tampered elections, an end to censorship, and amnesty for political prisoners (Della Cava 1989, 149).

In an August 1981 letter, the CNBB called specifically for democratic government, and during the 1982 election, the church was a strong advocate of free and open elections, was involved in voter education, and gave considerable support to the opposition (though it did not explicitly support any party or candidate) (Hewitt 1989, 130). The church criticized the regime in 1983 and 1984, supported the direct election of the president, and mobilized political participation through the grass-roots channels of the CEBs. After the campaign for direct elections failed, the church continued to argue for a democratic transition, and supported the candidacy of Tancredo Neves in 1984 (Bruneau 1989, 294).

Social Justice

The institutional church showed both rhetorical and institutional commitment to social justice. The pastoral letters written between 1975 and 1985 tackled contentious issues of social justice. In a 1977 pastoral letter to the "People of God" the bishops of the CNBB criticized the conditions that led landholders to be forced off their

property by the state and large agro-businesses (Hewitt 1992a, 248). From 1981 to 1983, additional letters and studies were released regarding rural and urban land reform (Hewitt 1992b, 146). There were also several shorter statements in 1981, 1982, and 1985 devoted to the problems of the Indian population and the destruction of the Amazonian jungle (Hewitt 1992a, 248-9).

The most profound evidence of a commitment to social justice was the church's support of progressive organizations such as the CJP, CIMI, the CPO, and the CPT, and the support shown for base communities. The progressive organizations of the church fought important battles for social justice before many other social movements had been formed. The CJP kept the abuse of human rights in the public eye and mind, the CPO fought urban workers' battles in an era of oppression, the CPT agitated for land reform for rural peasants and braved the violence that accompanied such a commitment, and CIMI took up the cause of indigenous populations of the Amazon before the international community took much notice (Hewitt 1992b, 147). The church lent not only the institutional resources to the organizations, but also the clout of official church support.

The official support of the CEBs was also a commitment to the achievement of social justice among the laity. While the accumulation of evidence suggests that CEBs are heterogeneous in nature and often conservative, they represented a break from the control of the hierarchy and a

desire of the church to be more relevant in the everyday lives and problems of its members. CEBs were often the organizational link which carried out the social justice policies of the church, providing personnel for church organizations and social movements alike (Hewitt 1991).

Conclusion

Despite the pressures to depoliticize church behavior after 1982, the church had a broad commitment to political and social change in the time immediately preceding the constitutional rewriting and presidential election. This is not to say that institutional interests were not important to the church. As authors such as Bruneau, Della Cava, and Hewitt have suggested, the innovations in the church and the move to a preferential option for the poor were motivated in large part by concerns that the church not lose its relevance to the people nor its institutional base of support. While the church may not have been motivated by as clear goals as during the authoritarian regime, after 1982 the church continued its concern for poor Brazilians in the hopes of restoring the influence of the institution itself.

Resources and Constraints

Understanding the goals and interests of the church helps to explain why the church became more politically involved in the period leading up to constitutional reform. However, to more fully understand influence, the church's

capabilities must also be taken into account. What I call organizational resources help to indicate the scope of the church's influence in the country, and the relative effectiveness of the exercise of that influence. Material resources speak more directly to the ways in which the church hoped to exercise influence and what strategies were open to it.

Organizational Resources

Membership

The Catholic Church is large and influential in Brazilian society. There are more people who call themselves Catholic in Brazil than in any other country -- 129 million out of 148 million (APS Bulletin 1990, 6). Some estimates are even higher, claiming as many as 90% of the population is Catholic (Hewitt 1991, 15). Organizationally, the Brazilian church is third only to Italy and the United States in the number of dioceses, parishes, bishops, priests, and members of religious orders (Bruneau 1989, 305). No region of Brazil is left untouched by Catholicism, neither by the institutional church nor the thousands of base communities and social organizations tied to the church (Bruneau 1982, 273).

Structure

Though the Brazilian Catholic Church is hierarchically structured, there is considerable diversity within the

institution by virtue of its vast size and the innovations in ministry that emerged in the 1960's and 1970's. The hierarchical church is divided into 14 regions, 36 archdioceses, and 199 dioceses, which, along with 14 prelatures and several other designations of formal organization, total 250 ecclesiastical divisions. These divisions are served by 7 cardinals, 46 archbishops, and 313 bishops (Foy and Avato 1992, 335).

Closer to the people, there are over 7,600 parishes with nearly 14,000 priests (Foy and Avato 1992, 335). For a Catholic population of 148 million, there is clearly a shortage of priests, and this is worse in some rural areas. Though the church has had this problem for some time, and has tried to recruit more clergy, the shortage of priests has intensified. This has led to an increased use of the religious orders (whose members total more than 40,000) and the laity in parish work (Hewitt 1991, 15).

One of the innovations in church structure was the creation of the CNBB in 1952. Though the CNBB's membership consists of all the bishops in Brazil in the General Assembly, there has historically been a fairly autonomous leadership through the CNBB's central organizations. The CNBB's organs include the Presidency (made up of the president, vice president, and secretary general), the Permanent Council (the presidency and representatives of the 14 regions) and the Episcopal Pastoral Commission (eight elected members) (Hewitt 1992a, 247).

When the CNBB was first organized, its leadership was quite independent from the rest of the hierarchy. This gave the leadership considerable autonomy to innovate and take on progressive policies on behalf of the entire church. When the military took over, the CNBB and its leadership became more closely controlled by the hierarchy. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the CNBB again took on greater independence with new leadership, and undertook an innovative and politically active role in Brazilian society.

The religious orders and the central body of the religious, the Conference of Religious of Brazil (CRB), are organized in similar ways as the CNBB, with regional organizations and a central administration headed by a presidency (Anuário Católica do Brasil 1989, 37). The CRB was formed two years after the CNBB and for many years, particularly during the 1960's, was considered more influential than the bishops' council (Della Cava 1993, 275). This influence was realized because of the large number of religious, the fact that so many clergy were also members of religious orders, and because the orders and CRB controlled many religious enterprises, including the most prestigious schools in the country, publishing houses and radio stations, and several economic ventures (Della Cava 1993, 275). The CRB was caught in financial scandal in 1970 and was taken over by reformers, who used this base to further the progressive agenda. When the papacy and the conservatives within the church began their attack on the

progressives and liberation theology, it was often the CRB and the individual orders such as the Jesuits, who defended the progressive positions and theologians (Della Cava 1993, 275).

Cohesion

Divisions between progressive and conservative clergy have had differing effects depending on the nature of the social and political environment and the nature of internal church politics. There was considerable unity within the institutional church as political repression increased in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The church rallied around the activities of its own progressives, and provided institutional support for their struggles. The church also spearheaded the opposition against the military regime in the absence of other open political space.

Since 1982, and especially 1985, the political and social milieu has changed, as have the conditions within the church. This has eroded cohesion considerably. The greater openness of political society in the early 1980's, including active political parties, social movements, and non-governmental organizations, allowed the population to channel their political ambitions outside of the church. The church was no longer the surrogate for civil society, and many church people felt no need to play an explicitly political role any longer. Decisions about the level and

nature of political involvement tended to divide the church instead of bringing it together.

Further, Pope John Paul II's agenda of depoliticizing the clergy in several countries, including Brazil, served to divide Brazilian leadership. The pope's conservative appointments strengthened the conservative forces within the Brazilian church and split the leadership of the CNBB. The threat of Protestantism also divided the church and several solutions were offered, from strengthening the progressive CEB movement to more fully depoliticizing it. During the time of the two political events which are the concern of this chapter, the Brazilian church had a considerable diversity of opinion and increased dissidence. Because of this dissidence and fragmentation, the church was not as effective in influencing the constitutional process nor having an effect on the presidential elections.

Material resources

Material resources represent very concrete assets which can be used in specific contexts. For example, church membership may be a very influential variable, but church media presence is particularly useful when trying to disseminate information that mobilizes the membership. The following section attempts to list some of the material resources that were important in understanding the church's ability to influence political outcomes.

Funding and its sources

Pinpointing the level and sources of funding in the Catholic Church is difficult. However, it is clear that a good portion of the funding that is received by the Brazilian church comes from outside the country. After World War II, the sources of funding for many of the episcopacies of the Third World came from networks of funding agencies and philanthropies in the prosperous churches of North America and Europe. Some were channelled through the dioceses and some through the religious orders. The papacy had relatively little control of these funds, especially those of the orders. In Brazil, the CRB was well funded by the religious orders, and had considerable wealth from investments and business enterprises (Della Cava 1993, 275). Some of the programs of the CNBB that received attention were a French funding agency's support of the CEB movement and groups who were advocating political conscientization and the support of the CPT by a branch of the German bishops in the 1980's (Della Cava 1992a, 54, 1993, 276).

These sources of funds have become a controversial issue for several reasons. The Vatican has faced increasing financial difficulties in the last several decades, and wishes to not only tap these funds for its own use, but also direct them to less progressive ministries. Also, as the newly opened churches of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are seeking to get on their feet, the papacy is

pushing a shift of funds away from the churches of the third world (especially progressive churches such as Brazil's) and toward these new "European" churches (Della Cava 1993, 260-262). The CNBB issued a letter to the bishops in December 1990 suggesting that belt-tightening and generation of local funds would be necessary given the shifting funds and tough times (Della Cava 1992b, 198).

Wealth

The church still has several sources of wealth and influence in Brazilian society, despite the fact that it is no longer the holder of land and wealth that it once was. Traditional sources of influence, such as primary and secondary schools (of which there are several thousand), twelve universities, several research institutions such as the *Centro de Estatística Religiosa e Investigações Sociais* (CERIS) in Rio de Janeiro and the *Jesuit Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento* (IBRADES), and many hospitals are still run by the church or through some association with the church (Barrett 1982, 194-5).

There is also a vast network of resources tied to the dioceses, parishes, and Catholic organizations such as the CPT, CPO and MEB which span the entire country. Brazil is distinguished from the other cases in this thesis by virtue of the considerable autonomy dioceses and organizations have in the use of their resources. This is very evident in the case of mass media.

Media

The church has considerable media holdings in Brazil, but these are controlled primarily by the dioceses and parishes. Most of the media presence of the church is radio, although there is also an active print media at the national, diocesan, and grass roots level. The Catholic Church has not utilized television very extensively, despite setting goals to the contrary (CNBB 1987a, 19-20).

Estimations of the number of Catholic radio stations vary, but it appears that in 1986, there were 124 radio stations throughout the country owned and run by the church (Veja July 9, 1986, 23). These were controlled at the diocesan or parish level; national organizations such as the CNBB had no national radio at their disposal (Montero and Della Cava 1986, 210).

Much of the content of religious programming tends to reflect traditional Catholic religiosity as practiced in local dioceses and parishes. Montero and Della Cava present the example of a successful station, Radio Aparecido, which is almost wholly dedicated to traditional musical programming, the broadcasting of masses, and news concerning the religious shrine for which the station is named (Montero and Della Cava 1986, 202, 207-8). This mix of programming was designed to appeal to the traditional rural clientele for whom the station was originally created as well as the increasingly secular urban population that was tuning in with greater frequency. The national-level church has no

means by which it can standardize or approve the type of broadcasting for these stations.

The progressive church has been somewhat more reluctant to launch into mass media, in part because of a philosophical opposition to the "massification" of Brazilian social culture (Straubhaar 1989, 150). Progressive organizations have tended to seek out alternative, grass-roots forms of media presence, sometimes dubbed the "little media." These include the publication of local periodicals by groups like the CEBs and pastorals, and the production and dissemination of "popular videos" (Straubhaar 1989, 151, Santoro 1989, 80-81, 98-99). Popular videos are videos shot on inexpensive cameras in order to record the positions of unions or church organizations. These videos are then distributed through labor or church channels in order to more widely disseminate information that would otherwise be neglected by the mass media (Straubhaar 1989, 151).

The progressive church at the diocesan level also has a presence in the print media. In the late 1970's, over 100 diocesan bulletins were being produced, and these were instrumental in the dissemination of information within and among the progressive dioceses (Soares 1980, 145). Cardinal Arns of Sao Paulo used a archdiocesan newspaper, *O São Paulo*, to promote the agenda of the progressive church throughout the 1970's (Hewitt 1991, 32).

Increasingly threatening to the Catholic church has been the pentecostal churches' media presence. Much of the massive growth of the pentecostals and evangelicals is credited to their use of mass media, especially television (see below). Though the Catholic church seems to understand the potential influence of such a media, Montero and Della Cava believe the church has so far been unable to fully use such means because their current resources are so decentralized and because the church has a basic mistrust of the mass media and the business mentality that accompanies it (Montero and Della Cava 1986, 210).

Conclusion

The churches national presence and resources continued to be pervasive and influential. However, increasing conservative pressures from the Vatican combined with increased internal competition for resources, led to an erosion of unity and decreased influence. Because the church's structure and many of the church's resources remained decentralized, there was considerable dissemination of traditional and progressive messages. This positioned many sectors of the church to be able to influence the constitution writing and the elections.

Constraints

Catholic Religious Practice and Competing Value Movements

There has long been concern among Catholic leadership about the extent and nature of religious practice in the Brazilian Catholic population. Practicing Catholics make up only 70% of those who consider themselves affiliated with the church (Barrett 1982, 186). Attendance at mass is highest in the small towns, where up to 70% may attend with some regularity. In more rural areas, attendance is lower, in part due to the shortage of priests (Barrett 1982, 188). Large cities fare much worse, with only 10 to 15% of those confessing to be Catholics attending mass, and in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, between 3 and 8% (Barrett 1982, 188, Della Cava 1976, 24).

It is not just the level of attendance which alarms church leadership, but also the nature of Catholic religiosity. Despite the decades-long attempts to promote Catholic orthodoxy, such as mass attendance and adherence to the moral authority of the church, orthodox Catholicism has not been the dominant form of religiosity. Of Bruneau's four "types" of Catholic practice -- popular, spiritist, orthodox, and social catholicism -- spiritist appears the most pervasive. Spiritist Catholic practice includes a mixture of Afro-American Umbandism and French-originated Kardecism with traditional Catholic practice. Figures from 1982 suggest that 30% of all those identified as Catholics

were affiliated with organized spiritism, and that a majority of Catholics participate in spiritist practices such as consulting a medium or attending a spiritist service from time to time (Barrett 1982, 187). Spiritist groups freely appropriate Christian symbols such as the cross and altar in their religious services, creating a sort of hybrid Christian-Spiritist religiosity.

Popular catholicism, emphasizing traditional church activities such as the veneration of saints and the observation of church festivals, has grown recently, in part due to John Paul's reemphasis of the veneration of the Virgin Mary. Traditional Catholic practices such as processions for the virgin have been reemphasized in Brazil, to the dismay of many progressives (Bruneau 1982, 11, Veja December 23, 1987, 69-72). Social Catholicism, which is tied to the models of liberation theology and the socially and politically active CEBs, has grown in importance and influence, but has pulled back from social and political action more recently.

A final form of Catholic religiosity combines the spirit-filled practice of the Protestant pentecostals with more traditional Catholic doctrine (Veja March 23, 1988, 64). Charismatic Catholicism claims over two million members, and more than half of the dioceses in Brazil had a recognized chapter of the Charismatic Renovation movement in 1988. The popularity of the movement's radio programs, which were broadcast through over 50 radio stations to an

estimated audience of 500,000 each week, have contributed to the movement's success (Veja March 23, 1988, 64). Much like the Protestant Pentecostals discussed below, charismatic Catholics have healing services and speak in tongues during their emotion-filled religious services.

Protestantism

A major factor eroding the Catholic Church's influence is the growth of Protestantism. The CNBB estimates that 600,000 Catholics leave the church for Protestant groups each year (Beck and Hendon 1992a, 126). There are an estimated 26 million Protestants in Brazil, which constitutes about 17 to 18 percent of the population. These members fall into three primary categories: mainline Protestants, Pentecostals, and conservative evangelicals. Of these three, about 70% are Pentecostals (Beck and Hendon 1992a, 126).

The mainline Protestant denominations (Lutherans, Presbyterians and Methodists, Baptists, and Seventh-Day Adventists) had their origins in 19th Century proselytization of missionary societies in the United States and Europe and account for 4-5 million of the Protestants in Brazil (Barrett 1982, 189, Veja May 16, 1990, 49). It is difficult to characterize the membership or religious practice of these groups in a singular way, except to say that these mainline groups had their greatest growth among a prosperous middle class, emphasized individual salvation,

and tended to be organized around a bureaucratic model (Martin 1990, 63-64, Nelson 1988, 322). Ministries and functions of these churches are specialized and rationally organized, as is the governance of the church. Charismatic leadership is less prominent, while the preservation of theological orthodoxy and homogeneity is considered important (Nelson 1988, 323).

Most of the members of the Pentecostal churches are former Catholics -- about 16 out of 18 million (Beck and Hendon 1992b, 412). Pentecostal growth has occurred primarily within the marginalized urban population, for which it provides both a religious community and a concrete set of ideas about life (Martin 1990, 65). The pentecostals are organized along a much looser model of church organization, relying more heavily on the charismatic leadership of the church pastor. Nelson likens this to a clientelistic model of agrarian social organization, with pastors as patrons and church members as clients (Nelson 1988, 323-4).

There is considerable competition for religious clients, which he believes helps to explain the explosive growth of pentecostal groups. This religious competition occurs not only with non-pentecostal groups, but also among pentecostal bodies (Veja November 30, 1988, 85, May 16, 1990, 52). About 4 or 5 pentecostal churches make up the bulk of the pentecostal population. The Assemblies of God

have over 8 million members and have operated independently of missionary societies since they were established in 1910. Other pentecostal churches include the Christian Congregation with two million members, the *Evangelho Quadrangular*, with 250,000 members, and *Deus e Amor*, or God is Love, with about 500,000 members (Veja May 16, 1990, 49).

One of the new pentecostal churches that garners attention is the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. Founded in 1977 by Edir Macedo, this church is known for its mass healing sessions and its move into "televangelism" (*Latin American Weekly Report* June 1991, 20). Macedo's use of television and radio (the church owns a national television network and two radio stations) has enabled the church to grow rapidly since its founding less than twenty years ago -- the church has a membership of about 500,000 (Veja May 16, 1990, 48-49). Macedo has taken a political profile as well, leading protests against the showing of Martin Scorsese's film *The Last Temptation of Christ* in 1988 (Veja September 7, 1988, 39).

Pentecostal religious practice is geared toward individual conversion and communal accountability for a moral and pious life (Ireland 1991, 81-93). The growing popularity of pentecostal practice has been attributed to the almost required participation of members in the life of the church, and to the liveliness of religious services and meetings (Veja May 16, 1990, 51). Besides the dramatic healing services, the pentecostals emphasize charismatic

practices of being "filled with the Holy Spirit" and "speaking in tongues." The highly emotional and spirit-filled nature of pentecostal religious practice has been compared to spiritist religious practices found in religions such as Umbanda (Martin 1990, 60).

The religiosity of the pentecostals has traditionally compelled members to set themselves apart from the worldly behavior they see around them, including political activity. Some have suggested that this behavior provides no incentive for social and political critique (Veja May 16, 1990, 51). However, the emphasis on personal conversion and responsibility is also loaded with promises of the fruits of success for those turn their lives around (Martin 1990, 65). These promises of wealth and personal success have drawn especially the marginalized urban population that makes up a bulk of the membership of the newer pentecostal churches (Veja May 16, 1990, 50). This has created a sense of the possibility of social mobility and has given pentecostalism a powerful social presence.

Finally, conservative evangelical churches are also growing in Brazil. American-based fundamentalist groups began their influence through the mass media, such as television evangelism and large-scale revival meetings, but remain largely in the hands of foreign missionaries (Barrett 1982, 189). An indigenous evangelical church, the Christian Congregation of Brazil, is organized along a clan-based structure and has approximately one million members (Nelson

1988, 325, *Veja* May 16, 1990, 49). Other churches operating in Brazil currently include the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon and the Mormon Church, although their numbers are still very small (*Veja* December 3, 1986, 118-9).

There are several difficulties in measuring Brazilian religion and religious influence. Some of the figures from competing Protestant groups are undoubtedly inflated, as is the Catholic tendency to claim Catholic membership despite low rates of participation. Brazilians also engage in multiple religious practices, such as the spiritist Catholics mentioned above. Some trends are unmistakable, however. The Catholic church is losing members and has so far been unable to promote more orthodox practice, despite the influence of base communities. The growth of Protestantism, and in particular pentecostalism, has been rapid and threatens to supplant the dominant role of the Catholic church. Some believe as many as 50% of the population will be Protestant within 30 years (Beck and Hendon 1992a, 176).

The Catholic church has taken these changes very seriously, from the pope on down to the parish priest. Papal visits throughout Latin America have emphasized the need to meet the challenge of the pentecostal movement head on. An October 1991 papal visit to Brazil identified the growth of "fundamentalist sects" as a major threat to the Brazilian church, and the prescription is usually to more fully depoliticize the church and concentrate on spiritual

matters (Beck and Hendon 1992a, 176, *Veja* May 16, 1990, 46). The CNBB, too, has identified the growth of evangelicalism as a major threat to Catholic faith and influence, and made a response to this growth the main theme of the general assembly's annual meeting in 1990 (*Veja* May 9, 1990, 51).

External pressures

The pope and members of the Vatican have undertaken a major effort to reverse some of the progressive movements within the church. One of the prime targets of this effort has been the Brazilian church, where the vatican and the pope have utilized multiple means of control to thwart the progressive theology and political activity of the church. More than half of the current bishops (there are more than 300) have been appointed since 1978 by John Paul II, and he has generally chosen conservatives or bishops who have exhibited no previous political activities (Della Cava 1993, 273). Aiding in this process has been several conservative papal nuncios, who have had much influence over the direction of appointments (Lernoux 1990, 133). Where progressive clergy have dominated key dioceses, the pope has either found ways of moving the clergy members, or in the case of Cardinal Arns in São Paulo, carving up a large diocese into five districts with autonomous leadership (*Veja* September 14, 1988, 83).

Several bishops and liberation theologians have been disciplined by the Vatican as well. The most famous of these cases is that of Brazilian liberationist Leonardo Boff. John Paul II empowered Cardinal Ratzinger of the Doctrine of Faith to rein in stray doctrine, and with the urging of conservative Brazilian bishops, he made the Brazilian church a special target of his desire to reassert orthodoxy. He called Leonardo Boff to Rome to defend several of his theological writings from accusations of fomenting revolutionary and marxist ideas. Despite the heavy attention this visit received, and not much of it positive for the Vatican, the Doctrine of Faith silenced Boff indefinitely in May 1985 (Veja May 15, 1985, 67). The pope intervened in 1986 to soften the criticism of the Brazilian liberationists and drop the ban on Boff, but the pressure did not recede (Lernoux 1990, 104-113).

Other progressive theologians have had their writings discredited or have been silenced, including Bishop Casaldaliga of Araguaia, whose trip to Nicaragua angered the Vatican, Archbishop Lorscheider of Fortaleza, who has defended Boff and criticized the new conservatism of the Vatican, and Leonardo Boff's brother, Clodovis, who has been prohibited from holding positions in the prominent Catholic universities in Rio de Janeiro (Veja September 28, 1988, 60, October 5, 1988, 32-37, Lernoux 1990, 106, 133-135).

There are several other tools of conservative pressure that have also been used to quiet the progressives. The

regional body of Latin American bishops, CELAM, which had become a very activist body in the late 1960's when the Medellin conference was held, began to change after the Puebla conference was held in 1979. With the help of conservatives from the Vatican, CELAM became controlled by much more conservative voices, including Columbian Cardinal Lopez Trujillo (Della Cava 1992b, 182). The support for liberation theology and the preferential option for the poor largely evaporated in the body, and CELAM, through recommendations to the Vatican concerning appointments of conservative bishops, and theological statements which are more conservative and less political in nature, led an attack on the progressive church in Latin America (Della Cava 1992b, 182).

Finally, the pope has begun disciplining progressive religious orders in Brazil and elevating conservative lay movements such as Opus Dei and Cultura y Fe in São Paulo (Della Cava 1992b, 186-7). It is reported that the Pope has been particularly critical of the Jesuits for their progressive leanings and their level of politicization in Brazil as well as other areas. Once known as the pope's "shock troops," the Jesuits are being abandoned in favor of other movements which promise to be more fully at the bidding of John Paul (Della Cava 1992b, 187-9).

State repression

I have already documented in Chapter 4 the role that repression played in spurring on church activism in the 1970's. As the abertura progressed after 1974, considerable progress was made in civil and human rights, and a greater number of voices were heard in Brazilian society. While the church remained active in pushing the government toward greater openness and democracy, specific repression of church interests was less evident, and played less a role in motivating the church.

However, repression of landless workers during the abortive attempt to promote land reform in 1986 and 1987 placed the church in opposition to the state again. As Sarney's agrarian reform program was haltingly implemented, a conservative organization of landowners called the Rural Democratic Union (UDR), became increasingly active and bold, promoting the organization of private militia to impede the turnover of land (*Latin America Weekly Report* May 16, 23, 1986, 2). The CPT was the primary organizing force for the landless, and became a target of the militias. Lernoux reports that a death list of 106 people was drawn up by the UDR, and that several bishops, priests, and religious were targeted. In 1986, two priests and two nuns associated with the CPT were murdered, and in 1987, Bishop Cravalheira of Guarabira narrowly escaped death by armed hitmen, and Cardinal Lorscheider, a leading progressive, had his house fire-bombed (*Veja* May 21, 1986, 28, Lernoux 1990, 126).

Between 1983 and 1986, about 600 rural workers were also murdered (Bruneau 1989, 297, *Veja* May 21, 1986, 30).

The CNBB repeatedly demanded government action to quell the rural violence, but Sarney, who had at first tried to promote positive relations with the church, became annoyed with church criticism and was unwilling to cooperate in stopping the rightist hit squads (*Latin America Weekly Report* May 23, 1986, 2, June 26, 1986, 2, Lernoux 1990, 126). Sarney made a trip to Rome to "consult" with the pope about agrarian reform and rural violence, but many interpreted this as a search for legitimacy from the pope for Sarney's policies (*Veja* June 18, 1986, 44-45, July 9, 1986, 20-27, July 16, 1986, 36-40). The pope was only somewhat sympathetic with Sarney's plight, and later called for a meaningful agrarian reform in Brazil as a basis for greater social stability (*Veja* July 16, 1986, 39-40). As the regime caved in to rural elite interests as the process wore on, the conflict between the church and state escalated.

Conclusion

In the period leading up to the constitutional writing and elections, the Catholic Church continued to retain influence by virtue of its position in society and the resources at its command. However, the entire Brazilian Catholic Church was feeling the pressure of competing

religious groups. This tended to push the church toward the pursuit of its own interests, and to weaken the progressive agenda.

Progressives were also being squeezed by the conservative agenda inside and outside Brazil, and continue to be the primary target of repression. These trends were ongoing as the constitutional process got underway. As the political atmosphere changed, the church, which had lost much of the unity of the *abertura* period, became one of many social actors trying to realize its own institutional and moral interests.

Political Space and Church Strategies from 1985 to 1990

Constitutional Reform

The constitutional process in Brazil was much like the transition to democracy itself, gradual and drawn out. The process began almost simultaneously with the coming to power of the civilian government and did not end until October 1988. Only a few weeks after Tancredo Neves' electoral win, the president of the CNBB sent a letter to him urging adequate attention to the formation of a new constitution, and offering the insight of the church into the process (CNBB 1985, 51-2).

There were several ways in which the church tried to exercise its influence. I will examine three areas: 1) the fight over how the constituent assembly would be chosen, 2) the attempts to influence the assembly through statements of

the CNBB and 3) mobilization, education, and lobbying efforts regarding the church's positions on key issues. After examining these areas, I ask what the church got from the constitutional process and whether the church exercised any real influence.

Choosing the Constituent Assembly

Just before victorious Tancred Neves' death, Jose Sarney became the full-fledged president, but the issue of his constitutional powers remained. Though there was near universal agreement on the need to draft a new constitution, the way in which this would occur was hotly contested. It was in this atmosphere that the church attempted to influence the process of choosing the constituent assembly. Several of the groups involved in the campaign for direct elections, including the Order of Brazilian Lawyers, the PT, and smaller grass-roots organizations, joined the CNBB to form the Plenary for Popular Participation in the Constituent Assembly (Bruneau 1990, A13). Viewed as a natural outgrowth of the direct elections campaign, this network of groups argued for several major goals in the formation of the constitution.

First, the plenary argued for a change in the system of representation which was biased toward the overrepresentation of landed elite interests in rural districts. The plenary also called for immediate passage of legislation eliminating the "authoritarian rubbish" of the

national security laws and rule by decree, so that the Constituent Assembly would not be laboring in an atmosphere still controlled by the rules of the military regime. The plenary also called for the election of an exclusive Constituent Assembly and a popular referendum once the drafting was completed. Finally, the plenary tried to promote societal input on the writing of the Constitution rather than leaving the job exclusively to the elite and educated (Bruneau 1990, A14).

The CNBB also declared that Constituent Assembly members should be without party affiliation and that the assembly should not be combined with the national legislature (Veja July 9, 1986, 23, Bruneau 1988, 296, CNBB 1985, 13-4). The church opposed Sarney's combination of Congress and Constituent Assembly in the 1986 elections not only because the implementation of the constitution would be delayed, but also because the church believed that the constitutional process would be held hostage by the elite interests of traditional politics (Bruneau 1988, 296-7).

This attempt to influence the Constituent Assembly process was not successful. The PMDB-dominated Congress voted in November 1985 to go along with Sarney and hold elections a year later for a combined Congress and Constituent Assembly. The writing and adoption of the constitution would also remain in this body. When the church lost this battle, the CNBB declared its intention to influence the elections of November 1986. The April 1986

pastoral letter *Toward a New Constitutional Order* called on Christians to participate in the extraordinary opportunity to "help their brothers and sisters", especially the poor, in "truly exercising their rights as citizens" (CNBB 1986a, 209). The bishops called for fair elections, free of fraud and open to the people, and also indicated in general principles what kind of candidate would be acceptable.

The bishops believed that a worthy candidate should espouse Christian values and fight for justice and the cause of the marginalized. Candidates should not compromise themselves to their own personal interests or the interests of partisan politics and privileged groups. While hoping to avoid politicizing organizations of the church such as the CEBs, the bishops called on those of Christian vocation to run for office and take up the cause of the poor and those of faith (CNBB 1986a, 210).

Later in 1986, the CNBB's Permanent Council reiterated the points of the April letter, but made some more specific recommendations regarding the elections. Candidates should hold those values of character and Christian values noted above, but also should not spend exorbitant amounts on their campaigns nor risk being captured by strong partisan loyalties (CNBB 1986b, 636). The permanent council also called for heavy church involvement in a political education effort surrounding the campaign, including the use of radio broadcasts, letters, weekly bulletins, plenarios, and the pulpit to generate discussion of the election and

constitution. Though there was some sense of caution regarding partisan behavior of the clergy (the council urged that no names be endorsed, simply criteria), there was no apology for the need for Christian values to be applied in choosing candidates and becoming politically involved (CNBB 1986b, 638-9).

The call for nonpartisanship did not stop some individuals within the church from making specific endorsements. Bishops Arn of Sao Paulo and Padim of Bauru released detailed lists of "acceptable" candidates for Congressional seats, behavior reminiscent of the 1930's voting leagues under the direction of Cardinal Leme (Hewitt 1989, 138). Neither non-partisan nor partisan strategies proved very effective. The candidates that were elected, though they appeared to represent change (307 PMDB, 133 PFL, 26 PDT, 19 PCB and PC do B, and a few others), were primarily from the old school of traditional politics. Of the PMDB members, 217 were formerly members of the state ARENA party (Pang 1988, 22).

It is interesting to note that the Catholic church did not pursue a strategy intended to seat "their own" on the Constituent Assembly. In contrast, several of the pentecostal and evangelical churches tried to seat deputies on the Constituent Assembly, and were relatively successful. One quarter of the delegates were members of these

conservative groups, including several clergy. President Sarney called the evangelical lobby "very important" (Veja July 1, 1987, 48).

The politics of these delegates were conservative, including opposition to abortion, homosexual rights, and gambling. The evangelical churches parted company with their Catholic co-religionists on several issues, including legalized divorce (which the evangelical churches supported), contraceptive use and a national program of family planning, and the support of state controls on television content (Veja July 1, 1987, 49). The evangelical delegates tended to downplay social justice issues such as agrarian reform and workers' rights, criticizing the Catholic church for being out of touch with the average person's concerns. Several delegates set their goal as bringing Biblical principles to the constitution, while criticizing the Catholics on the left for not even mentioning the name of Jesus in their proposals (Veja July 1, 1987, 49). The Catholic bishops later did call for the constitution to be promulgated "in the name of God," but this was a hotly debated subject (CNBB 1987b, 213). With the support of evangelical delegates, "God" was incorporated into the preamble of the constitution (Veja October 7, 1987, 83).

Writing the Constitution

The constitution went through several drafting procedures and was significantly altered at each level. The Commission of Notables that Sarney appointed soon after he took office produced a document much more progressive and nationalistic than he expected. The draft was widely condemned, particularly by the business community, and Sarney decided to withhold the draft from the Constituent Assembly (Bruneau 1989b, 16).

Instead of working with a set draft, the Constituent Assembly divided itself in March 1987 into eight committees, each with three subcommittees. These groups held public testimony sessions and prepared reports on issue-specific areas of the constitution, including science and technology, education, and the family. A systematization committee was assigned the task of integrating the reports into a single draft. This powerful committee of 90 members was dominated by liberal factions of the PMDB and had strong contacts with several popular movements (Bruneau 1989b, 21). The work of the committees and subcommittees provided ample space for issue-specific lobbies to attempt to influence the constitutional draft (Smith 1990, B-55).

The subcommittees and committees turned in their reports in May 1987, and the systematization committee produced the first comprehensive draft in July. This first draft was harshly criticized by the military and business communities for progressive worker and agrarian-reform

policies, and was revised by September (*Latin America Weekly Report* September 10, 1987, 4). Though this draft was more conciliatory on economic issues, the draft remained dominated by the liberal elements of the PMDB. The military and Sarney were incensed by two issues in the draft: the reduction of Sarney's presidential term from five to four years, and the adoption of a French-style mixed parliamentary and presidential system (*Latin America Weekly Report* December 17, 1987, 4, Smith 1990, B55). Sarney opposed the weakening of presidential powers for obvious reasons, but the military also perceived the draft as weakening the powers of the presidency too much. With both thinly-veiled threats from the military and a mass buy-out of delegates by Sarney's patronage machine, in March 1988, a "supra-party" bloc called the *Centrão* reversed the Constituent Assembly's decision and approved a five-year term for Sarney and a strong presidential system of government. Smith notes that though the *Centrão* held together for these key votes, the coalition began to fragment in May 1988, and many progressive policies in social and economic rights were passed after this (Smith 1990, B57).

Influencing the writing of the Constitution

Given the failure to wield much influence on the composition of the Constituent Assembly in the way the church had hoped, the church and other organizations turned

to other strategies. The most prominent way in which the hierarchy attempted to influence the writing of the constitution itself was bishops' statements regarding the constitutional process and content. The popular church poured most of its efforts into key portions of the constitution regarding land reform, workers' rights, and the indigenous population.

Bishops' Statements

In the concluding section of the CNBB Pastoral Statement *Toward a New Constitutional Order*, the bishops noted that the elaboration of the new constitution provided a "rare occasion" for society to be "conformed to the plan of God" (CNBB 1986a, 230). This most prominent of the bishops' statements attempted to spell out the "plan of God" in six areas: the social, political, economic, cultural, and international orders. I will bend the bishops' categories to match my own designation of the church's goals and interests in the constitution.

Institutional Interests

In the area of the church's institutional interests, the church argued for religious liberty and independence and a role for the church in religious instruction in the public schools. First of all, the CNBB called for religious freedom for individuals and the freedom for religious faiths to propagate their own doctrines (216-7). The document also

argued for the rights of community and cultural groups to form their own schools which would foster their moral values and conceptions of life. The bishops argued that parents should have the freedom to choose this sort of education and access should be wide through the support of these schools through state resources (227) (although the CNBB believed that forms of accountability to the state and society should also be implemented). Religious instruction in the confession of the parents and child should also be provided within public education (227), and churches and religious bodies should be allowed to decide who provides such instruction, while expecting the state to provide fair salaries to these instructors (228).

The CNBB's general assembly in 1987 toned down these demands when it was clear that little support existed (CNBB 1987b, 214). The general assembly instead approved a proposed amendment to the constitution which, as an option to parents and students, would provide religious instruction to children in the first and second grades of the public schools (CNBB 1987b, 214).

Finally, the CNBB suggested that the constitution should empower the Congress to give access to media outlets (especially television) to religious and societal organizations (228). This suggestion indicated not only the bishops' aversion to state monopolization of the media, but also the desire of the church to have a greater media presence.

Traditional Moral Teachings

The CNBB also set out some demands regarding the traditional moral teachings of the church on life and family. *Toward a New Constitutional Order* called for the protection of life from conception, and strongly condemned legalized abortion in every instance (CNBB 1986a, 214). The bishops also condemned the promotion of any family planning or population control policies in the constitution (216). Again in 1987, the general assembly made these issues paramount, calling for amendments to the constitution prohibiting abortion and euthanasia (CNBB 1987b, 213).

Regarding the family, the 1986 bishops' statement called for the prohibition of divorce in any case, a position that put the church in opposition to much of the population (Lustosa 1991, 85). The bishops also called for the denial of legal status of relationships outside of marriage and sought to promote the unique right of families to protection and support from the state in order to maintain stability and conditions conducive to the birth and development of children (CNBB 1986a, 215-6, CNBB 1987b, 213).

Political Democracy

In regards to political democracy, the CNBB called for freedom of expression and association, the universal right to vote, including the indigenous population and illiterates, and the cessation of arbitrary uses of power.

In order to control the power of the state, the CNBB asked for constitutional mechanisms to control abuses of power and unfair privileges of office, to keep financial matters open and accountable, and to allow citizens to defend themselves against claims by the government, including the creation of a special office of "Defender of the People" (CNBB 1986a, 220-1).

Social Justice

In *Toward a New Constitutional Order* the bishops declared that the guiding principle for the achievement of economic justice should be work for everyone and fair compensation for work (CNBB 1986a, 221-2). The CNBB called on the state to provide opportunities to everyone regardless of sex, race, age, physical deficiencies, ideology, or religious confession and to assure remuneration to meet the needs of the worker and his dependents, while controlling excessive remuneration of those working in the public sector (222-3). Finally, the general assembly called for a system of unemployment compensation, social security benefits for the retired, and improvements in occupational and environmental safety in the work place (223).

The bishops also affirmed the rights of workers to organize and negotiate through collective bargaining, except in situations where "necessary services" would be threatened, in which case a process of mediation should be pursued (223). The CNBB called for worker participation in

national legislation that would affect them, and went so far as to say that the remuneration of work should take priority over the return to capital, and proposed a constitutional article to affirm this (CNBB 1987b, 214).

Regarding property rights, the bishops set out the basic principle that the right to private property should not subordinate the common good of the people, but rather, that private ownership carried with it societal responsibilities (CNBB 1986a, 224). This led the bishops to argue strongly for agrarian reform, including legislation designed to turn over land for permanent access to cultivation by the landless (225). The council also called for urban land reform and greater access to property for poor in the cities. This was reiterated in the 1987 statement of the general assembly, in which the bishops wrote that property rights were conditioned by social obligations. The assembly urged Catholics to support the popular amendment on agrarian reform being sponsored by several organizations of the church (CNBB 1987b, 212).

Finally, the bishops set out several principles for the international order. Besides making pledges against the violent use of nuclear technology, terrorism, torture, and racial segregation, the CNBB called for a just distribution of international resources and the preservation of "economic autonomy" from the wealthy nations of the world (CNBB 1986a,

229). This nationalist tone was taken up with some fervor by several groups during the writing of the constitution, and remains a main characteristic of the 1988 constitution.

Popular Organizations of the Church

The progressive tone of the CNBB's letters was supported by much of the popular church. Individual organizations tended to be more intensely involved in specific issues, the most prominent being land reform and indigenous rights. The CPT was a sponsor and major supporter of the Popular Amendment for Agrarian Reform, while CIMI sponsored another popular amendment regarding the rights and living conditions of the indigenous population (CNBB 1986c, 212).

Conclusion

The institutional church as represented by the CNBB did not leave out any goals in their extensive statements, but what was the priority of their interests? This is difficult to ascertain by the words of the letters only, but there are several clues that institutional and traditional moral teachings were increasing in importance. In all the documents cited so far, abortion, contraception, divorce, and religious education receive much attention. Hewitt quotes Luciano Mendes, president of the CNBB, as saying that

the first priority of the church should be the preservation of the family, with agrarian reform and workers' rights coming close behind (Hewitt 1989, 130).

While the move to incorporate more traditional interests was a prominent goal, the church did not abandon social justice issues. In an atmosphere of increasing civic and political openness, the church could organize with other elements of civil society in order to promote such issues as agrarian reform and workers' rights. However, the church was the only group advocating its institutional interests and traditional means of religious influence. This may explain the prioritization of issues the institutional church chose.

Mobilization, Education and Lobbying about the Constitution

There were three main areas of church involvement in mobilization, education, and lobbying efforts: 1) the Plenary for Popular Participation in the Constitution, 2) the Special Commission to the Constitution, and 3) the popular amendments.

The Plenary for Popular Participation in the Constitution

The primary means of education and mobilization was the continued activity of the Plenary for Popular Participation in the Constitution, the organization of church and civic groups that had earlier attempted to influence the choosing of the Constituent Assembly. Since the plenary had both a

national organization and local branches throughout Brazil, it became a logical mechanism for the dissemination of information and the organization of discussion and debate (Tavares 1986, 70). The Plenary distributed primers in the constitutional process and its effect on workers and other groups. An example of this kind of discussion aid was the CNBB's "Church and Constitution," published in late 1985 (CNBB 1985). Using a catechism style of question and answer, the document went through the basics, such as "what is a law?" and more pointed questions, such as "why is the Church mobilizing the people?" (CNBB 1985, 1098, 1104). The document utilized historical analysis of the Brazilian political system, theological justification for the church's involvement, and discussion questions for use with small groups such as the CEBs. Audio-visual materials concerning the constitutional process were also made available through the local chapters of the plenary organization and other grass roots groups like the CEBs (Tavares 1986, 77-79).

The Special Commission to the Constitution

A Special Commission to the Constitution, or the Commission to Accompany the Constitution, was created to keep the church as a whole informed of the constitutional proceedings. The commission had the mandate of following the day to day proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, reporting back to the regions, dioceses, and organizations of the church, and working to establish dialogues between

the Constituent Assembly members and the commission (CNBB 1986c, 809-10). The commission sought out deputies who were sympathetic to the church's causes, and organized several meetings with them. This group of sympathizers was diverse, with members of minor parties of the left as well as the major parties (Veja July 1, 1987, 49).

Popular Amendments

The other prominent way the church mobilized societal forces was a proposal allowing amendments to the constitution by organizations within civil society (Alves 1988, 50). Voters would have the right to sign up to three amendments, and if any amendment received 30,000 signatures and the support of three associations, the Constituent Assembly would be required to act on it. The Constituent Assembly agreed to this scheme, and in all, 122 amendments were considered (Bruneau 1989b, 20). Alves argued that this was the only means by which the poor and working-class sectors could have an impact on the Constituent Assembly, given the largely elite interests of its elected members (Alves 1988, 50).

The CNBB urged Catholic organizations to utilize the popular initiatives to amend the constitution. Dioceses were urged to join other social forces to support popular amendments that followed the general outlines of the CNBB pastoral statement *Toward a New Constitutional Order* (CNBB 1986a, 212). In particular, the CNBB urged support of the

proposals for greater popular participation being pushed by the Plenário, the Popular Amendment for Agrarian Reform, and an amendment concerning the rights of the indigenous population being proposed by CIMI (CNBB 1986a, 212).

But even this innovative means of influence did not have much effect on the outcome of the constitutional writing. Though the Constituent Assembly was forced to consider all amendments which went through the process described above, they were not required to support any amendments, and they ended up not supporting any of the initiatives. The prime example of this was the Popular Amendment for Agrarian Reform, which was signed by 1.5 million people, and largely ignored by the delegates, particularly those of the *Centrão*. The constitutional articles dealing with land reform tilted heavily toward the elite interests of the landed classes and agrobusiness (Alves 1988, 50).

Direct Lobbying

While the CNBB issued statements and encouraged mobilization, another kind of effort was occurring -- personal lobbying of those in power by church leaders. This trend had begun soon after the transition to civilian rule. After Sarney's assumption of the presidency, key church figures, the most notable being CNBB president Dom Luciano Mendes, made frequent visits to the presidential palace. Mendes was thought to be a close advisor to Sarney, and used

his personal ties to have press criticism of CIMI quashed and to urge the ban on Goddard's controversial 1986 film (Bruneau and Hewitt 1992, 55-6). It appears that at the beginning of the constitutional assembly's work, church leaders continued to utilize personal lobbying with the president and congressional leaders, despite church complaints that lobbyists failed to take the nation's broader interests into account (Hewitt 1989, 130, CNBB 1988, 714).

The personal ties to Sarney began to weaken as his government bogged down in high inflation, corruption, and increasing use of patronage mechanisms. In early 1988, the three-person presidency of the CNBB issued a statement concerning the "grave national moment." In it, the clerics urged Brazilians to put aside apathy and cynicism and to support the popular amendments as the only way for the people's wishes to be heard and for Christian values to be incorporated into the Constitution. Though many of the popular amendments failed, many of the church's efforts paid off.

What did the Church get?

The constitution of 1988 represented the most comprehensive constitutional guarantees of basic human and social rights in Brazil's history. A political system of open representation and participation was assured by the constitution, as were basic political and civil rights of

free speech and assembly, habeas corpus, and social means of control over the state, such as the provisions for habeas data, or the openness of information.

The church was part of the coalition of efforts that supported these basic interests and rights, but on several more specific issues, the church also realized more immediate interests. The constitution assured the right of optional religious instruction in elementary schools during regular school hours, a measure the church argued was a key to the moral integrity of the country. Though this instruction was to reflect the chosen faith of the student and parents, it meant in practical terms a chance for Catholic influence in many of the country's public schools. Likewise, the constitution gave "special protection" to the family and promised to promote its interests and the rights of children to health, safety, and education (Chapter VII, Article 226). This was language that the church had proposed in the bishops' letters and other efforts.

However, the church lost several battles to uphold its traditional social teachings. Divorce was legalized, a "stable union" between a man and a woman outside of marriage was given legal status, and family planning was made a matter of "personal choice." The other major moral issue the church lost was the failure to prohibit abortion from the moment of conception, despite intense pressure from the Catholic Church and the evangelical movements (*Latin America Regional Reports* July 9, 1987, 6-7, September 17, 1987, 5).

In the areas of social and economic justice, the church saw its desires both promoted and defeated in the final constitutional draft. Several "noble goals," as the bishops later called them, were included in the constitution, including the pledge to eradicate the poverty and marginalization of the people (CNBB 1989a, 8-9). The constitution called for the eradication of torture, racism, sexism, and crime, and included sections dedicated to preserving the rights of indigenous Indian populations in Brazil (Title VIII, Chapter VIII). Progressive constitutional language concerning the rights of workers was also adopted, including the right to strike, a limited work week, and maternity leave (Chapter II, Article 7). And finally, the constitution called for an array of social programs, including social security and unemployment compensation, goals which the church had also promoted.

The greatest disappointment for the progressive church was the watering down of the section on agrarian reform. In an article of Chapter III of the constitution, it was stipulated that landholdings "in productive use" cannot be expropriated. The church correctly perceived that this stripped the agrarian reform provision of any teeth. The issue that mobilized the church more than any other, including the intense grass-roots support of the Popular Amendment for Agrarian Reform, was largely lost (*Latin America Regional Reports* June 2, 1988, 3). However, some progress was made in the issue of urban land reform,

although the bishops later complained that this progress was threatened by the failure of the National Congress to quickly pass Complementary Laws to implement urban land reform and the other progressive social measures (CNBB 1989a, 10).

Conclusion

On several of the major issues that generated much debate in the country, such as the length of the president's term of office and the presidential versus parliamentary system, traditional party politics and patronage were of primary influence in determining constitutional outcomes. But underneath the discussion of these issues, the church still exercised some influence through its constant attention to the process, daily connection to the delegates, mobilization of other social groups, and broad dissemination of information.

This is not to say that the church's role and influence came easy or was in any way dominant. The constitution was written and promulgated under open conditions, and the church needed to compete with other social interests in order for its interests to be heard. As Bruneau noted,

the already fractured party system came apart while lobbies of all types predominated. This is relevant as it encouraged diverse political pressures from all sides on the Assembly and made for an incredible variety of at times bizarre ad hoc alliances (Bruneau 1990, 22).

In this competitive atmosphere, the church won some key concessions in the face of societal opposition -- public funding of religious instruction was added after the systematization committee left it out (Bruneau 1989b, 21) -- but also lost several battles in traditional Catholic teachings regarding divorce, cohabitation, abortion, and family planning.

Overall, the constitutional process proved to be fairly conducive to church attention and influence, and the church exercised its interests in effective ways. Despite the wide variety of interests argued, from traditional moral issues to agrarian reform, the church retained a somewhat unified effort from the CNBB down to the pastoral organizations and CEBs.

The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1989

The church became involved in the 1989 presidential elections on three levels: the official position of the hierarchical church as found in the CNBB letters and other pronouncements, individual bishops and their specific endorsements, and the mobilization of the progressive church on behalf of the Workers' Party and Lula.

The CNBB: Moderate and Nonpartisan

The CNBB as a whole was careful to take a nonpartisan official position toward the presidential election. The main vehicles for the dissemination of the CNBB's message

were the pastoral letters and pronouncements of 1989. These letters had continuity with the general principles argued during the constitutional process and tended to emphasize broader issues of Brazil's social, political, economic, and cultural orders.

The Pastoral Letters

The major pastoral letter setting out the general political principles of the Brazilian church was the April 1989 *Exigencias Eticas da Ordem Democratica*. The letter was progressive in its economic and social prescription for the country, solicitous of a church role in the work of democratization, and strongly supportive of electoral means of change.

The letter began with a list of "obstacles to a democratic order" which included the dominance of executive power, corruption, a poor record of justice, high external debt, unemployment, raging inflation, and the poverty and social ills associated with the country's economic troubles. At the core of these difficulties the bishops pointed to a state-dominated national ethos, rather than a search for the common good. In order to reverse the trends of inequality, racism, ecological degradation, and personal and familial ethical decay, the letter called for a reassertion of values. This, the bishops argued, was essential to the restoration of democracy.

The church stood ready to assist the country in the reassertion of values and the work of democratization. The bishops noted several reasons for hope, including the political openness in the new politics, the wide participation of the people in the political process, and the dynamic organizations and social movements in Brazil, led by the work of the CEBs, neighborhood associations, and workers movements. The letter proposed a continued role for the church as a leader of civil society and creator of social community. The bishops argued that the church was the place where a conversation about the future of Brazil should take place, a conversation marked by a spirit of communion, co-responsibility, mutual respect, and an attitude of service (CNBB 1989b, 35).

In the letter's practical recommendations, the bishops clearly identified voting as a part of democratic rebuilding and economic justice. Christians were called on to vote conscientiously and responsibly on diverse aspects of the country's situation -- economic, social, and cultural. The letter argued for an immediate and permanent execution of agrarian reform, the guarantee of just distribution of urban land, the preservation of the environment, support for the struggles of workers in the name of social justice, adequate incentives for the participation of workers in unions, the guarantee of the social function of business, the direction of governmental projects toward the common good, and a reexamination of the foreign debt (CNBB 1989b, 35-38).

In late August, the CNBB issued another pastoral letter entitled *Participar com Esperanca*. This letter urged the Congress to pass laws to implement the constitution and encouraged full popular participation in the presidential elections (Bruneau and Hewitt 1992, 55). This letter was more specific by setting out criteria for evaluating the candidates, but the criteria mirrored those in the earlier pastoral letter. Among the criteria were the questions,

does the candidate favor agrarian reform, promote the just distribution of urban land, assist in the struggle of workers for social justice and workers rights, and intend to review carefully the country's foreign debt? (Bruneau and Hewitt 1992, 62).

Though this was more specific, and quite political, it did not tilt the bishops toward a single candidate at first, given the diversity of those running. When the field was trimmed down to Collor and Lula, it was more difficult to argue that the criteria did not support one candidate over the other, but even then, the official declarations of the bishops urged voters to vote their conscience.

Individual bishops and open partisanship

While the CNBB supported the dissemination of the letters and criteria and encouraged electoral participation, the organization itself did not take on any additional political activity. It was at the regional and individual level that partisanship began to emerge. Some individual bishops stuck to the neutral provision of ethical guidelines which did not discriminate in favor of a single candidate,

much as the CNBB letters did (Krischke 1991, 188). However, many individual bishops tended to group the candidates in the first round based on their political orientation. The conservatives, represented by Collor, Maluf, and Domingos garnered support from conservative-leaning clergy, and the progressives, represented by Lula, Covas, and Brizola found support with moderate and progressive bishops (Veja December 6, 1989, 57).

Early in the campaign, the only clear tendency was the support of Lula by progressive church activists who were tied to the CEBs and the PT. Covas and the PSDB had some support in the moderate and progressive wing of the bishops, especially in São Paulo, while Brizola was supported by progressive clergy in Rio Grande do Sul (Veja December 6, 1989, 57). Veja estimates that of the 378 bishops at the time, about 200 were moderates, 118 progressives, and 60 conservatives. About 100 of the progressive bishops openly supported and worked in one way or another for Lula's election (Veja December 6, 1989, 56-7).

As the campaign progressed, and especially in the month between the first and second round, individual bishops' support for specific candidates became increasingly clear. It was generally understood that influential progressives, including Arns of São Paulo, Lorscheider of Fortaleza, and Mendes de Almeida, then president of the CNBB, supported Lula in the run-off (Tyson 1990, 2). Other progressive bishops took very open actions in support of Lula, including

Bishop Morelli of Duque du Caxias outside of Rio de Janeiro, who stood on the same podium with Lula in campaign stops and appeared on PT-sponsored television programming (Tyson 1990, 2, *Veja* December 6, 1989, 57). Another bishop, Rodriguez of Juazeiro, near Salvador, suggested in sermons and statements to the press that "workers should vote for workers" and that a vote for the PT was a way of identifying with the church's pastoral mission (*Veja* December 6, 1989, 56).

Several conservative bishops also began an open campaign of support for Collor. Leading this group was Cardinal Eugenio Salles of Rio de Janeiro, who, while calling for non-ideological positions in the church, supported the candidacy of Collor (*Veja* December 6, 1989, 56, Tyson 1990, 3). Leading Catholic conservatives published signed articles in the Rio de Janeiro daily *O Jornal do Brasil* attacking the progressive church and the Lula candidacy, warning that the PT represented a turn toward communism (Tyson 1990, 3). There were even conservative-supported rumors that Lula would shut down the churches if he was elected president.

The conservative Catholic message was buttressed by the largely conservative evangelical vote and media presence. Many of the evangelical Congressional members became partisans of the PRN, though some were supporters of the PDT and the PT. In the constitutional debate, the evangelicals voted with the conservative *Centrão* and pushed hard for the mention of God in the preamble, positions which Lula opposed

(Veja December 6, 1989, 59). The evangelicals also raised the alarm that the progressive church's support of Lula was support for communism, and perpetuated the notion that Lula would "close the churches." Some prominent evangelical leaders came out for Collor in the late stages of the campaign. Edir Macedo of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God held a vigil during the first round of voting in which he denounced Lula as demonic and supported Collor, whom he declared an "excellent governor." Macedo used his prominent media presence in radio and television to disseminate his views during the campaign (Veja December 6, 1989, 58). Mainline Protestant denominations such as the Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists tended to remain more neutral, although there were reports of pro-Lula movements in Belo Horizonte and Recife (Veja December 6, 1989, 59).

The Progressive Church: Support for the PT

Progressive priests and church activists in the pastorals and CEBs were supportive of the PT and Lula's campaign. Of the approximately 14,000 parish priests in Brazil, Veja estimates that over 4000 were progressives who actively supported liberal candidates (Veja December 6, 1989, 57). In the first round of voting in November, Covas and Lula both got support from progressive priests, but in the run-off election, Lula garnered many of the activist priests' support (*Latin America Regional Reports* January 11,

1990, 2). *Veja* notes the reluctance of some priests to use sermons for specifically political declarations, but away from the pulpit, activist priests did not shy away from partisanship, holding special instructional meetings on the election and demonstrably supporting the PT (*Veja* December 6, 1989, 57).

The progressive church worked primarily through the organization of the pastoral councils and the CEBs. The CEB movement in Brazil, as noted earlier, had approximately 3 to 4 million members in 80,000 to 100,000 communities. Many of the CEBs also had a specifically political and activist orientation, which would seem to promise great potential as a political force in Brazilian society.

However, most agree that the potential electoral strength of the CEBs was not realized in 1989 (Tyson 1990, 2, Drogus 1992, 63, Krischke 1991, 187-8). This happened for several reasons, including the heterogeneity of the groups, the overestimation of the number of politically active within each group, and the intense debate concerning the degree to which partisan tactics should be employed by the CEBs. In July 1989, the CEBs held their national encounter and openly discussed the role of overt forms of political activity (Hewitt 1991, 109). Three possibilities for the relation between CEB and party were proposed at that time and in other discussions. Some, such as Leonardo Boff, argued for making the CEBs a basis of a party of the church. Others saw danger in any ties to the parties, and promoted

CEBs as strictly spiritual groups (Falcone 1989, 939). Still others desired CEBs which "discuss the political dimension of faith" but allow the party to develop "the concrete program that expresses religion and ethical beliefs" (Drogus 1992, 66-67). It was the third view of the relationship that appeared to prevail, as the CEBs and their leaders feared that too overt a partisanship would divide the CEB movement and limit its effectiveness (Krischke 1991, 196).

Veja found evidence of support among CEB members for not only the PT, but also the PMDB, PSDB, and the PDT (Veja December 6, 1989, 57). The majority of the members of the CEBs and pastoral councils, however, did get involved in the PT campaign (58-59). In some key areas support for the PT and Lula was very high. The São Paulo CEBs gave early support to Lula's leadership of the workers' movement in that city, and proved to be an important base for activists and workers in the PT and Lula's campaign (*Latin America Regional Reports* April 27, 1989, 6). The unexpectedly strong showing of Lula during the first round in some areas of the northeast where he hardly campaigned was attributed to the mobilization of the progressive wing of the Catholic church (*Latin America Regional Reports* January 11, 1990, 2).

The core members of the CEBs, which Drogus estimates to be 15 or less per CEB, also tended to be active in the Lula campaign, and may have provided up to one third of Lula's base in some areas (Drogus 1992, 66, Tyson 1990, 2). Within

this nucleus of activists, however, there was usually a priest controlling and organizing the activities, which suggests that the CEB movement, while important, was not a mass-based movement (Vejā December 6, 1989, 58).

The progressive pastoral councils of the church also advocated involvement in the elections. In a CPT declaration in August 1989, the delegates to the national meeting urged support of candidates who were receptive to the "popular mandate," which included agrarian reform, environmental protection, support for rural unions and associations, and the advance of women's interests (CPT 1989, 491-3). In perhaps the most overtly political statement of any of the church organizations, the declaration further urged "militant partisanship" in the pursuit of the goals noted above (CPT 1989, 492).

Results

The church was influential as a supporter of democratization and the electoral process as a means of change. The 1989 elections were supported by nearly all elements of society, both within the church and outside it. The church's use of its resources to educate and get out the vote were contributing factors in the success of the peaceful and generally accepted results of the presidential election.

The church as a whole was pervasive and active enough to make its views known to the public. The church effectively disseminated information through the pastoral letters, individual bishops' statements, organizations of the church, regional media outlets such as radio and newspapers, and through personal contact with parishioners. Straubhaar, Olsen and Nunes examined the effect of information and media on the election outcomes to test the notion that Collor's victory was primarily attributable to his command of mass media and especially television. They found that the most prominent forms of political information were interpersonal, that is, conversations with friends, family, and colleagues (Straubhaar, Olsen, and Nunes 1993, 126-7).

Organizational sources of information, while less prominent, were also important, especially for Lula supporters. These sources included labor leaders, neighborhood organizations, and the church. Between 4 and 7% of the respondents received information from the church (126). The authors conclude that Lula's strong performance suggests that Brazilians did not simply accept the message of the major media, which was pro-Collor, but utilized alternative sources of information to decide who to vote for (135). Further examination of the impact of the evangelical churches' media resources on voters, especially television, would be useful.

While the church's support for the electoral process and its dissemination of information were effective in a general sense, beyond this broad level of influence the church showed many of the same tendencies as the general public to split its vote among several partisans. This occurred because political openness in Brazil had proceeded considerably. In that atmosphere, the church found itself in open competition with other societal interests, and the vote was fragmented because of it.

Another contributing factor to the split in the church's vote has to do with the partisan nature of presidential politics. The church had to decide the position it would take in regard to the various political parties. It would appear that the partisan strategies of many church leaders and the lack of unity in the church ultimately decreased the church's influence. Partisan support of the PT by progressives was helpful to Lula's campaign and its level of success, perhaps even more in the narrow victory of the first round. However, overall the partisan support of the PT on the left and Collor on the right had deleterious effects on the church and its influence for several reasons.

The church, which was already suffering problems of lack of cohesion, further fragmented its leadership and membership. Already weakened from the Vatican's assault, the progressive church further alienated itself from the moderate and conservative branches of the church by its

outspoken support of Lula and the PT. The move to depoliticize the CNBB's statements that had begun earlier was pursued with greater vigor. Bruneau and Hewitt cite as an example the inability of the CNBB to adopt critical statements of the failed austerity plans of the Collor government once it was in power in 1990, something which would have been far more accepted and routine several years earlier (Bruneau and Hewitt 1992, 60). The partisanship of some on the right infuriated members of the progressive pastorals, who condemned the policies of Collor for their negative impact on the concerns of the marginalized, rural landless, and indigenous population (Bruneau and Hewitt 1992, 59).

The church's partisanship contributed to an increasing alienation from the Brazilian Catholic population as well, something the weakened church could ill afford. PDT candidate Brizola critiqued the progressive church support of Lula. In Brazil's increasingly open political environment, any partisan position taken by the church was sure to alienate parts of its membership (Bruneau and Hewitt 1992, 60).

Another reason for the church's declining influence in the presidential election occurred because the political nature of the contest did not present opportunities for the church to use its "moral authority" to influence outcomes. In the political atmosphere of the presidential elections, the institutional church was compelled to moderate its

political stands and move toward concentration on the devotional aspects of church life. This occurred for several reasons. The progressive branches of the church, with their strong support of Lula's program of the left, were far less representative of the church population ideologically. Numerically, activists in CEBs and pastorals were a small percentage of the church population and were not in tune with the political views of much of the general populace. As the institutional church's support of the progressive branches waned, church activists turned toward other progressive organizations within an increasingly open society.

The presidential election illustrated this mix of progressive involvement in church and societal organizations. The crossover of CEB, pastoral, and PT activists was considerable (Hewitt 1991, 83). A prime example of the mixing of roles was Lula's media campaign. Many of the producers of Lula's grass roots and television media campaign were at one time involved in the popular video movement supported by the unions and church. These activists could at the same time act as members of CEBs, pastoral councils, the PT, or Lula's campaign staff (Straubhaar 1993).

Finally, the increasing religious competition the church faced from Protestantism and the pressure from external and internal conservatives created discord

regarding the church's role in the elections and ultimately compelled the church to depoliticize its actions (Bruneau and Hewitt 1992, 60).

In an era of both waning political and religious influence, the Catholic Church turned its attention to the maintenance of its own interests. In the political field, this meant the maintenance of the church's institutional and traditional moral interests, goals which could be attained through traditional personal relationships with political leadership. In the religious field, this meant dedicating fewer resources to broad social movements and goals of social justice, and instead, concentrating on increasing the religious presence of the church in the everyday lives of Brazilians.

Chapter 6

The Church and Political Transition in the Philippines: 1986-1992

Chapter 4 dealt with the historical nature of church-state relations and the church's role in the initiation of regime change. This chapter examines the church's influence in the other phases of the transition: the contestation over transitional rules, the mobilization and struggle under the new rules, and the transition to a new regime. In order to understand church influence, I examine 1) the goals and interests of the church during the transition, 2) the resources and constraints facing the church, and 3) political space and church strategies in two events: constitutional reform in 1986-1987, and the presidential campaign and election of 1992.

The Philippine Church was able to exercise influence over the writing of the constitution and to a lesser extent on the presidential elections for several reasons:

- 1) The primary mission or theological paradigm of the church had moved toward one of political and social activism (despite the later "retrenchment" of the church hierarchy).
- 2) The goals and interests of the church were at stake, especially in the constitutional reform process, but also in the presidential election. This gave the church reasons to become politically involved.
- 3) Church resources, such as levels of membership, informal channels of communication, and media presence were used effectively in the constitutional writing, and less

effectively in the elections. External constraints imposed a greater burden on the church farther along in the transition process.

4) Because political space for non-church actors within civil society was constricted during the early phases of the transition, the church exercised more influence. This was especially true during the constitutional reform process, when the church was the dominant social actor. As political space opened to a greater number of actors during the presidential elections, the church became one among many, and its influence was diluted.

Goals and Interests

The activity of the church surrounding Marcos's ouster can lead to several conclusions about what goals motivated the church. Two extreme interpretations are possible: the church's behavior represented a coalition of the grass roots and hierarchy in a commitment to political and social justice; or the church's behavior was motivated by institutional and autonomy interests and occasionally, the preservation of traditional social teachings. I posit a hierarchy of goals, from institutional interests, to traditional social and moral teaching, to political liberalization, and finally to social justice goals.

Institutional and autonomy goals

The Philippine church experienced a deterioration of its institutional interests and autonomy during the Marcos regime. Among the institutional threats were harassment of clergy, arrests, detention, and murder of radical religious and lay leaders, military raids on religious establishments, and shutting down church media resources.

The Philippine government purposely intervened in the internal affairs of the church in order to cause dissension and divide the influence of the church. Government media began a program of criticism of the radical clergy, the Basic Christian Communities (BCCs) and the social justice movement in the church in the mid 1970's. In 1979, the Kintanar report was published by the Ministry of National Defense, which warned against the radicalism from the religious left, and especially the BCC movement. This report proposed a strategy of open support of the "conservative mainstream of the church hierarchy and clergy," while also suppressing religious radicalism by "sowing dissension and by using public criticism and modern intelligence techniques" (Youngblood 1990, 93). The report also recommended that BCCs be registered and seek approval from the government before their establishment. Another government-authored report in 1983 recommended

(1) the vital interests of the church be guaranteed, perhaps with legislation; (2) criticism of the church in the controlled media be curtailed; and (3) ideological differences between the church and state be downplayed while ideological differences within the church be emphasized (Youngblood 1990, 94).

As Youngblood notes, the regime's strategy was to undercut church criticism of the regime while portraying the church and state in a friendly relationship. The Marcos regime so oppressed the leftist church, however, that instead of dividing the church, the various elements of the church were driven together by the common threat to the institutional interests of the church (Ofreneo 1987, 327).

Traditional moral issues

It was Marcos's intention to deliver the conservative social agenda of the church (family planning, divorce laws, and abortion) in order to gain the support of more conservative factions of the church. However, on several occasions the Catholic Bishops' Council of the Philippines (CBCP) condemned the Marcos regime for adopting a population control policy. In a 1973 pastoral letter, the bishops condemned the population policy as depersonalizing and poorly designed to deal with the real problems of economic inequality and poor distribution of resources (Hardy 1984, 80-81). A 1976 pastoral letter rejected the push to legalize divorce in the Philippines, and repeated the condemnation of the government's population control policies

(Hardy 1984, 133-144). In 1979, the CBCP again condemned the Marcos administration for allowing abortion to take place despite its legal ban (Hardy 1984, 201-6).

The process of drafting the 1987 constitution discussed below shows the desire of the conservative and moderate factions of the church to obtain language in the constitution upholding the church's traditional position on birth control, divorce, and abortion.

Political liberalization

Despite the slow start by conservative and moderate elements in the church in opposing the martial law regime in the Philippines, political liberalization became a key goal of the church opposition. During the late 1970's, groups of bishops, social action arms of the church such as NASSA and the AMRSP, and the CBCP itself began a more critical relationship with the state. The more general condemnations of violence in Philippine society, such as in the 1979 pastoral letter "Against Violence," were followed by much more pointed condemnations of the regime's role in political repression.

Several pastoral letters issued by the CBCP from 1983 to 1986 pointed out the political liberalization goals sought by the church. These goals were centered on the return of the due process of law and the civil rights of dissent and political expression, the condemnation of politically oriented repression and murder, and the return

of fair elections. In February and November 1983, pastoral letters condemned the arbitrary arrest and detention of citizens, and called for the return of the writ of habeas corpus and due process for those who were detained (Hardy 1984, 232-8, 241-4). In July of that year, the bishops issued a letter which rejected the proposed Presidential Commitment Order, which would have legitimized Marcos's suspension of due process (Hardy 1984, 239). When Marcos withdrew the PCO, and merely renamed it and introduced it again later, the bishops soundly condemned him again. The church similarly condemned Amendment 6 of the 1973 Constitution which permitted presidential suspension of habeas corpus and due process (CBCP 1984, 4). Though these letters represent the institutional church and the bishops, groups such as the TFDP had sounded the alarm earlier and were key to pushing the CBCP to take this critical response to the regime.

After the Aquino assassination in 1983 and the stepped-up violence against the church in 1984, the CBCP wrote several letters deploring the political murders and use of secret marshals to carry out the wishes of the regime (CBCP 1984, 4). A 1985 letter called for the dismantling of all Civil Home Defense Forces and condemned the murders taking place on both the right and left spectrums of the political struggle (CBCP 1985). By the end of 1985, which was the period of greatest church repression and violence, the institutional church as represented by the bishops, the

progressive branches of the church as represented by such organizations as NASSA and TFDP, and the progressive bishops of the south were unified in their condemnation of the Marcos regime and its policies. However, they differed in their identification of the potential solution to the problems of the regime.

While the progressive branches of the church boycotted the 1984 elections and were gearing up to boycott the snap election called for early 1986, the CBCP supported the use of elections to further their political goals. The bishops generally supported the 1984 elections and sponsored the formation of NAMFREL to ensure fairer electoral processes. Before the 1986 snap election, the bishops issued an important letter which called on the government to uphold the people's political rights by holding fair elections. The CBCP and Cardinal Sin called on the people to vote as an act of faith, and issued voting guidelines to assist the faithful. When the election did not appear to fit the criteria of fairness, the bishops wrote their post-election statement condemning the government and calling for nonviolent disobedience. The church placed heavy emphasis on electoral processes as means to restore Philippine democracy.

Social Justice

Though social justice issues tied to economic inequality had been broached as early as the 1948 and 1949

pastoral letters of the Catholic Welfare Organization (see Chapter 4), a consistent and unified commitment to these issues was not evident until much later. The church began to make great strides in its social justice positions in the 1960's with the formation of NASSA, the work of the religious orders and the AMRSP, and the development work in Mindanao. Development efforts became a major focus of the church as it looked to improve the economic lives of its members, and this eventually led to a realization that broader changes in economic and political structures would be necessary if the church was truly to take on the needs of the poor. The organizations of the church such as NASSA and the MSPC became increasingly oriented toward social justice and political conscientization. In the minds of progressive leaders, the formation of BCCs was to be the structural means for creating a new and just order.

Though the hierarchy took on a more developmental approach in its pastoral letters in the 1960's, and at least paid lip service to a preferential option for the poor in the 1970's and 1980's, there is much controversy and disagreement over whether the hierarchy was deeply committed to these goals. Youngblood claims that

at the heart of the conflict [between the church and Marcos] was a fundamental disagreement over the best means of eradicating unjust structures and ameliorating conditions for the poor in a society that pitted the right of the churches to engage in social justice activities against the regime's economic programs, which were often justified in terms of national development and national security (1990, 201).

While Youngblood shows that the Philippine church began to move beyond an agenda of traditional social action, such as acts of charity, to include a more politicized concept of the church's role, it is unclear whether this approach was embraced by the entire church. Youngblood's data suggest a wide divergence of political and economic agendas within the church, and Marcos's attempt to exploit these differences.

Conclusion

The institutional church, under the leadership of Cardinal Jaime Sin and the moderate branches of the CBCP, was involved in the change of regime in 1986. The commitment of resources and of church clout helped to usher in the military installation of the Aquino regime. Ofreneo credits much of the movement of the center of the church during martial law to the pressure of the organized left in the church.

The church ceased to be a conservative monolith, although the forces of reaction and moderation continued to hold on to their traditional concerns and levers of power (Ofreneo 1987, 324).

Ofreneo believes that the ousting of Marcos in the days after the snap election was orchestrated by the moderate branches of the church, who, in concert with such middle class interests as the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, sought to place Mrs. Aquino in power, garner the spoils of her administration, and then resort to

conservatism in future political activity (Ofreneo 1987, 328-31).

Bolasco also claims that the "miracle" of 1986 was a gain for conservative, middle class forces of the institutionalized church. He believes that the mobilization of opposition to Marcos in February had very little to do with the theology of liberation or grass-roots organizations. The interests represented by Cardinal Sin, and even the religiosity displayed during the street protests in February, were characteristic of the middle class, and not of liberation theologians (Bolasco 1988, 57).

The behavior of the church since 1986 supports the claim that the institutional church was motivated in large part by institutional interests and has been slow to promote change in social and economic structures. Social justice issues, such as land reform, rural development, and peasant and labor issues, were the primary goals only of progressive elements of the church, and appear to have largely remained that way, despite an increased rhetorical commitment to these goals by the moderate and conservative branches of the church.

Resources and Constraints

The capabilities of the churches can be understood by examining two sorts of resources: organizational and material. Organizational resources help to indicate the scope of the churches' influence in the country, and the

relative effectiveness of the churches' exercise of that influence. Material resources speak more directly to the ways in which the churches hope to exercise influence and what strategies are open to them.

Organizational Resources

Membership

The Philippines is a predominantly Catholic nation with the highest percentage of Christians in all of Asia. Between 80% and 85% of the population calls themselves Catholic, and though some regions are stronger than others, only a very few areas in the Moslem south are not predominantly Catholic (CBCP 1989a, 40-41). Nearly all accounts of the Catholic Church, however, speak of the "nominal" characteristics of much of Filipino Catholicism or the "folk" quality of Catholic practice (Giordano 1988, 12, Barrett 1982, 564, Henry 1986, 5-7). Although Catholicism is widespread, its practice blends with traditional cultural practices in several ways. Catholic teachings of marriage, baptism, and the veneration of saints (especially the virgin Mary) find resonance with traditional tribal practices concerning the dedication of children, veneration of ancestry, and rites of passage. This gives Catholic folk practice a syncretic and uniquely Filipino character (Pertierra 1988, 98, 110, 127-8).

There are two major indigenous Christian churches, the Philippine Independent Church (PIC), or Aglipayan church, which broke from the Catholic Church in 1902, and the *Iglesia ni Cristo* (INC), or Church of Christ, which was founded by Felix Manalo in 1913. The membership of these churches, along with the many other smaller indigenous groups, constitute between 6 and 10% of the population (Barrett 1982, 562). The Aglipayan church (named after Gregory Aglipay, the priest who founded it) broke from the Catholics over the failure to indigenize church leadership. At first, the PIC drew as many as 50% of the Catholic Church members and many clergy, but when the United States Supreme Court ruled that church property under PIC control should be restored to the Catholic Church, people returned to Catholicism and their local parish church (Barrett 1982, 564). In 1948, following years of decline, the PIC entered into a formal relationship with the Philippine Episcopal Church (Anglican), and enjoyed strong growth among the middle class (Barrett 1982, 564).

The INC's founder, Manalo, claimed to be divinely appointed to revive the original Christian church (Barrett 1982, 564). The INC has an authoritarian and hierarchical leadership which commands great loyalty; members are known to vote as a block in elections, and their endorsement is sought out.

Protestants make up another 3 to 4% of the population (Barrett 1982, 562). Protestantism came with the American annexation in 1898, and included such denominations as the Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and Disciples of Christ. The Presbyterians and Disciples of Christ, along with several other denominations, united during the Japanese occupation to form the United Church of Christ. A National Council of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP) was established in 1963 and embraced many Protestant denominations, the most prominent being the PIC, the United Church of Christ, the United Methodists, Baptists, and Episcopalians (Elwood 1969, 367-8). Many of the mainline Protestant churches, along with the PIC, are represented in the NCCP. Though as a whole Protestants have tended to be politically conservative, the NCCP has taken on a more activist role, criticizing the Marcos regime during martial law, organizing nonviolent protest around the snap election, and advocating a social justice agenda since the restoration of democratic rule (Youngblood 1980, 22, Suarez 1989, 52).

Seventh-Day Adventists have also been in the Philippines since the turn of the century, and Pentecostal groups such as the Assemblies of God have had a long presence. More recently, alternative non-Christian religions have been growing, as well as the Church of the Latter Day Saints and ministries of fundamentalist American evangelists. The growth of fundamentalism and the threat it

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poses to mainline Protestantism and Catholicism will be discussed below.

Only four percent of the Philippines is Moslem. This group is concentrated in the South, however, which gives it some local influence. Conflict between Moslems and Catholics in Mindanao and Sulu led the Catholic Church in the early 1970's to promote Basic Christian Communities as a means of Catholic influence in the South (see Chapter 4). A Moslem independence movement has been in existence for many years on Mindanao (the Moro National Liberation Front), which has heightened the influence of this population there and led to clashes with the Philippine government. The South was the venue for some of the most repressive actions of the Marcos regime against the Moslem independence movement and against sympathetic members of the Catholic Church (Youngblood 1990, 154-156).

Less than 1% of the population would be considered practitioners of traditional religions, although, as noted above, Catholicism often includes traditional cultural practices (Barrett 1982, 563-4).

Structure

The Catholic Church is large and pervasive, despite the chipping away at the edges by Protestant, fundamentalist, and indigenous churches. The over 47 million Catholics in the Philippines are organized into 16 regions called ecclesiastical provinces, each with their own archdiocese

and several dioceses, prelatures, and apostolic vicarates within. Besides the archbishop in each of the 16 regions (in several there are more than one), there are 60 other ecclesiastical territories, each with at least one bishop (CBCP 1989a, 24-9). There are also two Cardinals presiding over the whole Philippine Church. Giordano noted that for 1981 (when there were 11 fewer ecclesiastical divisions), the Philippine Church was bishop-heavy while priests were in shortage -- in some parishes only one priest per 50,000 communicants (Giordano 1988, 12). Indeed, for the entire Philippine church, there are only 4,500 priests and 7,500 nuns (Wurfel 1988, 215). These characteristics continue to hold true.

The organization of these bishops and ecclesiastical territories follows a strict hierarchy based on rank and seniority. The Cardinals are the heads of the church, followed by the archbishops and the bishops under them. The bishops are represented by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, which has a permanent council of eleven members and five permanent departments dealing with doctrine and religious affairs, clergy formation, lay formation, services and communication, and external affairs (CBCP 1989a, 30-34). Within these departments are commissions and committees that deal with such issues as education, liturgy, youth, mission, and social action. The CBCP has annual meetings in January and July.

Despite the strict chain of command in this structure, considerable autonomy is also evident. The bishops do not always speak with a single voice nor do they follow the line set out for them by the hierarchy, and especially Cardinal Sin. The CBCP's statements around the time of the snap election were impressive in the degree of consensus achieved, but even on such important utterances as the post-election statement, only 60 of the 104 bishops of the CBCP signed on (Claver 1986a, 378-9). Cardinal Sin issues separate pastoral statements with some regularity, and regional bishops, especially from the south, are noted for taking separate stands from the rest of the hierarchy (Giordano 1988, 27-28). When Cardinal Sin and the bishops of the Manila Archdiocese wrote a catechism of appropriate political involvement for priests and bishops in early 1987, Bishop Fortich (who is considered to be a progressive) bluntly stated "I don't have to follow him" (Quimpo 1987, 8) . This illustrates not only the divisions in the church, but also the autonomy exercised by individual clerics.

One other issue remains in the area of structure. The Philippine Church has a strong representation of religious orders who do not fall directly under the supervision of the diocese or bishops, but rather under their own religious orders. This has historically been contentious for the Catholic Church, as "religious" and "secular" clergy battled among each other for influence. Much of the progressive church today, including the AMRSP and its TFDP, is comprised

of members of the religious orders. The diversity in the hierarchy, and the strength of the religious orders, not to mention the power of the grass-roots progressive church, give the Catholic Church a multiplicity of voices. These voices were driven toward unity when the Marcos regime threatened the church's institutional interests. As those threats diminished during the Aquino years, the many parts of the church often articulated separate goals and strategies.

Cohesion

Scholars such as Youngblood tend to break the CBCP into conservative, moderate, and progressive branches. Conservatives long held the major power in the body, emphasizing traditional Catholic moral teachings and the preservation of institutional church interests. Moderates are described as being more cognizant of the church's need to respond to the calls for a more relevant gospel message, but still generally careful not to erode institutional church influence nor directly challenge the legitimacy of the regime (Youngblood 1990, 73). Progressives, using organizations such as NASSA and the AMRSP, began to aggressively push the CBCP toward internal reform and critique of the Marcos regime.

Before Marcos's ouster, a considerable amount of competition arose over the issue of who should control the church's agenda and in particular, who should control the

expanding BCC movement (Shoesmith 1979, 248). Though the fight for this control was subsumed for a time under the unified opposition to Marcos, Shoesmith claims that the nature of the church's influence was and is conditioned by the agenda of the factions within. Even at the height of the church's influence, its effectiveness was limited by factionalism that existed alongside the apparent unity of the February 1986 events. Since Marcos's ouster, the factions have emerged again.

Material resources

Funding and its sources

I have not obtained information on the day to day funding of the Catholic Church and its activities. Regarding the church's political activities, however, it appears that funding came not only from traditional internal church fundraising, but also from influential internal and external sources. Among the most prominent backers of the moderate institutional church's step into politics was the business class of greater Manila, represented by such groups as the Makati Businessmen's Club and the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference. After the Aquino assassination, for example, the church sponsored the creation of NAMFREL, which was headed up by businessman Jose Concepcion, also the leader of the CBCP's Laity Commission. NAMFREL's activities in 1984 and 1986 were at least in part funded by the conservative business elements (Youngblood 1987, 1242-45).

Some have also suggested that NAMFREL was supported by funding from the United States, including both governmental and nongovernmental sources (KSP 1984, 15). It is assumed that the church played a role in bringing these funds to the Philippines.

Wealth

The Philippine church ceased to be the holder of wealth that it had been when the American occupation government assumed control of the vast agricultural holdings of some of the religious orders and redistributed them to non-church entities. Roughly 430,000 acres were purchased from the religious orders and sold to estate owners (Tano 1981, 22). While the church does not own land in the same quantities it did in the past, it continues to hold considerable resources in business and banking interests and in church-run schools, hospitals, and the media. Ofreneo pointed out that in 1987, the Philippine Catholic Church had an 18% share in the large Bank of the Philippine Islands and the Manila Archdiocese had a 64.5% interest in the country's third largest savings bank, the Monte de Piedad (Ofreneo 1987, 336).

John Carroll noted that there were over 2,100 parish churches in 1984, as well as over 2,000 church-run educational institutions "from grade schools to universities" (quoted in Ofreneo 1987, 336). The church's assets had also increased dramatically with the rise of church-related organizations such as NASSA, the AMRSP, and

the TFDP. As these groups increased their social involvement through the creation of social action centers, hospitals and health clinics, and community centers, a large network of church-run resources was created (Ofreneo 1987, 336). These resources, combined with the Philippine-wide reach of the institutional church, have made the church a major player in Filipino society and politics.

Media

The media resources of the Catholic Church and the Protestant and indigenous churches are extensive. The most well known and prominent of these resources is Radio Veritas of the Catholic Church. Radio Veritas is based in Manila and owned and operated as a non-profit organization. Its board is dominated by Catholic bishops. In 1982, there were 21 local radio stations in the Philippines associated with Radio Veritas, and a very aggressive international division broadcasting in 13 languages across East Asia (Barrett 1982, 566, Clad 1987b, 46). Radio Veritas was a key actor in informing and mobilizing the Philippine people around the time of the EDSA uprising, and managed to stay on the air using alternative transmitters and studios during the tense days before Marcos left the Philippines (Galang 1986, 20). The Catholic Church is also involved in television, producing programming for several television stations informally connected to the church (Barrett 1982, 566).

There is an extensive print media controlled by the church. Several newspapers were founded by church organizations after the Aquino assassination in 1983, and the Catholic journal *Veritas* became a widely read source of non-government information before Marcos's unseating (Clad 1987b, 46). In addition to these sources, the church publishes extensive material "from comic books to extracts from the Scriptures" (Clad 1987b, 46).

Protestant and indigenous churches also have a media presence in the Philippines. The Far Eastern Broadcast Company serves as a center for Protestant-produced radio broadcasting aired in the Philippines and East Asia, and the Church of Christ uses its radio station for aggressive proselytizing purposes (Barrett 1982, 566, Clad 1987b, 46). Television has also become a key tool of the fundamentalist movement in the Philippines, with most programming coming from American television evangelists. This topic will taken up more extensively in the section dealing with constraints on the Catholic Church from alternative value movements.

Constraints

Competing value movements

Competing value movements, to use a phrase from Latin Americanists Bruneau and Hewitt, are of many sorts in the Philippines, and are taken very seriously by the Catholic and mainline Protestant churches. Some Philippine observers have begun calling these groups New Religious Movements

(NRMs), which includes such diverse bodies as traditional spiritist groups, charismatic Christian groups, and American fundamentalist groups. It is the latter that appear to be of special concern to the established churches, warranting both a CBCP Pastoral Letter warning against the fundamentalist threat, and an NCCP publication documenting the alarming rise in popularity of fundamentalist organizations (CBCP 1989b, NCCP 1989).

Those parts of the fundamentalist growth deemed most threatening are those tied to American television evangelists and conservative political groups. Toward the end of the Marcos era and in the beginning of the Aquino regime, there was a boom in the broadcast of American television and radio evangelism programs, including Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network, The Rex Humbard Show, Jerry Falwell's Gospel Hour, Jim Bakker's PTL Network before its demise, and Jimmy Swaggart's Television Ministry (Formilleza 1989, 69-72, Nicolas and de Leon 1989, 54-55). Several other more conservative organizations have also become somewhat influential, especially on campuses, including Campus Crusade for Christ and InterVarsity Christian Fellowship (Formilleza 1989, 68, 71).

There are several reasons why the growth of these ministries is proving threatening. Of course, if these ministries are "stealing" traditional Catholics and Protestants from their churches, this takes away both numbers and vitality. The large resources that these groups

can bring in also threatens to muscle out the traditional churches' influence. The new religious movements' critics claim that these groups have cropped up quite purposely during a time when Filipinos are experiencing destitution and political instability, and that the religious movements have little commitment to a people-first, pro-poor mission. Instead, they preach a message that focuses on the next life and the millennial return of Christ rather than having a concern for society today (Dominguez 1989, 24-25).

Several of the American-based fundamentalist groups have not been politically neutral, or focused on heaven only. Their political conservatism has taken the forms of supporting the maintenance of an American military presence as well as a militaristic response to the leftist insurgency in the Philippines (Nicolas and de Leon 1989, 56-7, Formilleza 1989, 74). This has been especially troublesome to the progressive Catholic Church, which made the removal of the American bases one of its key points of activity during the Aquino administration.

The response of the Catholic Church is summed up in the January 1989 Pastoral Letter of the CBCP in which the bishops set out reasons for rejecting the fundamentalist sects and set out challenges for the practice of Catholicism. The bishops suggested that the church needed to further emphasize the reading and study of the Bible in BCCs and other smaller groups, to make liturgies and forms of worship more vital and warm, to catechize the

communicants regarding Catholic teachings, and to recruit and train "lay ministers of the word" (CBCP 1989b, 519-20). Several of these responses fit in with the more progressive commitment the church already made after Vatican II. Progressive bishop Francisco Claver suggested that the fundamentalists were not threats to those churches with thriving BCCs (Claver 1990, 5). However, it appears that rather than encouraging a progressive agenda of increased politicization at the grass roots, fundamentalist competition primarily has heightened the church's sense of needing to bring a more vital faith to its members. This realization has initially tended to propel the church away from the political and toward the devotional. This tendency has also been observed for Latin American churches (Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1992).

External pressures

The presence of American-based television evangelists may be considered an external pressure, but here I wish to deal with the pressure of the international Catholic Church as represented by the writings and behavior of the Pope and the Vatican. Pope John Paul II made a trip to the Philippines in 1981 in which he ignited the people and even elicited a confession from Ferdinand Marcos of his failings in meeting the needs of the Philippine population. However, despite the encouragement toward change in the Philippines

that this trip gave the people, most of the Papal and Vatican communications in the 1980's and early 1990's have emphasized a depoliticized church.

In an October 1985 meeting in Rome between the Pope and members of the CBCP, the Pope urged the bishops to avoid (without using the word marxism) "the use of division, opposition, hatred, or violence as a programme of Christian life or as progress in justice." The Pope also warned against the "monopolization and manipulation by ideological systems and political parties" (John Paul II 1985, 171). In the last weeks of the Marcos regime, the Vatican urged caution to the cardinals and bishops and generally was not supportive of the actions of Sin and the activists, although the pope's personal representative, nuncio Bruno Torpigliani, did intervene with General Ver to plead for non-violence in Marcos's last days (Clad 1987b, 42-3).

After the peaceful intervention of the church in February 1986, the Vatican was still very cautious about church intervention in politics. A June 1986 letter from John Paul II to the CBCP read

the Church is called not to take positions of a political character, or to take part in partisan conflicts, but to give society the expert contribution which is proper to her, as the spiritual light and strength that can contribute to building and consolidating the human community (John Paul II 1986, 392).

Despite this call for non-intervention, the Pope did urge "solicitude for the present drawing up of the new Constitution" (John Paul II 1986, 394). This deviation

makes some sense, however, since the church had considerable influence on the drafting of the Constitution and received for its efforts more conservative wording on traditional issues of family planning, education, and divorce.

When President Aquino travelled to the Vatican in 1988, John Paul further suggested that

the Church has no specific political programmes to offer, but by pursuing her own mission, in a context of religious freedom, she makes present in every area of life the religious truths and values which strengthen the resolve to serve the common good with wholehearted dedication and unfailing honesty (John Paul II 1988, 773).

Instead of political action, the Pope called upon the Philippine Church to preserve the traditional Filipino values of family life and human dignity.

The Vatican has also shown impatience with leftist priests who support the marxist-based insurgency. It has been reported that the Vatican was shocked to see priests acting as MNF negotiators during peace talks in early 1987, and that the papal nuncio, Torpigliani, complained to the bishops of the "frightening trend of involvement of priests in the leftist movement" (Clad 1987b, 42-3). In summary, it appears that the Vatican and Pope John Paul II were reluctant to support the February 1986 uprising, but having been assured that the traditional interests of the church were being addressed by the new constitution and the Aquino government, tacitly approved the church-state relationship that emerged. However, the Vatican had little patience or

support for "ideological" priests, and urged the disengagement of priests from political opposition of the left, and indeed of all of the church from active politics.

State repression

Areas of state repression of the church have been documented above and in Chapter 4. Marcos used the military to suppress church activity he deemed subversive and tied to the NDF. While this managed to silence certain critics, in general, the repression of the church only served to strengthen the church's opposition. Key figures in the radical left, such as Father Edicio de la Torre, were imprisoned, but his voice became more important as he rallied the church with writings from his prison cell (de la Torre 1986). The increasing intensity of the repression eventually dragged the reluctant moderate and conservative forces of the church into the opposition to the Marcos regime. The church remained the one social institution that the regime was unable to coopt or to bully into submission. Despite the raids, closing down of media sources, and general repression practiced by the Marcos regime, the church was a powerful and pervasive social institution that retained enough resources and autonomy to be able to successfully oppose Marcos's authoritarian rule.

Conclusion

Multiple interests drove the church to become involved in politics during the initial phases of the transition. The church had made rhetorical commitments to political liberalization and social justice, but these commitments may have remained rhetorical had it not been for the oppression of the leftist church, and the general level of oppression of Filipinos during the Marcos regime. The church saw institutional interests furthered by opposition to the authoritarian state.

The church was able to exercise influence because its resources were significant and pervasive. Catholic membership was large, though coming under attack during the transition. The institutional church also showed cohesion with the progressive church and its agenda since the goal of regime change was mutually beneficial. Specific resources in the media, such as the radio network that played a large role during the events on EDSA in February 1986, also allowed the church to recognize influence.

The common interests and significant resources were able to be used effectively because the church was one of the only places where political dissension could not be largely shut off. The following section examines two political settings to ascertain the influence the church was able to exert.

Political Space and Church Strategies from 1986 to 1992

Constitutional Reform

The church exercised a great deal of influence on the constitutional process of 1986-1987 for several reasons: 1) the church's political support of Corazon Aquino was rewarded with political appointments and consultation in the new regime, 2) church leadership was able to impact political appointments at the local level and on the Constitutional Commission, 3) the church used its role as the "moral leader" of Philippine society to more informally influence the constitutional process.

Several weeks after Aquino assumed the presidency, she had to make a decision concerning the legal authority under which she would govern the Philippines. Not wishing to perpetuate the Marcos constitution of 1973 nor the institutions, such as the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP), which sprang from it, Aquino decided to assume emergency powers, appoint a constitutional commission, and push for a quick restoration of democratic institutions which would resemble the Philippines' pre-martial law era. The church had influence in this process in several ways: appointments to the cabinet and close consultation of church leaders with Aquino and her government, membership on the Constitutional Commission, and education and get-out-the-vote programs urging ratification of the constitutional draft.

Appointments and consultation

After the successful participation of the church in the February revolution, moderate Catholic leadership found ready access to the Aquino administration through appointments to the administration and a receptive ear from Mrs. Aquino herself. Several of Mrs. Aquino's first appointments to her cabinet, including Finance Minister Jaime Ongpin, Local Governments Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Education Minister Lourdes Quisumbing, and Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez were among those known as the "Jesuit Mafia" because of their training at Jesuit institution Ateneo de Manila University. Another influential member of the Jesuit Mafia was legal scholar Father Joaquin Bernas, the president of Ateneo de Manila and the author of the "Freedom Constitution" which Aquino adopted upon taking power. This interim constitution was the rule of the land until the plebiscite in February 1987, and gave Mrs. Aquino decree power which she used with increasing frequency toward the end of her emergency powers (Clad 1987c, 16-17.).

Other appointments or advisors to Aquino with strong Church connections include economic advisor Bernardo Villegas, who was affiliated with the conservative Opus Dei organization, Trade and Industry Minister Jose Concepcion, who headed the Laity Commission of the Catholic Church with Jaime Ongpin, and National Economic Development Administration (NEDA) head Solita Monsod, who was also a

leader of the Laity Commission (Youngblood 1987, 1248-9).

The most prominent Protestant activist to become an Aquino appointee was Jovita Salonga, who was placed in charge of the Ministry for Good Government.

Not only did many church people receive posts in the new regime, but some clergy were also closely involved in screening government appointments to other positions. Chief among these at the national level was Cardinal Sin, who retained a close relationship with Aquino during her administration. There were reports of nearly daily consultation on matters of appointments to the regime and to the Constitutional Committee (Clad 1987a, 44). Sin himself suggested that he was somewhat uncomfortable with the close relationship between himself and Aquino and the charges of church meddling that came with it (*Business Day* May 22, 1986, 4). However, Sin did not refrain from making political pronouncements, even in quite partisan ways.

The church at a more local level also became involved in political appointments. The Ministry of Local Government approached local church leaders about potential candidates to take up positions left vacant by the dismissal of Marcos appointees. Several bishops who came together in March 1986 were concerned enough about the potential power this gave the church that informal guidelines were drawn up. Their guidelines included: endorse qualities rather than persons, preferably weed out candidates rather than promote specific candidates, submit more than one name per political post,

and encourage wide consultation with other members of civil society regarding the filling of political posts (Claver 1986b, 364). The bishops fully admitted that the church had become a power broker in Philippine politics, as political candidates made their pilgrimages seeking clerical blessings or endorsements (Claver 1986b, 366). While the bishops viewed the church's political *lakas* (Tagalog for power, pull, or influence) of the February days as appropriate to the needs of justice and fairness, they viewed the *lakas* of political appointments and endorsements with misgivings and warnings (Claver 1986b, 371-2).

The church supported the Aquino administration in several ways. Soon after the installation of the new regime, a public rally and mass for the new government were held in which the church and its leadership played key parts (Youngblood 1987, 1250). A general sense of support from the church came pouring in from many areas. Cardinal Sin and the CBCP gave their blessings to Aquino's decision to suspend the old constitution and rule by declarative power. When Aquino appointed the Con-Com (the popular name for the Constitutional Commission) instead of using an elected body, the CBCP issued a statement in support of this methodology, and urged all Filipinos to pray for the success of the Con-Com (CBCP 1986c, 1). Cardinal Sin also urged prayer and support of the administration and the Con-Com.

The church's support was not limited to prayers and blessings, however. In a message to a gathering of clergy on May 20, 1986, Aquino asked the church to continue the work of remaking the Filipino people. While noting that the church could not identify itself with only one political faction, the President asked the church to reject those of both the far right and left, and instead, to urge Marcos's former supporters on one side and the NPA on the other to join the mainstream of Philippine political and social life (Aquino 1986, 479-88). While Aquino saw the church's role in achieving this goal as primarily moral, later in 1986 she asked Cardinal Sin for his assistance in maintaining order during a coup attempt, something she would call upon the Cardinal to do several more times (Tasker 1987, 16).

Membership on the Constitutional Commission

Though Cory Aquino's appointment of the Con-Com came under attack, initially there was a feeling that her appointments were fairly balanced, though nearly all were her supporters (*Business Day* June 2, 1986, 28, Sacerdoti 1986, 16-17). It was also clear that the Catholic Church was very well represented in the membership of the Con-Com. Of the 48 initial appointees, 39 were Catholics, which is actually a bit lower percentage than in the general population (Clad 1987b, 47). Clergy and religious were well represented. Conservative Ateneo de Manila president Joaquin Bernas sat on several influential committees in the

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Commission, including the Steering Committee, Executive Committee, and the Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights. It was this committee which took up very basic questions of political liberties and rights, but also the traditional moral issues concerning family and abortion. Another conservative, Bernard Villegas, also sat on the Citizenship Committee as well as chaired the influential Committee on the National Economy and Patrimony.

Moderate Bishop Teodoro Bacani of Manila, and Sister Christine Tan of the progressive AMRSP, both were seated on the Committee on Social Justice. This committee took up many issues of social justice, including the disposition of labor, agrarian and urban land reform, the role of women, and human rights. Bacani was also present on the Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights and Sister Tan was a part of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. One Protestant cleric, Reverend Cirilo Rigos of the United Church of Christ, was also appointed. Youngblood points out that these clergy and religious had representation in two thirds of the committees (Youngblood 1987, 1250). Of the Catholic clerics and religious, only Sister Tan could be said to represent interests other than the moderate or conservative forces of the church.

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There were some worries in the press that with the cabinet appointments and the Con-Com appointments that the church had ceased to be truly separate from the state and held too great a role in the new political reality. Critics termed the Con-Com as comprised of "landlords, compradors, and church leaders" (*Business Day* June 2, 1986, 28). The rightist opposition to Aquino, led by former Marcos loyalist Blas Ople, who was a constitutional commissioner, suggested that the commission should seek a clearer separation of church and state in the new constitution, since religious and political distinctions had blurred considerably since the events in February 1986 (FBIS May 29, 1986, 4). Despite the controversy surrounding the decision to appoint the Con-Com's members, the appointment of several clergy, and the suggestion that the church had undue influence on the commission and Aquino, the constitutional process went forward. The CBCP and Cardinal Sin gave the process their blessings in pastoral letters and called for prayer for the commission's work (Sin 1986b, 578-9).

Ratification of the Constitution

Once the Con-Com had completed the document and submitted it to the government and the nation for review, the church stayed closely involved. Cardinal Sin declared the document "perfect" and "so beautiful" and urged that the constitution be adopted in the February 1987 plebiscite (FBIS November 4, 1986). He was reported to be heavily

lobbying for its passage in the weeks leading to the plebiscite (Clad 1987a, 24). The CBCP also published a pastoral letter on November 25 in support of the constitution. While claiming to be aware of the imperfections in the draft Constitution, the bishops nevertheless concluded that "the provisions of the new draft Constitution are consistent with the teachings of the Gospel" and urged its ratification (CBCP 1986d). A January 26, 1987 statement reiterated the CBCP's support of the Constitution, and condemned those who would "attempt to sabotage the efforts toward peace" (CBCP 1987, 59). This statement also further elaborated on the church's condemnation of those clerics or religious who were involved in marxist organizations.

An educational and get-out-the-vote effort was mounted by the church as well. Public hearings on the constitution were sponsored by the church and held around the country (Youngblood 1987, 1250). There was also considerable promotion of the plebiscite and the constitution from the local pulpits in the weeks before the plebiscite was held (Green 1987, 21). Finally, church personnel again conducted extensive poll-watching in a effort to eliminate fraud and conduct a fair plebiscite election (Youngblood 1987, 1250).

What did the Church get?

The plebiscite went overwhelmingly for the adoption of the constitutional draft. The turnout was very large, with

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nearly 85% of 25 million voters turning out (Clad 1987b, 10). Most credited the dramatic win to the persona and popularity of Cory Aquino and to the desire of the people to consolidate democratic rule in the face of instability from the left and right (there was a military mutiny several days before the poll and the NDF pulled out of negotiations with the government two days before the plebiscite due in part to the Mendiola Massacre).

The passage was also a victory for the church on several levels. First, the church proved itself able to influence the administration and mobilize the population after the dramatic events of early 1986. Secondly, the church obtained favorable outcomes regarding tax exemptions for church-owned properties (Article 6, Section 28(3)) and the right to include religious instruction in public schools. Article 14 Section 3 of the new constitution gave parents the option to choose religious instruction in their own faith during school days, and instructed schools to provide necessary facilities for this to occur (Philippine Constitution 1987, 49). Churches and other religious organizations, along with the parents, would be responsible for the provision of teachers of religion and any costs involved in their hiring (Putzu 1988, 167).

Because of this, the Catholic Bishops, in a July 1987 Pastoral Letter, called the constitutional provision an "educational revolution" (Putzu 1988, 168). The changes were considered to be both an "opportunity and a challenge,"

since parents and churches would need to provide the necessary resources for religious instruction without further burdening the state. Critics contended that the church obtained state-sponsored religion, which would violate the separation of church and state, and necessarily require the commitment of state resources (Clad 1987c, 44).

Among the church victories in traditional social issues, the church won a ban on abortion from conception in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2, Section 12). This was the section in which the church had considerable representation on the drafting committee. The constitution also promoted a weakened family planning program (Clad 1987c, 44). Though the administration did not eliminate all information about contraception in its family programs, the flow of information was so curtailed and the commitment of resources so low, that a family planning program largely ceased to exist. As an illustration of this trend, when Aquino left office in 1992, there were 200 population control workers versus 10,000 under the Marcos administration (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, July 20, 1993). President Fidel Ramos has also been more active in promoting family planning than Aquino was.

Another church victory in traditional social issues was the constitutional ban on divorce in Article 15, Section 2 (Philippine Constitution 1987, 53). The constitutional articles required that legislation follow up on the general provisions of the constitution, and this occurred in the

case of divorce and family law in the "Family Code" which was passed in July 1987. This code banned "absolute divorce," which is the full legal provision for divorce, while allowing legal separations, "relative divorce," and annulments for specific reasons. These reasons included physical violence of a spouse, the psychological incapacity of a spouse, drug or alcohol addiction, homosexuality of a spouse, and sexual infidelity, among others. The conservative family code also gave parents the right to deny permission to minor children to marry (Testera 1989, 641-2). Testera noted that:

aware of the fact that a great majority of the Filipino people as Catholics and Christians must live both under Church and state laws, the committee which drafted the new Family Code, with laudable astuteness, avoided a clash with Church laws by snubbing absolute divorce, while drawing heavily from Church law for the Code's provisions especially on void and voidable marriages (Testera 1989, 645).

This sort of "astuteness" which avoided conflicts with the church's social teachings was apparent in several areas of traditional church interests.

The constitution was not silent on issues of social justice, but left many of the provisions for pursuing social justice goals purposely vague while insisting on later legislation (Green 1987, 18-19). Among these provisions, the constitution states that:

the State shall protect labor and promote full employment and equality of employment ... the State shall by law undertake an agrarian reform ... the State shall by law undertake a continuing program of urban land reform and housing ... the State shall protect and promote the right to health by endeavoring to make health services available to all ... and the State shall establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels (Excerpted from Article 13, Sections 1-17 Philippine Constitution 1987, 44-47).

Though certainly impressive in the breadth of its commitment, the provisions of the constitution in these areas were so vague as to make them vulnerable to high words and no action.

A prime example of the failure of the constitution to achieve the goals it set out is land reform. The constitution left the specific provisions and implementation of a land reform program to the administration and the Senate. This decision was understood to mean that landed interests would be able to have greater influence on the outcome of any land reform legislation (Church Data Center 1991, 40). A religious member of the Con-Com, Sister Christine Tan, complained that during the constitutional process the church had not pursued social justice issues with the same fervor as they pursued the provision of favorable church interests in education and taxation (Ofreneo 1987, 331).

Conclusion

Probably no other organization or group could look on the constitution with as much satisfaction as the moderate

branches of church leadership led by Cardinal Sin and much of the CBCP. This success was due to several factors:

1) Because the church supported the Aquino candidacy through political brokering and commitment of church resources, the church was propelled into a powerful position of influence with the Aquino administration. Church leaders used this power to advance institutional interests of the church during the writing of the constitution.

2) The church had influence on the constitutional process because of the astute political involvement of the bishops and Cardinal Sin, the direct ties that church leaders were able to form with the new president and holders of political influence, and by gaining influential positions within the Con-Com. Broad mobilization and use of resources were not necessary for the church to obtain its interests. The constitutional process was well defined and fairly controlled. This allowed strategic bargaining in a face-to-face setting, especially useful for obtaining institutional benefits in taxation and education.

3) The "moral authority" of the church could be used to influence the outcome. The church was very successful in obtaining traditional moral teachings on abortion and family matters. The agenda of the progressive branches of the church, who wished to see more concrete guarantees of social and economic equality, were not as easy to assign a moral answer. Though the church made some attempts to support land reform issues during the constitution writing, its

connections to the process and eventual outcomes were clearly more tied to serving institutional interests and traditional moral interests.

4) The constitutional process was particularly well suited to church involvement, as universal principles and national loyalty could be alluded to in the support of the process without the appearance of partisanship. The political involvement of the church after the writing of the constitution is a different story with quite different results.

The 1992 Campaign and Elections

In the five years between the ratification of the new constitution and the first freely contested presidential election, the church pulled back considerably from political activity. The CBCP, under Cardinal Vidal, issued a pastoral letter condemning the agenda of the left, including partisan activity and membership in organizations advocating violence (CBCP 1987, 58-60, Church Data Center 1990, 5). Sin issued a catechism of appropriate political behavior of priests and religious where he attempted to demobilize the opposition to Aquino, particularly among the progressive and leftist parts of the church (Quimpo 1987, 8, 10). He announced that he would now be a "mere spectator in politics" given that there were "no impediments standing in the way of the layman to the task of restoring the temporal order" (FBIS March 5, 1987, 11). Despite this promise, Sin himself endorsed

specific candidates for the May 1987 Congressional elections, and organizations such as AMRSP, for fear of missing out, followed suit (Clad 1987c, 42-43).

Undoubtedly this turn toward supposed political neutrality came under pressure from the pope and Vatican conservatives, but it also appears that the CBCP was satisfied with Aquino's administration and the outcome of the constitution, and so began to pull out of activist politics on at least some issues. The condemnation of the progressive agenda and the protection of the status quo by the moderates and conservatives eroded the relative unity of the church in opposition to Marcos, so that hierarchy and grass roots, moderates and progressives, moved farther apart than before EDSA (Dones 1991, 5).

It was only upon the recognition that the Aquino administration was not achieving the political stability and social progress that it promised that the church began to wade into politics and social justice issues again. Though some members of the church hierarchy supported the continued presence of the American military bases, a wide grass-roots mobilization against the bases was launched within the church and played a key role in maintaining pressure on the leadership of the Philippine Senate (Torres Jr. 1991). In the area of peace talks between the government and the NDF, the progressive elements of the church issued consistent calls for renewed talks and condemned Aquino's all-out war on the rebels. Eventually, the CBCP came to condemn

government policy and call for peace talks in a 1990 pastoral letter entitled "Seek Peace, Pursue It" (CBCP 1990, 338, Church Data Center 1991, 40). The church also issued pastoral letters condemning the continued proliferation of graft in Philippine society, and began to join grass roots movements in the church in issuing warnings about the folly of poor environmental policy in rural Philippines (Josol 1991, 305, 327, Church Data Center 1991).

The main issue for much of the rural grass-roots church was land reform. As the Aquino administration began work on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1987 and 1988, an alliance of church-based groups, cause-oriented groups, NGOs, and peasant organizations joined together to form the Congress for People's Agrarian Reform (CPAR). CPAR lobbied the administration and landlord-dominated Congress for truly comprehensive reform, but the legislation that finally emerged in June 1988 (now called the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL) was considerably tilted toward the interests of landowners rather than peasants. CPAR immediately issued an alternative legislative program dubbed PARCODE, the People's Agrarian Reform Code, which more closely represented the interests of peasants.

At first the institutional church supported CARL, although with some apprehension (Riedinger 1991, 442, Church Data Center 1990, 18). Some progressive elements of the church, such as NASSA, rejected CARL from the start. However, after the modest results of CARL (much of the land

transfer that occurred was simply an implementation of the Marcos reform program) and the controversies over its implementation (progressive Agrarian Reform Secretary designate Florencio B. Abad was compelled to withdraw his candidacy after losing Aquino's support), the institutional church also rethought its stance. By the end of 1990, the church had rejected Aquino's implementation of reform and was calling for amendments based on PARCODE, the alternative pushed by CPAR (Church Data Center 1991, 31). Issues of this nature point out the areas in which the progressive agenda still has some influence on the church, despite the general conservative trend.

Political Space and Church Strategies

The Church's behavior during the campaign and 1992 elections can be placed into several categories of activity:

- 1) The hierarchical church, with the exception of Cardinal Sin, chose a non-partisan strategy that stressed moral guidelines for choosing candidates, electoral education, and free and fair conduct of the polls, including once again extensive monitoring of the elections.
- 2) Some of the more progressive branches of the Catholic Church, as well as several Protestant groups, took a less neutral position and were willing to support those candidates who most closely adhered to the progressive church's agenda.

3) Cardinal Sin chose the most blatant partisan strategy of thinly-veiled endorsements of candidates. In fact, a more accurate description of Sin's behavior may be personal rather than partisan endorsements, as once again, ideological political parties were not as important as mechanisms of political change.

The church did not have much influence on the outcome of the presidential election, but it did play a constructive role in voter education, the fair conduct of the election, and the level of turn-out.

The CBCP and the moderates: non-partisan strategies

The CBCP's strategies involved setting out voter guidelines and criteria for choosing candidates and encouraging the organization of parish-level groups to provide voter education and monitor the electoral procedures. The bishops encouraged this primarily through the dissemination of three pastoral letters.

The Pastoral Letters

The first pastoral letter was released as a part of the July 1991 meeting of the bishops and it set the tone for the position the bishops would take during the elections. The first strong message to emerge from the letters was the unequivocal support of the electoral process and voting; there were no concessions given to boycotters or "principled non-participants." While condemning the "lost

opportunities" of the previous five years and those who failed to live up to their elected office, the bishops still maintained that elections were a major part of reversing these trends.

The key is how we shall recognize and vote for true, generous and committed leaders of service and in who we shall preserve the sanctity and value of our votes. We have made some progress in this regard. But we must preserve and improve our gains (CBCP 1991, 504).

To this end, the CBCP set out three general principles to "serve as democratic instruments for establishing and changing political leaders and for securing society changes beneficial to the people" (505). The first principle the CBCP proposed was a "wise, informed, and formed electorate" (505). The clerics committed the church to a process of civic education and "raising the level of our voters' political judgement" (505). Of primary concern was the practice of vote-buying among marginalized groups which the bishops condemned with some vehemence.

The second requirement for achieving beneficial social changes was the preservation of free and fair elections. The CBCP condemned the use of "guns, goons, and gold" and rejected those candidates who used intimidation or money to ensure political support. The bishops made special mention of the role the regime, and especially COMELEC, should take in maintaining a lawful and peaceful election.

Finally, the bishops called upon the faithful to protect the voting process by exposing fraud at the local precinct and the ballot box. More specifically, they

encouraged parish pastoral councils and BCCs to organize task forces to monitor the electoral process and to "link arms... with others similarly intentioned in every barangay in the country and thus overcome evil with good" (506). This call to grass roots activism was taken seriously by the church, and monitoring and education groups were organized at national and local levels.

The first pastoral letter's call for informed voting and a free and fair electoral climate provided the basic parameters for the hierarchical church's tactics in the 1992 elections. The second letter, written in November 1991 and disseminated widely in early 1992, created more specific pastoral guidelines for choosing candidates in the election. The guidelines were prefaced, however, by the bishops' claim that their positions were non-partisan and not generated by the hierarchy only. The fourth paragraph of the letter says this:

To avoid misinterpretations, we wish to make clear at the outset that the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, through this Pastoral Letter, officially endorses no political party, supports no particular candidate, and favors no political platform... We should also note, that the ethical guidelines we present here regarding the essential qualifications of candidates, come from the collective discernment and wisdom of the laity, clergy, religious and Bishops who participated in the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines (CBCP 1992a, 205).

Having presented these two disclaimers, the bishops set out five qualifications for political candidates:

- 1) The candidate must have pursued, with persistency and consistency, the common good.
- 2) The candidate must have been a vigorous defender and promoter of justice.
- 3) The candidate must be imbued with the *maka-Diyos* spirit of service.
- 4) The candidate must possess an enduring and preferential option for the poor.
- 5) The candidate must have the necessary competence to effectively perform those tasks and responsibilities required by our laws.

In calling for candidates that seek the common good, the clerics specifically rejected those who had been involved in nepotism, graft, and corruption, and encouraged candidates who rise above vested interests. Those who defend justice must work to support programs designed to overcome inequality and must also protect the life of the unborn. A candidate with a *maka-Diyos* spirit should reject arrogance for humility and pursue reform in political systems which interfere in the lives of citizens (CBCP 1992a, 205-6).

In placing the phrase "preferential option for the poor" in their guidelines, the bishops clearly wished to make a statement in support of the progressive church. The CBCP did not make any specific recommendations concerning policies that might show a preferential option for the poor, such as land reform, but more generally called for solidarity with the poor and the defense of their human rights.

Finally, the bishops suggested that competence is a necessary quality if candidates are to be effective. The pastoral letter called on the populace to use their power to

make political changes, and also called on the political parties to field candidates with the five qualities listed (CBCP 1992a, 207).

The third letter, released in February 1992, noted both the progress and pitfalls in the electoral process. The bishops noted with satisfaction the organization of many voter education projects at the parish level and by church organizations such as NASSA. They also lauded COMELEC for its credibility and the police and armed forces for striving to enforce a ban on guns and personal bodyguards for candidates (CBCP 1992b, 200). However, the bishops also noted with some fear the continuation of patronage and money politics, as well as voter apathy and violence.

This third letter made specific appeals to groups within Filipino society to help ensure fair elections. The bishops urged the candidates to reject vote-buying and violence and pleaded with COMELEC and the PNP and AFP to maintain their loyalty and courage in the face of difficulties. To the NPA, the conference asked for non-obstruction of the electoral process, to the media, no showing of bias, and to the schools, a constructive and meaningful program of voter education (CBCP 1992b, 201-2).

Of special note was the CBCP's call for businesses to help finance organizations monitoring the electoral process. The extent to which business supported church-sponsored groups as a result of this is unclear, but the churches' pastoral council organizations were encouraged to make

connections with non-church organizations such as the Media Citizens Quick Count (MCQC), which was supported by business funds (CBCP 1992b, 202). Finally, the bishops in the third letter encouraged parishes that had not yet organized some sort of group tied to the election to do so. This call to mobilize the grass roots throughout the Philippines showed the potential impact the church could have on the electoral process, and potentially its outcome.

Voter Education and Monitoring

After the call for free and open elections in the July 1991 pastoral letter, the CBCP and the church took some concrete steps to organize the promotion of voter education and election monitoring. A national organization called the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) was created after the Second Plenary Council (a specially called meeting of the bishops) in early 1991 to encourage responsible voting through the dissemination of information about the candidates and poll watching activities. The organization was commissioned by the Congress in October 1991 to assist COMELEC in assuring no election irregularities (FBIS October 23, 1991, 49).

Local PPCRVs were encouraged in each of the parishes throughout the country, and along with several other church and non-church organizations and with the cooperation of COMELEC, an impressive network of education and monitoring was created. Local PPCRVs were responsible for

disseminating information such as the CBCP voting guidelines to the parishes, and for mobilizing lay leaders throughout the country to educate and keep on the alert for election violations (Timoteo 1992, 10). The national PPCRV organization also drew up election guidelines of its own, which were distributed to the local groups (Timoteo 1992, 10). These guidelines were at times more specific than the Bishops' guidelines, as, for example, they urged voters not to support candidates known for "sexual promiscuity, womanizing, extravagant spending, riotous living, gambling, and excessive drinking" (quoted in the *Church Chronicle* 1992, 3). The week before the elections, the national PPCRV had as its goal placing at least one volunteer in each of the 180,000 precincts throughout the country (*Asiaweek* May 8, 1992, 31).

The mass education program corresponding to the PPCRVs in the parishes was called Project V.o.t.e. H.o.p.e. (Voters' Organization, Training, and Education Toward Honest, Orderly, and Peaceful Elections). Project Vote Hope was carried out in each of the 78 diocese and was designed to educate the voters on candidate qualification and "obtain people's participation in poll watching" (Anonuevo 1992, 14).

Among the secular groups the churches worked with in educational and monitoring activities were COMELEC and the MCQC. Radically changed since the 1986 elections, COMELEC was widely commended for its evenhandedness and for using

its influence with the police and armed forces to neutralize private armies throughout the country and confiscate illegal weapons before the elections (Timberman 1992, 123). Also unprecedented was the cooperative effort COMELEC launched with the church groups and the MCQC, a group which played a role similar to that of NAMFREL during the 1986 snap election. The several hundred thousand church personnel organized by the PPCRVs and Project Vote Hope, combined with MCQC personnel and COMELEC officials resulted in over 800,000 people involved in monitoring precincts and ballot boxes (Asiaweek June 5, 1992, 31). Though COMELEC came under some criticism as the count dragged on for several weeks after May 11 and Miriam Defensor Santiago fasted and protested the results of the count, most conceded that the network of church, government, and other election organizations had done a credible job of ensuring a minimal level of electoral fraud (Timberman 1992, 123).

Given the voting guidelines and the mobilizing efforts of the CBCP, it appears that the moderate branch of the church hierarchy had a positive influence on the electoral process and succeeded in remaining nonpartisan. In the first and third pastoral letters, the bishops were careful to stick to the basic issues of voter awareness and a fair election process while not being afraid to be specific in their evaluation of the problems in the electorate, COMELEC,

the armed forces and police, and in traditional patronage politics. Their directness served to create a fairer climate surrounding the 1992 elections.

Despite the clear and sometimes specific guidelines of the second pastoral letter, the CBCP as a body largely steered away from partisan posturing. While it was widely believed that the church did not support Imelda Marcos or Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., due to their past of graft and fraud, the other conditions did not automatically eliminate candidates such as Protestants Ramos and Salonga (though the bishops would probably wish to have Catholic teachings prevail in issues such as family planning and abortion). Action backed up the words of the pastoral letters as the CBCP used its influence to organize PPCRVs and other groups in an effort to change the political climate of elections.

These efforts were commendable and somewhat successful, as an international observer mission made up of personnel from NGOs, churches, governments, and academia noted:

[The NGOs and church groups] contrapose new politics against traditional politics; the people's agenda against personal popularity; clean, honest, meaningful elections against vote-buying, intimidation, and coercion. They emphasize a pro-people standard on vital issues and track record as a decisive criteria for choosing candidates (Parel 1992, 8).

The Progressive Branches

It is impossible to separate entirely the progressive branches of the church from those groups already mentioned, such as the PPCRVs. This is because during the 1992

elections, groups that in the past had been identified with the yellow or even red branches of the church were advocating participation in the electoral process at some level. The word boycott was not heard, and even for those groups that did not believe elections would bring any real change to the Philippines, there was a commitment to the electoral process and an attempt to use democratic institutions to further the progressive agenda.

However, progressive branches of the church were clearly skeptical of the hierarchy's position on the 1992 elections. Despite the political pronouncements of the pastoral letters, the progressives complained that the CBCP remained conspicuously silent during the street protests in Summer 1991 over high oil costs, and during the Senate debates on the military base treaties (Dones 1991, 4-5). Though committed to a "pro-people, pro-poor" strategy through the Second Plenary Council, the CBCP, in the eyes of the progressives, was unwilling to take specific positions on critical issues and instead opted for guidelines dealing only with the candidate's qualities (Dones 1991, 5).

By contrast, progressive organizations such as the AMRSP took on a position of "prophetic intervention" (Timoteo 1992, 10). In a paper on the 1992 elections called "The State of the Poor: Education for Democracy and the Quest for Peace," the AMRSP set up a standard for candidates based on their positions on such issues as the leftist insurgency and Aquino's total war policy, and the debt

rescheduling and tax and import policies pushed by the World Bank and IMF. This willingness to state positions on specific issues and vote accordingly Timoteo calls "principled partisanship" (Timoteo 1992, 12).

The AMRSP and other progressive Catholic groups were joined by Protestant churches such as the Philippine Independent Church and the United Church of Christ in taking up more specific issues. These Protestant organizations' Justice and Peace departments were also engaged in voter education activities by distributing material called the "People's Political Platform." This material presented guidelines which specifically judged candidates on their positions toward the American bases, agrarian reform, and debt rescheduling (Timoteo 1992, 12). The platform was produced by the Ecumenical Forum for Church Response (EFCR), which represented several of the mainline Protestant churches. Another ecumenical Protestant organization called the Promotion of Church People's Rights was engaged in its own educational campaigns surrounding the elections (Timoteo 1992, 10).

The major Protestant ecumenical body, the NCCP, also took a more issue-specific approach to the election, and in particular, issues of peace. In a document entitled "Spirit of Truth, Set Us Free," the NCCP brought attention to two major issues: the bases treaty and the insurgency (CCHRP 1992a, 5). This document was sent to each of the candidates, who were also invited to present their vision of

peace to the NCCP leadership at several meetings held during the campaign period (Torres Jr. 1991, 6, Anonuevo 1992, 14). The peace document was also distributed to member churches and recommended to them to be used to determine which candidates most seriously were promoting peace.

Cardinal Sin's Partisanship

While the CBCP as a body managed to carefully steer a course that avoided overt partisanship in favor of education and monitoring, the Archbishop of Manila and Cardinal of the Philippine Church, Jaime Sin, did not toe a line of neutrality.

Early in the campaign, Cardinal Sin endorsed the CBCP's position of releasing election guidelines without naming names. However, in an October 1991 interview with several television journalists, Sin hedged his position, suggesting that the guidelines of the second pastoral letter should be the "first attempt" and that more guidelines might be needed later to narrow the field of candidates (FBIS October 23, 1991, 49-50). It soon became clear that Sin would not be limiting himself to the CBCP criteria, but would seek a more independent role.

In December 1991, while Cory Aquino was debating which presidential candidate to endorse, Sin was letting his preferences be made known. In a personal visit to Aquino in late December, a Malacanang source quoted Sin as saying that Ramos was an unacceptable candidate and should not receive

an endorsement from the President (FBIS December 31, 1991, 44). Days before the president's announced endorsement, the Cardinal was urging Aquino to give the nod to Ramon Mitra rather than Ramos (*Asiaweek* February 7, 1992, 28). Sin turned down an invitation to attend Aquino's birthday Mass, which was widely perceived as a disapproval of her choice (FBIS January 31, 1992, 40). When Aquino did announce support for Ramos that day, Sin's spokesman, Monsignor Soc Villegas claimed that Sin would not be making endorsements as Aquino had done, but would rather be sticking to the CBCP guidelines (FBIS January 28, 1992, 74).

Cardinal Sin did not stick to the bishops' guidelines, however. During an Easter homily, Sin denounced "oppressors and plunderers" of the Marcos regime, which was interpreted to mean Imelda Marcos and Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. The Cardinal made further references to Cojuangco when he spoke of rejecting those involved in "cartelization and oligopoly" (*Asiaweek* May 8, 1992, 33). Lest voters be tempted to forgive Ramos his role in the martial law regime, Sin drafted eight additional guidelines in a pastoral letter in late April in which he urged any candidate who had once backed Marcos to repent by "forsaking the ambition to govern the country they so deeply wronged" (Tasker 1992, 18). Further nailing down his rejection of Protestants Ramos and Salonga, Sin urged in his guidelines the election of a

president who "will put an end to the active promotion of mechanical and artificial devices of birth control" (FBIS April 27, 1992, 43).

In a final effort to throw his weight in support of Mitra, Sin attended a birthday party for Mitra's wife and at a Rotary Club meeting made jokes about the other candidates, including a reference to populist Miriam Defensor Santiago as an "insane candidate" (FBIS April 29, 1992, 29, *Asiaweek* May 8, 1992, 30). If a voter found that after all the guidelines that Sin imposed, he or she could not make a decision, Sin told the Rotary Club meeting to "come to me and request me to make the decision for you and I will" (FBIS April 29, 1992, 28).

Sin's clear rejection of non-partisan guidelines smacked of the old-time politics of personal connections and endorsements. Indeed, nearly all the candidates had at one time or another made personal trips to Sin to court his endorsement (FBIS November 25, 1991, 51). This tactic created division in the church prior to the election, as comparisons to the unity of purpose in 1986 were made: "the church doesn't seem to be united now the way it was against Marcos, and Sin alone doesn't speak for the church anymore" (Tefft 1991, 6). Sin received much criticism from both inside and outside the church for his partisanship. After the election was completed and Ramos declared President, Cardinal Sin made great efforts to patch things up with Ramos, which further angered those who had criticized Sin's

solo politicking. An editorial in a Quezon City newspaper noted that Sin tried to claim that he had never named names and remained officially neutral, for which the editorialist branded him opportunistic and dishonest (FBIS June 5, 1992, 28).

Results

As the final weeks before the May 11 elections passed, many pundits believed that religious groups would play an important role in the electoral outcome. The INC had already committed its nearly 1.5 million disciplined members to Cojuanco, while Protestant Salonga had received the support of the NCCP (Asiaweek May 8, 1992, 31). With Sin weighing in on the side of Mitra (who also claimed some strength in the 3 million member Muslim community), it appeared that religious backing could make the difference in a race split by seven candidates (Asiaweek May 8, 1992, 31). While Ramos was thought to be able to pick up some support among the fundamentalist groups, in the final days of the campaign, he tried to make clear that religious affiliation should not hinder anyone from voting for him (Tasker 1992, 18-9).

In an election where the winner only garnered 24% of the vote, it is impossible to say that anyone won decisively. The church appeared to have had little influence on the outcome of the presidential election. Ramos won without the endorsement and support of the

Catholic Church and without the block votes of the INC. In fact, Timberman claims that

Cardinal Sin's transparent endorsement of Mitra and the Iglesia ni Kristo's almost militant support for Cojuangco may have cost both candidates more votes than they gained. As a result, 1992 may represent the highwater mark of the involvement of religious groups in electoral politics (1992, 122).

The church fragmented its vote among the candidates as much as the general population, and so there was no definitive "church vote."

There are several reasons why the church was not able to influence the presidential election:

- 1) With new open political space, the church became one actor among many. The church found itself in open competition with other societal interests, and the vote was fragmented because of it.
- 2) Presidential elections are necessarily partisan. The church had to decide the position it would take in regards to the various political parties. This was divisive for the Philippine church, with some elements of the church seeking neutrality, some joining the parties of the left, and some endorsing the right. The strategy that would appear to have failed the most was Cardinal Sin's blatant partisanship. After the election he quickly backtreaded, but few believed that Sin remained neutral. The progressives' attempt at boosting their agenda also appears to have largely failed at the national level, although several independent and

progressive candidates were able to win some local offices (Doronila 1992, 5).

3) The open presidential election was necessarily political, and did not present opportunities for the church to use its "moral authority" to influence outcomes. The 1992 election was different than 1986. In 1986, the desire of the populace to rid themselves of the authoritarian regime allowed the church to speak as a moral leader whose desire was consonant with the majority of Filipinos who wished to rid themselves of Marcos. In 1992, the candidates did not represent anything quite so dramatic as Marcos or Aquino did in 1986. Rather, the 1992 elections were more partisan in nature and less controversial.

It appears that the 1992 elections may have been most consonant with the goals of the moderate, hierarchical church. Ramos represented the greatest continuity with Aquino, and despite the church's disenchantment with Aquino toward the end of her administration, she was pro-church. Though a Protestant, Ramos showed willingness to cooperate with Catholics, even though he did not load his cabinet with church people (he retained several Aquino appointees, however). Finally, Ramos was backed by the largely conservative business community of the Manila area, which also has quite strong historical ties to church leadership through such organizations as the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference (Tiglao 1992, 19-20).

Ramos faced conflict with the traditional church concerning family planning, however, when he chose Protestant Juan Flavio as Health Minister. Flavio is supportive of a more aggressive population program, and has clashed with Cardinal Sin on several occasions (*Asiaweek* August 21, 1992, 25).

4) The presidential election required large-scale mobilization and commitment of resources. The church showed its ability to mobilize a broad electoral effort and influence the conduct of the polls. Church-sponsored voter education and grass-roots involvement in election monitoring have been credited with helping create a fairer and more open electoral process.

Achieving specific institutional interests, however, is difficult in an event as far-flung as a presidential campaign and election. The church's resources as represented by the parishes, media, and mobilization efforts, were considerable. That the populace did not vote as the church leaders such as Sin or the hierarchical church wished may be further testimony to the people's efforts to break away from traditional electoral contests marked by the power of political machines and the church.

Conclusion

Both the constitutional process of 1986-1987 and the presidential election of 1992 provided opportunities for the church to use its position within Philippines society to

influence political outcomes and realize institutional interests. Because the constitutional process was a much more contained process and because the church emerged from the Marcos era as one of the most powerful organizations within civil society, the institutional church was very successful in securing institutional interests and traditional moral teachings. Presidential elections are played out over a wider range of interests, which makes influence much more difficult for any group within civil society. Also, because the church found itself competing with other societal interests in the 1992 elections, it did not have the same influence as it had in the 1986 snap elections or in the constitutional process. In the political atmosphere of the presidential race, the church had its greatest effectiveness in efforts to educate the voters and monitor the electoral process. In this way, the church contributed to the continued emergence of democratic processes in Philippine life.

Chapter 7

The Church and Political Transition in Kenya: 1990-1992.

Chapter 4 outlined the change of mission that occurred in the Kenyan churches in the 1970's and early 1980's, and discussed the general relationship between church and state for the period since independence. This chapter examines the church's influence in the other phases of the transition: the contestation over political rules, the mobilization and struggle under the new rules, and the transition to a new regime. In order to understand church influence, I examine 1) the goals and interests of the church during the transition, 2) the resources and constraints facing the church, and 3) political space and church strategies in two events: the 1990 and 1991 push for multipartism, and the presidential and parliamentary elections that were held in December 1992.

The Kenyan Church influenced the constitutional reform process in Kenya and to a lesser extent the presidential elections for several reasons. First, the goals of key members of church leadership, and to a lesser extent, church organizations, had moved toward one of political and social activism in the 1980's. Second, the goals and interests of the churches were being challenged by the Moi regime prior to the constitutional reform process and in the period leading up to the presidential election. The antagonistic relationship and deteriorating social situation prompted the churches to become politically involved. Third, church

resources, especially the dissemination of sermons, were used effectively to mobilize the population during the KANU Review Committee and in maintaining pressure for constitutional reform. Church resources were also effective in helping to launch educational programs and monitor the presidential elections. And finally, because political space was sufficiently constricted during the early phases of the transition, the church exercised more influence. This was especially true during the constitutional reform process, when the church was the dominant social actor. As political space opened to a greater number of actors during the presidential elections, the church was torn by partisanship and excessive politicization.

Goals and Interests

I posit four categories of goals to understand examine the goals and interests of the church: institutional and autonomy interests, the preservation of traditional moral issues, the promotion of political liberalization, and action toward social justice.

Institutional and autonomy goals

The Kenyan churches' institutional interests were increasingly threatened by the Moi regime in the first years of the 1990's. Most of these threats came from the repression of key clerical leaders in the major Protestant churches. As documented in Chapter 4, state harassment of

the outspoken clergy of the CPK and the PCEA increased in intensity. Most of the harassment came from local KANU leadership tangling with the clerics over controversial sermons and church statements.

This repression hit a peak with the events surrounding the death of Bishop Alexander Muge of the CPK in August 1990. Muge had been under attack since 1986 for his outspoken criticism of the queuing system. Several politicians called on the CPK to defrock Muge for his political stances as well as his tangles with the MP in his district, Stanley Metto (*Weekly Review* September 19, 1989, 1-3). Muge was also accused in 1986 of having ties to the shadowy radical movement, Mwakenya, though the regime never made the accusation stick. As noted in Chapter 4, Muge was barred from conducting a religious service and briefly detained in 1986 (APS July 25, 1988, 2). In 1989, Muge and Henry Okullu were verbally attacked by cabinet-level and local politicians for statements that were critical of the Moi regime. Disciplinary action and imprisonment were threatened to both clergy members (*Weekly Review* September 19, 1989, 4-6).

Finally, there was much controversy surrounding Muge's death in August 1990. Several leading clerics were stepping up the level of rhetorical criticism of the Moi regime for several reasons: the increasing constriction of political space, the repression of any opponent of the regime, and especially state pressure on the churches to cease political

statements. Cabinet minister Peter Okondo made open threats against Muge's life were he to refuse to be silenced and make a trip into the Busia district (*Weekly Review* August 17, 1990, 4). The following day, Muge was killed in a fiery road accident. Though Okondo claimed innocence, many suspected that the timing of the accident was not coincidental and involved government foul play (APS August 20, 1990, 2-4, September 10, 1990, 1). Muge's death was viewed as a martyrdom to many in the church, and it rallied sympathy for the cleric's message and increased the criticism of KANU and Moi.

Other vocal clergy members have also felt state harassment. Bishop Gitari of the CPK escaped threats on his life and Okullu endured verbal attacks and threats from KANU Youth-wingers (APS August 20, 1990, 3-4). Along with these actions against individual clergy members, the Moi regime intervened in church affairs in several other ways: shutting down the NCKK's magazine *Beyond*, issuing periodic threats to de-register the NCKK as a legal organization, and insinuating that the churches, and especially the NCKK, were controlled by foreign interests such as World Vision (*Weekly Review*, October 3, 1986, 19-20).

Institutional interests of the churches were not only eroded by the state repression directed at the clerics. The state began to intervene on several occasions in the traditional church sponsorship of schools. The nationalization of education in 1968 changed the traditional

role of the churches in running the schools. Though religious education continued as part of the school curriculum, the churches expressed some dissatisfaction with the status of religious courses alongside every other discipline (Bauer 1990, 208, *Weekly Review* September 15, 1989, 11). In September of 1989, Bishop Alexander Muge protested the intervention of the state in the naming of a school head of a CPK-sponsored school (*Weekly Review* September 15, 1989, 9-11). In their September 1991 statement, the Catholic bishops complained that education policy has become politicized and that local political officials had become "god fathers" in the style of their control of the schools (Catholic Bishops' Statement 1991, 2). The result was that "the role of the Church as sponsor of schools has become grossly eroded" (5).

Traditional moral issues

For most of the churches in Kenya, there has been little quarrel with Moi about traditional moral teaching in the churches. Moi is a church-goer and appears to be quite conservative on most issues of moral teaching. He has supported the notion that the church should provide moral leadership for the country and that the state should guarantee the freedom of worship and assembly for the churches (APS October 27, 1986, Chepkwony 1987, 213).

However, on several occasions the Moi regime clashed with Catholic leadership over issues of family planning education in the schools. When first introduced into the curriculum, the Catholic Church condemned the state for taking a position in matters of family planning, and in particular, condemned dissemination of information regarding contraceptives and the use of condoms in the prevention of AIDs (APS March 31, 1986, 5, *Weekly Review* May 28, 1987, 3). Though the Protestant churches do not protest the use of artificial contraceptives, the NCKC criticized the distribution of condoms to unmarried couples as contributing to promiscuity and immorality (APS October 23, 1989, 6).

Political liberalization

The stated goals of the churches and their leaders from 1986 to 1989 were concentrated on issues of political liberalization. The church in its various forms, including individual clergy of the CPK and PCEA, NCKC statements, and the Catholic Pastoral Letters, opposed the erosion of civil and political rights in Kenya. The churches condemned detention without trial and the removal of autonomy for the Attorney General, Auditor General, and judgeships.

The most prominent issue of political liberalization was queuing for elections. Queue voting was both degenerative of individual political freedoms and an invasion of the clergy's autonomy, since it would have required clergy to make their preferences public. The

church called for reforms in queue elections and the 70% rule, which antagonized the Moi regime. When the queuing debate died down, the Moi regime several times made direct accusations that the church should not take any stands on political issues and even used veiled threats of dissolving the NCKK to attempt to quiet critics from the church (Weekly Review September 5, 12, 19, 1986).

Social Justice

Most of the mobilizing issues of the Kenyan churches dealt with church autonomy and political liberalization, and less on challenging the legitimacy and sense of justice in the social and economic structures of Kenya. This reluctance can be explained in several ways. Post-independence Kenya, despite its lack of competitive democratic institutions, had what Barkan calls a legitimate governance realm (Barkan 1991). This sense of legitimacy stemmed from Kenyatta's creation and use of some accountable forms of social and political organization, most notably, harambee (see Chapter 3). The church was enlisted in the program of self-help and in the greater goal of nation building through its involvement in education, harambee, and other forms of development activities.

Though church leaders made public statements in support for Moi's philosophy of Nyayo (love, peace, and unity) when the new regime consolidated power, it became apparent that Moi was eroding the sense of social and political legitimacy

as he began to centralize his power. The long history of church-state cooperation in development, education, and harambee tempered the church's criticism of the social order for some time, but farther into the Moi regime, the church began to be more critical in areas of social injustice.

Among the issues mentioned in church statements, pastoral letters, and church publications were the increasing gap between rich and poor in Kenya (Pastoral Letter 1988), the need for agricultural reform and access to land and other resources (Pastoral Letter 1988), and criticism of politicized and "forced" harambees (Beyond July 1986).

Conclusion

In summary, goals of church autonomy and noninterference dominated the concerns of the churches early on. These were beginning to give way to a broader vision of political liberalization, which included the condemnation of the abuses of the Moi regime, the call for creating more open political space, and freer and more open campaigns and elections. However, the emphasis on these issues was new, and the organizational support for such goals was somewhat shallow, given the dependency of the progressives on several key clergy, and less on grass roots and lay organizations. The period of 1990 and 1991 illustrates this trend further; during this time there was a growing commitment to goals of

democratization and social justice, but the commitment was centered in key clergy members and leadership bodies of the churches.

Resources and Constraints

The capabilities of the churches can be understood by examining two sorts of resources: organizational and material. Organizational resources help to indicate the scope of the churches' influence in the country, and the relative effectiveness of the churches' exercise of that influence. Material resources speak more directly to the ways in which the churches hope to exercise influence and what strategies are open to them.

Organizational Resources

Membership

In 1980, Kenya was considered to be 73% Christian, with projections of around 81% by the year 2000 (Barrett 1982, 432). The largest Christian denomination is the Catholic Church, constituting about 26% of all Christians, or 22% of all Kenyans (Barrett 1982, 432). The Catholic Church has 5 million members and 18 dioceses found in all areas of Kenya, giving it influence beyond a regional area. There are over 300 Catholic parishes in Kenya (APS August 13, 1990, 2).

The Anglican Church, or Church of the Province of Kenya (CPK), is the second largest denomination, with about 6% of the Christian population, or slightly under one and a half

million members (Barrett 1982, 432). There are 13 dioceses in the CPK, also found in all areas of Kenya. Other Protestant churches who originated from the foreign mission societies, such as the PCEA, Methodists, and the African Inland Church (AIC), account for about 18 to 20% of the Christian population. Different denominations have strength of membership in different regions of Kenya, such as the PCEA among Kikuyu and the Methodists among the Meru people (Barrett 1982, 434). Barrett notes that within this group of Protestant churches, Pentecostal bodies such as the Assemblies of God are growing rapidly (Barrett 1982, 434). Evangelistic crusades and mass media from American churches and organizations have also enjoyed recent success in Kenya (*Weekly Review* January 26, 1990, 7).

African indigenous Christian churches account for as many Christians as do the former missionary churches, around 20% of the Christian population (Barrett 1982, 432). The largest of these churches is the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa, or AIPC, which broke from the Anglican mission church in the 1920's. There are several hundred other indigenous Christian denominations, and they are considered to be the fastest growing sector of all Christian churches (APS December 9, 1991, 3-4).

Churches that are members of the NCCK represented 19% of all Christians for data collected in 1972, but this has fluctuated as new churches have joined or left the NCCK. Bishop Gitari of the CPK claimed in 1988 that the NCCK had

37 member churches and 12 million followers (APS October 10, 1988, 1). In 1991, 35 churches were a part of the NCKK, and represented two thirds of the country's Christians (APS December 16, 1991, 2).

Structure

The structures of the Kenyan Christian churches are quite loose. First of all, Kenya is divided by the many Protestant denominations that evolved from the missionary churches and from the independent churches. Many of the Protestant denominations, such as the PCEA, are organized in a congregational form and rely far less on a national structure. Although the NCKK is an attempt to unify the Protestant churches, it is also loosely organized. A General Assembly and Executive Committee composed from the member churches runs the NCKK in order to enable the churches to direct and control the council's activities (Chepkwony 1987, 302-3).

However, beginning soon after independence, a fairly autonomous and quite large bureaucracy was formed to carry out the many development tasks of the NCKK. The NCKK also was able to achieve some additional autonomy from member churches by seeking funding from foreign sources (Chepkwony 1987, 304). Some churches objected to the council being run by a bureaucracy independently of members, and changes in the NCKK's constitution were made in 1978 in order to provide adequate checks and balances (Chepkwony 1987, 310).

Most evidence suggests, however, that the NCK continues to be a loose configuration run by a central bureaucracy. NCK statements and actions have not been uniformly supported by member churches, as evidenced by the pull-out of several churches surrounding the queuing issue. Independent voices of clergy from member churches tend to remain prevalent.

The CPK is also fairly loosely organized. Though not a decentralized congregational form of church governance, the CPK allows individual bishops to exercise much autonomy within each diocese. There are currently 13 dioceses with several proposals for creating more. During the Katakwa diocese controversy, it became clear that diocesan leadership had a considerable amount of autonomy. The CPK Constitution leaves issues such as the formation of a new diocese to the diocesan bishop first, and then to a consensus of bishop opinion at the national meetings of the Council of Bishops. The Archbishop is considered a first among equals, and does not have the same influence over the church as in the Catholic form of church governance (*Weekly Review* May 19, 1989, 17).

Despite the loose organization, the CPK form of governance does not allow for much input from the laity. Several bishops, such as Muge and Okullu, have called for greater democracy in the CPK's structure, and more input from lay members in the affairs of congregations and dioceses (*Weekly Review* July 21, 1989, 17-18).

Only the Catholic Church can really speak as a single voice, which it has done with much success in the last several years. Its hierarchical structure is more centralized and decisions are more likely to be made in consultation with the central leadership of the archbishop (*Weekly Review* June 30, 1989, 7-8). Much collegiality has been achieved, however, by the formation of the Kenya Episcopal Conference, which is an organization of the bishops and the archbishop. Pastoral letters and other statements of the Catholic leadership carry the weight of all the bishops, and avoid the tendency of individual clergy to free-lance, as in the CPK (*Weekly Review* January 12, 1990, 8). Though this centralized organization has traditionally been more cautious and conservative in addressing political issues, the unity with which the organization speaks gives it much influence. In 1992, the Catholic church became much more outspoken and allowed clergy somewhat more autonomy in political statements.

Cohesion

The NCKK and the CPK have been rocked by dissension on several occasions during the last several years. As mentioned above, the NCKK has a decentralized organization, but a fairly activist bureaucracy. On several occasions, decisions of the central leadership of the NCKK have been decried by member organizations and several churches have pulled out of the ecumenical body, especially around the

issue of queuing. Accusations of mismanagement of funds and tribal favoritism in the hiring of staff have been leveled against current general secretary Sam Kobia by members of the council (*Weekly Review* May 31, 1991, 15-16). The leadership of the council has also accused clergy of representing it without its consent (June 21, 1991, 11-12).

The individual churches have also had problems of poor cohesion. As noted above, the PCEA has tried to deal with the outspoken Timothy Njoya for several years, in turn trying to silence him and then restoring him to a position of leadership. The CPK has been the most torn by dissension, with leadership battles for archbishop and diocesan leadership, and with the contentious issue of the people's demand for a new diocese in Katakwa. The outspoken clergy members, including Muge, Okullu, Gitari, and Kuria have not been above criticizing one another over the Katakwa controversy nor political issues. The plethora of individual voices in the CPK has often left its central leadership disowning controversial uttering of the bishops, or making sure it was understood that the bishops spoke as individuals, and not as the church.

Having shown where the churches and the NCKK have difficulty in achieving unity, it should be noted that the CPK and the NCKK do make their unified positions known through statements and position papers broadly endorsed by their members. For the most part, the political demands

have been fairly uniform, with much consensus over goals, if not methods of achieving them.

The Catholic Church has been much more cohesive. As the Weekly Review noted in January 1990,

When the Catholic church speaks, it speaks with one voice either by the way of the pastoral letters signed by all bishops in the country or via statements issued by the chairman of the Kenya Episcopal Conference, which are regarded as the official and unshakable view of the entire Catholic church (January 12, 1990, 8).

Though the Catholic church has been more reticent concerning political issues, when it did become more active after 1990, it spoke with the power of a single voice.

Material resources

Funding/budget

Budgetary information about individual churches and the NCKK is difficult to obtain. It is noteworthy, however, that the churches receive much of their funding for individual projects from foreign sources. In Chepkwony's thesis about the NCKK, one of her main arguments is that the council came to dominate most of the relief and development projects of the Protestant churches, and also became highly dependent on foreign sources of funding, which left it vulnerable to influence from abroad (Chepkwony 1987, 325). The NCKK General Assembly report for 1984 listed 35 foreign churches and religious organizations that contributed funds to the work of the NCKK (NCKK 1985, 138-139). More recent projects, among them the voter education program discussed

below, also received nearly all its funding from foreign churches and organizations (APS December 16, 1991, 1-2). It appears that far less of the funding resources that are generated in the NCKC come from member churches or individuals. Chepkwony noted that in the 1970's, 80% of the budget was generated from foreign sources, and only 20% was locally mobilized (Chepkwony 1987, 315).

Wealth

The churches that sprang up from the efforts of the missionary societies do not represent the same sort of entrenched landed interests as the Catholic churches in Brazil and the Philippines. The churches have resources in their established dioceses, and even fight among themselves over these resources, but could not be considered to be great institutional holders of wealth (*Weekly Review* November 10, 1989, 12-13).

However, the churches have been involved in education and traditional avenues of mercy, such as health-care, social welfare and economic development, for many years (Friedman 1994, 4). Schools were started by the mission societies and the Catholic Church in the 1910's and 1920's. Statistics from 1982 showed that the CPK had sponsorship of 775 primary schools, 60 harambee secondary schools, and two hospitals (Barrett 1982, 434). Protestant churches such as the AIC and the PCEA also sponsor about 1000 primary and secondary schools and several hospitals (Barrett 1982, 434).

The Catholic Church has also remained very active in educational sponsorship and opened a university in 1984, the Catholic Higher Institute of Eastern Africa in Nairobi (Bauer 1990, 203). Of the approximately 16,500 primary, secondary, and special education schools, technical institutes, teacher training colleges, and institutions of higher learning that existed in Kenya in 1989, fully half were run by the Kenyan churches (Njenga 1989, 31).

Other involvements of the church include resources such as community centers, polytechnic schools, and health and development project. Bauer estimates that the Catholic Church provides about 25% of the health care in all of Kenya, due mostly to the church's involvement in rural health care (Bauer 1990, 210). While these things may not represent wealth that the churches are trying to protect, they do represent interests that the churches would like to maintain control of. As noted above, when the state intervened in the role of the churches in education, it created tension between church and state.

Media

There is quite a long history of religious broadcasting on radio, with programs being developed and aired by the Catholic Church and the NCKK. The programming is dependent on the state, however, as nearly all religious programs are broadcast from the state-run Voice of Kenya (VoK). The VoK had until July of 1984 broadcast live sermons from

Protestant services and up to 30 hours a week of other religious programming by 1979 (Barrett 1982, 435). But when Timothy Njoya of the PCEA delivered a controversial sermon which was critical of the government, live broadcasts were briefly shut down (*Weekly Review* July 27, 1984, 3-4). Though Moi intervened to restore live broadcasts for a time, in January of 1987, the VoK permanently suspended live broadcasts from the NCKK and claimed that it needed to "look for such materials from church organizations and individual evangelists" (*Weekly Review* January 23, 1987, 8). This was widely viewed as a punishment of the NCKK for taking up opposition to the government in the preceding year.

An independent print media is more prevalent in Kenya. The Catholic Church prints a national Catholic magazine, *Mwanachi*, and has an active book press (Bauer 1990, 217-218). The Protestant churches have also launched printing and magazine ventures, primarily through the publication office of the NCKK. Both Catholic and Protestant print media are noted for many start-ups and shut-downs as funding fluctuates (Bauer 1990, 217). The state has also intervened in the media sources of the church, as evidenced by the banning of the publication *Beyond* for critical editorial positions following the 1988 elections. Since that time, the NCKK began publishing a new monthly magazine titled *Target* (Friedman 1994, 5).

In summary, the material resources of the churches are not inconsequential. Nearly all of these resources, however, are dependent on either the state (broadcasting, church-sponsored school ties to the state) or on foreign donations, which have made up a significant part of the churches' development budgets. As sources for political change, these resources are not as strong as in the other cases, nor are they as independent and vocal as in the Philippine and Brazilian churches.

Constraints

The story of the churches' influence cannot be told without reference to the constraints placed on it by several sources outside of the churches themselves. I have chosen to highlight three of these constraints: state repression, competing value movements, and external pressures from other religious bodies.

State repression

State repression of the churches during the transition falls into several categories: reduced church autonomy, unsubstantiated accusations made against the church, harassment of clergy and religious groups, and direct use of force against the church or its members.

On several occasions the state threatened or carried out actions which removed church autonomy. As noted above, there were several threats to shut down the NCKC for

inappropriate political statements, although there was not direct threats to shut down individual churches. One religious sect, the Tent of the Living God, was raided by the police, however, and accused in court of attacking the government and fostering Kikuyu tribalism (*Weekly Review*, February 16, 1990, 5-6).

Rather than such blatant tactics, the Moi regime preferred to harass the church and its leaders in more subtle ways. As mentioned above and in Chapter 4, there were several occasions where the regime accused the churches of serving foreign masters who provide funding for the churches. Moi implied ties of the churches to radical movements without any substantiation, and encouraged churches to pull their membership in the NCKK.

The most prominent form of state repression was harassment of key clergy members. As noted in the section above describing institutional church goals, several of the outspoken clergy received threats on their lives and actual violence against their homes and their lives from figures usually tied to KANU "youth wings" or some other group with shadowy connections to the regime. On several occasions, the state used police repression of peaceful protest movements supported by the church (APS March 16, 1992, 1).

It should be noted, however, that there was not the same level of direct persecution of the church as in the Philippines or even Brazil. This may be in part due to the fact that the political involvement of the churches in Kenya

was not radical or leftist in nature. The general acceptance in the Christian community of the social and political order in Kenya kept the dialogue between church and state somewhat hostile, but not openly violent.

Competing value movements

Competing value movements, to use a phrase from Latin Americanists Bruneau and Hewitt, grew in influence during the transition and were taken very seriously by the mainline churches. According to Bryant, there are four types of competing religious groups that are growing in Africa: 1) Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witness, and Mormons, 2) New Age Movements and Eastern Religions, 3) African Independent Churches with African cultural and spiritist characteristics, and 4) Fundamentalist-Pentecostal churches with American origins (Bryant 1991, 2). Bryant believes that the growth of these non-traditional religious groups indicate that "mainline churches are not sufficiently addressing the needs of their members" (Bryant 1991, 1).

African Independents and Fundamentalist-Pentecostal churches are the fastest growing, and the latter has considerable resources from American religious organizations and crusades that created these ministries. Though each church or religious group is distinct, they do hold several characteristics in common: they are oriented to the laity and are participatory in nature, they appeal to the youth, which make up a large part of the groups' growth, and they

tend to be politically conservative (Bryant 1991, 2-3). This political conservatism is reflected in the ecumenical body, the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (EFK), which has attracted many of the independent and fundamentalist churches. The EFK was formed as a break-away from the NCKK after the NCKK took positions against queuing, and though the churches of the EFK generally perceive themselves as non-political, this tends to mean that they are politically supportive of the current Moi regime. EFK plans for a radio station were not opposed by Moi during a period when the regime was criticizing mainline denominations and the NCKK (APS March 4, 1991, 6).

The alternative religious movements were taken very seriously by mainline denominations, which feel competition for church membership as well as a conservative challenge to the more politicized mission of the mainline churches. NCKK General Secretary Sam Kobia interpreted the growth of such groups as a wake-up call to the churches to "reflect on their own circumstances, to see whether a reassessment of priorities is necessary" (quoted in Bryant 1991, 4). Kobia called for monitoring of the movements, self-examination by the mainline churches, theologically sound education of church members, and the production and dissemination of theologically respectable literature (Bryant 1991, 5).

External pressures

There was very little evidence of conservative pressure from external religious sources during the transition. Most donor bodies in the West which could have had influence over the Protestant churches in Kenya did not discourage political activity. In fact, ecumenical bodies like the World Council of Churches, to which the NCCK belongs, appear to have played a role in mobilizing the Kenyan churches to take a more politicized role in the country (Okullu 1984, 20). Contributions for the program of political education and awareness in 1992 also came from external sources.

Kenyan Catholics have so far avoided direct confrontation with the Vatican, although the pope has made clear the central hierarchy's opposition to overt politicization. In his latest trip to Africa in early 1993, the pope discouraged the political involvement of the churches, though there was no direct reference made to the Kenyan Catholic Church.

Conclusion

The Kenyan churches became more politically involved as Moi constricted political space and increased repression. A change in mission which emphasized greater social activism preceded the Moi regime's increased repression, but it was the authoritarian regime's behavior which spurred the church toward greater politicization.

Institutional interests of the churches were threatened by the political climate. This was especially true in the case of repression of key outspoken clergy, but also occurred due to the increasingly repressive control of the Moi regime on all aspects of Kenyan life. Persecution of the grass roots church was not as extensive in Kenya as in the other cases, because the grass roots church was not mobilized to any great extent in Kenya.

While Christianity and Protestant Christianity were dominant religious forces in Kenya, the churches' influence was diluted for several reasons: 1) the churches historically are divided into many denominational groupings, 2) their structures are much looser, and therefore the churches have difficulty speaking with one voice, and 3) their cohesiveness is poor, due to the fragmented nature of their organizations, but also due to the infighting occurring among religious leadership. The effectiveness of church resources was also somewhat constrained for several reasons: 1) funding was tied to external sources (though these sources were generally progressive) and 2) the media and educational resources of the church were dependent on the state.

Political Space and Church Strategies in Constitutional Reform and Presidential Elections

Constitutional Reform

In a two-year period beginning in December of 1989 and ending in December 1991, Kenya's politics underwent both liberalization and limited democratization. During this period, the churches and other groups from civil society escalated their push for change, and in particular, began to consistently call for multiparty politics. This agitation for multipartism resulted in a limited liberalization of KANU party rules and broader protection of civil rights in 1990. It took an increased mobilization of the opposition forces in Kenya in 1991 to push Moi to change section 2(A) of the constitution, and allow multiple parties in Kenya.

The opportunities for the church and other groups to influence the move to multipartism were limited. Under single-party rule and Moi's increased centralization of power, there were few opportunities for internal KANU or parliamentary debate, nor for a broader debate in a national conference or convention on multipartism. Nevertheless, the churches took action in several ways in order to push the Moi regime in the direction of democratization. I will examine three major tactics employed by the churches in the two-year period from December 1989 to December 1991: agitation for further debate in early 1990, pressure on the

KANU internal review committee in late 1990, and the protection of opposition forces which were mobilizing in 1991.

Agitation for further debate

Despite the occasional call for multiparty elections in principle from Henry Okullu before 1989, most of the demands of the church had been focused on liberalization of the current regime, and not the transition to a new regime. The churches sought liberalization in the civic and human rights accorded Kenyans, such as the reinstatement of habeas corpus and the political neutrality of the attorney general, auditor general, and judges. The churches also continued to call upon the ruling party, KANU, to return to secret ballot and to reform the organization of the party.

In December 1989, the NCK held a conference in which it considered the direction its ministry would take in the future. As part of the proceedings, a statement condemning the queuing system and 70% rule, and calling for a new electoral system was approved by the conference leadership. The Moi regime immediately condemned the statement and began vigorous attacks on the NCK from fairly high levels (*Weekly Review* December 15, 1989, 6-7, APS December 18, 1989, 1).

Figuratively speaking, "a bomb was dropped" in the 1990 New Year's sermon of Reverend Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian church of East Africa (PCEA). In the sermon, Njoya attacked single-party rule in Africa and Kenya,

likening it to the failed and crumbling socialist regimes of Eastern Europe. This set off considerable debate and counterattacks from the ruling party (*Weekly Review* January 5, 1990, 5-6, APS January 15, 1990, 1). Bishop Okullu of the CPK supported Njoya, and after it appeared that Moi had brought the multiparty forces and debate under control, Okullu launched a detailed set of demands in April 1990. The bishop called for four changes in Kenyan politics: 1) the repeal of article 2(A) of the Constitution, which had made Kenya a single-party state, 2) immediate parliamentary elections, 3) limited presidential tenure, and 4) a national forum to discuss Kenya's political future (*Weekly Review* May 4, 1990, 6-9, APS April 30, 1990, 3-4).

The immediate reaction to Okullu and some of the other outspoken clerics was quite vicious. Personal attacks were made against the clerics and idle talk of banning the NCKK was batted about (*Weekly Review* May 4, 1990, 25, May 18, 1990, 12-13). The president suggested that the church was involved in a plot to assassinate political leaders and then blame Moi (APS May 21, 1990, 2). Even traditionally reticent figures such as Archbishop Kuria joined in the debate in the interest of protecting church interests and integrity (*Weekly Review* May 18, 1990, 9-10, June 22, 1990, 10).

While some politicians were busily chastising the CPK, NCKK, and PCEA for their political involvement and support of multiparty politics, Moi and KANU were beginning to

concede the need for some liberalization within the single party system. Okullu's call for a national forum was answered when KANU leadership announced a "Kenya We Want" conference with promises of nationwide open debate on Kenya's political system (*Weekly Review* May 4, 1990, 17-18). At first, it appeared that KANU was placing no restriction on the level of discussion, but after Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia shocked the political establishment by calling for multiparty elections, Moi fought back at all his perceived opponents. Matiba and Rubia were soundly criticized, while the church and the American ambassador were accused of conspiring with the two men to overthrow the government (*Weekly Review* May 18, 1990, 5-6).

In a series of political rallies held around the country, Moi defended single-party rule, but dangled promises of party reform in answer to the emerging political demands (*Weekly Review* May 25, 1990). The "Kenya We Want" conference was downgraded to meetings of a KANU Review Committee, whose mandate was to discuss internal party reform in areas such as queue voting and the 70% rule. These concessions by Moi mark the beginning of the liberalization period in Kenya.

Pressure on the KANU Review Committee

The contrasting goals of the Moi regime and its opponents, which were led by the church, were evident as KANU began to form the review committee. The committee was

headed by vice president George Saitoti and consisted primarily of high-level cabinet ministers. Promises were made that anyone could address the committee without fear of reprisal. The conditions placed on the discussion, however, were that the committee was empowered to make recommendations only on KANU party issues.

Several forces of the opposition fought to broaden the scope of the committee's mandate, as well as broaden the membership of the committee. Matiba, Rubia, and the LSK were calling on the regime to allow multipartism and broaden the scope of discussion in a national forum. It was the church, however, that directed its critique to the nature and scope of the review committee itself. Archbishop Kuria, who until then had been a fairly conciliatory voice within the CPK regarding church-state relations, took up the cause of KANU reform with uncharacteristic directness and fervor. Kuria's entry marked an escalation of church involvement. For the first time, the leader of the established church put institutional support behind the demands of the more radical clergy. Kuria criticized the scrapping of the "Kenya We Want" conference and called for an independent commission to overhaul KANU (*Weekly Review* July 6, 1990, 4). The archbishop was particularly critical of KANU for choosing a 10-man review committee from out of the ranks of the party stalwarts.

Another normally reticent voice of the church made itself heard during this time. The eighteen Catholic

bishops of Kenya issued their annual pastoral letter in which they commented on the political and social situation in the country. Though described as "even-tempered," the pastoral letter was direct in its call for a broad national referendum on issues of political reform (*Weekly Review* June 29, 1990, 20-21). Specifically, the bishops complained about KANU's control of the state, the "philosophy of national security ... leading to political murder, unlawful home searches, arbitrary detentions... and actions that escape the control of public forces of order" (Pastoral Letter 1990, 6). The bishops also complained about queue voting and the blatant rigging evident in past elections. Finally, the bishops called for the closing of the gap between rich and poor and the cessation of "forced harambees," in which local party leaders and bureaucrats coerced donations from those least able to afford them (Pastoral Letter 1990, 8-9).

These critiques were not particularly controversial, but marked an important stage in the Catholic Church's opposition to the state. The Catholic clergy, though more "polite" than the outspoken clerics of the CPK and PCEA, speak in a unified voice that holds the weight of the Catholic community's opinion. The pastoral letter was also a direct call for a conference that Moi and KANU had already rejected. In this way, the letter became a direct challenge to the Moi regime, and showed the isolation of Moi from the opposition (*Weekly Review* July 6, 1990, 5). The Catholic

Church also appeared to have disseminated the pastoral letter widely, and directed priests to explain the contents to parishioners (*Weekly Review* July 6, 1990, 5).

Before the review committee began its work, the opposition won a concession from the regime, but lost another as political opposition in Kenya heated up. Moi agreed to expand the membership of the committee from 10 to 19, and he included less hawkish KANU members and non-KANU members, including two clerics (*Weekly Review* July 6, 1990). The party did not agree, however, to take up the issue of multipartism. This decision was sealed when rioting occurred in Nairobi surrounding the detention of Matiba and Rubia and the cancelled opposition rally of July 7. The KANU regime officially placed blame for the riots on criminal elements, but was clearly also fingering the advocates of multiparty politics (*Weekly Review* July 13, 1990, 7). The detention of key opposition figures continued, and suggestions that the KANU committee expand its mandate were quashed.

In the aftermath of the riots, the churches condemned the violence and made known their opposition to conducting illegal meetings. The NCKK top hierarchy "at the same time said the government should consider providing the public with a legal forum to express their views" (*Weekly Review* July 13, 1990, 12).

Though Moi insisted that the mandate of the review committee remain narrow, when meetings got under way, the scope of the committee widened considerably. There was more response from Kenyans than expected, and the people who addressed the committee chose not to divide internal party issues from governmental issues, since party and state were so closely intertwined (*Weekly Review* August 3, 1990, 8, APS September 3, 1990, 2-3).

The CPK was the first of the churches to address the committee. In their memorandum, the CPK bishops criticized the committee as a biased venue for any real discussion of Kenya's problems. The CPK called for a constitutional guarantee of multipartism, the protection of tenure of judges, the attorney general, and auditor general, the abolishment of queue voting and reinstatement of democratic elections by secret ballot, and the limiting of tenure of office for future presidents (*Weekly Review* August 3, 1990, 13, APS August 6, 1990, 1). An NCKK memorandum to the committee also called for greater citizen input into any constitutional changes, the abolishment of queuing, the 70% clause, and party expulsion, establishing a popular election of the president and limited terms, and KANU attention to corruption, tribalism, forced harambees, and several other issues of social justice (NCKK 1990). The NCKK came short of endorsing multipart politics, but did ask for a referendum in which people could decide their political fate (NCKK 1990, 27).

Individual clergy members, including Sam Kobia, Henry Okullu, and Alexander Muge, and dioceses also delivered statements to the review committee as it travelled around the country (*Weekly Review* August 3, 1990, 8). Muge's meeting with the committee was especially noticed, because a week before his death, he implicated top cabinet officials in graft and several land scandals and claimed that Moi was being led astray by those around him (*Weekly Review* August 10, 1990, 5, 10-11). After the embarrassment of perceived party involvement in Muge's death, the Saitoti committee agreed to allow open discussion of any subject in the meetings (*Weekly Review* August 10, 1990, 4).

The church was also at the forefront of organizing citizen responses to the review committee. Catholic bishop Ndingi Mwana a Nzeki urged fellow Catholics to turn out in large numbers for the meetings being held around the country (*Weekly Review* August 3, 1990, 14). From July to September, the churches facilitated citizens meeting with the KANU review committee at several locations.

The report of the review committee was given to Moi in November and debated briefly at a KANU delegates meeting in early December, before being passed unanimously. Progress was made on issues of the independence of the courts and the secured tenure of the attorney and auditor generals. Queue voting and the 70% clause were abolished and expulsions from the party decried. Moi and KANU also called for a renewal

of the spirit of harambee, and forbid harambees to become political tools of local politicians and bureaucrats (*Weekly Review* December 7, 1990, 4-8).

Despite the elite-led liberalization that the KANU committee recommendations represented, Moi combined this carrot with a stick. In October of 1990, Moi harshly criticized the CPK and other activist churches as subversive (*Weekly Review* October 5, 1990, 3). October also saw the detentions of political figures and the shutting down of the *Nairobi Law Monthly* (*Weekly Review* October 5, 1990, 21). The church remained the only opposition that could not be shut down. This gave the church significant leverage in the constricted political space of that time.

The individual churches and the NCCCK noted their appreciation for the party reforms that had been made, but suggested that they had not gone far enough (*Weekly Review* December 14, 1990, 3). Several months later, the NCCCK published an official response to the work of the committee entitled *A Kairos for Kenya*. In the document, the NCCCK criticized the passing of the recommendations without any debate and the delegates' unfamiliarity with the review committee's report (NCCCK 1991). The NCCCK did give room for single party rule, however.

If KANU wishes to remain the sole party in the country, then it should cease to conduct its affairs in a manner which provokes people to want to form another political party. The party should therefore devise systems which could realize democracy within the party so that it does not turn itself and the state into a dictatorship (NCCCK 1991, 4).

Despite this pull-back from multipartism, the NCKK document hit hard at several other problems within the political system. *Kairos for Kenya* assailed government corruption, rushing legislation through the parliament without debate, the failure to provide a broad "Kenya We Want" forum for the public, the close ties of KANU to the state, tribalism, and the rigging of elections (NCKK 1991, 6-12). Detention without trial was condemned, as was the readiness of the president to dissolve Parliament (13). Once again, the NCKK called for limited presidential tenure and urged KANU to use all its resources to combat poverty and inequity of resource distribution in Kenya (10, 14, 16). KANU officially termed the *Kairos* document "unfortunate," and claimed to be fully in control of political change (*Weekly Review* June 7, 1991, 9).

Protecting the growing political opposition

After the report of the KANU Review Committee, the churches became somewhat preoccupied with internal leadership wrangles, especially in the CPK, where the appointment of a new bishop in Muge's Eldoret diocese was creating much tension in the church. Several parties in the dispute accused each other of tribal motivations in the choosing of the new bishop (*Weekly Review* February 1, 1991, 14).

During this time, opposition to the regime turned to non-church actors. Oginga Odinga attempted to form a new political party, the National Democratic party, despite the fact that his attempt was clearly doomed from the beginning (*Weekly Review* February 15, 1991, 8). Prominent leaders in the Kenyatta era, Martin Shikuku and Masinde Muliro had defected from KANU by this time, and were also leaders of the opposition (*Weekly Review* April 5, 1991, 10). The political leadership of the opposition would later in 1991 meld into a group called the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). During this time when the political opposition outside the church was becoming more mobilized, the church took on two strategies: promotion of links with other actors within civil society, and the protection of restricted political space.

On several occasions in 1991, religious leaders attempted to forge alliances with other groups within civil society and to provide a forum for political debate. The most significant of these attempts occurred in June, when Henry Okullu and Paul Muite announced the formation of the Justice and Peace Convention-Kenya (JPC-K). The JPC-K was to be a coalition of the CPK, NCKK, and the LSK and had as its goal "establishing and sustaining justice and peace in a democratic and free Kenya" (*Weekly Review* June 21, 1991, 6). More specifically, the JPC-K was to hold "prayer meetings" around the country in which discussions and prayers would be held on

the widespread poverty in the country which is rooted in the mismanagement of the economy, unequal distribution of national wealth and the plundering of public resources by those in power... the deepening and widening political crisis which should be mitigated by expanded democratic space ... the pervading climate of fear and uncertainty which has hampered political, social, and economic development... and the non-involvement of the majority of Kenyans in decision-making (APS June 17, 1991, 1).

Not only was the convention to pray for current problems, but it also was to discuss the "strengthening of the democratic process under a pluralist political culture, on the basis of which a legitimate government could be established" (*Weekly Review* June 21, 1991, 14).

While the issues the JPC-K raised in its inaugural document were not particularly new nor even shocking coming from church representatives, the thinly-veiled political nature of the proposed meetings and the political coalition the organization represented were very threatening to the Moi regime. KANU members and Moi declared the announced coalition to be an opposition party, and severely criticized Okullu, the churches, and Muite (*Weekly Review* June 21, 1991, 14-15). Both Okullu and Muite faced government hostility and were warned not to hold the proposed first prayer meeting on June 30, lest the government take "stern measures" (*Weekly Review* June 21, 1991, 7).

Apparently the threats were effective, as Okullu and Muite called off the first meeting, although they declared their agenda alive (*Weekly Review* August 2, 1991, 5). Another contributing factor to the decision to hold off the

prayer meetings was the rifts in both the LSK and NCCK leadership that the announcement of the JPC-K caused. Sam Kobia, the general secretary of the NCCK, condemned Okullu's announcement and claimed that the NCCK had no part in the coalition, since its executive committee had never been consulted (*Weekly Review* June 21, 1991, 11-12). Muite, too, appeared to have committed the LSK to a coalition without consulting the LSK council or membership (*Weekly Review* June 21, 1991, 10).

One other attempt to use politicized prayer meetings was attempted by Archbishop Kuria of the CPK in July of 1991. Kuria called on all political leaders to join him at the All Saints Cathedral in Nairobi for prayer on July 28. Though Kuria claimed no political purposes, he called for a procession to the cathedral to precede the prayer service. Moi interpreted especially the procession as a threatening political move, and warned against holding such an event (*Weekly Review* August 2, 1991, 3). Amid claims of harassment and intimidation, Kuria backed down and "decentralized" the prayer meeting to local churches around the country (*Weekly Review* August 2, 1991, 4). Several churches did not heed the call to hold prayer meetings on July 28, and it appeared that the regime had weathered a potentially explosive situation.

During the last several months of 1991, the church appeared to be in disarray over the effective political approach to take (*Weekly Review* August 2, 1991, 3). The CPK

continued to have internal difficulties related to the diocesan leadership in the late Bishop Muge's diocese, Eldoret. Archbishop Kuria came under fire from nearly all corners for his handling of the leadership dispute, with especially vociferous attacks from Muge's widow, who claimed tribal motivations in Kuria's leadership decisions (*Weekly Review* August 30, 1991, 16). Timothy Njoya of the PCEA also tried to generate a coalition called the Moral Alliance for Peace, with ties between clerics, lawyers, and NGO leaders (*Weekly Review* November 1, 1991 12-13). Nothing much became of this coalition, however, as it was never heard from again.

Political opposition during this period had shifted primarily to the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). FORD was declared illegal and its offices were searched by the government in August. Key members such as Odinga, Muliro, and Shikuku experienced such tactics as police searches of their residences (*Weekly Review* August 30, 1991, 4-6). Several rallies were planned by FORD, but declared illegal by the government. However, on November 16, a banned rally at Kamukunji in Nairobi attracted large crowds, and opposition leaders Muliro and Shikuku managed to address the peaceful crowds briefly before they were detained by the security police. Muite of the LSK and Odinga were also detained, but released with the other FORD activists when all charges were dropped several days later (*Weekly Review* November 22, 1991, 10-12).

Apparently taking the mobilization of the opposition and the pressure being exerted by foreign sources as a warning, Moi took an abrupt turn and urged party leaders to repeal article 2(A) of the constitution, and allow the formation of multiple parties. At a KANU delegation meeting on December 6, 1991, the party approved the changes, and several days later the parliament made the constitutional changes law.

What influence did the church exercise?

There were events immediately preceding this decision that point to the influence of elements outside the church. The increasing mobilization of opposition to the regime from FORD and from the mass of people who supported FORD, despite the threat of sanctions from the regime, was a major reason for the changes. It may have become clear to Moi that promises of multipartism might blunt the increasing mobilization of the people that was threatening his regime. The successful multiparty elections in Zambia in November may also have led Moi to conclude that his regime would need to respond to increasing demands.

External influence also played a role. Western donors shocked Kenya when at a donor meeting in Paris the last week of November 1991, they froze aid expenditures until progress was made in Kenya on civil and human rights, and on political pluralism. Though Moi and other top leaders of

the party condemned the move, they heard and understood the message the foreign donors wished to send.

Despite these more immediate causes of the move to multipartism, the churches' role in the process of liberalization and democratization was important. The churches and their leaders managed to accomplish several things: they reinvigorated debate about the single-party system when it appeared Moi was not likely to make any concessions and stretched the terms of political dialogue during the KANU review process, and they provided space for emerging elements of the political opposition when Moi was cracking down.

Each of these strategies was possible because the church utilized its unique position within society to influence political outcomes. Outspoken clergy used the protected space of the pulpit to keep debate alive. The large numbers of churchgoers in Kenya ensured that their messages were well disseminated, as did the practice of distributing written copies of sermons for public consumption. It does not appear that large-scale resources such as media access and large budgets were needed at this point in the move toward democratization. The position as leading voice of the people and as a protected venue of societal discussion allowed the churches to have considerable influence at this time.

It is important to note, however, that the effectiveness of the churches was hampered for several reasons, the most prominent being the wrangling and lack of a cohesive strategy within the churches. Examples of this sort of difficulty abound. The CPK stands out as the least cohesive church, with numerous fights among powerful bishops regarding the direction of political involvement, between the bishops and archbishop regarding diocesan leadership in Katakwa and Eldoret, and between the laity and leadership in regards to the Katakwa diocese. The NCKK, too, had its moments of great dissension, with the disowning of the JPC-K by Kobia being the most prominent.

At this point in Kenya's political history, the Catholic Church was not as involved as the Protestants through the outspoken clerics. When the Catholics became more outspoken in the early 1990's, their unity of approach stood out in contrast to the Protestant churches and gave their message greater impact.

The aborted attempt of Okullu to take on a more politicized agenda with the formation of the JPC-K illustrates one of the greatest constraints on church involvement in political change. When the churches did more than simply criticize the direction of politics and political leaders, and tried instead to articulate a clear political agenda, troubles emerged. Churches became divided when they took on partisan characteristics, and then faced greater opposition to their activities when their voice

became more than critical. The Kenyan church began to turn to a political role that it appeared unable to sustain. Groups such as FORD became the locus of political opposition and were able to mobilize support and push the regime to make changes that a religious organization could not. Examining the churches' behaviors during the campaign and elections of 1992 further serves to illustrate where the churches were able to be effective, and where they chose ineffective strategies.

Church strategies during the 1992 presidential campaign and election

The churches' behaviors during 1992 and especially leading up to the elections in late December can be divided into several categories of activity: 1) pressure on the Moi regime to ensure social and political justice, 2) programs of public awareness and civic education, 3) non-partisan monitoring of the elections, and 4) attempts to hold the opposition parties together.

Pressure for social and political justice

The churches attained a new level of unity during the first half of 1992. This was centered on the churches' outrage over the government's stirring up of tribal violence and the blatant violations of the spirit of multipartism in the country.

The churches played several roles during the period of ethnic violence in late 1991 and early 1992. The churches served as monitors of the violence in their districts, they provided assistance to those affected by the clashes, and they strongly condemned the government's handling of the crisis. The Catholic Church was especially active in chastising the government's role in the conflicts. As early as September 1991, the Catholic bishops noted in their statement on pastoral concerns that tribal conflicts between the Kisii and Maasai communities appeared to be "politically incited," and called on the Moi regime to intervene to settle the conflict without bloodshed (Catholic Bishops' Statement 1991, 2). In their January 1992 statement, the bishops noted that "No action was taken in time to stop the so called 'tribal clashes' in and around Rift Valley borders which has made more than 20,000 homeless" (Pastoral Letter 1992a, 6). The letter also noted that "the government has taken very little part in relief operations. The authorities came in too late and with only inadequate supplies" (Pastoral Letter 1992a, 6).

The March 1992 Catholic Bishops' Letter more strongly implicated the Moi regime in the continued violence and condemned the regime's explanation that the conflicts centered on land disputes. The letter noted that

eye-witness accounts strongly suggest that the arsonists and bandits are well trained and are transported to the scenes of crime from outside the area so that they cannot be identified by local people... There has been no impartiality on the part of the security forces in trying to restore peace. On the contrary, their attitude seems to imply that orders from above were given in order to inflict injuries only on particular ethnic groups (Pastoral Letter 1992b, 4).

As further evidence of the regime's instigation of the violence, the bishops noted that "the whole issue is officially presented to the public as a clear sign of the failure of the multi-party system in this country" (4). The bishops also condemned the government for failing to take care of the victims of the clashes, who had been attended to exclusively by the churches and some non-governmental organizations (5).

Though the Catholic bishops played a very active role in the condemnation of the tribal violence, the other major churches were also involved. As the violence escalated in April of 1992, claiming many lives and leaving thousands homeless, the PCEA, CPK, and the NCKK issued harsh statements criticizing the government for its complicity in the violence, and its failure to retain public order and security for its citizens (Weekly Review May 1, 1992, 10-11). The NCKK issued a statement which read:

Having carried out a detailed, extensive, and thorough investigation in the affected areas, we have clearly observed that certain influential personalities in the government are directly involved in fanning tribal sentiments that led to acts of lawlessness and hooliganism, and violence (APS April 6, 1992, 3).

Sam Kobia of the NCKK suggested that the government had lost its credibility, and the general administration committee of the PCEA also suggested that the government was losing its sense of legitimacy (*Weekly Review* May 1, 1992, 10).

But the harshest condemnation was yet to come. On April 30, a 21-person delegation from the NCKK and Kenya Episcopal Conference (the Catholic bishops) received an audience with Moi at the Nairobi State House. There the president got a "dressing-down," as the *Weekly Review* termed it, for the official view that the violence was instigated by Libyan-trained opposition terrorists, and for Moi's handling of the violence (*Weekly Review* May 8, 1992, 20-21). In uncharacteristically frank language, the statement read that

whether you [Moi] like it or not the truth is that the people have lost confidence in you and those close to you... your people are hopeless, helpless, demoralized... your duty is not to any party, it is to all the people, ALL, every citizen has a right to live in any part of Kenya and to live in peace and security. At present, you seem to be securing the interest of a small clique of rich and powerful men who are surviving at the cost of life, blood and misery of thousands of small people... We believe God wants you to forget yourself, your party, your personal interest, you need to think of Kenya and all its people (quoted in *Weekly Review* May 8, 1992, 21).

This meeting with the president was noteworthy not only for the bold nature of the statement, but also for the unified approach from all the churches regarding an issue of social and political justice. The action was the most politicized taken by the churches, but it was also non-partisan (though

clearly condemning KANU). As the churches took on other issues and strategies, they had more difficulty in maintaining a common approach and having a unified impact.

The other set of issues that the churches tackled was the regime's failure to cultivate a truly multipartisan political atmosphere in the country. In the Catholic Pastoral Letter of January 1992, the bishops criticized the lack of distinction between the ruling party and the government, the lack of accountability and transparency, government corruption, intimidation of the opposition, and politicization of organizations such as the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) and of church-sponsored schools (Pastoral Letter 1992a, 3-6). The letter made several suggestions for the election period that was yet to come: an independent electoral commission, clear distinctions between the operations of the government and the operations of the party, registration processes that are fair to the opposition parties, open and equal opportunities to hold rallies and use the public media, and the formation of parties along ideological lines instead of tribal and ethnic identities (8-9).

Other churches also took up the issue of fairness and openness in the new multiparty situation. Leaders of the Protestant churches condemned the government's refusal to permit or delay in permitting opposition public meetings. They also condemned the practice of declaring certain areas of Kenya "KANU zones" and the harassment of the mothers who

had taken refuge in All Saints Cathedral to carry on their protest of the government's detention of their sons (APS April 13, 1992, 6-7). The churches at first supported the opposition calls for a boycott of the voter registration process, claiming that the electoral commission was biased and unable to carry on fair registration. But when it was apparent that their boycott was having little effect, the opposition parties and the churches reversed direction and urged registration of all voters (*Weekly Review* July 3, 1992, 11-13). Despite the reversal on this issue, the churches remained watchdogs of the political situation and continued to call for fairness in the new multiparty politics.

Public awareness and civic education

Soon after the alteration of the constitution to allow multiple parties, the NCKK launched a program of civic education called "Education for Participatory Democracy" or EPD. As originally conceived, the EPD was to conduct seminars, workshops, and conferences at a local level where "people will be taught election procedures, discuss and consider issues affecting them, and design ways of assessing candidates so that they make wise choices" (APS December 16, 1991, 1). The program also took on a media campaign, with the printing and distribution in English and Kiswahili of

20-page voting booklets entitled "Why You Should Vote," advertisements in daily newspapers, and the printing of a more extensive "Voter's Handbook."

The total budget for the entire program was around 20 million shillings or about \$700,000 (APS February 10, 1992, 7). Nearly all of this sum was collected from foreign church bodies and other non-governmental organizations (*Weekly Review* February 7, 1992, 13). Timothy Njoya, a member of the NCKC's executive committee, sharply criticized the media campaign as a waste of money, but general secretary Kobia defended the campaign as only about 5% of the total budget. Njoya was persuaded by the other clerical leadership to apologize for his criticism (*Weekly Review* February 7, 1991, 13). The CPK also organized several educational programs and lectures dealing with the political situation in Kenya. For example, diocesan leadership in Nairobi conducted a seminar for youth for the purpose of educating youth "about peace and how it could be achieved" (APS February 3, 1992, 8).

The civic education activities of the individual churches and the NCKC were combined with the formation of the National Ecumenical Civil Education Programme (NECEP) in March. NECEP was the creation of the CPK, NCKC, and the Kenya Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church. This broad grouping was noteworthy for several reasons: it represented the unified efforts of not only the Protestant churches, but also the Catholic church, and it endeavored to

not only educate voters about the multiparty system, but also to independently monitor the elections (*Weekly Review* March 27, 1992, 21).

During the course of the election year, many workshops and meetings were held. One of the international election monitoring bodies, the International Republican Institute (IRI), noted that church leaders reported little interference with their civic education activities so long as they were conducted in the churches. When civic education projects were to be held in public locations, the government tended to deny or delay permits so that the churches had greater difficulty in carrying out their plans (IRI 1993, 36). The IRI also commended the NCKK for its civic education program, as well as one other NGO, the Kenya Adult Education Association, which carried out an education program called the Legal Education and Aid Programme of the Kenya Adult Education Association (LEAP) (IRI 1993, 36). The IRI noted that these programs provided the only nationwide education effort other than the "biased efforts of the political parties" (36).

Monitoring

Kenya's election was monitored by several international groups, including a group from the Commonwealth and the IRI, and by internal groups. The primary internal monitor was called the National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU), which was a coalition of NECEP, the International Commission of

Jurists (ICJ), the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) and the Professional Committee for Democratic Change (PCDC). The IRI report of 1993 notes that there were internal struggles among the members of NEMU which hindered its effectiveness (IRI 1993, 35). Because NEMU was composed of organizations that were known to oppose the KANU regime, it had to work to acquire credibility by broadening its board of directors to include influential and neutral members (*Weekly Review* December 11, 1992, 9). NEMU managed to field only 5,000 monitors on the day of the election, despite original plans of sending 23,000 monitors. NEMU was also accused of showing bias against KANU and for the opposition parties, which is not surprising given the partisan nature of the activities of its members. NEMU did manage to conduct one opinion poll prior to the election and participate in monitoring on election day. Despite criticism of bias in both these activities, the IRI observers gave NEMU high marks for its objectivity (IRI 1993, 36, 40). NEMU received significant funding for its activities from a multilateral group called the Democratic Development and Governance Group.

The IRI noted that much of the work of NEMU was carried out by the church, and in particular, by NECEP. NECEP also had several internal difficulties, including the formation by the CPK of a separate monitoring and education group called the Bureau of Electoral Education, Research, and Monitoring (BEERAM) (APS November 23, 1992, 8). BEERAM

conducted separate educational and monitoring programs, which undoubtedly was part of the reason for the delays and lower number of monitors in the NEMU program. Despite these internal difficulties, the work of the church groups was commended by outside monitors, such as the IRI, which noted that "although the churches were never able to fully implement the overall election monitoring strategy developed by NEMU, they accomplished a great deal on relatively short notice" (IRI 1993, 36).

Holding the opposition together.

I argue that when the churches stuck to nonpartisan activities such as civic education and election monitoring, they avoided controversy and were very successful. However, partisanship on the part of the churches, and especially the Protestant churches, could be detected very soon after multipartism became law. On December 30, 1991, the opposition held its first legal meeting in a church -- All Saints Cathedral in Nairobi. Despite the claims of nonpartisanship from CPK Archbishop Kuria at that time ("the church should not be used to popularize any of the emerging political parties"), the church meeting was a portent of the partisan direction church involvement would take (APS January 20, 1992, 5). The most blatant of the partisan moves of the church was the attempt by the NCKK to hold the opposition parties together through NCKK-sponsored symposia.

The symposia were sponsored by the NCKK in response to the difficulty the opposition was having in early 1992 in both obtaining permission from the government to hold common meetings and in putting individual party's and leader's egos aside in an effort to combine forces against the Moi regime. Though officially an open invitation was given to all parties, KANU Secretary General Joseph Kamotho interpreted the meetings as attempts to "unite the plethora of emergent opposition parties," and refused to attend (APS May 18, 1992, 7). Several clergy basically admitted to this during the first symposium, when Okullu lamented the disunity of the opposition parties and asked "where shall our true liberators come from?" (*Weekly Review* June 19, 1992, 3).

The first symposium, held on May 11 and 12, was ostensibly called to deal with the ethnic violence that was plaguing the country. At the meeting in which the major opposition parties, several NGOs, and the NCKK attended, a 24-point resolution was adopted which called for an end to the ethnic violence and the assurance of free and fair elections through such means as an independent electoral commission. The resolution also rejected the new constituent boundaries that KANU drew up to its advantage right before the move to multiparty politics in December 1991 (APS May 18, 1992, 6, *Weekly Review* June 19, 1992, 8).

At one point, however, FORD activists Paul Muite and Raila Odinga, and several NGOs called for the symposium to reconstitute itself as a sovereign national convention and

draw up a new political agenda (*Weekly Review* May 22, 1992, 13). This was rejected by the participants, but could hardly be considered reassuring by the KANU regime. Opposition to KANU was clearly the order of the day at the first symposium.

By the time of the second symposium held in early June of 1992, the political agenda had become even more pointed, though the radical calls for the symposium to take on the role of a national convention were again soundly defeated. The NCKK and the opposition parties pledged to monitor the progress of the voter registration boycott, and "gave the government a two-week ultimatum to dismantle the electoral commission or face civil disobedience" (*Weekly Review* June 19, 1992, 4). The symposium also resolved to take legal action against the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation for biased coverage of the Moi regime (8). Perhaps the most striking resolution indicated the symposium's "total lack of confidence in the government of President Moi" to control the raging ethnic violence and to maintain peace and order in society (8). By calling the symposia and being a part of such politically charged resolutions, it became clear that the NCKK had moved to a new role of "shepharding the opposition itself" (*Weekly Review* June 19, 1992, 4).

The new role that the NCKK took on was not universally supported within the constituent churches, nor was it supported by churches outside the NCKK. The outspoken clergy members of the CPK and PCEA, such as Okullu, Kuria,

and Njoya, dominated the NCKK symposia, while other bishops and church leaders held back their support of some of the resolutions. For example, the decision to boycott voter registration that was taken by the symposia members was not widely shared in the CPK. One of the reasons the boycott was eventually reversed was the call by many clergy for parishioners to register in large numbers (*Weekly Review* June 19, 1992, 6). Despite the Catholic Church's increasing outspokenness, the church as a whole preferred to stay out of the symposia and outside of partisan politics (6).

The greatest religious opposition to the role of the NCKK was the coalition of churches known as the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (EFK). As mentioned above, the EFK was formed as a break-off from the NCKK during the queuing controversy. Since that time, the EFK had been one of Moi's most stalwart supporters. Early in 1992, the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa (AIPCA), which is one of the major churches in the EFK, pledged its loyalty to the government and to KANU (APS January 20, 1992, 4). As the symposia were being held, key leaders of the EFK criticized the role of the NCKK and urged churches to "preach obedience to the government and the established political order" (*Weekly Review* June 19, 1992, 6).

President Moi rejected the second symposium's threats of civil disobedience and talked of deregistering the NCKK since it was "no longer a religious organization" (*Weekly Review* June 26, 1992, 10). This threat was not interpreted

as particularly credible, with Bishop Okullu warning that a ban on the NCKC would cause such uproar inside and outside Kenya that the government would not be able to control it (10). Timothy Njoya of the PCEA, who clearly wished a confrontation with the government, urged the president to carry out his threat (10).

Despite the confidence with which the Protestant clergy spoke, and the heady days of the symposia, in which the NCKC appeared to be successfully controlling the nature of political opposition to the state, the churches' efforts to unify the opposition and oust Moi ultimately failed. Not only did the opposition parties FORD and the Democratic Party (DP) not form a common opposition, but FORD also split again over leadership wrangles over who should be the party's presidential nominee. Martin Shikuku and Kenneth Matiba broke away to form the FORD-Asili faction, while Oginga Odinga fashioned his FORD-Kenya faction. The government registered the two factions as separate parties, and the three major opposition parties ended up fielding three presidential candidates, Odinga, Matiba, and Mwai Kibaki of the DP.

As elections approached, the churches through the NCKC and their leadership again attempted to keep the political opposition from splintering through sponsorship of unity meetings (Daily Nation October 5, 1992, 1, The Standard October 16, 1992, 1). These last-ditch efforts failed, and

the opposition vote was sufficiently split to allow Moi to be elected with just 36% of the vote.

Conclusion

The activities of the church leading up to the elections in 1992 show where political strategies succeed and fail. The churches did not achieve their interests in the presidential elections, and did not influence outcomes as they wished. There are several reasons why these results occurred. First, with more open political space, the church became one actor among several. Though the church tried to broker a unity agreement among the various opposition interests, it found itself in open competition with other interests, the most prominent being the personal interests of the presidential candidates. The overall vote was fragmented with so many actors attempting to realize individual interests.

Second, presidential elections are necessarily partisan. Though partisanship appeared to promise benefits, including the ousting of the regime, for the church it caused internal dissension and diluted the churches' effectiveness. These problems are magnified in Kenya's very personalistic style of politics, where moving past neutrality quickly aligns one with personalities, rather than programmatic politics.

The key example of this was the NCCCK's attempt to unite the political opposition during the symposia of May and June 1992. Though one might interpret the problem of the symposia to be that they did not work to achieve unity, the broader problem was the fact that the churches' effectiveness was compromised once they endeavored to align themselves with political figures of the opposition. When the politicians split to form three parties, the church discovered that partisan strategies were limited in their effectiveness. In this regard, the Catholic Church seemed to position itself about right, neither endeavoring to participate in the symposia, nor letting up at all on its call for electoral fairness and social justice.

Third, presidential elections are necessarily political, and it is more difficult for the church to use its "moral authority" to influence outcomes. When the churches stayed to the broader agenda of critique and civic, pluralist education, they were able to use this moral authority more effectively. It is noteworthy that the greatest church unity and power of voice occurred when the churches were unified in the educational and monitoring programs and in opposing the regime's handling of the ethnic clashes. Internal disunity, which occurred over issues of funding, candidate support, and election monitoring, further diluted the churches' influence.

Fourth, the presidential election required large-scale mobilization and commitment of resources. The churches showed their ability to mobilize a broad electoral effort and influence the conduct of the polls. Electoral education programs and election monitoring helped mobilize the population and give them the fairest elections to date. The documentation of electoral abuses and irregularities and the continued struggle for civic awareness and social justice may have the greatest impact on Kenyan democracy. Achieving specific institutional interests, however, is difficult in presidential campaigns and elections, especially contests as tied to personal candidates as in Kenya.

Finally, not only were the churches examined in this thesis one among many social actors, but they were also competing more with other religious groups with different political agendas. Religious competition from the conservative EFK, which remained loyal to Moi and KANU, split the church vote and influence.

Chapter 8

Church Influence on Democratic Transitions

This chapter compares church influence in the three cases during the opposition to the authoritarian state and the initiation phases of democratic transition, during the constitutional reform process when the new regime rules were being fought out, and during the presidential elections when regime change under the new electoral rules occurred. During each of these political events, I evaluate the mission and goals of the churches, and the political space and resources the church was able to bring to bear to influence the transition. I also examine the constraints on the church's influence caused by competing religious groups and external pressures from the church. My focus has been primarily the institutional church as represented by the bishops' councils and other official church bodies. The progressive church is considered primarily as it impacts the behavior and influence of the institutional churches in each country.

Church Influence during Phases of Democratic Transition

There are several similarities of church influence in the three cases which point to the effectiveness of the church as a political actor during the transition period. In each of the cases, the church was the most effective political actor during the initiation of regime change. This was true because the churches were able to maintain unity

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during this period, were uniquely positioned in society to cultivate political discourse when political space was otherwise restricted, and controlled resources which were not available to other actors. The "moral authority" of the church was also best suited to opposition to the authoritarian regime at the beginning of the transitional period.

Church Unity

Key to the churches' roles as effective political actors was the unity they were able to attain during the initiation of the transition. This occurred for several reasons. In all three cases, though the churches had differing levels of commitment, they were all moving in the direction of an emerging mission of political and social activism. This helped to legitimize the political action of outspoken clerics and progressive church organizations who were voicing opposition to the state. Unity was also maintained during the initiation because repression against societal and church interests was increasing. Church hierarchy in each of the cases was initially reticent about increased political involvement. However, as repression against church interests (usually the progressive branches of the church) increased, the hierarchical church began to interpret the repression as a threat to its institutional interests. This unified various elements of the church in

opposition to the authoritarian regime. In each of the countries, there was also support from the international church for the removal of the authoritarian regimes.

Political Space and Church Resources

Restricted political space unified societal opposition to the authoritarian regime and helped to focus church and societal interests on opposition to the authoritarian state and the restoration of basic human and civic rights. This happened for several reasons. Clear and unified goals of opposition to the authoritarian regime dampened internal factions within the church and led to a unified commitment of resources and influence. Also, the political activity of the church, which in other circumstances would have been considered inappropriate, was given legitimacy in the dire straits faced. Again, this helped to dampen factions within the church, but also decreased external criticism, which aided the church's ability to exercise influence.

In each of the cases, as the authoritarian regimes further constricted political discourse, the church became the only arena where open political expression could occur. Resources unique to the church help to explain why this was the case.

The churches were large and pervasive, with membership in every part of the country. In Kenya, this was not true of any one church, but the number of Christians represented by the NCKC and the Catholic church combined was extensive.

This representation of society made the church an important intermediate institution between the state and societal interests.

The structure of the churches also allowed a wide dissemination of information and resources to all parts of the countries. The central bodies of the church, through their ties with dioceses, parishes, and other church organizations, could spread information and support to all areas. This was important in the initiation phase, since the means of communication the church employed -- sermons, pastoral letters, and radio broadcasts -- could not be stopped by the regimes. This was especially useful at a time when the state controlled nearly all other resources.

Moral Authority

The initiation period was also best suited to the moral authority the church commanded. Because the involvement of the church at initiation was a struggle against the repressive practices of the authoritarian regimes, the church role was widely supported. The church could credibly make the claim that opposition to the regime was a logical extension of the moral dictates of Christianity. In each case, universal principles of human rights were cited as reasons for church involvement. This "resource" became more difficult to use as the transitions moved toward the next phases -- the contestation of political rules and completed transition to a new regime.

Constitutional Reform and Presidential Elections

With the constitutional reform process and presidential elections came the loss of a single focus that had been a part of the opposition to the authoritarian state. This phase involved the contestation over transitional rules, and as such, involved more specific and divergent interests for a greater number of actors within the church. Though the rhetorical commitment to social justice issues remained high in the church, institutional interests and traditional moral teachings took on a greater urgency in the constitutional writing.

Church influence on the constitutional reform process was greater than for the presidential elections. The constitutional process in each case was well defined and somewhat controlled. The process allowed the church to insert itself in the reform process through membership on constitutional bodies, appointments of delegates, lobbying constitutional committees and subcommittees, and strategic bargaining in a face-to-face setting, which was especially useful for obtaining institutional benefits in taxation and education. Broad mobilization and use of resources was not necessary for the church to obtain its interests, though in each case, the churches successfully mobilized attention to the process.

The constitution was not overtly partisan, however, which allowed the churches to retain some unity of purpose and avoid cries of inappropriate political involvement.

Though the process was truly political, the churches were able to focus more on universal principles and national loyalty without the appearance of partisanship.

During presidential elections, church roles were most effective when focused on electoral support activities such as voter education and mobilization, and election monitoring. Realizing church interests and positively affecting transitions was much more difficult during presidential elections, however, for several reasons. During open electoral contests, political space increased considerably, and the church became one among many actors. Partisan actors were better able to realize their goals in this setting, but partisanship was criticized as inappropriate to the church. Churches who chose partisanship found it difficult to maintain cohesion, which in turn weakened the church's ability to exercise influence.

The election process was also less conducive to the application of church resources. Presidential elections require large-scale mobilization and commitment of resources. The churches in each case showed their ability to mobilize a broad electoral effort and influence the conduct of the polls. Achieving specific church interests, however, was difficult in an event as far-flung as a presidential campaign and election. Though the church set out general candidate guidelines for moral behavior in the interests of the common good, it was difficult to determine which candidate would most effectively meet the guidelines

and serve church interests. Moral authority was also harder to command, given the murky nature of many of the issues surrounding the choice of a political candidate.

In summary, one can generalize from the similarities drawn from Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya, that

Churches are more effective political actors during the initiation of transitions because they command political space and because political opposition to the authoritarian regime serves to unify the church and society.

Churches are effective political actors during constitutional reform, where the processes are well-defined, church resources can be effectively focused, and overt partisanship can be avoided.

Churches are effective political actors during elections when their activities are focused on education, mobilization, and monitoring. Partisan behavior is both ineffective and derisive.

Transitional Outcomes

Despite the usefulness of understanding similarities in each of the cases, there is greater explanatory power and understanding of nuance in the differences among the cases. In this section, I first outline the transitional outcomes

in each of the cases, and then examine the differences of church goals, resources, and behavior throughout the transition to explain the different outcomes.

Brazil

Brazil's transition resulted in a civilian, constitutional regime with a populist presidential form of government. Brazil's government remained highly bureaucratized throughout the transition, and the central government retained the primary reins of power in the country.

Representation in Brazil is multiparty, with primarily non-ideological and non-disciplined parties of the center with the exception of one party, the Workers' Party (PT). Unlike the other two cases, the PT represented a progressive, disciplined party representative of labor interests as well as the disenfranchised. The electoral process in Brazil was and remains widely supported, with a broad-based mobilization and participation of interests during electoral contests.

Despite these rather positive changes, the new regime has considerable continuity with the authoritarian past. Economic, political, and military elites were able to retain many of their interests in the new regime. This happened because elites were able to "pact" the changes that occurred with one another over a long, drawn-out process. Military and political interests were accommodated in return for

allowing liberalization. Though elements of civil society were able to push the liberalization farther than elites initially intended, the relative fragmentation of interests under the new regime has allowed considerable continuity of elite interests.

The Philippines

The Filipino transition also resulted in a civilian, constitutional regime with a presidential form of government. The Philippines, however, is a more personalist regime, and does not have the level of bureaucratization of Brazil. As under the Marcos era, the central government retains most political power in the country.

The Philippines has a multiparty system of representation, but parties are non-programmatic, non-disciplined, and tied to the personality of candidates. There is significant support of electoral politics, except in areas of leftist or nationalist insurgency. Electoral participation has been considerable during presidential elections, but ongoing participation in the political process is poor.

Elite interests have reemerged even more strongly than during the Marcos era. The relative weakness of organized civil society and the political successes of well-off clans have created conditions conducive to the continuation of elite interests, including those of the military.

Kenya

Kenya has not adopted a new constitution since the move to multiparty politics in 1991. The state remains dominated by Daniel arap Moi's "state-party" KANU, and the regime is highly personalistic and centrally controlled. Though opposition parties exist, the Parliament is more a formal body than a seat of power. Both regime and opposition parties are non-ideological in nature, and tied to personalist and patrimonial interests.

The electoral process in Kenya is broadly supported, but is still beholden to the control of the Moi regime, which intervened in the electoral process during the 1992 campaign. Civil society is poorly mobilized, and ongoing participation in the political process among the grass roots is minimal. Though political openness has improved, elite interests and more specifically, personalist interests, prevail.

The Churches' Influence on Transitional Outcomes

To what degree did church characteristics (and the differences in each case) contribute to the transitional outcomes? Though the process of transition is complex, it is possible attribute characteristics of the outcome to the behavior of the most prevalent actor within civil society in each case: the church.

Sense of Mission/Church Goals

Each of the churches of Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya, experienced a shift in theological paradigm prior to the initiation of regime change. Each experienced movement from a pietistic model to a model of social action and finally to a model of liberation. The degree to which the churches committed to the roles these paradigms imply, however, varied.

As Martin suggested for Brazil, the movement toward the liberating paradigm does not mean the demise of the other paradigms.. Two major factors help to determine the effect of the commitment to a liberating paradigm: the level of institutional commitment to social and political activism, and the degree of grass roots support of a progressive agenda.

The Brazilian Church had the earliest and highest level of institutional commitment to social activism of the three cases. The early support of Catholic Action in the 1950's and 1960's and the innovations in the CNBB and the pastoral councils in the early 1970's gave institutional backing to the theological innovations emerging from the international church during the 1960's. The Brazilian Church also became a leader in the dissemination of liberation theology and the growth of base communities. These institutional commitments to a "new way of being church" moved the church past a commitment to traditional social action to a "liberating" commitment to take up the cause of the marginalized. This

in turn helped to mobilize the grass roots, where many of the innovations had their origin. Institutional and grass roots support created a cohesive strategy and broad support for political involvement in the initiation of the transition to democracy. This in turn enhanced the effectiveness of the church's efforts.

In the Philippines, there was also a move toward the liberating model, but there was less institutional support for the theological shift. Social action organizations such as NASSA, the AMRSP, and organizations of the religious orders became involved in development activities in the 1960's. The CBCP gave these groups support when their activities were development related, but was quite reticent on more progressive agendas. Political criticism from the bishops was sparse and late during the initial period of martial rule and was not as radical as in Brazil.

The grassroots movements of the Philippine church were not as strong as in Brazil, either. Liberation theology was patterned after Latin America, but was not as widely embraced. The BCCs, though modelled after the CEBs of Brazil, did not take on as activist roles. The majority of the base communities in the Philippines were devotional and pietistic, while some added elements of mutual assistance and development. The BCCs did not play a major role as building blocks of social and political activism and involvement.

The Philippine church's shallow commitment to a liberating agenda helps to explain the elite-oriented nature of church involvement in politics and the subsequent failure of the transition to fully mobilize and integrate non-elite interests. This is evident in the drafting of the Philippine Constitution. The church sought its own institutional interests and traditional moral teachings on abortion and family matters, and had great influence not only because of its close ties to the Aquino regime, but because it could argue its moral authority in constitutional and legal matters. The agenda of the progressive branches of the church, who wished to see more concrete guarantees of social and economic equality, were not as easy to assign a moral answer. Though the church made some attempts to address social justice issues in the constitution writing, its connections to the process and eventual outcomes were tied more to serving institutional interests and traditional moral interests.

In Kenya, the churches were much later in moving to a progressive theology. Though the churches did move from a pietistic model of the church to one dedicated to a greater role in promoting self-help and development projects, this change came primarily in the support the NCKK and individual churches gave to the harambee movement. Support for harambee did not challenge the interests of the state, and it was not until leadership within individual churches of the NCKK spoke out in opposition to the issue of queuing

that the churches took on more political roles. When the churches spoke out, however, their voices tended to be much more fragmented, given the large number of churches that make up the umbrella body NCKK, as well as the fragmentation within individual churches such as the CPK or in the NCKK itself.

The Roman Catholic Church of Kenya remained reticent on development and political issues until later in the Moi regime, when it adopted greater opposition to state repression and a greater promotion of activism and liberation theology. In both the Catholic and major Protestant churches, grass roots activity was slight, and most activism was elite-led. The Catholic SCCs were not very extensive, and were primarily focused on spiritual activities and some self-help programs. In the Protestant churches and NCKK, clergy dominated the political activity of the church, and grass roots political activities were instituted primarily in the voter education program during the presidential elections.

In summary, each of the churches was changing in its theological approaches, but commitment to the liberating paradigm varied considerably among the churches as did the institutional and grass roots support for a more politicized agenda. Several conclusions can be drawn from the variation in the cases.

Churches with greater institutional support of a theological mission advocating political and social involvement are more likely to have a greater influence on political transitions.

Churches which emphasize mobilization of the grass roots around a theology of political and social involvement are more likely to successfully promote non-elite interests during transitions.

Both the institutional and grass roots support are positively influenced by the earlier adoption of a progressive theological agenda. The Brazilian church made the switch earlier than the others, had a more extensive mobilization of members through the base communities, and had the greatest extent of institutional support for progressive organizations and activities. This led the church to take on an earlier and more extensive political role in opposition to the authoritarian regime and gave the church a greater success early in the transitional period.

Mobilization and Links to Society

The differences in the three cases show that the more extensive the church's mobilization efforts and links to society, the more likely the church will be able to effectively use its political presence to influence the transitional period. This strength of mobilization is dependent on several conditions, including the level of

repression, the degree of open political space, the length of the transition, and the strength of organizations within civil society.

Repression

The threat to the church that the authoritarian regimes imposed created church unity behind a more activist social and political role. In the Philippines, state repression of church interests was the most extensive and explosive. The brutality directed against the leftist church mobilized and unified a church with somewhat disparate ideas about proper political involvement of the church. The blatancy of the oppression could not be ignored by the conservative elements of the church, who took on the agenda of opposition to Marcos. The church's actions surrounding the ouster of Marcos were unified despite the differences.

In Brazil, too, repression was directed primarily at the progressive and predominantly rural church. This repression was not as violent as in the Philippines, though in some areas, there was considerable violence directed against the church. Regional groups of bishops and large urban parishes became the first groups to mobilize around the oppression of specific church interests. Much of the oppression in Brazil was more generalized to the society as a whole. This repression served to unite the grass roots interests with the hierarchy, giving the church a much greater effectiveness.

In Kenya the church oppression was not as violent as in the Philippines, but was persistent nevertheless. The government directed most of its threats at the outspoken clergy of the Protestant denominations. Moi's direct challenges to individuals served to unify the clergy against him and his regime.

Mobilization and Links to Civil Society

A major reason for the churches' effective leadership during the transition was the restricted political space in each of the societies. Since the churches in each case could not be shut down, they became the focus of societal opposition for a time. Control of this political space gave the church considerable influence in directing the initiation of regime change.

In Brazil, the church enjoyed considerable influence at the initiation of the transition, but began to lose influence during the constitutional writing and the elections. Military repression, decree power through AI-5, the careful control of political parties and elections, and the cooptation and control of associational groups all contributed to the restriction of political space at the beginning of the transitional period. The church stood up to the regime through critical pastoral letters, institutional support of progressive grass roots organizations such as the CPT and the CEBs, and increased ties to organizations within civil society such as the

unions and rural organizations. Because the church had such a pervasive presence and refused to capitulate to the state's wishes, but instead preserved political dissent, the church remained an effective mobilizer of societal support.

The transition was well along the way when the constitution was rewritten. There was a greater level of political openness, and many more social and political actors vying for individual interests. In this climate, the church pulled in to defend its own institutional interests in education and taxation, which it had some success with. Influence on traditional moral issues was less prevalent, and though the constitution promised much in terms of social justice, concrete provisions to implement the social justice agenda, such as land reform, were not successfully included in the constitution.

By the time of the presidential elections, the churches found themselves in open competition with other societal interests. The church vote, while tilted toward Lula, was still fragmented, and did not determine a winner. The long, drawn-out transition had taken its toll on church influence, and other organizations within civil society had begun to articulate their own interests without the church.

At the initiation of transition in the Philippines, civil society was so weakened by Marcos that the church became the prime mobilizer and initiator of regime change. Even when Marcos allowed limited political action such as the plebiscites, parties were so weak, non-programmatic, and

out of touch with the people, that they were poor representatives of the people. Leftist and ethnic organizations were the only viable organizations, but were under such state repression that they were unable to extract change, even through armed struggle.

In this atmosphere, the Philippine church became increasingly critical of the regime. Through alliances with middle class organizations such as the Makati Business Club and increased linkages with grass-roots groups through NASSA, AMRSP, and TFDP, the church became a much more powerful actor during the waning months of Marcos' rule.

In the Philippines, the church emerged from the snap election as a dominant societal actor with powerful connections to the regime. This meant that there was less political competition for the church, and more clout. The process of transition had moved rapidly and the church was one of the only actors that was strong enough to take advantage of the political situation. Because political space was also largely controlled at the time of the rule-setting for the constitutional process, the church realized additional influence on this process, as the many appointments and the successful inclusion of church goals in the constitution attests. By the time of the 1992 election, however, the church was simply one among many actors. Political space was sufficiently open and the church had changed enough (for reasons noted below) that the "church vote" everyone predicted did not materialize.

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Finally, in Kenya, Moi's increasingly personalistic rule left only some professional organizations, such as the Law Society of Kenya, a few elements of the media, and the church in opposition to the state at the beginning of the transition. Under the single-party system, elements of society became increasingly beholden to Moi's patronage for their existence. When Moi clamped down further, and even on the church leadership, the church became the single voice that could not be silenced. In Kenya, however, the church was not that well integrated with grass roots organizations other than some of the development organizations of the church and the new Catholic base communities. The influence of the Kenyan churches was primarily the influence of key clergy.

During the constitutional reform process in Kenya, the church was a key actor because political space restricted other groups from more freely exerting their interests. The constitutional reform process itself was less open to input in Kenya than in the other cases, and most of the influence occurred within KANU. To the degree that influence could be exercised, the Kenyan churches were important in mobilizing societal interests, involving them in the reform process, and pressuring for greater political openness. During the Kenyan elections of 1992, the stage became occupied by more traditional political and social groups. Though the churches tried to broker a united opposition candidate, their efforts failed. The political parties, the elite

politicians who led them, and the ethnic groups represented by the parties became the focal point of societal mobilization. The church was unable to override the fragmentation of the vote, and Moi retained power because of it.

The different examples from each case lead to several conclusions about the effectiveness of the church as a political actor during democratic transition. Where the church was coming under attack and was well linked to a mobilized civil society (as in the case of Brazil), the church became an effective initiator of political change. However, a more mobilized civil society also forced greater openings of political space, which made it more difficult for the church to have consistent political influence. This explains why the most successful example of initiation of transition, the Brazilian church, became the least able to influence constitutional and election processes later in the transition. The church's initial successes led to a decreased role for the church as the transition process preceded.

Where the church remains the primary actor as the transition proceeds but is only minimally linked to a weak civil society, as in the Philippines, the church may retain political effectiveness, but the transition will be less tied to the interests of the grass roots. In the Philippines, the church was linked to society by the mutual repression of the Marcos regime. However, by the time of

the Philippine constitutional process, repression had decreased and quickly moving transitional events left primarily the Philippine church (and some middle class and elite interests) able to influence the process. Instead of using this position to elevate grass roots interests, such as land reform, the church tended to protect its own institutional interests. By the time of the presidential elections, civil society remained weak, but the church pulled back from political involvement and was not an important influence. The Philippine transition remains partial in the sense that societal interests have not become well integrated into the political process.

In Kenya, the church effort was primarily elite-led and poorly connected to the grass roots. Some unity was achieved through the repression of the church and society, but this did not meld interests too greatly, since most repression of the church was harassment of outspoken clergy. While the transition was certainly influenced by the clergy, the nature of the transition, which was elite-dominated and only partially democratic, points to the need for the church to move its politics from a primarily elite critique to a broader mobilization of society if the transition is to be pushed farther toward democratization.

Church Resources and the Transition

It is possible to assess the influence of church resources by examining the extent and control of these resources in each of the countries. The Brazilian Catholic Church is large and pervasive, with membership in every part of the country and in every social class in the country. This representation of society made the church an important intermediate institution between the state and societal interests, and the church used this position to increase its influence, especially at the initiation of the transition.

The broad structure of the Brazilian church also allowed a wide dissemination of information and resources to all parts of the country. The creation of a centralized CNBB allowed the wide-flung church to institute centrally directed policies as well. Through ties with dioceses, parishes, and other church organizations, the hierarchy could both spread information and support to all areas, and tie the grass roots to the institution. This was important in the initiation phase, when the state controlled nearly all other resources. The means of communication the church employed -- sermons, pastoral letters, and radio broadcasts -- could not be stopped by the regimes. Because the Brazilian church was so large, however, it became increasingly difficult to centrally control and utilize resources as the transition progressed. Without the unifying central issue of opposition to the authoritarian

regime, the central bodies of the church had less ability to maintain a unity of purpose. As the transition gave way to greater political competition, the different aspects of the church, including progressive branches, regional bodies, and parishes, became more atomized and pursued interests independently of one another.

In the Philippines, the church also touched nearly every part of the country except the Muslim south. The church was much more centrally controlled by the Bishops' Council and is a smaller church than in Brazil. Many useful resources, including Radio Veritas, and church publications, were centrally controlled and disseminated throughout the country. The central hierarchy of the church used this control of resources for broader interests, as in the case of the 1986 uprising in which Radio Veritas played such an important role, and for the institutional interests of the church, as in the constitutional drafting which was deemed "perfect" by Cardinal Jaime Sin. As in Brazil, when the transition moved to the phase of political competition, the hierarchical church was less able to use their resources for their own benefit. Effective educational and election monitoring programs were initiated through the use of church resources, however.

In Kenya, church resources are less centralized and are dependent on outside donors. The Christian churches, however, are prevalent throughout the country, and have historically played a very important role in education,

welfare, and health care. The centralized body of the churches, the NCK, has managed to use church resources to successfully launch several programs of development and education. The Catholic church, too, has disseminated information throughout the country by use of pastoral letters and sermons. During the KANU review committee process, the churches' resources and presence throughout the country were effectively used to open political discourse and protect dissident interests. The educational program of the church also contributed positively to the election process in 1992.

Despite these influences, the Kenyan churches showed several limitations in their use of resources when compared to the Philippines or Brazil. The NCK is made up of many groups, some of which have not consistently supported the central institution's policies. This has led to infighting and decreased the effectiveness of the NCK's actions. When the Christian churches attempted to combine forces to monitor the 1992 elections, the Anglican church or CPK, formed its own monitoring group. The CPK has been rife with dissension and criticized for the lack of lay input into church decision-making. While the Catholic church has not had evident dissension and has spoken with a unified voice, the bishops' ties to the grass roots church are not extensive.

Kenyan churches are also dependent for their resources on foreign churches and non-governmental organizations. While this has not been restrictive yet for the Protestant churches, whose political projects were funded from abroad, it does place the Kenyan churches in competition for external funding rather than in control of their own resources. The Catholic church in Kenya has not been singled out for attention by the Pope or Vatican, but the scramble for funds from the international Catholic bodies also places constraints on the Kenyan Catholic church's abilities to raise independent resources.

The differences in the three cases suggest that the more extensive the church's structure, membership, and resources, the more likely the church will be able to broadly influence transitional outcomes. This is conditioned by the degree of control over resources that is exercised by the institutional church. Where the church is extensive and central control over resources is high, the church is more likely to influence the outcome of the transition. In the Philippines, where the church was extensive and more centrally controlled, the church greatly influenced the constitutional language to reflect traditional values of the church. As the Philippine example shows, however, the results of the church's influence depend on the goals the church holds.

In Brazil, a similar divergence of interests also became apparent. The institutional church as represented by the hierarchy supported constitutional language promoting social justice issues such as fair pay, urban reform, support for indigenous peoples, and land reform. Most concrete efforts were concentrated on the interests of the church in public education and in issues of divorce and abortion. The progressive branches of the church took on separate agendas through the amendment process, and were not successful in achieving their main goal of land reform. Because the reform process was not as open or amenable to change and outside influence, the Kenyan churches did not hold any specific institutional interests besides the end of repression and greater openness in the political system.

Partisanship

Partisanship made it very difficult for the church to maintain cohesion, which in turn weakened the church's ability to exercise influence. At the beginning of the transition period, clear and unified goals of opposition to the authoritarian regime dampened internal factions within the church and helped the church to avoid most partisan behavior. Political participation, which in other circumstances would have been considered inappropriate, was deemed necessary and welcome.

The constitutional reform process was not overtly partisan, either, which allowed the church to retain some unity of purpose and avoid cries of politicization from within the church and outside it. Though the process was truly political, the churches in each case were able to focus more on universal principles and national loyalty without the appearance of partisanship. The Philippine church appeared to slip into partisan behavior more than the other cases, given the church's strong support of Aquino and the reciprocal support Aquino gave the church. This was quite a successful strategy for Philippine church leaders, as the constitution closely reflected the institutional church's goals. The Philippine church, however, drew heavily on the argument that their behavior was tied to universal principles rather than partisanship. This helped to keep the church united.

Because presidential elections are necessarily partisan, the Brazilian, Filipino, and Kenyan churches had to decide how to approach the issue of partisanship. This quandary was real for the churches, especially if one candidate appeared to represent church interests or clearly did not represent church interests. Further influence in the transition appeared to require overtly political behavior.

The three cases, while different, each point to the ultimate ineffectiveness of a partisan strategy if the church is to have an impact in the transitional process.

Those who decided to support partisan candidates were ineffective. The prime example of this was Cardinal Jaime Sin of the Philippines. Sin had been the most influential church actor during the 1986 uprising and in the early Aquino administration. He held the opposition together during the ouster of Marcos and enjoyed the benefits of payback as Aquino assembled her government. Sin's partisanship in the presidential elections, however, not only failed to get the results he desired, but also was very divisive in the church.

In Brazil, the partisan support of Lula appeared to have worked, as Lula came very close to victory. Again, the longer view shows that the ultimate effect of partisanship on the part of many church leaders was a decrease in the church's influence. The partisan support of the PT on the left and Collor on the right fragmented the church's leadership and membership, and alienated the Brazilian Catholic population as well, something the weakened church could ill afford. The international church also took note of the behavior of the progressive church and took additional steps to pressure clergy and church leadership to depoliticize.

In Kenya, partisanship was particularly misplaced, given the fragmented nature of the parties that emerged. The churches' attempts to unify the opposition at church-sponsored symposia broke down, and elements of the church became caught up in partisan and ethnic competition. This

was both ineffective and divisive. Non-partisan election education and monitoring appeared to provide the churches with greater respect and credibility.

In summary, the greater the appearance of non-partisanship in the churches' political behavior, the more likely the church will retain credibility and influence in the transitional period. Church actions may be quite politicized, such as church connections with the Aquino regime, and still be successful in achieving specific church interests. This kind of political behavior will be less conducive to furthering the democratic nature of transitions, however.

Religious competition and external pressure

Two final elements help to explain the role of the churches in democratic transitions: internal religious competition and external conservative pressure to depoliticize the church's agenda. Both of these kinds of influences tended to steer the churches away from the liberating paradigm discussed earlier toward a more conservative and pious agenda. The differences in the cases point to the increasing importance of these factors as the transitional period progresses.

The churches that were examined in this thesis, whether Catholic or Protestant, were faced with competing value movements, the most of which were conservative evangelical or pentecostal churches. Individual churches and coalitions

of conservative alternative groups (the large pentecostal churches in Brazil, the fundamentalists in the Philippines, and the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (EFK) in Kenya), were not politically involved during the initiation of the transitions in these countries, but became more and more influential as the transition progressed.

In Brazil, the pressure from competing groups was extensive. The incredible growth of these groups in Brazil placed considerable pressure on the Catholic church to return to sacred issues in the lives of their communicants in order to compete with the individualistic focus of the pentecostal groups. By the time of the constitutional reform process, not only were the numbers of these groups increasing, but their interests were being asserted more aggressively. In Brazil, where the political space was the most open, the pentecostals attacked the Catholic church on several issues, including using the word "God" in the constitution. During the presidential election, there was religious competition between the pentecostals, who supported Collor, and the progressive Catholic church, which supported Lula. Though the progressive branches of the church recommended further involvement of the church in social and political issues to counteract the conservative religious agenda, the consensus within the church was to pull back from overt political behavior.

The pressure from the Vatican and Pope to depoliticize the Brazilian church's behavior only added to the pressures already being exerted by the conservative pentecostal groups. Brazil became the most prominent "example" that the Pope and Vatican used to exert their authority over errant theology. The international church was largely successful in reorganizing Brazil's hierarchy by elevating conservatives and punishing progressives, including the defrocking of prominent liberation theologian Leonardo Boff. Internal conservatives were supportive of codifying the church's positions on traditional moral issues in the constitution, but did not support other kinds of political behavior, and were very cautious concerning potential political radicalism. These combined to place great pressure on the church to depoliticize its behavior and return to an emphasis on the sacred.

In the Philippines, religious competition from conservative fundamentalist and pentecostal groups also created pressures for the church to return to the individual and reduce the political. During the writing of the constitution, conservative Protestants were generally in agreement with the goals of the conservative Catholic church, but were quite antagonistic toward the progressive agenda. The international church was also placing considerable pressure on the church to withdraw from political behavior. This was a change from earlier approaches, where John Paul commended the political activism

evidenced in the streets of Manila. However, when the constitutional process was completed in the Philippines, the Vatican made clear its desire to fully depoliticize the Philippine church and pressured the Philippine hierarchy to withdraw. The hierarchy did depoliticize its behavior, but when the elections came, several bishops and Cardinal Sin became overtly partisan, a strategy which largely failed.

Contrasting Brazil with the Philippines helps to explain the prospect of the survival of the progressive agenda. In both the Philippines and Brazil, increasing religious competition the churches faced and the pressure from external and internal conservatives to get out of politics after the constitutional process compelled the institutional churches to largely depoliticize their actions. However, in Brazil, where the church was spread out and the progressives highly institutionalized, the progressive agenda remained alive, but with less support from the center. The progressives were able to play a significant role in the presidential elections and to keep the progressive agenda alive despite the competition and external pressure.

Though the progressive agenda in the Philippines did not die out, it was less prominent in the elections. The progressive branches were less institutionalized than in Brazil and were very poorly supported from the center. Because the Philippine church is less spread out and more control is exerted from the center, the depoliticizing

strategy affected the progressive agenda more adversely than in the Philippines. Progressives were not as prominent in their influence of the 1992 presidential elections and have had decreasing influence in political matters.

In Kenya, religious competition is increasing greatly, but external pressures remain minimal. During the KANU review committee work, the conservative groups did not exert much influence. In the multiparty elections, religious conservatives sided with Moi while progressives in the Protestant and Catholic churches alike sought to oust Moi in some way. Instead of the church becoming a block of influence, the church became another interest group among many. External pressure has so far not played a prominent role in Kenya, and because the grass roots church has not widely embraced the progressive agenda, it has not been a significant factor in politics. Religious competition has played a more significant role in the fragmentation of the church, rather than the mobilization of the grass roots.

From a comparison of all the cases, one could conclude that where external pressures from conservatives and internal competition from religious groups are greater, transitional outcomes will have less popular mobilization and will lead to less participation of the grass roots. If, however, the progressive agenda is substantially institutionalized through active progressive organizations, as in Brazil, the transition will be more likely to reflect greater social activism.

Churches and Other Civic Actors and the Transition

Both the similarities and differences across the three cases point to the areas in which the church is most likely to have influence over the transitional process and in which the church is not well suited for influence. In those areas where the church is poorly equipped to have influence, other social actors may be better able to take the next step in the process of transition.

Churches are well suited for the initiation phase of transition for several reasons: they can be politically active in opposing the authoritarian regime without partisan behavior tearing the church apart. They are large institutions with many resources throughout the country, not the least being the pervasive nature of the church and the representation of many classes of people. The churches also command moral authority during times of transition and can provide a direction for societal interests to follow. Finally, at the initiation of regime change, the churches can play a role in protecting political space for societal interests to continue political discourse and ultimately influence transitional outcomes. These are roles that other actors within civil society cannot play in the same way, because they tend to be tied to protecting specific interests, such as labor unions or lawyers' societies. The church is uniquely qualified to fill the role of leader of civil society.

During the political rule-making phase of transitions, churches tend to protect institutional interests, despite rhetorical commitments to broader social justice issues. This is not to say that progressive social justice issues get no support from the church. When the church has strong links to those who desire and benefit from the changes sought in the "progressive agenda," the church will act on those commitments. But as rules are contested, the church sees its institutional interests separately from civil society at large. The more open political space leads people to seek out groups other than the church to represent their interests. In this phase, the church is starting to become one of many societal interests vying for influence.

At the conclusion of the transition, when political power is being contested, the church is not well suited to exert its own interests and shape the transitional outcome. Because partisan behavior is both divisive within the church and perceived as inappropriate outside the church, it is difficult for the church to shape the outcome of the electoral process. The church is most effective when its activities are tied to education, mobilization, and monitoring activities. This ensures that the church is not divided by partisan behavior while supporting the electoral process as a long-term means of democratic change.

During the electoral phase of the transition, other social actors, such as parties or labor, are better able to contest political power and promote democratization. Can

the church take a role in supporting the kinds of organizations that can appropriately contest for political power? Can something like a Christian Democratic Party emerge in the cases considered here? There is nothing inherent to these cases that suggests that an intermediate institution such as a Christian Democratic party could not find some means of support from the church. The factor which currently would work against this occurring in any of the cases considered is the religious competition the conservative pentecostal and fundamentalist churches pose. In the current situation in each of the countries, but especially in Brazil and the Philippines, the churches have entered an era of both waning political and religious influence. In this atmosphere, the churches have turned their attention to the maintenance of their own interests. In the political field, this means the maintenance of the church's institutional and traditional moral interests, goals which could be attained through traditional personal relationships with political leadership rather than the extensive and openly politicized participation of the past.

In the religious field, this means dedicating fewer resources to broad social movements and goals of social justice, and instead, concentrating on increasing the religious presence of the church in the everyday lives of communicants. This was especially important in Brazil and the Philippines, as the Catholic church tries to staunch the

flow of members to competing religious groups. The church in Kenya may continue to have a prophetic voice since the Moi regime continues to constrict political space.

The Church and the Perseverance of Patrimonialism

In all of the cases, the transitions have been constrained by the continuities of patrimonial rule. In Brazil, elite interests continue to prevail, despite the greater level of openness in Brazilian society. In the Philippines, the return of landed families and economic to local and regional political power has been very dramatic, despite the widespread support of the electoral process. In Kenya, Moi managed to use the electoral process to usher in only very partial changes and maintain the ascendancy of his and KANU's rule.

Does the nature of the church's involvement explain the similarities of the persistence of patrimonial rule? I would argue that the nature of civil society as a whole helps to explain the patrimonial continuity, and that the church, as a part of civil society, also is a part of the explanation.

In each of the cases examined here, the churches were active in keeping political discourse alive throughout civil society, as mentioned above. Civil society as a whole continued to be somewhat weak in each case, however, despite the differences among the cases. To the degree that the

churches could promote the cultivation and growth of a mature, representative civil society, the churches could contribute to breaking the power of patrimonial rule.

The churches' records on the cultivation of civil society were mixed, however. In Brazil, the church went the farthest in not only protecting but also joining with grass roots organizations within civil society in promoting a more viable civil society. In the Philippines, this commitment was less developed, and in Kenya, ties of the church to the grass roots hardly existed. Even in the most optimistic case of support of civil society, in Brazil, there were many factors which helped to erode church support of a mobilized civil society. Some I have spoken of above, including the tendency for the church to look after institutional interests as political space opens, and the danger that partisan behavior represents for the church.

Were the churches themselves patrimonial? The Catholic church is hierarchical by its very nature, and the Protestant churches in Kenya also have similar structures. Innovations in the organization of the church represented by the CEBs, BCCs, and SCCs went some distance in breaking down patrimonial attitudes in the church, but even in Brazil, where the base community movement is the most advanced, many of the CEBs are conservative in nature and structure. The fact that the progressive elements in each of the churches

continues to call for a more democratic and less patrimonial structure is indicative of the fact that patrimonial elements remain in the churches.

Can one take the next step and imply that the churches were unwittingly supportive of continued patrimonial rule? Some leaders of the churches may openly support and benefit from the patrimonial nature of their political settings, but the reasons probably lie more in what the churches were unable to accomplish rather than what the churches desired. Because the churches were ill suited by nature to shape the transition at the electoral phase for the reasons listed above, the churches were unable to break the continuity of elite rule and interests. Given that the churches began to run up against limits to what they could achieve, they made decisions to attempt to realize their own interests in the newly opened space, much as labor groups and other groups in civil society had to do. This fundamental tug and pull of institutional interests versus a theology of liberation will continue to play out in the concrete realities of the transitional period. Churches which realize their limits and strengths may yet have a lasting effect on the nature of the transitions in their countries.

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