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A Regime Analysis of Education Reform
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**CHALLENGING BUREAUCRATIC INSULARITY:
A REGIME ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION REFORM IN DETROIT 1988-1994**

By

Richard W. Jelier Jr.

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
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ABSTRACT

CHALLENGING BUREAUCRATIC INSULARITY: A REGIME ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION REFORM IN DETROIT 1988-1994

By

Richard W. Jelier

This study examines collaborative and competitive approaches to education reform in Detroit. It investigates the impact of outside stakeholders on the success or failure of reform. The research specifically investigates the institutional legacy of even short periods of agenda access and evaluates whether the reforms brought comprehensive changes to the Detroit Public Schools.

The regime approach guides this study. Regime refers specifically to the informal arrangements that surround and complement the formal workings of government authority. The burgeoning literature on urban regime studies have focused primarily on coalition formation in support of growth-centered downtown development schemes. This research extends urban regime scholarship from economic development to human capital initiatives.

This case study research employs a wide array of techniques including field research, intensive semi-structured interviews, observation of board meetings, special committee meetings, Detroit Compact District Stakeholder Council meetings, Local Compact Council meetings, financial and programmatic data, official program records, outside program evaluations and a wide array of secondary data sources. Primary data collected for this field-based research consists of face to face comprehensive semi-structured interviews with over 80 respondents from every major sector in the city

including the business sector, non-profits, foundations, community organizations, universities, city government, school board members, union leaders and programs specialists within the Detroit Public Schools.

The two major parts of the reform agenda advanced from 1988 to 1994, the Detroit Compact and Empowerment, Diversity and Choice were analyzed. Research findings suggest successful education reform depends largely on political rather than technical factors. The Detroit Compact in building a broad-based organization of 12 stakeholders was successful in generating sustained community support. In contrast, the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda failed to generate external support. Reformers who implemented these programs were removed from office, and the DPS took a distinctive turn away from specialized schools of choice in favor of traditional neighborhood schools. By focusing on the viability and sustainability of local linkages between the public and private sector this work moves beyond the existing literature which often ignores nonofficial actors in education reform.

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**CHALLENGING BUREAUCRATIC INSULARITY:
A REGIME ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION REFORM IN DETROIT 1988-1994**

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Like a number of other cities in the late 1980s, Detroit embarked upon a period of school reform. Beginning in 1988 a reform-minded slate of candidates swept out of office long-term incumbents, replaced a superintendent of 15 years and attempted to advance a series of policy reforms. This research explores the two primary vehicles of reform, a public-private partnership, the Detroit Compact (Chapter 4) and a series of specialized schools packaged by the reformers under the rubric of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice (Chapter 5). The political firestorm generated by advancing these reforms resulted in the removal of the reform slate of candidates at the next election, the resignation of the superintendent they hired and an apparent return to the less dynamic period. This case provides the opportunity to study a finite period of activism and explore the process of policy change. Numerous concrete questions emerge. How does the educational arena relate more broadly to theories of agenda setting and urban decisionmaking? What can this era tell us about the difficulties in attempting to advance comprehensive policy reform? What are the long term institutional consequences of short bursts of policy activism?

The study of urban politics has been dominated by issues central to political science as a whole: Who has power? (Wong 1990) In what sense are cities democratic? What are the political relationships among the social classes? What is the significance of the distribution of power? Current theories of urban decision making have evolved

from the debate which emerged from a large body of case study research in the 1960s. Prominent examples included Robert Dahl (1961), Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman (1960), Edward Banfield (1961, 1963, 1965), Morton Grodzins (1961) and Norton Long (1962). These scholars expounded a pluralist view of urban politics. Their findings challenged earlier elitist conceptions of public decisionmaking advanced by Floyd Hunter (1953) C. Wright Mills (1956) and others. The pluralist conception of decisionmaking was supported by a second configuration of scholars including Nelson Polsby (1963), Aaron Wildavsky (1964), and Theodore Lowi (1964). The pluralist scholars stressed the fragmentation of policy within cities, with each issue arena with its own constellation of players. Many stakeholders influential in one area of politics had little or no involvement in other areas.

Over the past two decades, a significant literature in urban politics has focused on how local leaders mobilize community resources to implement policy preferences. A large number of careful case studies make it clear that while successful leaders use a wide variety of strategies, some commonalities exist. The most important is the linking of both public and private resources to some common goal. Clarence Stone (1989) has developed the notion of the urban regime to describe conditions needed to exist for successful policy implementation. Stone argues an electoral coalition is seldom sufficient to actually govern. Rather, political leaders must create a more inclusive regime which include "the informal arrangements that surround and complement the formal workings of government authority" (p. 3). The burgeoning literature on urban regime studies (see among others Elkin 1985, 1987; Jones and Bachelor 1986; Judd 1984; Judd and Kantor 1992; Logan

and Molotch 1987; Ross et al. 1991; Stone 1989, 1993; Sanders and Stone 1987) focused primarily on economic growth manifested in downtown development schemes. From this perspective, the key to understanding successful policy implementation is the process by which public actors create viable coalitions around substantive issues.

A good deal of empirical evidence has been amassed over the past decade showing that in many American cities, such political coalitions have been forged around economic development programs. These pro-growth coalitions engineered a massive allocation of private and social resources in a number of American cities, sometimes with spectacular results. Cities like Baltimore and Pittsburgh have seen much of their downtown rebuilt during the last decade. The coalitions included city politicians working with a "new breed" of bureaucrats, corporations, central business district real estate and merchant interests. This governing coalition stabilized to such an extent that it was virtually the only unified political interest that spoke for the central cities (Judd 1984,375). Scarcely a large city in the United States lacked such a centralized coalition.¹

This emphasis on local regime forces a reconceptualization as to how we examine the policy process. In stressing the interconnectiveness of elements of the local polity, regime theory demands that scholars and practitioners consider a wide variety of potential actors. It rejects the traditional view of political power as an exercise in hierarchical

¹ Examples are numerous and include: Pittsburgh's Allegheny Conference on Community Development; Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley's Chicago's Loop and Lakefront development coalition; Boston's New Boston Committee promoting the Prudential Center project, the urban renewal of Boston's North End, and the building of a large governmental center; San Francisco's redevelopment coalition dramatically altered the skyline. Similar coalitions are evident in Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, St. Louis (Mollenkopf 19784; Kerstein 1975; Jones and Bachelor 1986; Judd 1984).

control, and replaces it with a capacity to coordinate and motivate private and public actors. Emphasis is placed not simply in the delivery of a concrete good or service, but in creating the political capacity to produce a desired outcome.

In recent years, urban scholars have begun to note some change in the constellation of forces and the shift in focus in urban decision making. Embryonic regime formation in some cities, appears to be coalescing around urban education in much the same way that partnerships formed around physical development concerns in previous decades. While it is by no means certain that a successful local coalition around education issues can be formed, the history of local economic development efforts seems to offer a potential path to genuine systemic reform efforts. Little scholarship has investigated the potential transformation of growth-centered downtown development coalition to education-centered coalitions. This research will help bridge that gap.

The interest in educational policy as an important arena of research at the local level parallels national and state trends. The issuance of the National Commission on Excellence in Education report, *A Nation At Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform* (1983) has been credited with stimulating this attention. However, the general agreement on the increasing importance of education has not translated into consensus about educational reform. Scholars increasingly pay attention to components of educational policy reform, including, (1) the impact of changing intergovernmental relations on states and local school districts including the effects of mandates and school finance reform (2) the economic context from which reform has culminated (3) the introduction of structural reforms including decentralization initiatives, market and choice alternatives and many

other organizational changes (4) emerging public-private partnerships, particularly coalitions that are forming between business and schools and (5) the redesign of bureaucratic structures to a more adaptive, flexible organizational system that is more inclusive of outside stakeholders. This dissertation explores a subset of these issues through an examination of the principal educational reforms that were advanced in Detroit.

Most research on educational failure and reform has focused on "technical" educational solutions. Researchers and practitioners are only just beginning to fully recognize the interdependence of education with the business community, neighborhoods, social service organizations and various government agencies. Educational decision makers have not fully understood the political complexities of building alternative organizational structures capable of restructuring urban schools.

The main limitation of the abundant research on urban education policy reform is its exclusive focus on examining, testing and analyzing for direct effects on school improvement and student based outcomes. There have been few attempts to link education policy to broader theories of urban decision making. Little attention has focused on the important political *processes* and mechanisms by which coalitions are formed, new ideas placed on the agenda and new institutional structures built that may have long term consequences. To be sure, educational success will ultimately need to be assessed at the level of the student. However, if there is to be measurable impact at the classroom level, reformers will need to generate some minimum degree of political support which would permit their implementation.

This research directs attention to the political structures of urban education reform. There is much evidence to suggest that many urban districts have attempted to move away from centralized governance and the closed, insular school organization.² Decentralization represents one institutional response to current policy challenges (Bastian 1986; Clune and White 1988; Hess 1991; Pierce 1977; Reed 1992). There is growing consensus that effective reform must be structured so that decision making and hence responsibility for performance is closer to the school (Bastian et al. 1986; Comer 1980,1986; Henderson 1987). Shared governance is illustrated by the scholarship in public-private management, site-based management, empowerment, magnet academies, choice, advisory councils and other decentralization experiments. This research investigates reform activity in Detroit that has followed this pattern.

While some researchers no longer subscribe to the notion of an insulated system, others like John Chubb and Terry Moe (1990) insist that politics cannot bring about real change in governance structures. They argue direct democratic control over institutions is "inherently destructive of school autonomy, and inherently conducive to bureaucracy" and they contend that public schools are far too responsive to external political demands. (p. 47). Their argument dismisses district institutional reforms such as public-private partnerships, empowerment, school based decentralization, and compacts as insignificant.

² A number of big city districts across the country have moved into the forefront of educational reform (Cibulka et al. 1992; Clune and White 1988; Crowson and Boyd 1992; Dugan et al. 1988; Elmore 1990; Hess 1991). Examples are plentiful and include Baltimore's experiment with privatization, Milwaukee and New York City's experiments with interdistrict school choice and Chicago's radical experiment with parental empowerment. Besides Detroit, Washington D.C., Pittsburgh, Boston and Baltimore have redirected emphasis on education as a policy arena for the city's primary interests.

By the 1990s, many urban districts have adopted some form of shared governance whereby parents and community representatives participate in the decision making. Shared governance differs greatly from district to district. It may be an overstatement to suggest that an "adaptive realignment" is under way (Elmore 1990) but in the continuing battle between top-down and bottom-up there seems to be a new power and determination from the bottom. Clearly, the centralizing and bureaucratic tendencies have by no means lost full authority, but in some cities, new organizational rules are emerging and new institutional structures being created to handle participants who have not played a role in the past.

The city of Detroit which serves as the laboratory of this study has been especially noted for its closed insular school system. From 1974 to 1988 the district was run by one superintendent, Arthur Jefferson. Little board turnover existed during this period. Public-private coalitions were notably absent in the school district. A large volume of research on urban decision making in Detroit (see among others Darden et al. 1987; Hill 1983, 1986; Jones and Bachelor 1986; Rich 1989; Thomas 1990) focused on the corporate center regime of Mayor Coleman Young. Mayor Young forged strong relations with some of the economic elites in the city, primarily the old industrial leaders and directed his attention to some very costly, high scale developments. Unfortunately, projects such as the Renaissance Center, the Riverfront West project, Poletown, and the Chrysler Jefferson Avenue plant fell far short of revitalizing the city.

The Detroit Business community in the mid 1980s, created a Detroit Strategic Plan which targeted the district school system as part of a concerted long term strategy to

revitalize the city. Out of this grew a number of collaborative ventures with the Detroit School District. This was followed with an election of an aggressive reform minded school board in November 1988. This research investigates the reform efforts to restructure the Detroit Public School System.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Little research has been conducted at the school district level on the political processes which drive the formation of new alliances involving outside stakeholders. This study explores the relationship between the infusion of outside stakeholders and attempts at producing institutional change in educational policy. There are four principal research questions that structure this case study drawn from theoretical frameworks in Chapter 2, from previous research on urban decisionmaking, education policymaking and agenda formation and its consequences:

** Did the Detroit education reform flow from an expansion of the scope of conflict?*

** What have been the institutional consequences of expanding the scope of stakeholder involvement in advancing policy innovations in Detroit?*

** Has the agenda access and resultant attempts at policy innovation left an institutional legacy that may continue to have direct policy consequences?*

** Does incrementalism best describe the reform era in the urban education policy arena in Detroit?*

GENERAL CONTEXT OF URBAN EDUCATION REFORM

Although this study investigates the policy arena at the local level, the Detroit Compact (Chapter 4) and the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice initiatives (Chapter 5) that achieved agenda status in Detroit, cannot be fully understood in isolation from the broader contextual forces evident in the formation of urban coalitions and education reform all over the country. There are three principal elements to the context of public-private collaboration and urban education reform. The first is the organizational context from which urban school systems were designed. The second is the state and federal political context, in particular the escalation of mandates and the intergovernmentalizing of urban education. The third is the socio-economic context of recent structural changes in the economy. In this research, Detroit serves as an illustrative case, not because of its uniqueness but because of its similarity to other urban districts, many of which have also engaged in public-private collaborations and designed empowerment and choice programs in their districts. The case study findings (Chapters 3-6) should be understood within this general context.

I. Organizational Context: Bureaucratic Insularity and Urban School Governance in the 1990s

Until very recently the dearth of scholarship on educational coalitions attested to the relative isolation of urban school institutions. Quite simply, there weren't many outside interests that played a significant stakeholder role in the schools. During the 1960's concerns for equity, due process, and professional control distanced schools from the rest of the community. Educational policy became firmly under the control of the unions and a few professional, legislative and bureaucratic interests. Central office

bureaucracy emerged as the locus of power for developing rules to allocate resources and in the name of expertise, insulating curricular and institutional affairs from lay influence (Callahan 1962; Cuban 1990; Katz 1987; Tyack 1974; Zeigler and Jennings 1974). This rigidity grew out of the moralistic reformers and progressive movement of the 20th century. Moralistic reformers wanted to end political graft and corruption, and pushed for non-partisan civil service and greater professionalism in government (Knott and Miller 1987). Knott and Miller state, "the Progressives enshrined the notions of control and efficiency in addition to moral judgement about political machines, and as the means to that end, advanced the notion of a politically neutral bureaucracy, staffed by professional administrative experts (1990, 5). In education, Progressives sought legitimacy for their expertise and developed a culture and social efficiency that attempted to place school above 'politics' (Wong 1992).

School boards before the progressive era were highly politicized. For instance, in Philadelphia, there were 42 local school boards of 12 members each; in addition, each local school board sent a representative to a very large city-wide school board (Knott and Miller 1987, 29). The school districts generally coincided with the electoral districts of the political party, and the ward boss was most influential in the hiring of teachers, the purchasing of school texts and school supplies and infrastructure development followed the corrupt practices of the political machines. Progressives deliberately sought to separate politics from administration. The professional and not the elected office holder should decide how things are done. In attempts to depoliticize education, most local school systems were separated from local government. School governance shifted from

neighborhood based school wards to centralized city boards. Over time school organizations enjoyed increasing autonomy from external forces.

School systems structured themselves along the lines of the corporate model - their goal was efficiency (Callahan 1962; Tyack 1974; Tyack and Hansot 1982). The result according to Tyack, was "the growth of vast and layered bureaucracies of specialized offices,..Byzantine organization charts, and tens of thousands of incumbents protected by tenure" (Tyack 1974, 176). This hierarchial organizational development was consistent with Max Weber's conception of the comprehensive, classic formulation of the characteristics of bureaucracy. Weber's ideal administrative model - accountability, neutrality, specialization, simplicity, rules, professionalism, hierarchy, efficiency and expertise -underlies the rationalistic orientation of most urban school systems. Frederick Taylor's (1911) scientific management principles also had support from the Progressive reformers and the "efficiency craze" impacted education organizations (Knott and Miller 1987). The creation of specialized offices, standardization and simplification of procedures, centralization of administrative authority under a single executive was also hinted at by Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow.³ The principle of hierarchy was key, with those below subject to the authority of those above, as necessary to maintain the accountability of the public organization.

David Tyack (1974) describes the evolution of "the one best system" that extended from the progressive movement to envelope education. He contends the organizational

³ Frank Goodnow, often called the "Father of Public Administration," wrote a major book expanding on Wilson's insistence of the importance of the goal of efficiency. Once the technical nature of administration was admitted and recognized, then someone could develop "scientific" principles of efficient administration (Knott and Miller 1987).

revolution that took place in American schooling during the last century closely parallels the transformation of the United States into an urban-industrial nation. Movement from the village school to the urban school accompanied revolutions in technology and the restructuring of economic and political institutions into large bureaucracies. In the governance of education, lay community control gave way to the corporate-bureaucratic model under the guise of "taking the school out of politics" (Tyack 1974). Part of urban "progressivism", this education movement glorified expertise, efficiency and the disinterested public service of elites. Educational administration became a recognized area of study at universities between 1910 and 1920 (Knott and Miller 1987, 61).

Convinced that there was one best system of education for urban populations, leading educators sought to discover it and implement it. Meranto (1975, 5) noted that "educators have been notably successful in developing and selling to others a set of ideological doctrines which have given them considerable autonomy of operation and insulation from public inspection." The quest for autonomy is strengthened when the school system is separate from local government as it is in Detroit. Such separation makes it easier for school professionals to maintain that they alone "are qualified to determine how much money is needed and how it should be allocated" (Meranto 1970, 5).

In many ways, demographic, racial and class changes also isolated the big-city schools from the broader community. By the early 1970s, the disjuncture between school and workplace became especially acute. Many scholars (Darden et al. 1989; Wilson 1987) vividly illustrated how the structural inequities in the changing economy, the racial

and socioeconomic segregation, and the mismatch in jobs skills and employment needs posed critical problems for urban youth. Large urban school systems were heavily impacted by these larger demographic trends and faced declining tax bases, stagnant economies and a high percentage of at-risk students. Despite higher tax efforts, most of our nation's urban schools remain highly segregated, and have lower expenditures per pupil and larger class sizes.

Much of the scholarly attention over recent policy reform has been focused on the nature of the large and centralized urban bureaucracy. For a long time the 'bureaucratic insulation' model prevailed (Callahan 1962; Eliot 1959; P.E. Peterson, 1976; Rogers 1968; Weick 1976). It depicts school systems as complex bureaucratic structures where organization insiders enjoy substantial autonomy from outside influence because the former possess the expertise and the information on how the system operates. Standard operating procedures dominate, school professionals determine the use of resources, exercise control over curricular and instructional material, and design the administrative organization leaving no place for those outside the embedded organizational milieu.

Many scholars by the late 1960s, became especially agitated that during a time of heightened interest in citizen participation, large urban school systems remained essentially closed to lay influence. This isolated system seemed alien to democratic practices. Zeigler and Jennings found in a nationally representative sample of 186 boards, that school districts were not responsive to the communities in which they operated (1974). Zeigler and Jennings described a lack of board turnover and a serious gap between the public beliefs of democratic control and the reality of school decision

making.

Over the last decade, scholarly activity has focused on the dysfunctions of the urban school system bureaucracy emphasizing how overregulation has led to goal displacement and other inefficiencies associated with large organizations. Sarason (1990) has characterized city school systems as too large, bureaucratic and unable to engage in change from within. This closed system model assumed management had the knowledge of what to produce and how to produce it, carried out through a rigid hierarchical system. The professional community's claim to autonomy has seriously eroded. School bureaucracy no longer has the guise of efficiency. Paul Hill states, "the accretion of rules has created schools that no one would have consciously designed and that do not work (1992, 138). The discrediting of the ideology of the primacy of professionalism paved the way for reform mobilization (McDonnell 1991).⁴ Tighter resources have also exposed limits to the political insulation of schools and highlighted connections between public schools and their broader environment (Bidwell 1991; Wong 1991).

Prior to the mid-1980s, experiments with community control and decentralization were exceedingly limited. In spite of academic concerns over the bureaucratic paradigm, it faced few serious challenges until recently with the movement towards site-based decision making. Examples include the partial political decentralization in Detroit and New York in the 1970s. The creation of local school councils at each Chicago public

⁴ This mimics recent changes in the private industry. In order to remain competitive, many industries have undergone significant restructuring. Frequent changes in technology and changing market demands and global competition have led to more decentralized management strategies in the private sector (Ozaki 1991; Block 1990; Lash and Urry 1987; Piore and Sabel 1984; Peters and Waterman 1982).

school in 1989 went much farther towards decentralization than any of the previous attempts (Hess 1991).

Organizational resistance to change remains strong. Perhaps the foremost preservers of the old centralized, insular system are the unions, particularly the National Education Association. Grimshaw (1979) claims the transitions from machine to reform governments after the turn of the century, effectively transferred political and citizen influence into managerial control. He claims union rule separated the governance of education from both management and citizenry and delivered it into the hands of union leadership, elected solely by the union's membership and accountable only to the membership. By the mid-1980s, however, it seemed clear because of forces previously mentioned, that politics and management of large urban districts were a far cry from the condition of union domination forecast by Grimshaw. Today, the insular bureaucratic system has increasingly come under attack. Tyack (1974) argues,

Increasing bureaucratizing of urban schools has often resulted in a displacement of goals and has often perpetuated positions and outworn practices rather than serving the clients, the children to be taught.

Recent efforts to come to grips with the rise of modern organizations have led to the development of new organizational theories within the field of public administration. For instance, the Human Relations Approach beginning with Mayo's "Hawthorne Experiment" was one of the first to recognize the social/psychological dimensions to productivity and that a high degree of specialization is not necessarily the most efficient. Interestingly enough, support for the Weber and Taylor conceptions began to break down as early as 1940 but the rationalistically oriented school bureaucracy remains the

dominant urban organizational model some five decades later, attesting to the difficulty of attempts at restructuring.

Our understanding of the politics of urban education has very slowly begun to shift from the bureaucratic insularity model to the perspective that external political and economic forces can substantially shape school policy (Katz 1987; Callahan 1962; P.E. Peterson 1976; Weick 1976). Many analysts are finding external forces important in shaping school finance, leadership succession, racial desegregation and issues related to the education of the disadvantaged. School politics in other words may go beyond the autonomous control by school professionals and insiders within the administrative organization (Mitchell 1988; Burlingame 1988; P.E. Peterson 1976).

II. Political Context: Mandates and the Intergovernmentalizing of Urban Education

Urban education has been subjected to intense pressures over the last decade for both centralization and decentralization. A lot of attention has been placed on the importance of local autonomy in the research literature (Bastian et al. 1986; Clune and White 1988; Comer 1980, 1986; Hess 1991; Henderson 1987; Reed 1992). Therefore, understanding the impacts of changes in federal and state policy serves as a framework to view recent developments. Urban school districts struggle with top-down mandates from the state and federal government and community pressures for greater inclusion and responsiveness. State and federal mandates ultimately affect local school control and the bureaucratic insular notion. More than one entity is vying for increased authority over the schools. Thus, mandates that one level of government imposes on another, are not

just a federal-state issue, they also affect state-local relations (Fix and Kenyon 1990). Mandates may skew local policy agendas and reflect the interests and priorities of national constituencies rather than local interests (Neiman and Lovell 1981, 1982).

Top-down efforts at policy control affect the distribution of intergovernmental responsibilities and resources. Clearly, the pattern over the last decades has been declining federal aid but growing federal regulation (Conlan 1988; Fix and Kenyon 1990; Zimmerman 1992). Mandates from above are an autonomy issue and get to the heart of the controversy over who should have the legal right to make decisions in educational policy. There is often a perverse way in which mandated costs are distributed, with poor jurisdictions bearing the largest proportional burdens (Fix and Kenyon 1990; Jelier and Weissert 1993). As city districts become increasingly fiscally dependent on federal and especially state sources, power to intervene in district policies may continue to shift tangibly from the local school board to higher levels of government. State and federal mandates subjugate local school districts to higher levels of government and in many ways restrict the possible range of activities and control over resources that local districts may engage. This subverts local autonomy which is being touted as necessary and prudent (Chubb and Moe 1990, 1992; Cibulka et al. 1992; Kirp and Jensen 1985; Tyack 1974).

Recent attention directed at decentralized governance structures has called into question the pervasive attempts of top-down political control that continues to be exercised by state and federal governments. State officials have become more aggressive in demanding more accountability of schools. The primary vehicle has been legislative

mandates. Local districts have expressed concerns that the federal government is relying increasingly on regulatory powers to impose its priorities on programs that receive no federal funding. The same practice has trickled down to the state. Not only is the cost and obtrusiveness of mandates a problem, as they are often unfunded, but the conditions attached greatly constrict states and local districts in administering regulatory programs. It has also contributed to the legalization of school decision making and "regulatory unreasonableness" (Bardach and Kagen 1982) paralyzing decision processes within schools. Local governments end up being responsible for the costly implementation of another government's regulatory priorities.

Mandates have also served a positive purpose. They have insured service to special populations, with special education needs that in the past were ignored. They have provided additional compensatory funds and services to disadvantaged children. They have provided greater equity between males and females in athletic and other programs. They have ensured greater equity and uniformity between the rich and poor states. They have provided additional access and opportunities to handicappers and minorities that would not have been possible with state and federal intervention. These and other positive attributes notwithstanding, recent studies have criticized the intergovernmental administrative structure of federal categorical programs and the failure to achieve many national objectives (Jelier and Weissert 1993; Kirp and Jensen 1985; Murphy 1971; Peterson et al. 1986; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Revenues for many special programs have primarily come from the U.S. Congress. The federal government imposes numerous and elaborate standards on local schools. The rationale is to make sure

certain targeted students directly benefit from the federal dollars. The outcome is the lack of autonomy by local districts to tailor the use of dollars to most effectively meet local needs. Studies have consistently shown the need for local flexibility for implementation effectiveness. This is a monumental issue for urban districts with enormously high concentrations of special needs populations.

For large urban districts which traditionally have received a larger share of federal and state revenues, the regulatory burden imposed from above, as well as the terms of the intergovernmental partnership, differ greatly from smaller and wealthier suburban jurisdictions. It helps reinforce bureaucratic insularity and can frustrate local attempts at school reform.

During the decade of the 1980s, the balance among state, local and federal percentages of education funding shifted, on average, away from the dominance of local taxes to a stronger reliance on state revenue sources (Cibulka et al. 1992). State activity, particularly the growing number of mandates and reform attempts in school finance, has widespread implications for local districts. Michigan for instance, has rapidly moved from a locally financed educational system based on property taxation to a state-financed system through a two cent increase in the sales tax and other state revenue measures. What is not yet well understood are the full long-term political implications of a shift to increased state financing of schools. While the beneficiaries of a locally financed school system were property-rich districts, the beneficiaries of a state-financed school system are, hypothetically, districts that have access to policymakers in the state capital and can influence state budget decisions. In addition, by moving the funding and other

decisionmaking to the state level, citizens and legislatures have put education in direct competition with funding for highways, environment, welfare, public health and a myriad of other state functioning responsibilities (Weissert 1994). Restricting the use of property tax as a revenue source shifts more authority to the state legislature and away from local districts. Before Proposition 13 drastically cut the property tax in California and caused the state to pick up a larger share of education funding, the state had been in the top five in the country in per pupil expenditures. Now it is in the bottom five (Feldman 1994). Coincidentally, in 1980 the state had only 19 state-funded education programs. By 1990-91, there were over 70 (Cibulka et al. 1992). Funding will remain a high stakes power struggle for competing special interests for years to come.

In contrast to the increased centralization of funding, federal and some state governments have also in recent years begun to respond to local pressures for decentralization by requiring citizen advisory councils at program sites in special programs such as compensatory education, special education, vocational education and bilingual education as well as performance reporting on a school-by-school basis. Bidwell (1992, 1996) notes the simultaneous centralization and decentralization of power to effect school district policies. Ultimately, local district reform initiatives must be understood within the context of these larger state and federal forces.

III. Socio-Economic Context: Structural Changes in the Economy

The last fifteen years have been a period of extraordinary economic restructuring. This restructuring refers to the transformation of the economic bases of cities in the advanced capitalist world from manufacturing to services, the rapid growth of producer services sector, the concentration of economic control within multinational firms and financial institutions and decentralization of manufacturing activities (see, among others, Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1980; Kasarda 1988). White-collar workers replaced blue collar workers, office towers sprung up where factories once stood. The transformation involved a shift from the production of goods to the use and manipulation of knowledge-information, finance, management, services (Fainstein et al. 1986; Knight 1986; Smith and Feagin 1987; Timberlake 1985).

With the emergence of the global marketplace, international competitiveness has been elevated to vital national importance. Competition from abroad has prompted American companies to increase their overseas investment in new factories, equipment and research and development at higher rates than in the U.S. (Reich 1992). Productivity in the global environment relies on quality, flexibility, precision and specialization. According to Reich (1992), the economic challenge facing the U.S. is to increase the value of what its citizens can add to the global economy by enhancing their skills and capacities.

Paul Peterson stresses that in contrast to the national government, cities are unable to control the movement of capital and labor across their borders. City governments lack authority to regulate immigration, currency, prices and wages, or the import and export

of goods and services. They are forced to compete for capital investment or suffer economic decline (1981). Because of global restructuring, the issue of how to promote economic development has taken on particular urgency in cities, particularly, for those local economies based on heavy manufacturing. Cities have been forced to adopt aggressive development policies.

By the 1970s, intense international and interstate economic competition drove states and localities to pursue high growth and high technology strategies. Aggressive business initiatives focused on the city, initially concentrating on bricks and mortar issues and central business district revival (downtown development). Often the result of these economic development collaborations was a "double donut" effect, with a small ring of renewal surrounded by deteriorating conditions in the areas enveloped by the renewal (Hula 1990).

Many scholars documented how downtown renewal efforts had little, if any, impact on the most disadvantaged populations. This realization led some political actors towards expanded conceptions of local economic development strategies with more attention to investment in human infrastructure and longer time horizons. The widely read study, *A Nation At Risk* (1983), also directed emphasis to the economic and competitive aspects of educational performance.

The waste of human capital for the nation's business-industrial-political complex has crystallized in renewed efforts at collaborations with schools. The costs of educational failure among central city youth have become enormous. Dropping out from school, costs the citizens of this country an estimated \$228 billion per year in lost tax

revenues, welfare and crime prevention (Harris 1990). Three-quarters of our prison population never completed high school (*Investing in Our Children: Business and the Public Schools* 1985). Every 1,000 unemployed dropouts is figured to cost a city at least \$12 million a year (Mann 1987).

The push for systemic reform is rooted in these concerns about a changing economy. Impetus for reform comes not only from business but also foundations, community groups, and non-profit agencies. In the current information economy, the level of educational attainment shapes future opportunities. The markedly inferior education in urban areas leads to intermittent or long term unemployment. Inner city communities that are overly populated by minorities that are overwhelmingly poor depend on urban schools to provide access to improved economic opportunities. Many of these schools are perceived to be failing in that mission with poor attendance patterns, high dropout rates and low scores on standardized achievement tests.

Demographic trends have greatly affected the composition of urban school children. Between 1910 and 1970 more than 6.5 million African Americans, mostly displaced agrarian workers, migrated to northern urban areas, largely in industrial cities where black communities had already been established- primarily New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland and Pittsburgh. In 1990, 40 percent of all African Americans in the U.S. were concentrated in eleven central cities (Action Council on Minority Education 1990). A similar pattern exists for Mexican Americans. By 1980, more than 50% of all Mexican Americans live in the five largest metropolitan areas (P. Hill 1990, 399). As the concentration of African Americans and Latinos in urban areas

increased, the white populations rapidly decreased. From 1970 to 1980 while overall central city population remained stable, the white segment of that population fell by six million (Wilson 1987).

Racial and socioeconomic segregation between central cities and suburbs is a central feature of U.S. metropolitan development.⁵ Furthermore, the exodus of middle-class families and businesses out of those communities reduced the political influence of urban districts in the federal and state legislatures. Our cities became less white and less affluent. The urban schools' concentration of racial and ethnic minorities from low-income families greatly increased. It is not surprising that the educational crises looms largest in most of these older, former industrial cities.

The negative consequences of demographic and economic change has brought education as a policy arena, to the forefront. By the year 2000, minorities will constitute over one-third of the American population, with a predominant concentration in our cities. Employers and the American economy will need to rely more heavily on a racially and ethnically diverse workforce. These students have not been well prepared to enter such a world.

By 1985 business increasingly was becoming more involved in the formation of educational processes (Aldcroft 1992; Dugan et al. 1988; *Exploring Common Ground* 1987; Hirsch 1992; *Investing in Our Children: Business and the Public Schools* 1985;

⁵ The U.S. Supreme Court in its 1971 decision over *Bradley v. Milliken*, scuttled metropolitan wide remedies to desegregation. In most cities the affect was further white flight out of the central city as local systems were still under court order to desegregate with the school district boundaries.

Levin and Trachtman 1988; Timpane and McNeill 1991; Warwick 1989). Business concerns about labor shortages and a decline in the general quality of the American workforce are often cited as principal factors causing the renewed attention to the performance of urban schools, but other considerations loom large as well. The benefits to corporations may include an improved public image, fewer problems with equal employment opportunities, an enhanced consumer base, improved morale in the workplace and a broader base of community stability and support. Business has shown it can also play a strong advocacy role such as taking out advertisements for bond issues, supporting the school budget before the city council and lobbying the state legislature.

Today, there is increasing recognition that American competitiveness as a producer in a global marketplace is dependent on our ability to produce a skilled, flexible workforce. There is a growing national consensus for the need to devote more time and effort to developing human capital resources. In state after state, a "new politics of education" has materialized. Task forces and commissions, established across the country, are not only emphasizing involvement of business but also drawing local government, civic and community groups and colleges and universities into the process, often at invitation (Timpane and McNeill 1991). A noticeable concentration of public/private collaborations in education is forming in areas of urban poverty. The range of activities greatly varies.

Recent events in Chicago demonstrate how new coalitions organized around educational change are indeed capable of altering existing power arrangements. In 1989, the Illinois state legislature's Chicago School Reform Act struck down the traditional

hierarchical school administration in favor of a radically more decentralized system. Under this act, local school councils were established, consisting of parents, community members, teachers and the principal for every one of Chicago's 540 schools (Hess 1991). Like most radical changes, Chicago's school reform was imposed from the outside. It was a coercive imposition of new organizational structures growing out of widespread dissatisfaction with Chicago's schools and the city's label as "the worst schools in the nation" given by former U.S. Secretary of Education William Bennett. The recent transformations in the economy have been paramount in crystallizing renewed attention towards educational policy.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RESEARCH

Political pressures for education reform have been running high across the nation. A widely held sentiment that schools are no longer in accord with their economic and political environments is likely to keep the pressures steaming for organizational change in urban school processes. However, specific reform efforts often quickly gather support, and then almost as quickly dissipate. This study will facilitate a broader understanding of the political and organizational struggles involved in attempts at changing existing institutional arrangements. It will also explore the institutional consequences of recent public-private collaborative attempts at inducing policy reform and investigate the nature of that change.

This research raises critical questions surrounding the recent surge of policy reform around ailing urban public schools. It seeks to describe the phenomenon and

define its scope (Putt and Springer 1989). The flurry of activity suggests more than political symbolism. Special attention is given to the effect of the breadth of stakeholder support in the larger community and the existence of institutional legacies in the wake of reform attempts. This research is based in theories on regime formation and agenda setting and should provide a basis of comparison and generalization from cities sharing similar characteristics.

At a time of such policy flux and change, the current lack of systematic, local school district based analysis of new coalitions (regimes), new policy initiatives and new institutional structures has worrisome implications. As perhaps never before, pressure groups, political parties and scholars are deeply divided in their explicated policies and prescriptions for educational reform. Further analysis about what kinds of stakeholders are actively involved, the nature and intensity of that involvement, the means by which they enter the agenda setting process and the kinds of systemic and institutional changes that they are capable of producing in organizational structures will be useful in better understanding the future role of public-private collaborations in the reform process and the degree to which education can become a key component in a city's quest for economic development.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter 2 provides the major theoretical underpinnings of the research investigation. It explores theories of urban decisionmaking and summarizes recent urban regime scholarship. It examines how recent economic transformations may have led to

embryonic regime formation around education policy. It questions whether expanding the scope of conflict may help achieve agenda status and advance policy reform. It investigates theories of policy change, especially whether policy lurch or incrementalism best describes decisionmaking in the educational arena. It explores the potential institutional legacy of even short-term periods of agenda access. Finally, Chapter 2 concludes with an explanation of research design and a discussion of case selection.

Chapter 3 investigates the stable and separate political regimes that formed in Detroit City government and the Detroit Public Schools. It explains why they were unable to either resurrect the city or meet the problems faced in the schools. It investigates a leadership vacuum in the 1980s which destabilized the earlier regimes. Problem perceptions of Detroit respondents are briefly examined. Finally, it examines a number of key events, paramount to the advancement of reform and emergent regime transformation in Detroit around education issues. Having established previous patterns of urban decisionmaking in Detroit paves the way for systemic examination of education reform efforts (Chapters 4 and 5) and an investigation of possible regime transformation.

Chapter 4 is devoted to rigorous institutional analysis of one of the key reform vehicles in the city's education processes, a public-private partnership, the Detroit Compact. The Detroit Compact with 12 stakeholders at the district level and within each participating school that has signed on to the Compact, is perhaps the best example and a cornerstone of public-private collaboration and urban school reform in Detroit. The formation of this key district reform initiative will be interpreted in terms of agenda setting theory of conflict expansion. Regime stakeholder participation will be analyzed

for each of the primary stakeholders including business, DPS administration, DPS Board of Education, community groups, higher education, Detroit City government, State government, the DFT, OSAS, organized labor, City-Wide School Community Organizations, and City-Wide Student Councils. Was expanding the scope of conflict through broad stakeholder participation in the Compact instrumental in achieving agenda status and in advancing programmatic reform? The institutional consequences of the Detroit Compact will be evaluated. Given the defeat of the HOPE coalition and Superintendent McGriff who were instrumental in the implementation of the Detroit Compact, the institutional legacy of the initiative will be examined. The nature of policy change in advancing this key district reform initiative will also be explored.

Chapter 5 is devoted to an institutional analysis to the other major policy initiatives to be advanced during the HOPE time frame of this study, 1988-1994. These reforms are classified under the rubric of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice. The participation or lack of participation of stakeholders in achieving agenda status will be analyzed and the institutional consequences examined. Given the ultimate political defeat of the architects of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice, the institutional legacy will be evaluated. The Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda provides a good case to examine the nature of policy change during this turbulent reform era.

Chapter 6 compares the reform models advanced in the DPS. It compares the collective solution set evident in the Detroit Compact with the competitive solution set evident in the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice reforms. The creation of Comer School Development Program suggests the policy impacts of the Detroit Compact and

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agendas.

Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the limitations inherent in the embryonic regime transformation around human capital in Detroit, the inferences from the research findings and contributions of the present study and the implications for future research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 provides the underpinnings of the case study research investigation that will follow drawn from theoretical frameworks in the fields of urban politics, education policy and public administration. If the research inquiry is a relatively new phenomenon or an unexplored area, an intensive case study is often the most appropriate choice of research design. Case study research allows the examination of both a complex phenomenon, and the contextual conditions surrounding it (Yin 1993).¹ The importance of linkage between cities and their environment has been recognized as critical to the understanding of the urban phenomena at the end of the 20th century (Henderson and Castells 1987; King 1990; Smith and Feagin 1987). The case study research method is appropriate when investigators desire to (a) define topics broadly and not narrowly (b) cover contextual conditions and not just the phenomenon of study (c) address a situation in which the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and (d) rely on multiple and not singular source of evidence (Yin 1989, 1993). The theoretical frameworks include research on urban decision making, education policy making and agenda formation and its consequences. These frameworks should be understood within the general context of urban education reform already discussed-- the organizational

¹ Robert K. Yin's (1993) *Case Study Research* provided a useful guidebook in the justification and execution of case study research.

context of bureaucratic insularity; the political context of the escalation of mandates and other attempts at intergovernmentalizing urban education; and the economic context of the recent rather dramatic changes in the economy.

Institutional and political arrangements in urban education are in a state of flux. The great institutional diversity that is emerging in large cities today is a far cry from the centralized paradigm that has grown since the progressive era. This case study evaluates the growing significance of education policy as an important issue arena in urban politics. It analyzes the capacity of public-private coalitions to marshal significant outside stakeholder resources to penetrate the insular urban school bureaucracy, generate organizational change, and advance policy reform. After articulating the theoretical frameworks that provide the basis for this study and how previous scholarship relates to the research problem and the formation of appropriate research questions, the research design will be explicated and the case selection will be justified.

URBAN DECISION MAKING AND REGIME THEORY

In recent years, Clarence Stone (1989) in his study of Atlanta, popularized the notion of an urban "regime". The study of urban "regimes" as a way to understand urban decisionmaking, however, goes back to at least 1953 and Floyd Hunter's classic study, *Community Power Structure*. Up until that time, traditional political scientists associated urban policy with formal urban political structures. Hunter argued that policy formation in cities often takes place outside of formal institutions. He described a power structure (regime) as a coordinated system, public and private, formal and informal, of learned and

repeated power roles and relationships, the functions of which is the maintenance of a prescribed, differentiated social order (1953, 1980). In his study of Regional City (Atlanta) he found key decisions were made by a few "powerful leaders" at the apex of stable, hierarchial power structures. Hunter's findings supported the elitist view of decisionmaking espoused by C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite* (1956) among others. Hunter's postulates on power structures generated much scholarship. Urban decision making came to be viewed as far more complicated than in past conceptions, involving economic factors, exogenous influences, ethnicity and other considerations.

Pluralist Conceptions of Urban Decisionmaking

A large body of urban case study scholarship emerged in the 1960s which espoused a pluralist view of the world and challenged the elitist framework of decisionmaking. Robert Dahl in his classic urban politics study of New Haven, raised the question who governs. He was interested in change and stability (1961). Dahl's research challenged the elitist arguments of Hunter, claiming that influence and power structures can only be understood in context of particular decisions or areas of influence. He studied a number of issue areas including education, redevelopment and nominations. His findings suggested a single elite does not exist *across* issues areas. He claimed that economic notables are only one among many groups which individually emerge to exert influence. He also asserted in many areas of public policy, economic notables have hardly any direct influence at all. The mayor of New Haven was the only participant who was influential in most of the issue areas studied, but his degree of influence varied from

area to area. As Dahl put it,

The Mayor was not at the peak of a pyramid but at the center of intersecting circles. He rarely commanded. He negotiated, cajoled, exhorted, beguiled, charmed, pressed, appealed, reasoned, promised, insisted, demanded, even threatened, but he most needed support and acquiescence from other leaders who simply could not be commanded (1961, 204).

Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman supported these pluralist tenets in their study of governance in NYC. They contended power is not centered anywhere. There are several functionally specialized decision centers with corresponding "core groups" and "satellite groups." Functional specialization of officials and government activities has subordinated "widely shared community values to the special interests of the separate and numerous 'islands of power' within it (1960, 719).

No single elite dominates the political and governmental system of New York City...Most individual decisions are shaped by a small percentage of the city's population-indeed, by a small percentage of those who are actively in politics...the city government is most accurately visualized as a series of semi-autonomous little worlds each of which brings forth programs and policies through the interactions of its own inhabitants...New York's huge and diverse system of government and politics is a loose-knit and multicentered network in which decisions are reached by ceaseless bargaining and fluctuating alliances among the major categories of participants in each center, and in which the centers are partially but strikingly isolated from one another(1960, 709-16).

Edward Banfield's study of decisionmaking in Chicago, also supported the pluralist view. He found Mayor Daley was able to maintain control in the city only by carefully brokering the demands of various interest groups (1961).

Chicago is too big a city, and the interests in it far too diverse, to allow for quick and easy agreement on anything.....According to the Chicago view, a policy ought to be framed by the interests affected...The political head should see that all principally affected interests are represented, that residual interests (i.e., 'the general public' are not entirely disregarded, and

that no interests suffers unduly in the outcome (1916, 270-71).

Norton Long, drawing on his experience from his studies of Boston and Cleveland also rejected a power elite. He argued conflict across policy areas does not resemble "upper class rules" (1958). His conceptualization of decision making as "an ecology of games". Within each issue area there are particular rules and goals but a lack of overall institutions in the territorial system (1958). Nelson Polsby, in a return to New Haven, supported the pluralist assumptions and argued there are multiple issue areas, which can be fleeting or consistent and provoke coalitions. He contended there is wide sharing of leaders, specialization to issue areas, uncertainty about payoffs and constraints in decisionmaking (Polsby 1965).

Aaron Wildavsky studied issues of conflict and leadership in a case study of Oberlin from 1957-1961, and found functional specialization across issue areas. He concluded that American cities are pluralist. Because activity is costly, no one group is powerful in most of the significant areas of community life. Most decisions are made by a relatively few people who specialize in just one or a few issue areas (1964).

Theodore Lowi, in conducting an intensive case study of urban decisionmaking, asserted urban decisionmaking can be described by three eras (1964). The first was dominated by a single power structure, elites of status and mercantile wealth which lasted until at least the Civil War. This gave way to the second era, the period of party control and the political machines. From his investigation of community power relationships in New York City, he argues during the third era, flimsy party control gave way towards specialized interest group control by policy area of interest. Lowi asserted that after

World War I, the political parties were left to bargain with resources that were no longer essential (1964). During this era of changing relationships between party and government, the meaning of modern urban politics changed. Thus, his work further reinforced the views of the pluralist school.

The City as a Growth Machine: Challenges to the Pluralist Conceptions of Urban Decisionmaking

Two decades of urban scholarship investigating redevelopment schemes has led to direct challenges to the pluralist conceptions of urban decisionmaking. These economic development schemes over the last two decades attracted support from a broad coalition within our large cities (Judd 1984). It included city politicians working with a "new breed" of bureaucrats, corporations and central business district real estate and merchant interests. By the 1970s, this governing coalition stabilized to such an extent that it was virtually the only unified political interest that spoke for the central cities (Judd 1984, 375). Scarcely a large city in the United States lacked such a centralized coalition.² The pro-growth coalitions engineered a massive allocation of private and social resources for cities, sometimes with dramatic results.

Paul Peterson's enormously influential book, *City Limits*, reinterpreted and synthesized the findings of pluralists. In his formulation, a particular economic situation

² Examples are numerous and include: Pittsburgh's Allegheny Conference on Community Development; Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley's Chicago's Loop and Lakefront development coalition; Boston's New Boston Committee promoting the Prudential Center project, the urban renewal of Boston's North End, and the building of a large governmental center; San Francisco's redevelopment coalition dramatically altered the skyline. Similar coalitions are evident in Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, St. Louis (Mollenkopf 1978; Kerstein 1975; Jones and Bachelor 1986; Judd 1984).

structures public policies in cities. He argues, development politics have a consensual quality- "support for development policy is broad and continuous" (1981, 132). The political task, then, is putting together a coalition of dependable supporters and managing conflict by compensating or isolating losers.

Peterson argued that cities like private firms must compete with one another to maximize their economic position. To achieve this objective, the city must use its resources to attract as much capital and as high a quality labor force as is possible, often by offering private inducements (1981). Peterson asserts all factions within cities share a "unitary" interest in promoting their community's economic growth because all cities compete for jobs and investments. Because a community's success in this competition defines its well being, growth is the first imperative of local politics. Peterson's work was the most wide ranging advancing a general theory of how city politics works and its limitations for pursuing various kinds of goals.

Other investigations provide support to Peterson's theory. Edward Hayes' study of power structures in Oakland argues that the city's focus on development allowed medium and large businessmen to reap the major and continuing benefits of local public policies. As he put it

To call this a government of all the people would be fiction. It would be more descriptive to speak of the city's political system as operating in the context of an economic system which has preponderant influence over public policies and which allows scope only to those public solutions which do not encroach on the interests of the economy (1972, 199).

More recently, Logan and Molotch (1987) assert a city's primary interests are coopted into a vision of the "city as a growth machine". They articulate how and why similar

growth coalitions are built and political structures mobilized to intensify land uses in city after city. Ultimately, they argue those left outside of the growth coalition are powerless to affect the agenda and influence the locus of decisionmaking.

Unquestionably, promoting the economic well being of a community has taken on a sense of urgency since the 1960s. Many local economies, particularly those based on heavy manufacturing were adversely affected by global economic restructuring. Detroit was not alone in its outpouring of capital from the central city and its attempts to revitalize its urban core through downtown development schemes. City after city adopted aggressive policies to attract outside investment and to provide an environment for service-sector growth. More recent scholarship, however, has presented challenges to Peterson's model of economic determinism, restating the importance of local politics.

Urban Regime Scholarship

Critics challenged elements of Peterson's theory, believing that he has oversimplified the nature of city politics. Peterson's argument ignores the costs invoked on certain actors. Clarence Stone and Heywood Sanders reject Peterson's assumptions that the city is a utility maximizing unit. Instead, they suggest a political paradigm with the following main assumptions:

1. Significant conflict surrounds development policy.
2. The city acts less as a utility-maximizing unit than as an aggregation of particular interests that must be held together by a combination of shared and overlapping purposes and strategic "side-payments." Political efforts in the form of coalition-building and conflict management are thus essential.
3. Concerned about protecting and using these political arrangements, key actors make substantive policy decisions in line with the interests of

coalition members and with the maintenance needs of the coalition itself.
4. Policy responses to the economic position of the city are thus mediated through the politics of the city (1987, 168-69).

In essence, they assert politics really matters and city decisionmaking is not simply subordinate to a particular economic situation.

Increasingly, urban scholars who study decision making in the city, have adopted an urban regime perspective. Over the last decade quality urban scholarship has focused on urban regimes that have formed around economic development issues (Elkin 1985, 1987; Fainstein et al. 1986; Jones and Bachelor 1986, 1992; Judd 1984; Logan and Molotch 1987; Ross et. al 1991; Sanders and Stone 1987; Stone 1989; Swanstrom 1989). At issue is whether policy decisions in cities are wholly constrained by economic forces beyond their control and whether local politics matters very much in urban decisionmaking. Governments possess significant resources, but in the U.S. rarely have the capacity to implement significant policies on their own without the cooperation or active assistance of private institutions and other actors (Judd and Kantor 1992).

Political scientists who study urban decisionmaking in recent years have shifted the focus to the ruling coalitions or "regimes" that govern cities. This concept points to the different types of relatively durable alliances that can emerge among electoral coalitions, business interests, professional bureaucracies and others. Regime studies have been deeply rooted in the basic assumption that defines the political economy approach - the notion that power in cities can be understood by observing the interaction between private and public institutions and actors (Judd and Kantor 1992). Scholars have come to realize, urban politics, is not the exclusive province of governmental institutions.

In recent years the literature on "urban regimes" has burgeoned. Elkin (1987), Judd and Kantor (1993), Ross et. al (1991), Stone (1989) and others argue that politics looks similar in city after city-- with issues of land use and development transcendent in the early 1980s. Yet the economic pressures on local governments to accommodate interests in promoting economic growth differ across time and from place to place. The political composition of central city regimes thus varies widely. Regimes are more inclusionary in some cities, meaning that many groups and political interests are allowed to participate actively in making policy. They may be remarkably closed in other cities. Historically, central city regimes have also differed systematically by region (Judd and Kantor 1993).

Steven Elkin investigated the regime concept in a case study of Dallas whereby major business interests organized themselves and the city's politics to promote their collective interests in economic growth. Over time, minority and neighborhood groups mobilized and altered the development politics, and reconstituted the urban regime. Steven Elkin maintains that since the 1970s, business coalitions became ascendant in defining municipal priorities; consequently Dallas focused on policies to promote economic growth. The important, but informal, links between governmental and economic sectors became especially important in the post World War II period, according to Elkin, when many cities embarked on policy activism. Recent cuts in federal social programs compounded by cities cutting expenditures for public health, city services and basic infrastructure have led government to foster more coalitions with other community stakeholders.

Clarence Stone illustrated how governance in Atlanta can usefully be understood by the concept of an urban regime. He demonstrated that in order to evaluate the institutional capacity of city government in Atlanta, it became necessary to enlarge the governing regime to include the broader participation from other stakeholders within the community. Research proceeds by analyzing the conjunction of factors not by isolating single variables. Regime is described as the actions of various elements of the community in bringing together, challenging and modifying the informal and even formal arrangements through which a community is governed (Stone 1989). The pervasiveness of conflict, according to Stone and Sanders (1987) underlies coalition building and conflict-management strategies that are so central in city politics.

The concept of instrumental power highlights how and why public officials are attracted to a partnership with business, and by extension why other groups might also seek political partnership. Electoral coalitions are seldom sufficient to govern. Urban regime theory posits that a coalition of public-private interests will seek to shape the agenda of public policy and as a consequence influence the development of a city. A variety of policy action can be initiated by urban regimes (Stone 1987; Stone et al. 1991). This research investigation will examine embryonic regime formation within the urban education arena in Detroit.

Regime theory asserts that politics matters, that there are important parameters through which local elites can affect development. Cities are not simply victims of economic forces (see also Judd and Parkinson 1990; Logan and Swanstrom 1990). Regime politics contends that local governments make genuine choices within structural

boundaries, that urban politics still matters.³ Structural constraints are real, but they are mediated through the political arrangements that enable a prevailing coalition to govern a community (Stone and Sanders 1987). What makes a local community governable? It is not just the formal machinery of government; American urban governments are noted for their weak legal position (Stone 1989). Regime formation taps private resource and efforts made to bring together different sectors of community life and coordinate and sustain them. Following Stone, "regime" refers specifically about the *informal arrangements* that surround and complement the formal workings of governmental authority. Because local governmental authority is, by law and tradition, even more limited than authority at the state and national level, informal arrangements assume special significance. A governing coalition has to bring various elements of the community together and be able to mobilize resources.

Informal arrangements are by no means peculiar to cities or, for that matter, government. James March illustrates that even narrowly bounded organizations, those with highly specific functional responsibilities, develop informal governing coalitions (1962). Chester Barnard also argued formal goals and formal lines of authority are insufficient by themselves to bring about coordinated action with sufficient energy to accomplish organizational purposes (1968). Browning, Marshall and Tabb's (1984) study of political incorporation also underscores the relationship between formal institutions and informal coalitions in influencing government responsiveness.

³ Clearly, cities are engaged in economic competition. Market processes are shaped by national-policy decisions, sometimes intentionally, sometimes inadvertently.

If there is no overarching command structure, what gives a regime coherence? The answer is that the regime is purposive, created and maintained as a way of facilitating action.⁴ To be more concrete, regimes are essentially the "governing coalition" where informal arrangements are held together by a core group who come together repeatedly in making important decisions. "Coalition" is the word emphasized in understanding that a regime involves bringing together various elements of the community and the different institutional capacities they control. As Stone, et al. state:

Policy-making is thus not simply a matter of choosing a reasonable course of action; it is shaped by the composition of the governing coalition, the terms that underlie the cooperation of coalition members with one another and the resources they are capable of assembling (1991, 224).

Regime Theory and Human Investment Initiatives of the 1990s

An urban regime is a set of arrangements by which a community is actually governed. Regimes are dynamic, not static. The mix of participants varies by community but according to Elkin (1987) is constrained by two basic institutional principles of American political economy (1) popular control of the formal machinery of government and (2) private ownership of business enterprise. Private interests are not confined to business interests but include labor-union officials, officers in nonprofit organizations or foundations, and church leaders. Yet business interests clearly dominate most urban regimes (Elkin 1987; Hunter 1953, 1980; Logan and Molotch 1987; Peterson 1981; Stone 1989).

⁴ In many respects, the classic urban machines represented one form of an urban regime. They brought together various elements of the community in an informal scheme of exchange and cooperation that was the real governing system of the community.

Norman Glickman points out that the priorities of cities have changed in step with transformations in the world economy (1987). In many large cities, human capital investment is being viewed as a principal means for improvement for the city's core population. Marsha Levine and Robert Trachtman (1988), see the recent increase of public-private partnerships in education as a "logic of common interest". Recently this common interest is taking the form of a strong relationship between economic development and human capital formation and the increased recognition of the interrelationship between the public and private sectors and their shared reliance on a prosperous economy.

A consensus may be emerging that the nation's economic progress will be increasingly threatened unless the country makes serious investment in human capital. Lester Salamon (1991) summarized the impact of technological advances and changing demographic trends that may be directing national to human capital needs.

On the one hand, significant technological advances...have increased the competition that America faces throughout the world and put a special premium on "brain power" instead of "brawn power" as the engine of economic growth. On the other hand, however, significant demographic trends have altered the flow of new entrants into the labor force to the point that over 85 percent will come during the next 15 or 20 years from segments of the population that have historically had the most limited educational and economic advantages- minorities, immigrants, and women. The upshot is a potentially serious mismatch between the labor force the nation needs and the one that our population dynamics and our educational institutions are making available. (p.1).

Consistent with this premise, recent collaborations around education policy may not be merely an anomaly but part of a concerted response to economic restructuring. In the tradition of Thomas Kuhn (1962), who documented how views of the world survive

long after they serve their purpose, we may be in the midst of a similar revolution with respect to our views of education. The emergence of the post industrial society in recent decades may demand a fundamental new role for education that we are only beginning to realize. We are rapidly moving from a capital-intensive, physical-resource-based economy to a knowledge-intensive, human resource-based economy. Regime formation around the urban educational arena would signal a change in direction from the former growth coalitions that centered almost exclusively on downtown redevelopment. This shift has direct consequences for our schools. This era of the closed bureaucracy and the cult of professionals in the educational arena may increasingly be challenged by outside stakeholders who demand a more sustained and institutional role in the educational processes.

Past research on regime formation centered around coalitions cultivated around bricks and mortar economic development, helped bring better understanding about urban decisionmaking. Recent shifts in urban regimes may signal a significant future direction for urban decision making and attempts to respond to the challenges of a post industrial age. While it is by no means certain that a successful local coalition around education issues can be formed, the history of local economic development efforts do seem to offer a potential path to genuine systemic reforms efforts.

URBAN REGIMES, AGENDA ACCESS AND POLICYMAKING IN URBAN EDUCATION

Urban school systems since the progressive era, have been remarkably successful at resisting fundamental organizational change. Many current bureaucratic incentives

impede greater experimentation. Clearly reform requires loosening powerful bureaucratic forces, institutionalized in law and often protected by the intense interests of teachers' unions and even administrators.

Whereas school reform initiatives in the past typically have originated and been nurtured within the education community, the scope of the current debate has expanded far beyond this arena. Many of the most vocal and influential reform advocates over the last decade are not educators. They have been politicians, business leaders, social scientists. This signals a shift in emphasis. It may be more difficult in the 1990s to maintain a subsystem independent of outside political influences than it was in the past (see Browne 1990; Berry 1989). However, obstacles tied to the organization of governance keep school systems from adopting effective school principles more readily.⁵

Lieberman (1993) remains unconvinced outside stakeholders or collaborative efforts will alter the urban school organization. He proclaims that "none will make a significant difference in the power structure of education, the way education is carried on, or student achievement (p.139). Given the skepticism about the ability for outside stakeholders to infiltrate in urban school processes, demonstrating that public-private entities are collaborating around urban education (regime formation) would be a significant finding. It needs to be demonstrated whether and how these constellations of actors can penetrate bureaucratic insularity, achieve agenda status and engage in reform

⁵ For effective schools research see, for example, Stewart C. Purkey and Marshall S. Smith, "Effective schools: A review," *Elementary School Journal*, 83 (March 1983): 427-52; James S. Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, *Public and Private High Schools*, NY: Basic Books, 1987; Chubb and Moe, 1990; Anthony S. Byrk, Valerie E. Lee and Peter B. Holland, *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

and restructuring.

Agenda Access and Expanding the Scope of Contagium

Regime expansion into urban education is consistent with much of the recent theoretical literature on agenda setting and how to achieve agenda status in a policy arena. How are agendas built? How does an issue gain access, how are alternatives generated and who participates in the process? With respect to urban education as an important issue arena, more theoretical rigor is needed to understand how and the conditions by which outside stakeholders are able to access decision making circles. Given the organizational context of decades of bureaucratic insularity in urban school processes, this understanding of how outside stakeholders are able to come together to influence decision making becomes especially important.

Despite an impressive array of concerned advocates and a strong case for change, education reform is still far from assured. Many past waves of reform have had a limited impact (Cuban 1990; Elmore 1990; Goodland 1984; Katz 1971; Powell, Farrar and Cohen 1985; Sarason 1982). The current wave of reformers see the necessity of fundamental change in the delivery system and the inadequacy of simply adding new policies. Put another way, "political change must precede educational change" (Katz 1971, 129).

According to Katz (1971), schools have represented an entrenched system of operation, based on an ideology of efficient management, serving the career aims of a cohesive and mobilized body of educators. As Chubb and Moe state, "Through their structures and the normal course of their operations, they generate all manner of benefits -

- for their leaders and members, the recipients of their services, and the suppliers of their inputs, among others --and these beneficiaries naturally resist any fundamental change in the structural arrangement that are the sources of their benefits (1990, 12; see also Elmore 1990, 6). Despite profound social and economic trends, combined with continuing indications of poor school performance pointing to the need for change, reform is no sure outcome.

Cobb and Elder (1983) stress the importance of the scope of participation and influence in the determination of political decisions and alternatives. Schattschneider (1960) poses that those left out of policy access have the motive to change the roster of participants by appealing to those not currently involved in the debate. Considerable debate has raged in the literature concerning the relative abilities of communities of experts to control the policy process in their areas and remain insulated (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Heclo 1978; Kindon 1994; Ripley and Franklin 1987 and others). Scholars have noted that descriptions of tightly controlled and stable subgovernments marked by consensus may be increasingly difficult to maintain in the modern political system (see Berry 1989; Brown 1990). Political scientists have always been concerned with the relative ability of actors to insulate themselves from the political system, to be granted powers within their areas of jurisdictional control.

To be successful, reform must penetrate the institutional level and restructure basic relationships. Machiavelli recognized centuries ago that this can not be easily done:

Nothing is more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage, than to put oneself at the head of introducing new orders. For the introducer has all those who benefit from the old order as enemies, and he has lukewarm defenders in all those who might benefit

from the new orders. This lukewarmness arises partly from the fear of adversaries who have the laws on their side and partly from the incredulity of men who do not truly believe in new things unless they come to have a firm experience of them (1985, 23-24).

E.E. Schattschneider presented a compelling explanation of policy resistance to change. He stressed how the outcome of conflict is determined by the scope of contagion (1960). Inertia makes it very difficult to change the prevailing bias. Status quo powers may stifle, reinterpret, or otherwise defuse an issue and thus prevent it from gaining agenda status (Cobb and Elder 1983). Thus bias is in the favor of those who wish to restrict rather than those who seek to innovate. As Bachrach and Baratz (1970) note:

While advocates of change must win at all stages of the political process- issue recognition, decision and implementation of policy- the defenders of existing policy must win at only one stage in the process. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that all systems have an inherent 'mobilization of bias' and that this bias strongly favors those currently defending the status quo.

Greater involvement is the outcome of a kind of conflict and the essence of political conflict is to enlarge the scope of participation (Schattschneider 1960). Regime expansion into urban education is very consistent with this premise and may be a necessary condition for comprehensive reform in the 1990s. Schattschneider, like Lindblom (1959; 1977), Hunter (1953), Stone (1989) among others, also places special emphasis on business, as the business community is by a wide margin the most highly organized segment of society. Hayes (1992) states: "Corporations possess significant resource advantages in the group struggle, making for a system of imperfect social competition on many issues." Private power, they assert can be modified by involvement of the wider public.

John Kingdon also asserts the importance of outside participants who are active in affecting agenda setting (1984). According to Kingdon, the agenda- the list of subjects or problems to which government officials and people outside of government are paying serious attention to at any given time- taps into entire policy communities. Organization is the mobilization of bias and change can be introduced by 1) development or expansion of conflict and 2) changing the scope of involvement. This symbolizes the strong tendency of institutions to favor some interests over others. Kingdon (1984) argues the agenda setting story must begin with the players in the game. He discusses 1) the importance of each participant 2) the ways they are important 3) whether each affects agendas, alternatives or both and 4) resources available to each participant. Coleman (1957) also supports the notion of conflict expansion as a means to help get formal agenda attention. Hayes (1992, 120) indicates "for any given issue, the policy equilibrium will be a formation of who participates (the configuration of demand), what resources each participant brings to bear, and how effectively each group translates its resources into influence. Cobb and Elder support the underlying proposition that the greater the size of the audience to which an issue can be enlarged, the greater the likelihood that it will attain systematic agenda standing, and thus access to the formal agenda (1983).

Research Questions:

** Did the Detroit education reform flow from an expansion of the scope of conflict?*

** What have been the institutional consequences of expanding the scope of stakeholder involvement in advancing policy innovations in Detroit?*

Policy Lurch v. Incremental View of Decisionmaking

Incrementalism has often been used to describe urban policy and policy arenas in general. As portrayed in city budgets, what was good enough last year is good enough this year with a two to three percent incremental increase. After studying nine cities prior to 1964, Banfield described urban policy thus: "Another striking similarity in the politics of cities is their conservatism" (Banfield 1965, 12). To bring about bold new changes requires significant resources and support. Large sums of money are necessary for implementing most urban programs. Community goals have to be agreed upon and the means of reaching those goals deemed politically feasible. The urban bureaucracy must be mustered for a united and concerted effort. Most cities rarely, if ever, have even one of those assets (Heiss 1974). Urban policy is determined in a "sea of constraints" rather than an ocean of opportunities. According to Huitt, what is most feasible is what is purely incremental, or can be made to appear so (1968).

The predominance of incremental policy outcomes is prevalent in policy analysis. Charles Lindblom (1959) advanced an influential theory of disjointed incrementalism. He asserted that inherent limitations on rationality and the inevitable need for bargaining and compromise among different interests preclude major policy departures within any political system. Lindblom (1977) states analysis is limited to "realistic" proposals differing only marginally from existing policy, and major policy departures are rare. This view is supported by Schon (1971) who attributes incremental policy outcomes because "belief in the stable state serves primarily to protect us from apprehension of the threats inherent in change...the more radical the change, the more vigorous the defense, the more

urgent the commitment to the stable state." Belief in the stable state is central because it is a bulwark against the threat of uncertainty. Hayes (1992) asserts the nature of the group struggle over policy implementation, like that at the agenda setting stage, will be profoundly affected by the configuration of active groups. They assert departures from normal incrementalism will only occur under very special circumstances like war, revolution, or some critical shift which threatens the social system (Hayes 1992; Lindblom 1959, 1977; Schon 1971).

Advancing urban policy innovation is a difficult, and many times a dangerous course for urban policy-makers to pursue. "Faced with overwhelming problems which require some kind of answer, the urban policy-maker is forced to match limited resources with conflicting demands, utopian dreams with political realities, and high ideals with middle-of-the road compromises" (Huitt 1968).

Another problem is the short attention span of the public and their elected representatives. According to Downs (1972), American public attention rarely remains sharply focussed upon any one domestic issue for very long- even if it involves a continuing problem of crucial importance to society. He said this situation is a result of the "issue attention cycle" (p.38). Peters and Hogwood (1985) undertook a systemic analysis of the relative attention given by the federal government to different policy areas. Their evidence supported Downs's notion of the issue attention cycle. However, this scholarship was problematic because while it may help us predict the broad rise and fall of public issues, at best it indicates only in the most general way what forces may shape the cycle. It tells us little about whether it is possible for groups to exert pressure and

ensure an issue will receive sustained or truncated attention.

Baumgartner and Jones (1993), unlike Peters and Hogwood's pessimistic view of agendas, assert agenda activities have important policy consequences. Some issues remain on the agenda a long time; some problems really do get solved. They contend that with agenda access, new institutional structures are often created that remain in place for decades. When new principles are under consideration, policymaking tends to be volatile; when a general principal of policy action is in place, policymaking tends to be incremental. They describe policy change in many issue areas as punctuated equilibrium--a dynamic associated with the various attempts to construct and undermine public monopolies. People, political leaders, government agencies and private institutions which had once shown no interest in a particular question become involved for some reason. The political system may later settle into a period of incrementalism surrounding a new point.

John Kingdon refers to the times when new policy ideas come forward (agenda access) as windows of opportunity to be taken advantage of by policy entrepreneurs. These opportunities present themselves infrequently and stay open for only short periods (1984). He envisions public policy as not one single actor's brainchild, but a plethora of different sources (1984). Kingdon asserts the importance of what makes ideas take hold and grow. He views the origins of those ideas as not so important. The outcome, according to Kingdon, will *depend on the mix of elements* present and how the various elements are coupled.

....Advocates lie in wait in and around government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their

solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their advantage. Sometimes, the window opens quite predictably (173).

Kingdon asserts that despite this rarity of the opening of a policy window, the major changes in public policy result from the appearance of these opportunities (1984, 175). Hayes (1992) also asserts, "such windows close quickly, and failure to seize the moment may forfeit any real opportunity for action for years. This process is not just a local phenomenon. According to Baumgartner and Jones, press attention and policy response begin to feed upon one another, and the positive feedback system results in nonincremental waves of policy outputs. Once government attention rises to historical highs, it rarely recedes to erstwhile lows (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Institutions are created, agencies reorganized, budgets appropriated and all these new organizations work to ensure their own institutional survival- hence the institutional legacy they believe remains. These periods of change, they contend, are likely to leave institutional legacies that will structure, influence and bias public policy outcomes for decades.

Mayhew (1991) also supports the notion of lurches in policy action and periods of "continuous high energy activity" in his examination of the ebb and flow of the enactments of major new policies. Policy entrepreneurs attempt to take advantage of favorable attention and move quickly. Political science has developed terms to describe such situations: escalation, bandwagons, slippery slopes and waves. New political movements take shape, gain momentum, and become irreversible and leave behind implementing institutions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). From time to time, issues normally confined to policy subsystems move higher onto the political agenda. This period of agenda access, when new participants become interested in the debate, is when

major changes tend to occur, often disrupting one or more policy subsystems. Baumgartner and Jones explain how many policy areas in the 1970s dominated by one-sided representation of interests were overwhelmed by a vast mobilization of citizen's and consumer groups. This study explores the education policy arena in Detroit during such a period.

Research Question: Does incrementalism best describe the reform era in the urban education policy arena in Detroit?

The Institutional Legacy

William Riker argues any time political actors can introduce new dimensions of conflict, they can destabilize a previously stable situation (1982). He contends that institutions change more slowly than preferences, but change nonetheless (1980). Baumgartner and Jones speak of the institutional legacy that may remain even after public interest dissipates. The institutionalization of new programs, policies, and agencies is thus strongly associated with the agenda setting process. "Even short lived periods of public interest to a given problem can therefore lead to bureaucratic institutionalization of solutions and to long term policy consequences" (Baumgartner and Jones 1993,88).

Policymakers attempt to take advantage of periods of agenda access in order to build new institutions and to alter those already in existence. Focusing on the consequences of agenda activity directs attention to institutional structures. When an issue emerges on the national agenda in an atmosphere of criticism, conditions are ripe for dilution of a policy subsystem. Institutions are often the children of agenda access and the means by which short periods of attention affect outcomes and government

policies for decades. Institutions may remain after attention dies away, structuring participation in policymaking, making sure some will have privileged access while others are shut out (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). These scholars assert agenda setting has long lasting organizational implications. In other words, public attention to a given issue may fade, but even a short-lived spurt of interest may leave an institutional legacy (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

Alterations in the structure of policymaking are the most important indicators of policy change. Changes in institutional structure are a policy output. A full investigation of embryonic regime formation in the education arena in Detroit and resultant attempts at policy innovation can help determine whether emerging collaborative efforts are capable of providing sustained institutional presence in urban education. The distinctions between actors inside and outside government are partly artificial and informal stakeholders can be key participants in affecting the agenda. Baumgartner and Jones assertion that even short periods of agenda access can leave institutional legacies is particularly important for Detroit as the lurch of activity has halted and the window of opportunity has closed for the intermediate future.

Research Question: Has the agenda access and resultant attempts at policy innovation left an institutional legacy that may continue to have direct policy consequences?

RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION

The research design designates the logical manner in which individuals or other units are compared and analyzed; the basis for making interpretations. Urban based research is multiparadigmatic - that is, there are several different frameworks that can be used to help understand how and why urban processes unfold and to identify and explain their outcomes (Andranovich and Riposa 1993). Students of urban politics know that most generalizations are suspect unless they are put into a context and often that context needs to be quite particular (Stone 1987). Most outcomes have multiple causes that are never easy to sort out. Contexts and the salience of various causal forces change, confounding our efforts to amass a body of scientific knowledge that can be replicated through repeated observations. That humankind is reflective and can change behavior accordingly is another complicating factor (Stone 1987).

This case study research employs a wide array of techniques including field research, intensive semi-structured interviews, transient observation of board meetings, special committee meetings, Detroit Compact District Stakeholder Council meetings, Local Compact Council meetings, financial and programmatic data, official program records, outside program evaluations and a wide array of secondary data sources. The primary data collected for this field-based research consists of face to face comprehensive semi-structured interviews with over 90 respondents encompassing representatives from every major sector in the city including the business sector, non-profit sector, foundations, community organizations, universities, city government, school board members, union leaders and program specialists within Detroit Public Schools (See Appendix A: Formal

Interview Respondents).

Intensive interviews are the best means of examining issues of process, how decisions are made and how programs evolved. They are the best means for explaining complex events and placing within a context to which projects are put into operation (Murphy 1980). In order to discover those individuals and groups which were influential within the educational arena during this period of study, newspapers and officials records were helpful in order to get an initial list of names of people involved in the education policy arena. These individuals were interviewed along with an early concentration of program specialists within DPS (including area superintendents, assistant superintendents, school board members and department heads). Respondents were asked to describe their participation and that of other key influentials. They were prevailed upon to suggest the names of others involved in collaboration with the schools. In this way the research branched out until a large representation of individuals were involved or until diminishing returns set in and additional interviews did not turn up new information.

A criticism of field research is limited generalizability. From the Positivist perspective, science demands the discovery, testing, and confirming, in probabilistic form, associations between variables that extend beyond specific cases. However, good qualitative research is needed to develop understanding about complex relationships. Competent case study research results in theory development.

In response to traditional concerns about the external validity of case studies, Yin claims the aim in a case study is to expand and generalize theories (1993, 10). Yin terms this "analytic generalization," and contrasts it with the "statistical generalization" used in

surveys (1993, 36). He asserts that the "analogy to samples and universes is incorrect when dealing with case studies" (1993, 36). The nature of the research question and the type of data should dictate the appropriate research methodology. The task of the qualitative researcher is one of analysis and synthesis. Synthesis requires fitting the pieces together into a meaningful matrix.⁶ A qualitative approach does not imply that qualitative inquiry makes no use of quantification. This is not the case. For some aspects of the research, quantification may be the most appropriate means for analysis. Without a proper research foundation however, quantitative studies can miss their mark. A classic illustration of this phenomenon is the original Coleman Report (1966). This study, one of the most comprehensive ever conducted of our nation's schools, concluded that schools make little difference once family background has been controlled. The Coleman Report focused on quantitative measure of input factors. A large volume of qualitative research was subsequently conducted on exemplary schools.⁷ Fifteen years later Coleman II (Coleman et al. 1982) concluded that schools do make a difference.

The qualitative researcher attempts to attain rich, real, deep, and valid data. From

⁶ Elliot Eisner had defined six core features of qualitative investigation. I briefly outline them here: 1) Qualitative studies tend to be field focused. Research entails going out to the site. 2) The self is an instrument, it is not a matter of checking behaviors, but rather of perceiving their presence and interpreting their significance. 3) Qualitative research has an interpretive character (a) inquirers try to account for what they have given account of. (b) Inquirers aim beneath manifest behavior to the meaning of events for those who experience them. 4) Qualitative studies display the use of expressive language and the presence of voice in the text. 5) A fifth feature is attention to particulars. 6) A sixth feature pertains to the criteria for judging their success. The research becomes believable because of its coherence, insight and instrumental utility (1991).

⁷ The effective schools literature, as articulated by Brookover et al. 1979, Edmonds 1979, 1986, Klitgard and Hall 1974, Lezotte and Bancroft 1985, and others countered the pessimism of the early Coleman Report.

a rational standpoint, the approach is inductive. Interpretation of the data involves uncovering patterns. Qualitative research can lay the groundwork for subsequent quantitative studies and can contribute in their own right to the accumulation of insights that lead to sound theory development. Case study approach as theory building has an especially rich tradition in urban politics. In this research investigation, Detroit was chosen as the primary case study for a number of reasons.

Case Selection

This study exams school reform from 1988 to 1994 in Detroit. During this period political activity coalesced around educational reform. The city has faced the effects of post-industrial restructuring within its economy perhaps more than any other city in the U.S.. Like most industrial belt cities, Detroit has been beleaguered by social, economic and fiscal strains. It has a massive bureaucratic presence and manages a billion dollar budget. It operates within a state (Michigan) where top down interference in public education has been especially prevalent in recent years (Jelier and Weissert 1993). Most importantly, within Detroit pervasive attempts at restructuring were introduced. New participants emerged, who began to act as stakeholders in the system. From 1988-1993 the number of substantial attempts at educational reform resembles the dynamics occurring in a number of other large urban districts across the nation. Consistent with the view that the ultimate test of policy is, in practice, examination at the district level is persuasive.

After more than a decade of relatively stable school board and superintendent

leadership, endemic poor performance of the city's schools and a number of scandals revolving around political patronage and perquisites made the incumbents particularly vulnerable in the November 1988 school board elections. School reform in Detroit also grew out of separate initiatives in the business community. For instance, business leaders introduced school reform as a major issue in the mid-1980s as part of a Detroit Strategic Plan initiative. Thus school reform contributed to the 1988 school board elections. Four reform-minded at-large candidates challenged long-time incumbents. The campaign platform of the reformers, dubbed the HOPE slate (Frank Hayden, David Olmstead, and Larry Patrick for Education, who were joined by Joseph Blanding after the primary), focused on an aggressive school reform platform. The HOPE team won an overwhelming victory on election day and then set about the task of keeping their campaign promises of school reform, much to the surprise and discomfort of some of their supporters.

The HOPE team built a strong majority on the school board (at one point 10 of 11 members according to a current board member) and began to implement its agenda of reform. Arthur Jefferson, superintendent of 15 years, resigned. Jefferson was replaced on an interim basis by Dr. John Porter, former president of Eastern Michigan University. The HOPE team's reform agenda was solidified when Dr. Deborah McGriff of Milwaukee, nationally-respected urban education innovator, was hired to a three-year contract in July 1991. During the HOPE tenure, a number of reform initiatives were advanced, principally the implementation and expansion of the Detroit Compact (Chapter 4), and School Empowerment and Schools of Choice (the focus of Chapter 5).

Over time, serious opposition to the reformers crystallized. First, early in the

summer of 1992, an alliance of 12 unions that represented teachers, principals, clerical workers, and other school district employees distributed a 12-page brochure that leveled a number of criticisms at the empowerment and specialized school reforms (Adams 1992). The controversy climaxed when the 10,500-member Detroit Federation of Teachers struck the school system in the fall of 1992. One of the primary issues of the strike was the empowerment plan. The DFT feared that empowerment would allow schools to circumvent union contract provisions on hiring, firing, and promotion of teachers. While the dispute was eventually resolved, the month-long strike left bitter feelings between Superintendent McGriff, the school board and the DFT. Indeed, the DFT, which had backed the HOPE team in 1988, worked hard for the ouster of the reform leaders in the November 1992 at-large school board elections.

The election saw three of the four HOPE reformers--Joseph Blanding (then board vice president), Frank Hayden (then board president), and David Olmstead (attorney and school finance reform expert) lose their seats on the Board of Education.⁸ Ultimately, the electoral reform coalition dispersed, Superintendent McGriff resigned in October 1993, and the school board hired an insider candidate, David Snead. With this appointment, the period of aggressive reform abruptly ended. This case study provides the opportunity to study educational politics as an emerging issue arena in the city of Detroit. The case

⁸. After his defeat former HOPE team member David Olmstead joined forces with Philip Kearny, a professor at the University of Michigan, to continue the crusade for school finance reform. Olmstead and Kearny shifted their attention to Lansing, the state capitol, and began spearheading a petition drive to put a proposal on the ballot to place a statewide school finance reform measure before the Michigan Legislature (Adams 1993). This effort was overwhelmed by the State Legislature's decision in August of 1993 to completely restructure the state's school finance structure.

provides an excellent avenue to determine how policy innovation was advanced given two decades of bureaucratic resistance and insularity. The study also provides the opportunity to evaluate the major reform initiatives, the means by which they achieved agenda status, the nature of policy change and the institutional legacy of this period.

CHAPTER 3

REGIME FORMATION AND URBAN DECISIONMAKING IN DETROIT

INTRODUCTION

Detroit serves as the laboratory for this case study which investigates public-private collaboration and policy reform within the education policy arena. Previous urban scholarship in Detroit has examined public-private coalitions formed to pursue bricks and mortar economic development. Have new leadership coalitions that have emerged in recent years become more focused on "human capital"?¹ If so, who has assumed primary leadership of this coalition? What is the impact of the mobilization of external forces on policy reform attempts in the Detroit Public Schools, specifically the Detroit Compact (Chapter 4) and Empowerment, Diversity and Choice (Chapter 5). Ultimately, have the public-private collaborations provided a sustainable coalition (regime) to help advance a human capital based economic development agenda?

This chapter investigates a leadership coalition in Detroit that emerged over the last twenty years in the city and in the school district and the connection between the two. An analysis of the broad constellation of decision makers that have exercised political power in Detroit lays the foundations for the institutional analysis of recent attempts at education policy reform. How policy innovation achieved agenda status within the school district, given a long tradition of bureaucratic insularity in the DPS and the institutional

¹ Human capital is a term developed by economists. It is defined as "an individuals productive skills, talents and knowledge." See among others Aaron 1978; Becker 1985; Schultz 1981 and Thurow 1970.

consequences of those reform attempts will be the focus of chapters 4 and 5.

The 1960s brought rapid disinvestment and deindustrialization, escalation of race and class disparity and metropolitan fragmentation to the Detroit metropolitan region which helped foster severe employment and crime problems. Leadership responded to economic decline with a concerted strategy to rebuild the central business district and bring back a strong manufacturing base to the city. The key player behind this coalition was Mayor Coleman Young, who in concert with a few of the old industrial elite, fostered a number of high profile, downtown development schemes. Notably absent from involvement with the Young regime was the school system, which operated as an isolated and politically separate enclave in the 1970s and early 1980s.

Following the desegregation activity in the 1960s, leadership of the DPS consolidated under black control in the 1970s. The district hired its first black superintendent in 1974, Arthur Jefferson, a position that he would hold for 15 years. With the exception of the religious community, there was little outside involvement of other sectors in the Detroit community in the schools. Leadership was quite stable for both the city and the school district during the 1970s and early 1980s.

By the mid-1980s, a set of leaders emerged who began to reconstitute the decisionmaking locus in the city. Attention was directed at the education arena for the first time by key Detroit leaders, many of whom were not active in the Young coalition or with the DPS. By the 1980s, the business community working through the auspices of Detroit Renaissance and the Detroit Chamber of Commerce stepped forward for their first institutionalized effort to engage the DPS. An array of other stakeholders and

community advocates followed suit. Out of this dynamic, a reform slate of candidates was swept into the Detroit Board of Education and what followed was a period of reform and collaboration with external stakeholders.

Before that reform activity can be evaluated, a foundation for understanding these events needs to be laid. This chapter examines the city regime under Coleman Young and the school district regime under Arthur Jefferson over a period of nearly two decades. It explores why these regimes were unable to resurrect the city, and examines the leadership vacuum that ensued in the 1980s. Problem perceptions as expressed by Detroit respondents are identified that might have given rise to regime transformation, followed by an investigation of key events that laid the underpinnings for the reform agenda that would follow. Having established this overall profile of the city and education regimes paves the way for a systematic investigation of recent policy reform attempts with the DPS.

REGIME FORMATION AND URBAN DECISIONMAKING IN DETROIT

An urban regime is a set of arrangements by which a community is actually governed. Regimes are dynamic, not static. They include both formal institutions and informal arrangements through which public bodies and private interests function together to make and carry out governing decisions. Private interests are not confined to business interests but include labor-union officials, officers in nonprofit organizations or foundations, and church leaders. Yet business interests clearly dominate most urban regimes (Elkin 1987; Hunter 1953, 1980; Logan and Molotch 1987; Peterson 1982; Stone

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1989). The key point is that regime building is more than just gaining electoral support or statements of endorsements. A governing coalition must have civic capacity to act on problems, to mobilize resources and bring various elements of the community together in an active system of cooperation.

Regime politics points to the different types of relatively durable alliances that can emerge among electoral coalitions, business interests, professional bureaucracies and others. The type of ruling coalition in a city and its orientation toward growth can change over time (Ross et al. 1991).² Regime studies have been deeply rooted in the basic assumption that defines the political economy approach - power in cities can be understood by observing the interaction between private and public institutions and actors (Judd and Kantor 1993). Scholars have come to realize that urban politics is not the exclusive province of governmental institutions. Regimes are relatively inclusionary in some cities, meaning that many groups and political interests are allowed to participate actively in making policy. In other cities, they may be remarkably closed.

Clarence Stone illustrated how governance in Atlanta can usefully be understood by the concept of an urban regime. He demonstrated that to expand the capacity of city government in Atlanta, it became necessary to enlarge the governing regime to include broader participation from other stakeholders within the community. Stone outlines critical research questions in his Atlanta work: (1) Who makes up the governing coalition

² For instance, from 1930 to 1970, urban regimes were defined by the New Deal Coalition. Cities used national resources to promote the redevelopment of business districts. The battle between political and economic logic ensued, particularly by the 1960s when blacks and other constituencies began to demand that city regimes use federal programs for social purposes (Judd and Kantor 1992).

- who has to come together to make governance possible? (2) How is the coming together accomplished? and (3) What are the consequences of the who and how (Stone, 1989,1993)? Stone's research centered primarily on the Atlanta regime's capacity to combine the elements necessary to redevelop the downtown. Yet, Stone indicates that a variety of policy agenda items can be taken up by regimes (Stone 1987; Stone et al. 1991). This research examines potential regime transformation around urban education. The research on human capital development is only in its infancy stages and merits additional scholarly attention.

The last fifteen years have been a period of extraordinary change in the world economic system, usually described under the rubric of economic restructuring. This restructuring refers to the transformation of the economic bases of cities in the advanced capitalist world from manufacturing to services, the rapid growth of producer services sector, the concentration of economic control within multinational firms and financial institutions and decentralization of manufacturing activities (see, among others, Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1980; Kasarda 1988). White-collar workers replaced blue collar workers, office towers sprung up where factories once stood. The transformation involved a shift from the production of goods to the use and manipulation of knowledge-information, finance, management, services (Fainstein et al. 1986; Smith and Feagin 1987). Have these changes affected the local regime in the city of Detroit?

REGIME FORMATION IN DETROIT

A set of players emerged in the early 1970s in Detroit that would exert leadership for the better part of two decades. Central to this coalition was Coleman Young. Elected as the first black mayor in Detroit in 1973, Young's presence as a strong mayor and his autocratic leadership style became subject of much scholarship and public attention (See among others Chavets 1990; Darden et al. 1989; Jones and Bachelor 1986; Rich 1993; Widdick 1989). Mayor Young's leadership was greatly influenced by the deteriorating conditions of the city he inherited. His leadership coalition can not be understood in isolation from broader contextual forces.

Crisis in Detroit: Context of Regime Formation under Coleman Young

Detroit over the 1960s and 1970s can be depicted by rapid deindustrialization, intense race and class disparity, pronounced uneven development and metropolitan fragmentation. These problems have resulted in severe impacts on employment opportunities and escalation of crime in Detroit. In some respects Detroit is representative of the many rust-belt cities that were hurt by the transformation to a post industrial economy. The externalities of this transformation were arguably more pronounced in Detroit than anywhere else, however, because of a singular reliance on the automotive industry.

Deindustrialization. Detroit's metal-bending economy was distinguished by its structural dependence upon one export industry, automobile production. For decades after World War II, Detroit prospered as the auto capital of the world. The subsequent boom

to related industries spread that prosperity to suburban Detroit and other regions in the state.³ Detroit's centralized reliance on the auto industry helped build Detroit into a center of trade and commerce, but subsequently impeded its transformation to a post-industrial economy. Detroit provides an excellent example of the devastating effect of de-industrialization. The city has suffered a severe loss of capital. Some of this loss has been to the region's suburban corridors. The flight of capital to other regions and abroad has also been pervasive.

By the early 1970s, as the auto manufacturers began to struggle, that the city's economic health was at great risk. Besides the increasing competition from abroad, by 1969 the Sunbelt began to attract major manufacturers who were attracted to the sunny skies, low wages and weak unions. Labor problems, a perception of a poor business climate saddled with a decaying infrastructure and an overinflated wage structure contributed to large scale transfer of manufacturing out of the city of Detroit. The city ever since, has attempted to compensate for its heavy loss of manufacturing employment.

The State of Michigan also has experienced the loss of good paying manufacturing jobs that was evident in Detroit. By 1983, the state's unemployment rate climbed to over 17 percent. The state faced a \$1.7 billion deficit (Hill 1990). The state's development vision, as defined in its principal economic strategy report at that time, *The Path to Prosperity* (State of Michigan 1984), was for Michigan to become an international center for the production of the "factory of the future". The core of the strategy was the

³ With the exception of Pittsburgh, Detroit's specialization on one branch of manufacturing is greater than the nation's other major metropolitan areas. In 1958, over 41 percent of the labor force in Detroit was employed in manufacturing, 38 percent of which were employed in motor-vehicle production (Hill 1986).

deployment of new technology into a massive network of smaller manufacturing companies, some 15,000 manufacturers employing over more than a half million workers, about half of whom are in industries linked to automobile production, such as plastics, primary and fabricated metals and machinery (Osborne 1988).

Race and Class Disparity. During the hey-day of Detroit's dominance as a manufacturing center, ethnic groups and immigrants flocked to Detroit and set up various enclaves. Eventually, most of these groups dispersed into the suburbs. While post World War II saw a rapid acceleration of black migrants from the South, the process of decentralization continued for whites. A black population that was less than 10% in 1940 blossomed to over 60% by 1980 (Darden et al. 1987). By the 1990 census, 75.7% of Detroit's population was black. Overall the city lost 20.5% of its population in the 1970s and over 349,147 white residents. By the 1990 Census, the Detroit population sank to barely 1 million, the lowest figure since 1920. The lower-class Polish and Irish enclaves are gone. The remaining whites tend to be the elderly.

Industry and retail followed the exodus to the suburbs and beyond. The city of Detroit was decimated by an outpouring of capital and the deterioration of the public infrastructure. From the 1940s to the 1980s the central city saw its share of regional manufacturing employment drop from 60.3% to 25%, the share of retail trade dropped from 72.6% to 15.4% and wholesale trade dropped from 90.1% to 29.6% while losing over 187,000 jobs in the process (Darden et al. 1987). Since 1970, the central city of Detroit's total employment share of the seven-county region in Southeastern Michigan fell

from 34% to 16% (Sowerby 1994). The public schools were hit hard by a lack of revenues to sustain them. A community advocate claims much of this exodus can be attributed to racial discord. He claims,

This is the most racist city in the United States. It's the birthplace of the commencement of the riots and has remained on top ever since in terms of racial strife...the race issue was so domineering that it became enormously destructive.

There is also great concern in Detroit expressed about the loss of the black middle class, particularly the professional class to the suburbs. The city can not afford to lose the civic leadership that this group could provide, nor the role models that their active presence in the city plays. This exodus will likely continue if the decline of DPS is not stemmed. Table 3.1 indicates the steady growth of black suburbanization during the last two decades. The rate of black suburbanization has grown 214% since 1960. This compares to a 3% growth rate of white suburbanization during the same period. Note, however, that blacks in 1990 still constitute less than 3.8% of the suburban metropolitan population.

---TABLE 3.1 HERE---

Table 3.1

Total Black Suburbanization in Metropolitan Detroit

<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1990</u>
76,647	96,655	130,691	164,300

Source: U.S. Census

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Uneven Development and Metropolitan Fragmentation. Detroit is a near perfect example of uneven development. Great disparities exist between the suburbs and between the municipality in terms of income, education, professional employment, jobs, retail establishments and a host of other important factors. Detroit has been plagued with spatial inequality of industry and commerce, chronic racial and class segregation and unabated regional political fragmentation that have been escalating since World War II. Of the 33 largest cities in the U.S., Detroit ranked number one in income disparity between central city and metropolitan area (Darden et al. 1987).

Manufacturing and wholesale industries followed the freeways out to the suburbs. With the closing of J.L. Hudson's downtown store in 1983, not one major shopping center within the city of Detroit remained. Much of the high technology that remained in the region shifted to Macomb County which blossomed into a strong manufacturing center. Neighboring Oakland County took a commanding lead over high technology industries and office complexes. Macomb and Oakland County saw their combined share of the region's employment rise from 27% to 46%.

Segregated housing and racial discrimination have been the rule rather than the exception in Detroit. Integration of schools on a metropolitan basis was severely opposed, real estate interests redlined communities to ensure that housing would not be made available for blacks, and business and industry made no effort to attract central city black labor into the suburbs. A white noose established itself around the central city. A big business respondent asserted,

This area's biggest problem is not poor education. It's racism. Racism as you well know takes many forms, the most insidious of which is apathy.

Because the education system in the suburbs is still pretty good, Detroit's malaise isn't a problem. If you happen to be racist, you really don't give a damn whether the schools in Detroit are good at all.

There are a number of reasons for housing inequities. The availability of a home mortgage within the city of Detroit is far more difficult to get than in other parts of the metropolitan region. There is a large disparity in rental incomes, interest dividends, etc., between blacks and whites. Yet, the availability of low value, low rent housing is only a partial explanation for people living in separate neighborhoods. Specific case studies have time and time again, pointed to blatant attempts by suburbs like Dearborn and Warren to keep blacks out using all the political tools at their disposal (Darden et al. 1987).

The central city of Detroit is no longer the dynamo for social mobility it used to be, having lost many economic functions. Today there are few low level entry jobs that pay a reasonable wage. Opportunities for gainful employment have dwindled. There are structural factors which are particularly alienating to the poor. A good example is the insufficient mass transit system. The poor in the city of Detroit lack the mobility to look for work outside their more immediate environment. Urban motorways, while addressing the more affluent car user, have ordered the city where movement is quite costly, beyond the reach of many marginalized citizens. Other exclusionary suburban practices remain.

While some parts of the metropolitan areas have been successful in attracting high-technology manufacturing and the region as a whole remains wealthy, the lack of a cohesive regional strategy left places like the central city of Detroit and downriver areas wrought with inequality, structural unemployment, crime and inadequate provision of

services- police protection, schools, housing. Richard Hill states, "The reign of the market, the fragmentation of the government, and the lack of federal planning, coordination and control means that urban economic development strategies are formulated within the context of bitter, local, regional and national competition" (1986, 117).

In Detroit, the lack of a strong regional planning structure and the home rule tradition made regional development strategies up to this point a virtual impossibility. This is true in spite of the fact that many residents have come to believe developers are destroying the suburbs through urban sprawl even while underutilized infrastructure remains in the city. Farm and rural landscape have been lost. Costly investment in roads, sewers, schools, police and fire protection for new communities continue even though the overall population in the metropolitan region is expected to stay about the same over the next 20 years. It is expected that Detroit, the Grosse Pointes, Hamtramck and Highland Park will lose population while communities to the north and northwest suburbs continue to grow astonishingly fast.

Suburban municipalities often offer enticing inducements to attract industrial and commercial firms. "The region's basic political structure- based on fragmented, fiscally independent municipalities- encourages economic competition and discourages cooperation, and thus sets up a difficult situation for the central city and other older, industrial suburbs." (J.Thomas 1990)

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Lack of Employment Opportunities. The changes in the global economy arguments, resonate among respondents who point to reasons for increased collaboration in the city and crossing of institutional lines that haven't been previously crossed. According to a community advocate, it is when business began to lay off white collar workers when everybody in the city started taking notice. Blue collar workers were replaceable. Business began to recognize that the way they operated for 15, 20, 30 years was no longer working. A respondent involved in the Detroit Strategic Planning Group emphasized his belief in the importance of education to the future of business in Detroit. If the educational system can not provide a suitable product, the alternative for business is massive and costly retraining of the workforce.

The capacity of the economy of metropolitan Detroit to maintain an environment in which private investment can succeed and produce jobs and economic vitality became of greater concern. The subchallenges of a poorly educated work force drew increased attention. A chamber official put it, "we are no longer a durable goods manufacturing dominated economy. Protecting that kind of historic situation and all that went with it, labor-management relations and a lot of other things have to change".

Wasted human resources have proved most damaging and threaten the economic vitality of the city of Detroit. The 1990 census statistics indicated, that Detroit has among the largest percentage of people below the poverty line of any large, major city. By 1988 teenage black unemployment in Southeast Michigan loomed at 68% (Economic Development 1988, 16). Blue collar employment in Detroit City dropped from 372,554 jobs in 1960 to 174,229 jobs in 1990. The number of children in poverty in the city has

grown from 18.9% in 1970 to 46.4% in 1990. See Table 3.2 for a cross section of economic and demographic changes that have affected both the city and the schools.

---TABLE 3.2 HERE---

Table 3.2

Economic and Demographic Changes in Detroit City

	1960	1970	1980	1990
Total Population	1,670,144	1,511,482	1,203,339	1,027,974
White:	70.8%	55.5%	34.1%	20.7%
Black:	28.9%	43.7%	61.6%	75.3%
Children in Poverty	n/a	18.9	31.5	46.4
Per Capita Income MSA/Detroit City	n/a	n/a	\$8475/ 6215	\$15,694/ 9443
Per Capita Income Ratio MSA/Detroit City	n/a	n/a	136%	166%
Blue Collar Residential Occupation	372,554	330,223	214,780	174,229
White Collar Residential Occupation	227,039	230,961	179,927	161,233

Note: Blue Collar jobs consists of the following Census categories: Technicians and related support occupations; administrative support, including clerical; private household occupations; protective service; other service; farming, forestry and fishing; precision production, craft and repair; and all operators, fabricators, and laborers. White Collar refers to all managerial and professional occupations and sales.

In Detroit there has been a considerable decline in manufacturing jobs. Table 3.2 reports blue collar employment in Detroit over the last four decades. Manufacturing jobs accounted for 42.4% of the area's jobs in 1958. In 1988 it represented only 24.2% of the job market. The effect has been devastating on the black and poor populations, which continue to have the highest unemployment figures in the region (Rich 1993). A former

superintendent argued,

It used to be in this town as you may well know, a person could make a damn good living. An individual could get a job at one of the automobile companies and really become a quality member of the middle class. Chrysler Corporation as their third quarter report indicated a few days ago is making more money then they ever have in the history of the corporation but they're making money with about 50 percent of the employees they had a decade or two ago. We seldom hear people, even the best educated of our kids graduating from high school getting a job in one of the automobile factories anymore. They're not hiring young people directly out of high school. That used to be common place.

Crime. Although Detroit lost its title of "murder capital of the world" to Washington D.C and then New Orleans, serious crime problems persist. With the crime issue a current American obsession, it is not surprising a large number of respondents view crime, violence, gangs and drug activity as major problems facing the city. The costs of crime in terms of human costs, high insurance rates, over-reliance on police departments are used to justify increased investment with youth and education. Drug related crime threatens to undermine the city's efforts to increase investment. Many companies employ their own police force.

Many nonprofit and community based organizations were created in direct response to concerns over violence. Some of these organizations such as Kids in Need of Direction (KIND), Save our Sons and Daughters (SoSAD) and Life Directions have begun to work directly with schools on crime and safety issues. They claim safety and security in schools is a major concern. Some community advocates attribute the high rates of truancy, in part, to fears about a safe environment. A communicate advocate related this story,

One of our mothers was complaining about her son, how sick she was he can't go to school because he gets jumped by this gang of kids at the Seven Mile and Puritan area. This opened up to a discussion about gangs. One of the grandmothers, she said move, just pack up and move. It is not so easy to get up and move.

Because such a high proportion of crimes in Detroit are committed by juveniles, the public schools are seen as a natural arena to address those problems by community advocates. In the past, advocates were unable to infiltrate the school bureaucracy. A community leader states:

There is more of a focus on youth issues now as opposed to what it was then. It is really unfortunate that it's almost like there has to be a blood bath before they realize that we have to pay some attention to these young people. The young in Detroit have become so rebellious, so angry. I'm not going to say that that's not without faults because we've been negligent in those responsibilities. I hate to say it but at one point there was this whole focus on police and incarceration and I see it resurfacing now in government. I'm saying that they'd better start doing some front-loading. I think some people in Detroit are beginning to realize that it makes more sense to invest in our children now. As we said yesterday in a meeting, if you want to really talk about being tough on crime, the best way to be tough on crime is to prevent it from the beginning. We need to do some front-loading with our young people, investing in them, understanding that they are untapped human resources and that we have to continue to build upon their potential, that there is a need for real serious nurturing.

The Corporate Center Regime of Coleman Young: Physical Redevelopment

As Detroit goes, so goes the country. Name the acute problems, past or present, of modern American society and the auto capital of the world has confronted them, with an impact felt by the entire nation. Many of these problems emerged when the lure of high profits and high wages drew hundreds of thousands of European immigrants, Southern white workers, dispossessed blacks, and the extraneous rural population of the Midwest into the factory complex of Detroit (Widdick 1972).

The 1960s were a turbulent decade for Detroit. Any hopes of continued postwar prosperity being able to absorb the influx of black migrants that came to Detroit were dashed by the riots of 1967. The events that led to the 1967 riot go back to rising concerns over crime at the beginning of the 1960s. Then Mayor Louis Miriani ordered a law enforcement crackdown. "Frisks and searches, mass arrests, and "holding on suspicion" became the standard pattern of police operations, which were concentrated in the black community" (Widdick 1972). The police were despised by many blacks in the 1960s in Detroit, who felt like they were being treated like enemy invaders in their own city. James Cavanaugh's surprise upset in 1961 temporarily put fresh hope for the city's future. Cavanaugh became a favorite of the nation's press and television. He worked early on to achieve some level of black incorporation. He was re-elected to a second term in 1965 (Widdick 1972).

While Cavanaugh was more inclusive of blacks and made a number of black appointments in his administration, friction between the police force and the black community remained high. There were repeated incidents between the police force and the black community during the 1960s. Eventually, tension erupted into the Detroit riot of 1967.

In the violent summer of 1967, Detroit became the scene of the bloodiest uprising in a half century and the costliest in terms of property damage in U.S. history. At the week's end, there were 41 known dead, 347 injured, 3,800 arrested. Some 5,000 people homeless (the vast majority Negro), while 1,300 buildings had been reduced to mounds of ashes and bricks, and 2,700 businesses sacked (Widdick 1972, 166).

The riots of 1967 resulted in even greater damage in white/black relationships than the obvious physical damage. Widdick describes the riot as not a race riot, but a social riot,

a rebellion of people who had no stake in society (1972). In the wake of the riots, New Detroit Inc. was formed as a consortium of decisionmakers across the community dedicated to racial harmony and economic opportunity. It has remained one of the most important community based organizations in Detroit since its inception, but its efforts proved hopelessly inadequate to address the deep seated problems, including the complete lack of confidence in the police department.

Cavanaugh decided not to run for re-election in 1969. White fear and black distrust followed in the wake of the riots. Roman Gribbs won a closely contested and racially polarized election in 1969 over a moderate black candidate Richard Austin. Austin became the first black in Detroit to win a mayoral primary. As the 1960s closed, social instability remained high in Detroit. The business leadership and union movement were deeply splintered as well. Widespread deterioration was evident throughout much of Detroit. "For every new business moving into the city, two more move out. There are over 7,000 vacant store fronts. Thousands of other small stores look like tiny military posts under siege because of their wire or steel fronts and closed doors (Widdick 1972).

In 1972, Detroit elected its first black mayor. The long tenure of Mayor Coleman Young left an indelible stamp on the city's politics and characteristic patterns of decisionmaking for the next two decades. Young's election against Police Commissioner John Nichols was bitterly fought and racially polarized. In a speech kicking off his primary campaign, Young let it be known that his first priority would be the reorganization of the police department. He stated:

The whole attitude of the whole Detroit Police Department, historically, has been one of intimidation and that citizens can be kept in line with

clubs and guns rather than respect. The present department under Nichols is following the old blackjack rule by terror. If elected, I would fire Nichols (Darden et. al 1987, 215).

The greatest evidence of Young's effectiveness in this matter was the radical change in the makeup of the police department. This was difficult due to the resistance of white police officers and their union. While Young would continue to have problems with the police department, it would no longer provide the symbol of white oppression to the citizens of Detroit. Young also inherited a change in the city charter. The strong mayor-council form of government was made stronger which increased the mayor's power in making appointments and over financial affairs, reducing the influence of the city council. City department heads now served at the pleasure of the mayor. Previous scholarship (Darden et al. 1987; DiGiaetano 1987; Hill 1983, 86; Jones and Bachelor 1986; Rich 1989; Thomas 1990) agree that Young fostered a strong partnership between big business and political interests around a corporate-center renewal strategy.

The Young regime emphasized two major economic development areas: central business district/riverfront development and industrial renewal. Residential neighborhood redevelopment received low priority on his agenda. A scheme of large-scale subsidy of private investors and downtown renewal was pursued. Richard Hill states,

Working closely with the city's major corporations, and within the framework of state and federal enabling legislation and programs, Detroit's public officials created a structure which knit together private development organizations and public development agencies...Detroit's public redevelopment blueprint had been worked out in close cooperation with a private coalition of corporate executives, bankers, and real estate developers (1986, 103).

Responding to global transformations in the economy, many former rust-belt cities

pursued a financial center strategy.⁴ The Young regime was no exception. Detroit attempted to rejuvenate its declining city through downtown economic development schemes. The question remains how appropriate this type of restructuring has been for Detroit. Detroit in following this path has been left with insufficient revenues to provide adequate services to its residents, and has had to increasingly depend on volunteer efforts to meet city needs.

The mayor's leadership of the regime increasingly came under attack for concentrating its resources downtown at the expense of local neighborhoods. Funds such as Community Development Block Grants could have been used for neighborhood projects but were used to leverage industrial, central business district and riverfront ventures. This pattern of economic development caused increasing conflict with the Detroit City Council over time.

The construction of the Renaissance Center, a riverfront hotel, office and shopping complex was completed in 1977 and was indicative of the development path pursued by the Young Regime. Henry Ford II, CEO of Ford Motor Company, provided the leadership to get his company and other investors to construct the project.⁵ It was hoped the building of the Renaissance Center would stimulate the rebuilding of the central core

⁴ Examples are numerous and include: Pittsburgh's Allegheny Conference on Community Development; Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley's Chicago's Loop and Lakefront development coalition; Boston's New Boston Committee promoting the Prudential Center project, the urban renewal of Boston's North End, and the building of a large governmental center. Similar coalitions are evident in Atlanta, Baltimore, and St. Louis (Mollenkopf 1978; Kerstein 1975; Jones and Bachelor 1986; Judd 1984).

⁵Young's close friendship with Henry Ford II, facilitated relationships with some of the top white corporate leaders in the city.

of the city, in particular the Riverfront and Central Business District.⁶ Stroh Brewery company made a major commitment to revitalize idle riverfront properties. The People Mover, a monorail that circles downtown with a three mile loop, was built at great expense, designed to attract more traffic to the central business district.⁷ These ventures were expected to at least partially ameliorate the economic crisis facing the central city, and they did contribute to a few other projects along the riverfront. Developments like the Al Taubman and Max Fisher Riverfront West project are characteristic of the Young coalition--expensive, high profile developments with the support of major CEOs and a few of Detroit's economic elite. These efforts have failed to generate broad central city revitalization common among large industrial cities, since the benefits accrued from them have simply been unable to counteract the simultaneous exit of capital and people.

Coleman Young's political coalition was centered on the old industrial-based leaders. He was personally involved with many of the projects to such an extent that he was perceived as the autocratic leader of the governing regime, not just a partner in the enterprise. A top official to the mayor repeated the frequent perception of the city as expressed by Mayor Young, "there's nothing wrong with the city that 100,000 jobs won't cure." From his actions, Young clearly looked for the "Big Three" to supply those jobs.

Reliance upon the manufacture of the automobile, once a source of strength, became a distinctive liability. General Motors, if treated as a nation, would constitute the 24th richest economy in the world (Jones and Bachelor 1986). The public ramifications

⁶ During the 1970s and 1980s the Renaissance Center sustained chronic, sustained financial losses.

⁷ It has not been able to pay for itself with tourists and office workers as riders.

of the private decisions made in the world headquarters of GM, Ford and Chrysler structured the institutional life of Detroit in the 1970s and 1980s. The automobile magnates influenced renewal efforts in the city of Detroit, often to their own benefit.

Perhaps the most striking example of the prominence of the "Big Three" in Young's decisionmaking circle was the city's role in the Poletown project (officially known as the Central Industrial Park Project). This undertaking would become the largest relocation project in the history of the United States. The city using its powers of eminent domain (subsequently challenged but upheld by the Michigan Supreme Court) provided the infrastructure development for a new GM plant.⁸ The city provided local property tax abatements, property acquisition through eminent domain, aid in administering the project, and in acquiring finance through the federal government, and tax increment financing to repay loans from the federal government. All told, the city was able to muster \$203 million dollars in state, federal and city subsidies for this project and subsequently sold the land back to GM for \$8 million and provided a twelve year, 50 percent abatement of property taxes (Jones and Bachelor 1986). A neighborhood of some 1,500 homes and 144 businesses was removed-- all paid by public funds (Jones and Bachelor 1986). Once again, however, the corporate-center strategy fell far short of expected outcomes.⁹

⁸ The city's new charter in 1974, strengthened the economic development structure. Cities could use programs under the Housing and Community Development Act- including Community Development Block Grants, Urban Development Action Grants, and Section 312 loans- for economic development activity (So et al. 1979).

⁹ A few years after the construction of the Poletown plant, GM closed down operations at the Fleetwood and Clark Street plants for a loss of 6,000 jobs. Poletown, when it ran at full capacity turned out about 4,500 jobs. The plant however has averaged about 3,000 workers in

The balancing effect of organized labor in the city partially explains the absence of stronger redevelopment leadership in the city. The city serves as the home base for the leadership of the nation's largest labor unions, including most prominently, the United Auto Workers (UAW). In Detroit, this has led to what Jones and Bachelor call "either a very structured form of pluralism or a fairly open system of elite rule, depending on one's perspective" (Jones and Bachelor 1986, 46).

Detroit's industrial and business firms left the center of Detroit at much higher rates than other cities (J.Thomas 1990). The service sector growth for the city has been especially slow in replacing that loss. Young was heavily criticized by members of the business community for his lack of inclusion of the new service-economy elite. While Young was a key political actor in the industrial renewal and corporate-centered strategy, acrimonious relations developed between the Detroit Chamber of Commerce and the Young administration. The Chamber is generally characterized as the voice of small to mid-size businesses. Those relations worsened throughout his tenure. The formation of a Detroit Strategic Planning group in the mid-1980s effectively excluded the Young administration. According to Rich (1989, 126-151) this suggested the passing of the old industrial-based leaders to a new service-economy elites. Leadership for the Strategic Plan came largely from the heads of banks, utilities and other service sector elites. An influential minister in describing the Young regime argued,

basically the Mayor Young administration for the last 20 years, his signature had to be on everything or else it was not going to happen....Mayor Young has sort of been like a shepherd, herding sheep,

the first few years after operation, far less than the 6,000 that was promised (J. Thomas 1989).

that he knows what's best and everybody has for the most part fallen in line.

A Detroit journalist put it this way,

During Coleman Young era, things got done because the mayor decided he wanted to see them done. It's just that simple. He's a very autocratic manager.....the studies have shown that the Chamber of Commerce was the least involved of any chamber in any major city.

Many business, civic and community respondents claimed his style was one of exclusion, not inclusion. One civic leader claimed, "whatever Young pretty much wanted to happen in the city, in the majority of cases happened. There were very few cases where you find he was out-voted or outdone in issues that were important to him". A respondent from the Detroit Urban League described leadership under Young,

For so many years the leadership, or impetus or initiation for getting things done, maybe to the detriment of the city, always originated in the mayor's office. There has not really been any original idea or initiation by other people and other groups. Even if you had a great idea, you had to run it past the mayor before you go out...

A school board member confirmed this view,

In the past the way things got done in Detroit was the mayor to have the blessing and it happened. If the mayor wasn't for it, it didn't happen. He controlled where ministers would end up. He controlled where business would end up and so in that vein, everything in this city was driven by the mayor.

A top Chamber of Commerce official maintains that power historically has been concentrated in organized labor, the business community and the minority power structure in Detroit. Each of those constituencies had self-interest. You couldn't get them to the table under the old regime. A Detroit business leader stated:

One of the problems Detroit has, in my view, is it has a very dysfunctional civic infrastructure, very dysfunctional....People don't know how to talk

with one another is the basis of the problem, but the civic language of Detroit is the language of the old style of labor negotiations. I mean, in your face, side deals, don't trust anybody, you know, what can I get for myself, and the only way I can get for myself is by pushing somebody else down--very, very win-lose, very dysfunctional culture.

According to a Detroit journalist, there was not an honest interchange that went on among influential groups during Young's twenty year tenure. They could never agree on anything. The result was a vacuum of leadership. Leadership in Detroit owed its power to one of those constituencies--organized labor or business or the minority political base--and it was not free to be independent. The minority political concentrations were described as isolated and protective of their power. Labor was described as dug in, trying to prevent further erosion of its influence. Management was described as preoccupied with survival. There was constant suspicion of "hidden agendas" between the groups. A Detroit journalist pondered, "If you have a power vacuum or if you have such competition among your power groups that they can't rise above it, above their self-interests then who steps in and knocks heads?"

The auto industry operating on a world stage in sort of a do or die corporate survival did not provide the community leadership that many respondents believe was provided by business in other cities that have rebounded. In 1965, the Big Three built 9,332,000 cars in the United States. By 1988 only 7,116,000 cars were built, a loss of 2,000,000 cars (Rich 1993). The census reported a 21 percent loss in industrial operation during the five year period from 1977 to 1982 in Detroit (See also Table 3.2 blue collar employment in the city of Detroit 1960-1990).¹⁰

¹⁰ Detroit Economic Forum, *1984 Economic Fact Book*.

According to a Chamber official, "There were a lot of people who decided they couldn't work with the Young administration. You had a breakdown of the shakers and movers who in Pittsburgh or Cincinnati or some of the more highly structured communities, continued to play a pivotal role." According to a top Chamber official,

The business community did not step up. We did not measure up as occurred in so many other communities. I often ask myself why? The explanation that I give is there is such a tremendous gap between our big companies and the next cut of companies in this community...we might have had the equivalent of 10 or 15 Fortune 500 companies within just a few of the GMs or Fords...so many companies and suppliers had been allowed to sit out any kind of a decision in this community because they just waited for the auto companies to send a signal. If the signal wasn't sent they felt they didn't have to do anything. They were off the hook....those who could call the signals with rare exception being unwilling to assume that responsibility...and there was no pressure on the public leadership to be accountable.

A city council member claimed Young had three primary goals during his twenty year rule. He was going to make the police department and city government more representative of the community racially, he was going to create black millionaires and he was going to do whatever was necessary to bring industry back into town. By most accounts, Young was successful in pursuing the first two goals. Cronyism was described as the modus operandi of the Young regime. "He did whatever big business wanted along as they included one of his friends.....Job creation for small and medium size industry was completely left out." One respondent claimed, "unless you were willing to take on one of the mayor's cronies as a full partner or unless you were one of his cronies, you had to stand and wait in line."

A business respondent argued that Young became so embittered towards the end, that even the people who were enlightened and who understood the depth of his feelings

were turned off by the obvious race bating that he was famous for and that it just wasn't productive. Another business respondent claimed that if the Young administration didn't think of the idea, the city wouldn't buy, no matter how great the plan. Young wanted to take credit for every success and was completely caught up in "ownership".

The Education Regime in Detroit

Detroit's school district is a legally separate institutional entity from the municipality. It is governed by a superintendent appointed by an eleven member school board, one representative from each of the seven areas and four at-large positions. The mayor's office has no formal authority over the school system. During his twenty years as mayor, Coleman Young played only a very minor role in educational policymaking, preferring instead to concentrate on economic development and other issues. In some cities, education policy may be a subset of the governing regime of a city where you might expect to find the elements of the general governing coalition in a city are involved in the education policy regime. In Detroit, however, the school system existed as a distinct political arena with separate set of leaders. This issue arena was simply not part of the Young regime's focus. Yet, the size of the DPS and the number of employees, rivaled that of the city. See Table 3.3 for a comparison of the education and municipal government budgets.

---TABLE 3.3 HERE---

Table 3.3

Detroit City and Detroit Public Schools Budget 1970-1994

Year	Detroit City (gen.expenditures/m)	*Detroit Public Schools (expenditures/m)	Ratio City/DPS
1970-71	428,622	279,000	1.54
1971	489,559	302,000	1.62
1972	540,268	297,000	1.81
1973	548,314	313,000	1.75
1974	622,368	348,000	1.79
1975	654,996	374,000	1.75
1976	690,570	367,000	1.88
1977	890,536	421,000	2.12
1978	989,341	461,000	2.15
1979	1,106,224	508,000	2.18
1980	1,173,927	557,000	2.11
1981	1,143,514	574,000	1.99
1982	1,066,060	570,000	1.87
1983	1,106,122	591,000	1.87
1984	1,144,563	630,000	1.82
1985	1,099,330	701,000	1.57
1986	1,334,409	738,000	1.81
1987	1,590,072	756,000	2.10
1988	1,527,974	762,000	2.10
1989	1,458,081	791,000	2.01
1990	1,583,629	846,000	1.84
1991	n/a	923,000	
1992	n/a	1,026,000	
1993	1,431,169	n/a	
1994	n/a	n/a	

* Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, City Government Finances and Michigan Department of Education

Education had its own unique leadership which was very specialized. Most of the people involved in education were not involved in many other policy areas. A University respondent claimed the city and the school board saw themselves as natural enemies during the Young years. He claims,

The city never established effective liaison relationships so that the school district, city and the county can work together to insure the educational system is improved. I think too often they didn't talk at all. At least that is my experience in this city.

A number of historical events greatly contributed to the development of a narrow governing coalition within the educational arena. Long standing political conflict in the school district over black representation within the system, desegregation, and debates over centralization v. decentralization dominated the educational agenda going back to the 1950s. Residential segregation in Detroit resulted in a neighborhood school system in which pupils were mostly all-black or all-white. Detroit's rather dramatic spatial shift of whites to the surrounding suburbs and southern black migration into the urban core meant neighborhoods were undergoing rapid transition by the late 1950s. The Detroit School Board instituted a transfer policy which allowed students to go to schools in other areas, thus preserving the segregated nature of the schools (Glass and Sanders 1978).

During the 1960's a progressive board and superintendent, Norman Drachler, implemented a number of reforms that enhanced integration efforts. They hired more black teachers, appointed black administrators, rescinded the transfer policy, established more integrative school boundaries (LaNoue and Smith 1973). However, in further pursuing integration goals, they aroused both black and white protest. Many in both the black and white community, wanted racially homogenous districts (LaNoue and Smith

1973). The progressives were ousted in favor of white conservatives. The state legislature also responded by passing a new decentralization bill which required that children attend the school nearest their home, ensuring continued desegregation (Dimond 1985).

With the support of an influential state legislator and future Detroit Mayor, Coleman Young, a decentralization law, Act 48, was passed in 1971 which radically altered the institutional structure of DPS. This law created eight regions with five-member boards in each region. The central board was expanded to include the top vote-getter from each of the regional boards and five at-large members. The eight regions were divided racially with five predominantly black regions and three white.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s community control was favored over integration. This approach, backed with the support of the state legislature, the white community and many radical black leaders in Detroit, left the school board and superintendent with little control over integration reforms. The NAACP filed suit alleging that Act 48 caused de jure segregation in Detroit (Dimond 1985). Judge Stephen Roth agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the Detroit school board to create a magnet school plan and a desegregation plan. Roth also ordered the state to construct a metropolitan desegregation plan for the Detroit area (Dimond 1985). Judge Roth rejected the school board's magnet school plan and desegregation plan. In its place he ordered "two-way busing between Detroit and fifty-two white suburbs, the largest desegregation order ever issued in either the North or South" (Green 1974, 214). However this desegregation victory and a subsequent reinforcement of the decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals were short lived, as

the U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 scuttled any metropolitan remedies to desegregation.

With the escalation of white flight out of the city after the riots of 1967, desegregation was effectively futile. By the mid 1970s, the racial balance of school board officials and key administrative positions began to shift in favor of black control. Detroit elected its first black mayor, Coleman Young, in 1973, and Arthur Jefferson was appointed superintendent in 1974. Detroit Public Schools entered a period of insular control and stable board leadership over the school system.

Dissatisfaction with the decentralization plan grew throughout the 1970s. The regional boards were seen as adding additional, unnecessary layers to the bureaucracy and contributing to a wasteful, patronage system. Proposal S was placed on the September, 1981 ballot in Detroit, which if adopted would abolish the regional boards. Voters approved Proposal S by a wide margin. This plan abolished the eight districts and created seven wards in their place. The central board was to consist of eleven members, with one elected from within each area and four at-large members. This is the current structure for Detroit Public Schools.

As stated, the Young regime did not engage with Detroit Public Schools. It was considered a separate issue arena, left out of the regime's focus on industrial renewal and CBD revival. A top AFL-CIO representative indicated, "The abdication of the mayor's office in representing the entire city was evident, he ought to have gotten behind and pound the living hell out of the school system in terms of progress." A top business official claims,

-- General leaders did not play an important role in education. The Mayor avoided interfering with education.....there's been no stated up front

declaration on the part of the political leadership in this community that they're concerned about the quality of public education and the bureaucracy that has permeated the public education system. The business community until the mid-1980s assumed the same posture.

A former DPS board member asserted that prior to 1989, the school system was an island all to itself, where the educators were the leaders, the drivers. He maintained that during the 1970s Detroit operated a high cost, deficit operation, with a lack of physical accountability, a lack of good management techniques and micromanagement by the board. Those problems were compounded as the district, like the city at large in the 1960s and 1970s, was punctuated by white disinvestment. Ultimately, this had drastic consequences on the funding mechanism for DPS. As Standard Equalized Value (SEV) values dropped in the city, citizens in Detroit had to accept extremely high millage rates in attempts to adequately fund school programs.¹¹ This and other tax burdens in the district made the city even less attractive as a place for future investment, maintaining existing businesses and wealthier residents. A community advocate claims,

The public education system in this city has some incredible journeys over the last 10 to 20 years, from integration, the whole busing issue, school finance, having to deal with the unions, those difficult strikes. Tons of political infighting which is beyond belief, none of which I believe has done anything for the benefit of youth and their education.

The school system was very closed under the Jefferson tenure. An educational liaison for one of the big businesses in Detroit stated, "Teachers are essentially isolationist and a bit power hungry- that is why they chose the profession because there is a lot of autonomy. Consequently, they are not real open to new ideas, nor are they open to

¹¹ From 1972 until a state referendum in 1993, local property tax was extremely important in raising revenues in Michigan's schools. SEV in Michigan during this time was set at half the value of the property in question.

having people in the classroom and they are not eager to share their turf."

According to a leader of a powerful non-profit group, the educational philosophy of the district was mired in the concept that we don't prepare people for jobs, we prepare them for life. He contends this philosophical reach denied accountability for the youngsters' lack of preparedness for any kind of employment. The business commitment was described as highly erratic during the long Jefferson tenure and a group that could not be depended on. A former DPS official claims,

The business community is primarily white. They operate within the city but do not live in the city. Consequently, one would question the level of intensity of their interest and their commitment to be in it over the long haul....at times they were very critical. Criticism is one thing and useful perhaps. However it is also necessary, if you will, to roll up your sleeves and work, not on the basis of some spur of the moment thing but develop partnerships and collaborations and be in it for the long haul....they were unpredictable. Hopefully that is changing....it's got to be much more institutional, systemic, a marriage. I don't think schools can operate effectively in isolation, nor can the business community anymore afford to be willy nilly on its own and not become involved with education and training issues.

The religious community, probably more than any other group, had the most involvement with the schools during the long period of insularity under Jefferson. According to a former superintendent they were the only group without a well established agenda except to help kids. They were a powerful support group and all Detroit superintendents worked to cultivate those relationships. Jefferson spent a good deal of time in conference with local ministers and in attending and addressing congregations. A business official claims that of the top 20 leaders in the city at least four or five are ministers, with the single most powerful organization in Detroit, the Baptist Church. A former superintendent quipped, "I found the religious community to be extremely helpful.

I maintained contact with organizational leaders, went to their meetings, not only when I wanted something but periodically to give them update reports." Left outside of any sustained involvement with the schools was city government, state government, county government, non-profit and community groups, universities and most importantly the business community.

The City of Detroit and Detroit Public Schools: The Leadership Vacuum

According to a large number of respondents, by the mid 1980s, there was a leadership crisis in two major institutional arenas in Detroit, city government and the school system. Neither was generating new policy ideas. With respect to the city, a respondent from one of the Detroit papers argued, "There have not been any individuals in the forefront of leadership because our current mayor was so powerful, whether it's real or whether it's pseudo. Everybody stayed in the background, kept their mouth shut, that's about the size of it."

Within city government, many placed the blame at the lack of communication or tandem thinking between city council and the mayor's office. Others pointed towards the racial polarization behind every decision, and that every direction became literally black-white. A Chamber official emphatically suggested decisions didn't get made in the city since the late 1970s. He suggested,

There was no consensus of priority for Detroit. Every place I've been that existed. There was some kind of a commonly understood set of goals that didn't have to be written down, a blueprint that people subscribe to-- not in blood-- but there was a constant dialogue going on between people who were elected to leadership roles and those who inherited leadership roles and those who earned them through action and those who simply got them

from the position they've occupied....That doesn't go on here. And to the extent that there was a decision made now and then, I think we just kind of stumbled into it.

A community advocate commented, "I have not had the privilege to go to Beirut but I would bet they are further ahead in recovery than Detroit since the 1960s. I would say without any hesitation, leadership has been absent in this city."

Advocate after advocate claim they were not an active stakeholder in either the city's or the school district's affairs during the Young and Jefferson tenures. A respondent from United Community Services claims, "We didn't do a lot with the city. That was primarily because of the way the city operated under the old mayor. I think the vision calls for us to do a lot more differently now that the situation has changed."

Another community advocate responded,

When you asked the question of leadership, I've been very cautious. I've been tiptoeing around it for the last half hour but Young was the leader and the disintegration of the city escalated under his watch...when the man took office everybody rallied around him and he had tremendous ideas and objectives and a spirit of the future. Over the years he built this cocoon around himself and lost image and sight.

The Young regime was described as highly confrontational and stood aside from and outside of the metropolitan area. The breach in communication between the mayor and the entire business community was so bad that it contributed to an escalation of disinvestment. The mayor's statement during his last year in office, according to a Detroit journalist, "was that the business community's idea of me getting along with them is to have me kiss their ass." While such overt hostility did not exist between the business community and Arthur Jefferson, business involvement was virtually non-existent throughout his tenure. The Detroit business community was making a statement by

leaving the city, and not by reinvesting in sustained school initiatives. What little involvement did exist was primarily on a school by school basis. By all accounts, both the city government and the DPS faced fiscal and political crisis in the 1980s.

PROBLEM PERCEPTIONS BY DETROIT RESPONDENTS

This research investigates a vigorous period of policy reform in education in Detroit following the long period of stability. The reform efforts involved stakeholders who were absent from decisionmaking roles in the past. New items were placed on the agenda in Detroit, in particular the Detroit Compact (Chapter 4) and Empowerment, Diversity and Choice (Chapter 5). John Kingdon (1984) states the reason for agenda activity (the why) is less important than the who (the stakeholders) and the what (the consequences of the who). Stakeholder involvement and institutional consequences of the reform process are the primary focus of this research, but the reasons for agenda activity will be briefly explored by examining the problem perceptions as expressed by Detroit respondents. Ideas have the ability to mobilize. As a consequence, urban regimes are defined both by the participants that are engaged in the governing process and by the ideas that energize these participants (Stone 1989). Rochefort and Cobb (1994, 4) conclude that "public policymaking must also be understood as a function of the perceived nature of the problems being dealt with, and the qualities that define this nature are never incontestable..Once crystallized, some definitions will remain long-term fixtures of the policy-making landscape; other definitions may undergo constant revision or be replaced altogether by competing formulations." Regime changes may occur when the

ideas supported by the governing coalition undergo a major shift (Jones and Bachelor 1993). That is why problem perceptions may be helpful in understanding educational reform.

If there is transformation in the leadership coalition inducing changes in the education agenda in Detroit, what factors could account for this change? For many years, leaders in Detroit focused on the physical redevelopment of the downtown as the principal strategy for arresting the damaging impact of economic restructuring. This research investigates whether leaders in Detroit today are moving to discuss and put on the agenda human capital enhancement programs. What would explain the recent interest in the broader community in Detroit to target the educational arena in the city and engage with DPS? Table 3.4 shows the top responses to the question posed to respondents, what are the biggest problems the city of Detroit faces? Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue, how a policy is understood and discussed, the "policy image", helps set the political agenda and mobilize actors and resources for change. While this is a biased sample because respondents have been already identified as "players" within the education arena, the elaboration of their answers provides important clues to suggest why the education arena became of growing significance to a variety of leaders in Detroit.

---TABLE 3.4 HERE---

Table 3.4

Problem Perceptions of Detroit Respondents

Quality of Education	69%
Jobs-Employment Opportunities	57%
Crime and Safety	49%
Economic Development	29%
Breakdown in Social Values	15%
Poor City/Suburban Relations	13%
Racism	13%
Poor Health and Social Services	10%
Poor Political Leadership	6%
Poor Transportation	4%
Poverty	4%
Housing	4%
Negative Media Coverage	3%
City Budget	1%

Note: Based on 68 interview respondents who were asked this question. Multiple responses were accepted.

Most notably, a large percent of respondents claimed quality of education and job-employment opportunities as the primary problems in the city. Many mentioned pervasive concerns over the impact of crime and safety and continuing concerns over economic development.

Because this case study investigates possible regime formation around education

issues, the emphasis on quality of education by Detroit respondents is important to this research. According to a Chrysler respondent, the industry began to realize in the 1980s, the quality of workmanship in the city was really suffering. Chrysler was forced to provide manual pictures of what they wanted the workers to do in very simple language. That served as the catalyst that Chrysler needed to become more involved with the K-12 system. Another big business official stated,

Education is the answer. It doesn't matter whether you're talking about preparing yourself for a job or understanding why you have racist feelings or how to play a trumpet, the way to achieve your goal is through education. If Detroit can't produce students who are job ready, then Detroit doesn't have a future because I can assure you that there are other states that are getting it right. If we want to continue to thrive, if we want people to continue to afford our products and services and if the area can't produce people who are job ready, then the General Motors, the Fords, the Whirlpools and those who depend on highly skilled people are going to go where they can find them.

According to business respondents, involvement in the educational processes provides business and industry with a better chance of getting the kind of skills that business needs to the students.¹² A consensus was slowly emerging that employment and education programs should be linked more strongly with economic development. A stronger educational and training system began to get attention and was frequently mentioned by consultants hired to analyze strategic planning for the city (Williams 1987). A former

¹²The issuance of the National Commission on Excellence in Education report, *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform* (1983) has been credited with focusing attention on education as a tool for economic development. This report exhorted business leaders to take an interest in the schools. A former superintendent believes that over the last couple of years at the national level, more of a rhetoric has emerged which supports the kinds of collaboration increasingly becoming evident in the Detroit community.

school board member put it this way,

I think the educational system is a key piece for developing future resources in this city that has in the past been neglected, i.e. our children and for setting up a good economic base to attract middle- and upper-class people back into the city. If the city has a poor school system, people with jobs, with incomes, people that pay taxes are going to leave for other places.

A former board member and union official stated, "the unskilled portion of the population has become such an economic drag on the whole region. This is really one of the reasons I got into this." According to a community advocate,

We have not prepared our young people for the world of work...and that has disastrous implications....for our metropolitan area. Our young people are not prepared and really have not the skills and wherewithal to survive...that's going to cost us dearly in the years ahead.

A DPS principal reflecting on the need to expand the scope of business involvement stated,

I don't see any other way of our schools becoming schools of the future without our business affiliations. We cannot have candy sales and expect that these children pay for computers and all the technology that they'll need....I see that businesses will have a major, major role in helping the schools.

Chrysler's "most harrowing, private nightmare," vice chairman Gerald Greenwald told a group of minority suppliers, "will be finding people capable of running its sophisticated, state-of-the-art Jefferson Avenue assembly plant, now under construction in Detroit." (Muller 1989).¹³ According to Elaine Gordon of the Michigan Department of Education, businesses in Detroit are being hit by a double whammy because the number of young

¹³ According to Greenwald, Chrysler already spends \$120 million a year retraining its work force. Chrysler had to rewrite its training materials from 9th and 10th grade reading levels to 6th grade level. In some cases they have had to replace any written instructions with pictorials.

people entering the work force is declining and many of those who do may be unemployable (Muller 1989).

The business concern for the educational quality of DPS students is also echoed in the area university concerns. A significant portion of college bound students in the DPS empties into Wayne State University and the University of Detroit. A Wayne State respondent claims that they were giving an English proficiency test at the end of two years of college. Coming out of the Detroit school system, 60 percent of blacks were flunking at the end of two years. Forty percent of whites were failing that same test. Another university respondent explained,

Education is the only key for any of our salvation. If we look for Dennis Archer or Sharon McPhail or Art Blackwell or Bill Clinton or John Engler or whoever to get us through the night, we are wrong. They can do the road maps for us, but we'll have to take the journey ourselves.

The Chamber of Commerce annually surveys its members about their attitudes and concerns. According to a Chamber respondent, concern about the quality of the Detroit Public Schools rose to a position of prominence in the mid 1980s. Before that time jobs, unemployment, crime, insurance costs and the image of Detroit were frequently listed. Chamber members began to realize that education affects all these areas. A former superintendent agrees that external forces have begun to more sharply focus on the need for producing a kind of citizen and worker who will be able to effectively compete. It is those kind of forces that have been instrumental in driving the structural signs of collaboration and cooperation that are evident in the Detroit Compact, the focus of Chapter 4.

With the changes in the local economy in Detroit, the mismatch between labor

force needs and skill levels poses problems for the city. During the 1980s, jobs that require high skills and advanced education were rising just as the dropout rates were increasing and achievement scores were lagging. A business respondent claims, "We need to do some significant training of our richest resource which is our people. We have to link economic development with the fortunes of our youngsters". The continued education failure of the DPS system began to be seen as a threat to the economic future of the community.

Table 3.5 indicates the growing educational demands placed upon the workforce in Detroit. From 1970 to 1980 the percentage of jobs available with less than a high school education dropped from 37.3% to 21.1%. At the same time the distribution of jobs that required a college degree or at least some college increased from 21.9% to 46.1%.

Table 3.5

Percentage Distribution of Jobs in Detroit
by Education Level of Jobholders 1970 and 1980

	Less than high school	High school graduate	Some college	College graduate
1970	37.3	36.8	13.9	12.0
1980	21.1	32.8	25.8	20.3

Source: John D. Kasarda (1989). "Urban Industrial Transition and the Urban Underclass." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501: 26-47; Table 4.

The increasing need for investment in human capital and intellectual infrastructure was becoming apparent to many within the Detroit community.

By the 1980s it became obvious to many in the Detroit community, that DPS could not address the multitude of education problems on their own. According to a

former superintendent, the deficits associated with poverty have gotten so much worse in Detroit even in the last 10 to 15 years. Racial isolation, high drop out rates, absenteeism, crime, teacher unrest and building deterioration are but a few symptoms of how the city's decline has impacted the Detroit Public Schools. A former superintendent stated that any collaborative reform initiative that is less than community-wide is not likely to impact the system, given the enormity of the needs that exist within the district. A religious leader states:

The school should be the centerpiece of the Detroit community. The block club, the churches, the area businesses, that should be their primary function is the area school. If you have a good school you're going to have good people living in your neighborhood which is going to translate into having a good community, having a viable church.

In addition, the Detroit community had repeatedly supported additional tax increases for their schools. Yet, DPS faced continual financial crisis. A general consensus emerged that the district was not managing its money very well. The crisis was the result of long term fiscal problems. For eleven of fifteen fiscal years beginning July 1, 1972, the Detroit Public School District had reported a deficit in its general fund balance. The accumulated deficit as of June 30, 1988 was estimated at \$69.7 million and projected to rise to \$151 million by 1989 (using State of Michigan school accounting rules). Table 3.6 documents the growth of the deficit.

---TABLE 3.6 HERE---

Table 3.6

The Development of the DPS Deficit

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Accrued Deficit</u>
1990	\$201 million (est.)
1989	\$151 million
1988	\$69.0 million
1987	\$33.4 million
1986	\$18.1 million
1985	\$18.6 million

Source: Citizens' Education Committee, October 1989.

The quality of Detroit's school system continued to decline precipitously in the 1980s and by 1988 the system was on the brink of state receivership. Significant numbers of young people were ill prepared to participate in an economy that was rapidly changing. These concerns over education quality as well as the expressed problem perceptions of jobs-employment opportunities, crime and safety and economic development, along with the recognition of the inadequacy of the Young regime's physical redevelopment of the central business district, may have led key local decisionmakers to reevaluate their interest in working with the schools.

Sayre and Kaufman in their study of New York City argued that it is only by studying specialized decision centers that you can really understand urban governance (1960). It is the education issue arena that the rest of this research investigation will turn before revisiting how the education arena relates more broadly to decisionmaking in the city. There may be some significant realigning of some of the community institutions in Detroit with a new set of priorities emerging for the city.

UNDERPINNINGS OF EMERGENT REGIME TRANSFORMATION IN DETROIT

A number of events transpired in Detroit in the mid 1980s which laid the foundations for the reform agenda that would ensue. One of the events paramount to the new focus around education issues in Detroit was the making of the Detroit Strategic Plan in 1987. The local regime's corporate sector decided that redevelopment of the downtown had been insufficient to revitalize the city. That realization culminated in the formation of the Detroit Strategic Planning Group. The set of priorities that emanated from this group indicated that the governing regime had not adequately handled most of Detroit's most pressing needs. The major recommendation that would be implemented out of this plan was extensive public-private collaboration with Detroit Public Schools. This effort would be no small undertaking, given over two decades of bureaucratic insularity with virtually no business involvement in the district.

Detroit Renaissance, which has spearheaded a lot of the high powered visionary work about the future of Detroit, financed this plan. Top executives involved on the Strategic Plan's task force included Michigan Bell, Detroit Edison, Michigan Consolidated Gas, the American Automobile Association of Michigan. Noticeably absent from the leadership circle were representatives from the Big Three automakers (except for one of ten cochairs) and Mayor Young. The plan offered a means by which partners could reevaluate the role of corporate leadership and the various civic organizations in the city's redevelopment. The five task forces made recommendations on crime, image, education race relations and jobs and economic development. Of the five, only the education task

force recommendations would achieve agenda status and begin the process of implementation in the form of the Detroit Compact.

The Detroit Strategic Planning Initiative that emerged in the mid 1980s indicated that solving technological displacement, retooling the smokestack industries towards computer design and production systems, as well as continuing in the development of new ideas and materials and strengthening the small and mid-size business entrepreneurial base, would pose new challenges *to Detroit's educational system*. Local business and community leaders began conceiving improved educational effectiveness as imperative to their own survival and growth. The business community worried that in Detroit, with a less and less educated workforce, there would be a shortage of needed workers. A director of one of the alternative schools in the city argued,

Companies and individuals and chairman of major corporations in this city told me that they spend enormous sums of money trying to retrain or bring up to par people who come to work for them in different parts of the city. They just spend thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars for education. They are not getting the value for what they pay.....There is a desire to want to invest. Because everyone realizes that the greatest resource of this city are the children.

The Detroit Strategic Planning Group coincided with other business and community leaders, parents, as well as the State, who began to express grave concerns regarding Detroit Public School's operations.

In addition to the fiscal problems discussed, the Detroit Board of Education was also racked by allegations of corruption and expensive perquisites. Some board members were using district funds to be chauffeured in expensive limousines and to take first class trips to other states. All the while, drop out rates soared to all time highs. From 1981-

1986 the DPS dropout rate soared to 41.34%.¹⁴ The DPS Board of Education, agreed to the establishment of a Citizens Education Committee (CEC), chartered during 1987, to investigate these problems and help implement the recommendations of the Detroit Strategic Plan. The Citizens' Education Committee brought together disparate parts of the Detroit community. One of the members of the CEC claims there has never been such a prominent collection of leaders like that ever assembled in Detroit. Most of the leaders involved in the CEC would later become evident in the institutional structure of the Detroit Compact. See Table 3.7 for a cross section of the diverse participation in the CEC.

---TABLE 3.7 HERE---

¹⁴ Source: Department of Student Information Systems, June 1991.

Table 3.7

DPS Citizens' Education Committee 1987

Co-chair: Mr. Donald R Mandich Chairman/Chief Executive Officer Comerica, Inc.	Dr. E. Daniel Grady Vice President Public Relations/Public Affairs Michigan Bell Telephone Company	Rev. Edmund A. Millet United Methodist Church
Co-chair: Mr. Howard F. Sims Chairman/Chief Executive Officer Sims-Varner and Associates, Inc.	Mr. Dennis Green General Auditor Ford Motor Company	Rev. Charles Morton Metropolitan Baptist Church
Dr. John C. Burkhardt Executive Director Citizens' Education Committee	Dr. Joe Green President Organization of School Administrators/Supervisors	Ms. Lisa Ilitch Murray Director of Corporate Communications/Public Affairs Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc.
Dr. David Adamany President, Wayne State University	Mr. Frank Hayden Chairperson City-Wide School/Community Organization	The Honorable Frances Pitts Presiding Chief Judge of Juvenile Court
Rev. William Ardrey St. Paul A.M.E. Zion Church	Mr. Paul Hubbard President, New Detroit, Inc.	Dr. John W. Porter President Emeritus Eastern Michigan University
Rev. Charles Butler New Calvary Baptist Church	Representative Teola Hunter President Pro Tem Michigan House	Mr. Armando Rivas Director, LA SED
Mr. James Cordes Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer American Natural Resources Co.	Dr. Arthur L. Johnson President NAACP, Detroit Branch	Mr. John Sagan, President John Sagan Associates
Ms. Marie Farrell Donaldson Ombudsman, City of Detroit	Representative William R. Keith Chairman Michigan House Ed. Committee	Senator John Schwarz Chairman Michigan Senate Education Committee
Mr. Walter E. Douglass President, Avis Ford	Mr. John Kelmendi Chairman City-Wide Bilingual Advisory Council Committee	Mr. Edgar A. Scribner President Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO
Mr. John Elliot President Detroit Federation of Teachers	Ms. Lillian Kyser Student Renaissance High School	Mr. Roger Short Auditor General City of Detroit
Dr. Maureen A. Fay President Mercy College of Detroit	Dr. Robert F. Larson President and General Manager WTVS - Channel 56	Representative Alma Stallworth Chairman Black Legislative Caucus
Mr. Jonathon Fisher President Detroit Area Council, PTSA	Rev. James A. Lewis Mt. Beulah Baptist Church	Mr. S. Martin Taylor Vice President Community/Governmental Affairs Detroit Edison Company
Mr. Leonard Fuller Partner Management Consulting Services Coopers and Lybrand	Mr. John Lobbia President The Detroit Edison Company	Mr. James Trent President Detroit Association of Black Organizations
Mr. Dennis Gibson Executive Director Metropolitan Detroit Youth Foundation, Inc.	Ms. Barabara Roberts Mason Immediate Past President Michigan State Board of Education	Mr. Richard Van Dusen President Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Charles Gordon President, City-Wide School Community Organization		

There was also a direct link between the CEC and the Detroit Strategic Planning Group. Both Co-Chairs of the CEC, Donald R. Mandich, chairman and chief executive officer of Comerica Inc., and Howard F. Sims, chairman and chief executive officer of Sims-Varner and Associates, Inc., played key roles in the Detroit Strategic Planning Process a year earlier, with Sims chairing the Education Task Force of the Detroit Strategic Planning Process from which the Detroit Compact originated. The increasing activism of the business community coincided with the goals of various civic, religious, and community leaders who wanted to see change. For a year, these individuals with representation from business, labor, government, education, religious and community groups met to prepare their recommendations for the district. The Committee expressed its recommendations to assuring educational quality, fiscal stability and managerial accountability. The introduction to the CEC recommendations state,

The tenure of the Citizen's Education Committee coincided with a period of unprecedented focus on the leadership and governance of the Detroit Public Schools. Public debate, newspaper and television scrutiny, contested ballot issues and political intrigue have sustained an environment where schools and schooling are prominent issues for anyone concerned with the future of our city.

In addition to the CEC and the Detroit Strategic Planning Group, the State of Michigan also charted a panel of experts through the State Board of Education for a Select Report on the DPS. In June of 1988, the Interim State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Gary Hawks, appointed a select, five person panel to investigate matters relating to the DPS's deficit. The chair of the Select Panel, John Porter, would subsequently be appointed as interim general superintendent in Detroit. The panel was

directed to report its findings and recommendations to the State Board of Education by December 15, 1988. The panel sought the advice and counsel of the Department of Education staff and of professionals in finance, public policy and law. They documented the magnitude of the educational and financial difficulties besetting the DPS. "They are not simple problems of race, poverty or underachieving children; but rather a complex amalgam of fiscal, organizational, cultural and social issues that require serious consideration and concerted effort on the part of all stakeholders." The major conclusion reached by the Select Panel is that without immediate and significant intervention, the Detroit Public School District would be unable to improve the delivery system and would continue to incur substantial deficits. The community decided it was imperative to find new ways to *keep kids in school* and drastically reduce the drop out rates while improving performance. Encouraging drug free behavior was another big issue, especially with the business community.

All of this transpired while Detroiters consistently approved additional tax dollars for their schools (See Table 3.8). In the fall of 1988, when administrators asked for one more tax hike, the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce did what it had not done in 20 years. The board voted against providing more money for Detroit schools and refused to support the renewal of the existing tax levy and a request to authorize the selling of \$160 million in debt retirement bonds. A Chamber of Commerce respondent contended,

We endorsed every millage that came along on the basis of those in charge of the public education system said it was necessary but we never went back and made an assessment as to what we were getting for that...and all of the sudden we found the system had gone to pieces because the people who presented themselves at the front door, for a job, were totally incapable of meeting the requirements of the workforce...it wasn't until the

mid 1980s that this organization began to question and demand more accountability.

Table 3.8

Detroit Public Schools Millage Votes
and Detroit Chamber of Commerce Positions: 1980-1992

DATE	REQUEST	CHAMBER POSITION	OUTCOME	IMPACT
Nov. 1980	3.5-mill increase (defeated in Aug. 1980)	Support	Approved: 56%-44%	Avoid Teacher Layoffs, Restore school day, music art, etc.
Nov. 1981	3-mill renewal	Support	Approved	Maintain status quo
	\$40-mill bond issue, 15 yrs	Support	Approved	Repair to 70 buildings
April 1984	7.5-mill renewal (special election)	Support	Approved: 68%-32%	Maintain status quo
Nov. 1984	4-mill increase, 5 yrs	Support	Approved: 53%-47%	Security officers/alarm system, 6th hr., books, transportation
Nov. 1985	2.5-mill renewal	Support	Approved: 62%-38%	Daily operations- continue staffing levels, books/supplies, alternative learning
1986	\$162-mill bond issue	Support	Approved	School Center Bldg
April 1988	7-mill renewal	Support	Approved: 55%-45%	Partial elimination of deficit
Nov. 1988	6-mill increase	Oppose	Defeated: 3-2 margin	Continued deficit
	\$160-mill bond issue	Oppose	Defeated: 3-2 margin	
Nov. 1989	5-mill increase (raising operative levy to 40.9 mills)	Support	Approved: 3-2 margin	Restore programs, 6% pay raise, \$14-m academic reforms
Nov. 1992	3-mill renewal	Support	Approved: 67%-33%	Reinstates expired tax levy
Nov. 1994	\$1.5-billion bond issue, 45 yrs	Oppose	Approved: 60%-40%	Renovation, new construction, tech. upgrades, equipment

This unprecedented level of activism contributed to the 1988 school board elections in which four reform-minded at-large candidates challenged long-time incumbents. After a decade of relatively stable school board leadership, endemic poor performance of the city's schools and a number of scandals revolving around political patronage and perquisites made incumbent board members particularly vulnerable in the November 1988 school board elections. Table 3.9 indicates the stability in the DPS Board of Education positions before the reform era. All four incumbent at-large board members were ousted in favor of reform-minded advocates who ran as a team calling themselves HOPE.¹⁵ The HOPE team built a strong majority on the school board (at one point 10 of 11 members according to a current board member were reformers). There was broadbased community support because they ran on an educational agenda and there was dissatisfaction with the previous board. Included in this reform coalition, for the first time according to a former superintendent was a "very strong business community actively involved in education and not simply in terms of rhetoric". The Detroit Chamber of Commerce played an especially important role in concentrating support for the electoral victory.

---TABLE 3.9 HERE---

¹⁵ The team called itself HOPE, using the first letter of their last names: Frank Hayden, David Olmstead, and Lawrence Patrick, Jr. for Education. They were joined by Joseph Blanding after the primary.

Table 3.9

DPS School Leadership

	Supt's Name	Supt's race	Supt's previous position	School Board: Total Members	Board: Members with <2 yrs experience
Fall 1980	Arthur Jefferson	Black		13	4
1981	Jefferson			13	3
1982	Jefferson			11	3
1983	Jefferson			11	1
1984	Jefferson			11	2
1985	Jefferson			11	2
1986	Jefferson			11	0
1987	Jefferson			11	1
1988	Jefferson			11	1
1989	John Porter	Black	President, Eastern MI University	11	5
1990	Porter			11	10
1991	Deborah McGriff	Black	Deputy Supt. Milwaukee Schools	11	6
1992	McGriff			11	3
1993	David Snead	Black	Principal Cass Tech High School	11	3
1994	Snead			11	2

While the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce does not endorse candidates and as such, took no public position on any of the candidates for the school board, the HOPE team's list of campaign contributors included almost all of the who's who of metropolitan Detroit business leaders. According to a former HOPE team member, the business community provided the majority of campaign funds. The president of New Detroit, Inc., Martin Taylor, was also an outspoken critic of the incumbent school board. New Detroit's opposition probably has even a greater impact than the Chamber's because the civic group had more "grassroots" credibility in the community. New Detroit, Inc., the Chamber and the Booker T. Washington Business Association (a group of black business men and women) and Detroit churches held forums to enable the candidates to make their case to the public.

Like the Detroit Compact which can be traced to the Detroit Strategic Planning Group and the CEC, the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda that would soon be advanced by the HOPE reformers, also had roots in earlier actions taken in the District. The first attempt in Detroit at fostering greater site-based decisionmaking (empowerment) can be traced to the decentralization law that was mandated in DPS on January 1, 1971 by the Michigan State Legislature which was eliminated a decade later. As a result, the eight existing regional boards were replaced with an 11-member board of education with the power to hire or fire six area superintendents. For a long period, decentralization was ignored.

A number of events were paramount to helping elevate empowerment to agenda status, even before the HOPE victory. A year before the election, in 1987, Dr. Jefferson

reintroduced two new decentralization efforts- participatory management and school-based management. In 1987, Jefferson's plan to reintroduce decentralization to the DPS in his *Design for Organizational Effectiveness*, was approved by the pre-HOPE board of education. In the early part of 1988, the implementation steps for the 1987 *Design* were outlined in the *Organizational Effectiveness Plan: Moving Toward the 21st Century*. The plan introduced the concept of local school empowerment and recommended a fundamental restructuring of the organization of DPS to provide better support for schools.

The Citizen's Education Committee (CEC) also endorsed empowerment as part of a reform strategy. The CEC argued for the need for an advanced version of the decentralization initiatives begun by Jefferson. The CEC recommendations stated:

- empowered schools should have considerable discretion over curriculum, instruction and other activities
- empowered schools should be encouraged to use their creativity and talent to design their program in a way they believe will be effective
- empowered schools should have significant control over the allocation of the school's budget, personnel and other resources
- empowered schools should be expected to involve parents and the community
- empowered schools should be held accountable for the results of the school's program, the most important result of which is student learning.

Source: Final Report of the Citizens Education Committee, October 1989.

Advocacy for Diversity and Choice also began before the HOPE elections. Schools of choice were first examined in a task force that studied the issue in 1986. When the Parental Task Force's report presented its findings to the DPS board of education in 1986, there were only 4 k-8 schools of choice and two high schools of choice in a district of 262 schools (Patrick 1989). This task force studied existing schools

of choice within the district and throughout the United States and made recommendations to improve educational offerings to students. HOPE board member Lawrence Patrick claims the Detroit Public Schools Parental Task Force's comprehensive report provided clear and convincing evidence that an overwhelming demand for additional schools of choice existed in Detroit (1989).

After the election, the HOPE board quickly established a working majority based on election pledges to restructure the city's school system. They incorporated many of the recommendations from both the CEC and Select Panel into their agenda. In 1988, the election of the HOPE reformers who were swept into office raised expectations for radical policy reform in Detroit. Eventually the HOPE team agreed to a synthesis of empowerment and choice as central tenets in their reform agenda, along with the implementation of the Detroit Compact. One of the HOPE reformers states:

We discovered in 1987 that we had a shared common interest in education. Larry (Patrick) at that time was part of a public funded Detroit civic taskforce- Schools of Choice. Larry and I used to have extended debates over several months time, sort of like the Old Miller Light commercial's 'great taste' versus 'less filling.' Our arguments were about empowerment versus choice. I did not accept the notion of choice at the time. I raised the concerns usually brought forward in the choice debate, relating to skimming and other inequalities. Finally, after all of these debates Larry and I reached a consensus over the agenda, a synthesis of Empowerment, Diversity, and Choice. We felt if you really truly had empowerment, schools would take on their own character. By the way, we meant full scale empowerment. Virtually all authority down at the school level, subject only to accountability for physical integrity and academic performance.

The HOPE team decided that a change in administration was needed at the top, in order to advance their reform agenda. According to a former DPS Board of Education member, Dr. Jefferson was thoughtful and competent but during his 15-year tenure spent

most of his time battling with the board and never had the votes to implement anything especially innovative. Jefferson was described as a micromanager, never delegating authority. Thus, the HOPE team inherited a system of actors who were not used to independent action. A HOPE team reformer complained that just like city hall, everything that happened in the school system took place out of the general superintendent's office. The six Area superintendents had been given very little discretion to act independently. The people in place were not used to making important decisions.

According to a HOPE team member,

We asked Jefferson to come up with someone to fill the spot, and he met with us the next day and that's when I noticed, that he decided that he needed to leave. He couldn't think of one person among his hierarchy that could handle that, a very educational process. 'You hired and put in place every one of those people to the level of management, supervisors, department heads and you mean there isn't one that is up to that task?' I think he recognized this point and that he could not put good people in place. And that was basically when he decided to leave.

Under pressure from the HOPE reformers, Jefferson retired. He was replaced on an interim basis by Dr. John Porter, former president of Eastern Michigan University. The business community not only helped recruit Porter to serve as interim superintendent while a national search was conducted, but they agreed to Porter's precondition to accepting the job- that his salary and the salary of his staff would be paid not by the Detroit Public Schools, but by the business community. That amounted to over one million dollars raised through Detroit Renaissance and its auspices. This level of community involvement had been unprecedented in the operation of DPS.

According to a former HOPE team member, Porter's primary charge was to improve the financial condition of the Detroit Public Schools and set the stage for

structural reform. The district became financially solvent and accountability improved. With the active engagement of community stakeholders in the education arena that had long been silent and the election of a reform minded school board, all the pieces seem to be in place to advance policy reform. The HOPE team's reform agenda was solidified when Dr. Deborah McGriff, a nationally-respected urban education innovator from Milwaukee Public Schools, was hired to a three-year contract in July 1991. McGriff came to Detroit committed to a broad agenda for change. A DPS administrator stated:

McGriff came to Detroit because the board that was interviewing her, made a commitment to a 5 year plan. They had recently been elected so there was broadbased community support. They had run on a specific educational agenda and there was dissatisfaction with the previous board in the way they had conducted business. There was also a very strong business community actively involved in education with the advent of the Detroit Compact and not simply in terms of rhetoric but they implemented a program that many people found helpful. Parents were beginning to demand that the partnership program be in their schools. The Compact was very closely connected to accountability in terms of increased achievement and increased student attendance and connecting that to college scholarships and jobs. So there was every indication that she was entering a place that matched her philosophy of education. There was broadbased support for what she wanted to do.

The city's school system seem poised on the brink of significant change. The period of attempts at advancing a reform agenda-- the Detroit Compact and Empowerment, Diversity and Choice-- in Detroit would commence with high expectations. Despite the emergence of a reform coalition, policy change is not assured. The new board would still face an administration that was not accustomed to decisive action, a highly organized teachers union, a history of political divisiveness, and a city government under the leadership of Coleman Young, which remained on the sidelines and could not be counted on as an advocate for change.

SUMMARY

For two decades under Mayor Coleman Young, a relatively closed regime involving the mayor and a small circle of industrial elites maintained a singular focus on industrial renewal and the central business district revitalization. Similarly, since the consolidation of black political power in the early 1970s, the Detroit Public Schools maintained an insular regime with little interference from those outside the educational community. There was no direct involvement between the city's decisionmakers in city hall and the city's massive urban school system. Many important community stakeholders were noticeably absent from a leadership or collaborative role in both the city and the schools systems affairs.

With the leadership of the business community through the auspices of Detroit Renaissance and the Detroit Chamber of Commerce in the latter part of the 1980s, both informal and institutional attempts were made to engage key city stakeholders with the city's educational system as part of a human investment strategy. This contributed to the electoral success of a reform slate of candidates on the Detroit Board of Education whom enhanced this effort. They hired a well respected interim superintendent and eventually an aggressive school reformer. Concerted efforts were made to bring community stakeholders together, engage with the school system and attempt to advance policy reform.

A flurry of activity would occur in the early years of the HOPE reform team in the DPS. New players stepped to the table and new items placed on the agenda. The Detroit Compact, the Empowerment Schools and Schools of Diversity and Choice all

achieved agenda status during this period, although their fates were very different. There was a concerted effort on the part of the leadership coalition to bring more players into the system, business leaders, religious leaders, political leaders, community leaders.

The best way to investigate embryonic regime transformation around the education arena is to examine agenda activities and institutional consequences of the policy preferences the new leadership coalition pursued. Chapter 4 examines the district's principal public-private collaboration, the Detroit Compact, which best represents embryonic regime formation. Chapter 5 examines the "Empowerment, Diversity and Choice" initiatives that were advanced by the HOPE board and the new superintendent in conjunction with various community stakeholders that agitated for structural and organizational change.

CHAPTER 4

THE DETROIT COMPACT: INSTITUTIONAL FORMATION, STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES

INTRODUCTION

Since its founding in 1988, the Detroit Compact has been an integral part of school reform in Detroit. As a cornerstone of public-private collaboration in the district, the Compact serves as an institutional vehicle for stakeholder involvement in the DPS, provides direct incentives to students for improved performance and promotes external advocacy for reform. A second reform effort, Empowerment, Diversity and Choice, is the focus of Chapter 5. This Chapter examines the Detroit Compact, its inception and the means by which this public-private partnership was able to achieve agenda status. Each of twelve stakeholder groups will be examined, their contributions to elevating a school-Compact to agenda status will be analyzed and the specific resources they bring to the partnership identified. The relationships that have been developed through the Compact structure facilitated further public-private collaboration both in the DPS and the City of Detroit. The major institutional consequence has been internal restructuring within participating schools. The Detroit Compact has attempted to change the reward structure. Preliminary indicators suggest the partnership has made significant resource contributions and is making a positive impact within Compact schools. Finally, the institutional legacy of the initiative will be analyzed and the nature of policy change brought about by the Compact investigated.

The Detroit Compact specifically originated from one of the key recommendations

of the 1987 Report of the Detroit Strategic Planning Project: to "provide certainty of opportunity for Detroit students...to demonstrate a shared commitment to quality education...on the part of the educational system, the business community, and the community at large."¹ The aim was to bypass the DPS bureaucracy and provide incentives directly to the students. The Detroit Compact was designed to guarantee academically successful students who participate in the program, four-year tuition scholarships at Michigan's public universities or interviews for career-track jobs if they maintain minimum grade requirements, test and attendance standards (*Detroit Strategic Planning Initiative*, 1987). Additionally, the Compact provides students with summer job opportunities, tutoring and other support resources.

The Detroit Compact is not the first such institutionalized partnership involving a large urban district and business. The first, which was subsequently widely copied in one form or another, was the Boston Compact, established in 1982. In Boston, a collaboration between the business community and the public schools hoped to stimulate improvement in the declining public school system by infusing supplementary resources. The Boston partnership exposed a number of endemic difficulties that face long range reform efforts in engaging outside stakeholders.² The formulators of the Detroit Compact

¹ Certainty of Opportunity, the major goal of the Detroit Compact, was also one of the key recommendations of the Citizens Education Committee (see Chapter 3).

² Political obstacles have hampered implementation. In particular, concerns that the business community is trying to micromanage the district. Despite these tensions a second major business initiative in 1984 established "The Boston Plan for Excellence," an endowed public education fund whose business contributions now total over \$15 million (Farrar and Connolly 1990). A total of 760 companies now provide permanent or part time jobs (Farrar and Connolly 1990). The Massachusetts Advocacy Center, has criticized the compact for not adequately addressing deep structural issues. While substantial impacts on educational performance in the early stages of

designed their reform model using the experiences of similar programs in other cities like Boston.

Establishing public-private collaboration, given long traditions of bureaucratic insularity in most urban school systems, is a difficult process with many obstacles to overcome. Collaborations which have formed vary considerably, from loose knit informal relationships to more structured patterns of interaction. Not surprisingly, the consequence of this involvement also varies considerably, and includes business contributions of tangible goods and services (equipment, software, grants) as well as tutor-mentoring programs, speakers, programmatic help, career-preparation assistance, job-readiness programs, endowments, scholarship programs, substantive reorganization of school curricula, help with building and sustaining magnet schools or academies and advocacy for state and even national policy changes.

AGENDA ACCESS AND THE DECISIONMAKING ARENA IN DETROIT: THE INSTITUTIONAL FORMATION OF THE DETROIT COMPACT

Although the Detroit Compact was only one of over 42 recommendations that came out of the Detroit Strategic Planning Group, it subsequently received more than 85% of the financial support from Detroit Renaissance. It has been the principal avenue for the business community's involvement with the educational processes in the city (*Detroit Strategic Plan* 1987). The Compact is designed as a comprehensive, long term intervention to provide certainty of opportunity for Compact graduates who meet mutually

collaboration would be surprising, this is where most of the early evaluation of the Boston partnership focused.

agreed upon standards. It seeks to prepare students who will be job-ready and college ready. The hope of the partnership is to act as a catalyst to drive bottom level changes throughout the district and more closely connect the economic fortunes of Detroit youth to the business community.

Many obstacles existed for business to become a more active partner with the school system. The business community in Detroit has a poor reputation with many residents and community leaders who question the sincerity of motives given the rapid dis-investment the city experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, the strength of organized labor in Detroit and its history of conflict with management made it difficult for corporate leaders to claim a legitimate leadership role in Detroit (Georgakas and Surkin 1975). The city's history of bitter racial conflict has made many suspicious of the white corporate community (see Aberbach and Walker 1973; Fine 1989; Widdick 1989). A director of one of the powerful foundations active in the city, contends the African American community distrusts those outside the community "who want to control but don't want to get their hands dirty, who left us here with the problems and still want to control all the strings from long range". A business official responded that he honestly believed people in the city have a fear of being identified as stepping forward to collaborate with business.

Given the skepticism about the ability for outside stakeholders to engage the public school system, demonstrating that public-private entities have been able to penetrate the education arena in Detroit (regime formation) would be a significant finding. It needs to be demonstrated whether and how these constellations of actors could achieve

agenda status, penetrate bureaucratic insularity, and engage in reform and restructuring. Considerable debate has raged in the literature concerning the relative abilities of communities of experts to control the policy process in their areas and remain insulated.

Drawing from the research literature, John Hess (1991) and Mary O'Connell (1991) posit that shifting the locus of political control from top-down structures towards local control requires incorporation of much enlarged community stakeholder participation. Given the organizational context of decades of bureaucratic insularity in urban school processes, this understanding of how outside stakeholders were able to come together to influence decision making is instructive.

Inertia makes it very difficult to change the prevailing bias. Status quo powers may stifle, reinterpret, or otherwise defuse an issue and thus prevent it from gaining agenda status (Cobb and Elder 1983). Thus bias is in the favor of those who wish to restrict rather than those who seek to innovate. As Bachrach and Baratz (1970) note:

While advocates of change must win at all stages of the political process- issue recognition, decision and implementation of policy- the defenders of existing policy must win at only one stage in the process. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that all systems have an inherent 'mobilization of bias' and that this bias strongly favors those currently defending the status quo.

Stasis in the DPS was maintained by the persistence of functional specialization by professionals. Widespread involvement of stakeholders as planned with the Detroit Compact challenges this stasis. The Chamber of Commerce's role as conduit for the Renaissance Foundation has always been viewed as suspect because there's always been such strong animosity between the employers and many of the institutions in the city. Yet, a broad array of stakeholders were finding they were bound by similar concerns.

How can a wider set of players be activated to participate in the restructuring of schools? Goodland calls for a critical mass large enough to make a visible difference and that new configurations of educational institutions need to be created to enhance the understanding of education reform as community wide rather than a school-based activity (1984, 354). Partnerships encourage repeated interactions and repeated interactions make norms of cooperation more likely (Axelrod 1984). Sarason calls for spanning the divide between "inside and outside" between professionals and lay people (1984).

According to a number of respondents, during Arthur Jefferson's 15 year tenure as general superintendent, there were good ideas that were never implemented. A former superintendent claimed, "The education agenda is not immune to the political process. You may have the best idea, but if you have not mobilized the forces that you need to mobilize in order to help get them actualized, then it's just a good idea." There may have been forces that may have attempted to break down bureaucratic insularity during Jefferson's long tenure but there were always forces, sometimes equally as strong to maintain the status quo.

THE DETROIT COMPACT: AGENDA ACCESS AND INSTITUTIONAL FORMATION

Social scientists have a long tradition of asserting that participation leads to a sense of commitment and a sense of ownership. Leadership attempted to model the Detroit Compact with this in mind, hoping that they could "build a community" around involvement in the education arena, in a district that had in the past, largely excluded outside participants. According to a Chamber official, the key to the early organization

of this partnership was getting support from four key areas, the business groups, community organizations, state government and key officials of the public school system. The belief was with the active support of these groups, others such as the unions, the city and some of the critical parent organizations would also engage. As the partnership has matured, according to a Chamber representative, those four groups continue to lead and then depending on the initiative, get other actors involved.

Architects of the Detroit Compact looked carefully how it related to existing agendas in the community. A number of groups that were brought together found that they shared many goals, and they were able to coalesce around these concerns. The key task was analyzing individual agendas and finding common ground to make a partnership work. According to most respondents, this honest interchange was never accomplished during the Young regime.

Stakeholder Participation and Agenda Access with the Detroit Compact: Expanding the Scope of Contagium

As noted above, the Detroit Compact was purposively designed as a collaborative vehicle to bring together 12 specific stakeholder groups with a vested interest in providing certainty of opportunity to Detroit Public School (DPS) students.³ Partners include:

- * Business Community
- * DPS Administration
- * The Detroit Board of Education
- * Community
- * Higher Education
- * State of Michigan
- * City of Detroit
- * The Detroit Federation of Teachers
- * The Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors
- * Organized Labor
- * City-wide Schools Community Organization
- * City-wide Student Council

Each of these groups sits on a District Stakeholder Council. Table 4.1 provides a list of 1994/95 representatives and the specific organizations they represent. At many of the monthly stakeholder meetings both the representative and alternate are present.

---TABLE 4.1 HERE---

³ The Compact agreement was finalized on May 11, 1989 and signed by the various partners in May and June of that year.

Table 4.1

Detroit Compact District Stakeholder Council 1994/1995

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>REPRESENTATIVE</u>	<u>ALTERNATE</u>
Business	Jack Veese, IBM	Ray Beyers, Ford
DPS Administration	Sharon Johnson-Lewis	Elysa Robinson
DPS Board of Education	Robert Boyce, President	
Community	Horace Sheffield, DABO	Bernard Parker
Higher Education	Glenn Stevens	
State of Michigan	Willard Walker, Detroit Compact Chairperson	Ivan Louis Cotman
City of Detroit	Lisa Webb	
DFT	John Elliot	Carol Thomas
OSAS	Don Boggs, President	
Organized Labor	Lugene Nelson, AFL/CIO	
City-Wide Schools Community Organization	Geneva Williams	
Student Council		Deborah Taylor
*Wayne County	Elliot Ware	
+Higher Education, Private	Ed Blews	William Liebold

*Wayne County was added as the thirteenth partner in 1995.

+The Association of Independent Colleges and Universities of Michigan, representing 46 private non-profit universities and colleges became the fourteenth Compact stakeholder March 1995.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Compact initiative is its unique organizational structure. The District Stakeholder's Council not only exists at the city level but also within each participating school in the form of a Local Compact Council (LCC). The Local Compact Council meets monthly and is a "mini" version of the system-wide Stakeholder Council. The LCC has a representative from *each* patron group that is involved district-wide and, along with the school principal, oversees the Compact budget and coordination. As an example, Table 4.2, describes an LCC for Northern High School. Note that there is no set Compact program. Rather, each school is provided with the flexibility and capacity to adjust the partnership to best suit local school needs. Each stakeholder pledges to provide vital jobs, career and technical awareness skill development, volunteers, mentors, tutors and/or financial assistance.

After some debate about only selecting high schools, the Detroit Compact concluded that it was also important to target middle schools. As a result, during an application period, any Detroit Public middle or high school may apply to become a Compact school to a District Compact Selection Committee. A school interested in becoming a Compact school must vote and achieve the following percentages in favor of the partnership: Parent Organization of Record (55%), Teachers (75%), Students (55%) and the principal. School selection is based on the quality of the application by a Compact Selection Committee. Only a handful of schools are accepted each year.

---TABLE 4.2 HERE---

Table 4.2

Northern High School Local Compact Council (LCC)
Stakeholder Representatives 1994/1995

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>REPRESENTATIVE</u>
Business	Kim Payne, Northern High School Detroit Compact Coordinator Jacob Keli, National Bank of Detroit Jeff Forster, TV 2 Agnes Scott, WTVS 56 Vernita Beverly, WTVS 56
Community	Marie Ferguson-Jones, Kellogg Foundation David Akins, Kellogg Foundation
Higher Education	Cynthia Hendrix, Oakland University
State of Michigan	Dell Alston, Michigan Employment and Securities Commission
City Government	Lt. Vivian Talbert, Detroit Police Department
DFT	Jessie Gibson-Eldridge, Teacher
OSAS	Jacqueline Hughes, Principal Carolyn Briscoe, Guidance Dept Head
L.S.C.O.	Dwight Burks, Parent
Student Council	Alexis Ramsey, 9th Grade Representative Crystal Boone, 10th Grade Representative Deborah Taylor, 11th Grade Representative Angela Brown, 12th Grade Representative

Note: As recent additions to the Detroit Compact, Wayne County and the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities will be placing representatives within Northern High and each of the 33 Detroit Compact schools next year.

As Kingdon (1984) argues the agenda setting story must begin by identifying the important players in the game. Broad-based stakeholder involvement was critical to the formation of the Detroit Compact and requires a sector by sector analysis. Following Kingdon's typology, this section details the active stakeholders in the Compact, their contribution to achieving agenda status and to advancing policy reform, and the contributions/resources of this group of participants (1984). Each stakeholder group's involvement with the DPS before the advent of the Compact will be briefly outlined. This is followed by an institutional and personal/informal look at the role this stakeholder group played in helping elevate the Compact to agenda status and the type of contributions this sector plays in the Compact structure.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: Business. The business community leadership in advancing the Detroit Compact is in stark contrast to previous patterns of involvement with the DPS. Until recently, many observers stressed the Detroit business community's disinvestment from the city's economy rather than reinvestment in sustained initiatives with the schools. What limited involvement did exist was primarily on a school by school basis. The business community was not important in affecting the educational agenda during the 15 years of the Jefferson superintendency. From 1973 to 1988, business was not engaged in the politics of education except for Chamber support of school millage requests. The Chamber's opposition to the millage request in 1988 signaled the business community's desire to become more active in education politics. The Chamber's actions contributed to the first millage request defeated in a decade (refer

to Table 3.8)

The Detroit Strategic Plan Initiative was an effort to redefine education more clearly in human capital terms. Business became interested in education in Detroit because of the needs of the firms, not primarily social welfare goals. A former HOPE team member who helped design the Compact talked about the needs of business.

Business is there for one purpose and that is to make dollars.... Their commitment to the Compact is because according to all data that has been generated indicates that the workforce in the year 2000 is going to be increasingly minority...if those people are not educated to the point that they can come in and work in your factory or in your store you're going to lose business and you're going to go down hill. They were driven to get involved in the whole educational process for their own self worth. Optimally everyone's interests are served.

According to a former HOPE team member, the business community wanted to use the Detroit Compact as a wedge to help move the system in the right direction. One corporate respondent described how extraordinarily frustrating it was during the formative stages of the development of the Detroit Compact because some of the other stakeholders were very slow to come around. In particular, he singled out the Detroit Federation of Teachers whose "fingernail scratches can be seen all over town, wherever there's an education reform initiative." Community stakeholders generally agreed that the school system was "captive of the unions" throughout the Jefferson tenure. A business official responded, "I think we need to remind ourselves, particularly in Detroit, just how much of a union town we are." The defensive posture of the unions was most difficult to overcome and why broad stakeholder leadership was required beyond the business community, even though the business community would be the entity committing the lion's share of the monetary resources. "They thought that by offering benefits to the

students that somehow administrators and teachers would be glad to help only to find out that teachers and administrators didn't give a damn what was going to be done for the students."

Business elites realized that the Compact initiative required acquiescence from other actors in the city to succeed. The only way to achieve this goal was the development of a broad-based coalition. Business leaders saw the District Stakeholder Council as a means of getting the leverage for union support for the Compact. Given the suspicion of business community motives, the initiative would not likely have achieved agenda status without the support of other stakeholder groups. According to a state official, community groups were involved from step one in all phases from the executive committee all the way down through the Compact structure. Because key community groups felt a part of the process, there was not the need to be disruptive. Key business stakeholders include the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce, the Detroit Renaissance and the larger members of the Detroit Corporate Community.

The Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce. The Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce has been a key leader in the Compact. According to a Chamber official, there are over 11,500 business members in the Detroit Chamber. An influential minister stated, "I think the Chamber of Commerce because of their involvement in Compact has a real leadership role now in education." Many see the Chamber of Commerce as the primary vehicle for business involvement in public education. An AFL-CIO representative claims the Chamber stepped right out front into a leadership role in the areas of education...."I hate like hell to give them credit...but the Chamber has become a great supporter".

The Chamber is generally characterized as the voice of small- to medium-sized businesses--frequently suburban, rather than city-based, businesses. The Chamber is also generally classified as a "white" group, in contrast to the black-majority center city. The primary role of the Chamber in the Detroit Compact is administrative. The Detroit Compact administration and staff is housed in the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber provides technical support. Within the Chamber there are two principal groups involved with the Compact. The Business Educational Alliance is the primary business support group for the DPS and the Greater Detroit Alliance of Business is the agency inside the Chamber that seeks private sector jobs for students.

Detroit Renaissance. Another key player in the business sector is Detroit Renaissance, Inc., a CEO-level group regarded as the voice of the big-business community. Detroit Renaissance, a group of 45 chief executives from leading southeast Michigan companies, is the region's most powerful economic development organization. Its directors include local business leaders such as financier Max Fisher, Little Caesars pizza company founder Mike Ilitch and Chrysler Corp. Chairman Robert J. Eaton. Renaissance is generally considered a major source of capital for major city initiatives. Support by Detroit Renaissance may determine a project's feasibility. Renaissance is limited to the chief executive officers of businesses. Renaissance is generally felt to exert significant control over the board of directors of the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce. Detroit Renaissance was probably the most influential group in the business emergence as an education policy actor. The primary example is that the Detroit Compact's existence came out of the Detroit Strategic Planning Group developed under

the auspices of Renaissance.

The Corporate Community. While there are hundreds of businesses involved in a variety of capacities, the Compact's business support is driven by large Detroit businesses. This includes the new service sector elites, the utilities and the banking industry. Each one of the Compact schools has a business partner or several business partners and the business community provides the largest source of volunteers. A Chamber official responded, "I think most business people, the larger business community seem to prefer to pool their resources into the Compact initiative."

The business participation in the Detroit Compact varies from advocacy to the direct provision of resources. For instance, AT&T is a Detroit Compact company. They partner with Ford Motor Company at Henry Ford High School. They also play an important advocacy role for the business community, taking a very high profile role in getting other companies to sign on to become Compact supporters. For example, they sponsor the AT&T Presents Meadowbrook Music Festival. The festival is a series of about 30 concerts promoting the Compact to a largely suburban audience.⁴

AT&T has additional programs including direct support through employees who tutor students. As the business partner at Henry Ford High School they are in the process of building a tutoring lab. Other efforts include a stay in school program with the Detroit Pistons, a day of the arts at the Fox Theatre for all children enrolled in arts programs and

⁴ Meadowbrook is at Oakland University. AT&T wanted to sponsor something that was high profile, in the suburbs. A respondent argued that often they're the ones that most frequently make decisions about whether corporations are going to get involved in the city. The entire concert series is devoted to the Compact. All the signs, all the brochures and programs and parking has "Compact" all over it. According to a business respondent, it has really helped bring other businesses into the Compact because AT&T is high profile.

a DPS essay contest.

Chrysler is also very involved in the Detroit Compact. They partner with Cody High School, and the UAW and Chrysler's National Training Center. Most major Detroit business leaders, including Ameritech, IBM, General Motors, Chrysler, KMart, NBD, Comerica, Detroit Edison and AAA of Michigan are active in the Compact.

Small and mid-size businesses have not been as active in the Compact. A university leader and stakeholder in the Compact was critical of this lack of participation, particularly for African-American businesses.

Regal Plastics is owned by a black man. I understand it is doing well. Yet Regal Plastics has not signed on as a partner in the Compact. It seems to me that Regal Plastics could make not only a donation but could put some of its people out there who could serve as role models. It is the larger corporations e.g. General Motors, Ford Hospital, NBD, CoAmerica and all of those that have bought in and are supplying resources to get things done. Those that are small and medium size have not found there niche yet.

According to a DPS administrator, the smaller businesses can less afford to take risks. The district had to give them a proven product first. She believes efforts will now be made to increase small business involvement and she believes that they can step up to the challenge. A big business respondent argued that most companies don't really realize that you don't have to be an AT&T or a General Motors to get involved. He asserts,

I think many smaller and midsize businesses are behind in their thinking but are catching up fast in their realization that if you give \$1,000 to 30 organizations you are not going to have an impact, but if you give one highly targeted grant to an organization, that can really make a difference.

The business community, through dollars for scholarships and commitments for jobs for Compact students, sought to implement accepted standards regarding student and teacher

attendance, grades and standardized test scores, substance abuse and school completion. By 2003 the business community will devote just under \$19 million to the Compact.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: DPS Administration. The General Superintendent is the chief administrative officer for DPS, supervises the Six-Area Superintendents and reports to the 11-member Board of Education. Obviously, the general superintendent plays an important role in defining the policy agenda for DPS. Institutionally, a partnership with DPS is not feasible without the active support of the general superintendent. There has been significant instability in the position of General Superintendent of Detroit Public Schools over the past several years, following a long period of stability. Three individuals have occupied the superintendency since the resignation of Arthur Jefferson in 1988. Discussions of the Compact began with Arthur Jefferson. It was implemented under John Porter. Under Deborah McGriff, the Compact expanded to include well over 1/4 of all the middle and high schools in the district.

---TABLE 4.3 HERE---

Table 4.3

DPS General Superintendent's Role in the Detroit Compact

General Superintendent	Tenure	Summary of Role in the Detroit Compact
Arthur Jefferson	1974-1988	*Formulation of the Detroit Compact began, with Jefferson's support
John Porter	1989-1991	* Restored fiscal accountability in the district which make the business community more supportive of involvement * Leveraged the business community to pay his salary and the salary of his staff as a precondition to taking the job * Demanded that DPS agree to implement the Detroit Compact as a condition for accepting the superintendency * The Compact agreement formalized * The first five schools selected to become Compact schools
Deborah McGriff	1991-1993	* Expansion of Compact from five pilot schools to 27 Compact schools * Started Detroit Education Day * The \$10 million Van Dusen Endowment was established to fund Compact Scholarships through the year 2003
David Snead	1993-present	* Expansion of Compact from 27 to 33 schools

Arthur Jefferson. During Jefferson's tenure, Detroit public schools were getting higher and higher concentrations of very poor children, and many of the deficits that one associates with poverty began to take their toll on the district. In addition, the workplace was increasingly changing from year to year especially requiring a higher level of education in order to get jobs and to maintain employment (refer to Table 3.5). A district respondent claimed, "It used to be in this town as you may well know, a person could earn a damn good living, with a high school diploma or less. An individual could get a job at one of the automobile companies and really could become a quality member of the middle class in Detroit." Facing these conditions towards the end of his tenure,

Jefferson was described by a Chamber official as supportive of the Compact.

John Porter. John Porter's mandate was to bring financial stability to the district and lay a solid foundation for subsequent board attempts at district reform. According to several former board reformers, Porter was successful in righting a financially sinking ship and greatly restoring credibility to the district. According to then Chamber of Commerce Chairman Richard Gabrys, things changed with the appointment of John Porter. Porter's specific proposals to trim the deficit and lay the foundations for structural reform paved the way for increased activism that business leaders began to play with the DPS (Muller 1989). Porter was an active and well respected partner in the Compact who was heavily engaged. In fact, Porter demanded that DPS agree to implement the Detroit Compact as a condition for taking the position of general superintendent.⁵ He believed the Detroit Compact was the way to lock the business community and external groups into a long-term reform effort.

Deborah McGriff. Dr. Deborah McGriff oversaw the period of the Detroit Compact's rapid expansion from five pilot schools to 27 schools in the district. McGriff was an avid supporter of the Compact. Her involvement was key to its viability and its successful implementation and expansion. She met frequently with the business community and kept them informed of general areas of concern. In turn, the business community provided her with a forum to help foster additional business involvement. She started a Detroit education day, in which business executives would come in the schools

⁵ Certainty of opportunity was one of the key recommendations from the Civic Education Project he spearheaded.

in the capacity as a principal, teacher or student for the day. This effort helped to bridge the divide between the school system and key business leaders.

David Snead. A long-time district insider, Snead was appointed on an interim basis after the resignation of McGriff. After calling off their national search, the board of education hired Snead permanently in December 1993. A key state official involved with the Compact doesn't sense a whole lot of change or variance from the McGriff vision of the Compact in the early days of the Snead administration. While supporting the Compact, he is considerably less involved than McGriff in day to day operations. Under Snead, the Compact has continued to grow. Six additional schools were selected as Compact schools during the 1994-1995 school year bringing the total to 33 middle and high schools in the district.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: Detroit Board of Education. Although the Compact was planned before the board elections in 1988, the election of the reform minded HOPE team made it easier to solicit additional business involvement. Their goals coincided with many of the Compact's. The HOPE board was closely connected to the Compact throughout their four year tenure. In fact, one of its leaders, Frank Hayden, was one of the chief architects of the partnership before his election to the board and served on the Civic Education Committee.

In the post-HOPE era, continued support for the Compact remains evident, but there are concerns about the commitment of some board members. A business official stated that in comparison with the unions who are very skilled in lobbying for their

agenda, the business community is not as effective in explaining why the Compact is so important. He states: "some of the board members don't even understand why the Compact is so significant and I blame the business community for that."

The DPS Board of Education has a major resource commitment to the Compact. According to an OSAS official, "this isn't just taking from the business community". The district spends over \$1.6 million each year on the Compact. From 1989 to 1995, the board of education committed a compact teaching position. The high schools in which a Compact program exists offered a Compact class and in most cases the business education department head assigned business education teachers. The Compact class involved things such as resume and business letter preparation, how to prepare yourself for an interview and other exit criteria. In 1995, due to the high cost, a series of weekend seminars have replaced the Compact class. Organized and staffed by volunteers, this change will significantly reduce the costs of the District of this part of the Compact. This became necessary because of the growth in the number of Compact schools. The overall DPS financial commitment remains the same.

Originally there was no board representative on the stakeholder council. Either the superintendent or one of her top deputies was charged to keep the board informed. In 1993 board member Bob Boyce agreed to sit on the District Stakeholder Council. According to a key stakeholder on the Compact, Boyce is very active. He served on the selection committee for the new Compact director, Dr. Belinda Rose. His role as a Compact stakeholder has facilitated better communication between the board and the Compact. In December of 1994, Boyce was elected Board President, replacing April

Howard Coleman.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: The Community Sector. Before 1988, few community organizations operated directly in the schools. Involvement with the Detroit Compact has begun to change that. A number of community organizations, religious organizations, and foundations are especially active Detroit Compact "Community Sector" stakeholders. The non-profit community is especially involved. A United Way official in Detroit which represents fund raising for 140 non-profits, contends there are at least another 1,000 non-profits active in the city.

The Compact connected the various fragmented non-profits to the organizational structure of DPS. According to a Chamber official, hundreds of agencies and organizations are involved. As the Compact expands into additional schools, they build the appropriate groups that are active in that part of the community into the partnership at the Local Compact Council (LCC). The partnerships that have formed at the school site are designed to create a permanent base of support. A top DPS administrator under McGriff reflected on a meeting that she attended trying to solicit community advocates to play a role in the Compact,

I sat through and listened to one of the program officers talk about the reason they didn't have programs in the school system was because we didn't want them. I said, 'yes we do' and they were shocked. They really hadn't talked with us in a long time. Boy were they pleased to hear that we did want them involved! There was a time and I guess you've probably heard that repeatedly about our district. There were people who didn't want those programs in the city or interference in the schools but that's no longer true. I said, I can get you in any school you want.

According to that DPS official, the Compact has been the vehicle for dialogue

above and beyond what has taken place within a particular school. This is also occurring with city and state governmental agencies as well. For instance, the district is working with the Department of Social Services (DSS) to increase department services in the schools. For 8th and 9th grade students too young to participate in the job guarantee component, the Compact tries to make placements within the non-profit organizations.

The Compact depends on the non-profits for many of the volunteers and support programs. Some schools also have special relationships with non-profits and use their facilities to continue work that needs to be done after school. For example, Western International High School works with Latino Americans United for Social and Economic Development (LASED). LASED conducts financial aids workshops for Compact students and also provides extra tutoring or mentoring on sight. According to a community advocate, "I didn't know what this thing role models was all about because when I was growing up I just had them. I never thought that there were young people growing up without knowing people who did different kinds of things. That is really a major aspect of the Compact- its really major that you connect with a kid." It is not possible to capture the total contribution of this sector and their involvement in the Compact, but a few of the participants active in agenda setting will be highlighted.

United Community Services and Detroit Association of Black Organizations. Two of the most important community groups involved in the Compact are United Community Services (UCS) of Metro Detroit and the Detroit Association of Black Organizations (DABO). UCS's president, Geneva Williams, served as board chair for the Compact until 1995 and she is frequently mentioned as a key community leader. Horace Sheffield is

also on the Compact board and heads DABO. A former HOPE team member claimed that Sheffield in many respects was the Godfather of the Compact coalition. Sheffield had organized the Trade Union and Leadership Council back in the 1940s so that black autoworkers would have a voice in their union. Because of this strong union background, he was able to sit the teachers unions down and say "now, you're going to do this for our children." Union acquiescence for the Compact was started literally in his home through an informal working group that met weekly.

The Religious Community. Black churches continue to be strong in Detroit. They are the only outside stakeholder group with a long record of active involvement with DPS before the Compact. A director of one of the Detroit foundations argued,

The black church has always been the most important entity in our community that thrives even to this day, and it is one of the institutions that we actually own and control and operate, free of any other thing. Most of the major black churches have burned their mortgage and their minister is usually in the leadership where people come to want endorsements.

A University respondent claims it is almost impossible to overstate the influence of the ministers in Detroit. The Council of Baptist Pastors of Detroit and Vicinity has long been viewed as a key constituency group by the school superintendent and the board of education. They have had standing meetings with the board and superintendent concerning policy issues and issues of mutual interest or concern. They are very involved not only in agenda setting but in generating alternatives. Individual pastors often are seen as primary political and social leaders.

Thus, religious leaders are critical stakeholders in the Compact. They associate with all the other groups, foundations, business and community advocates as perhaps no

other entity in the city. The churches have made a significant commitment to partner with the Compact according to a Chamber official. This outreach to church organizations has continued to grow since the inception of the Compact in 1988. In 1991, five churches from the Detroit Ministers Alliance Advisory Council agreed to provide summer jobs in 1991 for on-target Detroit Compact students. The following year, an additional 50 churches committed and more are expected to sign up (*Detroit News*, 22 May 1992, 3B).

As one Chamber official put it,

We've got an administrative alliance in the Chamber that is involved in hustling church support for summer jobs and in creating places for students to go for after school tutoring and other services. Just recently the area ministers are involved in a new program called Church-One School, where each church has adopted a school, which complements the Detroit Compact, by offering the human resources.

Another business advocate stressed the influence of the black ministers. He contended that of the 20 most influential stakeholders in the Compact, at least four or five are ministers. They are extraordinarily powerful. He contends its undeniable that the black ministers could close this operation down if they wanted to. Their early involvement was critical to the success of the coalition. The role of the ministers as key Compact stakeholders has also been most instrumental in keeping the coalition together during times of heated conflict. A business official describes the mood after the HOPE team was defeated:

Anybody who has been progressive, who is there to challenge the bureaucracy has been recalled. I can tell you the day after the vote took place, there was a meeting of Compact partners. There were a lot of long faces and a lot of people were asking 'why are we even doing this when the very people we're trying to help are being manipulated by the people who are trying to keep things the same. That was very powerful. I remember that like it was yesterday. It was a Baptist minister who gave

us a pep talk that day. Just to say, look, this is a setback but it's not forever. We're gonna continue to fight. We can't give up. We are here to help kids.

Foundations. A number of area foundations have become especially important stakeholders in the Compact. As stakeholders, these foundations provide an array of resources that make school district personnel take notice. A few of these foundation's efforts are worth noting because of the resources they have brought to the table as a group of participants in the Compact. The most notable foundation participants in the Compact include Skillman, Kellogg, McGregor, the Coalition of African Americans for Education and Black United Fund.

The Skillman Foundation has been an especially active Compact stakeholder. The foundation focuses in the tri-county, metropolitan Detroit area, with its primary area of interest, children and youth. Within that area of interest, they have five program areas, child and family welfare, child and family health, juvenile justice, youth development and education. They conduct an annual summer training program for Compact students who fall off target from Compact standards. Their current objective under their educational program area is to improve the way schools are organized, staffed and managed as well as an interest in helping kids get ready for school and helping youth make a successful transition from school to work. They have funded school projects directly with the Detroit Public Schools and with external organizations.⁶ Not all of the projects are focused directly on education, rather the school is a convenient site.

⁶ Their first big entry into education with the Detroit Public Schools came with the High School Development Center. It was a multi-million dollar, four year grant that Skillman made to support an alternative high school for kids who are academically able but had other kinds of social problems.

As an important Compact stakeholder, Skillman decided to explore a way to complement the Compact program at the elementary school level. Originally there was an elementary school prototype of the Compact. The stakeholders were never able to implement it because of lack of resources. In 1993, Skillman began a project to bring the Yale Child Studies Center School Development Program (the Comer Model) to the Detroit Public Schools. According to a Skillman representative, the strong relationships built through their involvement in the Detroit Compact led to the willingness of Skillman to commit to working further with the DPS.

Except for the religious community, no other external actor, has had a more sustained relationship with DPS than the Kellogg Foundation. Even before the implementation of the Compact, Kellogg was involved with schools in Area A, the northern constellation in the city. The Kellogg Foundation's long standing involvement over the years has been described by a DPS administrator as "just splendid". There's a huge initiative in the Area A neighborhood schools, one of the toughest regions in the city. A district responded contended,

They bit off a real project and I applaud Kellogg and the people that have worked on that. I have friends that are administrators and work in schools that are the recipients of the Kellogg Foundation. I think they've made a long-term commitment to us. They've taken neighborhood schools and they have taken schools from elementary, middle and high school. It's an intelligent approach. It's a long-term commitment. It couldn't be better.

Through its Kellogg Youth Initiative Program, the foundation has made a long-term commitment in Detroit and its Compact partner school, Northern High. The Kellogg Foundation's program officer is concerned with crime prevention and preserving families. He feels that there "needs to be a continuum of mutually supported activities and

education and enrichment...so that schools and organizations and parents and communities (are) working together."

When the Detroit Compact announced plans for an ambitious \$10 million dollar college Van Dusen Endowment drive to broaden the scholarship funding base and to be sure that college assistance would be available to all qualified Compact students, the McGregor Foundation immediately provided a grant of \$800,000 as part of a three year, \$1.5 million grant to the Compact.

The Coalition of African Americans for Education (CA\$E) was formed to solicit support for the Van Dusen Endowment drive. Leaders within the African American community wanted to ensure at least one million of the ten million dollar endowment drive would be raised within the African American community. Already \$650,000 has been raised.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: Higher Education. Area universities became active partners, according to an official from one of the Detroit universities, because they were finding that many DPS students did not have basic skills needed to succeed. Some students were spending a year to a year and a half in intermediary courses, lengthening the time they will be at the college level. When one of the Detroit universities was first approached to play a role in the Compact, the official representing the university's interest was less than enthusiastic. In his words,

I was not a supporter of the Compact when it first started....I went because it was a university assignment. After several months and certainly within the first year, I had done a complete flip-flop. I became a big supporter of the Compact...it had attainable goals and has made tremendous progress

with attention given to excellence to the family in ways which the schools had not been able to do so before. I think I have excellent testimony to give on the Compact's behalf because I was opposed to the Compact in the beginning and now I am probably one of their strongest supporters.

This official believes that the development of human resources will ultimately benefit the university directly by improving the quality of incoming students. He also believes that the universities active involvement as a Compact stakeholder will increase the number of DPS students interested in enrolling in his school.

The Michigan Department of Education has coordinated a group called the College Committee, which works to increase the number of college ready students in the Compact schools. Wayne State, Michigan State, University of Michigan, Madonna College and Detroit Mercy have taken the lead. There are close links with the area community colleges and representatives work in many of the Compact schools to help in motivation and test preparation. Currently there are 18 participating public colleges and universities.⁷ Some Compact schools want to see even more university involvement from this sector, more regular contact and periodic workshops to be held on a monthly basis.

⁷ Currently those colleges and universities include: Alabama State University, Eastern Michigan University, Highland Park Community College, Michigan Technical University, Oakland University, Schoolcraft Community College, Wayne County Community College, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Central Michigan University, Grand Valley State University, Michigan State University, Morehouse College, Northern Michigan University, Wayne State University, Wiley College, University of Michigan. Compact staff is continuing its efforts to recruit more Black colleges to participate in the program. Each of these institutions designs its own financial benefit package. Students who choose to attend a college or university that is located outside of Michigan or does not participate in the Compact program receive two financial awards of \$500 each. Students who do not attend college immediately are eligible for the financial assistance guarantee for one year following graduation.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: The State of Michigan. The State Commerce Department played a critical role in the formation of the Detroit Compact. The State was instrumental in taking the lead with the business community. The State under then Governor James Blanchard provided half a million dollars worth of seed money to help advance the initiative. Blanchard also recruited Dr. John Porter, former president of Eastern Michigan, to serve as the interim general superintendent when the DPS faced state receivership. Department of Commerce Director Doug Ross encouraged other stakeholders to become involved in the Compact. The Commerce Department has a representative, Willard Walker, who is a stakeholder and key participant at all levels of the Compact structure.

It is significant that the Department of Commerce and not the Department of Education has been the major facilitator in the partnership. This shows local economic development strategies have become closely integrated into an overall education strategy. According to a Commerce official, it has become obvious that if the state is to be competitive with other states and in the global marketplace, commerce must be in the business of education. There is also a political dimension. A respondent stated, "the Commerce Department has helped to keep the Compact more neutral. In the Education Department, everyone in the city has a bureaucrat that they know. In the Commerce department they don't."

According to a Commerce Department respondent, "The Department of Commerce was there when the initial commitments were made so I'm sure that made everybody feel better." The State's presence was very important early, particularly in working through

problems concerning the lack of trust in parts of the community towards the business community that they may be harboring a "hidden agenda" behind their involvement in the schools. According to a State official,

I don't have that history. I see the Chamber as being a good partner and I also see the Chamber as having become really involved. I don't see any reason to be suspicious. It may be there. I just don't see it and I'm not looking for it. If it were on the table, I'm sure I wouldn't miss it. So if they have a "hidden agenda" it's pretty much hidden as far as I'm concerned.

A business leader finds the suspicion of a hidden agenda as inflammatory.

I have every right to expect that the kids that are in Detroit are getting a good education because the same people who are educating them want me to hire them when they are done with them. If they are poorly prepared then don't come to me and say I'm a racist because I would rather hire someone from Brighton than someone from Detroit. I'm the customer and don't forget it. People who need the wake up call are the people who are doing the educating, those who are trying to engage the business community to give 100 percent of what they want and give back 20 percent of what the business community wants.

At the state level the scope of participation in the partnership has steadily increased. The Commerce Department has solicited the involvement of nearly a dozen other state departments who serve on the Local Compact Councils (LCCs) in each Compact School in Detroit. By 1996, virtually every state department will be involved in the Compact including the Departments of Education, Commerce, Social Services, Mental Health, Civil Service, Transportation, and State Housing Authority. Not only do members from these departments sit on all of the 33 LCCs, but some departments have adopted schools and provided surplus equipment, expertise, data analysis and significant volunteer time. In total, these contributions from the state may even exceed the current \$650,000 annual appropriations to the partnership from the state legislature. All the State

departments that have been asked to do specific tasks, have responded positively according to a State official. "It's sort of like nobody ever asked us to do this before so let's see if we can find a way to do it."

The Commerce department is particularly concerned about the long term participation of the state. The business sector has pledged support for Compact through 2003. Obviously the State can't do that but they would like to provide a mechanism where departments can be involved and engaged in this kind of program for that period of time. A Commerce Department official states, "We talk to directors and we talk to people in departments and we sort of institutionalize the concept of state departments remaining involved in the Compact."

Besides being a key stakeholder, Willard Walker, the Commerce Department's representative also chairs and sits on a couple of other important committees including the standards committee and the selection committee. As a measure of the State's contributions to the Compact, he was voted to Chair the District Stakeholder Council in 1995. Walker also has a staff person who works with the Chamber through its business education alliance. He has another staff person who works with the social agencies to develop and maintain school based social work programs. He has another staff person who works on the volunteer component.

The Commerce Department has identified a number of specific policy goals for the Compact. This includes pressuring the Detroit Medical Society to put doctors in the health centers in Compact schools. The Commerce Department is working to interest innercity Detroit kids in non-traditional employment options-- for example, natural

resources, public health, the highway department. They want kids to understand those kind of opportunities that are available in State government. The State also has conducted in-service for teachers and a Compact career learning seminar for Compact high school students. More recently the State has been instrumental in providing job opportunities and training for special education students that are Compact students. Recently, a number of state services are being redirected to the school site level at Compact schools including a number of state social workers, mental health workers, etc. This trend will likely expand in future years.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: City of Detroit. The mayor's involvement in public education in Detroit was extremely limited under Coleman Young. Young showed little inclination to be involved in education agenda setting or policy making. Mayor Young had the idea according to a top DPS administrator, "you do your thing, I'll do mine." Mayor Young's involvement was principally limited to political support of (or opposition to) school board candidates.

A Young aide, however, noted a significant level of behind the scenes influence with the board of education when it was desired. "We could count on at least five (of 11) votes of the board because we helped with their campaigns... I'd call the chairman and the superintendent of the schools and have the issue placed on the agenda and we'd get the votes to get it through." According to the aide, "When millage time comes around or union issues reach the point of work stoppage," school board members seek assistance from the Mayor simply because he's able to pull various coalitions together and get

people to move and act. For the most part, however, Mayor Young rarely ventured into the education arena. Formulators of the Compact feared that without at least the mayor's tacit support, the initiative would fail.

According to a Compact representative, it was critical for Mayor Young to step up as a stakeholder and sign on even if he was less than enthusiastic. This was accomplished according to a well respected community advocate by a large delegation of well placed stakeholders who were reported to have descended on the mayor, all imploring him of the importance of his signature. He signed the agreement but the city was noticeably absent by their lack of representation on the LCCs during his tenure. Mayor Archer, who took office in 1994, has expressed a commitment to the Compact. Archer's rhetoric is of a more active, collaborative partnership between the city and school district. Given that his law firm was a business partner in the Compact, many have high expectations for the role that he will play.

Safety has been a critical concern for both the DPS and the City. Archer has placed a police commander of the nearest local precinct as the city's stakeholder representative at each of the 33 LCCs. The police commander works actively with the Compact school on issues of safety and violence both within the building and to and from school. Archer has also worked to increase the number of city jobs available for on target students. Still, city government maintains a limited functional role at this point.

A number of respondents believe there are many other indirect and informal ways the city can become a more active stakeholder in the Compact. Recent changes in administration have altered the whole hierarchy in city government. The stakeholder

council has begun, with the city, to identify additional people to serve on LCCs throughout the Compact structure. For instance, the city of Detroit Employment and Training Department has become an important source in producing summer jobs for Compact ready students. According to a top Employment and Training Department official, the relationships over the last two years between his office and DPS have flourished after decades when no one knew any one from the perspective bureaucracies and the lines never crossed. He attributes much of this to the Compact. He states,

...for the past year we have worked out some amazing agreements with the board of education in terms of release of information regarding certain student files. We now have access to the counseling files, academic files and just anything that has been placed into that student folder...we never had that contact before..we never had face to face before, now we have our meetings and we are having monthly meetings to continue knowing each other.

Mayor Archer has put cooperation with the suburbs towards an integrated mass transit system as a high priority. Solving the city's transportation dilemma would greatly assist in the placement of Compact jobs.

Detroit Compact Stakeholders: The Detroit Federation of Teachers. School employee unions, according to almost all interviewees, have been a major force in policy agenda setting in Detroit Public Schools. The principal union is the Detroit Federation of Teachers (DFT). John Elliott, DFT president, is the undisputed education labor leader in Detroit. The union role during the Jefferson tenure was characterized as bread and butter reactionary. A former superintendent states, "Sometimes they mouth some of the rhetoric for becoming engaged in partnerships with management but the reality of it is

that, particularly at the local level, they have been concerned with how much more money they can get for their members and how they can improve "their working conditions" which generally translate to more goodies."

A leader of Detroit Association of Black Organizations, with a former UAW leadership background, spoke passionately about the difficulties of bringing the DFT and OSAS into the Compact alliance with the business community in trying to bring about change.

In putting together the Compact, the community advocates, the Chamber of Commerce and the business community were a coalition that had to really beat heads with the school community to forge the kind of Compact that became a very viable one. We did all the right things at the very outset. They had so many competing interests within the school system. I guess about 20 different unions were not very receptive but we grew past that...it was our presence within the community component of the Compact and our tradition of putting the need of the community first that made the difference.

While the DFT interest in acquiring new technologies for schools probably was an important reason for acquiescing to the Detroit Compact, the most important reason according to a community advocate was the breadth of stakeholder support for this initiative. Elliott typically is publicly skeptical of reform and pilot initiatives, instead advocating for total system-wide efforts to improve schools. Yet a DFT union representative alluded to the union buy in with the Compact program.

The Chamber of Commerce wants certain things in education like the elimination of the tenure act, schools of choice not only across school boundaries but for private schools. On those things we disagree strongly. But remarkably, as I've said, we've been able to come together on some things such as the Detroit Compact.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: The Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors (OSAS). A second major union is the Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors (OSAS). OSAS represents about 1,200 administrators in the Detroit Public Schools. There are two categories of employees, 12-month employees which are school-center based, such as Area based administrators, directors of curriculum, community relations, transportation, and those kinds of positions. The set of 10 month employees are primarily the school based employees such as principals, assistant principals, department heads and unit heads. As the sole bargaining unit for those employees, OSAS negotiates contracts, writes grievances, and works on many task forces affecting the Detroit Public Schools. It also serves as a stakeholder in the Detroit Compact. OSAS works with the Chrysler Corporation in the "World of Work Program" which employees develop relationships with schools and work in schools. OSAS is thus involved in a variety of capacities other than just negotiating contracts and grievances. An OSAS union official who had negative words for every initiative under the HOPE team as faddish praised the Detroit Compact,

The Detroit Compact is a good program...I think that's a prime example of something that was jointly developed between the business community, the education community, the labor community and the grassroots community that is doing a good job in our schools.....

Detroit Compact Stakeholder: Organized Labor. According to a former superintendent, the presence of organized labor in the Compact structure in Detroit was very important. "All this involvement with Renaissance and the Chamber won't work if you don't get the labor people in. Detroit's very unionized. If you can't get union

officials to say, 'yes, we want to work with you' then everything else goes out the window." A former superintendent argued that in a strong union town, if you are going to involve big business you must find a way to involve the unions. Organized labor is also supposed to provide access to DPS students to the skilled trades, but placements have been limited. Labor and Compact representatives are working to reduce union barriers which have prevented involvement in apprenticeship programs.

Organized labor was described as helpful in at least two other ways when the Compact was being formulated. The first was assistance in some very tough contracts with the DPS unions. There are at least 18 unions represented in the DPS. During the two years of the Porter administration when the Compact was first implemented, there was never one work stoppage. Secondly, the unions were helpful in the millage campaigns. Either DPS union strikes or loss of the millage campaigns could have impeded the coalition building in the formative stages of the Compact.

Detroit Compact Stakeholders: City-wide Schools Community Organization and City-wide Student Council. Parents and students are also formal stakeholders in the Compact structure. The President of the City-wide Schools Community Organization sits on the district stakeholder council. The parents who chair the Local School Community Organizations (LSCOs) also sit on the Local Compact Councils. In addition, individual parent(s) must sign the Compact agreement along with the students. Parents are supposed to use the frequent reports on progress as a guide, to take steps to help their children get and stay on target. The Student Council president of each grade in every Compact school

also sits on the LCC.

Detroit Compact Stakeholder Analysis

The Detroit Compact's unique organizational structure was critical to the Compact's success, both in achieving agenda status for the initiative and during implementation. It was deliberately created in response to the shortcomings of other partnership models. For instance, in the Boston Compact, critical advocacy in support of business involvement in the district was lacking. What is so novel about this particular Compact, according to a Commerce official, is the degree of stakeholder participation. Any of the 12 stakeholders can bring any issue to the district wide stakeholder council. There are also 6-8 operative subcommittees at the district level.

According to a DPS administrator, the story of the Compact was the ability of people outside of the DPS to create a positive groundswell of support for this initiative. This was the one initiative advanced by the HOPE reformers that would be championed by so many others external to the school district when it came time for implementation. While the other principal part of the agenda of the reformers (Empowerment, Diversity and Choice-Chapter 5) experienced fierce political resistance, the Compact has generated widespread support. A chamber official stated, "We've pretty much staked our reputation on the technique that you can get consensus among the stakeholders, parents and teachers and unions and business and administrators and so on around a process."

According to a Chamber representative, with a real partnership you have to work every concept through every partner. You have to do that to maintain the integrity of the

relationship because you want as much consensus as possible. When there is a difference of opinion you have to work very hard at all levels. The community component led by Geneva Williams of United Community Services and Horace Sheffield of Detroit Association of Black Organizations (DABO) were extremely instrumental in building this kind of advocacy.

The relationships established through the Compact have stimulated further public-private collaboration in the city and in the schools. A major new initiative of the Compact is to create networks of government entities and of the nonprofits that service particular Compact schools. This effort requires cooperation between agencies which have seldom worked together. For instance, McMichael Middle School had one of the highest incidents of violence and truancy in the district. The Compact is working holistically to address those problems. The Michigan Department of Commerce designed a special program for the delivery of social work services through McMichael. It was initially presented as a small pilot. The model has spread and now operates in four other Compact schools. In each of those schools, a consultant paid by the state, went in and talked to the existing groups. The consultant observed what the Compact school was doing, what the special needs of the students were and gradually created a network of social service agencies that would work within the process of the existing network (the LCCs) that were already in place.

According to a state official, they started small and built an effort, and brought those to the table who were not there. The effort has involved the Social Security Administration and other actors not often associated with education. The network now

includes 30 or 40 agencies in these five participating Compact schools. The goal is to target some state services to children in Compact schools. These efforts are likely to expand in future years.

One of the nice things about having social workers in the schools is that referral is immediate. The agreement is that if something happens at school and an agency gets a call from the social worker that there's an immediate response. The hope is to create sort of a one stop shopping for all agencies that service kids. You don't have to call the parent and then arrange transportation. The social worker can handle that. You got the folks who can get through the red tape and get directly to where the services are.

Another example of how the relationships developed in the Compact have helped foster other collaborative initiatives is the Comer School Development Program, in which the Skillman Foundation will be committing \$16.9 million (see Chapter 6). According to a top DPS administrator, the district had tried unsuccessfully for over a decade to bring in the health and social agencies to the schools. The Comer School Development Program incorporates these principles. According to a Skillman respondent, collaboration was created from the Compact experience. Skillman trustees were willing to support the Comer program as a complement to the relationships that had been developed in the Compact, and the increased willingness demonstrated by the DPS to partner with outside entities in the city.

A major proponent of African-Centered education in the district asserted that support for implementation was facilitated by the active involvement of outside stakeholders in the Compact. The School Empowerment movement, the focus of Chapter 5, was also driven by high profile representatives involved in the Compact structure, including one of the original HOPE team members.

A leader of the Detroit Association of Black Organizations argues that the relationships developed between stakeholders active in the Compact structure extends to areas beyond the DPS. The Compact brought together actors who have common interests in the city, who were unable to work together during the leadership vacuum that ensued in the later part of the Young regime. This was the first time that the fragmented leadership elements in the city of Detroit were actually coming together. The education arena just happened to be the place for stakeholder collaboration in the city. A Compact administrator states:

I doubt if Bernard Parker (Wayne County Commissioner) would have spent a lot of time with the Chamber of Commerce in finding out that they have a real coincidence of interest, but a linkage happened as a result of the Compact. We've created a conduit that allows people to move into the education arena and introduced groups who thought they were so disparate and found out that they had a common agenda.

As one community advocate put it, "when these people came together in committees, this gave them the opportunity to affect relationships and work together outside of their competing interests for the first time. The Compact in general is a coalition of people that you wouldn't have expected to come together." A Chamber respondent added,

If you would have told anyone five years ago that there would be 35 community agencies and 35 businesses all coming together at the district level everyone would have said it can't happen in Detroit..... and this is repeated on the micro level within each school....a coalition of youth serving agencies, principals, the teacher unit, business groups, community advocacy groups all sitting together making important decisions.

Another striking example of a formal spin-off is that many key actors in the Compact have collaborated around a new city wide initiative called the Alliance for Safer Greater Detroit. This alliance includes a broad range of business involvement, a

community component and law enforcement officials from the federal, state, city and county to coalesce around dozens of crime issues. It was the brainchild of Horace Sheffield who was one of the chief architects of the Compact. It is partially based in the Chamber. One of the originators of the Compact stated,

If we can get people around a table in a coalition, I think that's our best chance for arriving at a common agenda. That's been demonstrated through the Compact. It's being demonstrated through this alliance. We went through a long strategic plan just to try and refocus and get back to the agenda where we bring the community, bring business around a table, so there are collaborative activities where you don't have people making decisions in isolation.

INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES THE DETROIT COMPACT

The partnership has attempted significant institutional restructuring by changing the reward structure within each participating Compact school. The Compact structure attempts to bypass the bureaucracy and provide incentives directly to the student. This is accomplished through the creation of Local Compact Councils (LCCs) within each participating school, which is a mini-version of the district wide partnership.

Many experts across the country contend the urban school system and incentive structures as they exist today, do not prepare students technically, intellectually, and emotionally to be productive citizens in the 21st century. The traditional organizational structure of public K-12 schools in Michigan is a locally elected board, a centralized administration and students geographically assigned to schools. It was designed to accommodate a way of life 150 years old and may be obsolete to meet current demands. Centralization of urban schools paralleled trends in representative government. In large urban areas, the older structure has many incentives to maximize budgets and control clientele. There is little incentive, however, to provide exceptional education or assure equality of opportunity. According to a foundation official,

Dr. Porter (former superintendent) once said to me that the district's organized to survive not succeed, to endure not excel. I think he makes a good point. I think in many ways, public schools as institutions are isolated from the forces which drive change in other kinds of organizations, even non-profit organizations or quasi-governmental organizations like hospitals. They're locally controlled. They're independently and securely financed and frankly they're free from the pressures which drive other people.

While little unanimity exists on how to restructure, a general consensus exists among effective school researchers that more autonomy and accountability is needed for

individual schools.⁸ The Compact structure is consistent with that logic. As the Compact matures, Compact principles are being woven into the fabric of the school system. The partnership involves the institutionalization of education reform, building it into the goals of each stakeholder group. Many activities take place at Compact schools in support of Compact goals (see Appendix B for specific Compact activities such as academic enrichment, career/job preparation activities, personal development, recognition/awards, field trips and incentives/parties which take place within the various Compact Schools).

In some cities like Boston, efforts to restructure through public-private collaboration, have been stalled by political infighting. To date, the District Stakeholder's Council in Detroit has remained remarkably free of overt political conflict. However, the very nature of the multilevel partnership and the desire to bring change to the district means that conflicts will exist. Certainly there have been moments of tension between stakeholders. In November 1992, the school board elections became especially politicized. The Chamber of Commerce, a key Compact member, took a rare public stance on public policy issues and endorsed the HOPE candidates. They threatened millions of dollars of future aid if the reform-minded HOPE team was not reelected, arguing going back to the old ways was not acceptable. The Chamber's intervention had little effect as three out of four HOPE members were ousted. Eventually this conflict

⁸ For effective schools research see for example, Stewart C. Purkey and Marshall S. Smith, "Effective Schools: A Review," *Elementary School Journal*, 83 (March 1983): 427-452; James S. Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, *Public and Private High Schools*, NY: Basic Books, 1987; Chubb and Moe 1990; Anthony S. Byrk, Valerie E. Lee and Peter B. Holland, *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

subsided and the Compact stakeholders have had few major problems dealing with the new board with respect to the Compact.

Another example of tension at the District Stakeholder Council, revolved around the selection of a co-chair. Frank Smith, former president of the Detroit Chamber of Commerce, wanted to nominate to the position of co-chair, a white businessman who had never attended a meeting. The stakeholder council vetoed that idea but it created discord nonetheless. The basis of the dispute was that Smith might try to circumvent the democratic nature of the stakeholder council. Following that misunderstanding, all Compact partners signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" underscoring the collaborative nature of the partnership. For the most part, the stakeholders have clearly focused on school improvement according to a Commerce Department official. He states:

With a real partnership, you have to work every concept through every partner. You have to do that to maintain the integrity of the relationship because you want as much consensus as possible. When there is a difference of opinion, you have to work very hard at all levels.

In the operation of the Local Compact Councils, respondents indicate that there has been little serious conflict among stakeholders within each school. A Compact school employee argues the LCC at her building (Western International High School) has been amazingly non-conflictual and has operated under consensual decision making quite effectively. An observation of Northern High School's Local Compact Council supported this view. Partners rarely vote, instead efforts are made to gain consensual decisionmaking.⁹ The one problem among the LCCs is questions of why one school

⁹ How to conduct meetings was built into the Compact structure. There is a free exchange of ideas. There are a set of rules that are written out and followed. If a vote does become necessary, majority rule presides.

receives more resources from their business partners than others. There is also difficulty for the Compact employee in finding time to do all the things that need to be done. Part of the job of the full-time Compact employee in each school is to build strong community relations, coordinate tutors and mentors and work to find jobs for students. Each month the LCCs come up with the goals and objectives that they want to accomplish for the month and for the year. There are also meetings in the summer and an annual two day retreat, which is attended by all 12 stakeholder groups in each of the 33 Compact schools. A business partner argues the biggest challenge will be for the Compact to come up with all the scholarships that will be needed in 10 years. When it first started he claimed, it wasn't a problem because no one was meeting the standards.

Educational reform critics such as Moe and Chubb (1988) have argued that democratic control cannot solve educational problems. They insist schools need to be subject to market control and greater consumer choice. There are many examples of "feel-good" partnerships around the country more cosmetic than anything else and failing to restructure schools or promote any *real* kind of education reform. Has the Detroit partnership served as a catalyst to promote significant school restructuring?

The early evidence of Local Compact Council's activities as part of the Detroit partnership is a promising indicator of a meaningful structural reform in the operation of individual schools within the district. Almost all respondents claim the LCCs are working. The 12 active stakeholders have engaged renewed partnership efforts at the school site and brought many actors into the education system who have been relegated to the sidelines for decades. Given the level of political divisiveness in Detroit, this is

no small achievement. The monthly LCC meetings and the bi-monthly stakeholder's meetings provide a vehicle where community input is accepted and conflict by stakeholders resolved. It has helped to open up a district that had been closed to outsiders. A Chamber official described the pervasive insularity of DPS that they confronted before the Compact,

The schools really were a closed community. What is happening now and again I think because of the Compact, the schools are becoming more open communities. For example, in each compact school there is a council that replicates the major stakeholders group so that the schools now have business people and community people and union people and higher education people who visit the school regularly, who work with the schools. I think the schools are realizing that their success in the future really lies with being an open community, taking advantage not only of the resources that they want but also of the expertise and the volunteers that really are required to get involved in education. So, yes I do think there's a significant shift going on there.

According to a Commerce official, no other partnership efforts across the country involves as many stakeholders as the multi-level nature of the Detroit Compact. As a result, the Detroit Compact is being looked at as a model for the recent federal schools to work legislation. A Detroit university respondent states:

I'm a Detroit resident. I was a Detroit teacher. I work in a university that sits in the middle of the city. From my point of view, all the groups that exist within the city are much more involved with the DPS than they used to be, especially the business community. When I was a first year teacher, big business was not involved in our schools at all. At the time, they didn't see that as their role.

Most Compact schools have opened teaching labs. For instance, Western International High will have two to three tutors in the teaching lab at a given time and about 25 volunteers a week at the school. There are Compact pep rallies and grade level assemblies where the stakeholders go over the standards and the guarantees that are

available at the end of the school year. Table 4.4 indicates the job ready standards, Community College ready standards and College ready standards for the Compact.

---TABLE 4.4 HERE---

TABLE 4.4

Detroit Compact
Job and College Ready Standards

JOB READY STANDARDS

- A. 95% Attendance (no more than (10) days absent)
- B. 97% Punctuality (no more than (5) tardies to homeroom or first class of the day)
- C. 2.00 GPA "C" for JOB readiness (Summer or Permanent)
- D. 40th percentile or better on this year's CAT reading test
- E. 40th percentile or better on this year's CAT math test
- F. No major (category A,C,or V) and no more than 3 minor (Category B) violations of the Student Code of Conduct
- G. Pass the exit criteria for the Compact class

COMMUNITY COLLEGE READY STANDARDS

- A. 95% Attendance (no more than (10) days absent)
- B. 97% Punctuality (no more than (5) tardies to homeroom or first class of the day)
- C. 2.00 GPA "C" for JOB readiness (Summer or Permanent)
- D. 40th percentile or better on this year's CAT reading test
- E. 40th percentile or better on this year's CAT math test
- F. No major (category A,C,or V) and no more than 3 minor (Category B) violations of the Student Code of Conduct
- G. Pass the exit criteria for the Compact class

COLLEGE READY STANDARDS

College Ready Standards include all of the above Job and Community College Ready Standards and are based on high school graduation.

- H. 3.00 GPA cumulative throughout 9th - 12th grades
- I. Score 21 or better on the college ACT exam (the ACT standard was 19 for 1992 graduates, 20 for 1993 graduates and raised to 21 by 1994)

Students meeting all of the Compact standards receive summer jobs. Qualified graduating seniors receive a full-time permanent entry level position, plus community college tuition.¹⁰ Those meeting the college level standards, will be able to go to one of the participating schools in the Compact program to earn four full years of college paid tuition.

Business representatives have worked to maintain high standards for the Compact. In a compromise with community stakeholders, the Compact now provides second chance opportunities at the beginning of each year for those who have not met the requirements and special assistance for those who need help staying on target. An area superintendent credits business with playing an extremely important role in the Compact, because the end result of what we do should be in compliance with the need of business and industry.

As closely as school districts become linked with that sector of the community- then the school districts should be successful. If they're willing to comply with those needs. Because if that change comes about, schools must change. That is the most important thing driving reform. To me there are only two things that a school can do for a youngster. And that is to ensure the youngster is employable at the end of the education career in the public school system and the other is to ensure that the youngster is ready for any post-secondary experience. Business involvement is crucial to what we are doing and should be doing.

Clearly if there is a "hidden agenda" to business involvement in the Compact, it

¹⁰ At the end of the year, Compact students who have met the job standards will be provided with an entry level job in accordance with the Compact's job guarantee pledge within 60 days of graduation. The student is required to be an active participant in the job interview process. Students who accept full-time employment will also be eligible for scholarship assistance to attend a participating community college. The assistance covers six credit hours per semester at the in-district rate. The student who has met the job standard also has the option to seek summer employment only and be provided with scholarship assistance at a participating community college covering full tuition and mandatory fees.

is to drive reform throughout the district. Because the standards are tough, the business community believes the organization must change in order to get kids to meet those standards. According to a business official, DPS is an organization that has been doing things the same way for at least 50 years. It was measuring the same things it measured 50 years ago. A top Chamber of Commerce official argues,

The Compact is a desire to drive reform through the Detroit Public School System. Since we couldn't do it from the top down, we couldn't penetrate that bureaucracy, then the way to do it was to create a mechanism that had all these incentives, so it went right straight to the parent and the youngster. It became very clear what the benefit would be if they stepped up to their side of the bargain....and through that process demonstrate that there is a better approach and get other people moving in that direction.

According to a former superintendent, an important aspect of the institutional restructuring brought on by the Compact was common parent demands that the Compact be in their school. As the compact solidifies at the middle school level, kids move into the high school knowledgeable about what the standards are. A former superintendent stated,

You're not going to create any kind of major change in Detroit until you create a certainty of opportunity that goes around the bureaucracy. That was the key to the Compact. The whole purpose of Compact was to figure out some mechanism that will get you around the bureaucracy so that the kids and the parents will feel that there's something in this for them.

According to a Chamber official, part of that hidden agenda has already been realized in the schools, by the setting of easily measured standards that can serve as a gauge for measurement. Before the Compact, there was no uniform attendance policy. According to a Chamber official, "they didn't let numbers drive the system." Individual schools are motivated not to be on the bottom of the list. There are now at least informal

sanctions for being on the bottom of the list. According to a Chamber official, "Now some of the Compact schools will end up on the bottom of the list. But we've never had the same school on the bottom two years in a row". According to a business respondent, there was no pressure for schools to do anything differently in the past. Many view the Detroit Compact's link of funding with standards as a very positive step for the district. The Chamber believes it also influences the reward structure of the professionals in the DPS. Their goal is to increase the number of kids who come out capable of operating in the real world. A business advocate noted:

Without defining what good is, you can't ever tell whether you got better. Our standard of attendance is 95%. We started with more than half the kids that didn't meet one of the standards. Then with the reading standard, the math standard, the grade point average standard your best suburban districts would probably be around 30%. Detroit was well below 10%. Without defining what good is you can't ever tell whether you've gotten better. And you don't have the shock value of saying, this is why these kids can't go out in the real world and do well.

The Chamber credits the actions of Porter and McGriff for focusing on results, the willingness to give detailed school by school measures of what the performance looks like and the willingness to demand that performance improve each year.

The Compact has served as a base on what those objectives need to be and how you might go about measuring it. The standards the district now uses are the same as our standards. We came first and they followed. It is actually more important now that they own them...we helped build a community consensus around it. The difficulty of getting the standards negotiated probably took a good 8 months to get people to agree to it because you are invading their territory, you're invading a cultural mindset of schools that is anti-performance or measuring performance based on outcomes.

As one university official involved with the Compact stated,

The Compact has defined excellence and it has brought the parents in as

partners with the schools because the parents have to sign the agreement. They have to work with the student to make sure that he or she is Compact ready. And they have to understand the rewards that are available. The Compact has done an excellent job in communicating with the students saying this is what excellence means and this is what we expect of you. If you do these things, this is what will come to you.

The Compact has encouraged the independent functioning of the schools. Kids want to go to a Compact school because there is an incentive. The Compact, observe some, is helping the schools become "more open communities." The Chamber has been an active player now with DPS for over five years. A chamber official put it,

We've got \$30 million on the table in the business community for the Detroit Compact as a way to demonstrate that there's a better way to do business. Without a doubt, in the few years that the Compact's been in business, we've shown that if you provide an incentive to a youngster, you're going to find him rising to the occasion.....I think that's a way for us to show the public, parents, teachers, unions, everybody that you can have a quality education system but the problem is the only way we could see to drive reform through the system was to create that pressure from the bottom up, through the Compact. There's a lot of things built into the Compact that can ultimately become operating procedures in the public system. Simple things like making sure the kids are in class every day. The district used to take attendance once a year in order to get state funds and then never know whether the youngster shows up afterwards. That is crazy. We demanded the offering of mandatory curriculum minimums at least that will allow a youngster to be able to have a foundation from which they can go on ...and set standards including disciplinary standards and performance that goes beyond just academic achievement, the need to interact with other people. Those are all conditions built into the Compact.

Another big business respondent provided this perspective on the need to change the priorities of the district's schools,

I like to say that the business community is the ultimate customer....What has been really lacking in Detroit is that in the business world, we have to continuously focus on who is the customer and what is the customer's expectations. If we don't meet those expectations and if we misunderstand those expectations then the customer will buy from someone else. The customer for education are the businesses that eventually end up hiring

DPS students. If they don't like the product they're getting out of Detroit schools, they're going to go to someone else who's producing those products and in this case it would be another school district, perhaps another state....I know John Elliot (DFT President) personally. He's a nice human being but he's into the status quo and he doesn't know who his customers are and his members don't understand who their customers are....if they understood who the customer is, they wouldn't be going to the PTO to learn what to teach. They'd be going to employers who are going to inherit the students and employers who are leading this whole effort.

As area businesses become aware of the Compact criteria, they will use the program as a means to screen students. Students will come to realize that if they want to get a job, they will have to meet the criteria. Thus the incentive will become more powerful as relations are built up over time. According to a Compact representative, 93% of employers who hired an on-target Compact student, in a follow up survey conducted by the Greater Detroit Alliance of Business, indicated that they would hire that student again. He claims,

If you set the expectations right, the kid walks in and they are good kids. They know what to expect and they demonstrated that behavior during the course of the year. They know they can learn because they've demonstrated that.

The relationships that are developing have helped bridge the gaps and increase understanding on both sides of the divide. The Compact has greatly increased the dialog by which the district is learning how to work with the business partners. This includes the use of fax machines and other electronic means. Business leads such regimented lives according to a school official. Working with kids has opened a whole new feeling for them towards what an urban school district like Detroit is all about. Volunteers learn more realistically what conditions of schools in urban cities are really like. The exchange and learning process has not just been one way. An OSAS official supports this claim,

I think those businesses that have actually done the grunt work, that have actually come into the schools now have that understanding.....I don't want to totally castigate them but business thinks so little of what we do from the outside ...but once they get in and start working and see what it's all about there is a terrific relationship that has developed most of the time between the business partners and the school. That's the feeling I get from the principals and their excitement about the Compact.

A DPS administrator claims the Compact has changed the relationships in the city between the key players.

When we revised the agreement several months ago, there were certain people who sat at that table, who were also part of the original discussions. Some of the same arguments and complaints that I had in issues were the same ones that I had five years ago when we were planning the Compact. But the difference was the respect that those people at that table had for me was different and my respect for them was different. Even though we still had some disagreements, I clearly felt more comfortable that we all wanted the same thing than I did five years ago. Participation and involvement changes things.

The partnership has contributed to significant resource contributions to the DPS. Many of the most important contributions of the various stakeholders are in-kind and not direct monetary expenditures. Still, direct monetary contributions have been significant, including several large infrastructure improvement efforts. Recently, Mumford High in Detroit opened a \$725,000 high technology laboratory with 20 Apple and 20 IBM computers. Michigan Bell and Ameritech, Mumford's Compact business partners, donated \$400,000 for the project and the Detroit Compact funded another \$105,000 (*Detroit Free Press* 1991). Without the involvement of the business community, Detroit Public Schools could have never even considered such a facility.

IBM's Compact presence will be strongly felt for years to come through their support of a "IBM-David Mackenzie Science Wing," a multi-media, self-contained science

wing at their partner school, Mackenzie High. The new wing includes seven laboratory classrooms, three presentation rooms that were outfitted with state of the art equipment including 36 IBM PS/2 computers, three file servers, microscopes, multimedia monitors, CD-ROM drives, laser discs and related software. The cost is in excess of \$500,000 and will have a computerized science curriculum for required freshmen and sophomore science classes. IBM also provided training for 15 school based employees in computer based science instruction. AT&T is in the process of building a tutoring lab at Henry Ford High School.

Many supports and benefits are designed by stakeholders to encourage students to meet the tough Compact standards. One of the most important resource contributions of the Detroit Compact is the large number of volunteers that become engaged within each Compact school. The community/business partners of the Compact provides one tutor or mentor for every ten students who enroll in the Compact. The school partners pledge improvements in reading, math, attendance, discipline, and curriculum. The community/business partners commit resources (mentors, tutors, summer jobs, summer learning programs, discretionary funds, etc.) that will be used to achieve the pledged performance. Some community organizations working through the Compact have even pledged to provide recreational or other support to Compact students.

Before the Compact, there was no means by which to organize those interested in working in the schools. The Compact is aggressively recruiting an additional 500 neighborhood volunteers. In 1992-93 there were an estimated 1,392 volunteers. There remain problems in how to most effectively utilize volunteers. A Compact employee

states:

We are supposed to have one volunteer for every 10 kids in a Compact school and many of the volunteers have said, quite frankly, that some of the schools have not been volunteer friendly. That's a by product more than anything else of the organizational structure of the school number one and secondarily in our staff's inability quite honestly to know how to use volunteers in the most meaningful way. You've got to remember there is also a logistic problem from the volunteers respect. They may say I'm available from 9 to 2 or 9 to 11. That might not be the time you need them for your reading program, so matching the human resources with the schools ability to appropriately utilize them continues to be a problem.

Table 4.5 indicates the volunteers by partner group involved within Compact schools.

---TABLE 4.5 HERE---

Table 4.5

Volunteers by Partner Group 1992-93

<u>Partner Group</u>	<u># (%) of Volunteers</u>	
Business	568	41%
Compact Council Members	443	32%
Community	304	22%
State	30	2%
City	24	2%
Higher Education	13	1%
DPS	<u>10</u>	<u>0%</u>
Total	1,392	100%

Source: Moore and Associates 1994

The number of volunteers varies greatly within each school.

According to a big business respondent, they found in their partnership with a Detroit high school that many of the students did not have anyone in the family who has ever worked. A DPS administrator states, "many of these kids are working and their parents don't work and so we are teaching them job skills that they can't even observe from the adults in their life." That's why the mentoring program is so important and exposure to the workplace and workplace exposure in the school is so critical. A business official stated, "when you ask students what got them on the right path, it is rarely a program but a person who is the answer".

Discretionary funds exist to provide direct incentives to students. For instance, the Compact provides \$100 to each student in grade 6 and 7 and \$150 for grade 8 who meets the standards at the end of the year. There is also a goal within each Compact school to raise the funds to provide an overnight trip each year for on target students. From time to time, some or all Compact schools will be chosen as demonstration sites for innovative academic interventions funded by the Detroit Public Schools. Compact schools are also increasingly becoming the focus of corporate and foundation education support.

More than \$6.5 million of the \$10 million Van Dusen Endowment has been raised as of March 1995. This will fund the scholarship component of the Detroit Compact through at the least the year 2003. According to a high level DPS administrator, the business stakeholders in many schools have committed resources above and beyond the guarantees in the Compact. She contends,

If you go into several high schools, their business partners have gone over and beyond what was committed. The commitment--it is a financial

commitment towards guaranteeing college and jobs. But then I can go into some schools where the business partners have renovated a whole wing of the building. That wasn't part of the deal, that is above and beyond the deal. Clearly that was not a part of it. And when I talked to some of those business partners and they get to talking about 'my school this and my school that', I mean it is just great. It is fantastic.

In order to create the organizational capacity to provide Compact support for *every* middle and high school in the district by the year 2000, the partners will need to attract more small and mid-size business involvement. Most of the large corporations have already signed on to the Compact. Indeed, this general lack of involvement of small and mid-size businesses has been suggested as a weakness in the Compact. This is viewed by some as critical to long term support of the Compact beyond the year 2003 and in hopes of expansion into all of the district's middle and high schools.

A Department of Employment and Training official believes the links between the schools and business must continue to expand over the next couple of years. Otherwise, he believes the labor force is not going to survive in this city. He states, "A person who spends just two days at an employer learns a whole lot more about that employer's expectations than spending maybe a whole 14 weeks at a school being told by somebody else what those expectations are."

The Detroit Compact was designed as a long term reform vehicle. Full implementation will not be complete until at least the year 2000. Therefore, the findings regarding the impact of the institutional restructuring on the district are necessarily tentative.

The Compact program has shown tremendous growth in both the number of schools and the number of students involved. Over the past five years, the number of

schools grew from an initial five schools in 1989-90 to a total of 33 in 1994-1995. The number of students participating increased over seven times from its initial 2,700 students to over 20,000. This number would represent a good size district anywhere in the country and the third largest district in Michigan.

Institutional expansion is one important performance measure. The Detroit Compact has maintained its constituency and continues to expand. During its initial year of operations during 1989-90, five schools and 2,700 students participated. This represented about 62% of the five Compact schools' enrollment. Thirty-five students received scholarships totaling \$70,362. Some 233 jobs were provided through the Greater Detroit Alliance of Business, DPS and other Detroit employers. A goal of bringing all DPS schools on board by the year 2000 was established. Some 635 or 23% of compact students met the standards during the first year (See Table 4.6).¹¹ In each of the first four years of the Compact, every student who has earned a job and wanted one, was placed.

---TABLE 4.6 HERE---

After the original trial year, the Compact expanded to 12 schools during 1990-91 and 8,245 students participated. Of this group, 16% met the on-target Compact standards (21% of the middle schools and 8% of the high schools). A total of 535 jobs were obtained.

¹¹ Data on Compact operations during 1989-92 is taken from (Moore and Associates 1990,1991,1992) who are an independent firm contracted for DPS and Detroit Compact evaluations.

Table 4.6

Detroit Compact Vital Statistics

Year	#Schools	#Students	%Meeting Standards	Jobs Awarded	#Tuition Awards	Amount Tuition Awards
1989-90	5	2,700	23	233	30	70,362
1990-91	12	8,245	16	535	34	168,834
1991-92	21	14,495	18	1,068	50	318,136
1992-93	27	20,265	18	1,100	50	512,929
1993-94	27	20,223	19	1,280	50	n/a
Total	-	-	-	4,216	214	1,070,260

During 1991-92, the Compact expanded to 21 schools with 14,495 students participating or 64% of those schools' populations. The Summer Jobs program involved 1068 students. The College Assistance expanded to 50 students with cumulative resources totaling \$318,136 for the year.

By 1992-93, the Compact expanded to include 27 schools. Over 100 students were attending college with Compact support and the summer jobs program involved 1100 students.

The Detroit Compact also announced during this period, an ambitious plan for a ten-million dollar endowment for college scholarships. One million was donated or pledged in the first year of the endowment drive (Martin 1992). In 1992-93 total funds received at the school site were \$2,601,725. This figures includes \$513,725 for discretionary use by Local Compact Councils, \$270,000 for summer learning grants, \$837,000 for the cost of Compact Coordinators, \$738,000 for instruction of the Compact

class and \$228,000 for student on-target financial incentives. By the summer of 1993, compact members found 1,100 jobs for students.

According to a business respondent if you look at the Compact schools that have been involved for three and four years, it's having a huge, significant impact on the number and quality of the student graduating with an ACT score of 21 or better and considered to be college ready. It should be stressed, however, that still represents a very small number of students graduating. In the 1992-93 graduating class of 27 Compact schools, 50 students received tuition assistance. A total of 214 Compact students have received college financial assistance by the end of 1994. One hundred and fourteen of the 116 Compact students receiving tuition assistance in 1991-92 continue to receive Compact college financial assistance. It is significant to note that this is a 98% retention rate of students returning to college, compared to a 40 to 50% retention rate nationally.

In 1993-94 total funds received at the 27 school sites (excluding transfer students) was \$1,603,430. This includes \$686,180 for Local Compact Council funds, \$837,000 for Compact coordinators and \$80,250 for student on-target financial incentives. Among the 1993-94 graduating class, 50 students received tuition assistance.

The Compact expanded again in 1994-95 with the implementation of six more Compact schools. By 1994, nearly one half (33 out of the 76) middle and high schools participate. Ultimately, improved student performance will be necessary to sustain long term stakeholder commitment. The Detroit Compact relies on an outside contractor, Moore and Associates, to conduct overall evaluations of student outcomes. According to a business partner,

The one problem that probably still exists is the data collection problem from the district. Because the Compact is outcome oriented, we need data to in fact determine whether young people are on target or not. You need it very timely and we're still working on that problem....the attitudes of the school district people in understanding the problem have been real good.

Preliminary results indicate that the Compact is making a positive difference in many of the city schools. The longer a school participates in the Compact, the better the performance at that school. The four schools with the highest rates of on-target twelfth graders are those schools which have been in the Compact for three or more years (Mumford 22%; Cody 23%; Murray-Wright 31% Northern 20%). All of the schools which have in the Compact for only two years have below average Grade 12 on-target status (Cooley 13%; Northwestern 8%; Henry Ford 5%; Southeastern 3%).

---TABLE 4.7 HERE---

Table 4.7

Trend Analysis of On-Target Status by Round of School

	1993-94 % on target	1992-93 % on target	1991-92 % on target	1990-91 % on target	1989-90 % on target
Total Round 1 Schools Only	27%	27%	26%	22%	23%
Total Round 2 schools Only	19%	16%	13%	11%	-
Total Round 3 Schools Only	20%	18%	15%	-	-
Total Round 4 Schools Only	10%	10%	-	-	-

Source: Moore and Associates 1994.

Note: Transfer Students not included in this analysis

Round 1 Schools: Barbour Magnet, Detroit Open, McMichael, Taft, Mumford

Round 2 Schools: Cadillac, Drew, Hampton, Hutchins, Webber, Cody, MacKenzie

Round 3 Schools: Dewey, Earhart, Halley Open, Pelham, Ruddiman, Kettering,
Murray-Wright, Northern, Western

Round 4 Schools: Foch, Jackson, Cooley, Henry Ford, Northwestern, Southeastern

For every school joining the program, both attendance and test scores have risen (*Detroit Free Press* 1993). Furthermore, Compact schools have improved performance during each year of their involvement.¹² Round one schools (those schools who have participated since 1989-90) have a higher percentage of on-target students than rounds two, three and four schools. During 1992-93, there were 27% of round one students on-target compared to 16% of round two students, 18% of round three students and 10% of

¹² The year before the Compact began, only 8% of Mumford High School's graduating class would have met the compact standard. Last year, 38% of Mumford Seniors did. While the performance monitoring is still in the early stages, these trends have held up across the district for participants in the Compact (*Detroit Free Press* 1993).

round four students. This indicates that the longer a school participates in the program, the better the students within that school perform. Detroit's high school dropout rate tumbled to 28% in 1993 from a high of 41% in 1986. Some have attributed this improvement to the Detroit Compact, a district more focused on implementing alternative programs to bring youngsters back to school and the presence of community stakeholder participation in the district.

THE INSTITUTIONAL LEGACY OF THE DETROIT COMPACT

In 1992, the Chamber took a rare public stance, threatening long term Compact resources on the basis of the outcomes of the elections. Three members of the HOPE reform team that were critical to the implementation and expansion of the Detroit Compact were defeated in November elections. Shortly thereafter, Dr. McGriff who had played such a strong advocacy role for the Compact partnership, resigned. With the window of reform effectively closed for the near future, to what degree has the Detroit Compact survived the electoral defeat of the reform coalition? What is the institutional legacy of the Compact?

In Detroit, the Compact has become firmly institutionalized. The Compact has a guaranteed financial commitment through 2003. Detroit Renaissance has already committed some \$19 million to finance the Compact and another \$72 million in future Compact financing is likely forthcoming through state and federal grants, university funding and private foundation support (Russell 1992).

The reason the Compact has survived, according to a Compact administrator, is the institutional involvement of so many different players in the community. No one group no matter how politically strong, can kill the program. Another testament to the institutional legacy of the Compact is that it has now survived the passage of three superintendents, Arthur Jefferson, John Porter and Deborah McGriff as well as the ouster of the highly supportive and reform minded school board members. The new superintendent, David Snead, has committed although he has been less involved than his previous predecessors. In December 1994, Bob Boyce, the board member who serves on

the Compact Stakeholder Council, became board president.

A business leader indicated that too much money has been invested to give up. In fact, she asserts that just as the Boston Compact has been strengthened by two subsequent revisions, that the Detroit Compact will likely improve as the partnership becomes more fully seasoned. The institutionalization of the Compact cannot be understood however, just in terms of the financial commitment or by studying its formal charter. According to a top DPS administrator, what has made the change is the participation of the stakeholders into the educational processes.

You cannot become actively involved and not change. It is not like everything would be perfect. No there would still be some problems. But 80 percent of the time when someone becomes involved in our schools, their receptivity and their perception of the schools improve. They don't have to be 100 percent pleased with everything that goes on, but they understand differently and they are much more supportive. Participation makes the difference.

Institutionalization also occurs around the networks that are built up within each school. According to a school district official, "there was a time in this district when I don't think educators ever thought to go to the business community other than to say can you give us money..but now we are sitting down to the table with them and we are saying, as they with us what are your expectations....it's no longer just what can you give me, but real ongoing relationships." The degree of stakeholder engagement within the formal structure of each Compact school (the LCC) helps to diffuse conflict higher up in the organization structure. One Compact employee states, "my principal is completely behind the Compact, 100 percent. I know and she knows it is making an improvement. It is helping. It is not something that is smoke and mirrors."

Recently there was a revision of the Compact agreement. According to a DPS administrator the process was a testament to the institutionalization of the Compact,

We were in synch., the business partners at the local schools and the principals and the staffs and the other stakeholders at those local schools were in total agreement. Now we were disagreeing at the district stakeholder council, the Chamber and at my level at the top of the organization, but the people in the field at the schools, you couldn't tell who was speaking, the business partner or the principal. They were in synch. That's exactly what it was supposed to do when the Compact was designed. When I met recently with the business partners, it was really uplifting. 'My school is Northern High School and we are doing XYZ, it was just great to see the commitment, the involvement. Not long ago, not many were involved.

The biggest obstacle for all partners remains trust. There is still a degree of apprehension on the part of educators towards the business community. A school board member stated,

You don't go into Ford Motor Company, Comerica Bank and go into the boardroom and tell them what they need to know and what they have to do to make certain achievement. And yet the same time, when business comes to the schools they look at students like they look at their end of year performance review. And children don't develop that way.

There also remains cynicism from some in the business community that the people who are in really powerful positions, namely the newly elected DPS Board of Education and the DFT leaders are going to prevent real reform from happening. A business respondent states:

I think if we had too many more elections that produced the DFT lackeys that seemed to get voted in the last time around (which replaced the HOPE team) that would be the most serious threat to the Compact or any other parts of the reform agenda. In my opinion they're just trying keep the status quo. What we really need is change magnified. We're way, way behind. We don't need more incremental change. We need accelerated change.

Another indicator of institutional strength is the Compact's growing independence

from state appropriations. According to a state commerce official, the state dollars are certainly still helpful (currently \$650,000 a year), but are no longer essential to the Compact. Detroit has developed the *internal capacity* to make good on the promises that were made. The logistics are in place in order to have sustained organizational capability and the Compact will provide a commitment through the year 2003.

In light of the city's recent history, the overall absence of leadership and the fragmentation of key interests, the partnership has represented a successful organizational effort in an environment where effective coalitions have been limited. A solid base of broad participation has been established, including an active citizen component with their own representative on the stakeholder council, Geneva Williams. With a long history of mutual suspicion by the various partners (who in the past often resembled warring factions), the Detroit Compact has led to the realization that the objectives of the various participants are sometimes closer than they imagined.

THE NATURE OF POLICY CHANGE

What can the creation and implementation of the Detroit Compact tell us about the policymaking process in advancing reform in the educational arena in the city of Detroit? To bring about bold new changes requires significant resources and support. Large sums of money are necessary for implementing most urban programs. Community goals have to be agreed upon and the means of reaching those goals deemed politically feasible. The urban bureaucracy must be mustered for a united and concerted effort. Most cities rarely, if ever, have even one of those assets (Heiss 1974). Urban policy is determined in a "sea of constraints" rather than an ocean of opportunities. This view has led many scholars (Hayes 1992; Lindblom 1959, 1977; Schon 1972 and others) to adopt an incremental view to describe public policymaking.

For two decades, Detroit Public Schools was almost completely insulated from most of the broader community forces. Concerned primarily with consolidation of black control over the schools out of the 1960s and coupled with white disinvestment from the city of Detroit, the district became isolated from external forces. The failed experiment with decentralization further escalated this sense of isolation.

Within a short period of time between 1987 and 1988, engaged stakeholders were able to elect a reform coalition on the board and institutionalize a formal presence in the schools through the implementation of the Detroit Compact. These events will continue to shape external participation in DPS through at least the year 2003. A principal of one of the nine African-Centered academies argued,

when you look at the Detroit Compact and the coalition of businesses that have stepped forward and the kinds of dollars that they have committed

and in the services that were committed and the various partnerships that we have developed with the schools and business I think clearly there is evidence that change is under way....We have not educated children properly, and it affects how businesses function. It becomes a dollar and cents issue. They have to go back and retrain an employee.

The Detroit Compact, coupled with the collaborative spin offs that occurred, support Baumgartner and Jones contention that even short periods of agenda formation (that began in 1988 and closed by 1993) can continue to structure outcomes for perhaps decades to come. Furthermore, the stakeholders that became engaged are not likely, in the short term to retreat to their former levels of involvement.

A foundation representative claims the last five years of vigorous debate around school improvement in Detroit have raised people's awareness of the continued need for investment in with DPS. "There are not too many people who would continue to argue that if we just tweaked the system a little bit at the edges, if we just do this or that a little bit better, we'll get the kind of radical improvements in student performance that we desire." The "punctuated equilibrium" evident in the Detroit Compact support Baumgartner and Jones view of the policy lurch. Even short periods of change, they contend, are likely to leave institutional legacies that will structure, influence and bias public policy outcomes for decades. The Detroit Compact provides a strong case to support this proposition.

SUMMARY

By 1985, the corporate sector decided that physical redevelopment alone could not address Detroit's problems. Within two years, under the leadership of Detroit

Renaissance, the Detroit Strategic Planning Group was formed. The leadership for the strategic plan came from the segments of the corporate community that had largely been excluded from the Young regime who yet had a great stake in the city, principally the bank, utilities and service-sector industry.

The Detroit Compact illustrates that the business leaders are not necessarily indifferent to the educational needs of the community. The Compact indicates that the possibility for agenda compatibility between business and other community stakeholders around education issues exists. While other initiatives, such as the Empowerment and Choice movement lost agenda status (Chapter 5), the broad-based stakeholder participation has maintained an institutional legacy for the Compact, despite the removal of the reform based coalition that was instrumental in getting the Compact on the agenda. While the Compact is not a panacea either for the city's problems or for DPS, the involvement of the various stakeholders in the Detroit Compact, has nurtured some innovation in the DPS.

Creation of a governing coalition is more than gaining electoral support for new initiatives. A governing coalition has to be able to mobilize resources and bring various elements of the community together in active cooperation and decisionmaking. The Detroit Compact has provided the clearest example of the changes occurring in the city of Detroit, in particular the rise of a new class of leaders, the transformation of the local agenda incorporating a human capital development program and the willingness to come together by stakeholders who in the past who were unable to coalesce around a common agenda.

Detroit's partnership is attempting to address the inability of the urban underclass to substantially benefit from the processes of public education. The challenge in Detroit's partnership will be not only to involve the membership of the community for a long-term commitment but also to help all the stakeholders involved to understand what's at stake. The only group left out is probably federal government agencies and county government.¹³ The Compact is going to start looking at employment opportunities in Oakland County and that means expanding to at least look at working with the Oakland County Chamber of Commerce.

According to a Chamber official, there are enthusiastic stakeholders today who were skeptics. What has really driven the process is changing the reward structure. The rewards of jobs or college had become so disconnected from the work that was done in school. The task was to reestablish the connection. The participation has been substantive and not merely symbolic. While the phrase, "It takes an entire village to raise a child" may strike many as a cliché, it clearly has been resonating through community leadership circles. More than one quarter of the ninety respondents to this study made reference to this expression. A business partner agrees,

the Compact is one of the best examples of collaborative education reform that I've ever seen and it makes a good case study. Everybody likes to say, why are you doing that. It already failed in Boston...now it's very obvious that it's going to be a huge success in Detroit.

The state will soon be heavily involved with a new "Schools to Work" program, emanating from the new federal school to work legislation. The State of Michigan

¹³ Wayne County became the 13th partner of the Detroit Compact in 1995.

application cites the Detroit Compact as a perfect model. Thus, the Detroit Compact may become a federally funded national demonstration model for school to work.

Institutional and political arrangements in urban education are in a state of flux. The great institutional diversity that is emerging in large cities like Detroit is a dramatic shift from the centralized paradigm that has dominated urban education since the progressive era. Clearly the insular bureaucracy remains powerful in Detroit, but pressure has been placed and progress made in adapting institutions towards sustained involvement with outside participants in the community. This public-private collaboration in urban education may be the best hope to begin to combat the poor conditions in schools more comprehensively, through a multifaceted strategy involving employment opportunities, human and social services, health services, employment training and economic development. This transformation, however, is far from complete. Dramatic evidence of the limitations of reform is provided in Chapter 5.

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CHAPTER 5

EMPOWERMENT, DIVERSITY AND CHOICE: INSTITUTIONAL FORMATION, STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda pursued by the HOPE reformers. In part, these initiatives rest on a logic consistent with the Detroit Compact. Both reform agendas attempted to restructure institutional dynamics at the school site and involve larger segments of the Detroit Community. However, Empowerment, Diversity and Choice diverged from the Compact, stressing the positive impact of competition that schools of choice were expected to generate. "Diversity and Choice" includes special emphasis schools, such as fine and performing arts, math and science, multiculturalism and African-centered schools. "Empowerment" increases site based decisionmaking at the school level by a coalition of the principal, teachers, parent groups, staff and sometimes other groups. Empowerment seeks to transfer more authority for planning, training and teaching to the building level and reducing the role of central administration. Proponents of these reforms contend that since within a large urban district, pupils have special needs and interests, a single educational approach will not be best for all students. The curriculum should reflect what parents, students and the community demand.

While the Compact surrounded selected secondary schools with a vigorous

partnership to facilitate student success, the HOPE board saw Empowerment, Diversity and Choice as a path to significant internal restructuring of the delivery system of the DPS. Unlike the Detroit Compact, the efforts at implementing Empowerment, Diversity and Choice aroused significant opposition. Reform leaders were unable to build a broad based coalition capable of generating sustained political support. Indeed the implementation of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice led to a bitter 18 day union strike, and a strong political counterattack by the Detroit Federation of Teachers. In the 1992 board elections, most of the key reform minded school board members were ousted.¹ This defeat eventually led to the resignation of the reform superintendent Dr. Deborah McGriff.

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND AGENDA ACCESS WITH EMPOWERMENT, DIVERSITY AND CHOICE- EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF CONTAGIUM?

Chapter 4 suggests broad-based stakeholder support was instrumental in achieving agenda status and in the implementation of the Detroit Compact. In contrast to the formation of the Detroit Compact, in which supporters of the partnership became active "stakeholders" with specific responsibilities, the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice initiatives lacked a clear institutional structure. The initiatives were advanced around a loose-knit aggregation of supporters principally led by the DPS Board of Education and the general superintendent, along with scattered administrative and teacher support,

¹ The lone HOPE survivor, Lawrence Patrick, was re-elected in part because the other reformers, sensing their political defeat, mobilized their at-large constituencies in favor of Patrick.

sporadic university involvement, select community leaders and individual parents. The following sections examine the coalitions that developed to support and oppose Empowerment, Diversity and Choice and the impact of the coalitions to the success of the reforms.

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice Proponent: DPS Board of Education and DPS General Superintendent

The HOPE/Porter Coalition. Upon the forced retirement of Arthur Jefferson, John Porter was appointed interim superintendent on Friday, May 19, 1989. He received just six votes from the board of education, with four votes of opposition and one abstention.² The HOPE reformers were unanimous in their desire to recruit Porter since January 1989, but experienced strong resistance from the old guard who remained on the school board and entrenched bureaucrats who were unhappy with Porter's past criticism of the DPS management as chair of the State Select Panel and Citizens Education Committee member (see Chapter 3). Some members of the community believed an open search should be conducted and many supported the appointment of an internal candidate for the position. Porter also expressed his repeated reservations to taking the position in the months prior to his appointment. Despite this early resistance, the HOPE/Porter leadership got off to a promising beginning. Porter was instrumental in getting the business and organized labor in Detroit to support the DPS. He negotiated contracts with the 18 DPS unions,

² On January 3, 1989 Jefferson expressed his decision to leave the superintendency by June 30 or even sooner if a replacement could be found. Jefferson had been given the option of retiring from the post or being publicly ousted by the Board of Education in December 1988 (*Detroit Free Press* 1989). The HOPE board honored Jefferson's legally binding contract through June 1990. Jefferson maintained an office and had "consultant" duties.

without a single work stoppage. The early support of both business and organized labor was also instrumental in two successful millage campaigns. For the first time in 17 years, the DPS had a balanced budget and for the first time in 18 years, teachers started the school year with a signed contract.

Porter's involvement in the Citizens' Education Committee (CEC) and the State Select Panel, a few years earlier (see Chapter 3), had convinced him of the need to significantly restructure the delivery system of the DPS to provide more options for parents, greater community participation and more authority/accountability at the school site.³ In fact, eight of the 25 items in Porter's first year plan to restore fiscal integrity and managerial accountability were recommendations of the State Select Panel (*Detroit Free Press* 1989). Porter's first year was spent stabilizing the financial condition of the DPS, which he thought necessary before attempting to implement significant restructuring.

By early 1990, Porter and the HOPE board released the *Detroit Quality Education Plan*, which proposed a reorganized structure for the district "to provide intervention strategies for improving school effectiveness and increasing student achievement." The plan presented a blueprint for the implementation of school-empowerment and schools-of-choice. On June 5, 1990 the plan received the endorsement of the administrators' and teachers' unions they sought through a "Memorandum of Understanding: Empowerment and Schools of Choice." According to a former board member,

³ The CEC was a watchdog group formed by the school board to help implement the education recommendations of the Detroit Strategic Plan. The Committee was formed with the support of then Superintendent Arthur Jefferson. Facing a \$160 million dollar deficit and the need to continually go before the public in search of millage support, convinced the superintendent of the need for the creation of the CEC to study the deficit and make recommendations.

The HOPE board was determined to implement empowerment. It was already negotiated.⁴ It was in the contracts. The unions never bothered about negotiating this kind of thing. They didn't care because they knew nothing about it anyway. It had never been implemented. So they said, fine, you want to do that, good. We wanted to make it happen.

This was viewed as a positive first step in gaining union support for the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda. A former HOPE team member stated,

The union has got to be a partner. They've got to allow teachers and schools the flexibility to change the working environment within that building. The contract says that schools will run from this time to this time. The contract says that class sizes can only be this big. The contract says that teachers deserve this amount of time during a day to get ready. There's got to be some flexibility in those rigid standards that are set forth, so schools have the flexibility and freedom to do what has to be done for those children in that building. What the union contract is saying is, that every school and every environment in that school is the same, no matter where it's located in the city, it's the same. We know that's not true. So if we know that's not true then there's got to be some flexibility if anything is going to happen.

The "Memorandum of Understanding" outlined voting procedures for becoming "empowered" and called for the establishment of district wide and local school governance structures. By February, 1991, the DPS issued *Strategy 9: School Empowerment*, as an initial effort to implement the Board's 1990 *Detroit Quality Education Plan*. The "Memorandum of Understanding: Empowerment and Schools of Choice" was incorporated into Strategy 9 to clarify the provisions of the Policy on Empowerment and Schools of Choice (See Appendix C: Memorandum of Understanding: Empowerment and Schools of Choice).

Although it appeared a strong foundation had been laid to implement

⁴ Arthur Jefferson reintroduced decentralization to the DPS in 1987, outlined in his plan *Organizational Effectiveness Plan: Moving Towards the 21st Century* (See Chapter 3, p.28).

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice, this apparent consensus quickly eroded. In this original plan, empowerment and choice were limited to schools that were rated "excellent" or "satisfactory" by the interim general superintendent John Porter. The HOPE reformers originally planned to use empowerment as a reward only for schools that were successful, with benefits and sanctions based on the school ratings. They believed this competition would compel less successful schools in the district to improve their product or face declining enrollments. In addition, the original plan called for the removal of empowered principals if their schools didn't improve in three years.⁵ The HOPE board claimed the empowerment resolution was consistent with the findings of a blue-ribbon Citizens' Education Committee chartered to study the DPS a few years earlier.⁶ A HOPE reformer stated:

Meaningful choice is not possible if parents must queue up or win a lottery to enroll their child in the school they prefer. Real choice is possible only if successful schools expand or spin off imitators while failing schools shrink or close. Because school moneys follow children, schools with expanding enrollments will be assured the resources to do the job while schools with declining enrollments will not be permitted to maintain their share of the district's budget.

Limiting empowerment to above average schools led to an early perception that the reformers were elitist. Despite growing opposition, board members David Olmstead and April Howard Coleman introduced the *Resolution to Charter Detroit's Empowered*

⁵ Plans for empowerment temporarily came to a standstill when OSAS leadership objected to this provision. The district dropped the clause which allowed the firing of principals whose schools did not improve on July 19, 1990 (*Detroit Free Press* 1990).

⁶ The final report of the CEC, recommendation 3, endorsed the concept of local school empowerment in Detroit. Each school's program should be entrusted to teachers, principals, and other school staff in close cooperation with parents and students. The CEC identified 40 exemplary schools that would pilot empowerment for the rest of the district.

Schools in hopes of further moving the initiative forward and creating private school conditions within the public schools. In the resolution the board states, "Merely tinkering with a flawed system of top down educational organization would be a dereliction of our solemn responsibilities." The DPS board of education unanimously adopted the resolution to grant legal charters to create "new schools" at its Jan 22, 1991 meeting. Board members Coleman and Olmstead argued, "For too long now, the term "public" has come to mean bureaucratic, unimaginative, monopolistic and unresponsive. Our chartered schools will be autonomous, creating competition and responding to the needs of their students" (1992).⁷ They argued that this version of chartering avoids the constitutional issues that a voucher system would bring yet would enhance strong leadership and accountability at the school level. DPS board member David Olmstead and Paul Dimond stated in 1992,

The 'turf-guarding' public educators must be forced to retreat to a politically untenable position of no choice in publicly supported education, in the face of popular opinion which now seems to favor radical reform of public education. This is what we believe the concept of a public system of chartered schools would accomplish. Unlike any other school system in America, there is a window of opportunity in Detroit to quickly implement chartered schools (Olmstead and Dimond 1992)

When Porter left office, he was credited with restoring fiscal responsibility to the district and laying a solid foundation for restructuring.

⁷ As originally conceived, "charters" and "empowerment" were used interchangeably. In 1992, the Michigan State Legislature created their own version of chartered schools which should not be confused with the DPS "charters".

The HOPE/McGriff Coalition. From the beginning of her appointment, Deborah McGriff was an active participant in reshaping the reform agenda. She was not content to merely implement the HOPE reforms. Even before her appointment, Superintendent McGriff spent at least one week every month in Detroit preparing for the superintendency. A DPS administrator states that she carefully studied every document that anybody wanted to send her. She based her reform plan in part on programs that people had already expressed an interest for but the administration had not acted upon in the past. For instance, the board had already approved the establishment of African-centered academies but had not yet created an implementation plan. A DPS Task Force on schools of choice in 1986 had already determined the degree and type of choice schools parents wanted. By immediately moving to implement some of these initiatives, McGriff inherited a favorable constituency. However, she also acquired immediate enemies because the people who had opposed implementation in the past were angry that she was reviving them. A DPS administrator states:

Every decision creates some enemies for you and it creates some friends for you. She made decisions on what she felt was appropriate for kids. She forgot about who she made happy or who she didn't make happy based upon implementing a decision.

McGriff was loved by people who wanted theme schools, diversity and choice. She was loved by poor parents who said that citywide schools should provide transportation to kids so that low-income kids have access to what's considered the best schools in the city. She was loved by parents who wanted to be actively involved in decision making at their building and to be free of the central office bureaucracy. At the same time she was hated by people who felt that unless you could do something for all 250 schools you should not do anything for a single school. Until you had enough money to do it across the district you should not try to improve individual schools.

Deborah McGriff inherited a growing political firestorm over the reform initiatives. She moved quickly to change the elitist perceptions of the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice by calling for the elimination of restrictive qualifications for school empowerment defined in *Strategy 9*. She consulted with Al Shanker, the president of the American Federation of Teachers, who outlined a version of chartering schools that the AFT could support. The recommendation was adopted by the DPS Board and enabled any school, with appropriate school approval, to become empowered.

By September, 1991, the Board approved the General Superintendent McGriff's strategic plan, *Design for Excellence*, which provided an updated framework to implement Empowerment, Diversity and Choice. In this plan, all schools would be eligible for empowerment and schools of choice would be rapidly expanded. By the start of the 1991-1992 school year, nine schools voted for empowerment and were officially recognized by the DPS Board of Education. The board presented its completed empowerment plan to the public in March of 1992. It stated, "Empowerment cannot be delivered centrally and must be guided by the evolving priorities and service needs of empowered schools - that is the dramatic paradigm shift that changes DPS from top-down administration process control to school-focused control of educational program and resource allocation" (*Design for Excellence* 1991).

The reform leaders had a difficult time building and maintaining support for the implementation of empowerment and expansion of diversity and choice. Some advocates contended that implementation was hindered because Dr. McGriff never had the full support of the HOPE reform board. A former HOPE member alluded to the divisions that

began during the decision to hire McGriff that carried over into her appointment. A

HOPE member states:

She interviewed well. She got hired on a very slim basis. My personal choice for general superintendent was the general superintendent of the Dayton School System, Franklin Smith.⁸ He was my choice. In the interviews, when they asked about empowerment, he said that his choice was to get it in place slowly -- he believed in it because he had tried it in some schools in Dayton, but he knew the problems. He said the only way you're going to do it is to set up a five-year program because you have to change the way people think first. You've got to let them become free in their thinking before you can actually move them into position to make those kinds of decisions. The members of the selection committee didn't like that answer. They wanted a solution right away. Dr. McGriff said, 'you can put it in place right away.' That's the basis she was hired on. It's funny because she did much to hamper it, the implementation.

According to a former HOPE team member, there were five board members on the selection committee. There were two votes for Franklin Smith and there were two votes for Deborah McGriff. The third member on a slim basis voted for McGriff based on her response that she could implement empowerment right away. The two members who opposed the appointment of McGriff wanted to show that they were not bringing a general superintendent without total support, so the selection committee went public with a unanimous vote.

Throughout her tenure, Deborah McGriff often disagreed with the school board on implementation strategies as well as who had the authority to make key implementation decisions. According to a number of respondents, such disagreements consumed considerable energy. A HOPE team member explained this tension:

⁸ Franklin Smith was subsequently hired to run the Washington D.C public school system. He has moved to implement his own version of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice.

McGriff believed in magnet schools and schools of choice. She put the emphasis of resources in that direction as opposed to going with empowerment. The understanding in the Detroit papers was that we, the Board, were micro-managing. Yet, the understanding we had when we hired and when we interviewed every superintendent, was we sent them a copy of the plan that we had worked up. 'Here are the directions for how to steer this ship. It was agreed on by the Board, accepted and adopted by the community, here's our plan. Here's what we want to do.' We sent it to them ahead of time. And when they were interviewed we asked, 'how can you implement this plan'? We don't mind if you tweak this a little bit here or there but we have a reform vehicle. We have built the race car that we want to race. You want the seat back a little further, you want it up front, you want a little minor adjustment, we'll make those. But we need to know whether or not you can drive this vehicle. She said she could -- without making any adjustments, without making changes.

Another HOPE board member had this conversation with Superintendent McGriff,

'The blueprint is laid out, the finances are there. The town is supportive, and you have got a solid Board that can almost guarantee you anything you want to implement, you can get six votes on it.' In fact, we told her we don't want you to battle with the Board, that's the role for the board president. You go to the president, convince the president what you want to make happen. Your job is to sell the president and then it's the president's job to get six votes for it. If you keep it that way then you don't have to get into the Board politics. If you decide that you can't reach agreement with the board president and you want to go around him, fine, you have a right to do that. Chances are the president's going to win. She became embattled with the issues that she wanted to implement that weren't part of our plan, that we didn't have the resources to do, and that weren't well thought out. As opposed to working them out with us and convincing the Board that this was the direction to go in, or dropping it, she got a little bitter.

By early 1992, McGriff released *The Design for Excellence*, which called for a transition period, during which schools would receive business management support in school budget development, operating plan development, accounting, school financial management, DPS Board legal and policy compliance analysis, school improvement planning, service brokering and technology development. A school management support

team was established to work for empowered schools. The team was staffed with a combination of internal (District) and external (non-District) resources. For empowered schools, the administrative role was to shift from school control to school support. A school board member argued,

More than anything else, I'm concerned with us having policies here in Detroit that would assure that decision making can be at the local school level whenever and wherever possible, i.e., that the principal and teachers and parents and support staff and even students where possible at local schools are able to decide for themselves how to get the job done as opposed to having decisions made by a far away bureaucracy that doesn't have the knowledge or perhaps even the interest to make the same quality decisions and is really not in a position to be accountable or responsible for the outcome.

Through the empowerment process, local schools are supposed to administer their own site based management. The idea behind empowerment, according to a DPS administrator, was involvement of the entire school community. Not only the teachers but the secretary, the janitor, the businesses, the parents, everyone would become actively involved. A DPS administrator commented,

At one point, that may not have been necessary. Schools could operate in relative isolation to the rest of the community in terms of the decision making processes. The change in focus evolved because society changed.

The empowerment initiative is an attempt for schools to divest themselves from many of the bureaucratic components of the district.⁹ The aim at placing decision making authority at the school site is to enhance leadership, ownership, commitment and accountability. According to the final plan, any of the 268 schools in the district were

⁹ Under the empowerment agreement, 90 percent of monies come directly to the school. The allotment is determined by the number of students in the school and the per pupil allocation. A local school empowerment committee is then supposed to make appropriate decisions locally.

eligible to apply for empowerment if the following representative members in each school, vote yes:

- * Administration (the principal)
 - * Teachers: 75% (by secret ballot)
 - * Parents: 55%
 - * Support Staff: 55%
 - * Students: 55% (in middle and high schools only)
- (*Design for Excellence* 1993).

A Wayne State University advocate argued,

I believe in empowerment. I think that who ought to be running the school are the parents and the teachers that know those kids. Detroit is made up of so many different communities. The school that we are partnering in, we put students on a bus and took them all over the city. One of the students said, 'are we still in Detroit?' They had no idea of the pockets that we have within the city, how diverse the community is from northeast Detroit where we are working with a large Hmong population to southwest Detroit, the Hispanic neighborhoods.

The empowerment agreement grants individual schools authority to define mission, goals and objectives. It requires the formation of an Empowerment Council in each participating school, to manage educational programs, the budget, personnel, student and parental support and community involvement. The Empowerment Council is given considerable discretion over curriculum, instruction, and other school activities, but must conform within the parameters of existing policies of the DPS Board of Education and union contracts. The local school decides the number of School Empowerment Council members, determines how decisions are made and who sets the agenda.

Diversity and Choice was a complement to Empowerment and the preferred reform instrument of superintendent McGriff. She believed that citizens of Detroit needed evidence that some DPS schools were effective, to create a sense that the system could

be transformed. She believed limited dramatic change was more useful than small changes happening in many places. She wanted to show that the DPS had the capacity to create excellent schools. She particularly hoped to attract back to the system parents who had left the system. Interdistrict choice, she believed would foster pockets of early adapters that would create pressure on other schools to improve. A DPS administrator states:

If it didn't exist she had to create it. She created about 20 new programs at the beginning of her second year and opened four African centered academies at the beginning of her first year because they didn't exist. If parents want something you've got to create them. Her belief is you respond to what parents say they want for their kids....if what they wanted was consistent with what she believed and the district has the resources to put it in place, She didn't tell them be happy with the traditional school that's down on the corner from your house, that's all you're entitled to. She didn't believe that was the way to build community support. It's not the way to get people to support public education and feel good about it. It was not going to be the way to bring people back into the school system.

A school of choice was defined as a specific program, a school within a school or an entire school community with a special educational theme or focus. Schools of choice are not neighborhood schools. Yet, most choice schools give first choice to neighborhood and siblings and then citywide. Any school can become a theme school but a school can only become choice if it has excess capacity. Some schools of choice have citywide enrollment; others have limited area student enrollment. All schools of choice reserve at least 30% of the classroom seats for applications from neighborhood children. Choice schools are created by Choice Design Teams composed of parents, teachers, business persons, college and university personnel or any organized group with an interest in education in the city. Schools of Choice Design Teams define student

selection criteria for each school. The criteria may include: interest, needs, residency, age, advanced course work, or grade point average (*Design for Excellence* 1993). Schools of choice under McGriff were given special planning and start-up funds.¹⁰ A former HOPE team member who was not initially a schools of choice proponent stated:

I think that the notion of diversity, the notion of different kinds of schools that parents feel fit their needs is very important. I know we've had a lot of debate in Michigan, and in Detroit about African- centered schools, about male academies, female academies. My views have just shifted radically on education. I now would give parents choice of whatever they want. I believe that the parents are inclined to make the right choices. I believe they care a lot more about their children than the union leaders care.

While some pressure was placed on individual schools to come forward, empowerment and choice in Detroit were voluntary. Only a small proportion of schools responded. With respect to empowerment, A board member stated,

It puts added pressure on your school. Now you have got to manage a budget as opposed just to managing your kids. Whenever you have got to manage money, there are always problems if the principal spends too much money here or too much money was allocated there. I don't think we are going to see it take off like people had first envisioned it to do. It had not been refined. It needs to be refined. You need to bring all of the players back to the table to redefine it in terms of how they see it best fitting their own situation.

The frequent disagreements by the HOPE board and superintendent McGriff made gaining broad based support more difficult. The board members felt that they were accountable for outcomes they had promised in order to get reelected. Therefore, they became intimately involved in the administrative implementation process. According to

¹⁰ For instance, the 1992 budget included over \$4 million for implementation of additional schools of choice (DFP June 16, 1992, 1A).

a DPS administrator, the HOPE board was a highly professional group, much more heavily involved in school administration than the typical urban school board. Supporters of McGriff claim that constant micromanagement by the board made her job very difficult.¹¹ In addition to normal administrator pressures, General Superintendent McGriff had personal reasons for wanting significant oversight authority. By signing a contract that was pay for performance, she believed that she should be given considerable freedom in accomplishing the goals that had been agreed upon. She had placed \$25,000 of her salary at risk.¹² McGriff inherited executive staff members who were hired by her predecessor, who still had a year left on their contract. The board resisted her attempts to make her own appointments of top-level administrative positions during her second year. She states:

Each position took months of pushing behind the scenes. The board wanted control. There was never the attitude, 'you've been appointed, do it your way' (Winerip 1993).

A former superintendent argued,

To be successful you have to have the support of your board, the support of your union and the support of the community. At any given time you try to have two out of the three. Seldom, if ever, beyond your first few days of getting the job will you have all three.

A DPS administrator commenting on McGriff's leadership style stated: "perhaps

¹¹ The Detroit papers reported that one of the HOPE board members, Lawrence Patrick, was angered because Dr. McGriff would not name him to be her deputy superintendent. He denied this, although he confirmed that he was willing to make himself available for the \$102,000 post (Winerip 1993).

¹² For instance, there were provisions based on the number of empowered schools that would be implemented, there were provisions based on the implementation of additional schools of choice. There were also goals established for reducing the drop-out rates and increasing the MEAP scores.

the best way to keep your job is to make the most politically neutral decisions. Clearly that was not McGriff's style. She was hired based on a history of strong political ideas and she did not waver from them." A former board member and McGriff supporter was distressed by the treatment that McGriff often received at the hands of the HOPE reformers. She commented,

The superintendent was left hanging out there quite a bit. She was frequently undermined by the very group that brought her in. They failed to work in partnership with the person who should have been the general of the battle. Instead she was treated as a flunky and often undermined. So this is not good. I think they're such true believers. While I admire them (the HOPE team members) and we're personal friends, in terms of how to do things, we parted ways.

Dr. McGriff's leadership invoked strong reactions. She was not a native Detroit. She was a woman in a strong leadership role in a city described by respondents as highly patriarchal. A former HOPE team member commented on how the personal attributes of Deborah McGriff sometimes impeded implementation of her agenda,

She could never see herself as a Detroit. She alienated a lot of people. She came here with an open hand, total support. I've had several talks with her saying, stop saying to people that's how we did it in Milwaukee. Detroiters don't want to hear that. She never became a Detroit, I think that was a big drawback.

The Detroit press and eventually the community at large, recognized the deep divisions in the educational hierarchy. A number of Detroit educators asserted that Detroit pays a lot more daily press attention to its schools than a lot of other major urban school districts. "Our media delivers controversy well" according to a civic leader. Eventually opponents of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice played upon this divisiveness in leadership in their effort to thwart the reforms.

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice Proponents: Select Administrators and Teachers

The 1988 board elections signalled a desire for change. The HOPE/Porter/McGriff leadership had broad initial support among select administrators and teachers. Despite the DFT and OSAS organizational resistance to Empowerment, Diversity and Choice, a number of principals and teachers embraced reform. Since union interests seemed less visibly threatened by the Diversity and Choice initiatives, administrators and teachers tended to prefer these over empowerment. Supporters, however, tended to be loose aggregations of individuals interested in advancing particular versions of choice schools, rather than "stakeholders" in support of a broader choice agenda.

The relationship between superintendent McGriff and union leadership obscured her more positive relations with individual teachers and principals. Although the union's leadership usually opposed McGriff's reform vision, principals and teachers stepped forward to volunteer for every initiative that was announced. No school was ever forced to participate in any new initiative. An area superintendent explained his enthusiastic support for schools of choice,

If you know that at least half your day you are going to be able to dance, because you like to dance you are more apt to do the math and English. And you could also be creative enough to tailor the math and the reading curriculum to dance. There is measurement, there is beats...you have to know what people are interested in.

He argues the whole idea of the choice initiatives was to match abilities with interests.

I believe, wholeheartedly, if you can get those two things going in any human being you have a very powerful person. I think the more choices you give people, if they are in tune to hearing you and trying to hear you, they can make some better, empowered decisions for dealing with the young person.

A DPS administrator agrees:

I've been doing research on how to start a Montessori preschool program. Anything that you have to pay for in the private sector we should be offering it free as a part of the Detroit Public Schools. You should not have to go outside of the district boundaries to get a program that you want for your child. So when we say diversity, that's what we mean by diversity of programming.

An elementary principal contended she loved being a school of choice, because the parents understand that they have to sign on the dotted line, that this is what the mission of this school is all about. If they don't agree with the philosophy, they don't have to send their children to the school. Therefore, it is helpful, because everybody wants to be there.

When the coalition works, that is just beautiful. It is beautiful. But I don't think that everybody can do that. I don't think we should force everyone to do it. Everybody can't do that. I can go to Paul Roberson Elementary School and the principal truly depicts a community school. He really has a community school but I find I can't do what he does.

Teacher support is evident in the 26 schools which voted for empowerment (the agreement calls for an extraordinary majority (75%) of teachers) and in the large number of choice plans submitted to the DPS.

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice Proponent: Community

Community leaders in Detroit became deeply divided on the issue of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice. Community leaders in support of the reforms, fervently believed in the need to expand curricular offerings in the district that choice would provide. Other community advocates favored choice and empowered schools not for the value of competition that they might create, but their belief that the educational

system needed to become more directly accountable to the people who support it. A Detroit minister stated, "the diversity is good while trying to meet the kids' needs rather than trying to have one box of cereal for everybody, let's get the 12 pack."

The empowerment agreement did not create a formal institutional role for the community except in the parent organizations. However, empowered schools interested in working with community groups would no longer require permission from the DPS bureaucracy. Specific diversity and choice programs demanded various amounts of community participation. In particular, three Professional Development Schools (PDS) and seven original African-centered choice schools fostered broad-based participation.

The Professional Development Schools of choice were created as part of a \$48 million Michigan Partnership for Education program to link individual schools with Michigan universities.¹³ The school is operated by a team of educators including representatives of the local school district, one or more universities, PDS staff, students,

¹³ The Michigan Partnership is a non-profit corporation established in 1990 as a collaboration among Michigan business, education and government, to modernize teaching and learning. Its purpose is to stimulate continuous high-quality education in both the schools and communities that prepare children and youth and in the colleges that prepare educators. The partnership works to support ongoing innovation in local settings and statewide. In the first phase of the Partnership's plan, 25 innovation sites (Professional Development Schools) were established in Michigan. There are four basic program components: 1) The School and University Alliance helps innovating schools and universities develop and evaluate new approaches to teaching and learning, education management and preparation of educators 2) The Business and Community Alliance develops locally-based coalitions which mobilize employers, neighborhoods, community agencies and citizens to share responsibility with schools. 3) The Collaborative Leadership Center develops a critical mass of leaders who share the understanding, energy and commitment needed to effect continuous educational renewal. 4) The Educational Extensive Service provides the state's schools and communities with access to up-to-date, practical research-based knowledge. This coalition was established by Bloomfield Hills shopping center mogul, Al Taubman. He became interested in public education, in part because of his A&W restaurants. In a promotion for a 1/3 pound hamburger, he found customers were unwilling to pay more for the 1/3 pound burger because they believed it was smaller than a 1/4 pound burger (*Detroit News* 1992, 1A).

parents, business and community members. In Detroit, Wayne State University, Michigan State University, Eastern Michigan University, Western Michigan University, Central Michigan University and Marygrove College are involved. The PDS serves as a model for teaching and learning, including teacher preparation and development. The PDS provides the setting for school educators, the university and community to implement effective educational practices and to conduct action research to improve teaching and learning (*Professional Development Schools-Design for Excellence* 1993). A PDS school principal states:

The whole process has taken like two years before even any of the schools had an opportunity to access it. Dr. McGriff met with the six universities through the Michigan Partnership in Education. Out of that it finally evolved that the PDS school would become a school of choice. So that was one of their thrusts. So in the spring of last year, any of the schools that were in the Kellogg Constellation, in the Kellogg Foundation 20 year grant, which is any schools in the northern constellation (Area A) were eligible to apply. So we as a result had to put a letter of intent and the letter of intent. We wrote a proposal and there was a design team which was a composition of teachers and paraprofessionals, a couple parents basically, a few key people like myself and a couple teachers.

Many in the community enthusiastically embraced DPS efforts to move towards a more multicultural curriculum. Community advocates stressed the importance of the need for cultural centering in education in a city that is 76% African-American and a school population that is 92% African-American. The overwhelming response of parents to the expansion of African-centered education is evident in the March, 1992 opening of the Mae C. Jemison Academy. With only 120 seats available in this kindergarten school, nearly 800 applications were submitted (*Detroit Free Press* 1992). There was even greater demand when Malcolm X Academy opened as the first African-centered school

a year earlier. According to a principal of one of the nine African-centered schools, all of the schools have long waiting lists. A principal of one of the African-centered schools argued,

Essentially they grew out of my proposal to set up all male academies which, of course, we were sued in the courts and the compromise agreement was that we would admit a certain percentage of girls. The players in that coalition primarily were really the community at large, key board members who, along with myself and the committee organized and pushed that concept that I developed through.

A Detroit journalist stated,

Three of the African Centered academies started out as African Centered male academies, but of course the ACLU and NOW challenged that in court and those schools were required to admit girls, but the people in those communities said that we are not going to send our daughters. So less than 10 percent of the enrollment at those three schools are female. People would argue that for all their faults, they are working and kids are doing better there. There is greater self-esteem and kids are more excited about participating. So people in Detroit would argue that that's one kind of reform initiative that's had some level of success.

Other choice schools (see Table 5.3) were created around very specific curricular offerings or academic themes such as business and commerce, citizenship, fine and performing arts, gifted and talented and math, science and technology. The problem with building a community coalition in favor of district-wide schools of choice was that support was very diffuse. Residents tend to coalesce around specific choice schools, but there was no district-wide mechanism to link school based coalitions into support for district wide reform. For instance, some advocates who were generally in favor of choice, opposed specific choice plans. Supporters of African-centered schools of choice were not necessarily supporters of Professional Development Schools.

In some cases, the DPS in responding to the demands of community leaders and

parents to create specific choice schools, aroused and offended others, who mobilized to thwart them. This was a common pattern with multicultural and African-centered schools. In addition, choice schools fought amongst themselves. A number of existing choice schools such as Boyton Magnet Middle, Erma Henderson Institute, Catherine Blackwell and Malcolm X academies have been battling for new buildings.¹⁴ McGriff's expansion of five new schools of choice in 1993-94 added to the mix of schools competing for new buildings. James Humphries, parent group president at the Erma Henderson Institute of International Studies, Commerce and Technology states: "I will be watching very closely to see what facilities that they're offering to the new schools. I am concerned that they will be opening more schools when the current schools that exist do not have adequate, efficient and proper facilities for their educational programs" (*Detroit Free Press* 1993).

Missing Partners: City Government, Business, University and the School Community (parent) Organizations

Unlike the Detroit Compact which drew at least tacit support of Mayor Coleman Young, the city maintained a cold neutrality toward other reforms. Young was described as distrustful of the HOPE team and as a result kept his political distance. This is not surprising given his public support of the incumbents in the 1988 elections, preferring to support "the rascals he knew rather than those he didn't" (*Detroit News* 1988).

Similarly, the business community while generally supportive, were not willing to endanger relationships carefully built up with the Detroit Compact by becoming

¹⁴ Parents of Malcolm X academy students have demanded that the school be relocated because of the hostile reception it received in the predominantly white Warrendale neighborhood, but a suitable building could not be found.

directly involved in empowerment and choice.¹⁵ The exception to this general pattern occurred in the 1992 school board elections in which the Detroit Chamber took an ill-fated position in support of the HOPE team, and threatened future support of the school system.¹⁶

Beyond the involvement in the three PDS schools of choice, Wayne State University was the only Michigan university directly engaged in Empowerment, Diversity and Choice. Under the leadership of President David Adamany, Wayne State expressed a desire to work with Detroit Public Schools in creating up to nine jointly administered schools. The schools would have been in the Wayne State neighborhood. After a year of failed negotiations, Wayne State decided to create a university middle school without the involvement of the DPS.¹⁷ A business respondent comments:

I was not in total agreement with Wayne State to establish their own school independent of DPS, but on the other hand, in some ways it was their own exasperation in trying to work with the city schools. They were

¹⁵ This kind of politicization was evident in the Boston Compact, and business leadership in the Detroit Compact generally tried to stay out of contentious political debates. McGriff was well respected by the business community. In fact, Crain's Detroit Business named her 1992 Newsmaker of the Year. Richard Gabrys, the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce's education liaison stated: "We support her programs because we think they're the direction the school district needs to go to improve the overall ability of students" (*Detroit Free Press* 1993).

¹⁶ The opposition immediately cried "plantation politics" and cut deeply into the black vote to the extent that Frank Hayden and Joe Blanding lost by 2,000 votes and 4,000 votes respectively.

¹⁷ President Adamany said university officials were daunted when Superintendent McGriff explained her requirements: the schools would first have to become empowered, meaning the Wayne State University plan would have to be approved by 75 percent of the faculty, 55 percent of the parent organizations and 55 percent of the students in the schools. In addition, the DPS refused to provide Wayne with the data and research it requested. Adamany decided it would be faster for WSU to open its own school. The WSU proposal was loosely patterned after a relationship between Boston University and the 3,700-student Chelsea, Mass. school system (*Detroit Free Press* 1991).

saying if we are going to do it, we might as well just do it because waiting for the rest of these guys to come along with it, is just going to delay us two, three, four years.

While this decision greatly angered many within DPS, the 5,200 applications the Wayne State University Middle School received for its 340 student openings may have contributed to pressure on the DPS to expand its own choice options for parents within the district. The University Middle School was established in 1993 as Michigan's first "charter school "under Michigan State law and operates as an autonomous public school under the administration of Wayne State University.¹⁸

Although parent demand in Detroit was an important reason for the expansion of the schools of choice, parent groups were never effectively incorporated into the reform effort. There does exist in the DPS an institutionalized process of school-community dialogue at the level of individual buildings, regional, and district-wide. Local councils are called "Local School Community Organizations" and are comprised of teachers, parents, students, and administrators from individual schools. At the other end of the spectrum is the Area-Wide and District School Community Organization. According to a Detroit city council member, the parent organizations have historically never had much influence or authority in the DPS. The HOPE/Porter/McGriff leadership did not effectively engage these groups. In explaining the difficulty a HOPE reformers indicated that over the years many of the traditional parent groups had been co-opted by the unions. However, pockets of dissatisfied parents in the district, represented by a host of

¹⁸ Wayne State has subsequently had a difficult time with the University School. The principal they hired, resigned during the middle of the school year. Many of the teachers have also left the school.

fragmented parent organizations were supportive of change.

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice Opponent: DFT and OSAS

As support remained fragmented, the reforms drew vitriolic opposition by the DPS unions. With over 11,000 members the DFT has repeatedly demonstrated its continued presence as a formidable entity in Detroit. OSAS is also powerful, and generally moves in lockstep with the DFT.¹⁹ Parts of the community at-large also became strongly opposed to both the reforms and the reformers. Parents with children attending traditional neighborhood schools became resentful and viewed the reformers as elitist.

The Detroit federation of Teachers is perhaps the most powerful single organized interest group in the Detroit education political system. There is a near consensus that the DFT has long been singularly focused on the direct welfare of its members. The union has been suspicious of organizational reforms which might threaten the economic and political power of the union. A former HOPE team member expressed his resentment of the defensive positions of the unions.

When you say interested in education for children and youth, that excludes the MEA, the NEA, the AFT, the DFT. That's not their interest. However, if you talk in the education arena, who is a most effective advocate, it clearly is the MEA and its chapter members and the AFT and its chapter members.

¹⁹ For example, DPS principals are on a 10 month contract. The HOPE team reformers wanted to make them full-time employees, and talked about enhancing the pay of principals about \$10,000 a year. Despite writing the language of the proposal, OSAS refused to sign on because the DFT had not reached agreement yet. They ended up with a four percent raise, the same as the teachers. According to a board member, more than the money, the concept would have been revolutionary. The principal's professional status would have grown. The individual principals never were informed about the opportunity because of OSAS fear of DFT reaction.

There are at least 18 unions represented in DPS, and they have played a decisive leadership role over the schools for the last thirty years. A HOPE reformer argued,

The leadership was basically the unions. I don't regard that as leadership. It was basically status quo mentality. The administration pretty much succumbed to the union...the administration essentially went along with the union and many parent groups were coopted.

The unions proved to be the chief opposition to Empowerment, Diversity and Choice. By the time the final empowerment plan was issued in February 1992, serious union resistance had mobilized. In addition to the problems discussed, union distrust was exacerbated by a number of initiatives only indirectly related to empowerment. For example, McGriff wanted to open public school principal jobs to business and community leaders who had no teaching experience.²⁰ HOPE member Lawrence Patrick, and some members of the board, wanted to use the legal "charters" that were created in the empowerment agreement to allow existing private schools in Detroit to become public and receive public funds. These ideas enraged the labor community in Detroit and made union cooperation with the reformers impossible. A former board member commented on the difficulty in working with the unions:

Well, if you're promoting something that's sort of innovative, new reform kind of thing, first you get a protest from the union because many people don't like change. You have to bring them along. If you don't bring them along carefully enough...sometimes there's not any way you can bring them along. On some issues they just aren't gonna budge. For example, merit pay- they're not gonna budge on; privatization- they're not gonna budge on, having people be principals without having been certified- they're not gonna budge. There's just certain things they're not gonna budge on. They're not gonna budge on the governor having chartered

²⁰ Such action would have required state waiver, and if implemented, Detroit would have joined a handful of other districts nationwide.

schools without unionized staff. They will fight that to the death. They feel that is union busting.

Despite some effort to work behind the scenes with the unions in the formative stages of the reform process, the HOPE board grew quickly impatient. They began to push aggressively for additional concessions. For instance, the HOPE team wanted to enable schools to become empowered with a simple majority of teachers in the schools, rather than the 75% that had been negotiated. Union leadership was already distressed by the desertion of some members who were willing to vote away certain union provisions within their individual school buildings. Eventually, the union leaders labeled the reform advocates as union bashers. A former HOPE team member stated,

That's what we were labeled, which was totally unfounded, but it was good propaganda. The union was able to use this tactic to get people to not to be supportive of empowerment. We as a board and those of us who were the drivers behind this reform effort made some problems, we made some mistakes. In our zest to move the district forward we didn't take the time that was necessary to bring everybody along so that everybody was comfortable with where we were going. And as a result, it did create some problems between us and the labor community, but those problems were not problems that could not have been resolved.

Despite earlier union acceptance of the "Memorandum of Understanding: Empowerment and Schools of Choice," the DFT issued an embargo on empowerment in December 1991. This union action virtually blocked all progress. By the end of 1991-92, nearly all the other DPS unions went on record against empowerment. An OSAS newsletter to members indicated concerns over: definition and merit of empowerment; equity concerns; accountability linked to pay for performance; "out-sourcing" or privatization of members' and colleagues' work; transfer of staff into and out of empowered schools; and loss of jobs for union members.

The union saw the HOPE reformers as trying to take away their rights. They particularly objected to more hiring and firing power at the school site and the authority to override contract provisions, thus weakening job security. A DPS administrator argued that clearly the superintendent was committed to abiding by the contractual agreement.

The contractual agreement tells you no, you can't just fire a person. There is a whole lot of due process. There was a whole lot of negotiation that went into the empowerment process. Maybe there was some ill-will generated. Empowerment came to take on a negative light with many members within the community, particularly within the teaching community.

In response to growing opposition, general superintendent McGriff created the Office of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice in 1992, headed by her assistant superintendent, Sharon Johnson Lewis, to diffuse criticism, build support and generate positive public relations for the reform agenda. A Special Committee on Empowerment, Diversity and Choice was also created on the DPS Board of Education. However, the momentum in support of reform had been lost. A DPS administrator states:

We allowed the media to pit schools against each other. That's what happened to some of the McGriff initiatives. Then we fell into the trap. So now we talk about our schools as a neighborhood schools vs. choice schools. I mean we give these classifications. We allowed the media to frame the issue in a way that was very unfavorable.

Union power in the DPS comes from conventional sources- a large and readily mobilized constituency, political contributions and campaign support that make them formidable players in open battles over policy formulation. The unions on August 27, 1992, decided to use their ultimate political weapon and struck over empowerment. According to the HOPE team, the DFT leadership never gave the board any idea of how they wanted it different. The reformers argued they took the empowerment plan exactly

the way the national leadership told them they would accept it. They argue, the DFT then went to their membership and misrepresented the whole process. As is clear in Table 5.1 the union has not been reluctant in the past to use the strike as a tool to achieve its desired outcome in the DPS.

---TABLE 5.1 Here---

Table 5.1

Detroit Public Schools Teacher Strikes 1967-1992

DATE	ISSUES	SETTLEMENT
September 1967	9,700 teachers, 2 weeks. Calls for \$850 raise, reduction of school year	2-year contract
September 1973	10,600 teachers, 43 day. Teacher pay raise, evaluation plan	1-year contract
September 1979	12,000 DFT teachers, 17 days	7% wage increase
September 1982	Wages/benefits, salary ranges, \$38-million deficit	Teachers lend 10 days per pay to be repaid over 10 yrs. Freeze in basic salary rates. Rejected nonpayment of longevity pay, class size increase...
September 1987	12-14% pay raise vs. freeze, co payment of health insurance, class size, supplies	Aver. 6.5% pay raise over 3 years.
September 1992	4-week strike. Status quo vs. change, union solidarity vs. school board's reform agenda	7% wage increase over 2 years. No lead teachers/mentors, no change in class size. Layoffs due to pay raise.

The strike lasted 18 schools days until September 28. A former board member stated,

This reform board for all its zeal and passion did not bring along the unions, the bargaining units, or the community with them and were perceived as union busting. They tried to push too fast on certain reforms like merit pay and privatization. Included in empowerment was a provision that individual school buildings could waive portions of the union contract if 75 percent of the teachers agreed. At one point they were talking about 51 percent of the teachers. This just enraged the union. This is Detroit, you have to remember, the stronghold of unions if not the birthplace. The union successfully painted the HOPE school board members as union busters. This is the kiss of death in Detroit and within the community. It was a perfect political ploy. They pulled it off masterfully. I believe the voters would have elected David Duke, to replace the HOPE members.

During the labor negotiations, the antagonism between McGriff and the unions

escalated. A Detroit journalist commented on the venom exchanged: "The union guy said everything is fine, we only fired three teachers last year. Deborah McGriff said, that's the problem, we should have fired 30 percent of them." McGriff labeled the striking teachers and their union representatives as "mean-spirited, selfish individuals more interested in filling their pockets than filling their students' heads with knowledge" (*Detroit Free Press* 1992). A former HOPE team member blames his defeat and the dispersal of the reform coalition on the union strike tactic. A former HOPE member who was intricately involved in the union negotiations over empowerment, bitterly vented his frustrations with the whole process,

You know, this is how naive I am, but I really thought that people's main intention was in educating their children. I took the union's position, took their resolution and made it the basis for negotiations. Would you believe that Ford Motor Company would take the UAW's resolution, put it on the table, and say, okay, here's where we'll start negotiating. I got shot down by the union for actually saying yes, we will adopt and go with your resolution in order to educate the children. They backed off. They ran away from their own resolution. I was bloodied in the strike. This is my 30th year in the union. Thirty years of experience as an international representative. I represent and negotiate the contracts for other unions, including the Big Three, most of the companies that have come on board in the Detroit Compact. My life is that effort. And I'm labelled a union buster! I laid their resolution on the table and I'm called a union buster for wanting to improve the ways education is delivered in Detroit.

Another HOPE member stated,

There were strategic problems rather than content problems. That was our position all along. Yes, there are some problems here. Let's work on the problems as we move along through. The union's position, only because they were looking for self-interest was, no, let's stop the process, rather than let's work out the problems and then let's move along. The empowerment contract that we negotiated with them, was the one which eventually became the straw that broke the camel's back, they got us kicked off the board.

In addition to the DFT strike tactic, OSAS also took the board to arbitration over the empowerment issue just before the 1992 board of education elections. While it was clear that there would not be a ruling anytime soon, the complaints did generate favorable publicity against empowerment. According to a former HOPE board member, a year after the elections, the district received an answer which totally upheld the school board on the empowerment plan. There was no violation of their contract anywhere. He states:

My job here in the UAW is to read contracts. We collect, and read, and analyze cost-wise, word-wise all those contracts that the union has negotiated. I went over and over the empowerment contract with the unions and said please show me that I missed something. Show me where I've violated your contract anyplace. I'll change it, we'll get rid of it. There was no violation. They never found it. Week after week of meetings they never indicated one violation. There was some things they didn't like but they had to admit that it did not violate the contract. But one of the unions pursued it to arbitration and the arbitrator came back and said there was no violation. But it was a year late!

Another defeated HOPE board member was even more cynical about the DFT motives behind the strike. He contends it wasn't really about empowerment, but union leadership grandstanding with the membership, in finding an issue to divert attention from the high expectations the rank and file membership had over pay. He states,

A union leader told me, we needed to do strike over the empowerment plan to take the wind out of their sails. Their expectations for pay were too high. So, they created these false issues to strike over. They knew they would not have got much sympathy if they struck over pay, so they struck over these other issues which involved our reform agenda. It was the most dishonest negotiations I've ever heard of. They kept them out for four weeks and then came back in for exactly what we would done four weeks earlier. Members felt like the leadership had stood up for something. I don't think if you asked any one of them, they couldn't tell you what they stood up for, what it was they accomplished, but the union leader's goal was accomplished because he lowered their expectations.

Yet, many respondents contend the HOPE board's treatment of the unions was

heavy handed. DFT leadership claims their involvement in the Detroit Compact and the Comer Intervention Model (Chapter 6) proves their willingness to partner in the reform process. They assert it was the domineering tactics of the HOPE reformers which ill served the cause of reform. A former board member who supported the reforms but lamented the aggressive tactics of the HOPE reformers, tended to lend support to this view, claiming the HOPE team was not inclusive.

Blanding alienated his own base. Even though he was right, technically. You can be right but kill yourself because you don't handle it properly. He would point out that UAW plants that had site-based waivers and that this is not revolutionary, but you cannot just shout at people and make them do it. You cannot just bully them into doing it. You have to bring them along. That was the piece that was missing in bringing along the bargaining unit to help them understand that this was not threatening their very survival. So it was a lesson in inclusion and consensus building the HOPE reformers could not learn. I learned here at the Girl Scouts when we were attacked in 1984 by the Right to Life...they thought that our sex education was going to teach girls how to get abortions. Of course, nothing could be further from the truth but they successfully mounted a public campaign to boycott the Girl Scout cookie sale which is 60 percent of our revenue. I learned a lesson early on. You must include those who can kill you. If they can kill you, you must include them or they will kill you. If you do not include them and fail to bring them along, you will be dead. So what have you gained?

The labor community was also described as influencing the black ministers against the HOPE reformers, which had a powerful impact. A HOPE member states, "That for example, is when I knew we were going to lose the election in 1992 and we would not be back. We were not allowed to come into the churches to campaign like in 1988."

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice Opponent: Community

In addition to organized union resistance, vigorous community-based opposition developed. The reformers reintroduced the controversy regarding neighborhood schools vs. specialized schools that first erupted under Arthur Jefferson when he established the magnet academies and the examination schools.²¹ A community advocate expressed her disdain for the magnet schools.

The way they became examination schools was they just threw everybody out that didn't meet their criteria. I don't know how much more elitist you can get than that. There are still attempts by the elitists within the district to isolate the 'really good kids' from the other kids.

A DPS administrator supported this criticism,

I am not for examination schools of any type. I think there needs to be pure random selection for choice schools. The parents like the heterogeneous groupings when they are outside of the school, but once they are on the inside, they are happy to test to keep others less qualified out.

Perceptions that empowerment and choice would starve traditional neighborhood schools of resources, began to resonate among a number of community leaders. In particular, there is a small segment of the community that consider themselves "the grass roots" of the community. They come to every board meeting. As one advocate put it if you want to see a real live civic entity in action, with plenty of action go to a DPS board meeting. They were described as adversarial, often hostile, towards DPS leadership. They were especially critical of the "Empowerment, Diversity and Choice". Many other

²¹ For example, Cass Tech and Renaissance High School (examination schools) were created under Jefferson. In addition, it was Jefferson who decided that King High School would change its image and focus, which at that time, was one of the worst high schools in the city. There were a lot of opinions that were contrary to his regarding the creation of the magnet academies that resurfaced during implementation of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice.

grass roots groups don't attend the meetings according to one respondent, because they are so unpleasant. A community advocate argued there is constant bickering back and forth for three hours at every board meeting each month and nothing is solved. Participant observation of a number of board meetings confirms this view.

All board members, past and present, have alluded to this group, as well as former superintendents and a large number of community activists currently engaged with the system. They are considered significant because they monopolize every meeting and draw significant press coverage, all of it negative on attempts at educational leadership. A former HOPE school board described them in this way,

There are these group of women that come down to the Board meetings on a regular basis and their main goal in life is to be printed in the newspaper or be viewed on television. They will do almost anything to capture that. They have no agenda. They have no direction. They are loud. The papers give them what they want. They get quoted more than Board members. They aren't community leaders. Most of them haven't had children in the school system for 20 years but they claim themselves to be parents.....you can't reason with them, you can't talk logically to them, and they lie.

While it is difficult to ascertain how much influence they really have, a leader claims, she has an underground network and takes primary credit for "getting out the vote" against the HOPE reformers. She recently shouted at a DPS board meeting in April 1995, "You want war, we'll give you war! We've already shown you will lose. We've done this before. Do you want to do this again?" As a leader of this group, she described her tactics, "We are noted for embarrassing people on the board and the staff members only to make the community aware of what's really going on so now they begin to be a little more open about things." Respondents have linked some of the agitators

with direct connections to union leadership and with DPS board member and former board president April Howard Coleman. Another board member critical of their presence commented,

There is this self-appointed watchdogs who've made a career out of following the board. Probably they spend 10 to 20 hours a week each, a group of 5 to 10 people, who attend every committee meeting and every gathering of anything that has to do with the board. They snoop around in the schools and come up with gossip and just make our lives miserable.

If nothing else, the constant personal attacks diverted energy. An influential Detroit minister saw the agitators as doing a grave disservice, attempting to prevent anything from getting done. He contends there are relatively few agitators but they seem to really take the rhythm of the whole. A former superintendent made these comments about the board groupies,

It's just annoying and serves no purpose other than obstruct. It doesn't build a sense of community. We had high school students who would attend our board meetings as part of their government class and these kids would stand up and reprimand adults for their behavior. As an adult you're supposed to set a model for kids in terms of appropriate public decor. High school students would stand up and tell these detractors, I would be expelled from school for the behavior you're displaying.

Other community members expressed concerns often raised by choice opponents that reforms were elitist, with less "choice" for poor families, who would have less information and more prohibitive obstacles such as transportation and distance which would make their involvement in choice schools problematic. Critics also objected to extra resources targeting the specialized or innovative schools at the expense of the neighborhood schools. The decision to originally target empowerment and choice to schools that were already judged effective, magnified these concerns. Even though

McGriff moved quickly to remove restrictive qualifications, perceptions that the reforms were elitist endured.

While the African-centered choice academies had a large number of supporters in the community, they also drew venomous opposition. The first African-centered academy, Malcolm X was placed in a school surrounded by a mostly white enclave in the city, near the Dearborn border. Local neighborhood groups mounted legal challenges to the proposed all-male academy, charging the curriculum was sexist and contained religious ceremonies that violated the separation of church and state.²² The main opposition, however, to the single-sex requirement of the academies came from longtime guardians of civil-rights interests including the NAACP, the National Organization of Women, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Legal Defense Fund. A city council member and opponent of the Malcolm X academy commented,

The premise was wrong to begin with because some of the little boys were saying they needed a male academy because the girls were distracting to them. If you can't learn with girls in the elementary school, then God help us. One of the problems we have today, we have a continuation of spousal abuse and part of that is related I think to the attitude towards women.

Board members were divided with four opposing the plan. Individual leaders such as Horace Sheffield, executive director of the Detroit Association of Black Organizations, who was one of the key communities leaders in the formation of the Detroit Compact,

²² Bloomfield Hills lawyer Constance Cumbey sued the DPS claiming the Malcolm X Academy violates the First Amendment by allegedly teaching anti-Christian religion. Students at Malcolm X Academy practice meditation as part of harambee, Swahili for "a coming together ceremony." She claims the meditation at Malcolm X is a sacrament of a new religion and the African-centered curriculum "racist propaganda." Opponents in the mostly white Warrendale neighborhood surrounding the school see that argument as the best hope for closing the school (*Detroit Free Press* 1992).

strongly opposed the single-sex exclusion. He argued there is "no rationale for bringing any form of segregation back into the schools....the law of the land is that school segregation is unconstitutional and inherently unequal" (*Detroit Free Press* 1991). The plan was struck down in October 1991, by U.S. District Judge George Woods, who ruled it was unconstitutional because it discriminated against females. While the decision opened the academies to girls, few have enrolled.²³

In addition to the initial single-sex plan for the academies, some community leaders objected to the emphasis on culture over basic education. While the African-centered academies overall have maintained majority support in the city, the schools remain divisive. Controversial black scholar Leonard Jeffries who heads the black studies department at the City College of New York has been invited four times to Detroit by the DPS to lead a series of seminars on African-centered education (*Detroit Free Press* 1994).²⁴ Opponents suggest this indicates how Afrocentrism can too easily become a tool of monoculturalism rather than multiculturalism. Detroit journalist and critic of the African centered schools argued,

We ended up with a Malcolm X school across the Street from Dearborn because groups are focusing on culture, history and identity and all this kind of stuff rather than to zero in on can you read? Can you write?

A community leader expressed these sentiments:

²³ The ACLU and NOW are monitoring the academies under an agreement between the school system and the civil rights groups.

²⁴ Jeffries has come under fire since the mid-1980s for comments perceived as anti-Semitic and challenged for his belief that skin pigmentation contributes to intellectual superiority. Richard Lobenthal, Michigan region director for the Anti-Defamation League called the visit part of a growing anti-Jewish sentiment in the Detroit district (*Detroit Free Press* 1994).

We have got to understand that the bottom line is economics. We cannot keep dwelling and dwelling and dwelling in the past as long as we've been here in this country....we should know just from common sense point of view that what is the bottom line is money. Where is the money? I'll take it one step further than that. My own parents were not brought here from Africa as slaves because of the color of their skin. They were brought here to America for economic reasons. That's where it starts. That's what this country was founded upon. That's how we operate.

Clergy are key political and social leaders in Detroit. A university respondent claims it is almost impossible to overstate the influence of the ministers in Detroit, especially the Baptist Pastors of Detroit and Vicinity. They are active in agenda setting and the generation of alternatives. Dozens of other religious groups are extremely influential within the city with active ministries such as Capuchin, Joy for Jesus, and Focus Hope among others. A former superintendent stated:

One of the first things that I realized was that the religious community has to be prominent in anything you do. It is even more important than the business community in Detroit. It's surprising but it's true, particularly the Baptist ministers.

As I said, education is not immune from the political process and those of us who are in leadership positions in education be it on the board or in management, must know the political system and work hard in establishing political bases, within the community so that, so that when you need those forces and in order to achieve your particular policy objective, they're there to provide support. As I said before, I found the religious community to be extremely helpful. I maintained contact with organizational religious leaders, went to their meetings, not only when I wanted something but to periodically give them update reports so they felt and hopefully believe that they believed that we didn't simply come to them only when we wanted something.

Strong support from the religious community in the 1988 elections waned as leaders felt the HOPE team was not inclusive. The HOPE leadership style alienated many in the religious community. In some cases it became difficult to separate opposition of

the reforms from the dislike of the personal style of the reformers. A Detroit minister claimed, "when you don't include people, rebellion takes place. You may be doing the things that you feel are in the best interest of all the people but you become an elite group, you're the talented 10 and that you know all the answers."

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice Opponent: Select Parents

Some parent groups and individuals were skeptical of the benefits of reform. According to a leader of one of the parent groups, parents had not been given enough information to make an informed decision. Little effort was made to involve the parents directly through the Local, Area and District School Community Organizations. A community advocate claimed that everything that was going on in the education field in Detroit was anti-parent. It was assumed the parent knew nothing or didn't want to know anything about their own children's education. She stated, "you cannot have an excellent educational system without involving parents." In addition, some parents became embittered with their inability to enroll their children in the specialized schools of choice. A common allegation made by parents are that some students are admitted or given first priority because their parents have money, social status or connection to school officials. A DPS administrator maintains the integrity of the application process, but admits the system has flaws and the limited access of the more popular options have sewed seeds of discontent with some parents.

Stakeholder Summary

Opposition from the unions, some community and grassroots leaders and parents of neighborhood schools led to the successful school board challenges of Kwame Kenyatta, Rodena Murphy and Robert Boyce in 1992. They campaigned on the neglect of traditional neighborhood schools and defeated three of the HOPE members. One of the challengers who won office commented on the reform tactics of the HOPE team,

The method by which the change was instituted, the closure, the secrecy, the we know better than you kind of mentality that I saw was one of the reasons that I ran for this office, and one of the reasons we won is because the community did not like that style of development. They were not opposed to growth, they were opposed to the method by which the growth was being instituted.

An influential community leader who supported the reform agenda, echoed these sentiments:

The reform movement split apart because the leadership of the movement, in my opinion, did not believe in or care enough about working with the bargaining units and the public. They got too far out in front as visionaries often do. They got too far out in front of the masses, you might say. They thought they could sort of, 'read my lips. You'll love this when we're finished. Trust me. This is gonna be good. It's a great idea. Follow me. Yes, just don't ask any questions. Let me do this. You're gonna like it'. Truly, that was sort of the philosophy. In fact, I have heard Larry (Olmstead) even say, his philosophy is ready, shoot, aim. I thought Larry was reckless. They learned a lesson, a bitter lesson. We are now suffering from it. At least two of the three board members who replaced them are rather bullying in their approach and are not as enlightened as I would like to think we should all be about the need for change.

A former board member and HOPE team critic claims it's the model of management you choose to use that becomes critical. She contends the Hope Team made promises to the business community and to the broader community to transform our

schools in a specified period of time. So they skipped over necessary steps in building support. If you're really wanting to have change work, she claims, you must start by involving the people.

As Stone (1989) states, electoral coalitions are insufficient to govern. It appears that HOPE/McGriff leadership fell to Stone's fallacy (1989), of the "simple-minded premise that formal governmental authority confers a capacity to redistribute at the will of those who hold office by virtue of public election." The DPS leadership was unable to structure a strong institutional role for external actors in the reform process to countervail the pervasive union influence. The governing coalition had a narrow base and proved unable to develop a "scheme" of accommodation for diverse interests. With the narrow base of support, they were limited in their ability to modify district goals and alter rules of decision making. The Detroit experience indicates that one must appreciate institutional capacities and the resources that various groups control. The HOPE/McGriff leadership seriously misjudged Detroit's union clout and their confrontational style backfired. The Detroit case suggests the unions remain a formidable entity whose acquiescence remains an essential component to sustainable reform. The Detroit Compact and the Comer School Development Program (Chapter 6) indicates that the unions are willing to partner, but the process of gaining union support is long and tedious.

With Empowerment, Diversity and Choice, the reformers proved unable to expand the scope of contagium beyond internal DPS actors. Actors who developed a consensus around the Detroit Compact were indifferent or deeply divided towards the implementation of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice. Given that the business

community did not want to risk their credibility, carefully built up over a period of years in the negotiations over the Compact, by escalating their advocacy\involvement with the HOPE reformers, other support bases in the Detroit community were needed. The inability of the reformers to gain the support of Coleman Young and his powerful political network hindered the ability of the reformers to create a sustainable coalition. They were also unsuccessful in involving parent groups directly in the process of reform. In addition, the HOPE team lost the strong support of the religious community, who thought they were not inclusive. A former superintendent stated,

As I said, the educational agenda is not immune to the political process. You may have the best idea but, if you have not mobilized the forces that you need to mobilize in order to help you get to actualize, then it's just a good idea.

This inability to create a broad-based formal and informal support around choice is consistent with Jeffrey Henig's view that choice programs do not build a collective logic. In contrast, Chubb and Moe (1990) turned to markets and choice after reaching the bleak conclusion that efforts to reform schools through normal political channels were destined to fail. In response to pro-choice advocates such as Chubb and Moe (1990), and Lieberman (1993) among others, Henig asserts competitive approaches to education reform, evident in the schools of choice in Detroit and the original plan for empowerment to be a reward only for above average schools are not designed to develop or foster a collective capacity to act (1994). He argues, "For all its exasperatingly slow pace, democratic government plays an absolutely critical role in airing alternative visions, encouraging compromise, and enticing disparate groups to redefine their interests and seek common ground (Henig 1994). The logic of the choice schools is to encourage

individuals or small groups of individuals to act based on self-interest, putting the parent in the role as consumer. The inability of choice advocates interested in their particular schools or themes to coalesce around district-wide choice programs offers support to this view. Henig states, "to the degree that education reform requires the collective action of urban regimes, competitive strategies will ill-prepare a city to address such concerns" (1994).

INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES EMPOWERMENT, DIVERSITY AND CHOICE

Empowerment, Diversity and Choice enjoyed a relatively short period of agenda status. As the chief focus of the HOPE coalition and Superintendent McGriff, most of the activity occurred between 1990 and 1992. Empowerment has virtually disappeared from current DPS vernacular. Diversity and Choice, although weakened, experienced a somewhat better fate.

Institutional Consequences: Empowerment

At the time of the DFT strike in 1992 there were 24 formally empowered schools. By the departure of general superintendent McGriff in 1993, there were only 26 (See Table 5.2 Empowered Schools in Detroit). In the year and a half under new general Superintendent David Snead, only one additional school community has formally opted for empowerment. The 27 schools currently empowered fell far short of the 268 schools in the district in which the reformers had hoped to empower.

---TABLE 5.2 HERE---

Table 5.2

Empowered Schools in Detroit

1990-91	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94	1994-95	1995-96
8	14	24	26	26	27

According to a DPS deputy superintendent, the degree of institutional transformation district wide, varies greatly among the 27 empowered schools. Only a few of the schools have used the empowerment structure, to significantly increase local control. Board reformers and empowerment administrators express frustration that many of the empowered schools have not implemented shared decision making. Union rights have been emphasized rather than efforts to change the governance and the academic program at the school level. Some schools which voted for empowerment status are described as only wanting financial control. A DPS administrator contends:

So we have these empowered schools. Only a few of them, not many that are intent on really implementing any change. That's my frustration. At the district level, we don't have the staff to really follow up on empowered schools. Six months later we find out the principal has not convened a School Empowerment Council meeting. If the parents don't complain it may not come to our attention. In conversation with a non-complying principal recently, I really got frustrated. I find out the principal has spent money without involving the stakeholders, 'but you just told me you didn't spend any money. Well I needed the books in order to operate my curriculum. Yes, but if you become empowered, you cannot make decisions about money without involving the council. Yes, but it is my curriculum and I needed to'for a few principals, personally they just want the control over the money.

There have been negative institutional consequences of corruption stemming from the empowerment initiative. In 1993, Robert Biter, the principal of Guyton Elementary, an empowered school, was charged with embezzling over \$140,000 in empowerment

funds (Thurtell 1994). Under the terms of the empowerment agreement, he was to report all expenditures to a fiscal control committee at the school. Instead, he formed three companies, opened bank checking accounts for each company and began to write checks to them. He was empowered to write checks up to \$5,000. He eventually wrote over 36 checks to his firms. Biter also wrote additional checks to other firms who did construction work on his house. A DPS administrator stated,

This office has only been in existence for a year and it started a year ago in August. When I am naive, I can be real naive. I just assumed that folks were doing things that they said they were doing. Some weren't doing. Now the two new schools that are becoming empowered the 25th and 26th, we have already written provisions into the empowerment contract. I will make sure they won't get a dime until I am sure that there is compliance. I've been burned, now I want to come out and talk to the group. So you learn.

A former DPS superintendent believes that empowerment has been largely symbolic. He contends that training which is essential for empowerment if the culture is to significantly change within an empowered school setting, has been lacking. He states, "there are predicates and prerequisites for successful implementation. You don't just say 'we're going to have site based management today'." He believes the reform coalition acted too hastily in advancing the initiative before a minimum support network could be built and before proper oversight arrangements could be established.

I clearly don't have a problem with empowerment. I think it was the method by which it was imposed. The district spent, I believe a half million dollars on the empowerment plan and nobody knows where it is. It is somewhere up collecting dust. And the unions didn't buy into it. The parents had some problems with it. Empowerment means that you allow the people who are going to be empowered to empower themselves by defining the methodology. You don't say, this is empowerment, I'm empowering you. They didn't buy into it because they were not a significant part of it. So I think that was the problem with empowerment

under McGriff. It also made the principal a CEO, which may be a problem. That means now the vendors will go directly to the principal and then you have got a lot of politicking going on, whereas that person should be trying to run the school.

In 1993, the DPS used the \$1.3 million slated to support the expansion of empowered schools to balance its budget, further reducing the ability of the administration to provide financial management and reporting, budgeting, parent and teacher training and technology design. Union leaders contend the funding change signals a move away from the empowered movement. DFT president John Elliott, the chief opponent argued, "Can additional empowerment happen without money? I doubt it very much. I know the budget is tight. I don't see any more money in the immediate future" (*Detroit Free Press* 1993). Shortly thereafter, Superintendent McGriff requested that the board eliminate the expansion of empowered schools as a performance objective in her contract. While admitting the lack of administrative support may deter additional schools from voting for self-governance, she claimed the request shouldn't be interpreted as abandoning empowerment. "This is not about supporting empowerment, this is about making the objectives fair" (*Detroit Free Press* 1993).

Concerns have been expressed that the existing empowerment agreement does not provide local actors with enough authority to set local policy. A principal of an empowered school claimed that if she is to be held accountable, she needed even more control than currently provided under the empowerment agreement. She cited the disciplinary rules set by the DPS that she must abide by, as an example of the limitations for an empowered principal.

I should have rules that I can say, if you don't do this, then there will be

some consequences. Usually there aren't. I was looking at the new DPS discipline proposal. I can't believe it. A student can come to school with a gun one day, and they could be spanked on the hand. They could get some verbal reprimand and then they are right back. So what message are we sending? How does that leave my school empowered?

The voluntary nature of empowerment has also been criticized. Strong principals are the ones most likely to garner support for the agreement in his/her building. A strong principal may want the greater autonomy that empowerment brings, but not necessarily the more inclusive governance structure. In addition, empowered and choice schools often already possess active community support. Those schools which have neither are unlikely to generate a workable management team.

Regardless of the amount of institutional restructuring that has occurred within the 27 empowered schools, the reform thrust clearly fell far short of becoming a district wide phenomenon. Rather than a systemic revolution throughout the district structure, it became an element of a complex mosaic of self-improvement strategies.

Institutional Consequences: Diversity and Choice

Although controversial, schools of choice enjoyed pockets of focused support. Choice schools also drew less overt political resistance than empowerment.²⁵ Table 5.3 indicates that the number of choice schools expanded greatly under the aggressive thrust of superintendent McGriff. By the time of her resignation in 1993, additional choice options included three Professional Development Schools, nine African-centered schools,

²⁵ Exceptions exist such as discussed with the establishment of Malcolm X academy. Organized political resistance mounted to oppose the location of the school, the all-male academy and the content of the African-centered curriculum.

and over two dozen theme schools of choice. Detroit became only the second public school system that had a Waldorf Program.²⁶ In total, over forty schools of choice were created during the HOPE/McGriff tenure.

---TABLE 5.3 HERE---

²⁶Waldorf schools try to develop a sense of morality in young children by teaching them about different world cultures and civilizations. Waldorf schools are located throughout the country and strive for unity through respect of diversity.

Table 5.3

Pre-HOPE/McGriff DPS Choice Schools 1986-87

8 Magnet Middle

Ann Arbor Trail
Barbour Magnet
Boyton Magnet
Fisher, Dorothy L. Magnet
Hally Magnet
Ludington, Ivan Magnet
Pelham Magnet
Young, Whitney Magnet

4 Examination School Programs

Bates, Alonzo Academy for the Gifted and Talented
Cass Technical College Preparatory Curriculum
King, Martin Luther Jr. Senior High School
 Mathematics, Science and Applied
 Technology Program
Renaissance High School
 College Preparatory Curriculum

Alternative Schools

3 Enrichment Modified Educational Programs

Detroit Open School
Golightly Educational Center
Community High School

1 International

Burton International School

5 Vocational/Technical

Breithaupt Vocational/Technical Center
Crockett, Ethelene Jones Academic
 and Career Oriented Focus
Davis, Benjamin O. Aerospace Technical
Golightly Vocational/Technical Center
Randolph, A. Philip Vocational/Technical Center

Source: "Detroit Public Schools School's of Choice: Unique Educational Alternatives. Detroit Board of Education 1986/1987

Table 5.3 Continued

Post HOPE/McGriff DPS Choice Schools 1994-95

8 Magnet Middle

Ann Arbor Trail
Barbour Magnet
Boyton Magnet
Fisher, Dorothy L. Magnet
Hally Magnet
Ludington, Ivan Magnet
Pelham Magnet
Young, Whitney Magnet

7 Examination School Programs

Bates, Alonzo Academy for the Gifted and Talented
Cass Technical College Preparatory Curriculum
Cooley, Thomas M.
 Triad Academy for Gifted Students
King, Martin Luther, Jr. Center for
 International Studies and Commerce
King, Martin Luther Jr. Senior High School
 Mathematics, Science and Applied
 Technology Program
Renaissance High School
 College Preparatory Curriculum
Young, Coleman A.
 School-wide Modified Enrichment Triad

3 Professional Development Schools

Cooley, Thomas M. Professional Development
 High Schools
Southeastern Professional Development High School
White, Katherine B. Professional Development School

9 African-Centered

Blackwell, Catherine C. Institute of International
 Studies Commerce and Technology
Cooley, Thomas M., Professional Development School
Garvey, Marcus Moziah African-Centered Academy
Henderson, Erma L. Institute of International Studies
 Commerce and Technology
Jemison, Mae C. African Centered Academy
MAAT IMHOTEP Technical
 African-Centered Academy
Malcolm X African-Centered Academy
Robeson, Paul African-Centered Academy
Southeastern Professional Development School

Choice Theme Schools

2 Business and Commerce

Cooley, Thomas M./Randolf, A. Philip Business
 Administration Program
Southwestern High School Science
 and Business Program

3 Citizenship

Herman Academy for Leadership
 and Citizenship Development
Murray-Wright Junior Naval Academy
Rogers, Charles C. Academy for Leadership
 and Citizenship Development

2 Cosmetology

Crockett, Ethelene Jones School for Allied Health,
 Visual Communications and Cosmetology
Redford High School of Cosmetology

5 Enrichment Modified Educational Programs

Arts in Academics Academy Waldorf Inspired
Detroit Open School
Dewey Center for Urban Education
 and Whole Language Philosophy
Golightly Educational Center
Young, Coleman A. Elementary School-Wide
 Enrichment Triad

3 Fine and Performing Arts

Area E Academy for Fine and Performing Arts
Detroit High School for the Fine and Performing Arts
Spain, Charles L./Zodie A. Johnson Center for the
 Performing Arts

3 Gifted and Talented

Bates, Alonzo Academy for the Gifted and Talented
Cooley, Thomas M. Triad Academy for Gifted
 Students
Young, Coleman A. Schoolside
 Modified Enrichment Triad

2 Health and Allied Science

Beaubien Middle school Career Exploration Program
Crockett, Ethelene Jones School for Allied Health
 Visual Communications and Cosmetology

Table 5.3 Continued

Post HOPE/McGriff DPS Choice Schools 1994-95

7 International

Blackwell, Catherine C. Institute of International
Studies, Commerce and Technology
Burton International School
Henderson, Erma L. Institute of International Studies
Commerce and Technology
King, Martin Luther Jr. Senior High School Center for
International Studies and Commerce
Western International High School
Multicultural/BASICO (International
Business
Careers, Language and Computer Technology Program

5 Vocational/Technical

Breithaupt Vocational/Technical Center
Crockett, Ethelene Jones Academic
and Career Oriented Focus
Davis, Benjamin O. Aerospace Technical
Golightly Vocational/Technical Center
Randolph, A. Philip Vocational/Technical Center

9 Language/Communication & Writing

Academy of the Americas/Academia De Las Americas
Chrysler Elementary School of Journalism
Communications and Media Arts High School
Crockett, Ethelene Jones School for Allied Health,
Visual Communications and Cosmetology
Dewey Center for Urban Education
Whole Language Philosophy
Foreign Language Immersion
and Cultural Studies School
Northwestern Science, Mathematics, Arts, Radio, T.V.
Production and Technology (SMARTT)
White, Katherine B. Professional Development School
Yost, E.W. Academy Whole Language/
Fine Arts School

11 Math, Science and Technology

Blackwell, Catherine C. Institute of International
Studies, Commerce and Technology
Detroit Academy for Science, Mathematics
and Technology
Henderson, Erma L. Institute of International Studies
Commerce and Technology
Jemison, Mae C. African-Centered Academy
Kettering, Charles F. Center for Technical Education
Applied Math
King, Martin Luther Sr. High School Mathematics,
Science, and Applied Technology Program
MAAT IMHOTEP Technical Academy
Northwestern Science, Mathematics, Arts, Radio, T.V.
Production and Technology (SMARTT)
Osborn, Laura F. Center for Academic, Technology
and the Arts (CATA)
Southwestern High School Science
and Business Program
Stark School of Technology

Obviously, designating a school as choice, does not ensure academic improvement in the curriculum, teaching methods or service delivery. As one community advocate stated, "choosing between two lousy schools is not much of a choice." One of the major premises of the inter-district choice advocates is that it will lead to greater institutional involvement of parents in their children's education. According to a DPS administrator, great difficulty remains in how to effectively mobilize parental involvement.

One of the problems, quite frankly, is that it's very hard to engage parents. All the DFT has to do is put a few key parents in the leadership roles and there are no agents for change that are in those ranks, then choice and empowerment doesn't mean a whole lot to me. So a major problem is getting parents engaged and, you know there are at least 30 reasons why parents have a hard time doing that.

A principal argued,

I've been at several schools in the city and I know that levels of parental support are different. You need a real strong parent commitment to have that kind of school of choice. It won't work everywhere. It takes a lot of work. It takes a lot of coming to meetings and getting together for consensus building, group decisions. Unfortunately, not many of the schools of choice have that kind of parental participation.

To facilitate parental involvement, DPS established an annual choice fair in 1992. The first fair drew about 800 parents, The second one had 2,000. By 1994, 6,000 parents attended the third choice fair. A DPS administrator states, "parents can't make good choices if they don't have information."

Some respondents have been enthusiastic about the changes they have observed in specific Diversity and Choice schools. A community advocate that conducts non-violent workshops directly in the elementary schools provided this observation:

I see changes. More school pride, more individuality. Deborah McGriff encouraged each school to show its uniqueness. I think they are moving

to more autonomy at each school. That's been great for us in getting in the schools because with that autonomy, those who wanted us in their buildings didn't have to answer to anyone above. That was fantastic.

A DPS administrator states,

You mentioned Western International and it is one of my favorite examples. I don't know what turns a school around, because I had been working with the school and they are a Compact school also but when they got the international theme, I don't know what finally made them turn the corner, but when I go in that school, the staff couldn't stop talking. I mean they were bouncing off the walls the last time I was in there, telling me about their multicultural program and this, that and the other and did you see this? So the greatest joy for me is watching the enthusiasm of the staff or the school community as it begins to change and we see the reform initiatives implemented.

A principal of a choice school which also happens to be one of the first schools to be empowered adds,

I am a principal of a school of choice and I see the difference it makes in the children. If you listed the top performing schools I think you would find that they are in some way involved with choice. The communities across Michigan in which there is a lot of parental participation will have better scores and will be doing a better job in educating.

She claims she has been overwhelmed with the kind of interest and participation in her school.

I've tried innovation in other schools. Sometimes it was very difficult to get ten people to come to a school meeting. I think some of that has to be our responsibility to break down some of those old walls and make it a place where people aren't intimidated to come and feel very welcome when they get here and know that their presence is not just a token.

Clearly, it takes time to make significant change in a school's academic program.

The difficulty is compounded in that the district currently lacks an effective means of gauging progress. A former superintendent stated:

We encouraged some of these schools of choice which began during my

tenure but they have to be able to meet the rigorous standards that we've set up in the system. If they can't meet those standards, then in my view, they're not doing the job that we had hoped they would do. I'm not interested in having a Marcus Garvey school for the sake of having a Marcus Garvey school. I'm interested in having Marcus Garvey school so that I can see whether or not the dynamics of that school is going to enable the kids to be able to function better and by the standards that we've set for all the rest of the 300 schools.

A DFT representative and reform cynic had this point of view:

The reformers created a lot of programs. These programs are proclaimed to be successes but nobody looks behind the scenes. I do not believe that they are any more successful here than they've proven to be any place else. In other words, they are fad type of programs that have never been clearly demonstrated to be successful when they were initiated. Some really are just revisions of other programs in the past that were never successful such as the fad programs such as site-based management type of schools which we have a number of now, the schools of choice which is being emphasized, merit pay. The latest one, of course, is chartered schools, all of which are minimally successful for a few kids. I'm not saying they don't work at all but like so many other programs I've seen in my 30 some years in this business, they are fads that work with certain types of kids, usually kids who come from a relatively decent home background where education is encouraged and that kind of thing. But it does nothing to touch the larger body of the type of students that we have here in Detroit. In other words, you cannot say that our schools of choice are not a success. They are a success with the kind of kids that they attract. But we still have that larger student body in the neighborhood schools that we're not reaching.

INSTITUTIONAL LEGACY

It's my view that no urban school system in America can reform itself without external assistance and that external assistance has to be driven by both human resources and financial resources. That was a key to the two years John Porter was there. I think Deborah McGriff continued to support those principles. I don't think those principles are being supported at the same level now as they were for the previous four to five years.

DPS administrator

After the crushing defeat of the HOPE team, there was still an eight to three

majority for reform on the post-HOPE board, but now the reform group was split. According to a former HOPE member, the reform minded board members that remained, while a majority, were totally intimidated by the minority. As a result, the majority coalition for reform was soon squandered. The ousted board member stated, "One reason I didn't worry so much about the election was because I felt even under the worst of worlds, there would still be a majority on the board for reform. I mean, virtually all those people on the board got there because of us." The new board president, April Howard Coleman, was caught in this political struggle. A former board member states, "should she, to maintain her base, go with the street fighters and the bullies who are the so called grassroots representatives which is really kind of her, where she started or should she stay true to her reform roots which is where the other group is?" Additionally, the great personal animosity developed between Coleman and Superintendent McGriff split the reform board even further. A former HOPE team member commented,

The new board president April Howard Coleman and McGriff had a real problem -- a personality problem. Dr. McGriff brought them on. I don't know who was giving her advice and telling her things but I used to tell her all the time that this is Detroit. It's quite different than Milwaukee. People do things, think things, and see things differently. She kept a foreign car. I tried to get her to sell it -- I'm sure she still has it. I mean as soon as somebody finds out you got a foreign car, you're going to be explaining it. It's not worth it coming to Detroit but she housed it somewhere or stored it. She didn't drive it around because the board makes a car available to the general superintendent. So she didn't drive it around but everybody knew it was there and to me that says, well, I'm not going to be here long anyway so why should I sell my car?

Board meetings began to increasingly focus on the opposition to the initiatives advanced by the previous board.

The open hostility between McGriff and then board president April Howard

Coleman escalated and was often played out in the press. Coleman attacked McGriff's status as an outsider. A McGriff supporter complained, "How can we talk about preparing kids for the global economy and we can't even deal with leadership from another state in the United States."

On the surface, the electoral defeat of the HOPE team and the resignation of general superintendent, Deborah McGriff, signaled the end of reform. Yet, Baumgartner and Jones (1992) contend that even short bursts of reform can have long term institutional consequences through a restructuring of basic relationships and decisionmaking. Therefore, despite the community backlash, the importance of this reform period, 1988-1993, may continue to impact the district. Sometimes a policy lurch can create a platform for successive waves of reform. The question remains whether another reform period will occur in Detroit in the near future or whether long term stability will reappear.

While empowerment was most responsible for the anti-reform backlash, the defeat of the HOPE team and the resignation of choice advocate Deborah McGriff has also impeded the further development of schools of choice. Community concerns over the traditional neighborhood schools left out of any self-improvement strategy, has been the preeminent preoccupation with McGriff's successor, David Snead. A DPS administrator states:

I think the objective of the strike by the teachers back in '92 was to bust the board and undermine the superintendent. They were very successful at that. I think that intimidated other board members whose primary objective was to hold office. There's been a lot of backsliding, a lot of timidity by the people who are on the board today. Of course, the change of superintendents, basically followed the election returns.

Despite McGriff's opponent's desire to remove any vestige of her efforts, the

institutional legacy is apparent. For schools which embraced choice, they have continued to retain their themes. A few of the choice schools implemented under Dr. McGriff have become very popular, with long waiting lists of parents who want to send their children to those schools and have led to more inclusion of the community. A current board member believes that there is a need for continued replication of the more successful models. Most of the major Empowerment, Diversity and Choice initiatives have survived in one form or another. Even with new elected boards in 1992 and again in 1994, and a new superintendent in 1993, a current DPS administrator doesn't see a fundamental departure from the original HOPE or McGriff agenda.

It wasn't the mission. It was the road to get to the mission. It was not the mission. Most everyone agrees that we still need to be about the same mission, goals and objectives. But you cannot cram things down peoples throats. You have to wait until the people are ready.

In fact a key appointee of McGriff, Dr. Sharon Johnson Lewis who headed the Office of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice had her interim status removed by the new general superintendent David Snead. She continues to have an important role in DPS administration, even though the Office of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice no longer exists.

A HOPE team member commented on one important institutional legacy of the reform efforts,

The major change has been the willingness to engage in a conversation as to whether the public school system should continue on in its present form. That's been the biggest change. Previously it was accepted as a given.

A principal of one of the African centered schools stated that while the new board does not appear to be interested in dramatic reform, he does not believe they will be able to

reverse the changes that were put in place under the previous administration,

I think that because of the number of empowered schools, the African centered schools and a number of parents who pulled their kids from private schools back to the public system, that you don't want to go backwards. You would get a backlash, parental outcry and a lot of board members have their kids in these empowered type schools. So, I don't think you're going to see a going backwards on the earlier initiatives but you're not going to see expansion. At one time, we had 10 schools empowered at one time all together. You're not going to see that.

With respect to empowerment, a top DPS administrator appointed under McGriff contended, "my philosophy and I hope that of the new general superintendent's philosophy is we continue to want shared decision making. If schools want to take a formal vote, that's up to them, but we still want to involve that greater community in making decisions." There are a number of other schools that have adopted a shared decision making government structure of one form or another. They sometime opt not to seek the formal designation, because of the bitterness in the union over empowerment.

While not abandoning previous reforms, current superintendent David Snead has not vigorously supported new programs that stress specialized academic themes and self-governing empowered schools. His emphasis on "Clean, Safe and Healthy" schools has replaced "Empowerment, Diversity and Choice" as his principal agenda in a strategic plan unveiled in 1994. Snead states: "We're not going to stop our efforts on empowered schools, choice schools, theme schools.....We purposely did not want to make dramatic changes. My intent was not to destroy the efforts of the past, but to capitalize on them, and establish a new emphasis on clean, safe and healthy environment for our youngsters (*Detroit Free Press* 1994). This agenda appeals to many of the parents of traditional neighborhood schools, who felt left out of the previous reforms. The president of the

City-Wide School Community Organization, Delores Smith, praised the new agenda which will focus on all the schools (Russell 1994).

Superintendent Snead has met strong resistance to expand choice offerings in a number of buildings that were recently donated by the business community. General Motors donated three buildings at the former Cadillac Clark Street plant. The total gift, which includes money for renovation totals \$5.1 million and is the largest corporate gift ever received by the DPS (*Detroit Free Press* 1994). The DPS plans to open an environmental education and training institute.²⁷ In addition, a downtown building was donated by Comerica which DPS plans a new Business and Commerce High School. Despite these gifts, parents of traditional neighborhood schools insist that not one dollar should be spent on additional choice offerings until neighborhood schools are brought up to standards. At a March 1995 board meeting, a parade of parents lashed out at the board over the proposed projects, maintaining their "neighborhood schools are still neglected, roofs are leaking and windows are over 50 years old and in need of replacement". The conflict between the special schools and neighborhood schools appears to have been turned on its head. Now the proponents of the specialized schools are the critics of a district wide focus on "clean, safe and healthy". Many parents of innovative schools maintain the specialized programs are necessary to motivate the other schools in the district to improve.

Snead's back to the basics approach, is envisioned as a one-year interim step to

²⁷ The plan is part of Detroit's successful empowerment-zone application with the federal government in 1995.

developing a five-year plan. One of the DPS reformers defeated in the 1992 board elections, left office pessimistic that actors in Detroit would be in a position anytime soon, to revive the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda.

I don't see replicating what we had in 1988. So what's going to happen now? If changes are going to occur it will be in other cities and the empowerment is going to occur in other places, other geographic areas in Michigan. Rather than being at the forefront, Detroit will lag behind.

A former HOPE board member expresses his ultimate pessimism about the institutional legacy of the reform years,

I guess I have almost come to the conclusion, it is kind of hopeless. I used to think that the revolution would come within a big city, where the people would demand to get their children educated. However, these same people they just confront, all of these other powerful economic forces that are really exploiting them.

While the education union leadership in Detroit is so powerful that its opposition to radical change may be enough to prevent it from being fully realized, some respondents remain optimistic about the chances for revival of reform. A business respondent argued the successful strategy of the DFT to squelch the HOPE reform efforts was effective in the short term, but believes larger forces in the Detroit community, in the State of Michigan are in favor of continued change. He also expressed the opinion that many teachers in Detroit are themselves often frustrated with the reactive position taken by their own union. A former superintendent comments on the continued power yielded by the teacher unions in Detroit:

They're very powerful -- and I think they've tipped the balance, they've gone too far. There is going to have to be some curbing of union power in this state if not in the country, but definitely curbing in the state of Michigan. We're a union state and certainly Detroit is a union town.

The extremely short tenures of general superintendents in large urban districts over the last decade has heightened concerns about lasting institutional legacies of reform periods. The tremendous volatility in school district leadership may be an obstacle to sustainable reform. The average tenures of general superintendencies across the country have been quite short. Of the 47 largest U.S. school districts, 42 have hired new superintendents since 1990. The average urban superintendent remains only two years, compared to five years for other districts (Winerip 1993). A former superintendent commented,

I think that short tenures have become a problem. If a superintendent stays for five, seven years or so, which it might get to, that won't be a big problem but what's happened whether you look at Chicago or Detroit or so many of the other large districts like New York, the turnover has been so rapid.

The efforts to emphasize technical qualifications and expertise over coalition-building skills in the recruitment of superintendents may be a primary reason for the high turnover and instability in superintendent leadership that characterizes many large urban school systems. Reforms that have worked in one city frequently fail in others, and reformers who succeed on one setting don't necessarily succeed in the next (Henig 1994). Superintendent Snead may have the built in political networks to maintain power for a longer period of time, but his status as an insider, according to a number of respondents, makes a return to a more aggressive reform thrust less likely. A community advocate was concerned about Snead's rise from inside the organization.

McGriff didn't owe a whole lot of favors because she was an outsider and she was selected based on her credentials. I believe that Dr. Snead is extremely educated and competent but he came up through the system. He came through the ranks. The concern that I have is that sometimes it's

very difficult when you come up through the ranks with these people, sometimes it's very difficult when you've made these alliances to be able to say to your supporters that look, you've been a great friend but I really don't think that you really bring any innovativeness to this particular area so the reality is that I might need to ask you to retire, to move on to another area, I think that's more difficult to do when you're risen and been amongst your peers.

The State of Michigan's recent charter school legislation may provide additional incentives for the DPS to boost interdistrict choice options or face declining enrollments.²⁸ In fact, general superintendent Snead stated at a board meeting in 1994, "We want to get into the ballgame of chartering schools. We don't want to sit back and watch universities, other individuals, other organizations come into our school system and establish charter schools without us having input. We want to play an active role in the charter school movement. Board member Kwame Kenyatta urged fellow board members to endorse Snead's statement arguing "We can either let it go on with us or we can let it roll over us." (*DPS School Board Meeting Tuesday June 7, 1994*). In August 1994, Casa Maria Academy was authorized as the first charter school in Detroit by Central Michigan University, to serve at-risk middle school students (Wayne State University School, the state's first charter school was authorized under a different law). In the face of such pressure, on September 6, 1994 a Detroit Public School Board committee voted unanimously to approve the application process to authorize its first charter school, Aisha Shule, an Afrocentric private school in Detroit.

On another level, the virulent anti empowerment backlash has had the effect of

²⁸ Charter schools are independent public schools made possible by Michigan State legislation passed in December 1993. Only one of the state's 13 public universities, a community college or a school district can create charter agreements. Schools would receive the same per-pupil money as the district in which they're located.

focusing more attention on the neighborhood schools which were not part of any self-improvement strategy under the HOPE/McGriff regime. This may have contributed to the passage of proposal S in 1994, a \$1.5 billion dollar bond issue that will attempt to rejuvenate declining neighborhood facilities district wide. Snead also emphasized the bond will stimulate the local economy.²⁹ It's successful passage may itself be a "legacy" of the reform years and contribute to the next "successive wave" of reform.

NATURE OF POLICY CHANGE

True reform which there's very little of and this is a test for your study. I suspect it's not part of the study, true reform is not teaching with your curriculum and doing all this nonsense that the state boards now are playing with. True reform is being able to change the delivery system. That's what education reform has got to be about and by-and-large, the educational system does not have the wherewithal to do what has to be done unless there is significant alteration of the delivery system which is labor intensive. Most urban school systems are organized and financed to survive, not to succeed.

former DPS superintendent

Upon her appointment, McGriff was one of only five women to run big-city school systems (Wilkerson 1991).³⁰ McGriff argued, "We are at a critical juncture in education. We have to decide if we are going to remain in the horse-and -buggy age or move into the next century. Some people want to continue to tinker and try to fix the old

²⁹ Snead claims each \$1 million spent in construction produces \$707,000 in household earnings and creates over 30 jobs across all industries. The construction, manufacturing, business services and wholesale and retail trade industries will receive 75 percent of the expected benefits. Local business leaders have criticized those claims (*Detroit Free Press* 1994).

³⁰ She was also one of only nine female superintendents in Michigan, a state with more than 500 school districts (*Detroit Free Press* 1993).

system. We have to move to something totally new and totally different because the vast majority of our children are not succeeding" (Wilkerson 1991). A business respondent and supporter of McGriff argued,

I heard a speaker say one time, don't be critical of the bomb throwers because while they might get a lot of attention for their very extraordinary method of getting things done, but they're the ones that really force change. McGriff was a bomb thrower. She was very controversial but she was given a huge job. She also had incentives to be a bomb thrower because her incentives were geared toward performance and she couldn't achieve her own objectives by being a stone thrower. She had to be a bomb thrower. I was really saddened when she left because I really felt that she surrounded herself with good people. She could of been more politically astute but if you're dealing with people whose real agenda is to keep things the way they are, it's damn frustrating.

The HOPE/McGriff leadership directly challenged the status quo in the district. The reformers campaigned on a platform of revolutionary change in 1988 and they hired the most assertive reform candidate for general superintendent that they could find. Eventually the HOPE reformers were thrown out of office, and the new superintendent resigned under pressure. Until her resignation in 1993, McGriff remained steadfast in her advocacy of empowerment, choice and the things the HOPE team had hired her for. A DPS administrator and McGriff supporter states:

I've always described the superintendency as every decision you make makes somebody happy and it makes someone else unhappy. Unless you are a superintendent who will make decisions based on how long you can keep your job and therefore, make the most politically neutral decision you can possibly make. That's not what she did. She went in with a history on certain political ideas. She did not waver from those because she was committed to the teachers and students, she was committed to local school development, she was committed to high expectations for all kids. She was committed to diversity in curriculum. She was not a one size fits all person. So, if you are against these things you're going to be against her. She simply accepted that. She was not going to compromise her values to be superintendent. Not everybody takes that position but that's the

position that she took.

The efforts to implement Empowerment, Diversity and Choice, speak to the difficulties of advancing comprehensive policy change and on the surface appear to support conservative theories of incremental change (Hayes 1992; Lindblom 1959, 1977; Schon 1972 among others). Lindblom asserted, "inherent limitations on rationality and the inevitable need for bargaining and compromise among different interests preclude major policy departures within any political system (1959, 79).

Obviously reform efforts in the DPS have not radically transformed the district. Yet, relative to many urban districts who have embarked on reform, the Detroit community has moved further than others from the original point of departure.³¹ At one point, the reform coalition had hoped that empowerment would have revolutionized the district. Obviously, revolution did not occur. Yet, after a fifteen year period of stability under Arthur Jefferson, change did occur. Twenty six schools voted to accept the empowerment provisions during the HOPE/McGriff era. All 26 schools have remained empowered under the new administration. Choice options also grew considerably and parental demand for additional choice options is evident. Recently, the Skillman Foundation has agreed to support the implementation of the Comer School Development Program in 18 DPS neighborhood elementary schools (see Chapter 6). A DPS administrator argued,

I think the general attitude in education, when you try something new is that it is much easier not to change. Because the minute you try anything,

³¹ This assessment based on a 11 city study of civic capacity and urban education including New York, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Washington D.C., San Francisco, Houston, Los Angeles and Denver.

you are going to be scrutinized. Criticism is tough. You don't always get credit for the good things, but we've got to continue to at least try to do something that is going to help these kids. You've got to keep kids as the number one focus and not personalities or whatever it is that attempts to block innovation and reform.

Clearly the reformers had unrealistic expectations of rapid change. They proved too impatient to build a broad based coalition. A Detroit journalist argued,

I think that in education, there have been a number of changes that have been made which have some degree of promise of changing for the better the school system and the prospects for some of the kids. I think that a lot of it has been the reorganization of the Detroit School System that took place when the HOPE Team was elected and John Porter was brought in as interim superintendent. At least some of the business practices were improved during that time, and there's more accountability and I think some degree of more effectiveness, at least in terms of management. An important new idea which has never quite lived up to its billing has been the so called empowerment concept and the schools of choice. I think the concept of helping people to take a sense of ownership of the school and make it work for them rather than simply being a detached, bureaucratic kind of operation was an important idea. I don't think it's ever quite lived up to its promise because the teachers' union became fearful of it and frustrated efforts to apply the concept. I think the rigidity of the old system has gotten in our way.

Fundamental disagreement remains over what really constitutes incremental or comprehensive reform in Detroit. Some advocates maintain that the pockets of excellence approach, began by the reformers, can be the only way to advance substantive reform in a district as large as the DPS. DFT president John Elliott disagrees. He states: "McGriff's policies have led to elitist types of schools, and that's wrong. We have 170,000 students and we ought to be trying to find programs to help 170,000 students (*Detroit Free Press* 1993). A former HOPE team member commented on what he believes is the limitations of the logic of reform critics, who remain insistent that reform must involve all schools district-wide:

Again, an attitude adjustment is needed --people really have a fear that any initial rule you make to improve education isn't a blanket improvement. It doesn't apply to every school, every kid in every spot. It's as though they would prefer to have no improvement if it can't be a blanket, a total improvement. The resources aren't there for that kind of a total improvement. And I don't mean just money, I mean the school buildings, skilled educators, parents, involved parents, etc. etc. It's been allowed to deteriorate so long that you can't automatically mandate all of that change system-wide. We tried to do it by allowing the parents and the teachers and principals in areas that were good or that were comfortable doing their jobs to have the freedom to do so. You can call it -- known as empowerment, but it was really just site-based management or each school making the decisions on how they use their school and their resources. We wanted to do it on a pilot basis which is what the school unions recommended, which made sense to us.

A community respondent who favored the HOPE/McGriff approach, also responded to the critics who demanded "why not make all the schools excellent." He argued,

Why not make all the schools excellent? No one can wave the hand or magic wand and create excellence all over. The different segments of the community must buy into the process and they must want to do so willingly. You are never going to have those kind of forces district wide.

A former superintendent agreed,

I see bits and pieces happening. You don't see it in a large system like Detroit. When I was there or under the current administration, you don't see it impacting a total system. You see isolated spots, here and there which maybe it's the only way it can be.

Reform opponents contend the "pockets of excellence" is incapable of driving systemic change. According to a community advocate, the question that always lingered in the air with Empowerment, Diversity and Choice was what would happen to existing traditional neighborhood schools where most of our kids in the district attended. She argues,

We do know what the result is of creating a small series of isolated alternatives. We have lots of evidence. While critics might say we've had

over 100 years of evidence of what happens when you go at it incrementally in every school, I do not think it can be done just in a few schools. You're gonna have to bring about changes that impact every school, every classroom. You're gonna need massive public support to be able to pull that off. One of the other things that Dr. McGriff demonstrated is that reform can't be shoved down the throats of teachers and administrators. At least at this point it appears that the unions are more solidly behind Dr. Snead. It's less threatening to them. It looks more like the status quo.

A DFT official asserts, "We've got to get back to district-wide standards for learning.

I think we have to stop experimenting with programs of limited or questionable value."

He states:

Empowerment doesn't solve the problem. I think that in lieu of just trying to solve the problem, what is happened is that we are saying, let's build a site based management. The problem is too much bureaucracy, so let's go to site based management. Or the problem is that parents can't send their kids where they want to go, so let's go to choice. The problem is that you have not developed a quality education system in all your schools and you are not delivering a quality education system in all of your schools and you are not delivering the type of funds and materials that are needed with the curriculum that is desired to educate all the children.

This period of reform in Detroit, supports Baumgartner and Jones's contention that in many policy arenas, punctuated equilibrium better describes policy change than traditional models of incrementalism. The system operated for 15 years conservatively and incrementally. With a short period of agenda access, reformers placed empowerment and schools of choice on the political agenda. This period of policy lurch brought on by the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice reforms, more than quadrupled the schools of choice in the district and fostered 26 empowered schools. Reactive forces mobilized to oppose change, but did not return the DPS to the period before the reform. Rather it appears a new equilibrium has been established. Snead in fact indicated: "I thought Dr.

McGriff was a positive catalyst for constructive change in the Detroit Public Schools. ...I would like to continue what she has begun, we had similar ideas and strategies" (*Detroit Free Press* 1993). Yet, despite this rhetoric, his leadership appears to reflect a less contentious, highly risk adverse agenda. A foundation leader commented on the early tenure of David Snead,

I think that he's much less of a risk taker. He doesn't seem to be willing to say, look, what we're doing is not working. Let's do something really dramatic. Nothing that we could do would work as bad as what we're doing now and that gives me some cause for concern. I think schools of choice could have an impact in Detroit because I think that if you are a bureaucrat or a teacher that is just interested in the status quo, the only wake up call that's really gonna get your attention is when the principal says, 'if we lose 200 enrollment this year that means that we're gonna have to layoff eight teachers', that will be a powerful.

SUMMARY

Unlike the Detroit Compact, Empowerment, Diversity and Choice were principally advanced by internal actors within the DPS. The agenda lacked the kind of district wide, systemic network evident in building support for the Detroit Compact. Little "leverage" existed to apply external pressure on the unions to support the reform initiatives. Instead, the unions were coerced for a short time following the HOPE elections until they had the opportunity to literally strike back. Deep divisions among the reform leaders also impeded advancement of the agenda. Implementation was attempted too quickly before a broad based coalition in support of the reforms could be generated. A former board member commented:

I think there's always an innate resistance to change but I think it's far more dramatic over how you approach change. Change is difficult for everyone, but it is far more difficult when you make change a contractual issue, rather than involving all of the stakeholders in that change. I think that we all know how to make change. It takes longer no doubt. I think that, unfortunately, the Hope Team and maybe even some members of the administration felt they could force people to accept change rather than saying this is going to take some time, so let's go about it the way we know it should be done and hopefully get it enacted. You can always make change in terms of policy from the top, but that doesn't mean that somebody's not gonna dig in and you're gonna drag them along, plowing the earth, plowing up the earth.

This case suggests the importance of broad-based coalition building. Empowerment, Diversity and Choice did not falter because of the "technical" aspects of the reforms, but because of the inability to create political networks capable of weathering adversity and permitting broad implementation. A business respondent agreed:

I was a very big fan of the HOPE team and Deborah McGriff. I thought they were really on the right side. I think there were a lot of fans out in the community. I thought they had a lot of good ideas. One of the reasons they failed was because they weren't politically smart. They didn't have the networks.

Education researchers are often quick to focus on measurable signs of progress for new reforms advanced, and ultimately measurable improvement at the school site must be a goal of any reform agenda. Yet, the collapse of the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda indicates political rather than educational inadequacy. To be sure educational success will ultimately need to be assessed at the level of the student. However, if there is to be measurable impact at the classroom level, reforms will need to generate some minimum degree of political support and this requires a reconceptualization of how we examine the reform process. More attention must be directed to the formal and informal relationships that surround and complement the formal

workings of the governance structure. As the HOPE/McGriff leadership coalition learned too late, electoral coalitions themselves, are indeed insufficient to govern.

CHAPTER 6
COMPARING THE REFORM MODELS
AND THEIR IMPACT
ON THE COMER SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION

The policy decisions and reform efforts that emerged from the prevailing problem definitions in Detroit, tended to fall in two types of solution sets-- competitive and cooperative. Each solution set entailed a set of policy strategies. The competitive solution set evident in the HOPE/McGriff lead Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda, created significant difficulties in generating sustainable support, while the collective solution sets evident in the Detroit Compact have facilitated the creation of common goals. The Skillman Foundation's advancement of the Comer School Development Program provides an example of the practical implication of this finding.

COMPARING THE REFORM MODELS: THE DETROIT COMPACT
AND EMPOWERMENT, DIVERSITY AND CHOICE

The competitive solution set evident in Empowerment, Diversity and Choice reforms assumed pockets of early adapters in the district would provide pressure on other schools to restructure. Implicit was a market model in which parents act as educational consumers. The initiatives sought to induce pressure among teachers, administrators and schools to improve their educational product in order to attract and retain student and parent customers. In contrast, the cooperative solution set evident in the Detroit Compact, worked to identify common goals and build consensus around a collective strategy. Civic

capacity is increased as interested actors work together to support programs and services.

Popular conservative ideology claims that government has failed to shape collective solutions to social problems. This is the heart of Chubb and Moe's (1992) critique of American education policy. Henig (1994) rejects this view and reminds us that collective, democratic deliberation often succeeds when it has enunciated clear goals and mobilized public support based on appeals to concepts of what is right and just and under the broader interest. He sees the failure of public programs as a result of an inability to develop and sustain a vision of collective purpose. The Detroit Compact cultivated such a vision. Empowerment, Diversity and Choice, on the other hand, failed to do so. This case provides tentative support of Henig's assumptions that there are problems endemic to competitive solution sets. While competitive solution sets can work at the margins to improve the range of opportunities for select students and parents, because of political considerations they are unlikely to provide the quick fix that would drive comprehensive reform in public education that Chubb and Moe (1990; 1992) Lieberman (1993) and others have called for. A former DPS superintendent agrees:

Specialized schools all started during my tenure. I believe in choice, not as a solution to the urban problem but I believe in choice to create diversity and competition. Yet, choice is not going to be the panacea. No matter how you design it, you can only impact about 10% of whatever you do with choice. People who run out and try to say choice is going to totally reform urban education, they just don't know what they're talking about.

Unlike the Compact organization, which provided a formal role for non-DPS participants, Empowerment, Diversity and Choice was dominated by the board of education and the general superintendent. As a result, the initiatives had a difficult time

building a vision of collect purpose. Differences among reform leaders impeded efforts in initiating and maintaining a broad based coalition in support of reforms. While empowerment and the specialized schools of choice were not necessarily in conflict, tactically there was only so much political capital the reformers could mobilize.¹ A board of education member states:

I think we have a couple of problems. The first is we have a series of competing agendas. Most people are ultimately focused on the same goal and that's improving learning and development for kids but how we get there-- I think there are some serious disagreements. There has emerged in this district and in its leadership a number of initiatives which compete for their time and attention and resources. That's a significant problem. There are plenty of difficulties to be overcome in school improvement, but when everybody's not pulling in the same direction, we multiply those difficulties by all the different players. To get everybody on the same page, I think would make a big, big difference. This is an area in which leadership outside of the district can play an important role.

Ultimately, the HOPE/McGriff leadership failed to adequately expand the scope of contagium beyond internal DPS actors. Their support base remained highly fragmented. In contrast, the Detroit Compact had numerous business and community partners and no real opponents (see Table 6.1 Comparisons of the Detroit Compact and Empowerment, Diversity and Choice). The State provided useful resources, leadership and tactical support. Empowerment in contrast, was not embraced significantly by anyone outside of the school district. While choice schools did have external support, it was highly fragmented and focused around individual school programs. Ultimately, the HOPE board and the general superintendent were unable to generate sufficient civic capacity to implement their agenda.

¹ For example, a school of choice can also become an empowered school.

Table 6.1
Comparisons of the Detroit Compact and Empowerment, Diversity and Choice

	Detroit Compact	Empowerment, Diversity and Choice
Agenda Leaders	Business: Detroit Renaissance, Detroit Chamber of Commerce State of Michigan: Commerce Department Community: Detroit Association of Black Organizations, United Community Services and New Detroit Inc	DPS School Board HOPE Reformers: Hayden, Olmstead, Patrick and Blanding DPS General Superintendents: John Porter and Deborah McGriff
Principal Advocates	DPS HOPE reformers DPS general superintendents: John Porter and Deborah McGriff Community: non-profit, religious and foundations Higher Education Organized Labor: UAW, AFL-CIO City Government Detroit Federation of Teachers Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors Parent Organizations Student Organizations	Small Minority of DPS Teachers and Administrators who Voted for Empowerment and Submitted Choice Plans Various Community Leaders and Organizations Parent Demand for Alternative Schools
Principal Opponents	none	Detroit Federation of Teachers Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors Various Community Leaders and Organizations Parents of Traditional Neighborhood School Children
External Factors Affecting Progress	- limited involvement of small and mid-size business - periodic tensions between Detroit Chamber of Commerce and other stakeholders - difficulties in adequately monitoring performance - defeat of HOPE team and resignation of Deborah McGriff - limited resources - coordination problems - lack of enthusiasm by city government	- micromanagement of policy by HOPE reformers - lack of inclusion of other stakeholders - split between DPS Board president and general superintendent - community divisiveness over content of programs - early restrictions on empowered and choice schools - charges of elitism and opposition from traditional neighborhood schools - threats to union contract provisions, plans to allow private schools to receive DPS public funds, weakened job security - union embargo over empowerment - 18-day union strike over empowerment - court challenges - lack of effective oversight/administrative support - corruption, unrealistic time frame - charges of favoritism to middle class parents - no monitoring of progress

The HOPE board was unwilling to take the time to build support for the advancement of empowered and choice schools. Indeed, they hired Deborah McGriff, specifically because of her belief that empowerment and choice could be implemented right away.² In contrast, the Detroit Compact has been implemented gradually on the basis of a 10-year plan. The Compact agreement indicated that it would take until 2000 AD to involve all the middle schools and high schools.

This case study illustrates that the problem in Detroit, like a number of other large urban school districts, has not been the absence of reform. In fact, many large-city districts have been virtually overrun with reform initiatives.³ Rather than blanket resistance to reform as indicated by the bureaucratic insularity paradigm (see Chapter 1), many urban schools districts are engaged in multiple initiatives. Many districts, however, seem unable to convert pedagogical reforms into comprehensive and sustained programs with system-wide consequences. Henig argues:

Making social policy work means adjusting the original conception to local circumstance. It means investing in it the resources and effort needed to give it a chance to succeed. It means monitoring, feedback, and responding to new information and changing conditions...It means maintaining allegiance to collective solutions even when some individuals and groups might solve their own problems by going it alone. For many policies- especially like education, in which most of the important consequences are likely to become evident only after considerable time has passed- means exercising the patience to wait for results without abandoning the effort prematurely (1994).

² Interestingly enough, Franklin Smith, who argued that it takes at least five years to build the support network to implement empowerment, still has his job as general superintendent of the District of Columbia.

³ This evidence is based on the Civic Capacity and Urban Education Project, National Science Foundation, Grant# RED 9350139 involving 11 cities.

The problem in education, also evident in other areas of public policy, is policy debates all too often start and end with the question "What should we do? This question implies that there is a technical solution that once, identified, is readily recognized, easily put into practice, and safely left to do its good work. This "information paradigm" implies that there is an identifiable set of pedagogical techniques or organizational adjustments that once injected into the local arena- will generate a positive and self-sustaining impetus to reform (Henig 1995). The education debate, according to Cherryholmes (1993) is dominated by these assumptions. He asserts rational procedures have a long history of failing to meet the desired expectations for educational change,

Instead of adopting the view that our educational change failures can be reversed if only we become more rational and systematic, more modern if you will, I will argue something quite different. Many of these failures resulted not from failed attempts to be rational, systematic, and instrumental but followed from the fact that many of these change efforts were quite modern indeed. Rationalization, systematization, task fragmentation, and specialization that are the marks modernity are themselves limited in what they can bring about (Cherryholmes 1993).

Indeed, there is no shortage of good ideas floating around in what John Kingdon refers to as the "policy primeval soup" (1984). The problem has been the ability to sustain a coalition around a reform agenda, leading to the "problem of ephemeral education reform" or "the multitude of undigested reforms" (Henig 1995). The Detroit Compact and Empowerment, Diversity and Choice indicate that the critical variable in the success or failure of reform is the existence of a sustainable political coalition, or a regime, around educational issues.

The emphasis on technical components and expertise over coalition building in the advancement of reforms is often evident in the recruitment of superintendents. The

information paradigm puts the premium on the knowledge and skills of the superintendent. If the path to reform lies through expertise in organizational restructuring, it makes sense for districts to invest heavily in the search for a superintendent with a demonstrated record of reform. What reform failures around the country have indicated, however, is that lack of technical expertise is not the major problem superintendents face. The problem in advancing sustainable reform, as evident in the Detroit case, lies in building coalitions and institutions capable of handling the difficulties and political chaos that change brings. A DFT union respondent argued,

It's one thing to proclaim a program or a policy but you have to set about convincing others that this program or policy is good. My experience has been that you do this or you attempt to do this before you get too far out in front or you get too public....Some don't do this and they learn slowly and with some bitterness in a few cases that just proclaiming something as the latest miracle doesn't make it so or it doesn't make people agree with it.

In Detroit in recent years, it has not been a lack of energy, not a lack of ideas, nor a willingness to change by many actors within the system. The problem as indicated by the political fallout from efforts to advance Empowerment, Diversity and Choice, involves the inability to build school-based efforts into district-wide programs and an incapacity to sustain a reform agenda. This is evident by the ouster of the reformers and in the current focus on "clean and safe" neighborhood schools, which supplanted the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda. Bryk et al. (1993) note the tendency of reform oriented coalitions towards "reform du jour":

A natural concomitant to the multiplicity of programs, however, is that they are often uncoordinated and may even be counterproductive in terms of student learning. The addition of new programs on top of old ones may result in a disjointed and fragmented set of experiences for

students....Much of school life seems to follow an endless cycle of soliciting more funds for even newer initiatives to replace current ones." (Bryk et al. 1993, 26)

This case study exposes the difficulty of mobilizing a constituency more broadly around education reform. While much of the contemporary dialogue has emphasized the need for decentralization, the regime perspective reminds us that the task of setting priorities, nurturing promising initiatives, systematically evaluating school-level initiatives to determine what works and what does not, and transplanting successful models may require a stronger (albeit not necessarily larger) central institutional capacity (Henig 1995).

Part of the failure for empowerment and choice was the inability of central administration to monitor progress. Comprehensive, sustainable reform may necessitate building a strong data collection and analysis function, to enable officials, educators and citizens to make informed judgements about what is working and what is not. The DPS failed in establishing effective oversight and were ill-prepared to disseminate positive information about the reforms to the public.⁴

IMPACT OF THE HOPE/PORTER/McGRIFF REFORM ERA ON THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE COMER SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Towards the end of the HOPE/McGriff tenure, the Skillman Foundation began to investigate bringing the James Comer Yale School Development Program to Detroit's

⁴ An assistant superintendent for DPS believed the problem under McGriff in providing accurate information to the Detroit Community about what they were doing. She believes the district made significant progress in restructuring the schools but people often didn't get the message, or the information that they needed in order to understand the progress.

elementary schools. The foundation's trustees were persuaded that education is one of the fundamental areas that they should target if they wanted to improve the welfare of young people in Detroit and they saw the Comer model as a natural complement to their involvement with the Detroit Compact.⁵ Skillman hopes to improve student achievement primarily by increasing parental and community stakeholder involvement in schools around broader school improvement issues. Unlike the Detroit Compact which was largely designed and implemented by Detroiters, the Comer School Development Program is a fully mature model and has been used for over 25 years, on various scales, in a number of urban school districts.⁶ It addresses developmental, social and emotional needs. Since its adoption and implementation would attempt to invoke serious organizational change within the schools that would participate, the effort can generate serious local opposition.⁷

There are three major components to the Comer program. The first component is a school planning and management team which focuses on school improvement issues

⁵ Skillman focuses in the tri-county, metropolitan Detroit area. Their primary area of interest has been children and youth. Within that area of interest, they operate five program areas, child and family welfare, child and family health, juvenile justice, youth development and education. Their first big entry into education with the Detroit Public Schools came with the High School Development Center. It was a multi-million dollar, four year grant that Skillman made to support an alternate high school for students who were academically able but had other kinds of social problems.

⁶ James Comer led a team of specialists from the Yale Child Study Center in 1968 in a project with two of New Haven's worst elementary schools. The intervention included specialists in social work, early childhood education, program evaluation and teacher training. The Comer model subsequently became widely popular with replications around the country including Chicago, Cleveland, New York City, Washington D.C., Dallas among others.

⁷ It is estimated to take at least five years in order to see results of this intervention model, thus without building some level of sustainability the strategic initiative can wither before it has a chance to bear fruit.

as it relates to the children's learning, growth and development. A respondent states, "the team won't be spending a lot of time talking about where to buy the paper toweling or how to get the flagpole painted but talking about issues directly related to improving the welfare of the kids". The second component is a student support team made up mental health, social workers, psychologists and counselors and others who are involved in any of the areas of children's health and development. They will come together once a week to coordinate their efforts and to put together individual treatment plans or case plans to deal with students who have particularly difficult troubles. The third component is parent participation. Parents serve on the planning and management team, and are involved in the school on a daily basis as volunteers or as paid paraprofessionals. Parents also take responsibility for events like report card night, orientation at the beginning of the year, the Christmas program, etc.

The implementation of the Comer School Development Model might be viewed as the final element to the reform era under study. While implementation will not begin until 1995-96, this effort is significant to this case because Skillman Foundation incorporated valuable lessons from the previous reform efforts. They explicitly modeled their program on the Detroit Compact and a Skillman representative contends that the foundation worked laboriously to avoid the political obstacles that blocked much of the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda. The Skillman Foundation has a particular advantage in that they were viewed as a neutral party in the reform discussions. They sought support of all actors who would be involved before committing funds. Like the Detroit Compact, Skillman planned to be engaged in this project for at least ten years and

have made a major financial commitment.

It looks to some folks like we have a lot of dollars but in the big picture, when you consider the district's budget, even for a single elementary school, the amount of dollars we're spending is relatively small. Yet, at Skillman we look for leverage points. It's a kind of institutional judo. We're looking to find those points in our world where a relatively small effort can turn a much larger body. We think education offers that opportunity in neighborhoods where especially disadvantaged kids live. Schools in many ways are the last remaining social institution which touches the lives of everybody. You know, you can say a lot of bad things about schools but public education is engaged and in ways that no other social institution...hospitals, even churches...you can count on the schools for being there....

Support for the Comer program was cultivated during the political infighting over the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda. Therefore, it is instructive how Skillman went about gathering support for this initiative. In the wake of the 18 day strike and the ultimate political defeat of the HOPE team, superintendent McGriff issued a pamphlet, *Design for Excellence: Lessons from the Detroit Public Schools*. The pamphlet indicated a number of political lessons the district learned in the desire to implement Empowerment, Diversity and Choice. In early discussions with Dr. McGriff, Skillman incorporated these recommendations into their reform plan. They include:

- * Avoid threats of punishment or sanctions which aroused the fury of the unions.
- * Avoid the perception of elitism, by ensuring that all schools are able to participate on an equal basis and by providing an equitable distribution of human and financial resources for all change initiatives.
- * Avoid promoting reform as a panacea and quick fix for the problems of urban education by realizing that there is no one best system and that change requires a three- to five-year time perspective.
- * Avoid the expectation that reform will be readily accepted. Work to adopt management strategies that overcome resistance and promote

ownership.

Source: Design For Excellence 1993.

Skillman began discussions with district staff at the central office and the Area office levels, with both the teacher and administrator unions. They were explicitly conscious of the political issues and conflict raised by the earlier reforms. With these considerations in mind, Skillman created a working group, to educate key partners about the model. This included the city-wide school community organizations, a university partner, the unions, and other foundation partners. Skillman also included representatives from each of the six Area offices. They added local school people early on despite the concerns about the growing size of the group. Eastern Michigan University was selected as the university partner. Finally, the working group grew to over 20 people. The target schools were chosen so that there would be an equal number of schools in each Area. There was concern about political resistance if all of the Area offices were not involved.

One of the problems of the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice reform plan was that it was owned by the leadership. These were Dr. McGriff's ideas. These were the HOPE school board's ideas. These were not the ideas of the district's rank and file or of its parents. How do you engage rank and file teachers? How do you engage people in the community at the very grassroots level around school improvement issues in serious ways? Unless the rank and file folks are really engaged, unless grassroots people are fully involved, we won't move this forward.

Skillman came to recognize that there is not one or even in two education constituencies in Detroit, but rather dozens. The HOPE/McGriff leadership team failed to recognize not only the importance of building consensus at every step of the process but also the need to provide a long enough time frame in implementing change in order

not to drive reform before coalitions are effectively created or mechanisms are put in place that can monitor progress. Trustees expressed some concern about the volatility of the leadership in Detroit.⁸ As one respondent put it,

The district's launched a number of improvement initiatives on relatively short timetables. I think without exception, those programs have run into serious political problems not only in terms of public relations but implementation. People weren't adequately prepared. We brought Dr. Comer to Detroit. We hosted a meeting for teams from elementary schools, to give them a chance to hear him and to think a little bit about his ideas. They began to talk among themselves about whether this would be a good idea. We think that schools themselves as they begin the application process are going to be much better prepared to think seriously about how this program might fit, given their culture and environment.

Because of the perceived instability and the political firestorm that the empowerment initiative created, Skillman, worked to create broad based support through consensus building. This proved to be strategically sound as soon, Dr. McGriff, a key player in the working group, resigned. Dr. Snead has subsequently been supportive but not as directly involved. Skillman realized that by engaging across the community to create leadership and support for the model, they could survive changes at the top of the organization.

We're likely to see a series of superintendents over the next 10 years. Let's hope Dr. Snead stays but certainly history wouldn't suggest that that's likely. The board of education is almost certain to undergo change because of the political process that brings people to and from and away from the board. What you have is sort of a permanent bureaucracy in place that may have never been fully engaged in school improvement efforts. We're hoping that the work that we've done on the front end will provide us with some help as we move through the various stages of implementation in what are certain to be difficult times. We're involved in the process of change. If it's not difficult and arduous, you're not doing any significant reform. We expect some problems, that there will be some obstacles, there are going to be difficulties we have to work out but we're

⁸ The average tenure for urban school superintendents is 2 years since 1980 (Winerip 1993).

hoping that the coalition we've built will be on solid footing to deal with those things.

Like the Compact, the Comer program incorporates the active involvement of the unions, not just as advisors but as genuine partners in the school improvement process. A respondent states, "They should be at the table. If they're only viewed as labor organizations, that works to the district and to the student's detriment". Both the DFT and OSAS were part of the working group from the outset. The vice presidents of both unions served long hours on the working group. A Skillman respondent states:

I think it's essential that any initiative not only include these other key partners like the unions and parents but it's essential that it also include leadership at all of the different strata within the school district. We've become persuaded that any of those groups, despite how strongly the superintendent, board members or coordinator of the programs supports the project, have the ability to sabotage the project if they're not fully behind it. Building that kind of support takes time.

When negotiations were concluded, one of the district Area Superintendents involved in the working group said,

You know, we could of done this in two months instead of the year and a half that it took us but we would not have been as thoughtful. We would not have the kind of support that we have currently if we'd done it that quickly.

Skillman argues that with the exception of the Detroit Compact, external advocates who have been interested in working with the schools have not been central enough in the DPS. A Skillman respondent stated,

Many of the projects that are funded by private organizations exist outside of the normal working culture and structure of the schools. I think these projects are important but it's our intention to move the school development program into a very central position within the district. The Detroit Chamber demonstrated by making long and substantial commitments to the Compact that outside groups can in fact take a major

role in defining education issues in the district. But that endeavor taught us it doesn't happen over night.

By the spring of 1994, Skillman completed an agreement that all the partners would sign which will allow the foundation to support the implementation of the Comer School Development Program. Six traditional neighborhood schools were selected to begin the Comer School Development Program in the fall of 1995. None will be choice or empowered schools. This avoids competition with other innovation and the possible perception of Comer schools as elitist.

Skillman has committed approximately \$16.5 million over a ten year period. The district itself and Eastern Michigan University will make in-kind contributions. The DPS commitment over 10 years currently will be about a one and a half million, and Eastern Michigan approximately \$100,000. According to Skillman, many foundations around the country have a reputation for looking at a problem and working on it for a relatively small period of time and then turning their attention to something else. Skillman's trustees wanted to involve themselves in an important issue at a significant level for a long period of time. An OSAS official involved in the working group argued,

I think it is realistic, intelligent, based on sound principles and it's going to be long term. The Skillman Foundation is proposing a ten or twenty year investment with us. In terms of what we usually get, its light years ahead of everyone else.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY: SIGNIFICANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF EMBRYONIC HUMAN CAPITAL REGIME FORMATION IN DETROIT

The reform era introduced new patterns of decision making in Detroit which directly challenged over two decades of bureaucratic insularity in the DPS. Many actors external to the DPS became engaged in attempts to restructure the education system. Given the absence of cooperative endeavors across a broad range of interests in the past, the relationships developed by key Detroit leaders around education issues is significant. Despite these efforts, important limitations in the embryonic regime formation around education issues in Detroit remain.

The Detroit Compact in particular brought together disparate elements from the community which had previously been unable to unite. The Detroit Compact institutionalized a formal presence at both the district level and within each of the 33 Compact schools. Great care and attention was placed in creating a broad based organization and in building support at each stage of the process. Although the implementation began under the newly elected HOPE team, the Compact maintained its political viability and has continued to expand even after their political defeat. The partnership also weathered the passage of three superintendents. The Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda, on the other hand, proved less successful in establishing sustained political support. While empowerment and choice exists in some form, it failed to revolutionize the delivery system of the DPS. While the Detroit case indicates the

difficulty in creating a broad based coalition around education issues, it does suggest that such coalitions are possible. Important constraints include the limited sphere of influence for the business community, the relative lack of involvement of city government, and the fragmented nature of the community and parent organizations.

While the business community through the auspices of Detroit Renaissance and the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce was successful in the formation and implementation of the Detroit Compact, the restricted "political clout" of business became evident in the very limited advocacy they provided in the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice reforms. Their support for the HOPE reformers actually proved detrimental in the 1992 board elections, and their opposition to a \$1.5 billion physical improvement bond was ineffective.

In addition, it remains an open question how much the Detroit area businesses will require DPS students over those of the suburbs and it remains unclear whether business leadership in the Compact can be maintained over the long term. The Compact presents the classic "free rider" problem for sustained business commitment. While many companies may favor a well-trained workforce, in the long term they may be willing to support only those programs directly related to their needs, particularly in the absence of strong indicators that the program is achieving desired outcomes. There is also a serious issue of the capacity of local business and industry to absorb DPS students.

A more fundamental weakness in the embryonic regime formation around education issues continues to be the relative disengagement of city government. Former Mayor Young kept his political distance from the reformers. Most respondents indicate

that the current mayor, Dennis Archer needs to become a much more active participant. Many believe Mayor Archer will become more heavily committed to partnership because of his previous education background. His strong advocacy may be necessary just to maintain the current levels of external stakeholder interest in working with the DPS.¹ The current relationship between DPS and the mayor is also complicated by the fact that current General Superintendent David Snead recently married Sharon McPhail, Archer's political opponent in the 1993 elections. She has already declared an interest to challenge Archer again in 1997, adding an element of political risk if he escalates his involvement with the schools. A current DPS board member also expressed criticism of the Detroit City Council's limited engagement. He argued, "The city must play a more supportive role. We share the same youth and the same parents that the city is responsible for. We share the same taxpayer". A long time Detroit City Council member cites the need for much greater collaboration in providing recreation opportunities and after-school programs, by maximizing the use of neighborhood school buildings, and by working directly with the schools in providing better safety for children.

The community and parent organizations remain highly fragmented. While there are over 1,000 non-profit agencies in Detroit, a limited funding base has meant a highly competitive environment that often precludes more active cooperation. The historic chasm between citizen and business groups also impedes business/community relations. Business cannot sustain reform without citizen support. In addition, the parent

¹ Archer expressed his desire to engage directly with the DPS at a 1994 Urban Affairs Conference held at Michigan State University, but in the first year of his administration, convincing evidence of increased engagement is lacking.

organizations have historically had limited authority in the DPS and many are perceived to be coopted by the unions. The Empowerment, Diversity and Choice reforms further polarized community activists, creating cleavages between proponents of the traditional neighborhood schools and those who wish to see further expansion of empowerment and choice.

Finally, the State of Michigan, while an active partner in the Compact through the Commerce Department, was not directly involved in the DPS board reformers' desire to increase local autonomy and expand schools of choice. A former superintendent argued, "it does seem a little disingenuous to be talking about movement toward site-based management, local control and empowering people at local schools and classrooms and yet still have all the centralized mandates." While there have been some overtures coming from the federal and state level about waivers and more flexibility for states and local communities, most funding agencies continue to tack on some rules and regulations to funding programs. Recent action by the Michigan State Legislature including an overhaul of the state funding mechanism, a charter school law, restrictions on labor activities by the state teacher's unions, and a discussion of scraping the State Code altogether will likely greatly affect state/local relations in the state.

Urban regimes centered around economic development have been fluid. There are no guarantees that the embryonic regime formation around education issues in Detroit will be sustained. Partners currently engaged may lose interest in working with the DPS, particularly if leadership returns to more exclusionary patterns. Current DPS leadership has redirected their attention towards the neglect of traditional neighborhood schools

through the passage of a \$1.5 billion physical improvement bond, raising uncertainty about how this new agenda will affect the coalitions and patterns of involvement developed during the reform years.

This case demonstrates the centrality of politics in the process of advancing educational reform. The key skills that are needed for sustained reform are political skills. Consistent with Hunter (1953) Schattsneider (1960) Stone (1989) and others, expanding the scope of conflict was instrumental not only in getting the reforms on the agenda but also in implementation and sustainability. The information and bureaucratic perspectives which have dominated education scholarship, exclude the broader political and social processes and institutions which ultimately determine how local priorities are defined.²

This "political" view of education reform is supported by recent education scholarship. Andrew Sirontnik concludes, "to ignore the intimate connections between school and community in the reform and restructuring of urban schooling is to condemn attempts to almost certain failure (1991, 264). Michael Fullan in his comprehensive review of education reform, *The New Meaning of Educational Change* (1991), also directs attention away from thinking about educational change from innovation to institution building, focusing on the social and physical context of change as well as the plurality of interests and visions of those involved.

The regime perspective which provides the foundation for this research forces us

² The "Bureaucratic Resistance Paradigm" (see Chapter 1) presumes that we already have a good idea what needs to be done, but that self-interested education professionals, wielding disproportionate power, scuttle or emasculate any efforts that interfere with their comfortable routines (Henig 1994).

to assess the web of political alliances and interactions that potentially support human capital initiatives, rather than thinking about reform as the discrete province of a school bureaucracy. It focuses on the extent to which various sectors of a community have developed formal and informal means to define common interests and pursue common goals. Good concepts and solid information are insufficient to advance policy reform. This is why reforms that work in one city frequently fail in others. As urban regime theory suggests, pursuing a policy priority such as school reform requires a coalition whose members are not only supportive of that aim but also the task of assembling the necessary resources.

INFERENCES FROM THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY

In returning to the original research questions, a number of inferences can be drawn from this study.

** Did the Detroit education reform flow from an expansion of the scope of conflict?*

First, acquiring the civic capacity necessary to actually implement reform requires more than the vision, will and formal powers of elected leaders. As the HOPE/McGriff reformers learned, governance depends on others not only for resources and support, but also for directly helping to raise issues on the agenda, implement policies and pursue common goals. In cities like Detroit, without a history of collaborative endeavors across broad ranges of interests, building such a constituency around reform poses additional challenges. The HOPE coalition learned the hard way that you just can't dictate or impose change upon a community. Building civic capacity to actually implement and

sustain reform, is a necessary condition for successful reform. Electoral coalitions that have shorter time lines than it takes to generate the political will necessary to make significant reform are not likely to remain in power. Certainly, the political fallout surrounding the advancement of Empowerment, Diversity and Choice has raised concerns about the future inclusiveness on the part of the DPS. Respondents are divided on whether a return to more aggressive reform is eminent or whether current leadership will undertake a long period of stability centered around the new equilibrium that has been established.

The Detroit case also demonstrates that the teacher and administrative unions remain a formidable entity whose acquiescence to reform remains an essential component to sustainable change. Unions were willing to partner in the Detroit Compact and Comer School Development Program, but the process of gaining union support is long and tedious. However, with enough effort the union can be engaged. Expanding the scope of conflict to include external stakeholder involvement in the reform process proved necessary in leveraging union acquiescence for the Detroit Compact and was helpful in securing enthusiastic support for the Comer School Development Program.

** What have been the institutional consequences of expanding the scope of stakeholder involvement in advancing policy innovations in Detroit?*

The 33 Detroit Compact schools, the 26 empowered schools, the expansion of over three dozen schools of diversity and choice and the soon to be implemented Comer School Development Program in 18 schools, provide strong evidence that bureaucratic

insularity has been significantly challenged institutionally by the expansion of conflict in Detroit. Although more fragmented and less comprehensive than originally intended, the reform era induced a policy lurch and a period of nonincremental policy change. Business leaders, city government, community leaders, university officials, state officials and parents are much more directly involved in the operations of the DPS. In addition, the DPS has restored fiscal stability and maintained a balanced budget after over a decade of deficit spending.

The consequences of a public mobilization in education policies in Detroit support Baumgartner and Jones's description of punctuated equilibrium in nuclear power policies, smoking and tobacco policies and pesticide policies. While reform was less than comprehensive, significant institutional change did occur. The subsystem of insular control, while not broken, was substantially weakened. Despite the political defeat of the reformers, institutional legacies of reform remain. Given the political changes discussed at the state level, the election of a new Detroit mayor and the passage of a \$1.5 billion physical improvement bond, it remains unclear whether Detroit will return to a long period of stability.

** Has the agenda access and resultant attempts at policy innovation left an institutional legacy that may continue to have direct policy consequences?*

In Detroit, the Compact has become firmly institutionalized. The Compact has a guaranteed financial commitment through 2003. Detroit Renaissance has already committed some \$19 million to finance the Compact and another \$72 million in future

Compact financing is likely forthcoming through state and federal grants, university funding and private foundation support (Russell 1992).

The reason the Compact has survived, according to a Compact administrator, is the institutional involvement of so many different players in the community. No one group no matter how politically strong, can kill the program. Another testament to the institutional legacy of the Compact is that it has now survived the passage of three superintendents, Arthur Jefferson, John Porter and Deborah McGriff as well as the ouster of the highly supportive and reform minded school board members.

In light of the city's recent history, the overall absence of leadership and the fragmentation of key interests, the partnership has represented a successful organizational effort in an environment where effective coalitions have been limited. A solid base of broad participation has been established, including an active citizen component. With a long history of mutual suspicion by the various partners (who in the past often resembled warring factions), the Detroit Compact has led to the realization that the objectives of the various participants are sometimes closer than they imagined.

On the surface, the electoral defeat of the HOPE team and the resignation of general superintendent, Deborah McGriff, signaled the end of the advancement of the Empowerment, Diversity and Choice agenda. Yet, Baumgartner and Jones (1992) contend that even short bursts of reform can have long term institutional consequences through a restructuring of basic relationships and decisionmaking. Therefore, despite the community backlash, the importance of this reform period, 1988-1993, may continue to impact the district. Sometimes a policy lurch can create a platform for successive waves

of reform. The question remains open whether another reform period will occur in Detroit in the near future or whether long term stability will reappear.

Despite McGriff's opponent's desire to remove any vestige of her efforts, the institutional legacy is apparent. Schools which embraced choice have retained their status. A few of the choice schools implemented under Dr. McGriff have become very popular, with long waiting lists of parents who want to send their children to those schools. Some of the choice schools have also led to more inclusion of the community. A current board member believes that there is a need for continued replication of the more successful models. Most of the major Empowerment, Diversity and Choice initiatives have survived in one form or another.

While not abandoning previous reforms, current superintendent David Snead has not vigorously supported new programs that stress specialized academic themes and self-governing empowered schools. His emphasis on "Clean, Safe and Healthy" schools has replaced "Empowerment, Diversity and Choice" as his principal agenda in a strategic plan unveiled in 1994. This agenda appeals to many of the parents of traditional neighborhood schools, who felt left out of the previous reforms. Superintendent Snead has met strong resistance to expanding choice offerings. Parents of traditional neighborhood schools insist that not one dollar should be spent on additional choice offerings until neighborhood schools are brought up to standards. At a March 1995 board meeting, a parade of parents lashed out at the board over the proposed projects, maintaining their "neighborhood schools are still neglected, roofs are leaking and windows are over 50 years old and in need of replacement". The conflict between the special schools and

neighborhood schools appears to have been turned on its head. Now the proponents of the specialized schools are the critics of a district wide focus on "clean, safe and healthy". Many parents of innovative schools maintain the specialized programs are necessary to motivate the other schools in the district to improve.

While the education union leadership in Detroit is so powerful that its continued opposition to radical change may be enough to prevent it from being fully realized, some respondents remain optimistic about the chances for revival of reform. A business respondent argued the successful strategy of the DFT to squelch the HOPE reform efforts was effective in the short term, but believes larger forces in the Detroit community and in the State of Michigan are in favor of continued change. Superintendent Snead may have the built in political networks to maintain power for a longer period of time, but his status as an insider, according to a number of respondents, makes a return to a more aggressive reform thrust less likely.

** Does incrementalism best describe the reform era in the urban education policy arena in Detroit?*

In the Detroit case, traditional theories of incrementalism are not very compelling explanations of reform. These findings challenge the more conservative views of policy change offered by Hayes (1992), Lindblom (1959; 1977), Schon (1971) and others who assert the predominance of incremental policy outcomes. Lindblom maintains major policy departures are rare, and change is limited to "realistic" proposals differing only marginally from existing policy. Schon (1971) indicates the predominance of the "stable

state" despite rhetoric which emphasizes change. Hayes (1992) states "nonincremental change is simply impossible for many issues, particularly in areas with conflicting objectives," of which education would certainly qualify. The Detroit case also contradicts Chubb and Moe's pessimism (1990; 1992) regarding the ability for democratic, non-market based approaches aimed at educational reform.

This research makes a major contribution in examining theories of decisionmaking that have been developed around economic development case studies and applying those theories to the human investment arena. This study suggests urban regimes which are able to build the civic capacity necessary to act on common goals are more likely to be linked with the cooperative rather than competitive solutions sets discussed in Chapter 6. The Detroit Compact provides tentative support to these assumptions. The Compact was able to sustain a broad based coalition in support of reform, while Empowerment, Diversity and Choice deeply divided the Detroit community. Moe and Chubb (1990; 1992) focused on the problems endemic to democratic reform in public education, but failed to address endemic problems associated with market models of school reform. This study exposes some of those problems and provides important corrections to current skepticism about the inability for democratic measures to impact upon urban school systems. It suggests those concerns were overstated. In particular, this case redirects attention to the political aspects of education reform, in contrast to the educational literature focusing on the technical specifications of various reform plans. The Detroit case also challenges the continued pervasiveness of the bureaucratic insularity model which insists schools remain closed to outsiders. The most important finding is that

education reform remains an eminently "political" phenomenon.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Based on this research, several areas for further research can be suggested. Additional comparative research on education reform centered on political coalitions is warranted. Are patterns in Detroit consistent with other large cities embarking on a reform agenda? Is the centrality of union power in Detroit evident in other cities? What is the impact of strong mayoral advocacy? Regimes are dynamic, not static. Therefore, this research while not directly transferable to other cities has important implications for other school districts which are attempting radical transformations in the delivery system.

Further case driven research is needed on how embryonic regime formation around human capital relates to traditional economic development coalitions. Factors which link business with the educational enterprise need to be explored. The degree to which business interests find compelling reasons for long term investment may ultimately determine the sustainability of relationships developed around education issues. With the establishment of emergent education regimes in a number of cities evident in the NSF Civic Capacity and Urban Education Study, the question remains whether human capital regimes complement or compete with a regime focused on traditional bricks and mortar economic development? For instance, some Detroiters supported the \$1.5 billion school bond not only to improve the physical infrastructure of the DPS but also because they believed it would serve as an economic development tool for area businesses, particularly African-American businesses that could vie for contracts.

The competition between "human investment" and traditional economic development has been evident in the early priorities of the Archer administration. Archer inherited a city where the corporate-centered regime under Young, frayed and then broke. Politicians and business leaders often went their separate ways. It remains an open question how the revival of a new corporate-centered regime under the leadership of Archer will affect the embryonic human capital regime around education issues. A community leader believes the mayor remains primarily preoccupied with "Tiger Stadium" or "casino gambling" type of development issues. Further research is needed on how traditional regimes centered on economic development interact with a human capital regime and whether alliances based on human capital can reap dividends in other areas of development.

Third, as a result of a recent state referendum which substantially increased the degree of state financing, state government may in the future more directly impinge on local school reform. While the reform momentum slowed in Detroit by 1993, the Michigan State Legislature has been especially active, pushing forward charter schools legislation as well as legislation to weaken the bargaining power of the unions. As a result of the state charter law, a number of universities including Central Michigan University and Wayne State University have become extremely active in working to create additional charter schools.³ The state just announced a \$500,000 grant to the

³ A former HOPE member takes credit for the charter school idea in Michigan. "Larry and I were the founders of that idea here in Michigan and persuaded John Engler to make that a centerpiece last year about this time." While there are eight charter schools receiving funds in 1994-95, a large number of charter schools are planned for 1995-96. Central Michigan alone has submitted 35 charter school proposals across the state for the 1995-96 school year (*National Public Radio: State Edition* July 1995).

Michigan Partnership for New Education to foster an additional 200 charter schools for the 1996/97 school year (*Lansing State Journal* July 13, 1995). In the long run, these external actions may contribute to a revival of reform in the DPS. The complex relationships between DPS policy and State of Michigan warrants additional research.

Finally, given the tumultuous period following the reform era, the institutional legacy and significance of the Detroit reform efforts can better be understood over a longer time perspective. Important implications about the reform era remain uncertain. As a result of the election of a new mayor, the recent passage of a \$1.5 billion bond and recent State legislation (which restructured school finance, challenged the bargaining power of the unions and established charter schools), the education policy arena in Detroit will remain a fascinating laboratory for the study of local politics.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Interview respondents were guaranteed not to be cited to encourage accessibility and openness. Therefore, no respondents are mentioned by name. Categories of respondents are generic enough to ensure no individual could be directly connected to any particular disclosure of information.

Nine	<i>Detroit Public School Program Specialists:</i> includes Assistant Superintendents, Area Superintendents, Department Heads, Principals and School Compact Employees
Three	<i>DPS Superintendents</i>
Eight	<i>DPS School Board Members</i>
Ten	<i>Nonprofit Organizations:</i> Kids in Need of Direction (KIND), Save Our Sons and Daughters (SoSAD), Latino Americans for Social and Economic Development (LASED), Focus Hope, Salvation Army, Life Directions, Capuchin Ministries, YWCA, Operation Get Down, Black Parents for Quality Education
Seven	<i>Detroit Civic Associations:</i> New Detroit, Inc., Detroit Urban League, United Community Services, Detroit Association of Black Organizations (DABO), National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP)
Four	<i>Church Leaders</i>
Eight	<i>Business and Banking</i>
Six	<i>Union Representatives:</i> Detroit Federation of Teachers, Organization of Superintendents and Supervisors, UAW, AFL-CIO

Seven	<i>Foundations:</i> Skillman, Black United Fund, Kellogg, United Way, Community Foundation for Southeastern Michigan, Michigan Partnership for New Education
Two	<i>State of Michigan Departments:</i> Commerce Department and Department of Education
Four	<i>City Departments:</i> Executive Office, Employment and Training Department, Neighborhood Services Department
Six	<i>University Liaisons:</i> Wayne State University, Oakland University, Wayne County Community College, Michigan State University
Three	<i>Detroit Press:</i> Detroit Free Press, Detroit News, Michigan Chronicle
Two	<i>City Council Members</i>
One	<i>County Agencies</i>
Two	<i>Alternative Schools:</i> Wayne State University School, Cornerstone Schools

APPENDIX B

COMPACT SCHOOL ACTIVITIES

Academic Enrichment

- * Detroit Open held a volunteer tutoring program to improve student CAT reading and math scores
- * Drew, Hally Open, and Jackson held tutorial programs throughout the school year
- * On-target strategy sessions were held at Webber to improve in-school performance
- * Taft, in conjunction with Lawrence Technological University and Detroit Edison, had a summer learning program
- * Hally Open sent some students to Wayne State University to participate in an accelerated math program.
- * Colley had an ACT class to help prepare students for the test
- * Murray-Wright held a "Saturday School" tutoring and ACT registration
- * Mumford established a peer tutoring program.
- * Western developed "Teach Lab" a tutoring center

Career/Job Preparation Activities

- * Barbour Magnet held a career awareness week for 8th graders where guest speakers made presentations.
- * Motivational presentations were delivered by guest speakers at Barbour and Jackson
- * McMichael students attended an Oakland University College Day.
- * Cooley sponsored a professional career day, workplace visits, and job workshops.
- * Northwestern students participated in a job shadowing program at Health Alliance Plan.

Personal Development

- * Foch developed a Afro-centric book club for on-target students.
- * Hally held "You Nip It" a conflict resolution and non-violence program.
- * Hally, with the assistance of Comerica, set up an in-school banking program.
- * Mentoring programs were held at Pelham and Murray-Wright
- * Cadillace sponsored a community clean upday and planted a community garden across from the school.

Recognition/Awards

- * Webber awarded their on-target students with certificates
- * Barbour held an awards reception to recognize students who met the GPA standard.
- * The Detroit Economic Club sponsored luncheons throughout the year for Compact students with high honors.
- * Hampton held a recognition ceremony at the end of the school year.
- * Taft recognized their students' performance throughout the year during three honors assemblies per grade.
- * Northern held a recognition dinner for students with former Tigers' player Gates Brown as the speaker.
- * Southeastern sponsored several luncheons to recognize on-target students.

Field Trips

- * Barbour students took field trips to the Detroit Science Center, the Paul Robeson Theater, and the Piston's Stay in School Jamboree.
- * Cadillac students went to Wayne County Community College, the Piston's Stay in School Jamboree, Tiger Stadium and Boblo Island.
- * Earhart on-target 8th graders took field trips to Cedar Point and Greenfield Village.
- * Foch students visited Mercy Hospital and were treated to lunch.

- * Hally Open students took Oakland University campus tours.
- * Hampton students participated in the Pistons' Stay in School Jamboree and attended a Detroit Tigers game.
- * Hutchins students took trips to the NBD Bank Technology Center, the African Heritage Museum, the Detroit Institute of Arts, the Detroit Science Center, Disney on Ice and the Piston's Jamboree.
- * Jackson students visited and had lunch at the offices of Coopers & Lybrand. On-target students went to Boblo.
- * McMichael students took field trips to the J.W. Williams Center, Joe Louis Arena, and the Pistons' Jamboree.
- * Ruddiman students took tours of Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Greenfield Village and the Henry Ford Museum. They participated in college day at U of M, Dearborn and Arnold Schwarzenegger Physical Fitness Day. They also went to the Northland Roller Rink and an All City Dance Performance.
- * Webber on-target students went to the University of Michigan to participate in the "Around the World Summer Adventure".
- * Cody students visited many colleges and the Detroit Economic Club.
- * Cooley students also visited several college campuses, took a historical tour of Detroit, and were visited by members of the Pistons and the Detroit Police.
- * Murray-Wright on-target students went to Cedar Point and attended a brunch and concert.
- * Northern students took tours of Oakland University and Wayne State University. They attended a play "Ain't Misbehavin", a ballet performance, a Detroit Lions game and a Detroit Pistons game.
- * Northwestern students took trips to Oakland University and the Museum of African-American History. They attended luncheons with the Detroit Pistons and at the Women's Economic Club. Students also participated in the IBM Student Pennant Race and the State Employee's volunteer rally.

Incentives/Parties

All Compact schools provide incentives to students for meeting certain standards. Incentives included clothing, coupons for discounts, school supplies. Some schools awarded points or tokens so students could select items from the school's Compact store. Listed below are some of the items that were awarded.

- t-shirts
- sweatshirts
- jackets
- hats
- backpacks
- book bags
- pens/pencils
- address books
- notebooks
- water bottles
- bandanas
- key chains
- bumper stickers
- radio headphones
- wrist bands
- stereos
- mountain bikes
- movie passes
- roller skating passes
- bowling passes
- food certificates

Some schools sponsored parties in recognition of improved student performance. These included roller skating parties, bowling parties, pizza parties, barbecues, holiday parties, McDonald's luncheons and dances.

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