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*ETHNIC REPRESENTATION AND STABILITY IN  
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS: A MULTIPLE REGRESSION  
STUDY OF 45 COUNTRIES*

*VOLUME I*

*By*

*Phyllis A. Puffer*

*A DISSERTATION*

*Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of*

*DOCTORAL OF PHILOSOPHY*

*Department of Sociology*

*1997*

## ABSTRACT

### ETHNIC REPRESENTATION AND STABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS: A MULTIPLE REGRESSION STUDY OF 45 COUNTRIES

By

Phyllis A. Puffer

This study tested the fundamental principle that including all ethnic groups in a government leads to longer presidential tenure in power than does excluding ethnic groups. The study extends Lijphart's (1968) consociational theory to African government. The main source of data was documents but they were supplemented by interviews with informants. The principle was strongly confirmed but at least as important were the unexpected discoveries about African government which the data held. It was found that the office of vice president was key to presidential longevity if the appointments were made to achieve ethnic diversity in the government administration. It was found that the position of vice president was notably uninstitutionalized and varied in form. The phenomenon of the military president was carefully

considered. The finding was that the ethnic group membership of the president was more important for longevity than whether the president was civilian or military. A major contribution of this study is the appendices which give the name, title, dates in office, and ethnic group for every president and vice president for all Sub-Saharan African countries since independence. They constitute a universe of data and not merely a sample which is unusual in social science research.

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In memory of my parents

Lela M. Puffer and K. Hart Puffer



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The first acknowledgement is to the chair of my committee, Harry Perlstadt, who was willing to take on a controversial project. As the research progressed, he shared my excitement and enthusiasm for the unfolding surprises the data held. Stan Kaplowitz deserves recognition for his indispensable statistical expertise but also for his analytical insights. It is imperative to acknowledge that this research is built directly on my previous US government employment as a foreign area analyst. The study owes its existence to those years of high quality academic and practical experience in an atmosphere of real intellectual freedom.

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## INTRODUCTION

This study reports the results of the test of an hypothesis formed while studying the historical development of the governments of two tiny countries located side by side on the west coast of Africa. The two countries are Togo and Benin, each of which experienced extraordinary turmoil and violence just after independence in the early 1960s. Government succeeded government in coup after coup, but at one point the coups and tumult ceased in both countries. In both countries, one government came to power which endured for over 20 years (Cornevin 1967, DeCalo 1976, Prouzet 1976, Ronen 1975). Why did that one government last so long? Why did the series of coups end at the particular point it did and not before and not after? What distinguished the enduring governments from the ephemeral governments?

Investigation into the social origins of the coup makers led to an interesting finding. The coups stopped when

the pattern of ethnicity of office holders changed. In the unstable governments, all the principal units were controlled by the historically dominant group. In the stable governments, both the dominant and subordinate groups were represented. The hypothesis based on this observation is that other stable African governments will also display a balanced representation of ethnic groups. The purpose of this study was to test that hypothesis for all the countries in the Sub-Saharan African region.

This research concerns a convergence of two areas of study, government stability and ethnicity. The literatures in these general topics are vast but the literature for the specific problem addressed here is very small. That literature is presented in the first chapter, as well as a relevant, on going debate in the African ethnicity literature. That debate over ethnicity has implications for the research methods used. The second chapter describes the methods with special attention to the debate. A discussion of the unusual statistical approach is also included in this chapter. The hypothesis being tested requires a lengthy explanation which is presented in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5

carefully consider several explanations for the observed phenomena which might fit the data better than the proposed hypothesis. Chapter 4 considers characteristics of the country as possible alternative explanations and Chapter 5 considers characteristics of the ruler as possible explanations. Chapter 6 is a gradual sifting through of one unanticipated finding after another about the structures and processes of African governments. These revelations lead straight into Chapter 7 and the centrality of vice presidents. Chapters 6 and 7 together compose the core of the research findings. Chapter 8 is a limited attempt to project the findings into the future. It seems reasonable that these findings should provide some idea of what future African governments might be like. The final chapter summarizes the research project and underlines the contributions it is believed this study makes to the discipline of sociology.



## CHAPTER 1

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A search of the literatures of sociology, political science, and anthropology revealed that an explanation of the Togo/Benin phenomenon and a rationale for extending the observation to other Sub-Saharan African countries are found in the political science rather than the sociological literature. It is a small but important body of political science research on "consociationalism" based on the work of Arend Lijphart (1968). Consociationalism essentially means a structure or arrangement for sharing power among the principal ethnic groups of a country. It has long been concluded that a balance of power among independent nation states results in stability, or peaceful relations, or absence of war among them (Simowitz 1983). Thus, it would also be reasonable to expect that a balance of power among a country's internal units would lead to stability or peaceful relationships among those units.

### Consociational Theory

Consociationalism first of all applies to the problem of how to govern countries which are deeply and strongly divided along ethnic lines. In such deeply divided societies, forming and maintaining a national government is particularly challenging. A host of bitterly contested issues seriously threatens the existence of the central government in such societies. Civil war is perpetually in the background.

A system for maintaining a viable central government in a deeply ethnically divided society emerged in Belgium. It was described and named "consociationalism" by Lijphart (1968). The principle underlying consociationalism is that the important ethnic groups in a society are in contact with each other at the top of society to make the decisions for the country as a whole. In this way, the points of view of all the groups are taken into consideration and compromises can be reached. The society below the top level can remain as divided and mutually, ethnically exclusive as ever but the central government is protected from destruction by adjustments elites make.

The Belgium of Lijphart's study was deeply divided into the two nearly self sufficient and institutionally complete communities of Catholics and Protestants. Solution to communication and conflict resolution developed informally at first and was later institutionalized in formal organization. The two independent religious communities were united at the top through contacts between the two communities' elites. Elite members met with each other periodically and made decisions for the common good of both communities. One important characteristic of both communal groups was critical for the success of the system. The norm in both communities was the deference of commoners for aristocrats. The ordinary citizen believed that the aristocrats would make decisions for the common good and these decisions were to be honored.

### Malaysia

The consociationalist principle has since been identified outside Belgium. Enloe (1970) and Horowitz (1985) studied Malaysian society. The details of the consociationalist structures and processes in Malaysia differ from those of Belgium. The principle is the same. The elites

of antagonistic ethnic groups in a country are in decision making contact at the top of society. The Enloe (1970) and Horowitz (1985) work expanded Lijphart's (1968) original theory by applying it to a different region of the world and to different social/political processes.

Three communal groups comprise Malaysian society: indigenous Malays, immigrants from China and immigrants from India. The three groups are quite distinct at the lower socio-economic levels. All three groups have separate languages, religions, schools, and follow different occupations. Nonetheless, all groups generally agree on one important value. The Malays were the original settlers and their symbols should be the national symbols. Culturally, the elites are tied together by the language of higher education, English. They honor each other's holidays and exchange social visits. The political system structurally unites politically active elite members. Representatives of the political parties, which are communally based, meet in a permanent coalition called "The Alliance." In the Alliance, the representatives make compromises and common decisions. The representatives must then obtain support for their decisions

back in their own parties (Enloe 1970, p. 113; Horowitz 1985, p. 408, p. 419-420). In Malaysia, the arrangements do not seem to be as well established as they are in Belgium and the elites might have to work harder to obtain support from their communities for their compromises.

### Lebanon

The principle of consociationalism has been extended even further than Malaysia and applies to yet another set of socio/political structures and processes. The government of Lebanon has attracted wide academic and journalistic attention because of the clearly stated formula for regulating ethnic conflict. Descriptions of the system are legion. One of these is Gilmour (1983).

When the country of Lebanon was created after WWI, it was given a system called "confessionalism" which still endures, even after a bitter civil war in the 1970s. The confessional system is an unwritten agreement for representation in parliament and government administrative offices of all the major religious groups, or "confessions," in the country. Representation is based on the country's

demography. When the French left their colony of Lebanon, the Maronites, a Christian faith resembling Eastern Orthodox Catholic, outnumbered the Muslims who were divided into Sunni, Shia, and Druze. Because of their greater numbers at independence, the office of president was designated for a Maronite Christian and the office of prime minister was designated for a Sunni Muslim. All the offices and agencies in the national bureaucracy were apportioned among the religious communities in the same way. Before the civil war in the 1970s, in practice, the under-educated Muslims, especially the Shia, were under-represented in government positions while the well educated Maronite and Greek Orthodox were over-represented (Gilmour 1983). Many internal and external changes temporarily disrupted the system. Some of these changes were: increased Muslim population in Lebanon, increased organizing of Muslims by Fundamentalists from Syria and Palestinians ejected from Jordan, and attacks by Israel. The formal structure of the system was not changed by the war, but informally the Muslim prime minister now enjoys more real power than the Christian president (The Economist 1995, p. 42-45). In Lebanon, the elites of the antagonistic ethnic

groups were brought into direct contact through appointments in the central government bureaucracy.

### Africa

This study attempts to extend the theory of consociationalism to yet another region of the world and to other systems of socio/political structures and processes. This data analysis shows that consociationalist arrangements exist in Sub-Saharan African countries. These countries possess a large variety of governmental structures and processes, undoubtedly widely removed from those of Belgium, the country where the system was first identified. The African system would be closer to those of Malaysia and especially Lebanon. The various forms of African government will further extend the variety of structures which achieve the crucial contact of ethnic groups at the top of society. This research project seeks to add to the literature built on Lijphart's work which expands the original theory of consociationalism.

### Sociological Concepts

Consociationalism combines consideration of formal and informal structure in the same theory. In doing so, it bridges political science and sociology. Formal structure is the government office a person holds. Old line, traditional political science studied formal government structure extensively. Informal structure is the ethnic group to which that same individual belongs. Newer political science focuses on informal structure. Informal structure has long been a major concern for sociology. Consociationalism describes how the formal structure, or political units, can be distributed among the units of informal structure, or ethnic groups, to reduce conflict.

### Weber

The interest of this study, equally in both formal and informal structure, is a return to the authentic roots of Weber. Weber is considered to have ignored or neglected the informal structures of formal organizations. Article after article opens with a statement that the particular findings to be presented are a corrective of Weber because Weber is



said to have recognized only the formal structure. On the contrary, Weber's work can be shown to contain clear acknowledgement of the existence and the importance of informal structure in formal organizations. Weber was not interested in the formal structure to the exclusion of informal structure.

Weber identified two kinds of relationships in human organizations, "associative" and "communal" (Parsons 1947, p. 136-137). These words correspond to "secondary" and "primary," to "bureaucracy" and "family," to "gesellschaft" and "gemeinschaft." Weber said that the two concepts can be separated for the purposes of definition and analysis but in practice organizations are not pure cases of either category but are mixed. Bureaucracy contains personal relationships and families contain calculating behavior. Below is quoted the key passage from Weber.

"No matter how calculating and hard-headed the ruling considerations in such a social relationship - as that of a merchant to his customers - may be, it is quite possible for it to involve emotional values which transcend its utilitarian significance." (Parsons 1947, p. 137)

The translator of Weber emphasized this point in a footnote to the passage.

"Weber's emphasis on the importance of these communal elements even within functionally specific formal organizations like industrial plants has been strongly confirmed by the findings of research since this was written." (Parsons 1947, p. 137 footnote)

### Consociational Government

Unlike our own representative democracy, consociational government is not majority rule. The winner might be the majority in terms of proportion of the population or it might as easily be the demographic minority. Ethnic social organization is inherently exclusive. In all governments, and certainly so in the exclusionist ethnic ones, a clear need is for more secure protection for minority rights. The disastrous case of Rwanda is only the best known case of minority oppression, not the only one. The Rwandan government has been controlled since independence by the Hutu who are probably eighty to ninety percent of the population. In 1995, the Hutu preempted efforts to bring the minority Tutsi into the government by attacking and killing them by the hundreds. The attacks were particularly gruesome as the primary method

was hacking the victims with machetes. Consociationalist arrangements have the advantage of providing a structure within which minorities can protect themselves to a certain degree.

### The Ethnicity Debate

The most determined objection to the application of consociationalism to Sub-Saharan African countries stems from the "ethnicity" debate and the heated argument over the nature of African societies' social structure (Gutkind 1970, p. 1-10; Uchendu 1970, p. 51-65). The debate is multi-disciplinary but is perhaps dominated by historians rather than anthropologists or sociologists.

The definition of ethnicity used in this study is more precisely an old definition of "tribe" which extends back to Weber (Gerth and Mills 1958, p. 189) and others (Maine 1885, p. 64-68). The tribe is simply all those people who believe themselves to be descended from a common ancestor. Close scrutiny of these genealogies might reveal that many members of this group were not actually born into it, but the essential point is that even these individuals believe they

were born into it, others believe they were, or they were formally adopted. The well know phrase by W.I. Thomas (1939) applies here, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." Such groups might contain many hundreds or thousands of members but all members know the origin story of the group, can give the name and history of the original ancestor, and can show how they are related biologically to that person. These types of groups have been studied for decades by anthropologists. Some of their social structures are quite complicated and some are quite simple, but the ideology of common descent is key.

The African studies literature has been rent for decades with the debate over whether ethnicity is meaningful in and of itself or whether "ethnicity" is a proxy for "something else" (Horowitz 1985, p. 21; Journal of African and Asian Studies, January 1970). A work considered to be a foundation study for the argument that ethnicity is not a factor is Crawford Young's, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. In this work, Young demonstrates that ethnic groups disappear, merge with each other, are created from disorganized aggregates, and have indistinct boundaries

(Young 1982, p. 11). It was demonstrated that ethnic group identity which was strong enough at one point to divide a large community had completely disappeared only a few years later (Young 1982, p. 3-4).

Many other writers have added to Young's work which is now referred to as the micro-ethnicity literature. Lemarchand reconstructed the development of Sara identity in Chad and Rwanda (Rothchild 1983, p. 49-50). A later well known historical study by Vail and White (Vail 1989, p. 151-192) showed how an entire tribal group identity, complete with origin stories, a founder, and historical events, was created out of whole cloth for the Tumbuku of northern Malawi. Vail and White concluded that ethnic groups which give the appearance of being almost timeless can often actually have quite short histories, in the case of the Tumbuku, approximately 50 years.

This body of literature is presented as evidence that "ethnicity" or "tribe" is not a tenable concept. On the contrary, such research does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that ethnicity is either non-existent or simply a proxy variable. In the preface to his famous work, Young

(1982) himself said that his purpose was to study the micro process of ethnicity precisely because ethnicity is such an important variable. Referring to the terrible wars in Biafra and Pakistan in the 1970's he says, "In the face of such holocausts, few indeed would be disposed to debate the power of the ethnic factor in African and Asian politics" (Young 1982, p. 6). Young did not intend to define ethnicity out of existence and nowhere in his book does he deny ethnicity. On the contrary, his stated purpose is to understand the details of ethnic processes.

Those who argue that ethnicity is not a variable in African socio-political processes tend to argue that African societies are organized into social classes. Whatever the facts of African social structure might be, recent work on ethnicity (Olzak 1984) shows that ethnically organized groups exist quite comfortably in the most industrialized societies with the most pronounced social class structure. A prime example is the United States. Unquestionably organized into socio-economic classes, the US is a society where ethnic groups such as Native American and African American are major actors socially and politically. A host of ethnic groups are

prominent socially and culturally everywhere in the US from the Irish in Boston to the Scots in North Carolina to the Hispanics in the Southwest and the Chinese in both New York and San Francisco.

It was formerly thought that modernizing processes led to the obliteration of ethnically organized groups. The undeniable persistence of these types of groups has attracted research attention. The conclusion now is that modernization processes actually stimulate the creation and mobilization of ethnicity (Olzak 1986, p. 2). One of these processes is by bringing formerly isolated groups into contact with each other through rural to urban migration (Cohen 1974). A group becomes aware of its distinctiveness when it comes into contact with another group. Competition arises over jobs and places in school. Favoritism occurs and then is exaggerated beyond reason by jealous onlookers (Young in Olzak 1986, p. 125). Elections for political office notoriously organize along ethnic lines even when educated, intelligent, and determinedly non-ethnic leaders try to avoid it.

One piece of research specifically investigated ethnicity in relation to Third World social class formation.

Lloyd (1971) found that conflict in both Nigeria and India fell along ethnic or religious lines and not class lines. Conflict took place along ethnic lines even in those situations where economic rivalry was the root cause (Lloyd 1971, p. 101). Furthermore, he found that social class as understood in the West was not understood by respondents in either Africa or Asia (Lloyd 1971, p. 76). Even in a modern factory, where ethnicity is most likely to disappear, ethnicity continued to be important (Lloyd 1971, p. 118-121). Lloyd confirmed Young's concern with ethnicity as a social structure and process.

Returning again briefly to Weber, Bendix (1974) found that Weber spoke directly to the Marxian argument about social class. Weber noted that a social class cannot in and of itself undertake action. A social class has to have an organization of some kind, apart from itself, in order to accomplish action (Bendix 1974, p. 153). On the other hand, the members of the structure Weber called a status group, which includes ethnic groups (Bendix 1974, p. 153), have the same lifestyle and life experiences. Even without communicating with each other, status groups come to the same



conclusions about who should be excluded and discriminated against. Status groups do not have to be internally united or coordinated to take this negative action in concert. They can act in themselves without a special administrative body.

### Characteristics of African Society

The characteristics of African societies should lead logically to the prediction that ethnicity would be important. African states possess heterogenous cultures. Part of the heterogeneity is due to colonial boundaries which passed through and not around ethnic territories. Nearly all countries are peopled by a minimum of two groups speaking mutually unintelligible languages (Morrison 1989). Somalia is often given as an example of an African country whose citizens all speak a common language. Even so, the modern elite is divided by two European languages: English and Italian. In a vast country such as Zaire, which was recently renamed Congo, many language communities exist. Languages are not isolated cultural artifacts. They are accompanied by distinctive clothing, religious beliefs, holidays, inheritance systems, attitudes, and values. Where different

languages and their associated cultural systems exist, conflict is not necessarily predicted but it often occurs (Grillo 1977, p. 17). Not only do African groups possess different cultural characteristics which could be the basis for disagreements, some groups have suffered much from cattle raids, slavery, and other forms of oppression. The Dahomean kingdom in what is now Benin made enduring enemies of its neighbors through wars for territory and slaves (Herskovitz 1938). The Bemba in present day Zambia made themselves similarly unpopular in pre-colonial times by attacking their neighbors (Horowitz 1985, p. 431).

### Organization Theory

Bates (1983) draws on organization theory to explain why ethnicity remains such a strong force in African society and government. Organizing a group has costs of time, effort, and sometimes money and other material resources. It is simply more rational to organize in ways which cost less than in ways which cost more. Organizing across a language barrier has a formidable cost. Organizing across cultural lines of different customs and perspectives also costs, even if the

language is the same. How much easier it is to create an organization which follows already established social ties and whose members can communicate easily with each other. It is clearly much easier to organize a political party, a business enterprise, or even a school or clinic inside ethnic boundaries than across them. Bates (1983 p. 164) says that ethnicity persists in Sub-Saharan countries because it is rational in Weber's terms.

Bates argues that the institutions which could replace ethnicity/kinship are not strong enough in most parts of Africa to force ethnicity to disappear as a central social structure and process. Public welfare is not strong enough to replace private welfare. For example, even the most modern individuals must rely for retirement support on land or traditional offices controlled by relatives in the village.

Bates also finds in organization theory the reason why ethnic group organization is so fluid, as Young (1976) had discovered. It is basically because a group must be large enough to obtain its goals and small enough for all members to receive a reasonable portion of benefits. As goals change, as available resources change, as size of obstacles changes,

the size of the group changes and boundaries are redefined (p. 164).

### Ethnicity in Practical Politics

The formal literature in sociology and political science arguing that ethnicity is an important variable in African society is amply supported by both observers and participants in practical politics on the ground in African countries. During the process of collecting data for this study, blunt statements were made by Africans and academic African specialists that ethnicity is a preoccupation in practical African politics. Some of the statements are from published analysis.

Decalo (1989) gives three examples of ethnicity in practical African politics. First, Ngouabi took the government of Congo by coup in 1968. He was a soldier from the subordinate Mbochi in the poor northern region. Ngouabi ended the chronic neglect of the north, the home of his own group, diverting development funds for roads, clinics, and schools from the more highly developed and wealthier south (1989, p. 158-159). Second, President Bokassa of the Central

African Republic wisely manipulated the ethnic composition of government appointments to his political advantage. Bokassa was able to appoint a Baya fellow soldier to well-deserved high government office which gave him the needed political support of the Baya people (1989, p. 146). Decalo's third example is from Togo. It shows how political ethnic balance and competition can lead to a measure of economic progress. President Eyadema of Togo is from the Kabrai group, but the capital where he must work and live is in Ewe territory. Eyadema has been forced to pay more attention to sound economic policies than his strong tribal affiliations might otherwise allow. His being physically located out of his home region contributed to his having to listen to the concerns of another group.

At least two countries presently or in the past have followed formal regulations according to which the posts of vice president or prime minister were assigned according to the principle of obtaining geopolitical balance. The first is Chad after the first president, Tombalbaye, was deposed (personal communication). That is why in 1975 Felix Malloum of the army was made president and Djime Mamari Ngakmar of

the gendarmerie was made vice president. In Tanzania, a vice president must be selected from Zanzibar if the president is from the mainland and vice versa (Legum 1994).

Evidence of concern with ethnicity is apparent for Sierra Leone from the beginning through the 1990s. Milton Margai, the first president, was known to place the highest priority on ethnicity. Later, in 1967, soldiers who had just won a coup made an unprecedented change in decision. One of the people they had chosen to be in the new government was on his way from London when the soldiers announced he had been replaced. The reason given for replacing Ambrose Genda was that at the last minute it had been discovered that too many officials would be from the same region. "We want two men from each of the north, south, east, and west provinces. With Genda on, it would have meant three from the south, so we have put this right." (Africa Diary 1967, p. 3360). In January 1996, a former minister in the Sierra Leone government reported in a lecture in the US that the public looks carefully at the list of government officials and comments on whether the list is ethnically balanced and representative.

The documents also report long standing concern for ethnicity in Niger. In 1972-1973, Legum reports, "The Niger government has always been carefully balanced to represent tribal and regional forces" (p. B674). In 1987-1988, Legum stated that a member of the minority Taureg had been appointed minister in the government. The appointment assured the loyalty of the Taureg people to the government and contributed to national unity. However, in March 1990 the Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported demonstrations against the Songhai-Djerma because of their over representation in the government. People from that group held 16 of 22 cabinet positions (p. 28).

In Madagascar, ethnicity was the cause of a mutiny in the armed forces. In December 1974, coastal members of a paramilitary unit protested the unrepresentative distribution of key administration and military posts (Legum 1974/1975, p. 217-218). In February, the president of Madagascar announced that jobs would be allocated on ethnic lines to respond to the demands (Africa Confidential, February 1975, p. 7). Finally, Aptidon, the first president of Djibouti, works at keeping an ethnic balance in government (Schraeder 1993).

Ethnicity can be an unspoken election issue. I, myself, was present in the Central African Republic during an election in the late 1970s. One of the Americans with whom I was staying was interested in politics and had unusually close ties to the Central Africans. He reported that a voter had commented to him about a candidate, "He's a good man, but I will not vote for him. He is not Sango."

### Conclusion

Ethnicity is an undeniable element of African societies no matter where a particular society might be on a continuum of modernization. Ethnicity has proven sometimes to be lethal and in need of management. Consociational theory shows one way how this might be done.

The imposition of the Western type of state on the ethnically organized African societies presents a governing challenge. The difficulty is the independent, autonomous nature of the component ethnic groups. Each such group was either historically, is presently, or could become in the future economically, socially, and politically independent. Each group is capable of providing its members with all the



necessary requirements of human life. Each is self governing with a variety of internal political arrangements as well as traditions and structures for warfare and alliances with neighboring groups. Each group controls territory. This type of group is institutionally complete (Gerth and Mills 1958 p. 398).

The political problem in ethnically structured societies is how to combine separate societies together into a single unit (Furnivall 1944, p. 469). One answer has been consociationalism referred to above. It has been seen that consociational arrangements in Belgium, Malaysia, and Lebanon accomplished this by knitting together the relatively independent ethnic groups through power sharing at the top.

It can now be shown that the theory of consociationalism explains the observation of events in Togo and Benin which opened this paper. In Togo and Benin instability was rife when a single ethnic group monopolized power. But when the excluded group obtained a place in government, even though it was by coup, a relatively equitable sharing of power was achieved and the government

continued in office for an extended length of time. In other words, a consociationalist arrangement had formed.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE TOGO BENIN HYPOTHESIS

#### Key Concepts and Variables

The research reported here has endeavored to apply consociational theory to African governments. Consociational theory suggests that those governments which are ethnically representative or ethnically balanced should have longer tenure in power than those which are ethnically unbalanced or ethnically unrepresentative. The hypothesized consociational system in African governments follows most closely the system of ethnic representation in the formal government units in Lebanon. It will be remembered that in Lebanon, government positions from the president down are allotted to specific ethnic groups. A review of the literature on Togo and Benin indicated that the long lasting governments in those countries similarly exhibited a particular ethnic pattern of four units: the president, the vice president, the civil service, and the army. That pattern of ethnicity of those government units has become the hypothesis for this research.

It has been named the "Togo/Benin" hypothesis and is as follows: a government is in power longer if, 1) the president is from the historically subordinate ethnic group, 2) the vice president is from the historically dominant ethnic group, 3) the civil service is from the historically dominant ethnic group and, 4) the army is from the historically subordinate ethnic group. The objective of this research is to test systematically whether the hypothesis in fact is valid for Togo and Benin and whether it can be extended beyond those two countries to other Sub-Saharan African countries.

The hypothesis contains two complex variables which must be explained at some length. The first is the four units of government. The second is the historically dominant and the historically subordinate groups.

#### Units of Government

The Togo/Benin hypothesis includes four units of power structure in African governments. These are the president, the vice president, the civil service, and the armed forces, usually and especially the army. It will be noted that a

seemingly crucial unit of government, the legislature or parliament, is not listed among the units forming the African government power structure. The legislature was omitted for several reasons. In the first place, no analysis of legislatures has surfaced in an extensive review of the African government literature. Secondly, not all African countries have legislatures, and those countries which have them do not all have them all the time. Where legislatures exist and when they exist, they must certainly have some political effect. The nature of this effect is at the moment a fascinating gap in the literature. The lack of data on legislatures and the fact that they do not exist at all in broad reaches of the political landscape lead to the conclusion that they are generally not an important unit in African governments. They have thus been disregarded throughout this study.

### *The President*

It is recognized that not all African governments have the same president/vice president structure as those of Togo and Benin and some have a different system altogether. For

the purposes here, the governments can be placed in three categories. One is the presidential system found in Togo and Benin and the US. In this category, the president is the most powerful figure and the vice president is subordinate to the president. The second is the European or parliamentary system. In this category, the prime minister is the most powerful figure and the president is subordinate to the prime minister.

The third category is the monarchy. In some cases, the monarch is clearly the ruler. An example of the ruling monarch was Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. In other cases, the monarchy is similar to that of Great Britain where the monarch is subordinate to the prime minister if not also to other government units. King Mswati III of Swaziland is considered the ruler now, but when he was a child and his mother was Queen Regent political reporting and analysis indicated that the prime minister was the ruler. In this study for that period, the prime minister is considered the ruler.

The Sub-Saharan region contains many different government structures. Titles also differ. Nonetheless, it

became necessary in this study to select a uniform term of reference for the rulers. Several possible titles were considered: Head of Government, Number One, Chief Executive, Ruler, and Chief Power Holder. It was finally decided to refer to all the actual rulers as "president," even if their formal title were "prime minister" or "king" or something else. The first reason for this decision is that the data show that 75 percent of the leaders hold the title of "president." Secondly, these are the titles used in Togo and Benin where the hypothesis originated. In addition, using presidential terminology does not adversely affect data interpretation. On the contrary, presidential terminology increases understanding of the results for a US audience which is most familiar with the title of "president."

#### *The Vice President*

The same difficulty with terminology affects discussion of the second government unit. In this case titles are even more varied. To maintain consistency with the decision to use the title, "President," the title, "Vice President," was

selected Again, "Vice President" is the title used in the countries where the hypothesis originated.

The vice president in this study is a high level office appended to the president. The office of vice president is a weak one and is more dependent on the president than is any other high level government official. Not only is the vice president selected and appointed by the president and thus owes the position solely to the president, as far as is known, the vice president has no jurisdictional responsibility. The vice president only carries out duties as the president directs. The president is free even not to give assignments to the vice president. All other government officials have large bureaucracies to command which serve them as independent power bases in disputes with each other and when dealing with the president. The vice president is a minister without portfolio with no such large and purposeful bureaucracy. This is a weak position. It must be admitted that a few African vice presidents have overthrown a few African presidents, indicating in those cases the presence of an independent power base of some kind. But such is not the



usual situation. Considering how close the vice president is to the president, it is fairly unusual.

In the coding of data for this study, those officials on lists of government members who appeared to fit this description were classified as "vice president." Some individuals with the title of "Prime Minister" or just "Minister" instead of "Minister of Development" were coded as "vice president." This is because they seemed to have no specific governmental responsibilities. Referring to the preceding discussion of the presidents, some officials with the formal title of "president" or "king" were also coded as "vice president." Finally, all the officials forming the data base for the study are listed in the appendices along with their government titles.

#### *Consociational Theory and the Vice President*

The dependence of the vice president on the president is important for consociational theory. In consociational theory, the two independent and often antagonistic ethnic groups are united, even fused, at the top of the socio/political structure. An African president has no

interest in inviting into his office an independent and powerful leader of the antagonistic group. Such an action not only makes the president vulnerable to overthrow, but makes the already divided society vulnerable to division along the ethnic cleavage at the top as well as the bottom. On the other hand, a dependent vice president from an independent ethnic group creates a relatively safe channel of communication for both the president and the antagonistic ethnic group. The vice president's group can convey information and desires to the president through the channel of the vice president. The president can monitor attitudes and conditions in the other group by the same means. Adjustments can be made more peacefully on both sides.

#### *The Civil Service and the Army*

These last two units of African government do not need as much explanation as the first two. They are considered in this research as large units not as individuals. Not even the head of each unit is considered individually. Both units are important in the regulation of African society. In countries without legislatures, government administrators make and

enforce laws. Individuals from the military are used as administrators in many countries. The military is the source of many African presidents as well as maintaining the president in power.

#### Dominant/Subordinate Status of Ethnic Groups

Ethnicity can be discussed from at least two aspects. The first is the specific ethnic group by name. For example, is the president from the Ewe group or the Kabrai group? Does the civil service have disproportionately more Bembas in it than in the population? Anthropologists have studied individual African groups of this nature for many years and have amassed a voluminous literature.

A second aspect of ethnicity is the one of interest here, the aspect of "dominance" and "subordination." In this way, this study directly addresses a concern expressed by Bienen and Van de Walle (1991, p. 32). They asked whether the subordinate status of a group might be relevant to presidential longevity. The concept of dominant/subordinate is fundamental for the Togo/Benin hypothesis. The question is whether the ethnic group to which a president, vice

president, civil service, and army belong is an historically dominant or an historically subordinate group in the country. In popular terms this corresponds to the "haves" and the "have nots." This study focuses closely on dominance and subordination.

In African societies, ethnic groups are generally not dispersed evenly among the leadership, the civil service and the military but are concentrated in one or two. Such ethnic occupational specialization, as Horowitz (1985, p. 581) calls it, is a well known phenomenon in ethnic, or communal, societies. In Malaysia, for example, laborers on the tea plantations are predominantly from India, while commercial enterprises are heavily Chinese. The high degree of ethnic occupational specialization in African governments was in part deliberately created by the European colonizers as a way to protect their power. The ethnic division of labor in African government is generally between the civil service and the military. The civilians in the government civil service are primarily from dominant groups. At the present time, African military forces, both officer and enlisted, are primarily from subordinate groups.

*The Dominant Group*

A dominant group is defined as the one which had the most political control during the colonial period. It was the one which had the highest levels of education and Westernization and consequently the most jobs in the colonial civil service. Generally, the dominant group was located in the region where the Europeans placed their colonial capital. Their proximity to European society gave this group its high level of education and some individuals were accomplished in the European language. For example, the first president of Senegal, Senghor, has a secure place in modern French literature as a poet. Some dominant group members traveled to Europe and some married Europeans. Just after independence this ethnic group acquired even more positions in the modern sector as the Europeans left.

*The Subordinate Group*

In contrast to the historically dominant group, the historically subordinate group is poor, uneducated, of low prestige, and sometimes even from a slave caste or tribe. First in India and then in Africa, the Europeans purposely

selected these types of ethnic group members for their armies. These groups were located in regions far away from the capital and were the least Europeanized (Enloe 1970, Horowitz 1985). European powers did not need to protect their colonies from outsiders but they did need to protect their power within the colony from attacks by the colonized. The Europeans' most vulnerable point in the colony was their capital. In cases of an uprising in the capital, the military could be expected to be more loyal to Europeans if it lacked contacts and relationships with the capital peoples. The Europeans purposely selected their troops from groups which did not speak the same language or have the same customs and occupations as the capital peoples. It was most important that the soldiers did not have local kinship ties. In short, the military was purposely composed of an ethnic group different from and even antagonistic to that of the capital.

#### Government Patterns of Ethnicity

Ethnic occupational specialization is still a feature of African societies. Some of it has been perpetuated by the leaders for the same reasons as the colonizers. Some of it is

explained by the internal dynamics of ethnically organized societies. Whatever the causes, the two elements of the hypothesis, government unit and ethnicity of government unit, can be combined in patterns of government ethnicity. If the four government units of president, vice president, civil service, and army, and the two categories of dominant and subordinate ethnic groups are combined, sixteen patterns of government ethnicity are possible. They are displayed in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1. All Possible Patterns of Government Ethnicity

Pattern	President	Vice President	Civil Svc	Military
1.	D	D	D	D
2.	D	D	D	s
3.	D	D	s	D
4.	D	D	s	s
5.	D	s	D	D
6.	D	s	D	s
7.	D	s	s	D
8.	D	s	s	s
9.	s	D	D	D
10.	s	D	D	s
11.	s	D	s	D
12.	s	D	s	s
13.	s	s	D	D
14.	s	s	D	s
15.	s	s	s	D
16.	s	s	s	s

D = Dominant

s = Subordinate

It is clear from Table 2-1 that not all the possible combinations of government unit and ethnicity are configurations of power balance. The extremes of power imbalance are patterns #1 and #16. Pattern #1 shows that the



dominant group controls the government entirely and pattern #16 shows that the subordinate group controls the government entirely. Neither pattern would be a consociational pattern. Several other patterns appear on their face to be unbalanced combinations of power between ethnic dominants and minorities. Patterns #2, #3, #5, #8, #9, #12, #14 and #15 are unbalanced because they allow only one unit to the other group. If all the unbalanced patterns are removed, the patterns remaining are #4, #6, #7, #10, #11, #13 which distribute the two categories of ethnicity equally among the four units. But based on modern realities, some of these patterns were considered highly unlikely to appear in any stable government. For example, pattern #4 gives two units to the dominant group and two to the subordinate group which is an arithematically balanced pattern. The problem is that it gives the civil service to the poorly educated, subordinate group. It is difficult to govern any country in today's world with a grade school educated civil service. It was therefore expected that the civil service of any stable government in Africa would be comprised predominantly of members from the well educated, dominant ethnic group. Only three patterns in

the table fulfill the requirements both for ethnic balance and expertise in the civil service: #6, #10, #13. It was hypothesized that of these #10 would have the most stability. It is the ethnicity pattern associated with government stability in Togo and Benin. Patterns #6 and #13 were predicted to be less stable because the president and the military are from different and usually historically antagonistic groups. The army with its control of weapons would not be expected to readily accept a president from another ethnic group (Horowitz, 1985).

### Conclusion

It is theorized that the Togo/Benin ethnic pattern of government, or pattern #10, accomplishes what the three well studied consociational systems of Belgium, Malaysia, and Lebanon accomplish. In particular it is strikingly close to the systems in Malaysia and Lebanon. The elites of the separate groups are in direct contact through the president and the vice president who are in direct contact. The major ethnic groups in the country are represented at the center of the national political system. Each group is placed where it

can protect its own interests from the others (Dahl 1971, p. 115). No group has a monopoly of power with which it could threaten any other group with extinction (Horowitz 1985, p. 175-181). The groups thus operate in an informal but effective system of checks and balances. The groups have the possibility of uniting to achieve a common goal but each group can check the other. The groups are brought together in one overall system based on a division of labor. That is to say, the civilian bureaucracy cannot rule entirely without coercive force, i.e., the military, and the forces of coercion are not capable of managing the civilian bureaucracy. Neither has the required training or experience to do the other's job.

In the Togo/Benin administrative pattern, the weaker and stronger governmental units are combined in a checkerboard of power with the weaker and stronger ethnic groups. The stronger ethnic group is relegated to the less powerful office of vice president. The weaker ethnic group controls the more powerful office of president.

The structure at the top of this system is a unitary one since the vice president is dependent on the president.

If the structure at the top of the system consisted of two equally powerful offices, such as co-presidents or two individuals with separate and equally independent power bases, the system would not be stable. The system would split vertically from top to bottom. As long as the elites are united at the top, in this case through the independent president and the dependent vice president, the society remains a single unit.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

#### METHODOLOGY

This study is mainly based on data drawn from documents, though much time and effort were devoted to interviews with informants.

#### Countries

This study includes 45 countries compared with a standard reference work on Sub-Saharan African countries which contains data for 49 countries (Legum 1968-1991). Following Legum, some countries are included which are sometimes classified as "Indian Ocean" rather than "African": Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros, and Madagascar. All but four of the countries in Legum are included in the data base. Reunion was omitted because it is still a colony and strongly desires to stay that way for economic reasons. St. Helena was omitted due to a lack of data needed from other sources. The country of Eritrea has been excluded. It became independent

from Ethiopia in May 1993 after data collection had ended. The Republic of South Africa was also omitted. It was thought that South Africa's political system and history are too dissimilar from those of all other Sub-Saharan African countries to be helpful in this study. Data were gathered for Namibia but it was excluded from most analyses because it had been independent such a short time.

### The Data

The data base contains 169 different presidents and all their vice presidents. There are four periods of war in the 45 countries when no government could be identified at all. These data under report domestic turmoil. More than four periods of warfare occurred during the data collection period. But for all except those four periods, government officials were listed in the documents, even though anyone knowing the situation would say that the government did not in fact control the country.

The data are complete for the main variables for all presidents and all but two or three vice presidents. The data are complete for all countries except two or three of the smallest ones.

The basic data for the analysis consist of seven variables and are presented in appendices 1, 2, 3, and 4. For each official of each country the following data are included: name, title of vice presidents, date entered office, date left office, total months in office, ethnic group, whether that group is historically dominant or subordinate.

#### Data Sources

##### *Documents*

An estimated 80 percent to 90 percent of the data were obtained from published documents. Most of the data came from Africa Contemporary Record (1981 to present), Africa South of the Sahara (1971 to present), Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments (1972 to present), Daily Reports: Sub Saharan Africa (1979 to present), and Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook (1989).

Name of office holders, title, and month and year in office are all available in the US government publication, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, and two British publications, Africa Contemporary Record and Africa South of the Sahara. The best source for these data

proved to be Chiefs of State. It is a monthly publication containing the names and titles of office holders for all the governments in the world. Dates in office were deduced from the month and year in which the office holder was listed. Unfortunately, this publication was discovered late in the data collection. It would have saved time and prevented confusion over titles of offices if discovered earlier.

Africa Contemporary Record (1968 to present), edited by the well known British Africanist Colin Legum, and Africa South of the Sahara (1971 to present) are both annual, hard cover publications. Each Sub Saharan African country has two or three or more pages of description. Names and titles of government members are presented along with updated sections on general topics such as history, politics, geography, economy, and society. Legum's publication is the most scholarly and contains the most detailed descriptions. A special feature is a long introductory section which is an analysis of the whole region for that year. Africa South of the Sahara (1971 to present) contains shorter country descriptions but is probably more readily available in non-specialized libraries.



In addition to providing officer holder names and titles, these two publications were valuable for insights on socio-political events in each country. They were particularly helpful for understanding changes in leadership for each country.

Ethnicity data of all kinds was the most difficult to locate and collect. For this task Morrison's Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook (1989) was indispensable. This source has been discovered by other researchers (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990). It is a single, large volume with a three or four page entry for each country in the region. The entries begin with an outline map showing the locations of the most important ethnic groups. The estimated population of each group is given. It must be underlined that no accurate census exists for these countries. These are estimates based on all the most reliable estimates available for each country. The methods are mainly anthropological. Reputable authorities often differ in their population estimates. In these cases, the range of estimates is given as well as the reason why a certain figure was selected over another one. A brief description of the basis for ethnic group classification is also provided whether linguistic, geographic, political

alliance, or something else. Scholarly controversies about the classifications are also presented concisely and reasons given for selections made.

This reference work is impressive for its comprehensiveness and careful presentation of elusive and controversial data. Indexes of ethnic diversity and homogeneity used for statistical analysis in this research could not have been constructed without this book.

Other sources provided ethnicity data. Ethnicity of the ruler was often mentioned in Africa Contemporary Record (1968 to present) and Africa South of the Sahara (1971 to present). Morrison (1989) also provided ethnicity data for many rulers. Daily Reports: Sub Saharan Africa (1979 to present) by the US government Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) often provided helpful for ethnicity as well as other kinds of information. Daily Reports is a serial covering all regions of the world. It contains verbatim the radio programs on topics of interest to the international diplomatic community each country broadcasts every day. The broadcasts contain a wealth of data on the minute of a country's domestic and international life. The broadcasts provided this study with some ethnic information and were also helpful in untangling

sequences of events in complex events such as coups. The broadcasts were helpful for establishing names and dates for some officials. They were especially helpful for interpreting the responsibilities associated with unfamiliar government titles. It was important to understand what office holders did so they could be coded in a uniform classification system encompassing all the various types of African governments.

#### *Informants*

The small amount of data which could not be obtained from documents were obtained through interviews with informants. Interviews were mostly in person or by telephone. A few were contacted by letter.

Informants were located through "snowballing" references along chains of friends and acquaintances. Experience with snowballing gave me appreciation for the advantages it held for this type of research (Waterbury 1972). Informants took an active role in the snowballing process. From talking to me, they learned what data were required and the style of thought and communication necessary for working with the project. At the same time, informants knew the national community well and were able to select

another individual as informant who had the required knowledge and could respond in research terms. My own tentative efforts to select informants taught me to have confidence in selections made by others (Waterbury 1972). Working only by myself proved to be time wasted. Someone knowledgeable needed to screen the community for a person who had the necessary information and who would discuss the topic with an outsider.

Informants were the most needed for data on vice presidents, above all their ethnic group membership. Informants were also indispensable for identifying the vice president in many administrations when documentary sources were unclear or incomplete. Data were most lacking for the late 1950s and early 1960s. Informants were often critical in supplying the ethnic identity of the civil services and armed forces. Occasionally an informant had to provide guidance on classifying groups as subordinate or dominant.

Informants often went to some effort to provide information. Three wrote reports several pages long. One asked a relative to write to me who turned out to have been an exceptionally important figure in the early post independence period of his country. When informants did not

know the information required they unhesitatingly contacted others who did. When several informants were located in different towns, states, or countries, the process resembled a geographically dispersed focus group.

The research relationship with informants was a fairly personal one, partly because African cultures in general rely more on personal relationships than does the US. Informants went to some lengths at times to perform the social rituals which insured I would be well received. Not only was I authorized to say, "So and So sent me," informants telephoned and faxed ahead of my call to introduce me. Exchanges of favors occurred. I spent some hours interviewing one informant while helping to xerox, fold, staple, and mail political literature, all the while hoping the political movement and mailing were well within the limits of US State Department international policies. I wrote a letter for another informant permitting close relatives more quickly to obtain visitors' visas to the US. I was rewarded with lovely Christmas gifts from the home country, one of which was confiscated by US customs because it was made from the skin of an endangered species! The informant was horrified.

Overwhelmingly informants were pleased to talk about their countries. Many African countries are small, poor, and little known, receiving no international publicity. One informant thanked me for being interested in his country. Many others gave that impression without so stating.

### *Informant Reliability*

It was initially planned to obtain at least two informants per country to be able to check informant reliability. This proved to be impractical. It was unexpectedly time consuming to locate and interview informants. A serious problem was that informants for some countries were difficult to locate. Even after a community from a particular country was located, an individual from that community had to be identified and contacted who was able to provide the necessary information and who was willing to be interviewed. Fortunately from the aspect of time, some informants were obtained who had been born in one African country and educated in another African country and so were able to provide data on two countries.

It would seem that the most reliable data would be from someone who had personal knowledge of the public figure. As

it turned out, most of the informants were in-laws, cousins, schoolmates, friends, co-workers, and childhood neighbors of the officials. Other informants were Africans who were raised or educated in the country. In addition, two or three embassies were queried as well as approximately half a dozen US scholars who are recognized specialists of the countries in question. All the data gathered through both documents and informants are presented in the appendices and, therefore, subject to verification by others.

#### Ethnicity of the Government Units

##### *The President*

The ethnicity of the president of an African country is rarely in doubt. Even if the president should actually be of mixed ancestry, his "politically useful" ancestry will be emphasized. That is, he will be perceived as being of whatever ethnicity as that of the group which forms his political base. Which ethnic group the president comes from is common knowledge among all adults. It is widely known in what village the president was born, who his parents were, what languages he speaks, and which costumes he wears. The ethnicity of the president is given in several different

publications. Among the most useful were: African Biographies, Africa Confidential, and Africa Contemporary Record. Informants supplemented the documents.

### *The Vice Presidents*

Data on vice presidents is less often recorded in documents. Informants were the main source of information on vice presidents' ethnic group membership and occasionally the names of the earliest vice presidents. Any informant who knew a vice president or recognized the name could easily identify the ethnic affiliation. The difficulty was that sometimes informants did not know who the vice president was and could not identify an office or title which fitted the description used in this study. Alternatively, when given the name of a person listed in the official documents as the vice president or the equivalent as defined in this study, sometimes informants had never heard of the person. The documentary sources most helpful for names and dates of vice presidents were Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments and African Contemporary Record.



### *The Civil Service*

The ethnicity of the civil service is based on which group is perceived to predominate numerically in that institution, especially numerical predominance at the highest levels. The ethnic composition of African civil services has not been well studied. Though information was fragmentary, much was found in journalistic and scholarly publications. Perceptions and debate about ethnic composition in this institution are often in the public domain. Jobs in the government are highly prized. Who gets these jobs and who loses them is carefully analyzed. For example, the high proportion of Ewe among the civil servants dismissed from President Busia's government in Ghana was debated in parliament (Smock and Smock 1975, p. 246-247). Informants were also a source of data.

### *The Military*

As with the civil service, ethnic identification of the military is for the whole institution and is the public perception of which group predominates numerically in it. As with the civil service, the ethnic affiliation of the head of the military is not the measure.

Of all the most powerful institutions in the African government, possibly the military has been the most studied from the standpoint of ethnicity. Highly detailed studies have been made of certain African military forces at certain times. For example, Cox's (1976) book on Sierra Leone is a detailed study of the relationship between the presidential level and the military command level for the first seven years of independence. Ethnicity is one of the aspects explored. Another example is a special study by Adekson (1976) of ethnicity in the Ghanaian army under President Nkrumah. The ethnicity of Togo's army has been clearly established as Kabrai (Horowitz 1985, p. 529). The area handbooks were a good general source for less researched military forces.

#### *Dominant or Subordinate*

As previously mentioned, a special and restricted definition of "dominant" and "subordinate" is used here. The full explanation of "dominant" and "subordinate" was presented in the explanation of the Togo/Benin hypothesis. Briefly, the dominant group is the one with the most education and wealth and power during the colonial period.

Any other group is classified as subordinate. The groups from which the armies are usually drawn have historically had conspicuously less education, power, and Westernization than the dominant group. The classification of leaders and their ethnic groups can be put in US terms. For example, President Clinton would be identified as a White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant which is a dominant group in the US. The African equivalent would be President Olympio, the first president of Togo. He was an Ewe which is the dominant group.

The classification of ethnic groups in a country as dominant or subordinate was made by historians and political scientists during colonial times for most African countries. These classifications are generally accepted in the African studies literature. For example, Horowitz (1985, p. 34) provides a table with a few of these classifications for ethnic groups worldwide. Indications of dominant and subordinate classification of groups often occur in biographies of leaders and are found in political and social analysis. For this study, all types of data sources were used to code the ethnic groups as either dominant or subordinate.

In most countries, one group is clearly dominant by the definition used here, but it is possible that more than one

group in a country is dominant. Zaire/Congo has three groups which fit the definition of dominant. More than one center of high level Western education developed in the large colony which now comprises Zaire/Congo. Each group became dominant in its own area over a collection of less well educated peoples. Each of the three dominant groups sent many members into the colonial government. Thus, a president of Zaire/Congo from either a Kongo, Tetela, or Luba, is considered as being from a dominant group. A president from any other group is considered a subordinate. An example is President Mobutu who is Ngala which is a subordinate group.

#### DATA ANALYSIS

##### Dependent Variable

Following Bienen and Van de Walle (1991), the dependent variable of the proposed research is months in power of the president. "Months in power" can have more than one definition. One definition is months in power of a particular president. For example, in Ghana the first president, Nkrumah, was in power 194 months and the second president, Ankrah, was in power 31 months. Another definition is months in power of each government administration. For example, in

Malawi the government administration of the first president, Banda, and the first vice president, Jones, was in power 24 months while the government administration of President Banda and the next vice president, Muwalo, was in power for 123 months. The prediction was that a consociational pattern of ethnicity in the government administration would be positively associated with longevity in power.

#### Independent Variable

The independent variable to be tested is the ethnic balance of the government. The ethnic balance variable is composed of four parts. Each part is the ethnicity of one of the four components of government: 1) president, 2) the vice president, 3) the civil service, and 4) the army. In addition to the independent variable of ethnic balance as measured by the 16 patterns described earlier (see Table 2-1), this study also examines the effects of characteristics of ethnic groups, geography, and political institutions on longevity. These independent variables proposed by alternative theories of governmental stability/instability will be examined and analyzed in Chapter 4.

Units of Analysis

Two units of analysis were used. The first was the individual president. For example, President Olympio of Togo, who was succeeded by President Eyadema of Togo. The individual president was the unit of analysis used most frequently. The N was 155.

The second unit of analysis was the government administration. It sometimes proved more convenient to refer to this unit just as the "administration." For the purposes of this study, an administration is composed of the president, the vice president, the civil service, and the army. Each time one of these elements changes, the government administration changes. In practice, the composition of the civil service and the army do not change greatly. Thus the changing units are the president and the vice president. For the purposes of this study, two types of changes define the beginning of a new administration. The first is any change in the president. Every time a new person entered the office of president, a new administration was counted as beginning. The second way of defining a new administration was a change in the vice president. Any time a vice president entered office a new administration was counted as beginning.

The two types of changes in an administration, change of president and change of vice president, might or might not be a change in the ethnic composition of the administration. Two presidents from the same ethnic group could succeed each other and two or more vice presidents from the same ethnic group could succeed each other. Or ethnic group members might alternate in those offices. Whether or not ethnicity changes with changes of persons in offices, each administration has its own pattern of ethnicity. Each government administration was coded according to the ethnic patterns presented in Table 2-1. The administration was used less frequently as the unit of analysis than the president but it was essential for testing the main hypothesis. The N was 475.

### Measuring Ethnicity

How to measure the independent variable of ethnicity is part and parcel of the debate over the concept of ethnicity addressed in the review of the literature. For several reasons, measurement was not a problem in this research. The variable was measured at face value for exceptionally visible individuals and political units. As previously indicated, the reputational method was used. The reputational method has

been widely used in US studies of community elites and social class. In those studies, respondents were asked to name the social class of certain individuals. The difference in this study is that identification of ethnic group membership is sought rather than identification of social class membership. The rationale is that in politics ethnicity is an important socio/political element perceived and defined by others. In public life, the "real" ethnic affiliation is of no importance. The perceived affiliation is the only affiliation. The measurement of ethnicity in the study was the "perceived" ethnicity or "political" ethnicity.

#### *Name Research*

In those few cases where officials were not personally known to any informants, the informant identified ethnic affiliation by name. All these informants were Africans with intimate and authentic knowledge of the country and its political figures. In African societies personal names are closely related to ethnicity in the same way as "McDonald" is identifiable as Scottish in US and European society.

The use of names to identify ethnicity has a long research tradition in the United States. One example is



Theodore Caplow (1991, p. 195) who used family names to study the ethnic composition of US Presidents' cabinets from Hoover to Bush. It was found that the percent of officials with English and Scottish names had decreased from 100 percent to 43 percent during that period. Another example is an ethnological study of Illinois agricultural communities (Salamon and Davis-Brown 1988, p. 197). Ethnicity of family names was used to establish the German origins of the communities. Stark (1992) reports that last names of boxers have been used to indicate the historical change in ethnicity of US boxing champions. Included is consideration of boxers changing their names for the purposes of appealing to an audience.

#### Presidents Still in Power

A serious analytical problem in studies of longevity is how to treat presidents still in power at the time of data collection. This is a study of all the Sub-Saharan African presidents and vice presidents but the question arises of how to calculate the total time in power of those presidents who are still in office at the time of the study. No one knows which ones will be out of office immediately after the data

are collected and which ones will continue for many years. Bienen and Van de Walle (1991, p. 39-45) solved the problem by eliminating from their study those presidents still in power at the data collection cut-off date.

Elimination of all those presidents from the study who were still in power at the data collection cut off point was not appropriate for several reasons. First of all, that approach would eliminate some of the most important and long lasting leaders in all of African politics and history. It should be particularly important to be able to study what these leaders have done to stay in power so long. At the cut-off date, Houphouet-Boigny was still alive, in office and enormously respected. Banda was still president of Malawi. Whatever the evaluation of Mobutu now, he was hailed as a national savior when he gained power, and his importance in African history and politics cannot be denied. Other fathers of their modern states were also in power in December 1992. Two were Eyadema and Kerekou, the very presidents who inspired this study. Secondly, removing this group of presidents would simultaneously remove several important countries from the data base. Those countries had only had one president in their whole history as independent

countries, and that president was still in power at the data cut off date. The Ivory Coast, Malawi, Zaire/Congo, Togo, Benin and others would not be available for study and the results would be seriously biased toward the tumultuous countries. The stable and peaceful countries would not be available for comparative analysis. Finally, the focus would shift towards military leaders and civilian presidents would be under represented.

An alternative approach was to use the end of a president's term in office as the cut off date. The problem with this approach is that fixed terms and regular elections are nearly absent from the continent. A few presidents are clearly president-for-life, either by formal election or by common understanding. Kenyatta of Kenya was one example. The historical "term" for government leaders in these societies is lifelong since the chief is elected for a lifetime. Many governments have gained power by coup. Any government obtaining power by coup has no fixed end date by definition. Even when such governments later agree to an end date, the agreements have proved to be fragile. The most recent example is Nigeria. Finally, elections often serve more as precipitators of coup than as means of peaceful change of

power holder. An example is Sierra Leone in the Margai-Siaka election shortly after independence. The early vote returns showed that the Margai government would lose heavily to Siaka so it nullified the election and remained in place by coup.

The methodological solution adopted for the problem of sitting presidents was to eliminate from the analysis those presidents who had been in power five years or fewer as of the data collection cut off date of 31 December 1992. The assumption was that anyone who had been in power five years or more would probably remain in power for a time into the future. Removing from the analysis a few short-term presidents left a proportionately larger number of long-term presidents to analyze which is the objective of the study. A total of 18 presidents were removed from the analysis.

The minimum amount of time to be in office to be included in the study was one month. A few presidents were in power less than a month, sometimes only hours, before losing in a counter coup. The one month minimum excluded only about two or three presidents.

### Monarchs

It has been noted that the data contain not only presidents and prime ministers but also monarchs. It became a running question whether to include the monarchs in analyses or to exclude them. The data were usually analyzed both ways to check how the monarchs might influence the results. Sometimes they were included and sometimes excluded depending on the problem. There are only six of them in all and generally they seemed to have little effect.

A particular concern was the monarchs' effect on the findings for length of time the leader was in power. Bienen and Van de Walle (1991) found that monarchs stayed in power notably longer than other leaders. Their finding was confirmed here but the difference with presidents and prime ministers was not large. In the Bienen and Van de Walle study, the monarch's entire reign is included. In this study, the data begin only with the date of the country's independence and not with the accession to power. Two examples illustrate the point. Two African monarchs had exceedingly long reigns but they entered office before independence. Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and Sobhuza II of Swaziland reigned for decades, but counting their years in

power from the date of independence brought them more within the normal curve of longevity. Turn over of monarchs during the data collection period also "normalized" monarchs. A new king began his reign in Swaziland during this time. The king in Lesotho was deposed. The king in Uganda was killed.

### STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

#### The Universe

It must be especially noted and repeated from time to time that these data are not from a sample. These cases comprise the universe of all presidents, all vice presidents, all civil services, and all armed forces of 45 of the 49 Sub-Saharan African countries since independence. As just discussed, some presidents were excluded from the analysis but the remaining presidents do not compose a sample. In particular, they do not compose a random sample. It is rare in any of the sciences to be able to obtain universe data. The opportunity of working with a universe provides an opportunity to consider more closely the basic concepts of statistics.

Significance Tests: Samples

One of the most basic concepts in quantitative studies is that of the significance test. It will be remembered that the significance test was developed to interpret results obtained in samples. The problem with the results from samples is whether these same results can be confidently assumed to obtain also in the universe or whether they are merely a quirk of an unusual sample. It has been theorized that if the sample were randomly drawn from a universe or population, then the distribution of data in the sample would be representative of the distribution of the same data in the universe. The significance test is intended to provide some indication of whether that is indeed correct.

Usually tests of significance such as the F and t tests are applied to quantitative data almost by reflex. Having a complete data set from a universe gives pause. One approach is to reconceptualize the universe under study as a sample. Using this approach, these African governments would be considered as a sample drawn from all the governments in the world or as a sample drawn from all the governments in the Third World. These African governments could also be considered as a sample drawn from all the African governments

which have existed in the past and which will exist in the future.

The approach of reconceptualizing these data as a sample of a larger unit has the advantage of making the results of this study generalizable to the larger unit. Any relationship found in these data shown to be statistically significant through tests would be considered valid for governments outside Sub-Saharan Africa. Depending on the conceptualization, the African findings would then be considered to apply to governments in the Western world such as the US and France, to governments in the Third World such as Pakistan and Iran, or to government in Botswana in the year 2055.

#### Significance Tests: Universe

A justification for significance testing on a universe has been developed (Henkel, 1976, p. 85-86). One justification is again to hypothesize that the data are a sample but not a sample of any existing population. In this justification, the universe is a pure abstraction and consists of all the possible cases from which the real data might have been drawn. Another justification is to recognize



that random measurement error may be present in any results obtained. A significance test would be used to show whether or not the differences from the hypothesis were so large that measurement error could not explain them. Such might be a particularly useful interpretation when evaluating small differences or small coefficients. A last justification is that the data might have been randomly generated. A statistically significant result would then rule out this possibility, thus supporting the conclusion that some theoretically important factor was operating.

#### Use of Significance Tests

A double approach has been followed in this study. First, in the analysis and conclusions any generalization beyond the data either outside the region or into the future is rigidly avoided. Secondly, some tests of significance are reported though not commented upon.

The analysis refuses to go beyond these data because of the undeniably changing nature of these societies (Gourevitch, 1997). It is quite possible that findings from Sub-Saharan Africa apply to other regions. It is highly likely that the findings apply at least to other Third World

governments. Nonetheless, the more conservative approach is to present Sub-Saharan African data and relationships as valid for the Sub-Saharan African region and as merely suggestive for other regions. It is best to be particularly cautious in applying findings to future governments in the Sub-Saharan African region. The hypothesis tested in this study depends on a special type of society. While it is more than likely the Sub-Saharan African region will continue to host ethnically divided societies, some countries there even now do not follow that pattern and possibly others will change in that direction. Furthermore, the peculiar combinations of ethnicity in government administration patterns associated with presidential longevity which have held for the past might even now be in the process of changing. The changes in administration occurring at the moment in Zaire/Congo are a departure from the results of this study and could easily be the wave of the future. At present political conditions in Rwanda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone are unclear (Gourovitch, 1997).

Even though significance tests have been formally rejected for this study, they have been reported when easily available, that is when automatically generated by SPSS. When

correlation and regression coefficients are reported the test of significance is also reported. In all cases, the reader is reminded that the data are from a universe and not a sample. It is recognized that many wish to be guided as if the data were from a sample.

### *Eta Squared*

The measure relied on the most in this study is a rarely used measure of strength of association named eta squared (Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1988, p. 234-236). Eta squared is related to ANOVA. In ANOVA the total sum of squares equals the sum of squares between the groups plus the sum of squares within each group. Eta squared equals the sum of squares between the categories of the variable divided by the total sum of squares. Eta squared measures the "explained" variance. Eta squared is a population measure (Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1988, p. 235) and suitable for data from a universe. It is a positive number ranging from 0 to 1.00. As a guide to interpreting eta squared scores, it is pointed out that typically an independent variable in the social sciences explains around .25-.30 percent of the variance and often as little as .05-.1 percent (Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1988, p. 236).

### Statistics Used

The most important statistics for this study were comparison of means and multiple regression. Comparison of means in conjunction with eta squared provided most of the information. Multiple regression showed the variables' relative effects. The regression analysis was limited by lack of linear relationships between the independent and dependent variables. At a preliminary stage of the analysis, dummy variables were constructed for two variables having a curvilinear relationship with the dependent variable.

### Conclusion

A major contribution of this study is the painstaking, patient, and comprehensive compilation of ethnic identities of the major units of African governments. No other similar set of data is known to exist. The data are presented in the appendices. The appendices stand as the first argument of this study for the importance of ethnicity in African government. Whereas the specific ethnicity of an individual might be disputed, the fact that all public officials in all countries of Africa have an identity that is defined as ethnic, or tribal, and not "something else" is now impossible

to deny. The presidents and vice presidents with their titles, dates in office, and public ethnic identities show name by name, individual after individual that public officials are seen by their constituents as having ethnic affiliations.

These data are unusual in being drawn from a population rather than a random sample. This unusual situation required reconsideration of statistical analysis and the selection of eta squared as a measure of association.

Data for this study were obtained from documents supplemented by interviews with informants. The estimated 10 percent of the data obtained from informants is vulnerable to a criticism of unreliability. The minimum requirement for reliable data is judged to be at least two informants per country with each informant coming from a different ethnic group. If both informants from different and hopefully politically competitive groups agreed on the ethnic identification of an official, then the data would be judged reliable. This requirement could not be met. In addition, it proved difficult in some countries to identify a government office equivalent to the US vice president and/or a person

occupying that office. These problems might have led to inaccurate data for that government unit.

## CHAPTER 4

### ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LONGEVITY

#### Introduction

Many theories have been proposed both in the formal literature and in popular thought as to why one country experiences rapid turn over of presidents and another one does not. All these theories are possible alternatives to the Togo/Benin hypothesis. Therefore, before testing the Togo/Benin hypothesis, three theories represented by twelve variables suggested by the literature were explored by frequency distributions, comparison of means, and correlations. The first theory was "Ethnicity" measured by six different variables: Diversity Index (D), Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV), Configuration of Ethnic Groups, Proportion Speaking A Common Language, Number of Ethnic Groups in the Country, and Size of the President's Ethnic Group. The second category of "Geography" had three categories: Size of Country, Population Size, and Population Density. The third category, "Political," had three

variables: Colonizing Country, How the President Came to Power and Presidential/Parliamentary System. In analyzing these variables, the measure of association used was eta squared as explained in Methodology and Analysis.

### Ethnicity Variables

The literature disagrees on how ethnic heterogeneity of the population affects government duration (Horowitz 1985, p. 576; Young 1982). One argument is that ethnic homogeneity of a country promotes political stability. According to this view, fewer ethnic divisions promote peace and harmony, or at least a lower level of disharmony. A contrary argument is that a society composed of many, small ethnic groups is harmonious because no one group is able to monopolize power. In such a fragmented society, any one group must obtain the cooperation of other groups in order to gain and maintain power. Political stability is promoted through the necessity of cooperation. Tanzania is presented as an example of this condition (Young 1982). Since ethnicity is the central concern of this study, six measures of a country's ethnic heterogeneity were devised and employed. Measures used were



Diversity score, IQV score, ethnic configuration of the population, percent speaking the most common language, number of ethnic groups in the country, and size of the president's ethnic group.

*Index of Diversity (D)*

One measure of a country's ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity is the Diversity Index or D. Data was available to calculate D for all but one country. D is calculated by subtracting the sum of the squares of the proportion of the population in each ethnic group from one (Bohrnstedt 1982, p. 76).

The D scores for the 45 countries ranged from the most homogenous at .02 to the most heterogenous at .89. The D scores confirm the general impression of ethnic heterogeneity in African countries. Eighty percent of the presidents are from countries which received a score of over .60.

Table 4-1 presents the findings for longevity by homogeneity/heterogeneity. The table shows long terms in power for presidents from the most homogenous countries. Presidents from countries with D scores up to .30 are

consistently in power well over a mean of 100 months. At scores above .30, long terms in power are also found but the relationship becomes irregular and inconsistent. The eta squared is a negligible .03. It will be remembered from Chapter IV that eta squared is a test of the strength of a relationship suitable for data from a universe.

Table 4-1. President's Mean Months in Power by Country's Score on Diversity Index (D)

D Score		Mean Months	S.D.	N
homogenous	.01-.10	123	99	7
	.11-.20	121	75	8
	.21-.30	189	NA	1
	.31-.40	83	66	9
	.41-.50	159	29	3
	.51-.60	124	43	3
	.61-.70	95	92	31
	.71-.80	103	103	61
heterogenous	.81-.90	83	103	27
Total				150

Eta squared = .03

Data are missing for five presidents

*Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV)*

The findings for the Diversity Index were duplicated for the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV). The IQV is calculated by subtracting the sum of the squares of the proportion of the population in each ethnic group from one and dividing by the quantity, number of ethnic groups minus one divided by number of ethnic groups (Bohrnstedt 1982, p. 76). While the maximum possible value of D gets larger the greater the number of groups (asymptotically approaching 1.0), the IQV has a maximum value of 1.0 regardless of how many groups there are.

On a scale of 0 to 1.0, the IQV scores obtained for the 45 countries ranged from the most homogenous at .04 to the most heterogenous at .97. As with the D scores, the IQV scores for these countries clustered at the most heterogenous end of the scale. Eighty percent of the countries received a score of .80 or higher. Only ten countries received an IQV score below .50.

Table 4-2 also shows consistently long terms in power for presidents of the more ethnically homogenous countries.

Table 4-2. President's Mean Months in Power  
by Country's Score on Index of Qualitative  
Variation (IQV)

	IQV Score	Mean Months	S.D.	N
homogenous	.1-.25	105	89	11
	.26-.50	116	72	14
	.51-.75	142	38	6
	.76-.80	72	92	18
	.81-.85	88	95	50
	.86-.90	144	94	17
	.91-.95	84	95	31
heterogenous	.96-1.00	244	152	3
				150

Eta squared = .10

Data are missing for five presidents

In Table 4-2, the intervals for the categories of IQV scores are not equal. Intervals are 25 points for scores ranging from .1 to .75 and only 5 points for scores of .76 and higher. This presentation shows more clearly that variation in presidential mean months in power is much greater at the more heterogeneous end of the scale. Presidential longevity increases linearly up to an IQV score of .75. Above .75, or high heterogeneity, which includes 119 or most of the presidents, longevity varies greatly and

inconsistently. At the higher IQV scores, mean months in power almost doubles from one category to the next and then goes back down again. Eta squared is a weak .1.

#### *Configuration of Ethnic Groups*

Another measure of heterogeneity is the configuration of the groups. The configuration of groups refers to the relative sizes of ethnic groups in a country. Different hypotheses drawn from different case studies have been proposed linking ethnic group configuration with stability, as already mentioned (Horowitz 1985; Young 1983). Tanzania has been presented as an example of peace being associated with a society composed of many small groups. Uganda's long period of warfare has been attributed to its quite different ethnic group configuration. Uganda has one large, and at the same time, unusually well organized group, named the Ganda, along with numerous small groups. Nigeria's civil war has been widely attributed to its ethnic group configuration. Nigeria's society is characterized by two large, nearly equally powerful groups, the Hausa and the Ibo.

Bar graphs were constructed for the countries showing each ethnic group's proportion of the population. The graphs

showed four distinct ethnic group configurations. The first configuration is labeled "1 group" in Table 4-3. In this configuration at least 80 percent of the population belongs to the same ethnic group. This is essentially a one-group country, even though those countries contain at least one minority if only Europeans or settled refugees. Well known examples of one-group countries are Swaziland, Botswana, and Somalia. The next configuration is labeled "2 groups" in Table 4-3. In this configuration, most of the population is divided nearly equally into two large groups, even though other much smaller groups might also be present. As already stated, Nigeria during its civil war is usually considered to fit this pattern. The next configuration is labeled "1 large." This means the population has one ethnic group comprising up to, but not more than, 80 percent of the population. It also has in addition several smaller groups. It differs from the "1 group" configuration in that the large group does not go over 80 percent of the population. The well known example of this configuration is Uganda. The fourth configuration is labeled "stairs" for "stair steps" in Table 4-3. These countries, such as Tanzania, have many small

ethnic groups. When the groups are ordered by size on a bar graph they form a stair step pattern, one after the other, with only small differences in size from one to the other. No group is much larger than the others, but neither are all of them exactly the same size.

The results shown in Table 4-3 do not support the hypotheses in the literature. First, eta squared is only .013, so a conclusion of no relationship can be drawn. The mean months in power vary little among the four types of countries, from 92 to 117 months. Contrary to the example of Nigeria, one-group and two-group countries have essentially the same presidential longevity. Also contrary to the conclusions of the case study of Uganda and Tanzania (Young 1982), countries composed of one large group along with smaller groups and countries with stair-step sized groups have presidents in power fewer months. Cross tabulations indicate that presidents from homogenous, or one-group, countries might have a slight advantage over all the others. Eta squared is a negligible .01.

Table 4-3. President's Mean Months in Power by Country's Ethnic Configuration

	Pattern	Mean Months	S.D.	N
homogenous	1 group	114	74	29
	2 groups	117	105	21
	1 large	94	104	55
heterogenous	stairs	92	91	45
				150

Eta squared = .013

Data are missing for four countries (five presidents)

1 group= The most ethnic homogeneity. 80 percent or more of the population belongs to the same group.

2 groups= Most of the population is divided almost equally into two groups. Other, smaller groups are present.

1 large= One large group comprising up to 80 percent of the population, along with several smaller groups.

stairs= The most ethnic heterogeneity. Many small groups of slightly different size forming stair steps on a bar graph of population composition.

These results cast some doubt on the conclusion in the literature that Tanzania's well known and respected stability is due to its unusual ethnic heterogeneity. Two alternate interpretations might be suggested. One is that Tanzania might be stable in spite of its heterogeneity rather than because of it. If so, it is not alone. According to these data, seven presidents have been in power from 16 to 30 years



who are from the most ethnically heterogeneous countries. Secondly, it is possible that Tanzania's culture might be more homogeneous than it seems. Tanzania has language homogeneity with Swahili as a widespread lingua franca.

*Proportion Speaking a Common Language*

Following the speculation above about whether Tanzania's society is ethnically heterogeneous or homogeneous, another way of measuring ethnic heterogeneity was used. Ethnic heterogeneity was measured by the percent of the population which is estimated to speak the most widely spoken language in the country. This refers to the proportion of the population which speaks the lingua franca. The lingua franca might be French as in parts of Cameroun or English as in Ghana. But African languages also serve as lingua franca. Swahili is perhaps the most widely spoken. Sango is the lingua franca in the Central African Republic. This measure does not reflect a particular level of proficiency in the language. An individual might be highly proficient or might be able to barely carry on a simple conversation. On this variable, with Swahili as the most widely spoken language,

Tanzania moves from the most heterogenous category of society to the most homogenous.

The data show for all the countries together that the proportion of the population speaking the most common language ranges from 24 percent to 100 percent. In practice it is not likely that 100 percent of the people of any African country all speak a common language. Table 4-4 shows a curvilinear relationship of proportion speaking the most common language with the dependent variable of presidential longevity. The intermediate category of 51-75 percent speaking the most common language has the shortest time in power (71 mean months). Nothing in the literature so far explored anticipated such a finding. The finding of longevity associated with the most homogenous countries (75-100 percent speaking the most common language) is consistent with the trend shown in Table 4-3 that ethnic homogeneity might be associated with longevity. Eta squared is a negligible .04.

Table 4-4. President's Mean Months in Power by Percent of the Population Speaking the Most Common Language

	Percent of Population	Mean Months	S.D.	N
heterogenous	1-23	0	0	0
	24-50	109.1	109.3	60
	51-75	70.9	84.6	50
homogenous	76-100	118.0	75.4	35
				145

Eta squared = .04

Data are missing for 10 presidents

#### *Number of Ethnic Groups in the Country*

The simplest measure of ethnic heterogeneity of a country is the number of different groups the country contains. The data show that African countries contain from two to 12 identifiably distinct groups according to Morrison (1989). Morrison's categories are more inclusive than many. It is common in African materials to see reports of dozens to hundreds of ethnic groups for various countries, but Morrison's work seemed to be the most thorough and reliable. Comparison of mean times in power shows an irregular relationship with number of groups in the country. (Table 4-5) Eta squared is a negligible .03.

Table 4-5. President's Mean Months in Power by  
Number of Ethnic Groups in the Population

	Groups	Mean Months	S.D.	N
homogenous	1	None	None	None
	2	123	99	7
	3	104	76	19
	4	97	67	6
	5	79	77	28
	6	221	93	4
	7	127	111	27
	8	80	88	33
	9	241	134	3
	10	59	66	20
	11	78	139	5
heterogenous	12	172	123	2
				154

Eta squared = .03

Data are missing for one president

#### *Size of the President's Ethnic Group*

It seems reasonable that the president who stays in office longest would come from the ethnic group which enjoys the largest proportion of the population of the country. Data was available on the estimated proportion of the population for all but 11 presidents. Table 4-6 shows that the largest

number of presidents, 68, or 47 percent, are from small groups comprising 25 percent or less of the population. Sixteen presidents, or 11 percent, are from large groups of over 75 percent of the population. Comparison of means shows that presidents from both the smallest ethnic groups and the largest ethnic groups are in power about the same amount of time, over 100 mean months (Table 4-6). The presidents from the intermediate sized groups are in power for less time. The curvilinear relationship is reminiscent of Table 4-4 and was not anticipated in any of the literature reviewed. Eta squared is a negligible .02.

Table 4-6. President's Mean Months in Power by Proportion of the President's Group in the Population

Proportion	Mean Months	S.D.	N
.1 - .25	110	97	68
.26-.50	83	99	52
.51-.75	78	72	8
.76-.99	106	80	16
			144

Eta squared = .02

Data are missing for 11 presidents

The lack of a linear relationship of presidential longevity with size of president's group can be interpreted as evidence that these governments are not based on the popular vote. In governments based on the popular vote, the candidate from the largest ethnic group would be expected to have a substantial advantage in gaining and retaining power. The data shows that presidents from small groups have the same longevity as those from large groups.

#### Geographic Variables

##### *Size of Country*

The effect of size of country on longevity of the president was given some attention because it appears in the literature as a reason for governing difficulties. It is commonly supposed that a large country such as Nigeria or Sudan could be difficult to govern based on long distances alone.

Data was available on size in square miles of land area for all but one country. The smallest of the 45 countries for which data is available is a group of islands in the Indian Ocean called the Seychelles. It has 119 square miles of land

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surface, not counting water. As a comparison, Rhode Island is 1,054 square miles in area. Five countries are under 1,600 square miles in size and all are islands or groups of islands. The two largest countries are over 900,000 square miles, the size of Alaska, Texas, and Colorado combined. One of two largest countries is Zaire, recently renamed Congo, located in the center of the continent and a former Belgian colony. The other is a former English colony, Sudan, located to the north of Zaire/Congo, forming the southern border of Egypt. All the other countries, 38 in all, range in size from Gambia at 4,500 square miles to Angola at 500,000 square miles in land area. This is the range from twice the size of Delaware to the combined size of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. The largest proportion of the presidents in this study (37 percent, N=57) are from countries ranging in size from 10,000 square miles (New Hampshire), to 100,000 square miles (Colorado).

Comparison of means showed inconsistent and erratic results. For example, presidents of countries up to 10,000 square miles were in power a mean of 116 months. Presidents of countries from 10,000 to 100,000 square miles who were in



power a mean of 91 months, while presidents of countries from 100,000 to 200,000 square miles were in power a mean of 115 months (Table 4-7). Eta squared is a negligible .06.

Table 4-7. President's Mean Months in Power by Area of the Country in Square Miles

Square Miles	Mean Months	S.D.	N
10,000	116	95	16
100,000	91	92	57
200,000	115	107	18
300,000	133	89	16
400,000	78	71	17
500,000	121	106	16
1,000,000	53	89	15
			155

Eta squared = .06

### *Population*

Only estimated population is available for most African countries. In many countries, the exact size and composition of the population is so politically sensitive that an accurate census is not possible. In other countries, serious practical problems of funding, transportation, and locating nomadic and/or isolated peoples have prevented a census.

The results of comparison of means were not linear. Presidents of the smallest countries and the next to largest countries were in power about twice as long as the others (Table 4-8). No reason for this kind of distribution has been found. The eta squared is a weak .09.

Table 4-8. President's Mean Months in Power by Total Population in Thousands

Population	Mean Months	S.D.	N
50-1,330	122	87	26
1,500-4,799	81	80	49
4,800-7,999	158	118	20
8,000-72,000	79	91	58
			153

Eta squared = .09

Data is missing for 2 presidents

#### *Population Density*

Another way of measuring size is by population density. This measure is also an estimate. It is calculated by dividing the total population of a country by the total number of square miles. No provision is made for various ways the population might be distributed, such as one large city containing a large proportion of the population in contrast with a fairly evenly dispersed rural population. The



comparison of means for the density variable shows erratic results (Table 4-9). Eta squared is a weak .10.

Table 4-9. President's Mean Months in Power by Population Density

Density	Mean Months	S.D.	N
1-20	104	86	40
21-40	79	86	23
41-60	174	90	12
61-80	96	117	26
81-100	none	none	none
101-120	109	107	3
121-140	81	92	14
141-160	70	101	10
161-180	none	none	none
181-200	none	none	none
201-400	48	37	8
401-600	122	65	6
601-800	63	79	6
801-1000	120	164	3
over 1000	146	36	2
			153

Eta squared = .10

Data is missing for two presidents

The intervals for the categories are not equal because of the small number of cases at the higher population densities.

Political Variables*Colonizing Country*

One hypothesis predicts that different colonizers will have different effects on the political stability of their former colonies. Colonizing European governments possessed different forms of government in their own countries and also followed different principles in governing their colonies. It is reasonable to expect that such variations might be reflected in present day political outcomes in the independent countries. Portugal, England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium all had colonies at one time or another in Sub-Saharan Africa. England and France had the largest number of colonies and probably controlled the most territory. A special category of colonization experience might be presented by those African countries which were held by more than one European power. For example, present day Togo was colonized first by Germany, but then was taken over by France at the outbreak of WWI. It was hypothesized that former British areas would have longer lasting governments than former French areas because the English colonies developed more local institutions of government than did the

French. The French government instituted a more centrally directed colonial administration (Njeuma 1989, p. 94).

The Anglophone and Francophone presidents are of the greatest interest because of their importance on the continent. The data shows that 56 presidents came from former English colonies and 55 presidents came from former French colonies (Table 4-12). The mean months in power for the two sets of presidents differed by only nine months. Anglophone presidents were in power a mean of 81 months and Francophone presidents a mean of 90 months. Cross tabulations and comparison of means show Anglophone and Francophone presidents were in power about half as long as "other" presidents. No further work was done on this variable since no differences appeared between the two most important categories of presidents. Eta squared was a negligible .05.

Table 4-10. President's Mean Months in Power by Colonizing Country

Country	Mean Months	S.D.	N
England	81	86	56
France	90	96	55
Other	131	95	44
			155

Eta squared = .05

*How the President Came to Power*

Leaders of African countries have achieved their positions through several different methods. One way is by leading a peaceful movement for independence. President Banda of Malawi illustrates that method. There was no warfare or terrorism but a peaceful mass movement of the population. Another way is by leading a war of revolution for independence such as President Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Mugabe and leaders in the former Portuguese colonies are the few African independence leaders who actually participated in warfare. Contrary to popular impression, in Africa much of the armed conflict took place after, not before, independence. President Mugabe led a citizen army in a revolutionary war as a civilian who took up arms. He was not a career member of the armed forces and had never been through basic training. Swaziland is headed by a king. Some African heads were elected to their positions in free and fair national elections. President Milton Margai of Sierra Leone was peacefully elected. Finally, many African heads of state came to power through military coup. They were uniformed members of the armed forces and took power with the help of a small,

secret group of friends from their service. Some coups have been seen by analysts as popularly supported repudiation of the preceding leader's policies and abilities. Analysts see other coups as raw power grabs.

Consistent with the literature (Bienen and Van de Walle 1994), the data show that monarchs (4 percent) were in power the longest with a mean of 163 months (Table 4-10). Second were those presidents who acquired power through leading peaceful independence movements (25 percent) with a mean of 153 months. This group of leaders includes the most important leaders on the continent: Banda of Malawi, Kaunda of Zambia, Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and Kenyatta of Kenya. Most numerous were those presidents who acquired power through coups after independence (45 percent). They were in power a mean time of only 80 months, but this category also includes the durable Mobutu of Zaire/Congo, Eyadema of Togo, and Kerekou of Benin. Those peacefully elected after independence (10 percent) were in power a mean of only 48 months.

It became evident that this variable corresponds closely with the variable of historical order of the



president. Historical order, which is whether an official is the first, second or ninth president of the country, turned out to be of prime importance for longevity and is treated extensively in succeeding chapters. Eta squared is a little higher at .15.

Table 4-11. President's Mean Months in Power by How the President Obtained Office

Office	Mean Months	S.D.	N
Coronation	163	125	6
Peaceful independence movement	153	108	39
Appointed/Queen Mother	87	77	19
Coup	80	84	69
Post independence civil war	68	30	4
War of independence	59	22	2
Post independence election	48	52	16
			155

Eta squared = .15

*President vs. Parliament*

The literature contains a lively debate over whether the presidential system or the parliamentary system is more conducive to maintaining stability in a consociational arrangement (Lijphart 1968, Horowitz 1994). The data provided an opportunity to extend the question beyond European data to African data.

For this analysis, the title of "president" or "prime minister" was accepted as prima facie evidence of the type of government involved. No attempt was made to determine whether African governments were "really" parliamentary or presidential. It was found that most heads of African states carried the title of president (75 percent). The title of prime minister was less common (19 percent). In addition there were six monarchs, one of whom was queen regent of Swaziland. A fourth category of title was found which has no counterpart in the Western world. These are titles of revolution such as Supreme Commander, Guide of the Revolution, Chairman. Over time these titles tended to evolve into President. In cases where such a mutation was known, the office holder was coded as having the more traditional title.

A comparison of mean months in power shows that presidents are in power 105 months and prime ministers 75 months (Table 4-11). Those with revolutionary titles were in power a mean of 41 months. Again, monarchs were in power the longest with a mean of 125 months. Eta squared was .026. Even though these seem to be important differences, the eta squared is a negligible .026. (Table 4-11)

Table 4-12. President's Mean Months in Power by President's Title

Title	Mean Months	S.D.	N
Monarch	125	145	6
President	105	91	115
Prime Minister	75	99	30
Revolutionary	41	29	4
			155

Eta Squared = .026

### Correlation Analysis

A zero order correlation matrix was constructed with presidential time in power and the eight continuous variables: 1) Diversity Index, 2) Index of Qualitative Variation, 3) Number of groups in the country, 4) Size of the country in square miles, 5) Proportion of the population

speaking the most common language, 6) Size of the population, 7) Density of the population and, 8) Size of the president's ethnic group. It will be remembered that Table 4-4 showed a curvilinear relationship of percent of the population speaking the most common language with presidential mean months in power. Also, Table 4-6 showed a curvilinear relationship of the size of the president's ethnic group with months in power. Therefore, a dummy variable for each of these two variables was added to the correlation matrix. Table 4-13 presents the correlation coefficients of each variable with presidential longevity. All coefficients are small. The largest coefficients are for population (-.14) and size of country in square miles (-.12). The negative sign of the coefficients indicates that presidents of countries small in size and/or with small populations might be in power longer than presidents of large countries. This result is consistent with popular wisdom that small countries are easier to govern.

Table 4-13. Zero Order Correlation Coefficient Matrix of  
President's Mean Months in Power with Country Variables

Variables	Coefficients
Population	-.14 (153) .05
Size of country	-.12 (155) .07
Number of Groups in the Country	-.07 (154) .21
Dummy for % speaking the most common language	-.07 (144) .20
IQV (Index of Qualitative Variation)	-.06 (150) .25
D (Diversity Index)	-.06 (150) .23
Percent speaking the most common language	.04 (144) .32
Size of president's group	-.04 (144) .32
Population density	.01 (153) .47

Note: Three numbers are presented for each variable. The first number is the zero order correlation coefficient for that variable. Beneath it is the N for that correlation. The last number is the one tailed t test of significance. It is presented only as a guide and cannot be interpreted in the customary manner since these data are not from a random sample.

Table 4-14 presents the correlation coefficients of the above variables with each other. In contrast to the lack of relationship with longevity shown in Table 4-13, Table 4-14 shows that the independent variables are strongly related to each other. Much of the clustering of variables is due to their relationships in mathematical formulas. D is used to calculate IQV. The number of groups in a country is used to calculate D and IQV. Other variables cluster for anthropological and geographical reasons. The number of groups in a country is automatically related to the number of languages spoken since groups are defined by language. Size of country in square miles is related to the number of groups as are population size and density.

Table 4-14. Zero Order Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Country Variables with Each Other

	Pop	Size	Grps	Lang Dum	IQV	D	Pres grp
Size	.39 (153) .00						
Grps	.57 (152) .00	.53 (154) .00					
Lang dum	.18 (144) .02	-.22 (144) .00	.40 (144) .00				
IQV	.35 (148) .00	.25 (150) .00	.76 (150) .00	.56 (144) .00			
D	.40 (148) .00	.30 (150) .00	.84 (150) .00	.56 (144) .00	.99 (150) .00		
Pres grp	-.22 (144) .00	-.08 (144) .17	-.50 (143) .00	-.86 (144) .00	-.69 (144) .00	-.70 (143) .00	
Dens	.03 (153) .37	-.33 (153) .00	-.24 (152) .00	-.43 (141) .00	-.72 (143) .00	-.11 (148) .09	.01 144 .45

Pop = Estimated number of people in the country

Size = Size of the country in square miles

Grps = Number of ethnic groups in the country

Lang dum = Dummy for proportion of the population speaking a common language. The dummy variable had a larger coefficient with months the president was in power than the "real" variable.

IQV = Index of Qualitative Variation

D = Index of Diversity

Pres grp = Proportion of the population in the president's group

Dens = Number of people per square mile

Note: See Table 4-13 for explanation of the numbers.


### Conclusion

Three alternative theories of presidential longevity were examined for the 45 Sub-Saharan African countries and essentially rejected. Special attention was given to the variables measuring ethnicity of the country's population since ethnicity is the central concern of the study. When ethnicity is measured by IQV, presidents from the most homogenous societies might have the advantage, but the three presidents from the most heterogenous societies, Ivory Coast and Tanzania, were in power longest of all (Table 4-2). When ethnic group configuration is the measure, the more homogenous countries again have a slight advantage (Table 4-3). For the variable of proportion of the population speaking a common language, presidents from both the most homogenous and the most heterogenous societies are essentially equal in longevity (Table 4-3). When the measure is number of groups in the country, long terms in power are found throughout the spectrum with possibly a slight advantage for the more homogenous countries (Table 4-5). When presidents from the different sized ethnic groups are compared, those from both the smallest and the largest had essentially the same



longevity (Table 4-6). In short, none of these variables of a country's ethnic characteristics correlated even modestly with presidential longevity (Table 4-13).

The analysis showed that African governments are most likely to follow the presidential form of organization rather than the parliamentary. The leader is in power longest who is a monarch or a president rather than a prime minister (Table 4-4). Those leaders who came to power through a peaceful independence movement have more longevity than those who came to power by other means including post independence, peaceful election or coup (Table 4-10). The results are weak and exceptions abound but it might be that the president is in power longer who governs a country which is small in area and/or population (Table 4-7 and 4-8). Population density seems to have no influence on longevity (Table 4-9). Most presidents are from small ethnic groups but the data seem to show that presidents from both the smallest groups and also the largest groups might be in power longer than those from intermediate sized groups (Table 4-6). It was found that an equal number of presidents are from former English and French



colonies and there is no practical difference in the length of time both are in power (Table 4-12).

The twelve variables suggested by the alternative theories together provide an interesting and valuable description of African countries and their leaders, but the effects on president's length of time in power are so weak that they are not considered viable alternatives to the Togo/Benin hypothesis.

## CHAPTER 5

### PRESIDENT'S CHARACTERISTICS AND LONGEVITY

#### Introduction

Four variables merited extensive analysis because of their importance in the literature and in practical politics. Preliminary analysis showed they could be expected to have an important effect on the dependent variable. They might, in fact, prove to be more important for longevity than the Togo/Benin variable.

1. Historical order of the president as the first president of the country or one who came afterwards.
2. The ethnic group of the president, either dominant or subordinate.
3. Whether the president is from the same ethnic group as the armed forces or from a different one.
4. Whether the president is civilian or military.

#### Historical Order of the President

The father of the country, or the first president after independence, has a special standing in a country's history

and the eyes of its citizens. Bienen and Van de Walle (1991) found that first presidents were in power longer than following presidents. It is possible that popular judgement of the first president of the country is more tolerant than judgements of later leaders. Perhaps later leaders are more strongly opposed in the political arena and, therefore, have shorter stays in power. It is also possible that first presidents are able to maintain better ethnic balance in their governments. Maintaining ethnic balance was predicted to be strongly associated with longevity in power. Based on the literature, it was predicted that the first president of the country would be in power longer than later presidents.

#### The Ethnic Group of the President

Ethnicity is the central concern of this study. This particular variable is the ethnic group the president comes from or is perceived by the public to be from. Just one aspect of ethnic group affiliation is considered, whether the group is defined as either dominant or subordinate. It will be remembered that the definition of dominant and subordinate is precise and limited. The dominant group is the one which

had the most wealth, education, and power during the colonial era. During the colonial era the dominant group predominated in the upper ranks of the civil service and sometimes acted as governors for the Europeans. The subordinate group is, in contrast, the poorest and least educated. This group also inhabits the least developed regions.

Contrary to general expectation, the prediction made here is that a president from the subordinate group will be in power longer than a president from the dominant group. The reason is that armies generally are also from subordinate groups and the shared kinship of president and army protects the president from army intervention (Horowitz 1985, p. 458).

### Military Congruence

Whereas the variable ethnic group of the president, considers only one government unit, the variable military congruence considers two, the president and the army. Not all armies are from subordinate groups. In some countries the dominant group comprises a large proportion of the population. In these countries, dominant group members also are found in the armed forces in large numbers. In these

cases, it is the dominant group president and not the subordinate group president who shares the ethnic bond with the army. In other countries, such as the Central African Republic, the dominant group is relatively small but so also are the government and the army. Even though small, the dominant group has enough population to staff both the government and the army without going to other groups. Furthermore, the subordinate groups are sociologically and geographically unusually remote from the capital. Perhaps then, two units of government would make a more accurate prediction of longevity than just one.

The Congruence Hypothesis predicts longer tenure in office for the regime in which the president and the military are from the same ethnic group. Horowitz proposed the hypothesis and provided ample illustration for it in his encyclopedic 700 page book on Third World ethnicity and the military (1985). This research project is an opportunity to test the hypothesis systematically.

Whether the President is Civilian or Military

Of the 155 leaders in this study, 65 are military. To Westerners, the phenomenon of widespread military presidents is one of the most striking and disappointing characteristics of African governments. Contrary to popular wisdom, it is predicted in this study that whether a president is civilian or military would have little effect on length of time in power. It was pointed out earlier that armies are generally composed of subordinate ethnic groups. The explanation for the large number of military presidents might lie in the opportunity military service offers subordinate groups to enter national government. Upon close examination it can be seen that the variables of membership in the military and ethnic group membership are confounded. Military presidents are often from subordinate ethnic groups. It is predicted that the variable of subordinate ethnic group is more important for a president's longevity than is the variable of civilian/military status.




### Multiple Regression Analysis

The four independent variables were coded as follows. Presidential historical order (X1) was coded "1" for first presidents and "2" for later presidents. A negative coefficient means the first president is in power longer. President's ethnic group (X2) is coded "1" for dominant and "2" for subordinate. A positive coefficient means the subordinate group president is in power longer. Military congruence of the president (X3) is coded "1" for congruent and "2" for not congruent. A negative coefficient means the congruent president is in power longer. Civilian or military status of the president (X4) is coded "1" for civilian and "2" for military. A positive coefficient means the military president is in power longer. Multiple regression analysis was performed and standardized regression coefficients obtained.

The analysis was performed two ways. First was with monarchs included (N=155) and second with monarchs excluded (N=149). It has been shown that monarchs are in power longer than presidents and they are also from dominant ethnic groups. It was important to see how much difference they

would make in the results of the analysis. The standardized regression coefficients were slightly smaller when monarchs were included. The adjusted R square was also smaller. The most notable difference was a change in the correlation coefficient between presidential order and president's civilian/military status. With the monarchs included, the correlation coefficient was .35. With the monarchs excluded, the coefficient was .54. The difference might be in the categorization. Including the monarchs makes three categories of head of country, excluding them makes two categories and a more linear relationship. It was decided to exclude the monarchs because the relationships were stronger and clearer with them absent. Figure 5-A presents the regression equation using standardized coefficients.

Figure 5-A. Standardized Multiple Regression of President's Characteristics on President's Longevity



N=149 Adjusted R square=.17

Y = months in power

X1 = president's order

first (1), later (2)

negative coefficient means the first president is in power longer

X2 = president's ethnic group:

dominant (1), subordinate (2)

positive coefficient means the subordinate group president is in power longer

X3 = president and army:

congruent (1), not congruent (2)

negative coefficient means the congruent president is in power longer

X4 = president's status

civilian (1), military (2)

positive coefficient means the military president is in power longer

Standardized regression coefficients

$$Y = -.40X1 + .18X2 = (-.11)X3 + .04X4$$

Regression Analysis Results

The hypotheses for the four variables were all supported. The first president is in power longer. The subordinate president is in power longer. The military congruent president is in power longer. It makes almost no difference whether the president is military or civilian.

Without a doubt, whether a president is the first or a later one is the most important variable in the equation. The next most important variable is whether the president is from a subordinate or dominant ethnic group. But the standardized regression coefficient for this variable (.18) is less than half the one for presidential order (.41). Whether or not the president and the army are from the same ethnic group has a small standardized regression coefficient (-.11). Whether the president is civilian or military has a negligible coefficient (.04).

Most of the variation in president's longevity can be explained with only two of the four variables. The adjusted R square for the standardized regression equation with just the first two variables (.174) differs little from the adjusted R squared for the equation with the first three variables

(.177) or from the one with all four variables (.172). The large adjusted R square for the first variable alone (.123) confirms that historical order is the most important variable in the equation.

Table 5-1 presents the correlation coefficients among the variables.

Table 5-1. Zero Order Correlation Coefficient Matrix  
for Figure 5-A.

	Months	Order	Cong	Group
Order	-.36 (149) .00			
Cong	-.21 (149) .01	.03 (149) .36		
Group	.18 (149) .02	.15 (149) .04	-.52 (149) .00	
Civil/mil	-.13 (149) .11	.54 (149) .00	-.11 (149) .09	.21 (149) .01

Months = President's mean months in power

Order = Historical order of the president

1=first

2=later

Cong = Ethnic congruence of the president and army

1=congruent

2=not congruent

Group = President's ethnic group

1=dominant

2=subordinate

Civ/mil = Civilian/military status of the president

1=civilian

2=military


Note: Three numbers are presented for each variable. The first number is the zero order correlation coefficient for that variable. Beneath it is the N for that correlation. The last number is the one tailed t test of significance. It is presented only as a guide and cannot be interpreted in the customary manner since these data are not from a random sample.

The correlation matrix explains why the two variables of military congruence and civilian/military status have such small standardized regression coefficients. Presidential order is highly correlated (.54) with whether the president is civilian or military, with later presidents more likely to come from the military. Likewise, whether the president is from a dominant or subordinate group is highly correlated (-.52) with whether the president and the army are from the same ethnic group. This is undoubtedly due to the historical origins of the military in subordinate groups.

The strong association (-.52) between president's group membership and president's military congruence is undoubtedly due to the historical origins of the army. As previously explained, African armies are overwhelmingly drawn from the subordinate ethnic group.

#### Regression Analysis Summary

In summary, the regression analysis shows that, consistent with the literature, the first president of the country is in power longest, as a general rule, and that whether a president is first or later is the most important





variable for length of time in power. Secondly, the president from the subordinate group is in power longest. Of less importance is whether the president is of the same ethnic group as the army. Of almost no importance is whether the president is civilian or military. However, the last two variables are important because they are strongly related to the first two. Generally speaking, the first president is civilian and the subordinate group president is from the same group as the army.

### Comparison of Means

Comparison of means supports the regression analysis with more detail. Table 5-2 below presents a summary of president's characteristics and mean months in power. Monarchs are excluded.

Table 5-2. President's Characteristics and Mean Months in Power

	Months	S.D.	N
<b>Order (eta squared=.134)</b>			
<b>First</b>	152.2	110.3	45
<b>Later</b>	76.5	77.2	110
<b>Ethnicity (eta squared=.026)</b>			
<b>Dominant</b>	82.8	87.0	84
<b>Subordinate</b>	116.3	96.0	65
<b>Military Congruent (eta squared=.034)</b>			
<b>Congruent</b>	115.7	90.1	80
<b>Not Congruent</b>	76.3	90.7	69
<b>Civilian/Military (eta squared=.023)</b>			
<b>Civilian</b>	108.0	97.5	84
<b>Military</b>	83.9	83.8	65

**N=149**

**Monarchs excluded.**

Rounding the figures presented in Table 5-2, comparison of means shows that the first president is in power a mean of 152 months and later presidents a mean of 77 months. Eta squared is .13. As explained in Chapter IV, eta squared is a measure of strength of association suitable for a universe. Dominant group presidents are in power a mean of 83 months and subordinate group presidents are in power a mean of 116

months. Eta squared is .03. Military congruent presidents are in power a mean of 116 months and non congruent presidents are in power a mean of 76 months. Eta squared is .03. Civilian presidents are in power a mean of 108 months and military presidents are in power a mean of 84 months. Eta squared is .02.

Even though the differences between means in this set of findings are large, the etas squared are negligible. This can be explained by the fact that large variations appear in all the categories. For example, even though dominant group presidents are in power fewer mean months than subordinate group presidents, some dominant group presidents are in power a very long time and some subordinate group presidents are in power a very short time.

### Interaction Effects

*Historical Order, Civilian/Military Status, and  
Ethnicity*

As shown in Table 5-1, important interactions exist among the independent variables. The interactions can be

explored further with cross tabulations, comparison of means and socio-historical analysis.

The first interaction is between the president's historical order and civilian/military status with a correlation coefficient of  $-.54$  (Table 5-1). The negative sign indicates that presidents become more military over time. This finding is consistent with observations of journalists and political analysts on the ground. Cross tabulations quantify the general impression of military take over of African governments. Table 5-2 shows that all first presidents of all African countries were, without exception, civilians. Military presidents appeared immediately and impressively at the first change of government after independence. Of all second presidents, nearly half, or 47 percent, were military. Militarization continues with the next presidential turn over. Of all third presidents, 68 percent were military. Following presidents remained in about the proportion of two thirds military to one third civilian. Eta squared is a strong  $.32$ . Unquestionably the military, overwhelmingly the army rather than the navy or air force, has become the origin of most of today's African presidents.

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Table 5-3. The President's Historical Order and  
Civilian/Military Status

Status	Historical Order			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4+
Civilian	100 (41)	52.6 (20)	31.8 ( 7)	33.3 (16)
Military	0 (0)	47.4 (18)	68.2 (15)	66.7 (32)
Total	100 (41)	100 (38)	100 (22)	100 (48)

N=149 Monarchs are excluded

Number of cases is given in parentheses

Eta squared=.32

Cross tabulation further shows that another interaction effect is between president's historical order and ethnic group membership. Table 5-4 shows that the shift from civilian to military president was simultaneously a shift from dominant to subordinate ethnic group. The data shows an increase in proportion of subordinate group presidents with succeeding changes of president. Approximately 32 percent of first presidents were from subordinate ethnic groups. Second presidents were 40 percent from subordinate groups, and over 50 percent of both third and later presidents were from subordinate groups. The eta squared is a negligible .03 indicating a weak relationship. Nonetheless, Pareto's famous

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line comes to mind, "History is a graveyard of aristocracies." (Olsen 1970, p. 117).

Table 5-4. The President's Historical Order and Dominant/Subordinate Group Membership

Group	Historical Order			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4+
Dominant	68.3 (28)	60.5 (23)	45.5 (10)	47.9 (23)
Subordinate	31.7 (13)	39.5 (15)	54.5 (12)	52.1 (25)
Total	100 (41)	100 (38)	100 (22)	100 (48)

N=149 Monarchs excluded

Number of cases is in parentheses

Eta squared=.03

In some countries the shift from dominant group civilian president to subordinate group military president occurred in a single step. In Zaire/Congo, Mobutu was the first coup maker, the first military president, and the first subordinate president. In other countries, the shift to subordinate military president occurred in a two-step process. The first step was from dominant civilian president to dominant military president. The second step was from dominant military president to subordinate military



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president. In both cases the subordinate military president lasted longest.

Ghana and Benin are examples of the two-step process. In Ghana, the first coup was led by Ankrah, a general from the wealthy and powerful Akan group. Coups continued at brief intervals among dominant group members until a coup was led and won by a subordinate member. That was a junior officer named Rawlings who was still in power at the data cut-off date. In Benin, the first coup was won by Soglo, a general from the wealthy and powerful Fon group. The series of coups stopped when Kerekou came to power. Kerekou was the first subordinate group coup leader and an enlisted man. Both Rawlings and Kerekou stayed in power longer than any of their predecessors.

Since it is well established that the colonial powers selected subordinate group members for their armed services (Enloe 1980), the discovery of military presidents from a dominant rather than a subordinate group was unexpected. The phenomenon can be explained by the internal structure of the colonial military. The Europeans recruited the subordinate groups as the fighting force but used some educated, dominant

group members as officers. In some countries the first coups after independence were led by these officers. Military presidents from dominant groups tended to be in power relatively short periods. As coup succeeded coup, the top layers of the military institution were removed, bringing the lower ranks, where subordinate groups were present, closer to the presidential office. Later coups were then led and won by subordinate group members.

Not all presidents from subordinate groups are military. Some of the most important African presidents were from subordinate groups but were civilians. Banda, president of Malawi for over 30 years, was from the subordinate Chewa group and not the Tumbuku who dominated the higher government levels in colonial Nyasaland. Nkrumah in Ghana was considered a hero by the whole continent as an independence leader. He was from the Azima group, generally considered a poor and uneducated group. Neither Banda nor Nkrumah were ever in the military. Both gained their positions by leading peaceful independence moments in their countries.

*Military Congruence, Ethnicity, and Historical Order*

The third interaction effect is shown by a strong correlation (-.52) between military congruence and ethnic group membership (Table 5-1). Subordinate group presidents are more likely than dominant group presidents to share ethnicity with the army because of historical reasons as previously explained. When the relationship is presented in cross tabulation form, the eta squared is a strong .27 (Table 5-5).

Table 5-5. The President's Civilian/Military Status and Ethnic Group Membership

	Dominant	Subordinate
Military Congruent	31 (26)	83 (54)
Not Military Congruent	69 (58)	17 (11)
Total	100 (84)	100 (65)

N=149 Monarchs excluded

Number of cases is in parentheses

Eta squared=.27

Investigation of interactions between the military congruence variable and other variables was continued with comparison of means. First, comparison of means shows that the military congruence variable increases in importance with succeeding changes of government. Table 5-6 shows that

military congruence makes virtually no difference in longevity for presidents who are fathers of their country or the first ones after independence. The difference in mean months in power between first presidents who are military congruent and first presidents who are not military congruent is only seven months. For second and third presidents, military congruence makes a difference of 39 months. For fourth and later presidents it rises to 61 months. Thus, Horowitz's (1985) Congruence Hypothesis is shown to be modified. It is supported for later presidents. Eta squared is not available to test strength of the relationship. SPSS calculates eta squared for the main variables and not the controlled variables.

Table 5-6. The Effect of the President's Historical Order and Military Congruence on Mean Months in Power

Order	Mean Months in Power	S.D.	N	Months Difference
<b>1st</b>				
Congruent	154	94	23	
Not Congruent	147	123	18	7
<b>2nd</b>				
Congruent	121	78	19	
Not Congruent	82	79	19	39
<b>3rd</b>				
Congruent	69	70	12	
Not Congruent	31	40	10	38
<b>4-12</b>				
Congruent	96	93	27	
Not Congruent	35	36	21	61

N=149 Monarchs excluded

Eta squared is not available for controlled variables

Table 5-7 explains why the ethnicity variable displaced the congruence variable in the multiple regression analysis. There is an interaction effect between ethnic congruence and ethnic group membership. Congruence adds 41 months to the dominant president's longevity but does not make the slightest difference for subordinate group presidents.

Subordinate group presidents are in power a mean of 116 months whether or not they are from the same ethnic group as their armies.

Table 5-7. The Effect of President's Ethnic Group Membership and Military Congruence on Mean Months in Power

Ethnicity	Mean Months in Power	S.D.	N	Months Difference
<b>Dominant</b>				
Congruent	111	82	27	
Not Congruent	70	87	57	41
<b>Subordinate</b>				
Congruent	116	95	54	
Not Congruent	116	106	11	0

N=149 Monarchs excluded

Eta squared is not available for controlled variables

The last interaction is that between civilian/military status and military congruence. Table 5-8 shows that military congruence is more important for military presidents than for civilian presidents. Ethnic congruence gives civilian presidents 20 months longer in power but it gives military presidents 68 months longer in power.

Table 5-8. The Effect of President's Civilian/Military Status and Military Congruence on Mean Months in Power

Status	Mean Months in Power	S.D.	N	Months Difference
<b>Civilian</b>				
Congruent	118	90	42	
Not Congruent	98	104	42	20
<b>Military</b>				
Congruent	111	92	39	
Not Congruent	43	48	26	68

N=149 Monarchs excluded

Eta squared is not available for controlled variables

### Conclusion

The most important variable for longevity so far investigated is whether the president is the first or later one. As predicted by the literature, the first president is in power the longest.

The next most important variable for longevity was shown to be the president's ethnicity. Presidents from subordinate groups are in power longest. The finding that ethnicity is an important variable was as predicted and goes to the heart of this study. The prediction and the finding depart radically from most of the African studies literature.



As expected, the variable of president's ethnicity is strongly correlated with whether the president and the army are from the same ethnic group ( $-.52$ , Table 5-1). Most armies are drawn heavily from subordinate groups. Even so, the variable of president's ethnicity has more effect on longevity than does the variable of congruence. The subordinate group president is in power longest even when the army is from a different group.

The prediction was also made and supported that whether a president is civilian or military has no effect on longevity. The finding is startling in the context of African politics and holds much significance for practical application. Military presidents have come from both the dominant and subordinate ethnic groups, but the finding is that military presidents from the subordinate ethnic groups have survived longest. The histories of Ghana and Nigeria are examples of how dominant group military presidents were overthrown in a relatively short period of time by their armies. Dominant group military presidents were a product of the internal horizontal ethnic cleavage in the armed forces put in place by the Europeans. After independence, a military

president from the dominant group was no more acceptable to an army largely composed of members from the subordinate group than was a civilian president from the dominant group. The importance of the ethnic tie between president and army (Horowitz 1985) is shown here to be at least as great for military presidents as for civilian presidents. The data indicates that armies are more interested in whether their president is from their own ethnic group than whether the president is from the military.

The unspoken assumption in the literature has been that military presidents are so numerous in Africa because of the organizational tie of military president to military institutions. On the contrary, these findings show that the military president does not control power through the organizational relationship but through the ethnic relationship.

The hopeful practical implication of this finding is that civilian presidents are possible in African governments. A president does not have to come from the military in order to survive. The focus should be on the ethnic origin of the president and not the organizational origin. According to

these findings, a subordinate group civilian has a good chance of surviving. Two outstanding historical examples are Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone and Nkrumah of Ghana. Both were civilians from subordinate ethnic groups who were in power many years.

One possible reason why subordinate group civilians have not made it into the presidency in recent years might lie in the political environment outside the military institution. The political environment in the civilian world outside the military might be so tightly controlled by dominant group members that a subordinate group civilian leader cannot come within reach of high government office. Possibly the military provides the only environment within which a subordinate group political leader can survive at the highest levels.

## CHAPTER 6

### ETHNIC BALANCING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

#### Introduction

The preliminary analysis has been completed. Twelve variables relating to three theories of ethnicity, geography, and politics have been eliminated from further consideration. Four variables of the president's characteristics have been selected as controls. It is now time to explore the effects of the Togo/Benin administration pattern itself on the president's longevity.

#### The Administration Patterns of Ethnicity

It will be remembered that the Togo/Benin hypothesis predicts longer time in power for the president who has a specific pattern of ethnic representation among the four units of government. The units and pattern of ethnicity are: the president is from the dominant ethnic group, the vice president is from the subordinate ethnic group, civil service is from the dominant ethnic group, and the army is from the

subordinate ethnic group. A new government administration begins whenever a new president enters the government and also when a new vice president enters or leaves the government. Some of these changes of personnel bring with them changes in ethnic composition of the government administrations. Some do not.

The ethnicity of the government units of president and vice president is simply the ethnicity of the person who holds the office. The other two units of government, civil service and the army, are large institutions composed of many people. The ethnicity of these units is a collective identity of all the members together and not just of the head official. The institution takes its identity from that of the group which is most visibly and disproportionately represented in it. Unlike ethnicity changes in the units of president and vice president, ethnicity changes in the units of the civil service and army are rare but do occur.

Chad provides an example of how an army can change ethnicity. The Chadian army had a dominant group ethnic identity at independence. Some years after independence a civil war broke out which was won by the subordinate ethnic

group. The subordinate group's army then became the national army and the ethnic identity of the army changed.

The frequency distribution of administration ethnicity patterns is presented in Table 6-1. The unit of analysis is the administration pattern rather than the president which makes the N larger than in previous tables when the president was the unit of analysis. Most presidents have several different administrations as defined here because of the turn over of vice presidents. Not all presidents are included in the table. Those presidents are excluded who were in power fewer than five years as explained at length in the methodology chapter. Excluding these presidents does not exclude any category of administration ethnicity pattern. All patterns found in all African governments are in the table. In the table, "D" stands for dominant group status and "s" stands for subordinate group status.

Table 6-1. Administration Ethnicity Patterns Found in African Governments

Admin Pattern No.	Pres	Vice Pres	Civil Svc	Mil Svc	Frequency	Percent
1	D	D	D	D	38	8.0
2	D	D	D	s	54	11.4
3	D	D	s	D	0	0.0
4	D	D	s	s	0	0.0
5	D	s	D	D	27	5.7
6	D	s	D	s	41	8.6
7	D	s	s	D	0	0.0
8	D	s	s	s	0	0.0
9	s	D	D	D	9	1.9
10	s	D	D	s	66	13.9
11	s	D	s	D	0	0.0
12	s	D	s	s	1	.2
13	s	s	D	D	12	2.5
14	s	s	D	s	48	10.1
15	s	s	s	D	0	0.0
16	s	s	s	s	1	.2
17	no VP				65	13.7
18	multiple VPs				113	23.8
<b>Total</b>					<b>475</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Administrations of presidents in power five or more years as of 31 December 1992.

The frequency distribution proved to be very interesting. The first discovery of the table is that six of the possible 16 ethnicity patterns are not found in real African governments. The administration patterns of ethnicity which do not appear in real African governments are 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 15. These six administration patterns have the subordinate ethnic group as over represented in the upper levels of the civil service. The prediction was made in Chapter II that no civil services would be found which drew its membership heavily from the subordinate group because of the educational requirements of that institution. The finding confirms the prediction. In addition, two administration patterns were found which had only one case each. These were #12 and #16. Again, both #12 and #16 have the civil service from the subordinate group.

Administration pattern #12 is a case of failed social engineering in the Comoros. This administration pattern lasted only 28 months and is one of the reasons for the downfall of the president who instituted it, Ali Soilih (Legum 1978-1978, p. 86-187). Soilih was from a subordinate group, poorly educated himself, who came into office on a



platform of giving power and position to the poor and also the youth. Experienced civil servants from the dominant ethnic group were replaced with the young, poor, and uneducated from the subordinate ethnic group. Government services collapsed in a shambles. One outsider on an official visit was shocked to discover that his counterpart in the Comoros was a boy of 18 who was drunk.

The second administration pattern with only one case, #16, was found in Cape Verde. The coding of the Cape Verdian civil service as filled with members of the subordinate group is an anomaly in this data set. In other countries, the Cape Verdian civil service would be coded as "dominant." The peculiar coding of the Cape Verdian civil service stems from the social structure of the islands which differs fundamentally from the social structures of the other countries. Cape Verde is unusual among African countries in having a true social class structure rather than an ethnic or tribal social structure. The highest social class in Cape Verde is composed of owners of very large plantations who are Creoles, or a mixture of European and African families. The Cape Verdian civil service originates in the poorer, small

landholders and urbanites who are as well educated as the plantation owners, professional, hard working, and notably incorrupt.

The next thing to note in the frequency distribution is that, contrary to prediction, not all African countries have armies which are from subordinate groups. Administration patterns 1, 5, 9, and 13 all have dominant group armies. Seventeen countries in Africa have armies coded as dominant. One way this can come about is exemplified by Angola and Zimbabwe. In those two countries, civil war divided the country between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups/regions. The dominant groups had either won or controlled the government at the time of data collection and the subordinate groups were the "enemy" and effectively outside the country. Another way that a country's army might be coded as dominant is provided by the Central African Republic. In the CAR both the civil service and the army originate in the same region, peopled by many small groups known collectively as "Riverain." They are located in a restricted area around the capital, Bangui, on the islands and banks of the huge Congo River. The army is small and apparently has had no need to go

outside its ethnic group for recruits. Another reason armies could be coded as "dominant" is that some countries have only one ethnic group for all practical purposes. In Swaziland, the Swazi group comprises at least 90 percent of the population. In Lesotho, it is the Sotho, and in Somalia it is the Somali.

#### Unanticipated Administration Pattern #17

The frequency distribution of administration patterns clearly shows two more unexpected and important surprises of the study. One is the existence of the administration with no vice president whatsoever. This type of administration pattern was coded "17," or "no vice president." These administrations were scrutinized long and hard before being coded as "17." Since the US has a clearly identified vice president, the possibility that a government would exist which did not have one was never entertained. When the documents first showed administrations without a vice president, the initial reaction was that the data was insufficient or the concept poorly defined. Another indication of difficulty with the office of vice president

was the problem previously mentioned that informants sometimes had in identifying a vice president in their country's governments. After long searching, the conclusion was reluctantly drawn that some administrations do not have vice presidents.

The determination to find a vice president for every president lead to the discovery that African governments have an unexpected variety of officials who can be interpreted roughly as performing the role of the US vice president. As previously explained, the key to identifying a possible equivalent of the US vice president was whether the title indicated an absence of a power base separate from the president's. The US vice president does not have a separate power base but serves only the US president. An example in African governments is the title of "Minister" with nothing added. "Minister" carries no indication of a stable, substantive area of concern and no separate staff of which to be the minister. In contrast, "Minister of Development" indicates a substantive area of governmental concern with a staff for the Minister to direct independently of the president's staff. Scattered information acquired

unsystematically while collecting data indicates that some of the "staffless" "Ministers" were people who previously and afterwards held exceptionally important government positions. Others did not.

The positions found which were eventually accepted as identifying possible equivalents of the US vice president include: Governor General, Secretary to the President, General Secretary, Minister at Large, Chef du Cabinet, Presidential Advisor, Minister without Portfolio, or simply, Minister. Support for the decision to define these titles as an approximation of the US vice president is found in the publication, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments: A Directory. In that publication, officials bearing these titles are listed just after the president/prime minister in many governments. The rest of the top leaders are listed afterwards.

Other well known and clearly defined offices were often accepted as the "vice president" under certain circumstances. Some African countries have the European system of the Prime Minister as the powerful official and the President as a figurehead. In these cases, the "President" was seen as

operating as the "Vice President" in US terms. Such was also sometimes the evaluation of monarchs. A monarch who was considered in the area studies literature to be a true ruler was defined in this study as the "president." Examples are Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and Sobhuza II of Swaziland. A monarch who seemed not to rule independently was redefined as "vice president." The two queens who were in turn the monarch of Swaziland during the time when the heir was growing up were redefined as "vice president" because the literature indicated that the "real" ruler was the prime minister. Consequently the prime minister was defined as the "president."

All of the titles which were interpreted as the equivalent of the US vice president are shown in Table 6-2. The titles are presented in descending order of frequency found in the data. In addition, Appendix 2 gives the name and title of every individual coded as an equivalent of the US vice president.

Table 6-2. Titles Defined as the Equivalent of the US Vice President

Title	Percent	N
Prime Minister	24.7	152
Vice President	20.2	124
Minister	19.2	118
Secretary General	7.8	48
Deputy Prime Minister	6.3	39
First Vice President	5.2	32
Governor General	4.2	26
Second Vice President	4.1	25
Chief of Staff or other Revolutionary or Military Title	2.8	17
President	2.1	13
Monarch	1.8	11
Second Deputy Prime Minister	.5	3
Third Deputy Prime Minister	.5	3
First Deputy Prime Minister	.3	2
Third Vice President	.3	2
Totals	100.0	615

All "vice presidents" of all presidents are included.

#### Unanticipated Administration Pattern #18

The final surprise of Table 6-1 was the discovery of administrations with two or more vice presidents at the same time. These were coded "18," "multiple vice presidents."

The first indication of the presence of multiple vice presidents was overlapping dates in office for two or more officials. It was at first suspected that errors had been made in the documents or in recording data from the documents. Nonetheless, the finding persisted and was repeated for many administrations. An informant was questioned who replied that, yes, there were multiple vice presidents. The informant's explanation was illuminating and goes to the heart of this study. Two or more vice presidents were installed in a government for the purpose of creating ethnic balance. Late in the data collecting, titles were encountered which unambiguously showed multiple vice presidents. These were: First Vice President, Second Vice President, and even Third Vice President. Table 6-3 below presents the distribution of types of vice presidency for all African government administrations.



Table 6-3. The Vice Presidency in African Governments

Structure	Percent	
no vice president	13.5	(67)
1 vice president	63.4	(314)
2 vice presidents	16.2	(80)
3+ vice presidents	6.9	(34)
Total	100.0	(495)

All administrations of all presidents are included.  
The number of cases is given in parentheses.

#### Types of Vice Presidency

It is now clear that more than one type of vice presidency exists in Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 6-3 shows that in spite of the vigorous reinterpretation of government offices, 13.5 percent of all African government administrations have no identifiable vice president at all. Next, over 63.4 percent of the administrations have one vice president in the US style. Finally, a little over 16 percent have two vice presidents and nearly seven percent have three or more. All together, 23 percent of African government administrations have multiple vice presidents.

A rapid check was made of all governments of the world to see whether the phenomenon of multiple vice presidents

occurred in governments outside Africa (Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments: A Directory, March 1975). It was found that African governments were not unusual in this characteristic.

Table 6-4. The Vice Presidency in Non-African Governments Worldwide

Structure	West	Other
no vice president	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
1 vice president	48.0 (12)	32.9 (26)
2 vice presidents	36.0 (9)	24.1 (19)
3+ vice presidents	16.0 (4)	43.0 (34)
Totals	100% (25)	100% (86)

The category "West" in the table includes the US, Canada, Western Europe, Scandinavian Countries, New Zealand, Australia, Spain, and Portugal. The category "Other" includes Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.

Table 6-4 shows that nearly half (N=12) the governments of the Western countries have one vice president. Over 35 percent (N=9) of Western governments have two vice presidents and 16 percent (N=4) have three or more. The "Other" countries have the most governments with three or more vice presidents at 43 percent (N=34), compared with 16 percent

(N=4) for governments in the Western region. A comparison of Table 6-3 and Table 6-4 shows that African countries are unique in having governments with no vice president at all but not unique in having more than one vice president at a time. In fact, a smaller proportion of African government administrations have more than one vice president at a time (23 percent) than either Western countries (52 percent) or "Other" countries (67 percent).

One possible interpretation of the finding that many African governments do not have a vice president is that more governments in the African region might be autocratic than in other regions. The finding might lend quantitative support to the qualitative categorization of many African governments as "personalist" or depending more on the person of the leader than in Western democracies. On the other hand, having more than one vice president at a time lends an air of representativeness to these governments or perhaps it simply indicates bureaucratic inefficiency. Whatever the meaning, it is an interesting finding.

Testing the Togo/Benin Hypothesis

Comparison of means was used to test the Togo/Benin hypothesis. It was predicted that of all the administration patterns, the Togo/Benin administration pattern would be associated with greater presidential longevity because it is ethnically balanced.

The total number of months each president was in power was calculated from the dates entering and leaving office. The administration ethnic patterns were then compared on how many months presidents using them were in power. Eta squared was not available to test the strengths of all the relationships since it does not make calculations for controlled variables. The problem is not serious in this analysis. All that must be demonstrated is that the Togo/Benin pattern results in reasonably more months in power than the other patterns.

Table 6-5 presents the administration patterns in descending order of mean months in power for presidents in power five or more years as of 31 December 1992. The Togo/Benin pattern is marked with an asterisk.

Table 6-5 clearly shows that the Togo/Benin pattern, #10, is not the first ranking in longevity. It only ranks fifth. Eta squared is a negligible .09.

Table 6-5. Comparison of Administration Patterns on President's Mean Months in Power

Administration Pattern	Mean Months	S.D.	Rank
14 (ssDs)	228.2 (48)	97.0	1
16 (ssss)	188.0 (1)	NA	2
9 (sDDD)	182.1 (9)	96.2	3
18 (2+ vps)	179.1 (113)	116.3	4
10* (sDDs)	172.6 (66)	100.5	5*
5 (sDss)	164.3 (27)	93.7	6
6 (DsDs)	147.7 (41)	117.1	7
1 (DDDD)	143.1 (38)	89.1	8
2 (DDDs)	133.9 (54)	126.2	9
13 (ssDD)	120.9 (12)	86.0	10
17 (no vp)	117.3 (65)	94.7	11
12 (sDss)	28.0 (1)	NA	12

N=475

All administration patterns of all presidents in power 5 years or more. The number of administration patterns is in parentheses.

\*=Togo/Benin pattern

Eta squared=.09

Controls were then applied in the search for conditions under which the Togo/Benin administration pattern of ethnicity might be the most enduring. Table 6-6 shows the

influence of the president's historical order which was previously shown to be an important variable in presidential longevity.

Table 6-6 shows that the Togo/Benin pattern is associated with longer times in power for later presidents but not for first presidents. For first presidents it ranks eighth in longevity. For later presidents it ranks second in longevity. Even though the Togo/Benin administration pattern is more important for later than for first presidents, it still does not rank first even for them.

Table 6-6. Ranking of Administration Patterns on President's Mean Months in Power by President's Historical Order

First President				
Administration Pattern	Mean Months		S.D.	Rank
18 (2+ vps)	271.9 (43)		105.9	1
14 (ssDs)	267.4 (19)		81.1	2
13 (ssDD)	239.3 (3)		23.7	3
9 (sDDD)	232.5 (2)		29.0	4
5 (DsDD)	215.9 (11)		109.7	5
6 (DsDs)	208.3 (24)		115.3	6
2 (DDDs)	204.5 (27)		140.0	7
10* (sDDs)	191.0 (8)		135.8	8*
16 (ssss)	188.0 (1)		NA	9
1 (DDDD)	179.7 (17)		92.5	10
17 (no vps)	146.0 (19)		94.8	11
Later President				
14 (ssDs)	202.4 (29)		99.2	1
10* (sDDs)	170.1 (58)		96.0	2*
9 (sDDD)	167.7 (7)		105.4	3
5 (DsDD)	128.8 (16)		62.5	4
18 (2+ vps)	122.1 (70)		80.6	5
1 (DDDD)	111.6 (21)		75.3	6
17 (no vp)	105.4 (46)		93.1	7
13 (ssDD)	81.4 (9)		55.0	8
2 (DDDs)	63.3 (27)		51.3	9
6 (DsDs)	62.1 (17)		43.0	10
12 (sDss)	28.0 (1)		NA	11

N=475. All administration patterns of all presidents in power 5 years or more. The number of administration patterns is in parentheses. \*=Togo/Benin pattern. Eta squared is not available for controlled variables.

The next control variable investigated was whether the president was from the dominant ethnic group or the subordinate ethnic group. The results are presented in Table 6-7.

It can be seen from Table 6-7 that presidents from dominant ethnic groups cannot use the Togo/Benin administration pattern of ethnicity. The Togo/Benin pattern requires that the president be from the subordinate ethnic group. For presidents from subordinate ethnic groups, the Togo/Benin administration pattern ranks fifth in longevity.



Table 6-7. Ranking of Administration Patterns on President's Mean Months in Power by President's Ethnic Group Membership

Dominant Group					
Administration Pattern	Mean Months		S.D.	Rank	
18 (2+ vps)	165.2	(52)	141.7	1	
5 (DsDD)	164.3	(27)	93.7	2	
6 (DsDs)	147.7	(41)	117.1	3	
1 (DDDD)	142.1	(36)	89.1	4	
2 (DDDD)	133.9	(54)	126.2	5	
17 (no vps)	104.4	(39)	87.0	6	
Subordinate Group					
14 (ssDs)	228.1	(48)	97.0	1	
18 (2+ vps)	191.0	(61)	89.0	2	
16 (ssss)	188.0	(1)	NA	3	
9 (sDDD)	182.1	(9)	96.2	4	
10* (sDDs)	172.6	(66)	100.5	5*	
17 (no vp)	136.5	(26)	103.9	6	
13 (ssDD)	120.9	(12)	86.0	7	
12 (sDss)	28.0	(1)	NA	8	

N=475

All administration patterns of all presidents in power 5 years or more.

The number of administration patterns is in parentheses.

\*=Togo/Benin pattern

Eta squared is not available for controlled variables.

The next control variable is whether the president is a civilian or comes from the military. The results are presented in Table 6-8. Eta squared is not available for controlled variables.

Table 6-8 shows that the Togo/Benin administration pattern is affected by whether the president is a civilian or from the military. It is way down in ninth place for civilians but rises to second in longevity for military presidents. Nonetheless, the Togo/Benin pattern is not associated with the longest times in office even for military presidents.

Table 6-9 shows that the Togo/Benin administration pattern is fourth in longevity for presidents who come from the same ethnic group as their armies.

The findings of the preceding series of tables are summarized in Table 6-10. The rank in longevity for the Togo/Benin pattern is given for all presidents together and then for each category of president, whether first or later, and so on.

Table 6-8. Ranking of Administration Patterns on President's Mean Months in Power by President's Civilian or Military Status

Civilian President				
Admin. Pattern	Mean Months	S.D.		Rank
9 (sDDD)	266.8 (4)	42.9		1
14 (ssDs)	237.1 (24)	99.1		2
5 (DsDD)	211.2 (12)	105.9		3
18 (2+ vps)	206.5 (65)	132.2		4
13 (ssDD)	192.0 (5)	66.9		5
16 (ssss)	188.0 (1)	NA		6
6 (DsDs)	185.6 (29)	117.5		7
1 (DDDD)	160.7 (21)	95.1		8
10* (sDDs)	137.7 (24)	99.0		9*
2 (DDDs)	123.0 (35)	107.4		10
17 (no vps)	121.6 (33)	85.3		11
12 (sDss)	28.0 (1)	NA		12
Military President				
14 (ssDs)	219.2 (24)	96.1		1
10* (sDDs)	192.6 (42)	97.0		2*
18 (2+ vps)	145.0 (41)	81.0		3
5 (DsDD)	126.7 (15)	64.1		4
1 (DDDD)	114.9 (14)	83.4		5
9 (sDDD)	114.4 (5)	65.1		6
17 (no vp)	112.8 (32)	104.7		7
2 (DDDs)	74.0 (10)	55.5		8
13 (ssDD)	70.1 (7)	58.0		9
6 (DsDs)	57.6 (10)	45.5		10

N=475

All administration patterns of all presidents in power years or more. Monarchs are not included since they are neither military nor civilian. The number of administration patterns is in parentheses

\*=Togo/Benin pattern.

Table 6-9. Ranking of Administration Patterns on President's Mean Months in Power by Military Congruence

Military Congruent Presidents				
Administration Patterns	Mean Months		S.D.	Rank
14 (ssDs)	228.1 (48)		97.0	1
16 (ssss)	188.0 (1)		NA	2
18 (2+ vps)	178.6 (74)		91.4	3
10* (sDDs)	172.6 (66)		100.5	4*
5 (DsDD)	164.3 (27)		93.7	5
1 (DDDD)	142.1 (38)		89.1	6
17 (no vp)	140.1 (31)		97.6	7
12 (sDss)	28.0 (1)		NA	8
Presidents Not Military Congruent				
9 (sDDD)	182.1 (9)		96.2	1
18 (2+ vps)	180.1 (39)		154.4	2
6 (DsDs)	147.7 (41)		117.1	3
2 (DDDs)	133.9 (54)		126.2	4
13 (ssDD)	120.9 (12)		86.0	5
17 (no vp)	96.5 (34)		88.3	6

N=475

All administration patterns of all presidents in power 5 years or more.

The number of administration patterns is in parentheses.

\*=Togo/Benin pattern

Eta squared is not available for controlled variables.

Table 6-10. Summary of Rankings of Togo/Benin Administration Pattern on President's Mean Months in Power

VARIABLE	RANK
No Controls	5 (66)
Control	
First President	8 (8)
Later President	2 (58)
Subordinate President	5 (66)
Civilian President	9 (24)
Military President	2 (42)
Military Congruent President	4 (66)

Number of cases is in parentheses.

Eta squared is not available for controlled variables.

Table 6-10 shows that the Togo/Benin administration pattern never ranks first in longevity for any of the presidential characteristics considered. When presidential longevity is compared for all administration patterns without controls, the Togo/Benin administration pattern ranks fifth. When all first presidents are compared with each other, the Togo/Benin administration pattern ranks eighth in longevity, but for all later presidents it ranks second in longevity. For subordinate group presidents it drops back to fifth rank. For civilian presidents it ranks ninth but rises again to

second for military presidents. For presidents from the same ethnic group as their armies, it is in fourth rank. The Togo/Benin hypothesis must again be rejected.

The Togo/Benin administration pattern might be called the "military" administration pattern because military presidents use it most often. Apparently it was not an accident that this administration pattern was first observed in a military government, Eyadema's of Togo.

Reviewing Tables 6-5 through 6-10 shows that the administration pattern most often ranking first is #14 (ssDs). Administration pattern #14 is not ethnically balanced. On the contrary, it is based on a principle of near ethnic monopoly with the president, vice president, and army all from the subordinate group. Because administration pattern #14 is clearly unbalanced it was not predicted to be associated with long terms in office. However, it is militarily congruent, which is consistent with the military congruence hypothesis.

Number of Administration Patterns

The preceding series of tables is based on the assumption that presidents stay in the same administration pattern of ethnicity the whole time they are in office. Surprisingly, this was discovered to be incorrect. Only half the presidents remain in the same administration pattern of ethnicity. The other half used two, three, or even four different patterns of ethnicity in their administrations. Table 6-11 presents the data.

Table 6-11. The Frequency Distribution of Number of Administration Patterns Per President

Number	Percent	N
1	50.3	78
2	31.0	48
3	16.1	25
4	02.6	04
Total	100.0	155

All presidents in power 5 or more years

It was further found that presidents who changed administration patterns were in power longer than those who did not. Table 6-12 presents the results.

Table 6-12. The Number of Different Administration Patterns of Ethnicity and President's Mean Months in Power

Number of Admin. Patterns	Mean Months	S.D.
1	60.0 (78)	80.8
2	112.0 (48)	80.2
3	170.0 (25)	89.6
4	239.5 (4)	113.8

N=155

All presidents in power 5 or more years

The number of presidents is in parentheses

Eta squared=.24

The table shows a strong linear progression from fewer to more mean months in power with more variety in administration patterns of ethnicity. Eta squared is a strong .24.

Following the finding that half the presidents changed their administration patterns of ethnicity and increased their longevity, the rank of the Togo/Benin administration pattern was compared for three categories of presidents. The categories are: 1) all presidents together, 2) presidents remaining in the same administration pattern and,




3) presidents who changed administration patterns. The results are presented in Table 6-13.

Table 6-13. Comparison of the Rank in Longevity of the Togo/Benin Administration Pattern for Three Categories of Presidents

	All Presidents	Presidents with 1 admin pattern	Presidents with 2+ admin patterns
	Rank in Longevity		
No controls	5	8	3
Types of Presidents			
First	8	5	7
Later	3	5	2
Subordinate	5	6	2
Civilian	9	8	7
Military	2	3	2
Military Congruent	4	6	3

N=475

Comparing across the rows, it can be seen that except for first presidents and military presidents the rank in presidential longevity is higher for the Togo/Benin pattern when it is combined with other administration patterns. The first row shows that when no controls are used, the Togo/Benin pattern ranks fifth for all presidents together,



eighth for presidents with one administration pattern, but third for presidents who use at least two different administration patterns. In the following rows, the same results are obtained. The Togo/Benin administration pattern is associated with the more presidential longevity only when combined with other administration patterns. But even when combined with other patterns, the Togo/Benin administration pattern of ethnicity never ranks first. The highest ranking it achieves is second for later, military, and subordinate presidents.

The hypothesis must be rejected again. In not one of the comparisons in Table 6-13 is the Togo/Benin administration pattern of ethnicity associated with the longest time in power. The Togo/Benin administration pattern never ranks first.

#### Proportion of Time in Administration Pattern

The finding that the Togo/Benin administration pattern made the best showing in combination with other administration patterns suggested that perhaps a certain proportion of time spent in the pattern might be important

for longevity. Possibly the Togo/Benin pattern is associated with the longest time in power not if it is used all the time, but simply most of the time, or over 50 percent of the time.

The proportion of time in power each president used a particular administration pattern was calculated. The results are presented in Table 6-14. The entries showing the most mean months in power are in bold face.

Table 6-14 shows that the only condition under which the Togo/Benin pattern ranks first in longevity is when it is used less than half the time. In this one instance the Togo/Benin pattern is associated with 274 mean months in power which is longer than the other patterns. But the result is contrary to the prediction. It was predicted that more time in the Togo/Benin pattern would be associated with more time in power. On the contrary, less time in the Togo/Benin pattern, not more time, is associated with more time in power. Once again, the hypothesis is rejected.

Table 6-14 shows that five administration patterns are associated with greater longevity if they are used over

50 percent of the time: #5 (DsDD), #9 (sDDD), #14 (ssDs), #16 (ssss), and #18 (2+ vps).

Table 6-14. Influence of Proportion of Total Time in Administration Pattern on President's Mean Months in Power

Administration Pattern	% of Time in Admin. Pattern	Mean Months	S.D.
1 (DDDD)	<b>under 50%</b> (20)	<b>175.9</b>	89.5
	over 50% (18)	104.4	74.1
2 (DDDs)	<b>under 50%</b> (20)	<b>141.3</b>	109.5
	over 50% (34)	129.5	136.5
5 (DsDD)	under 50% (8)	148.3	70.0
	<b>over 50%</b> (19)	<b>171.0</b>	103.1
6 (DsDs)	<b>under 50%</b> (15)	<b>184.6</b>	111.2
	over 50% (28)	126.3	117.1
9 (sDDD)	under 50% (5)	169.0	86.7
	<b>over 50%</b> (4)	<b>198.5</b>	118.4
10* (SDDs)	<b>under 50%</b> (24)	<b>274.4</b>	69.0
	over 50% (42)	114.5	61.8
12 (sDss)	<b>under 50%</b> (1)	<b>28.0</b>	NA
	over 50% (0)	0	0
13 (ssDD)	<b>under 50%</b> (5)	<b>145.6</b>	47.8
	over 50% (7)	103.3	105.7
14 (ssDs)	under 50% (28)	223.1	87.3
	<b>over 50%</b> (20)	<b>235.2</b>	111.2
16 (ssss)	under 50% (0)	0	0
	<b>over 50%</b> (1)	<b>188.0</b>	NA
17 (no vp)	under 50% (23)	135.1	109.0
	<b>over 50%</b> (42)	<b>107.5</b>	85.7
18 (2+ vps)	<b>under 50%</b> (21)	<b>195.9</b>	99.0
	over 50% (92)	175.3	120.1

N=475

All administration patterns of all presidents in power 5 years or more.

The number of cases is in parentheses

\*=Togo/Benin pattern

Eta squared is not available for controlled variables.

The category with the most time in power is in bold.

It can be noted that administration pattern #14, previously mentioned as frequently ranking first in longevity, is not much affected by whether it is used less or more than 50 percent of the time.

These findings on proportion of time in an administration pattern were puzzling. Further research eventually revealed an explanation which is presented in the next chapter.

### Conclusion

The Togo/Benin hypothesis as stated is not supported by these data and analysis. It was hypothesized that a particular pattern of ethnicity in the four units of African government would be associated with more time in office for the president because the government is ethnically balanced. The administration pattern is sDDs: 1) the president is from the subordinate ethnic group, 2) the vice president is from the dominant ethnic group, 3) the civil service is from the dominant ethnic group and, 4) the army is from the subordinate ethnic group. Comparisons of mean months in power were made for all presidents together, first and later

presidents, subordinate group, civilian and military, and military congruent presidents. Comparisons were also made with presidents who used one administration pattern, those who used two or more, and those who used the Togo/Benin pattern less and more than 50 percent of the time. The only condition under which the Togo/Benin administration pattern ranked first in presidential longevity was when it was used less than half the time.

This exercise has been not only the test of an hypothesis. It has been a succession of surprising discoveries about the nature of African government not reported in the literature as far as is known.

It was found that the office of the vice president in African government is more varied and more complicated than in any way anticipated. Some governments do not have any equivalent of the US vice presidency, while other governments have two or more vice presidential officials at the same time. Preliminary assessment was that the appointment of multiple vice presidents is for the purpose of achieving ethnic balance. It was also found that ethnic composition of half the administrations changed. Following the discoveries

reported here led to even more surprising and important discoveries which are presented next.



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## CHAPTER 7

### THE VICE PRESIDENT(S)

#### Introduction

What began as a study of the president for an explanation of government stability has come to focus on the vice president. The African vice president is rarely powerful in the tradition of an "eminence grise," but is always and almost by definition a background figure. Naturally enough, the focus of previous presidential longevity studies has been on the president (Bienen and Van de Walle, 1991), and on the army (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990), with a certain amount of speculation on characteristics of the country (Lijphart 1977, p. 54-57, p. 65-70, p. 173). Without planning to do so, this study shifted its focus of attention from the president to the (usually) faceless, nameless, "unimportant," background figure of the vice president or the vice president's equivalent.

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Combinations of Administration Patterns

It was just shown that half the presidents used two to four different administration patterns of ethnicity while in office (Table 6-11). It was also shown that those presidents who changed administration patterns were in power longer (Table 6-12). The next table compares presidential longevity controlling for administration patterns used and change in pattern.

Table 7-1 shows, with two exceptions, that those presidents who used an administration pattern in combination with one or more other patterns were in power from six months to nearly 14 years longer than those who used only one administration pattern.

The next point to be investigated is whether presidents used the administration patterns in particular combinations. This was found to be true.

Table 7-1. Number of Administration Patterns and Presidential Longevity

Admin. Pattern	Months in Power		
	Same Admin. Pattern	Changed Admin. Pattern	Months Difference
#1	136 (11)	144 (27)	+8
#2	130 (20)	136 (34)	+6
#5	113 (5)	176 (22)	+63
#6	79 (12)	176 (29)	+97
#9	301 (2)	148 (7)	-153
#10	58 (11)	196 (55)	+138
#12	None	28 (1)	NA
#13	8 (2)	144 (10)	+136
#14	82 (5)	245 (43)	+163
#16	188 (1)	None	NA
#17	53 (1)	140 (48)	+87
#18	42 (14)	198 (99)	+156

N=475

Administration patterns of presidents in power five or more years

N is in parentheses

Table 7-2 shows that not all logically possible combinations of two administration patterns are found in real governments. The combinations of two patterns of administration ethnicity actually used by presidents in

forming their governments are in fact quite limited. The table shows that if administration patterns #17 and #18 are not counted, only four combinations of two administration patterns are used by African presidents. The combinations are listed in the table: #1 and #5, #2 and #6, #9 and #13, #10 and #14. It will be remembered that administration pattern #17 has no vice president at all and administration pattern #18 has multiple vice presidents.




Table 7-2. The Combinations of Two Administration Patterns  
Found in African Governments

Administration Patterns	Number
#1 and #5	4
#2 and #6	4
#9 and #13	1
#10 and #14	6
#1 and #17	4
#2 and #17	3
#5 and #17	1
#6 and #17	3
#9 and #17	1
#10 and #17	3
#13 and #17	1
#14 and #17	2
#1 and #18	4
#2 and #18	3
#10 and #18	4
#12 and #18	1
#13 and #18	1
#14 and #18	2

N=48

Twenty-five presidents, or 16 percent, of the presidents used three different administration patterns while in office. Four presidents used four administration patterns.



They are Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Ahmed Abdallah of the Comoros, Traore of Mali, and Diiori of Niger. The combinations of administration patterns used are displayed in Table 7-3.

Table 7-3. The Combinations of Three and Four Administration Patterns Found in African Governments

Administration Patterns	N
<b>Combinations of Three</b>	
#1, #5 and #17	3
#2, #6 and #17	5
#9, #13 and #17	2
#10, #14 and #17	2
#1, #5 and #18	1
#2, #6 and #18	2
#10, #14 and #18	7
#9, #13 and #18	1
#14, #17 and #18	2
<b>N=25</b>	
<b>Combinations of Four</b>	
#1, #5, #17 and #18	2
#2, #6, #17 and #18	1
#9, #13, #17 and #18	1
<b>N=4</b>	

Table 7-3 shows that, not including administration patterns #17 and #18, the same administration pattern pairs

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appear again: #1 and #5, #2 and #6, #9 and #13, #10 and #14. All the combinations of three administration patterns and of four administration patterns are the same as all the combinations of two administration patterns. The only difference is addition of administration patterns #17 or #18. Presidents using three and four administration patterns do not invent novel combinations of administration patterns. The presidents with more than two administration patterns use the same combinations as the two administration pattern presidents. The table shows that the only distinction between combinations of three administration patterns and combinations of four administration patterns is the use of both administration patterns #17 and #18 and not just choosing one or the other.

#### Focus on Vice Presidents

In an effort to understand the significance of these particular combinations of administration patterns, the following table was constructed showing the ethnicity of the government units in the combinations presidents used.

Table 7-4. The Ethnic Composition of Combinations of Administration Patterns

Admin. Patterns	Ethnic Composition			
	President	Vice President	Civil Service	Army
#1	D	D	D	D
#5	D	s	D	D
#2	D	D	D	s
#6	D	s	D	s
#9	s	D	D	D
#13	s	s	D	D
#10	s	D	D	s
#14	s	s	D	s

Note: D = Dominant ethnic group  
s = Subordinate ethnic group

Table 7-4 clearly and strikingly shows the way presidents have devised to increase their stays in office. The long lasting presidents change the ethnicity of their vice presidents. In all the combinations of administration patterns used in real African governments, only one unit changes ethnicity, that of the vice president. For example, looking at the first and second rows of Table 7-4, pattern #1

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is DDDD and pattern #5 is DsDD. The ethnicity of all government units is the same in administration pattern #1 and #2 except that of the vice president. The ethnicity of the vice president alternates between the dominant and subordinate groups. All the remaining pairs of rows in the table show the same thing. The only ethnic change from one administration pattern to the next is that of the vice president.

Now that the table shows the mechanism used, the reason for the importance of the vice president becomes apparent. Of the four units of government in the administration pattern of ethnicity, the ethnicity of the vice president is the easiest and often the only one a president can control. A president enters office with the ethnicity of three of the four units inflexibly set. The president cannot change the public perception of his own identity after he is in office, though it might be possible to manipulate his identity within narrow limits to gain office. The civil service and the army are both very large groups with a collective ethnic identity already well established before any president gains office. The president can change the ethnicity of only a relatively

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few positions in either unit and then only with care. The politically aware public is watching for such ethnic "stacking" in these institutions. In contrast, the vice president in these governments is the personal choice of the president. As far as is known, the president exercises a relatively free choice in the selection. This series of tables shows that presidential longevity is positively associated with vice presidential ethnic diversity.

Administration pattern #17, or no vice president, and administration pattern #18, or multiple vice presidents, play the role of "helping" administration patterns. These two initially unexpected administration patterns are special in their flexibility. They can and do "help out" all the other administration patterns. They might also be interpreted as transition patterns, occurring in the intervals between periods of the other patterns.

Percent of Time in Administration Pattern

Table 7-4 showing alternating vice presidential ethnicity now explains the puzzling results of Table 6-14. That table showed that presidential longevity is affected by



using a particular administration pattern under or over half the time. In effect, no administration pattern is "best" used 100 percent of the time. Any president who alternates the social origins of the vice presidents at the same time reduces the proportion of time spent in each administration pattern. It would seem that the most equitable arrangement for a two administration pattern president would be to spend approximately half the time in each administration pattern. In the case of the Togo/Benin administration pattern, #10, it is "best" used under half the time (Table 6-14). Administration pattern #10 is paired with administration pattern #14 (Table 7-14) which is "best" used over half the time. Both tables together affirm the importance of ethnic balance in African government.

#### Vice Presidents Only

From now on the discussion can move forward by focusing only on the government unit of the vice president. Since in practical terms the other units of government do not change ethnicity, the vice president alone can substitute for the

whole cumbersome pattern of president, vice president, civil service, and army. The discussion is simpler.

Number of Vice Presidents: More is Better?

Work with the changes in administration patterns lead to the suspicion that presidential longevity might not be related simply to alternating the ethnicity of the vice presidents. On the contrary, it might simply mean that having many vice presidents is important, no matter whether they are ethnically diverse or not. In short, perhaps the phenomenon is a matter of quantity rather than quality.

Table 7-5 presents the findings on longevity and number of vice presidents. It is important to note that the table includes only those presidents who had one administration pattern their whole time in office. In other words, some of the presidents had ethnically diverse administrations and some did not, but they did not alternate the ethnicity of their vice presidents. The table also includes only those presidents who always had a vice president and whose vice presidents served one at a time. These are the US style vice presidencies of African governments. Therefore,

administration patterns #17 and #18 do not appear in the table.

Table 7-5. Total Number of Vice Presidents and Presidential Longevity: One Administration Pattern

Admin. Pattern	Mean Months	
	1 VP	2-5 VPs
#1 (DDDD)	77.3 (3)	158.3 (8)
#2 (DDDs)	38.6 (16)	400.0 (5)
#5 (DsDD)	0.0 (0)	125.0 (4)
#6 (DsDs)	23.5 (6)	134.5 (6)
#9 (sDDD)	0.0 (0)	301.0 (2)
#10 (sDDs)	31.2 (6)	76.7 (6)
#13 (ssDD)	8.0 (2)	0.0 (0)
#14 (ssDs)	18.0 (2)	125.0 (3)
#16 (ssss)	188.0 (1)	0.0 (0)

N=299

Excludes administration pattern #17 and #18

The number of cases is in parentheses

Eta squared=.18

Table 7-5 demonstrates that numbers of vice presidents alone can explain longevity. It was found that having two or more vice presidents was associated with longer times in office, even within the same administration pattern. It is apparent that presidents are in power longer who have more than one vice president. Eta squared is a strong .18.

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### Example of Many Vice Presidents

An extreme example of the importance of having a large number of vice presidents and changing them often is provided by Houphouet-Boigny. He became president of the Ivory Coast at independence. He held that office with the sincere support of the people and the other African leaders for the rest of his life. He died in office of old age after more than 30 years as head of the country. As counted in this study, his vice presidents number 67. The most any other president is credited as having is 23.

### Possible Interpretation

The finding that increasing the number of vice presidents without changing their ethnicity contributes to longevity was not anticipated, but the literature on the Middle East contains an explanation why it should be so (Bill 1975, p. 20). The former Shah of Iran protected himself from coups by his officials through instability of tenure. The Shah moved his closest officials in and out of government and from position to position frequently and unpredictably. What the bureaucratic world would call "personnel turmoil"

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prevented any one person or small group of people from organizing a power base or acquiring enough influence to challenge the Shah. In general, whenever a person is removed from a group those remaining must adjust their interpersonal relationships to compensate for the loss. At the same time, whenever a new person enters a group, those already present must change their relationships among themselves to accommodate the newcomer, and they must also build relationships with the newcomer. A conspiracy against a shah or king or president depends critically on unusual trust among the conspirators due to the great danger involved in such an enterprise. Such trust must be built over a long period of stable relationships. Frequent changes of officials in and out of government positions moves people out of contact with each other before the necessary personal knowledge can be acquired and the exceptionally high level of trust can be established. This system worked well for the Shah of Iran. In the end he was not deposed by any of his own officials but by the power of an entirely different institution, religion.

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Appointing many vice presidents for short time periods, whether singly or in groups, can broaden the president's base of support among different sectors of the population. Every vice president is attached to a different group of supporters. Even if all the vice presidents come from the same ethnic group, their social circles would not overlap completely. Most politicians seek to gain as many supporters as possible from as many different groups as possible. Relatively rapid changes of officials, including the vice presidents, would bring more people into the president's base of support.

#### Direction of Causality

The finding that number of vice presidents is dramatically associated with increase in presidential longevity raises the fundamental question of direction of causality. At first it appears that having many vice presidents increases time in office. But it is equally true that a president who is in power a long time has more opportunity to appoint many vice presidents.

Conspicuous examples in African history show that a person can be in power a long time and not have many vice presidents. Two presidents are examples of leaders who had many years in which to appoint many vice presidents and who did not. The best known is Nkrumah of Ghana. Nkrumah was in power many years and did not appoint even one vice president. Kerekou of Benin is not as well known but he was in power longer, well over 30 years, and as far as can be determined never appointed a vice president either.

Many tests were conducted in an effort to solve the problem of direction of causality. The following variables were investigated: number of vice presidents, type of vice presidency, percent of time the administration is ethnically mixed, and percent of time in a type of vice presidency. These variables were then included with others in regression analysis. Other research questions were considered. Causality is discussed further at the end of the analysis.

#### Type of Vice Presidency

The question of number of vice presidents also involves the question of type of vice presidency. It will be

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remembered that three types of vice presidency were identified in the data. They are labeled "no vice president" (administration pattern #17), "single vice president," and "multiple vice presidents" (administration pattern #18). Perhaps it is more important that vice presidents be appointed in groups rather than singly. The conspicuously successful Houphouet-Boigny almost always had multiple vice presidents. Usually he had more than two vice presidents at a time. Often he had four or five and once he had ten. Table 7-7 shows the relationship of type of vice presidency and presidential longevity.

For Table 7-6, each president is coded in one of three categories. The first category, "No VPs", is presidents who never appointed a vice president as far as can be determined. Examples of this category have already been given. The second category, "Single VPs," is those presidents who only had one vice president at a time. Such a president might have had just one vice president the whole time in office, or might have appointed many vice presidents in all but appointed only one at a time in the US style. An example is Ramgoolam of the Comoros who was in power 171 months. Ramgoolam changed vice

presidents ten times but never had more than one vice president at a time. The third category, "Multiple VPs," is presidents who during all or even just part of their time in office had two or more vice presidents at the same time. Houphouet-Boigny again is the supreme example but there are many others. Kenyatta of Kenya had a total of four different government administrations. In three of those administrations he appointed only one vice president. In one of his administrations he appointed three vice presidents at one time. Therefore, Kenyatta is coded in the "multiple vice presidents" category.

Table 7-6. Types of Vice Presidency and President's Mean Months in Power

VPs	Months	S.D.	N
No VPs	48.4	66.6	19
Single VPs	97.4	93.2	95
Multiple VPs	124.1	99.5	41

N=155

Eta squared = .05

Table 7-6 shows that the type of vice presidency has a clearly linear association with longevity. Having two or more

vice presidents at the same time is associated with more mean months in power (124) than having either single vice presidents (97) or no vice presidents at all (48). However, in spite of the large differences in mean months between categories, the eta squared is a negligible .05.

#### Ethnicity vs Numbers

The analysis must now consider the relative influence on presidential longevity of three interrelated variables: 1) ethnic diversity of vice presidents, 2) number of vice presidents and, 3) type of vice presidency. The analysis is complicated by the practice of some presidents to use all these variables in different combinations. After some experimentation the variables were reconceptualized and four new variables were created.

#### Proportion of Time the Administration is Ethnically Mixed

The first new variable is the proportion of a president's time in office during which the group comprised of the president and all the vice presidents is ethnically mixed. The unit for this variable is the president and all

that president's vice presidents no matter how long or how short a time that president was in office. For example, Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast has been introduced as having appointed 67 vice presidents while he was president. He is calculated as having been in office 388 months during the time covered by this study. In 350 of those months the group comprising him and all his vice presidents was ethnically mixed. That is, at least one person in that group was of a different ethnic origin than was Boigny. In practice, Boigny nearly always had at least two vice presidents from a different ethnic group. On the new variable, Boigny was coded as having a 90 percent ethnically mixed presidency. Another example is Tsiranana of Madagascar who was in office 143 months. During that time he appointed a vice president from outside his ethnic group a total of only 15 months. Tsiranana was coded as having a 10 percent ethnically mixed presidency.

Table 7-7 presents the relationship of mean months in power with the proportion of time the administration was ethnically mixed. Eta squared is a very strong .24.

Table 7-7. Proportion of the Total Administration Which Is  
Ethnically Mixed and President's Mean Months in Power

Proportion Mixed	Mean Months	S.D.	N
0.0%	75.7	91.0	43
1-10	182.8	68.1	5
11-20	162.0	107.9	6
21-30	163.4	111.1	7
31-40	139.6	77.4	7
41-50	204.3	101.9	6
51-60	113.0	132.7	5
61-70	94.0	63.7	5
71-80	124.0	65.2	6
81-90	209.0	165.7	3
91-99	160.9	84.5	8
100%	61.3	63.5	32

N=133

Excludes presidents who never appointed any vice president at all.

Eta squared=.24

The important point to note in table 7-7 is that the shortest times in power are associated with the two end categories. Presidents having ethnically homogenous administrations were in power a mean of about 76 months. Presidents having all their administrations ethnically mixed



were in power a mean of 61 months. With one exception, the categories of ethnic mixture from one to 99 percent are associated with well over 100 mean months in power.

Proportion of Time in a Type of Vice Presidency

The variable, Type of Vice Presidency, was recoded into three variables: 1) the proportion of time in power during which the president had no vice president at all, 2) the proportion of time in power during which the president had a single vice president and, 3) the proportion of time the president had two or more vice presidents together. For these variables, all those presidents who never appointed any vice president at all, of whatever type, were excluded. That is why the following table does not have the category "100%." The table presents the findings for proportion of time with no vice president and presidential longevity.

Table 7-8. Proportion of the Total Administration With No Vice President and President's Mean Months in Power

Proportion No VP	Mean Months	S.D.	N
0.0%	97.9	96.2	99
1-10	155.6	136.6	5
11-20	98.0	NA	1
21-30	88.0	117.9	6
31-40	155.5	116.5	4
41-50	74.6	57.7	5
51-60	211.7	49.1	3
61-70	143.5	34.3	4
71-80	78.0	NA	1
81-90	181.3	50.8	4
91-99	124.0	NA	1

N=133

Excludes presidents who never appointed any vice presidents at all.

Eta squared=.08

The important point to note in Table 7-8 is that the shortest times in power are associated with the two end categories. Presidents having ethnically homogeneous administrations were in power a mean of about 76 months. Presidents having all their administrations ethnically mixed were in power a mean of 61 months. With one exception, the

categories of ethnic mixture from one to 99 percent are associated with well over 100 mean months in power.

Table 7-9 presents the findings for the relationship of proportion of the time with one vice president and presidential longevity.

The table shows a relationship similar to the one shown in Table 7-7. The two end categories have the fewest mean months in power.

Table 7-9. Proportion of the Total Administration With One Vice President and President's Mean Months in Power

Proportion One VP	Mean Months	S.D.	N
0.0%	35.4	26.4	11
1-10	202.2	123.8	6
11-20	149.7	71.1	7
21-30	131.5	46.0	2
31-40	168.6	85.2	5
41-50	142.1	82.7	9
51-60	77.2	57.4	5
61-70	207.8	145.7	4
71-80	94.1	101.8	8
81-90	109.9	39.3	8
91-99	161.0	77.1	4
100%	89.1	98.2	64

N=133. Excludes presidents who never appointed any vice president at all.  
Eta squared=.19

Table 7-10 presents the findings for proportion of the administration with two or more vice presidents at the same time and presidential longevity.

Table 7-10. Proportion of the Total Administration With Two or More Vice Presidents and President's Mean Months in Power

2+ VPs	Mean Months	S.D.	N
0.0%	100.5	94.8	95
1-10	185.7	57.1	3
11-20	24.0	NA	1
21-30	129.6	46.8	5
31-40	112.5	46.0	2
41-50	341.0	NA	1
51-60	140.0	87.7	3
61-70	166.8	96.3	4
71-80	149.4	148.6	5
81-90	254.0	NA	1
91-99	205.5	75.7	2
100%	35.4	26.4	11

N=133

Excludes presidents who never appointed any vice president at all.

Eta squared=.17

The findings of Table 7-10 are roughly consistent with those of Table 7-9. Table 7-10 shows that presidents who

never appointed any vice president at all had the fewest mean months in power (35.4). In spite of variations in longevity, those presidents who appointed vice presidents between one percent and 99 percent of the time had greater overall mean longevity than those who never appointed a vice president or those who always had a vice president (89.1 mean months).

Why the end categories in these tables should have such low mean months is puzzling. An indication can be found in looking at the presidents who had two or more vice presidents 100 percent of the time, Table 7-10. Two of the presidents were located in Benin and one was in Ethiopia during particularly unstable times in their country's history. Each president had two vice presidents, one from each ethnic group, as a result of formal agreements in the midst of severe ethnic conflict. The agreements had been made specifically in an effort to reduce the conflict. In these cases the agreements were not effective, and the presidents were shortly overthrown.

Zero Order Correlation

Multiple regression analysis was then performed. In preparation for the multiple regression analysis, zero order correlation coefficients were obtained for all the independent variables with each other. One purpose was to identify multicollinearity to eliminate variables from further consideration. Many variables were considered. They can be grouped into two sets. The first set is the variables of vice presidents' ethnicity and number. They are: 1) proportion of the president's total administration that the group comprised of the president and all the vice presidents was ethnically mixed, 2) total number of administration patterns of ethnicity the president had, 3) total number of vice presidents the president had, 4) proportion of the president's total administration with no vice president, 5) proportion of the president's total administration with one vice president and, 6) proportion of the president's total administration with two or more vice presidents at the same time. Tables 7-8 through 7-11 showed non-linear relationships so dummy variables were prepared.

The second set of variables are those of the president's own characteristics. They are: 1) president's historical order as first or later, 2) president's ethnic group as dominant or subordinate, 3) whether or not the president is from the same ethnic group as the army and, 4) president's status as civilian or military.

Because of the large number of variables, the zero order correlation matrix is not presented in a single table. Tables 7-11 through 7-14 present all the coefficients. The first table in this set, Table 7-11, shows the zero order correlation coefficients of all ten variables with the president's months in power. Three numbers are presented for each variable. The top number is the zero order correlation coefficient. The second number, given in parentheses, is the N. The third number is the one-tailed t test of significance. Since the data is from a universe and not a sample, t cannot be interpreted in the usual manner. It is included for those who wish to be guided as if these data are from a sample.

Table 7-11. Zero Order Correlation Coefficients of Variables of Number of Vice Presidents, Ethnicity of Vice Presidents, and President's Characteristics with President's Mean Months in Power

Variable	Coefficient
<b>Vice Presidents</b>	
Number of Vice Presidents	.51 (155) .00
Number of Administration Patterns of Ethnicity	.49 (155) .00
Proportion of ethnic mixing of president and vice presidents (dummy)	.43 (133) .00
Proportion of the presidency with no vice president (dummy)	.31 (133) .00
Proportion of the presidency with one vice president (dummy)	.31 (133) .00
Proportion of the presidency with 2 or more vice presidents (dummy)	.30 (133) .00
<b>President</b>	
Historical order	-.37 (155) .00
Military congruence	-.18 (155) .01
President's ethnic group	.16 (155) .02
President's status as civilian or military	-.06 (155) .24



Table 7-11 shows that all the variables of the vice presidents are strongly correlated with president's time in power. The coefficients range from .51 to .30. Of the variables of president's personal characteristics, only historical order is as strong at  $-.37$ .

Table 7-12 continues the presentation of zero order correlation coefficients in preparation for the multiple regression analysis. Table 7-12 shows the zero order correlation coefficients among those variables themselves which measure number and ethnicity of the vice presidents.

Table 7-12 shows that multicollinearity abounds. All the variables are strongly correlated with each other. Of the 15 coefficients in the matrix, ten are above  $.50$ .

Table 7-13 shows the zero order correlation coefficients for the variables of president's characteristics.

Table 7-12. Zero Order Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Variables of Vice Presidents' Numbers and Ethnicity

	VPs	Patterns	Mixed (dum)	No VP (dum)	1 VP (dum)
Patterns	.47 (155) .00				
Mixed (dummy)	.34 (133) .00	.75 (133) .00			
No VP (dummy)	.33 (133) .00	.73 (133) .00	.57 (133) .00		
1 VP (dummy)	.29 (133) .00	.75 (133) .00	.57 (133) .00	.94 (133) .00	
2+ VPs (dummy)	.53 (133) .00	.53 (133) .00	.40 (133) .00	.59 (133) .00	.53 (133) .00

VPs= number of vice presidents  
 Patterns= number of different patterns of administration ethnicity  
 Mixed= proportion of the total administration ethnically mixed (dummy)  
 No VP= proportion of the total administration with no vice president (dummy)  
 1 VP= proportion of the total administration with one vice president (dummy)  
 2+ VPs= proportion of the total administration with 2 or more vice presidents at the same time (dummy)

Note: The top number given in each set of three numbers is the zero order correlation coefficient. The second number, given in parentheses, is the N. The third number is the one-tailed t test of significance. Since the data are from a universe and not a sample, t cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

Table 7-13. Zero Order Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Variables of President's Characteristics

	Order	Congruence	Group
Congruence	-.00 (155) .49		
Group	.17 (155) .01	-.50 (155) .00	
Civ/Mil	.35 (155) .00	.07 (155) .21	.11 (155) .09

Order= historical order of the president  
 Congruence= military congruency of the president  
 Group= ethnic group of the president  
 Civ/Mil= civilian or military status of the president  
 Note: The top number given is the zero order correlation coefficient. The second number, given in parentheses, is the N. The third number is the one-tailed t test of significance. Since the data are from a universe and not a sample, t cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

The president's ethnic group and congruence are strongly correlated (-.50), which means subordinate group presidents are from the same ethnic group as their armies since armies are overwhelmingly, though not always, from subordinate ethnic groups. President's historical order and civilian or military status are also strongly correlated (.35). First presidents are civilians and later presidents

are about half civilians and half military. The other variables are not correlated with each other.

Table 7-14 is the final table in this series. Table 7-14 presents the zero order correlation coefficients of the two sets of variables with each other.

Table 7-14. Zero Order Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Variables of Vice Presidents' Numbers and Ethnicity and President's Characteristics

	VPs	Patterns	Mixed dummy	No VP dummy	1 VP dummy	2+Vps dummy
Order	-.17 (155)	-.14 (155)	-.12 (133)	-.02 (133)	-.04 (133)	-.10 (133)
	.01	.04	.09	.42	.31	.12
Group	.06 (155)	.03 (155)	.10 (133)	.04 (133)	-.01 (133)	.11 (133)
	.23	.36	.14	.35	.47	.10
Congruence	-.07 (133)	-.10 (133)	-.02 (133)	-.08 (133)	-.05 (133)	-.13 (133)
	.19	.12	.40	.18	.28	.07
Civ/Mil	-.03 (155)	.01 (155)	.07 (133)	.15 (133)	.14 (134)	.07 (133)
	.35	.45	.21	.04	.05	.20

VPs= number of vice presidents

Patterns= number of different patterns of administration ethnicity

Mixed= proportion of the total administration ethnically mixed (dummy)

No VP= proportion of the total administration with no vice president (dummy)

1 VP= proportion of the total administration with one vice president (dummy)

2+VPs= proportion of the total administration with 2 or more vice presidents at the same time (dummy)

Order= historical order of the president

Group= ethnic group of the president

Congruence=military congruency of the president

Civ/Mil= civilian or military status of the president

Note: The top number in each set of numbers is the zero order correlation coefficient. The second number, in parentheses, is the N. The third number is the one-tailed t test of significance. Since the data are from a universe and not a sample, t cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

The table shows that the two sets of variables are either weakly or negligibly related to each other. Of the 24 coefficients in the matrix, all are smaller than .20. Thirteen are smaller than .10. In other words, the two sets are free of multicollinearity.

### Regression Analysis

Table 7-15 presents the standardized multiple regression coefficients obtained for the variables of vice presidents and presidents. The purpose of this table is to eliminate from further consideration those variables with too small regression coefficients. Included in the table is the t significance test for those who wish to be guided as if these data were from a sample instead of a universe.

Table 7-15. Standardized Multiple Regression Coefficients  
with President's Mean Months in Power

Variable	Coefficient	T	Significance
Number of VPs	.35	4.4	.00
Order	-.33	-4.7	.00
Patterns	.22	1.7	.09
Group	.16	2.1	.04
Mixed (dum)	.13	1.3	.19
2+VPs (dum)	.12	-1.3	.20
Congruence	-.06	-.8	.43
1 VP (dum)	.04	.2	.85
No VP (dum)	-.03	-.2	.88

N=133

Excludes presidents who never appointed any vice presidents at all  
Adjusted R Square=.43.

Number of VPs= total number of vice presidents a president had

order= whether the president is the first or later one

Patterns= total number of patterns of administration ethnicity a president had

Group= whether the president comes from the dominant or subordinate ethnic group

Mixed(dum)= the dummy variable for proportion of time in power that the group comprised of the president and all the vice presidents was ethnically mixed

2+VPs= the proportion of time the president had two or more vice presidents at the same time

Congruence= whether the president is from the same ethnic group as the army or another one

1 VP(dum)= the dummy variable for the proportion of time the president had one vice president

No VP(dum)= the dummy variable for the proportion of time the president had not vice president.

Note: The one-tailed t test of significance is provided but it cannot be interpreted in the usual manner since the data are from a universe and not a sample.

Table 7-15 shows three variables with standardized regression coefficients under .10. These can be eliminated from further consideration. They are: military congruence (-.06), proportion of time with one vice president (.04), and proportion of time with no vice president (-.03). The variable of president's civilian/military status has already been eliminated since it had a very small correlation coefficient (-.06) with president's months in power (Table 7-12). In addition, two more variables can be eliminated for considerations of multicollinearity. It will be remembered that all the variables of number and ethnicity of vice presidents are strongly correlated with each other. Thus the variable of proportion of time the president had an ethnically mixed administration is very strongly correlated with number of patterns of ethnicity (.75). The variable of proportion of time the president had two or more vice presidents at once is very strongly correlated with number of patterns of ethnicity (.53) (Table 7-13). Eliminating these two dummy variables has an added advantage. All the regression analysis performed with dummy variables includes only presidents who always had a vice president of one type



or another. Leaving out the dummy variables has the advantage of including all the 155 presidents in the study.

Table 7-16 presents the standardized multiple regression coefficients for all the presidents for the four most important variables for longevity.

Table 7-16. Standardized Multiple Regression Coefficients with President's Months in Power

Variable	Coefficient	T	Significance
Number of VPs	.306	4.4	.00
Order	-.303	-4.8	.00
Patterns	.300	4.4	.00
Group	.187	3.0	.00

N=155

Adjusted R Square=.43

Number of VPs= total number of vice presidents a president had

Order= whether the president is the first or later one


Patterns= total number of patterns of administration ethnicity a president had

Group= whether the president comes from the dominant or subordinate ethnic group

Note: The one-tailed t test of significance is provided but it cannot be interpreted in the usual manner since the data are from a universe and not a sample.

Table 7-16 presents the interesting finding that three variables are essentially equally important for presidential longevity: total number of vice presidents (.306), historical order (-.303), and number of administration patterns of ethnicity (.300). The fourth variable, president's ethnic group, is considerably less influential (.187). The adjusted R square is a good .43. Table 7-17 is diagramed in Figure 7-A below.

Figure 7-A. Standardized Multiple Regression  
on Presidential Longevity



N=155

All presidents in power 5 or more years

Adj R Square=.36

X1 = Total number of vice presidents

X2 = President's historical order

1=first 2=later

Negative coefficient means the first presidents  
are in power longer

X3 = Number of administration ethnicity patterns

X4 = President's ethnic group

1-dominant 2=subordinate

Positive coefficient means the subordinate group  
presidents are in power longer

$$Y = .306X1 + -.303X2 + .300X3 + .187X4$$

Number vs Ethnicity of Vice Presidents

Figure 7-A can contribute to the question asked early in the chapter about whether just numbers alone can explain presidential longevity or whether ethnic diversity is the explanation. This study is based on the hypothesized fundamental importance of diversity. The answer is that the two variables are inextricably interrelated. Figure 7-A shows a strong correlation (.47) between number of ethnic patterns and number of vice presidents.

Presidents have achieved ethnic diversity in their administrations in more than one way. One way is to choose one vice president from outside their own group and either keep that one the whole time or select successor vice presidents also from outside their own group. Another way is to appoint two or more vice presidents at a time, with at least one of the vice presidents from outside their own ethnic group. Lastly, they appoint one vice president at a time but alternate the ethnic origins of the vice presidents between the dominant and subordinate groups in the country. It was shown that this approach is especially associated with long times in power.

It is clear that all but one method presidents use to vary the ethnicity of their administrations absolutely requires a larger number of vice presidents. Only if a president chooses one vice president from a different ethnic group and keeps that one vice president for the whole time in power, can a president achieve ethnic diversity with a small number of vice presidents. One president who followed that formula is Eyadema of Togo. Eyadema, from the subordinate Kabrai group, had one vice president, Lacle, from the dominant Ewe, for many years. Few long-term presidents have chosen that method. Most long-term presidents alternate their vice presidents from different ethnic groups. A few appoint two or more vice presidents at the same time with at least one vice president from a different ethnic group. As a general rule it is not possible to have ethnic diversity without also having a number of different vice presidents.

#### Important Variables for Presidential Longevity

Briefly stated, three variables emerge from this analysis as equally important above all others for presidential longevity in Sub-Saharan African countries. Two

of these can be combined into a "double" variable. They are: 1) the combination of the number of vice presidents and ethnic diversity of vice presidents, 2) being the first president after independence and, 3) being from a subordinate ethnic group. The last variable is important because most African armies are heavily drawn from the subordinate ethnic group. The importance of the first variable is related to it. A president from the dominant ethnic group can overcome the "disadvantage" of not being from a subordinate group by ensuring ethnic diversity among the vice presidents or being the president of independence.

Previous work (Bienen and Van de Walle, 1991) established historical order as an important variable in presidential longevity. This research adds a new variable in the search for causes. Until now, the importance of the vice president was not even suspected.

### Conclusion

This investigation into what variables are important for presidential longevity has led to the discovery of the vice president as an unsuspected, key variable. It was found

that half the presidents changed the ethnic pattern of their administrations. Those who did not only stayed in power longer but changed their administration patterns of ethnicity in only one way. Long lasting presidents alternated the ethnic origins of their vice presidents between the dominant and subordinate groups in the country. Such a strategy might contribute to longevity in two ways. One would be to extend the president's base of support beyond the president's own ethnic group. Another would be to reduce the cohesion of those closest to the president which would reduce the probability of coups.





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*ETHNIC REPRESENTATION AND STABILITY IN  
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS: A MULTIPLE REGRESSION  
STUDY OF 45 COUNTRIES*

*VOLUME II*

*By*

*Phyllis A. Puffer*

*A DISSERTATION*

*Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of*

*DOCTORAL OF PHILOSOPHY*

*Department of Sociology*

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## CHAPTER 8

### THE FUTURE

#### Introduction

The countries collectively known as black African are entering a new stage of political reality. Their first presidents have nearly all left. Only two new countries, Namibia and Eritrea, have been created in the last decade, establishing only two recent first presidents in the region. At this point, no new countries are reasonably predicted. Repeatedly and consistently, the data has shown that first presidents differ from later presidents. In a future with essentially only later presidents, what can be expected about presidential longevity and ethnicity?

#### Future Importance of Ethnicity

Since no new first presidents are expected, the variable of ethnicity could be even more important in the future than in the past. The variables consistently ranking second in importance after presidential historical order have

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all been variables of ethnicity. The first presidents have been shown to be less affected by ethnicity than the later presidents. Removing all first presidents from the analysis should give us a glimpse into the future and should tell us how important ethnicity might be.

### Methodology

The preceding multiple regression analysis was repeated for later presidents alone. All first presidents were omitted. Simultaneously, the outlier Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast who had so many vice presidents and who changed them so often, was also removed. In the previous analysis, it will be remembered that sitting presidents were removed from the data base who had been in power fewer than five years as of 31 December 1992. At that time, it was not known whether the "short timer" presidents would be long lasting presidents or would be out of power soon afterwards. A rapid glance through the documents showed that as of 31 December 1995 most of them remained in power. Only eleven of these presidents had been replaced. Further, for the purposes of answering the present question, it is important to know about all the

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recent presidents, no matter how new they are to their positions. The data has shown that the important distinction is between first and all later presidents with relatively unimportant distinctions among the later presidents themselves. Therefore, all those presidents who had been removed from the preceding analysis because they had been in power fewer than five years were put back in the data set.

### Findings

The following series of tables begins with the zero order correlation coefficients and proceeds to the standardized multiple regression coefficients. Table 8-1 presents the zero order correlation coefficients of all the variables with the president's time in power. The variables are divided into two categories. First are the characteristics of the vice presidents and second are the characteristics of the president.

Table 8-1 shows that the characteristics of the vice presidents have larger zero order correlation coefficients with length of time in power than do the president's personal characteristics. The number of administration patterns of

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ethnicity the president had has the largest zero order correlation coefficient (.57). The coefficient for the total number of vice presidents a president had is a close second (.52). Contrary to the findings for the first group of presidents, for these presidents historical order has the smallest zero order correlation coefficient (-.15). It will be remembered that previously the correlation coefficient for president's historical order and length of time in power was the largest. The small correlation coefficient for later presidents confirms findings elsewhere that the important distinction is between the first president and all the others who follow. It is shown here that among the later presidents, it does not seem to make much difference whether the president is the second or the ninth.

The next three tables present the zero order correlation coefficients of the variables with each other. First is the relationship of the vice presidential variables with each other.

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Table 8-1. Zero Order Correlation Coefficients for Variables of Vice Presidents and Presidents and Presidential Longevity for Later Presidents

Variable	Coefficient
<b>Vice Presidents</b>	
Months in Power	
Number of Administration Patterns of Ethnicity	.57 (124) .00
Number of Vice Presidents	.52 (124) .00
Proportion of ethnic mixing of president and vice presidents (dummy)	.46 (105) .00
Proportion of the time in power with one vice president (dummy)	.45 (105) .00
Proportion of the time in power with no vice president (dummy)	.43 (94) .00
Proportion of the time in power with multiple vice presidents (dummy)	.31 (105) .00
<b>Presidents</b>	
Military congruence	-.28 (124) .00
President's ethnic group	.28 (124) .00
President's status as civilian or military	.16 (124) .03
Historical order	-.15 (124) .05

Note: The top number in each set of three numbers is the zero order correlation coefficient. The second number (in parentheses), is the N. The third number is the one-tailed t test of significance. Since the data is from a universe and not a sample, t cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

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Table 8-2. Zero Order Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Variables of Vice Presidents' Numbers and Ethnicity for Later Presidents

	Patterns	VPs	Mixed dum	1 VP dum	No VP dum
VPs	.48 (124) .00				
Mixed dummy	.78 (105) .00	.38 (105) .00			
1 VP dummy	.78 (105) .00	.34 (105) .00	.63 (105) .00		
No VP dummy	.76 (105) .00	.43 (94) .00	.63 (94) .00	.91 (94) .00	
2+ VPs dummy	.53 (105) .00	.65 (105) .00	.36 (105) .00	.46 (105) .00	.55 (94) .00

Patterns= number of different patterns of administration ethnicity  
 VPs= total number of vice presidents  
 Mixed= proportion of the total administration ethnically mixed (dummy)  
 1 VP= proportion of the total administration with one vice president (dummy)  
 No VP= proportion of the total administration with no vice president (dummy)  
 2+ VPs= proportion of the total administration with 2 or more vice presidents at the same time (dummy)

Note: The top number in each set of three numbers is the zero order correlation coefficient. The second number (in parentheses), is the N. The third number is the one-tailed t test of significance. Since the data is from a universe and not a sample, t cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

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Table 8-2 shows that these variables are just as strongly correlated with each other for later presidents as they are for first presidents. The zero order correlation coefficients range from .34 to .91.

Table 8-3 presents the relationships of the variables of the president's characteristics with each other.

Table 8-3. Zero Order Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Variables of President's Characteristics

	Congruence	Group	Civ/Mil
Group	-.56 (124) .00		
Civ/Mil	-.15 (124) .00	.14 (124)	
Order	.03 (124) .36	.03 (124)	.06 (124)
VPs	-.18 (124) .02	.15 (124) .05	.10 (124) .13

Group=ethnic group of the president

Civ/Mil=civilian or military status of the president

Order=historical order of the president

Congruence=military congruency of the president

VPs=number of vice presidents

Note: The top number in each of three numbers is the zero order correlation coefficient. The second number (in parentheses) is the N. The third number is the one-tailed t test of significance. Since the data is from a universe and not a sample, t cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

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Table 8-3 shows that in general these characteristics are not strongly related to each other for the later presidents. The exception is the coefficient for the ethnic group the president comes from and whether or not the president and the army are from the same ethnic group (-.56). Comparing Table 8-3 and 7-13 shows that this coefficient is a little larger for later presidents than for first presidents (-.50). This means that later presidents are more likely to be from the same ethnic group as their armies.

Table 8-4 presents the zero order correlation coefficients for the two sets of variables with each other.

Table 8-4 essentially repeats the findings of Table 7-14 in the last chapter. For both groups of presidents the two sets of variables are weakly or negligibly related. Only two of the 24 zero order correlation coefficients are larger than .20. All other coefficients are smaller than .15 and 14 are .10 or smaller.

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Table 8-4. Zero Order Correlation Coefficients of Variables of Vice Presidents' Numbers and Ethnicity and President's Characteristics for Later Presidents

	Pattern	VPs	Mixed dumm	1 VP dumm	No Vp dumm	2+ VPs dumm
Congruence	-.10 (124)	-.19 (124)	-.10 (105)	.01 (105)	-.02 (94)	-.08 (105)
	.14	.02	.16	.45	.43	.20
Group	.07 (124)	.15 (124)	.11 (105)	-.00 (105)	.02 (94)	.11 (105)
	.21	.05	.13	.50	.43	.14
Civ/Mil	.15 (124)	.10 (124)	.18 (105)	.26 (105)	.24 (94)	.12 (105)
	.05	.13	.03	.00	.00	.12
Order	-.14 (124)	-.08 (124)	-.03 (105)	-.05 (105)	-.02 (94)	.04 (105)
	.06	.20	.37	.32	.44	.34

Congruence= military congruency of the president

Group= ethnic group of the president

Civ/Mil= civilian or military status of the president

Order= historical order of the president

Pattern= number of different patterns of administration  
ethnicity

Vps= total number of vice presidents

Mixed= proportion of the total administration ethnically  
mixed (dummy)

1 VP= proportion of the total administration with one  
vice president (dummy)

No VP= proportion of the total administration with no  
vice president (dummy)

2+Vps= proportion of the total administration with 2 or  
more vice presidents at the same time (dummy)

Note: The top number in the set of three numbers in the table is the zero order correlation coefficient. The second number (in parentheses), is the N. The third number is the one-tailed t test of significance. Since the data is from a universe and not a sample, t cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

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Standardized multiple regression coefficients were obtained for all the variables in Table 8-1. Table 8-1 shows ten variables but SPSS will accept only nine variables for one equation. Therefore, two regressions were prepared, one for each of the two variables with the smallest zero order correlation coefficients with president's months in power. The first set of standardized multiple regression coefficients included the variable of civilian/military status of the president. In that equation, the adjusted R square was .50 and the standardized regression coefficient for civilian/military status was .03. The second equation substituted the variable of president's historical order for the variable of civilian/military status. In that equation the adjusted R square was .51 and the standardized regression coefficient was -.13. Table 8-5 presents those coefficients.

Table 8-5. Standardized Multiple Regression Coefficients  
For All Variables With President's Mean Months in Power  
for Later Presidents

Variable	Coefficient	T	Significance
Patterns	.50	3.2	.00
VPs	.46	4.6	.00
2+ VPs (dum)	-.30	-2.8	.00
Group	.20	2.3	.02
Order	-.13	-1.7	.10
Congruence	-.12	-1.4	.16
1 VP (dum)	-.03	-.2	.85
Mixed (dum)	-.06	-.5	.60
No VP (dum)	-.03	-.2	.86

N=94

Adj R Square=.51

Patterns= number of different patterns of administration  
ethnicity

Vps= total number of vice presidents

2+ Vps= proportion of the total administration with more  
than one vice president (dummy)

Group= ethnic group of the president

Order= historical order of the president

Congruence=military congruency of the president

1 VP(dum)=proportion of the total administration with one  
vice president (dummy)

Mixed(dum)=proportion of the total administration  
ethnically mixed (dummy)

No VP(dum)=proportion of the total administration with no  
vice president (dummy)

Note: The t test of significance is reported, but since the  
data is from a universe and not a sample, it cannot be  
interpreted in the usual manner.

Table 8-5 shows that three variables can be eliminated immediately because of very small standardized regression coefficients. These are the three dummy variables for type of vice presidency: proportion of time the president had one vice president (-.03), proportion of time the president had an ethnically mixed administration (-.06), and proportion of time the president had no vice president at all (-.03). A fourth variable can be eliminated because of multicollinearity. The variable of proportion of time the president had more than one vice president has a large standardized regression coefficient (-.30), but Table 8-2 showed that it also had large zero order correlation coefficients with two variables: number of vice presidents (.65) and number of different patterns of ethnicity (.53). An important advantage lies in the elimination of all the dummy variables. The N for the data with the dummy variables is only 94. Without the dummy variables all the presidents can be included, giving a more realistic analysis.

Table 8-6 presents the standardized multiple regression coefficients for the new equation.

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Table 8-6. Standardized Multiple Regression Coefficients  
for Five Variables With President's Mean Months in Power  
for Later Presidents

Variable	Coefficient	T	Significance
Patterns	.40	5.1	.00
Vps	.27	3.5	.00
Group	.16	1.9	.06
Congruence	-.11	-1.3	.20
Order	-.07	-.1	.33

N=124

Adj R Square=.43

Patterns= number of different patterns of administration  
ethnicity

Vps= total number of vice presidents

Group= ethnic group of the president

Congruence=military congruency of the president

Order= historical order of the president

Note: The t test of significance is reported, but since the data is from a universe and not a sample, it cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

Table 8-6 shows a reduction in the adjusted R square from .51 to .43, but it is still a strong relationship. Two more variables can be removed. Presidential historical order has a very small standardized regression coefficient (-.07). The variable of military congruence is still negligible (-.11) and it is also strongly correlated with president's

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ethnic group (-.56, Table 8-3). Therefore, it too can be removed. The standardized multiple regression coefficients for the remaining three variables are presented in Table 8-7.

Table 8-7. Standardized Multiple Regression Coefficients  
For Three Variables with President's Mean Months in  
Power for Later Presidents

Variable	Coefficient	T	Significance
Patterns	.41	5.3	.00
VPs	.29	3.6	.00
Group	.21	3.0	.00

N=124

Adj R Square=.43

Patterns= number of different patterns of administration  
ethnicity

Vps= total number of vice presidents

Group= ethnic group of the president

Note: The t test of significance is reported, but since the data is from a universe and not a sample, it cannot be interpreted in the usual manner.

Table 8-7 shows first of all that reducing the number of variables from five to three has no effect on the adjusted R square which remains .43. The variable for the number of patterns of ethnicity remains the most important variable in the equation (.41). The variable for the number of vice presidents remains the second most important (.29). The final

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
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result of this series of tables is that three variables have been shown to be the most important for presidential longevity: 1) having at least two different patterns of administration ethnicity, 2) having a large number of vice presidents and, 3) being from a subordinate ethnic group. This conclusion is diagramed in Figure 8-A.

Figure 8-3




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X1 = number  
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$$Y = .41X1$$

Figure 8-A. Standardized multiple Regression Equation for Longevity for Future Presidents



N=124

Adjusted R Square = .43

X1 = number of patterns of ethnicity

X2 = number of vice presidents

X3 = president's ethnic group

1=dominant

2=subordinate

positive coefficient means that longevity is associated with subordinate group membership

$$Y = .41X1 + .29X2 + .21X3$$

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Past and Future Presidents

Table 8-8 provides a comparison of Figure 7-A and Figure 8-A as a way of comparing the final results for the two groups of presidents.

Table 8-8 shows several important differences between the presidents of the past and those of the present and presumably the future. A striking difference is that historical order of the president is not important for the second group of presidents. All later presidents are the same on this variable. For the second group of presidents, the most important variable is having a large number of different patterns of administration ethnicity. In other words, ethnic diversity is by far the most important variable for staying in power a longer period of time. The largest standardized regression coefficient is .41 for number of different patterns of ethnicity. The standardized regression coefficient for the president's ethnic group is slightly larger for the second group of presidents than for the first group of presidents. The coefficient increases from .19 for the first group of presidents to .21 for the second group. Since this variable is strongly correlated with the variable

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of ethnic congruence of the president and the military (-.56, Table 8-3), the coefficient probably signals an even greater importance of the military in the future than in the past.

Table 8-8. Comparison of Past and Present Presidents with Present and Future Presidents:

Summary of Figure 7-A and Figure 8-A

Variable	Past and Present Presidents Figure 7-A	Present and Future Presidents Figure 8-A
Number of VPs	.31	.29
Historical order	-.30	NA
Number of patterns	.30	.41
Group	.19	.21
Adjusted R Square	.36	.43
N	155	124

Number of Vps= total number of vice presidents a president had  
 Historical order= historical order of the president  
 Number of patterns= number of different patterns of administration ethnicity

Note: Numbers have been rounded to two decimal points

#### Future Role of African Armies

The slightly increased importance of military congruence indicated in Table 8-10, directly reflects the removal of the first presidents. A higher proportion of first presidents than later presidents were dominants who had

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subordinate armies. The unique dynamics of the first presidencies and possibly of first presidents themselves reduced the importance of ethnicity for longevity in previous calculations. The finding substantiates the often made qualitative observation that both the military and ethnicity have increased in importance in public life since independence.

Many negative things can legitimately be said about African armies (DeCalo 1989). As a whole, they are incompetent, corrupt, predatory, cruel and opportunistic. They do not have a legitimate mission since African countries do not have foreign enemies for the most part. The African armies blackmail the legitimate government for an ever greater share of a far too small national budget. Wherever low ranking troops can get the opportunity, they demand/take possessions and money from the poor (Shoumatoff 1984, p. 115). Wherever high ranking officers can get the opportunity they demand and receive bribes and spend on duty time building their private businesses (Decalo 1976, p. 233). Most African countries would be better off with a high quality police force in the tradition of Costa Rica in Central

America. Costa Rica is well known for political stability and economic prosperity and much of it is considered due to its lack of an army.

All of the foregoing complaints against African armies are too well documented to be disputed. At the same time, it must also be admitted, albeit reluctantly, that the army is an important avenue of upward mobility for the historically subordinate groups. The army is the only concentration of subordinate group members in the national government. These data unequivocally show that the military is the source, and an increasingly important source, of presidents of African countries. But it has also been shown that, at least for the early presidents, the military status of a president is less important than the ethnic affiliation of a president. A civilian from a subordinate ethnic group is at least as acceptable to the army as is a military person from a subordinate ethnic group. The role of African armies in the future will be the same as in the past. African armies will seek to put in power and to keep in power a co-ethnic president, whether military or civilian. From the standpoint of the West, the challenge for African politics is to find a

civilian from a subordinate ethnic group as a candidate for the presidency. The continuing difficulty is how to bring a civilian subordinate group leader to power in a non-elective, ethnically divided, political system.

### Conclusion

The data all indicate a continued and even increased importance of ethnicity for presidential longevity in the future. It will be important that presidents appoint their vice presidents from ethnic groups outside their own. Having more than one vice president at a time from different ethnic groups is one way to achieve this goal.

## CHAPTER 9

### CONCLUSION

#### The Study in Brief

This research began with the observation that in the two tiny West African countries of Togo and Benin a rapid series of destructive coups suddenly and completely stopped. An hypothesis was proposed to explain the phenomenon. The hypothesis was narrow and strictly defined: A government is in power longer if 1) the president is from the historically subordinate ethnic group, 2) the vice president is from the historically dominant group, 3) the civil service is from the dominant group and, 4) the army is from the subordinate group. The dominant ethnic group is the one in the country which had the most power, wealth, and education during the colonial era. The subordinate group had little power, wealth, and education during the colonial era. The hypothesis is based on Consociational Theory which says that government stability can be achieved in deeply ethnically divided

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societies if the diverse ethnic groups are all included in decision making at the top levels of government.

Using documents supplemented by informants, eight pieces of data were collected: ethnic origin of the president, date entered office, date left office, ethnic origin of the vice president, date entered office, date left office, ethnic origin of the civil service, and ethnic origin of the army. Data was also gathered on 12 control variables of the country's ethnicity, geography, and politics, and three control variables of the president's characteristics.

It was found that presidents apparently remained in power longer through ethnic diversity of their vice presidents. The presidents accomplished vice presidential diversity mainly by appointing vice presidents alternately from the dominant and subordinate ethnic groups. Another way of achieving diversity was to appoint the vice president only from outside the president's own ethnic group. A third method used was to appoint at least two vice presidents at the same time but from different ethnic groups. One president could employ all techniques at various times while in office.

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In short, the hypothesis as originally stated was rejected, but the principle that stability is associated with inclusion of the diverse ethnic groups in decision making was strongly supported. The major conclusion of the study is that including all important ethnic groups at the highest level of the government is not merely important. It is vital.

#### Contributions of the Study

This chapter will present how these findings contribute to political sociology and our understanding of African governments. The findings as new pieces of data are valuable in themselves, but they have also added to various larger bodies of knowledge. Not only the findings, but other aspects of the study, have contributed to larger bodies of knowledge such as to theory and research methods. In addition, some interpretation and speculation are undertaken here which did not find a place in previous pages. It is difficult to rank the various contributions in order of importance but an attempt was made.



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*Vice President*

Possibly one of the most important contributions is the discovery of the role of the office of vice president in Sub-Saharan African governments. The vice presidency is strictly defined in this study. It is that office next to the president which has no established area of jurisdiction, and consequently no independent power base apart from the president. The vice president is an official who depends utterly on the president. Not only is it by definition a weak and powerless position, the vice presidents in this study were regarded by informants as powerless and unimportant. Informants did not consider the vice president as worthy of attention and more than likely wondered why time was being wasted collecting data on them.

As revealed in this study, the African vice presidency contrasts strongly with the same office in the U.S. In the U.S., the office of vice president is institutionalized. Throughout the African region, with rare exceptions, the office is poorly institutionalized. In the first place, there are no fixed terms in office. As a practical matter, presidents do not have fixed terms in office either. But the

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vice president serves very much at the "grace and pleasure" of the president in the monarchical sense. The president is free to replace the vice president at any time. Some vice presidents serve many years, some only a few months. Furthermore, the office itself is not fixed. The position comes and goes. Sometimes this position is listed in the government table of organization for a country and sometimes it is not. In addition, the title of the position changes not only from president to president, but also at different times under the same president. Finally, the number of vice presidents changes not only from president to president but also under the same president. Although the number of vice presidents in office at any one time can vary, a president rarely has more than three simultaneously. The uninstitutionalized nature of the vice presidency is itself an indication of its weakness.

Perhaps the weakness of the vice presidency preserves the unity of the government. A vice president with an independent power base could challenge the president and produce a split at the top of the government, in other words a coup or rebellion and instability. This is an important

point, easily overlooked. It is difficult to consider that at the summit of society a weak position might exist and might be a good thing.

The major premise of this study is that different ethnic groups in the country should be present in the central government for national unity. It seems intuitively reasonable that a leader from one ethnic group will not bring into the same office a strong leader from another and probably antagonistic ethnic group. Possibly the weakness of the vice presidency encourages group contact in this case. Not only the weakness of the position would be important. A leader of another ethnic group with a strong and united personal following also would threaten the structure at the top of a divided society.

Structure is one aspect of the groups' relationship. Another is social process. Granovetter's (1973) theory of weak ties might indicate how the weak and non-threatening vice presidency could contribute to presidential longevity in office. It is possible that information contribution to stability could be flowing back and forth between the different ethnic groups through the "weak tie" (Granovetter

1973) of the vice president. Such information might include politically relevant socio-economic and cultural perceptions and conditions. More than likely also present is an informal flow of more tangible resources along kin, patron-client, and village lines. These bureaucracies are what Weber would characterize as "traditional" and "patrimonial" in contrast with our own "legal-rational" bureaucracies (Parsons, 1947, p. 329-358). This informal flow of resources is more commonly called "corruption" by Western observers. It is a system of its own, with its own internal rationality, and it is highly vulnerable to being cut off by ethnic exclusiveness.

Furthermore, the vice president from the "out" group might play an important symbolic role. "That's 'our man' up there." In this way "out groupers" could be attached to a government. In this way a president could expand the government's power base and attract the loyalty of one more group.

#### *Military Presidents*

Possibly an equally important contribution of this study is the explanation it provides for the plethora of

military presidents in the region. Perhaps the explanation can be extended to other Third World regions as well. In all calculations with the African presidents, which ethnic group the president came from was shown to be more important for longevity than whether the president was civilian or military. Many will find this result difficult to believe. The explanation lies in the ethnic occupational specialization of these societies. Armies are usually drawn disproportionately from the subordinate group. Armies have been more likely to challenge presidents from the outside dominant groups, whether military or civilian, than they have been to challenge presidents from their own subordinate group. Apparently, armies accept civilian presidents from their own ethnic group before they accept military presidents from outside their ethnic group.

#### *Military Congruence Hypothesis*

The phenomenon just explained is related to the military congruence hypothesis (Horowitz 1985). That is, if the president and the army are from the same ethnic group, the president will be in power longer than if the president

and the army are from different ethnic groups. As a general rule, this hypothesis is too reasonable to be disputed. The study found weaker than expected results for the hypothesis because it was found that lack of military congruence can be overcome in two ways. The first is the strength of the first president after independence. But congruence becomes increasingly important the further a president is from the historically first one. The second way is through the central finding of this study. A president from a group different from the army, usually a dominant group president, can appoint one or more vice presidents from the army's ethnic group.

### *Appendices*

The appendices could stand alone as a contribution to the sociological study of Sub-Saharan Africa. As far as is known, this is the first attempt to prepare a comprehensive compilation of African leaders' social origins. The appendices, then, provide a resource for future scholars of African governments and societies to evaluate this study and build upon it.



*Previous Longevity Research*

This study has affirmed the previous findings of Bienen and Van de Wall (1995) that, on the whole, the best way to stay in office a long time is to be the first president after independence. Some first Sub-Saharan African presidents were in office only briefly, but the mean is clearly longer and 152 months.

This study has also considered several other variables commonly and reasonably thought to be associated with presidential longevity. The results showed possible support for the view that small, ethnically homogenous countries were more stable or peaceful but the evidence was weak and all geographic and historical variables of the country were excluded from the final analysis.

While this study rejected some variables proposed previously, it showed the importance of new ones. Being the first president is no longer sufficient explanation for longevity. A statistical profile of long-lasting presidents can now be drawn.

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*Profile of the Long-Lasting President*

In addition to being the first president, the long-lasting president is a civilian. He is from the subordinate ethnic group, as is his army. He has many vice presidents who are from different ethnic groups, both his own and others. He replaces at least one of the vice presidents about every two or three years.

Five presidents fit this profile: Sekou Toure of Guinea, Tsiranana of Madagascar, Banda of Malawi, Senghor of Senegal, and Nyerere of Tanzania. They had from 11 to 19 vice presidents each. These presidents were in power an average of 216 months each or 18 years.

Many long-lasting presidents do not fit the profile. But what is interesting when comparing these presidents with the statistical profile is how little they vary from it. They lack only one or two of the key characteristics. President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast has been discussed. He and Kaunda of Zambia vary from the profile only by being from the dominant group. Mobutu of Zaire/Congo, Eyadema of Togo, and Kerekou of Benin fit the profile by being from the subordinate groups. They differ from it by being later

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presidents rather than first presidents. Contrary to the statistical profile, they had few vice presidents but those vice presidents were from dominant groups.

Comparing the statistical profile with real presidents illustrates the central finding of this study. That is, the elements of the statistical profile are not static but can be mixed and matched to ensure longevity. In all cases, the basic formula for longevity is one of dynamism and representation. The simplest formula is to bring many vice presidents into the government, whether serially or concurrently. They must be from different groups and they should be changed frequently.

### *Theory*

This has been a data focused study, but it has contributed to theory. This study has joined the discussion of whether consociationalism applies to the African region. It has been concluded that it applies to the region, as it applies to certain time periods in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

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This study has brought consociational theory (Lijphart, 1977) into sociology from political science. Consociational theory justly belongs in sociology. It focusses on the fundamental sociological concept of ethnicity, as well as on the informal structure of government. Informal processes and structures are well established as subjects of study in sociology.

More importantly, even through briefly, this study has brought attention to an overlooked passage in Weber (Parsons, 1947, p. 136-137) showing that, contrary to many statements in the sociological literature, he profoundly appreciated the power of informal social structure and processes in formal organizations. This study has been true to that passage. It has simultaneously studied informal and formal social structures and has assumed the inextricable relationship of both. The government political units of president, vice president, civil service, and army are the formal structures and ethnicity/kinship is the informal. In this study, the two types of structures have been treated as operating hand in glove.

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*Ethnicity*

This research shows indisputably that Africans and African specialists perceive African political leaders as possessing ethnic or tribal membership and identity. Every name in the appendices testifies to the socio-political reality of ethnicity. Furthermore, it has equally been shown that ethnicity has an effect on human events in Africa just as it has in the US, notably the Civil Rights movement and Europe, notably the breakup of Yugoslavia. In Africa ethnic exclusiveness in political organization is associated with shorter times the president is in power than is ethnic inclusiveness.

As explained in Chapter 1, this study has a narrow and limited focus. It has not considered many aspects of the structure and social processes of ethnicity. Whether or not the groups named in the appendices are vague, amorphous, and internally divided or are true groups undertaking purposeful action is entirely outside the scope of the discussion. What their structures are and what their social processes are must be taken up separately. This research has shown what it

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intended to show. Ethnicity, whatever it is, is a force in Sub-Saharan African political life.

#### *Research Methods*

More research is starting to appear on the Sub-Saharan African region which employs the method of broad sweeps of a few variables over all countries in the region (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1970) rather than case studies or comparative studies of two or three countries. Much more data is available now than formerly, making these broad statistical studies possible. Unfortunately, these broad statistical studies are open to questions of reliability because of the notorious inaccuracy of much of the data available. This study has purposely avoided such data. Dates when the president and vice president entered and left office should be reasonably accurate. Names and titles of presidents would be accurate. As noted more than once throughout the study, it was assumed that names and titles of vice presidents would also be accurate, but this was found not to be the case. The major criticism of inaccuracy of data is the ethnicity of the political units.

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Using a broad, all inclusive approach has at least one notable advantage over small scale studies. The broad approach has at least one notable advantage over small scale studies. A case study of one country with rapid turnover of presidents, or of one administration within that country, will identify many different variables explaining the phenomenon. A comparative study of a country with a stable, long lasting administration with a country experiencing coups or short term administrations can refine the number and definitions of variables but only for extreme situations. Such a small scale study does not examine the full range of countries and administrations. By including all the governments in the region, the large scale study includes all the conditions for the independent variables.

The approach this study has adopted of investigating all governments together helps bring understanding about all governments, even those of which we strongly disapprove. For example, Mobutu in Zaire/Congo earned the wrath of Western powers for corruption and authoritarianism, yet he remained in power for decades. It is said that the might of the West kept him in power. This study has shown that the possibility

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exists for another explanation. He has been shown to be from a subordinate group, the same one as his army, and he appointed vice presidents from the dominant group. The West, and in the end his own country, rejected him but perhaps large numbers of his own ethnic group have quietly benefited from his rule. Those who remember their neglect under colonialism and previous regimes might have feared transfer of power to another group. Such was the case in Togo when groups, aided by the West, were trying to dislodge Eyadema from the presidency (Pressi, 1991).

#### *Statistical Analysis*

The data in this study is from a universe and not a sample. For several reasons it was decided not to reinterpret this universe as a sample of something larger. Having a universe instead of a sample should be considered an advantage, but it was found that a yearning for the guidance provided by tests of significance remained. The uncommonly reported eta squared was selected as a replacement. For correlation and regressions, SPSS automatically reported the  $t$  and  $R$  scores which were included.

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A problem of causality appeared with the findings on the vice presidents. When it became clear that, in general, the president who had more vice presidents was in power longer than the president who had few, a question of epiphenomenon arose. Was it rather the case that the president who was in power longer simply had more time in which to appoint vice presidents? Many tests were made to try to answer the question. The final conclusion was simple. The presidents used more than one way of achieving ethnic diversity in their administrations. However, the method most commonly used was to alternate the ethnicity of their vice presidents. This method absolutely requires appointing many vice presidents. The result of the investigation into direction of causality was that the variables of vice presidential diversity and the number of vice presidents are strongly correlated.

#### Caveats

This study is not intended to argue that a 30 year presidency by one person has been good for any particular country or should be advocated for any country. The same

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person in power for a lifetime is rejected in principle by Western democracies, though it is the historical form of government in old African society. What is commonly accepted is that a government can be in power too short a time and that excessively rapid changes of government are associated with popular suffering.

The conclusions from this study are also not intended to imply that it is always easy to bring the all groups into the government. Sometimes it is even impossible. Even if a president recognized the need to include another ethnic group in the government, the president's co-ethnics might strongly oppose the action. The seriousness of this pressure is illustrated by the origin of the 1994 massacres in Rwanda (Africa Confidential April 1994, p. 8).

The massacre by Hutu of Tutsi and the counter massacre by Tutsi of Hutu originated in a quarrel among Hutu over letting Tutsi into the Hutu government. At the time, the president and the army were Hutu. Neighboring heads of state were pressing the Rwandan Hutu president to admit Tutsi into the government. The Hutu president was hesitating, possibly because of the opposition within his own group. It has been

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concluded that the massacres in Rwanda began as an extension of a coup against the Hutu president. Those Hutu who most feared and opposed bringing Tutsi into the government are now blamed with killing their Hutu president and starting the massacre of Tutsi. The president was returning from a conference in Tanzania at which the divisive issue was discussed when his own soldiers shot down his helicopter and he was killed in the crash.

Finally, as stated more than once previously, African government is changing. The most profound change is the end of the era of the first presidents. Perhaps it is also the end of presidents from subordinate groups. The new leaders of Zaire/Congo, Rwanda, and Zambia are from the dominant groups by the definition of this study. Furthermore, subordinate groups are changing. They are acquiring higher levels of education and wealth. Perhaps the findings of this study will apply to the new governments and societies, but perhaps they will not.

## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

### RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

The information is arranged in four columns. The heading in the first column, in all capital letters and bold face type, is the name of each country in alphabetical order. Under the country name are listed all the leaders in that country who held the position equivalent to the US president. The leaders are presented in chronological order from the country's independence to 31 December 1992. The second column gives the leader's official government title. These titles are: President, Prime Minister, King or Queen, and "Other." "Other" means a revolutionary or military title, such as Supreme Leader. The third column names the ethnic group to which the president belongs. The last column shows whether the group to which the president belongs is an historically dominant or historically subordinate group. A single line under the last entry on the page indicates that more presidents follow for that country. A double line indicates that no more presidents follow for that country.



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APPENDIX A - continued  
 RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>ANGOLA</b>			
Neto	President	Kimbundu	dominant
Dos Santos	President	Kimbundu	dominant
<b>BENIN</b>			
Maga	President	Somba	subordinate
Soglo	President	Fon	dominant
Apithy	President	Yoruba	dominant
Congacou	President	northeast	subordinate
Soglo	President	Fon	dominant
Alley	President	north	subordinate
Zinsou	President	Fon	dominant
de Souza	President	Brazilian	dominant
Maga	President	Somba/north	subordinate
Ahomadegbe	President	Fon	dominant
Kerekou	President	Somba/north	subordinate
Nicephore Soglo	President	Fon/south	dominant
<b>BOTSWANA</b>			
Khama	President	Tswana	dominant
Masire	President	Tswana	dominant
<b>BURKINA FASSO</b>			
Maurice Yameogo	President	Mossi	dominant
Lamizana	President	Samo	subordinate
Zerbo	President	Samo	subordinate

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## APPENDIX A - continued

## RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
J.B. Ouedrago	President	Mossi	dominant
Sankara	President	Mossi	dominant
Compraore	President	Mossi	dominant
<b>BURUNDI</b>			
Mwambutsa	President	Tutsi	dominant
Micombero	President	Tutsi	dominant
Bagaza	President	Tutsi	dominant
Buyoya	President	Tutsi	dominant
<b>CAMEROUN</b>			
Ahidjo	President	Fulani	subordinate
Biya	President	Beti/ south	subordinate
<b>CAPE VERDE</b>			
Pedro Pires	Prime Minister	Fogo/ middle class	subordinate
Carlos Veiga	Prime Minister	upper class	dominant
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</b>			
David Dacko	President	Mbaka	dominant
Jean Bedel Bokassa	President	Mbaka	dominant
David Dacko	President	Mbaka	dominant
Kolingba	President	Yakoma	dominant

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CEAD

Tomba

Felix

Souko

Ouedo

Habre

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COMO

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APPENDIX A - continued  
 RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>CHAD</b>			
Tombalbaye	President	Sara	dominant
Felix Malloum	Other	south	dominant
Goukoumi Oueddi	President	north	subordinate
Habre	President	north	subordinate
Idris Deby	President	north/ Zaghawa	subordinate
<b>COMOROS</b>			
Admad Abdallah	President	Anjou Island	dominant
Muhammed Joffar	President	Noble/ Prince	dominant
Ali Soilih	President	Grand Comoro	subordinate
Ahmed Abadallah	President	Anjou Island	dominant
Mohamed Djohar	President	middle/lower class	subordinate
<b>CONGO</b>			
Fulbert Youlou	President	Kongo	dominant
Massembe-Debat	President	Kongo/ Lari	dominant
Alfred Raoul	President	Vili/ south	dominant
Ngoubi	President	Kouyou	subordinate
Yhombi-Opango	President	Kouyou/north	subordinate
Sassou Ngueso	President	Mbochi/north	subordinate

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APPENDIX A - continued  
RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>DJIBOUTI</b>			
Aptidon	President	Issa	subordinate
<b>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</b>			
Macias	President	Fang	subordinate
Obiang	President	Fang	subordinate
<b>ETHIOPIA</b>			
Selassie	Emperor	Amhara	dominant
Aman Andom	Prime Minister	Eritrea	dominant
Teferi Banti	Other	Oromo	subordinate
Mengistu	President	Oromo	subordinate
Meles Zenawi	President	Eritrea/Tigre	dominant
<b>GABON</b>			
Leon Mba	President	Fang	dominant
Bongo	President	Teke	subordinate
<b>GAMBIA</b>			
Jawara	Prime Minister	Protectorate/ Mandinka	dominant



APPENDIX A - continued  
 RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>GHANA</b>			
Nkrumah	Prime Minister	Nzima	subordinate
Ankrah	President	Ga	dominant
Busia	Prime Minister	Akan	dominant
Acheampong	Other	Akan	dominant
Akufo-Addo	Prime Minister	Akan	dominant
Rawlings	Prime Minister	Ewe	subordinate
Liman	President	Frafra/north	subordinate
Rawlings	President	Ewe	subordinate
<b>GUINEA</b>			
Sekou Toure	President	Malinke	subordinate
Conte	President	Soussou	dominant
<b>GUINEA BISSAU</b>			
Luiz Cabral	President	Cape Verde/metis	dominant
Joao Vieira	President	Pepel	subordinate
<b>IVORY COAST</b>			
Houphouet-Boigny	Prime Minister	Baoule	dominant

APPENDIX A - continued  
RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>KENYA</b>			
Kenyatta	President	Kikuyu	dominant
Moi	President	Kalenjin	subordinate
<b>LESOTHO</b>			
Jonathon	Prime Minister	Sotho	dominant
Lekhanya	Prime Minister	Sotho	dominant
Ramaema	Prime Minister	Sotho	dominant
<b>LIBERIA</b>			
Tubman	President	Americo	dominant
Tolbert	President	Americo	dominant
Doe	President	Krahn	subordinate
Amos Sawyer	President	Americo	dominant
<b>MADAGASCAR</b>			
Tsiranana	President	Cotier	subordinate
Ramanantsoa	Prime Minister	Merina	dominant
Andriamahazo	President	Merina	dominant
Ratsiraka	President	Cotier	subordinate
<b>MALAWI</b>			
Banda	President	Chewa	subordinate

APPENDIX A - continued  
RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>MALI</b>			
Keita	President	Mandingo	dominant
Traore	President	Mandingo	dominant
Amadou Toure	President	Sonrai	subordinate
Konare	President	Mandingo	dominant
<b>MAURITAINIA</b>			
Moktar Daddah	President	Maure/Arab	subordinate
Saleck	President	Maure/Arab	subordinate
Bouceif	Prime Minister	Maure/Arab	subordinate
Haidalla	Prime Minister	Maure/Arab	subordinate
Taya	President	Maure/Arab	subordinate
<b>MAURITIUS</b>			
Ramgoolam	Prime Minister	Hindu/middle caste	dominant
Jugnauth	Prime Minister	Hindu	dominant
Uteem	President	Muslim	subordinate
<b>MOZAMBIQUE</b>			
Samora Machel	President	Gaza/south	dominant
Chissano	President	south	dominant
<b>NAMIBIA</b>			
Sam Nujoma	President	Ovambo	subordinate

APPENDIX A - continued  
 RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>NIGER</b>			
Diori	President	Djerma	dominant
Kountche	President	Djerma	dominant
Ali Seibou	President	Djerma	dominant
<b>NIGERIA</b>			
Balewa	Prime Minister	North/Muslim	subordinate
Ironsi	President	Ibo	dominant
Gowon	President	Middle Belt Anga	subordinate
Murtala Mohammed	President	Hausa/Fulani	subordinate
Obasanjo	President	Yoruba	dominant
Shagari	President	north	subordinate
Buhari	President	Muslim/north	subordinate
Babangida	President	Middle Belt	subordinate

## APPENDIX A - continued

## RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>RWANDA</b>			
Kayibanda	President	Hutu	subordinate
Habyarimana	President	Hutu	subordinate
<b>SAO TOME</b>			
Manuel da Costa	President	upper middle class	dominant
Miguel Travoada	President	worker class	subordinate
<b>SENEGAL</b>			
Senghor	President	Serer	subordinate
Diouf	President	Serer	subordinate
<b>SEYCHELLES</b>			
James Manchem	President	Creole/white	dominant
F.A. Rene	President	Grand Blanc	dominant
<b>SIERRA LEONE</b>			
Milton Margai	Prime Minister	Mende/south	dominant
Albert Margai	Prime Minister	Mende/south	dominant
Juxon-Smith	Other	Creole	dominant
Siaka Stevens	President	Limba/north	subordinate
Momoh	President	Limba/north	subordinate
V. Strasser	President	Creole	dominant

APPENDIX A - continued  
 RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SOMALIA</b>			
Osman	President	Hawiye	dominant
Shermarke	President	Darood	subordinate
Barre	President	Darood	subordinate
Ali Mahdi	President	Hawiye	dominant
<b>SUDAN</b>			
Azhari	Prime Minister	Arab/Riveraine	dominant
Khalil	Prime Minister	Darfur	subordinate
Abboud	President	Arab/Riveraine	dominant
Sirr al-Khatim	President	Arab/Riveraine	dominant
Majoub	Prime Minister	Arab/Riveraine	dominant
al-Mahidi	Prime Minister	Arab/Riveraine	dominant
Nimiery	President	Danagla	subordinate
el Dahab	President	Arab	dominant
el Mahdi	Prime Minister	Arab	dominant
el Bashir	Prime Minister	Arab	dominant
<b>SWAZILAND</b>			
Sobhuza II	King	Swazi	dominant
Dzeliwe	Queen Regent	Swazi	dominant
Bhekimpi	Prime Minister	Swazi	dominant
Mswati III	King	Swazi	dominant

## APPENDIX A - continued

## RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>TANZANIA</b>			
Nyerere	President	Zanaki	subordinate
Mwinyi	President	black/Zanzibar	subordinate
<b>TOGO</b>			
Olympio	President	Brazilian	dominant
Grunitsky	President	European/Togo mixed	dominant
Kleber Dadjo	President	Kabre region, north	subordinate
Eyadema	President	Kabre	subordinate
<b>UGANDA</b>			
Mutesa	King	Ganda	dominant
Obote	President	Langi/north	subordinate
Amin	President	Acholi	subordinate
Lule	President	Ganda	dominant
Binaisa	President	Ganda	dominant
Mwanga	President	Ganda	dominant
Obote	President	Langi/north	subordinate
Okello	President	Acholi	subordinate
Museveni	President	Rwandan/ Nyankoli	subordinate

APPENDIX A - continued  
 RULERS - TITLE AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>ZAIRE</b>			
Lumumba	Prime Minister	Tetela	dominant
Mobutu	Prime Minister	Ngala	subordinate
Adoula	Prime Minister	Equateur	subordinate
Tshombe	Prime Minister	evolue	dominant
Mobutu	President	Ngala	subordinate
<b>ZAMBIA</b>			
Kaunda	President	Nyanja	dominant
F. Chiluba	President	Bemba	dominant
<b>ZIMBABWE</b>			
Mugabe	Prime Minister	Shona	dominant



APPENDIX B

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## APPENDIX B

### RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE

The information is arranged in six columns. The heading in the first column, in all capital letters and bold face type, is the name of each country in alphabetical order. Under the country name are listed all the leaders who held the position equivalent to the US president. The leaders are presented in chronological order from the country's independence to 31 December 1992. The entry "none" means that during that period no "president" could be identified because of war. The second column lists the month the president entered office, and the third column lists the year. The next two columns give the month the president left office and the year. The last column gives the total months the president was in office. A single line under the last entry on the page indicates that more presidents follow for that country. A double line indicates that no more presidents follow for that country.

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## APPENDIX B - continued

RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE					
	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>ANGOLA</b>					
none/civil war	11	1975	2	1976	3
Neto	2	1976	9	1979	43
Dos Santos	9	1979	12	1992	159
<b>BENIN</b>					
Maga	8	1960	10	1963	38
Soglo	10	1963	1	1964	3
Apithy	1	1964	11	1965	22
Congacou	11	1965	12	1965	1
Soglo	12	1965	12	1967	24
Alley	12	1967	8	1968	8
Zinsou	8	1968	12	1969	16
de Souza	12	1969	5	1970	5
Maga	5	1970	5	1972	24
Ahomadegbe	5	1972	10	1972	5
Kerekou	10	1972	8	1991	226
Nicephore Soglo	8	1991	12	1992	16
<b>BOTSWANA</b>					
Khama	10	1976	7	1980	165
Masire	7	1980	12	1992	149
<b>BURKINA FASSO</b>					
Maurice Yameogo	8	1960	1	1966	65
Lamizana	1	1966	11	1980	178
Zerbo	11	1980	11	1982	24

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## APPENDIX B - continued

## RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE

	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
J.B. Ouedrago	11	1982	8	1983	9
Sankara	8	1983	10	1987	50
Compraore	10	1987	12	1992	62
<b>BURUNDI</b>					
Mwambutsa	7	1962	7	1966	48
Micombero	7	1966	11	1976	124
Bagaza	11	1976	9	1987	130
Buyoya	9	1987	12	1992	63
<b>CAMEROUN</b>					
Ahidjo	10	1961	11	1982	253
Biya	11	1982	12	1992	121
<b>CAPE VERDE</b>					
Pedro Pires	7	1975	3	1991	188
Carlos Veiga	3	1991	12	1992	21
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</b>					
David Dacko	8	1960	1	1966	65
Jean Bedel Bokassa	1	1966	9	1979	164
David Dacko	9	1979	9	1981	24
Kolingba	9	1981	12	1992	135

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## APPENDIX B - continued

RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE					
	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>CHAD</b>					
Tombalbaye	8	1960	4	1975	176
Felix Malloum	4	1975	2	1979	46
none/civil war	2	1979	8	1979	6
Goukoumi Oueddi	8	1979	6	1982	34
Habre	6	1982	12	1990	102
Idris Deby	12	1990	12	1992	24
<b>COMOROS</b>					
Admad Abdallah	7	1975	9	1975	2
Muhammed Joffar	9	1975	1	1976	4
Ali Soilih	1	1976	5	1978	28
Ahmed Abadallah	5	1978	11	1989	138
Mohamed Djohar	11	1989	12	1992	37
<b>CONGO</b>					
Fulbert Youlou	8	1960	8	1963	36
Masseмба-Debat	8	1963	9	1968	61
Alfred Raoul	9	1968	1	1969	4
Ngouabi	1	1969	3	1977	98
Yhombi-Opango	3	1977	2	1979	23
Sassou Ngueso	2	1979	12	1992	166
<b>DJIBOUTI</b>					
Aptidon	6	1977	12	1992	186

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## APPENDIX B - continued

RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE					
	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</b>					
Macias	10	1968	8	1979	130
Obiang	8	1979	12	1992	160
<b>ETHIOPIA</b>					
Selassie	5	1941	9	1974	400
Aman Adom	9	1974	11	1974	2
Teferi Banti	11	1974	3	1977	28
Mengistu	3	1977	5	1991	170
Meles Zenawi	5	1991	12	1992	19
<b>GABON</b>					
Leon Mba	8	1960	11	1967	87
Bongo	11	1967	12	1992	301
<b>GAMBIA</b>					
Jawara	2	1965	12	1992	324
<b>GHANA</b>					
Nkrumah	5	1957	2	1966	105
Ankrah	2	1966	8	1969	42
Busia	8	1969	1	1972	29
Acheampong	1	1972	7	1978	78
Akufo-Addo	7	1978	6	1979	11
Rawlings	6	1979	9	1979	3
Liman	9	1979	12	1981	27
Rawlings	12	1981	12	1992	132

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## APPENDIX B - continued

## RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE

	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>GUINEA</b>					
Sekou Toure	10	1958	4	1984	306
Conte	4	1984	12	1992	104
<b>GUINEA BISSAU</b>					
Luiz Cabral	9	1974	11	1980	74
Joao Vieira	11	1980	12	1992	145
<b>IVORY COAST</b>					
Houphouet- Boigny	8	1960	12	1992	388
<b>KENYA</b>					
Kenyatta	12	1963	10	1978	178
Moi	10	1978	12	1992	170
<b>LESOTHO</b>					
Jonathon	10	1966	1	1986	231
Lekhanya	1	1986	4	1991	63
Ramaema	4	1991	12	1992	20
<b>LIBERIA</b>					
Tubman	1	1944	8	1971	331
Tolbert	8	1971	4	1980	104
Doe	4	1980	9	1990	125
none/war	9	1990	11	1990	2
Amos Sawyer	11	1990	12	1992	25

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## APPENDIX B - continued

## RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE

	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>MADAGASCAR</b>					
Tsiranana	6	1960	5	1972	143
Ramanantsoa	5	1972	2	1975	33
Andriamahazo	2	1975	6	1975	4
Ratsiraka	6	1975	12	1992	210
<b>MALAWI</b>					
Banda	7	1964	12	1992	341
<b>MALI</b>					
Keita	9	1960	11	1968	98
Traore	11	1968	3	1991	268
Amadou Toure	3	1991	6	1992	15
Konare	6	1992	12	1992	6
<b>MAURITANIA</b>					
Moktar Daddah	11	1960	7	1978	212
Saleck	7	1978	4	1979	9
Bouceif	4	1979	5	1979	1
Haidalla	5	1979	12	1984	67
Taya	12	1984	12	1992	96
<b>MAURITIUS</b>					
Ramgoolam	3	1968	6	1982	171
Jugnauth	6	1982	6	1992	120
Uteem	6	1992	12	1992	6

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## APPENDIX B - continued

## RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE

	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>MOZAMBIQUE</b>					
Samora Machel	6	1975	10	1986	136
Chissano	10	1986	12	1992	74
<b>NAMIBIA</b>					
Sam Nujoma	3	1990	12	1992	33
<b>NIGER</b>					
Diori	8	1960	4	1974	164
Kountche	4	1974	11	1987	163
Ali Seibou	11	1987	12	1992	61
<b>NIGERIA</b>					
Balewa	10	1960	1	1966	63
Ironsi	1	1966	7	1966	6
Gowon	7	1966	7	1975	108
Murtala Mohammed	7	1975	2	1976	7
Obasanjo	2	1976	10	1979	44
Shagari	10	1979	1	1984	51
Buhari	1	1984	8	1985	19
Babangida	8	1985	12	1992	88
<b>RWANDA</b>					
Kayibanda	7	1962	7	1973	132
Habyarimana	7	1973	12	1992	233

## APPENDIX B - continued

## RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE

	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>SAO TOME</b>					
Manuel da Costa	7	1975	4	1991	189
Miguel Travoada	4	1991	12	1992	20
<b>SENEGAL</b>					
Senghor	4	1960	1	1981	249
Diouf	1	1981	12	1992	143
<b>SEYCHELLES</b>					
James Mancham	1	1976	6	1977	17
F.A. Rene	6	1977	12	1992	186
<b>SIERRA LEONE</b>					
Milton Margai	4	1961	5	1964	37
Albert Margai	5	1964	3	1967	34
Juxon-Smith	3	1967	4	1968	13
Siaka Stevens	4	1968	11	1985	211
Momoh	11	1985	4	1992	77
V. Strasser	4	1992	12	1992	8
<b>SOMALIA</b>					
Osman	7	1960	6	1967	83
Shermarke	6	1967	10	1969	28
Barre	10	1969	1	1991	254
none/civil war	1	1991	9	1992	20
Ali Mahdi	9	1992	12	1992	3

## APPENDIX B - continued

RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE					
	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>SUDAN</b>					
Azhari	1	1956	7	1956	6
Khalil	7	1956	11	1958	28
Abboud	11	1958	11	1964	72
Sirr al-Khatim	11	1964	6	1965	7
Majoub	6	1965	4	1966	10
al-Mahidi	4	1966	5	1969	37
Nimiery	5	1969	4	1985	191
el Dahab	4	1985	6	1986	14
el Mahdi	6	1986	6	1989	36
el Bashir	6	1989	12	1992	42
<b>SWAZILAND</b>					
Sobhuza II	9	1968	8	1982	167
Dzeliwe	8	1982	8	1983	12
Bhekimpi	8	1983	4	1986	32
Mswati III	4	1986	12	1992	80
<b>TANZANIA</b>					
Nyerere	4	1964	11	1985	259
Mwinyi	11	1985	12	1992	85



## APPENDIX B - continued

## RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE

	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>TOGO</b>					
Olympio	4	1960	1	1963	33
Grunitsky	1	1963	1	1967	48
Kleber Dadjo	1	1967	4	1967	3
Eyadema	4	1967	12	1992	308
<b>UGANDA</b>					
Mutesa	10	1962	4	1966	42
Obote	4	1966	1	1971	57
Amin	1	1971	4	1979	99
Lule	4	1979	6	1979	2
Binaisa	6	1979	5	1980	11
Mwanga	5	1980	12	1980	7
Obote	12	1980	7	1985	55
Okello	7	1985	3	1986	8
Museveni	3	1986	12	1992	81
<b>ZAIRE</b>					
Lumumba	6	1960	9	1960	3
Mobutu	9	1960	7	1961	10
Adoula	7	1961	7	1964	36
Tshombe	7	1964	11	1965	16
Mobutu	11	1965	12	1992	325

## APPENDIX B - continued

## RULERS - DATES IN OFFICE

	In		Out		Total
	Month	Year	Month	Year	
<b>ZAMBIA</b>					
Kaunda	10	1964	10	1991	324
F. Chiluba	10	1991	12	1992	14
<b>ZIMBABWE</b>					
Mugabe	4	1980	12	1992	152

APPENDIX C

## APPENDIX C

### EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins

Appendix C is arranged in four columns. The heading in the first column, in all capital letters and bold face type, is the name of each country in alphabetical order. The second heading beneath it in the first column is a person's name followed by the entry: (Head of the Country). This is the person coded in this study as the equivalent of the US president. Under the "president's" name are the names of all the people that person appointed who are coded as the equivalent of the US vice president. The entry "none" means that after thorough searching of documents and questioning of informants, no equivalent of the US vice president could be identified. In the second column is each "vice president's" formal government title. The next column gives the name of the ethnic group to which each vice president belongs. The last column gives whether that group is an historically dominant group or an historically subordinate group. A single line under the last entry on the page indicates that more



vice presidents follow for that country. A double line indicates that no more vice presidents follow for that country. An effort has been made to keep presidents and their vice presidents together on the same page, resulting in some uneven bottom page margins.

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>ANGOLA</b>			
Neto (Head of the Country)			
Nascimento	prime minister	mestizo	dominant
Dos Santos (Head of the Country)			
Van Dunem	prime minister	mestizo	dominant
Marcolina Moco	prime minister	Umbundu	subordinate
<b>BENIN</b>			
Maga (Head of the Country)			
Ahomadegbe	minister	Fon	dominant
Apithy	minister	Yoruba, south	dominant
Soglo (Head of the Country)			
Maga	minister	Somba, north	subordinate
Ahomadegbe	minister	Fon	dominant
Apithy	minister	Yoruba	dominant
Ahomadegbe	minister	Fon	dominant
Apithy	minister	Yoruba	dominant
Apithy (Head of the Country)			
Ahomadegbe	vice president	Fon	dominant
Congacou (Head of the Country)			
Soglo (Head of the Country)			
Alley (Head of the Country)			
Kouandete	prime minister	Somba, north	subordinate
Zinsou (Head of the Country)			
de Souza (Head of the Country)			

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>BENIN - continued</b>			
Maga (Head of the Country)			
Kouandete	revolutionary, military	Somba, north	subordinate
Apithy	revolutionary, military	Yoruba	dominant
Ahomadegbe	revolutionary military	Fon	dominant
Ahomadegbe (Head of the Country)			
Kerekou (Head of the Country)			
Nicephore Soglo (Head of the Country)			
Desire Vierya	secretary general	Fon	dominant
<b>BOTSWANA</b>			
Khama (Head of the Country)			
Masire	vice president	Tswana	dominant
Masire (Head of the Country)			
Seretse	vice president	Tswana	dominant
Mmusi	vice president	Tswana	dominant
Mogae	vice president	Tswana	dominant
<b>BURKINA FASSO</b>			
Maurice Yameogo (Head of the Country)			
Dennis Yameogo	minister	Mossi	dominant
Lamizana (Head of the Country)			
Malick Zorome	secretary general	Goumantche	subordinate
Gerard Ouedraogo	prime minister	Mossi	dominant
Joseph Conombo	prime minister	Mossi	dominant

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
Title	Group	Dominance	
<b>BURKINA FASSO - continued</b>			
Zerbo (Head of the Country)			
Sankara	secretary general	Mossi	dominant
J.B. Ouedrago (Head of the Country)			
Sankara	secretary general	Mossi	dominant
Sankara (Head of the Country)			
Compraore	minister	Mossi	dominant
Compraore			
Prosper Vocouma	secretary general	Mossi	dominant
Salif Diallo	secretary general	Fulani	subordinate
Roch Kabore	secretary general	Mossi	dominant
Ouedraogo	secretary general	Mossi	dominant
<b>BURUNDI</b>			
Mwambutsa (Head of the Country)			
Muhirwa	prime minister	Tutsi	dominant
Ngendadumwe	prime minister	Hutu	subordinate
Nyamoya	prime minister	Tutsi	dominant
Bamina	prime minister	Hutu	subordinate
Bihumugani	prime minister	Tutsi	dominant
Micombero (Head of the Country)			
Ntare	monarch	Tutsi	dominant
Ntahokaja	minister	Tutsi	dominant
Bagaza (Head of the Country)			
Nzambimana	prime minister	Tutsi	dominant
Nkengurutse	minister	Hutu	subordinate
Niyungeko	minister	Tutsi	dominant

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**BURUNDI**

Buyoya

Adrien

**CAMEROON**

Ahidjo

Foncha

Muna

Biya

Biya

Bella

Luc A

**CAPE**

Pedro

Arist

Carlo

Antor

**CENTRAL**

Davis

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J.B.

Augu

Anto

Ange

Rade

Alex

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>BURUNDI - continued</b>			
Buyoya (Head of the Country)			
Adriene Siboma	prime minister	Hutu	subordinate
<b>CAMEROUN</b>			
Ahidjo (Head of the Country)			
Foncha	vice president	English	subordinate
Muna	vice president	English	subordinate
Biya	prime minister	Beti	dominant
Biya			
Bello Bouba Maigari	prime minister	Fulani	subordinate
Luc Ayang	prime minister	Christian north	subordinate
<b>CAPE VERDE</b>			
Pedro Pires (Head of the Country)			
Aristides Pereira	president	Boa Vista middle class	subordinate
Carlos Veiga (Head of the Country)			
Antonio Monteiro	president	upper class	dominant
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</b>			
David Dacko (Head of the Country)			
Clement Hassen	secretary general	Fulani/Ubangi	subordinate
J.B. Bokassa (Head of the Country)			
Augustine Mbongo	minister	Mbaka riveraine	dominant
Antoine Guimali	deputy prime minister	Banda	subordinate
Ange Patasse	minister	Sara/north	subordinate
Radembino-Coniquet	minister	Foreign not C.A.R.	dominant
Alexis Tcheouti	secretary general	Banda	subordinate

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CENTR

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David

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Berna

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - continued</b>			
Elizabeth Domitien	prime minister	Mbaka riveraine	dominant
T. Blaise Lamine	minister	Mbaka riveraine	dominant
Ange Patasse	prime minister	Sara	subordinate
Henri Maidou	prime minister	Banda	subordinate
David Dacko (Head of the Country)			
Henri Maidou	vice president	Banda	subordinate
Bernard Ayando	prime minister	Yakoma riveraine	dominant
J.P. Le Boudier	prime minister	Sango riveraine	dominant
S.Narcisse Bozanga	prime minister	Nzankara riveraine	dominant
Kolingba (Head of the Country)			
Edouard Franck	prime minister	Banda	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>CHAD</b>			
Tombalbaye (Head of the Country)			
Abo Nassour	minister	north	subordinate
R. Delsia Soussia	minister	south	dominant
Djibrine Kherallah	minister	north Muslim	subordinate
Mamari Djime Ngakinar	vice president	south	dominant
Felix Malloum (Head of the Country)			
M. Djime Ngakinar	vice president	south	dominant
Habre	prime minister	north Garone	subordinate
Goukoumi Oueddi (Head of the Country)			
Kamougue	vice president	Mbaye south	dominant
Dono Djidingar	prime minister	Ngambaye south	dominant
Habre (Head of the Country)			
O. Homsala	minister	Mayokebi south	dominant
Dono Djidingar	minister	Ngambaye south	dominant
Idris Deby (Head of the Country)			
Bada Abbas Maldoum	vice president	Ngambaye south	dominant
Jean Bawoyeu Alingue	prime minister	south Sara	dominant
Joseph Yodoyman	prime minister	south	dominant

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COMORO

Ahmad

Muhamm

Abdal

Mohame

Ali S

Abdal

Moham

Abdal

Hassa

Abdal

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Ahmed

Mohan

Abdal

Sale

Ali

Moha

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>COMOROS</b>			
Ahmad Abdallah (Head of the Country)			
Muhammed Joffar (Head of the Country)			
Abdallah Mohammed	prime minister	upper class	dominant
Mohamed Hassanly	vice president	upper class	dominant
Ali Soilih (Head of the Country)			
Abdallah Mohammed	prime minister	upper class	dominant
Mohammed Hassanly	vice president	upper class	dominant
Abdallah Mohammed	prime minister	upper class	dominant
Hassan Ali	vice president	noble	dominant
Abdallah Mohammed	vice president	upper class	dominant
Ahmed Abadallah (Head of the Country)			
Mohamed Ahmed	vice president	noble	dominant
Abdallah Mohammed	prime minister	upper class	dominant
Salem Ben Ali	prime minister	Arab/noble	dominant
Ali Mroudjae	prime minister	middle class	subordinate
Mohamed Djohar (Head of the Country)			

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>CONGO</b>			
Fulbert Youlou (Head of the Country)			
Jacques Opangault	1st vice president	Kouyou north	subordinate
Stephane Tchichelle	2nd vice president	Vili south	dominant
Massembe-Debat	minister	Kongo/Lari	dominant
Massembe-Debat (Head of the Country)			
Pascal Lissouba	prime minister	Banzabi	subordinate
Amboise Noumozalay	prime minister	north/not Kongo	subordinate
David-Charles Ganao	vice president	Bateke north	subordinate
Alfred Raoul (Head of the Country)			
Dieudone Itoua	minister	Makoua north	subordinate
Ngouabi (Head of the Country)			
Alfred Raoul	vice president	Vili south	dominant
Moudileno-Massengo	vice president	Basoundi/Kongo/Lari	dominant
Henry Lopez	prime minister	Bagangoulou north	subordinate
Louis Sylvain Goma	prime minister	Vili south	dominant
Yhombi-Opango (Head of the Country)			
Sassou Nguesso	1st vice president	Mbochi north	subordinate
Louis Sylvain Goma	2nd vice president	Vili south	dominant
Sassou Nguesso (Head of the Country)			
Louis Sylvain Goma	prime minister	Vili south	dominant

CONGO

A. E.

Poat

Loui

Andr

DJIB

Apti

Ahme

Abda

Bark

EQUA

Maci

Edmu

Eyeg

Ntut

Ngue

Obia

Maye

Eia

Eul

Cr

Bio

Cr

Bio

F.

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>CONGO - continued</b>			
A.E. Pongui	prime minister	Mbochi north	subordinate
Poaty-Soucklaty	prime minister	Vili south	dominant
Louis Sylvain Goma	prime minister	Vili south	dominant
Andre Milongo	prime minister	Lari south	dominant
<b>DJIBOUTI</b>			
Aptidon (Head of the Country)			
Ahmed Dini	prime minister	Afar	dominant
Abdallah Kamil	prime minister	Afar	dominant
Barket Gourad Hmadou	prime minister	Afar	dominant
<b>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</b>			
Macias (Head of the Country)			
Edmundo Bosio Dioco	vice president	Bubi	dominant
Eyegue Ntutumu	vice president	Fang	subordinate
Ntutumu Manque	secretary general	Fang	subordinate
Ngue Esono Nchama	minister	Fang	subordinate
Obiang (Head of the Country)			
Maye Ela	1st vice president	Fang	subordinate
Ela Nsing	2nd vice president	Fang	subordinate
Eulogio Oyo Riquenza	2nd vice president	Bubi	dominant
Cristino Seriche Bioco	2nd vice president	Bubi	dominant
Cristino Seriche Bioco	prime minister	Bubi	dominant
F. Mba Onona Nchama	deputy prime minister	Fang	subordinate

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EQUATO

Cristi  
Bioco

Ale. F

Cristi  
Bioco

Isi.  
Ander

Silver  
Bile

M.O.

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>EQUATORIAL GUINEA - continued</b>			
Cristino Seriche Bioco	prime minister	Bubi	dominant
Ale. Envoro Ovono	deputy prime minister	Fang	subordinate
Cristino Seriche Bioco	prime minister	Bubi	dominant
Isi. Eye Monsuy Andeme	deputy prime minister	Fang	subordinate
Silvestre Siale Bileke	prime minister	Bubi	dominant
M.O. Ndong Mifumu	deputy prime minister	Fang	subordinate

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ETHIOP

Haile

Endel

Aragal

Habte

Endel

Imru

Aman

Asfa

Tefer

Meng

Atna

Meng

Atna

Meng

Wog

Fiss

Wog

Gib

Tes

Mel

Tam

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>ETHIOPIA</b>			
<b>Haile Selassie (Head of the Country)</b>			
Endelkatchon	prime minister	Amhara	dominant
Aragai	prime minister	Amhara	dominant
Habte-Wold	prime minister	Amhara	dominant
Endelkatchon	prime minister	Amhara	dominant
Imru	prime minister	Amhara	dominant
<b>Aman Andom (Head of the Country)</b>			
Asfa Wossen	monarch	Amhara	dominant
<b>Teferi Banti (Head of the Country)</b>			
Mengistu	revolutionary military	Oromo	subordinate
Atnafu Abate	revolutionary military	Amhara	dominant
<b>Mengistu (Head of the Country)</b>			
Atnafu Abate	revolutionary military	Amhara	dominant
Mengistu Gemechu	revolutionary military	Oromo	subordinate
Wogderes	secretary general	Amhara	dominant
Fisseha Desta	revolutionary military	Tigre	dominant
Wogderes	secretary general	Amhara	dominant
Gibre Kidan	vice president	Oromo	subordinate
Tesfaye Dinka	prime minister	Oromo	subordinate
<b>Meles Zenawi (Head of the Country)</b>			
Tamirat Layne	prime minister	Gurage	subordinate

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**GABON**

Leon

Yemb

Bonge

Bonge

Leon

Casin

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**GAMBIA**

Jawa

John

Fari

Dibb

A. D.

N' J.

Boka

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>GABON</b>			
Leon Mba (Head of the Country)			
Yembit	vice president	Bapounou	subordinate
Bongo	vice president	Teke	subordinate
Bongo (Head of the Country)			
Leon Mbiame	prime minister	Fang	dominant
Casimir Oye Mba	deputy prime minister	Fang	dominant
<b>GAMBIA</b>			
Jawara (Head of the Country)			
John Paul	governor general	British	dominant
Farimang Singhateh	governor general	Mandinka Up River	subordinate
Dibba	vice president	Mandinka Up River	subordinate
A.D. Camara	vice president	Fulani	subordinate
N'Jie	vice president	Wolof Up River	subordinate
Bokary Darbo	vice president	Mandinka Up River	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>GHANA</b>			
Nkrumah (Head of the Country)			
Ankrah (Head of the Country)			
Busia (Head of the Country)			
Akufo-Addo	president	Akan	dominant
Acheampong (Head of the Country)			
A.H. Selomey	secretary general	Ewe	subordinate
C.S.C. Grant	secretary general	Fanti	dominant
Akufu-Addo (Head of the Country)			
A. Karbo	secretary general	North	subordinate
Rawlings (Head of the Country)			
Liman (Head of the Country)			
Graft-Johnson	vice president	Akan	dominant
Rawlings (Head of the Country)			
Obend	revolutionary military	Akan	dominant

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**GUINEA**

Sekou

Keita

Cisse

Oumar

Nabi Y

Saifou

Keita

Beovog

Saifou

Keita

Beovog

Keita

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Conte

Traore

Amadou

Tamba

Henri

Tamba

Henri

Mamob

Alsem

Mamob

Alsem

Alpha

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>GUINEA</b>			
Sekou Toure (Head of the Country)			
Keita N'famara	secretary general	Malinke	subordinate
Cisse	secretary general	Soussou	dominant
Oumar Deen Camara	secretary general	Soussou	dominant
Nabi Youla	secretary general	Soussou	dominant
Saifoulaye Diallo	secretary general	Foulani	dominant
Keita N'famara	vice president	Malinke	subordinate
Beovogui	minister	Tomas	subordinate
Saifoulaye Diallo	minister	Malinke	subordinate
Keita N'famara	minister	Malinke	subordinate
Beovogui	prime minister	Tomas	subordinate
Keita N'famara	minister	Malinke	subordinate
Conte (Head of the Country)			
Traore	prime minister	Malinke	subordinate
Amadou Camara	secretary general	Soussou	dominant
Tamba Kallas Traore	secretary general	Lele	subordinate
Henri Foula	secretary general	Soussou	dominant
Tamba Kallas Traore	secretary general	Lele	subordinate
Henri Foula	secretary general	Soussou	dominant
Mamoby Diawara	secretary general	Malinke	subordinate
Alsemy Rene Gomez	secretary general	Soussou	dominant
Mamoby Diawar	secretary general	Malinke	dominant
Alseny Rene Gomez	secretary general	Soussou	dominant
Alpha Camara	secretary general	Malinke	subordinate



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**GUINEA B**

Luiz Cab

Francis

Constant

Joao Vi

Joao Vi

Vitor S

Paulo C

Iafai C

Vasco C

Carlos

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>GUINEA BISSAU</b>			
Luiz Cabral (Head of the Country)			
Francisco Mendes	prime minister	Cape Verde/metis/ Cache	dominant
Constantino Teixeira	prime minister	Cape Verde	dominant
Joao Vieira	prime minister	Pepel	subordinate
Joao Vieira (Head of the Country)			
Vitor Saude Maria	prime minister	Cacheu Province	dominant
Paulo Correia	1st vice president	Balanta	subordinate
Iafai Camara	1st vice president	Mandingo Gambia	dominant
Vasco Cabral	2nd vice president	Cape Verde, black	dominant
Carlos Correia	prime minister	Pepel	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>IVORY COAST</b>			
<b>Houphouet-Boigny (Head of the Country)</b>			
Jean-Baptiste Mockey	deputy prime minister	Akan	subordinate
Camille Alliali	minister	Akan	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Philippe Yace	minister	Akan	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Mathieu Ekra	minister	Aboure	subordinate
N'Dia Koffi	minister	Baoule	dominant
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Mathieu Ekra	minister	Aboure	subordinate
N'Dia Koffi	minister	Baoule	dominant
Germain Koffi Gadeau	minister	Baoule	dominant
Loua Diomande	minister	Dioula, Muslim	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Germain Koffi Gadeau	minister	Baoule	dominant
Loua Diomande	minister	Dioula, Muslim	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Germain Koffi Gadeau	minister	Baoule	dominant
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Loua Diomande	minister	Dioula, Muslim	subordinate
Bamba	minister	Mandinga	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant

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IVORY C

Bamba

Auguste

Mathieu

Thierry-

Auguste

Alliali

Genoleba

Boguinar

Coulibal

Auguste

Mathieu

Thierry-

Alliali

Gnoleba

Boguinar

Coulibal

Thaim

Dibo

Diabate

Auguste

Mathieu

Alliali

Gnoleba

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>IVORY COAST - continued</b>			
Bamba	minister	Mandinga	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Mathieu Ekra	minister	Aboure	subordinate
Thierry-Lebe	minister	West	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Alliali	minister	Baoule	dominant
Genoleba	minister	Beti, West	subordinate
Boguinaud	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Coulibaly	minister	Mandinga	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Mathieu Ekra	minister	Aboure	dominant
Thierry-Lebe	minister	West	subordinate
Alliali	minister	Baoule	dominant
Gnoleba	minister	Beti, West	subordinate
Boguinaud	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Coulibaly	minister	Mandinga	subordinate
Thaim	minister	Wolof, Senegal	subordinate
Dibo	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Diabate	minister	North	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Mathieu Ekra	minister	Aboure	subordinate
Alliali	minister	Baoule	dominant
Gnoleba	minister	Beti, West	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>IVORY COAST - continued</b>			
Boguinaud	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Coulibaly	minister	Mandinga	subordinate
Dibo	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Diabate	minister	North	subordinate
Auguste Denise	vice president	Baoule, Caribbean	dominant
Mathieu Ekra	minister	Aboure	subordinate
Coulibaly	minister	Mandinga	subordinate
Dibo	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Genoleba	minister	Beti, West	subordinate
Guy-Alain Guaze	minister	Beti, West	subordinate
Alliali	minister	Baoule	dominant
Boguinaud	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Outarra	vice president	Mandinga, Burkina	subordinate
Mathieu Ekra	minister	Aboure	subordinate
Coulibaly	minister	Mandinga	subordinate
Dibo	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Guaze	minister	Beti, West	subordinate
Gnoleba	minister	Beti, West	subordinate
Boguinaud	minister	Dan, West	subordinate
Alliali	minister	Baoule	dominant
Outarra	minister	Mandinga, Burkina	subordinate

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**KENYA**

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Kenyatta

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McDonal

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Odinga

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Mboya

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Moi

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Moi

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Moi (He

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Kibaki

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Karanja

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Saitoti

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**LESOTHO**

---

Jonathon

---

Moshoeshe

---

Mamaohat

---

Moshoseh

---

Lekhanya

---

Moshoeshe

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Letsie I

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Ramaema

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Letsie II

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>KENYA</b>			
Kenyatta (Head of the Country)			
McDonald	governor general	British	dominant
Odinga	prime minister	Luo	dominant
Mboya	1st vice president	Luo	dominant
Moi	3rd vice president	Kalenjin	subordinate
Moi	vice president	Kalenjin	subordinate
Moi (Head of the Country)			
Kibaki	vice president	Kikuyu	dominant
Karanja	vice president	Kikuyu	dominant
Saitoti	vice president	not Kikuyu (Masai?)	subordinate
<b>LESOTHO</b>			
Jonathon (Head of the Country)			
Moshoeshoe II	monarch	Sotho	dominant
Mamaohato	monarch	Sotho	dominant
Moshosehoe II	monarch	Sotho	dominant
Lekhanya (Head of the Country)			
Moshoeshoe II	monarch	Sotho	dominant
Letsie III	monarch	Sotho	dominant
Ramaema (Head of the Country)			
Letsie III	monarch	Sotho	dominant



## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins				
	Title	Group	Dominance	
<b>LIBERIA</b>				
Tubman (Head of the Country)				
	Tolbert	vice president	Americo	dominant
Tolbert (Head of the Country)				
	Fahnbulleh	vice president	Vai	subordinate
	Greene	vice president	Americo	dominant
	Warner	vice president	Americo	dominant
Doe (Head of the Country)				
	Syen	vice president	Kru	subordinate
	Podier	vice president	Kru	subordinate
	Moniba	vice president	Kpelle	subordinate
Amos Sawyer (Head of the Country)				
	Ronald Diggs	vice president	not Americo	subordinate
	Peter Naigow	vice president	not Americo	subordinate

APPENDIX C - continued  
EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>MADAGASCAR</b>			
<b>Tsirana (Head of the Country)</b>			
Tsiebe	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Resampa	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Rabemananjara	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Miadana	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Tseibo	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Resampa	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Rabemananjara	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Miadana	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Ramangasavina	vice president	Merina	dominant
LeChat	vice president	French	dominant
Tseibo	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Rabemananjara	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
Miadana	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
<b>Tsirana (Head of the Country)</b>			
Ramangasavina	vice president	Cotier	subordinate
LeChat	vice president	French	dominant
<b>Ramanantsoa (Head of the Country)</b>			
Tsirana	president	Cotier	subordinate
<b>Andriamahazo (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>Ratsiraka (Head of the Country)</b>			
Rakotomalala	prime minister	South	subordinate
Rakotoniana	prime minister	Betsileo	dominant
Rakotoorjoana	prime minister	Merina	dominant
Ramahatra	prime minister	Merina	dominant
Razanamasy	prime minister	Merina	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>MALAWI</b>			
Banda (Head of the Country)			
Jones	governor general	British	dominant
Muwalo	minister	Ngoni	subordinate
Chiwanda	minister	South	subordinate
Muwalo	minister	Ngoni	subordinate
Chiwanda	minister	South	subordinate
Muwalo	minister	Ngoni	subordinate
Munyenyeembe	minister	Tumbuku	dominant
Nkoma	minister	Chewa	subordinate
Muluzi	minister	Yao	subordinate
Nkoma	minister	Chewa	subordinate
Muluzi	minister	Yao	subordinate
Lungu	minister	North	dominant
Muluzi	minister	Yao	subordinate
Matenje	minister	Nyanja	subordinate
Chirwa	minister	Tonga	subordinate
Somanje	minister	Chewa	subordinate
Chirwa	minister	Tonga	subordinate
Pashane	minister	Chewa	subordinate
Tembo	minister	Chewa	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT			
Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>MALI</b>			
Keita (Head of the Country)			
Jean Marie Kone	vice president	Bamara	dominant
Traore (Head of the Country)			
Yoro Diakite	prime minister	Fulani	subordinate
Diarra	2nd vice president	Segou	subordinate
Baba Diarra	vice president	Segou	subordinate
Mamadou Dembele	prime minister	Mandingo	dominant
Django Cissoko	secretary general	Mandingo	dominant
Amadou Toure (Head of the Country)			
Sacko	prime minister	Sarakoli	subordinate
Konare (Head of the Country)			
Younoussi Toure	prime minister	Sonraie	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>MAURITANIA</b>			
Moktar Daddah (Head of the Country)			
Diagana	minister	Soninke, black, south	dominant
Abdallahi Boye	minister	Maure, Arab	subordinate
Saleck (Head of the Country)			
Bouceif (Head of the Country)			
Saleck	vice president	Maure, Arab	subordinate
Haidalla (Head of the Country)			
Mohamed Louly	vice president	Maure, Arab	subordinate
Houssein	minister	Maure, Arab	subordinate
Dia Amadou	minister	Poular	dominant
Benijara	prime minister	Maure, Arab	subordinate
Taya	prime minister	Maure, Arab	subordinate
Taya (Head of the Country)			
Mohamed Ould Amar	secretary general	Maure, Arab	subordinate
Mohamoud Ba	secretary general	Poular, South, black	dominant
Selmouth O.M. Wane	secretary general	Poular, South, black	dominant
Barou Abdoulaye	secretary general	Poular, South, black	dominant
Boubaker	prime minister	Maure, Arab	subordinate
N'Diaye Kane	minister	black	dominant
Ba Alassane Yero	secretary general	black	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>MAURITIUS</b>			
Ramgoolam (Head of the Country)			
John Rennie	governor general	English, Mauritian	dominant
Leonard Williams	governor general	English, Mauritian	dominant
Abdul Osman	governor general	Muslim	subordinate
Leonard Williams	governor general	English, Mauritian	dominant
Abdul Osman	governor general	Muslim	subordinate
Leonard Williams	governor general	English, Mauritian	dominant
Abdul Osman	governor general	Muslim	subordinate
Jugnauth (Head of the Country)			
Duvall	deputy prime minister	Creole	dominant
Ramgoolam (Head of the Country)			
Abdul Osman	governor general	Muslim	subordinate
Burrenchobay	governor general	Hindu	dominant
Jugnauth (Head of the Country)			
Burrenchobay	governor general	Hindu	dominant
Duvall	deputy prime minister	Creole	dominant
Ramgoolam	governor general	Hindu	dominant
Duvall	governor general	Creole	dominant
Ringadoo	governor general	Hindu	dominant
Duvall	deputy prime minister	Creole	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>MAURITIUS - continued</b>			
Boolell	2nd deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Lutchmeenaraido	3rd deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Ringadoo	governor general	Hindu	dominant
Boolell	2nd deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Lutchmeenaraido	3rd deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Ringadoo	governor general	Hindu	dominant
Boolell	deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Lutachmeenaraido	deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Ghurburram	deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Ringadoo	governor general	Hindu	dominant
Lutachmeenaraido	deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Ghurburram	deputy prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Nabasingh	deputy prime minister	Sikh	subordinate
Ringadoo	governor general	Hindu	dominant
Uteem (Head of the Country)			
Ghurburram	vice president	Hindu	dominant
Jugnauth	prime minister	Hindu	dominant
Nabasingh	deputy prime minister	Sikh	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>MOZAMBIQUE</b>			
Samora Machel (Head of the Country)			
Oscar Monteiro	minister	north, mestiso	subordinate
Jacinto Veloso	minister	south, white Mozam.	dominant
Chissano (Head of the Country)			
Machungo	prime minister	south	dominant
<b>NAMIBIA</b>			
Sam Nujoma (Head of the Country)			
Hage Geingob	prime minister	white	dominant



## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>NIGER</b>			
Diori (Head of the Country)			
Abou Sidikou	secretary general	Djerma	dominant
Mai Maigana	secretary general	Beriberi	subordinate
Mai Maigana	minister	Beriberi	subordinate
Mamadou Maidah	minister	Hausa	subordinate
Kountche (Head of the Country)			
Sani Souna Sido	vice president	Hausa	subordinate
Oumarou Mamane	prime minister	Peul	subordinate
Ali Seibou (Head of the Country)			
Hamid Algabid	prime minister	Taureg	subordinate
Mamane Oumarou	prime minister	Hausa	subordinate
Aliou Mahamidou	prime minister	Hausa	subordinate
Amadou Cheiffou	prime minister	Peul	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>NIGERIA</b>			
<b>Balewa (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>Azikwe</b>	governor general	Ibo	dominant
<b>Ironsi (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>B.A.O. Ogundipe</b>	revolutionary, military	Yoruba	dominant
<b>Gowon (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>Awolowo</b>	revolutionary, military	Yoruba	dominant
<b>Stanley O. Wey</b>	revolutionary, military	Yoruba	dominant
<b>Murtala Mohammed (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>Obasanjo</b>	revolutionary, military	Yoruba	dominant
<b>Obasanjo (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>Shehu Adua</b>	revolutionary, military	Hausa	subordinate
<b>Shagari (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>Alex Ekwueme</b>	vice president	Ibo	dominant
<b>Buhari (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>Babangida (Head of the Country)</b>			
<b>Ebitu Ukiwe</b>	revolutionary, military	Ibo	dominant
<b>Agustus Aikhomu</b>	vice president	Edo	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>RWANDA</b>			
Kayibanda (Head of the Country)			
Habyarimana (Head of the Country)			
Ntezilyayo	minister	Hutu	subordinate
Enoch Ruhigira	minister	Hutu	subordinate
Nsengiyaremye	prime minister	Hutu	subordinate
<b>SAO TOME</b>			
Manuel da Costa (Head of the Country)			
Miguel Trovoada	prime minister	language, plantation workers	subordinate
C. Rochas da Costa	prime minister	wealthy, good education	dominant
Miguel Travoada (Head of the Country)			
Daniel Daio	prime minister	upper mid class	dominant
Norberto Alegre	prime minister	literary family	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SENEGAL</b>			
Senghor (Head of the Country)			
N'Gom	vice president	Wolof	dominant
M'Bache	vice president	Wolof	dominant
Toure	vice president	Bambara, Wolof	dominant
Gueye	vice president	Wolof	dominant
Abou Diouf	vice president	Serer	subordinate
Amadou Cisse Dia	minister	Tukulor	subordinate
Cabou	minister	Diola, Casamance	subordinate
Ba	minister	Wolof	dominant
Diouf	prime minister	Serer	subordinate
Diouf (Head of the Country)			
Thaim	prime minister	Wolof	dominant
Moustaphe Niasse	minister	Wolof	dominant
Jean Collin	secretary general	French	dominant
Sonko	secretary general	Serer	subordinate
Thaim	prime minister	Wolof	dominant
<b>SEYCHELLES</b>			
James Mancham (Head of the Country)			
France-Albert Rene	prime minister	Grand Blanc	dominant
France-Albert Rene (Head of the Country)			

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SIERRA LEONE</b>			
Milton Margai (Head of the Country)			
Lightfoot-Boston	governor general	Creole	dominant
Albert Margai (Head of the Country)			
Lightfoot-Boston	governor general	Creole	dominant
Juxon-Smith (Head of the Country)			
Ambrose Leigh	deputy prime minister	W. Indies or Liberia	dominant
Siaka Stevens (Head of the Country)			
Banja Tejan-Sie	governor general	Furah Bay, South	dominant
Chris. Okoro Cole	governor general	Creole	dominant
Koroma	vice president	Temne, north	subordinate
Fofanah	prime minister	Mende, south	dominant
Koroma	vice president	Temne, north	subordinate
Kamara-Taylor	deputy prime minister	Limba, north	subordinate
Kamara-Taylor	1st vice president	Limba, north	subordinate
M.S. Mustapha	2nd vice president	Muslim	subordinate
Koroma	1st vice president	Temne, north	subordinate
Kamara-Taylor	2nd vice president	Limba, north	subordinate
Koroma	1st vice president	Temne, north	subordinate
Francis Minah	2nd vice president	Mende, south	dominant
Momoh (Head of the Country)			
Francis Minah	1st vice president	Mende, south	dominant
Abubaker Kamara	2nd vice president	Temne, north	subordinate
Abubaker Kamara	1st vice president	Temne, north	subordinate
Salia Jusu-Sheriff	2nd vice president	Mende, south	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

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 EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
 Title and Social Origins
 

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	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SIERRA LEONE - continued</b>			
Abdullah Conteh	1st vice president	Soussou	subordinate
Salia Jusu-Sheriff	2nd vice president	Mende, south	dominant
V. Strasser (Head of the Country)			
Musa	revol., military	Mende, south	dominant
John Benjamin	secretary general	Mende, south	dominant

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SOMALIA</b>			
Osman (Head of the Country)			
Egal	prime minister	Isaaq	subordinate
Shermarke	prime minister	Darood	subordinate
Abdk Rizak Haji Hus	prime minister	Darood	subordinate
Shermarke (Head of the Country)			
Egal	prime minister	Isaaq	subordinate
Siad Barre (Head of the Country)			
Ali Korshil	vice president	Darood	subordinate
Ainanshe	vice president	Isaaq	subordinate
Kulmiye Afrah	vice president	Hawiye	dominant
Ali Samatar	vice president	Isaaq	subordinate
Ali Abokor	vice president	Isaaq	subordinate
Kulmiye Afrah	secretary general	Hawiye	dominant
Suleiman Abdalla	secretary general	Darood, son-in-law	subordinate
Kulmiye Afrah	secretary general	Hawiye	dominant
Ali Samatar	1st vice president	Midgan Caste	subordinate
Kulmiye Afrah	2nd vice president	Hawiye	dominant
Ali Abokor	3rd vice president	Isaaq	subordinate
Ali Samatar	1st vice president	Midgan Caste	subordinate
Kulmiye Afrah	2nd vice president	Hawiye	dominant
Ali Samatar	prime minister	Midgan Caste	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

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	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SOMALIA - continued</b>			
Abdalla Mhmd Fadil	prime minister	Arab	dominant
Hawadle Madar	prime minister	Isaaq	subordinate
Jamma Barre	1st deputy prime minister	Darood	subordinate
<b>Ali Mahdi (Head of the Country)</b>			
Arteh Ghalib	prime minister	Isaaq	subordinate
Aden Gabayow	1st vice president	Darood, Ogaden	subordinate
Umar Ma'alim	2nd vice president	Darood	subordinate

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## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SUDAN</b>			
Azhari	(Head of the Country)		
Khalil	(Head of the Country)		
Abboud	(Head of the Country)		
Sirr al-Khatim	(Head of the Country)		
Majoub	(Head of the Country)		
Azarhi	president	Arab, River.	dominant
al-Mahidi	(Head of the Country)		
Azarhi	president	Arab, River.	dominant
Nimiery	(Head of the Country)		
Babikr Awadallah	vice president	Arab, River.	dominant
Babikr Awadallah	1st vice president	Arab, River.	dominant
Abbas	vice president	Arab, River	dominant
Babikr Awadallah	1st vice president	Arab, River.	dominant
el Baghir	vice president	Arab, El Sofi, East	subordinate
Abbas	1st vice president	Arab, River.	dominant
el Baghir	2nd vice president	Arab, El Sofi, east	subordinate
el Baghir	1st vice president	Arab, El Sofi, east	subordinate
Alier	2nd vice president	Dinka/Christian	subordinate
Ibrahim	1st vice president	Arab	dominant
al Tahir	2nd vice president	Arab	dominant
Alier	vice president	Dinka/Christian	subordinate
Majid Khalil	1st vice president	Arab/Kordofan	subordinate
Alier	2nd vice president	Dinka/Christian	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SUDAN - continued</b>			
al Tayeb	vice president	Arab	dominant
Alier	vice president	Dinka/Christian	subordinate
al Tayeb	1st vice president	Arab	dominant
Joseph Lagu	2nd vice president	Dinka/Christian	dominant
<b>el Dahab (Head of Country)</b>			
Daffalah	prime minister	Arab	dominant
Aru Bol	deputy prime minister	Dinka/Christian	subordinate
<b>el Mahdi (Head of the Country)</b>			
el Mirghani	president	Arab	dominant
al Hindi	deputy prime minister	Arab	dominant
el Mirghani	president	Arab	dominant
al Husayn	deputy prime minister	Arab	dominant
el Mirghani	president	Arab	dominant
Deng	deputy prime minister	Dinka/Christian	subordinate
el Mirghani	president	Arab	dominant
<b>el Bashir (Head of the Country)</b>			
Salih	deputy prime minister	Arab	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Title and Social Origins			
	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SWAZILAND</b>			
<b>Sobhuze II (Head of the Country)</b>			
Makhosini Dhlamini	prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Khumalo	deputy prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Mophevu Dhlaminia	prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Khumalo	deputy prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Mophevu Dhlaminia	prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Nsibandze	deputy prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Mandabala	prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Nsibandze	deputy prime minister	Swazi	dominant
<b>Dzeliwe (Head of the Country)</b>			
Sozia	secretary general	Swazi	dominant
Mandabala	prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Nsibandze	deputy prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Sozia	minister	Swazi	dominant
Bhekimpi	prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Nsibandze	deputy prime minister	Swazi	dominant
<b>Bhekimpi (Head of the Country)</b>			
Mhambi Mnisi	minister	Swazi	dominant
Ntombi	queen regent	Swazi	dominant
Bhekimpi	prime minister	Swazi	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

## EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT

## Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>SWAZILAND - continued</b>			
Ntombi	queen regent	Swazi	dominant
Mswati III (Head of the Country)			
Bhekimpi	prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Ntombi	queen regent	Swazi	dominant
Sotja Dlamina	prime minister	Swazi	dominant
Mhlangano	minister	Swazi	dominant
Sotja Dlamina	prime minister	Swazi	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>TANZANIA</b>			
<b>Nyerere (Head of the Country)</b>			
Karume	1st vice president	black, Zanzibar	subordinate
Kawawa	deputy prime minister	Songea	subordinate
Aboud Jumbe	1st vice president	black, Zanzibar	subordinate
Kawawa	prime minister	Songea	subordinate
Aboud Jumbe	1st vice president	black, Zanzibar	subordinate
Sokoine	prime minister	Masai	subordinate
Aboud Jumbe	1st vice president	black, Zanzibar	subordinate
Msuya	prime minister	Kalimanjero Pare	dominant
Aboud Jumbe	1st vice president	black, Zanzibar	subordinate
Sokoine	prime minister	Masai	subordinate
Mwinyi	vice president	black, Zanzibar	subordinate
Salim Ahmed Salim	prime minister	black, mainland Zanzibar	subordinate
<b>Mwinyi (Head of the Country)</b>			
Wairoba	prime minister	Zanaki	subordinate
Abdul Wakil	2nd vice president	black, Zanzibar	subordinate
Malecela	prime minister	Gogo	subordinate
Salim Amour	2nd prime minister	black, Pemba Island	subordinate

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>TOGO</b>			
Olympio (Head of the Country)			
Grunitsky (Head of the Country)			
Meatchie	vice president	Kotekoli north	subordinate
Kleber Dadjo (Head of the Country)			
James Assila	military	Ewe	dominant
Eyadema (Head of the Country)			
Pierre Adossama	minister	Kabre	subordinate
Lacle	secretary general	Ewe	dominant
Lekezime	secretary general	Kabre	subordinate
Koffigoh	prime minister	Ewe	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>UGANDA</b>			
Mutesa (Head of the Country)			
Kiwanuka	prime minister	Ganda	dominant
Obote	prime minister	Langi North	subordinate
Wilberforce Nadiope	vice president	south	dominant
Obote (Head of the Country)			
Wilberforce Nadiope	vice president	south	dominant
Babiiha	vice president	Nyankoli West	subordinate
Amin (Head of the Country)			
Adrisi	vice president	Lugbara	subordinate
Lule (Head of the Country)			
Ngobi	vice president	Soga	dominant
Binaisa (Head of the Country)			
Mwanga	minister	Ganda	dominant
Mwanga (Head of the Country)			
Museveni	vice president	Rwandan Nyankoli	subordinate
Obote (Head of the Country)			
Mwanga	vice president	Ganda	dominant
O. Allimadi	prime minister	Acholi	subordinate
Okello (Head of the Country)			
Waligo	vice president	Ganda	dominant
Museveni (Head of the Country)			
Kisekka	vice president	Ganda	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>UGANDA - continued</b>			
Eriya Kategaya	1st deputy prime minister	Nankoli	subordinate
Ssemogerere	2nd deputy prime minister	Ganda	dominant
Mayanja	prime minister	Ganda	dominant



## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>ZAIRE/CONGO</b>			
Lumumba (Head of the Country)			
Kasavubu	president	Kongo	dominant
Mobutu (Head of the Country)			
Kasavubu	president	Kongo	dominant
Adoula (Head of the Country)			
Kasavubu	president	Kongo	dominant
Tshombe (Head of the Country)			
Kasavubu	president	Kongo	dominant
Mobutu (Head of the Country)			
Mulamba	prime minister	Luba	dominant
Karl-I-Bond	prime minister	Lunda	dominant
Mpinda Kasinda	prime minister	Luba	dominant
Karl-I-Bond	prime minister	Lunda	subordinate
Boboliko	prime minister	Bandudu Province north	subordinate
N'Singa	prime minister	Bandundu Province north	subordinate
Kengo	prime minister	Equateur	subordinate
Mulamba	prime minister	Luba	dominant
Sambwa	prime minister	Equateur north	subordinate
Kango	prime minister	Equateur north	subordinate
Lunda Bululu	prime minister	Lunda	dominant
Mulumba Kukoji	prime minister	Luba	dominant
Tshisekedi	prime minister	Luba	dominant

## APPENDIX C - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Title and Social Origins

	Title	Group	Dominance
<b>ZAIRE/CONGO</b> - continued			
Mungul Diaka	prime minister	Bayaka	subordinate
Karl-I-Bond	prime minister	Lunda	dominant
Tshisekedi	prime minister	Luba	dominant
<b>ZAMBIA</b>			
Kaunda (Head of the Country)			
Kapwewe	vice president	Bemba	dominant
Mainza Chona	vice president	Tonga	subordinate
Elija Mudenda	prime minister	Tonga	subordinate
Mainza Chona	prime minister	Tonga	subordinate
D.N. Lisulo	prime minister	Lozi	dominant
Nalumina Mundia	prime minister	Lozi	dominant
Musokotwane	prime minister	Tonga	subordinate
Malimba Mosheke	prime minister	Tonga	subordinate
Frederick Chiluba (Head of the Country)			
Levy Mwanawasa	vice president	Lamba Lemja	dominant
<b>ZIMBABWE</b>			
Mugabe (Head of the Country)			
Muzenda	deputy prime minister	Shona	dominant
Banana	president	Ndebele	subordinate
Nkomo	minister	Ndebele	subordinate
Muzenda	deputy prime minister	Shona	dominant
Banana	president	Ndebele	subordinate
Muzenda	1st vice president	Shona	dominant
Nkomo	1st vice president	Ndebele	subordinate

APPENDIX D

## APPENDIX D

### EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT Dates in Office

The information is arranged in five columns. The first column contains three types of information. First, in all capital letters and bold face type, is the name of the country. Under the name of the country is a person's name followed by the entry: (Head of the Country). This is the person coded in this study as the equivalent of the US president. Under the name of the head of the country are the names of all the people that person appointed who are coded in this study as the equivalent of the US vice president. The entry "none" in this column means that no official could be identified who was the equivalent of the US vice president. The next four columns give the month and year each "vice president" entered and left the office. When no vice president could be identified, the four columns give the dates between which that head of country had no equivalent of a US vice president.

Sometimes a vice president's name is repeated twice in a row. This indicates a change of title and is coded as a separate administration for that head of country. Two or more vice presidents with the same dates in office indicate that these vice presidents served together as a group at the same time. A single line under the last entry on the page means that more vice presidents follow for that head of country or that country. A double line means there are no more entries for that country.

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>ANGOLA</b>				
no government/civil war	11	1975	2	1976
Neto (Head of the Country)				
Nascimento	2	1976	10	1978
no government/civil war	10	1978	9	1979
Dos Santos (Head of the Country)				
none	9	1979	7	1991
Van Dunem	7	1991	9	1992
Marcolino Moco	9	1992	12	1992
<b>BENIN</b>				
Maga (Head of the Country)				
Ahomadegbe	8	1960	12	1960
Apithy	12	1960	10	1963
Soglo (Head of the Country)				
Maga	10	1963	12	1963
Ahomadegbe	10	1963	12	1963
Apithy	10	1963	12	1963
Ahomadegbe	12	1963	1	1964
Apithy	12	1963	1	1964
Apithy (Head of the Country)				
Ahomadegbe	1	1964	10	1965

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>BENIN</b> - continued				
Congacou (Head of the Country)				
none	10	1965	12	1965
Soglo (Head of the Country)				
none	12	1965	12	1967
Alley (Head of the Country)				
Kouandete	12	1967	8	1968
Zinsou (Head of the Country)				
none	8	1968	12	1969
de Souza (Head of the Country)				
Kouandete	12	1969	5	1970
Maga (Head of the Country)				
Apithy	5	1970	5	1972
Ahomadegbe	5	1970	5	1972
Ahomadegbe (Head of the Country)				
none	5	1972	10	1972
Kerekou (Head of the Country)				
none	10	1972	8	1991
Nicephore Soglo (Head of the Country)				
Desire Vierya	8	1991	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>BOTSWANA</b>				
Khama (Head of the Country)				
Masire	10	1966	7	1980
Masire (Head of the Country)				
Seretse	7	1980	1	1983
Mmusi	1	1983	5	1992
Mogae	5	1992	12	1992
<b>BURKINA FASSO</b>				
Maurice Yameogo (Head of the Country)				
none	8	1960	10	1963
Dennis Yameogo	10	1963	1	1966
Lamizana (Head of the Country)				
Malick Zoromo	1	1966	5	1967
none	5	1967	2	1971
Gerard Ouedraogo	2	1971	3	1974
none	3	1974	2	1978
Lamizana (Head of the Country)				
Joseph Conombo	2	1978	11	1980



## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>BURKINA FASSO - continued</b>				
Zerbo (Head of the Country)				
none	11	1980	9	1981
Sankara	9	1981	2	1982
none	2	1982	11	1982
J.B. Ouedrago (Head of the Country)				
none	11	1982	1	1983
Sankara	1	1983	8	1983
Sankara (Head of the Country)				
Compraore	8	1983	10	1987
Compraore (Head of the Country)				
Prosper Vocouma	10	1987	6	1990
Salif Diallo	6	1990	8	1990
Roch Kabore	8	1990	6	1992
Ouedraogo	6	1992	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>BURUNDI</b>				
<b>Mwambutsa (Head of the Country)</b>				
Muhirwa	7	1962	6	1963
Ngendadumwe	6	1963	2	1964
Nyamoya	2	1964	1	1965
Bamina	1	1965	8	1965
Bihumugani	8	1965	7	1966
<b>Micombero (Head of the Country)</b>				
Ntare	7	1966	11	1966
none	11	1966	2	1972
Ntahokaja	2	1972	5	1972
none	5	1972	11	1976
<b>Bagaza (Head of the Country)</b>				
Nzambimana	11	1976	4	1979
Nkengurutse	4	1979	4	1981
Niyungeko	4	1981	12	1982
none	12	1982	9	1987
<b>Buyoya (Head of the Country)</b>				
none	9	1987	7	1989
Adriene Siboma	7	1989	12	1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>CAMEROUN</b>				
Ahidjo (Head of the Country)				
Foncha	10	1961	1	1968
Muna	1	1968	6	1975
Bija	6	1975	11	1982
Bija (Head of the Country)				
Bello Bouba Maigari	11	1982	8	1983
Luc Ayang	8	1983	1	1984
none	1	1984	12	1992
<b>CAPE VERDE</b>				
Pedro Pires (Head of the Country)				
Aristides Pereira	7	1975	3	1991
Carlos Veiga (Head of the Country)				
Antonio Monteiro	3	1991	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</b>				
David Dacko (Head of the Country)				
Clement Hassen	8	1960	1	1966
J.B. Bokassa (Head of the Country)				
Augustiine Mbongo	1	1966	4	1969
Antoine Guimali	4	1969	1	1971
Ange Patasse	1	1971	8	1974
Radembino-Coniquet	8	1974	11	1974
Alexis Tcheouti	11	1974	1	1975
Elizabeth Domitien	1	1975	4	1976
none	4	1976	9	1976
T. Blaise Lamine	9	1976	1	1977
Ange Patasse	1	1977	7	1978
Henry Maidou	7	1978	9	1979
David Dacko (Head of the Country)				
Henry Maidou	9	1979	11	1980
Bernard Ayando	9	1979	11	1980
Jean-Pierre Le Boudier	11	1980	4	1981
S. Narcisse Bozanga	4	1981	9	1981
Kolingba (Head of the Country)				
none	9	1981	1	1981
Edouard Franck	1	1989	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>CHAD</b>				
Tombalbaye (Head of the Country)				
none	8	1960	7	1962
Abo Nassour	7	1962	7	1963
none	7	1963	11	1964
R. Delsia Soussia	11	1964	11	1965
none	11	1965	8	1972
Djibrine Kherallah	8	1972	10	1973
Mamari Djime Ngakinar	10	1973	4	1975
Felix Malloum (Head of the Country)				
M. Djime Ngakinar	4	1975	8	1978
Habre	8	1978	2	1979
no government/civil war	2	1979	8	1979
Goukoumi Oueddi (Head of the Country)				
Kamougue	8	1979	5	1982
Dono Djikingar	5	1982	6	1982
Habre (Head of the Country)				
none	6	1982	10	1984
O. Homsala	10	1984	10	1985
none	10	1985	5	1986
Dono Djidingar	5	1986	12	1990

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>CHAD</b> - continued				
Idris Deby (Head of the Country)				
Bada Abbas Maldoum	12	1990	4	1991
Jean Bawoyeu Alingue	4	1991	5	1992
Joseph Yodoyman	5	1992	12	1992
<b>COMOROS</b>				
Ahmad Abdallah (Head of the Country)				
none	7	1975	9	1975
Muhammed Joffar (Head of the Country)				
Abdallah Mohammed	9	1975	1	1976
Mohamed Hassanly	9	1975	1	1976
Ali Soilih (Head of the Country)				
Abdallah Mohammed	1	1976	9	1977
Mohammed Hassanly	1	1976	9	1977
Abdallah Mohammed	9	1977	12	1977
Hassan Ali	9	1977	12	1977
Abdallah Mohammed	12	1977	5	1978

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>COMOROS - continued</b>				
Ahmed Abdallah (Head of the Country)				
Mohamed Ahmed	5	1978	12	1978
Abdallah Mohamed	5	1978	12	1978
Salem Ben Ali	12	1978	1	1982
none	1	1982	2	1982
Ali Mroudjae	2	1982	12	1984
none	12	1984	11	1989
Mohamed Djohar (Head of the Country)				
none	11	1989	12	1992
<b>CONGO</b>				
Fulbert Youlou (Head of the Country)				
Jacques Opangault	8	1960	8	1963
Stephen Tchichelle	8	1960	8	1963
Masseмба-Debat	8	1960	8	1963
Masseмба-Debat (Head of the Country)				
Pascal Lissouba	8	1963	5	1966
Amboise Noumozalay	5	1966	1	1968
none	1	1968	7	1968
David-Charles Ganao	7	1968	9	1968

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>CONGO - continued</b>				
Alfred Raoul (Head of the Country)				
Dieudonne Itoua	9	1968	1	1969
Ngouabi (Head of the Country)				
Alfred Raoul	1	1969	1	1972
Moudileno-Massengo	1	1972	8	1973
Henry Lopez	8	1973	12	1975
Louis Sylvain Goma	12	1975	3	1977
Yhombi-Opango (Head of the Country)				
Sassou Nguesso	3	1977	2	1979
Louis Sylvain Goma	3	1977	2	1979
Sassou Nguesso (Head of the Country)				
Louis Sylvain Goma	2	1979	7	1984
A.E. Pongui	7	1984	8	1989
Poaty-Soucklaty	8	1989	1	1991
Louis Sylvain Goma	1	1991	6	1991
Andre Milongo	6	1991	12	1992



## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>DJIBOUTI</b>				
Aptidon (Head of the Country)				
Ahmed Dini	6	1977	12	1977
Abdallah Kamil Hamadou	12	1977	9	1978
Barket Gourad Hamadou	9	1978	12	1992
<b>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</b>				
Macias (Head of the Country)				
Edmundo Bosio Dioco	10	1968	3	1974
Eyegue Ntutumu	3	1974	11	1975
Ntutumu Mangué	11	1975	11	1976
Ngue. Esono Nchama	11	1976	8	1979
Obiang (Head of the Country)				
Maye Ela	8	1979	2	1980
Ela Nsing	8	1979	2	1980
Eulogio Oyo Riquenza	2	1980	12	1981
Cristino Seriche Bioco	12	1981	12	1982
Cristino Seriche Bioco	12	1982	9	1986
F. Mba Onona Nchama	12	1982	9	1986
Cristino Seriche Bioco	9	1986	1	1987
Cristino Seriche Bioco	1	1987	1	1990

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</b> - continued				
Obiang (Head of the Country) - continued				
Ale. Envoro Ovono	1	1987	1	1990
Cristino Seriche Bioco	1	1990	8	1992
Isi Eyi Monsuy Andeme	1	1990	8	1992
Silvestre Siale Bileka	8	1992	12	1992
M.O. Ndong Mifumu	8	1992	12	1992
<b>ETHIOPIA</b>				
Selassie (Head of the Country)				
Endalkatchon	5	1941	4	1958
Aragai	4	1958	3	1961
Habte-Wold	3	1961	2	1974
Endelkatchon	2	1974	7	1974
Imru	7	1974	9	1974
Aman Andom (Head of the Country)				
Asfa Wossen	9	1974	11	1974
Teferi Banti (Head of the Country)				
Mengistu	11	1974	3	1977
Atnafu Abate	11	1974	3	1977

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>ETHEOPIA</b> - continued				
Mengistu (Head of the Country)				
Atnafu Abate	3	1977	1	1978
Mengistu Gemechu	1	1978	4	1979
Wogderes	4	1979	1	1980
Fisseha Desta	1	1980	4	1983
Wogderes	4	1983	4	1991
Gebre Kidan	4	1991	5	1991
Tesfaye Dinka	4	1991	5	1991
Meles Zenawi (Head of the Country)				
Tamirat Layne	5	1991	12	1992
<b>GABON</b>				
Leon Mba (Head of the Country)				
Yembit	8	1960	11	1966
Bongo	11	1966	11	1967
Bongo (Head of the Country)				
Leon Mbiame	11	1967	11	1990
Casimir Oye Mba	11	1990	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>GAMBIA</b>				
Jawara (Head of the Country)				
John Paul	2	1965	3	1966
Farimang Singhateh	3	1966	4	1970
Dibba	4	1970	1	1973
A.D. Camara	1	1973	4	1978
N'Jie	4	1978	4	1983
Bokary Darbo	4	1983	12	1992
<b>GHANA</b>				
Nkrumah (Head of the Country)				
none	5	1957	2	1966
Ankrah (Head of the Country)				
none	2	1966	8	1969
Busia (Head of the Country)				
none	8	1969	8	1970
Akufo-Addo	8	1970	1	1972
Acheampong (Head of the Country)				
A.H. Selomey	1	1972	1	1973
none	1	1973	7	1977
C.S.C. Grant	7	1977	7	1978

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>GHANA</b> - continued				
Akufu-Addo (Head of the Country)				
none	7	1978	12	1978
A. Karbo	12	1978	6	1979
Rawlings (Head of the Country)				
none	6	1979	9	1979
Liman (Head of the Country)				
Graft-Johnson	9	1979	12	1981
Rawlings (Head of the Country)				
none	12	1981	5	1984
Obend	5	1984	12	1992
<b>GUINEA</b>				
Sekou Toure (Head of the Country)				
Keita N'famara	10	1958	3	1960
Cisse	3	1960	10	1963
Oumar Deen Camara	10	1963	12	1965
Nabi Youla	12	1965	9	1967
Saifoulaye Diallo	9	1967	4	1972
Keita N'famara	9	1967	4	1972
Beovogui	4	1972	9	1981

## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>GUINEA</b> - continued				
Sekou Toure (Head of the Country)				
Saifoulaye Diallo	4	1972	9	1981
Keita N'famara	4	1972	9	1981
Sekou Toure (Head of the Country) - continued				
Beovogui	9	1981	4	1984
Keita N'famara	9	1981	4	1984
Conte (Head of the Country)				
Traore	4	1984	12	1984
Amadou Camara	12	1984	12	1986
Tamba Kallas Traore	12	1984	12	1986
Henri Foula	12	1986	12	1988
Tamba Kallas Traore	12	1986	12	1988
Henri Foula	12	1988	12	1989
Mamoby Diawara	12	1988	12	1989
Alsemy Rene Gomez	12	1989	12	1991
Mamoby Diawara	12	1989	12	1991
Alseny Rene Gomez	12	1991	8	1992
Alpha Camara	8	1992	12	1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>GUINEA BISSAU</b>				
Luiz Cabral (Head of the Country)				
Francisco Mendes	9	1974	7	1978
Constantino Teixeira	7	1978	10	1978
Joao Vieira	10	1978	11	1980
Joao Vieira (Head of the Country)				
Vitor Saude Maria	11	1960	3	1984
Paulo Correia	3	1984	11	1985
Iafai Camara	11	1985	3	1989
Iafai Camara	3	1989	12	1991
Vasco Cabral	3	1989	12	1991
Carlos Correia	12	1991	12	1992
<b>IVORY COAST</b>				
Houphouet-Boigny (Head of the Country)				
Jean Baptiste Mockey	8	1960	12	1960
none	12	1960	2	1963
Camille Alliali	2	1963	9	1963
Auguste Denise	9	1963	9	1968
Philippe Yace	9	1968	9	1969

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>IVORY COAST</b> - continued				
Houphouet-Boigny (Head of the Country) - continued				
Auguste Denise	9	1969	9	1972
Mathieu Ekra	9	1969	9	1972
N'Dia Koffi	9	1969	9	1972
Auguste Denise	9	1972	9	1973
Mathieu Ekra	9	1972	9	1973
N'Dia Koffi	9	1972	9	1973
Germain Koffi Gadeau	9	1972	9	1973
Loua Diomande	9	1972	9	1973
Auguste Denise	9	1973	9	1974
Germain Koffi Gadeau	9	1973	9	1974
Loua Diomande	9	1973	9	1974
Houphouet-Boigny (Head of the Country)				
Auguste Denise	9	1974	9	1975
Germain Koffi Gadeau	9	1974	9	1975
Auguste Denise	9	1975	9	1976
Auguste Denise	9	1976	9	1977
Loua Diomande	9	1976	9	1977



## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>IVORY COAST - continued</b>				
Houphouet-Boigny (Head of the Country) - continued				
Auguste Denise	9	1977	9	1980
Bamba	9	1977	9	1980
Auguste Denise	9	1980	11	1983
Mathieu Ekra	9	1980	11	1983
Thierry-Lebe	9	1980	11	1983
Auguste Denise	11	1983	4	1987
Camille Alliali	11	1983	4	1987
Genoleba	11	1983	4	1987
Boguinar	11	1983	4	1987
Coulibaly	11	1983	4	1987
Auguste Denise	4	1987	10	1988
Mathieu Ekra	4	1987	10	1988
Thierry-Lebe	4	1987	10	1988
Camille Alliali	4	1987	10	1988
Gnoleba	4	1987	19	1988
Boginard	4	1987	10	1988
Coulibaly	4	1987	10	1988
Thaim	4	1987	10	1988

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>IVORY COAST - continued</b>				
Houphouet-Boigny (Head of the Country)				
Dibo	4	1987	10	1988
Diabate	4	1987	10	1988
Auguste Denise	10	1988	8	1990
Mathieu Ekra	10	1988	8	1990
Camille Alliali	10	1988	8	1990
Gnoleba	10	1988	8	1990
Boguinar	10	1988	8	1990
Coulibaly	10	1988	8	1990
Dibo	10	1988	8	1990
Diabate	10	1988	8	1990
Auguste Denise	8	1990	11	1990
Mathieu Ekra	8	1990	11	1990
Coulibaly	8	1990	11	1990
Dibo	8	1990	11	1990
Genoleba	8	1990	11	1990
Guy-Alain Guaze	8	1990	11	1990
Camille Alliali	8	1990	11	1990
Boguinar	8	1990	11	1990
Outarra	11	1990	7	1991

## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>IVORY COAST - continued</b>				
Houphouet-Boigny (Head of the Country)				
Mathieu Ekra	11	1990	7	1991
Coulibaly	11	1990	7	1991
Dibo	11	1990	7	1991
Guaze	11	1990	7	1991
Gnoleba	11	1990	7	1991
Boguinard	11	1990	7	1991
Camille Alliali	11	1990	7	1991
Outarra	7	1991	12	1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>KENYA</b>				
Kenyatta (Head of the Country)				
McDonald	12	1963	12	1964
Odinga	12	1964	4	1966
Mboya	4	1966	1	1968
unknown	4	1966	1	1968
Moi	4	1966	1	1968
Moi	1	1968	10	1978
Moi (Head of the Country)				
Kibaki	10	1978	3	1988
Karanja	3	1988	5	1989
Saitoti	5	1989	12	1992
<b>LESOTHO</b>				
Jonathon (Head of the Country)				
Moshoeshoe II	10	1966	2	1970
Mamaohato	2	1970	1	1971
Moshoeshoe II	1	1971	1	1986
Lekhanya (Head of the Country)				
Moshoeshoe II	1	1986	11	1990
Letsie III	11	1990	4	1991
Ramaema (Head of the Country)				

Letsie III

4

1991

12

1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>LIBERIA</b>				
Tubman (Head of the Country)				
Tolbert	1	1944	8	1971
Tolbert (Head of the Country)				
Fahnbulleh	8	1971	2	1972
none	2	1972	4	1972
Greene	4	1972	8	1977
Warner	8	1977	4	1980
Doe (Head of the Country)				
Syen	4	1980	8	1981
Podier	8	1981	8	1984
Moniba	8	1984	9	1990
No Head of the Country - civil war				
Moniba	9	1990	11	1990
Amos Sawyer (Head of the Country)				
Ronald Diggs	11	1990	5	1991
Peter Naigow	5	1991	9	1991
none	9	1991	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MADAGASCAR</b>				
Tsiranana (Head of the Country)				
Tsiebo	6	1960	6	1970
Resampa	6	1970	2	1971
Rabemananjara	6	1970	2	1971
Miadana	6	1970	2	1971
Tseibo	2	1971	6	1971
Resampa	2	1971	6	1971
Tsiranana (Head of the Country) - continued				
Rabemananjara	2	1971	6	1971
Miadana	2	1971	6	1971
Ramangasavina	2	1971	6	1971
LeChat	2	1971	6	1971
Tseibo	6	1971	5	1972
Rabemananjara	1	1971	5	1972
Miadana	6	1971	5	1972
Ramangasavina	6	1971	5	1972
LeChat	6	1971	5	1972
Ramanantsoa (Head of the Country)				
Tsiranana	5	1972	2	1975

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MADAGASCAR</b> - continued				
Andriamahazo (Head of the Country)				
none	2	1975	6	1975
Ratsiraka (Head of the Country)				
Rakotomalala	6	1975	8	1976
Rakotoniana	8	1976	8	1977
Rakotoorijoana	8	1977	2	1988
Ramahatra	2	1988	8	1991
Razanamasy	8	1991	12	1992
<b>MALAWI</b>				
Banda (Head of the Country)				
Jones	7	1964	7	1966
Muwalo	7	1966	12	1969
Chiwanda	12	1969	12	1970
Muwalo	12	1970	11	1971
Chiwanda	12	1970	11	1971
Muwalo	11	1971	3	1977
Munyenyeembe	3	1977	6	1977
Nkoma	3	1977	6	1977
Muluzi	6	1977	5	1979



## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MALAWI</b>				
Banda (Head of the Country) - continued				
Nkhoma	6	1977	5	1979
Muluzi	5	1979	6	1980
Lungu	5	1979	6	1980
Muluzi	6	1980	5	1982
Matenje	5	1982	2	1983
Chirwa	2	1983	7	1987
Somanje	2	1983	7	1987
Chirwa	7	1987	7	1988
Pashane	7	1988	6	1991
Tembo	6	1991	12	1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MALI</b>				
Keita (Head of the Country)				
Jean Marie Kone	9	1960	8	1967
none	8	1967	11	1968
Traore (Head of the Country)				
Yoro Diakite	11	1968	9	1969
Diarra	11	1968	9	1969
none	9	1969	5	1973
Baba Diarra	5	1973	5	1978
none	5	1978	6	1986
Mamadou Dembele	6	1986	6	1988
Django Cissoko	6	1988	3	1991
Amadou Toure (Head of the Country)				
Sacko	3	1991	6	1992
Konare (Head of the Country)				
Younoussi Toure	6	1992	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MAURITANIA</b>				
Moktar Daddah (Head of the Country)				
none	11	1960	8	1975
Diagna	8	1975	8	1977
none	8	1977	2	1978
Abdallahi Boye	2	1978	5	1978
none	7	1978	4	1979
Saleck (Head of the Country)				
none	7	1978	4	1979
Bouceif (Head of the Country)				
Saleck	4	1979	5	1979
Haidalla (Head of the Country)				
Mohamed Louly	5	1979	1	1980
Houssein	1	1980	12	1980
Dia Amadou	1	1980	12	1980
Benijara	12	1980	4	1981
Taya	4	1981	12	1984
Taya (Head of the Country)				
Mohamed Ould Amar	12	1984	6	1985
Mohamoud Ba	12	1984	6	1985

## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MAURITANIA</b> - continued				
Taya (Head of the Country) - continued				
Selmouth O.M. Wane	6	1985	6	1986
Barou Abdoulaye	6	1986	5	1992
Boubaker	5	1992	9	1992
N'Diaye Kane	9	1992	12	1992
Ba Alassane Yero	9	1992	12	1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MAURITIUS</b>				
Ramgoolam (Head of the Country)				
John Rennie	3	1968	9	1968
Leonard Williams	9	1968	8	1970
Abdul Osman	8	1970	10	1970
Leonard Williams	10	1970	12	1971
Abdul Osman	12	1971	2	1972
Ramgoolam (Head of the Country) - continued				
Leonard Williams	2	1972	12	1972
Abdul Osman	12	1972	10	1977
Jugnauth (Head of the Country)				
Duvall	10	1977	8	1978
Ramgoolam (Head of the Country)				
Abdul Osman	8	1978	4	1979
Burrenchobay	4	1979	6	1982
Jugnauth (Head of the Country)				
Burrenchobay	6	1982	8	1983
Duvall	8	1983	12	1983
Duvall	12	1983	2	1984

## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MAURITIUS</b> - continued				
Jugnauth (Head of the Country) - conintinued				
Ramgoolam	12	1983	2	1984
Duvall	2	1984	1	1986
Duvall	1	1986	1	1987
Ringadoo	1	1986	1	1987
Duvall	1	1987	8	1988
Boolell	1	1987	8	1988
Lutchmeenaraido	1	1987	8	1988
Ringado	1	1987	8	1988
none	8	1988	1	1989
Boolell	8	1988	1	1989
Lutchmeenaraido	8	1988	1	1989
Ringado	8	1988	1	1989
Boolell	1	1989	9	1990
Lutchmeenaraido	1	1989	9	1990
Ghurburum	1	1989	9	1990
Ringado	1	1989	9	1990
Lutachmeenaraido	9	1990	6	1992
Ghurburum	9	1990	6	1992
Nabasingh	9	1990	6	1992
Ringado	9	1990	6	1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>MAURITIUS</b> - continued				
Uteem (Head of the Country)				
Ghurburram	6	1992	12	1992
Jugnauth	6	1992	12	1992
Nabasingh	6	1992	12	1992
<b>MOZAMBIQUE</b>				
Samora Machel (Head of the Country)				
Oscar Monteiro	6	1975	5	1983
Jacinto Veloso	5	1983	6	1984
none	6	1984	10	1986
Chissano (Head of the Country)				
Machungo	10	1986	12	1992
<b>NAMIBIA</b>				
Sam Nujoma (Head of the Country)				
Hage Geingob	3	1990	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>NIGER</b>				
Diori (Head of the Country)				
none	8	1960	10	1969
Abou Sidikou	10	1969	10	1970
Mai Maigana	10	1970	8	1972
Mai Maigana	8	1972	4	1974
Mamadou Maidah	8	1972	4	1974
Kountche (Head of the Country)				
Sani Souna Sido	4	1974	1	1983
Mamane Oumarou	1	1983	11	1987
Ali Seibou (Head of the Country)				
Hamid Algabid	11	1987	7	1988
Oumarou Mamane	7	1988	12	1989
none	12	1989	3	1990
Aliou Mahamidou	3	1990	11	1991
Amadou Cheiffou	11	1991	12	1992



## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>NIGERIA</b>				
Balewa (Head of the Country)				
Azikewe	10	1960	1	1966
Ironsi (Head of the Country)				
B.A.O. Ogundipe	1	1966	7	1966
Gowon (Head of the Country)				
Awolowo	7	1966	12	1971
Stanley O. Wey	12	1971	7	1975
Murtala Mohammed (Head of the Country)				
Obasanjo	7	1975	2	1976
Obasanjo (Head of the Country)				
Shehu Adua	2	1976	10	1979
Shagari (Head of the Country)				
Alex Ekwueme	10	1979	1	1984
Buhari (Head of the Country)				
none	1	1984	8	1985
Babangida (Head of the Country)				
Ebitu Ukiwe	8	1985	4	1989
Agustus Aikhomu	4	1989	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>RWANDA</b>				
Kayibanda (Head of the Country)				
none	7	1962	7	1973
Habyarimana (Head of the Country)				
none	7	1973	7	1990
Ntezilyayo	7	1990	4	1991
Enoch Ruhigira	4	1991	4	1992
Nsengiyaremye	4	1992	12	1992
<b>SAO TOME</b>				
Manuel da Costa (Head of the Country)				
Miguel Trovoada	7	1975	4	1979
none	4	1979	1	1988
C. Rochas da Costa	1	1988	4	1991
Miguel Travoada (Head of the Country)				
Daniel Daio	4	1991	5	1991
Norberto Alegre	5	1991	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SENEGAL</b>				
Senghor (Head of the Country)				
Mamadou Dia	4	1960	12	1963
Guillabert	12	1963	2	1964
N'Gom	12	1963	2	1964
M'Bache	12	1963	2	1964
Toure	12	1963	2	1964
Gueye	12	1963	2	1964
Abou Diouf	2	1964	3	1968
none	3	1968	5	1968
Amadou Cisse Dia	5	1968	7	1968
Cabou	7	1968	2	1970
Ba	7	1968	2	1970
Diouf	2	1970	1	1981
Diouf (Head of the Country)				
Thaim	1	1981	4	1983
Moustapha Niasse	4	1983	10	1984
Jean Collin	10	1984	3	1990
Sonko	3	1990	4	1991
Thaim	4	1991	12	1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SEYCHELLES</b>				
James Mancham (Head of the Country)				
France-Albert Rene	1	1976	6	1977
France-Albert Rene (Head of the Country)				
none	6	1977	12	1992
<b>SIERRA LEONE</b>				
Milton Margai (Head of the Country)				
Lightfoot-Boston	4	1961	5	1964
Albert Margai (Head of the Country)				
Lightfoot-Boston	5	1964	3	1967
Juxon-Smith (Head of the Country)				
Ambrose Leigh	3	1967	4	1968
Siaka Stevens (Head of the Country)				
Banja Tejan-Sie	4	1968	3	1971
Chris. Okoro Cole	3	1971	4	1971
Koroma	4	1971	5	1976
Koroma	5	1976	6	1977
Fofanah	5	1976	6	1977
Koroma	6	1977	5	1979

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SIERRA LEONE - continued</b>				
Siaka Stevens (Head of the Country) - continued				
M.S. Mustapha	5	1979	6	1980
Koroma	6	1980	6	1984
Kamara-Taylor	6	1980	6	1984
Koromo	6	1984	11	1985
Francis Minah	6	1984	11	1985
Momoh (Head of the Country)				
Francis Minah	11	1985	7	1987
Abubaker Kamara	11	1985	7	1987
Abubaker Kamara	7	1987	9	1991
Salia Jusu-Sheriff	7	1987	9	1991
Abdullai Conteh	9	1991	4	1992
Salia Jusu-Sheriff	9	1991	4	1992
V. Strasser (Head of the Country)				
Musa	4	1992	12	1992
John Benjamin	4	1992	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT				
Dates in Office				
	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SOMALIA</b>				
Osman (Head of the Country)				
Egal	7	1960	8	1960
Shermarke	8	1960	6	1964
Abdk Rizak Haji Hus	6	1964	6	1967
Shermarke (Head of the Country)				
Egal	6	1967	10	1969
Barre (Head of the Country)				
Ali Korshil	10	1969	12	1970
Ainanshe	10	1969	12	1970
Ainanshe	12	1970	12	1971
Kulmiye Afrah	12	1971	2	1980
Ali Samatar	12	1971	2	1980
Ali Abokor	12	1971	2	1980
Kulmiye Afrah	2	1980	10	1980
Suleiman Abdalla	10	1980	3	1982
Kulmiye Afrah	10	1980	3	1982
Ali Samatar	3	1982	6	1982
Kulmiye Afrah	3	1982	6	1982

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SOMALIA</b> - continued				
Barre (Head of the Country) - continued				
Ali Abokor	3	1982	6	1982
Ali Samatar	6	982	7	1989
Kulmiye Afrah	6	1982	7	1989
Ali Samatar	7	1989	9	1990
Abdalla Mohammed Fadil	7	1989	9	1990
Hawadle Madar	9	1990	1	1991
Jamma Barre	9	1990	1	1991
no government/civil war	1	1991	9	1992
Ali Mahdi (Head of the Country)				
Arteh Ghalib	9	1992	12	1992
Aden Gabayow	9	1992	12	1992
Umar Ma'alim	9	1992	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SUDAN</b>				
Azhari (Head of the Country)				
none	1	1956	7	1956
Khalil (Head of the Country)				
none	7	1956	11	1958
Abboud (Head of the Country)				
none	11	1958	11	1964
Sirr al-Khatim (Head of the Country)				
none	11	1964	6	1965
Majoub (Head of the Country)				
Azarhi	6	1965	4	1966
al-Mahidi (Head of the Country)				
Azarhi	4	1966	8	1967
none	8	1967	5	1969
Nimiery (Head of the Country)				
Babikr Awadallah	5	1969	10	1971
Awadallah	10	1971	2	1972
Abbas	10	1971	2	1972
Awadallah	2	1972	6	1972



## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SUDAN - continued</b>				
Nimiery (Head of the Country) - continued				
el Baghir	2	1972	6	1972
Abbas	6	1972	1	1974
el Baghir	6	1972	1	1974
el Baghir	1	1974	3	1978
Alier	1	1974	3	1978
Ibrahim	3	1978	9	1980
Nimiery (Head of the Country) - continued				
Alier	3	1978	9	1980
Majid Khalil	9	1980	1	1982
Alier	9	1980	1	1982
al Tayeb	1	1982	7	1982
Alier	1	1982	7	1982
al Tayeb	7	1982	4	1985
Joseph Lagu	7	1982	4	1985
el Dahab (Head of the Country)				
Daffalah	4	1985	6	1986
Aru Bol	4	1985	6	1986

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SUDAN - continued</b>				
el Mahdi (Head of the Country)				
el Mirghani	6	1986	6	1987
al Hindi	6	1986	6	1987
el Mirghani	6	1987	5	1988
al Husayn	6	1987	5	1988
el Mirghani	5	1988	3	1989
Deng	5	1988	3	1989
el Mirghani	3	1989	6	1989
el Beshir (Head of the Country)				
Salih	6	1989	12	1992
<b>SWAZILAND</b>				
Sobhuza II (Head of the Country)				
Makhosini Dhlamini	9	1968	12	1971
Makhosini Dhlamini	12	1971	3	1976
Khumalo	12	1971	3	1976
Mophevu Dhlaminia	3	1976	2	1979
Khumalo	3	1976	2	1979
Mophevu Dhlaminia	2	1979	11	1979
Nsibandze	2	1979	11	1979
Mandabala	11	1979	8	1982
Nsibandze	11	1979	8	1982

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>SWAZILAND</b> - continued				
Dzeliwe (Head of the Country)				
Sozia	8	1982	3	1983
Mandabala	8	1982	3	1983
Nsibandze	8	1982	3	1983
Sozia	3	1983	8	1983
Bhekimpi	3	1983	8	1983
Nsibandze	3	1983	8	1983
Bhekimpi (Head of the Country)				
Mhambi Mnisi	8	1983	2	1985
Ntombi	8	1983	2	1985
Ntombi	2	1985	4	1986
Mswati III (Head of the Country)				
Bhekimpi	4	1986	10	1986
Ntombi	4	1986	10	1986
Sotja Dlamini	10	1986	11	1987
Mhlangano	10	1986	11	1987
Sotja Dlamini	11	1987	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>TANZANIA</b>				
Nyerere (Head of the Country)				
Karume	4	1964	9	1964
Karume	9	1964	4	1972
Kawawa	9	1964	4	1972
Aboud Jumbe	4	1972	2	1977
Kawawa	4	1972	2	1977
Aboud Jumbe	2	1977	11	1980
Sokoine	2	1977	11	1980
Aboud Jumbe	11	1980	2	1983
Msuya	11	1980	2	1983
Aboud Jumbe	2	1983	1	1984
Sokoine	2	1983	1	1984
Nyerere (Head of the Country) - continued				
Sokoine	1	1984	4	1984
Mwinyi	4	1984	11	1985
Salim Ahmed Salim	4	1984	11	1985
Mwinyi (Head of the Country)				
Wairoba	11	1985	7	1992
Abdul Wakil	11	1985	7	1992
Malecela	7	1992	12	1992
Salim Amour	7	1992	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>TOGO</b>				
Olympio (Head of the Country)				
none	4	1960	1	1963
Grunitsky (Head of the Country)				
Meatchie	1	1963	1	1967
Kleber Kadjo (Head of the Country)				
James Assila	1	1967	4	1967
Eyadema (Head of the Country)				
Pierre Adossama	4	1967	6	1967
Lacle	6	1967	2	1977
none	2	1977	1	1988
Lekezime	1	1988	8	1991
Koffigoh	8	1991	12	1992
Mutesa (Head of the Country)				
Kiwanuka	10	1962	6	1964
Obote	6	1964	4	1966
Wilberforce Nadiope	6	1964	4	1966
Obote (Head of the Country)				
Wilberforce Nadiope	4	1966	6	1968
Babiiha	6	1968	1	1971

## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>TOGO - continued</b>				
Amin (Head of the Country)				
none	1	1971	5	1977
Adrisi	5	1977	4	1979
Lule (Head of the Country)				
Ngobi	4	1979	6	1979
Binaisa (Head of the Country)				
Mwanga	6	1979	5	1980
Mwanga (Head of the Country)				
Museveni	5	1980	12	1980
Obote (Head of the Country)				
Mwanga	12	1980	7	1985
O. Allimadi	12	1980	7	1985
Okello (Head of the Country)				
none	7	1985	9	1985
Waligo	9	1985	3	1986
Museveni (Head of the Country)				
Kisekka	3	1986	8	1988
Kisekka	8	1988	12	1992
Eriya Kategaya	8	1988	12	1992
Ssemogerere	8	1988	12	1992

389

Mayanja

8

1988

12

1992

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## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>ZAIRE (CONGO)</b>				
Lumumba (Head of the Country)				
Kasavubu	6	1960	9	1960
Mobutu (Head of the Country)				
Kasavubu	9	1960	7	1961
Adoula (Head of the Country)				
Kasavubu	7	1961	7	1964
Tshombe (Head of the Country)				
Kasavubu	7	1964	11	1965
Mobutu (Head of the Country)				
Mulamba	11	1965	11	1966
none	11	1966	5	1977
Karl-I-Bond	5	1977	7	1977
Mpinda Kasinda	7	977	7	1978
Karl-I-Bond	7	1978	6	1979
Boboliko	6	1979	7	1981
N'Singa	7	1981	11	1982
Kengo	11	1982	1	1987
Mulumba	1	1987	8	1988



## APPENDIX D - continued

EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>ZAIRE (CONGO) - continued</b>				
Mobutu (Head of the Country) - continued				
Sambwa	8	1988	8	1989
Kengo	8	1989	4	1990
Lunda Bululu	4	1990	4	1991
Mulumba Kukoji	4	1991	8	1991
Tshisekedi	8	1991	10	1991
Mungul Diaka	10	1991	12	1991
Karl-I-Bond	12	1991	8	1992
Tshisekedi	8	1992	12	1992
<b>ZAMBIA</b>				
Kaunda (Head of the Country)				
Kapwewe	10	1964	2	1971
Mainza Chona	2	1971	5	1975
Elija Mudenda	5	1975	7	1977
Mainza Chona	7	1977	6	1978
D.N. Lisulo	6	1978	2	1981
Nalumina Mundia	2	1981	4	1985
Musokotwane	4	1985	3	1989
Malimbe Mosheke	3	1989	10	1991
Frederick Chiluba (Head of the Country)				
Levy Mwanawasa	10	1991	12	1992

## APPENDIX D - continued

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EQUIVALENT OF THE US VICE PRESIDENT  
Dates in Office

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	In		Out	
	Month	Year	Month	Year
<b>ZIMBABWE</b>				
Mugabe (Head of the Country)				
Muzende	4	1980	1	1981
Muzende	1	1981	2	1982
Banana	1	1981	2	1982
Nkomo	1	1981	2	1982
Muzende	2	1982	12	1987
Banana	2	1982	12	1987
Muzenda	12	1987	12	1992
Nkomo	12	1987	12	1992

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