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**ON THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES: TESTING A THEORY
OF MAJORITY PARTY RELIABILITY**

presented by

Philip Andrew Kloha

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of the requirements for the

Ph.D. degree in Political Science

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**ON THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES:
TESTING A THEORY OF MAJORITY PARTY RELIABILITY**

VOLUME I

By

Philip Andrew Kloha

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ABSTRACT

ON THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES: TESTING A THEORY OF MAJORITY PARTY RELIABILITY

By

Philip Andrew Kloha

A central contribution of this dissertation is its elaboration of a partisan theory of committee organization. Legislative scholars have historically tested whether committees are generally representative of the chamber or whether they are disproportionately composed of legislators who have a higher demand for the constituency goods within each committee's jurisdiction. This present work suggests that this debate has overlooked the key role of party in creating the committee system. By introducing the concept of majority party reliability, this work argues that majority party leaders use systems and component strategies to create committees that will tend to operate reliably. Systems strategies involve the structure of the committee, while component strategies are related to the allocation of members within that structure. The systems strategy hypotheses examined suggest that majority party leaders "stack" a committee in their favor when the floor is closely divided and when a committee is small or important. The component strategy hypotheses suggest that smaller committees and important slots receive more reliable members, and unreliable members are less likely to receive multiple assignments. Each hypothesis receives empirical support in the U.S. House of Representatives for 1975-2001.

Given that the majority party both creates structures and assigns members in a manner that favor its collective interests, it naturally follows that the resulting committees will reflect these biases. These outlying committees are not distributive in nature, but

partisan. The theoretical basis for and empirical recognition of these outliers has been almost entirely absent from the literature. Regressions and graphical evidence in support of these outliers are presented for the U.S. House.

The analysis is extended to a wide array of institutional contexts. The party reliability hypotheses receive less support in the U.S. Senate, but systems solutions are often found in the 92 state chambers examined. Evidence confirming majority party reliability's presence in these institutions tends to be found when there is incentive to use the reliability solutions, the body is free from restrictions to implement the solutions, and there is an agent present to structure and make assignments to committees.

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To the One Who works on behalf of those who wait for Him.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Congressional scholars have devoted much attention to the composition of congressional committees, and especially so in the last fifteen years. A primary question in this research considers whether committees (or party contingents on committees) are “outliers,” or whether they closely resemble the chamber (or party caucuses) from which they are drawn according to measures of various dimensions. This study will make a contribution to this literature by providing a new perspective on this question. The basic premise of this study is that majority party leaders use a variety of strategies to construct committees that will act as reliable agents for the majority party. Majority leaders will engage in these strategies when the risk of poor committee behavior is relatively high or costly and there are no rules or norms prohibiting the strategies. When used, the outcome of these strategies is that committees are systematically biased in favor of the majority party.

As Groseclose (1994, 268) has noted, debates concerning the composition of committees are important for at least two reasons. First, there are important policy consequences to consider if committees are indeed composed of outlying members. Outlying committees with the property rights of proposing policy, gatekeeping, and membership on conference committees could produce legislation that does not reflect the majority of the chamber. Indeed, Adler (2002, 118) notes that one motivation of congressional reformers has been to end the parochialism that results in “district advocates dominating committees.” A second reason for the importance of examining committee composition is that different theories of legislative organization generate

conflicting testable hypotheses on these matters. In their review of the theoretical literature on committees, Shepsle and Weingast (1995, 9) note there are three classes of theories that are most prominent: distributive, informational, and partisan. Each of these provides a different explanation for committee composition, and therefore each has a unique expectation concerning the representativeness of committees. These three theories will be briefly reviewed here.

When congressional scholars speak of the theoretical basis for outlying committees, they are almost invariably referring to a distributive (or gains from exchange) theory of congressional organization. This perspective is well-represented by Adler (2002), having important predecessors in Shepsle (1978) and Weingast and Marshall (1988). In brief, distributive theories note that some policies confer benefits on fairly narrow constituencies, yet all policies require a floor majority to be enacted. Committees are thought to be composed of “high-demand” legislators who wish to bring home these narrow benefits to aid their districts. These legislators engage in a logroll with legislators who are “high-demanders” of a different sort, and therefore each committee is allowed to pass its narrow legislation. Similarly, Shepsle (1978, 238) observed an interest-advocacy-accommodation dynamic in committee assignments in which party leaders (in the form of the committee on committees) tried to accommodate the constituency interests of members. Thus the Agriculture Committee, for instance, would tend to have a disproportionate number of members who represent rural farming districts.

In terms of the committee outlier debate, the distributive theory has a clear expectation: committees will be outliers on appropriate jurisdiction-specific dimensions.

Examples of such evidence is presented in Adler (2002, chapters 3 and 4) and Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde (2001, 917-918). It is important to note that distributive theories do not usually address the ideological composition of committees. Adler (2002, 48) reminds us that the essence of distributive theory “is *not* that congressional committees are composed of members with extreme *ideological* preferences, but that they are composed of members who seek to provide for the specific social or economic needs of their constituencies.” After providing support for his constituency-characteristics approach to outlying committees, Adler (2002, 74) allows that his findings “do not necessarily prove that committees are unrepresentative of the chamber in all respects—it may still be the case that several panels are composed of a broad distribution of *ideological* perspectives.” Thus the distributive theory leaves ample room for a multi-dimensional view of committees in which they may or may not be outliers on nondistributive dimensions.

Distributive theories dominated a generation of positive congressional theories (in the 1980s), and it was a generally accepted proposition that committees were composed of preference outliers (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, 11). Outlying committees are most often associated with distributive theories, but there are others who suggest that committees will instead generally mirror the chamber from which they are constituted. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989, 1990) and Krehbiel (1991) argue for an informational theory of organization that suggests committees are primarily the agents of the chamber floor, and therefore it is “informationally inefficient” if they do not generally resemble the preferences of the floor. Using both ideological and (somewhat) jurisdiction-specific measures, Krehbiel (1991) finds that committees are only rarely outlying, such as the

Armed Services Committee. In addition, Groseclose (1994a, 270) demonstrated that the seemingly robust evidence for committee outliers presented by Weingast and Marshall (1988) was not replicable, and he reports that only two committees and one subcommittee actually appeared to be outliers. Such findings are consistent with an informational theory of organization that has an explicit expectation for the central tendencies of committees, namely that they should largely mirror the central tendencies of the chamber.

The distributive and informational theories can be described as having clearly stated expectations (on at least a distributive dimension) concerning committee medians and their relation to the floor. The third branch of congressional theories, which focuses on the vital role of parties and their leaders, has been much less clear in these expectations. Londregan and Snyder (1994, 263) affirm this, writing that “a problem with the theorizing on congressional parties, however, is the lack of detailed hypotheses about committee composition.” In his review of prior research on committee composition, Adler (2002, 45) writes that partisan theorists “could not avoid this debate over committee composition,” and he suggests that “the most thorough treatment has been presented by Cox and McCubbins” in chapter 8 of *Legislative Leviathan*. That chapter, however, is titled “Contingents and Parties,” and it offers expectations on the representativeness of party contingents based upon the type of externalities that the committees produce. They distinguish three classes of committee jurisdiction, based upon “the uniformity or skewness of their typical external effects.” Committees with uniform externalities are those “whose external effects on average fall about equally on all noncommittee members,” and they expect these committee contingents to be “microcosms of their party caucuses.” If the external effect “usually falls primarily on a

well-defined subset of noncommittee members and leave the rest largely unaffected,” then the committee is characterized as having “targeted externalities.” Cox and McCubbins suggest that these contingents will be “unrepresentative of the party caucus on one or more dimensions.” Finally, some committees have “mixed” external effects that “do not fall into either of the first two categories,” and they suggest it is “harder to say anything definitive” about the representativeness of these contingents.

Even if one were to grant their typology of targeted, uniform, and mixed externalities, it does not follow that *party contingent* central tendencies are the appropriate statistic to examine. The reason for this is that the suggested externalities are only realized via an actual legislative product, and this, of course, normally requires a majority of a *committee*, not a party contingent. In the 107th Congress (2001-02) the Appropriations Committee had 36 Republicans and 29 Democrats for a total of 65 members. If the Republican majority were concerned with the externalities produced by this committee (characterized as having “uniform” externalities), Cox and McCubbins’ argument suggests that the party will devote much attention to regulating the median (or mean) member of the majority contingent. This would lead them to focus on approximately the eighteenth position on their contingent. Yet this legislator is *fifteen* positions removed from the analytically important committee median on a unidimensional scale (ideological or otherwise). It is the committee median, not majority party contingent median that is theoretically relevant when discussing the externality-producing legislation that will actually be approved by a committee. What Cox and McCubbins present as a party contingent expectation is actually most theoretically appropriate at only the full committee level. Yet these expectations (uniform externality

committees being representative and targeted externality committees being unrepresentative) are apparently not met at the full committee level of analysis, with Cox and McCubbins finding very few committee (ideological) outliers (1993, 60-82).

Other partisan theorists have offered expectations concerning committee composition that focused on the committee as a whole instead of primarily the party contingents. Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde (2001, 914) note that “we expect committees to be outliers on some (e.g., distributive) issue dimensions but not on others (e.g., those salient to parties).” In this view, committee representativeness depends primarily upon the issue dimension being examined. Adler’s findings of outlying committees would therefore not be surprising since they tapped a distributive dimension. In the same way Cox and McCubbins’ findings of very few committee outliers would also not be surprising since they were based on ideological measures, a dimension salient to parties.

Marshall, Prins, and Rohde (1997, 25) note that many null findings for committee outliers may also be due to the fact that the measures used “had nothing to do with the reasons committee members were assigned.” They suggest that “if we were to analyze the distribution of member heights or shoe-sizes on committees, and were to compare them to the corresponding distribution among nonmembers, it is likely that we would find that the distributions were the same, or very similar.” They argue that this apparent “mirroring” of the floor by the committee is not evidence of a deliberate attempt to create representative committees; rather, the measure simply bears no relationship to the reasons why members are given their committee assignments. Thus Marshall et al. should not be surprised by findings such as Cox and McCubbins that seem to indicate committees are

generally representative of the floor on ideological measures, since these measures are irrelevant to the process that creates the committees.

Aldrich and Battista (2002, 165) also make some explicit claims about the expectations that a party-based theory has for committee representativeness. In their article on conditional party government in the states, they write that

Obviously, if both party contingents are representative of the parent caucuses, then the committee will be approximately representative of the larger chamber. This links Cox and McCubbins' cartel account to Gilligan and Krehbiel's information-based model of committees subservient to the full chamber.

This claim is wholly unwarranted, however. The representativeness of contingents need not be related whatsoever to the representativeness of the committee as a whole.

Consider, for example, a House committee with two contingents that represent their respective party caucuses very well, but in which the minority party contingent is three times larger than the majority contingent. In such a case, one would have little expectation that this committee's central tendency would typically be equivalent to that of the chamber. Instead, that committee most likely favors the minority party even though both contingents were representative. This same logic would hold if the committee had equal sized contingents or if the majority party had an oversized contingent. If a party is given a sizable seat advantage (or disadvantage), then this often prevents the representativeness of the committee as a whole, even if both party contingents are representative. Therefore there is no necessary connection between representative party contingents and representative committees, and the link between partisan and informational theories suggested by Aldrich and Battista is quite dubious.

Summarizing Prior Theoretical Expectations

One possible way to summarize the scholarly literature on committee outliers is to classify it by the models' expectations for various measures. Thus far, there are essentially two classes of expectations. Distributive and partisan theorists have generally been on the same page, suggesting that the legislative setting is multi-dimensional and that a committee could be outlying (or not) depending on the measure that is used. Both partisan and distributive theorists have generally claimed that committees will be outlying on appropriately constructed distributive measures, but they will largely be representative on ideological measures. Informational theories, however, have an expectation that committees will be representative of the floor regardless of the measure employed. This information is summarized in table 1.1. One might add an additional row titled "Irrelevant Measure" to include the observation by Marshall, Prins, and Rohde. Their expectation for this class of measure is that the committee would be representative of the chamber.

[Table 1.1 about here]

The Purpose of This Study

Having discussed the importance and a brief history of where the committee outlier debate has been, we are now in a position to discuss the course of this present work. A major objective of this study is to elaborate a partisan theory of organization that lays a claim on the one vacant cell of table 1.1. By introducing the concept of *majority party reliability*, I have an expectation that outlying committees ought to be commonly found under some circumstances using ideological measures of central tendency. The essence of majority party reliability is that the majority party (through the agency of its leaders) will create a system of legislative subunits that generally operate reliably when

the interests of the majority party are at stake. This approach therefore views committee construction as an engineering problem for the majority party: the majority leaders must create committee structures and assign members to those structures such that the committee as a whole will reliably operate as an agent of the majority party caucus.

The prior research on committee outliers emphasizes constituency characteristics as a basis for assignment, in which members' interests are accommodated. This study, however, will emphasize that committees are also constructed for a distinctively partisan purpose: for the majority party to win if a dimension salient to the majority party arises. The majority would rather not have its agenda items be defeated in committee, nor would it prefer that inimical proposals supported by the minority party be approved by the committee. Such failures are time consuming, embarrassing to the party, and harm its popular reputation that Cox and McCubbins (1993) suggest is important in elections. Some of this trouble could be avoided if the majority leaders threaten to punish "unreliable" (or promise to reward "reliable") specific committee member behavior. Majority leaders, however, would prefer not to have to use these resources nor expend extensive time monitoring that behavior, and an alternate solution would definitely be desirable. Majority party reliability suggests that such a solution has indeed been utilized in that committees are constructed precisely so that these tools need not be often employed by the majority leaders. Instead of having to routinely twist arms to get reliable behavior from its own members, majority party leaders will instead seek a structural solution (one with a reliability focus) to avoid these problems. This solution of making reliable committees will be particularly evident when it is most important for the majority party to win or when the chances of the majority winning would be most vulnerable.

Thus this study argues for a new perspective on outlying committees and actually argues for the recognition of a new type of outlier, a party-reliability based outlier in which committees give an advantage to the majority party. As noted above, the traditional notion of outlying committees has been based on a theory of high-demand legislators seeking assignment to committees that would allow them to act on legislation advantageous to their districts. Here, however, outlying committees are the product of majority party leaders forming reliable subunits.

It is worthwhile to note some specifics as to what this study does not do. First, this study does not challenge the empirical findings of distributive theorists that at least some constituency committees are typically outliers according to distributive measures. The concept of majority party reliability does, however, have some effect on distributive theorizing, calling for recognition that the commonly cited “self-selection” or “interest-advocacy-accommodation” hypotheses are insufficient descriptions of the committee assignment process. To the extent that the self-selection phenomenon occurs, it does so within a context that was previously created to meet a partisan reliability objective. This is so because both committee sizes and party ratios are negotiated before committee assignments occur, and both of these can be used to give an advantage to the majority party.

A second goal that this research does not have is to claim that all committees in all settings will be partisan outliers. If distributive theories expect some committees to be (distributive) outliers all the time, then majority party reliability expects that (almost) all committees will be (ideological) outliers some of the time. There are no universal claims being made here of committees always being ideological outliers favoring the majority

party. (Indeed, a proponent of my more cautious view already has an apparently dismal empirical history to inherit since the most well-known studies routinely find ideologically representative committees.) Instead this research elaborates conditional claims for when committees will tend to be constructed to favor the majority party. For instance, the majority party can only seek an advantage in committee composition if the institutional rules or norms do not severely restrict or otherwise discourage the strategy. Even in the absence of such barriers, the majority party will only create reliability-based outliers under certain conditions (that is, when the jurisdiction of the committee is important or a representative committee would be relatively unreliable). Further, I will argue that in some circumstances, the majority party may find it advantageous to take the somewhat counter-intuitive step of creating some apparently ideologically hostile committees to facilitate the reliable operation of other, more important committees.

This study will focus initially on more explicit theoretical expectations of majority party reliability. That will be the purpose of chapter 2 in which majority party reliability is defined and the strategies for pursuing it are introduced. The subsequent chapters will be primarily empirical, with chapters 3, 4 and 5 all centering on the U.S. House of Representatives. Chapters 3 and 4 will be devoted to two reliability-based strategies available to majority party leaders. Chapter 3 will focus on the *systems* strategies that the majority party pursues as it establishes the size and party ratios of committees. Systems strategies involve structural choices made by party leaders in the formation of committees. Chapter 4 will examine some of the *component* strategies used by party leaders to increase the chances that the committee contingent (and therefore the committee as a whole) acts as a reliable agent for the majority party. Component

strategies deal with the allocation of members within a committee structure. Chapter 5 is the logical child of the two chapters preceding it. When the committees are structured to favor the majority party (chapter 3) and members are assigned in a manner that favors the majority party (chapter 4), this necessarily influences the median position of committees on measures relevant to the parties. Therefore using ADA, ADA-adjusted, and D-W NOMINATE (hereafter NOMINATE) scores, chapter 5 demonstrates the conditions under which House committees are outliers.

Chapters 6 and 7 test the hypotheses of majority party reliability under different institutional settings. Chapter 6 focuses on the Senate and repeats the empirical inquiries that are tested for the House. Chapter 7 tests majority party reliability hypotheses in most of the states, with both state houses and senates being examined over 8 legislative sessions. While this provides a rich setting for empirical testing, this chapter only explores systems-strategy hypotheses since historical ideological measures for all states, needed to study component strategy hypotheses, are not available. Chapter 8 concludes this work by summarizing the findings, examining some alternative explanations, and outlining many avenues for future work on the majority-party reliability theory.

Chapter 2: Understanding Majority Party Reliability

As its name suggests, the concept of majority party reliability proceeds directly from the school of thought which posits that parties and their leaders are important in the organization and operation of the legislative institution. Like Cox and McCubbins, I expect that the majority party will endow its leaders with powers to enhance the party's popular reputation. They suggest (1993, 8) that majority party leaders can make significant strides toward this goal "simply by structuring the committee system ... and then letting things run on 'automatic pilot.' " In this chapter, I explore some specific ways that a majority party structures the committee system to enhance its reliable operation on matters relevant to its collective interests.

Defining Reliable Performance

When discussing the reliable operation of a committee, it is important to first define in what manner the committee (or a committee member) is being described as "reliable." In this study, a committee's reliability is not defined by how it performs on all the issues set before it. Rather, the domain of reliable performance is restricted to issues in which an ideological dimension is tapped and most of the majority party members favor a proposal that is opposed by a majority of the minority caucus. If the committee is addressing such an issue and acts in a manner consistent with what the majority of the majority party wanted, then the committee has acted reliably. This is a positive way of identifying reliable behavior by a committee or majority committee member: an ideological issue is addressed, the parties differ, and the committee (or member) chooses the option approved by most majority caucus members.

Engineers have historically defined a system's reliability in more negative terms by describing the error that is to be avoided. In designing a reliable car, reliable performance is demonstrated if the vehicle stays out of the repair shop. The car's engine performs reliably as long as it keeps the car running. These examples view reliability in terms of a two-state world: either the system is operating or it is broken. Heimann (1997, 5-8), however, viewed administrative organizations as capable of multiple types of failure, with government agencies capable of committing Type I or Type II errors. Type I errors occur if an agency acts when it should not have acted. Heimann cites NASA approving an unsafe space shuttle launch or the FDA approving an unsafe drug for use as examples of Type I errors. Type II errors are associated with missed opportunities or failures of conservatism in that the agency fails to implement a policy that should have been implemented. Heimann suggests that NASA failing to approve a warranted shuttle flight or the FDA failing to approve a safe drug are both examples of Type II errors.

More generally, Type I and Type II errors can be defined in terms of maintaining or rejecting a null hypothesis. Heimann (1997, 5) notes that since "presumption often favors the status quo," the null hypothesis should reflect this by saying that no new action should be taken. This, of course, leaves the alternative hypothesis that new action should be taken. Using these hypotheses, a Type I error occurs when the null hypothesis is inappropriately rejected, and a Type II error occurs when a null hypothesis is maintained when it should not have been. Just as there are two ways for agencies to make wrong decisions, there are also two ways for correct decisions to be identified. The agency can maintain the null hypothesis when it should, and it can also reject the null when it should. These possibilities are summarized in Table 2.1.

[Table 2.1 about here]

Applying this general framework to a legislative setting, it is possible to conceive of committees also being reliable to the extent that they avoid both Type I and Type II errors regarding legislation they are assigned. For a committee, a reasonable null hypothesis reflecting a no-new-action position would be the following: the bill should be defeated. Such a null hypothesis is consistent with the observation that the vast majority of legislation introduced is never passed. This leaves the alternative hypothesis that the committee should approve the bill. It was noted above that what a committee “ought” to do is determined in this study solely from the perspective of the majority party. If a bill addresses an ideological issue and a majority of majority party members supports it with a majority of minority caucus members opposing it, then this defines a circumstance in which the null hypothesis should be rejected by the committee. If the committee does so, then it has performed reliably; if it maintains the null hypothesis, then a Type II error occurs. A Type II error would occur, for example, if a majority agenda item (favored by majority and opposed by minority) were defeated in committee. Type II errors involve an unsuccessful change sought by most majority party members.

Alternatively, there may be circumstances in which a piece of legislation is favored by a majority of the minority party, but is opposed by a majority of the majority party. Under these conditions, a Type I error occurs if the committee were to approve this bill. If this occurs, the null hypothesis would have been inappropriately rejected (in the view of most majority party members) and the committee therefore would have failed to operate as a reliable agent for the majority caucus. Of course, if the committee defeats this bill, then this is the other way that the committee can make a correct decision. This

correct decision is defensive in nature (killing minority legislation) while the prior correct decision was offensive (adopting measures that most majority party members agreed with). These possibilities are summarized in table 2.2.

[Table 2.2 about here]

In summary then, a committee (or majority member) is defined as acting reliably when three conditions are met. First, the legislative content being considered is ideological in nature. Second, majorities of each caucus are in opposition. Third, the committee (or majority member) votes so as to avoid Type I and Type II errors.

It should be clear from this definition of reliable performance that there is no absolute normative judgment being expressed here in terms of the goodness, effectiveness, or desirability of the legislative proposals. Truly foolish, useless, or evil legislation could be approved by a committee, and as long as most majority caucus members agreed with the action (given minority opposition), the committee would be deemed reliable for the purposes here. Therefore the notion that a proposal “ought” to be adopted is used only in a relative sense in that most majority party members think it “ought” to be. Whether the policy desires of the majority party are moral, wise, or good is outside the scope of this analysis and is best left to policy analysts, philosophers, or theologians.

How to Pursue Reliable Performance

Heimann (1997, 8) notes that improvements in avoiding one type of error often come at the expense of the other. For instance, if the FDA adopted a structure that made it easier to place new drugs on the market, then this would lower Type II errors but it would likely increase the chances that an unsafe drug were approved, a Type I error. In

the legislative context defined here, however, gains in Type I reliability also will likely lead to increases in Type II reliability. The logic of this relationship is clear since a committee that reliably promotes majority agenda items is very naturally likely to be hostile to minority proposals on ideological issues. Committees that are good on offense for the majority party will also tend to play good defense against minority legislation. Therefore, even though the types of errors that could occur for a committee are conceptually distinct, we will not have to address tradeoffs in Type I versus Type II reliability. We can instead refer to an increase in system reliability and this refers to reducing both types of errors simultaneously.

The perspective taken here is that majority party leaders view committee construction as something akin to an engineering problem. If a majority party were to pursue a solution to this problem of avoiding Type I and Type II errors, there are two chief strategies available to reduce errors: systems or component strategies. According to Heimann (1997, 103) a systems strategy “involves modifying the number of components within the system or changing their location within it, or both.” Systems strategies therefore rely upon a *structural* solution to a reliability problem. When the number of components is altered or their relationships with other components are altered, this is evidence consistent with a systems strategy to increase reliability.

It is useful to distinguish between *serial* and *parallel* systems in discussing how components interact. Heimann (1997, 73) defines a serial system as one in which “policy must successfully pass through each of [the] components. The result is that, for the system as a whole to fail, it is only necessary for one of the components in series to fail.” A serial system can readily be imagined in a legislative setting. Suppose that the floor of

a legislature is divided 60% to 40% and this ratio is perfectly represented on a five-person committee by giving three seats to the majority and two seats to the minority party. If the minority contingent were routinely united in opposing majority agenda items, then the only way that the majority party legislation will pass is if the majority contingent *never* has any defections. This situation essentially mirrors a serial system in that if even one of the majority members “fails” (by opposing the legislation) then the system as a whole fails (the committee does not pass the legislation). In this example the committee is the system, and the system basically has three components since all majority members must function reliably for the system to avoid a failure. Serial systems can thus be described as “and” systems, since the reliable operation of one component *and* a second component *and* a third component (*and* the reliable operation of however many other components are present) are all necessary for the system as a whole to operate reliably.

Alternatively, a parallel system is one that provides multiple paths for successful operation. According to Heimann (1997, 73) the result is that “for a policy to fail to get through this type of system, all components must fail.” If the five-member committee from above were arranged in a parallel system fashion, then if even one member of the committee approved of the legislation it would be approved and sent to the floor for consideration. Whereas serial systems require approval from multiple potential hurdles, parallel systems are arranged such that there are alternatives if one particular hurdle can not be overcome. Parallel systems could therefore be characterized as “or” systems since the reliable operation of one component *or* a second component *or* any other component is sufficient for the system as a whole to operate reliably.

Majoritarian settings in the U.S. House (such as committee or floor votes) typically operate on a type of parallel system since any combination of a majority of members is sufficient for legislation to advance. These are “or” systems in that the reliable operation of this majority *or* the reliable operation of another majority *or* the reliable behavior of any type of majority coalition is sufficient for the system as a whole to operate reliably.

Many times a system will have both serial and parallel qualities. For example, federal legislation typically faces what can be described as a serial system before it becomes law: it must be approved by a majority of the House *and* a majority of the Senate *and* the president. The system is actually more complex, however, since it incorporates a parallel quality that allows the House and Senate to override a presidential veto. The system can operate reliably with a House majority *and* a Senate majority *and* the president’s approval *or* two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate. Therefore this system has serial aspects since both House and Senate majorities are required, but the final action can be either a presidential signature or supermajorities of both chambers. Whenever multiple paths for reliable operation are available, this signifies the presence of parallel elements within a system. If a component is a necessary element to the success of a system, this identifies a serial element. As we will see in the next section, party leaders may find it advantageous to form committees which will offer multiple avenues for reliable behavior, and this can be done by adding parallel features to a committee.

Systems Strategies in a Legislative Setting

If a party wants to increase the reliability of its committees, one method of doing so is to engage in a systems strategy that alters the number or interaction of components within a system. Let us again return to the five-member committee (three majority and two minority members) as our system of interest, constructed from a floor divided 60%-40%. If this committee were to consider multiple majority agenda items, then the concern would be to avoid Type II errors.¹ Let us suppose that the minority members will routinely be opposed to any such items, that two of the majority party members will always support them, but that the third majority party member is something of a maverick who tends to vote with the majority of the caucus only 50% of the time when these types of items are considered. Now it is possible the majority party leaders could leave the committee exactly like this, with a ratio that mirrors the floor ratio. If they do this, however, the committee would likely commit several Type II errors (since the maverick would often vote with the minority members), a result the majority party would want to avoid.

To resolve this problem, majority leaders may turn to a systems (i.e., structural) solution to reduce the number of Type II errors. One way this could be done is to add two reliable majority party members to the committee, making it 5-2 instead of 3-2. The committee would no longer be representative of the floor ratio (making it a ratio “outlier”), due to the adoption of a systems solution that changed the number of components involved. In the 3-2 committee, the maverick member was essentially a serial component since he had to operate reliably for the system as a whole to avoid an

¹ Type I errors could be avoided in part by giving agenda control to a majority party member who denies or limits the ability of minority members to make legislative proposals. This identifies the chair as a type of serial component position. Although majority party members almost universally chair U.S. House and Senate committees, this is not always the case in state legislatures.

error. With the systems strategy in place in the 5-2 committee, however, he is no longer the only option (indicating that a parallel element has been introduced). If the two minority members oppose and two majority party members support an agenda item, then if the maverick opposes it, that does not automatically signify a defeat for the majority party since the additional majority members could still approve it.

This hypothetical committee scenario demonstrates a powerful insight by organizational theorists like Landau (1969) and Bendor (1985). These scholars stressed the virtues of redundancy in government service delivery, noting that adding multiple components in a parallel fashion could increase the reliability of the system. To return to an engineering example, much effort could be expended in trying to capture marginal improvements in the operation of a plane's engine. If an engine operated reliably 99% of the time over a ten year period, then improvements could be sought to reduce the failure rate from 1% to 0.5%, for instance. An alternative, however, would be to use a systems strategy by simply adding an identical engine in a parallel manner. In that case, the system as a whole could fail only if both components failed. If the plane has two 99% reliable engines, then the chances of the system failing plummet from 1 in 100 (for the single engine plane) to just 1 in 10,000 (for the plane using a systems strategy). As Bendor (1985) has noted, using structural solutions for reliability helps the system avoid the proverb that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. When systems strategies are used, the system as a whole can be made much more reliable than its weakest component. Under the representative ratio committee mentioned above (3-2), the committee was only as reliable as its maverick median member. Using a systems strategy by adding redundant

components (additional reliable majority party members), the committee as a whole became more reliable.

Component Strategies in a Legislative Setting

An alternative (or complement) to a systems strategy is to engage in a component strategy. Whereas systems strategies change the number of or the relationships among components, a component strategy focuses on improving the individual operation of components in the system. Heimann (1997, 103) defines a component strategy as one that “would require greater performance from some or all of the components that make up the system while keeping the basic ... structure intact.” In the airplane example, adding an engine was a type of a systems strategy since it altered the number of components in the system. A component strategy for the airplane would be to improve the performance of the engine.

In a legislative setting party leaders were said to engage in a systems strategy in determining the size of the committee and of each party’s contingent. Party leaders engage in a component strategy to the extent that they can extract reliable performance from those slots. There are two chief arenas in which component strategies are exercised by majority leaders. First is in the area of assigning appropriate members to component slots on committees. Maltzman (1997, 41-55) has a principal-agent conception of parties and their committee contingents, and committee assignments are equivalent to his discussion concerning the hiring of the right agent. When a majority party is establishing its committee contingents, it engages in a component strategy when it is careful not to assign a large number of moderates or ideologically hostile majority party members to the same committee. If an unreliable member were replaced with one who is more

reliable, or if a reliable member is assigned to an open slot on a traditionally unreliable committee, these too are examples of component strategies. Component strategies may be especially important when filling the committee chair slots. Since these members will usually have substantial resources and agenda control, it is often vital that majority leaders fill these slots with members favorably disposed toward the majority agenda, at least insofar as that committee's jurisdiction is concerned.

The second manner that majority leaders use component strategies is in influencing the behavior of members once they have been assigned to their slots. In his principal-agent framework, Maltzman (1997, 57-87) discusses this in terms of designing a contract that encourages the agent to act in accord with its principal (the majority party caucus in this case). Whenever party leaders seek to reward, punish, threaten, arm twist, or just plain persuade a member to behave reliably, this is evidence of a component strategy since costs and benefits are being used to invoke reliable performance from a component. This leadership activity could be quite ad hoc and idiosyncratic, as in a member receiving assurance that a project favorable to his district is included in a bill if he in turn behaves reliably. In other cases, component reliability is enhanced more generally as is the case when all majority members perceive that it is a good idea to behave reliably if they want to ever sit on a desirable committee, serve as a chair, or maintain either of these positions. In sum, component strategies are concerned with getting the right people into committee slots and then giving them the incentives to act as reliable agents.

If there were no restrictions or norms associated with committee assignments and party leaders were able to treat committee construction as purely an engineering exercise,

then party leaders would presumably give few (or even no) assignments to unreliable members and make more abundant use of the reliable members. Most legislative settings, however, do have norms and limitations preventing this type of “pure” reliability focus. For instance, all majority party members expect to receive committee assignments, and so party leaders are compelled to place these members *somewhere*. In addition, it may also be the case that some of the more reliable members are assigned to important slots, which prevents them from serving as components on other committees. In some legislative settings committee membership amounts to a property right and is an important factor in determining committee composition. Generally speaking, however, majority leaders still have enough leeway to use at least some component strategies, and therefore they will not invite the trouble that would arise by assigning an unreliable member to several committees. If someone is needed for component slots on multiple committees, then party leaders will tend to use relatively high reliability members to fill them. The frequent use of high reliability members has its limitations, though, since effectiveness is hindered and scheduling difficulties increase with more assignments.

It is worth noting that component strategies are distinct from systems strategies in that the legislative parties have differential abilities to engage in each. The systems strategy of increasing the size of a contingent is generally the sole purview of the majority party. If the majority party wants to give itself extra seats on a committee, it usually can without too much difficulty. This is an asymmetric power that the minority party cannot match (see Aldrich and Rohde 1998). With component strategies, however, the majority and minority parties have been on somewhat more equal footing in recent years in Congress since each party is usually allowed to assign its own contingents. The

minority party too can try to marginalize its unreliable members or utilize reliable members more frequently on important committees.

Systems and Component Strategies in Tandem

While conceptually distinct, it is certainly possible for majority leaders to pursue both systems and component strategies simultaneously. For instance, let us suppose that party leaders have concerns about the reliable performance of a committee in the upcoming session and therefore use a structural solution (a systems strategy) by increasing the majority party contingent size above what a representative party ratio would be. In this instance, the majority leaders may also use a component strategy by assigning reliable members to those new slots. If the component strategy were discarded and somewhat unreliable members were instead assigned, then this would at best cancel any positive effect of the systems strategy. If unreliable members were assigned to the added component slots, this would tend to exacerbate the poor performance of the committee, and the party leaders would have been better off not using the systems strategy at all.

When are Majority Party Reliability Solutions Sought?

While majority party leaders may use both systems and component strategies in constructing committees, it is possible to specify conditions under which each strategy is most appropriate. Elaborating these conditions provides the hypotheses that will be tested in the subsequent empirical chapters.

Systems Strategy Expectations

The systems strategies that majority party leaders use in committee construction involve the size of a committee and the size of each party's contingents on those committees. The systems strategy of stacking the party ratio in favor of the majority party will tend to be sought under two conditions. First, if the jurisdiction of the committee is important to the ideological objectives of the party, then it is more likely to exhibit systems solutions that favor the majority party. It is possible that nearly any committee can become an ideological battleground, and sometimes a committee may be reliably structured in anticipation of a specific agenda. In the aggregate, however, two types of committees emerge as routinely important to the ideological objectives of the majority party: those that deal with money and agenda issues. Most legislative bodies have a committee or committees that address taxation and appropriations issues. These committees deal directly with legislation involving economic distribution, and this topic is a fundamental issue content that Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 35-46) associate with their first dimension NOMINATE scores. Since the two parties differ on their redistributive goals and their reputations are important on these issues, the majority party will want to ensure that these committees operate reliably. Likewise, agenda or rules committees are important to the majority party's interests. Since these committees structure the timing and form of the debate, they can be an important tool for the majority party. Since it is so important for the majority party not to have unreliable behavior on these committees, the majority leaders will use system strategies to diminish these difficulties. This will often be manifested by the majority party granting itself extra seats on these committees. This discussion yields a first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Majority parties utilize system solutions on committees that are important to their ideological objectives. These key committees will therefore tend to have party ratios that favor the majority party.

The second condition under which the systems strategy occurs in committee construction is when the committee—not necessarily just a key committee—would be at relatively high risk of acting unreliably if a systems strategy were not employed. This applies to situations involving either the majority party's floor advantage or the size of the committee.

The floor advantage of the majority party is important in committee construction because committees are often constructed to mirror the floor ratio, at least to some extent. If a party composed 60% of the floor, then it would be common for this party to give itself approximately 60% of the seats on each committee for that session. Systems solutions become very relevant, however, when the floor is closely divided between the parties. Consider a floor in which the majority only holds a 52% to 48% advantage over the minority party. A 19-member committee could roughly mirror this floor ratio by assigning ten seats to the majority and nine to the minority. If the minority were united in opposition to a majority agenda item, though, the majority party would only have to suffer a single defection from one of its ten components for the committee to commit a Type II error. Rather than accepting this relatively risky structure, majority parties often engage in systems strategies by increasing the number of components for their contingent when the floor is so closely divided. Thus instead of a 10-9 committee that actually would mirror the floor, majority parties will, for example, create 11-9 (55%) or 12-9 (57%) committees instead.

When the majority party's share of the floor increases, there is less incentive for systems strategies to be used. If a majority party had a 2-1 advantage on the floor, then a

mirroring of this with 2-1 proportions on the committees offers a sufficient structure for the majority to operate since several majority defections can be endured. The use of systems strategies should therefore be at their greatest when the majority's floor advantage is narrow. As the majority party's floor advantage increases, there is less need for the additional components, and committee ratios will tend to more closely resemble the floor ratio or even give a slight advantage to the minority if the majority's advantage is quite large. For example, if a party has 80% of the floor, it will usually make little difference if a committee is 16-4 (mirrors floor) versus 16-5 or 16-6 (ratios favor minority). On issues that divide majorities of the parties, any of these three committees would likely be able to act as a reliable agent of the majority party, even though the latter two make the committee a "ratio outlier" favoring the minority. To summarize these points, I suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The systems strategy of including additional majority seats on committees will be at its peak when the majority party's floor advantage is narrow. A negative relationship exists between majority floor advantage and the advantage that the majority party grants itself in committee ratios.

Another circumstance besides close floor division that places a committee in a relatively high risk position is the size of the committee. If a small committee and a large committee both having the same partisan ratios are compared, it becomes clear that the larger committee allows for a greater margin of error. Let us consider a floor that is divided 60% to 40% and two committees that mirror this ratio. If a five-member committee were constructed, it would have three majority members and two minority members. Unless the three majority components are quite reliable, this is a relatively precarious situation since it only requires one majority member joining both minority members to render the committee unreliable. If the same representative ratio were applied

to a 50-member committee, however, the situation is less tenuous for the majority party. With 30 members composing the majority contingent versus 20 minority members, the majority party has several more members than the minority. It would take several more defections for the committee to be an unreliable agent, and this advantage for larger committees is even more pronounced if wavering majority members can be convinced to abstain from the vote. Because of their vulnerable position, majority party reliability therefore suggests that the system solution of adding majority member components will be sought with small committees. Thus instead of a 3-2 committee, the majority party will instead establish a more favorable ratio for itself, perhaps something on the order of 5-2 or 5-3 on such a small committee. Such additional components will tend not to be sought on larger committees, since larger committees can endure several defections and still act as reliable agents. If a majority party had what looked to be an unreliable small committee, there are therefore two systems strategies for making it more reliable. First, its small size could be generally maintained while more seats are allocated to the majority contingent. Alternatively, the committee could be expanded in size even while the same partisan ratio is maintained. A third hypothesis reflects this relationship of committee size with systems solutions:

Hypothesis 3: Larger committees have majority contingents that can suffer several defections yet still produce a reliable performance, whereas the performance of smaller committees can be threatened by just a few defections. Therefore committee size is inversely related to the ratio advantage that the majority party grants itself.

These three systems strategies need not be mutually exclusive, of course. One can imagine a committee that has all three factors suggesting a majority party advantage (close floor division, important committee, small in size), but it is of course possible for only one or two of these variables to be favoring majority ratio stacking.

Component Strategy Expectations

Whereas systems strategies focus on creating a structure advantageous to the majority, one type of component strategy focuses on how members are allocated within that structure. The systems strategy ensured that enough component slots were allocated to the majority party; component strategies center on how well those slots perform.

Although it was noted earlier that component strategies can involve influencing the behavior of members once they are assigned to their slots, the focus in this work will be on which members are assigned to those slots in the first place. Just as with systems strategies, if majority parties do follow component strategies, there are specific hypotheses that can be developed to test for the presence of this phenomenon.

Component strategies will manifest themselves in some of the same ways as systems strategies. Just as systems strategies are used with important committees or when the majority party has a relatively high risk of losing, so also are component strategies used in these same circumstances. In addition, component strategies will also be used when leaders consider giving multiple committee assignments to their members.

While systems strategies created ratios advantageous to the majority party on important committees, component strategies involve placing reliable members in important slots. Important slots include not only the important committees (money or agenda-related, for instance) but also the position of chair on each committee. Majority party reliability suggests that more reliable members will tend to be used to fill these slots rather than having unreliable members entrusted with them. If the majority party exercises systems strategies to give itself additional seats on these committees, it makes

little sense that they would fill them in a way that would frustrate their agenda or promote that of the minority party. This yields a first component strategy hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Important committee slots (such as the chair or seats on key committees) will tend to be filled by more reliable members.

The second hypothesis for the systems strategy suggested ratio-stacking would be at its greatest when the majority's floor advantage is at its smallest. More generally, in any instance that the majority party gives itself a ratio advantage on all committees, this mathematically requires that majority party members have more committee seats per capita than the minority. This necessity can be seen by imagining a legislature in which all members received only one committee assignment. In such a case, each committee could mirror the floor ratio; if the majority wanted to stack some committees this would have to come at the expense of being underrepresented on other committees. These same options would be present if all members had two committee seats. This restriction of equal per capita assignment is not very common, however, and the majority party routinely grants itself additional slots, especially so when the floor is closely divided. It is important to recognize to whom these additional slots are granted. Majority party reliability suggests that if any member is going to be used repeatedly (more frequently than the typical majority member), then that member should be highly reliable. If some members are needed to sit on multiple committees to enhance their reliable operation, then those members should be expected to act in a reliable manner as well. If a majority party were to instead assign unreliable members to many committees, this would increase the risk that those committees would produce errors. In fact, if it were possible, majority party reliability suggests that unreliable members would tend to be minimized, garnering few assignments. This discussion gives a second component strategy hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: The reliability of a majority party member is positively related to the number of committee seats he is assigned, ceteris paribus.

Component strategies, like systems strategies, will also be employed when the majority would be at relatively high risk of losing if the strategy were not employed. As with systems strategies, this suggests that component strategies will be evident when small committees are compared with larger committees. Since large committee contingents can endure several defections and still result in a reliable committee performance, majority leaders should disproportionately assign unreliable members there. In a sense, the majority party is more able to “hide” its unreliable members by placing them on these large committees. On a smaller committee (with the same ratio as a larger committee), an unreliable member is more likely to actually be the determining factor in a committee’s performance. Majority leaders will tend to avoid this risk by not assigning unreliable members to small committees. Majority party reliability therefore suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6: Majority contingents on small committees will be more reliable than majority contingents on larger committees. Majority contingent reliability is inversely related to committee size.

Majority Party Reliability and Outlying Committees

This chapter began by making a claim that there are specifiable conditions under which ideologically outlying committees could be expected. Now we are in a position to be quite explicit about what those conditions are. The first three hypotheses have suggested that a majority party will seek structural advantages for itself on important committees or when it would be at relatively high risk of losing if a structural advantage were not incorporated. In short, it is hypothesized that the majority party uses systems strategies to give itself additional seats when it helps them. With an adequate structure in

hand, the majority party then uses a component strategy by allocating members who will tend to behave reliably to these slots.

In the empirical chapters following, a member's reliability will be proxied by using various ideological measures. For eras of Democratic control, it is assumed that the more liberal the score, the more reliable the member is. When Republicans are the majority the reverse is true, with conservative scores being counted more reliable than moderate or liberal scores. If the first six hypotheses are supported, then this sheds considerable light on the conditions in which ideological outlying committees may be found. The systems strategy suggested that structural advantages are sought for the majority when the committee was either at risk or important. The component strategy discussion suggested that majorities assign reliable members to important or higher-risk slots. It also suggested that more reliable majority members in general would be more likely to garner more assignments than average. With the marriage of systems and component strategies, we can suggest that ideologically outlying committees will therefore be produced under the same circumstances that these majority party reliability solutions were sought. Therefore, ideologically outlying committees in favor of the majority party may be the result of systems and component strategies being individually or simultaneously pursued. As a result it is possible to identify additional hypotheses specific to the committee outlier debate that are associated with the earlier hypotheses.

Proceeding in the same order as the previous hypotheses, majority party reliability suggests that committees important to the majority party will tend to exhibit an ideological bias in favor of the majority. This follows because both systems and component reliability strategies will tend to be used on these committees since their

successful operation is so important. The systems strategy grants overrepresentation on important committees, thus shifting the median of the committee closer to the majority median. The component strategy suggests that these slots on important committees tend to be filled with reliable members (i.e., those who are ideologically friendly to the majority). Taken together, this gives a first hypothesis directly related to the committee outlier debate:

Hypothesis 7: Important committees likely to be involved in handling party public goods legislation (such as agenda and money committees) will be outliers in favor of the ideology of the majority party. This is so because majority contingents on these committees are extraordinarily large (systems strategy) and they tend to comprise relatively reliable majority members (component strategy).

Ideologically outlying committees should also be expected when the committees would be at risk of being unreliable if majority party reliability solutions were not used. This risk is highest when (1) the majority's floor advantage is slight or (2) the committee is small. When the floor is closely divided, the majority stacks the committee ratios in its favor above what proportionality would suggest. When the majority departs from proportionality on many committees at once, this usually requires that some majority members be assigned to multiple committees, even more than the average majority member. The component strategy suggests that the majority members utilized most frequently will also be more reliable. So when the floor is closely divided, additional seats are granted to the majority on many committees (systems strategy) and the members used to fill these slots tend to be relatively reliable (component strategy). This gives two related hypotheses:

Hypothesis 8a: The level of ideological advantage to the majority will be positive and at its greatest when the floor is closely divided. This is due to the ratio stacking in favor of the majority and the filling of those slots with reliable members.

Hypothesis 8b: A negative relationship exists between majority floor advantage and the ideological advantage that the majority party grants itself on committees. This occurs because there is less need for the majority to give itself any additional structural advantage in the ratio when the majority's floor advantage is already large, and without these additional seats highly reliable members are not utilized as frequently.

The other “risky” scenario that has an important influence on its ideological representativeness is the size of a committee. The systems strategy suggests that larger committees will be less ideologically friendly to the majority party than smaller committees since larger committees will lack the ratio advantage that is sought with smaller committees. The component strategy also suggests that large committees will tend to be somewhat less ideologically advantageous than small committees. This occurs since unreliable members can be placed on large contingents with less danger of their influence being determinative for the performance of the committee. On small committees, majority party leaders will need to be more cautious in assigning members since the margin for error is narrower with smaller contingents. Taken together, these suggest a final hypothesis related to the committee outlier debate:

Hypothesis 9: Large committees have larger majority contingents and are able to endure more defections than small committees. This means that majority party leaders will tend to not stack the committees' ratios in their favor, and they will be willing to assign them more moderate or ideologically hostile members. Therefore, the smaller the committee, the more likely one is to see evidence of an ideological outlier favoring the majority party.

Summary

To summarize then, majority party reliability is a concept proceeding from a partisan theory of legislative organization. It suggests that majority party leaders view committee construction as an engineering problem, at least in part, with errors of omission and commission to be avoided. Reliable performance is measured only on

ideological issues on which the majorities of the parties disagree. If a majority member votes in agreement with the majority opinion of his caucus on such an issue, then he has behaved reliably. If a committee votes in agreement with the majority opinion of his caucus on such an issue, then it has behaved reliably.

Majority party leaders engage in systems and component strategies to promote reliable performance by the committees. Systems strategies refer to changing the number of or the interaction among components in a system. One systems strategy available to the majority party is to stack the committee party ratios in its favor by giving itself additional members (i.e., beyond proportionality). This strategy will be especially evident when the jurisdiction of the committee is important or when the committees would be at relatively high risk behaving unreliably if the strategy were not used. This risk is highest when the floor is closely divided or a committee's size is small. Systems strategies therefore focus on the structure of the system.

Component strategies, however, include a focus on what the majority party leaders actually do with that structure. Majority party leaders use component strategies when they place reliable members in key committee positions, assign them to small committees, or use them more frequently than unreliable members. In this study, reliable members will be operationalized as those who have ideological scores that are neither moderate nor hostile to most majority party members.

When majority party leaders do use these strategies, this will tend to produce committees that are ideologically unrepresentative of the floor and instead are biased in favor of the majority party. This is so because the majority party gives itself oversized contingents and tends to utilize its reliable members more frequently to fill committee

slots. Ideologically biased committees under these conditions are the natural expectation of a partisan theory of organization that includes majority party reliability concerns.

The remainder of this work is devoted to empirically testing the hypotheses developed in this chapter. The next three chapters will work through these nine hypotheses in the much-studied U.S. House. Chapter 3 examines the systems solution of stacking committee ratios in the U.S. House, and thus tests hypotheses 1 through 3. Chapter 4 tests hypotheses 4 through 6 for the House and thereby explores the prevalence of component strategies. Chapter 5 then tests hypotheses 7 through 9 to see if majority party reliability concerns do indeed create committees biased in favor of the ideology of the majority party. Chapter 6 tests the same hypotheses for the U.S. Senate, and chapter 7 concludes the empirical portion by examining systems strategies in state legislatures.

Chapter 3: Systems Solutions in Committees of the U.S. House

In the first days of 2003 Democrat John Dingell took to the House floor to charge that the House minority party's rights had been trampled upon by the majority party Republicans. This former chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee had several examples of abuse in mind, yet one of his most detailed charges involved committee structure. More specifically, he alleged unfairness in the party ratios, noting:

Committee ratios have been consistently stacked against the minority. For example, on the Committee on Energy and Commerce, during Democratic control the majority representation of the committee was always within two percentage points of its ratio in the House, and the difference averaged less than one percent. In the past three Congresses, under Republican control, the difference was more than 3 percent. In short, the Republican majority has robbed the Democratic minority of seats they deserve in our committee. (*Congressional Record* Jan. 7, 2003, H18)

Had Republicans initiated an era of diminished minority rights in the House? Were Democrats more fair-minded concerning minority representation when they had been the majority party? And in any case, why would Dingell or the majority Republicans apparently care so much about just a few percentage points on committees? This chapter addresses these and other questions by looking at majority party systems solutions in U.S. House.

As defined in the previous chapter, systems solutions involve the number of, or interaction among, components in a system. The chief systems solution explored here is practice of adding seats for the majority party on its committee contingents. This chapter will begin with a review of what previous researchers have suggested concerning committee party ratios. This conventional wisdom is most consistent with only one of the three models of legislative organization, and this will be shown by making explicit the

expectations of each perspective for committee ratios. The third section of this chapter will evaluate the U.S. House as a venue in which majority party reliability techniques are likely to be exercised. Finally, the systems strategy hypotheses will be tested, and the data, method, and results will also be discussed.

Previous Research on Committee Ratios

In a classic study of House committee assignments Kenneth Shepsle identifies five sequential aspects of the process in *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*. The first three stages include the structure of the preceding Congress, an election that “shocks” this structure, and requests from freshman and returning members. The fourth stage is “the negotiation of the new committee structure—the establishment of committee sizes and party shares—by party leaders,” and the fifth stage is “committee assignment by ... each party” (Shepsle 1978, 30).² Since this chapter focuses on systems solutions, it is the fourth stage of establishing committee sizes and party shares that is of primary interest. Shepsle notes (p. 120), however, that “our knowledge of the maneuvers by which committee slots are manufactured in the early days of a new Congress is quite limited,” and “the only *public* aspect of the negotiation of the committee structure is the actual structure that emerges. Descriptive detail of other aspects of structure negotiation is sketchy. An occasional bit of information emerges from journalistic accounts of momentous events” (p. 301). The process that generated stage four outcomes was generally hidden, even to Shepsle who had considerable access. Despite this limitation, there has been a wide consensus in which many scholars have made strikingly similar generalizations about the outcomes

² It is, of course, possible that decisions in the fifth stage (member assignment) could alter the sizes and ratios established in the fourth stage. Despite this (marginal) interactive effect, this study will maintain Shepsle’s ordering and treat the systems stage as temporally preceding member assignments.

eventually observed. Shepsle, for instance, notes (p. 110) that even though “minority representation on committees is at the majority’s pleasure,” the minority party

has come to expect a fair share of the committee seats. The minority, that is, expects its proportion of seats on most committees to be approximately its chamber proportion. The majority party generally maintains extraordinary majorities on the two money committees and the agenda committee.

As evidence of this general proportionality principle, Shepsle lists chamber ratios and committee ratios for the 86th through 94th Congresses.

Rohde and Shepsle (1973, 890-1) suggest that “party ratios usually reflect the partisan division in the House,” but that “it is not unlikely that the decisions on both these question [i.e., size of committees and their party ratios] are influenced by the leadership’s knowledge of the requests of the members of their party.” In this view, the committee structure “may well be conceived as endogenous, since it is probable that deviations from the aggregate party ratio on any given committee are partly a result of the configuration of requests” that party leaders have already received. Thus proportional committees are the norm, but exceptions are sometimes made, based primarily upon member requests that are frequently constituency-based.

Several scholars have affirmed this claim that committee ratios generally mirror the floor ratio, albeit with some exceptions. Krehbiel (1993) examines House committees in the 99th Congress and notes that “consistent with conventional wisdom, a large majority of committees lie within one seat of proportionality ... and a handful of committees give a slight proportional advantage to the minority party.” Examining House and Senate committees, Deering and Smith (1997, 97) report that “party ratios on most House and Senate committees are close to the chamber-wide party ratios ... The only exception to this norm occurs in the House, where the majority party has always

maintained an outsized number of seats on the Rules Committee.” Groseclose and King (1997) also affirm this conventional wisdom: “Congressional committees are composed of Republicans and Democrats in roughly the same proportion that each party holds the House and Senate ... Some committees are exceptions such as the House Rules Committee and the House Oversight Committee, but the general thrust is toward proportional representation.”

There has not been unanimous agreement on the proportionality of committees, however. Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 188) suggest a majority-party advantage, noting that the “majority party is typically somewhat overrepresented on a committee.” Just a few pages later (1997, 204), though, they appear to reject this, writing that “the average majority and minority party ratios on committees have tracked the actual party ratios fairly closely throughout the twentieth century.” In addition, Aldrich and Rohde (1998) found that majority party “bonus seats” tend to increase as the majority size decreases, and that this overrepresentation of the majority party was common on control committees.

In sum, although there is some confusion on the exact nature of their relationship, the dominant view has been that committee party ratios largely mirror the floor ratios in the House. Significant caveats, however, are commonly noted that are inconsistent with this proportionality explanation. Thus the consensus is currently an uneasy hybrid of proportionality with seemingly ad hoc exceptions allowed for some committees.

Committee Ratios and Theories of Legislative Organization

As Maltzman (1997, 55) has noted, “in many respects, the committee appointment process is a prime testing ground for the predictions of competing theories on principal-

agent relations in the House.” Shepsle’s fourth stage is no exception to this observation, as each of the three dominant perspectives on congressional organization has different expectations for what should transpire in creating committee party ratios.

Distributive Theory and Committee Party Ratios

The distributive theory of organization (Weingast and Marshall 1988, Adler 2002, for example) suggests that an unrepresentative subset of the chamber desires to sit on each committee. According to this viewpoint, legislators will request to have membership on committees that will bolster their ability to meet their constituency-related goals of re-election and making good public policy. Members’ self-selection onto committees is a key theme in this model. Therefore in terms of partisan ratios on committees, this theory, strictly speaking, would suggest that committee party ratios would simply be the by-product of whichever party had a greater number of interested members.

Since this information is revealed before committee sizes and ratios are established (in Shepsle’s third stage), it would be possible for the accommodation of each member’s interest to be entirely met. Indeed, Rohde and Shepsle (1973, 891) explicitly allow for this dynamic, suggesting that the committee structure “may well be conceived as endogenous, since it is probable that deviations from the aggregate party ratio on any given committee are partly a result of the configuration of requests,” which party leaders have already received. If the minority party had more members interested in a committee than the majority party, then the distributive theory seems to suggest that this committee would be under minority party control since member interests dominate and are accommodated. This implies that any sustained, systematic advantage to the majority party on every committee would be unlikely unless the majority party *always* had a

greater number of interested members for every committee. By this view, a change in party control may not even dramatically alter committee party ratios.

Even the conventional wisdom of proportionality contradicts this view, however, since the majority party nearly always has a majority of a committee's seats. The distributive theory discussions of committee assignment that suggest accommodation and self-selection "dominate" the process overlook an important stage. To the extent that self-selection occurs, it can only do so *after* a partisan structure has been created.

In sum, the distributive theory expects that the party having a higher number of interested members should generally have a larger contingent on that committee. Since interest of members is likely uneven between the parties, committee ratios should not consistently mirror the floor (even approximately) nor give a consistent advantage to the majority party. Instead, party ratios should often bear little resemblance to the floor ratio, and may sometimes even give more seats to the minority party on a committee so that member interests are reflected.

Informational Theory and Committee Party Ratios

The conventional wisdom of committee ratios mirroring the floor ratio is most readily associated with an informational theory. The majoritarian or informational theory of legislative organization views committees as agents of the chamber, and they will be structured to represent the floor. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) and Krehbiel (1991) have advanced this view that committees have the function of specializing in subject areas, thereby gaining expertise for the whole institution. Commenting specifically on committee ratios, Krehbiel (1993, 243) notes that a "well-known fact of committee assignments is that, with few exceptions, the party ratios that leaders negotiate closely

approximate the partisan composition of the parent chamber.” Groseclose and King (1997) note that “proportional representation on committees is consistent with informational theory,” and that it “seems to be evidence against the party government theory.” This is so because informational theory suggests that committees are generally representative microcosms of the floor. As with distributive theories, any sustained or conditional advantage (or disadvantage) to the majority party is not expected. In the event that stage 4 structures do not mirror the floor, an informational theory expects this to be rectified in stage 5 assignments. In general, though, informational theory expects the structure of the committees to mirror the structure of the floor.

Partisan Theories and Committee Party Ratios

A third view focuses on the majority party as a primary actor in congressional organization. Partisan theories have viewed committee party contingents as agents of their caucuses. According to Cox and McCubbins (1993), the majority party desires that the institution produce a certain set of public goods. Prominent among these goods is the party’s popular reputation among the electorate, and the majority will therefore seek to pass (or reject) legislation that will help secure this goal. The partisan model expects the majority party to structure the institution in a manner that furthers its collective interests. This can be accomplished by “stacking the deck” in favor of the majority party and then allowing the institution to run on “autopilot” once these advantages have been incorporated. Aldrich and Rohde (1998) reported some evidence of this phenomenon by noting the presence of “bonus seats” for the majority party on control committees and most committees in the 103rd-105th Congresses. Some partisan theorists, however, implicitly assume proportional committees. For instance, Aldrich and Battista (2002,

165) claim that if both parties create representative committee contingents, then the committee as a whole will be representative. This logic rests upon a notion that party ratios mirror the floor ratio, and would be incorrect if the majority party were to give itself large advantages (or disadvantages) in the committee ratio.

As outlined in chapter 2, a partisan theory of organization is the perspective taken in this current work. Of importance to this chapter, the concept of majority party reliability suggested that systems solutions are sought when the committee's jurisdiction is important or the majority's voting margin would be narrow if the systems solution were not used. This is manifested by the majority party giving itself additional seats on important committees, small committees, or on nearly all committees when the majority's floor advantage is narrow. These expectations compose hypotheses one through three, and will subsequently be tested in this chapter. Before doing so, however, the propriety of the U.S. House as a venue for finding majority party reliability evidence needs to be evaluated, focusing on systems strategies in this chapter.

Evaluating the U.S. House as a Venue for Finding Majority Party Reliability Systems Strategies

To find evidence of systems strategies being used in a legislative setting, there are three necessary conditions to consider, and they relate to incentive, ability, and agency. First of all, there must be some incentive or motivation that would work in the majority party's collective interest to use a systems strategy. If, for instance, committees were created but not sent legislation, or were bypassed entirely, or committee-approved bills were amended so extensively that they were not important to the final legislation passed, then there would be little incentive to make them reliable structures. The U.S. House,

however, does appear to be a venue in which there would be incentive for the majority party to give itself extra seats on committees. The reasons for this are numerous. House committees have a property right to matters within their jurisdictions, amendments in the House need to be germane, and committee members also are those who represent the House in conference committees. All bills introduced are assigned to committee, and if the floor is going to approve legislation, it usually requires approval by a majority of committee members. While it is possible to extract a bill from a committee using a discharge petition, this is time-consuming and a majority party would rather not have to resort to this tactic on issues important to its collective interests. All these point to the importance of committees in the House, and the typical need to have a committee majority approve a bill for floor action suggests the potential importance of that committee operating reliably for the majority party. Adding seats to the majority contingent could certainly be advantageous to the majority party to enhance the reliability of a committee.

While incentive is one necessary element, there must also be the ability for this to be implemented. What is important here is the absence of restrictions that would prevent systems solutions from being implemented. If the House, for instance, had a rule requiring proportional representation on committees to the extent that it was mathematically practicable, then this would prevent a majority party from using this systems solution. Also relevant are per capita committee seat restrictions. If all legislators were restricted to the same number of committee seats, then it would be impossible for the majority party to give itself additional seats on all committees, and in the aggregate, committee ratios would be exactly proportional to the floor. In such a scenario if the

majority party wanted to give itself additional seats on an important committee, it could only do so by making itself somewhat more vulnerable on at least one other committee. The systems solution under per capita restrictions becomes a zero sum game. Of course it would be possible to grant the minority party a large majority of seats on an unimportant or little-used committee, and thereby allowing the majority party to stack the ratios on committees more central to their agenda.

In terms of ability, the U.S. House is generally quite free from these types of restrictions, however. It is true that House Rule X says that a member “may not serve simultaneously as a member of more than two standing committees,” but this is a restriction that has gone by the wayside. While the majority of House members usually serve on two committees, it is quite common for several members to sit on three, and occasionally a member will sit on four or five committees. Oftentimes committee chairs (and ranking members for the minority) and members of exclusive committees have those seats as their only assignments, but since other members are essentially free to sit on multiple committees, this does not prevent the House from using systems solutions. A final important characteristic of the House is that it is a majoritarian institution, meaning that a simple majority rules. If a legislative setting requires supermajorities for action to be taken, then a majority party that falls below the supermajority threshold would be unable to implement the systems strategy unless it receives aid from nonmajority members. In general, then, it appears that the House has considerable freedom from restrictions that would prevent systems solutions.

The presence of incentive and the ability for the systems solution to be used still does not necessarily indicate that the systems solution will be manifested. An additional

requirement is that some form of implementing agent be present to produce the solution. If, for example, House committee rosters accepted whichever legislators were interested, then the resulting party ratios would only represent these interests, not necessarily achieving majority party control (much less additional advantage) on each committee. Very often the implementing agent(s) in legislative settings will be party leaders who negotiate the committee structures at the beginning of the legislative session.

Systems solutions do not necessarily require personal agents, however. It is possible that the rules of the institution could be written such that systems solutions become institutionalized. The New York House, for example, requires that additional seats be granted to the majority party on every committee as a matter of a House rule. The rule is written such that committee sizes are first established. The majority party is then entitled to its floor proportion of these seats (rounding upward for any portion of a seat), plus an additional seat. Therefore, if the floor were divided 51%-49% and a committee had ten members, the majority party would be entitled to seven of these seats (six from rounding up from proportionality, plus one from the additional seat they are given), leaving just three for the minority. In this instance, the majority barely had an advantage on the floor, yet it would receive four more seats than the minority party on the committee due to the institutionalized systems strategy.

While the U.S. House does not make systems solutions a matter of rule for committees, it is accomplished through the agency of party leaders. As Shepsle (1978, 30) noted, “the negotiation of the new committee structure—the establishment of committee sizes and party shares” was accomplished “by party leaders.” More recently, Deering and Smith (1997, 96-97) affirm that party leaders are the agents who bring about

systems solutions, noting that “party leaders must establish the size and party balance for each committee,” and these are “the product of informal decisions made by party leaders.”

Clearly, then, the House has an agent able to implement a systems solution, and the earlier discussion demonstrates that such a solution is also desirable and not prevented procedurally. The U.S. House therefore is a legislative setting in which majority party reliability systems solutions should be detectable. This, of course, needs to be supported empirically, and the subsequent sections will be devoted to this evidence. First the data and variables used will be described.

Testing for Systems Strategies in the U.S. House

The first three hypotheses of chapter 2 suggested that party ratios on committees will favor the majority party on important committees or when the majority’s margin for error is small (when the committee is small or the majority’s floor advantage is small). To test these hypotheses, floor and party ratio data were collected for all House committees from 1975 to 2001. The only exception to this is that data are not reported for any committee that gave equal representation to majority and minority parties regardless of the floor advantage for the majority party. For the House, this means that the Standards of Official Conduct Committee is not included in the analysis. Data were collected from *The Congressional Directory*, with additional verification from *The Congressional Staff Directory* series and Garrison Nelson’s collection of committee rosters. While some conflicts among these sources were inevitable, they can safely be classified as uncommon and small. Where possible, the earliest discernible structure is reported since this is

closest to the actual thought process of the party leaders. Vacant slots were included in the size of party contingents since they reflect the structural decisions of party leaders.

The dependent variable used in this chapter measures the amount of advantage the majority party grants itself on committees. This is referred to as “ratio stacking,” and can be computed by subtracting the majority’s floor proportion from its proportion on a given committee. Thus, if a majority holds 60% of a committee’s seats, and it holds 55% of the floor, then the ratio stacking for this committee is 0.05, or 5% (since $0.60 - 0.55 = 0.05$).

This is distinct from Aldrich and Rohde’s “bonus seat” approach (1998), which identifies how many additional seats are actually given to the majority party above what proportionality would have suggested. By this method, if the majority should (following proportionality) have ten seats on a committee, but instead gives itself eleven seats, then they report one bonus seat. The shortcoming of this method is that it treats all additional seats the same, regardless of the size of the committee receiving the bonus. This tends to underemphasize the value of extra majority seats on small committees. If a very small committee were given two bonus seats, this is much more important than if two bonus seats were given to the majority on a very large committee. For example, if a floor were divided 55% to 45%, then a small committee being 7-4 (instead of a proportional 5-4) is much more important than a large committee being 37-28 (instead of a proportional 35-28). The bonus seat approach reports the same number (2) for each of these scenarios; the ratio stacking approach reports an advantage to the majority of 0.086 (since $0.636 - 0.55 = 0.086$) for the small committee and only 0.019 for the large committee (since $0.569 - 0.55 = 0.019$). The ratio stacking approach used here has the advantage of highlighting the size of the majority advantage relative to the committee’s size.

It is worth taking special note of what the conventional wisdom (and informational theory) would suggest for the dependent variable of ratio stacking. If committees did indeed mirror the floor ratio, then this ratio stacking dependent variable will be expected to nearly always approximate a value of zero. This would have to be the case since the floor ratio subtracted from the committee ratio would usually equal zero.

One of the ways that hypotheses 1-3 will be tested is through a linear regression with ratio stacking on individual committees as the dependent variable. Each of these hypotheses will be repeated here with specific descriptions of the independent variables to be used.

Hypothesis 1: Majority parties utilize system solutions on committees that are important to their ideological objectives. These key committees will therefore tend to have party ratios that favor the majority party.

The first independent variables are dichotomous variables that reflect the importance of a committee. As was stated earlier, money committees and agenda committees are routinely important and powerful in the execution of a party's ideals. In the U.S. House Ways and Means and Appropriations are powerful money committees with the former being the primary revenue committee and the latter being an important allocator of funds. The Rules Committee is a very important tool of the majority party (in the modern era) and is vital to helping the majority achieve its objectives with its ability to schedule legislation and dictate if and what type of amendments will be permissible. Each of these committees is therefore assigned a value of one on a dichotomous variable, with all other committees being assigned a zero. With three such dichotomous variables representing the important committees, this leaves all the other committees as the excluded case. From hypothesis 1, ratio stacking is thought to increase with the importance of a committee.

Therefore, each of these dichotomous variables should be positively related to the dependent variable.

The second hypothesis involves the majority party's floor advantage:

Hypothesis 2: The systems strategy of including additional majority seats on committees will be at its peak when the majority party's floor advantage is narrow. A negative relationship exists between majority floor advantage and the advantage that the majority party grants itself in committee ratios.

"Floor advantage" could be defined several ways. One could use the difference in the number of members between the majority and minority party, or perhaps the difference in the floor proportions of the parties. It is conceivable that one might try to include some sense of majority party homogeneity to assess the extent to which a nominal majority would actually be able to produce procedural majorities. The approach taken in this study, however, is to define "floor advantage" as the majority's proportion of the floor minus 0.50. Thus, if a majority party had 62% of the floor, then its "floor advantage" would be $0.62 - 0.50 = 0.12$. If the majority's floor advantage were quite small (say 0.02), then hypothesis 2 suggests that ratio stacking will be relatively large since it tends to increase as floor advantage decreases. Therefore there is an expectation that floor advantage variable will be negatively related to the dependent variable.

The third independent variable is related to the size of an individual committee:

Hypothesis 3: Larger committees have majority contingents that can suffer several defections yet still produce a reliable performance, whereas the performance of smaller committees can be threatened by just a few defections. Therefore committee size is inversely related to the ratio advantage that the majority party grants itself.

The variable "committee size" is straightforward here, being the total number of seats allocated to the majority and minority contingents. Since small committees have a smaller margin for error, hypothesis 3 suggests that these are more likely to exhibit ratio

stacking. A negative relationship is expected between committee size and the dependent variable. As mentioned above, vacant slots are considered part of the systems strategy decision-making process, and they are therefore included in the total size of the committee.

Since these hypotheses are being discussed in the context of a linear regression, it is possible to also present an expectation for the intercept of the regression. The intercept can be defined as the average value of the dependent variable when all independent variables take on the value of zero. Although committee size is never zero, and a floor advantage of zero would technically result in no majority party, it is nevertheless possible to discuss a small non-prestige committee in a closely divided floor. A small committee created during a close floor advantage should lead to high levels of ratio stacking. Therefore, there is a strong expectation that the intercept will be positive in this regression.

Results

These hypotheses were tested on 281 committees in the U.S. House from 1975-2001. The results of the linear regression are reported in table 3.1.

[Table 3.1 about here]

The results of this regression provide some compelling support for the existence of majority party reliability systems solutions. A great deal of variation is being explained for a variable that had previously been thought to be essentially nonexistent. The first hypothesis suggested that ratios would favor the majority party on important committees. The regression reports a ratio advantage for the majority party on each of the prestige committees, with both the Appropriations and Ways & Means committees being stacked

approximately 2.5% in their favor. The Rules Committee was structured even more favorably, with an advantage of a little over 6% going to the majority party. In each of these instances, the coefficient is in the predicted direction and is statistically significant. Taken together this provides strong support for hypothesis 1 in the U.S. House.

The second hypothesis also is supported by the regression results since the variable “floor advantage” is also substantively and statistically significant. The negative sign on floor advantage does indicate that ratio stacking decreases as floor advantage increases. With a coefficient of -0.324 , this indicates that if the majority’s floor advantage increases by 5% then the ratio stacking on committees will decrease by about 1.6%. Alternatively, if floor advantage were to decrease by 10%, then ratio stacking on committees would increase by approximately 3.24%. Another way to look at this result is to view how much of the floor change is actually reflected in the committee ratios. If the majority’s floor advantage were to increase by 10%, then the -0.324 coefficient indicates that the majority actually increases its committee ratio by only 6.76%. So when floor advantage increases, so does the majority’s share on committees, but it is not on a one-to-one basis. The increase in committee ratios does not mirror the floor increase, however, since narrow floor advantages resulted in large levels of ratio stacking that are not maintained as the majority’s floor advantage increases. The negative relationship predicted in hypothesis 2 is supported by these results.

A committee’s size also bears a substantive and statistically significant effect upon the partisan ratio of a committee, as hypothesis 3 suggests. As predicted, the coefficient for this variable is negative, indicating that the larger a committee is, the less ratio stacking it tends to exhibit. With a coefficient of -0.00091 , this indicates that if a

committee were increased in size by 11 members, then it would tend to exhibit about 1% less ratio stacking. Similarly, if a committee had 33 fewer members than another committee, this smaller committee would tend to exhibit about 3% more stacking due to that difference alone.

When coupled with the earlier finding about the prestige committees, the committee size hypothesis gives insight into the consistently large majority contingents on the Rules Committee. Not only is Rules stacked because it is a prestige committee, but an independent effect is also exerted by the smallness of its membership. Both of these variables combined would predict an extraordinarily large majority share of membership, a result commonly noticed but not explained.

The Appropriations Committee result is also worth noting in combination with the size hypothesis. What is extraordinary with this committee is that it has consistently been either the largest or almost the largest committee in the House. With such a large committee, the size variable would suggest that levels of stacking are actually quite diminished. For instance in 2001, the Appropriations Committee had 65 members whereas the Rules Committee had only 13 members. With 52 more members than Rules, the size coefficient reported in the regression suggests that Appropriations has almost 5% less ratio stacking than Rules due to its size alone. In fact, if the Appropriations Committee were reduced to 13 members, this analysis suggests that the committee would exhibit even more stacking than the Rules Committee reported (about 6%). This would be the case since Appropriations, even with its large size, exhibits 2.3% stacking (seen in its dummy coefficient), and if its size were reduced it would gain almost 5% of ratio

stacking, resulting in a total ratio stacking of about 7%, slightly greater than 6% stacking that Rules reported.

Finally, the intercept of the regression is positive as predicted and statistically significant. This indicates that for a non-prestige committee that is small with a small floor advantage (in principal zero in size and floor advantage) would exhibit about 8.3% of ratio stacking. This 8.3% of stacking therefore represents something of a “high-water” mark for ratio stacking on non-prestige committees. As committees increase in size, ratio stacking decreases, and as floor advantage increases ratio stacking also decreases. The only variable in the model that could lead to stacking above 8.3% is if the committee were a prestige committee.

A Graphical Representation of the Model

A good way to summarize this empirical evidence and the heart of this chapter is to examine figure 3.1, which displays the average amount of ratio stacking per Congress by the size of majority floor advantage. The intercept in this figure is clearly positive and substantively significant, as it was in the regression. Thus closely divided floors show the greatest amount of ratio stacking as was predicted. The clear downward slope reflects the expectation of the second hypothesis, that ratio stacking would decrease as floor advantage increased. Since any given point in the figure is an average value of ratio stacking for a given session, we would expect an upward shift if the committee were a prestige committee (due to hypothesis 1) or small in size (due to hypothesis 3). Likewise, if a committee were not a prestige committee or had a relatively large membership, we would expect a downward shift in ratio stacking for a given point in figure 3.1.

[Figure 3.1 about here]

The Scope of Systems Solutions in the House

The primary timeframe of this study on the national level is from 1975 to the present. One might wonder, then, if the relationship depicted in figure 3.1 is primarily due to a few recent close Republican majorities. As Kloha (2003) has demonstrated, however, the hypotheses of this chapter are supported in an extended timeframe and also at the individual committee level of analysis. Figure 3.2 provides the same information as figure 3.1, but instead includes all relevant House committees from the 20th century. This figure demonstrates that the system solution of stacking the party ratios on committees in favor of the majority for closely divided floors is of no recent origin. Indeed, average ratio stacking has been at even higher levels historically, with several congresses displaying about seven or eight percent ratio stacking on average.

[Figure 3.2 about here]

Interestingly, when the majority party has an exceptionally large floor advantage, it appears to give a substantial advantage to the minority party in ratio construction, as shown by the negative average ratio stack scores. While at first this may seem puzzling, it is not necessarily contrary to the expectations suggested by majority party reliability. The system solution of ratio stacking is sought for the purpose of creating a structure that enables the reliable performance of a committee. When a party possesses 80% of the floor, it could mirror this ratio on a committee by giving itself eight seats and two for the minority. This 8-2 structure would likely be little different from a 9-2 or even an 8-3 structure, though, and the 8-3 division represents about a 7% ratio advantage to the minority party, similar to the ratio stacking depicted in the largest floor advantages in figure 3.2. All three of these example ratios present a structure that still gives a

substantial numerical advantage to the majority party. Whether the committee acts reliably or not depends on the component strategy of the majority (how the slots are filled). Therefore when the floor advantage is extraordinarily large the minority party appears to be allotted more than its share of seats. This does not, however, necessarily result in a committee that acts unreliably since the structure still overwhelmingly gives a numerical advantage to the majority party.

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 both depict average ratio stacking for a given level of floor advantage. If the unit of analysis is changed to the individual committee, it is possible to test hypothesis 2 for individual committees. Basically, this means that the positive intercept and downward slope of figures 3.1 and 3.2 should also be evident for individual committees as well. Charting 45 individual committees over 1900-2001, figure 3.3 (repeated from Kloha 2003) shows that hypothesis 2 is supported by virtually all individual House committees, with a positive intercept and negative relationship between floor advantage and ratio stacking.

[Figure 3.3 about here]

Evaluating the Conventional Wisdom of Proportionality

Figure 3.1 gives us a clear picture to have in mind when reconsidering the conventional wisdom on House committee party ratios. The conventional wisdom of proportionality would have suggested that the intercept should be zero and the average value of ratio stacking would be randomly and narrowly scattered around zero for any level of floor advantage. Such an expectation is decidedly contrary to the evidence presented here. Committee party ratios often do not mirror the party ratio of the floor. Instead, committee party ratios vary systematically with the size of the majority party

floor advantage, presenting a clear negative relationship. Closely divided floors tend to produce committee party ratios that are consistently to the advantage of the majority party, and very large majorities tend to give an advantage to the minority party.

Proportionality tends to be abandoned either when it would give the majority little structural advantage or when floor advantage is so substantial that all of it need not be mirrored in committee. Some Congresses will have committees that do appear to very nearly approximate proportionality, but it would be just as inappropriate to generalize from only these congresses as it would be to generalize from those that always favor the majority (small floor advantage) or the minority party (large floor advantage). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide compelling support for hypothesis 2, a result that the conventional wisdom can not accommodate.

The linear regression results presented in this chapter also offer a challenge to proportionality. Hypothesis 1 received support, as the prestige committees all displayed a ratio advantage for the majority party. It is often noted that the Rules Committee gives a substantial advantage to the majority party, yet this usually remains unexplained. This analysis suggests that *all* prestige committees receive an advantage, and Rules is only the most obvious departure from proportionality. The ratio advantage on Rules is also exceptional due to its size, which is noted in hypothesis 3, that committee size is related to ratio stacking. Here too the conventional wisdom does not account for the result that smaller committees have higher levels of ratio stacking. In each of these cases an expectation grounded in majority party reliability systems solutions is contrary to the conventional wisdom of proportionality, yet is supported by empirical evidence.

This analysis suggests that the conventional wisdom is an approximation too simplistic for the actual process of reliability concerns undergirding party ratios. It seems that the proportionality explanation needs revision or at least a prominent asterisk to acknowledge that floor advantage, the type of committee, and even the size of the committee all play a substantive and statistically significant role in the party ratio of a committee.

In evaluating the conventional wisdom, one is also implicitly evaluating the theories of legislative organization as well. Proportionality in committees is the expectation most naturally associated with a majoritarian theory of legislative organization. Majoritarian theory would expect null findings for all hypotheses in this chapter, expecting that floor advantage and size or type of committee are irrelevant to the committee ratios. The graphical and statistical evidence presented here suggest that majoritarian theory does not explain committee party ratios well.

Furthermore, a distributive theory of legislative organization does not appear to explain committee party ratios either. Whereas majoritarian theories would have expectations explicitly contrary to the findings of this chapter, the distributive theory has generally been silent in regard to these hypotheses. This is due to the focus of distributive theories on component types (high-demander legislators are accommodated) rather than systems strategies. In other words, distributive theories tend to overlook how the committee structure (size and party share of committees) was created and instead focus on how members are assigned within that structure. It is not, however, impossible to identify some expectations that distributive theories could have for committee structure. Party ratios could emerge as simply the by-product of whoever was interested in sitting

on each committee. This expectation, however, is not consistent with the evidence presented in this chapter. The consistent advantage to the majority party when and where it enhances reliability, across *every* kind of committee in the entire 20th century, is not something that a purely distributive theory would expect.

Indeed, only a partisan theory of legislative organization appears to offer a suitable framework for the evidence presented in this chapter. The majority party reliability concept suggests that the majority party gives itself additional seats when its margin for error is small or when the jurisdiction is important. Therefore the majority gives itself an advantageous committee structure when the floor is closely divided or the committee is relatively small (cases of small margin for error) and on prestige committees. The graphical and empirical evidence presented here supports these hypotheses, and appear to offer some validation of the systems solution aspects of majority party reliability for the U.S. House.

Chapter 4: Component Solutions in Committees of the U.S. House

The previous chapter discussed systems solutions that the majority party uses to create a favorable committee structure. Since one of the goals of this research is to demonstrate that committees are at times reliability-based outliers, the systematic structural advantage to the majority party is an important piece of evidence. It is not sufficient, however. As Krehbiel (1993, 242-245) has noted, ratios that do not mirror the floor “do not guarantee unrepresentative committees,” nor do “so-called fair ratios ... guarantee representative committees.” In short, if the majority party desired a committee system that would tend to act reliably, the adoption of a systems solution alone is not a sufficient condition. The systems solution provides additional slots on committees when appropriate, but the reliable performance of the committee still hinges on what members are actually assigned to those slots. The creation of committee slots is a systems solution; the performance of those slots is a component solution matter.

As mentioned earlier, a component strategy can be an alternative or complement to a systems strategy. Whereas systems strategies change the number of components or the relationships among them, a component strategy focuses on the individual operation of components in the system. In a legislative setting component strategies to enhance majority party reliability could take on a multitude of forms and occur at many stages in the legislative process. For example, if majority party members behave reliably because they perceive that their chances of transferring to a more desirable committee improve if they do so, then this practice of party leaders rewarding members is a type of component solution. Cox and McCubbins (1993) suggest that majority members’ behavior is

influenced by the costs and benefits that can be distributed through the committee assignment/transfer process.

Rohde (1991) gives several examples of what might be construed as measures taken to improve component performance, particularly of committee chairs. For instance, Rohde (pp. 71-77) identifies Democratic caucus voting on chairmen as “a control mechanism” with the intention of “protecting shared policy positions within the Caucus.” Rohde’s presentation of Representative Jamie Whitten’s remarkable increase in party support (in an era when Southern chairmen were being replaced) may be the quintessential example of how the majority party is able to increase component reliability (p. 76). Elsewhere (p. 79) Rohde relates how the Steering and Policy Committee would designate “litmus-test” votes and “those who hope to be rewarded by the caucus can expect to have their votes scrutinized.” Rohde (p. 108) mentions how even the mere suggestion of a threat can serve to enhance component reliability. When Butler Derrick, a Democrat party loyalist, was upset at some unreliable behavior by a new appointee to Appropriations, he suggested that all committee assignments should be temporary for the first term. A task force studied the idea, and although the task force never reported, word got around, leading to Rohde’s observation that “just the possibility of such a change could do wonders to encourage loyalty.”

Component solutions could also be much more idiosyncratic, as in the case of a member who is threatened or “bribed” to behave reliably perhaps by means of a distributive reward (or one withheld as punishment). Changing a member’s mind through debate and persuasion by majority party members could also be classified as a component strategy.

While all of the above are indeed types of component strategies, the focus of this chapter is upon the component strategy of committee assignments at the beginning of a House session. As in the systems solution chapter, this chapter will begin by discussing previous research as it relates to component solutions in the U.S. House. The second section will explore the expectations of the theories of legislative organization for component reliability. Following this is an evaluation of the House as a venue for finding component solutions to enhance majority party reliability. The final section is an empirical examination of the hypotheses related to component solutions.

Previous Research Relevant to Component Solutions

By the definition discussed previously, this study considers that an individual majority party member behaves reliably if the following conditions are met: an ideological issue is addressed, the parties disagree, and the member chooses the option approved by most majority caucus members. Whether majority leaders take concerns like the reliability of members into account when making committee assignments is an issue that has received some previous attention, usually in the context of members receiving transfers.

Rohde and Shepsle (1973) employ request data for Democratic committee assignments in the 86th-90th Congresses, and they discuss a “party support goal” in which the “prime concern here is the degree to which members will support the party position on issues which come before the standing committees.” They use two lines of evidence to evaluate the extent that the party support goal is sought in committee assignments. First, they note that “generally speaking, southern Democrats are less likely to support their party’s position than are northern Democrats.” Because of this lack of support, they

hypothesize that “the leadership should be less likely to intervene with the Committee on Committees on behalf of a southerner than a northerner.” In addition, since the Ways and Means Committee majority contingent members (who at the time composed the Committee on Committees) were more liberal in general, “those members, even when acting on their own, are likely to be more favorably disposed toward the requests of northern Democrats than toward those of southerners.” In sum, they “expect southerners to be less successful than northerners in obtaining requested committees.” Citing evidence for both freshman and nonfreshman that southerners are less successful, they conclude that “the evidence is unequivocal: Region has a strong, independent impact on committee assignment success, even when electoral margin is controlled.”

The second piece of evidence that Rohde and Shepsle cite is the party support scores of nonfreshman requesters. Comparing those members whose support surpassed the mean for the party in the previous Congress with those who gave less than mean support, they find that for each of the four Congresses, “high party supporters were more successful in securing assignments.”

Several things are noteworthy about Rohde and Shepsle’s analysis. First, the use of region (where South includes the eleven states of the Confederacy) is a somewhat blunt proxy to assess the reliability of a member, yet it still receives empirical support. Southerners were indeed less successful. Second, Rohde and Shepsle conceive of reliable assignments more so as a possible by-product of self-interested behavior rather than an explicit goal pursued by majority party leaders. Note the reasons stated for why southerners would not receive desired assignments; it is (1) because intervention is more likely for northerners by leadership and (2) because the liberal Ways and Means members

“are more favorably disposed toward the requests of northern Democrats.” Marginalizing or neutralizing unreliable members is not displayed so much as a goal as it is simply an outcome that fits some preferences of actors involved in the process. In majority party reliability the reliable performance of committees is posited more explicitly to be an actual goal sought by the majority party leadership. Third, both lines of evidence support the hypothesis that reliable members are rewarded with transfers, but this does not actually inform us of the reliability of the committees. Do these transfers of reliable members leave other committees as unreliable in some sense? Do the committees transferred to become relatively high reliability committees, or are reliable members being sent to “fix” unreliable committees?

Shepsle’s *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle* (1978) also includes some work relevant to component strategies. Looking at nonfreshman transfer request successes in the 87th to 93rd Congresses, he estimates a probit equation that has two “party support differential” independent variables, one for the distance a member has from his zone representative and one that was a more general measure of party support. The former was statistically significant, but the latter more general party support differential measure was not, and Waldman (1980, 377-78) cites this as evidence that “general party loyalty has ... failed to affect assignments to most House committees.” Cox and McCubbins (1993, 168) suggest that Waldman’s interpretation of Shepsle is incorrect, stating “we cannot see that Shepsle’s research supports such an inference in any straightforward way.” What Cox and McCubbins have failed to note, however, is that Waldman is discussing Shepsle’s *general* party loyalty variable that was insignificant (discussed on Shepsle’s page 217), not the significant *zone representative* party support differential variable (included on

Shepsle's table on page 216). Shepsle's null finding concerning general party loyalty is indeed apparently contrary to the finding of Rohde and Shepsle (1973) that party loyalty was positively related to transfer success. In addition, Shepsle also examines regional bias, including a regional dummy variable (South vs. non-South) as an independent variable in a probit equation with assignment success as the dependent variable. Again, contra Rohde and Shepsle (1973), he finds (p. 217) that "there is no regional bias" and that "Southerners ... are neither more nor less likely to have their transfer requests honored, all other things being equal."

Smith and Ray (1983) examined nonfreshman Democrat success in receiving assignments for which they had been nominated. Using *Congressional Quarterly* party unity scores, they find that party loyalty was a statistically significant variable, and it was positively related to success in receiving the assignment.

Cox and McCubbins (1993, 163-187) suggest that these previous studies are limited since they only include written Democratic transfers made at the beginning of Congresses. In addition, the number of Congresses that these studies include is not large, and finally they note that the results of these studies are statistically mixed. (Indeed, since they do not recognize Shepsle's null finding for general party loyalty, the results are even more mixed than Cox and McCubbins realize.) Their solution is to examine party loyalty, not in terms of party unity votes (where party majorities oppose each other) but instead in terms of loyalty to party leaders (a measure of how often the member voted with his leaders when they were in opposition to the other party's leaders). They find that "loyalty to the party leadership is a statistically and substantively important determinant of who

gets what assignment. The effect is particularly strong in determining who transfers, but it is noticeable even in determining the initial assignment of freshmen.”

Rohde (1991, 77, 108) reports several scholars’ descriptive detail of the importance of reliable behavior in committee assignments, particularly for prestige committees. He cites Sinclair (1989a, 4) to report that “before appointments were made to one of the prestige committees, Wright talked to the candidates to make sure they understood their obligation to support the party position.” Rohde (1991, 77) quotes a party leader (originally in Sinclair 1981, 187) saying that “we tried to put reasonable people on the [important] committees. Some members who wanted new assignments didn’t get what they wanted. Members who never go with the leadership—never help out.” Rohde also includes some of Barry’s discussion (1989, 393) about how Wright was being very careful with a vacancy on Appropriations in 1987, saying, “I can’t afford to have any more members on these key committees who aren’t leadership people.” Rohde cites Smith and Deering (1984, 242) that Speaker O’Neill “provided ‘leadership support scores’ for members who were seeking assignment transfers, and in some cases when they were not provided, committee members asked for them.” More recently, Deering and Smith (1997, 107) note that “during the organizational meetings for the 104th Congress, Speaker Gingrich was reported to have asked members to sign a pledge of allegiance prior to joining the Appropriations Committee.”

In sum, the scholarly literature has indeed placed some emphasis already on the ideas of component reliability in House committee assignments. The scope of this examination has been quite limited, however, in that these studies tend to focus on only two areas: assignment to prestige committees and committee transfers in general. In both

cases members' reliable behavior was found to be positively related with their success in receiving these assignments, although the statistical evidence has not been unequivocal. While prestige committees certainly are important, it would seem reasonable to suspect that the majority party leaders would also be concerned with the reliable operation of the other committees as well. And while examinations of transfers give us some insight about how parties re-allocate their members, these changes affect the committees only at their margins since transfers usually do not compose a large percentage of the committee members. Many tantalizing questions remain. For example, if reliable members are more likely to be rewarded with transfers, what is the (or is there a) party leadership's strategy regarding unreliable members? Or if prestige committees typically have ratios giving additional advantage to the majority party, and if reliable members are those allocated to these committees, why is it that these committees are not commonly found as ideological outliers favoring the majority party? These questions and the limits of the existing literature indicate that a more general approach (including more members and committees) to component reliability would be desirable.

Component Strategies and Theories of Legislative Organization

As was done in the previous chapter concerning systems strategies, it is also possible to consider component strategies in relation to the theories of legislative organization. In particular, each perspective may be able to generate a set of expectations for component strategies that are falsifiable.

Distributive Theory and Component Strategies

The distributive theory of organization does predict that the types of components assigned to committees matter a great deal, but these predictions center on constituency-based measures, not on a dimension of loyalty to party. If there is a connection between distributive theory and component reliability, perhaps the strongest expectation is that members supportive of party leaders should be more successful in transferring to committees that serve their distributive interests. This sort of loyalty reward tends to contradict the rather unconditional “self-selection” hypothesis so prominent in distributive theory. In addition, the focus on transfers to desired distributive committees again would leave a narrow focus because (1) transfers focus on only a few members and (2) only some committees are clearly of a distributive nature. Distributive theories as currently stated are therefore probably best described as agnostic concerning the relevance of party reliability in assigning members.

Informational Theory and Component Strategies

Informational or majoritarian theories of organization offer a relatively rich set of expectations for component strategies. Since this perspective views committees as mirroring the floor to avoid informational inefficiencies, it ought to expect components to be assigned to committees in a manner that facilitates this goal. Generally speaking, then, party loyalists should not dominate *any* committee since this would likely lead to a bias away from the median in favor of the majority party. As the Krehbiel quote opening this chapter indicates, informational theory expects that if structure and component allocation work in tandem, they do so to cancel each other out. For instance, if additional seats were given to the majority party on a committee, informational theory suggests that members would be allocated in a manner to negate this advantage so that the committee remained

representative of the floor. This could be done by the majority assigning some relatively moderate members who are not reliable majority party members. In this way, component assignment counters structural advantage. Similarly, if a majority party were to have fewer than its “fair” number of seats on a committee, this could be countered by the majority assigning members who are more loyal. In either case, structural peculiarities are expected to be negated by corresponding (and counter-acting) component peculiarities.

For the most part, though, informational theories do not expect structural deviances (like the systems solutions demonstrated in the prior chapter) that need to be countered in the component stage. Thus, highly reliable members should not demonstrate a greater level of utilization (to counter structural disadvantages to the majority party) nor should relatively unreliable members be more likely to be assigned multiple times (to counter structural advantages to the majority party). Instead, high, medium, and low reliability members should tend to exhibit about the same levels of utilization with the result being representative committees.

Partisan Theory and Component Strategies

A partisan theory of legislative organization is the most natural home for the existing literature relating to component strategies. If party leaders are rewarding reliable behavior with transfers and tending to promote reliable members to the important committees, then this is quite consistent with a theoretical view that suggests parties and their leaders are important factors in organizing a legislature.

A partisan theory of organization is able to suggest more expectations for committee components than the literature has examined to this point. As mentioned

above, most of the attention related to reliable components has suggested that they are more likely to receive transfers and receive positions on prestige committees. A majority party reliability perspective suggests at least three additional areas where component reliability should be manifested.

First, it should be the case that the majority party would prefer reliable components in *all* important slots, not just on prestige committees. This means that party leader and committee chair slots should be expected to be filled with fairly reliable members.

The second area of expectations involves the number of assignments that individual members receive. Returning to an engine example, if a mechanic were able to discern that some of the parts he used were high quality, but some were shoddy and quick to break, he would (hopefully) want to use only high-quality parts. If he repeatedly used low-quality parts, his repairs would not last and neither would his business. Some of this same concern is present for majority party leaders. They can know pretty well which members are going to be reliable votes when the party needs them. The leaders also know which members would be more likely to defect from the party position and possibly end up causing trouble. It makes sense, then, that if a member is needed to (or allowed to) sit on multiple committees, then these members would be relatively reliable. If unreliable majority party members were allowed to sit on many committees (three or more in the House), then the majority leaders would be planting the seeds of future headaches involving recalcitrant committees.

A third area of new exploration related to component reliability is simply the size of the committee. It was discussed earlier how larger committees are more able to suffer

defections and yet remain reliable for the party. Smaller committees do not have this same level of margin for error, and just a few defections can be determinative. For the same reason, then, majority leaders should also take care to assign more reliable members to smaller committees. Each of these three areas is potentially an area where a partisan theory of organization provides additional expectations for the reliability of components.

It is interesting to note how the existing literature is consistent with different theories of organization depending on which strategy is in view. The literature relevant to systems strategies is most consistent with informational theory, since committee ratios are thought to largely mirror the floor ratio. On component strategies, however, the literature is much more consistent with a partisan theory of organization since members are thought to alter their behavior in order to be rewarded by party leaders with desired committee assignments.

Also worthy of note is the expected interaction of systems and component strategies. Informational theory expects these strategies to correlate, with one counteracting the influence of the other. Structural advantage to the majority is thought to be offset by the assignment of relatively moderate members. Structural disadvantage to the majority is offset by the assignment of party loyalists. In either case, it is expected that the equilibrium result of mirroring the floor is ultimately achieved. A partisan theory of organization tends to see these strategies working in tandem so that the dynamic is additive, not conflicting. For instance, majority party leaders may give a structural advantage to their party on small committees, and then also assign relatively high reliability members to that committee. Before turning to an empirical examination related

to these expectations, it is necessary to evaluate the House as an institution in terms of whether it is likely to exhibit the component strategies of majority party reliability.

Evaluating the U.S. House as a Venue for Finding Majority Party Reliability Component Strategies

Just as in the previous chapter, it is important to consider whether the House is an institution likely to exhibit component strategies. This requires that incentive, ability, and an agent of implementation be present. The incentive or motivation to pursue component strategies is similar to those qualities listed for systems strategies. To briefly overview these again, committees are important in the legislative process. They are not by-passed regularly, members have property rights to their jurisdiction, amendments to bills have to be germane, and floor action on a bill usually requires that a majority of committee members reported it, and committee members compose those who sit on conference committees. All these again point to the importance of committees in the House, and the typical need to have a committee majority approve a bill demonstrates the desirability of having party slots filled with reliable members.

In terms of ability to implement component solutions in committee assignments, House majority party leaders do not have complete freedom in allocating from its pool of members. There are some practical as well as more formal restrictions to note. First is the presence of an upper limit on the number of committees that a member may sit on. House Rule X limits members to two committee seats, yet exceptions to this rule are very common in the post-reform era. Practically speaking, members cannot be given a multitude of committee assignments because scheduling conflicts would prevent regular attendance, and the workload for so many committees would likely become oppressive.

Another restriction upon majority party leaders is that committee chairs and members of exclusive committees are usually not assigned to multiple committees (except for the Budget Committee, which draws some of its membership from exclusive committees). Most majority party members, however, are free to be assigned to more than one committee, although there are some restrictions in the types of second committees members can be assigned. While there are these types of “ceiling” limitations, it is also true that the majority party has a “floor” limitation in that all of its members must be assigned to some committee, no matter how unreliable the member is. In general, though, there are still opportunities for majority party leaders to pursue component strategies by strategically assigning reliable and unreliable members.

A final necessary hurdle to clear if component strategies are to be observed is an agent to implement them. Whereas systems solutions were negotiated by a few party leaders, component strategies are pursued by a somewhat larger committee on committees. The makeup of these steering committees has changed over the years and varies depending on the party. Deering and Smith (1997, 102) report that the House Republican Steering Committee included a leadership group, a committee chair group, a regional group, and a class group for a total of twenty-six members with the Speaker acting as a chair who also had more votes than the other members. The House Democratic Steering Committee included “the Democratic leader, Caucus chair, Caucus vice chair, whip, Democratic Campaign Committee chair, a co-chair and two vice chairs named by the leader, the four chief deputy whips, twelve regionally elected members, up to ten members appointed by the leader, and the senior Democrats of the Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means committees,” for a possible total approaching forty

members. These relatively small workgroups include a strong party leadership aspect, and it would therefore be possible for them to pursue component strategy goals.

As was found regarding systems strategies, the House also appears to have motive, ability, and an agent for pursuing component strategies. Whether this occurs or not requires an empirical evaluation and that task occupies the remainder of this chapter.

Testing for Component Strategies in the U.S. House

The fourth through sixth hypotheses of chapter 2 suggested that reliable components were more likely to be used for important slots, on smaller committees, and when multiple assignments were given. Previous studies relevant to component reliability have typically defined party reliability by two methods: region (South vs. non-South) or party support scores. This study, however, will instead use ideological scores as a proxy for party reliability. Such measures are certainly more precise than a regional dichotomous variable, especially since that variable was used during an era of an ideologically heterogeneous majority party where ideology did correlate somewhat with region. Such a relationship is much less prevalent in recent years given the increasing homogeneity of both parties (Rohde 1991).

The main reason that ideology scores are used in this study is so that the results found here can be compared with the much more pervasive committee outlier literature. Those studies do not examine whether committees are outliers in terms of their party support scores; they typically use ideological or distributive measures. Therefore, this study uses ADA scores, adjusted ADA scores (using Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder's technique to make these scores comparable across years) and Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE first dimension scores. Using ideology scores, it is assumed here that when

Democrats are the majority party, the more liberal the score, the more reliable the member is. Likewise, when Republicans control the House, more conservative scores reflect higher reliability.

The theory outlined in this present work suggests that an examination using some form of party support scores (either a general or a party leadership form) would also be quite compelling. Such measures are probably even more theoretically appealing than the ideology scores used here, although they are likely to yield similar results. Using the ideology scores, though, allows a far greater interaction with the existing congressional studies. As in the prior chapter, the data employed here consist of committee assignments at the beginning of House sessions during the post-reform era (1975-2001).

Per Capita Seat Assignments and Component Strategies

The first two component strategy hypotheses are related in that they both expect a relationship to exist between an individual member's reliability score and the number of committee assignments he receives. Consider the per capita assignment distribution if there were absolutely no restrictions (including scheduling conflicts, time and energy resources of the representative, or even loss of majority due to alienating moderate members) upon party leaders in making these assignments. In such a world, party leaders would tend to utilize highly reliable members again and again, while marginalizing or perhaps even giving no assignments at all to unreliable members. The result, of course, in this unrestricted congress is that reliable members would have a higher per capita assignment figure than low reliability majority party members. While there are important restrictions in the House, the basic premise holds that reliability should be positively related to the number of committee assignments a member has.

In the Congresses examined here, majority party members usually sit on one, two, or three committees. In every session, a plurality of majority members sit on two committees, with the next largest group having one assignment and those with three seats comprising the smallest segment. It is much less frequent for members to sit on four or more seats, although in 1999 and 2001, five Republican members were assigned to four committees, one Democrat received four assignments in 1985, and in 1989 one Democratic member received five assignments. If majority parties do pursue component strategies, then these members receiving multiple assignments should be among the most reliable members available. Similarly, if there were no restrictions on membership, we would expect steering committees to minimize the impact of unreliable members, giving them fewer assignments. These strategic assignment considerations provide the basis for the fifth hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: The reliability of a majority party member is positively related to the number of committee seats he is assigned, ceteris paribus.

The phrase *ceteris paribus* is included because restrictions do exist in the House that obscure a purely positive relationship between a member's reliability and the number of seats he is assigned. Chief among these restrictions is the fact that chairs and members of exclusive committees typically only have that as their only assignment. Given that these slots are important to the majority party's agenda success, these positions should tend to be filled with reliable members, hypothesis 4:

Hypothesis 4: Important committee slots (such as the chair or seats on key committees) will tend to be filled by more reliable members.

The distinction that needs to be made, then, is that members with only one assignment may have it by virtue of being in important positions (therefore being more

reliable) or they may have only one assignment apart from any restrictions (and therefore they may have only one assignment due to their unreliability).

It is therefore possible for a majority party reliability perspective to provide a rank-order expectation for the reliability of members based on their number of committee assignments. This analysis will distinguish four basic groups of members: *multiple assignment* members (who have three or more seats), *two seat assignment* members (which is the most common occurrence during this period), *one assignment-restricted* members (who chair or sit on prestige committees and do not serve on more), and *one assignment-unrestricted* members (who only have one committee apart from any restrictions). If party leaders do indeed follow component strategies, then on average, the most reliable members will be those who are used most repeatedly. In the House, this means that the average reliability should be the highest for those majority party members who receive three or more seats, the multiple assignment group. To include unreliable members in this group would tend to give opportunity for these members to cause problems in multiple venues.

The next most reliable group should be those majority members who only have one assignment due to restrictions from sitting on additional committees. Those with this restriction occupy positions that are important by virtue of being on a prestige committee or chairing a committee. While this group with one seat should be relatively reliable, on average it will tend to be somewhat less reliable than the multiple assignment group. This is so because some of the prestige committees will usually include at least some unreliable members, and Ways and Means and especially Appropriations are large

enough that some unreliable members can be included without too much negative consequence.

The third most reliable group of members—and the largest one—is those with two assignments. This is the group containing most majority members, and it will not be the highest reliability (like the multiple or important seat members) nor the lowest (like the one assignment-unrestricted group), but will instead occupy the middle ground.

The least reliable of the four groups should be those members who only have one assignment apart from any restrictions. These members would have been eligible to sit on additional committees, but they were not given any. If majority parties do follow component strategies, the more unreliable members of the party should appear most frequently in this group so that they do not cause multiple committees to be unreliable.

In summary, the expected ranking from the most reliable group to the least is as follows: multiple assignment, single assignment-restricted, two seat assignment, and single assignment-no restriction. If the single assignment-restricted group tends to be relatively reliable, then this supports hypothesis 4 (that important slots will tend to be filled with reliable members). If the rest of the rank-order can be substantiated, then this supports hypothesis 5 (that there is a positive relationship between reliability and the number of assignments a member receives).

To test hypotheses four and five, data from the post-reform era House were collected on committee assignments at the beginning of House sessions to determine the number of committee assignments each member had. As mentioned above, this study will use ideology scores as a measure of a member's reliability, with liberal scores being reliable under Democratic control and conservative scores counted as reliable under

Republican control. Two commonly used ideological measures will be used to assess reliability. First are ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores, which give the “liberal quotient” for each member. This liberal interest group selects a relatively few number of votes and generates scores for representatives depending on their proportion of agreement with the ADA’s preferred options. These scores range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing a member who always votes with the ADA position and 0 representing a member who always opposes their position. Therefore a member with high ADA scores is considered reliable during Democrat control, but unreliable during Republican control.

The other set of ideological measures used here are Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE first dimension scores. Unlike the ADA measure, these scores are comparable across years, and they are based on thousands of roll call votes. These scores range from -1 to 1, with higher scores representing conservative positions and lower scores representing liberal positions. Therefore, when Republicans control the House, the most reliable members have the highest NOMINATE scores, but the lowest ADA scores. Similarly, when Democrats control the House, high ADA and low NOMINATE scores indicate reliable members.

The data appropriate to testing hypotheses 4 and 5 are reported in table 4.1. There are few Congresses that do not offer at least some support for the hypotheses. Turning first to hypothesis 4, table 4.1 indicates that important seats are on average filled by more reliable members, particularly in Democratic Congresses. Using the NOMINATE scores, in nine out of ten Democratic Houses the one seat-restricted (important seats) are on average more reliable than the typical two-seat member. According to ADA scores, one seat-restricted members are more reliable than two-seat members in eleven of the

fourteen Congresses, with the only exceptions being the first three terms of the sample (1975, 1977, and 1979).

The NOMINATE scores suggest that these important slots became filled with reliable members quite rapidly, with the one seat-restricted member average surpassing the two-seat member average by 1977. The ADA scores, however, tend to show that the transition to reliable members in these slots was more gradual with the one seat-restricted average finally surpassing the two-seat average in 1981. The one seat-restricted average is also consistently more reliable than the one seat-unrestricted group, especially in Democratic Congresses (Republican Houses did not place many members in the one seat-unrestricted category). Using either measure, in eight of ten Democratic Houses, the one seat-restricted group is more reliable than the one seat-unrestricted group. In the two sessions where this was not the case, the one seat-unrestricted groups only had four members (1989) and one member (1993). In general, hypothesis 4 receives support since the one seat-restricted group usually has the most reliable group average except for the multiple assignment groups.

[Table 4.1 about here]

Hypothesis 5 is also supported by the data in table 4.1. This can be seen by the frequent monotonic increase in reliability as the number of seats a member receives increases. Those with four or five assignments are almost always more reliable than those members with three assignments, who in turn are on average more reliable than those members with two or one unrestricted assignment. For example, in 1983 the eleven majority members with only one unrestricted assignment average an ADA score of only 50.9. Five of these eleven members were exceptionally conservative, receiving Armed

Services as their only committee assignment. This allocation of conservative Democrats to only the Armed Services Committee was a frequent practice in the 1970s and 1980s, reaching its pinnacle in 1979 and 1975 when eight Democrats were assigned to this committee with no additional assignments. Continuing to look at 1983, those majority members with two assignments composed by far the largest group, and with an average ADA score of 73, these 175 members were more reliable than the one assignment-unrestricted group. The 65 majority members on important single slots were on average slightly even more reliable by the ADA scores (much more so by NOMINATE). Finally, the most reliable group was that of members with three assignments, with those 16 members averaging an ADA score of almost 81. This predicted rank-ordering is also visible with the NOMINATE scores.

As hypothesis 5 predicts, the most reliable group is nearly always the multiple assignment group. Using either ideology measure, the members with three or more seats typically dominate all other groups in terms of reliability. In a few instances a very small group exceeds the reliability of the multiple assignment group, but even in those cases the difference is not large. In addition, hypothesis 5 is confirmed by virtue of unreliable members often being confined to a single committee. In every instance where more than eight members compose the one seat-unrestricted group, it is the most unreliable of any of the groups by either measure. Republican majorities did not appear to marginalize unreliable members in this manner, since very few of their members received one assignment when unrestricted.

Component strategies appear somewhat more prominently during times of Democratic control. This can be seen since the rank orderings of the groups appear

exactly as hypothesized in several of the Democratic congresses of the 1980s and 1990s. These rank orderings are less apparent, though, during the era of Republican control. Does this mean that Republicans have not followed component strategies? There are two lines of evidence that suggest Republicans also use component strategies. First, Republican-controlled Houses still demonstrate the important characteristic of allocating multiple seats to the party's most reliable members. The averages for members with three or more seats are consistently among the highest reliability by either measure.

Second, a major reason for the apparent differences between Republican and Democratic Houses is the degree of heterogeneity in each party. The Democratic party in the 1970s and 1980s was a much more heterogeneous majority than the Republicans, and therefore component strategies could be much more evident as unreliable members were marginalized and reliable members were repeatedly used or assigned to especially important slots. When Republicans controlled the House, they were a much more homogenous majority, lacking a large unreliable wing that needed to be allocated cautiously. While the Republican Houses might not exhibit the expected rank ordering in all instances, it is important to observe that there is actually relatively little variance across any of their groups. For example, in the 1995 House, the biggest ADA difference between any of the groups is a mere 2 points. In 1983 and 1985, though, the largest difference between groups for the Democrats is 30 and 50 points, respectively. Such differences demonstrate that Democrats had a greater incentive to engage in component strategies, thus displaying the expected rank order much more prominently. From the available evidence, it appears that Republicans too have not been hesitant historically to engage in component strategies when the party was more heterogeneous. As a minority in

1975 and 1977, the Republicans had more ideological diversity in their party than has been the case recently. For both of these sessions, the Republicans followed almost exactly the expected rank ordering that majority party reliability expects, regardless of measure used. For the rest of the period, the Republican groups in any given year do not differ drastically from each other, especially when compared to the variance within the Democratic party.

Since table 4.1 reports minority assignment outcomes as well, it is possible to offer a word concerning what might be called minority party reliability. The incentives facing the minority party are somewhat different from those faced by the majority. The minority knows that it will not have agenda control, and that it will generally be defeated in any ideological battle. In a sense, it may not matter too much to the minority how it plays its hand in allocating members since it would only be determining its margin of defeat, not whether it would be defeated or not. A minority that zealously followed component strategies in allocating members may lose narrowly, whereas a minority that entirely disregards component strategies may lose votes by wide margins. Either way, though, the minority loses. If, however, the floor division is quite close or the minority party has at least some expectation of soon becoming the majority party, then the incentives to allocate members are quite similar to those the majority faces. This is so because in close Congresses, the minority may have an actual chance of winning in committee with some majority defections. If the minority has an expectation of possibly becoming the majority soon, the party leaders will take care in making the assignments since the property right norm is rarely violated (once a member is on a committee he will usually stay there in future Congresses) and these assignments also form the queue for the

chair positions on committees (unless seniority is violated). If a party allocates members carelessly as a minority, then this would create potential reliability problems once it achieves majority status.

From the data in table 4.1, it appears that the minority party engages in component strategies less frequently than the majority party. A major confounding factor, however, is that the Republicans were the minority party during much of this period. Given their ideological homogeneity, component strategies would not need to be followed since most members could be counted as reliable. The Democrats in the minority too seem to exhibit less evidence of component strategies than they had as a majority party, but here again party homogeneity is relevant. By the time the Democrats had become the minority, their party homogeneity had greatly increased, and therefore there would be less need for the leadership to allocate members using component strategies.

It would be interesting to see if a heterogeneous minority party that had a reasonable chance of soon becoming the majority would engage in extensive component strategies. That would seem a reasonable expectation, but such a scenario is not present in this data set. When the minority has been heterogeneous, it has not had a very strong likelihood of becoming the majority. When the minority has had a relatively good chance of becoming the majority, it has not been heterogeneous. Testing for component strategies by a heterogeneous minority with a close floor awaits future work that may find such a scenario historically.

Committee Size and Component Strategies

The first two component strategy hypotheses were related to the per capita seat assignments of majority party members. The third component strategy hypothesis relates to the size of the committees. Traditionally when scholars have theorized concerning the ideological representativeness, they have suggested that the type of legislation produced by the committee or the distributive benefits available through the committee are important factors in whether the committee is an outlier. Majority party reliability suggests, however, that the simple size of the committee is a potentially important factor in determining which members are appointed to the committee.

The basis for this expectation can be made clear by an example. If a committee had five majority members and four minority members, then for the majority party to win in committee every single majority member would need to vote in unison if the minority were perfectly opposed to them. If, however, we maintain the same ratio of this committee on a larger committee, the situation changes. On a committee with 35 majority members and 28 minority members, there is now a 7 seat advantage to the majority, and on this larger committee several defections can be endured, or a majority party member who opposes the majority position could choose or be convinced not to vote at all. Larger committees are thus a venue in which unreliable members can be “hidden” without major consequence, as long as not too many unreliable members are placed on the same committee. On smaller committees, loyalty to the majority party is more essential since there is less margin for error, and unreliable majority members could threaten the reliable performance of the committee. Repeating the hypothesis from chapter 2,

Hypothesis 6: Majority contingents on small committees will be more reliable than majority contingents on larger committees. Majority contingent reliability is inversely related to committee size.

To examine this hypothesis, the House committees from 1975-2001 were divided into three groups based on their size. The small committee group was defined as those that had 35 total members or less. Committees that had 36 to 45 members were placed in the middle group, and the large group contained any committees with more than 45 members. By this classification about 33% of committees were small, 41% were in the middle group, and 26% were large. For each of these groups, an annual average reliability score is computed, which represents the average reliability of the majority contingents in that group. For example, in 1975 there are seven committees in the small group. The average ADA ideological (reliability) score of the majority contingent is computed for each committee in the small group, and then these numbers are averaged to give a reliability rating of 64.9 for the small group as a whole. Hypothesis 6 suggests the highest reliability scores should be reported for the small group, with the middle and large groups being increasingly unreliable. This expectation is confirmed in 1975, with a middle group score of 63.7 and a large group score of only 55.5. The full set of results using the ADA scores as a proxy for reliability is reported in table 4.2.

[Table 4.2 about here]

The expected negative relationship between committee size and contingent reliability is pervasive in these results. In 11 of the 14 Congresses the monotonic decrease in reliability occurs, and in every Congress the small group has the most reliable score (high for Democrat Houses, but low for Republican) reported of the three groups. The expected relationship occurs during both Republican and Democratic Houses. As with the per capita hypotheses, majority party heterogeneity again appears in these results. When Republican Congresses follow the expected pattern (with low scores being more reliable),

the largest difference among the three groups in a given year is quite small, with 5.2 points being the largest difference. For Democratic Houses, however, the difference among the groups is consistently much larger, usually with a difference of 10 to 15 points between groups in a given year. Regardless of the party in control, the small group *always* has the most reliable score.

Note too from table 4.2 the trend to larger committees in general. At the beginning of the timeframe examined here, only one committee had more than 45 members. By 2001, however, an actual majority of committees (10 of 18) had 46 or more members. As the last chapter on systems solutions argued, larger committees tend to be more reliable structures, and so the secular increase in committee size is actually additional evidence of the majority party pursuing a systems strategy over time.

Table 4.3 presents the same data as table 4.2 except that it uses NOMINATE scores as a proxy for reliability instead of ADA scores. The picture is again quite similar to that already discussed, with eight of the Congresses displaying the expected monotonic relationship. As with the ADA scores, 1981 and 1983 do not precisely meet the hypothesized expectations, but the smallest group is still the most reliable in these years. The expected relationship manifests for none of the Republican Congresses, and the small group is usually not the most reliable. The real story, though, is that there is actually very little difference in the reliability of *any* of the groups during Republican control, again due to the fact that they were such a homogeneous majority. As with the prior hypotheses, component strategies are more apparent when the majority party is heterogeneous.

[Table 4.3 about here]

For comparison purposes, the minority party's use of component strategies is also explored in tables 4.4 and 4.5, which are directly analogous to the tables just mentioned except that they are computed for the minority contingents. The NOMINATE scores from table 4.5 seem to indicate that the minority party also consistently engages in component strategies relating to committee size. In eight of the fourteen Congresses the average reliability of minority contingents decreased as committee size increased, and in all fourteen Congresses, the average value for the small group exceeds the reliability of the large group. The picture using ADA scores as reliability proxies in table 4.4 is less compelling, though, with the expected rank ordering occurring in only four sessions. In eleven of fourteen Congresses, however, the small group is more reliable than the largest group. Again, the prevalence of minority party homogeneity tends to limit the observation of majority party reliability concerns.

[Tables 4.4 and 4.5 about here]

The information in tables 4.2 through 4.5 is instructive since it demonstrates two secular trends: increasing party homogeneity (especially for the Democrats) and increasing committee size. The relationship between committee size and contingent reliability can also be presented on scatter plots, and these demonstrate that the confirmation of hypothesis 6 is not an artifact of the committee size classifications just discussed for the preceding tables. Figures 4.1 through 4.4 show the average reliability of House majority contingents using ADA and NOMINATE scores for members. Since scores across sessions are being placed on the same graph, the ADA scores for contingents have been adjusted so that they are directly comparable. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the relationship between committee size and majority contingent reliability from

1975-1993, a period of Democrat rule. Both figures suggest a negative relationship between contingent reliability and committee size. The smallest committees have adjusted ADA scores exceeding 90, while larger committees often have majority contingents 20 points, and sometimes 50 points lower than this. The NOMINATE figure portrays a similar relationship with an even stronger correlation. That Democrat contingents display such a wide range of reliability demonstrates the party's heterogeneity present during the period. That the small contingents were consistently allocated high-scoring members suggests that committee assignments are being made in a manner consistent with the hypotheses of majority party reliability. Larger committees have a greater capacity for absorbing unreliable member behavior, and Democrat contingents often relied upon this structural feature.

[Figure 4.1 and 4.2 about here]

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the corresponding scatter plots for Republican majority contingents, again using adjusted ADA and NOMINATE scores. Support for hypothesis 6 is less obvious from these figures, primarily because the Republican majority contingents were so homogenous in comparison to Democrat contingents. Whereas the Democrat contingent averages vary by as many as 60 ADA points, Republican contingent averages all lie within a 20 point range, and the NOMINATE figure portrays a similar story. The adjusted ADA figure does seem to suggest that even with the Republican homogeneity there still was a slight tendency to place the more reliable members on smaller committees. This feature is less prominent in the NOMINATE figure, but even there the smallest committees tend to be more reliable than the largest committees.

[Figure 4.3 and 4.4 about here]

For comparison purposes, the minority contingent scatter plots are also presented in Figures 4.5 through 4.8. The Republican minority contingents are presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, and while there is more variance in average reliability the relationship between reliability and committee size is not obviously strong. Part of the reason for this is that Republican contingents on the relatively small District of Columbia committee were exceptionally liberal in the 70s. If just a few outliers are dropped, the expected negative relationship between size and average reliability is more evident, and the correlations strengthen in the expected direction.

[Figure 4.5 and 4.6 about here]

For minority Democrat contingents, the negative relationship between committee size and average reliability is more obvious as seen in figures 4.7 and 4.8. By either measure, Democrat contingents on smaller committees tend to be more reliable. This relationship exists even though the caucus had become much more homogenous by the time it reached minority status.

[Figure 4.7 and 4.8 about here]

Summary and Discussion

This chapter explored the presence of component strategies used by the majority party in allocating committee assignments. In hypotheses four and five, it was suggested that reliable majority members would be more likely to receive multiple assignments or important positions. Both of these expectations were supported by data from the post-reform era House with two sets of ideological data serving as proxies for a member's reliability. The third component hypothesis suggested that unreliable members would be more likely to be assigned to large committees, while reliable members would tend to

populate smaller committees. This hypothesis too was supported with post-reform House data, with the expected negative relationship between reliability and size being substantively significant and pervasive.

It is worth revisiting the three theories of congressional organization in view of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter. The distributive theory was described as being primarily agnostic about a relationship between committee assignment and member reliability since it is concerned with an entirely different dimension than that explored here. Suffice it to say that distributive theory does not provide a strong basis for the relationships presented here. Informational theory did have expectations for the relationships examined in this chapter, but they are not confirmed by the evidence presented here. Since informational theories generally expect no structural advantage to the majority party, they would also tend to expect no systematic relationships between a member's reliability and the number of seats he receives or the size of the committee to which he is assigned. Such relationships do appear to exist, however, and random assignment of members without regard to their reliability was not supported by the evidence examined here. Instead, majority party members are assigned in such a manner that is consistently advantageous to the majority party from a reliability perspective. Indeed, only a partisan theory of organization provides a basis for understanding the member allocation outcomes presented here.

Chapter 5: Majority Party Reliability and House Committee Outliers

The previous two chapters presented empirical evidence indicating that majority parties both structure the committee system (systems strategies) and assign members within that system (component strategies) in a manner that is consistent with a concern for the reliable operation of those committees. The data presented in those two chapters were primarily from the U.S. House from the 1970s to the present. Yet these results leave us with something of a mystery. If indeed majority parties do structure committees and assign their members to their advantage, then why have so many studies apparently found that House committees are typically representative of the floor on ideological measures? As table 1.1 showed, ideologically outlying committees have generally not been claimed by any of the three legislative theories of organization, and some scholars have taken the absence of partisan outliers as evidence against partisan theories of organization.

This chapter aims to shed some light on this question by specifying conditions under which committees will tend to be outliers favoring the majority party. This chapter will proceed in four sections. A review of some of the most prominent studies on committee ideological representativeness comes first. Second, a new framework for testing committee representativeness will be presented, one based upon the concept of majority party reliability. The third section tests these hypotheses and discusses the results. This chapter concludes with some possible explanations why previous studies have often failed to detect ideologically outlying committees.

Prior Research on the Ideological Composition of House Committees

Weingast and Marshall (1988) presented an important analysis of the committee assignment process in the House, suggesting that it looked “remarkably like an optimization process that maps members into those committees they value the most.” The result of this process is that “members of the relevant committee or subcommittee significantly differ from the rest of the House.” To test this proposition, they gather evidence for eight legislative subunits using interest group data, all of which is for only 1978. Three of the legislative subunits were analyzed using the general ideology ADA scores, and the rest were tested with measures that were thought to be more jurisdiction-specific. Conducting difference-of-means tests, they find that all eight subunits are statistically different from the rest of the House. They conclude that “this pattern is precisely that expected by the view that committees institutionalize trades over influence so as to give their members greater control over policies with their jurisdiction.”

Groseclose (1994a) attempted a replication of this study, finding that the evidence for outliers was not as compelling as Weingast and Marshall suggested. Instead, he finds that only four of the eight subunits were significant outliers. Of the three subunits that used the ADA scores, only one of them is statistically significant in his reexamination. Groseclose warns researchers of a “tendency only to select committees which they have read or heard are outlying,” and he reminds them that the “few attempts to examine all committees of a Congress ... tend to suggest that a general outlying tendency does not exist.”

One of the main challenges to the notion of prevalent distributive-based committee outliers came from Krehbiel (1990, 1991). These two works have nearly identical empirical presentations that explore the ideological representativeness of

committees, and he uses ADA (and unreported American Conservative Union) scores “to see whether systematic and general biases in general ideology outliers exist or whether cross-committee variation exists.” Using data for the 99th House, Krehbiel finds that “most standing committees do not have general ideology medians or means significantly different from the House.” He reaches this conclusion by noting that “for 15 of the 22 standing committees fewer than 10% of the House’s members lie in the gap between the House and committee medians.” Of the seven that exceeded the 10% standard, only five (Foreign Affairs, Education and Labor, Post Office and Civil Service, Armed Services, and District of Columbia) had t-statistics significant at the 0.05 level. Based upon these findings, Krehbiel concludes that there is a “paucity of general ideology outliers” and that the traditional notions of outlying committees may be “an endangered species.” He quickly adds, however, that “these results must be interpreted with extreme caution.” This warning is only an allowance that jurisdiction-specific measures may detect outlying committees, though, and not that committees may actually have predictable tendencies to be ideological outliers. Krehbiel concludes the section by noting that “few contemporary committees are composed predominantly of high-demand preference outliers.”

These oft-cited works by Krehbiel use data from only a single session, however. Acknowledging that conclusions based on a single session may be unreliable, he questions “Are the findings reported above for the House in the Ninety-ninth Congress atypical?” Comparing data from only three additional Congresses (the 96th to 98th) Krehbiel suggests that the data “clearly say *no*” (1990, 158). Knowing that some will still be skeptical of his findings and particularly critical of the narrow time period of analysis, he notes that future research “may continue to entertain beliefs that classical preference

outliers once thrived and theorize about historical change.” In a passage very relevant to the current study of majority party reliability, Krehbiel continues:

What might this research look like? Suppose that similar data were collected for the 1950s and 1960s and that convincing evidence of preference outliers was found. What might account for the change in the 1970s? Formal theorists are fond of explanations that are potentially amenable to refutation by testing comparative statics predictions derived from the equilibrium of a given model. Scientific and sound as this can be, a word of caution is in order. Properly conducted empirical research of this sort requires that exogenous variables of the model be explicitly identified and be shown to have changed in value during the historical period. Otherwise, these essential theory-testing efforts run the risk of causing more confusion than clarity. (1990, 160-161)

This is sound advice, and specifically so for those who conduct tests of committee representativeness using ideological data. The primary goal of this chapter is to explicitly identify independent variables that have indeed “changed in value during the historical period,” and to argue that the fluctuations in these variables cause changes in the ideological representativeness of committees. Krehbiel seems skeptical that such exogenous variables would exist, much less that they would vary substantially from their values in the three sessions he examined. This will be discussed in detail below, but floor advantage of the majority party, the size of the committee, and the importance of the committee all are exogenous variables that may vary across sessions

In *Legislative Leviathan* Cox and McCubbins (1993, 60-82) use several ideological measures to assess the representativeness of House committees over several sessions. Using a difference-of-means test they analyze seventeen committees (curiously excluding Budget, District of Columbia, and House Administration and subsequently including the latter two in their contingent representativeness tests of chapter 8) over twelve congresses (86th-97th) on ADA, ACA, and conservative coalition scores. Few outliers are reported. For instance, with ADA scores they find an outlying committee in

38 of a possible 187 instances, with 25 of the 38 outliers being in favor of the majority party. No Congress ever had more than 4 outliers favoring the majority, and in 8 congresses there were 2 or fewer outliers reported to favor the majority party.

In the same chapter Cox and McCubbins conduct tests over a broader timeframe when utilizing NOMINATE scores. Using a Wilcoxon difference-of-medians test in 21 congresses (80th to 100th) they again report few outliers. Out of 340 possible instances, only 28 outliers are found, and 17 of these actually favor the minority party.

Based on both sets of ideological data, Cox and McCubbins conclude that for “most committees in every Congress, we could not reject the hypothesis that the committee was representative of the rest of the House.” Only “the Agriculture, Armed Services, Education and Labor, and Government Operations committees were unrepresentative of the House membership more than a few times,” and both Agriculture and Armed Services were outlying in a manner that would favor the minority party.

Londregan and Snyder (1994) suggest that “the two-sample tests used in previous studies are biased toward not identifying committees as preference outliers.” Using a “heterogeneous preferences” model, they find “a much larger set of outlier committees than was found, for example, by Krehbiel (1990, 1991) and Cox and McCubbins (1993).” Using NOMINATE scores over 17 congresses (82nd-98th), they find that committees qualify as outliers in 35.61% of the possible cases. Of the 125 outliers they report with their model, 80 of them are in favor of the majority party (being liberal under Democrat majority or conservative under the one Republican majority). The Agriculture, Armed Services, Standards of Official Conduct, Un-American Activities, and Veterans committees were found to be fairly consistent conservative outliers (favoring the minority

party), while Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs, Government Operations, and Budget were frequent liberal outliers (favoring the majority party). Interestingly, they find that “whenever any of the exclusive committees were outliers, they were always on the same side of the House median as the majority party median.” Further, they suggest that it “is particularly noteworthy that Appropriations and Rules were conservative outliers only in the 83rd Congress, the only congress in our sample with a Republican majority.”

As intriguing as results like this may be, Londregan and Snyder appear to recognize that neither they nor the literature have offered an expectation for committees in general, or exclusive committees in particular to so consistently favor the majority party. In fact, they later admit that a “problem with the theorizing on congressional parties, however, is the lack of detailed hypotheses about committee composition,” and they conclude that “clearly, better theoretical models are needed.” They then discuss why this is necessary, given the confusion they have concerning some of their results, noting “for example, we find that Rules and Ways and Means were frequently outliers, while Appropriations seldom was. Is this consistent or inconsistent with the majority party theory?” This will be discussed more below, but the majority party reliability theory outlined in the previous chapters here suggests that both of these findings may be consistent with a partisan theory of organization. The reason that Appropriations is somewhat less likely to appear as an outlier is the size of its membership. Since it is consistently among the largest of House committees, it is less likely to have a large ratio advantage, and it can also absorb more unreliable members since it takes several defections for the committee to fail as a whole. Ways and Means and especially Rules

have far fewer members and therefore will tend to exhibit the structure and component allocation that would make them more likely to be majority outliers. So both findings are consistent with a partisan theory that has a reliability focus.

Another major inquiry into the representativeness of House committees was conducted by Poole and Rosenthal in *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. In a section titled “Are Committees Preference Outliers?” they discuss their findings for the House in the 80th to 100th congresses. Using Monte Carlo simulations and their first-dimension NOMINATE scores, they run 1,000 experiments for each committee in each session and report the proportion of these “that produced a median that was farther from the House median than the true committee median was.” If fewer than 50 of the 1,000 experiments were more extreme than the actual committee median, then the (actual) committee was identified as an outlier for that session. Using this standard, they report 79 outliers over 21 congresses with no session ever having more than 6 outlying committees. Although it is not noted in their discussion (and like Londregan and Snyder they provide no theoretical expectation of it), a large majority of the reported outliers are in favor of the majority party. Of the 79 total outliers, 55 favor the majority, and the exceptional Armed Services Committee accounts for several of those that favor the minority.

Poole and Rosenthal conclude that “our findings for this period generally support the view that the committee system is representative of the chamber” and “in the House, the proportion of outlier committees is small.” Findings such as these are, of course, relevant to the theories of legislative organization, and they note that “the evidence is also consistent with Gilligan and Krehbiel’s (1990) informational theory.”

In summary, previous efforts examining the ideological composition of committees have often found that they are representative of the chamber. When outlying committees are not found, this is taken as evidence against distributive theories and in favor of informational theories, with partisan theories largely absent from the discussion. Yet despite this absence of partisan expectations, a consistent majority of outlying committees does favor the majority party. Party effects are being reported (sometimes unknowingly) where none were even anticipated. What can account for these phenomena? The next section outlines a theoretical basis that relies on a majority party reliability focus to offer an explanation for these types of findings. It may be that majority party reliability is the approach that is the “better theoretical model” that gives the “detailed hypotheses” that Londregan and Snyder were seeking.

A Majority Party Reliability Approach to Understanding Ideologically Outlying Committees

Chapters 3 and 4 provide a solid foundation for the theoretical discussion here concerning outlying committees. The first three hypotheses (chapter 3) concerned committee structure, noting that an advantage for the majority party in the party ratio would be more likely if (1) the committee’s jurisdiction were important (2) the committee were small or (3) the floor were closely divided. The second set of hypotheses (chapter 4) outlined expectations in the area of member allocation within the committee structure. In this regard, it was suggested that reliable members were more likely to be assigned (1) if the slot were important (2) if the committee were small, or (3) to multiple committee assignments.

What is particularly noteworthy for this examination of ideologically outlying committees in the House is how well the systems and component strategies harmonize in their expectations for when a majority advantage should be found. For instance, both strategies suggest that the majority party will tend to give itself an advantage on important committees. The systems strategy expects this advantage due to a structural advantage the majority grants itself on these committees; the component strategy expects this advantage due to the majority party's allocation of more reliable members to slots on these committees. Taken together, both strategies suggest that important committees will be particularly reliable. Since reliability has previously been defined here as ideologically friendly to the majority party, this indicates that important committees will tend to be ideological outliers. These considerations form the basis for the first outlier hypothesis:

Hypothesis 7: Important committees likely to be involved in handling party public goods legislation (such as agenda and money committees) will be outliers in favor of the ideology of the majority party. This is so because majority contingents on these committees are extraordinarily large (systems strategy) and they tend to comprise relatively reliable majority members (component strategy).

Another factor related to the ideological representativeness of committees is the floor advantage of the majority party. As was the case with the prior hypothesis, the system and component strategies both predict larger advantages for the majority party the closer the floor is divided. Chapter 3 offered compelling evidence that House committees usually exhibit a substantial structural bias in favor of the majority party under closely divided floors. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 gave a visual display that showed this structural advantage for the majority in the ratio of most committees. Instead of mirroring a 51-49 or 52-48 floor, House majority committee contingents have historically claimed a much larger proportion of seats, often garnering nearly 60% on average. This structural

advantage for the majority begins to dampen as floor advantage becomes larger, and this is evidenced by the downward slope in figures 3.1 and 3.2 and the negative coefficient for floor advantage in table 3.1. This systems strategy that overrepresents the majority party creates a structure in which committee ideological medians tend to shift closer to the majority party median than committees that mirrored the floor ratio would have had.

Of course, ideologically outlying committees are not *necessarily* created if a structural advantage is given to the majority party. As Krehbiel (1993, 242-245) has rightly noted, ratios that do not mirror the floor “do not guarantee unrepresentative committees.” Indeed, if the majority party assigned unreliable components to these additional seats for the majority, the resulting committee median may be ideologically representative of the floor or even show an advantage for the minority party.

There is, however, good reason to suspect that majority parties do not tend to negate majority-favoring systems strategies with minority-favoring component strategies. Instead the evidence seems to indicate that majorities use these strategies in tandem, with the result that committees will be ideologically biased in favor of the majority party. When creating a structural advantage for itself in committees, majorities assign themselves a disproportionate number of seats, or “bonus seats” as Aldrich and Rohde have termed them. The presence of these additional slots to be filled by majority members influences the distribution of per capita assignments. In particular, more majority members are more likely to be sitting on multiple seats under closely divided floors. Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 demonstrate this tendency.

[Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 about here]

Figure 5.3 shows that the number of majority members with a single seat does not change radically in relation to the majority's floor advantage, although there may be a slight positive relationship. Figures 5.1 and 5.2, however, show a dramatic alteration in response to the majority's floor advantage. When the floor is closely divided the number of members with two seats drops even as there are large increases in those sitting on three or more committees. Importantly, these tendencies of the majority party are not shared by the minority party, as can be seen in figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6.

[Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 about here]

Particularly noteworthy is the general absence of multiple seat assignments for minority party members. This points to an asymmetric power of the majority party (Aldrich and Rohde, 1998) in that it alone is able to create "bonus seats" for itself.

So when the floor is closely divided, the majority party grants itself extra or "bonus" seats on committees. To fill these seats, some majority party members are more likely to sit on three or more committees instead of only one or two. The final piece of evidence (which leads to a rejection of Krehbiel's claim) is that these members filling the bonus seats are consistently among the most reliable in the majority party. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the extra slots created under closely divided floors are not filled with moderates or ideologically hostile members. Instead, relatively reliable majority members are tapped to take on additional seats. Therefore, both systems and component strategies suggest that committees will be more likely to be outliers in favor of the majority when the floor is closely divided. These considerations provide the basis for the hypotheses related to majority floor advantage:

Hypothesis 8a: The level of ideological advantage to the majority will be positive and at its greatest when the floor is closely divided. This is due to the ratio stacking in favor of the majority and the filling of those slots with reliable members.

Hypothesis 8b: A negative relationship exists between majority floor advantage and the ideological advantage that the majority party grants itself on committees. This occurs because there is less need for the majority to give itself any additional structural advantage in the ratio when the majority's floor advantage is already large, and without these additional seats highly reliable members are not utilized as frequently.

A third key variable in which both component and systems solutions cooperate is the size of membership on the committee. From a structural standpoint, the majority party will find it advantageous to give itself additional seats on smaller committees, whereas the need for this systems solution is less pronounced on larger committees. This structural advantage for the majority on small committees tends to make them more likely venues to find outliers favoring the majority party, and similarly larger committees should be less likely to be ideologically unrepresentative of the chamber. Component strategies also suggest that smaller committees should favor the majority party. Since small committees are less able to endure even a few defections, majority leaders will avoid placing unreliable members on these committees. Instead, unreliable members can be placed on larger committees with less chance of creating a committee that will behave unreliably. These larger committees have a greater margin for error, and unreliable members can be marginalized more easily. In sum, both systems and component strategies suggest that smaller committees are more likely to be outliers favoring the majority party, the final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 9: Large committees have larger majority contingents and are able to endure more defections than small committees. This means that majority party leaders will tend to not stack the committees' ratios in their favor, and they will be willing to assign them more moderate or ideologically hostile members. Therefore, the smaller the committee, the more likely one is to see evidence of an ideological outlier favoring the majority party.

In summary, in each of these hypotheses systems and component strategies are in agreement on the direction of the predicted bias. Important committees, smaller committees, and closely divided floors are all characteristics that bias committees in favor of the majority party. This bias in favor of the majority party tends to decrease on larger committees, on regular committees, and when its floor advantage is larger. This majority party reliability approach to outlying committees is new, and departs from the traditional distributive basis for unrepresentative committees. Instead of outliers based upon constituency characteristics of members, this approach provides a rationale for *majority party reliability-based outliers*. It is also an approach for which ideological data are more theoretically appropriate, although empirical results should not vary according to the theory that is presenting them. Indeed, one might wonder about the power of this majority party reliability model considering how previous studies have often found very few ideological outliers. The next section takes up this question of empirical support for a partisan reliability approach to committee construction.

Testing a Majority Party Reliability Model of Committee Representativeness

The review of prior research on the ideological representativeness with which this chapter began showed that studies have often found very few outlying committees. Methodologically speaking, these studies have generally computed a median (or mean) ideological score for the committee and then compared it with a median (or mean) ideological score for the floor. This difference between the committee and floor was then assessed for statistical significance, using tools such as difference-of-means tests, difference-of-medians tests, or the frequency of more unrepresentative simulated

committees in Monte Carlo simulations. Whatever method employed, if the difference between the floor and the committee were large enough, then the committee would be labeled an outlier for that year with the rest (those not meeting the statistical significance threshold) presumably representative of the floor. Some studies have employed multiple standards for what constitutes an outlier. In *Congress*, Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 194-199) report committee outliers for both a 5% and 10% level of significance, with the 10% level predictably including a few more outliers (although it is not possible to discern in which direction these additional committees are outliers from what they report.) Cox and McCubbins (1993) also vary their standard for significance, but only in the chapter dealing with whether committee party *contingents* were representative of their respective caucuses. Their commonly cited chapter finding few outlying committees does not vary the standard for significance.

Regardless of the standard employed, the result is a dichotomous classification of committees into the categories of representative or outlying. Such blunt treatment potentially discards much information about the representativeness of the committee system, however. For instance, if a small committee consistently favored the majority party, it would have a difficult time achieving statistical significance due to its size. And while larger committees may have the size that makes statistical significance easier to achieve, hypothesis 9 suggests that these committees are less likely to exhibit outlying tendencies.

One innovation of this study is to use the difference between floor and committee as the actual object of inquiry, rather than merely an isolated number used to assess statistical significance. This chapter takes the difference between a committee median

and the floor median as the dependent variable and this value will be referred to as “ideological stacking.” Instead of using this difference as a measure of statistical significance, this chapter explores what processes causes large or small differences between the floor and the committee.

As in previous chapters, both ADA and NOMINATE scores will be used as ideological measures. Since higher ADA scores reflect a more liberal legislator, a committee median with an ADA score higher than the floor will be ideologically stacked in favor of the majority only if Democrats control the House. For instance if the House were under Democratic control, the floor ADA median were 50, and a committee’s median were 60, then the dependent variable of ideological stacking would take on a value of 10. If Republicans controlled the House with a floor median of 40, then a positive value for the dependent variable (ideological stacking) would occur only if committees had medians lower than 40, indicating a bias in favor of that majority’s ideology. In a Republican House with a median of 40, the dependent variable would take on a value of 5 if a committee’s ADA median were 35 or a value of –10 if the committee’s median were 50.

When the dependent variable of ideological stacking is computed using NOMINATE scores a similar process occurs, recognizing that higher NOMINATE values (those approaching 1.0) reflect a more conservative legislator, and lower scores (those approaching -1.0) are associated with more liberal members. For example, in a Republican House with a median of 0.230, a committee with a NOMINATE median of 0.300 would have an ideological stack value of 0.070. In a Democrat House a committee with a median of –0.350 and a floor median of –0.200 would give a value of 0.150 for the

dependent variable, while a committee median of -0.140 would return a value of -0.060 .

In all instances that a floor median is being computed, committee members are never excluded from the floor membership (as some previous studies have).

With ideological stacking as the dependent variable, a linear regression will be conducted with several independent variables that have already been described and used in prior chapters. Hypothesis 7 suggested that the important committees were more likely to exhibit ideological stacking, and so the control committees (Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means) are again individually represented with dichotomous variables, with (almost) all other committees constituting the excluded case. When Democrats control the House, Armed Services also is assigned a dichotomous variable since chapter 4 demonstrated that it was a frequent and only assignment of exceptionally conservative Democratic majority members. Whereas the control committee variables are expected to be positively related to ideological stacking, the Armed Services variable is expected to be negatively related to ideological stacking.

Hypothesis 8 suggests that ideological stacking is positive and at its apex when the floor is closely divided. To assess the division of the floor, the independent variable “floor advantage” will again be used. As it was defined in chapter 3, floor advantage is computed by subtracting 0.50 from the majority party’s proportion of the floor. For instance, if the Republicans had 54% of the House, the variable floor advantage would take on a value of 0.04 (since $0.54 - 0.50 = 0.04$). The final independent variable (associated with hypothesis 9) is the size of the committee. Here too the same definition is used as in chapter 3, with this variable simply being the sum of the total seats allocated to the majority and minority parties.

These independent variables were regressed on three versions of the dependent variable, ideological stacking. The first regression uses raw or unadjusted ADA scores for the dependent variable, while the second regression uses adjusted ADA scores using the method described by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999). The final regression uses the NOMINATE-based dependent variable. To maintain comparability with the prior chapters concerning system and component strategies, the same post-reform committees (1975-2001) are those examined in these regressions.

Raw ADA Regression Results

The first regression reported here uses raw ADA scores to compute the dependent variable of ideological stacking. The results of this regression are presented in table 5.1.

[Table 5.1 about here]

A primary observation from table 5.1 is that each of the hypotheses receives at least some support, and this suggests that the committee outlier debate has long overlooked key elements of the data generation process. Majority party reliability variables are both statistically and substantively significant.

Hypothesis 8 is supported by the regression results. The first part of this hypothesis contended that ideological stacking would be at its pinnacle when the floor was closely divided, and the second part expected that this majority advantage would dampen as the majority's floor advantage increased. Both of these contentions are supported, with the positive and large intercept term supporting the first, and the negative and large floor advantage variable supporting the second. The intercept can be defined as the average value of the dependent variable when all independent variables take on a value of zero. Therefore, the intercept in this regression suggests that a very small (in

theory with a size of zero) noncontrol committee created under a very closely divided floor (again, in theory where the majority has zero floor advantage) would have an ideological advantage to the majority of almost 35 ADA points. In other words, if the floor median were 50 and the Democrats were in control, then this hypothetical committee would have a median of 85. The floor advantage coefficient of -75.426 suggests that this majority advantage dampens as the size of the majority increases. This variable indicates that for a 10% increase in floor advantage (say from 55% to 65% of the floor), there will be about a drop of ADA medians of about 7.5 points (since $0.10 * -75.426 = -7.5426$). Of course, if a majority party were to lose 4% in its floor advantage, this variable indicates that committees would experience an increase of about 3 ADA points (since $-0.04 * -75.426 = 3.02$).

Hypothesis 7 suggested that the control committees would tend to be stacked in favor of the majority party, and this is the hypothesis that the existing literature seemed most likely to recommend. Yet only Appropriations was statistically significant, with an advantage to the majority of nearly 8 ADA points. Neither the Rules nor Ways and Means dichotomous variables were statistically significant. This does not mean that these committees were therefore usually representative, though. What the absence of statistical significance for these two committees indicates is that their ideological fluctuations are consistent with those of the other committees, and the remaining variables in the regression account for some of their variation.

The dichotomous variable for Armed Services under Democratic control was both substantively and statistically significant. The coefficient of -25.381 indicates that in Democratic Houses, Armed Services was typically 25 ADA points lower than other

committees, *ceteris paribus*. This result is consistent with the finding of chapter 4 that exceptionally conservative Democrats were often assigned to this committee as their only assignment.

It has been suggested by some (for instance Krehbiel 1991, 130; Groseclose and King 1997, 19-21) that the presence of this exceptionally conservative committee during an era of Democratic control refutes the concept of majority party control. Rohde (1994, 354-355) too seems to grant that Armed Services is an exception to what a partisan theory of organization would expect. He suggests that for Armed Services “the multiple domains within committees and other features of party organization should lead us to expect a different outcome from the one predicted by the partisan perspective.”

It may be, however, that both Krehbiel and Rohde are utilizing too narrow a definition of what is consistent with a partisan perspective of organization. It is, of course, possible that a partisan theory could be articulated that required that reliable majority members dominate all committees, and this seems to be what Rohde is describing for the expectations of a partisan perspective. Yet there are conditions under which it would be quite reasonable for a majority party to create and maintain apparently ideologically hostile committees such as Armed Services has been for Democrats in the House. Consider the two following conditions: (1) all members of the majority party must receive committee assignments, and (2) the majority party has a sizable moderate or ideologically unfriendly segment of membership. Under these conditions, the leadership of the majority party has a couple of component strategy options. First, they could scatter the unreliable members over several committees, being careful not to concentrate them on any one committee, and perhaps not granting them many committee assignments. This

strategy depends on the reliable majority members on the committee to remain so when necessary, thereby overcoming potential problems that the minority party and the unreliable majority members may be able to pose.

Alternatively, the majority leadership could concentrate the unreliable majority members on one or a few committees. The advantage of this strategy is that there is more certainty as to which committee(s) would need monitoring and possible correction by the majority caucus, and there would be enhanced reliability of operation for all other committees. If the unreliable majority party members were concentrated on a committee with an unimportant jurisdiction or one not especially relevant to the majority party's collective interests, then little monitoring may be necessary. If the concentration of unreliable members occurred on an important committee, however, the majority party would want to be able to have corrective options available. For instance, in the House the legislative product of an unreliable committee can be greatly subdued by a reliable Rules Committee. Open and special rules give opportunity for House majority members to amend an undesirable bill, and of course the floor must also give majority approval for a bill to advance. Such serial elements (treating Rules and the floor as individual components in the system of the House) give the House majority party ample room to alter the results of an unreliable committee.

Thus the creation of an extremely unreliable committee may be entirely consistent with a partisan theory of organization. Placing the unreliable members on such a committee has the effect of marginalizing them (especially if it is their only assignment) and thereby enhancing the reliability of the remaining committees. This type of marginalizing practice is apparently common in some state legislatures that require a

certain number of committee seats be assigned to all members. In these settings, it is common for minority party members to dominate or have all of the membership on an unimportant committee. This leaves more of the desirable committee seats to majority party members and makes their operation more reliable even as all members receive their minimum number of committee assignments.

The situation with Armed Services in the House controlled by a heterogeneous Democratic majority may be akin to that described in the 1963 classic *The Great Escape*. In this movie the German commander of a prison camp describes how they have built a camp uniquely designed to hold Allied troops who had been especially successful in escaping from other prison camps. He tells the English commander that they have “in effect placed all [their] rotten eggs in one basket” and intended to watch it carefully. The concentration of these problematic POWs was done to enhance the overall security of German prison camps. Rather than having a few escape artists inciting problems in many camps, they were all gathered in a single camp. These actions did not demonstrate that the Germans did not care about camp security; on the contrary, this concentration of difficult prisoners was done precisely because they did care about camp security. Such may also be the case with extremely unreliable committees like Armed Services had been. The prevalence of unreliable members on the committee is actually consistent with what an ideologically heterogeneous majority party may choose in order to enhance the reliable operation of the committee system as a whole. Far from refuting the concept of majority control of committees, the existence of such an unreliable committee may actually be a predictable feature of legislatures operating under the control of a majority party under the conditions discussed here.

Returning to the regression results in table 5.1, it may qualify as something of a surprise that the Rules dichotomous variable is not significant, especially given the exceptional structural advantage that it bears. Yet the size variable associated with hypothesis 9 offers the primary basis for the often exceptional nature of Rules' ideological position. With a coefficient of -0.539 , the size variable suggests that adding 10 seats to a committee results in a drop in the ideological median of that committee of just over 5 ADA points. Comparing Rules with the large Appropriations Committee suggests that size is indeed an important consideration in committee ideological representativeness. In the sessions covered here, Rules had 16 and then 13 total members, while Appropriations grew from 55 to 65 total seats. With 40 or 50 more seats than Rules, the size coefficient suggests that the larger committee will score 25 fewer points of ideological stacking than the small committee. Such a distinction tends to be confirmed in figures 5.7 and 5.8.

[Figures 5.7 and 5.8 about here]

These figures show Rules quite consistently at an elevated level, and approximately of the order suggested by the regression (once one includes the +8 points that Appropriations receives from its dichotomous variable.) Note too how at the individual committee level the positive intercept and downward slope of the graphs support hypothesis 8. Finally, these figures also suggest the conditional nature of committee representativeness. A committee's size, its type, and the level of the majority's floor advantage are all important factors in determining the ideological composition of a committee.

The results of this regression using raw ADA scores to compute the dependent variable of ideological stacking can be understood visually from figure 5.9. In this figure, one point on the scatter plot is an average score of ideological stacking (again, using raw ADA scores) for a session. For instance in 1999 the floor advantage of the majority was slightly over 0.01, and the average ideological stacking of House committees was nearly 16 points. Most prominent in this representation is the positive intercept and downward slope predicted in hypothesis 8. This figure demonstrates that the size of the majority's floor advantage is an important (and heretofore unappreciated) factor in understanding the ideological composition of House committees. Although recent close divisions of the House have resulted in the higher levels of ideological stacking, the presence of the majority party reliability-based phenomenon is still prominent even if these cases are excluded. In figure 5.9 hypothesis 7 suggested that an upward shift would occur for important committees, although this was only confirmed for Appropriations. Hypothesis 9 suggests that points on the scatter plot would shift up for smaller committees and down from the average on larger committees.

[Figure 5.9 about here]

Adjusted ADA Regression Results

The previous section used raw ADA scores to compute the dependent variable of ideological stacking. One possible shortcoming of this approach, however, is that ADA scores over years are not directly comparable, meaning that 5 ADA points in one session could conceivably be equivalent to 15 ADA points in another. This presents a potential difficulty for this study since the size of ideological stacking reported for a given session

may be misleading since what appear to be large levels of ideological stacking may actually be equivalent or even smaller than levels of ideological stacking in other years.

Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) describe the problem, noting that because “the set of votes used to construct the ratings are different each year, the scales underlying interest group ratings are likely to shift and stretch across chambers and time.” To address this, they “derive an index, much like an inflation index for consumer or wholesale prices that allows one to convert the scores so that they can be used to make intertemporal and interchamber comparisons.” The computation of adjusted ADA scores is straightforward, with a “shift” score subtracted from the actual ADA score, and this result is then divided by a “stretch” parameter. The final figure is an adjusted ADA score that is meant to be comparable over time and even across institutions.

Using this method the House floor and committee medians of this study were all adjusted so that the dependent variable used in the prior regression could be computed in terms of adjusted ADA scores. Including the same reliability-based independent variables and time period (excepting 2001 due to unavailable shift and stretch parameters) as previously, a regression was again conducted to assess ideological stacking. The results of this analysis are reported in table 5.2.

[Table 5.2 about here]

Comparing the adjusted results with the unadjusted results of table 5.1, a primary observation is that no major differences are apparent. All coefficients that had been significant remain so in the direction predicted, and no new coefficients became significant either. The interpretation of these coefficients remains very similar to that of the regression on the unadjusted ADA scores. The positive intercept and negative slope

support hypothesis 8, the positive coefficient on Appropriations provides some support for hypothesis 7, and the negative coefficient on the size variable is consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 9. Figure 5.10 gives a visual display of the results with the adjusted dependent variable, and again there is little detectable variation from the results presented in figure 5.9.

[Figure 5.10 about here]

As before, figure 5.10 shows ideological stacking being at its greatest when the floor is closely divided and then dampening as the majority party floor advantage increases. Important (at least Appropriations according to the regression) and smaller committees would occupy places above average, while large committee are more likely to have less ideological stacking. Overall, these results using adjusted ADA scores also support this study's contention that majority party reliability considerations are a significant factor in the ideological composition of House committees.

NOMINATE Regression Results

The raw and adjusted ADA regressions of ideological stacking both offer compelling evidence that the representativeness of House committees is at least somewhat contingent on party reliability considerations. To further bolster this claim, a regression was also conducted using Poole and Rosenthal's first dimension NOMINATE scores to compute the dependent variable of ideological stacking. The results of this regression are reported in table 5.3.

[Table 5.3 about here]

Comparing the NOMINATE regression with those using the raw and adjusted ADA scores, what is perhaps most notable is the consistency of results. As before, the

positive intercept and negative coefficient on floor advantage provide support for hypothesis 8. The intercept of 0.290 indicates that a very small (size of zero in theory) non-prestige committee in a very closely divided House would give a NOMINATE ideological advantage to the majority party of 0.290. The coefficient of -0.637 on floor advantage indicates that ideological stacking decreases as the majority's floor advantage increases. If a majority's floor advantage increased by 5%, then its ideological stacking would decrease by about 0.032 on the NOMINATE scale.

The size coefficient is again both substantively and statistically significant, providing support for hypothesis 9. The coefficient of -0.0046 indicates that the larger the committee, the less ideological advantage it tends to exhibit. For instance a committee with 30 fewer seats than a larger one is predicted to have 0.138 more ideological advantage using NOMINATE scores.

The dichotomous variables for the prestige committees are all positive as predicted, but only Appropriations is statistically significant. This is a similar pattern to the ADA results as well, providing some support for hypothesis 7 that important committees will have an advantage for the majority party. As expected the Armed Services dichotomous variable is large and negative, indicating that during Democratic control this committee had a median much higher (more conservative) than the median of the House floor.

As with the ADA results, these NOMINATE findings can also be depicted graphically. Figure 5.11 shows the average amount of ideological stacking in a Congress for the various levels of floor advantage. The intercept is clearly positive, and the downward slope of the line provides support for hypothesis 8. Small and important

committees would tend to have a shift upward from the scatter plot line, while large and less important committees would tend to fall below a particular point on the graph. Both individually and in tandem, figures 5.10 and 5.11 provide strong support for the notion that House committees often differ from the floor median.

[Figure 5.11 about here]

These results using the NOMINATE dependent variable of ideological stacking again suggest that variation in the ideological representativeness of committees is present and predictable on the basis of a majority party reliability perspective. The evidence suggests that close floors, small committees, and important committees all tend to produce committees that give an ideological advantage to the majority party. Majority parties with a heterogeneous membership may also find it quite appealing to concentrate their more unreliable members in a single or less important committee.

Evaluating Prior Studies of Ideological Representativeness

This chapter has presented both visual and statistically significant evidence suggesting that House committees are predictably not representative of the chamber. What is one to make of the apparently detailed examinations by others that have fairly consistently failed to detect ideological outliers? While it is not the goal of this chapter to offer a detailed comparison between those efforts and those presented here, it is possible to provide some thoughts on the differences.

Some shortcomings of Krehbiel's findings (1990, 1991) were briefly discussed above. A major concern (which even Krehbiel seems to acknowledge) is the relatively small sample of committees examined, given that most of his focus for ideological representativeness centers on a single Congress, reporting a single general ideological

measure. A larger sample size certainly would have been desirable given the sweeping claims that he presents. It is also possible to question the standard Krehbiel used to qualify a committee as an outlier. One standard he employs is the “percentage in gap,” which reports the percentage of House members that lie in the gap between the floor median and the committee median on an ideological measure. He uses a 10% figure as a cutoff for this measure and finds that seven committees had a percentage in gap figure higher than this. Yet it is likely that for sessions meeting Rohde’s condition of conditional party government (i.e., the parties are each homogeneous and differ from each other), such a standard could be quite misleading. Using a 10% in gap figure would allow committees with medians about 43 positions away from the floor median to be identified as representative. Yet the middle ideological ground has increasingly become sparsely populated terrain, with both parties’ membership becoming more homogeneous. A great deal of ideological ground may be traversed in just a few positions under these settings, and the percentage of members in gap is not nearly sufficient to give a sense of how different a committee may be from the floor. In some legislative settings, it would be entirely possible for a committee with only a 2% in gap figure to be dramatically different ideologically from the floor median.

The weakness of this percentage in gap standard is evident even in the results that Krehbiel presents for the Congress he examined. Using 10% in gap as the cutoff, Krehbiel implies that the Standards of Official Conduct Committee was representative of the floor median. Yet this is a committee that consistently does not mirror the floor in a structural sense since both parties are given equal representation. The influence of this structural choice is evident in that Krehbiel reports the committee favoring the *minority*

party by 14 ADA points, yet since only 9.4% of House members fell in this gap, Krehbiel suggests that this committee does indeed mirror the floor ideologically.

Others have criticized the standard difference-of-means test that Krehbiel also uses. Londregan and Snyder (1994) suggest that such tests “are biased towards not identifying committees as preference outliers.” One possible solution is to follow Hall and Grofman (1990) by choosing a higher significance level. Cox and McCubbins (1993) follow this advice, using significance levels of not only 0.05, but also of 0.10 and 0.15. With these higher levels of significance it is more likely that one would detect an outlier. Yet what is puzzling is that Cox and McCubbins only use these more sensitive significance standards when comparing committee party *contingents* with their respective caucuses (their chapter 8), and not when comparing the actual full committees with the floor (their chapter 3). The 0.05 standard alone is reported when Cox and McCubbins (1993, 79) state their conclusion that “for most committees, however, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that the committees were representative of the interests and preferences of the House.” One is left to wonder how many committees as a whole would have been identified as outliers had a higher level of significance been employed.

Cox and McCubbins’ method does seem to miss a great many of the substantive differences that occur between the floor and committees. For instance, in the four sessions that the data from this study overlap those of Cox and McCubbins (94th-97th Congresses), the Post Office Committee had an ADA ideological advantage for the majority party of 16, 20, 9.5, and 20 points, but Cox and McCubbins never identify it as an outlier. Many more such instances emerge: Banking advantages the majority by 11, 10, 13.5, and 25 points; Foreign Affairs has majority advantages of 21, 11, and 20 points;

Judiciary has majority advantages of 27, 7.50, and 17.50 points; Rules has a majority advantage of 20 points; Ways and Means has majority advantages of 11, 8, and 10 points. Yet in none of these cases do Cox and McCubbins identify the committees as outliers for those years. Nor do they include any findings at all for House Administration, DC, or Budget, all of which had sessions strongly favoring the majority party. Several of these committees with large advantages for the majority party are not large in size, and therefore it is difficult for them to achieve statistical significance using the difference-of-means tests. Larger committees have the sample size that makes statistical significance easier to attain, but hypothesis 9 suggested that these committees are less likely to exhibit outlying tendencies favoring the majority.

A fortunate innovation arrived that exploited a computer's ability to generate hundreds or even thousands of hypothetical committees, which could then be compared with the actual committees. For instance, if there were a House committee with 50 members, these Monte Carlo simulations would create perhaps 1,000 committees of size 50 and compare their ideological medians with that of the actual committee. If the actual committee were more extreme than the vast majority of the hypothetical 1,000 committees, then this was deemed evidence that the actual committee was indeed not representative of the floor. This method allowed researchers to not be limited by the methodological shortcomings of the difference-in-means tests, and also allowed the focus to return to the more theoretically relevant median (rather than mean.)

Given these advantages of Monte Carlo simulations, how could it be then that the Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 208) study also finds that "the committee system is representative of the chamber" and "in the House, the proportion of outlier committees is

small,” and ultimately that “the evidence is also consistent with Gilligan and Krehbiel’s (1990) informational theory.” Part of the answer may be in the assumptions used to generate the hypothetical committees. Many times these assumptions are useful in that they help replicate the actual decision environment facing party leaders. For example, researchers can insert assumptions that members be limited to only a certain number of seats, or they could include the limitation that if a member sits on one type of committee he may not sit on any (or certain types of) other committees. By inserting these conditions, researchers can more nearly approximate the real-world limitations that party leaders actually face when forming the committee structure. It is in trying to capture this realism that Poole and Rosenthal specify a condition that actually undermines their ability to find the answer to their question of whether committees are outliers or not. The problematic condition is that they require the simulated committees to always have identical party ratios as those in the actual committee. As benign and even reasonable as such an assumption may sound, its impact can be dramatic.

Even Poole and Rosenthal are at least somewhat aware of the consequences for this choice, stating that

The majority party is typically somewhat overrepresented on a committee. Finding that committee medians differ from chamber medians because of this overrepresentation would not be very interesting. Therefore, letting the random assignment process reflect overrepresentation is appropriate. (1997, 188)

There are several things worthy of note from this quotation. First, the suggestion that overrepresentation exists for the majority on (apparently) all committees breaks sharply with much other literature that claims committee ratios mirror floor ratios with only a few exceptions. As chapter 3 (and particularly figures 3.1 and 3.2) demonstrated, neither of these views is an adequate explanation. Poole and Rosenthal are correct to reject the

notion that committees simply mirror the floor ratio, but they err in suggesting that such deviations are the exclusive domain of the majority party. One need only examine the typical ratio advantage in figure 3.2 for a majority party with a very large floor advantage to see that the majority does not usually possess additional seats in some sessions.

Second, when the majority party does receive overrepresentation in a committee ratio, the magnitude of this advantage varies substantially, tending to spike when the floor is closely divided, when the committee is important, or when the committee has few members. The variation of the advantage (or even disadvantage) to the majority can be known much more precisely than to only suggest that the majority is “somewhat overrepresented.”

Finally, although characterizing something as “interesting” is necessarily a somewhat subjective matter, it certainly seems that finding a tremendous prevalence of outlying committees favoring the majority party (which is what they imply they would find) would qualify as such, given that much of the prior literature and even Poole and Rosenthal’s own conclusion (1997, 208) is that committees ideologically represent the chamber! It is not as though there has been a well-known work that is commonly accepted showing that committees are often outliers favoring the ideology of the majority party. The majority party reliability focus of this present work expects such outliers under certain conditions and predicts the (important) variation that Poole and Rosenthal dismiss as uninteresting (even though their ultimate finding that committees are representative is apparently “interesting”).

Some examples of Poole and Rosenthal’s technique will demonstrate its impropriety for the question they are examining of whether committees are outliers.

Many recent Houses have had very narrow floor divisions, with Republicans only having 51-53% of the seats. Most committees do not mirror this division, however, and instead give an advantage to the majority party much like Poole and Rosenthal suggest. Rules, for instance, is quite different in its structure since it has consistently been divided 9-4 in favor of the majority. If Poole and Rosenthal were trying to assess whether a Rules Committee were an outlier, their method would be to construct 1,000 committees, always with 9 majority members and 4 minority members. If 50 or fewer of these simulated committees were more ideologically extreme than the actual committee, then they would classify the actual committee as an outlier. The problem is that this method compares a stacked deck (the actual Rules Committee) with another stacked deck (the simulated Rules Committees), and doing so does not enable one to comment about how a stacked deck (the actual Rules Committee) compares with a deck that is not stacked (the actual floor or smaller random samples of it).

Imagine if the Republicans had formed a committee that gave them a 30-1 advantage. To assess whether this 30-1 committee were an outlier, Poole and Rosenthal's method would have them constructing 1,000 committees that also had a 30-1 advantage for the Republicans, and then comparing the actual 30-1 committee with the 30-1 simulations. Such a comparison is obviously not the correct one when trying to assess whether the 30-1 committee is representative of the floor. In fact, Newt Gingrich's task forces composed solely of Republicans could easily qualify as representative of the floor by Poole and Rosenthal's method, as long as the Republicans selected were representative of their caucus. In essence, Poole and Rosenthal have incorporated a party effect (by using actual party ratios), and then concluded that there is no party effect (since

the actual and simulated committees are similar). An intriguing route for future research is to simulate the committees without the forced party ratios. Of course, it should be recalled that committee median ideological position can also very nearly approximate the floor median depending upon the reliability variables of floor advantage, committee type, and committee size.

In summary, some previous studies have used weak tests with levels of significance that were perhaps too low, and not enough sessions for comparison. Monte Carlo simulations offer a valuable alternative to previous tests, but care needs to be taken so that party effects are not hidden. If some prior studies were replicated using higher levels of statistical significance (Krehbiel 1990, 1991 and Cox and McCubbins 1993), including more sessions (Krehbiel 1990), or allowing party ratios not to be fixed in simulated committees (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) then it seems likely that many more outliers favoring the majority party would be identified.

Conclusion

This chapter concludes this study's direct examination of the U.S. House. Chapter 1 began by noting in table 1.1 the territory that was unclaimed by any previous theory of legislative organization. In particular, it was stated that this study would outline an argument for outlying committees using general ideological measures. Distributive theorists tend to be agnostic on the ideological composition of committees; they are instead concerned with evaluating committees on an entirely different dimension (one that taps constituency characteristics, for instance). Informational theory does not typically expect any committee outliers since their creation would be informationally inefficient. Partisan theorists seem to have struggled in articulating expectations for

committee formation. They have instead focused on parties and committee contingents (Cox and McCubbins 1993), and some have even gone so far as to suggest that if both parties create representative contingents then representative committees will necessarily result, exactly as informational theory suggests (Aldrich and Battista 2002). Londregan and Snyder (1994) note this gap, suggesting that a “problem with the theorizing on congressional parties, however, is the lack of detailed hypotheses about committee composition.” They had found evidence of many (and especially the important) committees being outliers in favor of the majority party, yet they admit that they had not articulated a theory that would have anticipated that outcome. They conclude that “clearly, better theoretical models are needed.”

The first several chapters of this work have been an attempt at a better theoretical model, and it does indeed anticipate the result of several outliers favoring the majority party. The traditional approach to committee outliers has been to view committees as composed of high-demanders of constituency benefits, and informational theory has questioned how well such a view comports with reality. What has been missing, though, is a view of committees as elements necessary to the success of a partisan agenda. Committees are an essential part of the legislative process in the House, and as such are venues in which the majority party will either win (and forward an agenda item) or lose (and waste time, risk looking inept, or have to use rewards or punishments to extract reliable behavior from members). Preferring to win, the majority party has multiple strategies available to itself to enhance the reliable operation of its committee system. Chapter 3 concerned itself with a systems strategy that the majority party can use by granting itself more than proportional seating on committees. This strategy is employed

especially when the floor is closely divided, the committee is small, or the committee is important. With this structural advantage in hand, majority party leaders then are able to use a component strategy in how they allocate members to those slots. Chapter 4 demonstrated how multiple assignments, assignments to important committees, and membership on small committees were all disproportionately given to reliable majority members.

So majority party reliability suggests that majority parties will create structures and assign members within those structures to produce a committee system as a whole that is capable of reliable operation. If indeed majority parties are overrepresenting themselves on committees (as chapter 3 suggests) and assigning members to committees in a way that advantages the majority (as chapter 4 suggests), then these two strategies necessarily combine to create committees that (conditionally) advantage the majority party. In other words, there are specifiable conditions under which House committees are ideological outliers favoring the majority party. This suggests that a new rationale for outlying committees needs to be acknowledged, one that has majority party reliability at its core.

Some have criticized partisan theories of organization as being unable to specify hypotheses about committee formation. Others (and especially some partisan theorists) have suggested that the partisan theory of organization has the same expectations as informational theory on the ideological representativeness of committees. Far from being unable to specify hypotheses (much less agreeing with informational theory) the analysis presented here shows that a partisan theory of organization alone is now making claims as to why and how variation in ideological representativeness in committees occurs. This

is variation that is not expected by distributive theory, nor is it expected by a theory that explicitly does not include a place for party. The seemingly systematic efforts to empirically examine this question have often concluded that ideological outliers are something of a rarity. This chapter has also addressed several of the possible methodological shortcomings of those efforts while outlining several potential avenues for future work.

Chapter 6: Majority Party Reliability and U.S. Senate Committees

Up to this point, nearly all of the analysis has centered on the U.S. House. This is a reasonable allocation of effort given that the vast majority of work relevant to this topic has been conducted on the House. Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 208) note that “the committee outlier debate has been concerned only with the House committee system during and after the 80th Congress.” Prince and Overby (2005, 71) too affirm that the scope has been narrow, writing that

While the debate over legislative organization is typically couched in universalistic terms, the empirical evidence brought to bear on these hypotheses has generally been drawn from only a single legislative body: the United States House of Representatives.

Yet the majority party reliability theory outlined in chapter 2 contains nothing that applies exclusively to features of the House. This means that other legislative venues offer a good opportunity to test the generalizability of the theory. This chapter takes up one such alternative setting in applying the theory to the U. S. Senate over the same period. Whereas the prior chapters have sought to present the expectations of the theory with much detail and appropriate examples, such features will be more absent from this chapter since the reader will already be quite aware of the expectations of the theory. In a sense, chapters 2 through 5 were the elaborate explanation of the theory, hypotheses, and data involved. This chapter will be a brisker walk through the same terrain, with the only difference being the legislative setting. The framework for this examination of the Senate will follow the same order as was used for the House. First the Senate committees will be examined from the standpoint of systems strategies relating to committee ratios. With this structural analysis in hand, the focus will then shift to component strategies in how

senators are allocated to committees. The third section explores the traditional committee outlier debate issues as the cumulative effect of structural decisions and component allocation are examined. This chapter concludes with a discussion of majority party reliability in the Senate, especially as compared to the House.

Systems Strategies in the U.S. Senate

Evaluating the U.S. Senate as a Venue for Finding Majority Party Reliability Systems Strategies

Back in chapter 2, a systems strategy was defined as a plan of action “modifying the number of components within the system or changing their location within it, or both.” Systems strategies were therefore noted to emphasize a *structural* solution to a reliability problem. It was noted that when the number of components are altered or their relationships with other components are altered, then this qualifies as evidence consistent with a systems strategy to alter reliability. Although many types of systems strategies are conceivable, chapter 3 examined one form of it in how House majority party leaders create advantageous partisan ratios on committees. The three hypotheses examined there suggested that advantageous party ratios were more likely to be present when the floor was closely divided, the committee was small in size, or the committee was important.

For systems strategies to be evidenced, it was suggested that three elements were necessary. In particular this majority party reliability phenomenon would be likely to manifest if there were appropriate incentive, ability to implement it, and an agent of implementation. House committees had all three of these characteristics, and therefore were a likely venue in which to find the systems strategies of ratio stacking. The Senate, of course, is a much different institution than the House, and therefore may not

necessarily replicate the House on these counts. In fact, on all three counts the Senate seems a less likely venue for finding the systems strategy of ratio stacking.

To assess incentive for using the systems strategy in the Senate, it is helpful to evaluate the level of importance Senate committees have in achieving party policy objectives. Evans (1991, 497) discusses the importance of committee membership in relation to a member's participation on legislation. He writes "participation in Senate committees is clearly selective and concentrated among those members in positions of formal leadership—full and subcommittee chairs and ranking minority members." Thus committee membership, and especially leadership, is an important factor in understanding the legislative process and outcomes that the Senate produces. This suggests that Senate committees are a quite relevant venue for policy making, and therefore the majority party would have an incentive to create a structure that enhanced its ability to win in committee votes.

Yet there are other features of the Senate that would seem to mitigate this incentive. Prominent among these is the lack of a germaneness requirement on the Senate floor, meaning that any individual senator can amend most legislation without the requirement that it be relevant to that already being discussed. This freedom for senators also technically allows for the possibility that the committee system could be almost entirely circumvented. Senators are individually able to introduce legislation on matters that are entirely separate from the jurisdiction of any committee on which they serve. This makes it possible for a majority party to achieve legislative success quite apart from a stacked committee system. Sinclair (1986, 878) notes a major change in Senate decision making, suggesting that "the Senate floor became a much more active decision-making

arena.” For the post-1975 sessions in this present study, Sinclair would characterize them by a “widespread unrestrained activism.” This conclusion is buoyed by data indicating that almost “the entire membership offered amendments to measures from committees on which they did not sit; furthermore, the typical senator offered many such amendments” (pg. 891). Although the Senate rules do allow committees to be bypassed, Sinclair allows that committees are still a very important decision making venue. She writes that “actually outright defeat of a committee-approved bill on a Senate floor roll call vote is a rare occurrence,” and that “once a bill is approved by committee, is taken up on the floor and comes to an up or down roll call, its chances of passing are extremely high” (pg. 899).

Thus, winning in Senate committees is still important, even in an era that saw individual senators greatly increase their floor amending activity, sometimes completely bypassing the committee system. It therefore seems likely that the majority party in the Senate would have incentive to stack the ratios of committees in their favor, although the incentive in the Senate may be somewhat less than that of the House. That the minority party never possesses a majority of committee membership during this time period also suggests that majority parties find it advantageous to maintain numerical control of committees.

A second requirement for observing a systems strategy of stacking committee ratios is the ability to implement them. Some legislative bodies prevent this systems strategy by formally requiring mathematical representation as nearly as possible on committees. Alternatively a legislative body may have other requirements such as a strict committees per capita requirement for all members that would necessarily have the effect

of preventing an overrepresentation of the majority party on all committees. The Senate does not require committee ratios to mirror the floor ratio, nor does it have strict per capita limitations on how many committees assignments members may have.³ A Senate feature quite relevant to the ability to implement this systems strategy, however, is that it is not a majoritarian institution. With cloture requiring 60 votes, a cohesive minority can prevent a vote on the organization of the body until it gets what it wants. Under these circumstances, a majority party on a closely divided floor will not be able to extract much advantage in committee ratios. When the majority does have enough votes to achieve cloture and force an organizational vote, the incentive to stack committees in its favor is lessened since it already would have a fairly large numerical advantage in committees that simply mirrored the floor ratio. In short, the ability of the minority members to obstruct the will of a small majority encourages the majority party to grant proportionate representation on committees.

The ability of the minority to prevent this systems strategy was evident in early 2003. The Republicans had just regained control of the Senate and had a slim 51-49 advantage, yet nearly a week after the new members had been sworn in, the body had still not organized and the new members had yet to receive their committee assignments. On the senate floor Senator Kyl, a Republican from Arizona, described how the organization would normally occur:

The majority leader asks unanimous consent that the list of Republican Senators assigned to these committees be accepted, with the committee chairmen as indicated. The Democratic leader does the same thing for the Democrats. And then the Senate is considered organized. The new Senators have their committee assignments, the chairmen are noted, and we get to work. But that has been objected to on the Democratic side. (*Congressional Record* Jan. 14, 2003, S276)

³ Some efforts to limit the number of assignments have been made, but exceptions to these rules have been very common (see Sinclair 1988).

In the House, minority objections to the organization of the Senate would carry little weight since the majority party can simply impose its will as long as it can achieve a majority. Yet Senator Kyl explained why this was not the case in the Senate:

In the Senate we have a procedure called the filibuster, and in order to stop debate and force a vote on our organizing resolution—or committee resolution, it is called—it takes 60 senators to agree to force the vote. It only takes 51 to adopt the resolution, but 60 senators are required to actually force the vote; otherwise you have to just keep talking. And that is what we are doing right now.
(*Congressional Record* Jan. 14, 2003, S276)

Such a discussion would be unthinkable in the modern House, yet it reflects an important institutional difference between the House and Senate. Smith and Deering (1984, 231) affirm that this anti-majoritarian feature of the Senate is important to understanding the composition of committees. In their section on committee sizes and assignments, they write that “the minority, especially in the Senate, can be irritatingly obstructionist if it believes it has been slighted by the majority. Thus party ratios on most committees are close to the chamber-wide party ratio.” Thus the Senate is an institution that greatly hinders a majority party’s ability to implement the systems strategy of stacking committee ratios.

A third requirement for observing the majority party ratio advantage is that there be an agent of implementation. In discussing committee formation in the House and Senate, Smith and Deering (1984, 231) report that “in most cases ... sizes and party ratios usually are set only after consultation between majority and minority party leaders.” In the Senate, the standing rules of the chamber actually establish committee sizes, but these are very commonly altered, albeit not dramatically so. Senate majority party leaders are involved in the discussions that do result in the marginal changes in committee sizes, and

thus there is an agent present if ratio stacking were able to be implemented. Even apart from a majority party leader, individual senators can exercise considerable influence and technically would be able to offer the ratio stacking strategy.

In sum, the Senate has only two of three characteristics that are necessary to observe the systems solution of stacking the ratios on committees in favor of the majority party. While there is some incentive to do so and there are agents available to fight for such a strategy, a substantial obstacle exists in the inability of the majority to force such a strategy upon the minority. Since the Senate is not a majoritarian institution, the minority is able to credibly insist that it receive its full share of committee seats. This difference sharply distinguishes minorities in the Senate versus those in the House. House minorities may not be pleased with the “unfair” party ratios, yet they have little remedy available. Chapter 4 opened with a quote from John Dingell complaining about committee ratios in the House, but the subsequent motion for committee ratios to mirror floor ratios was promptly rejected. Senate minorities, however, can threaten the use of obstructionist tactics to avert this type of outcome. The result is that the Senate is not a venue likely to exhibit strong evidence of ratio stacking as a systems strategy to enhance majority party reliability. An empirical examination comparing this systems strategy in the House versus the Senate should therefore show this strategy to be substantially muted in the Senate, and it is to this assessment that we now turn.

Testing for Systems Strategies in the U.S. Senate

To facilitate a comparison of House and Senate practices, this study will use the same time period (post-reform sessions) and approach that was used in the House analysis of chapter 3. The three hypotheses of chapter 3 suggested that party ratios on

committees would favor the majority party on important committees or when the majority's margin for error is small (when the committee has few members or the majority's floor advantage is small). To test these hypotheses in the Senate, floor and party ratio data were also collected for Senate committees from 1975 to 2001 from the same sources and by the same methods as were used for the House. The previous section indicates that for the Senate much of this is an exercise with the expectation of finding far less evidence for the majority party reliability systems solutions of stacking committee ratios.

To assess any committee ratio advantages, this section again uses the "ratio stacking" dependent variable as it had been defined in the House analysis. This variable measures the amount of advantage the majority party grants itself on committees above what the floor ratio would suggest. It can be computed by subtracting the majority's floor proportion from its proportion on a given committee. Thus, if a majority holds 53% of the floor, and it holds 55% of a committee's seats, then the ratio stacking for this committee is 0.02, or 2% (since $0.55 - 0.53 = 0.02$).

One of the ways that the three systems strategy hypotheses will be tested is through a linear regression with ratio stacking on individual committees as the dependent variable. Each of these hypotheses will be repeated here with specific descriptions of the independent variables to be used.

Hypothesis 1: Majority parties utilize system solutions on committees that are important to their ideological objectives. These key committees will therefore tend to have party ratios that favor the majority party.

The first independent variables are dichotomous variables that reflect the importance of a committee. In the House, the money and agenda committees were coded

as important in the execution of a party's ideals. In the U.S. Senate the money committees are again among the most important, and Sinclair (1988, 281) identifies Appropriations, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services as the most prestigious. Since committee approval of court nominees has been vital for possible floor action, the Judiciary Committee is also included here as among those important to the parties. Each of these five committees is therefore assigned a value of one on their own dichotomous variable, with all other committees being assigned a zero. From hypothesis 1, ratio stacking increases with the importance of a committee, and so these dichotomous variables would be positively related to the dependent variable if the majority does use this systems strategy. Yet because of the powers of the minority to frustrate the will of the majority party in the Senate, it is expected that even these important committees do not exhibit ratios different from the other committees.

The second hypothesis involved the majority party's floor advantage:

Hypothesis 2: The systems strategy of including additional majority seats on committees will be at its peak when the majority party's floor advantage is narrow. A negative relationship exists between majority floor advantage and the advantage that the majority party grants itself in committee ratios.

As was done with the House, "floor advantage" will be defined here as the majority's proportion of the floor minus 0.50. Thus, if a majority party had 54% of the floor, then its "floor advantage" would be $0.54 - 0.50 = 0.04$. If the majority's floor advantage were quite small, then hypothesis 2 suggests that ratio stacking will be relatively large since it tends to increase as floor advantage decreases. In the House, this negative relationship was expected because of extra seats that the majority would grant itself on committees. With systems strategies muted in the Senate we would not expect to see extra seats being allocated to the majority party. This does not entirely exclude a negative relationship

between floor advantage and ratio stacking, however. When the floor advantage is very narrow it is mathematically difficult to mirror this on committee ratios. For instance when the floor is divided 51-49 as in 2001, the closest that committees can approximate this is to give the majority party a single seat advantage on committees.⁴ Yet this single seat advantage gave the Democratic majority a slight ratio stacking advantage on every committee, resulting in a few percentage point advantage for the majority party. With larger floor majorities it is usually easier to approximately mirror the floor ratio, and very large floor majorities do not have the incentive to aggressively stack the committee ratios since mirroring the floor (or even giving a slight advantage to the minority) will still provide opportunity for a very reliable committee structure. Due to these factors, there is an expectation in the Senate that floor advantage variable will be negatively related to the dependent variable, albeit of less magnitude than that observed in the House.

The third independent variable was related to the size of an individual committee:

Hypothesis 3: Larger committees have majority contingents that can suffer several defections yet still produce a reliable performance, whereas the performance of smaller committees can be threatened by just a few defections. Therefore committee size is inversely related to the ratio advantage that the majority party grants itself.

In the House analysis it was noted that small committees have a smaller margin for error, and therefore were strong candidates for ratio stacking. Because of minority powers in the Senate, committee size is not expected to be related to ratio stacking for those considerations. Yet as with floor advantage, it is still likely that a relationship exists between committee size and ratio stacking due solely to mathematical rounding

⁴ It is actually a relevant piece of evidence to observe that the majority party *always* received a majority on these committees. While the majority party advantages are muted in the Senate, the composition of committee ratios is still distinctively partisan in nature. Committees are not composed purely on self-selection as traditional distributive theory tends to suggest, for such a process would almost certainly not produce committees in which the majority party always had a majority of committee seats.

considerations. For example one of the smallest Senate committees during this time was Veterans' Affairs, often consisting of just 12 members. When the floor was closely divided (as in a 53-47 Republican advantage in 1985) the closest that a 12-member committee can approximate this and still give an advantage to the majority party is to set a ratio of 7-5, yet this yields a ratio stacking advantage of over 5%, a fairly large value for an attempt at floor ratio approximation. Larger committees are able to yield ratios that more nearly approximate the floor, and because of minority power in the Senate, one would expect that they do. From the same 53-47 Congress, the largest committee was Appropriations with 29 members, and its division was 15-14, actually giving a small ratio advantage to the minority. As these examples illustrate, the marginal member on a small committee has a larger impact on the ratio stacking dependent variable than a marginal member on a larger committee. Due just to these mathematical rounding considerations, small committees are likely to exhibit ratio stacking more than large committees, and thus a negative relationship between the variables is expected.

Since these hypotheses are again being tested in the context of a linear regression, it is possible to present an expectation for the intercept of the regression. The intercept can be defined as the average value of the dependent variable when all independent variables take on the value of zero, but for practical purposes here it can be thought of as a small committee on a very closely divided floor. Since both of these factors have been hypothesized to lead to higher levels of ratio stacking, it is expected that the intercept of this regression will be positive, albeit less than in the House.

Systems Strategy Results

These hypotheses were tested on 227 committees in the U.S. Senate from 1975-2001. The results of the linear regression are reported in table 6.1. The results of this regression confirm the expectations for each of the hypotheses in the Senate. Perhaps the sharpest contrast of these results with those of the House is the failure of any of the important committees to exhibit any ratio advantage for the majority party. In the House, all the important committees did provide a ratio advantage that was also statistically significant. In the Senate, however, the “important committee” coefficients are not even close to substantive or statistical significance. Thus hypothesis 1 is not supported in the Senate, possibly due to the ability of the minority party to prevent majority advantage in committee ratios.

[Table 6.1 about here]

Hypothesis 2 concerning floor advantage is supported by the results of the regression. As a Senate majority increases in size, there is less advantage to the majority party in committee ratios. As explained above, this result is likely due to the mathematical inability of close floors to be closely mirrored in committee ratios, as close floors often exhibit a ratio advantage to the majority party. The magnitude of this coefficient is smaller than it had been in the House (-0.253 for the Senate vs. -0.324 for the House). The ratio stacking in the House is larger under close floors, and therefore there is a greater distance for this advantage to dampen as floor advantage increases. In the Senate ratio stacking is not as large under close floors, and therefore there is less distance for this advantage to fall. A coefficient of -0.253 indicates that for an 8% increase in floor advantage (from 52% to 60%, for example), ratio stacking in a Senate committee would decrease by slightly over 2%.

The expectations of hypothesis 3 are also confirmed by the regression, with the size coefficient being negatively related to ratio stacking. This result in the Senate is likely due to the advantage large committees have in their ability to mirror floor ratios. Although the size of this coefficient is about twice the size of that reported for the House (-0.00179 in the Senate vs. -0.00091 for the House), it is important to note that the range of this variable for the Senate is much narrower than that for the House. For each session in this study, the smallest Senate committee usually has around 10 total seats, and the largest has about 30 seats. The regression suggests that a committee with 20 more seats would have about 3.6% less ratio advantage than the small committee. In the House the smallest committees typically had between 10 and 15 seats, while the largest committees grew from 55 to 74 seats. In the 107th Congress the smallest House committee had 9 seats, and the largest had 74. The House coefficient suggests that this 65 seat range means that the smallest committee would have almost a 6% greater ratio advantage than the largest committee. Thus, although the Senate coefficient is twice as large, the impact of the smaller House coefficient can be even greater on the dependent variable due to the greater range in House committee sizes.

Finally, the intercept of the regression is positive as predicted, since a small committee on a close floor (technically the intercept definition would have both assume a value of zero) would give a ratio advantage to the majority party. As was expected, the magnitude of the intercept is smaller in the Senate than it had been in the House (0.052 vs. 0.083), indicating a lower baseline of ratio stacking in the Senate. With the relatively large coefficient on the size variable, this indicates that this advantage rapidly dampens as committee size increases.

It is worthwhile to note that for both hypotheses 2 and 3 in the Senate, the regression reports a slight ratio advantage given to the majority party on small committees and close floors. It, of course, did not have to be this way. It is conceivable that small committees could have given an advantage to the minority, and minority parties could have received the advantage on close floors, but this did not occur. Additionally, committees with equal memberships would sometimes be the closest approximations to the floor ratios. That outcomes other than these are chosen points to the relevance of party, however muted, in the organization of the Senate.

A Graphical Representation of the Model

An effective way to summarize the results of this regression is to again view a graphical depiction of them. Figure 6.1 displays a scatter plot of the average amount of ratio stacking per Senate session by majority floor advantage.

[Figure 6.1 about here]

The intercept in this figure is clearly positive as it was reported in the regression, indicating that closely divided floors show the greatest amount of ratio stacking. The slight downward slope reflects the expectation of the second hypothesis, that ratio stacking would decrease as floor advantage increased. Since any given point in the figure is an average value of ratio stacking for a given session, we would expect an upward shift if the committee were small in size (due to hypothesis 3). Likewise, if a committee had a relatively large membership, we would expect a downward shift in ratio stacking for a given point in the figure. Since none of the dichotomous variables for the important committees were significant, there is no upward shift for the Senate as there had been in the House.

It is interesting to compare this figure with its House counterparts, figures 3.1 and 3.2. Figures 3.1 and 6.1 cover the same period, and all three of the figures are constructed in the same manner. The difference in pictures between institutions is an important piece of evidence in evaluating congressional theories of organization. In figures 3.1 and 3.2, we see a majority relatively unrestrained, able to stack the deck against the minority with a magnitude and pattern that is undeniable. In figure 6.1, however, we see the frustrated majority party of the Senate, unable to extract the advantage that the House can claim so much more easily. An informational theory cannot easily explain the differences in these pictures, and even the muted Senate picture displays some advantage to the majority party. The conventional wisdom on House committee ratios has long described the House in terms that more closely resemble the near proportionality of figure 6.1, not figure 3.1. Yet the difference is clear and substantial. The Senate does come closer to meeting the expectations of an informational theory, yet it has been the argument here that this result is present due primarily to the minority's ability to frustrate the majority party. When the majority party is able to work its will, it creates an institution unlike figure 6.1. When the majority party is restricted, structures emerge that are more consistent with Krehbiel's theory.

Summary of Systems Strategies in the Senate

The evidence presented here strongly suggests that majority parties in the Senate do not use systems strategies in stacking committee ratios in the same manner as House majorities. In the Senate, important committees have party ratios that are not statistically distinguishable from other Senate committees. Small committees and close floors do tend to yield committees that give a slight advantage to the majority party, but the magnitude

of this advantage is quite muted when compared to that of the House. When a Senate committee is of even average size or the floor advantage is not minute, many Senate committees do come very close to mirroring floor ratios. It was suggested here that the Senate does not construct its committees in the same manner as the House due to the differential minority power in the Senate. A cohesive minority is able to use obstructionist tactics in the Senate to extract the more representative committee party ratios.

This comparison of House and Senate systems strategies is important for several reasons. First, by comparing figures 3.1, 3.2, and 6.1 it is clear that House party ratios are produced by a different process than Senate committees. In some treatments (the Smith and Deering editions, for example), both House and Senate committee ratios are described very similarly, with both allegedly mirroring floor ratios. To present both institutions identically is seemingly untenable in light of the evidence presented here. A second reason this comparison is important is that it brings one of the limitations of informational theory into sharp relief, and this is an intriguing piece of evidence in the debates over perspectives on congressional organization. Informational theory suggests that the House is constructed like figure 6.1 (of the Senate), yet this is clearly not the case. Neither a distributive nor an informational perspective can easily explain the differences between figures 3.1 and 6.1. A partisan perspective seems most capable of such an explanation, and the majority party reliability perspective taken here has been a fruitful avenue for generating testable hypotheses that provide explanations for the differences between the institutions.

Component Strategies in the U.S. Senate

Just as chapter 3 focused on a systems strategy in the House and chapter 4 subsequently looked at component strategies within that structure, so now we turn to component strategies in the Senate. Whereas systems strategies deal with the *structure* of committees, component strategies involve *allocation* of membership within that structure. It is again appropriate to weigh whether the Senate is a venue likely to exhibit component solutions.

Evaluating the U.S. Senate as a Venue for Finding Majority Party Reliability Component Strategies

Generally speaking, a component solution has been described here as the utilization of reliable majority party members in important positions, on smaller committees, and with higher frequency (i.e., reliable members have more committee assignments). For the Senate to exhibit component strategies, I have suggested that there needs to be incentive, ability, and an agent to implement the solution.

Majority party leaders would have some incentive to use component strategies on Senate committees for much the same reasons that systems strategies were desirable. Senate committees are key decision making arenas, and committee members (and especially subcommittee members) often exercise major influence on the content of legislation. Although Senate rules are far more permissive than the House in terms of nonmembers' abilities to introduce legislation on the floor, it would generally be desirable for committee members to be the primary movers on areas within their jurisdiction since they presumably have greater resources and expertise for the issue. It would therefore behoove a majority party to place members on committees who are likely to introduce, work on, and vote for legislation that in some sense embodies

collective partisan goals when relevant. Strom Thurmond hinted that this type of component reliability was relevant in a conversation he had with Senator Hatch, the chair on Labor, recalling:

Hatch asked me to join. I said I couldn't, I had my hands full. He said *I need the conservative vote*—give me your proxy when you can. (Evans 1991, 25; emphasis mine)

Having reliable members on committees may be particularly desirable in the Senate due to the inability of the majority party to impose a structural advantage in committee party ratios. In general, therefore, having reliable members on committees is indeed a desirable feature, although the incentive to do so is less than in the House due to the fact that the Senate is not a majoritarian institution and nongermane bills may be introduced on the floor.

The second factor for component strategies to manifest themselves involves feasibility, in that the institution must be free of restrictions that would necessarily prevent component solutions from being implemented. It is especially relevant for component strategies that members be free of per capita restrictions in terms of the number of committees on which they may serve. The Senate does, however, have some restrictions of this variety. Smith and Deering (1984, 239) report that Senate rules prohibit members from serving on more than one of the Appropriations, Armed Services, Finance, or Foreign Relations committees. They add that technically speaking, "Senate rules formally limit members to two major committee and one minor committee assignment." Yet exceptions to this ceiling are so numerous that it can hardly be considered binding, at least for the period under examination here. In addition, the so-

called Johnson Rule guarantees each party's members a seat on one of the best committees before any member from their party receives a second top assignment.

Deering and Smith (1997, 103) quote Charles Jones' evaluation of these restraints:

Such measures as the Johnson Rule, while laudable on other grounds, have made it even more difficult in recent years to employ the committee assignment process for party policy purposes. All Senators are guaranteed major committee assignments regardless of their policy stands.

Jones' comment is directly relevant to the discussion on component strategies. If he is correct, then such limitations would have an effect on the ability of majority parties to follow component strategies on the top committees, at least for the sessions under consideration here. When combined with the Senate's general adherence to seniority in determining committee leadership, it is unlikely that the majority party would be able to implement component strategies for important slots. In other ways, however, the majority party would still be quite able to use component strategies. For instance, unreliable members are not guaranteed a chance to sit on the less important committees (since the Johnson rule does not apply to all committees), and therefore these could be structured in a more reliable manner. Of course the desirability of doing so is not as compelling given that these are lower-tier assignments.

Another instance in which parties could use component strategies relates to per capita assignments. If parties are going to allow some of their members to sit on a few committees and others to sit on several, a component strategy would suggest that those members with multiple assignments would tend to be more reliable. For a party to give an exceptional number of seats to an unreliable member would be to welcome much potential trouble in those committees, especially since they do not exhibit a strong ratio

advantage for the majority party. In sum, some component strategies are not able to be implemented in the Senate under its current rules. Important slots in particular are difficult to consistently fill with reliable members. Apart from this, though, the Senate is largely free from restrictions on how lesser committees are filled and in the number of seats given to reliable (versus unreliable) members.

A third element to see component solutions manifested in the Senate is that there be some form of agent to implement it. In the House, the agent identified was each party's committee on committees. While each party in the Senate also has a steering committee, the actual role of the committees may be much different from the House and may vary by party. Smith and Deering (1984, 242) discuss the topic and begin by describing factors that influence Democratic House committee assignments. These include a "nominee's willingness to support the party and its leadership, policy views, seniority, and other personal characteristics." They add that "interviews with House Republican and Senate Democratic members and leadership aides indicate that similar criteria are important in their parties' decisions." If correct, this essentially equates House assignments of both parties with those of the Senate Democrats. If it is true that a "nominee's willingness to support the party and its leadership [and] policy views" are important to Senate Democrat assignments, then it sounds very much like component strategies are at work, with the Senate Democratic steering committee as the agent of implementation.

For Senate Republicans, however, the committee assignment process is notably different. Smith and Deering (1984, 242) report that

Senate Republicans, however, apply seniority more strictly as a means for resolving competing demands. This helps reduce direct personal conflict among

Republican senators, but it also reduces the number of opportunities Republican leaders have to influence assignments. Personal factors normally come into play only when senators of equal seniority are competing for the same seat. For the other three parties [i.e., House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and House Democrats], seniority is usually “only weighed in the balance,” as a Senate Democratic leadership aide explained. When seniority differences are a factor, it is often one member’s previous effort to get an assignment, rather than seniority per se, that is critical.

Marshall, Prins, and Rohde (1997, 14) also note the exceptional nature of Senate Republican committee assignments, calling it a function of “seniority and self-selection.” With self-selection as a prominent feature for Senate Republicans, Marshall et al. suggest that this will “promote the occurrence of outliers,” yet their discussion is restricted to the traditional distributive dimension form of committee outlier. Using floor votes from the 100th Congress for Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry; Appropriations; Commerce, Science, and Transportation; Environment and Public Works; and Labor and Human Resources they find that Republican contingents are unrepresentative of their caucus because they “vote differently from their partisan counterparts on the floor” (1997, 24).

An agent of implementation, therefore, does seem to exist for Senate Democrats as manifested in their steering committee, and some previous research has indicated that this committee has indeed operated with component strategy considerations in mind. For Senate Republicans, however, there is a greater dependence on member seniority and self-selection, and this precludes their formal central mechanism from allocating many members on party reliability grounds.

In sum, on all three counts the Senate is less likely to exhibit component strategies. While there is some incentive to use component solutions in the Senate, the ability to introduce nongermane measures on the floor and the extraordinary ability of individual senators to block legislation lessen the usefulness of component strategies.

Further roadblocks for component strategy manifestation occur when it comes to an agent and the ability to implement the strategy. Features such as the Johnson Rule tend to blunt a party's leadership from stacking the most important committees with highly reliable members. It is, of course, possible that the component strategy could be a viable option for the remaining committees. Yet even on these lesser committees it appears that there is a stronger expectation for component strategies to be used amongst only *Democratic* members since their steering committee has the ability to allocate members for pursuing partisan goals. Since Republicans rely primarily on seniority for assignments, there is not a central agent empowered to pursue a party reliability goal. The absence of this type of agent does not necessarily prevent a data pattern that conforms to the expectations of component strategies. Indeed, Republican senators may still self-select in a manner that gives the appearance of reliability goals being pursued. Yet such a feature should be a more sustainable pattern for the Democrats, while its appearance for Republicans may be more occasional, depending on how the decisions of the individual members aggregate.

Testing for Component Strategies in the U.S. Senate

The component strategy discussion of chapter 2 suggested that reliable components were more likely to be used for important slots (hypothesis 4), when multiple assignments were given (hypothesis 5), and on smaller committees (hypothesis 6). Given the limitations discussed in the previous section, not all of these hypotheses are as appropriate for the Senate as they were for the House. In particular, due to the Johnson Rule and the strong reliance on seniority for committee leadership positions, the expectations of hypothesis 4 are unlikely to be confirmed in the Senate and therefore will not be extensively explored here. Instead the primary venues for testing component

hypotheses in the Senate will focus on the less important committees, primarily in terms of which members receive multiple assignments and which committees receive the more reliable members. Given the difference in committee assignment procedures it is expected that Senate Democrats are more likely to exhibit component strategies.

The fifth hypothesis of chapter 2 suggested that a relationship existed between member reliability and number of committee assignments. Specifically, that hypothesis was stated as follows:

Hypothesis 5: The reliability of a majority party member is positively related to the number of committee seats he is assigned, ceteris paribus.

When this hypothesis was examined in the House, it was discussed how some members did not serve on multiple committees due to either chairing a committee or serving on one of the prestige committees. These restrictions are not repeated in the Senate, with chairs and members of important committees almost universally sitting on multiple committees. The primary exception to this occurred when Minority Leader Tom Daschle sat on only the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee as his sole assignment for a few sessions. Generally speaking, though, senators are not bound by per capita limitations as they are in the House. As mentioned earlier, senators are technically limited to two major and one minor assignment, but exceptions to this are so common that the restriction can hardly be considered binding. These circumstances therefore offer a setting in which the relationship between a member's reliability and the number of seats he possesses should be positive. Some members have had as many as five committee seats, and a partisan reliability focus suggests that these members with several assignments will be relatively reliable. Of course, the corollary to this expectation is that unreliable members will garner fewer committee assignments.

This examination of Senate members will again use general ideological scores as proxies for a member's reliability. As in the House chapter ADA scores and first dimension NOMINATE scores will be the measures employed. For Democrat contingents higher ADA scores and lower NOMINATE scores will represent more reliable members, and the converse is true for Republicans. The various per capita average reliability scores are reported in table 6.2.

[Table 6.2 about here]

The entries in table 6.2 reflect the average ideological score for members with a certain number of committee assignments. For instance, in 1993 there were 12 Democrat majority members who sat on exactly two committees. The average ADA score for these 12 members was 68.58, and their average NOMINATE score was -0.320. Hypothesis 5 suggests that as the per capita number increases, so would the reliability of the components utilized. In 1993 this expectation is confirmed for the Democrats in that reliability (NOMINATE-based) increases monotonically across the categories, rising (in absolute value) from -0.320 for those with only two seats, to -0.352 for those with three seats, again increasing to -0.412 for those with three seats, and peaking at -0.413 for the one member with four seats. For sessions that demonstrate the positive relationship hypothesized, the average scores have been placed in bold print.

From table 6.2, the results for the majority party following the component strategy support hypothesis 5, with the positive relationship being evident to some extent in 10 of the 14 sessions. In a majority of the sessions, the highest per capita group (i.e., those members with four or five seats) has the highest average reliability of any of the majority groups according to one or both of the ideological measures. This frequent use of highly

reliable members is consistent what a component strategy would recommend if party reliability were being pursued. Similarly, it is common for the least reliable group to be the one with only two committee assignments, again providing some support for the hypothesis.

Perhaps the most interesting finding from the table is the possible affirmation of component strategies for the Democrats, be they in the majority or minority. By one or both of the ideological measures, in 13 out of 14 sessions Senate Democrats display a tendency to use component strategies with only the 1975 session as an exception. Republicans, in contrast, confirm the expectations of a component strategy in just 8 of the 14 sessions according to at least one of the measures. For Republicans, this failure to exhibit the expected pattern is not due to a remarkable level of ideological homogeneity that would obscure the pattern. Unlike their House counterparts, Senate Republicans have displayed a fairly large level of ideological heterogeneity, with large differences among groups being noticeable in table 6.2. In the Senate, though, the presence of this unreliability has often not resulted in the marginalization expected by hypothesis 5. In 1981, for instance, the most unreliable majority group by both ideological measures is the one with the highest number of assignments. This prominence of unreliable members occurred again for the Republicans (albeit in minority status) in 1987 and 1989. This type of outcome where unreliable members are most utilized is far less prevalent for the Democrats, however, occurring only in 1975.

In sum, both parties exhibit component strategies that confirm hypothesis 5, but Democrats have a greater tendency to produce outcomes that suggest this strategy is being used. Why would there be a difference between the parties in this aspect? Here it

may be productive to return to the discussion of the prior section concerning ability, incentive, and agency for implementing a component strategy. While both parties were described as having incentive and ability, only the Democrats had an agent empowered to implement the strategy. Their steering committee was described as being accustomed to making assignments with partisan policy goals in mind, and it is therefore possible this agent is purposively allocating an overrepresentation of reliable members. The Republicans, in contrast, are accustomed to a system that relies primarily upon seniority and self-selection for committee assignments. It may be that this more decentralized allocation system is less accustomed to accounting for the reliability concerns present in hypothesis 5. Even under this Republican system, their allocation still usually presents data patterns that are consistent with the component strategy hypothesis concerning per capita assignments. The pattern does appear to be more pervasive among Senate Democrats, however.

Another avenue that had been explored regarding component strategies compared a contingent's reliability and the size of the committee. These expectations were contained in hypothesis 6:

Hypothesis 6: Majority contingents on small committees will be more reliable than majority contingents on larger committees. Majority contingent reliability is inversely related to committee size.

Again, the basic logic of this hypothesis is that larger committees have a greater margin of error than would smaller committees with exactly the same party ratio. Larger committees can more easily suffer defections by majority members and still behave reliably, but smaller committees would be at a greater risk with the defection of just a few members. If a majority party agent takes this dynamic into consideration, then it should

be more likely to assign its unreliable members to larger committees, thus “hiding” the negative impact they could have. Similarly, the majority party would tend to place relatively reliable members on the smaller committees.

To explore this component strategy hypothesis, it is theoretically appropriate to first separate the top four committees from this analysis. This separation is necessary due to the Johnson Rule, which virtually ensures that all members receive a seat on one of the important committees. The quote from Charles Jones above noted how this rule tends to frustrate the ability of parties to use these committee assignments for party policy purposes. If this is true, then the contingents on these top four committees should tend to reflect the central tendency of their respective caucuses. Including these median-tending committees in examining hypothesis 6 would therefore have a confounding effect. If one of the top four committees were considered “large,” this inclusion could have the effect of making the large committees appear too reliable. Similarly the presence of one the top four committees in the “small” category could make those committees appear excessively unreliable. On this basis, the top four committees will constitute their own category.

The remaining committees do not have the restrictions of the Johnson Rule, and are therefore more appropriate for examining hypothesis 6. As has been the practice throughout, a member's reliability will be proxied by using ADA and NOMINATE general ideological scores. For the 14 sessions examined in this study, there are a total of 227 Senate committees. When the top four committees for each session are removed, this leaves 171 committees to test hypothesis 6. Using a committee size of 18 seats as the dividing line separates the committees into two nearly equal groups, with 85 committees having fewer than 18 total seats and 86 committees having 18 or more seats. Hypothesis

6 suggests that the contingents for the smaller committees will be more reliable than the contingents for the larger committees. As in the House, there has been a general trend toward larger committees over time, and this in itself is a type of systems strategy that the majority party may be employing. The practical effect of this growth is that the under-18 seat group is overrepresented early in the sample, composes about half the cases in the middle years, and is ultimately underrepresented in the final years.

Component Strategy Results

The average of the contingent scores and the number of cases in each group are reported in tables 6.3 and 6.4 for the majority and tables 6.5 and 6.6 for the minority. The figures for the top four committees are also reported in these tables as well.

[Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 about here]

Table 6.3 lists the average contingent ADA scores for the majority party. For example, in 1977 there were 8 committees with fewer than 18 total members, and the score 61.7 in the table is an average of the ADA averages for those 8 majority contingents. For hypothesis 6 to be supported, the smaller committees should have a higher ADA score (i.e., more reliable) than the large committees during Democratic control, and this should reverse during Republican control, with the large committees having the higher ADA scores. This table does not support the negative relationship hypothesized between size of committee and the reliability of its members. In fact, of the 14 sessions reported here the small committees are more reliable in 7 sessions and also less reliable in 7 sessions, suggesting no relationship, at least by the ADA data. Table 6.4 tells a similar story, with the smaller group being more reliable in only 6 of the 14 sessions and the larger contingents actually being more reliable in a majority of cases.

This pattern of the smaller contingents being less reliable is even stronger for the minority party, with table 6.5 showing three instances and table 6.6 showing a similar four cases.

The influence of the Johnson Rule is observable in these tables in that the average score of the top four committees (Appropriations, Armed Services, Finance, and Foreign Relations) does usually fall in between the scores of the large and small groups. Regardless of which ideological measure is used or if majority or minority contingents are examined, the top committees occupy this middle ground in a majority of sessions. This tendency for the contingents of the top committees to not be highly reliable confirms the suspicion that hypothesis 4 (suggesting that important slots would be highly reliable) would not hold in the Senate.

The evidence from these tables does not appear to support hypothesis 6 since smaller contingents are not typically more reliable. Of possible interest, though, is that in the instances where the small majority contingents are more reliable it is almost always *Democratic* contingents. By the ADA table, the smaller contingents are more reliable in 1975, 1977, 1979, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993. The NOMINATE scores repeat this pattern except for 1975, and these are all years of Democratic majorities. In minority status the smaller Democratic contingents were more reliable in 1985, 1995, and 1999 by the NOMINATE measure. It may be, then, that the difference in committee assignment for the two parties is being manifested here, with the Democratic agents taking reliability issues into account. To explore this possibility several regressions were conducted with the individual contingent means as the dependent variable, and the size of the committee as the chief independent variable. For Republican contingents, the evidence is quite

consistent with larger committee actually being the more reliable contingents, and the evidence is statistically significant. This positive relationship between committee size and contingent reliability is the opposite of that expected in hypothesis 6. For Democratic contingents, however, the direction and statistical significance of the size coefficient is dependent upon the years included in the regression. In the early years of the sample, and especially in 1975, the relationship between reliability and size is positive and achieves a high level of statistical significance, contra the expectations of hypothesis 6. For later years (1983-2001), however, the negative relationship of hypothesis 6 does emerge for Democrats, and it is statistically significant.

In general the evidence is mixed as to whether Democratic contingents tend to confirm hypothesis 6. For Republicans, the data do not support hypothesis 6, and in fact suggest a positive relationship between committee size and contingent reliability. In some years, this also appears to be the case for Democratic contingents. What could account for this finding, this possible positive relationship between committee size and contingent reliability? One possibility is that the size variable may instead be proxying for the importance or salience of a committee. For example, the smallest committees in the Senate have typically been amongst the least desirable committee assignments (Bullock 1985, 795), with committees such as Rules and Administration, Veterans' Affairs, District of Columbia, and Post Office and Civil Service composing this group. The largest committees (outside the influence of the Johnson Rule) have typically been more desirable and important assignments such as Commerce, Budget, and Judiciary. It may be that the less reliable members are somewhat marginalized by receiving assignments on

the less important (and smaller) committees while the more reliable members are placed on more salient (and larger) committees.

Another way to examine the evidence is via scatter plots which show committee size with average contingent reliability. Since the top four committees are forced open to unreliable members via the Johnson Rule, they are excluded from the following scatter plots. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show Democrat majority contingents with committee size, and figures 6.4 and 6.5 show Republican majority contingents. What seems to be common to all four scatter plots is that there is a collection of small and unreliable committees. Excepting these, the remaining pattern looks quite random.

[Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 about here]

Figures 6.6 through 6.9 show the corresponding scatter plots for Senate minority contingents. In figure 6.6 and 6.7 there is no discernible relationship for Democrat minority contingents. For the Republican minority contingents in figures 6.8 and 6.9, however, there does appear to be a positive relationship between committee size and average reliability. This is the reverse of what is generally expected according to the majority party reliability theory in the House, yet Senate qualities make this finding not too surprising.

[Figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 about here]

Summarizing Component Strategy Evidence

This examination of component strategies in the U.S. Senate has shown some similarity to, but more often a fairly strong contrast with the picture presented by the U.S. House. The strongest area of similarity occurred in the relationship between a member's reliability and his number of committee assignments. In both institutions the members

with the most per capita assignments were usually among the most reliable choices available. In the Senate the positive relationship between reliability and number of assignments did appear for most sessions, and especially so for Democrats. In contrast to the House, however, was the presence of the Johnson Rule, virtually assuring even the most unreliable members a seat on one of the most important Senate committees. Whereas important House positions were typically filled by relatively reliable members, important Senate positions are procedurally precluded from following the same strategy, resulting in somewhat less reliable majority contingents. Also in contrast to the House was the finding that there is generally not a negative relationship between a committee's size and the reliability of its contingent. Whereas the House data did support such a relationship, the Senate data appeared to either show no relationship or even support a positive relationship between the variables.

Some bases for the similarities and differences between the House and Senate have been explored here. The institutions differ in each of the categories of incentive, ability, and agency. The incentive to use component strategies may be somewhat lessened in the Senate because committees are not as vital there. This is due to the extraordinary ability of individual senators to both introduce nongermane amendments and to filibuster unacceptable legislation. With these institutional features, the Senate committees are not so critical since each senator essentially has the ability to become a serial veto point or a parallel component able to introduce legislation to the floor. Such qualities are not shared by a House member and likely indicate a lessened incentive for the majority party in the Senate to zealously pursue component strategies in forming committees.

The House and Senate have important differences in the ability to implement component strategies. Some commonalities are shared in that both institutions usually respect a member's seniority on and property right to a committee. Additionally, both institutions allow members to receive varying numbers of seats, thus allowing the most reliable members to be tapped more frequently as appears to be the practice in both bodies. A primary difference, though, is how the bodies approach restrictions in relation to their most important committees. In the House the limitation is upon the individual member in that if he serves on a key committee he is usually limited from serving on any additional committees. This allows the House party leaders to seek the placement of loyal members in these key positions. In the Senate, however, the limitations of the Johnson Rule essentially force open the membership of the top committees to even the most unreliable elements in the party, and particularly so if those members have seniority.

There are also differences in the presence of an agent to implement component strategies. The parties in the House have steering committees that collect requests and allocate members. The Senate Democrats have a steering committee that has been described in terms quite similar to those of the House, but Senate Republicans rely primarily on seniority in allocating members. Rather than relying primarily upon a steering committee, this more decentralized system allows individual senators to self-select their seats. The final committee composition for Republicans would therefore be just the aggregation of the individual preferences rather than a centralized agent allocating members to achieve the collective goal of having reliable committees.

On each count, then, there are important differences between the House and the Senate, and in each instance the House is the more likely venue to produce evidence of

component strategies. The data are generally consistent with this, as both smaller and important Senate committees tend to have a relatively unreliable membership.

The U.S. Senate and Committee Outliers

Chapter 5 examined the representativeness of committees in the House, building upon majority party reliability findings introduced in chapters 3 and 4. The basic logic was that if one could specify conditions in which majority parties created committee structures and assigned members in a manner favorable to their collective interests, then this ought to identify a situation in which a committee would be an outlier toward the ideological median of the majority party. The presence of these ideological outliers was contingent upon the utilization of systems or component strategies in the House. If this party reliability approach is a useful basis upon which to understand the ideological representativeness of committees, then the Senate is a venue that provides a diminished expectation of finding a systematic tendency for outlying committees to favor the majority party. Much of this final section's work is done primarily to confirm the expectation that the party reliability approach does not offer much additional explanation to the ideological representativeness of Senate committees. To explore specifically why the committee representativeness hypotheses would be expected to fail in the Senate when they had been fairly successful in the House, each will be reviewed and discussed here in the Senate context.

The first committee representativeness hypothesis dealt with important slots:

Hypothesis 7: Important committees likely to be involved in handling party public goods legislation (such as agenda and money committees) will be outliers in favor of the ideology of the majority party. This is so because majority contingents on these committees are extraordinarily large (systems strategy) and they tend to comprise relatively reliable majority members (component strategy).

Important committees in the Senate have neither the structural nor the allocation advantages that House committees have. If one compares the ratio stacking on the important committees of the House from table 3.1 with those of the Senate in table 6.1, it is apparent that the Senate majority parties are not creating these committees with large structural advantages. Senate party ratios on even the important committees do usually approximate the partisan division of the floor, even under the narrowest of majorities. In addition to this lack of structural advantage is the limitation of the Johnson Rule, which ensures that even unreliable members are entitled to seats on these top committees, thus limiting the ability of steering committees to marginalize such members. A final difficulty for Democrats is that the few members who were exempted from the Johnson Rule and allowed to sit on two of the top committees were usually somewhat unreliable members, such as Senators Byrd and Stennis.

This combination of little or no structural advantage and limited freedom in allocating members to the top committees gives an expectation that the Senate committees will *not* be outliers in the direction of the majority party's median. Instead, these committees should tend to reflect the ideological median of the chamber, or perhaps even favoring the minority position.

The second area of committee representativeness hypotheses addressed the majority's floor advantage as an independent variable:

Hypothesis 8a: The level of ideological advantage to the majority will be positive and at its greatest when the floor is closely divided. This is due to the ratio stacking in favor of the majority and the filling of those slots with reliable members.

Hypothesis 8b: A negative relationship exists between majority floor advantage and the ideological advantage that the majority party grants itself on committees. This occurs because there is less need for the majority to give itself any additional structural

advantage in the ratio when the majority's floor advantage is already large, and without these additional seats highly reliable members are not utilized as frequently.

In the House, committee medians were expected to be closest to the majority median when the floor was closely divided. This occurs because the majority party imposes structural advantages in committee party ratios under these circumstances, and the evidence for this can be found in figure 3.1. In addition to this systems strategy, the majority party tends to use a component strategy of assigning multiple seats to the most reliable members. It is not unusual that the members with multiple seats in the House were the most reliable; what is unusual under close floors is the higher frequency of members receiving these multiple assignments as shown in figure 5.1. Because of the decreasing structural advantage as well as the decline of multiple assignments to highly reliable members, the ideological advantage to the majority was thought to dampen as floor advantage increased in the House.

The Senate, however, is quite different from the House in important respects that influence the ideological representativeness of its committees. The most apparent area of difference discussed here is the lack of substantial structural advantage in Senate committees even under the most closely divided floors. Figure 6.1 displays this lack of ratio advantage for the majority party, whereas the comparable figure for the House (figure 3.1) shows a large substantive difference under close floors.

One potential point of similarity between the House and Senate is that when the floor is closely divided in either institution, the majority party tends to increase its frequency of assigning multiple seats to members. For the Senate, this tendency for the majority party can be observed in figure 6.10, which shows the frequency of members with multiple assignments for each level of floor advantage. The correlation between

floor advantage and the number of members with more than three assignments is -0.891, indicating a strong negative relationship.

[Figure 6.10 about here]

When this tendency (for multiple assignments to increase as floor advantage decreases) is combined with the finding of table 6.2 that the members with multiple assignments tend to be more reliable, a possible effect is that Senate committee medians would therefore tend toward the majority median position when the floor is closely divided. This is nearly the argument that was elaborated for the House, yet there is an important caveat. In the House the majority party alone was assigning multiple members under close floors. No such phenomenon was present for the minority party, and this can be seen by comparing figures 5.1 and 5.4. It is quite likely that the reason for this difference is the structural advantage that the majority party is able to extract in the House, giving an asymmetric opportunity for the majority party to utilize reliable components. As we have already seen, this asymmetric advantage is not evidenced in the Senate in that the minority party receives roughly its proportional share of seats. It is therefore not too surprising to see that the minority party also shares almost exactly the same trend as the majority party in the increased frequency of assigning multiple seats to members when the floor is closely divided. Figure 6.11 demonstrates that the minority party too has increased these multiple assignments when the floor is closely divided.

[Figure 6.11 about here]

The effect of this shared trend for the majority and minority parties is that they should tend to cancel each other out. In the House, this lack of shared trend meant that one could reasonably expect committees from close floors to tend to favor the majority

since the majority party alone was making greater use of reliable components. In the Senate the shared trend of multiple assignments for majority and minority members suggests that no expectation is present for outlying Senate committees due to this component strategy consideration.

The expectations for the Senate in relation to hypothesis 8 can be summarized as follows. The slight structural advantage for the majority party under close floors would tend to give a small ideological advantage to the majority in the ideological medians of the committees. When this expectation is combined with the tendency of the majority party to repeatedly use reliable members, it would seem likely that the amount of ideological stacking will be small but still positive under very close floors. Another way to say this is that a Senate regression having ideological stacking as the dependent variable should have a positive intercept term, albeit smaller than that for the House. As floor advantage increases committee party ratios are even more able to mirror the floor ratio, and so even the slight structural advantage does dampen. This loss of structural advantage for the majority should tend to also lead to a dampening of the ideological stacking. In other words, floor advantage should still have a negative relationship with ideological stacking.

The final ideological representativeness hypothesis concerned the size of the committee.

Hypothesis 9: Large committees have larger majority contingents and are able to endure more defections than small committees. This means that majority party leaders will tend to not stack the committees' ratios in their favor, and they will be willing to assign them more moderate or ideologically hostile members. Therefore, the smaller the committee, the more likely one is to see evidence of an ideological outlier favoring the majority party.

The Senate systems strategy regression (from table 6.1) reported similar results to that of the House in that both displayed a substantive and statistically significant relationship between the size of a committee and the level of ratio stacking. In both institutions a negative relationship was found, with small committees having the greatest party ratio advantage. As the size of the committee increased, the party ratios began to approach the floor ratio, or perhaps even give a small advantage to the minority party on very large committees. So in terms of systems strategy, both the House and Senate have a similar expectation for ideological representativeness: smaller committees should favor the majority party because of the structural advantage they include. A difference for the House and Senate occurs when one examines the possible component strategies related to committee size. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 suggested that in the House a negative relationship existed between a majority contingent's reliability and the size of the committee. In the Senate, however, the results (tables 6.3 and 6.4) were less compelling on this count, with the negative relationship not being consistently supported. In the House, the representativeness of a committee was related to its size by both component and systems strategies. In the Senate, only the systems strategy provides an expectation of possible outlying committees, and component strategies do not appear to be a factor operating in the same direction.

To summarize, the ideological representativeness hypotheses are not identical for the House and Senate. The top committees in the Senate are not expected to favor the majority party due to a lack of both systems and component strategies, and this is contrary to the expectation of hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 8 may still receive some support since there is a slight structural advantage for the majority as floor advantage decreases

and there is a fairly consistent tendency for the majority party to give multiple assignments to its most reliable members. In combination, these factors would lead to the expectation of a small positive intercept term and a slight downward slope as floor advantage increases. Finally, there is an expectation (albeit somewhat slimmer) that smaller committees will tend to produce committees with an ideological advantage in favor of the majority party.

Testing a Majority Party Reliability Model of Committee Representativeness in the U.S. Senate

As in chapter 5 relating to the House, linear regression will be used to test a party reliability model of committee representativeness. The dependent variable in these regressions is ideological stacking, as defined earlier, being computed by differencing the ideological median of a committee and the floor. If the committee median were between the floor median and the majority party median, then the ideological stacking is positive and in favor of the majority party. For instance if the NOMINATE median of a committee were -0.200, the median of the floor were -0.050, and the Democrats controlled the Senate having a caucus median of -0.320, then the ideological stacking would be 0.150. If, however, the committee's median were -0.020, then the ideological stacking would take a value of -0.030, indicating a committee with an advantage to the minority party. Three main regressions will be displayed, each using a slightly different dependent variable as the basis for computing ideological stacking.

The independent variables will be similarly constructed to those used in the House analysis. The “important” committees of hypothesis 7 will again be represented by dichotomous variables. The top four committees in the Senate (Appropriations, Armed

Services, Finance, and Foreign Relations) are all coded as a one, and the Judiciary Committee is also coded with a one given its important role in approval for judicial appointments. All other committees constitute excluded cases. The independent variable of floor advantage mentioned in hypothesis 8 is again coded as the proportion of the floor belonging to the majority minus 0.50 such that a majority with 53% of the Senate has a floor advantage value of 0.03. Finally the size of committee discussed in hypothesis 9 is simply the total membership of the committee. To have all three regressions cover an identical time frame, the sessions included are 1975-1999, giving a total of 211 committees for analysis.

Raw ADA Regression Results

The first Senate regression reported here uses raw ADA scores to compute the dependent variable of ideological stacking. The results of this regression appear in table 6.7.

[Table 6.7 about here]

A first impression from the table is that the majority party reliability model is far less effective, as expected, in the Senate than it had been in the House. The altered expectations for the Senate do find some support in this regression. The important committees do not even have a direction that favors the majority party (except Foreign Relations) and they do not achieve statistical significance at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test (although Foreign Relations is borderline). On the whole even the most important committees of the Senate have medians that closely approximate the floor median, and this generally confirms the altered expectations of hypothesis 7.

The intercept and independent variable associated with hypothesis 8 have the correct direction, but the intercept is substantively small (only a two point ADA advantage) and not close to statistical significance. Floor advantage is close to statistical significance for a one-tailed test, and there is a substantive effect in the size of its coefficient. The coefficient of -51.497 would indicate that if a floor advantage were to increase by 0.10 (from 53% to 63% for instance), then the ideological stacking would drop by about five points (on the ADA scale). The substantive significance of this variable is not as large as in the House, however, and its statistical significance is fairly dubious, depending on one's preferred level of statistical significance.

Finally the size of Senate committees appears to have no relationship with their ideological representativeness. The coefficient is essentially equivalent to zero and does not come close to statistical or substantive significance.

The R-square of the model is only 0.053 with an adjusted R-square of 0.02, and the standard error of the estimate is 12.59. Overall, the model provides almost no additional explanation, and one is left largely with the impression that Senate committees tend to mirror the floor. This conclusion is bolstered even further by figure 6.12, which shows the average amount of ideological stacking for each Senate session in the sample. The Senate's differences from the House are especially apparent if one compares figure 6.12 with its House equivalent, figure 5.9.

[Figure 6.12 about here]

Whereas the House routinely gives an average ideological advantage far above two points, Senate committees only rarely exceed this amount. The occasional double-digit House advantages are not close to being approximated in the Senate. The

difference between these figures should give pause to any who would characterize both the House and the Senate similarly in terms of the ideological representativeness of their committees.

Adjusted ADA Regression Results

The previous section used raw ADA scores to compute the dependent variable of ideological stacking. As mentioned in the House analysis, a shortcoming of using ADA scores over time is that scores from one session are not necessarily directly comparable with those from another, meaning that five ADA points in one session may not be equivalent to five ADA points in another. This lack of comparability presents a potential difficulty for this study since the size of ideological stacking reported for a given session may be misleading since what appear to be large levels of ideological stacking may actually be equivalent or even smaller than levels of ideological stacking in other years.

To remedy this problem, the Senate ADA scores were adjusted using the inflation index-type method described by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999). This required an application of the “shift” and “stretch” parameters computed by Groseclose et al. to the unadjusted ADA scores, with the result that “intertemporal comparisons” become possible using these adjusted ADA scores.

Using this method the Senate floor and committee medians were adjusted so that the dependent variable used in the prior regression could be computed in terms of adjusted ADA scores. Including the same reliability-based independent variables as were used previously, a regression was conducted to assess ideological stacking in the Senate. The results of this analysis are reported in table 6.8.

[Table 6.8 about here]

The results using the adjusted ADA score dependent variable are almost identical to those using the unadjusted figures. The important committees do not tend to favor the majority party, except perhaps for Foreign Relations, which became slightly more statistically significant in this regression. Armed Services is the only other top committee to come close to being statistically significant, and its direction would favor the minority party. This is likely due to the tendency for Democratic contingents on Armed Services to be relatively conservative. The intercept and floor advantage are both in the predicted direction, yet neither is significant, with the latter becoming less statistically significant in the adjusted ADA results. Finally, the size variable is once again neither statistically nor substantively significant. As with the unadjusted regression the party reliability model of committee representativeness using adjusted scores adds little explanatory power to Senate committees. The graphical depiction of average ideological stacking in a session with the adjusted scores is shown in figure 6.13. As before, it is rare for the average ideological stacking of Senate committees to stray far from the floor median. Again, this offers quite a stark contrast with the results presented for the House.

[Figure 6.13 about here]

NOMINATE Regression Results

The raw and adjusted ADA regressions of ideological stacking both offered little evidence that the representativeness of Senate committees is related to majority party reliability considerations. To further examine this claim, a regression was also conducted using NOMINATE scores to compute the dependent variable of ideological stacking. The results of this regression are reported in table 6.9.

[Table 6.9 about here]

This regression has much in common with the ADA-based regressions in that the reliability variables, once again, seem to offer little help in explaining the ideological representativeness of Senate committees. In most instances, the NOMINATE results offer even less support for the influence of reliability variables. For example, the constant is not even in the predicted direction, as its value is essentially zero. Floor advantage is in the predicted direction, but its coefficient is of little substantive significance (a 10% decrease in floor advantage would lead to an ideological stacking increase of only about 0.006 in NOMINATE value) and does not come close to statistical significance. The important committees, far from favoring the majority party, almost uniformly favor the minority's ideology, and now both Armed Services and Finance are statistically significant. Once again the exception to this is Foreign Relations, which favors the majority ideologically both statistically and substantively. This tendency of Foreign Relations to be an outlier favoring the majority is the main constant, as it has been the sole independent variable to have both substantive and statistical significance across all three regressions presented here. Finally, the size variable is not in the predicted direction and is not close to statistical significance.

A graphical depiction of the average NOMINATE ideological stacking for each session is presented in figure 6.14. As with the ADA scores, the strong majority of sessions present very little or no general advantage to the majority party. Ten of the thirteen sessions have averages that are less than 0.020 points away from the floor, and consistent with the regression results, there does not appear to be a tendency for ideological stacking to increase as floor advantage decreases. This is markedly different from the NOMINATE graphical depiction of the House shown in figure 5.11 in which *all*

of the sessions favor the majority party. In only two instances did a House session have less than a 0.020 advantage to the majority, and most were at or above an advantage of 0.060. In closely divided floors, the House average ideological advantage approaches and even exceeds 0.100, a level almost unimaginable for the Senate. When these large majority advantages dampen out in the House as floor advantages become large, it is only then that they bear some resemblance to the committees of the Senate.

[Figure 6.14 about here]

These NOMINATE results affirm that it would be a mistake to equate House and Senate committees as products of essentially the same forces, leading to consistently representative committees. The data generation processes of the two institutions are different, and this has been supported here theoretically, statistically, and graphically.

These results concerning the ideological representativeness of Senate committees allow for some comment on the major theories of legislative organization. By comparing the figures of ideological stacking in the House versus the Senate, it appears that the Senate tends to be more consistent with the results expected from an informational theory perspective. Senate committee medians do tend to fairly consistently mirror the ideological median of the floor. In the House such a mirroring is not necessarily uncommon, but such representativeness is only one of several manifestations possible for the House. The perspective of this work is that a partisan theory with a reliability focus is essential to understanding this variation in House committees.

Summary of Senate Findings

This chapter has explored both systems and component strategies in the U.S. Senate and applied these findings to provide expectations for the ideological

representativeness of Senate committees. In almost all respects the Senate was described as having a diminished reliability potential when compared to the House. The incentive to produce committees that favor the majority is diminished in the Senate due to the greater power of individual senators to introduce nongermane amendments and the nonmajoritarian nature of the Senate. The ability to structure committees favoring the majority is hindered by the ability of the minority party to credibly protest what it might consider unfair ratios. Finally, party agents (especially Republican) are less empowered in allocating members to committees since seniority plays a more prominent role in allowing members to self-select onto committees.

Given these limitations, the reliability foundation for explaining committee representativeness is much weaker in the Senate. In the House, the logic for ideologically outlying committees was straightforward: the majority party created beneficial committee structures for itself, and it assigned members within that structure to benefit itself. From these two bases it was not surprising that committees favoring the majority party could be predicted. In the Senate, however, the picture is much different. Senate majority party leaders do not create committee structures that give them a substantial advantage, be it due to inability or apathy. Within this structure Senate majority members are not always allocated in a manner consistent with a reliability focus. The Johnson Rule tends to prevent this type of allocation on key committees, and there does not appear to be a negative relationship between the size of a committee and the reliability of its contingent. It does appear that more reliable party members are allowed to serve on a higher number of committees. Given the lack of systems strategy (structural advantage) and the mixed findings for component strategies, the bases for predicting ideologically outlying

committees in the Senate were less compelling. The Senate results confirm these expectations, showing that committees did tend to largely mirror the floor.

In understanding these differences between the House and Senate, it is important to note the likely role of party as the primary explanatory factor. In the House the majority party leaders are able to pursue the reliability objective by imposing structure and allocating members with much more impunity than would be possible in the Senate, and both the systems and component data support such a contention. In the Senate, however, these reliability expectations go largely unfulfilled due to the inability of or a diminished incentive for the majority party to pursue them. To absent party from a theory of congressional organization would do great harm to our ability to predict and explain many of the outcomes explored in this study. For the House, the reliability-based outcomes are generated because party is unshackled; in the Senate the muted reliability results can be accounted for substantially by the restrictions upon party influence that those majorities face. In both cases, understanding the incentive and institutional framework the majority party finds itself in is a key to understanding the resulting committee compositions.

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**ON THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES:
TESTING A THEORY OF MAJORITY PARTY RELIABILITY**

VOLUME II

By

Philip Andrew Kloha

A DISSERTATION

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Chapter 7: Majority Party Reliability in State Legislatures

The vast majority of work on legislative committees has concentrated on the U.S. House of Representatives. The three main theories of legislative organization can be applied to other legislative settings, though, and it is only very recently that this has been undertaken. Although studies examining U.S. Senate committees are still not extensive, there has been a recent flurry of scholarship extending these theories to state legislatures. These authors often cite similar advantages of studying state legislatures. In particular they emphasize how the state legislatures offer plentiful and varied venues for assessing the generalizability of theories that were developed largely from a single national chamber.

This chapter adds to this literature on state legislatures by aiming to clarify some previous research and answering some standing questions that have been posed. This chapter has four chief parts, beginning with a review and analysis of some important prior work on state legislative committees that relates to majority party reliability. After this review, state legislatures will be assessed as venues in which majority party reliability is likely to be found, and this evaluation will be made on the same dimensions as in previous chapters: ability, incentive, and agency. An empirical section follows in which all state legislatures (the 92 where it is feasible) will be tested for the presence of systems strategies over several sessions. The final section summarizes the chapter and offers a first impression of how these states would fare in component strategies and examinations of committee representativeness.

Unlike in the House and Senate, this chapter will not test for the presence of component strategies, nor will it take the final step of assessing state committee representativeness. There are primarily two reasons for this absence. One is that neither ADA nor NOMINATE-type scores are commonly available for all states over several sessions. Researchers can and have created ideological scores (Aldrich and Battista 2002, Battista 2004, Wright and Schaffner 2002, Robeck 1971, Beth and Havard 1961) for state legislatures, with recent efforts commonly using a NOMINATE procedure. Given that the construction of these indices is labor-intensive, it is quite understandable that these efforts have focused on creating scores for just a single session, only a small number of states, and frequently on bodies with small memberships.

In addition to the absence of ideological measures for states is the fact that even if such data were available, it would be extremely time consuming to collect and organize the data necessary to test the component strategy hypotheses for several states. This is so because the component hypotheses require data collection where the individual legislator is the unit of analysis. As it is, this chapter takes on the ambitious task of presenting data for all states where it is possible to test the systems strategy hypotheses, using data from more than 12,000 committees. This analysis of systems strategy hypotheses will hopefully give pause to those who have jumped right to tests of committee representativeness, encouraging them to consider that resulting committee rosters are quite possibly the product of both a structural and allocation strategy where party reliability is prominent. So even though this study will not include the testing of component strategy or committee representativeness hypotheses, I include in the literature review studies that have relevance to these topics. This is done primarily

because the conclusions of these studies are so commonly at odds with both the systems strategy findings that are presented here and what a party reliability perspective in general would lead us to expect.

Prior Research on State Legislatures Relevant to Majority Party Reliability

State committee research can be divided by which reliability strategy is most in focus. Some recent studies (Hedlund and Hamm 1996, Benton 2004) focus quite explicitly on systems strategies, but most research entirely bypasses these structural considerations. Some scholars have examined allocation issues directly (Robeck 1971, Beth and Havard 1961), but much of the research appears to skip right to tests of whether committees represent the floor or not. This tendency is unfortunate since these articles tend to overlook the processes by which state legislative committees are formed. As was seen earlier in the comparison of the U.S. House and Senate, institutional procedures matter a great deal in understanding the resulting committee memberships. While state committee outlier articles present a punch line, they are largely predicated (at least implicitly) on the notion that state legislative committees are formed just like U.S. House committees. Even a cursory examination of state legislatures should give one pause about such a proposition, and results below will demonstrate that some state legislatures differ wildly from the House in their committee structure. By skipping the story of how state committees are built, this outlier research leaves us with little explanation for why the results should occur. This general absence of testable hypotheses being generated is displayed as researchers simply rely upon U.S. House hypotheses about committee representativeness to apply to the states. In doing this, state legislative scholars have ceded theoretical development to those who have studied an institution that is sometimes

quite different from their own. By adopting the national House hypotheses, state researchers have also adopted some expectations that this study has claimed are highly dubious even for the House, namely that committee ratios and ideological medians largely mirror those of the floor. Fortunately there is a body of state research that is relevant to how state committees are built, and these are the studies that focus on systems and component strategies.

In an article titled “Political Parties as Vehicles for Organizing U.S. State Legislative Committees” Hedlund and Hamm (1996) examine the extent to which party is active in creating the committees of five states. The foundation they use for this research is normative rather than positive. This is so because they rely upon Malcolm Jewell's perspective that a strong party system is a desirable feature, and they then test Jewell's conditions to see if strong parties are present in those five states. They suggest (Hedlund and Hamm 1996, 384) a theme of Jewell's is that “strong, responsible, competitive legislative parties are essential to a viable democratic system,” but he found “responsible parties are often absent.” Thus when Hedlund and Hamm are testing Jewell's strong party propositions, they are not seeking to explain how state legislatures actually are; instead they are merely testing to see if they comport with Jewell's concept of how they ought to be. Several propositions are tested, however, that are relevant to positive theories of organization.

Hedlund and Hamm (1996, 386) report that Jewell had four main conditions to indicate the presence of a strong party system. First “for the majority party, a strong party system means that it appoints members from its party to both committee chairs and a proportion of committee seats greater than its representation in the legislature.” Thus

there is a component strategy at work here for chairmanships and a systems strategy hoped for in committee ratios. For the minority party, Jewell suggested that “the minority party has not only a proportional share of committee seats relative to its strength in the chamber, but also has the final word over which of its members will be appointed to which committees.” Again, this taps both a structural and an allocation aspect. Strangely, Jewell has specified conditions for a strong party system that are impossible to satisfy simultaneously. By logical necessity, when the majority party is stacking committees by granting itself seats “greater than its representation in the legislature” it is impossible for the minority party to also have “a proportional share of committee seats relative to its strength in the chamber.”

Hedlund and Hamm do not comment on the contradiction, and instead characterize Jewell's propositions as saying that “party ratios on all committees will be proportional to the ratios in the chamber as a whole.” This formulation, of course, abandons the earlier proposition that the majority party should be stacking committees in its favor. Elsewhere, Jewell had made the positive assessment that “the ratio of Republicans to Democrats on each committee usually approximates that in the legislature, though the ratio may not be adhered to as rigidly as is done in the Congress, and the minority sometimes has to fight for its proportionate share of seats” (Jewell 1962, 96). Of course, this present work has argued at length that there is no “rigid” adherence to proportionality in Congress. It probably suffices to say that neither Jewell originally, nor Hedlund and Hamm subsequently, had clear theoretical expectations for committee party ratios.

Hedlund and Hamm proceed to test Jewell's four conditions for strong legislative parties. To find support for the proposition that party leaders appoint committee members, they note the general absence of the seniority system except in the Texas and Kentucky Houses and the South Carolina Senate as suggestive evidence. The second condition entailed the minority party controlling its appointments, and they find that in 47 chambers "the minority is able to appoint its own members to committees either formally or informally" (Hedlund and Hamm 1996, 387). The third proposition required committee chairs to be members of the majority party. Of the 1,643 committees they examined, only 1.7% were chaired by minority members with most of these occurring in the South or where a bipartisan coalition had organized the chamber.

The final condition is the most relevant to this study, in that it tests whether each party gets its "fair share" of committee seats. They suggest this is a "more exacting" question that has received "very little systematic attention," and they approach it from four angles. First, they examine total committee seats per party and suggest that "committee system stacking in the aggregate does not appear to be prevalent" (pg. 390). The reliability approach in this present work has suggested that committee stacking favoring the majority is not universalistic, but would instead occur only under certain conditions (i.e., close floors, small committees, or important committees). An additional problem is selecting a standard for what would constitute an advantage to the majority. The difficulty is that even a very small deviation from proportionality can have substantial consequences. Take a floor that is divided 52%-48% but constructs a committee equally divided between the two parties. The equal membership committee deviates from the floor by only 2%, yet equal membership committees are readily seen to

be substantively different from those that would give the majority party an additional member. If the majority party does strategically grant itself additional seats (especially valuable ones), these advantages could quite easily be hidden by aggregate figures such as those used by Hedlund and Hamm. This would especially be the case in states where the majority party has sole appointment power and there are unimportant committees in which the minority party is given majority representation.

A second expectation by Hedlund and Hamm is that the majority party controls a majority of the committee seats. They report that this is almost universally so, with 97.2% of the 5,060 committees bearing this characteristic. A strong majority of the exceptions were instances of equally divided membership. Hedlund and Hamm examine a similar third expectation, that the majority party controls both the chair and a majority of the committee's members. As before they find that an overwhelming majority of committees satisfy these criteria, with 4.5% of 1,643 committees not fitting the profile, and they offer no suggestion for why the exceptions occur (pgs. 390-391).

The final expectation, and the one most important for this present study, is that the majority's seats on individual committees would be proportional to its strength in the chamber. They do an "over-time analysis of five state legislatures" that they claim "reveals that chambers do have different practices." Yet after examining chambers in only five states, Hedlund and Hamm claim that "five patterns appear" (1996, 391-393).

The first pattern they suggest is "the level of representation most approximates equality" but when the ratio does differ the advantage is for the majority. A second pattern is "for roughly 43 to 48% of the committees, the composition can be said to mirror the chamber membership," but for about "one in eight committees the majority

party is underrepresented, while for the remaining they are overrepresented.” Their third pattern is apparently similar to the second, but “the major distinction is that the percentage of committees on which the majority party can be called underrepresented approximates 19 and 20%.” A fourth pattern is suggested in which “for more than a majority of the committees significant overrepresentation of the majority occurs.” The final pattern Hedlund and Hamm observe is that “the number of committees that are over and underrepresented is almost equal.” This attempted taxonomy of committee ratio patterns leaves us with an intriguing question: are state patterns so varied that they have little systematic in common? If five patterns appear after examining five states, how many more patterns exist in the remaining state legislatures? I will argue below that although state chambers do often have important institutional factors that differentiate them from others, many legislatures are likely to share one of three committee ratio construction patterns with the most common approximating that of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Hedlund and Hamm (1996, 394-403) do attempt an explanation of the ratio variation within individual legislatures (although they do not present a positive theoretical basis upon which to base an explanation). They conduct a linear regression for each chamber they examined, using the majority party ratio in the committee as the dependent variable. Several independent variables are utilized that are in great harmony with the theory outlined in this present work. They include the majority party’s ratio on the floor, the presence of a bipartisan coalition, dichotomous variables for important and unimportant committees, and the size of the committee is included only “as a control.”

Although their regression results have much to support the reliability approach supported here, Hedlund and Hamm repeatedly misunderstand the nature of the most important coefficients they report. The chief problem is in their interpretation of the coefficient on the majority party's floor ratio. If committee ratios do essentially mirror floor ratios, then the coefficient on the floor ratio should be very close to 1.0, reflecting a one-to-one relationship between floor and committee ratios. Yet most of their regressions do not have coefficients close to 1. Instead, the coefficients reported include values as low as 0.580 and 0.584. The difference between a 0.58 and 1.0 coefficient is substantial. If the majority's floor advantage increased 10 percentage points, then the 1.0 coefficient would suggest that this is mirrored in committee ratios by a corresponding increase of 10 points. A 0.58 coefficient, however, would suggest that for a 10 point floor increase, the majority would only reap a little less than a 6% increase in committees, thus leading to committees that depart from proportionality. Yet Hedlund and Hamm apparently only see that the coefficients on the variables are positive, and they conclude that proportionality therefore holds since they expected a positive relationship between the two variables. As the example illustrates, though, not all positive coefficients support proportionality, and most of theirs do not since they are not close to approaching 1.0.

An additional problem with Hedlund and Hamm's analysis occurs when they switch to a slightly different dependent variable. Whereas the first dependent variable for their first round of regression had simply been the proportion of majority members in individual committees, in this second round the dependent variable is the majority's ratio in the chamber subtracted from their ratio in the committee. In all other aspects the two rounds of regressions are identical. The resulting coefficients for all the independent

variables stay exactly the same in this second round, except for the coefficient on the main independent variable, the majority's floor proportion. Even here, though, the difference is more apparent than real, and an example will illustrate this. Whereas in the first round, one of the coefficients for majority floor proportion had been 0.584, in this second round the coefficient is -0.416. The latter result is not new information; it is just the flip side of the first result (it is the first coefficient minus 1). Whereas the first result emphasized that a 10 point majority floor gain would lead to only a 5.84 point gain in committee ratio, the second result emphasizes that for a 10 point majority floor gain, they would not keep 4.16 of that (thus gaining the 5.84). It is exactly the same information in both regressions just packaged somewhat differently. Yet Hedlund and Hamm apparently do not recognize this, and conclude that this second round of results is "contrary to the analysis for majority party on the committee" (1996, 403).

There is nothing "contrary" in the two regressions, however, and both actually affirm the same principle, that proportionality does not hold in committee ratios. In fact, if Hedlund and Hamm were correct that proportionality is quite universalistic, then there would be little point to creating the second dependent variable (majority floor proportion minus majority committee proportion) since proportionality would create a series of 0s for that dependent variable. Hedlund and Hamm conclude the article by writing "despite press and reformist suggestions to the contrary, in many state legislative committees, the proportion of partisan members on a committee approximates their proportion in the chamber." Such a conclusion, however, is inconsistent with both rounds of their regression results and their earlier claim that five patterns emerged in how chambers organize committees.

Other state legislative scholars have also examined systems strategies in state legislatures. Looking at committee ratios in the Florida House and Senate from 1976 to 2004, Benton (2004) tests two hypotheses directly relevant to this present study. First, he presents a hypothesis that “party ratios on standing committees in competitive legislative settings are more likely to be similar to proportions of members in the chamber than is the case in non-competitive legislative settings.” The theoretical basis for this proposition is not clear, but he is apparently again relying upon Jewell (1986) as a foundation just as Hedlund and Hamm (1996) had. The claims of this hypothesis are contrary to the expectations that have been presented in relation to majority party reliability in this present work. Since Benton operationalizes “competitive legislative sessions” as those in which the floor is more equally divided, he expects party ratios to be especially proportionate when the floor is closely divided. Benton presents only a table comparing committee ratios with floor ratios, and concludes “on the whole, there are no appreciable differences” and “the ratio of Democrats to Republicans on standing committees is similar to the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in the respective chambers” (Benton 2004, 14). The data he presents, however, do not support this contention. For example one of the most “competitive” sessions he reports is in the 1996-1998 Florida House in which Republicans controlled only 51% of the floor. Contrary to Benton’s hypothesis, however, committee ratios did not mirror this circumstance. Republicans instead created a committee structure that gave them 62% of committee seats on average, a result consistent with the expectations of this present work.

A second hypothesis by Benton is more consistent with the majority party reliability perspective, stating:

Party ratios on key standing committees (appropriations, finance and taxation, and rules and calendar) in competitive legislative settings tend to be considerably higher than the committee ratios generally and the proportions of members in the chamber than is the case in non-competitive legislative settings. (Benton 2004, 10)

Benton does not find evidence to support this hypothesis in the Florida Senate, surmising that “the party leadership does not appear to engage in the practice of ‘stacking’ these committees during competitive periods” (Benton 2004, 15). Further, although he finds (2004, 15) that the House party leadership “has consistently ‘stacked’ these important committees in favor of the majority party over the years,” he does not find that the party ratios are “appreciably higher” during competitive periods.

Some state legislative research has focused on allocation of members, or what I have earlier termed as a type of component strategy. Robeck (1971) for example seeks to explain committee assignments in the California Senate. He describes the California Senate's committee assignment process as somewhat exceptional since it relies heavily upon the seniority system. He notes that “the California Senate gives the members with the greatest tenure the best overall assignments,” but he also cautions that seniority is ignored “in some instances when policy considerations or personal factors intervene” (Robeck 1971, 528). Such a characterization suggests that seniority is perhaps followed in general, but that the reliability of the committee's operation is still of paramount interest in that “policy considerations” remain key. A five-member Rules Committee made the committee assignments, and it was composed of two members nominated by each party and chaired by the president pro-tem. Although Democrats had a numerical majority of the Senate, Robeck notes that many believed the institution was “run by a conservative ‘old guard’” (1971, 529). Since the Rules Committee membership was

elected by the whole chamber, a bipartisan conservative coalition was able to select a fairly conservative membership, which was able to then place conservatives on key committees.

Robeck creates ideological scores for all the senators and finds that “70 percent of the ten most important committees had a more conservative membership than the average for all members, and that no more than 30 percent of the ten least prestigious committees had more conservative than average memberships” (pg. 536). Switching from averages to medians, he further finds the “data indicate that conservatives possessed a controlling majority on almost every Senate committee” for the two sessions he examined (pg. 537). He concludes the article by noting that “seniority is the most important criterion” for committee assignments, but “it is equally obvious that ideology plays a part in determining the individuals assigned to each of the committees” (pg. 539). The resulting committees gave then Governor Reagan a relatively friendly committee system with which to work.

Beth and Havard (1961) is another individual state study that focused primarily upon what I have termed component strategy issues. These authors examine both the Florida House and Senate over three sessions from 1955 to 1959 in which Democrats had a very large numeric majority. They suggest that “committee assignment is used as a device to create and perpetuate a ruling oligarchy in the legislature” by a conservative “pork-chop gang” that is “militantly segregationist” (1961; 60, 68). The authors suggest that three forms of committee “stacking” are used by these conservatives:

The first form is the stacking of those committees which are most important in the substantive work of each house. The second deals with certain committees which handle matters relating to specific economic interests. The third example is the so-

called “dog-house” committee in the House, which is used by way of contrast. (Beth and Havard 1961, 68)

The second form of stacking they mention is essentially a form of the distributive theory argument, and they support this by showing that members with heavy citrus interests (personal or representative) also sit on the Citrus Committees. The first and third types of stacking are more closely related to the reliability arguments that have been presented in this work. After categorizing the members by whether they are friendly to rural (i.e., the conservative “pork-choppers”) or urban areas, they present evidence that rural members dominate the important committees, with “the same men appearing on several such committees” (Beth and Havard 1961, 80). Reliable members, then, are placed on important committees and they are used repeatedly, both notions consistent with a reliability focus. Not only are reliable members utilized in this manner, but unreliable members are marginalized on the “dog-house committee.” They note that “urban movers-and-shakers ... were relegated to the doghouse” and “this committee serves as a repository for [minority party] Republicans” (pg. 77).

Beth and Havard's seeming displeasure with these circumstances likely led them to overreach in attributing causality for these legislative features. In their conclusion, they suggest that

Committee stacking in Florida deviates from orthodox models of representative democracy in two respects: it involves a calculated disregard for the general public will, substituting a set of local wills which do not add up to a majority; and it is an indication of the substitution of oligarchy for a popular, responsible exercise of political power. Yet stacking is a reflection of the nature of politics in Florida—fragmented, locally oriented, malapportioned—and one would not expect any great changes in the makeup of committees unless it were preceded by a pronounced transformation of the political system. This does not seem imminent. (Beth and Havard 1961, 83)

To suggest that committee stacking is caused by some factors idiosyncratic to Florida is to likely misunderstand the nature of committee formation in many, if not most, American legislatures. Utilizing reliable members repeatedly and on key committees is commonplace in the U.S. House, as chapter 4 demonstrated, and the House does not suffer the same deficiencies as Florida apparently did. It is likely that if the urban legislators were to achieve a numeric majority in the Florida legislatures that they too would place ideologically friendly members in several and key positions. In fact, Beth and Havard present some evidence of this occurring when an urban-friendly speaker had control of committee assignments (pg. 70). Such allocation techniques are not a signal of a deficient political system; instead they are the tools used by a majority seeking to create a structure that will tend to operate reliably.

Both the Robeck (1971) and Beth and Havard (1961) studies offer a good caution for this present study. The theory presented here has consistently labeled the phenomenon as “*majority party* reliability.” In both of these studies, however, there was a conservative block that pursued component reliability at the expense of the majority party's liberals. Neither study addressed systems strategies to any great extent, and so it would require further examination to see what party ratios emerged. It is probably safe to say that if a majority party is so heterogeneous that it cannot even organize the institution in a manner that is desirable to most majority members, then the expectations of *majority party* reliability will not hold. Instead, under these circumstances it may be that some form of “majority coalition reliability” has emerged. When the majority party is unable to agree on organizing the body, things can get quite messy, with idiosyncratic deals being struck with minority members in exchange for support. In these instances one would suspect

that distributive theories would continue to receive strong support from the committee system, but perhaps less support would be present for a partisan theory. This is probably a valid concern to keep in mind when examining state legislatures where ideology and party may not correlate to a high degree.

Several recent state legislative studies have taken the outlier approach to committees, often entirely bypassing the question of varying institutional features across states. With great uniformity these studies have reported that state legislative committees are representative of the floor and that an informational theory of legislative organization is therefore supported by their analyses. As mentioned earlier, this chapter will not be addressing the question of committee ideological representativeness, but I include these articles in the review since current studies are consistently reaching conclusions at odds with what a reliability perspective would expect.

Overby and Kazee (2000) examine the prevalence of outlying committees in the lower houses of 12 states. As is common (but unfortunate) each state is examined on a single year basis instead of an over-time analysis. Comparing committee and floor means on business interest group measures for eight states, they conclude “the story told ... is unequivocal: outlying committees are rare,” and “in none of the eight states is a control committee an outlier in respect to the floor” (pg. 709). Switching to a modified roll-call measure for three states, they again find “committee outliers still appear to be relatively rare,” and “none of the control committees emerges as an outlier” (pg. 712). Using a constituency characteristic-based measure for South Carolina, the authors find few outliers, leading them to suggest that “these findings cast doubt on whether the findings by Hall and Grofman (1990) and Adler and Lapinski (1997) regarding constituency-

based measures are generalizable to the states” (pg. 715). Using a survey-based measure for Kentucky, they find that only one committee (Banking and Insurance) is an outlier compared to the floor. They conclude that committees are “broadly similar to their parent chambers,” and “it is especially clear that important control and money committees are generally representative of their respective chambers” (pgs. 719, 721). They take these findings to support information-based theories of legislative organization.

Several criticisms can be made of the Overby and Kazee (2000) approach. First, although they use a variety measures, the propriety of using of using business interest group measures to test any of the theoretical perspectives is questionable. A party reliability perspective would want measures on a dimension relevant to party, and a distributive theory would want measures relevant to factors such as constituency characteristics. A business interest group measure likely does not suffice for either of these theories, and instead approaches the “irrelevant measure” discussed here in chapter 1 in relation to table 1.1. Second, Overby and Kazee use a traditional difference of means test instead of a median-based test, which have obvious theoretical appeal in majoritarian settings. Third, the absence of longitudinal data for any of their states would likely inhibit the ability of the researchers to detect representativeness variations due to floor advantage variation even if they had used medians and more appropriate measures. Finally, as a theoretical matter, the expectations that they suggest for “the” party control model are flawed, and this is a recurring problem in the literature. They believe that

The party control model would predict that state legislatures with strong party caucuses would have few outliers; party leaders would seek to ensure that committees are representative of the legislature as a whole—or at least their respective party delegations. (Overby and Kazee 2000, 717)

My expectations for a party control model (one focusing on reliability) are quite different from those they suggest. Depending on the type and size of the committee, and especially on the partisan floor divisions, party leaders may often seek committees that are *not* representative of the floor. Overby and Kazee may have drawn their party expectations from the work of Cox and McCubbins (1993) who made a popularly cited claim about some contingents being representative of the caucuses from which they were derived. Although I earlier argued that this contingent claim is dubious, even if one grants their claim, it is quite another matter to transfer a contingent claim to one about full committee rosters. Two contingents may appear to be quite representative of their respective caucuses by some measure of central tendency and still constitute a committee that has an unrepresentative central tendency. This is most obvious when committee party ratios differ from those of the floor, such as in the House Rules Committee or a committee with equal partisan membership like many ethics committees. Cox and McCubbins' theoretical claim was limited to party contingents on some committees, and to arrive at a full committee claim, one is assuming that committee party ratios typically mirror the floor. As we have seen in the House, this claim is often not supported by the data (see figure 3.1).

Overby and Kazee (2000) is extended in Overby, Kazee, and Prince (2004) by an expansion of the sample from twelve to forty-five lower state chambers. The theoretical portion of the paper is noteworthy for indicating the proverbs being formed from the U.S. House literature. Overby et al. suggest the creation of nonrepresentative committees “would be decidedly irrational,” and “there is growing evidence that outlying committees are, at best, a relative rarity, especially on the more important control committees” (pg.

82). Using a measure of legislator preference created by a single pro-business interest group (the National Federation of Independent Businesses, or NFIB), they conduct difference of means tests to determine the existence of committee outliers. They find that “only 3% of all committees and only 6% of important control committees are outliers,” and suggest that this evidence “adds even more weight to an informational model of legislative organization” (pgs. 98-99).

Although they find “a dearth of committee outliers” the authors attempt to create and test an explanation for why outliers occur where they do. The dependent variable they use is “the percentage of outlying committees from each state.” For independent variables they correctly note that “the existing literature on committee outliers provides little in the way of guidance.” This is a slightly dismaying admission since it renders a whole domain of outlier research findings as largely lacking a theoretical basis. According to the authors this theoretical absence exists because “previous authors have been more interested in tallying the numbers of outlying committees rather than in exploring their root causes” (pg. 93). This is a void which this present work has tried to address.

Given this absence of theory to explain variation in committee outliers among the states, the authors say “we are left largely, then, to rely on our own judgment and instincts in selecting our independent variables” (p. 93). They report results for seven variables, including a Southern dichotomous variable, a measure of professionalization, a dichotomous variable for party, a “locus of power” variable, a dichotomous variable about minority power in committee assignments, the number of committees in the chamber, and finally a variable based upon parties’ seat shares. This last variable might

be thought to have some merit from a majority party perspective, but the nature of the dependent variable may cloud its effect. Since the dependent variable used by the authors simply taps the presence of outliers, measures of party competition may not be very helpful in predicting this. The reason for this can be seen from a graph like figure 3.2. Very close floors may lead to outliers favoring the majority, but large floor advantages may lead to outliers favoring the minority. The presence of outliers for close floors *and* large floors (albeit in opposite directions) tends to frustrate a linear regression variable of party competition.

Conducting separate regressions for control and noncontrol committees, they find “overwhelming null results” for the noncontrol regression since no independent variable “approaches even a liberal threshold of statistical significance” (p. 96). The regression for control committees produces nearly identical results, with only the “locus of power” variable achieving statistical significance in the direction opposite of what was predicted. They conclude that “the percentage of outlying committees in state legislatures does not appear to be dependent upon major partisan, cultural, or institutional features in the states’ political landscapes” (p. 98).

This article demonstrates how there is something of a predisposition to support informational theories. These authors find almost no committee outliers, produce two regressions that fail to give any insight on the incidence of outliers, yet the article is characterized as producing strong support for informational theory at the expense of both distributive and partisan theories. As Marshall et al. (1997) have noted, nearly all committees may appear to be representative of the chamber if they are evaluated on measures which are irrelevant to the process that composes the committees.

Another extension of the Overby and Kazee (2000) analysis is found in Prince and Overby (2005), in which the authors apply the same framework to 42 state senates. Purposefully trying to make this study comparable with their previous work, the authors again use a single business-oriented interest group measure of legislator preference to generate means for floors and committees. Although the analysis extends the scope of states examined, they incorporate just a single session for each state using the traditional difference of means test. Their findings are again characterized almost unequivocally:

Outlying committees are rare in state senates, although not as rare as in the lower chamber.... Among the control committees that structure the rules, appropriations, and taxation policies in state senates, only 7.5 percent were preference outliers (four outliers in 53 control committees). More telling is that, of the 33 states in our sample for which we have data on control committees, fully 29 (87.9 percent) had no outlying control committees at all. Outliers were somewhat more common in non-control committees, representing 11.3 percent of the total, a level similar to Krehbiel's (1991) original results from the 99th Congress. In almost 40.0 percent of the states in our sample, there were no outliers at all, and in only one state (Kansas) can outliers be said to have been common.... The relative scarcity of outlying committees based on these [NFIB] scores in state senates provides additional support for the information theory of legislative committee organization. Like their lower chamber counterparts, most state senate committees appear to be constituted to mirror the preferences of their parent chamber. (Prince and Overby 2005, 76-79)

They offer a similarly strongly stated conclusion:

Beginning with Krehbiel's 1990 study, informational theorists invited us to reconsider the traditional distributive model of legislative organization in light of new theoretical and empirical developments. Our study supports this revisionist view by extending its tests to a large number of legislative chambers that have not been assessed previously: the state senates. Together with similar studies of lower chambers in Congress (Krehbiel 1990, 1991; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Groseclose 1994; Maltzman 1995; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) and state legislatures (Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004; Battista 2004), this study provides compelling evidence of generally representative legislative committees organized much as informational theory suggest. The weight of this evidence—from various legislatures, using various measurement techniques, and employing various methods—suggests that those who hold to the distributive view of legislative organization have a significant burden to overcome. (Prince and Overby 2005, 82)

Finally, they report some regressions that were intended to predict the presence of committee preference outliers in state senates. As in their prior research, the percentage of outlying committees in each state is again used as the dependent variable, and they conduct two regressions: one for control and one for non-control committees. The independent variables they include are “region (as a surrogate for political culture), legislative professionalism, party control of the chamber, locus of power within the chamber, minority party input into the committee composition, effective number of parties in the chamber, and (in the equation for non-control committee outliers) the number of non-control committees in the chamber.” They find that “none of the independent variables in these models even approaches statistical significance, a fact underscored by the negative adjusted- R^2 ” (Prince and Overby 2005, 80).

This study shares many of the same shortcomings as Overby and Kazee (2000) and Overby, Kazee, and Prince (2004) in that it again uses means, examines only a single year, and probably most importantly it employs a measure that no theory of legislative organization would use to claim that committees are outliers. To test a distributive theory, one would need a distributive-related measure, and to test a party reliability theory one would need a measure relevant to party reliability. The business measure used here likely satisfies neither of these conditions, and therefore the authors are consistently looking for outliers on a dimension in which no one has expected them. This leads them to sweeping conclusions that are probably not warranted. As I will discuss below, there is good reason to expect that some state settings will systematically produce outliers while others will be much less prone to do so.

Aldrich and Battista (2002) examine committee representativeness as part of their study of conditional party government in eleven states. They compute NOMINATE-style measures for each state and use Monte Carlo simulations to examine if committees are outliers. For each chamber they simulate 10,000 committees of *average* size and compare those means with the means of the actual committees. These are unfortunate choices from a party reliability standpoint. First, means are not as desirable theoretically and they are utilizing a method that easily accommodates median analysis. Battista himself subsequently finds that means tests are not “a reliable substitute for medians” because their estimates “differ wildly” (Battista 2004, 167). Also the use of average committee size negates the ability to test for differences that party reliability suggests may exist between large and small committees.

Apparently following the Cox and McCubbins claims about party contingents, they expect “control committees and committees more generally important to a party's reputation to be more representative of the parent chamber (if each party's contingent is more representative of the larger party)” (Aldrich and Battista 2002, 170). They make a similar theoretical claim elsewhere, suggesting that:

Obviously, if both party contingents are representative of the parent caucuses, then the committees will be approximately representative of the larger chamber. This links Cox and McCubbins' cartel account to Gilligan and Krehbiel's information-based model of committees subservient to the full chamber. (Aldrich and Battista 2002, 165)

This claim about representative contingents leading to representative committees is frequently the only claim made about committee representativeness for partisan theories of organization. Yet it is a very questionable claim to make, especially when committee ratios do not mirror floor ratios. Add to this the fact that partisan theories

alone are probably best-suited to explain the tendency for ratios and committee ideological medians to favor the majority party under some circumstances, and one begins to see that party theorists should not be claiming a link to informational theory on these matters. Partisan theories have long been in a uniquely qualified position to make a major contribution to our understanding of legislative committee organization, but this ground has largely been ceded to informational and distributive theorists.

Aldrich and Battista's regression results are somewhat difficult to decipher since they do not explain what their dependent variable is in their OLS regressions of committee representativeness, nor do they give a substantive interpretation to any of the independent variable coefficients. They do include some analysis for different types of committees (money, education, environment, judiciary, rules, and transportation) and find that none of them approach traditional levels of significance. The committees closest to significance (and therefore closest to being outliers) were education committees, with significance around 0.17 and 0.20 (2002, 171).

Battista (2004) follows up this study with another re-examination of legislative committee representativeness. He follows some of the same methods of Aldrich and Battista (2002), adding the improvement of switching the focus to comparisons of committee and chamber medians. Creating a type of NOMINATE score for state legislators, he examines 11 states for a single session each. To test the representativeness of each committee, Battista "created 10,000 committees of the same size as each actual committee with membership selected randomly from the entire parent chamber" (Battista 2004, 168). Using a 0.05 level of significance, he finds that only 9 of the 201 committees are outliers, but a 0.25 level of significance yields a substantial 40 committees as outliers,

nearly 20 percent of his sample (pg. 169). Battista, however, summarizes the evidence by writing that “this lack of outliers is consistent with the informational and partisan models of committee organization, both of which predict few outlying committees” (pg. 170). Here again it appears that the Cox and McCubbins claim about some committee contingents being ideologically representative is being generalized to suggest that committees as a whole will be ideologically representative. As has been stated repeatedly in this present work, this claim is unwarranted since two representative contingents can quite easily produce an unrepresentative committee, especially when deviations from the floor party ratio occur.

Battista's work makes several improvements over previous efforts by adopting median tests that use random assignment and the actual committee sizes. He also acknowledges that his data are inappropriate for testing distributive theories. Unfortunately he remains focused on single sessions for individual states. Another potential problem is that 3 of his 11 states (Connecticut, Maine, and Rhode Island) primarily use joint committees, meaning that they are composed of both upper and lower house members. Several methodological problems would seem to result from the inclusion of these states, but chief among these is that it is not clear which body's floor median is being compared to the committee's median. The article makes no mention that these states use joint committees, and there is no discussion of the problems unique to testing these committees as outliers.

Battista makes a worthy distinction when he notes that outliers “are clustered in just a few chambers” (Battista 2004, 169). He suggests that state legislative chambers “fall into three categories of representativeness: clearly representative committee

systems, those that are no more representative than those that would be the result of a random assignment process, and those that are clearly unrepresentative” (pg. 177). A majority party reliability focus would suggest states should not be placed into a single category since most states create committee systems that could fit each of these classifications. In other words, it is not that chamber X always makes unrepresentative committees but that chamber X can make either representative or unrepresentative committees depending upon the relevant reliability concerns. Under a closely divided floor, many state legislatures will tend to have unrepresentative committees that favor the majority party. When the floor advantage increases for the majority, then it is more likely that one would see a committee system approximating representativeness. When the floor advantage is very large, then the committee system may tend to become unrepresentative, but this time it would favor the minority party. So individual legislatures can be capable of many faces depending upon strategic reliability considerations. Of course, some states have institutional mechanisms that would prevent this type of variation, and Battista's representativeness classification might make more sense for them.

Battista closes the article with a plea for theorizing that would be able to predict the differences he does report. Although he had earlier summarized his empirical work by saying that outlying committees were “rare” and that “most chambers have few, if any outliers” (pg. 169), he is apparently convinced that it is a worthwhile pursuit to see why these outliers do exist. He writes

We find a world where different legislatures organize their committees along different lines and for different reasons. This variation cries out for theoretical and empirical explanation. We should devise theories that predict which kinds of committees will be more or less representative of their parent chamber ... We should also develop theories of systematic chamber-wide variation in committee representativeness. (Battista 2004, 178)

This plea is quite similar to that of Londregan and Snyder (1994) in which they acknowledged that better theoretical models were needed to account for the ideological variation in committees they found. It has been the aim of this present work to fill some of this theoretical gap by providing a majority party reliability framework for analyzing committee composition.

To summarize, state legislative committee research has enjoyed an increasing level of recent attention, but it is marked by some of the same deficiencies that are apparent in research done at the national level. Most prominent among these is the consistent inattention to or misperception of the role of systems strategies in committee formation. State research has often implicitly assumed that the committee party ratios simply mirror the floor ratio, and this is why outlier researchers have frequently extended Cox and McCubbins' claims about party contingents (that those producing important "externalities" will be representative of their respective caucuses) to the full committee (that it will be ideologically representative of the chamber). In the article that examines state committee party ratios most directly, Hedlund and Hamm add to the confusion in two ways. First, after examining committee ratios in five states, they suggest that there are five patterns used by these states. One wonders how many more patterns could be discerned as the sample size increases. Second, when they conduct individual state regressions they misinterpret the most important coefficients, erroneously suggesting there is a contradictory result in the relationship between floor advantage and a committee's party ratio.

Other state research has focused on issues related to component strategies, and there has been support for reliability-related allocation hypotheses. Most recent research

involving state committees has centered on outlier studies, and almost without exception the authors have concluded that the vast majority of committees are representative of the parent chamber, thus supporting informational theories of legislative organization.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of state legislative systems strategies. The approach to state legislatures will be similar to that used in earlier chapters in that it will proceed in three stages. First, state legislatures will be evaluated as venues for observing systems strategies, and this will be done by examining incentive, the ability to implement the strategy, and the presence of an implementation agent. Second, the systems strategy hypotheses will be reintroduced for those legislatures that do appear to be likely venues for observing systems strategies. Finally the empirical evidence for systems strategies in both chambers of 46 states over eight sessions will be presented and analyzed. One major aim of this chapter is to clarify the nature of committee party ratios in state legislatures. Understanding the role of party reliability in committee structure may shed considerable light on what is just one stage of the process to establish final committee rosters. I would expect that the influence of a reliability approach would be of great help to those doing outlier analysis of state legislative committees in that it (finally!) provides a theoretical basis to explain some of the observed variation in committee representativeness.

Evaluating State Legislatures as Venues for Finding Majority Party Reliability Systems Strategies

In prior chapters when venues were being evaluated for reliability strategies, only one institution was in view at a time. In looking at the chambers of many states at once, there is good reason to wonder whether a sufficient picture of the institution is available

in order to conduct such an evaluation. For three reasons, I believe it is possible to give a helpful first look at committee party ratios in state legislatures. First, there is an existing literature by state legislative scholars that characterizes some of the features of state legislatures. These include 50-state studies that rely upon survey responses of state legislators specifically on committee-related issues. Second, there are organizations such as the National Conference of State Legislatures that conduct extensive 50-state surveys asking questions specifically about the state legislative process. Other regularly-produced works such as the *Book of the States* and the *State Yellow Book* also offer helpful information on each state. Finally, there is much institutional information widely available now as nearly all states have their bodies' rules posted online. Each of these resources has been explored here in order to create a picture of the features specific to each legislative body, and the extent of the leverage that these resources have provided will be demonstrated in the empirical section. With that being said, it would be most desirable to have a number of intimate investigations of each state legislative chamber's process of creating committees, akin to *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*. As was noted earlier, however, even Shepsle's classic examination still resulted in the unsound conclusion that committee ratios mirrored the floor. With this caution made, I turn to an evaluation of the states as venues for finding systems strategies related to committee party ratios.

The first characteristic examined here is the incentive for systems strategies to be pursued, and for the purpose of this chapter the focus is entirely upon these strategies being used on committee party ratios. A key piece of evidence in this regard can be found in the survey work of several state legislature scholars. One of them has written of the

pervasive importance of state legislative committees, summarizing his own and others' work as follows:

Repeated surveys since 1963 (Francis, 1967; Uslaner and Weber, 1977; Francis and Riddlesperger, 1982) have made it very clear that standing committees in state legislatures are very important centers of decision making. In a related multistate work, Rosenthal (1974) gave principal weight to the attributes of standing committees in his assessments of legislative performance in the states. (Francis 1989, 4-5)

Francis goes on to demonstrate that for the states he examined, "members do in fact sponsor bills that go much more often than chance would allow to the committees on which they serve" (1989, 27). Further, the "bills sponsored by members on the committee to which they are assigned have greater success" (p. 29).

Francis describes the typical state legislative committee as being semi-autonomous, meaning that they require "approval from the larger group for any decision that causes a change in the status quo" (Francis 1989, 100). Being the gatekeepers of their respective jurisdictions, they do have the power to kill legislation. Hamm and Hedlund (1994) similarly use survey data to describe the importance of state legislative committees. They note that "it is rare for more than a small percentage of the proposals to bypass the standing-committee system" (p. 692), and also "there was relative agreement that committee recommendations generally were being followed in the legislative process" (p. 695).

Procedurally, state legislatures operate more like the U.S. House than the U.S. Senate in terms of majoritarian structure and germaneness requirements. State legislatures usually operate under majority rule, and most states have explicit germaneness requirements. Research conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures demonstrates that most states have very explicitly addressed the issue of

germaneness, with 40 state constitutions containing “a provision that requires a bill to address or contain a single subject,” and “over three-fourths of the state legislative chambers report[ing] that they have rules on germaneness of amendments or motions.” In some other states, germaneness is implied but there is no specific statement requiring it (National Conference of State Legislatures 2005).

If it sounds like state legislatures tend to approximate the U.S. House, this is exactly the impression that some state researchers have offered. Francis (1989, 5) wrote that “in almost every important way relating to structure and development, most of the state legislatures are similar to Congress.”

This evidence suggests that there should be an incentive for the majority party to create committee structures that are able to act reliably. This is so because committees are important for creating legislation, killing legislation, having the sole right over certain jurisdictions, and producing legislation that tends to prevail on the floor. This view of the importance of state committees is shared by state researchers and state legislators as well.

The second requirement for viewing systems strategies in state legislative committees is that there be the ability to implement them. In this work, I have taken ability to mean that there are no rules or norms that discourage the adoption of the reliability strategy. The prior section suggested that states are fairly uniform in having the incentive to implement system strategies. They appear to be far less uniform in their ability to pursue systems strategies, however. I will demonstrate below that this varying ability has a tremendous affect on the committee structures produced, and it is quite likely that different structures lead to different types of ideological representativeness on committees. Many state legislative committee studies have not given attention to this

topic and therefore have overlooked an important variable for explaining either the structure or representativeness of those committees.

What types of limitations on ability exist? My review of state legislatures suggest primarily two types of factors inhibit the ability of a majority party to construct committee ratios in a reliable manner. The first and most common is a rule or established practice prescribing that committee ratios should reflect the floor ratio. In many cases these committee ratio concerns are written quite explicitly into the standing rules of the legislature. In other cases, however, the practice is apparently less formal. Surveys of the 50 states were conducted in 1991 and 1996 by the American Society of Legislative Clerks and Secretaries in cooperation with the National Conference of State Legislatures, and each of these included questions pertaining to committee ratios. State respondents indicated that committees either used proportional ratios in committees, or they did not. For those chambers that did use proportional representation, respondents marked whether this was required by chamber rule, or whether it was only “usually followed.” Whatever the genesis of the proportionality guideline, the presence of such a restriction would be a barrier to majority party systems strategies being pursued.

Some states that generally follow proportionality actually have something of a hybrid system in which some committees are allowed as exceptions to the rule. The Kansas Senate, for instance, has rules stating that the “two major political parties shall have proportional representation on each standing committee other than the Committee on Organization, Calendar and Rules.” The exceptionalism of this agenda committee was apparent in that it consistently has given a 7-0 or 9-0 membership to the majority party in eight recent sessions. The Ohio House has been similarly explicit, requiring that the

“membership of committees shall be proportional to the partisan composition of the House,” with the notable exception that the “chairmen, and the vice-chairman with respect to the Finance and Appropriations Committee, shall not be included for purposes of this calculation.” As one would then expect, the Finance and Appropriations Committee consistently bears a ratio advantage favoring the majority party. That such key committees are explicitly allowed as exceptions to proportionality is a compelling piece of evidence supporting a majority party reliability perspective.

A second and less common restriction on the ability to implement ratios reliable for the majority party is the presence of uniform per capita seat quotas. For example if a legislature had 110 members, the division was 60-50, and each member had only one committee seat, then the challenge facing the majority party for making reliable structures becomes evident. If there were ten committees, then the majority could, for instance, make each one 6-5, a somewhat precarious setting for reliable operation. For the majority to increase its margin on a single committee, it can only do so at the expense of at least one other committee, and it would be impossible for the majority party to stack every committee simultaneously. If a majority party has such a per capita restriction, there remain methods for reliability to be pursued. One such option is to create favorable structures where they are most essential. In the 2003 Nevada Senate, for instance, all the senators received 3 seats. The majority party Republicans gave themselves almost a 10% ratio advantage on the Finance and Taxation committees (a 5-2 split), while almost all of the remaining committees had a 5% disadvantage in the committee ratio (a 4-3 split).

A more extreme variation of this same option is for the majority party to use what I have called “marginalizing” committees, and these may be akin to the “doghouse”

committees described by Beth and Havard (1961). These committees would have narrow or less important jurisdictions, and their chief purpose is to keep members off committees that have more important business and therefore need to behave reliably. An example of one of these marginalizing committees might be found in the 1999 Vermont House. The majority Democrats had about 55% of the floor, but almost every member sat on only one committee. To allow themselves a larger cushion on committees like Appropriations and Ways and Means, the Democrats gave the minority Republicans 7-2 control of the Fish, Wildlife, and Water Resources Committee. Perhaps similarly, majority Democrats again gave Republicans a 10-1 margin on the Municipal Corporations and Elections Committee in 1993, even as both Appropriations and Ways and Means gave the majority over a 10% ratio advantage.

These marginalizing committees would seem a most attractive option in settings where reliable majority members are restricted from repeated use, but they are likely an attractive option in other legislatures as well. The Georgia Senate, for instance, does not have a per capita limit, but a per capita floor in that all senators must serve on four committees. The Special Judiciary committee appears to exist for the purpose of being a venue on which to place minority members so that the four seat requirement is satisfied, and in 1991 and 2001 the minority Republicans were given 11-0 majorities. In 2003 when Republicans became the majority party, they removed Democrat Minority Leader Michael Meyer Von Bremen from the Judiciary Committee and relegated him to Special Judiciary, which now was controlled 10-0 by the minority party Democrats. He commented on his disappointment with the switch, saying

I just spent four years on the Judiciary Committee and I am an attorney and have been for 20 years and now I am suddenly not on it anymore. (Special Judiciary) is a good sedative to go to sleep with at night. (AP, Jan. 15, 2003)

This explanation for the presence of such marginalizing committees should give pause to both congressional researchers and reformers alike. For congressional researchers, the exceptional nature of these committees should not be taken as evidence against partisan theories of organization. In fact, they may be a demonstration of majority parties enabling the reliability of the committee system where it is most important. To the reformer's eye such a committee may appear to be inefficient, ineffective, and generally a waste of resources. Again, the marginalizing committee may be serving the specific purpose of enhancing the majority party's ability to have a committee system as a whole that acts reliably on key matters.

The presence of these two types of restrictions on the ability of the majority to implement systems solutions is important for our understanding of legislative committee rosters. State legislatures often have limitations that are not shared by Congress, and state researchers overlook a key piece of evidence when they do not take such features into account. There are more than a few instances where researchers have examined either committee ratios or committee representativeness in which they have actually selected a legislature that requires proportional representation. Such qualities go unmentioned in the research, however, perhaps because many scholars have erred in assuming that committee ratios routinely mirror the floor ratio anyway. As will be shown in the empirical section below, the differences among state legislatures on the question of committee ratios are sometimes profound and therefore give a strong basis for expecting a certain type of ideological representativeness on committees. The differences among

states on their freedom from restrictions provide an important classification scheme to be utilized when testing for systems strategy hypotheses.

A third requirement for observing systems strategies in state legislative committees is that there be an agent of implementation present. This is a question of whether there is an individual or a group present who is both empowered to act and has the collective reliability interests of the majority party at heart. The best systematic data available on this topic is something of a second-best option. The biannual *Book of the States* is published by the Council of State Governments, and its surveys contain questions about who appoints committee members in each state, who appoints committee chairs, and the number of standing committees in each chamber. Strictly speaking, the questions about who appoints members and the chairs gives evidence relevant to component rather than systems strategies, since the former is about allocation and the latter is about structure, our current focus. What would be ideal is to have an explanation of how each state's committee ratios emerge. But one must also consider that even though Shepsle had considerable access to the House players in *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*, he was still unclear about how the committee ratios were produced. For some states, the presence of a personified agent is of less importance since there are specific guidelines about proportionality set forth in the chamber rules. For these states, component strategies would seem to be the primary avenue for majority party reliability to be pursued. For the remaining states, it will be assumed here that those who allocate the seats are also the ones who determine the committee ratios. In many instances an examination of legislative rules confirms that these roles are played by the same agent.

There is important variation in who allocates seats in chambers, which can make some states quite unlike Congress, yet these differences are often not reported in state research. Such an absence is especially critical for outlier studies that would have an obvious interest in who the allocators of seats are. In a majority of chambers, the allocation of seats is similar to the House in that there is a centralized agent (either a single person or a small committee) who makes the decisions for the whole chamber or the respective caucus. There are important exceptions to this generalization, however. In a few chambers, seniority plays such a vital role that the commonly-cited self-selection hypothesis may have especially strong support. In other state senates (Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, and Washington) the committee members and chairs are selected by the president of senate, who is the lieutenant governor, and this person is neither a senator nor is he necessarily of the same party as the majority of the Senate.

That the person forming committees is external to the institution surely provides potential for some strong contrasts with Congress. For instance in Mississippi Lieutenant Governor Amy Tuck was elected as a Democrat, but became a Republican in late 2002. In making the subsequent committee composition decisions for the Democrat-majority Senate, she placed three Republicans as chairs of key committees, including placing one of the most conservative Republicans as the chair of the Public Health and Welfare Committee, which would be taking up key abortion legislation (AP, Jan. 19, 2004). Such minority control outcomes are quite different from what is routinely observed in Congress, and one would expect that these institutional differences would have an influence on the ideological representativeness of the resulting committees. With a different constituency, length of service, and perhaps party affiliation than the majority of

state senators the lieutenant governor could produce outcomes quite different from what have been observed at the U.S. House. These outcomes might not abandon reliability, but may exhibit reliability from the agent's perspective instead of the chamber's majority party. This would seem to be an interesting avenue for future research.

In summary, the legislative chambers of the states exhibit varying traits that are likely to influence the presence of the systems strategies explored in this work. I have characterized state chambers as having incentive for pursuing systems strategy, and a main reason for this is that legislative committees are routinely characterized as key decision making arenas for legislation. State chambers do vary importantly in their ability to implement systems solutions. Several states have explicit rules requiring proportional representation in committee ratios. Some states do not have this as an explicit rule, but have consistently been characterized in surveys as generally following proportionality. There are also some chambers with per capita committee requirements that would inhibit consistent or large departures from proportionality.

While individual chamber studies may uncover further norms or restrictions, utilizing the available nationwide survey information offers an improvement by incorporating features that have gone unreported in much state research where it could be quite relevant. There are several chambers that do not have restrictions on the ability to implement the systems strategy, and these chambers are strong candidates for bearing features similar to the U.S. House, provided that there is an agent to implement much like there is in the House. Yet on this characteristic there is some state variation as well. In the state houses, the vast majority of appointments are made by a single person, the speaker. In three state houses there is a committee on committees that makes the appointments. In

state senates, there is more variation, with a committee on committees being more frequent. It is still common, though, in state senates for a single individual to make the appointments, usually by the president, the president pro tem, or the majority leader. As was noted earlier, though, in a few cases the leader of the senate is external to the institution, being the lieutenant governor of the state.

Testing for Systems Strategies in State Legislatures

To test for the presence of systems strategies in state legislatures, the first three hypotheses of chapter 2 will again be examined. These hypotheses suggested that party ratios on committees will favor the majority party when the jurisdiction of committees is particularly important or when the majority party's margin for error would be small if proportionality were followed. This latter condition is particularly relevant when committees are small or the majority's floor advantage is narrow.

The dependent variable used in this chapter is identical to that used in the earlier House and Senate sections exploring systems strategies. This "ratio stacking" dependent variable measures the amount of advantage the majority party grants itself on committees and can be computed by subtracting the majority's floor proportion from its proportion on a given committee. Thus, if a majority has 52% of the floor and holds 61% of a committee's seats the ratio stacking for this committee is 0.09, or 9% (since $0.61 - 0.52 = 0.09$). As has been noted before, a common assumption and the expectation of informational theory is for this dependent variable to take on a value of zero, since this is what proportionality in committees would produce. Some state chambers have rules or norms preventing the use of this systems strategy, and these chambers may more closely approximate proportionality.

One of the ways that the systems strategy hypotheses will be tested is through a linear regression with ratio stacking on individual committees as the dependent variable. Each of the hypotheses will be repeated here with specific descriptions of the independent variables to be used.

Hypothesis 1: Majority parties utilize system solutions on committees that are important to their ideological objectives. These key committees will therefore tend to have party ratios that favor the majority party.

The first independent variables are dichotomous variables that reflect the importance of a committee. A commonality that state legislatures share with the House is that money committees and agenda committees are among the most important and powerful in the execution of a party's agenda. On this basis state committees that have a title dealing with appropriations, budget, ways and means, finance, revenue, taxation, or rules are all classified as important committees, and therefore should be more likely to exhibit a ratio favorable to the majority party. Some state research has found that other committees are quite important in the states as well such as judiciary and education. To reflect their possible importance these two committee types are also given dichotomous variables. Several states had reapportionment committees and these have very important jurisdictions since they participate in creating the district lines by which members are elected. Finally, some states have committees on committees to allocate their members, and these are likely to have prominent reliability concerns. Each of these committees is assigned a value of one on a dichotomous variable, with all remaining committees being assigned a zero. From hypothesis 1, ratio stacking is thought to increase with the importance of a committee, so each of these dichotomous variables should be positively related to the dependent variable.

The second hypothesis involves the majority party's floor advantage:

Hypothesis 2: The systems strategy of including additional majority seats on committees will be at its peak when the majority party's floor advantage is narrow. A negative relationship exists between majority floor advantage and the advantage that the majority party grants itself in committee ratios.

"Floor advantage" is again defined here as the proportion of the floor belonging to the majority party minus 0.50. Therefore if the majority party held 67% of the floor, then its floor advantage would be 0.17 (since $0.67 - 0.50 = 0.17$). This second hypothesis indicates that when floor advantage is at its lowest levels (i.e., less than 0.05) then the dependent variable of ratio stacking should be at its greatest. This implies that the intercept of the linear regression should be positive, and that the coefficient on floor advantage should be negative since ratio stacking favoring the majority becomes less necessary as the majority's size increases.

The third independent variable concerns the size of an individual committee:

Hypothesis 3: Larger committees have majority contingents that can suffer several defections yet still produce a reliable performance, whereas the performance of smaller committees can be threatened by just a few defections. Therefore committee size is inversely related to the ratio advantage that the majority party grants itself.

The independent variable "committee size" is again just the combined number of seats allocated to the majority and minority contingents. Since small committees have a smaller margin for error, hypothesis 3 suggests that these are more likely to exhibit ratio stacking. A negative relationship is expected between committee size and the dependent variable. Some have suggested that small committees only exhibit a tendency to favor the majority party as an artifact of mathematical inability to achieve proportionality. For example, if a party has 52% of the floor and there is a committee with only three members, then some would argue that the closest that the committee could come to

proportionality would be to have a membership of 2-1. This, of course, would yield a large ratio stacking value of almost 0.15 ($0.67 - 0.52 = 0.15$). This suggestion overlooks two important factors.

First, a value quite close to proportionality could be achieved on a small committee by giving equal membership to both parties, perhaps making it 1-1 or 2-2. Yet because of the importance of party, such outcomes are rarely observed even though they would come much closer to reflecting proportionality. Theoretical perspectives that exclude party as an important factor (as informational theory explicitly has) are less well-equipped to explain these deviations from proportionality. Partisan theories of organization, of course, can have a ready explanation for such phenomena.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, is that it needs to be recognized that the choice of committee size is itself endogenous. In most chambers, committee size is not set in stone, and roster sizes routinely vary over time. This indicates that the agent of implementation for the chamber is able to structure committees however it sees fit. It is quite likely that a committee like Rules in the House is small on purpose to facilitate its control by the majority, especially when a component strategy is combined with the structural choice. In any case, it is clear from comparing the House and Senate systems strategy results that proportionality can be approximated much more closely than the House actually does. Studies that have included committee size as an independent variable (Hedlund and Hamm 1996 and Poole and Rosenthal 1997) have tended to view it only as a control variable rather than a legitimate theoretical expectation related to party reliability.

Since a linear regression will be used to test these hypotheses, it is possible to also present an expectation for the intercept of such a regression. The intercept can be defined as the average value of the dependent variable when all independent variables take on the value of zero. Although committee size is never zero, and a floor advantage of zero would technically result in no majority party, it is nevertheless possible to discuss a small non-prestige committee in a closely divided floor. A small committee created during a close floor advantage should lead to high levels of ratio stacking. Therefore, there is a strong expectation that the intercept will be positive in these regressions.

Data

To test these hypotheses, floor and party ratio data were collected for all state legislative committees from 1989 to 2003. Where possible, the earliest structures reported in *The State Yellow Book* were used as the source for member allocations, party affiliations, and floor division. As has been the practice throughout, any vacancies reported were included in party ratios since they reflected a structural intention. There are four types of committees not included in this collection.

First, some states (including Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts) primarily use joint committees, meaning that they are composed of members from both the lower and upper chambers. This presents the problems of deciding which floor's partisan division to reference and which chamber's members to include in the committee ratios. On this basis all joint committees are excluded here, although these committees' unique configuration would provide interesting grounds to examine both the structural and allocation decisions made there, particularly from a party reliability perspective. Committees for Nebraska's unicameral legislature are also excluded because that

chamber is nonpartisan, and this prevents a straightforward construction of some of the variables necessary for testing the model. The third type of exclusion is for any committee that persistently gave equal representation to majority and minority parties regardless of the floor advantage for the majority party. Just as the Standards of Official Conduct Committee had been excluded in the House analysis, so this rule also excludes several ethics committees in the states since both parties held the same number of seats.

The final type of committee excluded were those that had equal party membership based on an equally divided floor. These are somewhat rare instances where the floor is impressively mirrored in the committee ratios, but these are also instances where no majority was present to implement a majority party reliability systems solution. These cases too provide a unique setting to examine especially component strategies on key committees. If, however, a floor were equally divided and reported a committee structure that gave a partisan advantage, then these committees were included. With these exclusions there remain 12,889 committees in 92 chambers on which the hypotheses can be tested.

In the discussion of state legislatures as venues for finding majority party reliability systems strategies, it was noted that there is not a uniform expectation for their presence being detected. In particular, states varied in their freedom from restrictions and in the presence of an agent of implementation. Such variation may have a considerable influence on how a state chamber fares against the reliability hypotheses outlined here. For this reason results for states will be presented in two main groups that will also be subdivided. The first group will contain those chambers that would be strong candidates for producing structures that follow proportionality. This group includes chambers that

have explicit rules prescribing proportionality (34 chambers), equal per capita committee assignments (6 chambers), and those that surveys reported as usually following proportionality, even though it was not required (31 chambers). The second major group contains those chambers that did not have rules requiring proportionality, nor was it reported as usually followed. For each chamber, a linear regression will be presented as well as a graphical depiction of the average ratio stacking for each session. For each chamber’s regression the coefficients significant at the 0.05 level (with a one-tailed test) have been placed in bold. This is the same level of significance as had been used previously for the House, but it is employed here on chambers with a smaller sample of sessions.

Thirty-four Chambers with Proportionality Rules

The first grouping consists of 34 chambers that have an explicit proportionality rule. A graph, regression, and additional information are included for each of these chambers in table 7.1. Where possible, the actual proportionality rule has been listed in the table. By perusing this table, one sees that several of these chambers, despite their proportionality rules, appear to depart from proportionality in order to pursue reliability objectives. This can be seen in the large and positive intercepts on the graphs and regressions as well as a downward slope of average stacking as floor advantage increases. Several of the dichotomous variables are also in bold type, meaning that they achieve statistical significance. Several of these chambers, even with proportionality rules, appear to follow a pattern similar to that of the House.

[Table 7.1 about here]

Other chambers, however, do stay consistently close to proportionality. These chambers are those that have average ratio stacking hovering around zero, regardless of the majority floor advantage. The commitment to follow proportionality is especially clear in the cases where the majority has a very narrow floor advantage yet has not increased its ratio advantage in committee. These chambers quite clearly depart from the pattern of the House, and these are some of the relatively few chambers that, by this data, could accurately be described as routinely following proportionality.

Some chambers that may appear to follow proportionality have only constructed committees under the conditions of exceptionally large floor advantages. It may be that proportionality would be departed from if the incentive to follow reliable committee construction increased, especially if the floor were more closely divided. It is therefore difficult to classify these chambers as following either the House pattern or proportionality because there is such limited variance in one of the key independent variables. More variation could place these chambers in either camp, so for now these will be treated separately. Each of these subgroups will now be discussed.

Nine Chambers That Follow Their Proportionality Rules

Of the 34 chambers listed in table 7.1, I have classified 9 as following proportionality, and this list includes the Colorado House, Colorado Senate, Idaho Senate, Kansas Senate, Missouri House, Missouri Senate, Nevada House, South Carolina Senate, and Washington House. Perhaps the purest examples of this subgroup are the Idaho Senate, Kansas Senate, Missouri House, and Nevada House. These chambers share many characteristics in their regressions. First, the intercept term is routinely small, suggesting that ratio stacking is not large even when the floor is very closely divided.

Second, the coefficient on the floor advantage variable is close to zero, and this indicates that committee ratios track floor ratios quite closely. For example, the Kansas Senate has a floor advantage coefficient of -0.082, and this means that for every percentage point gained (or lost) by the majority on the floor, almost 92% of this gain is also reflected in committee ratios. For the Idaho Senate, the (insignificant) coefficient of -0.04 suggests an even higher level of mirroring where the relationship between floor and committee is nearly one-to-one.

A third characteristic of these chambers is that very few (and usually none) of the dichotomous variables are significant. This indicates that even important committees are not allowed as exceptions to the chambers' practice of following proportionality. The only exception to this is in the Kansas Senate, which has a Committee on Organization, Calendar, and Rules that was always composed of only majority members. As the table indicates, though, this committee is explicitly addressed in that chamber's rules as not being bound to proportionality. Finally, the size coefficient is usually small or not significant, suggesting that proportionality is followed regardless of how many members are on the committee. The graphs for these four chambers are also quite similar in that the scatter is quite flat, never fluctuating very far from zero even under very close floor conditions. These scatter plots confirm the regression results of small intercepts and small floor advantage coefficients.

The other five chambers classified in this proportionality group are not quite as consistent in following proportionality, though it does seem to be their general pattern. The Colorado House has several quite proportional sessions, yet the single close session (a 34-31 floor) appears to give some special advantage to the majority party, with

Appropriations being 6-4, House Services 3-1, and Joint Budget 2-1. Apart from these, the remaining committees are reasonably close to proportional. The Colorado Senate has a scatter plot that looks quite reminiscent of the U. S. House, with its large intercept and downward slope, yet it could reasonably be argued that this indeed is an instance where approximating proportionality still results in apparent advantages to the majority party. The reason for this is that both the floor and the committees of the Colorado Senate are quite small, with committees often being composed of only seven total members. In 2001 Democrats held an 18-17 floor majority, and in 2003 Republicans took the same advantage. The closest that a 7-member committee could come to proportionality would be 4-3, which with a 51.4% floor majority yields a ratio stacking value of almost 6%. For these it is plausible that proportionality is being pursued even though some features look quite similar to the House. Even for these sessions, though, both parties constructed Appropriations committees that were 6-4, departing from strict proportionality on one of the most important committees.

The South Carolina Senate similarly tended to follow proportionality but with some notable exceptions. In 2001 Republicans held a 24-22 floor advantage that increased to 25-21 in 2003. Despite these close floor divisions, the average ratio stacking hovers around zero, with average ratio stacking of only 1.5% and -2.2% and only one committee has what might be called a “bonus seat” for the majority. Yet in 1999 Democrats had a 24-22 floor advantage, and ratio stacking appeared on committees like Finance (12-6) and Rules (13-4), with average ratio stacking exceeding 6%. This session also had what may have been a marginalizing committee, with the “General Committee” having 12 minority and 6 majority members. The difference between the sessions may in

part be attributable to a rule change. According to a survey conducted by the American Society of Legislative Clerks and Secretaries over 1996 and 1997, the response for the South Carolina Senate indicated that neither was there a rule requiring proportionality nor was proportionality generally followed. Yet recent sessions of the Senate have rules requiring that proportionality be followed “as nearly as possible” and that combat marginalizing committees somewhat by requiring that the majority party have a majority of each standing committee.

The Missouri Senate follows a very similar story, with occasional Democratic ratio stacking being eliminated by rule once Republicans became the majority. Finally, the Washington House has followed proportionality for many of the sessions examined here, but there remains evidence that is more consistent with a majority party reliability perspective. Specifically, in 2003 Democrats held about 52.5% of the floor with a 51-46 advantage, and nearly all committees are constructed with just a single seat advantage to the majority, a result according well with proportionality. Yet the division on Appropriations was 15-12 and on Rules it was 10-8. Such a committee system is something of a hybrid, with proportionality generally being the rule, but with exceptions allowed for the most important committees.

These nine chambers have explicit proportionality rules, and these results affirm that they generally do follow them. Few instances of departure from proportionality are in evidence, and therefore these chambers offer little support for the majority party reliability hypotheses. It is interesting to note, however, that some of the departures from proportionality even for these chambers are very much in accord with the majority party reliability hypotheses.

Seventeen Chambers That Depart from Their Proportionality Rules

Half the chambers with proportionality rules actually appear to substantially depart from them in order to pursue majority party reliability objectives. From table 7.1, I would classify 17 of these chambers as creating reliability-based committee ratios, and this includes the Alaska House, Alaska Senate, California House, Indiana House, Kentucky Senate, Maryland House, Minnesota House, Minnesota Senate, New Hampshire Senate, North Carolina House, Ohio House, Oregon House, Pennsylvania Senate, Virginia House, Virginia Senate, Wisconsin Senate, and Wyoming Senate. These chambers share the converse characteristics of the prior subgroup in that they display evidence supporting majority party reliability. This evidence is manifested four ways in the chambers' regressions. First, their intercept terms tend to be positive, relatively large, and statistically significant. This is affirmed by the accompanying scatter plots that suggest a large level of average ratio stacking when the floor is closely divided. In 16 of the 17 regressions, the intercept is positive as predicted with the Virginia Senate being the sole exception. (The Virginia Senate had a bipartisan coalition in 1999, resulting in a committee structure favorable to the minority party even though the floor was closely divided). Of the 16 positive coefficients, all but 4 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

A second feature of these regressions is that the coefficient on floor advantage is negative, relatively large in magnitude, and statistically significant. In 15 of the 17 chambers, the coefficient for floor advantage is in the predicted direction and significant at the 0.05 level. Virginia's Senate does not have the predicted sign, but once again the

presence of the bipartisan coalition and the resulting minority-friendly committee structure is the likely cause.

Indiana's House also does not report a significant coefficient for floor advantage, and this provides a particularly interesting case. By looking at the scatter plot for the chamber, one observes that all of the committees examined were constructed under the condition of closely divided floors, with the majority never having more than 56% of the chamber. It is quite likely that more variance on this independent variable would lead to committees with less of a ratio advantage as they tend toward proportionality. This is the basic premise of hypothesis 2, that the incentive to stack the ratios on committees decreases as floor advantage increases. As Indiana's House has wider floor margins, more proportional committees are likely to emerge, leading to the predicted coefficient on floor advantage.

These data give occasion for an important caution to state legislative researchers when trying to categorize state committee ratios. Looking at the Indiana House evidence, one might observe a repeated overrepresentation of the majority party in committee, and therefore conclude that the Indiana House is an institution that consistently overrepresents the majority. Yet such a classification would be too hasty and too simplified a view for the actual underlying process. Instead, chambers such as these can wear multiple hats, as it were, adjusting the majority's representation on committees as the reliability environment dictates. Indiana's House does over-represent the majority according to the data presented here, but this overrepresentation is likely to vanish (at least some) when the floor advantage increases. This move toward proportionality need not represent a change in structural philosophy by the majority party; instead, in many chambers both

disproportionate and proportionate committees are locations on a continuum suggested by the same data generation process. Indeed, if sessions from only the last ten years of the U.S. House were examined, a researcher might induce that House majorities always stack committee ratios in their favor. Yet the inclusion of more years with added variance on the floor advantage independent variable illustrates the broad range of ratio representativeness that occurs in the House.

A third characteristic of these regressions is that there are frequently statistically significant ratio advantages for the important committees, as indicated by the bolded dichotomous variables. Over the 17 chambers, there are 34 dichotomous variables significant at the 0.05 level. Collectively and individually, these results support the hypothesis that majority parties tend to increase their ratio advantage on important committees. By comparison, the 9 chambers of the previous section that were classified as following proportionality, only 6 total dichotomous variables were significant at this level. The Minnesota House alone (classified as departing from proportionality) nearly equals that, reporting five such significant variables.

A final feature of these regressions is that the size coefficient is often significant. In two chambers there is so little variation in committee size that a coefficient could not be computed, but for the remaining 15 chambers, the size coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.05 level or better in 7 chambers. This provides some support for hypothesis 3 that larger committees will exhibit less ratio stacking.

The scatter plots associated with each chamber give a nice visual summary of the data, and the similarity to the scatter plot of the U.S. House is often apparent. Most chambers either depict the positive intercept and downward slope or occupy a single

location on that slope. The Wyoming Senate depicts one extreme with the minority advantage in committee somewhat common when the majority has such a large floor advantage. The Indiana House shows the opposite extreme, with all the close floors leading to consistent large advantages for the majority party. Several other chambers have enough variance in floor advantage to show a full range of average ratio stacking. A few chambers (i.e., Alaska Senate, New Hampshire Senate, and Virginia Senate) are not exactly classic cases fitting the mold of the U.S. House, but they do favor the majority party substantially at times, and their structural patterns clearly prevent them from being grouped with the proportional chambers.

What is one to make of these large departures from proportionality in chambers that ostensibly require it? It is useful to note that all of these proportionality requirements are usually just part of chamber rules, and can be easily amended (or perhaps dropped) from session to session. If these rules were more exogenous (written formally in the state constitution, for instance), then perhaps stricter adherence would be observed.

These 17 chambers provide a compelling piece of evidence in support of majority party reliability. Despite explicit rules suggesting that proportionality be followed, committees are routinely constructed in a manner that departs from this guideline. These departures occur in a predictable manner, often providing confirmation of the majority party reliability hypotheses.

Seven Ambiguous Chambers That Have Proportionality Rules

This is the third and last major subgroup of chambers that have proportionality rules, and it includes the Alabama House, Hawaii House, Hawaii Senate, Kentucky House, New Hampshire House, Rhode Island House and Wyoming House. Based on the

data examined here, it is difficult to classify these chambers as either following or departing from their proportionality rules due to the absence of any closely divided chambers. Because these chambers did not experience any floors with a division closer than 60-40, majority parties following proportionality and majority parties pursuing reliable structures would both be likely to construct similar committee structures. Majority parties concerned about reliability might construct committees that look like those of these seven chambers because following proportionality in these cases still provides quite a friendly structure to work with, and there would be little advantage to increasing the ratio. Of course if these chambers were devoted to proportionality then these ratios may just be confirming that commitment. If data were examined based on closer floor ratios, then it would be possible to see how strong the chamber's commitment to proportionality is.

These seven chambers typically have few significant coefficients, except for the Kentucky House, which has some significant variables for important committees. This suggests that the Kentucky House's commitment to proportionality is not strong and this would likely become more evident with smaller floor advantages. For the remaining chambers, however, the absence of significant variables should not be hastily taken as support for reliability concerns being absent. Much as the Indiana House did not have many significant variables (even though ratio stacking was large), so these states with large advantages may not exhibit substantial majority party reliability evidence. More variance on the floor advantage variable may lead to significant reliability evidence for these seven chambers as well as for the Indiana House.

These seven chambers share some characteristics in their scatter plots in that the average ratio stacking does not stray far from proportionality. As in the U.S. House, there is at least some tendency in these chambers for the minority party to be somewhat overrepresented when the floor advantage is exceptionally large. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the Hawaii House, Hawaii Senate, and Alabama House. Such minority overrepresentation even occurs on important money committees, and it is likely allowed because the advantage for the minority would have little effect. For example in 1989 Hawaii Senate Democrats held 88% of the floor but allowed two seats for Republicans on Ways and Means instead of the more proportional one seat. Such a structural choice favoring the minority on such a key committee would be quite rare under close floor conditions, but it is not that surprising in this case.

The New York House: An Exceptional Proportionality Rule

The New York House is the last of the 34 chambers with proportionality rules examined here, and given its unique structure it will be treated as its own category. By comparing its scatter plot with any other chamber presented in this study, its exceptionality is clear. No other majority party consistently gave such large average ratio advantages in its committees under fairly large floor advantages. While other chambers approach and sometimes exceed this average level of ratio stacking, they generally do so only under much closer floor conditions. The New York House, though, has a very large average ratio advantage without closely divided floors, and the chamber's rules indicate why this is so. They state that "the number of majority members on each standing committee shall be in the same ratio as the majority members of the House are to the entire membership of the House, with all fractional members plus one member being

credited to the majority.” This rule sounds relatively benign, yet it is precisely the reason that the New York House committees are so different from those of all other chambers.

Some examples will show how such disproportionate outcomes emerge from this rule. In 2003 Democrats held slightly better than a 2-1 edge on the floor of the New York House, having a 102-47 advantage, or approximately 68.5% of the seats. The rule stated above indicates that a committee’s total seats be multiplied by 0.685, with any fractional portion given to the majority and an additional seat also going to the majority. In that session there was a Libraries and Education Technology Committee that was to have a total of 9 members. Applying the chamber’s “proportionality” rule, the 9 is multiplied by 0.685, resulting in 6.165. This 6.165 is rounded up to 7 majority members due to the fractional member, and one more majority member is added to the total, giving the majority Democrats an overwhelming 8-1 membership on the committee. For the dependent variable used in this study, this committee yields a large ratio stacking value of approximately 0.204.

Applying the same procedure to the 34 member Ways and Means committee, 0.685 is multiplied by 34, giving about 23.28. Since fractional seats are awarded to the majority and one more seat is also given, the Democrats receive 25 seats to the Republican’s 9. On this larger committee, the formula gives the majority 73.5% of the seats, or a ratio stacking advantage of about 0.051. The comparison of the Ways and Means Committee with the Library and Education Technology Committee shows how this rule leads to very large advantages on small committees. That is why the coefficient on the size variable in the regression is negative and highly significant. Since all the chamber’s committees are made hyper-reliable by the rule, there is no need for the

important committees to be made even more so, and this likely explains why none of the dichotomous variables are significant. Although there is little variance in the floor advantage independent variable, it seems likely that the intercept and coefficient on floor advantage would remain as they are even if closer floors were added to the sample. The intercept would remain large and positive, and there is no dampening of this advantage with increased floor strength. Instead, the New York House is likely to be a chamber that consistently gives an average ratio advantage of around 0.10 to the majority party.

This proportionality rule in the New York House has made very reliable structures for the majority a matter of institutional procedure. Given the remarkable advantages that result for the majority, this chamber would probably best fit the category of chambers that departs from proportionality, but it differs from those chambers in that it always creates ratio advantages, regardless of circumstance. The New York House approach to majority party reliability is different from the model of the U.S. House in that the reliability enhancements are not selective. Rather than stacking based upon importance or closeness of floor, the New York House paints with a broad brush and stacks them all. Based upon this structural evidence, it seems likely to expect that New York House committees would not mirror the ideological composition of the floor. Incredibly, Overby and Kazee (2000, 720) use a roll call measure to find that very few New York House committees are outliers. By their data, no control committee was an outlier and only 6% of noncontrol committees were outliers.

To summarize this first grouping, 34 state chambers reported some explicit form of proportionality rule for committee ratios. Despite the presence of such mechanisms, a majority of these chambers (18) made large departures from proportionality, and these

departures were consistent with an objective of making reliable committee structures for the majority party. Nine state legislative chambers did follow their proportionality rules quite consistently, but even these chambers sometimes took on hybrid characteristics by allowing departures from proportionality on important committees. Finally, seven chambers did not experience closely divided floors, thus absenting them from the incentive to create structures more reliable than proportionality would present. For these seven there is insufficient data to characterize them as either maintaining or departing from proportionality.

Thirty-one Chambers That “Usually” Follow Proportionality without Its Requirement

One of the questions from the *Inside the Legislative Process* survey specifically inquired about the proportionality of committees. One of the responses available was to indicate that although there was no chamber rule requiring it, proportionality was still “usually followed.” Such a response may occur for several reasons. First, it is possible that these chambers do have a long tradition or norm of creating committees that are indeed proportional. Second, the survey respondent may be basing the response on recent floors that (for whatever reason) did appear to follow proportionality. This rationale leaves open the possibility that these chambers did not recently experience closely divided floors, and perhaps there was no great incentive to stack committee ratios. A third possibility is that the respondent classifies a chamber as following proportionality even when the evidence indicates it does not. Indeed, this has often been the case for the U.S. House by those who have erroneously characterized its committees as almost always following proportionality.

This section operates on the possibility that the first explanation is operative, that the 31 chambers characterized as “usually” following proportionality do adhere to it as a norm or tradition. If the respondents are correct in characterizing the chambers as usually following proportionality, then this could be a possible explanation for the existence of proportional committees in these chambers. As in the prior section, each of these 31 chambers will be categorized as maintaining proportionality, departing from proportionality, or having insufficient evidence. The information and results for each of these 31 chambers are presented in table 7.2.

[Table 7.2 about here]

Eight Chambers That Maintain Proportionality Apart from a Rule

Of the 31 chambers that were described as “usually” following proportionality, the data examined for this study suggest that this is actually occurring for only eight chambers. This includes the Delaware House, Kansas House, Michigan Senate, Oregon Senate, South Dakota Senate, Tennessee Senate, Vermont Senate, and Washington Senate. One common characteristic of these chambers is that they tend to have relatively small floor memberships, with the respective totals of 41, 125, 38, 30, 35, 33, 30, and 49. When there is such a small floor membership, it would be difficult to consistently stack committee ratios without placing an exceptional burden upon majority members. Most of the committees in these small chambers are also small and so even with closely divided floors, committees often are divided along the lines of 6-5, 4-3, and 3-2. Giving the majority party a majority membership on such small committees often leads to relatively large values of ratio stacking under closely divided floors, and this explains why these chambers have the familiar positive intercept and downward slope in their scatter plots.

These characteristics (which are usually associated with chambers that depart from proportionality) are particularly evident for the Michigan Senate, Oregon Senate, South Dakota Senate, and Washington Senate.

It was, of course, an option available for these small chambers with small committees to construct ratios with equal memberships (perhaps with a rule favoring the chair or majority party in ties) and thus more closely approximate proportionality. That they do not and instead quite consistently establish majorities for the majority party is perhaps a key argument for partisan theories of organization and a weakness of distributive (i.e., those who overemphasize request accommodation, ignoring the key roles of partisan structure and partisan allocation) and especially informational theories of organization. Even so, I have decided to allocate these chambers as maintaining proportionality, and this is for primarily two reasons. First, the perspective of this study has been overtly partisan, and therefore it is likely to be helpful if presumption favors an alternate theory. Even though many have characterized legislative committees as following proportionality, few chambers are consistently fitting this profile. This broader definition of what constitutes proportionality in effect sets a lower threshold for identifying chambers that are consistent with conventional wisdom. Second, an occasional criticism of the type of work being presented here is that the advantage to the majority party is only apparent rather than real, a result of rounding in favor of the majority party. By placing chambers such as those described in this section as “proportional” that argument is granted (whether deserved or not) and this has the effect of showing how for the remaining disproportionate chambers it is not possible to argue that their outcome is a result of rounding favoring the majority.

These eight chambers often take on hybrid characteristics, blending typical proportionality with consistent exceptions allowed for important committees. In the Delaware House, Appropriations was frequently an exception, with a 5-2 division giving the majority an advantage well above proportionality. In the 1989 Kansas House the Republicans held about 53.6% of the floor and followed this quite closely in most committees. Yet on the Appropriations, Education, and Taxation committees the majority held a 13-10 advantage, giving the majority party the edge on exactly the type of committees that hypothesis 1 suggests. In Michigan's Senate, Appropriations was again a frequent an exception, taking on a 7-5 or 8-5 advantage under close floors. In the Oregon Senate the Ways and Means Committee was a sometimes large exception with 7-1 and 6-2 divisions favoring the majority. Similar examples hold for other chambers, with Appropriations in the South Dakota Senate, Finance and Rules in the Vermont Senate, and Rules and Ways and Means in the Washington Senate being frequent exceptions to proportionality. It is the contention of this study that such variation is not meaningless, but is there on purpose. Although other explanations for these phenomena are possible, the majority party reliability perspective provides hypotheses that are often supported by the data, even emerging in the few environments where proportionality is generally followed.

The committees that are exceptions usually appear in the regressions for those chambers as positive and significant, showing a ratio advantage for the majority party. The regressions for these chambers in the proportionality group differ from their counterparts in the prior section (those that followed their proportionality rules) in that their intercepts are often positive and significant, and the coefficient on floor advantage is

negative and significant. This pattern gives these chambers an apparent commonality with chambers that depart from proportionality. As explained above, though, the positive intercept and downward slope for these chambers is largely a function of the small committees being constructed in these small chambers. When the floor is close and there is a five-member committee, this usually leads to a large ratio advantage for the majority party in committee. This type of mathematical approximation being difficult for close floors may also account for the three instances where the size variable is statistically significant and negative. Larger committees are more mathematically able to approximate floor divisions due to the finer gradations of the marginal seat. On small committees each seat represents a large percentage of the committee, and giving just a one seat advantage to the majority can appear to give them a large ratio advantage.

The Oregon Senate has a unique feature that may have quite profound effects in terms of committee reliability. In that chamber, the president of the senate not only makes the committee appointments, but he is also a voting member of every committee. Such a rule could easily justify removing this chamber's committees from this proportionality group, since the president is a potential voting member not included in the ratios for these committees. Explicit inclusion of the president in committee ratios would result in an upward shift of the line on the scatter plot and an even higher positive intercept. The inclusion of the president as a component to all committees not only enhances the structural reliability of the committee, it likely also has important component reliability effects. Majority members may be inclined to behave more reliably in committee if they know that unreliable behavior would simply be countered by the president's attendance and vote. Majority members may decide it is not worth it to inconvenience the president,

and therefore they behave reliably. If this dynamic is present where members' behavior is influenced by a potential vote of the president, it is possible that Oregon Senate committees behave more reliably, even without many (or perhaps any) interventions by the president.

Eighteen More Chambers That Depart from Proportionality

Of the 31 chambers that the survey characterized as “usually” following proportionality, I have classified 18 as departing from it. This includes the Arizona House, California Senate, Florida Senate, Indiana Senate, Iowa House, Iowa Senate, Maryland Senate, Michigan House, Montana House, Montana Senate, New Jersey House, New York Senate, Ohio Senate, Oklahoma House, Oklahoma Senate, South Dakota House, Tennessee House, and Wisconsin House. If such a classification is correct, then this is yet another group of chambers in which proportional committees might be expected (based here on a survey instead of a rule) but do not even constitute a majority.

These chambers share many characteristics with those that had proportionality rules but departed from them. For 16 of the 18 chambers, the intercept is positive as predicted, and in 14 chambers this value is significant at better than the 0.05 level of significance. This coefficient represents a level of ratio stacking if the floor were closely divided, the committee were small, and a less important committee were in view. For most chambers this intercept is of substantive significance as well with most reporting an intercept above 5% and some exceeding 10%. Similarly strong results hold for the floor advantage variable, with 17 of the 18 regressions displaying the predicted negative coefficient, and statistical significance of 0.05 or better is attained in 15 of these. These results offer some compelling support for hypothesis 2.

Several dichotomous variables are significant in these regressions, with a total of 23 committees showing an additional ratio advantage. This number would likely be even higher if the size of committee variable were dropped because in some chambers these important committees are also among the largest. For these chambers, this tends to lead to positive coefficients on the size variable, and insignificant coefficients on the dichotomous variables. The Arizona House offers an example of this, in that it has no significant dichotomous coefficients, even though its Appropriations Committee pretty consistently had a majority party ratio advantage of about 3%. This was the largest committee in the chamber, though, and rather than have a significant appropriations coefficient, the size coefficient has absorbed this and is positive. Such an explanation likely accounts for the relatively poor showing of the size coefficient. It is in the predicted negative direction in 11 of the 18 chambers, but is statistically significant in only 5. The size coefficient is actually positive and significant in 5 chambers, but it is also these chambers that are reporting no or few significant dichotomous variables. This reflects the tendency for the important committees in those chambers to also be the largest, and therefore their reliable structure is captured in the size coefficients.

Visually, the scatter plots for many of these 18 chambers are quite similar to that of the U.S. House, with the positive intercept and downward slope of data points. The Indiana Senate and Wisconsin House are two examples showing the wide range of average ratio stacking that can occur within a single chamber over time. The Michigan House shows a possible danger of too simple a categorization of a chamber's committee ratios. One might view the data on the Michigan House's committees and conclude that this is a chamber that consistently over-represents its majority in committee ratios. But

just as was mentioned with the Indiana House, Michigan's ratio advantages are likely better seen as a product of the reliability environment in which they were formed. It is quite likely that as that environment changes, so will the resulting committee ratios. For both the Michigan and Indiana House, it is likely that their large ratio advantages would decrease if the majority party had a larger portion of the floor. Rather than having an altogether different process than the U.S. House, these two chambers occupy primarily one location on the continuum of values that the House has reported.

Two of the chambers examined here also have unique rules quite relevant to a majority party reliability view of committee structure. It was discussed above how the Oregon Senate allowed the president a vote on all committees, and a similar rule is present in both Oklahoma chambers. In the Oklahoma House the speaker has a vote on all committees, and the speaker pro tem can similarly vote under some circumstances. In the Oklahoma Senate both the president and the president pro tem are voting members of all committees. On this basis one could justify adding two majority seats to each majority contingent in these chambers, leading to somewhat exceptional ratio advantages. As noted before, just the possibility of these leadership votes occurring may induce changes in the component reliability of other members on the committees. This would seem to be especially compelling in these chambers since these leaders are also those who make the committee assignments.

Five Chambers without Sufficient Evidence

Included in the 31 chambers that were said to "usually" follow proportionality are five chambers that did not experience any close floors for the period included here. This list of chambers includes the Idaho House, Rhode Island Senate, Utah Senate, West

Virginia House, and West Virginia Senate. For most of these floors the majority's membership hovers around 75-80%, and therefore the advantage over the minority does not need to be increased even further in committee. Following proportionality or even giving the minority a modest overrepresentation still would present a structure capable of quite reliable performance. Without any close floors it is difficult to classify these chambers as either following or departing from proportionality since the ratio outcomes presented here are consistent with both patterns. It is not too surprising to see that the regressions for these chambers report almost no significant reliability coefficients, with only two total reliability-based coefficients being significant.

In summary, although these 31 chambers were classified as "usually" following proportionality in a survey, the evidence presented here suggests that a strong majority of these chambers also make notable departures from proportionality. Eighteen chambers made departures from proportionality that were generally consistent with the predictions of a majority party reliability model. These chambers follow the same pattern as the U.S. House in many ways, especially with the large advantages on close floors and the particularistic advantages on important committees. Using a fairly generous definition of what constitutes proportionality, eight other chambers fit this classification. Even in these chambers it was common for important committees to have a ratio favoring the majority, thereby departing from proportionality. Finally there were five chambers that could not easily be classified since they experienced only very large majority parties.

Six Chambers with Equal Per Capita Assignments

The first two groupings of state legislatures were both based on an expectation of proportionality, the first group by rule, the second by usual practice as reported in a

survey. A third grouping of chambers might tend toward proportionality (on average, at least) due to per capita seat restrictions. In particular, these chambers follow some form of equal per capita assignments for all members. Such a rule curtails the ability of the majority party to stack committees since adding seats to one committee necessarily diminishes the ability to add seats on other committees. For example, suppose there were a 30 member chamber with 18 Democrats and 12 Republicans, there were three committees composed of 10 members each, and each member had to sit on exactly one committee. A proportional division would result in each committee being divided 6-4. If, however, the majority wanted to add another seat to one of the committees (perhaps the most important one), then increasing that committee to 7-4 would require an action like making one of the other committees only 5-4. By increasing the ratio above proportionality in one area, the ratio of at least one other committee has to fall below proportionality. On average, the body will be proportional or very close to it.

Under such a restraint, a majority party that cares about the reliability of its committees may face some difficult decisions, especially when the floor is closely divided. Under this condition, the majority party leaders could maintain proportionality in ratios across all committees, and they would likely engage in a component strategy as well by making sure that only highly reliable members are placed on the most important committees. Another alternative would be for the majority to stack the ratios of only the most important committees, and allowing the minority party to have a disproportionate share of seats on the other committees. In these chambers majority parties may find it particularly useful to have a marginalizing committee in which minority party members could be concentrated, perhaps even having a majority of the members. Such a committee

would also be a helpful venue for placing unreliable majority party members, thereby preventing them from causing problems on other, more important committees. The presence of these committees helps satisfy the per capita membership requirement without placing the members on more important committees. As was mentioned earlier, the South Carolina Senate has now explicitly ruled out this type of committee, requiring that the majority party must hold a majority of membership on each committee.

There are six chambers that I have grouped together because of their per capita seat restrictions, and they include the Nevada Senate, New Mexico House, New Mexico Senate, North Dakota House, North Dakota Senate, and Vermont House. The type of restriction varies across chambers, with the Nevada Senate having three seats per member and the Vermont House allowing only one. In the North Dakota House and Senate, the same restriction holds with two seats per member, but only one if the member serves on Appropriations. The New Mexico Senate's restriction is similar, with two seats per member, but only one if the member sits on Finance. Finally in the New Mexico House each member is limited to no more than two substantive committees. This "upper limit" form of restriction is slightly different from that of the other chambers in that the restriction is only for "substantive" committees, and being only a limit, minority members could be compelled to sit on less than two substantive committees. I have chosen to include the chamber in this group, though, since the seats per majority and minority member are quite similar for the sessions I have collected data on, and this chamber's rule structure probably fits the per capita restriction group better than any other. The scatter plots and regression results for these six chambers are listed in table 7.3.

[Table 7.3 about here]

Turning to individual state regression results, it appears that majority leaders in these chambers frequently employ marginalizing committees to enhance the reliability of other committees. One piece of evidence in favor of this view is that almost all of these chambers have at least one statistically significant dichotomous variable, indicating that the ratio was stacked for an important committee. Several examples seem to demonstrate the existence of trading ratio advantage in one committee for disadvantage in another. In the 1989 Nevada Senate, Republicans held a 13-8 floor advantage or about 62% of the membership. With three seats for every member, Republicans chose to make most committees 4-3 (57%-43%), but this slight disadvantage on these committees allowed them to have more substantial advantages on others. For example, both the Finance Committee and the Taxation Committee had 5-2 memberships, giving a ratio advantage to the majority of almost 10%. The 1997 New Mexico Senate had 25 Democrats to 17 Republicans, and Democrats had 7-4 (disproportionate) advantage in the Finance Committee while allowing a relatively large minority share (5-4) on the Indian and Cultural Affairs Committee.

The North Dakota Senate offers several good examples, but a particularly noteworthy case occurred in 1991 when Democrats held a meager 27-26 edge in the chamber. With such a narrow advantage and tight per capita seat restrictions, the Democrats could not afford large advantages on committees, but they did establish majorities on key committees, taking an 8-6 advantage on Appropriations and 4-3 advantages on others such as Agriculture, Education, and Finance and Taxation. Democratic majorities on these committees were traded off, however, by giving the

minority Republicans a majority of membership on committees such as Human Services and Veteran Affairs, State and Federal Government, and Transportation. As a final example, the Vermont House in 1993 had 92 Democrats to 58 Republicans, and each member has one committee assignment. Democrats gave themselves substantial structural advantages on some committees, taking Appropriations 8-3, Commerce 8-2, Education 10-3, Judiciary 8-3, Natural Resources and Energy 9-2, and Ways and Means 8-3. All of these represent a ratio advantage to the majority of over 10%, and with one seat per member the Democrat majorities must therefore be much lower elsewhere in the committee structure. Indeed, they are. In fact, the minority Republicans were given a 10-1 majority on Municipal Corporations and Elections and a 5-2 majority on Fish and Wildlife. While the members of these committees may enjoy these jurisdictions and even consider them important, they are not comparable to money committees such as Appropriations or Ways and Means. These two committees with large Republican majorities are probably quintessential examples of marginalizing committees, which there is considerable incentive to create in these per capita limit chambers.

Turning to scatter plots for these chambers, they are distinguishable from other chambers by their seeming tight adherence to proportionality. It should be remembered, however, that each data point on these graphs represents only average ratio advantage to the majority for a session. In these chambers where per capita assignments are equal, it is logically necessary that these average values approach proportionality, even though individual committees may be far from it.

These six chambers do not neatly fit into the categories described thus far. They do not fit proportionality well since they do make substantive and predictable departures

from it. Yet because of the per capita restrictions, these chambers do not often stray far from proportionality. Neither do these chambers identify easily with the U.S. House model of reliable committee construction. The advantages to the majority are not large enough or consistent enough across committee types, and the sometimes minority control of committees (albeit marginalizing committees) would be almost unthinkable in the House. If a choice were forced, these chambers probably have a better home with those that depart from proportionality like the U.S. House. They are certainly not strict proportionality adherents, and the outcomes are quite consistent with a majority seeking reliable structures under certain constraints. If the U.S. House did not have the ability to utilize majority members multiple times and more frequently than minority members, then the committee structure there would likely take on the characteristics of these six chambers. Namely, marginalizing committees would become prominent, majority ratio advantages would be smaller and less consistent, and average ratios would hover around proportionality.

These six chambers show that the presence of marginalizing committees is a predictable feature of chambers with per capita limits, and partisan theories of organization are in a distinctively strong position to offer an explanation for the phenomenon. In table 7.3 I have labeled these chambers as following a “stack and dump” system, and this terminology emphasizes the zero-sum game brought about by the institutional rules. Marginalizing committees are created with rosters favoring the minority party so that other committees can be more advantageously stacked to favor the majority party.

To show some of the importance of this work to legislative studies, consider recent 50-state studies of committee representativeness that make no mention of these per capita seat restrictions, let alone any reliability considerations related to them. It is exceptionally likely that in these per capita limit chambers the important committees with ratios stacked favoring the majority do not mirror the ideological median of the chamber, but tend toward the majority party median. It is also quite likely that the marginalizing committees do not mirror the floor's median and instead tend toward the minority party's median. These are not contradictory findings, nor does the presence of a minority advantage on a marginalizing committee signal a failure of partisan theories of organization. (In fact, large minority ideological advantage on a marginalizing committee is a *demonstration* of a partisan theory, not a refutation). Rather, the majority party has constructed reliable committees where it matters greatly while allowing minority advantage or even control in less compelling jurisdictions. The least likely option is that both types of committee are representative of the floor, yet that is exactly what the literature is currently suggesting.

As further evidence of the value of this present work, consider the attempts of nonpartisan theories of legislation to explain the presence of highly reliable and highly unreliable committees in these chambers. A purely distributive theory would seem to suggest that these ratio outcomes are primarily a matter of member interests subsequently accommodated by leadership. Yet it is probably a dubious proposition to suggest that the majority party consistently has a disproportionate interest in the money committees with the minority party members just not very interested in those jurisdictions. Indeed, when the former minority becomes a majority, it too shows an increased "interest" in the

important committees. Neither does it seem credible to suggest that instead of being interested in the major committees, the minority party has exceptional interest in the jurisdictions of minor committees such as Fish and Wildlife, leading to their overrepresentation or even dominance of such committees.

Just as distributive theories struggle to explain these outcomes, so it would be a difficult task for an informational theory of legislative organization as well. Informational theory does not expect ratios to routinely depart from proportionality, but if they should then such imbalance is thought to be countered by the preferences of members assigned to the committees. Basically structural departures from proportionality would usually be negated by allocation decisions according to informational theories. If a ratio substantially favors the majority, then this would be corrected by moderate (or ideologically hostile) majority members being assigned to the committee, for instance. It is beyond the scope of this present work to test this possible alternative since this chapter includes no data collection for component strategies in the state chambers. As a first impression, though, it seems unlikely that the important committees with their enhanced reliability structure are the ideological equivalent of marginalizing committees that are heavy with minority party members.

An informational theorist may counter that general ideology scores would be inappropriate to use in comparing the important with the marginalizing committees. Instead each committee may be fairly representative of the floor on a dimension specific to its jurisdiction. Thus, even though the minority party may have a majority of a committee like Fish and Wildlife, the committee membership may actually be a reasonably good agent for the chamber on the issues related solely to that jurisdiction.

This is to miss the forest for the trees, though, since the very presence of marginalizing committees is inherently partisan. Their creation is for the purpose of placing problematic members onto them, thereby keeping them off the more important committees where their general ideological outlook may have much more serious consequence. Thus, even though a marginalizing committee may be representative of a chamber on a jurisdiction-specific measure, it is at least equally appropriate to evaluate such a committee on its general ideology since its unrepresentativeness (and likely hostility to the majority party) on that measure may be the primary explanation for its existence.

Twenty-one Unrestricted Chambers

To this point 71 state chambers have been examined that have had some form of possible restriction on the ability to pursue systems strategies. The restrictions have varied, with the first group having explicit proportionality rules, the second potentially following a norm of proportionality, and per capita limits being the hallmark of the third group. This final group is absent any of these restrictions and consists of the following 21 chambers: Alabama Senate, Arizona House, Arkansas House, Arkansas Senate, Delaware Senate, Florida House, Georgia House, Georgia Senate, Illinois House, Illinois Senate, Louisiana House, Louisiana Senate, Mississippi House, Mississippi Senate, New Jersey Senate, North Carolina Senate, Pennsylvania House, South Carolina House, Texas House, Texas Senate, and Utah House. The scatter plots and regression results for these legislatures are presented in table 7.4.

[Table 7.4 about here]

A reasonable assumption to make regarding these chambers is that they would tend to approximate the U.S. House and not follow proportionality since they are free of

the other restrictions. Yet such an assumption is not obviously in evidence for several of these chambers, and two reasons may be primary for this absence. First, many of these chambers have been dominated by a single party for the time period examined here. Nine of the twenty-one chambers rarely had a chamber division closer than 60%-40%, and the absence of close floors fails to give an environment in which systems strategies involving committee ratios would aggressively be pursued.

Second, many of these chambers are from the South with 13 of the 21 fitting this classification. In these southern states the Democrat party has had many relatively conservative members, and this heterogeneity can lead to some intriguing ratio outcomes. For instance if Republicans are a close majority in a chamber, they may appoint conservative Democrats to key committees or even chairmanships, considering them as reliable components. If, however, Democrats control the chamber then the heterogeneity in the party can lead to some difficult structural and allocation decisions. It may be that reliable members are allocated primarily to the most important committees while other committees are allowed to be unreliable. If the conservative element in the Democratic party is large enough, then the resulting committee structure may be the result of a bipartisan conservative coalition with a conservative Democratic leadership. In such a setting party ratios may take on a wide range of values, each with a strategic reliability influence that is only evident after viewing the component strategy data. For instance, majority party Democrats may hold a large ratio advantage on a committee, but this may be coalition conservatives marginalizing liberal Democrats on a less important committee. Key committees may actually give the minority party a ratio advantage to

give the bipartisan coalition control. In short, when the institution is controlled by a bipartisan coalition, committee ratios are exceptionally difficult to predict.

This does not mean that all reliability concerns are absent, but *majority party* reliability concerns likely are. Indeed, as Robeck (1971) showed in the California Senate and Beth and Havard (1961) demonstrated in the Florida Senate, reliability concerns are still present, but they are there to empower the coalition, not the majority party. Such reliability strategies would be more evident in allocation strategies rather than party ratios, which are the subject of this present chapter. In sum, several of the 21 chambers are not readily equated with the U.S. House patterns because there are few close floors and many of these chambers are from the Deep South, which has significant conservative elements in the Democrat party. At least one and usually both of these conditions exist for 16 of the 21 chambers. With these cautions in mind, we now turn to a classification of these chambers.

One Proportional Chamber

The only chamber of this group that plausibly could be considered as a candidate for the proportionality group is the Illinois House. For most years, and even under quite close floor conditions, the Illinois House created committees with ratios that very nearly approximated the partisan composition of the chamber. There is a notable exception to this, however, in 1995 when the Republicans briefly became the majority party by a very slim margin (53%-47%). Average committee stacking was almost 7% for that session, and this outlier is apparent in the scatter plot for that chamber. When Democrats regained control in 1997, the committee ratios returned to generally approximating proportionality.

Ten Chambers That Depart from Proportionality

Approximately half the chambers in this unrestricted group follow a pattern that is similar to that of the U.S. House in ratio construction, and these chambers include the Arizona Senate, Delaware Senate, Florida House, Georgia House, Georgia Senate, Illinois Senate, New Jersey Senate, North Carolina Senate, Pennsylvania House, and South Carolina House. These chambers are typically characterized by positive scatter plot intercepts, negative coefficients on the floor advantage variable, and one or more significant dichotomous variables. In some cases, the resemblance of the state chamber scatter plots with those of the U.S. House is particularly striking, as with the Illinois Senate or Pennsylvania House. For example, in the 2001 Pennsylvania House, Republicans held a 104-99 advantage or about 51% of the seats. Rather than mirror this in committee ratios, Republicans created most committees with 15-11 or 14-11 divisions and an Appropriations Committee with a 21-12 roster. As has been noted above, researchers should be careful in generalizing about such chambers if only close floors are represented in the data. It is probably not the case that the Pennsylvania House “usually” stacks committee ratios, although it may be tempting to surmise as much from this data. Instead, the advantage to the majority party would likely dampen as the size of the floor advantage increased, and the scatter plot suggests as much.

Four Chambers without Sufficient Evidence

When chambers have majority parties with only large floor advantages, it is more difficult to assess whether they follow proportionality or if they would depart from it under more competitive conditions. Four of the unrestricted chambers included almost no close floor conditions, and this made it difficult to categorize them. This list includes the Arkansas House, Louisiana Senate, and Mississippi Senate, which were numerically

dominated by Democrats and the Utah House in which Republicans had a similar advantage. Among all of the independent variables in the regressions for these chambers, only one was significant, indicating the Rules Committee in the Arkansas House gave the majority an atypical advantage. This unrestricted group is therefore quite similar to the other chambers with large floor advantages in that structural features are not adopted to enhance the reliable operation of the committee. Should the minority parties in these chambers become more competitive, this would clarify if there is a continuing commitment to proportionality or if systems strategies are followed to enhance structural reliability for the majority party.

Six “Stack and Dump” Chambers

A class of chambers was described above in which members had approximately equal per capita seat memberships. A common outcome for these chambers was for the majority party to stack the key committees and to have a smaller advantage elsewhere. A similar phenomenon appears to take place among six more chambers, the difference being that there does not seem to be a formal restriction (like per capita equality) promoting its use. In what might be termed a “stack and dump” form of systems strategy, the majority party stacks the ratio of some key committees in its favor, but also creates some marginalizing committees dominated by the minority party.

This strategy appears to be present in the Alabama Senate, Arkansas Senate, Louisiana House, Mississippi House, Texas House, and Texas Senate. For example, in the 1993 Alabama Senate, the Democrats had a slightly better than 3-1 floor advantage, yet stacked the Rules Committee 9-1 and the two finance and taxation committees 12-1 and 14-2. On the “dump” side, the ratios on some other committees gave a

disproportionate share to the Republicans, with Education 6-3, Governmental Affairs 9-4, Health 6-3, and Public Welfare actually having a Republican majority of 3-2. In the Arkansas Senate, majority Democrats stacked the ratios on most committees, while allowing minority control or overrepresentation on committees such as Aging and Legislative Affairs, Public Transportation, or Children and Youth. In the 1997 Louisiana House, Democrats had a 76-28 floor advantage and stacked Appropriations 15-4 and Ways and Means 17-1. In that same session minority Republicans had majorities on House and Governmental Affairs (8-7) and Labor and Industrial Relations (7-6), and they held equal membership on Retirement (6-6). When Democrats had an 84-38 floor advantage in the 2003 Mississippi House, they stacked Appropriations 26-7, Apportionment and Elections 13-4, Legislative Budget 7-0, and Rules 10-1. Minority Republicans were given control of Insurance (9-8), and they were overrepresented minorities on committees like Public Utilities (9-8), Municipalities (9-8), Military Affairs (6-5), and Conservation and Water Resources (15-14). Similar cases can be stated for both Texas chambers, with minority control of committees being even more prominent than in the other chambers. The presence of the ratio stacking on important committees is verified in the regressions, with each of these six chambers having at least one significant dichotomous variable, giving twelve total significant dichotomous variables.

These chambers share some important attributes that may help explain some of these outcomes. First, every chamber listed in this group is from the South, and except for Texas, Democrats have been the dominant party. As mentioned above, these majority parties may be relatively heterogeneous in ideological composition, and thus Democrat majorities may have incentive to keep these more unreliable members off key

committees. One way to do this is to use marginalizing committees, and perhaps key committees are stacked so substantially here so that conservative Democrats can still sit on important committees and still be outnumbered by more liberal Democrats.

Component strategy data could help clarify whether this is the case. If this conjecture is correct, then this suggests two possible causes for marginalizing committees. In the prior case the cause had been institutional in that chamber rules required equal per capita assignments. To gain a ratio advantage in one committee, there had to be a reduction elsewhere. One way to lessen the pain of such a transaction is for the majority party to create committees with less important jurisdictions and to have such committees be those favoring the minority. A second rationale for marginalizing committees is not institutional, but is instead contingent upon the ideological composition of the majority party. Majority parties with several moderate or otherwise unreliable members may find it convenient to have lesser committees on which to place these members.

Summary

This chapter tested for majority party reliability systems strategies in 92 state chambers over eight recent legislative sessions, encompassing nearly 13,000 legislative committee rosters. The legislatures were divided into four main groups: 34 chambers with proportionality rules, 31 chambers that a survey found “usually” followed proportionality apart from a rule, 6 chambers with per capita seat restrictions, and 21 chambers without these restrictions. Using a fairly generous standard of what constitutes proportionality, only 19 of the 92 chambers appeared to fit the classification. Even among these 19 chambers there were frequent exceptions for the most important committees that were stacked in favor of the majority party.

Almost half the chambers (45 of 92) were categorized as departing from proportionality and following a pattern similar to that of the U.S. House. This usually meant that the chamber had a scatter plot indicating a positive intercept, a negative slope on floor advantage, significant dichotomous variables, and often a negative size coefficient. That a large plurality of chambers fit this profile (even despite of rules or norms that would discourage it) offers support for the majority party reliability hypotheses.

Another 15 chambers were not classified as proportional or departing from it due to the absence of virtually any closely divided floors in the data. With such large floor advantages it is not possible to discern if these ratios are produced by an adherence to proportionality or if they just represent the low end of a scatter plot like that of the U.S. House. Since the observed ratios are conceivably consistent with either approach, I remain agnostic on what process is present.

Twelve chambers showed a tendency to use marginalizing committees to enhance the reliability of the important committees. This “stack and dump” approach suggests a strong concern for majority party reliability on key committees, offering support for hypothesis 1. It was suggested that the appearance of these marginalizing committees may result from either institutional rules or the level of variance present in the reliability of the majority party caucus. Finally, the New York House is an exceptional chamber in terms of its committee ratios because its proportionality rule creates hyper-reliable structures.

There are two errors that state legislative scholars need to avoid in regard to committee ratios. First, the implicit or explicit assumption that state committee ratios

mirror the floor ratios must now be considered guilty until proven innocent. Few chambers clearly fit this designation, and even these chambers are not altogether consistent in mirroring the floor. Indeed, most chambers experience large and predictable departures from proportionality in a manner that is consistent with a majority party reliability approach. This chapter demonstrates that state chambers should not be regarded as the same in merely following proportionality; there is clearly more variation than that. The second error to avoid is a nearly endless classification of chambers into ill-defined categories. Recall that Hedlund and Hamm (1996) examined committee ratios in five states and concluded that there were five different patterns. Such an approach fails to recognize a good amount of commonality that is present in the practices of many state chambers. In this chapter, I have suggested that there are primarily three patterns for states to follow, including proportionality, a pattern similar to the U.S. House, or a “stack and dump” approach. This is not to say that these three categories explain all variation in state committee ratios. Indeed, there is variation within these categories deserving of further examination, but perhaps these three categories can provide a better template for examining state committee ratios with a recognition of the often prominent factor of majority party reliability.

Although this chapter has not explored it, there appears to be much productive work that could be done in the state legislatures regarding component strategies, perhaps exploring if reliable members are used more frequently and on important committees. Majority parties in state legislatures have frequently followed systems strategies, and in chambers where this strategy is discouraged, it may be that component strategies are an attractive alternative to create reliable committees. If both strategies are indeed pursued

in state chambers, then a majority party reliability perspective provides a strong foundation for explaining variation in the ideological representativeness of committees. Even with the limited scope of this current project, it seems reasonable to suggest that neither marginalizing committees nor committees formed under close floors (for those chambers that stack ratios) are ideologically representative of the floor. More generally, committees with ratios that substantially depart from the floor ratio should be prime candidates for classification as outlying committees, and this study demonstrates that departures from floor ratios are predictable for many chambers.

That the present literature has examined state committee representativeness and consistently concluded that committees almost universally mirror the floor constitutes the continuance of a major failure that was initiated in federal-level studies. Surely many committees indeed are representative, and in some states rules or norms increase this tendency. If, however, state committees were examined as the U.S. House committees were in chapter 5, then I would anticipate that the unrepresentativeness of many state committees would be detected. If component strategies in states also operate to favor the majority party as described in the U.S. House, then the combination of structural advantage (systems strategy) and allocation (component strategy) necessarily lead to unrepresentative committees.

This chapter's findings also inform the debate on the applicability of the theories of legislative organization. Informational theories expect committee ratios to usually mirror the floor ratio since this is thought to facilitate committees capable of acting as agents of the chamber as a whole. If there are ratio departures from the floor, then informational theorists suggest that such structural departures from representativeness

can be countered by allocation decisions. Indeed, some floor majorities do construct committees that usually mirror the floor ratio, but it is important to note that most of these instances occur in situations where party has been institutionally restricted from implementing systems solutions. Further, even in these proportional chambers, there are often exceptions allowed where ratios on the most important committees do give an advantage to the majority party.

As mentioned before, informational theorists might counter that such ratios may be negated by a majority assigning more moderate members to the committee. They also may suggest that the magnitude of ratio stacking is just not that great. Yet even relatively small departures from proportionality can have a considerable influence on the reliability (or representativeness) of a committee. For example, many scholars would readily concede that a committee such as the U.S. House Standards of Official Conduct should not be expected to be representative since it gives equal membership to both parties. Yet in terms of departure from proportionality, this committee's value may also be quite small. For example if the floor is divided 55-45, an equal membership committee is only 5% away from proportionality, a relatively modest figure, but most would concede this has a great influence. As the scatter plots and dichotomous variables show, though, majority party reliability-based departures from proportionality often dwarf this 5% figure, sometimes exceeding 10%. Just as equal membership committees are expected to be unrepresentative, so majority party reliability-based departures from proportionality should not be overlooked as insignificant.

While it is possible that allocation of members does counter structural departures from proportionality in some cases, it strains credulity to suggest that this is typically so.

Indeed, these departures from proportionality are predictable and occur in situations where it is either important (key committees) or relatively risky (close floors, for instance) for the majority party to win. For the majority party to create these advantages in strategic situations and then to simply negate them with allocation decisions seems unlikely, and it would be contrary to the findings on component strategies in the U.S. House shown in chapter 4.

It is likewise difficult to imagine that distributive theories could account for the substantial amount of party reliability evidence presented in this chapter. Distributive theories tend to be silent concerning committee structure, instead focusing on the preferences for the median member on constituency-related measures specific to that committee's jurisdiction. Some state legislative scholars have overstated the role of distributive theories in creating committee rosters, tending to present a view that accommodation of member interests is the dominant factor. Francis (1989, 26-27) is noteworthy in this regard, but his evidence is based solely on a survey question indicating that members were generally pleased with their committee assignments. Yet if accommodation of interests were the dominant factor in committee creation, it is doubtful that the observed ratio outcomes would be produced. For instance, if accommodation were the key, then the committee ratios would simply be the result of however many members were interested in that jurisdiction from both parties. If this were the case, then it would seem likely that some committee rosters would substantially favor the minority party fairly often, and majority control of other committees would vary substantially, bearing perhaps little connection to the majority's floor advantage.

Indeed, this present work suggests distributive theory may be most applicable as a second and perhaps third stage factor in committee formation for most American legislatures with partisan structure and member partisan reliability being more prominent concerns. In most chambers, a partisan structural decision precedes any distributive accommodation, and it seems likely that when members are allocated to committees they are evaluated on two dimensions, one partisan and one distributive. The question of whether the member can be a “good” Democrat/Republican on that committee (especially in light of the current reliability makeup of the committee or the upcoming agenda) would seem to be at least as important as the question of whether the member is personally interested or has constituency concerns relevant to that jurisdiction. Members’ constituencies and personal backgrounds are often diverse enough such that several committee assignments could conceivably support distributive hypotheses. This means that party reliability concerns can be satisfied (and perhaps be the more foundational concern) even as members are seemingly accommodated. While distributive concerns may be present and statistically affirmed, they may be doing so within a partisan structure and party reliability concerns involving committee members may be equally present.

Partisan theories of legislative organization appear to be in the strongest position for explaining the systems strategy results presented in this chapter. A plurality of chambers showed traits strongly similar to those of the U.S. House, and several other chambers might display this evidence if more competitive floors were examined. In most instances where party ratios mirrored the floor ratio this was done because there was either an explicit rule or norm restricting the reliability strategy. The “stack and dump” set of chambers is also difficult for nonpartisan theories of organization to explain since

both the stacked and the marginalizing committees are unrepresentative of the floor in their ratios, and both of these are present to achieve a partisan reliability objective.

These results for the 92 state chambers serve to provide a further context on the national chambers examined earlier, since three main patterns were suggested for the state chambers. The House is a prominent example of a chamber constructed in accord with partisan reliability concerns, and many state chambers have reflected a similar approach to constructing their committees. The Senate never strayed far from proportionality in its committees, and some state chambers do so as well, albeit normally by rule. The “stack and dump” committees are a somewhat unique third category, although if my suggestion that the House Armed Services Committee was a marginalizing committee is correct, then the U.S. House has shown some characteristics of this group. An important difference, however, is that the Armed Service Committee was characterized as a marginalizing committee primarily by its component, not systems strategy. In the states the “stack and dump” phenomenon was suggested by the committee ratios, and component considerations await future work.

Chapter 8: Summary, Alternatives, and Implications

This chapter concludes this discussion of majority party reliability, and it will contain three main sections. First, there will be an overview of what this work has accomplished. Second, some alternative explanations will be examined. The third section is devoted to the influence of this work, both in terms of the existing literature and on directions it may profitably be pursued in future work.

Summary of Work

This study has examined systems and component strategies for pursuing majority party reliability in committees for the U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and 92 state legislative chambers. The systems strategies involved the party ratios on committees, and the basic premise was that the majority party would depart from proportionality to enhance the reliability of the committee structure when the jurisdiction of the committee was especially important or when the majority party would be at relatively high risk of losing votes if proportionality were followed. Practically, this was operationalized such that a ratio advantage was expected on money and agenda committees, when floors were closely divided, and when committees were small. These hypotheses were frequently supported in venues where the majority party did not face restrictions in its ability to implement systems strategies on committee ratios. The U.S. House and a plurality of state legislatures appeared to substantially support the concept of majority party reliability as embodied in these hypotheses. A noteworthy vindication of majority party reliability can be seen in the scatter plots for these chambers with their positive intercepts and negative slopes. A great many of these chambers also had significant dichotomous variables,

indicating ratio stacking on important committees, and several chambers also had the predicted negative coefficient on the size variable. Individually and corporately, the results for these chambers present a picture quite different from the commonly assumed proportionality.

Majority parties also appeared to be pursuing a reliable committee system through the use of component strategies where it was permissible. In this study data were collected to test component strategies at only the national level, but the House appeared to support these hypotheses as well. In particular, reliable members tended to receive more assignments, be placed on key committees, and were more frequently assigned to smaller committees. In the Senate where there is less incentive, a weaker agent of implementation, and a more restricted ability to implement the solution, component strategies are not generally supported. Again, where majority parties have an incentive, ability, and agent present to implement reliability strategies, they usually do so.

An important contribution by this work is the insight it provides on the committee outlier debate. In particular, this study presents expectations for variation in committee representativeness from a partisan theory of organization. Up to this point, none of the three main theories of legislative organization had predicted committee outliers on general ideological measures. This expectation was natural enough for informational theorists since they expected committees to essentially be microcosms of the full chamber. Neither is it very surprising that distributive theorists had not predicted this variation in committee representativeness, for their interests are restricted to other dimensions of member preference. What is somewhat unusual is that partisan theorists have also agreed that committees will mirror the floor on ideological measures,

suggesting that this result is an “intersection” of party and informational theories. As Londregan and Snyder (1994) and Adler (2002) noted, partisan theories have often had little to say concerning committee representativeness. Instead party theorists have usually restricted their comments to committee party contingents, suggesting that the creation of representative contingents leads to representative committees. As shown earlier, this dubious claim implicitly assumes that committee ratios mirror those of the floor.

This present work has argued that majority parties engage in systems strategies to create advantageous committee structures. Not only do they create favorable structures, but they also use component strategies in the allocation of their members to those structures. Chapter 5 demonstrated how when combined these two strategies lead to variation in committee representativeness. Figures 5.9-5.11 give remarkable portraits of the phenomenon of majority party reliability, showing the outlying tendency of committees created under close floor conditions dampening as floor advantage increases. These figures demonstrate how the same data generation process (based on party reliability) could result in the same committee over time being an outlier in favor of majority, representative of the floor, and an outlier in favor of the minority. That the same committee can be an outlier in both directions is not necessarily a “curious paradox” as some have suggested, nor is it necessarily adverse evidence for partisan theories of organization. Instead the majority party reliability perspective provides a basis for expecting such variation as the response of majority parties to their strategic environment. Given this, researchers can expect much variety of committee representativeness depending upon the environment present in the year they choose to examine. Far from agreeing with informational theorists on the representativeness of

committees, partisan theories have a unique and needed perspective to understand the variation that is present. For partisan theory to become known for its theoretical and empirical advantages on this issue, it must first overcome some serious theoretical and empirical missteps in some of its more prominent work.

Alternative Explanations

Since science in general and social science in particular operate on the basis of induction it is not possible to make definitive statements of proof. What has been offered here is just a theoretical viewpoint that generated hypotheses supported by data. What commends the party reliability approach is that it is a reasonable theory that seems to explain data better than prior attempts. Others may be able to improve the reliability theory presented here or present an altogether distinct explanation for the data. In this section I present two possible alternative explanations for some of the data and offer an explanation why they may not be as compelling. One alternative comes from a partisan perspective and the other is more consistent with an informational theory.

A Partisan Alternative to Majority Party Reliability

This present work has consistently suggested that the primary motivation behind the observed outcomes was reliability-based. In that view, majority party leaders see committees as essentially a statistical problem, with each member a component having a probability value. The outcome of committee work was either a party win or a party loss (at least on partisan dimensions), and therefore leaders would make structural and allocation decisions to increase the likelihood of the party winning, or at least not losing. Other partisan theorists may observe these outcomes and suggest that a more proper

emphasis should be assigned to the resulting ideological position of the committee rather than its reliability. In this view, committees are being biased in favor of the majority party in order to produce legislation closer to the ideological median of the majority party. Imagine an ideological continuum of 0 to 10, for example, in which the floor median were a 5 and the majority median were an 8. According to a majority ideological position theory, this structural and allocation behavior by the majority is intended to achieve legislation that represents a 6 or a 7 instead of a 5. Majority party reliability, in contrast, sees the outcomes more as 1 or 0 (i.e., dichotomous categories of success or failure, not continuum-based outcomes) and therefore leaders act to increase the chances of a 1.

While majority-biased committees may have the *effect* of producing biased legislation, there are good reasons to suspect that this majority-friendly ideological position is not *causal* for the observed ratio and allocation behavior. First, the ratio advantage to the majority usually dampens as floor advantage increases. If biased legislation were the goal, then it would seem likely that the ratio advantage would remain. In the House and many state legislatures it does not, though, and the ratio eventually comes close to proportionality or even gives the minority a slight advantage. Such outcomes are not consistent with the biased legislation argument, but a party reliability theory can handle them well since the structures are all very friendly to a 1 or 0 outcome battle.

Second, when floor advantage increases, the number of majority members with multiple seats decreases, as shown in figure 5.1. Majority members with multiple seats tended to be very reliable, as shown in table 4.1, and their inclusion on multiple

committees would enhance their outlying tendency. Yet the utilization of highly reliable members does diminish as floor advantage increases, suggesting that their purpose is more particularistic (to enhance reliability when needed) than universalistic (to shift the ideological median toward the majority median). That their use diminishes as the majority size increases seems to be evidence contrary to the biased legislation argument. Finally, the substantive and statistical significance of the size coefficient in tables 5.1-5.3 also suggests that reliability is the motivating factor. If the ideological position argument were correct, then this size coefficient would seem to require the argument that ideological position is less important on larger committees. This does not seem plausible, however, given the importance of large committees such as Appropriations and Ways and Means. Again, a majority party reliability argument fits the evidence well with its acknowledgment that there is more room for unreliable behavior on larger committees.

It is entirely possible that the committees with large ratio advantages will be amongst those producing legislation most at variance with the floor's median position. For the reasons mentioned above, however, these committees' ideological outlying tendencies are probably better seen as a consequence of a majority party seeking reliable committees rather than as a direct aim in itself. This is not to say that majority parties do not seek non-median outcomes either; it is to say that the majority's use of structure and allocation are not consistent enough to suggest that non-median outcomes are routinely being sought through the mechanisms explored here.

An Informational Alternative to Majority Party Reliability

An informational theorist may see the ratio stacking evidence such as that in figure 3.1 or comparable data for the states and suggest that few conclusions can be

generated from this. The basic argument would be that although there may be some departures from proportionality these are countered in the allocation of members. Thus if a committee gives a ratio advantage to the majority party, this may be negated by a large number of moderate or ideologically hostile assignments on the majority contingent. In fact, perhaps with such close floors moderate members are given better or extra seats to encourage party loyalty, or they may be able to extract such concessions under threat of forming a cross party coalition.

It is possible that this explanation is correct for some state legislatures since component strategy data have not been examined in this study. For the U.S. House, however, it can be rejected with some confidence. When the floor is closely divided in the House and the majority is overrepresented in committee ratios, this means that some majority party members are sitting on a disproportionate share of committee seats. Figure 5.1 shows that the majority members with three or more seats increases as floor advantage tightens, and table 4.1 showed that the members with these multiple seats tended to be more reliable. In other words when the floor is closely divided majority parties create extra slots on committees and fill them with reliable members, not moderates as informational theorists have suggested.

Influence on Existing Literature

Perhaps the most important implication of this work is that it suggests that the scholarly understanding of committees in chambers such as the U.S. House has been in error for quite some time. These errors are both passive and active. The errors of passivity are largely the responsibility of party theorists who have been noticeably absent in theorizing about the makeup of committees. This study suggests that a partisan

perspective is essential to a proper understanding of legislative organization, at least in committees. The active errors belong to those who have suggested two main legislative features that are incorrect. The first error is the explicit or implicit assumption that committee ratios routinely mirror those of the floor. As many figures in this work demonstrate, this assumption is not warranted, and instead committee ratio departures from proportionality are often predictable by reliability-based variables.

A second error is the suggestion that committees generally mirror the general ideological composition of their parent chamber. Surprisingly, even partisan theorists have argued for this proposition, suggesting that informational and partisan theories share this expectation. As this work has shown, however, House committee medians do not consistently mirror the floor medians. Instead, committee representativeness departs from the floor in a predictable manner, and this is supported by the regressions and figures (especially figures 5.9-5.11) of chapter 5. For each of these errors, partisan theories of organization are in a unique position of strength to explain the phenomena, but they generally have not. A majority party reliability version of partisan theories gives a coherent theoretical framework from which hypotheses can be generated to give compelling insight on some long-standing questions.

If partisan theories do have an advantage in explaining committee formation, this suggests a re-evaluation of the role of distributive and informational theories is necessary, particularly for the dominant venue of study, the U.S. House. For example, to the extent that distributive theory is present in committee assignments, this work suggests that it only does so within a partisan context. As argued in the previous chapter, distributive concerns in member assignment are likely a secondary and perhaps tertiary concern, with

partisan concerns being more foundational. Before distributive concerns are accommodated for members, a partisan concern is accommodated with party ratios on those committees. In addition, as chapter 4 demonstrated, the partisan reliability of members is also taken into consideration in assignments, with reliable members receiving more and better assignments. This suggests that it is perhaps better to think of each member as a component having a distributive dimension score as well as a party reliability score. By this perspective, a member's distributive interest in a committee is better viewed in tandem with that member's partisan reliability as well as the current reliability status of the committee of interest. If the member is unreliable and the committee of interest is also relatively unreliable, then this member is unlikely to receive the assignment, no matter how strong his distributive interest may be. If the member were instead quite reliable, then assignment to the committee would be much more likely since the member is interested and the committee could use a boost in reliability performance. If the interested member were unreliable and the committee was already very reliable, then he may receive the assignment because the committee would be able to absorb the impact of an unreliable member.

Notice here that such an assignment (an unreliable, but interested member to a very reliable committee) would likely move the committee closer toward mirroring the floor's ideological median. Yet the motive for such a move is not to create a committee that is a microcosm of the chamber. In other words, informational theory is not the explanation for such a move. Instead, majority party reliability (in tandem with the member's distributive interest) is the motive for such a move, matching components to appropriate rosters so that a partisan objective is still accomplished. In such an example

also lies a proposition quite disturbing for informational theories of organization. Namely, the sometimes plausibility of informational theories may be primarily the by-product of partisan agents achieving partisan reliability objectives. In some cases this work presents data that are quite challenging for informational theorists to explain, particularly the large ratio and ideological departures from the floor when it is closely divided and on some smaller and control committees. But as floor advantage increases for the majority, informational theories become more statistically plausible. Viewing figures 5.9-5.11, the far left portion of the scatter plots is plainly inconsistent with informational theory since committees are not close to mirroring the floor. As the majority increases, however, the ideological outlying tendency of committees does dampen somewhat. If these committees were taken in isolation and compared to the floor, they may appear to be statistically indistinguishable from the floor in their ideological representativeness. In some cases, this is no doubt correct given that the majority's structural advantage can diminish to zero (or even indicate an advantage to the minority). Yet these three figures show the broader picture, that many committees even with larger floor advantages still are distinct from the floor, and therefore claiming their representativeness would be a Type II error.

More generally, these committee outcomes are not based upon some agent's desire for committees that mirror the floor. Instead, these figures and others suggest that the committees look like they do because party agents are pursuing party reliability in structure (systems strategy as reflected in party ratios) and in allocation (component strategy as reflected in how members are assigned). In some instances, these partisan strategies combine to produce outcomes that are similar to those hypothesized by

informational theories. The party reliability theory outlined in this work expects that. What is important to note, however, is that these cases of committees mirroring the floor are not generally so. Informational theories do not expect that and have not explained these systematic departures.

As intriguing as the distributive and informational theories are, and as interesting or debatable their empirical support may be, the scholarly literature on legislative organization lacks an emphasis on a most basic point: committees are venues for numerical battles in which a majority wins. I have argued here that majority party leaders do not lack this emphasis, and that is why they produce the committee ratios and committee rosters as they are. Partisan theories of organization are uniquely qualified to elaborate on this foundation.

Future Work

Viewing legislative organization from a majority party reliability perspective opens several promising avenues for research, some of which I have mentioned along the way. I will introduce or elaborate on several of these possibilities here.

First, much more could be done by examining different types of systems and component strategies. Here I have restricted systems strategies to only committee ratios, yet many other forms exist. For instance, when Newt Gingrich assembled task forces comprising mostly majority members as an alternative to committees, this has profound reliability implications. First of all, the use of task forces was a systems strategy that altered the committee structure by essentially adding a parallel component since it provided an alternative route for legislation to proceed. Second, component strategies were prominent here in member allocation since these task forces sometimes had only

majority party members. This suggests the task force would be a highly reliable venue. Third, this addition of a reliable parallel component may have the effect of enhancing the reliability of the actual committee upon whose jurisdiction the task force is intruding. This too is a type of component strategy. When the number and/or jurisdiction of committees are altered, this too is a form of systems strategy. More generally, any changes to a legislature that alter the structure of the institution (by adding serial or parallel components, for instance) are the territory of systems strategies. Any actions taken to improve the reliability of a given component (be it an individual or a committee) are the domain of component strategies.

Second, this work can be expanded in venues, in time, and on measures used. This work did explore 94 different legislatures, but many more remain. The composition of conference committees and subcommittees from a reliability perspective should be quite interesting, and other countries may offer opportunities to examine the theory as well. Most of this current work was restricted to relatively recent sessions, but this could readily be expanded historically for the national bodies. For state chambers the ratio analysis can certainly benefit from an expansion in time since this work only covers eight recent sessions. There remains a great deal of work that can be done on component strategies and committee representativeness, since the House work of chapters 4 and 5 were not done for any state chambers. If the majority party reliability hypotheses continue to be supported for many state chambers, this would constitute a substantial departure from most conclusions of the current state legislature literature. A further extension would be to use another measure for party reliability, perhaps party support scores or party leadership support scores.

Third, a majority party reliability perspective may provide new insight on committee assignments and transfers. This is an area where a fusion of partisan and distributive theories may be productive, in which members are evaluated on their interest (distributive concerns) *and* reliability (partisan theory), and committee reliability (both the destination committee as well as the committee of origin) itself being an important factor. This may yield some interesting results. For instance an unreliable member contributing to a committee's overall unreliability may be transferred to a very reliable and better committee, thus negating his effect on the committee of origin while not having a dramatic effect on the destination committee. Yet a bivariate relationship suggested in such an instance would seem to indicate that unreliable majority party members receive better assignments. This simple bivariate relationship is counterintuitive to the partisan theory outlined here, but the party reliability motivation may become clear once the overall reliabilities of the "source" and "sink" committees are considered. It may also be interesting to examine how relatively unreliable committees are treated in subsequent sessions. If a committee commits a notable Type I or Type II error in voting, does it tend to be expanded in size with reliable members coming on board? Are unreliable members transferred off committees to those that are more reliable? Are reliable members transferred to unreliable committees? Also of interest is the relationship between the value of a member's committee portfolio and his party reliability. Is there a positive relationship between a member's reliability and portfolio value? Many such questions could be considered from a party reliability perspective.

Most of this work is dedicated to *majority* party reliability. A fourth area of future work focuses primarily on matters relevant to the minority party. For instance, do

minority parties become more careful in their assignments when they are numerically closer to being a majority party? If the minority appoints unreliable members to its committee contingents, does the majority party take this into account and stack the committee less or appoint less reliable members? If the majority does take minority actions into account, does the minority also respond in its assignments, seeking to appoint its most reliable members to the majority's most unreliable committees?

A fifth and probably minor area of inquiry is to explore the possibility that a majority party's pursuit of reliable committees can actually make them more unreliable under some circumstances. For instance, in Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde (2001), they explore the presence of both distributive and partisan issues within the Agriculture Committee (and the relevant Appropriations subcommittee) during the 104th Congress. One of the votes examined there was partisan in nature, and both committee members and noncommittee members voted similarly, with majority Republicans largely united against Democrats. Another vote was distributive in nature in which committee members were largely united to oppose a phase out of peanut supports, while noncommittee members were much more likely to support the phase out. The final vote was 209-212 with the position of the Agriculture Committee (and relevant Appropriations subcommittee) winning, even though most of the majority party Republicans not on the committee supported the phase out.

What is unnoticed by the authors is the unique role that party reliability had in this vote, particularly in two areas. First, Republicans increased the size of the Agriculture Committee from 46 to 49 total seats for that session, and this increase may have the effect of creating more advocates for the committee's distributive issues. Second, although

Republicans held only 53% of the floor, their advantage on Agriculture was 27-22, and this ratio stacking created distributive advocates from among a group (Republicans) likely to oppose the price supports. The relevant Appropriations subcommittee was similarly stacked with a 7-4 majority advantage. In other words, both the expansion of the committee and the extra seats awarded the majority party may have had the effect of creating additional advocates for price supports. Apart from these actions, it is likely that the price support vote would have been a similarly narrow defeat for the position of most Agriculture Committee members. More generally, when distributive and partisan dimensions conflict, it seems likely that the majority party's pursuit of reliability can create additional distributive dimension advocates who are more likely to break with the position of fellow party members not on the committee. If distributive advocates have enjoyed more success recently, then it would seem quite possible that some of this success could be attributed to a reliability goal being achieved through much larger committees. Ironically the majority party's pursuit of reliability may be the very factor that leads to a lack of partisan reliability on issues where partisan issues and distributive issues conflict.

Sixth, a number of previous outlier studies may benefit by a re-examination from a reliability perspective. For instance Poole and Rosenthal's lack of finding outliers may have been largely contingent upon their methodological choice to use the actual committee ratios for their Monte Carlo simulations. Other studies were based on sessions where the floor advantage was such that there would not be much incentive for committees to depart from proportionality. Many of Cox and McCubbins' results fit this category, and they also used a fairly demanding level of statistical significance as they

were finding that committees were largely representative of the floor on general ideological measures. The reliability focus of this present work also strongly recommends the median as the point of comparison between the House and committees. Important for future state legislative work will be the use of preference measures upon which some theory of organization suggests committees will be outliers. If researchers continue to use measures that no one expects committees to be outliers upon, then it will not be surprising that these studies find committees to be microcosms of the floor.

A seventh area of future work might involve an attempt to formalize some of this work in a type of “expected utility” argument. The focus here has been on how majority party leadership attempts to make committees reliable in a probabilistic fashion, and there is some recognition (through the dichotomous variables) that reliable performance is more valuable on some committees than others. This suggests that an expected utility could be considered in which a committee’s probability of a particular kind of performance is in a multiplicative relationship with some form of valuing a committee’s jurisdiction or upcoming agenda items.

An eighth and quite interesting area of future work is the further examination of marginalizing (or “dump”) committees. This is an instance where good state legislative work may be able to inform the U.S. House work. A good avenue to explore this further is by an examination of component strategies in states where marginalizing committees were thought to be present. This work suggested that these committees were present primarily on the basis of committee ratio examination only. This proposition would be further supported if it is demonstrated that party component strategies are also being pursued on these committees. Informational theory expects the component strategy to

oppose the systems strategy, a rowing in opposite directions, as it were. The party reliability perspective here suggests it will be more common for the strategies to be pursued in tandem, where allocation choices reinforce structural choices. If it could be further demonstrated that marginalizing committees do tend to occur under some rule settings (i.e., equal per capita assignments) or when the majority party is heterogeneous, then this could aid our understanding of Congress. This may be particularly useful as component strategies are expanded over time for Congress.

Many other avenues for exploring a theory of majority party reliability exist, and others are likely to see applications to their areas of specialization. The most basic foundations of any such work, though, should recognize that legislative success depends upon having majorities at each voting stage. In order for a majority party to win, it routinely creates a legislative structure and makes allocations of members within that structure to make achieving majorities on partisan dimensions more likely. Informational theories do not expect such strategies, and instead suggest that committees mirror the floor. If the floor were mirrored in committee, this would make committees risky voting environments for the majority party when the floor is closely divided or when a committee is small. As this work has demonstrated, however, majority parties often depart from proportionality under these circumstances and others in order to have more reliable committees. Distributive theories have no major conflict with the partisan theory presented here, except in the instances where it is claimed that distributive concerns dominate the committee formation process. This work suggests that partisan concerns are the more foundational in committee ratios and are perhaps at least equally important in the assignment process. The findings here suggest that partisan theories in general and

majority party reliability in particular have much more to add to our understanding of legislative organization.

APPENDIX

Table 1.1 Congressional Theories and Outlier Expectations

	Outlying Committee Expected	Representative Committee Expected
Ideological Measure		D, P, I
Distributive Measure	D, P	I

Note: D-distributive theories, P-partisan theories, I-informational theories

Table 2.1 Possible Outcomes in Relation to a Null Hypothesis

		The Proper Course of Action	
		Reject Null Hypothesis	Maintain Null Hypothesis
Action Taken	Reject Null Hypothesis	<i>Correct Decision</i>	Type I Error
	Maintain Null Hypothesis	Type II Error	<i>Correct Decision</i>

Null Hypothesis: No new action should be taken.

Table 2.2 Possible Legislative Outcomes in Relation to a Null Hypothesis

		The Proper Course of Action from the Majority Party's Perspective	
		Approve Bill	Defeat Bill
Committee Actually	Approves Bill	<i>Correct Decision</i>	Type I Error
	Defeats Bill	Type II Error	<i>Correct Decision</i>

Null Hypothesis: The bill should be defeated.


Table 3.1 Systems Strategy Regression Results for the U.S. House

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t
Constant	0.083	0.005	17.679
Floor Advantage	-0.324	0.021	-15.786
Appropriations	0.023	0.005	4.649
Rules	0.061	0.005	11.755
Ways & Means	0.025	0.005	5.363
Size	-0.00091	0.000096	-9.397

R-squared = 0.701, Adjusted R-squared = 0.696, Standard Error of the Estimate = 0.0168

Dependent Variable: Majority Ratio Stacking on Committees, N = 281

**Figure 3.1: U.S. House Average Ratio Stacking
(1975-2001)**



**Figure 3.2: U.S. House Average Ratio Stacking per
Congress (1901-2001)**




Figure 3.3 U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)

Figure 3.3.4: Banking and Currency




Figure 3.3.5: Budget




Figure 3.3.6: Census




Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Figure 3.3 (continued) U.S. House Committee Ratio Stacking (1901-2001)






Table 4.1 Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats--U.S. House

1975	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	21	48.5	-0.137
	2 seats	181	64.2	-0.312
	1 seat-restricted	72	60.8	-0.303
	3 seats	15	67.1	-0.339
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	13	22.2	0.224
	2 seats	98	23.1	0.251
	1 seat-restricted	30	15.8	0.294
	3 seats	2	0.0	0.364

1977	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	18	36.7	-0.143
	2 seats	183	55.2	-0.293
	1 seat-restricted	68	48.5	-0.307
	3 seats	20	54.8	-0.328
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	9	21.7	0.166
	2 seats	101	19.9	0.257
	1 seat-restricted	32	13.1	0.292
	3 seats	1	0.0	0.642

1979	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	19	34.6	-0.059
	2 seats	179	59.7	-0.293
	1 seat-restricted	67	57.6	-0.339
	3 seats	11	62.0	-0.338
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	23	15.6	0.306
	2 seats	101	16.0	0.291
	1 seat-restricted	32	10.0	0.281
	3 seats	1	21.0	0.316

Table 4.1 (cont.) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats—U.S. House

1981	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	13	38.3	-0.106
	2 seats	143	58.4	-0.283
	1 seat-restricted	64	60.9	-0.338
	3 seats	21	69.8	-0.312
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	43	12.8	0.342
	2 seats	111	18.1	0.299
	1 seat-restricted	35	14.6	0.306
	3 seats	2	25.0	0.281

1983	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	11	50.9	-0.083
	2 seats	175	73.0	-0.291
	1 seat-restricted	65	74.4	-0.337
	3 seats	16	80.9	-0.411
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	35	13.0	0.392
	2 seats	96	14.0	0.334
	1 seat-restricted	32	13.1	0.292
	3 seats	3	18.3	0.411

1985	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	8	41.9	-0.187
	2 seats	156	65.1	-0.296
	1 seat-restricted	62	70.9	-0.353
	3 seats	24	77.5	-0.359
	4 seats	1	90.0	-0.698
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	34	12.8	0.398
	2 seats	116	16.5	0.347
	1 seat-restricted	30	12.8	0.310
	3 seats	2	17.5	0.452

Table 4.1 (cont.) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats—U.S. House

1987	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	7	60.6	-0.246
	2 seats	153	73.2	-0.289
	1 seat-restricted	63	78.4	-0.363
	3 seats	33	83.5	-0.372
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	35	11.0	0.387
	2 seats	113	16.2	0.359
	1 seat-restricted	30	14.8	0.331
	3 seats	4	20.0	0.304

1989	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	4	83.0	-0.495
	2 seats	160	71.0	-0.291
	1 seat-restricted	62	74.6	-0.359
	3 seats	30	84.8	-0.393
	5 seats	1	100.0	-0.443
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	22	14.7	0.373
	2 seats	114	16.5	0.363
	1 seat-restricted	31	15.9	0.331
	3 seats	9	15.0	0.343

1991	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	3	60.0	-0.255
	2 seats	164	64.1	-0.295
	1 seat-restricted	60	68.4	-0.361
	3 seats	40	77.1	-0.395
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	11	11.8	0.393
	2 seats	104	15.3	0.358
	1 seat-restricted	29	15.9	0.352
	3 seats	21	10.7	0.435

Table 4.1 (cont.) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats—U.S. House

1993	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	1	90.0	-0.470
	2 seats	146	72.7	-0.314
	1 seat-restricted	57	74.3	-0.389
	3 seats	54	81.0	-0.397
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	16	10.7	0.434
	2 seats	96	15.2	0.383
	1 seat-restricted	36	11.9	0.387
	3 seats	26	11.8	0.441
	4 seats	1	20.0	0.256

1995	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	7	6.4	0.463
	2 seats	121	7.7	0.434
	1 seat-restricted	68	6.1	0.413
	3 seats	35	5.7	0.483
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	31	72.4	-0.334
	2 seats	123	77.9	-0.373
	1 seat-restricted	47	82.4	-0.429
	3 seats	1	90.0	-0.476

1997	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	2	7.5	0.496
	2 seats	112	14.2	0.449
	1 seat-restricted	64	11.5	0.418
	3 seats	47	10.6	0.489
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	26	79.8	-0.363
	2 seats	126	80.2	-0.378
	1 seat-restricted	50	82.5	-0.449
	3 seats	3	86.7	-0.352

Table 4.1 (cont.) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats--U.S. House

1999	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	5	18.0	0.491
	2 seats	80	20.7	0.435
	1 seat-restricted	68	14.4	0.436
	3 seats	64	13.9	0.493
	4 seats	5	12.0	0.533
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	20	90.3	-0.392
	2 seats	134	87.2	-0.379
	1 seat-restricted	50	88.3	-0.440
	3 seats	6	90.8	-0.488

2001	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	5	2.0	0.531
	2 seats	84	9.3	0.461
	1 seat-restricted	61	7.1	0.442
	3 seats	66	7.7	0.485
	4 seats	5	3.0	0.523
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1 seat-no restrictions	22	80.9	-0.327
	2 seats	118	88.0	-0.421
	1 seat-restricted	50	86.1	-0.436
	3 seats	18	83.1	-0.336

**Table 4.2 Committee Size and Average Majority
Contingent Reliability (ADA)—U.S. House**

Majority Contingent ADA	Committee Size:			Majority Party
	<36	36-45	>45	
1975	64.9	63.7	55.5	D
Committees (N):	7	13	1	
1977	56.5	53.7	50.2	D
Committees (N):	7	11	3	
1979	64.6	58.4	51.4	D
Committees (N):	8	11	2	
1981	66.0	57.4	60.8	D
Committees (N):	9	11	1	
1983	79.1	70.5	74.4	D
Committees (N):	9	9	3	
1985	76.1	66.4	63.1	D
Committees (N):	8	9	4	
1987	82.1	74.7	72.5	D
Committees (N):	8	9	4	
1989	82.3	74.2	69.6	D
Committees (N):	8	8	5	
1991	77.9	69.6	61.3	D
Committees (N):	6	10	5	
1993	82.8	80.1	69.7	D
Committees (N):	6	8	7	
1995	5.8	6.9	7.4	R
Committees (N):	4	6	8	
1997	9.5	14.7	12.5	R
Committees (N):	5	4	9	
1999	14.5	16.1	16.4	R
Committees (N):	4	4	10	
2001	6.2	7.0	8.3	R
Committees (N):	4	4	10	

Table 4.3 Committee Size and Average Majority Contingent Reliability (NOMINATE)—U.S. House

Majority Contingent NOMINATE	Committee Size:			Majority Party
	<36	36-45	>45	
1975	-0.328	-0.301	-0.279	D
Committees (N):	7	13	1	
1977	-0.327	-0.289	-0.276	D
Committees (N):	7	11	3	
1979	-0.352	-0.282	-0.275	D
Committees (N):	8	11	2	
1981	-0.353	-0.261	-0.341	D
Committees (N):	9	11	1	
1983	-0.381	-0.265	-0.318	D
Committees (N):	9	9	3	
1985	-0.395	-0.295	-0.290	D
Committees (N):	8	9	4	
1987	-0.390	-0.298	-0.293	D
Committees (N):	8	9	4	
1989	-0.393	-0.318	-0.290	D
Committees (N):	8	8	5	
1991	-0.401	-0.333	-0.292	D
Committees (N):	6	10	5	
1993	-0.422	-0.378	-0.300	D
Committees (N):	6	8	7	
1995	0.424	0.464	0.434	R
Committees (N):	4	6	8	
1997	0.460	0.467	0.454	R
Committees (N):	5	4	9	
1999	0.456	0.476	0.467	R
Committees (N):	4	4	10	
2001	0.465	0.485	0.473	R
Committees (N):	4	4	10	


**Table 4.4 Committee Size and Average Minority
Contingent Reliability (ADA)—U.S. House**

Minority Contingent ADA	Committee Size:			Majority Party
	<36	36-45	>45	
1975	19.7	22.9	18.2	D
Committees (N):	7	13	1	
1977	18.6	18.1	22.4	D
Committees (N):	7	11	3	
1979	15.3	16.3	10.2	D
Committees (N):	8	11	2	
1981	15.1	17.7	18.4	D
Committees (N):	9	11	1	
1983	12.1	14.7	14.7	D
Committees (N):	9	9	3	
1985	16.3	14.9	15.8	D
Committees (N):	8	9	4	
1987	15.5	14.9	16.4	D
Committees (N):	8	9	4	
1989	16.7	15.0	17.0	D
Committees (N):	8	8	5	
1991	12.7	14.0	15.0	D
Committees (N):	6	10	5	
1993	12.4	14.8	13.2	D
Committees (N):	6	8	7	
1995	83.0	83.0	74.5	R
Committees (N):	4	6	8	
1997	85.5	85.3	78.3	R
Committees (N):	5	4	9	
1999	89.1	91.3	86.6	R
Committees (N):	4	4	10	
2001	89.1	90.6	85.5	R
Committees (N):	4	4	10	

Table 4.5 Committee Size and Average Minority Contingent Reliability (NOMINATE)—U.S. House


Minority Contingent NOMINATE	Committee Size:			Majority Party
	<36	36-45	>45	
1975	0.277	0.250	0.244	D
Committees (N):	7	13	1	
1977	0.276	0.262	0.240	D
Committees (N):	7	11	3	
1979	0.303	0.292	0.271	D
Committees (N):	8	11	2	
1981	0.340	0.291	0.258	D
Committees (N):	9	11	1	
1983	0.361	0.332	0.316	D
Committees (N):	9	9	3	
1985	0.358	0.364	0.326	D
Committees (N):	8	9	4	
1987	0.356	0.365	0.335	D
Committees (N):	8	9	4	
1989	0.366	0.375	0.345	D
Committees (N):	8	8	5	
1991	0.381	0.378	0.371	D
Committees (N):	6	10	5	
1993	0.403	0.402	0.397	D
Committees (N):	6	8	7	
1995	-0.414	-0.412	-0.350	R
Committees (N):	4	6	8	
1997	-0.419	-0.433	-0.364	R
Committees (N):	5	4	9	
1999	-0.397	-0.449	-0.381	R
Committees (N):	4	4	10	
2001	-0.418	-0.466	-0.387	R
Committees (N):	4	4	10	

Figure 4.1: U.S. House Committee Size and Average Adjusted ADA Score for Democrat Majority Contingents




Correlation: -0.414

Figure 4.2: U.S. House Committee Size and Average NOMINATE Score for Democrat Majority Contingents




Correlation: 0.490

Figure 4.3: U.S. House Committee Size and Average Adjusted ADA Score for Republican Majority Contingents




Correlation: 0.255

Figure 4.4: U.S. House Committee Size and Average NOMINATE Score for Republican Majority Contingents




Correlation: -0.020

Figure 4.5: U.S. House Committee Size and Average Adjusted ADA Score for Republican Minority Contingents




Correlation: 0.027

Figure 4.6: U.S. House Committee Size and Average NOMINATE Score for Republican Minority Contingents




Correlation: -0.028

Figure 4.7: U.S. House Committee Size and Average Adjusted ADA Score for Democrat Minority Contingents



Correlation: -0.336

Figure 4.8: U.S. House Committee Size and Average NOMINATE Score for Democrat Minority Contingents



Correlation: 0.250

Figure 5.1 Number of House Majority Members with 3+ Seats




Figure 5.2 Number of House Majority Members with 2 Seats




Figure 5.3 Number of House Majority Members with 1 Seat




Figure 5.4 Number of House Minority Members with 3+ Seats




Figure 5.5 Number of House Minority Members with 2 Seats




Figure 5.6 Number of House Minority Members with 1 Seat




Table 5.1 Ideological Stacking Regression Results—Raw ADA, U.S. House

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t
Constant	34.814	3.254	10.700
Floor Advantage	-75.426	14.137	-5.335
Appropriations	7.750	3.397	2.282
Rules	-3.688	3.566	-1.034
Ways & Means	-0.049	3.154	-0.016
Armed Services	-25.381	3.767	-6.737
Size	-0.539	0.067	-8.045

R-squared = 0.371, Adjusted R-squared = 0.357, Standard Error of the Estimate = 11.45

Dependent Variable: Raw ADA Ideological Stacking on Committees, N = 281





Figure 5.9: U.S. House Average Ideological Stacking—Raw ADA (1975-2001)




Table 5.2 Ideological Stacking Regression Results—Adjusted ADA, U.S. House

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t
Constant	37.844	3.516	10.764
Floor Advantage	-80.040	15.511	-5.160
Appropriations	8.194	3.598	2.277
Rules	-5.803	3.764	-1.542
Ways & Means	-0.187	3.324	-0.056
Armed Services	-24.920	3.838	-6.492
Size	-0.604	0.073	-8.290

R-squared = 0.386, Adjusted R-squared = 0.372, Standard Error of the Estimate = 11.63

Dependent Variable: Adjusted ADA Ideological Stacking on Committees, N = 263

Figure 5.10: U.S. House Average Ideological Stacking—Adjusted ADA (1975-1999)




Table 5.3 Ideological Stacking Regression Results—NOMINATE, U.S. House

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t
Constant	0.290	0.023	12.628
Floor Advantage	-0.637	0.100	-6.386
Appropriations	0.126	0.024	5.262
Rules	0.0053	0.025	0.209
Ways & Means	0.0208	0.022	0.937
Armed Services	-0.144	0.027	-5.395
Size	-0.0046	0.00047	-9.717

R-squared = 0.428, Adjusted R-squared = 0.415, Standard Error of the Estimate = 0.0808

Dependent Variable: NOMINATE Ideological Stacking on Committees, N = 281





Table 6.1 Systems Strategy Regression Results for the U.S. Senate

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t
Constant	0.052	0.0084	6.171
Floor Advantage	-0.253	0.0394	-6.431
Appropriations	0.008	0.0067	1.164
Armed Services	-0.004	0.0048	-0.861
Finance	0.001	0.0049	0.247
Foreign Relations	-0.005	0.0047	-1.138
Judiciary	0.004	0.0047	0.943
Size	-0.00179	0.00042	-4.221

R-squared = 0.207, Adjusted R-squared = 0.182, Standard Error of the Estimate = 0.0170

Dependent Variable: Majority Ratio Stacking on Committees, N = 227

**Figure 6.1 U.S. Senate Average Ratio
Stacking (1975-2001)**



**Table 6.2 Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats--U.S. Senate
(1975-2001)**

1975	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	32	65.47	-0.329
	3	24	53.08	-0.272
	4	5	57.80	-0.271
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	19	33.58	0.237
	3	17	30.65	0.239
	4	2	17.00	0.254

1977	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	36	59.03	-0.286
	3	25	57.40	-0.309
	4	1	80.00	-0.459
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	21	25.00	0.244
	3	17	25.29	0.188

1979	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	31	47.39	-0.265
	3	26	46.65	-0.304
	4	2	84.00	-0.551
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	20	21.80	0.265
	3	21	24.43	0.198

**Table 6.2 (continued) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats--
U.S. Senate (1975-2001)**

1981	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	14	15.36	0.283
	3	31	16.77	0.286
	4	8	19.38	0.189
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	16	56.25	-0.212
	3	27	68.70	-0.295
	4	4	76.25	-0.432

1983	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	14	16.07	0.353
	3	30	24.67	0.265
	4	8	25.63	0.176
	5	2	20.00	0.331
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	13	62.31	-0.243
	3	27	68.67	-0.305
	4	5	80.00	-0.396
	5	1	75.00	-0.301

1985	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	17	13.24	0.294
	3	27	12.78	0.325
	4	8	25.00	0.139
	5	1	5.00	0.206
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	15	62.33	-0.237
	3	28	73.39	-0.356
	4	4	66.25	-0.316

**Table 6.2 (continued) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats--
U.S. Senate (1975-2001)**

1987	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	13	71.92	-0.253
	3	31	75.48	-0.322
	4	8	84.38	-0.438
	5	2	72.50	-0.374
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	10	25.91	0.273
	3	27	25.19	0.319
	4	7	31.43	0.192

1989	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	13	68.85	-0.292
	3	32	66.25	-0.332
	4	9	85.00	-0.386
	5	1	65.00	-0.421
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	12	16.67	0.260
	3	24	14.79	0.324
	4	8	13.75	0.342
	5	1	20.00	0.191

**Table 6.2 (continued) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats--
U.S. Senate (1975-2001)**

1991	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	14	70.00	-0.276
	3	32	74.69	-0.361
	4	9	83.33	-0.381
	5	1	75.00	-0.417
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	12	24.17	0.276
	3	24	16.67	0.337
	4	7	13.57	0.345
	5	1	10.00	0.203

1993	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	12	68.58	-0.320
	3	35	75.29	-0.352
	4	9	83.33	-0.412
	5	1	75.00	-0.413
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	8	23.75	0.330
	3	25	22.40	0.356
	4	10	17.00	0.310

**Table 6.2 (continued) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats—
U.S. Senate (1975-2001)**

1995	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	13	10.38	0.333
	3	24	6.04	0.425
	4	13	11.15	0.283
	5	4	5.00	0.361
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1	1	95.00	-0.394
	2	11	89.55	-0.385
	3	22	86.59	-0.353
	4	9	93.33	-0.390
	5	3	95.00	-0.513

1997	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	16	14.69	0.385
	3	20	9.50	0.448
	4	14	19.64	0.353
	5	5	13.00	0.355
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1	1	80.00	-0.391
	2	9	76.11	-0.371
	3	21	82.38	-0.389
	4	13	82.31	-0.411
	5	1	100.00	-0.818

**Table 6.2 (continued) Member Reliability Associated with Member Seats--
U.S. Senate (1975-2001)**

1999	For Majority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	13	8.54	0.365
	3	22	4.77	0.455
	4	17	7.65	0.339
	5	3	3.33	0.393
	For Minority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	1	1	90.00	-0.388
	2	8	95.00	-0.297
	3	21	95.71	-0.437
	4	14	96.79	-0.382
	5	1	90.00	-0.852

2001	For Majority (D): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	6	95.00	-0.337
	3	19	87.89	-0.434
	4	24	90.21	-0.373
	5	2	97.50	-0.702
	For Minority (R): Committee Seats	Members	Average ADA	Average NOMINATE
	2	7	19.29	0.389
	3	23	8.91	0.440
	4	18	15.83	0.355
	5	1	0.00	0.344


Table 6.3 Senate Committee Size and Majority Reliability (ADA)			
Majority Contingent ADA	Committee Size:		
	<18	18+	Top 4
1975 D	58.6	56.4	58.9
Committees (N):	13	1	4
1977 D	61.7	57.4	56.1
Committees (N):	8	3	4
1979 D	52.2	48.6	43.8
Committees (N):	8	3	4
1981 R	17.5	14.8	17.6
Committees (N):	4	8	4
1983 R	26.0	22.1	22.5
Committees (N):	4	8	4
1985 R	15.9	15.0	14.4
Committees (N):	8	4	4
1987 D	78.0	75.5	74.9
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1989 D	75.1	67.1	71.3
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1991 D	80.5	72.1	75.6
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1993 D	78.7	74.2	76.0
Committees (N):	5	7	4
1995 R	8.9	7.4	8.6
Committees (N):	7	6	4
1997 R	17.2	13.0	14.3
Committees (N):	4	9	4
1999 R	8.4	5.9	5.9
Committees (N):	4	9	4
2001 D	85.5	90.8	90.5
Committees (N):	2	10	4

Table 6.4 Senate Committee Size and Majority Reliability (NOMINATE)			
Majority Contingent NOMINATE	Committee Size:		
	<18	18+	Top 4
1975 D	-0.294	-0.313	-0.285
Committees (N):	13	1	4
1977 D	-0.331	-0.281	-0.275
Committees (N):	8	3	4
1979 D	-0.330	-0.294	-0.257
Committees (N):	8	3	4
1981 R	0.245	0.316	0.270
Committees (N):	4	8	4
1983 R	0.244	0.275	0.273
Committees (N):	4	8	4
1985 R	0.258	0.290	0.289
Committees (N):	8	4	4
1987 D	-0.367	-0.320	-0.322
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1989 D	-0.372	-0.312	-0.347
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1991 D	-0.390	-0.327	-0.345
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1993 D	-0.382	-0.352	-0.352
Committees (N):	5	7	4
1995 R	0.358	0.364	0.359
Committees (N):	7	6	4
1997 R	0.348	0.410	0.394
Committees (N):	4	9	4
1999 R	0.351	0.400	0.406
Committees (N):	4	9	4
2001 D	-0.411	-0.416	-0.399
Committees (N):	2	10	4

Table 6.5 Senate Committee Size and Minority Reliability (ADA)			
Minority Contingent ADA	Committee Size:		
	<18	18+	Top 4
1975 D	28.8	31.3	31.7
Committees (N):	13	1	4
1977 D	25.5	16.2	29.3
Committees (N):	8	3	4
1979 D	24.7	18.7	23.7
Committees (N):	8	3	4
1981 R	69.1	70.4	61.2
Committees (N):	4	8	4
1983 R	67.0	72.1	67.5
Committees (N):	4	8	4
1985 R	71.9	70.0	68.5
Committees (N):	8	4	4
1987 D	30.5	24.6	25.8
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1989 D	18.9	12.1	15.2
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1991 D	22.8	12.4	17.6
Committees (N):	6	6	4
1993 D	26.8	17.1	22.2
Committees (N):	5	7	4
1995 R	92.5	88.1	89.3
Committees (N):	7	6	4
1997 R	82.1	83.4	79.6
Committees (N):	4	9	4
1999 R	95.3	96.2	95.5
Committees (N):	4	9	4
2001 D	13.2	12.3	12.8
Committees (N):	2	10	4


Table 6.6 Senate Committee Size and Minority Reliability (NOMINATE)				
Minority Contingent NOMINATE		Committee Size:		
		<18	18+	Top 4
1975	D	0.273	0.165	0.216
Committees (N):		13	1	4
1977	D	0.200	0.302	0.195
Committees (N):		8	3	4
1979	D	0.219	0.251	0.236
Committees (N):		8	3	4
1981	R	-0.307	-0.337	-0.244
Committees (N):		4	8	4
1983	R	-0.292	-0.325	-0.294
Committees (N):		4	8	4
1985	R	-0.338	-0.337	-0.303
Committees (N):		8	4	4
1987	D	0.259	0.296	0.294
Committees (N):		6	6	4
1989	D	0.215	0.344	0.318
Committees (N):		6	6	4
1991	D	0.252	0.371	0.331
Committees (N):		6	6	4
1993	D	0.267	0.373	0.341
Committees (N):		5	7	4
1995	R	-0.425	-0.364	-0.370
Committees (N):		7	6	4
1997	R	-0.415	-0.419	-0.397
Committees (N):		4	9	4
1999	R	-0.430	-0.415	-0.409
Committees (N):		4	9	4
2001	D	0.341	0.399	0.407
Committees (N):		2	10	4

Figure 6.2: U.S. Senate Committee Size and Average Adjusted ADA Score for Democrat Majority Contingents




Correlation: 0.244

Figure 6.3: U.S. Senate Committee Size and Average NOMINATE Score for Democrat Majority Contingents




Correlation: -0.238

Figure 6.4: U.S. Senate Committee Size and Average Adjusted ADA Score for Republican Majority Contingents




Correlation: -0.364


Figure 6.5: U.S. Senate Committee Size and Average NOMINATE Score for Republican Majority Contingents



Correlation: 0.326




Correlation: 0.017




Correlation: 0.049

Figure 6.8: U.S. Senate Committee Size and Average Adjusted ADA Score for Republican Minority Contingents



Correlation: -0.418

Figure 6.9: U.S. Senate Committee Size and Average NOMINATE Score for Republican Minority Contingents





Correlation: 0.406

Table 6.7 Ideological Stacking Regression Results—Raw ADA, U.S. Senate

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t
Constant	2.408	6.402	0.376
Floor Advantage	-51.497	31.151	-1.653
Appropriations	-3.706	5.278	-0.702
Armed Services	-5.523	3.717	-1.486
Finance	-2.329	3.788	-0.615
Foreign Relations	6.984	3.662	-1.907
Judiciary	-2.441	3.645	-0.670
Size	0.03966	0.326	0.122

R-squared = 0.053, Adjusted R-squared = 0.020, Standard Error of the Estimate = 12.59

Dependent Variable: Raw ADA Ideological Stacking on Committees, N = 211






Table 6.8 Ideological Stacking Regression Results—Adjusted ADA, U.S. Senate

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t
Constant	2.382	6.051	0.394
Floor Advantage	-47.283	29.444	-1.606
Appropriations	-2.955	4.989	-0.592
Armed Services	-5.530	3.514	-1.574
Finance	-2.039	3.581	-0.569
Foreign Relations	6.705	3.461	-1.937
Judiciary	-1.796	3.445	-0.521
Size	0.02421	0.308	0.079

R-squared = 0.052, Adjusted R-squared = 0.019, Standard Error of the Estimate = 11.90

Dependent Variable: Adjusted ADA Ideological Stacking on Committees, N = 211




Table 6.9 Ideological Stacking Regression Results—NOMINATE, U.S. Senate

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t
Constant	-0.0004	0.050	-0.008
Floor Advantage	-0.0593	0.243	-0.244
Appropriations	-0.0340	0.041	-0.825
Armed Services	-0.0574	0.029	-1.981
Finance	-0.0747	0.030	-2.528
Foreign Relations	0.0776	0.029	2.718
Judiciary	-0.0198	0.028	-0.698
Size	0.0015	0.003	0.579

R-squared = 0.089, Adjusted R-squared = 0.058, Standard Error of the Estimate = 0.0982

Dependent Variable: NOMINATE Ideological Stacking on Committees, N = 211





Table 7.1 Results for 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker
Proportional?: By Rule


"The Speaker shall proportion, as accurately as is reasonably possible, all committee appointments in a manner which is inclusive and reflects...the political party affiliation of the members of the body."

Classified as: Inconclusive

Alabama House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0619	0.037	-1.65
Floor Advantage	-0.1280	0.106	-1.20
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0414	0.047	0.88
Ways and Means	0.0516	0.045	1.16
Judiciary	0.0317	0.047	0.67
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.0485	0.044	1.09
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0034	0.002	1.35
R-squared	0.037		
Adjusted R-squared	0.008		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.129		
N	206		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Committee on Committees (then approved by majority)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The membership of each committee shall total to an uneven number. On each standing committee the minority is entitled to the number of seats that is proportional to the number of minority members compared to the total house. [F]ractional numbers that represent the minority proportional entitlement to a seat shall be ignored."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Alaska House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0151	0.071	0.21
Floor Advantage	-0.5960	0.166	-3.59
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0017	0.034	0.05
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0332	0.034	0.98
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0811	0.052	-1.55
Education			
Budget	-0.1030	0.092	-1.12
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	-0.0579	0.039	-1.48
Committee Size	0.0146	0.010	1.45
R-squared	0.204		
Adjusted R-squared	0.132		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.089		
N	86		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Committee on Committees (then approved by majority)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The membership of each committee shall total to an uneven number. On each standing committee the minority is entitled to the number of seats that is proportional to the number of minority members compared to the total house. [F]ractional numbers that represent the minority proportional entitlement to a seat shall be ignored."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Alaska Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0600	0.073	0.82
Floor Advantage	0.1190	0.138	0.87
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0094	0.036	0.26
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0216	0.036	-0.60
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.1070	0.046	2.33
Education			
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	0.0133	0.047	0.29
Committee Size	-0.0066	0.013	-0.51
R-squared	0.114		
Adjusted R-squared	0.035		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.088		
N	74		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: By Rule

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

California House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0835	0.015	5.62
Floor Advantage	-0.3000	0.118	-2.54
Appropriations	0.0466	0.021	2.17
Rules/Calendar	-0.0451	0.015	-2.91
Ways and Means	-0.0059	0.024	-0.25
Judiciary	0.0247	0.015	1.61
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0110	0.014	0.81
Education	0.0270	0.012	2.32
Budget	-0.0072	0.023	-0.31
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0012	0.001	-1.58
R-squared	0.147		
Adjusted R-squared	0.102		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.040		
N	181		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker, Minority Leader (Speaker determines ratios)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The party representation on committees shall be in proportion generally to the relative number of members of the two major political parties in the House."

Classified as: Proportionate

Colorado House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1370	0.023	6.08
Floor Advantage	-0.1630	0.119	-1.37
Appropriations	0.0165	0.014	1.17
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0022	0.015	0.14
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0061	0.014	-0.43
Education	0.0105	0.014	0.75
Budget	0.0146	0.031	0.48
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0102	0.002	-5.48
R-squared	0.385		
Adjusted R-squared	0.333		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.037		
N	90		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Majority leader, minority leader
(Majority Leader determines numbers)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The party representation of such committees shall be in proportion, as nearly as practicable, as determined by the majority leader, to the relative number of members of the two major political parties in the Senate."

Classified as: Proportionate

Colorado Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1910	0.024	7.93
Floor Advantage	-0.2460	0.072	-3.44
Appropriations	0.0678	0.016	4.27
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0154	0.015	1.05
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0283	0.015	-1.86
Education	-0.0225	0.014	-1.57
Budget	-0.0412	0.031	-1.33
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0195	0.003	-5.91
R-squared	0.496		
Adjusted R-squared	0.449		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.038		
N	83		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Each caucus chooses its members

Proportional?: By rule


"The membership of each standing committee...shall be on a proportional basis, with the members of the majority party designating the chair, vice-chair, and majority party members, and the minority party designating the minority party members."

Classified as: Inconclusive

Hawaii House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0088	0.013	0.65
Floor Advantage	-0.1430	0.031	-4.64
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0013	0.013	-0.10
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0125	0.014	-0.92
Education	-0.0111	0.010	-1.16
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0026	0.001	2.75
R-squared	0.171		
Adjusted R-squared	0.141		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.035		
N	145		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: President (with minority nominating its members)

Proportional?: By rule


"The majority and minority parties shall to the extent practicable be represented on all Standing Committees on a proportional basis or on such basis as may be prescribed by the Senate."

Classified as: Inconclusive

Hawaii Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1300	0.059	2.19
Floor Advantage	-0.5840	0.143	-4.09
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means	-0.0171	0.025	-0.68
Judiciary	-0.0195	0.020	-0.96
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.0413	0.017	2.38
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0096	0.003	3.34
R-squared	0.277		
Adjusted R-squared	0.241		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.053		
N	108		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules




Appointments by: Senate Leadership
(headed by President Pro Tem)
Proportional?: By Rule

Classified as: Proportionate

Idaho Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0649	0.037	-1.73
Floor Advantage	-0.0403	0.034	-1.20
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0101	0.013	0.77
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0073	0.013	0.56
Education	-0.0045	0.013	-0.34
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0068	0.003	1.95
R-squared	0.13		
Adjusted R-squared	0.064		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.032		
N	71		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: By Rule


"Insofar as feasible and practical, the membership of the standing committees shall be made proportionate to representation of parties in the House."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Indiana House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1800	0.020	9.03
Floor Advantage	-0.0064	0.073	-0.09
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0070	0.008	0.89
Ways and Means	0.1240	0.018	6.78
Judiciary	-0.0066	0.006	-1.05
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	-0.0024	0.006	-0.38
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0094	0.001	-6.65
R-squared	0.398		
Adjusted R-squared	0.371		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.016		
N	145		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Committee on Organization, Calendar and Rules (majority dominated)

Proportional?: By Rule, except for Rules


"The two major political parties shall have proportional representation on each standing committee other than the Committee on Organization, Calendar and Rules. In the event application of the preceding sentence results in a fraction, the party having a fraction exceeding .5 shall receive representation as though such fraction were a whole number."

Classified as: Proportionate

Kansas Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0500	0.019	2.59
Floor Advantage	-0.0820	0.036	-2.29
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means	-0.0131	0.011	-1.16
Judiciary	-0.0212	0.012	-1.84
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0136	0.011	-1.24
Education	-0.0136	0.011	-1.24
Budget			
Reapportionment	-0.0188	0.021	-0.90
Committee on Comm.	0.3370	0.011	31.42
Committee Size	-0.0045	0.002	-2.54
R-squared	0.899		
Adjusted R-squared	0.893		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.029		
N	138		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Committee on Committees (5-1 majority)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The Committee on Committees shall select members of each standing and special committee in proportion to the representation of each political party in the House."

Classified as: Inconclusive

Kentucky House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0447	0.027	1.66
Floor Advantage	-0.1230	0.126	-0.98
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0950	0.018	5.16
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0220	0.017	-1.31
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0516	0.019	2.66
Education	0.0421	0.018	2.40
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	0.1510	0.029	5.27
Committee Size	-0.0015	0.001	-1.59
R-squared	0.348		
Adjusted R-squared	0.315		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.046		
N	144		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Committee on Committees (5-3 majority)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The Committee on Committees shall select members of committees and standing subcommittees in proportion to the representation of each political party in the Senate."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Kentucky Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1920	0.036	5.34
Floor Advantage	-0.3510	0.072	-4.84
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	-0.0119	0.026	-0.46
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0047	0.021	-0.22
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0535	0.024	2.23
Education	0.0239	0.023	1.05
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	0.0178	0.029	0.62
Committee Size	-0.0142	0.003	-4.47
R-squared	0.25		
Adjusted R-squared	0.197		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.060		
N	108		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: By Rule

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Maryland House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0161	0.035	0.46
Floor Advantage	-0.1610	0.077	-2.10
Appropriations	0.0253	0.017	1.47
Rules/Calendar	0.1350	0.016	8.53
Ways and Means	-0.0005	0.016	-0.03
Judiciary	-0.0175	0.016	-1.09
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education			
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0011	0.001	1.01
R-squared	0.633		
Adjusted R-squared	0.591		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.039		
N	60		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: By Rule


"The Speaker must make the proposed assignments with the purpose of attaining proportionate representation on the committees for the minority caucus."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Minnesota House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0913	0.007	13.55
Floor Advantage	-0.1910	0.043	-4.45
Appropriations	0.1000	0.019	5.33
Rules/Calendar	0.0456	0.009	5.20
Ways and Means	0.0423	0.009	4.77
Judiciary	-0.0068	0.008	-0.82
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0309	0.009	3.36
Education	0.0226	0.007	3.19
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0045	0.017	0.26
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0027	0.000	-8.04
R-squared	0.479		
Adjusted R-squared	0.45		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.024		
N	177		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: A subcommittee of Rules and Administration (4-1 majority)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The majority and minority groups must each be represented on all standing committees of the Senate substantially in proportion to their numbers in the Senate."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Minnesota Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0571	0.009	6.72
Floor Advantage	-0.2800	0.042	-6.73
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0478	0.011	4.35
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0156	0.010	1.61
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0052	0.009	0.61
Education	0.0034	0.008	0.42
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0919	0.025	3.63
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0006	0.000	-1.25
R-squared	0.367		
Adjusted R-squared	0.335		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.025		
N	148		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker, Minority Leader

Proportional?: By Rule


"The membership of all standing committees...shall be composed, as nearly as may be, of majority and minority party members in the same proportion as the number of majority and minority party members in the House bears to the total membership of the House."

Classified as: Proportionate

Missouri House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0338	0.007	5.11
Floor Advantage	-0.0505	0.040	-1.27
Appropriations	0.0068	0.005	1.30
Rules/Calendar	-0.0032	0.010	-0.31
Ways and Means	-0.0093	0.011	-0.83
Judiciary	-0.0055	0.010	-0.53
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0164	0.029	-0.56
Education	-0.0024	0.008	-0.30
Budget	0.0016	0.012	0.13
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0007	0.000	-1.99
R-squared	0.024		
Adjusted R-squared	-0.002		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.029		
N	346		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by:

President Pro Tem

Proportional?:

By Rule

"The membership of all standing committees...shall be composed, as nearly as may be, of majority and minority party members in the same proportion as the number of majority and minority party members in the senate bears to the total membership of the senate."


Classified as:

Proportionate

Missouri Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0653	0.016	4.16
Floor Advantage	-0.3830	0.051	-7.45
Appropriations	0.0398	0.015	2.62
Rules/Calendar	-0.0067	0.013	-0.52
Ways and Means	-0.0062	0.013	-0.48
Judiciary	0.0078	0.013	0.61
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.0106	0.015	0.69
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0030	0.002	-1.76
R-squared	0.272		
Adjusted R-squared	0.241		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.035		
N	172		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker (but party caucus usually determines)


Proportional?: By Rule

Classified as: Proportionate

Nevada House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0262	0.037	0.70
Floor Advantage	-0.1750	0.090	-1.94
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means	0.0014	0.020	0.07
Judiciary	-0.0122	0.020	-0.61
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0261	0.018	-1.44
Education	0.0090	0.018	0.49
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0006	0.003	0.21
R-squared	0.085		
Adjusted R-squared	0.008		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.045		
N	79		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker (minority leader advises)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The membership on all standing committees of the House shall be divided between the two major political parties in the same majority proportion that the House membership of the party bears to the House membership of the minority party."

Classified as: Inconclusive

New Hampshire House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0249	0.034	0.74
Floor Advantage	-0.0774	0.065	-1.19
Appropriations	0.0016	0.018	0.09
Rules/Calendar	0.0050	0.014	0.36
Ways and Means	0.0136	0.014	0.99
Judiciary	0.0034	0.011	0.31
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0025	0.016	0.16
Education	-0.0028	0.011	-0.26
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0004	0.002	-0.24
R-squared	0.017		
Adjusted R-squared	-0.031		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.030		
N	173		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: President (with advice from minority leader)


Proportional?: By Rule

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

New Hampshire Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0274	0.038	0.73
Floor Advantage	-0.2840	0.082	-3.46
Appropriations	-0.2280	0.083	-2.76
Rules/Calendar	0.0454	0.030	1.50
Ways and Means	0.0584	0.030	1.92
Judiciary	-0.0034	0.030	-0.11
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0744	0.032	2.30
Education	-0.0111	0.030	-0.37
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0007	0.006	0.13
R-squared	0.185		
Adjusted R-squared	0.135		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.082		
N	139		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: By Rule


"The number of majority members on each standing committee shall be in the same ratio as the majority members of the House are to the entire membership of the House, with all fractional members plus one member being credited to the majority."

Classified as: Unique

New York House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1730	0.019	9.13
Floor Advantage	0.0433	0.111	0.39
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0228	0.017	1.35
Ways and Means	0.0163	0.016	1.00
Judiciary	-0.0023	0.015	-0.15
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0106	0.015	-0.70
Education	0.0034	0.011	0.30
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0048	0.000	-10.79
R-squared	0.376		
Adjusted R-squared	0.36		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.041		
N	283		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: By Rule


"The Speaker shall appoint the members of all standing committees having no permanent subcommittees at the beginning of the first regular session in a manner to reflect the partisan membership of the House, except that the standing committee on Congressional Redistricting and Legislative Redistricting shall have an equal number of members of the two parties having the largest membership in the House."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

North Carolina House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0579	0.011	5.14
Floor Advantage	-0.2060	0.095	-2.17
Appropriations	0.0270	0.017	1.59
Rules/Calendar	0.1180	0.028	4.22
Ways and Means	0.0414	0.037	1.13
Judiciary	0.0161	0.018	0.89
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0187	0.030	0.63
Education	0.0791	0.019	4.14
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0015	0.000	-3.39
R-squared	0.242		
Adjusted R-squared	0.209		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.072		
N	195		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: By Rule (except on Finance & Appropriations)


"The membership of committees shall be proportional to the partisan composition of the House. The chairmen, and the vice-chairman with respect to the Finance and Appropriations Committee, shall not be included for purposes of this calculation."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Ohio House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0736	0.009	8.00
Floor Advantage	-0.3350	0.063	-5.34
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0025	0.009	0.27
Ways and Means	-0.0120	0.009	-1.30
Judiciary	-0.0102	0.011	-0.90
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0343	0.012	2.94
Education	-0.0160	0.010	-1.67
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0010	0.000	-2.19
R-squared	0.217		
Adjusted R-squared	0.185		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.025		
N	183		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: By Rule


"The Speaker shall appoint majority party and minority party members to all standing committees and statutory committees, in the same proportion as the number of majority party members in the House bear respectively to the total membership of the House. Except as otherwise provided by law, the Speaker shall determine the number of members on each committee."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Oregon House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1200	0.013	9.58
Floor Advantage	-1.0380	0.150	-6.92
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	-0.0033	0.012	-0.27
Ways and Means	0.1190	0.020	5.92
Judiciary	0.0048	0.011	0.43
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0110	0.013	-0.83
Education	0.0009	0.013	0.07
Budget	0.1560	0.032	4.88
Reapportionment	0.0366	0.033	1.10
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0057	0.001	-4.24
R-squared	0.557		
Adjusted R-squared	0.518		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.031		
N	111		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: President Pro Tem


Proportional?: By Rule

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Pennsylvania Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1120	0.018	6.14
Floor Advantage	-0.9180	0.047	-19.34
Appropriations	0.0385	0.020	1.89
Rules/Calendar	0.0448	0.013	3.55
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0133	0.008	1.71
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0083	0.007	-1.11
Education	-0.0019	0.007	-0.26
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0017	0.002	-1.03
R-squared	0.711		
Adjusted R-squared	0.699		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.021		
N	173		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: By Rule


"All subcommittees and committees shall have proportionate minority membership when feasible."

Classified as: Inconclusive

Rhode Island House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0703	0.087	-0.81
Floor Advantage	0.0487	0.247	0.20
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	-0.0243	0.020	-1.19
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0185	0.012	-1.49
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0220	0.013	-1.76
Education	-0.1070	0.034	-3.09
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0035	0.002	1.68
R-squared	0.385		
Adjusted R-squared	0.303		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.030		
N	52		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Election (senior members choose their 4 first, then reverse order)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The total membership of each Standing Committee shall be composed of members of the two major political parties in proportion to the number of Senators of each such political parties as nearly as possible and ensuring that the majority party as defined in these Rules contains a majority of the membership within each Standing Committee."

Classified as: Proportionate

South Carolina Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.2220	0.042	5.27
Floor Advantage	-0.0033	0.103	-0.03
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.1240	0.038	3.23
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0265	0.039	-0.68
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.1150	0.039	2.96
Education	-0.0227	0.038	-0.60
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0133	0.002	-5.33
R-squared	0.292		
Adjusted R-squared	0.252		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.102		
N	114		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by:

Speaker

Proportional?:

By Rule

"Membership on all standing committees shall be contingent upon membership or nonmembership in the majority caucus. The apportionment of members on all standing committees shall be according to the same ratio of members in the House of Delegates who are members or nonmembers of the majority caucus. If such ratio would represent a fractional number of the committee membership assigned to the majority caucus, then the number of majority caucus members on standing committees shall be the next highest whole number of committee members."


Classified as:

Reliability-based ratios

Virginia House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0502	0.027	1.85
Floor Advantage	-0.2370	0.132	-1.79
Appropriations	0.1110	0.028	3.97
Rules/Calendar	0.1430	0.029	4.95
Ways and Means			
Judiciary			
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0667	0.028	2.40
Education	0.0315	0.028	1.14
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0002	0.001	-0.17
R-squared	0.271		
Adjusted R-squared	0.237		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.070		
N	134		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Election

Proportional?: By Rule

"The total membership of all Committees and the membership of each standing Committee shall be composed of members of the two major political parties in the Commonwealth in proportion to the number of Senators of each of such political parties, as nearly as practicable."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios


Other: Apparent coalition in 1999

Virginia Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0071	0.017	-0.41
Floor Advantage	0.1100	0.115	0.96
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.1600	0.037	4.34
Ways and Means			
Judiciary			
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.1350	0.037	3.66
Education	0.0643	0.037	1.74
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			

R-squared	0.3
Adjusted R-squared	0.261
Std. Error of Estimate	0.092
N	77

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker (but each party caucus has a major role)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The speaker, in open session, shall appoint committee chairs from the majority party of the house and shall appoint members to committees in the same ratio as the membership of the respective parties of the house, unless otherwise provided by law or house rules."

Classified as: Proportionate

Washington House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0352	0.013	2.71
Floor Advantage	-0.1950	0.076	-2.57
Appropriations	0.0176	0.021	0.85
Rules/Calendar	0.0397	0.018	2.23
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0016	0.019	-0.08
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0097	0.016	0.61
Education	-0.0115	0.012	-0.98
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0008	0.001	-1.00
R-squared	0.117		
Adjusted R-squared	0.061		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.038		
N	119		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Organization Committee (Majority Leader
Chairs 3-2)

Proportional?: By Rule


"The majority and minority parties of the senate shall be represented on all senate standing committees and on all joint standing committees on the basis prescribed by the chairperson of the committee on senate organization, but at least in proportion to the representation of the 2 major political parties in the membership of the senate unless, for the senate membership of a joint committee, such proportional representation places the senate majority party in a minority position on the joint committee."

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Wisconsin Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1110	0.020	5.55
Floor Advantage	-0.2960	0.131	-2.26
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	-0.0349	0.047	-0.75
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0235	0.017	-1.38
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.1140	0.023	4.99
Education	0.0114	0.015	0.74
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0058	0.003	-1.72
R-squared	0.254		
Adjusted R-squared	0.211		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.046		
N	109		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: Speaker (with advice and consent of Rules and Procedure Committee)

Proportional?: By Rule


"Membership on committees shall be apportioned as nearly as possible to reflect the percentage of the elected membership of the majority and minority parties of the House."

Classified as: Inconclusive

Wyoming House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1630	0.076	2.14
Floor Advantage	-0.1120	0.093	-1.20
Appropriations	-0.0426	0.022	-1.96
Rules/Calendar	0.0201	0.025	0.81
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0092	0.015	-0.60
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0046	0.015	0.30
Education	-0.0093	0.015	-0.60
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0150	0.007	-2.05
R-squared	0.082		
Adjusted R-squared	0.001		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.040		
N	88		

Table 7.1 (cont.) 34 Chambers with Proportionality Rules



Appointments by: President (with advice and consent of Rules and Procedure Committee)

Proportional?: By Rule

"Membership on committees shall be apportioned as nearly as possible as to reflect the percentage of the elected membership of the majority and minority parties of the Senate."


Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Wyoming Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0521	0.026	2.01
Floor Advantage	-0.7240	0.147	-4.91
Appropriations	0.0000	0.011	0.00
Rules/Calendar	0.0000	0.011	0.00
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0250	0.011	2.28
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0250	0.011	2.28
Education	0.0000	0.011	0.00
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			

R-squared 0.296
 Adjusted R-squared 0.243
 Std. Error of Estimate 0.029
 N 88

Table 7.2 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Arizona House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0164	0.021	0.77
Floor Advantage	-0.2170	0.086	-2.52
Appropriations	-0.0113	0.012	-0.96
Rules/Calendar	-0.0043	0.011	-0.41
Ways and Means	-0.0175	0.011	-1.65
Judiciary	-0.0013	0.011	-0.12
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	-0.0022	0.011	-0.21
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0023	0.001	1.94
R-squared	0.197		
Adjusted R-squared	0.155		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.029		
N	142		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Rules Committee (composed of President

Pro Tem and 4 others elected by senate.)


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

California Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1070	0.033	3.22
Floor Advantage	-0.5140	0.193	-2.66
Appropriations	-0.0275	0.030	-0.93
Rules/Calendar	-0.0843	0.028	-2.98
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0415	0.027	1.51
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0251	0.024	-1.07
Education	0.0898	0.028	3.16
Budget	0.0269	0.030	0.90
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.00002	0.003	-0.01
R-squared	0.157		
Adjusted R-squared	0.12		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.075		
N	191		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Proportionate, with exceptions

Delaware House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0485	0.020	2.46
Floor Advantage	-0.5310	0.114	-4.64
Appropriations	0.0465	0.024	1.93
Rules/Calendar	-0.0383	0.048	-0.80
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0237	0.024	-0.99
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0221	0.023	-0.97
Education	0.0005	0.026	0.02
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0019	0.003	0.74
R-squared	0.164		
Adjusted R-squared	0.127		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.066		
N	168		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: President

Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey


Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Other: Some coalitions present

Florida Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0521	0.026	2.03
Floor Advantage	-0.5060	0.171	-2.97
Appropriations	0.0358	0.054	0.67
Rules/Calendar	0.0332	0.033	1.00
Ways and Means	0.0701	0.082	0.86
Judiciary	0.0049	0.028	0.18
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0047	0.038	-0.12
Education	0.0330	0.026	1.25
Budget	0.0006	0.081	0.01
Reapportionment	0.2410	0.056	4.29
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0021	0.002	-0.99
R-squared	0.198		
Adjusted R-squared	0.132		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.075		
N	132		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Inconclusive

Idaho House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0133	0.029	0.46
Floor Advantage	-0.0972	0.061	-1.60
Appropriations	0.0157	0.016	0.98
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means	-0.2030	0.018	-11.14
Judiciary	-0.0208	0.015	-1.36
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0152	0.016	0.93
Education	0.0099	0.016	0.61
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0004	0.001	0.29
R-squared	0.657		
Adjusted R-squared	0.634		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.041		
N	112		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: President Pro Tem


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Indiana Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0705	0.017	4.23
Floor Advantage	-0.5720	0.036	-15.82
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0429	0.009	4.84
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0093	0.007	1.29
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0380	0.009	4.03
Education	0.0139	0.007	1.91
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0001	0.001	-0.05
R-squared	0.713		
Adjusted R-squared	0.7		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.020		
N	139		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Iowa House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0530	0.017	3.17
Floor Advantage	-0.4070	0.045	-9.03
Appropriations	-0.0053	0.008	-0.66
Rules/Calendar	0.0201	0.015	1.37
Ways and Means	-0.0104	0.008	-1.30
Judiciary	-0.0008	0.007	-0.11
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	-0.0119	0.007	-1.59
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0003	0.001	-0.38
R-squared	0.445		
Adjusted R-squared	0.412		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.020		
N	124		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional




Appointments by: Majority & Minority Leaders after consultation with President
Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey
Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Iowa Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1680	0.023	7.29
Floor Advantage	-0.7450	0.159	-4.69
Appropriations	0.1180	0.022	5.49
Rules/Calendar	0.0277	0.015	1.80
Ways and Means	0.0122	0.014	0.84
Judiciary	0.0161	0.015	1.08
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.0121	0.015	0.80
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0066	0.002	-4.10
R-squared	0.375		
Adjusted R-squared	0.335		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.039		
N	118		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Proportionate

Kansas House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0603	0.016	3.67
Floor Advantage	-0.3470	0.073	-4.78
Appropriations	0.0237	0.018	1.30
Rules/Calendar	-0.0221	0.015	-1.46
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0175	0.018	0.98
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0082	0.015	0.54
Education	0.0400	0.014	2.83
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0020	0.001	-2.52
R-squared	0.15		
Adjusted R-squared	0.115		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.048		
N	181		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: President


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Maryland Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0028	0.043	0.07
Floor Advantage	-0.0978	0.086	-1.14
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0316	0.019	1.63
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0446	0.020	-2.26
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0473	0.019	-2.44
Education	-0.0670	0.042	-1.60
Budget	0.0368	0.021	1.79
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0040	0.002	1.71
R-squared	0.453		
Adjusted R-squared	0.358		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.040		
N	48		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Michigan House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0493	0.008	5.97
Floor Advantage	-0.0578	0.118	-0.49
Appropriations	0.0536	0.015	3.65
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0123	0.014	0.85
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0120	0.012	0.96
Education	-0.0076	0.011	-0.71
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0908	0.031	2.94
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0001	0.001	0.18
R-squared	0.161		
Adjusted R-squared	0.126		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.031		
N	176		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Majority Leader (minority leader submits a list from which to choose)


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Proportionate

Michigan Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0493	0.024	2.03
Floor Advantage	-0.7000	0.134	-5.24
Appropriations	-0.0220	0.043	-0.51
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0186	0.015	-1.20
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0052	0.015	0.35
Education	0.0052	0.015	0.35
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0303	0.026	1.17
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0047	0.005	1.02
R-squared	0.197		
Adjusted R-squared	0.154		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.040		
N	137		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Montana House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0002	0.012	-0.02
Floor Advantage	-0.3820	0.040	-9.58
Appropriations	0.0060	0.009	0.68
Rules/Calendar	0.0412	0.009	4.55
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0023	0.009	-0.25
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0062	0.009	-0.68
Education	0.0108	0.009	1.24
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0026	0.001	3.57
R-squared	0.507		
Adjusted R-squared	0.476		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.023		
N	122		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Committee on Committees (which comprised only majority members)


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Montana Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0509	0.012	4.22
Floor Advantage	-0.2350	0.062	-3.77
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0044	0.011	0.41
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0125	0.011	1.16
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0159	0.010	1.66
Education	-0.0076	0.011	-0.70
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	0.3780	0.011	33.18
Committee Size	-0.0021	0.001	-1.99
R-squared	0.915		
Adjusted R-squared	0.91		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.029		
N	134		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

New Jersey House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0573	0.021	2.67
Floor Advantage	-0.6000	0.077	-7.75
Appropriations	-0.0912	0.032	-2.82
Rules/Calendar	-0.0088	0.032	-0.27
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0182	0.022	0.82
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	-0.0223	0.020	-1.11
Budget	-0.0117	0.047	-0.25
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0104	0.004	2.91
R-squared	0.284		
Adjusted R-squared	0.254		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.061		
N	173		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: President Pro Tem


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

New York Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0976	0.011	9.12
Floor Advantage	-0.4410	0.102	-4.33
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0119	0.011	1.11
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0171	0.010	1.64
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0322	0.014	2.29
Education	0.0060	0.007	0.83
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0032	0.001	-4.50
R-squared	0.179		
Adjusted R-squared	0.159		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.027		
N	255		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: Senate


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Ohio Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0681	0.022	3.04
Floor Advantage	-0.7850	0.105	-7.46
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	-0.0427	0.012	-3.60
Ways and Means	0.0064	0.011	0.60
Judiciary	-0.0255	0.010	-2.50
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0228	0.012	-1.86
Education	-0.0093	0.011	-0.88
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0070	0.002	3.11
R-squared	0.416		
Adjusted R-squared	0.376		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.028		
N	110		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey


Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Other: Speaker can vote on all committees
(and Speaker Pro Tem sometimes, too)

Oklahoma House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0281	0.012	2.40
Floor Advantage	-0.1720	0.063	-2.74
Appropriations	0.0452	0.026	1.74
Rules/Calendar	0.0551	0.023	2.43
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0044	0.021	-0.21
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0140	0.021	0.68
Education	0.0259	0.021	1.22
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0321	0.042	0.77
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0005	0.001	-0.98
R-squared	0.072		
Adjusted R-squared	0.037		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.057		
N	217		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Pres. Pro Tem, Minority Leader

Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey


Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Other: President and President Pro Tem are voting members of all committees

Oklahoma Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0261	0.014	1.91
Floor Advantage	-0.0867	0.046	-1.87
Appropriations	0.0854	0.025	3.47
Rules/Calendar	0.1010	0.014	7.48
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0036	0.012	0.30
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0168	0.012	1.36
Education	0.0164	0.013	1.27
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0021	0.001	-2.83
R-squared	0.313		
Adjusted R-squared	0.277		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.033		
N	142		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: President

Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey


Classified as: Proportionate (with a Ways and Means exception)

Other: President can vote on all committees

Oregon Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0507	0.040	1.28
Floor Advantage	-0.5270	0.129	-4.08
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0160	0.024	0.68
Ways and Means	0.1450	0.037	3.90
Judiciary	-0.0145	0.027	-0.53
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0047	0.026	-0.18
Education	-0.0101	0.024	-0.42
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0714	0.056	1.28
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0019	0.006	0.30
R-squared	0.375		
Adjusted R-squared	0.303		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.054		
N	79		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: President

Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey


Classified as: Inconclusive

Other: Could add 2-1 ex officio members to all committees

Rhode Island Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.1540	0.100	-1.54
Floor Advantage	-0.0325	0.257	-0.13
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0958	0.073	1.32
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0293	0.026	1.11
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0254	0.026	0.96
Education	0.1170	0.071	1.66
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0101	0.003	3.33
R-squared	0.243		
Adjusted R-squared	0.144		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.067		
N	53		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

South Dakota House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0616	0.028	2.19
Floor Advantage	-0.3850	0.131	-2.94
Appropriations	0.0124	0.020	0.62
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0089	0.020	-0.44
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0277	0.020	1.35
Education	0.0300	0.020	1.47
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0003	0.002	0.19
R-squared	0.121		
Adjusted R-squared	0.067		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.053		
N	104		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional




Appointments by: President Pro Tem, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader
Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey
Classified as: Proportionate

South Dakota Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0975	0.025	3.92
Floor Advantage	-0.2160	0.065	-3.30
Appropriations	0.0482	0.020	2.36
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0253	0.019	-1.35
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0087	0.020	0.43
Education	-0.0079	0.019	-0.42
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0095	0.003	-2.74
R-squared	0.203		
Adjusted R-squared	0.154		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.050		
N	104		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Tennessee House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0071	0.022	-0.32
Floor Advantage	0.0575	0.196	0.29
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.3670	0.020	18.74
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0428	0.020	2.18
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0998	0.022	4.58
Education	0.0233	0.020	1.19
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0009	0.001	-1.25
R-squared	0.791		
Adjusted R-squared	0.778		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.052		
N	102		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey


Classified as: Proportionate

Other: Coalition Government in 1989

Tennessee Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0076	0.053	0.14
Floor Advantage	-0.2830	0.168	-1.69
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0075	0.036	0.21
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0072	0.025	-0.29
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0328	0.025	1.31
Education	-0.0177	0.025	-0.72
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0017	0.006	0.29
R-squared	0.066		
Adjusted R-squared	-0.002		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.065		
N	89		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: President

Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey


Classified as: Inconclusive

Other: Rules and Revenue are stacked

Utah Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0121	0.030	0.40
Floor Advantage	-0.1700	0.146	-1.16
Appropriations	0.0356	0.025	1.44
Rules/Calendar	0.0687	0.026	2.67
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0132	0.026	0.51
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0274	0.026	1.06
Education	0.0179	0.026	0.70
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0002	0.003	0.10
R-squared	0.116		
Adjusted R-squared	0.044		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.068		
N	94		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: Committee on Committees (has a 3-0 majority membership)
President (who was Lt. Gov.) appointed committees in 1989


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Proportionate (with exceptions)

Vermont Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1790	0.126	1.43
Floor Advantage	-0.1170	0.340	-0.34
Appropriations	0.0615	0.048	1.27
Rules/Calendar	0.0955	0.056	1.70
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0087	0.044	0.20
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0723	0.050	1.45
Education	-0.0823	0.048	-1.71
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0283	0.021	-1.33
R-squared	0.156		
Adjusted R-squared	0.077		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.109		
N	83		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: President (Lt. Governor)


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Proportionate (with exceptions for Rules and Ways and Means)

Washington Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0907	0.009	10.53
Floor Advantage	-0.6670	0.112	-5.98
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0465	0.013	3.64
Ways and Means	0.0627	0.015	4.16
Judiciary	-0.0023	0.013	-0.18
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	-0.0058	0.007	-0.78
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0034	0.001	-3.69
R-squared	0.426		
Adjusted R-squared	0.39		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.025		
N	103		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are “Usually” Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Inconclusive

West Virginia House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0160	0.031	0.51
Floor Advantage	-0.0749	0.112	-0.67
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0205	0.022	0.94
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0201	0.017	1.20
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0043	0.017	0.26
Education	0.0081	0.017	0.48
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0002	0.001	-0.32
R-squared	0.029		
Adjusted R-squared	-0.028		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.045		
N	110		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: President


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Inconclusive

West Virginia Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0266	0.020	1.33
Floor Advantage	0.0184	0.040	0.46
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	-0.0438	0.015	-2.86
Ways and Means	0.0310	0.042	0.74
Judiciary	0.0059	0.017	0.35
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0091	0.018	-0.51
Education	-0.0082	0.016	-0.51
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0017	0.001	-1.25
R-squared	0.082		
Adjusted R-squared	0.034		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.042		
N	143		

Table 7.2 (continued) 31 Chambers That Are "Usually" Proportional



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: Usually is followed according to survey

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Wisconsin House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1130	0.008	13.46
Floor Advantage	-0.5130	0.073	-7.02
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	-0.0113	0.013	-0.86
Ways and Means	0.0210	0.014	1.54
Judiciary	-0.0040	0.013	-0.31
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.1240	0.014	8.91
Education	0.0217	0.012	1.88
Budget	0.0038	0.036	0.10
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0048	0.001	-7.02
R-squared	0.394		
Adjusted R-squared	0.378		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.036		
N	298		

Table 7.3 6 Chambers with Equal Per Capita Seats



Appointments by: Majority Leader (but party caucus usually determines)


Proportional?: On average, by equal per capita assignments (3 assignments per member)

Classified as: Stack and dump

Nevada Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0731	0.076	0.96
Floor Advantage	0.0417	0.193	0.22
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0006	0.023	-0.03
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0557	0.018	3.11
Education			
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0132	0.011	-1.23
R-squared	0.134		
Adjusted R-squared	0.082		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.061		
N	72		

Table 7.3 (continued) 6 Chambers with Equal Per Capita Seats



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: On average, by equal per capita assignments

Classified as: Stack and dump

New Mexico House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0221	0.036	-0.62
Floor Advantage	0.0775	0.101	0.77
Appropriations	-0.0198	0.034	-0.58
Rules/Calendar	0.0159	0.028	0.56
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0514	0.025	2.04
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0500	0.028	1.80
Education	0.0139	0.025	0.56
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0009	0.003	-0.31
R-squared	0.066		
Adjusted R-squared	0.01		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.065		
N	124		

Table 7.3 (continued) 6 Chambers with Equal Per Capita Seats



Appointments by: Committee on Committees
(8-3 for majority)

Proportional?: On average, by equal per capita assignments
(2 per member, 1 if on Finance)


Classified as: Stack and dump

Other: Seniority "shall prevail at all times
in committee assignments"

New Mexico Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0075	0.020	-0.37
Floor Advantage	-0.0271	0.114	-0.24
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0326	0.010	3.33
Ways and Means	0.0152	0.019	0.82
Judiciary	0.0362	0.010	3.64
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0210	0.013	1.66
Education	0.0015	0.011	0.14
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	0.1200	0.012	10.02
Committee Size	-0.0001	0.002	-0.05
R-squared	0.667		
Adjusted R-squared	0.625		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.025		
N	73		

Table 7.3 (continued) 6 Chambers with Equal Per Capita Seats



Appointments by:

Speaker, but Committee on Committees
started in 2001 (5-3 majority)

Proportional?:

On average, by equal per capita assignments with 2
seats per member or 1 if on Appropriations


Classified as:

Stack and dump

North Dakota House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0540	0.034	1.61
Floor Advantage	-0.0098	0.043	-0.23
Appropriations	0.0472	0.019	2.50
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0099	0.010	-0.95
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0153	0.010	1.46
Education	-0.0292	0.011	-2.78
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0037	0.002	-1.75
R-squared	0.201		
Adjusted R-squared	0.142		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.028		
N	89		

Table 7.3 (continued) 6 Chambers with Equal Per Capita Seats



Appointments by: Committee on Committees
(5-3 all majority appointed)


Proportional?: On average, by equal per capita assignments
2 seats per member or 1 on Appropriations

Classified as: Stack and dump

North Dakota Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1830	0.060	3.04
Floor Advantage	0.0478	0.110	0.43
Appropriations	0.2340	0.063	3.74
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0395	0.021	-1.88
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0274	0.021	1.30
Education	0.0047	0.021	0.22
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0283	0.008	-3.37
R-squared	0.209		
Adjusted R-squared	0.151		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.056		
N	89		

Table 7.3 (continued) 6 Chambers with Equal Per Capita Seats



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: On average, by equal per capita assignments

Classified as: Stack and dump

Vermont House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0301	0.143	-0.21
Floor Advantage	-0.1100	0.334	-0.33
Appropriations	0.0213	0.055	0.39
Rules/Calendar	0.0113	0.075	0.15
Ways and Means	0.0493	0.055	0.90
Judiciary	0.0304	0.055	0.56
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.0062	0.055	0.11
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0027	0.014	0.20
R-squared	0.012		
Adjusted R-squared	-0.05		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.146		
N	120		

Table 7.4 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: President (who is the Lt. Governor)


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Stack and dump

Alabama Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0547	0.057	-0.96
Floor Advantage	0.0266	0.174	0.15
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.1590	0.053	2.98
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0392	0.052	-0.76
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.1080	0.049	2.20
Education	-0.0378	0.053	-0.71
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0041	0.004	0.96
R-squared	0.121		
Adjusted R-squared	0.091		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.144		
N	182		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: President


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Arizona Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0306	0.033	-0.92
Floor Advantage	-0.2490	0.111	-2.24
Appropriations	0.0114	0.023	0.49
Rules/Calendar	0.0084	0.012	0.69
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0101	0.012	0.83
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0719	0.012	5.93
Education	0.0124	0.012	1.02
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0053	0.004	1.50
R-squared	0.431		
Adjusted R-squared	0.375		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.030		
N	79		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Speaker until 95, then changed to election by House district caucuses


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Inconclusive

Arkansas House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.1880	0.117	-1.60
Floor Advantage	-0.0398	0.105	-0.38
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.1430	0.066	2.18
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0768	0.031	-2.50
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0091	0.031	-0.30
Education	0.0277	0.031	0.90
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0106	0.006	1.83
R-squared	0.143		
Adjusted R-squared	0.078		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.081		
N	86		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Committee on Committees


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Stack and dump

Arkansas Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.2400	0.242	1.00
Floor Advantage	0.0541	0.390	0.14
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.0397	0.160	0.25
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.1030	0.056	1.82
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0333	0.056	-0.59
Education	0.0671	0.056	1.19
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	0.0397	0.160	0.25
Committee Size	-0.0374	0.023	-1.59
R-squared	0.111		
Adjusted R-squared	0.028		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.150		
N	83		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: President Pro Tem


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Delaware Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1690	0.028	5.94
Floor Advantage	-0.1120	0.109	-1.02
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0270	0.025	1.10
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0053	0.020	-0.26
Education	-0.0341	0.025	-1.37
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0180	0.005	-3.57
R-squared	0.093		
Adjusted R-squared	0.066		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.068		
N	177		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Speaker (who can place Speaker PT or Majority Whip as voting member of any committee)

Proportional?: No


Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Other: Some coalitions present

Florida House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0275	0.010	2.82
Floor Advantage	-0.3260	0.072	-4.54
Appropriations	0.0229	0.017	1.33
Rules/Calendar	0.0364	0.018	1.97
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0060	0.019	-0.31
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0152	0.020	0.77
Education	0.0057	0.013	0.45
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0577	0.025	2.29
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0012	0.000	2.60
R-squared	0.161		
Adjusted R-squared	0.131		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.050		
N	232		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Speaker


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Georgia House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1140	0.018	6.28
Floor Advantage	-0.1300	0.069	-1.88
Appropriations	0.3890	0.052	7.43
Rules/Calendar	0.2350	0.030	7.69
Ways and Means	0.1180	0.036	3.23
Judiciary	0.0755	0.036	2.08
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.0096	0.026	0.37
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0059	0.001	-6.70
R-squared	0.32		
Adjusted R-squared	0.301		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.101		
N	252		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: President (who is the Lt. Governor)

Proportional?: No, but everyone serves on (at least) four committees generally


Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Other: Marginalizing Committees Present

Georgia Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0182	0.043	-0.43
Floor Advantage	-0.2240	0.116	-1.94
Appropriations	0.0266	0.099	0.27
Rules/Calendar	0.0904	0.060	1.51
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0464	0.055	0.85
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0131	0.060	0.22
Education	-0.0036	0.040	-0.09
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.1440	0.064	2.27
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0051	0.004	1.43
R-squared	0.139		
Adjusted R-squared	0.102		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.151		
N	196		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Speaker, Minority Leader


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Proportionate (for most years)

Illinois House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0407	0.006	6.28
Floor Advantage	-0.2960	0.058	-5.07
Appropriations	0.0018	0.007	0.27
Rules/Calendar	0.0409	0.014	2.83
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0012	0.009	-0.13
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0013	0.013	-0.10
Education	-0.0066	0.009	-0.74
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0009	0.000	-2.48
R-squared	0.148		
Adjusted R-squared	0.126		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.035		
N	276		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: CC in 89, President and Minority

Leader from 1991

Proportional?:

No


Classified as:

Reliability-based ratios

Illinois Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0882	0.015	6.02
Floor Advantage	-0.8780	0.176	-4.98
Appropriations	0.0185	0.011	1.70
Rules/Calendar	0.0114	0.013	0.85
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0370	0.011	3.46
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0067	0.010	0.66
Education	0.0008	0.010	0.08
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	0.4110	0.032	12.85
Committee Size	-0.0006	0.001	-0.64
R-squared	0.634		
Adjusted R-squared	0.612		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.031		
N	143		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers




Appointments by: Speaker (appoints only 12 of 19 Appropriations Members)
Proportional?: No
Classified as: Stack and dump

Louisiana House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.1850	0.072	-2.56
Floor Advantage	-0.0037	0.183	-0.02
Appropriations	0.0371	0.054	0.69
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means	0.0936	0.054	1.74
Judiciary	0.1320	0.052	2.55
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	-0.0819	0.053	-1.56
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0115	0.004	2.98
R-squared	0.153		
Adjusted R-squared	0.115		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.139		
N	139		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: President


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Inconclusive

Louisiana Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0597	0.134	0.45
Floor Advantage	0.1490	0.119	1.26
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0443	0.032	-1.40
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0620	0.073	0.85
Education	0.0225	0.051	0.44
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0115	0.018	-0.63
R-squared	0.04		
Adjusted R-squared	-0.002		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.137		
N	132		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Speaker (except for Rules and Management, and some of Appropriations Committee)


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Stack and dump

Mississippi House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0346	0.027	1.28
Floor Advantage	0.0148	0.085	0.17
Appropriations	0.1660	0.040	4.21
Rules/Calendar	0.0967	0.038	2.58
Ways and Means	0.0250	0.040	0.63
Judiciary	0.0427	0.023	1.88
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.0707	0.027	2.61
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0028	0.001	-3.37
R-squared	0.127		
Adjusted R-squared	0.102		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.103		
N	250		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: President (who is Lt. Gov) except for

Rules Committee

Proportional?:

No


Classified as:

Inconclusive

Mississippi Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0224	0.031	0.72
Floor Advantage	0.0152	0.082	0.19
Appropriations	0.0477	0.053	0.91
Rules/Calendar	0.0284	0.044	0.65
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0070	0.048	0.15
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0021	0.053	-0.04
Education	0.0060	0.031	0.19
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0016	0.002	-0.72
R-squared	0.009		
Adjusted R-squared	-0.021		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.118		
N	244		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: President


Proportional?: No

Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

New Jersey Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0186	0.041	0.46
Floor Advantage	-0.5270	0.206	-2.56
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	-0.1340	0.041	-3.25
Ways and Means	0.0138	0.049	0.28
Judiciary	0.0186	0.044	0.42
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0307	0.059	0.52
Education	0.0111	0.027	0.42
Budget	0.0781	0.034	2.28
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0069	0.007	0.99
R-squared	0.232		
Adjusted R-squared	0.174		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.068		
N	114		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Pres. Pro Tem and Min. Leader through 1995,

Pres. Pro Tem alone since then

Proportional?:

No


Classified as:

Reliability-based ratios

North Carolina Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0593	0.016	3.65
Floor Advantage	-0.1410	0.053	-2.66
Appropriations	-0.0001	0.011	-0.01
Rules/Calendar	0.0116	0.022	0.54
Ways and Means	-0.0037	0.022	-0.17
Judiciary	0.0031	0.016	0.19
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0074	0.022	-0.33
Education	-0.0301	0.020	-1.54
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0319	0.042	0.76
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0005	0.001	-0.90
R-squared	0.062		
Adjusted R-squared	0.015		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.058		
N	188		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers




Appointments by: Committee on Committees makes recommendation; Speaker only in 1989
Proportional?: No
Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Pennsylvania House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0963	0.020	4.82
Floor Advantage	-1.0320	0.087	-11.86
Appropriations	0.0469	0.007	6.64
Rules/Calendar	-0.0184	0.007	-2.67
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0049	0.004	-1.15
Finance/Revenue/Tax	-0.0006	0.004	-0.14
Education	0.0001	0.004	0.02
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.	0.0801	0.009	8.73
Committee Size	-0.0006	0.001	-0.70
R-squared	0.747		
Adjusted R-squared	0.736		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.012		
N	186		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: No, but close on per capita basis


Classified as: Reliability-based ratios

Other: Some stack and dump present

South Carolina House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.1570	0.052	3.04
Floor Advantage	0.1750	0.306	0.57
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar	0.1660	0.060	2.74
Ways and Means	0.2970	0.076	3.92
Judiciary	0.1860	0.076	2.44
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.1010	0.064	1.59
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0139	0.003	-4.11
R-squared	0.225		
Adjusted R-squared	0.168		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.156		
N	88		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Speaker (but seniority is very significant factor)

Proportional?: No


Classified as: Stack and dump

Other: Frequent minority control of committees

Texas House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0136	0.053	0.26
Floor Advantage	-0.1950	0.207	-0.94
Appropriations	0.1680	0.108	1.56
Rules/Calendar	0.0679	0.038	1.78
Ways and Means	0.0440	0.053	0.83
Judiciary	0.0704	0.049	1.43
Finance/Revenue/Tax			
Education	0.0961	0.037	2.57
Budget			
Reapportionment	0.0732	0.055	1.34
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0017	0.006	-0.30
R-squared	0.062		
Adjusted R-squared	0.036		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.145		
N	288		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: President (who is Lt. Gov.)

Proportional?: No


Classified as: Stack and dump

Other: Frequent minority control of committees

Texas Senate OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	-0.0458	0.043	-1.07
Floor Advantage	-0.0983	0.133	-0.74
Appropriations			
Rules/Calendar			
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	-0.0362	0.036	-0.99
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0591	0.042	1.42
Education	0.0269	0.036	0.75
Budget			
Reapportionment	-0.0090	0.095	-0.10
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	0.0050	0.005	0.99
R-squared	0.102		
Adjusted R-squared	0.04		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.094		
N	93		

Table 7.4 (continued) 21 Unrestricted Chambers



Appointments by: Speaker

Proportional?: No

Classified as: Inconclusive

Utah House OLS Regression:

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-score
(Constant)	0.0008	0.021	0.04
Floor Advantage	0.0227	0.094	0.24
Appropriations	-0.0192	0.016	-1.20
Rules/Calendar	0.0028	0.017	0.16
Ways and Means			
Judiciary	0.0112	0.017	0.64
Finance/Revenue/Tax	0.0024	0.017	0.14
Education	-0.0080	0.017	-0.46
Budget			
Reapportionment			
Committee on Comm.			
Committee Size	-0.0001	0.001	-0.28
R-squared	0.031		
Adjusted R-squared	-0.037		
Std. Error of Estimate	0.046		
N	108		

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