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DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN EMERGING
AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES
DO RELIGION AND GENDER MATTER?

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**DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN EMERGING AFRICAN
DEMOCRACIES
DO RELIGION AND GENDER MATTER?**

VOLUME I

By

Virginia Parish Beard

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ABSTRACT

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN EMERGING AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES DO RELIGION AND GENDER MATTER?

By

Virginia Parish Beard

Are Islam and Christianity driving forces in democratic orientations among Africans? Do Islam and Christianity affect democratic positions of African men and women differently? In order to add to the growing conversation on the compatibility (or not) of religion with stable democracy (Oded 2000), this study asks if adherence to Christianity and Islam, within the context of other factors, helps to explain African democratic values, attitudes and behaviors. These political orientations are essential foundations for stable democracy. In developing nations, it is unclear how religious affiliations act upon male versus female democratic political orientations. I use state of the art public opinion data to advance the inclusion of religion and gender in the study of democratization in Africa. I take into account other factors, such as poverty levels, education, and political interest, which have been shown to drive political values, attitudes and behaviors. I focus on women because of their oft-noted pivotal role in the power and vibrancy of faith communities (Ellis and ter Haar 2004). Furthermore, studies of gender, development and democracy reveal that the exclusion of women can be a deathblow to long-term, sustainable democratic growth (Potgieter

2004). Along with the cross-national investigation, I present a case study on Kenya, using both quantitative and qualitative evidence. Kenya is a transitioning democracy, with vibrant religious communities and a growing focus on gender equality. I therefore believe Kenya is a pivotal case in which to examine the role of gender and religion in democratization. Thus, this study asks the following questions: Does gender affect one's political values, attitudes and behaviors? Is religion a factor in democratic orientations? What factors help to explain variations within and across religious groups among male and female popular orientations to democracy?

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DEDICATION

**This project is dedicated to Kim Perez
who held Africa in her heart**

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 General

Though previously ignored, gender and religion have risen as factors on the mainstream agenda of those seeking to understand democratization. A strict focus on economic factors over the past half-century has yet to explain or predict democratic transitions or failures, and thus space for cultural explanations has reopened in the past decade. Democratization is defined in this project as:

Transitions from authoritarian systems to democratic political systems, where democratic systems are taken to be those with regular, free and fair elections, which allow for transitions of power as dictated by the electorate (Huntington 1991).

The effort to understand democratization is monumental, given the complexity of the processes behind governance changes. A great deal of attention has been given to the structural and economic factors believed to help drive or sustain democratic formation and consolidation. The formula(s) or answers to democratization writ large have yet to be adequately put forth. Good economies do not always become democratic nor do bad economies always remain or return to non-democratic alternatives. Institutional arrangements do not necessarily reveal support for democracy or true practice of democracy.

To complement the findings and gaps left by these two foci in democratization studies of the past few decades, a recent shift to include cultural variables has entered the discussion. This project adds to cultural conceptions of democratization studies. Are Islam and Christianity driving forces in democratic orientations among Africans? Does religion affect the democratic values, attitudes and behaviors of African men and women differently? I would like to examine adherence to Christianity and Islam across gender within the context of other factors to investigate African democratic orientations. Some

Christian churches in Africa are decidedly apolitical, calling adherents to refrain from political engagement and condemning politically active denominations or leaders. Other Christian groups are foundationally committed to engage the political realm as a core part of their beliefs. These branches of the Christian faith encourage political awareness and pursuit (Gifford 1995). Historically, Shia Muslims across the globe have been noted to approach the political realm differently than their Sunni counterparts (Oded 2000). I obscure these differences within Christianity and Islam for a broader understanding of the variations in political orientations between members of these two religions. I do so recognizing that the general trends I espouse do not necessarily come without counter cases. In order to reveal whether or not fears about the compatibility of Islam or Christianity with democracy are justified, it is important to compare the democratic values, attitudes and behaviors of Muslims vis-à-vis Christians.

Despite the growth in democratic transitions across Africa, and an increase in female voice and activity in African democracy, numerous reports indicate that a democratic 'gender gap' remains in developing nations (Logan and Bratton 2006; Lopez-Claros and Zahidi 2004).¹ It is unclear why this gap persists. Though some investigation of the reality of this gender gap exists, little work has been done regarding the reality of a gender gap in relation to democratic values, attitudes and activities, or how religion potentially affects the gender gap in Africa. This study speaks to these issues by empirically examining how membership and activity in Islam and Christianity affect African women's political orientations towards democracy. I focus on women because of their oft-noted pivotal role in the power and vibrancy of faith communities. Furthermore, studies of gender, development and democracy reveal the exclusion of women

¹ The World Economic Forum reported that Africa was doing terribly in women's political empowerment. 7 is the highest possible score given in their rankings, and African countries received between 2 and 3 (http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/gender_gap.pdf).

undermines the sustainability and quality of long-term democratic growth. I present a case study on Kenya, using both quantitative and qualitative evidence. I believe Kenya is a pivotal case in which to examine the role of gender and religion in democratization. Thus, this study asks the following questions: Does gender affect one's political values, attitudes and behaviors? Is religion a factor in democratic orientations? What factors help to explain variations within and across religious groups in female popular orientations to democracy? Overall, this study asks if Islam and Christianity are driving forces in democratic orientations among African women.

The overall picture that emerges throughout this project reveals that the foundation for democracy exists in Africa. Women value democracy at the same levels as men, both within Christianity and Islam. Furthermore, men and women support democracy equally, and are on par in their dissatisfaction with the levels of democracy they are receiving. The only gender gap in democratic attitudes comes in response to improvements in political rights over time. Women are slightly less satisfied with the improvement in their rights to engage in the political realm than are men. The notable disjuncture between men and women, as well as between Muslims and Christians comes in what they do about democracy. While both men and women, regardless of religious identity, are actively involved in politics, women overall are less active than men when it comes to political activism. Despite the growth and power of women's movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gender gap in political activism remains. When religion is a significant factor driving political engagement, I find that Muslims are more apt to engage politically than are Christians. Their minority status and oppressed position throughout sub-Saharan Africa, I argue, drives the relevance and types of behaviors in which religion matters. Religion does affect men and women differently in political activism. Men in

both Islam and Christianity are highly active in democratic political behaviors, more so than their female counterparts. The gap between Christian women and men is much smaller than that between Muslim men and women in political engagement. This is likely because religiosity, in the forms of religious service attendance and active religious organization membership, encourages positive political engagement. Christian women are more often highly religious than are men or Muslim women, so therefore are less disadvantaged than women who do not actively engage in religious civil society. Religiosity reduces some of the gender gap.

1.2 Concepts

1.2.1 Democracy and Democratization

Drawing from Bratton and van de Walle (1997), I define democracy as hinging on its *procedures*, rather than on its outcomes or substance. I therefore see democracy as the tools by which citizens of a nation have a voice in the selection of their own law-makers/decisions makers through free and fair, regularly-held elections and surrounding activities. Democracy literally means rule by the people, and modern democracy has largely come to mean representative democracy. I argue democracy is a measurable set of procedures by which citizens have a choice in the governing of their lives. Thus, democracy is a set of rules that allow representative input by the governed people. Democracy as defined in this project sees its value not in the end results of what decisions are made, but in the process and set of institutions that allow for political access to the decision-making process for ordinary citizens.

“One of the main indicators of democratic practice is the periodic holding of free and fair elections. The more competitive the election, the more refined in the democratic process. Elections usually offer a country’s citizens the chance to participate in governance. This they do by retaining residual power over the government and, if possible, exercising this power to reject an errant government or one that did not fulfill the promises made at an earlier election” (Mitullah, *et al* 2005; Wanjala, *et al* 2002c).

As laid out above, I define democratization similarly to Huntington as the transition from authoritarian rule into democratic rule, with the onset of regularly-held, free and fair elections, which allow for transitions of power as dictated by the electorate (Huntington 1991). I believe that different causes may lie behind the ending of a non-democratic regime, whether or not a regime in transition moves towards democracy, and whether a democracy first formed will consolidate and survive over time. When I speak of democratization, then, I am referring primarily to the end of a non-democratic regime and the steps following such an end leading to an onset of democracy.

1.2.2 Values

I begin with an examination of the values held by Africans. By values, I mean those deeply held norms, acquired through socialization processes throughout one's life, which guide one's attitudes and behaviors in life. Values are independent of circumstances or events. They are the core beliefs that a person holds. Values are the least mutable of the three categories I will consider. I believe that the attitudes and behaviors Africans have towards democracy will be rooted in their core values. I have identified a number of political values such as tolerance, accountability and political equality. In factor analysis tests of Afrobarometer data, these do not scale together, so each will be treated as separate dependent variables. In doing so, I will be able to compare those who hold one or more of the values and whether or not gender or certain aspects of religion affect certain democratic values.

1.2.3 Attitudes

Unlike values, attitudes are individuals' responses to concrete situations. An attitude is a reaction to the circumstances or events that affect one's life. Support, satisfaction, approval are all attitudes in response to *some external stimulus*. I will measure attitudes in regards to both the supply side of democracy (how much democracy do people think there is in a given country?) and the demand side of democracy (how much democracy do people desire?)

1.2.4 Behaviors

Behaviors are the actions that people take in regards to the political arena. I look at five main categories of democratic political behaviors: political communing, formal

contacting, informal contacting, demonstrating, and political violence. Political communing captures horizontal political behaviors, or engagement of the political realm in which peers act together. Contacting includes decisions to contact both formal political leaders as well as leaders who relate to the political realm in more informal manners. Finally, I evaluate African decisions to participate in political demonstrations or violence over political issues.

1.2.5 Religion

As I will unpack in the review of important literature in my dissertation, I draw from Ellis and ter Haar in conceptualizing religion. They define religion as a belief in the existence of an invisible world often thought to be inhabited by spirits that are believed to affect people's lives in the material world (Ellis and ter Haar 2004). I rely on this definition of religion, as it does not ascribe moral value to any one religion, and is not using a Western view of what religion is. I consider religion through Africans' self-ascribed adherence to either Christianity or Islam.

1.2.6 Gender

I define gender as referring to rules, norms, customs and practices by which biologically associated differences between male and female members of humanity are translated into socially constructed differences between men and women, boys and girls which give them unequal value, opportunities and life chances. Stated simply, gender encompasses the "culturally defined roles and responsibilities for females and males" which are some think are innate and others think are learned, "may change over time, and vary among societies" ("Gender" 2005).

1.3 Research Questions

In order to investigate the dependent variables of this project, I put forth the following research questions:

- Does gender affect political values/attitudes/behaviors? How?
- Are there variations across or within religions in female political values/attitudes/behaviors?
- If so, *how* are female political values/attitudes/behaviors affected across religion?
- What explains these variations, if they exist?
- What role will religiosity play in gender and religious democratic political orientations?
- What are the potential relationships between the presence of contextual factors and the political orientations among African women?

The first five questions deal with individual level data. The fifth question looks at the systems level.

1.4 Hypotheses

Below, I present hypotheses based on existing analysis of Round 1 & 2 Afrobarometer data as well as on a literature review. I build these hypotheses in an order of progression that reflects the assumption, mentioned earlier, that political values are foundational for political attitudes, which are then foundational for political behavior.

1.4.1 Political Values

H1.1 I expect democratic political values to be widespread across emerging African democracies. Tolerance will be the least ubiquitous, though the majority of Africans will hold each democratic value.

- Does gender affect political values? How?

H1.2 I expect that women and men will value democracy equally within each country and cross-nationally. I expect that the only difference across gender in democratic political values will emerge in valuation of gender equality. Women will value gender equality to a greater extent than will men. I presume controls for education will diminish but not eliminate this gap.

- Are there variations across or within religions in political values?

H1.3 I assume that variations will exist between Muslims and Christians in the democratic values they hold. Muslim women and men will value political equality, tolerance and accountability equally, but will vary in the degree to which they hold gender equality as a value. The same discrepancy will exist between Christian men and women. Men in both religions will value gender equality less than women.

- If so, *how* are political values affected across religion? Are there gender variations within or across Islam and Christianity?
- What explains these variations, if they exist?

H1.4 I suppose that Muslims will value gender equality less than Christians. I expect Muslims, both men and women, will value political equality, tolerance and accountability slightly more than Christians of both genders due to the life-situations facing Muslims throughout Sub-Saharan African emerging democracies.

- What role will religiosity play in gender and religious variations in democratic values?

H1.5 Regular attendance at religious services will foster democratic values among men and women. Religiosity will potentially reduce any gender gap that does emerge in democratic values if women are more engaged than men.

- What are the potential relationships between the institutional and cultural context in a nation and the political orientations among African women?

H1.6.1 In regards to institutional, national level variables, I assert that residents of nations that have gender quotas in their constitutions will reflect a greater degree of overall valuation for women's political equality than will residents of nations who lack such legislation.

H1.6.2 I hold the same to be true for nations who have adopted both the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)² as well as its optional protocol.

H1.6.3 Christian heritage will encourage democratic values.

H1.6.4 Higher levels of democratization will lead to higher overall levels of valuation for democracy among citizens.

1.4.2 Political Attitudes

H2.1 Africans in transitioning democracies will demand democracy, though variations will exist in their satisfaction with the democracy they are receiving.

- Does gender affect political attitudes? How?

H2.2 I assume that women and men will support democracy to the same extent. Men and women will vary in rejection of one form of autocracy – one-party states. Women will support one-party states in the face of turmoil to a greater extent than will men. Women will be slightly less satisfied than men with the supply of democracy they believe they are receiving.

- Are there variations across or within religions in political attitudes?

H2.3 Christians are the majority in fourteen of the sixteen countries in this sample. Christians have traditionally held the reigns of power and been advantaged educationally and economically in emerging democracies in Sub-Saharan democracies. Therefore, Christians and Muslims will vary in their perception of the supply of democracy they are receiving, though they will demand democracy equally.

- If so, *how* are political attitudes affected across religion? Are there gender variations within or across Islam and Christianity?
- What explains these variations, if they exist?

H2.4 I believe that Muslims, both men and women will be more satisfied than Christians of both genders with democracy. Both religions and genders will demand democracy as the best form of government, but Muslims will feel they are receiving democracy more so

² The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) CEDAW was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly. It is an "international bill of rights for women" ("CEDAW"). CEDAW defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national action to end such discrimination. When states accept CEDAW, they commit to undertake measures to end discrimination against women in all forms.

than will Christians. Women within each religion will be less satisfied with democratic deliverance, though Muslim women will be notably less content with their democratic goods than will Christian women. Muslims have more to gain with the opening of political space through democratic transitions since they have been more fully excluded than their Christian counterparts. Muslims will therefore rate any democratic opening as a step in the right direction. Christians, who have held the reins of power over and above Muslims, will be less pleased with the having to share the political space. Other Christians who have fought for democratic change will be unhappy with the impartial implementation of democracy, and will therefore be displeased with democracy more so than Muslims.

- What role will religiosity play in gender and religious variations in democratic attitudes?

H2.5 Regular attendance at religious services will foster democratic attitudes among men and women. Africans who attend religious services on a regular basis will demand democracy to a greater extent than will those who attend less frequently. Active membership in religious associations will also encourage demand for democracy.

- What are the potential relationships between the institutional and cultural context in a nation and the political orientations among African women?

H2.6.1 In regards to institutional, national level variables, I expect that nations with gender quotas in their constitutions overall will have residents with higher levels of satisfaction, among men and women, with democracy than will nations who lack such legislation.

H2.6.2 I anticipate the adoption of CEDAW and its optional protocol in a nation will also correlate with higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.

H2.6.3 Christian heritage will encourage demand for democracy and increase satisfaction with supply of democracy.

H2.6.4 Higher levels of democratization will lead to higher overall levels of satisfaction with democracy among citizens.

1.4.3 Political Participation

H3.1 Africans will evidence high levels of political participation. Their engagement will be more frequent in certain behaviors than others. Grassroots involvement and use of informal political channels will be more widespread than formal engagement. Overall, however, Africans will be relatively active in the political realm.

- Does gender affect political behaviors? How?

H3.2 I assume that women will be less likely than men to be active in various forms of political activity.

- Are there variations across or within religions in political behaviors?

H3.3 I expect that there will be variations both across and within Christianity and Islam in female political behavior. Variations, however, will depend on the type of political behavior being examined. As discussed earlier, I will consider five different forms of political participation.

- If so, *how* are political behaviors affected across religion? Are there gender variations within or across Islam and Christianity?
- What explains these variations, if they exist?

H3.4 I purport that Muslims will engage in political activities more often than Christians of similar life circumstances. Christian women, however, will be more likely than Muslim women to be involved politically. Muslims have traditionally been left out of the political realm to a greater extent than have Christians. Muslims will therefore, evidence slightly higher activism in the newly-opened political space as they step forward to seize the newfound opportunities to have a voice in the governance that rules their lives. Christian women are very active in civic organizations of various ilks. This experience will advantage them over Muslim females in skills and perceived efficacy in engaging in the political realm.

- What role will religiosity play in gender and religious variations in democratic orientations?

H3.5 Religiosity of both kinds will increase positive political engagement while reducing political activities that are potentially destabilizing to transitioning democracies.

- What are the potential relationships between the institutional and cultural context in a nation and the political orientations among African women?

H3.6.1 In regards to national level institutional variables, I anticipate that nations with gender quotas in their constitutions will have higher overall levels participation among women in positive democratic behaviors (communing, contacting an attending rallies) than will nations who lack such legislation. I expect violent political participation will vary based on the political, economic and social standing of the women in question, which will at times, be expressed through religious identification.

H3.6.2 I hold that the adoption of CEDAW and its optional protocol in a nation will lead to similar outcomes in political participation as will the presence of gendered legislation.

H3.6.3 In regards to cultural variables at the national level, I assume that a nation's dominant religion, if it exists, will lead to a clustering of artificially high levels of participation in democratic behaviors, depending on type of behavior, among adherents to the dominant faith.

H3.6.4 Higher levels of democratization will lead to higher overall levels of satisfaction with democracy among citizens.

1.5 Data Sources

In the absence of funding for long-term fieldwork, I have written a dissertation based on secondary data. Without the insight that fieldwork would bring, I will focus on reviewing literature and research on the areas of gender, religion, democratization, and political orientations to bring to bear on the analysis of Afrobarometer Round 2 data. I will use Kenya as a case study, drawing from the extensive study of Kenya I have already and will conduct. I believe a chapter that focuses on one country will provide a greater depth of insight without the variations in culture, history and geopolitical location that exist in cross-national comparison. I will include Freedom House scores of democracy to control at the systems level for satisfaction or values that could hinge on higher or lower actual levels of democracy in each nation. Finally, I will include measures of the presence or lack of gendered legislation, again controlling at the systems level, and revealing the general context in regards to gender equality in each nation. I have built into my dissertation an understanding of what questions secondary data analysis can and can not answer about female orientations towards democracy in Africa. It contains the instruments and theoretical foundation for future work that will build off my dissertation.

- **Individual Level Analysis**

- **Afrobarometer Survey Data from Afrobarometer Round 2**

The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa. Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys were conducted in sixteen African countries and are part of a three-round time series project. Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries can be systematically compared. Trends in public attitudes are tracked over time. Results are shared with decision makers, policy advocates, civic educators, journalists, researchers, donors and investors, as well as average Africans who wish to become more informed and active citizens. The Afrobarometer is a collaborative enterprise of Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD, Ghana). Afrobarometer papers are simultaneously co-published by these partner institutions.

Source: www.afrobarometer.org

Countries included in Round 2: Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

- **National Level/Systems Level of Analysis**

- **Freedom House (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>)**

To look at the level of democratization in each country, I think it is important to control for the context of actual levels of democratization and compare this with values, attitudes and behaviors in regards to democracy. Does a greater or lesser extent of democratization affect the clustering of democratic political orientations?

Freedom House conducts an array of U.S. and overseas research, advocacy, education, and training initiatives that promote human rights, democracy, free market economics, the rule of law, independent media, and U.S. engagement in international affairs.

Source: www.freedomhouse.org

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as well as its Optional Protocol.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its Optional Protocol: CEDAW was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly. It is often described as an “international bill of rights for women” (“CEDAW”). CEDAW defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national action to end such discrimination. When states accept CEDAW, they commit to “undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms.” These include: to incorporate the principle of equality of men and women in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women; to establish tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination; and to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises. Adopters of CEDAW agree to take all appropriate measures, including legislation to try and ensure that women can enjoy equal rights with men, with equal access and opportunities in private, political and public spheres of their lives. Countries that have ratified or acceded to the Convention are legally bound to put its provisions into practice. As a form of accountability, states that ascribe to the Convention are also committed to submit national reports, at least every four years, on measures they have taken to comply with their treaty obligations.

“By ratifying the Optional Protocol, a State recognizes the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women -- the body that monitors States parties' compliance with the Convention -- to receive and consider complaints from individuals or groups within its jurisdiction.

The Protocol contains two procedures: (1) A communications procedure allows individual women, or groups of women, to submit claims of violations of rights protected under the Convention to the Committee. The Protocol establishes that in order for individual communications to be admitted for consideration by the Committee, a number of criteria must be met, including those domestic remedies must have been exhausted. (2) The Protocol also creates an inquiry procedure enabling the Committee to initiate inquiries into situations of grave or systematic violations of women's rights. In either case, States must be party to the Convention and the Protocol. The Protocol includes an "opt-out clause", allowing States upon ratification or accession to declare that they do not accept the inquiry procedure. Article 17 of the Protocol explicitly provides that no reservations may be entered to its terms.”

I use ratification of CEDAW and its optional protocol as proxy measure for system-level clustering around gender issues. Do countries that have CEDAW exhibit higher levels of support for gender equality? Smaller gender gaps in democratic orientations?

Source: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/>

Gender quotas in legislative bodies across the nations under consideration (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)'s quota project). Quotas are being increasingly included in national constitutions, requiring some fixed percentage or number of women who hold certain elected, political positions of power. The logic behind such quotas maintains that women will represent the needs and interests of women

better. Furthermore, such quotas help level the playing field for women to have similar opportunities as men. Requiring more women to be in public positions will help institutionalized a norm of people seeing female leaders as legitimate leaders.

Sources: www.idea.int and www.quotaproject.org

National Religious Heritage and Religious Breakdown

I use available data on national religious identity from nationmaster.com, which draws from data sources such as the CIA World Factbook, United Nations, World Health Organization, World Bank, World Resources Institute, UNESCO, UNICEF and OECD. I will include this as a systems level indicator of religion, seeing if any clustering happens in individual level responses due to the presence of a dominant religion at the systems level.

<http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems - CSES

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) is a cross-national research program bringing together election studies in over fifty states. As described on the CSES website: "The CSES is composed of three tightly linked parts: First, a common module of public opinion survey questions is included in each participant country's post-election study. These "micro" level data include vote choice, candidate and party evaluations, current and retrospective economic evaluations, evaluation of the electoral system itself, in addition to standardized sociodemographic measures. Second, district level data are reported for each respondent, including electoral returns, turnout, and the number of candidates. Finally, system or "macro" level data report aggregate electoral returns, electoral rules and formulas, and regime characteristics."

I use data on responses to questions about political orientations on other continents to provide benchmark comparisons for democratic political orientations in Africa.

<http://www.cses.org/>

Kenya Pre-dissertation/Afrobarometer Round 3 Research Trip

I spent a large part of the month of September, 2005 in Kenya. The major purpose for this trip was to gather information that would complement Afrobarometer quantitative data on religion and gender for use in the chapter on Kenya in this dissertation. I participated in training and administrative sessions of Afrobarometer's round 3 data collection. I sat in on one field survey. I also met with leaders from the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK), the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM), the National Muslim Council of Kenya (NMCK), and other religious, political and women's groups as opportunities arise. The purpose of this trip was to help me better understand the Afrobarometer project and data that we collect.

1.6 Intended Theoretical Contributions

We presently do not know whether (and how) religion in Africa affects political orientations of female adherents. The data and literature only take us so far in offering descriptions and explanations of the roles of women in this context. Part of this gap is due to the long-prominent gender framework, especially in anthropology and sociology, known as Women in Development (WID). By grounding my work in the more recently emerging GAD (Gender and Development) framework, I will fill in some of the gap left by much of political and political feminist research on examining women's empowerment and orientations in society. Thus, this project seeks to go further in increasing understanding of women's political values/attitudes/behaviors in Africa generally and Kenya specifically, as countries with growing democratic political space. I will help refine and build theory by adding explanations of *why* variations exist across religions and gender regarding democratic values, attitudes and behaviors.

Also, much of the work on satisfaction with political regimes and governmental performance does not include a gendered perspective, recognizing the different and important effects acting upon men versus women. Also, little academic research includes perspectives of non-Western feminists. I will tie ideas from gender theorists, drawing from the GAD³ school of thought as much as possible, as well as African, Islamist and Muslim feminists to evaluate the role that gender plays in democratization. In mining the wealth of Afrobarometer data, as of yet, no work has been undertaken to tie components of gender theory to the evaluation of democratization.

³ GAD = Gender And Development, as opposed to the other leading schools of thought on gender, WID (Women in Development) and WAD (Women and Development). The distinction is nuanced, but important. The first school, WID, looks at development and how women are affected in the process. The second, WAD, looks at women's lives and development separately and how women play into development. GAD looks not just at women but at the interacting roles of gender and how these construct or are constructed by development processes. Both political and economic development are part of this literature (Parpart 1995).

As is the case with gender theory, I have found little work that draws from empirical and theoretical work on religion, and ties this to evaluating public opinion data and ensuing ideas. I will bridge this gap by using research on Islam, Christianity and religion in Africa and tie this to the role that public opinion plays in democratization.

Analysis of Round 1 Afrobarometer data reveals some basic trends in causal relationships across political values, attitudes and behaviors in African nations. For example, Bratton, *et al* find that Muslims are no less supportive of democracy than are non Muslims (2005). They also find that support for democracy is explained largely by cognitive awareness of democracy, and is thus a function of formal education and other opportunities for learning. The supply of political rights and extent of corruption, however, do affect people's attitudes, or satisfaction, with governments in democratic transitions. The causes of political participation are found to vary depending on the type of political participation in question (Bratton *et al* 2005). I will build off this initial analysis, as well as other components of analysis of Round 1 data, to see if a) the findings in Round 1 were unique to that time or begin to reveal a potential persistence over time and b) I will bring four major differences to the deliberation on causes behind political orientations among Africans.

First, and most basically, I will be considering data collected during Round 2 of Afrobarometer. By the time the second round of surveying was conducted, the survey instruments had been standardized across nations more completely, and a few countries had been added or dropped.

Secondly, I will include and highlight consideration of political values, attitudes and behaviors in Kenya. Kenya was not part of the initial round of surveys, yet I believe is an important country to consider. A more complete discussion of the insight that Kenya

has to offer appears in chapter 6. In summary, Kenya recently underwent a peaceful transition to democracy through multi-party elections. Kenya also has vibrant faith communities. Religion is an important factor in the public and private lives of Kenyans. Gender issues have also gained increasing attention in Kenya. Women's groups, such as the National Muslim Council of Kenya or the Kenya Association of Female Lawyers, are increasingly active in fighting for women's equal rights at home and in the political arena. Kenya was also not included in analysis of emerging democracies, yet was noted to be an important case that deserved attention (Villalon and VonDoepp 2005).

Thirdly, analysis of Round 2 data across the 16 included countries has only begun, and there is no work that highlights the wealth of information available regarding gender, religion, and other rival social factors that might explain political orientations. Previous analysis of Afrobarometer data on gender or religion mentions only that a clear popular preference for gender equality seemed to emerge (Bratton *et al* 2005). There was no examination of the interaction that potentially exists between gender and religion and political orientations. How religion plays out in women's political lives has yet to be explored.

The limited findings that were presented regarding gender and religion need deeper investigation in light of the subfields in political science, as well as in sociology, anthropology and gender studies that deal with these areas. For example, the findings presented by Bratton *et al* reveal a stronger correlation between affiliation with Protestant institutions and support for democracy. Research in other fields, which will be reviewed later, reveal opposite findings, namely that Catholic adherence promotes attitudes supportive to democracy, as well as empowerment to be involved in democratic processes and institutions. I will use Round 2 data on Kenya more deeply explore these apparent

contradictions in chapter 7.

Finally, little to no careful quantitative examination of the political values captured by Afrobarometer research has been undertaken. The inclusion in this dissertation of an entire chapter investigating how values could be formed or affected, will potentially contribute new understandings and important foundations for future work.

1.7 Methodology

Round 2 data was gathered between 2002 and 2003. At the national level in each participating county, a random sample was drawn from all citizens of voting age to gain a representative cross-section of all voting age citizens. In most countries, the sample size was around 1200.⁴ Paraphrasing the Afrobarometer sampling protocol, “The sample design is a clustered, stratified, **multi-stage area probability sample**. The objective of this design is to give every adult citizen an *equal* chance of being selected as a respondent in the sample. This objective is achieved by strictly applying **random selection methods** at every stage of sampling. The sampling design has **four stages**: A first-stage to stratify and randomly select *primary sampling units*; A second-stage to randomly select *sampling start-points*; A third stage to randomly choose *households*; A final-stage involving the random selection of individual *respondents*.”⁵

I recognize there is a debate surrounding the use of OLS, linear regression if dependent variables are not interval in nature. Many articles have appeared, however, arguing that methods used for interval level variables are appropriately employed for ordinal variables, particularly in the case of public opinion survey research. Power and flexibility, they argue, are gained through the use of multivariate regression. These gains outweigh any small biases that may occur (Winship and Mare 1984; Allan 1976; Borgatta 1968; Kim 1975, 1978; Labovitz 1967, 1970; O’Brien 1979a). These studies claim that

⁴ In some countries, larger samples were drawn. For example, due to the heterogeneity of Kenyan society, a relatively large sample of close to 2400 was drawn.

⁵ Extract from Afrobarometer Survey Manual, Round 2, April 2002

they actually find little bias by employing OLS techniques with ordinal dependent variables. Thus, I use OLS linear regression in the project as a procedure that is commonly employed in ordinal, survey research. I do so aware of the debates and alternative perspectives on this methodological issue.

1.7.1 **Dependent Variables**

I will use three categories of dependent variables: political values, attitudes towards democracy, and political participation. In creating indices for a number of these variables, I use factor analysis to ensure that the dependent variables I want to consider do in fact represent similar factors. I will consider three standard political values: tolerance, political equality, and accountability. And I add the important dimension of gender equality. I will assess political attitudes on both the demand side, assessing questions about Africans' support for democracy and concurrent rejection of non-democratic alternatives. I will also evaluate democratic attitudes on the supply side, looking at how Africans perceive the democracy they are receiving. I will explore five categories of democratic political behaviors: communing among peers about politics, contacting formal political leaders, contacting leaders who are informally connected to the political realm, decisions to engage in demonstrations or protest marches, and choices to engage in violence over political matters.⁶

1.7.2 **Independent Variables**

I will use three main explanatory variables: gender, religion and religiosity⁷. Theory drives me to add the following explanatory factors to each model. As discussed above, previous research indicates that urbanization and economic growth account for value formation. Also, higher levels of education have been shown to reduce the gender

⁶ For a delineation of question text and response options for dependent variables in this project, see Appendix 1.

⁷ For a breakdown of the independent variables as drawn from the original Afrobarometer survey, please see Appendix 2

gap, as well as decrease the affects of religious ideology, in opportunities and decisions in people's lives (Bratton 1999). As mentioned above, economic arguments of democratic value formation point towards unemployment (Oded 2000) and actual economic standings (captured in a Lived Poverty Index⁸) driving democratic orientations. Interest in politics, willingness to closely affiliate with a political party, and exposure to forms of mass media are also widely believed to be important in democratic orientations. In order to capture potential significance among highly religious women or women who are members of specific groups, for example, rather than just looking at the various groups overall or women overall, I explore for interaction effects: between gender and religion as well as gender and religiosity. My interest in potential clustering due to national level factors, as well as the ability to test the claim that institutions could not matter without value change, leads me to include controls for country level democratization, gender equality, religious heritage and economic situation.⁹ I include country dummy variables in my analysis to control for fixed effects, and found that a respondent's country of residence did make a difference in their expressed democratic values. With the foci of this project centering on democratization, trying to verify cultural versus institutional or economic explanations for democratic value formation, I have included country level variables to test if the areas in which I am interested are part of the differentiating effects across countries. Ignoring the variations that exist across nations could lead to inflated estimations of the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables in this project, as well as under estimations of standard errors. Thus, I include controls at the systems level. Finally, since I this work builds on the belief that behaviors are founded on political attitudes which have their roots in political values, I include political values and

⁸ This is an index created from Afrobarometer questions regarding access to basic resources. It more fully captures actual economic standing than reports of income in Africa. See Bratton (2006) for a discussion of this variable.

⁹ See Appendix 2 for explanation of these variables

attitudes to see if they are statistically significant in forming political behaviors in emerging African democracies.

Due to the large number of respondents in this sample, 24,301 to be exact, it is rather easy to get results that are significant at more relaxed levels of confidence. Thus, I only report findings as notably significant at the $p < .010$ (**) or $p < .001$ level or higher (***).

In frequency tests, few cases emerged as missing, as well as part of “don’t know” or “refused.” Thus, as in Bratton et al’s initial reporting on cross-national, Round 2 findings, I reclassify the “don’t know” and “refused” responses as missing for statistical testing. With the large number of respondents (N=19,201 weighted; 24,301 unweighted) and the minimal number of cases included in these categories, little to nothing was lost by including the “don’t know” and refusal responses in the missing category. Furthermore there were no central cases into which the “don’t know” or refusal responses logically fit in any of the questions under consideration in this paper. For statistical analysis, these responses were thus excluded.

Chapter 2 – Background Theory

2.1 Democratization

The study of transitions to democracy gained a great deal of attention after what Huntington (1991) calls the “third wave¹⁰” of democracy began in the mid 1970’s. As changing national boundaries usher increasing numbers of new states onto the world stage, as old authoritarian regimes fall to new forms of government, and as former colonial holdings move forward in independence, academics and practitioners seek to understand and explain the emergence and success (or failure) of democracy. The study of democracies – their transitions and consolidations – spans an array of topics regarding what initiates democratic formation to what supports sustainable, thriving democratic entities. These studies, attempting to explain the factors that cause and/or sustain democracy, make up a subfield of political science known as *democratization studies*. Studies of democratization largely seek to explain the hows, whys and whens of democratic transition.

In the following pages, I will discuss the findings and trends in the study of democratization as they apply to the main question of this project: *do gender and religion play a role in the under girding political cultures potentially necessary for the emergence of democracy?* I will trace the major debates about democratization, drawing from the classifications put forth by Geddes (1999) and Bratton and van de Walle (1997) for organizational purposes. I will not adhere to their discussions strictly, but employ them as useful, thorough guides for my own exploration of the field of democratization. I will thus include my own conceptualizations of issues regarding democratization. I recognize two major weaknesses in the field of democratization studies: *the lack of a clear, consistent definition of democratization and methodological inconsistency* (Geddes

¹⁰ Huntington defines a wave of democratic transition as a “group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction within a specified period of time” (Landman 2000: 145).

1999). Democratization is unclearly referred to as a number of phenomena. For example, Huntington (1991) seems to view democratization as transition to democracy. Linz and Stepan (1996) view democratization as democratic transition and consolidation. Democratization includes, however, the existence of democracy, the process of transition to democracy, and the process of democratic consolidation. Secondly, the original studies of democratization were small-N designs. While works such as that by Huntington (1991), Jagers and Gurr (1995) and Vanhanen (1997) are more inclusive, there is still a need for democratization studies to take more care in the degrees of freedom issue. As the number of variables increase, so too must the number of cases. I seek to avoid these pitfalls in my own ensuing discussion and research.

2.1.1.1 Structural Explanations: Economic and Elite Approaches

The study of democratization originated with attempts to explain prerequisites needed in order for democracy to emerge and thrive. The arguable father of this movement was S. M. Lipset, with his foundational study of potential preconditions for democracy (Lipset 1959). His work most clearly defined the relationship between economic development and democratic formation, spawning the largest body of research on any single topic in the field of comparative politics (Przeworski 2000). Varied responses to and continuations of Lipset's work have emerged. Through this stream of work, the basic relationship between economic development and democracy has been empirically established (e.g. Jackman 1973; Bollen 1979; Diamond 1992; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994).

Arguments explaining the relationship between economic development and democratization vary. Some attest that certain levels of economic development are necessary for democratic transitions to occur (e.g. Lipset 1959; 1960). Others focus on

the role that elite actors play within the modernizing economic forces. They argue that once a country passes a certain level of industrialization, an urban bourgeois will sponsor democracy. But this outcome will not occur if a country possesses certain conditions that make it ripe for authoritarianism, such as a landed upper class and an urban bourgeois (Moore 1966). Additional research asserts that evidence points towards democracy emerging in countries in middle levels of economic development (Huntington 1991). Przeworski & Limongi (1997) claim that once transition to democracy takes place, democracy survives more readily in countries above certain levels of economic development. Their work does not address the tie between economic development and democratization's transitional phase. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) focus on the consolidation phase. Once democratization occurs, it is more likely to last and thrive, and not see authoritarian interventions, in countries with higher levels of economic development (Przeworski & Limongi 1997; also: Bratton 2006; Bollen 1979; Jackman 1973). Regardless of the type of relationship (transition or consolidation) or the complex potential explanations regarding the correlation, it has become abundantly clear that the level of economic development does matter for the status of democracy.

There are even a few studies, focused primarily on Africa, suggesting that weak economic performance led autocratic regimes to liberalize. This happened because elites lost effective use of their patron-client networks (Seely 2006; Bates 1994; Grosh 1994). The range of studies that focus on economics as tied to democratization all basically confirm that poverty or economic development play a role in a nation's regime type. Arguments about the role of elites or middle classes as pieces of democratization have proven less convincing, but economic importance has persisted (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Consequently, from about the middle of the twentieth century, common wisdom asserted that economic conditions were the main foundation of democratization in all its stages. Thus, democracy was seen as more likely in developed (or at least *developing*) countries. A linkage was established among economic growth, modernization and democracy. Why this is true – why modernization theory in some form holds – is unclear. As Bratton and van de Walle aptly assert, “any supposed socioeconomic “preconditions” of democracy are remote from the dynamic political processes of democratization itself” (1997: 22). Bratton and van de Walle (1997) classify these as structural or economic arguments. Geddes (1999) catalogues them as rational approaches. Regardless of the name given these studies, each in some form ties economic development to democratization. This work accounts for macro-level events. It fails to give proper attention to the timing and method of democratic transitions. Foci on economic development and democratization offer a rather inert view of regime transitions. They give little room for variations across cases with similar structural, economic situations. Thus, while I will not ignore the potential explanatory power of economics in democratic possibilities, I will use these as control factors, seeking to further our understanding of factors that guide the whens and hows of democratization more robustly.

2.1.1.2 Institutional Explanations (The Political Approach)

A second set of theories on democratization considers the roles that institutions play in encouraging and sustaining democracy. The term institution has been defined to mean the rules of interaction, organizations, or recurring patterns of behavior. The majority of institutional studies in political science, however, rest on the first definition of institutions:

“the rules of the game in a society or... the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”¹¹

¹¹ North, 1990. p. 3.

Current institutional theory became a force in organization studies in the 1970's. Political scientists returned to questions about institutional arrangements that were largely left off during nearly three decades of research focused on behavioral concerns. Institutions were brought back in to democratization discussions as researchers found that behaviors and preferences of political actors could only be understood "in the context of the institutionally generated incentives and institutionally available options that structure choice" (Shugart and Carey 1992:14). Democratic institutionalists begin asking whether or not such institutional arrangements as executive branches, legislatures, judiciaries, or constitutions mattered for democracy. Are there variations in the ability for democratization to occur based executive-legislative arrangements or centralized versus diffuse systems of government?

Do presidential or parliamentary systems weather the storms of democratic transition more effectively? Research by various scholars compares the presidential system of the United States with parliamentary systems abroad. These studies examine how each system has dealt with the issues that have seriously challenged their governing capabilities. They find that political institutions, in context, do affect the ability of systems to respond to crisis and threats to democratic growth (Weaver and Rockman 1993). The choice of presidential or parliamentary arrangements alone, however, does not determine democratic success. Corresponding institutional arrangements must be understood. Together, various institutional arrangements affect democratization. The strength and prevalence of political parties, frequency of elections, electoral lists, as well as executive-legislative arrangements are important elements in democratic success (Shugart and Carey 1992). Comparative studies such as Lijphart (1994, 1999), Jones

(1995), and Stephan and Skach (1994)¹² offer insight into understandings or normative prescriptions regarding presidential versus parliamentary systems and the electoral laws that build effective democracies within these systems. Electoral laws, for example, are found to be vital in the success of presidential democracies. Legislative-executive arrangements that encourage democracy are more likely to form under certain electoral laws (Jones 1995).

Does democracy flourish more under federal or unitary states? Using the federal system of Italy as a case study, Putnam (1993) questioned the effectiveness of institutions based on the political cultural context. Putnam concluded that institutions perform differently based on the political culture in which they are applied, and that social capital, or a culture of civic engagement, is necessary for democratic institutions to perform optimally. Putnam's work offers a bridge between institutionalist, economic and culturalist perspectives on democratization. Again the finding held that institutions matter, but under certain conditions. Why do some representative institutions succeed or fail? Institutions succeed more where socioeconomic development is higher (economic arguments), civic culture is more collegial (political cultural arguments), and society is more stable across history. Institutions matter, but so do other factors.

Institutions continue to prove necessary conditions, *in context*, for democratic success. A study on electoral laws and social cleavages¹³ reveals that it is not simply the institutional arrangements that encourage democracy. Institutions interact with social realities, such as ethnic fragmentation. The interaction of institutions and identities fosters strategic voting. Through strategic voting, institutional arrangements then affect representation in parties and legislatures (Cox 1997). In the case of Latin America,

¹² Stephan and Skach look at pure presidential versus pure parliamentary systems and argue that pure presidential systems, based on various institutional structures, are unable to draw on the conflict-reducing function (veto points- Tsebelis 2002) of multi-party systems.

¹³ Drawing from Duverger (1954) as well as Sartori (1968), Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and others who emphasize the role of social cleavages

research reveals that institutionally inconsistent regimes lack the “reinforcing characteristics” of an elected executive, robust political participation and effective constraints on executive power. Without these institutions, democracies are unlikely to form or persist (Jones 2000b).

Institutional research also discusses institutional arrangements as crucial components in building the type of support that is necessary for long-term democratic sustenance. On a whole, losers are less satisfied with democracy than winners. Losers in systems with more consensual arrangements, however, are more satisfied than losers in majoritarian systems. Institutions mediate the levels of support that are lost among those who are losers in democratic electoral competitions (Anderson and Guillory 1997). Furthermore, accumulated experience with democratic institutions over time shapes citizen support for or against a political regime.

“Over time, where constitutional arrangements succeed in channeling popular demands into government outcomes, then we would expect this to be reflected in diffuse support for the political process” (Norris 1999: 219).

This research shows political attitudes and subsequent behaviors as important in light of their institutional contexts. Citizens in countries with more civil rights are more satisfied with their regime, democratic or otherwise. Winners in an electoral system are more satisfied. And democratic institutions correlate with a more highly satisfied citizenry.

In the African context, formal institutional arrangements are generally underdeveloped. Citizens generally work through informal arrangements to participate in governance. Here informal institutions are both the rules of the game as well as the organizational and associational life through which Africans interact with the codified governing institutions (Bratton *et al* 2005).

2.1.1.3 Exogenous, International Influences

External influences are not heralded as independent causes of democratization or regime transition. They have, however, been widely found to impact the sustainability of authoritarian or democratic regimes. The oil crisis of the 1970s, leading to a global economic crisis, was related to the collapse of numerous authoritarian governments, especially those that were military regimes. IMF structural adjustment requirements diminished government abilities to provide favors for their pool of supporters. This led to a breakdown in support among citizens of emerging democracies, whose own economic situations were worsening. The external economic hardships faced by developing democracies during the 1970's and 1980's exacerbated internal splits that were threatening military rulers and urged mobilization of popular protests against governments that were increasingly less able to provide for their citizens. This was true in Africa, as well as across the globe. The neo-patrimonial political culture in Africa could not withstand the loss of support for regimes that could not provide "patron" services to their "clients" (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

"Economic reform reduced benefits to regime supporters at the same time that the crisis itself reduced acquiescence among ordinary citizens" (Geddes 1999:115-144).

The end of the Cold War with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 also had a dramatic affect on political life in Africa. Throughout the Cold War, newly-independent African states were used as pawns by the Axis and Allied powers alike in their race pitting democracy against communism. The United States and its allies propped up numerous dictators in the name of democracy. The Soviets and their allies did the same in the name of communism. Munitions and money were funneled to notorious tyrants such as Uganda's Idi Amin or Somalia's Said Barry. Furthermore, the battle among elites for foreign resources obscured the inherited problems facing African governments left over

from colonialism (Akinade and Sesey 1998). When the struggle between the West and the East ended in 1989, these states were suddenly inconsequential to global powers. The support they had received quickly eroded, and manipulative leaders lost their ability to monopolize political power as they had done in the past. The problems that had been on hold for decades now came rushing to the forefront (Akinade and Sesey 1998). Economic crisis was now coupled with political crisis across the continent.

The personalist regimes that dominated Africa fell more slowly than did the military regimes, but the 1990's saw a great deal of personalist leadership unraveling. External pressures, from donors and lenders, forced states to reduce the spending that had been a primary tool in bolstering their support. Thus, the economic hardships within African countries, much like elsewhere in the world, combined with global economic shocks and donor policies and pressures to undercut authoritarian leaders. The presence of external shocks, thus far, has reinforced beliefs about the role that economic indicators play in democratization and regime transitions. External threats or shocks aggravate poor economic situations and unseat pools of support on which authoritarian rulers – especially military and personalistic rulers – rest.

2.1.1.4 Cultural Explanations: Culturalist Approaches

As the relationship between economics and democracy was being firmly established, another vein of interest emerged in efforts to understand democratic emergence and growth. Beginning largely with Almond and Verba's landmark study (1963), *The Civic Culture*, the investigation and recognition of the importance of political culture surfaced in democratization studies. The term political culture was coined earlier in research by Almond (1956), who helped bring the idea of a political culture from sociology into political science. A country's political culture is comprised of its citizens'

values, attitudes and behaviors. With Almond and Verba's attention, political culture as a studied factor entered political science during the behavioralist period. Lichbach and Zucherman (1997) define the culturalist perspective as focusing on more holistic, shared aspects of collectivities of individuals in attempts to explain political phenomena. Thus, space that is supportive of democracy is argued as necessary in order for democracy to transpire and thrive. Values and attitudes of individuals must be supportive of democracy, thus encouraging democratic behavior, in order for democracy to emerge or persist. Culturalist arguments do not negate the importance of economic factors or of institutions, but rather argue that these are important as part of a triad that makes democracy likely and possible. Neither economics nor institutions, without fostering and emerging from supportive democratic political cultures can help explain democracy. Following is a discussion of the development of this mode of thinking.

Prior to the explicit discussion by Almond and Verba (1963), the ideas that recognized the culture of political realms as significant were germinating. Almond (1956) offers a study that groups countries according to what he sees as common political cultures that cross national boundaries. He defines political culture as "a particular pattern of orientations to political action" that he believes every political system possesses (Almond 1956: 396). He divides the political systems in the world into four main categories (Anglo-American, pre-Western, Totalitarian, and Continental European) based on the extent of their ability to employ legitimate, comprehensive physical coercion over their territories. Each system's orientation towards political action affects the category into which it is placed. Thus, fitting in to the behavioralist approach, studies such as Almond's begin with society, rather than institutions. Believing there is value in understanding political culture in explaining political outcomes, they examine how

society affects the political system.

Continuing with the appreciation of society's affect of the political system, Easton (1957) offers evidence that it is important to maintain reserves of support for democracy among citizens, regardless of fledgling performance, in order for democracy to flourish in a country. These "pools of support" are, he argues, built and sustained through a process of politicization, or political socialization, of citizens through which individuals learn to play the public role that society deems worthy or necessary. Democracies are arguably less likely to form or survive in the long-run if such support for democracy persists at low or dwindling levels over time (Lipset 1959; Norris 1999).

Though Lipset's (1959) greatest contribution was to the relationship between economics and democratic development, he did inadvertently further the idea of an interaction between political culture and democratization. Modernization theory, even in its early stages, included a role for political culture. Lipset defined democracy as follows:

"a political system which supplied regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office" (Lipset 1959: 71).

Lipset argued that two factors, the *empowerment of the middle class* (including economic and political power) and the *spread of education*, led to a weakening of elites in authoritarian rule and the ability for the middle class to demand democracy. Moore's (1966) focus on the bourgeoisie also supports this idea. The role of the middle class and the need for education denote the need for a collective space that is conducive to democratic ideals. In responding to the expanse of literature that responded to this early work, Lipset (1994) later more explicitly brings the importance of a political atmosphere conducive to democracy when he introduces *the idea of cross-cutting group*

memberships/cleavages as mitigating the demands placed on a governing system, thus allowing it to stabilize.

Almond and Verba (1963), however, offer the major cornerstone study in this area. They base their ideas of the role of political culture on a body of theories about the “characteristics and preconditions of the culture of democracy” using empirical-quantitative testing (Almond and Verba 1963: 10). They define political culture as “the political system... internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population” (13). Thus, political culture to Almond and Verba is a particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation, including one’s own role in it. They define three main categories of political culture: parochial, subject and participant. The theme of this work is the congruence between political culture and institutions of democracy. Thus, they do not negate the role of institutions in fostering democracy, but see factors of political culture as imminently equal in importance, and thus necessarily studied in their own right as part of democratization inquiries.

Almond and Verba assume that there is a stable form of democratic process that is suitable to particular cultures and social institutions of a nation or region. They look comparatively across five societies, exploring the link between civic culture¹⁴ and democracy. They discuss how the growth of a civic culture, which was neither modern nor traditional, but partook of both, would moderate the change towards democracy. They believe the growth in a democratic culture, which gives the growing middle class the ability to present their demands, what a crucial element in democratization. Almond and Verba found that people had subjective political confidence, believing that they could

¹⁴ “...an allegiant participant culture” that involves congruence between political culture (awareness of one’s role in subsystem and system levels of society) and political structure (Almond and Verba 1963: 30).

join groups and affect government (sense of effectiveness), and had faith in other people that bolstered this subjective confidence.

Though institutional explanations dominate the democratization field from about the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, cultural factors were not wholly forgotten. In “The Silent Revolution,” Inglehart (1971) discusses the distinction between values (fundamental orientations/beliefs, which are not easily subject to short-term change) and opinions. This assumption, largely in line with Almond and Verba (1963), advocates for a core, widely-held set of beliefs among citizens within an age-cohort and across differing degrees of affluence. Based on assuming the existence of overall values, Inglehart creates a country-level score assuming there is a true central tendency in each country. Thus, he assumes that there are various values that will be relatively stable and widely held, reflecting either a supportive or adversarial democratic political culture.

Gradually the importance of political culture in democratization studies reemerged. A “renaissance of political culture” (Inglehart 1988) eventually occurred as economic and institutional explanations failed to fully capture explanations of democratization (e.g. Davis *et al* 1999; Granato *et al* 1996; Jackman and Miller 1996). The development of the debate regarding the role of political culture does not only focus on its affect of democratization, but also considers other areas. By developing the concept, researchers are able to more fully understand the role that political culture plays in general, as well as in relation to democratization. Inglehart relates political culture to democratization using time-series survey data from twenty-six nations, gathered from 1970 through 1988 (Inglehart 1990). He analyzes the cultural changes that are occurring through generational replacement on issues such as religious beliefs, motives for work, desire for families and children, and in attitudes toward divorce, abortion, and

homosexuality. These changes are discussed as having important political and economic development implications, actually driving economic performance and democratic stability.

Robert Putnam supported cultural findings in his study of Italy (1993). In *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam compares regional governments in modern Italy, arguing that some characteristics of the government itself cause legislative outcomes, while other aspects of the government performance are caused by traits of the government (political culture), and finally that some traits of the political culture are legislative outcomes. Thus, Putnam contends that his findings show a strong link between effective democratic governance and traditions of civic engagement.

Abramson and Inglehart (1992) later take up the idea of generational changes in political culture, studying generational replacement and its effect on value change in eight western European societies. They find relevance for the role of political culture in orientations towards politics. They show that affluence leads to the adoption of increasingly post-materialist values, progressing through generations.

Granato, Inglehart and Leblang (1996) tie cultural arguments to the importance of economic growth. They argue that, if cultural factors influence economic growth, and therefore democratization, they must be quantified and measured. They define culture as a “system of basic common values that help shape the behavior of the people in a given society” (608). They look at achievement motivation and post-materialist values as key cultural values that have significance in predicting economic growth, which is part of securing democratization. Thus, they add both to the culturalist approach as well as to the rationalist approach, supporting a place for political culture in modernization theory.

Linz and Stepan (1996) conducted the final study on political culture and

democratization that I will consider. Their comparison, conducted after the third wave of democratization, attempts to come up with a set of fundamental explanatory variables regarding various forms of democratic transition and consolidation. International influences are shown to play a role in their analysis, as are a number of variables that fall under the category of political culture (e.g.: 'stateness,' or a national identity; regime legitimacy based on political economy). Using a few-countries design, their study offers thick, contextual description (Geertz 1973), as well as classification of regime and transitions, and hypothesis testing (Landman 2000). Other important variables are prior regime type, its leadership base, and who initiates the transition.

Norris (1999) sees the emergence of lack of satisfaction with governments as evidence of more critical citizens who show adherence to democratic values, but see existing structures/institutions as lacking. She distinguishes among five objects of political support, revealing significance in the degree of support for each one. Increased dissatisfaction with the faulty institutions of democracy adds pressure for political reform, which then ultimately strengthens democracy if positive changes happen, but could also lead to the undermining of democracy if improvements are not made and the pool of support for democratic ideals wanes. Thus, her view is one of a dynamic role of political culture driving democratization.

All of these report some idea of political culture as affecting or driving the process of democratization. Whether it is in influencing the structure and functioning of institutions or shaping the actions of members of various generations and citizens in mobilizing civil society, political culture is seen as an essential idea in the onset and sustainability of democratization.

2.1.1.5 Religiosity: The Role of Civil Society and Democratization

A final set of arguments regarding causative factors behind democratic transition and consolidation revolve around the strength of a nation's civil society. Civil society creates democratic values and behaviors (Bergdall 2000). Civic engagement makes possible movements for change in the political arena by ordinary citizens.

"Where associational networks are better formed, political opposition to authoritarian rule may be better able to take advantage of political opening"(Seely 2002).

The role of civil society in democratization has gained increasing attention over the past two or three decades. Civil society encompasses the part of our social order linking individual citizens with government and the public sphere:

"Governments and markets are not enough to make civilization. There also must be healthy, robust civil sector: a space in which the bonds of community can flourish. Government and market are similar to two legs of a three-legged stool. Without the third leg of civil society, the stool is not stable and cannot provide support" (Bradley 1997).

Involvement in civil society allows citizens to hold their leaders accountable. Civic associations draw people with shared values together, allowing them to advocate under a united front for their common interests and concerns. Civic society ties citizens to the structures that govern their lives (Bergdall 2000). Civil society is necessary in order for democracy to function well. It is the foundational space not only for instilling democratic values, such as gender equality or political equality, but also for seeing equality put into practice (Potgieter 2004). It is a training ground for both men and women to gain the skills and perceived efficacy that they need to engage as effective democratic citizens.

In Africa, however, the depth of vibrant associational life is unclear, as is the progression of civic engagement from the private sphere to an enriched, democratic public sphere. Though civic society organizations, and in Africa this especially includes religious associations, are noted as indispensable actors in democratic formation, it is possible that African civil society leaders will not be able to deliver political goods "as

effectively as can more traditional or ethnically based clientelistic networks” that persist in Africa (Seely 2002; Widner 1997). And patron-client relationships are still deeply rooted in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Civil engagement is especially important to include in a discussion about gendered empowerment in emerging democracies. Women in Africa are highly involved in civil society organizations, especially in the religious sector. How such political engagement plays out in Africa is greatly understudied. Most research on women’s political participation in Africa has focused on elite women, or on those who are involved at the national level (Logan and Bratton 2006; Lindberg 2004; Hirschman 1991). This type of engagement, however, may serve two empowering purposes for women vis-à-vis the state. First, as discussed previously, women may gain skills and confidence through empowerment in non-state organizations that translates to their becoming involved in more traditional forms of political behavior, such as voting, contacting formal leaders, or attending rallies. In the long-run, civic engagement may translate into political understanding and empowerment. Civil society literature tells us that voluntary associations serve as incubators for democratic values and practices (Bergdall 2000). Secondly, these organizations may serve as outlets through which women are involved in politics in the absence of opportunities to be involved in more traditional forms of democratic political behavior (Haynes 1996). In the short-run, civic associations may channel otherwise excluded female concerns into the political realm.

2.1.1.6 Democratization in Africa: Generalizations and Exceptions

Huntington’s (1991) stance that countries likely to democratize need be in the middle level of economic development,¹⁵ offers a bleak outlook for most African nations, with their low GNP and instable economic growth. Yet, economics is not the only factor

¹⁵ “In poor countries, democratization is unlikely, in rich countries it has already occurred” (60).

that the above theories discuss as important to democracy. And democratic experiments are occurring in Africa. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) reveal a number of African states having experienced democratic transitions to varying degrees. The case studies presented by Villalón and Von Doepp (2005) reveal a number of conditions that were present across those states that were more successful in their democratic experiments. For example, Benin's elites learned the value of inclusiveness, especially in the face of their conflict-prone, ethnically diverse society. Benin is argued to be a largely overlooked success in its steps towards democracy. Benin shares with Kenya (2002) and South Africa (1994) the experience of power-sharing across historically contentious parties in order to move towards democratic stability (Magnusson 2005). Thus, "pacts" among elites does seem important in African democracy. Zambia, however, evidenced elite cooperation in order to end 18 years of one-party rule, but has had less than successful experiences with democracy since (Simon 2005). Thus, Villalón and VonDoepp conclude that the quality of the goals and aims underlying a consensus, not just the "technical aspects" of building a pact, are primarily important (2005: 275).

The above example is just one of the lessons regarding African democracy that emerges in Villalón and VonDoepp's edited volume. The overall importance of this compilation, however, is two-fold. First, and foremost, we see hopeful experiences of democracy in Africa. Though not complete, countries such as Benin are experiencing forms of democracy.

Secondly, the case studies offer lessons on what has worked and what has failed to work for democracy in the African context. African democracies have begun to take root and grow in the face of consensual behavior among elites, a vibrant civic tradition, and resultant institutional capability that is able to flex with change over time.

“The more consensual and devoted to fundamental democratic values elites are, and the higher they place national interests above those of the faction, the better for democracy and the institutional framework it requires”(Villalón and VonDoepp 2005: 281).

The multiple cases of failed democratic experiments trace the breakdown of democracy to divisiveness among elites. State institutions implode under self-interested pursuits of power that ignore national interests. Countries such as the Congo or the Central African Republic offer precarious forms of day-to-day life to their citizens precisely because of the way democracy was (or rather was not) pursued by their leaders.

The previous lessons reveal that theories on elites, institutions and cultures all work together with economic conditions to affect the chances for democracy in Africa. In that case, Africa offers insight for democratization studies outside its borders. There are unique histories to African countries, and these affect the way their elites work, the manner in which democratic institutions are implemented, and the political cultures in which democratic norms and practices must grow. Africa is not, however, completely alien to the rest of the world. Democracy in Africa requires the same type of soil in which to grow: energetic civic culture, elites committed to democracy, institutional forms that support democratic practices, along with efforts to overcome the economic obstacles that Huntington, Lipset, and others have proven to be crucial in democratization.

2.1.2 Values, Attitudes and Behaviors

Democratic Values

Why are values important to consider in regards to democratization? Why is studying value formation important in understanding women’s roles in emerging democracies? Modernization theory, debated and refined over time, has largely emerged as valid in explaining democratic transition and consolidation. Countries with increasing levels of economic development, which leads to modernization and urbanization, tend to

support the likelihood of democracy more than countries with higher levels of poverty (Lipset 1994; 1959). Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel argue that modernization makes democracy more likely as it affects values (Inglehart *et al* 2003; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Modernization draws more females into the workforce, ushers more people into urban areas where they are exposed to more diversity and modern technology, and increases access to resources and educational opportunities. These processes prove to be socializing, changing people's values. Gender equality becomes more accepted publicly, at least by women (Aubrey 2001). This project speaks to this line of reasoning, also arguing that outcomes of modernization, including economic changes, urbanization, and education, are part of fostering values that are necessary for democracy to grow. I diverge from traditional modernization discussions by focusing specifically on the *cultural* influences of gender and religion.

Furthermore, understanding value formation speaks to the core of understanding the other two areas believed to be important in democratic success: democratic attitudes and democratic behaviors. David Easton and those who have built off his work assert that a necessary component for successful democratization is a pool of "diffuse" support for democracy. A waning of such support undermines democratic growth and consolidation and people lose heart and withdraw from democratic institutions and practices (Easton 1975; 1965). The literature on values is dominated by those investigating the transitivity or existence of value hierarchies, or debates regarding the directionality of causation of values, attitudes and behaviors. Though there are debates within and across disciplines on the roles that values play, my work is built on the idea that values are the building-blocks of how people view the world, and that these lead to attitude formation, which then drive behaviors, both within and external to the political realm. Drawing from the social

psychologist, Milton Rokeach, and those who have built on his work both in his own field as well as in political science (Jacoby 2006), I assert that people hold rather stable value hierarchies or structures and that understanding values is key to understanding the processes and possibilities of democracy as well as female empowerment in emerging democracies (Rokeach 1973).¹⁶ The common theme that my work and the current literature share is a belief that values are core to understanding democratization. If this is the case, regardless of the difficulties, it is a necessary and important effort to engage in systematic attempts to explain value formation.

Finally, the literature as a whole has tended to focus on democratization issues at the macro-level, using countries as the units of analysis. The major stream of work seeking to explain value prevalence and formation globally, analysis from the World Values Survey, looks at micro-level responses, but aggregates responses by country, thus offering analysis with nations as the units of analysis (Inglehart *et al* 2003). To give true depth to our findings and understandings, however, we must consider the micro-level answers to questions regarding democratic consolidation factors. Are women more or less attached to democracy than men? Are women more or less likely than men to act in democratic manners? Are Christians more or less likely than Muslims to value or support democracy, or to participate in democratic behavior? “If democracy consists of “rule by the people” then the values, attitudes and behaviors of ordinary folk are central to considerations of the fate of democracy” (Bratton 2006).

Political Attitudes

Why do I consider political attitudes as the next level of democratic orientations?

Why are democratic attitudes important? Democratic attitudes and democratic actions are

¹⁶ For values as the building blocks of human behavior, also see: Feldman 2003; Kuklinski 2001; For value structures as the key to understanding human behavior, see: Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz 1992; Schwartz 1996; Verplanken and Holland 2002.

inextricably linked, and each results from the values that people hold towards the political realm (Sen 1999). Without supportive democratic attitudes, Africans will withdraw from political behaviors that foster democracy. The erosion, therefore, of political support could then lead to erosion of the possibility for political development in emerging democracies. Even when Africans are dissatisfied with the democracy they are being given (“specific” support according to Easton), there must be a reserve of support for democracy as a system in order for democracy to take root and flourish in a country (1975; 1965).

Furthermore, looking back to the previous discussion on the foundational roles of democratic political values in establishing democracies, research reveals how the valuation of democracy may suffer in the long run if support for democracy persists only at low levels (Norris 1999; Lipset 1959). Considering the African context, van de Walle endorses the same notion in such:

“if democratic regimes cannot overturn the recent pattern of declining real wages, rising levels of poverty, and inadequate public spending on physical infrastructure and social services, they may lose their popular legitimacy [attitudes] and eventually fall prey to political instability” (van de Walle 1999: 95).

Thus, it is important in a study of democratization to examine the levels of support that exist in democratizing states. What do people demand from government? Do citizens of emerging African democracies desire democracy? Do they equally reject other forms of non-democratic governments? How do Africans evaluate their governments? I investigate levels and factors behind attitudinal support for democracy with this outcome in mind: an erosion of attitudinal support for democracy may lead to a destabilization in political behaviors in emerging democracies.

Political Participation and Democratization

Popular engagement in politics has long been considered necessary for democracy to

take root and grow. Democracy requires consent in the making of decisions in the political realm (Lewis 1940). In order to gain this consent, citizens must be involved in the processes of politics. The very definition of democracy that I put forth necessitates an understanding of political participation. I define democracy as a set of political procedures that channel popular consent to leaders (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Bratton *et al* 2005). Said another way, democracy is the process by which popular legitimacy is conferred upon leaders. Democracy is rule by the people, including choices of leaders and their ensuing decisions requires popular input. Therefore, we must hammer out to what people we are referring and how will they rule (Dahl 1967). High participation in civil society has been shown to be a necessary, if not sufficient, aspect for democracy to result and persist (Putnam 1993; Lipset 1959). Any gaps in participation tend to favor those who are economically or socially better off. This omits a majority of perspectives and needs from the conversation that determines the leaders and policies governing a nation (Lijphart 1997). Bratton *et al* find that Africans are very engaged during election seasons, but are less involved during inter-electoral periods. Yet, they also find that Africans who do engage in political behaviors other than voting alone tend to be early adopters of democratic reforms (2005).

Norris finds that voting, as well as other “elite-driven behaviors” is diminishing when she examines developed societies (1999). Norris then argues that these citizens are becoming more critical of hierarchical authorities and party lines. Values of democracy are deepening at the same time as these behaviors diminish and elite-challenging behaviors are expanding, leaving people overall more involved in political life. Channels of political participation in this light can be seen as evolving, with more people becoming active in more ways. In a thorough examination of democratic orientations in emerging

democracies, it is therefore imperative to consider inter-electoral, or “elite-challenging” political activities, such as the forms of communing or contacting examined in this project.

The Debate: Direction of Relationships between Values, Attitudes and Behaviors

In this project, I maintain that values lead to attitudes that lead to behaviors that are crucial for the emergence and growth of stable democracy. This is not, however, a universally accepted direction of “causation.” Three strands of thought comprise a lively debate in the literature regarding the direction of the relationship primarily between cultural attitudes about politics and regime type.

First, there is the view on which this project is based. Ingelhart (1988) is the primary founder of the literature that argues “causal” relationships begin with political culture and result in political regime type. Following this logic,

“ In Costa Rica, an embryonic civic culture would have had to supplant its initial Iberian authoritarianism, thus leading to today’s democracy. In contrast, Nicaragua presumably never developed a civic culture, its protracted institutional authoritarianism nourished from deep authoritarian cultural roots” (Seligson and Booth 1993: 779).

Thus, in order for the democratic behaviors and institutional norms to take root in a society, a culture that is supportive of democracy must first emerge. Thus, the foundations for political behaviors are attitudes, and the foundations for political attitudes are the deep-seated values that people hold about politics (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

A second strain of this discussion maintains that experience with democratic institutions and practices foster democratic norms among citizens. Democratic institutions emerge independently and then progressively help democratize political culture. Political culture moves towards the political system under which it grows (Almond and Verba 1963).

A third possibility is that culture and regime type are reciprocal. Almond (1980) revisits the ideas presented in *A Civic Culture* and argues that a clear back and forth relationship exist between cultural attitudes about politics and the regime type in a country. Inglehart's (1988) work even allows for a backlash from experience with democratic political institutions and the culture that exists in a society.

Using a most similar systems design, Seligson and Booth (1993) test the idea that political culture is linked to the emergence and stability of democratic systems.

Comparing Nicaragua and Costa Rica, they argue that, if the link between cultural attitudes and democratic political behaviors holds, then Costa Rica should evidence a more democratic political culture. Costa Rica evidenced a more stable democracy than did Nicaragua. Therefore, if political culture fosters institutions, if experience with institutions fosters political culture, or if the two are reciprocal, then Costa Rica would have to have a more democratic political culture than Nicaragua.

They find unusually high levels of support for democracy in Nicaragua, a country with virtually no democratic tradition. In Costa Rica, conversely, they find cases of intolerance towards opposition groups and their ideas. Thus, the long history of democracy in Costa Rica has not altered mass political attitudes, nor seemingly derived from unalterable commitments to democracy. Yet, in Nicaragua, a prolonged struggle against authoritarianism and its abuses likely reflect a link between the democratic attitudes and values of the people and the regime type. Experience with the abysmal record of an authoritarian government fosters deep commitments to its alternative. In Costa Rica, high levels of support for democracy do exist on a whole. The opposition groups that were rejected were those that espoused largely undemocratic ideas, and were likely seen as a threat to democracy. Therefore, the findings of Seligson and Booth,

despite their basic interpretation, do not negate a link between culture and regime type. Rather, their findings give support to *each direction* of this relationship: culture breeding regime type, regime type fostering culture, and each reinforcing one another.

2.1.3 Religion

Religion and Politics

“The sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm” (Mills 1959: 33).

The conventional wisdom of political science for decades omits religion. The belief in the ebbing of religion as part of public life, however, goes back centuries. Premier thinkers in the social sciences, dating back to the Age of the Enlightenment, have suggested that religion – theological “superstitions, symbolic liturgical rituals, and sacred practices” included – would wane throughout the growth of modernization (Norris and Inglehart 2005: 3). Increasingly bureaucratized governments combined with specialized labor forces in industry and scientific revelations would erase reliance on the mystical knowledge and comfort provided by religion. Modernization and secularization theorists believed religion would become increasingly irrelevant in people’s lives as societies and economies developed. Theories regarding *secularization*- or the “systematic erosion of religious practices, values and beliefs” (Norris and Inglehart 2005: 5) – argued that reason and science and greater security and control over the natural world would erase the proclivity of mankind to turn to supernatural explanations for their experiences and existences.

In political science, finally, this thesis is receiving increasing attention and scrutiny, as its premise has not held up. Our world is not less religious now than it was in past ages. To the contrary, religious adherence is alive and well. And the health and vitality of the religious realm is affecting the political sphere. Events in the last few decades,

including the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, reveal religion as a factor that unites and mobilizes people, even in the political realm. Thus, in studying political changes, religion is a salient factor that cannot be ignored. A compelling argument avers that a sense of existential security, felt most acutely in post-industrial, affluent nations, drives the sustained impact of religion on public and private aspects of people's lives (Norris and Inglehart 2005). While this may be the case, I believe the social, psychological and emotional effects of religion run much deeper than secularization theorists anticipated. Religion matters in people's lives and affects, among other things, their orientations towards politics. Where major world religions have waned in industrial or post-industrial societies, syncretic or grassroots adaptations have emerged. Where religion is banned in modernizing states, home groups centered on religious identities draw adherents, at the peril of their very lives. And where modernization has perhaps not taken root, or is being adapted to fit local realities, religion remains a chief force in people's everyday lives. Whether in North America, Europe, Asia or Africa, religion remains an important vestige in the lives, both public and private, of citizens.

The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views [regardless of the venues through which they express these views] than ever before – and they constitute a growing proportion of the world's population (Norris and Inglehart 2005: 5).

Though Norris and Inglehart offer an indispensable analysis of religion and its persistent role across 76 nations, their argument about lived insecurity driving persistence of religious adherence is weakened by the lack of inclusion of a majority of the most insecure nations in the world: those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The World Values Survey, from which their work is taken, includes only five SSA countries: Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Uganda. These are important nations in Africa, but do not represent the linguistic nor religious diversity that SSA holds. This

project does not parallel their attempt to revise secularization or modernization theory, though I agree with Norris & Inglehart on the continued importance of religion in the political and private realm of humanity. The importance of religion here will be tested against other proven factors that drive democratic orientations in Africa.

I consider the way in which Africans view and integrate religion into their public lives. In Africa, citizens see ultimate power as an intertwining of the spiritual and physical (Ellis and ter Haar 2004). They do not separate religion and religious practice from their roles, ideologies and abilities in the physical, governing realm. And in African nations where political institutions flounder or fail, religious adherence “can be seen as an attempted remedy by means of reordering power (Ellis and ter Haar 1998: 176).

Understanding religion and politics in Africa reflects an awareness of how Africans conceive of the way power is exercised (Ellis and ter Haar 1998). Therefore, I aver that a comprehensive exploration of democratization in the African context *must* take into account the role that religion plays. In a study of Africa, religion’s role in the political realm cannot be ignored. Religion is held to play a prominent part of nearly everyone’s life across Africa, including actors in the public sphere. Actors’ incentives, both in creating and in functioning within political space, are affected by their beliefs in the spiritual realm (Ellis and ter Haar 2004). Religious ideas

“influence people’s thinking about the world and the nature of reality” in Africa and therefore affect the way they view and engage in all areas of life, including politics (Ellis and ter Haar 2004: 7).

Religious responses to power critique government and power structures. Even religious discourse that is not overtly political in Africa, but rather focuses on morality and the way they world *should* work, has political implications due to the *political idiom* by which most Africans view the world (Ellis and ter Haar 2004; 1998). When religion is studied in Africa, often an institutional approach is used (Ellis and ter Haar 1998). It is

important, however, to take the cultural aspects of religion, as a frame of reference by which people interpret the world, into account along side institutional forms of religion.

Institutional expressions of religious views and identities, however, are important. They are expressions of civic engagement, by which citizens gain skills and efficacy that transfers to the public realm. Both engagement at religious services as well as membership in religious organizations are institutional forms of religious adherence. Increasing levels of involvement in such activities, beyond simply the identification with a certain religion might actually be more influential in democratic political orientations among religious adherents (Bratton 2002a). Those who attend religious services are often brought together through church attendance to deal with other community matters. Furthermore, affiliation with a religion often drives involvement in religious-centered para-church/mosque organizations. Norris and Inglehart find that membership in such organizations has been shown to correspond with increased civic activity and affinity for democratic forms of government (2005). Modernization has not suppressed this relationship, but has simply changed the form of civic engagement encouraged by religiosity over time (Norris and Inglehart 2005; Norris 1999). Within both Christianity and Islam, members are not the same. Some are frequent attendees of religious services, while others attend only funeral, weddings, or at holiday observances. Some people who are religious involve themselves in religious associations, taking up religious mandates to fight poverty or engage politically. This project therefore takes both religious identity as well as religion-affiliated involvement into consideration when examining affects on political orientations across Islam and Christianity.

Finally, research overtime gives us reason to believe that a nation's religious history creates proclivities towards certain resultant social and political cultures. The

dominant religion or religious heritage of a country is important because “through a broader process of diffusion everyone in these societies might be affected by these [religious] cultural values” (Norris and Inglehart 2005: 177). The political values, attitudes and behaviors of citizens in a society are formed in part by the dominant cultural/religious mores of that society, even if a particular citizen never attends a church or mosque or religious association. Contextual cultural norms work in synthesis with the religious path on which a nation lies, adapting the significance or influence that various tenets of a faith have in a nation. Dominant trends, however, have been found to correspond with certain religious heritages.

2.1.4 Gender

Gender and Democratization

Why is gender an important component to consider when investigating the possibilities for democratic growth and consolidation in Africa? Women are cornerstones in African societies. Women are vital national resources whose exclusion and oppression hurts everyone (Amisi 1992). They provide for families through their domestic, agriculture and cash labor. Afrobarometer empirical evidence reveals that theoretical discussions on the burden women bear as caretakers and providers for society bear out in notable ways. There is a significant difference between men and women in time spent on lifetime survival activities. While men spent more of their time earning money, still a majority of women are also involved in the cash economy. Women also spend, however, significantly more time than men doing household work, caring for children and tending to sick household members.

Table 2.1: Time Spent on Survival Activities: Gender Differences

Time spent working to earn money: men (72%) more than women (59%)	t=7.275	p<.001
Q8c. Time spent doing household work: women (95%) more than men (69%)	t=-23.679	p<.001
Time spent caring for own family's children: women (89%) more than men (71%)	t=-14.523	p<.001

Time spent caring for orphaned children: women (35%) more than men (30%)	t=-3.283	p<.001
Time spent caring for sick household members: women (63%) more than men (58%)	t=-3.237	p<.001

Hardships from struggling economies and weak governments fall squarely on the shoulder of women (Nzomo 1995). Women in Africa, however, are largely excluded from the decisions that guide their opportunities to provide for their families, social networks and societies. Exclusion of women from the political arena undermines the vitality and progress of African democracy. Since struggles for independence, women have largely lost ground in political rights and activism. At the same time, in spite of many democratic transitions, most African countries have fallen far short of becoming stable, consolidated democracies. Yet, in order to understand these crucial roles that women play in the political development of a country, women must be studied as part of a context of the social understandings that define what it means to be a woman (Rathgeber 1995). This means that women must be examined in relation to men. Female political orientations must be investigated in relation to those of their male counterparts to be usefully informative.

“Projects undertaken from a gender perspective that assigns value to the experience and voices of all concerned actors are likely to have far-reaching implications...the Gender and Development [GAD] approach has clear advantages...in trying to integrate women’s overall roles into an analysis of their participation in processes of social change...[GAD] tries to reflect the totality of women’s experience and the nature of power relations with other actors in a given social context, it offers the possibility of broader interpretations (Rathgeber 1995: 219-220).

Gendered considerations of the co-phenomena of democracy and development maintain that the exclusion of women from democracy undermines the quality of democracy that is possible in a long-term, sustainable fashion (Potgieter 2004; Sen 1999).

As Potgieter relates:

“Whilst it is important to emphasize the need for democracy, it is also crucial to safeguard the conditions and circumstances that ensure the range and reach of the democratic process. Valuable as democracy is as a major source of social opportunity, there is also the need to examine the ways and means of making it function well, to realise its potential. The

achievement of social (gender) justice depends not only on institutional forms (including democratic rules and regulations), but also on effective practice” (2004).

Democracy in its institutional forms cannot consolidate if it does not take into consideration the various sections of society, or *reaches* as Potgieter terms them, and how forms of democracy differently affect them. Institutions that include and give voice to one segment of society may exclude or oppress another element of that society. The structures of democracy will not lead societies to increasing stability without inclusion of perspectives that incorporate the varied needs of ethnic, socioeconomic or gender groups. Otherwise, democracies that do not consider gender in their development will face rising discontent among women as well as men. As will be discussed later, discontent destabilizes democracy. And gendered political discussions cannot remain relegated to “women’s” organizations or interest groups. Theoretical discussions establish the importance of drawing dialogues about women in the public sphere, actively talking about women’s concerns and effectively creating space for women at the table of public power and discourse (Lycklama *et al* 1998; Moser 1993; Staudt 1986).

In order to conceptualize the role that gender plays in African democracy, I first explain who I define gender. Drawing from gender theorist Cheryl Potgieter, I hold gender to entail:

“the socially constructed roles of women and men ascribed to them on the basis of their sex whereas sex refers to biological and physical characteristics” (Potgieter 2004).

Therefore, I seek to expound upon the function that women’s roles *in relation to men’s roles* have in the political realm. How do the ways that male and female play out in the African context affect democratic orientations? This draws from the Gender and Development (GAD) school of feminist discourse, recognizing that women cannot be understood in isolation from the roles and constructs that they face vis-à-vis men.

This project discusses democratic orientations in 16 African countries. Though each country has its own varied, rich history and current story, there are some generalizations about gender in Africa that offer important insights on why gender is a crucial consideration in order to understand democratic possibilities throughout Africa. A sketch of women's roles prior to colonialism, through colonial times and struggles for independence, and then into current times offers us a crude yet important picture of the role women have played and the need for an understanding of gender in order to understand African democratic futures.

Iris Berger offers a scrupulous discussion of women's roles throughout African history, explaining their opportunities in pre-colonial times:

“During the nineteenth century, women in most [African] societies remained central to production, trade and other economic pursuits and had considerable autonomy in controlling the products of their labor. In centralized kingdoms, queen mothers and members of royal families wielded significant power and authority. As healers, priestesses and spirit mediums, other women addressed individual and communal afflictions, while older women directed life-cycle rituals for girls that helped to create cohesion in values and institutions. Substantial variation remained, however, in the levels of women's political and legal authority and in the degree of submissiveness and deference demanded of them” (Berger and White 1999).

Prior to colonial domination, therefore, though there was “considerable variation in the level of women's political access and influence” in African societies, women had positions of power in economic and political arenas (Bauer and Taylor 2005). Colonial powers brought in economic, political, and social systems that largely stripped women of their previous roles and opportunities. Relative to men, women were made worse off and found few positive outlets that had previously been available to them (Berger and White 1999; Parpart 1988; Staudt 1987). Women lost ground politically largely due to losses they sustained in economic rights – namely in access to land and labor opportunities (Bauer and Taylor 2005).

Economic terms were not the only ones that changed to the disadvantage of

African women during the colonial period. Social conceptualizations of gender changed in conjunction with the tangible jobs and activities played by women.

“The colonial state laid the foundation for societies to conform with its cultural notions of appropriate gender relations in industrializing class society, in which women enable and stimulate male work force productivity through home labor (which in Africa includes food production and water and fuel collection) and consumer demand as well as serve as a low skill reserve labor force. In this conception, women are also politically conservative and thus help maintain a given political order” (Staudt 1987: 197).

Antiquated, Victorian conceptions of gender were introduced with colonial governments and economic endeavors. Women were relegated to the private, domestic sphere, and seen as a support service for the “real” labor force. Colonial powers saw African societies through their own worldviews. They offered agricultural technological advances and credit primarily to men, not understanding the crucial role that women played in African agriculture. Thus, efforts by colonial powers to modernize African agricultural production occurred at the expense of women.

Women found increased access to their lost power during periods of nationalist struggles. In states that endured (mostly) peaceful transitions from colonies to independent counties, women were active largely through *women's arms* of newly organized nationalist political parties. Gendered concerns or rights were subjugated to national concerns. These women were primarily “backstage supporters” for men or found expression in areas deemed female concerns – including health care or family life (Bauer and Taylor 2005: 311).

“...while nationalist and liberation movements throughout the world often relied heavily on women...they almost universally subordinated gender concerns to the larger nationalist struggle” (Bauer and Taylor 2005: 314).

Women in countries that required increasingly militarized struggles for freedom (such as in Mozambique or Angola) fought alongside their male counterparts, and found more full expressions of their feminine power. They had political organizations in their

own right. They were still, however, excluded from the highest echelons of power-brokering or decision-making. Finally, Bauer and Taylor discuss how women made the most substantial gains in countries that achieved freedom last, and through the most sustained and profound struggles. In Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, women participated in “crucial ways in their national liberation movements,” fighting in battles, carrying military equipment, and having roles in the political arena (2005: 313). Gender differences were shelved as the common goal of freedom from outside dominance offered common ground to Africans in these countries. The length of the colonial governance left many women, along with their male counterparts, highly educated by the time of independence. Along with the skills gained in the protracted struggle for freedom, women in these three countries entered freedom unwilling to be subjected to inferior roles or opportunities. Unfortunately, even in these countries, women were often unable to sustain the gains they found during the process and onset of independence. The consolidation of power in one-party states, who focus were primarily keeping power for the few elite, oppressed any concerns that were not central to their mission.

During the past decade, however, multiparty states have toppled African one-party states. Many African nations have had experiments with democracy ((Villalon and VonDoepp 2005; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Women throughout Africa have risen up during these times in greater numbers demanding an active place at the political table in their countries (Tripp 2001a). Yet, the gender gap persists in female education, political awareness, political interest, and political involvement. The outcomes for women in the opening of democratic space across Africa has been mixed. Only in a few states, namely South Africa and Namibia, do women seem to have maintained a notable amount of the gains they saw through independence. A realization of how gender

inequality and lack of democracy could be reinforced through democratic institutions if specific head was not given to gender issues has helped Africans in these countries weather falling gender equalities faced in other emerging African democracies (Bauer and Taylor 2005).

Despite the more hopeful outlook in these two countries, the gap between men and women in democratic opportunities remains in emerging African democracies. We need to understand this gap between men and women if we are to understand possibilities for democratic consolidation in Africa. Nelson argues that there is a considerable need for more attention to gender as a political cleavage, with specific notice given to activities of women “differentially situated within countries” as well as across countries (Nelson 1992: 495). Inglehart et al confirm the need to investigate gender and values of gender equality in relationship to democratization. Through empirical analysis, they reveal two key findings that need further attention. They show gender equality as a value that most fully explains democracy over and above any other single democratic value. They also present a positive correlation between gender equality as a value and higher levels of democracy across a study of over 90 countries (Inglehart *et al* 2003). My own findings, however, indicate that men lag far behind women in their support for female inclusion in power structures and political voice.

Women, however, remain disadvantaged in relation to men in the political realm. One important reason that has emerged in studying gendered political space is the failure of modernization to fulfill its promises in developing nations. This is true on the African continent. Modernization and all its trappings have often harmed, rather than benefited Africans. This failure of political and economic development falls most heavily on women in developing societies. Furthermore, any successes that do arise benefit women

the least, and often leave them worse off (Haynes 1996).

Why are studying catalysts for political engagement important in understanding women's roles in emerging democracies? The literature as a whole has tended to focus on democratization issues at the macro-level, using countries as the units of analysis. To give true depth to our findings and understandings, however, we must consider the micro-level answers to questions regarding democratic consolidation factors. Are women more or less attached to democracy than men? Are women more or less likely than men to act in democratic manners?

Gender and Religion in Democratization

Why study gender and religion together in an investigation of democratization? We presently do not know whether (and how) politicization of religion in Africa affects participation of female adherents. Current scholarship only takes us so far in offering descriptions and explanations of the roles of women in a religious context. An increasing amount of attention is being given to religion as a crucial factor in democratization studies. Gender has received notable consideration over the past few decades, at least in some fields and among certain theorists, as an indispensable factor to investigate in understanding social and political realities. Yet, no coherent work has sought to empirically tie these two fields and examine the potential important links that exist between gender and religion for democratic opportunities. This project seeks to fill in some of this substantial gap. Following, I discuss what recent scholarship *does* reveal about women's roles in religion, and how this might affect democratic orientations. This research on gender and religion offers important insight regarding democratic behaviors off which my work builds. Bauer and Taylor relate religious roles as some in which African women found power in pre-colonial times. This power

was not separated into a private or “religious sphere” as Westerners may conceptualize it, but was influential in the public, political realm as well (2005).

Inglehart and Norris’s look at gender as a political cleavage reveals significant gaps in attitudes towards women’s political roles across nations due to religious adherence, among other factors (Inglehart and Norris 2003). They note significant differences in political activism among women correlating with these attitudes, realizing that decreased engagement has adverse consequences for real leadership in politics for women. This has negative outcomes for democratic stability and sustainability.

Ellis and ter Haar explain differences across the spiritual roles of men and women in Africa. They focus on female reverence due to their believed power in the spiritual realm. This reverence translates into a type of empowerment in the public, temporal realm (2004). Women often are ascribed special political status due to the belief that they have unique access to the spiritual origin of power. Africans often view women as members of society with special connections to the spiritual realm, largely because of their ability to create life. Women can use these avenues to gain power, and politicians in Africa often attempt to co-opt such religious leaders for political gain.

Among women, variations exist in political opportunities across Islam and Christianity. Some research shows Muslim women as disadvantaged vis-à-vis- Muslim men or non-Muslim women. This is because of the errant interpretation and faulty application of Islam, however. Islam, for many Muslim women, has been applied in ways that belittle them and undermines their attempts at progress (Ellis and ter Haar 2004; Oded 2000) Muslim women often have less access to formal education than do their Christian counterparts (Ellis and ter Haar 2004). African Muslim women are not

content, however, tolerating oppressive patriarchy in passivity or silence. "...a pattern of women's agency where they negotiate, debate, and manipulate the legal complexities of Islamic law from behind the scenes..." emerged in research on Coastal Muslim women, thus giving credence to informal ways that women are becoming involved in the public sphere (Joseph 2003: 291). African women are being mobilized through religious affiliation (Steady 2006). An understanding of how this is affecting their role in the public sphere is crucial to understanding prospects for democracy in Africa.

In spite of the above discussion, research on women, and especially Muslim women in the political sphere in SSA is limited, leaving African women, and their religious and political roles largely invisible in scholarly investigation. I hope to add to this crucial, yet neglected conversation on the role of women and gender across religions in democratization across select areas of SSA. Women in SSA are not content with the patriarchal oppression under which they largely lived and desire a more active role in the governing of their lives. Thus, scholarly research needs to include their voices and perspectives in order to gain a fuller picture of the situation of democracy and the public sphere in Africa.

2.1.6 Gender Legislation

Women's political empowerment has greatly improved over the past few decades (Tripp 2001). Africa evidences the fastest rate of increase in political representation of women than does any other region in the world (Tripp 2004). Types of gender legislation have proven to be indispensable in encouraging equality among men and women in the political realm. The usefulness of gender legislation, in its various forms and within varied political contexts, is highly debated. But, foundationally, failure to recognize that

liberal principles alone will not empower groups marginalized by race, class or gender, perpetuates women's exclusion. In order for women to gain access to the citizenship rights to which they are entitled we must institutionalize avenues that recognize both women's equality with men and their role as a united group, albeit with heterogeneous needs and life situations (McDonagh 2002).

One of the many avenues through which women have gained in-roads to the political realm in Africa is through the enactment and implementation of international and national pieces of legislation that target female needs and rights. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is one major case of international gender legislation to which over 180 countries have signed ("CEDAW"). Fifteen of the sixteen countries evaluated in this project have adopted CEDAW and set in progress various internal programs and policies to meet CEDAW requirements (Appendix 4). A second type of institutional effort to increase women's political power is the implementation of electoral quotas. These represent national level attempts to encourage political equality among women. Ten African nations under scrutiny in this report have implemented some form of electoral quota, either in their constitution or in electoral laws (Appendix 3). Among emerging democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa, and Zimbabwe each have political party quotas for electoral candidates. Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have quotas mandated by legislature or constitution that require reserved of special seats for women, usually nominated by the executive. Gender quotas are often part of a countries effort to meet CEDAW guidelines for increasing the political representation of women (Tripp 2004).

The type of regime (democratic, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian) that

introduces gender quotas or adheres to international gender legislation is a mixed bag. Uganda, Tanzania, Senegal and Kenya are all noted to have experienced flawed or incomplete democratic transitions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Kenya and Senegal, however, have more recently undergone notably successful transitions (Villalon and VonDoepp 2005). Freedom House ranked Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania as partly free and Senegal as free in its 2005 rankings. Each of these has adopted gender quotas and, with the exception of Tanzania, are signatories of CEDAW. South Africa, Ghana, Mali and Namibia are ranked as free states by Freedom House. These four nations have both adopted gender quotas in various forms and are adopters of CEDAW.

Electoral system arrangements also vary among states that adopt gender empowering legislation. Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe all have first past the post (FPTP) plurality systems. Mali has a two round majority system. Cape Verde, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa have list proportional representation (PR) arrangements. Senegal has a parallel party bloc and semi-proportional system. Lesotho has a mixed member proportional system (“African Elections Database”).

Research on gender quotas, which is limited but growing, reveals a potential correlation in the success of gender quotas when linked with PR systems in more democratic states. And the most successful form of quota tends to be voluntarily adopted party quotas, which lay out numerical guidelines for female inclusion on electoral lists (Tripp 2004).

Many countries that adopt gender legislation have very active women’s movements. Botswana, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda all have notably active women’s associations (Tripp 2004). Thus, gender quotas

and attempts to meet international women's rights often serve to reinforce strides women have already made, as well as to open additional opportunities for women in the political sphere. International women's movements, such as the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing, the 1997 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Declaration on Gender and Development, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, also encourage gender empowerment through steps such as quota adoption (Tripp 2004). External pressure and diffusion may force countries to formalize regulations that push open political doors for women.

Adopting gender quotas, and even successfully using gender legislation to increase female political representation, does not necessarily translate into democratic gains for women. At times, leaders adopt gender-equalizing legislation as a signal of their interest in women's rights and interests (Tripp 2004). This signal is simply to gain support by average women, rather than a sign of true dedication to female empowerment. Political elites also may allow for gender representation legislation in order to gain a critical mass of women who serve in legislative bodies who are then loyal to governing elites. Tripp relates how the introduction of gender quotas in support of Ugandan allegiance to various gender conventions

“created a bloc of loyalist women who could be used when needed to suppress various demands of the women's movement or of democrats when they ran counter to government wishes”(2004: 76).


No real commitment to women's empowerment may exist at the highest levels of public power, but merely a façade intended to elicit support from female voters. Furthermore, gender legislation may fail to foster real gains in female empowerment even

if women acquire increased statistical representation in political bodies and positions of leadership. These “descriptive representatives” of women may not represent the same interests as the average women (Dovi 2002). They may be inhibited by the demands of governing elites (Tripp 2004) or the institutional framework of the legislative bodies in which they serve (Keiser *et al* 2002; Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Kathlene 1994). Furthermore, in context where gender equality is valued, men may be more able than women to take up issues regarding women’s rights. Women who do say may cause fear that they will neglect other important issues or cleavages, such as those along socioeconomic or ethnic lines (Perkins and Fowlkes 1980). Finally, attitudes towards women that are deeply embedded in society may reduce the effectiveness of gender legislation. The set of assumptions regarding gender that prevail in a society influence the beliefs and actions of those in power, whether men or women (Rubin 1996). Mental attitudes must be overcome in order for women’s movements and institutional gains to have their intended effects (Geiger 1982). Gender legislation interacts with women’s movements, levels of civil and political liberties in a country, external influences and cultural attitudes (Tripp 2001b).

Chapter 3 - Religion and Religiosity Across Emerging African Democracies

Prior to exploring the possible empirical evidence for relationships between religion and democratization, religiosity and democratization, or gender and democratization, it is necessary to make clear what the religious landscape looks like in emerging African democracies. What is the distribution of Islam and Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa? Are Africans actively involved in these religions? Are there gender differences in religious identity or activism? We must be aware of these facts in order to identify how religion and gender act upon Africans political lives. In this chapter, I will describe what Africans say about their own religious identities and practices. Confirming Ellis and ter Haar's (2004) wisdom, I find that a majority of Africans cite adherence to some form of religion. Furthermore, nearly 90% of Africans in democratizing African nations identify with either Christianity or Islam (Figure 3.1a). Thus, the investigation undertaken in this project is asking about religious effects that include a vast majority of Africans. Only in South Africa and Botswana, do some "other" religions claim a substantial amount of adherents. Mainstream Christianity, including Protestant evangelicals, Pentecostals, and Catholics, dominates throughout sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations that have experimented with democracy. Only in two of the 16 sampled countries is Islam the dominant religion: Senegal and Mali. In this sample of over 4,000 Muslims, only 19 are Shi'a, and all nineteen of these respondents are Kenyan. Thus, Sunni Islam emerges as the dominant form of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. In Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia, Muslims make up less than 1% of the total population. In Cape Verde, there were no Muslims among the 1200 respondents, reflecting the fact that Islam is likely not an entrenched religion in Cape Verde.


Figure 3.1a: African Religious Identity across Countries



Note: N = 24,301

In emerging sub-Saharan African democracies, men and women make up equal proportions of both Islam and Christianity. Furthermore, the proportions of men and women who adhere to each religion correspond to the proportions of adherents to each religion that surface in the overall population. Thus, evidence does not point to gender differences in religious identity within Christianity or Islam.

Figure 3.1b: African Religious Identity: Gender Distribution




Note: Male vs Female N = 24,301; Religion question was not asked in Zimbabwe, thus N = 21422

I am interested in not only potential effects that Christian or Muslim identity may have on democratic orientations, but also in the consequences that depth of religious

involvement as a form of civic engagement may have on democratic values, attitudes and behaviors. In other words, does religiosity affect democratic leanings? Therefore, I lay out here the levels of religious involvement that Africans in emerging democracies exhibit.

Africans overall are fairly religious. 35% of respondents attend religious services at least once a week, while a full 25% more attend more than once a week. Thus, 60% of SSA respondents attend religious services with more than passing regularity. Such attendance is likely to translate into political inclinations (Inglehart and Norris 2005).

Figure 3.2: Religiosity – Frequency of Attendance



Note: N=24,301; Question asked: "Excluding weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?" Numbers are from total sample, including Zimbabwe.

Breaking this down by gender (Table 3.1), around a quarter of both males and females attend religious services more than once a week. Men and women are equal attendees of religious services. Only a slight, albeit real, difference exists between men and women in religious service attendance.¹⁷ If religious service attendance does encourage certain political values, attitudes and behaviors, such conditioning is likely to be occurring in Africa equally for men and women.

¹⁷Difference of means: $t = -7.588, p < .001$

Table 3.1: African Religiosity (Attendance) across Gender

		% of Gender		
Female Religiosity	Never Attend	10%		
	Once a month or less	27%	N:	
	Once a week	37%	Male	12167
	More than once a week	26%	Female	12134
Male Religiosity	Never Attend	12%		
	Once a month or less	30%		
	Once a week	33%		
	More than once a week	24%		

Both Muslims and Christians are regularly involved in religious services in SSA (Table 3.2). Yet, there is a notable difference between Muslims and Christians in their frequency of religious service attendance.¹⁸ 50% of Muslim respondents attend services at least once a week or more, while nearly 70% of all Christian respondents attend services at least once a week or more. More Muslims attend services “more than once a week” than do Christians, while more Christians attend services “once a week” than do Muslims. This could reflect the different number of religious services offered throughout the week by Muslim versus Christian institutions.

Table 3.2: Religiosity (Attendance) among African Christians and Muslims

		% of Religion		
Muslim Religiosity	Never Attend	11%	N:	
	Once a month or less	36%	Muslim	4911
	Once a week	18%	Christian	16511
	More than once a week	32%		
Christian Religiosity	Never Attend	3%		
	Once a month or less	27%		
	Once a week	44%		
	More than once a week	26%		


While 11% of Muslims never attend religious services, other than weddings or funerals, a majority of this total is female. Overall, 50% of all Muslims attend religious services at least once a week or more. Slightly less than half of Muslims who are

¹⁸Difference of means: $t=-21.804$, $p<.001$

attending once a week or more, however, are women. This does not necessarily represent an exclusion of Muslim women from religious life. Islam is set up with women attending the mosque less frequently, but evidencing their religious involvement in different ways. This is part of the reason I also examine membership in religious associations other than churches or mosques to capture mobilizing religious involvement.

Among Christians, men are twice as likely as female Christians to stay away from church services. Thus, a gender gap does exist within each religion in this form of religiosity. Furthermore, there is a gap across religions. Comparing Christian women with Muslim women, Christian women attend religious services more often than do Muslim women (Figure 3.3). Therefore, it is likely that any effects of religious service attendance on democratic orientations may be least prevalent among Muslim women.


Figure 3.3: Religiosity (Attendance) among African Female Christians and Muslims



Note: $N=24,301$; Difference of means: $t=-31.267$, $p<.001$

Membership in religious organizations is another form of religiosity.


Figure 3.4a: Religious Organization Membership among Africans



Note: $N=24,301$

As in the case of religious service attendance, Africans are highly religious. Greater than 50% of all respondents are active members or leaders of religious organizations.

Figure 3.4b: Religious Organization Membership among African Christians and Muslims



Note: $N=24,301$; $t=-22.625$, $p<.001$

Over a third of all Muslims in SSA are active members of some type of religious organization, while over half of Christians are involved in such organizations. While this paper does not directly investigate the reasons behind membership in religious organizations, I conjecture that socio-economic status and opportunity may in part drive the gap between Christian and Muslim membership in religious organizations. In all but

two of the countries examined in this project, Muslims are minorities in their home countries. Conceivably, fewer organizations exist in predominantly Christian nations for Muslim adherents to join. Furthermore, Muslims tend to live at lower socio-economic levels in predominantly Christian nations, and therefore may have less time to engage in activities outside basic survival.

Afrobarometer R2 data bolsters my ideas. In Mali, where around 95% of respondents are Muslim, around 69% of all Christians have “never” or “just once or twice” had to go without food, while around 57% of all Muslims have “never” or “just once or twice” had to go without food.¹⁹ In Senegal, where around 94% of all respondents were Muslim around 69% of all Christians have “never” or “just once or twice” had to go without food, while around 67% of all Muslims have “never” or “just once or twice” had to go without food.²⁰ Thus, in SSA countries in which Muslims dominate religiously, there is little to no gap in basic poverty between Christians and Muslims, and the slight gap that does exist is “in favor” of the Christian minority.

In the countries with extreme Christian majorities, however, Muslims fare far lower than their Christian counterparts in access to basic necessities. In five of the countries investigated, Christians comprise greater than 80% of the population: Lesotho, Kenya, Namibia, Uganda and Zambia. In Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia, there are only 3 respondents from each country who are Muslim, so any conclusions drawn from results in these countries are very reckless. Thus, I turn to the other two countries with extreme Christian majorities. In Kenya, around 65% of Christians have “never” or “just once or twice” had to go without food, while around 53% of all Muslims have “never” or “just once or twice” had to go without food.²¹ In Uganda, around 69% of Christians have

¹⁹ $t=1.746, p=.081$; I use this as a more reliable measurement of poverty than household income, which are remarkably unreliable data in surveys across Africa.


²⁰ $t=.150, p=.881$

²¹ $t=4.860, p<.001$

“never” or “just once or twice” had to go without food, while around 65% of all Muslims have “never” or “just once or twice” had to go without food.²² In each case, there is a gap between Muslims and Christians in resource access that favors the Christian majority. This gap is most pronounced in Kenya, and least so in Uganda, but the gap remains nonetheless. Thus, it is likely that the economic hardships faced by Muslims affects their activities outside those necessary to survive.

How do women fare in religious organization membership across democratizing African nations? Are they equally as active as their male counterparts, or does a gender gap exist in such membership?

Figure 3.4c: Religious Organization Membership among African Female Christians and Muslims



Note: $N=24,301$; $t=-22.703$, $p<.001$

39% of all Muslims across Africa are members of religious organizations. About half of these are women and half of these are men. 51% of all Muslims across sub-Saharan Africa are members of religious organizations. 55% of Muslim religious organization members are women. Only 45% are men. Thus, there is only a slight gender gap among active members in religious organizations within Islam as well as within

²² $t=1.106$, $p=.269$

Christianity. This gap favors men within Islam, even as women are more active than men within Christianity.

Overall, the above discussion offers us a few empirical starting points for investigating democratic political value formation. Democratic political values are widespread across Africa. Men and women tend to support democratic political values equally. The only exception to this finding is on the value of gender equality. Thus, it is possible that gender will emerge as a significant causal factor only on gender equality in the analysis that is to follow.

Africa is home to both large numbers of Christians and Muslims. Well over half of all SSA cite either Islam or Christianity as their religion. AB R2 data reveals that only 6% of respondents claim that they have no religious affiliation. Thus, 94% of all Africans living in sub-Saharan Africa, in democratizing states, adhere to some form of religion. As theory suggests, religion remains an important part of Africans lives, even in the face of modernizing trends.

Africans are highly religious among both men and women. There is a gender gap in religiosity as measured by frequency of service attendance. There is also a gap between Islam and Christianity in religiosity. Christians attend services more regularly than do Muslims. Female Christians attend services more than Christian men, while male Muslims attend services more often than Muslim women. In religious organization membership, there are both religion and gender gaps. Christians overall are more likely than Muslims in SSA to be members of religious organizations. Christian women are more likely than Muslim women to attend with increasing frequency. In religious organization membership, there is a slight gender gap, with Islamic men being *more* likely to be involved in religious organizations than Muslim women and Christian men

being *less* likely to participate in such organizations than Christian women.

The high levels of involvement among Africans in their religious groups, as well as the large number of Africans who cite a religious identity, and finally the variations across gender in activity and support for democratic political values lead me to expect that gender, religion and religiosity will play a role in democratic orientations among Africans.

Chapter 4 – Roles of Gender and Religion in Political Values

4.1 Introduction

This chapter begins the empirical investigation of political orientations in emerging African democracies through an exploration of political values in fifteen African nations.²³ I explore political values that are deemed foundational to democracy, and are therefore *democratic* political values. Democratic values are a form of political values. I explain why I believe the standard values of political equality, accountability and tolerance are core *democratic* political values. I also add gender equality as a core democratic political value. I make a case for why equality between men and women is an essential component to democracy. Resistance to gender equality is believed to drive the exclusion of women in Africa from the political realm. Their exclusion directly impacts other political values and proceeding democratic attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, this chapter looks at popular democratic values among Africans, specifically addressing the effects of gender and religion. Without changing values, it is argued, democratic institutions can never matter.²⁴ My investigation seeks to examine the truth of these claims. How widespread are the core democratic values of tolerance, accountability and equality? Do women hold these values more or less than men? If so, what are some of the potentially significant factors, including religion, driving value formation across genders in Africa?

Throughout this chapter, I investigate African political values and the potential impact that gender and religion have on the formation of these values. First, I explain what I mean by political values, how these are democratic values, and how they are

²³ Due to political unrest, sensitive questions on political values were not asked in Zimbabwe.

²⁴ Personal interviews, Kenya, September 2005

measured. Then, I lay out my expectations as far as what the literature and data will reveal. Next, I enumerate the theory and evidence in political science and sociology regarding democratic value prevalence and formation. Finally, I present and evaluate state of the art public opinion data taken from 15 African nations. I end with overall conclusions.

The findings I present in this chapter reveal that Africans overall value democracy. The only gender gap that emerges is in the prevalence of gender equality as a value. As expected, women value the inclusion of women in political processes more than do men. Muslims and Christians vary in their political values. Religiosity encourages democratic value formation. These cultural factors are part of the bigger picture behind democratic value formation.

4.2 Political Values

The core political values that I will be investigating are political equality, tolerance, accountability and gender equality. I assert that each of these is a foundational *democratic* political value. I argue that political equality, tolerance, accountability and gender equality are necessary values among democratic citizens based on the definition of democracy on which this paper is based. I define democracy procedurally, as the process of free and fair elections resulting in peaceful transitions of power in leadership (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). *Based on this definition, I assert that the four values investigated in this paper are inherent in democracy.* For elections to be free, all citizens must have a reasonable chance to express their desire for the form of government under which they will live and the leaders under whom they will serve. This is political

equality. Fair elections involve leaders who are accountable to the wishes of their society laying aside the reigns of power when told to do so by the ballot box. This is accountability. In order for elections to be free and fair, a variety of view points represented in society must be welcome in the public political discourse. This is tolerance. Therefore, all of the procedures surrounding elections must allow for the inclusion of all citizens and their varied world views, with leaders who are responsive to the expressed desires of these citizens. That is democracy. Political equality, accountability and tolerance run to the very core of the processes I have just described.

I add gender equality as a core democratic political value. If political decision-making is to be truly free and fair, nearly half of a society's population cannot be left out of the processes of politics. Gender equality is simply the stance that both men and women should be effectively included in the public conversation. Leaving women out damages all three of the above values. Democracy cannot stand without tolerating the often diverse perspectives and expressed needs that women bring to the political realm (Potgieter 2004). Political equality is not a fully realized value if it does not include a gendered perspective. A focus on the equal access of all citizens to the political realm must specifically highlight gender differences. In the past, when it has not, women are left out (Staudt and Parpart 1989). To have political accountability, tolerance and accountability, a gendered perspective must be included. Mainstream perspectives still too often only apply in practice to the male half of the equation. Africans may value political equality, tolerance and accountability, but if this does not extend to women as well, they are not fully realized democratic values. Gender equality *is* political equality

that accounts for the very real differences experienced by men and women in the political arena.

4.2.1 Political equality

As defined in chapter 1, I measure *political equality* by responses given to the question, “All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election” versus “Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders.” Free elections require equal voting opportunity for all adult citizens. Therefore, an underlying value of political equality, which ultimately drives inclusive voting policies and behaviors, is necessary for democracy.

4.2.2 Tolerance

I assess *tolerance* by respondents opinions on the statement “In order to make decisions in our community, we should talk until everyone agrees” versus the statement “Since we will never agree on everything, we must learn to accept differences of opinion within our community.” In order for transitions of power to occur, the political arena must allow competing voices to participate. Leaders and citizens must tolerate a forum of organized and safe competition of political ideas. Tolerance is thus also a value that underlies the free and fair conducting of electoral politics.

4.2.3 Accountability

Accountability is captured through estimations offered on the statement “As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders” versus “In our country these days, we should show more respect for authority.” The very procedure

of elections is a form of accountability. If leaders do not perform well, citizens can and should punish them through failure to reelect such leaders. Citizens must value some degree of elite accountability to constituents in order for them to support and participate in the process of elections.

4.2.4 Gender Equality

Finally, *gender equality* is evaluated through responses to the statement “Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so” versus “In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.” I include gender equality as a core democratic political value because I firmly believe that no governing process that leaves out nearly 50% of its citizens is free, fair or representative. If women are not valued as necessary players in the political arena, then the process of government is not free, fair, accountable, tolerant or representative. Inglehart *et al* show that gender equality as a value most fully explains democracy over and above any other single democratic value (2003). Gender equality is a necessary condition for the procedures of democracy to materialize and stabilize. They also present a positive correlation between gender equality as a value and higher levels of democracy across a study of over 90 countries (Inglehart *et al* 2003). Thus, at the macro-level, valuing equality of genders in the political realm does seem to be crucial to democracy.

4.3 Expectations

Democratic values, or those deeply held norms about politics acquired through socialization processes throughout life that guide attitudes and behaviors, will emerge as widespread across Africa. Africans will value democracy at high levels, regardless of

their religion or gender. Tolerance, however, will be less embedded than equality or accountability. There are high levels of cleavage across Africa. Africans see themselves as part of various identity groups based on ethnicity or socio-economic status. One important group into which nearly all Africans sort themselves is religion (Ellis and ter Haar 2004). Religious plurality may reduce levels of tolerance among respondents (Ellis and ter Haar 1998; Gifford 1995). Furthermore, traditional forms of government in Africa tend to be more consensual at the local levels. The hierarchy through which this consensus works, however, excludes members of society who are part of lower classes or strata. Modernization brings with it forms of decision making that are collegial and cooperative, including larger sectors of communities and society at large. Modernization also introduces more specialized, diversified forms of government that require acceptance of difference (Inglehart *et al* 2003).²⁵ Until cultural values change regarding hierarchical government in which those who are leaders must all agree, tolerance will not be widespread.

Women and men in emerging African democracies will value democracy equally, with one notable exception. Women will espouse the importance of equal rights for women more so than men. This will be true when differences are examined between Muslim women and men, as well as between Christian women and men. My expectations run counter to the other major work in the field of political science regarding gender as a factor in explaining democratic values. Inglehart and Norris, using data from the World Values Survey, find that women are increasingly likely, and perhaps more so than men, to value democracy (2003). Their survey countries are, however, primarily developed,

²⁵ Their analysis of shifts from traditional hierarchical forms of government to collegial forms includes very few sub-Saharan nations (Ghana, South Africa and Nigeria), and so their analysis does not readily apply, but offers some insight into possible findings in SSA.

including only a few sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations. Furthermore, they analyze their data at the aggregate level, which may explain in part the differences in their results from what I find here.

I expect that there will be variations across the two major religions in Africa, Christianity and Islam, in support for democratic values. Religious traditions have been key differentiating factors in transformations to democracy (Lipset 1994; Huntington 1993). Variations across Islam and Christianity in African political orientations exist due to the social and economic exclusion and hardships faced by Muslims in predominantly Christian African nations (Oded 2000). I propose, therefore, that Christians will support political values more fully than will Muslims across emerging African democracies.

I look beyond religion as an identity group to anticipate differences between Christian and Islamic adherents who participate in their religion at different levels in politically mobilizing activities. I call these forms of *religiosity*. Religiosity in the form of regular religious service attendance as well as in the form of membership in para-church or para-mosque associations will drive democratic value formation. The more involved someone is in an ideological, resource-laden and mobilizing religious organization, the more likely they are to support values that allow them to be involved in other arenas. This includes the political realm. I suppose that both forms of religiosity (attendance and membership) captured in this project will foster democratic value formation. Church and mosque leaders in Africa frequently speak to political matters. Religious tracts, sermons, and discussions influence the way adherents view and function in all areas of their lives (Ellis and ter Haar 1998). I consequently expect increased contact with religious

discourse through more frequent service attendance to influence the values people hold towards the political sphere.

Experience gained through activity in religious organizations, as types of civil society organizations, persists in the political realm. Thus, religious organizational membership will shape political values in both the short and long-term. In the long run, religiously affiliated associations serve as incubators for political values, attitudes and behaviors (Putnam 1993). In the short-run, religious organizations offer alternative outlets of influence to people who lack effective representation in the political realm. Civil society, including religious organizations, offers avenues of political training when formal political routes are closed. For example, in Nigeria, the Federation of Muslim Women's Association (FOMWAN) has been essential since the mid-1980's in mobilizing Muslim women. FOMWAN provides members with a forum through which they can examine and express women's roles in religion and society at large. Religious associations in Sierra Leone have been instrumental in bridging economic, educational and political gaps between Muslim or Christian men and women (Steady 2006). Active membership in religious associations will therefore increase respondents' valuation of the participatory processes that are essential parts of democratic governance (Lipset 1994; Finkel 1987; Verba 1965; Lipset 1959). Thus, though I am interested in the effects that religious identity has on democratic value formation, I am equally interested in factors within religion that may be driving salience of religion in the political realm. Is it identification with Islam or Christianity that affects political values, or is it depth of adherence within one or both of these religions that is actually affecting political

orientations?


Finally, I believe that there will be variations that arise due to the cross-national nature of my data. Thus, I include country dummy variables to control for fixed effects across countries. As a person's country of residence does prove to be significant in explaining variation in political values, I include some national level controls to help explain why national identity causes variations in political values. Hence, I examine the potential relationships between the presence of contextual factors and the political orientations among Africans. Understanding the mixed impact that gender quotas and international gender legislation has had, I anticipate that nations with gender legislation will have higher overall levels of support for democracy than will nations who lack such legislation (Ballington 2004). Thus, I believe that democratic values are driven both by institutional as well as cultural factors. I assume that a nation's religious heritage affects democratic political values. Nations with a predominantly Christian heritage will exhibit higher valuation of democracy (Putnam 1993). I hold that nations with higher levels of democratization will have adherents who maintain democratic values to a greater extent than nations with lower levels of democratization. Nations with worse economic situations will have higher levels of democratic values, as citizens seek a better way of life. I believe this will be the case even at the individual level. Drawing from modernization theory, I insist that respondents with higher levels of economic security will be more likely to evidence democratic values (Bratton 2006).

4.4 Findings

4.4.1.a Prevalence of Democratic Political Values in Africa

What political values do Africans hold and how do these differ across religion and gender? Three of the four democratic political values investigated in this project are widespread across sub-Saharan African nations that have experimented with democracy to some degree (Figure 4.1). This finding contradicts conventional wisdom and begs the question, “If Africans value democracy, and values are the necessary building blocks of democratic attitudes and behaviors, then why hasn’t democracy taken deeper root in Africa?” In other words, my findings suggest that Africans value democracy. There must therefore be some other reason than a lack of convergence between African cultures and democracy that explains the shallowness of democracy across African nations that have attempted democracy (Bratton 2002b; Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Figure 4.1: Overall Support for Individual Democratic Values




Note: Value questions were not asked in Zimbabwe; N=23,197; Percents are valid percents

Men and women in SSA tend to value democracy equally (Figure 4.2). African men and women hold standard democratic political values equally. The variation between men and women emerges only on the valuation of gender equality. Though a cross-

national examination reveals, as AB R1 data indicate, that a “clear popular preference for gender equality” emerges (Bratton *et al* 2004: 18), men and women are not equally committed to the inclusion of women in the political realm. More than two-thirds (71%) of all respondents across 16 African nations assert “women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men.” Less than one-third of all respondents (29%) hold the view that “women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.”²⁶ As predicted, there is a small but marked, statistically significant gap²⁷ in gendered support of gender equality. Women support gender equality more often than do men.

Figure 4.2: Support for Individual Democratic Values across Gender in Africa




Note: N=23,197; valid percents; percent within gender

Muslims and Christians, however, do not value democracy equally.

²⁶ See figure in Appendix 8

²⁷ Difference of means: $t=-13.426$, $p<.001$

Figure 4.3: Support for Individual Democratic Values across Religion in Africa



Note: N=23,197; valid percents; Percent in religion

There is a gap between Muslims and Christians in support for two of the four democratic political values (Figure 4.3).²⁸ Christians support gender equality and tolerance more than do Muslims in SSA.

The low levels of support for gender equality among Muslims vis-à-vis Christians I imagine is partially a function of question wording. Question wording is one of the most crucial variables in assessing public opinion data. This question includes reference to female subjection to “traditional laws.” Muslims in Christian-dominated African states²⁹ usually have rights to traditional, Islamic-led courts (qadis courts) that govern issues concerning inheritance, marriage and divorce. These issue areas heavily affect the lives of women. There have been increasing challenges to the legality of these traditional courts across Africa. Women’s rights advocates have been among the leaders in challenging the restrictions and uneven legal rights offered Muslim women through traditional legal

²⁸ These are significantly different findings, with $p < .001$ on both difference of means tests. Comparing Muslims to Christians on tolerance, $t = -14.221$; on gender equality, $t = -21.131$.

²⁹ Fourteen of the fifteen countries included in this chapter are predominantly Christian


arrangements. Muslims, however, largely feel their culture and way of life is being challenged. Thus, Muslims may see this question as referring to the rights they feel are being undermined by current objections to traditional Muslim legal structures. The phrase “traditional laws” in this question is therefore potentially problematic for fully capturing true support for gender equality among Muslims, especially in comparison to Christians.

Question wording, however, does not fully explain the very real difference between Muslims and Christians on their support for democracy. Muslims are less tolerant than are Christians in emerging African democracies. The disparity between Muslim and Christian commitments to democracy is more fully understood in terms of the life situations facing Muslims and Christians across emerging African democracies. Muslims are minorities in all but two states in this sample. They live at lower economic and educational levels than their Christian counterparts. Muslims have historically been shut out or greatly restricted from access to the political arena. Thus, views different from their own have caused their oppression. Muslims potentially want a turn in which their view of how governance should occur dominates.

There are alternative possibilities to the variation between Muslims and Christians in their agreement or disagreement with the need to come to agreement versus the necessity of accepting differences in decision-making. It is more than probable that respondents interpret the responses options differently than the previous explanation assumes. An affirmation that community members need to talk until everyone agrees could in fact be a valuation of a different type of tolerance. Muslims, whose opinions are often left out of public discourse, may view the consensual arrangement captured by the

first response option as one that includes all expressed needs and ideas, incorporating them in a form of a compromise. They may, therefore, see the later option, which asserts the value of differences, as being one in which different opinions exist, but in which only one dominant set of opinions receives real attention. Thus, Muslims may be more likely to desire decision-making through consensual agreement because of their desire for a tolerance of various opinions. Christians' heightened support for the acceptance of differences may reflect their desire for minority groups to acquiesce to a dominant, exclusive, oppressive discourse.

Figure 4.4: Support for Political Values: Comparison of Gender & Religion



Note: N=23,197; Valid percents; percent in religion & gender

An additional significant difference emerges when I consider gender differences within Islam and Christianity. Muslim men more often say that they value tolerance than do Muslim women. Though Christian females evidence a potentially substantial amount of tolerance (51%), Africans overall are still wary of allowing dissension in political decision-making. And Muslim women, who bear the heaviest burdens both in their identity as women and as Muslims, are least supportive of a political arrangement that

could breed increased volatility (Mikell 1997).³⁰

4.4.1.b Values by Countries

Democratic political values are widespread across each of the fifteen countries assessed in this project. There are not one or two nations driving the high levels of support that are seen overall.

Political equality is valued by more than 70% of respondents in each of the fifteen countries evaluated in this project (Figure 4.5). Africans support equal access to voting for everyone, regardless of a fellow Africans' level of education about the issues. Why are some countries more fully committed to political equality (such as Kenya, Lesotho, and Senegal), while other countries have nearly 25% of their population still lacking a full commitment to this democratic value (including Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda)? Mozambique underwent thirty years of civil war which destroyed much of the "fabric" of the country, undermining its democratic potential. The civil war further left enduring cleavages among citizens of Mozambique (Bauer and Taylor 2005). The psyche of Mozambiqueans has yet to overcome these deep divides. Mozambique is also ethnically diverse and religiously plural. Religious and ethnic identities tend to overlap with regional and political divides (Bauer and Taylor 2005). Thus, cleavages within Mozambique are largely reinforcing. Mozambiqueans live in an extremely divided society in which power sharing has yet to become the order of the day. South Africa has a similar legacy, rooted in its apartheid, racist past.

³⁰ *Differences between Muslim men & women on tolerance and gender equality are statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. Difference between Christian men & women on gender equality is statistically significant at $p < .001$ level. Differences between Muslim & Christian men are statistically significant at $p < .001$ level for tolerance and gender equality. Differences between Muslim & Christian women are statistically significant at $p < .001$ level for tolerance and gender equality.*


“Many if not most of South Africa’s contemporary problems are rooted in its racist history; thus it is impossible to discount its past experiences and the structural, social, and historical inheritance of the contemporary [situation]” (Bauer and Taylor 2005: 245).

Thus, experiences within these two nations suggest historical trajectories have cut deep cleavages within many African nations that have yet to be overcome in the minds and hearts of their citizens. In Lesotho and Senegal, however, intervening experiences in the countries have helped to push Africans away from inherited and created divisions. Senegalese have taken part in regular multi-party competition, with only a brief break in the late sixties since independence. Residents of Senegal have no consistent experience with exclusive single-party regimes (“Senegal” 2006).

Sweeping efforts to foster inclusive and transparent elections were dogmatically launched with the onset of democratic transition in Lesotho. Up to its 1993 transitional elections, Lesotho had a checkered electoral history. This led elites to allow external election monitors to track voter registration and electoral processes to ensure that the outcome of the election would be accepted domestically. The international community contributed financing and expertise from such entities as the Commonwealth, the United Nations, and various human rights groups. Lesotho also welcomed an international chief electoral officer. Efforts were additionally made to ensure that voter registration was as transparent and available as possible. Prior to 1993, around half of the eligible electorate had never voted. Through radio programs, press releases and public meetings, a comprehensive Voter Education Program was put in place. By the time of the election, it is estimated that nearly 90 percent of the total electorate were registered to vote (Southhall and Petlane 1995). Thus, from the inception of democratic elections in

Lesotho, equal access to the voting arena has been a central issue, and one in which great strides towards democratic equality have been made. Lesothoans are accustomed to a political realm in which high levels of equality exist. The value of political equality has been instilled in the country for over a decade.

Figure 4.5: Political Equality as a Value by Country




Note: N=23,197; Value questions were not asked in Zimbabwe; Percent reflects within each country

Looking at accountability as a political value, 60% or greater of respondents in each nation also valued accountability, with the exception of Namibia (Figure 4.6). Just over 35% of Namibians see the need for citizens to “question leaders.” In Namibia, Bratton *et al* found that an inordinately high number of people had no employment outside the home, with Namibia’s harsh environment offering few opportunities for viable livelihoods. They also found that Namibians were willing to accept power concentrated in the hands of a president (Bratton *et al* 2005). I suggest that this attitude towards democracy, resting on a low valuation of accountability, is largely due to the

instability faced by many Namibians. Harsh conditions and few opportunities leave Namibia with high levels of poverty. As Bratton *et al* found, “the very poor and the destitute remain especially susceptible to the siren song of civilian one-man rule” (2005: 178) In other words, democratic values and attitudes have yet to take root in Namibia because of the extreme levels of poverty and few foreseeable ways out faced by a majority of Namibians.

Figure 4.6: Accountability as a Value by Country




Note: n=23,197; Value questions were not asked in Zimbabwe; Percent reflects within each country

Tolerance is the only democratic political value that is not broadly accepted across most sub-Saharan African countries in this study. Respondents are split in their support for tolerance. Only a minority (around 43%) of all respondents support tolerance, while a plurality (47%) support a need for *everyone* to agree before a decision is made. Tolerance has yet to take firm root among Africans.

The same uncertainty holds true across each sampled country. Only in about half of the countries do respondents support tolerance more than unanimity. There is also a wide range among countries in how much they value tolerance. Support for tolerance

ranges from 33% (Mali) and 37% (Cape Verde) to 60% (Botswana, Namibia and Uganda). Earlier we saw that Muslim women were least supportive of tolerance among men and women in both Islam and Christianity. There are country variations to this finding. Greater than fifty percent of Muslim women who live in countries where less than 1/3 of the population is Muslim (i.e.: Kenya, Uganda) support tolerance. Potentially, then, Muslim women who are minorities in both their gender and religious identity have more to gain through diverse discourse in the political realm.

Figure 4.7: Tolerance as a Value by Country




Note: n=23,197; Value questions were not asked in Zimbabwe; Percent reflects within each country

I propose that the ambivalence in support for tolerance taken as a whole is due to the inherited cultural values held by many respondents. Many African cultures value consensus at family and local decision-making levels. This value may help explain the nebulous finding regarding tolerance as a political value across Africa. Furthermore, female uncertainty about diverse ideas in the political realm likely rests in their fear of potential violent conflict. Political violence has often erupted due to the multiple cleavages (ethnic, religious, ideological) in transitioning African political realms (Logan

and Bratton 2006).

Another probable explanation for the variation across countries could be the existence of politicized cleavages, especially along ethnic lines. An examination of the home language of respondents, however, reveals inconsistency in ethnic diversity per country. At least 10 language groups were reported by 80% of survey respondents in Uganda. Thus, Uganda has a high level of ethnic fragmentation though support for tolerance is highest in Uganda. In Mali, 85% of respondents have home languages scattered across only 6 language groups. There is less fragmentation in the country with the least amount of support for tolerance. In Cape Verde, with only a slightly higher percentage of support for tolerance, a full 99% of respondents report having the same home language, Crioulo! These findings suggest that ethnic cleavages do not help explain variation in tolerance levels across democratically experimenting African nations.

Figure 4.8: Gender Equality as a Value across Sixteen African Nations



Note: N=23, 197; Value questions were not asked in Zimbabwe; Percent reflects within each country

Valuation of gender equality is most widespread in South Africa (86% support equality), Tanzania (85% support equality), and Cape Verde (80% support equality) (Figure 4.8). South Africa is likely the leader of the pack in support for gender equality because of both its liberal and inclusive governing institutions (the constitution and executive cabinet specifically) and the impact of women’s movements in the country. Women’s groups were among the most ardent participants in movements that struggled against Apartheid in South Africa, including the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress of Azania (PAC) (Steady 2006: 18). In the process of transition to democracy, women in South Africa were “successful in using identity politics” to found a powerful women’s rights lobbying group, the Women’s National Coalition. The Coalition was then triumphant in developing a *Women’s Charter* for women’s rights in the country (Steady 2006: 8). Through this charter, women in South Africa have been

successful in establishing further institutions that include women's rights and objectives in political and economic development plans for South Africa. Women's associations have continued to be part of major decision-making and government oversight processes since the overturn of apartheid. For example, in 1993, were crucial participants in tracking and analyzing the South African Budget Initiative, with a critical eye to bloated expenditures on the military and "image-improving" projects that often sate African budgets (Steady 2006). In 1996, women in parliament started the Women's Budget Initiative to "promote welfare and the needs of the poorest and most disadvantaged members of society" (Steady 2006: 142).

At the institutional level, both former President Mandela and current President Mbeki worked to institutionalize liberal ideas and inclusive governing structures. Both the current and former South African presidents used their cabinet appointments to reflect the diversity in their nation. Both men appointed women to their cabinets, as well as to the helms of other ministries (Bauer and Taylor 2005). South Africa also instituted a liberal constitution, enshrining political freedoms that had long been denied to many sectors of South African society. Freedom from torture, freedom of speech, assembly and association, right to a speedy and fair trial, and electoral rights are central guarantees in the South African constitution (Bauer and Taylor 2005). Taken together, the institutional guarantees for human rights for both men and women as well as the effective and active women's movement in South Africa have driven high levels of regard for equality among men and women in the political arena.

Namibia, Botswana and Ghana also overwhelmingly evidence support for the

value of gender equality. Each of these three countries demonstrates over 75% of respondents supporting gender equality. Mali is the only country in the sample that goes against this trend, with a clear majority of respondents (60%) favoring women remaining subject to traditional laws and customs. Mali is a Muslim society, which could help explain its outlier status. The only other Muslim-dominated society in this study is Senegal, in which just over 50% of respondents support gender equality. Senegalese and Malian respondents support gender equality less than respondents in any of the other nations. Thus, there is some foundation in empirical evidence to suspect a relationship among religion, gender, and democratic values.

4.4.2 Factors Influencing Democratic Values in Africa

Having seen that democratic values do seem to be widespread across Africa, I now investigate some of the potential related factors behind *these deeply held democratic political beliefs*. Tolerance, political equality, accountability, and gender equality are used as dependent variables. The three independent factors with which I am most keenly concerned are gender, religion and religiosity.³¹ As we have seen, there does not seem to be a large gender gap in religious identity nor in religiosity. Thus, if gender emerges as significant in explaining value formation, we can safely assume religion is not driving the variance in male and female political values. If religion emerges as significant in helping explain variation in democratic political values, it is likely that each religion is affecting the values of its male and female adherents similarly.

First, I consider gender, religion and religiosity as separate, independent factors affecting democratic political value formation. Using bivariate correlations as well as bivariate OLS regression, I examine potential affects these factors have on value

³¹ See Appendix 2 for question wording

formation. Differing from other works on value formation, I use individuals as my unit of analysis. As Tables 4.1 and 4.2 reveal, religion, religiosity and gender do affect democratic political value formation. Women are more likely than men in SSA to support political accountability and gender equality. Muslims are less likely than Christians to support the values of political tolerance or gender equality. The more frequently a respondent attends religious services, the more likely they are to support political accountability, political tolerance and gender equality. Finally, those who are more active in religious organizations are more likely to espouse all four democratic political values.

A caveat to these findings is in the extremely low amount of variance that is explained in each political value by the separate factors. In order to be confident in the causal relationship between gender, religion or religiosity, I would hope to find a greater amount of explained variance across democratic political values in more fully specified models. There are a few potential exceptions to this that warrant comments. Whether or not a respondent is male or female explains a full 1% of the variance in support of gender equality. Also, whether or not a respondent is Islamic or Christian explains nearly 3% of the variance in support for gender equality and over 1% of the variance in support of tolerance (see adjusted r-squared in Table 4.2). Therefore, my models bring us closer to understanding albeit a small but important measure of the factors that influence political values.

Table 4.1: Bivariate Correlations on Value Formation – Do Religion, Religiosity or Gender Matter?

		Tolerance	Accountability	Political Equality	Gender Equality
Gender	Pearson Correlation	-0.013	-0.020*	0.012	0.101**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.088	0.007	0.118	0.000
	N	17226.753	17137.490	17035.018	17489.322
Christian	Pearson Correlation	0.084**	0.017*	0.012	0.127**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.031	0.121	0.000
	N	17182.217	17094.530	16992.372	17443.898
Muslim	Pearson Correlation	-0.114**	0.012	-0.004	-0.165**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.103	0.589	0.000
	N	17182.217	17094.530	16992.372	17443.898
Religiosity	Pearson Correlation	0.041**	0.055**	0.009	0.056**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.219	0.000
	N	17062.453	16974.016	16871.494	17320.944
Member of religious group	Pearson Correlation	0.032**	0.053**	0.039**	0.077**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N (weighted)	17177.938	17086.526	16987.582	17436.977
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).					
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).					

Note: N=23,197

Theory drives me to add some further explanatory factors, however, to each model. As explained in chapter 1, I control for the following influential factors: urban versus rural residence, economic attitudes and personal experiences with poverty, education, employment; interest in politics, affiliation with a political party, exposure to mass media, membership in civil society organizations, and national level indicators for democratization, gender equality, religious heritage and economic situation.³² I included country dummy variables in my analysis to control for fixed effects, and found that a respondent's country of residence did make a difference in their expressed democratic values. With the foci of this project centering on democratization and the role of gender and religion as factors behind democratic political orientations, I have included country

³² See Appendix 2 for explanation of these variables

level variables to test if the areas in which I am interested are part of the differentiating effects across countries.

The overall findings in regards to the variables in which I am keenly interested are shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Multivariate Regression on Value Formation – Do Religion, Religiosity or Gender Matter?

	Tolerance	Political Equality	Accountability	Gender Equality
Constant	2.495*** (.138)	2.900*** (.119)	3.537*** (.126)	2.218*** (.132)
Gender (Female = 1)	.009 (.019)	.023 (.016)	-.020 (.017)	.277*** (.018)
Christian (Base Group=Muslim)	.156*** (.030)	.051* (.026)	-.248*** (.028)	.106*** (.029)
Other Religion (Base Group=Muslim)	.072* (.035)	.047 (.030)	-.018 (.032)	.010 (.033)
Religiosity	.010 (.007)	-.004 (.006)	.002 (.006)	-.004 (.007)
Education	.064*** (.006)	-.033*** (.005)	.015** (.005)	.066*** (.006)
Employment Status	.076*** (.020)	-.064*** (.018)	-.032 (.019)	.018 (.020)
Urban vs. Rural Residence (Urban =1)	.055* (.022)	-.050** (.019)	.011 (.021)	.025 (.022)
Interest in politics	-.009 (.013)	.053*** (.011)	.089*** (.012)	.013 (.012)
Attitude towards country's economic situation	.011 (.008)	-.027*** (.007)	-.069*** (.007)	.034*** (.007)
Lived Poverty Index	.016 (.012)	-.020* (.010)	-.019 (.011)	-.025* (.011)
Close to a political party	-.110 (.073)	.182** (.063)	-.057 (.067)	.481*** (.070)
How close to party?	-.011 (.015)	.040** (.013)	.003 (.014)	.099*** (.014)
Radio	-.004 (.008)	.001 (.007)	.018* (.007)	.021** (.008)
Television	-.002 (.007)	.000 (.006)	.006 (.006)	.025*** (.007)
Newspaper	.013 (.008)	-.007 (.007)	-.003 (.007)	.017* (.008)
Member religious group	.011 (.011)	.036*** (.010)	.005 (.010)	.069*** (.011)
Member trade/farmer's group	.007 (.013)	-.005 (.011)	-.004 (.012)	-.010 (.012)
Member business association	.030 (.016)	-.043*** (.014)	-.034* (.014)	-.008 (.015)

Member community development group	-.034** (.012)	.046*** (.010)	.055*** (.011)	-.014 (.011)
FH	-.287*** (.039)	.269*** (.034)	-.061 (.036)	-.174*** (.038)
CEDAW	.209*** (.043)	-.109** (.037)	-.239*** (.039)	-.461*** (.042)
CEDAW Optional Prot.	.108*** (.029)	-.197*** (.025)	-.137*** (.027)	-.021 (.028)
Gender legislation	.078*** (.024)	-.046* (.021)	-.163*** (.022)	-.144*** (.023)
Economic situation	.029* (.014)	-.105*** (.012)	-.051*** (.012)	.096*** (.013)
Christian National Heritage	.140*** (.026)	.134*** (.022)	.215*** (.023)	.223*** (.025)
Gender*Religiosity	.003 (.012)	.006 (.010)	-.006 (.011)	-.006 (.011)
Gender*Member	.016 (.019)	.003 (.017)	-.002 (.018)	-.005 (.019)
Gender*Christian	.044 (.039)	.005 (.034)	-.009 (.036)	.022 (.038)
N	22210	21993	22127	22556
Adj. R²	.045	.026	.039	.104

N=23,197; Values questions not asked in Zimbabwe; Unstandardized coefficients followed by standard errors

4.4.2.1 Gender

In a basic multivariate linear regression, I find that gender and religion do play certain roles in value formation. Gender does not influence the formation of the three standard democratic political values. But, gender positively affects support for gender equality as a political value. Unlike previous work on values, I do not find that gender affects democratic basic political values. Where gender does matter, in regards to gender equality, African women in democratically experimenting nations are *more* likely than their male counterparts to support democratic values. As with the finding that democratic values are widespread across Africa, this result counters standard democratization theory regarding gender. Women are not more nostalgic for authoritarian regimes than their male counterparts. At the deep-seated values level, women desire the voice and

opportunity that democracies offer their citizens. Women in Africa are more likely than men to support gender equality. Men are not yet fully on board with the democratic understanding that women must be included in the process in order for democracy to truly exist. Women and men are equally as likely, given other circumstances in their lives, to hold democratic values. Furthermore, when gender does matter, women are *more* democratic than men in the political values they express. Women are simply not more autocratic than men in emerging democracies. There was not a perceivable gender gap in religious identity or religiosity. Thus, we can surmise that religion is not driving this variance in male and female support for gender equality as a political value.

3.4.2.2 Religion and Religiosity

SSA Muslims are less likely than Christians to support gender equality or to tolerate differing opinions in the public sphere. Muslims are, however, *more* likely than Christians to value accountability of leaders. Though not as strongly significant, Muslims are also more likely than Christians to support political equality, or inclusive voting opportunities regardless of educational attainment.

As mentioned previously, Africans see ultimate power as an intertwining of spiritual and physical (Ellis and ter Haar 2004). Access to power in the tangible world is regarded as directly correlated with access to power in the supernatural realm. Both the view of religion as an intertwining of the physical and spiritual worlds and Muslims' life situations across sub-Saharan Africa help explain why religion influences political values. For example, Muslims are more likely to value political accountability than are Christians. Religion is a differentiating factor in political accountability because

accountability relates to power. And power is a thing of both the natural and supernatural worlds. Power in decision-making processes in the political realm reflects access to power in the spiritual realm and vice versa. It is therefore important among religious adherents to have access to political power as well as to spiritual power. The two go hand-in-hand and are mutually reinforcing. Logically, then, religion affects the core political value that mirrors access to power.

Furthermore, Christians are more widely represented in a majority of SSA governments. Christianity is actually the dominant religion in twelve of the sixteen nations in this study.³³ Muslims are often left out of government decisions and procedures. Governing officials frequently fail to offer substantive representation to Muslim members of SSA societies. Muslims are therefore more likely than Christians in this project to support accountability because Muslims do not feel their leaders are accountable to or represent them. Muslims could feel a stronger need to call their leaders to task because leaders do a poor job of including the voices and needs of their Muslim constituents in their decisions. Mobilization due to real or perceived exclusion exists in democratizing African nations (Oded 2000).

The variation between Muslims and Christians in their support for political accountability may vary in countries in countries with Muslim majorities. Potentially, in countries where Christians are the minority, they may be more supportive than their Muslim counterparts of the need for accountability. If Christians in Muslim-dominated states face the same exclusion as Muslims in Christian-led nations, the same heightened affirmation of accountability may have been fostered among Christians in these nations.

³³ Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent, Zambia Source: <http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>

Thus, arguments made in political science literature on the political values of political winners versus political losers may help explain the variation between Muslims and Christians more so than their religious affiliation. Furthermore, the structure of the religious organization, lateral or hierarchical, may affect the political values expressed by adherents (VonDoepp 2002). In Africa, Catholics and Anglicans have been frontrunners in the battle for democratic change in many states. From the top down, the Catholic hierarchy has pushed for electoral monitoring, civic education, gender equity programs and other such efforts to instill democratic norms and practices across the continent. With the centrally controlled chain of command, the Catholic Church has broadly disseminated democratic programs and ideas throughout its constituency. Other Christian denominations as well as Islam are more laterally and locally organized. There is no guarantee that the tenets and programs of a Baptist or Sunni groups in Nairobi, Kenya will converge with those put forth by Baptist or Sunni groups elsewhere in Kenya or in Lagos, Nigeria or Cape Town, South Africa. Variations both within countries and within Christianity or Islam may exist in the support for political accountability held by Africans. More refined data analysis that includes such variations will offer more rich understanding of the interaction between religion and the valuation of political accountability.

The same could hold true for findings regarding political equality. Muslims across SSA overall have lower levels of education than do their Christian counterparts.

³⁴Afrobarometer Round 2 data reveals that nearly 51% of all Muslims have “no formal schooling” or informal schooling only” compared to around 13% of Christians in SSA who have “no formal schooling” or informal schooling only.” Furthermore, more than

³⁴ Difference of means: $t=-41.096$, $p<.001$

twice as many SSA Christians have completed secondary school than have SSA Muslims (6% of SSA Muslims have completed secondary school versus 16% of SSA Christians).

Finally, nearly twice as many SSA Christians have a) some sort of post-secondary qualifications (7% of Christians versus 3% of Muslims), b) have completed university (2% of Christians versus 1% of Muslims) or have c) done any post-graduate work (.5% of Christians versus .2% of Muslims). Muslims want to be included in choosing their leaders, regardless of their own lack of access to mainstream educational opportunities.

In regards to the relationship between religious identity and the value of tolerance, if Muslims feel their voices are not being heard and their needs are not being addressed in the political realm, they could feel that the government is illegitimate. Muslim support for governing decisions that require all to agree may stem from the fact that their ideas are currently left out.

Membership in various business or civil society organizations tends to increase valuation of democracy. Looking specifically at the religious realm, membership in religious organizations significantly increases overall valuation of democracy. When democratic values are considered individually, membership in a religious organization increases the likelihood that a respondent will support gender equality and political equality. Thus, those who are active in religious organizations are more likely to support female access to the same rights as men in the political realm, and to support equal access to voting regardless of educational status. Neither accountability nor tolerance is affected by religious organizational membership. Arguments have been made that membership in civil society organizations, including religious organizations, acts as a breeding ground

for informed and empowered citizens. Involvement in civil society builds needed “social capital” that fosters democratic citizenship (Putnam 1993). Members gain confidence and experience in participatory venues through organizational membership. Thus, it is not surprising that there are at least some effects on democratic values related to membership in religious organizations, regardless of which religion the organization is a part.

Finally, religious identity did emerge as significant in helping explain variance in support of three of the four democratic political values. Since no real gender gap in religious identity nor in religiosity exists, it is more than likely that each religion and the amount of involvement a person invests in that religion is affecting the values of males and females similarly. Running separate models with interaction terms between gender and religion, as well as gender and each form of religiosity revealed no significantly different affects between Christian women, Muslim women, or highly religious women and their counterparts in the types of democratic values they hold. Females who are highly religious are not significantly more or less likely to hold democratic values than are males or inactive men or women.

4.4.2.3 Other Control Factors

Additionally, there are interesting findings regarding democratic value formation that emerge in regards to my control variables that I will discuss in the following pages.

In regards to overall democratic value formation, interest in politics, closeness to a political party (the closer the better), higher levels of education, and residing in a country with a Christian national heritage increases the likelihood that a respondent will support democratic values. The better a respondent thinks their country is doing

economically, the less likely they are to hold democratic values, and the better off a person is doing economically themselves, the less likely they are to profess adherence to democratic values. These findings do give support to the impact that structural/economic factors have on value formation. As I will show later, however, it does not rule out the importance of cultural factors, including gender and religion.

Contrary to what might be expected, higher levels of education actually reduced the likelihood that a respondent would support equal voting opportunities. Respondents with higher levels of education are less likely to support inclusion of the under-educated in the voting process. Perhaps the educated Africans assume they are better suited than those with lower levels of education to decide political issues.

Considering the fixed effects at the national level, respondents who are residents of countries with higher Freedom House scores, and who have adopted gender supportive legislation are *less* likely to value democracy overall. Freedom House scores, capturing one measure of democracy in a nation, counter-intuitively have significant negative effects on democratic values in all cases except in regards to valuation of political economy. In this case, there is a strong and significant positive relationship between levels of democracy and a respondent's support of political equality. Justification for the directions of these relationships is, at the present, unclear. I offer two main explanations, which I believe go hand in hand in explaining why democracy does not positively encourage three of the four democratic values in my models, and why more so it seems to negatively impact these three values. First, just as has been found regarding Africans having yet to switch from holding identities as clients rather than citizens (Bratton and

van de Walle 1997), it is possible that Africans in these transitionally democratic nations have yet to fully integrate values that are foundational to democracy in their hierarchies, regardless of their experience with democracy. Since most of the democracies in Africa are only partially implemented (Chabal and Daloz 1999), higher ratings on Freedom House scores do not necessarily, in an entirely African sample, represent fully instituted democracies. Furthermore, in countries with reasonably high levels of democracy and order, which lack political accountability or gender equality, respondents may fail to associate these as necessities for democracy.

Secondly, Bratton and van de Walle reported that most Africans view democracy as procedural, thus centering on free and fair elections (1997), so the positive relationship between presence of democracy and a desire for political equality (in voting) could reflect the procedural definition of democracy as well. I hypothesize that it is these two explanations combined, the limited implementation of democracy in Africa and the instrumental nature of Africans' views of democracy that explains why more democratic countries do not positively correspond with three of the democratic values I am considering.

A second important category of country-level variables in my models includes the gender quotas and international gender legislation, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and/or its Optional Protocol. Four of the six countries reported as having greater than 70% support rates for gender equality, namely South Africa, Tanzania, Namibia, and Botswana, have some form of constitutional gender quota provisions.³⁵ Five of these six countries have adopted

³⁵ South Africa has Constitutional Legislative Quotas for the Sub-National Level as well as Political Party Quotas for Electoral Candidates; Tanzania has Constitutional Quotas and Election Law Quota Regulation

CEDAW, and two of these have also adopted CEDAW's Optional Protocol, which is basically enforcement legislation.³⁶ A respondent who lives in a country that has adopted CEDAW, has adopted CEDAW's Optional Protocol, or has some form of national level gender quota surfaces as *less* likely to espouse values of gender or political equality, or accountability. The one positive relationship gender institutions and value formation is in regards to political tolerance. Respondents who live in countries with all three gender institutions are more likely to support political tolerance. It is not apparent why a negative relationship exists with three of the values and a positive relationship with one. I, however, speculate that adoption of gender quotas and international conventions by a nation may reveal a lack of gender equality or internal support for changes necessary to reach gender equality. Therefore, adoption of gender legislation is an attempt to help force citizens and leaders to increase their support of equal rights for men and women. If such legislation is implemented once it is introduced, it would necessarily bring dissenting voices into the public sphere. Thus, some level of toleration of non-conformist voices would become necessary in order for ordered governance to continue. Thus, the presence of gender quotas and legislation reasonably could be encouraging people to see the benefits of tolerance in the political realm. The high levels of significance overall of the contextual level variables does give us one clear indication: context matters for democracy.

4.5 Conclusions and Caveats

4.5.1 Conclusions

for National Parliaments, as well as Constitutional Legislative Quotas at the Sub-national level. Namibia has Constitutional Legislative Quotas at the Sub-National Level. Botswana has Political Party Quotas for Electoral Candidates. Source: <http://www.quotaproject.org>

³⁶ Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Namibia, and South Africa have adopted CEDAW, with Ghana and Namibia having also adopted the Optional Protocol. Source: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/>

Democratic political values are widespread in select African nations. We must, therefore, consider why democracy has only shallow roots in these same countries. Values are arguably the basic building blocks of democracy. My findings indicate that the foundation for democracy exists in Africa. This project clearly shows the pervasive nature of democratic values in democratically transforming African nations. This is a positive finding for those concerned with democratic political development in emerging democracies. If values for democracy are widespread, then the foundation necessary for democratic attitudes and behaviors exists. The values necessary for democratic attitudes and behaviors to flourish are present in democratically experimenting states across Africa. Why, then, are these values not translating in a deep and consistent manner into unfaltering democracy in each of the nations that have or are attempting democracy on the African continent?

Values are equally widespread among men and women. The only gap that exists shows women valuing democracy, in the form of gender equality, to a greater extent than men. This result should compel researchers to ask why the gap persists at the political attitude and behavioral level, if the gap is diminished or gone at the building block level of values. I argue that it is this value gap that drives the divergence in men and women's political attitudes and participation in the public sphere in emerging African democracies.

Gender equality is valued more among women. This finding supports conventional wisdom among gender researchers. It is a factor that researchers and practitioners in democratization need to take into consideration. Men are still not on board, as they need to be in order for women to be included in the governing of their

lives.

Across Christianity and Islam, religion is significant in helping explain variation across three of the four political values considered – tolerance, accountability, and gender equality. Social and political status of members of each religious group could help to substantially explain these variations. Regardless of what is behind this finding, however, with the cleavages as they are, religion does largely matter in democratic value formation.

Religious service attendance does not influence support for any of the four political values captured by Afrobarometer. Religious organization membership, however, has a positive influence on political value formation. Those who are active members in religious organizations are more likely to support the values of political equality and gender equality. Involvement with civil society organizations, specifically tied to religion, empowers those who are involved. Many such organizations in Africa are involved in civic education, female empowerment and mainstream educational programs. Thus, members are likely to gain experience and insight into these issues, which directly relate to gender equality and political equality as measured in this project.

Contextual factors do matter. The direction of the relationship varies depending on the value under investigation, but the presence of gender institutions does help explain value formation in these African nations. Some might argue that there is endogeneity issue in this model, with values driving the adoption of such conventions. I argue that the negative relationship, however, with CEDAW, its optional protocol, and gender quotas with accountability, gender equality and political equality suggest that adoption reflects a

need for or potential attempt to change values.

4.5.2 Caveats

In my investigation of democratic value prevalence and formation across a sample of African nations, we see statistical significance among many of the traditionally important causal factors discussed in democratization literature and research regarding democratic behaviors and even attitudes. I present, however, one major caveat to my causal findings.

I present any causal relationships between my independent variables and the formation of democratic political orientations circumspectly. This is due to the amount of variance explained by each model: it is very low, even for public opinion data. Thus, I issue a caveat in the application of my findings. The highest amount of explained variance is on the value of gender equality, with around 10% of the variance explained. The other models explaining democratic values account for only around 3-4% of the variation among respondents. Thus, the models put forth in this chapter do not capture 90-95% of what is going on in value formation in these African nations. I have faith that the considerations of my project are important, nevertheless. First, I present an attempt to systematically, and quantitatively, investigate value formation. I recognize that there are a great many unknowns that affect people's core beliefs. I assert, however, that, if values are the crucial building blocks of stable democratization, then an attempt at understanding what tangible, and potentially alterable factors are driving value formation is crucial. This venture applies common wisdom from democratization studies to investigating values, including the first of the three steps of individual level traits that are

deemed necessary for democratization (values, attitudes, and behaviors) in a rich field of study that has often omitted this foundation factors. Finally, though my models do not tell the whole or majority of the story behind political value formation, in this work, I lay the foundation for future research and theorizing that should bring a richness of understanding regarding political values to the field of democratization studies.

Finally, a future step in this investigation is to investigate the relationships across religion and gender within each country. I believe the overall results across 15 democratically experimenting African nations offer important insight into the roles that religion and gender play in Africans' political lives. I assert, however, that variations within countries, which I mentioned in brief as evidence in this paper, would offer deeper and richer understandings of the role that these two identities play in political life.

Chapter 5 – Roles of Gender and Religion in Political Attitudes

5.1 Introduction

In chapter five, I turn to the next tier of political orientations. Here I ask about the demand for and perceived supply of democracy among individual Africans in emerging African democracies. In discussing attitudes towards democracy, I will draw from what Bratton *et al* call perceived supply of democracy as well as attitudes regarding the demand for democracy that exists across Africa (Bratton *et al* 2005). Why is this important? As with values, attitudes are foundational to political participation, which is in turn necessary for democracy to take root and persist over time. There is a debate as to the direction of this relationship. The sides of this debate were dealt with in chapter two. Research by such theorists as Inglehart and Norris maintains that attitudes are the building blocks on which political activism rests. Muller *et al* (1982) find this to be the case, given the manner in which political support is measured: under certain measures, political support translates into behaviors; under other measures, it does not. Work by Seligson contends that people learn what they believe through experience. When someone votes or participates in a political rally, demand for democracy is fostered. Booth and Seligson (1984) examine political attitudes in Mexico only to find a disconnect between the prevailing regime type (authoritarian) and the mass political culture (democratic). They use this to argue that the link between culture and regime is weak to non-existent. I see their results as a snapshot of a political culture that was emerging in Mexico and did in fact drive political change over the next couple of decades. Here I simply assert that it is attitudes that found behaviors. Reserves of

support for a political system must exist in order for that system to survive, especially in times of fledgling performance (Easton 1965). Furthermore, democratic attitudes and democratic actions are inextricably linked (Sen 1999). The erosion of political support could therefore lead to the erosion of political engagement, thereby undermining possibilities for political development in emerging democracies.

"If democratic regimes cannot overturn the recent pattern of declining real wages, rising levels of poverty, and inadequate public spending on physical infrastructure and social services, they may lose their popular legitimacy [support] and eventually fall prey to political instability" (van de Walle 1999).

Without pools of support from which regimes can draw, countries may revert to old, ineffective forms of government during times of economic and political crisis (Norris 1999; Lipset 1959). Such crisis is sure to occur during the process of democratic transition and consolidation. Countries, therefore, need reservoirs of support for democracy as a political system that is independent from the supply of democracy they are receiving.

Thus, it is important in a study of democratization to examine the levels of support that exist in democratizing states. I therefore ask if Africans are committed to democracy. Do Africans want this form of political regime? Do they demand democracy over and above all alternative forms of government? Furthermore, do they feel they are getting adequate levels of democracy? Are they satisfied with regime performance? This project will draw out how gender and religion function as factors in democratic political attitudes. Are there differences between men and women or across Islam and Christianity in support for and satisfaction with democracy? Do forms of religiosity affect democratic attitudes? Does religion affect gender or vice versa in political support for democracy?

Are religion and gender causative factors in political attitudes?

5.2 Political Attitudes

On the demand side, I look at both support for democracy as well as a rejection of other forms of government (Bratton *et al* 2005: 273). As mentioned in the introduction, I draw from two main survey questions to create an index of demand for democracy.

5.2.1 Prefer Democracy

The first major component measuring support for democracy on the demand side will be labeled “Prefer Democracy.” The key indicator is the proportion saying they prefer democracy rather than a non-democratic form of government.

5.2.2 Reject Autocracy

Respondents were also asked if they would approve or disapprove of certain governmental practices, captures the idea I have called *reject autocracy*, on the demand side of democratic satisfaction. The four components of this question include rejection of one-man rule, single-party rule, military rule, and rule by traditional chiefs or elders. Together, I form an index of these components called “Reject Autocracy.” Though the four components work well as one index, they also seem to represent two ideas (See Table 1 in Appendix 7). Removing the rejection of rule by chief or elders from this variable leaves us with a reliability factor of .6695, revealing highly reliability. Thus, I will have three separate factors here. The first will capture rejection of more modern forms of autocratic rule, including one man rule, military rule and one party rule, while the second variable will capture the more traditional form of autocratic rule, namely the rule by elite chiefs or elders. The final factor will include all four forms of autocratic rule.

I will use these as three of the four main dependent variables capturing support for democracy across Africa. In testing my hypotheses, I will run models that use collective dependent variables as well as models that look at each of the four components separately. I conduct the separate test because there are qualitative reasons to believe that someone who values democracy may not see rejection of all of these as incompatible with democracy.

5.2.3 Supply of Democracy

On the supply side, I draw from three questions administered in the Afrobarometer surveys. First, respondents were asked if they thought things under their current government were worse or better than under previous regimes on seven different democratic standards: freedom to say what you thing, freedom to join any political organization you want, freedom from being arrested what you are innocent, freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, the ability of ordinary people to influence what government does, safety from crime and violence, equal and fair treatment for all people by government.³⁷ Secondly, respondents were asked how much of a democracy they thought their country was “today.” Finally, respondents were asked how satisfied they were overall with the way democracy was working in their country. These three questions reflect various takes on the perceived supply of democracy across Africa. Bratton *et al* report that levels of satisfaction with democracy are generally unstable over time. For example, there were spikes in levels of satisfaction in Kenya, Ghana and Namibia in Round 2, while Nigeria’s levels of satisfaction plummeted from their artificially high levels revealed in Round 1 (Bratton *et al* 2004). I will seek to explain how factors that are potentially behind cross-national variations in levels of satisfaction may

³⁷ See Appendix 1 for full text of original question

affect or be affected by gender and religious affiliation. I will examine the emerging trends across surveyed nations, applying specific investigations into the roles that gender and religion could play in helping explain satisfaction.

5.3 Expectations

Africans in emerging African democracies will support democracy. This will be in the face of less-than-stellar experiences with democracy over the past few decades. My findings will support those of Bratton *et al* (2004) regarding democratic political attitudes in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey. Where my discussion will differ is in a primary focus on the role that gender, religion and religiosity play in attitude prevalence and formation in emerging African democracies. Furthermore, I am able to include Zimbabwe, a country in which surveys had yet to be completed when Round 2 results were initially released.

On the demand side, I believe Africans overall will both prefer democracy and reject autocratic forms of government. Men and women will differ only on one aspect of democratic demand: women will be less likely than men to reject one-party rule. This will not, however, lead to conclusions that women are less democratic or more autocratic than are men. Women are the stabilizers of both families and societies. Multi-party democracy both has the potential to and has actually destabilized societies in Africa. The brunt of such instability and chaos falls squarely on the shoulders of women (Nzomo 1995). Women's desire to have a secure, stable environment in which to live, work and raise their children lies behind their lack of full rejection of single-party rule (Logan and Bratton 2006). In Africa, political parties often form along other social cleavages, such as

ethnicity or religious affiliation. Such alignment both draws already-volatile disputes into the political realm and politicizes religious and tribal identities. This has often led to violence, political chaos, war and economic hardship. Women feel the brunt of such instability the hardest (Logan and Bratton 2006; Mikell 1997; Nzomo 1995) and therefore are the most wary of any potential arrangements in the political realm that may lead to precarious political and social relations.

Both Muslims and Christians will demand democracy and reject non-democratic forms of political rule. The only foreseeable differences between Muslims and Christians will lie in their rejection both of single-party democracy and of one-man rule. Christians have benefited at the expense of their Muslim counterparts under single-party and one-man governing arrangements (Oded 2000; Sanneh 1979). They will therefore potentially be less likely than Muslims to reject single-party or one-man rule.

On the supply side, both men and women will feel they are not receiving fully implemented democracies. Both men and women will view their country as a democracy but with problems. Women will, however, be slightly less satisfied than men with democracy. This will result from their lower levels of improved freedoms in the political realm. Women remain disadvantaged in the public sphere due to cultural bias against women as necessary players at all levels of public life. Women will recognize their disadvantaged state and, because they demand democracy, will be more critical of the democracy they are (or are not) receiving.

Muslims will be more satisfied with democracy than will their Christian counterparts, though both groups will exhibit overall low levels of satisfaction with

democracy in their countries. Democracy has failed to fully consolidate in sub-Saharan African nations, and Africans will recognize the unfulfilled nature of their democratic experiments (Villalon and VonDoepp 2005). As discussed previously, Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa benefited the least from non-democratic forms of government (Oded 2000), and will therefore be more satisfied with the democratic progress that has been made than will Christians, who have lost power and had less to gain under democratic reform.

Muslim women, who we have seen are the most disadvantaged among women in sub-Saharan Africa, will be the least satisfied with democracy, in relation to Christian women, Christian men, and Muslim men. Muslim women stand to gain the most from democratic reforms. They will therefore put a great deal of stock in democratic promises. When these promises go unfulfilled, Muslim women will respond with dissatisfaction. They will be critical citizens (Norris 1999) who recognize the partial democracy they are receiving. Consequently, I believe the gap between men and women within Christianity will be smaller than that within Islam on satisfaction with democracy.

Religiosity will affect democratic political attitudes. Higher levels of both forms of religiosity will increase support for democracy. Consistent contact with religious leaders and regular exposure to normative religious messages will affect both the type of governance Africans demand as well as how satisfied they are with the public order they are receiving. Increased activity in religious civic associations will enhance the awareness and ability of participants to judge and evaluate their public space (Norris 1999). Active members in religious associations, consequently, will have different political attitudes

than inactive or nonmembers. Therefore, because religious groups have been crucial agitators for democracy in Africa, I assert that frequent attendees of religious services and active religious association members will more often support democracy than those who are less involved in religious bodies. Due to increased training and education, religiously-active Africans, however, will be more critical of democracy on the supply-side than will inactive Africans.

Finally, as in political values, there will be variations in political attitudes that arise due to the cross-national nature of my data. Thus, I include country dummy variables to control for fixed effects across countries. As a person's country of residence does prove to be significant in explaining variation in political values, I include some national level controls for gender, religion or democratic orientation clustering to help explain why national identity causes variations in political values. I anticipate that nations with gender legislation will display higher aggregate demand for democracy than nations that lack such legislation (Ballington 2004). I assume that a nation's religious heritage affects democratic political attitudes. Nations with a predominantly Christian heritage will demand democracy more often than nations with varied religious histories (Putnam 1993). Nations with higher levels of democratization will demand democracy more than less democratic nations. Residents within these nations will also be more satisfied with the democracy they are receiving. Thus, democracy is self reinforcing.


5.4 Findings

5.4.1.1 Prevalence of Democratic Political Attitudes in Africa: Demand for Democracy

Do Africans prefer democracy? Do they reject autocracy? I find that Africans in

emerging African democracies both demand democracy and reject autocracy overall as well as in each of its forms.


Figure 5.1 Support for Democracy



Note: These are valid percents, excluding "Don't Knows" and other missing responses; N=21701

A majority of Africans consistently prefer democracy (Figure 5.1). There are, however, a troubling minority of respondents who are split between those who would allow for non-democratic alternatives under certain circumstances (15%) or who say the type of government under which they live does not matter to them (13%). Among men and women, a similar pattern holds (Figure 5.2). Subsequent analysis will attempt to shed light on what traits characterize those Africans who fail to fully support democracy as the only preferable form of government.

Figure 5.2 Support for Democracy across Gender in Africa




Note: These are valid percents, excluding "Don't Knows" and other missing responses; N=21701

Women and men, overall, see democracy as always preferable to alternative forms of government. Women, however, are less likely than men to see democracy as always preferable. They do not turn to non-democratic alternatives, though, but are more likely to offer non-committal answers.³⁸ The heightened indifference among women reflects the theme raised throughout this project regarding women's roles in society. Women are the core providers and stabilizers for society (Logan and Bratton 2006). Women are also hit the hardest when chaos and poverty plague a country (Mikell 1997). Therefore, women are more likely than men to see the stability of a society and economic opportunity as primarily important regardless of the type of government that comes in to handle these issues.

³⁸ A difference of means test reveals that, although small, these differences are statistically significant: $t=7.113, p<.001$

Figure 5.3: Support for Democracy across Islam and Christianity in Africa



Note: N=21701

Both Muslims and Christians prefer democracy. A clear majority of Muslims and Christians opt for democracy as their favored form of government. Muslims, however, are more likely than are Christians to prefer democracy. They are also less likely to allow for non-democratic alternatives.³⁹ Christians are notably more likely than Muslims across sub-Saharan Africa to allow for non-democratic alternatives and to say that the form of government does not matter to them. Christians who allow for non-democratic governance in certain circumstances may be nostalgic for a time when power was concentrated in the hands of nominally Christian leaders. Democratic governance requires Christian clients to share patronage with Muslims who now have more leaders (patrons) in powerful positions.

Breaking this down by country, I find that, of the states with significant Muslim populations, South Africa evidences a considerable gap between Muslims and Christians in the opposite direction. Christians in South Africa more often say democracy is always


³⁹ This finding is statistically significant, reflecting an important difference, albeit small, between Christians and Muslims in their demand for democracy: $t=5.205$, $p<.001$

preferable. Namibia, Botswana and Zambia also reveal a gap in the opposite direction, but each of these countries has a very small population of Muslims⁴⁰, so while their “extreme” minority status may drive Muslims to express little support for democracy, the sample is too small to make a confident assertion. All of these are, however, Southern African countries. Though Kenya and Ghana lead the pack as individual countries in support for democracy, as a region, Southern Africa evidences a more full commitment to democracy than either West or East Africa. Democracy is doing better in Southern Africa than in other African regions. Nearly every state in the region claims to be democratic. Namibia, Zambia, South Africa and Botswana have all been lauded for their commitment to the rule of law and institutionalization of democratic procedures. And unlike the other regions in Africa that have also experienced democratic experiments, no Southern African state has undergone a military coup (Bauer and Taylor 2005).

It is important to note that the split that exists within Islam and Christianity, between their men and women, is the same split that emerges between Christians/Muslims and women/men across sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 5.4). The only notable difference emerges in non-committal responses. While Christians overall more often say that the form of government does not matter, we see that Christian and Muslim women are equally likely to offer an ambivalent answer. The real difference lies among men. Slightly more Christian men than Muslim men do not care what type of government they have. Thus, though women overall are less likely to commit to democracy with vigor, religion potentially alters the commitment that men make to democracy. Christianity likely reduces African men’s allegiance to democracy.

⁴⁰ Namibia has 3 Muslim respondents in our sample, Botswana has 5 and Zambia has 3


Figure 5.4: Democratic Preference Across Gender Within Christianity and Islam



Note: $t=4.562, p<..001$ Muslim vs Christian men; $t=2.663, p<..008$ Muslim vs Christian women; $t=5.659, p<..001$ Christian men vs women; $t=4.259, p<..001$ Muslim men vs women; $N=21701$; valid percents

In their demand for democracy, do Africans reject non-democratic forms of government? Do Africans vary in their rejection of different forms of autocratic government? Overall, Africans reject autocratic forms of rule. They are least certain, however, in their refusal to accept rule by chiefs or elders.


Figure 5.5: Reject Autocracy



Note: $N=21022$; valid percents

Even in the face of struggling democratic transitions, Africans do not want former non-democratic forms of leadership to return. Of the four forms of autocratic government we asked about, Africans are most likely to allow for traditional rulers to as acceptable forms of government. This reflects a co-mingling of modern and traditional in African understandings of governance, and the persistence of informal venues of power as important to the functioning of African political systems. Neo-patrimonialism is alive and well in African politics (Villalón and VonDoepp 2005; Bratton and van de Walle 1997).


Figure 5.6a: Reject Autocracy – Gender Differences



Notes: Includes all four forms of autocracy; These are valid percentages; $t=8,281$, $p<.001$; $N=21022$

Women in emerging African democracies more often accept non-democratic forms of government than do men. Nearly three-fourths of all men and women disapprove of autocracy in all of its forms. Women, however, are slightly yet significantly more willing to allow non-democratic forms of government under certain circumstance. Does this difference remain on all four types of autocratic governance? I find that the gender gap disappears on all but one form of autocratic rule: the governing of a one-party state.

Figure 5.6b: Reject One-Party Rule – Gender Differences




Notes: These are valid percentages; $t=11.189$, $p<..001$; $N=23,588$

African women south of the Sahara less often disapprove of single-party governance. Those women who are as equally convinced that one-party rule is bad are not indifferent, but actually say they approve of one-party states. Again, the theme supported by this finding likely hinges on the role that women play as the sure and steady securers of their families and communities. Tribal, ethnic, economic and religious cleavages are often highlighted by party politics, even turning violent in many cases during democratic transitions across Africa. As the caretakers of society, women view any potential unsettling forces circumspectly.

Does religion make a difference in rejection of non-democratic alternatives? Do Muslims and Christians vary in their views of autocratic government?

Figure 5.7a: Reject Autocracy – Religious Differences



Notes: Includes all four forms of autocracy; These are valid percents, $N=21,022$

Contrary to my expectations, Muslims more often approve of autocracy, and less often disapprove of non-democratic forms of governance.⁴¹ This seems to contradict earlier findings in which Muslims less often accepted non-democratic alternatives than did Christians (Figure 5.3). In theory, it seems, Muslims reject non-democratic alternatives. When given specific examples of alternative forms of government, however, Muslims are less ready to reject autocratic government forms. The gap is small, but important. Muslims fail to reject one-man rule, military rule and rule by traditional leaders to the same degree as Christians. Muslims, however, more often reject and less likely to approve of one-party rule. Under single-party rule, many Muslims in Christian-dominated African states have seen their rights ignored and their political, educational and social opportunities averted (Oded 2000; Sanneh 1979). Their negative experience with single-party governance has instilled an aversion to one-party rule among African Muslims.⁴² Tying this finding to the fact that Muslims

⁴¹ A difference of means test reveals that the gap between Muslims and Christians is statistically significant, $t=-10.513$, $p<.001$

⁴² $t=-1.894$, $p=.058$

offered high levels of support for democracy, it seems that Muslims define democracy *procedurally*. Democracy is found in the institutions that drive electoral politics, namely competitive political parties. Muslims in emerging African democracies are slightly more likely to prefer democracy in the form of multi-party politics than are Christians. The gap between Muslims and Christians is notable on their rejection of military rule and one-man rule, as well as on rule by traditional leaders. Christians more often than Muslims reject all three forms of non-democratic rule.⁴³

This gap, both its existence and its relatively small size, likely results from the experiences Muslims in emerging African democracies have had with democratic transitions. Muslims in Mali and Mozambique may remember the constructive role that the military and traditional forms of government have had in their efforts towards democracy. Mali boasts a residency of 97% Muslim, thereby claiming 28% of Muslims in the 16 nations under scrutiny. Thus, a large number of Muslims in SSA experienced a democratic transition in which the military played a positive role. In Mali, the military ended a single-party dictatorship in 1991, ushering in democratic reforms. President Traoré was unseated by military force, which then unconventionally began instituting democracy in Mali. Mozambique is home to around 7% of SSA Muslims (27% of the Mozambiquen population). Democracy broke through here when a *military* resistance party, Renamo, finally gained access to the political arena in the early 1990's and seamlessly shifted gears from military to relatively peaceful political channels of competition. In both countries, informal channels and traditional power

⁴³ Reject military rule: Christians (83%), Muslims (75%) $t=11.732$, $p<.001$; Reject one-man rule: Christians (82%), Muslims (76%), $t=7.700$, $p<.001$; Reject rule by chiefs or elders: Christians (60%), Muslims (46%), $t=13.597$, $p<.001$

structures remain important avenues for getting things done in the political arena (Villalón and VonDoepp 2005).

Senegal, however, is home to an equally concentrated number of Muslims. 28% of Muslims in SSA (95% of the Senegalese population) live in Senegal. Muslims here overwhelmingly reject military rule and one-man rule. They have, however, faced different democratic experiences. Senegal has had consistent multi-party competition, with a brief hiatus from 1966 to 1974. Opposition parties were reintroduced when Abdoulaye Wade sought and was granted permission from president Léopold-Sédar Senghor to create the Senegalese Democratic Party (Parti Démocratique Sénégalais—PDS). Senegalese retain no experience with crushing military dictatorships, immovable one-man leaders, or exclusive single-party regimes (“Senegal” 2006).

Nigerians have had similar experiences. In Nigeria, military rule dominated off and on for over two decades following Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Five coups d’etat resulted in changes of government from either a military or civilian government to a military regime (“Nigeria” 1991). Military leaders who staged these “rescue operations” cited economic mismanagement, corruption, ethnoregional politics and over ambitious elites as reasons for their interventions. Military leaders who stepped in to govern, though unpredictable and inconsistent in areas of human rights abuses, often did halt severe economic decline, combat growing corruption, and restore order to the country. Furthermore, these leaders were usually from the Muslim north. Both Buhari and Babangida were military leaders who led successful coups d’etat in Nigeria. Both were Muslims. Thus, interventions by Muslim military leaders brought about forms of

economic recovery and steps towards less corrupt, more democratic governance. This instilled Nigerian Muslims with a sense that military intervention may be necessary when other forms of government, including elected civilian rule, impose harmful, corrupt practices on the people.


For example, the leader of a 1983 coup, Buhari, tried to restore accountability of the government to the public and to restore a dynamic economy in the country. Buhari's military regime held tribunals to counteract corruption, through which many scandals were revealed. They cleansed the civil service. To stave off rapid economic decline, the Buhari regime launched major reforms to trim the federal budget ("Nigeria" 1991). Yet, the international debt was a major obstacle for Buhari's government, and ultimately led to his overthrow. In 1985, Babangida, also a Muslim, albeit from a smaller tribe than Buhari, staged a coup against the Buhari regime.

"The economic crisis, the campaign against corruption, and civilian criticism of the military undermined Buhari's position ("Nigeria" 1991).

The new military regime was actively committed to returning Nigeria to civilian rule. They supported the 1979 Nigerian constitution. Though not elected, the Babangida regime took steps towards civilian rule through endowing Babangida with the title of president. He used the Constitution to justify this step. The Babangida government did take firmer economic steps, attempting to assuage the unrest in the country by correcting the excesses of the Buhari regime ("Nigeria" 1991).

The experience of the concentrated number of SSA Muslims in Nigeria and Mali, as well as in Mozambique, creates a perceivable compatibility in the minds of African Muslims between democracy and intervening military rule.

Figure 5.7b: Reject Autocracy – Gender Differences within Religion



Notes: Includes all four forms of autocracy; N=21,022

While Muslim men and Christian men are equally likely to approve of autocracy, they are notably different in how often they *reject* autocracy (Muslim men 3% lower than Christian men) or choose a middle ground response (Muslim men 3% higher than Christian men).⁴⁴ The same difference exists between Christian women and Muslim women. Muslim women more often offer an indifferent response towards autocracy and less often reject autocracy than do their Christians counterparts.⁴⁵ Thus, the differences within each religion across gender replicate the findings across religions – when presented with non-democratic alternatives, Muslims are less sure in their rejection of autocracy than are Christians. Women also are not a homogenous group. Other identities in their lives, along with the socially constructed norms that make up their gender roles, affect their attitudes towards democracy.


⁴⁴ Muslim men vs Christian men $t=5.612$, $p<.001$

⁴⁵ Muslim women vs Christian women $t=5.467$, $p<.001$

5.4.1.2 Prevalence of Democratic Political Attitudes in Africa: Supply of Democracy

We have seen that Africans demand democracy. Discrepancies do exist between Muslims and Christians and men and women, but overall, members of each of these sub-groups are highly committed to democracy. We must now ask how Africans in emerging democracies view the supply of democracy they are receiving.


Figure 5.8a: Extent of Democracy



Note: 6% said don't know, but as stated in Chapter 1, these cases were excluded from analysis; N=21,344

Most Africans believe they are living in a democracy (80%), though the majority of those who see their country as democratic believe it has some problems (Figure 5.8). A slight majority of Africans (52%) espouse the view that they are living in a full or nearly full democracy. A minority (35%) have more grave concerns about the situation of their country's democracy. Thus, of Africans who understand what democracy means, most believe they are living in promising democracies.


Figure 5.8b: Extent of Democracy – Gender Differences



Note: Valid percentages; $N=21,344$; $t=-.310$, $p<.757$

Both men and women in emerging African democracies mostly assert that they live in a democracy, albeit with problems. As anticipated, men and women equally assess the state of their country's democracy.

Figure 5.8c: Supply of Democracy – Religious Differences




Note: Valid percentages; $N=21,344$

Between 64% and 69% of both Muslims and Christians say they live in a democracy, though more often cite it as having minor problems. As expected, however, Muslims less often say that they live in a democracy with major problems or a society

that is not a democracy. Muslims more frequently say they live in a full democracy than do Christians, while Christians more often say their country is either not a democracy or if a democracy, has notable problems.⁴⁶ The direction of this divergence persists when religious identities are disaggregated by gender. Christian women are more troubled with the quality of democracy they are receiving than are Muslim women.⁴⁷ Christian men are unsure of the quality of democracy they live under to a greater extent than are Muslim men.⁴⁸

Africans were also asked how satisfied they were with the way democracy was working in their country. Overall, a slight majority of Africans in emerging democracies are at least fairly satisfied with democracy (Figure 5.9a). A notable minority is moderately to completely dissatisfied with the way democracy is playing out in their country.

Figure 5.9a: Supply – Satisfaction with Democracy



Note: Valid percentages; N=22,005


⁴⁶ $t=7.869, p<.001$

⁴⁷ $t=6.153, p<.001$ Muslim women vs. Christian women

⁴⁸ $t=5.002, p<.001$ Muslim men vs. Christian men

As anticipated, there is not a significant difference in this evaluation among men and women.⁴⁹ There are also no gender gaps when religious identity is disaggregated by gender. Men and women in sub-Saharan Africa, regardless of their religious affiliation preliminarily seem to respond to democracy at similar levels. There is, however, a gap between Muslims and Christians in their evaluation of the democracy they are receiving (Figure 5.9b).

Figure 5.9b: Supply – Satisfaction with Democracy Across Religion



Note: Valid percents; N=22,005

Christians more often said they were not satisfied, while Muslims more often said they were at least moderately satisfied with democracy in their country. Thus, on both measurements of perceived supply of democracy, Muslims are at worst less critical of democracy than Christians and at best more satisfied than Christians. Muslims, though, have lived under regimes that have denied them their political and social rights more often than not. They have not had the “luxury” of blindly supporting the government without a critical eye. I therefore argue that Muslims are more satisfied with the changes that are finally occurring that open political space and improved political and economic opportunities for them across sub-Saharan Africa. I believe the discrepancy between

⁴⁹ $t=1.714, p<.087$

Muslims and Christians on perceived supply of democracy is driven by the reality that Muslims stand to gain while Christians stand to lose with the opening up of political space that occurs with the transition to democracy. Multi-party politics and popular elections bring Africans from varied walks of life to the political table. Many of these voices were excluded from political discourse under the autocratic regimes that predominated African politics prior to democratic transitions. Muslims were, by and large, part of those who were excluded (Oded 2000; Sanneh 1979). Institutional changes brought on by democratic transitions open the door for Muslims to fight for political representation. In order for Muslims to gain in power and opportunity, however, other groups must share power. In their eyes, this often signals a loss of power. Losing power means losing control over and access to a limited pool of resources. Democratic transitions consequently receive less enthusiastic evaluation by Christians. Democracy forces power and resource sharing to which Christians are not accustomed.


Africans are overall at least moderately satisfied with the democracy they are receiving. These point-in-time estimates, however, could be indicative of momentary successes (such as the successful multi-party transition of power in Kenya occurring just prior to the round 3 Afrobarometer surveys). To shed more light on whether or not moderately high levels of satisfaction with democracy in emerging African democracies reflect conditional responses or a hopeful view of positive change, I turn to responses asking Africans if they think things were better or worse than in the past. Are their personal and political freedoms improving? If Africans think things have improved, are these conditional responses that could wane if conditions do not continue to improve, at

least in the eyes of average Africans?

Africans were asked about the improvement of their lives on two dimensions of freedom. The distinction between these two types of freedoms, which I call *freedom to* and *freedom from* are often portrayed as the difference between positive and negative freedoms (Berlin 1959).

Africans in general think that they have more political freedom, or freedom *to* engage in political activities, than they did in the past. They are less convinced that their personal freedom, or freedom *from* certain unjust treatment, has improved (Figure 4.10a). One in every four Africans say that their freedom from unjust arrest, crime and violence or unequal treatment has gotten worse. This is more than twice the proportion of Africans who perceive their political freedoms – freedom *to* influence government, say what they think, join organizations or vote – have gotten worse. It seems, then, that Africans perceive a significant improvement in their political situation, even while their personal freedom may or may not be improving.

Figure 5.10a: Present versus Past: Freedoms




Note: Valid percents; Political Freedoms N=21,439; Personal Freedoms N=21,659

There are some notable deviations from the overall norms among specific

perceived freedoms (Figure 5.10b). While three in four Africans feel their ability to vote, join organizations or express themselves in the political arena has improved, only around two out of every four Africans believe they are better able to influence the government. And while fewer than half of Africans in emerging African democracies believe they are safer from crime and violence or unequal treatment, nearly two-thirds say they are less likely to be unjustly arrested.

Figure 5.10b: Present versus Past: Freedoms



Note: Political Freedoms N=21,439; Personal Freedoms N=21,659

Do men and women share a similar perspective on their personal and political freedoms? Men and women equally perceive freedoms from injustice (personal freedoms) as having improved (50%) or having declined or stayed the same (50%). Both men and women also say their political freedoms are better or much better to an overwhelming extent (76% of men and 72% of women). A small but significant difference, however, does emerge in men versus women's perceived changes in their

political freedoms.⁵⁰ Men are 4 percent more likely than women to believe their political freedoms have improved. This variance is driven by the fact that women are less likely than men to see that their political freedoms as “much better.”⁵¹

Do Christians and Muslims evidence divergence in their opinions regarding their gains in personal and political freedoms? Christians are more likely to express a feeling that political freedoms are worse than in the past than are Muslims, while Muslims see political space having opened to them (Table 5.1).⁵² The incomplete democratic transitions experienced across SSA have nevertheless ushered more voices into public discourse. In polities formerly under tight control of parties filled with Christians or by single-men rulers who were largely Christians, Muslims were shut out from real power channels. Their access has now expanded, and Christians must work with their Muslim countrymen. Muslims also more often say that their freedoms from unjust arrest, unequal treatment or crime and violence have improved, while Christians more often assert that their personal freedoms have declined (Table 5.1).⁵³

Table 5.1

Present vs. past: Political Freedom "freedom to"		Muslim	Christian
	Much Worse/ Worse	9%	12%
	Much Better/Better	78%	75%
	Same	14%	14%
Present vs. past: Personal Freedom "freedom from"		Muslim	Christian
	Much Worse/ Worse	22%	25%
	Much Better/Better	58%	57%
	Same	17%	19%

Note: Political Freedoms N=21439; Personal Freedoms N=21659

⁵⁰ $t=3.913, p<.001$

⁵¹ 23% of women versus 27% of men

⁵² $t=4.425, p<.001$

⁵³ $t=3.218, p<.001$

Men and women in both Islam and Christianity equally view the improvement of their personal freedoms.⁵⁴ Muslim and Christian men more often say that their political freedoms have improved than do their female counterparts.⁵⁵ Yet, as with the general findings discussed above, both Muslim men and women more often than Christian men and women respectively believe their personal and political freedoms have improved.⁵⁶ Women are less satisfied with their gains in the political arena, while Muslims are more satisfied with their personal and political gains. Therefore, being Muslim perhaps reduces the gender gap in satisfaction with the democracy an African is receiving.

5.4.1.3 So What?

What do the previous findings tell us? First, we have seen that Africans overwhelmingly demand democracy, and this is true for both men and women and Muslims and Christians. The gaps that do emerge show women being more willing to offer ambivalent responses about the importance of the type of government they receive. Furthermore, contrary to popular conceptions, I find that Muslims more firmly commit to democracy than do Christians. Though Africans chiefly reject autocracy, slight variations across gender and religious lines do emerge. Women and Muslims are slightly but significantly more likely than men and Christians respectively to allow for non-democratic alternatives. The substantial difference across religion and gender, however, is in the willingness of Muslims or women vis-à-vis Christian men to reject one-party rule. Women are more likely to allow one-party rule while Muslims are more likely to reject one-party rule. Women perhaps see multi-party democracy as a destabilizing force,

⁵⁴ Christian men vs Christian women $t=.218$, $p=.827$; Muslim men vs Muslim women $t=1.694$, $p=.090$

⁵⁵ Christian men vs Christian women $t=2.572$, $p=.010$; Muslim men vs Muslim women $t=4.351$, $p<.001$

⁵⁶ Personal freedoms: Christian men vs. Muslim men $t=4.285$, $p<.001$ & Christian women vs Muslim women $t=2.030$, $p=.042$; Political freedoms: Christian men vs. Muslim men $t=5.597$, $p<.001$ & Christian women vs Muslim women $t=2.620$, $p=.009$

while Muslims have suffered exclusion and heightened oppression under single-party states.

Secondly, Africans offer hopeful responses in their perceptions of the democracy they are receiving. Around 52% of Africans believe they are living in a viable democracy (Figure 5.8a), though most of these see their democracy as having problems to varying degrees. They mostly believe, however, that their personal and political freedoms are improving. Men and women agree on this assessment, with only a slight divergence in women's evaluation of the progress of their political freedom vis-à-vis men. Muslims and Christians, however, deviate on their satisfaction with their perceived supply of democracy. Muslims seem more satisfied with the democracy they are receiving than Christians.

There is, therefore, potential evidence that gender will be a causal factor in demand for democracy, while religion could be causally related to both demand for and perceived supply of democracy. While the findings regarding demand for democracy are somewhat contradictory to my expectations, I believe the reasons I have begun to unpack reveal that there is no fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy or women and democratic governance, but the political, social and economic situations and roles these subgroups face. Women want stability. They evaluate democracy with equal caution as do men, but believe they have benefited less from democratic changes. Muslims, as a minority group, have much to gain from democratic transitions. Their support for democracy in varied governing forms reflects the experiences they have had with military, party or individual leaders in bringing in the changes that have opened

political space into which they could step. They are pleased with the tentative success democracy has had in the personal and political arenas.

5.4.2 Factors Explaining Democratic Attitudes

5.4.2.1 Bivariate Relationships

Table 5.2a Bivariate Correlations

	Demand	Demand	Demand	Supply	Supply	Supply	Supply
	Support for democracy	RejectAutoc NoElders	Reject Autocracy	How democratic	Satisfaction with democracy	Present vs Past Political freedom	Present vs Past Personal Freedom
Gender	-	-	-			-	
Christian	-	+	+	-	-		
Muslim	+	-	-	+	+	+	+
Religiosity (service attendance)	+	+	+	-		+	+
Member of religious group	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
N	21701	22482	21022	21344	22005	21439	21659

Note: See Appendix 8, Table 2; + signifies a positive, significant correlation between items; - signifies a negative, significant correlation between items

5.4.2.1.a Gender

In simple relationships, gender does matter in attitudes towards democracy. Contrary to what was projected, females initially appear less likely than males to demand democracy. Women are less likely in emerging African democracies to both support democracy and to fully reject autocratic alternatives to democratic governance. As expected, however, women are less likely to be satisfied with the democracy they are receiving in the form of political freedoms. Though democratic improvements are occurring, women are benefiting less from any positive changes in the political realm.

5.4.2.1.b Religion

Christians are less likely to demand democracy as the only preferable form of government, but are more likely than members of other religions to reject autocratic alternatives. As was found in the previously-discussed percentages, Muslims are *more* likely to demand democracy, though they are less likely than non-Muslims to firmly reject all forms of autocratic government.

5.4.2.1.c Religiosity

Religiosity initially seems to encourage support for democracy. This could mean that religiosity reduces the above gender gaps, since women in Africa are involved in religious activities to a greater extent than are men. Those who attend religious services more frequently and those who are members of religiously-affiliated organizations are more likely to both demand democracy and to reject autocratic alternatives.

5.4.2.2 Demand for Democracy and Rejection of Autocracy

Table 5.2b Multivariate Regression – Demand for Democracy

	Support for Democracy	Reject Autocracy (no elders)	Reject Autocracy	Reject Elder Rule	Reject One-Party Rule
(Constant)	2.072*** (.097)	3.697*** (.119)	3.555*** (.116)	3.161*** (.188)	2.806*** (.186)
Gender	-.041*** (.012)	-0.115*** (.015)	-0.101*** (.015)	-0.058* (.024)	-0.197*** (.024)
Christian (Base Group = Muslim)	-.144*** (.020)	-0.094*** (.024)	-0.079*** (.024)	0.064 (.038)	-0.127*** (.038)
Religiosity - Religious Service Attendance	.004 (.005)	-0.092** (.036)	-0.002 (.006)	0.012 (.009)	-0.021* (.009)
Member of religious group	.016* (.004)	-0.002 (.009)	0.025** (.009)	0.042** (.015)	0.009 (.014)
Education of respondent	.016*** (.004)	0.021*** (.005)	0.054*** (.005)	0.093*** (.008)	0.068*** (.007)
Employment Status	.020 (.013)	0.046 (.016)	0.022 (.016)	0.075** (.026)	0.070** (.026)
Urban Rural (Urban =1)	-.033* (.015)	0.012 (.018)	0.039* (.018)	0.100*** (.029)	0.018 (.028)
Interest in public affairs	.064*** (.009)	0.023*** (.011)	0.031** (.010)	-0.015 (.017)	0.023 (.016)
Member of trade union or farmers association	.011 (.008)	0.046 (.010)	0.009 (.010)	-0.016 (.016)	0.043** (.016)
Member of professional or business association	-.011 (.010)	0.015*** (.012)	-0.042*** (.012)	-0.078*** (.020)	-0.031 (.019)
Member of community development association	.003 (.007)	-0.041*** (.009)	0.038*** (.009)	0.020 (.014)	0.060*** (.014)
How close to political party	.006 (.010)	0.044*** (.012)	-0.043*** (.012)	-0.040* (.019)	-0.048** (.019)
Close to Political Party	.082 (.048)	-0.046*** (.059)	-0.255*** (.058)	-0.182* (.093)	-0.305*** (.092)
Radio news	.023*** (.005)	-0.270*** (.007)	0.032*** (.007)	0.032** (.010)	0.060*** (.010)
Television news	.011* (.005)	0.023*** (.006)	0.046*** (.006)	0.054*** (.009)	0.073*** (.009)
Newspaper news	-.015** (.005)	0.037 (.006)	-0.010 (.006)	-0.017 (.010)	0.006 (.010)
Opinion of country's present economic condition	.007 (.005)	-0.003*** (.006)	-0.033*** (.006)	-0.018 (.010)	-0.018 (.010)
Freedom House Level of Democratization	.037 (.025)	-0.039** (.032)	0.219*** (.033)	0.237*** (.053)	0.176*** (.049)
CEDAW Adoption	.063* (.029)	0.093** (.035)	-0.267*** (.034)	-0.649*** (.055)	0.119* (.055)
CEDAW Optional Protocol Adoption	-.123*** (.019)	-0.099*** (.023)	-0.377*** (.027)	-0.342*** (.044)	-0.038 (.036)

Presence of national level gender legislation	.028 (.016)	-0.247*** (.020)	-0.269*** (.022)	-0.370*** (.036)	-0.243 (.030)
Economic situation by country	-.036*** (.009)	-0.132*** (.011)	-0.073*** (.011)	-0.056*** (.018)	-0.007 (.017)
Personal Poverty (LivedPovertyIndex)	-.035*** (.008)	-0.061* (.009)	-0.025** (.009)	-0.059*** (.015)	-.033* (.015)
Christian Nation	-.008 (.017)	-0.019 (.021)	-0.001 (.020)	-0.120*** (.033)	-0.207*** (.032)
Gender*Religiosity	-.006 (.007)	.002 (.009)	.006 (.009)	.014 (.014)	-.021 (.014)
Gender*Member	.000 (.012)	.012 (.015)	.016 (.015)	.025 (.024)	-.016 (.023)
Gender*Christian	.002 (.025)	.040 (.031)	.046 (.030)	.062 (.047)	-.013 (.047)
N	21701	22482	21022	22106	23588
Adj R²	.046	.107	.135	.099	.080

N=19,201 weighted; Unstandardized coefficients followed by standard errors

Do gender, religion and religiosity continue to affect Africans' political attitudes, regardless of other factors that theory and research tell us matter? Regardless of any other factors in their lives, women are less supportive of democracy and less likely to reject autocracy than are men. As discussed earlier, women are the stabilizers of the family, and the experience these African women have had with democracy thus far has been transitional. Transitions from non-democratic forms of government tend to be chaotic and uncertain. Therefore, the gender gap in support for democracy likely lies in female wariness of the unclear outcomes that will follow from their countries' experiments with democracy (Mikell 1997). Women fail to reject autocracy as strongly as do men. The gap between men and women, however, is not the same on each form of autocratic rule.

Table 5.3: Gender Rejection of Forms of Autocracy

	Reject Military Rule	Reject One-Party Rule	Reject Rule by Elders	Reject One Man Rule
(Constant)	4.134*** (.148)	2.806*** (.186)	3.161*** (.188)	3.644*** (.143)
Gender	-.060** (.020)	-0.197*** (.024)	-0.058* (.024)	-.076*** (.019)
Beta scores	-.028	-.072	-.021	-.036
N	23415	2358822106		23114

Note: Gender, *ceteris paribus*

Women are less likely than men to reject one-party rule; the gap on one-party rule between men and women is more pronounced than the gap between men and women on any of the other forms of autocratic rule. This is followed by a highly significant gender gap regarding one-man rule. Both one-party and single-man rule offered cohesion that many African countries have lost due to the opening of political space. The onset of multi-party politics, ushering in power-sharing in ways that was previously unknown in most African countries, has brought with it heightened tribal and ethnic tensions that often result in violence and chaos. Women bear the brunt of such instability the hardest (Mikell 1997).

Christians are less likely than Muslims to both demand democracy and to reject autocracy (Table 5.2b). This finding holds regardless of educational levels, economic standing, political party affiliation, and a battery of other factors that influence political orientations. This finding reinforces my earlier discussion regarding the loss of power facing Christians in the face of democratic reforms. As minorities, Muslims stand to gain more with the growth of democracy in Africa. Christians, on the other hand, lose out, as they must share political space with other religious groups. They are therefore less supportive of democratization. Interactions between gender and Christianity as well as

gender and Islam proved insignificant. Christian women in Africa are not significantly more or less supportive of democracy than are Christian men or Muslims. The same holds true for Muslim women.

Religiosity also maintains modest significance in helping explain democratic attitudes on the demand side (Table 5.2b). Those who are active members of religious organizations are more likely to reject non-democratic forms of government. This is an important finding, as it contradicts any fears that those who are increasingly religious are likely to coalesce around fanatical leaders. Those who are active in religious organizations reject autocracy, specifically in the forms of one-man rule, military rule, and traditional rule. Those who are active members in religious associations are also slightly more likely than nonmembers or inactive members to demand democracy. This supports the idea that civic involvement, through religious organizations, raises awareness and understanding among Africans as to the benefits of democracy vis-à-vis other forms of government. Religious organizations in Africa have been the leaders in civic education and political mobilization among members. Africans who gain experience and understanding through such activities are then willing to support democracy, even in the face of partially implemented democratic institutions and struggling economies.

As a final note, interaction between gender and each form of religiosity was insignificant in explaining variations in demand for democracy. This does not rule out, however, religious engagement as an equalizer between men and women in the political realm. It simply indicates that, in the present, short-term picture, the higher levels of involvement among women likely offer alternative channels of engagement for women

who are still left out of the political realm. Religious engagement still offers a promising venue of training and empowerment for women that could spill over into the political arena in the long-run.

5.4.2.3 Supply of Democracy

Turning to the supply side of the equation, do gender, religion and religiosity affect Africans' assessment of the democracy they are receiving?

Table 5.4 Multivariate Regression – Supply of Democracy

	How Democratic	Satisfaction with Democracy	Past vs Present Political Freedoms - Freedom To	Past vs Present Personal Freedoms - Freedom from
(Constant)	1.481*** (.117)	1.053*** (.137)	2.330*** (.105)	1.760*** (.117)
Gender	0.002 (.015)	-0.017 (.017)	-0.051*** (.013)	-0.002 (.015)
Christian (Base Group = Muslim)	0.033 (.024)	-0.050 (.028)	0.004 (.021)	-0.004 (.024)
Religiosity - Religious Service Attendance	0.024*** (.006)	0.024*** (.006)	0.015** (.005)	0.028*** (.006)
Member of religious org	-0.005 (.009)	0.016 (.010)	0.012 (.008)	0.021* (.009)
Education of respondent	-0.033*** (.005)	-0.037*** (.006)	-0.014*** (.004)	-0.007 (.005)
Employment Status	0.012 (.016)	-0.003 (.019)	-0.012 (.014)	0.042** (.016)
Urban Rural (Urban =1)	-0.074*** (.018)	-0.073*** (.021)	-0.015 (.016)	-0.098*** (.018)
Interest in public affairs	0.037*** (.010)	0.077*** (.012)	0.042*** (.009)	0.011 (.010)
Member of trade union or farmers association	-0.001 (.010)	0.008 (.012)	-0.010 (.009)	-0.022* (.010)
Member of professional or business association	-0.007 (.012)	0.000 (.014)	-0.032** (.011)	-0.002 (.012)
Member of community development association	-0.019* (.009)	-0.005 (.011)	0.017* (.008)	0.005 (.009)
How close to political party	0.024* (.012)	0.051*** (.014)	0.068*** (.011)	0.039*** (.012)
Close to Political Party	0.239*** (.058)	0.399*** (.068)	0.397*** (.052)	0.252*** (.058)
Radio news	0.007 (.007)	0.026*** (.008)	0.020*** (.006)	0.010 (.007)
Television news	-0.015** (.006)	-0.019** (.007)	0.033*** (.005)	0.016** (.006)
Newspaper news	-0.013 (.006)	0.005 (.007)	-0.022*** (.006)	-0.031*** (.006)

Opinion of country's present economic condition	0.109*** (.006)	0.139*** (.007)	0.029*** (.006)	0.100*** (.006)
Freedom House Level of Democratization	0.402*** (.031)	0.463*** (.036)	0.576*** (.028)	0.677*** (.031)
CEDAW Adoption	-0.063 (.035)	-0.184*** (.040)	-0.201*** (.031)	-0.155*** (.035)
CEDAW Optional Protocol Adoption	-0.095*** (.022)	-0.169*** (.026)	-0.146*** (.021)	-0.182*** (.023)
Presence of national level gender legislation	0.236*** (.019)	0.263*** (.022)	0.134*** (.017)	0.250*** (.019)
Economic situation by country	-0.090*** (.011)	-0.173*** (.013)	-0.300*** (.010)	-0.296*** (.011)
Personal Poverty (LivedPovertyIndex)	-0.07*** (.009)	-0.089*** (.011)	-0.057*** (.008)	-0.063*** (.009)
Christian Nation	-0.05* (.020)	0.062** (.024)	0.037* (.018)	0.044 (.021)
Tolerance	-0.014* (.007)	-0.011 (.008)	-0.007 (.006)	-0.002 (.007)
Gender Equality	0.012 (.007)	0.025** (.008)	0.051*** (.006)	0.038*** (.007)
Accountability	-0.021** (.007)	-0.015 (.008)	0.041*** (.006)	0.016* (.007)
Political Equality	0.023** (.008)	0.047*** (.009)	0.055*** (.007)	0.019* (.008)
Gender*Religiosity	-.023** (.009)	.011 (.010)	-.007 (.008)	-.008 (.009)
Gender*Member	-.007 (.015)	.014 (.017)	.001 (.013)	.011 (.015)
Gender*Christian	-.027 (.030)	.002 (.035)	.046 (.027)	.007 (.030)
N	21344	22005	21439	21659
Adj R^2	0.097	.104	.120	.110

Note: Unstandardized coefficients followed by standard errors

As anticipated, regardless of other factors facing them, women and men in emerging African democracies are equally satisfied with democracy overall. The only divergence between the two genders is in their evaluation of their gains in political freedoms. Women are less likely than men to express a feeling of improved access to the political realm. Women do not feel free to say what they think in public venues to the same degree as do men. This is true for women from all educational and socio-economic levels, irrespective of their civic involvement or media exposure. Democracy may have improved in sub-Saharan Africa, but men and women have not felt the gains equally.

Women continue to lag behind men in political opportunities regardless of their education or training.

Also as anticipated, Christians and Muslims equally appraise their democratic experiences. Both groups are equally satisfied or dissatisfied with the democracy they are receiving. Intensity of involvement in religion, both through service attendance and through para-church/mosque activities, does affect satisfaction with democracy. Africans who are active members in religious bodies are more satisfied with their experienced democracy than are those who are less involved. The experience and understanding of democracy that is gained through organizational involvement perhaps builds more realistic expectations and patience among citizens of emerging democracies. A weakly significant effect emerged when gender was interacted with religion. Christian women are potentially more likely than Muslims to be satisfied with gains made in their political freedoms. Muslim women are slightly less likely than Christians to positively appraise their gains in the political realm. This finding is barely significant statistically, but may offer important insight. While religion on a whole does not affect African political attitudes, religion has different affects on women depending on whether they are Muslim or Christian.

Finally, on the supply side of the equation, religiosity, when interacted with gender, did not matter except among Christians. Christian women who are more highly religious in the form of regular service attendance are significantly more likely than those who are inactive to be critical of democracy.⁵⁷ This is not necessarily bad for democracy, however. Women are gaining experience and understanding about the political realm and their roles within society. This heightened awareness is likely giving them a more keen

⁵⁷ Gender*Religiosity (Christian only): Unstandardized Coefficient = -.019, Standard Error = .009, p=.036

perspective on what to expect from their governing institutions (Norris 1999). Thus, religious activity, when it matters, may not be reducing the gap between men and women, but may actually be fostering sophisticated, democratically-minded Christian women. Religious engagement, therefore, seems positive for democratic success.

5.4.3 Other Important Factors

We see that gender, religion and religiosity do affect Africans' political attitudes. Other factors, however, do work with these cultural identities to mold the way Africans view democracy. Across the board, exposure to mass media, through newspapers, television and radio, increases the likelihood that an African will both demand democracy and reject autocracy. Media exposure, however, has divergent effects on perceived supply of democracy. Those who get their information from the radio are more likely to be satisfied with democracy, while television viewers are less likely to be satisfied with democracy. Television viewers are, on the other hand, more likely to believe their freedoms have improved, while newspaper readers are less likely to profess an improved state of affairs in both personal and political freedoms.

Higher actual levels of democracy, as measured by Freedom House scores, encourage both demand for democracy and satisfaction with democracy. Experience with improved democracy is reinforcing. Those who have lived in a positive democratic environment are more likely to profess democracy as the only alternative and to be satisfied with the way democracy is turning out in their country. Citizens in countries which have adopted CEDAW are perhaps more critical citizens (Norris 1999). Residents in these countries seem less satisfied with the democracy they are receiving than are

residents in non-CEDAW adopting states (Appendix 8, Table 4). CEDAW adopting nations evidence citizens, on the other hand, who more often demand democracy and reject one-man rule, one-party rule, and military rule (Appendix 8, Table 3). The presence of other gender institutions in a country also affects the proclivity of residents' democratic political attitudes. Residents in countries with some form of electoral gender quotas less often reject autocracy, but are more satisfied with democracy than residents in countries without electoral gender quotas (Appendix 8, Tables 3 and 4). Adoption of gender legislation may be an attempt to force citizens and leaders to increase their support for democratic norms, including but not limited to gender equality. Thus, the presence of gender quotas and legislation reasonably could be encouraging people to see the benefits democracy. The high levels of significance overall of the contextual level variables does give us one clear indication: context matters for democracy.

Economic explanations continue to play a role in democratic attitudes. Africans who live in poorer performing economies are more likely to demand democracy and to reject autocracy. They have seen the economic disarray that autocratic leaders have caused and want the more predictable political space that democracy offers in which their economies can grow. Strangely enough, those who live in countries with weaker economies are also more likely to be satisfied with democracy. While counterintuitive, this finding is a hopeful one regarding the chance for democracy in struggling economies states. Africans whose countries are coming up short economically are willing to stick with democracy, perhaps recognizing that part of their economic woes are because of the incomplete democratic transitions in most of their countries.

5.5 Conclusion

As expected, Africans on the whole demand democracy. Yet, there are differences among men and women. Women, due to their role as the caregivers in society, more often allow for the non-democratic alternative of one-party rule. They are wary of the division and instability that multi-party transitions often bring. Africans also generally believe they are receiving democracy, albeit with problems. Muslims express greater satisfaction with the democracy they are receiving than do Christians. As members of a minority group based on their religion, Muslims had more to gain with the opening up of political space due to democratic transitions. Once most other possible explanations for democratic attitudes are held constant, women are still less likely than men to be satisfied with democracy in the form of gains in political freedoms. Religious identity loses its significance in favor of economic, social and institutional variables. Muslims decidedly limited access to educational and economic opportunities drives their hope in the promises of democracy. Religious engagement, however, does increase both demand and perceived supply of democracy. Christian women who are actively involved in religious services and associations become more critical of the democracy they are receiving. The civic training and perceived efficacy gained by Africans who are active in religious services and organizations encourages democracy.

5.6 Caveat

In my investigation of democratic attitudes among Africans, there is a statistical significance among many of the traditionally important causal factors discussed in democratization literature and research regarding democratic orientations. I present,

however, one major caveat to my causal findings.

I present any causal relationships between my independent variables and the formation of democratic political orientations circumspectly. This is due to the amount of variance explained by each model: it is very low, even for public opinion data. Thus, I issue a caveat in the application of my findings. The amount of explained variance ranges from 4% to 13%. Thus, the models put forth in this chapter do not capture around 90% of what is going on in democratic attitude formation in emerging African democracies. I have faith that the considerations of my project are important, nevertheless. First, I present an attempt to systematically, and quantitatively, investigate support for and assessment of democracy in transitioning democracies across Africa. I recognize that there are a great many unknowns that affect people's core beliefs and judgments of their political situations. I assert, however, that, if attitudes are crucial building blocks of stable democracy, then an attempt at understanding what tangible, and potentially alterable factors are driving democratic demands and evaluations is crucial. This venture applies common wisdom from democratization studies to investigating political attitudes. Furthermore, previous research using African public opinion data shows that additional measures of cognitive awareness more fully explain demand for democracy and evaluation of received political goods increase the explanatory outputs regarding perceived supply of democracy (Bratton *et al* 2005). I include formal education and measures of cognitive political engagement (interest in politics, discussion of political events, and internal sense of political efficacy), but omit political awareness as a third form of cognitive awareness that Bratton *et al* (2005) evidence as influential factors in the

demand for democracy. Evidence is also presented for an important role played by performance evaluation of regimes and economies in resultant perceptions of the democracy Africans believe they are receiving (Bratton *et al* 2005). I include the measures that the theory outlined in chapter two supported, rather than simply including all controls that may potentially help explain my dependent variables. Thus, I include some controls for political awareness and performance evaluation, but not others, believing I have included factors pertinent to the theory on which this project. Yet, it is important to note that performance evaluations, such as trust in state institutions, performance of the economy, government policy performance, or the president's performance effect the amount of variation in perceived extent of democracy among Africans. Also, cognitive awareness, including knowledge of one's leaders, awareness of democracy, and political understanding, add to the amount of understood variance in demand for democracy among Africans. Finally, though my models do not tell the whole or majority of the story behind political attitude formation, in this work, I lay the foundation for future research and theorizing that should bring a richness of understanding regarding political values to the field of democratization studies.

Chapter 6 – Roles of Gender and Religion in Political Participation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter turns to the final building block underlying democratic orientations among citizens of emerging African democracies: political behaviors. Chapter 4 shows that, by and large, both men and women in Africa value democracy. Also, while religion does affect variations in African's democratic values, most Christians and Muslims value democracy. This is true for men and women within each religion. In chapter 5, I show that most Africans also demand democracy, though are a bit more reserved in their evaluation of the quality of democracy they are receiving.

Chapter 6 will assess the validity of prior research that revealed gender disparities in political engagement. I believe that it is important at this juncture to examine the validity of the gender gap claims in regards to democratic behaviors. It is necessary to situate gender within overall political activism as well as within other important factors potentially behind African political behaviors. Religion and religiosity are likely pieces of the puzzle regarding African political activism that receive inadequate attention, especially in relation to their effects across gender. How widespread are political behaviors in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) generally? Do women engage in these behaviors more or less than men? If so, what are some of the potentially significant factors, including religion, driving political behaviors across genders in Africa?

As with chapters 4 and 5, I set up my discussion with explanation of the behaviors I will examine. I then lay out my expectations as far as what the literature and data will reveal. Finally, I present and evaluate state of the art public opinion data taken from 16

African nations. I end with overall conclusions.

6.2 Political Behaviors

Conventionally defined, political participation incorporates “those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba *et al* 1978: 552). Political participation has generally come to be viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon and must be studied as such (Verba and Nie 1972). Thus, I disaggregate the dependent variable, believing that different explanations will emerge in regards to different forms of political participation. I use factor analysis on the measures of political participation to see if they fall into conventional categories, thus considering horizontal political engagement among peers, which I call *political communing*, contacting political leaders, participation in protests or demonstrations, and participation in political violence as the potential categories for this dependent variable.⁵⁸ Political communing captures horizontal political behaviors, or engagement of the political realm in which peers act together. In this project, these include attendance at community meetings, joining together with peers to raise political issues, and discussing politics among peers. I maintain that each of these sets of behaviors, communing, contacting, protesting and violence, is found in emerging democracies.

Each of the five categories of political engagement I consider directly stem from the procedural definition of democracy on which this project is built. Each involves some connection to the structures of democracy, whether horizontally with fellow voters, vertically through contacting those who have been elected, or through protesting against

⁵⁸ The “communings” and “contacting” dependent variables are drawn from Questions 25 and 29 from the Afrobarometer Questionnaire. See Appendix 1 for question text and responses.

those who are in the power structures. Each of the behaviors I consider deviates from the political behaviors, such as voting or membership in a political party or economic organization, which are traditionally studied in democratic participation research.

Norris (1999) finds that elite-driven behaviors in developed societies, such as voting, are diminishing as citizens become more critical of hierarchical authorities and party lines. Democratic values are deepening at the same time, as elite-challenging behaviors expand and people actually become more involved in political life (Norris 1999). Citizens engage the political realm, though, through different avenues. This project focuses on the effects of gender and religion on instances of these newer forms of political activism.

Initial surveys across democratizing African nations offer foundational insight for my project. Bratton *et al* (2005) assessed responses to surveys across emerging African democracies in 1999-2000. They included consideration of protesting, communing, and contacting. Overall, they found that people who participate in these behaviors tend to be “early adopters” of democratic orientations. This suggests that actions precede attitudes, as discussed in chapter two. These findings contradict the direction of the relationship between cultural attitudes and regime types assumed in this project. Their work, however, substantiates a relationship between culture and regime type. Thus, their findings offer insight to this project. I build from such demonstrated links on culture and democracy in citing more recent evidence on the prevalence of and potential reasons behind communing, contacting, or protesting offers indications about the opportunities for democracy across Africa.

Previous work on the political behaviors included in this endeavor does not specifically address the crucial differences that likely exist between men and women or among interactions between gender and religion or religiosity variables. Bratton *et al* (2005) do take into account the effects of religious membership on these political behaviors. They find that, when looking at membership in religious groups, voting is not explained by such membership. Membership in a religious group is found, however, to help explain protesting and communing and contacting. Religious group affiliation corresponds to a negative relationship with protesting and a positive relationship with communing and contacting. The impacts of gender and religion do not receive equal attention. Thus, there exists a void in our conception of mass level political engagement that focuses on two key identities by which people sort themselves: gender and religion.

6.2.1 Communing

Communing is an index of horizontal interaction among citizens in relation to politics. Respondents are asked if they have ever personally done the following during the past year: “Discussed politics with friends or neighbors,” “Attended a community meeting,” and “Got together with others to raise an issue.” It includes response which range from “ yes, often” to “no, would never do this.” These three behaviors vary together and have a high degree of reliability in explaining one basic form of political interaction. The index of communing factors together with a high degree of reliability capturing peer-level, shared political engagement (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Communing Index: Factor Analysis and Reliability

Discuss politics	0.482
Attend a community meeting	0.532
Join others to raise an issue	0.639
Cronbach’s alpha (Reliability)	.697

Thus, I consider them as one. In order for democracy to grow, people must feel free to express their opinions and engage with others to learn about political issues. Collective action around policy issues is an important expression of political engagement open to a much wider section of society. In order to truly understand if Africans are participating in democracy, an inclusion of the most basic forms of political interaction is crucial. These behaviors capture such activities.

6.2.2 Contacting

Both forms of contacting, formal and informal, come from a question in which respondents were asked how often during the past year they had “contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views?” When analyzed, responses to this question fell into two categories: contacting of formal political leaders and communication with leaders who are part of informal political channels.⁵⁹ Formal leaders include local government councilors, members of parliament, officials of government ministries, or political party leaders. Informal political leaders include religious leaders, local elders or “some other influential person.” Bratton and van de Walle (1997) find that African politics is still largely patrimonial. Networks and contacts are the venues through which political outputs are gained. Therefore, in Africa, “a visit to a religious leader...can be just as political as a visit to an elected politician or a government official” (Logan and Bratton 2006: 15). Evidence of both citizenship and patronage exist in Africa. Residents of African states have yet to fully shift away from seeing themselves as clients of patron leaders. There is a mix of clientelistic sentiment and the citizenship view that leaders are under the will and initiative of “we the people.”

⁵⁹ see Appendix 7

In order for democracy to take root in Africa, this transition must occur. I will assess the extent of contacting that occurs as well as if it is through formal or informal channels, thereby speaking to the role that Africans are playing as either citizens or clients.

6.2.3 Protesting or Demonstrating and Political Violence

I analyze participation and causation of protests and violence through responses to the question of whether or not respondents had “attended a demonstration or protest march” or “used force or violence for a political cause” during the past year. Growing protests and violence may indicate instability and lack of satisfaction with the performance or core tenets of a regime. These activities may also be signs, however, of more critical citizens who are pushing for a deepening of democracy (Norris 1999). Democratic commitments in Africa have proven in the past to be widespread, though somewhat shallow (Bratton 2002). I will consider the incidence of protests and violence, specifically focusing on gender and religion. Do religion, religiosity or gender encourage or mitigate decisions to engage in protests or violence over political issues.

6.3 Expectations

Do Africans participate in their own governance? This depends. I expect that participation levels will prove to be high across democratically experimenting African states. Africans will be involved to differing degrees, however, depending on the type of political behavior in question. Furthermore, the type of political behavior will affect the significance of all three of the variables of primary interest in this paper. Whether and how gender, religion and either form of religiosity help explain variation in political engagement will directly relate to the type of participation under examination.

Do women engage politically more or less than men? Does gender affect political behavior? How? Overall, African women usually participate less than African men in politics (Tripp 2001; Norris 1999). While this gap is usually moderate, it is consistent across many forms of civic behavior (Inglehart and Norris 2003). I expect that my findings will not differ, though I focus on less commonly examined forms of political engagement. Women will participate in political activities less than men. Women are not, however, more passive in the governing of their lives nor are they more authoritarian than men. Women do a large part of the work in developing countries to provide for their families, both immediate and extended (Mikell 1997). Thus, women are already overburdened in many cases, and arguably have little extra time for extra activities in the public realm.⁶⁰ Also, women are much more likely to receive little to no formal schooling relative to men. Women in emerging African democracies report a significant gap in education. 19% of women report having received no formal schooling compared to only

⁶⁰ This argument has been a central thesis in sociology and anthropology over the last two decades. In political science, however, Logan and Bratton (2006) have recently shown that this argument may not persist. Their work across emerging African democracies reveals that the busiest women participate in politics most in comparison to less busy women.

15% of men who lack formal schooling.⁶¹ Furthermore, men still dominate the public space in Africa, and do not relish giving up their power in order to bring women into the conversation. Intimidation and harassment continues to accompany elections and surrounding forms of political engagement, pointed especially at women. Tripp cites behavior ranging from the stealing of women's voter cards to beatings, abandonment and murder as a result of female attempts to engage in Uganda's 1996 presidential elections (Tripp 2001b). The continued oppression of women throughout the world excludes them from many formal avenues of political engagement.

Are there variations across or within religions in democratic political participation? If so, *how* are democratic behaviors affected across religion? I expect that there will be variations across Christianity and Islam in political participation among Africans, depending on the behavior in question. Research over time has shown that religious traditions can be key differentiating factors in transformations to democracy (Lipset 1994; Huntington 1993). Historically, there is evidence revealing that women come under greater degrees of subordination in Africa during periods of Islamic expansion (Aubrey 2001). There is also qualitative research demonstrating variations across Islam and Christianity in African political orientations due to the social and economic exclusion and hardships faced by Muslims in predominantly Christian African nations (Oded 2000). Thus, I expect religion to affect political participation in emerging African democracies even when other theoretically important explanations are considered.

Democracy is not yet consolidated across Africa, and therefore disadvantaged groups have yet to make up lost ground between themselves and majority groups.

⁶¹ $t=12.686, p<.001$

Muslims have gained in access to the political realm in Africa. They are still, on the other hand, disadvantaged in many ways. Thus, after controlling for the areas that are obstacles to Muslim political engagement (e.g.: income, perceived economic status, education), Muslims will be more involved than Christians, as they are fighting for their rights in the political realm. Therefore, even though a direct relationship may emerge between religion and political participation, I believe the status of Muslims as part of an oppressed, minority group will in part help explain their higher levels of political activism. Women within each religion, contrarily, will buck this general trend. Christian women will prove less involved than Christian men, but more involved than Muslim women. Muslim women will emerge as the least active in the political arena.

If there is a gender gap, what are some of the potentially significant factors driving this gender variation? Does religiosity affect levels of democratic engagement? African levels of religiosity are traditionally high. I expect that variations in religiosity will partially help explain variations in political behavior. Frequency of service attendance will encourage political communing and contacting among Africans, but will not have any consistent effect on protesting or violent behavior. Membership in religious organizations, regardless of religion, will increase democratic participation in all five behaviors I examine. Experience through activity in religious organizations, as types of civil society organizations, will increase respondents' valuation of the participatory processes that are essential parts of democratic governance (Lipset 1994; Finkel 1987; Verba 1965; Lipset 1959). Women tend to be more religious than men in Africa. I expect, therefore, that religiosity will reduce gender gaps in participation.

Finally, there will be variations in political participation that emerge due to the cross-national nature of my data. Thus, I include country dummy variables to control for fixed effects across countries. If these prove to be significant in explaining variation in political participation, I will include some national level controls to try and explain why there are differences across countries. Thus, what are the potential relationships between the presence of contextual factors and the political orientations among Africans across gender and religion? I anticipate that nations with gender quotas in their constitutions will have higher overall levels of political engagement, especially among women, than will nations who lack such legislation. I assume that a nation's dominant religion, if it exists, will affect democratic participation. Christian nations will evidence more engaged citizens than non-Christian nations (Putnam 1993). I hold that nations with higher levels of democratization will have citizens who are involved politically to a greater extent than nations with lower levels of democratization. Countries with worse economic situations will have lower levels of democratic participation, as citizens are constrained by activities necessary for survival. I believe this will be the case even at the individual level, though higher levels of poverty may be associated with a greater likelihood of resorting to protests or violence. Drawing from modernization theory, I insist that respondents with higher levels of economic security will be more likely to engage politically (Bratton 2006; Oded 2000). I dispute modernization theory in its claim that secularization must necessarily accompany the transfer of authority from religious institutions to political institutions (Norris 1999). In Africa, as we will see, modernization is happening with shared power in the religious and political realms.

6.4 Findings

6.4.1 Prevalence of Democratic Political Behaviors in Africa

I now turn to the frequency with which Africans in general participate in politics. Is participation widespread? Across which form(s) of behavior? What role do gender and religion play in these political activities?

As a background, I compare overall participation results across continents taken by the Comparative Study of Electoral System. While the questions are not exactly the same⁶², there are comparable questions that relate to each of the behavioral categories in which I am interested: contacting, communing and less conventional forms of political engagement. Africans are more likely to contact formal political leaders than are Asians, Europeans or South Americans, but less so than North Americans or Australians. Africans are more likely than residents throughout the rest of the globe to protest. Finally, Africans in emerging democracies are far more likely to join others to raise political concerns than residents elsewhere in the world. In a global perspective, therefore, Africans are very politically active in behaviors that promote democracy.

⁶² **AB questions:** Formal Contacting: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views? A Member of Parliament; An official of a government ministry; A Local Government councilor; Protesting: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? Attended a demonstration or protest march; Work with others who share a concern: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? Got together with others to raise an issue. **CSES questions:** Formal Contacting: Over the past five years or so, have you done any of the following things to express your views about something the government should or should not be doing? (Have you) contacted a politician or government official either in person, or in writing, or some other way?; Protesting: (Have you) taken part in a protest, march or demonstration?; Work with others who share a concern: (Have you) worked together with people who shared the same concern?


Table 6.2: Forms of Participation Globally

	SS. Africa	Asia	Europe	North America	South America	Australia
Formal Contact: Politician or Official	18%	7%	12%	21%	11%	24%
Protest or Demonstration	14%	10%	11%	8%	8%	11%
Work with Others Who Share Concern	52%	8%	19%	23%	19%	21%

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 2 FOURTH ADVANCE RELEASE [dataset]. April 10, 2006.

Mass level surveys confirm that Africans engage with one another in politics. Overall, only one-fifth of Africans in our sample say they have never and would never participate in communing. Another 60% revealed they have communed to varying degrees.

Figure 6.1: Communing Across Africa



Note: N=23,887; valid percentages; percent of men/women or of Christian/Muslims, not of overall sample

Is there a gender gap across Africa in political communing? Are there variations between Christianity and Islam? If so, are there variations within each religion across gender? There is a gender gap in political communing. Men are 10% more likely than

women to discuss politics; 6% more likely to attend community meetings, and 14% more likely to join others to raise an issue. Overall, 55% of men say they have communed, while only 45% of women have participated in communing. That means that 33% of all Africans are men who commune, while only 27% of all Africans are women who commune. A marked difference between men and women in horizontal political engagement exists.⁶³ Even at this foundational level, men are advantaged in political activism over and above women.

Overall, Muslims are statistically less involved in communing than are Christians.⁶⁴ Of Africans in emerging democracies, 41% are Christians who commune, 11% are Muslims who commune, and 8% are members of other religious groups who commune. Muslims and Christians discuss politics at equal rates, but Christians are more likely to attend community meetings and to join others to raise political issues. This reveals a gap in opportunity for Muslims. While they feel equally open to talk about political issues they find important, the avenues for mobilizing these issues are either less present in Muslim communities or there are greater obstacles facing Muslims regarding horizontal political activism. Do similar gaps exist between men and women within Christianity and Islam?

Muslim women are conspicuously less likely than Muslim men to participate in all three forms of horizontal political engagement.⁶⁵ 5% of all Africans are female Muslims who actively participate in politics with their peers. 6% of all Africans, however, are male Muslims who engage in such activities. Christian women also

⁶³ Difference of means test: $t=22.121$, $p<.001$

⁶⁴ Difference of means test: $t=-10.151$, $p<.001$

⁶⁵ Difference of means test: $t=13.840$, $p<.001$

commune remarkably less than their male religious counterparts.⁶⁶ 22% of Africans are Christian males who commune, while only 20% of Africans are Christian women who commune. Christian women are notably more involved than Muslim women, however, in horizontal communing.⁶⁷

Breaking communing down by behavior, we get a fuller picture of what type of horizontal political behaviors are utilized by Africans in emerging democracies.⁶⁸

Africans in democratically experimenting nations overall attend community meetings more regularly than they discuss politics or join with others to raise issues (66% versus 59% or 52% respectively). If Africans are attending community meetings regularly and not discussing politics, do we see a lack of depth in their involvement, perhaps reflecting a more mobilized rather than autonomous form of political engagement (Bratton 2006)? Or are community meetings simply a consistently used form of interaction in emerging African democracies, bring people together for both political and non-political reasons? If we opt for the later explanation, as I do, even without specifically addressing political issues at these meetings, they are building the skills necessary in participants to prepare them for efficacy in the political realm. The social capital is being created that will support Africans' ability and awareness to participate in political activities (Norris and Inglehart 2005; Putnam 1993).


Do these trends in horizontal political participation exist in vertical forms of political participation?

⁶⁶ Difference of means test: $t=16.756$, $p<.001$

⁶⁷ Difference of means test: $t=-10.574$, $p<.001$

⁶⁸ See Appendix 1

Figure 6.2: Formal Contacting



Note: N=23,251; Valid percentages; percents within gender or within religion

Overall, Africans in emerging democracies contact formal leaders at notably low rates when considered next to their levels of communing or informal contacting. Only 18% of those sampled have ever contacted either local government representatives, members of parliament, officials of government ministries or political party leaders. Around 81% of Africans surveyed said they never contact any of their formal leaders, compared with only 21% of those who said they would never commune.

Again, women are less involved than men. Women (15%) turn to formal political leaders at a reliably lower rate than men (22%).⁶⁹ Muslims choose to contact formal political leaders notably less than Christians.⁷⁰ The gender gap persists within both Islam and Christianity. The gap between men and women is notably larger than the gap between Muslims and Christians. Therefore, it seems the important differences in formal contacting are between men and women, rather than across religion. Religion seems to reinforce the gender gap, though the gap between men and women is smaller among


⁶⁹ Difference of means test: $t=-17.302$, $p<.001$

⁷⁰ Difference of means test: $t=-3.331$, $p<.001$

Christians than among Muslims. I assume this is due to the higher religiosity among Christian women than among Muslim women.

Who are Africans contacting when they do contact formal government leaders?⁷¹ Africans are most often contacting local government representatives. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) found that Africans were still largely clients rather than citizens, meaning they look to government as a parent or patron who should take care of them, rather than as a set of institutions and employees who administer the will of the people. The results I present seem to indicate that this neo-patrimonial nature of African governing systems is drawing Africans to contact leaders who can most readily provide for them in a very tangible sense. Local government agents represent fewer people. They are more readily accessible, and more likely to be able to meet immediate needs of constituents who come to them. Thus, it makes sense given the political culture of most African societies that local government representatives would be the first in the formal chain of command to which average citizens would turn.

Figure 6.3: Informal Contacting



Note: N=22,294; Valid percentages; percents within gender or within religion, not overall sample

⁷¹ See Appendix 1

Consequently, Africans are far more likely to contact leaders who informally affect the political realm. More than twice as many respondents regularly contact religious leaders, traditional leaders, or some other influential people than contact formal leaders.

As with formal contacting, men are strikingly more likely than women to contact informal leaders,⁷² as are Christians vis-à-vis Muslims.⁷³ The gender gap between men and women continues within Islam⁷⁴ and Christianity.⁷⁵ Echoing findings on formal contacting, the gap between Muslims and Christians, though significant, is smaller than between men and women. There is a slightly smaller gender gap within Christianity than emerged in the overall gap between men and women. Muslim men and women are slightly more divided in contacting formal leaders than men and women overall in Africa.

Who do they contact first? Africans regularly contact their religious leaders to a greater extent than they contact traditional leaders or other influential individuals. Statistical tests reveal that these differences are notable and significant. As discussed, Africans are highly religious. Africans regularly attend religious services and engage in para-church/mosque religious organizations. This gives recurrent opportunities for them to connect with their religious leaders. Regular religious activism also builds trust, fostering networks to which Africans readily turn.

To drive the point home regarding the prevalence of informal contacting versus formal contacting in Africa, I offer a view of informal versus formal contacting by country.


⁷² Difference of means test: $t=-7.181$, $p<.001$

⁷³ Difference of means test: $t=11.007$, $p<.001$

⁷⁴ Difference of means test: $t = -11.378$, $p<.001$

⁷⁵ Difference of means test: $t=-7.120$, $p<.001$

Figure 6.4: Contacting Across Countries (percent in country)




Note: Formal: N=23,251; Informal N=22,294; Valid percents

Clearly, informal contacting is more widely practiced than formal contacting in every emerging African democracy. This finding supports the thesis that Africans are yet to make the full transition to citizen, functioning as clients of government-patrons. They use informal channels, through which more direct and immediate results can be obtained. This finding also suggests that the formal institutions of Africa's emerging democracies may not be reliable avenues through which Africans in need choose to function. A final point of note is that the two most highly regarded democracies in Africa, South Africa and Botswana, rank as two of the three least active in formal and informal contacting. Their ranking gives cautious support to the idea that increasing levels of democracy create critical citizens who avoid participation with political elites, both formal and informal (Norris 1999).

Most Africans in emerging African democracies do not protest or demonstrate.

This could both be a positive or negative finding for democratic growth in Africa. Protests can turn violent, causing the break down of order in a society. Protests are also evidence of a critical citizenry that feels safe enough and free enough to take bold action against abuses of the state or to voice grievances they have with political ideas or practices (Norris 1999). The low level of protesting or demonstrating among Africans compared with their relatively high levels of communing could signal Africans opting for less potentially-volatile forms of political engagement. Yet research has shown that many of the communing activities are mobilized rather than autonomous actions of citizens (Bratton 2006). This then would signal that the small proportion of Africans who are protesting represent a lack of widespread citizenry among Africans. They are not evaluating their governments independently at high levels, evidenced by their participation in mobilized activities but major absence from more autonomous activities in the political realm.

Figure 6.5: Protesting



Note: N=23,904; Valid percentages

There is a discrepancy in the frequency with which men engage in political

protests versus women who demonstrate.⁷⁶ Across Islam and Christianity, around 14% of each faith said they had protested or demonstrated over political issues. Muslims and Christians report protesting equally. Religion does seem to matter, however, in its effects on the gap between men and women in political protesting. Women overall are less likely than men in both Islam and Christianity to protest or demonstrate. Muslim men are the most likely to protest. They do so nearly twice as often as Muslim women and slightly more than Christian men.⁷⁷ Christian men protest only moderately more than Christian women. Thus, there is a marked difference between Muslim and Christian men in protesting. As with previous findings, Muslim women are the least likely to protest, though the difference I found between Muslim women and Christian women is not statistically significant.⁷⁸ It seems that gender, rather than religion, is a more determinative factor in explaining whether or not an African will protest or demonstrate. Women simply do not protest as often as men. Women's fear of the potential violence that could result from protests or demonstrations keeps them away from this form of engagement (Personal Interviews, September 2005). If protesting is a sign of growing citizenship in democracies (Norris 1999), women are disadvantaged in an important modern form of democratic engagement.


Far fewer Africans said that they had ever resorted to violence over political issues than said they had done any of the previous forms of inter-electoral political activities (Figure 6.6).

⁷⁶ Difference of means test: $t = -11.953$, $p < .001$

⁷⁷ Difference of means test: Christian vs Muslim men: $t = 3.144$, $p = .002$

⁷⁸ Difference of means test: $t = -.995$, $p = .320$

Figure 6.6: Political Violence



Note: N=23,909; Valid percentages

If Africa is any example, it seems, then, that the riots and violent outbursts reported in emerging democracies in the developing world are perpetrated by the few, not the many. As has been the trend throughout this paper, women are slightly yet notably less likely to participate in politics than men.⁷⁹ Muslims elect violent political activities slightly more often than Christians.⁸⁰ Muslim men will more readily turn to violence to handle political issues than will Christian men or women in either religion.

Statistically, each of these differences emerges as significant at the $p < .001$ level, thus revealing that the variations across gender and religion are noteworthy. These differences, albeit small, are present and potentially salient in explaining political activism. Muslim men, as part of economically, socially and politically disadvantaged strata of society, have few outlets through which to express their public needs. In resources-scarce emerging democracies, these outlets are crucial to avoid political disarray (Ayoob 2004).

⁷⁹ Difference of means test: $t = -6.382$, $p < .001$

⁸⁰ Difference of means test: $t = 4.850$, $p < .001$

6.4.2 Religiosity as a Bridge across the Gender Gap in Political Participation

Thus far, we have seen a gender gap in political participation. Does religiosity affect women's decisions to contact formal leaders? I consider women who contact local government representatives, since Africans contact these leaders relatively frequently. Women in emerging African democracies who never attend religious services are notably less likely to contact local government leaders than those who attend weekly⁸¹ or those who attend more than once a week⁸². African women who are active members of religious organizations are significantly more apt to contact their local government representative than are nonmembers.⁸³ Thus, membership and active participation within religious organizations, as well as more frequent attendance at religious services encourages women to contact formal leaders at the local level as well as leaders who are more informally tied to the political realm. The informal leaders they are primarily contacting are religious leaders. Thus, active religiosity encourages women's political activism, albeit in more localized or informal arenas. It does not, however, seem to significantly reduce a gap between men and women, if they are at the same level of activity in either service attendance or organizational membership. Men who are increasingly active in religious organizations and who attend religious services with increasing regularity are also more likely to contact formal and informal leaders. Christian women in Africa, however, participate in religious services and organizations with greater frequency than do men. Therefore, it seems that the gap between men and women within Christianity may be slightly lowered due to this activity over time.

⁸¹ Difference of means test: $t=-7.840$, $p<.001$

⁸² Difference of means test: $t=-6.419$, $p<.001$

⁸³ Difference of means test: $t=-8.034$, $p<.001$

When other forms of political behavior are observed, the results of religiosity on gender are mixed.⁸⁴ Males who are inactive members of religious organizations seem to engage in violence over political issues slightly more often than active members, nonmembers, or leaders of such groups. These differences do not bear up, however, under further tests of difference of each group's mean. Overall, membership in religious organizations does not seem to encourage political violence. Membership in religious associations does have an effect upon protesting among women. Females who are active members of religious groups more regularly protest than nonmembers.⁸⁵ The more often males and females attend religious services, the less likely they are to both protest or engage in political violence. This has important implications for concerns regarding the growth of religious adherence or fundamental religion as a threat to democracy. Higher levels of religiosity seem thus far in my findings to be good for democracy.

Overall, however, Christian women are more active in both forms of religiosity than their male counterparts, so such activity could reduce the gender gap in political participation among Christians. Muslim women, on the other hand, are less involved in religious activities than are their male counterparts. Therefore, in SSA, Muslim women's exclusion from the political realm is likely being exacerbated by the unequal access that Muslim men have to religious activities.

6.4.3 Factors Explaining Democratic Behaviors in Africa

I have shown that democratic participation is moderately widespread across Africa. Women are less involved than men; Muslims are less active than Christians. Religiosity advances democratic political behavior. I now investigate some relationships

⁸⁴ See Appendix 6, Religiosity Matrix

⁸⁵ Difference of means test: $t=2.017$, $p=.044$

surrounding Africans' decisions to engage in political behaviors. Communing, formal contacting, informal contacting, protesting and political violence are used as the dependent variables.

First, I consider gender, religion and religiosity as separate, independent factors affecting democratic political behaviors. Using bivariate correlations, I examine potential affects these factors have on political actions.

As Table 6.3 reveals, religion, religiosity and gender do prospectively affect democratic political behavior. These correlations tentatively confirm the previously-discussed incidence of political engagement.

Table 6.3: Bivariate Correlations of Political Behavior – Do Religion, Religiosity or Gender Matter?

	Communing	Formal Contacting	Informal Contacting	Protesting/ Demonstrating	Political Violence
Gender	-.159**	-.127**	-.083**	-.087**	-.046**
Christian	.078**	.041**	.095**	-.023**	-.036**
Muslim	-.065**	-.012	-.031**	-.009	.035**
Service Attendance	.076**	.099**	.170**	-.023**	-.016**
Membership in Religious Organization	.112**	.114**	.217**	.022**	-.016**

Statistic is the Pearson correlation; Significance is at the $p < .01$ level (2-tailed)

Women appear to participate less than men in all forms of political behavior under examination.

Christians participate in the conceivably more positive forms of political activism more than members of other faiths, while they participate less in the arguably negative forms of political engagement. Muslims are less likely to commune or contact informal leaders than are Christians, though they are perhaps more likely to engage in violence to deal with political issues. I will discuss potential reasons behind this finding later. In

short, I purport throughout this paper that the disadvantaged position of Muslims in a majority of the countries covered in this project offers key insight into the relationship of Christianity and Islam to political engagement. Regular religious service attendance and active membership in religious organizations encourages political engagement, except in the case of political violence. These two forms of religiosity discourage turning to violence to deal with political issues.

Do these relationships hold when accounted for among other theoretically dynamic causes of political activism? It is highly likely that these bivariate results are spurious, once the factors that theory says drive political participation are included in more fully specified models. Thus, I will consider if, once a range of important elements are taken into account, gender, religion and forms of religiosity still affect Africans' decisions to involve themselves politically.

As in chapters four and five, theory drives me to add the following explanatory factors to each model. As discussed above, previous research indicates that urbanization and economic growth account for value formation. Also, higher levels of education have been shown to reduce the gender gap, as well as decrease the affects of religious ideology, in opportunities and decisions in people's lives. As mentioned above, economic arguments of democratic value formation point towards unemployment and actual economic standings (captured in the Lived Poverty Index⁸⁶) driving democratic orientations. Interest in politics, willingness to closely affiliate with a political party, civil society involvement, area of residence (urban or rural) and exposure to forms of mass media are also widely believed to be important in democratic orientations. My interest in

⁸⁶ This is an index created from Afrobarometer questions regarding access to basic resources. It more fully captures actual economic standing than reports of income in Africa. See Bratton (2006) for a discussion of this variable.

potential clustering due to national level factors, as well as the ability to test the claim that institutions could not matter without value change, leads me to include controls for country level democratization, gender equality, religious heritage and economic situation.⁸⁷ I included country dummy variables in my analysis to control for fixed effects, and found that a respondent's country of residence did make a difference in their expressed democratic values. With the foci of this project centering on democratization, trying to verify cultural versus institutional or economic explanations for democratic value formation, I have included country level variables to test if the areas in which I am interested are part of the differentiating effects across countries. Finally, since this work builds on the belief that behaviors are founded on political attitudes which have their roots in political values, I include political values and attitudes to see if they are statistically significant in forming political behaviors in emerging African democracies.

As in chapters 4 and 5, due to the high number of respondents in this sample, 19,201 to be exact, it is rather easy to get results that are significant at more relaxed levels of confidence. Thus, I consider findings as importantly significant at the $p < .010$ (**) or $p < .001$ level or higher (***).

The overall findings in regards to the variables in which I am keenly interested are shown in Table 6.4.

⁸⁷ See Appendix 2 for explanation of these variables

Table 6.4: Multivariate Regression on Political Behavior – Do Religion, Religiosity or Gender Matter?

	Communing	Formal Contacting	Informal Contacting	Protesting	Violence
(Constant)	0.873*** (.119)	-0.375*** (.068)	-0.141 (.097)	0.026 (.114)	0.302*** (.076)
Gender	-0.181*** (.016)	-0.094*** (.009)	-0.109*** (.013)	-0.080*** (.015)	-0.037*** (.010)
Christian	-0.102*** (.026)	-0.072*** (.014)	-0.026 (.021)	-0.060* (.025)	-0.031 (.016)
Other Religion	-0.186*** (.026)	-0.076*** (.021)	-0.038 (.031)	-0.070* (.035)	-0.042 (.024)
Religiosity	0.005 (.006)	0.015*** (.003)	0.039*** (.005)	-0.023*** (.006)	-0.006 (.004)
Member of religious group	0.015 (.010)	0.001 (.005)	0.101*** (.008)	0.012 (.009)	-0.018** (.006)
Education of respondent	0.063*** (.005)	0.024*** (.003)	0.015*** (.004)	0.041*** (.005)	0.007* (.003)
Employment Status	0.065*** (.017)	0.035*** (.010)	-0.051*** (.014)	0.018 (.017)	0.005 (.011)
Urban Rural Residence	-0.149*** (.019)	-0.052*** (.011)	-0.135*** (.016)	0.022 (.018)	-0.024* (.012)
Interest in public affairs	0.351*** (.011)	0.069*** (.006)	0.092*** (.009)	0.110*** (.011)	0.024*** (.007)
Member of trade union or farmers association	0.071*** (.011)	0.073*** (.006)	0.085*** (.009)	0.064*** (.011)	0.000 (.007)
Member of professional or business association	-0.032* (.013)	0.037*** (.007)	0.036*** (.011)	0.053*** (.013)	0.031*** (.009)
Member of community development association	0.152*** (.010)	0.078*** (.005)	0.100*** (.008)	0.034*** (.009)	0.034*** (.006)
Close to Political Party	0.539*** (.062)	0.473*** (.035)	0.204*** (.051)	0.305*** (.060)	0.151*** (.040)
How close to this political party	0.045*** (.013)	0.075*** (.007)	0.029** (.010)	0.039*** (.012)	0.021** (.008)
Radio news	0.045*** (.007)	0.011** (.004)	0.025*** (.006)	-0.005 (.007)	-0.035*** (.004)
Television news	-0.018** (.006)	-0.013*** (.003)	-0.025*** (.005)	0.041*** (.006)	0.019*** (.004)
Newspaper news	0.046*** (.007)	0.031*** (.004)	0.031*** (.006)	0.043*** (.007)	0.017*** (.004)
Attitude towards country's present economic condition	-0.019** (.007)	0.012*** (.004)	-0.003 (.005)	0.003 (.006)	0.005 (.004)
Freedom House Level of Democratization	-0.019 (.034)	0.079*** (.019)	0.209*** (.029)	-0.010 (.032)	-0.108*** (.022)
CEDAW Adoption	-0.134*** (.037)	-0.286*** (.020)	-0.149*** (.030)	-0.124*** (.035)	-0.053* (.024)
CEDAW Optional Protocol Adoption	-0.124*** (.025)	-0.088*** (.014)	-0.109*** (.024)	-0.099*** (.024)	0.042** (.016)
Presence of some national level gender legislation	0.009 (.021)	0.040*** (.012)	-0.094*** (.019)	0.075*** (.020)	0.007 (.013)

Economic situation by country	-0.027* (.012)	-0.049*** (.006)	-0.090*** (.010)	0.029** (.011)	0.032*** (.007)
Personal Poverty	0.090*** (.010)	0.035*** (.005)	0.106*** (.008)	0.062*** (.009)	0.016** (.006)
Christian Nation	0.152*** (.022)	0.035** (.012)	0.006 (.018)	-0.079*** (.021)	-0.044** (.014)
Gender*Religiosity	.034*** (.010)	-.009 (.050)	.002 (.008)	.034*** (.009)	.013* (.006)
Gender*Member	.067*** (.017)	-.020* (.009)	.003 (.014)	.035* (.016)	.012 (.011)
Gender*Christian	.102** (.033)	.029 (.018)	.089*** (.027)	.107*** (.032)	.061** (.021)
Adj R ²	.218	.171	.160	.080	.023
N	23887	23251	22294	23904	23919

OLS Regression, with unstandardized coefficients over standard errors in parentheses

6.4.3.1 Analysis

6.4.3.1a Gender

Does gender matter? My answer is a resounding yes! Regardless of an African woman's education, they will be present at political activities in fewer numbers than will men. Poor women and rich women alike are disadvantaged in the political realm because of their gender. I have found that men and women value democracy equally. Thus, the foundational building blocks for democratic engagement exist. I also found a convergence among men and women in their demand for democracy. Overall, men and women equally demand democracy and reject other forms of government. The only real difference I found between men and women in their political attitudes was in their support for one-party regimes. Women were more likely than men to support one-party systems. Women are not necessarily less democratic than men, but hold greater concerns about the potential divisiveness of multiparty systems.

"We find this to mean that women are adverse to the uncertainty that comes with change; they tend to fear the potential for conflict and divisiveness along ethnic and other line that might come if the political system is opened up" (Logan and Bratton 2006).

Thus, in the hierarchy of political values, attitudes and behaviors, it is in political

activism that equity among men and women breaks down. Women value democracy and demand democracy but are left out of its processes, and are correspondingly unhappy with the political freedoms they are not receiving.

I break the indices I created down and assess whether or not an African's gender affects each specific behavior. Gender is statistically significant in explaining variations in Africans' decisions to commune. Women are consistently less likely than men to engage with their peers in behaviors that advance democracy. Women relate to their formal political leaders less than men. Gender continues to be a barrier for women in informal political engagement. Women contact informal leaders less than men. Women stay away from protests more than men, regardless of their education, urban or rural residence, affiliation with a political party, etc. Gender matters in political activism. Women may have gained ground in access to the political arena, but they still remain behind men in many ways.

6.4.3.1b Religion

Religion matters on select political behaviors. Where religion does matter, SSA Muslims are more likely than Christians to be actively involved. Holding education, poverty levels, political party affiliation, and other important factors that drive political activism constant, Muslims engage *more often* than Christians. Christians commune less than Muslims and get in touch with their elected and appointed leaders less than Muslims. The one exception to this finding is that Christians are more likely than Muslims to attend community meetings. This finding bucks the trend found in overall communing and in Muslim participation vis-à-vis Christians. Muslims and Christians are

only marginally different in those who have resorted to violence over a political cause. This sampled difference proves unreliable in further statistical scrutiny. The real difference is between Christians and Muslims who say they haven't but would resort to violence for a political cause. More Muslims than Christians say they would use violence if given a chance than Christians. Looking in each country, patterns are consistent, except in Senegal, which is a Muslim-majority country. Here, Christians more often said they would use violence over political matters if given a chance (19% to 10% of Muslims)! This reverse does not hold true in Mali, though gives some credence to the idea that the minority status of Muslims in most of the countries in this sample may help explain their willingness to resort to violence in the public arena. Even if their actual poverty levels, education or residence location are controlled for, the psychological effects of being largely shut out of governing the decisions that affect their lives as citizens of each country may help explain the greater use of political violence among Muslims.

Thus, when opportunities are equal, it appears that Muslims step into the political arena in positive ways more than Christians. Christians are more widely represented in a majority of SSA governments. Christianity is actually the dominant religion in twelve of the sixteen nations in this study.⁸⁸ Muslims are often left out of government decisions and procedures. Governing officials frequently fail to offer substantive representation to Muslim members of SSA societies. Muslims are therefore more likely than Christians in this project to feel the need to contact formal leaders, since their informal chains of command may have less access to resources than do Christians' informal leaders.

⁸⁸ Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent, Zambia *Source:* <http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>

Furthermore, constructive avenues to participation are often closed to Muslims. In Kenya, when the Islamic Party of Kenya attempted to register as a political party in 1997, they were denied official registration because they were organized along religious lines. Many Muslims, however, felt that the other parties, though not officially, represented the interests of Christians, and that an explicitly Muslim party was necessary to ensure they had a voice in their government. Oded argues that failing to offer such formal venues for political engagement on religious lines in Africa will lead to the type of violent outburst that have occurred elsewhere in the world. In the Middle East, for example, Islamist groups have resorted to violence in the past when formal political channels were closed to them (Ayoob 2004; Oded 2000). Thus, the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political life in a majority of the democratically-experimenting countries in SSA could be an underlying reason that Muslims are a bit more likely than their Christian counterparts to participate in political violence. They use it as a last resort when their fundamental rights and needs are ignored and other avenues of political engagement are closed to them.

Besides their economic disadvantaged status that I reported earlier, and the political exclusion they face, Muslims across SSA overall have lower levels of education than do their Christian counterparts. Afrobarometer Round 2 data reveal that nearly 51% of all Muslims have “no formal schooling” or informal schooling only” compared to around 13% of Christians in SSA who have “no formal schooling” or informal schooling only.” Furthermore, more than twice as many SSA Christians have completed secondary school than have SSA Muslims (6% of SSA Muslims have completed secondary school

versus 16% of SSA Christians). Finally, nearly twice as many SSA Christians have a) some sort of post-secondary qualifications (7% of Christians versus 3% of Muslims), b) have completed university (2% of Christians versus 1% of Muslims) or have c) done any post-graduate work (.5% of Christians versus .2% of Muslims). These differences are significant both substantively and statistically. Muslims in SSA are living in desperate conditions, in countries with increasing levels of poverty and instability, and their options for overcoming their perilous life-situations are limited. They are left out of formal governing structures, denied equal access to education, and suffer from extreme poverty. My finding that Muslims are more likely to be involved than Christians when religion was statistically significant reflects the acute situation facing Muslims in emerging African democracies.

When interacted with gender, religious identity is also significant on certain forms of political engagement. Affiliation with Christianity fosters democratic participation among women in all but one form of political behavior: formal contacting. Remember that women overall are less involved in politics than men, and Muslims overall are more involved in politics than Christians in three of the evaluated political behaviors. Christian women, however, seem to resist this trend. Muslim women also go against the general findings for their religion, and are significantly less involved in politics than Christians or men. Not only do gender and religion matter separately, but religion changes the effect that gender has on variations in political engagement.

6.4.3.1c Religiosity

Vibrant involvement in religion, both Christianity and Islam, encourages

democratic political engagement. Clearly, religiosity also discourages the type of political violence that threatens to unseat democracy. More active church and mosque attendees, however, are encouraged to join with others to raise issues, as well as to contact their formal and informal political leaders. Thus, religiosity in the form of service attendance encourages democratic activism. Africans who are more active in religious organizations contact informal leaders more than those who are less active. Active members are also less likely than non-members to resort to political violence. Thus, it is possible that those who are more actively involved in religious organizations (and other civil society groups) will be discouraged from engaging in political violence, as more constructive avenues to influence power are introduced or opened for members.

Increasingly since 9/11, public sentiment has turned against religion organized along political lines as dangerous and destabilizing. My findings reveal that fears associated with high levels of religious organizing in poverty-stricken, democratically growing nations prove unfounded. To the contrary, though religious organization membership draws people out and encourages them to use their voices against practices with which they do not agree, it reigns in this dissention, discouraging violence over political issues. High levels of religiosity seem to foster positive political behaviors and discourage destabilizing political activities.

This holds true when both forms of religiosity are interacted with gender.⁸⁹ Attendance at religious services and active religious association membership encourages women to commune, as well as to participate in political protests or marches. Active membership in religious organizations discourages formal contacting among women. Their increased access to religious leaders, who are connected to the political realm,

⁸⁹ See Appendix 8

likely offers these women access to power channels. Women shun remote formal political channels in favor of available informal avenues.

6.4.3.1d Other factors that influence political activism

6.4.3.1.d.i Select individual level control factors

First and foremost, Africans who align themselves with a political party are more likely to commune, to contact formal and informal leaders, to demonstrate and to engage in violence over political issues. Alignment with a political party has the largest effect on decisions among Africans to engage in politics. Political parties mobilize affiliates.

Furthermore, urban residents commune less than rural residents, potentially reflecting the mobilization of rural communities (Bratton 2006). Rural Africans are prime targets for political patrons. Rural dwellers are also more likely than urban residents to contact formal leaders, as well as informal leaders. These politicians mobilize rural residents through promises of various resources.

Poverty also matters. People without access to basic resources commune more, contact their formal and informal leaders more frequently, and demonstrate in greater numbers. The poor are potentially motivated to action by desperation over their life chances. The poor are more active in political behaviors than those who feel more economically secure.

Membership in community development organizations or farmers' groups encourages communing, as well as contacting of formal and informal political leaders. This finding continues to support the theory that efficacy in the political realm is enhanced by experience in other organizations. Africans who are members of various trade and community organizations are also more likely to join others to raise an issue.

This finding indicates that civil society literature offers valid insight on factors behind functioning democracy. Involvement in civil society empowers people in ways that foster democratic political engagement (Putnam 1993). In this behavior, non-religious civic engagement trumps religious civic involvement in fostering democracy.

Interest in public affairs increases political engagement. Those with increasing levels of political interest are more likely to commune, to contact formal leaders, to contact leaders with informal links to the political arena, to demonstrate, and even to resort to violence over political issues.

Education across the board encourages political activism. Africans with higher levels of education are more likely to participate in communing, contacting, demonstrating and political violence than those who are less educated.

Exposure to mass media has no empirical relationship to democratic activism, with one notable exception. Exposure to newspaper articles, radio broadcasts and television stories encourage demonstrating and political violence. The results of media exposure are less clear on communing and contacting. Radio programs and newspaper ads encourage communing and both forms of contacting. On the other hand, television consumption is significantly related to lower levels of communing and contacting.

6.4.3.1.d.ii National Gender Legislation (Quotas, CEDAW, Optional Protocol)

Africans in nations with international gender legislation (CEDAW) are less likely to commune or to contact formal leaders. Conceivably, residents of nations that have adopted this international convention feel that their government is working towards a more democratic end and therefore they do not need to engage with one another or with formal leaders for change. Presence of any national level gender institutions decreases

likelihood of contacting informal leaders, possibly because citizens feel like formal channels in these nations with such progressive institutions are open to them, so there is no need to contact informal leaders. Africans in nations in countries with some form of national level gender quotas, however, are more likely to contact formal leaders. Avenues are increasingly open for formal political engagement in states with progressive national level institutions, of which gender quotas are a prime example.

Adoption of CEDAW reduces demonstrations. More equal rights discourage the need to demonstrate. The presence of national level gender quotas encourages demonstrating or protesting, potentially because of the lack of implementation of many formal institutions in emerging African democracies and the frustration this breeds as citizens fight for their law-given rights (Chabal and Daloz 1999). National level gender legislation also discourages political violence. Equality breeds stable space for further freedom to grow. Room for positive political dissention seems to remove the stimulus for violent political engagement.

6.4.3.1.d.ii Christian Heritage

Residents in nations with a Christian national heritage are more likely than residents of other nations to commune. This reflects the predominance of Christianity as the majority religion overtime in a nation. Previous research evidences Protestant national heritage encouraging democratic transitions and consolidation (Putnam 1993). I include this control to examine the validity of this finding in the African setting. I report on it carefully, however, recognizing that a majority of the countries in my project have Christian majorities over time. Yet, even with controls for economic situations and levels of democracy, the religious heritage of a country does seem to matter in relation to

communing. A political culture situated within a Christian national heritage is good for democracy. Christian heritage also seems to support democracy in that it discourages political violence. Residents of states that have a Christian heritage are less likely to resort to violence over political causes.

6.4.3.1.d.iii Freedom House (FH)-Democracy

Residents in more democratic countries, measured by FH scores, are more likely to join with others over political concerns. The presence of increased rights decreases fears of retaliation for stepping out and making one's voice known, even if the expressed ideas are unpopular. Africans in more democratic nations are also more likely to contact their leaders, both formal and informal. Africans likely feel like space is open for them to engage in their own governance. Higher levels of democratization, on the other hand, reduce demonstrations and discourage political violence. Freedom and equality breed stable space for further freedom to grow. Room for positive political dissention seems to remove the stimulus for violent political engagement.

6.4.3.1.d.iv Economic Situation

Countries with worse economic situations have respondents who are more likely to contact formal and informal leaders. The poor lack many basic survival resources. The neo-patrimonial culture that persists throughout emerging African democracies likely encourages those with the most need to contact their formal political patrons to seek the resources they desperately need.

On the other hand, countries that are better off economically are more likely to experience protests, perhaps because residents of these countries have greater opportunity to protest. It is possible that counties that are poorer also have other traits in common,

such as oppressive economic and political legislation, that decrease a citizen's ability to forcefully fight for their rights (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.5: Countries Level of Democracy Based on Economic Situation

Freedom House Level of Democratization	Economic Situation by Country					Total
	Poorest	2	3	4	Least Poor	
Not Free	1	0	0	0	0	1
Partly Free	2	3	2	0	0	7
Free	0	0	5	1	2	8
	3	3	7	1	2	

The above table shows that, in my sample, all of the countries that are poorest are either not free or are partly free, and all of the countries that are least poor/richest in SSA among emerging democracies are free. This table shows a correlation between poorer countries and lack of rights among citizens. Also, countries with a Christian national heritage are less likely to experience protesting or demonstrating.

As with protesting, residents in countries that are better off economically are more likely to experience outbursts of political violence. It is possible, along with the higher levels of oppression in poorer countries, that countries with better overall economic situations have worse financial distributions. The poor may see the wealthy increasingly gaining in wealth while they remain poor, and may see protests and violent acts as their only options to fight against the failed promises and growing corruption under which they live.

6.5 Conclusions, Caveats, and Future Directions

6.5.1 Conclusions

In the beginning of this chapter, I said I would uncover the prevalence of political participation in SSA, as well as expose gender or religious gaps that existed in political engagement. Overall, I found that Africans participate more in certain forms of political activities than others, and that gender, religion, and religiosity do matter. I also found, however, that these cultural factors matter within the context of other significantly

important factors.

Political participation is diverse across emerging African democracies. A majority of Africans engage in horizontal political participation, including discussing politics, attending community meetings and joining others to raise political issues. Africans who participate in these behaviors, which together I call “communing,” choose to attend community meetings more than they discuss politics or joins others to raise concerns. Africans contact informal leaders more often than they contact formal leaders. This trend holds in all 16 countries across which this study spans. Informal channels, and the neo-patrimonial political culture reflected by informal political venues, offer the strongest form of vertical political engagement to Africans in emerging democracies. Only a few Africans participate in protest or demonstration marches in emerging democracies, and even fewer resort to violence over political matters. Thus, fears about the destabilizing affects of democratic transitions among the majority of Africans seem unfounded. Africans are not rioting or causing chaos in their countries in the face of many unfulfilled democratic promises, increasing poverty, and rampant corruption. Africans, when they do engage politically, do so through contact with one another or contact with informal leaders.

Across the board, women are less likely than men to participate in politics. Where religion does matter, once other potential factors have been held constant, Christians participate less than Muslims. Muslims are worse off economically and have less access to formal education than do Christians in SSA. Muslims are the minority in 14 of the 16 countries in this sample. I therefore argue that their minority status, funneled through the

vehicle of religion, drives Muslims increased likelihood of communing, contacting formal leaders, or engaging in violence over political causes. They are members of the most desperate strata of society in emerging African democracies and therefore have much to gain by stepping out and making their needs known and felt in the political realm. This trend is reversed among female members of Islam. Muslim women, on the one hand, are inhibited from active political engagement. Christian women, on the other hand, are encouraged to engage in the political realm. Thus, religion affects gender differently depending on if the respondent is Muslim or Christian.

Africans who attend religious services more frequently contact leaders, both formal and informal, more than sporadic or non-attendeers. Political leaders in SSA often make great fanfare of attending church or mosque services. It is possible that those who attend services regularly have better access to those leaders who attend their services. Furthermore, the efficacy built by regular attendance, which usually increases other types of church or mosque involvement, likely leads to a spillover in action in the political arena. Those who attend church/mosque regularly gain skills and confidence in communicating with leaders outside the religious realm. Active members and leaders of religious organizations are more likely to contact informal leaders. Religious and traditional leaders are more available to those who are part of religious organizations. As members of religious organizations, Africans gain client access to religious and other informal patrons. Contrary to much of the mainstream discussion regarding religiosity, I find high levels of religious involvement to *decrease* violence as an option over political matters. Those who are active members or leaders of religious organizations are among

the last to resort to violence over political issues. The picture that emerges in my study is one of religious organizations and bodies encouraging political activities that advance democracy, while discouraging violent, destabilizing political engagement. Religion encourages women to commune and demonstrate. Highly religious African women engage with their peers over political issues, sometimes even to the point of boldly marching or demonstrating to fight for their cause. Religiosity creates efficacy and awareness among women. The significant effect of gender and religiosity reveals religious civic engagement in Africa to be a potential equalizer among men and women over time.

Finally, while gender, religion and religiosity do help explain variations in Africans' decisions to engage in politics, the fuller story that emerges includes institutional, economic, cultural and contextual variables. Gender is second, however, only to whether or not a respondent identifies with a political party in explaining decisions to engage politically. The most powerful factor explaining decisions to engage in any of the behaviors studied in this project relates to the institution of political parties. Those who are involved in politics in one form are more likely to be involved in other forms. Other institutional/structural factors that significantly help explain political participation are membership in civic organizations, rural residence, and the presence of CEDAW. Economically, a respondent's personal access to basic needs influences their decision to engage in the political realm. Poorer Africans are more likely to commune, contact, protest and use violent measures in the political arena. Culturally, Christians participate less than Muslims, though Christian women participate more than Muslim

women; those with higher levels of interest in politics participate more. Residents in countries with Christian heritages commune more but join protests or violent encounters less frequently than Muslims. Residents in countries with higher degrees of democratic freedom contact formal and informal leaders more than residents in less free countries, and are less apt to engage in protests or demonstrations. Democracy reinforces itself; it encourages democratic-supporting behaviors and discourages destabilizing behaviors.

6.5.2 Caveats

In my investigation of democratic participation across a sample of African nations, we see statistical significance among many of the traditionally important causal factors discussed in democratization literature and research regarding democratic behaviors and even attitudes. I present, however, a major caveat.

I am slightly concerned by how much of the variance each of the models explains among the causal factors of the considered political behaviors: it is very low, even for public opinion data. Thus, I issue a caveat in the application of my findings. The highest amount of explained variance is on communing as a political behavior index, with around 22% of the variance explained. The other models explaining democratic behaviors account for around 17% of the variation across formal contacting, 16% of the variance in informal contacting, 8% of the variance in protesting, and only around 3% of the variance in the use of political violence among respondents. Hence, the models put forth in this paper do not capture anywhere from 75% to 95% of what is going on in political participation in these African nations. I have faith that the considerations of my project are important, nevertheless. First, I present an attempt to systematically, and quantitatively, investigate political behaviors that receive little to no attention compared

to voting as a democratic political behavior. I recognize that there are a great many unknowns that affect people's use of their time and resources. I assert, however, that, if political participation is necessary for the consolidation of stable democracy, then an attempt at understanding what tangible, and potentially alterable factors are driving political activity is crucial. This venture applies common wisdom from democratization studies to investigating political behaviors. Finally, though my models do not tell the whole story behind political participation, in this work, I lay the foundation for future research and theorizing that should bring a richness of understanding regarding political behaviors to the field of democratization studies.

Chapter 7 –Attitudes and Behaviors: Direction of Relationship among Democratic Orientations

In chapter two, I introduced the debate that exists over whether or not attitudes are foundational to political behaviors or vice versa. In chapter seven, I present empirical evidence that speaks to this discussion. This chapter has two goals. First, I investigate if adding political orientations that may drive other political orientations to my models alters the significance of the key factors investigated in this project: gender, religion and religiosity. Such in-depth empirical analysis will further deepen the credibility and usability of the findings in this research. Secondly, I offer some initial empirical analysis off which future research can be built to test the thus far theoretical discussion on the direction of influence between political attitudes and political actions. I find that the direction of the effects varies. My assumptions still rest on the research arguing that values are the building blocks for attitudes and behaviors. Yet, the tests I run are inconclusive on this issue. That is why I recommend future analysis.

I use multivariate regression to test the relationships between political attitudes and behaviors. I employ models replicated from chapters four and five, but adding values and attitudes to models of political behavior and including behaviors in models of attitudes.

Table 7.1: Political Behaviors

	Communing	Formal Contacting	Informal Contacting	Protesting	Violence
Constant	.569*** (.145)	-.417*** (.087)	-.234* (.122)	.180 (.145)	.458*** (.098)
Gender (Female = 1)	-.184*** (.018)	-.105*** (.010)	-.125*** (.015)	-.079*** (.018)	-.040*** (.012)
Christian (Base Group=Muslim)	-.118*** (.029)	-.057*** (.017)	-.029 (.024)	-.031 (.029)	-.053** (.020)
Other Religion (Base Group=Muslim)	-.202*** (.043)	-.067** (.026)	-.031 (.037)	-.009 (.043)	-.060* (.029)
Religiosity – Service attendance	.012 (.007)	.016*** (.004)	.041*** (.006)	-.011 (.007)	-.006 (.005)
Member religious group	.000 (.011)	.004 (.006)	.103*** (.009)	.022* (.011)	-.016* (.007)
Education	.054*** (.006)	.025*** (.003)	.011* (.005)	.036*** (.006)	.003 (.013)
Employment Status	.073*** (.019)	.040*** (.011)	-.035* (.016)	.009 (.019)	.003 (.004)
Urban vs. Rural Residence (Urban =1)	-.111*** (.021)	-.043*** (.013)	-.125*** (.018)	.032 (.021)	-.009 (.014)
Interest in politics	.322*** (.013)	.073*** (.007)	.084*** (.011)	.120*** (.013)	.033*** (.008)
Attitude towards country's economy	-.009 (.008)	.010* (.004)	-.002 (.006)	-.002 (.007)	.004 (.005)
Lived Poverty Index	.089*** (.011)	.036*** (.007)	.116*** (.009)	.066*** (.011)	.015* (.007)
Close to a political party	.508*** (.069)	.470*** (.041)	.206*** (.058)	.253*** (.069)	.145** (.046)
How close to party?	.040*** (.014)	.074*** (.008)	.030** (.012)	.029* (.014)	.021* (.009)
Radio	.048*** (.008)	.012* (.005)	.026*** (.007)	-.014 (.008)	-.045*** (.005)
Television	-.020*** (.007)	-.016*** (.004)	-.025*** (.006)	.039*** (.007)	.021*** (.005)
Newspaper	.038*** (.007)	.030*** (.004)	.029*** (.006)	.043*** (.007)	.014** (.005)
Member trade/farmer's group	.073*** (.012)	.072*** (.007)	.085*** (.010)	.062*** (.012)	.003 (.008)
Member business association	-.023 (.014)	.040*** (.008)	.045*** (.012)	.049*** (.014)	.023** (.010)
Member community development group	.142*** (.011)	.083*** (.006)	.096*** (.009)	.030** (.011)	.037*** (.007)
FH	.071 (.041)	.095*** (.024)	.236*** (.033)	-.122** (.041)	-.087** (.027)
CEDAW	-.164*** (.042)	-.294*** (.024)	-.203*** (.035)	-.107* (.042)	-.080** (.028)
CEDAW Optional Prot.	-.174*** (.033)	-.076*** (.020)	-.102*** (.027)	.031 (.033)	-.002 (.022)
Gender legislation	-.043 (.028)	.058*** (.017)	-.100*** (.023)	.199*** (.027)	.000 (.018)
Economic situation	-.020 (.013)	-.051*** (.008)	-.086*** (.011)	.051*** (.013)	.023** (.009)
Christian National Heritage	.180*** (.025)	.014 (.015)	.007 (.021)	-.113*** (.025)	-.035* (.017)
Value: Tolerance	.007 (.008)	.008 (.005)	.007 (.006)	.014 (.008)	.0000418 (.005)

Value: Accountability	.046*** (.009)	-.010* (.005)	.011 (.007)	-.006 (.009)	-.002 (.006)
Value: Political Equality	.005 (.009)	-.001 (.005)	.017* (.008)	-.002 (.009)	-.011 (.006)
Demand: Support for Democracy	.088*** (.014)	.016 (.008)	.015 (.012)	.003 (.014)	-.025** (.009)
Supply: Satisfaction with Democracy	-.003 (.010)	.010 (.006)	-.014 (.009)	-.002 (.010)	-.011 (.007)
Supply: How democratic	-.016 (.012)	-.024*** (.007)	-.016 (.010)	-.039*** (.012)	-.007 (.008)
Reject Autocracy: one-man rule	-.038*** (.009)	-.007 (.005)	-.013 (.008)	-.003 (.009)	.016** (.006)
Reject Autocracy: one party rule	.003 (.007)	.012** (.004)	.014** (.006)	.003 (.007)	.003 (.005)
Reject Autocracy: military rule	-.028*** (.009)	.000 (.000)	-.013 (.007)	.021** (.009)	.023*** (.006)
Reject Autocracy: rule by chiefs or elders	-.002** (.001)	.000 (.005)	.008 (.005)	.004*** (.001)	-.001 (.000)
N	23887	23251	22294	23904	23919
Adj R²	.217	.169	.164	.078	.028

Unstandardized coefficients followed by standard errors

Political values and attitudes emerge as statistically significant in helping explain variations in political actions. Valuation of democracy and rejection of autocracy encourages political activism. Those who do not hold a key democratic value or who are more autocratic are less likely to engage in horizontal political behaviors that sustain democracy. While only the value of accountability helps explain variations in political communing, both political accountability and tolerance are important for understanding decisions to discuss politics. Both values encourage political discussions. Whereas only demand side attitudes matter in explaining overall communing, a supply-side attitude is significant in understanding those who discuss politics. Africans who think their country is a democracy are less likely to discuss politics regularly. This could reflect a less urgent need to discuss politics, giving way to discussions about more pressing concerns (i.e.: economy) in countries where residents feel that their political rights are relatively secure through the proper functioning of democracy and its institutions.

Political equality as a value encourages attendance at community meetings, even though this value was not an important factor in explaining overall communing. Africans who support inclusion of everyone in the political process are more likely to attend community meetings. Africans who increasingly approve of one-party governance are slightly more likely to join others to raise political issues. This counterintuitive result could be due to the upheavals many African nations have faced as multiparty politics have been introduced over the last decade or so. Respondents are nostalgic for the stability that seemed to persist under the fallen one-party states. They are joining together perhaps to seek answers to the flailing multi-party states that currently exist. Conversely, someone who rejects one-man rule is more likely to join others to raise political concerns, perhaps reflecting the fight against one-man rule that has existed in many emerging African democracies.

I find that some political attitudes do matter in explaining formal leader contacting. Africans who do not feel they are being supplied with democracy are more likely to contact formal leaders. Thus, citizens who do not see democracy coming to fruition will stand up and make their discontent known. A respondent who approves of one-party rule is slightly more likely to contact formal leaders. Africans who fail to reject one-party autocracy are tentatively more connected to the formal political sphere, in which true power sharing among multiple parties has yet to occur. At the values level, none of the values were statistically significant in determining variation in formal leader contacting.

Values and attitudes do matter in decisions to contact leaders informally

connected to the political arena. Support for equal access to electoral events encourages informal leader contact. In earlier research, I found that Muslims and those who are poorer are more likely to hold political equality as a value. Africans who hold this value are primarily those who are left out of political procedures, and are perhaps contacting informal leaders both to demand change and because other avenues (i.e. to formal leaders) are often closed to them. Thus, it seems that those who are currently left out of many political opportunities desire a chance to have a say in the governing of their lives. They support equitable inclusion in political processes, regardless of education or access to political information. Turning to attitudes, I find that a respondent who approves of one-party rule is more likely to contact informal leaders. It is possible that those who support one-man rule are left out of the current, increasingly inclusive political arena. They are either those who had power but lost it or who are still not benefiting from the opened political space. They contact informal leaders because their other options are gone or never existed. Future research on who supports democracy and who supports autocracy in Africa, as captured by my current dataset, will offer clearer insight on reasons behind a relationship between support for one-man rule and informal contacting.

None of the political values captured in my research are significant in explaining variability in decisions to demonstrate, though some of the attitudes are statistically significant. A low perceived supply of democracy leads to higher levels of demonstrating or protesting. Support for rule by chief or elders, as well as support for military regimes corresponds with higher levels of protestation. Autocrats are more likely to protest or demonstrate, as are those who do not believe democracy is being delivered. It is possible

that those who fail to reject all forms of non-democratic rule are dissatisfied with the unfulfilled promises of democracy and are therefore open to other forms of government coming in to restore order, but still want democracy in the long run.

Finally, underlying attitudes do have an effect on willingness to engage in political violence. Africans in emerging democracies who support democracy are less likely to resort to violence to deal with political matters. Africans who fail to reject autocracy in the forms of one-man rule and military rule are more likely than those who do reject such non-democratic alternatives to use violence in politics.

Regardless of the additional variables in this model, gender, religion and religiosity maintain the direction of their impact on political behaviors, as well as their significance. Thus, though political values and political behaviors help explain variations in decisions to engage in the political realm, they do not alter the importance of gender or Christian versus Muslim religious affiliation in helping understand decisions to engage in the political realm.

I now turn to the potential relationship between people's experiences with democracy and their political attitudes. Experience with democracy does have some effect on how Africans view democracy.

Table 7.2: Political Attitudes

	Support for Democracy	Reject Autocracy	How democratic	Satisfaction with democracy
	B Std. Error	B Std. Error	B Std. Error	B Std. Error
(Constant)	2.030*** 0.103	3.433*** 0.122	1.354*** 0.127	0.975*** 0.149
Gender	-0.035** 0.013	-0.101*** 0.016	0.007 0.016	-0.009 0.019
Christian	-0.104*** 0.021	-0.048* 0.025	0.012 0.025	-0.072** 0.030
Other Religion	-0.113*** 0.032	0.004 0.038	0.000 0.039	-0.075 0.046
Religious Service Attendance	0.001 0.005	-0.006 0.006	0.022*** 0.006	0.017** 0.007
Member of religious group	0.026*** 0.008	0.034*** 0.009	-0.004 0.010	0.013 0.011
Education of respondent	0.015*** 0.004	0.059*** 0.005	-0.037*** 0.005	-0.045*** 0.006
Employment Status	0.004 0.014	0.038 0.017	0.019 0.018	-0.025 0.021
Urban Rural Residence	-0.041** 0.016	0.029 0.019	-0.074*** 0.019	-0.070** 0.023
Interest in public affairs	0.042*** 0.009	0.022* 0.011	0.040*** 0.012	0.067*** 0.014
Member of trade union or farmers association	0.002 0.009	0.008 0.010	0.001 0.011	0.003 0.012
Member of professional or business association	-0.011 0.010	-0.039** 0.012	0.005 0.013	-0.004 0.015
Member of community development association	-0.005 0.008	0.022* 0.009	-0.014 0.010	0.000 0.011
Close to Political Party	0.063 0.051	-0.231*** 0.061	0.282*** 0.063	0.427*** 0.074
How close to this political party	0.007 0.010	-0.038** 0.012	0.032* 0.013	0.057*** 0.015
Radio news	0.019*** 0.006	0.027*** 0.007	0.015* 0.007	0.031*** 0.008
Television news	0.011* 0.005	0.041*** 0.006	-0.010 0.006	-0.008 0.007
Newspaper news	-0.021*** 0.006	-0.011 0.007	-0.006 0.007	-0.006 0.008
Country's present economic condition	0.010 0.005	-0.027*** 0.006	0.114*** 0.006	0.150*** 0.008
Freedom House Level of Democratization	0.021 0.028	0.228*** 0.034	0.555*** 0.035	0.650*** 0.041

CEDAW Adoption	0.064* 0.030	-0.291*** 0.035	-0.143*** 0.037	-0.254*** 0.043
CEDAW Optional Protocol Adoption	-0.055* 0.023	-0.311*** 0.028	-0.227*** 0.029	-0.347*** 0.034
Presence of some national level gender legislation	0.088*** 0.020	-0.205*** 0.024	0.140*** 0.025	0.118*** 0.029
Economic situation by country	-0.036*** 0.009	-0.079*** 0.011	-0.115*** 0.012	-0.203*** 0.014
Personal Poverty	-0.046*** 0.008	-0.029** 0.010	-0.067*** 0.010	-0.092*** 0.012
Christian Nation	-0.030 0.017	-0.013 0.021	-0.013 0.021	0.109*** 0.025
Gender Equality	0.013* 0.006	0.043*** 0.007	0.014* 0.007	0.025** 0.008
Tolerance	0.007 0.006	0.013 0.007	-0.017* 0.007	-0.013 0.008
Political Equality	0.042*** 0.007	0.070*** 0.008	0.029*** 0.008	0.045*** 0.010
Accountability	0.055*** 0.006	0.108*** 0.008	-0.034*** 0.008	-0.025** 0.009
Communing	0.055*** 0.007	0.058*** 0.008	0.003 0.009	0.009 0.010
Formal Contacting	0.009 0.013	-0.026 0.016	-0.016 0.016	0.033 0.019
Informal Contacting	0.000 0.009	-0.009 0.011	-0.028* 0.011	-0.037** 0.013
Attend a demonstration or protest march	-0.012 0.007	-0.030*** 0.009	-0.026** 0.009	-0.001 0.010
Used force or violence for political cause	-0.039*** 0.010	-0.055*** 0.012	-0.002 0.013	-0.036* 0.015
N	21701	22482	21022	22106
Adj R ²	.052	.131	.107	.111

N=19,201; Unstandardized coefficients followed by standard errors

Communing increases demand side attitudes towards democracy. Africans who have engaged with their peers in grassroots level political activities are more likely to support democracy and to reject autocratic alternatives. Any other relationships between political engagement and democratic attitudes are negative. Africans who contact informal leaders are less likely to be satisfied with democracy. Participation in

protests or demonstrations reduces rejection of autocracy and an African's evaluation of their country's democracy. The relationship between informal contacting and rejection of autocracy seems to be driven by rejection of rule by chiefs or elders. Informal contacting loses significance on other individual types of autocratic rule. Therefore, Africans who have contacted informal leaders are less likely to reject rule by more traditional, informal leaders. Thus, contact with informal leaders teaches Africans that rule by these traditional chiefs or elders may provide them with the access that they do not have under their current leadership. That explains, therefore, part of why informal contacting also discourages satisfaction with democracy. Those who must work through informal venues to gain access to the political realm often have few to no other options politically.

Attending a demonstration or protest march reduces rejection of autocracy as well as evaluation of how democratic an African rates their nation. Attending a political protest reduces rejection of two of four forms of autocracy: military rule and rule by chiefs or elders. Participation in political violence discourages both dimensions of demand for democracy. Those who decide to turn to political violence are less supportive of democracy and less apt to reject autocracy than Africans who have not turned to violence over politics. Africans who choose political violence are specifically less likely to reject one man and military rule.

It is important to note that, regardless of the effects that political activities have on political attitudes, their added significance does not change the significance or direction of the relationship between gender, religious identity, or religiosity with political attitudes. Women are still less supportive of democracy. Christians support democracy

less and are less satisfied with democracy than Muslims. And religiosity encourages support for democracy and satisfaction with the growth of democracy.

Taking both models discussed above together, it seems that the third body of thought offers the most accurate description of the relationship between people's beliefs about democracy and their engagement in democracy. Attitudes affect behaviors, but behaviors also have an impact on attitudes. Political orientations seem reciprocal in their influence on each other. Future research on these relationships is still needed.

First, I test the joint significance of the attitude variables as part of the behavior models, as well as the behavior variables as part of the attitude models. In preliminarily employing these tests, I found that political attitudes, considered together, are jointly significant in helping to explain political behaviors. The reverse is also true for the effect of political behaviors on political attitudes. The magnitude of these effects, however, is quite small. Also, with the number of respondents, across sixteen countries employed in this project, it is possible that statistical significance emerges easily.

Table 7.3: Tests of Joint Significance of Additional Variables

F-tests		
Joint Significance of Political Behaviors in Explaining Political Attitudes		
Support Democracy	F(5, 15849) = 28.40	Prob > F = 0.0000
Reject Autocracy	F(5, 16199) = 30.21	Prob > F = 0.0000
How democratic	F(5, 15631) = 5.58	Prob > F = 0.0000
Satisfaction with Democracy	F(5, 16000) = 4.36	Prob > F = 0.0006
Joint Significance of Political Attitudes in Explaining Political Behaviors		
Communing	F(4, 15592) = 35.95	Prob > F = 0.0000
Formal Contacting	F(4, 15129) = 6.85	Prob > F = 0.0000
Informal Contacting	F(4, 15357) = 2.58	Prob > F = 0.0357
Protests	F(4, 15611) = 5.12	Prob > F = 0.0004
Political violence	F(4, 15587) = 17.73	Prob > F = 0.0000

Thus, there seems to be a reciprocal relationship between political attitudes

and political behaviors. To test this relationship further, the use of simultaneous equations is necessary. This technique will more concretely flesh out the links between political attitudes and behaviors. Simultaneous equations models (SEM) help solve a problem of endogeneity that likely exists in the models because of this reciprocal relationship between political attitudes and political activities. There is likely an equilibrium effect in the observed political attitudes and political actions. Simultaneity is a result of one or more of the explanatory variables being jointly determined with the dependent variable (Wooldridge 2003). In the case of this project, simultaneity in the models is potentially present through the joint determination of attitudes with behavioral dependent variables and behaviors with attitudinal dependent variables. In the regular OLS equations presented in chapter four through eight, there is potential bias in the results due to unmitigated endogeneity in the form of simultaneity. The impact of the reciprocal variables on the explained variance in each model is quite small. It is therefore more than probable that simultaneous models will not result in different relationships between the important variables in this project. The future use of simultaneous equation models is necessary in order to eliminate statistical bias, thereby offering deeper confidence in the results of this endeavor.

In a follow-up to this project, I will add this type of model. I will initially use one behavioral dependent variable and one attitudinal dependent variable. For the political behavior model, I will test communing. The highest numbers of Africans engage in communing. Furthermore, the greatest amount of variance in decisions to commune is explained in the models presented in this project. Therefore, more rigorous testing of the

relationships behind communing would tell a great deal about African political behaviors. Future research will test satisfaction with democracy as a political attitude. Again, the model with democratic satisfaction explains the highest amount of variance in political attitudes. Models of these two dependent variables fit the parameters for simultaneous equations models. Each equation has a behavioral, *ceteris paribus* interpretation on its own (Wooldridge 2003). Wooldridge (2003) notes that, because only equilibrium outcomes are observed in simultaneous equations, specifying an SEM requires one to ask counterfactual questions. For example, how much communing would citizens provide if their political attitudes were different from the current equilibrium value? Or How much satisfaction with democracy would citizens evidence in their experience with political communing was at a different level than the observed equilibrium value?

Initial analysis of the reciprocal relationship between the political attitude of satisfaction with democracy and horizontal political engagement reveals, first, that the error terms are not uncorrelated. Using a Hausman specification error test⁹⁰, I find that there is a simultaneity problem (Table 7.4). Thus, there is potential inconsistency in the OLS coefficients in this project.

Table 7.4: Significance Test of Coefficient on Error Term in Communing Model

Significance of coefficient	
F (1, 18212)	141.23
Prob > F	0.000

I then run a sample, two stage least squares (instrumental variable) regression (Table 7.5). The findings presented in this project on the role that gender and religion play in political attitudes and political behaviors do not change substantially.

⁹⁰ a test of simultaneity, testing whether an endogenous regressor is correlated with the error term in a model (Gujarati 1995). A linear regression of communing on all exogenous control factors is run. Then, satisfaction with democracy is regressed on the error term from the communing model and 'communing.' A t-test is performed on the resulting coefficient on the error term from the first model. If this is significant, then there is a probable simultaneity problem between the models.

Furthermore, this model shows that the relationship between democratic satisfaction and communing is reciprocal.

Table 7.5: Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Regression

Communing		Satisfaction with democracy	
Satisfaction with democracy	-.188*** (.034)	Communing	.260*** (.020)
Gender	-.225*** (.014)	Gender	.057*** (.016)
Christian (Base Group = Muslim)	-.093*** (.022)	Christian (Base Group = Muslim)	-.041 (.023)
Religious service attendance	.013* (.005)	Religious service attendance	.017** (.006)
Membership in religious organization	.035*** (.008)	Membership in religious organization	.018* (.009)
Education	.039*** (.005)	Education	-.057*** (.005)
Radio	.051*** (.006)	Radio	.004 (.007)
Television	-.037*** (.005)	Television	-.012* (.006)
Newspaper	.036*** (.006)	Newspaper	-.012 (.006)
Interest in politics	.369*** (.010)	Urban Rural residence	-.017 (.017)
Close to a political party	.659*** (.060)	Lived Poverty	-.113*** (.010)
How close to party	.063*** (.011)	Employment status	-.036* (.016)
Membership in trade organization	.083*** (.010)	Attitude towards country's economic situation	.156*** (.006)
Membership in professional association	-.012 (.011)	Freedom House Democratization	.514*** (.030)
Membership in community association	.158*** (.009)	CEDAW	-.176*** (.037)
Freedom House Democratization	.002 (.037)	Optional protocol	-.160*** (.023)
CEDAW	-.112** (.037)	Gender legislation	.259*** (.020)
Optional protocol	-.146*** (.024)	Economic situation by country	-.176*** (.010)
Gender legislation	.081*** (.022)	Christian nation	.082*** (.021)
Economic situation by country	-.071*** (.012)	Constant	1.19*** (.085)
Christian nation	.203*** (.020)		
Constant	1.27*** (.115)		
Adj R-squared	0.196		.064

In order to estimate the two stage models, it is necessary to have certain exogenous variables in the communing model that do not appear in the democratic satisfaction model. This allows us to differentiate between the two equations. Turning to the theoretical framework on which this project is built, I separate the factors in previous models into those that more directly help explain political attitudes from those that more directly influence political behaviors. For example, though economic status or urbanization do ultimately play a role in decisions to engage in the political realm, work by Inglehart *et al* (2003) and Easton (1975; 1965) maintain that these factors *directly* affect people's outlooks on life and politics. Thus, personal economic indicators and urban versus rural residence are included in the model on attitudes. Membership in civil society organizations (Putnam 1993) and access to political parties, though indirectly related to political attitudes, are more directly encouraging of political activities. I therefore include these factors in the model explaining communing. Gender, religion, religiosity, education, media exposure and national level control factors are included as important in both models.

With the consistent coefficients offered by this method, gender does seem to influence communing, while it didn't in previous analysis. Women seem *more likely* to commune than men in this model. A possible reason for this are the exclusion restrictions I employed. When political party affiliation variables are included in the model for satisfaction rather than behaviors, gender loses significance in explaining communing and has a negative relationship with democratic satisfaction. Future work will more fully determine which variables should be included in both models, potentially drawing from

additional theory to add control factors not currently under consideration. The more interesting finding for the purposes of this chapter, however, pertains to the reciprocal nature of the relationship between political satisfaction and political communing. Satisfaction with democracy does appear to influence decisions to attend community meetings, join others to raise issues and discuss politics taken as a whole. Communing also appears to help explain satisfaction with democracy. Future work will more rigorously use the techniques introduced in this chapter. In this venture, I simply recognize the potential reciprocal relationship between the dependent variables in the presented models. I leave it to forthcoming research to disentangle the effects that this might have, thereby adding a next step of depth and rigor to this project.

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**DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN EMERGING AFRICAN
DEMOCRACIES
DO RELIGION AND GENDER MATTER?**

VOLUME II

By

Virginia Parish Beard

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

2006

Chapter 8 – Kenya: A Case Study

8.1 Introduction

In chapter 8, I move away from the cross-national perspective employed in chapters 4-7. This chapter presents a more in-depth look at the questions addressed in this project in the context of the East African nation of Kenya. Focus on a specific country offers rich insight that cannot be usefully explored in a cross-national setting. Case studies, of which this chapter is an example, are useful in exploratory research, potentially leading to insights that could be studied as research hypotheses or could refine existing theoretical hypotheses (Nachmias and Nachmias 2000). Case studies complement larger studies with refined details and historical depth that simply cannot be covered in broader analysis. “Framing a case study around an explanatory question may lead to more focused and relevant description” than could be accomplished with large, quantitative studies alone (King *et al* 1994: 45). Single country studies offer the ability to produce “thick description” which adds to a fuller picture of all the intervening variables and circumstances that are acting on certain political outcomes (Geertz 1973). They also are useful for developing new classifications, as did Linz (1964) for authoritarianism in the Franco regime in Spain. Case studies can also generate hypotheses that can be tested in larger selections of countries (Lijphart 1971). A further advantage is the ability to confirm and inform theories, using known generalizations (Lijphart 1971) and seeing if they hold in the case under study.

In this chapter, I use Kenya’s path towards democracy, including the roles of gender and religion, to add richer interpretation to the findings in the previous

chapters. Through Kenya's democratic story, I will offer vivid insight on the analysis applied to the role of gender and religion in democratic political orientations among African democracies. Kenya also offers a unique opportunity to disaggregate Christianity and Islam into its diverse groups. Through this breakdown of religion into its sub-sectors, I can explore the heterogeneous effects that religious groups have on politics. I also take the opportunity that a country-focused examination offers to explore the role that religiosity takes through qualitative interviews that occurred during a fact-finding trip I took to Kenya in September, 2005.

Basically, this narrative confirms explanations presented in previous chapters regarding the effect democratic orientations across Africa. Kenya's political trajectory has left Kenya with a mixed bag of democracy. Patronage politics and ethnic tensions abound, and these affect Kenyans' political orientations. Support for democracy is high. This is in part due to a successful democratic transition completed in 2003. In this context, gender and religion both play a role in Kenyans democratic orientations. Religion and politics are intertwined in Kenya. Kenyan Muslims are disadvantaged politically, socially, and economically in relation to their Christian counterparts. The politicization of religion combined with the life factors facing Muslims and Christians makes religion a venue through which both groups engage the political realm. Women are disadvantaged vis-à-vis men in Kenya's political realm. Cultural attitudes against female equality are pervasive and have a strong impact on the opportunities facing women in the political arena. Most Kenyans are highly involved in religious bodies and associations, and this involvement translates in political engagement. Women

attend religious services more than men and are more active members in religious associations than men. Since religion is a political vehicle for Kenyans, religious involvement is a training ground for female leaders in Kenya. Leaders of prominent religious organizations in Kenya that affect the political realm affirm cultural attitudes as persistently inhibitive to women's progress in Kenya. Afrobarometer data reconfirms the findings that Kenyan men are not yet on board at the same levels as women in their support for gender equality. Though active involvement in religion has begun to reduce this gap for Christian women, Muslim women in Kenya have yet to experience similar progress in the short or long-term from active religiosity.

8.2 Why Kenya?


Villalon and VonDoepp (2005) provide an important framework for considering the prospects for African democracy, revisiting Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) typology of democratic transitions. The latter authors, however, exclude Kenya as a case study because it was classified during the 1990-1994 time period under consideration as having experienced a flawed democratic transition. Since that time, Kenya has experienced a successful transitional election. In December of 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeated Moi's KANU for Kenya's first peaceful transition of power through reasonably free and fair elections. Kenya is therefore a recently transitioning democracy, fitting the bill for the type of country under consideration throughout this project. Furthermore, Kenya has vibrant faith communities, with over 95% of Kenyans identifying with some form of religious group. Religion has played a pivotal role in Kenya's press towards democracy (Oded

2000; Gifford 1995). Finally, gender issues have gained increasing attention in Kenya over the past two decades (Nzomo 1997). Thus, the interplay of democratic transition, religious fervor, and gender equality is ripe for examination in Kenya. There is important evidence from the specific democratic experience in Kenya that has not been adequately explored.

8.3 Democracy in Kenya

Before diving in to the story of Kenya's democracy, I offer some facts and figures on the atmosphere of political orientations in Kenya. Kenya largely emulates the overall findings in democratic political orientations discussed in chapters 4 through 7. Kenyans value democracy, at levels on par with other emerging African democracies.


Figure 8.3.1: Political Values by Country



Valid percents; N=24,301

Kenyans are more committed to political equality, accountability and gender equality than they are to political tolerance.

Figure 8.3.2: Values in Kenya




Note: N=2398

While a bare majority of Kenyans value political tolerance, more than two-thirds of Kenyans value accountability of leaders to citizens, equality in voting access, and equality among men and women.

Kenyans also overwhelmingly support democracy at levels well above that of all Africans surveyed. Overall, 72% of Africans surveyed said democracy was always preferable. Over 80% of all Kenyans, however, assert that they always prefer democracy. Transitional euphoria, given the timing of the survey immediately following the transitional election, inflates the extreme levels of these findings (Wolf *et al* 2004). Preliminary analysis of Afrobarometer Round 3 survey data, collected in September of 2005, shows a gradual decline in support for democracy (75% say democracy is always preferable).


Figure 8.3.3: Support for Democracy



Note: N=2398

Around 86% of Kenyans leave no room for non-democratic forms of government. This makes Kenya the second highest ranking country in preference for democracy, only one percentage point lower than Senegal. And Kenya is 14 percentage points above the continental average of 72% in firm preference for democracy.

Figure 8.3.4: Democracy "Always Preferable" by Country




N=21,701; valid percents

A similar proportion of Kenyans firmly rejects all four forms of autocratic

government: military rule, rule by elders, one-party rule, and one-man rule.

Figure 8.3.5: Reject Autocracy



Note: N=2398


Kenyans believe, overall, that they are living in a democracy, though most of them see at least minor problems plaguing Kenya's democracy. Around 82% of Kenyans assert that they are living in a viable democracy. A minority (19%) project that Kenya is either not a democracy or is barely a democracy, plagued by "major problems." Thus, a startling majority of Kenyans deem Kenya to be a workable democracy.

83% of all Kenyans are fairly to very satisfied with democracy in Kenya. When asked about the progress of their political and personal freedoms, Kenyans were still remarkably satisfied with democracy. 87% of Kenyans say their political freedoms have improved. This is extraordinarily high in comparison to the continental average of 73% who say their political, "positive" freedoms are better or much better. A slightly smaller majority (67%) feel like their personal freedoms have improved. Yet, Kenyans remain way ahead of the rest of the continent in approval of their advances in personal

freedoms. The average across emerging African democracies is barely a majority at 56% saying their personal freedoms are better or much better.

Finally, Kenyans are involved in political activities at relatively high levels (Figure 8.3.6). Nearly three out of every four Kenyans engages in some form of communing, whether attending community meetings, discussing politics, joining others to raise concerns in the political arena, or some combination of these activities. Reflecting the rest of Africa, Kenyans contact informal political leaders more often than formal leaders. Few Kenyans protest or engage in political violence. Kenyans are engaging the political realm in ways that support democracy.

Figure 8.3.6: Democratic Participation in Kenya



Note: N=2398; Valid percents

The data presented thus far evidences Kenya as a nation with a reliable base of democratic political orientations. Yet, what has led Kenya to the place it is in democratically? What does Kenya's political development reveal about the prevailing theories of democratization? What roles have gender and religion played in Kenya's

democratization? The following portion of chapter eight will lay out the story of Kenya's democratization in order to offer deeper interpretation as to the factors that help explain democratic development, with specific focus given to the place that gender and religion have in this story.

Kenya's path towards democracy has been full of struggles and setbacks (Masime 2003), in spite of the fact that Kenya has remained relatively stable since its independence from the British in 1963 (Lonsdale 1992). Kenya's founding president, Jomo Kenyatta and the elites that held power alongside him failed to operationalize democratic norms during the initial period of Kenya's independence. His successor, Daniel arap Moi, continued down this path. Together, the two founding Kenyan presidents institutionalized personal rule, patronage politics, ethnic tensions, and endemic corruption (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Thus, though democracy is widely supported in Kenya, its roots run in rocky soil plagued with these obstacles to democratic growth and consolidation.

Kenyatta: 1963-1978

Kenyatta is remembered as a freedom fighter and the beloved inaugural president of Kenya. Yet, his legacy largely laid the foundation for Kenya's checkered political development. Kenyatta used promises of access to state patronage to co-opt opposition leaders, effectively governing over a single party state until his death in 1978. Kenyatta supported and popularized patronage politics by means of *Harambee*⁹¹

⁹¹ Harambee is a Kenyan tradition of community self-help events, including fundraising and community development activities. The literal definition of Harambee is "pulling together." Harambee events range from informal affairs that last a few hours to more formal experiences that are advertised in newspapers and last many days. Harambees foster community among attendees and provide avenues for political leaders to exhibit acts of patronage to Kenyan citizens. Often wealthy Kenyans who are or wish to be involved in politics donate large sums of money for community activities or local projects through Harambees. This

activities, through which he kept opposition leaders in check (Lonsdale 1992). Politicians used *Harambee* events to disperse patronage to the people and to gain political support. Opposition leaders might be denied state resources, limiting their ability to make contributions at *Harambee* functions. This would undercut their popularity with the voters (Masime 2003). The institution of Harambee could have been used to include small localities in the political process and as a form of leadership accountability. It became a funnel through which ethnic tensions were exacerbated and pork-barrel corruption developed into the official mode of operation in Kenyan politics (Lonsdale 1992). All in all, Kenyatta used the “art of neo-patrimonialism” to entrench his leadership in the new country (Asingo 2003).

Furthermore, Kenyatta drew on the loyalties of his own ethnic group, the Kikuyu, to ensure the stability of the country under his rule. This strategy of drawing on the support of the largest ethnic group in Kenya through patronage politics set a precedent, which has increasingly exacerbated ethnic tensions and political disarray in the once promising country (Masime 2003; Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). Faced with the task of redistributing abandoned settlers’ lands, Kenyatta transferred these resources along ethnic and political lines.

“The politics of land settlement...transferred power to gratefully politicized tribes. It was the founding experience of the new Kenya, and one whose implications the country is still working out, in blood” (Lonsdale 1992: 13).

Finally, where patronage and ethnic politics failed to ensure compliance and submission, coercion and repression were employed (Masime 2003; Kihoro 1992).

offers current or future politicians a form of legitimacy and ties recipient communities to donating politicians through a patron-client relationship. This behavior gained popularity under president Kenyatta as a way to pull the country together, but became the norm under president Moi to the point that voters from constituencies could be counted on the vote for the leader who donated the most money to their community (“Harambee” 2006).

Kenya rapidly fostered a political culture that remains deeply divided along ethnic, social, and economic lines, held together by fear and insecurity.

Kenyatta also set the precedent for autocratic rule in Kenya, effectively causing the dissolution of the only existing opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), in 1966 (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Though a few opposition groups attempted to enter the political battle over the next decade or so, both Kenyatta and then Moi used endless tactics to undercut any true threats to their hold over the emerging nation (Kihoro 1992). Due to personalistic rule, factional politics are rife in Kenya, whereby elites maneuver and scheme in order to take advantage of power and other patronage resources (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Personal rule and 'big man politics' persist as Kenya's dominant form of governance.

International influences favored the stronghold of Kenyatta's, and later Moi's, regimes. Under the auspices of supporting democracy versus communism during the Cold War, Western donors financed Kenya's government (Odhoambo-Mbai 2003). The resources of internal opposition groups were no match for the wealth provided from developed countries and international donor agencies. A destabilized Kenya would be bad strategically for Western interests (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Therefore, as long as the Cold War lasted, and Kenya's leaders appeared to support Western ideals, the international community was willing to turn a blind eye to the corruption that was building in Kenya.

Moi: 1978-2002

Kenya's second president, Daniel arap Moi, entered the presidency with

promises of democratic change, but these did not come to pass. Moi also favored his own ethnic group (the Kalenjin) with political and economic resources (Atieno-Odhiambo 2002), while at times wooing the Kikuyu to ensure his hold on power (Ndegwa 2003). Moi justified acts of patronage to his own albeit small tribe by arguing he was trying to level the playing field for disadvantaged, smaller ethnic groups (Lonsdale 1992). This hurt the country as a whole, exacerbating communal tensions and funneling limited resources to narrow areas. Fearing the larger tribes and their displeasure with his ethnic patronage, Moi banned all ethnic associations, which had been forms of democratic engagement under Kenyatta, in 1980 (Masime 2003).

In 1982, the Kenyan Air force attempted a coup against the Moi government. The undertaking was ultimately unsuccessful. The coup attempt, however, stands as a pivotal moment in Kenya's political trajectory. Afterwards, Moi became increasingly paranoid of challenges to his power, and revised laws, bred fear and insecurity, and stirred up violence to ensure his hold on the country (Lonsdale 1992). Moi progressively consolidated power in the executive, formally outlawing opposition parties in 1982. Kenya then became a de jure one-party state. As Moi's popularity waned, he increasingly neutralized remaining vestiges of democratic institutions (Masime 2003). This led to a crisis of governance throughout the rest of the 1980's and into the 1990's, when opposition to authoritarian rule finally began to reemerge in Kenya.

Yet, before there was hope, things got worse. In 1987, president Moi was reelected to the presidency, but under questionable election laws and in the face of

violent suppression of opposition leaders. By 1988, with additional amendments to the constitution, Moi had entrenched all but full-fledged authoritarianism in Kenya (Masime 2003). Yet, agitation for change remained. Civil society groups, including religious bodies, continued to advocate for democratic norms and institutions. In efforts to quell these stirrings, Moi embarked on campaigns to create lack of unity among opposition and ethnic tensions that would remove any challenges to his rule. Prior to 1992 elections, thousands were killed in the Rift Valley Region of Kenya (Kihoro 1992). Though Moi managed to stop the violence and emerge with the image of a peacemaker, most observers within and outside of Kenya maintain that KANU was responsible for the violence.

In the face of the continued hold on power that KANU had through the 1990's, dissatisfaction with their governance was rising among Kenyans (Kihoro 1992). Increasing street protests and occasional outbursts of violence became increasingly prevalent from about 1992 until the 2002 general elections. This time period was not only a time in which political changes were being made, but were also the years in which World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other external donors came in with strict economic liberalization policies (Masime 2003). The economic hardships that these brought combined with the corrupt and oppressive Moi government were pushing people to their limits. Kenyans began to voice their recognition that the political and economic situations in their country were declining rather than improving (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003).

On top of growing internal pressure due to economic and political chaos,

international pressure affected Kenya's political movements. The end of the Cold War shifted the alliances of the West and the donor community. Rather than supporting any regime that was not communist, with a blind eye to their actual performance, Western leaders and donors threw their support behind groups agitating for democratic change (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Together, economic, political and global pressures forced Moi's hand. Moi officially reinstated multi-party elections in December 1991 (Masime 2003). Yet, when elections came around in 1992, Kenyans, disliking Moi but fearing the violence and chaos with which Africa is rife, reelected Moi. Nevertheless, the 1992 elections mark an important transition for Kenya, as the country's first multi-party elections since mini-elections in 1966 (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003; Nzomo 1997).

External and internal pressures finally forced Kenyan elites to, at least nominally, allow for legal multi-party competition. Yet, the institutional and cultural political climate into which this change was introduced proved quite prohibitive to truly competitive, democratic politicking. First, the law was changed by simply removing the clause in the constitution that disallowed opposition parties. All the other constitutional amendments that encouraged autocratic, single party, personal rule were left in tact (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). There are numerous pieces of legislation in Kenya that bar free and fair democratic processes in the country. Examples of these include the Preservation of Public Security Act, which allows for detention without trial, and the Public Collections Act (Kibwana 2002). Secondly, Moi and KANU worked hard at encouraging the internal conflict that kept opposition parties from being truly effective. The opposition lacked unity as lack of effective party institutions in the new bodies

(Kibwana 2002) and patronage power grappling dominated their new efforts (Wanjala 2002b). Furthermore, patronage and ethnic politics had become entrenched in all levels of politics in Kenya. Opposition candidates rarely received more than twenty-five percent of valid presidential votes outside their home districts (Masime 2003). Thus, the opposition was largely fractured and ineffective at posing a real threat to the Moi regime.

In 1997, however, further changes were made that initiated glimmers of democratic hope in Kenya. Though many undemocratic statutes were left in place, the government revised oppressive laws that had reigned since the independence, thereby increasing civil liberties in the areas of freedom of speech and assembly. (Kibwana 2002). The improved public freedoms founded elections that were generally believed to be credible in 1997. With the weak and divided opposition, civil society stepped in the late 1990's to assist more forcefully in fighting for democratic changes. Civic and religious groups taught free civic education, held rallies and advocated for leaders who they thought would lead Kenya towards democracy (Personal interviews, September 2005). Moi and KANU, however, were still reelected.

Beyond Moi: Kibaki's election and the future of Kenyan democracy

Most recently, in 2002, Kenya finally underwent a multi-party election in which a peaceful transition of power occurred from one political party to another. Mwai Kibaki, a respected economist and popular politician who has served in the Kenyan government since its independence, replaced Moi as Kenya's third president. Though patronage-ethnic politics persist in Kenya (Masime 2003), and many of

Kibaki's promises are incomplete or untried, these elections were a watershed in Kenya's path towards democracy. Kenyans gained the confidence that their efforts at the polls matter.

"Elected leaders can no longer afford to flagrantly ignore the wishes of the electorate and get away with it, as was hitherto the case" (Masime 2003:19).

The coalition of parties that unseated the KANU-Moi regime, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), benefited from faltering unity among KANU elites, the building climate of democratic grassroots agitation, and the growing activism of civil society during the decade leading up to the 2002 elections. Prior to NARC's successful bid for the presidency, a major obstacle to Kenya's democratic transition was the inability of opposition elites to build a viable, unified alliance against KANU. After the removal of section 2A of the Kenyan Constitution that banned opposition parties in 1992, many political parties formed. Yet, divisions along ethnic lines, class interests, personality cults tore the opposition apart (Kanyinga 2003).

"What initially appeared to be a united opposition with a common cause became factions with varied interests" (Kanyinga 2003: 108).

Thus, in the first election under the new laws in 1992, a divided opposition presented multiple candidates for the presidential bid. With a fractured support base behind each candidate, Moi and KANU easily retook the executive office. This defeat, however, brought opposition parties together in an effort to re-strategize and reorganize for the next presidential election that was to be held in 1997. Opposition parties formed an umbrella organization called the United National Democratic Alliance (UNDA) under which opposition members worked to come up with tactics to dislodge KANU and Moi from power when given the chance. Unfortunately, fissures

in ideas about reform agendas undermined the alliance.

By the 1997 elections, the opposition was again deeply divided and unable to offer a credible threat to the Moi/KANU regime. Two umbrella organizations had formed, thereby competing for the loyalties of Kenyans who wanted to see Moi removed from office. Thus, in 1997, the opposition was again unable to present a unified front. They fielded different presidential candidates, dividing the opposition vote, and ensuring that the Moi-KANU government remained in place. Notably, however, is the fact that KANU and the opposition earned nearly equal proportions of parliamentary seats. KANU no longer had a clear monopoly on power in Kenya, and would need to rethink its strategies if it was to stay in power much longer (Kanyinga 2003).

Immediately following the 1997 elections, the opposition began focusing on the next change they would have in 2002 to unseat Moi and KANU. This next election was even more important in a sense. Under the Kenyan constitution, Moi was barred from running for reelection. This provided the opposition with an opportunity to present a candidate that would be running against someone other than a KANU incumbent. The question in KANU of who should replace Moi would prove to cause divisions within the dominant party. The reinvigorated efforts of the opposition to present a united front and the faltering unity within KANU provided the perfect window of opportunity for democratic change in Kenya. KANU felt the weakening of their position and set out to bolster their standing.

In a late-stage bid to ensure they had a hold over the majority of power and

mass-level support, KANU merged in 2002 with the National Democratic Party (NDP). Shortly after, discord between party members in KANU-NDP who wanted to maintain personal rule and those who wanted democracy arose (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). The merger served to further fractionalize within KANU (Kanyinga 2003). NARC aggravated the growing fissures in the ruling party, pitting leaders against one another throughout the campaign.

Popular emotion in the country came to a head during the campaign of 2002. Kenyans saw the opportunity to rid themselves of Moi's oppressive and ineffective leadership, as well as to damage the very foundations on which personal rule in Kenya was built. People booed President Moi when he tried to popularize his chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Opposition politicians in both NARC and KANU-NDP were emboldened by the restless mood among the citizenry, and began vocally challenging attempts by Moi to hold onto power through a puppet heir. KANU-NDP leaders fought for the nomination process for their presidential candidate to follow the democratic procedures outlined in the party's constitution (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003).

Civic society organizations maintained an underpinning of opposition to autocratic practices in Kenya during colonial and post-colonial times. After the reintroduction of multi-party elections in 1992, however, they stepped up in the fight for democratic transition with a vengeance. Post-Cold War economic struggle, political liberalization, and the faltering capacity of the Kenyan state to provide social welfare goods to its citizens all created space for these non-state actors to intervene in

previously state-monopolized activities (Nzomo 2003; see also Mkandawire and Soludo 1999; Ibrahim 1997). The institutional restrictions that kept average Kenyans out of the public arena drove Kenyans to form informal and civic associations through which they could impinge upon the state. Civic organizations, such as the National Council of Churches in Kenya and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, worked along side opposition political parties to push for constitutional review (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Agricultural (e.g. the Kenya Farmers' Association – KFA), professional (e.g.: the Law Society of Kenya – LSK), and religious associations walked the precarious line that was political opposition in Kenya. Those that were too outspoken or directly political in nature found themselves banned (Nzomo 2003). But civic organizations pressed on.

“ In Kenya, as in many African countries, civic associations and other agents of social change dramatically mushroomed [after the 1992 elections] and gained prominence as catalytic social actors, responding to the challenge of undemocratic governance, political instability, poverty, and social fragmentation” (Nzomo 2002: 189).

Civil society was a crucial player in the push for democratic change among citizens and elites in Kenya, as well as a provider of civic education and electoral monitoring that was central to the success of the 2002 election. Since that time, however, civil society has lost ground. Under the new government, civil society has yet to redefine its role (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). The civic community was stalled by the troubled constitutional reform process as well as by the euphoria due to the NARC triumph that all but eliminated room for criticism of the new government. Weak financial foundations, ethnic fragmentation, and poor coordination and communication among various sub-sectors of civil society inhibit the post-transitional abilities of civic

associations (Nzomo 2003). Yet, civic organizations in all sectors remain important stewards of people's interests in the political sphere. The Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC) rose up to offer leadership to the civic community. They applied consistent pressure for constitutional review (Nzomo 2003). Despite recent improvements, Kenya continues to boast a political culture rampant with patronage, corruption, ethnic fractionalization, and personalistic vies for power. Thus, civil society is crucial in the continued push towards consolidated democracy that lies before Kenya (Nzomo 2003).

This historical sketch of Kenya's rocky path as an emerging multi-party democracy first helps explain the high levels of democratic support in Kenya and across the African continent. Recent turns towards democracy reinvigorate this support for democracy. Bratton deems this the "alternation affect," through which support for democracy is bolstered through positive experiences with a peaceful turnover of leasers via elections (Bratton 2004), as well as through constructive encounters with the activities that surround democratic elections. These include such activities as campaigns, political community meetings, and civic education.

The Kenyan story also endorses the various strains of democratic theory, including economic, institutional, elite, civil society and cultural philosophies regarding democratization. The lack of inclusiveness among Kenyan elites (i.e.: Moi) ultimately led to popular protests, external condemnation, and an erosion of political and economic opportunities in Kenya. Lack of unity among elites both hindered political opposition and helped unseat political leaders.

Economic decline in Kenya fostered democratic stirrings. As Kenya's economy went through economic mismanagement that necessitated the tough stages of structural adjustment programs, politics also were affected. Economic struggles encouraged political engagement among average Africans. Their desperation and belief that their government was not responding compelled Kenyans to fight for a more free and prosperous Kenya.

Institutional changes, allowing for multi-party elections and civic engagement, have been crucial in ushering in increased civil liberties for Kenyans. Institutional obstacles, limiting full democratic consolidation, have added fuel to the fire advocating for democracy.

Civil society played an indispensable part in democratic reform in Kenya. Civic associations provided civic education to the masses, vocally opposed human rights abuses and political corruption, served as election monitors, and functioned as training grounds for Kenyan public engagement. Religious organizations notwithstanding (see page 229 and following), civic groups offered inroads to political activism missing under the repressive, personalistic dictatorships that dominated the first thirty years of Kenya's independence. After the reinstating of multi-party elections, civic associations led the fight for further democratic changes and ultimately for effective challenges to the stronghold of Moi and KANU.

Finally, cultural identities, including ethnicity, religious affiliation and gender have played significant roles in the developing political space in Kenya. In the account above, the role of ethnicity is clearly woven throughout. Following, I will focus

individually on the part that religious and gender identities have played in Kenya's democratic political development. Faith communities and women's groups have both been crucial in pushing for democratic change in the country. The following sections will highlight the story of these two cultural identities, heretofore largely ignored in Kenya's democratic story.

8.4 Gender in Kenya

Women have played a pivotal part in Kenya's political progress. Prior to colonialism, there were women who had economic, political, and social influence and power in Kenya. The Kikuyu people group in Kenya was traditionally matrilineal, with children belonging to their mothers (Creighton 2006). Furthermore, Kikuyu women in the nineteenth century exercised authority over other women in their communities. Though their authority did not extend to Kikuyu men, they still had a realm of influence in which to exercise decision-making power. Kikuyu women also had considerable economic independence as cultivators, traders, prophets and diviners (Berger 1999). Yet, as economic changes occurred over the next century, so did the standing of women vis-à-vis men. Changing divisions of labor and productive roles gave men "greater control over women's productive and reproductive capacities by elaborating a new ideology of women's inferiority" (Berger 1999: 26; see also Gold 1981; Oboler 1985). Economic and social changes during this period largely privileged men and disadvantaged women. As agricultural cultivators, women had been central to agricultural production. Furthermore, agricultural production was the primary source of Kenya's economy. Yet, mechanization resting on new technologies changed who

controlled agriculture. Men increasingly received training and technological assistance from colonial governments (Berger 1999). This shifted the power over agriculture from women to men, thereby altering women's relative social and economic standing vis-à-vis men.

The changes to women's lives under colonialization and industrialization did not affect all women equally. Rural women throughout Kenya both suffered under and benefited from these alterations. For example, around the onset of the twentieth century, Luo women experimented with new crop varieties and agricultural techniques (Berger 1999). They were therefore able to take advantage of the presence of colonial settlers as increased forces of demand through the use of more modern techniques that expanded their output. Yet, economies varied by region in Kenya, and thus women were influenced differently across the country. Unlike the Luo, who continued throughout the early part of the twentieth century to benefit from these experiments and access to new technology, many Kenyan women in major trading centers after World War I faced increasingly unfavorable work conditions and declining opportunities for wage-earning employment. The onset of the Depression around 1930 exacerbated these women's hardships even more. Throughout the rest of the colonial period, economic security also began to shift from agriculture to education and wage employment. These avenues were frequently less available to women than to men (Berger 1999).

Agitation for independence from Britain also changed the foundation of Kenyan women's positions in society. Women played vital parts in local resistance

movements. For example, female coffee pickers organized labor strikes in demand for increased wages and less abusive work environments (Berger 1999: 42). Since independence, Kenyan women have continued to struggle for equal footing *as women* in the Kenyan public domain. Women have made significant though labored strides towards equality with men in Kenya especially over the past few decades (Nzomo 1997). Independence itself failed to bring the rights and benefits for which many Kenyan women had hoped and fought. Yet, efforts to ensure gender equality began about a decade after Kenya's birth as a free nation, with the inclusion of gender as a topic in Kenya's 1974-1978 Development Plan (Mitullah 2003). Various policies throughout the early eighties highlighted the need to take gender into account. The United Nations Decade for Women (1976-1985) occurred at the same time, bringing international pressure and focus on the need to account for disparities in political, social and economic standings of women throughout the world ("Platform" 1995). Yet, in spite of these institutional beginnings, no effective attempts were put into place to fully integrate women into mainstream political decision-making (Mitullah 2003).

At the national level, Kenyan women have found less support for their fight to have equal footing in Kenya's political sphere, and for fully inclusive democracy to take root and grow in Kenya. Efforts by national-level women's advocate groups to include women in democratization processes were often short-lived and ill-focused. Attempts to advance women's rights often came with normative messages that set a women's primary place as in the home and with family (Berger 1999). The leading female political body, Maendeleo ya Wanawake, co-opted by the government through

Moi patronage politics, supported such foci for women (Masime 2003). The stunting of women's political process proved to be an obstacle for Kenya's political development. Inclusion of women with increasing regularity in the political arena both reflected and helped foster overall democratization in Kenya. As Kenya's political space opened to formerly excluded sectors of society, women gained additional inroads into formal political venues. Women's increased access to the political realm in recent years, though far from equal to that of men, has reciprocally reinforced the liberalization of politics in Kenya. Surveys throughout the world have shown that women's presence in the halls of political power results in "more participatory, less autocratic styles and models of government" (Mitullah 2003: 213).

Unfortunately, inclusion of women in ways that make democracy more viable have been slow in coming. Reflecting the divisions and infighting found in male-dominated political parties and associations, both Maendeleo ya Wanawake and the National Council of Women in Kenya (NCWK) were rendered largely ineffective by internal wranglings for power among elite women and manipulation by the KANU government (Mitullah 2003). Elite interests have supplanted women's political interests across the country in the focus of major national women's groups (Berger 1999). Women campaign through local, and even informal venues more often than through national or formal routes stems largely from the lack of true responsiveness by national level, formal power venues. National politicians and women's leaders, with a few notable exceptions (i.e.: Wangari Maathai), tend to essentialize Kenyan women as domestic beings, pushing cultural attitudes that continue to exclude Kenyan women

from political efficacy. Throughout Kenya's history, women have employed formal and informal avenues through which they have influenced the public sphere (Hay 1976; Wipper 1971). At the national level, however, only a few women successfully kept the voices of the majority of Kenyan women alive. This has proven to be a powerful obstacle to democratic consolidation in Kenya. Women's exclusion was a

Therefore, the prime venue through which women have found successful advances for their plights have been channeled through associative engagement (Mitullah 2003; Ndegwa 2003). Kenyan women have furthered democracy through civil society. Though their forms of civic association vary, both rural and urban women in Kenya are noted for forming largely grassroots groups to regain control over resources and combat their declining social and political position relative to men (Berger 1999). Kenyan women's efforts at leveling the playing field for all Kenyans evidence their positive agitation for the inclusive, representative regime that is democracy.

A more cohesive set of women's movements have been crucial in Kenya's fight for gender equality. Many women "enthusiastically and aggressively" entered the political realm when Moi allowed for political competition in 1992 (Nzomo 1997: 232). Women's organizations, mobilized to fight for democratic political rights for women specifically and Kenyans in general, sprang up through church groups, rural organizations, and ethnic associations. These grassroots movements have made greater progress towards women's empowerment in the context of growing democratic norms than national level women's organizations (Staudt and Parpart 1989).

Gender has increasingly taken center stage as an important social and political divide in Kenya. There were a number of provisions in a rejected constitutional rewrite⁹² specifically supporting female empowerment and the election of more female leaders. A push for greater protection of female human rights through institutional change has gained momentum in the past few years. Yet, despite having made great strides, women remain far less involved than men. Kenyan women have been eligible to vote and stand for office since independence in 1963 (Nzomo 1997). Many Kenyan women turn out to vote. In the 2002 elections, 47% of Kenyans who voted were women. Though this is slightly yet significantly less than the proportion of Kenyan men who voted (53% of Kenyans who voted were men),⁹³ it still represents a lower gender gap in participation than in the forms of political engagement examined throughout the rest of this project. Unfortunately, very few ever present themselves as candidates for political office (Aubrey 2001). The one viable female presidential candidate Kenya has seen, Charity Ngilu in the 1997 elections, lost badly. Worse than losing were the attitudes and reactions she received as a candidate. She was not taken seriously because she was a woman.

“Voters told us point blank they could not fathom a woman presidency. Others promised to vote for her because of her looks. Her campaign manifesto was subdued by her womanhood” (Orchardson-Mazrui 2006: 150).

As a result of the 2002 electoral turnover, the number of women MPs in Kenya increased from four to nine, though five of these were NARC *nominees*. Regrettably, fewer women ran for office than did in the 1997 campaign (Nzomo 2003b). Physical

⁹² Kenya held a referendum on a draft Constitution, known as the Wako Draft, on November 21, 2005. The draft failed. In conducting pre-dissertation fieldwork as part of Afrobarometer in Kenya during the month of September, 2005, the referendum was the central point of concern in the public realm, and I thus include discussions I had on the draft constitution and its potential affects on women’s political orientations in my chapter on Kenya.

⁹³ Difference of means test: $t=5.571$, $p<.001$

violence, lack of financial support, verbal abuse and character attacks (*thus attitudes and resultant actions*) continue to block women from running for political office. Female candidates and their families are targeted and the women themselves are presented as morally loose and deviants as women. The abusive and maligning tactics against potential female leaders further deters Kenyans from voting for women who brave the political landscape to seek candidacy (Orchardson-Mazrui 2006). Even in the transitional election of 2002, women candidates were subject to open threats and physical harm. For example, Dorcas Wambui, a civic ward candidate, lost her husband and several other family members when her house was set on fire as a warning against her campaign (Orchardson-Mazrui 2006).

Women are assigned a secondary role in the political realm in most all forms of political engagement by the customs and attitudes of both men and women (Orchardson-Mzrui 2006; Nzomo 1997). This is not unique to Kenya, however, but reflects the main obstacles against which women across the globe continue to fight in order to gain equal footing with men in the political realm (Duverger 1975). As a result of these attitudes, government leaders in Kenya often made implicit and explicit attempts to prevent women's political participation.

As found in chapters four through seven, women in Kenya esteem democracy and the freedoms it entails, yet are less satisfied with and less involved with the governance to which they are subject. Through civic and formal education, Kenyan woman are shunning the view that they are less than men. Kenyan women want equal access in public and private arenas (Nzomo 1997). Socio-economic status and

educational levels, while important in explaining Kenyan women's low levels of political engagement, are secondary to the attitudes and ensuing actions taken by the male dominated political system in Kenya. These include public messages about the sexual identities that these leaders ascribe to women, as well as acts of violence against women who try to engage in the political realm.

"In a largely patriarchal world, there are few cases of men voluntarily giving up the privileged positions they have historically enjoyed as the authoritative decision makers in the private and public spheres of their country...Kenyan women who surmount all the typical sociocultural and economic constraints to their public participation still have to prove to be better than the male candidates to gain entry...once in, a woman is likely to be allocated a position of relative powerlessness"(Nzomo 1997: 236).

In line with the multi-party reforms in 1992, Kenyan women held the first ever National Capacity Building Workshop for Women organized by a new group, called the National Committee on the Status of Women (NCSW) in July of 1992 (Nzomo 1997: 244). This workshop was a giant leap towards increasing female civic education and gender equality in public campaigns. Yet, women remain disadvantaged when it comes to political participation in Kenya. Attitudes about gender equality are the major reason behind the disadvantaged position Kenyan women play in their country's emerging democracy. 66% of male Kenyans support equal rights for women, while 78% of Kenyan women support equal access for their gender to the public arena.⁹⁴ A discussion of religious leaders who work with women's governance and democratization reveals a consensus among these informal leaders that attitudes against female empowerment are the major obstacle Kenyans face to true democratic inclusiveness (Personal interviews, September 2005). Men still dominate in leadership and decision-making roles in Kenya's government. Since they lag behind in supporting gender equality, true reforms face an uphill journey.

⁹⁴ Difference of means test: $t=-7.595$, $p<.001$


The attitudes that prevail towards women and the ensuing political exclusion they face mirror the shallow roots of democracy in Kenya. Political leaders are willing to exclude members of ideological identity groups with which they do not agree. And they do so with a vengeance. Women are seen as challengers to the status quo of politics in Kenya, and are met with political violence and public character attack. This rebuttal of women comes against their advocacy for democracy in general as well as for greater attention and action regarding issues that more specifically affect women (Nzomo 2003b). Political elites in Kenya are willing to resort to intolerant, non-inclusive tactics in vying for power over Kenya's political agenda. Tolerance and political equality are therefore only moderately rooted in Kenya's political culture, at least among the ruling elites. The forced exclusion of women represents, therefore, not only shallow levels of gender equality as a political value, but also fragile remnants of standard, core political values. The situation facing women in Kenya replicates the democratic situation facing the country as a whole. Willingness to approach ideas or sectors of society (in this case women and the issues they espouse) with a disregard for the rule of law, for institutions that are in place (the constitution and CEDAW for example protect women's rights in the political realm), and for the human rights of women reflects an unsure foundation on which democracy stands in Kenya.

8.5 Religion and Politics in Kenya

Within the above democratic legacy, Kenya's religious bodies have been key players pushing for democracy and monitoring democratic progress in the country. Kenya reflects the overall picture in democratizing, sub-Saharan African nations: a

majority of Kenyans profess either Christianity or Islam as their religion.

Figure 8.5.1: Religion in Kenya



Note: N=2398

Kenya is religiously diverse, though a vast majority of its residents claim to be Christian. Muslims comprise around 10% of the Kenyan population, while Christians make up over 80% of Kenya.⁹⁵

Economic, social and political variations exist between Muslims and Christians in Kenya (Oded 2000). Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, Muslims are economically stifled. In Kenya, the situation is no different. The Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) acknowledges the disadvantaged position economically, as well as socially and politically, in which most Kenyan Muslims find themselves. SUPKEM formed as an umbrella organization for Muslims in Kenya. Membership in SUPKEM is by organization, not individual. SUPKEM regards itself as a link between Muslims and the government, serving as a sort of spokesman to the government for all Muslims (Personal interviews, September 2005). SUPKEM, though it is a non-political body according to its

⁹⁵ This is in line with other statistical estimates of the Christian and Muslim populations in Kenya (CIA World Fact Book; The Association of Religion Data Archives) though self-reporting among Muslims often places their numbers between 20-30% (SUPKEM Interviews 2005; Oded 2000).

constitution, saw the Kenyan Wako draft constitution last year as perpetuating the economic hardships facing Muslims.

A sheikh within SUPKEM explained to me in an interview that he believed he had a moral obligation to voice his concerns about the government's constitutional draft (Sheikh Abdul Latif, Nairobi, Kenya, September 2005). He believed the draft was detrimental to Islam and the good of all Kenyans. The economic, socio-political and educational struggle facing Muslims in Kenya prohibited Muslims from staying out of politics. Economically, he argued that the Wako constitution perpetuated an arrangement whereby all taxes from across the country go to the central government. Thus, residents from marginalized areas would not benefit from resources arising in their area. A large percentage of Kenya's gross domestic income comes from tourism on the coast, which is a predominantly Muslim area. The sheikh argued that Muslims benefit very little from the profit they bring their country, especially when considered in relation to members of other sub-sectors of Kenyan society. Many of Kenya's Muslims live in a hub of economic activity in Kenya. The coastal region of Kenya, primarily the city of Mombasa, is one of the best and most important deep water ports in East Africa ("The Kenyan Economy" 2002). Thus, most Kenyan Muslims do in fact work in tourism and shipping industries that provide a substantial source of cash flow to the Kenyan economy. He further argued that the draft constitution would have further removed their access to the resources they helped generate for Kenya. 50-60 billion Ksh were reportedly earned through Mombasa in 2004, but this money all came to the center and the president directed this money to his constituencies, and the port areas are still underdeveloped

(Personal interviews, September 2005). Furthermore, under the defeated draft constitution, executive powers remained consolidated, giving the president even more latitude in extracting resources from the poor to use for himself and his 'patrons.' Muslims do not want a new constitution that replicates faults in the old, and therefore must engage politically in order to fight for a more inclusive, representative governing document. The sheikh insisted, however, that these were his personal opinions. SUPKEM supported the draft constitution, most likely stemming from their ties to the drafters of the Wako constitution, KANU government (Personal interviews, September 2005).

SUPKEM also is troubled by the situation facing Muslims in the Northeastern, (NE) Province. Most Muslims here are Somalis who work as pastoralists. They have asked for tarmaced roads, which he insisted had been promised under all three of Kenya's presidents. Yet, it is claimed that perhaps only about 4 km of roads in that area were tarmaced (Personal interviews, September 2005). The sheikh further maintained that no reliable tap water regularly served their region. Furthermore, it is argued that the distance for most NE Province residents to the nearest hospital is more than 100 kilometers, and there are only four doctors in the whole NE Province. The Millenium Development Goals, to which Kenya ascribed, called for a health facility at least every 5 kilometers. Kenya is falling short in meeting these goals primarily in Muslim regions of the country. This signals more than a nation struggling to develop economically and politically. Muslims believe, he claimed, that this treatment of Muslims reflects a weak commitment to political equality, accountability of leaders to their constituents, and lack of tolerance of diversity in the nation.

Poverty alleviation is another area in Kenya where Muslims find themselves disadvantaged in relation to other sectors of society. Especially after the 1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, as well as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the Kenyan government disallowed funds from Islamic countries, such as Iran, that were previously used to support orphan centers, community support activities and educations. The Muslim community believes it has a moral responsibility to support its teachers, though their pay has been drastically reduced, especially in relation to state and Christian schools due to cuts in financial resources available to Muslim communities. Orphans, who are among the poorest and most vulnerable members of any society, have seen the resources used to support them erode as well. This problem is exacerbated due to the growing number of orphans as a result of HIV/AIDS. In the past, orphans were supported by the community or brought up by relatives. The burden is more than people can take as their expendable incomes shrink in Kenya's struggling economy, especially with so many orphans and so many relatives passing away. Increased levels of poverty, felt acutely among Muslim communities, intensify the burden created by the need to care for additional children. Orphan centers were created as pressures on families rose, but the cut in funds for these centers leaves orphans with no additional safety nets.

Muslims are looking for innovative ways to provide for their orphans, as well as the poor within their community. Many feel, however, that they are getting a raw deal. World Vision, and other such Christian organizations, still work with orphans across Kenya, but this isn't necessarily with Muslim orphans. The organizations that still have funds are largely Christian organizations. SUPKEM feels that Muslim programs have

suffered loss of resources to a far greater degree than the Western-funded, Christian organizations. Some Muslims believe that the government has this double standard because they fear funding Muslim programs will breed terrorism (Personal interviews, September 2005). SUPKEM has written proposals to secular organizations, but Muslim organizations don't get funded; prior to the cuts brought on by terrorism, Muslim organizations had their own structures and funding sources, so didn't built the relationships with the funding agencies to whom they now must turn. So, other organizations (largely Christian) have long-standing relationships with these agencies and are therefore getting funded.

Finally, SUPKEM regards the educational disadvantages of Muslims in Kenya as an issue that they must address. Historically, Muslims are behind other sectors of the population in Kenya in education. Christian missionaries predominantly ran early schools, so Muslim parents often opted not to send their kids to these formal institutions. Many went to Islamic schools, where they received primarily religious instruction, or were schooled at home. The chairman of SUPKEM and Nairobi University professor Ali Mazuri are few of the educated in their generation. Just before the end of colonization, the government allowed Muslim schools, but they were lower than the state or Christian missionary schools in their level of education and access to resources. After independence, Muslims entered public schools in larger numbers, but access to state resources remained less for Muslim schools than for state or Christian schools. Parents who wanted to preserve their religious and cultural heritage through sending their children to Muslim schools make a trade off in the academic rigor with which their

children can be trained (Personal interviews, September 2005). Together, the above facts drive SUPKEM and Muslims into the political realm *as Muslims*.

8.5.1 Variations within Islam and Christianity

Variations within Islam and Christianity push, however, both for and against religious politicization among Kenyan Muslims and Christians. A force *against* political forms of religion can be seen in the ethnic divisions and identity, especially within Islam, in Kenya. In Kenya, Muslims are split between those who are Arab and those who are black Africans. The majority of Kenyan Muslims are black Africans who practice the Sunni-Shafi'i form of Islam (Oded 2000). Globally, the Shia branch of Islam is better organized and more politically engaged than the Sunni groups (Ayoob 2004). The limited presence of Shia Islam in Kenya leads to a less politicized expression of Islam in Kenya.

Among Christians in Kenya, numerous groups espouse apolitical doctrines. Pentecostal churches often supported Moi as a God-fearing leader. They argued that, because President Moi professed Christianity, Kenyans should pray for him and their country, yet stay away from critical or engaged political actions. President Moi's attendance at church services was a weekly televised event (Gifford 1995). One pastor's comments reflect the sentiment on which these apolitical branches of Christianity based their stances,

"People should shut up, accept the present leadership, and prepare to go to heaven" (Gifford 1995: 4).

These newly emerging Pentecostal and evangelical churches, including the Seventh Day Adventists and Full Gospel churches, tended to provide support for Moi's

dictatorship. Their support came in the forms of verbal praise as well as in calling on their parishioners to refrain from political action in favor of praying for leaders. They urged the “faithful” followers of God to pray for their leaders but to shun activism with the growing fervor for change (Westerlund 1996). Ironically, this form of abstinence from politics very much tied churches to the political realm. Patronage was notable given to pastors and churches who praised president Moi as a divinely inspired leader. Furthermore, resistance to democratic change found a base in these churches. In 1992, Moi’s arguments against multi-party democracy came from a televised AIC evangelist in Kenya,

“In heaven it is just like Kenya has been for many years. There is only one party – and God never makes a mistake...President Moi has been appointed by God to lead the country and Kenyans should be grateful...” (Gifford 1995: 205).

This pastor continued with an echo of KANU political propaganda, denouncing politically involved clergy. The AIC church is not affiliated with the West, and therefore has fewer financial resources from which to draw. The pecuniary patronage afforded to them due to support for the incumbent was quite attractive to church leaders (Gifford 1995). The Seventh Day Adventists also vocally opposed socio-political teaching and action by fellow Christian pastors and leaders. They championed Moi as a protector of religious freedom. The United Evangelical Churches of Kenya supported Moi’s criticism of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Catholic church for their active engagement on the political stage (Gifford 1995).

A force *for* religious politicization in Kenya occurred with the onset of multiparty elections in 1992. This opened political space for groups who were

previously left out (Oded 2000). Thus, the Islamic Party of Kenya, representing the majority of Muslims in Kenya, attempted to register as a legitimate political party in 1992. The government, run by those who are mostly nominal Christians, denied the party registration, citing legislation that disallowed groups from registering on religious lines (Mitullah 2005). Members and supporters of the IPK were therefore given the hope that they would have room to fight for their needs and rights at the table of public discourse, and this hope was dashed. Without a valid outlet for their needs in the public sphere, excluded groups are more likely to resort to volatile avenues of expression (Ayoob 2004). In light of the dissatisfaction with the economic and political outcomes of the Moi and KANU governments, Muslim groups also advocated for democratic change in hopes of improved policy and performance in these areas. SUPKEM provided civic education prior to the 2002 transitional elections. SUPKEM was also involved in advocating against the Wako draft of the Constitution, which was defeated in a referendum in November, 2005. Thus, continued disillusionment with governmental discrimination, combined with support from Islamic nations, and increasing economic hardships are pushing for both politicized and politically extremist expressions of Islam in Kenya, regardless of the Sunni dominance there.

Among mainline Christian branches, adherents have been agitators for reform since before independence (Gifford 1995). The National Council for Churches in Kenya (NCCCK), an umbrella organization for predominantly mainline Protestant churches, as well as the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) have been two of the leading organizations campaigning for democracy in Kenya. Both groups hold

forums and rallies, offer civic education workshops, and formally participate in monitoring elections across the country (Personal Interviews, September 2005; Oded 2000). These churches and related organizations provided education and information to members, organized forums, and mobilized attendees into political engagement. The continued incomplete democracy in Kenya will retain the political critique and activism of these Christian groups. Furthermore, leaders of Christian groups and churches have had an ear in the highest echelons of political power (Oded 2000; Gifford 1995). Yet, with the opening of political space through multiparty politics, Christians have come under pressure to open seats at the public table. As Christian elites fight for their own survival, a venue which people trust is religious, and may thus be used by these elites to maintain their legitimacy and hold over Kenyan power structures (See for example Villalón and VonDoepp 2005 for a discussion on the role of elites).

Empirical data collected by Afrobarometer confirm the variations within Islam and Christianity painted by the political history of Kenya related in this chapter. Mainstream Protestants and Catholics are reported in Kenya's history to have perceived their roles in the public realm differently than Evangelical Protestants. Mainline groups include such denominations as Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Anglicans and Dutch Reformed. Evangelical groups include Seventh Day Adventists, African Inland Churches, and Full Gospel churches. Shia Muslims throughout the world are notably more politicized than are Sunni adherents. I test these stories using data in Kenya on the various sub-groups of Christianity and Islam.

I compare the means on political values, attitudes, and behaviors of these two groups of Christians (Table 8.5.1.1), namely those reported as more politicized (mainstream protestants and Catholics) and those noted to be less politically engaged (evangelicals). I find that there are significant differences between Christian adherents on six political orientations.

Protestants who are members of mainline denominations and Catholics are, in fact, more politically involved and more democratic in their political orientations.

Table 8.5.1.1: Mainline Protestants and Catholics versus Evangelical political orientations

	Mainline Protest/Catholic	Evangelical Protestants	t	Significance
Close to Political Party	72%	63%	3.784	0.000
Interest in public affairs	86%	80%	3.819	0.000
Accountability	80%	72%	3.729	0.000
Gender Equality	75%	70%	2.104	0.036
Reject Autocracy (Overall)	83%	60%	3.295	0.001
Reject one party rule	80%	74%	3.162	.002
Reject rule by elders	64%	59%	2.439	.015
Reject military rule	95%	94%	1.320	.187
Reject one man rule	93%	92%	1.677	.094
Communing (Overall)	77%	66%	6.656	0.000
Discuss Politics	79%	67%	6.574	0.000
Attend Community Meeting	80%	68%	5.343	0.000
Join Others to Raise Issues	70%	63%	3.463	0.001

N=2010; Percents are within each religious grouping

Mainstream Protestants and Catholics are significantly more likely than Evangelicals to cite a political party to which they are close. 72% of Mainline Protestants and Catholics name a political party with which they are closely affiliated. Only 63% of all Evangelicals cite similar attachment to a political party in Kenya. Members of these two older sets of Christian denominations are also more likely than adherents in recently emerging evangelical and Pentecostal groups to be interested in politics. The main form of political engagement in which there is a disparity between evangelicals and Catholics/mainstream Protestants is communing. Members of older, more mainline denominations are more active with their peers in the political realm. 77% of all mainline Protestants and Catholics engage with their peers in political activities. Only 66% of Evangelicals are similarly active. This divergence in grassroots political engagement between mainliners/Catholics and Evangelicals is true in all three forms of political

communing. Catholics and mainstream Protestants attend community meetings, discuss politics and join others over political issues more often than evangelicals and Pentecostals. Evangelicals are notably less supportive of accountability and gender equality as political values than are Catholics or mainstream protestants. They also reject autocratic forms of government with less frequency than do Catholics or mainstream Protestants. When each form of autocratic government is considered separately, it seems that failure to reject one party rule and, to a lesser extent, rule by traditional elders, that drives the gap between politicized Christian groups and those that are less politically engaged. Evangelicals are not firmly against one party rule. This reflects the story told above of the AIC, Seventh Day Adventist, and Full Gospel church leaders supporting the Moi regime as reflective of God’s leadership in Kenya. Evangelical groups in Kenya tend towards fundamental interpretation of their sacred texts, believing that God calls them to pray for their leaders and to support their leaders, but to be more concerned with saving souls than with creating a political utopia on this condemned world (Haynes 1996).

Table 8.5.1.2: Sunni versus Shia political orientations

	Shia	Sunni	t	Significance
Close to Political Party	80%	58%	1.794	.074
Attend demonstration	40%	15.9%	1.970	.050
Political Violence	26.6%	5.7%	3.440	.001
Gender Equality	86.7%	60.5%	2.215	.028
Reject one man rule	73.3%	93.2%	2.652	.009

N=247

Given that what Kenyans do in the political realm reflects their attitudes and opportunities, does the effect on political participation of being a Sunni versus a Shia

or a Mainline Protestant/Catholic versus an Evangelical persist amid other factors⁹⁶ in Kenyans lives?

Table 8.5.1.3: Divergence in Sunni and Shia Political Engagement in the Context of Other Factors

	Attend demonstration or protest	Political Violence
(Constant)	-0.702 (1.069)	0.886 (1.097)
Sunni (Base Group = Shia)	-1.134*** (0.342)	-0.727*** (0.352)
Gender	0.060 (0.177)	0.031 (0.182)
How often attend religious services	0.247 (0.154)	0.075 (0.158)
Member of religious group	-0.368** (0.129)	-0.390** (0.132)
Education of respondent	0.031 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.057)
How close to political party	-0.079 (0.129)	0.091 (0.132)
Employment status	-0.085 (0.070)	-0.028 (0.071)
Member of trade union or farmers association	0.136 (0.120)	0.114 (0.123)
Member of professional or business association	0.131 (0.182)	-0.085 (0.186)
Member of community development association	-0.118 (0.092)	-0.053 (0.094)
Urban Rural	0.506 (0.229)	0.214 (0.235)
Lived Poverty Index	0.081 (0.097)	-0.033 (0.100)
Country's present economic condition	-0.080 (0.062)	-0.012 (0.064)
Radio news	0.049 (0.076)	-0.057 (0.078)
Television news	0.166 (0.078)	0.096 (0.080)
Newspaper news	-0.061 (0.075)	-0.028 (0.076)
Interest in public affairs	0.460*** (0.128)	0.160 (0.132)
ken. Registered to vote.	0.557** (0.217)	0.145 (0.222)
Adj. R²	.273	.047

N=2398; OLS regression; Unstandardized coefficients over standard errors

⁹⁶ The following results are from OLS, multivariate regressions including the following controls: gender, religious service attendance, membership in religious organizations, education, affiliation with a political party; employment status, civil society membership, urban or rural residence, personal poverty, opinion on Kenya's economic situation, exposure to radio, TV and newspaper, interest in politics and whether or not one is registered to vote

Controlling for the other factors that influence Muslims lives, affiliation with Sunni Islam emerges as significant in relation to Shia Islam in explaining decisions to engage in political protests and political violence. Sunni Muslims are less likely to protest and to resort to violence over politics than Shia Muslims.

Table 8.5.1.4: Divergence in Catholic/Mainline Protestant and Evangelical Political Engagement in the Context of Other Factors

	Communing	Political violence
(Constant)	0.769*** (0.188)	0.342* (0.161)
Protestant Mainstream (Base Group = Evangelical Christians)	0.158** (0.052)	-0.091* (0.045)
Catholic (Base Group = Evangelical Christians)	0.109* (0.050)	-0.048 (0.043)
Other non Christian	0.208** (0.065)	0.128 (0.056)
Gender	-0.270*** (0.042)	-0.013 (0.036)
How often attend religious services	0.035 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.017)
Member of religious group	0.010 (0.028)	-0.051 (0.024)
Education of respondent	0.010 (0.013)	0.006 (0.011)
How close to political party	0.105*** (0.030)	0.024 (0.026)
Employment status	0.006 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.010)
Member of trade union or farmers association	0.093*** (0.025)	0.027 (0.021)
Member of professional or business association	0.000 (0.029)	0.024 (0.025)
Member of community development association	0.135*** (0.020)	-0.018 (0.017)
Urban Rural	-0.154** (0.053)	0.046 (0.046)
Lived Poverty Index	0.072** (0.026)	0.037 (0.022)
Country's present economic condition	-0.042** (0.017)	0.003 (0.015)
Radio news	0.061** (0.024)	-0.053** (0.020)
Television news	0.041** (0.015)	0.012 (0.013)
Newspaper news	0.046** (0.018)	0.021 (0.015)
Interest in public affairs	0.247*** (0.032)	0.049 (0.028)
Registered to vote.	0.205*** (0.052)	-0.046 (0.045)
Adj r-squared	.254	.021

N=2398; Unstandardized coefficients over standard errors

Among Christians, as frequency analysis suggested earlier, Kenyans who are


members of Mainline Protestant and Catholic denominations are more likely than Evangelical and Pentecostal Kenyans to enter the political realm in positive political behaviors. Mainliners more often commune than recently emerging denominations. Catholics and mainline Protestants, however, are less likely to protest than evangelicals. This counters the story that has been told in Kenya,, as well as the expectations presented by the reported frequency analysis.

What these findings evidence in is that, in spite of the forces against religious political engagement in Kenya, religious political mobilization has been a mainstay in the country. There are differences among variations of Christianity and Islam, but both Christians and Muslims in Kenya have maintained contact with the political realm through religious affiliations. The status of Muslims as social, political and economic minorities drives their agitation for democracy. The desire to hold onto rapidly uncertain chambers of power urges certain Christians to resist democratic reforms. The culture of Christian groups that agitate for democracy, however, drives Christians to engage in the political realm in support of democracy.

8.6 Religiosity in Kenya

It is important to note that, as religion is mobilized in the political realm, numerous Kenyans are affected. Kenyans are very involved in their churches or mosques, as well as in religious associations outside their churches or mosques.


Figure 8.6.1: Religious Service Attendance in Kenya



Note: N=2398

Kenyan are regular attendees at religious services. Most Kenyans attend church or mosque service at least once a week or more (82%).

Figure 8.6.2: Religious Organization Membership in Kenya



Note: N=2398


Kenyan are also highly involved in civil society organizations that are religiously affiliated. Only 12 percent of Kenyans are not members of some form of religious, civic association. And most Kenyans are *actively* involved in these organizations (60 %). This

does reflect a similar distribution to the high levels of religious involvement apparent throughout democratizing African nations.

Religious organizations in Kenya have been leaders in fighting for democratization, as well as for women's rights. Groups adhering to both Christianity and Islam have led the way in civic education and election monitoring. Muslim groups as well as Christian groups offer programs that target the special needs of women in gaining access to the public sphere, and in being able to provide for their families and society. Finally, religious associations of both ilk strive to educate men and women about the important role that women play in society and the need to ensure that their rights are protected. I will discuss four groups that I met with on a fact-finding trip to Kenya that are both religious and civic minded, and have been front-runners in the fight for female empowerment and democratization in Kenya.

I find that there is a small but notable gap between Christians and Muslims in their religious service attendance, but not in their religious association membership.

Figure 8.6.3: Religious Service Attendance among Christians and Muslims



Note: $N=2,398$; $t=13.282$, $p<.001$; Rounding leaves totals not exactly 100%

Though both Muslims and Christians can regularly be found at their churches or mosques, Muslims more often attend religious services in Kenya than do Christians. Around 95 percent of Muslims can be found once or more a week entering the mosque for religious worship or teaching. This is compared to the 83 percent of Christians who attend churches once a week or more. Both Muslim women (94%) and men (95%) in Kenya are equally more likely to attend religious services than are Christian men and women.⁹⁷ A significant gap between Muslim men and women fails to materialize regarding how regularly they appear at religious services.⁹⁸ Muslim women in Kenya are much more present at mosques than they appear to be throughout the 16 sub-Saharan nations examined in the earlier chapters of this study. Muslim women in Kenya perhaps face a greater degree of freedom than do their female counterparts in other democratizing African states. Christian women, however, are still amply more often seen at religious services than are Christian men.⁹⁹ Women in both religions in Kenya, therefore, are

⁹⁷ Christian men vs Muslim men $t=11.026$, $p<.001$; Christian women vs Muslim women $t=7.710$, $p<.001$

⁹⁸ Muslim men vs Muslim women $t=1.017$, $p=.310$

⁹⁹ Christian women vs Christian men $t=8.327$, $p<.001$

active in their faith communities. This could prove empowering for women in the public sphere as they gain a sense of efficacy and leadership skills in churches/mosques that could translate into political prowess.

Within Islam, Sunni Muslims are more involved in both religious services as well as in religious organizations. 95% of Muslims who attend mosque once a week or more are Sunni, while only 5% are Shia. Understandably, Sunni are much more prevalent in Kenya than are Shia. Within Shiis, however, this is only 67% of Shia who attend religious services once a week or more, while 95% of Sunni attend weekly or greater.¹⁰⁰

Within Christianity, 35% of Kenyans who attend religious services once a week or more are Evangelicals, while 64% are Catholics or Mainstream Protestants. Considering the proportions within each set of denominations, however, it seems Evangelicals are more regularly found in church than are Mainstream adherents. 82% of Catholics and Mainstreamers attend weekly or more, while 87% of Evangelicals attend weekly to multiple times a week.¹⁰¹

8.7 Gender and Religion in Kenya

Support for gender equality is potentially variable across Islam and Christianity in Kenya. Within Islam, however, men and women value gender equality at similar levels. Muslim men (61%) and women in Kenya (63%) support gender equality equally.¹⁰² The true variance between Kenyan men and women in regards to gender equality, therefore, is among Christians. Christian women (21%) support the continued oppression of women significantly less than Christian men (32%) in Kenya.¹⁰³ The

¹⁰⁰ $t=6.024, p<.001$

¹⁰¹ $t=4.934, p<.001$


¹⁰² Difference of means test: $t=-.393, p=.695$

¹⁰³ Difference of means test: $t=-7.385, p<.001$

difference between Muslim and Christian men is also insignificant.¹⁰⁴ Muslim women, however, are far more likely to support the persistence of traditional laws for women than are Christian women.¹⁰⁵ What these findings show is that a notable number of both Muslim and Christian men support the continued exclusion of women from effective political empowerment. Christian women, however, are least supportive of the situation in which they have found themselves. Thus, women are not a homogenous group in Kenya. Religious differences affect the different expectations women have for their role in the public realm.

Furthermore, there is a gender gap in religious participation.

Figure 8.7.1: Religious Involvement Across Gender in Kenya



Note: N = 2398; Service Attendance: $t = 8.046$, $p < .001$; Member: $t = 3.670$, $p < .001$

Kenyan women are the more regular attendees of religious services and are more active members in religious associations than are Kenyan men. Churches/mosques and para-church/mosque religious associations in Africa are often vehicles of civic engagement and venues for skill and educational acquisition. The National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK) has been extremely active in democratization in Kenya.

¹⁰⁴ Difference of means test: $t = -1.695$, $p = .090$

¹⁰⁵ Difference of means test: $t = -4.982$, $p < .001$

“...NCCCK has been in the forefront of opposition to the authoritarianism [in Kenya]”
(Gyimah-Boadi 1996).

Interviews with leaders of Muslim and Christian religious organizations in Kenya (September 2005) revealed these were actively speaking out against anti-democratic ideas and practices, as well as running civic education programs. It is possible, therefore, that women’s increased activity in religious organizations and bodies may have already reduced, or may reduce in the long-run, any gender gaps in democratic orientations in Kenya. Is this possibility more or less pronounced in Islam versus Christianity? Is any gender gap among Kenyan religious involvement different within Islam versus Christianity?

Table 8.7.1: Religious Service Attendance: Islam and Christianity across Gender

Muslim Attendance	Gender	
% within Gender	Male	Female
Never	1%	2%
About once a month or less	4%	4%
About once a week or more	95%	94%
Christian Attendance	Gender	
% within Gender	Male	Female
Never	2%	1%
About once a month or less	22%	10%
About once a week or more	77%	90%

I now turn to membership in para-church or para-mosque religious organizations. Are there variations within or across Islam and Christianity in gendered membership? I find that no notable differences emerge between Muslim men and women¹⁰⁶ or across Islam and Christianity among men¹⁰⁷. There are, however, important variations within Christianity among men and women as well as between women who adhere to Christianity and women who are Muslims.

¹⁰⁶ Muslim men vs Muslim women $t=.860$, $p=.391$

¹⁰⁷ Christian men vs Muslim men $t=.076$, $p=.940$

Table 8.7.2: Religious Association Membership: Islam and Christianity across Gender

Muslim membership	Gender	
% within Gender	Male	Female
Not a Member	17%	13%
Inactive Member	10%	21%
Active Member	63%	62%
Official Leader	11%	5%
Christian membership	Gender	
% within Gender	Male	Female
Not a Member	11%	7%
Inactive Member	21%	17%
Active Member	56%	66%
Official Leader	12%	10%

Christian women are far more often the active members that are driving religious organizations than are Christian men.¹⁰⁸ Christian men run the organizations more regularly (12 percent who are leaders are men compared to 10 percent of leaders who are women), but their supporters, the members who sustain and propel these organizations are women. This helps explain the bent of recent programs and activism among Christian organizations in Kenya. The Catholic group, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), has been a leader in civic education, focusing on women, as well as in empowerment programs in all areas of women’s lives.

A chief program officer with CJPC explained numerous programs within his organization focusing on governance and gender empowerment (Personal Interviews, September 2005). Their Governance and Democracy Program, currently in its third and final phase after 8 years of work on governance issues in Kenya, has a specific target series entitled “Women in Decision-making.” Within this series, as well as all of the various areas of focus on democracy in Kenya, CJPC holds workshops. Churches must send one man and one woman to these meetings. Workshops are held in each diocese that are mixed with lay men and women, as well as with priests and sisters. There are also

¹⁰⁸ Christian men vs Christian women $t=3.259$, $p=.002$

workshops for women only. At the end of each session, participants come together in one final workshop to pool ideas. They organized female-only workshops because they have found that women do not speak as much when men are present. Female levels of involvement, exceeding that of men, drive leaders in the CJPC to want their input.

The question was posed as to why CJPC, as well as the Catholic Church in general, had made such stark advances in female empowerment. A CJPC program officer responded that a few years ago, the Catholic Church in Kenya had taken a poll of its diocese and churches to find out who their members were and what needs these members articulated. They learned that their members were overwhelmingly women and that, in order to serve these women, they needed to address issues of gender equality, civic education and poverty. The Catholic church and its off-shoot bodies decided to act on what they learned, and have been advocating for and attempting to serve the needs of their largely-female parishioners ever since. With the phase out of this democracy program, CJPC launched a new program in 2005, supported by Action Aid, called “Gender & Governance,” which focuses on promoting gender equality in the political realm, and helps women engage in civic education and political activism. CJPC leaders believe that the skills and knowledge both women *and men* gain through church involvement as well as through para-church religious organization involvement do create important spillover effects into the public realm.

Catholic groups are not the only ones through which Kenyans, including special foci on women, are gaining information and competence that translate into public-sphere activism. Mentioned earlier, the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK) was

one of the leading organizations offering civic education and monitoring elections cites during the 1997 and 2002 transitional elections in Kenya. They remain one of the active voices pushing for multi-party democracy founded on the rule of law in Kenya. NCKK has a district coordinating committee for civic education in every district. Through these offices, they also coordinate female empowerment programs. Program officers in the Nakuru NCKK office discussed in detail their Masai Women Empowerment Program located in the Narok district. Offering literacy skills, credit, and survival resource access, they expect this program to have spillover effects among Masai women in the public sphere.

Muslim groups are also fighting for democracy and women's equality in Kenya. It is important to note that Muslim men and women are equal in their relatively high levels of active membership in religious associations. Though Muslim women are slightly less likely than Christian women (66%) to be active members in such associations, they are still turning out in notably high numbers (62%).¹⁰⁹

Part of this engagement in the political realm among Muslim women is attributable to the growing organization of Muslims around gender issues. Associations of Muslims have taken up political reigns to fight for the rights of the Muslim community as well as specifically for its women in Kenya. Among Muslims, two organizations show the short-comings and successes of these attempts to politically empower female Muslims in Kenya. SUPKEM, as the leading voice for Kenyan Muslims, has largely disadvantaged Muslim women under previous regimes. This likely helps explain the lower levels of involvement among Muslim women in relation to both Muslim men and Christians. The emergence of the National Muslim Council of Kenya (NMCK) is fighting

¹⁰⁹ Christian women vs Muslim women $t=3.060$, $p=.002$

to bring Muslim women into the political arena. The high levels of involvement among Muslim women are in part attributable to the role of NMCK and its affiliates.

SUPKEM has a specific arm designated to work on women's issues. This branch primarily works on issues that have been designated "female" over time. The Women's Affairs division of SUPKEM looks after orphans, advocates for schools for the poor, helps Muslim families with medical bills or food procurement, collects clothes for the needy, sends water to drought areas, and raises funds for post-secondary scholarships (Personal interviews, September 2005). The Director of Women's Affairs served in the Nairobi city council and was a nominated MP for the current NARC government. (She lost this seat because a political elite removed her name after she had been announced in the media. A wife of one of his friends was installed instead.) The Director is also a divisional chairperson elected with Maendeleo ya Wanawake. She formerly served as an elected women's leader in KANU in the Langata division. Her current and former ties alone reflect the previous discussion of women's movements in Kenya at the national level. She serves as a leader for Muslim women at the national level in a purportedly apolitical body. She has ties, however, to the current and former ruling parties, and serves as a leader in an additional organization (Maendeleo ya Wanawake) that is widely regarded as little more than a puppet of the elite and governing leaders. Thus, though SUPKEM has successfully advocated for democracy and Muslim rights in other regards, it is and has been largely ineffective in empowering women in public, political attitudes and behaviors.

In response to the fruitless efforts for women within SUPKEM, the former deputy

director of women's affairs, Nazlin Umar Rajput, left SUPKEM and started an independent non-profit organization with the intent purpose of empowering and fighting for Muslim women in Kenya. As a women's representative in SUPKEM, she felt that she had little real decision-making power (Personal interviews, September 2005). Many Muslims express having lost faith in SUPKEM, regarding it as an arm of the government, pursuant of elite interests (Oded 2000). SUPKEM is not seen as supportive of democratic changes, as its own body has not held elections proscribed by its constitution in years (Personal interviews, September 2005).

Ms. Rajput stands as a unique example of the possibilities within Muslim women that are so often ignored. The organization she founded, the National Muslim Council of Kenya (NMCK), is about four years old, and in this time has created the largest Muslim women's network in the sub-Saharan Africa ("Breaking" 2005). This network, called NUR, has representatives and activities in every province and district in Kenya ("About NMCK-NUR" 2005).¹¹⁰ They began by launching a national women's survey dealing with such issues as divorce, poverty, and polygamy. They gained support from Kenyan vice president Moody Awori, US Ambassador William Bellamy, qadis court officials, and Muslim scholars (ulama). They brought women together in forums throughout the country, surveyed and discussed the daunting issues in their lives, and then signed a resolution with these women about their ideas on the direction leaders should take with them to deal with women's issues. This resolution was then given to the ulama, who made additions. Finally, the resolution was given to the qadis courts, who added their views and approved the resolution. NMCK has followed this resolution in creating revolutionary programs to reach Muslim women in Kenya. Most recently, they have

¹¹⁰ NUR means "coming of a new, bright light" ("Championing" 2005)

begun the “Behind the Veil” project to tackle HIV/AIDS and its impacts on Muslim women and their communities (“Breaking” 2005). A New Project, called “Oasis of Hope” is about to be launched with international assistance that will offer free legal council, arbitration, and mediation for Muslim women and families (Personal interviews, September 2005).


NMCK also holds open outreach days every month through their district offices. There are NMCK offices in every constituency, so their leadership mobilizes Muslim women to attend public forums. NMCK brings in women who are leaders of other organizations in Kenya to inform Muslim women of their rights and opportunities, as well as to expose them to women as leaders. NMCK founds all of its views regarding women’s rights and the need for women in the public and private on rights it argues are guaranteed to women through the Qu’ran. For Muslim women to know their rights is an essential focus of NMCK. They are concerned with the fact that many women (and men) now read the Qu’ran only in Arabic, even though they don’t speak Arabic. NMCK is urging them to read it in their own language in order that they truly understand it.

NMCK is driven by the Koran: NMCK leaders attest that equality is in the Koran. For example, a woman under the Qu’ran is afforded all her own income, as well as all her own possessions in case of a divorce. A man, on the other hand, as a husband is required under the Koran to provide for his wife and family and to split his assets in the case of a divorce. This is to ensure that women have the resources they need to survive and provide for their children. Many women simply do not know these rights, so they are not taken care of and suffer. Through activity in NMCK, Muslim women’s voices are being

brought more forcefully into public discourse. During the constitutional referendum campaigns, NMCK held public rallies to publicize the referendum and the rights of voters. NMCK leaders spoke *as Muslim women* to both publicize the issues affecting Muslim women in Kenya and to show that leadership among Muslim women is possible and beneficial (Personal interviews, September 2005). Activities of NMCK have raised the expressed desire for women and Muslim women to have greater representation (Personal interviews, September 2005).

A final yet important note that emerged in discussions with all four of the religious organizations was their experience with cultural attitudes as obstacles to women's political, social and economic empowerment in Kenya. Men do in fact support gender equality across the board less than women in Kenya, as well as across transitioning African democracies (Figure 8.7.2). Though men and women in Kenya, as in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, value other democratic values equally, they diverge in their support for gender equality in social and political arenas.

Figure 8.7.2: Gender Equality in Kenya as a Value Among Men and Women



Note: $N=2398$; $t=7.595$, $p<.001$; Percents are rounded, so totals may not equal 100%

The Women's Affairs Director of SUPKEM cited culture, as opposed to religion, as driving requirements for Muslim women to be fully covered when they appear outdoors. She asserts that cultural attitudes against women impel support of female genital mutilation (FGM), otherwise known as female circumcision. Various ethnic groups in Kenya also use Islam to champion certain practices that have their roots in culture rather than Islam. In the Nyanza area of Kenya, women must eat in the kitchen and men in another room at the table. This is not dictated by the Koran, but by tribal, cultural attitudes. Such practices, however, have a negative effect not only in the home, but also in the public arena. They reinforce how women see themselves in relation to men, as inferior and subject to men. She argued that the Koran does not require full body covering and is actually against FGM, but that cultural attitudes sustain these practices, with supporters thereby using Islam and the Qu'ran to justify their beliefs. This, she argues, warps Islam (Personal interviews, September 2005).

Women leaders at NMCK also argue that culture inhibits women's progress, as well as

distorting true Islam and the rights it affords women. A program officer shared that among Muslim Somalis in Kenya, Islam is used to endorse FGM. As the Women's Affairs Director from SUPKEM stated, the NMCK program officer attested that FGM is not Islamic, but is a cultural practice that oppresses and harms women. It is not only a physical act, but one that represents social domination as well. This is not the spirit of Islam, according to NMCK (Personal interviews, September 2005).

Christian leaders recognize the impact that cultural attitudes have on women's rights and roles in Kenya as well. NCKK's director of Democracy and Governance division affirmed that there are a few political leaders and magistrates in Kenya who are women. Churches, he asserted, support female political leaders, because they have, so far, found them more responsive to community needs. Cultural and traditional attitudes, unfortunately, limit female involvement in politics and leaderships.

"When all is said and done, people make decisions based on their culture. They are more secure there...religion comes second [to culture] in whether involved in governance behavior" (Personal interviews, September 2005).

There is a struggle, he argued, between religious values and cultural attitudes in attempts to empower women. Attempts to harmonize these worldviews are informing the political involvement of women in Kenya. NCKK also mentioned the cultural mindsets driving FGM among some Christian or syncretically Christian groups in Kenya. FGM is against the spirit of Christianity as a practice, and yet Christianity is used to justify FGM. As with Islam, this warps true Christianity (Personal interviews, September 2005).

Not in the least, the Catholic governance body, CJPC, also cited experiences with cultural bias as a leading barrier to women's political empowerment. A program officer

for CJPC discussed a new project launched in 2005 called “ Gender and Governance.” Through this program, CJPC offers training in leadership skills and governance knowledge to women. They have found, however, that both men and women must support women in leadership roles, both within and outside the political realm, in order for women to step into such roles. They are encountering cultural attitudes as barriers to women’s equal or effective inclusion in political realms. Women who are leaders in Kenya are originating mostly from larger cities where access to education and encounters with other women leaders is changing mindsets (Personal interviews, September 2005). Since most Kenyans still live away from these influences, cultural attitudes against full inclusion of women in all forms of leadership are more prominent among both men and women than my data captures.

8.8 So What?

Democracy in Kenya has been slow in coming. Democratic headway has been made, especially over the last few years. The precedents of Kenya’s founding leaders, however, have instilled obstacles to full democratic consolidation. Patronage and ethnic politics rule the day. These two facts of Kenyan politics cause divisions among elites that often inhibit effective governance. Patronage and ethnic fissures have also impacted the role of gender and religion in the political arena. National women’s groups are largely co-opted by ruling elites, who engage national organizations along these ethnic and patronage lines. Manedeleo ya Wanawake and SUPKEM, two organizations that are widely regarded as puppets of the government, have leaders who are members of elite, neo-patrimonial networks and who are members of government leaders’ ethnic groups.

Thus, by stifling the effectiveness of national women's and religious organizations, patronage politics inhibits the empowerment of women and the inclusion of various religious voices in the public sphere. Grassroots agitation is pushing for change, and women and religious organizations are leaders in this effort.

8.9 Conclusion

Kenya's story is largely Africa's story, in regards to democracy and it's the political orientations that are the basis for democracy. Struggles for democracy have come up against patronage politics in the form of elites grappling for power, especially across ethnic groups. Autocratic forms of governance therefore coexist alongside newly emerging democratic norms and institutions. This incomplete consolidation of democracy in Kenya has failed to remove high levels of support for democracy, yet is an obstacle to the inclusion of marginalized sectors of society in the political arena. In this context of high levels of support for and involvement in democracy, gender and religion both play a role in Kenyans democratic orientations, in conjunction with other factors.

Throughout Kenya's stories of religion, gender and democracy, the echoes of the reasons given in chapters four, five, and six for the political orientations among Africans in relation to gendered and religious effects resound. Religion and politics are intertwined in Kenya. Kenyan Muslims are disadvantaged politically, socially, and economically in relation to their Christian counterparts. The politicization of religion combined with the life factors facing Muslims and Christians makes religion a venue through which both groups engage the political realm. Women are disadvantaged vis-à-vis men in Kenya's

political realm. Cultural attitudes against female equality are pervasive and have a strong impact on the opportunities facing women in the political arena. Most Kenyans are highly involved in religious bodies and associations, and this involvement translates in political engagement. Women are more involved than men. Since religion is a political vehicle for Kenyans, religious involvement is a training ground for female political understanding and activism in Kenya. Leaders at prominent religious organizations in Kenya that affect the political realm affirm cultural attitudes as persistently inhibitive to women's progress in Kenya. Afrobarometer data reconfirms the findings that Kenyan men are not yet on board at the same levels as women in their support for gender equality. Though active involvement in religion has begun to reduce this gap for Christian women, Muslim women in Kenya have yet to experience similar progress in the short or long-term from active religiosity.

Chapter 9 – Conclusions: What findings emerged and why do they matter?

Understanding democratization is a monumental project that has received attention from varied perspectives. This project seeks to highlight the oft-overlooked importance of gender and religion – cultural identities – in individual Africans' orientations towards politics. Exclusion of specific gendered understandings on democratic political values, attitudes and behaviors assumes that mainstream democracy affects men and women similarly (McDonagh 2002). This project refutes gender gap claims at the level of political values and political attitudes overall. Men and women are shown, however, to not participate in politics equally. Gendered opportunities and world-views shape men and women's lives differently, and this matters in the political realm. The findings discussed in previous chapters indicate that the gender gap in African political *engagement* persists despite efforts by international organizations and internal women's political movements to erase gender inequities. African women value democracy at comparable levels with men. Women in Africa also support democracy alongside their male counterparts. Women in emerging African democracies, however, are not receiving the same supply of democracy, and are notably less satisfied with the democratic political freedoms they are receiving.

Religion is also ignored to the detriment of a full appreciation of the factors that are driving democratic orientations. Religion is an important part of Africans' public and private lives. Thus, discrete religious identities and varied depths of religious adherence affect Africans' political orientations differently. Islam is not a hotbed for anti-democratic sentiment or action. Huntington's (1996) idea that Islamic tenets and

democracy are incompatible does not play out in the African context. Muslims, on the contrary, value and demand democracy at rates analogous to their Christian peers. Islamic Africans are equally unsettled as their Christian counterparts when democratic promises go unfulfilled. And Muslims are slightly more likely than Christians to engage in political behaviors that encourage democracy in emerging African democracies. The manner in which Islam is politicized seems to be good for African democracy south of the Sahara. Muslims refuse to accept the political exclusion they have overwhelmingly faced. They see democracy as the way out.

Religious involvement on a whole, in line with previous discussions on civic engagement, encourages political orientations favorable to democracy and discourages values, attitudes and behaviors that can destabilize this form of regime. Thus, Africans who are active church or mosque attendees, or who are active members in religiously affiliated civic organizations help to advance democracy in their societies.

The interaction of religion and gender reveal that these two identities, when taken together, affect Africans in diverse ways. The gap that does exist between men and women in political participation looks different for Christian women than it does for Muslim women. Muslim women are significantly less involved than are Christian women. I argue in chapter 5 that this gap between Muslim women and Christian women stems not from an inherently increased discord between Islam and democracy, but from the struggle of women within an already oppressed group. Especially in relation to Christians, Muslims are left out of political opportunities, economic affluence, and educational access. They are generally a minority group across sub-Saharan Africa as a

region, concentrated as the majority of two states and nearly equal in population to Christians in a third state in this project. As minorities, Muslims are often left grappling for resources (money, education, political voice) to survive. Within groups that have limited access to life-sustaining resources, the weaker parties are generally the most oppressed (Mikell 1997; Nzomo 1995). This is the reality we see facing Muslim women. They end up with what is left over as far as educational, financial and political resources are concerned. As women, they are part of a disadvantaged stratum of society. As Muslims they are part of a religious minority group in thirteen of the sixteen countries in this project. They face a double jeopardy in their fight for their rights in the political realm. Thus, women are not all the same, nor are religious adherents or each denomination within each religion the same. In seeking to understand the effect of people's identities on their political orientations, it is necessary to take into account the influence that diverse self-perspectives have on citizens' values, attitudes and behaviors.

In chapter 4, I found that democratic political values are widespread in select African nations, among both men and women. The only gap that exists between men and women in political values is in regards to gender equality. Religion, however, does alter political value formation. Muslims are less likely than Christians to value political equality and to tolerate varied political opinions. Muslims value accountability, however, more than do Christians in SSA. In chapter 3, I explain the social and economic factors that potentially drive this disparity.

I note, though, that this project clearly shows the pervasive nature of democratic values in democratically transforming African nations. This is a positive finding for those

concerned with democratic political development in emerging democracies. If values for democracy are widespread, then the foundation necessary for democratic attitudes and behaviors exists. The values necessary for democratic attitudes and behaviors to flourish are present in democratically experimenting states across Africa. Why, then, are these values not translating in a deep and consistent manner into unfaltering democracy in each of the nations that have or are attempting democracy on the African continent? What factors are causing a disconnect from values to attitudes, behaviors, and thus democracy overall?

In chapter 5, I established that democratic political attitudes are also widespread among Africans in emerging democracies. African men and women support democracy over and above autocratic alternatives, with one notable exception. Women are more likely than men to allow for one-party states. This is arguably a result of the role as caretaker that women play in society (see Table 2.1, chapter 2). While this statement arguably essentializes women, in various ways across the globe, women do tend to support stability and order for families and societies (Logan and Bratton 2006; Mikell 1997; Nzomo 1995). Multi-party politics has often proved destabilizing, divisive, and violent in Africa. Thus, women allow for one-party states likely with a nostalgic eye towards the reliability that often persisted under one-party governance.

Women also differ from men only on one form of perceived supply of democracy. Women argue that they are not receiving democratic political freedoms more often than men. The findings in chapter five, revealing women to be less involved in political behaviors than men, reflect women in fact not having gained as much ground as men

through the growth of democracy across Africa. Women accurately perceive their situation. Democracy is not benefiting African men and women equally in its current status.

Muslims and Christians also vary slightly on their democratic political attitudes. Muslims more frequently say democracy is always preferable than Christians. Christians more firmly reject autocratic governance, however. Under non-democratic rule in Africa, Muslims were largely left out of governance processes. Thus, they have more to gain under democracy than Christians. This conceivably explains their small but important heightened levels of support for democracy. Muslims also more often reject one form of autocracy: one-party rule. Most Muslims have suffered oppression politically and economically at the hands of single-party states in Africa. They are therefore likely more committed to work under multi-party arrangements. Many Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa have had neutral or positive experiences with other autocratic forms of government. As discussed in chapter four, Senegalese Muslims were introduced to democracy through a military take over that then ushered in promised democratic reforms. Thus, Muslims in emerging African democracies are less convinced that, in times of chaos or single-party tyranny, autocratic rule couldn't step in temporarily to restore or create inclusive long-term governing provisions. No real differences exist at the attitudinal level within religion across gender. Women who are regular attendees of religious services, however, are slightly more likely to be critical of the way democracy is going in Africa. Religiosity thus, seems to encourage critical citizenry. Taken with the other findings of this project, such willing to critique one's government is an example of

emerging citizenship identity. This is a positive finding for democracy. Citizens must be willing to reject undemocratic occurrences in their government in order for true accountability and rule of law to take root and persist. Thus, religiosity seems to be encouraging democracy among women.

In chapter 6, I discussed Africans' political participation. I found that democratic political engagement is pervasive across emerging African democracies. I also established that Africans engage more in certain forms of political activities than others. Furthermore, gender, religion, and religiosity, within the context of other important influences, do alter democratic political participation.

Political participation is diverse across emerging African democracies. A majority of Africans engage in horizontal political participation, including the discussion of politics, attendance at community meetings and joining others to raise political issues. Most Africans who participate in these behaviors, which together I call "communing," choose to attend community meetings. Africans contact informal leaders more often than they contact formal leaders. This trend holds in all 16 countries across which this study spans. Informal channels, and the neo-patrimonial political culture reflected by informal political avenues, offer the strongest form of vertical political engagement to Africans in emerging democracies. Only a few Africans participate in protest or demonstration marches in transitioning democracies, and even fewer resort to violence over political matters. Thus, fears about the destabilizing affects of democratic transitions do not apply to the majority of Africans. Any chaos that occurs is among the few, rather than the many. Additionally, Africans in general are not rioting or causing bedlam in their

countries in the face of many unfulfilled democratic promises, increasing poverty, and rampant corruption. Africans, when they do engage politically, do so through contact with one another or contact with informal leaders.

Across the board, women are less likely than men to participate in politics. Despite equal democratic values and attitudes, women have less access than men to the political realm. Years of toil by international advocates, African women's movements, and other groups agitating for female inclusion in the political realm have failed to erase the gender gap at the level of political engagement. Women's dissatisfaction with their gains in political freedoms mirrors their actual situation. Women want to play effective roles in the political realm and are frustrated with the obstacles that persist for them.

Christians participate less than Muslims. Muslims are worse off economically and have less access to formal education than do Christians in SSA. Muslims are the minority in 14 of the 16 countries in this sample. I therefore argue that their minority status, funneled through the vehicle of religion, drives Muslims increased likelihood of communing, contacting formal leaders, or engaging in violence over political causes. They are members of the most desperate strata of society in emerging African democracies and therefore have much to gain by stepping out and making their needs felt in the political realm. At the same time, however, religion affects men and women differently. Democratic political engagement is encouraged among Christian African women. Thus, Christian identity likely reduces the gender gap between men and women in their political activism. Muslim women are less likely to engage in politics. Thus, despite the efforts Muslims on a whole have made to fight for their place at the political

table, and endeavors Muslim women's groups have made to educate and empower other Muslim women, Muslim women are still largely missing from the action. Though Christian women are less involved than men in formal political activities, their engagement in Christianity is helping reduce their exclusion. Women who are adherents to Islam are being further excluded politically. Groups like the National Muslim Council of Kenya and the Women's branch of the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims have made strides in reducing the exclusion and oppression faced by their constituents. This is all the more impressive considering the multi-layered battle they are fighting. Yet, there is still more to do. Muslim women have only begun to climb out of the hole of exclusion and silence into which they have often been trapped.

Africans who attend religious services more frequently contact leaders, both formal and informal, more than sporadic or non-attendees. Political leaders in SSA often make great fanfare of attending church or mosque services. It is possible that those who attend services regularly have more access to those leaders who attend their services. Furthermore, the efficacy built by regular attendance, which usually increases other types of church or mosque involvement, likely leads to a spillover in action in the political arena. Those who attend church/mosque regularly gain skills and confidence in communicating with leaders outside the religious realm. Active members and leaders of religious organizations are more likely to contact informal leaders. Religious and traditional leaders are more available to those who are part of religious organizations. As members of religious organizations, Africans gain client access to religious and other informal patrons. Contrary to much of the mainstream discussion regarding religiosity, I

find high levels of religious involvement *decreases* violence as an option in the political arena. Those who are active members or leaders of religious organizations are among the last to resort to violence over political issues. Religious organizations and bodies encourage positive democratic political activities, while discouraging violent, destabilizing political engagement.

Religiosity is helping to reduce the gap between men and women in political activism. Women who are active religious society members or who regularly attend religious services are encouraged to engage in political arenas. Though women are still left behind when it comes to political control and efficacy, they are gaining skills and awareness that have begun to translate into political gains. Far from serving as only alternative outlets of control and expression, religious civic engagement is helping bring women into the political domain.

Though the individual factors in Africans' lives largely drive their political orientations, national level events shape political values, attitudes and behaviors as well. Democracy breeds further democracy. Gender legislation has varied affects on residents of adopter states, but is significantly important for understanding political values, attitudes, and behaviors among Africans. A country's economic situation shapes its citizens' political worldviews. Residents of poor countries value political accountability and political equality less than citizens in better performing economies. Africans in countries with weaker economies support democracy more but are less satisfied that Africans in richer countries. Poverty in a country encourages political contacting, but discourages political protests and political violence. Finally, the religious heritage of a

country, which includes the mission activities, ties with the west, and ideologies of religious groups, partially helps explain the political orientations of its citizens. In examining the cross-national opinions of Africans, therefore, it is important to recognize that co-nationals are not truly independent in their political leanings. Their shared national heritage, albeit checkered and often times short-lived, influences citizens' values, attitudes and behaviors about politics.

While religious and gendered cultural identities do influence democratic political orientations, other factors are part of the short. Theory asserts that elites play important roles in transitions to and implementation of democracy. Research has shown an indisputable link between levels of economic development and democracy. Governing institutions have an impact on the coming and functioning of democratic governance. The international context in which a country is situated affects the timing and type of democracy that surfaces within a country under political transition. And various facets of a country's political culture influences if, when and how democracy takes root. All of these persistent arguments about how and why democratization occurs emerge as telling in the African context. Gender and religion matter for democracy's underlying values, attitudes and behaviors – in the framework of a country's institutional arrangements, elite ideas and actions, economic situations, and interactions with the global community. Institutions and economic factors are captured explicitly in the multivariate models throughout this project. Global sentiments and implicit institutional impacts are implicit in the models (i.e.: adoption of CEDAW is an institutional change as well as highly influenced by the international domain). Elite impacts and international bearings are

explicit in the anecdotal evidence throughout the project, especially in the chapter on Kenya. So, democratization is a complex process with an array of strands that weave together forming the picture of a country's governance. These strands must both be studied together as a whole and taken apart and examined as the unique components that they are. This project attempts to do both, primarily highlighting the specific strands of gender and religion, but situating these within the larger theoretical tapestry of democratization studies.

9.2 Future Research

The findings of this project pave the way for future investigations on factors that influence democratic orientations in emerging African democracies, and potentially across the globe. First, there are potential reinforcing identity cleavages (Cox 1997) among Africans whose ethnic group is also primarily defined by adherence to either Islam or Christianity. For example, many Kenyan Muslims are also Somali (34%), and the rest of Kenya's Muslim population is divided among smaller ethnic groups of which almost no members are Christians. A large proportion of Kenyan Muslims are Mijikenda (11%), then Borana (5%), Swahili (6%), Digo (8%), Giriama (5%), and Duruma (6%). There are nearly no Christians represented in these groups. Christians are primarily Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (13%), Luo (12%), Kamba (13%), and Kalenjin (11%). The leading political elites in Kenya mainly come from the Christian tribes. Therefore, future research is necessary on the impact of religion and gender on political values, attitudes and behaviors that works to untangle the effects that are religion and those that are driven by persistent ethnic politics in Africa.

In-depth research remains lacking on the conditions and attitudes surrounding

gender equity in each newly-growing African democracy. This project lays the foundation for future work that will disentangle the varied effects that national level gender legislation has on grass-root political orientations. Further measures of attitudes towards gender equality, and how these influence standard democratic orientations, must be employed in order to understand what types of attitude changes are necessary and potential steps that can be taken to remove attitudinal barriers to gender parity.

Finally, the trends that were found to hold across a merged set of sixteen African nations most certainly have exceptions when each country is examined on its own. Future examination would look at the key findings of this work as it pertains to each emerging African democracy. There is evidence from various countries that supports the findings of the overall picture offered by sub-Saharan democracies. Country-level examination, however, will offer clearer understandings of the factors that foster *democratic* political orientations and steps that can be made to encourage contexts ripe for democratic growth.

9.3 Policy Implications

What do the findings of this project convey about democratization policies? What steps can be taken to encourage democracy regarding the role of women or religion as outlined in the previous chapters? Women remain disadvantaged in their access to the political arena. The political playing field is kept unequal by cultural attitudes against gender equality. Women also have unequal access to formal education. Furthermore, violence is often perpetuated against females who step outside socially prescribed norms. As the Kenyan case shows, women who try to run for political office or assert themselves as leaders in the public domain are painted as wanton renegades whose moral bankruptcy

threatens society. This persistent gender gap in access to the political arena supports the need for intervention focused on the political opportunities of women. In order to promote attitude change among both men and women that will protect women who desire to be involved at all levels of political engagement, gender equality must be included in civic and academic education. And education must be available for women along with their male counterparts in order for women to gain the skills and confidence to engage in political activities.

Therefore, variants of affirmative action that create space for women in the political domain remain essential if democratic orientations are to grow. Gender quotas in legislative bodies, reserved seats in government ministries, and electoral quotas for party lists and campaigns must be employed to change both attitudes and opportunities for women. This project reveals that gender quotas have varied results on grassroots level political orientations. Further research on the surrounding factors that have an impact on the success or failure of gender quotas at fostering qualitative differences in women's public lives is vital alongside the continued use of such legislation. Research on gender quotas also maintains that quotas are used throughout the world in more and less effective ways (Dahlrup 2004). Lowe-Morna (2004) reports that quotas adopted in PR systems allow women who are elected through this scheme to make a more real, qualitative difference in legislative bodies than do quotas in other electoral system. Reserved seats, while ensuring quantitative representation of women, tend to reduce the number of women directly elected to governing bodies, as women and voters tend to rely on the reserved seats for female candidates. Lowe-Morna (2004) also finds a hierarchy to exist

between directly elected female representatives and appointed legislators, with elected women being seen as more legitimate. She urges both intended and unintended consequences such as these to receive greater attention if the role that quotas potentially play in empowering women are to be properly understood.

Ballington (2004) adds the finding that both type of electoral system in which quotas are implemented as well as the type of quota employed affect the effectiveness of quota provisions. Legislated quotas are more enforceable, since they do not rest on the good will of the parties, as do voluntary party quotas. Requirements on the forming of lists in list systems ensures that female candidates are not relegated to the bottom of electoral lists where they are very unlikely to be elected. Furthermore, Ballington (2004) asserts that quota effectiveness can not be separated from dominant social attitudes, as well as the socio-economic position of women, and the presence or lack of a sustained, mobilized women's movement. Otherwise, quantitative representation of women in Africa will remain largely top-down, symbolic gestures that do nothing to change the lot of African women in the public domain. As is asserted in this project finds, institutions matter, but cultural attitudes, socio-economic situations and opportunities for women's mobilization also influence gender equity in the political arena. Thus, further research and use of gender quotas must accompany awareness of and focus on these aspects of a country or region's political landscape.

International gender policies such as CEDAW also surface as important in political orientations in transitioning and consolidating African democracies. The reasons and context of CEDAW's impact on political values, attitudes and behaviors has yet to be

fleshed out fully. Regular reporting and surrounding legislation supports and reflects commitment to implementing CEDAW mandates. The only comprehensive impact study of CEDAW, released in 2000, found that the following surrounding circumstances are crucial to the effectiveness of CEDAW as a tool for women's public and private equity: widespread awareness and understanding of CEDAW; non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as partners in awareness-raising and CEDAW implementation with local and national governments, women's movements and CEDAW representatives; governments learning how their policies can be altered or adapted to include CEDAW compliance; and regular appraisals of policy effectiveness. Barriers to CEDAW implementation were found to be: alienation of civic society from the political system; lack of support from government officials; difficulty in executing enacted policies; lack of media-awareness about CEDAW and women's rights; and civil society financial struggles (Mcphedran *et al* 2000).

For example, South Africa is discussed as a good example of having a legislative framework that enables operationalization and implementation of policies that support government and societal compliance with CEDAW norms and provisions. South Africa's liberal constitution specifically includes recognition of women's unequal social and political position, as well as an affirmative action provision which states that "legislative and other measures" will be taken to "protect or advance" disadvantaged people in South Africa. The provisions of CEDAW, therefore, are seen as "relevant to the interpretation of all South African laws even though there is no explicit [other] legislation" (Mcphedran *et al* 2000). There is support from government officials, guidelines under which all

entities in South Africa fall (including civic associations), and public awareness of gender issues that reach the highest offices.

Therefore, policies that foster the training and capacity of women's networks and civic associations are central components to effective use of CEDAW and other such mechanisms. Policies that recognize the disadvantaged position in which women continue to live and work must be instituted and implemented in local and regional governments in order for CEDAW and other international gender conventions to have space to affect change for women. Government leaders, grassroots workers, and general publics must be made aware of the need for gender equalizing legislation. Awareness is also necessary of the provisions, such as CEDAW, that are in place in order for these tools to be employed by those who are fighting for gender equality and democracy. Further research is essential on the methods and levels of implementation of CEDAW provisions, and the contexts in which CEDAW norms are being enacted. The 2000 impact study included in-depth exploration of CEDAW in only one sub-Saharan African nation: South Africa. Similar work in each emerging African democracy is essential. Clarity in how CEDAW is operationalized and enforced will shed light on successful and unproductive efforts to end discrimination against women. Solid insight on how CEDAW implementation varies across countries as well as within countries will also offer policy makers appreciation for the types of policies and programs that could effectively meet CEDAW goals. Understanding when and where CEDAW works well will also help untangle reasons that some countries with national level legislation that supports gender parity discourages democratic orientations.

Along with gender equalizing policies and programs, the findings of this project suggest that religion is good for democratic political growth. Interactions between state and faith-based civic organizations, churches and mosques will further democratic orientations in politically developing nations. Thus, there is a place for “faith-based” initiatives in political governance. The majority of these types of initiatives in Africa have been centered on the issue of the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. Groups such as the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, Christian Aid, the Catholic Medical Mission Board, Catholic AIDS Action: Namibian Catholic Bishops Conference, the National Episcopal AIDS Coalition, the Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches, the World Council of Churches, Islam and HIV/AIDS Project, and Positive Muslims have worked with governments across Africa to contain and combat AIDS and the wake of tragedy left by the disease (“Faith-Based” 2006). Numerous Christian and Muslim organizations have worked with African governments and international alliances to promote peace and reconciliation across Africa (“Reconciliation” 2005). While the latter example of peace promotion goes hand-in-hand with the ability for democratic governance to take root and grow, there is a difference between this work and religion-state interactions directly focused on democratic governance. Similar partnerships between local governments, international bodies, and religious organizations are necessary in the area of governance and democracy.

There are controversial sides to the use of “faith-based” and state partnerships to promote democratic governance. Supporters of religion-state interactions argue that faith-based organizations are often extremely effective in civic education and service provision

on the other areas that affect Africans public and private lives. They assert that service providers who are doing the best job should be able to receive public, financial support, regardless of the organizations creed or religious stance.

Those with concerns about intermingling of religion and government argue from a variety of perspectives. Some cite that church/mosque-state partnerships threaten the religious autonomy and “purity” of religious organizations. Others who push for extreme caution when religious groups are used as mediators between governments and people contend that current faith-based interactions in the West are inconsistent and based on unclear mandates. Current US standards rest on an idea of “pervasive sectarianism,” (Monsma 1996) which assumes that a sacred-secular dualism exists, in which sacred activities and secular activities can be untangled within religious organizations and funding and support only be extended to those that are not religiously biased. As this document and other research (i.e.: Ellis and ter Haar 2004) has shown, Africans do not generally hold such distinction. Attempting to employ such a perspective in work with African states fails to understand the respects in which values and attitudes regarding religion and governance underlie the work of religious and civic organizations, as well as the people with whom these associations work and serve (Monsma 1996). The unclear nature of state-religion interactions in the research that does exist necessitates research both globally and focused on Africa that untangles the potential benefits and drawbacks of church/mosque-state partnerships. Clearly, however, religious bodies are supporting democracy in Africa and must therefore be included in efforts to continue democratic consolidation across the continent.

The findings of this project support both gender-focused efforts by democratizing governments, as well as relationships between African governments, international bodies, and religious groups. There are, however, potential conflicts of interest between the promotion of gender equity and state-religion partnerships. For example, gender equity campaigns in Kenya have met dissatisfaction among Muslim men *and women* over a proposed gender equity bill as well as potential Constitutional revisions. Changes to traditional Muslim courts (khadi courts) would ban any decisions that conflicted with women's rights as held under federal, secular laws. Muslims see these changes as too sweeping in scope ("Kenya" 2004). Consequently, if a certain Muslim organizations were receiving government support for their civic education or women's empowerment programs, women's rights and provisions of gender equity may be violated. And this is not only a potential problem with Islamic groups.

A leader of the democracy and governance program for a prominent Christian organization in Kenya cited women's empowerment as a compounding cause behind rising immorality among women, the break down of marriages and families, and rising instances of women stepping outside the roles God intends for them (Personal interviews, September 2005). Whether or not the ideas expressed by this leader represent "true" Christian values or attitudes, if this organization is used as a vehicle for civic education, it could potentially undermine gender empowerment goals. In Africa, women may be the more active participants in Christian bodies, but the men remain the leaders. The religious beliefs mingled with cultural attitudes of these leaders affect the way women's roles are interpreted. As a result, policy makers, members of civil society, and religious

groups must move forward carefully, albeit firmly, in attempts to foster democratic consolidation across Africa. Care and consideration of the interactions of religious ideologies on gender, and gendered understandings on religious programming must be taken as these two areas are incorporated in democratization efforts. Research before program and policy implementation must include specific foci on potential effects between religious organizations and gender empowerment goals when democracy and governance efforts are channeled through Christian or Muslim organizations. On-going evaluations must accompany faith-based efforts to support democracy to ensure that gender equity priorities are not subverted or undone. Tangible indicators of equity and democracy must be part of policy and program goals in order for measurements of progress to be reported.

Democracy is growing, yet still has a long way to go in Africa. Gender equality is lacking in African political participation. The disadvantaged status of women and the cultural attitudes behind this disparity are obstacles to democratic growth. Religious groups in Africa have proven successful in fighting for and monitoring democratic progress as well as for women's empowerment. There are cases, however, of discord between religious beliefs and norms of gender equity. Thus, in order for African societies and supporting international community to take advantage of the benefits of the democratic encouragement offered by religious groups, they must move forward with a careful eye to the interaction of religious beliefs and women's rights. Religion has and can foster democratic growth in Africa. Women must be a central part of this process. Though this route is and will be difficult, it is the narrow path down which democracy

can grow in Africa.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Dependent Variables

Political Values

Tolerance

Q64. A. In order to make decisions in our community, we should talk until everyone agrees VS. Since we will never agree on everything, we must learn to accept differences of opinion within our community

- The variable was coded as: 1=Agree very strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with Neither; 9=Don't know
- The variable was recoded to 1=Agree very strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree very strongly with B; Missing (includes "don't know" and "Neither" responses)

Equality

Q66. All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election VS. Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders

- The variable was coded as: 1=Agree very strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with Neither; 9=Don't know
- The variable was recoded to 1=Agree very strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree very strongly with B; Missing (includes "don't know" and "Neither" responses)

Q67. Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so VS. In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.

- The variable was coded as: 1=Agree very strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with Neither; 9=Don't know
- The variable was recoded to 1=Agree very strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree very strongly with B; Missing (includes "don't know" and "Neither" responses)

Accountability

Q. 65 As citizens, we should be more active in questioning actions of our leaders

VS. In our country these days, there is not enough respect for authority

- The variable was coded as: 1=Agree very strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with Neither; 9=Don't know
- The variable was recoded to 1=Agree very strongly with A; 2=Agree with A; 3=Agree with B; 4=Agree very strongly with B; Missing (includes "don't know" and "Neither" responses)

Political Attitudes

- **Supply Side**

Question 36. We are going to compare our new government under President Kibaki with the former government under [President Moi]. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same.

[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]

- The variable was coded: 1=Much Worse; 2=Worse; 3=Same; 4=Better; 5=Much Better; 9=Don't know [DNR]
- The variable was recoded: 1=Much Worse; 2=Worse; 3=Same; 4=Better; 5=Much Better; Missing (including "don't know" responses)

- A. Freedom to say what you thing**
- B. Freedom to join any political organization you want**
- C. Freedom from being arrested what you are innocent**
- D. Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured**
- E. The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does**
- F. Safety from crime and violence**
- G. Equal and fair treatment for all people by government**

Question 37. In your opinion how much of a democracy is Kenya today? *[Read out options. Always state the word "democracy" in English, not in a local language. This instruction also applied to questions 38, 39, and 40.]*

- The variable was coded: 4=A full democracy; 3=A democracy, but with minor problems; 2=A democracy, with major problems; 1=Not a democracy; 8=Do not understand question/do not understand what 'democracy' is *[Do not read]*; 9=Don't know *[Do not read]*
- The variable was recoded: 4=A full democracy; 3=A democracy, but with minor problems; 2=A democracy, with major problems; 1=Not a democracy; Missing system (includes: 8=Do not understand question/do not understand what 'democracy' is *[Do not read]*; 9=Don't know *[Do not read]*)

- **Demand Side**

Question 35. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? *[Interviewer: Probe for Strength of opinion]*

- Th variable was coded: 1=Strongly Disapprove; 2=Disapprove; 3=Neither Approve Nor Disapprove; 4=Approve; 5=Strongly Approve; 9=Don't Know [DNR]
- The variable was recoded: 1=Strongly Disapprove; 2=Disapprove; 3=Neither Approve Nor Disapprove; 4=Approve; 5=Strongly Approve; Missing (includes: 9=Don't Know [DNR])

- A. Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office
- B. All decisions are made by a council of elders
- C. The military comes in to govern the country
- D. Elections and the Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything

Question 38. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? *[Read out statements. Only one option to be chosen]*

3=Statement A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government

2=Statement B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable

1=Statement C: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have

9=Don't Know *[Do not read]*

- The variable was recoded with "don't know" responses counted as missing

Question 40. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [Kenya]? Are you: *[Read out options]*

- The variable was coded: 4=Very satisfied; 3=Fairly satisfied; 2=Not very satisfied; 1=Not at all satisfied; 0=Kenya is not a democracy *[DO NOT READ]*; 9=Do not know *[DO NOT READ]*
- The variable was recoded: 4=Very satisfied; 3=Fairly satisfied; 2=Not very satisfied; 1=Not at all satisfied; 0=Kenya is not a democracy *[DO NOT READ]*; Missing (includes: 9=Do not know *[DO NOT READ]*)

Political Participation

Question 25. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. [If Yes, read out options 2-4]. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? [For No, read out options 0 and 1]

- The variable was coded: 4=Yes, often; 3=Yes, several times; 2=Yes, once or twice; 1=No, but would do it if had the chance; 0=No, would never do this; 9=Don't Know.
- The variable was recoded: 4=Yes, often; 3=Yes, several times; 2=Yes, once or twice; 1=No, but would do it if had the chance; 0=No, would never do this; Missing (includes: 9=Don't Know)
 - A. Discussed politics with friends or neighbours;
 - B. Attended a community meeting;
 - C. Got together with others to raise an issue;
 - D. Attended a demonstration or protest march;
 - E. Used force or violence for apolitical cause

Question 29. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views? [Read out options]

- The variable was coded: 0=Never, 1=Only Once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don't Know
- The variable was recoded: 0=Never, 1=Only Once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, Missing (includes: 9=Don't Know)
 - A. A Local Government councilor
 - A1. A District Commissioner
 - B. A Member of Parliament
 - C. An official of a government ministry
 - D. A political party leader
 - E. A religious leader
 - F. Local elders
 - G. Some other influential person (prompt if necessary: You know, someone with more money or power than you who can speak on your behalf)

Appendix 2a

Independent Variables

The measure of “**gender**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- “Respondent’s gender?” (Question 96)
- This variable was coded to “male=1” and “female=2”
- The variable was recoded to “male=0” and “female=1” for ease of interpretation

The measure of “**religion**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- “What is your religion if any?” (Question 85)
- The variable was coded: 0=None, 2=Catholic, 3=Protestant (Mainstream), 4=Protestant (Evangelical/Pentecostal), 5=African Independent Church, 6=Traditional Religion, 7=Hindu, 8=Agnostic, 9=Atheist, 10=Christian (general), 11=Jehovah’s Witness, 12=Seventh Day Adventist/Mormon, 51=New Apostolic, 52=Jesus Christ of the Last Days 380=Sunni Muslim, 381=Ithnashiri Muslim (Shi’a), 382=Ismaili Muslim (Shi’a), 383=Khodja (Shi’a) Muslim, 384=Bohra (Shi’a) Muslim, 385=Memon (Shi’a) Muslim, 386=Other Muslim, 387=Quaker, 388=Neo-traditional religion (Mungiki, Tent of the Living God), 999=Don’t Know
- The variable was recoded to several binary variables: Sunni Muslim, Ithnashiri Muslim (Shia), Other Shia Muslim, Other Muslim, Catholic, Hindu, None, Syncretic Religions, Protestant Mainstream, Protestant (Evangelical/Pentacostal), Traditional Religion, Mormon/Seventh Day Adventist, Quaker, Christian (general) and Other.

Also, two binary variables were created, Muslim and Christian. All Muslim categories were set equal to 1, with all else equal to 0 in the Muslim variable. Catholic, Mainstream Protestant, and Protestant Evangelical/Pentecostal were set equal to 1, with all else equal to 0 in the Christian binary variable.

The measure of “**religiosity**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

Service attendance:

- Excluding weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? (Question 86)
- The variable was coded as: 1=Never, 2=About once a year or less, 3=About once every several months, 4=About once a month, 5=About once a week, 6=More than once a week, 9=Don’t know
[DNR]

Religious organizational membership:

- Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member. (Question 24)

- The variable was coded as: 0=Not a member, 1=Inactive member, 2=Active member, 3=Official leader, 4=About once a month, 9=Don't know [DNR]

The measure of “**education**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Question 84)
- The variable was coded as: 0=No formal schooling; 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling); 2=Some primary schooling; 3=Primary school completed; 4=Some secondary school / high school; 5=Secondary school completed / high school; 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a technikon or college; 7=Some university; 8=University completed; 9=Post-graduate 99=Don't know [Do not read] 99

The measure of “**employment status**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)? (Question 89)
- The variable was coded as: 0=No (not looking); 1=No (looking); 2=Yes, part time (not looking); 3=Yes, part time (looking); 4=Yes, full time (not looking); 5=Yes, full time (looking); 9=Don't know [DNR]

The measure of “**urban/rural residence**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Do you come from a rural or urban area? (Question 109)
- The variable was coded as: 1=Rural; 2=Urban
- The variable was recoded as: 0=Rural; 1=Urban

The measure of “**interest in public affairs**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- How interested are you in public affairs (Question 27)
- The variable was coded as: 0=Not interested; 1=Somewhat interested; 2=Very interested; 9=Don't know

The measure of “**member of trade union or farmers association**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member? (Question 24)
- 0=Not a member, 1=Inactive member, 2=Active member, 3=Official leader, 4=About once a month, 9=Don't know [DNR]

The measure of “**member of professional or business association**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member? (Question 24)

- 0=Not a member, 1=Inactive member, 2=Active member, 3=Official leader, 4=About once a month, 9=Don't know [DNR]

The measure of “**member of community development association**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member? (Question 24)
- 0=Not a member, 1=Inactive member, 2=Active member, 3=Official leader, 4=About once a month, 9=Don't know [DNR]

The measure of “**close to a political party**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Do you feel close to a political party? If so, which party is that? (Question 87A)
- The variable was coded as: 0= No (does not feel close); country specific codes for party name if yes; 998=Refused to answer; 999=Don't know
- The variable was recoded as: 0=No; 1=Yes

The measure of “**how close to a political party**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close? (Question 87B)
- The variable was coded as: 3=Very close; 2=Somewhat close; 1=Not very close; 7=Not applicable; 9=Don't know

The measure of “**radio news**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- How often do you get news from the following sources? [Read out options] A. Radio (Question 26)
- The variable was coded as: 4=Everyday ; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=Don't know

The measure of “**television news**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- How often do you get news from the following sources? [Read out options] B. Television (Question 26)
- The variable was coded as: 4=Everyday ; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=Don't know

The measure of “**newspaper news**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- How often do you get news from the following sources? [Read out options] C. Newspaper (Question 26)
- The variable was coded as: 4=Everyday ; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=Don't know

The measure of “**opinion of country’s present economic condition**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Let’s begin by talking about economic conditions. In general, how would you describe: *[Read out response options]* A. The present economic condition of this country? (Question 1A)
- The variable was coded as: 5=Very good; 4=Fairly good; 3=Neither good nor bad; 2=Fairly bad; 1=Very bad; 9=Don’t know

The measure of “**Freedom House Level of Democratization**” is taken from 2002 Freedom House rankings of each country in this sample

- Do you come from a rural or urban area? (Question 109)
- The variable was coded as: 1=Rural; 2=Urban
- The variable was recoded as: 0=rural; 1=Urban

The measure of “**CEDAW adoption**” is taken from the CEDAW data on country adoption

- The variable was coded as: 1=Country has adopted CEDAW; 0=Has not adopted

The measure of “**CEDAW optional protocol**” is taken from the CEDAW data on country adoption.

- The variable was coded as: 1=Country has adopted optional protocol; 0=Has not adopted

The measure of “**National gender legislation**” is taken from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)’s quota project information

- The variable was coded as: 1=Country has some form of gender quota legislation; 0=Country has no gender quota legislation

The measure of “**economic situation by country**” was created to capture economic standings balanced with human development and distribution indicators. I looked at GDP per capita and external debt as measured by the World Bank to form rankings for each country.

- The World Bank List of Economies ranks countries by both income and debt. In the sample of countries I examine, WB labels countries as ranging from low income to upper middle income. In this sample, WB labels countries as ranging from severely indebted, less indebted, and moderately indebted.
- The variable was recoded as: 1=lowest; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6=highest

The measure of “**Personal poverty**” is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey.

- Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: *[Read out options]*? (Question 9)
A. Enough food to eat?; B. Enough clean water for home use?; C. Medicines or medical treatment?; D. Electricity in your home? ; E. Enough fuel to cook your food? ; F. A cash income?
- The variable was coded as: 4=Always; 3=Many times; 2=Several

times; 1=Just once or twice; 0=Never; 9=Don't know

- The variable was recoded as an index of the above categories

The measure of “**Christian nation**” is drawn from nationmaster.com, which compiles data sources such as the CIA World Factbook, United Nations, World Health Organization, World Bank, World Resources Institute, UNESCO, UNICEF and OECD.

- The variable was coded as: 1=Christian national heritage; 0= Other

Appendix 2b

Country Economic Ranking

Country	World Bank Income category	# ranking by income	World Bank Debt Ranking	# ranking by indebtedness	Total: Income Score + Debt Score
Botswana	Upper middle income	4	Less indebted	2	6
Cape Verde	Lower middle income	3	Moderately indebted	1	4
Ghana	Low income	1	Less indebted	2	3
Kenya	Low income	1	Moderately indebted	1	2
Lesotho	Low income	1	Less indebted	2	3
Malawi	Low income	1	Severely indebted	0	1
Mali	Low income	1	Less indebted	2	3
Mozambique	Low income	1	Less indebted	2	3
Namibia	Lower middle income	3	Debt not classified	0	3
Nigeria	Low income	1	Moderately indebted	1	2
Senegal	Low income	1	Less indebted	2	3
South Africa	Upper middle income	4	Less indebted	2	6
Tanzania	Low income	1	Less indebted	2	3
Uganda	Low income	1	Moderately indebted	1	2
Zambia	Low income	1	Severely indebted	0	1
Zimbabwe	Low income	1	Severely indebted	0	1

“Standard World Bank definitions of severe and moderate indebtedness are used to classify economies by levels of external debt. Severely indebted means either: present value of debt service to GNI exceeds 80 percent or present value of debt service to exports exceeds 220 percent. Moderately indebted means either of the two key ratios exceeds 60 percent of, but does not reach, the critical levels. For economies that do not report detailed debt statistics to the World Bank Debtor Reporting System (DRS), present-value calculation is not possible. Instead, the following methodology is used to classify the non-DRS economies. Severely indebted means three of four key ratios (averaged over 2001-2003) are above critical levels: debt to GNI (50 percent); debt to exports (275 percent); debt service to exports (30 percent); and interest to exports (20 percent). Moderately indebted means three of the four key ratios exceed 60 percent of, but do not reach, the critical levels. All other classified low-income and middle-income economies.”

<http://www.iscb.org/pdfs/WorldBankClassificationList2005.pdf>

Appendix 3

National Constitution Gender Quotas & Percentage of Women Legislatures

Table App3 1: Gender legislation

Country	Quota Type(s)	Results last election	% of women in parliament
BOTSWANA <i>Africa – FPTP</i>	Political Party Quota for Electoral Candidates	8 of 47	7.0%
KENYA <i>Africa – FPTP</i>	Constitutional Quota for National Parliaments ; Political Party Quota for Electoral Candidates	15 of 224	6.7%
MALI <i>Africa – TRS</i>	Political Party Quota for Electoral Candidates	15 of 147	10.2%
MOZAMBIQUE <i>Africa – List PR</i>	Political Party Quota for Electoral Candidates	75 of 250	30.0%
NAMIBIA <i>Africa – List PR</i>	Constitutional or Legislative Quota, Sub-National Level	18 of 72	25.0%
SENEGAL <i>Africa – Parallel</i>	Political Party Quota for Electoral Candidates	23 of 120	19.2%
SOUTH AFRICA <i>Africa – List PR</i>	Constitutional or Legislative Quota, Sub-National Level ; Political Party Quota for Electoral Candidates	131 of 400	32.8%
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF <i>Africa – FPTP</i>	Constitutional Quota for National Parliaments ; Election Law Quota Regulation, National Parliament ; Constitutional or Legislative Quota, Sub-National Level	61 of 274	22.3%
UGANDA <i>Africa – FPTP</i>	Constitutional Quota for National Parliaments ; Election Law Quota Regulation, National Parliament	75 of 304	24.7%
ZIMBABWE <i>Africa – FPTP</i>	Political Party Quota for Electoral Candidates		N/A

Source: <http://www.quotaproject.org/>

Appendix 4

CEDAW and Optional Protocol Adopters

Table App4.1: CEDAW

a/ Accession; b/ Declarations or reservations; c/ Reservation subsequently withdrawn; d/ Succession		
State	Date of signature	Date of receipt of the instrument of ratification, accession or succession
Botswana		13 August 1996 <u>a/</u>
Cape Verde		5 December 1980 <u>a/</u>
Ghana	17 July 1980	2 January 1986
Kenya		9 March 1984 <u>a/</u>
Lesotho	17 July 1980	22 August 1995 <u>a/ b/</u>
Malawi		12 March 1987 <u>a/ c/</u>
Mali	5 February 1985	10 September 1985
Mozambique		16 April 1997 <u>a/</u>
Namibia		23 November 1992 <u>a/</u>
Nigeria	23 April 1984	13 June 1985
Senegal	29 July 1980	5 February 1985
South Africa	29 January 1993	15 December 1995 <u>a/</u>
Uganda	30 July 1980	22 July 1985
Zambia	17 July 1980	21 June 1985
Zimbabwe		13 May 1991 <u>a/</u>

Table App4.2: Afrobarometer Round 2 Countries who have ratified the Optional Protocol

Participant	Signature	Ratification, Accession (a)
Ghana	24 February 2000	
Lesotho	6 September 2000	24 September 2004
Malawi	7 September 2000	
Mali		5 December 2000 (a)
Namibia	19 May 2000	26 May 2000
Nigeria	8 September 2000	22 November 2004
Senegal	10 December 1999	26 May 2000

Appendix 5

Religious Heritage and Religious Breakdown

Botswana	<p>Christianity and Natural Religions <u>Christian</u> 71.6%, <u>Badimo</u> 6%, <u>other</u> 1.4%, <u>unspecified</u> 0.4%, <u>none</u> 20.6% (2001 census)</p>
Cape Verde	<p>Christianity <u>Roman Catholic</u> (infused with indigenous beliefs); <u>Protestant</u> (mostly Church of the Nazarene)</p>
Ghana	<p>Christianity and Natural Religions <u>Christian</u> 63%, <u>Muslim</u> 16%, indigenous beliefs 21%</p>
Kenya	<p>Christianity and Natural Religions <u>Protestant</u> 45%, <u>Roman Catholic</u> 33%, indigenous beliefs 10%, <u>Muslim</u> 10%, <u>other</u> 2% (a large majority of Kenyans are <u>Christian</u>, but estimates for the percentage of the <u>population</u> that adheres to Islam or indigenous beliefs vary widely)</p>
Lesotho	<p>Christian <u>Christian</u> 80%, indigenous beliefs 20%</p>
Malawi	<p>Christianity <u>Christian</u> 79.9%, <u>Muslim</u> 12.8%, <u>other</u> 3%, <u>none</u> 4.3% (1998 census)</p>
Mali	<p>Islam <u>Muslim</u> 90%, indigenous beliefs 9%, <u>Christian</u> 1%</p>
Mozambique	<p>Christianity and Natural Religions and Islam <u>Catholic</u> 23.8%, <u>Zionist Christian</u> 17.5%, <u>Muslim</u> 17.8%, <u>other</u> 17.8%, <u>none</u> 23.1% (1997 census)</p>
Namibia	<p>Christian <u>Christian</u> 80% to 90% (Lutheran 50% at least), indigenous beliefs 10% to 20%</p>
Nigeria	<p>Christianity and Islam <u>Muslim</u> 50%, <u>Christian</u> 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%</p>
Senegal	<p>Islam <u>Muslim</u> 94%, indigenous beliefs 1%, <u>Christian</u> 5% (mostly <u>Roman Catholic</u>)</p>
South Africa	<p>Christian <u>Zion Christian</u> 11.1%, <u>Pentecostal/Charismatic</u> 8.2%, <u>Catholic</u> 7.1%, <u>Methodist</u> 6.8%, <u>Dutch Reformed</u> 6.7%, <u>Anglican</u> 3.8%, <u>other Christian</u> 36%, <u>Islam</u> 1.5%, <u>other</u> 2.3%, <u>unspecified</u> 1.4%, <u>none</u> 15.1% (2001 census)</p>
Tanzania	<p>Christianity and Natural Religions and Islam (Except in Zanzibar, which is 99% Muslim)</p>
Uganda	<p>Christian <u>Roman Catholic</u> 33%, <u>Protestant</u> 33%, <u>Muslim</u> 16%, indigenous beliefs 18%</p>
Zambia	<p>Christianity and Islam <u>Christian</u> 50%-75%, <u>Muslim</u> and <u>Hindu</u> 24%-49%, indigenous beliefs 1%</p>
Zimbabwe	<p>Christianity and Natural Religions <u>syncretic</u> (part <u>Christian</u>, part indigenous beliefs) 50%, <u>Christian</u> 25%, indigenous beliefs 24%, <u>Muslim</u> and <u>other</u> 1%</p>

Appendix 6 Religiosity Matrix

Table App6.1: Religiosity Matrix I – Service Attendance

Percentage Who Say "Never"	Gender	Never	One a year or less	Once every several months	Once a month	NonRegular Attendees	Once a week	More than Once a week	Regular Attendees	% Difference b/w types of Attendees
Attend Community Meeting	Male	18%	18%	17%	12%	16%	11%	14%	12%	-4
	Female	28%	26%	21%	16%	23%	13%	18%	16%	-7
	Male	24%	21%	21%	18%	21%	19%	24%	21%	0
Discuss Politics	Female	36%	32%	30%	26%	31%	28%	30%	29%	-2
	Male	53%	52%	53%	56%	53%	60%	61%	61%	8
Protest	Female	67%	63%	61%	64%	63%	64%	68%	66%	3
Political Violence	Male	85%	85%	84%	86%	85%	87%	86%	86%	1
	Female	89%	91%	87%	87%	89%	89%	89%	89%	0
Join Others to Raise an Issue	Male	21%	24%	22%	18%	21%	19%	20%	20%	-1
	Female	37%	34%	30%	25%	31%	22%	25%	24%	-7
Contact Official of Government Ministry	Male	86%	87%	86%	84%	86%	80%	81%	80%	-6
	Female	93%	93%	91%	90%	92%	87%	87%	87%	-5
Contact Political Party Official	Male	84%	80%	80%	80%	81%	77%	75%	76%	-5
	Female	92%	87%	84%	87%	87%	86%	84%	85%	-2
Contact Local Government Official		79%	74%	73%	70%	74%	63%	65%	64%	-10
		86%	86%	82%	81%	84%	72%	75%	74%	-10
	Male	89%	90%	89%	87%	89%	83%	84%	83%	-6
	Female	93%	94%	92%	92%	93%	90%	88%	89%	-4

Appendix 6 Religiosity Matrix

Table App6.1: Religiosity Matrix I – Service Attendance

Percentage Who Say "Never "	Gender	Never	One a year or less	Once every several months	Once a month	NonRegular Attendees	Once a week	More than Once a week	Regular Attendees	% Difference b/w types of Attendees
Attend Community Meeting	Male	18%	18%	17%	12%	16%	11%	14%	12%	-4
	Female	28%	26%	21%	16%	23%	13%	18%	16%	-7
Discuss Politics	Male	24%	21%	21%	18%	21%	19%	24%	21%	0
	Female	36%	32%	30%	26%	31%	28%	30%	29%	-2
Protest Political Violence	Male	53%	52%	53%	56%	53%	60%	61%	61%	8
	Female	67%	63%	61%	64%	63%	64%	68%	66%	3
Join Others to Raise an Issue	Male	85%	85%	84%	86%	85%	87%	86%	86%	1
	Female	89%	91%	87%	87%	89%	89%	89%	89%	0
Contact Official of Government Ministry	Male	21%	24%	22%	18%	21%	19%	20%	20%	-1
	Female	37%	34%	30%	25%	31%	22%	25%	24%	-7
Contact Political Party Official	Male	86%	87%	86%	84%	86%	80%	81%	80%	-6
	Female	93%	93%	91%	90%	92%	87%	87%	87%	-5
Contact Local Government Official	Male	84%	80%	80%	80%	81%	77%	75%	76%	-5
	Female	92%	87%	84%	87%	87%	86%	84%	85%	-2
Contact MP	Male	79%	74%	73%	70%	74%	63%	65%	64%	-10
	Female	86%	86%	82%	81%	84%	72%	75%	74%	-10
Contact MP	Male	89%	90%	89%	87%	89%	83%	84%	83%	-6
	Female	93%	94%	92%	92%	93%	90%	88%	89%	-4

Contact Religious Traditional Leader	Male	82%	67%	58%	55%	262%	66%	45%	40%	85%	43%	-23
	Female	84%	69%	64%	60%	278%	69%	50%	42%	92%	46%	-23
Contact Other Influential Leader	Male	76%	72%	73%	69%	290%	72%	70%	69%	139%	70%	-2
	Female	84%	79%	81%	74%	318%	79%	74%	75%	150%	75%	-4

Note: A negative change in percentage indicates an increase in political participation.

Table App6.2: Religiosity Matrix 2 – Membership in Religious Organization

	Gender	NonMembers	Inactive Members	Active Members	Leaders	% Difference b/w types of Attendees
Percentage Who Say "Never "	Male	19%	13%	12%	8%	-7
	Female	25%	20%	14%	10%	-11
Attend Community Meeting	Male	23%	23%	20%	20%	-3
	Female	34%	31%	27%	24%	-7
Discuss Politics	Male	58%	59%	59%	53%	1
	Female	65%	69%	65%	58%	0
Protest	Male	86%	84%	86%	86%	0
	Female	89%	89%	89%	88%	0
Political Violence	Male	24%	22%	19%	15%	-5
Join Others to Raise an Issue	Female	32%	29%	25%	19%	-7
	Male	87%	84%	81%	77%	-6
Contact Official of Government Ministry	Female	91%	91%	88%	84%	-3
	Male	81%	80%	77%	70%	-4
Contact Political Party Official	Female	89%	88%	85%	81%	-4
		75%	69%	66%	58%	-9
Contact Local Government Official		85%	80%	75%	70%	-10
	Male	90%	87%	84%	76%	-6
Contact MP	Female	94%	93%	90%	83%	-4
	Male	73%	55%	43%	26%	-30
Contact Religious Traditional Leader	Female	76%	60%	47%	32%	-29
	Male	74%	71%	70%	59%	-4
Contact Other Influential Leader	Female	82%	78%	74%	63%	-8

Note: A negative change in percentage indicates an increase in political participation

Appendix 7 Factor Analysis

Table App7.1: Dimensions of Reject Autocracy – Factor Analysis

Type of Activity	
Q35a. Reject one party rule	.488
Q35b. Reject rule by chiefs or elders	.112
Q35c. Reject military rule	.775
Q35d. Reject one-man rule	.769

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood

1 factor extracted; 4 iterations required

The reliability of this factor: alpha = .610

The reliability of a factor excluding rule by chiefs or elders: alpha = .6695

Table App7.2: Dimensions of Political Participation – Factor Analysis

Type of Activity	Communing	Formal Contacting	Informal Contacting
Discuss politics	.536		
Attend a community meeting	.700		
Join others to raise an issue	.735		
Contacting local government councillor		.623	
Contact District Commissioner		.571	
Contact MP		.639	
Contact official of a government ministry		.616	
Contact political party official		.612	
Contact religious leader			.696
Contact some other influential person			.707

Table App7.3: Reliability Scores

	Alpha	N of Cases	N of Items
Communing	.6867	2382	3
Formal Contacting	.7390	2375	5
Informal Contacting	.6601	2398	2

Table App7.4: *Communing, Protesting and Violence – Factor Analysis and Reliability*

	Factor	
	1	2
q25a Discuss politics	0.482	0.206
q25b Attend a community meeting	0.532	0.426
q25c Join others to raise an issue	0.639	0.357
q25d Attend a demonstration or protest march	0.695	-0.445
q25e Used force or violence for political cause	0.294	-0.237
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.		
a 2 factors extracted. 20 iterations required.		
Chi-Square = 62.355		
df = 1		
Sig. p<.001		
Cronbach's alpha (q25a-c) = .697		

Total Variance Explained – Two Factors						
Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.053	41.054	41.054	1.494	29.87	29.87
2	1.117	22.347	63.401	0.605	12.105	41.975

Discussion of politics, attendance at community meetings and join together with others to raise political issues reduce down to one variable which I call “communing.” I believe the idea that each of these represent is peer-level, or *horizontal*, political engagement. This variable tests as a reliable measure of one item, therefore I include it as such.

Although statistically, political protesting and political violence factored together as capturing a cohesive form of political engagement, I treat them separately. I am interested in the factors that drive protesting or demonstrating, which are debatably both good and bad for the growth of democracy,¹¹¹ as well as those factors that shift such forceful but useful forms of political behavior into the chaos and devastation that is political violence.

¹¹¹ Norris, Pippa. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Table App7.5: Contacting – Informal and Formal – Factor Analysis and Reliability

	Factor	
	1	2
q29a Contact Local Government Representative	0.597	-0.084
q29b Contact Parliamentary Representative	0.636	-0.256
q29c Contact Official of a government ministry	0.618	-0.245
q29d Contact political party official	0.645	-0.18
<i>q29e Contact religious leader</i>	0.534	<i>0.291</i>
<i>q29f Contact traditional ruler</i>	0.583	<i>0.428</i>
<i>q29g Contact some other influential person</i>	0.441	<i>0.173</i>
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.		
a 2 factors extracted. 4 iterations required.		
Chi-Square = 286.455		
df = 8		
Sig p<.001		
Cronbach's alpha (q29a-d) = .728		
Cronbach's alpha (q29e-g) = .697		

Total Variance Explained – Two Factors						
Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.959	42.274	42.274	2.378	33.969	33.969
2	1.028	14.689	56.963	0.462	6.606	40.575

Contacting local government representatives, parliamentary representatives, government ministry officials and political party officials reduce down to one variable, which I call “formal contacting.” I believe the idea that these forms of contacting capture together are active communication with leaders in the formal political realm. This variable tests as a reliable measure of one item, therefore I include it as such. Contacting religious leaders, traditional rulers, and other influential people co-vary, and capture what I call “informal contacting.” This variable reliably expresses an Africans choice to contact leaders who are connected to but not officially apart of the formal governing institutions.

Appendix 8 Additional Tables

Table App8.1: Attitudes

Bivariate Correlations Table 2		How democratic	Support for democracy	Satisfaction with democracy	Present vs Past Political freedom	Present vs Past Personal Freedom	RejectAutoc NoElders	Reject Autocracy
Gender	Pearson Correlation	0.002	-0.055**	-0.013	-0.030**	-0.002	-0.069**	-0.065**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.757	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.833	0.000	0.000
	N	16626	16898	17187	16895	16964	17670	16381
Christian	Pearson Correlation	-0.051**	-0.020**	-0.024**	-0.004	-0.005	0.054**	0.077**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.009	0.001	0.625	0.508	0.000	0.000
	N	16582	16853	17139	16851	16919	17624	16340
Muslim	Pearson Correlation	0.061**	0.053**	0.053**	0.057**	0.043**	-0.039**	-0.069**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	16582	16853	17139	16851	16919	17624	16340
Religiosity (service attendance)	Pearson Correlation	-0.018*	0.033**	0.013	0.030**	0.032**	0.071**	0.098**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.021	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	16474	16738	17027	16754	16817	17516	16247
Member of religious group	Pearson Correlation	-0.026**	0.049**	0.027**	0.039**	0.033**	0.074**	0.102**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	15718	15948	16261	15821	15867	16530	15259
		** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).						
		* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).						

Table App8.2: Kenya – Sunni vs. Shia

	Attend demonstration or protest	Political Violence
(Constant)	-0.702 (1.069)	0.886 (1.097)
Gender	0.060 (0.177)	0.031 (0.182)
Sunni (Base Group = Shia)	-1.134*** (0.342)	-0.727*** (0.352)
How often attend religious services	0.247 (0.154)	0.075 (0.158)
Member of religious group	-0.368** (0.129)	-0.390** (0.132)
Education of respondent	0.031 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.057)
How close to political party	-0.079 (0.129)	0.091 (0.132)
Employment status	-0.085 (0.070)	-0.028 (0.071)
Member of trade union or farmers association	0.136 (0.120)	0.114 (0.123)
Member of professional or business association	0.131 (0.182)	-0.085 (0.186)
Member of community development association	-0.118 (0.092)	-0.053 (0.094)
Urban Rural	0.506 (0.229)	0.214 (0.235)
Lived Poverty Index	0.081 (0.097)	-0.033 (0.100)
Country's present economic condition	-0.080 (0.062)	-0.012 (0.064)
Radio news	0.049 (0.076)	-0.057 (0.078)
Television news	0.166 (0.078)	0.096 (0.080)
Newspaper news	-0.061 (0.075)	-0.028 (0.076)
Interest in public affairs	0.460*** (0.128)	0.160 (0.132)
ken. Registered to vote.	0.557** (0.217)	0.145 (0.222)

N=2398; OLS regression; Unstandardized coefficients over standard errors

Table App8.3: Afrobarometer Survey Countries

Botswana
Cape Verde
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

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