






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**POLITICS, DISCOURSES AND CONTRADICTIONS:
GALANDOU DIOUF IN FRENCH COLONIAL SENEGAL, 1890-1941**

VOLUME I

By

Shannon Vance Harris

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
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ABSTRACT

POLITICS, DISCOURSES AND CONTRADICTIONS: GALANDOU DIOUF IN FRENCH COLONIAL SENEGAL, 1890-1941

By

Shannon Vance Harris

By reevaluating the contributions of Galandou Diouf and his efficacy as a politician, this dissertation recasts Diouf as a major player in early twentieth-century Senegalese politics. Galandou Diouf's career has rested uneasily between Blaise Diagne and Lamine Guèye, documented but not explored. Many assumptions about Diouf's role in the colonial history of Senegal, about his intellect and attitudes, have been expropriated from colonial administrators, who tended to denigrate his intelligence and his importance. The apparent contradiction between Republican ideals and colonial realities were embodied in Galandou Diouf's experiences and rhetoric. This dissertation provides a model of Pierre Bourdieu's symbolic capital projected by an African politician in a constrained political field. Galandou Diouf's life and the lives of other political players and associates in colonial Senegal reveal how symbolic capital was obtained, deployed and lost in the public arena. Galandou Diouf was a resourceful and shrewd organic politician, who used his symbolic capital and his status as a veteran, Muslim, and African to build a network of political support within the communes, Protectorate and métropole. Diouf adapted to a changing colonial administration, which was often hostile to his program of reform. Diouf was able to identify some of the main problems of Senegal's economy and politics and he prefigured the nationalist movements of the 1960s. Diouf's career

and his coalition politics can help us understand the role political parties played in the decolonization process and the formation and efficacy of political parties in modern Senegal.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Hubert R. “Booney” Vance, PhD, who may not be here on this earth to witness its completion, but is surely celebrating with me from Heaven.

Thank you, Daddy, for being such an inspiration and for expanding my horizons.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française
ANS	Archives Nationales du Sénégal
BDS	Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais
DSL	Dakar—Saint-Louis railway
IFAN	Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire
LDRN	Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre
PSS	Parti Socialiste Sénégalais
SFIO	Parti Section Française Internationale Ouvrières
SIPs	Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance
STIDN	Syndicat des travailleurs indigenes du Dakar-Niger

Chapter One

The Framework

Galandou Diouf has long been a footnote in history. He is mentioned in passing in several texts on Senegalese history, but rarely does he move out of the periphery of the analysis.¹ He has proved an inconvenient figure for historians. He was the first African Muslim to be elected to the Deputyship of France's National Assembly, but not the first African. Blaise Diagne took that honor. After WWII, Lamine Guèye became famous for securing civic rights for Africans in West Africa under French colonialism. Galandou Diouf's career has rested uneasily between Diagne and Guèye, documented but not explored.

This dissertation reevaluates Galandou Diouf's political career. Many assumptions about Diouf's role in the colonial history of Senegal, about his intellect and attitudes have been expropriated from colonial administrators, who tended to denigrate his intelligence and his importance. This work challenges Diouf's characterization in the literature which closely dovetails with the accounts of colonial administrators. A more accurate and complex portrait of Diouf and his relationship to the colonial regime can thus be unpacked. The apparent contradiction between Republican ideals and colonial realities are embodied in

¹ There are many examples of this, from the rather cursory exploration of Diouf in comparison to Diagne in G. Wesley Johnson's works, to more recent monographs that mention him in chronology, but not much more. See G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: the Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920* (Stanford University Press, 1971). Typical of the analysis is Michael Crowder, "Much less articulate than Diagne, he [Diouf] made little contribution to political life in Senegal." Cited from Crowder's, *West Africa under Colonial Rule* (London: Hutchinson & Co., LTD, 1968), 437.

Galandou Diouf's experiences and rhetoric. The contradictions of France's "civilizing mission" are contained within Diouf as colonial politician, originaire, and African Muslim.

Although Galandou Diouf was not elected to an official office until 1908, I have chosen 1890 as the starting point of the dissertation. The late nineteenth century marks the end of pre-colonial times, and the conquest of Senegal was complete by the 1890s. This process, however, was gradual, as were the political and economic transformations that continue throughout the period. By 1890 the construction of the Dakar—Saint-Louis (DSL) railway had been completed, and the development of peanut production accelerated, as did the development of Dakar. The ending point of the dissertation, 1941, coincides with the death of Galandou Diouf in a clinic on the southern coast of France. This year also marks the end of the Third Republic with the Nazi victories over France and the establishment of the Vichy regime.

These are the main arguments of the dissertation:

1. Galandou Diouf was instrumental as a mobilizer during Blaise Diagne's campaign for deputy in 1914, and remained an important figure in Diagne's organization until 1927.
2. Diouf was a patriot, with a heritage of French loyalty and an admirable war record from World War I; he also adhered to his African identity and sense of place.

3. Diouf was a radical, deploying his distinctiveness as an originaire; he was dedicated to fighting against excesses and corruptions in the French colonial system.
4. Diouf pushed for Senegalese parity with the French within a shifting and constraining colonial system.
5. Diouf was an opposition leader, rallying diverse groups and people to a platform that challenged Diagne's political might and his relationship with the French state. Diouf was also an opposition leader against the influences of the Bordeaux commercial houses.
6. Galandou Diouf's experience as a Deputy to the National Assembly in Paris is a lens through which to view the colonial relationship in new and interesting ways.
7. Diouf was more of an organic intellectual than Blaise Diagne, Lamine Guèye or Léopold Senghor. He was raised in Senegal, a man of commune and Protectorate, and he had diverse occupations within Senegal.
8. Galandou Diouf was a resourceful and shrewd politician, who used his symbolic capital and his status as a veteran, Muslim, and African in a variety of situations at all levels. He was able to build a network of political support within the communes, Protectorate and métropole, and he adapted to a changing colonial administration, which was often hostile to his program of reform. Diouf's contributions to Senegalese history should be reevaluated; he was able to identify main problems with Senegal's

economy and policies. Diouf prefigured the nationalist movements of the 1960s.

9. Utilizing Bourdieu's social theory of symbolic capital, this dissertation charts how politicians in Senegal could build networks and operate in the colonial field. Galandou Diouf's life and the lives of other political players and associates in colonial Senegal reveal how symbolic capital was obtained, deployed and lost in the public arena.

Setting the Stage

The French colony of Senegal began as a series of coastal and river posts in the mid-17th century. Saint-Louis, on the mouth of the Senegal River, was established in 1658, and remained the capital of French imperialism in the area until the end of the nineteenth century. Dakar, a superior natural port situated south of Saint-Louis, was chosen and developed as the twentieth-century capital of French West Africa. The developing peanut economy provided opportunities for African *traitants*, who often adopted Islam as part of their upward mobility.² Participation in Sufi brotherhoods, particularly the Muridiyya and the Tijaniyya, dominated the practice of Islamic faith in Senegal.

From their base in Senegal, the French continued to expand in the region, eventually forming the administrative unit of French West Africa, or *l'Afrique occidentale française* (AOF). The AOF was a federation of eight French colonies

² David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 33. When using the term *traitants*, I am referring to traders who were often middle men between the large French commercial firms and the producers of goods.

on the western coast of Africa.³ By the 1890s France established civilian rule under a Governor General, based in Saint-Louis, Senegal. Not only was Senegal the center of French administrative rule; it also contained a unique structure.

The French colony of Senegal was divided into two different categories, the communes and the Protectorate. Saint-Louis and Gorée—a small island off of the Cape Verde peninsula—along with Rufisque, which was developed as an export center for peanuts, and the administrative capital, Dakar, formed the four communes. These ‘Four Communes’ of Senegal maintained an exceptional status in French West Africa. From as early as 1848, Africans living in Saint-Louis and Gorée could participate in voting for a representative to the National Assembly in Paris.⁴ By 1860, civil and political rights were extended to residents in Dakar and Rufisque. The legal status of French residents throughout Senegal was never a question, and by French custom, métis children were accepted as having nearly the same legal status. Africans living in the Protectorate—anywhere in Senegal other than the four communes—had no legal protection under the French Civil Code.

Africans who had lived in the four communes for an extended length of time had a different status.⁵ They were considered originaires and possessed

³ These eight colonies were Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea (now Guinea), Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin), and Niger.

⁴ H.O. Idowu, “Assimilation in 19th Century Senegal,” *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 9, 34 (1969): 195.

⁵ In the early twentieth century, five years’ residence in one of the communes was sufficient to obtain originaire status. In order to be inscribed onto the list of eligible voters, originaires had to demonstrate proof of residence and/or proof of birth. Often

the right to vote in city and national elections, and they were subject to the French legal code instead of the more capricious *indigénat*, or native justice, which was employed in the Protectorate. Originaires with a certain level of French education could run for offices. Women could not officially participate in politics, regardless of their status as métis, French or African. During most of the dissertation, the term originaire refers to Africans living in the four communes. Both Africans and colonial agents referred to Africans living in the communes as originaires. Some scholars have used 'originaire' to refer to the entire commune population, including métis and French men.⁶ Originaire was not the only term inhabitants of communal Senegal used to describe themselves. Both métis and Africans called themselves *enfants du pays* or 'children of the soil' to demonstrate their place as native Senegalese.

Powerful métis families and French commercial agents had dominated Senegalese politics in the four communes during the nineteenth century. When Galandou Diouf was elected to the General Council in 1908, it caused something of a sensation. An African Muslim without a very high level of education had successfully run for political office without being considered a 'yes-man' of more

Africans would not official hospital records or acceptable documents to reflect residence. In these instances, witnesses would be called before a colonial court or officer and these witnesses would formally swear to the validity of an aspiring originaire's claim. French administrators would often decry the relatively informal practice, and several attempts were made throughout the course of the twentieth century to reduce the roles of originaires eligible to vote. Sometimes the administration would strike large numbers of originaires off voting roles, particularly when a certain election did not go the direction they had hoped. The status of originaire and who could be considered an originaire continued to be a contested and negotiated aspect of French colonial rule in Senegal.

⁶ See James Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance: Chiefs, Muslim Leaders, and Politicians in Colonial Senegal, 1890-1934" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1985), 366-377 and Diouf, "Assimilation coloniale et identité religieuses de la civilité des originaires des Quatre Communes (Sénégal)," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 34,3 (2000): 565-568.

powerful coalitions. Africans were part of a colonial system that circumscribed political participation and individual rights, even though originaires enjoyed some privileges. While originaires were given partial access to political participation, French administrators in the colony and the métropole attempted to manipulate, delimit and re-define that participation.

By the time the 1914 election for the deputyship occurred, many originaires were ready for an African candidate. Blaise Diagne became a powerful contender and with the help of Galandou Diouf, defeated his competition and became the first African man to hold the position. This stunning victory propelled Diagne into a successful career, and he would not lose the deputyship until his death in 1934.

Lamine Guèye was the first African to take a law degree in Paris. Guèye had been Diouf's ally, but had chosen to support Blaise Diagne and had worked in La Réunion and Martinique before returning to Senegal in 1934 to run against Galandou Diouf for the open Deputyship position. Guèye lost, but continued his political career, joining forces with the French Socialist Party (SFIO: Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière) in an unsuccessful 1936 bid for Deputy against Galandou Diouf. Despite the fact that Guèye could not defeat Diouf in elections until Diouf's death in 1941, scholarship describes Guèye as "the leader of what was by then [1936] the dominant African political force in the colony."⁷

Guèye lent his name to the 1946 law granting circumscribed citizenship to all inhabitants of French West Africa. Guèye, along with Léopold Senghor, was

⁷ Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* (Berg Publishers, 2002), 35.

elected as Deputy in 1945. Along with the West Indian writer Aimé Césaire, Senghor developed the *négritude* movement, which “sought to capture and revalue a common cultural heritage, one which deserved a place in a broad conception of humanity.”⁸ In 1948 Senghor split with Guèye and formed his own political party, the *Bloc démocratique sénégalais*. Senghor became independent Senegal's first president in August 1960.

The historiography of colonial Senegal has given a great deal of attention to Blaise Diagne, Lamine Guèye and Léopold Senghor.⁹ According to various scholars, Blaise Diagne's great contribution to Senegalese history was his ability to entrench the citizenship rights of originaires by aiding France's African recruitment during World War I. Lamine Guèye is portrayed as successfully agitating for citizen rights of Africans outside of the four communes and for creating Senegal's “first political party.” Léopold Senghor is characterized by scholars as the father of modern nationalism and independence in Senegal. It is often noted that Blaise Diagne was the ‘first black Deputy’ from Africa. Lamine Guèye was the ‘first black lawyer’ in the French system from Africa. Léopold Senghor was the ‘first black African to take a French doctoral degree.’ Galandou Diouf seemed to be lacking a big ‘first,’ although he was the first Muslim African to hold the deputyship.

⁸ Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: the Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19.

⁹ See G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics*; Searing, “Accommodation and Resistance”; François Zuccarelli, *La vie politique sénégalaise (1789-1940)* (Paris: Le Centre des Hautes Etudes sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes (CHEAM), 1987).

Galandou Diouf is neglected in the historiography and his contributions are overlooked as contributing to the process of Senegal's move towards democratic independence and an end to a certain communal dominance. This dissertation seriously re-evaluates Galandou Diouf's role and impact on twentieth-century Senegalese and French colonial history. Diouf did not achieve the high education Diagne, Guèye and Senghor did. As such, he has been represented as an unsophisticated and compromised politician, limited by petty communal concerns and not having the political ability to maneuver in communal politics.¹⁰ This dissertation reveals a savvy politician, who was able to outmaneuver both Diagne and Guèye on various occasions and who successfully built a powerful and organized coalition more than once.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Social theories formulated by Pierre Bourdieu shape the framework of this study. In order to better analyze Galandou Diouf's successes and failures in the political sphere, I have framed his decisions, popularity and rhetoric within the structure of symbolic capital. Utilizing the concepts of symbolic, social and cultural capital allows me a way to explain how power is accredited and how it is lost by Africans within the confines of a colonial political field. My emphasis is on the practice and interaction of ideas, beliefs and identities within the structural

¹⁰ For example, see G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal*, "Diouf, in a very real sense, did not transcend his own bailiwick of Rufisque. He was a symbol rather than an effective leader for the many restless young Africans in Senegal." (149) and again, "Galandou Diouf did nothing to unify the various forces of discontent at work in Senegal." (148).

environment in which action takes place to produce practices.¹¹ Following the lead of David Robinson, I deploy Bourdieu's concepts of economic, social and symbolic forms of capital as an analytical tool.¹² Capital can be described as the currency of power within a given field. "The object is to accumulate capital and to draw upon this capital in order to secure more capital and a dominant position within the field."¹³ Economic capital is best expressed as material possessions or the production of an individual, family or group. Social capital encompasses networks of relationships and skills that can be deployed to meet specific needs of constituencies.

For my purposes, symbolic capital indicates the accumulation of prestige and power within a group, including a political party. Symbolic capital also includes personal qualities, such as family ties, Galandou Diouf or other politicians possessed that allowed them to gain positions and power. These forms of capital are translatable, fluid and convertible. One form of capital can constitute another, or become a stumbling block to success, such as Galandou Diouf's time of economic struggle that was linked intimately to his waning political fortunes.

For a leader like Galandou Diouf, symbolic capital reflects integrity and fidelity to a set of ideals and values. This fidelity acts as a link between who the leader presents himself to be and who he is. A leader's symbolic capital is also

¹¹ For a useful evaluation on how historians of international history can deploy the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, see Peter Jackson, "Pierre Bourdieu, the 'Cultural Turn' and the Practice of International History," *Review of International Studies* 34 (2008): 155-181.

¹² See David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*.

¹³ See Jackson, 168.

connected to his character, and his susceptibility to charges of corruption.

Symbolic capital and personal charisma can support a politician's ambitions.

Symbolic capital can be accrued or lost depending upon whether there is a fit, or a lack thereof, between what the leader says he stands for and what his behavior reveals about his actual commitment to those ideals and values.

A successful politician embodies symbolic capital, which is a set of qualities that a particular field, or group, believes are legitimate qualifications for a person to occupy a position of power. Character integrity provides the public with a sense of reassurance that they have given legitimacy to someone who deserves it. This symbolic capital serves as the basis for constituents to extend to the leader the benefit of the doubt in conflicted circumstances, and the capacity to tolerate setbacks and disappointments. When public trust becomes eroded, a leader experiences a loss of symbolic capital and a loss of position of legitimacy with his constituency.¹⁴ Part of the process of capital translation, accretion and loss occurs within the confines of civil society.

The space outside direct government control can be labeled civil society. The term civil society comes with its own embedded cultural authority and meaning, but is difficult to identify. Scholars have capitalized upon analyzing various forms of civil society in Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Jean Francois Bayart, Mahmood Mamdani and Jean and John Comaroff have all been at the forefront of the debate about civil society and its function, or lack of

¹⁴ For some ideas about symbolic capital and leadership in a modern American context, see Stanley A. Renshon, "Political Leadership as Social Capital: Governing in a Divided National Culture," *Political Psychology* 21, 1 (March 2000): 199-226.

function, in Africa.¹⁵ The concept of civil society arose in response to the development of nation-states in Western Europe, but it is an intellectual tool that has been, and can continue to be, deployed to other times and places. Indeed, scholars have begun to examine, for example, the relationship between Islam and citizenship in Senegal.¹⁶ Civil society has been defined in various ways, but for this study it will be used to describe two things: 1- institutions (including political parties) that have some autonomy from the state and can act as a mediating force between people and government, and 2- a somewhat politicized 'citizenry' able to both legitimize and restrain state powers. Civil society takes on distinctive local forms, and becomes the subject of distinctly local struggles.¹⁷

Authority of the state in colonial Senegal came from two rather distinct locations: from the colonial administration in Senegal and from the Third Republic government in Paris. Electoral institutions in colonial Senegal allowed originaires to have a political voice beyond the administrative apparatus of colonial rule. Electoral politics in colonial Senegal can be considered as arenas of "political contestation" because some political institutions could be considered as not an organic part of the administration. Organizations of civil society consist

¹⁵ See Jean Francois Bayart, *L'Etat en Afrique: La politique de ventre* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), translated as *The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly* (London: Longman, 1993), 993; Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); John L. and Jean Comaroff, eds, *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

¹⁶ Leonardo Vilallòn, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) analyzes the relationship between the contemporary Senegalese state and Muslim societies. Vilallòn argues Islamic orders in Senegal stabilize the country's current political system.

¹⁷ John L. and Jean Comaroff, "Preface," in *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa*, x.

of the political arena of electoral politics and the social arena of family, associations, social movements, religion, and forms of public communication. This work treats political parties and their politics as a form of civil society and assumes that these parties cannot exist in their current form without the state.

The Comaroffs argue that Western-oriented intellectuals, lawyers, entrepreneurs, academics, teachers, and sometimes Christian (never Muslim) leaders are seen as the vanguards of civil society in formation by 'outsiders' to Africa. It is they who are portrayed capable of developing an active public sphere, in which bourgeoisies might pursue their interests "untrammelled by parochial loyalties, identity politics, or intrusive governments; to equate those interests with the good of society at large, even of 'humankind'."¹⁸ I would argue that Blaise Diagne and Lamine Guèye represented this sort of Western-oriented intellectual/politician. The Comaroffs, of course, are referring to a post-colonial age in Africa, but this can be applied to late colonialism in Senegal. Diagne, Guèye, and Senghor challenged the colonial regime in many ways, but still represented the 'assimilated' African capable of bringing change.

Galandou Diouf, on the other hand, was the antithesis to colonial governments, the métropole, and many French civil society organizations that supported organic African intellectuals. Diouf was Muslim, not highly educated, and had multiple wives. The rhetoric from 'outsiders' surrounding Diouf's career and his capacities was very different from the rhetoric surrounding the more 'assimilated' Diagne and Guèye, and of course, formed by religious and race bigotry. This view of Diouf has, unfortunately, been perpetrated by Western

¹⁸ Comaroffs, "Introduction," *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa*, 19.

scholars, who tend to agree with colonial writers that compare him unfavorably to his peers, both in terms of his influence and his ability to speak French, for example. I believe these reports must be taken with a grain of salt and analyzed in the political context instead of wholeheartedly adopted as accurate descriptors of Diouf, particularly when one notes his career.

Mahmood Mamdani argues that the colonial state excluded Africans from civil society by creating a barrier that separated European citizens in the colonial centers from Africans governed by an authoritarian regime in the rural sphere.¹⁹ This is part of what Mamdani describes as a “bifurcated State” where two forms of power co-existed under a single hegemonic framework.²⁰ Mamdani concentrates his analysis on rural and urban power; this dissertation includes originaires connections and relationships with the Protectorate in the structure of analysis. But I would argue that there are more than two forms of power operating under a single hegemonic framework; indeed, the movement of power between originaires and the administration, and between urban Africans who did not have citizenship rights and originaires barely begins to cover the multiple flows of power struggle and sharing in this complex political environment, where personal interests could follow a range of options and opportunities.

¹⁹ Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 9-18.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

Historiography

G. Wesley Johnson's *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal* has been the standard text for the history of the origins of modern Senegalese politics.²¹ Johnson's book charts the increased participation of Africans in métis-dominated colonial Senegal. Diagne's 1914 victory is analyzed, but Johnson does not fully explain how Diagne was able to build his coalition and enter Senegalese politics so successfully. Johnson underscores Diagne's rhetorical abilities, but does not emphasize that Diagne only spoke in French during campaign rallies and speeches. Johnson downplays the role of men like Galandou Diouf and Mody M'Baye, who translated Diagne's message into Wolof and organized his speeches and campaign. Diagne, for Johnson, is a heroic figure, able to navigate colonial waters successfully and secure privileges for communal inhabitants. Johnson's other articles also relegate Diouf to the sidelines, portraying him as ineffective and a stooge to colonial interests.²² While Johnson describes Diagne's loss of prestige towards the end of his career, he does not chronicle much the efforts of Galandou Diouf to challenge and replace Diagne.

Lamine Guèye interpreted his own career in his *Itinéraire africain*.²³ Not surprisingly, he awarded a good deal of significance to himself in Senegalese politics. Although Guèye was a moderate, he presents his work as written in the

²¹ Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics*.

²² See G. Wesley Johnson, "The Ascendancy of Blaise Diagne and the Beginning of African Politics in Senegal," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 36, 3 (July 1966): 235-253 and G. Wesley Johnson, "The Impact of the Senegalese Elite upon the French, 1900-1940," in *Double Impact: France and Africa in the Age of Imperialism*, ed. G. Wesley Johnson (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), 155-178.

²³ Lamine Guèye, *Itinéraire africain* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1966).

spirit of “en témoin et en militant.”²⁴ The only text specifically about Galandou Diouf is a *mémoire de maîtrise* from UCAD.²⁵ Diallo’s thesis is a simple narrative of Diouf’s career, gleaned mainly from newspapers of Diouf’s day. It has not challenged the received historiography of colonial politics in Senegal. François Zuccarelli has also written about the politics of the period, but he reiterates much of G. Wesley Johnson’s information.²⁶ Zuccarelli dismisses the notion that Diouf contained much originality, and characterizes him as having a ‘moderate and prudent nature’ and following a Diagnost platform from 1934.²⁷

The era of decolonization and those associated with it captivated the interests of scholars working on Africa. Men like Galandou Diouf, who seemed to accommodate to French rule, instead of strongly resist it, were not popular subjects. Although Léopold Senghor was deeply influenced by French culture, his nationalism propelled him into national hero status. As such, he has received a good deal of attention.²⁸

²⁴ Ibid., 135.

²⁵ Mamadou Diallo, “Galandou Diouf: homme politique sénégalais (1875-1941),” Université Cheikh Anta Diop, mémoire de maîtrise, 1972.

²⁶ François Zuccarelli, *La vie politique sénégalaise*.

²⁷ Ibid., 141.

²⁸ One of the more recent and influential works on Senghor has been Janet G. Vaillant’s *Black, French and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). Vaillant’s work traces Senghor’s rise from a Senegalese village to president of the nation. Vaillant emphasizes Senghor’s development as an intellectual, and her narrative of Senghor as president is somewhat weak, however, her work succeeds in placing Senghor as one of the major African intellectuals of the twentieth century. See also Sylvia Washington Bâ, *The Concept of Negritude in the Poetry of Leopold Sedar Senghor* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); Jacques-Louis Hymans, *Leopold Sedar Senghor: An Intellectual Biography* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1971); Irving Markovitz, *Leopold Sedar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude* (New York: Atheneum, 1969); Ernest Milcent and Monique Sordet, *Leopold Sedar Senghor et la naissance de l’Afrique moderne* (Paris: Seghers, 1969). Michael Lambert, “From Citizenship to *Négritude*: ‘Making a Difference’ in Elite

The process of decolonization in Africa has a substantive literature. Many of the main works struggle with questions about the effect of colonization upon the continent today and variously trace these effects from the nationalist leaders in Africa to the structural realities of the métropole in the middle of the twentieth century. The amount and nature of Africans' true economic independence and agency in decolonization remain important threads of conversation. John D. Hargreaves, Raymond Betts and Tony Chafer have produced notable recent tomes on decolonization.²⁹ Most general works on decolonization focus on the development of nationalist leaders and ignore much of the structure built in the interwar period. Tony Chafer includes a chapter on West Africa in the 1930s and the lead-in to independence, but he barely gives Galandou Diouf a mention when he is discussing Senegal. Chafer continues the historiographic trend of focusing almost exclusively on developments amongst intellectuals in Paris and industrial workers in West Africa.³⁰ By analyzing the often ambiguous and contradictory nature of Galandou Diouf's impact upon the movement towards an independent Senegal, this dissertation adds a unique understanding of Africans' involvement and agency on the process of decolonization.

Ideologies of Colonized Francophone West Africa," *Comparative Studies in History and Society* 35, 2 (April 1993): 239-262.

²⁹ John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa* (London: Longman, 1996); Raymond Betts, *France and Decolonization* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?*

³⁰ For a good account of the role of labor in constructing nationalist movements, see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: the Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Much of the scholarship on urban elites in Africa has focused upon the impact of western-educated groups on the origins of modern nationalism.³¹ Previous studies on the topic tend to emphasize the separation between urban and rural established by the colonial order. For Abner Cohen, urban Africans appeared somewhat like a “detrribalized” group who rejected elements of their African identity to embrace “modern” values.³² Cohen argues that urban groups exaggerated their distinctiveness in towns to gain power in urban politics. There may be some similarities here to an “originaire identity.” Mamadou Diouf argues that originaires ‘acculturated’ their society in the context of a colonial experience, and as such, became a people with a “special status,” and standing.³³ The idea that originaires possessed a “special status” is not new; G. Wesley Johnson explored this concept as well.³⁴ Johnson argues that an adherence to Islam provided a cultural guard against assimilation’s attempts to change culture and allowed originaires to become only politically assimilated.

³¹ For example, James Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal*; Kristin Mann, *Marrying Well: Marriage, Status and Social Change among the Educated Elite in Colonial Lagos* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth Century Natal* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1986), and most recently, Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

³² I am referring to Abner Cohen’s meaning of “detrribalized” and “retribalized” in his study of urban politics for Hausa migrants in Yoruba towns in Nigeria. Abner Cohen, *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 1-5.

³³ Mamadou Diouf, “The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of the Originaires of the Four Communes (Sénégal): A Nineteenth Century Globalization Project,” in *Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of Flows and Closure*, ed. Birgit Meyer and Peter Geshiere (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), esp. 76.

³⁴ G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971).

The central problem for originaires, according to Johnson and Crowder, was how much, rather than whether or not, to assimilate. Mamadou Diouf denies that originaires lost a 'traditional' identity, and instead argues that this group had a distinctly modern and universalist outlook, allowing them to engage the French without becoming subordinates. Rebecca Shereikis focuses upon the Muslim identity of originaires operating in the Protectorate.³⁵ She argues that originaires in the Protectorate sought to uphold their special status by stressing their identity as Muslims, traders and partners with the French—none of which they found incompatible.

In the nineteenth century, many local inhabitants in West Africa's port cities derived their capital and their status from their roles as intermediaries in international commerce. By the beginning of the twentieth century, many of those groups had lost their commercial advantage and were actively seeking a new way for socio-economic mobility through such things as Christian missionary schools, European commercial firms, or the colonial bureaucracy. For example, in the British West African colonies urban elites became the leaders of Protestant missions or members of the limited representative institutions called Legislative Councils.³⁶

³⁵ Rebecca Shereikis, "From Law to Custom: The Shifting Legal Status of Muslim Originaires in Kayes and Medine, 1903-13," *The Journal of African History* 42, 2 (2001): 261-283.

³⁶ For African elites in missions in Nigeria see Jacob Ajayi, *Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891: the Making of a New Elite* (London: Longman, 1965). On African elites in the Legislative Councils of British colonies see Michael Crowder, *West African under Colonial Rule*, 203-204 and Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, Allen M. Howard and David E. Skinner, *Community Leadership and the Transformation of Freetown 1801-1976* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978).

Originaires were defined by space; they gained their status from their geographical location. *Evolués* were legally and culturally defined by how much they absorbed French civilization. Originaires were born either in Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque or Dakar. The claim to being an “originaire” could be inherited as well; originaires who had children in the Protectorate argued that their children should be classified as originaires as well. The definition of who could and could not be inscribed as an originaire on the legal roles of a commune was a site of contestation and accommodation between Africans, métis, and French colonial officials for generations. Occasionally roles were purged and people found themselves disenfranchised and stripped of a legal status.

Whether women could be considered full “originaires” is debatable. For the status of originaire was not just geographically bounded, it was politically bounded as well. An originaire had the right to participate in French governmental institutions, from the municipal councils to the Deputyship in the National Assembly. Originaires could vote, run for office, and, hypothetically, engage in a free press. Originaires were exempt from the *indigénat*, the capricious system of justice which operated in the Protectorate and was heavily controlled by traditional chiefs and French administrative officers instead of based upon French republican law. Indeed, originaires could choose between legally falling under the French Civil Code or a Muslim legal system, an option French men did not have. Women did not have the right to vote or to hold office. They were disenfranchised, regardless of where they lived or had been born. Women’s legal status was murkier than men’s and it would be difficult to argue

that they enjoyed the same justice system as originaire men. More research needs to be conducted on the subject. Regardless, this is why I argue that the status of legal originaire could not be claimed by women, although of course geographically men and women shared the same field.

But being an originaire was not merely a legal French definition for most inhabitants of the four communes; it was also a cultural identity. Many originaires were very aware of politics, and were exposed to the political process from a young age, through public rallies, debates and speeches. Newspaper articles were read aloud to those who were illiterate. Lack of education did not exclude anyone from being an originaire, although the powerful and influential originaires possessed a French education, or rarely, a Muslim one.

The originaire community drew social and symbolic capital from the length of time their families had been active as originaires; those whose fathers or grandfathers fought for Faïdherbe carried a specific and powerful symbolic capital that could be deployed against métis and French administrators. Race did not define originaires; they could be métis or African or Wolof or Bambara. Religion did not define the category either; originaires could be Christian, Muslim, or could adhere to older religious practices rooted in local traditions. However, it is important to point out that Wolof originaires carried the most social capital within African politics. Métis originaires tended to carry a great deal of weight with Bordeaux merchants. But social class did not disqualify or qualify someone for originaire status either.

The status of originaire can be compared to the old practice of “legal pluralism” Europeans had used to promote effective rule in the colonies. Legal pluralism utilized different processes and different rules for people within the space of empire; however through time this was increasingly standardized and brought under the control of states.³⁷ French establishment of republican institutions, and the limiting of them, allowed Africans to contest how far colonial power could go. This afforded them an opportunity to interpret and redefine their rights of citizenship in the French empire. So while the situation in the Four Communes was comparable in the history of empires, the particular combination of the extension of republican citizenship and the limitations within colonial rule was unusual in the early twentieth century.³⁸

³⁷ Laura Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 257-59. See also Emmanuelle Saada, “The Empire of Law: Dignity, Prestige, and Domination in the ‘Colonial Situation,’” *French Politics, Culture and Society* 20 (2002): 47-76.

³⁸ A parallel case of muddying subjects/citizens occurred in the old colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Guyana. Revolutionary governments in 1794, 1848, and 1870 had recognized these assimilated colonial populations as French nationals and granted them citizenship status. This status, however, was revoked by successive anti-republican regimes. During the Third Republic, the status of Antillean citizens remained contradictory, as they elected their own deputies to the National Assembly, lived under the *Code Civile*, and mostly ran their own municipal governments. However, they continued to exist in a racially organized colonial society, and were forced to submit to the authoritarian rule of an appointed governor. They were both colonial subjects and French citizens, whose political milieu was characterized by power struggles between popularly elected local politicians—mayors and colonial deputies—and unaccountable, Paris-appointed administrators. As Gary Wilder puts it, these Antilleans could practice citizenship, but were not fully citizens. See Gary Wilder, “Practicing Citizenship in Imperial Paris,” in *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives*, eds. John and Jean Comaroff (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 48. For general accounts of colonial politics in the French Antilles, see Pierre Pluchon, *Histoire des Antilles et de la Guyane* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982); Richard Burton, *La Famille Coloniale. La Martinique et la Mère Patrie, 1789-1992* (Paris: Harmattan, 1994).

The French policy of assimilation and accommodation permitted a co-existence between republican principles and imperial pursuits; this in turn created a space where local Africans could gain power and influence within the apparatus of the colonial state. The difference between rhetoric and practice in colonial Senegal would continue throughout the twentieth century until independence. This took its most distinctive form in the disparity between a citizen and a subject of the empire. A citizen was a participating member of a polity, but a subject was involuntarily incorporated, with obligations, but with no rights and no voice. In Algeria, in order to become a citizen, Muslims had to give up their right to have their civil affairs, including marriage and inheritance, come under Islamic law. But in Senegal, the originaires obtained, if not the name of citizen, then much of the citizens' political rights; this was based on geography, and not on renouncing Islamic civil status.

Thus in Senegal, subjecthood existed alongside citizenship, loosely defined by geography, but France attempted to put constraints on those originaires who did not meet a narrow, culturally specific notion of "Frenchness." The privileges contained in legal citizenship were appealing to many colonized peoples. After World War I, African, Vietnamese and Arab ex-soldiers demanded recognition of their sacrifices and citizenship. Their claims were perceived as threatening to the French government. They were joined by colonial students and workers in France, who were a growing presence during and after the war. France responded by trying to place constrictions on the citizenship process and emphasize another myth: that of the empire as a gathering place of different

cultures and nationalities, all tied under an imperial umbrella that guaranteed peace and the ability to preserve distinct cultures and traditions.³⁹

In West Africa, chiefs in the Protectorate were given power as authentic expressions of indigenous authority, while Africans who had advanced the farthest along the road to assimilation were belittled. In Senegal, this was embodied by the destruction of the General Council, which was controlled by urban originaires and the establishment of the Colonial Council, which was a legislative body shared—on paper—between originaires and chiefs from the interior. In reality, chiefs were often clients of colonial agents, and voted as they were told by the French administration in the Protectorate. Galandou Diouf would consistently seek a return to the General Council as a way of arguing for originaire participation in colonial Senegal that had once been there, but that had been phased out or eliminated by an increasingly autocratic administration.

Communes and the administration had become part of the 'establishment' in Senegal by the late 1930s, with their unique relationship and participation in the French colonial state. Indeed, Senghor ran a successful campaign against Lamine Guèye in the late 1940s, portraying Guèye as an appropriated member of this establishment. By the time Galandou Diouf challenged Blaise Diagne in Senegal's colonial field, Saint-Louis was also considered an appropriated part of the colonial establishment. Diouf used his connections to Rufisque and Dakar as leverage against Diagne's involvement with the corrupted and co-opted

³⁹ See Herman Lebovics, *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992) and Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), particularly ch. 6.

economic and political machines coming out of Saint-Louis. Thus, there was a structure of appropriation and ambiguity within colonial Senegal, not only between French imperialism and republican ideals, but also between French West Africa and the communes. The deputyship, as the main surviving institution and manifestation of communal power, existed in tension and accommodation with the Protectorate.

Scholars have recognized the colonial regime's dependence upon the people of Africa to allow the system to work as France needed the cooperation of local notables, educated personnel and especially colonial soldiers. David Robinson, in particular, has explored the process of negotiation, contestation and accommodation between African actors and members of the French colonial establishment.⁴⁰ Gregory Mann argues that in the case of Mali, its West African neighbors, and France, shared military experience lay near the heart of the colonial relationship, and it remains very near the core of its postcolonial counterpart. African politicians like Blaise Diagne used the breach between citizens and subjects that opened up due to military service of colonial subjects to make broader demands on the French state. "Military connections were the ties that bound, however awkwardly."⁴¹ Mann's work shows that not only were

⁴⁰ For example, David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000); David Robinson, "An Emerging Pattern of Cooperation Between Colonial Authorities and Muslim Societies in Senegal and Mauritania," in *Le Temps des marabouts*, ed. David Robinson and Jean-Louis Triaud (Paris: Karthala Press, 1997): 155-180. Searing also stressed the importance of accommodation in his dissertation "Accommodation and Resistance: Chiefs, Muslim Leaders, and Politicians in Colonial Senegal".

⁴¹ Gregory Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 11.

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interpretations of the past generated, but that they were appropriated by others; veterans' collective narrative of sacrifice and betrayal has come to be deployed by non-veterans, activists for various causes, and argued in French and African media.

Recent historical works have re-imagined the relationship between France and West Africa through the experiences of educated African elites living in Paris in the decades of the 1920s, 30s and 40s.⁴² This work seeks to reevaluate this same relationship through the experiences of men in Senegal not geographically separated from African culture and the coercion of daily colonialism, but those who instead navigate, struggle and accommodate within the bureaucratic, institutional and cultural network of colonialism. Thus Galandou Diouf is also "astride the divide between French and African cultures, between citizen and subject."⁴³

Studies of French colonialism in Africa have often looked at the impact of European rule on the continent from the top down. Themes involving the nature of conquest, the economic structure of French imperialism and the ideologies that guided the French empire have made significant contributions to our understanding of imperialism.⁴⁴ Some studies, however, take a different

⁴² Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State* and James Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence, Cultural Authenticity and the Limitations of Mimicry in French-Ruled West Africa, 1914-1956* (Peter Lang Publishing, 2004).

⁴³ Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 274.

⁴⁴ Examples of this literature include Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Michael Crowder, *Senegal: a Study of French Assimilation Policy* (London: Methuen, 1967). For insights into military conquest and civilian authority, see A.S. Kanya-Forstner, *The Conquest of the Western Sudan* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969) and William Cohen, *Rulers of Empire: the French Colonial Service in Africa* (Stanford:

approach and have indicated the inherent contradictions and weaknesses of the colonial state. Alice Conklin does this in *A Mission to Civilize: the Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa*.⁴⁵ Conklin provides insights into the thoughts and personalities of France's colonial administrators and how those men sought to reconcile imperialism and republican ideas.

Gary Wilder criticizes Conklin for this approach. Wilder argues Conklin promotes an idealistic and unrealized form of republican universalism by artificially establishing a difference between the motivations of individuals and how policy was actually implemented. Conklin thus sets up a false dichotomy between republican and colonial ideology, and does not differentiate between republicanism and universalism.⁴⁶ Wilder analyzes the French empire as a contradictory and disjointed political formation that must be dissected. Wilder argues that the historiographical focus should shift away from the contradictions between the promises of republican universalism and colonial or racist practices and towards the antinomy (opposing views held in common) between universality and particularity that existed within the métropole and the colony. This tension between universality and particularity thus produced a French drive to transform and preserve indigenous societies at the same time.

Recent scholarship utilizing *évolués* as an analytic category have failed to acknowledge or distinguish originaire influence and production of meaning in the

Stanford University Press, 1971). On French imperialism see Jean Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 1900-1945*, transl., Till Gottheiner (New York: Pica Press, 1971) and Jacques Marseille, *Empire colonial et capitalisme français: Histoire d'un divorce* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984).

⁴⁵ Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: the Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

⁴⁶ Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Négritude and Colonial Humanism*, 7.

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interwar years. James Genova's *Colonial Ambivalence, Cultural Authenticity, and the Limitations of Mimicry in French-Ruled West Africa, 1914-1956* seeks to discover what the history of the *évolué* community can tell us about the nature of the colonial experience and its enduring legacies for France and the Empire.⁴⁷ For Genova, the discourse about an "authentic" Africa circulating in colonial intellectual circles shaped colonial policy, but also informed African elites in the métropole, who delineated a particular nationalism that emphasized ethnic-based constituencies. Genova does not differentiate much between *évolués* in the métropole and those located in the colonies, thus the world of *évolués* in West Africa is unfocused. Genova also fails to differentiate between *évolués* and *originaires* in his analysis, a critical oversight because the two categories are not collapsible. By looking at Galandou Diouf's milieu, this dissertation seeks to correct this fallacy.

Thus many studies have furthered our knowledge of the mechanisms of power and the nature of the colonial state. This dissertation focuses upon these mechanisms, but also on the interactive and contradictory nature of the colonial process. In an East African example, Berman and Lonsdale argue that the British in Kenya were constricted by the lack of colonial financial resources and the difficulty of negotiating the interests of various groups within the colony.⁴⁸ Other works have demonstrated that colonialism in Africa was more a process of negotiation between foreign rulers and local actors who employed strategies to

⁴⁷ James Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence, Cultural Authenticity, and the Limitations of Mimicry in French-Ruled West Africa, 1914-1956* (New York: Peter Lang, 2004).

⁴⁸ Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Clan, Class and State in Colonial Kenya*, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992), 77-95. The interests the authors refer to include metropolitan merchant capital, local African producers and white settlers.

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accommodate one another and respond to situations “on the ground.”⁴⁹ This led to practices with a good amount of improvisation, contestation and uncertainty.

The French empire was the locus of political and ethical debate, but this did not lead to a steady push to include colonized people within a universalistic, egalitarian conception of a state. No, instead the assault on French hierarchy by those living in the colonies led to fears of social danger—and attempt by the métropole to foreclose upon originaire privileges in the Four Communes.

Discourses, events, institutions and interest groups occurred inside and outside governmental boundaries. This dissertation moves beyond the programmatic, rhetorical scholarly civil society that Mamdani has critiqued, and attempts to look at it from a historic and analytic perspective in a specific place and time in African history.⁵⁰ Indeed, taking a cue from Deborah Durham’s study of Botswana, I argue that in order to understand the nature of political life in Senegal, it is necessary to examine concerns with “civility” as well local concerns

⁴⁹ Jean and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa*, vol 1 (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991); David Robinson and Louis Triaud, ed., *Le Temps des marabouts* (Paris: Karthala, 1997); David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), Emily Osborn, “Circle of Iron,” African Colonial Employees and the Interpretation of Colonial Rule in French West Africa,” *Journal of African History* 44 (2003): 29-50.

⁵⁰ Mamdani parallels debates about civil society to earlier debates about socialism: Programmatic, rhetorical, typically ill-defined, and unduly abstract. For Mamdani, the discourse on civil society has claimed that civil society exists as a fully formed construct in Africa as in Europe, and the driving force of democratization everywhere is the contention between civil society and the state. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 13-14.

with the moral nature of political action and the political aspects of a person's agency.⁵¹

Leadership itself may be considered an "institution," studied for its rights and responsibilities, for its modes of legitimation, and for the way in which it exists in the accumulation and exercise of power. Studies of leaders pulled out of cultural contexts are not very valuable. One way to study leadership and leaders is to look at the rhetoric and discourse of political parties and politics, with recognition that discourse may not reflect reality. In colonial West Africa, a variety of discourses were deployed, each speaking to a specific group, which is not to say that discourses did not overlap or that there were not gaps between them.

In Senegal, however, many Muslim residents in the communes did not recognize a contradiction between their identity as Muslims and their claim to the rights and privileges guaranteed by their status as *originaires*. Indeed, the political life of Galandou Diouf provides a compelling argument for this. Other authors such as David Robinson, Mamadou Diouf and Rebecca Shereikis find accommodation between Muslim identity and involvement in colonial politics.⁵² Mamadou Diouf argues that Muslim *originaires* could work within the constraints of colonialism by not subscribing to the cultural and civil codes of France, whether it was through "gaudy esthetics" or building churches and mosques.⁵³

⁵¹ See Deborah Durham, "Civil Lives: Leadership and Accomplishment in Botswana," in *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa*, eds. John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, 193.

⁵² See David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*; Mamadou Diouf, "Assimilation Coloniale," 565-587 and Rebecca Shereikis, "From Law to Custom."

⁵³ Mamadou Diouf, "The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of

Diouf attempts to reclaim originaires from their isolation in sociological, anthropological, and historical studies by describing their “hybridized” culture. Diouf claims the originaires were “not French culturally, but they were French politically and economically.”⁵⁴

Originaires’ struggles to retain their rights highlight their agency. In tracing the life of Galandou Diouf in the public sphere, I have emphasized points upon which he could act. However, it is important to understand any political agency as historically crafted and framed by structural constraints.⁵⁵ This dissertation links individual and group agency to colonial and state structure. Originaires found agency within their constrained citizenship—they could vote, hold meetings, occasionally freely publish newspapers, and hold offices. The amount of agency they possessed was constrained by colonial disciplinary acts, such as dismissing the General Council or making it illegal for a newspaper to continue running. Africans also found agency through participation in a political party based in Africa. Sometimes this participation came at a steep economic or personal price. Africans also found agency through their practice of a specific religious identity and the social position that afforded them. Originaires could practice their agency through garnering an education—men with higher French educations translated this symbolic capital into political prestige. Many of the

the Originaires of the Four Communes (Sénégal): A Nineteenth Century Globalization Project” in *Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of Flows and Closure*, ed. Birgit Meyer and Peter Geshiere (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 94. I would have to take issue with the labeling originaire esthetics as “gaudy.”

⁵⁴ Ibid., 75.

⁵⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, “African States, Citizenship and War: A Case Study,” *International Affairs* 78, 3 (2002), 493.

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ways originaires practiced agency was tied to their relationship to the colonial state and with their identity as originaires.

Identity, and the projection of various aspects of it, is important to understanding early twentieth-century politics in colonial Senegal and to understanding Galandou Diouf's role and position. Historians and anthropologists have worked on the culture of colonialism by looking at the meanings of race, class and gender in the context of empire.⁵⁶ These works analyze the transforming power of métropole ideas upon colonial cultures, and in turn how these colonial cultures then inform and transform European identities and societies. Jonathan Glassman emphasizes Swahili citizenship as partially a kind of cultural and social belonging built around living in an urban area and practicing Islam.⁵⁷

This is not to imply that all members of society were treated the same way by the colonial state or had equal access and opportunities within the structured colonialism. Indeed, race, for example, was an important discriminating dynamic. But the members of this society existed within the same field, a social arena in which people pursued resources. Pierre Bourdieu defines a field as "a network, or a configuration of objective relations between positions."⁵⁸

⁵⁶ See Nicholas B. Dirks, ed. *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest* (Routledge, 1995).

⁵⁷ Jonathan Glassman, *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion & Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888* (Heinemann, 1995).

⁵⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1982), 121-34.

Sources and Methods

The arguments presented in this dissertation are predicated upon written sources for the most part, produced in a context of colonialism. Secondary sources make up an important aspect of my documentation, and situate my scholarship within Senegalese and African historiography. I also collected oral documents during my fieldwork, including an interview with one of Galandou Diouf's surviving daughters. While oral histories could certainly reveal a great deal about the topic at hand, I have infrequently utilized them directly in the construction of my narrative. Instead, at the core, this dissertation is a re-analysis of written materials and a re-interpretation of an accepted tradition and image of Galandou Diouf in the colonial archives and in the literature. This dissertation goes against the grain of some received wisdom about Diouf, but also writes with the current historiographical trend that cries out for contextualization and differentiation of historical subjects.

Although much of the surviving written material takes the shape of colonial documents, Africans influenced the knowledge and dissemination of information at all levels. Colonial administrators received, interpreted and acted upon knowledge transferred by informants, and by African actors themselves. Because the communes were a community with a variety of different people, they were complex spaces. Christians and Muslims lived alongside each other. In each religion there were further divisions. Men, women and children of all ages participated in urban lifestyles. People from different ethnic and socio-economic status mingled in common places; and were starkly separated in others.

[illegible]

European merchants and businessmen, métis and Africans struggled to represent interests and build political coalitions. Politicians, administrators, newspaper contributors all employed rhetoric, which was sometimes conflicting and competing within their own discourses.

The relations of power in West Africa were structured by African participation and struggle within the colonial state. When analyzing a colonial state that deigned to give some citizenship rights to a certain segment of the population, it is vital to include a discussion of hegemony. Hegemonic systems, as postulated by Antonio Gramsci, entail systems of consent given by masses to the impositions on social life by the dominant group. An important aspect of this is the “apparatus of State coercive power which ‘legally’ enforces discipline on those who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively.”⁵⁹

I argue that France succeeded in establishing a “soft” hegemony over the subject-citizens of the four communes, which was tempered by direct coercive threats and punitive measures taken by the administration upon citizenry whose infractions of the “law” were questionable at best. As part of this coercion there existed a good deal of surveillance, often carried out by Africans who were comfortable and accepted in the local milieu, but who transmitted information deemed vital by colonial administrators for control. As such, a pursuit, translation, analysis and dissemination of various forms of knowledge became central to the practices of colonial administration during this time. Africans actively sought to shape these discourses and deploy them for their own uses.

⁵⁹ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1992), 12.

There are several loci that must be mentioned in this process. Some upper-level administrator deemed the pursuit of information important to understanding, and thus controlling, the local population. Instructions were handed down to lower-level employees, who then hired African agents from a very specific pool of trustworthy and willing participants. African informants in turn attended political meetings or relayed rumors to the lower level agents, who then passed the information up. This bottom-up transfer of information also shaped what administrators deemed important to pursue and delineated future attempts at acquiring and analyzing information. At each node, individual agency delineated power relationships and controlled access to information, as well as the interpretation of it. African informants had great agency in their reporting; often they claimed to repeat those whom they were watching verbatim. They would translate the knowledge to be gained from their surveillance, not just in terms of language, but also in terms of context, and of information included and excluded. Thus, many of the “first-hand” accounts of historical events have been (re)mediated, (re)interpreted, and (re) analyzed. The French accepted many images mediated by others, not just in the early years of colonialism, but in latter times as well.⁶⁰

Originaires attempted to shape colonial discourse through the rhetoric they disseminated to a population living in Senegal and to one living in Paris. The distribution of their rhetoric occurred in a variety of formats. One of these was through newspapers published in the colony, often under the auspices of Europeans who were critical of the colonial establishment, such as D'army

⁶⁰ David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 5.

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D'Oxoby. African, métis and European politicians spoke at meetings and rallies and posted flyers declaring their platforms. Such political rhetoric would usually end with a Republican motto that incorporated Senegal. Many African politicians sent letters to friends and colonial officials that contained a reflection of Republican ideas, but also contained criticisms, advice, and veiled threats to administrators. Many of these documents can be found in the archival record, but how much of this sort of information was verbally relayed or lost?

The French archival record, despite its reams of papers, does not cover everything. As David Robinson has pointed out, "What is there must be scrutinized very closely, for its temporal context, audience, purposes, and discourse."⁶¹ The lacunae may be explained by oral instructions and intimations that supplemented written orders or superseded them altogether, and which, of course, are missing. When reading through accounts, there is often the feeling of being in on part of a conversation; you are missing a subtext that might have been made at a meeting or a dinner engagement, but to which you are not party.

And of course the French archival record was mediated by Africans, who made and kept most of the records. African clerks controlled access to French administrators. African employees created networks of information, and chose what knowledge to produce or elide. Indeed, one French colonial commander called the way in which he was vulnerable to his employees' construction of an

⁶¹ Ibid., 50.

African reality a "circle of iron."⁶² This mediation was particularly true for areas on the frontiers of the French empire.

African informants provided information the colonial regime found indispensable. There exist within the archives a series of secret notes colonial informants relayed orally (which were then transcribed) or in print. When these reports were transmitted in print, a name is often given, and it is usually an African one. The oral reports, however, are completely anonymous. It requires careful detective work to guess at the motivations, purposes and impact of these reports. They can reveal much about the nature of French colonialism within these Republican institutions, and about the politicians and their meetings, their rhetoric, and their connections. While the knowledge these informants reveal is important for the historian, it must be acknowledged that these are incomplete snippets of information. We do not know what material was left out of the reports nor do we know what motivated decisions to leave in or include certain information. Important questions needed to be considered: Who was the possible source of information? What were the benefits were the informants receiving for the information? How was the information "packaged" to the individual administrator for evaluation and consumption? How much of the information was "accurate"?

On either side of the colonial relationship, much was to be gained or lost based upon misinformation and misrepresentation. Nevertheless, without these notes and their inclusion within the colonial archives, our knowledge of party

⁶² Emily Lynn Osborn, "Circle of Iron': African Colonial Employees and the Interpretation of Colonial Rule in French West Africa," *Journal of African History* 44 (2003), 29-50.

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meetings and rallies would be much more limited. African informants attended a wide array of events, from intimate and sensitive political discussions to large party meetings and rallies. These documents, however problematic, are necessary for building a narrative of politics in colonial Senegal. I believe them to be generally accurate, given that multiple informants sometimes covered the same events and gave very similar accounts of them to colonial administrators. I believe these reports were not just mere reflections of a true event; it must be acknowledged that informants had their own agendas to pursue and their own attitudes and opinions about the political process and politicians. Informants may have been party loyalists trying to assuage colonial fears or make their candidate more “acceptable” in an administrator’s eyes.

Informants may also have been opposed to the party they were reporting upon, and may have manipulated information in such a way as to provoke colonial suspicions or arouse fear and distrust. Informants may also have been ‘professionals’ who reported as accurately as they could in order to secure future jobs from the administration. They may even have felt morally obligated to be as ‘honest’ as they could in their reporting. It is impossible to know, however, what was going on the mind of informants or the lens through which they interpreted and produced their reports. In order to use the documents more effectively, I have tried to “read between the lines” as much as possible in order to critically analyze the information found in informants’ reports.

The colonial archives also contain a vast repertory of reports, correspondence, and policy decrees between the minister of colonies, the

governor general, and colonial officials in various regions. Official documents such as the *Moniteur du Sénégal* and the *Journal Officiel du Sénégal* carried reports of elections and accounts of the General Council's sessions. The colonial government also documented electoral politics and the activities of elected officials. Administrative records from various communes' mayoral offices and of municipal councils and elections provide documentation on city administration. Colonial documents must be sifted through with care; the French as individuals had their own agendas and wrote from a variety of societal, geographic and temporal biases.

The majority of documents I used came from a "third generation of literature" produced by the French in West Africa.⁶³ This single largest category of archival material came from the administration of conquered territory. The administrators used forms (the *fiches de renseignement*) to record information about important Africans, including politicians. I use this data, which can be problematic because the opinions and biases of previous administrators are often handed down unvaried to the next set of officials.

The G series, "Politics and General Administration," contained in the National Archives in Senegal has been particularly fruitful for constructing this dissertation. The 2G series contains reports of governors, administrators and chiefs from 1895. The 3G series covers municipal institutions in the communes. The 13G series centers on Senegal and political, administrative and Muslim affairs. The 17G series concerns political affairs in the AOF, while the 20G files contain documents about elections. Police and security are the subject of 21G

⁶³ David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 51.

classified papers. The G series includes reports from administrative officials at all levels from the local to the Minister of Colonies in Paris. This crucial series includes newspaper articles and entire newspapers that cover political affairs in the colony. These newspapers provide insights and evidence of a civil society in colonial Senegal. This vast archive also encompasses speeches from politicians such as Blaise Diagne and Galandou Diouf, as well as reports and fiches on personalities. Within its pages also lie the small typed papers of colonial informants and employees who detailed political rallies and private campaign meetings. Information from the G series provides a framework for much of this dissertation.

The "Councils and Assemblies" series (E) contains records of a range of meetings in colonial Senegal. For my purposes the 4E papers were of most use, comprised of deliberations from the General Council, and then the Colonial Council. In the annals of the Chamber of Deputies in Paris, France provided records of Diouf's activities and verbatim copies of his speeches to the National Assembly. Most of the photographs used in the dissertation were located and scanned in the Annex of the National Archives in Dakar, Senegal.

Oral and cultural histories can provide an important supplement and sometimes ballast to narratives contained in French archival sources.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ For examples of authors who use this approach see Nicholas B. Dirks, ed., *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992); Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), Michel-Rolf Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Richard Roberts, "History and Memory: The Power of Statist Narratives," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, 3 (2000): 513-522.

I received a few private documents from Galandou Diouf's family, and was able to conduct several formal and informal interviews throughout the ten months I spent in Senegal in 2002-03. Jan Vansina refers to oral history as "inside information."⁶⁵ These bits of life histories can broaden and deepen our understanding of personality and identity. Oral interviews reflect as much about past events as they do about what the interviewee wants to convey, and in turn the scholar. Of course there are limitations with oral interviews, particularly in this study. The exceptional opportunity to collect oral data and conduct research in the archives in Senegal, however, has formed this historical account, born of a "relationship that exists between the evidence, its environment, and the researcher."⁶⁶ While I do not have many documented oral interviews in the text of the dissertation, my conversations in Senegal in 1998 and again in 2002-03 have formed a context in which to place written sources.

Unfortunately the sources have not allowed me to pursue much about women's participation in the communal politics of colonial Senegal.⁶⁷ Men were the voters, the politicians, the officials in the French administration, the leaders of Muslim communities, the veterans, and the "main interpreters of the documentation in the twentieth century."⁶⁸ I believe oral interviews may help capture important contributions only hinted at in the written record; I hope to

⁶⁵ Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985): 197-199.

⁶⁶ Janet Ewald, "Foxes in the Field: An Essay on a Historical Methodology," *African Studies Review* 30, 2 (June 1987), 10.

⁶⁷ Women did not obtain the right to vote in Senegal until 1947. See Saliou M'baye, *Histoire des institutions coloniales française en Afrique de l'Ouest, 1816-1960* (Dakar: Saint-Paul, 1991).

⁶⁸ David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 57.

[illegible]

pursue this approach in the future. The documents to which I had access did not reveal very much about the personal life or proclivities of Galandou Diouf, making it impossible to write a “true” biography. The limited information about Galandou Diouf available, however, far outweighs the material on Diouf’s constituency. I can only sketch his constituency’s composition, interests and attitudes by reading through the archival record, and attempting to find echoes of their voices in Diouf’s demands, programs and speeches.

The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One establishes the context, and contains the second and third chapters. The second chapter provides a framework for understanding the colonial and institutional history in Senegal and French West Africa; it also provides an account of the four communes. Chapter three provides an introduction to Galandou Diouf, and provides an analysis of Diouf’s early political career. Part Two includes chapters four, five, and six which cover Diouf’s time as Diagne’s lieutenant and the election of 1928, when Diouf ran against Diagne for the deputyship. The section concludes with Diouf’s years spent in opposition to Diagne’s deputyship, the colonial administration, and the Bordeaux commercial houses. Part Three analyzes Senegalese colonial politics from 1934-1941, which encompasses the 1934 deputy election, and Diouf’s subsequent career as Deputy until his death. The study ends with a concluding chapter.

This dissertation contributes to the field of African studies and French colonial history. The long-announced second volume of G. Wesley Johnson’s political history of colonial Senegal, which would have run from 1920-1945 or

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1960 has never been realized. By recreating and reevaluating the career of Galandou Diouf, this work provides a strong foundation for a narrative of that period, fulfilling a significant lacuna in the historiography of Senegal. This dissertation reveals an ambiguous, contradictory and engaged originaire contribution to the background of the independence movement. Breaking with received historiography, this dissertation does not base this movement mainly in Paris, but rather looks at it from an African milieu. This study is firmly rooted in the 'public sphere' of French colonial Senegal, and it reveals how political development occurred during the interwar period.

This dissertation moves towards better completing a history of the origins of modern Senegalese politics. By using the social theories of Pierre Bourdieu, I have attempted to explain the limits of agency and the intricacies of power in a colonial setting. This work aims to provide a model of symbolic capital projected by an African politician in a constrained political field, and demonstrates how symbolic capital can be created, increased, maintained or lost by local leaders in a colonial political context. By reevaluating the contributions of Galandou Diouf and his efficacy, or deficiencies, as a politician, I hope to recast Diouf as a major and independent political player in early twentieth-century Senegalese politics. Diouf's career and his coalition politics can help us understand the role political parties played in the decolonization process and the formation and efficacy of political parties in modern Senegal.

Part One

Chapter Two

The Changing Field of Colonial Politics in Senegal

In order to comprehend the politics of the four communes in the twentieth century, particularly between 1909 and 1941, it is important to have an understanding of colonial and institutional history in Senegal and in French West Africa. This is the field in which Galandou Diouf operated as a politician, and it shaped the accretion of his symbolic capital and the translation of that into political office. The early twentieth century marked a practice of intensifying colonial rule in Senegal. Centralization, rationalization, and secularization of the French bureaucracy, combined with the diminishing role of the military, budgetary constraints on the administration, and specialized services in the cultural and social spheres all contributed to this process.¹ The intensification of colonial rule and the strengthening of colonial authority did not go uncontested. Galandou Diouf's career in politics spans this time of opposition, accommodation and reassessment between colonial administrators and the inhabitants of Senegal—French, métis and African.

This chapter summarizes the emergence of the communes and their institutions under the Third Republic. It also tracks French presence in the form of conquest, colonial rule and a centralized administration in Senegal and French West Africa. From the 1890s, the administration made concerted efforts to weaken republican institutions in Senegal and in particular, the General Council.

¹ David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 71.




Figure 2.1 [Four Communes of Senegal; Saint-Louis, Dakar, Rufisque, and Gorée, from G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence*, 2.]

The Institutions in Senegal

From the beginning, colonial structure and the relationship between colonizer and colonized was differentiated in the four communes of Senegal, in part because of the age of the coastal colony. Originaire rights, however, were periodically expanded and then limited throughout colonial rule. This indicates that citizenship in the communes was “not so much a fixed status defined by law as a fluid site shaped by politics.”² It must be emphasized that France was a dominating, conquering and imperialistic power in the region. The conquest of Senegal and Mauritania occurred in incremental steps, and was presented to the metropolitan audience as a series of defensive responses to provocation. Conquest was done with an oft-divided and inconsistent leadership, both in the colony and in the métropole.³

The French colony of Senegal began as a series of coastal and river posts, with small hinterlands abutted. Conquest was not completed until the mid-1880s; a separate Ministry of the Colonies was not established until 1894. An important office in Paris during much of my time period was the Direction of Colonies. Governors, lieutenant governors, and commissioners stationed in Senegal reported to the Direction of Colonies, and if something was deemed important enough, the Direction moved it on to the Minister. Most governors were military officers, and they relied upon lower-level officials to provide knowledge of local situations.⁴ Many of these officials were métis or African

² Gary Wilder, *French Imperial Nation-State*, 129.

³ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 60.

originaires, and they were integral members of the communes' political landscape.

During the Third Republic, Senegal had three republican institutions—municipal councils, the General Council (later replaced by the Colonial Council), and the Deputy, who represented West African interests in Paris at the National Assembly. This gave Senegal some extent of self-determination. The electoral institutions of the four communes consisted of a mayor and city councils, which numbered fourteen to fifteen members. These municipal councils controlled certain aspects of city spending and possessed some local civil powers. The mayor had authority over police, health and other issues. By 1882 mayors and assistant mayors were directly elected. Businessmen and functionaries in Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis created political networks to mobilize voters and dispense patronage.⁵

Many of the most powerful members of the General Council held concurrent positions as mayors. Political alliances built by mayors and other city councilors were often deployed during General Council and deputyship elections. Mayors and their councils were in a good position to dispense political patronage and build strong patron/client relationships. This allowed them to increase their social and symbolic capital, and propelled them into national politics. At the same time, however, some politicians like Blaise Diagne first became national political figures, and their political partners were only later elected into municipal positions and General Council/Colonial Council seats. The party that controlled the deputyship often, but not always, controlled the legislative bodies in Senegal.

⁵ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 100.

Jean-Jacques Crespín, for example, was a perennially unsuccessful candidate for deputy in the late nineteenth century, but was elected to the General Council, the Saint-Louis municipal council, and was also mayor of Saint-Louis late in his career. Political corruption existed in Senegal with political clans and candidates making great promises and handing out money to win the vote, but the situation was not very different from most parts of Europe and North America at the time.⁶

After 1918, communal mayors were forced to abandon their authority over matters of hygiene, police and water supply to civil servants designated by the lieutenant-governor. A decree of 25 January 1927 applied the same rule to Rufisque. Communal independence began to recede. A decree of 21 October 1924 organized the *Territoire de Dakar et dépendances*, equipped with a self-government in control of the area's budget. However, in Gorée as well as in Dakar and its neighborhoods, a representative of the governor general controlled all the municipal services, except when the governor himself made decisions. This representative was usually the Governor of the Colonies.⁷ In 1926 a local decree was passed that instituted a Senegalese police force, theoretically placed under mayoral control when communal police forces were involved. In reality, the Senegalese police force was controlled by the governor general.⁸ The French administration had also taken over the Banque du Sénégal, which was originally established to give Africans more economic options and some freedom from the monopolies of the Bordeaux interests.

⁶ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 99.

⁷ *Le Périscope Africain*, 29 June 1935.

⁸ Henri Jacques Légier, "Institutions municipales et Politique coloniale: les Communes du Sénégal," *Revue Française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 55, 201 (1968): 433.

The decline of the General Council's influence followed a similar pattern. The General Council had some real powers over the budget and expenditures for the colony, which were to become important for the period of Senegalese development after 1880. The General Council was expected to play a bigger role in colonial politics than the municipal councils, but there were safeguards to limit the council's power over the administration.⁹ The members of the General Council were elected by an electoral college composed of those eligible to vote in municipal elections. The governor and later the governor general had supervisory authority over the conduct of the elections; voting was delayed and elected officials were suspended, but the process itself was never stopped.

Members of the Council in Senegal also had to be able to speak, read, and write French fluently. Clearly this disqualified many African originaires from seeking office, since the majority of African citizens in the communes were illiterate; however, any male who had lived in the communes for five years was eligible to vote.¹⁰ The Council could only make real executive decisions for Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar; the areas that made up the Protectorate were outside of their direct influence. This stipulation reflected the realpolitik of France's limited ability to exercise authority in the countryside. However, the

⁹ For example, the Governor of Senegal could enforce the collection and payment of existing taxes if the General Council did not vote enough taxes to pay for the regular functioning of crucial services. The supposed reason: to protect the rights of those who lived in a heterogeneous Senegal and to keep the Council from holding the local administration ransom. See Idowu, "Assimilation," 197. The French had also learned from their West Indian colonies that allowing Colonial Councils to control customs duties and municipal taxes (which were known as *octroi de mer*) could be disastrous. Therefore, the February 1879 decree gave the *conseil general* in Senegal not the power to take certain decisions, but the right to express its views on how customs duties should be set and to discuss the *octroi de mer*.

¹⁰ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 99.

council's power to vote on direct taxes concerned the entire colony, although only citizens from the communes were allowed to hold seats.¹¹

Even though the General Council was a colonial institution, it was influential not only because its members helped manage local affairs, but also because they also helped shape public opinion. Some councilors were politically aggressive and it was common to find the council criticizing the administration. Most members of the council, including Frenchmen, believed it to be an important institution that counterbalanced the weight of the colonial administration. In the late nineteenth century, Saint-Louisiens dominated the General Council and came to think of it as their own realm and employed it as a means of checking the power of the administration. As Hyacinthe Devès proclaimed in 1903, "The duty of the General Council is to exercise its control by criticism; by public debate conducted with moderation, politeness, and benevolence, but also with the weight of the responsibility we have assumed in relation to the voters."¹² The General Council was a thorn in the administration's side for an extended period of time, particularly in the late nineteenth century.

Most councilors realized that a less liberal policy would appear without the Council's existence. They fought hard against the colonial administration's attempts to abolish the General Council or strip it of most of its powers between 1900 and 1920. The General Council was the métis communities' most effective

¹¹ H.O. Idowu, "The Conseil Général in Senegal, 1879-1920" (PhD diss., University of Ibadan, 1966), 70-76.

¹² Idowu, "Assimilation," 205. Original text as follows: C'est un devoir pour lui [le conseil général] d'exercer son contrôle par la critique, par la discussion publique conduite avec modération, courtoisie et bienveillance, mais avec le sentiment des responsabilités que nous avons assumées vis-à-vis des électeurs.

political instrument, and the transformation of the General Council into the Colonial Council in 1920 was indicative of the eclipse of métis influence and the ebbing power of Saint-Louis in relation to Dakar.¹³ It was also indicative of French success in consolidating and limiting originaire involvement in civil society and colonial government.

In 1920 a new Colonial Council was inaugurated by the Decree of 4 December 1920. This was the culmination of several different interests. Diagne and other councilors favored it because it was an opportunity to allow Africans in the Protectorate a voice. Liberal French administrators preferred the creation of a new council for the same reason; to bring Protectorate Africans into politics. Governor General Martial Merlin pushed for the new council because he thought it might restrict the power of the urban elite in Senegal. Merlin had worked in West Africa in the early 1890s and developed the system of chiefs in the Protectorate. The Colonial Council gave greater representation to these chiefs from the Protectorate than communal citizens.¹⁴ In addition, appointed chiefs generally voted as instructed by administrators. This new council created a shift in the balance of power in the electoral institution.

Originaires argued that the French had achieved their goal of suppressing the power of the General Council and eliminating the interference of urban

¹³ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 101.

¹⁴ The new Colonial Council was comprised of forty-four members representing the communes and the Protectorate. Citizens of the communes elected eighteen of those representatives to the council, while the favored *chefs du canton* and *chefs du province* of the various regions chose twenty-six members to represent their interests.

representatives in the affairs of the colony.¹⁵ Elections for the new Council were held quickly, in June 1921. Not surprisingly, Diagne's party was victorious again. Thiécouta Diop and other Wolof from Saint-Louis broke with Diagne and formed an opposition list that achieved little success in the election. After the election, the Diagnist propaganda spun the Colonial Council's creation into a victory. Diagne claimed that the colony was no longer divided, and one region would no longer dominate the Council.

As the colonial regime successfully limited the influence of legislative institutions in Senegal, the deputyship retained its significance and independent function. At the same time what a deputy could accomplish in early twentieth-century Senegal was constrained. How do we judge a deputy's career as a success or a failure? This dissertation seeks to answer the questions vis-à-vis the ambiguous accomplishments of Galandou Diouf.

The deputy was elected to the French National Assembly in Paris, and was chosen by every eligible voter in all four communes. This position was the most visible of the Republican institutions; deputies were elected every four years. The Deputyship was the prize plum of all elected offices. The deputy spent a large part of his year in France, at the Chamber of Deputies in Paris. Some deputies also spent time in Bordeaux to interact with the large and important commercial firms involved in West Africa. These financial agencies

¹⁵ Ruth Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Clarendon Press, 1964), 127.

were very interested in the deputyship, and tried to make sure the deputy was sympathetic to their financial interests.¹⁶

The Bordeaux commercial interests had long been intimately involved with the political and economic system of Senegal. Bordeaux was the main port for freight and passenger ships going back and forth between France and West Africa. In the nineteenth century, Bordeaux merchants expanded into the local gum trade on the Senegal River at the expense of Senegalese traders, both métis and African. Members of the General Council accused the Bordeaux merchants of having no real interest in local affairs, desiring only profit to themselves. For example, in the nineteenth century, Bordeaux merchants had been able to set election dates in Senegal at a time when most Saint-Louisien traders were up the river, and thus not present to participate in elections. Bordeaux interests often coincided with administrative interests, but not always. Bordeaux merchants were often rich and powerful, as were those attached to them, and they did not always agree with directives from the métropole.

Most successful politicians running for deputy in Senegal had some backing from Bordeaux networks; Galandou Diouf had worked for a merchant house before entering politics and was strongly supported by Bordeaux money at the beginning of his career. Twentieth-century African politicians used Bordeaux influence and money in a variety of ways. But there could be a cost. Blaise Diagne was accused of selling out to Bordeaux interests, and his symbolic capital eroded amongst the African voters in Dakar. Not even his patronage networks could remove the stain Diagne suffered from his close association with the

¹⁶ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 100.

Bordeaux merchants. If heavy cooperation with Bordeaux interests could be politically risky, so could alienating them. Galandou Diouf was almost driven into bankruptcy by the Bordeaux interests.

The System of Justice

An important site of colonial contestation was the judicial system in Senegal. Three types of justice systems operated in nineteenth-century Senegal: French Civil law, Muslim law, and the indigénat. The French system operated in the communes, and originaires found the French Civil Code much less capricious than the autocratic decisions handed down by colonial administrators or native courts in the Protectorate. French codes in Senegal were modified, when necessary, to suit the local conditions, but were officiated by professional courts of justice modeled closely upon existing courts in France.¹⁷

Africans in the communes could choose to have their cases heard under Muslim law instead of in the French legal system. A Muslim tribunal was established in Saint-Louis by the decree of 20 May 1857; this allowed Muslims to be judged under Islamic law instead of the French Civil Code.¹⁸ The tribunal was officiated by a *qadi*, a Muslim judge, an assessor (who acted for the *qadi* when

¹⁷ As early as 7 January 1822, an act was established for creating a regular judicial system in Senegal. This act set up a Court of First Instance -- *tribunal de première instance* and an Appeal Court in Saint-Louis as well as maintained a Court of First Instance already established in Gorée. A *chef de service judiciaire* heard the Appeal courts which had original jurisdiction over larger claims. This *chef* was appointed by the ministry and as such did not come directly under the authority of the governor. See D. Robinson, *Paths*, 64. The appeals court was eventually transferred to Dakar in 1903 as part of the centralization program of the colonial government.

¹⁸ Idowu, "Assimilation," 199.

he was not available) and a court-clerk. Faidherbe's conception of the *qadi*, however, was not exactly what the Muslim community of Saint-Louis had in mind. They wanted a *qadi* who would be a sort of Muslim mayor, but Faidherbe wanted loyal, progressive judges from influential families, hand-picked by the administration.¹⁹ Christelow suggests that the simultaneous existence of a French judge and a *qadi* in the four communes may be viewed as an aspect in the development of a peculiar hybrid, the French colonial-Muslim city, since their presence represents two contrasting principles of urban social and political organization.²⁰

In the Protectorate the indigenous justice system and its concomitant, the *indigénat*, operated. Many members of the General Council were very concerned with the justice system in the Protectorate. Councilor Georges Crespin condemned the *indigénat* in 1913:

In the system of native justice there is no scale for penalties; nor is there a distinction made between a small offence and a serious crime; the punishments are arbitrary and excessive; the defendant cannot call up or provide witnesses or evidence, he cannot be attended by a lawyer, nor

¹⁹ During the nineteenth century *qadis* of Saint-Louis were men like Ahmadou Hamet and Bou El Moghdad, who were also sometimes colonial interpreters or emissaries.

²⁰ Allan Christelow, "The Muslim Judge and Municipal Politics in Colonial Algeria and Senegal," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, 1 (January 1982): 3. The court system in Senegal was reformed with the establishment of a uniform judicial policy with the decree of 10 November 1903, part of Roume's efforts to centralize and unify the colonies. The Muslim courts of Saint-Louis and Dakar were eliminated, since only French courts from this point on were to have jurisdiction in the four communes. This occurred as the African vote was becoming more and more important to successful candidates in municipal elections. The European mayors of Dakar and Saint-Louis extolled the *qadi* system, and less than two months after the ruling, Muslim courts were officially reinstated at Dakar and Saint-Louis, as well as at Kayes. The *qadi* was an important political influence because his recommendation could 'deliver' the votes of originaires. This is part of pattern of the importance of religious leaders upon politics in colonial Senegal.

even an agent of his own choice.²¹

Men like Crespín did not want to be subject to the native justice system when they were in the Protectorate. The governor controlled the Muslim tribunal and *indigénat* system which was directly governed by decree from a local administrative officer.²² Originaires fiercely protected their right to be tried under the French justice system even if they were traveling in the Protectorate. This was threatened by the decree of 12 August 1912 that proclaimed originaires would from henceforth be subject to the *indigénat* if they were in the Protectorate.

Ponty's decree of 1912 stated that only Africans complying with its detailed requirements were considered citizens; otherwise, originaires had limited rights.²³ For originaires, this was a step backwards forty years into the past. M'Baye's imprisonment had brought home to originaires the possible implications of this decree; originaires were now more alert to the need to protect their rights.²⁴ The 1912 decree made Africans' citizenship rights dependent solely

²¹ L'A.O.F., no. 247 of 8 November 1913. In French: Dans la justice indigène il n'y a ni échelle de pénalité, ni distinction entre le délit et le crime ; les peines sont arbitraires et excessives ; le justiciable ne peut ni appeler ni se pourvoir, il ne peut pas se faire assister d'un avocat, ni même d'un mandataire de son choix.

²² Robinson, *Paths*, 261. See footnote 27.

²³ William Ponty issued the order that was promulgated on 25 May 1912. The order stated that the accession of indigenous peoples of French West Africa to the status of French citizen had to be an individual act, instead of predicated upon place, in other words, where an African was born. The applicant was supposed to prove devotion to French interests, to know how to read and write French, and to have a stable means of support and lead a clean life. See James Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 19; Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics*, 84; Conklin, *A Mission*, 151-54.

²⁴ Mody M'Baye was an originaire born in Saint-Louis in 1871, and an influential critic of the colonial administration. He worked in Tivouane as a public letter writer. He was an advocate of French rule, and worked closely with François Carpot. He was also close friends with Galandou Diouf. In 1913, M'Baye faced colonial wrath when he criticized the administrator of Kaolack in print. When M'Baye later traveled to Kaolack, the administrator, Paul Brocard, put him in jail under the statue of the *indigénat* system. M'Baye mobilized his network of supporters, particularly Galandou Diouf, and quickly

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upon place; they were not individually held since someone could lose those rights in the Protectorate. The uproar in the originaire population was so intense that it prompted the colonial government to annul the 1912 decree within two years. In his presentation of the annulment, Albert Lebrun, Minister of Colonies, recognized that a 'certain emotion' was evident in the four communes.

The French succeeded in exerting more control over Africans living in the Protectorate. As a partial response to this, the influence of Islam and Islamic leaders on the African population, both rural and urban, increased. A growing number of marabouts, Muslim religious leaders, were gaining influence and power in the Protectorate as the authority of traditional chiefs declined. The population of the four communes exploded as peanut cultivation prospered, particularly in Dakar and Rufisque. Dakar was named as capital of French West Africa. Villages such as Tivouane, Thiès, Ziguinchor, Diourbel, and Kaolack were transformed from villages into regional urban capitals. The French struggled with how to administer these new places and came up with *communes mixtes*, or mixed communes, which had an administrator for mayor, with partially appointed and elected municipal councils.

In the next couple of sections, I provide an overview of the four *communes de plein exercice* in order to locate identities of politicians operating in colonial Senegal. The communes' boundaries were porous and flexible, and their internal constitution shifted as colonial agents tried to demarcate spaces as more

secured his release from Governor General Ponty. He then sued Brocard over abrogating his rights. His case quickly became a large test of whether or not originaires were to be treated as French citizens outside of the geographic boundaries of the communes. See David Robinson, *Paths*, 134-36 and G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence*, 136-37, 147.

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'African' or 'European.' Certainly the communes were not 'actors' in the sense people are agents, but originaires often defined themselves in relationship to one of the communes. Galandou Diouf's career reflects, to a certain extent, the shifting relationship between the colonial government, European merchants, and originaires.

Diouf was born in Saint-Louis, and his ancestors were prominent in the area. As Rufisque gained in commercial importance, Diouf followed the opportunities and settled in Rufisque, building a family and business connections. Dakar, however, was superseding both Rufisque and Saint-Louis in terms of political and economic significance. As a result, Diouf consistently held meetings, campaigns and rallies in Dakar. Although he never owned a house in Dakar, Diouf often stayed there, and his political base was as important in Dakar as it was Rufisque.

In a recent article, Gregory Mann argues that cities can be a unit of analysis that illuminates broad questions, and yet still allows the richness of individual stories to unfold in a particular site.²⁵ Focusing on specific groups and individual Africans living in cities without evaluating the physical spaces in which they lived ignores the essential element of city living.²⁶ David Harvey points out that individuals and groups constantly invest spaces and identities with value and what he calls "permanences," which organize and direct social life.²⁷ The

²⁵ Gregory Mann, "Locating Colonial Histories: Between France and West Africa," *The American Historical Review* April 2005

<<http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/110.2/mann.html>> (30 Jul. 2009).

²⁶ Lynn Schler, "Ambiguous Spaces: the Struggle over African Identities and Urban Communities in Colonial Doula, 1914-45," *Journal of African History* 44 (2003): 51.

²⁷ David Harvey, *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, 7-8.

historian's task, then, is to uncover the process through which certain spaces take on value.

Civil Society in the Communes

Part the urban population's participation occurred in the realm of civil society. I discuss whether a colonial state can have a civil society in other places. I am following the work of David Robinson, and dividing civil society into two arenas, the 'public sphere' and the 'private sphere'.²⁸ The public sphere refers to the electoral institutions in the four communes created and maintained by France. Social, educational, and religious organizations and institutions make up the private sphere. And it was in the private sphere that politicians and parties organized their networks, their meetings, and disseminated their rhetoric. Both spheres could work with or resist the French colonial administration and the military.

The inhabitants of the four communes were able to launch from this civil society effectively enough to change some aspects of colonial rule—this was one of the reasons the French administrators of Senegal and the AOF worked to reduce the powers of the electoral institutions in the four communes. Electoral politics, rhetoric of African politicians and cooperation from Africans permitted them to have a say in colonial affairs. Africans participated in colonial rule; with participation came a certain acceptance of the legitimacy of these institutions. At the same time this thin hegemony was complex because these institutions also became a site of resistance, sometimes overt and sometimes passive.

²⁸See David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, chapter five.

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Resistance often occurred inside an accepted colonial framework, but the French took those challenges seriously. The amount of French surveillance and record keeping on events such as political meetings reflects colonial uneasiness about the up and coming role originaires played in communal politics in the twentieth century.

Networks of civil society provided opportunities for Africans, métis and French to gather resources and pursue collective goals. Newspapers figured large in the civil society landscape. Several newspapers operated at various times in colonial Rufisque, for example: *L'Echo de Rufisque*, *La Vérité*, *Le Phare du Sénégal*, *La Voix de Rufisque*, *Le Progressiste*, *La Résistance*. Newspapers would sometimes document the political maneuverings in the communes. The newspapers did not operate in a free civil society, however, and their production was often censored by the colonial regime. Newspapers were forced to go underground, and their doors closed. Some reading material from the métropole and other colonies was contraband in Senegal. Newspaper production was intermittent; as was typical in coercive colonial regimes. Although much of the population of the four communes was not literate, when newspapers were available, they were often read aloud to others, so communities would share content.

Religious practices and associations were an important part of the private sphere in Senegal. Christianity took a unique form in the four communes, in that the Church did not proselytize as part of an agreement with the French administration. The Church was under the leadership of the Congregation of the

Holy Ghost and the Sacred Heart of Mary and the Ploërmel Brothers in Saint-Louis.²⁹ The church community encompassed a physical space as well, as a medical clinic and several schools were attached. In the mid-nineteenth century, many slaves converted to Christianity after the decree of 1848. The priest in Gorée translated and printed the catechism in Wolof, and used this language to deliver the Christian message.³⁰

Another important religious community was Islam and Muslim brotherhoods. Muslims maintained a distinct cultural identity, particularly those who were educated; this was due in part to their Quranic education and their ability to read and write in Arabic. It should not necessarily be perceived that religion was a dividing force, however. The festival of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary in Saint-Louis would be organized by Christian *métis*, but would include Europeans and Muslims. Everyone would wear their best clothing the day of the procession, floats were paraded down the street, and it became a grand event for both Christians and Muslims by the eighteenth century. Marcson argues that this sort of event was an indication of the development of a social group that shared kinship, social rankings, internal self-government, distinctive culture, and a common role in the economy.³¹ While this may be true, Islam for *originaire* adherents was not just a religion, but was also their primary cultural expression.

²⁹ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 101.

³⁰ Abbé Pierre D. Boilat, *Esquisses Sénégalaises* (1853), 18-19.

³¹ Michael David Marcson, "European-African Interaction in the Precolonial Period: Saint Louis, Senegal, 1758-1854" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1976), 45.

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Other originaires were secularists; this group often included French civilian and military personnel who were hostile to the Catholic church. A few métis families joined this group. It is unclear what relationship these secularists had to Masonic orders that existed in Senegal in the nineteenth century; they were forced to operate in the shadows. The Masonic *Union Sénégalaise* was re-established in 1881 in Saint-Louis with the approval of the city council. Saint-Louis was not the only city to have a lodge; the *Etoile Occidentale* was established in Dakar in 1893.³² It is hard to know the real influence these Masonic lodges carried. Governor General William Ponty was a member, the powerful Devès métis family belonged, and of course Blaise Diagne had significant links to the Masons.

Communal Population

One may hear the saying in Senegal, "There are no people called the Wolof. Wolof is a language. If you speak Wolof, then you are Wolof." Of course this is not quite the case, but the close connection between urban areas in Senegal and Wolof has become well documented.³³ The four communes were situated among Wolof speaking populations, and those who migrated from the interior almost automatically learned Wolof in Saint-Louis, Rufisque, or Dakar. Migrants learned Wolof and adopted Islam as part of their quest for upward

³² Robinson, *Paths*, 103.

³³ See Fiona McLaughlin, "Dakar Wolof and the Configuration of an Urban Identity," *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 14, 2 (December 2001): 153-172; Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *Symbolic Confrontations: Muslims Imagining the State in Africa* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2003) and Leigh Swigart, "Cultural Creolisation and Language Use in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Senegal," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 64, 2 (1994): 175-189.

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mobility.³⁴ Galandou Diouf used Wolof in his political rallies, in his personal communications, and sometimes in his speeches. His supporters also employed Wolof at those same rallies and in others.

Using Wolof instead of French could be a political choice. Clearly French remained the privileged language of politicians and French administrators. Wolof was the language of collusion and of evasion, the language in which orders were most effectively circumvented.³⁵ Diouf was renowned for using colloquialisms and Wolof sayings in his speech, whether it was for private or public consumption. When a scholar attempts to define a Wolof ethnicity, he or she is confronted with a great deal of ambiguity. Informants find it difficult to specify who can be identified as a Wolof, or even whether they, themselves, are Wolof.³⁶ There seemed to be no fixed ethnic boundaries, no lines of battle drawn up by colonial experience.³⁷ It is difficult to generalize about the Wolof; their culture spanned a large range, from small rural villages to important commercial middle men with roots deep in old Saint-Louis. Wolof from the Saint-Louis area fought with the French in colonial wars of conquest, while Wolof from Cayor and Baol resisted French incursions.³⁸

Wolof society was based on a hierarchical system very similar to other systems throughout the region; there were basically three classes: *geer*,

³⁴ Robinson, *Paths*, 33.

³⁵ Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *Symbolic Confrontations*, 130.

³⁶ L. Villalón, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 49.

³⁷ Cruise O'Brien, *Symbolic Confrontations*, 122.

³⁸ For more information, see James Searing, 'God Alone is King': *Islam and Emancipation in Senegal. The Wolof Kingdoms of Kaolack and Bawol, 1859-1914* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002) and Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

nyeenyo and *jam*. *Geer* (nobles) for Wolof includes every one of both sexes who supposedly does not have a trace of *jam* or *nyeenyo* blood.³⁹ *Nyeenyo* was the term used to refer to people who had a profession or occupational specialization and referred primarily to artisans.⁴⁰ The third class was referred to as *jam*, the Wolof word for slave.

The Lebou were the original settlers of the area around Rufisque and Dakar.⁴¹ They opposed French enculturation by refusing to send their children to Catholic or state schools and by refusing to serve as auxiliaries in the French administration. As a result, their Wolof and Toucouleur neighbors monopolized jobs in trade and commerce.⁴² Most Lebou remained illiterate and under the rule of the *diambours*, the guardians of tradition. Many *diambours* accepted favors from the French and at election time these traditional leaders would distribute rice and sugar in their precincts in return for voting promises. In 1914 they were

³⁹ This includes everyone from the royal princes to the lowest peasant (*baadoolo*). There are further divisions, of course, within the *Geer*. *Garmi* refers to the high class of nobles who have the right of ascendancy to the throne of the traditional kingdom of Waalo; *tany garmi* were persons having noble blood through their mother only and thus were not eligible for the throne of Waalo; *kangam* were at the bottom of the royal family, and were eligible to be chiefs of large territories or villages and could help choose a new king; *dom i bur* usually referred to those persons who were a product of a marriage between a prince and captive woman. See Michael T. Coolen, "The Wolof Xalam Tradition of the Senegambia," *Ethnomusicology* 27, 3 (September 1983): 477-498, specifically 482-3.

⁴⁰ These categories were the *jef-lek*, those engaged in a trade that provided their living such as smiths and jewelers, leather workers, weavers, etc. *Sab-lek* referred to those that made their living through music. *Baw-lek* referred to a group of Wolof that included all those who devoted themselves to the art of "buffoonery".

⁴¹ The Lebou lived in close-knit communities where they tended to practice fishing. In the eighteenth century the Lebou had gained independence from the Wolof states to the north and founded the "Lebou Republic." This Republic was an Islamic theocracy that was amalgamated with traditional social organizations. Although the Lebou spoke in a Wolof dialect, they defended their Cape Verde peninsula from the Wolof to the north and the Serer to the south before the French arrived.

⁴² G.W. Johnson, "Beginnings of African Politics," 241.

ready for change, however. The Lebou held a lot of voting power since they made up a significant proportion of African originaires in Rufisque and Dakar.

Matriculation into the status of 'originaire' was a process. Migration to the cities was not just change of location; it was a process of acculturation to urban habits and values. Originaires had developed an identity that included specific ways of appropriating space, architectural productions, the organization of eating habits and styles, and ways of perfuming, clothing, and accessorizing. Migrants were also sometimes introduced to new religious practices. Local practices by both newcomers and originaires shaped Islamic and Christian professions and practices of faith. Migrants coming to the communes from the Protectorate usually spent years living in huts on the periphery of the town, and some never moved further into the center of the city. Residence and a job in the commune often only came with some of the trappings of assimilation and increased status.⁴³ It was a rare migrant who did not change in response to a new urban environment. The migrant was separated from those in the Protectorate, not only by space and time, but also by law.

Originaires developed a specific social identity that was rooted in geographic location, family histories, and religion. Many originaires retained their African identity and did not wholly adopt French customs or *mentalité*. Mamadou Diouf argues that a large component of originaire identity derived from their

⁴³ John Hargreaves, "Assimilation in Eighteenth-Century Senegal," *The Journal of African History* 6,2 (1965), 177-80 and Johnson, "The Emergence," 23-24. Robinson points out that Africans could become clerks or interpreters after learning French. See *Paths*, 33.

imagined and real “special status” within the colony of Senegal.⁴⁴ Part of that special status came from the political rights and limited citizenship rights that originaires enjoyed.⁴⁵

Some migrants to the communes were never accorded originaire status, however, like the Lebanese living in Senegal’s cities. The Lebanese first came to Dakar at the end of the nineteenth century when their ships were routed from Marseilles to Dakar on their way to the Americas.⁴⁶ In French West Africa there were only 28 Lebanese in 1897. Their numbers grew rapidly as they successfully engaged in the retail trade and the purchase of export crops. In 1900 their numbers had reached 276, there were 1,110 in 1909 and by 1929 there were over three thousand Lebanese merchants in West Africa.⁴⁷ In 1933,

⁴⁴ Mamdou Diouf, “The French Colonial Policy,” 77.

⁴⁵ Due to the growth patterns of Rufisque, and especially Dakar, it becomes clear that these communes were shaped by migration. Migrants came from various areas and different ethnic groups. It would be a mistake to believe the African population in any of the four communes was homogeneous. As an example, let us use Dakar right after World War II. Wolof inhabitants made up the majority of the population, at forty-three percent. Halpulaaren (or Tokolor) made up thirteen percent of the African population, and Fulani and Sereer, and to a lesser extent, Bambara, were also represented. The commune also held people hailing from Cape Verde and Mauritania. See Raymond Betts, “Dakar: Ville Impériale (1857-1960),” in *Colonial Cities*, ed. Robert J. Ross and Gerard J. Telkamp (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 203.

⁴⁶ For more information on the colonial French administration’s role in Lebanese migration to Senegal, see Mara Leichtman, “The Legacy of Transnational Lives: Beyond the First Generation of Lebanese in Senegal,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, 4 (July 2005): 663-686. For historic accounts of Lebanese in Senegal, see Said Boumedouha, *The Lebanese in Senegal: A History of the Relationship Between an Immigrant Community and its French and African Rulers*, PhD Thesis, Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, October 1987; also by Boumedouha, “Adjustment to West African Realities: The Lebanese in Senegal,” *Africa* 60, 4 (1990): 538-49. See also Boutros Labaki, “L’émigration libanaise en Afrique Occidentale sud-saharienne,” *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 9, 2 (1993): 91-112.

⁴⁷ Michael Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule*, 294.

the Lebanese population just in Dakar numbered 1,389.⁴⁸ Lebanese concentration in Dakar reflected a general population pattern throughout Senegal in the early twentieth century.

The following table reflects total growth of the four communes from 1865 to 1921.

Table 2.1 *Population in the Four Communes, 1865-1921*

Commune	1865	1878	1910	1921
Saint-Louis	15,000	15,980	22,093	17,493
Gorée	3,000	3,243	1,306	917
Rufisque	300	1,173	12,457	11,106
Dakar	300	1,566	24,914	30,037

[Source: ANS 27 G 237 (108), from census reports.]

The Communes

Saint-Louis had a sense of uniqueness and individuality. It could be argued that one cannot completely understand the history of modern Senegal

⁴⁸ Raymond Betts, "Dakar: Ville Impériale," 203. Betts uses the term 'Syrians,' but I have changed it to Lebanese based upon M. Leichtman's comments in "Legacy." These immigrants from the Levant were occasionally targeted by the colonial state. Authorities in Saint-Louis blamed thirty-five Lebanese peddlers for spreading yellow fever in the area by buying and selling contaminated clothes previously used by people who became victims of yellow fever. They were ordered to submit to medical examination and issued identity cards in order to control their movement. See Kalala Ngalamulume, "Keeping the City Totally Clean: Yellow Fever and the Politics of Prevention in Colonial Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal, 1850-1914," *Journal of African History* 45 (2004), 197. Prior to the conclusion of WWI, the Province of Syria belonging to the Ottoman Empire included all of present-day Lebanon and Syria. Colonial officials called all emigrants from this province 'Syrians' without distinction, but most were actually from Lebanon proper. After WWI, the former Province of Syria was divided by France into two administrative units: Syria and Lebanon. See M. Leichtman, "Legacy," 664-65.

without understanding the sense of apartness the inhabitants of the city felt.⁴⁹ At the turn of the century many Saint-Louisiens began to move into the Protectorate or into the new towns along the railway. These African merchants made up the class of notable Saint-Louisiens, who referred to themselves as the “good families” of the town. They acted as cross cultural brokers who developed a strong Muslim identity around three Saint-Louis institutions: the main mosque in the northern part of the commune, the Tribunal Musulman, and the Muslim educational system.⁵⁰



Figure 2.2 [The mosque in northern Saint-Louis, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

⁴⁹ Johnson, “Emergence,” 36.

⁵⁰ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 120.




Figure 2.3 [Map of Saint-Louis at the end of the Nineteenth Century, D. Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 32.]

Muslim Saint-Louisiens possessed a distinctive identity that was reflected in their dress and manner. Regardless of where they traveled, they were urban Muslims, the “sons of Ndar.” These Muslims negotiated French authority, and often acted at the boundaries of French rule as mediators and diplomats. By the end of the nineteenth century Saint-Louis was recognized as possessing a distinctive Islamic culture and reputation.⁵¹

The tensions between the cities’ heterogeneous population resulted in a physical manifestation—the organization of public space. The nineteenth century Muslim community in Saint-Louis desired a plot across from the Catholic church to challenge its domination of space in the southern part of the island. In the first

⁵¹ Ibid., 121.

part of the nineteenth century, wealthy métis had completed a church in the Christian southern quarter of Saint-Louis to demarcate that space as centrally organized around a Christian ethic.



Figure 2.4 [The South-East 'European' section of Saint-Louis, including a view of the Catholic church, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

In Gorée, where the Muslim population was a minority, the mosque was very small and discrete, with its back facing the sea, almost invisible and out of place.⁵² In Dakar and Rufisque, on the other hand, whose populations were predominately Muslim, the mosque was at the center of the social space's composition.

⁵² Diouf, "French Colonial Policy," 78.




Figure 2.5 [The mosque in Rufisque, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

If these monuments and their stories are used as a device, they can be tools to analyze what their presence says about place.⁵³

The names of spaces also indicate a colonial inscription. One look at the names of places in the communes during the inter-war period reveals the symbols the communes' inhabitants shared.⁵⁴ The names were evocative of 'mythical pasts' of French heroes, like Governor Faidherbe. The bridge connecting the island of Saint-Louis with the mainland is called Pont Faidherbe.

⁵³ See Mann's work on war memorials in, "Locating Colonial Histories."

⁵⁴ For an analysis of how the *pieds noirs* in Algeria tried to foster settler unity through shared symbols such as street names, see David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920* (Cambridge: University Press, 1990).

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Figure 2.6 [Pont Faidherbe in Saint-Louis, Senegal, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

The town square at Saint-Louis was named after Governor Faidherbe as well. There were streets named after religious figures and romantic heroes of popular culture. The streets had names like Repentigny, Anne-Marie Javouhey, Blanchot, Pierre Loti, Jean Mermoz, Brière de l'Isle (which was renamed Marie Parsine Abdoulaye Seck Street).⁵⁵ The names of places introduced French names into conversational repertoire, even for non-speakers of French, and served as a very physical reminder of who 'ruled' the earth upon which they lived, traded, and built.

Saint-Louisiens lived in colonially modified spaces, but they developed networks, with which they tended to perpetuate their influence. When a new job came open in the administration, for example, a Saint-Louisien already employed

⁵⁵ Anne-Marie Javouhey was a French nun who founded the Sisters of Saint Joseph of Cluny who conducted mission work in Senegal, the Gambia and French Guiana, for example. Jean Mermoz was a gifted pilot who flew routes to West Africa. One of his planes crashed in the Sahara desert in 1926 and he was taken hostage by a group of Tuareg. He went down at sea in 1936.

there would use their influence to get a family member or clan member appointed. The same was true in civilian careers.⁵⁶ Galandou Diouf was from such a family. He was born in Saint-Louis 14 September 1875. His father, John, was an originaire and merchant who had converted to Islam. Diouf's family was part of the indigenous commercial bourgeoisie and was allied with the great Bordeaux commercial houses. His mother came from a "grand family of notables." His grandfather volunteered and suffered wounds during his service with Faidherbe.⁵⁷ Diouf's father died in the Mamadou Lamine episode of 1885-6 in Bakel. This brutal encounter imbued survivors and victims' families with a stronger sense of Saint-Louis identity, dependency on the French, and commitment to colonial rule.⁵⁸

Although Saint-Louis would continue to hold a significant place in Senegalese imagination, it would be eclipsed by Dakar as a commercial and political center. Rufisque held an important place in the peanut economy of Senegal. After the Franco-Prussian war, merchants and investors, particularly of the big commercial houses in France, demonstrated a renewed interest in Senegal. They chose Rufisque as their base of operations.⁵⁹ One of the most important economic features Rufisque possessed was its wharfs. The harbor area was also dominated by huge rectangular warehouses, owned by

⁵⁶ Johnson, *The Emergence*, 36.

⁵⁷ Mamadou Daillo, "Galandou Diouf: Homme politique sénégalais 1875-1941" (*Memoire de maitrise*, Université de Dakar, 1972), 18.

⁵⁸ Mamadou Lamine Drame was a Soninke pilgrim of Tijaniyya affiliation who put Bakel under a siege in early April 1886. The French captain of the fort recruited Muslim merchants from Saint-Louis, who were there to conduct business. At least sixty-four people in Bakel were killed in four days, and ninety-seven were wounded. See David Robinson, *Paths*, 132-33.

⁵⁹ André Villard, *Histoire du Sénégal* (Dakar, 1943), 164-165.

subsidiaries of the huge Bordeaux and Marseilles firms, specifically Vézia, Maurel et Prom, Devès et Chaumet, Delmas.




Figure 2.7 [The port of Rufisque, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

In the middle of the 1920s, however, the harbor system of Rufisque began to experience its first difficulties. With the construction of a better harbor in Dakar, merchants and administrators were reluctant to invest any more major capital into Rufisque's system. Just as Rufisque was basking in its golden days as a colonial commercial center, Paris announced their intention to make Dakar the main port of Senegal, but businesses could not move overnight. Thus, even though Dakar had superior ports to Rufisque, it was not until the 1920s that the economic balance of power shifted from Rufisque to Dakar.⁶⁰

Dakar began as a French settlement in 1857, when a small band of Frenchmen crossed the water separating Gorée Island from the mainland.

⁶⁰ Johnson, *Emergence*, 32.

Dakar's growth was meant to be planned on a grid pattern even before substantial settlement began. The chief military engineer on Gorée, Emile Pinet-Laprade, designed the grid to take advantage of the north-south currents of air.⁶¹ Despite the grand plans, Dakar remained static during the first half century of its existence, even though the location had long been recognized as one of Africa's best natural ports. Its development had to wait for proper infrastructure, such as railroads and roads, and a production for export. Indeed until the turn of the century visitors remarked upon Dakar's miserable accommodations, shabby wooden buildings, and filthy streets. When Dakar's growth did begin, it developed so quickly that the city expanded without any large-scale urban planning.

After World War I, Dakar was called an "imperial city" by the French. It served as a location through which imperial authority, commerce and communication would navigate. The original plat of Dakar was quintupled by new layouts to the south and west. In these sections the gridiron was abandoned for a freer pattern with diagonal avenues. They looked like "stars" and "round points" in the manner of Paris. Some of the new main streets had been country roads. The extended city also swallowed two or three African villages. For years the thatched huts of villagers, gathered close together, intermingled with the regular blocks of masonry houses put up by the government for its officials or by the trading and shipping companies for their administrators. Other more humble frame structures existed to house poorer whites. Mosques dotted the landscape. The Lebou, who found themselves in

⁶¹ Raymond F. Betts, "Dakar, Ville Impériale," 194.

the minority, tried to move their villages away from Dakar in order to maintain a unique sense of identity through isolation. The Lebou were forced to move from their old villages to Medina. Numerous legal disputes arose over the compensation of the Lebou for their expropriated land that was needed to further urban construction.⁶² Other indigenous villages were later subsumed under Dakar, but as late as 1941 the villages of N'Gor and Ouakam existed quite outside the confines of urbanized Dakar.⁶³



Figure 2.8 [Dakar in 1888, the Plateau, public domain.]

⁶² Assane Seck, *Dakar, métropole ouest-africaine* (Dakar: IFAN, 1970), 315-316.

⁶³ Ouakam, nestled among baobabs near the Mamelles was a different kind of village. There, low fixed dunes moistened the most extensive arable land west of Sangalkam. Villagers were able to grow millet, squashes, beans and a little tree cotton. They traded their agricultural surplus for fish. Pulaar speaking people also made their homes in Dakar proper. They possessed a history of trade with the caravans of the Western Sudan, and tended to hold closely to their Islamic identities. The Pulaar settled into neighborhoods along ethnic lines and competed for the same jobs as the Wolof. N'Gor was a fishing village located on the crest of a continuous line of sand dunes.




Figure 2.9 [Dakar after independence, public domain.]

Dakar was divided into two residential zones: European and African.

There were also liminal spaces monikered 'mixed zones' where Africans, Lebanese and Syrians lived. In the European zone, buildings were made of durable materials. There, on high ground, were built spacious and airy residences. Their villas hung with bougainvillea and sat in tree-shaded grounds. Wide windows opened on verandas.⁶⁴ Medina, the largest African neighborhood, was laid out on a gridiron pattern, with blocks smaller and streets wider than those of early Dakar. It was separated from the older town by a reserved clear belt 900 meters wide, as well as by a racecourse and a stadium. Africans were encouraged to move to Medina through land grants and aid in house construction, and were also forcibly and bodily relocated. As a result of these push and pull tactics, the area quickly grew. By the early 1940s it contained

⁶⁴ Taken from Raphael Antonetti, Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal in 1915, quoted in Raymond Betts, "Dakar," 198.

more than half the total population of Dakar.⁶⁵ Most of the residences were thatched huts, wooden cabins with tile roofs, and a few were of brick.




Figure 2.10 [Rue de Grammont in Dakar; one of the 'African' sections of the city, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

On 21 October 1924, Dakar's administrative status was reconfigured under the *Circonscription de Dakar*, which was similar to the status of Washington DC. The city was now under the direct administration of the General Government, with the *Commission Permanente du Gouvernement-Général* serving as the city's administrative council. Businesses found they needed a Dakar office as well, even if they were originally located in Saint-Louis or Rufisque. Dakar also became a city of migrants, particularly former agents of the large Bordeaux and Marseille merchant companies. During World War I, these Syrian and Lebanese migrants became important to the Senegalese economy,

⁶⁵ Derwent Whittlesey, "Dakar and the Other Cape Verde Settlements," *Geographical Review* 38, 4 (October 1941), 631.

as thousands of Frenchmen left for the trenches on the Western Front. Africans, however, tended to resent their presence.⁶⁶

And Africans also came in large numbers to Dakar, particularly the Wolof. The migrations began around 1900, and within twenty years, the population of Dakar was heterogeneous and cosmopolitan. Wolof traders and merchants had long been affluent middlemen in the gum trade on the Senegal River, and they did not find the transition to Rufisque, and then Dakar, difficult. They already had the contacts and the capital to succeed in business.

Imperial designs could be reflected in public works. In 1902 large public building projects were undertaken in Dakar. Offices and residences for the employees of the Government General were constructed. A lovely, ornate palace was built overlooking the Atlantic to house the Governor General.




Figure 2.11 [The Governor's Palace in Dakar, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

⁶⁶ ANS 2 G 17 (5)

Today the palace has been reformed to serve as the President's residence and sits very close to the location of the French colonial archives in Dakar. A new railway station and a city hall, or *hotel de ville*, were constructed. But Dakar did not have an overarching architectural design. However, Dakar's government-financed building projects failed to lend a 'genteel colonial personality' to Dakar like Casablanca or Hanoi.⁶⁷ Dakar's characterization as an imperial city was more imagination than it was reality.



Figure 2.12 [The train station in Dakar, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

In spite of its detractors, Dakar had gained the nickname "little Paris" of Africa in the 1920s. By the 1940s banks, shipping offices and curio shops were located on streets leading up from the passenger wharf. The avenue from the plaza to the governor's mansion was a principal shopping area. Between the old

⁶⁷ Raymond Betts, "Dakar," 205.

town and the plaza were bookstores, a music store, a pastry shop, a grocery and several barbers, but large wine stores dominated. Between the plaza and the "plateau" were located shops for women's wear, shoes, novelties, stationary, and refrigerators, pharmacies, photographic studios and a cinema. Many shops were branches of French firms. Others were of local origin. African shopkeepers tended to live on the premises, but it was a habit becoming more uncommon with Europeans. Shops run by Africans extended through to Medina. Dakar had a cosmopolitan flavor because of its function as a contact point for a variety of people and its heterogeneous population.



Figure 2.13 [Dakar: "Little Paris," postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

Not only was Dakar's public space one for material consumption, but one for symbolic use as well. World War I memorials served a variety of purposes in

both West Africa and France.⁶⁸ Most memorials built in West Africa were funded, proposed and designed by the French, but Blaise Diagne sought to create a memorial in Dakar, and was successful. His promotion of the idea, and the support of African war veterans, made Dakar a sight of Senegal's sacrifice, and the originaires' special status in the French army.



Figure 2.14 [The Monument to the Dead in the garden of the Place Protet, Dakar, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

Colonial Senegalese postcards attempted to document the world in Senegal. These postcards may be conceived as collectively constituting a "sort of imaginary visual encyclopedia."⁶⁹ I have provided images of a few postcards which I believe are emblematic of the processes I have described in this chapter, as well as representatives of the document genre in Africa at this time. Some of these postcards were produced by Edmond Fortier, who was based in Dakar. He

⁶⁸ See Mann, "Locating Colonial Histories."

⁶⁹ David Prochaska, "Fantasia of the Photothèque: French Postcard Views of Colonial Senegal," *African Arts* 24, 4 Special Issue: Historical Photographs of Africa (October 1991), 47.

was the single largest and most important postcard producer in colonial West Africa.⁷⁰ Fortier and others like him were colonialists producing these images for the market, and can say much about the people who bought and sold them, and about their *mentalités*. But I have provided them as photographic documentary evidence of how French colonists attempted to shape a shared cityscape in Senegal.

The Changing Field of Government in French West Africa

One of the most influential French leaders in Senegal and French West Africa in the 19th century was Léon Louis César Faidherbe. Faidherbe was a military man, and a master manipulator of knowledge.⁷¹ He pushed out the boundaries of Senegal, and developed its institutions. He earned the moniker 'father' or 'founder' of Senegal, if not all of French West Africa.⁷² Faidherbe was not interested in sharing political power with the inhabitants of the Four Communes and acted to establish boundaries and authority over the métis interests.⁷³

⁷⁰ For more information on Fortier and his work, see David Prochaska, "Fantasia," 40-47, 98 and Philippe David, "La carte postale sénégalaise de 1900 à 1960," *Notes Africaines* 157(1978): 3-12 and also by Prochaska, "Edmond Fortier," *Hommes et destins* 5 (1984): 208-11.

⁷¹ Robinson, *Paths*, 61.

⁷² Robinson, "French Africans": Faidherbe, Archinard, and Coppolani, the 'Creators' of Senegal, Soudan and Mauritania," in *Personality and Political Culture in Modern Africa* (Boston University, African Studies Center, 1998).

⁷³ See note 15, page 260 from David Robinson, *Paths*. In 1859 Faidherbe sent a letter to the managers of Devès & Chaumet Company, "In sending me a collective letter and protesting against my decisions, you arrogate to yourselves rights you do not have. I will limit myself this time to a simple warning and not call you before the *conseil d'administration*, but you should know that in the future... I will oppose any effort on your part that would tend to weaken the respect that is required by the government." Robinson quotes this from Bâ, *Pénétration*, 202-3, who took it from ANS 3 B 74.

Faidherbe set the foundation for a class of indigenous interpreters and chiefs friendly to the administration with his encouragement of the already established School of Hostages, where sons of chiefs were kept. Faidherbe was foundational in the development of the *tirailleurs sénégalais*, and increased African military recruitment into the Tirailleurs' ranks.⁷⁴ He also established the long-desired Muslim Tribunal to deal with civil issues in the commune of Saint-Louis. One of Faidherbe's most lasting innovations was his transformation of the local Direction of Political Affairs, which he made into an efficacious instrument of central control, particularly for the protectorates and independent areas. The Direction of Political Affairs had an intelligence service, a hospitality center for visiting dignitaries, and an Arabic translation service. What makes Faidherbe's innovations and system of control so important was the way his "modus operandi remained the standard for future administrators: hierarchical control, limited and carefully selected advisers, and a willingness to manipulate information to obtain desired goals."⁷⁵

After Faidherbe, the colony enjoyed a much quieter period for a few decades, but one institutional innovation stands out, the Direction of the Interior. It had jurisdiction over the communes, the military and commercial posts, and areas that had been annexed to the colony. The Direction of the Interior did not

⁷⁴ The Tirailleurs were much better trained and organized than previous militias and much cheaper than units consisting of French men. See Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960* (Portsmouth, NH, 1991).

⁷⁵ Robinson, *Paths*, 62.

deal with the protectorates and independent zones, which the Direction of Political Affairs controlled.⁷⁶

The Government General of French West Africa was established by the Colonial Ministry in Paris during the year 1895; the same year the *mission civilisatrice* became the official ideology of the Third Republic's imperialism. This same year, the French government decreed that the era of conquest in West Africa was at an end. A new policy of "constructive exploitation" was inaugurated, and one result of this decision was the creation of a centralized civilian authority in Dakar.⁷⁷

French West Africa—*l'Afrique occidentale française*—was created to provide governance from a senior official close to the colonies, who would be better capable of understanding what colonial administrators and Africans needed than politicians from Paris. These governors would be aware of events and conditions in the colony and would be better prepared to make informed policy decisions. A second reason for the AOF was to help what the French called their *mise en valeur*—economic development—of West Africa. French authorities in Paris believed that if each colony were administered separately, they would never prosper. The governors general of the AOF were subordinate to the minister of colonies and responsible for both the administration and the development of the federation. Governors of the individual colonies were subordinate to the Governor General.

⁷⁶ M'baye, *Histoire des institutions coloniales*, 33, 53-55.

⁷⁷ Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 11.

The governor of Senegal was stationed at Saint-Louis and part of his responsibility included pacifying ethnic groups in the Protectorate and factions in the four communes. This officer commanded the Territories of the Protectorate, which he ruled with administrators and traditional chiefs. There was no democratic experiment here. The governor of Senegal also administered the territories of direct administration, which consisted of the four communes. The position of governor of Senegal was difficult, and the governor often had contradictory and conflicting relations with his governor general.⁷⁸

Because governor generals shaped the atmosphere and range of possibilities for political action by Africans, this section includes a quick review of a few of the more notable French colonial trends reflected in programs advanced by governor generals. Governor General Roume was deeply committed to a program of *mise en valeur* by France, which reflected a new way of thinking in the métropole.⁷⁹ Instead of exploiting the colonies, French rhetoric emphasized the need to improve them.

Governor General Roume instituted a host of changes during his six-year tenure, but his biggest emphasis was upon railroads and a telegraph network that could tie the federation together. He envisioned a network that would link

⁷⁸ The following governors general served in Dakar between 1895 and 1943: Ernest Roume (1902-1907), William Ponty (1908-1915), François Clozel (1916), Joost Van Vollenhoven (1917-1918), Martial Merlin (1918-1923), Jules Carde (1923-1930), Jules Brévié (1930-1936), Marcel de Coppet (1936-1938), Léon Cayla (1939-1940), and Pierre Boisson (1940-1943).

⁷⁹ No longer was expansionism promoted, rather emphasis was placed upon the economic and moral development of people and business in the colonies, not just a quick and dirty exploitation. Exploitation was considered inefficient; better to concentrate on the long-term economic value of the colonies to the métropole. A more systematic management of French overseas resources was thus needed. This more rational and progressive development was designated *mise en valeur*.

the colonies together in such a way that no part of the vast West African interior would be inaccessible from the coast. The vision of this new emphasis in colonization would have a huge impact upon the people of West Africa and particularly upon the social and economic development of Senegal. The growth of railroads led to significant changes in the political power and structure of the four communes. Eventually the colonial regime's emphasis on *mise en valeur* would lead to the dominance of Dakar.

Roume's *mise en valeur* would have serious repercussions for Saint-Louis' métis community. For example, the enforcement of metropolitan legislation regarding the separation of church and state changed the role of the Catholic Church as the primary provider of educational services in the colony. The new laws ordered religious instructors from the orders of the Brothers of Ploërmel and the Sisters of Saint Joseph to close their schools and leave the colony. The Governor General created a new system of secular education for the entire federation, thus eliminating the monopoly the métis had enjoyed on access to French schooling in Senegal and higher education in France.⁸⁰

Political rights of originaires were weakened with the new budget. On 18 October 1904, the colonial ministry approved of Roume's proposal to create a general budget for French West Africa that would come from the revenues of individual colonies.⁸¹ The Governor General would have absolute authority over the revenues of the colonies and would also possess the right to collect

⁸⁰ See Hilary Jones, "Citizens and Subjects: Métis Society, Identity and the Struggle over Colonial Politics in Saint Louis, Senegal (1871-1920)" (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2003), 216.

⁸¹ M'baye, *Histoire des institutions coloniales*, 154.

Senegal's customs duties for use by the administration of the federal government. For residents of Senegal's communes, this was an erosion of one of their major responsibilities; budgetary authority and allocation of Senegal's customs duties was one of the main functions of the General Council. In establishing the new budget, Roume reduced the role of the General Council in the colonial administration.

World War I changed the landscape of modern Europe, and it also changed how the métropole perceived Senegal. Joost Van Vollenhoven, who was the Governor General of the AOF for a short eight months, from 1917 to early 1918, believed the situation in the federation dire; the French were hated and the Government General was to blame, for it had failed in its responsibility of exercising control from above. Van Vollenhoven believed that assimilation had not produced the desired results. French actions had caused a breakdown in African social relations; now French hegemony was threatened. Van Vollenhoven also believed the French had undermined traditional African authority with the justice system in the colony:

We created civil justice, but native society was scared by the rights we granted to individuals, particularly to women and to young people, [who began] challenging with impunity conjugal and paternal authority, ageless foundations of the African family. We suppressed the great commands, feared and respected, but we also deprived the collectivity of the tyranny that constituted a solid framework... I do not criticize these measures,, only assert that these reforms have profoundly troubled the natives who... observe that the rigorous hierarchy of yesterday has been replaced [today] by a well-intentioned but emasculated one.⁸²

As the French rethought their system of colonization and their colonizing mission after the First World War, they attempted to redefine the role Africans would play

⁸² Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 185.

throughout the colony, both in the Protectorate and in the communes.

Jean Suret-Canale has described the economy in postwar AOF in terms of “monopolies, mercantilism, parasitism, and stagnation.”⁸³ Postwar economic policies were constructed according to the post-liberal logic of development, regardless of whether they helped or harmed ordinary Africans. The colonial policymakers were responsible for West Africa’s place in a global economy. They drew on discourses of scientific management, technocratic planning, and social welfarism. The new colonial objective was to “create a coherent and dynamic colonial economy that would become integral to the national [French] economy.”⁸⁴

In 1919, Martial Merlin was appointed to Dakar as Governor General of French West Africa. He had spent the early 1890s in the colony of Senegal, where he had experimented with a policy of collaboration with aristocratic chiefs. His ideas would be called “association,” a term which was not new to French colonialism. France’s colonial association rested on two premises; the first was that some form of sharing power with the old and new elite in West Africa was necessary to maintain French authority. The second was that this power sharing, with the proper safeguards, was the best thing for African subjects, and was thus in the best interest of France’s civilizing mission to Africa. Merlin was well aware of the threat politically awakened Africans posed for French authority:

The ideas of emancipation.. are obviously destined to create illusions among the young educated blacks, agents of the administration or of commerce, desiring to equal the white man, and to incite them to dream of

⁸³ Jean Suret-Canale, *Afrique noire*, II. *L’ère coloniale* (Paris, 1964), 204.

⁸⁴ Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 85.

aspiring for themselves, to the exclusion of any foreign element, the role of educators and leaders of the indigenous societies. On the other hand, the masses have up until now stayed attached to the land and faithful to their ancient customs. The stories of the liberated soldiers, returning home from the métropole or the coastal cities, have perhaps awakened in them new feelings... But this new disposition, in favoring the intellectual development and the material progress of the natives, also renders them more vulnerable to the self-interested calls and fallacious promises of professional agitators. It thus behooves us to confront these unhealthy stimuli with the notions of order and social discipline, which should direct the evolution of the black races and preserve Africa from upheavals, whose certain effect would be to annihilate the work of civilization that has begun and return the continent to its ancient barbarism.⁸⁵

As Africans began to reinterpret French notions of political freedom and authority that they had learned, and deploy them for their own benefit and interest, the French began to have second thoughts about the sorts of 'freedoms' allowed to the members of the four communes in Senegal and the influence educated, elite Africans could have on the whole of African society.

Even so, Merlin realized that the aspirations of these new elite could not be completely ignored. He recommended that the *évolués* should be given their own say in making decisions. Merlin claimed that he had the same objective as Diagne, that of encouraging the progress of the indigenous populations along the path of civilization. However, Merlin questioned the speed of this process, and believed that Diagne and his intentions were not carefully considered, but were rather "measures inspired by a demagoguery that is as imprudent as it is utopian."⁸⁶

During his administration, Merlin made several policy changes that had an impact upon the nature of politics in French West Africa. The creation of *conseils*

⁸⁵ Conklin, *A Mission*, 191.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

de notables (councils of notables) occurred on 5 May 1919. Additional decrees were published on 4 December 1920. These served to increase the representation of African notables on the governor general's and the lieutenant governors' administrative councils, and they also created new councils made up entirely of Africans at the village and *cercle* levels. The decrees also provided for the transformation of all African communities into communes with municipal responsibilities. There were to be three types of communes: native communes, mixed communes, and full communes, or *communes de plein exercice* with the full range of privileges allowed to cities in France. The decree regarding the three types of communes was actually a reform of existing legislation that dated back to 5 April 1884, and that had been amended in 1891 and again in 1912. Only cities could qualify to be mixed communes such as Porto Novo, Abidjan, Conakry, Kayes and Bamako. Mixed communes were run by a joint commission of Europeans and educated Africans who met certain requirements and were headed by an administrator-mayor, but they still possessed no electoral rights.⁸⁷ No city was promoted to full commune status like the four communes of Senegal during the interwar period.

Merlin believed that sharing power with Africans under the policy of association would further the civilizing mission in Africa. This is a new theme in French colonization, as was a revised assessment of Africa's traditional ruling

⁸⁷ Conklin, *A Misison*, 193 and 309. African members had to be over twenty-five, fluent in French, and one of the following: a retired agent of the administration, a member of the Legion of Honor or recipient of a medal of valor, a recipient of a military pension, a merchant paying the *patente* (license for the exercise of a trade), an owner of a registered piece of property, or a notable with property noted as such by the local administrator.

class; this is evident in the creation of councils of notables and native communes. Before the 1920s, the traditional chiefs and ruling classes in West Africa were considered barbaric and the French did not really attempt to work with them. The work of Delafosse also informed colonial thinking, and this scholar/colonizer believed African political units were very diverse—the household, the *quartier*, the village, the canton, the kingdom (or confederation if it was ruled not by a king but a council of chiefs) and the empire.⁸⁸ Most of this new approach reflects France's attempt to maintain control and power of its African colonies. Administrators believed they needed traditional chiefs to maintain French authority in the colonies.

Merlin's successor, Jules Carde, strongly promoted education for chiefs and the sons of chiefs, which would make them better collaborators and examples.⁸⁹ For Carde as well as Merlin, strengthening and educating the chiefs could offset the new elite's challenges to French rule. Carde wrote in 1928, "It is not possible to arrest the evolution of the latter [elites], but one must direct it and control it by maintaining intact this traditional armature."⁹⁰ As Africans in the four communes learned to internalize and change French rhetoric to suit their own political purposes, colonial officials in Dakar and Paris tried to create a new aristocracy who would remain more 'African,' in other words, more subordinate, to counterbalance the revolutionary ideas of Africans participating in communal politics in Senegal.

⁸⁸ See Maurice Delafosse, *Afrique Occidentale Française, IV: Histoire des colonies françaises*. Paris, 1931 and Delafosse, "Sur l'orientation nouvelle de la politique indigène dans l'Afrique noire," *Afrique Française* 3-4 (1919): 53-59.

⁸⁹ ANS 2 G 25(8).

⁹⁰ Conklin, *Mission*, 200.

Under Carde the agronomy service in the AOF was reorganized to reflect a welfare approach to economic development. Technical studies, experimental stations, model farms and extension agents began operating among African farmers in the protectorate. The colonial state failed to motivate African farmers to meet Carde's production goals and could not prevent them from diverting large percentages of their harvest away from European merchants. These policies did, however, help institutionalize an approach to development based on public-private collaboration.⁹¹

I mention these economic developments because of Galandou Diouf's stated desire to reform the *societies indigenes de prévoyance* (SIPs). These "native foresight societies" were the instrument of the colonial state; they were introduced in 1910 and had spread throughout the AOF during the 1920s. Membership was compulsory, and African farmers were forced to pay annual dues. The SIPs were supervised by local administrators, and were meant to provide Africans, whom the colonial state viewed as improvident, with rational economic pedagogy in such things as saving, banking and planning for the future. On the local level, the SIPs had reserve stores of seeds and food as help against famine, sickness and accidents. They made loans and advanced seeds, fertilizer and equipment, all in the pursuit of the development of cash crop production.⁹²

⁹¹ Richard Roberts, *Two Worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the Regional Economy in the French Soudan, 1800-1946* (Stanford University Press, 1996), 66-133.

⁹² See Marcel Boyer, *Les sociétés de prévoyance, de secours, et de prêts mutuels agricoles en Afrique Occidentale Française* (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1935).

SIPs were governmental agencies through which economic productivity, social improvement and political peace were pursued at the same time.⁹³ Mann and Guyer have demonstrated that these societies were proxies for the colonial government, which used them as a means for development initiatives (by advancing seed varieties, introducing agricultural techniques, and ensuring a healthy labor reserve) and instruments of social control (by using debt to intervene in farmers' decisions and using food reserves to preclude local grievances and unrest).⁹⁴ The *Caisse d'Epargne de l'AOF*, which was established in 1920, worked with the SIPs as another tool of economic development and social reform. It put the capital of Africans into circulation while at the same time supposedly teaching Africans the virtues of property and planning.⁹⁵ The SIPs and the *Caisse d'Epargne* integrated Africans into an imperial economic system.

Jules Brévié became governor general in 1930, just after the world commodity markets crashed, and as the local markets in West Africa began to slump. The métropole extended large loans to the AOF, but it did not stall the vicious cycle in which West Africa was about to be embroiled: Africans' purchasing power weakened, they grew more food crops than export crops; colonial commerce suffered; colonial consumer markets shrank; commercial houses began to fail; European capital did not get invested in the colonies;

⁹³ Gary Wilder, *French Colonial Nation-State*, 88.

⁹⁴ Gregory Mann and Jane Guyer, "Imposing a Guide on the Indigène: The Fifty-Year Experience of the Sociétés de Prévoyance in French West and Equatorial Africa," in *Credit, Currencies and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective*, eds. Endre Stiansen and Jane I. Guyer (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999).

⁹⁵ Amos Hongla, "La caisse d'épargne en Afrique Occidentale Française de 1920 à 1945," *Revue Française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer* 86 (1999): 219-330.

revenues for the colonies declined. As a result, not surprisingly, local living conditions for Senegalese inhabitants declined as well.⁹⁶ Brévié was as concerned about the economic depression's effect on the social order in the AOF as he was with the AOF's economy.

Brévié warned that the declining living conditions were creating a crisis of confidence in French rule. He believed that West Africans were vulnerable to propaganda produced by communists and believed eruptions of popular discontent were imminent.⁹⁷ In the context of this crisis, Albert Sarraut once again became minister of colonies. Sarraut believed French education policies in the colonies had produced a group of people that were underemployed and difficult to control. He recognized that French policies were self-undermining. Because French political authority depended upon, at least partly, preventing local social fragmentation, African solidarities and hierarchies thus had to be protected. Thus was born colonial humanism.

Brévié promoted public works, health and education. He believed educated Africans who could not find jobs were dangerous because they could not return to the rural areas due to their alienation. Brévié promoted an urban scheme that would purge those inhabitants who constituted a 'danger' for the city. The administration made a series of regulatory recommendations that included employing the *indigénat* and anti-vagabond laws to turn young people away from the city. Public health regulations such as home construction codes,

⁹⁶ See Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "L'Afrique et la crise de 1930," *Revue Française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer* 63 (1976): 390-424.

⁹⁷ Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 93.

the salubrity of dwellings, and stagnant water laws segregated European and native neighborhoods.

The postwar French administration also had to deal with originaire and *évolué* claims and desires for better education, jobs, political rights and municipal autonomy. The Governor of Senegal, de Coppet, informed his superiors that originaires in Dakar in 1933 were beginning to strongly criticize and denounce the French regime and refused to pay their taxes.⁹⁸ French officials were wary of periodicals originaires published that “spread a spirit of rebellion among the population.” The French government tried to prevent the circulation of dangerous ideas instead of addressing the issues originaires brought up in their publications. Colonial officials instituted a surveillance network that was supposed to identify troublemakers and stop “anti-French propaganda” before it infiltrated the AOF.⁹⁹

The colonial state had censorship power over any published materials, such as images, posters or emblems that they believed could undermine French authority. This had been established in the 1920s in a series of decrees which gave the Governor General a great deal of freedom to exercise power over the African press, foreign press and non-French language publications. Authorities could seize and destroy any prohibited publication. Police, custom agents and postal employees were instructed by Carde to monitor the press and disrupt

⁹⁸ ANS 2 G 33.

⁹⁹ ANS 2 G 33, renseignements.

distribution networks.¹⁰⁰ Brévié would expand this censorship network by creating special commissions in each colony that were charged with examining and approving all films and phonographic albums produced inside the AOF or coming from outside.

French administrators tended to downplay the amount of originaire and elite dissent that existed in West Africa, usually dismissing incidents as isolated events from deluded individuals, or blaming them on outside propaganda and influence. In an attempt to limit outside influence on Africans, the French began restricting French and foreign immigration to the AOF in 1932. Communism, as we will see in Diouf's own experience, was often named the culprit. Rather than recognize the grievances and power of the pan-African movement, French administrators blamed Nazi propaganda in the Arab press, the war in Ethiopia, Islamic dissidents and international anti-imperialism for creating "a minor resurgence of Pan-Negro and xenophobic movements in Senegal."¹⁰¹ According to French administrators, Senegalese nationalist movements were confined in municipal electoral campaigns.

Part of the refusal to see Africans as agents was reflected in French stereotypes of Africans as big children during the interwar period. This was a racializing rhetoric that claimed to be progressive. Africans were in a parent-child relationship with French authorities; one day, perhaps, they would grow up to properly inherit political rights. Colonial administrators argued against granting

¹⁰⁰ ANS 21 G 44, note on the press. For a listing of colonial publications in Senegal, see Marguerite Boulège, "La presse au Sénégal avant 1939: Bibliographie," *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire*, 3-4 (1965): 555-74.

¹⁰¹ ANS 2 G 36 (25).

Africans citizenship based upon this deferment; it would happen one day, just not now. For the French, the *originaires* were an example of what could happen when Africans were granted rights for which they were not ready. After all, were they not influenced too much by radical ideas from foreigners?¹⁰² Did they not operate corruptly in their politics, rather too much like “natives”? This was the rhetoric in official documents. Galandou Diouf was operating in a field, a system, where the French were growing more reticent to recognize Africans’ rights; indeed, there were multiple attempts to limit citizenship rights of the *originaires* before and during Diouf’s career.¹⁰³ He recognized this and pushed back against the system, trying to defend and even expand African claims to citizenship.

As Senegal entered the late 1920s and 1930s, French colonial authorities continued to attempt to control the politics, politicians, *originaires* and discourses

¹⁰² In 1928, a decree was passed which created an Office of Emigration and Immigration in each colony of the AOF. This was an institutionalized way to create an apparatus for policing native mobility. It prohibited Africans from traveling outside their colony of origin without first applying for, and receiving a permit, and an official identity card which included the subject’s photograph, fingerprints, race and kinship lineage. If Africans wanted to travel to Europe, they had to supply proof that they could support themselves once they got there. The decree also prohibited the emigration of married women without the consent of their husbands, unmarried women without the consent of their family heads, unaccompanied minors under the age of 15, and men eligible for military recruitment. See ANS 21 G 37 and “Décret réglementation de l’émigration et de la circulation en AOF, 24 avri 1928,” *Journal Officiel de la République Française*. The identity cards were also used to restrict immigration to urban areas.

¹⁰³ Before WWI, the administration used colonial courts and decrees to redefine the category of “native,” seeking to incorporate some *originaires* into the definition. The colonial authorities also reduced the number of *originaires* eligible to be on electoral rolls by occasionally purging listed Africans. They also restricted access to French tribunals and stripped *originaires* from their status while they were in the Protectorate. The French also took *originaires*, when they were conscripted, from the French army and enrolled them into separate colonial regiments. This last battle over the rights of *originaires* to be treated as citizens in the French army was the location of Galandou Diouf’s and Blaise Diagne’s significant victory during WWI. See G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal* and Michael Crowder, *Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy*, 9-28.

of resistance, with mixed success. In 1928 Galandou Diouf announced his intention to run against Blaise Diagne for the deputyship of Senegal. Galandou Diouf's political fortunes are representative of the changes occurring within the colony. Diouf was African, originaire, and Muslim. He was educated under the French system, fluent in French, but also fluent in Wolof. As French colonial authorities attempted to strengthen their hegemonic influence and tighten their grasp on the four communes and on Senegal, Africans became more politically aware and active in their forms of resistance to this agenda.

The French had been moving against the republican institutions they created since the late nineteenth century. This pattern in Senegal was reproduced nowhere else in the twentieth century, as European colonizers, including the French, were just trying to hold the line. As the French pushed back against Africans shoving to be more active participants in republican French colonial institutions, the colonial field was enlarging as well. It grew beyond the boundaries of the communes, and into all of Senegal, and perhaps a bit to greater French West Africa. Blaise Diagne and Galandou Diouf would thus have an immediate electoral constituency in the communes, but they would also have a larger Protectorate one as well, dominated by a peanut economy and Muslim brotherhood interests.

Chapter Three

Galandou Diouf as Mobilizer and Organizer: Shaping a New Era of Politics in Senegal, 1890-1918

This chapter delineates several important factors in the growth and development of the social and political consciousness of originaires. The historiography surrounding the 1914 election has featured Blaise Diagne, due to the influence of G. Wesley Johnson's *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal*, as well as most assumptions of popular media and memory in Senegal. Blaise Diagne, however, would have gotten nowhere without Galandou Diouf, who made Diagne's speeches in Wolof and helped craft Diagne's political alliance. Diagne could not have mobilized and organized the campaign of 1914 without Diouf, who knew the political and cultural environment.

Blaise Diagne was an outsider to Senegalese politics in many ways. While Diagne has often been lauded for his speaking ability and intelligence, this was not enough to propel him into the position of Deputy in Senegal. Without the specific social and symbolic capital that Galandou Diouf brought to Diagne's candidacy, I argue Blaise Diagne would never have been elected. Diouf added legitimacy, impetus and experience to Diagne's most ambitious undertaking—the incorporation of originaires as citizens in the French army, and thus a recognition and guarantee of their status.

This chapter also explores how rural and urban Senegalese maintained different identities, based upon access or exclusion from French citizenship, geographical space, education, and sometimes, religious affiliations. The

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various experiences of Africans in World War I, from recruitment drives to digging ditches in northern France, helped shaped France's colonial project in West Africa, originaires' commitment and accommodation to Senegalese politics, and the relationship between Muslim marabouts, French colonialism and originaires.

Shaping Factors

As the French attempted to curtail African enfranchisement in the communes, urban originaires were enjoying increased economic prosperity. The peanut economy, however, also threatened many African middlemen.¹ It was, at least in part, a combined threat to African voting privileges and to originaire economic opportunities that increased participation in local politics. The railway and deep-water port network the French had built aided Senegal's economic development, but did not determine it. Cash crop production, particularly of peanuts, was the major factor in Senegal's economy. Because Senegalese society was highly stratified, with wealth and prestige inextricably linked, when peanut production was discovered to be profitable, elites encouraged their clients to grow the crop for a new source of income or as a replacement for income lost due to French conquest.

¹ For more information about the shifting fortunes of the peanut trade, see George Brooks, "Peanuts and Colonialism: Consequences of the Commercialization of Peanuts in West Africa, 1830-70," *The Journal of African History* 16, 1 (1975): 29-54. Originaires developed an extensive trading network that moved goods from coastal centers to rural villages. In the early years of the peanut trade, originaires were basically middlemen between the French and the African producers. Newer elites, who benefited from the wealth and new professions created by the export economy, operated differently in the French colonial system from earlier leaders.

Dakar, Saint-Louis and Rufisque all had branch offices for the Bordeaux firms and local trading posts were maintained in river *escales* and in the rail towns of the interior. Métis and Africans had conducted most of the trade in the interior before colonial conquest. These *traitants* carried goods on credit, and commercial firms were protected by the large mark-up on goods sold in the interior.² The commercial network led to a transfer of wealth from rural to urban coastal centers, and then finally to France. Bordeaux, where most of the commercial firms operating in Senegal had their headquarters, received the bulk of the benefit.³

From 1890 to 1914, originaires lost their position as indispensable intermediaries in interior trade to small European merchants and the beginnings of the Lebanese community.⁴ The Lebanese had better credit records than African subtraders, due in part to their position as outsiders, which allowed them to maintain more impersonal relations with their clients. The Lebanese were competitive with European merchants because they would accept a lower standard of living, and required fewer employees to run similar businesses.

² See C.W. Newbury, "Credit in Early Nineteenth Century West African Trade," *The Journal of African History* 13 (1972): 81-95, for Senegal. For a good discussion of trans-Saharan trading networks maintained by the Wād Nūn and other groups in Mauritania, see Ghislaine Lydon, "On Trans-Saharan Trails: Trading Networks and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Western Africa, 1840s-1930s" (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2000).

³ See Joan Elizabeth Casey, "The Politics of Imperialism in the Early Third Republic: The Case of Bordeaux" (PhD diss., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1973). A discussion of the role of the Bordeaux firms is also located in Xavier Guiraud, *L'arachide sénégalaise* (Paris: Librairie technique et économique, 1938). For a discussion about the firms and the development of the métis population of Saint-Louis, see Hilary Jones' dissertation, "Citizens and Subjects."

⁴ See Paul E. Pheffer, "Railroads and Aspects of Social Change in Senegal, 1878-1933" (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1975), 168-177. Lebanese migration did not reach substantial proportions until after World War I, see ANS, 21 G 122 (108).

Thus, African traders were squeezed from above by European merchants and from below by Lebanese traders.⁵

Aristocratic chiefs, marabouts, and originaires all encouraged the development of the export economy in one way or another. Islam served as an ideology of economic mobilization for the Muridiyya, and provided an ethic of piety and hard work. This served a variety of French interests, but it was really a local Muslim strategy to retain an authentic Islamic identity in the midst of a colonial framework.

Significant to the functioning of Muslim brotherhoods, and of politics in West Africa, is an understanding of the social exchange which was expressed in the patron-client, disciple-master, cheikh-talibé relationship.⁶ The financial contributions of the talibés to the cheikhs were voluntary gifts from peasants. The money the marabouts received was usually invested in brotherhood projects, agricultural expansion or commercial ventures. The gifts given to cheikhs established a personal tie between a disciple and his master, a tie which also implied mutual benefits and obligations. The disciple became a member of a larger religious and communal organization, with an in-road to a new, corporate

⁵ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 329. For a literary portrait of the financial obligations of an originaire Wolof merchant, see Ousman Soce's novel, *Karim* (Paris, 1935). Soce describes the dilemma of a young man who goes deeply into debt because he tries to live as a "samba linquere," an aristocrat. The courtship of a young woman plays a marked role in his road to financial ruin. Karim is a member of the French educated elite, but he is unable or unwilling to escape the aristocratic conception of honor in Wolof society that is fundamentally entangled with conspicuous consumption and distribution of resources.

⁶ Robert Fatton, Jr. has pointed out that marabouts have performed an intermediary role, or "transmission belt" between the urban center and the agricultural periphery. Fatton argues marabouts have helped the state penetrate the countryside but they have molded that penetration and manipulated it to their own advantages. See Fatton, "Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal," *African Studies Review* 29, 4 (December 1968): 61-78.

identity. The gifts in cash or kind and the labor services donated by the disciples closely resembled the gifts and services the Wolof would have traditionally paid to lineage elders, known collectively as *jambur*, the village chiefs, and the *laman*, who controlled the distribution of lineage lands.

In the nineteenth century, through these orders, Muslim communities were able to maintain considerable autonomy within the religious, social and economic realms. By the end of the First World War, Muslim religious leaders and their followers recommitted to significant intervention in politics. Marabouts may not have run for office directly, but they controlled constituencies, money, and influenced the political process in colonial Senegal and the success or failure of certain candidates. Muslim collaborators in the French administration often had no official role, but French administrators relied upon their influence and knowledge.

Cheikh Anta, Cheikh Ibra Fall, Mamadu Mustapha and other core leaders of the Muridiyya accumulated great wealth and considerable followers. They maintained and further developed ties with elected officials and the administration. Cheikh Anta was the most active politically. He had ties with the French administration, French-dominated commerce and the Senegalese deputies. He was an important supporter of Blaise Diagne until Cheikh Anta began to view him as an establishment man; he switched his allegiance to Galandou Diouf. Cheikh Anta demonstrated his support with campaign gifts, in exchange for intervention in favor of his interests and those of the Murids. It was

Cheikh Anta Mbacké who used his wealth, social connections, and prestige to manipulate the institutions of civil society.⁷



Figure 3.1 [Cheikh Anta Mbacké, public domain.]

Cheikh Anta Mbacké was an entrepreneur and politician. A wealthy man, he intimately understood the relationship between religion, culture, and power. Cheikh Anta is a good illustration of the connections between rural and urban, Protectorate and communes. Cheikh Anta was politically very savvy, and he was perceived as a threat to the colonial administration; so much so that he was exiled to Segou not long after the installation of Mamadou Moustapha as Bamba's

⁷ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 225.

successor in 1927. Galandou Diouf recognized Cheikh Anta Mbacké's contributions to his own career, and worked diligently to secure his release. After Diouf was elected deputy in 1934, Diouf was able to gain Cheikh Anta's freedom.

Galandou Diouf and Originaire Political Consciousness

Originaires found their educational and career opportunities circumscribed in the two decades before World War I. Separate cadres were created within the French bureaucracy; a *cadre métropolitain* and a *cadre colonial*. Previously, originaires had served in the same bureaucratic positions as equally qualified Frenchmen, but now they were relegated to the *cadre colonial*, with its lower pay and fewer opportunities for advancement.⁸ The school system that educated originaire children was reformed and secularized to meet general standards set for the AOF as a whole. However, these new schools were criticized by originaire politicians as substandard; their degrees were no longer comparable with those offered by French schools.⁹

Originaires felt that the French conquest of the interior was not living up to their expectations. Originaires had aided the conquest because they perceived French rule, with republican institutions, as a means to ensure future prosperity of commerce. The originaires protested the creation of the AOF federation because it deprived the old colony of Senegal of its preeminent status.¹⁰ The

⁸ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 332.

⁹ See ANS J 19 (124), in a letter from the Lieutenant Governor to the Governor General dated 10 March 1910 over protests about the reform of the educational system in the four communes.

¹⁰ ANS 4 E 6 (86), see General council of 29 July 1906 and the November 1904 session, located in 4 E 6 (15 to 39).

four communes became an isolated anomaly in the AOF, and in the spirit of protecting their threatened interests, the originaires began to combat the measures of 'large commerce' and the anti-democratic tendencies of the administration through political means.

Galandou Diouf was, in many ways, a superlative example of an African militant political originaire. Much of his early symbolic and social capital was derived from his family's circumstances. He was born in Saint-Louis in 1875, to John Legros Diouf, a *traitant*. Diouf family history holds that Diouf's paternal ancestors were of Serere aristocracy; they moved to Gorée and embraced Catholicism. Diouf's father, John, converted to Islam. On his mother's side Diouf came from a *grande famille* of *notables*. His mother's father, Déthié Guèye, was the chief of N'Galel in the late nineteenth century. His maternal family also had ties to royalty; a sister of his grandfather was married to Eli Djimbuett, son of Djimbeutt M'Bodj, Queen of Walo, and of Mohamed El Habib, Emir of Trarza.

Diouf's family, on both sides, allied with the French and participated actively in the campaigns of conquest in the 1880s and 1890s, thus purchasing capital as 'patriots' for the French cause in West Africa. Galandou Guèye and N'Diawar Yacine Guèye, Diouf's grandfather and grand-uncle respectively, were killed in battle fighting for Faidherbe in N'Gol. Kayré Sow and Maiael Guèye, two of his other grandfathers, were wounded respectively at Dilmath and Lore during

colonial campaigns. Diouf's uncle, Kéta Legros Diouf, also volunteered with Faidherbe and was killed in 1870 at Bapaume.¹¹

As mentioned in the previous chapter, John Legros, Diouf's father, was killed during the Bakel siege of Mamadou Lamine in 1885. Galandou was but eleven. This experience surely gave a kind of shared identity between Diouf's family and the French colonial enterprise. Diouf was imbued with symbolic capital by originaires, particularly ones with strong ties to Saint-Louis due to his father's demise in Bakel. In a larger sense, the experience at Bakel in 1885 made Saint-Louisiens and other Muslim originaires realize their shared fortunes with the French. Given his later rhetoric, Diouf grew up believing that his father's sacrifice was justified by the French promise of Republican rights and privileges. The Bakel sacrifice helps to account for Diouf's consistent patriotism and loyalty towards the greater French state.

For Diouf, the French were obliged to fulfill their promises to give Africans greater equality under the law. When Diouf ran up against the contradictions between French rhetoric and colonial reality, he was disillusioned and discouraged multiple times, but he never gave up believing that 'good' French men would fulfill their promises. Diouf's family had served Faidherbe, his father had died fighting with the French, and he, himself, would fight in the trenches of the Western Front during World War I. This lineage of sacrifice and duty was displayed to voters over the course of Diouf's career. Galandou Diouf was no stranger to the benefits, costs and contradictions of alliance with France.

¹¹ Mamadou Diallo, "Galandou Diouf: Homme politique sénégalais 1875-1941" (Memoire de maitrise, Université de Dakar, 1972), 17-19.

Galandou Diouf's primary education was conducted by the *Frères de Ploërmel*, and he later attended the short-lived Catholic secondary school in Saint-Louis. The *Frères de Ploërmel* operated Catholic schools throughout Senegal from 1841 to 1904. The brothers, with support from the French government, were to use the same manuals and the same pedagogical methods they employed in France. Senegalese educated at the Brothers' schools supplied the majority of public schoolteachers.¹² By 1903, the colonial administration had revoked certain books the *Frères de Ploërmel* utilized due to their "religious nature." They were replaced by books "truly secular and republican in outlook."¹³ Even though Diouf attended Catholic school, he was not forced to sacrifice his identity as a Muslim. Submission to French education became a tool of social promotion, and enhanced Diouf's symbolic capital and his ability to communicate in French and translate French culture and history.

After Diouf completed his studies, he began his career as a clerk in the postal service, which did not last long. He passed the examination to become a school teacher in 1897. The director of the school in Dagana, where he first worked, wrote in his administrative dossier, "good teacher, taking charge of his pupils and arriving at satisfactory results."¹⁴ Diouf was then sent to Niani to teach, where his knowledge of how to operate a Morse code telegraph machine

¹² Kristine Juul, "Nomadic Schools in Senegal: Manifestations of Integration or Ritual Performance?" in *Designing Modern Childhoods: History, Space, and the Material Culture of Children*, eds. Marta Gutman and Ning de Coninck-Smith (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 161.

¹³ Johnson, *The Emergence*, 141.

¹⁴ ANS 1 C 293.

came in handy. Again, he received the review of “good teacher.”¹⁵ It seems his people skills and his charisma were on display early in his career. But he left his post and refused to go back.

When Galandou Diouf had first arrived in Niani, the French administrator there would make sure he had provisions and regularly checked on him. When this particular administrator left, Diouf found his standard of living quickly decline. Diouf considered his current conditions a humiliation.¹⁶ The job of schoolteacher was a coveted appointment for many Senegalese, but Galandou Diouf’s identity as an originaire with certain ‘niceties’ of life conflicted with any benefit to be had from the career. The isolation and lack of urban amenities alienated Diouf, as did his treatment as someone less than a *citoyen*. It is evident he was not afraid to challenge French colonial authorities who refused to recognize him as equal. After he quit his teaching post, Diouf worked for the railway service for a number of years where he eventually became station master. It is not surprising Diouf would rapidly rise in rank given his industriousness and ambition, but Diouf wanted a place where he could be involved in securing France’s promises for Senegal.

Diouf began his business career as an accountant of the Moroccan merchant, Abdou Salam Boughreb in Dakar. In 1902, he began working for the merchant house Buhan and Teisseire, in Rufisque, where he became chief accountant. Employing his family contacts, Diouf began a career as a businessman. He seemed to have the knack for business, and soon prospered.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ From an oral interview with Papa Konaré, located in Diallo, “Galandou Diouf,” 19.

He bought land outside of Rufisque, cultivated it, and called himself a farmer. Diouf partnered with traders from Mauritania to buy cattle from Louga and sell them in Dakar.¹⁷ As Diouf increased his personal fortune, he became involved with François Carpot.

François Carpot was a leader in the Saint-Louisien métis community. He was elected deputy in 1902 by a coalition of métis interests. In April 1905 Deputy Carpot and other métis forces allied with African Muslims in Saint-Louis to pressure the colonial government to reinstall the Muslim court in the four communes.¹⁸ Originaire political force became apparent to both métis and French administrators. Originaires hoped that an alliance with métis political coalitions would give them greater power in their opposition to the loss of customs taxes that had previously been part of Senegal's coffers, but which would now be applied to the federal budget. Originaire politicians who had a stake in the interior wanted to regain some of the losses the community had recently suffered; Galandou Diouf was most prominent among them.

Diouf became Carpot's main lieutenant and representative for originaires and other important men in the Protectorate. Under Carpot, Diouf served a "political apprenticeship." Diouf began to strengthen his alliances in the Protectorate and became a spokesman for Protectorate interests to the communes. Diouf would continue the pattern throughout his career, building important symbolic capital and authority in both the Protectorate and commune. Diouf learned how to organize political meetings and conduct rallies. Diouf went

¹⁷ Secret Notice Concerning Galandou Diouf, Deputy of Senegal, perhaps written by Delthie Gueye, 1939, Galandou Diouf's family papers.

¹⁸ Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 134.

with Carpot to the houses of communal notables—Lebou, Muslim, métis. He established relationships. From Carpot, Diouf learned how to be a successful speaker, how to promote himself and how to raise campaign funds. Under his political apprenticeship with Carpot, Diouf also learned how integral coalition politics were in Senegal, and how effective originaires could be when they cooperated together against the colonial administration.

By 1908 Diouf was ready for the next step in his career. He had established himself in Rufisque as a businessman working for the Bourdeaux interests. These relationships and his knowledge of the political process in colonial Senegal became part of the foundation upon which Galandou Diouf's symbolic capital accumulated. Diouf was blessed with a natural gregariousness and charisma, which further enhanced his capital. He had earned a reputation among fellow originaires and with the French that he was no "yes-man." During the elections for the General Council in 1908, Diouf was elected representative from Rufisque, further cementing his symbolic and social position.

Diouf's election campaign of 1908 tended to appeal to Lebous, in particular.¹⁹ Demonstrating his canny political sense, Diouf campaigned for "increased local industry" to draw French support and "increased local justice" to woo Lebous. The significance of Diouf's election to Africans in West Africa was reflected in the congratulatory communiqués he received. One of particular note was sent from the Senegalese customs inspector in French Guiana, Blaise Diagne.²⁰ After being elected, Diouf joined the camp of Justin Devès, seeking to

¹⁹ G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics*, 146.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 147.

learn from Devès' political savoir-faire and organizational ability. Both Carpot and Devès served as models and tutored Diouf in organizing effective political campaigns.



Figure 3.2 [François Carpot, public domain.]

From the beginning the colonial regime found Diouf to be dangerous. The Lieutenant Governor felt compelled to mention in his official communiqués about the election that Diouf's victory was probably illegal, since he was not a French citizen.²¹ This accusation was completely unfounded, as Diouf was born in Saint-Louis and was currently residing in Rufisque. Fortunately, the governor general did not move against Diouf, and the election stood.

²¹ ANS 20 G 18. Elections. Results given in a communiqué from the Lieutenant Governor to the Governor General, dated 23 November 1909.

While the original impetus for the abolishment of the General Council came during the nineteenth century, Diouf's election to the General Council accelerated the French administration's instigation for change. On the second day of March 1908, right after Diouf was elected; General Ponty tried to sway his colleagues at the Department of the Colonies towards his proposal to create a Colonial Council to replace the General Council, believing the General Council was antagonistic towards the general organization of the AOF.²² The Department modified Ponty's proposal and suggested giving local inhabitants the same rights they had possessed in the General Council.

Ponty, whose main motive for the dissolution of the General Council was to constrain local rights, responded by sending documents outlining the differences between the Department's proposal and his own to the General Inspector. Indeed, Ponty's Colonial Council would only need to meet once a year because that was sufficient, he explained, due to the limited amount of power he proposed to give them. Ponty wrote, "the understanding originaires possessed was of a portion absolutely infinitesimally inferior" to the power they held.²³ Clearly they had shown their lack of understanding by electing men like Galandou Diouf to the Council.

The administration's concerns seemed further validated when Diouf became the spokesman of the Young Senegalese in the General Council, which secured his status as a 'radical' originaire. He was one of the first to denounce his former sponsor François Carpot when it seemed Carpot was prepared to

²² ANS 4 E 8, *Conseil General du Senegal*, 1911-1912.

²³ Ibid.

support Governor General Ponty's plans to limit or abolish the political rights of originaires. Diouf protested Carpot's presentation of a naturalization law in the French Chamber of Deputies that would have denied Muslims originaires the status of French citizens.²⁴ During Diouf's time in the General Council, he became a "thorn in the side" of the French government with his clear disgruntlement with French policies.²⁵ This reputation further built up Diouf's symbolic capital with his originaire constituency.

Diouf was vocal in his attempts to protect the Lebou. Diouf knew their support was crucial for his continued political success. He used the Colonial Council as a forum, as well as the press.²⁶ Galandou Diouf also took on grievances of working men early in his career, and he continued to support workers and the disadvantaged throughout his life. In the November 1912 session, Diouf pointed out the discrepancy between appointments for clerks and administrative cadres hired in France and those hired in Senegal. Africans had effectively been shut out of the highest rank in the civil service, the *cadre-général*. Cost of living increases given to French workers had been discontinued for African personnel holding the same rank. Diouf found it unfair that postal

²⁴ ANS 4 E 9 (4). General Council session of 12 October 1913.

²⁵ G. Wesley Johnson, "The Impact of the Senegalese Elite upon the French, 1900-1940," in *Double Impact: France and Africa in the Age of Imperialism*, ed. G. Wesley Johnson (Greenwood Press, 1985), 167.

²⁶ Diouf tended to collaborate with the newspaper *La Démocratie*. *La Démocratie* printed attacks on the administration's policy on the Lebou land question. It also alleged that the French army had evicted numerous Lebou from their fields near Ouakam on Cape Verde in order to hold cold-season maneuvers without any compensation to the Lebou. Diouf read French opposition newspapers like Clemenceau's *L'Homme Libre* and Jaurès's *L'Humanité*. *La Démocratie*, under the leadership of d'Oxoby, also ridiculed Henri Cor and Paul Brocard. The Governor General and other officials were satirized in a style similar to the Parisian press. G. Wesley Johnson, *Emergence*, 148, 151.

clerks from France did not have to take an entrance exam that was mandatory for Africans. Diouf also pointed out discrepancies in pay between African and French employees.²⁷ Galandou Diouf demonstrated political courage when he tackled such issues, and he built his social capital upon his reputation of being a 'man of the people,' someone who would defend the interest of the little guy in the communes. Diouf would remain true to this ideal throughout the course of his political career, which gave his constituency confidence in his integrity and further shored his symbolic capital.

From early in his career, Diouf moved between commune and Protectorate, a product of the communes, an originaire, but also a businessman with strong ties to the interior and an agenda as a political agent for Carpot. As Carpot, himself, described Diouf,

All who have followed political events in Senegal know that before he became one of the best lieutenants of Blaise Diagne, he was at my side for more than sixteen years. Until 1914 he fought with me against administrative authoritarianism and the egotism of large commerce.... We defended together the cause of the small man and the natives... We believed that if the Senegalese have a debt to the Europeans of the colony for bringing civilization and prosperity to the country, it must not be forgotten that the Senegalese is at home here, that he has the possession, if not the ownership, of the land, and that no one can deny him his place in the sun.²⁸

²⁷ Johnson, *Emergence*, 150-51.

²⁸ ANS 20 G 85 (23), Elections: Colonial Council, 1930. Campaign tract. Translation provided by J. Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 334.

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Originaires in the Protectorate

The French administration regarded the originaire trading communities in the interior as places of political activism and discontent.²⁹ Many of the *escales* in the interior had originaire communities. Originaires would often form mutual aid societies that incorporated political goals. In Dagana, for example, in 1900, such a society was formed under the patronage of François Carpot.³⁰ Originaires sought to carve out a social space outside of the arbitrary *indigénat* in the Protectorate. Colonial authorities, sensitive to the challenge of their authority, recognized the changing atmosphere in the Protectorate. By 1903, the Secretary-General of the AOF wrote about Podor,

The disposition of the population is less than satisfactory. One can sense hostility that is only restrained by the fear of reprisal; and certainly there is no sympathy for us. This state of feeling can be attributed in good part to the presence in the town of numerous Wolof merchants who have connections in Saint-Louis; some of them, who are voters in that city, often arrogantly refer to their status and to the influence that they supposedly have with certain political personalities in the capital or with business agents, who are increasingly getting mixed up in native affairs.³¹

In Kaolack, the French Commandant Brocard tried to disband a society he investigated. He wrote in a letter to the Lieutenant Governor,

The real goal of this association, although it is difficult to prove, is the creation in Kaolack of a Muslim political movement, independent of the local native authorities. This intention was clear from the time of my arrival in the *cercle*. Saër Guèye [the President of the association] describes himself as the village chief for the originaires from Saint-Louis, and clearly refuses to submit to the local hierarchy [the canton chief].³²

²⁹ See ANS 2 G 11 (42), on the cercle de Diourbel, report of November 1911, and 2 D 9-19, cercle de Louga, November 1915. The latter report emphasized that only the originaires of Louga refused to accept the authority of Samba Khary Cisse, the canton chief. See also Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 337.

³⁰ ANS 13 G 71 (12).

³¹ ANS 2 G 3 (7), translation provided by Johnson, *Emergence*, 132-33.

³² ANS 2 D 8 (15), translation from Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 338.

The French began an investigation into what they believed was a Muslim plot, to discover that in reality it was a mutual-aid society of the type found in many new urban centers in French and British West Africa. When Guèye was called to testify in court, he stated, "I am the president of an organization founded to aid, in case of need, all natives of Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque who live in or pass through Kaolack."³³ Brocard prosecuted the society's leaders anyway for 'misappropriating' funds that eighty-three members had paid in. All the members of the aforementioned societies were originaire traders. Administrators remained cautious about originaire organization and activity because their ideas and example could spread and affect the rest of the rural population.

In Baol, Galandou Diouf and Mody M'Baye organized a network for forwarding complaints against the administration through letters. In 1910, the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal issued an administrative directive to curtail the activities of the *écrivains publics*, who were the source of a growing number of complaints addressed to the government in Saint-Louis. The rural letter writer was a kind of rural notary, a lay lawyer, and a thorn in the administration's side; the administration insisted the public letter writers took advantage of their rural clients. But these letter writers could translate the grievances and petitions of those inhabitants of the Protectorate in a format the French would accept and recognize. Eventually, however, open letters to the French administration

³³ Johnson, *Emergence*, 133.

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became formal protests in the Protectorate, where abuses of the administration, the chiefs, and the bribery of officials became common fare.

The French did not appreciate this form of protest. Anonymous letters were no longer to be accepted, only those with the name and address of both the public writer and his client. Baol's Commandant Théveniaut decided not to deal with any letters of complaint because of the damage they were doing to his authority. As he wrote to the Lieutenant Governor,

The authority and prestige of the administrator has been diminished in the eyes of his subjects, who, due to the influence of these shady agents [*Diouf and M'Baye*], have come to consider the administrator not as a protector from whom one can demand assistance and protection, but as a tyrant whose caprices can be escaped through the great intelligence and influence of Galandou Diouf and Mody M'Baye, who claim they can place the native in direct contact with the head of the colony.³⁴

Governor General Ponty overruled Théveniaut's decision to stop accepting complaints because the Governor General knew such arbitrary decisions would only weaken the administration's authority and give credence to the claims of Diouf and M'Baye.³⁵

When Mody M'Baye was arrested by Commandant Brocard at Kaolack under the authority of the *indigénat*, M'Baye claimed exception through his status as an originaire and produced his election card (*carte d'électeur*) and a ballot showing his candidature for a position on the General Council.³⁶ M'Baye had

³⁴ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 339.

³⁵ Théveniaut's 'authoritarian manner' would be his undoing. When he wanted to put Cheikh Anta Mbacké in prison, Ponty warned him against the action. See Robinson, *Paths*, 222-23. Galandou Diouf's influence and reputation as a defender of African interests in Baol may have been the beginning of his profitable and long-standing relationship with Cheikh Anta.

³⁶ For a detailed description of the M'Baye's intrigues in the Protectorate, see Johnson, *Emergence*, 133-138.

been arrested for criticizing the administration in Sine-Saloum. Brocard hoped to use M'Baye as an example to all originaires that they were not exempt from the *indigénat* and not above the native law in the interior. His intention went awry, however, when Galandou Diouf became involved on M'Baye's behalf and Governor General Ponty ordered the release of M'Baye only one day after his arrest. Ponty did not publicly support M'Baye's claim to be exempt from the *indigénat*, but he did criticize Brocard for the arrest during a politically sensitive time in Europe and for attempting to force the French administration into making a major political decision about the status of the originaires.³⁷

This was not the only run-in Galandou Diouf had with Administrator Paul Brocard. In 1912, rumors of abuses in Sine-Saloum prompted Diouf to declare, in his role as a Colonial Councilor, that an inquiry should be done into the true state of affairs in the area. Diouf's 'gall' to question white French rural administrators' actions was radical at the time, and alienated some French colonists. Diouf also gave a speech in the Council about the lack of responsible criticism of French institutions and leaders in Senegal from the Senegalese press. He declared, "Our (local) institutions are in an enviable position compared to those of the great French nation, whose acts are held in check by the great tradition of the press in France... It's too bad that each newspaper in this colony kowtows to the government and winds up showering it with compliments... Words don't seem to be worth anything when we expendable Negroes write them."³⁸

³⁷ ANS 13 G 77, Document dated April 1913.

³⁸ Quoted from Johnson, *The Emergence*, 147-8.

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Diouf advocated for other inhabitants in the Protectorate as well. In 1910, the inhabitants of Dagana wanted the French-appointed chief Guibril Gaye removed from his office. The French resisted his removal, since Gaye had not done anything “discreditable.” Gaye had been appointed, however, upon a decision of an associate native affairs administrator; he had no symbolic capital and no authority with the local population. Galandou Diouf and Paul Sabourault, the French *écrivain public*, joined together in a successful attempt to have Gaye resign from the chieftainship.

Originaires in the Protectorate were more powerful vis-à-vis their rural cohabitants not just for the education and connections to politicians in Senegal, but also because they had access to outside agencies such as the *Ligue des Droits de l’Homme*, which took an active interest in complaints received from French citizens and subjects in the colonies. The Ligue had important connections of its own in the French Parliament and had previously set a precedent of conducting investigations in other colonies; Governor Ponty had no wish to bring the Ligue’s focus on Senegal, especially since he, himself, claimed membership in the humanitarian organization.

During June 1913, Mar Code Fall, an employee of a commercial firm, was arrested for his “disrespectful attitude.” His sentence was fifteen days in prison, but he was released after only serving four. The commandant in Diourbel discovered he was an originaire when protests from the originaire community in Baol began to pour in. Commander Théveniaut, who had become cautious of originaires, decided to release Fall, much to the chagrin and frustration of both

Govenor Cor and Governor General Ponty, who argued that Fall's premature release only served to confirm "that the natives of the Four Communes cannot be punished under the *indigénat*."³⁹ Théveniaut would not last the year in his post.

By 1912, African originaires in the Protectorate were excluded from voting outside the communes, unlike their French and métis counterparts. A 1912 legal reform sought to exclude African originaires even more by circumscribing citizenship only to those who had gone through a naturalization process. This would exclude most originaires because it was through communal residence that their citizenship was defined. The 1912 decree did not significantly alter life within the communes, but it had large ramifications for those originaires living in the Protectorate. The Muslim originaires living in Kayes and Médine opposed the decree as stridently as M'Baye and Diouf, and rested their arguments mainly on their identity as Muslims, intimating that they therefore were not a 'barbaric' African group. As originaires wrote in a petition to the Lieutenant-governor,

As a consequence of the Decree of 1912, we Wolof Muslims, who came from Senegal to bring commercial and industrial knowledge to this new country, we who are for the most part literate, [who] exercise a profession or a trade and who for a long time have been used to a modern civilization, we find ourselves currently being treated following this new decree like the most backward natives of the Soudan.⁴⁰

The French administrators to whom this appeal was made must have recognized the language and the sentiment, as their discourse resonated with France's civilizing mission. These Muslim originaires accused the administration of trying to force them to "assimilate" to native customs repugnant to their own.

³⁹ ANS 2 D 7(10), letter from the Lieutenant Governor to the Governor General, 31 July 1913.

⁴⁰ Quoted from Shereikis, "From Law to Custom," 279.

And while Shereikis states that these Africans were not arguing upon claims of their “assimilation,” I would argue that these originaires *were*, indeed, arguing upon such legal, rhetorical claims, and that they saw no disjunction between employing both their adherence to French ‘civilization’ and their fidelity to Islam.

If these originaires complained about the “local natives” and their practices, they assumed and expected that the French administrators reading these complaints would implicitly agree with them—because they understood that about French culture at the time. If the originaires stressed their literacy in French and their economic development of the Protectorate, they knew it was because the French valued such commodities. But the administration would not recognize these mutual interests and claimed discourses until the issue was forced by Blaise Diagne and Galandou Diouf. Indeed, Lieutenant-governor Angoulvant of the Ivory Coast wrote about originaires:

The Senegalese have a tendency to believe themselves superior and have manifested that pretension by the most absolute scorn of the customs and usages of the land where they come to do commerce. The fact that they take part in the election of the four communes does not confer upon them a more advanced civilization.⁴¹

So while originaires attempted to deploy France’s own discourse of assimilation and civilization to support their rights to a special status, the administration rejected that claim to a mutual discourse, and excluded them from its benefits. Of course, just because originaires and French employed the rhetoric of assimilation in discourse does not mean that the French did much assimilation in practice or that originaires assimilated to French culture. Rather, both groups

⁴¹ Shereikis, “From Law to Custom,” 281.

employed this discourse in the colonial field where both parties recognized that there was a disjuncture between rhetoric and reality.

The Election of 1914

By the time the campaigns for the 1914 deputyship election began, many originaires were ready for a change. François Carpot had made the mistake of admitting publicly that he believed originaires did not really possess French citizenship, but rather just the right to vote in local elections. While Carpot claimed that he was actually trying to fight for the extension of rights to more people in the Protectorate, the originaires were incensed. Galandou Diouf knew just the man to take Carpot's job.

Blaise Diagne was born on the island of Gorée in 1872, but for most of his adult life he lived outside of the colony of Senegal. He was 'adopted' by the elite métis family Crespin, located in Saint-Louis. The Crespin family made sure Diagne received an education in France, and secured him a place in the colonial customs service (*cadre supérieur*), in which he served from 1892 to 1914.

The service gave Blaise Diagne the opportunity to travel to other colonies and witness different forms of French imperialism. It separated him from local issues and politics in Senegal and also established his reputation as an originaire dedicated to pushing for African interests. As one of his superiors noted, "Monsieur Diagne is difficult to employ. Wherever he serves he causes his chiefs trouble and often draws violent protests from merchants. Some of his superiors,

on the other hand, consider him one of the most intelligent agents."⁴² He was stationed first in Senegal, and then in Dahomey, French Guiana, La Réunion, and Madagascar. Diagne's broad experience made him an ideal candidate to challenge French and métis dominance of the deputyship.




Figure 3.3 [Portrait of Blaise Diagne, ANS.]

In Diagne's view, Senegal was subject to an oppressive administrative system which was inferior to the French structure of the West Indies. It was not hard for Diouf to meld Diagne's preexisting dislike for a discriminating French

⁴² G. Wesley Johnson, *The Emergence*, 157. G. Wesley Johnson's works on Blaise Diagne are by far the most extensive and well researched data. The basic narrative of this section owes a debt to Johnson's work.

colonial system to originaires' concerns. Blaise Diagne sent a friend, François Pouye, a former inhabitant of Gorée, to Senegal to test the reaction of originaires to a new candidate for the deputy election of 1914. Pouye talked to many Africans, métis and French men and found a good deal of discontent and frustration among local inhabitants of the four communes. Pouye suggested Blaise Diagne as a candidate to many of those he talked to, but of all originaires, it was only Galandou Diouf that expressed any real interest in Diagne's proposed candidacy.⁴³

It was through Diouf, who was on the ground in Senegal, and other informants that Diagne was able to gain an understanding of the political situation in the colony. Diouf's perspective allowed Diagne to gain insight into originaires' outrage over Governor General Ponty's agenda to revoke their citizenship status. Galandou Diouf kept up a correspondence with Diagne, informing him of people's concerns. I argue that without Galandou Diouf in particular, and Mody M'Baye, Blaise Diagne would never have been elected to the position of deputyship in 1914.

Diouf capitalized upon his training with Carpot, and he had in Diagne a gifted public speaker. Diagne's rallies and speeches were held on a grand scale, directed toward a mixed audience of métis, originaires and Europeans. Diagne could be conceived as a bridge between ethnicities, religions, race, and incomes. That is the true uniqueness of the 1914 election—Diagne was Senegal's first true coalition politician.⁴⁴ But it takes lieutenants to form coalitions. Is it not likely that

⁴³ Ibid., 152.

⁴⁴ See ANS 17 G 234 (108), Dossier Blaise Diagne, 1914; and 20 G 21 (68).

his first lieutenant and right-hand man, Galandou Diouf, who had been part of this Senegalese political world for six years as an elected official, would shape Diagne's discourses? Diagne's ability to reverberate with originaires in Senegal came from his own passion and extraordinary speaking skills combined with Diouf's experience and knowledge. Diouf had what Diagne did not. Diouf's experience, knowledge, and education all were shaped primarily by Senegal, where he lived and worked. Galandou Diouf had symbolic and social capital with many inhabitants of the four communes who were not 'assimilated.' Blaise Diagne, on the other hand, had not lived in Senegal for many years prior to his campaign, and was an unknown before he stepped foot in the colony just months before the election.

Diagne was able to rally together the Young Senegalese, only with the direct help of Mody M'Baye and his network of public letter writers and civil servants, Galandou Diouf, Jules Sergent, and Daramy d'Oxoby. M'Baye was put in charge of obtaining the vote for Diagne from originaires living in the interior; he was also second overall in command. Galandou Diouf was Diagne's chief lieutenant and campaign manager. Diouf would tell the crowds assembled to hear Diagne, "The time had come for the black mice to begin to eat the white mice."⁴⁵ Diagne spoke passable Wolof, but he never campaigned in the language. Diouf spoke in Wolof for him.

⁴⁵ Secret Notice on Galandou Diouf, clearly a colonial document, from the papers of the Diouf family.

Diagne's success was also due to the deep and lasting connection to the Lebou community of Gorée, in which he was born and spent his youth.⁴⁶ This small community could not, however, garner enough votes to propel Diagne into the deputyship. Galandou Diouf worked hard to bring the Lebou of Rufisque and Dakar, far greater in number, in alignment behind Diagne. Diagne was able to garner the support of the grand Lebou marabout Assane N'Doye, who believed it was time to jettison the European political machine. Importantly, Diagne was able to tap into the deep-seated dissatisfaction many Lebou felt about land rights; Diouf understood this and helped Diagne capitalize upon it.

Corollary to this were the public health regulations the municipality of Dakar had followed. The legislative elections of 1914 occurred during an outbreak of the plague. This was the first time Dakar had felt the ravages of the bubonic plague and colonial reaction was swift once the disease had been confirmed in early May. During the run-off election municipal authorities in Dakar were busy burning huts in which African plague victims had lived.⁴⁷ The Lebou rioted in the aftermath of the election because they had heard that the French were going to burn their compounds as a punishment for supporting Diagne. The French admitted their own frustration with Lebou society and French health edicts. As Antonetti wrote,

The requirements imposed by our sanitation and health services, completely legitimate in a city that has suffered three outbreaks of yellow fever, one of plague and one of smallpox within the last three years, irritates the Lebou beyond all reason.... At the beginning of the current epidemic of plague, the Lebou threatened to violently resist the execution

⁴⁶ ANS 17 G 233 (108).

⁴⁷ Raymond Betts, "The Establishment of the Medina in Dakar, Senegal, 1914," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 41, 2 (April 1972), 144.

of sanitary measures and we were forced to call in the military. They were opposed to us removing the dead, which kept them from carrying out funeral customs, most notably the washing of the dead, which they said 'could create difficulties for them on their arrival in the other world.'⁴⁸

It is not surprising that the Lebou were ready for a more culturally sensitive candidate, such as Blaise Diagne.

D'Oxoby, the flamboyant French journalist and *petit colon*, gave Diagne a public forum with his paper, *La Démocratie*. This format was perfect for reaching educated métis and expatriate French men. The newspaper was also read aloud to illiterate originaires. D'Oxoby made Diagne the "political director," and had his name printed in large letters on the masthead of each issue.⁴⁹ Mody M'Baye, Thiécouta Diop, Amadou N'Diaye Dugay-Clédor, Galandou Diouf and other originaires would contribute to the columns of *La Démocratie*. The newspaper's candor and satire was a standard rarely again matched in French West Africa.

Jules Sergent, who owned several taverns and later a newspaper, also helped win the support of the many *petits colons* and small businessmen to Diagne. Sergent raised money for the campaign, including adding some of his own. Aside from the support of these influential and energetic men, Diagne's success also came from his waging of a political campaign that echoed nineteenth-century American campaigns with its whistle-stop agenda. Diagne knew he was the unknown candidate, and he sought to ameliorate this by traveling throughout Senegal, particularly utilizing the Dakar—Saint-Louis railway. His campaign included rallies, evening *palabres*, and house-to-house

⁴⁸ ANS 20 G 21.

⁴⁹ Johnson, *Emergence*, 163. For a detailed account of the 1914 election and campaign, see 154-77.

visits, much of which was organized by his lieutenants, particularly Diouf. He tried to bridge differences, asking Lebou and Wolof, Tijani and Murid to support him.

Some Muslim leaders believed French 'citizenship' in the four communes had the potential to be incompatible with Islam, so to overcome their hesitations, it was important to have the Muslim Galandou Diouf campaigning in these areas for the Catholic Diagne. Diagne's campaign promises to further their interests swayed many African originaire notables who were illiterate and unversed in much of the elite politics, but who still had a serious and important stake in the game.

The Muridiyya responded to Diagne's promises. Amadu Bamba and his brother Cheikh Anta Mbacké raised and donated a significant amount of the funds that made Diagne's campaign a solvent possibility. It is possible that Amadu Bamba had been introduced to Diagne during the former's exile in Gabon. This seems unlikely, but it was circulated to originaire Muslim voters in the communes that Diagne had a personal relationship with Bamba.⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, many Murids assumed that Diagne's success would translate into protection from French persecution.

While the Murids were thrilled with Diagne's victory, as were the Young Senegalese, the Lebous, Senegalese expatriate groups in Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Serere peasants who probably believed Diagne would give

⁵⁰ I have not been able to locate any independent verification of Diagne's supposed relationship with Bamba. The Murids had financially supported François Carpot's campaign in 1902; they were rewarded later when Carpot arranged for Bamba's release from exile.

them back lands taken from them by the Wolof centuries earlier, many were not happy with the 1914 election results. The Ministry of Colonies in Paris demanded an explanation from underlings. The older generation of Saint-Louisien Wolofs accused their juniors of selling out to the Lebou and Diagne. Ponty was ambivalent, but he did not try to have the election invalidated, which he could have done.

Acting Governor Antonetti, on the other hand, believed the future consequences of the election would be dire. For Antonetti, Diagne's victory had created a new, irrational political climate that could become dangerous. Antonetti perceived part of that danger in the large generational component of Diagne's victory. The younger Senegalese—and their ideas—were a force to be reckoned with. Antonetti also recognized that Diagne's aggressive campaigning had been a large factor in his victory. As Antonetti commented,

Diagne had his newspaper, he campaigned mightily... he spoke in public on a platform. He exalted the most secret African desires: 'Today him, tomorrow me.' He opened a door through which all hoped to pass. They dreamed of the public offices they would have. The General Council, the municipal councils—all of it would fall into their hands.⁵¹

It was not just certain colonial administrators who believed Diagne's victory to be the dawn of a new era.

Even after all the counting was done, and Diagne's run-off victory was successful, the calculating Justin Devès sought to overturn Diagne's election. He came before the Electoral Commission in Saint-Louis, which validated election results, and demanded that Diagne's victory be annulled; the main argument presented by Devès, Heimburger, and Théveniaut was that Diagne was not a

⁵¹ ANS 20 G 21, quoted from Johnson, *Emergence*, 174.

French citizen was thus ineligible to sit in the Chamber.⁵² The Bordeaux merchants supported the protest, as did other French colonial interests. The protest went nowhere but still Devès did not give up hopes of controlling the deputyship. He arranged for Heimbürger to become a “special consultant” to the Ministry of Colonies. The General Council of Senegal, which Devès controlled, voted an annual salary for Heimbürger. But when the man actually showed up at the office of the Ministry of Colonies, he was told by the *Chef de Cabinet* that the Minister would not receive “this kind of deputy, elected outside of constitutional law.”⁵³ Finally, Devès realized the limits of his power in this case, and Heimbürger disappeared from the political scene.

Blaise Diagne was riding a crest of popularity with his consolidated victory. He had accrued significant symbolic capital in the process; his election brought hope to originaires that a greater share of the government would now be theirs. Diagne’s education, his experience, and his fluidity in French allowed him to build capital among a European and métis population as well. At the beginning of his career he pushed back against the influence of the Bordeaux firms and the colonial administration. World War I would allow Diagne to garner even more prestige as he led a successful recruitment drive in West Africa. At the same time, his position as an agent of colonialism began to undermine his symbolic capital with Africans, even as he secured a measure of significant recognition of originaire rights.

⁵² Johnson, *Emergence*, 176.

⁵³ *La Démocratie*, 16 May 1916, quoted in Johnson, *Emergence*, 177.

The Influence of the Great War

World War I would prove to be a watershed event for Senegalese and French history, and the relationships between French and Africans. The imperial ideology of the *mission civilisatrice* was re-evaluated and re-deployed as colonial humanism. Beyond ideology there was a definite need for more men on the western front. Even before the war began the big practical question was whether African troops would be used as soldiers or even workers in the European theater. By 1915, the answer was an emphatic yes, but it was not uncontested.⁵⁴

However, West Africa became a source of soldiers for the European front.⁵⁵ Indeed, Africans fought valiantly at Verdun and fell disastrously in Nivelle. Whom to recruit, how, and when was another main issue surrounding the war. The recruitment law of 1912 authorized the raising of 7,000 to 10,000 soldiers a year in the AOF. This law applied to Africans in the Protectorate regions, and resistance to it became so serious that Governor General Ponty suspended it in early 1914 in favor of voluntary enlistment.⁵⁶ The suspension did not last long, but it was a clear indicator that the colonial regime needed assistance in recruiting Africans to war.

⁵⁴ C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, "France, Africa, and the First World War," *The Journal of African History* 19, 1 (1978), 15.

⁵⁵ For more information about the arguments surrounding the use of African soldiers, and the resolution of that discussion, see Charles J. Balesi, *From Adversaries to Comrades in Arms: West Africans and the French Military 1885-1918* (New York: African Studies Association, 1979), and the first part of Marc Michel's *L'Appel à l'Afrique: contribution et réactions de guerre en AOF* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982), 1-39. For a detailed and excellent study of the *tirailleurs sénégalais* from their beginnings throughout decolonization, see Myron Echenberg's *Colonial Conscripts*. For a social analysis of Malian soldiers who served France's empire and how it affects the relationship between France and West Africa today, see Gregory Mann, *Native Sons*.

⁵⁶ Michel, *L'Appel*, 33.

For Blaise Diagne, the issue of recruitment was a political windfall and was instrumental in the development of his future career. The astute politician used the circumstances to bring the conflicted status of originaires in the French empire to a head. As World War I broke out, many originaires advocated their right to serve in the regular French army. Blaise Diagne was in France, performing his duties as deputy. He had only taken his seat six weeks before, in spite of several challenges to the legitimacy of his election. Shortly after the war had started, Diagne communicated with his right-hand man, Galandou Diouf, and in order to stir up patriotic support, the contents of this communication were printed on the pages of *La Démocratie* on 11 August 1914. Parts of the published telegraph from Diagne to Diouf:

In light of yesterday's events, I appeal to you to ask the administration to allow us to defend our own territory by enlisting, for the duration of the war, in the French corps stationed in Senegal... [The French] should recognize that all our people are worthy of the rights and duties of citizens, especially after my election. Notify the Governor General and our compatriots of this, while I tell the Ministry.⁵⁷

Diouf, the newspaper asserted, responded back the next day with an approval, a promise to do as Diagne had asked, and a "Bravo!"

Galandou Diouf wrote letters advocating the cause of originaires who wished to serve in the French army rather than in the *tirailleurs sénégalais*.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ *La Démocratie*, 11 August 1914.

⁵⁸ See ANS 4 E 26. On 17 November 1915, Diouf sent a letter asking for an audience with the Governor General, so that he and the representatives of Rufisque could discuss the situation of the majority of the inhabitants in Rufisque, who had not the ability to produce a "pièce légale" to certify that they were originaires. These inhabitants wanted to become certified as originaires in order to "remplir leur devoir de bons Français." Signed by Diouf and eight other municipal councilors of Rufisque, of whom six signed their names in Arabic script.

Diagne instructed the *originaires* not to enlist in the colonial troops, or the *tirailleurs sénégalais*, until their citizenship was insured and they could join the French army. Petitions to the Governor General were circulated and signed by young men in Rufisque who claimed they needed a special “supplemental judgment” to certify them as *originaires* because, although born in the commune, their parents had failed to register their births with the authorities.⁵⁹ Galandou Diouf was the man on the ground persuading the *originaires*; he was successful in getting the General Council to endorse Diagne’s position.⁶⁰ Diouf had moved from campaign manager and first lieutenant of Diagne to the man who managed local politics in Diagne’s absence.

Diagne appealed to the Chamber of Deputies in October 1915 for *originaires* to have the right to serve in the French army. He couched his petition in nationalistic terms: *originaires* desired to fulfill their patriotic duties as Frenchmen. The citizenship question was answered; *originaires* could enlist in the army.⁶¹ The text read: “The *originaires* of the *communes de plein exercice* of Senegal are... to be incorporated in French units and subject to the same obligations and advantages.”⁶² This law made all *originaires* citizens, but did not exactly define to whom that applied. The subtext of the law insisted that only those born in Dakar, Rufisque, Gorée and Saint-Louis were entitled to protection under the 1915 law. Thus, there were two types of French citizenship: one for those from the *métropole*, and another for the four communes since children born

⁵⁹ ANS 4 D 26, letter dated Rufisque 17 November 1915.

⁶⁰ ANS 13 G 72.

⁶¹ Michael C. Lambert, “From Citizenship to Negritude,” 244–45.

⁶² ANS 4 D 21 (9), Recruitment, *originaires*, law of 19 October 1915.

of metropolitan citizens were automatically considered French, while originaire children were not.⁶³ The law of 29 September 1916 declared that not only were originaires citizens, but that their children were also. The law also made it possible for non-originaires to attain citizenship through marriage to an originaire, and made the children of such products automatic originaire citizens.⁶⁴ What the law really said was that originaires and their children, regardless of where they were born, were most definitely French citizens.

Diagne came back to Senegal to reinforce the advantage he felt originaires had won with the new recruitment law. After all, the flip side of the law was that now originaires were not exempt from military service; they were expected to volunteer for duty. Diagne, Diouf and other lieutenants claimed complete responsibility for the law, and they held a series of public meetings. In these meetings Diagne was careful to explain the benefits of the law and to emphasize the difference it made between the originaires and the subjects of the AOF.⁶⁵ In Saint-Louis, the law was enthusiastically embraced, but in Dakar and Rufisque, the Lebou were more wary of its implications.

The Wolof, who were more familiar with the French and thus had an immediate understanding of the victory the law represented, showed their support by volunteering. Of the first 150 volunteers, only three were Lebou; the rest were Wolof. As a French administrator noted about the hesitancy of Lebou

⁶³ Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 27.

⁶⁴ ANS 17 G 47 (17), Juridical statute of the four communes. Before this, children of marriages between originaires and *sujets* had to go through a maddening and often unsuccessful citizenship process.

⁶⁵ ANS 4 D 24 (68), Originaire recruitment, Lieutenant Governor Antonetti to the Governor General, 2 January 1916, and 4 D 20 (158), Originaire recruitment, 19 January 1916.

elders, “..notably [the Lebou believe] white soldiers drink alcohol, eat pork, and don’t say their prayers. [The Lebou elders] believe that their children will be uprooted by this new life and lost to their religion.”⁶⁶ Two hundred Lebou men were arrested in Rufisque, for example; the charge against them—they refused to be recruited because their elders believed the originaire Lebou were exempt from service.

Recruiting originaires turned out to be such a headache, French administrators had serious doubts the small numbers were worth the efforts. Diagne promised full cooperation to the military authorities, but they felt he willfully impeded progress. General Pineau, who was the *Commandant Supérieur* in the AOF, was plagued by Diagne, who protected originaire recruits and represented their interests in a stream of litigious complaints. Pineau accused Diagne of using recruits as spies within the military, and even thought about transferring all the originaires to Morocco or France to escape Diagne’s influence.⁶⁷ Outside of Diagne’s perceived interference, originaire recruitment became a bureaucratic nightmare.

Because originaires had the status of French citizens, they were recruited according to French law procedures. This meant that civil records such as birth registrations were employed to compile lists of eligible recruits based upon date of birth. The problem, however, was that many Muslim parents did not register their children. Those records that did exist were tricky. A man could be born

⁶⁶ Searing, “Accommodation and Resistance,” 409.

⁶⁷ ANS 4 D 20. A series of letters from Pineau to his superiors and to Diagne.

with one name, live under another, and die with a third.⁶⁸ Voting lists were unreliable as well; oral testimony from local notables, who verified the identity of electors before voting cards were distributed, could not be used for recruitment purposes under French law. Needless to say, the paperwork unleashed for the colonial officers was staggering.⁶⁹

Diagne, with his understanding of operations in colonial Senegal, which was gleaned from men like Galandou Diouf, recommended the use of oral testimony to establish eligibility and identity of originaires for recruitment purposes. A man's name, place and date of birth could be established in the *jugements supplémentifs*, during which two to three witnesses gave evidence for said identity. The danger this held, according to the French administration, was the 'creation' of new originaires who would all be Diagnistes. An African seeking such status only needed to find a willing witness, who perhaps had received a gift to enhance cooperation. The different experience the French colonial administration had between recruiting *tirailleurs* and originaires was startling. In fifteen days one person, the Administrator of Saloum, raised 2300 *tirailleurs*. It took twenty-five employees three months to raise 700 men in Saint-Louis.⁷⁰

Beyond the huge political consequences derived from originaires serving in the French army, there was a practical aspect to this victory as well. There was a difference in condition of service between citizens and subjects, and it was well known in colonial Senegal. The term of service was longer for a subject.

⁶⁸ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 423.

⁶⁹ For the recruitment of 6000 originaires, ten large dossiers exist in ANS 4 D 20 to 4 D 30; this in comparison with the fewer and smaller dossiers documenting the recruitment of over 20,000 *tirailleurs* in Senegal.

⁷⁰ ANS 4 D 24 (68), Antonetti's report on originaire recruitment.

The pay, food and perquisites were considerably lower than for citizens. The enlistment premium for an originaire was 500 to 800 francs, but only 50 francs for a *tirailleur*. Originaires in the French army had better housing, better family benefits, and better retirement benefits than a *tirailleur*. Petty originaire officers had the same family indemnity as a European, but a *tirailleur* only received an indemnity separation of 15 francs per month. If the originaire was stationed in France, his family could receive up to 240 francs a month. Originaires were guaranteed a bed, covers, mosquito nets, mattresses, etc., just like a European soldier, but a *tirailleur* was promised nothing but a place to sit. Originaires in the French army were also to be provided the same food as Europeans, but since many of them were Muslim, they were to be paid 3 francs 76 for their wine ration. For the entire food ration of a *tirailleur*, only 1 franc 68 was appropriated.⁷¹

A citizen may have been given an opportunity to learn a profitable peacetime skill, but the African subject learned few if any skills or trades beyond that of infantryman. Opportunities for advancement were more limited for subjects, and they were also exposed to indignities many originaires would have found abhorrent (not that subjects found them pleasant). For example, medical exams for subject inductions took place in public with the men completely naked.⁷² Administrators were concerned that the marked difference in status and privilege between originaires and *tirailleurs* in the French armed service would politicize subjects in the interior. The subjects in the interior would “not be able to

⁷¹ ANS 17 G 233 (108), “Comparison entre la situation militaire des originaires et celle des indigenes.”

⁷² Myron Echenberg, “Paying the Blood Tax: Military Conscription in French West Africa, 1914-1929,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 9, 2 (1975), 175.

suppress their admiration for politics, which generated so many desirable advantages for their neighbors in the Four Communes.”⁷³

The French administrator Antonetti believed that by affording originaires such status based solely on birth place, the administration had unfairly given privilege to the originaires over those in the Protectorate. Indeed, Antonetti emphasized that the native chiefs had set the example by making sure their sons and nephews enlisted in the *tirailleurs*. All the great families of Senegal in the Protectorate such as the Damels and the Burbas had sent their sons. These men, who were educated in *medersas* and trained to become rural leaders, were incensed by originaires—whom they held as inferior—who claimed they were the true French soldiers and not “mercenaries” like the *tirailleurs*.⁷⁴

Some leading French military leaders did not believe recruitment of Africans would be beneficial to French goals, whether in the French army as originaires or as *tirailleurs*. Indeed, of the great number of recruits presented by the chiefs, very few actually possessed the physical qualities that would allow the French to declare them fit for service.⁷⁵ Choosing men who were ineligible for service was most likely a ploy utilized by chiefs who were trying to limit the number of men who went off to war from their area.

Governor General Van Vollenhoven, who was Governor General from May 1917 to January 1918, believed that massive recruitment of Africans would

⁷³ ANS 17 G 233 (108), report on Diagne, around 1921.

⁷⁴ ANS 4 D 24 (68). It is worth noting that Blaise Diagne was an advocate for *tirailleur* concerns as well. He convinced the French command to pull their African troops out from the front during the winter months and allow them to stay in the south of France, for example.

⁷⁵ ANS 4 D 26, report.

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have a debilitating political and economic impact upon the continent. One of the major goals of his administration was to suspend the recruitment of Africans. But President Clemenceau and French public opinion counted more than Van Vollenhoven's protests. Governor Van Vollenhoven would ultimately resign his commission and throw himself to the lions on the battlefields of Europe. Part of Van Vollenhoven's disgust with the process originated with his sense that he had been made to share authority with Diagne. Diagne's enemies declared that Van Vollenhoven, who preferred death to dishonor, "gloriously died facing the enemy," while Diagne was more heralded in Paris by the government and Parliament as "a savior of the Fatherland."⁷⁶

The French public thought it only fair that the colonies "repay" the métropole for their sacrifice in establishing the colony. France's desperate need for manpower and the public's acceptance of the *mission civilisatrice* made colonial recruitment a foregone conclusion. As one French man put it to the Chamber of Deputies in France, "We have brought to our colonies prosperity and peace. We have delivered them from epidemics, raids, periodic famines, and civil wars. We have shed the most precious of our blood to ward off the great invaders and the slave merchants."⁷⁷ This statement masked the violence and dislocation of colonial expansion, and was a clear expression of the civilizing mission. France then appealed to its colonial subjects to participate in the war in the language of a reciprocal relationship. This was very similar to Diagne's

⁷⁶ ANS 17 G 233 (108), "Biographie de M. Diagne (attitude en Métropole)."

⁷⁷ Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 24.

rhetoric that asserted originaires' willingness to enlist in the army in return for permanent and legal citizenship status from France.

The inclusion of originaires into French units, under the same laws and military regime as French citizens, went a long way toward fulfilling Diagne's campaign promise to secure originaire claims to French citizenship. Galandou Diouf, by this point the father to seven children, volunteered to give an example to all Senegalese. By volunteering to fight in World War I as an originaire—recognized as a French citizen in the French army—Diouf gave legitimacy to Diagne's claims about the loyalty of originaires and his ability to deliver upon African recruits. In some ways, as Diagne's first lieutenant and representative in Senegal, Diouf was serving for Diagne.

Galandou Diouf fought bravely in World War I, earning several commendations. He was made a sergeant before his first year in the service was out. Diouf was an African fighting in the trenches alongside French men. On 10 September 1915, during the Battle of the Somme, Diouf's division, the 43^{ème} Division d'Infanterie, cited him for assistance he rendered to the 23^{ème} Bataillon de Chasseurs. Diouf engaged the enemy under heavy bombardment during his assist.⁷⁸ Diouf wrote a letter to the Chamber of Deputies after the passing of Diagne's law, in which he stated, "We are very happy to spill our blood for France, country of justice and liberty."⁷⁹

Like many African men, Diouf witnessed for the first time the weakness and destruction of European men. African impressions of European society

⁷⁸ ANS 23 G 100 (174); Eulogy of Galandou Diouf, by Maurice Guèye, Mayor of Rufisque in 1950.

⁷⁹ Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 27.

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falling apart affected their beliefs and interpretation of the colonial experience.

Africans realized that Europe was also composed of workers and farmers, and not just the elites of commerce and administration, with whom they had the most contact in Africa. To watch a young, white man engaged in manual labor was a revelation for many Africans. Galandou Diouf fought in the front lines of World War I, in the blood and the mud, at some of the war's most famous battles like Passchendaele.

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Figure 3.4 [Galandou Diouf in French WWI uniform, ANS.]

In 1917, Diouf's company commander, Captain Pascal, recommended Diouf for the *Médaille Militaire* with the following citation, "During the attacks of the Aisne, this elite *Sous-Officier*, courageous and audacious, was ready to fulfill all dangerous missions against the enemy. With his squad, even while wounded in the knee, he defended the access to our trenches with extraordinary violence,

using grenades.”⁸⁰ Galandou Diouf also was awarded the *Croix de Guerre*. Diouf earned a thirty percent pension and was awarded the *Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur* for his service in the war. He was also wounded and war-weary by 1918, when he came home attached to the mission Diagne.⁸¹ As a reward for his service, Blaise Diagne made him his chief assistant during Diagne’s appointment as commissar of colonial troops.

Although originaire recruitment had not been a boon to France’s war effort, Blaise Diagne had been appointed as Commissar of the Republic by Clemenceau’s government. Diagne was much better liked and respected in Paris than he was by administrators in the colony. In the words of Clemenceau, Diagne was chosen because of “the strong influence he can personally exercise on his racial brothers.”⁸² Another recruitment campaign was to be led by Blaise Diagne in his new capacity of Commissar. The status of Commissar was supposed to give Diagne stature and authority equal to that of a governor general in West and Equatorial Africa. With this position came a wealth of symbolic capital for Diagne. Here Diagne was awarded a rank that put him above most colonial administrators. His originaire constituency reveled in the moment.

Blaise Diagne threw himself into his new position with characteristic gravité and commitment. Again, he utilized the political strategies that had worked so well for him the past; he communicated with his constituency. Diagne organized a *grand palabre* in Dakar for canton and province chiefs, during which

⁸⁰ ANS 23 G 100 (174). This was probably the Second Battle of the Aisne, which was disastrous for the French army and resulted in several French divisions mutinying.

⁸¹ Secret notice on Galandou Diouf, from Diouf family papers.

⁸² Quoted in Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 35.

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he attempted to convince them of France's commitment to reward those who provided service during France's time of need. He promised chiefs there would be a "new understanding of their position."⁸³




Figure 3.5 [Blaise Diagne's arrival in Dakar, 1918 as *haut commissaire du gouvernement pour le recrutement des troupes noires*, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

Similar meetings were held in the major *escales* of Senegal for rural notables and originaires living in the Protectorate. Diagne made sure to use his connections well. In Diourbel, he met with Amadu Bamba. Bamba and his brothers recruited six hundred Murid volunteers after this meeting.⁸⁴ Diouf may have been at this meeting as well. Galandou Diouf was a personal friend of Cheikh Anta M'Backe, and Diouf's youngest daughter ardently affirmed that

⁸³ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 431.

⁸⁴ ANS 4 D 76 (2), recruitment in 1918.

Galandou was a friend to the Murid.⁸⁵ Diagne also handed out medals and honors to those who came to hear him speak.⁸⁶ Diagne knew how to create effective propaganda for himself and his purposes. He went out surrounded by an impressive entourage of European subordinates. An equally important part of his social capital came from the African members of his traveling committee, which included a large number of heavily decorated *tirailleurs* and three African officers. Galandou Diouf, who held the rank of lieutenant, was his most important African supporter on the voyage.

Galandou Diouf also had the opportunity to make important connections during this mission. Diouf met and became friends with Pierre-Alype, who became governor; they stayed in touch during the whole of Diouf's lifetime through written correspondence.⁸⁷ At the core of Diagne's success lay his canny understanding of politics in the Protectorate, which was surely due to Galandou Diouf's influence. Before Diagne's drive, outsiders to a community were often seized first to fulfill recruitment obligations. More sons and nephews of chiefs were enlisted in 1918, as a direct result of Diagne's voyage, than at any other time in the war. In the Protectorate he appealed, not to the new men imposed by the French, but to those who really held authority in their village communities.⁸⁸

During the war, 180,000 black Africans, one percent of French West Africa's population, served in France, both in the regular army and as *tirailleurs*

⁸⁵ Secret notice on Galandou Diouf, colonial document, in Diouf family holdings, and interview with Diouf's youngest daughter conducted in Rufisque, 2003.

⁸⁶ ANS 4 D 83 (56) and 4 D 76 (2).

⁸⁷ Diouf family documents.

⁸⁸ Michel, *L'Appel*, 233, 255.

sénégalais.⁸⁹ A small number of Africans were also exposed to new ideas: revolutionary socialism, democracy, and a whole range of pan-African ideologies on the war, colonialism, the relationship of power and race, and the future of blacks in a white society. Veterans who returned from the front and Africans who had worked in European factories and ports carried new ideas and attitudes back home. The massive demands of the war on France were felt in the staffing and running of colonies. European presence was at a bare minimum; the loyalty and service of African elites who cooperated were lauded and appreciated.

At the same time, nationalist thought and agendas began a new kind of threat to colonial rule. In the flush and relief of victory, France promised its colonies rewards. The Sarraut plan was the most ambitious program, and was to be paid for with loans from the French government.⁹⁰ It failed due to a lack of funds, but the plan provided a guide for self-financed colonial projects of the interwar years. *Mise en valeur* was the catch phrase for the interwar years, even though the colonies were left to fall back on their own financial resources.

Politicians and their careers were strengthened during World War I. The Muridiyya and the Malikiyya were strengthened by their accommodation to French needs. Diagne's election was validated due in large part to his successful drive to recruit West African soldiers for the French war effort. The originaires would win recognition of their French citizenship, partly as a result of political conditions created by the war. Diagne's successful recruiting mission in

⁸⁹ Crowder, "The 1914-1918 European War and West Africa," in *History of West Africa*, eds., J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (Essex: Longman, 1974): 495.

⁹⁰ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 363-64.

1918 would earn him an offer of the Legion of Honor, but Diagne refused it, saying he had but one goal, to be of service to France.⁹¹

The experience of serving in the French military, whether as a *tirailleur* or as an originaire in the French army, was a profound one. Many men in West Africa would define themselves as veterans for the rest of their lives. Look at the words of M'Bakhane Lat-Dior Diop, chief of the M'Bayar Nianing canton,

During the difficult times of 1914 to 1918, the love and attachment of black people for France.. compelled them to send help and to contribute in the gigantic struggle that France made against invaders on her soil... The voluntary offer of our lives that we, inhabitants of the old colonies have made, is the clearest proof of our love... I was the first Senegalese chief to register during the recruitment of 1918 and I received the Cross of the Legion of Honor from the hands of the illustrious General Archinard, at the Trocadéro in Paris. You can be sure, Mr. Minister, that our cadets are ready to follow in our footsteps if our motherland were attacked again.⁹²

Galandou Diouf received more from the war than medals and injuries; he could invoke his battle front experiences to demonstrate his understanding of duty, sacrifice and courage to both Africans and French. Diouf resonated with fellow veterans because of their shared, transformative experience, and throughout his subsequent political career he would exploit this symbolic capital. French colonial authorities believed the indigenous populations in the colonies and in the métropole regarded African war veterans as a “legitimate voice in discussions of the real France and the true nature of African society.”⁹³

⁹¹ ANS 17 G 233 (108), biographie of M. Diagne.

⁹² ANS 17 G 220 (104), discourse pronounced by Mr. M'Bakhane Lat-Dior Diop, chief of the canton of M'Bayar Nianing, on the occasion of the passage to Thiès of Mr. Marius Moutet, Minister of the Colonies, and Mr. de Coppet, Governor General of the AOF, 1930s.

⁹³ Quoted from French administrator in James Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 17.

Galandou Diouf would prominently display his status as a “former combatant” on his campaign flyers and placards. Upon his arrival in Paris he declared, “In 1914, the Senegalese were sent to all the fields of battle to spill their blood as children of France in order to save the peace of the world. And if by misfortune, it is once more necessary to demand the same sacrifice, they are always ready... I have the motto of all Republican veterans: Neither fascism nor nationalism.”⁹⁴ Diouf would maintain his membership in the General Confederation of Former Combatants (*Confédération Général des Anciens Combattants*) until his death.

Galandou Diouf and M'Bakhane Lat-Dior Diop served very differently during the Great War. The former was a citizen soldier; the latter was a subject soldier. Yet both men expressed similar sentiments. One was from the Protectorate; the other hailed from the communes. Both had connections to Islam and to Muslim brotherhoods. Both were leaders. Both men risked their life for a variety of reasons—status, money, social and political capital. Perhaps they served for personal reasons that have been lost in the trail of time. Galandou Diouf's experiences during the election of 1914, of the war, and on the recruitment campaign gave him national prominence in his native Senegal, and recognition in the métropole. Diouf would use his accumulated knowledge and prestige, translated into symbolic capital, to position himself as Blaise Diagne's first lieutenant, and representative in Senegal, in the upcoming years.

⁹⁴ Diouf family papers.

Part Two

Chapter Four

Galandou Diouf as Lieutenant: 1918-1927

This chapter evaluates the power relationship between Blaise Diagne, Galandou Diouf and the colonial regime. Diagne's career as Deputy until 1927 is chronicled, specifically the role and influence of Galandou Diouf as his lieutenant. Diagne's contentious relationship with Martial Merlin is explored, as are colonial practices limiting originaire influence and political power. This process takes its most material and symbolic form in the disbanding of the General Council of Senegal and its replacement with the Colonial Council. The erosion of originaire power in Senegal led Diagne to look wider for political support, and culminated with the 'Bordeaux pact.'

Diagne's shift towards the traditional powerbrokers of the Senegalese state—the administration and the Bordeaux houses—alienated Galandou Diouf and provoked an attenuation of Diagne's symbolic capital amongst Diagne's originaire supporters. This chapter narrates Galandou Diouf's emergence as a politician developing his own constituency, who increasingly distanced himself from Diagne and Diagne's policies. From 1924, Diouf began to attract a growing constituency of his own. Diouf utilized, expanded and transformed his symbolic capital; by 1928 he was powerful enough to challenge Blaise Diagne directly in the 1928 deputy election.

The Colonial Situation after World War I

Much of France's prewar colonial ideology had been transformed by Africans, appropriated, and used to oppose the abuses of French colonial rule. Africans appropriated and projected their own meanings and uses for French colonial ideology and language, and used this to express their desires for more autonomy, power-sharing, and to end what they perceived as France's double standard.

After World War I, French systems of state patronage, in a West African context, gave rise to a new political language of reciprocity, entitlement, and state responsibility. The strength and much of the meaning of this language was located at the intersection between the European experience of the Great War and mutual, if uneven, obligation. The language included ideas about patriotism, duty, sacrifice, and mutual obligations.

Members of the colonial administration, both civilian and military agents, used this language of obligation, as did veterans and colonial politicians. Members of the French administration found the rhetorical commitment to their self-proclaimed civilizing mission transformed by the Great War experience.¹ This new language of entitlement and mutual responsibility was present in the interwar period, and became more intense after World War II. The configuring of relationships in a patron-client network that was so common to Wolof society, to Senegal, and to much of West Africa, certainly had currency in understanding how veterans and their families perceived the role of the French state vis-à-vis themselves.

¹ Mann, *Native Sons*, 65.

Blaise Diagne had begun to link military service with political privilege when he used the issue to establish full citizenship for originaires. Diagne treasured the victory, and for his political future the phrase "[originaires and their descendants] are and remain French citizens" of the 1916 law was more important than the military obligations the law imposed on the originaires. Diagne's successful recruitment drive, further explored in the previous chapter, gave form to the idea that military service was a form of exchange that could be cast in political terms.² Diagne pushed the administration to make concessions to subject soldiers serving in the *tirailleurs sénégalais*.




Figure 4.1 [*Tirailleurs sénégalais* praying at the mosque in Saint-Louis on Armistice Day, postcard located in the Annex of the ANS.]

Marc Michel notes that though these concessions may appear "extremely slight," they do represent a recognition that "military participation should bring about a

² For a discussion on how military service was a form of political exchange, see Mann, *Native Sons*, 69.

transformation in the relationship between métropole and colonies.”³ A transformation occurred between the colonial state and its subjects, as both Diagne and the administration reinforced the idea that the state would reward those who defended it. The fact that Galandou Diouf had served as a citizen-soldier in the war, and had survived, coming to sit at the right hand of the most powerful African in the AOF, was a reminder to other Africans of the material and symbolic rewards service could entail.

But when many of the soldiers came back, they encountered difficulties in accommodating their expectations with reality, and in being reabsorbed into their former lives and communities. In foyers and family compounds across West Africa, as well as in the eyes of colonial governors and commandants, ex-*tirailleurs* were thought to be an unstable social element. As a group, former soldiers had earned this reputation during demobilization after World War I, and some maintained it during the interwar years, when they served as colonial agents and provided much of the muscle on which commandants relied.⁴ Returning African soldiers during the war, and particularly at the end of the war, disrupted both African communities and the colonial state; this was particularly true of the *tirailleurs sénégalais*, many of whom stopped in the port cities of Dakar and Saint-Louis, before being repatriated to a location in the AOF where they may or may not have wanted to be.

³ Marc Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*, 226-27.

⁴ Mann, *Native Sons*, 64.

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French politicians believed African war veterans were dangerous in more than one way to the French state; colonial rhetoric reflected these fears.⁵ No longer were colonial officers the only ones who usually represented France to Africans; returning soldiers could now make that claim. They were mediators of French colonization in a different way, and this could incur the wrath of the state, as evidenced by the slaughter at Camp de Thiaroye.⁶ The end of the war in Europe began a new struggle for authority within the colonial field. The 1918 decree which guaranteed *tirailleur sénégalais* French citizenship rights for service was revoked.⁷ Soldiers' "new mentalities" were discussed in official police reports and in letters between administrators. Delafosse described how veterans refused "to recognize any authority... neither that of the village chief, not that of the administrator."⁸ French authorities worried that citizenship would protect the political activities of returning veterans under the cover of French civil law.⁹ Diouf was not a *tirailleur sénégalais*, but he also carried some of this militant attitude back from the war. Galandou Diouf used the symbolic capital associated with serving in the French military throughout his political career.

⁵ The 1918 outbreak of the influenza epidemic in Senegal was linked to returning *tirailleurs sénégalais* by some colonial administrators. The base at Ouakam suffered quite a few casualties to the disease, and it spread throughout most of Senegal, resulting in around 47,000 deaths. In spite of the disease's lethal effect on the colony of Senegal, little is left in the colonial or oral history record about the epidemic. The curious silence has been documented by Myron Echenburg, "The Dog that Did Not Bark': Memory and the 1918 Influenza Epidemic in Senegal," in *The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19: New Perspectives*, ed. Howard Phillips and David Killingray (New York: Routledge, 2003), 230-238.

⁶ This was in response to *tirailleurs sénégalais* taking the commanding officer hostage. See Myron Echenburg, *Colonial Conscripts*.

⁷ Galandou Diouf lobbied hard in France and with the colonial government to have these promised rights to soldiers returned, but to no avail.

⁸ Maurice Delafosse, "Le Point Noir de l'armée noire," *La Dépêche Coloniale et Maritime*, 4 November 1919.

⁹ Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 59.

Galandou Diouf enjoyed a unique role as one of Blaise Diagne's most important lieutenants. As Deputy, Blaise Diagne spent most of his time in Paris, with infrequent and brief trips to Senegal, which were aimed at maintaining his position. As deputy, Diagne was able to meet directly with the Chamber, the governmental committees, and the Ministry of Colonies in Paris. This allowed the deputy more political autonomy away from the colonial administration in Senegal, and more maneuvering room. Before Diagne, the General Council was the dominant originaire political institution in the colony, but Diagne turned the deputyship into the lynchpin of local politics.

Galandou Diouf was Diagne's man on the ground, and spent the vast majority of his time in Senegal. On rare occasion, however, Diouf might travel to France to receive instructions and meet with Diagne. The Senegalese political coalition in power could exercise patronage, since certain jobs in the secretariats of city councils and the Colonial Council, as well as many municipal jobs, were reserved for Africans. Orders from Diagne came from Paris, then went to Diagne's lieutenant in Senegal—Galandou Diouf, and then Dugay Clédor. Recommendations also came from Diouf and went up to Diagne.

In 1919 Diouf was temporarily in France again, living in Paris and hoping to be demobilized out of the French army. Diouf had returned to Senegal during Diagne's recruitment drive in 1918; he had been released from the front to convalesce from a severe injury. His position in the military necessitated his return to France. After this, Diouf would not spend significant amounts of time in France until he was elected deputy in 1934.

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While in France in 1919, Diouf realized his standing as an *ancien combattant* held meaning with other veterans and their associations in Senegal, and held a different, but just as important, meaning to the French colonial state. His status as a veteran was not without internal contradictions, as perhaps evidenced by his correspondence. A Senegalese man named Diallo had written to Diouf in order to receive help in obtaining French benefits for his wife while he served in the French military; Diouf took the letter to Diagne who had “written immediately” to the Governor of Senegal so that Diallo and his wife could receive satisfaction.

The public audience colonial politicians spoke to was diverse and multi-layered. Even when among their fellows at a café, African politicians’ words were consumed by multiple players. Political intrigues, spying, and French administrators’ devotion to acquisition of knowledge made even private debates and letters sometimes “public” knowledge.

Galandou Diouf utilized his social capital and position with the Deputy in order to implement political favors. Diouf emphasized his impatience to get home and work with Diallo and the others for Senegal. Within his note was a definite sense of homesickness for Senegal. He concluded with the Wolof phrase, “Toubab bahoul wa Toub sa bope,” which the French translated as “the whites are bad, resist them all.”¹⁰ Like many veterans, Diouf experienced disillusion and dissatisfaction with France’s ability to effectively meet post-war obligations to Africans. Utilizing this phrase in Wolof also put Diouf firmly within Senegalese discursive space, and revealed Diouf’s frustration with the colonial

¹⁰ ANS 13 G 10, dossier on Galandou Diouf, letter, 16 April 1919.

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field. It is likely French racism affected Diouf; racist ideology had been part of colonial rhetoric since the beginnings of conquest.¹¹

After World War I, the *mission civilisatrice* was reformulated in French colonial circles. The emphasis, after 1918, shifted towards a return to 'traditional' sources in the colonies. This meant valorizing 'African culture' in the Protectorate above practices of 'partial assimilation' in the cities. Herman Lebovics argues that this spurred an intensification of plantation-style production in the "bush" under the eyes of the pre-colonial elite and French businesses when folklorists in France were discovering the passing of a failed rural France.¹² At the same time, imperial officials began to push the older idea that Africans possessed a mentality like "children" who never seemed to reach adulthood.¹³

Take, for instance, this 'ethnographic' entry about the Wolof, "The Wolofs are mild-mannered, used to Europeans for centuries... They are big children who live for pleasure and ostentation, incapable of thinking of tomorrow; they expose themselves to misery or famine in order to stand out with a rich *boubou* or a handsome get-up, spending all their money to acquire a pretty wife."¹⁴ "Un-racial" justifications that projected Africans as children provided an excuse for

¹¹ For more information on French racism, see Dana S. Hale, *Races on Display: French Representations of Colonized Peoples, 1886-1940* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).

¹² Herman Lebovics, *True France*, 110-117, 133. For more economic discussions of the transformations of Francophone sub-Saharan Africa see Suret-Canale, *L'Afrique noire*.

¹³ This racial idea of Africans had been prevalent at least since 1900, with the publication of Dr. Lasnet, Auguste Chevalier, A. Cligny and Pierre Rambaud, *Une Mission au Sénégal: ethnographie, botanique, zoologie, géologie* (Paris: Challamel, 1900).

¹⁴ Quoted from Dr. Lasnet, Auguste Chevalier, A. Cligny and Pierre Rambaud, *Une Mission au Sénégal: ethnographie, botanique, zoologie, géologie* (Paris: Challamel, 1900), 122 in Dana S. Hale, *Races on Display*, 43.

colonial administrators to use forced African labor for public works projects and for making unsalaried Africans work for private businesses.

It is important, however, to point out that many advocates of colonialism began to focus on the participation and performance of African troops in the Great War. The colonial *force noire* may have been problematic for colonial administrators, but in the French popular imagination, it was a source of pride. Some African troops remained on French soil in military bases and others were posted to the occupied Rhineland. Commercial images of *tirailleurs sénégalais* came into vogue during the war years.¹⁵ Speeches given in colonial expositions in Marseilles and Paris praised black African soldiers in public and private forums for the help they gave France. In interwar expositions, French officials stressed fraternal partnership and union with African peoples while keeping an ideological framework of white racial and cultural superiority. While rhetoric of 'partnership' was utilized to define French relationships with African soldiers, at the same time French depictions of black soldiers on trademarks were racist and belittling.¹⁶ So while the language of military sacrifice was powerful in France, it was countered with racist stereotypes of infantile African men.

¹⁵ Hale, *Races on Display*, 91.

¹⁶ Ibid., 95. Images of *tirailleurs sénégalais* appeared on French products from chocolate to water purification tablets. The soldiers were presented as carefree and childlike, harmless figures despite their military role.



Figure 4.2 [Blaise Diagne speaks in Reims, France on 29 October 1929, during a dedication of a monument for heroes of the Black Army, public domain.]



Figure 4.3 [The image of a *tirailleur sénégalais* is utilized in French advertising in the métropole to sell a breakfast cereal. Y'a bon, the slogan of the brand, was supposedly copying a broken form of French the Senegalese soldiers used, public domain.]

These ideologies are discourses, and not often practices. Those who utilized the language on both sides were playing a political game, in a public sphere. The rhetoric of assimilation was certainly projected by African politicians to the French of Senegal, to the French Chamber of Deputies and the colonial administration, and to foreign critics of French colonial rule. This rhetoric was a tool. An African politician who used the language of assimilation to an African audience would very likely be labeled as a *tubab*, or white person. However, the rhetoric of assimilation meant something different on an international stage. For example, the language of assimilation was utilized by Blaise Diagne in an international format in 1919, alongside and in opposition to some pan-African rhetoric.

After the war, the Pan-African Congress met in Paris. Diagne was the chair, and opened the conference with a speech contrasting the opportunities and freedoms experienced by Africans under French colonialism to the racial discrimination African Americans experienced in the United States.¹⁷ Members of the Pan-African Congress voted to approve this motion: "The world is facing two eventualities, first of all, the complete and natural division of Africa into two or three great strengths with one power, where social privileges would be absolutely equal between black and white citizens, or if this is not possible, then the dream of founding new African states."¹⁸ The subtext could not be clearer: if colonial authorities refused to give Africans equality under the rhetoric of assimilation, then Africans would seize that equality for themselves under self-rule.

¹⁷ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 472.

¹⁸ ANS 17 G 233 (108).

Diagne softened the pan-African language in the official press releases, fearing political reprisals and the alienation of his French supporters. Diagne's position of power came from his ability to mediate between African desires and realities and French discourse and power. As such, he attempted to strike a balance between the interests of métis, French men, and African originaires. He needed all three to keep a solid base of political support flowing from Senegal and, when that began to dry up, from the French administration and Bordeaux interests.

It is important to remember that despite certain freedoms originaires enjoyed, they were still subjects of a colonial state, and as such the state tried to bar them from having access to certain discourses. In a decree dated 4 August 1921, for example, publications by Marcus Garvey were forbidden in the AOF. Several days later, six copies of Garvey's *Negro World* did find their way into the port of Dakar. An originaire from Sierra Leone was thrown out of the colony because the papers were addressed to him.

Armand Angrand, a publicist who had participated for several years in the Young Senegalese party, received a circulating letter from Marcus Garvey announcing a world conference for black people. Angrand also served as a city councilor for Gorée, but this did not prevent the police from searching his residence. During the search they allegedly discovered plans to form an organization called the *Comité de l'Action Sénégalaise*. Alphée Guillabert, Alexandre and Joseph Angrand were also named as collaborators. Their goal was to develop, with the help of d'Oxoby, a newspaper whose purpose would be

to defend the interests of the black race.¹⁹ This sort of situation was exactly what the French feared from contacts between Europe, the Americas and Africa and the rhetoric of pan-Africanism.

Educated Africans were able to redeploy the language of assimilation and use it in a manner that reflected some goals from pan-Africanism, specifically the dream of independence from European rule. Discourse shaped the colonial relationship, and how politicians entered and navigated this political landscape. The Mayor of Saint-Louis, in an article in *L'Ouest Africain* wrote: "Under the tutelage of France, we would finally like to take the reigns of the political destiny of our country."²⁰ Lamine Guèye expressed his vision of the future in a political meeting with young Saint-Louisiens in 1924, "When you understand better, you will say with me, the Senegalese should be masters in their own country. We do not want a revolution, but the evolution of the country. In fifty or sixty years we will be self-sufficient: at that moment we will be masters in our own home once again."²¹ Or as Galandou Diouf proclaimed to the members of the General Council even before the Great War, "The French Republic, gentlemen, has freed *us*, the same as *you*; if we are the slaves of the last hour, you were among those of the first hour."²² Galandou Diouf became more attractive to many of Diagne's followers over the years, as progressive ideas about the roles Africans should play in the Senegalese government were rejected, for the most part, by Diagne in the latter years of his deputyship. Indeed, some historians have claimed that

¹⁹ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique sénégalaise*, 127-28.

²⁰ ANS 17 G 233 (108).

²¹ ANS 20 G 100 (100), report, 16 June 1924.

²² *La Démocratie* 18 July 1915.

Diagne was a faithful partisan of French cultural and political assimilation until his death.²³

Galandou Diouf appropriated symbols of French culture, but he operated in a Senegalese setting as a Muslim man. Diouf used his military service to the French state and his espoused republican sentiments to build symbolic capital in métis and French cultural milieus. Diouf believed Africans were equal to French men. The French administration, however, attempted to limit opportunities for Africans to participate and benefit from the colonial state at the same time as they worked with Blaise Diagne. Contradictions such as this were typical of the colonial state, and those living, working and operating within them. The French were attempting to reject political assimilation not accompanied by cultural assimilation, and at the same time they were revaluing and reasserting 'traditional' African cultures.

²³ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique sénégalaise* 128.



Figure 4.4 [Galandou Diouf with other members of the Colonial Council; Diouf is attired in a white suit with a black bowtie, c. 1920s, from ANS.]

After WWI, the French faced spreading dissonance from what they perceived as every corner. Dossiers were written about returning veterans, plots, revolts, and "spirits of rebellion." This was shaped by post-war forces in West Africa, but in Senegal they were exacerbated by Diagne's victories, his power, his party's rhetoric, and a legacy of assimilation that now seemed to threaten France's delicate balancing act in the Protectorate and their authority in the communes. Secondary school graduates in the elite schools of Dakar and Saint Louis, as well as students in other colonies of the AOF, were restless, as graduates were churned out without being placed in colonial or commercial positions.

The post-war political climate in France strongly influenced the relationship between the métropole and colonies. The election of 1919 was a

resounding victory for Diagne, but the concurrent election in France produced a government that was dominated by the right in the '*Bloc National*'. The biggest practical act of the *Bloc National* government that affected West Africa was the defeat of Albert Sarraut's economic development plan for the area. In 1921 Albert Sarraut, as Minister of Colonies, pushed for a financial program for the AOF that included "more than one billion francs... for investment in railways, ports and irrigation in West Africa, as well as schools, health care and research facilities."²⁴ The *mise en valeur* program was problematic for more than one reason; it had no source of funding, for example. The program also raised fears in the métropole and among colonial administrators about the "proletarianization" of the AOF. These fears seemed even more valid after the strikes of 1919.

The first strike in Senegal occurred in Rufisque, and by 1919, railway workers in Senegal were unionized. In cooperation with European workers, a strike was set for 13 April 1919. Governor General Angoulvant requisitioned troops to be sent into the area, but after successful negotiations with the company, the strike was called off on 18 April. The Senegalese railway workers received a substantial augmentation to their salaries. Except for a work-stop on the 8 June 1920 by railroad workers, there was a period of labor calm in Senegal, which ended in 1924. The Senegalese workers on the Thiès-Niger railway line protested the recruitment of European cadres of workers from Morocco. After two Senegalese workers were arrested and condemned, a larger strike occurred that included acts of sabotage. In 1925, barge sailors in the port of Rufisque received a pay increase after they enacted a strike. Several months before the

²⁴ Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 62.

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legislative elections of 1928, the African porters (*laptots*) of the *Société des Messageries Africaines* of Saint-Louis attempted to gain concessions, but were unsuccessful.²⁵

The French's fears of war veterans, recent immigrants to urban areas, and secondary graduates seemed demographically justified. The population of Dakar was increasing exponentially; in 1914 the city held 21,624; ten years later in 1924 there were 37,145 people. In 1934 the city's population reached 76,100. New immigrants were faced with inflation, as the French estimated the 1920 cost of 'basic necessities' had risen to ten times that of their prewar cost. As with most rapidly increasing urban areas, Dakar's crime rate went up, and incidences of armed robbery shot up in the city.

By 1922 the situation was so extreme that the administration sent 400 *tirailleurs* on a night raid into the *Quartier de l'Abattoir*, where they arrested 150 people. The neighborhood was located near the Sandiga market, between the European quarter and the Medina. The assault on the neighborhood was mostly in response to rising European fears of African social unrest.²⁶ Fears of African unrest in France led to the creation of the Service of Assistance and Surveillance of Senegalese Troops that was directed to monitor the activities and contacts of the *tirailleurs* while they were in France. This was the precursor to the *Service de Contrôle et d'Assistance en France des Indigènes des Colonies* (CAI) that

²⁵ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique sénégalaise*, 128.

²⁶ ANS 17 G 239 (108).

infiltrated and disrupted the activities of organizations founded by migrants from the colonies that lived in France during the 1920s and 30s.²⁷

The Diagne Coalition and Martial Merlin, 1923-4

Martial Merlin was appointed Governor General of French West Africa after World War I and held the post for five years. Merlin had extensive experience in Senegal, as from 1891 to 1895 he had served as Director of Native Affairs in Governor de Lamothe's cabinet. Merlin had also personally overseen the creation of the School for Sons of Chiefs. Merlin wrote the 1895 report that led to Amadu Bamba's exile to Gabon. From 1902 to 1908, Merlin performed as Secretary General to Governor General Roume, and during that time he served as acting Governor General in Roume's absence five times. Merlin's strength of will—perhaps stubbornness—was well known in colonial circles.

Merlin and Blaise Diagne had a contentious relationship from the time Merlin came into office; Merlin had a secret study conducted on Diagne in 1921, which accused Diagne of fomenting dangerous ideas throughout French West Africa.²⁸ Relations between originaires and the government eroded. Merlin believed Diagne overstretched his authority in speaking for all Africans in the AOF. This was repeated over and over in French colonial rhetoric—a sense of injustice that the originaires were allowed to represent *all* the inhabitants of the AOF. In 1921, for example, in an essay entitled “What the Deputy of Senegal Represents,” an administrator broke down the numbers of originaires eligible to

²⁷ Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 58.

²⁸ ANS 17 G 237 (108).

vote. The author was incensed at the number of originaires, because he claimed 8,496 of them became originaires through problematic “supplemental judgments,” which were used to establish identity.²⁹ The author concluded his report, “by a singular fiction, with a miniscule number of votes, the elected originaires, often illiterate, pretend to represent all the inhabitants of Senegal and 12,284,000 inhabitants of all of West Africa, and really the entire black race.”³⁰ These sorts of statistics were utilized as a justification for replacing the General Council with a Colonial Council that would hypothetically have representatives for Africans in the Protectorate. Merlin’s attitude towards originaires in Senegal conformed to this report.

Merlin disliked the French educated African elite, and he preferred to deal with the aristocratic chiefs of Senegal. He believed the originaires had taken too many liberties in their relationship with the colonial state. Merlin revoked many of the freedoms the newspapers enjoyed under William Ponty. Diagne and Merlin became bitter enemies. Merlin attempted to discredit Diagne to both Senegalese and French in the métropole. He accused Diagne of being a dangerous radical in France, saying Diagne spoke with a “forked tongue” and was disloyal to France when in Senegal.³¹

²⁹ ANS 17 G 233 (108), Two witnesses were required to swear upon the origins of the person in question in order for them to be originaires. Written documentation of births was spotty, at best, and the colonial government accepted the supplemental judgments with a sense of resignation. The fight over the veracity of supplemental judgments would continue on and off throughout the rest of France’s occupation of colonial Senegal. The author of this particular essay believed the supplemental judgments were acts of uncontrolled fraud.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Johnson, “The Impact of the Senegalese Elite,” 164.

Diagne and Diouf saw themselves as the real representatives of the African populations of Senegal. The stage was set for a duel between the two forces. Diagne tried to have Merlin recalled, and in his proposal, he accused Merlin of being anachronistic, anti-African, and ineffective in accomplishing France's postwar objectives in Africa. As Diagne wrote,

The war [WWI] created a state of mind and conditions which cannot be systematically ignored. We will not accomplish anything in the AOF without the native and the native will not give us his entire and sincere support unless he feels that we are treating him as a collaborator ... this preoccupation is not one of the top concerns of the current Governor General. We will have to change our methods, and I am afraid we will have to change the men who have the responsibility for the new political orientation.³²

Diagne was not successful in his attempt to discredit Merlin, but Diagne was delighted when Merlin was replaced with fellow Mason Jules Carde in 1924. Merlin, on his part, tried to limit or eliminate the gains Diagne had achieved during the war.

In addition to his conflict with the governor general, Diagne also alienated the representatives of the Bordeaux import-export firms in the early 1920s. The firms were shut out of political office in Senegal from 1919 to 1924, and only got their foot back in the door when they forged a political alliance with Diagne's forces. The firms did, of course, have recourse; they fired known partisans of Diagne and this hurt part of Diagne's electorate. James Searing calls the period from 1919 to 1923/4 as the "Diagnost militancy" because of the coalition's ability to negotiate from a position of strength.³³ It was during this time that Diagne's

³² ANS 17 G 234 (108), letter addressed to the Minister of Colonies from Blaise Diagne, 23 October 1920.

³³ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 461.

party attempted to challenge the power of both the French administration and the Bordeaux commercial houses.

Diagne and his party did not agitate for independence, but tried to negotiate greater expansions of opportunities for Africans in Senegal, both in the rural areas and for the *originaires*. For the *Diagnistes*, *originaires* could work within the framework of the current colonial system. Diouf and Diagne believed that if the artificial restrictions placed upon the rights of the *originaires* by certain French administrators were eliminated, then *originaires* would be able to take political power in local representative assemblies, and then move into the highest positions in administration and commerce. At that juncture, the *originaires* would then be able to extend democratic government and French law to the rest of the colony, and lead the colony into a form of home rule. For the urban elite, the fight was over equal pay for equal work, the demand for equal opportunity for employment and promotion, equal education, and a greater share of the trade economy. These were major themes of *originaire* political movements throughout the interwar years.

As Diagne successfully employed an effective political organization during the early 1920s, with Diouf's aid, any form of unrest or upheaval in Senegal was laid at Diagne's doorstep by French administrators. The files kept on Diagne, and his movement, "Diagnism" included all sorts of revolts that popped up in various places after the war. Diagne was an anti-French demagogue, according to the administration.³⁴ Indeed, his influence was described as "distant flashes of

³⁴ See ANS 20 G 233 (108), Tryptyque *Diagniste*, *Politique de M. Diagne au Senegal – Le Diagnisme*, and *Biographie de M. Diagne, attitude dans la Métropole*.

lightning warning of a storm coming in a serene sky.”³⁵ Diagne challenged the status quo in more than one way. One administrator wrote that the social order in Senegal had become “cloudy” because of color “questions,” that the Diagnost press then ridiculed.³⁶ For Sarraut, Diagne’s election was the “end of civilization, the end of the goodwill she guaranteed, anarchy, and a return to ancient forms of servitude.”³⁷

Indeed, for Diagne, Diouf, and for many Africans, Diagne’s election was the beginning of a new colonial relationship, one in which Africans would have more say in policies and politics. Administrators, however, were horrified that “Municipal Councils were composed of this element in great part, who could not speak French, and who deliberated in Wolof.” Men such as Dugay Clédor, who was the mayor of Saint-Louis, took “a cunning pleasure in humiliating a white man and French authority.”³⁸ Indeed, some French authorities blamed their own government for France’s declining authority and with it the decline of the white race. “... [I]f the prestige of our race is disintegrating, if we are gravely embarrassed, the fault lies with the capitulation of the Administration before the political powers... who want to please a political party and forget to respect the functionaries...”³⁹

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ See ANS 20 G 233 (108), Tryptyque Diagnoste.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ ANS 20 G 233 (108).

³⁹ Ibid. Le Herisse’s report on Tivouane, following an incident of violence between an African and colonial officers, repeats the same charge. Le Herisse blames the deteriorating situation in Senegal upon the Government in Saint-Louis, particularly the two postwar Governors, Levecque and Didelot. ANS 13 G 28 (17), *Rapport Le Herisse*.

But Blaise Diagne, thanks to political allies like Galandou Diouf, had a power base beyond the easy reach of the Government General or the Bordeaux firms, at least at first. While Diagne was in France, Galandou Diouf stood between the European community and the African population. Diagne's party and his lieutenants forged alliances between rural elites and urban counterparts. Diouf helped Diagne forge a coalition that included the interests of a diverse population, not just the concerns of a few elite urban residents.

The 1919 election was a landslide victory for Diagne's party. The métis power-brokers Louis Guillabert and Charles Pellegrin in Saint-Louis offered their support to Diagne, as did Antoine Guillabert in Dakar. Prior to this, these men and their networks had always supported Saint-Louisien métis families, particularly the Dèves or Carpots.⁴⁰ European *petit colons* could also hope to profit under Diagne's patronage, and Jules Sergent became the mayor of Dakar while Jean D'Army (or D'Oxoby, as he was known by his pen name), was elected to the General Council. African originaires made up the bulk of Diagne's supporters. They tended to be led by Young Senegalese activists, notables from the commercial elite, or by the Lebou oligarchy. Notable followers of Diagne tended to bring their own clientage network with them into the party. Because of the nature of clientage and interest groups in Senegalese politics, Diagne was able to poll seven-eighths of the votes cast in 1919.⁴¹

Coalition politics in interwar Senegal were complex due to the number of interest groups, patrons, powerbrokers, and how all of these different groups

⁴⁰ For a more in-depth analysis of the face of changing politics among the old and powerful métis families of Saint-Louis, see Hilary Jones, "Citizens and Subjects."

⁴¹ ANS 20 G 70.

related to one another. Patrons tended to be community leaders who brought a personal following into a coalition; their authority was personal, direct, and had ties to a societal system that existed in this region of Africa before the advent of colonialism. The Lebou notables were a good example of patrons, since they were lineage elders and Muslim leaders who could usually dictate how their followers voted. These patrons were wooed by political coalitions.

The Lebou notables located their power base and followers upon geography as well as capital, and they hailed from a certain section (quartier) of the city, although they were all grouped loosely under the *Serigny Dakar*, who was also known as the *Chef Supérieur de la collectivité Lebou*, and acted as the symbolic head of the Lebou community.⁴² Lebou traditional institutions existed alongside the municipal organizations created by the French. In order to speak to the Lebou machine, politicians needed to address issues like land rights, compensations, jobs, and contracts; Lebou leaders were not interested with esoteric discussions of French citizenship laws. Muslims leaders figured as important patrons as well, particularly the heads of the major Muslim brotherhoods and the *qadis*, and functioned both inside the Lebou communities and outside of them.

While powerbrokers may have controlled voting blocs as well, their base of authority came from more modern edifices than the patrons. Powerbrokers were usually men who had risen to positions of prominence through new social networks created by the modern trade economy and the colonial administration.

⁴² For more information on the Lebou notables, see ANS 18 G 78 (17) and 21 G 133 (108), and for the role of the Lebou notables in the elections of 1919 and 1921 see ANS 20 G 69 (23).

They worked as intermediaries, activists, and ideologues; as such they needed to know some French in order to operate in the dual cultural world of twentieth-century Senegalese politics. They often came from traders and employees of commercial firms, or from *fonctionnaires*. Associational members could also be leaders, such as Momar Sene and Wagane Diouf, who entered politics as leaders of the *Société des Anciens Combattants*, the first such association formed after the war.⁴³ They were able to mediate between French and African interest groups and social networks. They could be orators, journalists, or have a wide range of social connections. Clearly these powerbrokers took on some of the characteristics of traditional patrons, and their claim to leadership rested upon their personal achievements, social capital, material capital, and skills.

The most successful politicians, like Galandou Diouf and Blaise Diagne, combined the traditional functions of a patron with the modern aspects of a powerbroker. They could be described as “patron-brokers.” But not only Africans served as patron-brokers. The French administration also understood a system where clients expected to receive material capital for their support. In 1921, Governor General Merlin ordered the creation of spacious official residencies for chiefs and their families, with rooms to house guests. In addition, the French stipulated enough land for the chief’s personal needs and to assure a source of

⁴³ ANS 20 G 100 (200). This information was part of a *reseignement*, which were usually reports from African informers who observed party politics for the Government General, and a report would be generated and filed by a clerk or perhaps an administrator; certainly the reports were shown to administrators, and often sent to the very highest levels of colonial authority, or at least cited in colonial reports.

additional income. Chiefs were also to be paid travel indemnities to cover the costs of their duties.⁴⁴

This came at a time when the chiefs first began to participate in Senegal's newly created Colonial Council. The attempt to influence chiefs' favor is obvious. But beyond the obvious, chiefs were expected to fulfill a particular role in the village; having land and a nice house insured their projection of a certain social capital. Chiefs living in the city who were participating in the Colonial Council also needed to project a certain image of prosperity. By obtaining a material status, these men could translate this into symbolic capital with the people they sought to represent—those living in the Protectorate. This was a conspicuous display of public consumption arranged by Merlin. This effort was most likely designed to demonstrate the chiefs' new position to *originaires*. The aid of the administration to chiefs would certainly not go unnoticed by *originaires*, and would be a powerful symbol of the erosion of *originaire* status vis-à-vis the chiefs. Of course, being paid so handsomely by the French would also confirm the chiefs' dependence upon the French administration and be a clear symbol to other Africans of their submersion into the establishment.

There are important differences between three of the main African leaders during the interwar years: Lamine Guèye, Blaise Diagne, and Galandou Diouf. Both Diagne and Guèye were considered *évolués* by the French. Guèye, who succeeded Diagne as leader of Diagne's party in 1934, was a lawyer and the first African to win an *aggregation* in French law at a French university. His thesis was a defense of *originaire* political rights. He later became the leading

⁴⁴ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 496.

spokesman of the African functionaries employed by the French administration. These functionaries had derived their symbolic and political capital in large part from the educations, their experience, and their ability to be intermediaries with the French.

Diouf, on the other hand, did not have a higher education; indeed the highest level of instruction he completed was a French secondary school in Saint-Louis. His early roots were with the *métis*, where he began his political career as an agent of François Carpot, campaigning for him in rural areas. This experience introduced him to important patrons and Muslim leaders in the Protectorate and brought home to him how important their support was for *originaire* politicians. In Diagne's party as well, Diouf acted as an intermediary between *originaire* elites and *originaire* subtraders and other rural patrons. Diouf's knowledge of the interior, and his good relations with the administrators at Tivaouane, Thiès and Diourbel were crucial to Blaise Diagne's ability to maintain his position. These connections offset Diagne's increasing problems from Saint-Louis and the administration.

James Searing argues that Diouf's main weakness was that he would be unable to relate to the French on equal terms, and that this became a political weakness.⁴⁵ Searing makes this claim based upon Lamine Guèye's critique of Diouf, as Guèye claimed no one would pay attention to Galandou, because he could not speak French properly and delivered his parliamentary speeches in *petit nègre*. Guèye's criticism reflects colonial rhetoric and was based upon a

⁴⁵ Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 469-70.

French value of education and language, and is suspect given Guèye's and Diouf's later relationship.

Certainly Diouf was not considered as a black *tubab* (*tubab bu nul* in Wolof or "black European") by his fellow Africans. This allowed him to be an intermediary between the French educated elite of the communes, and the rural elites and Lebou patrons. Galandou Diouf was more of an organic intellectual than Blaise Diagne or Lamine Guèye. Diouf was raised in Senegal, a man of the communes and the Protectorate. Diouf had interior constituencies and friends, most notably Cheikh Anta Mbacké. Diouf had held diverse occupations, from farming to teaching to politician. These experiences gave him insight into rural Senegalese interests and to working class issues. Diouf was able to relate to the French on equal terms, as he proved over and over again in his political career. He was a defender of the "little man", trying to protect the originaire traders in the *escales* of the interior and coast. This may have cost him some regard from French administrators, at least one of whom claimed that Diouf was a "small time politician, vain, and only interested in paying off his debts and rewarding his allies. Nowhere near the stature of Diagne."⁴⁶ Interestingly enough, this was also the French stereotype of the domestic opposition.

As the intermediary between two cultures, the Deputy could pick and choose what messages he chose to send between the two, and what tactics he used within the two spheres. Diouf was a savvy and astute politician, and his knowledge of French and Wolof, and his ability to deploy them both on the campaign trail, gave him a symbolic capital that Blaise Diagne did not possess.

⁴⁶ ANS 13 G 10 (17), dossier, G. Diouf.

Guèye also used Wolof on the campaign trail. Neither the French authorities nor the originaires were able to completely guarantee or control the information they received from the Deputy. Blaise Diagne used this to his advantage, and he was able to convince the originaires that only he could achieve results for them because of his unique qualifications. On the other hand, the French eventually became sure that only Diagne could cooperate and still be popularly supported in Senegal.

Diagne's power, however, as previously mentioned, was based upon a powerful coalition, tied together by his top leadership. Galandou Diouf and Amadou Dugay Clédor were particularly important, for they were elected mayors to Rufisque and Saint-Louis, respectively, and helped control the propaganda and votes of the two communes. In order for Diagne to achieve power, he needed Diouf's participation in party politics, and this included being there at important political rallies, holding meetings with elders and patrons—the *notables* of the communes, particularly those who were Muslim and African. Clédor was important for his connections and relationships with the métis population.

When Diagne attempted a major political action, his lieutenants were on the front lines along side of him. In 1920, Diagne and his leadership attempted to have Siadoux, the French commandant in Kaolack, removed from office. Siadoux was accused of protecting one of his canton chiefs who had been accused of embezzlement from the *société de prévoyance* at Koalack; and in addition Siadoux was accused of treating prisoners so badly that a *notable*,

Seriny Mbodj, had committed suicide.⁴⁷ Diagne assembled a crowd of protestors, with Clédor and Diouf beside him, and they demanded that Siadoux be immediately removed from office. The next step in the campaign against Siadoux occurred in the General Council, where Galandou Diouf and Dugay Clédor were once again called upon to lead Diagne's assault.

During the March 1920 meeting of the General Council, it was Galandou Diouf who stood to tell of the suffering the population of Sine-Saloum had suffered under the administration of Siadoux. The complaints of the people of Sine-Saloum had been addressed to Diouf—not Diagne—for the past eight months. With his military background, Diouf cast Siadoux as a militaristic tyrant, who wanted to “command his troops who were to obey him without hesitation.” In clear, emotive language, Diouf continued to lay out accusations against Siadoux as though he were in a court of law. Of particular note is Diouf's allegation that Siadoux used the *indigénat* law illegally, capriciously, and cruelly. “The war was over, the black was once again a slave to peanuts, the administration, and to M. Siadoux, to be beaten, pursued, arrested, and condemned without mercy.”

Indeed, Diouf's description of Siadoux's tortures hearkens back to the methods used by slavers. Diouf appealed on behalf of Africans in the Protectorate through a humanitarian discourse: “But Sirs, these are men above all, they have families, they have daily occupations, they have interests, and when they are thrown into prison without justification, or if they are mistreated,

⁴⁷ ANS 20 G 233 (108), *Diagnism au Sénégal*.

one could well say that when they suffer, we all suffer.”⁴⁸ Towards the end of his speech, Diouf warned the French, “And the Administration who does not want to hear these things, whether because of obstinacy or solidarity, will be responsible for the discontent that will develop in the population.”⁴⁹

After Diouf’s speech, the issue was put to vote. Not surprisingly, the entire Diagnist party supported him, including Birahim Camara, D’Oxoby, Thiécouta Diop, Galandou Diouf, Manuel Durand, El Hadji Amadou Fall, Antoine Guillabert, Louis Guillabert, Jehn Ka, Ambroise Mendy, Clédor N’Diaye, Charles Pellegrin, Dieye Bakary Saer, Michal Sangue, Jules Sergent.⁵⁰ Diagne was not at the meeting; he was in France. Diouf orchestrated the vote.

Merlin was furious. He had insults against Siadoux struck from the record, and had four additional debates taken off later in the year because they addressed “political” topics supposedly outside of the assembly’s scope.⁵¹ Merlin’s reaction is telling. It is clear that Diagne and Diouf, while probably genuinely concerned about Siadoux’s excesses, were playing a high-stakes political game. The real issue was how much authority originaire politicians could invoke against colonial administrators in the Protectorate. The General Council was trying to assert power over the functioning of French colonialism in the Protectorate. Merlin most likely took the assault on Siadoux by Diouf as an attack upon himself and his authority.

⁴⁸ ANS 4 E 13 (173), General Council, 11 March 1920.

⁴⁹ ANS 4 E 13 (19).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ ANS 17 G 234 (108), 4 E 13 (19).

In addition, during the March 1920 meeting of the General Council, the rhetoric of assimilation, military commemoration, and exclusion came together when members of the elected Council of Dakar (who were Diagnistes) were excluded from an official reception ceremony for the sailors aboard the French naval training cruiser, *Jeanne d'Arc*. Both Merlin and members of Diagne's political party, engaged in the political game. The mayor of Dakar, Sergent, went to Diagne, who wrote a letter to the Governor General, boldly stating that he was sure the Governor General had not personally been involved in the invitation list, meaning, of course, quite the opposite.⁵² The General Council, dominated by the Diagne party, protested that they were not allowed to give honor to these members and future officers of the Navy on their first visit to Senegalese soil. The Council released an official response, whereby they recognized the "painful and glorious role" of French sailors during the Great War, which they have not ignored, and to prove it the Council decided to donate 2000 francs for the Orphans of the Marines. Using a combination of bureaucratic reasons (such as not enough members present at the extraordinary session), Merlin was able to void their generous donation.⁵³

In a private letter to the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, Merlin explained his reasons for not inviting Sergent and his wife to the reception and his explanation may reveal that he took the politics of Senegal personally. However, the affair has much to do with the public game he was playing. The real reason he did not invite the Sergents, Merlin claimed, was that they had never formally

⁵² ANS 4 E 13 (173).

⁵³ Ibid.

and properly called on Madame Merlin in their home, and that he was not about to invite them to his home for this soirée. Indeed, Merlin underlined *aucune visite* to make sure his audience understood how severely he thought the Sergeants had broken the “rules of civility in use all over the world.”⁵⁴ Galandou Diouf argued that Merlin had slighted not just his colleague Mr. Sergent, but “all the population of Dakar whom he represented.”⁵⁵ More specifically, in reality, the governor general was failing to give the General Council, and its representatives, their due. Members of the General Council knew, of course, about French attempts to reconfigure it, and were attempting to assert their authority. The rhetoric surrounding this affair was not about a social faux pas; it was rather a struggle between originaire and administrative authority. The members of the General Council realized that being excluded from official events was a blow to the prestige, position, and therefore the symbolic capital, contained in the position of councilor. They were fighting for their political life.

The General Council meeting of December 1920 was the last assembly of the legislative body. The meeting continued in the same strain as the one held nine months earlier, as members attempted to assert their authority and expand their position in the colonial hierarchy. There was a rather desperate tone in the minutes of the meeting. The members of the General Council had expected to be able to assert more power in the colony since their Deputy was a well respected and powerful man in France. Instead, the General Council would never meet again. The General Council, of course, did not have the authority to

⁵⁴ ANS 4 E 13 (173), letter dated 12 March 1920 to the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal.

⁵⁵ ANS 4 E 13 (173), minutes from General Council meeting, 11 March 1920.

initiate laws, but they would issue *vœux* to try and adjust existing legislation, and make their voices known on certain subjects.

In this last meeting, the General Council tried to introduce ways to void the administration's arguments for the Colonial Council. Diagne's party attempted to have the *communes mixtes* in the Protectorate to be made into *communes de plein exercice*, with all the rights and responsibilities, including citizenship, therein. In this way they could undercut the arguments put forward for a change to the structure of the General Council. There would be no need to include chiefs from the Protectorate because *originaires* from towns in the Protectorate would be part of the General Council. They would be representatives for the people. The General Council also wanted an end to the *indigénat* and the extension of French law to the entire colony. Again, here we see an attempt to expand *originaire* rights to the Protectorate. At a time when French colonial authorities were more interested in 'traditional' forms of authority, such as the chiefs, the *originaires* of Senegal were attempting to move in an opposite direction in a bid to retain and even expand their power. Galandou Diouf recognized that the General Council was an authentic expression of Senegalese participation. After his break from Diagne, Diouf would continually push for the General Council's restoration until the end of his career.

Dugay Clédor engaged the struggle through arguments about education. A French education could be translated into participation in the French colonial government; the argument over education was not about assimilation. Clédor introduced a motion to have primary schools in Senegal be exactly like those in

France. He believed France was trying to dumb-down the education system in the colony, to make Senegalese children into “boys,” instead of men conscious of their dignity and their duties. The General Council called for more schools, more time devoted to the study of French, and a curriculum identical to those found in France. This education reform was to be a “recompense for sacrifices of the Great War.”⁵⁶ Again, the arguments over education reflect the wide disparity between French shifts in policy and originaire political ambitions. As originaires were pushing for more equality with the French, the French were rethinking the ideology of the ‘civilizing mission’ and devaluing those Africans who wished to participate in the Republican institutions of an earlier era of imperialism.

This process had been developing for a while in Senegal. The colonial authorities were careful to document who was running for a seat on the General Council or on any city council and what their “credentials” happened to be. Specifically, the French were careful to record information that would negate participants’ claims to French citizenship rights. For example, during the election of 21 December 1919 in Rufisque, authorities carefully documented who among those elected were illiterate. Out of thirteen men elected, seven were considered illiterate by the colonial authorities.⁵⁷

As much as many members of the General Council were against the reconfiguration of their legislative body, the Colonial Council would replace it. The creation of the *Conseil Colonial* initiated a new era in Senegalese politics. On paper the new Colonial Council appeared as though it was including a voice

⁵⁶ ANS 4 E 11 (157).

⁵⁷ ANS 20 G 77 (23). It would be interesting to know how that illiteracy was determined.

for Africans in the Protectorate, and was instituted by the Decree of December 4, 1920.

Diagne, an attempt to save the General Council, proposed that the Colonial Council co-exist with the General Council. But Albert Sarraut, the Minister of Colonies, rejected that solution, stating that the old assembly was impractical and expensive. Sarraut pitched the new council to Diagne on economic terms, claiming that it would streamline administrative work and allow Senegal to have a unified budget and one territorial assembly. This in turn would give Senegal a chance to “rationally develop.”⁵⁸ One of Diagne’s major campaign promises and desires was for the economic development for Senegal. Diagne needed to deliver on material promises made to his constituencies, and at the same time he realized he needed to maintain his relationship with the Minister of Colonies.

There were political developments at home that encouraged Diagne to support the new council; new elections had been called, and were to be held in June 1921. Diagne could not afford to boycott the elections. The strength of his position depended in part upon support by members in the General Council—which was now replaced by the Colonial Council. If Diagne’s party did not fare well in the elections, he would suffer a concomitant loss of symbolic capital, prestige and authority. It is clear Diagne could not prevent the loss of the General Council and the creation of the Colonial Council. He did not have the political power to implement his proposal for co-existing councils. Diagne had

⁵⁸ David Heisser, “The Impact of the Great War on French Imperialism” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1972), 251-334.

been outmaneuvered by France's colonial administration. But Diagne was determined to put a good face on the defeat, and chose to support the new council. Perhaps he feared an admission of failure would drastically corrode his symbolic capital and cost him the next election.

But originaire voters were becoming disenchanted with Diagne. His inability to stop the colonial administration from instituting the Colonial Council, and his tacit condoning of the new Council by his silence infuriated members of the originaire population in Saint-Louis. Originaires from Saint-Louis, African and métis, strongly felt the loss of the General Council. Two strong opposition lists formed against Diagne. Both were supported and financed in large part by French merchants, but they put forward a majority of African candidates. Candidates included Diagne's own brother-in-law, Abdou Karim Ndiaye, and the president of the Young Senegalese, Thiécouta Diop, who had always been lukewarm towards Diagne. The opposition ran on two points: first, the need for a union between Europeans and Africans, to replace the "race war" practiced by Diagne and second, an effort to abolish the Colonial Council and restore the General Council.⁵⁹

The Diagnost list only won the run off elections by fifty votes. One of the opposition candidates in Saint-Louis described Diagne's support of the Colonial Council as a "violent blow against the liberties which had been granted to our fathers... This mistake alone equaled all those committed by the métis

⁵⁹ ANS 20 G 74 (23), elections, Conseil Colonial.

politicians.”⁶⁰ Diagne and his party struck back at the opposition parties in Diagne’s organ, *L’Ouest Africain Français*. Diagne accused the opposition parties of merely being “representatives” of the large Bordeaux firms. He repudiated their claim to unify all the elements of the population, stating instead that their volunteers were “trying to sow discord and division.”⁶¹ Diagne went on to redeploy and reclaim the rhetoric of unity for his own party by demonstrating how most of the members of the two electoral colleges in the new Colonial Council have “disdained vain political or personal struggles... they are only preoccupied with equitably distributing their duties as members of the Community; they make up a union based on justice, as do I, and which I relentlessly defend.”⁶²

Diagne once again relied upon his aide Galandou Diouf to mitigate the council change, which was turning into a public relations disaster. It would be wrong, however, to characterize Diagne as merely acquiescing to the Colonial Council. Diagne intended to counteract the administration by winning the support of enough Protectorate chiefs to neutralize the strength of the alliance between the chiefs and the French. Diagne relied upon Diouf’s Protectorate connections to accomplish this as party directive. Diouf was able to partially succeed, and the support for Diagne’s party from the interior allowed Diagne to maintain his hold on the deputyship at a time when originaires in Saint-Louis were voting against him.

⁶⁰ ANS 17 G 78 (17), Hamet Sow Telemaque wrote this in retrospect, after Diagne’s death in 1934: Hamet Sow Telemaque, ed., *L’Action Senegalaise*, 17 February 1934.

⁶¹ ANS 17 G 233 (108), *L’Ouest-Africain Français*.

⁶² Ibid.

The French considered three of the chiefs elected to the Colonial Council to be allies of Diagne. One of these men was the son of Lat Dior, Mbakhane Diop, who was considered by colonial authorities to be “the closest friend” of Galandou Diouf.⁶³ The commandant at Thiès, a Mr. Tellier, was Diouf’s friend. Mbakhane Diop was being investigated for corruption in the *cercle* of Louga and to protect him, Diouf had him transferred to the *cercle* of Thiès. Tellier then appointed Diop chief of Thor-Diander.⁶⁴ Once Diop was appointed to the Colonial Council, he would meet daily with Diouf to discuss “whatever would be of interest” to Diouf. The two men also traveled together, meeting with French administrators in the Protectorate, and offering ‘gifts’ to them.

Galandou would send men into the Protectorate to “talk up” Diagne and the party’s policies. One colonial agent called them “emissaries” to the chiefs. A few French administrators reported that Diouf claimed--in Diagne’s name--that the days of the French administration were limited and that a black republic would be created.⁶⁵ Diouf was able to reach out to military veterans who had attempted to settle back into rural areas. According to a chief loyal to the administration, military veterans were particular targets of Diagnist party propaganda, spearheaded by Galandou Diouf.⁶⁶ Diouf also had alliances with members of Governor Didelot’s cabinet and several French commandants. This earned him the nickname “Warwick of the chiefs.”⁶⁷

⁶³ ANS 13 G 10 (17), dossier on Galandou Diouf, 1922.

⁶⁴ ANS 13 G 10 (17), note au sujet de Mbakhane Diop, 30 August 1921.

⁶⁵ ANS 13 G 10 (17), dossier on Galandou Diouf, 1922.

⁶⁶ Searing, “Accommodation and Resistance,” 511.

⁶⁷ ANS 13 G 10 (17), Dossier on Galandou Diouf. From Earl of Warwick, known as “the Kingmaker” in the 15th century, a renowned statesman.

Le Hérissé, Inspector of Administrative Affairs in Senegal, described Diouf's propaganda and patronage network that extended throughout all of rural Senegal, and back again to the communes—particularly, Rufisque. In other places in the colonial record, Diouf was described as a “true chief of propaganda.” Diouf visited *cercles* on the Senegal River, where his family had operated as traders and campaigned with the French. Diouf went into the Protectorate and collected contributions for Diagne's party from the chiefs, rural notables, and the Murids. In return, Diouf performed acts of a patron (for Diagne and his party, but also for himself) by passing on favors, redistributing wealth, and negotiating the colonial landscape

Diouf not only connected with chiefs and marabouts in the interior, but he was also able to garner friends among French administrators. Le Hérissé put together a dossier on “African loving” commandants, and three of these men were personal friends of Galandou Diouf—Commandant Tellier at Thiès, Henri at Tivaouane, and Maubert at Diourbel.⁶⁸ Not surprisingly, Le Hérissé believed these administrators corrupt and accused Maubert, in particular, of taking generous sums from the Murids as a bribe. Maubert was purportedly bribed in order to allow Diouf to collect contributions for the Diagnist party.⁶⁹ Thiès, Tivaouane and Diourbel were three of the most important rural centers in Senegal at the time. They were religious, agricultural, and financial centers in the Protectorate.

⁶⁸ ANS 13 G 10.

⁶⁹ ANS 17 G 239 (108).

In spite of Diagne's and Diouf's attempt to exert control over the Colonial Council, most chiefs voted predictably with the program the French administration desired; Diouf would later claim that Diagne ruined his collaborative effort with the chiefs because of the way Diagne treated them. In 1922 the administration proposed new taxes on commercial transactions in the Four Communes and in the Protectorate. Originaires voted against the taxes, but it became clear they would pass because the chiefs supported them. In response, the originaires walked out of the assembly, and continued their protests by criticizing the role of the chiefs in the new Colonial Council. Amadou Dugay Clédor, the mayor of Dakar, spoke for the originaires in the assembly:

...you.. wish to reduce us to the same level as the new colonies, which were conquered and civilized by us or with our aid, [and] you will create an unbridgeable gap between us... It is not going to be said that we, the elected members, the real representatives of the population, have relinquished the rights and prerogatives of this country, which has ... a legitimate right to be part of the *grande famille française*.⁷⁰

Chiefs, originaires argued, were not the real representatives of Senegal.

Regardless of originaires' perception of unique status, they had lost part of the battle over control of Senegal's legislature. Calls for the abolition of the Colonial Council would continue, unheeded, until after World War II. At the same time, the chiefs who were supported by the administration lamented the lack of morale amongst their fellows.⁷¹ The Diagnists were disappointed, and relations between Diagne's party and the French administration reached an all time low between the years of 1921 and 1923. Due to a series of political mistakes by Diagne, such as refusing to meet with a group of chiefs who were colonial

⁷⁰ ANS 4 E 13 (135).

⁷¹ ANS 13 G 10, dossier on Galandou Diouf, 1922.

counselors in Paris, and serious political maneuvering of Merlin and the French administration, the alliance between many of the chiefs and the originaires was broken by 1922. Diagne and his top aides were castigated in official French documents. Galandou Diouf was ridiculed for his limited education and inaccurately accused of being a terrible manager of the commune of Rufisque. French colonial detractors also accused him of running a corrupt political machine in the countryside.⁷²

1923-1928: The Pact of Bordeaux and the Rupture

Diagne's party could not form an alliance with the chiefs, so Diagne looked elsewhere to secure basis for his political power. The Diagnists had been able to almost shut the Bordeaux firms out of power in Senegal. But in 1923, on a summer day, Diagne met with major representatives of the Bordeaux firms at the *Palais de la Bourse* in Bordeaux. This meeting became the corner stone of the Pact of Bordeaux, a "business marriage" between Diagne and the commercial firms of Senegal.⁷³ This was quite an about-face for a politician that had spent years trying to break the financial monopoly of the firms on the peanut trade. But Diagne's overtures were not enough. The representatives of the firms wanted to know if Diagne's party and his aides were also behind him. Diagne assured them of their support. But it is clear from his conversation that many of his party insiders probably had no idea about the forthcoming agreement.⁷⁴

⁷² ANS 17 G 233 (108).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ See Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 519-521.

In exchange for Diagne's support, the firms agreed to join Diagne in convincing the administration of the importance of certain mutual interests, and the firms would also finance Diagne in electoral campaigns. Diagne would allow commercial representatives to join and be active members in the party, and run for elections. Diagne was concerned with the upcoming elections, because he knew the Diagnist party was facing dissatisfaction in Senegal along two major political axes.

The functionaries had formed their own association, which they used to campaign for equal pay for equal work, and Lamine Guèye was their representative. Lamine Guèye began gathering his supporters in earnest in 1923. Guèye and his organization were based in Saint-Louis, instead of the newer communes of Rufisque and Dakar, from which Diagne garnered the most support. Although Guèye's base was in Saint-Louis, he attempted to build a coalition from all of the communes—which was completely necessary to win the big elections. Guèye was supported by the *Association des Fonctionnaires Indigènes*, which was founded in 1923. Although many of these men worked for the government in Dakar, they originally hailed from *notable* originaire families in Saint-Louis, much as Guèye, himself.



Figure 4.5 [Lamine Guèye, ANS.]

Guèye's base in Saint-Louis was further strengthened when he was named the honorary president of the *Société Amicale des Jeunes Saint Louisiens*. Guèye envisioned a future where Senegalese functionaries gradually took over government jobs held by the French, until they controlled the government, itself, even if it did take fifty or sixty years. Guèye was highly educated, and he was a master of rhetoric, yet as a politician he also knew how to strike a balance by paying homage to his own culture. For example, in 1924, he brought his *griot*, Amidou Fall, to a meeting of the *Société Amicale*. Fall did what any *griot* would do and sang praises to Guèye in Wolof.⁷⁵

The fact that Guèye had a personal *griot* spoke volumes to his followers about his wealth and social status. Guèye named his party *Socialiste française*.

⁷⁵ ANS 20 G 100.

It stood in opposition to Diagne's *Parti Républicain socialiste*. The other major threat to Diagnist power was the possible loss of Lebou support in Dakar. The Lebou *notables* wanted the benefits they had received from their previous alliance with the Bordeaux firms. Clearly, Diagne hoped to keep the Lebou in his camp by giving them an opportunity to benefit from his cooperation with the Bordeaux firms. In 1924 Guèye did not run for the deputyship. Instead he and his allies put up a French lawyer, Paul Defferre. The electorate shunned this French candidate, and overwhelmingly voted for Diagne again. The Lebou population had come through for Diagne.

Blaise Diagne's political fortunes with the French administration improved with the appointment of Jules Carde. Diagne and Carde had served together in Madagascar, and they were both members of the Masonic order. Carde was willing to work with Diagne on developing a healthier *mise en valeur* in Senegal, and in the AOF as a whole. In 1922 Senegal was in need of economic revitalization. The price of peanuts had dropped precipitously in 1915, and Senegal's economy was just recovering.⁷⁶

The Pact of Bordeaux and the appointment of Carde led to a new direction in Diagne's policies and politics. The administration began to portray Diagne as an ally. Diagne's rhetoric was becoming not just assimilationist, but downright colonial. Eventually Diagne would be completely associated with the administration to the point where he was accused of stealing elections and taking bribes. But this did not stop the Diagnist party from maintaining a powerful

⁷⁶ From 1925-1928, Senegal enjoyed a brief surge in the economy, and production levels and export earnings remained high until the Great Depression began in earnest in 1931.

political organism, with the help and material capital from the administration and the Bordeaux firms. With the support of the administration, Diagne possessed significant ability to reward loyal followers through official government appointments.

Diagne made the administration happy by dropping the demand for full assimilation and the extension of political rights to the rest of the colony. In 1924, the nature of the communes changed as *Dakar et Dépendances* was created. *Dakar et Dépendances* subsumed three out of the four prewar Communes into one. That is, Dakar, Gorée and Rufisque were ruled by a delegate of the Governor General, under his direct authority. The municipalities still existed, but with reduced powers. Diagne did not do much to stop it.⁷⁷ In the political campaign of 1928, in which Galandou Diouf split from Diagne, Diouf would accuse Diagne of “mutilating” the communes.

Even as early as 1924, rumors circulated about the possibility of a split between Diouf and Diagne. Diagne wrote to Diouf, “I want to tell you something amusing that I think will make you laugh like me. In a letter Sergent wrote me, he told me that D’Oxoby and Sangué were helping you prepare your campaign against me. Sergent assured me you would not succeed. But between you and me, I would not dignify this proposal.”⁷⁸ Diouf was prodded by anti-Diagnists in 1924 to accept an opposition candidacy. He refused because he had already given his word to Diagne.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, Diouf began to make statements

⁷⁷ See ANS 4 E 6 (14) for the legislation.

⁷⁸ Diallo, “Galandou Diouf,” 33.

⁷⁹ ANS 17 G 241 (108), report “Attitude de Galandou à l’égard de Diagne avant election 1924.”

which hinted that the Deputy of Senegal was too attached to the interests of the administration and the large commercial houses and was failing to defend the interests of his electors and race brothers.

On the other hand, the situation in the Colonial Council changed to the Diagnists' favor. Carde modified the balance of seats in the Colonial Council before the 1925 election so that originaires would be more numerous than the chiefs; now originaires would have twenty-four representatives and the chiefs sixteen.⁸⁰ Carde was also afraid that if something was not changed on the Council, it would become too unpopular to function adequately, but he made sure that the political character of the council was not altered too much.

Diagne upheld the Pact of Bordeaux and put a number of European commercial representatives on the Diagnist list of candidates in each local election of 1925. Diagne carefully divided the European seats on his list between the representatives of medium and large commerce. European commercial agents gained access to positions of power in the municipalities. For example, in Dakar Diagne was officially the mayor, but when he was in France (which was most of the time), Prolongeau took his place.⁸¹ Diagne came back to Senegal from Paris to campaign in the election, and his house was a hub of political activity, as representatives from organizations such as the *DSL*, *Ancien Combattants* and the *Amicale Senegalaise* came to pay him a visit. He met with his major political advisors in cafés in Dakar, over French-style coffee and tea

⁸⁰ ANS 4 E 4 (14)

⁸¹ ANS 20 G 77 (23). Diouf probably felt this slight; characteristically the first lieutenant would substitute for the deputy as the mayor of Dakar.

and discussed strategy and politics. Galandou Diouf, as one of Diagne's major aides, was still constantly by his side.

Galandou Diouf was the vice president of the Council and was also president of the Permanent Commission of the Council, which allowed him to monitor and direct expenses voted on by the Council. But consequences from Diagne's shift in policies became evident in the elections of 1925. For the first time since they had come to power, the Diagnists lost the municipal elections of Rufisque and Saint-Louis, and seats on the Colonial Council in Saint-Louis. These positions were taken by Lamine Guèye and his party. This meant Galandou Diouf was no longer the mayor of Rufisque; he lost to Maurice Guèye. Diagne, however, remained victorious in Dakar, where his party won the election against two lists, one of which was supported by Lamine Guèye.

But Guèye was interested in outcomes beyond the 1925 election. Diagne and Guèye met in the grand hall of Saint-Louis, where the Colonial Council held their meetings, on 1 April 1927. Shortly after, Lamine Guèye announced his resignation as mayor of Saint-Louis, in order to "save Saint-Louis, which due to the struggles after the election, was falling into decline."⁸² Diouf was standing by Guèye and Diagne as Diagne's party offered a joint list with Guèye, and absorbed them into the Diagnist party. The former municipal council of Saint-Louis was dissolved by order of the Governor of Senegal, and the electoral college of Saint-Louis was called to elect a new city council which would be comprised of equal members from each party.⁸³

⁸² *La France coloniale*, 9 April 1927.

⁸³ ANS 20 G 77 (23).

But by 1927 Galandou Diouf had lost his position as Blaise Diagne's first lieutenant to Dugay Clédor. The entente between Lamine Guèye and Blaise Diagne would be short lived, as Galandou Diouf broke from Blaise Diagne definitively in 1927 and Guèye joined him. The break began in 1923 with the Pact of Bordeaux; Diouf was ignorant of the plan until after the fact. Diouf's hard-fought alliance with chiefs from the interior was undone by Diagne's mismanagement. Instead Diagne had begun to work closely with the colonial administration after Carde became governor general. Diouf made his definite break after Diagne's lack of support for him during the Tallerie affair.

Pierre Tallerie had been the Commandant of the *cercle* of Thiès, a place where Galandou Diouf enjoyed prestige and respect. In 1926 Tallerie, Mustapha Amadou and his brother Balla M'backé signed a contract in which Tallerie would be responsible for purchasing materials for a memorial mosque, which would be built in Touba on the Meccan model. The cost of the mosque was estimated at around five million francs. Tallerie was supposed to be paid an annual sum of 75,000 francs, and had a guarantee of 500,000 francs if the contract was broken by the Murids. When Tallerie left for France in September 1926, it was reported in the press that he carried 1.5 million francs that he was supposed to use to buy necessary material for the construction of the mosque.⁸⁴ The materials seemed to disappear, and Tallerie apparently never filled his contract agreements.⁸⁵ It

⁸⁴ *L'Ouest africain français* 13 Avril 1927. Bank statements have shown that the amount was lower than this, but still significant. Over 916,000 francs were paid into Tallerie's account from Balla M'Backe's account.

⁸⁵ Galandou Diouf wrote later in his life that automobiles, lorries, trucks, and building materials had been received by the Murids because Tallerie had sent them. ANS 1 Z

became a public relations disaster for Diagne's party and the French administration. It was later discovered that Tallerie embezzled the money.⁸⁶

D'Oxoby's newspaper quickly demanded justice for the guilty parties and the patrons who protected them.⁸⁷ Diagne felt moved to outline the main points of the affair in his journal *La France coloniale*. In an attempt to distance him from the scandal, Diagne called for administrative actions against Pierre Tallerie. Galandou Diouf found himself in a difficult situation. He had accepted 70,000 francs from the Murids on the order of Tallerie, perhaps for serving as an intermediary between the Murids and Tallerie.⁸⁸ Diouf claimed he had no knowledge of Tallerie's embezzlement, and he also denied that he had made a deal with Tallerie. Diouf stated that he did not know about the 70,000 francs until Balla M'Backé and Mustapha came to him when he was in Khombol.⁸⁹ Diouf was an acquaintance of Tallerie, but he had important connections in the brotherhood, as well. He was close to the Qadi Ndiaye Sarr and his son, Omar Sarr, who was his cousin.⁹⁰ Diouf was also an ally and friend to Cheikh Anta Mbacké, who was losing the struggle to succeed Amadu Bamba as head of the Muridiyya to Mustapha Amadou Mbacké. It seems unlikely that Diouf would have

56. Diouf expressed much bitterness at the accusations leveled against him by some of the Murid leadership, particularly Moustapha.

⁸⁶ Tallerie claimed his wife was sick in Senegal; he was tempted because he needed the money to help her. Christopher Harrison, *France and Islam in West Africa 1860-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 168.

⁸⁷ *L'Ouest africain français* 13 Avril 1927.

⁸⁸ Interview with Papa Konare, cited in Diallo, "Galandou Diouf," 43.

⁸⁹ ANS 1 Z 56. Diouf did, however, admit that he told the Murid representatives that they had chosen a good man with whom to work.

⁹⁰ Omar Sarr, interview with David Robinson.

risked his relationship with the brotherhood. Galandou Diouf felt Blaise Diagne had not supported him during the scandal; Diouf took it as a personal betrayal.⁹¹

Galandou Diouf was also frustrated with Diagne's new political alliances. He agreed with expatriate leaders in France like Lamine Senghor, that Diagne had compromised himself. By the early 1920s, Diagne's position as preeminent spokesperson of the *évolués* in the métropole had declined.⁹² Diouf also believed it was not possible to serve both the Senegalese and the French business monopolies at the same time. In addition, a group to whom Diouf was close, World War I veterans, had begun to blame Diagne for their plight as much as the métropole or the colonial administration. Diagne had promised citizenship and exemption from the *indigénat* in return for the "blood tax" of service. Instead, the *tirailleur* had been met by French distrust and broken promises.⁹³ Galandou Diouf decided he would be the better man to represent Senegalese interests in Paris.

⁹¹ The Taillerie affair was not the first time Diouf's name had been publicly tainted with corruption. He ran into trouble for fiscal irregularities at Rufisque city hall in the "*affaire des charbons*". Supposedly Diouf illegally profited from delivery of coal to the city. Blaise Diagne did not help him during this difficult time, either.

⁹² Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence* 63.

⁹³ By 1924 rumors circulated among Africans in Paris that Diagne had received a commission for each African recruited in 1918.

Chapter Five

The Election and Campaign for Député du Sénégal, 1928

This chapter analyzes the 1928 campaign waged between incumbent Blaise Diagne and challenger Galandou Diouf for West Africa's seat in France's Chamber of Deputies. Not since Diagne's initial election in 1914 had Senegal, or French West Africa, seen an election contested like this one. But instead of a European candidate being unseated by an African one, this campaign pitted two "*enfants de pays*" against each other. Galandou Diouf took a large personal and political risk by running against Diagne, for Diagne was well entrenched with the administration and the Bordeaux houses by 1928. The administration's political coercion combined with the economic force of the Bordeaux houses made victory for Diagne inevitable, regardless of the election's real outcome.

By charting Diouf's political rallies, the rhetoric of supporters and rivals, and the construction of his organization, it is possible to gain insight into the political process of colonial Senegal. Both Blaise Diagne and Galandou Diouf competed for métropole support; Diagne had the support of the French government, but he was a *bête noire* with the proto-nationalist *évolués* in Paris. Diouf garnered their support and became a symbol for African political rights in both West Africa and France. Lamine Guèye's support aided Diouf's symbolic capital in the métropole. When Diouf argued the election had been stolen from him, he was popularly portrayed as a crusader fighting French injustice. Métropole discourse about communism and the USSR, the new bogey man of

Europe's interwar period, was brandished in the 1928 Senegal election, as well. This chapter maps how Diouf deployed his symbolic capital in the political field; Diouf was a resourceful and intelligent politician. Diouf's discourses were produced for public consumption, and while they may not have mirrored his private thoughts, they do provide insight into the issues and controversies that sparked political interest in the métropole and Senegal.

The Lines are Drawn

By late 1927, rumors of an African candidate who would oppose Blaise Diagne for the deputyship began to circulate in earnest. Galandou Diouf announced his separation with Diagne and his intention to present himself and his compatriots as alternative candidates for the legislative election of 22 April 1928.¹ The looming rupture between Diagne and Diouf became official.

Galandou Diouf began the campaign on attack mode, and he would put Diagne on the defensive time and again. Diouf attacked Diagne's commitment to Senegal, and pointed out how apathetic Diagne had been when he heard about the outbreak of Yellow Fever in Senegal during the summer of 1927.² Diouf argued that Diagne was distanced from his constituency and knew nothing, and cared nothing, for the lived reality of Africans. Galandou Diouf accused Diagne of being mostly 'French,' and not African.

¹ *L'ouest africain français*, 10 mars 1928. The format of this announcement took the shape of a letter dated 15 February 1928, and addressed to Dugay Clédor, the president of the Colonial Council and one of Diagne's important lieutenants,

² *L'ouest africain français*, 2 Juillet 1927. Diagne had dismissed the news of the disease as a commonplace 'warning' that occurred often in the colony. In reality, the disease caused suffering and death to many Senegalese.

Galandou Diouf imputed that Diagne had adopted the view of the administration on several points. Diouf called Diagne the administration's stooge. Diagne's great crime, Diouf argued, was that he advanced the creation of the Colonial Council that replaced the General Council.³ Diagne had sold his mandate out to the Bordeaux firms. Galandou Diouf's supporters emphasized Diagne's distant style of government. Louis Guillabert, former president of the Colonial Council, tried to persuade originaires that Diagne was a tyrant. He proclaimed, "We are, now, under the strict authority of a man. We are worse off than Russia during the time of the Tsars."⁴ Lamine Guèye attacked as well, "Diagne is synonymous with blackmail, degradation, and regression."⁵

Lamine Guèye also commented on his reasons for supporting Diouf, "We are fighting less for Galandou Diouf than for the defeat of Blaise Diagne, a person without roots, the strong-box of the Bordeaux merchants."⁶ This statement reveals more about Lamine Guèye's political ambitions than it does about Galandou Diouf's real base of support. Lamine Guèye's association with Diouf helped both men; Guèye was considered too young and inexperienced to run for the deputyship himself. Guèye did not possess the symbolic capital with the Protectorate that Diouf held. Guèye served a political apprenticeship under Diouf's tutelage in much the same way Diouf was an apprentice of both Carpot and Diagne. Guèye would also break with Diouf when he considered his own capital to be sufficient to challenge Diouf's authority.

³ This was not entirely accurate, but as a politician Diouf rewrote history to make Diagne into a willing pawn of the Bordeaux interests and the administration.

⁴ ANS 20 G 80.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique*, 132.

Diouf successfully wove together several different strands of the disillusioned and discontented African, métis, and French populations. He was a savvy, intelligent and ambitious politician, imbued with a significant amount of symbolic capital and a wide base of support. Diouf was charismatic and an effective and persuasive speaker. Diouf's coalition was not merely a disparate band out to remove Diagne, it was also a group committed to Diouf and his vision of colonial reform.

Galandou Diouf created a platform that would reflect a diversity of opinions and interests of the opposition. In the 7 April 1928 edition of *L'ouest africain français*, Diouf presented his platform, which was divided into three large concerns: politics, economics and social issues. Diouf's platform tried to soothe French reaction about his radical affiliations. At the same time, Diouf promoted a program that appealed to originaires and other inhabitants of Senegal. Diouf's stand on the Colonial Council was a clear departure from Diagne. In order to distance himself from Diagne's accommodationist policies with the colonial government, Diouf called for a re-creation of the General Council. This provided clear evidence to originaires that Diouf was not prepared to cooperate in the same way Diagne was with the pre-colonial elite. This was an area in which Diagne was vociferously criticized by the LDRN and by many World War I veterans, within West Africa and France.

Diouf's platform pushed to have the municipal laws of 1884, which would protect municipal privileges and the municipal budget, enacted in the four communes. This would have reclaimed certain privileges for originaires. The

platform also demanded an end to the application of indigenous justice in the communes, and for the French code of law to be enacted in every case. This would protect Diouf's *évolué* allies working for him in the communes, as well as his other non-originaire supporters living in the communes, from Murid followers to Mauritanian merchants.

Diouf's campaign called for the promulgation of the French 1898 laws on work-related accidents and unions that was not applied in the colony. Diouf argued for equality of Africans under French law. His party also called for equal pay for equal jobs between European and African functionaries. In this way he reached out to working class men. Diouf's platform also called for obligatory primary education for children in the communes because only a small minority of children actually had access to schools; this went directly against the direction in which the colonial administration was heading. He wanted more hospitals and dispensaries, the practical results of a 'civilizing' mission. In the economic domain, Diouf's platform promoted the development of agriculture, the improvement of the ports of Dakar, Rufisque, Saint-Louis, Kaolack, and Ziguinchor.⁷ Around this political program, the opposition to Diagne regrouped.

Blaise Diagne counteracted Diouf's arguments by launching a few of his own. Diagne manipulated schisms between inhabitants of different communes and played on ethnic difference and fear. Diagne intimated to the Lebou in Cap-Vert that Diouf's association with Lamine Guèye was a personal attack against them, since Guèye was known to be a defender of Saint-Louis interests.

Diagne's propaganda worked. The Lebou believed Diouf's placement of Lamine

⁷ *L'ouest africain français*, 7 April 1928.

Guèye as his manager was giving assurances to the Saint-Louisiens of their superiority in importance and sophistication in comparison to the Lebou of Dakar and Rufisque. The accusation flew that Diouf was pandering only to Saint-Louisien interests. Indeed, in a communiqué dated 6 March 1928, an informant noted that Lebou from the villages of Cambarène, Ouakam, Thiaroye, N'Gor, Yoff, and Yeumbeul came out prepared to defend Deputy Diagne from Saint-Louisien protestors. They were armed with bullwhips in hand.⁸ This was a potent symbol not of any danger Diagne was in, but rather the lengths to which the Lebou were prepared to protect interests they felt were threatened.

Galandou Diouf accused the Diagnists of running a campaign of division. Diouf vociferously denied the allegation that he gave special privilege to Saint-Louis. In the pages of *L'A.O.F.*, he accused those who made such allegations as having short memories. "Yes," Diouf wrote, "I was born in Saint-Louis, but my family is found in none other than Dakar." It was in Rufisque, he reminded readers, where in 1909 he was elected to the General Council for the first time, not as a representative of Saint-Louis. Indeed, Diouf reminded readers, it was Rufisque where he had been head of the city from 1919 to 1925. In conclusion, Diouf wrote, "Lamine Guèye and I have all of our material and moral interests in Senegal. I don't know Lebous or Saint-Louisiens, but Senegalese by birth or adoption."⁹

⁸ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

⁹ Diallo, "Galandou Diouf," 49. The Bordeaux consortium controlled *La Grande Imprimerie Africaine de Dakar*, which printed the newspaper *l'A.O.F.* Orders were given to cease publication of *l'A.O.F.* shortly after its inception. Lamine Guèye was forced to find a publisher for it in Casablanca (Zuccarelli, *La vie politique*, 133). Dr. Huchard, a strong supporter of Galandou Diouf, who lived in Dakar, had the "Ronéo," a copying

Diouf's personal history and participation in the political and economic life of Rufisque, Dakar and Saint-Louis made him uniquely suited to transcend ethnic, geographical, and religious difference. His family history in Saint-Louis, commercial history in Rufisque and political history in Dakar situated him as a candidate who could claim allegiance to any of the three major communes. Diouf referred to his rootedness in Senegal in stark contrast to Blaise Diagne, who had barely lived in the colony. Diouf's appeal to the Lebou population, despite his Saint-Louisien heritage is striking, for the Lebou were popularly depicted as possessing a deep resentment and dislike for Saint-Louisiens.

Blaise Diagne counterattacked. He expressed consternation at the inexplicable betrayal of his friends. He defended his actions for the *Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale*, upon which he had been attacked. He publicly announced his confidence in the Senegalese voters, who he claimed had a sense of honor and friendship toward him. Diagne also attacked Diouf's intelligence and competency; this was a calculated attempt to paint Diouf as the ignorant and corrupt native politician. Diagne claimed that Diouf was an incapable mayor, who had been revoked due to incompetence, and whose defection from him was proof of his unreliable nature. In reality, Diouf was removed from his position as mayor because of his defection from Diagne. When he had been Diagne's ally, he had orchestrated Diagnist wins in the Colonial Council and municipal councils. Diouf had remained mayor for several years, serving effectively in the position until he fell completely out of favor with the colonial administration. Diagne's

device he put at the disposal of the Diouf campaign. He printed at least one tract in the form of a letter for Diouf (ANS 20 G 82 (23).)

allies in the French administration continued to cast suspicions on Galandou Diouf.

Diagne attacked Diouf's associations. He claimed that because Diouf's candidacy was patronized by Roger Roche, the driving force of the SFIO party in the colony, Diouf was, like Roche, "a communist enslaved to the third International [Communist Party]."¹⁰ These accusations were printed in the pages of Dugay Clédor's *France Coloniale*. Blaise Diagne, on the other hand, presented himself to the French administration and the Bordeaux firms as a confirmed capitalist, who was categorically known for his opposition to communism. He told his "compatriots in the colonies" that those who defended communism did nothing more than defend a "regime of disorder."¹¹

Diagne knew that Diouf was not a communist, but he played on establishment fears of communism. By portraying Diouf as a communist sympathizer, Diagne was able to further secure his symbolic capital as the safe candidate to the powerful Bordeaux monopolies and the French administration. The French administration believed the propaganda, as General Carde reported to Paris:

Because of the unexpected declaration of the candidacy of Galandou Diouf against the incumbent Deputy, whose active partisan Diouf has always been up to now, I expect that the election battle will have an unusual character. This impression is confirmed by the presence.. and support of several notorious European communists, who have given the new party its true nature.¹²

¹⁰ *La France Coloniale*, 29 March 1928. Roger Roche, the owner of a garage, along with two café owners, had initiated a communist cell in Rufisque in 1925. Failing to attract comrades from the Senegalese, Roche became a strong supporter of Diouf.

¹¹ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique*, 126-7, 133.

¹² Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 537.

Galandou Diouf was aware that the French administration was completely behind the candidacy of Blaise Diagne. He had to look for powerful supporters that he hoped would counterbalance Diagne's advantages. Diouf had always believed, perhaps due to his experiences in the war, that there were French people in the métropole who would be willing—and able—to stand up to the colonial administration. These Europeans, Diouf posited, were genuinely interested in African equality. Throughout his life Diouf would reiterate in personal letters the difference he believed existed between some French in the métropole and the corruption and coercion of French administrators that occurred in Senegal.

Galandou Diouf reached out to organizations and individuals who would be willing to support him against French colonial interests, and Diagne, in the colonies. Like all political campaigns, Diouf required funds to promote his candidacy. Diouf attracted adherents from a variety of backgrounds. Mr. Lavie was a French businessman who supported Diouf. Mr. Lavie was the Inspector of the House of Buhan and Teisseire in Dakar. The administration was wary of Lavie's new support of Diouf, for Lavie had lived in Senegal for many years, and had a significant amount of economic and social capital. Indeed, it was believed Lavie would be able to sway many European voters in Dakar because of his influence, wealth, and status as a fellow European.

Diouf had the support of the Young Senegalese organization and leadership from Saint-Louis. Amet Télémaque Sow attended Diouf's rallies and meetings and encouraged his followers from Saint-Louis to vote for Diouf.

During political events, Télémaque Sow would expostulate on the differences between the Colonial Council and the General Council, an issue near and dear to many Saint-Louisiens' hearts. Télémaque Sow's financial support of Diouf was due in part to Diouf's commitment to annul the Colonial Council and reinstate the General Council. Daramy d'Oxoby, Thiécouta Diop, and Captain Abdel Khader Mdemba, Diouf's comrade in arms at the French front, all supported Diouf monetarily. Cheikh Anta Mbacké provided key financial backing for Diouf, as well.

Galandou Diouf also looked toward the resources of larger organizations, such as the French communist party, the SFIO. Since 1926 Senegal had possessed an organized section of the *Parti Section Française Internationale Ouvrières* (SFIO), which was recognized by the *Fédération de Paris*. At the beginning, the party intended to focus on functionaries and on European personnel in Dakar, not on the indigenous element. The colonial administration began to take more notice of the SFIO in Senegal when Roger Roche became actively involved in 1927. Roche was well versed in the rhetoric of International Communism and the usefulness of effective propaganda. Roche was always treated with suspicion and derision in administrative communiqués; spouting communist propaganda had not endeared him to French administrators in West Africa. Roche challenged colonial authority with a rhetoric that he knew the French government feared and denounced.¹³

Before Diouf split with Diagne, Diagne had sent Diouf to meetings of the SFIO in order to gather intelligence on the organization. The SFIO had made

¹³ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

considerable gains in Senegal, which was most likely directly related to the decreasing popularity of Diagne. Diagne realized the SFIO's rhetoric was hostile toward him and hoped Diouf's presence could mitigate that aspect of it. According to sources, Diouf had to be "pushed" to go. However, this is where Diouf met Roger Roche, and Diouf began to become more seriously involved in SFIO, seeing it as a mighty resource upon which, in part, to base a campaign against Diagne. Diouf knew political campaigns in Senegal required serious resources; Diagne had the nearly unlimited resources of the colonial administration and the Bordeaux interests. In order to stand a chance of defeating Diagne politically, Diouf needed the SFIO.

The SFIO exposed Diouf to communist rhetoric, and while Diouf was never a communist, it did provide Diouf with a different perspective on the relationship between the métropole and the colonies. It also provided the ideological context for the development of new forms of struggle in France and West Africa.¹⁴ Being involved with an organized entity also provided Diouf further education in his political practices and coalition formation.

When the Diouf-Diagne split occurred, the SFIO prospered. For the French administration, the extension of SFIO in Senegal was attributable to this one cause.¹⁵ By 1928, the SFIO had a stable base in the indigenous population. D'Oxoby, Gay, and Louis Martin appeared on the list of European members of

¹⁴ For Lenin, the colonized peoples were not "backward" and in need of tutelage by Europeans. In terms of class struggle, they were actually more "advanced" and at the forefront of the conflict. As such, the communist party argued that colonial subjects should work with French proletarians in a united front against capitalism. Indigenous peoples should be groomed for revolutionary struggle when they returned home.

¹⁵ ANS 21 G 137 (108), "Renseignements sur la constitution et le développement du Parti SFIO au Sénégal."

the SFIO; all were significant in communal politics, economy, and Galandou Diouf's party. Among the Africans listed as members of the SFIO figured Galandou Diouf, Ibrahima Sow, Amadou Assane N'Doye, Maurice Guèye, Adama Lo, Moussa Fall, Magatte Ba and Babacar Camara. These men formed the backbone of Diouf's originaire political coalition.¹⁶

In addition to the SFIO, Diouf was able to claim another powerful group of supporters from the métropole. During the 1928 campaign and for several years after, Galandou Diouf had the support and attention of a politically active West African community in France. These men provided financial and symbolic capital to his campaign, although most of them could not vote in the deputy election. Diouf had spent time in France as a soldier during World War I, and made connections with other veterans across West Africa and France. During his tenure as Diagne's lieutenant, he had traveled to France to meet with the deputy and acquired contacts on those occasions as well. Among the most important of Diouf's contacts during this critical time in his career was Tiémoko Kouyaté.

Tiémoko Kouyaté was the leader of the *Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre* (LDRN), which he had cofounded with Lamine Senghor.¹⁷ The LDRN had

¹⁶ Ibid. Most of these names should be recognizable or familiar to the reader by now. Moussa Fall and Babakar Camara were both involved in the publication of Diouf's paper, *Périscopie africain*.

¹⁷ An early supporter of Diagne, Lamine Senghor lost his enthusiasm for the Deputy when many veterans from West Africa were denied pensions, citizenship, and other rights they had been promised. See Mann, "Locating Colonial Histories," 11, and Zuccarelli, *La vie politique sénégalaise*, 138. Lamine Senghor was born in Senegal in 1889, and was drafted into the war in 1915; he remained on active duty throughout the duration of the conflict. Senghor was wounded in the battle of Verdun in 1916, and contracted tuberculosis shortly thereafter. The disease would eventually end his life in 1927. After he was demobilized in 1919, Senghor stayed in France and picked up work on the docks at Midi. Thiémokho Garan Kouyaté also traveled to French ports trying to convince immigrant workers to join the C.G.T. U. Kouyaté did not participate in World

one stated goal: "The complete emancipation of the Negro race" which might require "violent struggle against colonization in general and against France in particular."¹⁸ The colonial administration and the French government in Paris kept close surveillance on the League and its members. The French believed it was a dangerous and radical association. The League was popular, however, not just in France, but also in the colonies. As the leader of the League, Kouyaté believed Diagne was uninterested in African emancipation, and he actively campaigned against him in France and Senegal. With financial support from Communist trade unions, Kouyaté traveled frequently between France and West Africa, building networks and support.

The French closely watched the League and Kouyaté due to their affiliations with the communist party. Spies and informants made copious observations and notes about the League's activities.¹⁹ The French investigated a wide array of individuals who had connections in both France and Senegal; these men were suspected of bringing radical ideas and notions to 'natives' in West Africa.²⁰

War I; he was too young. He had come to France to attend the *Ecole Normale Coloniale* in Aix-en-Provence. He was thrown out of the school, however, for expressing sentiments of 'hostility' towards the French Administration in the AOF.

¹⁸ Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 74. The League disseminated their ideas in a review entitled *Cri des Nègres*.

¹⁹ See ANS 21 G 142, on the activities of the Ligue de Défense de la Race Noire.

²⁰ One such man was Birahim Seck Yati Mar, who was an originaire from Saint-Louis. Before the war, Birahim had been employed by Maurel and Prom in English occupied Gambia. He was sent to the front at the beginning of World War I. The French Chief Administrator in Senegal accused Birahim of faking infirmities as a way to avoid actual fighting, and Birahim escaped the war without injury. Birahim approached Diagne to secure a pension, but Diagne treated him as a "shirker". After the war, Birahim returned to Senegal, where he worked as a business agent in Saint-Louis and then at Fatick, but he became embroiled in problems with the administration and was put in prison for a year. After his release, he moved to Diourbel and tried to set up a business. Birahim

In spite of French suspicion, by 1928 Diagne had recognized Kouyaté's influence, and had requested several meetings with him. Each time, however, Kouyaté and Diagne could not come to terms of cooperation. Diagne's credibility—a key component of political symbolic capital—with his constituency in Africa had been harmed when he associated himself with business interests accused of being proponents of forced labor throughout the colonies. Clearly Diagne's symbolic capital had waned for Africans in the métropole as well.

The League had been working on forming relationships with both Galandou Diouf and his first lieutenant, Lamine Guèye. The LDRN chose to support Diouf in his quest to become deputy. The LDRN had money, a newspaper, and adherents in both France and Senegal. Galandou Diouf recognized the importance of the *évolué* audience in France, and sought to expand his social capital in that milieu by having his opinions published in a French newspaper. In this way Diouf hoped to establish himself as an organic intellectual who spoke for all Africans' interests.

Diouf attempted to take the mantle of leadership for *évolués*. He wrote a letter to the editor of the French metropolitan newspaper, the *Matin*, to this effect, but the editor of the *Matin* was the nephew of Mr. Perrier, the Minister of Colonies. The French government was serious about limiting the influence of the

later travelled to Dakar, where he attempted to borrow money from several *notables* like Omar N'Dir and Salif Seck, and became active in colonial politics. Given his history with Diagne, it is not surprising that Birahim allied himself with Galandou Diouf in 1928. Birahim was an active member of the *Jeunes Sénégalais*, and had a reputation for being hostile towards the French administration. He was friends with Lamine Senghor, having maintained a letter correspondence with him. Indeed, Birahim was deemed dangerous by the administration, in part, because he helped illiterate Africans by writing letters of complaint to the administration. ANS 21 G 38 (17), "Suspected Individuals, 1928-39."

LDRN and the *évolué* community in Africa. The editor cablegrammed Diouf and informed him the letter could not be printed without receiving instructions from the government.²¹ *La Race Nègre*, the LDRN's newspaper, became contraband in West Africa. Africans were warned that any non-citizens in Senegal who made seditious statements against the government general or France could be arrested and held under the terms of the *indigénat*. This was targeted specifically at *évolués* returning to Senegal and French West Africa who argued for increased African participation and parity in the colonial government.

Galandou Diouf's Campaign

Colonial coercion and control could only be effected with some degree of knowledge of the political situation in the four communes. The French had operated surveillance networks throughout West Africa for many years; one of the most potent proved to be the method whereby colonial administrators kept tabs on Amadu Bamba.²² But of course Diouf could not be deported to another colony nor kept under house arrest; he was an originaire. With their networks of informants and spies, the colonial administration collected information, collated data and tried to effectively interpret it in order to move against Diouf's campaign.

Galandou Diouf projected the image of a 'man of the people,' and as such, he traveled extensively between the communes during the campaign, meeting his constituency, building support, parlaying upon his social capital. Informants for the French colonial administration closely watched his actions,

²¹ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

²² See David Robinson, "The Murids: Surveillance and Accommodation," *Journal of African History* 40 (1999): 13-21."

charting his movements by train from Rufisque to Dakar and back again. Diouf's meetings with supporters were also carefully chronicled in the archives on small pieces of typed papers, usually affixed with a date but no signature. These pieces of intelligence, or *compte-rendus*, were filled with rumors and witnessed events. In addition to oral interviews, these archival pieces of evidence inform historians about daily acts of campaigning, movements of candidates, and contents of speeches and conversations. These bits of information were passed onto the Police Commissioner, who occasionally wrote up reports for his superiors. These physical products of systematic surveillance were classified as "Confidential," or "Secret," and originated from a number of different informants. By using different informants, often African, or at least people insinuated enough into the campaigns not to appear as threats, colonial officials hoped to receive independent verification of events, which they often did. This independent verification speaks highly of the sources' validity, but must be interrogated against the background of a secretive colonial system spying upon its own "citizens" in the communes.

The gathered information could reveal schisms and differences of opinion within the colonial administration. The Governor General believed that Diouf's propaganda "had a distinctly communist character."²³ It seemed clear to the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, however, that Diouf was not a committed communist, and that he was merely playing a political game. The Lieutenant Governor pointed out that in a political meeting held at the Café Rey, Diouf

²³ ANS 20 G 82 (23), Confidential letter from the Governor of Colonies, Lt-Governor of Senegal to the Governor General, 1928.

affirmed his loyalty to French institutions in Senegal. The Lieutenant Governor had access to this meeting through his informants' surveillance. Although some of Diouf's adherents were communists, the Lieutenant Governor argued, many others were not. The symbols some of Diouf's partisans had appropriated from the Soviet Union, such as the hammer and the sickle, were actually being deployed with inscriptions like "*Opposition des ouvriers*," which indicated their antipathy to industrial workers and workers' concerns, and promoted the cause of agricultural laborers.

The coercive elements of the colonial state are apparent in the communiqués. Even though the hammer and sickle was not actually being used as a communist emblem, in order to "avoid a dangerous confusion," formal orders were given to the police to seize and destroy such symbols.²⁴ A young originaire who refused to obey the orders was arrested and incarcerated for a month, and had to pay a fine, as an example to others. So, while these pieces of information garnered through surveillance give the historian a view into daily political life in Senegal, the fact that they exist at all is an indication of the uneven power equation between African politicians and the colonial administration.

Africans challenged colonial authority in a variety of ways. In an imaginative letter of dark humor that challenged colonial authority and Blaise Diagne, "Young Saint-Louisiens" wrote and invited the French colonial "authorities" to a funeral. These "new voters of tomorrow" informed the authorities and the *rastaquouères*, the friends of Blaise Diagne, that they would "bury" this "satanic prince" at one o'clock in the morning on Monday 23 April.

²⁴ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

They went on to call Diagne a few other choice names, such as the “commander of the order of villains.” The letter named Governor General Carde, “Diagne’s faithful servant,” as the “funeral director.” The pallbearers would be *Monsieurs* Mornet, Blache, Clédor, and Lachaise—Diagne’s political allies. The body would be placed in a “cemetery of vultures.” The authorities were asked to bring their kitchen utensils to reinforce the orchestra that would play the funeral march. Diagne’s crown would be carried by the nieces of “Plague, Yellow Fever, Illness, War, Famine, Smallpox.” Indeed, the anti-Diagnists were told to take courage because all the population of Senegal would “cry tears of blood” for Diagne at this imagined political theater.²⁵

Diouf intended to capitalize upon this sort of disdain for Blaise Diagne and his close connections with colonial authorities. This subversive letter with its striking imagery may be analyzed as a public transcript of resistance to Diagne’s authority and his ties to the colonial administration. This written performance enacts a desired political death, and its rhetoric is dark and threatening, yet humorous. This ‘performance’ was a discursive assault on the authority and privilege the colonial administration and Blaise Diagne occupied.

And Blaise Diagne was not just threatened with words. Around 22 March 1928, the majority of *originaires* from the village of Guet N’Dar in Saint-Louis believed that Galandou Diouf and Lamine Guèye were coming by train from Dakar. Along with other inhabitants from Saint-Louis, they congregated at the station to welcome Diouf with tam-tams and cheers. However, Deputy Blaise

²⁵ ANS 20 G 82 (23), “Lettre d’invitation de la jeunesse saint-Louisien aux autorités,” dated vendredi 20 Avril 1928. Note: *rastaquouères* is a racist term used with reference to wealthy foreigners; it is seldom used now.

Diagne was the one who stepped off the train. When the Saint-Louisiens realized their error, the noisy welcome evaporated, and the sullen crowd watched the Deputy being escorted on foot quickly to the Colonial Council Hall. The building housing the Colonial Council had previously housed the General Council as well. Someone from the crowd cried in Wolof, "You do not have the right to enter into this hall since it was you who made it close!" Mabigue Gadiaga, a Municipal Councilor from Dakar, believed that the Deputy was in clear danger, and pulled out a revolver he had hidden under his clothes and pointed it at the crowd. When the colonial police realized this, they quickly intervened.²⁶ This was a striking indication of the efficacy of Diouf's campaign, the loss of symbolic capital Diagne suffered, and the hostility many originaires felt towards Diagne.²⁷

Galandou Diouf determined to take advantage of the people's disaffection with Diagne. His days were busy with campaigning. Early in March Diouf held a small conference with political allies in Medina, but the numbers of those interested grew so much that Diouf was forced to give a small speech to gathered crowd. The impromptu words he spoke give insight into how Diouf publically cast his arguments against Diagne:

Diagne left for France with assets that you entrusted him to multiply and be fruitful. In the place of conscientiously carrying out his mission, he neglected the interests of those who permitted him to go to France and he thought of no one but himself. The assets with which you entrusted him,

²⁶ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

²⁷ Saint-Louis was not the only location where Diagne faced hostile crowds. Diagne's first political meeting in Dakar was a stormy one. Diouf's partisans tried to be in the majority at the hall and kept disrupting his speech. Diagne, however, was finally able to finish when the police arrived.

he let them slip away... It is bad medicine; he must be replaced by someone who deserves your trust...²⁸

Diouf employed a language that resonated with originaires and emphasized Diagne's selfishness and corruption. Diouf played upon their disappointment and the betrayal of trust that originaires had put in Diagne. This tactic, Diouf realized, would erode Diagne's prestige and his symbolic capital.

That same evening, Galandou Diouf talked strategy with Lamine Guèye at Diouf's home. Their conversation, which was recorded by an informant, revealed Diouf's plan for gathering information. This shrewd politician realized it was crucial he have networks to counteract colonial sources of knowledge; Diouf had his own system of spies and informants. Diouf installed "sentinelles" at sensitive points to monitor the campaign's success and to pick up what the people wanted to hear. Part of the strategy session revolved around best practices for utilizing campaign monies to capture the Lebou vote.

Diouf realized the Lebou in the outlying areas of Rufisque and Dakar, such as Bargny, were loyal adherents to Diagne. This group of Lebou had very recently been made originaires, thanks to Diagne's efforts. With prompting from Diagne, the colonial administration had added areas to the circumscriptions of Dakar and Rufisque, allowing the Lebou living in outlying areas to vote in the election for deputy. This strengthened Diagne's candidacy. Lebou leadership also materially profited from association with Diagne. During the election of

²⁸ ANS 20 G 82 (23). This speech was transmitted to colonial authorities via an informant. The original French: Diagne est part en France avec un capital que vous lui avez confié pour le faire fructifier. Au lieu de remplir consciencieusement sa mission il a négligé les intérêts de ceux qui lui ont permis de aller en France et n'a pensé qu'à lui. Le capital que lui avez remis, il l'a dissipé au lieu de l'augmenter. C'est un mauvais traitant, il faut le remplacer par quelqu'un qui soit digne de votre confiance que lui."

1928, Diagne was able to promise the Lebou *notables* a million francs in compensation for land lost to the expansion of Dakar's port in 1923.²⁹ It was rumored that millions went to the Lebou *notables* from 1923 to 1933.

Diouf and his allies attempted to counteract the power of Diagne upon the Lebou vote during a meeting held on the beach in Rufisque. Around eight hundred Africans came, mostly Lebou. This rally was very different from the French-inspired meetings organized in the European areas of Dakar; here Diouf sought to present himself as the African candidate in touch with Lebou culture and interests. Griots were in attendance, and loudly sang Diouf's praises. When Lamine Guèye began speaking, his talk was punctuated by beats of a tam-tam drum, applause, and praises shouted from griots. As per tradition, Guèye paid the griots a large sum—100 francs—and the meeting became more serious.

It was a powerful and stirring event for those who attended. Lamine Guèye spoke to the crowd in Wolof, "It is not because of Diagne that I speak, because Diagne is dead. He's nothing but a corpse now; he could not feel any sting I could give him."³⁰ Guèye went on to accuse Diagne of using untoward force in trying to secure his "election," by sending spahis, gendarmes, and police agents against his adversaries for the least reason. Guèye advised the crowd to remain calm. "On the 22 of April," Guèye cried, "we will vote for the deserving candidate! When this happens, Galandou will block the misdeeds!"³¹

²⁹ See Assane Seck, *Dakar: Metropole Ouest-Africain*, 120-40, for information relating to Lebou land claims. This money came from Bordeaux firms.

³⁰ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

³¹ Ibid.

By mid-March, Diouf's networks were providing encouraging information about his chances in the election. On 13 March 1928, Diouf arrived in Dakar from Rufisque and proceeded to eat a meal at the *Chat Noir*. During the course of lunch, Diouf expressed confidence that he would win the election. Even with the most pessimistic of calculations, he reasoned that he would be elected in the first round easily. Diouf projected that he would win 1500 votes in Dakar, 1800 in Rufisque, 3000 in Saint-Louis, 400 in Bargny, 300 in Thiès, and about 800 from other locales, for a total vote of 8300. Diouf's constituency knew he was accessible, and Diouf was able to capitalize politically upon this difference between him and Diagne. For example, when Diouf walked home down the street that afternoon to the corner of Jules Ferry and Vincens, he found many young Africans waiting for him before the door. He spoke with them and encouraged their participation in the election.

As part of this accessibility, many meetings between Galandou Diouf and his lieutenants occurred in public places, particularly the cafés, restaurants and clubs of Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis. The candidate and his agents were observed taking coffee together on the terrace of the *Café Protêt* in Dakar. Or perhaps they were seen taking an aperitif around midday. Diouf and supporters like Gay, D'Oxoby, Samba Wade, and Dr. Huchard, knew their actions were scrutinized. Meeting and discussing tactics in public places was a consumption of French culture as much as it was an obvious symbol of wealth and privilege to fellow Africans. While these politicians consumed French liquor or cigarettes or coffee, they also consumed a French political system.

But of course this consumption was in an African setting, with a different set of rules and constituencies than France. Important political and personal connections were made in public spaces. For example, Félix Dupuy, a wealthy trader and merchant, stayed in lodgings provided at the *Café de l'Etoile* while he was in Dakar trying to make business connections. Dupuy had known Roger Roche in Paris, and they resumed their friendship in Dakar. Roche introduced Dupuy to Galandou Diouf and many of his wealthy and important followers. Dupuy became one of Diouf's partisans and contributed money to Diouf's campaign.³²

Meeting in open places also allowed the public to consume Diouf's image as an educated, capable, and successful political player, who would do well in Paris as Deputy. In this setting, Diouf made sure Africans and Europeans alike recognized his cosmopolitan tastes. Thus in the cafés of the communes, as in the cafés of Paris, we have a leitmotif of all the finer sentiments of the "civilizing mission," displayed for colonial and voter consumption, and an important meeting place for the exchange of ideas, knowledge and acquaintances.

At the same time, Diouf continued to push his image as a man of the people. Galandou Diouf's language was accessible and familiar to his constituency. He was in the habit of using 'homespun' metaphors and recognizable Wolof sayings to make his points. For example, during one

³² ANS 20 G 82 (23), 19 November 1929. On a side note, rumor had it Dupuy's mistress was Marthe Farget, who was the manager of a café in Rufisque called *La Brise de Mer*. Dupuy hoped to secure employment for Farget at the *Café de l'Etoile*. Diouf frequented both establishments and was aware of these sorts of situations.

campaign stop he used a metaphor to describe his previous and current relationship with Diagne:

We chose Diagne to pick up the coconuts and return them back to the population of Senegal. I, the palm tree, I was standing on the ground supporting Dugay Clédor and Diagne on my shoulders. Diagne kept the coconuts for himself that you were waiting upon; seeing you betrayed, I could no longer support or help Dugay Clédor and Diagne. I will let them fall and you will receive the coconuts that tumble down with them.

Mr. Diagne avoids meeting me because he fears that I, who stayed black, will eat him who is more civilized than a 'toubab,' in the fashion of cannibals.³³

When asked by older Africans why he wanted to take the place of Diagne after all these years, Diouf responded:

There was in France a General who at the beginning everyone admired because he had command of a large army. This General was named Bazaine. He became the "General of Shame" because he betrayed his compatriots. M. Diagne had betrayed us as well; he is our "General of Shame."³⁴

According to many contemporary observers, this explanation was successful in audiences, stirring the crowd to applause. The reference to World War I was not lost on the crowd, and this metaphor resonated with Senegalese living in the communes and in the Protectorate. It was a reminder of the way Diagne had not been able to keep his promises from his recruitment drive of 1918. Diouf played upon the sentiments of former *tirailleurs sénégalais* who believed Diagne had abandoned their cause when it became politically expedient for him.

Galandou Diouf reached out to former *tirailleurs* and other supporters in the Protectorate. Realizing the importance of commercial areas where originaires lived and worked, he held rallies and meetings in the interior. Diouf

³³ ANS 13 G 10 (40), 20 February 1928.

³⁴ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

once again demonstrated his keen political acuity when he campaigned in Thiès on 8 April. Thiès was an important station on the Dakar--Niger railroad line and the Dakar--Saint-Louis line; railroad workers made up a large part of the population of the city. The rally took place in the courtyard of the Commissariat of Police. Diouf spoke:

I do not oppose Diagne based upon personal ambition. I refused to march with him against the railway workers of the DSL and he treated me like a revolutionary communist. I was opposed to the exorbitant taxes placed upon the workers. When I discovered Mr. Carde was unhappy with me, I wrote him and told him that I would not sacrifice the needs of my constituents to the sincerity of our relationship. The decrees passed against the *communes de plein exercice* are a catastrophe... abuse succeeds abuse.... Many of my family have died in the service of colonization; I am the only lieutenant of Diagne's who mounted assaults from the trenches (of WWI). He treats me like an imbecile. He has said I am a marionette—look at my works and you decide. I promise you what he can not give you: that the towns of Thiès, Louga, Diourbel, Kaolack, and Tamba will become *communes de plein exercice*.³⁵

In this clever speech, Diouf counteracted Diagne's accusations, while at the same time emphasizing his commitment to workers' rights and his courage to stand up to the administration. He alluded to Diagne's mismanagement of his office, and emphasized his family's symbolic capital and sacrifice in the service of the colonial state. Diouf ended with a promise to make Thiès a full commune, a promise his audience wanted to hear.³⁶

³⁵ ANS 13 G 10 (1928), "Compte-Rendu de la reunion electorale publique du lundi 9 avril tenue dans la cour du commissariat de police à Thiès par la candidat Galandou Diouf."

³⁶ To be fair, when Diouf was elected Deputy in 1934, one the goals he worked toward was making several of the larger towns into full communes. For this election, Diouf even went so far afield as Mecké on 15 April (Mecké is located in the north-west of Senegal, between Dakar and Saint-Louis, in the region of Thiès, in the department of Tivaouane.) During his meeting in Mecké, Diouf explained the reasons for his candidacy against Diagne. He mentioned civic taxes, the strike of the T.K.N, and augmenting agricultural production. Diouf also discussed family benefits for veterans' families, and community issues such as the maintenance of roads. Diouf's campaign addressed issues of

During the week before the election Diouf centered his campaign upon Rufisque and Dakar, where he continued to meet with people individually and in groups. Diouf divided his agents and assigned them specific areas in which to campaign. Diouf's campaign manager, Lamine Guèye, continued to work actively for Diouf in the interior. Roger Roche was charged with canvassing for the European vote in the *escales de l'intérieur*.³⁷ Internal French sources seemed to believe Diouf's campaign was gathering steam in the final weeks before the election. Diouf stated in a telegram that he believed the only way he would lose the election would be through "administrative force."

The Results of the 1928 Election

As early as March, Diouf was writing to the *Ligue Française pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, warning that he had heard Diagne would be illegally reelected.³⁸ By emitting warnings about possible fraud to organizations in France, to his followers in Senegal, and to the colonial administration, Diouf was putting himself in a particular situation—whether he won the election or not. By calling the process into question, a win for Diagne would automatically be tainted, and Diouf would be able to claim, "I told you this

economic significance for both originaire and French businessmen as well as inhabitants in the Protectorate. Diouf had a good handle on the anxieties and concerns of originaires. In addition, he knew how important it was to have the support community leaders. Sangané Lô, a French citizen, was a major participant in this rally. Lô was the Chief of the Lebou neighborhood in Mecké. Tellingly, the political rally was organized by Lamine Guèye and several originaire merchants who were living in Mecké, and nearly one hundred people came out to hear Diouf, including all the Europeans living in the area. This is significant, given that there were only about one hundred eligible voters in Mecké overall. See ANS 20 G 82 (23).

³⁷ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

³⁸ ANS 13 G 10 (1928), 17 March 1928.

process was corrupted.” Diouf realized he could rally supporters to his cause if he lost. Diouf believed a loss would be a miscarriage of justice and a further indication of the corruption of the colonial regime—a blow to the reputation of both the administration and of Diagne. If Diouf won, however, he could claim his followers had been able to circumvent a corrupt political system, and this would be very empowering to both Diouf and his partisans, further building Diouf’s symbolic capital in Senegal.

And Diouf knew how to parlay symbolic capital. He was no naïve politician. He had years of political experience. Diouf understood the power of symbols and of associations. Diouf, for example, signed his letters with the titles he believed described his symbolic capital. After his name, he wrote Vice President of the Colonial Council, Reserve Officer, *Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur*, *Croix de Guerre*.³⁹ These titles carried meaning that could be transferred into political capital. They carried weight with both an African and European constituency. The ‘pre-vote warning’ revealed Diouf’s acumen as a politician.

The colonial government posted these results on the 25 April 1928: 9,975 voters had cast their ballot out of 16,553 who were registered. Blaise Diagne, of the *Républicain socialiste* party was elected in the first round with 5,175 votes as opposed to 4,396 votes for Galandou Diouf, of the *Socialist independent* party. The other two candidates, Maurice Bernard, Administrative Adjunct in Podor and Joseph Maubome, Police Commissionaire in Grenoble, polled 154 and 57 votes respectively. Even with the powerful support of the administration and the

³⁹ ANS 13 G 10 (1928), dépêche télégraphique, 2 April 1928.

Bordeaux commercial houses, as well as with French interference, Diagne only won by 779 votes. Diouf won the election in Saint-Louis and Rufisque, but he lost it in the outlying neighborhoods of Dakar and Rufisque, where he only won 101 votes against Diagne's 1,598. The neighborhoods were only attached to Dakar and Rufisque by the administration as a political gambit to keep Diagne in power, as Diouf had argued.⁴⁰

Immediately after the election, Galandou Diouf's political allies began to challenge the results. On the day after the election, the administration received word that Diouf's partisans were going to protest the results. Mr. Bernard, accompanied by Mr. Roche, came to Dakar, where they made it publicly and widely known that they had prepared a letter to send to the *Parti socialiste* in France and to the French Minister of Justice.

In this letter, the two men argued that the election, particularly in Bargny, operated in an illegal fashion and that the results should be annulled. They believed that partisans of Galandou Diouf were not allowed access into the voting office, particularly by Mr. Blanhet, the Administrator of Rufisque. Blanhet was also president of the voting office, and he told voters who were thinking of casting a ballot for someone other than Diagne that they could possibly face imprisonment if they did so. Bernard and Roche also alleged that *bulletins de vote* carrying the names of Bernard and Galandou Diouf were destroyed. Furthermore, they contended, the election took place under a threatening

⁴⁰ The electoral circumscription of Dakar was expanded to include a series of Lebou villages in the outlying areas, specifically, Ouakam, Yoff, M'Bao, Yumbeul, N'Gor, and Cambarene. These areas strongly supported Diagne, and with their help he was expected to win the election (Searing, "Accommodation and Resistance," 528.)

atmosphere, where gendarmes armed with rifles were stationed at the voting hall. Bernard and Roche also accused government officials of distributing voting cards to non-originares and letting them vote for Diagne.⁴¹ The accusations Diouf and his supporters volleyed against the colonial government were accurate. After all, Governor General Carde had written to his superiors in Paris that “all measures have been taken in the sense you (the minister of colonies) indicated” to disrupt Diouf’s campaign and the activities of his supporters.⁴²

Blaise Diagne struck back. In the 12 April 1928 edition of the journal *La France coloniale*, Diagne turned the tables on Diouf, and accused him of fraud. Diagne also alleged that Diouf was a communist agent. Diouf decried the indictments and decided to sue Diagne for defamation of character. Diouf realized that under the law, his suit against Diagne could not be prosecuted unless authorized by the Chamber of Deputies in Paris, since Diagne was a deputy.⁴³ The Chamber refused that authorization.⁴⁴ Aside from revealing the bitterness of both men about the election, the accusations and the subsequent aborted suit were a preview of Diouf’s failed attempt to overturn the legality of the election.

Galandou Diouf hoped to sway public opinion in France and force the governor general to conduct a recount. Once in Paris, Diouf told supporters that he intended to address the *Ligue des Droits de l’Homme* and other political associations. He would go there as an African, walking the streets of Paris and

⁴¹ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

⁴² Quoted in Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 77.

⁴³ ANS 20 G 82 (23), “Plainte de B. Diagne c. G. Diouf,” May 1928.

⁴⁴ ANS 20 G 82 (23), copy of letter from Le Procureur General Chef du Service Judiciaire de l’AOF to Monsieur le Procureur de la Republique, dated 3 May 1928.

entering the halls of government with other Africans, all dressed in boubous. Diouf publicly proclaimed that if the French administration persisted in “illegal acts,” there would be no reason why he, who had never been communist, might not become an anarchist instead. Diouf believed that he had the majority of the population of Senegal behind him.⁴⁵

Diouf, accompanied by Lamine Guèye and Tovalou, a native of Dahomey and member of the League, sailed for France. During his visit in Paris, Diouf made an important contact with Pierre Taittinger, President of the Parliamentary Commission of Colonies in the Chamber of Deputies.⁴⁶ Taittinger promised to look into Diouf’s complaints if Diouf would help spread Taittinger’s influence and ideas to Senegal.⁴⁷ While there, Diouf joined the National Republican party and Taittinger’s Patriotic League, as part of an attempt to gain symbolic capital vis-à-vis French deputies.⁴⁸ Diouf was also received cordially by the French Socialists, and he retained contact with them after his return to Senegal. Galandou Diouf and Lamine Guèye created a section of the National Republican party in Senegal as part of their attempt to extend links between métropole and colony.

The trip to France was not wasted. It provided Diouf and Guèye a public forum in which to express their dissatisfaction with the election, and it led to a few important contacts. But no real change occurred. Diouf could not get into the real halls of power in Paris, and he was effectively stonewalled by most colonial

⁴⁵ ANS 20 G 82 (23), compte-rendu, 30 April 1928.

⁴⁶ Taittinger was a member of the famous champagne family, and his position was formally held by Blaise Diagne.

⁴⁷ G. Wesley Johnson, “The Impact of Senegalese Elites,” 168.

⁴⁸ ANS 13 G 10, 16 September 1929.

officers. Despite the fact that Diouf and Guèye were returning to Dakar effectively empty-handed, they were welcomed back as heroes.



Figure 5.1 [Crowds await Diouf's ship at the Dakar harbor, ANS 3fi82.]




Figure 5.2 [Senegalese in pirogues from Rufisque come to greet Galandou Diouf after his return from France, ANS 3fi83-14.]



Figure 5.3 [Diouf disembarks from the *SS Ionie*. He is the figure in the dark suit, on the left, touching the brim of his hat. (ANS 3fi83-2)]



Figure 5.4 [Crowds at Dakar's port come to greet Galandou Diouf, ANS 3fi83-4.]




Figure 5.5 [Galandou Diouf, hat in hand, after his descent from the *SS Ionie*, ANS 3fi83-15.]




Figure 5.6 [Crowds line the street in Dakar to greet Galandou Diouf's motorcade. Note many in the crowd are clapping, and Diouf is waving from the back, ANS 3fi82-10.]




Figure 5.7 [Diouf addresses the crowd from his vehicle, ANS 3fi83-5.]



Figure 5.8 [Diouf addresses the crowd from Guèye's residence, ANS 3fi82-6.]



Figure 5.9 [Galandou Diouf appears with his supporters in a suit and tie. Lamine Guèye may be the man peering from behind his shoulder, ANS 3fi82-7.]



Figure 5.10 [Galandou Diouf, ANS 3fi82-8.]

Galandou Diouf and Lamine Guèye returned to Dakar on the morning of 5 October 1928 aboard the *SS Ionie*. Around five hundred Africans waited to receive them on the quays. Many pirogues, which had travelled from Rufisque, were bobbing on the water, waiting for Diouf. After the boat arrived around 10 o'clock in the morning, it took less than thirty minutes for a larger crowd to assemble. Many notable people were in the welcoming party, among them wealthy merchants, marabouts and politicians. Diouf's friend Roger Roche was there as well.

The press came as well as an informant. Mr. Girard, a writer for *Stégomya*, found a perch and wrote notes about the homecoming. The colonial administration was taking no chances and sent a large police force as well. When Diouf's partisans tried to form a procession around him as he left the *Port de Commerce*, the police acted quickly to disperse the crowd. Lamine Guèye victoriously held up a copy of *L'A.O.F.*, probably printed in Casablanca, to the dismay of colonial officials, who had hoped to stop its publication. Diouf and Guèye then entered an automobile and made their way to Guèye's residence. Once Diouf had reached Guèye's residence, he appeared on the balcony and addressed the crowd below.

Diouf told the crowd that during the course of his travels in France he had found many influential people who were interested in the future of Senegal. He also promised the people that there would soon be a printing press installed in Dakar which would enable him to regularly publish his paper. He finished by inviting the crowd to come to his house whenever they wanted, reemphasizing

and redeploying his image as the 'accessible' Senegalese politician.⁴⁹ But Diouf could not tell the crowd that the election results had been negated. In spite of this, the sheer number of people and the rowdy welcome Africans gave Galandou Diouf indicates that he was very popular. Diouf had reason to be optimistic about the future.

⁴⁹ ANS 20 G 82 (23), compte-rendu, 5 October 1928.

Chapter Six

Galandou Diouf in Opposition: 1928-1934

This chapter chronicles a difficult period in Galandou Diouf's life, when he was operating as an opposition leader against Blaise Diagne's forces, the colonial administration and the Bordeaux houses' power and influence. In spite of Diouf's significant popularity with originaires in the communes, organizations in the métropole and individuals in the Protectorate in 1928, Diouf had lost the election. Diouf's political situation and his financial status were precarious by 1932.

The public lost confidence over the years in Diouf's ability to effect any real change on the colonial situation, and he began to lose some support. It was a victory for Diouf just to remain viable during this period, with so many forces arrayed against him. Diouf was very popular, as evidenced by the photographs in the last chapter; his ostensibly stolen election discouraged the body politic and Senegalese in general. The Great Depression added to the general malaise in the colony. Galandou Diouf and his followers often experienced colonial oppression during this period, and publicly Diouf would express despair on more than one occasion. This chapter provides a perspective from Africans who participated—as fully as they could—in the process of reconfiguring colonial power relations, even when they faced serious reprisals. Colonial civil society located in opposition to, and in collaboration, with the state provided a space in which Diouf was able to operate a competing node of power. Diouf's symbolic

capital never evaporated, and he was able to keep himself financially solvent from supporters' funds, even during the hardships of the Great Depression. This period offers insight into Diouf's tenacity, originality and resourcefulness as a political leader in colonial Senegal.

Diouf as Populist Crusader: the Immediate Aftermath of the 1928 Election

Most of 1928 was a good year for Galandou Diouf, when he was riding a wave of popularity as a crusader against Diagne and the colonial administration. Diouf enjoyed a significant amount of support, from powerful members of the French establishment, to originaires operating in the Protectorate. His networks spread through Senegal, some of West Africa, and France. Mass public rallies, protests and spectacles revealed how the public perceived Diouf as a hero, wrongly cheated of an electoral victory, who was fighting for originaire rights and against colonial corruption.

For example, in a spectacle that reflected Diouf's symbolic capital, Diouf was received in grand style in Saint-Louis. About a thousand people came out to see him and cheer. Members of the crowd held signs decorated with saws, hammers, serpent tails, and other symbols. One particular sign carried the inscription "OPPOSITION" and was topped by two French flags. The police quickly confiscated the signs; French police were certain the signs were illicit and subversive, although they could not make clear sense of the deployment of such diverse symbols in a single placard.

When Diouf got out off of the train that day in Saint-Louis, he was met with a bouquet of flowers. The crowd marched and carried Diouf just to the Pont de Faidherbe, but there they were stopped by a police barricade. The crowd separated, some led by Lamine Guèye. Others melted away, but a few people filtered through the barricade and another "Opposition" sign appeared, carried by a youth. The Commissaire of Police stopped the child, took the sign and threw it into the river. An eerie silence settled over the crowd as Africans avoided being arrested for seditious speech.¹ The spectacle was over; Diouf the accessible politician had felt the crowd's love, but also its limitations. When met with colonial force, the crowd had peacefully dissipated, and Diouf walked home alone.



Figure 6.1 [A crowd waits at the train station in Rufisque, ANS.]

¹ ANS 20 G 82 (23), compte-rendu, 29 October 1928.

Galandou Diouf attempted to carry concrete benefits from his popularity into the Colonial Council in Dakar, but his efforts would amount to little. During the Council's first meeting since the April 1928 election, held on 30 October 1928, Galandou Diouf and several of his compatriots attempted to wrestle back some control over the Colonial Council from the administration. Galandou Diouf and Lamine Guèye attempted to postpone Council meetings until 12 November, but their attempts were blocked by the chiefs and other pro-Diagne councilors. Diouf took the floor and declared that the Colonial Council should not be at the disposition of the Governor General nor the Governor of Senegal. Then he made a dramatic exit, along with his partisans.

After leaving the Council, Diouf and his affiliates went to the *Café Audic*, passing before the Secretary General and a good number of functionaries who were watching them from the balcony. Many of the functionaries began to call out "Bonjour," to the departing politicians. They clearly understood Diouf's departure as an act of protest against Diagne's relationship with the colonial administration, and the colonial administration's control over the Council. Diouf and his entourage stopped and responded to the salutations. A crowd began to assemble, as Diouf, his followers and the functionaries carried on a very public demonstration of solidarity. Patrols of gendarmes and police agents were quickly sent out and swept the streets until that evening, aborting the possibilities for any spontaneous mass protest.² Even though the immediate consequences of Diouf's actions surrounding the Council were positive, over the long run Diouf's

² 20 G 82 (23), compte-rendu, 30 October 1928.

refusal to work with the government undercut his symbolic capital and his effectiveness as a politician.

At this time, however, Diouf's future looked bright. With his new party, the *Républicaine Nationale*, he and his agents began to hold successful and well-attended meetings in Dakar and the other communes. Spurred by outrage over the election results, the initial meetings saw record turnouts, and included many Europeans. In latter 1928 Diouf had concrete support with men like Babakar Kamara, Municipal Councilor from Dakar, Louis Martin, Magatte Bâ and Télémaque Sow. Sow, for example, promised to use all of his considerable influence to build the *Républicain National* party in Saint-Louis and surrounding neighborhoods. Marc Mouret became one of the founding members of Diouf's paper *Le PÉRISCOPE Africain*.³

One of the other principal founders of *Le PÉRISCOPE* was Louis Martin, who was descended from a very old and important métis family from Saint-Louis. Martin's uncle, Raymond Martin, was the inspector of the commercial house Buhan et Teisseire and before WWI, Raymond played a large role in the political and economic life of Senegal. Louis Martin was very profitably employed by Buhan et Teisseire. By the age of twenty-five, he was already head of this firm in Kayes. He left this post, however, and returned to the communes, where he

³ One of Diouf's primary goals after the 1928 defeat was the resurrection of a paper that he could use for propaganda and publicity. *L'A.O.F.* began to be published again and operated by Télémaque Sow and M'Baye Salzmänn in the fall of 1929. (ANS G 82 (23), compte-rendu, 28 October 1929). This provided a forum for Diouf and his followers to publicize their views and run anti-Diagnist and anti-administration propaganda. The newspaper would not be long-lived, however, as financial resources ran dry in the wake of government coercion. Diouf would replace it with the *PÉRISCOPE Africain*; its publication was also interrupted by financial and political difficulties.

eventually joined the army, but remained stationed at Saint-Louis during WWI. Louis Martin had been an opponent of Blaise Diagne as early as 1914; he was friends with Carpot, whom Diagne defeated for the deputyship. Martin's dislike for Diagne was solidified when he was sent to prison for a month after nebulous accusations during his employment in the Public Works department. In 1928 Louis Martin had become one of the most active agitators for Diouf's candidacy.⁴



Figure 6.2 [Télémaque Sow, public domain.]

In 1928/29, Diouf also was committed to maintaining his connections in the Protectorate. Diouf publicly proclaimed that his party could be a better ally to the chiefs than the French. In order to recruit chiefs' support, Diouf assigned agents to Sine-Saloum, Baol and Kaolack. While most chiefs rejected Diouf's

⁴ANS 20 G 82 (23), 14 November 1929.

overtures, Diouf did attract new followers in the Protectorate like Samba Wade, one of his most active supporters whom French informants described as a man with modern and progressive political ideas.⁵

Diouf continued to draw support from other organizations in the Protectorate. Diouf received 25,000 francs from Cheikh Anta Mbacké to help fund Diouf's new party; this was in spite of the fact that Cheikh Anta had been sent into exile at Segou. Twenty-five thousand francs was a significant sum at the time and crucial 'seed' money. Cheikh Anta had cause to support Diouf. When the struggle for succession to the leadership of the Muridiyya occurred in 1927, Diouf and his allies believed Mamadou Mustapha was an unpopular choice among the Murids and that his candidacy was pushed by the administration. They decided to aid Cheikh Anta's case with their propaganda, as Cheikh Anta continued to scheme against Mustapha.⁶

In return, Cheikh Anta chose to support Diouf and his new party. Supporting Diouf was still risky for Cheikh Anta in 1928, even though Cheikh Anta was an expert at transforming his wealth and prestige into social and political capital. Diouf's ties to Cheikh Anta are important for understanding one part of colonial opposition to Diouf, since he represented a challenge to the French alliance with the Murids and their peanut cultivation. Aiding Diouf was also a way for Cheikh Anta to protest against the administration and the policies of Blaise Diagne.

⁵ ANS 20 G 82 (23), compte-rendu, 17 December 1928.

⁶ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

Galandou Diouf would continue to ally himself with Cheikh Anta. He planned to use part of the income from his paper, *Périscopé Africain*, to convince a certain metropolitan Senator of the importance of securing Cheikh Anta's prompt return from the Soudan. Diouf worked with El Hadji M'Ballo Seck, a good friend of Cheikh Anta's and the Imam of the main mosque in Dakar. Diouf's support of Cheikh Anta drew the attention of Commandant Pal of Baol, and of the Governor General.⁷

Diouf was a politician who excelled at reading the nuances of power and understanding the unwritten rules—and the written decrees—from colonial agents, whether they were governor generals, or gendarmes. Many governmental agents found Diouf and his actions disquieting and disturbing. Diouf's support beyond Senegal's boundaries continued. During 1928 Diouf served as a local director for the interests of Pierre Taittinger, from whom he received monies. Diouf lost faith in Taittinger as a powerful ally, however, when Taittinger was unable to inquire seriously into the election of 1928.⁸ Diouf looked to increase his base of support in the métropole and sought affiliation with organizations like the *Ligue des Martyrs d'Afrique*.

The secretary of the *Ligue des Martyrs d'Afrique* was a French man named Brumauld. Brumauld decried the result of the 1928 election and tried to disseminate his ideas throughout West Africa.⁹ Galandou Diouf personally

⁷ ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential renseignements.

⁸ G. Wesley Johnson, "The Impact of the Senegalese Elite," 168.

⁹ For example, the Commissioner of the French Republic in the Cameroun Territories informed the Under-Secretary of the Colonial Ministry that shortly after Diouf's loss, M. Brumauld sent copies of tracts, which were read by indigenous people living in Cameroun.

received Brumauld in Senegal during June 1929, along with around twenty other people. Their goal was to extend the *Ligue des Martyrs d'Afrique* to Senegal. One of the functions of the society was to help colonial employees "victimized or wrongly transferred."

In their prospectus, the League of African Martyrs accused Diagne of stealing his seat on the Chamber of Deputies and declared that Galandou Diouf was the true Deputy from Senegal. The prospectus also contained a passage that indicated the colonies should be cleared of "brutes" and "*salopards*" who lived there.¹⁰ The League of African Martyrs had attracted honorary members like Albert Londres, Victor Margueritte, François Coty and Marechal Lyautey, important métropole figures. Diouf stood to gain symbolic capital from his association with the League and its respected metropolitan membership.

The League hoped to print a full magazine that would publish pictures and articles on crimes committed in the different French colonies by colonial administrators. Brumauld specifically asked Galandou Diouf to actively work amongst his friends and acquaintances, blacks or whites, to promote the League and its interest. Diouf was also asked to send a photograph in his army uniform, as well as information about his service and accomplishments during the war so that it could be printed in the next magazine. Diouf's position as a war veteran would be used to give the League credibility and gravitas. The article was meant to demonstrate Diouf's own significant prestige and capital. Galandou Diouf was also told to gather any information or documents that he could about the last electoral campaign (1928), which could demonstrate that the

¹⁰ ANS 21 G 38 (17), Individus suspects, 1928-39.

administration overtly aided Diagne's candidacy. Brumauld sweetened the deal even more for Diouf by promising to consecrate the first issue of the new magazine to Senegal; Diouf's picture would be figured prominently on the first page. Not surprisingly, Diouf expressed sincere interest in the magazine and the League, but once again, no change or real challenge to government authority and corruption occurred.

Diouf may have staged a way to show the administration that there were limits to his willingness to step outside of the boundaries of his colonial field. Diouf received a letter from Télémaque Sow railing against the French administration and asking Diouf to petition England to become involved in overturning or recognizing the fraud perpetrated upon Diouf. Diouf responded to Sow in measured tones. He wrote that he did not want to judge France only on its representatives to the Colonies, and even among the latter, he had discovered those, who by their neutral attitude, gave him hope for political freedom. Whether Diouf believed the future would bring justice to the illegal machinations he, himself, had witnessed is unclear, but he publicly expressed such confidence. He categorically refused to contact the British government on a political question that only concerned France and Senegal.¹¹

The fact that this letter was in the archival record indicates that the entire conversation may have been a staged production to allow French colonial officers to see Diouf's commitment and fidelity to France. Although Diouf was actively in opposition against French colonial policies, he had learned from the 1928 election that he was limited in his power against the colonial state. The

¹¹ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 10 May 1929.

colonial administration, particularly Jules Carde, a friend of Diagne, would move against Galandou Diouf; Carde, too, had learned a valuable lesson from 1928 about Diouf's ability to effectively run against Diagne. Carde and the Bordeaux interests were not about to let Diagne come that close to defeat again.

Losses of the Républicain National Party

Even before the stock market crash of October 1929, Galandou Diouf and his supporters began to run into difficulties. The administration was determined to keep Diouf's *Républicaine National* from reaching further heights of popularity. They had no wish to see Diouf replace Diagne in the next round of elections (for Deputy, 1932), or for Diouf's party to win seats in municipal and Colonial Council bids. By this time Diagne seemed extremely pro-French compared to the populist Diouf.¹² Membership in Diouf's new party began to have negative consequences for Diouf and many of his supporters. In early 1929, Lamine Guèye and Galandou Diouf were dismissed from the Colonial Council by the administration for repeated absences. Maurice Guèye was also removed as mayor in Rufisque for 'mismanagement'.

The governor general, Jules Carde, began to socially "freeze out" members of the opposition. Not being invited to an official reception at the Governor's palace was a clear sign of state disapproval and had translated consequences. Diouf expressed extreme concern when the Governor General did not invite any Diouf supporters to an official reception. Even Notary Gay, a

¹²Johnson, "The Impact of the Senegalese Elite," 167.

man of considerable wealth and power in the colony, did not receive an invitation.¹³

While on this surface this may not seem significant, it was a window into the game of coercion the administration decided to orchestrate against Diouf. Gay backed out of running at the head of Diouf's list for the municipal elections in the spring of 1929. It was well known that Gay was being courted by Diagne and his allies to run at the head of their list instead.¹⁴ Gay was not the only wealthy and influential supporter that turned towards Diagne and the administration. Mr. Roche also refused to run on Diouf's list, declaring to his European friends that he had become reconciled to Diagne after meeting with him for nearly an hour in Rufisque. It seems likely that Carde played a hand in arranging these shifts of loyalty. Carde was working to undermine Diouf's base of support, and he was successful. D'Oxoby and Martin also refused to run, but not because they had changed their allegiance; they feared reprisals from the administration.

Diouf and his remaining supporters decided to present a list composed only of Africans for the Municipal Council of Dakar. Diouf hoped to win with sheer numbers of Africans.¹⁵ Diouf was publicly optimistic, but he must have realized that coalition politics were the name of the game in colonial Senegal. Originaires would not vote for a list simply because it contained only Africans. During his campaigning, however, Diouf emphasized to African originaires that Diagne was only interested in defending the interests of Europeans in the

¹³ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 4 December 1928.

¹⁴ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 16 April 1929.

¹⁵ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 23 April 1929.

colony.¹⁶ Diouf could not run an effective campaign without European and métis candidates, and his National Republican party lost every municipal election.

As Diouf's political fortunes waned, so did his financial ones. In order to pay his debts, he began to sell off his furniture and personal belongings. Diouf had accumulated debt running his campaigns, during which he felt the need to conspicuously spend money on expensive lunches and hand out favors to originaires. He had also spent money on expensive furnishings for his house, in which he held political meetings and planning sessions.¹⁷ In order to bolster his symbolic capital, Diouf had embarked upon a heavy spending spree in 1928, and when Diouf found his credit frozen by the Bordeaux houses and the French banks, he could not buy seed for his farm, nor could he engage in his other form of income: acting as a trader in the Protectorate.¹⁸ He had no credit with which to buy goods to trade.¹⁹

Diouf's followers also faced punitive measures by the Bordeaux houses. Marc Mouret, a French man with excellent command and understanding of Wolof and other indigenous languages, worked for Maurel et Frères in Khombole. Mouret was a Dioufiste, and during the 1928 election, while Mouret was in

¹⁶ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 25 April 1929.

¹⁷ ANS 13 G 10. Diouf was also severely in debt to the maison Vézia in Rufisque, and barely succeeding in paying the debt with the aid of subscriptions among voters who remained loyal to him. He had to appear before the *Tribunal Civil* in Dakar because he was in debt 80,000 francs to a furniture dealer from Paris. Diouf's lawyer requested a filing of bankruptcy on Diouf's behalf, but Diouf hoped his friends would organize fund-raisers for him.

¹⁸ Diouf had reentered the world of agriculture and established farms that grew *ricin*, or the castor-oil plant. He had a business in Khombole that he had hoped would one day be strong enough to rival the Bordeaux firms' influence in Senegal.

¹⁹ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 12 June 1929.

Khombole, the area exploded in hostile riots against Deputy Diagne. Mouret paid a price for his association with Diouf and was fired from Maurel.

Diouf had hoped to create an independent commercial society that would give his followers a decent stake and income in the peanut trade, outside of the major commercial houses. His efforts, however, ended in failure as he was denied credit. As Diouf struggled to maintain his personal fortunes in Khombole, he would sometimes miss political meetings to take care of his failing business. Diouf privately shared his discouragement, and feared he was heading towards the end of his political career; however, it was only his political supporters that kept him solvent.

At an October 1929 rally of the *Républicain National*, Babakar Kamara, a leading figure in the party, gave a detailed explanation of Diouf's difficulties to three hundred supporters, and appealed to all the members of the party to contribute what they could to relieve Diouf's financial burdens. In order for Diouf to maintain independence from the manipulations of the Bordeaux merchants, Diouf's supporters would have to pick up the tab. And many did: in Saint-Louis Diouf was able to raise 10,000 francs.²⁰ Louis Martin would later recall how Galandou Diouf had lived with him and his wife for several months, all of them in penury. Mrs. Martin would wash and dry the only complete outfit Diouf possessed so that he could present himself clean the next morning.²¹

This was a stunning reversal of fortune from 1928, when Diouf seemed unassailable, despite the concerted efforts by the administration and Diagne.

²⁰ ANS 20 G 82 (23) 21 March 1929.

²¹ ANS 13 G 10 (1935), 1 May 1935.

When Galandou Diouf had returned from Paris in 1928, he still faced the lawsuit Diagne had filed. During the trial, Télémaque Sow and other *notables* from Rufisque and Saint-Louis came forward to support Diouf during the process and to provide character witnesses.²² The lawsuit concluded in early 1929; Diouf received a fine, but not a prison sentence. Diouf's supporters, however, emphasized Diouf's personal power in escaping the most stringent penalty.²³ Diouf, himself, was remarkably unflappable about the threat of prison, and mentioned to his closest supporters that he possessed a "*secret d'alcove*" about Diagne's wife that he believed would guarantee his freedom.²⁴ The two men had been intimate collaborators for many years; they undoubtedly knew a great deal about each other's lives.

But Diouf's setback in court was another example of how his popularity with the masses could not prevent him from experiencing defeat at the hands of the administration. Diouf's fine was another blow to his financial circumstances, and drove Diouf deeper in debt. Diouf's frustration about his new, reduced position in Senegalese society and politics began to spill over into other areas of his life. A conversation between a Colonial Councilor from Kaolack, Badara Guèye, and Galandou Diouf escalated. Both men claim to have been insulted; the two men began to fistfight. Diouf landed several blows upon Guèye, and Guèye claimed he would sue Diouf for damages by the sum of 10,000 francs.²⁵ Diouf protested his innocence, but Badara presented witnesses to the *tribunal*

²² ANS 20 G 82 (23), 15 March 1929.

²³ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 28 March 1929.

²⁴ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 11 March 1929.

²⁵ ANS 20 G 82 (23), 16 June 1929. Badara proclaimed his innocence as well and stated the attack was unprovoked. The court disagreed.

correctionnel de Saint-Louis and Galandou Diouf was found guilty of “*coups volontaires*.” However, he paid only a hundred franc fine and one franc for damages to Badara.²⁶ The violent action hurt his credibility among some Europeans. Certain rumors emanating from the Diagnist camp circulated that Diouf was a “primitive negro,” unqualified to be deputy.²⁷

Diagne and the administration attacked Diouf's political paper, *Le Périscopé Africain*. The first edition of the paper had appeared in late September 1929, to the disapproval of some of Diouf's supporters, who feared further colonial reprisals. Initially, the publication struggled to sell enough copies; only about two hundred were sold out of the first thousand printed.²⁸ Several months later, Boubakar Diallo, the editor of the journal and Moussa Fall, the manager, were brought before the *Tribunal correctionnel* of Dakar, accused of defamation by a Madiama Diop of Tivaouane. Diop's lawyer was Giacomoni, who was a big Diagne supporter. The Tribunal found Diallo and Fall guilty, fined them two thousand francs, and sentenced them to six months in prison.²⁹ Galandou Diouf was powerless to help them. Diouf continued to face personal difficulty, but Cheikh Anta was able to help him even from Segou by buying a building in Rufisque from Diouf.³⁰

Galandou Diouf attempted to redeploy his party for victory in the 1930 Colonial Council elections. Once again, he and his remaining followers

²⁶ ANS 13 G 10.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ ANS 20 G 82 (23), note from the Administrator of Dakar and dépendances to the Governor General, 27 February 1930.

³⁰ ANS 13 G 10.

attempted to gain support through mass rallies and speeches. During the campaign, Galandou Diouf claimed an authentic, organic and engaged originaire identity; the true heir and standard bearer of originaire interests. Ibrahima Sow, a candidate on Diouf's ticket, told originaires: "I am Muslim. I know how to read and write French and Arabic, I perform the daily prayers, I am the son of a Dakarois, vote for me in the place of Sangué [the Diagnist candidate], who is not Muslim, who does not pray, who drinks wine, as well as Dugay Clédor, who also does not pray and drinks wine."³¹ Diouf's candidates used Islam as a way to distance themselves from the corrupting influence of French culture. They denoted this difference to their constituency as an act of cultural independence from the French.

Diouf actively engaged Blaise Diagne directly during the 1930 campaign for the Colonial Council. Galandou Diouf attended one of Diagne's rallies in Thiès, on 2 April 1930. Nearly one hundred Europeans and many more Africans attended the meeting. Thiès had been heavily in favor of Diouf during the 1928 election. Diagne told the crowd of his unique qualifications for deputy, and expressed his willingness to work with opponents. When Galandou Diouf asked Diagne for details, the Deputy made it clear he would not, however, work with Diouf. Diouf immediately answered him with an invective (which was mostly edited by the informant) but which was basically, "For the first time you have the 'nerve' to be a 'jerk.'"³² Immediately, cries of "Vive Galandou Diouf!" filled the hall. Versions of the clash between the men swept through Dakar with many

³¹ ANS 13 G 10, compte-rendu, 2 May 1930.

³² ANS 13 G 10 (5), 2 April 1930. The sentence, but without the context: "C'est la première fois que tu as des c.... au c....." Note the use of personal pronoun, "tu."

more details, mostly disparaging of Diagne. Diouf was energized by the reaction, and attempted to take advantage of the revitalized energy in the communes.

Galandou Diouf retained popularity with many originaires in the communes, but administrative coercion guaranteed Diagne's victory. Diouf found it difficult to run a campaign like that of 1928. The administration had learned their 'lesson' about Diouf's popularity. The administration utilized direct police force and intimidation to disrupt Diouf's meetings and intimidate voters. Organized groups, such as the "Society of Young Lebous" worked actively to undercut Diouf's efforts.³³ Police and *tirailleurs sénégalais* patrolled Dakar and Saint-Louis. Leading participants in the Dioufist party, such as Télémaque Sow and François Mbaye, claimed that their rallies were suppressed, and that during the voting, urns were turned over by Diagnists.³⁴ Not surprisingly, Diouf's followers did not do well in the election.

Several of Diouf's supporters, and Diouf himself, were accused by the colonial administration of "incidents" during the 4 May 1930 elections. A few men were acquitted on the basis of insufficient evidence, but many others spent months in prison and paid steep fines. François M'Baye, called Salzmann, was sentenced to eighteen months in prison and a thousand franc fine. Hamet Sow

³³ ANS 20 G 82 (23).

³⁴ ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 12 July 1934, Dakar. Although much of the political narrative of Senegalese politics in the colonial period revolves around men, women also participated. During this time a woman named Soukcina Kounare took an active part in Saint-Louis politics. She was known by the name "Jeanne d'Arc" for her participation in events during 1930 in Saint-Louis. Several years later, in 1934, when a special election was being held to determine the successor of Blaise Diagne to the deputyship, Soukcina Kounare was sought out by both Lamine Guèye and Galandou Diouf. She deferred to her brother, Alassane N'Dir, who was better to represent Senegal due to "order of birth." Her words made many in Saint-Louis unhappy.

Télémaque received a year in prison and a thousand franc fine. Louis Martin received a six month sentence and a fine of one thousand francs. And Galandou Diouf received three months and 1 day in prison and a one hundred franc fine. In total, thirty men received prison sentences and paid fines of varying amounts. Perhaps most revealing, all the judgments were pronounced by default, for the accused refused to come to court.³⁵ They protested the entire affair by refusing to 'participate' in a subversion of justice.

While Galandou Diouf continued to criticize the administration, he also made it clear to his supporters that he was not advocating violence or a total break with France. His conciliatory words at a meeting held after his loss in the 1930 elections are telling. Around 150 people came to the house of Seye Dane to hear Galandou. Diouf spoke,

The goal of this meeting is to thank you for all you have done for me and to thank you for keeping the peace in accordance with our line of conduct.

We are no longer in an electoral period. And except for the incarceration of our friends, we are all back at our jobs, including myself, as I am a common farmer.

We have a politic of interest to follow, and that is the recovery of the economy of the country. All good Senegalese and French men have to work to resolve this difficult situation in which the inhabitants of this country find themselves. This situation will improve through peace and work.

It is also the rainy season, and we must work the earth to obtain from her the best part that all honest workers can expect from her. Don't worry about those who think that politics will eat up this good man. They are feeling sorry for themselves. Have confidence in us. Sooner or later the truth will penetrate the obscure shadows.

³⁵ ANS 13 G 10 (5), letter to the Governor General, 9 October 1930.

Calm and sang-froide. And above all do not let yourselves become involved in a bad situation with the *agents provocateurs*. Those are our enemies, not our friends.

Long live France, Long live Senegal, Long live Freedom!³⁶

Diouf understood how any violence would be used as a justification for severe crackdowns on his party and on Senegalese liberties under colonial rule. This man had become personally violent; he had seen the ugliness of trench warfare in Europe. He was also a savvy politician, who was aware he was being watched and that his words and actions were closely monitored by the police.

At the same time as Diouf found his political fortunes waning, West Africa had found itself catapulted into economic depression along with the rest of the world. The value of peanuts, Senegal's main export crop, fell to a record low, having lost fifty percent of their value between 1925 and 1930. Peanut production slowed, as farmers ceased to grow the export crop and turned towards foodstuffs to feed their families.³⁷ The *Banque française de l'Afrique* closed. Not surprisingly, colonial investments dropped and the purchasing power of urban Africans living in Senegal plummeted.

Galandou Diouf tried to become the voice of the farmer and the little man in colonial Senegal during the Depression. His status as a farmer gave his arguments credibility with the people. Diouf attempted to turn the financial downturn into a political advantage by deploying a new rhetoric that castigated Diagne's and the colonial administration's handling of the crisis. In this way, Diouf would not only be the 'accessible candidate'; his party would be a force

³⁶ ANS 21 G 137 (108), police information, 1930.

³⁷ ANS 17 G 241 (108).

economic justice as well social justice. Diouf argued that proper development of agriculture in Senegal and West Africa would ameliorate the crisis. Diouf accused the administration of being “more worried about losing their authority than thinking about politics of consequence.”³⁸

Galandou Diouf postulated that the colonial bureaucracy was better at creating reports than worrying about the worth of their content. Diouf’s rhetoric reflected the widely held belief that the institutions of the administration were corrupt. He argued that the *Sociétés de Prévoyance* had fallen into the hands of the *cercle* commanders and that the Office of Product Inspection did better at paying out monies to local politicians than to those who actually worked.³⁹ Diouf argued for a modernization of agricultural techniques and an augmentation of land for cultivation. Diouf’s rhetoric reflected how many farmers felt about the administration. With Diouf’s ties to Cheikh Anta Mbacké, it is not surprising that Diouf argued for an expansion and support of peanut production methods, but he also called for diversification, including the cultivation of cotton as well as rice and other staple crops.

Galandou Diouf criticized the role of the Bordeaux merchants in the peanut crisis, writing that “the consortium formed by the Bordeaux merchants... facilitates the unilateral establishment of the price for peanuts, which they buy at low rates from the producer, then sell for ten times as much as they paid.”⁴⁰ Throughout the course of the economic crisis Galandou Diouf represented

³⁸ *Périscopie africain*, 18 January 1930.

³⁹ For more information on the societies, see Mann and Guyer, “Imposing a Guide on the Indigène.”

⁴⁰ *Périscopie africain*, 7 December 1929.

himself as the peoples' representative to the French administration. Diouf promised voters that he would visit top officials in the French government to discuss the economic situation. For example, during the course of a 1931 rally, he promised those in attendance that he would go visit Governor General Brévié as soon as he arrived, to keep him informed about the economic crisis rampant in Senegal.⁴¹

Affiliating with the SFIO

French colonial authorities remained very interested in Diouf and his followers, in part for their continued connection to the SFIO. After the 1930 elections, Diouf became more strongly affiliated with the SFIO, as he sought métropole funding and support. During this period colonial officers considered socialists agents from Moscow; Diouf was openly branded a communist by the French press, many French businesses, and the French colonial government.⁴² Jules Brévié replaced Jules Carde as governor general in 1930, and Brévié continued the administration's support of Blaise Diagne.

The SFIO attempted to raise money to help its members, and to win the next elections. Raising sufficient funds became a crucial component of Diouf's politics in the early 1930s. Men who wanted to run at the head of Diouf's list were required to make a donation for 200 francs. One hundred francs would assure a lesser place on the list, and ten francs was the cost of membership.

⁴¹ ANS 13 G 10, 3 November 1931.

⁴² Johnson, "The Impact of Senegalese Elites," 168.

Women could become members for only five francs.⁴³ Women were playing important roles in commune politics, although recorded history elides their involvement. Meetings were sometimes held at women's houses. Women also served as fund raisers. Marietou Bâ, a Diouf supporter, was assigned to collect money from other women in the Nord *quartier* of Saint-Louis. Many women gave ten or five francs each.⁴⁴ Galandou Diouf had received support from women since the beginning of his political career. Although women could not vote, they could provide a variety of aide to a campaign. Volunteer collectors for the party were most often women, who went each day to local indigenous neighborhoods. Even women with very small incomes would give just a little sum of money to Diouf.⁴⁵ Diouf's discourse resonated with women from diverse backgrounds.



Figure 6.3 [Committee of Women from Dakar who supported Diouf, ANS.]

⁴³ ANS 21 G 137 (108), renseignements, 12 July 1930, Dakar.

⁴⁴ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 12 July 1930.

⁴⁵ ANS 13 G 10, renseignements.

Political meetings of the SFIO tended to forgo communist rhetoric. During one meeting, Louis Martin talked in outline form about socialism, but did not go much beyond stating that socialism was the party of the future. He spent the majority of his speech enumerating what the SFIO could do for Senegal. His remarks covered old territory and reflected long standing originaire concerns.⁴⁶ Diouf's ally and longtime friend Daramy d'Oxoby recognized the limitations on what the SFIO métropole organization would provide Senegalese. He pointed out to his fellow members, "Our group is not powerful enough; we need at least one hundred members. We lack organization and cohesion. You should not hope to obtain the visit of one delegate speaker or other envoys from the métropole."⁴⁷ D'Oxoby seemed to believe the SFIO was hurting Diouf's party; he identified certain members who had recently left the party for fear of colonial retaliation.

Diouf and the SFIO had also gained the support of a few powerful Moroccan allies. Moroccan merchants operated in the four communes of Senegal, and often carried a specific symbolic capital that revolved around their Muslim affiliations. These merchants could not vote, but by advocating Diouf's candidacy, they made an important statement about the solidarity of Muslims. Abdou Karim Ben Geloun sent six letters to other Moroccan Muslims living in

⁴⁶ Martin talked about the suppression of justice for indigenous people who actually qualified for administrative justice, but were handed over to the indigenous courts. He said the SFIO would enlarge political rights for originaires in the four communes, would reestablish the General Council, and would create agricultural banks.

⁴⁷ ANS 13 G 10, reunion du parti SFIO.

Dakar, Rufisque, Thiès, Kaolack and Diourbel, encouraging them to support their Muslim colleagues who were working on behalf of the [Muslim] religion.

Galandou Diouf had clearly garnered the Muslim mantle among many of the populace in Senegal, which allowed him to possess a type of symbolic capital Diagne could not touch. The Moroccans were an important source of income for Diouf. Abdou Karim Ben Geloun, along with Muslim Syrians and other Moroccans, had donated around seven thousand francs, according to Galandou Diouf. Diouf and many of his followers also claimed, to many members in the general public, that they had important connections in the métropole, friends who were deputies in the National Assembly, senators, and ministers.⁴⁸ Diouf was able to maintain a variety of supporters in the face of coercion and hostility. He may not have been successful in specific political situations, due to the tactical advantages employed by the administration, but he was able to maintain his symbolic capital and—to a certain extent—a distinct coalition of commune, Protectorate and métropole interests. Diouf hoped that resources from the SFIO would help him prove that there had been voting irregularities and corruptions during the past several elections in the four communes.⁴⁹

The colonial administration had tactics at its disposal to control election outcomes beyond just inaccurate counting of votes, or disappearing ballots. During the summer of 1931, the administration deployed a new method of control against Diouf's efforts to secure symbolic capital and maintain a high profile with the public. Galandou Diouf and other important members of the opposition had

⁴⁸ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 19 June 1930.

⁴⁹ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 4 June 1930.

financed wrestling matches to be held during an important holiday. These athletic events were an important part of annual celebrations for the population of Dakar. Diouf was demonstrating his power as a politician by financially supporting the wrestling matches. However, the administration cancelled them, blaming necessary quarantine measures after an outbreak the plague in Dakar. Entire neighborhoods were sanctioned off and wrestling matches were forbidden.

In an effort to represent the originaires, Galandou Diouf appealed to the administration to allow the events to occur if spectators produced a *carte de vaccination*. Diouf attempted to work with the administration to have the matches moved to a “neutral” zone between Dakar and Medina. Many Dakar residents believed the *cordon sanitaire* was a manufactured device by the colonial government to prevent the matches from going forward.⁵⁰ The colonial government remained unmoved by African arguments and enforced the wrestling ban. This intersection of health, boundary control, and population management in colonial Dakar had a political motivation. The timing of the invocation of these ‘health’ measures seems very strong, indisputable evidence of administrative punitive intent.

While the colonial administration used strong arm tactics to control the Senegalese population, Blaise Diagne was enjoying a good life in France. He rarely returned to Senegal, preferring to let Dugay Clédor and Moustaphe Malick Gaye run his operations in Senegal. Gaye was the mayor of Saint-Louis, and Clédor was prominent in the Colonial Council and Dakar. He served as mayor of Dakar in Diagne’s absence. Blaise Diagne, according to his son, Roland, loved

⁵⁰ ANS 13 G 10, letter dated 28 June 1931.

the revues, the operettas of the time, the Bouffes Parisiennes, the Casino de Paris. The Diagne family lived in a beautiful neighborhood in Paris, and his children went to the finest schools in the country. It is difficult not to discern the effect Diagne's education, his acculturation, his wife, his participation in the freemasons, and his parliamentary life in Paris had upon him. Diagne certainly dressed, talked, and comported himself as a French gentleman, who often, in his own speech, talked of the "common heart" Africans and Frenchmen could have. Diagne publicly promoted the concept of Africans achieving equality with French nationals through a link between the cultures and futures of the regions.⁵¹

Diagne was awarded official positions for supporting administrative agendas. In 1931 he was appointed *Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat aux Colonies* in the government of Pierre Laval, in part because Diagne had defended France's forced labor in the colonies to the international community. Regardless, Diagne was the first African, and for a long time the only one, who was able to rise to such a prestigious political position in the French system. Diagne's own party materials reflected his new titles, and in 1932, Diagne described himself as a symbol of French principles of the Revolution of 1789. He proclaimed the unity of "Greater France," which went beyond differences of skin color. France was the only country capable of giving other nations "a lesson of high moral probity." Indeed, Diagne claimed the people of French West Africa fought and sacrificed in World War I for these liberties—that he, himself, symbolized.⁵² So Diagne took the rhetoric of sacrifice, and used himself as an example not of exclusion, but of

⁵¹ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique*, 136-37.

⁵² ANS 20 G 88 (23), Legislative elections, 1932.

inclusion and success in a Greater French empire. Indeed, to not vote for Diagne, his propaganda declared, was a repudiation and betrayal to those very sacrifices.

Diagne was able to reap benefits from the social capital and propaganda that came with high office. The paper *La Petite Gironde* noted in its edition of 28 April 1932, that for [the French], “Blaise Diagne symbolizes the ascension of a race and of the profound French virtues in one of our oldest colonial provinces.”⁵³ Diagne was honored by the administration in other ways as well, which built upon his symbolic capital. Indeed, his opposition accused the administration that these honors had only one goal—to impress and intimidate the population.⁵⁴ Opposition candidates, on the other hand, received very different treatment from the administration; they were labeled “communists” and “separatists,” among other things. They were subjects of surveillance to the colonial police, and were often harassed.

The Elections of 1932

Galandou Diouf was not immune to colonial tactics and the crumbling economy. The colonial administration had effectively attacked Diouf’s access to credit, had forced him into debt, and had drug him into court. Diagne, with the administration’s backing, had coerced or cajoled many of Diouf’s supporters into abandoning him. One of the biggest blows came when Lamine Guèye deserted Diouf in 1931 in order to accept a magistracy at the Court of Appeals of Saint-

⁵³ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique*, 135.

⁵⁴ ANS 13 G 10 (17), dossier Galandou Diouf.

Denis de la Réunion. Guèye also spent time in Martinique.⁵⁵ Diagne had utilized his influence to secure the appointment. Diagne was outmaneuvering Diouf, and culling off his most effective supporters by offering them plum positions and financial compensation. Losing Guèye undercut Diouf's ability to speak for *évolués* in the métropole and to secure the support of organizations like the SFIO.

As the Depression made itself felt in Africa in 1931 and 1932 with a sharp drop in commodity prices, Diouf's political possibilities shrank. Diagne's position was further entrenched with the French administration, which was suffering from cutbacks and difficulties of its own. The métropole was reluctant to fund African projects during a time of financial crisis. In a marginal time, the inhabitants of the four communes were less likely to take a political and financial risk to support Diouf, when their previous efforts had been for naught. The administration, fearing popular uprisings in the cities as migrants swelled already crowded areas, became more repressive. The French regime's response to a dramatic decline in revenues was to tighten tax collection. This placed a heavy burden on individuals and households.⁵⁶

People could no longer afford to contribute as much to campaigns, but Galandou Diouf continued to raise money through creative and resourceful methods. For example, during a rally held in Rufisque, Diouf attempted to build a reserve fund to finance the 1932 elections by requiring every member of the party to contribute fifteen francs. A similar meeting was held in Dakar. Diouf

⁵⁵ Johnson, "The Impact of the Senegalese Elite," 168.

⁵⁶ Martin Klein and Richard Roberts, "The Resurgence of Pawning in French West Africa during the Depression of the 1930s," *African Economic History* 16 (1987), 23.

declared that the sums were necessary to pay for propaganda and if needed, the expense of trials.⁵⁷ But Diouf still struggled.

Galandou Diouf's supporters were under pressure within their own communities as well. On 24 April 1932, two meetings were organized by several important chiefs in the Lebou community. The meetings were held to consolidate the Lebou of Dakar around the candidature of Blaise Diagne. Some members at the meeting decided to form a delegation that would visit members of their Lebou community who were known supporters of Galandou Diouf. They would invite them to vote for Diagne. Those who did not share their opinion were to be excluded from the community and "abandoned completely."⁵⁸ This sort of social coercion, combined with administrative intimidation and financial pressure from the depression and the Bordeaux firms guaranteed Diagne's victory in the Deputy election of 1 May 1932.

Diouf fared much worse in the 1932 election than in the one of 1928. Out of 12,109 votes, Diagne took 7,250 to Diouf's 3,785. It was a landslide victory for Diagne and a testament to the nature of coercive and corrupted colonial politics in Senegal.⁵⁹ These numbers are suspect because the colonial authorities still actively intervened in the electoral process. The number of candidates from different affiliations had mushroomed, further splitting votes.⁶⁰ Once again, Galandou Diouf cried foul. This time he had another outside ally. Mr. Faure,

⁵⁷ ANS 13 G 10, information from Doula.

⁵⁸ ANS 13 G 10 (8), 24 April 1932.

⁵⁹ ANS 21 G 137 (108), Confidential note on 1 May 1932 elections in Senegal, dated 7 June 1934.

⁶⁰ ANS 21 G 137 (108), Résultat des Elections legislatives du 1er Mai 1932 au Sénégal.

President of the League for Defense of the Black Race, sent a formal protest notice to the French Parliament.




Figure 6.4 [Political cartoon indicating voting fraud in which people used the dead still on the rolls to vote in the 1932 election for Deputy in Senegal. The bottom caption reads, "Stand up, the dead!..." ANS 21 G 137(108), in *L'A.O.F. Républicaine*.]

Faure's official objection began,

In the name of the Senegalese voters of the four communes, of the Indigènes of the Senegalese protectorate, who do not vote but consider the Deputy of Senegal as their representative; from the population of the other colonies grouped in the AOF who do not vote, but are in solidarity with the politics of the four communes, and who express their indignation at the reelection of Diagne. We seek an annulment of the election of Mr. Diagne of Senegal as the Deputy of Senegal.⁶¹

⁶¹ ANS 13 G 10 (8).

The petition listed the basis for the annulment, beginning with the pomp and ceremony the colonial state afforded Mr. Diagne, which the complainants found “unmerited and intended to impress the population.”⁶²

The petition complained about Diagne’s extraordinary reception by high ranking members of the French colonial government. When Diagne arrived in Dakar, for example, he was received by an official delegation which was composed of Governor General Brevié, who embraced Diagne warmly, as well as Beurnier, the Governor of Senegal. Also in the party were sixteen top civil servants, four chefs de canton, one notary public and one commissioner. Griots greeted Diagne as if it “were the arrival of a Great Black King.”⁶³ Besides the striking imagery, this particular complaint reveals the manifest workings of symbolic capital in the Senegalese political system during this time. Affiliation with the colonial state was politically expedient.

The complaint continues to describe how Diouf’s political meetings were broken up by emissaries of Diagne who were aided by police authorities. Faure even makes the argument that one of the candidates, Barthélemy, was a victim of a conspiracy between an assassin, Mr. Martine, and Duclos, the Police Commissioner. The assassin, using a whip and a gun, shouted “death to whites,” and wounded several people. Mr. Faure, the President of the League for Defense of the Black Race, pointed out that Mr. Martine received a large promotion immediately following the event. Most of the complaint was a little more mundane: voters who had not received their cards, even though said cards

⁶² ANS 13 G 10 (8).

⁶³ Ibid.

were requested from the city council. Other voters were turned down, even though they produced witnesses and identification papers. Voting booths were taken away from polling places under Diagne's authority, which of course negated privacy. The absence of voting booths, the presence of Diagne's supporters in the voting halls, the harshness of the tone of French officials towards those who did not support Diagne, all led many voters to be afraid to ask for any other voting sheet than that of Diagne's, which was automatically handed to them as they approached. Election commissioners and observers also noted the voting irregularities.⁶⁴

It is likely that voting irregularities were directly condoned by the French colonial government in Senegal. This was an environment where all copies of newspapers that strongly critiqued the colonial government were swiftly taken off the streets, as in the case of *L'Action Sénégalaise*. In its pages a municipal councilor from Kaolack, a Mr. Etienne N'Diaye, caused quite a stir in political circles by calling on councilors from Saint-Louis and other municipalities to quit taking dictated orders from the administration.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ ANS 13 G 10 (8).

⁶⁵ *L'Action Sénégalais*, "Declarations Necessaires by Etienne N'Diaye." Copy located in ANS 13 G 10 (8). The orders, N'Diaye claimed, served as an offense to the people that elected them. In this account, N'Diaye gave his reasons for his resignation. While the city councilors had recognized the importance of collaboration with the administration of Kaolack in order to benefit the people, the Mayor, Mr. Reynier, refused to recognize the municipal council's legal status. Mayor Reynier's "authoritarianism" and meddling in affairs such as the leadership of mosque in Kaolack angered and alienated the councilors. It seems Mr. Reynier, ignoring the "principles of sane collaboration," blindly launched himself into the affairs of the mosque instead of staying out of it like all other administrators before him. Thus, his administration installed the Imam, and a mosque that was built from mostly public collections was only being used by a small minority of Muslims in the area. N'Diaye also called out Francois Gomis's meddling as well. As a result of Gomis' and Reynier's meddling in civil society institutions in Rufisque, several city councilors from Kaolack resigned. Galandou Diouf, who had at first been sent by

A Changing Landscape

In the late summer and early fall on 1933, Senegal was under the command of an interim governor, Mr. Debonne, who met with Galandou Diouf and seemed to be friendly to him. Indeed, some French archival sources point out that within the Diagne camp, "the politics of the interim governor towards Galandou Diouf may be blamed for having encouraged the opposition instead of promoting reconciliation attempts hoped by friends of Mr. Diagne."⁶⁶ Galandou Diouf told his allies that Governor Debonne had cordially received him and his friends and that Debonne was a "true Republican" unlike the previous governor.⁶⁷

This audience with the Governor was agreed by friends and opposition alike as a high favor, which gave Diouf a bit of new ammunition with which to carry out his campaigns. Diouf attempted to be friendly to the interim governor, working for him on occasion to settle disputes in the Protectorate.⁶⁸ Galandou Diouf took an exhaustive train trip throughout the countryside and to Rufisque and Saint-Louis, and it was commonly thought the interim governor had financed this voyage. Indeed, it was said that the governor thanked Diouf the next time they met for keeping him up to date with information, for some area commanders, like Kaolack's, neglected to inform him of events.

the interim governor on behalf of the administration, supported their efforts, and promised them his help in the electoral campaign which would soon begin.

⁶⁶ ANS 13 G 10 (8), information, 28 September 1933. Diouf also wrote some of his contacts in France and requested that they work to have Debonne be appointed permanently as governor.

⁶⁷ ANS 13 G 10 (8), confidential information, 2 September 1933.

⁶⁸ One example involved a dispute in Kaolack between the French mayor and the African municipal councilors. See ANS 13 G 10 (8), copy of "Necessary Declarations by Etienne N'Diaye," in *L'Action Sénégalais*.

What this accord with the interim governor may really indicate is Diouf's willingness to work with certain administrators. Diouf had realized that he could not effectively take on Blaise Diagne, the Bordeaux interests, and the administration, all allied against him. The friendliness of Debonne did not make a long-term difference for Diouf, but it did provide a brief reprieve of administrative hostility and a hope of détente for Diouf.

For most colonial administrators, there would be no real détente with Diouf. Diouf could certainly be a thorn. Mr. Pal, the acting secretary general, did not approve of the interim governor's closeness with Diouf and was a friend of Diagne's. Diouf had his own political weapons to countermand such opposition. Diouf tried to rekindle an inquiry into the missing funds of Amadou Bamba and the Murid brotherhood. This was a large scandal, and published in *L'AOF* and *AEF Républicaine*.⁶⁹ It was alleged that at the death of Amadou Bamba, much of his wealth had "disappeared," transferred to the "Residence of Diourbel."

Diouf claimed to have a document created right around the death of Amadou Bamba, which stated that Bamba had collected 22 million francs from his constituency, while only 5 million were mentioned in the *actes de succession*. Diouf also claimed to have a letter from Mr. Lalanne, a trader from Diourbel, in which the trader confirms that he was present when the amount was collected and sealed, but that he had not been called when the seals were taken off. Furthermore, Diouf claimed to have proof that Mr. Pal, who was the Commander of the Diourbel area at the time, made a sizable deposit in a Buenos-Aires

⁶⁹ *L'A.O.F. Républicaine* had been resurrected to promote Diouf's interests. It was funded by Alfred Goux.

bank.⁷⁰ Pal had previously alerted his superiors to Diouf's 'dangerous' activities in Baol; there was antipathy between the two men. Not only was this sort of inquiry an embarrassment to the colonial administration, it also indicated how Diouf utilized his symbolic capital to aid Murid interests and make himself well known in the Protectorate.

Even though Galandou Diouf's political fortunes were rising again, as evidenced by increasing public support, administrative attention, and train campaigning to the full communes of the coast and the important cities of the interior, Diouf was still realistic about his political chances. Diouf was overheard telling a friend that he could not stop Diagne's re-election in August 1934. He surmised that now he had to deal with Diagne as a parliamentarian for life and he was trying to find a solution or a compromise.⁷¹ Diouf continued to try and utilize, as well as, expand his influence. He strongly supported Debonne for governor of Senegal, and wrote to influential politicians, such as Mr. Alype, Director of the Cabinet of the Minister for Colonies, to express his opinions and request their intervention, and would show supporters their letters of response.

While Diouf may have been growing resigned to Diagne's life-long position as deputy, he made serious efforts to keep his supporters together, and managed to retain the loyalty of Télémaque Sow, even though Diagne had nominated Sow as Secretary of City Hall of Saint Louis. Perhaps, as the cynics thought, Diouf was biding his time to rejoin Diagne until his pride and his finances and his thirst for power had been satisfied. In other words, until he received the

⁷⁰ ANS 13 G 10 (8), secret information, 23 September 1933.

⁷¹ Ibid.

guarantees and promises for which he had worked. Or perhaps Diouf felt strong convictions to protect the interest of the people. Whatever the reason, Diouf was right about Blaise Diagne's ability to hold on to the position of Deputy of Senegal for his lifetime. Galandou Diouf could never have imagined, however, how short that time that would be.

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**POLITICS, DISCOURSES AND CONTRADICTIONS:
GALANDOU DIOUF IN FRENCH COLONIAL SENEGAL, 1890-1941**

VOLUME II

By

Shannon Vance Harris

A DISSERTATION

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

History

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Part Three

Chapter Seven

Galandou Diouf's Political Resurrection: the Special Election of 1934

In April of 1934, Blaise Diagne traveled to Bamako for the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Soudan's colonization. Becoming ill, he was repatriated to France. When he arrived in Bordeaux on the third of May, his doctor believed his health was improved enough to send him to convalesce in Cambo. However, Diagne died on 11 May 1934, with his wife and his son, Raoul, nearby.¹ Shock ran throughout France and West Africa. Diagne's death would create a new playing field for the deputyship.

A power struggle ensued between Dugay Clédor and Lamine Guèye, as each jockeyed for position. Guèye became Diagne's successor, and ran as a candidate in 1934.² Blaise Diagne's absence had allowed Diouf to successfully re-deploy his symbolic and social capital within the Senegalese political field. Diouf expertly maneuvered around Guèye and Clédor, and successfully secured victory in the 1934 election.

This chapter charts how Galandou Diouf won the special election of 1934, which was held to replace Diagne in France's Chamber of Deputies. Colonial materials and contemporary news accounts form the bulk of the source material for this chapter; most of the information comes from the public arena. It is still possible, however, to provide an account on what was happening behind the scenes. The resourcefulness and intelligence of Galandou Diouf in augmenting

¹ ANS 20 G 90 (23).

² See ANS 21 G 137 (108), and Lamine Guèye, *Itinéraire Africain* (Paris, 1966).

his symbolic capital is evident. Diouf was able to operate in the complex colonial arena of commune, Protectorate and métropole. Diouf's rhetoric and the arguments he furnished during his campaign give insight into the political process of colonial Senegal.

Upheaval in Diagne's Républicain Socialiste Party

During Blaise Diagne's illness, Dugay Clédor, the President of the Colonial Council, had sought to act as an "interim deputy," according to some colonial reports.³ Clédor had been Diagne's party secretary, and was instrumental in building Diagne's coherent political organization from the diverse elements in colonial Senegal. Using familiar forms of political discourse, Clédor tried to use rallies and meetings to secure his place as Diagne's successor, attempting to translate his previous position in the party into social capital that would carry him in as the new representative.

For example, during a meeting held in Dakar, Dugay Clédor addressed the crowd in both Wolof and French. Speaking in Wolof, Clédor called upon the "friends of the party" not to worry, and encouraged Diagne's followers. "The same way a Colonel does not abandon the course of the battle because his

³ ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 16 April 1934. Amadou N'Diaye Dugay Clédor was originally from Saint-Louis. His father was a spahi in service to the French colonial army. He caught Blaise Diagne's eye as one of the first originaire journalists, and had even written one of the first histories of old Senegal. After WWI, Diagne put Dugay Clédor in charge of his political mouthpiece, *La France Coloniale*. Clédor's paper tended to promote assimilationist ideas. Clédor enjoyed European clothes, and popularized the *vin d'honneur* for African political gatherings despite the fact that many Muslim Senegalese were nondrinkers. Dugay Clédor was a large man, in girth and in influence during Diagne's presidency. G. Wesley Johnson, "The Senegalese Urban Elite, 1900-1945," in *Africa & the West: Intellectual Responses to European Culture*, 159.

general has died or been wounded, so I, first lieutenant of M. Diagne, will continue his politics, and assume the direction of the destiny of the party."⁴ When commenting about Clédor, Diouf stated to friends, "[At least] he is a real black from Senegal like me... unlike Blaise Diagne."⁵

Some of Diouf's supporters urged him to reconcile with Clédor, but a rapprochement never materialized. Diouf realized that Clédor was unpopular with most originaires; he had played the role of petty tyrant as Diagne's first lieutenant and alienated many members of the body politic. Clédor had little clout or connections with the Protectorate, and limited support among Muslims, who criticized him for his drinking and European proclivities.




Figure 7.1 [Dugay Clédor, public domain.]

⁴ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 16 April 1934.

⁵ ANS 21 G 137 (108).

Dugay Clédor faced a wave of discontent. He did not have the symbolic capital or the networks of support that Diagne enjoyed. Originaires took multiple opportunities to display dissatisfaction with Clédor.⁶ Clédor had collaborated too closely with the administration and the Bordeaux interests to appeal to African voters. Lamine Guèye and Galandou Diouf could claim allegiances and symbolic capital outside of the administration and the commercial houses. Clédor would be quickly eclipsed by Guèye and Diouf.

Clédor's position as Diagne's inheritor was attacked by young, educated originaires in Saint-Louis from the beginning. During a meeting of Diagne supporters, a call was made to form a candidate committee. A young representative spoke up in response,

We have for the moment no interest in forming a committee now that Mr. Diagne is dead; in 1932 we voted as a block for Mr. Diagne, following your [Mr. Gaspard Kâ] invitation and that of Mr. Clédor's, who told us he was our general. The election ended, Mr. Diagne was elected with a large majority, and the next day Mr. Clédor shut the doors and refused to receive any indigenes who wanted to express congratulations. For another thing, all of us young people; we are going to rally to the cause of Mr. Lamine Guèye, who will rally to us and with whom we count. Mr. Lamine Guèye is coming back and we will do nothing before he gets here.⁷

The director of the meeting, Gaspard Kâ, attempted to regain control, but he was shouted down by the young people who consistently interrupted him. In the street, after the meeting, those who attended whispered amongst themselves, "C'est la fin du Diagnisme." Diagnists in Dakar wanted answers from Clédor

⁶ See ANS 21 G 137 (108). Complaints ranged from mosques that had been promised but never built, to Clédor's inaccessibility. Colonial reports noted that during meetings, Diagnist supporters were handing out "gifts" to those who attended, seeking to silence their disgruntlement.

⁷ ANS 21 G 137 (108), letter, 14 May 1934.

about how the employment in Dakar's city positions had been awarded; now that Diagne was gone, originaires wanted answers from Clédor—and reckoning—for Diagne's policies.⁸

Guèye left his post as a legal advisor for the Appeals Court of Saint-Denis de La Réunion, taking a career risk similar to Diagne's in 1914.⁹ Once in Paris, Guèye sent out letters to important and wealthy personages in Diagne's party, seeking their support for his candidacy for deputy, before he left for Senegal. For example, Abdoul Karime Ben Gelloune, a Moroccan merchant living in Louga, received a letter from Guèye dated 17 May, in which he wrote, "Without doubt I will board the ship on 5 June at the same time as the body of Mr. Diagne... I have received a great deal of letters from friends in Senegal, most of all from Saint-Louis. My friend, I believe that I am more qualified than anyone to replace Mr. Diagne."¹⁰ In these letters Guèye claimed he was coming back to Senegal with a mandate from Diagne's supporters, who were begging him to run for deputy. By returning with Diagne's body, Guèye was symbolizing his position as successor and caretaker of Diagne's legacy.¹¹ Clédor was aware of the letters, and expressed public confidence in his ability to defeat Guèye's bid to take over Diagne's party. Privately, however, he must have been gravely concerned, for he offered his allegiance to Guèye once Guèye arrived in Senegal.

⁸ ANS 21 G 137 (108).

⁹ Guèye would later open a legal office in Dakar.

¹⁰ ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 1 June 1934.

¹¹ It is not completely clear where Blaise Diagne is buried. It seems he might have been buried in the Muslim cemetery of Soumbedioune in Dakar, but that seems unlikely due to his affiliations with the Freemasons. More research needs to be pursued in this matter.

In 1935, Lamine Guèye claimed he had written three letters to Diouf around the time of Diagne's death, asking Diouf if he was going to be a candidate for the special election for deputy. Guèye received no reply from Diouf. He later officially heard that Diouf was going to be a candidate, and wrote him again. In reply to this forth letter, Guèye claimed, Diouf replied that they were *concurrents*-competitors, and not *adversaires*--adversaries.¹² Diouf then promised Guèye, that if Diouf were elected deputy, he would collaborate with Guèye. Perhaps this explains why Guèye seemed to adjust rather well after losing.

Galandou Diouf's Candidacy for the Special Election

Galandou Diouf, who had previously been very vocal publically in matters concerning Senegal's politics, was oddly silent about his intentions after Diagne's death. Indeed, colonial authorities remarked that Diouf was "an enigma" who kept his thoughts to himself and was extremely reserved. Diouf mentioned privately to originaire supporters that his biggest concern was for the Senegalese people, "not to vote for a white man or a métis" for deputy.¹³ While he may have had his differences with Diagne, it was clear Galandou Diouf did not want the deputyship to revert back to a métis or French man. Diouf's son-in-law, Souleye Diouf, attended meetings in Saint-Louis to feel out the situation. It seems Diouf wanted to test the waters before announcing his candidacy; after receiving the support of a few wealthy Europeans, and encouraging replies to his inquires, he went forward.

¹² ANS 20 G 10 (1), renseignements, Dakar, 20 May 1935.

¹³ ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 24 May 1934.

By the end of May 1934, Diouf had decided to run in the deputy election.

Diouf presented himself to the public, and reassured followers about his chances of success. Diouf declared:

Diagne is dead and Diagnism also. There is nothing left but Dioufism. Dugay Clédor is incapable of creating a "Clédorism" that possesses the least amount of success. Lamine Guèye, before his return to the political life of Senegal, first must find forgiveness for his previous attitude and win the sympathy and aid of his former friends, now not interested, to his cause. I know the country and I have the sympathy of an enormous amount of the inhabitants. For the moment, Senegal has no need in the Chamber of Deputies of a "savant," capable of a thousand intrigues. The Chamber needs a farmer to help the Administration to conquer the economic crisis... There is no one more qualified than me for a new agricultural program. I will present my opinion in the electoral college and I am certain of success.

If Lamine Guèye understood the situation, he would help my candidature. He could follow my lead in 1940.

At this time, it is impossible for Lamine Guèye to regain a single part of the lost territory. It did not astonish me in the least when Clédor offered his services to Lamine Guèye. Clédor realized he would never again hold a political office in Senegal if he did not, and Lamine Guèye gives him an opportunity to retain the presidency of the Colonial Council. We will address that after the arrival of Lamine Guèye. In the meantime, I have explained my point of view to him, in response to his letter where he announced to me his intention of presenting himself as a candidate with my assent. I made it known to him that I had absolutely no intention of "tirer les marrons de feu" for him and that he could wait his turn.¹⁴

By this point in the campaign, it had become evident that Clédor was, indeed, going to fall in behind Guèye's candidacy. Diouf presented Guèye as an upstart, and he emphasized the distinction between himself and Guèye as well as Diagne. Guèye and Diagne were the "savants," too educated, too elitist, too French; Clédor could be included in that pejorative as well. Diouf, on the other hand, was a common man, a farmer, who retained his currency by remaining in

¹⁴ ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 1 June 1934.

Senegal, something Guèye could not claim. Diouf drew negative parallels between Diagne and Guèye, for clearly Diagne's position in the establishment weakened his popularity and symbolic capital in Senegal. Portraying Guèye as Diagne's inheritor did not build Guèye's symbolic capital, but rather detracted from Guèye's appeal. Guèye's symbolic capital was further injured because he was using proxies to campaign for him until he arrived in Senegal in late June.

Galandou Diouf had an established political network and a resurgence of symbolic capital on which to build. From the beginning of his campaign, Diouf emphasized Guèye's perfidy to the public, and redeployed his own image as an African farmer, a man in touch with the people and interests of Senegal, and a protector of the 'little man' against a corrupt colonial administration, as well as politicians like Guèye who were only interested in self-aggrandizement and political games. These themes resonated strongly with originaires.

Diouf held one of his first large political meetings on the 3 June, with perhaps a thousand people in attendance. All the lieutenants of the party were present, including his old friends Assane N'Doye and Louis Martin. Several notable Europeans, including Alfred Goux, were in attendance as well. Tellingly, delegates were sent from Yoff, N'Gor, and Ouakam, three of the neighborhoods strongly held by Blaise Diagne since 1928. These neighborhoods helped defeat Diouf in that year's extremely close election; their presence indicated a major shift of allegiance. There was anxiety among Diouf's supporters that the election would once again be stolen from them. Certain Europeans tried to reassure those present that the administration was neutral, and would not support one

party above another in this election. Their assurances were met with warm applause by the crowd, who were encouraged to vote for the “party of opposition” for the upcoming municipal elections. Diouf even had a ‘celebrity endorsement’ during the meeting from a wrestling champion and former Diagnost.¹⁵

One of Diouf’s strongest supporters was Alfred Goux, a French man who was a fellow World War I veteran. During Diouf’s darkest period, Goux had not left him, and indeed, had acted as the editor of Diouf’s political organ, *L’A.O.F. Républicaine*. Criticisms of Goux abound in colonial documents; colonial informants mention Goux’s unpopularity several times. It is difficult to discern the veracity of these accounts.¹⁶ Certainly Guèye attacked Diouf through Goux. On more than one occasion Lamine Guèye would proclaim in public meetings that his true opponent was not Galandou Diouf, but was rather Alfred Goux. Lamine Guèye publicly expressed the sentiment that he could not support Diouf because if Diouf were elected, Goux “could do all that he wished.”¹⁷ Guèye accused Goux of being Machiavellian. Originaires were told Goux would deceive the Senegalese people. Guèye argued that the people were not, in fact, choosing between two men of the same black race, but rather, in fact, were choosing between a Senegalese (himself) and a white man (Goux).

Guèye’s attack could be seen as a ploy to present Diouf as a collaborator with white interests. Alfred Goux seemed to inspire strong emotions, but the true nature of his relationship with Diouf is not apparent in the colonial record.

¹⁵ Abdoulaye Diop of Yumbeul was a wrestling champion. His father had once been a member of Dakar’s municipal council. ANS 21 G 137 (108), 4 June 1934.

¹⁶ ANS 20 G 90 (23), 27 June 1934.

¹⁷ ANS 20 G 90 (23), 7 July 1934.

Informants recorded negative items each man had allegedly said about the other. Significantly, however, Galandou Diouf continued to employ Goux in his rallies and meetings. Goux's position with Diouf was aided by his connections with several Lebou businessmen. Goux ran on Diouf's ticket for the Dakar municipal election. Diouf rather dramatically declared that if his party was once again defeated, he would never again be involved in politics. Fortunately for Diouf, his party was elected to the municipal council. In an ominous sign, however, Goux was defeated for the mayoralty by Armand Angrand, a Diagnost and supporter of Lamine Guèye. This was significant, for Angrand was in a good position to dole out favors and rewards to Guèye's supporters.¹⁸

But it was enough for Galandou Diouf that members of his party had been elected to the council. Diouf and his party began campaigning in earnest for the Deputyship, holding meetings in the four communes, including outlying neighborhoods as far away as Kaolack. Diouf traveled to Dakar and personally visited employees in the administration's service and those working for the commercial houses.¹⁹ Alfred Goux, Louis Martin, Amadou Assane N'Doye, and Max Burty spoke at rallies. Diouf released printed propaganda with his name and the title "Champion of the Senegalese Democracy."²⁰

Galandou Diouf persisted in calling his party the Opposition. And the party continued to publicly express itself as a force outside of the established powers—the Administration, the Bordeaux houses, Diagne's *Républicain Socialiste* party. As part of that image, Galandou Diouf presented himself as an

¹⁸ ANS 21 G 137 (108), note dated 15 June 1934, and a sheet containing "Information."

¹⁹ ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 7 July 1934.

²⁰ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 16 June 1934.

organic politician, born and raised in Senegal, only leaving his natal country for his commendable service in the Great War. Diouf presented his African wives as proof of his allegiance to Senegalese culture; this was a dig at both Lamine Guèye and Blaise Diagne, neither of whom had taken Senegalese wives.

Galandou Diouf presented himself as the populist candidate—his speech was self-consciously simple and liberally sprinkled with metaphors and Wolof sayings. Diouf projected an image of a homespun candidate; his approaches were true, without the glitz and glitter of a Blaise Diagne. Lamine Guèye was described by Diouf as eloquent but empty, whereas he, himself, was straightforward and full of ideas. Diouf portrayed Lamine Guèye as a man who had abandoned Senegal for his own ambitions. Diouf's allies called Guèye “more European than Senegalese,” and reminded people of how Guèye had deserted them. Guèye was too educated; he was not worried about the masses.²¹

It is revealing that representatives from Lamine Guèye approached Galandou Diouf through his lieutenants to proffer an agreement or accord. On 20 June 1934, Moustaphe Malick Gaye, the Mayor of Saint Louis, traveled to Dakar to meet with Amadou Assane N'Doye to see if the latter could convince Diouf to agree to an accord with Guèye. Guèye must have realized Diouf had a significant amount of support in Senegal; co-opting him would guarantee Guèye's success in his bid for deputy. Guèye had written to Diouf before, seeking cooperation, but had been rebuffed. Gaye, however, entered into the

²¹ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 25 June 1934.

discussions with a superior attitude. He intimated that Diouf would be better placed in the Colonial Council, and Lamine Guèye would make a better deputy.

Gaye suggested, "It would be preferable if each one aspired to the place he deserved and the place he could keep."²² The offer was an insult to Diouf and his supporters. N'Doye spurned Gaye, and indicated that it would be difficult to convince the people of Dakar not to support Galandou Diouf in his bid for the Deputyship. The presence of this Saint-Louisien delegation provoked resentment in certain quarters of Dakar, where Dakarois indicated it would be better if the Saint-Louisiens kept their opinions to themselves, and shared other choice sentiments about those from the northern commune.

This small incident further illuminates the discrete communal identity active in Senegal during colonial times. A reoccurring theme was the sense of umbrage those from Rufisque and Dakar felt towards the people of Saint-Louis, who were accused of possessing "superior" attitudes and undue influence upon the political community of Senegal. Indeed, a native Saint-Louisien, François Salzmänn, misspoke during a rally held for Galandou Diouf in Dakar. Salzmänn, who had gone to jail for Diouf, infuriated the gathered crowd when he mentioned that the first volunteers who accompanied Faidherbe were from Saint-Louis. Those gathered manifested their anger loudly and clearly and began to cry in unison, "Tais, toi,.. tais, toi..." over and over.²³ The originaires in Dakar had no interest in Saint-Louisien colonial exploits. For Dakarois, service with Faidherbe

²² ANS 21 G 137 (108), 20 June 1934.

²³ ANS 20 G 90 (23), 20 June 1934. "tais-toi" can be translated as "Don't tell me about it!"

held no symbolic capital and was an infuriating reminder of how Saint-Louisians had maintained a privileged status with the colonial administration.

The only way the crowd settled was when Salzmann's brother, Max Burty, took the floor and said of his brother, "He is all Saint-Louisien, but he knows that the Lebous are the most honest of all the other races, more intelligent than the Saint-Louisians."²⁴ After the meeting concluded, many young people tried to approach "Salzmann from Saint-Louis" (François) in order to criticize his remarks, and perhaps even to strike him, but order was kept due to the aplomb of party leaders. Salzmann would become a supporter of Lamine Guèye.



Figure 7.2 [Max Burty, partisan of Galandou Diouf, public domain.]

²⁴ Ibid.

The Race to the Deputyship

Into this turbulent political atmosphere arrived Lamine Guèye during the morning of 21 June 1934 on the steamer *Banfora*. Several notables waited for him on the dock, including Moustaphe Malick Gaye, the Mayor of Saint-Louis and Maurice Guèye, the Mayor of Rufisque. Galandou Diouf was in Rufisque, and did not come to Dakar for several days. Rumor had it that the French government supported Guèye's candidacy, for Lamine Guèye was educated, and was a dignified successor to Blaise Diagne. Certainly Guèye reflected more French cultural appropriation than Diouf.

If Guèye had achieved support in some quarters, he faced a battle in Senegal, particularly in Dakar. He was coldly received by several Dakar notables. Guèye believed he had the support of the youth, as was the case in Saint-Louis, but he was wrong. On one instance he returned to a supporter's house in which he was staying to a crowd of about thirty young people, waiting for him. When they saw Guèye, they began to cry out with hostility, "Down with Lamine! Down with Lamine!"²⁵ They dispersed peacefully due to the compelling presence of several government policemen.

Galandou Diouf and his party chiefs successfully sought to create images of his power and support, critical for prestige and further construction of his symbolic capital. Redeploying a spectacle similar to that from 1928, on 27 June 1934, Diouf arrived on the evening train from Rufisque to Dakar's train station. A crowd of around two thousand people waited for him. Diouf thanked the crowd and was photographed in the middle. He got into Goux's car and was taken to

²⁵ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 21 June 1934.

his preferred residence, the Pyrénées Hotel on Avenue Ponty. The car was followed by five or six taxis holding the dignitaries of the party. The crowd followed the cars at a distance and was only dispersed at the Gambetta-Ponty intersection by the *service d'ordre*. The original plan had been to drape Diouf's chief lieutenants in the French Tri-color flag, but they were discouraged by colonial agents. Diouf's reception could be directly compared by the people to Guèye's smaller, less boisterous greeting at the dock when his boat arrived.²⁶

When Lamine Guèye outlined his program in early July, François Salzmann and Duguay Clédor of Saint-Louis came announced their support of him, and encouraged their bloc of voters to vote for Guèye on 20 July. Duguay Clédor's support was a mixed blessing. If Goux was a problem for Diouf, then Clédor served the same position in Guèye's campaign. Diouf countered Guèye's propaganda about Goux directly and accused Clédor of being the "most unpopular" man in the colony; his propaganda proclaimed, "A vote for Guèye is a vote for Clédor."²⁷

²⁶ ANS 20 G 90 (23), 28 June 1934.

²⁷ ANS 20 G 92 (23), Dioufist propaganda flyer.

En mon absence de **Dakar** **Lamine GUEYE** a clamé dans les diverses réunions qu'il a tenues que voter pour moi serait voter pour **M. GOUX** qui deviendrait, désormais, le grand maître de la politique Sénégalaise.

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Mon adversaire a publiquement déclaré que je suis à la solde de **M. GOUX** oubliant, volontairement, que depuis trois ans **M. GOUX** et moi travaillons la main dans la main pour révoquer le pays qu'un pouvoir tyrannique a conduit à la mort.

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N'ayant pas le temps matériel avant le scrutin de dimanche prochain de réfuter dans les réunions et palabres les inepties de **Lamine GUEYE** et fils, un dernier appel à votre clairvoyance, par la voie de tracts

Comme vous vous en êtes rendu compte dans ma dernière tournée de conférences, **M. GOUX** n'est pas le **SEUL EUROPÉEN** à postuler nos candidatures : j'ai en effet le bonheur fortuit d'être soutenu dans mon aspiration à la Députation par un élément **Européen** tout premier plan, dont les connaissances des choses du pays sont incontestables, et ce, aussi bien à Saint-Louis - Kaolack - Thourbel - Thion - Louga - qu'à **DAKAR** et autres localités de moindre importance.

Comme **Lamine GUEYE** n'est pas touché à cet élément européen c'est sur **M. GOUX** qu'il devra sa bile : parce que **Lamine GUEYE** n'est assoué que par le **RACAILLE MUNICIPAL** de Dakar et de Saint-Louis et par l'homme le plus **IMPOPULAIRE** de l'A.O.P., j'ai nommé **Dugay - CLEPOR**.

En votant pour moi, vous votez donc pour votre vrai frère de race, qui depuis vingt-cinq ans ne s'est pas un instant départi de son attitude combative pour arriver à permettre dans ce pays l'ascension aux fonctions électives à quiconque veut y participer sans qu'il soit besoin de se mettre sous la rotelle d'un parti dominant.

Les électeurs de Dakar ont magistralement approuvé cette politique le 10 juin dernier.

Et j'ai le droit de dire que voter pour **Lamine GUËYE** c'est voter pour **CLEDOR**.

vous et le terre pas, ci partout vous avez deslats que vous ne voulez pas de ce deslats et overreindat
personnage.

Le plus haut responsable des relations publiques qui se veut exposer partout n'a fait des conférences, le soir du dimanche qui ayant travaillé à vos côtés, et ayant souffert vos misères, je connais vos besoins, le concours de l'élément Français qui ne récrémait et ne s'élève dans nos tâches, ignore RIEN, lui aussi de ce qu'il convient d'attendre des Pouvoirs Publics pour rendre aux affaires de notre pays une tce, alors, prompt, de même de travail rémunérateur, pour tous ceux sans distinction d'épiderme qui travaillent et peinent dans le Sénégal.

Voter pour moi c'est voter pour nous l'élément **SAIN** qui veut le bien-être du cultivateur, pour que celui-ci ait la cheville ouvrière conditionnant la vie économique Sénégalaise.

Entre le Candidat **Lamine GUEYE** Vraie glorieuse Politique et qui au corps à déserté le Pays pour accepter un Poste grossièrement rétribué à la Réunion et **MOI** qui n'ai pas cessé de vivre pour vous, vous n'hésitez pas et **VOUS VOTEREZ POUR MOI.**

Entre le Candidat Lamine GUIYE qui perpétuerait la politique autoritaire et arbitraire qui amoindrit vos libertés depuis **VINOT ANS**, et **MOI** qui agite à votre redonnez vos libertés pendant **VOUS VOTEREZ POUR MOI.**

Encore **Lamine GUEYE** qui n'a d'autre ambition en brisant l'écharpe de Député que de continuer à maintenir en fonction toute la camarilla politique qui a ruiné votre pays, et **MOI** qui n'aspire qu'à vous en débarrasser **VOUS VOTEREZ POUR MOI.**

Entre la liberté, l'essor de votre pays, la lutte à soutenir pour l'amélioration de votre sort, et le succès d'une révolution "Sous l'égide de CLEOR" nous nous sommes donnés à cœur joie.

VOUS VOTEREZ TOUS POUR MOI

Rafin je Gai, également, appelé aux Européens, beaucoup me connaissent bien, beaucoup me connaissent mal, mais tous me connaissent. J'aurais pu être l'objet de franchise de soumission à l'égard de tous et je n'en ai rien dit, car je ne veux pas travailler en étroite collaboration avec vous au relèvement du pays en vous le montrant non pas comme des hommes libres, mais comme des hommes travaillant à l'union des difficultés des prisonniers.

A TOUS JE DIS VOTER POUR MOI
C'EST VOTER POUR LA DÉLIVRANCE DU PAYS ET POUR LA LIBERTÉ
Vive la France ! Vive le Sénégal !

Galandon DIOUF, Cultivateur.
Officier de Réserve Ancien Combattant
Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur
Croix de Guerre
Candidat aux Elections Législatives du 15 juillet

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When Lamine Guèye accepted Clédor's patronage, he alienated Mayor Moustaphe Malik Gaye of Saint-Louis, one of the first who laid the framework for Guèye's candidacy in Senegal. Clédor, however, actively worked for Guèye's candidacy, holding meetings with city notables and exhorting them that he would "always defend their interests with all his energy."²⁸ The loss of the mayor of Saint-Louis, however, was a significant blow to Guèye's political network and patronage. Gaye began to actively campaign for Diouf, instead.²⁹ Saint-Louis, which looked as though it would be a solid base of support for Guèye, began to slip away from him.



Figure 7.5 [Moustaphe Malik Gaye, public domain.]

²⁸ ANS 20 G 90 (23).

²⁹ Gaye would switch allegiance back to Guèye months after the election, and would approach Diouf again in 1936, however this time Diouf rebuffed him.

Lamine Guèye was aware of the negative press that his opponents had circulated. He attempted to counteract Diouf's propaganda during a meeting held in Dakar in late June. With an audience of around 1800 people, Guèye took the floor,

I am very happy to see this gathering composed only of brave people. My deepest thanks to all of you who have greeted me with great enthusiasm.

I have returned to Senegal to ask for your votes; but today, as I find myself among you for the first time, I will not speak of politics. I have come foremost to greet you. Before introducing a campaign to the voters, one must first file one's candidacy with the Governor. Tomorrow I will leave for Saint-Louis where my [application for] candidacy will be handed to the Governor of Senegal.

It seems as though it has been told everywhere that Mr. Minister of Colonies and the Governor General are on my side; never believe the same jokes... Since the day of my arrival, I have heard a lot of criticism against me; there are certain people who speak only ill of me. You need to understand that no one can be in politics without being criticized; those who do not want to be critiqued should not engage in politics.

I want you to also understand that I am not for the Dioufistes nor for the Diagnistes; I am for all of Senegal, because I mean to represent the country with dignity.³⁰

Guèye would continue to mark himself as the "distinguished" or "dignified" candidate during the campaign. In this speech Guèye clearly tried to present himself as an independent, downplaying his association with either Diagne or Diouf. Guèye's disavowal of the possibility of the colonial administration's support indicates that this association was crippling his chances for success.

But Guèye was running with the support of Diagnost networks, and he could not afford to dissociate himself from Diagne too much. In latter meetings, Lamine Guèye would draw parallels between himself and Blaise Diagne. He

³⁰ANS 20 G 90 (23).

would often begin a meeting retracing Diagne's life and the important posts he held due to the "grace of his conduct and his intelligence." To replace this man of an "international class," Guèye thought the Senegalese voters, rather "evolved and intelligent," knew whom to support.³¹ Guèye's lieutenants would emphasize Senegal's dire need of an educated man to the crowd—that man was clearly he. Guèye's public rhetoric indicated that Diouf was not a man with the means to continue Senegal's amelioration. Guèye's supporters told voters that Guèye was the only one capable of explaining, in French, to members of the Assembly what the Senegalese wanted. A typical example: Adama Lô, a teacher from Rufisque, warned during a rally that Diouf was "without culture" and would sell his brothers of color to the Europeans.³²

Diouf's campaign attacked Lamine Guèye on his morality and character. Diouf began with Guèye's finances. When Guèye had left Senegal previously, he had left a rather significant amount of unpaid debt. During the campaign it became increasingly apparent that Lamine Guèye was suffering financial difficulties. Diouf spread rumors that Guèye was receiving free meals from a supporter, and that he was receiving loans from another. Diouf's lieutenants told the tale of a dozen griots who sang Guèye's praises, and were given only twenty-five francs. The unhappy griots, the tale was told, then refused to perform favorably for Guèye throughout the election.³³ The truth of these claims is difficult to know, but if Guèye was experiencing personal financial difficulties, he recovered enough to continue a political organization after the election. The

³¹ ANS 20 G 90 (23), Dakar, 5 July 1934.

³² ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 23 July 1934.

³³ ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 18 July 1934.

rumors about Guèye's penury persisted, and were probably effective pieces of negative propaganda. Diouf had been hurt before by rumors of his own economic insolvency; perhaps he sought to do the same damage to his competitor.

Guèye was also condemned by the Dioufists for being a "traitor." Diouf's supporters proclaimed at rallies, "Here is a man [Lamine Guèye] without a steady character! He changes his character as he changes his shirt."³⁴ In order to prove his upstanding character before Europeans, Galandou Diouf "regularized" his personal situation. Diouf had contracted with three women through Muslim ritual, but had "re"-married his first wife before an officer of the Civil State in Rufisque in 1934.³⁵ Prior to 1913, Diouf had married Kévé or Kébé N'Daw in a Muslim ceremony. In 1913, Diouf had taken another wife, Khady Cisse. He also married a younger, third wife, in a Muslim ceremony. Diouf realized his polygamous status was proof of his 'African-ness' with an African electorate, but that it was deployed against him in political rhetoric with Europeans both in Senegal and in the métropole.

Diouf's political meetings cleverly showcased former Diagnist supporters who now championed 'Galandou' and explained their changes of heart to the listening crowd. Diouf's lieutenants used his first name to emphasize his accessibility and his status as one of them. Diouf also publicized his support from the métropole, particularly the symbolic capital he gained from his standing as a WWI veteran. Louis Martin, for example, argued on the campaign trail that

³⁴ ANS 20 G 90 (23), Dakar, 9 July 1934.

³⁵ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 21 July 1934.

Diouf would be successful in the Chamber of Deputies because Diouf's old friends, the war veterans, would help him. Diouf would read a letter sent by an association of war veterans from the métropole to audiences at political rallies. Diouf would directly quote to the crowd, "If the local Administration is incapable of assuring voting freedom, we will give justice to our comrade Galandou Diouf."³⁶ In other meetings, tales of Diouf's courage at the front were told, including a particular story of self-sacrifice when Diouf saved a wounded fellow soldier with much risk to himself.

If Guèye compared himself directly to Diagne as a legitimate successor in certain settings, then Diouf and his supporters pointed out the fact that without Galandou Diouf, there would never have been a Blaise Diagne in Senegalese politics. Diouf also gained the support of voters in the peanut business, who believed that Diouf, being a farmer himself, would understand that peanuts were central to the entire economy of Senegal and would seek to support peanut farming efforts.³⁷ In this, and in other ways, Galandou Diouf presented himself as the candidate who truly understood the people of Senegal, and of the AOF. Diouf knew the miseries the people had suffered over the course of the depression. Lamine Guèye, according to Dioufist propaganda, did not. He was too busy in Martinique with his Martiniquais wife.

³⁶ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 16 July 1934. Diouf would also read a complimentary letter from the President of the Parliamentary Commission of the Colonies, Mr. Taittinger, a fellow veteran, to indicate powerful European support in the métropole.

³⁷ ANS 20 G 90 (23).

Many of the items on Galandou Diouf's political platform reiterated long-standing originaire concerns, but other sections spoke to Protectorate causes and local business interests. Diouf called for, among other things:

- Suppression of the Colonial Council and its replacement with the General Council.
- Promulgation, without restrictions, of the 1884 Law on Municipalities.
- An overhaul of the February 1932 decree on private land ownership.
- Creation of public primary schools and of Justices of the Peace in all *communes mixtes*.
- Suppression of *justice indigène* throughout Senegal.
- Creation of schools of agriculture.
- Development of a road network, and cultivation of other agricultural products (such as rice, manioc) to supplement the peanut industry.
- More complete protection of colonial products touched by the depression.
- Institution of a juried court for the colonies.
- Development of the port of Rufisque.
- Increasing the navigability and development of the River Senegal (a Saint-Louisien cause).
- Increasing the number of health centers: pharmacies, maternity wards, medical assistance.
- Benefits for former combatants (veterans).

- Agricultural development of the Casamance, which "should become the granary of Senegal."³⁸

Diouf's approach towards West Africa's needs, particularly Senegal's, reflects his broad knowledge of the area and his intellectual engagement with the issues.

Diouf's arguments were as relevant in the 1950s, as independence approached, as in the 1930s. By reflecting legitimate concerns about Senegal's economy and social conditions, and also proposing ways to ameliorate the problems, Diouf enhanced his symbolic capital with educated originaires as well as the 'common' man. Diouf's platform was progressive, concrete and insightful.




Figure 7.6 [The beginning of Galandou Diouf's posted platform for the 1934 deputy election, ANS 20 G 90(23).]

³⁸ ANS 21 G 137 (108).




Figure 7.7 [The end of Galandou Diouf's posted platform for the 1934 deputy election, ANS 20 G 90(23). Note the titles following Diouf's name. Farmer. Former General and Colonial Councilor. Former Mayor of Rufisque. Reserve Officer. Military holder of the Legion of Honor and the War Cross. WWI veteran.]

Some of Diouf's platform dovetailed nicely with a colonial program Brévié intended to implement. But while Galandou Diouf, Lamine Guèye, and many of their contemporaries pushed a program of "égalité" between the French and Africans in Senegal, the French administration tried to tie Africans to village communities and essentialize their cultural as African, and thus incompatible with the French. French reformers would rather have given full political rights only to exceptional individuals than to the general African population. At the same time, the French colonial establishment was refocusing on the benefits of "nativism."³⁹

Pierre Bourdieu describes "fields" that limit the decisions people make because they believe their range of options are circumscribed. Given the

³⁹ By 1936, Brévié had established Rural Popular Schools, which taught village students practical skills appropriate for their rural lives—including agriculture—as well as basic math and courses in the French language.

prescribed range of options for politicians in colonial Senegal; it is not surprising that Lamine Guèye's platform did not radically depart from Diouf's. For example, neither Guèye nor Diouf could demand political freedom for the Senegalese because of the limitations of their colonial field. If they pushed the boundaries too much, either man could be arrested or punished by the administration. Most voters expected Guèye's platform to reflect his intelligence and his education; he could not help but come across that way to voters. Guèye's inability to connect with the 'common' man stunted the growth of his symbolic capital among uneducated originaires. In order to distinguish himself from Diouf, Guèye needed some originality in his program; it was lacking. Guèye appeared to be imitating his elder Diouf. Guèye could not touch Diouf's symbolic capital with the population in the Protectorate, either. Guèye did not project a Muslim identity and he did not seem to have support of the leadership the Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal.

In meetings, Guèye told of his program in broad strokes that included quotas for peanuts, and called for an end to political quarrels and factions so that the Colony could concentrate upon the economy. He pushed to extend the July laws of 1881 that protected freedom of the press and freedom for public gatherings to the colonies. He wanted accident benefits for those who worked, and for the AOF seriously to recruit its functionaries from Africans. Like Diouf, he called for a reestablishment of the General Council.

Newspapers also figured in the campaign. Early in the campaign François Salzmänn used his paper *La Sirène Sénégalaise* to promote Lamine Guèye's

candidacy. The Mayor of Saint-Louis was rudely attacked in the pages of the pro-Guèye *Franco-Senegalais*, which pushed him further into supporting Galandou Diouf. *La Renaissance Coloniale* published an editorial letter addressed to “Mr. Martine, Administrator of the Circonscription,” which criticized Martine’s obvious support for Lamine Guèye. After reminding Martine that functionaries should remain neutral in an electoral period, the author concludes with a threat, stating the “people have no wish to become violent,” but “If you provoke a riot, you alone will bear the terrible responsibility.”⁴⁰

Newspapers like *La Renaissance Coloniale* made no claim to neutrality. Also found in its pages was a positive view of Diouf’s chances in Saint-Louis and a glowing account of Diouf’s travels on the railroad. *La Renaissance Coloniale* had functioned as a Dioufist organ almost from the beginning of the campaign. *La Renaissance Coloniale* was founded by Pierre Salzmann, aka Max Burty, and was relatively short-lived. Alfred Goux distributed on the streets of Dakar a free reproduction of his “open letter to Clédor” which had been published in the last issue of the *Sénégal*. *Sénégal* served a Dakarois audience. In Saint-Louis, Diouf loyalist Télémaque Sow directed *L’Action Sénégalaise*, which also would serve to further Dioufist interests.

The Election and Its Immediate Aftermath

Despite how the colonial government allowed the operation of a relatively free press during the election campaign, Galandou Diouf worried about irregularities during the voting. He placed members of his party as observers in

⁴⁰ ANS 21 G 137 (108).

all the important electoral centers of Senegal, and paid particular attention to Dakar. The leadership of the party formed *equips de contrôle*, which were assigned to voting offices. Dioufists sent one or two European municipal councilors to the offices in Dakar. At the Town Hall, Lavie and Goux would be stationed. Siguier and Sibenaler would be at the *Ecole des Garçons* on rue de Thiong. Durand would be at the *Ecole des Filles* on Avenue Albert Sarraut. Contival would be stationed at Ouakam. Other representatives would be at Yoff and Thiaroye.⁴¹ The presence of Europeans and other notable men at the polling stations may have also served as a form of intimidation for some voters.

There were questions about voting cards. Some were distributed in the names of people who were out of the country or who had died. Goux communicated with Diouf right before the election and assured him that the cards had been deposited in the hands of the Committee Chiefs: 2700 to Dakar, 800 to Kaolack, 450 to Thiès and 1800 to Saint-Louis.⁴² On the evening before the election, some cards were distributed during meetings, particularly to presidents of committees, or committee chiefs. Presumably, these leaders would then distribute the cards to their constituents. Rumors of fraudulent distribution of electoral cards in Dakar and surrounding neighborhoods frightened Dioufists, who alleged that the distribution was made by the employees of city hall—supporters of Lamine Guèye. During the election, cards in Rufisque were distributed late to Diouf's partisans. Diouf, himself, had trouble voting. A few days after the election was over, it was discovered that 800 cards had not been

⁴¹ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 27 July 1934.

⁴² ANS 21 G 137 (108), confidential information, 23 July 1934.

distributed properly and were in the residences of many Voting Committee

Presidents who supported Lamine Guèye.⁴³

In spite of the irregularities, Diouf anticipated the results. He cast his vote in Rufisque on Sunday 29 July. That evening, at 11:00, looking worn and tired, Galandou Diouf returned to Dakar and went to the Marie-Louise restaurant on rue Vincens, where he met with members of his campaign staff, particularly those who had been at voting stations. Diouf must have had supporters who received information about the voting results, for late that night, Diouf, accompanied by top lieutenants, went to the Atlantic hotel where he began to celebrate his success.

The colonial government broke down the results of the election:

Table 7.1 [ANS 20 G 90 (23).]

Results of the 29 July 1934 Legislative Elections in Senegal

Bûreaux	Registered Voters	Galandou Diouf	Lamine Guèye
<i>Dakar</i>			
Mairie	1,987	676	409
Av. Alb. Sarraut	1,571	532	350
Rue de Thiong	2,028	666	442
Médina	1,388	648	382
Gorée	232	44	87
Ouakam	394	186	37
Yoff	451	196	111
Tiarroye	333	71	165
N'Gor	153	56	46

⁴³ANS 21 G 137 (108), 31 July 1934.

M'Bao	175	29	90
Yambeul	137	54	32
<i>Saint-Louis</i>			
1 st Bureau	2,565	750	525
2 nd Bureau	603	272	186
3 rd Bureau	325	363	276
Rufisque	2,510	1,640	523
Dagana	37	10	18
Louga	262	133	100
Kébemer	97	30	24
Thiès	904	322	258
Bargny	891	365	306
M'Bour	273	110	95
Joal	88	18	22
Tivaouane	166	86	56
Mecké	108	59	28
Khombole	94	66	14
Diourbel	405	161	119
Bambey	100	35	40

Table 7.1 continued

Diouf won convincingly in Saint-Louis, Rufisque and Dakar. Guèye could not compete with the symbolic capital Diouf had built in Senegal during a political career that had spanned more than twenty-five years. Diouf had spent most of

that time in Senegal, except for his years as a soldier fighting in World War I. Diouf had built capital as an opposition leader, and his ability to come back into political prominence post-1928 added to Diouf's reputation as a heroic figure who struggled against all odds. Guèye's political history in Senegal was short, and most of it was spent in support of Diouf; he then changed his allegiance in return for a prosperous, career-enhancing position. The reputation as Diagne's inheritor most likely damaged Guèye's symbolic capital instead of aiding it. Losing Mayor Gaye's support in Saint-Louis damaged Guèye's credibility and legitimacy; Clédor was dead weight.

The final results were sent by an official telegram to the Governor General of the AOF from the Governor of Senegal. On the 30 July 1934 telegrams began arriving bearing congratulations from all the colonies in West Africa. In the afternoon, the Chamber of Commerce invited businessmen to close their *boutiques* and *magasins* in honor of Galandou Diouf's victory. Most everyone complied.⁴⁴

In spite of their defeat, Lamine Guèye and his supporters in Saint-Louis did not cease their political propaganda, for Guèye was determined to win the deputyship in 1936. Immediately following the election, Guèye laid out goals: 1) to reconcile Dugay Clédor and Moustaphe Malick Gaye, 2) to create an account into which a certain sum would be deposited every month in view of the next elections of 1936, 3) to establish Guèye's residence in Senegal.⁴⁵ Yves Person has argued that Lamine Guèye realized the need for a modern African political

⁴⁴ ANS 13 G 10 (1934), *Bulletin Quotidien de la Chambre de Commerce de Dakar*.

⁴⁵ ANS 21 G 137 (108), 7 August 1934.

party, complete with congresses, programs, propaganda and militants, and thus established the first modern political party in Senegal, the Parti socialiste, inspired by the SFIO.⁴⁶ If congresses, meetings, programs, propaganda and militants are the criteria Person uses to define “modern” political parties, then it can easily be argued both Blaise Diagne and Galandou Diouf had been operating such parties for years. Lamine Guèye, instead, followed a familiar pattern in his political organization. Guèye’s PSS may have sounded more progressive than the “Guèye-ism,” but Guèye’s party was built upon his symbolic capital and position. It was very similar to Diagne’s and Diouf’s political parties. Guèye and Senghor followed a political pattern that had been established in Senegal from at least 1914.

Galandou Diouf moved to establish his authority as Deputy, and began playing the role. Some of his first actions were punitive. Diouf almost immediately wrote the Governor General of French West Africa about the posts of Administrator of the Circonscription of Dakar and Delegate to the Governor of Senegal to Rufisque. Diouf argued that his predecessor—Diagne—had always placed his devoted friends in these posts; Martine, who controlled both posts, was demonstrably hostile to Diouf. Diouf asked for his men, Mr. Leon to be placed in Rufisque, and for Mr. de la Rocca to be placed in Dakar. There was a certain urgency in Diouf’s request for Leon, for Leon was about to be shipped off to a remote post in the interior of Soudan.

⁴⁶ Yves Person, “Le Front populaire au Sénégal (mai 1936-octobre 1938),” *Le Mouvement social*, no 107 (April-June, 1979): 85.

Governor General Brévié, however, refused to give the post to Leon. In a letter to Diouf, the Governor General indicated that Leon had been involved in a disciplinary hearing before the *Cour d'Assises*, and that he was an inappropriate choice at this time for the position in Rufisque. However, Brévié mollified Diouf; if Leon performed well in Soudan, perhaps he could be appointed in the future.⁴⁷ Early in his career as Deputy, then, Diouf ran into the boundaries of his power against the Governor General's will; it seems clear that Diouf expected to have more power and persuasion as deputy than the reality dictated. Diouf would push against this reality the rest of his career. Even though Leon would not receive the position, Brévié did write to the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal and indicate that Martine's load was too heavy, serving both as interim Administrator of the Circumscription of Dakar and as Delegate to Rufisque. He wanted to know whom the Lt-Governor would recommend for the post in Rufisque.⁴⁸

While Brévié did not respond favorably to Diouf's request, he also did not ignore the situation. The Governor General communicated with Diouf's friend Pierre Taittinger, who emphasized Martine's enmity towards Galandou, but believed an accord could be reached between the two men if Brévié were to broker the peace.⁴⁹ And indeed, in October Diouf would write to Brévié and indicate that Martine's behavior had modified his first impression and asked for Martine to become the permanent Administrator of the Circumscription of

⁴⁷ ANS 17 G 369 (126), Correspondances avec le Deputé du Sénégal Galandou Diouf, letters dated 22 August 1934, 23 August 1934, 28 August 1934 and from Brévié to Diouf, 30 August 1934, Diouf to Brévié, 30 August 1934.

⁴⁸ ANS 13 G 10 (1934), Dakar, 1 September 1934.

⁴⁹ ANS 13 G 10 (1934), letter from Taittinger to Governor General Brévié, dated 4 September 1934.

Dakar.⁵⁰ Although Taittinger was an important métropole connection for Diouf, and treated Diouf with respect and dignity in their personal correspondence, the tone Taittinger took about Diouf in his letters to the Governor General could at best be described as paternalistic and indulgent. Taittinger seemed eager to convince the Governor General that Diouf was willing to play ball. Taittinger assured Brévié that Galandou Diouf had lost his “persecuted” mentality, and was now ready to work with Brévié.⁵¹ Both Taittinger and Brévié would be disappointed by Diouf’s persistent push for the implementation of his program, particularly the resurrection of the General Council. Diouf would set the tone for the next several years with his speech of 8 September 1934, where he laid out his vision for reform in colonial Senegal.




Figure 7.8 [Galandou Diouf, center, with his lieutenants, original photograph located in ANS.]

⁵⁰ ANS 13 G 10 (1934), letter from Diouf to Brévié, dated 13 October 1934.

⁵¹ ANS 13 G 10 (1934), letter from Taittinger to Brévié, dated 20 September 1934.

Galandou Diouf's Discourse of 8 September 1934

In a move concretely demonstrating his symbolic capital, Galandou Diouf held a great banquet on 8 September 1934 at the Hotel Métropole in Dakar, with over two hundred people in attendance; only about thirty were African. Diouf sat at the table of honor along with his top lieutenants and municipal councilors. Several functionaries of the P.T.T. and railroad attended. Only a few women came; only white spouses were mentioned by name, but two Greek women were there with their husbands, and three or four métis women were also in attendance. Most of the assembly was composed of agents and employees of the large commercial houses.⁵²

After dessert, Diouf rose to speak for about an hour to set the tone for his deputyship. Occasionally, according to a colonial informant, he would stumble over pieces of his written, extensive program. However, the condescending tone of the account makes it difficult to give much credence to criticisms of Diouf that fit a French colonial stereotype. The speech encompassed practical economic reforms and policies, and, to a certain extent, was very programmatic. It also included an outline of the type of agenda Diouf believed should be implemented for the best governance of Senegal.

Galandou Diouf began his speech on a combative note, clearly citing the absence of Bordeaux employees' support during his campaigns. Diouf assured them, however, that he would follow a policy of 'appeasement' in order to aid the

⁵² ANS 13 G 10 (1934), Banquet Galandou Diouf, 8 September 1934 (confidential).

people of Senegal.⁵³ In other words, Diouf was willing to cooperate with the colonial state and business interests in return for concrete aid to his Senegalese constituency. Diouf went on to assure his listeners that he had no intention of purging the country of “bad elements,” a rumor that had circulated during his campaign, when certain voters believed he would kick Syrians and other nationalities out of Senegal. Instead, Diouf soothed, he was sure natural selection would accomplish this, as those who loved “justice and legality” would prosper. Diouf was willing to work with people who “would not chase their egos,” but rather would work together, for the “vital condition of our colony and our destiny.” Diouf called for unified action to “save Senegal.”⁵⁴ Diouf critiqued the operation of the Bordeaux firms and their selfish pursuit of profit to the detriment of Senegal. He hoped to ameliorate this by implementing new conditions for peanut farming and trade in Senegal.⁵⁵

Diouf's speech revealed a sophisticated understanding of depression economics. He stated, “The current economic crisis we are in passes all previous crises. We cannot regard it as superficial, we must rapidly realize we must adapt in a new way. All the known theories are destroyed by the state of

⁵³ ANS, Galandou Diouf, “Discours prononcé par M. Galandou Diouf,” bi III, no. 147. In the text: “L'expérience d'un passé très proche, me contraint à affirmer que la politique d'apaisement, dont je suis un partisan convaincu, est seule capable, de sortir de la misère le Sénégal, dont les électeurs viennent de me charger de la défense de leurs interest au parlement.”

⁵⁴ ANS, “Discourse prononcé par Galandou Diouf,” bi III, no. 147.

⁵⁵ This is not surprising given that the result of a peanut monoculture in Senegal was that production had skyrocketed, while price had dropped. In 1929 Senegal produced 400,000 tons of peanuts, 508,000 tons in 1930, and the price had fallen from 130 francs per 100 kilograms in 1929 to 120 francs in 1931, to 45 francs in 1932. This year marked the apogee of the crisis: the value of peanut exports plunged from 654 million in 1929 to 501 million in 1931 to 165 million in 1932. See Person, “Le Front populaire au Sénégal (mai 1936-octobre 1938),” 82.

actual things; the excess of production increases misery by lowering the price...which is a great disaster for farmers.”⁵⁶ Diouf boldly attacked the colonial system in the Protectorate. He called the canton chiefs “*vautours rapaces*” of Senegal, and he accused them of ruining farmers with their deplorable and tyrannical decisions. Diouf publicly aligned himself with Protectorate interests in this speech at the same time as he was indirectly attacking the Colonial Council, and the legitimacy of the chiefs' involvement with it.

Diouf moved to directly and strongly critique the Colonial Council in his speech, indicating how its creation had shifted economic power out of the hands of elected members of the State and into the hands of Governor General. The Governor General had also assigned seats in the Council to agents of the administration, namely the indigenous chiefs named by the local Government. The Colonial Council, Diouf declared, had become “the symbol of moral oppression.” Diouf called for a reinstatement of a General Council, with real power, and he hoped that the Minister of Colonies would listen to the voice of reason.⁵⁷

It is likely that Galandou Diouf realized that he could not turn back the hands of time and win colonial support for the reinstallation of the General Council. But by pushing for the General Council's reinstatement, Diouf continued to position himself as an opponent of the colonial administration and an advocate for originaire rights. It is possible many originaires in Saint-Louis wanted to believe the General Council could be reinstated; Diouf's expressed desire for this

⁵⁶ ANS, “Discourse prononcé par Galandou Diouf,” bi III, no. 147.

⁵⁷ ANS, “Discourse prononcé par Galandou Diouf,” bi III, no. 147.

bolstered his symbolic capital amongst métis and notables. Perhaps Diouf also believed that there were still points of negotiation available from the administration on the composition of the Colonial Council.

During the speech Galandou Diouf emphasized that he was willing to crusade for an end to the days of European corruption and abuse of Africans. He called on the French state to support infrastructure in Senegal for hospitals and schools. He made a point of emphasizing how Lebou inhabitants of Cap Vert had been victimized by broken promises and exploitation by 'some' *petit fonctionnaires*. Diouf called upon a government that "professed humanitarian values" to ameliorate the poor's suffering on Senegal's city streets. Diouf was publicly appearing as a crusader for African rights to a European audience. He was letting Europeans know that, with his election, he intended that the balance of social power should shift; it was time for Africans to be treated with the same respect and equality Europeans enjoyed. He encouraged small businessmen attempting to retain independence from the Bordeaux firms, and promised them he would be "in all circumstances, an ardent defender."⁵⁸

One of Galandou Diouf's pet projects was obtaining citizen rights for African *anciens combattants*. He told those assembled that France had completely abandoned war veterans in the colony. Diouf pledged to obtain all the advantages he possibly could for the veterans and their families. He tried to appeal to French sympathy by pointing out that those who had suffered in the war or been mutilated were treated as undesirables. African families seeking a pension from their fallen loved ones fought their own wars with the state. Diouf

⁵⁸ ANS, "Discourse prononcé par Galandou Diouf," bi III, no. 147.

appealed to French patriotism, “As long as they [African veterans of WWI] were going into battle, as long as they were killed, there was no difficulty [for the French state]; there was no need for them [veterans] to know how to read or write French. [I]t is past time for them to receive their due.” Diouf actively worked for veterans’ rights during the rest of his career.

While the speech began on a combative note, and carried a crusading zeal throughout, Diouf ended his speech with a rousing bit of patriotism and a cry of “Vive la France! Vive le Sénégal! Vive tous les Sénégalais!”⁵⁹ As he was leaving the stage the orchestra played *La Marseillaise*.⁶⁰ In some ways Diouf’s program may have been naïve and ambitious, but many of the issues he addressed sprang from his role as a leader living within the field of colonial Senegal, who had experience with cultivating the land, dealing with administrators, parlaying with businessmen, and hearing veterans’ woes. Galandou Diouf’s speeches and writings have been categorized as lacking sophistication or any sort of original comprehensive program, but in reality this speech pushed for sweeping and serious colonial reforms. This was a call to action.

Even though Diouf easily defeated Guèye in the special election of 1934, one of Diouf’s failings as a politician was his refusal to cooperate with Guèye. Guèye was a shrewd politician himself, and could be a powerful ally or opponent. Guèye would attempt to wrest Diouf’s mantle as radical originaire in both the communes and the métropole. Guèye was able to serve as a spokesman for

⁵⁹ ANS, Discours prononcé par Monsieur Galandou Diouf, bi III, no. 147.

⁶⁰ 13 G 10, 1934.

educated youth, and he tried to develop a reputation as the workers' friend. Guèye chipped away at Diouf's base of political support, and narrowed Diouf's symbolic capital. Guèye might have been open to reconciliation with Diouf, at least in the mid-1930s, but his support came with a price: Diouf had to get rid of Goux. Diouf would not compromise, and as a result, he lost Guèye. Perhaps Guèye knew that Diouf would not jettison Goux. However, if Diouf had allied himself with Guèye, he would have been much more powerful during his time as deputy because he would have significantly united the *évolués* in the métropole, the left, the working class, originaires both educated and not, and Africans in the Protectorate. With such a coalition, Diouf would have been better able to challenge the authoritarian power of the administration, particularly during the time of Marius Moutet, the Popular Front Minister of Colonies, who openly supported Guèye. As it was, however, Diouf's efficacy as a deputy was circumscribed by an increasingly limited colonial field and a series of hostile administrations.

Chapter Eight

Galandou Diouf as Deputy, 1934-1941

This chapter chronicles Galandou Diouf's career as the first Muslim, African Deputy of French West Africa. By looking closely at Diouf's rhetoric through his speeches, letters, conflicts, and law proposals, a more complete and complex picture of the politician emerges. Diouf was often stymied by the colonial regime. In spite of this, he was as astute in his position as deputy as he was in opposition. Diouf knew when he could oppose or protest French policies, and when he needed to confirm his loyalty to France. He knew what part of the colonial regime he could work with, and how to maneuver within colonial practices in order to achieve his goals.

For France, Diouf was a contradiction. He was the most important indigenous politician from French West Africa, yet he had only obtained a limited education. He was Deputy in the heart of Paris, yet he was Muslim with three wives. He proclaimed universalist republican ideas, yet he lived during an age when the French state was reevaluating the *mission civilatrice* and emphasizing native culture. This chapter goes into a good amount of detail into the 'nuts and bolts' of Diouf's popularity, his successes and failures, and reconfigures his significance in Senegalese history.

Galandou Diouf and the Political Field

On 19 September 1934, Diouf boarded the ship *Anfa*, bound for Marseille. While in Paris he lived at 11, Avenue Malakoff in the 16th arrondissement. Alfred Goux became his first lieutenant in Senegal, and his representative to the governor general. Diouf communicated regularly with Goux about activities in the communes' municipal councils, particularly Dakar. Goux also monitored the sessions of the Colonial Council. The available information from the colonial record on Goux in the National Archives in Senegal is limited and biased. Goux was clearly an effective campaigner for Diouf, and he had secured Diouf's loyalty and trust during the most difficult years of Diouf's life. During 1931 to 1934, Goux had never wavered in his loyalty to Diouf, and had continued to support him when many failed. Goux also had business connections in Dakar and Rufisque; these resources had also figured in Diouf's successes. Goux's experience as a fellow veteran of World War I, and one who had fought with distinction in the trenches, like Diouf, was very significant to Goux's place in Diouf's organization.¹ Goux would maintain his position as Diouf's right-hand man in Senegal throughout the rest of his career.

The funds Diouf hoped could be used to implement his reform program were hard to come by. Goux wrote Diouf, who wrote Brévié, requesting more funds for roads and dealing with the mundane complexities of establishing electricity and water services in the communes. Colonial funds had to be approved in Paris, and the National Assembly sometimes voted for or against

¹ I have no information currently about Alfred Goux's actual war service, beyond the fact he was a veteran and won the Croix de Guerre, but this is an avenue of for further research. It may be that Goux and Diouf even served together during the war.

monies for colonial projects. During difficult financial times, these deputies were responsible to their local taxpayers, and did not often vote to increase funds for colonial programs. Diouf would appeal directly to the deputies on a number of occasions. The operating budget of the colonies was expected to be furnished from taxes on businesses and individuals in the colonies themselves, although this was seldom sufficient. The governor general and his staff could control access to these funds. Colonial administrators could also control job appointments, a major way Senegal's deputies distributed patronage.

Galandou Diouf needed some way to keep his fingers on the pulse of the Senegal and greater French West Africa; someone who could help him distribute what patronage was available, and keep him abreast of current events. All deputies had a manager or first lieutenant who fulfilled this function while the deputy was in France. Often, the current deputy would be voted mayor of Dakar, and then would allow his first lieutenant to fill the position while he was in France. For Diagne, Dugay Clédor was this man after Diouf's defection. After 1935, Goux was that man for Diouf. Goux sent Diouf information about colonial sanctions against functionaries and supplied names of those who had engaged in political activities when they were supposed to remain neutral.² The first lieutenant had a great deal of authority and control over the party while the deputy was away. Goux was distrusted by originaires because he was French, and he wielded his authority with a heavy and sometimes punitive hand, which further alienated Senegalese.

² ANS 17 G 369 (126).

Once Diouf was in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris he tried, almost immediately, to secure emergency assistance for Senegal. His preliminary speech also set the tone for his years as deputy; he clearly characterized himself as an independent whose main goal was to aid the people of West Africa. He envisioned himself as holding a mandate to speak for all Africans in the AOF. Diouf emphasized how he could concretely serve the métropole with his power to raise troops. Adolf Hitler had taken control of Germany in 1933; France was aware of Hitler's aggression. Diouf was offering a political bargain to the deputies; help Senegal and we will help you with our young men, willing to fight for you.

On 30 November 1934 he stood and introduced himself as the "youngest deputy in the Chamber and also the newest elected." Throughout his career Diouf had used colorful metaphors to emphasize his points, and he was not about to stop now. He exhorted the Chamber not to wait to help suffering Senegal, like a doctor who at the last moment cannot decide whether to give his patient an injection of quinine or camphor. Diouf was tired of French equivocation. He advocated passing a law that had been stalled since 20 December 1933. Diouf indicated that all of West Africa counted on the deputies. He played upon the patriotism of the Chamber and declared, "I am perhaps the sole Deputy [for this entire area], but one whose little finger can perhaps raise 400,000 men [to fight to protect France]." His remarks were met by strong applause from the center, the left and the right, but the extreme left communists ridiculed him. He met them by declaring that "I do not do politics, I employ only

'la politique du ventre' in pleading the cause of men who suffer from hunger and who ask for urgent protection."³ Diouf's friends congratulated him as he sat down.

Diouf propelled Goux into the leadership position he coveted—the mayoralty of Dakar. Galandou Diouf's party seemed in danger of splitting over Goux's leadership, as a group within the party calling themselves the "Avant-garde" actively campaigned against Goux. As it became clear their politics were discrediting Diouf, they backed off and fell into line.⁴ Louis Martin, one of Diouf's most loyal supporters, personally disliked Goux and publicly expressed his consternation about Diouf's alliance with Goux. Eventually Martin would break with Diouf. Regardless of the level of Goux's unpopularity, originaires voted for political lists as a bloc of names; Diouf was a popular and magnetic deputy and his list easily took municipal and Colonial Council elections in the early years of his deputyship.

Goux's name was on the top of Diouf's list. If voters wanted to support Diouf, they tended to vote for the entire list. Beyond Goux's personal relationship with Diouf, it is possible that Goux won the position as head of the list by giving the most money to Diouf's campaign. As mentioned in the previous chapter, during Diouf's financially lean years, he would put those who gave the most money to the Dioufist cause at the top of his political lists. Goux and Diouf could not follow the typical route of first lieutenants becoming the mayor of Dakar

³ ANS 17 G 369 (126), extrait du compte rendu analytique officiel de la chambre des députés, séance 30 Novembre 1934.

⁴ ANS 13 G 10 (1935), renseignements, 20 April 1935, 3 May 1935.

because Diouf's status as a legal resident of Dakar had been blocked years before.




Figure 8.1 [Municipal Election flyer for Dakar, 1935. ANS 20 G 91(23).]

The personal politics of Senegal sometimes determined election campaigns and loyalties. It was a complex political field, full of perceived personal betrayals and jealousies. For example, Galandou Diouf lost the support of Turbe, the President of the Chamber of Commerce of Dakar. The break came when an article appeared in *L'AOF Républicaine* in 1934, attacking Turbe. Turbe

demanded to know who had written the damaging piece. Girard, who was editing *L'AOF Républicaine*, claimed that the article had been sent to him by Alfred Goux. Turbe swore to destroy Goux politically at all costs.

When Galandou Diouf kept his promise to support Turbe during the Colonial Council elections of February 1935, Turbe refused the offer extended by Diouf's man Goux, and instead headed the dissident list. During the next round of municipal elections, Turbe campaigned actively against Diouf, and emphasized Diouf's shortcomings as a friend and his lack of intellectual fortitude and character. These attacks were reflected, occasionally, in the reports of colonial administrators. In his pique, Turbe also wrote and distributed flyers attacking Galandou Diouf and posted them around Dakar and surrounding areas.⁵

The intricate personal clashes and loyalties shaping Senegalese politics happened within a wider world that was influenced strongly by events and currents in France. Many French administrators and members of the French government were very concerned about radical organizations like the *Ligue universelle de defense de la race noire*, founded by Dahomean Marc Kojo Tovalou Hounou in 1924 and the *Comité de defense de la race nègre*, founded by Lamine Senghor. These organizations had ties to pan-African sentiments and communist ideologies, although communism seemed like less of a threat to French administrators after many pan-African leaders disassociated themselves with the Communist International over the war in Ethiopia.⁶

⁵ ANS 13 G 10 (1935), renseignements.

⁶ See Yves Person, "Le Front populaire au Senegal," 85-87.

Still, when Galandou Diouf attended a banquet in Paris held by the *Union des travailleurs nègres*, his presence was closely monitored by French authorities, who were quick to point out Diouf's sympathies towards workers in Senegal. Diouf publicly professed that he believed workers were squeezed between big business on the one side, and colonial administrators on the other.⁷ Galandou Diouf must have been influenced by the more radical persuasions of Kouyaté and his compatriots. Just a year later Léopold Sédar Senghor and several friends started the Négritude movement, which would have a much greater impact than Kouyaté and his League. Despite the limited influence of such radical organizations, the colonial regime instituted the Rollin decree of 10 April 1935 that gave governors increased censure powers in the colonies; it was strongly supported by Governor General Brévié.

Contestations over the Colonial Council

In a time of shifting colonial attitudes and increased surveillance of Africans, Galandou Diouf needed to keep his power base strong in Senegal, not just to secure his victory in the election for the deputyship in 1936, but also as a position of power from which to push his political agenda. He would often be frustrated in his major attempt to wrest more control from an administration bent upon curtailing rights of originaires. Diouf continued to campaign for the termination of the Colonial Council of Senegal and its replacement with the

⁷ ANS 13 G 10 (1935), document marked secret, "Resume de la note sur la propaganda revolutionnaire interessant les pays d'outre-mer, novembre-decembre 1934."

General Council; Diouf seemed to think he would find a sympathetic ear with the Minister of Colonies in France.

While it was quite improbable that the General Council would ever be revived, Brévié did have the Deputy Governor carry out a complete study on the Colonial Council in the spring of 1934. The action was taken in response to a letter requesting the removal of chiefs from the membership of the council sent by Mr. Videau, then Vice President of the Colonial Council. Videau had argued that the chiefs were subordinate to the administration and could not participate in the Colonial Council with a "free mind." Videau had sent his plea to the Minister of the Colonies, as well. The Governor of Senegal, Beurnier, examined the report and came to the conclusion that the Colonial Council as prescribed by the decree of 4 December 1920 was still perfectly adequate for its set mission and there was no reason at the time to amend it.⁸ This was a foregone conclusion, but the administration in Senegal could appear to be taking the Minister of Colonies' concerns seriously.

Beurnier's report revealed the colonial field within which Diouf was really operating; valorization was awarded to 'traditional' African society and forms of social control by French administrators. Beurnier reflected this trend when he expressed worry that the chiefs' constant contact with the originaires would "develop within them a spirit of systemic opposition which would be incompatible with our policies towards the natives."⁹ However, Beurnier argued, most of the chiefs had not shown such tendencies, and instead exercised good judgment. In

⁸ ANS 13 G 10 (1935).

⁹ ANS 13 G 10 (1935), letter dated 30 July 1935.

other words, they were good representatives for French interests and the Colonial Council was good for France's regime in Senegal. Not surprisingly, Brévié completely agreed with Beurnier's analysis.

This analysis ignores the real way chiefs were compromised on every level as they acted as conduits for administrators' decrees. By the 1930s the traditional chiefdom had given way to the administrative chiefdom.¹⁰ The obligations of chiefs included tax collection, administration of justice, military recruitment, and providing (forced) labor; in return chiefs won recognition as their community's representation to the colonial administration. As part of the deal, chiefs also received a higher salary, and could collect on benefits derived from their peoples' forced (*corvée*) labor. The colonial government could also act against the chiefs almost with impunity. It was completely disingenuous of the colonial administration to claim chiefs' independence. Dakar administrators imprisoned, publicly humiliated and replaced chiefs who did not meet their obligations. As James Genova has pointed out, chiefs "appeared more like sentries for the colonial state than representatives of the community."¹¹

Brévié had no intention of increasing the *originaires*' power by reinstating the General Council; nor would Boisson during his brief tenure as interim governor general in the summer of 1935 during Brévié's vacation. The French believed most *originaires* were only partially assimilated, taking on the negative characteristics of their 'traditional' past without being circumscribed by 'native'

¹⁰ Jean Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 1900–1945*, trans. Till Gottheiner (New York, 1971), 79.

¹¹ James Genova, "Conflicted Missionaries: Power and Identity in French West Africa during the 1930s," *The Historian* 66, 1 (March, 2004): 54.

controls on behavior. They were just 'French' enough to challenge colonial authorities. They could not be trusted. They were not *évolués* who had earned their position of citizenship with assimilation. Originaires had unjustly won their rights just by the happenstance of their birth.¹² One of Galandou Diouf's main goals—the re-commission of the General Council and the creation of new originaires in mixed communes—would never be realized in his lifetime. Diouf's expectations for Senegalese participation in government laid a groundwork that both Lamine Guèye and Leopold Senghor built upon. The recreation of the General Council in the 1930s would have run counter to contemporary French ideology.

By the 1930s many colonial officials believed that the "civilizing mission" as practiced by France prior to WWI had produced a dangerous class of semi-civilized Africans who threatened the power of France in Africa. Rising fears of communism and a deepening racism in the French Empire after WWI further shaped the political climate. Brévié and others like him wanted to limit the power of the urbanized elite. Brévié very clearly stated that he believed the originaires were not really qualified to lead, and he feared their influence would lead traditional chiefs to challenge French authority.

Yves Person argues that Brévié "excessively compromised" himself by supporting Galandou Diouf, and one of the reasons he was removed from his post by Blum's government was this relationship.¹³ The tenor of communications between Diouf and Brévié, and between Brévié and his staff about Diouf, make it

¹² ANS 13 G 10 (1935), letter from the Governor General of AOF to the Minister of the Colonies, 31 December 1935.

¹³ Yves Person, "Le Front Populaire au Senegal," 89.

very evident there was no “compromising” on Brévié’s part. The relationship, rather, was oppositional in many respects, with Brévié often doing little to fulfill Diouf’s requests, whether personal or political. If some of Diouf’s major projects seemed to be going forward, it was because they dovetailed with Brévié’s intentions, not because Brévié supported Diouf. Once Brévié and colonial administrators realized Diouf would be no radical in office, they communicated their relief to each other, but this did not mean a promotion of Diouf’s agenda by colonial agents. Indeed, during Brévié’s tenure Galandou Diouf’s attempts at fulfilling his campaign promises were thwarted on multiple levels several times.¹⁴

Galandou Diouf also ran into difficulty in local politics. The mayor of Dakar, Armand Angrand, a Lamine Guèye supporter, refused to register Diouf as a voter in the commune because he had not lived in the city for over six months. However, Diouf argued that he owned land in Medina and paid taxes on it. Diouf immediately informed the Governor General’s office and demanded he be added to Dakar’s roles, as his predecessor Blaise Diagne had been, because he owned land in Dakar. Brévié responded by inviting the Administrator of Dakar to “give his [Diouf’s] request the decision it requires.”¹⁵ Even with Alfred Goux’s

¹⁴ Diouf’s requests were denied occasionally due to “insufficient documentation.” Local administrators also barred Diouf’s attempts at ‘modernizing’ Senegal, such as dismissing the feasibility of establishing a fire fighting service in Dakar. Brévié would also claim he had not received Diouf’s letters until after he had made decisions. There were many other ways the colonial administration justified their decisions to ignore Diouf’s suggestions and requests. See ANS 13 G 10 (1935).

¹⁵ ANS 13 G 10 (1935), letter from Brévié to the Administrator of Dakar and Dependences, 19 March 1935.

determined lobbying to the Chief of Judicial Services, Diouf's request would be denied.¹⁶

Diouf's failures at both the local and national level to implement campaign promises or his sweeping reform program eroded Diouf's social capital. It would be incorrect, however, to assume that Diouf did not have any political influence in colonial Senegal or in the métropole. Being Deputy did come with an ability to help individual supporters. Galandou Diouf communicated relatively often with Brévié through letters, making a case for the advancement or improved position of a few men. Diouf's intercession for one of these men reveals how coercive politics could be in French West Africa.

Antoine Peres, *Surveillant Contractuel des Travaux Publics* in Côte d'Ivoire, found his contract canceled by Brévié. Peres had previously been posted to Senegal as *Chef de Cantier* in Dakar beginning in 1921, but had been sent to the Côte d'Ivoire precipitously in 1928. His sudden departure was linked to former Governor General Carde, who called Peres into his office and gave him instructions to have his workers vote for Blaise Diagne, or else suffer disciplinary

¹⁶ The interim Administrator of the Circonscription of Dakar and Dépendances was still the Mr. Martine, who Diouf had tried unsuccessfully to have dismissed right after he was elected. Martine responded to Governor General Brévié, informing him that his office had not been able to find the piece of land Galandou Diouf claimed to own in Medina. However, Mrs. Kewel N'Daw, the Muslim wife of Diouf was the owner of land located near the "quartier de l'abbatoire" in Dakar. Martine claimed this did not change Diouf's status at all, as the land was owned solely by N'Daw. Diouf, Martine pointed out, was also still registered in Rufisque in 1934, and to be able to appear on the list of the city of Dakar, a certificate of annulment from Rufisque was needed and it was not presented to the commission. Diouf hired a lawyer, Mr. Lavie, but it was for naught. Women could hold land in their own name, it seems, but they could not vote or hold office. ANS 13 G 10 (1935), letter from Louis Martine, Interim Administrator of Dakar to the Governor General of the AOF, 27 March 1935.

measures. Mr. Peres, however, “conscious of his duty as a French man,” refused to be pressured into such a decision.

Diouf’s ability to maintain his position as deputy depended, in part, on being able to act as a patron for his friends and allies. Diouf indicated to Brévié that he and Peres had served together in the trenches.¹⁷ For Diouf, the bond between war veterans was the ultimate obligation, and he expected these associations to carry the same weight with colonial Administrators and with other members of the Chamber of Deputies. For Diouf, it was the preeminent weapon in his arsenal of personal influence. In this instance, it worked and Peres received favor from the administration.¹⁸

Diouf did not abandon his program just because he ran into difficulties with the colonial administration. Diouf pushed Brévié to work with him on a program to provide jobs for the unemployed in Dakar and Bargny. As Diouf pointed out to the Governor General, “for contrary to what goes on in France, we have neither social insurance nor unemployment funds.”¹⁹ Diouf also lobbied hard for roads to be built in Dakar, and he personally met with French ministers to request 500,000 francs of credit for the construction of the Thiès road. Diouf successfully petitioned the governor on behalf of the people; asking, for example, for a three minute passenger train stop in Bargny.

These examples demonstrate how Diouf sought to uphold his popularity and reputation as a man of the people; he represented ‘ordinary’ Senegalese.

¹⁷ ANS 13 G 10 (1935), letter from Galandou Diouf, Deputy to the Governor General, 11 January 1935.

¹⁸ See ANS 13 G 10 (1935), letter from Diouf to the Governor General, 9 March 1935.

¹⁹ ANS 13 G 10 (1935), letter to the Governor General from Galandou Diouf, 2 March 1935.

Many in the Protectorate, however, complained of Diouf's indifference to their requests, and accused him of favoritism for the communes; Diouf set about to rectify the situation. Diouf's attempt at meeting the needs of those in the Protectorate, and having the support of important brotherhood figures such as Cheikh Anta in the Protectorate, prefigured the future distinctions between Lamine Guèye and Léopold Senghor. Years before Senghor ran a successful campaign against Lamine Guèye by appealing to the interests of those in the Protectorate, Diouf was doing the same.

Following a familiar pattern in Senegalese politics, Guèye brought Senghor into the PSS as his protégé. Senghor resigned from the PSS in 1948, and created a new party, the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (BDS). Senghor chose Thiès, one of Diouf's former strongholds, as the location of the BDS's inaugural congress on 15-17 April 1949. Senghor would lose to Guèye in the 1951 parliamentary elections, again following a familiar pattern. The support of Muslim brotherhoods in the Protectorate was a major component of Senghor's ultimate success over Guèye. The Muslim brotherhoods continued to be crucial to Senghor's continued status in Senegal, particularly against the challenge by Mamdou Dia, his first lieutenant.²⁰

²⁰ For this era of Senegalese politics, see Janet Vaillant, *Black, French and African*; Lucy Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970); Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa*.




Figure 8.2 [Deputy Galandou Diouf, ANS.]

The Municipal Elections of 1935 and the Deputyship Election of 1936

A new political alignment in Senegal was first reflected in the municipal elections of 5 May 1935. Amadou Assane N'Doye became a partisan of Lamine Guèye, and ran the second to Armand Angrand's list for Dakar. Losing N'Doye was a large loss to Diouf. Both Angrand and N'Doye were Guèye supporters, but Guèye did not run in the municipal elections. Angrand and N'Doye, and other Guèye supporters throughout the communes ran under the banner of the *Union pour la Défense des Intérêts Economiques et Sociaux de la Ville de Dakar*. On some propaganda pieces, Angrand printed after his name, President of the Directing Committee of the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais, so clearly Guèye's party was operating.

Angrand campaigned heavily against Alfred Goux, his direct competition. On his official platform, Angrand called for voters to elect him against the "dictatorship of Alfred Goux," who was a demagogue and a liar who made false promises.²¹ Angrand and Guèye had flyers drawn up specifically criticizing Goux, and flyers addressed to the "Youth." On a flyer Angrand described how Diouf had unsuccessfully attempted to secure Dr. Sibenaler's patronage away from Guèye by offering Sibenaler the Colonial Council seat at Ziguinchor. Sibenaler turned him down. This incident may not have happened; it may have been pure propaganda, however, it does indicate that Diouf probably deployed such tactics to reduce Guèye's base. 'Stealing' supporters was quite common in

²¹ See ANS 20 G 91 (23), elections municipals, 1935, all flyers and notices described above are contained in this file.

the colonial politics of Senegal; the archives are full of such incidents in colonial reports.

The second on Diouf's Dakar list, after Goux, was Valmy Lavie, who was a general agent for the Bordeaux Teisseire House. This prompted accusations from the opposition that Diouf had been co-opted by the Bordeaux interests, and that Lavie must be against *originaires* by virtue of his position. Goux's and Diouf's propaganda had a very different tone from Guèye's. Not many names were mentioned, but Diouf's accomplishments, and his promises, were enumerated. In meetings, however, Diouf's partisans accused Angrand of being nothing but a "marionette in the hands of Graziani."²² Graziani was a representative for a Bordeaux merchant, and the accusation was the same as the one leveled at Diouf—appropriation by the Bordeaux interests.

Diouf realized he needed to be on the ground in Senegal in the weeks before the election. He arrived in Senegal on the steamer *Anfa* on 11 April. He was met by a grand reception from his supporters. It seems he toyed with removing Alfred Goux off of his list, after a variety of supporters complained about how Goux treated them. For example, Baba Diop, described by colonial officials as a "militant" and active Dioufist, became involved in an altercation with Goux, and he told everyone in Dakar who would listen that Goux was a "pirate." Whether out of sheer stubbornness or deep loyalty, Diouf allowed Goux to keep his place in the organization. In spite of this, Diouf's presence in Senegal and his popularity secured Goux's win. The Dioufist list won every municipal election.

²² ANS 20 G 91 (23), elections municipals, 1935.

Two weeks after the election, El Hadj Amadou Fall, on behalf of Galandou Diouf, went to the residence of Lamine Guèye. He was sent in order to see if Guèye would cooperate with Diouf. Guèye told Fall that Galandou was “my parent.” Guèye claimed he wanted an accord with Diouf, but that Diouf was “inexplicably” hostile towards him. Guèye recalled how, right after he had reconciled with Diagne in 1927, he had “extended his hand” toward Diouf and Diouf had refused to take it.²³ Guèye indicated he might retake his post in La Réunion, and would like to reconcile with Diouf, but not as long as Diouf retained Goux. If Diouf would give up Goux, then Guèye would ask Diouf the next day, “Do you want me to retake my post or do you want me to work with you?”²⁴ Goux was not dropped; Diouf and Guèye were not reconciled. It seems unlikely that Guèye would have reconciled with Diouf, regardless of Diouf’s course of action. But Diouf’s failure to drop Goux was a mistake; it cost him supporters and symbolic capital.

A month after the failed municipal elections, Guèye held a meeting of the PSS, in which he launched his campaign for the 1936 deputy elections. Guèye claimed his decision was compelled by Diouf’s incapacity as deputy. Guèye called for the formation of a “bloc sénégalais,” to bar the way to “demagogues and pirates.”²⁵ The main thrust of Guèye’s speech revolved around how his party was egalitarian, and would benefit everyone in Senegal, “Africans as Europeans.” Guèye’s PSS would continue to build strength in the months ahead.

²³ ANS 20 G 10 (1), renseignements.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ ANS 20 G 10 (1), compte rendu, 30 June 1935. Does that sound familiar? It should; Senghor’s party was the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.

Galandou Diouf returned to Paris on 25 June 1935. A colonial informant remarked upon the number of notable originaires who had not attended Diouf's departure; the knowledge swept through Dakar. Originaires discussed how Diouf "made plenty of promises but kept none of them."²⁶ Diouf's symbolic capital ebbed as his discontented and disappointed constituency complained about his ineffectiveness as deputy.

During December 1935, Diouf returned to Senegal and toured the country ahead of the 1936 deputy election, trying to quell any dissatisfaction. Diouf spent more time as deputy campaigning and visiting in Senegal than Blaise Diagne had. Diouf maintained many of his social connections in Rufisque, where at least one of his wives, and several of his children, lived. Diouf only later took his youngest and third wife to France with him.²⁷ This was in direct contrast to Blaise Diagne, who had a French wife, and whose children went to primary school in France. Diouf was respected throughout his career for being accessible to all his constituents when in Senegal. He had always built part of his symbolic capital on being the 'accessible candidate.' Diouf also maintained the respect of many Africans for his fidelity to Senegalese traditions and values—including his Muslim religion.

Diouf heard many accounts of penury and hardship in the Protectorate, and from the urban poor in the communes. The period from 1934-37 were growth years for the general colonial economy, but indigenous producers never

²⁶ ANS 20 G 10 (1), renseignements.

²⁷ Purportedly, Diouf's young wife caused quite a stir in Paris. She was photographed in her traditional Senegalese dress, and her image was in the newspapers. Her dress was widely copied, and even "exercised a subtle influence upon the Parisian salons." Johnson, "The Impact of the Senegalese Elite," 169.

recovered from the Depression. The upswing in the economy mostly benefited large commercial houses; while many Africans worked harder than ever, their standard of living continued to fall. Local administrators exploited African labor and raised taxes in order to meet métropole pressures for increased productivity and development. This forced farmers to use more land for export production and less for food cultivation. Food reserves were eroded, and famines, chronic undernourishment and ill health became prevalent. This was one of the reasons the colonial government had organized Africans into the *Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance*. The famines, however, were not due to native mismanagement, but from colonial policies. The SIPs required Africans to cultivate certain products and sell them at a deflated price. The Bordeaux houses and the administration reaped the profits.²⁸

This reality and how it affected Africans helped shape the 1936 election. Galandou Diouf had long been the candidate billed as a fellow farmer, who understood such issues. He had retained the support of wealthy patrons from the Murid brotherhood since Cheikh Anta's return from exile in 1934, which Diouf had been instrumental in obtaining. Diouf's standing with the brotherhood was aided by his campaign to reform the SIPs. Many of his campaign rallies reflected this agenda, and he spoke to the concerns of small businessmen and producers in the peanut industry.²⁹

²⁸ Mann and Guyer, "Imposing a Guide on the Indigène," and Gary Wilder, "The Politics of Failure: Historicizing Popular Front Colonial Policy in French West Africa," in *French Colonial Empire and the Popular Front: Hope and Disillusion*, ed. Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1999), 48-49.

²⁹ ANS 13 G 10.

Much of Diouf's 1936 platform reflected his program from 1934. Diouf's limited success in implementing many of his reforms hurt his symbolic capital with young voters from the communes, particularly Saint-Louis. The colonial government had frozen hires from originaires in the communes, and many young, educated Africans were unemployed and angry. They believed Lamine Guèye could improve their fortunes.

Lamine Guèye redeployed many of his same platform points as well, but under the banner of a new party he had created in 1934 called the *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais*. The PSS sought to become the mouthpiece for the young and the working class in Senegal. Guèye formulated his proposals and disseminated his propaganda in his paper *Clartés*. The subheading for *Clartés* was "organ of social and economic renewal for the protection of white and black workers of Senegal."³⁰

From the beginning of 1936, the Popular Front had begun organizing committees in Dakar and Saint-Louis, as well as in most of the other urbanizing centers of Senegal, in order to aid the candidacy of Lamine Guèye. Members of the SFIO (French Socialist Party), the communist party and the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, all of which were a part of the Popular Front, rallied around Lamine Guèye as a candidate for the deputyship. But the character of Guèye's coalition alienated many former Diagnists who had previously supported Gueye. On 21 February 1936, the director of the *Parti Républicain Socialiste Indépendant* decided to replace Dugay Clédor, who was seriously ill, with a partisan of Galandou Diouf, Aby Kane Diallo. Diallo had won the mayoralty of Saint-Louis

³⁰ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique*, 142.

running as the head of Diouf's party during the municipal elections of 1935. If Guèye lost partisans, however, so did Diouf. Significantly, Louis Martin left Diouf's party and became a supporter of Lamine Guèye. Louis Martin carried a good deal of weight and symbolic capital in the métis community; Diouf's symbolic capital shrank among that part of his constituency.



Figure 8.3 [Aby Kane Diallo, public domain.]

Despite the switches in allegiance, Lamine Guèye and Galandou Diouf presented programs that were nearly identical: reestablishment of the General Council, adding new communes, protection of those engaged in the peanut economy, building roads and other infrastructure. One of the few ways Guèye differed from Diouf was in calling for the freedom to create labor unions in Senegal. Guèye campaigned in Rufisque, visiting functionaries, merchants and

employees. Diouf, on the other hand, made contact with notables and religious chiefs. By this time Diouf was the mayor of Rufisque, and had his lieutenants placed as mayors in Saint-Louis (Aby Kane Diallo) and Dakar (Alfred Goux). Diouf looked more like the establishment candidate.

The administration, by many accounts, was not thrilled with either candidate, and mostly stayed out of the campaigns and elections. No overt administrative coercion was recorded in the colonial archives nor in contemporary papers; this was a clear departure from the 1928 campaign. Lamine Guèye was concerned with electoral fraud and he created groups of young men who were supposed to protect the PSS at rallies. These young men often served as agitators, however, against Dioufist supporters and violent confrontations broke out in Rufisque, Saint-Louis, and in the Medina of Dakar.

The vote occurred on 26 April 1936. Diouf won with a convincing 8,323 votes to Lamine Guèye's 5,288. There were accusations of fraud by Guèye's supporters against the Dioufist mayors of Dakar and Saint-Louis. The colonial administration, as with Diagne's elections, refused to engage the issue. The basis of the fraud charge stemmed from 1,000 voters who had presumably been illegally added to the electoral list of Dakar after 4 February 1936. Dead people and those who were out of the country cast their votes; this type of fraud was widespread and relatively endemic to Senegalese politics under French colonial rule.

As in 1928, the election results were officially challenged by the losing party. This time, of course, Galandou Diouf was on the other side. The

committees of the Popular Front brought Dakarois and Saint-Louisiennes into the *cour d'assises*. The administration decided to delete invalid voters from the roles; 2,874 out of 8,849 in Dakar, 1,034 out of 4,032 in Saint-Louis, but only 5 from Rufisque, due in part to Diouf's influence and opposition to the motion. The National Assembly in France merely validated Diouf's re-election.

It looked as though Guèye's attempts at overturning the election were over, but on the 5 May 1936, the Popular Front triumphed in France. There was hope among Guèye's supporters that Léon Blum's administration would reverse Diouf's validation.³¹ But this was not to be, even with the appointment of a new Minister of Colonies, the socialist Marius Moutet. From the beginning, Moutet supported Guèye; the two men shared political support from the Popular Front. Moutet even came to Senegal and campaigned for Lamine Guèye, a surprising event for many Senegalese, who were not often visited by the Minister of Colonies. Some historians have emphasized the fraudulent nature of the 1936 election, basing their claims upon Guèye's.

For example, Yves Person, in his sympathetic portrayal of Lamine Guèye and the Popular Front government in Senegal, writes that "It was regrettable that Diouf was validated because, had electoral fraud been eliminated, Guèye would have, without doubt, been elected."³² Person provides no compelling evidence, yet he accuses Diouf's party of being "without doctrine and without principle."³³ This sweeping condemnation seems to have little basis in fact. Person's

³² Person, "The Front populaire au Senegal," 95. James Genova reiterates Person's position. See Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence*, 159.

³³ Person, 95.

analysis ignores the broad foundation upon which Galandou Diouf built his symbolic capital; Guèye had not yet been able to unmoor Diouf from that base. Guèye was perceived by the Senegalese as overly “French” and overly supportive of France’s mission and administration; Moutet’s campaign tour may have actually hurt Guèye instead of helped him.

Most historians who have written about this era portray Diouf as a compromised collaborator with the colonial administration.³⁴ While Diouf understood the constraints of the colonial field, and attempted to cooperate with the administration, he was usually operating in opposition. Diouf utilized republican rhetoric as a tool, knowing when to employ it as a discourse, but this does not mean he completely internalized the ideology. The discourse Diouf employed should be distinguished from the narrative of his life.

Diouf was initially excited about the change of government in France that brought Marius Moutet in as the Minister of Colonies and Marcel Jules de Coppet in as governor general. Moutet seemed to reflect Diouf’s own agenda when he announced that he desired to improve the lives of the people of West Africa. Both men wanted to prevent hunger and starvation and to protect Africans from labor exploitation.³⁵ Moutet announced his wish to apply “the great principle of brotherhood and equality” in Senegal. Moutet claimed his colonial program would follow the “road toward political emancipation,” and would include the

³⁴ See Person, “The Front populaire au Senegal,” Johnson, “The Impact of the Senegalese Elite,” Zuccarelli, *La vie politique*.

³⁵ Robert Delavignette, *Les vrais chefs de l’empire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1939), translated as *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*, (London: Frank Cass, 1969.)

dismantling of the *indigénat* system and the establishment of a council to encourage participation in local Protectorate politics.

Diouf was not the only one who hoped for change. There was a sense of excitement in Dakar, which prompted parades and rallies. There was a review of troops on the Boulevard Maritime at 8 o'clock in the morning. An hour later 3,000 people assembled on the *terrain de Tound* to listen to short speeches from Popular Front leaders. This was followed by a parade; about forty Europeans led the march around Dakar's main roads, followed by about 2500 Africans. Two balls were given that evening, one at the Town Hall and the other on the "*terre-plein du môle III*." The latter, organized by the Popular Front, was attended by 200 to 600 persons.³⁶



Figure 8.4 [Popular Front rally in Dakar, 14 July 1936, ANS 3 G 9 (11). Music was played from the vehicle, la "Marseillaise" alternated with "l'Internationale." ANS 3 G 2 (132), renseignements, Dakar, 15 July 1936.]

³⁶ ANS 3 G 2 (132), Dakar diverse 1929-1937, letter from the Administrator of the Circonscription of Dakar to the Governor General, 15 July 1936.




Figure 8.5 [Popular Front rally on the terrain of Tound, Dakar, 14 July 1936, ANS 3 G 9 (2).]



Figure 8.6 [The crowd marches with signs in Dakar, 14 July 1936, ANS 3 G 9 (3). The signs had a variety of inscriptions, including "Down with War!" "Down with Fascism!" "We want to live under the same laws as those in France!" "Less taxes!" "Milk for our children!" "Bread, work, freedom!" ANS 3 G 2 (132), renseignements, Dakar, 15 July, 1936.]

The optimism appeared founded; de Coppet seemed like a progressive governor general. He spoke about African rights like no French man of such rank before him. Although he promised to alleviate Senegal's fiscal problems, develop production, and extend education, none of this was particularly new or striking. However, he was the first Governor General to invite African students to the colonial palace for a luncheon. De Coppet was the first to officially have the colonial administration observe several Muslim holidays.³⁷ Moutet was also aware of de Coppet's colonial record when he appointed him as governor general of French West Africa. De Coppet had successively split the nationalist movement as Governor of Dahomey from 1933-4, by parlaying with moderate, French-speaking nationalists with whom he felt he could cooperate. This strategy helped shape French policy in dealing with African political activity throughout the AOF.³⁸ De Coppet continued the policy by preferring Lamine Guèye over Galandou Diouf.

Galandou Diouf, however, wasted no time representing himself as the spokesman for Senegalese people, addressing the Minister of Colonies in a letter written 20 October 1936, as a "Dear Friend." In this letter Diouf enumerated the desires of the Senegalese people, and presented "most of their grievances."³⁹ The six claims dealt with the Colonial Council, the communes, the *Office du Conditionnement des arachides*, the local cadres, indigenous justice, and the

³⁷ Ghislaine Lydon, "The Unraveling of a Neglected Source: A Report on Women in Francophone West Africa in the 1930s," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 37, 147 (1997): 560.

³⁸ Chafer, *The End of Empire*, 32.

³⁹ ANS 17 G 369 (126), letter from Galandou Diouf to Marius Moutet, Minister of Colonies, 20 October 1936.

Government of Senegal. Diouf presented another sweeping reform program; he probably believed the new administration would be more open to his ideas.

Not surprisingly, Diouf yet again called for an immediate reinstatement of the General Council and an end to the Colonial Council. His argument about the Colonial Council had not changed much; even though only sixteen chiefs out of forty were on the Council, out of the remaining twenty-four members, most were Europeans who often left Senegal for health reasons. Consequently, Diouf argued, the chiefs were often a majority faction, especially since they voted as a bloc and followed the directives of the colonial Administration.⁴⁰

Diouf argued Dakar, Rufisque and Saint-Louis had proven “perfectly capable of managing the communal heritage,” and as such was it not “outrageous that the cities could vote appropriations on public works, road systems, schools, police and sanitation, without having a say in the use of said appropriations?” Diouf argued, “If, after three hundred years of occupation, France is unable to form elements capable of managing the interests of the country, then one must admit that French colonization has gone bankrupt; if, after all this experience, the municipal franchise [of the communes] is reduced.... Knowing your liberalism, Mr. Minister and dear Friend, I am certain that you would want to repair the unjust measures of which my Compatriots are victims...”⁴¹ The tone of the letter was striking and forceful. Diouf’s subtext insinuated that the Senegalese would cease to support the French government if change did not occur.

⁴⁰ ANS 17 G 369(126), letter from Diouf to Moutet, October 1936.

⁴¹ Ibid.

Diouf very specifically pointed out the injustices carried out by French government programs. The *Office du Conditionnement* was responsible for guaranteeing the quality of peanuts and seed. However, employees of large firms were judge and jury of the office. The officers were not free to note problems coming from the firm that employed them. Diouf accused the Office of other frauds and impropriety. In another matter, Diouf pointed out the “agonizing” injustice of family taxes made by the *cadres locaux*. “If,” Diouf wrote in an indignant tone, “you consider the suffering the population has endured during the entire crisis without ever receiving any help from the Administration, don’t you think it is admirable that there has not been any trouble raised against administrative authority? Does this inferior level of life experienced by these people dignify the mission that France assumed?”⁴² Diouf publicly held Moutet responsible for ameliorating the situation.

Diouf appealed to the governor’s *sentiments d’humanité* when he argued for reform of the *indigénat*. Diouf pointed out that although he was not an eminent lawyer like the governor, even he could see the modification of the laws was in order. This comment was also a dig at Moutet’s relationship with Guèye; it was Diouf’s way of letting Moutet know that his inferior level education to Guèye’s did not disqualify his recommendations or concerns. Diouf also re-asserted his role as Deputy; Guèye was not the representative for Senegalese. Diouf was.

Diouf ended the letter on a dark note. He warned the governor that if his recommendations were not considered, then the Senegalese people would not

⁴² ANS 17 G 369 (126), letter from Galandou Diouf to Marius Moutet, 20 October 1936.

see the Minister's "loyal collaboration," and that it would hurt Diouf's prestige as Deputy. The danger to the French government would then be Diouf's inability to control the discontents of the population, which might lead to an upsurge of anti-colonial radical action. Diouf's bold and aggressive stand received a polite acknowledgement, and not much more. The deputy was, more or less, dismissed. Diouf must have felt it in the official, stilted, sanctimonious reply he received. There were no ensuing invitations to Diouf to work towards a solution. Instead, Diouf would be publicly excluded from the governor's conference while Lamine Guèye was invited.⁴³

Guèye's defection was costly to Diouf, and Diouf's inability or refusal to cooperate with Guèye was a political mistake. Diouf lost support in Senegal to Guèye, as Guèye revitalized segments of Senegal's population that felt Diouf had not fulfilled his promises. Diouf's position was hurt in the métropole; the clearest indication was the defection of the League's leadership and Moutet's refusal to constructively work with Diouf. Diouf realized how his symbolic capital was damaged, as he wrote to his son Mohamed Papa Diouf, "The internecine conflict

⁴³ In November 1936 Leon Blum and Marius Moutet called a conference with governors general in order to work on France's imperial mission. The conference established a committee for the study of "native customs" in French West Africa. The committee included leading French ethnographers such as Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and Henri Labouret as well as important members of the overseas French administration like Robert Delavignette and Charton. Tellingly, Moutet's friend Lamine Guèye was also invited for membership in the committee, even though the emphasis was on North Africa and Indochina. In a painful bureaucratic process, the committee took six months to draw up a questionnaire, and then proceeded to become stalled; it, and its project, was scrapped. W. B. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front," *French Historical Studies* 7, 3 (1972): 371.

is only a denial, an admission of impotence, a renunciation of our capacity for self-government.”⁴⁴

The erosion of Diouf's social capital had many causes, some of which were inevitable for a politician. When Diouf, who built part of his symbolic capital on being anti-establishment, became a part of the system, his symbolic capital eroded. Diouf tried to maintain his anti-establishment reputation; he was only partially successful. The oppressive economy made people's lives more difficult, and Diouf was blamed for circumstances outside of his control. Moutet and de Coppet had good reasons for blocking Diouf's agenda and reforms; they supported Lamine Guèye. This concerted effort of Guèye and the administration also hurt Diouf's symbolic capital, as did Diouf's decision to keep Goux. Certainly Guèye was an intelligent candidate, and tried to exploit every weakness of Diouf's he could.

Galandou Diouf fought to maintain his position in colonial Senegal. During 1937, the originaire population of Saint-Louis had thrice voted for members of Guèye's list to be placed on the Municipal Council. Each time the results were contested by Diouf's party. Diouf was present in Saint-Louis during the municipal election, and Louis Martin's *Périscopie Africain* reported,

Galandou, booed by the crowd, was obliged to seek refuge in a friend's house where he stayed confined all day and only left at nightfall, taking the road to Dakar. The Mayor, Aby Kane Diallo, in order to escape the crowd's jeers, followed him in an ambulance.⁴⁵

Diouf and his partisans were convinced that the colonial government's favoritism towards Guèye and his supporters was responsible for Dioufism's decline.

⁴⁴ Zuccarelli, *La vie politique*, 144.

⁴⁵ *Périscopie Africain*, no. 368, 6 March 1937.

Diouf went to de Coppet to protest the government's interference in the election. De Coppet handled the fraud charges as the colonial government usually did; Diouf's protests were ignored. Aby Kane Diallo wrote to Diouf, "After everything that has happened, we can no longer count on M. Moutet to whom you have denounced the ongoing trickery... From experience, my dear friend, you know better than I that this time those who remained silent deserted their own cause. We listen. M. de Coppet is working to ruin the Party."⁴⁶ Diouf's hopes that Moutet would still work with him on his reform program were dashed.

Diouf's party lost the municipal elections in Saint-Louis in 1937; this was an ominous indication for the future. Paul Vidal, from the SFIO list, had defeated Dioufist Aby Kane Diallo 1526 votes to 862 votes.⁴⁷ Members of Guèye's party believed this was the first step towards usurping the power of the Dioufist party. As stated in *Périscopie Africain*, "Paul Vidal was elected mayor. After the city of Saint-Louis, the Colonial Council. Whose turn is it next? Dakar? Rufisque? The days of Dioufism are numbered."⁴⁸ Diouf's party also lost seats on the Colonial Council during the 27 June 1937 elections.⁴⁹

Galandou Diouf tried to bolster his symbolic capital by lobbying for citizenship rights of African WWI veterans. During a meeting of the *Groupe Parlementaire de l'AOF* in Paris on 17 October 1937, Diouf gave a speech in

⁴⁶ ANS 13 G 10, letter from Aby Kane Diallo to Galandou Diouf, 10 July 1937.

⁴⁷ Diouf had broken his ties with the SFIO years before; Lamine Guèye became their candidate. After his defeat in the 1936 deputy election, Guèye joined his PSS more firmly with the SFIO and began to call his party the SFIO, seeking to profit from the SFIO's popularity in France and among colonial administrators. This process argues against the claim that Guèye created the first Senegalese political party in the 1930s.

⁴⁸ *Périscopie Africain*, no. 378, 24 Juillet 1937.

⁴⁹ ANS 20 G 93, 20 G 96 and 20 G 97.

which he re-requested a fulfillment of promises made to the *anciens combattants*.⁵⁰ Throughout his career Diouf had campaigned for his fellow war veterans, out of shared sentiment and for political purposes. Diouf deployed his best rhetoric in his proposal, arguing for a “law that would recognize [war veterans] as French citizens, which would be a just homage to the sacrifices they made for the defense of our shared fatherland (*patrie*).”⁵¹ This law would grant citizenship automatically to African veterans who had served France in World War I.

The veterans would be colonial citizens, like *originaires*. Diouf argued that religious identity was irrelevant to French citizenship, in the same way that a Frenchman’s identity as a Protestant, Catholic, or “Israelite” was irrelevant. Diouf used himself as an example, directly challenging colonial convention when he asked, “[A]m I not a French citizen and a Muslim and between these two categories, to which I am equally attached, is there the slightest incompatibility?”⁵² If Diouf had been successful in pushing this proposal into law, it would have marked a significant shift in colonial policy. Diouf’s law would have allowed “colonial subjects” all over West and Equatorial Africa to become full French citizens regardless of religion, social status, level of education, or

⁵⁰ANS 18 G 151 (108), discourse of Galandou Diouf.

⁵¹ANS 18 G 151 (108), discourse of Galandou Diouf; see also report to the Governor General dated 22 December 1937. See ANS 23 G 9 (17) for further information about the proposed law.

⁵²ANS 23 G 9, proposition of law.

matriculation into French culture. His proposals received press in a variety of colonial newspapers.⁵³

The current French administration perceived plenty of incompatibility with Diouf's bid. The French Director of Political and Administrative Affairs was incensed by the proposition. Indeed, he argued the citizenship of the originaires was a dangerous and provocative anomaly.⁵⁴ Serving in French trenches was not enough sacrifice to win French citizenship, the colonial administrators argued; citizenship should be bestowed upon "*indigènes évolués*" only. Governor General de Coppet also provided a response to Diouf's rhetorical question. He argued that "for primitive or Islamic peoples, traditional laws and customs, concerning the organization of the family, polygamous marriage, divorce, successions etc., are closely tied to religious beliefs. As a result, for the native, the renunciation of his [customary civil] status is practically equivalent to abjuring his religious concepts."⁵⁵ De Coppet was persuaded that traditional culture was incompatible with citizenship. Although Diouf would not achieve his goals of offering war veterans French citizenry, he continued to work actively for their interests.⁵⁶

Diouf's anger towards de Coppet's lack of cooperation with him (and the governor general's sympathy towards Guèye) sometimes spilled over into official

⁵³ See Galandou Diouf, "Les Anciens Combattants sénégalais et le droit de cité," *La Presse Coloniale*, 23 February 1938; *Les Annales Coloniales*, 6 December 1937, many others located in 23 G 9 (17).

⁵⁴ ANS 18 G 131 (108), Report.

⁵⁵ Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 133.

⁵⁶ ANS 13 G 10 (1939), letter from Galandou Diouf to Governor General of AOF, Cayla, 24 July 1939. During the summer of 1939, Diouf wrote the Governor General of the AOF, Cayla, indicating that the *Comité saint-louisien des Anciens Combattants* had still not received the benefits de Coppet had promised them.

communications. Diouf had argued before, in official communiqués with de Coppet, that if the administration refused to remain neutral in Senegalese politics, that violence and instability could occur between groups in Senegal, similar to what had happened in Algeria.⁵⁷ In the spring of 1938, Diouf accused Mr. Borrel, governor of the Circonscription of Dakar et Dépendances, of being “unfriendly” towards Diouf’s party. The only reason Diouf had not protested before was not “from weakness, nor from naïveté, but rather from love of peace.”⁵⁸ Promoting peace was a common theme in Senegalese political rhetoric; both Diouf and Guèye linked peace with prosperity in their discourses. Borrel had failed to include important leaders of the Dioufist party in official ceremonies; and Diouf angrily wrote, “You well know, Mr. Governor, the valor of certain gestures in this country where a policy of prestige has been instituted... I will not tolerate much longer, Mr. Governor, that you have ignored the power of my party.”⁵⁹

Diouf believed that when he or his party was disrespected, he suffered a concurrent loss of symbolic capital and prestige with his constituency. As a matter of course he took such incidents seriously. For example, on 21 August 1938, Galandou Diouf and several members of his personal entourage were travelling through Louga on the train, with a special compartment car attached for Diouf. They stopped at the station in Louga that afternoon, and several dignitaries came out to meet Galandou Diouf, including the Commandant of the Circle, Captain Hippolyte and Mr. Guernion, the Chief of the *Service Spécial de*

⁵⁷ See ANS 17 G 369 (126).

⁵⁸ ANS 17 G 369 (126), letter from Galandou Diouf to Governor Borrel, 16 April 1938.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Police et de Sûreté au Sénégal. Guernion had agents there, but arranged security to be “flexible enough to allow electors and supporters to welcome the Deputy.”⁶⁰ After initial greetings, Diouf walked with Mr. Lamotte, the Chief of the station, to his office, where he also met with Momar Gaye, the president of the local branch of his party. As Galandou Diouf was walking back to his car, an “incident” occurred.⁶¹

Abdoulaye Camara, the *comptable des Trésoreries* of Louga, attempted to approach Galandou Diouf as he was walking towards his railway car. In a loud voice, Camara cried out something along the lines of, “What about the promise of the loan?” François Salzmänn, who had become a partisan of Diouf’s, was following Diouf, and heard Camara cry out; it is unclear whether Diouf heard him or not, according to witnesses. Diouf did not respond to Camara. After this Salzmänn told Camara that if he had questions for Diouf, he needed to send them in writing in order to receive a response; “il ne faut pas poser des questions verbales de Député.”⁶² Hyacinthe N’Dir, who was close to Camara, told Camara “You’d better shut your mouth,” whereupon Camara attempted to seize an umbrella from N’Dir and use it against him. Salzmänn approached the scene, and an “altercation” ensued between Salzmänn and Camara.

“Offensive language” was exchanged between the two, rapidly turning from French to Wolof. Salzmänn, according to several witnesses, then grabbed

⁶⁰ ANS 13 G 10 (1938), letter from Le Commissaire de Police de la ville de Louga to the Administrateur Commandant le Cercle de Louga, 2 Septembre 1938. Confidentiel.

⁶¹ There were several witnesses, whose statements were recorded by the local police. The police, however, tried to make sure to take statements from Diouf’s supporters as well as others in order to maintain “strict neutrality” in the investigation.

⁶² ANS 13 G 10 (1938), letter from the Administrateur-Adjoint des Colonies, Commandant of the Cercle of Louga to The Gouverneur du Senegal, 16 Septembre 1938.

Camara by the sleeves of his boubou and pulled him closer. Mayoro Diop, an employee for the *Maison peyrissac* in Louga, told authorities he took Salzmänn by the hand and said, "Mr. Salzmänn, someone like you should not fight about such things." Salzmänn answered, "Quand même, let go of my hand."⁶³ People rushed to separate Salzmänn and Camara, Africans and police agents. At the end, witnesses saw Salzmänn with a crop or whip in his left hand; he may have struck Camara once.⁶⁴ As Salzmänn approached Diouf's railway car he was overheard saying, "This problem has been corrected."

In the opinion of Hervouin, the commander of Louga, Abdoulaye Camara "committed a blunder that could have seriously disturbed the public order." Camara's attitude "was not one an official should adopt in such circumstances."⁶⁵ Hervouin had already pointed out these things to Camara, who was informed that he had also invited sanctions by higher authorities.

Galandou Diouf wrote a letter to Lefebvre, the Governor of Senegal, demanding an official inquiry into the incident. According to Diouf, he had heard Camara make several disrespectful remarks, accompanied by some choice adjectives. Diouf found this very insulting, given his "age first of all, and my social situation above all."⁶⁶ Despite the social gaff, Diouf ignored him, for he was

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Most witnesses did not see a blow from the crop, but according to Hyacinthe N'Dir, who was in the midst of the argument, and one of the instigators, really, describes how Salzmänn landed a blow. Camara, himself, also claimed he was hit by Salzmänn. ANS 13 G 10 (1938), letter from the Commissaire de Police de la ville de Louga to the Commandant le cercle de Louga, dated 2 September 1938.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ ANS 13 G 10 (1938), letter from Galandou Diouf to the Governor of Senegal, 22 August 1938.

busy with “meeting local notables and authorities,” but people from his entourage had not remained indifferent, particularly François Baye Salzmänn.

Diouf got to the point, “The attitude of this functionary, who, in an open forum, in the presence of the *Commandant de cercle* and other authorities of the area, derided an official personality, causes me to ask if he was not encouraged in a premeditated provocation by certain superiors.”⁶⁷ After all, Diouf pointed out, the incident occurred not far from the head of the Treasury, Abdoulaye N'Diaye, who attentively watched the actions and gestures of Camara. The tone of the letter was clearly indignant. Diouf wanted Camara punished; he had broken traditional social rules concerning how elders and betters should be treated. Diouf was certain this was a symptom of a wider conspiracy against him. Diouf requested a formal inquiry in order to judge what sanctions should be placed on Camara. After all, if the remarks had been made towards the Governor of Senegal or the Governor General of the AOF, sanctions would have been enacted swiftly.

But no further sanctions would be forthcoming. Lefebvre, Governor of Senegal, after perusing the reports from the *Commandant de cercle* and from the Commissaire of Police, came to the conclusion that Camara had “not, in fact, breached the rules of strict neutrality imposed on officials in electoral matters.” Camara, according to Lefebvre, was “until today the subject of high praise in notes from his superiors.”⁶⁸ Lefebvre could not find a grievous insult to Diouf in the incident, and thus came to the conclusion that there was no need to sanction

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ ANS 13 G 10 (1938), confidential letter from the Governor of Senegal to the Governor General of the AOF, 22 September 1938.

Camara. De Coppet sent Lefebvre a follow-up note concurring with his opinion.⁶⁹ Relationships between Galandou Diouf and the colonial authorities were at a new low. In spite of the large crowds who came out to view Diouf, Diouf's party continued to decline in popularity at the polls.⁷⁰ Perhaps Diouf reacted so strongly to the Camara incident to indicate publicly to the colonial administration, to the SFIO, and to his network of supporters, that he was still alert and vigilant in Senegal.

The STIDN Strike of 1938

The colonial administration of the Popular Front did not chart a completely new imperial course in Senegal, but it did modify labor laws. An *arête* of 21 August 1936 promulgated the Law of 1898 on work accidents; another *arête* of 16 September 1936 concerned the protection of women and children. The *livret de travail* (book of work) was updated and four thousand copies were distributed in Senegal. Among the regulations contained in the books was a limited eight-hour work day. On 11 March 1937 a decree was passed that legalized the formation of labor unions, and another decree passed on 20 March indicated the conditions of reconciliation and arbitration for unions and employers, and provided a framework for collective contracts.⁷¹ Prior to this, union formation by Africans had been strictly forbidden, as well as corporate or local strikes, and

⁶⁹ ANS 13 G 10 (1938), letter from the Governor General of the AOF, De Coppet, to the Governor of Senegal, Lefebvre, 30 September 1938.

⁷⁰ *Paris-Dakar*, no. 973, 11 septembre 1938. An indication of Galandou Diouf's continued popularity occurred in Saint-Louis on 10 September 1938. A reception was held in his honor at the entrance to the Pont Faidherbe that was described by a local newspaper as having numbers revealing a "veritable human tide."

⁷¹ Yves Person, "Le Front Populaire," 91.

union recruitment. Soon unions began to proliferate in Senegal.⁷² From the month of May 1936, even before the legalization, 119 new associations, of which 42 were unions, were declared in French West Africa.⁷³

From 1936 through 1937 the colonial government treated strikes and unionizing activities as ordinary events. De Coppet publicly declared that he was trying to “provide the wage labor force with a professional organization analogous to that of the métropole.”⁷⁴ Spontaneous strikes broke out throughout Senegal from November 1936 to an apogee in August 1937. The movements were a rupture in colonial order, allowing many Africans to become more engaged in their economic and political situation. But Africans were not the only ones to take advantage of the new laws. European employees working in Senegal, mostly in Dakar, also formed their own unions in 1937. Some of these unions collaborated with African collectives and engaged in political action. However, the majority remained separated from African workers; when the *Union des syndicats de*

⁷² For more information on unions, see J. Meynaud and A. Salah Bey, *Le Syndicalisme africain*, Paris, 1963. A. November, *L'Evolution du mouvement syndical en Afrique occidentale* (Paris:La Haye, 1965). There were significant restrictions on union membership in Senegal, however. In order to join a union, a worker was required to read and write French, and outside of the four communes, had to present a certificate of study. Workers could not have spent more than a month in jail, and those who did unionize were to present to the authorities each year an appraisal of their organization.

⁷³ There was a formation of “gens de maison,” association, which included “boys,” drivers and cooks, in Senegal, much to the mortification the colonial press. The *Syndicat des employés du commerce, des industries, des banques et assurances* (EMCIBA) was formed 24 August 1936. Metal workers formed an association on 28 August 1936. Builders formed an association on 28 September 1936 and the *Fédération des fonctionnaires de l'AOF* was organized on 24 October 1936. Professions requiring a certain amount of education saw a strong spurt of unionization.

⁷⁴ Fred Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: the Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 75.

Dakar tried to organize as an umbrella organization for all unions, the European syndicates refused to join.⁷⁵

The *syndicat des travailleurs indigènes du Dakar-Niger* (the Union of Indigenous Dakar-Niger workers or STIDN) was a professional organization that represented Africans throughout Senegal who worked on the railroad. It was one of the most important corporative organizations in French West Africa, and most of its leadership claimed to be “socialists.” However, union leaders had found Popular Front support inadequate. Iba Der Thiam makes the argument that Galandou Diouf became involved in the STIDN for two reasons: one political, and the other for pure personal satisfaction.⁷⁶ Diouf made his position clear to STIDN leaders. Sam Diop, a member of the Dioufist party recalled some years later,

Several days before the strike of the *cheminots auxiliaires*, Galandou convened Manekh Seck, Cheikh Diack and me to Rufisque. At our arrival, he opened his heart to us and wanted us to know that the local and federal administration had helped the SFIO make gains against his party. The longer we wait, he told us, the greater the risk that our political group will not achieve electoral victory.”⁷⁷

Dioufist involvement in the STIDN was also noted by colonial officials. The first account appeared on 8 August 1938, from the Administrator-Adjoint Cau to the Governor of Senegal.⁷⁸ Rumors flew that Galandou Diouf had asked the head of the railway company for permission to visit the railway workers personally.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Persón, “Le Front populaire,” 93.

⁷⁶ Iba Der Thiam, “Galandou Diouf et le Front Populaire,” *Bulletin de l’I.F.A.N. (Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire)*, Tome 38, no 3 (Juillet 1976), located in ANS po. II, no. 2, 596.

⁷⁷ Interview with Sam Diop, as contained in Iba Der Thiam, “Galandou Diouf,” 598.

⁷⁸ ANS K 1, letter.

⁷⁹ ANS K1, police information, 28 August 1938.

On the first morning of the strike, which occurred in tandem in Thiès, Dakar, and Louga, one of Diouf's men called the strike. He beat the tam-tam drum at Diouf's Dakar house in order to assemble the auxiliary workers of the Dakar-Niger railway. While no violence occurred anywhere else, inexperienced soldiers fired into a protesting crowd of about 200-300 strikers in Thiès. Six strikers died and more were wounded in Thiès.⁸⁰ However, the strike had occurred without major assistance from Guèye's SFIO, as Diouf had hoped.

At the beginning of the strike Diouf found his authority substantially improved. Workers visited Diouf, and he recommended they stay calm, but not return to work. Diouf hoped to act as the strikers' intermediary and resolve the situation, but the Governor of Senegal was committed to a quick resolution. By 30 September the strikers were back at work, having won amnesty and recognition for their union.⁸¹ The Governor of Senegal's definitive ending of the strike took Diouf and his allies by surprise. While Diouf did not play the role he had hoped, the controversy surrounding the strike, including who was to blame for it, accelerated. Diouf attacked de Coppet for condoning brutality, while members of the European business community believed de Coppet had not done enough to circumvent the strike. Lamine Guèye's newspaper, *L'A.O.F.*, blamed the whole disaster on Galandou Diouf, claiming that Diouf had instigated the strike.⁸² Diouf was attempting to challenge Guèye's position as labor leader and representative, and undermine Guèye's symbolic power with the métropole's left.

⁸⁰ ANS K 1.

⁸¹ Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 106. Cooper points out that oral testimony indicated that Diouf tried to persuade the workers not to parlay with the government without him.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 107.

Diouf would use his involvement in the strike in future propaganda to indicate his sympathy with working class Africans. Diouf was probably also hoping that de Coppet would suffer consequences because of the strike; Diouf was aware de Coppet's support in France had greatly diminished after the Popular Front fell in the autumn of 1938.

The new Minister of Colonies, George Mandel, appointed a certain Gaston Joseph, *conseiller d'Etat*, to go to Senegal and investigate the situation. After Joseph's return to France in October 1938, Mandel took a series of administrative measures. Mandel replaced Lefebvre, Governor of Senegal, by the ex-Governor of Gabon, Parisot. The *commandant de cercle* of Thiès was replaced as well, by Paolini, the commandant of Tambacounda. Finally, and most significantly, de Coppet was sent on a "vacation" and replaced. Diouf did not benefit from the situation as he had hoped, but he had undercut Guèye's claim to stand for working class people in Senegal. Even though the new colonial administration under Minister Mandel moved aggressively to silence the STIDN, Diouf continued publicly to act the role of agent for the little man, and defender of African rights. In this way, Diouf reasserted his symbolic capital and his image in Senegal.

Senegal in 1938-39

The new administration tried to reverse much of what the Popular Front had done, or had attempted to do, in Senegal. The international atmosphere had changed from 1936 to 1938. The success of the STIDN strike demonstrated what

Africans could accomplish with allied action, and these workers enjoyed at least a temporary improvement in the quality of their lives and the respect of their rights. The sense of well being was fleeting, however, as salaries were “adjusted” down and workers who were involved with the strike were fired.

Even though eye-witness accounts and evidence from the dead bodies indicated it was the *tirailleurs* who had fired the shots that killed six people in the 1938 STIDN strike, some strikers were tried and convicted of various crimes in colonial courts. Galandou Diouf came in voluntarily to provide witness of the events. At one point during the proceedings, in frustration Diouf snatched a rifle out of the hands of a *soldat fusilleur* and gave it to a judge as evidence of *tirailleur* culpability against strikers; his testimony was to no avail.⁸³ Diouf’s indignant commentary on the injustice appeared in the pages of *Le Sénégal* on 3 November 1938, where he bitterly commented, “Often justice is like a spider’s web. Only the large succeed in getting through it.”

When Galandou Diouf decided to leave Paris to return to Senegal in early October 1939, Mandel sent a telegraph to the Governor General that Diouf’s voyage could “only look good for us,” and instructed the governor general to give Diouf all the “facilities he might require.”⁸⁴ Mandel, however, did not expect the flood of supplicating letters he began to receive from Diouf, asking for better working and social conditions for those living in Senegal. For example, Diouf

⁸³ Iba Der Thiam, “Galandou Diouf,” 613.

⁸⁴ 13 G 10 (1939), telegram from Mandel, at Minister of Colonies, to the Governor General of AOF, 1 October 1939.

took on the plight of Lebanese businessmen in Senegal.⁸⁵ Diouf traveled often to Senegal before his health, and the strictures of the Vichy regime, made voyages impossible.

Once war was declared between Germany and France, Galandou Diouf tried to deploy his capital as a recruiter; this image boosted his symbolic capital with the métropole and the administration. After all, in Saint-Louis, Dakar, and Rufisque, Diouf claimed, there were already more than 20,000 volunteers awaiting their orders. "You can have these arms, my dear Minister, these are your men, they are dedicated body and soul, they belong to you, but leave us the arms of those who are participating in the economic battle. Our faith in you knows no bounds."⁸⁶ Diouf pointed out that France was facing two wars, one on the battlefield and another on the economic front. If France continued the current economic policies in Senegal, Diouf argued, it would lose the second battle and destroy the economy of the country.⁸⁷ Diouf also argued against applying recently passed ordinances "to the letter," because of hardships Senegal would suffer with a rapid evacuation of Frenchmen.

⁸⁵ As part of France's wartime measures, laws had been enacted which prevented these Lebanese and Syrian merchants from traveling back from the Levant to French West Africa. Since their import-export business depended upon getting merchandise from Lebanon, they had to leave the AOF. However, their economic life was in Africa, Diouf argued, and by disallowing their return the French administration was "a great hardship" on them. He requested intervention from the colonial authorities numerous times, suggesting remedies like a special visa that could be quickly dispensed. Diouf also emphasized the importance of allowing Lebanese merchants to transfer funds from Africa to Lebanon and Syria. ANS 13 G 10, letter from Galandou Diouf to the Governor General of the AOF, 18 November 1939.

⁸⁶ 13 G 10 (1939). Between September 1939 and June 1940, around one hundred thousand Africans were enlisted to go to war with Germany. (Statistics from Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts*, 88.)

⁸⁷ 13 G 10 (1939), letter from Galandou Diouf to Minister of the Colonies, 7 November 1939.

In the fall of 1939, Diouf toured the Senegalese countryside, but less as a political campaigner and more as a symbol. The “Laminists” attempted to pursue propaganda against Diouf, but most independents and Senegalese ignored it in this time of crisis. Diouf’s popularity in Senegal was mounting again. As Galandou Diouf traveled within Senegal he was accompanied by a cinematographer, Mr. Le Noan. It is unclear who secured the cinematographer’s services. Le Noan recorded images of the mobilization of African troops, of Diouf’s voyage, of the families of *tirailleurs*, and of the economic production of the colony. A package containing his work was sent by airmail before 13 November 1939, and handed over to the Commissioner General of Information in Paris.⁸⁸ The Commissioner Edouard de Warren had already been in touch with Galandou Diouf about creating a journal for indigenous troops and a *Centre de l’Entr’aide* for Africans in the métropole.

The film, the association and the journal were all to aid in the spirits and loyalties of Africans in the métropole, but the film was also described as a useful tool that could be employed to help métropolitains know and understand “our colonies.”⁸⁹ Diouf had astutely positioned himself to be the public face and representative of French West Africa in modern media. Had it been successfully shown, the film would have allowed Diouf an opportunity to communicate directly to French people about Africa; although the conversation would be one-way. In

⁸⁸ See 13 G 10 (1939). I could find no record of the film itself, nor is it apparent whether or not the film was ever actually utilized.

⁸⁹ ANS 13 G 10 (1939), letter to Governor General Cayla from the Commissariat General of Information, 26 October 1939.

December Galandou Diouf returned to France, in spite of the danger.⁹⁰ He would never again see the native shores of his Senegal.

France Succumbs

Before the invasion of France, Governor General Léon Cayla and Galandou Diouf exchanged correspondence concerning social and economic conditions in Senegal, with Diouf suggesting several avenues for improvement. Diouf's request for an expansion of the *Office du Conditionnement* was refused.⁹¹ Letters were exchanged concerning the *Sociétés de Prevoyance*, with Diouf continuing to push for reform. Diouf had been arguing hard since 1937 for a reevaluation of the *prestation* system in the AOF, and in Senegal in particular. Abuses in the system were downplayed, proclaimed to be sporadic, and due to human error rather than recognized as an institutional problem by the French government.⁹² The government did, however, agree to raise the minimum salary of workers from eight to nine francs a day in the territory of the *Circonscription of Dakar et Dépendances*. Employers in Dakar were also supposed to augment their salaried employees' income by ten to twenty percent for their "*petit personnel indigène*." The Administration also raised the salaries of their

⁹⁰ ANS 13 G 10 (1939), telegram, 21 October 1939.

⁹¹ ANS 13 G 10 (1940), letter from Cayla to Diouf, 4 March 1940.

⁹² ANS 13 G 10 (1940), letter from the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, 19 April 1940.

employees.⁹³ Although not all of Diouf's suggestions were heeded, his concerns, at some level, were considered.

Galandou Diouf also performed his role as a patriot for France. He publicly called for Africans' assistance to France. His sentiments were published in the French newspaper *France-Soir* April 1940: "France is our mother. Black people cannot forget all the benefits they have received and this is why, by the hundred thousand and soon by the millions, our *tirailleurs sénégalais* will join our youth, and our force, with yours: you farmers, workers, and bourgeoisie of France. A white race? A black race? Perhaps, but all men, united by the defense of the same ideal and a beloved fatherland."⁹⁴ Diouf's position and his symbolic capital depended, a good deal, on the survival of republican France. Diouf also had been fighting for veterans since the end of the Great War, and he had witnessed the legitimacy and power Blaise Diagne gained after his great recruiting campaigns in French West Africa—campaigns in which Diouf played a pivotal role.

⁹³ ANS 13 G 10 (1940), letter from the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs in response to "intervention du Député du Sénégal à propos salaires et niveaux de vie au Sénégal et à Dakar," 2 May 1940.

⁹⁴ ANS 13 G 10.



Figure 8.7 [Galandou Diouf on the right, dated April, 1940. ANS.]

France used Diouf and its colonies in Africa for propaganda purposes.

Galandou Diouf received Cayla's gratitude for attending the opening of the *Salon de la France d'Outre-Mer*. Diouf described the *Salon* as a "harmonious ensemble" of the natural products of the Federation, including indigenous arts and economic goods. "The opinion of the crowd which pressed around our stand confirmed my personal impression," of the display's grandeur, wrote Diouf.⁹⁵ Just days before the German invasion, France was putting colonial Africa on display for public consumption and to reassure the French of Africa's strength.

⁹⁵ ANS 13 G 10 (1940), letter from Diouf to Cayla dated 8 May 1940.

Around the same time the French government was planning displays of colonial greatness, they were instituting new regulations to control the population. Complaint letters were intercepted by the *service du contrôle technique* which had been established on 12 December 1939; it censored any outgoing sensitive mail (from both France and Africa).⁹⁶ The previous January, a law had been passed declaring that members of an elected body who belonged to the *Section Française de l'Internationale Communiste* would be required to forfeit their seat unless they repudiated their affiliation with the party. The law was applied to the colonies in March 1940, and on 15 April 1940, a letter was sent to every governor of French West Africa instructing them to make sure this law was followed. The expression "member of an elected assembly" applied not just to members of legislative assemblies or communes like the Senate, Chamber of Deputies, General Councils, city councils, but also to members of committees or other organizations that were part of public administration, and included "those organizations whose members were elected and appointed (by the administration)".⁹⁷ The Senegalese SFIO, operated by Lamine Guèye, was now illegal.

In April 1940, Galandou Diouf wrote an article that appeared in the French newspaper, *Paris Soir*. The article was composed as a letter to Goebbels, Hitler's master of propaganda. Diouf opened his letter with a Wolof proverb, "You have to answer blows by blows more numerous and harder, and in the

⁹⁶ Ruth Ginio, *French Colonialism Unmasked* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 109-110.

⁹⁷ ANS 13 G 10 (1940), letter the Governor General of AOF L. Geismar, en tourney, to the Governors of Sénégal, Mauritanie, the Administrator of Dakar, Governor of Soudan Français, of Guinée Française, of Côte d'Ivoire, of Dahomey and of Niger.

battle of words, the arm of the truth will victoriously defeat any lie.”⁹⁸ He went on to refute the Nazi belief that Africans were brutes and slaves, incapable of fidelity, patriotism or courage by writing a short history of Africans’ accomplishments and relationship with France. He compared the present situation to that of 1914, with the prediction that the result of the war would be the same as WWI’s. He ends the letter with a patriotic justification of French colonization, and an affirmation that whether black in Africa or white in France, they were “French united in the defense of an idea.”⁹⁹ Diouf’s letter took Nazi rhetoric and brilliantly redeployed it as an African proverb. He was writing as a World War I veteran, and a patriotic French citizen. He was writing as the representative of Africans, whom he pledged were willing to give their lives to France. But rhetoric and reality were quite different.

When France fell to the Nazis in June 1940, colonial administrators had to make a choice. They could opt to follow Charles de Gaulle from his base in London or they could decide to accept the authority of World War I hero, Marshal Pétain, who collaborated with Nazi invaders, and who was also the legal leader of France. The day the armistice was signed between France and Germany, Boisson supported Pétain and was quickly appointed to high commissioner of French Africa (*haut commissaire de l’Afrique française*). Thus the AOF became part of Vichy France on 25 June 1940. Boisson immediately suspended all local political institutions in the four communes. For the first time since the 1790s, the local population could not participate in a political process. The right to organize

⁹⁸ Galandou Diouf, “Monsieur Goebbels, permettez-moi de vous présenter l’armée noir,” *Paris Soir*, 22 April 1940.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

or publish a newspaper in French West Africa was also revoked. These were not the only repressive measures the new colonial regime instituted. Boisson implemented dismissals of foreigners, Communists, Freemasons and Jews from public service.¹⁰⁰ Arrests and imprisonments became so frequent that the jails were filled to capacity by November 1940.¹⁰¹

In this repressive atmosphere, in late July 1940, a confidential piece of information floated across a colonial official's desk that claimed the "indigenous milieu" in Dakar was preoccupied with Deputy Galandou Diouf's situation.¹⁰² One of his sons had claimed that Diouf had taken refuge in Algiers with other Parliamentarians. According to the source of the information, Galandou Diouf's conduct was criticized by notables who had aided Diouf in gaining power. They believed the place of the deputy was in France and that quitting the métropole meant Diouf had abandoned his work and responsibility. Diouf was accused of having forsaken his "race brothers" who were still fighting in France. The notables believed that if Diouf had left France, then he had lost his mandate and his title of French citizen. They even believed Diouf would be imprisoned by the French government for life.¹⁰³ Diouf was in a difficult situation, regardless. He had co-written a letter to Albert Lebrun, the President of the French Republic,

¹⁰⁰ Cohen, *Rulers of Empire*, 115.

¹⁰¹ William Hitchcock, "Pierre Boisson, French West Africa, and the Postwar Eputation: A Case from the Aix Files," *French Historical Studies* 24, 2 (Spring 2001): 322.

¹⁰² ANS 13 G 10 (1940), renseignements, Dakar, 29 July 1940.

¹⁰³ The Wikipedia site on Diouf in English claims that Diouf was among the *Massilia* deputies who escaped France as Nazi Germany was invading. They landed in Casablanca, and were arrested by Nazi collaborators. The sources cited, however, are not adequate to make me believe Diouf was with the deputies, but it makes me wonder, especially since the rumor was running rampant in Senegal.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngalandou_Diouf

asking him to keep France free, and declared that Africans would fight until their last breath for France. Diouf's sympathies, it seemed, lay with the Free French.

In the meantime, the British and Gaullist forces had not given up hope that French West Africa might shift towards the Allied side, even after Boisson's clearly stated allegiance to Vichy France. When de Gaulle supporter Félix Eboué was appointed Governor General of French Equatorial Africa, the Allies attempted to persuade Boisson. They sent a delegation to Boisson on 23-25 September 1940, asking Boisson to join them voluntarily. Boisson imprisoned every member of the delegation save its commander, whom he had shot. The British retaliated by lobbing bombs on the harbor at Dakar. The attack lasted three days, during which time over two hundred people, mostly Africans, were killed.¹⁰⁴ Diouf wrote a personal letter to Field Marshal Pétain on the day after the attack, emphasizing the loyalty and commitment of the Senegalese population to France.¹⁰⁵ He feared for his constituency, but he was not suddenly a Vichy sympathizer. From the attack on Dakar to the spring of 1941, Diouf did not make any "unwelcome requests" to the new government. He lay low while attempting to reassert his authority as the representative for Senegal's African population.

Even though Vichy stripped French West Africa of many of its republican institutions, Diouf still sought to be deputy. On 1 April 1941, Galandou Diouf began actively agitating for several Africans accused of working for the Free French. It could be that Diouf's health had declined to the point that he felt he no

¹⁰⁴ Suret-Canale, *Afrique noire*, 577.

¹⁰⁵ Ginio, *French Colonialism Unmasked*, 112.

longer needed to worry for his own safety because his illness would not let him live much longer. Whatever the reason, Diouf began to take risks for his constituency. For example, he sent a letter to the *Contre-Amiral* Platon, Secretary of State of the Colonies for Vichy France. In the letter he protested the recent convictions of Abd El Kader Diagne and Seykou Diop.¹⁰⁶ Diouf described how he had been waiting “in vain for an indication that there would be some sort of cooperation and collaboration between French and Africans” that he had always worked for. But recent events had compelled him to believe this would not happen. Seykou Diop, a colonial councilor, and a municipal councilor from Dakar, one of his “loyal friends” had been convicted to two years in prison and charged a 5,000 franc fine for having “anti-French sentiments.” Abd El Kader Diagne, also a municipal councilor, was accused of the same crime and was convicted and deported to Algeria. Diouf was outraged by the severe punishment for nebulous convictions. The list of Diouf’s friends who had trouble with the repression in Senegal was much longer than the two he mentioned in the communiqué.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ ANS 13 G 10 (1941), letter sent from Cannes, Galandou Diouf to Admiral Platon, Minister of the Colonies, Vichy, 1 April 1941.

¹⁰⁷ Diouf tried to intervene for Mr. Rouillon, his protégé, several times between 1937 and 1939 in Côte d’Ivoire. Mr. Rouillon had joined de Gaulle and was well known for his activities in Accra against the Vichy-held French Africa. The list continued. There was Ousmane Diouf, who also worked for de Gaulle in the Gold Coast and Senegalese Alphonse Kane, player in a jazz band, arrested recently in Paris for impersonation and fraud, there was Mortier, Municipal Secretary in Saint-Louis, then at Kaolack thanks to Galandou Diouf. Mortier was interned at Dagana for his clear pro-Gaullist attitude during the September events. Senegalese Emile Faure, secretary of the Ligue de la Défense de la Race Negre, friend of Diouf, was convicted of “offenses against the external security of the state” and sentenced to five years in prison and 5,000 francs fine by the Military Tribunal of Abidjan. And finally there was Sheikh Hamallah, whose early release from prison Galandou Diouf helped secure in 1936. Sheikh Hamallah followed the practice of the Algerian marabout Al-Akhdar and repeated one of the prayers of the

Just as Galandou Diouf's relationship with the Vichy regime began to become quite dangerous, Galandou Diouf's health began to decline precipitously in early June 1941.¹⁰⁸ He began desperately trying to return to the land of his birth. In June 1941, Diouf penned a formal letter to the Minister of Colonies, Platon, and began with a Wolof saying, "Those who wait for the rain to fall before they buy an umbrella risk getting wet." Diouf attempted to convey how vital it was for him to return to Senegal; he would be the liaison between Vichy and the African population. Diouf could give his black brothers "advice that would light the road ahead."¹⁰⁹ Diouf made sure to stress to Platon that his authority with the Senegalese people did not derive from his position as deputy to the National Assembly, but rather arose from the traditional authority his family's place in the history of Senegal accorded him. Clearly, Galandou Diouf understood that while

Tijaniyya eleven times instead of twelve. Hamallah had issues with the Tijani leaders over their cooperation with the French colonial regime. He chose to ignore the French as much as possible, but not disobey them directly. Other Tijanis believed Hamallah's movement, which was gaining strength in the 1920s, was heretical. Hamallah's movement openly declared its hostility to non-Muslims, which threatened many colonial officials. The Hamallists and their Tijani opponents clashed several times in 1924, finally escalating to violence conflicts that Sheikh Hamallah chose not to control or could not control. The French imprisoned Hamallah in December 1925 and he remained in jail for ten years within West Africa and was exiled to France for two years. Hamallah's eldest son took revenge in a violent battle in Mouchgag, a village in Nioro and four hundred people were killed. The battle took place late July 1940 in the mistaken belief that the Vichy regime would be too occupied to deal with the incident. Boisson believed Hamallah was involved, or at least would refuse to condemn the violence. Almost a year later, on 19 June 1941, a day later called by Hamallists as "Terrible Thursday," the Vichy colonial authorities arrested Hamallah early in the morning. He was taken along with about eight hundred of his supporters. Women, the elderly and children were released after twenty-four hours. The "less influential" were sentenced to five years. The "more influential" were sentenced to ten years. Sheikh Hamallah was exiled to Algeria and later to France, where, like Galandou Diouf, he died in a French hospital during the war. See Ruth Ginio, *French Colonialism Unmasked*, 140-144.

¹⁰⁸ The Director of the Sûreté Générale had openly threatened Diouf in a letter addressed to Platon. See ANS 13 G 10 (1941), "Rapport."

¹⁰⁹ Ginio, *Colonialism Unmasked*, 113.

many of the structures of Third Republic France, and some of the people remained, the old Republic, as he knew it, was dead. "Deputy" meant nothing to the Vichy regime; it carried no symbolic capital, no real or rhetorical authority. Its privileges were defunct. The savvy, but ailing, politician based his claims on an authority outside of the traditional French state, and with a "traditional" African state.

The letter Diouf wrote his son, Mustapha Galandou Diouf, on 6 June 1941 is much more revealing about his true opinion of Vichy. The personal letter was, of course, intercepted by the postal control service. In the letter Diouf laments France's loss to Germany and the affect this had on the colonies, which were now filled with "Nérophobes." In Diouf's opinion, the French believed Africans were good Frenchmen and good brothers when they were working or dying for France, but when these black men wanted some of the advantages enjoyed by their white brothers; then they became disposable dirty Negroes. It disturbed him to hear the French around him in Cannes say things like "Let us throw all the colonies to the Germans so that they leave us in peace." Without the empire, where would France be today? Diouf wrote his son. "It is not the color of the skin which determines who is a good French man."¹¹⁰

G. Wesley Johnson believes Diouf died thinking that the French had lied to him and the principles of 1789 were never meant for black people. But I do not see such clear cut evidence. In this letter to his son, one of his last communiqués, he clearly believed many Africans were superior to the French men with whom they were supposed to "assimilate," but he still believed there

¹¹⁰ ANS 13 G 10 (1941).

were “good Frenchmen.” The letter is full of sorrow, deep sadness, “Here in France there is nothing left to hold onto... Better to have died than to have let this country deteriorate to such an extent.” Like the novelist and Antillean administrator René Maran, Diouf was critical of the French nation, yet still considered himself and his fellows an organic piece of the whole.¹¹¹ Diouf had built his symbolic capital in Senegal upon defending Africans’ interests and rights. He had built his symbolic capital in France upon his status as a patriotic war hero. Vichy stripped his ability to operate in the political sphere effectively and stole the Republic he had so bravely defended. Diouf died alone, and felt the symbolic capital that had buoyed him even in his darkest hours, had been extinguished.

Diouf’s disappointment in France and in many of the French people would doubtless have propelled him in a new political trajectory had he outlived the war. I believe as a popular leader he would have begun pushing for greater liberties and probably would have surpassed Lamine Guèye in what he could have accomplished. However, on 7 June 1941, Galandou Diouf was checked into the Clinique Chirurgicale “Lutetia” located at the Rue d’Oxford in Cannes.¹¹²

There he would spend the final sixty days of his life. Towards the end of June 1941, Galandou Diouf’s health had deteriorated to the point where his family was deeply concerned. Several family members traveled to Cannes to

¹¹¹ See Gary Wilder’s analysis of Moran in *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 151-166.

¹¹² ANS 13 G 10 (1941), bill from the Clinique Chirurgicale “Lutetia.” Each day Diouf spent in the clinic cost 110 francs, for a total of 6,000 francs. After the addition of taxes, telephone calls Diouf made or received, various medications (from glucose serums to ether), and sundry items like pajamas, the total bill was 8,678.10 francs. The Vichy government paid this debt, and others Diouf had accrued for medical expenses, although it took a decree and the better part of a year.

see if they would be allowed to bring Diouf back to Senegal, but their efforts were unsuccessful.¹¹³ The rumor about Diouf's failing health swept through Senegal, and created a "deep emotion" in the population. On 17 July 1941 Galandou Diouf's health was considered stable enough to allow him to fly home from Cannes to Senegal. Platon was willing to fly Diouf immediately, charging the costs to the colony. Urgent telegrams were exchanged. Boisson agreed. A few days later on 21 July the *Haut-Commissaire*, Governor and Administrator of the Circonscription of Dakar, was informed Galandou Diouf would be arriving on the next plane. The next telegram, however, announced news of Diouf's death on 6 August 1941.¹¹⁴ The airplane trip never materialized. Did Diouf's failing health prevent his return to Senegal or did Vichy France drag its heels long enough to guarantee Galandou Diouf would never return alive? Colonial documents often had a subtext or had complementary oral instructions that belied written official communications.

Galandou Diouf was the only colonial Senegalese deputy to have such deep and strong connections in the local scene before being elected to the National Assembly in France. This, in a period different from the 1930s, might have made him particularly effective. Diouf successfully identified some of the main problems of Senegal's economy and politics, although they were not effectively dealt with during his lifetime. Diouf was a shrewd politician, who had a common's man touch and an impressive ability to form allegiances and networks across the Protectorate, the communes and the métropole. His efficacy as

¹¹³ ANS 13 G 10 (1941), renseignements, 24 June 1941.

¹¹⁴ See ANS 13 G 10 (1941), a series of telegrams between Vichy colonial offices.

deputy was undercut, however, by his tendency to maintain grudges, by his inability to form an alliance with Lamine Guèye, and by his refusal to dismiss Alfred Goux as his first lieutenant in Senegal.

During his time as deputy, Diouf would be confronted with a hostile colonial administration, an eloquent and effective opponent, and an economic, and later, military crisis. Through it all Diouf knew when to utilize Republican rhetoric, and when to operate as the opposition. During his time as deputy, Diouf never compromised himself as an agent of colonialism, nor did he become an agent for the Bordeaux houses. His ability to continue to defy the administration and the Bordeaux interests and still maintain his political popularity and momentum is impressive.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion

Even in death Galandou Diouf created problems for the colonial administration. Aside from the costs of Diouf's medical expenses, which were eventually resolved by the government, there remained the question of pensions to Diouf's family. It was complicated because Diouf had taken three wives under Muslim ceremonies. Reams of paperwork and opinions would be produced by Vichy's colonial government on how to deal fairly with the dilemma, but only his first wife, remarried under French civil law, would receive an official letter of sympathy when Diouf died.¹

In the late summer of 1950, Galandou Diouf finally came home to Senegal. If Diouf could not return to his native soil in life, then his family and friends wanted to make sure his remains, at least, found their final place in Senegal. They began asking for his return not long after his death. There were, however, religious issues with the transportation of his mortal remains. In 1941 Seydou Nourou Tall was asked to give his opinion on the transfer of Diouf's body. Tall listed the conditions under which Diouf's remains must be transported

¹See both ANS 13 G 10 (1941) and a sheaf of documents with a title page from the Administration of Justice, entitled "Député du Sénégal. Galandou Diouf et la veuve, 1939-44." The final decision recognizes the complexity of the four communes using both civil and Muslim law. Diouf had contracted with three women through the Muslim ritual, but had "re"-married his first wife before an officer of the Civil State in Rufisque in 1934. Before 1913, Diouf had married Kévé or Kebe N'Daw in a Muslim ceremony. In 1913, Diouf had taken another wife, Khady Cisse. The Vichy French colonial government refused to make a decision, or constantly reversed itself. On 25 February 1942, the Cadi of Saint-Louis had decided that the three women were "among the heirs of the deceased." The colonial government concurred with the Cadi.

under the (Maliki) law of Islam, and gave his permission for the action.²

However, Diouf's remains would not be transported from Cannes, France to Dakar for another nine years.³ Galandou Diouf's body arrived in Dakar and was finally buried in Saint-Louis in 1950. But before this, in 1948, Rufisque had raised money for Diouf's remains to be returned, and buried. In death, as in life, Galandou Diouf had connections, allegiances, supporters and debts to all three communes.

The internment ceremony on 27 August 1950 in Saint-Louis was carried out with appropriate pomp and circumstance and was praised by Galandou's son, Mohamed Diouf, who claimed "You can see in these ceremonies a great national reconciliation in a way, and that in the Senegalese soul, despite everything, France resides in our hearts."⁴ Among those attending the ceremony were Diouf's family, his friends, members of the General Council of Senegal, and colonial officials.⁵ Galandou Diouf was eulogized by Mr. Karim Gaye of the Permanent Commission of the General Council of Senegal.

This was the framework in which Galandou Diouf's life was meaningfully

² ANS 13 G 10 (1941), 19 August 1941, document from Seydou Nourou Tall, translated from the Arabic by O. Rajel.

³ I am assuming Diouf was buried in Cannes during this time, but I do not have any evidence. Diouf was transported on the *Medie II*; the boat was due in Dakar's port on 26 August 1950. See ANS 23 G 100 (174), letter from High Commissioner of the Republic, Governor General of AOF to the General of Division, Superior Commander of Land Forces of the AOF, dated 21 August 1950. Mohamed Diouf was given permission to travel from Abidjan to Cannes and back again; the trip was made so that he could accompany the remains of his father. The French government paid for the voyages. See also 23 G 100 (174).

⁴ ANS 23 G 100 (174), letter from Mohamed Galandou Diouf, chef de Bureau des Services Financiers in Rufisque to The Governor of the Colonies and Senegal, 5 September 1950.

⁵ An account of the ceremony accompanying the transfer of the remains to Saint-Louis is found in ANS 23 G 100 (174). The fiche is entitled "Transfert restes mortels Galandou Diouf ex-Député du Sénégal.

memorialized. Gaye spoke:

On 7 August 1941, fourteen months after the German invasion, and the painful armistice of the slain Country, we cried for the death of Galandou Diouf. It was as though the hero of the Great War could not survive the defeat of France. For the generation who carried arms in 1914-1918, Galandou Diouf was the symbol of their dreams and their aspirations. He was among those who left their mark on the advent of mass Senegalese political life.

In 1908, Galandou Diouf was thirty-three years old. With an independent spirit and a combative temperament, this former student of the *Ecole des Frères Plöermel* and the secondary school, turned his back on an administrative career.

Neither teaching nor the PTT could provide the sustenance needed for this character's real thirst for freedom, for social justice and for political equality. His intimate friends know well the personality of this man, with his powerful and domineering traits, designed for struggle. Truthfully, at that time, the country had a complex character.⁶

At this point in the eulogy, Karim Gaye went into a short political history of Senegal, emphasizing the unique status of the four communes. Gaye portrayed Galandou Diouf as the champion of Senegalese originaires, whose status was not recognized as equal to that of the métis or French inhabitants.

According to Gaye, Galandou Diouf, was the soul of the "Jeunesse de Saint-Louis," which was a call to arms. Diouf struggled for the "political emancipation of his race." He gained notice in June 1911 when, in the General Council, he vehemently protested that the law of 1905 on the recruitment of the Army did not apply to the black inhabitants of the four communes. From there, Diouf launched his campaign to solve the problem of "our political rights." When war broke out in 1914, Galandou Diouf once more fought to have originaires incorporated into French regiments. Three years later, in the heart of the

⁶ ANS 23 G 100 (174), Speech pronounced by Karim Gaye.

General Council, Diouf and the “Jeunesse de Saint-Louis” demanded the right to pay “the blood tax.” Gaye declared of Diouf’s efforts, “On the moral plane, his victory was complete.” The “Diagne laws” thus were the consecration of originaire rights. Gaye pointed out that although Diouf was father to seven children, he volunteered in the active troops. Gaye then recited his bravery in battle: “On 10 September 1916, his unit was engaged in a violent bombardment. In the evening of the battle, he was cited with the *ordre de la division*. There was in the heart of this athlete, something of a black warrior’s fever.”⁷

Gaye then covered Galandou Diouf’s political career, mentioning his rapid rise in the General Council to Vice President, then President of the Permanent Commission. From 1919 to 1925, he was the “first Magistrate of the City of Rufisque.” In 1934, he served in the *Palais Bourbon*. Gaye then provided a long extract of a petition Diouf and his “noir” colleagues launched from Bordeaux on 19 June 1940, appealing to French people to write to the President of the Republic, asking him to save “our Great and Dear Fatherland in honor, in her dignity, and in the respect of her promised word.” The plea Diouf signed urged France’s government to fight the Germans from North Africa and “in her [France’s] Black Africa she will find a fight to the last breath, and by her heroism and loyalty, she will maintain her alliances and her friends, and... win the sympathy of America.”⁸ The eulogy for Galandou Diouf ends, “May the earth of his ancestors, in which he consecrated all his living force be soft, as the land of Islam is always sweet to the warriors of Islam.”

⁷ ANS 23 G 100 (174), speech from Gaye.

⁸ Ibid.

This official, state-sanctioned memorial is interesting on several points. Gaye's focus on Galandou Diouf's successes rests on his early career, and his character is portrayed as being best reflected in his courageous and loyal service in World War I. Diouf's concomitant career is briefly scanned, with nothing from the years 1925-1934, and the eulogy ends with a long quote from a document calling upon France to resist the Nazi invaders from African soil. If a scholar only had the information from this funeral, he or she would be left with the impression that Diouf's major contributions occurred early in his life and that he accomplished little else than promoting an idealistic relationship between France and Africa. It contains very little personal information, and presents a sterile portrait of the man. Perhaps modern scholarship has, indeed, taken a page from Diouf's official eulogizer, for it reflects these trends as well, eliding the man's complex and sometimes contradictory contributions, and ignoring the centrality of Galandou Diouf in Senegalese politics, not just in 1914-1918, but throughout all of the years from 1909-1941.

Galandou Diouf's role in the history of Senegal, and in the history of colonialism, has been overlooked. Diouf's contributions have been either briefly mentioned or ignored in the literature. This dissertation reconfigures Diouf's contributions to the colonial process in Senegal, and reevaluates his career. Galandou Diouf has often been described as "eclipsed" by Blaise Diagne, as through Diouf's influence so paled in comparison to Diagne's, that Diouf stepped out of his way and became subservient to him.

Certainly Diagne possessed a different symbolic and social capital from Galandou Diouf. Diagne had the education, the attitude, and the experience that appealed to métis and disenchanté Europeans living in Senegal. But it was Galandou Diouf who deployed his own symbolic capital among originaires living in the four communes who really brought Diagne's victory home. Without Galandou Diouf there would have been no Blaise Diagne.

Blaise Diagne was, in many ways, an outsider to the political process in the four communes. He had spent much of his youth abroad working for the French customs office. He was a Freemason and had married a French wife. He was educated, considered intelligent and was interested in African rights. Diouf recognized why Diagne could be a good black candidate for Deputy. When Diagne decided to sail to Senegal in January 1914 to pursue the deputyship, his friend François Pouye had surveyed the political scene for him and had come to the conclusion that only Gorée could be counted on in an election for Diagne. There were seven contenders for the deputyship, the strongest was Carpot. Diagne was an outside candidate, at best. What could turn the tide for him? Certainly it was a balance of factors, including a split métis vote, but I argue that without Galandou Diouf's support, Diagne would not have garnered the necessary votes.

Galandou Diouf was attracted to Blaise Diagne as an African candidate. It was Diouf who launched Diagne's candidacy. It was Diouf who helped secure the Lebou support for Diagne. It was Diouf who gave speeches in Wolof to Muslim African originaires, calling on them to support Diagne. It was Diouf and

Mody M'Baye who set up opportunities for Diagne to talk with the Young Senegalese in Saint-Louis, who admired Diouf for his outspokenness when Diagne was still an unknown. It was Diouf and other militant originaires who helped organize evening *palabres*, who worked to set up whistle-stop campaigns; it was Diouf who was instrumental in setting the stage. Diagne was able to use his own symbolic capital as a Freemason married to a white woman to influence métis voters and French men, as well as some Africans. But Diouf gave Diagne's candidacy a much-needed legitimacy against accusations of him being 'parachuted' in.

By 1914 Diouf carried weight with an African electorate; Diouf's symbolic capital was transformed into votes for Diagne. Diagne gave stirring campaign speeches that reflected his opinions about the rights of originaires and other specific reforms. Clearly, some of this rhetoric was an organic part of Diagne's politics that he had espoused elsewhere; however, his political acumen and knowledge of the politics in the four communes had to come from somewhere other than his own experience. Galandou Diouf, his first lieutenant, who had been part of this political world for six years as an elected official would shape Diagne's discourse. Diagne's ability to reverberate with originaires in Senegal came from Diagne's passion and extraordinary speaking skills and Diouf's experience and knowledge. Diouf mobilized support for Diagne in significant ways that would shape the election of 1914. Diouf had what Diagne and later, Guèye, did not. His experience, knowledge, and his education were all shaped primarily by Senegal, where he lived and worked, failed and succeeded. Only at

the end of Diouf's life and career did he depart from Senegal for any significant length of time.

In many ways Galandou Diouf can be considered a 'militant or radical originaire' similar to men like Mody M'Baye. He was not afraid to challenge the French colonial authorities directly. He refused to sacrifice his identity as a Muslim to France's assimilationist doctrine. He was educated in Africa, spoke French only moderately well, and used Wolof in campaign speeches and rallies. While deeply entrenched within the French colonial system, he nonetheless challenged it, from French laws to governor generals.

Galandou Diouf had a distinct identity as an originaire, and a great part of this was directly related to the rights and responsibilities of republican citizenship. As part of this role, Diouf was critical of the conduct of corrupt officials and agencies in the colonial system. He would speak out against them at personal risk throughout his career. Galandou Diouf believed he had the force of law behind him to challenge the administration on its own terms. While he was sometimes bloodied in these encounters, he nonetheless persisted in pushing back against perceived injustices and slights, to himself and to his Senegalese constituents.

As Blaise Diagne shifted on his political axis, symbolized by his "Bordeaux Pact," Galandou Diouf decided to pull himself out of Diagne's group of political insiders. This marks the beginning of Diouf's role as an opposition leader. Part of Diagne's shift coincided with Diouf's loss of position vis-à-vis Diagne, who had accumulated enough social and symbolic capital as Deputy to be inured from

Diouf's advice or defection. Part of that capital came from Diagne's cooperative relationship with the colonial administration and with the Bordeaux merchants. The other piece of his capital came from the nature of politics in colonial Senegal, where everything from jobs to food were distributed to loyal supporters.

But Galandou Diouf had access to symbolic capital that Diagne did not. Galandou Diouf came from a family saturated in colonial sacrifice and service. When Diouf's family served the colonial government during the conquest of the hinterland, this was not looked upon negatively by the inhabitants of Senegal, particularly those of the four communes. Quite the opposite was true. At the age of eleven, Diouf had lost his father during the battle in Bakel against Mamdou Lamine in 1886. Diouf's ancestors Ndiawar Guèye, Yacine Guèye, and Aly Sow were combatants with Faidherbe and died in the battle of N'Gol. Kayre Sow and Mafal Guèye were also soldiers of Faidherbe, and they were injured at Dialiamath and at Loro, respectively.⁹ Diouf's ancestors had fought for Faidherbe, Diouf's father had died during the infamous siege of Bakel, Diouf fought for the French in the trenches of the Western front. Diouf's family had a history of sacrifice, and deep collaboration with the French presence in Senegal. Diouf's family provided him with symbolic capital in Saint-Louis.

By volunteering to fight in World War I as an originaire--recognized as a French citizen in the French army--Diouf gave legitimacy to Diagne's claims about the loyalty of originaires and his ability to recruit African volunteers. Diouf's enlistment was regularly trotted out during Diagne's speeches to the General Council and to the inhabitants of the four communes as an exemplar of duty and

⁹ ANS 23 G 100 (174), eulogy by Maurice Guèye, Mayor of Rufisque.

courage. When Diouf returned to Senegal, he accompanied Diagne on his enlistment tours; Diouf's valor was cited as a rallying point around which all Africans could feel pride and inspiration. After the war was over, the symbolic and social capital of 'war veteran' was deployed by Diouf for the rest of his career. Diouf's service appealed to a variety of people: other originaires who had served in the French army, French men who were veterans themselves, members of the *tirailleurs sénégalais*, whose rights and benefits Diouf would fight for during the extent of his career.

Diouf's categorization as an *ancien combattant* also propelled him to 'patriot' status, among originaires, inhabitants in the Protectorate, and, very importantly, many of the French. His actual experience in the war solidified that image. This was an African fighting in the Western Front alongside French citizens. Diouf's war record was impressive. Diouf earned multiple commendations for his performance in the war.

Diouf would return from the war with the rank of Lieutenant of the Reserves. Diouf could invoke his battle front experiences to demonstrate his understanding of duty, sacrifice and courage. Even outside the image of Diouf as a patriot, Diouf resonated with fellow veterans. Veterans possessed a common, powerfully transformative experience could transcend race, class, ethnic, and geographical boundaries, as evidenced in the relationship between Alfred Goux and Galandou Diouf.

By 1928 Galandou Diouf was a formidable opponent to Blaise Diagne, running a political party which called itself the "opposition." This was a huge

career risk for Diouf, however. Losing the election could mean the end of Diouf's political career and could decimate his capital (economic, social and symbolic) in Senegal and with the French administration. It almost did just that after Diouf narrowly lost the election. The meetings, rallies and documents about this race shed new light upon the political process in colonial Senegal. Diouf's ability to effectively organize supporters and a campaign is impressive. Diouf even tried to secure victory after loss by appealing to a sense of French republican justice in Paris, traveling there to argue that the 1928 election was rife with fraud and corruption.

Part of the organizing force of Galandou Diouf's campaign and party revolved around disenchantment with Blaise Diagne. Diouf accused Deputy Diagne of being too far removed from the Senegalese people to be aware of their interests or needs. Diagne was the administration's accomplice. This was embodied in Diagne's support for the creation of the Colonial Council and the abolishment of the General Council. The Colonial Council reduced originaire say in local governance and authority vis-à-vis the colonial administration. Diagne was in the hands of the Bordeaux merchants and had sold out to their interests. Diagne was corrupt. But Diouf's opposition party needed more than just accusations against Diagne; it needed a program. Diouf came up with a platform that he promoted as a corrective to Diagne's positions and as a fulfillment of the needs of originaires and all Senegalese. Diouf was met with colonial surveillance and threats, but also with enthusiastic support from a variety of personages in Senegal. But it was not enough to dislodge Diagne as deputy.

Galandou Diouf's professed republican sentiments and his struggles within the system draw attention to colonial contradictions, and Diouf's deployment of his circumscribed range of options in his limited field. Diouf's position as opposition leader would last six years, during which time Diouf would face colonial oppression and financial difficulties. He also received support from métropole organizations, such as Kouyaté and his *Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre*. A textual analysis of discourse within a narrative format has provided a reimagining of Diouf's consequence in his years of failure and harassment from colonial officials. Diouf was 'frozen out' of the economic and political field of Senegal.

But Galandou Diouf's life would not be marked by failure. In 1934 Blaise Diagne died, and with him his powerful coalition. Diagne's *Républicain Socialiste* party needed a new leader. Dugay Clédor was rejected and Lamine Guèye became the chosen heir. Galandou Diouf decided to throw his hat in the 1934 special election for Deputy, held to replace Diagne. With economic support, Diouf was able to resurrect his political career. Diouf's rhetoric in the campaign against Guèye demonstrated how Diouf differentiated himself as the populist leader opposed to the smooth-talking lawyer—Guèye—who had abandoned Senegal.

Diouf won the election and would win again in two years, consolidating himself as one of the most influential politicians in French West Africa from 1934 to 1941. Although Galandou Diouf worked within the colonial state's framework, he possessed a progressive program of reform. Diouf's political program often

reflected his organic connection to the people of Senegal, and strengthened his image of a populist politician who had been a farmer himself. Diouf also kept the interests of originaires in the center stage. Of particular concern to Diouf were the re-creation of the General Council, and the annulment of the Colonial Council, which he would never witness. Diouf knew the Colonial Council had watered down independent originaire authority and power. Governor General Brévié stymied many of Diouf's projects, believing them financially unrealistic or detrimental to colonial interests.

When arguing against or for certain projects or laws, Diouf would use the rhetoric of the 'civilizing mission' to emphasize his points and to push his own symbolic capital within the system. Diouf did not have a great deal of power in the French system outside of what he could coerce through discourse, personal relationships and symbolic capital. Diouf's ability to achieve the most influence on the colonial government came from having a powerful support base in Senegal, which could incorporate a wide range of interests significant to the French state.

The colonial framework in which Diouf found himself was particularly challenging and his range of options in decision making was limited by his field. During his years of influence as deputy, France and French West Africa were in the midst of a world depression. Senegal was experiencing drought. France was undergoing significant political changes and upheaval and the colonial mission was in contest. Colonial focus and colonial culture had shifted away

from assimilation and towards humanism and a colonial 'revival' of African cultural tradition, which devalued men like Galandou Diouf.

Diouf struggled with French administrators and local authorities in Senegal. He was not even allowed to register in Dakar's voting list because his claim to own land in the city was challenged. Some of Diouf's successes were on a personal level, however, when he obtained positions or favors for friends or supporters. Diouf deployed his social capital in these situations, but was not always successful. Perhaps this was not the most elegant part of colonial politics, but Diouf's recognition of its importance helped shape him as a politician.

After 1936 Diouf became embroiled in a contentious relationship with the Popular Front. In his initial optimism, Diouf once again attempted to persuade the French government to implement lasting and real reform in Senegal when the Popular Front came to power. Representing himself as the spokesmen for Senegalese people (and Africans throughout the AOF), Diouf wasted no time expressing the grievances of the Senegalese people to the new Minister of Colonies, Marius Moutet, being careful to point out colonial excesses and fraud. Diouf's bold and aggressive stand was politely answered and basically ignored.

Diouf became convinced that the Popular Front's Governor General de Coppet was actively supporting Lamine Guèye's PSS against him in local elections, and accused de Coppet of illegal favoritism. Diouf's insistence upon foul play was once again dismissed. Diouf became involved in the labor movement, perhaps even agitating the situation between employees and employers of the DSL in order to prop his flagging capital and discredit de

Coppet. Historians have accused Diouf of having no other interest in the working class, but this flies in the face of much of Diouf's political appeal, agenda and purpose as the leader of the "common man."

The final days of the Third Republic would correspond to the waning days of Diouf's career. In 1938 and 1939, Diouf continued to push for reforms, particularly of French institutions such as the *Sociétés de Prevoyance*. Diouf claimed such reforms were for the good of the rural inhabitants of Senegal. As France moved towards another world war, Diouf the patriot provided the French government with propaganda. Just days before the German invasion, France was putting colonial Africa on display for public consumption and to reassure the French about Africa's willingness to help the country. Diouf publicly applauded the display and echoed Republican sentiments of 'Greater France' and her ability to defend herself.

At the same time as these republican sentiments were being lauded, the French administration was foreclosing on liberties in the colonies. France soon was embroiled in another World War and eventually Diouf was subsumed into Vichy France, much to his great dismay and disappointment. Even as he was falling sick, Diouf attacked the excesses of Vichy's French colonial administrators, accusing them of being hypocrites and invoking the wrath of authorities. Diouf died in occupied France, writing a final letter to his son that expressed both his loyalty to the republican ideals of France, his disillusionment with many French people, and his love for Senegal.

In this limiting, challenging, shifting colonial framework, Diouf sparred, pleaded, cajoled and threatened French administrators to implement points from his platform. Many times he was frustrated, but he kept pushing, getting into rather personal confrontations with men like Governor General de Coppet. He agitated for radical economic and social reforms, such as automatic French citizenship for all war veterans; but historians have often found him not radical enough. In many ways Galandou Diouf was a colonial contradiction. He was African, black, a Muslim man with seven children and three wives. He was a republican, a colonial politician, a deal maker and breaker. He was not “African” enough for colonial humanists and he was not “assimilated” enough to be considered a real *évolué*.

Diouf’s political trajectory might have been quite different had he been elected Deputy in 1928. During the election campaign of 1928, Diouf had a wide base of support that encompassed the SFIO and other metropolitan interests, as well as Lamine Guèye, and he was quite popular in Senegal. By 1932, however, that base had narrowed. Diouf’s relationship with France’s administrative personnel remained rocky and his schism with Lamine Guèye and the Popular front ebbed at his power and ability to promote change for West Africa after 1934.

Galandou Diouf was difficult to classify for colonial France; and he has been rather inconvenient to historians. Too much a part of colonial structure to be a “resistor,” his success in academic literature has often been contributed to his “corruption.” This view of Diouf is lifted off of colonial documents written by

colonial officials frustrated with Diouf's populist appeal and his lack of "high" French language, education and culture. To them, he was not "French" enough. How could Diouf be considered assimilated when he had three wives? Galandou Diouf was a contradictory African leader for French colonial administrators. An inconvenient subject like Galandou Diouf has promoted a simple categorization and analysis in the literature, when the narrative of his life reflects a much different reality.

Galandou Diouf constantly tried to achieve parity for originaires with the French. What Diouf believed his range of choices were as a nationalist was constrained by the colonial field and his position as an originaire, but his dislike of the Colonial Council had little to do with his desire to disenfranchise Africans in the Protectorate. After all, he tried to get all veterans citizenship status, including *tirailleurs sénégalais*. He strongly believed Africans—particularly black men—should be treated as equals with the French. He could not imagine completely revolting against French rule because for him the path to Senegalese freedom was within the French system.

Diouf was a part of the system, but also stood in opposition to it. Proto-nationalist protest in most colonies during the 1930s was directed at the European monopoly of power at the heights of colonial society and rule. Diouf can be considered a proto-nationalist, for he consistently challenged the European monopoly of power in Senegal, and attempted to exert influence on colonial policy and practice throughout his career. Diouf publicly proclaimed that

he would like to be the first African Minister of Colonies.¹⁰ Diouf was an ambitious man. His life, his career, his failures and victories have much to teach about the changing landscape of Senegalese politics throughout the course of more than thirty years.

Galandou Diouf was aware of the contradictions that molded his life. While in Paris, he gave himself the nickname "Black Lion," after the name of a popular French brand of black shoe polish.¹¹ Diouf re-reflected French images of himself back on the French. During one debate on the fate of Communist deputies, Diouf roared, "What France really needs is to import a few more good anthropophagites like me and we would eat them alive."¹² He once attracted a huge crowd of French men and women on the banks of the Seine by pointing at the river and jabbering in pidgin French about how big and dangerous French crocodiles were. Galandou Diouf despaired about French images of Africans and racist stereotypes. He recognized the contradiction between French colonial refusal to recognize his, and fellow Africans' rights, and the Republican ideas at the foundation of the government.

The political history of Senegal before 1960 should be profoundly reinterpreted. Future research conducted upon some of the secondary characters in Senegalese politics, such as Alfred Goux, Dugay Clédor and Louis Martin, would be profitable. These men helped shape the colonial political field, and provided crucial support for men like Lamine Guèye and Galandou Diouf.

¹⁰ "Lion of Senegal," *Time Magazine*, 1 April 1940.

¹¹ "Lion Noir" was the name of the polish. "Lion of Senegal," *Time Magazine*, 1 April 1940.

¹² Ibid. An anthropophagite is defined as "a person who eats human flesh," i.e., a cannibal, and also a "barbarian, savage."

They acted as the representatives for deputies in Senegal, and their stories could reveal much about the internal workings of Senegalese politics.

More research should also be pursued surrounding the relationship between Cheikh Anta Mbacké and Galandou Diouf, as well as Diouf's connections to other Muslim leaders and brotherhoods in Senegal, West Africa, and in France. Diouf's position as a Muslim leader with deep connections in the Protectorate is significant and warrants further inquiry. Galandou Diouf's story would be enhanced by more data on the private aspects of his life, particularly his relationship with his wives and children. What kind of symbolic capital did his wives possess? Did they aid Diouf's political career? How were Diouf's children positioned in the colonial administration? How do his descendents interpret his political career? How does the modern state of Senegal? Answering all of these questions would open windows into the African aspect of Senegal's political field and provide depth to any portrayal of Diouf.

This dissertation has seriously re-evaluated Galandou Diouf's role and impact on twentieth-century Senegalese and French colonial history; my interpretation is based mainly upon original research from archival documents located in the National Archives in Dakar, Senegal. Future research on the topic would be enhanced by oral interviews with Diouf's family members and associates, or their children. Future projects would benefit from further archival research in Dakar, Saint-Louis and Aix-en-Provence.

The main arguments of the dissertation are as follows:

1. Galandou Diouf was instrumental in Blaise Diagne's campaign for deputy as a mobilizer and organizer in 1914, and he remained an important figure in Diagne's organization until 1927.
2. Diouf was a patriot, with a heritage of French loyalty and an admirable war record from World War I; he also adhered to his African identity and place.
3. Diouf was a militant originaire, deploying his distinctiveness as an originaire dedicated to pushing against excesses and corruptions in the French colonial system.
4. Diouf pushed for Senegalese parity with the French within a shifting and constraining colonial system.
5. Diouf was an opposition leader, rallying diverse groups and people to a platform that challenged Diagne's political might and relationship with the French state. Diouf was also an opposition leader against a shifting colonial administration and against the influence of the Bordeaux commercial houses.
6. Galandou Diouf was a Deputy to the National Assembly in Paris, the highest elected office a man from West Africa could hope to attain. His career and his experiences are a lens through which to view the colonial relationship in new and interesting ways.
7. Diouf was more of an organic intellectual than Blaise Diagne, Lamine Guèye, or Léopold Senghor. He was raised in Senegal, a man of commune and Protectorate, and he had diverse occupations within Senegal, from a farmer, to a businessman, to a politician.

8. Galandou Diouf was a resourceful and shrewd politician, who used his symbolic capital and his status as a veteran, Muslim, and African in a variety of situations at all levels. He was able to build a network of political support within the communes, Protectorate and métropole, and he adapted to a changing colonial administration, which was often hostile to his program of reform. Diouf's contributions to Senegalese history thus should be reevaluated; he was able to identify some of the main problems of Senegal's economy and politics, and he prefigured the nationalist movements of the 1960s. Diouf may have been a contradictory and often combative politician, but never a second-rate one.

9. Utilizing Bourdieu's social theory of symbolic capital, this dissertation charts how politicians in Senegal could build networks and operate in the colonial field. Galandou Diouf's life and the lives of other political players and associates in colonial Senegal reveal how symbolic capital was obtained, deployed and lost in the public arena.

Galandou Diouf maintained his Senegalese identity and his French patriotism under difficult conditions, and he never sold out to the Bordeaux interests. By the late 1940s, both administrative control and commune privilege were part of an establishment that was being challenged by Africans, and would be eventually eclipsed. Diouf prefigures these movements, and charts a pattern of relationships that Senghor and other nationalists would successfully build upon to secure independence for Senegal.

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