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presented by

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ENCLOSING THE COMMONS? A POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ACCESS TO
LAND AND WATER IN SUSSUNDENGA, MOZAMBIQUE

By

Michael Madison Walker

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
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ABSTRACT

ENCLOSING THE COMMONS? A POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ACCESS TO LAND
AND WATER IN SUSSUNDENGA, MOZAMBIQUE

By

Michael Madison Walker

This dissertation examines smallholders' access to and use of land and water
resources in Sussundenga District in central Mozambique. It takes a political ecology
and historical perspective on how access to land and water resources has changed under
different forms of political authority over the last 50 years. Patterns of authority
governing access to land and other natural resources have shifted from pre-colonial
chiefly rule to chiefly rule alongside Portuguese administration as Portuguese settlers
arrived in Sussundenga in the 1950s and appropriated land and labor from African
residents. Following independence, the new government embarked on a rural
villagization program establishing communal villages in Sussundenga in 1979 and 1980.
Though Frelimo attempted to marginalize traditional authorities in communal villages,
regulos continued to exercise authority alongside newly imposed local party structures.
The civil war (1976-1992) created food insecurity, curtailed agricultural production, and
displaced populations. Political and economic liberalization undertaken in the late 1980s
added more layers of complexity surrounding legitimating local authorities and control
over land.

Despite the profound political and economic changes Sussundengans have
experienced over the last half century, many continue to view chiefly rule as the most
legitimate form of rule over land and people. Access to land and water remains rather

flexible and negotiable, and many Sussundengans draw on chiefly authority to substantiate their claims to land. Rural residents who migrated to Sussundenga during the war have been incorporated into, not excluded from, the existing socio-political milieu through submitting to local chiefs in exchange for access to land.

Although land and water are legally state property, the state does not exert absolute authority over resources, and instead, is one of several modes of power which shape access to resources.

I recorded numerous cases of people negotiating over access to wetland areas, which are critical for wet and dry season agriculture, and provide women fruits and vegetables for household consumption as well as income generating opportunities. Surprisingly, valuable wetlands have not been enclosed through a process of commodification and exclusion attesting to the flexibility of local norms and practices governing the control of these critical resources.

Based on 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork including participant observation, identifying land and water resources, semi-structured interviews on access to land and water, semi-structured interviews with development workers and government employees, and analyzing land, water, and development policy documents, this dissertation documents the multiple ways Sussundengans claim access to land and the sources of authority they articulate to substantiate their claims.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

ARAs	Administrações Regionais de Água, Regional Water Authorities
ARA-Centro	Administração Regional de Água Centro, Central Regional Water Authority
BSAC	British South African Company
CAN	Companhia Nacional Algodoeira, National Cotton Company
DINAGECA	Direcção Nacional de Geografia e Cadastro, National Directorate of Geography and Cadastre
DNA	Direcção Nacional de Água, National Water Directorate
DUAT	Titulo de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra, Land Use Title
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambique Liberation Front
GoM	Government of Mozambique
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MT	Metical, Mozambican Currency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ORAM	Organização Rural de Ajuda Mutua, Rural Mutual Help Organization
PARPA	Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, Action Plan to Reduce Absolute Poverty
PIDE	Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado, Portuguese Secret Police
PRE	Programa de Reabilitação Económica, Economic Rehabilitation Program
PROAGRI	Programa Nacional de Desenvolvimento Agricultura, National Agricultural Development Program

RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Mozambique National Resistance
RTI	Repartição do Trabalho Indigena, Native Labor Department
SPGC	Serviço Provincial de Geografia e Cadastro, Provincial Mapping and Land Registry Service
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

GLOSSARY

Aldeamentos	Colonial fortified villages (Portuguese)
Aldeias Comunais	Communal villages (Portuguese)
Assimilado	Assimilated status (Portuguese)
Bairro	Neighbor or zone (Portuguese)
Baixa	Wetland or low-lying area (Portuguese)
Capitão Mor	Military/Civil authority in Portuguese administration
Chibaro/Chibalo	Forced labor (Chiteve)
Civilizado	Civilized (Portuguese)
Colonato	Colonial agricultural settlement scheme (Portuguese)
Deslocado	Displaced person (Portuguese)
Ferias	Portuguese-established trading fairs (Portuguese)
Ganho-ganho	Short-term or day labor (Portuguese)
Indigena	Native (Portuguese)
Kukumbira	To request or ask (Chiteve)
Kutaurirana	To discuss with each other (Chiteve)
Lobola/o	Brideprice (Chiteve)
Luta Armada	Armed Struggle against colonialism (Portuguese)
Machamba	Agricultural land (Portuguese)
Makoto	Sorghum Beer used in rainmaking ceremonies
Mambo	Chief (Chiteve)
Matoro	Wetland (Chiteve)
Mugero	Irrigation canal (Chiteve)

Munda	Agricultural Field (Chiteve)
Muridzi/Varidzi	Original settler or first arrival (Chiteve)
Prazos de Coroa	Portuguese crown lands granted in the Zambezi Valley in the Seventeenth Century (Portuguese)
Regulo	Traditional authority or chief (Portuguese)
Sipaio	African policeman in colonial service

Chapter One
Introduction
A Political Ecology of Access to Land and Water in Sussundenga

The sun was still coming up as we walked with it facing our backs. For the first time in six months the ground was wet. There had been several light rain showers over the course of the dry season, but none heavy enough to saturate the soil. It was now mid-November and it seemed everyone was talking about the lack of rain. In conversations people predicted, questioned, lamented, and hoped that the first rains of this year's agricultural cycle were not far away. Over the last two weeks, we eagerly watched gray, heavy clouds form and dissipate over the western mountain range without bringing more than a drizzle to our part of central Mozambique. Many households' grain supplies run low by late October and early November, while maize and vegetable prices increase due to stronger demand. Households with access to wetland or stream-bank gardens are able to harvest at least twice a year, providing food and income and mitigating the effects of high prices and food insecurity during the months before the first rains. Timely and adequate rains are essential for Sussundengan farmers to plant maize and sorghum to be harvested in April and May.

On this particular morning, Nelson Malungisa and I left early in order to meet with chief Buapua before he was occupied by other visitors. As we set out for his compound, the main road through Sussundenga-Sede bustled with activity, people carrying small hoes and bags of seed. Puddles still stood in some parts of the road as we left the immediate confines of the town and took a smaller pathway leading to Buapua where we were to meet the chief by the same name. Upon veering off the main road, we traversed fields full of people sowing seeds in the wake of last night's generous rainfall.

In some cases, entire families, husbands, wives, and children stood in recently tilled rows, knees bent and backs arched over the soil, dropping seeds into newly dug holes several inches apart. The hard red-clay soils near the town were now soft and malleable to the touch of small hand-held hoes. Fields were alive with activity as people talked and worked hard to get their seeds into the ground.

When we arrived at chief Buapua's home, he was sitting alone outside. His wife and daughters had gone early to their fields to plant maize. His bicycle, leaning against a tree, was loaded with a bag of seed and a small hoe tied over the rear fender, ready to depart for his *machamba* after our interview. He cultivates on a piece of land about a 30 minute bike ride from his home and grows vegetables in a wetland garden closer to his residence. His livelihood practices reflect a dominant land use pattern for older residents and families connected to ruling lineages, access to and use of rainy season sorghum and maize fields and smaller wetland or riverine gardens producing dry season fruits and vegetables.

Fives days earlier, chief Buapua presided over a rain ceremony at his compound. The land surrounding the 10 thatched-roof and sun-dried brick huts that is his home was full of people from the area known as Buapua. The men slaughtered a goat while the women roasted the meat and brewed a sorghum beer known as *makoto* often used in rain-making ceremonies. People, young and old, sang and danced to the rhythms of a goat-skin drum called a *batuki*. The ceremony lasted throughout the day and into the evening.

Rainmaking represents one way in which the lives of the present are inextricably linked to the lives of the past. Ancestral spirits must be propitiated through these ceremonies in order to guarantee timely and adequate rainfall to produce a successful

harvest. Throughout many parts of Southern Africa, sufficient rains are a reflection of social harmony and respect for the ancestors while drought or insufficient rain connotes social discord. Thus rainfall, soil fertility, agricultural production, and social relations are intertwined in a way of understanding the social and biophysical worlds that call into question dichotomies such as nature/culture or symbolic/material.

In addition to maintaining a linkage between the present and the past, rainmaking also represents one of several practices by which people attempt to gain access to or control over water. Chief Buapua attempts to facilitate the arrival of rain on behalf of his subjects for the benefit of the entire "community" through propitiating the ancestral guardians of the land. Like other parts of Southern Africa, rainmaking and ancestral propitiation have a long history in central Mozambique. However, longevity does not automatically produce consensus. Not everyone believes in the ability of the ancestors to control the rain. After the conclusion of our interview, as we walked home, I remarked to Nelson that chief Buapua seemed to have brought the rain just in time. Nelson gave me a skeptical look and replied "If he knew the area needed the rain that badly, why did he wait so long to perform a ceremony? It is only that he waited to the last possible minute before the rains would arrive before doing it. That way he could take credit for it." From Nelson's perspective the arrival of the first rains with Buapua's ceremony is at best coincidence if not a more strategic endeavor to increase his prestige in the eyes of his subjects. Nelson's skepticism of things he defines as "traditional," such as rainmaking, derives from his faith and practice as a Jehovah Witness. However, many other Sussundengans, from a diversity of religious backgrounds, invoke a connection between rainfall and the ancestors usually expressed in the saying "water is a gift from God."

3

Access to fertile land and water is critical in a country where 85% of the population is based in rural areas and dependent on agriculture to meet their subsistence needs and provide income for commodities not produced at home. How do individuals and families secure access to the land and water resources critical to their survival? Though land and water are defined legally as state property, the control over, use of, and access to it are often mediated through locally embedded structures that vary throughout Mozambique. However, local practices and cultural idioms shaping access to land and water exist alongside other forms of authority and ways of accessing resources. In Sussundenga, access is embedded in multiple fields of power relations, overlapping claims to authority, and "entangled landscapes"[1] of rule. How has access to land and water changed under different regimes of authority and rule? Local ways of understanding and allocating land and water in central Mozambique are discussed in the pages that follow. My work provides an ethnographic account of the processes by which people gain access to land and water resources, and how these practices are changing in the context of broader political and economic dynamics.

The enclosure or exclusion of various social actors to critical resources such as land and water has received attention in the more recent literature in the field of political ecology and by scholars interested in common property resources. According to this literature, enclosures are more likely to occur in contexts where land values are increasing, the production of cash crops is prevalent, or irrigation potential is high. Furthermore, forecasts of African rural class formation have animated debates within agrarian and peasant studies for several decades. While socio-economic differentiation

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[1] I borrow this phrase from Moore (2005:4) to suggest how multiple sources of power and authority are produced and reproduced through historically situated symbolic and material struggles over land and resources generating overlapping claims to authority and land derived from specific historical conditions.

4

has increased in numerous contexts, there are also multiple examples of the flexibility, resiliency, and negotiability of local practices and cultural idioms mediating access to land and water resources that ensure a basic level of access to land and water for members of a defined group. These cases complicate the processes by which enclosures take place and ask us to reconsider the linkages between access to land and water and socio-economic differentiation. This study contributes to these debates by highlighting the multiple ways people obtain access to land and water and how they are legitimated. In Sussundenga, the site of this study, land allocations by various chiefs coexists with neighbors and relatives negotiating land amongst themselves, a small informal land market, inheritance, and state allocation of land. Despite the multiple ways in which people claim and seek access to land, chiefly allocation and negotiation are the most prevalent practices structuring access. Furthermore, land use practices and land allocation today cannot be separated from historical patterns of access and control over land in central Mozambique.

Sussundenga is located in a high potential agro-ecological zone characterized by a temperate climate, fertile soils, and reliable rainfall. During the 1950s, the climate along with the proximity to the infrastructure of the Beira corridor, attracted colonial settler interests, and the colonial state supported a Portuguese farming community at the site of present day Sussundenga-Sede.[2] From the waning years of the colonial period until today, Sussundenga has undergone several radical transformations that have shaped how land and water are accessed and controlled. Patterns of authority governing access to land and other natural resources have shifted from pre-colonial chiefly rule to chiefly rule

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[2] *Sede* means center in Portuguese. I use Sussundenga-Sede to refer to the area of Sussundenga District that was once the center of a Portuguese *colonato*, and today serves as the administrative center of the district.

alongside Portuguese administration. Following independence, the new government embarked on a rural villagization program establishing communal villages in Sussundenga in 1979 and 1980. Though Frelimo attempted to marginalize traditional authorities in communal villages, *regulos*, as they are called in Portuguese, continued to exercise authority alongside newly imposed local party structures. The era of political and economic liberalization undertaken in the late 1980s, and the food insecurity, displacement, and destruction created by the war added more layers of complexity surrounding legitimating local authorities and control over land. The existence of multiple ways in which people claim and secure access to land and water and the multiple authorities legitimizing access in Sussundenga cautions against generalizations about rural class formation or the inherent negotiability of local land tenure systems. Instead these dynamics warrant a historically situated ethnographic analysis with attention to context, detail, and the material and symbolic struggles over access to resources.

Like access to productive resources, power and authority in Sussundenga are also multiple and overlapping. Ruling party political structures coexist with chiefly rule, family hierarchies, gender relations, and divisions between longstanding residents, and more recent arrivals. Local embodiments of the state, such as the police, district court, and district agricultural office also wield power over land and water resources through enforcing laws and adjudicating disputes. Given the presence of multiple forms of authority whose legitimacy counts and to whom? Moore (2005) deploys the concept of "selective sovereignties" to probe the entanglement of power relations and authority in a postcolonial Zimbabwean resettlement scheme layered over a rainmaking territory and a chieftaincy. "Selective sovereignties" challenge an absolute notion of state power and

6

authority (Moore 2005:3). In the context of Sussundenga, though land and water are legally owned by the state, the state does not exert absolute authority over land and water resources. Nor was a highly centralized state in the years immediately following independence able to govern in the ways the ruling party desired. There were a number of compromises, revisions, and reformulations of government strategy. Consequently, Sussundengans negotiate a field of multiple and overlapping authority where some continue to seek permission from the chief to cultivate a specific piece of land while others negotiate amongst themselves, petition the local ruling party officials, or district agricultural officers for access to land.

Decentralizing Authority: Policy and Institutional Context since the 1990s

Over the last two decades Mozambique has undergone several profound political and economic changes. In 1990, the government amended the constitution creating a multi-party democracy and facilitating political decentralization from a once highly centralized state as part of the peace negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo. Two years later, on October 4, 1992, Renamo and Frelimo signed the Rome Accord formally ending the sixteen-year civil war. In 1994, Mozambique held its first multi-party elections, and national elections have followed in 1999 and 2004 with Frelimo maintaining a parliamentary majority and the presidency. However, the balance of political power in Manica province is more closely contested. In 1994, the majority of Sussundenga District voted in favor of Renamo and subverted the district's chances to participate in the first local elections in 1998 (Schafer and Bell 2002:409). During the most recent general election in 2004, Frelimo and Renamo each won seven seats in

Manica province[3] while Frelimo maintained control over Sussundenga District, but enjoys more popularity in the northern half of the district.

At the height of the civil war and after several years of drought, in 1987 Mozambique signed its first structural adjustment package designed to liberalize the economy, reduce public expenditures, and control inflation. Since this time Mozambique has become one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world and dependent on donor funding for over half its national budget. Scholars and commentators from various perspectives have documented the deleterious consequences for different segments of the Mozambican population. Under the conditions imposed by structural adjustment, many people have watched as health and education services become eroded and user fees climb higher while macro-economic figures predict higher growth rates and lower inflation. Perhaps most importantly, the era of structural adjustment has made access to cash critical in order to survive. During this period Mozambicans have witnessed an escalation in government corruption and land grabs often connected to the ruling party. Paradoxically, the era of economic liberalization and free market ascendancy coexists and perhaps produces a growing reliance on access to the state and state power in order to obtain essential resources such as land and capital.

Legal reforms have also been carried out in the areas of land, water, environment, forestry, and wildlife. A new water law, signed in 1991, established the legal framework for the decentralization of water management to the watershed level and created new stakeholder institutions designed to better manage water, represent various commercial

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[3] In the first multi-party election in 1994, Frelimo won four seats in Manica while Renamo captured nine. In the second general election in 1999, Frelimo increased its seats to five, and Renamo won 10. In 2004, each party won seven seats. As of 2004 Frelimo controlled 160 seats and Renamo 90 seats in the unicameral parliament. Renamo enjoys a majority of seats in Sofala and Zambezia provinces while Frelimo maintains a slim advantage in Nampula Province. Frelimo has a majority in the other 6 provinces.

interests, maintain water infrastructure, and collect water taxes. In 1995, the government implemented a new national water policy that is consistent with many of the water reforms carried out in other parts of Southern Africa during the 1990s emphasizing the decentralization of water management and a user pay principle through water taxes and concessions for commercial enterprises. Under this policy, water is understood as both a social and economic good. In Mozambique water is now divided into the categories of common and private waters.[4] Common waters refer to water used for drinking, cooking, washing, animals, and subsistence farming in which users do not pay to use or access the water. Private water is defined as water contained on private[5] lands in which the user receives a five year renewable concession. Mozambique's new water law and policies mirror other water reforms in Southern Africa designed to address perceptions of water scarcity, stimulate agricultural and industrial development, and address inequalities in access to water and water infrastructure.[6]

The Forestry and Wildlife Act of 1999 recognizes communities' roles and rights in the management of natural resources and underscores the importance of communities deriving benefits from their natural resources. The act stresses the conservation of forest resources and their sustainable use. The government also signed a new environment law in 1997 that serves as a basis for other environmental legislation. These acts reflect a shift from a highly centralized management regime to community-based natural resource

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[4] Mozambique's division of waters resembles the new categories in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean waters are now divided into primary and productive whereby everyone has a right to primary water to use for cooking, cleaning, drinking, watering gardens and livestock for subsistence. Productive water is defined by use such as for commercial farming and livestock, mining, and hydroelectric power.

[5] All land is legally owned by the state. In this context, private lands refer to commercial enterprises with the right to use and improve the land known as a DUAT (Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra) in Portuguese.

[6] See Ferguson and Derman (1999) for discussion of the tensions between regarding water as an economic and a social good.

management whereby communities are envisioned to participate in and benefit from the control of their resources. However, in practice, the regulatory framework for monitoring and enforcing these new laws is weak and there is considerable opposition within in the government to devolving power to the local level.

The land policy of 1995 and the new Land Law of 1997 recognize existing rights to land and provide land tenure security to rural communities in the face of outside appropriation. Under the new law, communities can formally register their land individually and collectively with the legal backing of the state. Once registered, communities are able to negotiate with foreign and domestic private interests to lease land, labor, or other natural resources to the private sector in exchange for jobs, cash remuneration, or other development activities. The new law attempts to balance the protection and recognition of local mechanisms for accessing and using land with rural development stimulated by a national or foreign private sector.

The government has also signed new laws and decrees in the area of local governance. In 1997, provisions were made for elected local governments in 33 urban municipalities under the Municipal Law. In 2000, the government issued a decree that formally recognizes "traditional authority." In theory these laws transfer power to democratically elected officials in urban areas or kin-based authorities in rural areas. The recognition of traditional authorities commonly referred to as *regulos* in Portuguese has stirred much debate within the government and donor community and produced struggles for legitimacy at the local level.[7]

The new laws and policies of the 1990s in the areas of land, water, natural resources, and local governance have produced a new institutional context prescribing

[7] See Buur and Kyed (2006) and West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999).

10

how land and natural resources should be used and governed. They are often informed

by multiple and competing discourses which attempt to secure access to productive

resources for the country's rural residents while creating conditions to facilitate private

investment and "development" in rural areas. Common throughout these various policies

and laws is an emphasis on decentralizing authority and decision making over resources

and implanting authority in local institutions perceived to be more responsive to local

needs. However, in practice, many of the new laws and policies are poorly disseminated,

and there is unwillingness by some within the government to devolve considerable

powers to the local level. Moreover, a new policy and institutional context should not be

assumed to automatically alter local livelihood practices and norms for using and

allocating land and natural resources. New policies, laws, and institutions are often

understood, interpreted, and reformulated through historically situated cultural idioms

and material practices. However, it is within a new legal, political, and economic context

that Sussundengans, as well as other rural Mozambicans, are now engaging in livelihood

practices and articulating claims to land and water.

Traditional Authority

Local political authority in Mozambique varies across time and space. Prior to

the onset of colonial rule, diverse amalgamations of individuals, families, lineages, and

institutions governed the political and socio-spiritual domains through cultivating "wealth

in people". Group boundaries were often porous allowing newcomers to be incorporated

into the existing social milieu through pledging submission to the sovereign authority or

authorities. In northern Mozambique, settlements emerged around matrilineal families

with settlement heads playing an important and decisive role in the political, spiritual,

and economic realms (West 2005) while in central Mozambique political leaders maintained alliances with large state complexes on the Zimbabwean plateau or submitted to Gaza Nguni overrule shortly before the Mozambique Company appropriated central Mozambique (see Chapter 3). However, in spite of the imposition of new forms of authority, whether through company agents, colonial officials, or powerful empires such as the Gaza, what are vaguely termed "traditional authorities" have endured, though not unaltered, and continue to be deemed legitimate by innumerable Mozambicans.

Traditional authorities, many of them deriving their legitimacy based on kinship, have not gone unchallenged by colonial authorities, Frelimo, or their followers. Their strength, legitimacy, and efficacy vary tremendously across the country, and thus a discussion of traditional authority is better served by focusing on specific families, lineages, and locales.

Portuguese charter companies and the colonial state used traditional authorities, commonly referred to as *regulos* in Portuguese, to extract taxes and labor from their populations. In cases where *regulos* resisted colonial demands, Portuguese officials beat, killed, or replaced them with more compliant subjects. Some *regulos* benefited economically from their positions as tax collectors, labor recruiters, and policing agents and provoked the anger of their followers. In central Mozambique, because of the region's topography, international border, and competing demands of the colonial economy, chiefs entered into negotiations with company recruiters and the colonial administration with considerable bargaining power (see Chapter 3) that shielded their followers from the harshest aspects of forced labor.

Following independence, the new ruling party attempted to marginalize *regulos* and strip them of their authority within the new state administrative apparatus. For members of Frelimo adhering to a Marxist/Leninist scientific socialism, traditional authorities represented a "backward" and "primitive" institution characteristic of a feudalist era and inhibited the transformation of the country into a new modern, socialist nation-state. Despite the rhetoric strongly condemning *regulos* as the "handmaidens of colonialism," many local party cells depended on their cooperation and support in the early years of independence. The government's stance towards *regulos* softened during the protracted war against South African-backed insurgents, and since the peace accord (1992) and first multi-party elections (1994), the government has slowly attempted to (re)-incorporate traditional authorities into the structure of local governance.

The local governance decree of 2000 formally recognizes traditional authorities and outlines their specific responsibilities (see Chapter 2) as officially licensed members of the state. This new recognition has generated struggles for legitimacy at the local level and increased the stakes for being acknowledged a *regulo* (Buur and Kyed 2006). These struggles over legitimacy have also ignited debates over the criteria by which a chief or a sub-chief should be recognized by the population and the government. Some Mozambicans continue to conceptualize *regulos* in terms of a hereditary status while others contend these titles should be bestowed on individuals based on their ability to perform the duties of a chief. Buur and Kyed (2006) document cases in Sussundenga where the population and local authorities are divided over these issues particularly in cases where the chief refuses to engage with the local government. Whether *regulos* are recognized by kin-based or performative criteria, by officially acknowledging traditional

authorities and allocating them roles and responsibilities in local governance, the state, and by extension, the ruling party, is attempting to expand its administrative reach into rural areas in which it never established a presence or where it lost legitimacy during the years of fighting. Thus kin-based political leaders and their institutions, as well as their legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects, will continue to change in response to new political, economic, and social pressures.

In Sussundenga, what is remarkable about traditional authority is the level of legitimacy accorded to *madzimambo* (Chiteve word for chiefs) by Sussundengans. Despite, and perhaps because of, the disruptions of Portuguese settlement, postcolonial resettlement, and civil war, many Sussudengans continue to look to chiefs for access to land and to adjudicate land-related disputes. Chiefly authority remains constant in a context of rapid political and economic change. Sussundengans continue to articulate and understanding of political sovereignty and territory centered on the power of chiefly rule through describing Sussundenga as *nyika yeCupenha* or Cupenha's land.

A Political Ecology of Access: Struggles Over Land and Water

My work draws on and contributes to the field of political ecology and debates over land tenure and rural socio-economic differentiation and processes of enclosure in Africa. Political ecology is a diverse field encompassing a range of theoretical orientations, and emphasizing to different degrees the salience of politics and power relations in shaping ecological and social change. Just as there is no one theoretical or epistemological orientation guiding political ecology research, there is also no standardized methodology for how data should be collected and analyzed. Many political ecologists employ accepted methods in their given fields. However, there is a more

general emphasis on interdisciplinary and multi-scale analysis that attempts to understand the articulation of global processes and local socio-economic and ecological dynamics.

Despite the heterogeneity of the field, there are several common assumptions underpinning a significant amount of political ecology research. Bailey and Bryant contend that political ecologists agree on two basic premises: environmental problems reflect broader political and economic forces and there is a need to change local, regional, and global political processes in favor of the "poor" (1997:3). Political ecologists recognize that environmental change is not neutral, that ecological dynamics interact and are influenced by socio-economic inequalities and political processes (Bailey and Bryant 1997:28). Many scholars who identify their work as political ecology share a concern for investigating power relations and how these relationships shape ecological and social dynamics.

Political ecology emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in reaction to the predominant trends in fields such as ecological anthropology in the 1960s. During this time, theory and research focused on people and culture as one part of an ecosystem. Anthropologists understood culture to be adaptive to particular ecological circumstances. The process of adaptation was believed to shape symbolic or ideational aspects of a particular culture. Anthropologists emphasized stability and homeostasis in human-environment interactions. Furthermore, these frameworks abstracted people and their environments from specific historical conditions and viewed cultures in isolation from broader political and economic forces. Today environmental anthropology and political ecology reflect, like ecological anthropology of the 1950s and 1960s, broader theories, conceptualizations, and practices within anthropology. In particular, environmental

anthropology draws influence from post-structuralism, cultural theory, political economy, transnationalism, and globalization with an emphasis on issues of power, inequality, and the production of knowledge (Brosius 1999:278). Not only do environmental anthropology and political ecology garner influence from multiple epistemological and ontological sources, but they also combine "theory and analysis with political awareness and policy concerns" (Kottak 1999:23) that position researchers to contribute to debates over social and environmental justice.

During the 1960s and 1970s, neo-Malthusian predictions of growing environmental scarcity resulting from increasing population pressure became prevalent explanations for environmental degradation in many circles. Anthropologists, geographers, political scientists, historians, and others influenced by world systems and dependency theory critiqued this line of thought for failing to recognize how global political and economic forces impinged on people and their environments and structured their livelihood practices often in ways detrimental to their biophysical surroundings. Political ecology also emerged out of a critique of neo-Malthusian explanations of environmental degradation and the apolitical, equilibrium-focused work of ecological anthropology during this period.

Because of the time period in which it developed, political ecology is wedded to twentieth century Marxist dependency theory and world systems theory (Biersack 2006:9). According to Neumann, the original concern of political ecology explored "how the politics of access to and control over land and resources were related to environmental change" (2005:5). This is exemplified by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987:17) in defining their approach to understanding land degradation as linking

"concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy." This approach stressed a shifting dialectic between society and productive resources such as land and between classes and social groups (ibid.). In one of the first publications to use the term political ecology, Eric Wolf called for an approach to human-environment interactions focused on power relations and the articulation of "local" social and ecological systems with global political and economic forces (Wolf 1972). The historical connection with political economy and dependency theory endowed political ecology with a sharp focus on the social relations of production and access to, control over, and the distribution of resources.

With the growth of the field, several prominent debates have emerged over the present and future direction of political ecology research. Below I will highlight several important areas of contention that leads those of us working within a political ecology framework to clarify, strengthen, and reformulate our understandings of human-environment relationships. I also highlight the following debates because they are important to how I conceptualize the political ecology of access to land and water resources in Sussundenga.

In recent years, attention has been devoted to just how political is political ecology. Or what constitutes politics in political ecology and subsequently how do we characterize the environment or biophysical world? In addition to conceptualizing politics and ecology, how are these two domains intertwined, how do they articulate with social realities, and at what scales? These questions have produced a number of views and reflections on the relationship between political processes, power relations, and ecological dynamics.

Recent emphasis on the centrality of politics in political ecology stems from political ecology's macro-structural and deterministic legacy. By situating politics more centrally, political ecologists are in a position to study access and control over resources, property rights, and the production of environmental knowledge in arenas such as the household, community, and state (Peet and Watts 1996:9). Politics often becomes synonymous with power relations. Paulson et al. (2005:28) use political to mean "the practices and processes through which power, in its multiple forms, is wielded and negotiated." Drawing on post-structuralism and discourse theory, Peet and Watts argue that greater attentiveness to politics expands the objects of study from class to other social movements and collective forms of identity and resistance and deepens areas of analysis from property rights and control over resources, to incorporate the realms of discourse, knowledge production, and imagination (1996:37).

Peluso and Watts (2001:27) contend the point of entry for political ecology is not politics,[8] but rather the social relations of production shaping how nature is appropriated under specific historical conditions. An emphasis on social relations of production involves looking particularly at patterns of ownership and control over capital, labor, and resources. According to Peluso and Watts (2001:29), the social relations of production entail three elements including patterns of accumulation, forms of access to and control over resources, and the actors that emerge from the social relations of production (firms, workers, peasants, state operatives). In conjunction with Peet and Watts' (1996) call for

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[8] Peluso and Watts emphasize the salience of social relations of production partly in response to Vadya and Walters (1999) article advocating "event ecology" or "evenemental" as method for understanding ecological change through identifying ecological changes and then working backwards to establish chains of cause and effect. Derman and Ferguson (2003) highlight how a framework that does not recognize political/economic aspects of environmental change until the change has occurred offers anthropologists little in the way of contributing to policy debates or addressing issues of social and environmental justice.

a greater emphasis on politics, Moore (1996) also envisions a more politically vigorous political ecology, however, with an emphasis on a different type of politics. Moore (1996:126) argues scholars have placed too much attention on structural determination and macro-structural frameworks, eschewing the micro-politics of access to productive resources and the symbolic and material contestations that constitute struggles over resources. A focus on micro-politics highlights differentiation by class, gender, ethnicity, age and articulates structural forces, symbolic practices, and material struggles (Moore 1996:126).

An emphasis on the way multiple forms of power are deployed, contested, and negotiated situates political ecology to not only focus on the social relations of production and symbolic and materials struggles over access to resources and labor, but to explore power relations and the conditions under which environmental narratives are produced, legitimated, and enacted as policy (Fairhead and Leach 1996; Stott and Sullivan 2000). According to Forsyth (2003:4), "a critical political ecology may be seen to be the politics of ecology as a scientific legitimization of environmental policy" as a way of examining the political forces constructing various and competing definitions of ecology that are presented as representations of a biophysical reality. Forsyth's "critical political ecology" departs from other political ecology approaches that take at face value environmental science's constructions of ecology and the implications of these constructions on environmental politics. What are the implications of these narratives or specific forms of environmental policy for social and environmental justice or economic development? How is scientific knowledge about the environment socially and politically situated (Stott and Sullivan 2000)? Attention to the production of

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environmental knowledge and debates over the construction of science provides an optic for examining environmental change without attributing its sole cause to the logic of capitalist accumulation (Forsyth 2003).

As political ecologists devote more attention and analytical space to politics, some political ecologists fear biophysical processes or ecology is becoming marginalized, leading some to level charges that political ecology has become "politics without ecology"[9] (Vadya and Walters 1999). Alongside calls to foreground politics and power relations are also arguments for a more balanced and integrated approach to the political and ecological dimensions of environmental issues (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003) and that biophysical processes also influence human/environment interactions (Forsyth 2003; Robbins 2004; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). These approaches ask political ecologists to take seriously biophysical and ecological dynamics, recognizing that despite human transformation of the environment, there are still processes and dynamics that exist outside of human control.[10]

In Southern Africa, the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and the El Niño-Southern Oscillation[11] shape patterns of rainfall and drought over extended periods of time. The band of low pressure known as the ITCZ gives Africa its wet and dry seasonality, bringing rains to Southern Africa as it migrates southward in September/October. Despite efforts of scientists, engineers, African governments, and

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[9] However, in reviewing the debates over what constitutes ecology in political ecology, Walker (2005) argues there is still plenty of evidence political ecologists have not abandoned a concern with the biophysical world. Also see Walker (2007) for an overview of the debates over politics in political ecology.
[10] See for example Cronon (1996) and White (1995) on nature's agency. O'Connor (1998) recognizes the mutual constitution of social and environmental history from a Marxist perspective. Ingold (2000) provides a relational view of human and nonhuman organisms that reflects the mutual constitution of people and their environments.
[11] Davis (2001:262-263) cites a 1998 study correlating the ten strongest El Niños of the twentieth century and rainfall over the southern half of Africa. La Niña events shaped the devastating floods in Mozambique in 2000.

farmers to store, transfer, and direct the flow of water through dams, canals, and other infrastructure, the environment continues to exercise its agency reflected in the timing and amount of rainfall, humidity, temperature, and the propensity to generate strong storms along the Indian Ocean coastline which all have a direct influence on how people structure their livelihoods and how governments and international organizations prioritize development efforts, build infrastructure, and allocate resources.

Biersack (2006) identifies five theoretical shifts that characterize contemporary political ecology that inform how I conceptualize the ways in which Sussundengans negotiate and claim access to land and water resources. First there is a resistance to dichotomizing and reducing symbolic and material factors to separate entities. Instead there is a focus on how symbolic expressions and material processes condition each other and how struggles over access to and control over resources can be simultaneously symbolic and material[12] (Moore 1996). Access to and use of land and other natural resources in Sussundenga reveal implicit ideas over who can be granted access to particular lands and under what conditions and what forms of authority legitimate claims to land. Furthermore, struggles over particular land or water resources are not only about material benefits derived from these environments, but also about the power to define the relationships between different social groups and the biophysical world.

Second, political ecologists have been apt to critique epistemological separations of nature and culture. Political ecologists have offered accounts that emphasize how environment and society are mutually constitutive and how our understanding of the

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[12] See the section on Access, Enclosure, and Socio-economic Differentiation in this chapter for more examples of how symbolic and material struggles are intertwined. Hornborg (2001) attempts to erode the boundaries between the symbolic and material in demystifying the social relations and patterns of inequality and unequal exchange on which technology is built.

biophysical environment is intimately linked to how we engage with it (Hornborg 2001:10). Ingold contends that "people develop their skills and sensitivities through histories of continuing involvement with human and non-human constituents of their environments" (2000: 10). The mutually dependent and embedded relationship between humans and the biophysical world captures how both participate "in an unending dialectic with human history...where neither nature nor humanity ever achieves absolute sovereign authority, but both continue to make and remake each other" (Worster 1985:22). Thus Sussundengans come to know and experience the biophysical world through direct and practical engagement with it. Ideas, understandings, and perceptions of the environment are irreducible from one's active involvement with the biophysical world and the other people and institutions that constitute one's social environment.

Third, political ecologists highlight local-global articulations demonstrating how places are constructed and relational to broader processes. The attention to how geographic scales are produced and connected contrasts to earlier approaches to human-environment relationships that understood cultures as bounded and isolated entities or world system approaches that reduced geographical diversity to a single class system. Broader social, political, ecological and economic processes have produced peoples and landscapes of present-day Sussundenga. Chapters Two and Three provide an ethnographic and historical overview of the influences, connections, and transformations that have shaped the cultural milieu and biophysical environment of the area.

Fourth, many scholars within political ecology engage, to some extent, with practice theory to explore the dialectic between structure and agency. This approach

emphasizes people as conscious and active agents[13] in understanding how people negotiate pre-existing social, political, and ecological structures in gaining access to productive resources.[14] In Sussundenga, people live and interact in an environment shaped by global weather patterns, pre-colonial land use practices, settler land use practices, and government resettlement and land allocation strategies all with consequences for the physical landscape as well as how people relate to one another.

Finally, today's political ecology, largely due to contributions by feminist scholars, extends beyond an examination of class inequalities to explore how gender, race, ethnicity, age, and marital status shape access to productive resources and how these identities mediate one's engagement with the environment. "From the start, political ecology was firmly grounded in class analysis; now it is developing a more comprehensive social theory that allows for identification and analysis of dynamics among multiple, overlapping dimensions of identity" (Paulson et al.. 2005:26). Writing at a time of growing interest in feminist anthropology, Henrietta Moore claimed "Gender can no more be marginalized in the study of human societies than can the concept of 'human action' or the concept of 'society'" (1988:6). The importance of gender relations to the study of human societies is as important as gender relations are to the study of human-environment interactions.

Feminist political ecology treats gender as a salient factor in shaping access to and control over resources and examines the unequal access to resources, property rights, and the construction of environmental knowledge through how gender intersects with multiple identities and structures of social and economic inequality. "Gender is not just a

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[13] Though there are debates over the extent to which subjects of power are self-sovereign actors.
[14] Lansing et al.. (2006) provides an example of how Balinese farmers today negotiate a natural and social environment built on the labor, vision, and ingenuity of past generations.

women's concern, however. It is a social construct through which all human beings organize their work, rights, responsibilities and relationships" (Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau 1995:20). Rocheleau et al. (1996) outline three ways in which the environment is gendered: the production knowledge in that women and men have different understandings and experiences that inform their perceptions and engagements with the biophysical world; property rights defining use, access, and ownership of resources are mediated by gender relations[15] within the household, community, and state (Carney 1996); politics, activism, and collective struggles over resources are also mediated by gender through power relations, the gendered division of labor, and practical engagements with the biophysical world. The emphasis on multiple and intersecting identities reflects how "Social difference shapes people's relations with the environment" (Jacobs 2003:17). Feminist political ecology has been particularly fruitful in theorizing, documenting, and understanding the intersections of gender, class, ethnicity, marital status, and age in Africa and how these social differences mediate access to resources such as land, water, and labor (Jackson 1993; Mackenzie 2005; Moore 1996; Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997; Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau 1995).

In addition to focusing on the salience of gender in mediating social and ecological relationships, feminist political ecologists and feminist environmentalists have also challenged unitary models of the household that assume households and the various interests embedded in them are often cooperative and homogenous. Instead, they have

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[15] Throughout the dissertation I follow Agarwal's definition of gender relations as "relations of power between women and men which are revealed in a range of practices, ideas, and representations including the division of labor, roles, and resources between women and men, and the ascribing to them different abilities, attitudes, desires, personality traits, behavioral patterns and so on" (1994:51). Gender relations within the household can also be shaped by "community" expectations and constructions of gender (Meizen-Dick and Zwarteveen 2001).

re-conceptualized the household as an arena of conflict, contestation, and cooperation noting how decision-making processes are gendered and mediated by power relations (Agrawal 1994; Jackson 1993). In many parts of Africa, gendered power relations within the household often structure access to land, labor, income, inheritance, marriage, and natural resources. Women within Sussundenga generally have more autonomy over what is cultivated in wetland and stream-bank areas and possess greater decision-making power over crops or income produced from these areas than rainy season maize and sorghum fields. Thus gender is a salient concept in understanding power relations and access to resources and constitutes an important theme running through this dissertation—access to resources in Sussundenga are gendered and that stream-bank gardens and wetland areas provide women with greater income opportunities, and incomes earned from crops grown in this area is more likely to provide a direct benefit to the household through vegetables rich in micro-nutrients or money to buy household commodities, pay school fees, or assist in unforeseen medical emergencies. However, women's control over their labor and the products from it are not immune to male appropriation even in spaces where women have more social and economic autonomy. Carney (1998) and Schroeder (1999) demonstrate that women's control over gardens and wetland rice production in the Gambia was challenged and undermined by male landholders as market conditions changed and new development priorities and technologies (such as irrigation infrastructure) were introduced. These cases reflect the centrality of gender relations in shaping struggles over land, labor, and capital in the household and community.

A political ecology of access signifies the interconnections of power, authority, social relations, symbolic, and material struggles over resources. Like Paulson et al. (2005), my use of politics is synonymous with power relations—the power to define relationships between people and things; the power to set the conditions of their use; the power to articulate a specific vision of authority, and the power to derive material benefits from land, water, and labor. How people obtain access to land and the sources of authority that substantiate their claims are intertwined with, not separate from, abstractions such as the state, market, or community. Claims and counter-claims, conflicts and contestations, negotiations and sharing are imbued with (micro) politics and power relations that shape social interaction as well as how people relate to their biophysical surroundings.

Mozambique in a Global Context

Although this dissertation primarily focuses on one rural district in central Mozambique, it is important to situate and understand Mozambique in a broader regional and global context. As summarized above, one of the strengths of a political ecology framework is its attention to multi-scale analysis and the articulation of global processes with local social, political, economic, and ecological dynamics. Mozambique's contemporary economic patterns, landscapes, and political debates have been shaped by an array of external and internal influences dating to at least the colonial period, if not longer. By situating Mozambique regionally and globally, how Mozambique became "impoverished" and "underdeveloped" becomes more visible as well as how Mozambique becomes constructed as a "development success story" by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and donor community.

Mozambique has long since been enmeshed in circuits of trade stretching across the Indian Ocean to the interior of eastern and southern Africa. However, with the imposition of charter company rule in the 1890s, and later the colonial state, Mozambicans became increasingly tied to regional and global markets. Forced labor and cash crop production mobilized African labor and intertwined it with regional labor and commodity markets while protecting Portuguese and other European farmers from African competition. Male labor migration reconfigured household gender and generational dynamics and increased the agricultural workload on women and children remaining in rural areas. Mozambique's economic (under)development during the colonial period primarily depended on its relationships with Portugal and South Africa. The colonial state earned foreign exchange through the use of its railways and ports, and South African mining companies paid the salaries in hard currency to the colonial state of the growing number of Mozambican migrant laborers working in South Africa. Mozambique's economic dependence on South Africa would continue following independence.

Portugal's lack of resources and commitment to Mozambique's infrastructural development, combined with little investment in health or education for black Mozambicans and the unequal and discriminatory legal system, fostered animosity towards the colonial state and colonialism. The experiences of inequality, subjugation, and exploitation coalesced in the formation of several political organizations opposed to colonial rule. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1962, several of these organizations united to form the Mozambique Liberation Front or Frelimo. The new political/military organization received training, education, and resources from China, the Soviet Union,

Tanzania, Algeria, and others that helped shape Frelimo's political identity and socialist ideology.

After 10 years of armed insurrection against Portuguese colonialism, Mozambique gained independence, and Frelimo transitioned from a military organization into a ruling political party. Mozambique continued to receive financial resources and training from many of the same countries that supported Frelimo during the liberation struggle, however, Frelimo eventually carved out an international policy position of "non-alignment" by which the government would not officially align itself with either side of the cold war, but would remain sympathetic to revolutionary movements in the developing world and countries or groups espousing a commitment to fighting imperialism and colonialism. Advisors and professionals from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia worked in Mozambican institutions to fill positions left vacant by the exodus of Portuguese settlers, but also to help reshape the country's development from a dependent colony to a socialist nation.

Within Southern Africa, Frelimo had the dubious task of articulating positions against apartheid South Africa and minority-ruled Southern Rhodesia (until 1980) without provoking South Africa into direct military conflict. Mozambique and other "Frontline States" challenged the legitimacy of white minority governments in the region, allowed the African National Congress (ANC) to organize within their borders, and played a pivotal role in the formation of SADC (The Southern African Development Community) in 1980 to decrease their economic dependence on apartheid South Africa.

The transfer of power in South Africa in 1978 from Vorster to P.W. Botha signified a new policy and method for engaging with its regional neighbors. Botha's

"total strategy" sanctioned military intervention in neighboring states as a means of upholding apartheid and thwarting black liberation movements. On the surface Mozambique and South Africa pursued diplomatic channels to resolve tensions over Mozambique's support of the ANC and South Africa's military aggression in the region. Clandestinely, South Africa provided funding, training, and organized the logistics for Renamo, a rebel movement originally created by the Southern Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization and now under the control of the South African defense forces. Renamo became one of the most profound and detrimental external influences on Mozambique's socioeconomic development. Originally comprised of defected Frelimo members and others hostile to the new government, the Rhodesian CIO used Renamo as a counter-insurgency force inside Mozambique to attack ZANLA fighters operating from Mozambique since 1975. After Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, South Africa became the main source of Renamo's training, armaments, and logistical coordination and used the rebel group to destabilize Mozambique. When South Africa acknowledged its links with the group, it justified its support based on its fear of being encircled by "hostile" Marxist regimes. In addition to South Africa, the Malawian government often allowed Renamo fighters to enter Mozambique through its borders, and the Kenyan government permitted the operation of a radio link in East Africa. Renamo opened international offices in Portugal, West Germany, and the United States in an attempt to garner more international support and communicate its anti-communist and anti-Frelimo messages in those countries.

While Renamo relied on a loose affiliation of international right-wing networks to fund and arm its fighters, Frelimo enlisted the help of Zimbabwe soldiers to guard the

Beira corridor in central Mozambique, and Tanzanian troops in northern Mozambique to curb the rebels from spreading across the border. Due to the array of international contributors, as well as the ideological battles linked to the war, Mozambique's conflict exemplifies Nordstrom's (1997) contention that there is no such thing as a local war.[16]

Mozambique paid a heavy social and economic price for Frelimo's socialist ideology and its stance against racism, colonialism, and imperialism. The war, along with a global recession and a regional drought, devastated Mozambique to the point where Frelimo could no longer delay joining the IMF and World Bank as means of receiving international aid. These events in the 1980s and the negotiated end to the war in 1992 signified the end of Frelimo as a Marxist/Leninist vanguard party and a shift to the right.

Since the end of the civil war and a shift to multi-party democracy, international financial institutions and donors have grown more influential in shaping Mozambique's development trajectory and in the case of the IMF, imposed conditionalities on the country in order to receive more foreign aid. These institutions, through development consultants, have helped to craft many of the country's development policies. And in cases such as PARPA II (discussed in Chapter 6), although donors did not play a direct role in producing the document, the substance of the poverty reduction strategy paper is compiled from existing policies in which donors did actively shape the contours of policy. It is through engagement, often on unfavorable terms, with the international arena, not isolation from it, which has impoverished Mozambique and resurrected it as a model of structural adjustment and market efficiency.

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[16] By calling attention to the larger context in which the fighting to place, I do not mean to suggest that the conflict did not take on more localized and internal dynamics over a sixteen-year period.

Access, Enclosures, and Socio-economic Differentiation

Access to productive resources such as land, water, labor, knowledge, and capital is a socially embedded process. Access is seldom a one time event, and instead must be reclaimed and reproduced as social and ecological conditions change, as new social actors emerge and older ones disappear, and as those individuals, groups, and institutions with the authority to legitimate claims evolve and transform. Thus like property, access also refers to the social relations between people over the right to specific things. "To define property is thus to represent boundaries between people; equally, it is to articulate at least one set of conscious ecological boundaries between people and things" (Cronon 1983:58). What is entailed in constructing boundaries between people and between people and things? If both concepts reflect a process of social relations, how do people or groups turn access into property (Lund 2002)?

Within the social scientific scholarship on property, particularly common property resources, property regimes are often reduced to four types: private, state, common, and open-access. On the one hand, the proliferation of these four property systems is a reaction to Garrett Hardin's influential article "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) where he equates common property to open access and ultimately argues the only way in which to prevent degradation and over use of common pool resources is through privatization or state control. Since the publication of this article, numerous theoretical and empirical studies have disputed Hardin's conclusions and sought to delineate more useful analytic categories for understanding the diversity of property institutions and their abilities to define users, regulate use, impose sanctions, and prevent scenarios that degrade or undermine the ecological and social sustainability of resource. However, in

challenging the "tragedy of the commons" thesis, common property research has reified these categories resulting in obscuring more complex processes and arrangements of property relations than what these categories can tell us.

Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Melanie Wiber (2006) argue for a new analytical framework for understanding property that allows for an understanding of property relationships that encompass a diversity of arrangements. They contend property relations are composed of three elements which are situated spatially and temporally: "the social units (individuals, groups, lineages, corporations, states) that can hold property rights and obligations; second, the construction of valuables as property objects; and third, the different sets of rights and obligations social units can have with respect to such objects" (ibid.:15). In this framework property takes on a variety of forms beyond simply a type of right or ownership. Closely linked to this understanding of property is the metaphor of property as a bundle of rights that allows us to distinguish between different aspects of categorical property relationships capturing "the total range of rights and obligations" (ibid.:17). "The use of the bundle metaphor allows us to investigate the relationship between accumulated property rights and economic or political power" (ibid.:21). Deconstructing categories such as communal or private often reveals a diversity of rights, claims, and property relationships such as when private rights are not always ownership rights like in the case of sharecropping or other tenant arrangements which have important implications in understanding processes of enclosures that produce categories of people dependent upon such arrangements for continued access to land.

Like access, property is only as secure as the processes of its recognition. "Recognition of property rights by an institution simultaneously constitutes a process of recognition of the legitimacy of this institution" (Lund 2008:10), whether the institution in question is the Mozambican state, ruling party, or chiefly rule. A recognition of the social relations inherit in the access to productive resources does not preclude nor diminish the materiality of "things," but rather foregrounds the social dynamics involved in claiming, negotiating, contesting, and managing "things." However, in contrast to property, access includes a broader spectrum of legal and socially embedded structures, institutions, and relations. Jesse Ribot (1998) argues for a need to shift analysis from property to access in order to situate property as one mechanism along a continuum shaping access to various resources. "Property is *de jure*. Access includes the *de jure* and the *de facto* or extra-legal" (ibid.:310). In following Ribot, throughout this dissertation, my focus is also on access: how it is claimed, how it is legitimated, and how it has changed through time. In addition, access alone may not be sufficient for securing one's livelihood. The ability to benefit from a particular resource may be contingent on numerous factors such access to capital, inputs, infrastructure, favorable ecological conditions, and access to markets (Berry 1993, 2002; Ribot 1998). Furthermore, the concept of property does not translate easily cross-culturally.[17] In the Shona-based family of languages spoken throughout eastern Zimbabwe and central Mozambique, there is no one word that encapsulates a Western juridical notion of property. It is through an understanding of how access is claimed, negotiated, and contested within both locally

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[17] See Lund (2008:15) for a discussion on the difficulties of translation and how translating indigenous terms for property into Western forms of ownership serves to increase the exclusivity of access.

embedded structures and the state, that we see how groups or individuals are able to exert control or rights over particular resources.

Access to land and other resources can be obtained, claimed, recognized, granted, and negotiated through a variety of processes and institutions including individual and group identity,[18] social relations, market transactions, state allocation, coercion, gift giving, inheritance, loan, rental, sharecropping, occupation, first settlement, conquest, and spiritual sanction (Berry 1989, 1993; Lund 2002; Ribot 1998; Shipton 1994).

Access signifies the right to use or benefit from a productive resource such as land. The right to use a specific resource does not always infer a right to exclude others (Shipton and Goheen 1992); while control over a particular resource represents the effective exercise of a right or the ability to exercise power over others through mediating access (Berry 1989; Ribot 1998). According to Ribot, "The term 'right' implies an acknowledged claim that society supports (whether through law, custom, or convention)" (1998:310). Access can occur without control, however, in many contexts access may rest on the control over labor or some portion of the harvest produced from a particular piece of land. For example, when women's access to family land is mediated through her husband or other male relatives, men often attempt to control their labor or the decision making regarding disposal of the plot's produce. Thus in the context of Sussundenga, which historically has been inhabited by groups organized around patrilineal descent and patrilocal residency patterns, women's access to family plots is mediated by her husband, and male household heads generally have considerable influence over the disposal of maize and sorghum grown on the plot. However, women typically have more autonomy

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[18] This includes kinship and extended families, lineages, villages, or chieftaincies.

and control over their own labor and the crops grown in wetland areas or along stream-banks.

Contests over land and other natural resources also involve struggles over power and authority (Berry 2002; Lund 2002). Power extends to not only the physical control over land and land-based resources, but also the power to define types of land, types of persons and their relations to land, and to interpret historical events to legitimate claims to land (Shipton and Goheen 1992). Because access to land is inherently linked to contests over power and authority and the processes through which authority is legitimated, people invest as much in struggles over meaning as they do in struggles over material resources (Berry 1992, 1993, Carney and Watts 1990; Hammar 2002; Moore 1993, 2005; Neumann 1998; Peters 1984, 1994; Ranger 1999). As Berry notes "people may invest in meanings as well as in the means of production—and struggles over meaning are as much as part of the process of resource allocation as are struggles over surplus or the labor process" (1988:66). Rights to land and water resources in Sussundenga also intertwine symbolic and material struggles. Families with a long history of residency in the area often claim access to land based on the recognition of being a *muridzi* (plural, *varidzi*) signifying owner or founding individual whereas more recent arrivals are referred to as a newcomer or *mutorwa* (plural, *vatorwa*). Categories such as *muridzi* and *mutorwa* are contingent on the context in which they are deployed and are never politically neutral. Furthermore, these terms are relational and situated in a particular time and space. While people displaced by the civil war and resettled in Sussundenga in the early 1990s are often referred to as *vatorwa* in relation to families with a longer history of residency and occupation, in comparison to newly arriving

Zimbabweans, they are not described as *vatorwa*. The categories of *mutorwa* and *muridzi* reflect particular histories and social relations and are negotiated in specific contexts.

Which groups or families constitute *varidzi* is also subject to debate and contestation. There is no consensus on who are the founding families though many residents contend the chieftaincies of Cupenha, Buapua, and Ganda represent some the earliest arrivals. These three chiefs fall under the jurisdiction[19] of the paramount chief Moribane (located further south) whose power and authority is recognized throughout most of the district. However, the specific lines of descent within chiefly families are often contested and generate competing interpretations of who is the appropriate authority.[20] Debate also surrounds the hierarchy of authority between chiefs such as Cupenha, Buapua, and Ganda as well as other sub-chiefs.

In some cases recognition as a *muridzi* and the longstanding residency and cultivation rights inherent in this category have enabled some families to claim larger and more fertile tracts of land and wetland areas. However, in the case of the traditional authorities Cupenha and Buapua, their recognition as *mambo* (chief) and kinship with ruling families has not translated into material wealth or the ability to expropriate large tracts of land as is the case in other parts of Southern Africa.[21] As we left Buapua's compound after the interview discussed at the opening of this chapter, Nelson remarked "The chiefs are not living well." Nelson referred to the material conditions in which

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[19] Buapua and Ganda also fall under the chieftaincy of Zixixe located on the other side of the mountains and in some contexts are more accurately described as sub-chiefs.

[20] See Buur and Kyed (2006) for ethnographic material on contested authority in Sussundenga District and West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999) for a discussion of the recognition of traditional authority and political decentralization in Mozambique.

[21] See Peters (n.d.) for a discussion of how chiefs and headmen in southern Malawi have strengthened their control of wetland and stream-bank plots and are able to derive rent or sharecropping arrangements from them.

Buapua and Cupenha live in compared to some of their more affluent neighbors with cement and metal roof homes equipped with TV antennas, radios, and new bicycles. Though highly respected by many Sussundengans, kin-based power and authority are not automatically translated into material wealth.

Debates over access to resources in Africa, particularly land, highlight the flexibility of indigenous land tenure systems and the negotiability of socially embedded norms mediating access to land (Berry 1988, 1989, 1993; Bruce 1988; Haugerud 1989). Shipton (1994:350) terms the propensity for indigenous land tenure systems to allocate land to those who need it and provide a minimum safety net in access to land for people understood to be part of the same group as "fairness in flexibility." Berry (1993:13) contends negotiability is a central feature of African social and economic life and as a result people invest in social networks as a means of securing access to productive resources. Rights to land are salient part of African identity; however, relations between land and identity are complex and varied and include identities beyond simply ethnicity (Derman et al. 2008:9). There is a general acceptance within much of the scholarly literature on African land tenure systems that rights of access are often mediated by membership in a particular group whether it is an extended family, lineage, chieftaincy, or ethnic group which provide a minimal level of security for members of the particular group. Group boundaries are often porous and flexible depending on the context and the social and economic relationships between those defined as part of the group and those who are constructed as outsiders.

Over the last two decades, research suggests that what are often defined as "customary" tenure regimes are anything but egalitarian (Lund 2000). Some argue the

emphasis on the negotiability and flexibility of rights of use and access may obscure increasing inequality in access to and control over land (Peters 2002a). In some contexts, claims have hardened and are linked to growing socio-economic differentiation in rural areas. Peters (2002b) argues that disputes involving land in southern Malawi are central to the breakup of matrilineal families and produce a process of socio-economic differentiation and class formation often turning family members into strangers that no longer can claim access to family land. Ambiguity can be exploited by those in positions of power to secure their own interests. Peters encourages us to ask whose interests do negotiable and flexible resource tenure regimes support and consider the consequences of these arrangements. Likewise, Berry (2002) suggests that negotiation and flexibility may legitimize the appropriation of land by more powerful actors. The debates over "customary" land tenure and rising socio-economic differentiation asks us to consider the linkages between control over land and natural resources and the production of wealth and power.

Mamdani's (1996) important work on colonial and postcolonial power in Africa details how colonial authorities enlisted "customary" institutions in local governance and how this practice has persisted in many places following political independence. Through what he terms "decentralized despotism," "customary" authorities, under the supervision of local Native Affairs offices, governed Africans (subjects) according to fixed tribal/ethnic identities while settlers/Europeans (citizens) were ruled by a "modern" civic code. The documentation and even invention of customary rules, mediating access

to land, inheritance rights and marriage practices became essential to rule by decentralized despotism.[22]

In following Mamdani's argument, the definition of land as a customary possession became a central feature of indirect rule through decentralized despotism. And because colonial authorities characterized land as a customary possession, it became partially insulated from the market, making force necessary to propel land and labor out of the customary realm and onto the market (Mamdani 1996:22). More importantly for a discussion on access and control over land, the designation of land as customary property by colonial authorities produced three important distortions of pre-colonial land tenure regimes. First, it created an idea of right that is exclusive, rupturing longstanding practices that accommodated both communal and individual rights.[23] Second, ritual powers such as those expressed by rainmakers, spirit mediums, or traditional leaders were confused with rights of ownership. Finally, communities were identified as tribes and migrants were conceptualized as strangers not belonging to the tribe and thus not retaining a traditional right to land. Mamdani summarizes these distortions in that:

> the community as customary proprietor of land, its appointed
> political leaders as holders and executors of that proprietorship, and the
> right of access to community land on a customary basis as tribally
> defined and therefore excluding strangers—in fact turned into many
> pivots around which developed a specifically colonial notion of
> customary land tenure [1996:140].

However, in the case of colonial Mozambique, the dichotomy between citizen and subject and the subsequently bifurcated state does not adequately reflect the social and

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[22] Berry (2002) argues colonial regimes refashioned African relations to land through the construction of social and territorial boundaries, through the physical displacement of Africans from their land, and inventing or reinterpreting norms and rules structuring access to land.

[23] For example, rainy season plots were managed by individual families whereas pastures and forests were used as common property. In other contexts, pastoralists often had rights to left over crops during the dry season (Shipton and Goheen 1992).

economic realities of colonial rule in Mozambique. O'laughlin (2000) challenges[24] Mamdani's argument in regards to the separation of the "native" question from the "labor" question noting that "The forms that local governance took in Mozambique were rooted in the labour question" (ibid.:9). The laws, policies, and statues that positioned citizen against native derived from the labor question and were not separate from it (ibid.:12).

Distinctions between *civilizados* (non-natives) and *indigenas* (natives) deriving from questions surrounding the exploitation of labor and property relations also structured access to and control over land in colonial Mozambique. Chiefs managed land located in areas designated as native reserves under "customary" rules of use and access.[25] In 1918, the colonial state demarcated native reserves and increased their size in 1927. Colonial administrators oversaw the practices of chiefly rule and could appoint and dispose of chiefs for failing to recruit labor, enforce cash crop cultivation, and collect taxes. While *indigenas*' use, access, and occupation of land[26] largely depended on a particular tribal/ethnic identity attached to a specific geographic space under the rule of a customary authority, *civilizados* could acquire land and own property in freehold areas.[27] However, instead of rigidifying African customary norms and practices under a system of indirect rule (Chanock 1998; Ranger 1983), colonial authorities instigated debate "over

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[24] O'Laughlin (2000:8) outlines four specific critiques of Mamdani including: the separation of the organization of labor from a more general colonial concern of how to govern African populations; reification of binary categories obscuring more complex realities; underestimating the democratic content of Frelimo's reforms; failure to explore why challenges were mounted to the content of Frelimo's political program. Hart (2002:43) also questions Mamdani's binary oppositions.

[25] Under the 1929 statute on native policy in Portuguese colonies, natives were characterized as someone who is "part of a community ruled directly by a chief, and subject in the first instance to African customary law" (Newitt 1981:54).

[26] While most Africans' access to land was restricted to reserves, African farmers could, in theory, purchase up to 2 hectares of land outside the reserves. However, the economic costs of purchasing, surveying, and demarcating the land prohibited most Africans from obtaining land.

[27] During this time land was classified into three categories: native reserves, freehold, and state.

the meaning and application of tradition which in turn shaped struggles over authority

and access to resources" (Berry 1992:328). Berry elaborates further on the tendency of

the intersection of indirect rule, colonial authorities, and Africans in shaping the contours

of tradition and how it is applied to access to productive resources:

> In general, the effect of indirect rule was neither to freeze African
> societies into precolonial moulds, nor to restructure them in
> accordance with British inventions of African tradition, but to generate
> unresolved debates over the interpretation of tradition and its meaning
> for colonial governance and economic activity. In seeking to maintain
> social and economic administrative stability by building on tradition,
> officials wove instability—in the form of changing relations of
> authority and conflicting interpretations of rules—into the fabric of
> colonial administration [Berry 1992:336].

Debates over African land tenure systems and socio-economic differentiation are

also implicit debates about the nature of "rural Africa." African peasantries have been

described as operating on a social and economic logic different from a capitalist mode of

production. Hyden (1980:19) refers to the "economy of affection" as a structurally

induced reciprocity shaping social and economic behavior that defends peasant societies

from market intrusions. Consequently, African peasantries are able to exercise a degree

of social and economic autonomy unlike other peasantries (Hyden 1980). James Scott's

The Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976) also shaped understandings of African rural

societies. Scott argues, in the context of Southeast Asia, that peasants display a set of

norms that ensure a minimum access to land for members of a group. According to Scott,

the right to subsistence constitutes a moral principle structuring social and economic

behavior (Scott 1976:7). Across Africa, moral economies embedded in African

landholding systems guarantee a minimum access to land and other natural resources to

meet subsistence requirements while resisting widespread commodification and privatization of what are often vaguely referred to as "common property" resources.

Many scholars with a focus on African peasant and agrarian issues have been predicting rural class formation for several decades. However, evidence to support this claim in highly varied and context specific. Market forces are often described as something introduced from the outside, usually through colonial or imperial conquest and thus foreign to the social and economic fabric of African peasantries. Scholars characterize the contact between African (pre-capitalist) and capitalist modes of production as the articulation of modes of production to explain how African peasantries become immersed in a milieu of capitalist relations. However, despite the penetration of market forces, peasants were not completely alienated from the means of production. Even in contexts of strict cash crop production, such as in colonial Mozambique, peasants maintained access to land and controlled their own labor outside of the demands of cash crop production (Isaacman 1996). Debates[28] surrounding African peasantries often position market forces, commodity production, and individualized interests against more cooperative forms of subsistence production, risk aversion, and moral economies that provide a minimum safety net for a given village, lineage, or chieftaincy. The case of Sussundenga suggests that "rural Africa" is neither inherently cooperative nor immune from commodity production. In Sussundenga multiple patterns of access to and control over land coexist. Land is more family property than "communal" property. Land used for rainy season fields is controlled by individual families and access is mediated through the household head. Historically, families legitimated access to land through allocation by the chief and the subsequent longstanding use and occupation of the land. By

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[28] See Isaacman (1990) for an overview of different debates shaping understandings of African peasantries.

clearing, cultivating, and transforming the landscape through labor, individuals and families secured their rights to specific land and resources.[29] Sussundenga presents evidence of negotiability and flexibility in how access is obtained and legitimated and also finds evidence to suggest a trajectory of concentration of rights over particular resources in some areas of Sussundenga-Sede. At what stage does the concentration of rights of access and control over resources become defined as an "enclosure"?

The metaphor or analogy of enclosure conjures images of exclusion, prohibition, and circumscription. To enclose, simply means to shut off. It incorporates an idea of boundaries or of designating particular places and spaces. In the case of landscapes or the environment, enclosure is often associated with fencing thus limiting access by some and preserving access for others. However, enclosures do not have to be manifest in a material sense such as a wall or a fence; they only have to be seen as socially legitimate and/or legally backed by the force and authority of the state. While sometimes fences or barriers are erected around fields, land, canals, and water sources that have become enclosed and more exclusionary, other times it is the social or legal recognition of the owner to claim exclusive access that embodies an enclosure.

From early eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century, the nobility enclosed common pastures and open fields across England replacing a system of common property and establishing a system of private property through what Williams (1973:98) terms "legalized seizure." The enclosure acts reorganized landscapes, access to productive resources, and relationships between different social classes. Dispossession or separation from the means of production (in this case land) signifies the first step in a historical

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[29] However, the Lockean notion that labor structures rights to property needs to be qualified. Women's agricultural labor does not automatically confer rights to land in contexts where access and use rights are mediated through her husband or male lineages.

process Marx termed primitive accumulation to understand the formation and accumulation of capital. In Marx's formulation, the appropriation of land and the resulting displacement of people from the means of their production established the preconditions for the exploitation of labor and the accumulation of capital. According to O'Connor (1998:23), the violent and forcible transformation inherent in the process of primitive accumulation separated humans from the biophysical world and aided in transforming land into a commodity. Land, like labor and money, is a "fictitious commodity" in a sense that it is not produced by people for sale, but yet its commodification is an essential aspect of a market economy (Polanyi 1944). The separation of people from land/environment through the enclosure of common lands produced the conditions under which land and labor could now circulate as commodities.

Similarly to the English enclosures, African enclosures have also produced divided landscapes[30] and separated farmers from their land making them more dependent on wage labor, renting or sharecropping arrangements to survive. However, unlike with the enclosure of common lands in England, in many contexts, African smallholders have been able to retain some access to land while being incorporated into labor markets providing them the ability to reproduce their own existence. From a capitalist perspective, peasants or kin with access to land means that they can be paid less than a subsistence wage. Considering these realities when we speak of African enclosures, what are we describing? What are the processes driving African enclosures? What are the consequences for the segment of the population that loses access to land and water resources?

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[30] Neumann (1998) and Igoe (2004) argue the creation of National Parks and Game Reserves in East Africa segregated landscapes into landscapes of production and landscapes of consumption much like the English countryside.

An enclosure is the "increasing commodification and individualization of access to land and water" (Woodhouse 2003:1706). The enclosure of land and water may constitute a "default mode" regardless of the system of land tenure in place. This mode may be strengthened or reinforced by efforts to decentralize management and control over land and water resources (ibid.). In the edited volume entitled *African Enclosures*, Woodhouse et al. (2000) argue there is a growing trend towards greater commodification and privatization of land and water resources. The volume presents case studies from Botswana, Kenya, Mali, and South Africa where changing agricultural production, based on the intensification of water use, driven by farmers responses to market opportunities is producing a pattern of greater socio-economic differentiation and more individualized and exclusionary access to land and water resources. The case studies reveal a trend of commodification regardless of the local land tenure systems in place. Hulme and Woodhouse (2000:222) write in referring to the case studies, "commoditized access to land is inherent in 'customary' tenure where land values (productivity) rise and/or competition for land increases." The two crucial dynamics propelling the process of enclosure is the strengthening of land claims through investment and translating customary rights into rights to rent or sale land (Woodhouse 2003:1713).

In discerning what exactly constitutes a process of enclosure, it is important to distinguish between the concentration of particular rights and the privatization of land ownership. Concentration may apply to some rights, but not others and can occur through the market, state appropriation, and claims based on local rules of use and access and does not always lead to privatization (Berry 1988). In some areas surrounding former Portuguese farms in Sussundenga, current small-scale commercial farmers have

concentrated their rights of access to land to include nearby streams where they now use the water to grow bananas for the market or establish tobacco nurseries. However, the land adjacent to the river is not "privatized" and several nearby smallholder families contest these exclusionary practices by encroaching on the land through planting their own fields in areas claimed by the commercial farmers or grazing livestock along the river.

Another set of factors that may produce a process of enclosure hinges on the complex interplay of social, economic, and spatial dynamics. Woodhouse (2002:7) identifies "stagnant" and "boom" areas as a way of distinguishing between spaces likely to produce patterns of commodification and individualization of land and water resources. Stagnant areas are characterized by low or declining populations and removed from private or state investment. Stagnant areas, however, are not necessarily "resource poor" environments. In contrast, boom areas exhibit a high degree of immigration and increasing competition over land, water, and other natural resources. Boom areas are more likely to be located in regions serviced by reliable infrastructure and able to produce agricultural products for urban markets. Materially poor women and men reside in both categories, however, in stagnant areas there is more likely a larger population of elderly, dependent children, disabled, and lack of health and education services. Due to the population composition of stagnant areas, they are more likely to experience labor shortages and, because of their spatial remoteness from channels of investment and urban markets, the intensification of land and water use is more restricted and less likely to produce heightened competition over resources than in boom areas (Woodhouse 2002:9).

In Mozambique, struggles over land and water resources in the peri-urban areas of Maputo, Beira, and Nampula exhibit many of the dynamics characteristic of Woodhouse's boom areas: large urban markets, urban migration, high population density, infrastructure, and investment. During my 16 months in Mozambique, numerous media reports highlighted conflict over land and water in these peri-urban areas often involving government officials and traditional authorities.[31] However, other regions of Mozambique are more difficult to typify using the stagnant/boom typology. Paradoxically, Sussundenga embodies aspects of both stagnant and boom areas. Sussundenga is located not far from the Beira corridor, an important rail and transportation line bisecting Mozambique. The Beira corridor, historically and today, is the site of both commercial and state investment. Sussundenga is only a short distance from the provincial capital of Chimoio. During the colonial period, the colonial state made considerable investment in the area in hopes of stimulating a viable settler agricultural community. Following the end of the civil war, private investment has returned to the district. During the war, the population of Sussundenga-Sede increased due to people fleeing the southern parts of the district. Over the last several years, a number of white Zimbabwean commercial farmers have arrived in the district and applied for DUATS. In addition, Sussundenga lies in a favorable agro-ecological zone. With this combination of factors, we should expect to see more competition over land and water resources.

The actual social and economic dynamics of the area suggest another picture. Based on my data, areas of conflict and contestation over land and water resources exist,

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[31] For example, between January 2007 and June 2008, municipal authorities in Matola recorded 2,080 cases of land conflicts. This number only reflects the cases that were reported to officials.

but are historically situated and often derive from the multiple and overlapping claims to land generated by successive attempts, first by Portuguese settlers and then by the government's villagization program, to reshape control over land and livelihood practices. To complicate matters further, the ad hoc process of state farm divesture in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coupled with war-induced displacement, added more layers and more opportunities for contesting and negotiating access to land. However, in other areas surrounding Sussundenga-Sede conflict over land and water is very low. One potential explanation as to why processes of enclosure are not sweeping through the Sussundengan countryside is that both of the dynamics Woodhouse (2003) outlines as a necessary component of enclosures: investment and translating customary rights to rent or sale land are very small in Sussundenga.

I recorded very few instances where customary rights to land were being sold on an informal land market. In cases of land speculation, it was just that, speculation usually by individuals with ties to the government. At the moment, they lack the capital and labor to invest in their land to make it more productive. In several cases, smallholders continue to cultivate or graze livestock within areas claimed by these individuals. Even small-scale Mozambican commercial farmers lack sufficient capital to make their farms commercially viable enterprises and several of them consume what they grow at home or sell their surplus on the market, a strategy not very different from local smallholders. Smallholders are even less able to make substantial investments in their land beyond clearing and tree planting. Finally, non-farm sources of employment are very limited.[32]

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[32] Socio-environmental history interviews conducted with elders and local leaders identified unemployment (falta de emprego) as one of the biggest challenges the people of Sussundenga face. Numerous informal conversations with younger men, often with secondary education, reflected the difficulties many of them have finding formal employment.

Berry (1993:152) documents the importance of non-farm income to socio-economic differentiation in Kenya and Zambia. In Sussundenga, non-farm sources of income such as health worker, teacher, or the few government administrative jobs provide employment for only a small number of people in Sussundenga-Sede. However, people within this group of formal employment constitute the wealthiest families and individuals in the area. They are able to purchase livestock, hire seasonal workers for their fields, and pay for transporting their crops from field to home or from field to market. Other forms of non-farm income generally referred to as *conta propria* or self employment such as brick making, shoe repair, beer brewing, selling firewood, etc., while providing crucial sources of income for many households, are not sufficient enough to contribute to significant agricultural investment.

Research conducted on access to water within Zimbabwe's communal lands also suggests that processes of enclosure are not hegemonic. Derman and Hellum (2002) contend that cultural norms granting everyone access to water, especially for drinking, remain strong and traverse different land tenure arrangements expressing the notion that no one should be denied access to water. Nemarundwe and Kozanayi (2003) argue that many of the rules and norms governing water use and access are implicit and unwritten. Access to water is structured by appropriate use and the rules differ depending on the type of use. These studies ask us to reconsider or qualify arguments that present enclosures as hegemonic and teleological.

The evidence and debates surrounding processes of enclosure, the commodification of land and water resources, and socio-economic differentiation reflects the importance of historically situated, context specific research to address these

dynamics. In this dissertation, I attempt to offer a historically situated, ethnographic account of how access to land and water in Sussundenga has changed under various forms of authority during this century. In doing so, I highlight the multiple ways in which people claim access to these resources. In some cases, processes of enclosure exist alongside normative frameworks, often expressed through cultural idioms, over how people negotiate access to land and water.

Agency and Negotiation

Negotiation has become an important concept in understanding how socially differentiated actors claim, maintain, and secure access to land, labor, property, and natural resources. As highlighted in the section above, the use of negotiation to understand how people obtain access to resources has generated important debates concerning the "limits to negotiability" (Peters 2002) while also recognizing that the negotiability of rights provides members of a particular group the right to access a specific resource (Berry 1993). In various parts of Africa, negotiation allowed people to be incorporated into new households and communities. "Negotiations often included transfers of goods or money in exchange for rights of access or control, but the meanings of such transfers were not fixed—as colonial officials assumed them to be" (Berry 1992:337). During the course of my research, negotiation emerged as an important tactic in how women and men secure access to land and wetland areas. The act of negotiating, expressed through the Chiteve word, *kutaurirana*, literally meaning to discuss with each other, remains a strong practice despite the history of colonial land evictions, government-sponsored resettlement, and a growing population. Negotiation also implies the right must be continually activated in the face of changing social, economic,

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ecological contexts. As is discussed in Chapter Four, negotiation played an important role in securing access to land prior to the arrival of Portuguese settlers in the 1950s and continues to structure claims over land today.

Negotiation, in my use of the term and how Sussundengans deploy it, does not imply some form of rational choice where individualized subjects conscious of all choices and decisions structuring their lives interact and decide what actions are in their best interests. People never negotiate as equals. Some actors have more power than others and are able to use their power over others for specific ends. Instead negotiation reflects a process whereby differentiated social actors interact, contest, and comprise over the issues at stake. Because negotiation involves the interplay between broader political and economic forces and how different actors, think, behave, and interpret their lives, negotiation demands a focus on human agency or an actor-oriented approach to understanding social change.

Bailey and Bryant (1997) advocate an actor-oriented approach to political ecology that emphasizes human agency by situating the competing motivations, interests, and actions of various actors and foregrounding the central role of politics in political ecology. In calling for a place-based approach to political ecology, Biersack (2006:19) urges political ecologists to overcome a legacy of structural determinism by focusing on local-global articulations and consider "how the grassroots responds to the engines of globalization." This entails a focus on human agency by understanding and documenting how "local" actors resist, reshape, redefine, and accept environmental and development discourses and practices. Finally, Moore's insistence that micro-politics matter implies a focus on differentiated actors both at the local level and within institutions such as the

state which are often composed of multiple and competing interests. Micro-politics entails attentiveness to culture, power, and history. "The micro-politics of resources struggles are animated by local history, mediated by cultural idioms, and gendered through the different practices men and women have pursued in defense of local livelihoods" (Moore 1996:139-140). Moore's analytic of micro-politics suggests how to conceptualize the ways in which external political and economic forces articulate with internal agency and material and symbolic struggles over access to resources.

An actor-oriented approach "stresses the interplay and mutual determination of 'internal' and 'external' factors and relationships, and which recognizes the central role played by human action and consciousness" (Long and Long 1992:20). This approach can help us to understand how socially differentiated actors respond to similar structural constraints while viewing social actors as active participants and not simply passive recipients of their interactions with actors and institutions at various scales (ibid.). Ferguson and Derman (2001:149) highlight an attention to agency, context, knowledge, and power embedded in social processes "emphasizing contingency in the context of the wider political economy and competing paradigms of knowledge." Thus agency is not just about decision making, it is intertwined within social relations organizing the way people process experiences and construct meanings. "In other words, agency (and power) depend crucially upon the emergence of a network of actors who become partially, though hardly ever completely, enrolled in the 'project' of some other person or persons" (Long and Long 1992:23). A focus on agency helps illuminate multilayered fields of power and the "battlefields of knowledge and power wherein a multiplicity of

actors engage in struggles over the meanings and practicalities of livelihoods, values and organising processes" (Arce and Long 2000:8).

In understanding how women and men claim and obtain access to land and wetlands, my work focuses on the dialectic between structure and agency. Sussundengans make decisions over where to cultivate, how to cultivate, and who cultivates based on practical engagements with the biophysical world, historically situated livelihood practices, gender constructions, social relations, and interactions with the state and local authorities. People think, act, feel, process experiences, and interpret events based on past histories, power relations, and structured modes of interaction. A focus on agency emphasizes the ways in which people are active and conscious subjects embedded in structures of power relations and broader political and economic forces.

Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 provides an ethnographic description of Sussundenga and outlines my research questions and research methodology including participant observation, identifying land and water resources, socio-environmental history interviews with elders, semi-structured household interviews on access to land and water, interviews with NGO and government employees in the provincial capital, and collecting government and media documents on land, water, agriculture, and development. The chapter concludes with a discussion on my positionality, how it structured my interactions with people and how people interpreted my presence in Sussundenga, which have important implications for the types of data I could collect.

Chapter 3 chronicles the history of central Mozambique and Sussundenga with an emphasis on shifting patterns of control over land and labor. The politics and social

dynamics of larger Shona-speaking state complexes on the western highlands shaped pre-colonial settlement patterns and cultural practices with the first settlers being linked to migrating families from the Mutapa kingdom. In the early 1800s, Gaza Nguni, migrating from South Africa, drew the area into their control and established a system of overrule based on the extraction of tribute and military service. This lasted until 1895 when the Portuguese defeated the last Gaza ruler. For the next 50 years, central Mozambique fell under the control of the Mozambique Company, a Portuguese charter company funded mostly by British capital, with exclusive rights to rule and develop the territory. Similar to Gaza rule, the company's ruling logic centered on the extraction of labor, though labor demands varied widely through the territory. After the expiration of the company's charter, the colonial state encouraged white settlement in Sussundenga to stimulate commercial agriculture. Settlers cleared land, constructed dams and water infrastructure, and erected farm houses on land once ruled by three African chiefs, displacing their subjects to the margins of the area designated as a *colonato* or commercial farming scheme.

The second half of Chapter 3 details the post-independence years, elaborating on the government's establishment of communal villages around Sussundenga designed to facilitate the delivery of health and education services while attempting to reorganized smallholder agricultural practices through the formation of cooperatives and state farms. However, shortly after the initiation of the government's resettlement program, Rhodesian and eventually South Africa-backed guerrillas, infiltrated central Mozambique and generated a 16-year war of destabilization causing tremendous hardship for half of the country's residents. The war sharply curtailed agricultural production and alienated

people from their fields. The histories of land appropriation by Portuguese settlers, government resettlement efforts, and dislocation and war-induced migration have created a context of multiple and overlapping rights to land in some parts of Sussundenga.

Chapter 4 examines the multiple ways women and men gain access to land in Sussundenga and the sources of authority they articulate to substantiate their claims. Sussundenga's "entangled landscape" intertwines multiple sources of authority deriving from different historical moments that continue to structure relations between people and land. Despite local structures of governance imposed by the colonial and postcolonial state, many Sussundengans continue to articulate an understanding of authority and power centered on chiefly rule. In conjunction with the ability and a socially-defined right to allocate land, many residents also intimated the importance of negotiating with various social actors for access to land. I situate these practices in the context of broader debates over land and state farm divesture in Mozambique, and the changing legal context over land introduced by the new land law in 1997. The new law strengthens communities' claims to land through recognizing existing land use practices while providing space for commercial investment in rural areas. However, only five communities have delimited their land in accordance with the new law. What impact the law will have on strengthening Sussundengan's access to land and promoting economic development remains to be seen.

Chapter 5 discusses the ongoing transformation of the Mozambican water sector from a highly centralized water management regime to a more decentralized and participatory framework. The water law of 1991 and the water policy of 1995 have refashioned how water should be valued, managed, and allocated with more emphasis

placed on stakeholder involvement and pricing water for commercial use to reflect its value as a scarce commodity. The implementation of a demand-driven approach to water management has reduced the government's role in the water sector and opened it to more donor and private investment. While laws, policies, and management frameworks are revised in Maputo, Sussundengans continue to manage water in accordance with culturally informed understandings that no one should be denied access to water. The second half of this chapter examines smallholders' access to wetland areas and their importance to agricultural production. Wetlands constitute gendered spaces where women have more control over the products of their labor. Wetland gardens provide households with important food sources as well as income through fruit and vegetables sold in local markets. However, despite the importance of wetland cultivation to rural households, some development workers and government extension agents contend that wetland cultivation causes environmental degradation. The final pages of the chapter examine the issue of wetland cultivation and ecological change.

Chapter 6 broadens the discussion over access to land and water in Sussundenga to national debates over land, agriculture, and development. I situate these debates in the anthropological literature on neoliberalism, development, and governmentality to examine the ways in which current development policies and practices in Mozambique embody the tensions and contradictions of neoliberalism. Mozambique is often depicted as success story by advocates of structural adjustment and market liberalization. While inflation has decreased and gross domestic product has increased, the vast majority of Mozambicans continue to struggle to meet their material needs. The government and donor emphasis on outside investment and a more business-friendly environment has

important ramifications for access to productive resources. The government is now focusing on rural districts as "sites of development" and attempting to inject more money into the countryside. Mozambique's most recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PARAPA II) stresses human and social development, but underemphasizes the importance of job creation and rural income generation. Interviews with NGO workers and government extension agents suggest smallholders are conceptualized as poor, backward, lacking sufficient agricultural knowledge to improve their livelihoods or as disconnected from the market economy. These understandings of rural residents necessitate and justify particular forms of development intervention. While Mozambicans continue to articulate various livelihood practices, the government calls of them to essentially development themselves. But, the discursive celebrations of the efficiency of the market economy obscure a reliance on the state for access to land, capital, and political influence to shape development according to specific desires and interests.

In the conclusion, I reassess the arguments over processes of enclosure, the commodification of land and water, and socioeconomic differentiation in Mozambique in light of the evidence presented on Sussundenga. I argue for a perspective that takes into account the multiple and competing ways people claim access to land and water—a perspective that is attentive to both growing socio-economic differentiation while not discounting the cultural norms and idioms that offer the possibility for a more equitable distribution of resources. In doing so, I re-evaluate the metaphor of enclosure as a trope for understanding patterns of commodification and exclusion. Finally, I consider what

this ethnographic account of access to land and water in Sussundenga can tell us about rural Africa or peasantries in the twenty-first century.

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Chapter Two
Ethnographic Setting, Methods, and Positionality

The road from the provincial capital, Chimoio, to Sussundenga-Sede is predominantly dirt. It winds through the countryside of Manica Province and around Zembe Mountain, an important rainmaking site on the border of Gondola District and Sussundenga District. As the road twists and curves over this high plateau and through miombo woodlands, more and more gray, concrete structures appear in the countryside. From a closer range the outlines of cement houses become more visible. Architecturally they seem out of place with the rest of their surroundings, drawing a stark contrast with mud-brick and thatch roof homes, tall boulders, and dark, brown soils. These former Portuguese farmhouses are now skeleton structures usually surrounded by a wall of tall shade trees and a derelict tobacco barn. Yet, they serve as some of the last material vestiges of a colonial settler presence in central Mozambique. Though small in number, colonial settler schemes called *colonatos*, refashioned labor practices, reorganized settlement patterns, and contested authority and control over land in the countryside during the 1950s and 1960s.

Access to water resources, fertile soils, and a temperate climate enticed Portuguese settlers to take up land near the Revué River with the support of the colonial state. The bridge over the river provides an aerial view of the water rushing over the rocks below as it flows from the Chicamba Real Dam located 30 kilometers upstream. Shortly over the Revué is the turn off for the *Estação Agraria de Sussundenga* (Sussundenga Agricultural Station) and the area known as Matica, where Portuguese settlers first arrived in the 1950s. Sussundenga-Sede is located about another five

kilometers from the turn off to Matica. It is from this watery boundary that I began to investigate how women and men in Sussundenga negotiate access to water and land resources. I spent the majority of 16 months in Mozambique engaged in ethnographic fieldwork in Sussundenga-Sede in Sussundenga District.

Figure 1: Sussundenga District

This chapter provides an ethnographic background to Sussundenga-Sede and discusses the research methods used to collect data on access to land and water resources. Finally, the chapter explores my positionality and how it shaped my interactions with residents of Sussundenga, and what influence my positionality might have on the type of data I collected.

Sussundenga-Sede: Local/Global Articulations

Sussundenga-Sede, in its current cultural, political, economic, and ecological composition, has been forged through complex processes spanning several centuries.

The relationship between the physicality or materiality of place and the people who inhabit this space is not bounded or sealed from broader regional and global reverberations. As opposed to seeing place as a backdrop or stage upon which social, economic, and political interactions unfold, place is produced and imbued with meaning through the contours of lived experience. Moore writes "Cultural practices, social relations, and political economic processes meld with the materiality of the milieu, producing place" (2005:17). In Sussundenga, the production of place fuses both location and relation (Biersack 2006; Moore 1998) positioning Sussundenga as a meeting point of historically situated migrations, long distance trade, the emergence of global and regional markets, war, and colonial and post-colonial governance. Chapter Three presents a historical trajectory of Sussundenga, but here I would like to mention briefly the processes and connections that have shaped the socio-cultural milieu of people living along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border. The rise and fall of several large Shona-speaking state complexes to the west, Gaza Nguni migrations from present-day South Africa, tax imposition and labor recruitment under the Mozambique Company, land and labor appropriated by Portuguese settlers, postcolonial resettlement programs, displacement and war-generated migration, and a recent influx of Zimbabweans have constructed this place and positioned the people living within it. Sussundenga is a production of the articulation of multiple and overlapping process reflecting that "the global has always been part of the construction of the local" (Massey 1994:116).

In framing Sussundenga as an articulation of local dynamics and global processes, I assert that the local should not be taken for granted and is instead discursively and historically constructed (Gupta and Ferguson 1997a:6). By viewing place as a byproduct

of ongoing, historically situated processes, power relations and reconfigurations become more visible alongside the ethno-linguistic and socio-economically differentiated residents of the area. In following Gupta and Ferguson, anthropologists should not assume "the autonomy of the primeval community, we need to examine how it was transformed as a community out of the interconnected space that always already existed...but always foregrounding the spatial distribution of hierarchical power relations" (1997b:36). The control over land and labor and the wealth produced by these "fictitious commodities" occurs across a cultural terrain shaped and interlinked with national politics and the global economy.

Sussundenga District is one of 10 districts in Manica Province. Manica Province, located in central Mozambique, stretches from the Zambezi River to the north to the Save River to the south and from the Indian Ocean in the east to the border of Zimbabwe in the west. Sussundenga District extends over the *planalto de Chimoio* (Chimoio Plateau) until the Chimanimani mountains form the western border with Zimbabwe. Sussundenga is situated in a temperate climate characterized by fertile soils and adequate rainfall (800-1000mm annually). Sussundenga-Sede is a small agricultural town about 44 kilometers southwest of the provincial capital, Chimoio. The road from Chimoio to Sussundenga is mostly dirt except for the portion of the Beira corridor near the Chimoio airport. The road to Sussundenga (EN 216) is dry and dusty during the winter months, while in the rainy season, it is usually passable except during a few days of extremely heavy downpours. This road connects Sussundenga to the Beira corridor, a road and rail network stretching from Beira on Mozambique's eastern coast to Mutare, Zimbabwe.

Sussundenga District is composed of four *posto administritivos*[33] (administrative posts). Each administrative post is sub-divided into *localidades*[34] (localities). Sussundenga-Sede is the government seat for the entire district. The Mozambican state is represented at the district level by the following offices: education, agriculture and rural development, transport and communication, public works and habitation, health, mineral resources and energy, tourism, industry and commerce, and women and social action. The town contains the district administration building, the district Frelimo party headquarters, the district Renamo party headquarters (the building is quite dilapidated and I have never seen anyone there), the district agricultural and forestry offices, the house of the district administrator, the district health post, houses for the health post's nurses, a police station (formerly the *Centro Social* for the Portuguese settlers), a community radio station (*Radio Comunitario de Sussundenga*), and a small bank. In the center of town is a Catholic Church built by the Portuguese settlers. Adjacent to the church is the bus stop (*parragem*) where *chapas* (commuter minibuses) from Chimoio and Munhinga, and open-bed trucks going to and from Dombe, load and unload. The bus stop is a horse-shoe shaped area surrounded by *banca fixas* (small stores) and a restaurant. The bus stop also serves as an informal market where people sell vegetables, cooking oil, *refrescos* (soft drinks), dried fish, bread, pens, and other small items. Across from the bus stop is a small playground for children, though it is rarely used during the summer months because of the lack of shade.

Political authority in Sussundenga is multiple and overlapping, combining district ruling party and government structures with local hierarchies of power and authority

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[33] The administrative posts are in Dombe, Muoha, Sussundenga, and Rotanda.
[34] Sussundenga-Sede administrative post is divided into Sussundenga-Sede, Matica, Munhinga, and Nhaurombe.

expressed through chiefs, sub-chiefs, and influential elders. The state's political authority at the local level flows from the district administrator and ruling party secretary. Residents of Sussundenga-Sede live in one of 17 *bairros* (neighborhoods) surrounding the center of town. Each *bairro* is "governed" by a *secretario de barrio* (neighborhood secretary), who is a local government official responsible for keeping a register of the *bairro's* residents and disseminating information from the district government.[35] Large *bairros* often have more than one neighborhood secretary. District directors of government offices such as agriculture and education are also held in high esteem by many people.

Alongside the administrative power of the state exists several historically situated and kin-based political leaders. Chiefs commonly referred to as *regulos* in Portuguese and *mambo* in Shona/Chiteve, rule over the population and are associated with both people and territory. During colonial rule, Portuguese administrators used traditional leaders broadly categorized as *autoridades gentilicas* to recruit labor, collect taxes, and police the population. Colonial rule instituted a three-tier system of authority with *regulos* at the top while the names of lower tier authorities varied[36] across the country (West 1998). Within this system of colonial governance, *regulos* occupied a position "betwixt and between" (West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999:475) the colonial state and their subjects. Some chiefs not only subjugated their populations to colonial rule through carrying out the demands of the state, but also amassed personal wealth in relation to their subjects.

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[35] In 2004 the government officially recognized 16 neighborhood secretaries around Sussundenga-Sede in the run up to the December national elections (Buur and Kyed 2006:853).

[36] The tripartite division is often divided by *regedoria* (chieftaincy) following *grupos de povoações* (population groups), and then *povoações*. In Portuguese, sub-chiefs are often called *chefes do grupo* and third-level sub-chiefs are known as *chefes da povoação*.

When Mozambique became independent in 1975, Frelimo, under the leadership of

President Samora Machel, labeled traditional authorities and practices such as witchcraft,

healing, ancestor veneration, and initiation ceremonies as backward and obscurantist.

Frelimo denied traditional leaders a role in the new government and replaced them in

local settings by *grupos dinamizadores* (dynamizing groups) headed by party secretaries.

Frelimo portrayed chiefs as collaborators with the colonial state and as opportunists who

benefited from their positions as tax collectors and labor recruiters during colonialism.

While the party officially refused to incorporate traditional authorities into the state, the

realities of local governance necessitated a different strategy. Frelimo secretaries and

administrators often collaborated with and relied on chiefs at the local level (Alexander

1997). In Sussundenga, the district administrator sought chiefly consul as early as 1980

and appointed them to Frelimo committees in government-controlled zones (Kyed and

Buur 2006:570). By the mid-1980s, with Joaquim Chissano as president and fighting

between Renamo and Frelimo intensifying and spreading, Frelimo softened its stance

towards traditional authorities.[37] Official tolerance of chiefs in Manica province is traced

to 1987 (Alexander 1997:5).

In post-war Mozambique, the role of traditional authorities in local governance

continues to be debated within the government as well as the donor and academic

community. Within these debates, traditional authority is portrayed as either irrevocably

corrupted by colonialism or as an expression of authentic Africa institutions without

spatial or temporal reference and of little interest in specific histories of chieftaincies

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[37] Some argued Frelimo's disdain towards traditional authorities and practices weakened their rural support and bolstered the population's support of Renamo in some areas and provided the conflict more internal dimensions. However, in many local contexts, Renamo recognized and used individuals more likely to adhere to their demands as opposed to *autoridades gentílicas* or chiefs sustained by local legitimacy (West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999:460).

(West 1998). In 1997 the government passed the Municipal Law 2/1997 which instituted

a system for elected local government in 33 urban municipalities, but not in any rural

areas.[38] Three years later, Decree 15/2000 formally recognized traditional authority. The

decree recognizes three types of traditional authority: traditional chiefs, former Frelimo

secretaries, and other local leaders people deem legitimate. These authority figures are

envisioned to represent rural communities and also assist the state at the local level

through their roles as policing agents, tax collectors, population registration, land

allocation and rural development. In addition to administrative tasks, traditional

authorities should also support and celebrate national holidays, foster a patriotic spirit

within their communities, prevent crime, encourage environmental sustainability, and

prevent HIV/AIDS, premature pregnancy and marriage (Burr and Kyed 2006:848).

Through the recognition of kin-based or traditional institutions the state is

attempting to incorporate rural communities into is territorial and administrative reach

and re-claim state sovereignty (Buur and Kyed 2006:851). Authorities are to be selected

based on the norms of a respective community. However, ethnographic research in

Sussundenga by Buur and Kyed (2006) highlights the tension created between different

sources of legitimacy and contestation over the criteria used to define a "traditional

authority" as they compete for state recognition. Kyed and Buur (2006) contend Decree

15/2000 is an attempt by the state to create a group-based citizenship through

incorporating communities into the nation-state through membership in a territory-based

entity.

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[38] Prior to the 1997 municipal law, the government revoked the 1994 municipalities law and replaced it
with another law that stipulated the devolution of government functions and created a framework for
democratically-elected local governments (West 1998).

As authority figures within these territory-based entities chiefs and neighborhood secretaries govern *bairros* and more dispersed settlements away from the town. Houses in the *bairros* are often close together, though residents still find space to cultivate fruit trees (mango, banana, papaya, and avocado) around their homesteads. Sweet potatoes (*batata doce*) are also grown around homesteads, particularly in March and April. During the rainy season, maize is also planted on any remaining land around the house.

The houses in Sussundenga-Sede are a mixture of homemade bricks with corrugated iron or asbestos roofs and stone and thatched roof homes. The kitchen is usually separate from the main house, and there may also be separate sleeping rooms depending on the size and composition of the family. Many homes also have a *celeiro* (granary) made of logs perched 1-2 meters off the ground where maize and sometimes sorghum is stored following the April harvest to protect it from rodents. Most homes have their own pit latrines, but these structures vary from stone/concrete structures to grass/thatch walls, while others have dark plastics sheets erected around them for privacy. Several homes have *poços* (wells) where the water is used for cooking, washing, bathing, and sometimes drinking. There is at least one *bomba* (borehole) in each *bairro*, while some larger *bairros* have more than one. However, only 26% of the district population has access to potable water. According to a report written in 2004 by ICRISAT, in conjunction with the District Agricultural Office, the district has 76 boreholes, however, only 47 of these are operational.

Several homes in Sussundenga have electricity, though during the rainy season the town would go for weeks at a time without *energia* (electricity). At night many of the shops in the market are illuminated by candlelight. In February of 2006, the town began

receiving cell phone reception from a newly constructed Mozambican Cellular (MCEL) tower. By late May, transmissions from TVM (Mozambican Television) reached the town just in time to watch the World Cup. Until this point, those few families with a television set were subjugated to watching programs from Zimbabwe's ZBC.

Women perform the overwhelming majority of work around the household and a majority of the agricultural work on *matoro* and *machamba* lands. Women and young girls cook on small iron stoves with *carvão* (charcoal), and neighbors commonly *pedir fogo* (ask for fire) to start the stove by transporting a burning coal from an adjacent house on a small piece of metal. Neighbors also share mortars and pestles when the time comes to turn maize into flour. Five or six mortars can be seen at one house with children, especially young girls, pounding maize in unison. There are also several *moagens* (grinding mills) in Sussundenga that facilitate the process of turning maize into flour used to make the staple food of *sadza* or *massa* (stiff maize porridge). Though during the rainy season, with frequent power cuts, many families must rely on a mortar and pestle and their labor to ensure an adequate stock of flour.

Laundry is usually washed by women at one of the small rivers like the Chicueu or Nhamezara or one of the dams in Sussundenga. Additionally, some of the boreholes have concrete sinks and scrubbing areas where women also wash their families' clothes. A few families have concrete sinks at their homes. People bathe in their latrines or at one of the nearby rivers. On a warm day many people can be seen washing clothes or bathing in the rivers.

The residents of Sussundenga primarily speak Chiteve or ChiNdau, both variants in the Shona-based family of languages stretching through much of Zimbabwe and

central Mozambique. Many Sussundengans refer to the Teve as the *varidzi* (owners) of this area and are said to be its first arrivals. Many Ndau speakers from the Dombe area in the southern part of the district migrated to Sussudenga-Sede towards the end of the civil war. Linguistically, Chiteve and ChiNdau are mutually intelligible, but have some differences in vocabulary and pronunciation.

There are numerous types of churches in Sussundenga-Sede: Catholic, Jehovah Witnesses, Zionist, 7th Day Adventist, Assemblia de Chuva, Apostori de Johoana Marange, Masowe, and Habbakuk. Many residents attend one of these churches on a weekly basis and church participation forms one of the primary group activities that people are involved in. On Saturday evenings and Sunday mornings drum beats resonate from one of these churches filling the air with polyrhythmic sounds.

There were 24 schools in the district before the civil war. Today there are only 16 primary schools in Sussundenga District, and one school catering to levels 6-7, and a secondary school in Sussundenga-Sede. The existence of only one secondary school for the entire district presents challenges in expanding secondary education to more Sussundengans. Before the civil war, there were 17 health posts in the district (Pfeiffer 1997). Today there is a 40 bed health clinic in Sussundenga-Sede (*Centro de Saude de Sussundenga*) and six other health posts in the district. Residents of Sussundenga-Sede rely on this health clinic, as well as *curandeiros* (traditional healers) to provide them with physical, emotional, and spiritual healing.

The Revué River and the Munhinga River form the aquatic boundaries of my fieldsite. The majority of my ethnographic research was conducted with residents living within the area circumscribed by the two largest rivers in the area. There are numerous

small streams (*riachos*), drainages, and wetlands (*matoro* or *baixas*) within this area that people rely on for irrigating crops, washing clothes, bathing, nurturing grasses used to make reed mats (*esteira*), and watering wild plants used for medicines.

The majority of the produce grown in and around Sussundenga-Sede is sold at one of the markets in town. Most *bairros* contain a small market where women sell vegetables from their gardens and men sell small dried fish (*peixe seco*). There are several larger markets located on the main road running through Sussundenga-Sede. These markets (*mercados*) offer more fruits and vegetables, dried fish, cooking oil, candles, soap, and firewood. At the bus stop, there is a covered market where many of the same items found in the *mercados* are sold. Many *camponeses* (rural farmers) sell their crops and produce at one of these local market sites. However, some with the ability to pay transport costs to and from Chimoio, will market their produce in the provincial capital. Furthermore, many Sussundengans shop in Chimoio when Sussundenga is lacking particular fruits and vegetables or to purchase the latest imported consumer goods such as televisions, DVD players, radios, bootlegged CDs and DVDs making up part of what Mozambicans refer to as the African Tsunami—the influx of cheap Chinese commodities filling the shelves of stores in the provincial capital.

According to the 1997 census, the population of Sussudenga-Sede was 14,977. There are slightly more women living in this area than men (7,805 women and 7,172 men). The administrative post of Sussundenga has 39,241 residents (20,470 women and 18,771 men), comprising 8,412 families, while the entire district of Sussundenga has a population of 92,622 (49,046 women and 43,576 men). Finally, the population of Manica Province is 700,828 (372,475 women and 328,353 men).

My fieldwork in Sussundenga-Sede was facilitated by arranging to live with a local family to whom I am incredibly grateful. Originally I planned to spend six weeks to two months at a time conducting fieldwork before returning to Chimoio, where I rented a small house with another American anthropology student, to enter fieldnotes and download interviews into my computer. However, by June of 2006 I was forced to re-think my research strategy following several cases of malaria, stomach parasites, and overall deteriorating health. From July 2006 until the end November of the same year, I conducted research in Sussundenga during the week and returned to Chimoio on the weekends to rest and enter data into my computer. This new strategy also allowed time on Fridays to conduct interviews with various NGOs and government offices in the provincial capital.

Research Questions

This research project began with a broad concern about how people manage natural resources such as land and water. In particular, my interests revolved around issues of inequality and access to land and water resources. These issues are particularly relevant to Mozambique which has undergone profound political and economic transformations since independence. In the 32 years since independence, Mozambique has moved from a one-party Marxist/Leninist state to a multi-party democracy, endured a 16-year civil war, become one of the leading recipients of structural adjustment programs and donor aid, reformed existing land laws to better protect the rights of Mozambican smallholders while trying to attract outside investment, and devolved water management responsibilities from a once highly centralized state to regional water management authorities, following the course of water reform in other countries of Southern Africa.

These political, economic, and legal changes have important implications for access to productive resources such as land and water and how people secure access to resources critical to their livelihoods.

This dissertation attempts to address the following research questions. 1) How is access to wetlands, stream-banks, and their adjacent lands mediated in practice? 2) Who legitimates access to and control over these water and land resources? 3) Is access to these resources becoming more individualized and commodified? 4) Does this lead to increasing socio-economic differentiation within rural communities, and if so, who benefits from this process?

In order to answer these questions, I collected data through the following methods: mapping wetland areas, dry season gardens and fields, and rainy season fields; 15 in-depth social and environmental history interviews with elders and traditional authorities; semi-structured interviews focusing on access to land and water resources with a random sample of 75 households; participant observation at water resources (including seasonal wells, boreholes, garden sites, and rainy season fields) to identify water users, irrigation practices, and crops grown; two focus groups discussing development issues and access to land and water resources in Sussundenga; 15 semi-structured interviews with NGO workers and government employees in the areas of agriculture, development, water management, and land reform in the provincial capital; collected archival and policy documents on land, agriculture, water management, and development.

Identifying and Mapping Land and Water Resources

Smallholders use different land and water resources at different times of the year. In central Mozambique, the rainy season generally begins in late October or early November and stretches to mid-March, with the heaviest rains falling in January and February. The remainder of the year is usually dry, though Sussundenga received some light rain showers in June and July. Before I could begin to understand how Sussundengans negotiate access to land and water resources, I had to identify which land and water resources are important and when and why.

With the help of a research assistant, Nelson, we identified the areas where people cultivate rainy season fields (*machambas*) and wetland areas (*matoro* or *baixas*) where people, predominantly women, grow dry season vegetable gardens. We identified these areas by walking the landscape, recording the names of rivers, streams, and dams. We also observed and recorded the types of fruit trees and other plants and trees that are used for building materials, reed mats, firewood, or medicinal purposes. We constructed hand-drawn maps with the rivers, boreholes, wetland areas, rainy season fields, and different *bairros*. Early in the research, these maps helped us to identify the areas where we would conduct semi-structured interviews on access to land and water resources as well as revealed the spatiality of these resources. This allowed us to follow up with questions about how and why certain areas came under intensive cultivation and how people secured access to the land in these areas.

Participant Observation

Participant observation formed the foundation of my research methodology in Sussundenga. Living with a local family allowed me to learn about their lives and the

lives of my friends and neighbors through intimate personal experiences. Though I could never transcend my status as an *estrangeiro* (foreigner), there were numerous instances where the family and other close friends remarked that *"Mano* (brother) Michael is not like the other *brancos* (whites)." The other *brancos* in this context refers to white commercial farmers, development workers, and Peace Corp volunteers. Though anthropologist was not a category that most people were familiar with, by the end of my stay many people did distinguish between someone attempting to speak the local language, eat *sadza* and *peixe seco*, and try to learn about people's lives on their own terms as being different from the cast of development workers, Peace Corp volunteers, and commercial farmers working in or visiting Sussundenga. However, I realize that my stay was also short-lived, and that many of my friends and neighbors expected me to one day return to my own country.

As a research method, I used participant observation beyond just recording the events and conversation transpiring around me. I purposefully observed specific sites and activities central to my research questions. Early in my research, I conducted daily observations at boreholes and wells to record the number and type of users drawing water from these areas. Observation also informed my understanding of what crops are grown and when, who performs which tasks around the household, who works in the fields and during what times of the year. Long before I conducted any interviews, I spent time observing people working both *machambas* and *matoro*. I also used observation in the various marketplaces to record which crops were being sold, how much they cost, and who was selling them.

Before I conducted any semi-structured interviews, I spent time walking the countryside, observing the surroundings, and discussing what I saw with Nelson. Delaying interviews until several months of observation had passed allowed us to construct more appropriate interview questions and also permitted us to ask about specific events, activities, or phenomena we had observed. The time we dedicated to walking and observing also provided us with the opportunity to meet people whom we would later interview.

The emphasis on my use of participant observation is more on observation than participation. Because I was interested in access to land and water, I imagined myself learning about agricultural practices not only from interviews and observations, but also through participating in agricultural labor. I soon realized it was not the place of an educated, wealthy visitor to perform such tasks. In fact, the household in which I lived hired seasonal workers to cultivate and manage their fields and a domestic worker to help with everyday household chores. During visits to people's fields or while conducting interviews I offered to assist people in whatever work they were performing when we arrived to compensate for the time they offered me. People were sometimes surprised and always refused my offers with exception of the few times I was allowed to peel maize or search grains for weevils. In addition, I was not allowed to draw my own water for bathing or cooking, and instead was expected to delegate this responsibility to one of my younger siblings. These examples illustrate the dynamics of power relations in a specific context fieldwork. My power as a wealthy foreigner was often circumscribed by local agency. Not only was my participation shaped in ways in which people wanted me

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to participate, but I was also heavily dependent on Sussundengans for my stay, health, and well-being.

Despite the restrictions on performing more arduous household and agricultural work, I was able to participate in people's lives through attending religious activities, weddings, watching *futebol* (soccer) and Brazilian *telenovelas* (soap operas), celebrating holidays, and sharing food. These activities enabled me to gain a richer understanding of people's lives in Sussundenga and provided a context for interpreting the interview data I collected.

Social and Environmental History Interviews

We conducted 15 semi-structured interviews with elders, traditional authorities, and two formal authorities (*secretario de bairro*) on the social and environmental history of Sussundenga. Informants for these interviews were selected through snowball sampling. I began by asking the *secretario de bairro* to refer me to people who have lived in Sussundenga for a long time or who are knowledgeable about its history. The list of names he provided me contained only men. Likewise, when I interviewed the nearest *regulo* (traditional authority or chief), he also suggested other men I might want to speak with. Incorporating elderly women into my interview schedule became difficult because men always recommended other men under the assumption that men would know the "real" history of Sussundenga. However, I did interview a husband and wife together, but women's voices are insufficiently represented in the data I collected on the history of Sussundenga.

These interviews revolved around several topics of discussion. First, we talked about the history of Sussundenga prior to the arrival of Portuguese settlers in the 1950s.

These discussions centered on the crops people cultivated, how they obtained access to land and water resources, and settlement patterns. Second, we focused on the arrival of the Portuguese; where they settled, how they obtained land, what crops they grew, the construction of infrastructure, forced labor, and issues of authority. Third, we elaborated on what changes occurred after independence in 1975 and turned to discussions of the civil war. Questions about the civil war focused on how people farmed during this period, interruptions in agricultural production, and the availability of land and water resources. Finally, we discussed changes taking place in Sussundenga today. For example, is the population increasing or decreasing, what problems (*matamboziko*) people are facing, how they can be resolved, and the government's role in dealing with these issues. The data derived from these interviews will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Three.

Semi-Structured Interviews on Access to Land and Water Resources

We conducted 75 semi-structured interviews on access to land and water resources. These interviews were conducted in seven of the 17 *bairros*, and participants were selected randomly.[39] These interviews focused on how people gain access to areas to cultivate a *machamba* and areas near a wetland or stream-bank where dry season vegetable gardens are grown. These interviews also compiled basic demographic information on the household as well as the type of crops grown in each field. Additionally, the interviews discussed irrigation and labor practices, whether crops are grown for the market or home consumption, what is the income used for if the crops are sold, and who will inherit the different land resources. The data generated from these interviews will be discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Five.

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[39] Participants were chosen by selecting every 4th household in a given *bairro*.

Interviews with NGOs and Government Offices in Chimoio

I conducted 15 semi-structured interviews with NGO workers and employees of government offices in Chimoio. These interviews explored the type of development interventions these actors are implementing in Sussundenga and more generally in Manica Province. Additionally, I talked with NGO and government workers about their knowledge of the new land and water legislation. These interviews illuminated how many development professionals perceive and understand their rural beneficiaries and ways in which these development workers understand the problems smallholders face in terms of access to critical resources and agricultural production. Furthermore, the interviews provided an overview of the policy context in which debates about poverty reduction, agricultural production, food security, and development (broadly defined) are taking place. These issues will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

Documents and Media Sources

Documents and media sources, mainly collected in the provincial capital of Chimoio, also form part of my data collection. I collected documents from various NGOs and government offices in Chimoio where I conducted interviews. In addition, I collected documents and reports from the ARA-Centro[40] library in Beira. These documents deal specifically with water and hydraulic issues in the country. Finally I collected newspaper articles addressing issues related to land, water, poverty, development, and agriculture from two daily newspapers (*Noticias* and *Diario*) and two weekly newspapers (*Savanna* and *O Pais*), and a third weekly paper that appeared near the end of my research (*Meia Noite*). I also received daily electronic news articles from the English and Portuguese AIM (Mozambique Information Agency) listserv. These

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[40] Administração Regional Água Centro.

documents and media sources are used to examine ongoing debates around agricultural and development policy. They provide a window to analyze the various actors involved in constructing, implementing, and evaluating "development" projects designed to alleviate rural poverty.

Positionality, Power, and the Production of Anthropological Knowledge

Power saturates the fieldwork and post-fieldwork process (Wolf 1996). The power relations embedded in ethnographic research derive from multiple sources: the different positionalities of the researcher and informants; the researcher's ability to define the research questions and structure research-related interactions; disparities in access to knowledge and resources; the researcher's ability to choose what to represent in text and how it is represented (Kirsch 1999). However, these positionalities are not fixed and are always in the process of being negotiated. Naples (1996) argues that we are never fully outside or inside a community and our relationships with people in the course of research are continually negotiated and re-negotiated in particular social contexts. In Sussundenga, context is important for how people identified me, how I identified myself, and how people perceived Nelson, my research assistant, and our ability to interact with people and conduct research.

In the context of fieldwork, people's perceptions and images of you can be vastly different than how you perceive yourself (Whitehead 1986). When Ifi Amadiume returned home to conduct research in Nigeria, she brought with her a number of subject positions which included, but were not limited to, membership in the village where she conducted research. Perceptions and expectations of her differed from that of a researcher arriving as "stranger" (Amadiume 1993). Hapke and Ayyankeril (2001)

79

reflect on their experiences as researcher and research assistant through gendered interactions with informants and highlight how their positionalities changed as their friendship evolved into a relationship, and how people reacted to them differently once they were married. Whitehead (1986) examines various aspects of his positionality, noting the importance of gender, class, and ethnicity, while conducting fieldwork in Jamaica and how these aspects of identity influenced people's interaction with him. Like these examples, various aspects of my positionality such as being white, man, student, and American influenced how I interacted with people and the types of relationships I was able to form and how people understood and perceived me and my research in Mozambique.

It is difficult for a 6 foot tall white man not to be noticed in rural Mozambique. Under no circumstances could I blend in and not stand out amongst the people around me. Consequently, my presence provoked numerous stares, laughter, and questioning. However, my status as an anomaly had its advantages. Because I stood out, many people introduced themselves and wanted to learn more about this *estrangeiro*. In the early months of my residency in Sussundenga this provided the context for introductions and sharing experiences (*trocar de experiencias*) with my new friends and neighbors.

Early in my fieldwork, my white skin relegated me to the following two categories: priest or Peace Corp Volunteer (PCV). During my first week of living in Sussundenga, numerous people greeted me in Portuguese by saying "*bom dia padre*" or "good morning father." I usually smiled and also greeted them with "good morning," but why did they call me father? I was terribly perplexed by the use of the Portuguese word for priest (padre) to refer to me. It was not until three weeks later that I learned one of

the priests for the Catholic Church in Sussundenga was French. The priest shared several

physical and social characteristics with me that people used to interpret and understand

my arrival in the town. In terms of our physical qualities, we were both white and had a

beard. More importantly, we shared several social attributes that linked me to this

gentleman in ways I had not anticipated. We were both single men living under the care

and guidance of local residents. The priest lived in a small convent run by Mozambicans,

and I stayed with a Mozambican family heavily involved in the Catholic Church. We

also shared the distinction of speaking not only Portuguese, but also Shona. According to

numerous residents, few foreigners ever made an attempt to learn and communicate in the

local language. Therefore, many people assumed this new foreigner living in the town

was a Catholic priest recently assigned to the local church.

If I was not being greeted as a priest, I was greeted as a teacher (a role I felt a

little more comfortable with). But, it was assumed I was a new United States Peace Corp

Volunteer placed in Sussundenga to teach English or biology at the secondary school.

This category provoked questions such as which subjects I taught or how long I planned

to teach in Mozambique. Until the very end of my stay, some people still perceived me

as a teacher/volunteer, while people soon realized I was not the new priest after several

Sundays had passed without any formal introduction in the church.

As I conducted research, the categories I fell into became more complicated and

shaped my interactions with people in different ways. Because most people were not

familiar with the identity of "anthropologist," I was routinely mistaken as a development

worker or agricultural extension officer due to the nature of my research. Many people

assumed I was there to help them "improve" their agricultural techniques, conduct farmer

training seminars, or to offer them agricultural inputs, such as seeds, watering cans, and water pumps. On most occasions, after some lengthy discussion, I was able to explain what I was doing and what my research was about. However, on a few occasions, I left interviews feeling as if people will expect me to return with some type of inputs. On one occasion, I had to abandon the interviews I collected due to the strong perception that I was working as part of a development organization. It was in October and Nelson and I were interviewing several women about their *matoro* when I noticed a line forming of about 15-20 women. Interestingly, all of their responses to my questions about their *matoro* were similar. I whispered to Nelson that we should stop doing interviews since the women were giving us the same answers and try to explain again the purpose of our visit.

Apparently after the first interview, the woman went and collected other women to interview with the hope that I was going to return and deliver seeds and fertilizer. Thus the majority of the women spoke about not having access to seeds, watering cans, and fertilizer. I am very skeptical that the interviews we collected that day accurately reflect how women gained access to this particular wetland area given the similarities in all of the responses. Though I also realize access to inputs are real obstacles for many rural farmers, particularly women. Understanding and accepting my presence did not remove me from other ascribed identities and power relations.

Mozambicans have a long history of interacting with *estrangeiros* or foreigners. This history informs perceptions and understandings of European and American presence in the country today. Historically the area has been occupied by Shona-speaking lineages that migrated from larger state complexes on the Zimbabwean plateau further west from

the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. From the 1830s until 1895, Nguni populations

migrated from present-day South Africa and subjected the area to a new system of

overrule. Under Gaza rule, Shona speaking populations paid tribute to the Gaza ruler and

the men served in the military ranks, but many local political structures and social

organization remained in place. In addition to being incorporated into larger polities,

people of central Mozambique also have a long history of trading ivory, gold, and slaves

with Portuguese, Arab, Indian, and Swahili merchants. Following independence in 1975,

foreigners sympathetic to the new Marxist government, known as *cooperantes*, aided the

government in the areas of education and health. Foreign aid and intervention were not

limited to programs and activities in support of the ruling party, but also directly opposed

to it. White minority governments in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa

recruited, armed, and supported a rebel group (Renamo) designed to destabilize the newly

independent country. During the civil war of the 1980s, numerous organizations

provided food and aid to rural Mozambicans displaced by the fighting. Following the

end of the war in 1992, many of these organizations switched their missions from food

relief to "development" and have maintained a presence in the rural areas. Thus my

presence in rural Mozambique was not particularly uncommon from the perspective of

many Sussundengans who had grown accustomed to Euro-American relief work and

development interventions echoing Long and Long's (1992:20) contention that "All

forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals

and social groups affected, and in this way are mediated and transformed by these same

actors and structures." Sussundengans interpreted and re-interpreted my research

activities in light of this history of colonial settlement, foreign assistance, and development work.

Consequently, I had to engage with them on terms and understandings forged through this history of outside intervention, particularly the more recent "development" interventions and programs that have grown since the late 1980s. As a result, it is not surprising that people often perceived me as a development worker or linked me to international non-governmental organizations (NGO), which have become part of the social and economic landscape of central Mozambique. My actions, statements, and research activities were often interpreted based on prior experiences with development workers or agricultural training seminars. Sussundengans and I negotiated the pre-established structures of social interaction characteristic of how previous visitors had engaged local residents. For some, participating in semi-structured interviews or group discussions was a novel experience, while for others it was reminiscent of earlier encounters with researchers, development workers, or government officials.

Though Sussundenga has a history of Portuguese settlement and a recent influx of white Zimbabwean commercial farmers, I was only mistaken for a white commercial farmer on one occasion. However it proved to be a very important case of mistaken identity. My physical appearance and my Zimbabwean Shona shaped how I was perceived by an important traditional authority early in my fieldwork. After our introductions and a description of my research, he questioned Nelson about my true motives. Through his interrogation and change in demeanor, it became apparent he thought I was a spy. He alleged I had come from Zimbabwe to steal Mozambican's agricultural knowledge. Ironically, Zimbabwe at least until 2000, represented one of the

most highly mechanized and productive agricultural economies in Southern Africa. Why would Zimbabwe desire the secrets of its poorer, less "developed" neighbor? I told him I would return next week with more documentation from the Mozambican university supporting my research. I initially could not make sense of his accusations.

However, as we walked home that evening, I began to see his fears as more understandable. He had direct experience of land and labor being appropriated from his subjects by white settlers a half century ago. Under Portuguese rule, colonial officials used traditional authorities as the instruments of indirect rule positioning them "betwixt and between" (West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999) the colonial administration and their subjects. In the 1970s the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia authorized its elite fighting unit, the Selous Scouts, to launch incursions into central Mozambique to disrupt ZANLA[41] training exercises destroying people and infrastructure inside the country. In more recent memory, numerous NGOs and development organizations descended on Sussundenga with promises to alleviate poverty and improve living standards, though many Sussundengans express frustration that their material circumstances have not matched the rhetoric of modernity, progress, and development.

The fact that he questioned my "real" intensions is more intelligible when read from this context. Was I just another foreigner promising to deliver things I had no intentions or capacity to deliver? Moreover, I was interested in questions concerning land, water, and authority. Was my presence somehow related to the increasing arrival of white Zimbabwean commercial farmers to Sussundenga that were now securing access to large tracts of fertile soil? Broader political and economic events spanning the last half

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[41] Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army.

century structured his perceptions and understandings of me. It was only after repeated visits and conversations that his fears subsided.

My positionality as a white, foreign man facilitated access to particular types of knowledge and people while restricting my research activities in other ways. The majority of my closest informants were men. At times this became problematic due to my research interests. Access to land and water is often mediated through household gender relations and thus to understand how people claim, contest, and negotiate access to productive resources, it is crucial to examine household and community gendered power relations. Although I interviewed numerous women, I was unable to develop the type of relationships and rapport with women that I was able to with men. It would have been inappropriate for me to spend considerable time alone with women and would have aroused suspicions on the nature of my relationship with these women. The one exception to this rule is that I was able to develop a strong friendship with my *mãe Mocambicana* or Mozambican mother whose household I lived in while conducting fieldwork. Though she is only six years older than me, our relationship always reflected that of a mother and son. I always addressed her as *mãe*, *amai* (Shona word for mother) or *senhora* and she referred to me as *meu filho branco* (my white son) or *mano* Michael (brother Michael) in referencing me to her children. My *mãe Moçambicana* taught me a lot about the gendered division of labor, the challenges women face, kept me up to date on local gossip, and provided invaluable insights into some of the gendered dynamics of Sussundenga while not provoking accusations or suspicions of improper behavior. The other data gathered on women's lives comes from interviews conducted on access to *matoro* and *machamba* lands and from participant observation.

As a white American man, Mozambicans most often associated me with wealth. Relatively speaking, this was certainly the case. My monthly living stipend provided by my funding sources exceeded the yearly household income of an average Mozambican family by several times. Though I was always conscientious about how I presented myself, including visual displays of wealth, most people's initial perceptions equated me with wealth and privilege. Furthermore, my receding hairline provided further evidence of my wealth.[42] As if my white skin was not enough, my status as a wealthy foreigner became inscribed on my head! Subsequently, numerous initial conversations centered on economic disparities, which Mozambicans are acutely aware of, between the United States and Mozambique. Within the context of these discussions, emerged questions about how I obtained the money to come to Mozambique, how much I was "paid" by the university to do this research, and would I make money off the work that I do here. These questions demanded honest responses and spoke directly to some of the inequalities inherent in conducting ethnographic research. But perhaps more importantly, they provided a context for discussing with Mozambicans how my research might be used to benefit people living in Sussundenga.

As a wealthy foreign researcher, I often proved powerless when attempting to arrange interviews with district and provincial officials. Government employees evaded my attempts to arrange interviews, canceled meetings, and sometimes refused to answer sensitive questions. This is not to suggest that they were unwilling to work with me or unhelpful. In fact, many district and provincial government employees displayed patience, entertained my questions, and opened my eyes to the challenges of their work.

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[42] Numerous Mozambicans in both rural and urban contexts commented that the way in which I am going bald is an indication of wealth both in material terms and in terms of friendships and experience.

Power relations are contextual. In some contexts, my identity as a foreign researcher conferred special privileges such as exemption from agricultural labor, being served food first, or offered the best seat in a given household, whereas in other contexts my power was curtailed and directed by others. Despite my various subject positions such as man, researcher, American, Mozambicans exert their own power and agency in how they interact with others and are not simply passive informants, but rather social actors guided by their own interests, motivations, desires, and prior experiences.

Throughout the majority of the time I worked in Sussundenga, I was accompanied by a research assistant, Nelson, who also appears in this text. Nelson was born in the north-central province of Zambezi in the early 1980s. Shortly after his birth, Nelson and his family left Mozambique because of the war and settled briefly in Malawi, before moving to Zambia. In the early 1990s, his family moved outside of Harare, the capital of neighboring Zimbabwe. During the Zimbabwean presidential elections of 1995, his family returned briefly to Mozambique. After the election and the reduction of government rhetoric against immigrants in Zimbabwe, his family returned to Zimbabwe. Nelson continued to live in Zimbabwe until 2005, when he came alone to Sussundenga to live with his aunt and uncle. Like many Zimbabweans, Nelson came to Mozambique to seek educational and economic opportunities that simply no longer exist in Zimbabwe.

I provide a short sketch of Nelson's history to illustrate the complexity of deciphering who is inside and who is outside a given "community" as well as how identity is negotiated and forged in practice. Nelson is Mozambican by birth, but spent the majority of his life growing up in English-speaking neighboring countries. However,

he retained kin-based social networks in Mozambique to which he one day returned.[43] Because he is educated and lived the majority of his life outside Mozambique, he is comfortable speaking English, Shona, Sena, Nyanja, and Portuguese. On numerous occasions many people with whom we worked assumed Nelson was born and raised in Sussundenga. People were often surprised when they learned he arrived in Sussundenga more recently because of his command of Chiteve and Ndau dialects of Shona as well as Portuguese. However, other people who knew he lived the majority of his life in Zimbabwe associate him more with the recent influx of Zimbabweans. Additionally, though members of his immediate family are also multi-lingual, Zimbabwean Shona is the language spoken within their household.

Like my positionality, Nelson's positionality was also in a continual process of negotiation and renegotiation. Not only did he negotiate his identity as a Mozambican who grew up outside of Mozambique, but also as a research assistant and someone strongly associated with my presence. Nelson's new job aroused suspicions as to how much money he was making and accordingly, requests for *ajuda* (help or aid) or *apoio* (support) increased. People also requested things from me indirectly through Nelson and the family with whom I stayed. Thus how Nelson and I were perceived as well as how we positioned ourselves depended on numerous contextual factors.

At times throughout my research I was considered a priest, a teacher, a volunteer, an adopted son, a wealthy foreigner, a spy, a friend, a neighbor, and a researcher. These categories also are neither mutually exclusive nor static. In some ways our identities embedded us within the social fabric of specific families, kinship networks, and places

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[43] Nelson's mother, father, two sisters, and brother moved to Sussundenga in 2007 after I had returned to the United States.

within Sussundenga, while in other ways, we were located on the margins of the nodes of power. In some regards, Nelson and I were understood as being insiders (to use Naple's 1996 terminology). He lived with his aunt and uncle, spoke the dialects of Chiteve and Ndau, and was actively involved in a local church, while I lived with a highly respected family, spoke the local language, and outstayed many foreign visitors. Overtime many Sussundengans began to separate me from the volunteers, development workers, and foreign visitors. However, in other ways we were understood as outsiders. Nelson's command of English was well-known, and he did not have a long history of residency in Sussundenga. People knew I would one day leave Sussundenga and return to the United States. Despite my attempts to eat their foods, speak their language, and behave in cultural appropriate ways, I was always understood to be an American or a foreigner. It was only in relation to other *estrangeiros* that some people conferred upon me a temporary insider status, or through the social networks in which I was intertwined as a result of my status as an "adopted son." Within my networks of fictive kin, I was referred to as *mano* (brother) or *filho* (son), signifying an insider status and situating me within a specific family history.

Nelson's work as a research assistant is invaluable to this project. He helped identify wetland areas, rivers, dams, dry season gardens, and rainy season fields. He accompanied me on the majority of the interviews and helped iron out the differences between my Zimbabwean-style Shona and the locally spoken Chiteve. He also aided in my interpretation of events and interactions though I cannot hold him responsible for the conclusions I draw in this text. Nelson's involvement in this research and appearance in this text is an attempt to "make the research assistant visible" in the production of

anthropological knowledge (Schumaker 2001) since so much of the knowledge

anthropologists have produced about other peoples and places has depended on the work

of "local" assistants. The material context of working in Sussundenga, along with the

data and interpretations gathered and formulated with Nelson, shape the contours of my

ethnographic data and the interpretations that I draw from the data. It is my hope that by

being upfront about my positionality, how I collected data, and the relationships that I

had with people in Sussundenga, that readers will be able to understand how and why I

interpret events as I do.

Chapter Three
From Chiefly Rule to Enclosure and Back Again: Shifting Patterns of Authority
over Land and Water

On an early April morning, Nelson and I sat waiting for an elder gentleman to
return from his field. We had spoken to his daughter the previous day, and she assured us
he would return in the morning and would entertain our questions. After a short wait, he
appeared pushing a bicycle, the deflated rear tire dragging the ground. The flat tire
delayed his arrival home, but despite the inconvenience, he remained in good spirits and
welcomed his visitors to his homestead. We arose quickly from our seats on a small
wooden bench and greeted our host. Once we were all seated, we greeted each other
again, this time including a sequence of clapping as a way of showing respect. After our
introductions, we enjoyed a *matabicho* (morning snack) of boiled sweet potatoes and
began discussing the history of Sussundenga.

I asked him "who were the first people to live in Sussundenga?"[44] He replied
"King Ngungunhana (Ngungunyana). People wore only animal skins. The king was
carried on a wooden platform by his servants on their shoulders."[45] Later that day, during
an informal conversation, another man mentioned the Matewe (sing. Teve or Tewe)
people as the first settlers of this area. The seemingly conflicting statements over
Sussundenga's first arrivals attests to the fluid and overlapping forms of political
authority that existed in central Mozambique prior to the British and Portuguese
partitioning of the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border in 1891. While several people
recalled the presence of Ngungunyana and the Gaza Nguni Empire in central
Mozambique, Shona-speaking groups in Mozambique were linked historically to large

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[44] "Ndivanani vakatanga kugara muSussundenga?" (Sussundenga, 10 of April 2006).
[45] "Rei Ngungunhana. Vaitotakurwa pane chakagadzirwa nemiti sechifambiso."
(Sussundenga, 10 of April 2006).

state complexes covering the Zimbabwean plateau prior to the Gaza Nguni migrations in the 1830s.

Sussundenga is located within the area historically ruled by the Teve (Pfeiffer 1997:86). Numerous people recalled the Teve as the first people to live in Sussundenga.[46] Another person emphasized that not only were the Teve the first to live here, "they were born here. They are the owners of the place."[47] As *varidzi* (owners), the Teve make historical claims to access and use the land and its resources. Furthermore, ancestral spirits (vadzimu) of ruling lineages continue to *kuchengeta* or look after the people and the land and must be respected and venerated to ensure timely and adequate rainfall to produce a successful harvest. Many people not only remember the Teve as Sussundenga's first arrivals, but also recalled important chiefs past and present. In the area where I conducted research, three chiefs: Buapua, Ganda, and Cupenha exercise political authority. Cupenha is a sub-chief of Moribane (Moriane), one of the most powerful Teve chiefs who commands authority throughout most of Sussundenga District. Some people even equated the Matewe people with Cupenha using the phrase *dzinza raVaCupenha* or Cupenha's "tribe" to describe the Matewe as synonymous with Cupenha's lineage.

Chiefly authority in west-central Mozambique has evolved and transformed over several generations. Sussundengans do not agree on all the particularities of chiefly family genealogies, and there continue to be debates and contestations over the official titles of specific individuals, the hierarchy of these titles, and the criteria by which an individual should be labeled a chief or sub-chief. Two different genealogical pictures

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[46] "Matewe vakatanga kugara muSussundenga." (Sussundenga, 4 of April 2006).
[47] "Vakaberekwa muno. Varidzi venzvimbo." (Sussundenga, 4 of April 2006).

emerged from my interviews with chiefs and other Sussundengans. Many people identify the Matewe people as descendents of the Cupenha family. Currently within the Cupenha family, Cupenha's brother is the acting chief. Because of his age, Batromeu Cupenha does not have the capacity to move around, attend meetings, interact with officials and visitors, and therefore, he bestowed these responsibilities on his brother. His brother is also a *secratrio de bairro* in addition to now being the acting chief. However, some people now consider Cupenha's brother the actual chief due to his ability to perform the tasks characteristic of chiefly rule.

Many describe the Cupenha lineage as the *varidzi veSussundenga* or the original settlers of Sussundenga. In our interview, Cupenha stated that when Gaza Nguni ruler, Ngunguyana, arrived in central Mozambique and subjected the populations to his overrule, the Cupenha chieftaincy was already here.[48] Cupenha traces his lineage back to Muribane. Nhaucaranga, Muribane's sister, was the first chief of the Matewe people. The Matewe are sometimes referred to as Chimoios because they do not eat the heart of any animal (their totem is the mwoyo). Muribane migrated from the area near present-day Chimoio and settled in Sussundenga. Along the Zimbabwe border near Rotanda is another chief, Musinwa, who came from Zimbabwe. In contrast, Buapua told us Chingerere is the original chief of the Matewe and is from the same family as Zixixe. In this version, Zixixe and Buapua are from the same family. Chinyere, Zixixe's grandfather, was also a chief. After Zixixe succeeded his father, he allocated part of the area to Buapua. According to the local administration, Buapua and Ganda are officially registered as sub-chiefs (chefes do grupo) of Zixixe. Within this lineage, Mandara, Fero,

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[48] "Umambo hwaCupenha hwabvira kare, Ngungunyane wakasvika Cupenha ari muno." (1 of November 2006).

and Dzimurwi comprise the lowest hierarchy known as *chefes de povoação*. However, all chiefs, including Zixixe are underneath Muribane, who Buapua explained is the highest chief or *regulo maximo*.[49]

The Teve speak Chiteve (Chiute), a dialect of the Shona language spoken in central Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However, other dialects of Shona, including Ndau and Chimanyika, are also spoken in Sussundenga. Furthermore, because of labor migration during much of the twentieth century and internal displacement caused by the civil war, numerous other languages (Sena, Lomwe, Chuabo, Nyanja, Barue, and Changana) can also be heard in Sussundenga. Many residents, particularly near Sussundenga-Sede, also speak Portuguese, the official language of the country. The processes of internal and external migration have constructed a diverse, multilingual environment.

Control over the land and labor of present day Sussundenga has undergone numerous transformations since the Teve Kingdom ruled over central Mozambique. The outer margins of the Teve kingdom even fell under the control of the powerful eighteenth century *prazo*, Cheringoma and the nineteenth century *prazo* lord, Gouveia. During the mid-nineteenth century, the people of the area submitted to Gaza Nguni overrule, and following the demise of the Gaza state, British and Portuguese capitalists struggled to gain "effective occupation" over the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border region. In 1891, the *Companhia de Moçambique* (Mozambique Company), gained administrative and political control over central Mozambique and governed the area until 1941. Following the end of the company's charter, a new influx of Portuguese settlers arrived in Sussundenga as part of the government's efforts to stimulate commercial agriculture.

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[49] 10 of November 2006.

However, the settler presence in Sussundenga was short-lived as Mozambique gained independence 20 years later. Independence ushered in new forms of control and authority as the government converted northern Sussundenga into several *aldeias comunais* (communal villages) to socialize the countryside and restrict people's movements during the civil war. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, residents confronted the presence of government troops near Sussundenga-Sede and the Beira Corridor, while Renamo seized control of southern portions of the district. The war interrupted agricultural production, and many residents became dependent on food aid for their survival. Towards the end of the war, 1991-1992, a large influx of people migrated from the Dombe area in the southern part of the district to Sussundenga-Sede, increasing dramatically the size of the population around the town.

Since the end of the civil war in 1992 and the first multi-party elections in 1994, Sussundengans live in a radically transformed politico-economic context. Gone are they days of socialist rhetoric, communal villages with collectivized production, state farms, cooperatives, and government controlled marketing boards, replaced by the discourse of privatization, outside investment, and decentralization. Consequently, many residents feel abandoned by the government, expressed through sentiments such as "there is no help or support."[50] While often frustrated with the lack of formal jobs, educational opportunities, difficulties obtaining agricultural inputs, and markets for their agricultural products, people are forced to navigate this new economic and political terrain negotiating various channels of authority and invoking different cultural idioms to gain access to productive resources.

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[50] "Não há ajuda ou apoio."

The events in Zimbabwe over the last seven years also continue to reshape the linguistic, cultural, and politico-economic composition of Sussundenga. Black and white Zimbabweans began migrating to central Mozambique following the upsurge in violence orchestrated by Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF party following the parliamentary elections of 2000 and the presidential election of 2002. With the highest inflation in the world, rampant unemployment, and authoritarian rule, Zimbabweans continue to seek physical safety and economic opportunities in Mozambique (and other neighboring countries). Recent Zimbabwean migrations to Sussundenga offer another chapter in the history of Sussundenga characterized by migration, resettlement, and multiple and overlapping forms of political authority.

This chapter explores the evolving history of Sussundenga from the Teve Kingdom until the last days of my fieldwork in 2006. In order to understand the history of Sussundenga, it is necessary to situate it in the context of central Mozambique since the numerous forms of rule over Sussundenga extended throughout this region. Sussundenga represents what Moore (2005) terms an "entangled landscape." This signifies the coexistence of multiple and competing forms of authority shaped over the last century. In Sussundenga, several long-standing chieftaincies coexisted and submitted labor and tribute to Nguni invaders and then foreign capitalists, lost land and labor to Portuguese settlers, were re-located by socialist modernizers, and offered their cooperation and hope to cadres of elected officials and foreign development workers. In more recent years, the government has reincorporated "traditional" authorities into local governance. Despite the multiple knots that constitute this entanglement, one consistent thread is the control over labor as the primary form of political authority. The history of

Sussundenga fuses past and present and will undoubtedly structure future socio-economic dynamics.

The Pre-colonial[51] Teve Kingdom

The peoples of central Mozambique have longstanding relationships with people from other parts of Southern Africa as well as from more distant places. Nguni migrations from present day South Africa, large state complexes such as Great Zimbabwe and Muenemutapa, and the Malawi Confederation all extended influence into central Mozambique. The Indian Ocean trade routes controlled by Swahili, Arab, and Portuguese merchants linked central Mozambique to the global trade in gold, ivory, and slaves. The Portuguese founded their first settlement in Mozambique at Sofala in 1505. Portugal wanted control over Mozambique due to its strategic ports, gold, and ivory that was needed to fund Lisbon's expansionist desires (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983:14). Sofala provided an entry point to the goldmines of the Manica Highlands. By the time the Portuguese arrived at Sofala, the Teve (Kiteve or Quiteve) state covered the area from Sofala to the Manica highlands and was already a local power (Beach 1994:111).

Reconstructing the precolonial history of central Mozambique is more challenging than recounting the history of Shona-speaking peoples further to the west. Pfeiffer (1997:84) and das Neves (1998:54) contend there is less ethnographic and historical information on Shona-speaking groups in central Mozambique. However, there is more information available on the Teve state than other eastern Shona-speaking states

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[51] I use pre-colonial here to refer to the period before the "Scramble for Africa" in the late 1800s and to distinguish the period in central Mozambique before Mozambique Company rule. It is problematic to draw discrete boundaries between pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial Africa. Pre-colonial social relations, modes of power and authority, and livelihood practices did not disappear at the onset of colonial rule, but rather became entangled with or co-opted by newly imposed structures of authority, taxation, and labor recruitment.

due to the Teve's close interactions with the Portuguese (Newitt 1995:41) and accounts written by missionaries and chroniclers such as Father João dos Santos, a Dominican friar, who lived in Sofala and wrote an extensive account of the region under the control of the Teve rulers in his book *Etiópia Oriental*.[52]

The Teve and other eastern Shona-speaking states (Barue, Manica, Danda, and Sanga) maintained a precarious relationship with the larger and more powerful state complexes on the Zimbabwean plateau. At various times, three large states covering the Zimbabwean plateau exerted influence over the populations of central Mozambique. In the southeastern plateau, the Great Zimbabwe complex remained strong until the 1500s. In the northern region of the plateau, the Mutapa or Muenamutapa state continued in various forms until the early nineteenth century. The Changamire state and Rozvi followers, built on the remnants of the Great Zimbabwe complex, exercised power from the seventeenth century until the 1840s (Pfeiffer 1997:86). However, the eastern states were too far geographically to fall under the direct control of their larger, more powerful neighbors. But despite the distance, they were still subjected to raids and the extraction of tribute (Beach 1980:105).

The eastern states, such as Teve, relied on Mutapa for "symbolic legitimacy" (MacGonagle 2007:7). Accordingly, the Teve paid tribute to Mutapa and shared many cultural similarities with the Mutapa state. Patrilineal extended family groups, whereby inheritance is passed along the male line, patrilocal residency patterns, a gendered division of labor, and ancestor veneration formed the contours of social organization (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983:12). In addition to property, family names and totems or *mutupo* were also transmitted from father to son (das Neves 1998:57).

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[52] See MacGonagle (2007) for more information about dos Santos' writings.

This "symbolic legitimacy" also extends to the claim that three sons of Mutapa founded the eastern states of Teve, Sanga, and Danda. MacGonagle writes "after the death of the Mutapa king the three princes forged their own political identities in the new territories" (2007:46). Furthermore, das Neves (1998:55) states that near the end of the fifteenth century, Karanga elites from Mutapa migrated and settled in central Mozambique. It is believed these new settlers are the founders of Teve, Danda, Manyika, and Bvumba. These new kingdoms maintained political and economic ties to the states of the Zimbabwean plateau as well as cultivated relationships with the Portuguese. But because of the physical distance, they also enjoyed more autonomy from Mutapa (Beach 1980:114).

While a gendered division of labor existed, Beach (1994:58) cautions against applying rigid gender roles to labor practices in the early Shona states. However, there are some generalizations that can be made about how labor was organized during this period. Men were responsible for hunting and performed most of the herding, though women did occasionally participate in herding activities. Women spun cotton and collected wild plants (Beach 1980:91; Pfeiffer 1997:85). Everyone contributed to clearing and preparing fields. Millet and sorghum formed the basis of the diet and were complimented by a variety of groundnuts, peas, local fruits and vegetables (Beach 1977:41). Rice could be found in central Mozambique, but was not grown in the Teve kingdom, while maize, the staple crop today, did not arrive in Mozambique until the eighteenth century and only became more widely cultivated in the nineteenth century (Pfeiffer 1997:89).

The *mambo* or chief allocated land to individual families. The *mambo* could also

delegate land allocation authority to sub-chiefs residing in his territory. The land linked

the history of the chiefdom with the present chief and the ancestral spirits (Bourdillon

1998:67). The chief or sub-chiefs also settled disputes arising over land or other natural

resources. Farmers practiced shifting cultivation, letting fields remain fallow from three

to twenty years depending on soil fertility (Pfeiffer 1997:138).

Once a man received land from the *mambo*, he would give each wife their own

plot to produce food for herself and her children. Women also cultivated along

riverbanks or in wetland areas called *matoro* in Chiteve or *baixas* in Portuguese. Gardens

cultivated in these areas provided maize, fruits, and vegetables during the dry season.

Wives worked individually in their own fields, but would also work together to share

their labor (Pfeiffer 1997:138). Because the Teve are patrilineal and patrilocal, men

mediated women's access to land through marriage. However, if the marriage did not

last, the woman could return to her father's lineage and receive access to an arable plot

(Pfeiffer 1997:147).

Though land provided the basis for subsistence and linked the protective powers

of the ancestral spirits to ruling lineage, control over labor and trade formed the

foundation of political rule in Teve. Controlling trade routes and levying taxes buttressed

the royalty's power. The Teve traded gold from the Manica highlands for beads, cloth,

and other goods carried by Portuguese merchants at Portuguese trading centers called

ferias. The Portuguese negotiated a treaty with the Teve and Manica which allowed

Portuguese trade in the area with taxes being paid to the local kingdoms (Bhila 1982:72).

The Teve rulers' authority derived not only from the control over important inland trade

routes, but also on the ability to extract tribute from their subjects. According to Newitt (1995:46), the peasantry was required to work the chief's millet fields for a specified period of time and dos Santos observed men working the fields of the king (Beach 1980:99).

Teve authority extended beyond the materiality of trade and forced labor and also involved the production of rituals such as firelighting ceremonies to guarantee sufficient rainfall and plentiful harvests (das Neves 1998:56) and project their power and authority over "invisible realms" to their followers. Despite the elite's performance of these ceremonies, Newitt (1995:40) contends they did not see themselves as rainmakers. In discussing the practice of rainmaking, I could not find any evidence of particular spiritual provinces associated with rainmaking,[53] though chief Cupenha and other elders spoke of a renowned rainmaker near Dzembe Mountain on the border of present day Sussundenga and Gondola districts.[54] People often stated that the chief performed rainmaking ceremonies instead of a rainmaking specialist.[55] In some cases, the chief served as an intermediary between his subjects and the rainmaking medium.[56] Like the Gaza Nguni and the Portuguese who come later, the Teve royalty ultimately maintained their political hegemony through coercion (Newitt 1995:45) and material and symbolic power.

Since their arrival at Sofala in 1505, African populations continually challenged Portuguese influence in central Mozambique. Because European hegemony had to be produced and reproduced through specific forms of control, the Teve had a long and

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[53] See Lan (1985).
[54] See Alexander (1994:43, 54-55) for a brief discussion of the renowned Chirenje medium.
[55] Chief Buapua performed a rainmaking ceremony in November 2006. This is the only ceremony that I know of during my time in Sussundenga.
[56] Chief Ma'ate's mediated the relationship with the Chimerera medium (Alexander 1994:54-55).

conflictual relationship with the Portuguese (das Neves 1998:59) that resulted in numerous battles and claims that the Portuguese conquered the Teve in 1575 (MacGonagle 2007:43). During the early seventeenth century, the Teve did not join Mutapa against the Portuguese nor did they join the more general uprising against the Portuguese in 1631. Newitt (1995:95) argues this complacency on the part of the Teve reflects the Portuguese influence within the kingdom. The rise of the Changamire state at the end of the seventeenth century challenged the Muenemutapa and Portuguese held trade networks (Pfeiffer 1997:1991). Portuguese defeat at the hands of Changamire in 1695 weakened their influence in central Mozambique for another 100 years. As a result, Changamire exerted varying degrees of influence over the region.

Before the rise of Changamire and the displacement of Mutapa and Portuguese influence, lands under the control of the Teve king faced encroachment from the Zambezi valley. The Portuguese monarchy granted large estates known as *prazos de coroa* to Portuguese settlers to form the basis of European settlement. *Prazo* lords and their slave armies known as *achikunda* ruled the Zambezi valley through control over trade, particularly slaves. In the middle of the seventeenth century, *prazo* owner Sisnando Bayão annexed a section of Teve territory (Isaacman 1972:18). According to Isaacman (ibid.:20), Bayão obtained Prazo Cheringoma[57] for his efforts helping King Berenha subdue a Tonga revolt, and he supported the king in an attempt by the royal family to oust him from power. He was given an outer portion of Teve lands. The loss of the area known as Gobira, weakened Teve prestige as well as material resources (Newitt 1995:95). This would not be the only time a portion of the Teve kingdom would fall

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[57] Cherinogoma remained under the control of the Bayão family until the 1830s when Barue and Nguni forces invaded the area (Issacman 1972:36). Also see Isaacman (1976) for the spread of the Barue rebellion.

under the control of a *prazo* ruler. In 1881 Gouveia,[58] installed as *capitão mor* of central

Mozambique, exerted informal control over Manica and Teve (Isaacman 1972:149).

The Teve kingdom remained large until the end of the eighteenth century. A

combination of civil wars triggered by dynastic succession, Portuguese expansion from

the coast, and Nguni migrations from South Africa weakened the large state into a

number of smaller chieftaincies. In the following decades, the Gaza Nguni Empire would

subject Shona-speaking groups in central Mozambique to forced labor and tribute,

foreshadowing the early days of charter company rule in central Mozambique.

Gaza Nguni Migrations and Establishing an Empire

Migrations known as the *Mfecane* brought Nguni people from the Zulu state of

Shaka to much of southern and central Mozambique. The creation of the Gaza Nguni

Empire involved several different Nguni migrations. Nxaba led the first group of Nguni

warriors into Teve areas (das Neves 1998:62). However, between 1821-1831,

Soshangane and his followers moved north and subdued Nxaba (ibid.) and established the

Gaza state in the lower Limpopo valley. From there, Nguni warriors raided areas

controlled by the Teve (MacGonagle 2007:93). The capital of the Gaza state, always

referred to as Mandhlakazi, shifted across time and space during Nguni occupation of

central Mozambique.

After the death of Soshangane in the 1850s, Mzila captured the throne in a

fraternal succession dispute (Rennie 1973:135) and built diplomatic links as far as Natal

and Matabeleland (ibid.). While Mzila extended Gaza military and political control, he

did not incorporate the rain shrines and territorial cults into his political sphere

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[58] Gouveia is the name of António Manoel de Sousa who built a vast empire across the Zambezi valley (see Isaacman 1972:147-150).

(MacGonagle 2007:98). By not honoring the land's ancestral spirits, military power justified the Gaza Nguni kingdom to its subjects (Hughes 1999:40). Mzila's son, Ngungunyana, succeeded his father in the mid 1880s. Ngungunyana relocated the capital to Bilene, and with this move, forcibly relocated many Ndau speakers to the Limpopo valley in southern Mozambique (MacGonagle 2007:95).

The Gaza state introduced a military and state structure over most of central Mozambique. The military, where men were assigned to regiments based on age-sets, maintained the political hegemony of the Gaza state (Rennie 1973:144). The Nguni aristocracy formed the state nucleus and referred to themselves as Nguni, Gaza, or Shangana. Beneath the aristocracy, in the Nguni class system, were subjects who adopted aspects of Nguni culture such as taking on Nguni totems or piercing their ears, and finally beneath them, were people that preserved their old ways (ibid.). Liesegang (1981:178) describes the Nguni social structure as being stratified with the ruling group at the center, and societies now under Gaza control relegated to the periphery. The social structure also included a large number of captives circulating and being assimilated into the core area.

The Gaza economy revolved around cattle while the aristocracy regulated hunting and trading and imposed a subsistence tax. First Mzila, and later Ngungunyana, strengthened Nguni power through the management of large herds of cattle, by conscripting male labor, and by controlling external trade (das Neves 1998:64). Despite the formidable rule of the Gaza king, he did not intervene in the daily affairs of the chieftaincies as long as tribute was paid and men were provided for military regiments (Rennie 1973:149).

Gaza hegemony in central Mozambique rested more on the control of labor than the control of land. Age-based regiments raided neighboring polities and worked in the royal kraals of the king's wives. Nguni raids generated captives, orphans, and displaced people. Some of the men were conscripted into the army while others worked as slaves for the *nduna* (chief). Women were taken as wives by Gungunyana and the children were distributed as wives or workers for loyal notables (Hughes 1999:40-41). The Nguni institution of *kukhonza*[59] structured this form of ambulatory enslavement. The act of *kukhonza* falls on a spectrum, at the milder end, accepting Nguni overrule constitutes *kukhonza* while the opposite end hardens into slavery. Orphans or destitute people could pledge themselves to an *nduna* or chief in exchange for protection (ibid.:2006:26). The people who performed *kukhonza* joined a lineage as adopted children or fictive kin and worked the fields (ibid.:2006:26). Even before the arrival of Nguni migrants, other Zulu offshoots and coastal residents sold large numbers of people (Hughes 1999:42). "The *kukhonza* act, thus, detached people from their kin and generated a floating population of clients, sometimes known as *varanda* (singular: muranda)" (Hughes 1999:42). This form of ambulatory enslavement produces mobility and servitude and instituted a "portable politics" that traversed preexisting geographical boundaries and introduced a system of kingdom wide ceremonies (Hughes 2006:25). "People, rather than claims to cultivate fixed plots of land, constituted the long-term economic security of the kingdom" (Hughes 2006:28).

By 1889 the Portuguese believed the area to still be under the rule of Ngungunyana. Not long after, the Gaza state fell between 1895 and 1897 when the

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[59] Zulu term meaning submission.

Portuguese defeated[60] Ngungunyana and the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and the *Companhia de Moçambique* (Mozambique Company) divided the territory once under his control. Like the Teve kingdom before, Gaza Nguni authority rested more on the control of human resources than cultivable land. The Gaze Nguni Empire imposed a militarized state structure over disperse populations loosely connected with larger societies of the Zimbabwean plateau, however, Gaza rulers left everyday decision-making, such as land and resource allocation in the hands of local *madzimambo* as long as men were available for military service and taxes were paid. Although Portugal outlawed slaving in 1836, the Mozambique Company and white settlers' ongoing quest to secure a supply of cheap labor blurs the boundaries between slavery, forced labor, and coerced volunteerism for the next 50 years and becomes a primary marker of colonial rule.

The Mozambique Company and Settler Agriculture in Central Mozambique

By the late nineteenth century, Portugal faced an increasing threat to its colonies from other European powers. Portugal's desire for a territory stretching from Mozambique to Angola was thwarted when Lisbon lost control over the Congo basin, and the growing European interest in Africa threatened to wrestle imperial control of southeast Africa away from Portugal. In order for Portugal to maintain its grip on Mozambique, it had to demonstrate "effective occupation" to rival European countries. To gain international recognition of its control over Mozambique, Portugal relied on chartered companies to provide cheap administration and stimulate economic development (Vail 1976). Beginning in the 1870s and increasing in the 1880s, the Portuguese government granted concessions to Portuguese nationals (Vail 1976:390).

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[60] The Portuguese captured Ngungunyana, and exiled him to the Azores.

Over the next 50 years, company rule would transform the political economy of central Mozambique; however, the control over labor would anchor many of the new socio-economic dynamics.

In March of 1888, the consolidation of Colonel Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade's various interests south of the Zambezi formed the *Companhia de Moçambique*. Control over the mineral resources of Manica and Quiteve shaped the initial economic interests of the company. In February of 1891, the Portuguese government granted the company a new charter, including full sovereign rights over the territory stretching from the Sabi (Save) River to the Zambezi River (Vail 1976:391). The initial charter was granted for 25 years, but in 1897, the government extended it to 50 years. The charter allocated rights to all land and natural resources within company territory (Allina-Pisano 2002:53). In the newly restructured company, shares could be held by anyone regardless of nationality[61] and the company could also grant sub-concessions to non-Portuguese nationals. In the words of Allina-Pisano, "The Company was, in effect, a form of privatized government: a mechanism for Portugal to project its sovereignty throughout Mozambique while avoiding the burden colonial administration placed on its treasury. There is no meaningful distinction to be made between Company and colonial administration: in central Mozambique they were one and the same" (2003:63). The company, as colonial administrator, sought to govern African populations living in Manica and structure the conditions under which they allocated their labor while providing incentives for foreign capitalists to invest in the newly demarcated territory.

With the company now responsible for colonial settlement and economic development in central Mozambique, a new influx of foreign settlers arrived from across

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[61] The government demanded the company headquarters be based in Lisbon (Vail 1976:393).

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the world. The environment and communication network of west-central Mozambique

attracted settlers and entrepreneurs from Greece, Portugal, Italy, France, Germany, Great

Britain, South Africa, India, and China (das Neves 1998:70). Due to the high costs of

building the infrastructure of central Mozambique, the company granted numerous sub-

concessions[62] to entities related to the British South African Company, particularly Beira

Railway and the Beira Junction Railway Company (das Neves 1998:71), to construct a

road and rail network that would stretch from the coastline to the interior. The company

hoped to earn dividends for its shareholders from the money generated by the

concessions and sub-concessions (Allina-Pisano 2002:56). While the company exercised

political and administrative control, the Portuguese colonial government was not entirely

absent of the colonization process in central Mozambique. The colonial government

"selected one thousand Portuguese family farmers to be sent by boat from Portugal to

Manica and Sofala in order to establish a nucleus of European farmers to work side by

side with the Mozambique Company" (das Neves 1998:71). Although the company

charter stipulated the provision of land, farming implements, and financial subsidies to

settlers, little of these resources ever materialized (ibid.). Instead, the company relied on

its sub-concessions to mining companies as an important source of revenue.

During the first decade of company rule, sporadic projects, such as railroad and

port construction, shaped labor demands. With the company as one of the largest

employers of African labor, company officials conducted labor recruitment at the district-

level, but as the colonial economy grew the need to recruit labor on a territory-wide basis

intensified (Allina-Pisano 2002:22). The establishment of the *Repartição do Trabalho*

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[62] Other concessions include the Buzi Company, Gorongoza Company, and the Moribane Company
(Allina-Pisano 2002:56).

Indigena or Native Labor Department in 1911 centralized labor recruitment. The RTI did

not differ greatly from the 1907 labor law dictating that every African had the "moral and

legal obligation" to work. The significance of 1911 rests on the bureaucratized control of

the labor recruitment process under the RTI and according to Allina-Pisano resulted in

"making the system more predictable, uniform, and more coercive" (2002:187).

Company recruitment agents working alongside African collaborators conducted

recruitment sweeps across the countryside and conscripted unsuspecting smallholders

into *chibaro* or forced labor.

The creation of the Native Labor Department subjected Africans to a more

centralized, bureaucratized, and ultimately more brutal labor system; however, those

living within Manica district[63] were largely protected from the predatory reach of the

recruitment system. Years earlier (1903-1904), company officials, African chiefs, and

villagers negotiated a deal to exempt Manica residents from forced labor as long as the

chiefs provided laborers for public works projects, such as road construction, when

needed and encouraged their followers to return from Southern Rhodesia and settle in

company territory (Allina-Pisano 2003). What begin as a one year exemption became a

stable agreement from 1907-1925. The deal strengthened chiefs' roles as enforcers of

company power and situated the traditional authorities between their subjects and

company authority (Allina-Pisano 2002:136), while also shielding Manica residents from

the more atrocious aspects of forced labor. The arrangement also had important

ramifications for settler farmers and private entrepreneurs and forced them to recruit

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[63] Under colonial administration, district boundaries were different than today. Manica Province consisted of three districts or *circumscrições*: Chimoio District, Manica District, and Mossurize District. Sussundenga was part of Manica District. Today Sussundenga is a separate district and Chimoio, the provincial capital, is located in Gondola District. During the colonial period what is today the city of Chimoio was called Vila Pery.

labor from other districts while the company administration secured a "free" supply of labor to maintain the road network.

The growing number of foreign settlers claimed land along the Beira railway line and in the valleys of the Pùngué and Revué rivers displacing African families from their land. With an increase in the number of settler farmers now producing maize, the need for African labor became more urgent (das Neves 1998:74). The increase in maize farming also created tension between agricultural and mining interests within the territory. Both operations required laborers, and the mines provided a market for maize, while the farms provided a cheap source of food for the mineworkers intertwining the competing interests in a symbiotic relationship. Following the first decade of the twentieth century the company made a more concerted effort to promote commercial agriculture through the distribution of free maize seed, credit facilities,[64] and agricultural machinery (ibid.).

With a stronger commitment to settler agriculture, the company also set up a Commission of Agricultural Development.[65] Despite the colonial government's efforts to attract Portuguese settlers by the 1920s and 1930s, Afrikaners, Britons, Greeks, and Chinese still dominated settler agriculture (das Neves 1998:76). The growing number of settlers along the Beira railway line and the establishment of the sugar industry at Buzi increased competition for land and African labor. In order to mobilize African labor, the company instituted hut and pole taxes as well as labor regulations.[66] The company relied

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[64] According to das Neves (1998:74), "between 1917 and 1919, the National Bank of South Africa provided funds for white settlers in Manica and Chimoio. From 1919 to 1932 credit for agriculture and mining was provided by the Bank of Beira, a shareholder in both the Banco Nacional Ultramarino of Portugal and the Mozambique Company."

[65] Comissão de Fomento Agricola.

[66] In 1900 the company's labor regulations stipulated that Africans have the "moral obligation to work," as for wages or as subsistence farmers producing at least one hectare of food crops and another half hectare of

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on African chiefs and African police, known as *sipaio*, to mobilize labor. In addition, the company lowered salaries to attract more investment to its territory (das Neves 1998:78). Thus in the eyes of many white settlers, the company functioned as their labor recruitment agency.

The discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the 1860s did not help efforts to recruit labor in company territory. The attraction of mineral wealth at Kimberley and Witwatersrand, combined with low salaries and difficult work conditions, undermined company and government efforts to secure a steady supply of cheap labor. The labor needs of the company were being unmet to the extent that the company imposed child labor on young boys beginning at the age of twelve (das Neves 1998:80). In what later became the southern-half of Sussundenga District and Mossurize District, labor migration steered away from company territory opting instead to migrate toward the Transvaal, while men further north escaped to Southern Rhodesia to find work (das Neves 1998: 79-80). The competition over labor between the mines of South Africa, the farms and mines of Southern Rhodesia, and the mines and settlers of central Mozambique resulted in formal legislation prohibiting South Africa and Southern Rhodesia from recruiting migrant labor in company territory. However, this did not stem the flow of clandestine labor recruiters from operating in Mozambique (das Neves 1998:82). The labor issue continued to provoke controversy and concern for local employers. In 1926,

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cash crops. By 1907, labor regulations stated that "natives who did not cultivate their own farms properly, or did not voluntarily offer for work, would be conscripted into contract labour with the company of individual entrepreneurs for fixed wages and for a period of not less than three months" (das Neves 1998:77).

the company devised its own Department of Native Affairs[67] to undertake the labor issue (das Neves 1998:83).

Company and private labor demands and African resistance to forced labor shaped rural livelihoods and the political economy of central Mozambique. Forced labor intertwined smallholders with regional labor markets and global agricultural commodity markets. The *chibaro* system depressed wages and prices for smallholder produce and made wage labor crucial to agricultural pursuits, a relationship that still exists today (O'Laughlin 2002). But, how and why Mozambican men migrated varied across company territory.

In Manica District, the proximity to the border, a mountainous topography, and the ability of agriculture to meet most families' material needs provided Manica communities with more autonomy and negotiating power with company officials. Manica residents did not only cross the international border to evade forced labor, but to seek higher wages in order to pay their taxes and purchase consumer goods. Through international migration, men were able to exercise more flexibility in the types of work they engaged in and earned more competitive wages for their labor (Allina-Pisano 2002). Manica residents also sought work on Southern Rhodesian farms to take advantage of educational opportunities and earn money to pay *lobola* (bridewealth) and purchase agricultural inputs (das Neves 1998).

In the southern reaches of company rule, Machazian men engaged in labor migration to pay *lobola* and gain more social autonomy from elder kinsmen. In other words, Lubkemann (2008) argues that labor migration is not just a reaction to an oppressive authority, but enmeshed in household, gender, and intergenerational struggles

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[67] Direcção dos Negocios Indigenas.

that has reshaped social relations in the district. Moving as means of securing a better livelihood or what Harries (1994) terms "mobility as a resource" instilled a migratory pattern in southern Mozambique long before Mozambican men sold their labor in South African mines or on sugar plantations. Forced labor, migration, and resistance shaped livelihood practices, integrated smallholders with labor and commodity markets, and fostered interdependence between wage labor and agricultural production prior to and during company and colonial rule.

While the labor question plagued the Mozambique Company and individual settlers, Portuguese control over central Mozambique faced a continuous threat from Cecil Rhodes' British South African Company (BSAC). Likewise, Jan Smuts and South Africa coveted southern Mozambique, particularly the areas providing access to Delagoa Bay. Outside threats and African negotiation and resistance hindered the absolute expansion of company power and its authority had to be continually refashioned to adapt to changing labor demands and inconsistent agricultural production.

Though the company's control over central Mozambique was far from totalizing, within company territory, Africans faced the threat and reality of forced labor, forced cash crop cultivation, the imposition of taxes, and the loss of agricultural lands along the Beira Corridor and in the fertile valleys of the Pùngué and Revué rivers. For example, concessions along the corridor made to settlers for maize farming evicted Africans from their lands. They could remain on the lands and work as tenant farmers or relocate away from the corridor (das Neves 1998:90). Men were forced to labor on public works projects or on sugar plantations while women were forced to grow cotton and market their crops to company agents. While taxes such as the 1901 hut tax sought to ensure a

supply of African labor, the company failed to construct schools and build hospitals stipulated by its charter (Vail 1976:396-397).

In 1913, for the first time, Rhodesia could now recruit labor from company territory (Vail 1976:406). The company paid its labor in devalued Portuguese paper while requiring taxes to be paid in silver coin or sterling bank notes. When the company's charter expired in 1941, it was a financial failure and facilitated the weakening of Portuguese sovereignty in Mozambique. However, many of its sub-concessions were financially successful (ibid.:415-416).

Antonio Salazaar's ascension to the head of government in Lisbon in 1928 ushered in a change in Portuguese colonial policy. Under the *Novo Estado* or New State (1928-1962), Portuguese colonies became more oriented towards nationalist economic policies and were to be "developed" for the benefit of Portugal. In Mozambique, this meant in the following years a growing number of Portuguese settlers arrived to "develop" the country.

Because Lisbon had little interest in investing in Mozambique, the extraction of labor became the primary means of organizing the colonial political economy for the benefit of Portugal. The 1930 labor regulations, drawn up by the Native Affairs Department,[68] established a system of forced labor whereby Africans were made to work for Portuguese plantations and other industries for at least six months of the year as well as grow cotton and other crops. Restrictions from marketing and credit facilities accompanied the forced labor regulations in order to make Africans dependent on wage labor (das Neves 1998:87-88).

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[68] Repartição dos Negocios Indigenas.

Despite legislation and practices designed to favor Portuguese interests,

Portuguese nationals continued to own small and medium scale operations, while the

large farms and enterprises remained in the hands of non-Portuguese settlers or the

Mozambique Company (das Neves 1998:90). By the late 1930s, the government

encouraged settlers to form associations such as employers' guilds[69] and marketing

boards[70] to mediate financial, labor, transport, marketing, and technical concerns (das

Neves 1998:91). These associations figured prominently in protecting settler agriculture

against African competition (ibid.). In 1936, the Mozambique Company organized a

Maize Marketing Board[71] to promote commercial farming and eliminate competition

between settlers. The formation of associations and the possibility of assistance resulted

in a small increase in the number of white farms in the late 1930s (das Neves 1998:94-

95). Beira, Southern Rhodesian, and Portugal served as the primary markets for settler

produce.[72]

Following the expiration of the Mozambique Company's charter in 1941, the

Portuguese government took over administrative responsibilities for Manica and Sofala.

The end of the company's charter also corresponded with settler protests over labor

shortages and the imposition of forced labor[73] (das Neves 1998:109). In order to promote

white commercial agriculture, it encouraged the formation of new associations.

According to das Neves, "these associations not only constituted the way through which

white entrepreneurs negotiated their projects or forwarded their complaints to the State,

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[69] Gremios.

[70] Juntas.

[71] Junta do Comercio do Milho e sua Farinha.

[72] Tobacco, maize, and cotton were exported to Portugal (das Neves 1998:97).

[73] The new labor regulation stipulated that "all able-bodied African men between the ages of 18 and 55 had to prove that they lived on the proceeds of their labor, and that they had worked at least six months of each years as employees for the state, private individuals, or companies" (das Neves 1998:109).

but also functioned as instruments to undermine the African household economy, mainly through segregationist maize marketing policies, the distribution of land far from the main communication networks and credit restrictions" (1998:99).

Before the company's charter expired, the colonial government instituted a forced cotton regime (1938-1961). While men were compelled to work on private or state enterprises, women became the primary cotton growers, particularly in central Mozambique where state and concessionary companies extracted male labor from African communities (Isaacman 1996:83). Following the end of the Mozambique Company, the *Companhia Nacional Algodoeira* (The National Cotton Company or CNA) obtained nine cotton zones in Manica and Sofala from areas formerly under company control (Isaaman 1996:37). Sussundenga became the site of several cotton producing areas, particularly Mavita to the west of Sussundenga-Sede and Dombe in the southern part of the district. Though production did not reach the levels of northern Mozambique, by the 1950s, central Mozambique had become and important secondary source of cotton. With men laboring on commercial plantations and settler farms or earning wages in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere, cotton cultivation increased women's workloads and they divided their time and labor producing enough food crops to support their families while meeting the demands of the colonial cotton regime.

In addition to the few cotton production areas, Portuguese officials also promoted wheat cultivation. In 1947, 300 farmers cultivated wheat in Mavita and in Rotanda, along the Zimbabwe border, and the colonial government established a research station, the *Junta da Exportação dos Cereais das Colonias*[74] (Pfeiffer 1997:107). During this time, cultivating wheat, maize, and cotton exempted smallholders from forced labor and

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[74] The Colonial Cereal Exportation Board.

117

the majority of these producers were women due to male labor migration (ibid.:108).

Forced crop cultivation and the government's promotion of commercial agriculture and development would culminate in the alienation of land and control over water sources in Sussundenga a few years later.

Colonial Enclosures: Portuguese Settlers and the *Colonato de Sussundenga*

In 1897, the Mozambique Company founded *Colónia* Meyrelles in Manica. Located north of Macequece, the settlement represented an early attempt to support a white farming community as stipulated by the company's charter to settle Portuguese citizens in the territory. However, it was not until the expiration of the company's charter that the colonial government made a strident effort to encourage European settlement and the development of commercial agriculture. Under Antonio Salazar and the *Novo Estado*, Portuguese colonies became more oriented to nationalistic economic policies and authoritarian rule. During the late 1950s, a growing number of Portuguese immigrants settled in Mozambique as part of the government's efforts to develop the colony. The establishment of agricultural settlements in Mozambique was linked to poverty in Portugal, and many arrivals during this period were poor, unskilled farmers or workers from Portugal. However, some settlers in the new commercial agricultural schemes were recruited locally (das Neves 1998:38) and some of these recruits had lived in Mozambique for two generations (Hanlon 1984:96). The colonial government established settler schemes, known as *colonatos*, in the fertile lands of Manica Province as well as in the Lower Limpopo valley in Gaza Province. The Portuguese government allocated farmers land, housing, subsidies, and technical assistance to establish their own farms or cultivate as part of a settlement scheme (Pitcher 1993:183).

Portuguese settlers arrived in Sussundenga during the late 1950s and displaced

Chiteve-speaking peoples from their lands. The temperate climate, fertile soils, and

proximity to the infrastructure of the Beira Corridor attracted settlers to Sussundenga.[75]

The *colonato de Sussundenga* formed part of a broader development scheme in the Revue

river valley, which included the establishment of large tobacco farms, roads, and trading

posts (Pfeiffer 1997:108-109).

The arrival of the settlers reconfigured spatial relationships, access to land and

water resources, and labor relations in the Sussundenga countryside. Many smallholders

lost access to land and were forced to live on the outskirts of the area demarcated as the

colonato or retreated to more distant mountainous areas. Others essentially became

tenant farmers, allowed to remain within the boundaries of the new agricultural scheme

or work as domestic servants inside settlers' homes. Smallholders remaining in the

colonato could no longer keep livestock and were forced to cultivate at least two

kilometers from the settler farms (Alexander 1994:6). The settlers' lack of capital and

labor mitigated the wholesale eviction of Matewe people from the *colonato*. In addition,

the settlers allocated land to chiefly families inside the settlement scheme and land to a

small number of African farmers who were permitted to live and farm near the *colonato*

as part of the colonial policy to "modernize" the African population (ibid.). These farms,

called *pequenas empresas* (small enterprises) were drastically smaller than settler

landholdings, but this designation provided some smallholders with better access to

markets and labor (Pfeiffer 1997:110).

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[75] The government also established settlement schemes in Sussundenga District in Mupandia, Rotanda, and Dombe. The government surveyed approximately 18,000 hectares in Sussundenga District during the colonial period (Alexander 1994:6 footnote 7).

Sussundengans generally remember Portuguese settlers arriving in the 1950s. The first arrivals settled in an area called Matica. Matica is located about five kilometers from Sussundenga-Sede and today is the site of the Sussundenga Agricultural Station.[76] Before the arrival of the whites, people described the area as forest.[77] The colonial government cleared forests, built roads, farm houses, storage facilities, and constructed water infrastructure (Alexander 1994:6). The colonial state also made available machinery such as tractors and harvesters to the new settlers and at least eight free laborers for two years (ibid.). Sussundengans remember a Portuguese agronomist named Villanova David Guerra as the first white settler and administrator of the area. Other settlers soon arrived from Vila Pery (Chimoio). Around 1960, the site of the *colonato de Sussundenga* moved to the area that is today referred to as Sussundenga-Sede. The settlers constructed a Catholic Church and Social Center in the middle of town where, on the weekends, Portuguese settlers from across the district attended church services and congregated.

The settlers constructed six dams and a water storage tank perched high on a small rocky mountain. "They blocked the rivers to make dams so they could raise fish and to irrigate crops such as tomatoes and cabbage."[78] They build the first dams between the years of 1962 and 1964, while the last one was built a year before independence in 1974. Portuguese farmers pumped water from the Chizizira River through a system of pipes connected to the tank. They used the water from the dams to irrigate their vegetable gardens, to raise fish, and to soak and clean canafi grass used for making sacks.

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[76] Estação Agraria de Sussundenga.

[77] "Raiva sango." (Sussundenga, 5 of April 2006).

[78] "Vakavhara nzizi ndokudziita mabarragem, vachida kuchengeta hove uye kudiridza zvirimwa zvavo matomatoe necove." (Sussundenga, 10 of April 2006).

They converted land along the Chizizira River to an important site for growing potatoes and tomatoes and relied on a mixture of family and forced labor (Hanlon 1984:96).

During this time, Africans continued to grow maize and sorghum as their staple food crops. However, many remember being forced to grow potatoes, onions, garlic, cotton, tobacco, and sunflowers. As one man recounted this period, "It was a crime not to grow these."[79] Another gentleman stressed the coercive nature of *chibaro*, stating that "We were forced to grow these crops: maize, cotton sunflower, and potatoes."[80] Sussundengans recalled a variety of crops cultivated by the Portuguese: maize, tobacco, butter beans, finger and bulrush millet, peanuts, wheat, cassava, sunflowers, tomatoes, and cabbage.

Prior to the arrival of Villanova David Guerra and other Portuguese settlers, people lived under the jurisdiction of several chieftaincies. Chiefs Cupenha, Ganda, Xau, and Buapua ruled over the areas closest to where the Portuguese settled. The chiefs mediated access to land and other natural resources. People asked (kukumbira) for the chief's permission to cultivate a particular piece of land or negotiated amongst themselves. Negotiation (kutaurirana) played an important role in how people obtained access to wetland areas. People could ask the chief to allocate them an area near a stream, but people could also negotiate access with neighbors, particularly if a neighbor claimed a large portion of wetland area. Thus patterns of access and use remained flexible and negotiable.

People primarily depended on rain to sustain their fields. Annual rain ceremonies helped ensure the fertility of the soil and a timely and adequate harvest. The chief

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[79] "Kusadyara izvozvo zvaisungisa." (Sussundenga, 4 of April 2006).

[80] Taimanikidzwa kudyara idzi mbeu: magwere, donje, maringazuva, nebatatas." (Sussundenga, 5 of April 2006).

121

brewed sorghum beer called *makoto* to offer to the ancestors and show respect in order for them to bring the rains. Sussundengans recalled water being generally abundant in the rivers and streams prior to the Portuguese construction of the dams.

The arrival of Portuguese settlers, the subsequent dispossession of land, and the imposition of a six month labor contract reconfigured power and authority in the countryside. However, the settlers' authority to allocate land and demand labor was not totalizing. Sussundengans retained a degree of autonomy, and chiefs continued to wield power in areas distant from the newly established settler farms. Both chiefs and whites mediated access to land and other natural resources depending on the proximity of fields, forests, and water resources to settler farms. Cupenha, Ganda, and Buapua continued to exercise authority over the land and the people living outside of the nucleus of settler farms and stretching into the mountains. However, unlike other parts of Mozambique, colonial authorities in Sussundenga did not appoint new chiefs, but used Cupenha and others to police the population and arrest people who attempted to escape *chibaro*.

While the alienation of agricultural land dispossessed African farmers from their *machambas* forcing their resettlement to the outskirts of the *colonato*, many Sussundengans remember forced labor as the primary marker of European settlement in Sussundenga. An elderly shoe repairman named Arlindo stated "There was a six month labor contract. People from here went to Tsetsera and Tandara where it was very cold to work the farms."[81] People also expressed differential treatment at the hands of the Portuguese. "Those who were in favor of the whites were living well, but others were

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[81] "Kwaiva nechibharo uye necontrato ye6meses. Vemuno vaienda kuTsetsera neTandara kwaitonhora." (Sussundenga, 6 of April 2006).

suffering. They were arrested and forced into a six month labor contract."[82]

Furthermore, when I asked this gentleman how things are different today than from the past he replied "there is no longer a six month labor contract."[83] Another person echoed similar sentiments when asked the same question. "A person is free to grow what he wants, and there is no house tax or six month labor contract."[84] Alexandra stressed the cyclical nature of forced labor: "There was a six month labor contract. After this period, a person could rest for six months and after the rest, the next six months was work. The government and the Portuguese would force people to go to their contracts. Sometimes people voluntarily went to work for the 'good' Portuguese. But to the ones who were not good, they were forced to go."[85] Forced labor competed with food production, with more and more agricultural responsibilities falling on the shoulders of women while their husbands or other male relatives worked on farms or crossed the border looking for better employment opportunities.

By the late 1960s, the *Luta Armada* (armed struggle), against Portuguese colonialism covered parts of northern Mozambique. But despite Frelimo's military campaign, the colonial government continued to invest in settlement schemes in the Manica highlands. Frelimo forces did not reach the northern areas of Manica Province until the early 1970s, and during 1973 and 1974, Frelimo guerrillas arrived in parts of Sussundenga. However, Frelimo did not establish any liberated zones in Sussundenga nor did the Portuguese resettle people into *aldeamentos* (fortified colonial villages)

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[82] "Vaiva vedivi ravarungu vaive vakagarika asi vaisava vedivi ravo vaitambudzwa. Vaisungwa vaichindoita contrato ye6meses." (Sussundenga, 5 of April 2006).

[83] "Hakusisina zvema contrato ye6meses." (Sussundenga, 5 of April 2006).

[84] "Munhu akasununguka kurima chaanoda uye hakusisina imposto, necontrato ye6meses." (Sussundenga, 20 of April 2006).

[85] "Kwaiva necontrato ye6meses. Pashure pe6meses dzecontrato munhu waizorora 6 meses dzinotevera. Dzinoteverazve dzacho waidokazve kucontrato. Hurumende yakabatana nevarungu vaiita kuti vanhu vaende kucontrato." (Sussundenga, 13 of April 2006).

(Alexander 1994:7). Between the coup which overturned the government in Lisbon in April of 1974 and when Frelimo assumed power in June of 1975, the majority of Portuguese settlers had fled Sussundenga. According to Hanlon (1984:96), many of the new settlers, particularly in the *colonatos*, continued to think of Portugal as their home. Only two Portuguese settlers remained in Sussundenga, each with landholdings on the southern edge of the *colonato* (Alexander 1994:7). Countrywide the Portuguese population shrunk to nearly 20,000 by 1976 (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983:113).

Following independence in 1975, the new Frelimo government nationalized all land and socialized the healthcare and education systems. In the towns and cities, they nationalized housing and most industries, while in the countryside; Frelimo instituted a two-prong approach to transform socio-economic relations. The government converted former Portuguese farms and plantations into state farms and envisioned young men working as wage laborers on these farms. The second aspect of socializing the countryside involved the creation of *aldeias comunais* or communal villages. The villagization program began in 1977 and relocated approximately 18% of the rural population into 1,350 communal villages.[86] The government reorganized and resettled smallholders into communal villages, designed to collectivize agricultural production and facilitate the delivery of health and education services, transportation, marketing, water infrastructure, and other agricultural services. In order for a settlement to be classified as a communal village, it had to, in theory, satisfy the following conditions: collective production or be in the process of forming cooperative agriculture as the basis of the

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[86] Communal villages varied in terms of their stages of development and the installment of local party structures. In some cases villages served the need to relocate people from the Limpopo and Zambezi river valleys to protect against future flooding while in other cases, the government converted former Portuguese *aldeamentos* into communal villages (Hanlon 1984:128).

economy; be composed of a planned physical setting separating residential areas from productive areas; and have in place local government institutions to guide village development (Coelho 1998:65). The communal villages model is based the forms of settlement and modes of production established in liberated zones during the *Luta Armada* (Hanlon 1984:122). However, in practice, collective production rarely occurred in the new *aldeias* (Hall and Young 1997:102).

The government established communal villages in Sussundenga in 1979 and 1980. Some of these new villages overlapped with land once cultivated by Africans as *pequenas empresas* (Alexander 1994:8). State farms were also carved out of the area once demarcated as the *colonato*. The largest state farm, *Empresa Agricola de Sussundenga*, was located in this area along with the *Estação de Experimentação Agraria de Instituto Nacional de Investagação Agraria* (INIA) and the *5 de Novembro, Unidade de Produção da Policia Popular de Moçambique* (PPM). The creation of state farms and *aldeias* relocated people back to the area where they had been evicted nearly twenty years before (Alexander 1994:8; Pfeiffer 1997:115). The proximity of *aldeias* to state farms fit within the government's vision that men would become wage laborers on state-run enterprises (Alexander 1994:8).

Aldeias comunais drastically altered settlement patterns, household composition, and asset ownership. Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese settlers and the government's villagization program, people lived in widely dispersed settlements organized around kinship. People raised livestock such as cattle, goats, and chickens and cultivated maize and sorghum fields during the rainy season and relied on stream-banks and wetland areas to provide crucial water resources for agriculture during the dry season. Within the

confines of the *aldeia*, household plots called *talhões*, were constructed close together making the traditional raising of small animals more difficult and an obstacle that is still experienced in many Sussundenga *bairros* today.[87]

Furthermore, in an attempt to discourage polygamy, Frelimo often divided extended families by allocating family members distant *talhões* in the *aldeia*. However, Pfeiffer's informants in the mid-1990s reported that extended family groups often managed to find a way to live near each other inside the *aldeia* (1997:115) while residents of the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique reproduced "the former geography of the region within the boundaries of the new village" (West 1998:156). The spatial reorganization of people and families inside the new villages increased social tensions and witchcraft accusations (Pfeiffer 1997:115-116). Sussundengans conveyed to Alexander in the early 1990s that witchcraft increased inside the *aldeias* and Frelimo's disdain for authorities and institutions labeled as "traditional" undermined the very avenues for addressing malevolent practices. With people now living close together and their personal possessions more visible, charges of witchcraft and jealousy intensified[88] (Alexander 1994:41).

The *aldeias comunais* limited people's movements and relocated them from ancestral lands and dispersed settlements to *bairros* where houses were built close together and *machambas* (fields) were located greater distances from where people now lived. In some ways villagization fostered socio-economic differentiation in the countryside as families whose land remained close to the new village thrived, while

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[87] With the exception of small groups of chickens, *bairro* residents keep larger animals such as goats, pigs and cattle at distant *machambas*.

[88] West (2001) documents the intensification of sorcery accusations inside communal villages on the Mueda plateau.

families whose land was at a great distance suffered (Finnegan 1992:115). In addition to spatial reordering, the *aldeais* introduced new forms of political authority through government appointed officials and *grupos dinamizadores* or dynamizing groups designed to usurp the power of "traditional" institutions and replace them with "modern" democratic forms of governance. Dynamizing groups, organized as neighborhood-based committees, served a variety of functions in the new villages from mobilizing public works projects and adult literacy to local courts and councils (Hanlon 1991:11) to raising political consciousness, disseminating government information, encouraging collective production, helping to combat social problems such as crime, and providing a forum for choosing local leadership (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983:116-121). Groups were headed by an elected neighborhood secretary; however, the ruling party nominated the list of candidates often selecting individuals from other areas. Communal villages "constituted a technique by which government officials made national subjects more legible in their attempts to consolidate new relations of power within the state domain" (West 2001:133). In Sussundenga, Chief Cupenha recalled a meeting where the government told the *regulos* they no longer have power (Alexander 1994:37). Despite the government's efforts to eliminate kin-based authority, these figures continued to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of their followers.

Sussundengans not only continued to accord legitimacy to *regulos* or *madzimambo*, but also relied on them to settle land disputes and adjudicate marriage and inheritance disputes. In addition, like residents of the Mueda plateau, Sussundengans constructed their own ways of inhabiting communal villages that were contrary to the settlement patterns, production practices, and social relations envisioned by the ruling

party. Some *aldeias* reflected a practice of "symbolic occupation" whereby residents built houses and burned cooking fires, but continued to live and cultivate as before (Alexander 1994:10). Finally, Sussundengans' understandings of the *aldeias* are inseparable from their experiences during the civil war, with many people perceiving them as efforts to control movements and provide security as opposed to a blueprint for socialist modernization (ibid.:12).

The government's attempt to transform settlement patterns and productive relations in the countryside also necessitated reorganizing the rural trading and credit network. At independence there were roughly 6000 private rural traders, the majority of which were Portuguese or Asian (Cravinho 1998:94). The exodus of the Portuguese led to the collapse of much of the rural trading network. Subsequently, rural Mozambicans were left with a severe shortage of basic commodities. During the colonial regime, rural traders traveled from town to rural areas and back trading basic commodities and agricultural implements or inputs, acquired in the towns for agricultural produced grown in the countryside. In addition, during this time, this network served as the primary source of credit, which disappeared after independence (ibid.:95). The collapse of the rural trading network, coupled with restricted movements and limited access to land and productive resources exacerbated the hardships faced by rural Mozambicans during the 1980s.

The new Frelimo government allowed rural traders to continue private trading, but in accordance with government established prices[89] (ibid.) and under heightened

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[89] The 1979 Private Trade Law (Law no. 7/79 of 3 July 1979) set the terms for private trade (cited in Cravinho 1998:95).

suspicion by Frelimo officials.[90] In keeping with Frelimo's socialist development model and nation-building strategy, the importance of private rural traders was predicted to diminish with the advancement of production and socio-economic transformations on state farms and cooperatives (ibid.).

The government also converted many rural trading posts into state-owned people's shops referred to as *Lojas do Povo*. The people's shops were not only an attempt to keep the rural trade network functioning after the departure of Portuguese *cantineiros*, but also sought to control one part of economic life that could have increased socio-economic differentiation in rural areas. In 1980 the government closed the *Lojas do Povo* and absorbed them into the National Directorate for Agricultural Marketing and Economics (DNCA). A year later, the DNCA was transformed into the state-owned enterprise known as Agricom (Cravinho 1998:100-101). The government's efforts failed to keep the rural shops operating and consequently rural Mozambicans faced shortages of basic commodities such as soap, salt, seeds, and oil, along with shortages of bicycles, tools, and lanterns. Without goods on rural shop selves, Mozambicans had nothing to buy with the money earned marketing their surplus crops (Finnegan 1992: 115).

Agricom, built on the remnants of the old grain marketing board, was designed as a wholesale agricultural company that would buy agricultural produce from smallholders and deliver consumer goods and agricultural inputs to rural areas through a network of collection points and storage sites. Agricom also served to deliver everything from agricultural tools such as hoes and sickles, to seeds and sacks, to donated second-hand clothing commonly referred to in Mozambique as *calamadades*. In Sussundenga, the

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[90] For much of the Frelimo elite, private traders were viewed as colonial collaborators as well as providing the means of exploitation in the countryside. Furthermore, private trading activity is often linked to Lazaro Nkavandame and his supporters during the 1960s Frelimo internal disputes (see Cravinho 1998:95).

Agricom depot at Sussundenga-Sede purchased smallholder crops at a fixed price

ensuring farmers a market for their produce. Many smallholders in 2006 lamented the

loss of Agricom and a guaranteed market. Agricom finally collapsed in 1993-1994 after

accruing substantial losses during the 1980s and the effects of structural adjustment and

privatization after 1987.[91]

The Civil War: Cultivating Fear

According to Nordstrom (1997), almost half of Mozambique's population of 16

million was in some way affected by the 16-year civil war, and Manica Province was one

of the provinces most devastated by the conflict (das Neves 1998:26). The *Resistencia*

Nacional de Moçambique, known as Renamo or by the English acronym MNR

(Mozambique National Resistance), created by the Southern Rhodesia secret police to

undermine Zimbabwean guerrilla forces based in Mozambique unleashed a campaign of

terror over much of Mozambique for more than a decade. Following Zimbabwe's

independence in 1980, support of Renamo shifted to South Africa. South Africa

provided more economic and military resources to Renamo and supported Renamo's

destabilization of Mozambique because of Frelimo's support of the African National

Congress (ANC) and its anti-apartheid struggle.

Given Sussundenga's proximity to Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) where

Renamo was formed, its closeness to the Beira Corridor, and the association of Renamo

with Ndau speakers, Sussundenga was positioned directly in the crosshairs of the

fighting. Furthermore, Renamo attacked symbols of the Frelimo government such as

cooperatives, state farms, communal villages, along with health clinics and rural schools.

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[91] It was generally accepted within the government that Agricom would loose money instead of turning a
profit. Agricom consistently sold grain at a lower price than it had purchased it throughout the 1980s (see
Cravinho 1998 for more details).

Zimbabwean troops guarding the Beira Corridor and government forces positioned near the *aldeia* and former *colonato* prohibited Renamo from gaining direct control in this area. However, sporadic attacks on the outside of the *aldeias* were not uncommon. Renamo insurgents attacked and burned the village *3 de Fevereiro Buapua* located on the southern edge of the former *colonato*. These attacks forced more people to sleep near Sussundenga-Sede and the presence of government troops while others crossed the border to Zimbabwe or moved to Chimoio and surrounding areas.

The fighting curtailed agricultural production throughout the Mozambican countryside. Renamo attacks, combined with drought, mismanagement, and lack of capital spelled the end of the state farms in Sussundenga and left only three functioning cooperatives by 1987 (Alexander 1994:12). The war displaced nearly one million people externally while another two million people were uprooted from their homes and communities and relocated to new towns, villages, or refugee camps. These *deslocados* (displaced people) often faced the greatest difficulties securing access to land in new areas since they lacked historical claims to these areas. Moreover, Nordstrom (1997:96) contends that the reconfiguring of different language and cultural groups into one large community necessitated the continual contestation over whose authority and traditions would receive greater voice.

Southern parts of Sussundenga District, such as Dombe, saw heavier fighting than northern Sussundenga. In November 1991, Renamo fighters overran Dombe town and sent the largest migration of internally displaced people from Dombe to Sussundenga-Sede during the war (Pfeiffer 1997:120). Many people fleeing from Dombe settled in and around Sussundenga-Sede. This time period saw the largest increase in population

around Sussundenga-Sede and the creation of new neighborhoods or *bairros* around the town.

In Sussundenga, access to land during the war years presented several problems. Because of the presence of government troops near the *aldeia* and the town, and roaming groups of *bandidos armados* (armed bandits) in areas outside of the town, people faced dangerous obstacles getting to their *machambas*. Sussundengans risked their lives to cultivate *machambas* located beyond the protective parameters of the government troops. "It was difficult especially for the people who lived far from the town because the ones near the town were protected by the military."[92] Another man summed up this situation by saying "it was impossible to cultivate far away, only near the town."[93] Once in the *mato* (bush), Sussundengans risked being captured or killed. They also had to negotiate the restrictions placed on them by government forces. "It was difficult because people cultivated in the morning; in the evenings, they would flee the war. People were captured by force without considering their ages. Some were given passes which allowed them to go and cultivate and return at an appointed time."[94]

Access to water outside of protected areas also posed numerous challenges.[95] The war disrupted rain-making ceremonies seen by many as essential for guaranteeing the fertility of the land. "It was difficult because no one had time to make ceremonies asking

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[92] "Zvaiva zvakaoma kunyanya kune vaigara kure nevila nokuti vaiva muvila vaiva nedziviriro." (Sussundenga, 4 of April 2006).
[93] "Zvaisakwanisika kurima kure kure, asi mudhuze nevila chete." (Sussundenga, 5 of April 2006).
[94] "Kwaishupa nokuti vanhu vairima mangwanani; manheru votiza hondo. Vanhu vaibatwa zvechesimba pasina kusarudza zera vachiendeswa kundorwa hondo. Vaipiwawo masenha aipa nguva yokugumira kurima pazuva." (Sussundenga, 10 of April 2006).
[95] Water availability was a problem in many *aldeias comunais* formed in Tete Province (Coelho 1998:71-72).

132

for rain."[96] "When there was good rain, people survived well, but when there was little rain, people suffered."[97] Concentrated settlements around Sussundenga-Sede increased pressure on boreholes and wells. Today some *bairros* do not have enough boreholes to serve the population growth experienced during the war. Accessing water resources outside government protected areas posed significant difficulties. People ran the risk of being captured or killed collecting water or irrigating fields in the bush. People expressed to me that not only were land and water resources difficult to obtain, but the war also destroyed concepts of order. "People were not well settled where they could have a water source and a good place because of the war."[98] The danger and violence, government and *de facto* relocation, and growing food insecurity disrupted people's lives in profound and challenging ways.

The war instilled a sense of fear and uncertainty, so much in fact, that when an earthquake struck central Mozambique in February of 2006, people conjured up memories and experiences of the war. Sussundenga is situated about 100 kilometers from the epicenter of the quake. The quake sent me, my host family, and our neighbors scrambling into the open night air. Many of the first words out of people's mouths expressed the notion that they thought Renamo and Frelimo were fighting again. After fears for our immediate safety subsided, conversations turned to what it was like at night during the civil war. "It was difficult to sleep. You always had to sleep with your things on your back. When we heard fighting, we grabbed our children and things and fled into

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[96] Zvainetsa nokuti hapana akanga achawana nguva yokukumbira mvura sekare." (Sussundenga, 10 of April 2006).

[97] Kukanaya kwaitobatsira vanhu, asi mvura ikasanaya vanhu vaitambura." (Sussundenga, 5 of April 2006).

[98] "Vanhu vaiva vasina kugadzikana kuti vawane mvura nenzvimbo yakanaka nemhaka yehondo." (Sussundenga, 4 of April 2006).

the bush."[99] People expressed the uncertainty of not knowing when or who might arrive in their village or homestead. As the quote above illustrates, people needed to be prepared to flee without much forewarning.

Fear and uncertainty accompanied people to their *machambas*. "You would be cultivating in fear. Seeing a person with a gun, you would run away."[100] Another man stated the specific dangers of seeing someone with a gun. "You would cultivate in fear of being caught by the soldiers. People who were caught were killed or forced to go to war."[101] To cultivate in fear (kurima uchitya) was expressed repeatedly as people recounted the decade of the 1980s and early 1990s.

Zimbabwe Migrations

Over the last seven years, Zimbabweans, both black and white, are crossing the border in search of new homes, jobs, economic stability, and tolerance. Many of these migrants are better characterized as returnees. Many Mozambicans living along the border fled to Zimbabwe during the 1980s at the height of the civil war. Roughly 20 years later, they are returning to seek a more promising future in the country they once left. Many of these returnees still maintain family and social networks in Mozambique. The return of numerous Mozambicans from Zimbabwe parallels early processes whereby Mozambicans moved into Zimbabwe and pledged themselves to Zimbabwean headmen (Hughes 1999b). Now these Mozambicans return to seek land and economic opportunities from Mozambican authorities.

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[99] "Era dificil para dormir. Sempre tinha que dormir com tuas coisas nas costas. Quando ouviamos brigar, pegavamos as nossas crianças e coisas e fugiamos no mato."
[100] Wairima uchitya. Kungoona munhu ane pfuti, waitotiza." (Sussundenga, 4 of April 2006)
[101] Waitorima uchitya kubatwa nemasoldier. Vanhu vaibatwa vaiurawa kana kumanikidzwa kuenda kuhondo." (Sussundenga, 19 of April 2006).

However, other newcomers are first-time arrivals, speaking no Portuguese and unsure of how they will be treated. I encountered numerous Zimbabweans in Sussundenga, mostly because they were eager to speak English with someone or thought that I would be able to help them find a job. The majority of Zimbabweans I met were men in their 20s or early 30s who left Zimbabwe due to a lack of jobs and economic insecurity. Some of them still have wives and children back in Zimbabwe and hope they earn enough to send some money back home. However, numerous Zimbabweans told me they were having great difficulty finding work although some did manage to work as carpenters, mechanics, or repairmen.

White Zimbabweans, many of them commercial farmers, are also arriving in Sussundenga as well as other districts in central Mozambique. Following the defeat of a new draft constitution, the growing popularity of the opposition party MDC, and the declining support of ZANU-PF, the Zimbabwean government unleashed a campaign of violence against white Zimbabweans, farm workers, and opposition supporters. Consequently white-dominated commercial agriculture and commercial agriculture in general suffered a deleterious decline. White Zimbabweans arrived in Mozambique with little capital and little access to credit. Several white commercial farms are now operating south of Sussundenga-Sede on the road to Dombe, but the vast majority of farmers face significant financial hardships, lack of government support, and no research and technical infrastructure necessary for large-scale farming enterprises (Hanlon and Smart 2008:27-36). Farmers have tried several different cash crops including paprika and tobacco. Growing tobacco has been difficult due to the terms set by tobacco

companies. Some farmers have turned to growing flowers for export to Europe. Four years of insufficient rainfall have increased farmers' financial hardships.

It is uncertain what the effect of white commercial agriculture in Sussundenga will be on smallholder's access to land and water resources. Some Mozambicans worry that commercial farms will encroach upon their lands, while others hope a growing commercial agriculture sector will provide jobs and a source of cash income. Several white Zimbabweans expressed desires to not repeat the mistakes made in Zimbabwe and hope for better race relations in Mozambique, while others, including some white Zimbabweans, see their tactics as business as usual. The possibilities, challenges, and contradictions of new white settlers in Sussundenga are far from clear at this point in time.

Conclusion

Several continuities emerge when taking a historical perspective on shifting forms of authority over land, water, and labor. First, dating back to the Teve kingdom, control over labor has provided the basis for political authority as opposed to control over land. Even during the height of company rule and commercial agricultural settlements, land displacement was not widespread and was concentrated to areas along the Beira Corridor and Revué and Buzi River valleys. Within the *colonato de Sussundenga*, colonial enclosures appropriated land and labor from Matewe smallholders, but the European settlement was short-lived. Following independence, the government relocated many smallholders back to the lands Portuguese settlers evicted them from 20 years earlier. The colonial legacy of forced labor and the ways in which Mozambicans circumvented or negotiated the conditions of their labor embedded rural households in broader labor and

commodity markets and increased the importance of short-term wage labor to agricultural production. The ways in which the colonial state, Mozambique Company, and individual settlers incorporated central Mozambicans into labor and commodity markets, and the strategies Mozambicans used to resistance, evade, or negotiate the terms of their labor shaped socio-economic differentiation during the colonial period. Mozambicans with employment options in Southern Rhodesia or South Africa were able to invest in agriculture, livestock, education, as well as obtain multiple wives in ways that smallholders, constrained by forced labor and artificially low agricultural prices in Mozambique, could not.

Second, though Frelimo's socialist policies and re-imagining of the countryside altered productive relations through the creation of state farms and communal villages, this transformation was incomplete. As Pitcher (1998) argues, Frelimo's socialist initiatives and the end of the civil war without a clear-cut winner disrupted agrarian relations as opposed to transforming them. In other words, many rural Mozambicans continue to cultivate family plots and complement agricultural production with temporary wage labor. However, livelihood practices are now situated in a different political and economic context. Does the new economic and political landscape premised on free markets, deregulation, private investment, and decentralized authority constitute a transformation or another disruption of longstanding agrarian practices? In the following chapters, I examine how Sussundengan smallholders secure access to land and water resources essential for their livelihoods and the sources of authority they draw on to substantiate their claims and gauge to what extent contemporary land claims constitute an enclosure.

Chapter Four
On Whose Authority? State Farm Divesture, Land Reform, and Securing Access to Land in Sussundenga

Perceptions of land scarcity vary within Mozambique. How much land is available or "free" is a matter of debate and contestation.[102] Some groups, particularly people within the private sector and government officials, perceive that Mozambique has a relative abundance of land. From this perspective, this "free" or unoccupied land should be allocated to individuals or entities capable of exploiting it in order to stimulate economic growth and development. From another perspective, although not every hectare of land is under cultivation, there is no unclaimed land in Mozambique. The majority of land is claimed, allocated, and managed under "customary" tenure regimes. Land claimed under the jurisdiction of a traditional authority such as a *regulo* often falls into different categories of use and access. Some land is allocated for cultivating a rainy season field or wetland garden while other land is used as a communal grazing area, to collect firewood and building materials, to collect plants used in traditional medicines, hunting, planting fruit trees, as an area for sacred burial sites, or land reserved for the future expansion of the "community." In other words, the vast majority of land is occupied, claimed, or managed by some group or "community."

While Mozambique does not face significant population pressure, there are areas where the legacies of colonial evictions, post-independence resettlement, war-induced migration, state farm divesture, and post-war returnees have created densely populated settlements and multiple and overlapping claims to land. Consequently, conflict over access to and use of land is often nuanced and context specific. In addition, many of the

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[102] See Hanlon (2004:607) for quotes demonstrating the contested nature of land availability in Mozambique.

most fertile lands are being cultivated. Since the late 1980s land speculation and land

conflict have increased. The rise in land-related tensions can be attributed to a number of

interrelated factors. The divesture of many state farms transferred not only infrastructure,

but also land, often as a free good, to new owners with little regard for smallholders and

farm workers occupying or cultivating land on the farm. In the cases where state farms

were carved out of former colonial land holdings, the government did not consider the

historical claims to land by adjacent communities. Structural adjustment and economic

and political reforms also created a context whereby government elites and military

officials were able to stake claims to large tracts of land for speculative purposes. The

16-year civil war displaced nearly two million people within Mozambique, and following

the peace accord in 1992, many did not return to their "zones of origin," instead choosing

to remain closer to roads, markets, and other infrastructure. Today many land conflicts

occur in the green zones around major cities like Maputo, Beira, and Nampula or along

prized coastal areas where the potential for tourism is high.[103] Land conflicts in the peri-

urban areas of Maputo and Matola are highly publicized and have involved city officials

and neighborhood secretaries selling land illegally to people living outside Matola.[104]

The construction of a mansion for former president, Joaquim Chissano, on Catemba

Island across from the city of Maputo, has also generated controversy and accentuated

fears of land displacement on the island.[105] People are being dislocated and resettled

away from lands now contained in national parks such as Gorongosa and the Limpopo

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[103] "Sociedade Civil Ganha Batalha Contra a Privatização da Terra," Savana, 12 of May 2006.
[104] "Conflito de Terra Agita Matola," Savana, 3 of March 2006.
[105] "Mansão Presidencial da Catembe Gera Polémica," Savana, 1 of September 2006.

Park.[106] Other conflicts are localized around areas where there is irrigation infrastructure, access to markets, and a history of land evictions and migrations.[107]

In this chapter, I examine contemporary struggles over land in Sussundenga focusing on how people secure and legitimate access to land. Access to land is not only about the material benefits derived from the soil, but also speaks to the authority to allocate land and prescribe the conditions regulating its use. In Sussundenga, women and men navigate multiple terrains of authority to establish their claims to land. Despite the history of Portuguese settlement, post-colonial resettlement, civil war, and state farm divesture, chiefs continue to play a salient role in allocating land and resolving land-related disputes. Thus access remains rather flexible and negotiable, challenging the assumption that land and natural resources in "rural Africa" are becoming enclosed and privatized. In the cases of conflict that I document, these contestations emerge from historically situated claims and counter-claims and not from a hegemonic process of enclosure traversing the Mozambican countryside. I begin the chapter with an overview of state farm divesture in the late 1980s and early 1990s which generated competing claims to land and debates over which groups and sectors can best exploit the land for economic development. From there, I turn to the new land law of 1997, drafted and signed to protect smallholder land use rights and create a favorable legal climate for investment. Next, I examine the forms of power and authority over land in Sussundenga,

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[106] See "Comunidades Deixam Suas Terras a Partir de Finais deste Ano" (Meia Noite, July 25-31, 2006) for resettlement taking place in the Limpopo Park while debate continues on restricting habitation and cultivation on the higher elevations of Gorongosa Mountain in Gorongosa National Park.

[107] See West and Myers (1996) for an examination of the *Complexo Agro-Industrial do Vale do Limpopo* in Chokwe district located in Gaza province, one of the largest former state farms where numerous conflicts have ensued.

how Sussundengans claim land, and the struggles that emerge involving land and authority.

In contrast to other countries in Southern Africa such as Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, colonial settlement in Mozambique never produced large-scale land evictions. Nor was the *luta armada* fought around the idiom of returning the land to the people, but rather on the basis of the inequality, subjugation, and degradation produced by and experienced under colonialism. Following independence, the ruling party, Frelimo nationalized all land. Land became officially owned by the state and could not be sold or mortgaged. Frelimo's new land policy recognized some rights on the basis of occupation, but neglected to recognize customary land tenure (Hall and Young 1997:85). The new government derided practices identified as "traditional," such as chiefly authority over land, and sought to remove *regulos* from power and replace them with local party cells. Furthermore, as a vanguard party, party leaders believed it was their duty to guide what they perceived as an ahistorical, undifferentiated "peasantry" and engaged the in "modern" productive relations. Frelimo's vision involved converting abandoned land into state farms and creating *aldeias comunais* (communal villages) and cooperatives where smallholders would work as wage laborers or engage in collectivized forms of labor. Frelimo modeled post-independent development and land-use practices based on strategies learned and employed during the liberation war such as collective *machambas*, and building population centers to monitor the population and extract agricultural produce from smallholders. Despite the important contributions smallholders made to Frelimo fighters in the liberated zones, following independence, the state farm sector formed the basis of Frelimo's socialist agricultural development model.

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By 1981 the government had grouped together nearly 2,000 abandoned former colonial landholdings and converted them into 100-110 state farms covering between 600,000 and one million hectares (West and Myers 1996:31). Some former colonial plantations and enterprises that were not grouped into state farms were brought under government control. The government designated these enterprises "intervened," signifying the government undertook the operation and management of the farms, but the farms were not "nationalized." Intervention occurred in freehold areas and did not entail the legal seizure of land and assets. Many of the "intervened" farms were of strategic importance such as providing export earnings from cotton, sugar, copra or food crops for urban areas (West and Myers 1993) or when foreign owners accrued substantial debts to the Bank of Mozambique, failed to repair infrastructure and equipment, or tried to take money out of the country (Hanlon 1984:76). Nordic countries supporting the government during this time also favored the state farm approach (Hanlon 1991:12). Frelimo denied traditional authorities a role in the administration and allocation of land. However, many conflicts continued to be solved within local institutions. In the same year as the state farm sector covered nearly one million hectares of land, the government confessed that none of the state farms were profitable, while the cooperatives suffered from labor shortages and technical and organizational problems (Bowen 1992:260-261; Hanlon 1984:101).

Despite the government resources allocated to the state farm sector, many farms continued to struggle and the escalation of fighting between the government and the South African-backed rebels diminished the productivity of numerous enterprises. Because Renamo often deliberately targeted state farms, the state farm sector allocated

increasing amounts of resources to security measures decreasing money available for purchasing farming implements, paying wages, and covering the daily operations of the farms. Not only were farms attacked, equipment destroyed, and people killed, but the war also disrupted transportation routes, markets, rural to urban trade, and other infrastructure necessary to the state farm sector. In addition, austerity measures implemented in 1987 curtailed government credit available to state farms causing many of them to cease their operations (West and Myers 1996). Thus state farm divesture began in 1989 in the context of resource shortages, technical and organizational problems, precarious security, and intensified fighting.

State Farm Divesture and the Emergence of the Private Sector

The divesture of state farm land and property transpired with little coordination between different levels of the government and with minimal documentation. Financial instability caused the rapid divesture of many state farms and consequently produced a situation of opportunism whereby the recipients were almost all foreign investors, government officials, and military veterans (West and Myers 1996:38). To complicate matters further, as the peace accord was signed, former colonial landholders returned to (re)claim their properties. The 1987 land law (Art 79) provided former colonial landholders three years to renew existing claims, but as no legal mechanism existed to determine what happens when claims have elapsed, many have continued to invoke former claims. Furthermore the Constitution, 1979 Land Law, and 1987 Land Regulations do not clarify the status of existing or previous land rights (Myers 1994: 615). According to Myers (1994:610), in the early 1990s "the office of DINAGECA[108]

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[108] National Directorate of Geography and Cadastre.

143

in Maputo reports that there are approximately 60,000 potentially valid land titles from the colonial era" across Mozambique.

Land grabbing and land speculation plagued the transfer of former state farms and infrastructure. "Access to procuring state assets depended on one's position in relation to the very institutions that had previously regulated the land and associated infrastructure" (West and Myers 1996: 49). State farms produced tensions surrounding land rights between smallholders, local families, and farm workers. The government assumed many people crowded onto state farms during the war would return to their "zones of origin" after the fighting ended, however, many smallholders wanted to stay in such fertile areas to take advantage of transportation and markets, and avoid landmines and banditry. The government failed to realize smallholders are motivated by many of the same incentives as commercial farmers thus placing them in direct conflict for land and resources.

The Mozambican government recognizes four categories of producers: the private sector, the family sector, the state sector, and the cooperative sector. However, these categories do not reflect the realities found in any of these four sectors, particularly the blurred boundaries between subsistence and commercial farming. As Wuyts (2003:142) notes "During the phase of central planning, the peasantry was seen as a mass of subsistence producers, while during the subsequent period of economic reforms it came to be seen as a mass of smallholder producers." These views neglect to see the linkages between household production and off-farm employment that structure rural livelihoods. Furthermore, these categories serve as a justification to deny land to particular groups (Myers 1994:608). Land is denied to smallholders in the family sector on the basis that they do not have the resources to use it productively while land

144

concessions are allocated to private farmers under the assumptions they possess the capital and knowledge to exploit it. In reality many private sector farmers face the same problems and constraints as smallholders such as a lack of capital, they do not employ wage laborers, and they consume much of what they produce (West and Myers 1996).

In the early 1990s the government granted concessions to private national and foreign enterprises at various levels and through different ministries. These included concessions for agriculture, mining, timber, wildlife, and tourism (West and Myers 1996:29). During the process of divesture the government shifted from direct exploitation of land to promoting joint venture and private sector enterprises (West and Myers 1993:13). The size of the farm or enterprise dictated the appropriate administrative authority. The Provincial Director of Agriculture under took the titling and registration for agricultural lands under 250 hectares. As of May 1994, estimates suggested that the government granted nearly 40 million hectares of land as concessions or sold to private commercial enterprises across the country (Myers 1994:609).[109] Smallholders were excluded from divesture, and land concessions were given without the consent of smallholders living near or on former state farms. The *de facto* land policy created a situation where government-granted concessions overlapped with existing claims to land deriving from historical occupancy, colonial evictions, government-sponsored resettlement, war-induced migration and resettlement. In some cases smallholders remained on state farms as workers or grew small plots in areas not being cultivated. "Rather than the government distributing land (or returning it to its previous owners, whether they are smallholders or larger commercial farmers), the provincial and district governments have 'made the land available' for acquisition or occupation" (West

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[109] The authors note this might be a conservative estimate.

and Myers 1993:21). Land along the Beira corridor, in the Zambezi Valley, the Limpopo River valley, in Maputo province, in green zones around large cities, and land adjacent to former state farms is under increasing pressure and subject to multiple conflicts and contestations (Myers 1994:611). During this time, all actors involved in the divesture process confronted land tenure insecurity.

Between the end of the civil war in 1992 and the first multi-party election in 1994, neither party, Renamo nor Frelimo, placed land reform high on their political agendas. Neither party wished to jeopardize their election chances by embarking on a contentious issue such as land reform or state farm divesture and risk alienating potential constituents. Despite the government's inaction, access to and control over land was changing hands on the ground. Often decisions regarding the divesture of former state farms were made at the provincial level with little or no documentation with the central government. State farm divesture occurred without a clear legal framework detailing the transfer of land (West and Myers 1993:65). The manner in which the government granted concessions to private interests produced conflicts between smallholders and the commercial sector and created a category of postwar displaced people (Myers 1994:629).

The divesture of state farms parallels a more general reorientation of the Mozambican economy from centrally-planned to a more liberalized, market economy in accordance with the conditions stipulated in Mozambique's structural adjustment package in 1987. Despite the vision outlined in the PRE of an autonomous market economy emerging as state spending is curtailed and state-owned enterprises are sold off, the divesture of state farms reflects the inherent linkages between the "state" and the "market" as many of these properties were transferred to individuals and groups with ties

to the government, thus sharpening class divisions and accentuating access to state power. For those who acquired farms and other enterprises through government auctions and other less transparent means, the market and the state served to legitimize their new wealth and resources.

Strengthening Land Tenure Security, Stimulating Development: The New Land Law (1997)

Through what has been praised as a remarkably democratic process involving the consultation of academics, technical advisers, representatives of various government ministries, researchers, activists, NGOs, and donors, a new land policy was drafted in 1995.[110] The National Land Commission and its Technical Secretariat, created by a presidential decree in 1996, oversaw the debates and subsequent creation of a new land policy. The new land policy approved by the Council of Ministers in October of that year represented several important changes from the existing land policy. The new policy now recognized customary rights over land and the various inheritance systems mediating the transfer of land.[111] It also recognized the role of local community leaders in resolving land-related disputes. In October 1997, Mozambique signed into law a new Land Law (Lei de Terra 19/97). Additional regulations for administering rural land were adopted in 1998 and a Technical Annex detailing the methodology for registering community land in 1999.

The new law is not a land reform instrument. It does not provide a framework for the redistribution of land from one group to another nor does it change the structure of the existing land tenure system. Instead it reflects the social and economic realities of land

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[110] See Tanner 2002 for an overview of the law making process.
[111] The revised constitution of 1990 obliges the State to recognize rights obtained through inheritance or occupation.

use and access in the Mozambican countryside (Tanner 2002). The law centers on recognizing and protecting existing rights to land. Many of these rights are claimed on the basis of "customary" or local social practices. Under the new law, these practices are legitimated and provide rural Mozambicans with stronger land tenure security in the face of outside encroachment. While the law emphasizes protecting existing rights to land, it also reflects an attempt to balance land tenure security with attracting foreign and domestic investment by allowing "communities" to negotiate directly with investors.

In this scenario, communities, with legally recognized land rights, can negotiate and enter into agreements with the private sector to stimulate the rural economy. It is envisioned that investors can lease registered community land or obtain a title to "unoccupied" land though it is debatable if such land actually exists (Hanlon 2004). The new law attempts to balance strengthening smallholder land security, investment in the rural economy, and the formation of community-private sector partnerships.

The new law remains consistent with the Land Law of 1979 and the constitution (Article 109) in that land remains state property. "The land is the property of the state and cannot be sold or otherwise alienated, mortgaged or encumbered"[112] (19/97 Ch 2 Art 3). Under the new law, the right to access, use, and improve land can be acquired by the following ways:

"Occupancy by individual persons and by local communities, in accordance with customary norms and practices which do not contradict the Constitution

Occupancy by individual national persons who have been using the land in good faith for at least ten years

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[112] "A terra é propriedade do Estado e não pode ser vendida ou, por qualquer outra forma, alienada, hipotecada ou penhorada."

Authorization of an application submitted by an individual or corporate person in the manner established by this Law"[113] (19/97 Ch 3 Art 12).

For the purposes of the law, a community is defined as "a grouping of families and individuals, living in a territorial area that is at the level of a locality or smaller, which seeks to safeguard their common interests through the protection of areas for habitation or agriculture, whether cultivated or lying fallow, forests, places of cultural importance, pastures, water sources and areas for expansion"[114] (19/97 Ch 1 Art 1). The definition of community is purposefully vague allowing different configurations of people depending on the local social context. Despite the salience of a notion of community embedded in the new law, some within the Mozambican government were uneasy with decentralizing power, particularly to individuals or institutions, such as *regulos*, that may compete with or undermine local government structures. Thus, the law recognizes "customary norms and practices which do not contradict the Constitution" leaving in place local party structures and elected district officials.

Communities can be issued a title, in the name of the community, and individuals within the community may also request individual titles after the particular plot of land is separated from the community land[115] (Ch 3 Art 13). In keeping with the objective of recognizing the reality of land use and access, the new law recognizes oral testimony by

[113] "Ocupação por pessoas singulares e comunidades locais, Segundo as normas e práticas costumeiras no que não contrariem a Constituição; Ocupação por pessoas singulares nacionais que, de boa fé, estejam a utilizar a terra há pelo menos dez anos; Autorização de pedido apresentado por pessoas singulares ou colectivas na forma estabelecida na presente Lei." All translations of the Land Law are provided by MozLegal.
[114] "agrupamento de famílias e indivíduos, vivendo numa circunscrição territorial de nível de localidade our inferior, que visa a salvaguarda de interesses comuns através de protecção de áreas habitacionais, áreas agrícolas, sejam cultivadas ou em pousio, florestas, sítios de importância cultural, pastagens, fontes de água e áreas de expansão."
[115] "Os títulos emitidos para as comunidades locais são nominativos conforme a denominação por elas adoptada. As pessoas singulares, homens e mulheres, membros de uma comunidade local podem solicitar títulos individualizados, após desmembramento do respectivo terreno das áreas da comunidade."

men, women, and members of the given community as evidence of land use rights. Land rights are also recognized through the presentation of the respective title or expert evidence (Art 15). Land use rights may be transferred by inheritance without discriminating by gender. Improvements made on the land such as infrastructure may also be transferred. (Art 16).

Companies or individuals embarking on commercial activities can receive a government-granted lease known as a DUAT[116] (Right to Use and Improve the Land) or title. A DUAT is subject to a 50-year lease renewable for an additional 50 years. However, land is not subject to a time limit where it is acquired by local communities through occupation, where the land is intended for residential purposes, and where Mozambicans intend to use the land for subsistence (Art 17). In other words, smallholders using the land for subsistence purposes, in principal, are secure in their rights. In addition, smallholders do not have to pay for the use and benefit of the land where land is designated for family or subsistence agriculture (Art 29). Nor do small-scale agricultural or livestock associations or cooperatives need to pay for land use rights.

Communities or individuals allocated land through customary tenure systems or good faith occupancy can formally register their rights to land. Occupants can receive a *certidão* (certificate) by having their land delimited and a sketch map entered into the provincial land registry. Communities and individuals can undertake a more costly mapping exercise known as a demarcation that allows them to apply for a formal title. This is the same title used for government-granted leases; however, it is not subject a 50 year expiration period. Investors must undertake a full demarcation in order to receive a

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[116] Título de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra.

DUAT. Individuals living and cultivating within a given community can also receive an individual title, but it must be agreed upon by the community.

Investors who wish to gain access to land they do not occupy must submit an application to the SPGC[117] (Provincial Mapping and Land Registry Service). The application must include a business or investment plan outlining development or economic activities on the land. The government awards a five-year provisional authorization for Mozambicans and a two-year authorization for foreigners. The development plan must be carried out during this time frame, if so, the applicant receives a title. Provincial governors can approve applications covering up to 1,000 hectares while the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development must approve applications between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares. Land requested beyond 10,000 hectares is subject to approval by the Council of Ministers. However, the land law was amended in October 2007 restricting the power of provincial governors to allocate land. Under the new amendment, governors can only allocate up to 1,000 hectares to any community, individual, or company. The restrictions derive from reports that provincial governors were allocating more than 1,000 hectares to communities. Like commercial enterprises, communities must now apply to the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development for allocations greater than 1,000 hectares.

Local communities are not only recognized as having legitimate claims to land, they are also envisioned to participate in the management of land and natural resources. Participation includes the resolution of conflicts surrounding land and natural resources and identifying and defining the boundaries of the land that communities occupy (Art 24). If an investor desires land in which no certificate or title is recorded, the local

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[117] Serviço Provincial de Geografia e Cadastro.

community has to be consulted by the government. However, in cases where a title or certificate has been issued, the investor negotiates directly with the community and the government is not involved. The simple consultation raises questions about the existence of free or unoccupied land in Mozambique, and the ability of rural communities to negotiate favorable terms with more powerful economic actors.

In Zambezia Province, located in north-central Mozambique, research conducted since the implementation of the new land law reveals that many communities are defining their boundaries around existing chieftaincies (Norfolk et al. 2003). In some cases the new Land Law has enabled smallholders to protect their land from expropriation. In the district directly south of Sussundenga, a counter-mapping team, working with local leaders, produced a map and effectively enclosed Chief Gogoi's territory from a South African timber company (Hughes 2001). At the time of my research only five communities in Sussundenga District had undergone a land delimitation exercise. According to the provincial director of the SPGC, Sussundenga is ahead of other districts in the province in the number of land delimitation exercises. An NGO involved in protecting smallholder land rights, Rural Mutual Help Organization (ORAM), facilitated the delimitation process in these communities. These tend to be communities located near or adjacent to the *Area de Conservação Transfronteira de Chimanimani* (Chimanimani Transfrontier Conservation Zone) along the border with Zimbabwe.[118]

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[118] The communities which have undertaken a land delimitation exercise include Tsetserra in Mavita Administrative Post, Zomba in Zomba Administrative Post, Chikukwa in Mussapa near Rotanda, and Mahate, also located in Mussapa. MICOA and the *Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentavel* (Center for Sustainable Development) are also facilitating land delimitation in several communities around Munhinga just south of Sussundenga-Sede.

Power and Authority over Land in Sussundenga

Sussundenga District is one of the more fertile areas in the country. Because of its agro-ecological dynamics including rainfall and soil quality, its agricultural potential is high. Portuguese settlers, with strong support from the colonial state, arrived in the 1950s and cleared land, built roads and infrastructure, and tried to establish a viable commercial farming sector. Since independence, the Mozambican state and private investors have allocated resources and capital to the district in hopes of reviving the former colonial landholdings and converting the area into a productive farming zone. Today, several of the former Portuguese farms, under new owners, struggle growing food mainly for consumption or through contracts for tobacco and cotton with larger agricultural companies. Many smallholders continue to negotiate a complex terrain of authority to obtain access to land and wetland areas often further away from their homes.

According to the 1999-2000 agriculture and livestock census, there are approximately 307,005 hectares under cultivation in Manica province with the average area under cultivation at roughly 1.5 hectares (GoM 2004). Of the total land under cultivation, only 1.8 percent of the land is being used by farmers with a DUAT. There are 10 foreigners with DUATs in Sussundenga. The number of requests for titles in Manica province is down from 140 in 2005 to 39 in 2006. Sussundenga is behind other districts in Manica province along the Beira corridor in terms of titles. There are 11 titles in Gondola, 37 in Manica, and 28 in Barue. Very few farms use irrigation, and the government reports that 92.8 of the land under cultivation is not irrigated. There are 199,199 families in the province with 18% being female-headed household and 82% male-headed households. The population is distributed unevenly throughout the province

and population densities register from 35 people per square kilometer in Manica and Gondola districts to 1 person per square kilometer in Macossa district. Most of the population is concentrated along the Beira corridor. The main cash crops in the province are cotton, tobacco, sunflower, sesame, tea, cashews, and flowers. Sussundenga District covers an area of 7,060 square kilometers while Sussundenga-Sede, the site of this research, occupies 2,411 square kilometers.

In Sussundenga, access to and control over land is nuanced and context specific. Colonial-era evictions, socialist-period resettlement, war-induced migrations, and post-war returns created an environment of multiple and overlapping claims to land in some areas of Sussundenga. Another significant consequence of this history is the spatiality of fields, homes, and infrastructure. Portuguese settlers prohibited Africans from residing inside their farmland, consequently, Africans relocated to the outskirts of the *colonato*. Colonial infrastructure development catered to Portuguese farms, thus roads, markets, irrigation, and storage facilities were located in areas restricted from black occupation. Frelimo's villagization scheme also concentrated infrastructure in areas occupied and developed by the Portuguese settlers. People were now being forced to relocate to land from where they were once chased away. During the civil war a growing number of *deslocados* arrived and settled in Sussundenga-Sede. As a result, people must now cultivate further away from where they live in the *bairros* around the center of town. Some people cultivate land located 25 kilometers from their homes. Because of the distance of fields, it is difficult to work on a *machamba* and return home in the same day. Therefore, some families build temporary shelters at their *machambas* and sleep there during peak agricultural periods such as plowing, planting, and harvesting. During the

dry season, these temporary shelters give the feeling of an abandoned village. The more

well-off families are able to hire seasonal laborers to work on their *machambas* during

the rainy season. When asked why people now cultivate so far from where they live,

many people responded that the soil around the *bairros* is infertile, describing it as

cansada, literally meaning tired. Why the soil is now *cansada* is subject to multiple

interpretations. Some argue the intensive cotton cultivation by Portuguese settlers and by

the few remaining commercial farmers extracted the soil's nutrients leaving it infertile

while others contend, particularly *tecnicos*, that smallholders' rudimentary farming

techniques are to blame. Regardless of the soil quality, there is a wildly held consensus

that there is no available land in or near Sussundenga-Sede.

Sussundengans' livelihoods articulate a diversity of agricultural and non-

agricultural practices. These practices connect the materiality of water, soil, and crops

with markets, cash income, social relations, cultural idioms, and local cosmologies.

More wealthy residents generally support their households through an assemblage of

wage labor and access to fertile fields and wetlands. Other households are mostly

dependent on the food produced from a *machamba* and a *matoro* to feed their families

and generate a small amount of cash income to buy household commodities such as salt,

soap, cooking oil, candles, and matches.

Maize and sorghum are used to make the staple food, *sadza* (stiff porridge), which

is generally eaten with a vegetable relish or with meat[119] by those who can afford it.

People also intercrop several varieties of beans, pumpkins, peanuts, and groundnuts in

their *machambas*. Field preparation commences in August and September with the

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[119] The most common sources of meat and animal protein are chicken (galinha), goat (cabrito), beef (carne de vaca), dried fished (peixe seco), and field mouse (mbeva in Shona/Chiteve).

clearing of fields generating thick clouds of haze hanging over the countryside as the

underbrush is cleared by burning. Fields are plowed and seeds are planted in October or

November depending on the proximity of the first rains. Most plowing is done by hand

using a small hoe called an *enxada*. Some families use oxen to plow their fields and rent

their animals to others. Even a smaller number of families are able to rent a tractor from

a nearby commercial farmer. The majority of *machambas* in the area are rain-fed;

however, fields cultivated on the slopes of mountains use some form of *regadio por*

gravidade or gravity-fed irrigation usually by digging small canals called *migero* (sing

mugero) in the soil to capture and direct run-off water to a desired field.

Name-English	Portuguese	Chiteve	Planted on Machamba	Harvest	Planted on matoro	Harvest
Maize	Milho	Magwere	Oct/Nov	Mar/Apr	May	Oct
Sorghum	Mapira	Mapfunde or Mapira	Nov/Dec	May/June		
Cassava	Mandioca	Mujumbuya	Nov	May		
Tomatoes	Tomates	Matimati	Nov	Feb/Mar	Mar	May-Aug
Carrots	Cenouras	Cenouras			April	June
Onions	Cebolas	Cebolas			March	June-July
Sun-flower	Girassol	Girassol	April	June		
Sesame	Gergelim	Gergelim	Jan/Feb	May/June		
Pumpkin	Abóbora	Matikiti	Oct	Mar/Apr	Sept	Jan/Feb
Cabbage	Repolho	Repolho			Mar/Apr	May-Aug
Lettuce	Alface	Alface			Mar/Apr	Aug
Potatoes	Batatas Reno	Batatas	April	July		
Sweet Potatoes	Batata Doce	Madima	Dec	Mar/Apr	May	Aug
Sugar Cane	Cana de açucar	Musale			Oct/Nov	Apr/Sept
Beans	Feijão	Chimbamba	Oct/Nov	Mar/Apr	Aug	Dec
Peanuts	Amendoim	Manzungu	Dec	May		
Ground nuts	Feijão Jogo	Nyimo	Dec	May		
Cotton	Algodão	Tonje	Nov/Dec	June-Aug		
Tobacco	Tabaco	Fodya	Sept Jan/Feb	Jan/Feb Sept		
Paprika	Páprica	Páprica	Oct Dec/Feb	Jan Apr	Sept	Dec
Bananas	Bananas	Makobo			All	All
Elephant Ear	Inhame	Madhumbe			Aug	Mar/Apr
Mustard leaves	Tsunga	Tsunga			Mar/Apr	Aug
Cove	Couve	Couve			Mar/Apr	Aug
Rice	Arroz	Mupunga			Dec	Apr
Hot Pepper	Piri Piri	Piri Piri or mutoronga	All year	All year	All year	All year

Table 1: Crops Grown on *Machambas* and *Matoro* in Sussundenga

the family's fields through the duration of the rainy season. Children also contribute their labor to the family's field as well as post-harvest tasks such as peeling and pounding maize or transporting it to the nearest grinding mill. Some of the wealthy families are able to hire seasonal laborers to work their fields and others may engage in temporary, sometimes daily, small wage labor usually with neighbors or people living nearby known as *ganho-ganho*. Under this arrangement the laborer is paid in food or cash for activities such as weeding a neighbor's field. The majority of crops grown in a *machamba* are consumed in the household; however, if there is surplus, it is likely to be sold in one of the local markets. Women conduct the majority of economic activities in the local markets.

Some smallholders, most often men, grow cash crops, such as cotton, tobacco, paprika, and sunflowers through contracts with agricultural companies, some as far away as Beira, or supported by local commercial farmers. Under the arrangements of these out-grower schemes, commercial farmers or agricultural companies provide the essential inputs such as seeds and fertilizers while smallholders provide their labor and land to plant, care for, and harvest the crop. The harvest is then sold back to the commercial farmer or company at a fixed price and the value of the inputs is subtracted from the total amount paid to the smallholder. These arrangements offer a way for companies and commercial farmers to avert some of the risk associated with cash crop production in Mozambique. While some farmers have been able to make a profit from these arrangements, many complain the companies never return to collect the harvest, distribute expired pesticides, and others worry they will become indebted to these companies.

In addition to agriculture, Sussundengans also engage in other gendered livelihood strategies. In many cases, wage employment or off-farm income is essential for agricultural production dating back to the colonial period. Wealthier families are more likely to be involved in some form of wage labor thus sharpening socio-economic and class divisions[120] (Tschirley and Benfica 2001), while many families rely on a mixture of farming, wage labor, and self-employment to meet subsistence and monetary needs. Women collect and sell firewood or chop wood to make charcoal also sold in the local markets. Men make and sell bricks, repair bicycles or electronics such as cell phones and radios, operate transport such as *chapas* (minibuses), and do carpentry. In addition to agricultural products, women sell cooking oil, dried fish, and reed mats in the local markets. Very few women and men are employed in formal wage jobs such as teachers, health workers, or local government administration. Many supplement their farming activities and earn additional income through some form of *conta-propria* or self-employment.

Educational opportunities are also limited with only one secondary school in Sussundenga and few opportunities to continue schooling at a technical school or university. After completing secondary school, many new graduates remain in the district searching for income opportunities either through agriculture, construction, or some form of self-employment. One of the most common challenges people articulated during interviews was the lack of jobs, sentiments that have been echoed across Mozambique.

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[120] For debates and divergent viewpoints on the significance of wage labor to agricultural production and the most appropriate development and poverty alleviation strategies to address this issue see (Cramer and Pontara 1998; O'Laughlin 1996; Pitcher 1999; Tshirley and Benfica 2001).

Access to cash has become more important since the implementation of structural adjustment and intensified market relations. More aspects of life in the countryside are becoming commodified. Communal work parties are in decline and being replaced by hired workers or *ganho-ganho* arrangements. Families must also make difficult decisions on how to spend household income. As a gentleman explained to me in a mixture of Portuguese and English, "In the past a child knew all of his relatives well. We would say here is your uncle's house, there is your grandfather's house, there is your other uncle's house, but today it is different. Families now live in different districts and provinces. We must decide between sending our children to school or taking the money to visit our relatives." He referred to not only the cost of transportation to visit distant relatives, but also the chance that they might ask him for money. Thus families confronted with difficult decisions over household resources risk weakening social and kinship relations with relatives they are no longer able to see on a regular basis.

Some people are now gaining access to land through an informal land market, enriching those with connections to the government. Furthermore, the expansion of cash crop opportunities such as tobacco are encroaching upon wetland areas where women have traditionally grown food for the household and to generate income to cover household expenses such as children's school fees or unexpected health costs.

Modes of Access: Power and Authority over Land and People

Access to land is a socially embedded process. Sussundengans draw on multiple sources of authority to obtain access to land and legitimate their claims. In the process of articulating claims to land and natural resources, people also make implicit commentaries on the appropriate powers or authority to allocate resources and govern their lives. Thus

material struggles over land are as much about the power to produce wealth and subsistence as legitimating individuals, groups, or institutions with the right to allocate and set the conditions upon which land can be used, managed, and transferred.

Sussundenga's entangled landscape (Moore 2005) signifies the coexistence of multiple and competing forms of authority shaped over the last century as chiefly rule was incorporated into company governance and later the colonial state, only to then be marginalized by the new revolutionary government. Since the end of the civil war and political and economic reforms, "traditional" authorities are now being reincorporated into local governance. Consequently, in Sussundenga numerous individuals and institutions allocate land and set the conditions of its use. The chiefly families (Cupenha, Buapua, and Ganda) exercise power over people and landscapes based on their intertwined claims of historical occupation and linkages with the founding lineages of the Matewe people. The state, embodied through the district agricultural office, the provincial SPGC, the governor, the police, neighborhood secretaries, and local courts also, to varying degrees, controls access and use of land in the district. An informal land market in which several wealthy individuals are able to purchase land exists, but is also reliant on the state, not separate from it, in order legitimate exclusive control over land. Finally, numerous individuals and families discuss and allocate land amongst themselves often with the permission of the chief.

Myers (1994) identifies four layers of competitive land claims occurring in Mozambique that are applicable to Sussundenga. First there are rights based on historical occupation and lineage membership. The Matewe people and descendents and subjects of chiefs Cupenha, Buapua, and Ganda invoke ancestral claims to land through the

category of *varidzi* or owners of the soil or first arrivals. Many people still refer to the area encompassing Sussundenga-sede as *nyika yeCupenha* or Cupenha's territory. The second layer of rights derives from the colonial period. Mozambicans and foreigners obtained rights as part of a *colonato*, *aldeamento*, or private company. Third, smallholders articulate land claims based on resettlement as part of the government's *aldeias comunais*. Finally, as people fled the fighting and resettled themselves or were resettled by the government or relief agencies another layer of claims emerged.

Land allocated by a *regulo* or *mfumo* remains an important channel by which people gain access to land. Another important avenue by which people gain rights to land is through *kutaurirana* or negotiation.[121] Prior to Portuguese settlement in the 1950s, land allocation transpired through the *regulo* or *mfumo* or by negotiating[122] with someone who claimed a large piece of land. In recalling land allocation prior to the *colonato*, numerous people told me that land was given by the chief or *vaipiwa munda namambo* or they asked the chief (*vaikumbira mambo*) for land. With the arrival of white Portuguese farmers, these systems for allocating land did not disappear, but now existed alongside land allocation through expropriation. The establishment of *aldeias comunais* in the late 1970s and early 1980s added another layer of land rights and many people trace their current rights to land during this time period when the government allocated land. Today it is in the areas where Portuguese farmers once cultivated and then were transformed into state farms or *aldeias comunais* where the most conflict, contestation, and overlapping claims to land or wetland areas exists. While Mozambicans' attitudes towards resettlement vary, many Sussundengans expressed disdain at the government's

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[121] Kutaura is the Shona/Chitewe word for to speak or to talk. By adding the reciprocal ending ana, it connotes talking to each other.
[122] Vaingotaurirana (they would discuss with each other).

attempts to relocate them and impose a new structure of political authority over their lives. Ironically, today communal villages established in 1979 serve as a form of legitimacy for residents who feel new commercial farms are encroaching on their streams and wetland areas.

Chiefly legitimacy to rule over people and territory is connected to the ancestral guardian spirits of the land.[123] Chiefs are positioned as intermediaries between the living and the dead through a "symbolic relationship between sacred sites, land, and people" (Virtanen 20005:365). Accordingly, chiefs allocate land to their subjects as well as newcomers, mediate land-related disputes, perform ceremonies and ritualized acts to propitiate ancestors (vadzimu) and ensure the fertility of the soil, and enforce socio-spiritual prescriptions stipulated by the ancestors to maintain social and ecological harmony amongst the living and between the living and the dead. The complex interplay between chiefs, subjects, ancestral spirits, and the biophysical properties of the environment such as soil fertility, timing and amount of rainfall, and abundance or scarcity of wild game articulates a range of material and symbolic practices structuring livelihood practices and social relations.

Historically, chiefs governing the people and territory of present-day Sussundenga and neighboring districts, allocated land to the male head of the household. Within large extended families and lineages, male elders had the authority to distribute land. Gender was an important distinction shaping access to land and other natural resources. Women were dependent on their husbands or other male elders for access to land for agriculture. Land for agriculture, in this context, as well as today, is more accurately described as

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[123] For debates concerning whether chiefs rule over subjects or territory in Manica Province see Hughes (2006); Schafer and Bell 2002; and Virtanen (2005).

163

family property rather than common or communal property. Following the death of the male head of household, male kin inherited rights to the family's land. The father's eldest son often inherited this land. Consequently, women's land use rights were tenuous in cases of her husband's death or divorce.

In Manica province, chiefs varied in terms of their centralized control over land and their participation in the act of distributing land or managing natural resources (Schafer and Black 2003). Some exercised centralized control while others designated responsibilities to their subordinates. In particular, the *chingore* or chief's assistant played an important role in preparing rain ceremonies as well as showing newcomers an area to live and cultivate approved by the chief. As an elderly gentleman explained to me, the *chingore* is often the *sobrinho* or *neto* (*muzukuru* in Shona/Chiteve) of the chief. Ideally, if the chief's daughter has a son, then he is the *chingore*. However, based on my discussion with this man, the *chingore* performed more of the responsibilities in the past.

According to chief Cupenha, his *chingore* brought requests for land-use rights to him, the chief considered the request, and then told the *chingore* where to allocate the land. He explained "a person wants to cultivate a wetland and a field, he goes to the chingore, the follower of the chief, and says, 'Chingore, I would like a field'. Tomorrow morning they go to the chief and say, 'chief I have a person coming to stay and to farm. The chief would reply, 'good, I understand, now you, *chingore*, go and show this person a fertile wetland where he can cultivate'. The *chingore* is sent by the chief to go and show the person a field to cultivate and to show him a place to live."[124]

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[124] "munhu anoda kurima mumatoro nemumunda anoenda kuna chingore muteveri wamambo ondoti vaChingore, 'ndinodawo munda'. Mangwana mangwanani vanobuda voenda kunamambo voti 'mambo ndine munhu ari kubuda pakugara nokurima'. Mambo woti, 'zvakanaka ndazvinzwa zvino iwe chingore,

In Ndau speaking parts of the province the *saguta*, a lower-level position in the

chiefly hierarchy, carried out many of the chief's orders and collected taxes during the

colonial period while the chief sought spiritual advice from the *muwiya*, who ideally

should be the son of an unmarried female in the chief's lineage (Schafer and Bell

2002).[125] Thus chiefs, such as Cupenha, granted rights to land and knew the identities of

their subjects and where they were told to cultivate. The last question of this particular

interview asked Cupenha to discuss current conflicts over land. He stated there are no

conflicts since everyone who pledges submission to his rule is shown a place to live and

to farm. He emphasized, "no, there are no problems with fields or wetlands because a

person is shown a field and a wetland."[126] Cupenha's remarks reflect a desire to settle

people under his rule in an orderly manner and allocate land and resources within his

jurisdiction.

Historically, Shona-speaking lineages in central Mozambique transferred land

through inheritance along patrilineal lines or the local leadership allocated land to

newcomers for a token submission. This token often took the form of a chicken or *huku*.

The practice is often referred to as paying *huku*, though today, the object exchanged does

not have to be a chicken, but can be an object of similar value. It is more common for

someone to pay the value of chicken and then the money is used to buy sorghum to brew

beer to offer to the ancestors on behalf of the chief. The act of submitting one's

sovereignty, through this token submission, to the chief or council of elders ensured the

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endai mundomuratidza pane mupfudze pamatoro paangarima'. VaChingore vatumwa namambo vanoenda
kundoratidza munhu munda wokurima womuratidza wogara." (Sussundenga, 1 of November 2006).
[125] Mfumo is also a term used to designate a lower-level position in Sussundenga.
[126] "Aiwa, hamuna zvinonetsa panyaya yemunda nematoro nokuti munhu anenge ari paakaratidzwa kuva
pamunda nematoro." (Sussundenga, 1 of November 2006).

beer to offer to the ancestors on behalf of the chief. The act of submitting one's sovereignty, through this token submission, to the chief or council of elders ensured the right to use and produce from the land and inscribed the individual in an ongoing system of social and spiritual relations.

Under this system of land allocation, elders and the local leadership designated the most desired agricultural lands for *varidzi* or the original inhabitants. Through the act of pledging submission, a newcomer established a right to land and enshrined his position as one of the chief's subjects in exchange to live and cultivate under the chief's authority. Today the categories of *varidzi* (original inhabitants) and *vatorwa* (newcomers) continue to structure social relations and access to land reflecting a direct connection to the historical patterns of land access and how people obtain land now. *Varidzi* continue to use some of the largest and most fertile lands while more recent arrivals are often allocated land greater distances from where they live due to the land scarcity near the town and adjacent *bairros*. The disparities in access to *matoro* and riverine fields are more evident between the two groups (see Chapter 5). Newcomers are more likely to obtain access to land to cultivate a *machamba* as opposed to land along a stream or adjacent to a wetland area. While *vatorwa* are able to obtain land-use rights the size and quality of the land differs as well as the distance from the one's homestead to the fields.

Place of Birth	Number of Interviewees Born in the Particular Location
Sussundenga Includes areas surrounding Sussundenga-Sede such Matica, Nhamatikiti, etc.	36
Rotanda (Western Sussundenga District)	11
Dombe (Southern Sussundenga District)	9
Guro (Manica Province)	4
Sofala (Province)	1
Chimbua (Zambezia Province)	1
Malawi	1
Chimanimani (Zimbabwe)	2
Vanduzi (Manica Province)	1
Tete (Province)	2
Munhinga (South of Sussundenga-Sede)	3
Espungaberra (Mossurize District)	1
Chimoio (Provincial Capital)	3
Total	75

Table 2: Place of Birth for Interviewees

According to the majority of my respondents, they received land by one of the three chiefs/*madzimambo*. Interestingly a Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture, USAID, and MSU research survey suggests land allocation by the chief remains the most prevalent in Manica Province. This pattern appears to be found in Sussundenga. In addition to receiving land from a chief, numerous people reported inheriting or receiving land from an immediate family member or relative. Others trace their access to land to the colonial period when some Portuguese farmers allocated land to their workers or to the period immediately following independence when the government distributed land as part of its communal village resettlement scheme. A smaller portion of people have received land through an informal land market or by the local agricultural office. The table below summarizes the different ways 75 households obtained land in which to cultivate a machamba.

Access	Number
Self-Allocation	6
Allocated by Chief	22
Inheritance Father (5) Relative (2)	7
Allocated by Portuguese Farmer during the *colonato*	3
Allocated by the Gov. during communal villages	6
District Directorate of Agriculture	6
Negotiation Neighbor (3) Sister-in-law (1) Younger Sister (1) Mother (1) Relative (5) Church member (1) Brother-in-law (2) Not specify (4)	18
Purchase	5
No Machamba	2
Total	**75**

Table 3: Machamba Access

According to the semi-structured interviews, chiefly allocated, followed by some

form of negotiation with friends, relatives, or neighbors constitute the two most common

ways people obtain access to land. In particular, women were more likely to have

obtained land through social relations and some form of negotiation, though not always

with a man. For example, Luisa, who lives with her oldest son, received a *machamba*

from a neighbor, Lidia, where she grows maize and sorghum to consume at home. While

numerous women reported having negotiated with someone for access to land, two

women responded that they purchased their fields, one from the family of a deceased man

and the other from a local resident near the field in Munhinga. Thus, not all women

depend directly on their husbands for access to land. Several women also reported inheriting land, one from her mother and two others from relatives.

Historically, the social organization of ethno-linguistic groups in central Mozambique centered on patrilineal inheritance and patrilocal residency patterns. Under this arrangement, land and other inheritable property is passed down along the husband's side of the family. Typically this means women are unlikely to inherit land since a field will be passed on to a son or other male relatives as opposed to a wife or daughter. However, the data collected from 75 households suggests a more varied and flexible picture of who is likely to inherit land. The majority of respondents indicated their children will inherit the family's *machamba*. Many interviewees did not distinguish by gender when discussing their children inheriting land. Other people did mention specific children such as the oldest child (*mwana wokutanga*), sons (*vakomana vangu vachagovana*), or the last born (*gotwe*) as the rightful heirs to the family's land. Interestingly, many reported if the oldest child was a daughter, she could inherit the family's land. In some cases where land was given by an extended family member, it was reported the land is likely to revert back to the relative such as a cousin or uncle. Still other people were less sure as to who would inherit the family's land. Some remarked whichever children are likely to show the strongest interest in farming will receive the land. The evidence suggests that how land changes hands from one generation to the next is more context-specific and variable than descriptions such as patrilineal or matrilineal suggest. Research conducted on women's land rights in northern Mozambique, in a predominantly matrilineal area, revealed that women's access to land varied from household to household and from different research sites (Bonate

2003). Over the last two decades, *deslocados* and others have settled in Sussundenga increasing the socio-cultural diversity of people living in the area. While many people came from other parts of Sussundenga District such as Dombe to the south or Rotanda along the border with Zimbabwe, still others have arrived from Zimbabwe and Malawi or from neighboring provinces such as Sofala and Tete.

Situated Struggles: Land, the State, and the Politics of Legitimacy

Senhor Felipe stood over several bags of maize spread out over a reed mat on the ground. This was the second time we had gone to visit Felipe, promising him during our initial visit to return and see his *matoro*. On this particular morning, he was busy removing weevils from these sacks of maize. We crouched down beside him and began looking for small bugs. Felipe scooped up the maize using a metal can and poured it into a basket which he used to winnow the grain. He then applied insecticide and poured the maize back into the sacks. As we sat and watched him repeat this process, he told us about some of his economic ventures.

Felipe is an enterprising young farmer who has diversified his livelihood strategies to include fish raising, animal husbandry, and selling second-hand clothing. He was born in Rotanda near the border with Zimbabwe, but his family moved to Sussundenga in 1979 because of the fighting orchestrated by the Rhodesian-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Several of his neighbors also fled Rotanda around the same time and his *sobrinho* (nephew), Bernardo, lives five houses down from his home. The area where he lives was once part of a Portuguese farm; a concrete farm house still stands in the distance. The government allocated plots of land in this area in 1979 as part of its rural villagization scheme. Felipe remarked that back in those days

170

"we lived in the hands of the government."[127] Not far from this cluster of homes are two former Portuguese farms that were turned over to Mozambican owners following independence. Both smallholders and these larger enterprises compete for fertile land and water along the Muzoria River.

Felipe is 35years old and has three children. He is divorced and his 12-year old son lives with him, while his two daughters stay with his ex-wife in Gondola. He is building a new house adjacent to his old one. The new house has a metal roof and will have glass windows when it is finished. Inside the structure sits a large metal plough. His newer, larger rectangular-shaped house helps to distinguish his economic status from his neighbors' smaller, thatch-roof homes. On a later visit, Felipe asked me to take a picture of him in front of his new home. But first he went inside to prepare. He returned wearing a shiny gold watch, gold-frame eye glasses, blue button-down dress shirt, and carrying a radio in one hand and a black leather satchel in the other. He positioned the two items by his feet as he stood in front of his new home.

As we sat on the maize-filled mat, the diversity of his livelihood activities began to take shape. He planned to sell the maize spread out around us in one of the local markets. He calculated he could charge around 35,000 *metacais* (about $1.20) per can since peoples' maize supplies were running low this time of year (October). It is not uncommon for those with a maize surplus to wait until October or November to sale their surplus when the price of maize is likely to increase. In addition to selling surplus maize, he also markets tomatoes and pumpkins from his *matoro* in several of the small local markets. He also owns five head of cattle which he loaned to an uncle to raise in a distant

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[127] "viviamos nas mãos do governo."

area from Sussundenga-Sede where there are larger pastures and less likelihood the animals will destroy peoples' fields. He keeps 13 goats in a small kraal at his homestead.

Felipe's *matoro* is about a five minute walk from his homestead. In a small low-lying area along the Muzoria River, he dug two ponds in which he filled with water and now uses to raise fish. The fish are consumed in the household; however, his ponds have spawned some minor conflicts over water. Felipe does not allow people to draw water from the ponds worrying that it will kill his fish. Some neighbors feel they should be able to use the water since the ponds are located along the river in which people are entitled to use the water. He has another larger *matoro* down stream where he grows vegetables consumed at home and sold in the local markets.

When I first asked him if he had *machamba*, he said no. Several weeks later, I learned he had three! Two of his *machambas* are at Nhanguzué, but he has not planted anything on them yet. He is clearing the land and wants to grow orange and tangerine trees. He also wants to plant eucalyptus trees on another large piece of land not far from his home. He paid 100,000mt ($4) to the chief for the land in Nhanguzué. However, the money paid is considered a gift to the chief reflecting a longstanding practice of paying the chief *huku*, literally a chicken, but today *huku* may be offered in monetary form. This small gift is a demonstration of respect as well as reflecting the chief's legitimacy in the eyes of his subject to allocate land.

Like his uncle, Bernardo is also an enterprising young farmer. Born in 1978, he moved with his family to Sussundenga from Rotanda a few years later. He has a large *matoro* along the Muzoria River. He is currently growing maize, tomatoes, *madhumbe* and rice. He has constructed three small dams in the *matoro* where he raises fish to

consume at home. He dug several *migero* (canals) to control the flow of water. He built

another small dam to hold water for irrigating his tomatoes. The area where all these

matoro are located was once part of a Portuguese farm. He inherited this matoro area

from his father whom the government allocated land in 1979 as part of the same

communal village that Felipe received land. He also has another *matoro* and *machamba*

in Nhanguzue. He employs seasonal labor to harvest the tomatoes, paying the worker

with tomatoes. He hires a young man to herd his six cattle, five of which are on loan

from another uncle who lives closer to Sussundenga-Sede. At his homestead, he raises

goats and chickens, and like his uncle, he is also in the process of building a new house

with a metal roof distinguishing his compound from his older neighbors.

Over lunch one day in November, we discussed their experiences with a cotton

out-grower scheme. Bernardo's wife prepared *sadza* and *ishwa* (termites) caught the

night before and dried in the sun during the morning. His wife and three small children

sat off to one side on the ground as we sat at a small wooden table and talked. Bernardo

has grown cotton for two seasons. The first year he planted 1.5 ha of cotton and received

a payment of 9,300,000mt ($372 US). The costs of the seeds and pesticides totaled

1,300,000mt ($52) which was deducted from his payment leaving him 8,000,000mt

($320 US) to take home. The company distributing the seeds and buying the harvest is

based in Beira. The next season he increased the size of cotton under cultivation to 2.5

ha and received around 10,000,000mt ($400 US). He harvested twice a year. The first

harvest the company pays 5.5 *contos* per kilo and the second harvest 3.7 *contos* per kilo.

The cotton takes about six months to grow, but is labor intensive due to the consistent

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weeding necessary for the plant to mature. Bernardo feels he has had some success with cotton and plans to continue growing it.

Felipe and Bernardo's claims to land which underpin their livelihoods draw both on chiefly authority and the state. Like many smallholders cultivating wetland gardens along the river, they invoke the government's authority to allocate land and settle people during the early years of independence. They appeal to a collective and individual historical memory to justify their access to these lands in the face of encroachment by two small-scale commercial farms.

One of these farms is "owned" by Senhor Vasco, the first black administrator of Sussundenga. During the colonial period, he assisted the Portuguese administrator and worked for the Portuguese secret police (PIDE).[128] Shortly after becoming the district administrator, Frelimo learned he had collaborated with PIDE. The government accused him of killing people while working for the colonial regime. He was arrested and sent to a "re-education" camp in Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique. After his detention, he moved to Beira and returned to Sussundenga in 1999. He now openly supports Renamo. How he obtained a former Portuguese farm is subject to debate. A key informant told me Vasco acquired the property after the 24/20 ordinance whereby the government informed everyone hostile to the new regime that they had 24 hours and could take up to 20 kilograms of personal belongings and leave the country. Others suggested he purchased the farm through a government auction for divesting state farms. Regardless, the SPGC registered 10 ha of land under his name, but he is currently only using two or three hectares.

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Like many small-scale commercial farmers, Vasco and his family consume most of the maize, popcorn, onions, cabbage, tomatoes, cove, sesame, and sunflowers they grow. He debated growing tobacco as part of an out-grower scheme, but decided he did not want to end up in debt to a tobacco company. He also considered paprika, but other farmers warned him that it is difficult to make a profit with the crop. He did experiment with a cotton out-grower scheme, but complained the company gave out expired pesticides and the soils needed a significant amount of fertilizer to produce cotton. He also stated the companies from Beira did not come and collect the cotton after it was harvested. Ultimately, he felt it was not worth his labor and land to remain involved in the scheme.

In addition to his *machamba*, he has a large *matoro* on the Muzoria River. His *matoro* is planted with bananas which he intends to sell. He employs a handful of laborers to work his fields and wetland. His wetland bananas represent his largest commercial venture at the moment.

On the day Nelson and I spoke with Vasco, he drove up to his house in a black Toyota Corrolla. He was dressed in khaki pants and a button down shirt with eyeglasses resting on his head. Vasco spoke openly and passionately about the conflicts surrounding his farm and what he perceived as the problems with agricultural development and democracy in Mozambique. A number of the conflicts surrounding his farm stem from uncontrolled burning (*queimadas descontroladas*) in the area and cattle destroying his crops. He has lodged several complaints in the local court, but contends the court does not take action.[129] "The courts do not resolve the cases and the chiefs are afraid."[130] He

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[129] "Tribunal não ajuda" (literally the court does not help) (Sussundenga, 15 of November 2006).
[130] "Os tribunais não resolvem os casos e os regulos tem medo." (Sussundenga, 15 of November 2006).

175

believes the four local authorities including the courts, the police, the district agricultural office, and the chiefs pass his complaints back and forth never taking decisive action. In the case of the chiefs, he believes they have lost power in face of the state declaring that "The chiefs do not have power. Democracy has eclipsed the chiefs."[131]

The land claimed as part of his farm is contested, locking him in boundary disputes with surrounding cultivators. Several smallholders are cultivating *machambas* on the outskirts of the farm and Vasco believes the government is allowing people to encroach on his land. From his perspective, these fields serve to provoke his goats to eat their crops, providing smallholders with a complaint against him. In addition to the conflicts over grazing, he contends uncontrolled burning is endangering his land. Uncontrolled burning represents one of the "weapons of the weak" (Scott 1987) by which smallholders challenge the material and ideological hegemony of dominant classes through everyday forms of resistance often invisible to the state or ruling groups. However, fire is not invisible and can be seen (literally and metaphorically) to challenge the boundaries of Vasco's farm. Vasco believes the acts are committed with the tacit support of the local administration to undermine his claims to land and penalize him for supporting the opposition.

His complaints against his neighbors and local authorities also embody a more general critique of the Mozambican government and the ruling party. He criticized the government and its fight against poverty arguing the government does not have a "real" poverty alleviation strategy. He contends the government does not support farmers as evidence by the local authorities' unwillingness to punish those who practice

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[131] "Os regulos não tem poder." "Democracia eclipsiadou os regulos." (Sussundenga, 15 of November 2006).

uncontrolled burning. He compared the current circumstances of small-scale commercial farmers with the Portuguese settlers of the 1950s. "In the past the *colonato* was helped by the government."[132] Today he sees the government offering little help or having a realistic development plant. "We cannot remain in suspense. The plan (referring to the government's poverty alleviation strategy) is fictitious, it is not real."[133]

After her husband left, Cecilia, Vasco's wife, said people in Sussundenga are not united and they do not support her husband. She pointed to a blue Ford tractor in the yard and said they can hardly afford to purchase petrol for the tractor. She pulled a receipt from her pocket showing they had purchased 20 liters of petrol for 570,000mt (about $22.00). They often rent the tractor to other farmers since it is expensive for them to operate.

While Felipe and Bernardo invoke both chiefly and government authority to substantiate their claims to multiple lands and Vasco's land rights rest on the state (though he feels the state does not support him), other wealthy individuals also use connections to the state and ruling party to claim large tracts of land for speculative purposes. Several local residents reported an increase in land-grabbing by ruling party elites, some as far away as Maputo. The land is then registered in the category of wildlife or livestock husbandry stipulating a lower tax rate. But the land continues to lay fallow waiting for potential investors and land values to rise.

It is rumored a prominent government minister has claimed and registered land along the Chizizira River. The river provided fertile soils for white settlers in the 1960s to grow tomatoes and potatoes, and today is an important site of wetland cultivation for

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[132] "Antigamente o colonato era ajudado pelo governo." (Sussundenga, 15 of November 2006).
[133] "Não podemos ficar em suspense. O plano ficticio não é real." (Sussundenga, 15 of November 2006).

numerous smallholder families. The minister is not using the land, but instead has placed a worker on the land to safeguard his animals and prohibit others from cultivating in the area. However, by November several families had opened plots on his land and his worker, with whom we spoke, has not been paid and subsequently sold the minister's four cattle. The worker spent his time and energy cultivating his *machamba* instead of laboring on the land for which he would not be rewarded. Rumors circulate that the government will remove the families if the minister returns to use the land. Interestingly, the minister's lack of land-use practices defies the guidelines outlined in the new land law whereby land registered with the SPGC must be used in accordance with development plan submitted in a specific period of time or the land can be reclaimed by the government. Other people informed me of similar practices occurring on land near the Sussundenga Agriculture Station where influential people have placed guards on the land to strengthen their claims and dissuade others from using the land.

Conclusion

There is a Shona proverb that states "every power is subject to another power."[134] It is used as a reminder than no matter how powerful a person appears to be, there is always someone more powerful. Access to land in Sussundenga draws on multiple sources of power and authority to substantiate claims. Whereas many smallholders invoke the power of the *mambo* to allocate and legitimize access to land and natural resources, others rely on access to the state, often at the local level to secure land. Chiefly rule and state power are not mutually exclusive. Many people appeal to both sources of authority to strengthen their claims and solidify their positions against individuals or groups likely to make counter claims or engage in direct struggles over

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[134] "Chikuriri chine chimwe chikuriri chacho."

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land such as "uncontrolled burning" or livestock encroachment. Felipe and Bernardo justify their use of wetland areas based on the state's authority to resettle people and allocate fields in 1979 and 1980 while also recognizing the power of the *mambo* to allocate new land in more distant areas. Senhor Vasco's land use rights derive from the legal backing of the state embodied in the new land law. Regardless of whether he obtained the farm following the 24/20 ordinance or acquired the farm in a government auction, his access and land use rights are contingent upon the state and the legal framework enshrined within the land law. Paradoxically, he sees the state as undermining his claims to land through its unwillingness to prosecute smallholders he feels are encroaching on his property. The local state's complicity serves to validate actions and claims of the smallholders to his land. Vasco has appealed to all potential sources of authority at the district level to strengthen his claims to the contested area of his farm. He contends chiefly authority has been weakened and is unable resolve disputes in a "democratic" Mozambique and the local government, through the police, courts, and district agricultural office, refuse to take action on his grievances since he is a member of the opposition party.

Many other Sussundengans continue to access and use land according to longstanding practices legitimated by chiefly authority. Chiefly authority rests on a socio-spiritual relationship between the ancestors, the land, and the living. From this worldview, chiefs and their subordinates exercise legitimate authority over people and land. However, who is the rightful chief and the hierarchical relationships between different chieftaincies are subject to debate and competing interpretations. Despite these contestations, and in the face of both colonial and postcolonial attempts to remake

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authority and impose new structures of power to govern people's lives, the majority of

Sussundengans continue to articulate an understanding of power and authority centered

on chiefly rule. The salience of chiefs Cupenha and Buapua and their socio-spiritual

authority reflects Moore's (2005) contention that state power is never absolute. Instead,

Sussundengans are embedded into multiple fields of power relations including chiefly

rule, gender and class relations, and the local state.

Residents often negotiate access to land with the knowledge and permission of a

chief or subordinate. *Kutaurirana* or negotiation exemplifies an important and culturally

significant idiom detailing how Sussundengans secure access to land and inscribes a

somewhat flexible pattern of access to and control over land and water resources in the

socio-cultural fabric of the area. However, this is not to suggest that landholdings are

equal in terms of size, soil quality, and proximity to water, markets, and infrastructure or

that socio-economic differentiation does not exist. But rather it questions a view of

struggles over land as a hegemonic and teleological process. The diversity of ways in

which people obtain and claim access to land, including the frequency in which chiefly

allocation and negotiation factors in, does not signify a process of enclosure as defined as

the increasing commodification of land. Furthermore, it does not take into consideration

the growing diversity and sometimes ambiguity, expressed over who is likely to inherit

land. Many people reported that *machambas* are likely to be inherited within the

immediate family (sons, daughters, and wives) though enough variability exists within

the actual inheritance patterns to question essentialized descriptors such as patrilineal,

instead warranting an empirical investigation of how land actually changes hands from

generation to generation. At least for the moment, the Sussundengan countryside does not appear to be enclosed.

Chapter Five
Contentious Waters: Water Reform, Wetland Cultivation, and
Understanding Local Meanings and Practice

Almost a decade ago, Mozambique featured prominently in the international

media as the devastating floods washed over the central and southern regions of the

country. The March 2000 floods affected seven river basins including the Limpopo,

Save, Incomáti, Buzi, Púngué, Maputo, and Umbelúzi and generated pictures and video

footage of rescue helicopters plucking people from trees and rooftops of inundated

buildings. Several human and ecological factors converged to create the catastrophic

floods of that year. Mozambique is not immune to cycles of drought and flooding.

Severe droughts occurred in 10-year cycles in 1949-1950, 1959-1960, and 1969-1970

while longer periods of drought stretched from 1979-1984, and most recently from 1991-

1993. Flooding in 1976-1978 preceded the worst drought on record in Southern Africa,

and the most recent severe drought was followed by acute flooding in central

Mozambique in 1996-1998. During 2005 and 2006 while I conducted fieldwork,

numerous localized floods occurred along the lower Zambezi River and within the

Púnguè river basin resulting in crop loss, death, and human displacement.[135]

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[135] Three people died, 30 houses destroyed, and the fields of over 520 families were flooded in Dondo district in Sofala Province ("Chuva Mata e Desaloja em Dondo," Notícias, 3 of January 2006). 1600 families in Nampula province were affected by flooding and in need of assistance ("Afectados pelas Chuvas Carecem de Assistência," Notícias, 2 of January 2006). In December 2005 and January 2006, the Púngué river approached alert level ("Rio Aproxima-se do Nível de Alerta," Diário de Moçambique, 31 of December 2005). Flooding destroyed 4 million hectares of crops in the Púngué river valley ("Quatro Mil Hectares de Culturas já Perdidos no Vale do Púngué," Diário de Moçambique, 4 of January 2006). Storms and flooding aggravate the hunger crisis ("Inundações e Tempestades Agravam Crise de Fome," Savana, 6 of January 2006). Flooding along the Zambezi River in February 2007 affected 86,269 people, placing 49,185 people in resettlement centers (AIM, 19 of February 2007). In December of 2007 flooding continued to displace people and destroy crops in the Púngué river valley resulting in 200 hectares of crop damage and 150 displaced families (AIM, 21 December 2007). In January 2008, over 2000 people cut off by the Zambezi floods had to be rescued with another 7000 still needing to be evacuated (AIM, 16 of January 2008).

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The floods of the 1999-2000 rainy season were the consequence of intensified weather patterns across Southern Africa and longstanding changes in river systems in the region caused by human intervention. Heavy rain fell throughout southern Mozambique, northern South Africa, and southeastern Zimbabwe in conjunction with four cyclones during the 1999-2000 rainy season (Christie and Hanlon 2001:107). The cyclones are linked to La Niña events in the Indian Ocean which redirect cyclones westward passing over the island of Madagascar and toward the coastline of Mozambique (ibid.:111).

The human dimensions of the flooding are more contested. Numerous dams control the flow of water across Southern Africa. Because most of these dams are built to store water, few have release gates and instead allow the water to flow over the top of the dam wall (Christie and Hanlon 2001). There are debates as to whether or not the dams played a significant role in the March 2000 floods. Christie and Hanlon (2001) assert that dams are not responsible for the flooding experienced in Mozambique in March 2000 while others argue that although the dams might not be directly related to the severity of the 2000 floods, the long term effects of the dams could have made it worse. Dams lessen the likelihood of small floods essential for washing out river beds and clearing away sediment. Thus without small annual floods the river bed grows smaller leaving less space for water and the ability of the river system to cope with larger inundations. Scientists also debate the effectiveness of wetlands to ameliorate the impact of flooding. Some contend they play a crucial role in regulating watersheds by soaking up water and recharging groundwater resources reducing the damage of floods. From this perspective, the loss of wetlands has produced more intense flooding. Others argue that wetlands play

a minimal role in decreasing the severity of floods and are overwhelmed by large

inundations (Christie and Hanlon 2001:118).

The floods of March 2000 and the debates over their cause and intensity highlight

several issues crucial for understanding struggles over access to and use of water in

Mozambique today. First, biophysical and climatic conditions continue to exert influence

on the amount and timing of rainfall that is essential for farmers' livelihoods. The vast

majority of Mozambican smallholders are dependent on rainfall for their food production.

Ecological processes such as the Intertropical Convergence Zone and El Niño/La Niña

events at times endow Mozambique with either too much or too little water. Human and

natural history intertwine in ways that demonstrate how "water has been critical to the

making of human history" (Worster 1985:19). Second, these ecological conditions

produce the need for water infrastructure such as canals and irrigation schemes to store,

transfer, and control the flow of water. The development of water infrastructure and

institutions to manage water form the basis of new legal and institutional instruments to

reform how water is valued and managed in the country. Many of the water reforms

across Southern Africa are informed by predictions of water scarcity and designed to

make water sectors more efficient and amendable to national economic development.

New water laws and policies structure the legal conditions under which people secure

access to water essential for their livelihoods. However, across Mozambique

longstanding norms and practices shaping water management persist, resulting in a

disjuncture between water reform instruments and how people use and access water.

Finally, debates over land-use practices such as wetland and stream-bank cultivation

reflect the tensions between rural development and poverty alleviation, water

conservation and flood control, and which groups of land-users will derive benefits from these highly productive resources.

In this chapter, I examine the evolving policy and institutional context of water management in Mozambique and the locally situated practices of water use and access by Sussundengan smallholders. Like many countries in Southern Africa, Mozambique is in the process of decentralizing water management and creating stakeholder institutions to manage water more efficiently. In recent policy and legal documents, water is valued as both a social and economic good meaning that it must be treated as a scarce commodity and implying that some users must pay for water. Furthermore, the government is withdrawing from building and maintaining water infrastructure as part of economic liberalization and decentralization, and international and national water companies and NGOs are now replacing the government in the water sector. At the local level people continue to use, allocate, and manage water in accordance with culturally prescribed idioms and understandings of the relationship between living people, ancestral spirits, and the biophysical world. Wetland resources play a crucial role in dry season agricultural production. They allow Sussundengan smallholders to harvest more than once during the agricultural cycle contributing to food security and income generation. Wetlands constitute "contested" and "gendered" spaces. They are contested materially and symbolically; materially in that they provide fertile lands and water for dry season cultivation as well as sites for livestock grazing, building materials, and medicinal plants and so are attractive to a variety of land-users; symbolically in that like *machamba* land, people draw on multiple sources of authority to substantiate their claims to these areas, but also symbolically in that local people, agricultural extension workers, and irrigation

engineers associate different values with wetlands that dictate how they should or should not be used. I begin the chapter with an overview of water resources in Mozambique and then discuss the new water policy and institutional framework. From there, I focus on water resources in Sussundenga, including the multiple sources people use for household needs and agricultural practices. I examine how people obtain access to wetland areas and their importance for household nutrition and income generation and to what extent these critical resources are subject to enclosure. Finally, I explore the debates over the ecological sustainability of wetland cultivation drawing on interviews with agricultural extension workers and NGO workers in the provincial capital of Chimoio that often perceive wetland cultivation as ecologically harmful though recognize its importance to rural food security. Since the signing of the Rome peace accord in 1992, numerous studies have explored land-related tensions, state farm divesture, the new land law, and post-war returnee's claims to land, however, the myriad of ways people secure access to water on these lands has escaped empirical investigation. Wetlands, which I argue are critical for rural livelihoods, have been even less studied and it is my hope that this chapter can begin to fill in these gaps.

Mozambican Waters: Global Flows and Local Currents

Surface water, in the form of rainfall and international rivers, provide Mozambique with its main sources of water. The country has 104 river basins which drain water from the high plateau to the Indian Ocean. Mozambique is also located downstream from 10 major international river basins including the Zambezi, Incomáti, Púngué, Save, and Limpopo Rivers. Consequently, the timing and amount of water flowing through Mozambique is often dependent on ecological conditions and

186

political/technical decisions occurring beyond its borders. Irrigation is the main consumer of water in the country with about 85% of irrigated water used in agriculture. At independence in 1975, only 2% of the rural population had adequate water supplies. The postcolonial government prioritized access to water since it is a basic need (Hanlon 1991:176). The government embarked on a rural water program (Água Rural) to expand the number of wells and boreholes in the countryside. In Sussundenga, the government drilled boreholes and wells which constituted the new services provided in the *aldeias comunais*. After a decade of fighting, much of the country's rural water infrastructure lay in ruins, including that in Sussundenga. It is estimated that at the end of the war in 1992, only 33% of Mozambicans had access to portable water and in rural areas the number was considerably less (ADC-Austria 1995:43). Today it is estimated that only 30% of the urban population is serviced by public water supplies, and if Maputo (where 60% of the population has access) is removed from this estimate, it drops to approximately 18% of the population (Rodts 2000:11). At the beginning of 2006, Minister of Public Works and Habitation, Felício Zacarias, reported that at least 300,000 Mozambicans have access to potable water.[136] For a government that has always been committed to providing water as a basic need, real challenges remain in allocating clean and safe water to urban and rural populations. Ironically, the government has decreased its role in building, providing, and maintaining water infrastructure as part of its transition from a highly centralized economy to a liberalized, capitalist economy. Mozambique' first structural adjustment package decreased government expenditures, including money allocated to installing and maintaining rural water infrastructure (Hanlon 1991:178). Since the late

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[136] Quoted in "Mais 300 mil Pessoas Bebem Água Potável no País" (Notícias, 2 of January 2006).

1980s, the government has continued to liberalize the economy and decentralize the responsibility and authority for managing numerous sectors, including water.

From Colonial Waters to New Institutions

The colonial government passed the first water-related legislation in 1901, and it established a dual property regime. Under the 1901 law, water on private lands, including rain water, was considered private property as long as it was confined to the boundaries of the land. The law categorized the remaining water as public water and placed its management under the colonial Public Works Department. This dual property system continued until independence when the new government claimed all inland waters as state property. The Portuguese also created the first national measuring network for hydrological data (Serviços Hidraulicos) in 1930 and began a systematic monitoring of water flow by 1942. Water infrastructure built under Portuguese rule served mainly the European communities concentrated in the cities and *colonato* schemes. The colonial government built the Chicamba dam, which today provides water and hydroelectric power to Chimoio, in the 1950s and heightened its wall in the 1960s. Private farmers across Manica also built small earthen dams to store water and irrigate their fields. The pinnacle of colonial water infrastructure is the Cahora Bassa dam built in the early 1970s and located on the lower Zambezi River in Tete Province.[137] Colonial officials, hydrologists, and engineers praised the dam as sign that "nature could be conquered and

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[137] The dam's symbolic power has been subject to multiple interpretations during different points in its history and is intimately wedded to Mozambique's political history. At the time of its construction, the dam's architects and the colonial government praised its anticipated benefits such as irrigated agriculture, European settlement, mineral production, communication, and hydroelectric power, while the dam's opponents saw its construction as evidence of a political and military alliance between Portugal and South Africa thus integral to white minority rule in the region. Interestingly, after Mozambique's independence, the Frelimo government portrayed the dam as a symbol of liberation and a key to national development (see Issaacman and Sneddon 2000). In November 2005, Mozambique became the majority owner of the dam. President Guebuza proclaimed the new ownership as Mozambique's "second independence," and for the next year television commercials celebrated the transfer of ownership played throughout Mozambique.

biophysical systems could be transformed to serve humankind" (Isaacman and Sneddon 2000:597). With the lower watershed of Africa's fourth longest river under human control, colonial officials imagined growing European settlements, supported by irrigated agriculture, and illuminated by hydroelectric power, all in the waning years of colonial rule.

At independence, Frelimo inherited a limited and highly skewed water infrastructure. Rural boreholes and wells, along with health clinics and schools, featured prominently in the government's rural development strategy. Though despite these challenges, the government made an earnest effort to improve access for the majority of the population. In 1976 the government drafted a water resource plan for the next two and a half decades. The plan recognized Mozambican citizens' rights to water for domestic and subsistence needs (GoM 1976). By the late 1980s the country's shift from socialism to capitalism reshaped the government's role in water provision and ushered in a new era of demand-driven approaches to water management. The government enacted a new water law in 1991 designed to decentralize water management and create new management institutions known as Regional Water Authorities (Administrações Regionais de Água or ARAs). In 1995, the government created a new national water policy drafted to make the water sector more efficient and sustainable.

Mozambique's water policies and stakeholder institutions parallel many of the policies and institutions of other countries in Southern Africa designed to address historical imbalances in access to water and make the water sector more efficient and productive. The new water law and national water policy, and the stakeholder groups and institutions they created, are informed by multiple and competing discourses about the

value of water, how best to manage, conserve, and use it. In addition, the

decentralization of water management from a once highly centralized state to regional

water authorities reflects a broader pattern of decentralization taking place across

different sectors of the state including the management of forestry and wildlife, the

recognition and strengthening of smallholder land-use rights, and the motion to create

"democratic" local structures of governance. The diminished capacity and desire of the

central government to participate in the construction, maintenance, and delivery of water

services highlights the reconfiguration of the state since the late 1980s as part of the

conditionalities imposed on Mozambique by international financial institutions.

However, Mozambique's water policies are shaped by different and competing

discourses prescribing how water should be valued and managed. The notion that water

has both an economic and social value echoes the position of the Dublin principles on

freshwater resources and many other national water policies in the region. Thus

Mozambique's new water law and national water policy are an amalgamation of

neoliberal economic doctrine combined with the recognition that water may have

multiple values that conflict with understanding it strictly in economic terms.

The Dublin Principles (1992) conceptualize water as a social and economic good;

water management should be based on a user-pay principle; water management should be

decentralized and user-based; water management should be integrated and balance

efficiency, basic needs, and ecological sustainability; women's roles as water users and

managers should be recognized. Mozambique's new water law and policies derive many

of their visions of water use and management from these principles. Mozambique's

Regional Water Authorities (ARAs) echo water management institutions in neighboring

countries such as Zimbabwe's catchment and subcatchment councils, South Africa's water user associations,[138] and Malawi's river basin authorities.[139]

The government passed a new water law in 1991 which conceptualizes water as a scarce resource with both social and economic values and establishes the legal foundation of two categories of water: common water and private water. Common water includes all water used for domestic purposes including drinking, washing, and raising animals as long as the water is extracted without using a mechanical device (not including boreholes). It also includes water used in subsistence farming. In contrast private water is defined as water contained on "private" lands used for drinking, washing, and agriculture which does not detract from pre-existing common uses. There is also a second category of private water based on licenses and concessions. These concessions are granted for five years and can be renewed or revoked at any time.

The water law and national water policy (see below) are also based on a *princípio do utilizador-pagador* or user-pay principle and a *poluidor pagador* or polluter-pay principle reaffirming the economic value of water. Users who have the financial ability to pay for water should be required to pay. Water tariffs and concessions on raw bulk water, large-scale irrigation, hydroelectric power, urban water supply, and water used in industry are aimed at generating revenue to make the water sector self-sustainable and are the foundation of a demand-driven approach.

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[138] The 1998 South Africa National Water Act created local water user associations and larger catchment management agencies.

[139] Malawi's National Water Policy (2004) establishes 17 river basin authorities. In addition, government-run irrigation schemes are being transferred to farmers' associations as part of larger trend of decentralization and the reduction of the state. Wetlands are designated as public lands under the control of "traditional authorities" (see Ferguson and Mulwafu 2005).

The Water Law of 1991 also created the Regional Water Authorities (ARAs). The ARAs are water management institutions organized around the different hydrographic basins. There are five ARAs: Sul, Centro, Zambeze, Centro-Norte, and Norte. They are public institutions whose purpose is to implement a basin level development plan, maintain and operate hydrological infrastructure such as dams and waterways, maintain a register of water users and collect water use taxes. However, at the time of my research only the ARA-Sul in Maputo was fully operational.

Four years after the implementation of the new water law, the government issued a new National Water Policy (NWP) in 1995. The NWP is based on nine principles designed to ensure the sustainability of the water sector: 1) the satisfaction of basic needs is a high national priority and will require increased coverage for rural and low income groups 2) services should be provided in accordance with water users' desires and ability to pay 3) water has both economic and social values and should be priced to reflect its economic value in order to cover supply costs 4) water resource management should be decentralized to catchment authorities which should be self-financing 5) the role of government will entail setting priorities, defining minimum levels of service, but withdraw from direct implementation of services 6) bulk water will be allocated on the basis of integrated water management plans 7) investment should balance economic development with poverty alleviation 8) sector capacity will be expanded through human resource development and involve the decentralization of decision-making to local managers, users, and clients 9) the private sector will be used to accelerate the provision of services and level of quality.

In accordance with the water law and national water policy, the state is envisioned to decrease its direct role in the water sector and instead promote private sector participation through creating an investment-friendly environment with the necessary legal mechanisms, including policy making, strategic plans, and legislation. Although both documents recognize the importance of water as basic need and the urgency of expanding water supply services particularly to rural and urban poor, the documents also stress the economic value of water and responsibility to price water to reflect this value. While the government takes on a largely regulatory and monitoring role, the private sector will become involved through management concessions, contracting-out, or direct investment.

The state's withdrawal from the provision of water infrastructure and maintenance has restructured the delivery of urban and rural water services and produced a number of configurations whereby the state, international development organizations, and the private sector are involved in water service provisions. In some cases the Mozambican government has formed partnerships with other countries to rehabilitate water infrastructure such as water treatment and filtration[140] or once state-owned enterprises such as *Águas de Tete* or *Águas de Moçambique*[141] are now functioning as public/private partnerships attempting to expand services in urban and peri-urban areas.[142] In other cases, the government has partnered with the World Bank to restore urban water infrastructure.[143] The World Bank loan is administered by the Water Supply Investment

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[140] Mozambique has formed one such partnership with Portugal to rehabilitate the water treatment and filtration station along the Umbelúzi River, "Águas de Umbelúzi em Reabilitação," Meia Noite, 25 of July 2006.

[141] Is a private consortium that manages Maputo's water supply.

[142] "Água Potável para Arredores de Tete," Notícias, 6 of March 2006.

[143] The World Bank allocated a credit of 57 billion metacais to rehabilitate the water system in the northern city of Pemba, "Mais Água para Pemba," Notìcias, 15 of May 2006.

and Assets Fund (FIPAG) and money is being allocated to build a new water system for Quelimane, located on the coastline of north-central Mozambique, which should provide water to the city 24 hours a day. World Bank funds are also being dispersed to improve water supply coverage, particularly in peri-urban areas, in Beira, Nampula, and Pemba. The remaining dollars are allocated to provide institutional and operational support for the DNA or the National Directorate of Water (Direcção Nacional de Águas). Mozambique is also working with bilateral development organizations such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), which is allocating $18 million USD as part of the second phase of the Púngué River Basin Joint Water Resources Management Strategy. The Netherlands's government is also supporting the Mozambican water sector through $37 million USD to rehabilitate infrastructure in Tete, Moatize, Chimoio, Manica, and Gondola with total Dutch investment in the water sector for 2009 estimated at $52 million USD. There is evidence that Mozambique's demand-driven approach to building and maintaining water services is not working. In Cabo Delgado it is estimated that 567 wells and boreholes no longer supply water (AIM, December 30, 2007).

The water and sanitation sector is complex, involving numerous institutions, with overlapping responsibilities. At the central level, the Ministry of Construction and Water (Ministerio de Construção e Águas) was the authority responsible for water supply until 1996. It was renamed to be the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (Ministerio de Obras Publicas e Habitação). The MOPH is tasked with ensuring the proper use of water resources in conjunction with the law. The Ministry has a set of administrative units including the DNA which is the ministry's central institution for water policy making,

implementation, and planning and management. Following the course of the 1995 Water

Policy, the DNA is in the process of withdrawing from direct implementation of services

and focusing on policy development and transforming existing service providers. The

new water law also created a National Water Council (Conselho Nacional de Águas) that

functions as a consultative body to the Council of Ministers advising the government on

water resource issues. The CNA is chaired by the Minister of Public Works and Housing

and the council includes the ministers of Agriculture, Industry, Commerce and Tourism,

Mineral Resources and Energy and the heads of the National Institute for Rural

Development and the National Directorate of Water Affairs. It is rumored that the CNA

only meets about once a year.

At the provincial level, the Provincial Directorate of Public Works and Housing

oversees the management of water infrastructure. In the rural areas of the provinces, the

National Rural Water Supply Program (PRONAR), located within the MOPH, supervises

the maintenance of the rural water supply. PRONAR is coordinated in Maputo and is

essentially an implementation agency of the DNA. The ARAs coordinate and manage

water resources in their watersheds, collect data, and distribute resources within the

basin. The National Institute of Meteorology (INAME) and the DNA collect and analyze

meteorological and climate data including rainfall and evaporation rates.

The current state of water infrastructure in Manica province reflects many of the

political and economic changes implemented in the country over the last two decades.

Numerous rivers traverse the province, but it lacks the infrastructure and finances to store

water. Several *tecnicos* at the Provincial Agricultural Directorate spoke of *água perdida*

or lost water when describing the irrigation challenges that face the province.[144] Sixteen

years of fighting, destroyed water infrastructure and repairs have been slow.

Consequently, "the population does not have access to good irrigation systems."[145] In the

past, the Frelimo government controlled irrigation on the province's state farms. Today,

the government's reduced role in water management and infrastructure provision has left

a gap that has not been completely filled by the private sector, though more private and

joint-venture companies are now operating water supplies in many provincial capitals.

The state is also working with donors to rehabilitate or build irrigation systems for

identified smallholder associations.[146] Many people working within the province are not

familiar with the new water law and new water policies. As one *tecnico* explained "the

water law is not widely disseminated."[147]

In rural areas, international donors and NGOs also take an active role in the water

sector through allocating money for digging and installing boreholes. However, they are

reluctant to fund the maintenance of boreholes and wells. These responsibilities are now

falling on the shoulders of rural residents. Communities are now tasked with forming a

comité de água or water committee and contributing money or labor to construct a new

water source or repair an old one. The community is expected to form a *grupo de*

manutenção or maintenance group which then takes responsibility for repairing broken

down boreholes. I was able to witness a maintenance group in action. In late September

2006, an often-used borehole stopped working. It was the only borehole in this particular

bairro causing residents to venture to other *bairros* to obtain water. The *secretario de*

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[144] Chimoio, 6 of September 2006.

[145] "A população não tem acesso aos sistemas boas." (Chimoio, 6 of September 2006).

[146] "Neste momento o estado e os parceiros estão a construir sistemas de irrigação para beneficar associações idenntificadas." (Chimoio, 8 of September 2006).

[147] "A lei de água não esta muito divulgada." (Chimoio, 8 of September 2006).

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bairro directed 15 men in an all-day maintenance session. Residents contributed the equivalent of 20 cents to pay for the repairs, and women prepared food for the workers. After long hours they succeeded in repairing the pump, but what if they had failed? The policy of devolving the management of rural water supplies to user-communities raises important questions about the training necessary to repair water sources and the ability for rural residents to contribute food, labor, and money. Ferguson (2005) asserts that a similar policy in Malawi may disadvantage and restrict access to water by more marginal community members who are too poor to contribute money or food and too sick to offer their labor. However, in Sussundenga I could not find evidence that anyone had been denied access to borehole water.

Gift or Commodity? Interpreting Water from the Ground Up

Water is a contested resource. It is subject to multiple valuations informing how it should be used, conserved, managed, and priced. Recent anthropological studies of water have documented not only the importance of the productive capacities of water such as for agriculture, fishing, or health, but also the socio-cultural, religious, and symbolic significance of water in different ethnographic contexts. Moreover, these studies highlight "local" conceptualizations of water and the social, political, and religious institutions tasked with its management and how these micro-practices are often unrecognized by the state or contradict the state's conceptualization of water and the national-level laws, policies, and strategies for its use and management.

Drawing on ethnographic material from India, Mosse (2006) argues that water is both a productive and symbolic resource that has the power to shape social and political organization. In this view, environment and society are mutually constitutive whereby

the control and flow of water legitimizes political and social institutions, while policies and social systems shape access to water. Whiteford and Melville (2002) recognize the multiple values attributed to water in Mexico and how the intersections of politics, history, and social differentiation inform the country's water management policies.

Orlove (2002) examines the ecological, social, and economic continuities and changes in communities along Lake Titicaca, while Lansing's (1991) account of the "engineered landscape" of Balinese water temples traces the subtle hierarchies and ritualized power water temples exert over irrigation practices of the island's rice terraces, and the ecological crises that emerge when newly implemented Green Revolution agricultural practices disrupted the longstanding irrigation rituals. Gelles (2000) explores the conflicting models of irrigation and development whereby the Peruvian state's secularized and monetized water distribution system clashes with Andean smallholders' understandings of the religious and cultural significance of water and the local, ritualized practices for allocating water.

In the context of Southern Africa, anthropologists have cited the tensions between large-scale resettlement projects and the locally-understood ways of using and accessing water (Derman 1997, 1998) and the competing values of water within Southern Africa (Derman and Ferguson 2003). Derman and Hellum (2002, 2005) examine Zimbabwe's water reform from a human rights perspective and Derman and Hellum (2002, 2003) reflect on the intersections of Zimbabwe's land and water reforms. Ferguson and Mulwafu (2002, 2005) chronicle Malawi's water reform process and implications for access under new forms of land tenure and the reduction of the state's role in water allocation, infrastructure provision, and management. Peters (n.d.) documents the

enclosure of wetland resources in the Lake Chilwa basin by chiefs who have translated

their rights to allocate land into rights to rent and sale land. Hughes (2006) details the

symbolic importance of water in the imaginings of the African landscape by white Euro-

Africans and how views of Lake Kariba have shifted from ecological catastrophe to

pristine "nature."[148]

The strengths of these studies lie in their ability to understand how people

conceptualize water, how their conceptualizations inform water use and access as well as

prescribe relationships between people. Many of these studies also call attention to the

disparities between local ways of understanding and managing water and the state-

recognized or formal systems for allocating water, or the implications of new water laws,

policies, and management institutions (Zimbabwe and Malawi) for access and water use

rights by populations whose voices are less likely to be represented in new legislation or

stakeholder institutions.

These considerations are also vital for examining how water is valued and

managed in central Mozambique. Many Sussundengans understand a socio-spiritual

relationship between rainfall, soil fertility, and social harmony. Ancestral spirits are

important in mediating the dynamics of this relationship and must be respected and

propitiated regularly. From the perspective of many Sussundengans, timely and adequate

rainfall is a reflection of social harmony and respect for ancestral spirits. Because

rainfall, and ultimately water, is created and given by ancestral spirits, individuals cannot

"own" water because it is a gift from God. "Water as a gift from God" also structures

people's willingness to share water and make it available for everyone. Throughout my

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[148] The studies cited represent only some of the more recent anthropological approaches to the study of water and is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all of the ways anthropologists have studied water. I have not included the substantial literature on dams and the environmental and social consequences of them.

time in central Mozambique, people asserted and reaffirmed that water cannot be "owned". This is reflected in the practices of allowing neighbors and strangers to use boreholes and wells for drinking, cooking, and cleaning as well as sanctioning others to draw water from shallow wells in wetland gardens despite not contributing money or labor. Thus Sussundenga's waters flow from above, but are interpreted from below.

Sussundenga's Waters: Unlocking the Colonial Enclosure

Sussundenga is located within the Buzi River basin. The basin encompasses an area of 29,720 square kilometers and is shared between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However, the vast majority (87%) of the basin is within Mozambique's borders. The Buzi River flows east from the border, traversing the highlands of Manica before descending into Sofala province and emptying into the Indian Ocean south of the city of Beira. The Lucite and Revué are the Buzi's main tributaries. The Revué River rises in the Penhalonga Mountains and flows through northern Sussundenga. The Revué is fed by the Munhinga River originating in the Tsetsera Mountains along the border with Zimbabwe and winds through the countryside south of Sussundenga-sede. Irrigation constitutes the largest water demand in the watershed with the largest irrigation scheme located at the Buzi sugar cane company. The Buzi River basin falls under the jurisdiction of the ARA-Centro.

Closely connected to the control over land is the power to decide who gets access to water. Historically, and continuing into the present, land rights have often implied an implicit recognition of access to water. When Portuguese settlers claimed land and displaced African families, they also sought to control the flow of water, to harness it, and direct it to their newly tilled fields. With the material support of the colonial state,

the settlers dug seven dams in the area that is now Sussundenga-sede, stifling the flow of water on several small, but important streams. Further upstream from the *colonato*, the colonial state constructed the Chicamba Dam designed to generate hydro-electric power to Vila Pery (Chimoio) and as part of broader development scheme along the Revué river valley. Within the *colonato*, they built an irrigation system in 1964 to provide for the water and irrigation needs of the settler community. They constructed a pump house which extracted water from the Chizizira River and channeled it through a series of pipes leading to a water storage tank situated on top of a small, rocky hill. Water was then distributed to individual fields. Settlers also used the water stored in dams to raise fish and irrigate their crops. However, the scheme was short-lived and no longer functioned by 1972.

Sussundenga's current water supply system reflects the spatial control of land and water under the authority Portuguese settlers. The town's water supply serves the residents of the *bairro* closest to the center of town where the settlers held church services and congregated on the weekends. It is also the area of town near the home of the colonial administrator and now the local government administration. Today, the water supply system reaches about 56 households, and during the drought of 1992, the water source almost completely dried up (MARRP 1995). It is estimated that 26% of the district's population has access to potable water (ICRISAT/DPA 2004). Six of the dams constructed by the Portuguese continue to hold water, and people use them for fishing, bathing, swimming, washing cloths, and irrigating gardens. All that remains of the pump house is a dilapidated concrete structure overlooking the *bairro* of *7 de Abril*. The gray

concrete frame of the old pump house stands amidst newly tilled fields and along the river where the Portuguese once planted tomatoes and potatoes.

Most residents of Sussendenga-Sede's *bairros* depend on a combination of boreholes, generally referred to as *bombas* in Portuguese and deep wells or *poço* for water used for drinking, cooking, bath, and other domestic needs. Drawing water is a highly gendered activity, and procuring water for the household falls almost exclusively on women. The exception whereby it is socially appropriate for men to fetch water is in households composed of young men where there are no women present.[149] On numerous occasions I attempted to draw water for my bath from our well, and each time I was chastised and told to delegate this task to one of my younger sisters.

In the mornings, groups of women dressed in colorful *capulanas* congregate around boreholes talking, sharing news, and waiting to pump water. They collect water in large yellow or white plastic containers, place the containers carefully on their heads, often assisting each other in this exercise, and returning to their respective homesteads. Boreholes are unevenly distributed throughout the *bairros* as a consequence of the post-war growth in the population around the town. Women often wait in long lines for their turn at the pump in *bairros* that have experienced substantial growth since the days of fighting. Because one borehole often serves a large population, it is more prone to maintenance issues or breaking down. When this does occur, women are forced to venture into neighboring *bairros* to collect water thus increasing the time and distance allocated to this task.

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[149] For example, Nelson is staying in a neighbor's house where both parents have died. Their son, roughly Nelson's age, spends most of the year at school in Manica. Nelson watches over the house and also allows two young men to stay with him. The men fetch their own water for cooking, cleaning, and bathing.

A smaller number of households have deep wells that supply household members, and often neighbors, with water for domestic use. Many of these wells are treated as "open access" implying that anyone is allowed to use these resources. The household where I lived had a deep well (poço) in the yard or *quintal*. Neighbors procured water from this well on a daily basis sometimes forming a line of four or five people deep waiting for their turn to lower the bucket anchored by a metal chain. Day after day, week after week, neighbors repeated this scene. When I asked the *secretario* of our *bairro*, if there were any restrictions on who could use what at first glance might appear as "private" wells, he said there are none. He went on to iterate that frequent use keeps the water source clean and prohibits the build up of sediment since the water is always moving.

The only problem that ever arose with the well in "our" yard occurred in March when the bucket fell into the well while a neighbor was cranking it back to the surface. For the next week, the family along with the other neighbors relying on "our" well, collected water from another household well until someone was able to fish out the bucket. The bucket incident did produce some temporary tension between our family and the other water users as my Mozambican mother explained to me over breakfast. In our conversation she admonished our neighbors for being unwilling to replace the bucket, contribute a small amount of money to purchase a new one, or help retrieve it. She depicted our neighbors as greedy and only willing to derive benefits from the well without sharing any of the potential costs. However, her critique never questioned the right of people to use "our" well.

In communities far from the town or *bairros* with established water points, some women collect water from nearby rivers and streams to use for cooking, bathing, drinking, and cleaning while other women are willing to make the long journey to draw water from the nearest borehole. During my time in Sussundenga, I observed an incredible amount of cooperation and sharing of water resources designated for household use. My observations echo evidence from Zimbabwe's communal lands (Derman and Hellum 2002; Nemarundwe and Kozanayi 2003) suggesting that norms governing access to water are context specific and often stipulated by water usage. Cultural norms prescribing the appropriate relationships between the living and the ancestors and the individual and collective health of the community also shape access to water used for domestic purposes and express a sentiment that no one should be denied access to water. I did not observe nor record any reports or rumors of people being denied access to drinking water or water being sold informally.

In addition to people using boreholes, wells, streams, and rivers for household water, some families harvested rainwater by strategically placing large *bacias* or basins under their roofs to collect the run-off during heavy downpours. This water was also used for washing dishes, household cleaning, or watering small household gardens called *horta*. People value water symbolically as a gift from God and the ancestors and materially for sustaining life, cleaning the body and the household, and enabling crops and food to grow.

By late January and early February 2006 many of my daily conversations with people centered on rain. Sussundengans observed that January received more rain than usual; therefore, people were concerned about the amount that would fall in February.

After several weeks passed with clear, sunny skies and daily temperatures rising, some

worried February would end without any rain. One afternoon as Nelson and I were

taking break from identifying wetland areas and enjoying cold Fanta at one of the small

banca fixas at the bus stop, Nelson describe February 2006 as *mwedzi usina mvura* (the

month with no rain). In most years, people explained, the heaviest rains fell in February

providing sufficient water for maturing crops in preparation for April's harvest.

However, in 2006, plentiful rain in late December and throughout January cast doubt

over the quantity of rain expected in February. In describing this February to me, many

people asserted February *faz muito sol* (makes a lot of sun) referring to the clear skies and

warm temperatures that had become common over the last several weeks. In contexts of

climatic uncertainty and where livelihoods depend directly on the rain, access to different

fields, particularly plots adjacent to water, are crucial for agricultural endeavors and food

security. *Matoro* or wetlands provide these spaces.

Wetlands: Gendered and Contested Spaces

In addition to rain-fed agriculture, Sussundengans also rely on wetland areas

known locally as *matoro*[150] or *baixas* in Portuguese to grow fruits and vegetables

consumed at home or sold in one of the local markets. *Matoro* can be seasonally flooded

savanna lands and pastures or low-lying areas along streams and riverbanks. Across

Africa farmers and pastoralists use both wetlands and drylands to minimize risk and

manage labor shortages (Adams 1992:69). Historically, African farmers used wetlands

and river-fed fields as a salient feature in agro-ecological systems (Isaacman and

Sneddon 2000), and in Shona-speaking areas of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, farmers

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[150] Matoro is the most common word used for wetland areas in the Chiteve speaking areas of Sussundenga. Bane (mapane) and dambo (matambo) are more common words for wetlands in Shona speaking parts of Zimbabwe.

cultivated wetlands, using them to grow rice and other staple crops long before the arrival of Europeans (Mharapara 1995). In Sussundenga, *matoro* are characterized by their wetness and fertility. They are different shapes and sizes and vary in the amount of water they retain. Both surface runoff and groundwater seepage supply them with water. Like in Zimbabwe, *matoro* generally lack tree species, and vegetation is largely composed of grasses and sedges (Mharapara 1995).

The majority of the irrigation that takes place in Mozambican wetlands is small-scale and informal, meaning that it does not require capital-intensive machinery and that smallholders are exempt from paying water tariffs and other taxes related to large-scale commercial farming. Smallholders plant gardens and fields adjacent to river-banks, in stream-beds, alongside dams and reservoirs, small valleys, and in flood plains. Consequently, their crops consume water applied by hand irrigation as well as absorbing ground water (Andreini et al. 1995). A number of Sussundengan smallholders dig wells by hand in the midst of their fields and depend on the shallow water table to fill them.

Sussundengan smallholders cultivate *matoro* in both the wet and dry seasons. However, many abstain from planting in *matoro* that are prone to flooding from December through March. During the rainy season (October-March), they use wetlands to grow rice, sugar cane, *madhumbe* (elephant ear), and various fruit trees while planting maize, sorghum, cassava and intercropping different varieties of beans, groundnuts, and pumpkins in their *machambas*. When the rainy season has passed and *machambas* are harvested in April and May, farmers then turn to dry season cultivation in wetland areas. While some farmers continue to grow rice, *madhumbe*, and sugar cane, crops that require a generous amount of water, in *matoro*, the majority of dry season cultivation entails the

cultivation of vegetable gardens, maize, and fruit trees, particularly bananas. *Matoro* cultivation allows farmers to harvest more than once during the agricultural cycle and supply households with food for home consumption and crops to sell in the local markets. Many smallholders stressed that they primarily cultivate *matoro* for home consumption, but if their harvests are larger than expected, then they are likely to sell some of it. A husband and wife who grow maize in their wetland garden summed up this strategy nicely, "We eat maize, but when there is a lot, we sell maize."[151]

Women constitute the majority of the agricultural work force, particularly regarding food production for home consumption (Waterhouse and Vijfuizen 2001). Women's labor on both *machambas* and *matoro* sustains households, but their land use rights vary considerably. Gender relations shape structures of property, the reproduction of labor, and interact with other social attributes such as class, age, martial status, and ethnicity (Meizen-Dick and Zwarteveen 2001:66). For most women, access to land depends on social relations with male relatives (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997:1321). Historically in Sussundenga, women obtained access to land through marriage, but did not inherit land. This pattern is now changing, with more land and wetlands remaining in the conjugal unit instead of being passed down the male lineage. In other parts of Mozambique, women continue to rely on men for access to land and their land use rights vary depending on numerous contextual factors. In Zambezia province, Pitcher and Kloeck-Jenson (2001) found that while men often inherit land, women are able to establish other use rights such as the right to plant trees and control the income of tree crops. In southern Mozambique, Gengenbach contends that women as well as numerous men articulated "a flexible and situationally-specific character of customary practices"

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[151] "Tinodya magwere, asi kana akawandisa, tinotengesa magwere." (Sussundenga, 28 of June 2006).

that were unlikely to leave any woman completely landless regardless of her marital or social status (1998:12). However, in cases where irrigation potential is high, women's access to land is more tenuous. In Massaca irrigation scheme, located in Maputo province, Vijfhuizen (2001) documents the erosion of women's control over irrigated plots within the settlement scheme as a growing number of men with access to cash within and outside the community are "purchasing" plots when plot "owners" fail to pay for water and electricity. On the Mueda plateau in Cabo Delgado, competition for access to fertile *liteka* (plural, *mateka*) lands is increasing and producing a reconfiguration of inheritance patterns from matrilineal to patrilineal generating a growing trend of leasing and selling land that may disadvantage women (Daniel 2001). In other African contexts, women's access to wetland areas has been undermined and their labor appropriated as formal irrigation techniques are introduced and food crops are replaced by cash crops (Carney 1996, Carney and Watts 1991, Schroeder 1999). These cases suggest that women's land use rights are undermined by the commodification of land and labor.

Matoro constitute gendered spaces whereby Sussundengan women are able to exert more power and authority over agricultural production and are more likely to control the income generated from fruit and vegetable sales. The money earned from tomatoes, onions, sugar cane, bananas, cove, and *tsunga* (mustard leaves) is used to buy soap, school notebooks, salt, pens, candles, cooking oil, to use at the grinding mill, education expenses, and pay for unforeseen medical expenses such as malaria treatment. The green leafy vegetables such as cove and *tsunga* grown in wetland gardens provide households with food crops that are rich in micro-nutrients and thus beneficial to household nutrition. Women are more likely to spend their income on commodities or

expenses that benefit the entire household as opposed to purchasing items that only they will use. As an elderly gentleman named Mateos told us *"matoro anobatsira maningi"* or "wetlands help a lot." They provide an important source of micro-nutrients, bolster food security, and provide women with a source of cash income.

While *machamba* land is plentiful, *matoro* lands are limited by the presence of water. Thus wetland fields shadow many of the small, but important rivers and streams in the vicinity of the town. The Chicueu River contains numerous wetland areas and flows through several *bairros* closest to the town. Fields are divided into small plots between the adjacent households. As one elderly woman described to us *"ane padoko padoko, ane padoko padoko"* or "each one has a small piece" gesturing to the small gardens a short distance from her homestead. Along the Chicueu, women plant rice, sugar cane, maize, bananas, and *madhumbe* often leaving little space between them to minimize the amount of weeding and conserve labor.

The Dyatyatya, Muzoria, Nhamezara, and Ndarairwa Rivers also provide important wetland sites and are planted mostly with bananas, sugar cane, and *madhumbe*. Many families cultivate along the Chizizira River, the same water source the Portuguese used to construct their irrigation scheme. Today, fields of maize and sugar cane and small gardens of cove, onions, tomatoes, and *tsunga* can be seen along its banks. The larger Munhinga River, fed by the Chizizira River, also provides fertile soil and adequate water for dry season cultivation reflected by fields of bananas, maize, and sugar cane. In addition to maize, fruits, and vegetables, a small number of men use wetland areas to raise fish.

Like access to land for a *machamba*, access to wetland areas and stream-banks is also a socially embedded process connected to local understandings of authority. The most common way people obtain access to a *matoro* is by *kukumbira kwemambo* or by asking the chief and being given a wetland by the chief or *vaipiwa matoro namambo*. People also explained it is common to *kutaurirana* or discuss with one another over access to *matoro*. Negotiation is an important medium of communication for someone classified as being *mutorwa* or newcomer. As one man told me, when someone comes from another province and settles in Sussundenga, he must negotiate with the local people and the chief. He went on to elaborate that it might take this person some time to find a field and learn who to ask for permission. It is by recognizing and submitting to chiefly authority and entering into a network of social relations that a newcomer can obtain use rights to a *matoro*.

Wetland fields differ greatly in size and proximity to perennial rivers or water-logged areas. When I asked a group of five men and two women to explain why there are such disparities in the size of wetland fields, they informed me that *varidzi* who were *vakaberekwa muno* or born here generally have large fields. Those who migrate and settle here from other places will depend on people already living here for access. The size and spatiality of fields reflect patterns of inheritance within longstanding families.

The group also emphasized that people do not pay for land or wetlands. If someone exchanges money, labor, or another commodity for a *matoro*, the person is compensating the "owner" for plants, trees, or crops such as bananas or sugar cane that are growing on the land, but are not purchasing the land. A younger gentleman then

emphasized that "when it (referring to the land) does not contain things, it can be given freely."[152]

When I asked the same group who could inherit a *matoro*, they responded that children and cousins are most likely to inherit a matoro, especially the *mwana mukuru* or first born child. I asked if the gender of the child mattered. The men reiterated that a son or daughter could inherit the land. This response seems to suggest that it is no longer a given that only sons will inherit the family's fields.

Women and men who cultivate wetlands face some of the same constraints as farmers growing food on *machambas*. The high cost of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, and purchasing basins and watering cans to help irrigate their fields. However, in contrast to the 1.5 to 2 hectare *machambas*, *matoro* are typically smaller requiring less labor to clear the fields, plant seeds, weed, and harvest. Most *matoro* are cultivated by women who either work alone or are assisted by their children.

Three Cases of Use and Access

There is a large *matoro* located off the side of the road near the entrance to Sussundenga. It is difficult to see. The grass is high, small bicycle and foot paths weave their way to the fields surrounded by thick, mature banana trees. Once inside the fields, the banana leaves provide a nice cool shade. The soil is dark and fertile. The *matoro* is divided between several families into small plots. Fields contain maize, sugar cane, cassava, *madhumbe*, and several varieties of beans. Two women working side by side in their respective fields shared with us the history of this wetland.

Following the demarcation of Portuguese farms and the subsequent eviction of African families from their land in the 1950s, a Portuguese farmer allocated this land to

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[152] "quando não tem coisas, pode ser dado degraça." (Sussudenga Group Discussion, 7 of June 2006).

his African workers and their families. The area sits too low for the commercial farmers to plow using a tractor, and thus the farmer relinquished the land. Celia's husband worked on the farm and was one of the first men to begin cultivating here. Her husband passed away leaving her and six children the wetland and a two hectare *machamba* located away from the town. She plants maize, tomatoes, mustard leaves, and rice in her wetland garden, and in her rainy season field, she grows maize, peanuts, and cowpeas. Most of her harvest is consumed by her and her children. If she harvests more than she expected, she will sell some of it in the local markets. She also earns a small income by collecting and selling firewood and charcoal. In her eyes, chief Cupenha exercises supreme authority over the people and land of this area. She repeatedly called Sussundenga, *nyika yeCupenha* or Cupenha's land.

Ana is approximately 10 years younger than Celia. She was born in Guro, located in northern Manica province, but has lived in Sussundenga for many years. Like Celia, she is a widow, left to care for her two children, ages 14 and 10. Celia gave Ana a portion of her wetland field, and she has been cultivating maize and mustard leaves on this land for two years. She also has a *machamba* located in the more mountainous areas where she plants maize, pumpkins, and peanuts to consume at home. When she dies, she expects her fields to be divided between her two children. Celia and Ana's cooperation is not unusual and because Ana stated that when she dies, the field will be passed along to her children conveying a sense security over the land. In other words, the arrangement between the two women suggests that Ana has more than use rights to the land, that she also has the right to control and transfer the land.

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João was born in Rotanda near the Zimbabwe border, but has lived in Sussundenga since 1972. He has been married twice, but both wives have passed away. He has six children, four sons and two daughters. His two oldest sons ages 30 and 26 live in Zimbabwe. In the past, his sons sent money regularly, helping to supplement João's small pension and the money he makes from agriculture. He is no longer able to rely on his sons sending money from Zimbabwe, due the decline of the Zimbabwean dollar, rampant unemployment, and the economic hardships his sons now face living in Zimbabwe.

João is an *antigo combatante* (war veteran), and his service as a government soldier during the civil war took him to the northern provinces of Tete, Nampula, and Zambezia. On returning to Sussundenga after the war, he took up a position as one of the five *secretarios de bairro* for *bairro Unidade*. He is responsible for 15 households in the neighborhood. He is also a member of the Catholic Church. He worked as a mechanic on a Portuguese farm when European settlers claimed the lands on which we now sat as João recounted different periods of his life. This farmer allocated him the land where he now cultivates a wetland garden near the banks of the Chizizira River. He also grows maize, sunflowers, and wheat on a *machamba* a little further from the river. Though he acquired the land during the later years of colonial rule, he did not become a "serious" farmer until 1980. His tour of duty disrupted much of his agricultural production during the 1980s.

João has not remarried since the death of his second wife. And since her passing, he has decreased his agricultural production. He works his fields with his youngest sons, ages 15 and 10. At the end of 2006, he was in the process of building a second house,

near the edge of his *matoro* so that he can work earlier and stay later during peak agricultural periods.

João's livelihood practices reflect his status as a longstanding resident and affiliation with the ruling party as neighborhood secretary and war veteran. Like many Sussundengans, he cultivates a *machamba* and a *matoro*. His matoro sits on the edge of the Chizizira River on the boundary of a *bairro* (neighborhood) and a state forestry reserve. When I posed a hypothetical question to several Mozambicans about living and cultivating inside the reserve area, they equivocally stated that it was not permitted. However, numerous families collect wood and building materials from the forest and cultivate on the banks of the river. João seems to be the only one building a house inside the reserve. Though his *matoro* provides important food sources for him and his young sons, he contends it is too small to generate any money. He cleared the land using a small hand-held hoe called an *enxada*. His capacity to expand his wetland production is constrained by labor, irrigation, inputs, and markets. João is in his late 50s while his two sons at home are relatively young and attempt to balance their agricultural work with attending school. João's daughters have married and moved out of his household, taking with them their labor and now working in their husbands' and in-laws' fields. Consequently, João often labors in his fields alone. On occasions, a good friend and neighbor, Pedro helps with the more arduous tasks of plowing and harvesting.

João cultivates one of the larger wetland gardens we observed. It is located on the banks of a perennial river which he uses to irrigate his crops. Although neither João nor his sons must walk a great distance to collect water, irrigating his garden using a small watering can takes time. He argues that in order for him to increase the size of his field,

he would need a more "efficient" irrigation method. He often expressed his desire for a *motobomba* or a gas-powered pump to withdraw water from the river and then direct it to his crops. Innumerable Sussundengans discussed the difficulties of watering by hand invoking the pharse *dor de braço* to describe the pain in the arm after repeated trips to and from the river to collect water for their fields.

In addition to labor and irrigation, the cost of seeds and the distance he must travel to purchase them also factors into his livelihood strategies. He purchases most of the seeds planted in his garden such as cove, onions, and tomatoes. His small packet of onions seeds costs approximately $2. Changing soil qualities and people's perceptions of these qualities also shape their willingness to experiment with new seeds. More and more hybrid maize seeds have filtered across the border from Zimbabwe and are growing in popularity amongst Mozambican smallholders. João explained to us that in the past people would save a specific amount of seeds from their harvest to plant the following season. Because the soils have changed through intensive cotton and other cash crop cultivation, "indigenous" seeds no longer grow like they once did. More farmers are looking to hybrid seeds to maintain their production levels and guard against crop failure.

Finally, João and other smallholders perceive a lack of domestic markets for their produce. Because of poor roads and long distances, transport costs are high within rural Mozambique. Many smallholders lament the demise of Agricom which provided them with a guaranteed market, noting that it was easier to sell your harvest in the past. Today's markets appear uncertain and offer relatively low prices for agricultural commodities.

Despite the challenges João faces in expanding his agricultural activities, he continues to experiment and use his *matoro* to grow and harvest several times during the agricultural cycle. When we first met João in March 2006, he was growing maize, *madhumbe*, and sugarcane near the river banks. In fact on our first visit, he sent us away with a handful of sugar cane. By June, he had harvested all of his sugarcane and was now planting maize, cove, and *tsunga* which are used to make a relish or *caril* eaten with *sadza* (maize porridge). He sold the sugar cane in bulk to a group of young men who were planning to resell it in local markets. When we spent time with him again in August, he was growing cove, onions, tomatoes, *tsunga*, sugar cane, and maize. And on our final visit in November, he had harvested the cove, *tsunga*, and onions, and continued to grow maize and tomatoes, and had recently planted pumpkins. João obtained access to his *matoro* during the colonial period and has maintained his claims to a large, fertile riverine area through his position as a neighborhood secretary in the ruling party.

Solomão was born in Sussundenga and has a 14-year old daughter. He is not married and earns a small income through local construction work. These days he devotes more time to agriculture. He inherited two *matoro* from his father in 1997, but recently started to cultivate the one where we met him. Each *matoro* is approximately two hectares. While he cultivates two wetlands, he does not have access to a *machamba*. He said it is difficult to find fertile land close to the village. In the low-lying area where he cultivates, most of the small wetland plots have been inherited from the previous generation. Through the course of our conversations, Solomão iterated that he is only now learning how to farm.

Solomão's field originally caught my attention because of the small, hand-dug well located in the middle of the plot. I returned to the area for several consecutive days hoping to meet the "owner" of this field. On the day we met Solomão, he was hunched over the well, drawing water with a plastic bucket, taking a few steps and pouring the water over a row of beans. He dug the well alone, but stated that others were allowed to use the water to irrigate their crops.[153] When I asked him if there were conflicts over the water he said, no that people do not fight over water, that the rains and subsequently the water available in small wells and rivers "depende da força de Deus" (depends on God's power).

Solomão grows beans, pumpkins, and maize in his *matoro* for household consumption. Currently (in 2006), he only planted a small portion of his field. He cannot afford to purchase enough seeds to plant the entire field. Occasionally his aunt provides him with seeds, and he is awaiting the arrival of his brother to clear more land. His agricultural activities are dependent on his kinship relations. When I asked him who would inherit his wetland fields, he replied "meu irmão" (my brother).

Like João, Solomão's agricultural production is constrained by the cost of seeds and lack of labor. Neither man can afford to hire seasonal labor and must depend on the unpaid labor of neighbors and relatives for the more demanding tasks of field clearing and harvesting. Celia and Ana, both widows, continue to cultivate a patch of land that Celia's husband received during the colonial period. The two women *vakataurirana* or they discussed with each other the prospect of Ana securing access to part of Celia's *matoro*. Ana now has access to a *matoro*, and based on her statements, the right to

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[153] This seems to be a common practice. All the people I talked with that had dug shallow wells in their fields stated that anyone was allowed to use the water.

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transfer her rights to her children upon her death. In all three cases, the individuals secured access to a *matoro* through their social relations; João and Celia's husband as part of the workforce of a Portuguese farmer; Ana through her friendship with Celia; and Solomão from his father.[154] Ana, Celia, and João all stated that their children will inherit their fields and wetland areas. Their statements echo the predominant pattern that emerged in many interviews, that children (often times regardless of gender) are likely to inherit the family's land. The frequency of this response marks a shift in inheritance practices away from the patrilineage and towards the conjugal unit.[155] Thus land is more likely to remain within the nuclear family instead of being transferred to the wider lineage or male relatives.[156] It is not surprising that more sons and daughters are envisioned as the rightful heirs of family land. The increasing fragmentation of extended families, the disappearance of communal and lineage-based work parties, and the dislocation and resettlement caused by the civil war, has reconfigured the social milieu of many rural areas and produced social dynamics where practical experiences overshadow normative principles (Gengenbach 1998:12).

In contrast to other case studies in Southern Africa, Sussundenga's wetlands are not undergoing a process of commodification. In the conclusion, I offer a more detailed analysis of why land and water are not subject to enclosures at this moment in Sussundenga's history. At this juncture, what is significant is that despite the radical political, social, and economic ruptures of the last three decades, many Sussundengan's continue to articulate a vision of authority grounded in chiefly rule and a willingness to

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[154] When I asked Solomão how his father obtained the wetland, he stated that his father was born here (in Sussundenga).

[155] Pitcher and Kloeck-Jenson (2001) observe a similar shift in Zambezia Province.

[156] However, Solomão's comment that his brother will inherit his wetland attests to the longstanding practice of male relatives inheriting land instead of a daughter.

negotiate with each other for access to water and wetland resources. The colonial political economy exacerbated existing socio-economic inequalities, the socialist period attempted to redefine authority and productive relations, and the "democratic," capitalist era has intensified socio-economic differentiation, bred corruption, and introduced new models of social and economic behavior, yet local understandings of the linkages between authority, socio-spiritual prescriptions, and social relations inform how people relate to the environment and each other. This is not to suggest that Shona or Matewe beliefs and practices are unchanging or anchored in tradition, but rather we take seriously the ways people come to inhabit and understand their worlds and how these "local" visions articulate with broader political and economic structures.

Contested Space, Contested Knowledge

Wetland cultivation generates a number of opposing views within Mozambique. Smallholders and commercial farmers use wetland areas as important sites for dry season cultivation essential for growing food and cash crops. Wetland cultivation has a long history in much of Sub-Saharan Africa and was widely practiced in what is today Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The debates over wetland cultivation center on whether or not this practice causes environmental degradation, specifically erosion and siltation. Mozambique does not have a specific policy or guidelines over wetland and stream-bank cultivation, and in contrast to Zimbabwe, planting along streams, rivers, and wetlands has never been illegal. In fact one Mozambican development worker employed by an international NGO recalled that when Samora Machel was president (1975-1986), the government encouraged smallholders to cultivate *baixas* to improve food security and promote self sufficiency. The new land law establishes some partial protection zones

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around major navigable rivers, coastal areas, and hydro-electric dams in which

cultivation is prohibited (Chapter 2, Article 5), but does not restrict access to the

innumerable rivers, streams, and wetlands that traverse the countryside and that farmers

depend on for a variety of livelihood practices.

Colonial and postcolonial government concerns about soil erosion and other

forms of environmental degradation are often informed by perceptions of Africans'

agricultural practices as rudimentary, "primitive," and damaging. These perceptions have

been used to justify intervention (Beinart 1984). In the case of Zimbabwe, legislation

dating to the colonial period prohibiting stream-bank cultivation was often framed in the

language of protecting the environment. However, colonial policy makers intended the

Streambank Protection Legislation of 1952 to undermine African agricultural competition

and provide protection not for the environment, but a privileged class of white

commercial farmers (Potts 2000). In Mozambique, the discourse of environmental

degradation continues to resonate with some development workers, government

employees, and *tecnicos* engaged in rural development and poverty alleviation initiatives.

The argument that wetland cultivation causes environmental degradation in the

form of erosion and siltation is based on a misunderstanding of wetland geomorphology

and hydrology that rests on perceptions of these areas of sponges soaking up excess water

and recharging their water reserves (Potts 2000:52). Agro-ecological research in

Zimbabwe challenges this view and offers a complicated understanding of their

geomorphology and hydrology accounting for numerous and interacting variables that

shape the ecological dynamics of wetland systems (Owen et al. 1995). But despite

empirical evidence disputing the correlation and implied causation that wetland

cultivation generates erosion, this argument continues to persuade many within the development industry.

Within government offices and NGOs in the provincial capital of Chimoio, there are conflicting views on the legality of wetland cultivation and if legal, which practices ensure ecological sustainability. However, regardless of whether *tecnicos* believe wetland cultivation is harmful or not, many recognize that it benefits farmers. Some expressed concern that wetland and stream-bank cultivation leads to erosion and that river beds will become clogged with crops and weeds stifling the flow of water. As one gentleman told me the problem emerges when "smallholders do not protect the water and perform regular maintenance of the river."[157] Another emphasized that while it is not illegal, it is destructive. There is no law against cultivating in these areas,[158] but agriculture is causing harmful ecological changes to these water resources. "Many sources are disappearing because of this practice (referring to wetland cultivation)."[159]

In conversations where there was a consensus on the legality[160] of wetland cultivation, there were divergent views on what constituted the "best" practices and the ideal distance fields should be from water sources. Many acknowledged that people are allowed to cultivate *baixas* or land along stream-banks, but noted the government prefers they leave some distance between their plots and the water source. Some suggested farmers should leave at least three meters between their crops and the river, and others stated that it should be five meters.

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[157] "Eles não conseguem proteger a agua e eles não fazem manutenção." (6 of September 2006, Chimoio).
[158] "Não existe uma lei." (18 of September 2006, Chimoio).
[159] "Muitos nascentes ja desapereceram por causa desta practica." (18 of September 2006, Chimoio).
[160] In a number of interviews, lengthy discussions transpired amongst *tecnicos* before a consensus was reached on the legality of wetland cultivation.

Despite some hesitations over the legality of wetland cultivation and divergent views on how or where farmers should locate their fields, many *tecnicos* recognize that wetland gardens are an important source of food security and income generation. They are also seen as important to rural development.[161] As one *tecnico* stated "they are a great source of cash when done well. They are also a source of minerals. Health is guaranteed to combat hunger, and food security is guaranteed."[162] Matoro not only provide food and cash benefits, but also provide a source of work or *fundo de emprego* that gives people something to do instead of sitting idle. Ironically, while many agreed *baixas* contribute to food security and income opportunities, several disregarded the informal irrigation practices smallholders use to water their fields. "They (smallholders) are not accustomed to irrigating their crops"[163] and that one of the challenges is to "educate people how to use water."[164] Throughout the countryside Mozambicans use, allocate, and manage water to meet their subsistence and cash needs.

Like the land law, information about the water law and the new institutional and organizational structure of water management is lacking. I spoke with several *tecnicos* as well as the provincial public works office about a right to water. Does the new land law include a right to water? Do Mozambicans have a right to water for domestic or primary purposes? The most common response when I asked about the water law was that "it is not widely disseminated." However, it is clear in the land law that land use rights include a right to water, particularly for primary purposes. The ways in which people negotiate and obtain access to *matoro* also suggests an implicit right to water. As

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[161] "As baixas são importantes para desenvovlimento rural." (8 of September 2006, Chimoio).
[162] "São um grande fundo de rendimento quando faz bem. Tambem são um fundo das minerais. Saude garantida para combater a fome e segurança alimentar esta garantida." (6 of September 2006, Chimoio).
[163] "Eles não tem habito para regar as plantas." (Chimoio, 6 of September 2006).
[164] "Educar as pessoas como usar a água." (Chimoio, 6 of September 2006).

Andrenini et al. (1995:16) note for Zimbabwe, "allocation of a garden is tantamount to the allocation of water." In Sussundenga, when someone receives the right to cultivate a *matoro,* whether through negotiation or by the chief, it is implied that the person may also use the water adjacent to the field. However, people are reluctant to deny others access to the same water.

Conclusion

The water sector represents a microcosm of the broader political and economic changes taking place in Mozambique. The colonial state built water infrastructure to cater to the European population, and in areas where settler communities engaged in agriculture, water became subject to European control. At independence, the Frelimo government addressed the historical legacies of Portuguese rule by attempting to expand the water supply system to the majority of the population. However, war, poverty, and structural adjustment undermined the government's efforts build infrastructure and broaden access to potable water. Since the early 1990s, new laws and policies have been implemented to reform how water is managed in the country with the intentions of making the water sector more reliable, productive, and efficient. These changes have entailed a greater reliance on the private sector, international donors, NGOs, and rural communities to build and maintain water supplies, and in the case of commercial water uses, instituted a system of tariffs and concessions to reflect the economic value of the resource.

At the local level, Sussundengans continue to use multiple sources of water to fulfill their domestic and agricultural needs. People are reluctant to enclose water resources and access is negotiable and flexible. *Matoro* provide important sites for wet

and dry season cultivation, but especially during the six-month period where there is little to no rain. These fields supply households with food and income generating opportunities, particularly for women who more likely to use their money for the benefit of the entire household by purchasing household communities, medicines, and paying children's school-related expenses. Discussions with women on inheritance suggest that *matoro* are likely to remain within the nuclear family, however, there is a range of opinions on who will inherit the *matoro*, with some declaring it will be sons while others are partial to daughters. Several interviewees stated that it will depend on which child is the most interested in agriculture. These responses reveal a flexible inheritance system attentive to gender and individual household dynamics.

In contrast to neighboring countries such as Malawi and Zimbabwe, the water law and new water policies are not clear on the legality of wetland cultivation. Some agricultural extension agents and development professions perceive it to be a harmful practice causing erosion and environmental degradation, but also recognize its importance to rural livelihoods. How wetlands should or should not be used, the ecological impacts of wetland cultivation, and the food and economic benefits derived from them will continue to be debated by those with an interest in rural development and those whose livelihoods depend on them.

Chapter Six
Redefining the Struggle for Mozambique: Development, State Power, and the Contradictions of Neoliberalism

"The lack of habit and love of work are the principle causes that perpetuate hunger and poverty that still affect millions of Mozambicans. There are people who are always resting. They rest without being tired. "Their work is to rest until they are tired of resting!"[165]

"We cannot continue living in houses where the entire family sleeps in one room, in the same space. We have to dream of better homes and not continue living as our ancestors did thousands of years ago."[166]

President Armando Guebuza speaking in Pebane, Mozambique, April 13, 2007.

"In many aspects, the biggest danger is in the formation of new groups of privileged Africans. The educated in opposition to the non-educated, the factory owners in opposition to the peasants. Paradoxically, to block the concentration of wealth and services in small areas of the country in the hands of the few, strong central planning is necessary.[167]"

Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (1969:168-169).

The statements above, one by the current Mozambican president, Armando Guebuza, and the other by the first president of Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane, represent two different understandings of the nature of poverty and the best course of action to confront this "common enemy."[168] It was only three decades ago that Frelimo declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party, and as a vanguard party, envisioned a party/state capable of mobilizing society in a collective fashion, turning away from "backward" traditions and obscurantism, and moving forward to modernize and develop the country. However,

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[165] "A falta de hábito e amor ao trabalho como as principais causas que perpetuam a fome e a pobreza que ainda afectam milhões de Moçambicanos. São pessoas que estão sempre a descansar. Descansam sem terem se cansado. O seu trabalho è descansar ate se cansarem de descansar!"

[166] "Não podemos continuar a viver em casas onde toda a família dorme num quarto, num mesmo espaço. Temos que sonhar em casas cada vez melhoradas e não vivermos como viveram os nossos antepassados de há milhares de anos."

[167] "Em muitos aspectos, o maior perigo está na formação de novos grupos de africanos privilegiados. Os educados em oposição aos não educados, os operários das fábricas em oposição aos camponeses. Paradoxalmente, para impedir a concentração de riquezas e serviços em pequenas áreas do país e nas mãos de uns poucos, e necessária uma forte planificação central".

[168] Recently in numerous public appearances President Guebuza has described poverty as the common enemy of Mozambicans.

in my lifetime, the once Marxist-Leninist party/state is now identified as one of the

success stories of structural adjustment and neoliberal development by the IMF and

World Bank. At the end of 2007, Takatoshi Kato, the IMF Deputy Managing Director

and Acting Chair, remarked "the Mozambican authorities are to be commended for the

strong macroeconomic performance, attributable in large part to the implementation of

prudent fiscal and monetary policies in the context of a flexible exchange rate regime."[169]

Mozambique's Human Development Index (HDI)[170] has climbed over the last five years,

and during this period, the economy grew by an average of 8.7%. According to IMF

representative in Maputo, Felix Fischer, the economy is growing at 7% annually. By

November of 2007, the inflation rate stood at 8%, a decline from 13% at the end of 2006.

According to this macroeconomic evidence, Mozambique does seem to be "developing."

However, in 2008, 56% of the government's budget will be financed by foreign

aid through direct budget support and funding for specific projects and programs[171] thus

making Mozambique one of the most donor-dependent countries in the world. Since the

end of the civil war in 1992, Mozambique has received 11 billion USD in aid (Hanlon

and Smart 2008). More worrisome are numerous studies conducted since the Economic

Rehabilitation Program[172] (PRE) in 1987 that highlight growing socio-economic

differentiation, increasing childhood malnutrition, the erosion of social safety nets, rising

conflicts over land and productive resources, accelerating corruption, and decreasing

formal educational and economic opportunities. While macroeconomic figures suggest

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[169] AIM, December 18, 2007.

[170] The HDI combines life expectancy, education, and standard of living (calculated using purchasing power parity) to measure a broader definition of development. In 2005, Mozambique ranked 172 out of 177 countries on the HDI. Between 2001-2006 the HDI grew from a measurement of 0.398 to 0.458.

[171] 48% of the foreign aid will be in direct budget support while the remaining 52% is allocated to specific projects and programs. 68.1% of this aid will come in the form of grants while 31.9% is loans.

[172] Programa de Reabilitação Económica.

stability and economic growth, many Mozambicans live in more precarious economic circumstances and perceive poverty to be increasing, not decreasing. Alongside these socio-economic changes and rising inequalities are discursive calls by the government for Mozambicans to develop themselves. While Guebuza continues to define many of Mozambique's challenges in terms of a *luta*[173] (struggle), this vestige of socialist discourse is now wedded to calls for Mozambicans to be more productive, rest less, and work harder to alleviate poverty. From this perspective, poverty is not rooted in structural inequality and unequal access to power, but rather can be overcome by individual effort and hard work. The government now places a premium on attaining the appropriate knowledge and technology to improve well-being and on attracting foreign investment to generate economic growth.

In this chapter, I examine Mozambique's attempts to alleviate poverty and stimulate "development" in an age of neoliberalism. The country's rural development strategy now revolves around decentralizing fiscal responsibility to the district level, encouraging the formation of smallholder associations, strengthening inter-sectoral coordination, attainting improved agricultural inputs through a green revolution, attracting foreign investment in commercial agriculture and agro-processing, and promoting social development through improvements in health and education. Specific development initiatives are joined by calls from the government to dream of a better future and for Mozambicans to take responsibility for their own development and help end the country's struggle against poverty.

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[173] For example the president and other ruling party officials often speak of a *luta* against absolute poverty (pobreza absoluta), malária (malaria), HIV/SIDA (HIV/AIDs), and hunger (fome).

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In addition, to Mozambique's current development policies and strategies, I also look at how rural Mozambicans are imagined by development organizations, agricultural technicians, and government officials. Rural Mozambicans, and the livelihood challenges they face, are conceived of in ways that make intervention possible and desirable. In the process of designing, implementing, and monitoring development activities, smallholders' lack of development and the country as whole, are portrayed in a techno-economic manner obscuring political, social, environmental, and economic relations that shape livelihood practices and economic activities. In other words, donors, development workers, agricultural extension workers, and the government make "legible" (Scott 1998) the landscape and the people of the countryside and intervene through "rendering technical" (Ferguson 1994; Li 2008) the problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Within these imaginings, a new type of subject is constructed: the beneficiary or development recipient. This new category, by definition, is someone or group in need of being "developed."

Through this chapter, I broaden the discussion of access to land and water in Sussundenga to explore how development is being conceptualized and implemented more generally in Mozambique as well as how rural Mozambicans are constructed by the people and organizations defining development priorities, formulating development initiatives, and intervening in the lives of Mozambicans to facilitate the desired social and economic transformations. My concern for the current development policies and practices is linked to the overarching theme of this dissertation—processes of enclosure and socio-economic differentiation. While the previous chapters have documented multiple and coexisting patterns of access to land and water, the emphasis on

decentralization, privatization, and liberalization by current development orthodoxy in Mozambique may alter access to productive resources. In some areas of Mozambique, competition for land and water has increased favoring those with access to capital and political networks. With the emphasis now placed on attracting foreign investment and the development of a rural private sector, exclusive access to land and water resources is likely to disenfranchise some users. After all, privatization involves the "enclosure" of productive resources with the legal backing of the state. Specifically I examine agricultural extension workers and NGO development workers' understandings of poverty and rural development. These groups characterize and define Mozambican smallholders and their "problems" in specific ways in order to design and justify their development interventions. Why do they conceptualize smallholders in some ways and not others? How likely are policy prescriptions and development actions based on these conceptualizations to be effective in decreasing rural poverty? Or are they more likely to create jobs and social positioning for themselves? What unintended/intended outcomes (Ferguson 1994) are likely to be produced by current development policies and programs?

I situate these understandings of rural Mozambique and Mozambicans, agricultural development, and poverty alleviation in the context of neoliberalism and governmentality for several reasons. First, Mozambique offers an exemplary case of how crisis produces the conditions upon which neoliberal development models entered and gained legitimacy in Mozambique. Second, the country's transformation from a centrally-controlled economy and political institutions to a success story of the IMF, World Bank, and donor organizations marks a reconfiguration of the state, the ruling

party, and the creation of an unstable alliance between the state and capital. Third, the analytic of governmentality provides a conceptual tool for understanding how governmental functions have become more diffuse and inscribed in organizations and institutions that are by definition non-governmental. It allows us to examine how power operates without reverting to vague references to neo-colonialism to explain Mozambique's relationships with donor and international financial institutions or locating power solely within the state apparatus. Finally, governmentality offers an optic for examining how discourse and practice produces new subjectivities and understandings of the self. Thus understanding how politics and economics are linked under regimes of neoliberalism is essential to understanding processes of enclosure, power, and socio-economic differentiation. One of the ironies of Mozambique in an age of neoliberalism is that state intervention is pervasive, and it is often access to the state through political patronage and social networks that produces power and wealth, not solely the market[174] leading Pitcher to describe Mozambique as somewhere "between Marx and the market" (2002:6).

Mozambique and the Age of Neoliberalism

Since the mid-1970s political and economic changes have converged to create a new regime of governance referred to as neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is a set of ideologies and practices that embody particular ideas about human nature, society, economy, power, and the self. Neoliberalism is not an actor, it does not do things. It is a

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[174] Distinctions between abstractions such as the "state" and the "market" are not always clear. My point is that despite the celebration of market reform by proponents of neoliberalism and the lamentations over Mozambique's loss of sovereignty and foreign domination of the development industry by critics of neoliberalism, both perspectives neglect the continuing importance of the state in shaping access to resources, creating markets, and structuring the contours of privatization.

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social and political project[175] enmeshed in a specific economic and political doctrine which envisions market relations and individual rationality as the model upon which all social relations and interactions between the state, society, and market should be conducted. Neoliberalism emerged during a time of economic crisis[176] in Europe and the United States and articulated a critique against state intervention, particularly the Keynesian welfare state. What were to become the principal tenets of neoliberalism (discussed below), had been formulated, debated, and propagated by the Mont Pelerin Society in Europe, including notable members such as Austrian political philosopher Friedrich von Hayek and US economist Milton Friedman, who radically opposed state intervention in the economy and saw it as one of the greatest threats to individual freedom. By describing themselves as neoliberal, they signified an adherence to the "free market principles of neoclassical economics" and a commitment to individual freedom (Harvey 2005:20). By the late 1970s and early 1980s, their economic philosophies and desire to see society reshaped in the image of the market had gained legitimacy in the governments of the United States and Great Britain.

Neoliberal economic doctrine entails a belief in free markets, deregulation, liberalization, limited government intervention, reduced public expenditures, and

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[175] Following Harrison (2005), I use the word project to signify the instability and contradictions within and between neoliberal discourse and practice. It also suggests that neoliberalism is more than just an economic doctrine and represents a utopian socio-political vision rooted in a particular formulation of human nature. Harrison's use of the word project to describe neoliberalism "alludes to the importance of agency—the need for 'authors' of neoliberalism; and the use of the phrase 'free market social relations' allows us to encompass a range of development policies that are not solely concerned with the removal of the state from the economy. Neoliberalism is also about shaping the economy, the state and society (2005:1306).

[176] In the United States, this crisis took the form of stagflation where rising unemployment and accelerating inflation coexisted. For those critical of Keynesian economic prescriptions, this combination provided further evidence of the limitations and flaws of state spending and a goal of full employment. It was during the 1970s economic crisis that neoliberal orthodoxy gained ascendancy and eventually became institutionalized in the governments of Great Britain in 1979 and the United States in 1980. For a history of the rise of neoliberalism see Harvey (2005) and specifically for the consolidation of neoliberalism under Thatcherism see Hall (1988).

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privatization. The tenets of neoliberalism have been promulgated across the globe by international financial institutions, the IMF, World Bank, the World Trade Organization, development organizations, and political think-tanks. However, the adoption of these basic tenets has been uneven and contradictory,[177] and in some cases, such as China, has been reconfigured and wedded to a centralized and authoritarian state (Harvey 2005).

The age of neoliberalism marks a renewed and intensified faith in eradicating trade barriers, expanding markets, and facilitating the ease of capital mobility. In conjunction with heightening capital flows, the current era is also defined by the emergence and importance of new forms of capital, such as speculative capital, and the increasing salience of finance capital to the workings of the global economy. According to Trouillot (2001:128), "What is new is not the internationalization of capital as such but changes in the spatialization of capital of the world economy and changes in the volume and, especially, the kinds of movements that occur across political boundaries." The new forms and spatialization of capital signify a "regime of flexible accumulation" (Harvey 1990) whereby flexibility and mobility structure labor markets, investment, information flows, and patterns of consumption. The development of a market for financial derivatives has facilitated the proliferation of speculative capital across the globe, albeit unevenly, and produced a "culture of financial circulation" where speculative capital is not linked to the materiality of production or consumption, but capable of generating vast economic wealth[178] (LiPuma and Lee 2005). According to Harvey (2005), these new

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[177] For example, in spite of the rhetoric of free markets and free trade, the US government continues to subsidize agriculture and protect certain industries such as steel.
[178] LiPuma and Lee (2005) contend that the problem of over accumulation by Euro-American companies in the 1970s led to the outsourcing of production to other parts of the world, particularly Southeast Asia. As a result of the restructuring of production, new and intensified risks emerged and corporations had to find novel ways of mitigating risk. Derivative markets flourished and produced new institutions for managing them such as hedge funds and banking enterprises to manage speculative capital. LiPuma and Lee (2005)

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forms of wealth created by financial connectivity mark the restoration of class power on a global scale. Comaroff and Comaroff summarize the paradox of class under neoliberalism in that "Neoliberalism aspires, in its ideology and practice, to intensify the abstractions inherent in capitalism itself: to separate labor power from its human context, to replace society with the market, to build a universe out of aggregated transactions" (2000:305). Debates over speculative capital and the financialization of global capitalism have less relevance in the context of Mozambique, but are important in understanding the historical moment when neoliberalism gained mainstream legitimacy as well as new patterns of accumulation, the workings of the global economy, and novel forms of economic and political power.

The Neoliberal State

Proponents of neoliberalism not only exhibit an unwavering faith in the free market, but also envision a particular type of state designed to facilitate the ease of capital mobility, investment, and security. Under this vision, the state plays a contradictory role: its regulatory powers should be limited and the market should be allowed to function without interference, while at the same time, creating an investor friendly environment through providing infrastructure, weakening unions to drive down wages, and promoting favorable terms of trade so that capitalist entrepreneurs will invest. This discourse is embedded in many of the water policy documents generated on Southern Africa whereby the state should cultivate an enabling environment conducive to private companies, community organizations, and NGOs providing water services and maintaining water

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as well as Harvey (1990) argue the financialization of the global economy through speculative capital marks a decisive shift in global capitalism since the early 1970s.

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infrastructure.[179] One of the Mozambican government's overarching development policies is to attract foreign investment, not just in the water sector, but across the board. As the state is envisioned to play a more regulatory role, many governmental functions such as borehole construction or healthcare are outsourced to private organizations such as NGOs or transnational institutions like the World Bank or IMF. It is the diffusion of government or as Foucault describes it the "conduct of conduct" (1991), into entities that are by definition non-governmental that enables the emergence of new forms of self-regulation and self-discipline.

The neoliberal state is a contradictory assemblage of discourses and practices. As mentioned earlier, according to proponents of neoliberalism the state should have a reduced role in the planning and regulation of the economy while simultaneously creating conditions under which capital investment will be favorable and secured. Across Africa, neoliberal restructuring and development interventions have not eschewed the state, but rather worked through the state. "The 'role back' interventions especially championed by the IMF in the early 1980s appear now as a moment of discipline which, once effected, might be succeeded by a range of interventions to strengthen states, give the more presence in remote areas, make policy more effective, and render states more legitimate" (Harrison 2005:1307). In Mozambique, through embracing private capital, the state has been able to craft legitimacy that it did not attain under socialism (Pitcher 2002:146).

However in practice, deregulation and privatization in Mozambique has often not resulted in increased market competition, but rather the formation of monopolies or oligopolies particularly in the areas of rural trade or export commodities. The neoliberal state also increasingly relies on public/private partnerships (Harvey 2005:76). Since the

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[179] This applies to urban and peri-urban water supplies.

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divesture of many state farms in the late 1980s and 1990s, the government has entered into contracts with domestic and foreign private investors to create joint-venture companies to operate former state enterprises. Under these arrangements, the Mozambican government retains an equal or minority stake in the company, and by doing so, it is believed that this partnership strengthens investor confidence since the state also has a vested interest in the success or growth of the particular venture and is less likely to act against the interests of the company[180] (Pitcher 1996). In fact, almost all foreign investment in Mozambique takes the form of joint-venture companies with government involvement (Pitcher 2002).

Finally, the state reduction in public expenditures and welfare provisioning increases the vulnerability of large segments of the population. In Mozambique, the PRE curtailed the government's spending on healthcare and education and eventually undermined the food rations and controlled prices on crucial food commodities. According to Harvey (2005:76) this drawback from public service provisions reduces the social safety net "to a bare minimum in favour of a system that emphasizes personal responsibility. Personal failure is generally attributed to personal failings, and the victim is all too often blamed." President Guebuza's speeches imploring Mozambicans to essentially pull themselves out of poverty deflects attention from the structural dimensions of poverty and inequality as well as the political decisions, power relations, resource allocations, and institutions that shape ideas about development and frame potential solutions.

The state is neither a monolithic entity nor a fixed site of spatial and cultural production. Rather it is a series of practices, representations, and power relations not

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[180] See Pitcher (1996) for a discussion of the state's involvement in joint-venture cotton companies.

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necessarily connected to territoriality (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gupta and Sharma 2006; Trouillot 2001). Thus it is through routine bureaucratic practices that the state comes to be understood as an entity that exists above and beyond its citizenry and encompass a specific territorial space (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). The state as a set of practices, power relations, and representations articulates with international institutions, NGOs, and donors forming horizontal linkages across national boundaries through what Ferguson and Gupta (2002) term "transnational governmentality." The outsourcing of governmental functions to NGOs and transnational organizations is a salient feature "of an emerging system of transnational governmentality" (ibid.). In one province, Manica, the following NGOs contribute to some aspect of "development."

NGO	Agriculture	Health	Education	Social Action
American Friends	x	x		
Africare	x	x		
ACDI-VOCA	x	x		
Concern (Ireland)	x	x	x	
Terre des Hommes	x	x		
Health Alliance International (USA)		x		
INFAD	x	x		
Helen-Keller		x		
ADPP			x	
Save the Children			x	
Handicap International				x
OSEO				x
Save the Children (Norway)				x
Oxfam (Great Britain)				x
Horizon 3000 (Austria)	x			
GTZ (Germany)	x			
US Peace Corps		x	x	
British VSO		x	x	

Table 4: International Non-Governmental Organization and Volunteer Organizations in Manica Province, Mozambique[181]

[181] This is not a complete list, but only those organizations I came in contract with or have some knowledge about. There are over 400 NGOs in Mozambique as well as Catholic and Protestant church groups that also run specific projects or programs.

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Some of these organizations fund programs or operate in more than one sector, but often have little coordination with each other or with the particular sector of government in which they are helping support, often to the frustration of the government. Thus examining the horizontal linkages between the Mozambican government, NGOs, bilateral and multilateral development organizations, and entities within the government is crucial for understanding how state power is being reconfigured, how development interventions are being planned and implemented, and how donor funding is allocated and used in Mozambique by a diversity of NGOs.

Governmentality

The analytic of governmentality offers a means of understanding how subjects are enlisted in processes of their own governance and how power becomes dispersed and inscribed in nongovernmental institutions. Foucault's writing on governmentality, and what he describes as the "problematic government" or how to govern, emerges in the sixteenth century, but it is not until the eighteenth century when "economy[182] is introduced to political practice" (1991:92) that the "art of government" through the triangular relationship of sovereignty, discipline, and government begins to target the population in an effort to create, arrange, and regulate the relationship between "people" and "things." Foucault writes "The things with which in this sense government is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc." (1991:93). In other words,

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[182] Economy in this context is concerned with how to manage individuals, goods, and wealth within the family.

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government is no longer only a question of the relationship between an external

sovereign (such as a prince) and his territory and subjects, but now a question of how to

manage the population as the ultimate aim of government. "Governmentality offers a

way of approaching how rule is consolidated and power is exercised in society through

social relations, institutions, and bodies that do not automatically fit under the rubric of

'the state'" (Gupta and Sharma 2006:277). If for Foucault, government constitutes the

"right manner of disposing things" then through the history of governmentality he

attempts to demonstrate how the modern state and individual co-produce each other

(Lemke 2001:191). Thus in Foucault's vision, government becomes a form of tactics in

order to manage people and things to calculated ends.

Neoliberalism rests on the premise that the market is the most efficient means of

allocating resources, setting prices, and exchanging goods and services, and thus

economic regulations, particularly enforced by the state, should be abolished to allow the

market to function freely. Privatization, deregulation, and liberalization have become the

working formula for adjusting inefficient, inflationary, and distorted economies to the

laws of market discipline. Not only is the market the best way to allocate resources, set

prices, and stimulate growth, but for adherents to neoliberalism, the market is the model

upon which all social relations and interactions should also be conducted. Thus

neoliberalism is not only an economic doctrine, but a social and political project that

conceptualizes individuals, societies, and states through the ontological lens of the

market.

In contrast to the emergence of classical liberalism where governance was linked

to the rationality of individuals and concerned with reconciling market freedoms with

expansive political sovereignty, neoliberalism, according to Burchell (1996:23-24),

continues to assess the "limits of government in relations to the market," but instead of

assuming the existence of rational, private-interest individuals, attempts to foster a

specific type of conduct rooted in a free, entrepreneurial, rational, and competitive

individual. In other words, classical liberalism assumed people were inherently rational

and self-interested, and these qualities would mitigate the excesses of the state, whereas

neoliberalism conceptualizes individual freedom as "a technical condition of rational

government" (ibid.). In contrast to popular perceptions of neoliberalism as the reduction

or limitation of government, Rose (1996:53) contends that "Neo-liberalism does not

abandon the 'will to govern': it maintains the view that failure of government to achieve

its objectives is to be overcome by inventing new strategies of government that will

succeed." In Mozambique, these new strategies of government involve an increased role

of development organizations and NGOs that replace the state in certain functions such as

providing healthcare and education, water supply, and building infrastructure while

calling on Mozambicans to govern themselves.

Experts, or those with expertise in specific fields of knowledge, play an increasing

role in the management of people and things. In fact, Harvey (2005:66) contends

neoliberals prefer governance by experts or the elite. These experts, trustees, or elites

possess a strong faith in technological fixes when problems arise (Harvey 2005; Mitchell

2002; Rose 1996). By treating problems such as poverty or underdevelopment as

technical questions, development workers and government officials reframe these issues

as "nonpolitical and non-ideological problems that need technical solutions" (Ong

2006:3). The majority of Mozambique's development policies are silent on issues of

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power and structural inequality, but boisterous in conceptualizing poverty and underdevelopment as technical and economic conditions.

Under the "art of governance," the subject becomes the site whereby social, economic, and political forces acting on the subject and the internalization of norms and values interact to create a new subjectivity. For Foucault neoliberalism entails the expansion of economics to the social field absolving any boundaries between the economic and social (Lemke 2001). Studies of governmentality raise questions about the relationship between government and different forms of self-construction (Agrawal 2005). As Moore (2005:6) notes "Governmentality works through the agency of subjects, encouraging conduct and forms of self-discipline that target improvements in welfare and security. Subjects' conduct both sustains and challenge regimes of rule." In Mozambique, members of the government and donors imagine rural Mozambicans as individualized subjects capable, and to some extent, responsible for their own development. They are endowed with a "utilitarian individuality or subjectivity" (Harrison 2005:1313) and should make decisions and behave as rational economic actors.

Ferguson (2006) contends that Africa's experience with neoliberalism is largely through the imposition of structural adjustment programs. Mozambique's introduction to neoliberal economic policy and practice derived from the implementation of its first austerity package in 1987. However, the deregulation of the economy that accompanied these measures should not be thought of as a simple transition from a centrally-planned economy to a free market economy. Even during the period of centrally planning the market mediated relationships between the state and the people (Wuyts 2003). Furthermore, the political effects of structural adjustment often expanded state legitimacy

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and provided Frelimo more local-level legitimacy than during the period of central

planning (Pitcher 1996). The government has been as influential in shaping the process

of privatization and transition to capitalism as it was in crafting a socialist state.

The Coming Crisis and the Adoption of Structural Adjustment

If it is true that neoliberalism gains currency during times of crisis, then

Mozambique provides an exemplary case of how neoliberal restructuring comes to bear

on a country under extreme duress. When Mozambique entered into negotiations with

the IMF and World Bank it was in the context of escalating attacks by the South African-

backed RENAMO, the worst drought in Southern Africa in over a century, and a sharp

downturn in the economy following years of growth during 1977-1981. The human and

economic costs of the war cannot be overstated nor can the economic instability of the

early 1980s be understood outside of the context of war. Destabilization helped fuel the

shortage in basic commodities, rising prices, and the proliferation of the parallel market

known as the *kadonga*. Sanctions imposed against Southern Rhodesia and closing the

Beira Corridor to trade with its neighbor also weakened the economy. Following

independence in 1975, Frelimo established control over the economy to prevent its

collapse after the exodus of foreign capital and skilled and semi-skilled workers. Hall

and Young (1997:50) and Pitcher (2002:38) assert that state control of the economy did

not represent a premeditated or coherent economic model, but rather attempted to prevent

impending economic doom shaped by the colonial legacy. It was not until two years after

independence, in 1977, that state intervention became the cornerstone of Frelimo's

economic policies as the party attempted to not only articulate a socialist vision, but also

construct a nationalist and modernist political project (Pitcher 2002). The specifics of the

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party's ideological contours, policies, and practices would be forged through trial and error over the next several years.

Frelimo nationalized land, healthcare, education, the banking system, law, funerals, and rental housing. The government also nationalized some former colonial enterprises, while others were directed under a state-appointed manager or administrator, signifying intervention, but were not actually nationalized (see Chapter 4). Of the 1,675 companies at independence, the state had only intervened in 319 by 1977 (Pitcher 2002: 40). Large companies such as Entreposto, the remnants of the Mozambique Company, remained in private hands. Frelimo favored large-scale development projects such as state farms, agro-processing plants, and textile mills while attempting to re-organize rural Mozambique into *aldeias comunais* (communal villages) and cooperatives. During this period, the government signed foreign aid agreements with Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Canada, Portugal, and Greece (Hall and Young 1997:142). In 1983 at the party's 4th congress, Frelimo revised its economic strategy calling for a reduction in central planning, political decentralization, more small-scale projects, shifting agricultural policies and more resources direct to smallholders and the family sector (Hanlon 1991:26; Marshall 1990:29). During the congress, Frelimo agreed that the private sector should be encouraged, but that the state still should play an important role through the ownership of key industries, setting prices on essential commodities, and controlling foreign exchange, in order to develop the country (Hanlon 1991:167).

With the intensification of South African-backed destabilization, drought, and economic hardships,[183] Frelimo began negotiations with the IMF and World Bank.

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[183] Mozambique's terms of trade declined rapidly during the world recession in the early 1980's. Export earnings fell from $281 million in 1981 to $132 million in 1983. Interest payments on commercial credit

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Though drought curtailed food production, destabilization forced Mozambique to enter into loan agreements with international financial institutions. Hanlon (1996:15) estimates the total damage from the war at roughly $20 billion.[184] In January of 1984, Mozambique announced it could not repay its debts, and its creditors said they would only renegotiate if it joined the IMF and World Bank (Hanlon 1991:29). Nine months later in September 1984, Mozambique joined the IMF and World Bank. A year later Mozambique signed its first World Bank loan of $45 million. By becoming a member of the Bretton Woods institutions, the Frelimo government increased its standing with Western Europe and the United States, rescheduled debt payments, and opened the channels for more foreign aid.

Mozambique instituted its first IMF approved structural adjustment program known as the PRE (Economic Rehabilitation Program) in 1987. The PRE drastically reduced the government's role in the economy. It imposed credit restrictions, raised interest rates, increased income tax, curtailed government spending, devaluated the currency, and gradually liberalized prices. The Mozambican currency, the metical, was devalued in relation to the U.S. dollar dropping from 42:1 to 756:1 in 1987 and by 1990 stood at 840:1 (Marshall 1990:29). Devaluation triggered massive price increases on important commodities such as rice, maize, and sugar causing them to skyrocket by 300 to as much as 500% (ibid.:32). Initially under the PRE, the state continued to control key prices[185] and maintained the food rationing system until 1993 (Hanlon 1991:121). While

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had risen 10 times higher from 1980-1982. With exports down, the government nearly exhausted its currency reserves (Hanlon 1991:24).

[184] According to this figure, the $11 billion in aid Mozambique has received since 1992 still does not match the economic costs of the war.

[185] Some prices were liberalization in 1985 (Tickner 1992:28).

prices increased, incomes shrunk. A year after implementing PRE, the minimum wage

dropped from $52 a month to $23 a month (Hanlon 1996:69).

Now with the IMF setting exchange rates, calculating devaluations, and imposing

limits on government spending, Frelimo could no longer allocate sufficient resources to

its program of equitable development. Government cutbacks severely affected health and

education creating textbook shortages and rising health costs (Marshall 1990:41).

Structural adjustment also weakened terms of trade and purchasing power in the

countryside. The eventual closure of Agricom, the parastatal company, which provided

smallholders with a guaranteed market for their grains and brought consumer goods to

rural areas, left rural residents without a dependable market for maize and other grains.

Instead of liberalization creating competition in rural Mozambique, it has produced

wholesale monopolies in some districts (Hanlon 1991:169). In 1989, under donor

pressure, Mozambique deregulated agricultural prices linking them to international parity

prices. Smallholders have experienced a decline in their terms of trade, reduced output

(Bowen 1993:265) and a reduction in purchasing power (urban residents also experienced

a reduction in purchasing power) while raising official producer prices has had a

marginal impact on the money smallholders' are able to earn from their crops (Tickner

1992:32-37). Structural adjustment has intensified conflict over productive resources in

areas formerly designated as state farms, and land speculation and corruption plagued the

divesture of many state enterprises (Bowen 1993:265; West and Myers 1994; see Chapter

4).

While the PRE and austerity measures have had a deleterious effect on many

Mozambicans, this impact has not been shared equally. Women and children have

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suffered the most from the state's withdrawal from health and education services. The social and economic costs of structural adjustment programs have reshaped gender relations in the household as men have benefited more from economic liberalization and access to wage work, while women have been confined to domestic production (Pfeiffer et al. 2007:689). Women are more likely to be self-employed while men are more likely to be engaged in wage employment (Sheldon 2002). Not only are women more likely to be self-employed, but under new economic conditions, they must find new sources of income to buy clothing and essential goods at higher prices. Consequently petty trade, visible on the streets of the capital and major cities and towns, has become more important for their livelihoods. Economic insecurity has heightened conflict within the household often dealt with by men through increased drinking and violence directed against women. Furthermore, on the streets, women become targets for violence in the arena of informal trade and some turn to prostitution to survive (Hanlon 1996:71). Cash has become more important under structural adjustment with men more likely to have access to cash than women.[186] Women are increasingly turning to African Independent and Pentecostal churches to seek comfort while men are more likely to engage in occult practices to mediate misfortune in the market economy (Pfeiffer et al. 2007). Since the late 1980s, several scholars working in central Mozambique have reported a rise in spiritual insecurity and witchcraft accusations (Alexander 1994; Pfeiffer 1997) and West (2005), working on the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique, documents an increase in sorcery and counter sorcery discourse to explain power and authority in postcolonial, post-socialist Mozambique.

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[186] Crehan (1997) argues that in the context of rural Zambia, access to cash is significant source of socio-economic differentiation between men and women.

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Far from establishing the conditions for economic growth and development, most Mozambicans have experienced economic hardships, rising inequality, and enhanced stress on household resources. According to Sheldon (2002:230), two years after the PRE over 60% of the population was living in absolute poverty. Quantitative and qualitative research undertaken in the provincial capital of Chimoio during 2002-2003, reveals that a majority of responds believed their households were as poor or poorer now when compared to 10 years ago (Pfeiffer et al.. 2007:697) and recent work by Hanlon suggests socio-economic differentiation is increasing with more and more Mozambicans trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty[187] (Hanlon and Smart 2008).

The IMF's ardent belief in monetarism as an effective means of producing economic stability through controlling the money supply[188] undermines growth and investment in Mozambique (Hanlon 1996). Under the restrictions of structural adjustment, increased export earnings are used to pay down debt instead of allocated to domestic investment. In the early 1990s,[189] Mozambique was the most heavily indebted country in the world with its standing at more than four times the annual GNP and 20 times greater than its export earnings (Plank 1993:412). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mozambique lost another $150 million in aid, and the end of the cold war reduced the government's bargaining power in negotiations with western donors (ibid.:410). Thus Mozambican leaders adopted many of the tenets of neoliberal economic orthodoxy

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[187] Hanlon and Smart (2008) report that living standards are insecure and half the rural population above the poverty line in 2002 were living below the poverty line in 2005. Socio-economic differentiation is rising while the number of poor and extremely poor is increasing. Malnutrition is increasing as people turn towards consuming cassava instead of maize. Most Mozambicans are in no position to pull themselves out of poverty because they do not have assets and external links to take advantage of the free market.

[188] IMF prescriptions attempt to control the money supply through cuts on domestic credit, limiting government spending, and higher taxation to combat inflation (see Hanlon 1996).

[189] In 1990 Mozambique had a debt of $5 billion dollars (Hanlon 1991:65). In the same year, the country had the lowest rate of economic growth since the introduction of PRE (Bowen 1992:263). Plank (1993:411) reports there was zero income per capita in 1990 and 1991.

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under the conditions of drought, war, a global recession, and a changing geo-political

order. In the two decades since the implementation of the PRE, the majority of

Mozambicans have not seen their economic circumstances improve, and many feel they

have become worse off. The ruling party and donors have now embarked on a new

chapter in Mozambique's "development" with an emphasis placed on decentralization

and human development.

New Visions of Development

A significant amount of resources, debate, and vision is now focused on

Mozambique's development strategy for the next 5 years. In May 2006, The Council of

Ministers approved PARPA II, the country's new poverty reduction strategy plan for

2006-2009 mandated by the World Bank. The document outlines governance, human

capital, and economic development as the keys to poverty reduction. The ways in which

policies, strategies, and interventions are conceptualized and implemented fall squarely

within an understanding of the state, economy, and society in an age of neoliberalism.

However, the outcomes of these interventions challenge fundamental tenets of neoliberal

economic orthodoxy. Despite the emphasis placed on the private sector, access to the

state continues to provide an important channel for creating wealth and power. In this

section I will summarize the components of Mozambique's rural development strategy

with an emphasis on Manica Province and Sussundenga District.

Mozambique's current development strategy, as articulated by PARPA II, centers

on the themes of good governance, human development, and economic development.

PARPA II defines poverty as "impossibility through incapacity, or lack of opportunity of

individuals, families, and communities to have access to the minimum conditions defined

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by the basic norms of society"[190] (GoM 2006:8). This definition goes beyond an understanding of poverty as simply a lack of money, and instead conceptualizes it as an inability to access basic necessities and opportunities which speaks implicitly to issues of inequality. Not surprisingly, the document does not suggest concrete strategies for addressing inequalities and reconfiguring power relations in the country.

The government estimates over 10 million Mozambicans live in absolute poverty (GoM 2006) and articulates a development strategy to reduce the incidence of poverty from 54% of the population to 45% by 2009. While the architects of the strategy, envision an important role for the private sector in combating poverty and stimulating development, in contrast to PARPA I (2001-2005), PARPA II recognizes an economic role for the state, however, it is an economic role compatible with neoliberal understandings of the state, society, and market. It specifies that "the state has the power to promote investment in social and economic infrastructure"[191] (GoM 2006:116), establish public/private partnerships, and increase access to technology and extension services in the agricultural sector. The role of government should be to create a favorable business climate through providing infrastructure such as roads and electricity and investing in human capital such as health and education. With favorable conditions in place, the private sector is envisioned to create jobs and economic growth.

Mozambique's current development strategy also emphasizes the growth and development of several "megaprojects" such as a natural gas pipeline to South Africa, titanium mines, the rehabilitation of several large sugar estates, and continuing to invest in the Mozal aluminum smelter outside of Maputo. These projects all require substantial

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[190] "Impossibilidade por incapacidade, ou por falta de oportunidade de indivíduos, famílias, e comunidades de terem acesso a condições mínimas, segundo as normas básicas da sociedade."
[191] "O estado tem o papel de fomenter o investimento em infraestruturas económicas e sociais."

capital investment and are contingent upon forecasts of desirable economic returns and are unlikely to contribute poverty alleviation. In addition to large projects, the government, and numerous NGOs at the provincial level, are stressing decentralization, particularly fiscal decentralization at the district level, the formation of smallholder associations with their own "business plans," a green revolution, and increases of foreign investment as strategies for stimulating rural development.

Much like the debates over political decentralization in the late 1990s, fiscal decentralization is also controversial. In accordance with PARPA I,[192] the government began allocating funds to each district in 2006. Although PARPA I officially ended in 2005, the government did not begin allocating money to the districts until 2006. The transfer of fiscal authority to the district effectively establishes the district as the center of development. Under PARPA II, the districts continue to be the center of development and will receive, for example, 60% of the government's funds allocated for the National Agricultural Development Program[193] (PROAGI II). The 128 districts will now receive funds from the government based on several criteria: the population size of the district, physical size of the district, the district's poverty index, infrastructure, resources, and production potential. The funds should be used to create jobs and increase food production. In order to achieve this mandate, the government will embark on an exercise in "national zoning" to determine what each province can produce and what types of resources are at its disposal. In 2006, the 128 districts each received $280,000 US dollars in one lump sum, but now districts can receive more funding depending on the above

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[192] PARPA I was Mozambique's poverty reduction strategy plan that ran from 2001-2005. Its cornerstones were the development of human capital in education and health, good governance, development of agricultural infrastructure, and improved macro-economic and finance management.
[193] PROAGRI is the main financial source for agriculture by the state and is composed of money allocated by various donors into a common fund.

criteria. The reconfiguring of how money is dispersed is in reaction to a 2006 survey that indicated most of the money had not been used for its expressed purposes. Instead, district consultative councils allocated 31% on social infrastructure, 28% on improving district administration offices, 24% on economic projects and 11% on economic infrastructure. This new system of fiscal decentralization is believed to stimulate or create a private sector in the rural districts. The District Consultative Councils[194] will manage local investments since, in principle; each locality comprising the district is represented on the council. Sussundenga had an incredibly vibrant district consultative council under the leadership of a dynamic district administrator committed to the district's development, but sadly she died in an automobile accident on August 26, 2006. It remains to be seen if the council will continue with the same energy and vigor in her absence.

The push to decentralize money and resources to the district level reconfigures political power in several important ways. Under the new vision for rural development, the district administrator becomes the most powerful individual at the local level and development projects and support now flow through this individual instead of being administered through the appropriate sector (for example the district directorate of Education or Agriculture). While at the provincial level the permanent secretary of the party will be the most important official and no longer the directors of the various provincial directorates (for example the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture). The shift in administrative importance embodies a shift from specific sectors like agriculture or education and strengthens the importance of territorial control at the district level.

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[194] District Consultative Councils include four levels: the district, the *posto administrativo*, *localidade*, and *povoação*. At each level, they chaired by a government official and may also invite influential community leaders. They must also include 30% women.

In conjunction with fiscal decentralization, the government is emphasizing a "green revolution" to accelerate rural development in the fight against hunger and as a job creation strategy. Like green revolutions in other parts of the world, this call for Mozambique to transform its agricultural production centers on increased use of draft power, improved agricultural technologies such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation, creating agricultural markets, expanding financial services, and the sustainable use of natural resources. The green revolution is a component of PROAGRI II and is also linked to the formation of smallholder associations as a vehicle for delivering agricultural services to rural areas. In addition, the green revolution is also connected to the United Nations Millennium Villages project, though at this time only one village has been established at Chibuto in Gaza Province in southern Mozambique. In the eyes of the president, the green revolution should not only increase agricultural production, but also transform and enhance the manner in which Mozambicans perceive themselves. The green revolution "should promote self-esteem[195] among Mozambicans and give them the confidence that they are capable of overcoming hunger and poverty." Along with calling for renewed confidence and self-esteem, the president also reiterated that smallholders need to be taught the proper techniques to improve their livelihoods, such as the correct use of water resources, including the construction of small dams, where they would be able to harvest more than one time a year and better use their small plots. Based on my observations and conversations in Sussundenga, smallholders who have access to wetland areas, stream-banks, or small dams already use them to grow crops to harvest twice a year. I have serious doubts that Sussundengan smallholders simply lack the knowledge to use these resources efficiently. Along with calls for smallholders to improve their

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[195] See Cruikshank (1996) for a discussion self-esteem and self-government.

agricultural practices, the former minister of agriculture, Erasmo Muhate, is imploring agricultural extension workers to get out of the office and into the field to provide technical knowledge to Mozambican smallholders.[196]

Forming smallholder associations is now an important aspect of rural development and is closely linked to a desire to cultivate a Mozambican green revolution. Ironically, the Mozambique Company encouraged white settlers to form various associations during the early twentieth century to better deliver credit and agricultural services, and Frelimo during its years of socialist development, attempted to resettle rural populations into villages to deliver social and agricultural services and transform productive relations. Today's smallholder associations are envisioned to enable the provision of better agricultural extension services, credit, and development initiatives to rural Mozambicans. However, the formation of associations presents numerous problems. The Agricultural Markets Support Program (PAMA) is to try to organize 13,500 peasants into 360 associations. Numerous NGOs working in Manica Province are lending their services to rural communities to help articulate business plans, map and record natural resources, and negotiate with the government or foreign investors. There is an assumption that rural communities are unorganized and lack their own development plans.[197] Many of these organizations envision a process whereby the community undertakes a land delimitation exercise (in accordance with the new Land Law) and then the organization will work with the community to development a business plan.[198] First, it is often the better-off and more well-positioned families and individuals that participate

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[196] AIM, March 14, 2007.
[197] "Eles não tem plano." (Chimoio, 2 of October 2006).
[198] Interestingly, people often used the English phrase "business plan" to describe the creation of community development agenda.

in these associations. Second, due to the history of labor migration and dislocation caused by the civil war many "communities" are composed of people who share divergent histories which prove difficult when forming associations. Finally, any benefits attained by associations are more than likely to be appropriated by more powerful association members, particularly members with claims to traditional leadership or with strong connections to the ruling party. It is also ironic that despite the socialist rhetoric of the late 1970s and the early 1980s on the importance of the family sector and today's emphasis on boosting food production in the family sector, the Mozambican government has actually done very little to improve the socioeconomic standing of rural producers.

The government's strategy of foreign investment has provoked the most controversy. As an effort to build a vibrant private sector in the countryside, increase agricultural export earnings, and disseminate agro-technical knowledge, the government hopes to attract foreign investment in agriculture and agro-processing. The new land law strengthens communities' claims to land and enables them to negotiate directly with private enterprises to facilitate rural development. With the economic and political crisis across the border in Zimbabwe, numerous white commercial farmers have relocated to central Mozambique. Some farmers claim the government has not done enough in helping them establish profitable commercial enterprises such as attaining low interest credit, improving rural infrastructure, and timely registration and transparency in issuing farmers their DUATs. However, critics contend that the government favors foreign capital to an extent that it neglects to formulate a coherent and realistic agricultural policy of its own. During the last week of May in 2006, British journalist and researcher,

Joseph Hanlon, caused a small stir in the press over his remarks that the government's agricultural policy amounts to holding out its hand for the hopes of private investment.

In an article in the weekly paper *O País* entitled "The Outstretched Hand Policy,"[199] Hanlon argues the government should not wait for foreigners to come and resolve the country's agricultural problems. He remarks "The most serious problem is that we wait with an extended hand for foreigners to develop the country. Mozambicans themselves can develop the country- the government should end the requests for foreigners to invest; it should invest in its own development of the country."[200] Roughly a week later an article entitled "The Mozambican Government is not Going to Change its Agricultural Policy"[201] appeared in the daily paper, *Diario*, refuting Hanlon's interpretations of the end of the Manica agricultural boom and his accusation that the government simply waits for foreign investment to arrive. Roberto Albino, the head of the government agency to promote commercial agriculture (CEPAGI) rejects the notion that agriculture in Manica has not developed because of a lack of government policy. In Albino's words "At the very least, that opinion is ridiculous. The country needs foreign investors. In the policy of foreign investment attraction, the investor is the one who brings capital."[202] He goes on to say Mozambique needs investors who already have access to international markets and have the knowledge concerning how these markets function. He says the priority is based on building a competitive national business class and attracting foreign investment. Albino also contests the assertion that newly arrived

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[199] "Política de Mão Estendida" O País, 26 of May 2006.
[200] "O problema mais grave é que ficamos com a mão estendida à espera de estrangeiros para desenvolver Moçambique. Os próprios moçambicanos podem desenvolver o país- o governo deve acabar com os pedidos aos estrangeiros para investor; deve investor por si próprio no desenvolvimento deste país."
[201] "Governo Moçambicano Não Vai Mudar Política Agrária" Diário, 8 of June 2006.
[202] "No mínimo, essa opinião é ridícula. O país precisa de investidores estrangeiros. Na nossa política de atracção de investimento estrangeiro, o investidor é aquele que traz capital."

Zimbabwean commercial farmers were financed or subsidized by the government. The

farmers had to establish credit with commercial banks not the government.[203]

The debates ignited by Hanlon's article on the government's agricultural policy

and foreign investment highlight several crucial questions related to development in

Mozambique as well as who or what institutions are best suited to bring about economic

growth, job creation, and poverty alleviation. How important is agriculture to economic

growth and job creation? Why do donors not support state structures in place to train

more agricultural extension workers to better serve Mozambique's rural population?

What can the government and donors do to create more jobs and economic opportunities

for Mozambicans? Does the government have responsibility to create jobs for its citizens

or does it outsource the task to foreign investors? Will the influx of foreign investment

reach rural Mozambican and strengthen their livelihoods? What is the role of land and

land reform in stimulating commercial agriculture? Are the "rural poor" willing to

conceded access to land or other natural resources if it means securing regular wage

employment?

During the same week in May, another article by Hanlon appeared in the largest

daily newspaper, *Notícias*. In this article, "Will the Government and Donors Invest in the

Economy?" Hanlon presents a case for a shift in development policy from social and

infrastructural development to job creation and openly calls for a developmental state.[204]

He also calls for the creation of a development bank and more training and support to

small farmers. He critiques donors for being unwilling to accept risk as part of a

capitalist system. "The donors are still stuck in the era of central planning- they want

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[203] "Política de Mão Estendida," O País, 26 of May 2006.
[204] He further develops these arguments in his most recent book (Hanlon and Smart 2008).

255

detailed plans of where every dollar goes and to have certainty that none is

disappearing."[205] He cites examples from Sussundenga to suggest why economic growth

has not taken place despite the presence of commercial agriculture and a favorable agro-

ecological context: lack of finance, lack of technical support, and lack of marketing

support for farmers.

The 2004 Sussundenga District development plan outlines the district's

development initiatives in accordance with PARPA I and PROAGRI (approved in 1998).

The plan centers on fiscal and planning decentralization (PPFD). It highlights the need

for participatory planning, enhancing local capacities to plan and implement development

initiatives, to support policies, norms, and institutions that are conducive to participatory

planning and decentralized governance. It is based on an assumption that poverty

reduction can be achieved through better district governance.

In the vision of the district development plan, the tactic of planning includes

making transparent plans, integrating district planning process with the provincial level,

improved coordination of district development activities, and the rational use of natural

resources. Planning is broken down into different stages including preparing a detailed

work plan, diagnosing institutions and communities, and then preparing a realistic action

plan. There is no discussion as to what exactly constitutes a community, the power

relations within a community, the community's relationships to local government or other

forms of authority or inequalities in access to resources. Sussundenga is one of the

districts defined as a strategic priority of national development. It has been divided into

five development zones with emphasis placed on improving infrastructure and basic

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[205] "Os doadores ainda estão agarrados à era de planificação central- querem planear detalhadamente para onde vai cada dólar e ter a certeza que nenhum é 'despericado.'"

services without going into detail as to how these improvements will be accomplished.

In area of agricultural extension emphasis is placed on local seed production, promotion of small irrigation, demonstration shows, fish farming, training, increase extension network, formation of management committees, periodic revision of technologies.

At the provincial development efforts and poverty reduction strategies center on connecting the estimated 80% of the provincial population that lives below the poverty line to the rural economy. The mission "is to contribute to the integration of the population in the rural economy, through the participation of all actors of society in the rational use of existing resources to improve the living conditions of the citizens of the province."[206] Along with integrating the population within the rural economy, other strategic development priorities are to increase food and nutritional security, increase the contribution, currently around 5 percent, Manica Province makes to the GNP (PIB), and sustainable agricultural development and natural resource use.

Mozambique's current national, provincial, and district development and poverty alleviation strategies feature techno-economic tactics as the solution to poverty and underdevelopment. In order to intervene and promote the desired social and economic transformations in the countryside, rural Mozambique is broken down and conceptualized in terms such as development zones, agro-ecological regions, rural communities, and smallholder associations. By simplifying and making the countryside "legible" the state is able to intervene into rural lives and livelihoods based on the depictions it has generated of the countryside (Scott 1998). However, as the chapter tries to demonstrate, it is neither the state, nor a monolithic state, that shapes development priorities and

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[206] É contribuir para integração da população na economia rural, através da participação de todos os actores da sociedade no aproveitamento racional dos recursos existentes para melhorar as condições de vida dos cidadãos da Província."

practices, but rather a transnational network of consultants, trustees, NGOs, development workers, government officials, technicians, financial institutions, and organizations that sometimes articulate with state structures and other times usurp them in promoting and delivering their visions of economic growth, poverty alleviation, and development. Li (2005) refines Scott's general argument in suggesting that the processes of simplification and legibility are not only conducted through the workings of the state, but rather are more diffuse and operate "through the practices and desires of their target populations" (383). NGOs, experts, and trustees become central in how development problems are defined and understood in a way that makes intervention possible and desirable. Through a process that Li (2008:7) terms "rendering technical" boundaries are drawn between those who contain the ability to diagnosis problems or deficiencies in others and those who are subject to expert intervention. "Questions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical" (ibid.). Through "rendering technical" agricultural practices, infrastructure, community organizations, and social interactions, the agronomists, agricultural extension agents, and development workers are able to portray smallholders in ways that justify and demand techno-economic interventions while obscuring structural dimensions of poverty and access to resources.

Constructing the Objects of Development

Interviews with "experts" in the provincial capital of Chimoio on issues such as access to land and water, agriculture, poverty reduction, and development highlight the ways in which smallholders are conceptualized and their problems understood by the people and organizations designing, promoting and monitoring rural development. Agricultural extension agents, commonly referred to as *tecnicos*, most often define and

258

understand the "development" challenges smallholders face in terms of lack of knowledge or education about appropriate agricultural techniques and the lack of improved inputs such as better seeds, irrigation systems, credit, transportation, as the limiting factors in agricultural production. *Tecnicos* are not wrong to suggest smallholders face a lack of inputs, low prices for agricultural commodities or recognizing high transport costs and lack of rural credit, but the way in which *tecnicos* imagine smallholders constructs rural farmers in need of specific types of development interventions. The types of inventions *tecnicos* can offer are depoliticized technical interventions and information dissemination. During these interviews only one touched on issues of inequality and lack of power[207] when referring to smallholders. If poverty is ultimately the result of powerlessness (Ferguson 1994), then these initiatives are unlikely to win in the struggle against poverty.

In my encounters with development workers and government tecnicos, foreign development workers often displayed the strongest sentiments about the need for "educating" Mozambicans while denigrating Mozambicans agricultural practices. Early in my stay in Mozambique, while at a social gathering in Maputo, I talked with an employee of USAID who has lived in Mozambique for 10 years. I explained my research project to him, my interest in access to land and water resources and my excitement about working in a rural area. He was perplexed as to why I would want to study smallholder access to water. "I don't understand why you want to talk to Africans about water; you should instead talk with commercial farmers. You should talk to the white commercial farmers now living in Manica Province." His remarks imply that black Mozambicans have little knowledge that a white foreigner would want hear about and that

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[207] "Eles não tem poder." (Chimoio, 8 of September 2007).

commercially oriented enterprises must be non-Africa (or at least not black African). A few months later a European agronomist told me that "education is the most important issue in regards to improving agricultural production. Farmers are stuck in their traditional ways and lack knowledge about farming." He provided the example of farmers not tying up their tomatoes as evidence of their backward agricultural practices. In his eyes, program designed to teach Mozambicans more proper agricultural techniques[208] would go enable smallholders to produce more food and higher quality food commodities for domestic or international markets.

Discussions about water and wetland cultivation generated the belief that smallholders lack the knowledge and experience to use water efficiently and that wetland cultivation is generally bad for the environment (see Chapter 5 for more details). There is a general perception that smallholders lack the knowledge of how to irrigate their plots or are not accustomed to irrigated agriculture. One *tecnico,* with experience working for the Ford Foundation and the FAO told me, "we need to educate the people how to use the water. They (smallholders) are not accustomed to irrigating their crops."[209] Two days later another *tecnico* expressed similar perspective. While acknowledging one of the biggest problems smallholders face in *vulnerabilidade* (vulnerability) induced by either too much rain or too little, "smallholders do not use the water."[210]

Rural Mozambicans are often conceptualized by donors, government officials, and development workers in ways that demand and justify specific development policies

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[208] Development workers and government officials often bemoan the practice of burning to clear fields before the October rains. *Queimadas descontroladas* (uncontrolled burnings) are the target of a media campaign each year to eradicate this practice.
[209] "Precisamos de educar as pessoas como usar a agua. Eles não tem o habito para regar as plantas." (Chimoio, 6 of September 2007).
[210] "Eles não conseguem aproveitar agua." (Chimoio, 8 of September 2007).

and interventions. In my experiences with development professionals in Chimoio, the conceptualization often stressed that rural Mozambicans lack the knowledge to improve agricultural production, market their harvests, or engage in other livelihood activities to raise their incomes and provide economic stability. One of the overarching problems in rural Mozambique is that most Mozambicans are too poor to take advantage of market opportunities when they arise. Few rural Mozambicans have savings, large assets, access to credit and capital. In cases where markets have been created, few are in a position to benefit from them.

Beneficiaries or Citizens?

Neoliberal economic development has not only triggered radical changes in the Mozambican economy and curtailed public expenditures, but re-framed notions of self, subjectivity, and citizenship. Within neoliberal discourse, individual responsibility, efficiency, and self discipline are accorded the highest virtues, while entitlements and rights, beyond civil and political rights, are circumscribed by appeals to liberty, freedom, and choice.[211] Though Mozambicans are no longer subjected to a separate legal system, nor require passes to authorize their movements, denied access to civil courts, or forced to labor or grow cash crops as under the colonial regime, they have not attained rights as full citizens. Mamdani (1996) argues the postcolonial state has not been fully democratized and is prone to reproducing the same social, political, and economic cleavages of the colonial state. In contrast to being depicted as citizens by the government or donor community, rural Mozambicans are most often described as beneficiaries, stakeholders, or recipients. These categories echo an under current of

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[211] See Englund (2006) for how appeals to abstract notions of freedom and human rights curtail the mobilization and advocacy of social and economic justice.

consumption-based identities characteristic of a neoliberal age much like phrases such as human or social capital which are also common in Mozambican policy documents and development discourse.

Mozambicans are often viewed as beneficiaries of the interventions and services delivered by the state or donor organizations. Inherent in the idea of a beneficiary is one who receives aid or some type of benefit, not an individual or group that possesses the right to make claims upon specific goods, services, or ideas. In the PARPA II document the word *beneficiario* is used to depict rural Mozambicans as the recipients of projects, aid, or development. The language or discourse of development is essential in constructing the objects of development (Arce 2000). The power of development narratives that imagine countries and people in specific ways continue to justify development interventions (Ferguson 1994). In the words of West "Too many who work in the development industry, Mozambicans are no longer citizens with specific social, economic, and political rights or entitlements, but rather beneficiaries of particular development interventions" (2005:262). Ong (2006) details the changes in sovereignty and citizenship occurring across Southeast Asia as neoliberal reforms are adopted and reconfigured in specific contexts. Claims to citizenship are being articulated in diverse ways, sometimes enhancing the rights and security of particular groups, while in other contexts groups may become more marginalized and exploited. However, in Mozambique, rights to "development" or economic and social entitlements are not articulated in the language of citizenship, but rather through the prism of a beneficiary. As beneficiaries, Mozambicans are the ones who receive as opposed to the ones who are entitled. Ironically, it is often expatriates or foreign development workers whose status

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mirrors more the notion of citizenship than the supposed beneficiaries (Englund 2006;

Ong 2006; and Pfeiffer 2004) or Mozambican development workers employed by

international development organizations.

Ironically, by framing Mozambicans as beneficiaries or recipients, there is an

implicit acknowledgement that the market is not solving the problems of poverty and

underdevelopment, that it is not creating the conditions in which Mozambicans can pull

themselves out of poverty. The notion of beneficiary as one who receives aid, usually as

a charitable act by another person or institution, contradicts the assertions that through

hard work and individual efforts, Mozambicans can development themselves.

It is unclear to what extent rural Mozambicans have internalized the identity of a

"beneficiary" or "recipient." Do Mozambicans feel a sense of entitlement to

development projects or government support based on the understanding that they are

beneficiaries? Do they believe the government has a responsibility to them based on a

notion of citizenship? Or do rural Mozambicans make appeals for *ajuda* or *apoio* based

on more immediate material necessities? Despite the growing discourse calling for

Mozambicans to develop themselves, stop being lazy, and work harder, a discourse that I

situate in the age of neoliberalism, it is not clear to what extent Mozambicans have come

to think of themselves as rational and disciplined individuals responsible for their own

development.

In my interviews and conversations with Sussundengans on what constitutes

"development," many spoke of jobs, a decrease in diseases such as malaria, population

growth, and larger towns and cities as the signs of "development." When I probed how

development could be achieved, people responded by implicating the government. For

example a gentleman in his mid-50s identified Sussundenga's most important problems as a lack of jobs and no government help for agriculture. When I asked him what are people supposed to do, he stated that "people are supposed to ask for the government's help.[212] People like to cultivate, but the hoe is painful. The soil is fertile, but there are no machines to use. We do not have knowledge about export crops. There is no help being given on how to export."[213] Not surprising a neighbor secretary stressed "cooperation between people and the government"[214] as the path to overcoming Sussundenga's challenges. However, another elderly gentleman declared that "We do not know because the government is not helping us even if we ask."[215] These statements, and others like them, reflect people's beliefs that the government has a responsibility to its population. As the state has withdrawn services over the last decade, people are left feeling abandoned. While people bemoan the lack of state support for agriculture and other sectors, they are also growing more suspicious of the government as the state paradoxically attempts to extend its reach into rural areas through incorporating *regulos* into local governance while also distancing itself from the populations it claims to represent. More skeptical Sussundengans iterated that Frelimo only seems to care about them during election years.

The most economically successful families and individuals in Sussundenga are those with access to regular wage employment, formal sector jobs, and connections with the local government or NGO industry. The population of the town continues to grow

[212] "Mabasa hakuna. Hapana rubatsiro rwokurima runobva kuhurumende. Vanhu vanofanira kukumbira hurumende kuti ipe rubatsiro." (4 of April 2006).
[213] "Vanhu vanoda kurima chaizvo, asi badza rinorwadza. Ivhu rine kudya, asi hapana michina yokushandisa. Hatina ruzivo rwembeu dzinofanira kutengeswa kunze kwenyika. Rubatsiro rwokutengesa kunze kwenyika hakuna." (4 of April 2006).
[214] "Rubatano pakati pavanhu nehurumende." (4 of April 2006).
[215] "Hatizivi nokuti hurumende tiri kuikumbira asi haisi kutibatsira." (20 of April 2006).

since the end of the civil war as more people migrate looking for work. But, unemployment is the most frequent challenge that Sussundengans identified. Throughout public forums during 2005 and 2006, Mozambicans repeatedly questioned President Guebuza about unemployment.

During the first three months of 2009, violence and protests erupted in several towns and cities, including a large demonstration in Maputo on February 5, which was led and organized by youth working in the informal sector. These events reflect a growing frustration with the government and increasing socio-economic insecurity by the country's majority. It is not the market, but rather a particular market model that leaders within government and donors have attempted to implement in Mozambique over the last two decades that is leaving more people without formal jobs, access to healthcare and education, and future opportunities.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argue that neoliberalism as an economic, social, and political project has been implemented in Mozambique since the 1980s, but has neither reconfigured the state, society, and market in ways imagined by its proponents, such as the World Bank, IMF, and USAID, nor has it eroded the state, and a subsequently Mozambique's national sovereignty as predicted by its detractors (Hanlon 1991, 1996; Plank 1993). The state has been active and pervasive in shaping the contours of privatization, and in the process, also been reconfigured. In some instances, the Mozambican state resembles the quintessential neoliberal state through creating an investor-friendly environment through new legal mechanisms such as the land law, promoting the development of human capital through health and education, forming

joint-venture companies with private capital, decentralizing more political and financial authority to local levels, contracting many essential services to donor, NGOs, and international companies, and calling on the population to "govern themselves" (West 2009) and work hard to eradicate poverty.

In other cases the Mozambican state defies the characterization of "neoliberal." The relationship between the state and the market is unstable, contested, negotiated, and re-negotiated. Mozambican elites shaped the process of privatization as much as the international donors (Pitcher 2002:130-131). Indeed, the companies which negotiated and received concessions from the state during the 1980s, emerged as the most politically and economically power enterprises following privatization (ibid.). The state directly influenced the process by which state farms changed ownership in the 1980s and the 1990s with land and infrastructure falling into the hands of party loyalists, war veterans, and party elites. Consequently and ironically, in an age of neoliberalism the state, not an autonomous free market disembedded from social and political institutions, continues to provide access to resources and capital through political and social networks, public/private partnerships, and less transparent channels.

The contradictions of neoliberalism do not end with the state. Current development policy as articulated by PARPA II and provincial and district development plans parallel many of the central economic tenets of neoliberalism. Furthermore, the proliferation of NGOs, the decentralization of political authority, with an emphasis on democracy and good governance, the importance ascribed to techno-economic development interventions such as "national zoning," designing community "business plans," and encouraging smallholder associations, work (un)intentionally to make the

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countryside more legible reproducing neoliberalism as a social and political project.

Government officials, development workers, and agricultural extension agents stress

acquiring the appropriate knowledge and technology to alleviate poverty and stimulate

economic growth, while the government courts foreign investors with the "know how" to

operate large capitalist enterprises. "Experts" and development professionals now strive

to create policies and enact programs that will bring about the "right disposal of people

and things" (Foucault 1991) for the benefit of the entire nation. The president and other

ministers call on the population to development themselves through hard work, effort,

and future aspirations.

It is unclear and unresolved to what extent a highly diversified population has

internalized the donor's and government's messages of self-discipline and hard work.

Many Mozambicans do work hard and are not resisting the incorporation into a global

market economy, but want to be included in ways that enable them to realize their

material aspirations and other life projects such as marriage and children. Does

neoliberalism in Mozambique actually tell us more about elites, development

professionals, experts, and transnational institutions than rural Mozambicans? In

Sussundenga, Mozambicans lament the lack of state interest, not necessarily intervention,

in their lives and often express these sentiments in terms of lack of help (ajuda) or

support (apoio). On the Mueda plateau, in northern Mozambique, West (2009) argues

that the push for democratic local governance and for communities to elect their own

leaders has been interpreted to mean the state no longer cares about cultivating "wealth in

people" and thus will offer Muedans nothing in return. Whether during colonialism,

socialism, or the age of neoliberalism the Mozambican state has always played a role in

shaping the economy. It will continue to offer some access to power, wealth, and

influence. The question is not whether or not the state should intervene in the economy,

but rather what types of interventions are desirable and by whom.

Chapter Seven
Conclusion
Re-Thinking African Enclosures

João led us along a small path from his newly constructed house near the

Chizizira River to the main, gravel road snaking through Sussundenga that Nelson and I

had walked innumerable times over the last year. Minutes earlier, we bid him farewell

and thanked him for his knowledge and time, for answering our questions during several

interviews, and for teaching us, more than anyone else, about agriculture in Sussundenga.

We returned copies of all the pictures I had taken during our visits and interviews, and I

also presented João with a green Michigan State t-shirt to further emphasize my

appreciation for his help and to offer some small form of reciprocity for the various fruits

and vegetables he bestowed upon us during numerous visits.

As we walked to the road, João pointed to newly opened fields and greeted

several women standing in loose, brown topsoil produced by their labor and a small

enxada. In the opposite direction, patches of land were stained black, the remaining

vegetation weak and brittle, after the annual fires used to clear new or fallow fields of

underbrush before tilling and planting can begin. I asked João if the land the women

were preparing were new fields or old, fallow fields. He replied that these *machambas*

are new, that women are cultivating this area for the first time. His comment caused me

to remember another remark he made during one of our first interviews—there is plenty

of land for everyone in Sussundenga. If land is abundant and new fields are being

opened, what does this say about enclosures and conflict over land?

When I set out to examine access to land and water in Sussundenga, I expected to

find a process of enclosure—increasing commodification of land, particularly land with

high irrigation potential and wetland areas. Alongside this process of enclosure, I expected to witness more exclusionary practices that structure how people obtain access to land. I hypothesized that because of favorable agro-ecological conditions, the presence of private and state investment, and reliable infrastructure, land in Sussundenga would be subject to enclosure and increasing socio-economic differentiation tied to the control over land. However, I was not sure if the process of enclosure would be connected to appropriation by local elites, such as ruling party officials or businessmen, or global ones, such as South African commercial farmers, tobacco companies, or some other transnational entity with a desire for Mozambican resources, or whether it would result from the refashioning of "customary" norms shaping land use and allocation involving chiefly families and ruling lineages. What I observed through 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork is a very different picture, a more flexible version of the reality I conjured up through my scholarly reading on land and water issues in Southern Africa and my assumptions about global capitalism, struggles over natural resources, and growing class divisions.

My data suggests that access to land and water remain rather flexible and negotiable. While there are some conflicts and contestations over land, these are historically-situated involving overlapping claims and counter-claims and appeals to multiple and entangled sources of authority, and are not the consequence of a broader process of enclosure. Though I contend access to land and water remains negotiable, and the vast majority of Sussundengans have access to land, this does not suggest that there is no socio-economic differentiation or that land holdings are equal in size and quality. In fact, there is a growing class of wealthier Sussundengans, but it is difficult to say if their

wealth is linked to the control over land and accumulation through agricultural production or through some other means. The majority of wealthier Sussundengans have access to some form of regular wage employment whether it is teaching in local schools, working in government administration or with an NGO, or running a shop or transport business, these families and individuals bring in off-farm income. Because they have access to a regular flow of cash, they are able to build bigger houses with metal roofs, purchase consumer products such as TVs, bicycles, automobiles, cell phones, etc., and hire laborers to work their fields and in their homesteads. Berry (1993) argues that rural inequality is often linked to differential access to non-farm income, and in the case of Northern Zambia, Moore and Vaughn (1994:234) contend that agricultural productivity is still largely shaped by access to off-farm income. For a variety of socio-cultural, spatial, and economic reasons, wealthier Sussundengans have not translated off-farm income into the power to evict others from their fields and appropriate their land.

In terms of space, northern Sussundenga District is well-connected to the infrastructure of the Beira corridor making transportation rather reliable and convenient and keeps transport costs comparably low in relation to other rural districts. However, the southern portions of the district lack good infrastructure, are geographically removed from the corridor, and eventually connect to Mossurize and Machaze Districts, both of which have functioned as labor reserves during the colonial and postcolonial periods and attracted little state or private investment. In other words, they are more characteristic of Woodhouse's (2003) "stagnant" areas and do not possess the market pressure to generate heightened competition for land and resources. Thus where I conducted research in Sussundenga sits in between an area with the potential for immigration, access to

271

markets, investment, and strong infrastructure and a region characterized by out-migration, unreliable transportation, weak markets, and little investment.

Within the confines of the former *colonato*, the site of this study, there are few groups and individuals with the capacity to exploit more land and increase agricultural production. First, while land is abundant, labor is scarce, meaning that few families or individuals are able to cultivate extensive pieces of land with the average land holding at 1.5 hectares. Because the vast majority of Sussundengans have access to a *machamba*, there is not a class of landless laborers in need of wages in order to survive. Additionally, many of those with the ability to hire labor, though wealthier than many of their neighbors, can easily find themselves in a more tenuous economic situation if crops fail, a household member becomes severely ill, or expected income decreases. In rural settings, materially well-off Mozambicans can easily fall back into to more extreme poverty. Because most Mozambicans lack capital and savings, they are unable to take advantage of market opportunities (Hanlon and Smart 2008). Furthermore, it is unclear what wealthier Mozambicans would invest in if they obtain a more disposable income. Would they be willing to invest in land or irrigation infrastructure or locally businesses, transport operations, or new shops? There are many economic uncertainties that mitigate large-scale appropriation of land by local elites such as the size of returns and profits from agriculture. Mozambican and white Zimbabwean commercial farmers also face many financial obstacles that have curtailed their need and ability to successfully farm large tracts of land.

There are socio-cultural reasons, in additional to spatial and economic ones, which diminish the likelihood of enclosing land and water resources. Because water is

viewed by many to be a gift from God and thus available to everyone, lessens the probability of excluding others from this essential resource. The longstanding practice of chiefly allocation of land and negotiating with friends, kin, and neighbors for wetlands suggests a system of "fairness in flexibility" (Shipton 1994) or a minimum subsistence ethic (Scott 1976) that all Sussundengans who submit to chiefly authority are entitled to. The fusion of space, economics, and longstanding cultural beliefs and practices shape social relations and human-environment relations in ways that guard against the commodification of land, the displacement smallholders, and the enclosure of common and family property.

Enclosures Revisited

The approximately 4000 parliamentary acts and the estimated six millions acres of land these acts enclosed across rural England from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth century radically transformed land ownership and class relations and converted English small farmers into wage laborers. Despite the importance of the legalized enclosure of English commons to the reordering of rural society, the commons had been exposed to an ongoing process of appropriation and enclosure since at least the thirteenth century (Williams 1973). The destruction of the "scratch-as-scratch-can subsistence economy of the poor" through "class robbery" by property owners and lawyers (Thompson 1966:217-218) exacerbated the need for more capital in order to pay growing rents and ultimately to survive. The small farmers, cottagers, squatters, and others dependent on common lands in order to reproduce their existence had few options once the nobility registered and enclosed these lands, but to sell their labor or migrate to urban areas.

In Sussundenga, land is described more accurately as family property as opposed to common property. Since the time of the Teve kingdom, chiefs and their subordinates allocated land to male household heads. Men allocated land within their respective families, and elderly men transferred land to their sons. Thus families, specifically men within the family, under the political authority of a chief, managed the vast majority of agricultural land under cultivation. Other lands containing pastures and forests fit more closely to a definition of common property. Lineage members or families and individuals who had submitted their authority to a given chief could graze cattle, and collect firewood and building materials from these lands. Prohibitions on disturbing chiefly graves sites, indiscriminately cutting trees and hunting wild game handed down by the ancestors also structured land use and mediated human-environment interactions.

Many of these historical patterns are reproduced today. Agricultural land continues to be family property under the entangled authority of a chief, neighborhood secretary, local agricultural officials, and the Mozambican state. Inheritance patterns are varied with most lands remaining within the conjugal unit, and more women obtaining land through inheritance and envisioning a future where they will pass land on to sons or daughters. However, the picture is less certain for women who marry and leave Sussundenga. It is unclear if they retain rights to family land. There are no longer pasture lands near the town dating back to the establishment of the Portuguese settlement where Europeans prohibited Africans from keeping livestock near their (European) farms, a practice continued by the revolutionary government during the process of rural villagization. Forest areas continue to be used by Sussundengans to collect firewood, medicinal plants, building materials, and hunting small game, while trees planted around

homesteads and on *machambas* and *matoro* are considered family property. Streams and rivers are used by residents for irrigating fields and collecting water for household use. Thus Sussundengans depend on a combination of family property and access to water resources, pastures, and forests to provide for their subsistence needs.

The case of Sussundenga demonstrates the flexibility and resiliency of local practices for managing and allocating land. Because of the ruptures of colonial rule, socialist modernization, and neoliberal development, many Sussundengans continue to look to chiefly authority as the first and most important layer in this entangled landscape. In the eyes of many Sussundengans, chiefs continue to exercise the most legitimate form of political authority. However, as the ruling party makes a more concerted effort to incorporate chiefly rule into state administration and local governance, it remains to be seen how this will reconfigure chiefly authority in practice and how local populations will accept, reject, resist, or renegotiate the terms of chiefly/state rule.

Newcomers have been absorbed into the existing socio-cultural milieu by submitting to chiefs and asking their permission for a piece of land or wetland. What continues to be remarkable about Mozambique and Sussundenga, in particular, is that despite the longevity of the civil-war, the number of people affected by the conflict, and the multitudes displaced and relocated by the fighting, the economic and political reforms of the late twentieth century have all proceeded rather peacefully, and at the local level in Sussundenga, there is relatively little conflict over land.

Given the evidence and arguments presented in this dissertation, at least for the moment, Sussundenga's lands are not subject to enclosure—increasing commodification and exclusion. Furthermore, it becomes more difficult to substantiate the enclosures

argument when there is not a class of landless laborers produced by the appropriation of land and displacement of rural residents. The majority of Sussundengans continue to maintain access to land for agriculture and are not completely dependent on wage labor, tenant farming, or sharecropping for their survival. This fact weakens any suggestions that enclosures are sweeping across the Sussundengan landscape. In other parts of Mozambique, particularly land adjacent to the Limpopo National Park and Transfrontier conservation zone, land has been "enclosed" by conservationists, tourist ventures, and park authorities (Hughes 2005), displacing Mozambicans, but not transforming them into workers, sharecroppers, or some other form of economic dependency and subordination.

What is missing from discussions of African enclosure is the connection between the appropriation of common lands or family plots by more powerful actors and the conversion of those who have lost access to land or wetlands into wage laborers, tenant farmers, or sharecroppers and the conditions under which these workers must sell their labor in order to survive. Without primitive accumulation can there be enclosure?

Land and Water in Southern Africa

My research and this dissertation contributes to the growing studies on land and water in Southern Africa by documenting the local ways in which Sussundengans obtain access to land and wetlands and the sources of authority they articulate to substantiate their claims. In spite of the political and economic changes introduced by colonial rule and postcolonial governance, chiefly authority continues to structure access to land and instill a level of flexibility in how land is controlled and allocated.

Although the government has introduced new land and water laws and policies over the last two decades, Sussundengans continue to use land and water in familiar ways

276

and understand and interpret the relationships between people, ancestors, and the landscape in accordance with longstanding cosmological beliefs and practices. Where the postcolonial state has intervened in Sussundenga, it has often produced negative repercussions from the perspectives of numerous Sussundengans. Postcolonial villagization and resettlement displaced people from ancestral lands and crowded them into villages with new political authorities and curtailed certain livelihood practices such as keeping livestock. Nor did government-orchestrated state farm divesture return land, originally taken by Portuguese farmers, to smallholders, but rather transferred it to Mozambican commercial farmers.

My research also highlights the importance of wetlands to rural livelihoods through providing fertile lands used in wet and dry season cultivation. Sussundengan women often have a greater control over their labor in wetland fields and more decision-making power over how to dispose of the crops grown on these lands. Consequently, households benefit from fruits and vegetables rich in micro-nutrients to complement the starch-filled diet of sorghum or maize-based *sadza*. Additionally, women are more likely to use money earned from the sale of wetland crops to purchase commodities for the household or allocate to educational and medical expenses.

Political Ecology

My work also contributes to the rich body of literature in political ecology by situating local social and ecological engagements in broader historical, political, and economic dynamics. In doing so, I present an understanding of people and the environment that is mutually constitutive and not reducible to simply dichotomies of nature/culture and symbolic/material. By examining access to land and water, I explore

power relations and the micro-politics that animate land claims in a specific ethnographic context. Sussundengans draw on multiple, and at times, competing forms of authority to articulate their claims to resources. Despite a history of disruption, migration, and resettlement, there is relatively little conflict over land. Chiefly allocation and negotiation with various social actors continue to play a significant role in how Sussundengans express their claims to land. Thus access to land is not just about land and material resources, but also about social relations and the authority to mediate people's engagement with the environment.

Neoliberalism

My research contributes to the anthropological literature on neoliberalism by revealing contradictions in how neoliberal development has taken place on the ground in Mozambique. In contrast to proponents of neoliberalism that celebrate Mozambique as a market-oriented development success story, I argue that the Mozambican state, not an autonomous free market, continues to structure access to sources of wealth and power. Private entrepreneurs who have benefited politically and economically since the late 1980s have done so through their connections with the state, the ruling party, and the market, not the market al.one. In spite of political and economic liberalization, the state, as an institution of disparate and competing interests, is pervasive in economic activities.

Furthermore, conceptualizations of rural Mozambicans as beneficiaries or recipients of development appears to undermine assertions that a free market will stimulate rural development. If rural Mozambicans must be "given" infrastructure, seeds, and other inputs then, the free market is not as efficient and capable of allocating resources as neoliberal economic orthodoxy claims. Many smallholders want to be

included in the market and are not resistant to it. Neoliberalism as a regime of governance premised on more dispersed forms of authority, an ardent faith in the free market, and that the free market offers the best model for social relations in fraught with tensions and contradictions that continue to surface when policies are translated into practice in specific contexts.

Protecting Smallholder Land Rights and Future Developments

At least in the case of Sussundenga, Mozambican smallholder's land use rights are not under threat at the moment. However, should political and economic conditions change and new land pressures emerge, there are several strategies that materialize from this research that could enable smallholders to protect their rights in the face of appropriation. First, interviews with development professionals and government extension agents at the provincial level revealed a lack of information about the new land law and the legal protections it provides Mozambican smallholders. This information gap is paralleled at the local level. Many smallholders across the country are unfamiliar with the law and the procedures whereby they can receive a title for their land. NGOs and development organizations engaged in rural development could allocate money or trained to staff to facilitate land delimitation exercises. In fact some NGOs, such as ORAM, are assisting in these activities. There is also need for an education campaign to inform Mozambicans of their land rights and how they can protect them. One option might be local radio broadcasts. Radio reaches more rural areas than print media and often carries programming in local languages. Audio messages can also reach rural populations without much formal schooling and few literacy skills. If the land law is going to provide a legal framework for rural development by allowing rural communities

to negotiate and enter into agreements with the private sector or private investors, then smallholders need to be aware of their rights since they will negotiate with more politically and economically power actors. Even less is known about the water law and new water policy. If the government is serious about creating broad-based stakeholder institutions to manage the country's waters, then smallholders need to be represented.

The new land law and the constitution prohibit gender discrimination in access to land, however, in practice; women's land use rights remain tenuous and dependent on men in numerous contexts. There is a need to strengthen women's rights to land. One option might be to reserve wetlands and stream-banks for women's cultivation, either individually or cooperatively through garden associations. Since wetland areas are socially legitimates spaces where women exercise more control over their labor and the benefits derived from it, they can be protected from outside appropriation or elite capture. By remaining under women's control, wetland gardens are likely to benefit households through providing crops rich in micro-nutrients and cash income to purchase commodities.

There is a need to explore in greater depth the link between wage labor or off-farm income and agricultural production, control over land and water, and socio-economic differentiation. This may also help determine the importance of land, and secure access to land, to improvements in material well-being. At the moment, land does not receive a great deal of attention in the country's most recent poverty reduction strategy plan (PARPA II) that is used as a development blueprint through 2009. Furthermore, it is equally important to understand what Sussundengans, or other rural Mozambicans, desire in terms of "development". Sussundengans, rural Mozambicans, or

smallholders are not uniform categories and embody tremendous variation in terms of social attributes, access to resources, power, and knowledge. While some might desire more land or labor for their fields, others might want access to wage employment, educational opportunities, or investments in rural infrastructure. One of the most striking social cleavages in Sussundenga is between elders and youth. Many young Sussundengans, particularly men in their late teens and twenties, desire wage labor or additional educational opportunities. Many of them do not want to be farmers. If they are unable to find work in the district, will more Sussundengans migrate to provincial capitals, large towns, or neighboring countries to find employment?

The case of Sussundenga suggests "rural Africa" is neither inherently egalitarian and cooperative nor competitive and self-interested. Instead rural landscapes are constructed through specific historical, political, social, economic, ecological processes that shape the contours of rural life in complex and contradictory ways. Although this dissertation focuses on access to land and water, it is also implicitly about the continuities of change. The past continues to structure and inform the present.

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