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## **The Bombardment of Manila**

Starting in early May 1898, Spanish-held Manila anticipated chaos from the upcoming battle with the Americans. Wealthy Filipinos kept their children home, rather than sending them back to school in the city, and carefully maintained their household firearms.<sup>35</sup> On May 26, 1898, British Consul E. H. Ransom-Walker sent the Foreign Office a forlorn but resigned update on the situation since Dewey's arrival: "I have had a most disagreeable time—I have had my life threatened and it is given out that when Manila is bombarded by the Americans the Spanish low class will shoot me."<sup>36</sup> Ransom-Walker worked to protect British mercantile interests and European citizens, but his negotiations with the Spanish Governor-General Basilio Augustin proved fruitless. The request to land several hundred British, German, Japanese, and French men from waiting ships to guard lives and property was firmly rebuffed, with the assurance that Spanish soldiers would provide adequate security. This promise provided little comfort. A fire had swept through Manila only the month before, and Spanish troops had openly and enthusiastically looted the city. Increasingly desperate, Ransom-Walker made an arrangement with Dewey to send European civilians to Cavite, telling the Foreign Office, "This is the only way I can see to protect women and children when hostilities begin. I dread what will take place after Manila has been bombarded."<sup>37</sup> These diplomatic efforts served to place the Americans in the position of providing security and protection to

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35. Berthelson, *The Tayabas Chronicles*, 130.

36. National Archives, London, FO 72/2076/295295, British Consulate Manila, May 26, 1898.

37. Ibid.



women, undermining both the Spanish and the Filipinos in the tripartite power relations and legitimizing the U.S. mission. In turn, the citizens of Manila, short on food and uncertain about their safety, had little to do but wait for the arrival of the U.S. Army and the impending offensive.

Aguinaldo, attempting to solidify his position during this tenuous time, released the “Constitutional Program of the Philippine Republic” on June 5. In it, he addressed all Filipinos in an appeal to growing nationalism and made ambitious offers of citizenship, civil rights, public services, and republican independence.<sup>38</sup> To be “Filipino,” according to this Constitution, one had to be born in the islands or to a Filipino mother or father; citizenship could also be gained through naturalization, marriage to a Filipino woman, or a contribution of some real value in industry or service to the nation. The “Constitutional Program” also gave the vote to all taxpayers, “who from their profession or business or property have an annual income which will more than cover the necessities.”<sup>39</sup> This designation included females among the taxpaying elite, specifically endowing upon women, if a bit priggishly, both suffrage and the ability to hold public office “compatible with the dignity of their sex, provided they do not lead a licentious life.”<sup>40</sup> Perhaps more importantly, it attempted to fulfill important strategic gender needs by giving women unrestricted rights to study any type of art or science at government educational institutions and practice their professions freely. In this, the Philippine government was

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38. For discussions of the growth of Filipino nationalism, please see Abueva, *Ang Pagbubuo* and Corpuz, *The Roots*, Vol. 1. For discussions of the Philippine Constitution, see Agoncillo, *History*, and Malolos.

39. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, 75.

40. Ibid, 53.

responding to pre-Revolution pressures for expanded educational opportunities but was also expressing a recurring theme of female inclusion in the tradition of Rizalist propaganda. Aguinaldo recognized that Tagalog women, as heads of household, were influential, and he wrote to a confidante that he was worried their power could be exploited by political rivals.<sup>41</sup>

Tensions increased as the American troops began arriving in Cavite, first Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson in June, then Brig. Gen. Francis Greene, Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, and Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, overall commander of the Eighth Army Corps, in July. Gen. Wesley Merritt was an iron-bottomed cavalryman and intrepid Indian fighter, a Civil War “boy general” who cemented his fine reputation by fighting Comanches in the rocky hills and dusty scrub of Texas. Merritt conducted operations after Utes “massacred” Indian agent Nathan Meeker, and he helped Buffalo Bill Cody claim the “first scalp for Custer” only a few weeks after the battle at Little Bighorn.<sup>42</sup> Cody’s Wild West rendition of this infamous hair-lifting captured America’s imagination for decades after. Merritt, however, was a soldier not a showman; tough and uncompromising, he had spent almost thirty years fighting native insurgencies in the Territories. When President William McKinley needed a commander to secure Manila, Merritt was quickly dispatched. He took with him to the Philippines a rough and ready expeditionary force of almost 11,000 officers and men, mostly state volunteers, armed with Colt pistols, Springfields, and the more efficient Krag-Jorgenson rifles.<sup>43</sup>

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41. Ibid, 422.

42. Holloway, *Wild Life*, 29.

43. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 23.

Nonetheless, the task to take and hold Manila was unlike anything he had ever undertaken.

Merritt, under instructions from the War Department, avoided direct contact with the Filipino revolutionaries, who held the countryside and surrounded Manila. Aguinaldo, for his part, appeared “suspicious” and unfriendly and was certainly intent upon taking Manila himself.<sup>44</sup> The U.S. Army was equally determined to unilaterally occupy the city and establish a military governorship. On a daily basis, relations between the two militaries eroded as Americans and the Filipinos competed for territory on which to position their soldiers and support to advance their domestic and international positions.<sup>45</sup> The anticipated assault on the besieged city was postponed as the United States encountered difficulties bringing men and supplies to shore in June and July. During this period, Aguinaldo abandoned the Dictatorial Government and replaced it with the Revolutionary Government, succeeding himself as president.<sup>46</sup>

On July 30, Aguinaldo issued a decree outlining the organization of the Philippine Army of Liberation as the Revolutionary Government’s conventional military force. The decree specified terms of enlistment, composition of companies, and garrisoning of battalions, as well as provisions for the support soldiers’ families and widows if they were killed or disabled in combat. Further, in a reflection of strategic goals, the decree ordered that “the commanding officer shall above all things see to it that the honor of the

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44. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, Anderson to AG, July 9, 1898, 778; Wilcox, *Harper’s History*, 85.

45. Wilcox, *Harper’s History*, 50.

46. Taylor, *Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 1, 134.

Filipino army is raised to a high standard” with the understanding that “great discipline and respect for the law constitute the duties of honor of an army, in whose history courage and heroic self-denial stand out in unfading characters.”<sup>47</sup> This organization reinforced both the ideals of military manhood and the centrality of protecting women and families, but the practical matter of logistics and the integration of civilian resources into the military structure belied the ability of the new government to fully separate its conventional military from the population. The creation of the Army of Liberation almost instantly transformed local volunteers from the suburbs of Manila into regular soldiers. In reality, though, the decree did little to materially change the ongoing efforts; the men drifted from their fields and homes to the trenches based on prevailing operational conditions.<sup>48</sup> The Revolutionary Government lacked the resources to fully implement the decree’s agenda, and so relied on civilians to supply and support the soldiers. Whole families accompanied soldiers to the front lines, where women sold fruit to the Americans, enabling them to supply the Filipino soldiers manning the earthworks.<sup>49</sup> The Philippine Army could not sustain itself this way indefinitely, and needed leverage to improve its position.

Dewey continued his attempts to negotiate Manila’s surrender with Governor-General Basilio Augustin and military commander Gen. Fermin Jaudenes, hoping to circumvent Aguinaldo, whom the Spanish publicly refused to recognize. Inside the city, the situation was dire; Augustin was faced with a starving population (“they had eaten up

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47. Taylor, *Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 2, 229-234.

48. Wilcox, *Harper’s History*, 69.

49. Ibid, 69.

nearly all their horses”) and little hope of reinforcement.<sup>50</sup> The Americans couched their appeal in humanitarian terms, making the surrender a matter of protecting the sick, wounded, women, and children from further suffering.<sup>51</sup> Both Jaudenes and Augustin only cautiously communicated with the United States, fearing bloody retaliation for past abuses if the Filipinos were to take the city. Any agreement, they insisted, would require restraining Filipino revolutionaries from entering Manila to protect the Spanish civilians. Additionally, Spanish military code dictated that officers who capitulated without resistance could be court-martialed, so the garrison commanders were reluctant to yield. The negotiations were frustrating, and amidst the bargaining, Aguinaldo found a way to intervene in the hopes of leveraging access to Manila. Filipino revolutionaries in Macabebe had captured Augustin’s wife and five children and were holding them hostage.<sup>52</sup>

Foreign consuls became involved, mediating the tense discussions to secure the release of Señora Augustin and arrange the surrender of Manila. German Vice Admiral Otto von Diederichs demanded the liberation of Señora Augustin, but Aguinaldo flatly refused.<sup>53</sup> He instead sent a lengthy missive to the British consul, stating that his foremost

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50. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2. Anderson to AG, 9 July 1898, 778.

51. Agoncillo, *Malolos*, 191.

52. *New York Times*, “Spain's Despair In The Philippines; Captain General Augustin Appeals To Madrid For Help. His Means Near Exhausted Report From Hong Kong That His Family Was Captured By Rebels. Should Manila Capitulate A Spanish Minister Says The Government Would Still Resist Rebels And Invasion,” June 18, 1898, 1.

53. McCutcheon, “The Siege,” 39.

concern must be humanity and therefore, he could not free the hostages without concessions. The Spanish had not adhered to rules of civilized warfare and had killed without distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants; according to Aguinaldo, only the week before, Spanish soldiers had set fire to two barrios and shot the women and children as they fled. They also mistreated and murdered Filipino prisoners, and the Philippine government was prepared to hold Señora Augustin to ensure the protection of vulnerable citizens.<sup>54</sup> Aguinaldo appeared on the verge of forcing international recognition of the Philippine government and possibly circumventing the Americans in the contest to occupy Manila. However, Augustin stepped down from his position the next day, stating that he did not want Manila to fall while under the authority of the governor-general, as this would empower the revolutionaries.<sup>55</sup> Augustin then retreated into the city, claiming he could no longer communicate with Madrid, effectively eliminating Aguinaldo's advantage.

The Americans continued to press General Juadenes to surrender, but throughout July they met steady resistance and continued preparations to attack Manila. General Anderson cabled Washington his suspicions that "Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with

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54. Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 468/3, Aguinaldo to British Consul, June 1898.

55. *New York Times*, "Gen. Augustin Steps Down; He Does Not Want To Capitulate As Governor General Of The Philippines," June 19, 1898, 4; *New York Times*, "Augustin Shut Up In Manila; He Notifies Madrid That He Cannot Communicate Again. Wants A Joint Occupation City Seems Certain To Fall Before Our Transports Arrive. Spain Supposes The European Powers Would Not Permit The Rebels To Enter The Town," June 21, 1898, 1.

the Spanish authorities.”<sup>56</sup> A few days later, Dewey told Secretary of Navy John Davis Long that he believed the Spanish leadership would “surrender to U.S. forces at once, were it not for insurgent complication,” implying that the Augustin hostages were continuing to impede action.<sup>57</sup> Merritt, still refusing to recognize Aguinaldo, allowed General Greene to work with the Philippine Army, and he was able to clear the road between Cavite and Manila, positioning his own troops in the revolutionary trenches on July 29. Through the Belgian consul, Merritt and Dewey were finally able to make headway with the Spanish garrison, learning that Juadenes would capitulate in the wake of a sham battle if the United States would keep the Filipinos from entering the city. On August 13, Dewey bombarded Manila, and the Spanish displayed the white flag as planned. General Anderson sent a message to the Filipino forces warning them not to enter the city, but he could not prevent them from occupying important positions around Manila. The U.S. envoys accepted the Spanish surrender on August 14, allowing liberal terms; Spanish soldiers and citizens could keep their personal property, and their families would be repatriated as transport became available, visibly reinforcing the U.S. presence as security guarantor to the international audience. Negotiations to end the war between the United States and Spain accelerated, moving toward a formal meeting of delegates in Paris in October.<sup>58</sup>

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56. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, Anderson to AG, July 18, 1898, 781.

57. Trask, *The War with Spain*, 413.

58. *Ibid*, 413-417.

## Conclusion

The Philippine Dictatorial Government employed a multifaceted strategy to gain independence in the final months of the Revolution against Spain. After years of struggle, they were in what has been defined as the third and final phase of insurgency, a “running war.”<sup>59</sup> Having come out of exile, the Philippine government found itself capable of toppling the regime, establishing an administration, and mustering an effective military organization capable of conventional warfare. However, U.S. intervention and unconventional warfare tactics provided both opportunities and challenges for the revolutionaries. Aguinaldo and other leaders were able to return from Hong Kong with much-needed ordnance, but were then forced to negotiate a complex, three-way struggle for dominance with the protection of women and children shaping the mission of each army.

Aguinaldo’s strategy focused on gaining international recognition for his government and involved centralizing power, controlling the provinces, gaining diplomatic recognition from the international community, and influencing the United States so that the U.S. government would support Philippine freedom. As part of this effort, Aguinaldo sought to prove that the Filipino government was civilized, politically sophisticated, and capable of self-rule, linking these issues to conventional military power that abided by the international laws of war and Western cultural ideals. Scarce resources and autonomous local commanders undermined these efforts, but Aguinaldo demonstrated prowess and creativity in his tactical development. He was able to muster

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59. United States Military Academy, “A Doctrinal Template for Insurgencies, Part 3,” [http://www.usma.edu/DMI/IWmsgs/doctrinal\\_template\\_3of3.pdf](http://www.usma.edu/DMI/IWmsgs/doctrinal_template_3of3.pdf), (accessed March 2, 2009).



organized civilian cooperation to bolster the government's position, gaining their support in the billeting of prisoners when Dewey threatened dire consequences for failure. The voluntary contributions of civilians provided logistics to the front lines in the siege of Manila, whereby the Dictatorial Government was able to stretch a deficient treasury. Left out of the negotiations for Manila, Aguinaldo exploited the capture of Señora Augustin to expand his access to diplomatic channels and attempt to gain concessions, or at least greater sympathy for independence based on Spanish abuses.

Aguinaldo, however, was outmaneuvered by both the United States and Spain, who had greater resources and more power in the international community. European observer nations, colonial authorities themselves, would simply not extend recognition to the Philippine government while the United States stood poised to intervene. These diplomatic efforts served to place the Americans in the position of providing security and protection to the civilian population, undermining both the Spanish and the Filipinos in the tripartite power relations and legitimizing the U.S. mission. The Philippine government nonetheless saw some short-term success, enabling Aguinaldo to remain a participant and deflect attempts to delegitimize his government, but Filipinos could essentially only employ stopgap resistance measures that lacked the weight to meet strategic goals. They did signify the ways in which gender underpinned the Philippine war machine and the nature of the conflict. Civilians, particularly women, would be enrolled as both supporters and symbols, participating actively throughout the hostilities. Both Filipino and American leaders would seek ways to exploit and manipulate women's roles and women's labor to gain a military advantage. Filipino women, however, chose their own means, place, and time to engage in these activities, resulting in a contest

between the armies to control their actions. Support and resistance during the Philippine-American War would continue to emerge from distinct, and often independent, motivators. Mass mobilization of women was less common than individual responses to specific needs, although Filipino leaders at the strategic level would make efforts to win and maintain the loyalty of the female elite through promises of reform and attempts to provide essential security through a series of gendered maneuvers.

## CHAPTER FIVE: GENDER AND THE CITY: “PRESERVE PEACE AND PROTECT PERSONS AND PROPERTY”

“The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein . . . it should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of

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substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.”<sup>1</sup>

President William McKinley, *Benevolent Assimilation  
Proclamation*, December 21, 1898

Although the Spanish had yielded Manila with little resistance, the Americans entered carefully, with Gen. Wesley Merritt taking pains to make certain both American soldiers and Filipino civilians understood the conditions of the occupation. He announced that the U.S. Army would establish a military government to provide security, and conversely, the people were expected to cooperate.<sup>2</sup> The general orders to the troops and the proclamation to the Filipino people reflected General Orders No. 100 and the practice of martial law, but in Manila, the Progressive Army also emphasized the mission of civilization and Americanization.<sup>3</sup> The transition to American rule, however, was not

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1. McFerson, *Mixed Blessings*, 267-268.

2. Department of the Pacific and 8th Army Corps, *General Orders* 43.

3. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 56.

smooth. When U.S. soldiers first entered the city, “the Spanish women would throw anything that menaced us in passing the streets, from their windows. They would do anything to harass and endanger the lives of Americans that they could think of without exposing themselves too much.”<sup>4</sup> That the women would expend resources harassing American soldiers is remarkable, as many were starving and suffering from disease as a result of the siege. A provost guard was immediately charged with policing the streets and keeping order. Before many of the immediate needs could be addressed, Merritt departed on August 29, 1898, leaving Brig. Gen. Elwell Otis responsible for the U.S. Army’s Eighth Corps, the military governorship of Manila, and the unenviable dual task of diplomatic and administrative duties in a dirty, belligerent city.

Otis was a capable, hardworking, and experienced leader with a degree in law, but not a particularly likeable fellow. Luxuriously mutton-chopped and stoically visaged, he nonetheless suffered constant pain from old combat injuries and was, as Admiral Dewey remarked, “a pincushion of an old woman” who dashed unpredictably between lavish optimism and panicky doom-saying.<sup>5</sup> The Eighth Army Corps mission, according to the War Department, was to “preserve peace and protect persons and property” in territory held by the United States, specifically the city of Manila, Manila Bay, and the harbor.<sup>6</sup> To do so, Otis faced the overwhelming task of both strengthening his military position and making Manila suitable for occupation. Quarters and workspace for the Eighth Corps

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4. Freeman, *A Soldier*, 31.

5. *Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Summary*, 485-486; Robinson, *The Philippines*, 354. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 29.

6. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, Adjutant General to Merritt, August 17, 1898, 754.

needed to be arranged, and in many instances the initial living conditions were miserable, damp, and filthy, with inadequate sanitation.<sup>7</sup> Within weeks, the quartermaster secured leases on over a hundred buildings in Manila, negotiating with the men, women, and companies who acted as both owners and agents of the properties. The officers agreed to sometimes outrageous monthly rents, receiving a quick education in the acumen of Tagalog businesswomen who contracted nearly one third of the properties.<sup>8</sup>

Volunteer soldiers put their professional skills to use, cleaning streets, building bridges, restoring markets, creating fire departments, and opening post offices in an attempt to demonstrate the benefits of American occupation.<sup>9</sup> Inspectors conducted examinations of markets and family dwellings as part of the effort to reform and regulate. The provost guard enforced public sanitation measures by fining or detaining violators, and hassling Filipinos to clean their homes, sidewalks, and privies according to military standards, an act that brought the occupation government “squarely into conflict with the daily life of the great mass of people.”<sup>10</sup> These efforts were intrusive and costly for the native population, an unwanted imposition into private lives, and a drastic break from Spanish laissez-faire administration. Otis was able to make headway on public works projects despite resistance, largely through imposing strict consequences. Preserving the peace proved more challenging, however, as reform efforts strained gender relations, alienating the population.

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7. Linn. *The Philippine War*, 31.

8. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports*, 1899, Vol. 1, Part 4, 205.

9. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 26-27.

10. Faust, *Campaigning*, 111.

The people of “Manila met with decided opposition acts such as those designed to supervise the public markets, and the evasion of many public health codes was common.”<sup>11</sup> Although sources fail to explain this resistance in great detail, it is clear that most of these reform efforts interfered specifically with women’s roles as reproductive laborers, heads of household, and market traders, making the control of women an immediate site of contestation that was novel for this generation of Filipinos. The Spanish had applied a deeply gendered assimilation campaign in the early days of colonization, but active Hispanization of the Philippines had plateaued much earlier, in the eighteenth century.<sup>12</sup> The Americans, perhaps unwittingly as they did not fully understand the gendered division of labor, entangled their perceptions of basic reform with Tagalog femininity. Implicitly, these actions in Manila set the stage for gynocentric counterinsurgency by placing women at the center of stability operations and increasing the Army’s awareness of these roles through direct contact. This was where native women and American soldiers began negotiating the terms of the occupation.

### **Gender Relations and the Occupation**

Determined to conclude the revolution on their terms, the Filipinos pressed for joint occupation of Manila and recognition of their sovereignty. As Aguinaldo pointed out, he and his forces were there for a perfectly legitimate and necessary purpose. Until a treaty of peace could be ratified, the Filipinos could not possibly know whether their country was to be taken over or turned back to Spain; if Spain was to repossess the Philippines, the war of independence would have to be resumed and they would need

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11. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 70.

12. Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 7-10.

every inch of territory they had conquered.<sup>13</sup> Washington, however, mandated that “the insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States,” and Otis summarily threatened Aguinaldo with military reprisal unless he withdrew from Manila.<sup>14</sup> This action nearly provoked open hostilities, but Aguinaldo grudgingly moved his position farther into the suburbs on September 16, after he convened the Revolutionary Congress in Malolos to prepare yet another constitution defining the Philippines as an independent state.

The American soldiers were no less challenging for Otis. Fractious volunteers, who had signed on to fight in Cuba, not the Philippines, wanted to go home, but replacements were unavailable. Disease and disability had reduced Regular regiments by one third, Congress dithered about enlarging the army, and Otis had no choice but to hold volunteers to their terms of enlistment until relief arrived from the United States.<sup>15</sup> Poor sanitation, bad food, and inadequate housing were only a few of the immediate issues. Racial and cultural clashes exacerbated tensions, with the newly arrived U.S. troops assuming the attitude of conquerors rather than peacekeepers. American soldiers in general, remarked one journalist in Manila, had an “innate sense of an Anglo-Saxon race superiority,” and as a result, were “quite too much disposed to regard those whom we have encountered in our ‘expanding’ as, in their own language, either ‘---- niggers’ or

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13. Russell, *The Outlook*, 37; Agoncillo, *History*, 242.

14. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, Corbin to Merritt, August 17, 1898, 754; Ibid, Otis to AG, September 3, 1898, 786; Ibid, Otis to AG, September 7, 1898, 787.

15. Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 121.

‘---- Dagos.’”<sup>16</sup> Manila was a cosmopolitan city, and many of the state volunteers were native-born White men from rural Nebraska, Minnesota, and Colorado, who were often, at first, overwhelmed by the contrast to their home.

Private John Clifford “Jack” Brown, a newly arrived volunteer soldier, wrote his impressions of Manila, noting that the fashionable district around Luneta was “thronged with people, officers, civilians, Filipinos, Chinese and Japs, all driving, the women with no hats.” He was “much impressed with the oddity and strangeness of everything. Water buffalos and coolies and . . . wild-looking women with loose hair.”<sup>17</sup> Jack Brown was among a generation of American men who had matured in the aftermath of the Civil War and who tended to venerate military virtues, but sometimes felt as if the nation was imperiled by economic changes, a closing frontier, and evolving gender roles that subdued the essential elements of manhood: strength, piety, honor, and self-control.<sup>18</sup> Jack Brown’s apparent belief in at least some of the prescriptive ideals of his own White masculinity, as well as modest and restrained womanhood, is evidenced in the strangeness attributed to Tagalog women, the wildness perceived in conjunction with their dress, hairstyle, and doubtless their skin color and other characteristics left unsaid (see Figure 6).

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16. Robinson, *The Philippines*, 58.

17. McCallus, *John Clifford Brown*, 75-76.

18. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*, 32.





Figure 6. "A Spanish Mestiza: The father of this young lady is a Spaniard and her mother a Tagalog, or native woman, all descendants of these two races being called Mestizos. Some of the women of this class are said to be very beautiful, though an American would probably object to the irregularity of their features (1899)." *Source*: Courtesy of the New York Public Library.

Soldier's perceptions of Filipino women in Manila varied widely, from admiration for their business acumen and chastity to disdain for their poverty and personal habits, but these perceptions universally shaped the social power relationships of

the American occupation.<sup>19</sup> Brown, in a common and unconscious act, constructed Filipino women constitutively as a function of his own American masculinity and also in relationship to an ideal American femininity that distanced women from participation in war.

An American soldier's first experience with native women was often commercial, buying fruit or tobacco as they landed on shore, or patronizing the saloons, gambling establishments, and brothels that flourished in the occupied city. One American politician expressed his perception of Tagalog culture in a succinct evaluation of gender roles: "The fact is that what little business affairs are managed by the natives are largely conducted by the women, and the men spend most of their time in cockfighting and carrying roosters under their arms."<sup>20</sup> In these initial interactions, American soldiers were perhaps encouraged by newspaper headlines that read "Native Women of the Philippines—They Are Rather Pretty and Exceedingly Picturesque, But Are Not Over-Burdened with Intellect," and many, like Pvt. Robert McNair, "found the country and people very interesting, but not very bright."<sup>21</sup> As a result, they almost immediately ran afoul of the *tenderas* and *vendadoras* (the female shopkeepers and street vendors), who formed the foundation of the Filipino economy. American servicemen stole produce in markets,

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19. U.S. Army Military History Institute. *Spanish American War Survey*, John LaWall, 27th USV Infantry; Ibid, Leander Saunders, 47th USV Infantry; Parker, *The Old Army*, 238.

20. Affairs in the Philippine Islands, 93.

21. *The Weekly News and Courier*, "Native Women of the Philippines—They Are Rather Pretty and Exceedingly Picturesque, But Are Not Over-Burdened With Intellect," September 17, 1898, 3; U.S. Army Military History Institute, *Spanish American War Survey*, Robert McNair, 39th USV Infantry.

cheated merchants who weren't familiar with U.S. currency, bullied people in the streets, and entered private homes at will. In turn, native women doubled and tripled the price on their goods for sale and widely refused to obey military regulations.<sup>22</sup> Native men were no less resistant to the harassment. One journalist wryly commented that, in the course of these encroachments, "very likely the little man expectorated on the big American," and just as likely got knocked down for the audacity.<sup>23</sup> In this way, the power hierarchy began to be defined in colonial terms, with native women in the middle of the two competing masculinities. Tagalog resistance to the American occupation and support for the insurgency became a combination of group and individual effort, motivated by both personal need and a sense of community.

Civil-military relations, while controlled, were not tranquil. In an effort to preserve order, Otis further alienated the disgruntled state Volunteers by restricting free time and closing the saloons on Sundays.<sup>24</sup> Vice, as always, moved with armies at war. Luzon had been devastated by years of revolutionary fighting, and the people of besieged Manila had few resources, creating an environment vulnerable to crime and corruption with the influx of foreign men and money. Both American and Filipino governments attempted to control cockfighting, monte, lotteries, card games, liquor establishments,

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22. Arthur C. Johnson, "From Manila" *Rocky Mountain News*, July 27, 1898, 2; Robinson, *The Philippines*, 58; National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117, Vol. 2; Linn, *The Philippine War*, 37, 123.

23. Robinson, *The Philippines*, 58.

24. Linn, *Philippine War*, 33.

and illicit sex, largely to keep men healthy and focused on military matters.<sup>25</sup>

Nonetheless, for the American soldiers, there were always “plenty” of “poker and craps,” as well as “native vino” to sustain the favorite recreations of “gambling, drinking, and whoring.”<sup>26</sup> Filipino soldiers were similarly engaged. One enterprising Filipino general authorized games of chance in his district and received kickbacks from monte dealers, which he used to finance his *querida* (mistress), prompting a dour complaint to Aguinaldo and a request for him to support the local *presidente* in his reform efforts.<sup>27</sup>

Brig. Gen. Robert P. Hughes, Provost Marshal General of Manila, alarmingly saw the incidence of venereal disease increase from 0 to 300 in the first few months of the occupation.<sup>28</sup> In August, facing the same problem, Aguinaldo chose to continue the Spanish policy of inspecting and certifying prostitutes, and, on this one issue, the Americans and Filipinos were in full agreement. Hughes adopted a similar plan, funding the program by charging women a fee for the required examination by a contracted surgeon.<sup>29</sup> Securing the compliance of the women, however, proved nearly impossible. Although American inspectors instituted a rigorous system of surveillance and incentives,

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25. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, Otis to AG, 16 September 1898, 791; Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 527/9, Aguinaldo Decree against Cockfighting, August 1898; Aguinaldo, “Decree,” November 1898, Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, 387.

26. U.S. Army Military History Institute, *Spanish American War Survey*, Allan Mummery, 30th USV; Ibid, Frank Lloyd Rose, 30th USV; Ibid, John D. LaWall, 27th USV; Ibid, Mathew Cook, 30th USV.

27. Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 182/4, Bonifacio Arevalo to Emilio Aguinaldo, no date.

28. U.S. Senate, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, 514.

29. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, 194.

prostitutes and madams creatively resisted these efforts through deceit and dissimulation. They changed locations to avoid detection, hid undetected among the native population, and forged identity documents, employing many of the same tactics as guerrillas to thwart the American system.<sup>30</sup>

Historian Paul Kramer has shown that the regulation of prostitutes was a transnational issue “tied to the politics of gender in the making of U.S. empire.”<sup>31</sup> It is important to remember that gender is about social relationships of power, involving not only the positioning of men and women, but of competing masculinities and femininities. This contest is seldom viewed more clearly than in an occupying army, where male-dominated systems involve a hierarchy among men, producing different and unequal masculinities, always defined in relation not only to one another but to women.<sup>32</sup> Although the sex trade in Manila involved women of many different nationalities, including Americans, the U.S. Army, as well as Progressive reformers, constructed Filipino women as the source of disease. This representation contributed to American fears about miscegenation, and prescriptively linked liaisons with native women to moral degeneration, representing one way to assert dominance in the power structure.<sup>33</sup> These assumptions affected all native women, not just prostitutes, in their interactions with American soldiers as the occupation progressed, serving to define Filipino women more

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30. U.S. Senate, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, 514; Kramer, “The Darkness that Enters,” 375-376.

31. Kramer, “The Darkness that Enters,” 368.

32. Moser and Clark, *Victims, Perpetrators*, 15-16.

33. Kramer, “The Darkness that Enters,” 379.

as sexual objects than heads of household. At the tactical level, this construction allowed U.S. soldiers to easily categorize female revolutionaries as “mistresses” and “illegitimate.” However, while the suggestion of illicit sex providing justification for counterinsurgency tactics that were antithetical to American ideals of gender roles, it also blinded the U.S. Army to many forms of gendered resistance.<sup>34</sup>

On the part of the Filipino population, this process of construction was inherently a continuation of the struggle for dominance that had underpinned the Spanish occupation, with concomitant understandings of social positioning based on race and racial mixing. The issue of prostitution only underscored differing cultural ideas of legitimate sexuality. Under the Spanish friars, the cost of marriage was prohibitive, and as there was no alternative civil bond, many Filipino unions were simply common-law arrangements. The first civil governor of Manila, William Howard Taft, observed, “although the people are not licentious, they have not the same restraints upon them that there are in a city or country like this,” noting also that “among the lower classes public opinion regarded that relation between a man and a woman as not disgraceful, provided they were faithful to each other.”<sup>35</sup> Marital status was an immediate concern to Otis given Hughes’s difficulty in regulating native prostitutes, so he quickly legalized civil marriage, with two thousand native marriages taking place in Manila during the first three years.<sup>36</sup>

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34. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2132, Vol. 5; Ibid, Entry 2131, Vol. 4; National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117, Vol. 2.

35. U.S. Senate, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, 403, 234.

36. Ibid, 234; Devins, *An Observer*, 124.

The specter of moral degeneracy did not prevent intimate encounters between Americans and Tagalog women; on the contrary, it only complicated them. American soldiers supported “regular women,” just as Spaniards had kept *queridas*. Americans sometimes married their Filipino sweethearts, but colonial perceptions of superiority, coupled with different social concepts of licit sexuality, often made it difficult for American soldiers to understand native women as autonomous actors, even with intimate contact.<sup>37</sup> Customs such as female control of property and inheritance, maintaining one’s maiden name after marriage, and the wife’s role as business manager could be difficult for American men to accept. Methodist minister John Devins observed this phenomenon:

We saw . . . a discharged soldier who has learned more about the rights of Filipino women since he became the husband of one of them than he had known before. She had before marriage a considerable amount of property. She had been his wife for a year or two, and still owned the property. To his relatives and friends he speaks of "my house and lot," and "my summer home." Those who know the facts say that he supports himself by running an American saloon, of which he is the real proprietor; but the house and lot, the summer home, and other property to which he lays claim are in the wife's name, and will remain there as long as she lives and after her death they will go to her relatives.<sup>38</sup>

The soldier may have learned about the rights of Filipino women, but he had difficulty defining his own position in the family network, given it was so contrary to his own American masculinity. His assertions of dominance, and his wife’s equal resistance to relinquishing her property rights, kinship ties, and income, represent the distance between the two cultures and the contest over socially defined gender roles.

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37. U.S. Army Military History Institute. *Spanish American War Survey*, Charles Pefly, 43rd USV Infantry; Ibid, Purl Mulkey, 45th USV Infantry.

38. Devins, *An Observer*, 126.

This attitude was remarkably consistent. Sergeant Jack Maska drew cartoons during his time in the Philippines, stereotyping life in Luzon. His image of a Filipino village is a telling expression of American perceptions. Nipa huts and palm trees furnish the background. The ubiquitous pigs and chickens, staples of the Tagalog diet and prime targets of American foraging, share the mid-ground with two squatting men and their fighting cocks.<sup>39</sup> This portrayal of native masculinity aligns with other popular accounts that describe the Tagalog man as “an easy going, indolent, good natured fellow, whose most serious business in life is cockfighting and religious parades, dancing and other fiestas.”<sup>40</sup> In contrast, two bold Tagalog women, perhaps mestizas, fill the center foreground. One bears a basket of laundry on her head, the other has a baby with White facial features on her hip.<sup>41</sup> Maska explains the cartoon with the quip, “Why make a fuss about the ‘White Man’s Burden’? The native girls did not.”<sup>42</sup> In Figure 7, Maska’s visual image emphasizes the dual perception of Filipino women as sexual objects and domestic workers in the military regime. The placement of characters represents the colonial hierarchy in the marginalization of Filipino men and suggests the physical and practical comforts provided by women were a privilege of dominant White military

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39. U.S. Army Military History Institute. *Spanish American War Survey*, Mathew Cook, 30th USV Infantry; Ibid, Edward Whitehead, 46th USV Infantry; Ibid, Karl White Diary, December 5, 1899.


40. *Salt Lake Semi-Weekly Tribune*, “Aguinaldo and the Malays The Filipino Leader Not a Monkey Nor a Fool,” August 9, 1898, 3.

41. In the cartoon, both the mother and child smoke cigars, a native habit that intrigued Western observers, for more on tobacco, see Stuntz, “The Children,” 17; Robinson, *The Philippines, the War*, 279; Morris, *Our Island Empire*, 451.

42. Maska, *The Dog Robber*, 12; U.S. Senate, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, Albert Gardner, 1st U.S. Cavalry.



manhood. The picture also hints at the ways in which women fulfilled their own practical gender needs through layers of negotiation with two opposing masculinities. Filipinas formed a contested middle ground between American men and Tagalog men, but also asserted their own agency in their choices regarding relationships and work.



*Figure 7. Manks's "White Man's Burden." Source: South Dakota State archives.*

Perceptions of Tagalog women in the colonial context as sexual objects and domestic laborers underestimated their social position, however, and American civil and military leaders, after a period of observation, did acknowledge the cultural differences between American and Tagalog gender roles. In 1902, Taft responded to a question from the Senate Committee regarding whether equality of the sexes distinguished Tagalogs from other Philippine ethnolinguistic groups by asserting, "the fact is . . . that not only

among the Tagals but all the other Christian Filipinos, the woman is the active manager of the family, so that Archbishop Nozaleda said to me, 'If you expect to confer any political power upon the Filipinos here, you ought to give it to the women.' . . . The wife exerts great influence in the family, especially in trading and in bargain making; indeed, she may often be called the real head of the household."<sup>43</sup> Taft represented one side of a complex issue, and not all strategic or tactical leaders fully understood where Tagalog women fit into the social hierarchy, but many did, using this information to develop effective counterinsurgency tactics.<sup>44</sup> Despite the evidence that Tagalog female influence was recognized at the strategic level, decision makers were unable or unwilling to act upon the knowledge to formulate policy. Instead, they largely left these negotiations of power to tactical leaders, thereby deflecting the political implications of targeting females as part of counterinsurgency warfare. Taft's postwar assessment, however, demonstrates that the social positioning of Tagalog women as heads of household had enough tactical-level attention to filter up to strategic-level leadership, making the importance of gender roles to the war a matter of public concern and discussion.

### **Trenches and Trickery**

In October 1898, the wet southwest monsoon was yielding to the dry northeast monsoon, and although the seasons were changing, the contention over Manila was not. Otis sent Aguinaldo a lengthy missive stating that the Army of Liberation was still occupying territory ceded to the United States under the Spanish capitulation and demanding a further withdrawal of Filipino forces from the trenches they had been

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43. *Affairs in the Philippines*, 93.

44. Becker, "Conditions Requisite."

constructing. A brief negotiation followed, but Otis refused to grant any concessions, other than extending the deadline. Aguinaldo responded by briefly reinforcing his position north of the city. Otis countered forcefully, refusing Aguinaldo any claim to the suburbs and halting the movement of Philippine infantry. Aguinaldo, still concentrating on the provinces, pulled his troops from the contested area just before the ultimatum expired. Otis appeared satisfied and turned his attention to other matters.<sup>45</sup>

Aguinaldo, too, was engaged in a multifaceted agenda. Most of the provinces were under Filipino control, with a few isolated pockets of Spanish soldiers holding out as their government negotiated with the United States. The Philippine government, however, only held real power in the Tagalog heartland near Manila.<sup>46</sup> Draft copies of the proposed constitution began circulating on October 25, and Aguinaldo sought to establish a firmer hold on the general population, but the people proved difficult to sway. The government initiated a number of civil projects to gain support, holding municipal elections, sending a male and a female teacher to many contested towns to establish schools, and resuming postal and telegraph service. More challenging was the effort to provide security against the *ladrones*, or bandits, who roamed the devastated countryside. Criminal activity was such a problem in Laguna that the headman of San Pablo had to concentrate the population of the surrounding barrios in the town to provide for their safety. War, either between Filipino factions or with the Americans, appeared likely.<sup>47</sup>

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45. Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 21-23.

46. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 2, 108.

47. *Ibid*, 104-109.

Although the rhetoric remained positive and congenial, Aguinaldo was preparing for this eventuality.<sup>48</sup>

The areas under the Philippine government's control began to show signs of readiness. American officers traveling to outlying towns on reconnaissance missions were met with both overt and covert counterintelligence operations.<sup>49</sup> American soldiers in Manila also noticed that the "friendly natives" were suffering from a "fatal epidemic of some character, judging by the number of caskets taken outside." Each day, male and female mourners carried caskets past the American guards, despite orders to search all boxes, trunks, and baggage. For over two weeks the coffins flowed through, until the guards' suspicion overcame their reluctance to muddle with dead bodies. They opened one, found it packed full of Mauser rifles, and "this ended the funerals." Other such deceptions occurred throughout the city. Filipino prisoners escaped by "exchanging clothing with their wives, who were permitted to visit their husbands in jail, the man passing out and leaving the woman in prison. A great many prisoners escaped in this way before the scheme was discovered."<sup>50</sup> Guns and men were in short supply, and these acts contributed much-needed resources to the war effort. Civilian cooperation and subterfuge, finding early success in Manila, would be a mainstay of the Filipino resistance.

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48. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, Aguinaldo to Filipinos, October 26, 1898, 393.

49. Ibid, Lt. Colonel of Paombong to Aguinaldo, November 22, 1898, 408; Ibid, Provincial Chief of Morong to Aguinaldo, November 28, 1898, 415.

50. Freeman, *A Soldier*, 31.

During the initial occupation, American soldiers generally subscribed to their social conditioning and rarely suspected female resistance or held women responsible for devious acts. Filipino men, Americans often felt, were by nature untrustworthy, but women were seldom characterized in this way.<sup>51</sup> A U.S. Army officer asserted, “The American Indian is often accused of treachery and deceit; but in comparison with the Filipino he is white as snow. The Filipino is sensitive, treacherous, deceitful, an abject coward, overbearing when in power, and fawning when not; he is cruel, sober, economical, industrious, and kind to women and children.”<sup>52</sup> Jingoist rhetoric and ideals of military masculinity created expectations about male and female roles in warfare that placed the onus of resistance on “treacherous” Filipino men. Common assumptions about the “Filipino character” determined the nature of the relationship between Americans and Filipinos. One American merchant who had lived in the Philippines for three decades advised military leaders that, “although, like all Malays, they are a fighting race, there is no trouble in getting along with them if foreigners do not meddle with their women.”<sup>53</sup> Early U.S. efforts to regulate prostitution were specifically designed to accommodate this belief, and although they resulted in unintended consequences, the treatment of native women was important to the military mission.<sup>54</sup> At the same time, Otis was convinced that the Philippine government was in the hands of “very radical men.” He focused his

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51. Philippine Information Society, *Facts about Filipinos*, 15; Young, *Life and Heroic Deeds*, 250; Conger, *an Ohio Woman*, 131, 149, 162; Bellairs, *As It Is*, 221.

52. Kennan, “The Philippines,” 309.

53. *Ibid.*, 306.

54. Kramer, “The Darkness that Enters the Home,” 378.

attention on the idea that a few revolutionary men, not the general population, were responsible for the unrest, effectively concealing women as agents in the struggle.<sup>55</sup> American values and assumptions enabled native women to engage in resistance by offering them a certain amount of protection. These perceptions were supported across the leadership hierarchies of both the Filipino and American militaries, where protection of women and children was foundational to competing masculinities.

Just as gendered security was a central issue in diplomatic interactions prior to the Battle of Manila, it continued to be a site where power was negotiated during the occupation. The U.S. Army had a specific mission in the Philippines to “protect persons and property,” a task that corresponded well to the moral principles that had stirred the Spanish-American War, the patriotic fervor of mass enlistments, and Progressive manhood. Despite the tactical-level friction between the American soldiers and *Manileños*, the strategic-level leadership was keenly aware of the protective imperative.<sup>56</sup> The Philippine government was perhaps even more sensitive to this rhetoric given its desire for diplomatic recognition by the “civilized” world. In response to Spanish atrocities, the *New York Times* unequivocally asserted that, “The way a nation treats its women is the mark of its standing among the world of nations, and shows in an instant its state of civilization or of savagery.”<sup>57</sup>

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55. Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 65.

56. Ibid, 81-82.

57. *The New York Times*, “A Spanish Woman’s Terrible Experience! The Difference Between Spain’s Brutality to Women and Anglo-Saxon Humanity,” July 31, 1898.

Aguinaldo was certainly responsive to this sentiment. Reports that Col. Antonio Montenegro, one of the four high ranking Filipino leaders in charge of the area surrounding Manila, was living with a woman against her will caused Aguinaldo to intervene with a scathing reprimand.<sup>58</sup> Aguinaldo informed Montenegro that his abuse of power reflected negatively on the prestige of the government that had commissioned him. He reminded Montenegro that the foreign powers were watching closely, and such actions could be used against them, undermining the Philippine government in their diplomatic relations. In Montenegro's case, the situation was clearly an exploitation of position for personal gain. Aguinaldo, however, was caught between a strategy that relied on conventional warfare and his weak state's lack of resources. The result was an intrinsic groundwork for guerrilla action established by both the government's reliance on civilian support and civilians' perception of insecurity, which caused them to resist, if only on a personal level.

This framework built on the activities of the Revolution and was apparent in the early days of the occupation. Despite noting that insurgents were recruiting civilians throughout the city, Pennsylvania volunteer John Henry Asendorf decided to use a day of leave to visit the countryside. He traveled four miles outside Manila, passing through groups of Filipino soldiers, who "by their looks and action are preparing for Trouble. . . . I seen at least 1,000 Insurgents Soldiers and many Women with weapons. It was rather a dangerous trip on my part, we were halted at three different times but had no trouble but

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58. Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 5/5, Aguinaldo to Montenegro, August 31, 1898.

was glad when I was back in the City.”<sup>59</sup> It is unlikely that the women were combatants, but they may well have been armed because of the general unrest, or perhaps they were influenced by a murder that had occurred just a few days before: indigenous Macabebe Scouts, a group cooperating with the U.S. Army, had stabbed a woman thirteen times. The provost guard increased the number of arrests, but failed to bring in the perpetrator or perpetrators of the crime.<sup>60</sup> Native women, often alone or isolated from their male kin, developed resistance tactics to maintain personal safety, and these basic efforts often became embedded in their daily lives as the conflict progressed.<sup>61</sup>

### **Benevolent Assimilation and Patriotic Blood**

In the midst of this instability, the Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10, officially ending the Spanish-American War. Spain gave up all rights to Cuba and surrendered Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States, spurring a flurry of response. In the United States, anti-imperialists squared off against expansionists, effectively halting the ratification process in Congress.<sup>62</sup> In the Philippines, advance word of the agreement had arrived on December 7, escalating violence. Aguinaldo issued orders to leaders in the provinces that no merchant ships were allowed to dock without authorization, unless they were arriving directly from a foreign port, in an attempt to

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59. John Henry Asendorf Diary, November 23, 1898, December 11, 1898.

60. Ibid, December 4, 1898.

61. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4327, Vol. 1; National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 5032, Vol. 1.

62. The anti-imperialist debates have been widely covered, for further discussion see Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*; Ninkovich, *The United States*.



block U.S. ships from moving through the islands.<sup>63</sup> The next day, Col. Juan Cailles sent word that three thousand Americans were in front of his position at Singalong and vowed that he would open fire if they proceeded into Pineda.<sup>64</sup> Native *tulisanes* (robbers) attacked the Army of Liberation at Camiling, setting fire to the village and sending the population fleeing into the countryside, while the people of the town waited for Aguinaldo to reply to their charges of corruption against the local president.<sup>65</sup> As a further complication, Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller had to be dispatched to hold Iloilo upon the evacuation of the Spanish, an act that Otis felt satisfied Aguinaldo, because “fighting would certainly commence on Iloilo with the landing of our troops, which would excite the natives of Luzon into active hostilities.”<sup>66</sup> While Miller attempted to negotiate the safety of petrified European and American civilians in Iloilo City, Otis received President William McKinley’s “Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation,” announcing the United States’ intentions to occupy and administer the Philippine Islands.

Otis’s legal training and existing operational posture doubtless sensitized him to the proclamation. Upon reading it, he thought that McKinley’s wording would be inflammatory, and set about with a fine pen to edit the piece into a form more palatable to the Tagalog audience. He felt references to U.S. “sovereignty,” “protection,” and “right of cessation” could be used by the Tagalog leadership to incite the populace to war.

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63. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, Aguinaldo “Orders,” December 8, 1898, 432.

64. Ibid, Cailles to Aguinaldo, December 9, 1898, 433.

65. Ibid, Macabulos to Aguinaldo, December 18, 1898, 436.

66. Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 59.

Unfortunately, General Miller at Iloilo had also received an original copy along with orders for its distribution and dutifully presented it to the public. Although Otis released his own version on January 4, he could not prevent the damage done by Miller's distribution. The revolutionary press responded with a deluge of anti-American propaganda, Aguinaldo issued a counterproclamation, and, Otis remarked, "the women of Cavite in a document numerous signed by them, gave me to understand that after all the men were killed off, they were prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence of their country."<sup>67</sup> Otis took the women's pledge as a grand statement of ideals, rather than a substantive claim to action, as indeed it was probably intended. However, the grave possibility of a full civilian mobilization was revealed in the Philippine government's plan for resisting the policy of benevolent assimilation.

The pretense of cooperation between the Philippine government and the United States was all but abandoned, and Aguinaldo set about organizing his forces to take Manila. The U.S. Army had about eight thousand officers and men in Manila, and another eleven thousand spread out some sixteen miles in a defensive line around the city, while the Philippine Army of Liberation commanded an estimated fifteen thousand officers and forty thousand men, although the true number of Filipino soldiers is impossible to ascertain.<sup>68</sup> The Filipino soldiers had made good use of their time since the occupation began, constructing imposing breastworks, reinforcing trenches, positioning artillery, and smuggling arms in and out of the city. They had also been recruiting and organizing *sandatahan*, or native militia, as a supplemental partisan force within the city.

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67. Ibid, 67-70.

68. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 42.

Shortly after the “Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation” became public, the Philippine government developed a plan for the seizure of Manila and issued instructions to the sandatahan in the city. This document was a curious contradiction to conventional operations and tactics, and its gendered implications would be used extensively by Americans to discredit Filipino claims to self-rule. Although partisan involvement would have been acceptable under the precepts of General Orders No. 100, Aguinaldo issued several orders that proved devastating to his strategic goals. Sandatahan were encouraged to spy on the Americans and locate secret places to gather for surprise attacks, developing a scenario for offensives contrary to the international rules of warfare. The sandatahan captain was instructed to send an advance party of four men bearing a gift to the American commander in an unthreatening manner, and once they had gained access, they were to facilitate a lethal surprise attack on the barracks.<sup>69</sup> Deception was understood as a military necessity under the United States’ Articles of War, but betrayal was not. Military law specifically equated such actions with savagery, condemning them as violations of the rules of war, and further claimed, “Civilized nations look with horror upon . . . the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.”<sup>70</sup> If the plan had only involved spying and surprise attacks, though, the damage may not have been as severe. However, the native militia’s tactics also explicitly undermined andocentric ideals of combat, and these aspects were particularly offensive.

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69. Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 206/5, “Instructions to the Brave Soldiers of the Sandatahan of Manila” (original in Spanish); Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, “Instructions to the Brave Soldiers of the Sandatahan of Manila,” (translated into English from original Tagalog and Spanish), 479-484.

70. Davis, *Military Laws*, 792, 798.

Earlier successes with gendered deception and civilian participation likely influenced Aguinaldo's tactics. In order to position the larger militia forces for a surprise attack during the battle for Manila, the sandatahan needed to quietly kill the barracks' guard. The orders were specific: "One or two should go in advance to kill the sentinel by employing some artifice such as dressing like a woman, so that the sentinel may not be able to fire his rifle."<sup>71</sup> This tactic exploited the U.S. Army's unambiguously gendered mission to protect women, and the masculine principles of warfare that precluded female participation.<sup>72</sup> Aguinaldo also mandated direct participation of presumed noncombatants throughout the city, further violating the Lieber Code. He ordered sandatahan chiefs to see that households had vessels filled with water, tallow, molasses, and other liquids to boil and pour down on the Americans as they passed through the streets. The sandatahan would be stationed with their weapons on the ground floor of the houses, "and on the top of same, women and children . . . shall throw the liquids."<sup>73</sup> Although he must have been aware that these actions were contrary to Western ideals and would certainly be vilified, Aguinaldo inexplicably ended his instructions with the reminder that "it is essential that the foreign nations who contemplate us be impressed with the best possible opinion."<sup>74</sup> In

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71. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, "Instructions to Sandatahan," 480.

72. Filipino guerrillas would continue to utilize female costume as a means to gain the advantage in operations throughout the war, see Borrinaga, *The Balangiga Conflict*, 83. Borrinaga offers a detailed discussion of gendered violence and resistance in the revolt on Samar.

73. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, "Instructions to Sandatahan," 481.

74. Ibid, 481.

reality, however, the instructions to the sandatahan proved disastrous for Aguinaldo's grand strategy by undermining his attempts to construct Filipino men within the ideals of Western civilization. The use of women and exploitation of gendered resistance tactics offended the foundations of Western masculinity and justified American aggression. Although Filipino forces in the Battle of Manila did not follow the written orders, the "Instructions to the Sandatahan" were frequently cited for years to challenge the legitimacy of the Philippine government and the ability of Filipinos to rule themselves.<sup>75</sup>

Otis became aware of the "Instructions to the Sandatahan" only in 1900, when American soldiers captured copies from Filipino forces. He forwarded them to Washington in May, and they soon appeared in the *New York Times*.<sup>76</sup> Aguinaldo was by this time pursuing a guerrilla war and had developed a strategy that hinged on the November presidential elections in the United States. He was increasing attacks on American soldiers, hoping that large numbers of casualties would hinder McKinley and help usher anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan into office.<sup>77</sup> Secretary of War Elihu Root, campaigning for McKinley, presented the "Instructions to the Sandatahan" to the

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75. A Retired Army Officer. "As We Treated Filipinos.; The Water Cure Was Necessary, and Cruelty Was Provoked," *The New York Times*, May 31, 1915, 6; *Affairs in The Philippines*, 522-528; Worcester, *The Philippines*, 80-84; Philippine Information Society, *Facts About Filipinos*, 37; *The New York Times*, "Aguinaldo's Orders to Kill Americans; Told Manila Forces How to Ambush United States Troops. Advised Use of Boiling Oil; Charged his Men to Make a Ferocious Onslaught, But to Spare Their Prisoners," September 6, 1900, 1.

76. *The New York Times*, "Aguinaldo's Orders to Kill Americans; Told Manila Forces How to Ambush United States Troops. Advised Use of Boiling Oil; Charged his Men to Make a Ferocious Onslaught, But to Spare Their Prisoners," September 6, 1900, 1.

77. Gates, "Philippine Guerrillas," 51-64.

American public to justify U.S. actions in the Philippines.<sup>78</sup> Although McKinley's reelection did not depend solely on the Philippine issue, Root's platform was firmly incorporated into the expansionist discourse that steered public opinion. In a similar manner, University of Michigan professor Dean Worcester included the text of the "Instructions to the Sandatahan" in his validation of American imperialism, and the Philippine Information Society likewise published it in its whole form as a negative example of the Filipino character.<sup>79</sup> As part of his defense against allegations of atrocities, Gen. Robert Hughes asked that the "Instructions to the Sandatahan" be read to the Senate committee.<sup>80</sup> The issues of gendered tactics made these political attacks on Filipinos and Philippine independence especially effective and virulent.

The implications of the "Instructions to the Sandatahan" are particularly clear in a postwar letter to the *New York Times* by "A Retired Army Officer" entitled, "As We Treated Filipinos: The Water Cure Was Necessary and Cruelty Was Provoked."<sup>81</sup> Written in response to atrocity allegations, the letter contended that American soldiers behaved with amazing self-restraint given the violations of the rules of war on the Filipino side. Four of the twelve sections of the "Instructions to the Sandatahan"—those that

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78. *The New York Times*, "Secretary Root On Campaign Issues; Makes Public New Documents In Speech At Canton. Aguinaldo's Orders In June Told His Followers To Show Activity Now—His Hope In Bryan. Other Filipino Papers—A Strong Defense Of Army—Bryan's Remedy For Trusts Ridiculed—A Paramount Issue Defined," October 25, 1900, 5.

79. Worcester, *The Philippines*, 80-84; Philippine Information Society, *Facts About Filipinos*, 37.

80. *Affairs in the Philippines*, 522-528.

81. A Retired Army Officer, "As We Treated Filipinos," 6.

specifically mentioned using female clothing and women's participation—were used to demonstrate the abhorrent methods of warfare employed by the Filipinos. To reinforce the objectionable tactics of Filipinos, the officer further referenced an order by the Philippine government that implicitly allowed the killing of American women and children in Manila.<sup>82</sup> The author felt that because American soldiers had been forced to confront women in combat, brutal punishments such as the water cure were not only justified, but necessary.

At the same time, the author denied American participation in gendered tactics, addressing accusations that American soldiers entered homes and gang-raped women and girls by unequivocally stating that such charges were “a malicious lie.” Although he admitted that rape occasionally occurred during wartime, he also upheld the ideals of American military masculinity by stressing that such criminals were severely punished within the law. He concluded by stating, “In a country [the Philippines] where the boys and women fight with the same weapons as the men, and where quarter is neither given nor expected, stern measures are necessary.”<sup>83</sup> The protection of women and children and their exclusion from war were fundamental to American concepts of military masculinity that shaped the mission abroad. These issues were carefully constructed in the discourse, where they served to both justify American actions and denigrate Filipino revolutionaries. Because gendered warfare was consigned to the uncivilized tactics, techniques, and

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82. For full text of Teodoro Sandico's order to “exterminate” all Americans, see Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 109.

83. A Retired Army Officer, “As We Treated Filipinos,” 6.

procedures of the natives, the U.S. Army distanced itself from condoning man-to-woman methods, no matter how necessary they were to counterinsurgency.

At the tactical level, the “Orders to the Sandatahan” proved equally disastrous to Filipino forces as the tensions escalated into war in early 1899. The Revolutionary Congress pushed the Malolos Constitution through a vote, and on January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo became President of the First Philippine Republic. Otis sent a short cable to Washington notifying the War Department of the events, and finishing with the brief assessment, “Excitement at Malolos, and threats to drive invader from soil.”<sup>84</sup> He observed that prominent Filipinos in the city avoided him and had, whether from fear or loyalty, pledged themselves—at least superficially—to the Malolos government. The Philippine government and the U.S. Army continued to discuss options for peace, with a final meeting on January 29 that ended in a stalemate. Conditions deteriorated as Filipinos fled the city and the Americans accidentally shot a woman and child.<sup>85</sup> The Army of Liberation assumed an increasingly belligerent and aggressive posture in the field. Otis was under orders to avoid armed conflict, and Aguinaldo needed time to strengthen his position both politically and militarily, so, despite the long escalation, the outbreak of hostilities on the night of February 4 was sudden but not entirely

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84. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, Otis to AG, Received January 23, 1899, 886.

85. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 41.



unexpected.<sup>86</sup> As one Iowa soldier commented, “Two armies, like two jealous women, could hardly occupy the same ground for long without difficulty ensuing.”<sup>87</sup>

The actual events of the evening are a subject of some dispute. Both sides have claimed that the other deliberately provoked the war, or, at least, were culpable for the ensuing battle.<sup>88</sup> Nonetheless, a few things are clear. An American soldier shot and killed a Filipino soldier, provoking a skirmish that spread along the opposing lines, resulting in firefights that lasted from eight o’clock in the evening until five o’clock the next day. Aguinaldo and many of his most trusted leaders were miles away in Malolos, taken by surprise and unable to direct operations. The sandatahan in Manila were also unprepared, and the few who responded according to plan were effectively suppressed by Hughes and the provost guard. A mass uprising, with support from the men, women, and children of Manila, failed to materialize. At the tactical level, the “Orders to the Sandatahan” were wholly unsustainable due to a conspicuous lack of systematic militarization throughout Tagalog society. Socially and materially, Manileños, specifically women, were unprepared to participate in organized combat despite efforts at the strategic level to draw them into the conflict. Aguinaldo perhaps misjudged women’s motivations and abilities to become involved in combat operations. It was a dreadful mistake because, in contrast, the U.S. Army fought aggressively, taking the offensive on the morning of February 5 and driving the Army of Liberation from its entrenchments and blockhouses, resulting in

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86. Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 93-96. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 42-45.

87. Markey, *From Iowa*, 166.

88. Legarda, *The Hills of Sampaloc*, passim; Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 76-81; Linn, *The Philippine War*, 42.

the largest conventional battle of the Philippine-American War.<sup>89</sup> The results were devastating for the Philippine Republic. The next day the U.S. Congress ratified the Treaty of Paris, formally laying claim to the Islands.

### **Lessons of the Second Manila Revolt**

The fighting around Manila continued throughout much of February 1899, with the U.S. Army and the Army of Liberation engaged in a conventional war of Aguinaldo's design, albeit underpinned by an American counterinsurgency focused on civilian pacification. American forces, supported by naval bombardment, pushed the Filipino soldiers away from Manila, forcing a retreat. The Army of Liberation regrouped twelve miles away in the suburb of Caloocan, protecting the railroad and the path to the Republic's capital of Malolos, but Caloocan fell bloodily to a U.S. Army offensive on February 10, leaving the Filipino forces in shambles. Aguinaldo responded by mandating the formation of town militias (*sandatahan*), requiring all men between sixteen and fifty-nine to arm themselves with bolos and unite under the municipal government for the common defense.<sup>90</sup> This directive marks the substantial devolution of power and decline of conventional capabilities, as Aguinaldo increasingly fell back on irregulars to supplement his stressed Army of Liberation.

A tactical shift in Filipino thinking was also reflected in Gen. Antonio Luna's new "Orders to the Sandatahan" for a second uprising in Manila, this time advocating "war without quarter" and the "extermination" of all non-Filipinos, "thus proving to foreign

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89. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 42-64. Linn offers a thorough and detailed analysis of the battle here; See also, Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 90-100.

90. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 57.

countries that America is not capable of maintaining order or defending any interests.”<sup>91</sup>

Luna was a cruel, hot-tempered commander who argued for the tactical necessity of guerrilla war early in the conflict, and his rhetoric was frequently inflammatory. He was so often at odds with Aguinaldo that the President had him assassinated only a few months later, but these orders demonstrated that the Philippine government’s initial strategy of emphasizing Filipino civilization and statehood through conventional military power was on the wane. Unable to prove their own conventional capabilities to the foreign audience, they hoped instead to discredit the American mission of protecting people and property, demoralizing the United States’ colonial enterprise. This critical moment represents the transformation of Filipino leaders once again into insurgents. The United States had won the power struggle in the international forum, but by delegitimizing the Philippine government, they forced the Filipinos to engage in the revolution by other means, more firmly seating the civilian population as a target for counterinsurgency operations.

In accordance with Filipino plans, the Manila revolt began with a fire in a brothel on the night of February 22. Forewarned by captured communications, the U.S. Army was prepared for the attack, so when flames swept through Binondo, they were quickly extinguished. Still, refugees filled the streets, running from pockets of rioters and snipers, eventually seeking safety behind American lines (see Figure 8). The Army of Liberation was supposed to simultaneously attack Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur’s forces north of Caloocan, but with the sandatahan failing to support the army, the Philippine soldiers

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91. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 4, “To the Field Officers of the Territorial Militia,” February 7, 1899, 546.

were once again without substantial civilian reinforcement. Hughes and the provost guard were able to restore order by the morning of February 23, driving the remaining militia out of Tondo's swamps. Thousands of homes were destroyed and several dozen Filipinos died, but the Philippine government gained nothing for those losses.<sup>92</sup>



**Filipino Women, by the Wall of Old Manila, Philippine Islands.**  
Copyright 1899 by Underwood & Underwood.

Figure 8. Filipino women and American soldiers inside the occupied city of Manila, 1899. Source: The Library of Congress.

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92. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 59-61; Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 109-111.

The Philippine government, or at least Luna, had believed that the offensive in Manila would bring about an uprising by “all Filipinos.” Servants were asked to burn the houses of their American and Spanish employers, and there was the idea that the populace would engage in mass revolt where blood would “run in torrents.”<sup>93</sup> Given the previous gender-specific instructions to the sandatahan and the plan that domestic workers, including maids, would set fire to houses during the revolt, women were again expected to participate directly in the fight. Instead, they fled the fires that burned most of the native suburb of Tondo and gave little, if any, assistance to the sandatahan. Tagalog women proved that they were unprepared to join in combat operations or become soldiers, exhibiting longstanding patterns of behavior in wartime by fleeing conflict and negotiating relationships of safety.<sup>94</sup> Filipino leaders mistook civilian involvement in support efforts or noncombat actions as a sign that they would join in an uprising, but females remained largely autonomous of the Army of Liberation and sandatahan during conventional battles. Efforts early in the war to involve groups of Tagalog women in military activities outside their socially defined roles proved difficult to coordinate, as the two unsuccessful Manila revolts demonstrate. During the decimation of Tondo, civilians

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93. Center of Military History. *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, Otis to AG, February 21, 1899, 913; Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 4, “To the Field Officers of the Territorial Militia,” February 7, 1899, 546.

94. *The Manila American*, “‘General’ Agueda, the Woman Insurgent General, is in Jail at Pila, Laguna,” January 26, 1902; National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2396, Box 3; Andaya, “Gender, Warfare,” 12-13. Agueda Kahabayan was commissioned as an officer by the government of the Republic of the Philippines and commanded a small guerrilla unit in the province of Laguna. Other women, particularly the wives of significant leaders such as Gregoria de Jesus and Hilaria Aguinaldo, accompanied their husbands into the field.

were jeopardized by both armies, and women used their position as “women” to leverage access to safety during combat operations rather than join the battle, a tactic they would develop further as the war progressed.<sup>95</sup> In this way, Tagalog female populations negotiated their own position at the center of the conflict, choosing their methods of confronting wartime violence, which most often played out at the tactical rather than the operational or strategic level.

As a result of the failures in and around Manila, the Filipino leadership stepped back from attempts to militarize the female population. Grand plans that included mass uprisings faded quickly from favor as the Filipino government lost ground and became mired in unsustainable conventional combat operations during the second half of 1899.<sup>96</sup> The government continued directing propaganda at female populations, fully understanding the importance of their support for the war, but these efforts now centered more on traditional gender roles. Nonetheless, Luna and Aguinaldo initially missed the larger gendered implications of the Manila revolt. They appear to have overlooked the inevitability of their civilian populations seeking security behind American lines, and in the upcoming months they would be unable to reverse the damage to their strategic capabilities as hundreds of displaced families reestablished households under the authority of the U.S. occupation forces and women engaged in resistance activities outside the control of strategic leaders. Although the autonomy of Tagalog women precluded the ready acceptance of top-down administration by either the Filipino or the

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95. Wilcox, *Harper's History*, 141.

96. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 5: 166-167, Trias to Aguinaldo, January 2, 1900.

American government, Luna's scorched-earth policies drove women into the control of the U.S. Army, further damaging Aguinaldo's already limited ability to leverage civilian populations from the strategic level.

### **Conclusion**

In 1898, the U.S. Eighth Army Corps mission in the Philippines was carefully constructed for both the world stage and domestic politics to legitimize the American presence. The clearly gendered objective to "preserve peace and protect persons and property" in territory held by the United States set the trajectory of the war. With limited strategic guidance, U.S. forces focused on civil-military operations during the first months in the Philippines. The Americans, perhaps unwittingly given they did not yet fully understand the gendered division of labor, entangled their perceptions of basic reform with Tagalog femininity. Implicitly, these actions in Manila set the stage for gynocentric counterinsurgency operations by placing women at the center of stability operations and increasing the Army's awareness of social roles through direct contact. This was where native women and American soldiers began directly negotiating the terms of the occupation. As a result of both top-down decision making and personal interactions, American soldier's perceptions of Filipino women varied widely, from admiration for their business acumen to disdain for their personal habits, influencing both Philippine and U.S. tactical development.

U.S. military regulation and Americanization were intrusive and costly for the native population, an unwanted imposition into private lives, and a drastic break from Spanish laissez-faire administration. Manileños responded in different ways, from low-level overt resistance to covert activities, forming a foundation for guerrilla resistance

and civilian support. Many of the U.S. Army initiatives interfered specifically with women's roles as reproductive laborers, heads of household, and market traders, making the control of women an immediate site of contestation. In this way, the power hierarchy began to be defined in colonial terms for the U.S. forces, with native women in the center of the two competing masculinities. Tagalog resistance to the American occupation and support for the insurgency became a combination of group and individual effort, motivated by both personal need and a sense of community.

Securing the compliance of the women, however, proved nearly impossible for either side. Filipino strategists saw opportunities afforded by willing female participation in certain support activities, but they were unable to draw native women, who had never been subject to widespread militarization, directly into more aggressive roles. Instead, indigenous women fulfilled their own practical gender needs through layers of negotiation with two opposing masculinities. These women formed a contested middle ground between American and Tagalog men but also asserted their own agency in their choices regarding relationships, work, and the war. Nonetheless, civilian cooperation and subterfuge, finding early success in Manila, would be a mainstay of the Filipino resistance. During the initial occupation, American soldiers generally subscribed to their social conditioning and rarely suspected female resistance or held women responsible for devious acts. Filipino men, Americans often felt, were by nature untrustworthy, but women were seldom characterized thus. Jingoist rhetoric and ideals of military masculinity created an expectation about male and female roles in warfare that placed the onus of resistance on Filipino men. American Progressive values and assumptions enabled native women to engage in resistance by offering them a certain amount of



protection. These perceptions were supported across the leadership hierarchies of both the Filipino and American militaries, where protection of women and children was foundational to competing masculinities.

In the colonial context, perceptions of Tagalog women as sexual objects and domestic laborers underestimated their social position, however, and American civil and military leaders, after a period of observation, did acknowledge the cultural differences between American and Tagalog gender roles. Despite evidence that Tagalog female influence was recognized at the strategic level, U.S. decision makers were unable or unwilling to act upon the knowledge to formulate policy. Instead, they largely left these negotiations of power to tactical leaders, thereby deflecting the political implications of targeting females as part of warfare. Taft's postwar assessment, however, demonstrates that the social positioning of Tagalog women as heads of household had enough tactical-level attention to filter up to the strategic-level leadership, making the importance of gender roles to the war a matter of public concern and discussion, shaping the intersection of gender and counterinsurgency.

**CHAPTER SIX: “WE COULD NOT SECURE THE OBEDIENCE OF WOMEN”:  
COUNTERINSURGENCY, COURTS, AND CONFRONTATION IN TOWNS  
AND HOUSEHOLDS**

*“Hibik Namin”*

*Mga kababayang tunay na kapatid,  
Tunghayan ang aming tapat na paghibik,  
Tapunan nang awa't mahabag sa tingin  
(tindig)  
Nang mga babayeng dito'y nagsititik.*

*Pagkatanto namin ng kuhilang asal  
Nang americanong labis nang kasamaan  
Sa sakit nang loob ang kulang na lamang  
Ay maubos kaming sa mapo'y lumual. . . .*

*Di pa sukat yaong madlang kahayupang  
Ginagawa nila sa pakikipaglaban,  
Pano't ang babayeng abutan sa bahay  
Na mapasok nila'y linalapastangan.*

*Kung minsa'y asawang angel sa pagibig  
O dalaga kayang uliran nang linis,  
Kapag inabuta't kanilang nagipit,  
Ang puri'y siya nang mulang pagkalait.*

*Dito magsitangis ang nangapahamak  
Niyaong pagkahulog sa kamay na sukab  
!kalangita'y kahit(bakit) di mo ibulalas  
Sa lupa ang bangis nang justiciang tapat!  
....*

*Ang pagsasarili'y ating ipaglaban  
Hangang may isa pang sa ati'y may buhay  
At dito'y wala na silang pagharian  
Kung hindi ang ating mga dugo't bangkay.  
....*

*Kayo namang mga nagsisipaniktik  
At nanganganyaya sa tanang kapatid  
Magbago na kayo nang masamang hilig  
At huag sa kualta mabuyo ang isip.*

*“Our Plea”*

Compatriots, true sisters and brothers  
listen now to this, our honest plea  
look with compassion and have mercy  
on the women who have written here.

We have known the wicked conduct  
of these scoundrels, blasted American  
soldiers  
the hurt we have been inflicted  
could almost wipe us off this earth. . . .

Why, when at every house they enter,  
Should they violate every woman they  
capture?  
These are the acts of brutality in war.  
This is the height of cruelty in battle.

She could be a wife who is an angel  
or a maiden so pure and clean,  
but once captured by American soldiers  
her honor is shamed and shattered.

Hear this plea from those who've been  
disgraced  
those who have fallen into the hands of  
traitors,  
Our voice may not reach the heavens now  
Yet on earth, justice will be fiercely meted.  
....

Let us fight for our independence  
And struggle, till the last fighter breathes  
Never again should we let anyone conquer  
us  
over our blood and over our dead bodies.  
....

And you who seduce

*Maniwala kayong pawang daya't hibo  
Nang Americano ang mga pangako,  
At kung matapos nang masunod ang buho  
Kayo'y ilulubog sa inyo ring dugo.*

....

*At baguhin iyang masasamang hilig  
Na kinagumunan nang kuhilang dibdib;  
Hangan dito kami't bahala ang langit  
Humatol nang tapat sa lalong matuwid.*

all our sisters and brothers in greed  
we urge you to change your ways and be  
wary  
and never again be tempted by money.

Believe us when we say these promises,  
of the Americans are lies and mere flattery  
for after they get what they want  
they will drown you in your own blood. . . .

So mend your devilish ways now  
Change that treacherous heart  
This is our call as heaven will judge  
In favor of what is right and just.<sup>1</sup>

On February 17, 1899, with the Philippine-American War only thirteen days old and Luzon in upheaval, nine women—Victoria Lactaw, Felipa Kapuloan, Feliza Kahatol, Victoria Mausig, Patricia Himagsik, Salvadora Dimagiba, Dolores Katindig, Honorata Dimauga, Deodata Liwanag—published a lengthy Tagalog poem in the revolutionary paper *El Heraldo Filipino*.<sup>2</sup> “Hibik Namin” (“Our Plea”) spoke frankly about the violation of women by American soldiers and their perhaps equal betrayal by Filipinos who collaborated with the occupying forces. In publicizing female victimization, the women presented their plight as both a personal struggle and a symbol of nationalism.

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1. Lactaw et al., “Hibik Namin,” *El Heraldo Filipino*, February 17, 1899. English translation and full text of the original newspaper piece appears in Quindoza-Santiago, *Ngalan ng Ina*, 225-228.

2. 2006 National Artist of the Philippines, Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, based a modern *sarsuela* (musical play) adaptation of “Hibik Namin” entitled “Hibik at Himagsik Nina Victoria Laktaw” [“Plea and Revolt of Victoria Laktaw and Friends”]. When I spoke with Dr. Lumbera about his interpretation of the poem, he stated that he felt the women used pseudonyms because of the possible repercussions from both Americans and Filipinos if their identities became public. Dr. Lumbera indicated that the words used for last names were significant: *himagsik* means “revolt or rebel,” *liwanag* means “bright light (beacon),” and *kahatol* refers to “judgment.” In the next year, the women did not publish again under the same names. I was unable to find any biographical information or other sources regarding any of the authors.

They asked readers to fight for Philippine independence, not only to protect Filipino womanhood, but for a more universal political sovereignty.

Nationalist fervor was unsurprising—the six-month American occupation of Manila emerged as only a temporary lull in a bitter five-year revolution—and elite Filipinas appeared frequently as anticolonial authors in newspapers, journals, literature, and theater.<sup>3</sup> Female propagandists used the press as a mode of resistance and often turned the same concept of moral degeneracy employed by American antimiscegenation reformers back upon the United States as part of their own rhetoric. *La Independencia* and *El Heraldo Filipino* printed articles, poems, and letters that invoked Filipino culture, positioning native women as moral guardians, ideal mothers, and bearers of national honor.<sup>4</sup> “Hibik Namin” was only one piece among many. A few days after it appeared, Esperanza Makapugay published her own Tagalog testament about the “atrocious manners” of Americans, accusing soldiers of trespassing, stripping women and stealing their money, and other crimes: “Just to satisfy their evil ways, they will not respect even the most respectful things. They are worse than the person bred in the wilderness . . . in that nation the mothers do not know how to teach; in that nation, honor is not known.”<sup>5</sup> These works adopted the discursive language of civilization, building on the theme of masculine protection to discredit the United States’ mission and woo the fragmented population to the side of the new Philippine Republic.

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3. Santiago, “The Flowering Pen,” 558-598; Riggs, “The Drama,” 279-285; Cervantes, “The Seditious Theater,” 2,289-90.

4. Mactal, “Ang Partisipasyon,” 20-21; Agoncillo, *History*, 250-251.

5. Esperanza Makapugay, “Atrocious Manners of the Americans,” *El Heraldo Filipino*, February 24, 1899. Carol Bello provided translation of the original Tagalog.

“Hibik Namin,” however, includes a unique subtext in its nationalist propaganda, expressing much more than a call to protect mothers and free the motherland. Although its prose emphasized the feminine position in the war, it also revealed a picture of the insurgent-counterinsurgent relationship that underpinned even the earliest days of the conflict. Victoria Laktaw’s enemies were not exclusively American soldiers, but Filipino “traitors” who chose to work with the “Yankis,” an issue of vital importance to the revolutionary movement. Filipino women who willingly provided services to U.S. military forces were among those who needed to mend their “devilish ways,” and “Hibik Namin” constructed the shame of moral “capture” or submission to the Americans as parallel to the mortification of rape or physical assault. “Hibik Namin” reveals the implications of McKinley’s Benevolent Assimilation policy, the bulwark of American counterinsurgency, by clearly identifying the household as a target of both the U.S. military and the Filipino revolutionaries. Although the poem did ask the reader to die for independence if he or she must, combat was in the periphery of its overarching message, consistent with the participation of Tagalog women in the war effort. The counterinsurgency was focused on the home, with the struggle centered on control of families, wealth, and cultural values that produced mechanisms of overt resistance. Writ large, this poetic sketch illustrates the conflicting tactical paradigms during the initial stages of the Philippine-American War, when American and Filipino forces began to better understand how counterinsurgency operations intersected with gendered resistance.

### **“Securing the Obedience of Women”**

After the second Battle of Manila, the war moved into the nearby suburbs, and the U.S. Army found civilians more important to its operational posture, even as it focused

on pursuing and defeating the Army of Liberation. By the end of March, Generals Wheaton, MacArthur, and Funston swept through the nearby villages of Meycauyan, Malinta, and Malabon, encountering stiff fighting from Filipino entrenchments as well as their first frustrating taste of chasing an elusive enemy.<sup>6</sup> Strategic failures by Americans regarding terrain and disposition of Filipino forces placed operational commanders in the impossible position of hunting a more mobile foe, prompting MacArthur to view his task of flanking insurgent forces “in the light of hope and not in the expectation of success.”<sup>7</sup> Many Filipino militia and citizen soldiers operated as guerrillas, hiding in the local communities and complicating American interactions with the civilian populations.

Security procedures in occupied areas necessitated tactical exchanges with frightened and resistant civilians. House-to-house searches for weapons and other contraband provoked unforeseen reactions, and the tolerance for intrusions by the U.S. military in Manila faded rapidly. Volunteer John Asendorf noted in his diary in late March that he had entered a house to search for weapons, “thinking it was deserted but on entering the Front Room a middle aged Woman with a long Machete jumped at me vigorous unexpected I stepped back a few Steps grabbed hold of a Heavy chair and felled her to the Floor where . . . I their disarmed her.”<sup>8</sup> Filipino women, while still reluctant to mobilize as part of a military initiative, were clearly willing to employ a variety of

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6. Young, *Life and Heroic Deeds*, 306; Ganterbien, *The Official Records*, 71-73.

7. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1899 Vol. 1, Part 5, 366.

8. Asendorf, *The War Diary*, 28 March 1899.

means, including violence, to fight against injustices or perceptions of danger.<sup>9</sup>

Asendorf's unanticipated encounter occurred against a larger backdrop of destruction and forced displacement that had quickly ratcheted tensions, initiating a change in the civilian response. During the occupation of Manila, unwarranted entries into private homes by American soldiers had largely been met with mild or passive resistance, but the newly elevated threat levels prompted more aggressive reactions, setting the stage for better-prepared and more-organized resistance from native households.

As the war spread outward from Manila in the summer of 1899, the Americans set homes and other buildings ablaze to destroy sniper positions and clear fields of vision, while the Filipino soldiers torched villages to disrupt the U.S. Army's advance.<sup>10</sup> With the lessons of the American Civil War still dominant, the U.S. Army seamlessly incorporated the calculated burning of houses into their Philippine tactics, even though there was much debate regarding the efficacy and morality of this policy at the highest levels.<sup>11</sup> Property destruction was supposed to be carefully regulated and authorized by officers who were accountable for the conduct of their men and any claims for restitution made against the United States.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless, tactical necessity and laxity or complicity by company-grade officers resulted in extensive property damage that placed civilians in precarious positions, as houses in the path of combat operations fell to the armies moving

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9. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 5107; Ibid, Entry 5103, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 5100.

10. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 115; Robert Hughes Diary, February 6-8, 1899, Hughes Collection, Library of Congress.

11. U.S. Senate. *Hearings*, 958-962.

12. U.S. Congress. *Document No. 151*.

through Luzon. The consequences were considerable, and one American soldier noted, “Almost every day women and children were brought in with burned hands and feet, the Filipinos burning every town which they thought was about to be captured, and the women and children suffered; doubtless, many were burned to death.”<sup>13</sup> Journalists and eyewitnesses wrote that the productive countryside was ruined by the passing armies, farm fields were flattened, buildings were burned to the ground, and blackened towns were abandoned by homeless refugees.<sup>14</sup> Luna himself ordered much of the destruction, and in a cruel irony, condemned his own people to poverty and starvation, making negotiations between Filipinos and the U.S. Army inescapable. The burning of houses and the restricted movement funneled displaced persons into occupied areas and shaped the demographics of local counterinsurgency and resistance.

The town of Malabon was burned as soon as Wheaton's brigade advanced past it, with nearby Malinta and Meycauayan meeting a similar fate. Devastated by both armies and occupied by companies B and D of the Third U.S. Infantry under Captain Arthur Williams on April 5, 1899, Malabon provides an early window into the development of U.S. counterinsurgency tactics. With little strategic guidance about pacification, Williams viewed the April 4 “Proclamation of the First Philippine Commission” as providential. Outlining “certain regulative principles,” the proclamation provided company-grade officers with a foundational policy and a vehicle for tactical innovation. The proclamation invoked the Lieber Code’s tenets, establishing a simple system of reward and chastisement with all the benefits of civil rights, prosperity, and liberty available to

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13. Freeman, *A Soldier*, 35.

14. Wright, *Leslie's Official History*, 610.



those who accepted U.S. sovereignty, while “those who resist it can accomplish no end other than their own ruin.”<sup>15</sup> The U.S. soldiers in Malabon seized the spirit of the proclamation and instituted an incisively gendered counterinsurgency effort that demonstrated a thoughtful evaluation of both their mission and the Filipino resistance.<sup>16</sup>

Property destruction, displacement, and regulation of civilian movement were tactical drivers in the early days at Malabon. Large numbers of Filipino men joined the Philippine Army of Liberation or separated from their families, leaving behind a substantial population of vulnerable women, children, and elderly. The U.S. military had initially allowed free trade between Manila and the suburbs and provinces, but as intelligence collection platforms improved and U.S. soldiers became savvy about enemy tactics, commanders reassessed this policy. It soon became clear that civilians supported insurgents through the levy of revolutionary taxes and by providing food, fuel, fabric, and other essentials. Otis sought to deprive the Army of Liberation of necessities, enforcing both land and naval blockades that limited the movement of people and supplies.

Native men were therefore prohibited from carrying any amount of rice in or out of Manila, whereas women and children could possess up to two pounds of the precious commodity. This regulation of traffic and trade contributed to the female majority represented in the masses of civilian refugees.<sup>17</sup> The Army instituted a system of passes and searches in February 1899, and Williams received a letter from headquarters

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15. Worcester, *The Philippines*, 977-980.

16. William Kobbe Papers, Cap. Arthur Williams to Maj. William Kobbe, May 31, 1899.

17. National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117; National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 820; Ibid, Entry 808.

instructing him that, although native men could enter Malabon, “no Philippino men will be allowed to pass our lines. . . . Women and children will still be allowed to cross our lines going to and from Manila, as the prohibition applies only to men.”<sup>18</sup> This policy of controlling civilian mobility had three primary consequences. First, it set in motion tactical food deprivation, allowing officers to implement reward and chastisement through the distribution of rice to families.<sup>19</sup> Second, women became the main source of commerce and transport, and therefore a target of both armies. Finally, it clearly gendered resistance activities by generating a cohort of female smugglers, many of whom found this activity compatible with both their gender roles in a market economy and practical needs.<sup>20</sup> As a result, the garrison at Malabon was faced with a transient female population that clogged the river and avoided the town.

For Williams, the first hurdle to pacification was enticing displaced families, specifically women and children, back into the village because their presence “promised security as far as internal disorders were concerned.”<sup>21</sup> The Third Infantry worked to stop looting, improve material welfare, and provide protection as a means of reestablishing households in Malabon. Such concerns were complicated by difficulties policing traffic and the anxieties of refugees regarding American intentions; one soldier remarked in his

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18. National Archives, Record Group 391, Entry 1088.

19. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 5098, Vol. 1.

20. Ibid, Entry 4327, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry 4751, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 5096; Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

21. William Kobbe Papers, Cap. Arthur Williams to Maj. William Kobbe, May 31, 1899.

diary, “Outpost guard along the Pasig river . . . stopped all canoes passing by and examined contents, got lots of tobacco and fruit . . . stopped one old woman who cried and begged me not to search her.”<sup>22</sup> Williams specifically requested Headquarters to investigate “indignities to women” perpetrated by soldiers during checkpoint searches, suggesting he understood alienation of females to be counterproductive to his operational objectives (see Figure 9).<sup>23</sup>



*Figure 9. “A welcome to Uncle Sam’s protection - three Filipinos entering American lines, Pasay, P.I., 1899” Source: The Library of Congress.*

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22. *SAWS*, John Lorentz Diary, Co. I, 30th USV Infantry.

23. National Archives, Record Group 391, Entry 1088.

By bringing women back to their homes, under direct military control, the Americans hoped to convince them that the promises of safety and prosperity in the “Proclamation of the First Philippine Commission” were genuine and thereby undermine the power of the Filipino government through benevolent assimilation. Concerted efforts to maneuver women into positions favorable to military rule underscored the prescience of Victoria Laktaw and her friends.

The immediate concern in burned-out Malabon was providing for practical needs, and to that end, the Army facilitated the resumption of wage labor and trade. A local cigar factory, owned by Swiss investors, soon went from fewer than 30 employees to over 600, presumably women who had been traditional sources of tobacco factory labor. Fishing and agriculture were likewise promoted. Williams permitted civilians under his authority to harvest the ylang-ylang flowers as a cash crop wherever the owners were absent. Still, food was scarce in the absence of any place to exchange goods, and Williams noted with emphasis, that Filipinos “are traders by instinct. . . . *Markets* are absolutely essential. . . . To establish and extend the markets and to regulate them, gave us considerable thought and no little concern and some labor.”<sup>24</sup> It was fortunate for Williams’ policy that refugees had established a clandestine floating market on the river, and he was able to coax these vendors, primarily women, under the supervision of soldiers by building them a commercial venue inside Malabon proper. Severe shortages of rice and fruit in the village soon prompted a flourishing barter economy from the influx of traders.

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24. William Kobbe Papers, Cap. Arthur Williams to Maj. William Kobbe, May 31, 1899, USAMHI.

The implementation of such basic measures as wage employment, an open market, and a safe environment was successful—perhaps too successful. Malabon's population swelled from a few hundred to over 10,000 in just two months, and this rapid surge of civilians into U.S. occupied areas was perhaps the greatest operational advantage to burning homes, for many starving families had no other recourse but to repopulate villages held by the Americans.<sup>25</sup> Williams was soon faced with a new set of pressing problems, illustrating that much of this pacification process depended on the goodwill and cooperation of the village's female population. Sanitation became a foremost concern, with smallpox and fevers, as well as "bowel disorders," posing a constant threat. The new market, so essential to practical needs, was also dirty and difficult to manage. Although women were eager to gather and trade, they overtly resisted the military's regulation of their livestock, household refuse, and places of business. An intensive campaign to enforce sanitation standards resulted in an unsatisfying power struggle, as Captain Williams wryly mused to a fellow officer, "soldiers could arrest or hustle people around; but could not secure the obedience of women."<sup>26</sup> Without the support of this vital population, the establishment of a viable local government bogged down.

Williams was able to turn the corner through an uncertified "court" (Williams himself declared it "hardly legal") that meted out fines for civil infractions. Taking to heart both the Philippine Commission's views and Otis's extensive initiatives to build and extend the legal system, the military administration at Malabon turned to juridical

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25. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 2, Eustacio Maloles (Civil-Military Governor) to Local Presidente Maluban, March 24, 1900.

26. William Kobbe Papers, Cap. Arthur Williams to Maj. William Kobbe, May 31, 1899, USAMHI.

negotiations with the female population.<sup>27</sup> By happenstance, rather than any particular tactical insight, it worked. Tagalog women had participated widely in colonial courts during the last half of the nineteenth century, utilizing them as a forum for conflict resolution. Females had traditionally instigated legal action and sought official rulings for disputes over property, services, and employment both among peers and between social classes, and Williams' court of necessity may have fulfilled a familiar role for the Malabon population. Through this kangaroo system, he was able to both enforce and fund his policies, gradually establishing legitimacy and gaining the political capital to work with local leaders.<sup>28</sup>

Williams' insight into the inner workings of the town and his tactical efforts to restore order emerge from his private letter to Maj. William A. Kobbe, who relieved him at Malabon in June and specifically inquired about the state of his new garrison. Typical of the era, Williams' reports on the gendering of his counterinsurgency operations did not filter up to the highest levels and are absent from official records. Contributions to the *Annual Reports of the War Department* by Kobbe and other commanders of the Malabon garrison, however, indicated that Williams' policies were continued and resulted in some success, despite deeply entrenched revolutionary sentiment in that area of Luzon. Kobbe encountered some of the same problems, commenting that his regulations related primarily to sanitation, traffic, and markets, and he collected small fines from those who violated rules. His tenure proved relatively stable and he reported in July that the

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27. Elwell, *Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis*, 36, 58, 148.

28. William Kobbe Papers, Cap. Arthur Williams to Maj. William Kobbe, May 31, 1899; Bankoff, *Crime, Society*, 57-58.

government “seems to be in good running order at Malabon, is taking shape at Meycauyan and Polo, and a beginning has been made Malolos.”<sup>29</sup> Kobbe drafted a plan for establishing local governments that became General Orders 43 in August 1899, a primary initiative of the American counterinsurgency. In his design of municipal authority, Kobbe’s views mirrored Williams’ approach to the pacification of Malabon, recommending the American garrison establish a council with a native presidente who held broad powers but was responsible for “taking into consideration the misery which at present prevails in towns.”<sup>30</sup> Although insurgent activity had flared in January 1900, a new commander confirmed that the Malabon government was still working, improved sanitation had dramatically lowered the death rate, and regular patrols were, at least superficially, maintaining security, in direct contrast to neighboring villages.<sup>31</sup>

The case of Malabon is most important for its illustration of tactical innovation and the responses of the Filipino population, clearly revealing the intersection of counterinsurgency with gendered resistance. Williams was tasked with neutralizing the insurgent threat, specifically through the directives of McKinley’s Benevolent Assimilation policy and the Philippines Commission’s proclamation. His management of the largely female civilian population during the initial stages of pacification indicates that he was sensitive to practical gender needs and saw the tactical value in engaging native women. The targeting of gendered resistance through reward and chastisement—building a market but regulating the users—enabled Williams to move toward the goal of

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29. *Annual Reports, 1900*, Vol. 2, Part 6, 139-140.

30. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2769, Box 1.

31. Ibid, Entry 3365, Box 1; *Annual Reports, 1900*, Vol. 2, Part 6, 162-167.

civil government. Although these gendered efforts did not eliminate all insurgent activity, they suppressed and shaped it in a way that was advantageous to the occupying forces, as Williams noted when he returned to Malabon in February 1900.<sup>32</sup>

For their part, native women in Malabon demonstrated the will to shape their own environment. Forced displacement, property destruction, restricted food supplies, and disease limited their options, but they developed their own framework for dealing with the occupation. They responded readily to opportunities to improve their position through employment in traditional wage labor, market vending, and repopulating a secure area. However, they refused to adhere to all conditions and firmly withheld their “obedience,” preventing key U.S. initiatives and forcing Williams to negotiate the emerging systems of governance. Women exerted pressure on American forces to develop approaches that more closely conformed to native culture and their own practical needs, rather than simply responding to structures created by the military, a pattern that would be repeated throughout the war in Luzon as Aguinaldo abandoned conventional warfare and the U.S. stepped up counterinsurgency efforts.

### **Flying Columns and Guerrilla Bands**

Although Otis sought to deliver a decisive blow to the Army of Liberation in 1899, he was hampered by poor maps, difficult terrain, and the inability to deploy forces rapidly enough to cripple the more mobile Filipino military, placing the burden of pacification on town-based counterinsurgency. By the summer of that year, one historian assesses that “a now familiar pattern had emerged: the Americans won the skirmishes, but their opponents escaped with little damage. As soldiers pushed deeper into the

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32. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 3365, Box 1.



countryside, their progress slowed to a crawl.”<sup>33</sup> Despite the best of intentions, a dazzling victory remained elusive, perhaps because Otis was particularly mindful of the dual mission inscribed by the policy of benevolent assimilation. Laboring under Otis’s command, MacArthur pushed this emphasis down to the tactical level, declaring, “It is therefore one of the most important duties of American soldiers to assist in establishing friendly relations with the native by kind and considerate treatment in all matters arising from personal contact. To exasperate individuals or to burn or loot unprotected houses or property is not only criminal, but tends to impede the policy of the United States.”<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, the spring campaigns were unavoidably destructive, with sweeping initiatives to the north of Manila and brisk penetrations of Filipino strongholds in the south. The Americans continued to make some progress pacifying the towns in the immediate vicinity of the capital but lacked traction to decisively end the conflict through force.<sup>35</sup>

With the arrival of federal volunteers and the departure of the rainy season in the fall of 1899, Otis renewed efforts to crush the Filipino army and capture Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo evaded the assault, but sacrificed his military in the process, retreating into the mountains of northern Luzon and losing oversight of most local commanders. By mid-November, Aguinaldo had few options, and so divided the command of Luzon. He ordered all troops to “maneuver in flying columns and guerrilla bands,” effectively

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33. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 118.

34. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 5, 401.

35. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 6, passim.

dissolving the Army of Liberation and retooling both strategic and tactical goals.<sup>36</sup> The Filipino leadership now sought to outstrip American support for a long and costly colonial war while at the same time consolidating their grassroots power base. In the latter objective, the tattered Filipino government was at an increasing disadvantage as more displaced persons sought safety behind American lines or were forced to establish households under American jurisdiction. Ironically, the same operational problem that plagued the Americans beleaguered the Filipinos: how to win the support of civilian populations through compassionate administration but decisively staunch collaboration with the “enemy.”

The most distinctive consequence of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency operations was the vulnerable position of female populations caught between two military forces. Culturally Tagalog women were not defenseless, but strategic and tactical targeting of households heightened susceptibility to starvation, disease, rape, kidnapping, executions, and imprisonment. Guerrilla leaders expressed their “greatest displeasure that many of our compatriots are returning to the towns” in areas where U.S. Army garrisons sought to reconcentrate civilians.<sup>37</sup> Echoing the language of “Hibik Namin,” Filipino leaders exchanged letters lamenting the “evil doers” in their midst, but agreed that “if we do not endeavor to gain the good will of our people our efforts will have been in vain.”<sup>38</sup>

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36. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 4, Emilio Aguinaldo and Ambrosio Flores, November 12, 1899, 734.

37. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 5, R.F. Santos, “Circular No. 21” August 24, 1900, 228.

38. Ibid, P. Garcia to Isidoro Torres (Malolos), February 1, 1900, 176.

However, guerrillas had little to offer citizens in occupied towns other than nationalism and kinship, and often turned to violence to control the hungry populace.

A Filipino government circular from January 1900 indicated the growing concern about native turncoats, asking that “All persons, without distinction of sex or age, who desire the salvation of this our Mother Country will not cease their zeal in spying upon traitors who desire the destruction of this government.”<sup>39</sup> Gen. Manuel Tinio issued a March proclamation scourging the “many misguided Filipinos” who worked with the enemy, stating bluntly that, again regardless of sex or age, they would be given a “most summary trial, and be sentenced to death.”<sup>40</sup> He followed up his March directive targeting complicit females by ordering his men to capture and execute Lt. Col. Irineo Guzman, advising that if Guzman sought “shelter with the enemy . . . [the officers should] take steps to apprehend and detain his mistress called Eufemia.”<sup>41</sup> A guerrilla colonel in another part of Luzon was even more ruthless, calling for Filipino soldiers to burn the houses and property of collaborators and shoot or behead children, mothers, and wives “to pay for the treason.”<sup>42</sup> These proclamations presented a very real danger, for insurgents participated in an unrelenting campaign against anyone who swore an oath of allegiance or appeared to aid the U.S. military. Guerrilla warfare was hidden within the realm of the private sphere, and women were frequent victims of violent negotiations carried out in homes and were subject to political abductions, intimidation, assault, and

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39. Ibid, P. Garcia to Isidoro Torres (Malolos), February 1, 1900, 163.

40. Ibid, Tinio, “Proclamation” March 20, 1900, 185.

41. Ibid, M. Tinio No. 102, March 22, 1900, 182.

42. Ibid, Unsigned “Proclamation,” April 18, 1900, 191.

murder by Filipino men.<sup>43</sup> Insurgent leaders throughout Luzon implemented violent measures to prevent civilian populations from falling under the control of Americans, where “their continuous contact with our enemies may cause the gravest damage to our sacred cause.”<sup>44</sup>

At the same time, U.S. operations continued to engage Filipino households, increasing the pressure on the native populations. In January 1900, Filipino Gen. Luciano San Miguel noted with some satisfaction that the U.S. military “continues to commit all sorts of abuses, and in the one town . . . they have already criminally assaulted six single girls and two married women, and they continue robbing and pillaging the houses . . . and confiscate the property of well-to-do people who do not wish to come into town, which acts irritate the people more each time they are committed.”<sup>45</sup> Aware that such actions were counterproductive, American commanders sought to stem negative encounters through clear orders protecting civilians, but tactical leaders had difficulty translating these directives into effective pacification techniques. The U.S. forces established a municipal government and implemented an American-style court system so “that individual liberty might be secured;” legal guarantees became a pressing strategic objective as a means to avert some of security and governance issues, but it was a slow

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43. National Archives, Record Group 153, Entry 2483; Record Group 395, Entry 2482; Ibid, Entry 2484; Ibid, Entry 2481; Ibid, Entry 2486; Ibid, Entry 2485; Ibid, Entry 2471.

44. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 5, Urbano Lacuna to Captains Sever and Dionisio de los Santos, August 12, 1900, 228-231; R. F. Santos, “Circular No. 21,” August 24, 1900; Julio Infante, “Manifesto of Julio Infante, Chief of the 6th Column of the Province of Laguna to the Residents of the Town of San Pablo,” September 1900.

45. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 5, 153.

process.<sup>46</sup> Civilians therefore remained subject to the fullest range of U.S. counterinsurgency at the tactical level. As one Army officer put it, “Filipinos must obey the Americans at all times, and failing to do this they will sooner or later suffer the consequences.”<sup>47</sup>

In June 1900, a Filipino general observed the continuing refugee crisis that promised to further disrupt operations for both sides:

The Americans are changing their tactics, in that they are setting fire to the hamlets . . . forcing the occupants of these houses to leave them and enter the town. If they continue this and the people continue to enter the towns occupied by the Americans, we will lose our interests. . . . It makes no difference, because, in my opinion, it increases the hate of the people and rebounds to the benefit of our ideal.”<sup>48</sup>

From this aggressive competition for military primacy and control emerged many of the mechanisms of resistance, given Tagalog women were not passive recipients of strategic maneuvering or tactical targeting. Under these circumstances practical needs shaped responses, bringing female populations in to negotiate with the better-resourced U.S. forces, despite threats of increasing violence. As the lawyerly Otis addressed deficiencies in the legal system, building an American judiciary upon the Spanish bureaucracy, he inadvertently introduced a primary instrument of gendered resistance and counterinsurgent tactics. American courts and military boards empowered women in their traditional economic and familial roles, offering venues to make demands of both the U.S. military and Filipino guerrillas.

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46. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, Vol. 1, Part 2, 475.

47. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4327, Vol. 2.

48. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 5, Sixto Reyes to the General and Politico-Military Governor of the Province, June 2, 1900, 200.

## **Rent, Reimbursement, and Restitution**

It took only a short while for civilians to avail themselves of the American legal system. A military Board of Officers investigated a startling \$1,988,942.55 in claims for rent and property damage between April 1899 and June 1900, although less than half of this amount was actually paid out.<sup>49</sup> European, Chinese, and Filipino men, as well as corporate entities, made up the majority of plaintiffs in the *Annual Reports of the War Department*; still, a significant number were Filipino women, such as Basilia Dairi, who demanded \$750 for the use of her house in 1899, and Eustacia Melindez, who received \$3,000 for the death of her husband.<sup>50</sup> However, those few women whose claims made it up to the highest levels represented only a small percentage of the total number beleaguering the Army. Far more cases filed by native women remained at the tactical level and were decided by local provost courts or courts of first instance, where Army officers dealt daily with formal requests from Filipinas. Although indigenous men filed their own claims or aided women in their petitions, cases at the tactical level predominantly revolved around female participation.<sup>51</sup>

Tagalog women seized upon this opportunity to earn household income as well as to covertly support insurgent activities, producing a series of tactical negotiations.<sup>52</sup> Everything in a woman's household had a rental price, and both demands and payouts

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49. Based on the Consumer Price Index, this number is roughly equivalent to 53 million U.S. dollars today.

50. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 10, 210-219.

51. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2132, Vol. 3; National Archives, Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 5; Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 7; Ibid, Entry 5098, Vol. 1.

52. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1899, Vol. 1, Part 4, 205.

were common.<sup>53</sup> Dolores Singiando wanted 766 pesos for furniture taken by American officers for their own use, whereas another woman bargained every inch of space before yielding her property to a military band for its headquarters.<sup>54</sup> The early work of Williams in Malabon, as well as commanders in Bacoar, Calamba, and elsewhere, indicate sensitivity to the immediate needs of the population faced with widespread starvation and disease.<sup>55</sup> One officer wrote desperately to Manila asking for additional funds to relieve suffering in his town, suggesting the easy distribution of rents was a means to prop the devastated economy by injecting small amounts of capital into the system.<sup>56</sup> In this manner, a set of counterinsurgency methods addressing microeconomics emerged from traditional Tagalog gender roles, with indigenous women actively seeking well-defined business arrangements with the occupying forces, rather than simply allowing soldiers to make use of their resources.

By mid-1900, however, the nature of guerrilla warfare altered the American outlook toward these cash distributions and soon women were forced to take an oath of allegiance to the United States before rent was paid. Some, like Donata Garcia, freely took the oath, apparently believing the benefits outweighed the risks of violence from Filipino guerrillas who might see her as a collaborator; Garcia not only received payments, but immediately sued the U.S. Army for two months' rent disallowed by the

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53. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2132, Vol. 3; Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 5; Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 7.

54. Ibid, Entry 5032, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 3.

55. Ibid, Entry 5032, Vol. 1.

56. Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1.

quartermaster prior to her oath.<sup>57</sup> However, tactical leaders soon understood the degree of dissimulation in Filipinos' oaths. For instance, in late 1901, a colonel wrote the Adjutant General asking that no more rents be paid through his post. Based on captured documents, he posited that at least half of the \$637.50 in gold distributed each month for the use of local properties was given to the insurgents. Nonetheless, both petitions for rent and payments across Luzon continued through the end of the war, indicating that the U.S. Army, at the strategic level, also saw benefit in the policy as both an administrative and counterinsurgent function. In 1902, widow Ines Rivera caused some consternation among the garrison at Pila because she had not, and likely would not, take the oath. Her advanced age, and the fact her family had all taken the oath without issue, broke the deadlock; the officer in charge decided to pay her anyway, determining that the goodwill was worth the exception.<sup>58</sup>

Reimbursements for lost or destroyed property were settled in a similar manner between the Army and native women but represented a deeper commitment to gendered resistance. Like rental income, Tagalog women almost certainly used the money to pay revolutionary taxes imposed as an "obligation of both sexes" by local insurgents.<sup>59</sup> However, requests for cash settlements were often discarded outright by the local U.S. Army garrison or were caught up for years in investigations before payment.<sup>60</sup> Given

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57. Ibid, Entry 4211, Vol. 1

58. Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

59. Ibid, Entry 5486, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4229, Box 1.

60. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 10, 200-219; 58th Congress, 2nd Session. *Document No. 151: Letter from the Secretary of War, Transmitting, with a Letter from the Quartermaster-General, Papers Relating to the*



these obstacles to monetary gain, the persistence of indigenous women in these suits suggests that they were rejecting victimization by demanding justice and deliberately drawing attention to the war's intrusion into their households. They made conscious decisions to hold the U.S. Army and American soldiers accountable for thefts and burnings and killings, even if they gained little materially. At the same time, these negotiations thrust native females into prominent positions in the power structure because each claim had to be adjudicated, making the women's lives visible to the American military and influencing soldier's perceptions of Tagalog gender roles.<sup>61</sup>

Accusations of wrongdoing at the tactical level could be brought to the attention of the senior leadership through the persistence of claimants. In November of 1900, Lenora Angelus Ildefonso complained that two American soldiers entered her house at three in the morning without cause. According to Ildefonso, the soldiers searched her home, piled the family's belongings in the center of the floor, and set everything ablaze. Then, she testified, the soldiers fired shots at the group to prevent them from extinguishing the fire, narrowly missing one of the women.<sup>62</sup> An officer of the Third U.S. Infantry, Lieutenant Kilbourne, was deemed responsible for the action that, endorsement after endorsement, made its way up and down the chain of command. Ildefonso was relentless and eventually drew the attention of the new governor-general, Gen. Arthur

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*Claim of Feliciano Mendiola* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903); W. F. Norris. "Claims Arising from the American Occupation of the Philippines" *The Pittsburgh Legal Journal* (21 August 1901) 49-50.

61. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2132, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 5239; Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; National Archives, Record Group 350, Entry 5, Box 282.

62. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2132, Vol. 3.

MacArthur, who reiterated the strict rules governing property destruction and sent a reprimand. The commanding officer, Captain Cooke, reassured his seniors that although Kilbourne was a little zealous in burning the house without proper authorization, and indeed contrary to policy, he had “acted for the good of the service.” Cooke recommended that settlement of the claim be denied because “such action will injure the prestige of military authority.”<sup>63</sup> Although no money was paid out for the incident, Ildefonso nonetheless exerted a significant degree of agency, forcing strategic leaders to consider the ramifications of tactical operations. It is perhaps due to these constant complaints that the issue of property destruction was elevated to the highest levels and became an issue in postwar atrocity trials.

While claims for burned homes illustrated the devastation of certain tactics, even seemingly mundane issues were rigorously pursued through legal channels. A woman in Pila immediately requested compensation after the theft of some tools, and the American commander in Santo Tomas was forced to give substantial attention to a woman’s assertion that her credit book had been stolen by an American soldier.<sup>64</sup> In April 1900, Senora Suazo’s complaint about the confiscation of a toy cannon went as high as General Otis for recommendation. Any act against a native household could result in a protracted negotiation, because women consistently protested the removal or destruction of furniture, fuel, boats, clothing, and other possessions.<sup>65</sup> The degree of effort involved in

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63. Ibid, Entry 4327.

64. Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 5239.

65. Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 5032, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4229.

formal claims was substantial, necessitating either a personal visit to the garrison headquarters or the presentation of a written petition to an American officer.<sup>66</sup> Confronting an occupying military force demonstrates the commitment and courage of Tagalog women, as well as that the U.S. Army took such claims seriously and saw value in these negotiations.

Although these petitions were a conduit of gendered resistance that asserted both practical and strategic gender needs, they were also exploited by the American counterinsurgency. As Tagalog women became comfortable with the military system, they began leveraging American authority to counter abuses by native men. After the collapse of Aguinaldo's government, there was no central authority and no recourse for civil or criminal suits other than an appeal to either local guerrilla leaders or the local American garrison. Crime and banditry were constant threats in areas outside government control and were often problems even in more-populated towns and rural areas. Guerrilla leaders had few resources for trials and no facilities for imprisonment, so little justice could be expected from that quarter, forcing native women to seek redress through the American channels.<sup>67</sup> The U.S. Secret Service actively recruited female informants and utilized this intelligence to capture high-value targets, so the legal exchanges with women were particularly valuable to the counterinsurgency efforts.<sup>68</sup> In what appears to have been an effective psychological operations campaign, Manila newspapers regularly ran

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66. National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117, Vol. 2.

67. May, *Battle for Batangas*, 210.

68. National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117, Vol. 1; National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 5107; Ibid, Entry 5098, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4327, Vol. 1.



articles highlighting the severe punishments for domestic abuse meted out by American authorities and described the salvation of women who sought the aid of the U.S. Secret Service.<sup>69</sup> Drawing women into the American military's sphere of influence through an open system of complaints and petitions created a tactical relationship with female populations that had several benefits. It built trust between soldiers and the civilians that could be exploited for actionable intelligence, legitimized American authority, and aided the identification and detention of insurgents, increasing stability and security.

In the wartime space where the social structures of colonial rule were negotiated, this tactical relationship was an essential means of meeting strategic gender needs. Filipino women publicly challenged the U.S. military and at the same time they exploited its systems to increase personal security, building for themselves significant positions within the local power hierarchies. Often colonial subalterns are boxed into subordination and silence, but this was not the case amongst Tagalog women during the Philippine-American War, where their visibility influenced strategic and tactical decision-making. Dr. George Becker, who served on the staff of Gen. J. Franklin Bell, suggested a trajectory for the counterinsurgency in 1901: "Not only our own men but our women also in the Philippines should be fully occupied in public affairs. As I have said, the Filipino women are both intelligent and influential. They can be most easily reached through our own women, who should seek to gain their confidence and to exert themselves

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69. *The Manila Freedom*, "Brutes Get Limit," April 26, 1900; *The Manila Freedom*, "Smashed Her Face: Roman Constantino Beats his Mistress and is Arrested," April 29, 1900; *The Manila American*, "Two Murderers to be Hanged," October 12, 1901; *The Manila American*, "Jealous Quarrel Causes Bloodshed," October 13, 1901; *The Manila American*, "Daughter Saw Father Killed, Americans Jail Insurgent," October 14, 1901; *The Manila American*, "Filipino Stabs Spaniard: Also Slashes Mestiza Woman Across the Breast," October 15, 1901.

systematically for the good of both races.”<sup>70</sup> To this end, the United States stepped up initiatives to bring American women to the Philippines as part of the pacification process. Ultimately, the counterinsurgency and occupation spurred short term military and civilian migrations of women between the United States and Southeast Asia that influenced social change in the Philippines.

The choice to increase the participation of American women in the counterinsurgency was deliberate, as Becker’s assessment indicates. When Mary Fee arrived in the Philippines in the early summer of 1901, she was part of this enterprise, noting, “there were but two other American women there, wives of military men. Later our numbers were increased by the wives of several civilian employees and two more women teachers.”<sup>71</sup> As civil governor, William Howard Taft took responsibility for continuing certain pacification initiatives conducted by the U.S. Army, and the Taft Commission passed Education Act No. 34 on January 21, 1901, establishing the Department of Public Instruction. The Taft Commission also authorized the further deployment of 1,000 educators, and on July 23, 1901, 365 men and 165 women left San Francisco aboard the *USS Thomas* bound for Manila. The expedition cost the U.S. government about \$105,000 but brought the third and largest contingent of American teachers to the Philippines as part of the United States’ counterinsurgency effort. A Spanish decree first introduced gender segregated public elementary education in the Philippines in 1863, and the Thomasites, as American teachers came to be known, were tasked to expand and improve the school system using English as the medium of

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70. Becker, “Conditions Requisite.”

71. Fee, *A Woman’s Impression*, 49.

instruction. As Becker revealed, military thinkers understood the mission of American women was not simply to teach, but to influence Filipinas during the pacification process. More American teachers followed the Thomasites in 1902, making a total of about 1,074 educators stationed throughout the country teaching reading and mathematics as well as agriculture, housekeeping, and household arts.<sup>72</sup>

These colonial education policies had complex consequences. The change from Spanish to American colonial rule imposed competing constructions of femininity on Filipino women, challenging social values in the household. American teachers, like the Thomasite “who was the possessor of an M.A. degree in mathematics from the University of California, and who was supposed to know more about conic sections than any woman ought to know,” clashed with Spanish-Filipino prescriptive ideals that emphasized religious devotion over intellectual achievement.<sup>73</sup> The California math whiz was by no means unique among this group of female counterinsurgents, and the *Michigan Alumnus* noted that there were “a score of University of Michigan graduates among the school teachers who came during the month of August, and the following list of those present will give some idea of how well scattered will be the influence of the University in the Philippines.”<sup>74</sup> Images of a certain American progressive femininity—English speaking, educated, independent, and civic minded—soon flooded popular culture,

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72. Sianturi, “Pedagogic Invasion,” 5-26; Sobritchea, “American Colonial Education,” 79-108.

73. Fee, *A Woman's Impression*, 60.

74. Alumni Association of the University of Michigan, *The Michigan Alumnus*, 85-87.

projecting images of the “new woman” to the native woman.<sup>75</sup> Elite Filipinas, though representing a small percentage, did enter the professions in greater numbers, demonstrating the prescience of Aguinaldo’s first Philippine constitution in 1898, which promised such rights to females.<sup>76</sup>

Although historians have argued that the American education system was primarily utilized to reinforce colonial rule, not to promote gender equality, there is evidence to suggest that this counterinsurgency tactic was successful because it met strategic gender needs of some elite women, pulling them into politics. In 1914, Filipinas who had begun their education under the Army initiative joined an international contingent of Asian women as Barbour Fellows at the University of Michigan to “train in modern science, medicine, and mathematics and other specialties critical to their native lands,” suggesting a rapid change in opportunities for women over the course of a single generation.<sup>77</sup> One Barbour Fellow, Encarnacion Alzona, returned to the Philippines as a vocal feminist and suffragist. Alzona called not only for suffrage but for a radical revision of the Spanish Civil Code—adopted by the American colonial government—which placed women in the same legal category as minors, deaf mutes, and morons.<sup>78</sup>

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75. Encanto, *Constructing the Filipina*, 35-51.

76. Sobritchea, “American Colonial Education,” 95-99.

77. Bentley Historical Library, “Records.”

78. Alzona, “Shall Filipina Women Vote?” 3-5; Alzona, *The Filipino Woman*, 23.



Some Filipino scholars observe that these changes caused a rift among the Filipino elite, challenging Filipino men working toward national independence.<sup>79</sup> As a result, a sector of conservative Filipinos rejected suffrage as part of the Philippine Republic's Constitution, perhaps because the American governors-general supported it and American women such as Carrie Chapman Catt came to Manila to organize Filipina suffragists. Filipino men saw the *panuelo*-clad wife as traditional and nationalistic, and the new woman as a colonial imposition, demonstrating the dual nature of such gendered initiatives. Many university-educated Filipinas such as Alzona believed universal suffrage represented international progressivism, while many pro-independence Filipino politicians understood it as an American import. The issue was only resolved in 1937 with a special plebiscite that gave women the right to vote, forty years after Filipino revolutionaries originally proposed female suffrage. This conflict between masculinity, femininity, and nationalism, largely emerging from the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency policy, contributed to changes in the power structure and the positioning of Filipino women in the household and the workforce.<sup>80</sup> The enhanced visibility of influential indigenous femininity outside the household became a durable feature of American-era and postcolonial Filipino society. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this attribute rests on high numbers of Filipino women who were engaged in national-level politics and held public office throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. At the present, few nations compare with the Philippines in terms of the proportion of female leaders, and the

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79. Roces, "Is the Suffragist," 40; Philippine Commission, *Report*, Vol. 2, 230; Tirona, "Panuelo Activism," 109-130.

80. Roces, "Is the Suffragist," 39-41; Philippine Commission, *Report*, Vol. 2, 230.

election of two female heads of state since World War II is exceeded only by Switzerland and the Republic of San Marino.<sup>81</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Gendered resistance in the first two years of the Philippine-American War, particularly overt manifestations such as petitioning and legal claims, focused largely on practical needs. Although Filipino strategic leaders attempted to influence women's participation in the war, they were unable to control populations and often forced their own civilian support into negotiations with the U.S. military. Driven by displacement, military pressure, and property destruction, Filipino women leveraged their position as females to seek safety and security outside of combat, rather than directly joining the fray. They remained largely autonomous of both the Philippine Army and the U.S. Army, subject to violence and negotiations from both sides, but distanced from strategic leaders. Native households were targets of both the U.S. military and Filipino soldiers, with the contestation over control of families, wealth, and cultural values producing its own set of responses. Although resistance behaviors were successful in shaping the gendered environment, as well as providing direct support to local guerrillas, these personal and tactical-level efforts proved insufficient to achieve larger revolutionary objectives. By exerting their influence at the tactical level through both formal and informal negotiations with occupying military forces, Filipinas established a significant presence and drew attention to their social and economic resources and had a variety of consequences, including the development of gendered tactics such as building and regulation of markets, economic development, open petitioning, and placement of American women in villages.

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81. Iwanaga, *Women's Political Participation*, passim.

Resistance shaped the environment and gender relations under American rule, demonstrating both the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. counterinsurgency. Innovation and operational fluidity, as demonstrated by Williams in Malabon, allowed U.S. forces to adapt based on situational need; however, tactical development was for the most part reactionary, subject as much to fortune as to forethought. Without strategic guidance, Progressive Era gender values colored American military action, and officers were initially reluctant to view indigenous women as participants in the war, empowering gendered resistance and limiting the legitimacy of alternative counterinsurgency methods. Nonetheless, Americans did demonstrate sensitivity to gender needs, and as the better-resourced authority, projected power through economic and legal infrastructure development. These complex interactions illustrate conflicting tactical paradigms during the initial stages of the Philippine-American War, when American and Filipino forces began to better understand how counterinsurgency operations intersected with gendered resistance.

As conventional war gave way to guerrilla conflict, the Filipino leadership sought to outstrip American enthusiasm for the fight and consolidate their grassroots power base. One of the most serious consequences of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency operations was the vulnerable position of female populations caught between two military forces. Culturally, Tagalog women were not defenseless, but strategic and tactical targeting of households heightened susceptibility to starvation, disease, rape, kidnapping, executions, and imprisonment. Guerrilla warfare was hidden within the realm of the private sphere, and women were frequent victims of violent negotiations carried out in homes and were subject to political abductions, intimidation, assault, and

murder by Filipino men. Still, Tagalog women were not passive recipients of strategic maneuvering or tactical targeting. From this aggressive competition for military primacy and control emerged many of the mechanisms of resistance. Under these circumstances, practical needs shaped responses, bringing female populations in to negotiate with U.S. forces, despite threats of increasing violence from guerrilla bands.

Confronting an occupying military force demonstrates the commitment and courage of Tagalog women but also indicates that the U.S. Army took such claims seriously and saw value in these negotiations. Through happenstance, American courts and military boards empowered women in their traditional economic and familial roles, offering venues to make demands of both the U.S. military and Filipino guerrillas. Tagalog women seized upon rents and restitution to earn household income as well as to covertly support insurgent activities, producing a series of tactical negotiations. In this manner, a set of counterinsurgency methods addressing microeconomic issues emerged from traditional Tagalog gender roles. Indigenous women actively sought well-defined business arrangements with the occupying forces, rather than simply allowing soldiers to make use of their resources. The persistence of indigenous women in these suits suggests that they were clearly rejecting victimization by demanding justice and deliberately drawing attention to the war's intrusion into their households. They made conscious decisions to hold the U.S. Army and American soldiers accountable for thefts and burnings and killings, even if they gained little materially. By mid-1900, however, the nature of guerrilla warfare altered the American outlook toward gendered resistance, and measures became increasingly severe, with U.S. forces more often realizing the influence of Tagalog women and more actively seeking to exploit it.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: “ANY SCHEME DEvised”: COLLABORATION, COVERT RESISTANCE, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY TO END THE WAR**

While in hiding and pursued by the Americans during the early months of 1900, Emilio Aguinaldo revisited the compelling voice of gendered nationalism to inspire guerrilla war, asking, “Young Filipinos, with what dignity must we show our love for our wives, what country will we offer our beautiful maidens? Can our dignity consent, and will it perhaps consent that the Filipino women bow their heads and bend their delicate necks before the haughty foreigners? No, never, never!!!! Rather death!!!!”<sup>1</sup> It is unclear how this particular message was received, but local insurgent groups were filling the vacuum left by the Army of Liberation’s dissolution, and civilian support was more important to nationalist strategy than at any other point in the struggle. However, although many Filipino women were certainly reluctant to accept foreign rule, they also displayed a keen understanding of the occupation structure and a sensible disinclination to simply die for the cause. Instead, native women utilized available resources to pursue their own agendas, which often blended practical needs with revolutionary sentiment and necessitated a delicate balance between the real dangers of collaboration and resistance. At the same time, U.S. forces were adjusting to the changes in warfare instigated by Aguinaldo’s fading prominence and the empowerment of local guerrilla commanders from 1900 to the end of the war in 1902.

In southwestern Luzon, a region that included the Tagalog provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas, the U.S. Army confronted a capably organized insurgency built on the indispensable framework of civilian support. Conventional tactics

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1. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 5, 98.

there often proved untenable; a disagreeable landscape regularly bogged American combat operations in wet-rice paddies, dense jungles, or mountainous elevations and rarely yielded high-value targets. The climate also seemed designed to tax the American constitution with summer monsoons nurturing malaria, dysentery, and a host of other incapacitating maladies. Although Manila was only thirty miles from the headquarters in Calamba of the U.S. Army's Second District, Department of Southern Luzon, combat operations during 1899 largely focused on the Republic's northern strongholds, allowing local guerrilla commanders in the south to extend their power networks, enlist soldiers, and, if not control the civilian population, at least discourage them from collaboration. As a consequence, civilian resistance was better prepared and offered the most extensive opposition to pacification in the archipelago, forcing a more-aggressive operational posture to establish security and stability. During the final two years of the war, Tagalog women increasingly faced violence and imprisonment as a result of guerrilla activities, martial law, and counterinsurgency, in turn compelling gendered responses that both shaped and were shaped by U.S. tactics.<sup>2</sup>

### **Support for Insurgents and Individual Schemes**

Hilaria Aguinaldo, wife of tenuously positioned president Emilio, signed her name to a woman's "Lament" in October 1899 and distributed copies in Tagalog to the Filipino public. Declaring her humiliation because she was unable to render military service like the men of the Philippine Army, she nonetheless drew attention to the importance of female auxiliaries. As the head of the Philippine Red Cross, Aguinaldo

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2. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900 Vol. 1, Part 5, 207-229; May, *Battle for Batangas*, passim.

ensured that women under her charge remained dedicated to the nationalist cause, readily providing medical care or interceding on behalf of prisoners of war. However, her ideas about feminine contributions to the war effort veered sharply from benign and basic Red Cross tenets, suggesting Filipino strategic-level leaders were still actively working to influence gendered resistance during the shift to guerrilla warfare. This perspective is clear in the following excerpt from “Lament”:

We must, therefore, think of the best means to defend our Philippine country, even by treacherously killing them [Americans], one by one, which in the long run, will exterminate them, since we are short of arms and have sufficient rights. Although we are women we can aid you in carrying out these ‘dukots.’ As an illustration: there is the case of what a member of this society has lately accomplished. An American officer being in love with her, she refused to reciprocate his passionate affection. The officer threatened her. The girl, acting through fear, pretended to accept him and at the same time appointed a place to meet him. When the officer was carrying out his designs and not having gone as far as the place appointed, he was captured by our flying guerrilla. . . . And you, soldiers, defenders of the Philippines! If any one of you has any scheme devised which will strengthen our country, I again entreat you to produce it in order that all of us may aid you in carrying out the same.<sup>3</sup>

Aguinaldo’s “Lament” portended not only the change of strategy but also the growing importance of small tactical missions and covert local resistance to the insurgency, leaving little doubt that revolutionaries intended to leverage all assets as force multipliers. The Filipino leadership had worked since the beginning of the revolution in 1896 to draw women into the nationalist struggle, gradually making small gains with gendered resistance by shifting to individual- and kinship-based activities. Instead of large-scale combat operations as Luna had anticipated earlier in the war, Tagalog women were being

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3. Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 511/1, Hilaria Aguinaldo, October 5, 1899; also in Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 4, 174. *Dukot* is the Tagalog word for kidnap, although U.S. military translators also conveyed it as assassination.

mustered through grass roots efforts that touched them personally, both in the household and the community.

Support for insurgents and individual “schemes” between civilians and local revolutionaries were a perpetual concern for the U.S. Army, as native females actively exploited their position within the barrios and the framework of American tactics. Disappearances of unwary U.S. personnel and incidents of individual attacks on Americans involving Tagalog women, though few, were on the rise beginning in 1900, indicating Hilaria Aguinaldo’s endorsement of *dukots* (abductions) may indeed have influenced behavior.<sup>4</sup> In one barrio, a well-liked American soldier was abducted in broad daylight so audaciously that the commanding officer concluded it was only possible with the cooperation of the local population.<sup>5</sup> In another town, populated almost entirely by women, an American private was knifed to death by a Filipina after inexplicably leaving his guard post.<sup>6</sup> At the very least, constant pressure on native women by strategic leaders and the occupying forces was having a slow affect at the tactical level, highlighting the direct involvement of civilians in attacks on U.S. soldiers. The coordination between guerrillas and civilians evidenced by these isolated occurrences of violence was disturbing to the U.S. Army, but perhaps more alarming were the complex, ongoing partnerships that offered no good tactical solutions under the strategic precepts of

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4. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4327, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry 5103, Vol. 1.

5. Ibid, Entry 3427, Vol. 2.

6. Ibid, Entry 5107.



benevolent assimilation and effectively stymied counterinsurgency operations on a larger scale.

Although the Second District, Department of Southern Luzon—at that point encompassing Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas—was garrisoned by U.S. forces early in 1900, occupation and pacification were quite different problem sets, each initially compounded by a robust lack of strategic vision on the part of the American leadership. Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, Civil War veteran and Medal of Honor recipient, was the initial Second District commander after the Army reordered its departments in April, but a rapid series of changes soon followed. Col. William Birkhimer replaced Wheaton almost immediately, working in the provinces for a few short months before Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall took the position June 26, 1900. Hall remained until April 10, 1901, when Cavite was added to the Second District's responsibility and the area was reorganized into the First District. With the bureaucratic shuffling at the upper levels, strategic planning and counterinsurgency policy remained secondary considerations, particularly as soldiers experienced little armed guerrilla activity in the slowly repopulating villages during the first half of the year, offering opportunities to focus on social reform and civil affairs.<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, as garrisons turned their attention to municipal government and civic organization under General Orders 40 and General Orders 43, they encountered simmering opposition.

From the outset, the development of civil government presented unique opportunities for gendered resistance. Combat operations clashed with town-based counterinsurgency, steadily impeding primary security and stability objectives of the U.S.

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7. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 5, 207-229.

forces. These circumstances complicated even basic reforms because villages impoverished by property destruction and forced displacement were often unable to collect enough tax revenue to improve infrastructure or pay local *presidentes*, even if American officers could entice the people to participate in their political initiatives.<sup>8</sup> Insurgents generally assumed one of two postures in their efforts to undermine U.S. capacity building: they either killed the *Americanistas* who became involved with U.S. policy or created a revolutionary shadow government that feigned cooperation with the United States.<sup>9</sup> Both methods required at least some degree of civilian support, and two cases are illustrative of the gendered activities undertaken against the occupation.

In the first instance, Domingo Punsalan, the unfortunate *presidente* of Bay, Laguna, was assassinated in April 1900 in a swift attack by a small band of guerrillas, effectively halting the implementation of General Orders 43. Several months afterward, American officers noticed “more than the usual number of males in the vicinity” of a house owned by Barcilia Corrillo. A search of the residence revealed that the thin walls of the structure were reinforced against attack with barricades of sacked rice, creating a defensive position overlooking the American barracks. The Americans placed the home under surveillance and later raided it, finding Corrillo, her friend Maria Bonifacio, and two local men standing innocently in the main room. Upon closer inspection, the patrol discovered guns, a substantial sum of money, and insurgent captain Benancio Cueto hidden in the building. Five revolutionaries, including Corrillo and Bonifacio, were

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8. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2408; Ibid, 4162; U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 8, 374.

9. Linn, *U.S. Counterinsurgency*, 76.

arrested, but only after the patrol disarmed Corrillo during a brawl as she attempted to help Cueto escape.<sup>10</sup>

The American commander refused to release Corrillo and Bonifacio from jail, classifying them as “too dangerous” to set free, and they remained the only two female prisoners among almost a hundred men held by the garrison at Bay. Corrillo’s house was within 100 yards of the American stronghold, and frequent searches of the premises had yielded “nothing unusual,” although she had assisted the local guerrillas for the better part of a year. Investigations identified Cueto as the presidente’s killer and Corrillo’s house as a base of operations for insurgent activities, suggesting tactical level “scheming” wherein female revolutionaries exercised individual autonomy in their resistance and capability in their covert activities. Court testimony, coupled with Corrillo’s actions, indicated she acted in her own interests, without significant fear of reprisal from either side. Reporting officers were quick to define female resisters as “mistresses” or “prostitutes,” but in this case, neither appellation applied, which may well have been a factor in her arrest and detention because she in many ways eluded a proper definition, both as a woman and an insurgent. Indeed, her imprisonment was atypical and apparently puzzled officers at headquarters, for they questioned the garrison commander regarding his refusal to release the females involved.<sup>11</sup> Under such circumstances, where success was achievable and punishment unexpected, Tagalog women had little reason to remain invisible to U.S. forces or to forgo resistance activities.

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10. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 3106, Vol. 2; National Archives, Record Group 153, Entry 25124.

11. Ibid.

In nearby Calamba, the establishment of civil government was also stalled for months by a well-coordinated scheme between the local mayor, Ramon Santos, and “one of his mistresses,” Lucia de la Cruz. As coconspirators, they secretly funneled municipal funds to the guerrillas and undermined American military authority through the shadow government’s covert activities. At one point, when Santos was under suspicion and close to arrest, de la Cruz sowed dissension between the garrison’s officers, engaging a junior officer in grievances against the commanding officer’s wife. The major was outraged that one of his subordinates would become involved in a dispute between a “troublesome” native woman and his wife, feeling that military honor had been infringed upon, largely because the young officer had referred de la Cruz to the court as a method of mediation. Shortly thereafter, de la Cruz publicly filed a “complaint” against the American woman. Incensed, the major accused de la Cruz of libel and had her tried in the provost court, a scandal that distracted the entire garrison for several weeks while Santos continued embezzling the town’s funds.

Eventually, Santos was removed from his position, but the damage to Calamba’s municipal government and the American counterinsurgency was substantial.<sup>12</sup> Legitimacy of American authority was undermined, and the ability to institute viable social reform or good governance was all but lost. The actions of Lucia de la Cruz and Ramon Santos suggest high levels of cooperation, planning, and political sophistication, as well as a willingness to risk personal consequences for insurgent gains. Although Santos was arrested, there is no indication that de la Cruz was detained or prosecuted for her participation, beyond the libel trial which she herself helped instigate, demonstrating

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12. National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117, Vol. 2.

an ongoing reluctance among American forces to punish women for supporting the insurgency. This sensitivity was regularly exploited by Tagalog females in a variety of roles during the initial phases of the guerrilla war.

American officers, for the most part, agreed that commerce and markets along with civil affairs were necessary for pacification, but management of these businesses presented no small problem. When a new officer in Bacoor filed a report, his comment that “Sabrina” was running her store as a blind to feed the revolutionaries was met with frustration. The commander returned, “the fact that this woman has this shop has been known for a long time but she is allowed to remain there because no testimony can be gotten that would convict her of aiding the insurrectos and also all of the shops in San Nicolas and Mambog are aiding the insurrectos . . . because the whole neighborhood hangs together. About the only thing that could be done to stop this would be to close all of the shops and allow eatables to be taken to the barrios only in small amounts.”<sup>13</sup> The concept of neighborhood collaboration suggests that kinship and patronage were significant drivers, and simple fear of insurgent reprisal was not the only motivation in the barrios. Sabrina, a guerrilla officer’s “woman,” had lived comfortably with a family in Manila in December 1899, likely as a displaced person, and they had been complicit with her revolutionary work before she returned to her own storefront in Bacoor. Extended-kinship networks provided support for insurgent involvement, and the female shopkeepers were clearly confident in their ability to evade prosecution, if not detection, under the early American occupation. The initial reluctance of U.S. forces to arrest

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13. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2979, LS #109; Ibid, Entry 2980, Vol. 2.

indigenous women reflects both the focus on a battlefield solution and the pressure of Progressive masculinity to avoid legitimizing the female role in insurgent warfare. As a result, these pervasive household connections were difficult to counter, and American strategic leadership, in most cases, was not yet ready to escalate suppressive operations against civilians in early 1900, while they still generally believed that the insurgency was perpetrated by a small group of zealous revolutionaries who lacked broad support from the people.<sup>14</sup>

Sabrina's case was not unique. Community and commerce were important aspects of the Tagalog resistance and U.S. counterinsurgency in a time when female-driven microeconomies buoyed the entire infrastructure. Women's labor in transportation, wage earning, market trading, and property management were emphasized by gendered tactics and essentialized in many cases by the absence of male kin.<sup>15</sup> Tagalog women's roles in the economy opened resistance opportunities and complicated operational and tactical decisions about managing community reconstruction projects. The situation in Malolos in November 1900 illustrates the friction between municipal revitalization and security. American soldiers raided a reopened tobacco factory after a small group of guerrillas inadvertently revealed themselves during a clandestine meeting. American officers long suspected the factory was a "rendezvous for insurgents if not a recruiting station," but the garrison had been unable to specify charges against the owner, or anyone else, until they responded to a sudden commotion during the night, capturing eight "hombres." A search of the premises, with female employees and their children present, yielded contraband

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14. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 6, 281.

15. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2354, Box 2; Ibid, Entry 5096.

including a gun, a jewelry case, and over \$750 in Mexican silver, cleverly hidden in crevices and covered with woven matting. Two Republic of the Philippines flags were found in the possession of Senora Lechuga, presumably the *maestra* (factory manager), who lived over the factory. The factory owner, Ignacio Adriano, was detained along with the eight men, although no arrests of female participants were recorded. The ongoing suspicions of the American garrison, the presence of women during the meeting, and the location of the weapon and money, all suggest these female factory workers were, as a group, complicit over an extended period of time.



Figure 10. A cigar factory in Manila, early 1900s. Source: The U.S. National Archives.

The flags are particularly telling. Such items were strictly forbidden, yet Senora Lechuga held them in her personal quarters rather than hiding them in common areas with the other items, unavoidable implicating herself in revolutionary activity. It is unclear whether Senora Lechuga feared reprisal or imprisonment, but her actions suggest

that she felt a certain degree of immunity from prosecution. After the incident, she quickly abandoned her position at the factory, packed her possessions, and moved to Manila, perhaps to avoid additional surveillance or consequences. Nonetheless, she filed a formal claim for damages against American soldiers even as she fled, demonstrating an attitude of unabashed belligerence.<sup>16</sup>

The regular appearance of women in insurgent camps confirms the female role as a conduit for information, money, and matériel, while the frequency and scope of these gendered activities indicate a high level of complicity with local government and kinship networks. Female mobility created avenues of resistance for the intrepid, such as Eufamia Tapia and Marcella Laurel, who were arrested for transporting guns, and Vernancia Gonzalez, who ran a neat business in contraband ammunition, allegedly using her “wiles” on American soldiers to obtain and transport cartridges for the insurgents.<sup>17</sup> However, these high-risk activities appear to be only a small part of the greater issue of gendered resistance, and likely the easiest to address through policing and regular patrols. More insidious and difficult as far as tactical development was concerned was the coordination between insurgents and an embedded infrastructure that provided both protection and plausible deniability. The mother of a prominent local politician was long suspected of collecting money and paying insurgent soldiers, but it was only by happenstance that she was observed engaging in resistance activities, and the wife of a Filipino general was eventually deemed responsible for local fundraising under the veil of a shadow

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16. Ibid, Entry 4327, Vol. 2.

17. Ibid, Entry 2381, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2398, Box 3.



government.<sup>18</sup> In another case, the Army questioned an entire family regarding the collection of revolutionary taxes after discovering that the father was acting as the “American presidente” and the son as the “insurgent presidente.” Interrogated at length, both mother and daughter professed no knowledge of any activities let alone money collection and innocently maintained that they were unaware family members had fled the area. Nonetheless, the officer in charge dispatched a letter to his superior stating unequivocally, “I believe all are insurrectos.”<sup>19</sup> Given the circumstances, he was likely correct, but the women were released without penalty, suggesting the durable influence of American ideals regarding the roles of men and women in wartime.

While there was no strategic plan or tactical guidance to help officers address gendered resistance, they were admonished to treat civilians with decency, and their own values dictated that they offer women a degree of respect.<sup>20</sup> In the absence of good alternatives, the Progressive Army relied on social reforms and enticements to woo female support rather than crush female resistance. The officer corps diligently supported these initiatives, with MacArthur, who assumed overall command and the military governorship in May 1900, seeing a coalescence of military and counterinsurgency goals in the building of schools and distribution of health care.<sup>21</sup> A Manila newspaper expounded on growing successes after American doctors visited homes offering free care: “At first the natives were prejudiced against this new order of affairs . . . but soon

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18. Ibid, Entry 2398, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2354, Box 1.

19. Ibid, Entry 3427, Vol. 2.

20. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 5, 401.

21. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 5, 64.

the native women commenced to appreciate the attention. . . . The Filipinas all fell in line and today there are thousands being benefitted. A modern hospital would prove the greatest blessing to the Filipina race and would aid in illustrating the policy of the American government in dealing with people.”<sup>22</sup> The stress on the Filipina recipient is indicative of the U.S. Army’s outreach with these programs, revealing a calculated approach to practical gender needs as a method of degrading the insurgent infrastructure. Local garrisons adopted the same method, and post surgeons treated both everyday ailments and provided emergency care to women wounded in firefights, often publicly claiming that insurgents were responsible for the violence.<sup>23</sup> However, although Tagalog women would exploit the resources to meet practical gender needs, social and civil affairs efforts in southwestern Luzon proved inadequate against an insurgency tied together strongly by kinship and patronage as well as revolutionary sentiment.<sup>24</sup>

The weakness of American counterinsurgency efforts in southwestern Luzon became clear in the summer of 1900 when attacks escalated in response to a new Filipino strategy. Hoping to influence the U.S. presidential election and upset McKinley’s incumbency in favor of anti-imperialist candidate William Jennings Bryan, Filipino guerrillas launched all-out offensives against U.S. forces.<sup>25</sup> Among the local insurgent leaders who rose to power as Aguinaldo’s hold on the revolution slipped, Maj. Gen.

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22. *The Manila Freedom*, “Care of the Sick; New Hospital to Be Built. Free Medicine and Attendance Prove a Blessing to Filipinas,” May 4, 1900.

23. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 8, 209.

24. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2412; National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117; *Ibid*, Entry 5721.

25. Gates, “Philippine Guerillas,” 51-64.

Miguel Malvar in Batangas and Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles in Laguna established powerful networks and nipped away at American gains. Along with revolutionaries such as Gen. Manuel Tinio in Ilocos and Gen. Arcadio Maxilom on Cebu, Malvar and Cailles demonstrated well-developed knowledge of guerrilla warfare, seldom seeking battlefield primacy, but instead undermining U.S. control of civilian populations and outlying terrain. They focused on creating and nurturing a clandestine support system throughout their area of operation, capitalizing on nationalism, patronage, and kinship where they could—and using violence where they could not.<sup>26</sup> A pamphlet published in Madrid by Isabelo de Los Reyes in July 1900 gave instructions for conduct, and insurgent groups seemed well disposed toward the strategic outline. Foremost among the objectives was to “obtain the sympathies of the people,” followed closely by the need to “constantly worry the Yankees in the pueblos occupied by them.”<sup>27</sup> The guerrilla posture in and around towns and barrios reflected this basic foundation.

Each town recruited a “column” from the local residents. The column was then dispersed in the village and surrounding barangay so they could work among civilians, blending into the local population. In many instances, these relationships with the inhabitants, many of whom were relatives and friends, insured a measure of protection for the insurgents. Lt. Col. Charles Crane noted, “As a rule . . . [guerrillas] conceal their weapons and appear as innocent amigos. Most of them live at home and work at their ordinary vocation, those who are not at home live in houses already occupied by their

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26. May, *Battle for Batangas*, 194-207.

27. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 5, 73.

friends and all appears to be one family in each house.”<sup>28</sup> Separating revolutionaries from their support under these circumstances called for a shift in tactics, and the U.S. Army began arresting suspected insurgents in town rather than launching fruitless offensives into the jungle, establishing evolving policy of mass detention. Often working at night, U.S. forces would close off a barangay, perform thorough household searches, and interrogate the people. At times, the entire male population of a given barrio was taken, including younger boys, resulting in hundreds of incarcerations and drawing women directly into the conflict.<sup>29</sup>

The dedication of Tagalog women to juridical negotiation was nowhere more apparent than petitions for release of prisoners. Although commanders admonished soldiers to gain the trust of the people and only arrest individuals with good cause, often all the men of a barangay were seized together; a single prisoner sweep in one town during late 1900 took 476 local residents into custody.<sup>30</sup> Among the American garrisons, the general feeling was that the innocent could be separated from the guilty later, but the possibility of losing high-value individuals due to dissimulation necessitated immediate action during operations.<sup>31</sup> As a result, between 1901 and 1902, ever-increasing numbers of Tagalog women presented themselves at garrison headquarters or submitted letters to

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28. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2412

29. Ibid, Entry 4327, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry 2078, Box 1; Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 138-139.

30. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4327, Vol. 2

31. Ibid, Entry 2078, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1.

officers requesting that they free male kin from detention.<sup>32</sup> Individual women would most often initiate negotiations for the release of a husband or brother or son, but frequently groups of women or entire communities would join together in force to sway a favorable outcome. Often their efforts proved effective, particularly as garrisons asked for guns or other matériel in exchange for family members. Company-grade officers felt a measure of success in both controlling the population and disarming guerrillas and became reliant on the tactic as a means to degrade insurgent forces without the casualties—from disease and disability as much as combat—associated with jungle “hikes.”<sup>33</sup>

However, the problems with the frequent ebb and flow of prisoners soon became apparent at the operational level, and procedural clarifications were pushed down to the tactical leaders. Something of a revolving-door policy at the detention centers had come into effect by 1901, prompting senior officers to rebuke garrisons for releasing prisoners for guns without a thorough investigation of the individuals involved, a situation that had implications for security and stability given known insurgents slipped away through the intercession of female relatives. Tactical leaders tightened their regulation in response; women soon lost faith in the exchange system and its efficacy dwindled, but the numbers of direct petitions did not. Filipinas simply redoubled their appeals through the legal system or turned to bribery and providing false information. Eventually, the Adjutant

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32. Ibid, Entry 4211, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2078, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4327, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry 3495, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2354, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2381, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2398, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2398, Box 3.

33. Ibid, Entry 2354, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 4211, Vol. 2; Linn, *Philippine War*, 90.



General sought to curtail problems by ordering that no prisoners be released, but this proved impracticable. Prisons were overcrowded and the perceived tactical benefits were too great, so tactical-level negotiations not only continued but also proceeded to evolve into new techniques and procedures.<sup>34</sup>

This policy of roundups had several consequences that appear unintentional but affected both gendered resistance and future tactical development. Sudden absences of all or most men in villages heightened pressure on women to maintain households and reinforced their centrality to both the family economy and the infrastructure, again making females more visible and more important in the wartime power structure. In many cases the absence of men forced women into a position of personal jeopardy, increasing resistance activities such as bribing officials for the release of male kin, dissimulation, or public appeals to higher authorities. The Americans could not help but note these incidents. The flood of women negotiating with the local officers unavoidably drew attention to their social position, setting in motion more active exploitation of gender roles by U.S. forces, including deliberate use of women as interlocutors and as leverage in counterinsurgency operations.<sup>35</sup>

These evolving gendered tactics became more apparent as the war accelerated in its final phase. Historian Brian Linn asserts that “by fall of 1900 Army pacification efforts throughout the Second District had failed in most of their goals,” and by early 1901 the U.S. Army again reorganized the area of operations, adding Cavite and

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34. Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2354, Box 2; Ibid, Entry 2078, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 4211, Vol. 2.

35. Ibid, Entry 4748, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117, Vol. 2.

renaming the region the First District, Department of Southern Luzon.<sup>36</sup> Brig. Gen. James F. Wade assumed command, bringing to the district the experience of a career cavalryman and a razor-sharp awareness of guerrilla tactics from his campaigns during the Indian Wars. McKinley's reelection in November 1900 also dealt a severe blow to the Filipino insurgency, whose strategic leaders had staked their future on its outcome. Bryan's convincing defeat empowered a perceived colonial mandate and increasingly severe counterinsurgency policies throughout the archipelago under the precepts of General Orders No. 100. Signs of success began appearing in the growing capacity of municipal governments and the replacement of Army garrisons with police as the colonial authority. Perhaps the most crippling setback for the Filipinos, though, was the capture of Aguinaldo and his entourage on March 23, resulting in the former president's startling public acceptance of U.S. sovereignty on April 19. These successes allowed the U.S. Army to virtually eliminate armed opposition outside of the new First District by July 1901.<sup>37</sup>

Aguinaldo's vision of a centralized Philippine military and political system had faded long before his surrender, however, and Cailles and Malvar independently controlled much of the First District from the Filipino perspective. Malvar's response to Aguinaldo's surrender was simply to issue a proclamation declaring himself commander of southern Luzon and urging the population within his sphere of influence to continue the nationalist cause.<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, the toppling of so many insurgent cells during the

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36. Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 142.

37. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1901, Vol. 1, Part 4, 107-119.

38. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 5, 328-336.



previous year increased disorganization and fragmentation among Filipino revolutionaries, leading to Cailles' surrender on June 24, 1901. According to Filipino Lt. Col. Bernardo Marques, desperate revolutionaries "surrendered for various reasons; some because they tired of staying in the field; some through fear and because they lost hope; because some of them had been injured or lost their health through life in the field and some because their families obliged them to surrender."<sup>39</sup> The mention of family influence indicates success of gendered tactical initiatives, including confiscation of wealth, property destruction, and using women as interlocutors to negotiate with guerrillas. Although the capitulation of so many high-value targets was significant, effectively eliminating a Filipino strategic presence, the guerrilla organization was too personal, informal, and localized to completely collapse.<sup>40</sup> Malvar, who replaced Aguinaldo as the Republic's President, made a commitment to long-term war, contributing to a growing feeling of frustration within the Army, which was succinctly voiced by Brig. Gen. Samuel Sumner: "There are few means at hand to impress these people with the disadvantage of warfare unless we burn the barrios, destroy the food, and subject them to personal torture which is inhuman and unwise."<sup>41</sup> His sentiments nonetheless portended a shift in American tactical thinking.

The First District became a primary focus of the U.S. counterinsurgency, with a coalescence of circumstances ratcheting military pressure. Relative quiet elsewhere allowed a modest troop surge in southwestern Luzon, and the replacement of U.S.

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39. In Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 150.

40. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2355.

41. Ibid, Entry 2349.

Volunteers with Army Regulars boosted the conflict's intensity, reflecting a professional disposition toward harsher methods rather than protracted war. The Army had learned much during the escalation in 1900, and officers across all levels refined their understanding of tactical developments that might offer an edge over stubbornly resistant insurgents and their civilian support, particularly as combat offensives continued to be ineffective and costly.<sup>42</sup> Strategic leaders began shifting their attention as well, and MacArthur stressed the importance of disrupting the insurgent supply system and undermining kinship networks, particularly the connections between elite families who could leverage patron-client relations to keep the population engaged. His approach mirrored his belief that "the towns, regardless of the fact of American occupation and town organization, are the actual bases for all insurgent military activities; and not only so in the sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of guerrillas, but as affording secure places of refuge."<sup>43</sup> Consequently, operational policy directed tactical units toward identifying and eliminating the more-static insurgent infrastructure rather than pursuing elusive armed combatants.

This articulation of an approved counterinsurgency policy directly tied to General Orders No. 100 offered company-grade officers the opportunity to employ a broad range of tactics consistent with both their own Progressive Era values and international laws of war.<sup>44</sup> When Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee replaced MacArthur in July 1901, he would only emphasize this attitude from the top down, doubtless influenced by his own vast

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42. Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 138-155.

43. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1900, Vol. 1, Part 5, 61.

44. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1901, Vol. 1, Part 4, 93-94.

experience as a cavalry regular who had campaigned in the Indian Territories, Cuba, and China.<sup>45</sup> The response at the tactical level is apparent in correspondence from officers in Cavite who were concerned about the posture of their developing civil government and Philippine Constabulary stability operations:

The interests of your government will not suffer in the slightest degree from a “general terrorizing of the country passed through.” . . . Those interests will un-questionably be greatly promoted if the military establishment will aid in thus terrorizing those people so long as legitimate methods are employed such as are outlined in General Orders 100. . . . As the Brigade Commander is well satisfied that the Chief of Constabulary does not wish illegitimate methods employed by his sub-ordinates (such as raping or abusing women) . . . [he] does not concur in your opinion that the acts of these police committed on these people called for the severest punishment, except as to such illegitimate acts as may clearly be proven to have been committed against women. It is not possible to sympathize with these people . . . without encouraging them to continue their lawless and disorderly conduct.<sup>46</sup>

This outlook was a distinct departure from the early occupation, when instilling fear was seen as counterproductive to pacification; in late 1899, soldiers were ordered not to shoot at dogs or chickens because it scared people and damaged the Army’s prestige.<sup>47</sup> Now, soldiers were only limited by their interpretation of abuse of women. Gendered tactics had to just stop short of criminal acts which, in any case, were contrary to military virtue and likely to result in an uncomfortable hitch in the stockade. The door was opened, however, and the acceptance of hard-war policies from the top down obscured the distinction between civilian and military targets. Female resistance broke down gendered barriers in American tactical development, and by 1901, U.S. forces were much less

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45. U.S. War Department. *Annual Reports*, 1902, Vol. 1, Part 9, 186-194; U.S. Senate, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, 1551-1553.

46. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2349.

47. National Archives, Record Group 94, Entry 117, Vol. 1.

likely to overlook female complicity and much more likely to pinpoint women's resistance, although they were clearly restrained by masculine values. Shifting American attitudes had drastic consequences for how the war was conducted, and U.S. forces configured their tactics to exploit other gendered weaknesses and compensate for operational difficulties, making imprisonment, reconcentration, and food deprivation legitimate means to end the conflict.

Operations in Laguna province offer a useful glimpse of escalating gendered resistance and counterinsurgency in the last two years of the war. Much of the province's 2,603 square kilometers were accessible to the huge waterway of Laguna de Bay stretching north to Manila, and with a population of almost 170,000, Filipino insurgents easily made use of both the terrain and human infrastructure.<sup>48</sup> In February 1900, the Army Chief of Staff sent Wheaton a short warning to "watch the town of Pila, south of Santa Cruz, insurgents passing property through that point from the lake," drawing attention to a potential problem area. By the end of the year, a garrison commander still noted, "the natives here are all in such fear of the insurrectos they will show no friendship to us . . . they will do no work of any kind."<sup>49</sup> These observations are consistent with other resistance activities, such as the simultaneous efforts by Lucia de la Cruz and Ramon Santos to undermine American authority in nearby Calamba, suggesting the volume of resistance activity in the area was substantial and often overt as well as covert.

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48. Philippine Commission, *Report*, Vol. 3, 455-457.

49. Otis, *Report of Major-General*, 237; National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

Reports of an insurgent outpost in a barrio near Pila, Laguna prompted a January 1901 operation that found the town “in such good order and the attitude of the people so satisfactory that it was not deemed necessary to burn the place.”<sup>50</sup> With roundups of male populations and property destruction routine, the barrio’s stakeholders were no doubt aware of the growing belief among American soldiers that “the theoretical dream of a humanitarian war had become more or less of a failure.”<sup>51</sup> It is easy then to see a degree of dissimulation in the good order and satisfactory attitude of the civilian population. Despite their outwardly benign demeanor, fifty men were arrested and brought back to the American camp “for observation and identification, with the prospect of finding some insurgent soldiers among them.”<sup>52</sup> Women immediately submitted their petitions for the release of the prisoners and negotiated with the local garrison. In contrast to other towns, like Malabon, there appeared to be little effort in Pila to address practical or strategic gender needs, but one apparently clueless officer hoisted an American flag to “make glad the hearts of loyal Philipinos in this insurrecto land.” Under pressure from headquarters to hold municipal elections, the same officer interpreted oaths of allegiance by fourteen prominent citizens in early March as a sign of capitulation. Given the growing food shortages and the desperate need for rent money and other services, the oaths were likely a means to improve the increasingly dire situation; almost 200 more residents signed on within a few days.<sup>53</sup>

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50. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

51. White, “The Pacification,” 440.

52. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

53. Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

The combination of U.S. offensives, pressure to implement General Orders 43, and Filipino oath taking spurred an uptick in violence, complicating efforts to establish a municipal government in Pila. Guerrillas under Cailles fired shots into the surrounding barangay, sounded trumpets, and cut telegraph wires to harass both the American and the Americanistas. The garrison's commanding officer, Major Pitcher, believed the leader of the local flying column, Lt. Col. Regino Revlova, was responsible and considered options for his capture. Experiences with gendered resistance very likely influenced his tactical decision making, for he arrested Revlova's wife on March 29 and "held her as hostage, confiscated two very fine houses and all the furniture in them, and gave out that the woman would be sent to Manila as a military prisoner." Within an hour, Revlova turned himself in, and the officer sent off a telegram to district headquarters, declaring "the bluff worked." He soon received a reply from district commander Gen. Robert Hall congratulating him on his strategy, indicating the operational-level leader's acceptance of gendered tactics, even if the details once again failed to appear in any official after-action reports.<sup>54</sup> This surrender is consistent with Lt. Col. Bernardo Marques's statement regarding the influence of families on individual capitulation, demonstrating that civilians successfully exerted pressure on the guerrilla fighters when personal livelihoods were jeopardized.

The implications of this incident were significant, both for the garrison at Pila and the war throughout southwestern Luzon. Any lingering reluctance to incarcerate women was clearly on the wane. Tagalog women had displayed both their important position as heads of household and their capacity for autonomous action, and U.S. forces now saw

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54. Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4748, Vol. 1.

opportunities for counterinsurgency success embedded in the gender dynamics of the civilian infrastructure. The unique feminine roles of Filipinas as property owners and economic drivers made their freedom and mobility essential, and so their restriction promised to destabilize family units, kinship networks, and guerrilla cohesion. Pitcher's accomplishment marked the rise of female hostage taking by U.S. forces, which would become a substantial factor in the final capitulation of guerrilla bands throughout the First District. It also set in motion a rapid local acceleration of gendered actions and reactions in Laguna.

Revlova admitted to Pitcher that the incarceration of his wife caused his surrender and that her protection was more important to him than his role as a partisan. Although he immediately agreed to take an oath of allegiance and claimed he was weary of war, complications ensued. He steadfastly refused to offer any information or assist the U.S. in any way. Rumors that several hundred insurgents intended to burn the town and liberate Revlova surfaced, indicating his capitulation was not as clear as it had appeared. Pitcher, who had "never seen the natives so frightened," noted that the Filipino men gathered the women and children together and mounted an all-night guard. The attack never materialized, but the town remained in a state of alarm while three hundred guerrillas under Cailles received supplies from the barrios just outside Pila, belying recent oaths of allegiance.<sup>55</sup>

Pitcher put some thought into the problem and soon arrived at a solution, deciding, "if all the rice in the vicinity is stored in a central storehouse and put under the immediate charge of the military, Juan Cailles will be forced into starvation, early

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55. Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4748, Vol. 1.

surrender, or evacuation of the province. The people of this province live wholly on rice and a small quantity of fish. . . . This will absolutely close the war in this province at once.” With the restrictions on transportation and the destruction of so much agricultural industry in the preceding years, tactical food deprivation was easily implemented. Although the post at Bacoor had been reluctant to disrupt the sale of “eatables” in 1900, even though the women were known to be supplying insurgents, by 1901 garrisons across Luzon embraced the concentration and destruction of rice, intensifying starvation throughout the Philippines.<sup>56</sup> This leverage was seen in Pila as ever-growing numbers of people took an oath of allegiance and elections were rapidly held in April, shortly after the complete concentration of rice.

Access to food likely played a greater role in compliance than changing loyalty, for schemes and gendered resistance remained constant in Laguna during the spring and summer. Outside Santa Cruz, an American patrol detained two women with heavily laden ponies before they could meet their insurgent partners to deliver supplies. This encounter led to the arrest of a local Filipino inspector who had allowed them to pass through the town with the full knowledge of their destination, revealing ongoing complicity and corruption within the municipal government. Shortly thereafter, a second scandal rocked the area, when Tomasa and Martina Ysberto admitted that they paid fifty pesos to a Filipino man employed by the U.S. Army to secure the release of several prisoners after petitions to the garrison commander had failed. Soon Ancelma Casilong also admitted giving thirty pesos to the man, who was unsuccessful in liberating the detainees, despite

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56. Ibid, Entry 4748, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 5098, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 3106; Glenn May, *Battle for Batangas*, 90.



the price he commanded for the service. He was prosecuted by the U.S. government and sued by the women; both were apparently dissatisfied with his performance.<sup>57</sup>

Despite difficulties petitioning for the release of prisoners and the increased likelihood of their own detention, the female population continued pressing legal negotiations on the garrisons in Laguna. Claims by women for restitution and complaints regarding illegal searches and seizures continued unabated. In a more serious incident near Santa Cruz, though, five American soldiers were accused of raping a native woman. The commanding officer recommended pressing charges and referring the men to trial by court martial, telling the Adjutant General, "I have personally examined the witnesses in this case and am of the opinion that the charges can be sustained."<sup>58</sup> The consistent willingness of native women to pursue justice or restitution, particularly in cases of sexual assault, indicates that Tagalog females remained either unafraid of U.S. forces or felt enough support from their own kinship networks and community to overcome fears of reprisal. Some rape trials and their appeals persisted for years; at least six sexual assault cases, several involving Philippine Constabulary, police, or other authorities dating from during the war, were not fully adjudicated until the Philippine Supreme Court ruled on them in 1904.<sup>59</sup> These efforts also demonstrate the determination of resistance motivated by practical and strategic gender needs because even as senior insurgent

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57. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

58. Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

59. Supreme Court of the Philippines, *Reports of Cases*, 135-137.

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leaders such as Juan Cailles surrendered, Tagalog women in the First District continued their opposition activities at the same or higher rate than earlier in the war.<sup>60</sup>

Despite some gains, the end of 1901 saw insurgent and resistance activity holding steady throughout southwestern Luzon. Col. William Dougherty of the Eighth U.S. Infantry grimly reported, "Diverse attempts have been made during the past summer and this fall to bring the enemy to an engagement to no avail. . . . It is apparent to me, and must be to anyone familiar with the conditions here, that a policy of moderation and forbearance toward those not under arms, but nevertheless engaged in supporting the insurrection, is untimely now and can only end in disaster."<sup>61</sup> In November, yet another reorganization of Army forces allowed Chaffee to place Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell in command of the newly created Third Separate Brigade with an area of responsibility encompassing most of the provinces around Laguna de Bay, including Morong, Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, as well as Mindoro and Marinduque. Bell's counterinsurgency policies were straightforward and reflected some of Sheridan's hardhanded approach to civilians in the Shenandoah Valley during the American Civil War. He clearly defined the counterinsurgent mission to "make the existing state of war and martial law so inconvenient and unprofitable to the people that they will earnestly desire and work for the reestablishment of peace and civil government."<sup>62</sup> Ports were

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60 National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4211, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2078, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4327, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry 3495, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2354, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2381, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2398, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2398, Box 3.

61. Ibid, Entry 2354, Box 1.

62. Ibid, Entry 4226, Vol. 1; *Telegraphic Circular*, no. 19, December 22, 1901.

closed, rents denied, and troops could commandeer transportation without payment, measures that further constricted the economy and threatened the welfare of families already teetering on the brink of devastation.<sup>63</sup>

Bell's most contentious course of action was to implement concentration, declaring certain outlying areas off limits and bringing the populace into "protected zones" where they could be definitively separated from guerrillas. Concentration was an extreme tactic, but it was not without precedent and had proved at least moderately successful in other areas of Luzon.<sup>64</sup> The policy was authorized December 8, 1901, and Filipino citizens had but three weeks to bring all property into the reconcentration zone or risk confiscation. Although ultimately effective, the tactic caused significant suffering; historian Glenn May estimates that malnutrition, insufficient sanitation, and disease may have affected as many as 11,000 Filipinos.<sup>65</sup>

In addition to concentration of the general population, Bell installed several experienced intelligence officers in the brigade and provost courts, while provost marshals stepped up activities to identify and arrest insurgents and sympathizers. These policing operations were given extensive flexibility in their methods, including the capacity to try civilians and mete out both prison sentences and monetary fines.<sup>66</sup> A telegraphic circular on December 12, 1901, declared that "until peace is restored in this

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63. Ibid, Entry 4226, Vol. 1; *Telegraphic Circular*, no. 3, December 9, 1901; *Senate Affairs*, 1607.

64. May, *Battle for Batangas*, 242-254.

65. May, "The Zones of Batangas," 90.

66. Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 155-157.

province no more native prisoners will be released if confined for political reasons. No more applications to be forwarded. No exceptional cases.”<sup>67</sup> The combination of arresting more men and eliminating female access to petitions demonstrates that counterinsurgency tactics had taken into consideration complementary male and female resistance, suggesting that American commanders were identifying and integrating gendered approaches. Nonetheless, indigenous women continued to petition with regularity, even if the chances of success were minimal.<sup>68</sup>

Bell, famous for his battlefield exploits, a veteran of the Indian Wars and a Medal of Honor recipient, had years of experience in the Philippines. He had worked closely with Taft and the Philippine Commission and was certainly aware of Tagalog social structures, class and kinship ties, and the roles of women. George Becker, who had served on Bell’s staff, commented during a lecture in 1901,

General Franklin Bell and I have a friend—a Filipino woman—who occupies a very responsible position in a large business establishment. She formerly had strong sympathy with the cause of ‘independence.’ Lately she has informed the General that she would rather see any government on earth assume the charge of the Philippines, even the Chinese government, than take her chances under native rule, and this she has frankly been telling her countrymen. You may wonder that I quote a woman on such a subject, but ordinarily a Filipino woman is brighter than her husband, and I know of no other country where women exert an equal amount of influence.<sup>69</sup>

Many of Bell’s policies reflected his intimacy with Filipino culture. Determined to undermine the civilian infrastructure, he focused on the destruction of elite Filipino

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67. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 5098.

68. Ibid, Entry 4747, Vol. 1.

69. Becker, “Conditions Requisite,” 3.

power, arresting large numbers of wealthy or influential individuals.<sup>70</sup> Although systematic dismantling of the class structure proved effective in bringing native elites into line, this tactic was not reserved for prominent citizens or simply to damage the prestige of the Filipino leadership. U.S. forces under Bell also extended these policies across gender lines and began leveraging female hostages in earnest in 1902 to exact surrenders of local insurgents or force compliance of recalcitrant barangay residents.

In increasing numbers, women began appearing on prison rosters. After the capture of Mrs. Revlova, a few women were held for crimes by the garrison at Pila—a couple of smugglers and an accomplice to murder—suggesting changes in American perceptions of female roles and rising willingness to confine individuals regardless of gender. Not a single female was incarcerated in Pila between September and December 1901, but, beginning in January after Bell’s concentration policies and aggressive counterinsurgency campaign came fully into effect, unexpected inmates began appearing. A variety of legitimate male criminals and prisoners of war were charged that month with real offenses such as spying, possessing firearms, Katipunán, insurrecto, and being “out of zone.” Among them also, however, were Alina Cordon, Colasa Regalo, Anastasia Iscusio, Urbana Ramos, and Ignacia Ramos, whose transgressions were their positions as wife, daughter, or niece of company-grade officers in the local flying column. While an abusive husband and a carabao thief were quickly released, the women and children sat in prison awaiting the surrender of their male relatives.<sup>71</sup>

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70. May, *Battle for Batangas*, 247-248.

71. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4751.

The situation at Pila was not unique. In Batangas, insurgent Col. Briccio Casala surrendered, in part, because his sister Lorenza Casala was held by U.S. forces. His compatriot Potenciano Montalbo likewise negotiated his own imprisonment in exchange for three family members being held at Camp McGrath.<sup>72</sup> Severina Turalia was arrested and held in Lipa because her “son, Captain Simplicio Esabillo, has not surrendered.” She was joined by eight other women and two men, all arrested to force capitulation of guerrillas related to them by blood or marriage. The Third Separate Brigade cut a wide swath through its area of responsibility, arresting dozens of women from different towns and barangay, some connected to high-value targets and some simply “relative of insurgent.”

The men held at Lipa proved exceptions to the trend, for there were few males used as hostages, perhaps because they were either accused of being guerrillas themselves or would have had less value in a prisoner exchange. Regardless, they were more likely to languish in prison. Women, with a few exceptions such as the Buenafe girls, who were “unabashed insurgents,” were seldom held for more than a few days or a month and were very likely liberated by male kin as soon as news of their plight was known; as a tactical windfall, several insurgents would often surrender together when one responded to a detainee situation.<sup>73</sup> This effort was highly successful in degrading insurgent capabilities in the first quarter of 1902 because it effectively blocked most options for women’s resistance while jeopardizing local economies and households.

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72. Ibid, Entry 4229, Box 1.

73. Ibid, Entry 2397, Box 1; Ibid, Entry 2354, Box 2; Ibid, Entry 2381, Box 1.

The high visibility of Tagalog women and their frequent negotiations with American officers made this tactic both logical and easy to implement. While Bell's combat operations in the mountains again proved costly and difficult, arresting women was remarkably successful in bringing in both high-value targets and less-prominent supporters without serious casualties.<sup>74</sup> Families could ill afford to lose female reproductive or wage labor, but men were less-involved in household economies, so the U.S. military had unique leverage in exchanging women for male prisoners. As a method, it remained within the boundaries of "legitimate acts" against females, provided the arrests were made without inflicting physical abuse or rape on the detainees. There were few complaints of such treatment among the Army records for posts like Batangas and Pila, where the tactic was enthusiastically employed. Both the willingness of Tagalog women to press rape charges and the Army's readiness to court martial soldiers suggest that there would be some record if sexual or physical violence were a significant factor in imprisonment. Glenn May notes increased incidents of torture, including the water cure, were applied to male prisoners during this time but also indicates that this abuse was directed more toward destroying elite opposition than gendered resistance.<sup>75</sup> Despite the efficacy of leveraging female hostages, the tactic remained concealed from public view. Combat operations and concentration efforts took center stage in official records.

Under extreme pressure from Bell, in the midst of widespread starvation and population loss, the remaining Filipino revolutionaries and their civilian supporters rapidly capitulated. Although Bell would face antagonism and censure for his hardhanded

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74. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports*, 1902, Vol. 9, 136-336.

75. May, *Battle for Batangas*, 254-259.



war operations, he was able to claim a military solution to the insurgency in a few short months. Malvar surrendered April 16, 1902, quickly followed by other senior commanders in southwestern Luzon, and Bell responded with an easing of operations. Civil control of the region was almost immediately reinstated, and political prisoners were released from detention. Civilians were allowed outside of zones and began repopulating devastated villages. Mid-May 1902 marked the end of the aggressive counterinsurgency in Luzon, final operations on Samar ended in June, and the U.S. declared victory in July.

Insurgencies, however, continued to flourish in the Philippines, bringing to mind Clausewitz's argument that even the most overwhelming military conquest is not final if the defeated population regarded the situation as temporary and reversible through political means. Some Filipino revolutionaries, such as Macario Sakay, did not succumb to the devastating operations during the first half of 1902 and continued pursuing the goal of independence for several more years. The U.S. Army, however, stepped back from counterinsurgency, redefining the guerrilla war as a police action. At the same time, the Philippine Commission passed several suppressive laws in 1902, including the Brigandage Act, effectively transforming insurgents into criminals.<sup>76</sup> Pacification fell upon the Philippine Constabulary, which continued to actively stifle revolts during the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>77</sup> Many of these anticolonial and populist rebellions, such as the Visayan *pulahanes*, the Collow Uprising, the Sakdalistas, and even World War II's Huk movement, depended on female support and generated unique forms of

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76. U.S. War Department, *Acts of the Philippine Commission*, 215.

77. Coats, "The Philippine Constabulary."

gendered resistance, as indigenous women continued to pursue practical and strategic needs left unaddressed by the colonial regime.<sup>78</sup>

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78. U.S. War Department, *Seventh Annual Report*, 434-442; National Archives, Record Group 350, Entry 5, Box 1331/F28875; Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings*, 112-117.

## CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

The Philippine-American War, although seldom in the consciousness of the modern American public, persists as a model of counterinsurgency success for U.S. military theorists and policy makers. However, perceptions of victory were, and still are, deeply tied to Progressive Era values stressing battlefield prowess and military solutions, illusions of conquest that failed to create long-term security and stability in the Philippines. Profound political issues stemming from colonization, such as land reform, gender positioning, and social equality, fomented into uprisings throughout the twentieth century, and today the U.S. supported Republic of the Philippines continues to fight longstanding and bloody insurgencies with roots in the American occupation. Almost daily, communist rebels or Muslim separatists blow up infrastructure, burn villages, and kill government soldiers or civilian collaborators, belying over a century of “pacification” efforts and attempts to build legitimate municipal governments able to meet the population’s practical and strategic needs.<sup>1</sup>

From 1899 to 1902, the U.S. Army skillfully innovated tactics to suppress resistance, which influenced both twentieth-century doctrine and military postures.

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1. *ABS-CBN News*, “MILF Rebels Burn Down 40 Homes in Sultan Kudarat,” January 21, 2009; *ABS-CBN News*, “Bomb Intended for Army Convoy Injures Civilian in Davao,” September 2, 2009; *ABS-CBN News*, “Two Killed, 15 Hurt in Jolo Town Blast,” September 17, 2009; *ABS-CBN News*, “Landmine Kills Two U.S. Soldiers in Jolo,” October 2, 2009; *The Philippine News*, “Muslim Rebels Met US Envoy for Peace Deal,” October 24, 2009; *The Philippine News*, “Philippines Accuses More Rebels in Irish Priest’s Kidnap,” November 6, 2009; *The Mindanao Examiner*, “Philippine Rescue Operations Put at Risk Captured Soldier’s Life, NPA Rebels Say,” November 7, 2009; *Philippine Star*, “Abus Behead School Principal,” November 10, 2009; Cecile S. Felipe, “4 Cops Killed In Sorsogon NPA Attack,” *Philippine Star*, November 11, 2009.

American officers and soldiers, always in the context of their own Progressive Era ideals, often keenly assessed the human terrain and developed methods that undermined popular support for guerrillas. For these reasons, the Philippine-American War is certainly worthy of study, but a closer examination suggests that the counterinsurgency was neither fully resolved in 1902 nor is it necessarily a model that can be applied to modern warfare. Not a single Pentagon official wants embedded journalists reporting a “Philippine Model” of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan that includes civilian starvation, concentration, property destruction, extortion, or female hostage taking. Hardhanded tactics legitimized by the American Civil War’s General Orders No. 100, although effective in the Progressive Era Philippines, have no equivalent in modern military practice or international laws of war.

Nonetheless, a gender analysis of civilian resistance and counterinsurgency in the Philippine-American War reveals important tactical drivers with applications today. Indigenous female mobility, kinship networks, cultural influence, wage and reproductive labor, business management, and access to legal systems offer opportunities to address practical and strategic gender needs that may impact long-term stability in certain cultures. These aspects of tactical development still remain largely invisible in historical studies and military lessons learned analysis. In an effort to draw attention to the mindsets and biases in operational analysis, I have argued in this dissertation that Progressive Era American ideas of masculinity and femininity had two major consequences for the future. First, they influenced the innovation of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics from 1898 to 1902 and shaped gendered resistance and violence in

the Philippines throughout the war and beyond. Second, they set the foundation for the future development of U.S. military doctrine.

Four main ideas draw the issues of gender and tactics together, with implications for both military analysis and operations. Indigenous social power structures and American gender ideals are two distinct elements of counterinsurgency in a rapidly changing environment, affecting interpretations and responses. Tactics, techniques, and procedures influence gendered resistance, and vice versa. Finally, the metrics for mission success across all levels of warfare are deeply entwined with these gender values and interactions. Military operations are complex, with many factors contributing to tactical innovation, but gender is an important analytical tool for understanding the U.S. Army's approach to counterinsurgency operations in both current and historical theaters.

These four main ideas—indigenous power structure, American masculinity, the intersection of tactics and resistance, and metrics for success—help define the operational challenges of the Philippine-American War. Within the Filipino social hierarchy, women maintained powerful familial and economic positions; as a group, they were mobile, influential within kinship networks, and essential to the economy. In contrast, Progressive Era American masculinity and military virtue stressed the separation of men and women in wartime, while at the same time emphasizing the protection of civilians. As a result, Filipino strategic leaders consistently attempted to leverage female participation, whereas American officers tended to dismiss or downplay it, leaving U.S. tactical development ad hoc and reactive rather than proactive. However, serious operational errors on the part of the Filipino military during the first few months of war empowered the U.S. Army in their negotiations with civilian populations, while superiority of resources kept U.S.

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counterinsurgency moving forward, as Americans were able to draw females into their sphere of influence through security and microeconomic initiatives. This access promoted interactions between Tagalog women and U.S. forces, drawing the attention of local garrisons to gendered resistance and tactical opportunities.

Tagalog women, because of property destruction and other tactics, were largely focused on practical gender needs such as food, water, medicine, and shelter, and this affected their perceptions of successful resistance. Many civilians remained localized and family oriented, distanced from revolutionary goals and directions. Resistance emerged through covert community activities such as smuggling or collusion with guerrillas, but also in high-visibility behaviors such as lawsuits, petitions, and court trials, although these acts were often embedded in the search for basic needs rather than as part of a widespread effort to overthrow the U.S. occupation. In almost every city and town, women aggressively held the United States accountable for wartime events, demanding reimbursements for use or destruction of property and making appeals for the release of detained family members. Rather than allow the U.S. Army to simply inhabit their towns and lands as vanquishers, Tagalog women actively imposed formal business arrangements on the occupation, shaping the power hierarchy through overt dialogues. Civilian resistance was certainly not a new phenomenon for the U.S. Army, but Filipino women used their own particular resources to take advantage of American weaknesses, and American soldiers, lacking a counterinsurgency strategy, were left to respond based on local exigency and personal evaluations of legitimate action.

The U.S. Army had the means to meet both practical and strategic needs and was able to make gains through tactical negotiations. Many of these gendered efforts not only

stabilized local villages, as in the case of Malabon, but also improved intelligence collection platforms, targeted high-value individuals, and provided access to civilian infrastructure with broader implications for combat operations. U.S. forces adapted well to local conditions, however, and made slow and steady progress against guerrillas through a combination of innovative regional combat operations, civil affairs management, and Progressive Era reform involving indigenous forces, Filipino elites, and local leaders. Although I agree that this combination of “reward and chastisement” was central to the conduct of the war, counterinsurgency was more intimate and personal, engaging gender power hierarchies and involving interactions between men and women at the tactical level. As military personnel practiced insurgency and counterinsurgency, the minds, bodies, and labor of women became sites of contestation.

Each element of the counterinsurgency was a negotiation of power. The U.S. Army destroyed food supplies and then distributed rice to starving populations. American and Filipino forces razed households and villages but then struggled to control displaced populations who resisted regulation from both sides. On the other hand, U.S. officers reconstructed local economies driven by female labor and prosecuted Filipino men for domestic abuse and other crimes against women. American soldiers opened schools, bringing American women in to teach—and to model American femininity. They also exploited Tagalog culture and the social positioning of men and women. Tagalog women were traditional mediators; American soldiers soon understood that females could barter the surrender of high-value targets and developed tactics to effectively utilize this role.

The Army’s official records emphasized masculine ideals and concealed actions that undermined popular visions of military manhood. The *Annual Report of the War*



*Department*, the official record published by the Government Printing Office each year during the Philippine-American War, contains thousands of pages of correspondence, endorsements, orders, and reports that, for the most part, reflected ideals of military manhood focused on andocentric visions of warfare. That is not to say that these records neglected actions contrary to military virtue, for they certainly included incidents of rape, assault, looting, and dereliction of duty common to military occupation and abhorrent to orderly behavior. These general forms of criminality are prevalent, but their inclusion served to reinforce military manhood because the perpetrators of crimes were disciplined, shamed, and censured. The unpublished daily logs and letters of individual garrisons, however, were steeped in the resistance of the civilian population and contained a continuous account of gynocentric operations and negotiations that were filtered out of public record as the information moved from the tactical to the strategic level. The results of gendered operations may have appeared in the official documents, but the tactics, techniques, and procedures were sanitized to omit female involvement and highlight perceptions of mission success based on traditional male combat actions.

Both Filipino and American leaders sought ways to exploit and manipulate women's roles and labor to gain the advantage. Filipino women, however, chose their own means, place, and time to engage in activities, resulting in a contest between the armies to control these actions. Support and resistance during the Philippine-American War would continue to emerge from distinct, and often independent, motivators. Mass mobilization of women was less common than individual responses to specific needs, although Filipino strategic-level leaders would make efforts to win and maintain the

loyalty of the female elite through promises of reform and attempts to provide essential security through a series of gendered maneuvers.

When military personnel practiced insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Philippines, Tagalog women became central to the war as a result of their place in the household and importance to community economics. Perceptions of power relations between American and Filipino men and women shaped how the militaries conducted operations and ultimately how the U.S. Army constructed itself in the beginning of the twentieth century. In the end, U.S. Army rejected gendered tactics in favor of conventional man-to-man combat operations that more closely corresponded to the socio-cultural constructions of gender, reinforcing the position of the United States in the world through a powerful image of conventional American military might. I do not want to suggest that gender was the only influence on tactical and strategic development throughout the early twentieth-century; however, social and cultural constructions of gender in the Progressive Era played a key role in steering the U.S. military away from a formal commitment to counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency made the control of female civilians essential to both the U.S. Army and the Filipino guerrillas, and man-to-woman negotiations were important to pacification. Although these counterinsurgency tactics proved highly effective in pacifying local populations, they also proved difficult to reconcile with American concepts of manhood. This intersection of gendered resistance and counterinsurgency underscored the vastly different concepts of victory and the will to resist. Tagalog women often effectively shaped their own local environment, but their actions had little impact on revolutionary goals such as independence. The results of the war were therefore

ambiguous in many ways. Filipino women had some tactical successes in meeting gender needs, American soldiers had some tactical successes in defeating localized guerrillas, both sides fell short of strategic goals, and in the end the Filipino people were neither independent nor pacified.

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DURING THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR, 1898-1902

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THE COST IS SWORN TO BY WOMEN:  
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By

Dawn Anne Ottevaere

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## ABSTRACT

### THE COST IS SWORN TO BY WOMEN: GENDER, RESISTANCE, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY DURING THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR, 1898-1902

By

Dawn Anne Ottevaere

During the Philippine-American War, the U.S. Army innovated gendered tactics to suppress native resistance, making control of female populations essential to military operations. I argue in this dissertation that Progressive Era American ideas of masculinity and femininity influenced counterinsurgency development from 1898 to 1902, shaping resistance and violence in the Philippines while setting the future course of U.S. military doctrine. An analysis of civilian resistance and U.S. counterinsurgency reveals key tactical drivers, including native female mobility, kinship networks, wage work, reproductive labor, portable wealth, and access to legal systems. Despite female support for local Filipino guerrillas, American soldiers' attention to these drivers often stabilized villages, enhanced intelligence collection platforms, targeted high value individuals, and provided access to civilian infrastructure. However, this approach also placed the minds, bodies, and labor of women at the center of a violent struggle, providing additional challenges for security operations. U.S. strategic leaders acknowledged clear indicators of indigenous female participation in the war, but could not reconcile gender issues into an overarching military policy. Ultimately, the ad hoc U.S. counterinsurgency was unsuccessful in establishing long term stability in the Philippines.

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For my Grandma, Dorothy Ottevaere,  
who wanted all her grandsons to grow up to be doctors and granddaughters to be nurses.

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## INTRODUCTION

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have reintroduced the word *counterinsurgency* into our everyday vocabulary, underscoring a historical problem confronting today's U.S. policy makers and military theorists. For almost a century and a half, the United States Army has prepared for conventional war, although its actual mission more often involved irregular warfare, defined as the "violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations."<sup>1</sup> The reasons for U.S. commitment to conventional warfare remain murky, although some historians suggest that, as the Gilded Age and Progressive Era Army evolved into a doctrinally driven institution, the U.S. Government simply did not view small wars as a threat. Additionally, public opinion, friction between civilian politics and military missions, and the "unpleasant nature" of counterinsurgency operations have been cited as underlying causes of this peculiar institutional blindness.<sup>2</sup> While all of these factors certainly played a part in the Army's choices, I see gender as a missing piece in the unexplained puzzle of the U.S. military's approach to irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. I argue in this dissertation that Progressive Era American ideas of masculinity and femininity had two major consequences for the future. First, these ideas influenced the development of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics from 1898 to 1902, shaping gendered resistance and violence in the Philippines. Second, they set the course of U.S. Army doctrine. An

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1. U.S. Special Operations, *Irregular Warfare*, 5.

2. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 271-273.

analysis of Filipino women's resistance and U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippine-American War, then, is the purpose of this study.

It seems appropriate to begin with a definition of terms, because both gender and counterinsurgency have taken on various meanings. For the purpose of this study, *gender* is considered "a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes" and is "a way of signifying relationships of power."<sup>3</sup> An *insurgency* is defined as an organized politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control of an established government or occupying force, thereby making *counterinsurgency* the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic action taken to defeat an insurgency.<sup>4</sup> These definitions allow us to approach counterinsurgency in terms of power relationships, revealing that the development of counterinsurgency tactics and metrics for mission success has been rooted in the cultural and social constructions of gender.

The Philippines are remarkably diverse, with over 7,000 islands and 100 ethnolinguistic groups, making the practice of counterinsurgency a local phenomenon. Therefore, I have limited the geographic scope of this dissertation to central Luzon, building upon the work of historians Brian McAllister Linn, John Gates, and Glenn May, who have focused on the well-organized Tagalog resistance in that region. These American military historians believe the Philippine-American War was the successful combination of innovative regional combat operations, civil affairs management, and

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3. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category," 153.

4. U.S. Army, *The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 2.

Progressive Era reform involving indigenous forces, Filipino elites, and local leaders. While I agree that this combination of “reward and chastisement” was central to the conduct of the war, counterinsurgency was also more intimate and personal, engaging gendered power hierarchies and involving interaction between men and women at the tactical level.<sup>5</sup> As military personnel practiced insurgency and counterinsurgency, the minds, bodies, and labor of women became sites of contestation. Perceptions of power relations between American and Filipino men and women shaped how the two countries conducted military operations, and ultimately how the United States Army constructed itself into the twentieth century.

Whereas many military historians support John Keegan’s premise that warfare is “the one human activity from which women, with the most insignificant exceptions, have always and everywhere stood apart” because it is “an entirely masculine activity,” I challenge this assessment.<sup>6</sup> I believe negotiations of power, violent or otherwise, between military and civilian men and women are the natural result of armed conflict. Political and military leaders, as well as historians, have been influenced by cultural ideals of military masculinity that presuppose a narrow definition of warfare privileging man-to-man engagements. During the Philippine-American War, the statutes of military law and social biases insured that resistance was gendered, with legitimate opposition very clearly defined along male and female boundaries. Although this inherent bias serves to hide women’s participation in the war, counterinsurgency in the Philippines underscores the

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5. Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, passim; Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, passim; May, *The Battle for Batangas*, passim.

6. Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 76.

artifice of these gendered boundaries and the effort needed to maintain them. Indigenous female resistance was a daily issue for the U.S. military at the tactical level, appearing with startling consistency in the Army's records and images of the war (see Figure 1 for an example).



*Figure 1. Resistance and counterinsurgency, 1899. Source: Library of Congress.*

In the Philippines, where nineteenth-century source material written by women is scarce, the effort to identify women's wartime activities often requires reading between the lines and making judgments based on the observations of male authorities. Overt

resistance is the easiest to detect in the primary sources, given contemporary writers, both Spanish and American, were quick to point out open subversion and detours from acceptable conduct. Covert behavior was embedded in Filipino guerrilla warfare and American counterinsurgency efforts; indeed, resistance tactics such as dissimulation, false compliance, slander, and sabotage were central themes of this conflict. Covert resistance becomes public when the target recognizes the activity, and these instances often appeared in both newspapers and military reports of the time. This dissertation, while not dismissing the idea of target-defined or unwitting resistance, focuses on overt and covert participation of women in the war made visible in news reports, military records, legal documents, and writings of participants.

Primary source materials on this topic are robust. The Progressive Era U.S. Army was exceptional in its record keeping, allowing historians to view meticulous accounts of tactical and strategic decision-making throughout the war. The U.S. National Archives' Record Group 395 provides a comprehensive view of local counterinsurgency and indigenous women's activities through the U.S. Army's unpublished daily reports. Record Group 395 is the voice of company-grade officers in each occupied village, detailing the challenges, successes, and missteps of tactical operations as they occurred. Equally important, gender perceptions and women's participation in the war are readily visible in each entry, with remarkable attention to these issues. In contrast, gendered tactics and female resistance are almost completely filtered out of the official version of events published in the *Annual Reports of the War Department*. Several volumes of these annual reports were printed each year by the federal government, conveying the strategic leadership's polished account of military operations for public consumption. Because of

the disparities between the tactical and strategic reports, I also utilized newspapers and journals from both the United States and the Philippines to trace military operations and discern issues of ongoing discussion. Personal papers of Philippine-American War veterans provided individual viewpoints, largely from a bottom-up perspective.

The U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania holds the Spanish-American War Veteran's Surveys (SAWS), a substantial collection of unpublished manuscripts from both officers and enlisted men. As a window into the Progressive Army's cultural beliefs and perceptions, the SAWS are an invaluable resource. The U.S. Military History Research Collection began sending the surveys in 1968, using government pension records to contact 8,000 veterans of the Spanish American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the China Relief Expedition. The written questionnaires covered a broad range of topics, including reasons for enlistment, opinions of the enemy, feelings about combat, and interactions with native women. The SAWS collection now holds both the completed questionnaires and personal materials such as letters, diaries, and memoirs written during and after the war.

Filipino records are more difficult to obtain, and personal papers from Tagalog women are almost nonexistent, but the Philippine Revolutionary Records (PRR) and other sources in English, Tagalog, and Spanish are available at the Philippine National Library in Manila. The PRR, known in the United States as the Philippine Insurgent Records (PIR), is an extensive collection of Filipino documents captured by the United States during the war. Although the original documents have not been fully catalogued, the PRR contains personal letters, diplomatic correspondence, government decrees, military orders, tactical reports, and public proclamations. In 1902, West Point graduate

Maj. John R. M. Taylor was tasked with organizing and translating the PIR's estimated three tons of Spanish and Tagalog papers; when finished in 1906, Taylor had compiled about 2,000 documents into several volumes of official history. He painstakingly chose and arranged the papers, and although his translations are largely dependable, the body of his work reflects his biases about the war, most notably his defense of U.S. policy in the Philippines. Taylor's manuscript was published in book form in the 1970s, so both the microfilmed original documents and the Army's translations are readily available.

The United States microfilmed the PIR for the National Archives and returned the originals to the Philippines after World War II. Improper handling and numerous thefts eventually degraded the collection, and the Philippine National Library now limits researchers almost exclusively to a microfilm copy of the PRR. I utilized all three versions—the PIR, the PRR, and Taylor's documents— reading Spanish or Tagalog originals and comparing them to Taylor's translations where possible. At times I relied solely on Taylor because I could not find the originals, but I was just as often grateful for Michigan State University's excellent Tagalog teachers and my Manila-based friend and research assistant, Carol Bello, who helped me read and understand very *malalim* (deep, or in this case, old) Tagalog. The Philippine National Library, the University of the Philippines, and Ateneo de Manila University also provided access to revolutionary newspapers from the late nineteenth century, as well as important secondary-source materials by Filipino scholars that were not readily available in the United States. As a whole, these resources contextualized transnational processes of conflict in the late nineteenth century and highlighted perceptions of gender in warfare across cultures. These Filipino sources were invaluable in drawing out the intersections of U.S.

counterinsurgency and female resistance, particularly at the strategic level, pointing to the continuities in the U.S. Army's approach to indigenous warfare across decades, even centuries.

The United States faced guerrilla conflicts more often than conventional wars between 1861 and 2001, yet counterinsurgency was seldom an institutional focus. Although campaigns of the Civil War and the Indian Wars demonstrated the need to address guerrilla tactics and civilian resistance, the Army, as an institution, turned its back on counterinsurgency after each major conflict, solidifying this cycle of rejection in the wake of the Philippine-American War by deliberately giving institutional primacy to conventional tactics, techniques, and procedures, and then maintaining this posture throughout much of the twentieth century. The Philippine-American War was very clearly an insurgency that involved significant civilian and female resistance, reinforcing previous operational postures, yet it failed to change the course of American military policy.<sup>7</sup> In fact, it apparently strengthened the resolve of the professional Army to dismiss counterinsurgency as a viable doctrine for modern warfare.

The Philippine-American War was a turning point for U.S. military and international relations, establishing precedent for the nation's role as a world power. As a result, many policy makers deemed it imperative that the conflict legitimize American political authority both at home and abroad in accordance with contemporary beliefs of civilization, democracy, race, and social reform, ideals that were all deeply gendered. However, during this war, the U.S. Army was forced to address the active resistance of indigenous women, who displayed significant autonomy, creativity, and determination in

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7. Mackey, *The Uncivil War*, 5.



opposing American rule. American officers innovated counterinsurgency tactics based on local circumstances, often resulting in operations that challenged American cultural constructions of masculinity and femininity.

Gendered counterinsurgency, regardless of its efficacy, ran contrary to Progressive Era ideals of masculinity, particularly military manhood, with its innate importance to American political authority. Officers and civilian leaders were deeply concerned, and often conflicted, about the consequences of man-to-woman military operations in terms of honor and American exceptionalism. In the end, American leaders rejected these tactics in favor of conventional man-to-man combat operations that more closely corresponded to sociocultural constructions of gender, thereby reinforcing the position of the United States in the world through a powerful image of conventional American military might—and, at the same time, perpetuating the myth of warfare as an exclusively masculine activity. I do not mean to suggest that that gender was the only influence on tactical and strategic development throughout the early twentieth century; however, social and cultural constructions of gender in the Progressive Era played a key role in steering the U.S. military away from a formal commitment to counterinsurgency. The first chapter of this dissertation explores the development of American counterinsurgency and rules of warfare from the Civil War through the Spanish-American War to contextualize the historical problem of Philippine-American War tactics, while the second chapter discusses the cultural importance of American military masculinity and constitutive femininity during the Progressive Era.

American masculinity, or manhood, is understood here as a dynamic ideological process that helps form identity, a fluctuating concept based on regional, ethnic, racial,

and class affiliations. However, military service in many ways homogenized these differences. During the Philippine-American War, units were segregated by race, with the majority of the volunteers and regular Army elements consisting of White men, although all of the African-American regiments, including the Ninth U.S. Cavalry, Tenth U.S. Cavalry, Twenty-fourth U.S. Infantry, Twenty-fifth U.S. Infantry, Forty-eighth U.S. Volunteer Infantry, and Forty-ninth U.S. Volunteer Infantry, served in the Philippines. Racial segregation reinforced White male privilege, while institutionalized training and *esprit de corps* brought men of diverse backgrounds together into a single functioning unit. At the same time, this process empowered a collective focus on the ideal attributes of military manhood that were discursively constructed through popular culture and official military reports. This Progressive Era manhood was constantly reinforced by certain beliefs about the interrelationship of gender, race, and power, and was tied to an ideology of civilization that emphasized White racial dominance and the political authority of White upper- and middle-class men.<sup>8</sup>

Filipino women are essential to the larger story of U.S. counterinsurgency history, and it is a mistake to analyze American warfare without fully considering the culture of the U.S. Army's first overseas foe. This unique intersection of U.S. military masculinity and Filipino femininity distinctly shaped the development of counterinsurgency tactics during the war, so these gender constructions must be examined side by side to understand the trajectory of U.S. military policy in the Philippines. Chapter 3 explores gender power structures in the Philippines, examining Philippine society as the sum of its precolonial and colonial history, a complex mixture of East and West, indigenous and

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8. Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*, 41-44.

foreign. Traditionally, Tagalog culture supported a symmetric gender structure that empowered autonomy through sexual freedom, equitable divorce, female leadership, legal rights, and equal access to resources.<sup>9</sup> Before the arrival of the Spanish, there were female leaders, called *babaylan*, who controlled important spiritual, agricultural, and social processes and collaboratively governed alongside the male headmen.<sup>10</sup> Spanish colonization, however, significantly changed Tagalog social relationships. The autonomy inherent in Tagalog femininity was publicly deconstructed through the imposition of a European culture and religion that emphasized ideals of purity, submission, and dependence in a patriarchal power structure.<sup>11</sup> As spiritual leaders, *babaylan* became particular targets of conversion. Despite significant resistance, the *babaylan* were eventually suppressed, but neither *babaylanism* nor Tagalog feminine ideals completely disappeared.<sup>12</sup>

By the end of the nineteenth century, Tagalog gender roles reflected a mix of indigenous culture, Catholicism, and international influence. Although women of all social classes held positions in business and wage labor, this public side was regulated by a Spanish religion and set of laws that obscured aspects of indigenous femininity. Private

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9. Reid, "Female Roles," 629.

10. In Tagalog, the word *katalonan* is understood as *priestess* or *shaman*; *babaylan*, or sometimes *baylan*, is the Cebuano language equivalent. The Spanish colonial texts often refer to female spiritual leaders as *catalonan*, but today the term *babaylan* is commonly used in both English and Tagalog, whereas *katalonan* is much less common. In keeping with the modern practice, and to avoid confusion, I will refer to female spiritual leaders of all ethnicities as *babaylan*. For an excellent discussion of the evolution of this language, see Brewer, *Shamanism*, 84-99.

11. Brewer, *Shamanism*, 84-99.

12. Mangahas and Claguno, *Centennial Crossings*, *passim*.

interactions in Tagalog households and communities, though, placed women in control of resources, gave them a sense of autonomy, and sustained a concealed belief in the babaylan. So, Tagalog social hierarchies were not entirely alien to the Americans who arrived in 1898, but neither were they immediately understood. Chapter 4 explores the ways U.S. and Filipino strategic leaders attempted to leverage gender ideals to assert both domestic and international legitimacy in scramble for control of the Islands in 1898, underscoring the importance of gendered security in military missions.

Tagalog women directly challenged U.S. military and political authority, forcing these competing masculinities and femininities to be publicly addressed and embedded in the pacification process. Chapter 5 examines the American occupation of Manila, highlighting both sides' efforts to control the female population. Following a long pattern of anticolonial opposition, Tagalog women combined overt resistance with what James Scott termed the "weapons of the weak": dissimulation, false compliance, feigning ignorance, slander, and sabotage.<sup>13</sup> This resistance was diverse, ranging from covert personal "schemes" to organized public behavior intended to undermine American power. Although many indigenous women certainly worked in concert with male guerrillas, they were also in the position to control their own resistance activities. At the most intimate level, they were willing to engage in violence to defend themselves or defeat their enemies, but they generally did not embrace militarization.<sup>14</sup> Instead, they were more likely to form resistance activities around practical or strategic gender needs,

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13. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 29.

14. National Archives Branch Depository, Record Group 395, Entry 5104, Charges and Specifications, October 27, 1901. Case of Pvt. James M. Moore, 6th United States Cavalry.

shaping their environment through economics, mediation, or kinship networks. Chapters 6 and 7 examine the intersection of gendered resistance and tactics, focusing on how the actions of indigenous women shaped the U.S. Army's responses and vice versa.

Progressive Era ideas of masculinity and femininity not only concealed gendered tactics during the Philippine-American War, but also tarnished counterinsurgency into the twentieth century. Although the U.S. Army viewed the Philippine-American War as a victory, its success was blemished by accusations of American atrocities. As a result, the Army failed to institutionalize key successes by integrating counterinsurgency operations, instead choosing to deliberately abandon the lessons learned, ensuring the primacy of conventional warfare doctrine in the early twentieth century and beyond. Filipino women are essential to understanding the reasons behind this choice. Widespread female indigenous resistance caused local counterinsurgents to conduct operations that were inconsistent with the social and cultural constructions of American manhood. Feminine minds, bodies, and labor were sites of contestation, and their compliance became essential to pacification. Although they were often effective, tactics like extortion, starvation, and "round-ups" of women simply did not fit with the ideas of Progressive Era masculinity, which idealized force-on-force combat. It was impossible to reconcile counterinsurgency's man-to-woman warfare with American social and cultural constructions of gender. By refusing to formalize this type of counterinsurgency doctrine, the Army effectively evaded the dilemma and reinforced important ideals of masculinity that sustained both domestic political authority and foreign relations.

## CHAPTER ONE: GUERRILLAS, CIVILIANS, AND THE PROBLEM OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

“Matakot sa kasaysayan pagka’t walang lihim na di nahahayag.”  
(Fear history because there are no secrets that aren’t revealed.)  
Gregoria de Jesus<sup>1</sup>

When Brig. Gen. Robert Hughes, commander of the Department of the Visayas, testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Philippines in February 1902, he represented a bridge between the military legacies of the Civil War and the challenges of twentieth-century American warfare. The committee called Hughes to the table, and Senator Joseph Rawlins, a Democrat from Utah, questioned him about the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency operations in the Philippine Insurrection. Hughes discussed military campaigns in his region, including routine tactics such as burning the homes of suspected insurgent sympathizers.

Rawlins inquired, “What became of the inhabitants?”

Hughes replied, “That was their lookout.”

Senator Dietrich broke in, “About what does one of these houses or shacks cost?”

Hughes, “The cost is sworn to by women on courts-martial and courts of inquiry, ranging between three and eight dollars.”

Rawlins, “If these shacks were of no consequence, what was the utility of their destruction?”

Hughes, “The destruction was punishment.”

Rawlins, “The punishment in that case would fall, not upon the men, who could go elsewhere, but mainly upon the women and little children.”

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1. de Jesus, *Mga Tala*, 20. Gregoria de Jesus was a prominent member of the Filipino independence organization, the Katipunan, and wife of Andres Bonifacio, a leader of the anti-colonial Philippine Revolution of 1896.

Hughes, “The women and children are part of the family, and where you wish to inflict a punishment you can punish the man probably worse in that way than in any other.”<sup>2</sup>

In his testimony, Hughes voiced an informal counterinsurgency doctrine based on forty years of institutional knowledge and international military law, while at the same time crystallizing the obvious logic of gendered tactics.<sup>3</sup> More subtle in the narrative, though, is the gendered resistance of the Filipino women who publically protested the tactic in court, while Filipino men covertly “went elsewhere” to fight. The U.S. Army’s understanding of this type of guerrilla warfare was firmly founded on the experiences of the American Civil War and Indian Wars, but developed rapidly as it confronted new military methods and social structures overseas. The process of institutional learning and tactical development in the Philippines was important to the American way of war throughout the twentieth century, when “projecting military forces over great distances to achieve strategic objectives became a hallmark of the U.S. Army.”<sup>4</sup>

Many American scholars and military analysts consider the Philippine-American War to be the United States’ most visible counterinsurgency success, using it to understand the twenty-first century conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> Strategic and operational lessons from the Philippines have influenced U.S. military doctrine for over one hundred years, shaping the U.S. Army’s approach to occupation and

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2. Graff, *American Imperialism*, 31-33.

3. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, passim.

4. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, ii.

5. Deady, “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency,” 53-68; Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*; U.S. Army, *FM 3-24*, 392; Kaplan, “From Baghdad to Manila”; Silbey, “The Successful Iraq.”

counterinsurgency. United States military history often portrays the Philippine-American War as an American victory, and tactically, it was. The issues, however, are more complex than the defeat of Filipino citizen soldiers in 1902 because the United States never effectively stabilized the archipelago, and insurgency has flourished in the Philippines for the last century.

American cultural constructions of gender influenced the conduct of U.S. Army personnel toward the Filipino population, and vice versa. Military historians Brian McAllister Linn and John Gates convincingly argue that counterinsurgency operations during the Philippine-American War were innovated at the tactical level by officers and soldiers in the field who solved a wide range of problems in remote garrisons by relying on their own experiences rather than strategic policy.<sup>6</sup> As these military personnel engaged in the planning and practice of counterinsurgency, their perceptions of power relations between American and Filipino men and women shaped how they conducted operations, as Hughes' testimony illustrates.

My analysis of these military actions focuses on the U.S. Army's strategic and tactical development and Filipino resistance by exploring four main ideas that draw together these two potentially disparate issues: (a) the sex, gender, and social structures and hierarchies in the Philippines before, during, and after the Philippine-American War; and (b) how American soldiers perceived these hierarchies in the Philippines and the gender constructions and military masculinities they brought with them; (c) the counterinsurgency tactics designed to react to, or accommodate, American perceptions of

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6. Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 2-10; Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 270-290.



gender in the Philippines and how they succeeded or failed; and (d) the forms of gendered resistance that emerged and whether they succeeded or failed. These questions tackle a single aspect of counterinsurgency development by focusing on gender in the historical context; however, I acknowledge that military operations are complex endeavors subject to diverse influences. Many factors contributed to tactical innovation during the Philippine-American War, not the least of which were Progressive philosophies, technology, the professional skills of the volunteer Army, military education, and institutional learning. The cold, hard realities of supply, communications, weaponry, and disease played their parts, as well. Gender is only one important analytical tool for understanding the U.S. Army's approach to counterinsurgency, but it is an element of violence and armed conflict that has particular resonance in twenty-first century global warfare.

### **Defining Counterinsurgency and the Philippine-American War**

Both gender studies and military history utilize a specific, and often confusing, vocabulary that requires some explanation. I rely on modern definitions of strategy, operations, tactics, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and gender, although these meanings may differ somewhat from the early twentieth-century understandings used during the Philippine-American War. *Strategy* is, as Richard Betts has defined it, "a plan for using military means to achieve political ends," but he has also pointed out that "strategies are chains of relationships among means and ends that span several levels of analysis, from the maneuvers of units in specific engagements through larger campaigns, whole wars, grand strategies, and foreign policies."<sup>7</sup> For the purpose of this study, this level refers

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7. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" 6.

more specifically to *grand strategy*, where politics, diplomacy, and warfare intersect. The operational level forms an intermediate connection between national and theater-specific strategies and the tactical use of military resources; military forces here achieve policy-driven goals by conceiving, coordinating, and executing campaigns. The term *operations*, however, refers to the performance of military actions or missions. *Tactics* are methods of engaging and defeating an enemy, and they are used on the ground at the most fundamental level. At the tactical level, commanders concentrate on winning engagements or battles, and their achievements or failures affect operational-level planning. Strategy, operations, and tactics represent interrelated levels of organization that may overlap, and they apply to military security and stability operations, as well as combat.<sup>8</sup>

In contrast, insurgency is a type of warfare. The public discourse of insurgency is confounded by the widespread use of terms like *guerrilla*, *irregular*, *revolutionary*, *partisan*, and *unconventional warfare*, which tend to obscure and conflate meaning. The U.S. Department of Defense and NATO define *insurgency* as “an organized movement to overthrow a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict,” but there are many alternative designations.<sup>9</sup> In his book *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, Ian Beckett made little attempt to distinguish between guerrilla, insurgent, revolutionary, and irregular warfare, using them almost interchangeably. In contrast, professional officer and military theorist David Galula described insurgency as

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8. U.S. Army, *FM 100-5*, 1-3.

9. U.S. Army, *FM 3-24*, 1-2; U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 267.

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9. U.S. Army, *FM 3-24*, 1-2; U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 267.

“the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.”<sup>10</sup> Galula also made distinctions between a revolution and an insurgency, claiming that a revolution is an accident that occurs spontaneously when the masses are set in motion, whereas an insurgency is a systematic, prolonged effort to achieve transitional goals before toppling the existing government. Scholar Anthony James Joes has taken the middle ground; for him, an insurgency is “an attempt to overthrow or oppose a state or regime by force of arms” which “very often takes the form of guerrilla war.”<sup>11</sup> Despite these layers of meaning, there are commonalities in the concept of insurgency. Most scholarly and military authors agree that insurgency is a lengthy process, engaging people across the political, cultural, economic, and military spectra while being fought asymmetrically, at least initially, against a better-resourced authority.

In the context of the hostilities between the United States and the first Philippine Republic in 1899, the military definition of insurgency is even more problematic. The discourse becomes challenging in a historical analysis, because, although words like insurgency and guerrilla have a common usage, the military meanings are more strictly defined and may impact the conduct of warfare according to international law. In the last two decades, the title “Philippine Insurrection” has been largely abandoned by historians because the discursive meaning of the war’s name has come under scrutiny. Filipino scholars and nationalists have opposed the term *insurrection*, which many believe obscures and devalues the struggle for freedom from Spanish and American colonialism. In the wake of this controversy, a variety of designations for the war have come into use,

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10. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 1.

11. Joes, *Resisting Rebellion*, 1.

including the Philippine War, the American War, the Philippine-American War, the Filipino-American War, the Fil-Am War, and the Second Philippine Revolution. For over a century, the United States has conceptualized its actions in the Philippines in terms of insurrection and counterinsurgency, but it takes careful examination of the terminology to understand the layers of meaning involved in this designation.

This semantic struggle is highlighted in one of the most influential American texts about the conflict. In his book *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, Brian McAllister Linn acknowledged that much of this language is unsatisfactory, stating, “the Philippine Insurrection suggests a rebellion against a constituted authority when in fact the war broke out before the United States exercised control beyond the city of Manila.” However, he added that “the [names] Philippine-American War and Filipino-American War suggest a war between two nations or two peoples, neither of which is applicable”.<sup>12</sup> One can easily argue that the 7,000 islands of the Philippine archipelago were not united in 1899, but it is more difficult to contest the existence of the first Philippine Republic on Luzon, an entity that was clearly engaged in the processes of nation-building and state formation. Therefore, identifying the political and military actors in the historical context is essential to understanding the nature of the conflict.

There was a concerted effort by Filipinos in Luzon to construct a legitimate regime with a broad appeal to the population, beginning with the Malolos Congress in September 1898. Using both European and Latin American models, the Malolos delegates created the first republic in Asia, framing a constitution that established three

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12. Linn. *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, xii.

branches of representative government, delineated the separation of church and state, and guaranteed the individual rights of citizens. A conventional military, divided into regular forces and militia (called *sandatahan* in Tagalog), was organized with commissioned officers under the oversight of the elected president.<sup>13</sup> Constitutional committee member Felipe Calderon feared that a strong executive branch would be controlled by then dictator Emilio Aguinaldo and the armed forces, so he argued for a dominant legislature to prevent a military oligarchy. He won the compromise, and in January 1899, Emilio Aguinaldo was elected president of the first Philippine Republic. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Paris, the document that would transfer control of the Philippines from Spain to the United States, sat unratified in a U.S. Congress deeply divided over issues of imperialism. Brig. Gen. James Parker noted in July 1899 that U.S. troops occupied Manila and some isolated spots on the island of Panay, but the territory was mostly under the control of the Philippine Republic: “They had their own government, modeled on ours—President, Judiciary, Houses of Congress; their own newspapers, telegraph lines, mail lines, postage stamps, etc.; their own church, for they had expelled the Spanish priests and installed Filipinos in their stead; they had municipal governments and numerous schools.”<sup>14</sup> Linn’s argument that the United States was not a “constituted authority” in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war on February 4, 1899, is correct, but the nascent Philippine Republic, whose uniformed army fought a conventional war against U.S. forces, certainly represented both a nation and a people. The manner in

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13. Dery, *Army of the First Philippine Republic*, 17-32. See also Agoncillo, *History of the Filipino People*.

14. Parker, *Old Army*, 224.

which the United States and the Philippine governments are situated shape the context, and perhaps the very definition, of insurgency in this instance.

The Filipino and American governments, and their methods of warfare during the time period, were subject to fluctuating identities, making classification difficult. Nonetheless, it is necessary to name the components for historical analysis. This study recognizes both participants in the war on equal terms by referring to the hostilities between February 4, 1899, and July 4, 1902, as the *Philippine-American War*. The study uses the definition of insurgency from the U.S. Army *Field Manual (FM) 3-24*, which more objectively defines this type of warfare by acknowledging a range of power structures:

An insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency [COIN] is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. . . . Though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctively different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare.<sup>15</sup>

These definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency most accurately describe the events of the Philippine-American War from the competing perspectives of the U.S. Army and Filipino nationalists, offering a reference point for analyzing both sides of the conflict. For the purposes of this dissertation, *guerrilla warfare* refers to the use of irregular forces in an asymmetrical conflict, and *guerrilla* refers to an irregular combatant

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15. U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 2.



in such a circumstance.<sup>16</sup> Unconventional warfare is “operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations.”<sup>17</sup> I only use of the term *insurrecto*, a word commonly used during the Philippine-American War and the twentieth century to refer to Filipino resisters, as quoted from historical sources because its meaning is often considered derogatory. Instead, I refer to these participants as insurgents, soldiers, guerrillas, or revolutionaries, depending on the context.

### **Defining Gender**

Attention to the power relations among genders allows military analysts to observe elements of operations and warfare that might otherwise go unnoticed. It is necessary to understand that “taking gender differentiations for granted, ignoring them and problematizing them are three approaches that produce different readings of a situation.”<sup>18</sup> To a large extent, military histories have overlooked gender as an analytical tool, despite its significance in strategic planning, tactics, and peace processes, thus

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16. Please see JP 1-02 for further definitions, including “Irregular warfare: a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetrical approaches, though it may employ a full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will” (280); “Guerrilla warfare is military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous, forces” (233); “Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of a long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery” (564).

17. U.S. Army, *FM 3-05.201*, 1-10.

18. Cockburn, “The Gendered Dynamics,” 13.

yielding a narrow set of conclusions about mission success. To use a modern example, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-1989 appears vastly different from a military and security standpoint if it is conceptualized as a strategic Cold War victory for the United States than if it is considered in terms of gendered resistance and the social positioning of men and women during anti-Soviet operations and postconflict resolution. Military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz argued that even the most overwhelming military conquest is not final because the defeated population may still regard the situation as temporary and reversible through political means.<sup>19</sup> If one accepts Clausewitz's argument, as scholars generally do, the inclusion of a gender analysis can better illustrate the short-term consequences of military operations alongside possibilities for long-term mission success because it takes into consideration factors such as civilian support, masculine and feminine nationalism, perceived injustices, and social hierarchies, which highlight a people's will to resist.

As the example above indicates, the historical problem of gender and warfare has been brought to center stage by the United States' twenty-first century engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the last three decades, gender studies have opened doors to the cultural, psychological, and physiological processes of human conflict.<sup>20</sup> Much of this historiography has emerged from feminist discourse and has addressed warfare in terms of sexist discrimination, biological differences, or postmodern categorical fluidity, edging

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19. von Clausewitz, *On War*, 32.

20. See Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*; Goldstein, *War and Gender*; Elschtein, *Women and War*.

the fundamental processes of military operations out of the discussion.<sup>21</sup> Social and feminist historians have often used the terms *gender* and *women* interchangeably, creating the opportunity for practitioners and consumers of military and international-relations history to dismiss gender as an analytical category for (what are usually seen as) male-dominated and state-centered mechanisms such as war and diplomacy.<sup>22</sup> Scholars such as Emily Rosenberg, Cynthia Enloe, and J. Ann Tickner have successfully challenged these boundaries in international relations, while a middle ground (the war-and-society approach) has emerged in the field of social military history.<sup>23</sup> At the same time, however, operational military history has been marginalized to the point that the average doctoral student has difficulty even defining it.<sup>24</sup> So, where does gender integrate into strategies, operations, and tactics, the traditional foci of military history?

The term *gender* has been used in myriad ways and is, at times, ill defined or misconstrued. For the purposes of this dissertation, gender is “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a

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21. Goldstein, *War and Gender*, 8. See also, Reardon, *Sexism and the War*; Stiehm, *Arms and the Enlisted*; Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*; Dombrowski, *Women and War*; Caprioli and Boyer, “Gender, Violence,” 503-518; Eisenstein, *Sexual Decoys*.

22. Scott, “Gender,” 1056-1057.

23. See Black, *Rethinking Military History*; Kagan, “Why Military History Matters.”

24. In the first reading of my dissertation proposal by my graduate writing group, I took for granted that the meaning of “operational military history” would be understood, but I found almost every student was uncertain about its definition. Operational history is here defined as the historical study of the employment of military forces and resources to achieve a specific goals or objectives. Please see Morillo, *What is Military History?*, and Kagan, “Why Military History Matters.”

primary way of signifying relationships of power.”<sup>25</sup> Gender, therefore, is the cultural construction of what it means to be a man or a woman, different from the biological differences between male and female. It represents the power relationships between individuals as a fluctuating identity that relies on numerous factors such as class, ethnicity, race, and geography. These variables in turn affect interpretations of gender, including ideals of masculinity and femininity, social roles, paid and reproductive labor, public and private activities, sexuality, access to resources, and political agency. As an example, we can look at historical interactions between North American White and indigenous peoples. Many European-Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries perceived Native-American men to be lazy and capricious while constitutively identifying Native-American women as undervalued and overworked. The gendered division of labor in some Native-American cultures made women responsible for cultivating, butchering, and other tasks that were traditionally masculine activities in Europe and the American colonies. This often led to misperceptions about native behaviors. In reality, as controllers of the food supply and essential reproductive labor, many Native-American women maintained greater influence over both private and public spheres than their European-American counterparts. The European-American misperception of labor divisions in native cultures negatively affected U.S. policies of assimilation, causing particular forms of gendered resistance as the American government attempted to replace indigenous ways of life with Western-style farming.<sup>26</sup> These cultural constructions of gender were so inherently durable that, during the early

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25. Scott, “Gender,” 1067.

26. See Purdue, *Cherokee Women*; Shoemaker, *Negotiators of Change*.

twentieth century, Americans drew similar conclusions and attempted comparable agricultural programs in the Philippines as a method of “civilizing” the native population.<sup>27</sup> Using this example, we can also see how gender plays an important role in relationships of power. The perceptions and realities of native people’s social power were based on gender roles, how men and women were supposed to behave according to culturally accepted practices.

Gender, therefore, provides an opportunity to better understand the mechanisms of military activities, from the synthesis of politics and warfare in “grand strategy” to the most basic tactics of the boots on the ground. As Caroline Moser and Fiona Clark have pointed out,

Gender power is seen to shape the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the international arena. It has expression in physique—how women’s and men’s bodies are nourished, trained, and deployed; how vulnerable they are to attack; what mobility they have. It has expression in economics—how money, property, and other resources are distributed between sexes. It structures the social sphere—who has initiative in the community and authority in the family, who is dependent. And of course gender shapes political power. . . . Even in social worlds where one sex prevails, as in most armies or police forces, a gender power system is not thereby lacking. For male-dominated systems involve a hierarchy among men, producing different and unequal masculinities, always defined in relation not only to one another but to women.<sup>28</sup>

These easily observable sites of gender power relationships—mobility, economics, distribution of resources, community initiative, family authority, institutional hierarchies, and unequal masculinities—are also the heart of counterinsurgency operations and tactics. The United States Army counterinsurgency manual, *FM 3-24*, asserts that “successful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with legitimacy and

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27. Worcester, *The Philippines*, 149.

28. Moser and Clark, *Victims*, 15-16.

the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order and security. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, social tensions, and injustice.”<sup>29</sup> The institutions that successful counterinsurgents legitimize and develop are all interpreted and received based on gender. Likewise, the manner in which cultural ideologies and injustices are identified and addressed are subject to the gender systems of both the counterinsurgent and the recipient community. It is in these essential areas that military and gender analysis merge, yielding important insight into guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency.

Power relationships are essential to the innovation, planning, and execution of all types of warfare and are apparent across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the highest levels, masculinity affects decision-making processes regarding both war and peace.<sup>30</sup> In the late nineteenth century, gender influenced the public debates surrounding the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars. Historian Kristin Hoganson has argued that jingoists utilized gender issues to frame their prowar arguments, playing on anxieties about shifting power relationships in families, suffrage, wage labor, and citizenship, while invoking principles such as honor, manhood, and chivalry to influence foreign-policy decisions. She also argued that these methods succeeded in both provoking conflict and securing the necessary support from Congress to move forward with overseas aggression, largely because they were firmly rooted in American cultural

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29. U.S. Army, *FM 3-24*, paragraph 5-1

30. For a case study of gender and strategic decision-making in the United States, see Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*.

ideals.<sup>31</sup> At the operational level, gender filters down from national policy and international relations, while rising up from the bottom as officers and soldiers interact with civilian populations. Operational-level leaders, such as General Hughes, rely on their own masculinity to negotiate the institutional hierarchies of the Army and achieve policy-driven goals through the execution of military campaigns. Their perceptions of the relationships between men and women in specific areas of operation often turn into policies such as reconcentration and property destruction, which were widely used during the Philippine-American War. Operational-level policies are then enacted at the tactical level by soldiers who bring their own identities to the job of counterinsurgency. At the onset of the Spanish-American War, many young people enthusiastically enlisted because “it was the custom for a man to go,” and they performed their missions with a similar commitment to the traditions of masculinity.<sup>32</sup> The most successful quickly learned to navigate the sometimes confusing social structures of the foreign lands where they were deployed.

There are many methods for observing these power relationships at all levels of warfare, some overt and some hidden in the historiography. In her book, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars*, Kristin Hoganson explored war and foreign policy in terms of masculinity and culture, focusing on the importance of military service to American political identity. She argued that “domestic concerns not considered relevant to

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31. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*, 17. For an additional perspective on gender at the strategic level, see Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*.

32. *Spanish-American War Surveys* (hereafter *SAWS*), Vance Hunter Marchbanks Papers, 9th and 10th Cavalry, Box 39.

international relations—namely concerns about gender roles—significantly affected militant U.S. policies at the turn of the century.”<sup>33</sup> Although this book is weakened by Hoganson’s conviction in the absolute primacy of gender as a causal mechanism, the idea that gender influences grand strategy is important. It begins a top-down synthesis of gender-power relationships that links the international to the domestic and crosses into the operational and tactical levels as diplomacy yields to warfare.

Mary Renda’s *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S.*

*Imperialism, 1915-1940* also helps illustrate the way gender can broaden the understanding of warfare by concentrating on the attitudes and actions of U.S. Marines in the Caribbean Basin. Renda posited that paternalism, as a gendered and racialized cultural construction, provided the methodological base for administering and subduing occupied Haiti. The U.S. Marines entered into this paternalist venture at the operational and tactical levels as agents of national policy whose actions toward the indigenous peoples were based on their own identity as American men. Renda explained that

each marine had a distinct relationship to the United States and to his own Americanness (53) . . . but individual marines carried with them to Haiti the local knowledge of their own ethnic communities, the memory of their actual father’s lives and ways and all the emotions attached to such knowledge and memory (60). . . . And if serving with the U.S. Marine Corps seemed likely to affirm a young man’s racial and national identity, even more so did it hold out the promise of validating his dawning masculinity (62). Their first impressions and thoughts on Haiti reflected simply their training as an elite military force, their indoctrination into the purposes of U.S. foreign policy, and the beliefs about themselves and about people of African heritage at home and in this new setting (82). The U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 was not a single conflict between two monolithic and singularly unified bodies; it was a struggle for identity and power waged in so many local instances, framed by a number of systematic factors, official acts, formal relationships, and informal structures (86).

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33. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*, 200.



Renda's analysis of these factors can equally be applied to U.S. military personnel stationed in other parts of the world, and particularly resonates with the concurrent occupation of the Philippines. Although *Taking Haiti* focuses on paternalism and the culture of imperialism, it suggests how gender informs military operations through masculine identities and cultural understandings in both formal and informal interactions. Neither Hoganson nor Renda addressed the strategic, operational, or tactical levels directly, although the implications of their cultural arguments inadvertently bumped into these issues. They have been rightfully criticized for their limited understanding of military science, which would have deepened both of their arguments.<sup>34</sup> However, both scholars have constructed a framework for relating gender to the processes of warfare that can be expanded into the study of military operations.

Gender is a part of American culture that affects international relations as well as personal interactions between soldiers and civilians. The officers and soldiers who arrived in the Philippines in 1898 brought with them their own identities based on race, class, geography, training, and unit cohesion. Garrisoned in small numbers in the cities and remote villages, they often set about their tasks of pacification and civil affairs with little guidance, relying on their skills and judgment to develop regionally effective counterinsurgency operations.<sup>35</sup> In his study of the U.S. Army's institutional learning processes, John Nagl contended that "tactical leaders in the field can spur innovation that,

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34. See Bernstein's review of Hoganson in *Military Review*, 108; and Ulbrich's review of Renda in *Journal of Military History*, 595-596.

35. Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 164.

when accepted by higher commanders, dramatically reshapes an army in combat.”<sup>36</sup>

Taking this observation one step further, one can also argue that whether leaders and commanders take gender for granted, ignore it, or problematize it influences both the innovation and acceptance of the tactics that shape and reshape the army at war. During the Philippine-American War, all three of these approaches were a part of the successes and failures of operations and indigenous resistance.

### **The Historical Context: Guerrillas, Gender, and General Orders 100**

Like Brig. Gen. Robert Hughes, many senior officers during the Philippine-American War were Civil War veterans whose framework for counterinsurgency operations began in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1862, Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck responded to the Confederacy’s guerrilla tactics by asking a respected jurist, Dr. Francis Lieber of Columbia University, to author a public document addressing the laws of war. The resulting work, titled *Guerrilla Parties*, formed a basis for “General Orders No. 100” (originally titled *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*), which Lieber prepared under the authority of President Abraham Lincoln in 1863. Also known as the Lieber Code, General Orders No. 100 articulated guidelines for the treatment of “the inhabitants of hostile countries” and “armed enemies not belonging to the hostile army.”<sup>37</sup> In other words, it defined how civilians and fighters were categorized and administered. General Orders No. 100 articulated American military practice in an actionable document, providing a foundation for U.S. Army policy through 1914. Equally important, the document had a profound effect on international law. Many European

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36. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup*, xv.

37. Lieber, *Instructions*, 12.

armies soon adopted similar policies, and the Lieber Code provided context for drafting international agreements at the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907.<sup>38</sup>

Under General Orders No. 100, a great deal depended on how one was classified. Article 57 defined what constitutes a soldier and offered certain protections: “As soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses.”<sup>39</sup> In contrast, Article 90 defined a war-traitor as “a person in a place or district under Martial Law who . . . gives information of any kind to the enemy or holds intercourse with him.” Uniformed soldiers and partisans were considered legitimate combatants, with the concomitant privileges of quarter and prisoner-of-war status. Prowlers, spies, war-rebels, and war-traitors were “persons” without such rights, and the punishment for their activities was death. The specific language is important because it conveyed the privileges and rules of war to male soldiers, while giving women, who were excluded from military service, virtually no legitimate means of resistance. These designations allowed individual commanders expansive rights of interpretation, resulting in the development of military policies based on personal morality and regional necessity.<sup>40</sup> The fundamental acceptance of this doctrinal gendering also renders women almost invisible in the historical analysis of U.S. military operations by presupposing that men are military actors, whereas women are marginally involved in armed conflict,

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38. Birtle. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 35.

39. Lieber, *Instructions*, 15-17.

40. See Grimsley, *The Hard Hand*; Linderman, *Embattled Courage*; Urwin, *The Black Flag*; Royster, *The Destructive War*.

perhaps as victims or passive observers, with a few notable exceptions. Unfortunately, “such positioning, in treating both men and women as ‘objects,’ denies their agency and associated voice in the processes [of war and reconciliation].”<sup>41</sup> Negotiations of power, violent or otherwise, between military and civilian men and women are the natural result of armed conflict, permeating both battlefield decisions and stability operations.

Negotiations of power in the context of the Lieber Code were most evident in occupied areas. Martial law was the immediate consequence of occupation under the Lieber Code, with all inhabitants of hostile territory subject to military authority. Drawing on nineteenth-century ideals of American manhood that emphasized patriarchy and paternalism, Article 4 of General Orders No. 100 dictated that “it is incumbent on those who administer [Martial Law] to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity—virtues adorning the soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.”<sup>42</sup> Integral to this American masculinity was the idea that certain principles and certain groups must be defended, more so than others. Religion and morality were protected in the Code, along with the “persons of inhabitants, especially those of women, and the sacredness of domestic relations.”<sup>43</sup> This identification of male power and female dependence contradicts the gendering of resistance, creating sites of contestation that individual

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41. Moser and Clark, *Victims*, 4.

42. Lieber, *Instructions*, 4. On patriarchy and paternalism, see also: McPherson, *What They Fought For*; Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*; Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*; Watson, “Flexible Gender Roles,” 81-106; Rotundo, “Body and Soul,” 23-38.

43. Lieber, *Instructions*, 18.

officers were forced to negotiate as they determined who belonged to protected groups and who did not. These layers of power were crucial to the conduct of war in the nineteenth and early twentieth century because the Lieber Code also sanctioned starving enemy populations, destroying civilian property, and obstructing transportation in order to more quickly subdue the enemy. That is not say that General Orders No. 100 advocated cruelty; to the contrary, it sought to promote ideals of humanity and fair treatment reconciled with the belief that hard-war tactics could shorten the duration of conflict, to the benefit of all. These ambiguities, however, became more important in the racialized environments of the Deep South, Indian Territories, and the Philippines.

Two essential legal principles were embedded in the conduct of all of these conflicts. First, the U.S. Army's training curriculum and General Orders No. 100 emphasized the idea that the international laws of war established a contractual agreement between an occupying army and the region's inhabitants. The army was obligated to provide an evenhanded administration of martial law and, in return, the population was obligated to submit. If the people resisted, the contract was nullified and the army was empowered to utilize all methods available to eliminate the hostile actions.<sup>44</sup> This tenet allowed for tactical and operational fluidity based on local conditions, as well as the escalation of force against civilian populations. The second guiding principle was the established law and custom of warfare based on European modes of thought. Internal rebellions, or insurrections, were approached differently than

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44. Birtle, *U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, 14; Vattel, *Law of Nations*.

wars between sovereign nations, so codifying a conflict was essential to determining the rights and obligations of its participants.<sup>45</sup>

During the American Civil War, the U.S. government denied legitimate legal status to the Confederacy, yet the Union conducted the war as a conflict between nations with full rights accorded to Southern soldiers. By extension, Southern civilians were subject to martial law, but were afforded the protection of General Orders No. 100 as long as they abstained from guerrilla activity. Throughout the first year of the war, the Federal Army “pursued a policy of conciliation, which deliberately sought to exempt Southern civilians from the burdens of war.”<sup>46</sup> By August of 1862, however, this benevolent strategy gave way to a new approach. Frustrated by military failures and the resistance of Southern civilians, Lincoln instructed the War Department to take more aggressive measures, including the seizure and destruction of private property. Although commanders now had the opportunity to act with greater severity toward civilians, their actions were restrained based on the behavior of the populace. Unionists, neutrals, and rebels were treated differently, according to their status. Additionally, the military practice of foraging for food, which began as a necessary means of supply during this period, evolved into a method of punishment that also included destroying surplus. This system led to the final hard-war policy that emerged in 1864, and is clearly seen in Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan’s operations in the Shenandoah Valley, where burning homes and

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45. Grimsley, “‘Rebels’ and ‘Redskins’,” 139.

46. Grimsley. “‘Rebels and Redskins’,” 143.

crops lead to widespread starvation and displacement.<sup>47</sup> This short overview is certainly a simplification of the developmental processes of military tactics and policies, but it illustrates how the nineteenth-century U.S. Army enacted the laws and customs of war according to the military exigencies of the time and place. It was upon this experiential framework that the officer corps matured in the Progressive Era.

### **Lessons of the Frontier, 1865-1898**

The Indian Wars compelled the U.S. Army to further develop its informal counterinsurgency methods and improve its policies for guerrilla warfare. Constabulary duties and frontier combat differed greatly from the concerted national effort of the Civil War. The U.S. Army found itself positioned as a national police force in the absence of external threats, bearing the burdens of both Reconstruction in the South and indigenous pacification in the West. Substantially understaffed for frontier duties, the Army faced enormous challenges in the vast territories west of the Mississippi, not the least of which were the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for apprehending and containing rebellious natives. There was no formal doctrine for Indian warfare; instead, the Army had “gradually evolved a theory that blended conventional with unconventional techniques to attack the social and economic resources upon which Indian power rested.”<sup>48</sup> The U.S. Military Academy at West Point was training young officers in small-unit tactics rather than large formations and allowing them to adapt school methods to the irregular warfare of the frontier. The Army gave serious consideration to the problems of

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47. See Gallagher, *Shenandoah Valley Campaign*; McPherson, *Ordeal by Fire*; Glatthaar, *March to the Sea*; Grimsley, *Hard Hand of War* and “‘Rebels’ and ‘Redskins’”; Royster, *The Destructive War*.

48. Birtle, *U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, 60.

frontier warfare, developing solutions for the pacification and administration of Native Americans that involved not only conquest, but assimilation.

Indians were designated as nonstate actors, and “military policy toward Native Americans . . . routinely followed the insurrectionary principle, which in effect denied legitimacy to Native American combatants.”<sup>49</sup> Unlike the White Southerners of the Civil War, Native-American warriors were explicitly denied lawful means of resistance. Indian women, as guerrilla supporters, were then subject to the harshest treatment under the principles of General Orders No. 100. The United States’ strategic goals were ill defined, partially due to cultural and political attitudes, and partially because officers received little formal training in the art of strategy, instead relying on personal experience.<sup>50</sup> These officers, then, brought their own notions of race and masculinity into the development of Indian War tactics. The results can be seen in the successful campaigns of the West. The primary method for defeating highly mobile Plains Indians involved surprise attacks on villages, where the presence of women and children hindered offensive capabilities and the destruction of domestic supplies handicapped further resistance. As a result, women’s bodies and women’s labor became tactical targets.

The greater significance of gendered material and sexual conquest distinguishes counterinsurgency operations on the frontier from the Civil War. Race and culture were certainly factors in perceptions of power between enemy populations. There was a fairly low incidence of rape among Southern White women during the Civil War, but Black women were frequent victims of both armies. The rape of Native-American women was a

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49. Grimsley, “‘Rebels’ and ‘Redskins’,” 140.

50. Wooster, *The Military*, 75.



significant component of frontier fighting, while the practice of “squaw-chasing” (pursuing and capturing Indian women for sexual exploitation) appeared as an element of western masculine identity.<sup>51</sup> As sociologist Joshua Goldstein has noted, rape is used in war for many reasons, including expressions of revenge or frustration, to demoralize or humiliate the enemy, and as a mechanism of territorial control and domination; it can also serve to promote cohesion amongst men, or prove “manhood and toughness within the military family.”<sup>52</sup> This aspect of warfare represents a site of power negotiations among men, both within the institutional hierarchy of the military and externally between armed enemy combatants. Until the recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, systemic rape as a military tactic, rather than a consequence of war, was rarely examined. There have been few studies about the efficacy of sexual assault as a gendered tactic, but these investigations present relatively consistent outcomes, noting that rape and fear of rape traumatizes victims, often causing their expulsion from family units and legitimate sources of income and limiting their access to basic resources by preventing women from working or appearing in public. Furthermore, rape damages the integrity of communities and, on a wide scale, undermines traditional social structures.<sup>53</sup>

In addition to the higher incidents of rape, the more extensive and concentrated destruction of Native-American property also reflects the different standards of treatment for White combatants and indigenous resisters. In 1868, Generals William T. Sherman

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51. Mitchell, *The Vacant Chair*; Drinnon, *Facing West*; Grimsley, “‘Rebels’ and ‘Redskins’”; Schultz, *Month of the Freezing Moon*; Brownmiller, *Against Our Will*.

52. Goldstein, *War and Gender*, 365.

53. El Bushra and Lopez, *Development in Conflict*, 49. See also, Moser and Clark, *Victims*; and Jacobs, *States of Conflict*.

and Philip Sheridan planned a winter campaign against the villages of belligerent Cheyenne, hoping to trap the men with their families. On November 27, Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer attacked Black Kettle's sleeping encampment alongside the Washita River, killing 103 men (according to the official estimate), capturing 53 women and children, and destroying all the lodges with their contents of food, utensils, and bedding.<sup>54</sup> Denying the population the means and resources of women's reproductive labor, in concert with aggressive combat pressure, guaranteed hardship and was used to hasten capitulation. The tactic of surprise attack on entire communities resulted in high rates of civilian casualties, as well as the opportunity to detain more vulnerable components of the population: the elderly, the female, and the young. These prisoners could then be forced to participate in the secondary tactic of pacification, which included "civilization" and assimilation.

Therefore, the killing, capture, and containment of native women and children were important operational and tactical decisions during the Indian Wars, built upon precedents set by hundreds of years of indigenous-European warfare. Although there was some humanitarian outcry about the Battle of the Washita, popular racial constructions of the "savage Indian" resonated with Article 24 of Lieber's code: "The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to be with barbarous armies, that the private individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection, and every disruption of family ties. Protection was, and still is with

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54. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 103; Hoig, *The Battle of the Washita*, 14; Greene, *Washita*, 112.

uncivilized people, the exception.”<sup>55</sup> Lieber clearly linked White Western ideas of sovereignty, nationhood, and citizenship to civilization, specifically referencing “modern regular wars of the Europeans” as a baseline for proper conduct.<sup>56</sup> These essential distinctions allowed officers and soldiers to apply tactics to Indian civilians that would have been intolerable if utilized against Whites during the Civil War. Historian Mary Renda noted a persistence of these ideas in the reactions of U.S. Marines to the Black populations of Haiti during the early twentieth century. In her examination of military culture, Renda convincingly argued that regional, class, and cultural identities influenced the development of military masculinity and that this masculinity informed the conduct of the occupying forces in relation to a racialized Other.<sup>57</sup> These identities and masculinities provided a decision-making framework for many officers, affecting the way they interpreted their strategic mission within the laws of war and influencing their conduct during the frustrating business of suppressing insurgency. In the context of indigenous resistance, protecting the “sacredness of domestic relations” was less efficacious than the “disruption of family ties” as a counterinsurgency tactic.<sup>58</sup> These methods of counterinsurgency eventually proved successful, and, as the last Indian insurrections were suppressed, the Army began reassessing its role in national security.

The U.S. Army’s experience in the Indian Wars shaped counterinsurgency in the Philippines in the twentieth century, providing not only a foundation for tactical

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55. Lieber, *Instructions*, 11.

56. Ibid, 11.

57. Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 86.

58. Lieber, *Instructions*, 12.

development, but for cultural understandings of foreign wars. Military and administrative policies for the conquest and pacification of indigenous populations in the western United States were adapted to suit the physical and human terrain of the Pacific Rim. However, while the military experiences and civil policies were a powerful influence, the U.S. Army continued to focus on conventional warfare, forcing deployed units to relearn and reinnovate counterinsurgency and pacification operations. Scholar John M. Gates argued that the U.S. Army's approach to irregular warfare evolved through guerrilla combat in the Mexican War, Civil War, Indian Wars, and Philippine-American War, but that the Army did not codify these lessons learned in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries.<sup>59</sup> Gates focused on the problems of establishing military doctrine from these counterinsurgency experiences, as did Andrew Birtle in his examination of counterinsurgency and contingency doctrine. They agree that the lessons learned from irregular warfare were only informally transmitted to new generations of Army personnel, creating an atmosphere in which the responsibility for developing military tactics, techniques, and procedures fell upon individuals at the operational and tactical levels. Leaders at the strategic level, whose political power was staked on martial policies, were consistently reluctant to incorporate gendered tactics into any formal doctrine.

Political historian Walter Williams supported these notions through a different approach, looking at the link between the Indian Wars and the Philippine-American War in terms of civil government and administration. He contended that "United States Indian

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59. Gates, John M. *The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare*, 2002.  
[www.wooster.edu/history/jgates/book-ch2.html](http://www.wooster.edu/history/jgates/book-ch2.html) (accessed October 29 2004).

policy during the nineteenth century reveals a clear pattern of colonialism toward Native Americans” and that “this policy served as a precedent for imperialist domination over the Philippines.”<sup>60</sup> Williams utilized court cases and the *Congressional Record* to establish that the United States had, within its body of law, the framework of imperial dominion over outlying lands. The construction of this framework did not grant rights or citizenship to the non-Anglo Others who inhabited those territories, establishing racialized power relationships in a legal context and upholding widespread popular beliefs about native peoples. The military government of the Philippines relied on these political and cultural structures to administer the islands. Anne Paulet, in her unpublished dissertation *The Only Good Indian is a Dead Indian: The Use of United States Indian Policy as a Guide for the Conquest and Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1905*, brought these military and civil policies together. She argued that the United States rejected European colonialism, but Social Darwinism, racial constructions, and the pacification of the Indians provided essential foundations for both civil and military action. By situating the Philippine-American war at a transition point for U.S. military policy, these authors have provided a framework for examining U.S. Army counterinsurgency development as it altered nineteenth-century models to suit the demands of a professionalized fighting force deployed overseas.

### **Reform and the “Modern” Army**

In the late nineteenth century, at the end of the Indian Wars, the Army faced reform movements and professionalization intended to improve its ability to fight

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60. Williams, “United States Indian Policy,” 810.

conventional wars and expand beyond U.S. borders.<sup>61</sup> To a large extent, the Army's passion for reform and professionalization during the 1890s reflected the Progressive Era ideals of middle-class American society in general. Military education grew more sophisticated, and the Office of Naval Intelligence was created in 1882, followed by the Military Information Division of the War Department in 1885, showing an increased appreciation for the analysis of foreign military matters. Military planners focused on "modern" conventional warfare as the Army's future mission, and the importance of unconventional warfare and pacification waned in a wave of new military intellectualism. The lessons of the frontier were not preserved in the new doctrine, but rather in the writings of officers, the lectures of post lyceums, and practical exercises lead by experienced Indian fighting officers. Historian Andrew Birtle noted that "through a combination of formal and informal methods, the Army managed to preserve some key principles that would shape its approach to counterinsurgency situations into the next century." These included a general counter-guerrilla strategy built upon aggressive small unit action, relentless pursuit, and the destruction of enemy resources in an effort to destroy his will to resist. In terms of pacification, the Army continued to abide by the twin principles of moderation and retaliation laid down by international law and General Orders 100.<sup>62</sup> The Army's approach to counterinsurgency and pacification at the end of the nineteenth century were also equally informed by Progressive ideas about social order, professionalism, and scientific knowledge. John Gates referred to the American

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61. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*; Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*; Weigley, *The American Way of War*.

62. Birtle, *U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, 91.

military of the time as “Progressives in uniform,” and it was this blend of experience and new philosophies that would distinctively shape the Army’s actions in Cuba and the Philippines after the United States declared war with Spain.<sup>63</sup>

This Progressive military thesis, presented by Gates in *Schoolbooks and Kraggs*, is one of the most influential, and controversial, aspects of Philippine-American War historiography. It is a response to works such as Leon Wolff’s *Little Brown Brother*, which demonized the U.S. Army by focusing on American atrocities and military failures in the Philippines. Taking the opposite approach, Gates asserted that the U.S. Army was a progressive institution that brought ideals of American reform movements such as education, sanitation, and social uplift to the Philippines. He argued that the Army used a regulated mixture of force and humanitarianism in a creative and resourceful pacification campaign that succeeded, despite isolated incidents of brutality. The U.S. Army’s role in the Philippines is most accurately situated somewhere between Gates’ positive assessment and Wolff’s disparaging one, but this debate extends through much of the Philippine-American War historiography.<sup>64</sup> The extent and value of Progressive reform in the Philippines has been challenged, but the idea that military personnel utilized their experiences as teachers, lawyers, doctors, and engineers to innovate new tactics has been an enduring theme. These Progressives in uniform—military professionals as well as volunteers—also brought with them American identities and masculinities that shaped

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63. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Kraggs*, 14.

64. For literature that focuses on the atrocities and failures of the U.S. military in the Philippines, see Miller, “*Benevolent Assimilation*”; Karnow, *In Our Image*; Borrinaga, *The Balangiga Conflict*. For literature that stresses the success of the U.S. military in the Philippines, see Roth, *Muddy Glory*; Linn, *The Philippine War*; Silbey, *A War of Frontier*.

their approach to counterinsurgency. They developed tactics based on the power relationships between men and women in the Philippines, as well as their own cultural ideals, both of which established a foundation for Army warfighting into the twentieth century.

### **Conclusion**

When the first soldiers of the Eighth Army Corps stepped off their troopships in Manila Bay on June 30, 1898, it marked an important moment in the U.S. Army's approach to irregular warfare. Many factors influenced military operations during this critical juncture, but the power relationships between men and women in the Philippines, and the U.S. Army's perception of them, would play a significant role in the development of the mission and the innovation of tactics. These tactics, including property destruction, reconcentration, regulation of transportation, and food supply disruption, provoked gendered responses that shaped indigenous resistance and violence in the Philippines. An examination of U.S. Army records, including the personal papers of American officers and soldiers, reveals the attitudes towards and understandings of gender that U.S. military personnel brought with them to the Philippines. Likewise, the investigation of the Philippine Revolutionary Papers, newspapers, and government documents offers insight into the social structures that American soldiers encountered and the development of resistance patterns during the war and occupation. Together, these sources reveal an aspect of counterinsurgency operations that is vital to understanding modern warfare yet, **at the same time, is substantially underrepresented in the literature.**



## CHAPTER TWO: THE AMERICAN WAY OF GENDER: MASCULINITY, FEMININITY, AND MILITARY VIRTUE

The rice in central Luzon was nearly ready to cut in early November 1899, the rivers passable and bridges in good repair. Several companies of the Thirty-third U.S. Volunteer Infantry under Maj. John Logan Jr. made good time heading down to San Jacinto from San Fabian, where Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton had concentrated his forces in the hopes of preventing the Philippine Army of Liberation from escaping into the mountains. The war was young, expectations were high, and fresh American soldiers were marching through signs of hasty retreat: abandoned *carabao* carts, fresh footprints, and caches of rice, salt, and tobacco, which they burned or poured onto road. They skirmished twice with small groups of Filipino soldiers, but Logan was confident there was no enemy force of any consequence north of his position. The detachment pressed south in fair weather, meeting up with Lt. Col. Lewis Brereton on November 11 a half mile from San Jacinto, and together they proceeded up the road between dense, flooded paddies. Col. Luther Hare and his staff heard shots to the rear, and then approximately 1,200 Filipino soldiers under Gen. Manuel Tinio, entrenched behind earthworks leading into the city, opened fire, hitting Logan as he deployed his men across the muddy fields in response to the sudden enfilade. Surgeons removed Logan to a nearby village, but the wound proved fatal, and the major died before the Battle of San Jacinto was over.<sup>1</sup>

Logan posthumously received the Medal of Honor in 1902 “for most *distinguished* gallantry in leading his battalion upon the entrenchments of the enemy, on *which* occasion he fell mortally wounded,” but initially his demise warranted only

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1. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports, 1900*, Volume I Part 6, 536-543.

passing mention in the official report.<sup>2</sup> Republican Congressman and veteran journalist James Rankin Young, however, seized upon the “Death of Gallant Logan” and immortalized the major as an icon of American manhood in his hefty 1899 publication, *Reminiscences and Thrilling Stories of the War by Returned Heroes*. From the book’s cover engraving of a stalwart and bountifully mustachioed Admiral George Dewey to the denouement provided by the fallen Major Logan, *Thrilling Stories* is a testament to military masculinity and its bond with American authority:

Words cannot adequately describe the emotions of the strong and active young men of America, who, being called, shouldered their arms, full conscious of the gaze of the friends they held most dear. To use a homely expression, they had been “given the dare,” and they soon demonstrated that death upon the field would be preferable to a return in dishonor. It was the full force of American pluck and pride, as well as the strong physical force and unfailing skill of American brain and brawn, which wrested victory from the Spanish forces. . . . All Europe stood amazed at the sweeping victories wherever the American flag was planted. The wonderful success of Admiral Dewey at Manila stirred the interest, if not the fear, of foreign potentates, as it had never been stirred before.<sup>3</sup>

Popular literature emphasized this social construction, focusing on the growing global dominance of American men, who, through matchless capabilities, were able to conquer foreign enemies, diminish other nations through their fear of American power, and bring a “new and lasting prestige” to the United States.<sup>4</sup> These ideals of Progressive manhood—honor, fortitude, strength, intelligence, and aggression—were embodied in the soldier, establishing prescriptive models of behavior and high expectations for the rising

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2. U.S. Army, Center for Military History, “Medal of Honor Recipients: Philippine Insurrection,” Full-Text Archive. <http://www.history.army.mil/html/moh/philippine.html> (accessed on February 4 2009).

3. Young and Moore, *Reminiscences and Thrilling Stories*, iv-v.

4. Young and Moore, *Reminiscences and Thrilling Stories*, vi.

generation. They also became essential images of U.S. authority at home and abroad, positioning American men at the apex of the Anglo-centric international hierarchy as the nation assumed a new place in the world as a colonial power.<sup>5</sup> In this effort, Logan was a valuable archetype, not because his rather average passing could be easily sensationalized, but because his life and death symbolized a dominant social ideal revolving around combat and American exceptionalism.<sup>6</sup>

Logan, known to his family as Manning, was the son of John “Black Jack” Logan Sr., a Civil War General, Republican Senator, and one-time candidate for Vice-President. His mother, Washington society matron Mary Simmerson Logan, authored several books including *The Home Manual: Everybody’s Guide to Social, Domestic, and Business Life*, doling out advice on such diverse topics as the health benefits of archery and how to make children healthy, beautiful, and graceful. Vision problems forced young Manning out of West Point, but he soon married Edith Andrews, heir to her father’s entrepreneurial fortune built from coal mines, iron foundries, and railroads. Manning himself managed a limestone mine and a prestigious stud farm, finding international fame as a horse breeder before volunteering for the Army at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Entering the service as a first lieutenant, he was rapidly promoted in Cuba, attaining the rank of major prior to being deployed to the Philippines.<sup>7</sup> Major Logan became an exemplar of American masculinity through Young’s eulogy, the valiant son of a hero who overcame physical adversity and whose masculinity is evident in his life’s accomplishments and

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5. Hooper, *Manly States*, 5.

6. Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity,” 844.

7. Lang, Collins, and White, *Medal of Honor Recipients*, 130.

death on the battlefield. Young purveys Logan and his wife as ideals of American manhood and womanhood, a young couple who had every advantage of earned wealth and social standing, but put duty to the nation, civilization, and humanity first.

In the final lines of *Thrilling Stories*, the essence of Young's message is clear. Young wrote about the many condolences Mrs. Logan received, and printed the words of President William McKinley: "It is my painful duty to convey to you the sad intelligence of the death of your husband while gallantly leading his battalion in the charge at San Jacinto. His splendid qualities as a soldier, and high courage on the firing line, have given him place among the heroic men of war, and it will be some consolation to you to know that he died for his country on the field of honor. You have in this trying hour for yourself and the children, the sincerest sympathy of Mrs. McKinley and myself."<sup>8</sup>

Young honed a significant point in the final passage, demonstrating Progressive Era attitudes toward the rewards and virtue of combat. Mrs. Logan was recognized for her sacrifice and her children, while Major Logan for his honor and bravery in battle. The President's praise was a paramount achievement, but it became accessible to men through battlefield gallantry and to women through supporting the military duty of husbands and sons. Not only did soldiers earn direct recognition for demonstrating ideal behavior, but they were given a prestigious and heroic place in American memory. Young, like many Progressive Era writers, used his publications to peddle a popular version of military masculinity and femininity, one that both reinforced the authority of middle- and upper-class White men and justified U.S. actions abroad. It also served to delineate socially *ideal* roles in warfare based on a White middle-class society that valued male combat

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8. Young and Moore, *Reminiscences and Thrilling Stories*, 754.

performance supported gently by loyal women from afar. These images only reinforced a prescriptive separation of women from warfare that was unsustainable in the operational environment of the Philippines, ultimately influencing how counterinsurgency was interpreted by policy makers.

Popular discourse such as Young's helped nourish a particular notion of American masculinity, with military virtue and force-on-force combat central in the portrait of American power. Progressive Era ideals of masculinity and femininity were deeply woven into American culture, instilled with certain beliefs about the interrelationship of gender, race, and power and tied to an ideology of civilization emphasizing White racial dominance.<sup>9</sup> The U.S. Army was affected on both the tactical and strategic levels by these social constructions of gender, with two significant consequences. First, American soldiers arrived in the Philippines with a set of gender values that influenced their behaviors, perceptions of Filipino social structures, and tactical decisions. Second, the Army, as a civilian-run institution subject to the politics of the day, publicly constructed itself within the conventional boundaries of White American manhood, limiting its ability to overtly acknowledge alternatives to this ideal.

Counterinsurgency tactics that addressed female civilian resistance rarely matched the heroic image personified by Maj. Logan, so these deviations from the prescriptive model were often expunged from the public record. This chapter explores Progressive Era White American masculinities and constitutive femininities, which are essential to understanding how American soldiers and the U.S. Army conceptualized their missions **and** successes during the Philippine-American War. These Progressive Era gender roles

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9. Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*, 41-44.

help explain the U.S. Army's commitment to conventional warfare, as well as the relationship between military manhood and authority, two factors that shaped operations in the Philippines.

### **Masculinity and the American Soldier**

Young and his icon Logan reflected Progressive Era American mindsets and cultural biases that played out in gendered interactions between American soldiers and Filipinos. Perceptions of warfare as idealized battlefield combat were deeply ingrained, and even the realities of experience often could not alter these images.<sup>10</sup> In his remembrances after the war, Private Jesse Peck recalled, "We were not told we were going over there to kill people and I know I aimed high until I was detached to go bring back two Company C men who had been killed the day before. They had cut off the penis of each and stuffed it into their mouths. After that, I shot to kill."<sup>11</sup> Peck, and many of his peers, regularly contrasted "uncivilized" Filipino actions in war with American battlefield honor to justify combat, elevating the primacy of force-on-force engagement and degrading alternatives. Peck's story suggests he felt he gave his enemy a fair chance, but the affront to honor and masculinity forced him to kill, a perception consistent with Progressive beliefs that U.S. soldiers were symbols of a larger moral imperative. There is much to suggest that men of this time, as they went through the process of becoming soldiers, internalized these lessons and came to believe in the centrality of conventional

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10. Lynn, *Battle*, 10-15.

11. *SAWS*, Pvt. Jesse Peck, 32nd USV Infantry.

battle to personal and national honor.<sup>12</sup> As a result, contrary actions were marginalized or suppressed, creating a monolithic vision of combat warfare inscribed on the Army as an institution. Just as Peck felt that a small-scale but symbolic attack on American manhood was a pressing reason to kill, perceptions of masculinity and its link to American exceptionalism were a key behavioral driver for Progressive Era soldiers.

Great effort was made to broadcast actions that supported the Army's concepts of military virtue and American authority, both in press and official documents. In June 1899, Gen. Henry Lawton, a headline-grabbing war hero and renowned "man's man," fought a grueling Philippine campaign under the worst possible conditions, much of it of his own making. Losing 50 percent of his command to fatigue and heat stroke during a brutal "hike" before arriving at the Zapote River, he nonetheless attacked an enormous force of Filipino soldiers in their entrenchments.<sup>13</sup> Lawton confidently wired Manila, "We are having a beautiful battle. Hurry up the ammunition, we will need it." The subsequent fighting was indeed fierce, and close range combat left a staggering forty U.S. soldiers wounded or killed. When Lawton reported again to Manila, he solemnly told his superiors, "The men and officers fought like Americans, and I will mention several later for most distinguished gallantry."<sup>14</sup> This commitment to bravery and battle was common throughout the U.S. Army (for another example, see Figure 2).

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12. *SAWS*, Lawrence Benton, 33rd USV Infantry; William R. Allen, 43rd USV Infantry; Milton Nixon, 33rd USV Infantry; Almus Daltha Ridgway, 33rd USV Infantry; John D. Lawall, 27th USV Infantry; William Wientz, 28th USV Infantry.

13. *The Denver Post*, "Major General Lawton, the Great Modern Fighting Machine in the Philippines," March 29, 1899, 4.

14. Otis, *Report of Major-General E.S. Otis*, 138.



Figure 2. "Till my Regiment is mustered out"—Funston's reply when asked how long he could hold a captured trench" (1899). Source: Courtesy of the New York Public Library.

Conviction about the superiority of Americanness and its articulation in man-to-man aggression was not singular in Lawton, but was expressed in attitudes of soldiers toward their Filipino adversaries in combat, as volunteers often expressed that "the *insurrectos* were not up to the American soldier."<sup>15</sup> In this process, national identity, citizenship, and authority were often attached to public displays of either real or symbolic combat. These beliefs were inculcated into all levels of society, politicized by men such

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15. *SAWS*, John D. LaWall, 27th USV Infantry.



as Theodore Roosevelt, and capitalized upon by the U.S. Army itself to maintain its own authority. Through constant usage, the connections between strength, competition, citizenship, and martial prowess were discursively constructed as essential to American manhood and access to power, making combat operations not only the symbol of mission success in the Philippines, but also a primary strategic metric. This approach was deeply ingrained by Progressive Era American cultural constructions of identity.

Masculinity is a dynamic ideological process that forms male identity by prescribing a set of socially acceptable behaviors, but there are always many versions of these culturally defined sex roles. Gender scholar R.W. Connell demonstrates that there is an ongoing contest between myriad competing masculinities and defines “hegemonic masculinity” as a dominant set of values that are “more socially central, or more fully associated with authority, than others.”<sup>16</sup> Hegemonic masculinity is constructed through cultural approval, discursive language, institutionalization, and the marginalization of alternatives, and subordinate masculinities are primarily positioned through this pattern of social supremacy rather than by force, although racialized and gendered violence do play a role in asserting and maintaining dominance. Combat veterans dominated politics in the late nineteenth century, linking battlefield experience to social power and normalizing military duty.<sup>17</sup> These ideas of prescriptive behavior were not necessarily expressed consistently in the everyday activities of boys and men but were constructed

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16. Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity,” 844.

17. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*, 35.

and reinforced through exemplars, symbols such as John Logan, George Dewey, and Theodore Roosevelt, who had power and authority that most men could not achieve.<sup>18</sup>

There are myriad global masculinities and femininities, but for the purposes of this dissertation, I utilize the term *American masculinity* to refer to the dominant set of values expressed in the United States by the White middle class. Many of these prescriptive ideals transferred across class boundaries, with the White working, middle, and upper classes subscribing to some of the same socially constructed expressions of power. Race, however, was at the crux of an American masculinity that privileged White, preferably Anglo-American, authority, so beliefs about manhood did not necessarily cross boundaries of color or ethnicity. Additionally, although African-American regiments distinguished themselves during both the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, they constituted only a small number of deployed soldiers and were under-represented in the Army's officer corps. The first African-American general officer, Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis Sr. would not achieve that rank until 1940, although he served as a junior officer during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars. Decisions about both tactical innovation on the ground and doctrinal development during and after the Philippine-American War were most often the purview of White men, who were the originators and consumers of American hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, I focus on constructions of White masculinity and military manhood, which may differ from the many competing masculinities expressed in the United States by other groups. As such, it is necessary to begin with a look at the White "American soldier."

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18. Connell and Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity," 846.

### **Millin', Drillin', Made for Killin'**

The average American soldier in 1899 was a 27-year-old White male, who, at five foot six inches tall, weighed 147 pounds.<sup>19</sup> Many of these soldiers were native born, although English, Germans, Canadians, and Irish were well represented, along with Swiss, Danes, Swedes, and Austrians.<sup>20</sup> Naturalized or not, he would have entered the service in one of three ways: as a Regular, a state volunteer, or a federal volunteer. A career soldier would likely have enlisted in the Regular Army, falling under the command of professional officers who had graduated from West Point. In 1898, the Regular Army was small, an institution of 28,000 men in a population of 73 million.<sup>21</sup> Regulars, many of them Civil War and Indian Wars veterans, served as the frontier constabulary, where they earned a rugged reputation:

No state'll call him 'noble son,' he ain't no ladies' pet  
But let a row start anyhow, they'll send for him, you bet!  
He don't cut any ice at all, in Fashion's social plan,  
He gits a job to face a mob, the Reg'lar Army man;  
The millin', drillin', made for killin',  
Reg'lar Army man.<sup>22</sup>

A Regular soldier was sold to the public as gritty, dangerous, capable, and fearless; indeed, he had chosen a career that sanctioned violence and often placed him outside the geographical boundaries of American civilization. Only a small percentage of men were thus endowed, and it set them apart as exemplars of masculinity. Progressive Era society

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19. Clerk of the Joint Committee on Printing, *The Abridgement*, Vol I, 578.

20. Gantenbein, *History of the Oregon Volunteers*, 99-349.

21. Coffman, *The Regulars*, 3.

22. Brownlee, *War-Time Echoes*, 120.

tended to admire both contact with the primitive and strenuous experiences in the American West, and in many ways, the Regular Army man lived the prescriptive ideal. The Regulars were the backbone of the U.S. Army, distinct from the temporary regiments of citizen soldiers that appeared only in times of conflict. Progressive Era military reformers of the 1890s, including Alfred Thayer Mahan and Wesley Merritt, touted the superiority of Regulars, and their absolute necessity as the best line of defense against foreign powers.<sup>23</sup> For military theorists as well as the general public, the trained career soldier contrasted sharply with the states' "noble sons," the volunteers of the American militia system.

Volunteers supplemented the Regular Army in times of need, and at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, state regiments swelled with short-term citizen soldiers. A volunteer soldier would have waited until the President signed the order authorizing the organization of state regiments, and would have waited again while the governor appointed recruiting officers to fill the quota. Filled with a sense of "ardent patriotism," as one volunteer described it, each volunteer would arrive at his local office on the right date and put his name in for an available space, perhaps choosing between cavalry, infantry, and artillery.<sup>24</sup> The muster rolls show that men left their jobs as carpenters, farmers, laborers, seedsmen, solicitors, engineers, candy makers, and many more to become temporary soldiers.<sup>25</sup> Each volunteer then served with men from the local area,

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23. *Rocky Mountain News*, "Our Militia Not Reliable," March 6, 1890, 6.

24. Prentiss, *History of the Utah Volunteers*, 24-31. *SAWS*, William Yarborough, 29th USV Infantry.

25. Gantenbein, *The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers*, 99-393.

and often strongly identified with his point of origin. In 1898, L.W. Calhoun demonstrated his local ties, leaving his residence in Utah to volunteer for his home state of Mississippi, while Lt. Frank Heinz was fulfilled by his duty to state and country in the Philippines, where, he wrote, “the Utah Light Battery won for the ‘Baby State’ of America a golden crown—for every raw recruit that left her fertile soil fought like an old soldier.”<sup>26</sup> The evolution from recruit to soldier, and the desire to perform like a veteran in combat, was a recurrent theme among the volunteers. Often poorly equipped and trained, and led by political appointees rather than professionals, the volunteer was challenged to prove himself, to earn the badges of masculinity that seemed innate to the Regular Army man; according to one young volunteer, it was a “*big show!* for a farm boy in his teens.”<sup>27</sup>

The Volunteer of 1898 was often seen as being in the process of achieving manhood or proving his capabilities to a doubting audience. He had much to live up to, for in the military hierarchy, he fell below Regular Army men and his own father and grandfathers, the venerated “boys of ’61,” who had filled the state regiments during the Civil War. This sentiment is reflected in motivations for joining, as one volunteer explained, “I wanted to have my name in Army records, as was my father’s in the Civil War.”<sup>28</sup> The Civil War veterans, Indian fighters, and Regulars had already proven their courage, capability, and fortitude, achieving manhood through their performance in

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26. Prentiss, *History of the Utah Volunteers*, 29, 177.

27. *SAWS*, William Yarborough, 29th USV Infantry.

28. *SAWS*, Alfred Mummery, 30th USV Infantry.

battle.<sup>29</sup> The volunteer, soft from civilian life, was certainly a very different sort, though his character, when revealed through service, was equally important to perceptions of American military power abroad. A great effort was made through prescriptive literature to foster the combat potential of these volunteers—many of whom, like Jesse Peck, were uncertain about their desire to kill, and had to be nurtured to perform in battle. Expressions of personal virility in a volunteer soldier's will to participate in war was reflective of national virility, and the performance of these men in battle was carefully observed by both foreign military personnel and journalists.<sup>30</sup> The transition from civilian to soldier was often lampooned, but the very process served to reinforce privileged military manhood:

When Cholly swung his golf stick on the links,  
Or knocked the tennis ball across the net,  
With his bangs done up in little kinks—  
When he wore the tallest collar he could get,  
Oh, it was the fashion then  
To impale him on the pen;  
To regard him as being made of putty through and through;  
But his raquet's laid away,  
He is roughing it today,  
And heroically proving that the Yankee dude'll do.

When Algy, as some knight of old arrayed,  
Was the leading figure at the 'fawncy ball,'  
We loathed him for the silly part he played.  
He was set down as a monkey—that was all;

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29. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, 38-39.

30. *The Denver Evening Post*, "Infantry Did the Heroic Work in Shafter's Army: Splendid Fighting of American Volunteers at Siboney and San Juan Surprised Foreign Military Men—Faced Bullets as They Would a Hailstorm," July 25, 1898, 8; Cruz, *The War in the Philippines*; *The North American*, "Our Guests of War: Foreign Military Attaches Who Have Come to See Us Fight," May 31, 1898, 2.

Oh, we looked upon him then,  
As unfit to class with men,  
As one whose heart was putty and whose brains were made of glue,  
But he's thrown his cane away,  
And he grasps a gun today,  
While the world behold him, knowing that the Yankee dude'll do.

When Clarence cruised upon his yacht,  
Or drove out with his footman through the park,  
His mamma, it was generally thought,  
Ought to have him in her keeping after dark;  
Oh, we ridiculed him then,  
We impaled him on the pen,  
We thought he was effeminate, we dubbed him  
'Sissy,' too—  
But he nobly marched away—  
He is eating pork today,  
And heroically proving that the Yankee dude'll do.

How they hurled themselves against the angry foe,  
In the jungle and the trenches on the hill;  
When the word to charge was given, every dude was on the go—  
He was there to die, to capture or to kill;  
Oh, he struck his level when,  
Men were called upon again  
To preserve the ancient glory of the old red, white, and blue;  
He has thrown his spats away,  
He is wearing spurs today,  
And the world will please take notice that the Yankee dude'll do.<sup>31</sup>

Cholly, Algy, and Clarence reflected a Progressive Era concern about the feminization of men by a changing industrial society and the hope that military service would invigorate American manhood, but also expressed the idealized mission of the soldier “to die, to capture or to kill.” Although there was little ambiguity in these expectations, there were

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31. Brownlee, *War-Time Echoes*, 113-114.

many components to a volunteer's transition from an object of ridicule to a real man. He put away the trivialities of civilian life and shouldered the burdens and duties of upholding the nation's honor. Eschewing feminizing acts and distancing himself from women, he learned to live rough, carry a gun, and subsist on government meat (and, given the number of soldiers allegedly poisoned by "embalmed" beef during the war, eating the provisions may well have been a significant act of bravery.) However, the real key to manhood was battle. By confronting the enemy and having the courage to kill or be killed, the "sissy" could win his spurs and be classified with the men. Although this poem satirizes the spectacle of the dude, the process of achieving military manhood was both well-defined and important. It was not just a private passage, but a public one that proved a man's, and by extension the military institution's, capability to the world. The glorified warrior was very much a symbol of national power, and the transformation of the male citizen into a conqueror was an important aspect of political might.<sup>32</sup>

In 1899, these state volunteers, capable as they might become under Uncle Sam's tutelage, were still citizen soldiers, anxious to do their duty and return to civilian life. They were, at their own demand, replaced by federal volunteers as the Philippine-American War exceeded their terms of enlistment. Fifteen Spanish-American War volunteer infantry regiments bearing state designations served during the first year of the Philippine Insurrection, eventually yielding to a new influx of federal volunteers. The state volunteer bore the brunt of conventional fighting in the Philippines during the first year of the war, whereas the federal volunteer handled much of the later

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32. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, 41.



counterinsurgency as the war plodded on.<sup>33</sup> Federal volunteers, an invention of Congress in 1899, were similar in background and constitution to state volunteers, but there were important differences. They had comparable two-year enlistments and probably expected to fight the war and then leave the military, perhaps transforming the prestige of federal service into a political opportunity at home. However, members of the United States Volunteers (USV), like the Regulars, were recruited from a larger geographic region, bringing together a broader array of experiences, biases, and beliefs.<sup>34</sup> Officers in the USV were typically more experienced and capable leaders and often had commissions in the Regular Army, so the men benefitted from better training. They focused on marksmanship, physical fitness, and open-order tactics that emphasized small-group movement and individual initiative, in contrast to some state-volunteer regiments that utilized Civil War-era, regimental, close-order drills with men shoulder to shoulder on a long advancing front—a method that was completely inadequate, even suicidal, for Philippine terrain and weapons technology.<sup>35</sup> The federal “volunteer regulars” arrived in the Philippines with a combat advantage that they intended to exploit, given their training emphasized small-unit tactics combining aggressive pursuit of opposing forces, maneuverability, and fire control.<sup>36</sup> Like the Regulars, they concentrated on advancing on the enemy, anticipating the problems of defensive positioning by preparing for aggressive

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33. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 123.

34. Craig, *A Federal Volunteer Regiment*, 49.

35. Hunt, *Colorado's Volunteer Infantry*, 23.

36. Craig, *A Federal Volunteer Regiment*, 53.

offensives.<sup>37</sup> These small differences in training, equipage, and command provided a certain status to the federal volunteers both during and after the war and emphasized the Army mission of force-on-force combat.

### **The Importance of American Military Virtue**

Progressive Era masculinity was a fluctuating identity based on regional, ethnic, racial, and class boundaries, but “military virtue” was central to constructing manhood across these differences for both Regulars and volunteers. Popular culture endowed military heroes with a greater measure of all the masculine qualities civilians found inspiring. One veteran described Civil War Gen. Philip Sheridan for the youth column in a popular magazine:

We then saw in our commander a man . . . compactly built, with broad square shoulders, and a muscular and wiry frame that suggested powers of endurance far beyond the average. With his firm chin, crisp mustache, and keen searching eye, he looked every inch the soldier. In more senses than one, the head of General Sheridan was not a common head. He found it difficult, it is said, to make a hat stay on properly. Certain irregularities called by phrenologists bumps of combativeness were the cause of this singular shape, and greatly inconvenienced himself—as well as his enemies.<sup>38</sup>

Manliness, in the Progressive eye, was not just exhibited in the actions of military men, but inscribed on their bodies, in their countenance and bearing, with the will to fight becoming a part of their physical being. This popular vision of military masculinity was helpful to the Army, encouraging enlistment, motivating performance, and fostering public support, but it was not entirely the same set of values the military sought for itself. A keen eye and crisp mustache was fine for stirring civilian interest, but did little to

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37. Jamieson, *Crossing the Deadly Ground*, 142-144.

38. A. D. Rockwell, “Home and Young Folks: My Ride With Sheridan,” *Christian Advocate*, July 7, 1887, 434.

ensure discipline and combat readiness. For battlefield functionality, institutionalized training and esprit de corps brought men of diverse backgrounds together into a single functioning unit, where a collective focus on the ideal attributes of American masculinity both empowered and dictated behavior for inexperienced soldiers, helping to insure standards of combat performance and providing consistent metrics for victory.<sup>39</sup> In the last decade of the nineteenth century, “the links between manhood, military service, and political authority led a number of political leaders to think that they would enhance their political standing if they supported martial policies,” a perception that reinforced the interface between the military institution, civilian political power, and cultural constructions of authority.<sup>40</sup> Military manhood, however, was really an ideal within an ideal. It was a subcategory of a larger set of cultural beliefs about masculinity that served its own purpose, even as it shaped societal perceptions of gender, and was largely predicated on clear definitions of mission success for both the soldier and the institution.

The process of embedding masculinity into the military institution, and vice versa, is a broader societal mechanism, based on cultural constructions of gender and power in relation to the state as an agent of policy. Popular discourse and cultural approval fed White American masculinity, but the military institutionalized it as a symbol of its own authority. The Army and the American people differed somewhat in their perceptions of martial virtue, but both valued these characteristics and judged military success on displays of certain manly traits. War is not a natural biological function, so populations must be socialized to fulfill the necessary roles in conflict, whether as warriors or

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39. Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 41.

40. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*, 10.

reproductive laborers. Gender identity is therefore an important social device that helps insure adequate human resources in times of conflict. The Progressive Era emphasized achieved masculinity, through which the military could more easily regulate behavior; during times of war, manhood could be withheld from those who did not participate or failed in battle, and endowed upon those who tolerated trauma and conquered fear.<sup>41</sup>

The glorified male warrior was an essential element in the behavior of both the polity and nation throughout the Progressive Era, serving to organize the domestic social order and the interstate system.<sup>42</sup> Warrior mystique privileges those who have attained such status, and excludes as inferior those who do not; in most societies, the male warrior limits female access to first-class citizenship because “giving one’s life for one’s country has been considered the highest form of patriotism, but it is an act from which women have been virtually excluded.”<sup>43</sup> Material and nonmaterial rewards are ingrained in military success and the fulfillment of the warrior role; booty and women are traditional benefits of battle prowess across cultures, but more important in American constructions of military virtue were honor, prestige, special memberships, political influence, and leadership.<sup>44</sup> Men were inspired by the promise of military promotions and public rewards for successful battlefield performance, but they were equally motivated by the threat of public shame and the loss of manhood resulting from displays of cowardice.<sup>45</sup>

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41. Goldstein, *War and Gender*, 264.

42. Tickner, *Gendering World Politics*, 6; Goldstein, *War and Gender*, 53-57.

43. Tickner, *Gendering World Politics*, 6; Goldstein, *War and Gender*, 28.

44. Goldstein, *War and Gender*, 252.

45. Holmes, *Acts of War*, 140-143.

To that end, the U.S. Army outlined its own specific prescriptions for creating and enforcing military virtues, with the idea that “to be effective in time of war modern military training must be uniform throughout the service, and must conform to basic principles.”<sup>46</sup> Lt. Gen. Nelson Miles issued General Orders No. 107 in an effort to condense previously defined standards into a single new document in 1901. These building blocks of military efficiency identified five principles that reflected Progressive Era masculine values adapted to the Army’s specific needs. Patriotism was the most important, and all members of the service were required to have an “absolute and unqualified devotion to the welfare of the country” and be “familiar with the brilliant achievements of our arms as recorded in our past military history.”<sup>47</sup> Discipline was the second obligation, with officers exhorted to show exemplary deportment, justice, and impartiality, while soldiers were expected to give cheerful, earnest, loyal obedience; any unsoldierly behavior, uncouthness, or laxity was considered subversive. Physical development for endurance and strength empowered courage and skill and limited the number of disabled men who were an encumbrance to the Army. Self-respect, self-reliance, and resourcefulness were combined into a single tenet with the belief that “these qualities making up a man’s individuality are in a large measure inherent in the American soldier” and “they have ever been marks of his character and efficiency.”<sup>48</sup> The final principle was professional knowledge, and it was within this section that mission success

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46. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports 1901*, 13.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., 14.

was identified with action. The actual practice of combat warfare was given primacy with the presumption that “the long-established reputation of the Army demands that nothing short of perfect proficiency *in active service* shall be accepted” (emphasis original).<sup>49</sup> These five principles, coupled with the imperative of courage under fire, provided prescriptions for ideal military conduct, but they also served to limit how such conduct could be constructed.

The principles of military virtue were linked to certain images of the Army as an institution. The demand for unqualified patriotism was embedded in the “brilliant” achievements of U.S. military history, leaving little room to deviate from the glories of former wars and conventional battles. The stress placed on active service in war defined military success as the result of battle, and combat was socially and culturally defined as actions between groups of men. Discipline and self-respect, as the opposites of uncouth and lax behavior, were shaped by the soldier’s personal values derived from their own homosocial and heterosocial experiences. Progressive Era expressions of male aggression and violence were deliberately channeled toward other men and away from women, as evidenced by one noncommissioned officer in an official after-action report of a 1901 engagement: “I ordered every man to be careful to shoot only at an insurgent, and told them that there were women sleeping in some of those shacks, and I wanted them particularly not to shoot at a woman, as I did not want any of our men accused of killing women.”<sup>50</sup> Treatment of self, comrades, enemies, and civilians was derivative of a soldier’s own socially constructed sense of deportment and justice, but how these acts

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49. Ibid., 15.

50. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports 1902*. Part 1, Volume IX, 358.

were received and redistributed at higher levels was based on normative behavior, particularly hegemonic masculinity that enforced the dominance of military authority and the prescriptive separation of women from warfare.

Nineteenth-century American culture defined men and women as fundamentally, scientifically different, so violence among and between the sexes was regulated both socially and legally. Military virtue placed a heavy emphasis on the distinction between acceptable male violence and violence against women that paralleled socially accepted values. However, the evolution of gender ideals at the end of the nineteenth century underscored differences, with the emerging “New Woman” defined by her desire for a greater public role, more autonomy, broader rights, as well as a rejection of the constraints of domesticity in favor of modernity. When the contradictions between prescriptive ideals and lived experiences became apparent, popular discourse was quick to undermine alternatives, particularly when it was expressed in terms of violence or violent negotiations between men and women. A Chicago newspaper reported acerbically in 1895 that “the new woman is readily adapting herself to the masculine arts,” and described an argument between two men regarding possession of a wagon. The argument escalated into a physical altercation, and just as one man appeared to be losing, his wife stepped in and “felled [his opponent] to the ground with a club, rendering him unconscious.”<sup>51</sup> None of the three individuals emerged from this episode in a positive light. The men were emasculated by their failed fight and the “new woman,” (whether she subscribed to the image of feminist or not) was lampooned, reinforcing the

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51. *The Daily Inter-Ocean*, “New Woman Uses a Club: Goes to Her Husband’s Rescue and Wins a Fight for Him,” August 12, 1895, 14.

prescriptive social roles of men as combatants and women as somehow innately separated from conflict.

Although incidents of male-female aggression were common in the United States, popular discourse still emphasized the woman's need to be protected and the man's obligation to do so.<sup>52</sup> The conflict between ideals and behaviors is distinct. Men were urged to protect and exhibit self-control but at the same time were compelled to defend their manhood against challenge. Women entered into frays despite admonitions to be at all times "pleasing, attractive, friendly and lovable."<sup>53</sup> Domestic violence, including marital rape, wife beatings, and child abuse, was documented and addressed by families, communities, and courts, and such behavior was generally considered aberrant.

Nonetheless, spousal murder constituted almost a quarter of homicides in Chicago at the turn of the century, often because wives threatened the authority of the male head of household.<sup>54</sup> In cases of wife beating, both the victim and the abuser often articulated the belief that such actions were wrong, implying consistency regarding the value system that condemned male aggression toward women, a social principle that complicated warfare in general and counterinsurgency in particular, at least at the strategic level, where policy was made; at the tactical level soldiers were apt to make decisions based on local

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52. *The Macon Telegraph*, "Three Were Killed Two Men and a Woman Went down in a Tennessee Fight," July 21, 1895, 3; *The Galveston Daily News*, "A Woman with a Winchester A Free Fight in Which Two Persons Were Fatally Wounded," July 5, 1890, 3; *Bismarck Daily Tribune*, "A Three-Cornered Fight Two Men and a Woman Try for about an Hour to Kill Each Other," November 12, 1890, 1; *Daily Evening Bulletin*, "A Desperate Fight Two Men Attack a Defenseless Woman," June 18, 1891, 1.

53. Houghton, Beck, Woodburn, Hoffman, and Houghton. *Rules Of Etiquette*, 25-26

54. Adler, "'We've Got a Right to Fight,'" 27-48.



exigencies, and often these gendered interactions were inconsistent with top-down military policies and ideal man-to-woman behavior.<sup>55</sup> It is clear, though, that men who resorted to violence against women, or were the recipient of female aggression, were likely to find their masculinity imperiled by public shame or censure, serving to reinforce the idea of andocentric combat in military virtue.

Progressive reformers intervened in gendered abuse situations, believing that “brutality against the weak was ‘unmanly,’ cowardly” and “masculinity required self-control, containment, rule through authority—i.e. symbolic force—which required no violence to impose itself.”<sup>56</sup> Indeed, behavior guides and books emphasized manly duty to women and subordinates, asserting that the true man “is bound to exercise courtesy and kindness in his intercourse with the world, he is doubly bound to do so in his intercourse with those who depend upon him for advice, protection and example . . . he is respectful and patient, distinguished above all things for his quick and active sympathy, his unwillingness to cause pain.”<sup>57</sup> The residents of Hookstown, Pennsylvania apparently agreed with these general principles, and took exception when they were violated in one case of domestic violence. Wealthy resident Johnston Calhoun was expelled from church for hitting his wife, but failed to reform. After yet another assault observed by a neighbor, a group of “regulators” took Calhoun from his house and rode the 60-year-old man around town on a rail, ignoring his offers of money, pleas for help, and, ultimately, his

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55. Peterson, “Wife Beating,” 97-118.

56. Gordon, *Heroes of Their Own Lives*, 255.

57. Houghton, Beck, Woodburn, Hoffman, and Houghton. *Rules Of Etiquette*, 25-

piteous begging. Bystanders refused to come to his aid, and Calhoun suffered from numerous broken bones and internal injuries before he was released.<sup>58</sup> The near castration of Calhoun underscores public distaste for aggression toward women, a sentiment that was expressed not infrequently in the whippings, murders, and ostracism of men who engaged in such acts.<sup>59</sup> Male-on-male aggression, including appalling events such as lynching, were not usually conceptualized in the same manner and did not warrant the same types of public interventions. Indeed, lynching, with its racial and sexual overtones in the protection of women, was often seen as a positive expression of natural White masculinity.<sup>60</sup>

A holistic portrait of military manhood emerges from these prescriptive values and the ways they are acknowledged. John Logan exemplified that giving one's life for one's country was the ultimate expression of patriotism, and the Army made an effort to systematically recognize men for their performance in battle. Congress designated a Medal of Honor "for gallantry in action and other soldier-like qualities" in 1862, but there were no guidelines for the award, and it was handed out to officers and enlisted men for a wide variety of reasons until its regulation in 1892, when Maj. Gen. John Schofield

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58. *The Galveston Daily News*, "Ridden on a Rail A Wealthy Pennsylvanian Given a Dose of Lynch Law for Beating His Wife," January 09, 1890, 1.

59. *The Daily Inter Ocean*, "White Caps in Kewaunee: A Farmer Charged with Beating His Wife is Lashed," January 26, 1894, 1; *Morning Oregonian*, "The Eastern Border: Another Case of Brutal Wife Beating Reported," March 24, 1891, 12; *The Milwaukee Sentinel*, "Shot Dead by His Own Son: A Prominent Citizen of Savannah, Ga., Killed While Beating His Wife," February 3, 1892, 4; *The Denver Evening Post*, "A Car Conductor Assaulted: Toughs Insulted a Woman and Got the Worst of It," June 13, 1898, 7.

60. Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*, 73-74.

established a hierarchy for military honors as part of an overall Progressive Era move toward modernization and professionalization. The Medal of Honor then became the highest achievement a soldier could earn, and was only awarded for “distinguished bravery in action,” making it more difficult to obtain.<sup>61</sup> Philippine-American War citations for the Medal of Honor illustrate the types of actions that earned the highest recognition. Private Otto Boehler received the Medal of Honor after he, “with 21 other scouts charged across a burning bridge, under heavy fire, and completely routed 600 of the enemy who were entrenched in a strongly fortified position.” Corporal Anthony Carson received his medal for assuming “command of a detachment of the company which had survived an overwhelming attack of the enemy, and by his bravery and untiring efforts and the exercise of extraordinary good judgment in the handling of his men successfully withstood for 2 days the attacks of a large force of the enemy, thereby saving the lives of the survivors and protecting the wounded until relief came.”<sup>62</sup> Boehler’s and Carson’s masculinity were implicit in these citations. Their acts of extreme heroism were certainly the exception, but military reports of even mundane operations often included mention of individuals for “devotion, willingness, endurance and extraordinary effort,” “conspicuous gallantry,” “unusual coolness and bravery,” or similar accolades for efforts during combat.<sup>63</sup> Conspicuously absent from any such recognition were pacification efforts and garrison duty, the basic building blocks of

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61. Mikaelian, *Medal of Honor*, xix.

62. U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Medal of Honor Full-Text Citations Archives*, <http://www.history.army.mil/html/moh/philippine.html>, (accessed February 9, 2009).

63. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports 1900*, 324, 335, 462.

counterinsurgency in the Philippines. By centering the principles of military manhood on active service and brilliant campaigns against male enemies, the Army reinforced the prescriptive values of Progressive Era masculinity through the regulation of men and the exclusion of women, lowering the visibility of gendered counterinsurgency. Andocentric warfare, with its ties to political power, had to be discursively constructed and vigorously defended because the authority of Progressive Era men was imbedded in many ways within combat performances. Every effort was made in the Army's official documents to keep the discourse within the boundaries of these values.

For example, U.S. Army jungle offensives in 1900 and 1901 often resulted in large casualties and small gains against well-hidden insurgents.<sup>64</sup> In response, junior officers living inside villages began utilizing Tagalog women as interlocutors and hostages to influence the posture of guerrilla forces, negotiating successful weapons exchanges and surrenders.<sup>65</sup> New approaches yielded tactical opportunities based on gender-specific behavior, often successfully nullifying Filipino advantages such as mobility and knowledge of the terrain. These tactics evolved in a variety of ways; some American officers came to realize that important Filipino guerrillas frequently returned to their communities for important kinship activities such as weddings and consequently social events became a means to lure insurgent leaders into town where they were more

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64. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4327, Vol. 1; Linn, *The Philippine War*, passim.

65. Junior officers and company grade officers are those holding the ranks of 2nd lieutenant, 1st lieutenant, and captain, who most often have tactical level responsibility. Field grade officers are majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels who typically have operational oversight. General officers usually control strategic policies.

easily captured.<sup>66</sup> One officer utilized the tactic aggressively, picking up local women and delivering them to a ball in carabao carts to ensure the “snare” was set.<sup>67</sup> Few tactical decisions of this type were approved by higher commanders, and they were virtually invisible in the Army’s official after action reports, if not deliberately suppressed by the strategic leadership.<sup>68</sup> Efforts to distance controversial counterinsurgency methods from honorable combat action influenced the development of future doctrine; the Army’s regulations between 1902 and World War II do not acknowledge these tactical lessons from Philippines. “Small wars” doctrine didn’t appear in manuals until 1940, and then only in Marine Corps texts.<sup>69</sup>

The War Department, precursor of today’s Department of Defense, was responsible for military policy and the conduct of the Philippine-American War. The department annually published several volumes of official reports, encompassing the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and ranging from mundane recitations of budget needs to elaborate accounts of campaigns. Operational reports were constructed to portray military actions in a particular light, omitting or subtly changing actions to serve this purpose. During the Philippine-American War’s transition from conventional to

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66. Philippine Information Society, “Facts about the Filipinos”; National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 5032/LS; National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 5107/Miscellaneous; National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 4327, Vol. 1; *SAWS*, Richard Mason, Co. A, 47th USV Infantry.

67. Parker, *The Old Army*, 332-334.

68. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 3106, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4748, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 4229, Box 1; Ibid, Entry E2397, Box 1; Ibid, Entry E5032, Vol. 1.

69. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency, 227; Ottevaere. *American Military Horsemanship*, 45-74.

guerrilla warfare in early 1900, typical operations often resulted in Filipino soldiers taking the Americans by surprise. The Army became so disturbed by the string of unflattering reports from local garrisons that it circulated an order requiring officers to eliminate the words “ambuscade” and “ambush” from all official documents, because they felt their use indicated a lack of readiness or capability.<sup>70</sup> Through this type of self-censoring, the Army preserved the ideal of the battle-ready American soldier, but ultimately hampered its ability to address weaknesses through training and doctrinal development.

Individual actions were also filtered, as in the case of Second Lt. Paul A. Barry of the Fourth Infantry, who was involved in capturing Lt. Col. Epipanio Gomez in 1901. Knowing that Filipino women often acted as intermediaries by formally applying to garrison commanders for the release of imprisoned relatives, or less formally by spiriting messages to guerrillas in the “boondocks,” Barry capitalized on this system by searching the Gomez house and taking “certain monies and jewelry.”<sup>71</sup> In the Philippines, much of a family’s money might be invested in jewelry, and American soldiers recognized the advantages gained by seizing a woman’s portable wealth.<sup>72</sup> In one such operation in 1900, Bernarda Tinio’s jewelry was confiscated in a failed attempt to force prominent Filipino Gen. Manuel Tinio to seek amnesty. As a result, company-grade officers questioned the policy of seizing and holding family money, but ultimately determined that if the surrenders were executed correctly and the money returned, it was deemed a

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70. National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 2979, Vol. 1.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid, Entry 4327, Vol. 2; Ibid, Entry E5032, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 1.

gesture of good faith.<sup>73</sup> Barry was following a pattern of tactical development when he promised Mrs. Gomez that her property would be returned upon the surrender of her husband, and secured the items in a safe until Colonel Gomez turned himself in to American authorities a few weeks later. Unfortunately, Barry's superiors at the operational level felt that the "honor of the U.S. Army" had been jeopardized by these actions.<sup>74</sup> Although both Lieutenant Barry and Colonel Gomez appear in the *Annual Reports of the War Department*, the circumstances of this capture are left out, and can only be found in the local garrison records.<sup>75</sup>

The Gomez scandal is an important indicator of how tactical decisions were perpetuated from garrison to garrison, even if they were not received by officers up the chain of command. In instance after instance, the U.S. Army's tactical leaders problematized gender, whereas the strategic leadership, deeply invested in maintaining sociocultural ideals, ignored it. Violence against and negotiations with native women in the Philippines would remain the purview of the garrison. This inconsistency served to reinforce the Army's historical approach to counterinsurgency, with doctrine and regulations focused on conventional warfare and the lessons learned from irregular warfare kept firmly out of politics at the highest levels. It also contributed to the lack of strategic focus on counterinsurgency, contributing to postwar instability in the Philippines and institutional blindness within the military throughout the twentieth century.

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73. Ibid, Entry 2132, Vol. 1; Ibid, Entry 5032, Vol. 1.

74. Ibid, Entry 2979, Vol. 1.

75. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports 1901*, 240, 241, 247.

## **Conclusion**

Strategic policy was shaped by American cultural ideals of manhood, ensuring the centrality of combat to the military's formal regulations and the metrics for mission success. The Progressive Era vision of man-to-man combat performed by conventional soldiers was powerful, underpinning American masculinity, and by extension domestic and international political power. Military virtue helped define ideal behavior for men, and it was institutionalized into the Army as a means to control behavior and reinforce military authority. While violence against women was not uncommon in the Progressive Era United States, it was almost universally condemned, and male aggressors were likely to suffer from hostile public interventions and damaging censure. Gender roles and wartime conditions forced U.S. soldiers into negotiations and conflicts with Filipino women, creating a struggle between prescriptive behavior and necessity. Resolution of gendered resistance was essential to pacification, yet reconciliation of gendered tactics with Progressive Era military masculinity was almost impossible. Progressive Era man-to-man engagements, however, encompassed a spectrum of socially (if not legally) condoned behaviors, from fist fighting to lynching, which were constructed as means to assert and sustain culturally important concepts of manhood.

Military virtue reflected these behaviors and was a key element of Progressive Era masculinity, providing visible rewards for socially admired conduct. Soldiers embodied the prescriptive characteristics of manly men, and military service was a singular opportunity to exhibit the most prized masculine values, allowing access to social and political privileges. The Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars were closely observed by foreign governments, and because the United States was only a recent player



on the world stage, the performance of its citizen soldiers was essential to its position in global politics. Prescriptive images reinforced dominant values of White male authority, as one journalist remarked in 1901, “To go to war and see no fighting, is, to the majority, a humiliation, if not a disgrace.”<sup>76</sup> Laboring under these pressures, U.S. soldiers had much invested in battlefield performance, and they pursued an idealized victory even while gendered resistance, terrain, and resources undermined these efforts. Recognition of Filipino women’s roles and counterinsurgency opportunities would be slow to develop because of this cultural bias. At the highest levels, success in warfare was characterized as a masculine effort to defeat the enemy on the battlefield, leaving little room for man-to-woman negotiations to shape policy making, even after the significant position of women in the Filipino power structure reached up to senior leadership. As a result, many effective gendered tactics that accomplished military goals without force-on-force combat remained invisible into the twentieth century.

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76. Robinson, *The Philippines*, 59.

### CHAPTER THREE: RESISTANCE AND REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

“The land was already planted with a few coconut trees, *lumbang*, mango, and *tampuy*. Between groves of *camias* and arbors of *achuete* were plots of sassafras, onions, tomatoes, pepper, and ginger. Along the road, an area of about two thousand square meters was luxuriant with corn stalks. The riverbanks were thick with bamboo that shaded the water that flowed lazily over stones and rocks. Cold and hot springs spilled into the river. It was lovely land,” wrote Maria Concepcion Herrera Vda. De Umali of her family’s home in Tayabas before the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>1</sup> Doña Concepcion’s view, though elite, was not singular. She was Tagalog mestiza from a family of means and position that had made a modest fortune selling copra on the international market, but individuals of many classes and cultures have chronicled both the bounty and beauty of the islands. Doña Concepcion would see much of resistance and revolution while the Spanish and the Americans and the Japanese fought over and ruled the Philippines, but even after years of war and devastation, when she finally penned her memoirs during the hard times of Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law, she still believed that hers was a lovely land. The history of the Philippines is one of conquest, resistance, and revolution, but also of resilience and tremendous human and natural diversity.

The Philippines is a Southeast Asian archipelago of over 7,000 islands laid out like a broken spine between the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. The islands, some of them too small to inhabit, envelop almost 116,000 square miles and are divided into three groups. The large island of Luzon, where Doña Concepcion’s family grew coconuts, ginger, and corn, stretches north toward Taiwan, while the Visayas sprawl

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1. Berthelson, *The Tayabas Chronicles*, 20.

across the middle and Mindanao extends southward to Indonesia. Because of their location along major trade routes, the Philippine Islands have been strategically and economically important to Eastern and Western powers for much of modern history. As a crucial link between Asian, European, and North American trade from the sixteenth century, the Philippines was a center of trans-Pacific exchange, a remarkable supplier of agricultural products, and a unique crucible for cultural mixing.

Ethnolinguistic diversity is a central theme in the Philippines. It is a nation that speaks over one hundred languages, and cultural groups have maintained their unique customs in the face of colonization and modernization. The northern part of Luzon, rugged, mountainous, and green with jungle vegetation, is home to ethnic Ilocanos, as well as the “non-Christians” of the Cordillera range, who long remained autonomous in the harsh interior.<sup>2</sup> Manila, the capital city and traditional seat of power, sits alongside a natural bay at the center of the fertile Tagalog-speaking region, which stretches east and south from the city, past the deep blue of the Taal caldera to the narrow San Bernardino Strait leading to the Visayan island of Samar. Cebu, Leyte, and Samar are home to large populations of Cebuanos, Ilongo, and Waray, while Muslim populations, historically referred to collectively as Moros despite their ethnic diversity, dominate the areas of Sulu and Mindanao. Despite sharing some traits among themselves and other Southeast Asian cultures, Philippine geography has segregated its different peoples, and their varied experiences make generalization problematic. Scholars often address this problem by examining a single ethnolinguistic category or geographic area.<sup>3</sup>

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2. Woods, *The Philippines*, 67.

3. See Linn, *The Philippine War*; May, *Battle for Batangas*.

This dissertation focuses on Central Luzon and the Southern Tagalog regions, particularly the area including Bulacan, Tayabas, Laguna, and Cavite. These Tagalog-speaking provinces, close to Manila, were centers of anti-colonial resistance throughout the turbulent epoch of the Philippine Revolution of 1896 and the Philippine-American War. To understand how gendered resistance and counterinsurgency intersect during the Philippine-American War, it is important to first examine the development of Tagalog society up to the end of the nineteenth century. Philippine nationalist scholars such as Vicente Rafael and Reynaldo Ileto have illustrated that Filipino rebellion and resistance cannot be understood as solitary events, but must be examined in the context of an entire past. Indeed, anthropologist Kathy Nadeau has argued in support of Ileto and Rafael's holistic approach to the study of resistance across time, pointing to the continuity of precolonial and colonial social structures in more recent Filipino power relationships:

Ileto and Rafael have shown that peasant revolts that have been the object of much research cannot be analyzed in isolation from their pre-colonial origins. By so doing, they challenged evolutionary frameworks used to categorize different kinds of peasant protest as either belonging to primary (pre-colonial), archaic (postconquest), or nationalist movements . . . Local elites and social organizations have persisted well into colonial and neo-colonial times . . . [and] rural forms of religious protest . . . that marked the archaic stage have continued to the present.<sup>4</sup>

Traditional periodization tends to artificially segregate Filipino history into precolonial, Spanish colonial, and American colonial eras, as if each one could or should stand independently, thereby pinpointing resistance as a set of discrete events rather than as an culturally constructed group of behaviors along a continuum.<sup>5</sup> The nationalist challenge

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4. Nadeau, "Peasant Resistance," 75.

5. Larkin, "Philippine History Reconsidered," 595-596.

to the structure of Filipino history provides a framework for examining resistance as a dynamic mechanism inseparable from culture.

### **Defining Resistance**

Resistance takes many forms, both active and passive, and its modes are culturally identified; a resistor, a target, and an outside observer may perceive such actions differently based upon their own worldview and understanding of the context.<sup>6</sup> Acts of resistance are seen most clearly in social and political movements because they are embodied in visible demonstrations, organization, and violence. More subtle forms of physical and material resistance are common and manifest in work slowdowns, theft, or even clothing choices. Gendered elements of culture such as fashion can become an issue of female subordination or resistance, as clothing transforms women into public objects of scrutiny.<sup>7</sup> Linda Boynton Arthur has demonstrated that clothing illustrates both agency and constraint, and “dress, and by extension, the body are sites where different symbolic meanings are constructed.”<sup>8</sup> In the first years of the American occupation of the Philippines, dress became a key site of contention, as masculine nationalism clashed with both colonial power and gender ideals. Beginning around 1903, upper-class Filipino women found more opportunities for higher education, particularly at American universities, where they adopted Western clothing, claiming that the puffy sleeves and

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6. Hoffman, “Turning Power Inside Out,” 671.

7. Wilson, “Deviancy, Dress, and Desire,” 50.

8. Arthur, “Clothing, Control,” 66.

stiff cloth of the traditional *terno* blouse were a hindrance in the “modern” scientific professions they pursued (see Figure 3).<sup>9</sup>



Figure 3. Filipina wearing *terno* and *panuelo*. Source: Image courtesy of the New York Public Library.

As one prominent Filipina noted, “The large puffed sleeves of this blouse make it unfit and dangerous to wear inside of laboratories, with their gas jets or alcohol burners and

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9. A group of women in Malolos petitioned for the right to education in 1888, an effort that was supported by nationalist writer Jose Rizal but contested by the Spanish clergy. By 1894, the Spanish had opened the teaching profession to both sexes, and after the American colonization, in 1903, small numbers of women began traveling abroad as “pensionadas,” or scholarship students, to foreign universities. The University of the Philippines admitted women in 1908, and the pensionada program was expanded with science as the focus. In 1914 the bequest of Levi L. Barbour established a scholarship program at the University of Michigan for women from the area formerly known as “the Orient” (encompassing the lands extending from Turkey in the west to Japan and the Philippines in the east) to study modern science, medicine, mathematics and other academic disciplines and professions critical to the development of their native lands.

rows of glass tubes.”<sup>10</sup> Western dress became a form of symbolic confrontation of the Spanish patriarchal system, female oppression, and limited opportunities outside the home that rankled conservatives in the Philippines. At the same time, however, many prosuffrage Filipinas, including the University of Michigan- and Radcliffe-educated Encarnacion Alzona, purposefully embraced traditional attire in public as a means to resist masculine nationalists who opposed the female vote.<sup>11</sup>

Elite Filipino men, working within the American system toward their own political emancipation, obstructed woman suffrage, arguing it was an American colonial imposition that endangered both Philippine independence and the Filipino family.<sup>12</sup> Facing the accusation that suffragists could not be nationalists, women resisted by wearing the indigenous piña-cloth terno and panuelo, an outfit that was closely associated with the prescriptively ideal Filipino woman, the feminine Maria Clara from Jose Rizal’s 1887 nationalist novel *Noli Me Tangere*. This act of resistance, to both masculine nationalism and Westernized female modernity, stressed the women’s Filipino identity while demonstrating their opposition to American colonial rule and the prevailing gender power structure. These Filipina suffragists were so identified with traditional clothing that they became known as panuelo activists.<sup>13</sup> Panuelo activists illustrate the faceted layers of resistance conveyed by a single action, as well as the cultural significance attached to certain behaviors. The choice of clothing identified early Filipina feminists as a certain

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10. Alzona, *The Filipino Woman*, 81.

11. Roces, “Gender, Nation,” 26.

12. Roces, “Is The Suffragist,” 32.

13. Tirona, “Panuelo Activism,” 109-129.

“type,” putting them in opposition to each other as well as with the gender power structure. Whereas the purpose of Western-style dress was easily perceived, the use of traditional clothing was more subtle, and an observer could misinterpret the connotation behind the demure costume. Resistance, then, is multidimensional, carrying with it fluctuating meaning for the actor, the target, and the observer.

Still, resistance activities are not limited to public, physical, or material displays. Both silence and breaking the silence can be oppositional actions; various types of communication, including speech, storytelling, dance, or art, are often methods of symbolic resistance.<sup>14</sup> Individuals and groups may engage in any of these behaviors as a widespread collective action or a localized phenomenon. Rebellions and protest require extensive cooperation among resisters, while other forms are intensely personal and private. Resistance is often understood in terms of political activity, but it can also be used in the formation of identity, to reject imposed categorization, or to maintain a sense of self. All of these modes are bound by the goals of resistance, which may be to initiate a transformation of status quo or to maintain tradition in the face of outside influences; that is, resistance is a tool of both the progressive and conservative, serving the needs of subaltern and dominant communities. At its core, resistance is an act of opposing something a person disapproves of or disagrees with, but in practice, it radiates out through social structures in countless forms and throughout all ranks of a power hierarchy.

Scholars across the disciplines have utilized the term *resistance* to describe a multitude of behaviors, from gossip and hair styles to violence and revolution, providing

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14. Hollander and Einwohner, “Conceptualizing Resistance,” 536.



many theories about the nature of activity along with far too many definitions.<sup>15</sup>

Sociology, anthropology, and political science have, perhaps, given the greatest attention to the concept, but academic fields still struggle to give meaning to the word, engaging in an inexact and often paradoxical discourse. Although scholars disagree on the exact meaning of resistance, common threads run throughout its study. Most examinations of resistance recognize the presence of both action (verbal, cognitive, symbolic, or physical) and a sense of opposition.<sup>16</sup> However, the ideas of intent, visibility, and recognition are more contentious. James Scott asserted that subalterns may have neither the resources nor the opportunity to openly resist subordination, but Jeffrey Rubin challenged this notion by arguing that resistance, by its very definition, must be overt.<sup>17</sup> Although both scholars agree that intent is essential, and indeed, Scott argued that it may be the most important aspect, the question of visibility is less clear in the academic debate.<sup>18</sup> Scott argued that the actor's intent to resist is the crux of the action, regardless of whether the behavior is ever recognized by anyone else, whereas Rubin posited that resistance must be both intentional and visible to observers.

Violent and visible manifestations of resistance, including revolt, rebellion, and protest, are just one side of a complex apparatus that communicates dissension within a power hierarchy. Scott pointed out that revolutions are the exception, whereas everyday

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15. Weitz, "Women and their Hair," 667-686; Sotirin and Gottfried, "The Ambivalent Dynamics," 57-80; Starn, "To Revolt Against Revolution," 547-580.

16. Hollander and Einwohner, "Conceptualizing Resistance," 538.

17. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, xvi; Rubin, "Defining Resistance," 237-260.

18. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 290.

struggles between the dominant and the subordinate represent the most common forms of bottom-up resistance. Scott saw the powerless in Southeast Asia incorporate “foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigning ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage” into their everyday lives, creating a system of resistance that passes from one generation to the next.<sup>19</sup> Peasants and the lower classes may use these weapons of the weak against elites, while elites may in turn co-opt these methods against other authority. That is not to say, however, that resistance is bound to a Marxist or class-based framework because actors can also oppose a power hierarchy from a gendered or racial perspective. With any of these forms, the threat of reprisal shapes modes of behavior and may force resisters to seek invisible opportunities to accomplish goals in order to maintain personal security; these actions cannot be overlooked as legitimate resistance, particularly in the context of counterinsurgency, where dissimulation, slander (propaganda), false compliance, and sabotage are historically the tools of guerrillas and insurgents. Layers of resistance allow for different patterns where “some acts are overtly oppositional, yet unrecognized because they are deliberately hidden from view. . . . In contrast, other acts are observable yet not necessarily recognized as resistance by the powerful.”<sup>20</sup> Despite Rubin’s attempts to confine resistance to overt acts, there are many hidden behaviors that achieve personal or collective goals and function as mechanisms of opposition.

Sociologists Jocelyn Hollander and Rachel Einwohner created a typology to address these conflicting beliefs about the nature of resistance (Table 1). They recognized

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19. Ibid, 29.

20. Hollander and Einwohner, “Conceptualizing Resistance,” 540.

the subjectivity of perception, as well as the difficulty in assigning a definition that meets the requirements of all social scientists, so they utilized a rubric that distinguishes the roles of different participants: resistor, target, and observer. The participants are subject to their individual and cultural biases, beliefs that may blind them to the affects of certain actions, or cause them to perceive resistance uniquely. Overt resistance, such as protest or rebellion, is most easily understood because it is intentional, visible, and recognized by all involved. Blatant actions, such as political organizing, legal action, refusal to work, or physically fighting against sexual attack, span the continuum of overt resistance.

*Table 1. Typology of Resistance*

| Types of resistance | Act is intended as resistance | Act is recognized by target | Act is recognized by observer |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Overt               | Yes                           | Yes                         | Yes                           |
| Covert              | Yes                           | No                          | Yes                           |
| Unwitting           | No                            | Yes                         | Yes                           |
| Target-defined      | No                            | Yes                         | No                            |
| Externally-defined  | No                            | No                          | Yes                           |
| Missed              | Yes                           | Yes                         | No                            |
| Attempted           | Yes                           | No                          | No                            |
| Not resistance      | No                            | No                          | No                            |

In contrast, Scott's "weapons of the weak"—foot dragging, theft, false compliance—represented covert resistance, which may also include gossip, subversion, or avoidances that require intent on the part of the actor but go unnoticed or unpunished by the target. Important to the concept of covert resistance is the idea that culturally aware outside observers would recognize the act as resistance, even if the target did not; this element allows historians and other social scientists to read between the lines of source material and argue for the agency of subalterns, even in the absence of their own writings or admission of intent. Of course, during insurgencies and guerrilla warfare,

opposing armies actively search for these covert forms of resistance, and many become public in courts martial or provost courts as the actors are prosecuted for violations of the rules of war or martial law.

Overt and covert resistance patterns are the subject of much research. Hollander and Einwohner have identified several additional types. “Unwitting” resistance is unintentional but causes an audience to feel threatened; tomboy behavior can be defined in this manner, insofar as young girls may not be aware that their clothing or play choices strain existing social discourses.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, target-defined resistance occurs when the actor and a culturally aware observer do not perceive an act as resistance, but the target does. Domestic abuse may fall into this category when an abusive husband perceives mundane behavior as challenging, but the wife and others do not. Externally defined resistance is often a function of social science research and occurs when the observer, through culture, bias, or other forces, identifies an action as resistance, even though the actor displays no intent and the target does not recognize the action. Not all resistant behaviors occur in an observed environment, however, and forums such as secret societies can be sites of opposition between an actor and target but might be missed by outside observers entirely. Actors can also fail in their resistance, and this attempted behavior goes unnoticed by both the target and the observer. Finally, the idea that individuals are not participating in any resistance activities cannot be overlooked.

Recognizing resistance, particularly from a historical perspective, challenges the observer to identify the different modes, as well as the meaning, conveyed by the actions of individuals whose stories are often incomplete or obscure. The statutes of General

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21. Carr, “Tomboy Resistance,” 528-553.

Orders No. 100, as well as cultural biases, insured that resistance was gendered during the Philippine-American War, with the legitimacy of opposition very clearly defined along male and female boundaries. Competing masculinities and femininities intensified the character of resistance at the time, as the change from Spanish to American rule and the counterinsurgency campaign fractured some of the gender power structure itself. For the Philippine-American War, from which source material written by women is scarce, the effort to identify resistance often requires reading between the lines and making judgments about intent based on the observations of male authorities. It is necessary to grant the possibility of no resistance, but there is ample evidence that Filipino populations actively opposed American rule. Overt resistance, even if target defined, is the easiest to detect in the primary sources, and contemporary writers, both Spanish and American, have been quick to point out open subversion and detours from acceptable conduct. On the other hand, covert behavior of the kind that Scott witnesses is deeply embedded in Filipino guerrilla warfare and American counterinsurgency efforts; indeed, dissimulation, false compliance, slander, arson, and sabotage are central themes of this conflict. Obviously, covert resistance becomes public knowledge when the target becomes aware of the activity, and these instances appear in both newspapers and military records of the time; for instance, the *Manila American* noted in October 1901 that a group of “insurrecto murderers” were captured, but during the skirmish, “soldiers fired, accidentally killing a woman who was with the ladrones.”<sup>22</sup> This dissertation, although not dismissing the idea of target-defined or unwitting resistance, focuses on overt and

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22. *Manila American*, “The Fourth Infantry’s Good Work—Insurrecto Murderers Captured,” October 23, 1901, 1.

covert opposition made public in news reports, military records, and writings of participants.

Relating resistance to a gender power hierarchy and to ideals of masculinity and femininity becomes a function of understanding both the actors and targets in their historical context. The factors that shaped Tagalog culture, such as power, cross-cultural interactions, agriculture, trade, crime, and conceptions of warfare, produced the modes and means of indigenous resistance across historical, as well as gender and class boundaries. The daily tempo of turn-of-the-century Filipino life, as a sum of its precolonial and colonial history, influenced indigenous resistance and the development of U.S. counterinsurgency tactics. One cannot be examined without the other.

**“She of the Horns Continues to Speak Secretly”: Datu, Babaylan, and Barangay**

Chinese, Arabs, and Indians actively traded with Philippine tribes as early as AD 900, often establishing permanent or semipermanent settlements near the family-based villages, or *barangay*, that were the primary form of government in the islands. A wave of Malaysian immigration during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries brought Islam to the southern islands of Sulu and Mindanao, gradually extending Islamic influence into the northern barangay and reinforcing the Austronesian heritage of the archipelago. This ethnic mixing resulted in the cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity that still underpins Filipino identity. In the pre-Spanish Philippines, barangay were a basic social unit of twenty to 500 people, relying on a male *datu* to provide political and military leadership.<sup>23</sup> Tagalog and Cebuano cultures also supported a female or androgynous male babaylan who controlled important spiritual, agricultural, and social processes,

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23. Constantino, *Volume I: The Philippines*, 29.

collaboratively governing the barangay with the datu and other male headmen.<sup>24</sup> The people of Luzon and the Visayas largely subscribed to an animist religion that venerated the spirits of nature and sought to pacify malevolent powers through rituals or effigies. Sacred idols—*anitos* (goddesses) or *diwatas* (fairies)—were common in homes and had powers associated with earthly needs or concerns such as war, agriculture, and health. The babaylan performed essential animist ceremonies, which often included entering a trance-like state and allowing these spirits to communicate through her; these rituals were ingrained in the culture, eventually gendering the act of mediation as the domain of women.<sup>25</sup> In the Muslim south, where the barangay structure was more class- and gender-stratified than other regions, the presence of the babaylan was less apparent. Despite local differences in governance, barangay were seen throughout the archipelago and provided a foundation for Tagalog society. Even today, barangay are a central element of Filipino social life, and babaylan continue to appear as healers and spiritual leaders.

These precolonial babaylan conducted religious rituals, regulated planting and harvesting cycles, and provided both physical and psychological healing services to the barangay population.<sup>26</sup> The earliest Europeans noted their presence and commented on

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24. In Tagalog, the word *katalonan* is understood as priestess or shaman; *babaylan*, or sometimes *baylan*, is the Cebuano language equivalent. The Spanish colonial texts often refer to female spiritual leaders as *catalonan* (spelled with the Spanish “c” rather than the Tagalog “k”) but today the term *babaylan* is commonly used in both English and Tagalog, while *katalonan* has all but disappeared. In keeping with the modern practice, and to avoid confusion, I will refer to female spiritual leaders of all ethnicities as *babaylan*. For an excellent discussion of the evolution of this language, see Brewer, *Shamanism*, 84-99.

25. Bankoff, “Devils,” 39.

26. Salazar, “Ang Babaylan,” 52-72.

the alien gender structure they encountered in the islands. Antonio Pigafetta, chronicler of Magellan's circumnavigation, reported a butchering ceremony on the island of Cebu and declared that "no one but the old women [babaylan] consecrate the pig's flesh and they would never eat of it unless it were killed in this manner."<sup>27</sup> The ritual involved the cooperation of two women, one of whom wore a kerchief bearing the shape of two horns around her head. She secretly spoke the words of the rite to the other woman before spearing the bound animal through the heart. After killing the pig, the women anointed their male kin's foreheads with blood and ate a meal of fish and rice in the company of the other women of the village, excluding the men from the repast while the skin of the pig was scalded by fire. Pigafetta continued his narration of this ritual with a discussion of native sex and gender roles, expressing amazement at the genital piercing of the men, who "told us that this was the wish of their women, and that if they did otherwise they would not have intercourse with them."<sup>28</sup> Pigafetta's observations illustrate the sexual agency of women and the position of females in the consultative leadership of the barangay, as well as the European reaction to a gender power structure that was unlike their own. Pigafetta related the ceremonial and ritual actions of the babaylan to what he considered aberrant sexuality, conflating religion and domestic relations. Pigafetta struggled to reconcile the social positioning of these women, because, unlike Christian European culture, the Tagalogs and Cebuanos supported a much more symmetric gender power structure that empowered greater sexual freedom, female headship, legal rights, and equal access to resources.

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27. Pigafetta, *Magellan's Voyage*, 85.

28. *Ibid.*, 86.



Historian Oliver Wolters saw a certain consistency in precolonial leadership systems throughout Southeast Asia, noting that independent and decentralized village systems like the barangay were common to the region. Moreover, as was the case in the Philippines, these social structures were neither authoritarian nor dictatorial, but rather subject to highly consultative power sharing among groups.<sup>29</sup> Filipino historian Renato Constantino also viewed the datu as “the administrative leader of the community,” not “an absolute ruler.”<sup>30</sup> Notwithstanding a system of inherited rank, particularly in the south, social status was dynamic in the barangay, where most residents, including the datu, were subsistence farmers, and land use was often communal. There was an enduring system of debt peonage that provided cultural precedence for later forms of social and economic patronage, and although the datu could capitalize on this system, he could only maintain his power as long as he commanded respect through personal skills and traits such as valor, physical strength, intelligence, willpower, public speaking, and self-confidence.<sup>31</sup> Wolters, along with historian Glenn May, focused on these male leadership styles that persisted from the precolonial barangay system through the Philippine Revolution and Philippine-American War, noting that the datos were “men of prowess” who established their claim to authority through “demonstrated performance” and that “everything depended on man-to-man relations.”<sup>32</sup> Filipino historians Zeus Salazar, Romeo Cruz, and Fe Mangahas, however, have argued convincingly that female babaylan

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29. Wolters, *History*, 27-32.

30. Constantino, *A Past Revisited*, 33.

31. Angeles, “The Battle of Mactan,” 11.

32. May, “Warfare by Pulong,” 454.

were essential to the tripartite social, economic, and political governance of the barangay. The social position of women and the leadership of the babaylan, as well as the typically consultative leadership of the barangay system, destabilizes the presumed supremacy of man-to-man relations in the daily administration of village life.<sup>33</sup>

The man-of-prowess concept ultimately identifies cultural constructions of Filipino masculinity without contradicting the presence of female power alongside it. Gender hierarchies in the Philippines tended to reflect regional characteristics. Scholars note a consistent pattern of male-female power relationships throughout Southeast Asia where “even the gradual strengthening of the influence of Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Confucianism in their respective spheres over the last four centuries has by no means eliminated this common pattern of relatively high female autonomy and economic importance.”<sup>34</sup> May and Wolters focused on the politico-military realm, where the male datu did exert a powerful influence within the consultative nature of the system.

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33. The role of women in the pre-Spanish and colonial Philippines is a point of contention in feminist discourse. Some Filipina feminists, such as Fe Mangahas, assert that the inherent power of female roles in Philippine history is an empowering precedent. In response, feminists such as Delia Aguilar argue that Filipinas have always been disempowered by a patriarchal system and that the myth of historical female power undermines attempts to expose and combat the roots of this oppressive social structure. However, primary source documents support the babaylan role in the barangay as outlined by Salazar, Cruz, and Mangahas, and, modern feminist debate aside, these social hierarchies do form a basis for gendered resistance throughout Philippine history. The pro-babaylan scholars convincingly argue the presence of this gendered social leadership, and, indeed, I have spoken with several modern babaylan who lead local religious rituals and the church, while also providing traditional guidance in agricultural techniques and mental and physical well-being. The argument of the babaylan scholars, particularly Romeo Cruz, breaks down only when they assert the supremacy or dominance of the babaylan, for clearly the datu was not subordinate. These opposing viewpoints suggest that use of Filipino women’s history in feminist discourse be approached with caution because the two sides have distinct agendas in the formation of their arguments.

34. Reid, “Female Roles,” 629.

Masculine roles dominated the interactions between competing barangay, including diplomatic and economic negotiations, as well as warfare. However, women's reproductive roles gave them a mystical power and ritual function, which established feminine space parallel to masculine space without directly competing against it. Rice production involved shared labor, but weaving and market trade were the purviews of women, giving them a great deal of control over communal and family resources, particularly capital. Women and men had different interrelated functions, creating a system that, at the local level, was more consistent with equiarchy than patriarchy.

In practice, the idea of prowess was gendered but not masculine; the barangay framework for respect, leadership, and power focused on similar characteristics across male and female responsibilities. Personal power was constructed and understood in the Philippines, and many other areas of Southeast Asia, using a distinctly non-Western framework, one where power was existential rather than abstract.<sup>35</sup> That is, power came from a person's inner self, rather than from material assets such as wealth or arbitrary elements such as social status. Leaders of both sexes needed "the ability to entice followers to cooperate in ritual, agricultural, commercial, or military matters" and "were believed to have special spiritual energy that enabled them to keep social relations within and between communities, between the earth and cosmos, in balance."<sup>36</sup> Male leaders ascended to leadership positions based on their mental and physical fitness, developing both combat skills and the ability to consult and collaborate with members of the barangay and external groups. While feminine roles centered on social, agricultural, and

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35. Ileteo, *Pasyon and Revolution*, 30.

36. Nadeau, "Peasant Resistance," 77.

reproductive work, female leadership was earned through diplomacy, apprenticeship and experience. Like the datu, the babaylan emerged as a leader based on respect accumulated from her demonstrations of oratory, physical and spiritual courage, and technical knowledge. Although some barangay had a custom of inherited status, power and leadership positions were not necessarily passed from parent to child, nor was one's line of descent more important than one's personal characteristics or broader kinship ties.

Kinship networks, developed through patronage and negotiation as well as blood and marriage, were essential to personal power and social hierarchies. These networks demonstrated prowess, providing a tangible manifestation of spiritual energy and the ability to make social connections. While gift giving and diplomacy could expand a network, blood kinship was "based on ambilineal descent . . . traced bilaterally through male and female lines" which "diminished the importance of status based on lineage connections to a single male or female ancestor" because "there was a greater interest in extending kin and kin like networks horizontally in space rather than vertically back in time."<sup>37</sup> These horizontal kin networks created a social structure that viewed social ties such as marriage in terms of power sharing. Divorce was easily obtained in Tagalog society, and the pattern of female autonomy insured that divorce did not affect a woman's livelihood, social position, family support, or kinship ties.<sup>38</sup> Children of dissolved unions were divided between the parents, the first child going with the mother, the second with the father, and so on.<sup>39</sup> Women had property rights and access to inheritances through

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37. Ibid., 77.

38. Morga, *History of the Philippines*, 275.

39. Reid, "Female Roles," 630.

both their mother's and father's lines, allowing females to establish kinship networks of equal substance and influence to that of their male counterparts.<sup>40</sup> Ambilineal descent reinforces the idea that many Philippine cultures tended toward equiarchy because the system made kin networks, which are essential to power and potency, available to both men and women.

The framework for understanding power and power relationships in the Philippines remained in place throughout Spanish rule, even as it was adapted to new forms of governance and religion. The concept of prowess, consultative leadership, and female autonomy persisted in Philippine cultures, despite changes in governance and religion. These gender roles and modes of power form the basis for late nineteenth-century Filipino social structures and illustrate the historical divisions of labor and community authority that carried through the colonial eras. At the same time, the prowess ideal forms a basis for understanding the Filipino way of war, a cultural perception of conflict that shaped methods of resistance throughout the Spanish and American colonial periods.

### **A Way of War and Spanish Conquest**

It is difficult to identify an overarching "way of war" for the Philippines, but the coastal cultures of southern Luzon and the northern Visayas share enough similarity with each other to examine indigenous resistance in terms of the social role of conflict and battle.<sup>41</sup> The concept of prowess figures prominently in the Filipino construction of

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40. Lindio-McGovern, *Filipino Peasant Women*, 24.

41. Lynn, *Battle*, xxi. Lynn argued that the discourses of war vary according to gender, social class, and profession and that the discourses themselves attempt to craft the realities of war to reflect perceptions of ideal combat experiences.

warfare, with combat providing an opportunity for leaders to display masculine traits that secured the respect and loyalty of their followers. This process of earning and displaying masculine power has its roots in precolonial society but provided a foundation for martial leadership throughout both the Spanish and American colonial regimes. A datu might establish essential human networks and social ties from acts of diplomacy, arbitration, or gift giving, but battle provided the opportunity to display courage and assert dominance in victory.<sup>42</sup>

The Filipino way of war, however, differed greatly from Western strategies, which focused on the destruction of the opposing army and occupation of enemy territory or seizure of fortifications. As historian Amiel Angeles asserts,

Indigenous warfare in the Philippine islands aimed to draw or keep people within the chief's alliance network through displays of spiritual potency; it was "aggregative" in that it aimed to consolidate and control people, as territory in and of itself was rarely the object of warfare. . . . In many cases the costs and risks of frontal combat would have outweighed the potential benefits. Indigenous warfare tended to avoid direct confrontation and combat. Observers have noted that Southeast Asians in general had a propensity for "deception" in combat and chose to avoid costly battles and confrontations because they were wasteful in lives and resources. . . . This ran counter to the datu's desire to either capture people or attract them as vassals.<sup>43</sup>

Resistance in the Philippines reflected the difference in Spanish and Filipino cultural constructions of battle, defeat, and victory. Whereas Filipino modes of combat sought to avoid population loss, early modern warfare in Europe was characterized by large armies and heavily fortified cities that contributed to enormous civilian casualties, as control of territory became both a strategic goal and symbol of victory. Technological advances in

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42. Angeles, "Mactan and Discourse," 12.

43. Ibid, 13.

Europe increased the effective distance of weaponry and prompted the ascendancy of infantry over cavalry with corresponding strategic and tactical adaptations. Armies had become larger and long wars, or wars of attrition, normative.<sup>44</sup> In contrast, the Filipino way of war emphasized control of population, so villages were often abandoned while the people of the barangay fled to avoid injury or capture. Datus might then negotiate relationships with their adversaries before returning to the village, a practice that Filipinos did not perceive as defeat, but rather as part of a traditional means of creating power networks. The Spanish viewed these postcombat resolutions as a part of conquest, assuming victory in the retreat and conciliation. Capitulation of the barangay was not certain under these circumstances, and the returning populations often resisted Spanish domination, perhaps surrendering only when the prestige and prowess of the datu had been significantly undermined by the “potency” of the Europeans.<sup>45</sup> As the Spanish gained power, the barangay system was adapted for colonial rule, with the extension of power networks to European leaders.

Spain permanently colonized the Philippines in 1565, establishing Manila as the capital, and soon controlled much of the Tagalog-speaking area of Luzon.<sup>46</sup> The independent village system facilitated European conquest in the sixteenth century, largely because the individual barangay could not, or would not, unify against the Spanish. Resistance, although widespread, was localized and small in scale. As female spiritual leaders, babaylan were offensive to the proselytizing clergy and became priority targets

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44. Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 115.

45. Angeles, “Mactan and Discourse,” 25-26.

46. Agoncillo and Alfonso, *History of the Filipino People*, 67.

of Spanish conversion. These feminine religious figures directly competed with priests in ritual duties and spiritual oversight, acts that were sometimes seen as apostasy in an era of witchcraft and inquisition.<sup>47</sup> The babaylan were often at the center of resistance to Christianization, maintaining traditional rituals and encouraging overt opposition to Catholic missionaries by retreating with their followers to the mountains to avoid reconcentration and the trusteeship labor system of *encomienda*. These rebels did not simply hide from the Spanish, but would destroy homes and crops to prevent their use by *encomenderos* and desecrate churches, provoking harsh retaliation from the colonial government.<sup>48</sup> As Spanish rule expanded and missionaries gained momentum in their conversions, many of the Philippine cultures covertly practiced pre-Christian rites under veils of subterfuge, later blending animist beliefs of power and nature with the Christian doctrines in a hybridized Philippine Catholicism. The babaylan were eventually suppressed, but they utilized a variety of adaptive behaviors to maintain their traditional position.

Some babaylan adapted to the new colonial system by integrating into the church, becoming nuns or religious women, thereby maintaining a certain degree of potency and autonomy.<sup>49</sup> Other babaylan resisted colonization through armed conflict, and as Zeus Salazar notes, “most rebellions . . . have a babaylan portion, a religious and cultural portion, until a political evolution came into being.”<sup>50</sup> Filipino historians have identified a

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47. Bankoff, “Devils,” 39.

48. Guerrero, “The Babaylan,”

49. Mangahas and Claguno, *Centennial Crossings*.

50. Salazar, “Ang Babaylan,” 216.



series of female-led rebellions between 1596 and 1780 that illustrate the persistence of the babaylan tradition throughout the early colonial period.<sup>51</sup> At the same time, though, the Hispanization of the Philippines, which was based on Catholicism, worked to transform traditional Tagalog gender relations into an asymmetric power structure in the European style, diminishing female sexual agency and enforcing Western ideals of good and bad women—the Madonna and witch dichotomy that is persistent in Christian understandings of women in a patriarchal society. These cultural and religious transformations gradually altered, but did not completely destroy, the equiarchy of precolonial gender power structure. Indeed, the roles of women accommodated the colonial social structure by reconstructing traditionally visible displays of autonomy, sexual agency, and power that were contrary to European gender norms and Catholic dogma into more subtle, concealed forms.<sup>52</sup>

Eventually, Spanish friars converted much of the population, and Catholic orders became the focus of political and economic power. The Spanish had accumulated experience colonizing the Americas and understood the expediency of maintaining local forms of governance, so the barangay system was adopted into the Spanish government of the Philippines. Filipino leaders, often the *datus*, remained heads of the barangay and came under the jurisdiction of Spanish priests and provincial governors, although the babaylan were eliminated from local governance. Local officials answered to the governor-general, who was appointed by the King of Spain. Throughout Spanish rule, upper-level political offices were appointed and held exclusively by Spaniards, excluding

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51. Guerrero, “The Babaylan,” 27.

52. Brewer, *Shamanism*, 45.

Filipinos from positions of power, and creating new social hierarchies based on ethnicity and gender. To meet the needs of the colonial system, the Spanish instituted a policy of *reducciones*, or resettlement, to consolidate the far-flung independent barangay. Through threats and enticements, the Spanish friars restructured population centers into *población-barrio-sitio* settlements, bringing the people under the direct administration of the church. The church became the axis of the *población* community, situated in a plaza at the town center with the municipal buildings nearby. Wealthy families and commercial interests congregated in the *población*, which was surrounded by smaller *barrios*, like suburbs, and even smaller *sitios* that consisted of a small group of rural-family dwellings. Although the Christianized families increasingly turned toward the church, the *barangay* system and kinship networks still underpinned daily life in the *barrios* and *sitios*.

Rebellion was common during the 400-year Spanish regime, and not without reason. The first permanent colonial envoy, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, had learned the art of domination as civil governor of Mexico City. He arrived in Cebu in 1565 after a brief stop in the Marianas, where his troops resupplied, then killed the local natives and burned their houses. Legazpi at once began a politico-military campaign that combined both armed aggression and network building to win allies, effectively creating for himself an extended power network. By 1570 he was able to muster several hundred Visayan warriors to accompany his troops into Luzon against the Tagalog *datus*. Arriving in the area around Manila, they engaged in fierce combat before the Spanish artillery forced the Tagalog retreat. Legazpi established Manila as his center of government, but the deposed chiefs regrouped and launched an uprising in 1574 that ended only with the death of the

datu Suliman.<sup>53</sup> In pitting one ethnic group against another, the Spanish established a policy of sustaining intertribal conflict that inhibited nationalism well into the twentieth century and set a precedent for utilizing native soldiers to suppress localized rebellion. Pacification waxed and waned, however, with periods of relative quiet disrupted by explosions of local violence. In 1622, tensions flared in Bohol, where Fray Juan de Medina reported that the “babaylan encouraged them by saying that there they could see how their divatas [spirits] had told them true . . . Consequently, they became like mad dogs; and they preferred death to enduring the conditions of conquer.”<sup>54</sup> The Spanish quelled more than 25 organized revolts in the first hundred years of colonization.<sup>55</sup>

Loss of political and cultural freedom, forced labor, religious differences, and the abuses of encomienda contributed to ongoing native unrest.<sup>56</sup> Spanish military garrisons were often small and understaffed, resulting in the development of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures to support the colonial army’s mission. Spain enlisted and conscripted native men to suppress regional uprisings and to fight small wars of aggression by foreign powers. For Filipino men living under the restrictions of colonial rule, the Spanish Army offered an opportunity for regular pay and higher social status but

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53. Baclagon, *Military History*, 5.

54. Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol. 24, 118.

55. Baclagon, *Military History*, passim.

56. Encomienda was the trusteeship labor system employed by the Spanish crown during the colonization of the Americas and the Philippines. In the encomienda, the crown granted a person a specified number of natives of whom they were to take responsibility. The receiver of the grant was to instruct the natives in the Spanish language and in the Catholic faith. In return, they could exact tribute from the natives in the form of labor, gold or other products, such as in corn, rice, or chickens.

also represented the loss of control over labor.<sup>57</sup> Both forced conscription and the encomienda system of appropriated labor altered the way farmwork was conducted along gendered lines, as the absence of men place a larger burden on women to maintain the family's subsistence.<sup>58</sup> In many ways this labor system reinforced women's traditional position as breadwinners and controllers of family capital, albeit in a more invisible and private manifestation, as social structures were incorporating European models of asymmetric gender relations. Additionally, Filipino soldiers were instructed in European tactics and military practices, a procedure that accelerated cultural changes and the Hispanicization of the native population, while reinforcing European ideals of masculinity and concepts of warfare. This indoctrination of Western values also introduced a gendered approach to combat that excluded female participation and defined leadership roles according to a Western hierarchy. Military service helped the colonial government accentuate ethnic differences and prevent nationalist solidarity, as native soldiers from one region were sent to fight revolts in different areas, a tactic that emphasized traditional tribal rivalries. In particular, Christianized Filipino soldiers were used to suppress ongoing unrest in the southern islands where the Muslim populations had never capitulated to the Spanish. Filipino soldiers fought not only native revolts, but foreign colonial conflicts, serving Spain against the Chinese and Dutch, and then the British when they occupied Manila during the Seven Years War.<sup>59</sup> By the time the British returned Manila to the Spanish in 1764, the number of babaylan-led revolts had dwindled

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57. Lindio-McGovern, *Filipino Peasant Women*, 26.

58. Ibid, 27.

59. Baclagon, *Military History*, 45-47; Jose, *The Philippine Army*, 19.

significantly and the roles of women in Tagalog society were altered by the growth of wage labor and export agriculture.

Spain attempted to keep the Philippines closed to the West, insulating the islands from outside trade while using Manila as the conduit between Asia and Mexico, but the financial insolubility of galleon trade and the British occupation pushed open the door by 1762. Spain had sought to protect the galleon trade because silk and porcelain were exchanged for silver and other Mexican commodities, but limited exchange undermined its economic viability. The agricultural products of the Philippines soon found wider markets and greater profitability; manila rope, manila envelopes, and manila folders remain in our vocabulary today, although they are no longer produced from the rough fibers of Philippine abaca and hemp. Tobacco and sugar were important commodities in the export system, and soon Americans, British, Japanese, French, Belgians, Germans, and Dutch, among others, established banks, businesses, and homes in Manila.<sup>60</sup> This influx of foreign settlement and economic interest contributed to social and political changes, as well as evolving gender roles.

Foreign investors and trading companies began to appear in Manila around the mid-eighteenth century, creating an international city that blended East and West. The Spanish government began promoting new goods for export between 1750 and 1799, establishing a monopoly on tobacco and encouraging the production of sugar, cotton, indigo, cinnamon, pepper, iron, and silk.<sup>61</sup> Ligaya Lindio-McGovern observes that “export agriculture exacerbated gender and class stratification: women and men from the

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60. Legarda, Jr., *After the Galleons*, 7.

61. Owen, *Prosperity without Progress*, 34.

land owning class acquired more wealth and greater access to higher education, while female workers who produced wealth for the haciendas were doubly exploited as they did both productive and reproductive work.”<sup>62</sup> Under the direction of government companies, the role of many women shifted from local subsistence to engagement in world trade.

Women’s roles in the marketplace had precolonial origins, but in the late eighteenth century, wage labor assumed greater importance in Filipino society. From October to December of 1796, the Salem, Massachusetts-based ship *Astrea* lay in the port of Manila, while her captain and crew traded for sugar and indigo. The ship’s buyer, Nathaniel Bowditch, noticed that the natives chewed betel and also “smoke[d] a great deal of tobacco. The Segars [cigars] used by the women are as large as they can get into their mouths and five or six inches long.”<sup>63</sup> Both cigars and betel nut packages, or *buyo*, were almost exclusively made by native women, although *buyo* was sold on the open market by female entrepreneurs while tobacco sales were controlled exclusively by the Spanish government. The oversized Segars that Bowditch found so interesting were likely the result of the native women’s own activity in the vast government tobacco monopoly. Spanish companies believed women to be superior in rolling cigars and encouraged their entry into the factory system in 1782, solidifying a nascent working class engaged in wage labor.<sup>64</sup>

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62. Lindio-McGovern, *Filipino Peasant Women*, 29.

63. McHale and McHale, *Early American-Philippine Trade*, 44.

64. Maria Luisa Camagay, *Working Women of Manila in the 19th Century*, 4.

### **Equivocal Positioning: Race, Class, and Womanhood**

By the nineteenth century, Spanish colonialism had significantly changed Filipino life. Society was stratified by race and class and influenced by European experiences with revolution. Tagalog gender roles reflected a mix of indigenous culture, Catholicism, and international influence. Although women of all social classes held positions in business and wage labor, this public side was regulated by a paternalist Spanish law and religion that obscured aspects of indigenous femininity. Private interactions in Tagalog households and communities, though, often placed women in control of resources, gave them a sense of autonomy, and sustained indigenous culture, even among the most visible manifestations of Spanish patriarchal power. Scottish entrepreneur Robert MacMicking observed this dynamic contradiction while living in Luzon from 1848 to 1850:

Most of the priests I have been in contact with appeared to be thoroughly convinced of, and faithful to, their religion in its purity. . . . This is not so . . . among the Mestizo and native Indian priests, whose education is worse, and ideas of religion much more vague, incorrect, and superstitious than those of the Spaniards; and sometimes, in the country parishes, an Indian or Mestizo padre is found openly living in the convent with his mistress and natural children. . . . This state of things however, is not the general state of the Church, although it may but too frequently be met with. . . . In many cases its existence can scarcely fail to be known to their bishops; and is not considered by the laity as being particularly scandalous, their notions on the subject being somewhat indefinite. . . . I have been in a convent where the priest, his mistress, and family all lived together, the padre being a Mestizo. On the village feast day . . . the padre . . . gave a great party to all the Spaniards, or white men. . . . Several Spanish ladies were present, and among them, quite as a matter of course, was the mistress of the priest. One or two of the ladies present were wives of high officials at Manila, and all of them were persons of the best character and standing, yet they did not appear the least discomposed by her presence, although none of them paid her any attention, or noticed her as the lady of the house . . . this may give some idea of their modes of thinking of such affairs, for all of them present perfectly understood the relation in which the spiritual advisor of so large a population as Mariquina stood to her. Both the priest and she were elderly people, and their intercourse, I understand,

has been of long standing, and during the course of it several children have been born.<sup>65</sup>

Although the sexual exploitation of native women by White Spanish priests caused considerable protest and resistance, the case of this Mestizo padre and his unnamed mistress is illustrative of different values and ideals.<sup>66</sup> As historians Caroline Brewer and Vicente Rafael have asserted and as MacMicking saw firsthand in the “incorrect” and “superstitious” religion of the Mestizo priests, native animism and customs mingled with Spanish Catholicism, rather than being subsumed by it. The native clergy were, at mid-century, actively struggling with the Spanish friars for equal status as part of a larger populist discontent spurred by rural economic conditions and a persistence of traditional culture.<sup>67</sup> MacMicking saw the relationship between the Mestizo priest and his partner as a function of their indigeneity, distinct from the behavior of the White Europeans. The feelings of the upper-class Spanish women toward the native women were clear, but they were expressive of race and class differences as much as they were a judgment of the sexual position of the priest’s companion. MacMicking had more difficulty interpreting the attitude of the native parishioners; he recognized that they were not offended by the sexual relationship, but otherwise could not, or would not, illustrate the indigenous viewpoint, perhaps because their permissiveness challenged his own White Protestant ethic. The duration of the couple’s relationship, their ability to raise children and run a

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65. MacMicking, *Recollections of Manila*, 60-61.

66. For discussions of the sexual exploitation of native women by Spanish clergy and the politicized antifriar movements, please see Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*; Corpuz, *Roots of the Filipino Nation*, 152-154.

67. Iletto, *Pasyon and Revolution*, 8.



household within the community, and their willingness to host social events together, suggests an openness regarding the woman's sexual choices, a persistence of Tagalog femininity, and the struggle to meet practical and strategic gender needs despite colonial boundaries in the more obviously racialized class structure.<sup>68</sup> In her relationship with the priest, this woman met her practical needs such as housing and food and obtained a certain amount of security. Although she was not accepted by the Spanish upper class, she was able to strategically assert her own position in the native community under the power of the local priest and raise her children as part of the mixed-race middle class.

The conflation of race with class created a gendered borderland where mixed-race populations struggled to obtain a sense of place. *Peninsulares*, Spaniards born in Spain, constituted the upper classes, followed by a middle class of Spanish *insulares*, who were born in the Philippines, and *mestizos*, who were of mixed Spanish descent. Chinese-Filipinos, also called *mestizo sangley*, and native Filipinos, or *indios*, were on the bottom of the colonial social scale, although Chinese mestizos often represented a segregated, but wealthy, merchant class. Fedor Jagor, a German traveling through the Philippines in the 1870s, observed:

Many of the mestizas are extremely pretty although their gait drags a little, from their habit of wearing slippers. As a rule they are prudent, thrifty and clever business women, but their conversation is often awkward and tedious. Their want

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68. Practical gender needs are the needs that women (and men) identify in their socially accepted roles in society. They do not challenge, although they arise out of, gender divisions of labor and women's often subordinate position in society. They are practical in nature and primarily concern living conditions, such as water, health care and employment. Strategic gender needs are the needs individuals, particularly women, identify because of their subordinate position in society. They vary according to particular contexts related to gender divisions of labor, power, and control, and may include such issues as legal rights, domestic violence, access to resources, and women's control over their bodies.

of education is, however, not the cause of this latter failing, for Andalusian women who never learn anything but the elementary doctrines of Christianity are among the most charming creatures in the world, in their youth. Its cause lies rather in this equivocal positioning; they are haughtily repelled by their white sisters, whilst they themselves disown their mother's kin.<sup>69</sup>

Jagor's description of "equivocal positioning" highlights the complex power structure that set a large population of mixed-race Filipinos apart in colonial society. Indigenous women in the Philippines represented an essential element in developing a middle ground of dynamic relationships where power was negotiated between Europeans and natives, and like native women in other borderlands, they were important agents of both cultural mediation and cultural identity (see Figure 4).<sup>70</sup> Both marriage and concubinage were common among Tagalog women and European men, but there were fewer intimate engagements between indigenous men and European women. Mixed-race men, while forced into a subaltern position by the colonial structure, nonetheless assumed a higher position in the patriarchal middle class, and their households were more homogenous as they married native and mixed-race women. This imbalance effectively guaranteed a conflict of gender needs across the race-class continuum.

Equivocal racial and class positioning made the gender power structure in the Tagalog region of the Philippines relatively unstable, with competing femininities and masculinities constantly in opposition. MacMicking, always the keen observer of sexual impropriety, saw this friction in the concubinage of native women: "When a native beauty forms such a connection with a white man, her relations do not sunder all former

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69. Jagor, *The Former Philippines*, 22.

70. See White, *The Middle Ground*; Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men*.



*Figure 4. "HIGH-CLASS TAGALOG GIRLS: Women of this class understand the art of entertaining perfectly, and converse as fluently as the educated women of civilized countries. The mantles shown in the photograph are made of the elegant pina cloth, richly embroidered by hand, this work being done by the ladies themselves." 1899. Source: The New York Public Library.*

ties existing between her and them, by casting her off, but on the contrary are, as frequently as not, highly pleased at it, viewing the affair in the light of a fortunate marriage for her. These feelings, however, are not universal, for some of the richer class of Indians would be highly displeased with a female relation forming such a connection.”<sup>71</sup>

Men and women, having diverse ways of seeking identity and social stability and distinct means of meeting practical and strategic needs, contextualized these intimate relationships differently. Additionally, the needs of indigenous, European, and mixed-race men and women varied. Spanish men drew advantages from the accessibility of native women and their ability to mediate relationships with the local populations, while native women could find upward mobility for themselves and their children, challenging native men in this social positioning. This competition was embedded in the most basic social functions and extended into the American period, as Don Victor Buencamino y Abreu remembered from his childhood in Manila. In the 1880s, his mestizo aunt, who was married to a Swiss businessman, drove every evening with “high society” in the area of Manila known as the *Luneta*, where there were “two well-defined groups, one consisting of the families of Spanish descent . . . and the other consisting of the Filipino principalia . . . such as ourselves,” with each group trying to “outshine one another.” His Aunt Adelaida, for her purposes, employed a “full-blooded” Spanish driver for her carriage, but changed tactics during the American occupation, when she “got a huge American Negro.”<sup>72</sup> Adelaida’s quick adaption to racialized symbols of dominance

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71. MacMicking, *Recollections of Manila*, 47.

72. Buencamino, *Recollections of the American Regime*, 72.

indicates a sensitivity to fluctuations in social norms, reflecting the equivocal positioning that necessitated constant maintenance. The friction between indigenous and European masculinity and femininity, propagated always by the possibility of restacking the unstable power structure, provided a foundation for gendered resistance as nationalism evolved in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Whereas the racialized social hierarchy was empowered by a colonial government that regulated land ownership and access to resources, gender inequality was enforced by laws that emphasized patriarchy.<sup>73</sup> The Spanish Civil Code traces its roots to Roman law and governed family and property in the Philippines, ensuring that “in every case, the wife shall follow the condition of the husband, and the children, not emancipated, that of their father.”<sup>74</sup> Some Filipinos belonged to the landed elite (*principalia*) or the middle class (*ilustrados*), and many of these families educated their male children in Europe, a system that excluded females from scholarship. This patriarchal structure gendered Filipino resistance even in the prerevolutionary era, largely separating elite male strategic thinkers from the wider female population. As anticolonial sentiment rose, the disconnections based on class and gender became more apparent, with male ilustrado reformers seeking ways to improve the colonial government, while a segment of working class revolutionaries, aided by a large female auxiliary, sought Philippine independence. Although a sense of nationalism was slowly developing, nurtured in many ways by the position of the mixed-race middle class, these social differences and the varied goals for

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73. Feliciano, “Law, Gender,” 549.

74. Walton, *The Civil Law*, 124.

Philippine government often prevented cohesion among the Filipino people, until the 1872 Cavite Mutiny laid the foundation for the Philippine Revolution of 1896.

### **Moving Toward Revolution**

A workers' strike at the naval shipyard in Cavite led to the arrest of three native priests, Mariano Gomez, Jose Apolonio Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora. Known collectively as *Gomburza*, the three priests were publicly executed by Spanish officials. This event deeply influenced leaders such as Jose Rizal and nurtured a nascent sense of national identity and patriotism among Filipinos, sparking a more organized political resistance. The Propaganda Movement soon emerged from the mingling of liberal Filipinos exiled to Europe after the executions and Filipino students studying abroad. These reformers hoped to effect changes in colonial policy from the Spanish government and secure representation for the Philippines in the Spanish parliament. Despite the desire for reform rather than independence, Propaganda leaders were often arrested by Spanish authorities. In 1887, when Rizal returned to the Philippines after writing his controversial anticolonial novel *Noli Me Tangere*, he was forced to flee prosecution, first traveling to Europe and then to Hong Kong. Again expatriated, Rizal continued to support growing Filipino nationalism and lead the reform movement from abroad, writing extensively on liberal and progressive ideas of individual rights and freedom. During this time, his friend and fellow Propagandist, Marcelo H. Del Pilar, entreated him to address a group of young women who had publicly requested access to education in defiance of the local Catholic friar, an event that pushed the Philippines closer to revolution by further articulating the distance between the Filipino people and the colonial system.

In a calculated maneuver on December 12, 1888, twenty-one elite young Chinese-Filipino mestizas from the town of Malolos, Bulacan, approached Spanish Governor-General Valeriano Weyler and presented him with a letter asking permission to attend Spanish classes. The Spanish parish priest objected and the governor-general turned down the petition. However, the young women continued their agitation for the right to attend school and improve their status through formal training in the Spanish language, a privilege generally denied to Filipinos by Spanish colonial policy. The women finally succeeded in obtaining government approval for their project on the condition that a female teacher would provide the instruction.

The incident caused a strong nationalist response, and the Propagandists capitalized on the women's small victory over the Spanish friars to push their own agenda. Del Pilar, writing in Barcelona, requested that Rizal send a letter in Tagalog to the women of Malolos. Rizal, who as an author had defined colonial femininity, responded with a missive that was intended to further shape the nature of Filipino gendered nationalism and resistance, outlining his views of female roles:

Now that you have responded to our first appeal in the interest of the welfare of the people; now that you have set an example to those who, like you, long to have their eyes opened and be delivered from servitude, new hopes are awakened in us and we now even dare to face adversity, because we have you for our allies and are confident of victory. No longer does the Filipina stand with her head bowed nor does she spend her time on her knees, because she is quickened by hope in the future; no longer will the mother contribute to keeping her daughter in darkness and bring her up in contempt and moral annihilation. . . . And, why should you submit to another your thoughts, seeing that thought is noble and free?<sup>75</sup>

While Rizal's view of female roles was somewhat conventional, with its references to maternal responsibility for education and opposing the abuses of Spanish friars, this

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75. Rizal, "A Letter."

direct appeal to women helped set a precedent. Over the next fifteen years, Filipino strategic leaders would attempt to shape the nature of gendered resistance, moving from Rizal's notions about creating a free society through feminine enlightenment to attempts to militarize women as combatants.<sup>76</sup> The social position of Tagalog women, coupled with their importance as wage laborers and property owners, made their participation essential.

Filipino women could not be excluded from any reform or revolutionary movement because they wielded significant power within the family, and perhaps more importantly, represented a large sector of the economy. Despite Spanish colonial paternalism, the native women of the nineteenth-century Philippines were conspicuous, constantly observed as the center of both the household and local business.<sup>77</sup> Although Chinese merchants and Spanish monopolies dominated large-scale and international exchange, the local economy was driven by female industry and property ownership.<sup>78</sup> Tagalog women dominated certain professions in line with Western perceptions of gendered work, including midwifery, teaching, prostitution, and domestic service, but they also formed the crucial foundation of factory labor, textile manufacture, market vending, and shopkeeping, which had a broader societal and political impact.<sup>79</sup> Although marginalized from the central government, Filipinas, as business managers, controlled

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76. Taylor, *Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 4, 174; Ibid, 546.

77. The Philippine Information Society, "The Superiority," 59; Hannaford, *History and Description*, 48-49.

78. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission*, Vol. 2, 341.

79. Camagay, *Working Women*, passim.



their own capital and represented their own interests in court, exercising a visible public presence.<sup>80</sup> Women often turned to the justice system to redress commercial and financial grievances, with many of these cases involving the arbitration of interpersonal relations, suggesting an adaptation of babaylan principles that placed Tagalog females in the role of interlocutor or mediator. This financial autonomy and capability in juridical negotiations was coupled with a high degree of physical mobility, making gendered nationalism and outreach to women an unavoidable aspect of the Filipino movement toward revolution.

Female power intersected directly with revolution after Rizal returned again in 1892 to create La Liga Filipina, a nationalistic civic organization for Filipinos desiring to reform the colonial system, bringing the islands another step closer to revolution. The Spanish government exiled reformist Rizal to Dapitan, effectively undermining La Liga Filipina, but other, more radical leaders stepped into the void left by Rizal's departure. Most significant, Andres Bonifacio soon reorganized La Liga Filipina into the revolutionary group *Katipunan*, including an active female auxiliary that participated directly in revolutionary activities in accordance with the society's founding ideal that women were partners in life's hardship.<sup>81</sup> Forming the base of the Filipino Revolutionary Movement, the Katipunan was a secret, working-class organization formed around more militant ideals of independence that soon garnered substantial support among the Tagalog population.

Dissent between *Katipunaneros* led to their discovery by Spanish authorities, sparking the Philippine Revolution. Fearful of Spanish retribution, the exposed

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80. Bankoff, *Crime, Society*, 57-58.

81. de Jesus, *Mga Tala*, 2; Corpuz, *Roots*, Volume 2, 251.

Katipunaneros tore up their *cedulas* (a document that served as a certificate of identification, residence, and proof of paying one's taxes,) and precipitously initiated war against Spain on August 23, 1896. The Filipino forces were ill prepared to face the Spanish Army, but provincial uprisings spread throughout the Philippines. In Cavite, ilustrado Emilio Aguinaldo lead the resistance, while revolutionary leaders Macario Sakay, Apolonio Samson, and Faustino Guillermo began organizing armies in central and southern Luzon, taking the offensive against the Spanish at San Mateo (Figure 5). Spanish Governor-General Ramon Blanco declared a state of war in Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas, and attempted to quash the rebellion by arresting and executing suspected insurgents, including Jose Rizal.<sup>82</sup>

From the beginning, the Katipunan was fragmented, making it less effective against the Spanish. Aguinaldo, the young mayor of Kawit, earned an early military victory over the Spanish General Aguirre at Imus on September 5, 1896, propelling him into a more important leadership position. His Cavite-based Magdalo faction of the Katipunan found itself in opposition to the Magdiwang group headed by Bonifacio's uncle-in-law, Mariano Alvarez. Although his base of power was in the province of Cavite, Aguinaldo issued appeals to the broader Filipino population, exhorting them to follow European and American models of independence. Finding success in both his political and military roles, Aguinaldo began undermining Bonifacio's Katipunan leadership and creating a new framework for the Filipino revolution.

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82. Constantino, *A Past Revisited*, 177.



*Figure 5. Emilio Aguinaldo. Source: Courtesy of the New York Public Library.*

Aguinaldo and his cousin Baldomero Aguinaldo, as leaders of the Magdalo faction, recognized the operational problems associated with disunited autonomous guerrilla bands. In other areas of Luzon, the Katipuneros were routed by the Spanish because of ineffective planning, uncoordinated movements, and isolated initiatives.<sup>83</sup> As Glenn May has shown, Aguinaldo attempted to move away from the traditional Tagalog *pulong*, or collaborative leadership, utilized by Bonifacio, and establish a centralized

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83. Baclagon. *Military History of the Philippines*, 28-38.

military organization. Whereas Bonifacio held lengthy meetings (also referred to as *pulong*) that offered all members a voice in the consultative solution, Aguinaldo tried to address practical problems of military leadership by establishing a command hierarchy. The *pulong* and kinship networks, however, were very much entangled with cultural constructions of the ideals of masculinity and men of prowess. Individuals and leaders found it difficult to relinquish their access to these expressions of manhood and power, and although Aguinaldo's centralization efforts met with some success in Cavite, his attempts to create a larger-scale unification failed.<sup>84</sup>

Aguinaldo and Bonifacio soon established rival governments. In a compromise election, Aguinaldo was chosen as president; he then quickly arrested Bonifacio and had him executed. Spain saw the Filipino leadership weakened and utilized the opportunity to launch an offensive against the revolutionary army. Just days after Bonifacio's death, the Spanish retook Imus and moved on Cavite. Aguinaldo's army was left in shambles, and he retreated to Batangas, where he joined with Gen. Miguel Malvar. The combined forces of Malvar and Aguinaldo were again defeated by the Spanish at Talisay on May 30, 1897. The Spanish overwhelmed the Filipino nationalist army, and Aguinaldo retreated again. Although independent units continued to oppose the Spanish, Aguinaldo himself surrendered under the pact of Biak-Na-Bato and was exiled to Hong Kong in December 1897, leaving behind scattered pockets of armed resistance bolstered by the Kaitpunan's remaining female auxiliary. Although these locally supported guerrilla bands continued fighting, Aguinaldo took with him key strategic leaders and a Spanish payoff of 400,000 pesos when he left the country.

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84. May, "Warfare by Pulong," 464.

The deported revolutionaries were received by the Hong Kong Junta, a group of Filipino expatriates responsible for intelligence and diplomatic communication during the Philippine Revolution and the Philippine-American War. Hong Kong was the primary location for Filipino resistance abroad and the de facto site of international relations for the first Philippine governments; its close proximity to Manila, and the protection granted to political refugees by the British colonial government, made it an ideal choice for such activities. Working from this international trade center, the Filipino revolutionaries could easily contact other foreign agents, facilitating both diplomatic exchanges and the purchase of weapons and supplies. Persecuted Filipinos had begun fleeing to Hong Kong after the Cavite Mutiny in 1872, seeking a haven for their anticolonial activities, and by the time Aguinaldo arrived in late 1897, had established a wide network of political contacts. Aguinaldo and his compatriots quickly established a base of operations to smuggle arms, food, clothing, and medicine back to the Philippines, where the revolution was still being actively fought. During this time, the Filipino leaders also worked to establish diplomatic ties with the United States, Japan, and Great Britain in an attempt to legitimize their nascent government, with only limited success, until the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898. At that moment, U.S. strategic objectives coincided with Filipino revolutionary goals, creating the intersection of American counterinsurgency and Tagalog gendered resistance.

### **Conclusion**

The intersection of gendered resistance and counterinsurgency during the Philippine-American War reflects the development of Tagalog society through the nineteenth century. Despite changes to native culture wrought by Spanish colonial rule,

the importance of Tagalog women and indigenous femininity remained evident in barangay economies and household management, undermining the presumed supremacy of man-to-man relations in the daily administration of village life. In many ways, colonial labor systems reinforced women's traditional position as breadwinners and controllers of family capital, albeit in more private manifestations, as Tagalog social structures adopted European models of asymmetric gender relations. Concepts of prowess, consultative leadership, and female autonomy persisted in Philippine cultures, however, with varying degrees of visibility, despite changes in governance and religion. These cultural and religious transformations gradually altered, but did not completely destroy, the equiarchy of precolonial gender power structure. Indeed, the roles of women accommodated the colonial social structure by reconstructing traditional displays of independence, sexual agency, and power that were contrary to European gender norms and Catholic dogma into more subtle, concealed forms.

The traditional Filipino concept of men of prowess ultimately identified cultural constructions of masculinity without contradicting the presence of female power alongside it because kinship networks developed through ambilineal ties and remained essential to power and social hierarchies. This structure enabled Tagalog women to pursue practical and strategic gender needs despite equivocal racial position, shaping their own environments in a variety of ways within externally imposed power structures. Gender roles and modes of community authority were evident in Filipino revolutionary activities, particularly the tensions between Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo as Aguinaldo moved away from consultative leadership toward Western philosophies of centralized power to create a strategic perspective for the revolution. The American

counterinsurgency would react to these aspects of Tagalog culture as it continued to shape the opposition. The precolonial Filipino way of war, which emphasized control of populations, did not disappear, so villages were often abandoned while the people of the barangay fled to avoid capture, even during nineteenth-century uprisings. This created a durable pattern of wartime behavior. Negotiating relationships during conflict was not perceived as defeat, but rather as part of a traditional means of creating power networks, with implications for American tactics and Tagalog resistance.

Violent and visible manifestations of opposition, including revolt, rebellion, and protest, are just one side of resistance, a complex apparatus that communicates dissension within a power hierarchy. Particularly in the Philippines, widespread revolution was the rare exception, whereas local uprisings and everyday struggles represented the most common forms of bottom-up resistance, evidenced by the centuries of anticolonial activities. Threats of reprisal shaped these modes of behavior and often forced resisters to remain invisible in the interest of personal security; such actions cannot be overlooked as legitimate resistance, particularly in the context of counterinsurgency where dissimulation, slander, false compliance, and sabotage are historically the tools of guerrillas and insurgents. The statutes of General Orders 100, as well as cultural biases, insured that resistance was gendered during the Philippine-American War, with the legitimacy of opposition very clearly defined along male/female boundaries. However, competing masculinities and femininities intensified the character of resistance even before the onset of American influence in 1898, with Filipino strategic leaders acknowledging the importance of women to the Revolution and encouraging gendered participation in resistance activities throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Foremost among the early supporters of female resistance was Jose Rizal, who laid the foundation for women's participation in the broader struggle. Although Rizal's view of female roles was conventional and Western influenced, with its references to maternal responsibility for education, his direct appeal to women helped set a precedent for later revolutionary leaders like Bonifacio and Aguinaldo. Beginning in the 1890s, Filipino strategic leaders would attempt to shape the nature of gendered resistance, moving from Rizal's notions about creating a free society through feminine enlightenment to attempts to militarize women as combatants. The social position of Tagalog women, coupled with their importance as wage laborers and property owners, made their participation essential. Filipino women could not be excluded from any reform or revolutionary movement because they wielded significant power within the family, and perhaps equally important, represented a large sector of the economy. Despite Spanish colonial paternalism, the native women of the nineteenth-century Philippines were conspicuous, constantly observed as the center of both the household and the local economy. Yet, the patriarchal structure gendered Filipino resistance even in the prerevolutionary era, largely separating elite male strategic thinkers from the wider female population. As anticolonial sentiments rose, the disconnections based on class and gender became more apparent, with elite Filipino men struggling to appeal to larger female populations. This groundwork deeply influenced both Filipino and American strategic and tactical development during the Philippine-American War.



## CHAPTER FOUR: GENDERED SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

American historians typically divide the Philippine-American War into four distinct periods, beginning with the U.S. military occupation of Manila from August 14, 1898, to February 4, 1899, as part of the capitulation of the Spanish-American War. According to the current historiography, this interlude of uneasy peace erupted suddenly into a conventional war with the Filipino forces on February 4, 1899, and ended November 13, 1899, with the defeat of the Philippine Army of Liberation. At that point, Aguinaldo formally transformed his conventional army into a guerrilla organization, initiating a period of Filipino guerrilla warfare and American counterinsurgency that lasted until the United States declared victory on July 4, 1902. A postwar constabulary phase suppressed remaining uprisings, reducing armed resistance to isolated events and focusing Filipino opposition on political change. The length of the constabulary period is open to debate, but most historians believe it was complete by 1917.<sup>1</sup> This periodization, however, serves to artificially separate the Philippine-American War from the Philippine Revolution, while at the same time overlooking dynamic elements of the gendered insurgency and counterinsurgency that occurred in the struggle for legitimacy between American and Filipino forces, which began as soon as United States engaged in Philippine politics. The Philippine-American War is better explained by the three phases of insurgency utilized by U.S. Army doctrine.

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1. Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 87-88, 130-131; Linn, *The Philippine American War*, passim; Linn, *The United States Army*, passim; Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, passim; Taylor, *Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 2, passim; Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, passim; Coats, "The Philippine Constabulary, 1901-1917," passim.

Insurgencies are unique and dynamic, often defying categorization, however the three phase model allows analysts to identify the power structure and contextualize the actions of the opposing sides. The first phase is “latent and incipient,” wherein the insurgent leadership builds an organization, recruits fighters, and seeks domestic and international support, while the constituted authority begins counterinsurgency operations. As these preparations evolve into armed conflict, the insurgency enters the second phase, guerrilla warfare. If the guerrilla campaign is successful, the government is destabilized and the insurgency empowered, resulting in a transition to conventional warfare and the third phase of conflict, a “war of movement.”<sup>2</sup> Not every insurgency passes through all phases of development, the stages may occur out of sequence or overlap, and if the insurgency loses power, it might withdraw into an earlier stage of development. Many insurgencies never reach the third phase, but the Philippine Revolution did, and it was at this point that the United States intervened.<sup>3</sup>

As part of the U.S. strategy in the Spanish-American War, the U.S. military supported an already advanced insurgency in Philippines, utilizing Filipino irregulars as surrogates to depose the Spanish government. This cultivation of insurgency is known today as unconventional warfare, a staple of U.S. Special Operations missions abroad. In 1898, however, it was a much less developed concept, without supporting doctrine or even a good name.<sup>4</sup> The American military soon found itself on Philippine soil with their insurgent partners, engaged in what amounted to an ill-defined stability mission in a

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2. U.S. Army, *FM 3-05.201*, 1-7.

3. Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis*, 3.

4. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts*, 9.

rapidly changing operational environment.<sup>5</sup> Relations between the two forces were never better than uneasy, and indeed, the United States always defined and treated the Filipinos as “insurgents,” simply shifting their own operational posture from that of ally to that of prevailing authority as the policies evolved.<sup>6</sup> The gendering of this military mission was essential to U.S. dominance and an important factor in preventing Filipino insurgents from progressing into state actors.

Protecting women was central to the military mission for both Filipinos and Americans, and each side tried to leverage ideals of military manhood to improve their position and assert political control. The protection and exploitation of the female civilian population was a transnational military and diplomatic issue in the surrender of Manila, becoming an immediate site of contestation where the United States was able to assert dominance and prevent Filipino insurgents from gaining legitimacy. Prior to the war with Spain, yellow journalists inflamed the American public by portraying the Spanish as violators and “outragers” of women.<sup>7</sup> This propaganda provoked an aggressive masculine response, constructing feminine security as fundamental to the U.S. mission abroad. One

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5. Joint Publication 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.” *Stability Operation*: An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

6. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, Williams to Cridler, March 27, 1898, 651; Merritt to AG, July 25, 1898, 781; miscellaneous correspondence, August 1898 to February 1899, 784-917.

7. *New York Journal*, “Butchered 300 Cuban Women,” November 30, 1896; Richard H. Davis, “Does Our Flag Shield Women?” *New York Journal*, February 12, 1897; Campbell, *Yellow Journalism*, 11.

reporter proclaimed, "Imagine any one of the hundred inhumanities and atrocities toward women which characterize the Spanish race being duplicated under the rule of an Anglo-Saxon nation. Impossible! No wonder so many frightened refugees look upon the American army as their deliverance."<sup>8</sup> The U.S. mission to take and hold Manila became centered on providing gendered security, while the Filipino strategy focused on developing a conventional military as a demonstration of power. However, the poorly resourced Philippine insurgent government relied on female participation to bolster its conventional capabilities and resorted to gendered tactics, undermining the country's position in the international hierarchy. The exploitation of masculinities and femininities shaped the contest over legitimacy and dominance, as well as the nascent American counterinsurgency.

### **War of Movement**

With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in April 1898, Emilio Aguinaldo believed that Philippine independence was attainable. Admiral George Dewey defeated the Spanish Navy in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, established the United States' Asiatic Fleet at Cavite, and there awaited the arrival of the Eighth Army Corps from the United States to begin an offensive against Spanish-held Manila. Spanish forces and Filipino revolutionaries had been battling for two years in the provinces, with escalating violence as both sides became increasingly desperate. In February, the hospitals were filled with wounded from daily battles that devastated civilian bystanders, and in March, a group of 74 unarmed Tagalogs at a church holiday were surrounded and summarily murdered by

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8. *The New York Times*, "A Spanish Woman's Terrible Experience! The Difference Between Spain's Brutality to Women and Anglo-Saxon Humanity," July 31, 1898.

police and military.<sup>9</sup> Oscar Williams, U.S. Consul in Manila, observed on May 12, “deaths have been many greater among the natives, first because the Spaniards have been much better armed; second, because the Spaniards killed many noncombatants—old men, women, children.”<sup>10</sup> Amid these reports, the U.S. Consul in Hong Kong, Rounseville Wildman, met with Emilio Aguinaldo and facilitated his return to the Philippines, initiating what would soon become a tense three-way struggle for power between the Spanish, American, and Filipino forces. The details of Aguinaldo’s agreement with the United States have been obscured by participants’ conflicting claims; however, it is clear that both sides hoped to use the other to their own advantage against Spain.<sup>11</sup> To that end, the U.S. Navy repatriated Aguinaldo and his troupe from Hong Kong to Cavite, Philippines on May 19, 1898.

Baldomero Aguinaldo, commander of a local Cavite militia unit and soon-to-be Philippine Secretary of War, sent a cautionary dispatch to his cousin Emilio the same day, warning that the exiled leader’s impending “arrival put us as well as our families in a dangerous situation.”<sup>12</sup> Baldomero entreated Aguinaldo to act decisively and suggested that the initial attacks should occur in Binacayan, Kawit, and Novaleta to

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9. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, 652.

10. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Vol 2, 718-719.

11. Wilcox, *Harper’s History*, 83-87.

12. Philippine Revolutionary Records, Philippine National Library, 603/3, Baldomero Aguinaldo to Emilio Aguinaldo, May 12, 1898. For English translation, see Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, 28.

“protect the concealment of our families.”<sup>13</sup> Aguinaldo did move quickly to consolidate the Filipino military and establish government rule through a short-term dictatorship, installing himself as the supreme commander.<sup>14</sup> Binacayan, Kawit, and Novaleta were among the first towns to be secured under the new government, while provincial militia commanders across the islands continued bloody offensives against the Spanish.<sup>15</sup>

Historian Brian Linn considers the decision to focus on the provinces to be “a serious military mistake.”<sup>16</sup> Manila was seemingly a more important strategic target, and in early June, the Spanish were weakened and demoralized. Had Aguinaldo concentrated his forces on the Spanish stronghold then, he might have taken Manila, denied the Americans access, and firmly established the Filipino government in the capital. By the end of June, however, the Spanish were entrenched around city, the U.S. Army had arrived, and the opportunity was lost.

The “military mistake” is not as clear as Linn suggests, however. Aguinaldo was returning to his center of gravity and building upon the remnants of his military machine in Cavite, an act that may well have been a sound decision given the state of the revolutionary forces at the time.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, Baldomero Aguinaldo’s concerns about

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13. Philippine Revolutionary Records, 603/3, Baldomero Aguinaldo to Emilio Aguinaldo, May 12, 1898.

14. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, 31-35.

15. Baclagon, *Military History*, 49.

16. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 23.

17. The *center of gravity* is a Clauswitzian concept, defined by the U.S. military as “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” (Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2008.) Thus, the center of gravity is usually seen as the “source of strength.”

protecting families proved genuine. Reports of civilian deaths and Spanish “barbarities” in the provinces were urgent, and gendered security drove Filipino strategic policy just as it influenced the United States’ approach.<sup>18</sup> In the wake of Aguinaldo’s arrival, Spanish forces placed women and children at the head of their column to cover their withdrawal from Angeles and burned the town of Bacolor to the ground.<sup>19</sup> Deeply rooted cultural ideas about kinship, *pakikipagkapwa tao* (group identity and empathy), the need for prowess, and geography all factored into Aguinaldo’s decision making process.

Moving on Manila would have necessitated drawing partisans away from their home regions, which were under threat from the Spanish, a task that was probably not feasible given the autonomy of local revolutionary leaders and the pressure to protect women and children. The dictatorial government’s hold on these independent units was only through Aguinaldo’s prowess and network; commanders from the area outside Cavite tended to see themselves as cooperative “partners” and not a part of a centralized hierarchy.<sup>20</sup> Realizing the limits of their forces, Baldomero had hesitated to forward Aguinaldo’s military instructions to some municipal captains, believing it placed an unfair burden on the people, who lacked the means to defend themselves and their families.<sup>21</sup> Aguinaldo himself would potentially have undermined his own power by denying protection to his kin network. Like the local militia leaders, he was culturally

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18. Center of Military History, *Correspondence*, Volume 2, 649.

19. McCutcheon, “The Siege of Manila,” 39.

20. Wilcox, *Harper’s History*, 67; May, “Warfare by Pulong,” 467.

21. Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 603/3, Baldomero Aguinaldo to Emilio Aguinaldo, May 12, 1898.

invested in extended kinship ties, influenced by *hiya* (an internal and external sense of shame), and subject to Tagalog concepts of power that emphasized earned leadership by men of prowess. Although Aguinaldo was a proponent of centralization, the *pulong* (consultative leadership) was still culturally respected, and the obligation to heed advice from his supporters was substantial.

Linn perceived Aguinaldo as the perpetrator of “grievous military errors” and a “litany of blunders” because he was “unable to place national interests above personal gain.”<sup>22</sup> Given that the Philippine bid for freedom was unsuccessful, hindsight of course exposes strategic and operational alternatives. To understand this initial phase of indigenous resistance, the question becomes one not of motivation but of failed strategy. Aguinaldo was responding to political exigencies of national independence more pragmatically than Linn’s analysis would suggest. Linn cited the failure to take Manila in May 1898 and the dedication to conventional war as crucial mistakes—which they certainly were—but neither of these actions can be fully understood outside the context of sociocultural constructions of power. Aguinaldo and the revolutionary leadership were clearly pursuing a long-term grand strategy focused on gaining international recognition for the Philippine government, one that was responsive to the U.S. posture.<sup>23</sup> Diplomatic recognition, and thereby independence, was, they thought, unquestionably tied to the conduct of a “modern war” that would place the Philippines “on a level with civilized

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22. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 323.

23. Mactal, *Hong Kong Junta*, 7-20; De Ocampo, *First Filipino Diplomat*, 70-73; Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 468/7, Emilio Aguinaldo to Foreign Consuls, August 1898; Agoncillo, *Malolos*, 310.



people.”<sup>24</sup> They were not mistaken. The observer community they hoped to engage included the United States, England, Germany, France, and Belgium, all members of an international power hierarchy influenced by White Western masculinity. White civilization and military manhood that exalted conventional warfare as symbols of power were indeed central to their politics.

Aguinaldo therefore prioritized the consolidation of a conventional army and implementation of a central command that could regulate its conduct under the international laws of war, providing essential security. In this effort, Aguinaldo’s strategic goals were firmly in line with the existing international politico-military values, rather than strictly a matter of self-interest. Aguinaldo and his compatriots exerted substantial effort to construct Filipino “civilization” through a well-developed propaganda apparatus emphasizing republican government, military virtue, and compliance with Western ideals, while at the same time attempting to initiate the social changes that would make these claims reality.<sup>25</sup> Had the Dictatorial Government been able to achieve diplomatic recognition, Manila would have belonged to them without a costly offensive, and Aguinaldo’s would have significantly extended his network, empowering the national republican reforms he had been seeking since 1896.<sup>26</sup> His failure seems not to have stemmed from the overall strategic vision, but his inability to overcome deeply entrenched cultural constructions of both global and domestic power, efforts that were effectively stymied by U.S. diplomacy and a nascent counterinsurgency.

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24. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, 29-30.

25. Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 102.

26. May, “Warfare by Pulong,” 463.

Despite shortages of funds and materiel, however, Aguinaldo was able, for a short time, to meet the expectations of the international community by drawing on civilian resources to support his conventional army at the tactical level, unintentionally maintaining the Revolution's gendered framework for the future guerrilla conflict.

Although imperfect, the conventional military structure in Cavite provided the foundation for Aguinaldo to pursue the government's grand strategy. Throughout the first part of his tenure, Aguinaldo repeatedly issued orders for officers and men to comply with international laws of warfare, while at the same time directly asking foreign powers to recognize Philippine independence.<sup>27</sup> International observers gave Aguinaldo little encouragement, and he was repeatedly denied direct access to Western leaders in the Philippines, who felt that even the most benign audience would implicitly recognize the dictatorial government. Aguinaldo continued his previous policies, emphasizing the protection of prisoners and private property, criminalizing the plunder and rape of Spanish noncombatants, and ensuring the security of the Red Cross, all with an eye toward influencing world opinion.<sup>28</sup> Treatment of Spanish prisoners and casualties fell under the Geneva Convention and proved one of the first significant issues in the Philippine government's efforts to wage a "civilized" conventional war.

The successful accommodation of hundreds of Spanish prisoners was critical to international relations and prevented an immediate humanitarian crisis that would have undermined the fledgling Filipino government. President William McKinley was still

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27. Philippine Revolutionary Papers, 468/7, Aguinaldo to Consuls, August 1898.

28. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 3, 34, 38, 40, 46.

uncertain about the military mission in the Philippines, and the administration seemed to sway between objectives, alternately ordering the possession of the Islands and denying the expectation of military conquest.<sup>29</sup> Aguinaldo's government sought to influence the decision-making process, but his negotiations with the U.S. Navy placed him in a delicate position. Dewey publicly claimed the Navy did not have the resources to care for the Spanish prisoners and placed the burden entirely on Aguinaldo, while at the same time making it clear that continued goodwill from the United States depended on their "civilized" treatment. He also invoked the specter of international censure with an implicit threat of U.S. intervention should the "nations of the civilized world" hold the United States "morally responsible" for allowing Aguinaldo to continue the Revolution.<sup>30</sup> The solution emerged in an ad hoc fashion, demonstrating the position of gendered negotiations and practical gender needs as they traversed the tactical and strategic levels.

In Tayabas, where there were large numbers of prisoners, Juliana Lopez y Basa, a prominent businesswoman, suggested that "all Spanish prisoners and strangers who did not have families in the provinces would be divided into groups" and kept in local homes.<sup>31</sup> Lopez y Basa helped organize the effort with other Red Cross women throughout Tayabas, assuming responsibility for two soldiers and an officer herself. The

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29. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 5-6.

30. *New York Times*, "Many Spaniards Captured," June 7, 1898, 2; *New York Times*, "Chief Aguinaldo Means To Rule; Asks For An American Protectorate For The Philippines. Victorious Over Spaniards Governor General Wanted To Surrender, But Was Dissuaded. Attack On Manila Expected At Any Time—Three Local Governors Among About 2,000 Prisoners," June 8, 1898, 2; *New York Times*, "Spain Demands Reply, American Troops Said to Have Mutinied Inquiry as to Spanish Prisoners in Philippines—Sensational Report Regarding U.S. Soldiers," January 14, 1899, 1.

31. Berthelson, *The Tayabas Chronicles*, 146.

family reconstructed part of their house to provide a secure location for the detainees and personally supplied most of the furnishings and food, an effort that would last over a year; during operations in the area in 1900, the Americans observed that “when the cavalry reached Tayabas, these prisoners were distributed in small groups among the surrounding barrios.”<sup>32</sup> The sheer number of Spanish refugees precluded the detention of them all in private homes, so municipal buildings and convents were converted to prisons. Aguinaldo stressed that prisoners were to keep their money and private property, and his efforts, although not entirely successful, at least proved practical when they were. Local market women set up trade outside the prisons, providing prisoners with food and other essentials, and foreign correspondents reported that conditions were good and the prisoners well provided for.<sup>33</sup> In September 1898, the Vatican and other European powers urged the United States to investigate the status of prisoners, particularly the friars, and Gen. Elwell Otis responded that they “were fairly well treated,” resulting in a public relations coup for Aguinaldo.<sup>34</sup> The Filipino government, because of its strapped treasury and tenuous position in the power struggle, depended on gendered resources to diminish the immediate danger of being delegitimized, and this reality placed the government in an unstable position. The billeting of the Spanish prisoners proved problematic, however, for just as militia leaders perceived themselves as independent partners, the female population also acted autonomously in response to local conditions.

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32. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports*, Vol. 1, Part 5, 405.

33. McCutcheon, “The Siege of Manila,” 39; Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection*, Vol. 2, 93.

34. Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, 538.

The exclusion of Tagalog women from political and military positions gendered civilian support for the insurgency, just as it gendered resistance. The distinction between support for the insurgency and resistance to American domination is important because, although the actions and consequences might overlap, the motivations were different. As Juliana Lopez y Basa and the market vendors illustrate, participation in the conflict typically occurred within socially defined gender roles and in response to gender needs. Aid to the revolutionaries was rendered for a variety of reasons. For elite women like Basa y Lopez, the success of the insurgent effort was likely important to their beliefs about changing colonial society and their own place in the racialized social and political structure. Philippine independence addressed strategic gender needs, improving the equivocal positioning of wealthy mixed-race women by promising to eliminate the colonial caste system. For the *vendadoras* (market women), however, participation was largely the result of fulfilling practical gender needs, such as selling out their inventory and making a little money to support their family. Women chose their own means, place, and time to engage in such activities, resulting in a contest between the armies to control these actions. Support and resistance during the Philippine-American War would continue to emerge from distinct, and often independent, motivators. Mass mobilization of women was less common than individual responses to specific needs, although strategic-level Filipino leaders would make efforts to win and maintain the loyalty of the female elite through promises of reform and attempts to provide essential security through a series of gendered maneuvers.

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