
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TOURISM AS A FORM OF DEMOGRAPHIC IMPERIALISM: A COMPARISON OF THE BAHAMAS AND VIRGIN ISLANDS

By

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A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

TOURISM AS A FORM OF DEMOGRAPHIC IMPERIALISM:
A COMPARISON OF THE BAHAMAS AND VIRGIN ISLANDS

By

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Tourism exemplifies the development of the service sector and contradictions of state capitalism in the periphery. In the Caribbean region, the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands became two of the pre-eminent destinations for international travelers. As a consequence of the extraverted growth associated with the expansion of tourism and their intensive economic articulation with the United States, these microstates achieved two of the highest per capita incomes in the region.

Due to the inequality between the center and the periphery in the world system and the cleavages of race and class within social formations, tourism and the immigration entail an unequal exchange of populations. The author constructed a theory of demographic imperialism to analyze the population dynamics within an unified political economy framework. The primary sociological research procedures were comparative and documentary methods supplemented by field work in the Caribbean.

The author concludes that tourism in the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands has had several serious, negative long term effects. 1) The socioracial stratification patterns differed from those of the other West Indian social formations prior to the tourist era, but the early influence of the tourist trade Americanized race relations. 2) In the world system, the islands performed the economic function of "off-shore consumption platforms." Consequently, immigration from the center and the periphery was a countervailing force that reconstituted a rigid, three tier, socioracial structure which corresponded to the international division of labor. 3) Additionally, these social formations were becoming increasingly stratified along the overlapping dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and class. This tendency was most vividly observed by the segregation in "lindurbs," a new form of urbanization accompanying tourism development exemplied in Freeport, Grand Bahama Island and Virgin Islands National Park, St. John. 4) Despite significant differences in political status, tourism was making both of the island archipelagos more dependent upon the United States and intensifying underdevelopment. Without structural changes and a new orientation of tourism policies, such as banning cruise ships and suspending subsidies to the private tourist sector, these trends are likely to continue.

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an appreciation for social history, the excitement of rediscovering a past frequently overlooked by mainstream social scientists, and the necessity to marshall solid evidence. Additionaly, Richard was a constant source of encouragement and consolation.

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My apologies are extended for the unintentional omission of persons and friends who contributed to the endeavor, and for any factual or typographical errors in this manuscript's content.

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Part One

INTRODUCTION

"Problems of Third World Development"

The most ominous factor undermining attempts to achieve independence and development in the Third World has been the rise of new forms of exploitation and domination within the global capitalist economy. One of them is tourism ... [which] in all its aspects is proving to be one of the new areas of expansion of the imperialist economy. It is a new way of confirming the dependence and subjugation of Third World economies, being seen in its most arrant and vicious forms in the Caribbean Territories.

Walter Rodney
(1981: 119-120)

Chapter One

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOURISM AND ITS LESSONS

Compelling Reasons

Analyzing the ramifications of tourism in two Caribbean microstates during a time of world economic crisis is in itself a luxury. However, the goal of this dissertation is to 1) demonstrate that the tourism, as a form of demographic imperialism, is a major factor in promoting societal change today, 2) identify the most significant changes, and 3) explain how those changes are produced. These objectives are accomplished by comparing the dynamics and effects of the tourist economies of the Bahamas and Virgin Islands.

There are at least four compelling reasons to compare the socioeconomic impact of tourism in the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands. On the most general level is the evaluation of tourism development as a strategy for economic growth. Prior research suggested that enormous changes had occurred in the structure of former plantation economies in the Caribbean with the ascendancy of tourism following World War II. While the author was greatly influenced by George Beckford's book, Persistent Poverty (1972), it was apparent that the plantation

model was no longer applicable to the Bahamas or the Virgin Islands. Although the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands were as frequently mentioned as proof of the success of the tourism model as they were cited for its negative effects, no equivalent to Beckford's work evaluated the role of tourism within the context of the development/underdevelopment process. Thus, one contribution would be to resolve the contradiction between the economic indicators and subjective appraisals cited to promote tourism and the theoretical critiques and social problems attributed to tourism in the attempt to resist such development.

Another reason was the discernible trend toward polarization between whites from North America and Europe and blacks from the West Indies, and the displacement of the indigenous black population. Social problems related to tourism in the Caribbean island microcosms are similar to those posed by tourism in larger social formations, but due to the islands' size, location, and history, certain problems may appear sooner or in an accentuated form which make the phenomena easier to apprehend. Once again, the most credible explanation of race relations in the Caribbean, Slavery and Race Relations in the Americas (Hoetink 1973), did not seem applicable to the contemporary situation in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands.

The search for a way to comprehend the change in socioracial structures was facilitated by borrowing from the theory and data of the African Diaspora (Hamilton 1982). To answer the questions regarding the diverse population groups--Who were present in the islands? What were the circumstances of their arrival? And under what kind of conditions did they live?--necessitated combining tourism and immigration conceptually. This reconciliation, in addition to addressing the economic function of the islands in the social hierarchy in the world system, was achieved in the chapter, "A Theory of Demographic Imperialism." Adapting the analytical concepts of the mechanism of geosocial displacement and the double bond of race and class from Hamilton (1982) to include the mechanism of confinement and the dimension of geopolitical origin respectively, the theory of demographic imperialism was applied to analyze the social impact of tourism in the islands. Additionally, two neologisms were coined; "offshore consumption platform" for the new economic function that the islands' tourist economies perform and "LINDURB," an acronym for leisure industry urban system, for the corresponding spatial form assumed.

The third reason that motivated the comparative aspect of this research was the opportunity to examine differences in dependency. World systems and dependency

literature often approach unequal exchange and structural deformation on a global scale or focus on a single social formation's history, but seldom compare two nations/colonies in depth. Thus, the investigation of the politically independent Bahamas and the politically dependent Virgin Islands, helped to determine the manner in which constitutional status affected the impact of tourism in these dependent economies.

Finally, the conflict and change experienced in the Caribbean during the early 1980's have elevated the islands from the travel pages to the front page of the news. From the Cuban and Haitian refugees to the military invasion of Grenada, the Caribbean peoples have been thrust into the center of American political debate. If for no other reason, the strategic importance of the Caribbean islands and peoples and the centrality of tourism to these islands warrant a deeper understanding of tourism dynamics.

If combat troops occupying a Caribbean island were a more blatant intrusion than than the hordes of tourists, the invasion of Grenada suggests a lesson about the nexus between these two forms of imperialism. The first is the signal sent to any other tourist destination contemplating an economic future as other than a puppet of American capitalism. Not only would that effort meet with destabilizing propaganda and economic sanctions

that would cripple the tourist industry, but also would invite overt military action.[1] The second lesson is that the psychological dependence displayed by the Grenadians in welcoming the American "liberators," apart from the media hype and winners' posturing, is exactly the type of behavior that tourism requires and creates. Obsequious, friendly "natives" will keep the American tourist dollars coming in and American compensatory aid flowing.

The tourist industry has lobbied hard to convince Third World governments that tourism will modernize their countries. The glamour of luxury hotels, sparkling new airports, and recreational resorts especially appeals to officials who identify more strongly with rich tourists than with their own impoverished compatriots. It is an industry built on dreams crafted by Madison Avenue and sold to the governments as well as the tourists. Yet instead of the demonstration effect instilling the desired "achievement motivation," it spreads discontent by creating demand for luxury commodities without the access to wealth (Rivers 1973: 539-540).

---

[1]The only large hotel on Grenada, a 210 room Holiday Inn, mysteriously burned in October, 1982 puting it out of commision and thus hurting the island's number two industry which was already suffering from adverse politically oriented travel articles attempting to dissuade American tourists from going to Grenada.

Similarly, Roszak has written about underdeveloped countries importing a vision of life from the developed countries,

> Or consider the poor countries that sell themselves to the international tourist industry in pursuit of those symbols of wealth and progress the West has taught them to covet: the luxurious airports, high-rise hotels, six lane motor ways. Their people wind up as bellhops and souvenir sellers, desk clerks and entertainers, and their proudest traditions soon degenerate into crude caricatures. But the balance sheet may show a marvelous increase in foreign exchange earnings (Roszak 1975: 7-8).

Unfortunately, the imported visions did not meet their expectations and other unexpected imports changed the impact of tourism.

An Alibi for What Went Wrong

Because the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands have been so preeminent in the tourist industry, the controversy surrounding the problems in the islands has been duly recorded in the travel and financial sections of the U.S. press. Although the Bahamas and Virgin Islands remained the two most popular destinations in the Caribbean after Puerto Rico, the exponential growth in tourist arrivals stopped in the 1970's. Previously, the Virgin Islands had the highest per capita income in the Caribbean at $5,050 (1975) and its population growth between 1970-75

was the highest in the Western Hemisphere at 8.9 percent. Similarly, the Bahamas was second in both indicators with a GNP per capita of $3,110 and an average annual population growth rate of 3.8 (World Bank 1977: 20).

However, by 1980 while the Virgin Islands still ranked first among Caribbean islands in per capita income, the Bahamas had dropped to sixth place; population growth between 1970 and 1980 had tapered off to 4.4 percent per year for the Virgin Islands and 2.2 percent per year for the Bahamas. Even with the reduced population growth rates, the GNP failed to keep pace and for the same time period the Bahamas had the second worst GNP per capita growth rates after Dominica, averaging a negative 2.9 percent annually, and the Virgin Islands had the fourth worse after Jamaica, averaging a negative 2.3 percent (World Bank 1983: 24).

Two events in particular are still singled out for the steep downturn in the economies. Both were connected to the tide of Black nationalist movements sweeping the West Indies during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The bad publicity from the 1972 killing of eight persons (seven whites) by Black Muslims in St. Croix at the Rockefeller owned golf resort of Fountain Valley has become the standard explanation for the Virgin Islands haphazard economic performance. In the Bahamas the uncertainty about the black nationalist party coming to power in

1967, and especially the subsequent revocation of authority over immigration decisions from the private Freeport concessionaire in 1970 and then independence in 1973 are ritualistically recited as having driven away tourists and investors. This mythology has been used to discipline workers and discourage radical political action.

Situating the Bahamas

The Bahamas became an independent country in 1973, ending 344 years of British sovereignty. As shown in Figure 1, twenty-nine islands and over 600 cays comprise this archipelago nation that stretches 760 miles from Florida to Haiti in a parallel fashion to Cuba.[2] The islands total surface area of 5,380 square miles (13,935 square kilometers) is slightly larger than Connecticut. The population of 209,505 was just above that of the city of Lexington, Kentucky. In 1953 when the census last enumerated race, 86.8 percent of the population was reported to be of African descent.


There are seventeen major inhabited islands. New Providence, where the capital Nassau is located, contained

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[2]The thirty Turks and Caicos Islands which forms the southeastern end of the Bahamas archipelago were part of the Bahamas colony until 1848, but today remain a British colony.

FIGURE 1

THE BAHAMA ISLANDS



sixty-five percent of the population. Another sixteen percent lived on Grand Bahama where the Freeport resort/industrial enclave was created in 1955. Andros, the largest island with forty-three percent of the Bahamas surface area, accounted for only four percent of the population. All of the islands other than New Providence and Grand Bahama were designated as out-islands, but are now called "family islands" in the tourist promotional literature. One of them, San Salvador (originally called Guanahani), was the first landfall in the Western Hemisphere of Columbus' expedition in 1492.[3] Since 1967 when the black political movement ousted the white oligarchy known as the "Bay Street Boys" from power, the Progressive Liberal Party has been led by Lynden Oscar Pindling. His tenure in office ranked third in the Americas behind Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay and Fidel Castro of Cuba. The Bahamas did not consider itself a Third World Nation and only sent ambassadors to London, Washington, and the United Nations. In December 1982 the Bahamas joined the Organization of American States.

---

[3]By virtue of Columbus' geographical error, the Bahamas became part of the West Indies. In spite of being eligible for the Reagan Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Bahamas are in the Atlantic and not the Caribbean.

Situating the Virgin Islands

The Virgin Islands is an "unincorporated territory" of the United States under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior since 1931.[4] The northern most of the Lesser Antilles, the Virgin Islands is a chain of forty islands and cays forty miles east of Puerto Rico (see Figure 2 below), and contain an area of 130 square miles (342 square kilometers) or about the size of the New York City boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan combined.[5] The islands were purchased from Denmark in 1917 for $25 million. The purchase was justified by considerations of naval defense: to prevent the rumored German occupation and thus a threat to the shipping lanes to the Panama Canal. As a vestige of the U.S. Navy's rule from 1917 to 1931, the Virgin Islands' flag is a modified Navy ensign.

The 1980 population of 96,569 was approximately the same as Miami Beach or Glendale, Arizona. The bulk of the population lived on three islands--St. Croix (51.5 percent), St. Thomas (45.9 percent) where the political


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[4]Unincorporated territory was the status conferred by the Congress upon its newly acquired colonies as sort of an apprenticeship position. Only selected parts of the U.S. constitution apply; the rest is mandated by Congress and implemented through local legislation.

[5]Geologically, the Puerto Rican islands of Vieques and Culebra, and the sixty British Virgin Islands are part of the same archipelago, but the colonial fragmentation resulted in even smaller geopolitical units.

FIGURE 2

THE VIRGIN ISLANDS



center of Charlotte Amalie is located, and St. John (2.6 percent). The 1980 census reported the black population to be 79.7 percent.

In 1978 it was estimated that forty-two percent of the population were native born Virgin Islanders. In 1984 the Governor was Juan Luis, a Puerto Rican born on Vieques and elected as an Independent. The non-voting Delegate to the U.S. Congress is Ron de Lugo, a Democrat born in New Jersey and also of Hispanic descent. The question of political status has been subjected to referendums four times since 1954 and all attempts to approve documents to establish a constitution for the Virgin Islands have been rejected or passed by such a narrow margin that it was not forwarded to Congress. Consequently, the Revised Organic Act of 1954 with amendments remains the chief constitutional instrument for government.

Comparative Statistics

The small size of these islands in terms of population, surface area, and gross national product relegates them to micro or mini-states in the terminology of poli-

tical scientists.[6] Also evident in the indicators presented in Table 1 below is the similarity in the relatively low amount of arable land, the small percentage of workers in the extractive or primary sector, and the negative rates of economic growth during the last decade. Although the Virgin Islands had a higher population growth rate and GNP per capita, the Bahamas' had more potential for development due to its closer distance to the U.S. markets and stronger agricultural base.

The Bahamas by virtue of their Atlantic location and proximity to the Untied States were customarily not included in the rest of the British West Indies while a colony. At one time the Bahamas was part of the grant made to the Proprietors of the Colony of South Carolina. Like the Bahamas, the circumstances of the Virgin Islands also permitted them to be pulled more easily into the U.S. political economic orbit.

First, the sole Danish colony in the West Indies was carved out of Spanish, British, French, and Dutch holdings, and Denmark never imposed a distinctly Danish culture equivalent to its European counterparts. The

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[6]One of most severe limitations of the Caribbean islands is their very small size. Cuba, which has the largest surface area, is about the size of Pennsylvannia. The land mass of the Bahamas is about one-nineth the size of Cuba and the Virgin Islands is even smaller. Regarding population size, the smallest European nations represented in the United Nations are Malta and Luxembourg, both with populations of over 400,000.

TABLE 1

A COMPARISON OF THE BASIC DATA FOR THE BAHAMAS AND VIRGIN ISLANDS

	Bahamas	Virgin Islands	Year(s)
Population	209,505	96,569	1980
Rate of Growth (%)	2.2	4.4	1970-80
Surface Area (km.2)	13,935	342	
Land Use (%)	100.0	100.0	1976
Arable land	14.7	0.1	
Permanent crops/ pasture	29.4	1.1	
Forest/woodland	5.9	23.2	
Other land use	50.0	47.8	
Water, swamp, etc.	--	27.8	
Gross National Product ($ million)	730	540	1980
GNP Per Capita ($)	3,450	6,520	1980
Rate of Growth (%)	-2.9	-2.3	1970-80
Labor Force by Sector	100.0	99.9	1970
I	7.0	1.4	
II	17.6	21.7	
III	64.8	63.8	
Unemployed/not stated	10.6	13.0	
Official Unemployment Rate	12.0	6.0	1980
Distance Miami to (Kilometers)	Nassau 304	Charlotte Amalie 1,781	
Cost of Roundtrip Air Fare from Miami	$96	$372	1982

Source: Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1981: 2: U.S. Department Commerce 1983: 55-5; World Bank 1983: 24; United Nations 1977: 48-49; and International Labour Office 1977.

Danes further weakened their influence by abandoning mercantilist protectionism and declaring St. Thomas the first free port in the Caribbean in 1766. Second, settlement by Dutch planters and French peasants and British and American traders helped make the Danish West Indies the only West Indian colony whose most prevalent language was not the official one--first Dutch papiamento, then English became the lingua franca prior to the United States takeover. Therefore, the 1917 official transfer to the United States, merely facilitated the Virgin Islands' disengagement from Europe. Since the 1970's the United States has received more than ninety percent of the exports from both the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands. The similarities of the Bahamas and Virgin Islands notwithstanding, comparative study of these two microstates' economies reveals crucial differences in the nature of political and economic dependency.

Synopsis of Remaining Chapters

The remaining chapters elaborate upon the issue of tourism as a form of demographic imperialism in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands. Part Two encompasses the theoretical and methodological issues which are organized in a sequence amenable to sociological analysis and a critical examination of the literature.

Chapter Two, "Tourism as a Strategy of Economic Development," reviews the literature related to the expansion of the tourist industry which occurred following World War II. Acknowledging the natural resource constraints which are limiting factors to Caribbean economic development, the primary attention is focused upon the underdevelopment process in which tourism assumes a dual cause and effect role. Tourism became an attractive investment possibility as a result of previous underdevelopment, but tourism in the periphery continued economic dependency upon the center and further underdeveloped the islands. It is observed that tourism has for the most part been overlooked by social scientists concerned with the proliferation of the service sector in the Third World. On the other hand, massive marketing campaigns have promoted tourism by emphasizing the underdeveloped ambience as the image of paradise. This idyllic and utopian image masks a reality full of contradictions--luxurious resorts constructed in the midst of grim poverty. Also discussed are the foreign investments that flow into the tourism sector in accordance with the profit accumulation criteria of transnational corporations. The latter dominate and control the lucrative business that is rapidly being concentrated and consolidated in the center. The last section specifically covers three negative features, cultural sub-

version, class polarization, and race and gender inequality.

Chapter Three, "The Sociology of Transitory Population Movements," traces the attempts of social scientists to conceptualize migrant and tourists as geographically mobile population groups. The limitations of the conventional approaches, such as their inability to bridge the transitory phenomena of tourism and migration, are presented. By considering the etymology of the terms, migrant and tourist, one gains insights into their common historical origin.

Chapter Four, "Demographic Imperialism and the Organizational Dynamics of Tourist Economies," advances the proposition that tourism in the center is the dominant force in reorganizing these two peripheral societies. It is argued that tourism, as a form of demographic imperialism, introduces new groups into the unequal exchange of populations, reinforces asymmetrical interaction, exacerbates inequality, and creates new patterns of stratification. Because the existing terms failed to adequately express the essence of the sociopolitical organization of tourism, two new terms are suggested. "Offshore consumption platform" describes the economic function in the new division of labor in the world system. "Lindurbs," Leisure Industry Urban Systems, represent the accompanying form of urbanization and transformation of space.

Part Three concerns the "Political Economy of the Bahamas and Virgin Islands." Chapter Five, "The Historical Background of Tourism in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands," begins with a narrative of 18th and 19th Century accounts of the islands' potential for tourism. Next, the early decline of the plantation economy in the islands is documented as is the early commercial articulation with the U.S. It is observed that once the Virgin Islands became an American colony, U.S. policy affected tha Bahamas and Virgin Islands differentially. The origins of the contemporary tourist industry are then sketched. A survey of the tourist data and other trade statistics confirms a similar pattern of economic dependency for the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands. However, the detailed analysis also reveals crucial differences betweem the island social formations due to political status.

In Part Four, the "Changing Socioracial Division of Labor," Chapter Six assesses "The Transition from Pre-Tourist Era to Tourist Era Socioracial Stratification." Hoetink's (1973) and Beckford's (1971) theories of West Indian stratification are critiqued and found to be inapplicable to the contemporary Bahamas and Virgin Islands. Additionally, the inadequacies of previous analyses of the Bahamas and Virgin Islands' socioracial structure are explained. By scrutinizing earlier patterns of stratification it was discovered that more complex relationships

than previously recognized also existed historically along the dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and class. Given the pervasive and profound influence of the United States in the region, the question of whether American tourism specifically or the more general American presence was responsible for imposing American somatic norms in the islands is considered. The final section provides the reader with a profile of the major immigrant and indigenous population groups.

Chapter Seven, "The Tourist Trade and Demographic Imperialism," rejects the simplistic explanation of rapid population growth as the primary reason for the problems reported by these tourist destinations. A critical evaluation of the policies, events, and social indicators for the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands discloses the substantial, pernicious impact of tourism. Gini coefficients are used to measure inequality in the distribution of incomes. Although tourism appears to be economically advantageous for the entire population, decomposing the gini indices and other measures of inequality demonstrate that a few segments benefit at the expense of the vast majority. Special attention is directed toward the three basic cleavages in the socioracial structure.

Chapter Eight contains two detailed case studies. The first investigates the immense private economic development project, Freeport, Grand Bahama Island. The contro-

versey over Freeport was a crucial factor in the political mobilization of black Bahamians and institutionalization of the "Bahamianization" of labor campaign which ultimately led to political independence. Despite the apparent success of the Bahamian government reasserting national sovereignty, Freeport retained its tendency for residential segregation in lindurbs and an hierarchical division of labor based on the three dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and class. The second case study, that of the Virgin Islands National Park on St. John, deals with the conservation oriented plan that should have been the antithesis of Freeport. However, the analysis indicates that the conservation efforts have had a similar effect in displacing Virgin Islanders with white residential tourists and in creating segregated lindurbs. The evidence suggests that international tourism may inevitably generate offshore consumption platforms and lindurbs as a result of the inherently unequal effects of demographic imperialism.

Part Five "Assessments and Conclusions" consists of Chapter Nine, "Demographic Imperialism Examined." First the form of demographic imperialism manifested in the tourist economies corresponds to a phase of underdevelopment which has been designated as "Afro-Caribbean Population Containment and Substitution." Following the discussion of the context of mass tourism in the Caribbean, the highlights of the investigation are recapitulated. The last

section considers several policies such as "work tourism"[1] that the author believes necessary to make tourism a viable developmental tool and thus no longer a form of demographic imperialism. However, the author takes a pessimistic view about the prospects of these changes being realized in the near future.

Appendix 1, "Comparative Methods, Documentary Research, and Data Collection," discusses the procedure followed from refining the topic to field work in the Caribbean, and the organization of the data. The primary sociological research procedures used were comparative and documentary methods. A retrospective description of the problems encountered in doing this research is also included.

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[1]Work tourism is a strategy proposed by the late Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop. He advocated a policy by which international tourism would be vertically and horizontally integrated into the local economy. Additionally, socially relevant tourism would seek tourists who were interested in observing and participating in the developmental problems of the islands. Bishop's alternative model runs counter to the trend for transnational companies to run islands as offshore subsidiaries oriented to processing the largest possible volume of tourists who are escaping reality in a tropical paradise.

PART TWO

THEORETICAL ISSUES

In the 1960s, spurred by jumbo jets, charter tours, and the growing influence of the middle classes in Western industrial nations, tourism erupted on a grand scale. This was seen as offering a new opportunity for Third World countries to secure foreign exchange and stimulate economic growth ... The end of the boom gave new urgency to existing concerns about whether tourism produced sufficient gains for developing countries to justify the investments required. In addition to doubts about whether tourism yielded economic returns commensurate with its economic costs, there was a general questioning of some of the basic assumptions about the relation between development and economic growth. In the case of tourism, these doubts were reinforced by the belief that it brings larger adverse social and cultural effects than does development of other sectors.

Emanuel de Kadt, Tourism--Passport to Development?

Chapter Two

TOURISM AS A STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

At the outset, it is incumbent to review the accumulated knowledge and consider the arguments for and against the tourist trade if one is to critically evaluate the impact of tourism. Because of the disparate conceptual elements, a political economy approach is used. This holistic epistemology conceptually unifies the complex configurations of social practices organized by the tourist industry in the capitalist world system during the late Twentieth Century. Ultimately, the following questions will be addressed: Has mass tourism been a viable economic development strategy to pursue? What kinds of changes have been observed that accompany the production of tourist services? In the future can policies be implemented to resolve the the social problems created by tourism?

The Phenomenal Expansion of the Tourist Trade

It is relatively simple to identify the factors that have enabled international tourism to rise from a fashionable activity restricted to members of the lei-

sure class to a $500 billion a year industry accounting for six percent of the gross world product (Lofting 1979: 5A). The labor movement succeeded in obtaining progressive measures such as paid vacations, the reduction in the work week, and earlier retirement age enlarged the sphere of free time. These now standard social practices, accompanied by an increase in the amount of disposable or discretionary income made the pursuit and consumption of leisure services available to a much wider range of the working class. Jet aircraft technology and low-priced air fares made overseas travel a competitive choice in the consumer's array of potential leisure activities. The transnational hospitality industry's organizational network, assisted by innovations in telecommunication systems, also facilitated the transition to an era of mass tourism. These events coalesced in the period following World War II and have continued to promote the expansion of tourism.

The degradation of work further contributed to the number of people traveling. According to one authority in the sociology of leisure,

> The work of production in the industrial plant of today, more fragmented and geared to a greater speed than in the Nineteenth Century is also far more exhausting to the nerves of the worker, so that they feel all the more a deep seated need for rest and escape from the job (Dumazadier 1958: 7).

The concentration of population, congestion, landscape, and pace of life in urban areas have resulted in additional pressure from which escape via travel to exotic destinations is a way to maintain the reproduction of the labor force and its ability to function in the work-a-day world. To assure that the alienation of workers and the need for escape is properly channeled into tourism, an estimated $713 million was spent on travel advertising in the United States and by American firms alone in 1977 (Travel Marketing Yearbook 1979: 107). The same year the World Tourist Organization placed the number of international travel arrivals to be nearly 300 million (Lofting 1979: 5A).

Usually, the early antecedents for mass tourism were related to pilgrimages to religious shrines (spiritual needs) or health spas (medical needs). In 1841 Thomas Cook became the first person to combine travel agent and tour operator services when he charted a train and led a group to attend a temperance convention in England. From this pioneering roundtrip journey of forty-four miles, the Thomas Cook Company became the largest travel services' business in the world before being taken over by Trust House Forte, an even more diversified company and the largest British hospitality conglomerate (Lundberg 1980: 106-109). Whether the need for self-actualization or simply the need to escape from the hustle and bustle of

Twentieth Century living is real or induced, travel has become a social necessity for millions of people.

The rise of tourism is part of of the more general proliferation of services. Services have become vital in performing intermediate functions of an increasingly complex social division of labor. The spread of services as commodities means that for the time in history all the branches of the economy are fully industrialized (Mandel 1978: 191, 383). According to Mandel,

> The logic of late capitalism is therefore the necessity to convert idle capital into service capital and simultaneously to replace service capital with productive capital, in other words, services with commodities (Mandel 1978: 307).

Not surprisingly, one witnesses a growing trend toward condominiums instead of hotels.[1] The recent introduction of Dunn and Bradstreet's electronic edition of the "Official Airlines Guide" makes it possible for individuals to use their personal computer to access the same information system used by travel agents. Soon, one will be able to select, print out, and pay for the ticket at home, thereby entirely by-passing the travel agent's services.

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[1] By 1983 the number of condos and housekeeping units in the Cayman Islands exceeded the number of hotels.

Geopolitical Constraints and Dependent Development

It has been argued that industrialization in the Caribbean region was impeded by the limited size of national markets and the constraints imposed on import substitution (Segal 1975: 6). Typically, these small islands, like other micro or ministate economies, are characterized by small populations, small land area, narrow production bases, diseconomies of scale, restricted number of export markets and import suppliers, and high vulnerability to natural hazards and global market fluctuations. In addition, the geographic isolation and economic remoteness of islands have actually been made worse by the deployment of the new shipping technology--container and cellular container vessels. This new mode of cargo transportation has centralized trade and the larger, longer range ships bypass the smaller islands (Legarda 1984: 42-43). However, conventional economists state that the ministates have an advantage in being predisposed toward a greater trade openess and would benefit from an even greater export orientation. Autarky is viewed as a hindrance to development in ministates (Galbis 1984: 38; and de Vries 1984: 40).

In this context, a prevalent notion exists that tourism is a preferred strategy for economic development

in ministates.[2] Tourism is seen almost as a panacea for the Caribbean islands with small population bases and limited natural resources. In fact, O'Loughlin suggested three alternatives for those islands whose size could not sustain the financial burden of government administration and services: 1) evacuation, 2) amalgamation, and 3) development to a point of viability. The third became feasible because many of the,

> small island were ideally suitable for the tourist industry. The world expansion of this industry has created a new resource base for them in which, in many cases, a sound development plan can be based with economic and financial viability as its aim (O'Loughlin 1962: 2-3).

Specific advantages of tourism development frequently cited are the creation of jobs in a region usually experiencing chronically high levels of unemployment, the generation of scarce foreign exchange and government revenues from the resources that do exist abundantly--the

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[2]In addition to developing tourism, a consultant to the International Monetary Fund has more recently advocated the diversification of small island economies into the dynamic sectors of light manufacturing for export, creating export processing zones, attracting foreign investment and multinationals, encouraging migration of excess labor, the setting up of offshore financial centers, and developing fisheries. Limitations such as the cost of trade infrastructure--credit systems, information and marketing networks, and shipping arrangements and other factors--location, labor, politics, environment, and culture might prevent some small island economies from entering the growth sectors. Of seventeen countries reviewed, tourism generated larger amounts foreign revenues than commodity exports and was, "responsible for dramatic increases in several small island countries..." (Legarda 1984: 43).

sun, sea, and sand--and the non-polluting nature of tourism in an era of rising environmental concern (Perez 1973-74: 473-475; and Turner and Ash 1975: 113-115). In short, extremely high benefits are to be gained with minimal costs enabling Third World ministates to play "catch-up" economic development.

Macroeconomic indicators have been used to demonstrate the success of the tourism-based model of economic growth. Indeed, the islands of the Caribbean already supporting a large scale tourist industry often exhibited a higher average per capita income than the other Third World Countries (Bryden 1973: 2). The two West Indian countries with the highest per capita income in 1975 were the United States Virgin Islands and the Bahamas at $5,050 and $3,110, respectively (World Bank 1977: 20). As measured by the number of visitor arrivals and the predominance of the tourist sector in the economy, the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands also have the most advanced tourist industries in the West Indies. As late as 1970 the Bahamas and Virgin Islands accounted for approximately one-half of all visitor arrivals in the Caribbean (West and Augelli 1976: 94).[3]

The growth of tourism also contributed to these two island archipelagos recording the fastest rates of population growth in the Western Hemisphere. Between 1960 and

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[3]In a recent article Agor still recommends the Bahamas as a model that can be transferred to other Third World economies (Agor 1980: 83-96).

1970 the Virgin Islands' population grew at an annual rate of 8.9 percent and the Bahamas' population increased at a 4.2 percent annual rate (U.S. Department of Commerce 1972: 55-11; and Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1976: 8). This population increase was a sharp contrast to most Caribbean islands that experienced a much slower rate of growth due to the high volume of emigration.

Yet the alleged success of tourism in the island mini-states and the importance of geopolitical constraints have been construed differently. From a dependency perspective, Thomas contends that size qualitatively effects the under-development process--the capacity to be transformed in the context of the world capitalist system and the material base of a given society.

> Smallness is not interpreted here as an attribute of material reality capable by itself of creating social forms. On the contrary, it is interpreted simply as constituting, in a certain sense, an additional dimension to underdevelopment...Smallness essentially manifests itself as one aspect of the context of relations between classes and groups in a society, and their own relationships to the material environment of their political unit. Smallness is therefore not the cause, but the spatial, demographic, and resource context in which social relations are formed and developed and the mode of production is organized (Thomas 1974: 30).

One of the reasons for the smallness is the political fragmentation of the islands in the region. According to Mintz,

> The smallness of these societies, and the distances which separate from each other have always militated against any integrated economic or political development, against federated solutions to regional problems, and against strong feelings of common identity, even in the face of commonly felt needs. The main reason, of course, for the lack of any regional coherence has been the complicated colonial history of each territory, the persisting influence of metropolitan power and the highly conflicting political pressures to which Caribbean peoples have been subjected for so long (Mintz 1974: 43).

Williams stresses that, in the present as well as in in the past, multinational companies operating across the artificial boundaries cast by the metropolitan powers take advantage of the fragmentation. As Caribbean countries compete with one another for economic aid, for new investment, for sheltered markets, for tourists, and even for emigration outlets for their surplus labor, dependence reinforces the isolation of Caribbean countries from each other (Williams 1970: 500).

Tourism and Underdevelopment: A Dimension of the Changing Global Division of Labor

Dependent Development

Dependency theory emerged in Latin America in the 1960's to explain the failure of the strategy of the export oriented economies supplying the needs of the industri-

alized nations to develop the periphery. To express the geopolitical manifestations of unequal power and trade relationships between the advanced capitalist countries and dependent Third World countries several metaphors have been used: Metropolis/Satellite (Frank 1969), Center/Periphery (Galtung 1971), and Autocentric/Extraverted accumulation (Amin 1976). The principal focus has been upon the implications of this asymmetry for the dominated countries in terms of their internal social relations, the generation of economic surplus, the way the surplus is distributed, and the stagnation experienced when the local economy's articulation with world trade abates.

Although considerable controversy surrounds the nature and historical stages of earlier mechanisms of control, a consensus exists regarding the post-World War II era. Galtung recognizes a change in the dominant form of dependency from colonial occupation to one of neo-colonial international organizations serving as the medium in interaction between the center and periphery (Galtung 1971: 94). Dos Santos states that,

> a new type of dependence has been consolidated based upon multinational corporations which began to invest in industries geared to the internal market of underdeveloped countries" (dos Santos 1970: 232).

Johnson seeks to demonstrate that,

> the incipient industrialization of Latin America has changed the character of dependence without fundamentally

> altering the basic fact of dependence itself (Johnson 1972: 232).

Amin concurs that transnational corporations are the dominant form; they impose a technological dependence and concentrate investments in a few high profit industries of the periphery.

Looking at the mining industry in the Caribbean, Girvan argues that a new model of industrialization exists for politically independent but economically dependent governments. Often in the form of joint ventures or state ownership, Caribbean governments underwrite the infrastructure costs, absorb the risks, pay for the technology, and assume responsibility for disciplining the labor force (Girvan 1976: 53). Trajtenberg observes that a third type of of capital penetration has taken the form of transnational corporations investing in certain countries for the manufacture of goods for export to take advantage of the low cost of labor (Trajtenberg 1978: 176).

De Janvry and Garramon specify two broad type of desarticulated economies as characterizing the totality of the contradictions of accumulation manifested in the periphery as follows: 1) export enclaves consisting of mines, plantations, and export industries; and 2) import substitution in which luxury consumption goods are produced locally behind protective tariffs for the bourgeoisie and landed elites (de Janvry and Garramon 1977: 32).

They also list three mechanisms of surplus extraction imposed by the dominant center over the periphery to counter

the tendency for the rate of profit to fall: 1) industrial and financial imperialism; 2) unequal exchange of commodities with unequal rates of surplus value; and 3) unequal trade or terms of trade against the periphery in which the prices of export commodities fall while prices of imported commodities rise. The export orientation is part of the new division of labor of production in the periphery for consumption in the center attributable to the transnational corporations' strategies. When the rate of profit is higher in the periphery than in the monopoly sector in the center the TNC's shift investments thereby transfering the contradictions of accumulation of the center to the periphery (de Janvry and Garramon 1977: 35-36).

Evans borrowing from Cardoso and Faletto's criteria of "associated development"[4] has introduced the notion of "dependent development",

> "...a specialized instance of dependence characterized by the association or alliance of international and local capital. The state also forms an alliance as an active partner, and the resulting alliance is a fundamental factor in the emergence of dependent development" (Evans 1979: 32).

Dependent development also implies the accumulation of

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[4]Associated development is distinguished by the following characteristics: 1) elevated level of economic diversification; 2) relatively reduced levels of repatriated profits; 3) specialized labor and development of tertiary sector; and 4) an emerging internal market capable of absorbing the production (Cardoso and Faletto 1973: 127).

capital and some degree of industrialization and diversification in the periphery according to Evans.

Formerly, Brazil was the model country that had avoided economic stagnation while still dependent. Not only the size of Brazil in terms of its human and natural resources is vastly different from the reality of the micro-territories of the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands, Brazil has been experiencing negative growth of the gross national product. Its enormous debt of $90 billion suggests that the growth achieved through foreign investments and government borrowing intensified the dependency relations and government economists freely admit that at most ten percent of the population benefited from the expansion.

While the dependent development apparently is a misnomer even for Brazil, the concept is even less applicable to the Caribbean islands. However, the triple alliance of private overseas and local capital and the active participation of the state accurately depicts the collaborating groups backing tourism. Furthermore, the one criteria of Cardoso and Faletto's that is relevant to the islands' experiences is the development of the tertiary sector that in turn is linked to an increased level of inequality in the dependent social formations.

Uneven Development and the Service Sector

In the periphery, the service sector expansion has been more pronounced or what Samir Amin refers to as the "hypertrophy of the tertiary sector" (Amin 1976: 236). The excessive growth of the tertiary sector is but one manifestation of the unequal international specialization according to Amin. His theory of the transition from a precapitalist subsistence economy to peripheral capitalism contains nine theses. Although Amin does not mention tourism, these nine theses capture the salient features of the transition to peripheral capitalist economies and are germane to tourist economies. They are summarized below as follows:

1. Destruction of crafts and agriculture without development of industrial production.

2. Unequal international specialization that produces distortions such as the confinement to export commodities and complementary production.

3. The hypertrophy of the tertiary especially apparent in the enormous growth of expenditures for government administration.

4. Investments in branches of light manufacturing with modern production techniques creating special problems.

5. Multiplier effects of investments in the periphery are dampened by various outflows of capital back to center.

6. The ideological hegemony of interdependence of international trade inhibits the periphery from acting against the foreign monopoly.

7. Structural consequences of underdevelopment include a) extreme uneveness in distribution of productivity in the economy; b) orientation of peripheral production to needs of center impeding the transmission of benefits from economic growth to the periphery's population; and c) economic dominance by the center dictates the specialization of the peripheral economy and creates dependency by investing in those specialized sectors.

8. Deepening underdevelopment as a result of extraverted growth lessens the possibility of autocentric and self-sustaining growth.

9. Lack of exclusivity of the capitalist mode of production, produces instead a social formation conditioned by its precapitalist mode and the manner of articulation in the world capitalist system (Amin 1978: 200-202).

It is uneven development--the non-industrialized landscapes and depressed wage levels that make the Third World attractive for investments in tourism development projects. According to Lenin,

> The uneven and spasmodic character of the development of individual enterprises, of individual branches of industry, and individual countries is inevitable under the capitalist system" (Lenin 1977: 62).

Trotsky in writing about uneven and combined development held that uneveness was the most general law of the historic process and was evident most dramatically in backward countries. Combined development referred to the fact that

external pressure forced countries to be inserted into different stages of the historical process. This combination of archaic and contemporary forms does not lead to repetition of the advanced societies. To the contrary, rapid changes in production techniques that were progressive achievements when transferred are adapted to strengthen the old order and thus retard development (Trotsky 1962: 265-266). Markusen more recently has noted that the three most common types of capitalist uneven development are 1) temporal, reflected by short and longer run economic cycles marked by crises; 2) sectoral, the imbalance resulting from unequal expansion of industries; and 3) spatial, the manifestation of the uneven progress of capital and capitalist social relations across regional and international boundaries (Markusen 1978: 40-41).

The hypertrophy of the service sector has resulted in the disproportionate number of displaced agricultural workers being absorbed in the service sector. The reason for this hypertrophy in Amin's judgement is the way that peripheral economies are integrated with the capitalist world market. He states that the articulation of periphery has three consequences expressed by the following: 1) competition by central countries' industry causes local capital to be funneled into commercial activities associated with export commodities; 2) the development of peripheral economies with a tendency to have excessive levels of employment in services with low productivity, a form of disguised

unemployment; and 3) the strengthening of ground rent position that encourages consumption of imported luxuries and local personal and leisure services (Amin 1978: 245-246).

Fiala and Ramirez following Cardoso (1982) argue that while foreign investment may result in dependent economies which exhibit short term growth in the gross national product and productive capacity for the world market, in the long run foreign investment has a negative impact on the structure of a nation's economy, policies, and labor force. Limits on the self-sustained economic growth and domestic accumulation are circumscribed by foreign capital. Repressive state apparatuses assume responsibility for implementing exploitation of their own people and resources under the auspices of national development. And the class structure is altered as the merchant bourgeoisie and privileged proletariat become linked to the transnational corporations' interests in profits and isolated from the rest of the working class and the developmental needs of the country. Consequently, these structural changes prevent sustained economic growth and egalitarian distribution of the surplus (Fiala and Ramirez 1983: 2-6).

Specifically, Fiala and Ramirez attempt to demonstrate that dependence shapes occupational structure through the expansion of the service sector and the informal sector. They contend that three factors account for this expansion: 1) lack of expanding factory sector and few dynamic

industries; 2) a skewed income distribution toward higher income groups; and 3) weak states unable to control investment (Fiala and Ramirez 1983: 9-12).

Unfortunately, they fail to establish any causal connection to the generation of low skilled, service sector and informal sector jobs. Additionally, like many other analyses of the third world service sectors, Fiala and Ramirez assume that an expanding service sector is a negative feature, thereby ignoring the tendency in the advanced industrial economies and possibly universal shift to service sector economies. A greater concern of this study is their lack of consideration of investments in a dynamic industry like tourism.

Even within their own framework, an analysis of foreign investments in the tourist trade and the limits of dependent economies discussed above would be more relevant for explaining the growth as well as the industrial crises. For example, foreign control of markets, a strong state apparatus subsidizing infrastructure, and employees who are dependent upon the disposable income of the American middle class accurately characterize tourist dominated economies. Moreover, tourism jobs are created directly unlike the residual or interstitial jobs of the informal sector.[5]

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[5]In the Bahamas the dominant informal sector activity was drug smuggling continuing the tradition of contraband trade of privateering, wrecking, blockade running,and rum running. The availability of the center's welfare system restricted the informal sector in the Virgin Islands.

The real question is not whether the low productivity of unskilled personal services and petty commerce generated by economic dependence inhibits economic growth or at best contributes little positive impact upon the economy as Fiala and Ramirez conclude (1983: 15-20). It is more meaningful to ascertain the manner in which direct foreign investment in the service sector differs from similar investments in the extractive or manufacturing sectors.

Evans and Timberlake make an even stronger case about the relationship between dependency and the service sector.

> [The] rapidly growing tertiary sectors, high levels of dependence on foreign investment, and high levels of inequality are empirically associated in the Third World Countries, or at least were empirically associated during the sixties (Evans and Timberlake 1980: 532).

While they acknowledge that some individuals in the informal sector make reasonable incomes and peasant agricultural workers who get jobs in that sector may improve their economic position, they also argue that the link exists between the tertiary expansion and inequality due to the following:

> 1) the polarization of income distribution within the tertiary sector and hence in the total income distribution.
>
> 2) a large mass of poorly paid, underemployed workers in the tertiary sector weakens the bargaining power of low skilled secondary sector workers.

According to Evans and Timberlake, these two factors result in higher levels of inequality among those nations

which have been more successful at pursuing a dependent development strategy. They refer to this pattern of growth as an "unequalizing spiral" producing a "twist in the Lorenz curve" so that the rich receive a larger and the poor a smaller proportion of the surplus. In their opinion, the growth of the tertiary indirectly exacerbates the effects of investment dependence on inequality in a country (Evans and Timberlake 1980: 534).

A major limitation of their analysis is that they ignore the sectoral composition of investment as well as the specific types of investments within the service or tertiary sector. Although Evans and Timberlake assert that a major reason for increasing inequality is the polarization within the service sector, in their analysis they fail to demonstrate how it occurs.[6] That a positive relation may exist between foreign investment and inequality or that disproportional increases in the tertiary sector labor force were related to the degree of dependency between 1950 and 1960 (Evans and Timberlake 1980: 538) is not disputed.

However, without controlling for the wide disparities within the tertiary sector or demonstrating how the income distribution of the tertiary sector vis-a-vis the income distributions of the other two sectors affects the overall

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[6]In their regression analysis a positive correlation between the expansion of the tertiary sector and the gini coefficients and income concentration among quintiles was the basis for their conclusion (Evans and Timberlake 1980: 540).

gini coefficients, it is an over generalization to conclude that greater inequality results from the expansion of the tertiary sector triggered by foreign investment.

Other studies have mixed results. Chase-Dunn found only weak statistical support that dependence, as measured by external foreign debt and direct foreign private investment, sustained income inequality (Chase-Dunn 1975: 733). Rubinson concluded that the dependence of economic production on external markets caused an increase in the degree of income inequality (Rubinson 1976: 655). In a cross sectional comparison of countries Weede's results led him to dispute those who contend that economic development does not lessen income inequality. Using an econometric or curvilinear function to specify the relationship between economic development (energy consumption per capita) and income shares, Weede discovered that economic development helped the middle two quintiles, hurt the top quintile, and had a negligible impact upon the bottom two quintiles (Weede 1980: 500).

Overall, the research literature suggests, with a few exceptions, that service sector expansion and inequality are associated with dependent economic growth. However, the studies which found a negative side effect of the service sector expansion do not consider direct foreign investment in a dynamic sector like tourism. Furthermore, because the studies use aggregate data without specifying the composition of the tremendously diverse service sector, the increasing

inequality may be due to intervening factors. On the other hand, there is little, if any, reason to assume that extraverted growth from direct investment in the service sector would differ substantially from industrial or extractive sector investments. Therefore, it is expected that tourism expansion is associated with increasing inequality.

The Changing Global Division of Labor

At a high level of abstraction tourism can be viewed as one of the latest manifestations of the international division of labor and the unequal exchange of commodities in late capitalism. One can trace the emergence of the Caribbean periphery back to embryonic development of the world economy. As the expanding European center forcibly incorporated non-European lands and peoples, the dominated social formations linked through long distance trade became specialized in a few commodities. This division of labor thus intrinsically exhibited a homologous specialization among racial/ethnic groups and geographic areas. Extraverted specialization lead to dependence often in monocultural production. As capital accumulation continues to be controlled by the center, the underdevelopment of the periphery also proceeds through the mechanism of unequal exchange (Wallerstein 1974: 84-87 and Amin 1976: 16ff).

The conjuncture of technological invention and economic growth in the center with the structural features of uneven development between the center and periphery--the large tracts of agricultural, forested, or otherwise non-urban or non-industrial built forms, large surplus population and low wages--facilitated the investments in tourism. The history of the Caribbean islands in general reflected the earlier division of labor that was formed during the embryonic development of the world economy. Wallerstein states the division of labor was effected between agricultural and industrial production as well as within agricultural activities (Wallerstein 1974: 84). Furthermore, the occupations were not randomly distributed ethnically or geographically. He summarizes this initial division as follows:

> After some false starts, the picture rapidly evolved of a slave class of African origins located in the Western Hemisphere, a "serf" class divided into two segments: a major one in eastern Europe and a smaller one of American Indians in the Western Hemisphere. The peasants of western and southern Europe were for the most part 'tenants.' The wage-workers were almost all west Europeans. The yeoman farmers were drawn largely even more narrowly, principally from Northwest Europe. The intermediate classes were pan-European in origin (plus mestizos and mulattoes) and distributed geographically through the arena. The ruling classes were also pan-European...disproportionately from Western Europe (Wallerstein 1974: 87).

These divisions in labor corresponded to geographical zones with a particular mode of labor control so that in the core wage labor and self-employment, the semi-periphery feudalism and sharecropping, and the periphery slavery were the best suited for the type of production carried out in the zone. Race and ethnicity became a central factor in controling labor legitimated by racist ideology, laws, and norms.

Portes and Walton argue that the internationalization of capital and labor migration, as in the Hawaiian case, has resulted in a shift from a mere geographical division of labor to a cross-national combination of labor processes that varies proportionally depending upon the particular country. They suggest that the professions, technical personnel, and management are core functions, labor intensive industrial jobs and the commercial and service sector are semi-peripheral functions and the periphery has the informal economy (Portes and Walton 1981): 190). They do not address the issue of race and ethnic cleavages or how this might complicate their tripartite scheme.

Because foreign investments are channeled into and dominate the growth sectors of the Third World, tourism has been a logical recipient of transnational company projects (Watson 1974: 6). An example of the transnational tourist industry in Fiji, a multimillion dollar resort hotel, indicates that an ethnic/racial division of labor

exists within the hotel itself. In a case study, Samy concluded that racial and ethnic criteria were prominent in determining the occupational distribution of the employees. Expatriate Europeans filled the management and reservations positions, East Indians worked in the accounting, building and ground maintenance, and the kitchen, while native Fijians were hired in the highly visible or direct contact jobs of reception, front office, porters, security, tour guides, dining room, room cleaning, switchboard, and bands (Samy 1977: 111-121). Hawaii has continued its practice of importing cheaper labor from the Pacific during its tourist expansion. Performing a similar function in the Pacific for the U.S. West Coast that the Caribbean Islands do for the East Coast,

> thousands of Filipinos are entering Hawaii annually along with a sprinkling of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Pacific Islanders to fill the dirtiest and most ill-paying jobs available in the hotels (Kent 1977: 198).

The international division of labor or in this case leisure assumes the patterns of other types of global trade and dependency. The majority, approximately eighty percent of international tourism, is transacted between advanced capitalist countries of Europe, North America, and Japan. The remaining twenty percent originates in the center and the periphery is relegated to receiving international tourists. According to Hector, the relationship between dependency and tourism,

> is a question of an industry, particularly in the Caribbean, fundamentally linked to the dynamics of the world capitalist system in its double aspect of the international division of labor and merger-concentration-accumulation. A corollary of this axiom: in its local impact in the industrial form or national industrial branch, tourism is a decentralized activity with regard to the national economy of the host country in such a way it engenders or accentuates deformations and distortions in the interior of the latter, in the last analysis, reinforces the general structure of dependence (Hector 1978: 3-4, author's translation).

The implications are cogently described in the following manner:

> Caribbean tourism is dependent upon a supply of North American and European visitors. The flow of these visitors is controlled by metropolitan institutions which choose to send them to the Caribbean rather than some other destination. This is done through marketing devices: package sales made possible by wholesalers and tour operators who can pull the plug of Caribbean tourism at any time. This means that Caribbean tourism as a whole is controled by external actors, including foreign airlines, tour operators, major hotel firms, and others (Mathews 1978: 38).

Formal political ties also contribute to the dependency syndrome because the former or present colonial territory facilitates the travel from the center through legal, cultural, and economic incentives.

> Other factors that may affect the outlook of the Caribbean tourist economy include the competition both in the

> region and from other tourist areas such as Mexico, the rising cost of international air travel, and above all the United States economy (West and Augelli 1976: 95).

For instance, the major thrust of the Mexican tourist strategy in promoting the Mexican Caribbean is to siphon off tourists from the islands.

> Mexican tourist planners avowedly aim to divert a major share of North American tourists from their habitual Caribbean destinations and capture a share of that rich trade currently estimated at six million annual visitors and $1 billion in revenues (Collins 1979: 359).

Only the Bahamas are closer to the U.S. markets, and the Yucatán has the advantages of the Mayan ruins, lower wage rates and less reliance on imports (See Garcia de Fuentes 1979 for an excellent study of the Cancún tourism development project and the regional underdevelopment of the Yucatan). The larger resource base available to the Mexican government make it a formidable rival destination; Cancun is projected to attract 1 million visitors by the mid 1980's.

The chaotic economic conditions following the 1973 oil boycott have tempered the sanguine forecasts of the tourist sector expansion. Deregulation of the airlines, petroleum price hikes, prolonged world-wide recession, political instability, and automation and new telecommunications technology in the travel trade itself have contributed to an unsettled and nebulous future for tourism. The upshot is that that tourist industry is no less vulner-

able, and perhaps more susceptible to the vicissitudes of international commerce.

As plantation colonies of the European countries, the Caribbean islands exchanged commodities and population unequally with the center. Tourism, then, is a contemporary form of this persistent asymmetrical interaction. Like the previous form, transnational corporations in the center preempt trading connections among the peripheral countries. However, it is possible to argue that tourism is an even more advanced form than the "new technological dependency" discussed by Dos Santos (1970: 232). Although tourism shares certain characteristics of the extractive sector's control of land and the manufacturing sector's control of technology, as a service sector activity, tourism represents what Galtung referred to as an emergent form of control through international communication (Galtung 1971: 95).[7] De Kadt, who supports tourism as a strategy for

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[7]It is evident that Galtung was concerned with the broader concept of telecommunication networks per se and not as applied to tourism. One example of this technology used in the service sector that seems to fit Galtung's control via communication is the Satellite Data Corporation of New York that farms out its keypunching, word processing, and data entry via satellite to its subsidiary facility in Barbados. The information is typed into a computer and transmitted back to the United States. The Bajun workers (mostly women) are paid sixty to seventy-five less than their American counterparts (Pollack 1982: 17).

economic development, affirms that,

> knowledge, communication, and organization are the basic assets and sources of power of foreign enterprises for promoting and developing tourism (de Kadt 1979: 28).

As will be demonstrated, the contradictory aspects of tourism are condensed in the industry's ideological position. On the one hand pro-tourism arguments promote tourism as a positive force in social and economic change. On the other hand, the images used to sell a destination as a tropical paradise often convey an impression of an underdeveloped or backward culture and defend the status quo of racial discrimination and inequality.

The Image of Paradise and the Ideology of Underdevelopment

According to one critic of tourism, the U.S. media promotional campaigns for Latin America have tended to market poverty as a tourist attraction and have,

> replaced an ignorance of the region and the people with racist, sexist, paternalistic portrayals packaged for the white upper and middle class people who stay in the first class and luxury hotels (Grynbaum 1971: 3).

Taylor vividly traces the Jamaican image of "the welcoming society" back to its being imbedded in the behavioral pattern of racial stratification of the planters and the slaves (Taylor 1975: 6). Instead of the plantation, tourism is the institution that demands the deferential behavior black

workers must exhibit toward white tourists. The subservient behavior is now justified as the requisite hospitality or welcome extended to a cash paying visitor. Taylor states that the rise of tourism helped rejuvenate social, economic and cultural domination of blacks by whites and continues to subvert fundamental social and human rights of the black population. The development of tourism promotes taste and value structures inimical to the developmental needs of a Third World society (Taylor 1975: 7, 32, 39).

McCartney uses the term "slave mentality" for the subconscious inequality and implicit inferiority of black Virgin Islanders. Linked to the motivational system, slave mentality explains why black Virgin Islanders obsessively reject menial status jobs in favor of professional or clerical jobs, and why they prefer to work for white employers (McCartney 1971: 66). Beckford refers to this mentality as a "psychology of dependence" (Beckford 1976: 36).

Overton addresses the commodity esthetics of tourism in which the cultural opposition of civilized/primitive societies forms a passive ideological ensemble. This ensemble manipulated by the advertising agencies shapes the experience of culture and simultaneously creates new mythologies and new needs that facilitates the realization of surplus value. The image of a tourist destination is a world without contradictions or history wrenched from the content of social relations; only the surface of the people

and landscape are projected. The advertisements are adept in manipulating human desires and fears to persuade one to travel and hence, constitute a material force in shaping action. While they only create the illusion of freedom and escape, the vacation does serve to recreate and regenerate the erstwhile tourists' working capacities. Consequently the advertisements and the trip together reproduce capitalist domination and ideology (Overton 1980: 115-127).[8]

Many of the advertisements project for the tourist destinations the same kind of functional ranking, licensed withdrawal, and ritualization of subordination, that Goffman attributes to them in depicting gender inequality (Goffman 1976: 32, 40, 57). One typically sees white tourists as "masters" and black West Indians as servants combining rank and ritual subordination. Instead of the licensed withdrawal of an unoriented woman in need of assistance or protection, it is common to see a depopulated tropical beach in need of a Robinson Crusoe explorer (although frequently an unoriented woman beckons the would be Crusoe on the beach). Additionally, many advertisements convey the impression of a gracious hospitality in a utopian paradise ranging from the Eden-like climate and landscape to smiling gentle servants and friendly natives. Britton states that one of the main

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[8]For example, an ad for the Cayman Islands in the March 2, 1981 New Yorker "extolled" dependency by boasting that the Cayman Islands were the only major British Crown Colony remaining in the Caribbean.

themes of tourist advertisements is enticement with the possibility of sexual liaison with non-whites (Britton 1979: 323).

A semiotic analysis of tourist brochures promoting packaged holidays also suggests that advertisements deliberately create myths which reinforce prevalent sexual, racial, and national stereotypes. These myths depoliticize communication and impute a natural justification of power relationships through the ritualization of subordination. Depicted as objects, women, people of color, Third World cultures and natural resources are projected as available to be consumed by the tourist. Indeed often a sensuous woman is seen strolling along an otherwise abandoned beach and typically a morena or trigueña of ambiguous racial characteristics.[9] The advertising shibboleth, "It's Better in the Bahamas," and the ubiquitous T-shirts emblazoned with, "I Slept on a Virgin," (with island in fine print) use sexual innuendo in the same vein.

The travel trades explicit and subliminal marketing of fantasies encourages overindulgence of food, alcohol, sex, and other types of socially unacceptable behavior in the local community. The industry assumes that the tourist is incapable of appreciating or indifferent to

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[9]The Spanish terms for brunette or light-skinned mulatto carry the connotation of African ancestry and through stereotyping, a subliminal appeal to erotic myths of heigtened sexuality.

authentic foreign culture; folk art is reduced to a caricature in the ads and at the resorts. Consequently, the pseudo-ideal of the image is translated into the pseudo-event (Boorstin 1962).

In the Bahamas when the tourist industry was floundering during the international recession and dollar crisis of 1971, a joint industry-government promotional campaign called "Goombay summer" packaged many different aspects of Bahamian life to market to the tourists. Credited with turning the decline around, the campaign created an artificial cultural event now commemorated on T-shirts and as a brand of canned fruitpunch softdrink ("People Who Promote the Islands" 1973: 185). This kind of synthetic culture reduces the travelers' experience to validating cliches and stereotypes (Britton 1979: 323). In the promotional literature urban images are cropped to falsify a pastoral ideal. International architectural style soon results in a hodge podge of building designs and a sanitized, non-descript landscape that conflict with the local esthetics (Britton 1980: 45, 47).

Deliberately revising history is another form of contrived images to promote tourism. According to the barrage of public relations announcements distributed to promote the opening of the new Mexican travel oasis, Cancún was said to mean "pot of gold" in Mayan. This imagery enhances the image in contrast to the authentic translation, "place

of the vipers" (Meraz 1981: 1, 9, 30). A less subtle change occurred when Huntington Hartford purchased Hog Island, across the harbor from Nassau, and renamed it "Paradise Island" to help launch his resort in 1959.

Furthermore tourists tend not to discern individual islands, but perceive the Caribbean as one destination. This is hardly surprising because lack of knowledge about the islands is compounded by the way the Caribbean is marketed--packaging of the Caribbean region in advertisements for airlines, cruise ships, and hotel chains serving several islands is increasingly accompanied by a packaging of tours to the Caribbean.

Another way the manipulated image of a society negatively affects the tourist economy is the distorted reporting of Third World affairs. News stories in the travel columns that ideologically portray a country's political orientation as unfriendly or unstable were found to influence travel agents more than the general public. During the Manley administration Jamaica suffered from the sensationalizing of crime and violence in the media of the center countries (Cuthbert and Sparks 1978: 204). Prior to the U.S. invasion, Grenada was a victim of a smear campaign in the media and President Reagan's egregious distortions of the new Port Salines airport being built the Cubans for tourism.[10] Even

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[10]For an example of the biased reporting about Grenada see Labich 1980; cf. Bohning's conclusion that U.S. charges about the Point Salines airport were unwarranted (1982: 22A).

politically aligned countries suffer from the tendentious coverage by the American press which emphasizes crime or civil unrest (See Thomas 1982). While in some instances the reporting may be accurate, the attention given to trouble in tourist destinations often supersedes the coverage given to more substantive issues and undoubtedly is disproportional in to comparison to similar news coverage in the center.[11]

The state apparatus has assumed responsibility for enforcement of this colonized mentality or ethos of dependence. The behavior rests on an inferior/superior relationship and imbues a psychological dependency. The state maintains that the prosperity of tourist business and hence jobs will be sacrificed if tourists expectations are not fulfilled. This defense of the status quo is legitimated by technological rationality that eliminates substantive considerations and confines the definition of a problem to issues of economic stability and growth (Habermas 1970). Within the center and the periphery as well as between them, the social relations of dominance and subordination are reproduced in the ideological sphere.

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[11]This sensationalized over-kill parallels the tremendous amounts of money spent by business and government to hype a destination as a paradise. However, any negative news that detracts from the idealized image is aggressively attacked as distorted.

Transnational Interests and the Rise of Tourism

The momentum to institutionally support international tourism in the Caribbean can be traced back to Roosevelt/-Churchill sponsored Caribbean Commission that deliberated upon the future of the Caribbean regional economy toward the end of the Second World War. One of the spin-offs was the establishment of the Caribbean Tourism Association (CTA) in 1951. Registered in Curaçao, but headquartered in New York, the hub of both North American tourism and its activities, the CTA's primary function is the planning and coordination of public and private sector tourism efforts (Tourism Education Guide for Caribbean Teachers 1981: 12).

However, the real impetus and justification used by the metropolitan tourist lobby were two reports by the American consulting firm, Zinder and Associates. The first, Essential Elements of a Tourist Development Programme: A Critical Commentary (1968) was sponsored by the World Bank; the second and even more influential was The Future of Tourism in the Eastern Caribbean (1969) commissioned by the United States Agency for International Development. The latter document had calculated an extremely favorable tourist multiplier that was sufficiently high to convince Third World leaders that the potential range of economic benefits--foreign exchange, balance of payments, tax reve-

nues, new jobs, and higher wages--was so great that they should accelerate their countries' rates of tourism development regardless of other considerations (Levitt and Gulati 1970: 326-327).

Subsequently, the World Bank established a tourism Projects Department in 1969 and began channeling financial resources in three ways: 1) Indirect aid through intermediary development finance associations like the Caribbean Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank; 2) Projects of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), an affiliate created specifically to assist private projects in Third World countries;[12] and 3) Direct World Bank loans to governments and government agencies commonly for infrastructure in specific projects to develop,

> a potential for a tourist area by putting in roads, water supply, sewage waste disposal, power, and communications to create a tourism estate in which a private investor will find it attractive to put up hotels ("How the World Bank Finances Hotels and Tourism" 1974: 16.)

However, the World Bank's support for tourism development has been curtailed as the following statement discloses:

> The Bank decided in 1978 to reduce its activities in the tourism sector, and it no longer helps to finance the development of tourist resort areas as self-contained projects. Never-

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[12]The IFC supplied about one-third of the total cost of hotels, beach resorts, holiday villages, and game park lodges.

> theless, it continues to finance basic infrastructure projects--roads, electric power, water and sewerage--which may serve tourist demand among other demands, and it continues to lend to development banks in its member countries which on-lend for various purposes including the financing of hotels. Moreover, the IFC continues to assist, with both loan and equity capital, the financing of hotels. The Bank is also continuing to provide, albeit on a modest scale, technical assistance in tourism to its member countries.
>
> The basis for the decision in 1978 to reduce the Bank's direct support for the tourism sector was the need to expand support for other priority sectors, particularly for the development of the energy resources of the developing countries, against the background of the constraints on total Bank Group lending (Simmons 1982).

The World Bank also concluded that the Caribbean already has an excess supply of tourist accomodations for the existing level of demand (Chernik 1978: 168).

The Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre (CTRC) was founded in 1974 with a grant from the Inter-American Foundation in turn funded by the U.S. Congress. Located in Barbados, the CTRC's mission was to guide the development of tourism into regionally appropriate social and economic patterns via social, economic, and marketing research, technical assistance, human resources development, and tourism education and training (Tourism Education Guide for Caribbean Teachers 1981: 115-6). In 1975 the United Nations joined the arena through the World Tourism Organization (WTO) to promote and develop tourism and with a mandate

to collaborate with the United Nations Development Programme and an emphasis on vocational training of hotel and tourist sector employees (United Nations 1978: 3,7).[13] Already in Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, and the Cayman Islands, like the Bahamas and Virgin Islands, tourism has replaced the traditional export plantation agriculture as the leading industry. Jamaica with its bauxite deposits and Trinidad with its petroleum reserves are also attempting to diversify by stimulating the tourist trade. Even most radical opposition parties usually view tourism a vital necessity to the continued well being of the islands.

The Social Impact in Tourist Economies

Cultural Subversion and Misplaced Priorities

Inspite of the apparent success of tourism and the island governments continuing to commit resources to bring more tourists to the region, in those islands having had time to evaluate their experiences with international tourism, critical voices are being heard. The critics cover a wide spectrum ranging from religious organizations like the Caribbean Area Development Ecumenical Council (CADEC), and social movements such as the Rastafarians, to more

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[13]The WTO is the successor to the International Union of Official Travel Organizations founded in Madrid in 1925, but not affiliated with the U.N.

individualistic forms of dissent such as rudeness and hostility of just plain folks who have seen enough tourists.

As Bryden has stated,

> The important distinguishing feature of tourism in developing countries is the fact that tourists have to come to the developing country in order to consume the product. This is in contrast with other exporting activities, and indeed most exchange relations, where producers and consumers are separated and rarely confront each other in person (Bryden 1973: 92).

Consequently, according to Turner and Ash,

> A holiday is a political action. The tourist is politically neutered while the host country is subject to social strains which make its future peaceful evolution increasingly unlikely. The tourist unwittingly leaves the world's social fabric more fragile than he finds it (Turner and Ash 1975: 181).

Academics have begun to critically examine tourism development in order to correct what was perceived as a bias toward the industry's beneficial aspects. [14] Foremost are Turner and Ash who approach tourism from a broad cul-

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[14] While critical papers of the tourism model have begun to be published, there have been only a few sociological analyses (Cf. Turner 1974). Basically three types of research have been most prevalent: 1) Industry sponsored research that usually focused on the social psychological characteristics of tourists to target a population for advertising and economic cost/benefit analysis of development plans or project feasibility studes; 2) Anthropological case studies that mostly examined social change in "primitive" or folk societies: and 3) Within sociology, tourism tends to fall under the area of leisure or recreation. Both conventional and radical social scientists in the United States have tended to ignore the growth of tourism as an industry particularly in peripheral countries.

tural perspective, and use a parallel between two golden hordes--the Mongol Tartar tribes who overran Eastern Europe in the thirteenth century and contemporary mass tourists. While the former barbarians threatened civilized urban centers, the new barbarians are invading the non-industrialized areas of the world. They acknowledge the enormous scale of tourism in terms of financial investments, expenditures, the volume of people processed, and the eight to ten percent annual rate of growth. Turner and Ash also point to the global institutionalization of leisure in a consumption activity which is turning Third World countries into "pleasure peripheries." Their evaluation highlights the trends toward the deterioration of the agricultural sector, the loss of community or local control over land, the diversion of public revenues into subsidies for the tourist sector, and government attempts to cover up social tensions.

In the opinion of Turner and Ash, the greatest social conflict occurs in the West Indies, where the tourism organizational structure places the descendents of slaves in work position that requires a subservient role to the tourist. The murders in St. Croix, Virgin Islands and Bermuda are mentioned as indications of increasing violence stemming from the stress imposed by tourism (Turner and Ash 1975: 93, 116-126, 200).

Additionally, they assert that mass tourism subverts the indigenous culture. What culture is preserved tends to assume the form of pseudo-folklore, stripped of its original meaning and authenticity. Tourists' satisfactions are given priority over the citizens' needs by the state apparatuses that conduct "Be Nice" (Jamaica), "Smile" (Barbados), and "Courtesy" (Bahamas) campaigns (Turner and Ash 1975: 190-208). Although the monograph reveals many polemical social issues related to tourism, it is more descriptive than analytical, and speculative rather then empirical.

One of the first was Bryden who has argued that the economic costs associated with tourism development have been generally ignored or when included have been inaccurately minimized. Indeed, he could not find any earlier studies that assessed the social costs and benefits. His book, Tourism and Development: A Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean, which was explicitly written to compensate for this dearth, is more concerned with accurately calculating the positive effects of tourism. Bryden contends that the magnitude of the multiplier effect on jobs, spin--off services, and income are not as high as predicted. His discussion only alludes to social costs such as resentment by the indigenous population, the high volume of tourist traffic, relative deprivation, and reference group dissatisfaction compounded by the history of racial stratifi-

cation in the Caribbean. Inflated land values that lead to the alienation of land, the corrosive effects of tourism on the cultural and value systems, and the growing commercialization of the host/guest relationship are mentioned as possible sources of aggravation. With little supporting evidence he infers that there must be a correspondence between the animosity of the island inhabitants and the social costs; Bryden adds a caveat that social costs are not easily quantified (Bryden 1973: 91-96).

A similar limitation applies to the article, "Aspects of Underdevelopment: Tourism in the West Indies," that points out the disparity between the emphasis on the potential benefits and the reality of the actual benefits derived and costs incurred from tourism (Perez 1973-4). Potential disadvantages arising from tourism are the aggravation of a country's balance of payments deficit, large seasonal fluctuations in business activity similar to the agricultural labor demands on the plantation, and the leakage of tourist expenditures (Perez 1973-4: 476-480).[15] In an expanded paper Perez appraises the impact of tourism unsympathetically,

> Through tourism, developed metropolitan centers, primarily Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and particularly, the United States, in collaboration with West Indian elites have delivered

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[15]For every dollar spent by a tourist in the Commonwealth Caribbean seventy-seven cents winds up in the sending countries principally the United States.

> the Caribbean archipelago to another regimen of monoculture. As an industry based on the appropriation of West Indian human and natural resources for the ephemeral pleasure of foreigners, tourism offers the Antilles little opportunity and less immediate likelihood of modifying the basic constellation of dependent relationships established first in the sixteenth century (Perez 1975: 1).

Additional negative features listed by Perez include the subsidizing of an enormous volume of tourists at an extravagant life style beyond the scanty resources of the islands, travel boards promotional budgets spent in the U.S., diversion of infrastructure from local needs, destabilization into "boom and bust" cycles, increased security costs to assure political stability and domestic order, increased distance between rich and poor, and public relations campaigns to indoctrinate school children. Furthermore,

> Caribbean societies now compete with tourist and metropolitan tourist agencies to retain final authority to interpret their own history and determine the relevance of the past to the present and future" (Perez 1975: 8, 14, 17, 23, and 25).

Tourism has radically reorganized the substance and form of Caribbean Society, and Perez concludes that it has been a bad deal for the islands.

Suttles reasons that a nation committed to tourism as a means of economic development has misplaced its priorities. She lists four categories of negative impacts in

support of her position. 1) Cultural - erosion of values, exhalting backwardness, and staged authenticity; 2) social psychological - xenophobia, crowding, relative deprivation, servile demeanor, and social cleavages; 3) Environmental - landscape degradation; and 4) premature modernization - adoption of advanced lifestyle without adequate economic system to support it (Suttles 1976: 112-26).

Class Polarization

In writing about vacation travel from a sociological perspective of leisure Dumazdier concludes that,

> A new kind of social segregation results, often more accentuated than in everyday life because of prestige spending and fancy activities that emphasize to an even greater extent the differences and the antagonisms among social groups (Dumazadier 1967: 138).

Cleverdon, concerned with the socioeconomic impact of tourism, argues that to demonstrate that tourism freezes the socioeconomic status of employees one must prove that tourism employees are drawn from the lower socioeconomic strata and 2) that tourism employees have no opportunity for advancement or status mobility. While admitting that lack of social mobility in the tourist industry might be valid to a certain extent, he holds that it was by no means universal because tourism also generates middle level jobs and opportunities for self-employment (Cleverdon 1979: 83).

In contrast, vander Werff perceived the tourist industry to have polarizing economic effects in the Tuscany province of Italy. In vander Werff's appraisal tourism has had an overall positive impact in this formerly underdeveloped agricultural region. Virtually everyone benefited from the new wealth that has been generated and hardly anyone complained. However, vander Werff identified three dimensions along which an "earnings gap" continues to widen between: 1) large scale capitalist rational economic units and precapitalist small simply managed family firms; 2) owners and non-owners, the former earned an estimated three to four times as much as wage laborers; and 3) tourist sector employees received higher wages than their working class comrades in the agricultural sector (vander Werff 1980: 217).

Additionally, this polarization was expressed geographically. The capitalist units reinvested their profits outside the area while the pre-capitalist reinvested locally. Segregated residential patterns reflected the polarization as the older areas of the city, the hilltop and harbor districts, were abandoned by the entrepreneurs who joined the professionals in their villas outside the city. Local employees tended to concentrate with the immigrant workers in large rental apartment buildings. The shift of former agricultural workers from the interior to work in coastal tourism is the another geographical manifestation

(vander Werff 1980: 218). These polarizing tendencies are ameliorated by leveling tendencies such as national welfare measures, strong organized labor in the tourist trades, and local government control by left-wing political parties (vander Werff 1980: 219). The muddled conceptualization of polarizing dimensions and the absence of hard data, other than impressionistic field notes, leave a rather ambiguous message.

In Tuscany everyone benefited from tourism development and while there is a polarizing effect, no one is complaining about it. Tourism thus is credited with promoting greater residential segregation, providing opportunities for improving one's socioeconomic status, and creating material benefits that are distributed universally but unequally.

According to Suttles, one reason for the disparity between the promised potential of tourism and the actual results is the structure of dependence that turns small Third World country destinations into subsidiaries of transnational companies--airlines, hotels, and tour operators (Suttles 1976: 82, 91). Experience has demonstrated that as tourist development occurs large transnational firms and chains tend to control an ever increasing share of the business. This not only pits foreign control against national interests, but the loss of local control is coupled with a smaller economic return as the multiplier decreases

("Research: TNC's and Tourism" 1978: 8). Hiller, an industry insider, who has remained a staunch critic of the record in the Caribbean concurs. Caribbean tourist industry with international development agencies serving as the catalyst since World War II has accelerated the transition from small guest houses and hotels integrated with the community to large scale cosmopolitan resorts either isolated from or overwhelming the local culture (Hiller 1979: 53).

Travel agents often guide tourists to islands and hotels from which they receive the highest percentage and bonuses thus reinforcing transnational control. The distributional volume of the package tour that accounts for approximately forty-two percent of the travelers to the Caribbean favors the more popular destinations with lower fares and the chain hotels with higher occupancy rates.

> The closure of many smaller hotel properties not used by mass marketers who demand larger facilities has already forced many of the independent travelers into large chain hotels in the West Indies (Britton 1980: 6).

With the rise of the tourist trade in the Third World, the colonial officials or their surrogates, national civil servants and local merchants, serve as intermediaries for the interests of American and European Capital. In the Third World these interests coalesce in controling the state apparatus. Amin explains that this "Third World State Capitalism" is a logical result of a local bourgeoisie and the absence of the metropolitan ruling class following

political independence. By default the participation of the state bureaucracy must be much greater (Amin 1976: 345). The state has assumed an increasingly prominent function in promoting tourism. Fanon has written about the collaboration of the ruling class in the periphery with foreign capital.

> The national bourgeoisie will be greatly helped on its way toward decadence by the Western bourgeoisie, who come to it as tourists avid for the exotic, for big game hunting, and for casinos. The national bourgeoisie organizes centers of rest and relaxation and pleasure resorts to meet the wishes of the Western bourgeoisie. Such activity is given the name of tourism, and for the occasion will be built up as a national industry (Fanon 1968: 53).

Racial and Ethnic Conflict

Race/ethnicity is one dimension that is certainly central to understanding the conflicts that have accompanied the development of tourism in the Third World. Despite the "modernizing" effects attributed to the tourist industry, Lewis observed that given the dominance of tourist industry in Bermuda, the status quo argument defended racial discrimination and segregation as necessary to protect the tourist trade (Lewis 1968: 326-7). Similarly, refering to the industry's obsession for excessively servile behavior and attitudes, one observer wrote that,

> even after political independence the Jamaican tourism establishment has remained a bastion of last resistance to social change in the direction of

In analyzing tourism as a form of ethnic relations van den Berghe restricted the scope to the ethnic/cultural tourism of Cuzco and Machu Picchu, Peru. In van den Berghe's opinion tourist interaction can shape the processes of forming ethnic identity, defining and maintaining ethnic boundaries, or changing the identities and boundaries. For example, he cites the tendency of tourists to lump all native groups together in a stereotypical fashion, and vice versa. This potential for change notwithstanding, Van den Berghe asserted that,

> tourism superimposes itself on a pre-existing native system of ethnic relations. Thus, the long established relationship of dominance and subordination between mestizos and Indians was transferred to the new system of ethnic relationships by tourism (van den Berghe 1980: 387-388).

According to van den Berghe, the urban mestizos of Cuzco continued to exert economic and political dominance over the rural peasant indigenous descendants of the Incas by gaining a monopoly in the middle men positions in the tourist trade (for van den Berghe this is the entire spectrum of tourism related jobs). The mestizos acted as cultural brokers who mediated and managed the transient and asymmetrical relationships between the tourists and the ethnic natives. He concludes that tourism in Cuzco and other parts of Latin America,

> represents an extension of traditional forms of mestizo domination and exploitation over local Indians, more than a profound transformation of ethnic relations (van den Berghe 1980: 390).

Unfortunately, tourism has not only tended to preserve the status quo of racial inequality, it has also been found to erode the precarious economic condition of the racially subordinate groups. In the Brazilian Amazon tourism,

> has served to accelerate many of the forces destroying indigenous communities. Further, tourism undermines the efforts to expose the public to the actual problems confronting such groups--land appropriation, exploitation, and ethnicide (Phillips 1982: 19).

In a related study in the United States, Thomas discovered that resort development in the Sea Islands off the South Carolina coast has contributed to the decline on the size of black property holdings and the percentage of black families who own their own homes (Thomas 1978: 274). Her research also indicated that the generation of new jobs did not compensate for the loss of property. Only approximately ten percent of the resort jobs were classified as supervisory positions. Most of the positions available to blacks were in the low skilled, low paying, seasonal occupations in ground maintenance, house keeping, food service, and preparation. Lack of qualifications and the hotel industry's record of operating a dual labor market in which whites were hired for the visible jobs and blacks were relegated to the invisible

jobs were cited as the chief reasons for this racial division of labor (Thomas 1980: 5, 8).

Sexual Exploitation

Furthermore tourism development may adversely affect women in several ways. While women have traditionally been concentrated in the service sector occupations, one study of a Mexican resort community found that the newer luxury hotels tended to hire more men and those women employed were more likely to work in menial positions. Many poorer women were forced to enter the paid labor market to offset the higher cost of living which curtailed subsistence food production activities (Reynoso y Valle and de Regt 1976: 130-1). Another pernicious consequence is the sexual exploitation of women whether explicity as prostitutes or disguised as hospitality girls, massage and bath attendants, performers in sex shows, hostesses and waitresses in cocktail lounges ("Tourism and Prostitution 1979: 3).

The literature suggests that tourism indeed does stimulate economic growth, create service sector jobs, and induce social change. Due to the geopolitical constraints of Caribbean island ministates, since World War II transnational interests have encouraged governments to systematically channel investments into tourism as a strategy to

transform stagnant plantation agriculture economies. However, inspite of a few macro economic indicators that are used to justify the success of tourism development, it is apparent that tourism has shifted the form of dependency to a more glamorous service sector industry, but has not changed the substance of dependent development.

In fact the literature indicates that a rapid expansion of the service sector in the periphery is attributed to economic dependency and is associated with an increase in income inequality. A new global division of labor associated with tourism still maintains national, racial, and gender biases. The marketing of Third World tourist destinations as primitive paradises contributes to an ideology of underdevelopment that impedes social development and exacerbates conflict. As the record of tourism is evaluated, concrete negative social impacts are evident in the cultural subversion and misplaced priorities, class polarization, and racial and gender inequality that occurs in the tourist economies.

Unfortunately, in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands, inequality frequently overlaps along the dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and class, a situation that serves to synergistically intensify the polarization. The entry of a large number of immigrants from the United States and other West Indian islands linked to the tourist industry has compounded the stress caused by the high

volume of tourists in these ministates. In order to conceptualize the entire tourism economy phenomena in terms of the impact on social inequality and stratification, a theory is needed that encompasses the complex dynamics among the tourists, immigrants, and inhabitants. The project of the next chapter is to construct a theory of demographic imperialism using a political economy perspective based on knowledge and experience from the African diaspora research.

People generally think of travel in terms of displacement in space, but a long journery exists simultaneously in space, time, and the social hierarchy...The aims and itineraries which we devise for ourselves are above all, ways of being free to choose at what date we shall penetrate a given society. Our mechanistic civilization is overcoming all others, but we can at least choose the speed at which it will be effecting its conquests.

Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques

The United States has always been of two minds about new immigrants. On the one hand, the country has historically been a refuge, a place of new beginnings, accepting and even recruiting new settlers to build the nation and its economy. On the other hand, the theme of protectionism has found recurrent expression in apprehension over the capacity of the culture and economy to absorb newcomers, in the desire to limit labor market competition and assure minimal health standards, and even in nativism and racist theories. The history of immigration policy is a dialectic of these two new themes of acceptance and protection.

Charles B. Keeley, U.S. Immigration: A Policy Analysis

Chapter Three

THE SOCIOLOGY OF TRANSITORY POPULATION MOVEMENTS: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL UNITY OF TOURISM AND IMMIGRATION

This section explains the relationship among international tourism, immigration, and inequality. Inspite of the prominence of tourism in the economies of the Caribbean islands, and the historical importance of population movements within, to, and from the region, there is apparently neither any theoretical work that encompasses these population movements as a totality, nor addresses social inequality in the context of migrant and tourist dynamics. The absence of theory is not a result of incognizance.

Certainly, those articles dealing with social problems of the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas remark that the immigration of large numbers of white Americans and black West Indians has contributed to the rapid population growth and increased social tension that accompanied tourism expansion. Unfortunately, the focus at the problem level usually results in the conclusion that something must be done to improve the conditions of the black citizens and aliens. How these groups are to share the prosperity is left unspecified. During the more recent fiscal crisis

and high levels of unemployment in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands, the black immigrants have been blamed for both economic problems and have been the targets of highly publicized campaigns to deport the "illegals."

The Sociology of Tourism: Some Conceptual Problems

The division of labor among and within the academic disciplines seems to be a major obstacle in developing a general theory of geographic mobility. Thus, there are sociologists who address tourism within a perspective of culture and leisure and those who approach migration with demographic models. For example, according to Portes and Walton,

> The movement of human populations has been an intrinsic component of major processes of structural change throughout history, whether in response to political or economic imperatives, whether spontaneous or coerced, whether involving entire nations or selected groups within them, the displacement of people through space has accompanied every major transformation of the social order (Portes and Walton 1981: 21).

International migration and migrant labor are central to their analysis of labor and class in the international

system, but neither tourism nor even the migrants who work in the tourist sector are mentioned.[1]

An economist, who has supported tourism development in the Caribbean, is one of the few to include the white entrepreneurs who immigrated to the West Indies in conjunction with the tourist trade.

> Tourist development not only brings the vast waves of seasonal visitors whose strange ways and wants can be endured and even enjoyed for the period they hold sway, but it also has brought a new class of expatriate employers and investors who as important providers of capital and employment must wield influence in the social and political fields as well as the economic ones and who because tourism is a personal service industry in which personal relations are paramount, must impose their own standards...this may have an important influence in molding the national character (O'Loughlin 1962: 152).

However, she did not consider that some of the expatriates came initially as tourists themselves, and did not anticipate the proliferation of vacation homes or the influx of West Indian workers.

In contrast to O'Loughlin, one of the leading anthropological scholars of tourism ignores the new entrepre-

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[1]The omission of any discussion of tourism in general theoretical works on migration, labor, and class, like the works concerned with the service sector in underdeveloped nations, is probably due to the tendency to focus on the larger dependent states where tourism has only recently become a major sector in the national economy.

neural class associated with tourism. In a recent review of his discipline's literature Nash asserted,

> Of course, the tourist's travels do not lead to permanent residence in another society; he or she is not an immigrant (Nash 1981: 462).[2]

Perez observes that it was through migration, travel, and settlement that Europeans were able to press de jure claims to possess the Antilles. He notes the irony that in the Sixteenth Century travel to the West Indian colonies was acknowledged to enrich the metropolitan countries, but the ideology of the Twentieth Century tourism commends travel from the metropolitan centers as benefiting the West Indies. However, in his discussion of tourism and underdevelopment, Perez excludes migration (Perez 1975: 4, 6).

In addition to the division of academic labor, the other severe handicap is the primitive level of the core theory about tourism (Travis 1982: 257). One of the problems is the failure to recognize the importance of the tourist industry in the political economic process. The small body of literature that falls under the rubric of the sociology of tourism only tangentially assists in providing a framework that could be applied to tourism.

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[2]In the "comments" section, one respondent did argue that tourism should be considered a subclass of migration studies. Her only elaboration was that tourists expect the host community to adapt to their expectations, but migrants must conform to the host community's norms (Akeroyd 1981: 468)

Cohen in "Toward a Sociology of International Tourism" notes the neglect of the phenomena by sociologists (Cohen 1972; 164). He proposes a general theoretical approach based on a continuum of tourists' experiences ranging from strangeness to familiarity. Cohen constructs a typology of four tourist roles derived from an individual's tastes or preferences (social psychological) and the institutional setting (tourist industry and host country)--organized mass tourist, individual mass tourist, explorer, and drifter. The tourist role determines the nature of experiences and effects on a country (Cohen 1972: 167-168, 177).

The part of his theory that is most germane to this research is not fully developed. He states that the tourist system becomes ecologically differentiated and separated from local society, culture, and land use. As the tourist establishment transforms the landscape into attractions, it standardizes facilities to remove hardship and risk while providing the illusion of adventure through a series of vicarious participation from within an "ecological bubble." While locally the tourist system is isolated, international tourism has transcended political and cultural boundaries and permits access for foreign tourists to attractions and facilities within a country that locals are unable to or are prohibited from entering. Cohen forecasts that the increase in international tourism will demolish national boundaries, but barriers between

tourists and local societies will become more rigid (Cohen 1972: 169-174, 181).

An earlier article, "The Sociological Consequences of Tourism" (Foster 1964) also comments that there is an absence of social science investigation in the area of tourism. Foster's discussion is mostly descriptive based upon his experiences in Hawaii and New Zealand, but it anticipates several issues that have not yet been incorporated into theory.

One of his observations is that underdeveloped societies are more susceptible to social and economic disruption by tourism than advanced economies on three accounts: 1) the flow of tourists is from advanced to underdeveloped economies; 2) all sectors of the national economy are not as fully developed as the advanced economies and there are fewer safeguards against drastic shifts in the occupations of the labor force; 3) advanced economies have entrenched capital and labor factions that can more easily resist incursions from a new industrial activity (Foster 1964: 219).

Other consequences of merit that Foster presents include the following: the trend for seasonal tourism to become year around tourism and for permanent settlement to occur as a spinoff; a precipitous rise in the prices of land, food, and other items as a result of intense competition for local resources from the new demand for goods

and services; commercialization takes over (the provision of services shifts from a moral basis to a cash nexus), hence the loss of "charm" of an area; new occupations, the rhythm of work is altered, the character of work is transposed from primary to tertiary disrupting overall development, and the immigration of unskilled, low level service workers is seen as a palliative (Foster 1964: 219-223).

Additionally, Foster mentions that the transformation into a tourist resort is resisted as the changes and magnitude of tourism create tension. Increased stratification of income within the community, generational disputes, and land use conflicts between preservationists and advocates of growth, crime associated with growth and transitory populations are some of the social problems. Finally, the tourist brings his/her racial prejudice so that the native is accepted in a service position, but avoided in other social settings. This results in discrimination by management and a heightened awareness in class and race as well as increased hostility (Foster 1964: 225-227).

Lamentably, no theory has yet incorporated these insights; studies of impacts or benefit/cost analysis simply reflect the manifestations of tourism development. In fact, Cohen in a later article, argues that the sociology of tourism consists of the application of general sociological theories to the special field of tourism.

According to Cohen, unity does not derive from a general theory of tourism, but from a set of common empirical characteristics.

> The complexity and heterogeneity of the field of tourism suggests that there is no point in searching for the theoretical approach to the study of tourism (Cohen 1979: 31).

Instead he advocates developing a research style consistent in the manner of dealing with problems--processural, contextural, comparative, and emic (Cohen 1979: 31).

The result of the sociology of tourism or anthropology of tourism (see Smith 1977) has been the construction of typologies such as the different kinds of tourist experiences, tourism, impacts, and destinations by which one can then evaluate the isolated phenomena without a comprehensive understanding of the relational dynamics of tourism. Given this type of theoretical tunnel vision, it is not surprising that the relationship between tourists and migration has not been examined by a sociology of tourism.[3]

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[3]More recently Cohen has written that, "The study of tourism as a sociological specialty rather than merely as an exotic, marginal topic emerged only in the 1970s." Cohen identified eight important conceptual approaches--Tourism as: 1) commercialized hospitality; 2) democratized travel; 3) a modern leisure activity; 4) a modern variety of the traditional pilgrimage; 5) an expression of basic cultural themes; 6) an acculturative process; 7) a type of ethnic relations; and 8) a form of neocolonialism. The content of tourism research embraces four issues: movtivations, attitudes, reactions, and roles of the tourist, relations between tourists and locals, the structure of the tourist system, and the consequences of tourism (Cohen 1984: 374-376). At the theoretical level, the sociology of tourism remains fragmented.

More perplexing is the lack of attention of demographers to tourism. Although tourism has not been conventionally included in demographic or migration theory, an economic planner notes that,

> It has long been recognized that some kind of relationship exists between migration and tourism. Both, obviously, involve the geographic movement of persons, and are accordingly part of the burgeoning travel industry (Schmitt 1968: 306).

The same author lists the use of transportation networks, resort complexes attracting new workers as well as tourists, and occupations that necessitate travel as examples of the connection between the two types of movements. Schmitt, an employee of the Hawaiian Tourist Bureau, dwells on the lack of statistical data and analysis as the primary reason for little appreciation that tourism and migration represent alternative expressions of geographic mobility (Schmitt 1968:307-310). However, Schmitt is more interested in generating statistical information that had a pay-off for planners than in a theoretical framework for understanding geographical mobility.

Only one other article was located that approached tourism as a component of migration. Wolfe, an applied geographer, observes that recreational travel, in addition to rural to urban migration, and commuting between residence and work is one of the three characteristic migrations of the Twentieth Century (Wolfe 1966: 117). His

most prescient argument is that while few countries now do not allow tourism,

> Countries that once allowed unlimited immigration have now placed limits on it. The same countries now foster unlimited migrations of another kind--the immigration of tourists--and at the same time attempt to cut down on the number of their own tourists doing their spending in other countries (Wolfe 1966: 120).

In the future, Wolfe predicts that countries would impose limits on tourism because the one commodity most used by tourists was space. Unfortunately, tourists who settle and workers who migrate to work in the tourist trade were neglected.

Transitory Migratory Movements: Tourists and Immigrant Workers

Tourists as a Transient Strata

In addition to the other theoretical problems posed by international tourists in population movements, their transient sojourn in another country complicates the analysis of their impact. In their function as temporary consumers, unlike the temporary alien workers who enter production, tourists are not even regarded as temporary residents. Yet there is a tendency, as with the "temporary" alien workers, for tourism to generate a more or less permanent community in the form of vacation homes,

second homes, retirement dwellings, and investment property. Both groups exert an enormous influence in the work-a-day world and everyday-life in the islands. From the contact level as in the inundation of the shopping districts by cruise ship passengers, the types of jobs available, and the major decisions by governments on budget allocations and development plans. Even the potential tourist shapes the subsidizing of infrastructural projects like roads and marinas and the building of hotels.

While the tourist business research regards the mass tourist market as segmented with heterogeneous population characteristics, by virtue of the prepondrance of tourists' advanced industrial country origin, their skin color, and their socioeconomic status, as well as their solitary pursuit of pleasure, they are differentiated from the working masses, indigenous or immigrant. An individual transient tourist is thus repeatedly replaced by a similar tourist who shares almost identical characteristics; a tourist becomes a standardized commodity. Indeed, this lack of permanence or more precisely, the constant turnover of transient human sojourners unlike any other commodity, increases the likelihood of conflict.

First the tourists neither spend sufficient time nor have much interest in learning how to adapt themselves to the local culture. To the contrary, having spent a handsome sum of money and been encouraged by advertisements to

indulge their hedonistic fantasies, and they demand satisfaction. Second, they spend at an extremely elevated level of consumption not infrequently in an ostentatious manner. Third, the continual replacement of the highly visible foreigner reinforces the intensity of the negative traits, but reproduces a cumulative effect of a long term presence of perpetual strangers who never adjust or conform. Fourth, the collective tourist does compete for services, for land, for food, and for other goods easily outbidding most residents and adding to the inflationary spiral of the islands' economies.

As a result of this collective presence (but individual absence), antagonism toward the tourist can not be expressed in the same way as toward the alien worker. The latter will be available both in terms of physical presence and lack of political rights and economic power--an easy target for an organized campaign. On the other hand , an individual tourist may experience a rude encounter as a reaction to a previous tourist already "off island" or as a defiant protest against tourism in general. The tourists then not only form the reserve for the expatriate entrepreneur/leisure class community, they serve as a highly visible extension and disproportionately influential (if by invisible proxy) of that expatriate community. This seemingly "hit and run" phenomenon is part and parcel of

the tourist trade on the consumption platforms and further polarizes the already inequitable distribution of wealth.

Etymological Comparison of Migrants and Tourists

Migration theory, like a theory of tourism, remains at a relatively rudimentary stage. Peterson states that the migrants' diverse economic roles as,

> workers, consumers, as well as demographic roles are so complexly interrelated that theory is inadequate" (Peterson 1968: 207).

One way to perceive the commonality of tourists and migrant workers is by examining the origin of the terms. Etymological comparison enables one to perceive the historical connections between travel and work, and guests and guest workers.

For instance, "Fremarbeiter," German for alien worker is semantically similar to "Fremverkehr" for alien traveler or tourist. Frem can be translated as foreign, strange, or alien. Because of the ideological manipulation by the Nazis, Fremverkehr came to mean "subhuman" and hence after the war "Gastararbeiter" or guest worker was substituted (Castles and Kosack 1974: 13). Guest is more characteristic of the hospitality/tourist industry, but reinforces the temporary nature of the stay. On the other hand, travel comes from the old French "travaillier" meaning to travail

or work hard before travel became institutionalized and a leisure activity.[4]

Not coincidentally, British West Indians in the Virgin Islands and Haitians in the Bahamas are referred to as "aliens" while North Americans and Europeans are referred to as "continentals" and "expatriates." The choice of labels for these "strangers" is definitely not a nuance between immigrant workers and immigrant residents because it emanates from the stereotyping along the overlapping dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and wealth. Alien definitely connotes a pejorative or inferior being while expatriate commands respect.[5]

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[4]Olgilvie traces the emergence of the word tourist as synonymous with traveler to early in the Nineteenth Century. Later tourist came to specifically describe any person who was absent from home and whose income was derived from home and not earned in the place visited. Thus, tourist encompassed sight seers, religious pilgrims, health seekers, holiday makers, and students, but not immigrants or migrant laborers (Olgilvie 1934:661-662). Journeymen societies were another link between travel and work. The societies required craftsmen to travel to perfect moral education and professional training. After registering at the craft hall, the journeyman was provided with work and money to continue travel (Hauser 1934: 424). The Latin base meant both day's journey and day's work. The Spanish word, "jornalero" means day laborer.

[5]A similar code is used in Great Britain where the popularly used "immigrant" means black man (Castles and Kosack 1973: 12). Inequality is thus conveyed at the ideological level and helps to perpetuate domination/subordination at the material level.

The Transition from Temporary to Permanent Communities

One of the major reasons for the rapid population growth of both of the islands was the importation of West Indian workers from even more underdeveloped islands of the periphery. In both the Bahamas and Virgin Islands these workers, like the tourists, were viewed and treated as temporary. Temporary workers provide a dual function in the capitalist accumulation process. During economic expansion, like the domestic reserve army of the unemployed, they increase the relative and absolute rates of surplus values by working for lower wages, more intensively and longer hours thus offsetting the tendency for the rate of surplus value to fall. Unlike minority or women workers during periods of high unemployment, temporary workers can be refused entry or deported thus reducing social consumption expenditures and social expenses (Castells 1975: 144-157).

While it is the undocumented workers who are most vulnerable, there are very tight restrictions placed upon the legal aliens. Piore contends that migrants are recruited precisely because they are transient. To prevent permanent settlement, stipulations usually include single sex recruitment, fixed, short-term contracts, isolated housing, and no re-entry for migrant workers (Piore 1979: 83-84). Attempts to deter temporary workers from changing jobs, encourages rotation and assures that they remain

in the temporary, and usually, the lowest paying, dirtiest jobs shunned by the nationals (Castles and Kosack 1973: 98, 112-113). The foreign workers are also subjected to racial and ethnic discrimination. "Immigrant workers are first perceived by indigenous workers as competitors for jobs, for housing and for scarce social service facilities" (Castles and Kosack 1973: 452).

Regarding the ephemeral versus more permanent settlement, Castles and Kosack write that,

> Even where most immigrants come temporarily, this does not mean that their impact on society is not comparable with permanent settlers. The individual immigrant may remain only a few years, but he is replaced by another with similar characteristics and the same position in the labour force. Such temporary immigrants may be regarded collectively as permanent social groups with rotating membership. Despite the difference between temporary and permanent immigration, their impact on society may be very similar (Castles and Kosack 1973: 56).

However, inspite of institutional safeguards to prevent settlement, according to Piore,

> Transitory migration movements seem inevitably to generate permanent migrant communities (Piore 1979: 81).

While acknowledging the tendency for the social practices of a human community to foster organized settlement, Piore states that a more compelling reason is that when demand remains high or even cyclically predictable, employer pressure and/or government regulations allow migrants to stay to

pick up other jobs other than the original industry for which they were legally admitted (Piore 1979: 84). Another point he makes is,

> As the migrant community settles down, it becomes increasingly less adapted to the role it initially played, and it is in this transition from temporary migration to permanent settlement that most of the social conflict and political problems surrounding the migration process arise (Piore 1979: 52).

According to Castles and Kosack, the position of immigrants on the labor market governs the social relationships. The type of work available to the immigrant determines his/her income levels, areas of settlement, the manner of interaction with the indigenous labor force, and social status. The concentration of guest workers in certain economic sectors, in low paying jobs, and in deteriorating or seggregated residential areas perpetuates their inferior position in society (Castles and Kosack 1973: 57). The low qualifications of the workers, their intention to return home, official restrictions, and discrimination all contribute to keep immigrants at the bottom of society.

Regarding the demographic trends, the potential for increase in the number of tourists is significant. Prior to petroleum crisis in October, 1973, the number of international tourists had been increasing at ten percent per year. According to Turner and Ash,

> international tourism is still a minority activity. In large parts of the world it is rare for people to have

> holidays, let alone to travel abroad. Ninety-five percent of the world's population did not cross an international border in 1971...Even within the richest nations, foreign holidays are still an exception...only 3.2 percent left the North American continent in 1972. In the poorer parts of the world the proportions are still lower (Turner and Ash 1973: 13).

In spite of the relatively severe recessions, international tourism outpaced the performance of the overall world economy. From 1972 to 1982 international tourism arrivals increased at a rate of 3.5 percent per year in comparison with the world's gross domestic product's year gain of 2.7 percent; in 1982 there were approximately 300 million international tourists ("Airlines Weather Storm" 1983: 320).

Ultimately, the sheer volume of tourists will reach a saturation point, if it has not already been reached in terms of a socially acceptable carrying capacity. Yet virtually all destinations continue to encourage the expansion of tourist accomodations and an ever increasing number of tourist arrivals. In contrast, the tendency has been for countries to selectively admit or to deter additional immigrant workers from arriving, to curtail the number of temporary work permits and to deport undocumented workers.

Walton and Portes identify four conditions shaping the contemporary mobilization, transportation, and utilization of labor within the world economic system: 1) The center's penetration of the periphery's economic and poli-

tical institutions; 2) dominant classes in periphery find it advantageous to allow out-migration while costs and risks of migration are born by migrants themselves; 3) deliberate political manipulation to assure vulnerable condition of migrants; and 4) network building at the individual level is the most crucial aspect of migration as a means of survival and access to economic gain (Portes and Walton 1981: 30).

Teitelbaum, in addressing international migration more amply through the categories of bonafide and illegal immigrants and refugees, lists four conditions that characterize the immigration process today: 1) states are far less permeable; 2) the rapid increase in the world's population has magnified the potential number of immigrants while simultaneously reducing the potential open space for new settlement; 3) the pervasiveness of modern communication and transportation has reduced the barriers to international population movements; and 4) the world is much less stable in terms of political and economic strife than any time since the end of World War II (Teitelbaum 1980: 22-23).

The forces promoting mass tourism have also changed since 1945. Like immigration, the way the periphery is incorporated into the world economic system and the advances in communications and transportation technology have stimulated an increase in the number of tourists. Other factors are the increase in leisure time and disposable income,

and the world wide network of transnational corporations organizing the tourist system.

Although the circumstances that motivate tourists and immigrants are different, the socioeconomic forces of Twentieth Century tourism in the capitalist world system have generated an increasingly large migratory stream comprised of both consumers and producers of leisure services. The next chapter elaborates the theoretical relationship between the tourist trade and tourists and immigrants who arrive at the same destination. These two groups must be analyzed together as the unequal exchange of populations.

"The Virgins"

Down the dead streets of sun-stoned Frederiksted,
the first freeport to die for tourism,
strolling at funeral pace, I am reminded
of life not lost to the American dream;
but my small-islander's simplicities
can't better our new empire's civilized
exchange of cameras, watches, perfumes, brandies
or the good life, so cheaply underpriced
that only the crime rate is on the rise
in streets blighted with sun, stone arches
and plazas blown dry by the hysteria
of rumor. A condominium drowns
in vacanacy; its bargains are dusted,
but only a jewelled housefly drones
over the bargains. The roulettes spin
rustily to the wind--the vigorous trade
that every morning would begin afresh
by revving up green water round the pierhead
heading for where the banks of silver thresh.

Derek Walcot, Seagrapes.

Chapter Four

DEMOGRAPHIC IMPERIALISM: ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF TOURIST ECONOMIES AND UNEQUAL POPULATION EXCHANGE

Toward a Conceptual Unity of Transient Population Movements: Demographic Imperialism Defined

To paraphrase Galtung, imperialism is a dominance system in which the external dimension is characterized by asymmetrical/vertical interaction between the center and the periphery and the internal dimension is characterized by feudal interaction that maintains and reinforces inequality by protecting the external dimension.[1] Galtung enumerates five types of imperialism--economic, cultural, political, military, and communication (Galtung 1971: 81, 89).

Demographic imperialism is proposed as a sixth type of inequality between the center and periphery. Demographic imperialism is an unifying concept to analyze the geographic mobility of the consuming tourist and the

[1]Galtung uses feudal to mean the divisive tendences between the countries in the periphery imposed by the center and not the political and military system where hierarchical obligation of services was enforced by custom and tradition.

working migrant in the world system (Dunkel and Ntiri 1980: 21). It is defined by the center's dominance over the periphery in controling--by policy, by market advantage, and/or by force--the movement and exchange of persons across international boundaries; demographic imperialism also shapes to a large part the living conditions and rights of foreigners vis-a-vis nationals within a country.[2]

> On a country-to-country basis, the tourist market is characterized by asymmetric market shares, asymmetric organization possibilities, and demand fluctuations which affect the receivers more intensely than the senders. A similarly asymmetric pattern is found at the level of firms and organizations engaged in tourism (Hoivik and Heiberg 1980: 90).

In the same vein,

> The basic factor favouring centre-periphery tourism of the standard type is the gap between income levels. Tourist consumption in the peripheral countries is directed towards goods and services that can be provided cheaply by cheap local labour...As long as the wage gap continues, consumers will gain economically by shifting consumption from the centre to the periphery, at least with respect

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[2] Demographic imperialism in its broadest sense includes the elements of structural violence--the inequitable conditions of life imposed by the structure of the world system which prevents human beings from realizing their physical and mental potential (Cf. Galtung 1969). Examples include birth control measures forced upon the peripheral population by the center, the higher infant mortality rates, and lower life expectancies in the peripheries, and at the extreme, genocide. See Population Target: The Political Economy of Population Control in Latin America which ties population policy into the general concept of imperialism (Mass 1976).

> to labour-intensive goods and personal services. Similarly, peripheral workers will gain from accepting employment at the center. The rule-of-thumb is: work in the centre consume at the periphery (Hoivik and Heiberg 1980: 93).

Applying Galtung's concept of convertibility, the other five types of imperialism can cross over with demographic imperialism in variants that serve to sustain unequal interaction with the center and prevent coequal interaction among the peripheral countries (Galtung 1971: 98-99). The following examples illustrate how this cross over effect operates to support dominant power relations with specific reference to tourism and immigration.

Political - Policies of the periphery become oriented to facilitate the flow of tourists from the center including tourist entrepreneurs who become resident investors. The center imposes restrictive legislation limiting immigration from the periphery. In the case of a colony such as the Virgin Islands whose citizens can not be barred, the center imposes its own laws in regulating immigration from other territories in the periphery.

Communication - The distribution channels including the reservation systems are located in the center. Communication transportation networks multiply connect with major cities in the center, but linkages with other islands even within an island archipelago are haphazard, and less

well developed in terms of ease of access, cost, and frequency. Sensationalized news coverage of the Third World can prompt tourists to switch destinations while inadequate reporting leads to ignorance of conditions in the destinations.

Military - Police enforcement to protect tourists from crime becomes a major concern as does periodic round-ups to deport illegal alien workers from the periphery. The use of state apparatus' repressive powers is justified on the grounds that tourism is extremely sensitive to political unrest or economic disturbances such as strikes.[3]

Economic - The center transnational corporations assume an ever increasing share of the tourist trade and its citizens reap the largest benefits from tourism both as consumers and investor/owners. Immigrants from the

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[3]"Tourism follows wars and conflagrations" (Donald Hawkins quoted in Hyde 1984 : E1). The connection between tourism and military imperialism in the Caribbean is illustrated by the fact that the Point Salines Airport, which was the centerpiece in Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's plan to enable Grenada to compete more ably for tourists was ironically first used by American war planes. This not only fulfilled Reagan's Cassandra-like propaganda about the airport's military potential, it was a reversal of past links between tourism and American military efforts. Many of the airports now serving tourists in the English speaking Caribbean, including those in St. Thomas and New Providence, were originally built by the U.S. Airforce under the Lend-Lease Act during World War II. When the American marines invaded on October 25, 1983, they carried tourist maps. Command headquarters were established in the Grenada Beach Hotel and continued to serve the American military command as of July, 1984. The Ross Point Inn was functioning as the American Embassy. Soon after the invasion, the U.S. government announced that it would complete the airport for the sake of tourism.

center enter the periphery at the upper echelons of the labor force while those at the periphery often enter clandestinely at the bottom or the few skilled professionals are drained off by selective immigration quotas. The low wage levels of the service sector jobs perpetuates economic inequality. Repatriated profits and remittances illustrate the discrepancy. Alien workers are scapegoats for economic problems. Caribbean tourist desinations must import much of the construction materials and food used by the tourists.

Cultural - Tourism advertising displays "natives" in subservient roles to tourists of the center. Tourists bring in foreign cultural accoutrements (goods and behavior) and are emulated as the dominant role model while indigenous culture is denigrated as inferior and outmoded and especially that of the West Indian immigrants. Anti-social behavior of tourists is tolerated by the government because they are "lifeblood" of the economy. Differences in somatic norm image transferred by the Americans exacerbates racial conflict in the West Indies.

Historically, the record of demographic imperialism began with the Lucayans (Bahamas) and Tainos (Virgin Islands), cultural branches of the Arawak tribe, who settled in their respective island chains as they fled Northward from the South American mainland and the bellicose Caribs. Subsequently, the indigenous populations

were displaced by the Spaniards, who in turn were driven out by the British and Danes and augmented with African slaves. More recently, it has been Americans through migration and tourism who have displaced the Afro-Caribbean peoples.

One effect of slavery was the extremely rigid control of geographic mobility. Afterwards, indentured labor was one way in which the subjugated peoples' movements were curtailed.[4] Another post slavery example from the Danish West Indies was the control of the inter-island movement of the black population by the use of passports and fees. A Crucian wishing to travel to St. Thomas was required to pay thirtytwo cents at the fort in Christiansted. The visa to journey beyond the boundaries of the Danish colony cost one dollar;

> although the amount demanded was so small, the tax on passports...prevented the emigration of absconders or Negroes who were in debt to the estate owners (Debooy and Faris 1970: 215).

While the Bahamas were still a British colony, a temporary agricultural worker program was established with the United States from 1942 to 1967. This labor program required that Bahamians sent to the United States be rotated periodically, and that one-third of their wages be

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[4]For a five year period beginning in 1863 the sugar cane planters on St. Croix employed 321 indentured laborers from Calcutta, but four-fifths returned to India at the end of their indenture (Sircar 1971).

automatically remitted and held in a Bahamian bank. These policies were designed to deter the temporary Bahamian workers from becoming permanent residents in the United States. When the tourism boom started in the Bahamas, Haitian laborers were brought in In the Virgin Islands a bonded alien labor scheme was implemented with similar provisions to keep the British West Indian workers from taking up permanent residence. When the tourism boom started in the Bahamas, temporary Haitian laborers, who were first recruited for agriculture and forestry, stayed on and filled many lower niches in the construction and tourist industry. Others escaping the abject poverty and political repression in Haiti, illegally entered the Bahamas to take up the low paying service sector jobs. However, in the United States, the Bahamas, and Virgin Islands these temporary labor programs resulted in large continuous communities of aliens who lived under tenuous legal circumstances.

International tourism and international labor migration both involve the movement or transfer of people across national boundaries. This spatial mobility is shaped by power relations that are often couched in terms of economics or policy. Due to the cumulative historical practices of unequal exchange such as protective tariffs, differences in labor productivity, colonial administration, and patents, as well as present power relations, the

population in the center has established an economic advantage over the population in the periphery.

Galtung argues that vertical interaction is the major source of inequality in the world whether it takes the form of looting, unequal exchange, or differential spin-off effects (Galtung 1971: 89). Historically, he argues that during the colonial phase of imperialism the form of domination was that of occupation by the military, during the present neo-colonial phase transnational organizations are the principal vehicle of dominance, and in the future communication in the form of information/transportation will replace the existing mode of dominance (Galtung 1971: 94). However, tourism and immigration, as primary expressions of demographic imperialism, suggest that the principal forms of dominance are cumulative.

> The necessary cause of tourism... appears to be a level of productivity sufficient to sustain leisure. If productivity is the key to tourism, then any analysis of of touristic development without reference to productive centers that generate tourist needs and tourists is bound to be incomplete. Such metropolitan centers have varying degrees of control over the nature of tourism and its development, but they exercise it... in alien regions. It is this power over touristic and related developments abroad that makes a metropolitan center imperialistic and tourism a form of imperialism (Nash 1977: 35).

The telecommunication systems and transportation networks that schedule and distribute tourists are indeed

a decisive factor in making or breaking tourist destinations. However, these are owned and operated by transnational organizations still based in the center countries and strengthen the center's power over the periphery. The movement of tourists and resident tourists/entrepreneurs is actually a type of foreign "occupation" that tends to integrate the periphery more closely in the center's orbit, while perpetuating inequality.

Domination is not only indirect, it is frequently invisible and welcomed by the governments as well as the general population in the periphery.

> The possibility of voluntary acceptance by a native people and voluntary participation in transactions that further expatriate interests are an essential part of this conception of imperialism (Nash 1977: 34).

For example, a survey found that Virgin Island citizens held generally positive perceptions and attitudes toward tourists and tourism, realized its financial importance, and wanted to meet and interact with the tourists (Sethna and Richmond 1978: 30-31).

Inspite of extolling the efficiency of market allocations, population movements are not a random social event. Standing argues that mobility is a mechanism of exploitation tied to a particular mode of production. The nomadic movements of pastoralism ceased in the immobilization of feudalism. A mobile population became necessary and played

a crucial role in the transition to capitalism (Standing 1979: 171-191). According to Petras,

> Export and import of labour, both as free and unfree labour, have been integral to the evolution of inequalities among nations and between regions with a modern world economy. From the purposeful uprooting and massive relocation of populations, to the persistent and often clandestine trickle of labour towards poles of capital growth, both the cause and effect of transnational labour movements are similar; the deepening of the process of combined and uneven development among national units and regional aggregates, and the facilitation of the accumulation of capital by an international capitalist class (Petras 1980: 157).

Similarly, internal migrations can be considered as part of a social process designed by the social and political groups who have succeeded in imposing their interests to redistribute population within the world system.

> Within this historical and structural context, the changes that occur in population redistribution are results of changes that take place at the level of the productive structure and the structure of domination, remembering of course that determination is never unidirectional and therefore these population changes in many cases will produce changes in the productive structure, in the system of domination and in the ideological forms that legitimize it (Arguello 1973: 38-39).

As Mandel states,

> The problem of °unequal exchange' ultimately goes back to the problem of different social structure of the underdeveloped countries...[the] disadvantageous conditions for the accumulation of capital in these

> countries must be ascribed to social causes which were hardened by the effects of imperialism (Mandel 1978: 365).

The persistence of unequal exchange of population has similar origins. Refugees who constitute one sub-category of immigrants and in fact become hard to distinguish at times from illegal aliens. Furthermore, it has been contended that underdevelopment itself generates refugee flows and certain groups are more vulnerable to state persecution. These include,

> ethnic minorities that straddle more than one state; trading diasporas without a homeland; ethnic groups associated with colonial rule as indigenous governing classes; any victims who seek to defend themselves and hence, by definition, come to be tagged as subversive (Zolberg 1983: 37).

Of course the decision to grant refugee status and legal entry or to classify as illegal aliens subject for deportation, like the decision to promote tourism as a strategy of economic development, is based on asymmetrical power relations between the center and the periphery.

Patterson contends that migration has become a major symbolic reference and dominant theme in West Indian art, literature, religion, and folklore. During slavery, control of the migratory process and struggle against that control was the focal point of class conflict and is evident by the prevalence of West Indian slaves who rebel-

led and migrated to form maroon communities in the mountains.

> The relationship between revolt and retreat by migration is significant: the two impulses were to become powerfully linked in a kind of binary psychic opposition in the minds of West Indians (Patterson 1978: 127).

It would seem logical that tourism, as a type of migration, has also become entrenched as a symbol of progress and resistance in the West Indies.

Demographic imperialism at one level involves the asymmetrical interaction of two or more populations by virtue of the central or peripheral location in the world system. The unequal exchange of population is expressed by the differences between the dynamic processes of migration and tourism. The next section reviews the attempts to represent demographic imperialism on a second level--the structural aspects of the economic function and the socio-spatial organization of tourist economies in the world capitalist system.

Socio-Spatial Organization of Tourist Economies

An adequate theory of West Indian socioracial structure must invoke a metaphor to convey the spatial and/or political manifestations of the division of labor and the organization of the economy. In this case the challenge is to accurately represent the defining characteristics of

the tourist industry from a political economy perspective. Such a metaphor would be analogous to the total institution for plantation economies or company town for mining enclaves.

Borrowing from Thompson, Beckford described the plantations as one type of settlement institution that shapes,

> the relationship of the people to the land and largely determines how people shall live on the land with one another" (Thompson 1960: 30 quoted by Beckford 1972: 8).

Beckford continues,

> Because it [the plantation] had to rely on immigrant labor of different ethnic and cultural origins, it also provided the rules of accommodation between these different groups (Beckford 1972: 9).

The assignment of status was based on a racial caste system. Tourism, it is held, also is a type of settlement institution that establishes the rules of accommodation among different groups. Several metaphors are applied to the tourist economies to determine their appropriateness.

The idea of the plantation as a total institution was based on Goffman's study of asylums which originally meant an inviolable place of refuge or sanctuary. Goffman defines a total institution as,

> a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut-off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time together lead an enclosed formally administered round of life" (Goffman 1961: xiii).

For a variety of reasons total institutions are used--to protect the community from persons considered a threat to society, to care for individuals who are incapable of taking care of their own welfare, to collectively pursue work related goals, to seek seclusion from the world, or a combination of the above. Examples include the following: prisons, mental hospitals, colonial compounds, large mansions, and monasteries. Frequently, they have physical barriers that restrict interaction with the outside world (Goffman 1961: 3-4).

An isolated resort complex such as Club Mediterranean (Eleuthera and Paradise Island) or Caneel Bay (St. John) exhibit several common features with total institutions.[5] Isolation from the indigenous population protects the tourists from contact with the island inhabitants except under controlled situations and vice versa. The combination of all touristic leisure activities in the same space, under the same authority, in the company of others who are treated alike and perform the same activity, tightly regulated and coordinated according to the rational plan of the institution fits the description of a packaged tour whether in one of these resorts or cruise ships.

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[5]An even closer approximation of a total institution would be the smaller islands completely in private ownership by individuals, corporations, and clubs whose employees stay on the islands.

Moreover, Goffman notes that a basic binary split between the inmates (guests) and supervisory staff (employees) entails two antagonistic classes. The former experiences restricted contact with the outside world, limited communication and decision making and are separated from the staff by social and cultural boundaries so that they are juxtaposed but have very little mutual interaction. The total institution is a social hybrid--part residential community, part formal organization (Goffman 1961: 6-12). Significant variations like voluntary/involuntary selection and permeability of the facility with the larger environment serve to differentiate total institutions (Goffman 1961:
118-119), and thus could encompass resort complexes.

Several problems arise from this comparison. The first is in delineating the unit at which the tourist economy becomes a total institution. While the resort complex is one possibility, the entire island, individual hotels, or even the entire tourist distribution system could be treated as total institutions. Second, who actually has the greater freedom. The visitors, usually with the illusion of much greater freedom than they possess, still can transgress their own and local social norms, without opprobrium and act on their own volition. In contrast the staff are often forced by the quasi-monopoly conditions of the tourist industry to perform service

sector work. It is the employees' behavior that is scrutinized by the visitors; the employees must conform to the tourists' expectations. Governments intervene with courtesy campaigns and training schools to teach proper servility not of the inmates, but of the staff. Thus, while one gains some insights into the characteristics tourism shares with total institutions, ambiguities arising from the contradictions in the application of the metaphor make it an unsatisfactory one.

Tourist resorts have also been referred to as "golden ghettos." The origin of the Italian word ghetto was in the medieval European urban centers where the Jews were officially separated in settlements from the rest of the population. Wirth described the ghetto as an instrument of control by which a minority is subordinated to a dominant group, but simultaneously is spared from greater conflict through isolation (Wirth 1981: 15). With an emphasis on race and ethnicity, the phenomena of ghettos has changed so that the term now applies to any residential area inhabited by a common racial, ethnic, or cultural group frequently caused by past and/or present discrimination in housing (Darden 1981: 8-9).

In an article entitled "The Tourist Ghettos of Hawaii" Farrell depicts the trend to develop golden ghettos of principally the high rent residences of mainland caucasians on the west and south sides of the island of Maui. The

future demand for immigrant labor, most likely from the Philippines, would help off-set the growing white population. Unfortunately, the regional differentiation along ethnic lines of Hawaiians and Asians in the east where the population centers of Wailuku and Kahului have always been mostly non-caucasian could easily develop into a "shadow ghetto" in the areas of lower land values. According to Farrell, the segregation of the island along socioeconomic lines of status occurs on every island to some extent and will inevitably transpire everywhere that intensive leisure development is attempted in the Pacific and will increase the potential for racial and ethnic conflict (Farrell 1974: 206).

If segregation in resort areas occurs due to the escalating cost of land as described above, the market mechanism is assisted by the deliberate planning of resort complexes. Some large scale resort development projects in Hawaii are of a sufficient magnitude to be classified as new towns. One of these total tourist centers--communities consisting of hotels and second homes and zones designated as service towns to house the labor force--was the Big Island Development Project, located along the Kohala coast of Hawaii. A consortium of the Dillingham Corporation, the Olemana Corporation owned by Laurence Rockefeller, and Eastern Airlines was developing a cluster of major resorts on 12,000 acres of land. Big Island

plans included a service town for 20,000 workers. A Signal Oil hotel complex at Pauho Kaupuelo projected the new community's population to reach 40,000 counting the workers quarters to be constructed at a safe distance from the paying customers (Kent 1977: 177, 193).

The Mexican Caribbean resort of Cancún represents a further step toward planning segregated socioeconomic divisions. Created expressly to give an image of modernism, comfort, and luxury, Cancún's major division is between the recreational zone of Isla Cancún and the urban zone of Ciudad Cancún. Ciudad Cancún lacks a permanent population and contains large hotels, condominiums, luxury shops, vacation homes, convention center, golf course, and other diversions. The plan projects 10,000 hotel rooms when development is completed in the early 1990's. The recreation zone is further subdivided into four tourist zones that groups hotels and residences according to land prices and room rates with the most expensive located the greatest distance from the urban zone. Ciudad Cancún is a model city that was designed to accomodate a permanent population of 70,000. The urban zone contains the workers' residences and commercial services to support the resort. Additional industrial and agricultural zones were planned to cater to Cancún's tourist needs. Thus FONATUR, the Mexican state tourist agency, tried to rationally plan and control development. However, they were unable to

avoid improvised shelters of a squatter settlement known as Colonia Puerto Juárez, now designated as a buffer or transitional zone (García 1979: 86-91).

Kent referred to the service town as a "workers' ghetto." Indeed not only does the racial and ethnic segregation seem to resemble a ghetto, the service sector workers concentrated in a residential area tend to share the characteristics of Fusfeld's ghetto economy. For instance, the four sources of income generation in the ghetto have island counterparts. Most of the income is derived from the hotels and restaurants and shops located outside the workers' ghetto in the golden ghetto reserved for tourists and expatriates.[6] The economic base is the service sector characterized by low wages and subject to cyclical fluctuations. The low wages of service sector employees are often supplemented by jobs in the even lower paying irregular or informal sector.

The drain of resources--savings, physical capital from housing, public facilities and public institutions, profits, incomes, and human talent--contributes to the ghetto's chronically high unemployment levels and pervasive poverty; this outward flow also keeps ghetto conditions in a state of permanent depression. Control of the power

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[6]In the Bahamas and Virgin Islands, the high wage manufacturing jobs were mostly restricted to the industrial zones of Freeport, Grand Bahama Island and Limetree Bay, St. Croix where the oil refineries and a few other capital intensive manufacturing operations were located.

structure by outsiders means that decisions effecting ghetto are removed from residents (Fusfeld 1970: 68, 78-80). A principal limitation of Fusfeld's description is that he equates ghetto with slum and thus, disregards the gilded tourist ghetto. Another objection is the lack of conceptual unity that would enable the two phenomena to be analyzed together instead of treating them in isolation. In the Bahamas and Virgin Islands, virtually the entire island is given over to tourism development, but contain an assortment of built forms from central business districts to planned self-contained resorts as well as decaying neighborhoods and housing projects.

Enclave is another term frequently used to describe tourist resorts. In discussing the manner in which visitors are often physically isolated from the local population Britton affirms that,

> Enclaves are not usually created to prevent corruption of those beyond them. Rather, they exist to ensure that a larger share of visitor expenditure is retained by the hotel instead of being spread to community entrepreneurs, to discourage local patronage, and to promote social cohesion among guests (Britton 1980: 46).

This "incarceration" of tourists to exert control over their behavior and money, does of course increase social separation between them and the inhabitants. The Club Mediterranean on Paradise Island had a fence and guard to keep the general public out. This is in addition to the

Paradise Island Bridge toll of $2.00 per car which was reportedly levied by Resorts International, Inc., the bridges owner, to keep black folks from driving over from Nassau (Mahon 1980: 71-72).

However, enclaves whether ethnic or economic, by definition are territorially or culturally distinct units enclosed within a foreign land usually cut off from the rest of society or economy. Classic colonial examples are Hong Kong and the Firestone empire within Liberia. Freeport in the Bahamas is the prototypical case in the Caribbean, but the Virgin Islands National Park would qualify as would Lyford Cay and almost any other white or black residential enclave. While enclave emphasizes the foreign element and lends appeal to nationalistic movements, aside from the correct designation of a privileged, foreign, spatially concentrated group, does little to advance the analysis. Indeed, by focusing on the area, the policies and practices that helped shape the enclave are usually given short shrift.

Aronowitz has described how the hierarchical organization of labor within the working class between immigrants and native born was a deliberate divisive strategy by the capitalist class. Immigrants and native born workers in competition with one another for jobs were manipulated by the owners who played on the racist and nativistic

sentiments. Company towns were another effective way of reinforcing racial/ethnic divisions (Aronowitz 1974: 163).

Company town has been used to refer to Freeport and several of the new resort development projects in Hawaii. In the Caribbean the mining town of Christianburg-Wismar-Mackenzie, Guyana owned by Demerara Bauxite Company, Ltd. (Demba), a subsidiary of the Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan), serves as a company town model. Like company towns in the United States, Demba exerted management rights over its residents as employees. In the West Indies, the transnational corporations add a colonial dimension similar to sugar plantation patterns of residential racial segregation.

A tripartite settlement, South Mackenzie was formerly an exclusive white expatriate residential area and looked like an affluent suburb with stylish houses, spacious green lawns, and paved streets complete with a private school and North American teachers. North Mackenzie homes for the skilled and semi-skilled Afro-Guyanese workers were stuck in the middle between bauxite and alumina plants and permeated by the red dust. Communal latrines and an overcrowded school demonstrate the disparity in amenities. The third area, the twin villages of Christianburg-Wismar, were informally dependent upon Demba and grew haphazardly; they soon took on the appearance of a squatter slum (Grant 1971: 53-57).

The distinct and zoned districts were termed a system of apartheid; until 1954 Afro-Guyanese needed constabulary permission to visit the white area. If an Afro-Guyanese worker were dismissed, he had to vacate the town within twenty-four hours. North and South Mackenzie were separated by the administrative buildings and the bauxite plant which further isolated the two communities. Formation of a local governmental authority has served to ameliorate the most blatant forms of the socially stratified community, but dependence upon Demba and the company's indirect control still made it a company town (Grant 1971: 46-72).

The Bahamas had its version of a company town in the extractive sector. In 1960 on Abaco an Owens-Illinois subsidiary imposed residential segregation along national origin lines by housing the 100 Haitian employees it recruited at a company owned settlement called Campbell Town while the forty Bahamians and 400 Turks Islanders stayed at the company's Lake City camp. When Owens-Illinois transferred its lumbering operations to Andros Island in 1967, it once again imposed racial/nationality segregation. The mostly white managerial staff lived at Morgans Bluff by the harbor while the West Indian employees and their families were lodged at Owen Town thirty-eight miles to the south. Bahamians lived on the south side of Owen

Town while Haitians lived in smaller houses on the north side (Hamilton and Dunkel 1983: 69-79).

On St. Croix,

> the Hess and Harvey compounds begin to look like examples of North American company towns, characterized by varying degrees of racial segregationalist patterns (Lewis 1972: 125).

Amerada Hess, the world's largest oil refinery, with 1,300 employees and 1,700 sub-contracted personnel is the largest employer other than the government.[7] Carved out of a mangrove swamp, the Hess industrial compound was, "a self-contained community that mixes little, if at all, with the local population" (Thomas 1981b: 6).

> The refinery sits behind a high chain-linked fence with its own power, water, sewers, police and fire departments, roads, shopping and housing. The oil and more than half the workforce comes from someplace else. The Virgin Islands gives Hess Oil little more than an address that is under the American flag, yet outside the Jones Act, which requires domestic refiners to use more expensive domestic ships to move their oil (Thomas 1981a: 10).

Although Freeport easily fits the description of a company town, most of the tourist complexes in the Bahamas

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[7]When asked about the fact that more than half of the positions are filled by non-Virgin Islanders, Leon Hess said that requiring him to certify no resident worker was available before he hired an outsider was illegal. Hess oil paid $11 million in taxes on an income of $99 million in 1979 due to tax concessions made by the islands' government; an U.S. Gulf coast refiner would have paid $51 million on an equivalent income (Thomas 1981a: 10).

and the Virgin Islands do not have company owned employees' quarters and are not isolated. While Resorts International on Paradise Island, Columbus Landings on San Salvador or the National Park Service on St. John have monopoly-like power over the respective islands, the limited number of applicable situations and little, if any, improvement in analytical capability render the term unacceptable to describe the spatial contours of the tourist economies.

The last model to be considered is the internal colony which makes an analogy between the contemporary situation in central city ghettos in the United States and European colonies. In his attempt to demonstrate the parallel, Blauner focused on three aspects of colonialism: 1) domination over a geographically external political unit; 2) formal recognition of differences in power, autonomy, and political status with agencies to maintain subjects of the colony; and 3) exploitation of land, natural resources and labor (Blauner 1981: 113). Obviously, internal is an inappropriate designation for the Bahamas, and the Virgin Islands is a de jure colony and external territory of the United States. Nevertheless, the insights gained into racism, culture, and economic exploitation justify exploring the internal colony as a heuristic model.

The model subsumes the characteristics of business ownership and administrative decision making in the controlling social institutions--the educators, police force,

social workers, and politicians by outsiders who are usually of a different race than the majority of the inhabitants. The latter do not exert very much influence over the larger metropolitan power structure (Blauner 1981: 116). Additionally, the black power movement was very active in the islands which seemed to parallel national liberation struggles and the agenda of self-determination, cultural nationalism, and revolution.

The Bahamas through the Bahamianization campaign and independence eliminated most features of colonial dominance except for those devolving from economic dependence and the tourist trade. The Virgin Islands to a lesser extent has discarded the vestiges of colonial rule through political reforms such as a popularly elected governor (1970), a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives (1972), and long standing affirmative action employment policies. However, Virgin Islanders could not vote for president, but were drafted into military service during the Viet Nam War. Additionally, many of the higher level technocrats in the Virgin Islands bureaucracy were still white mainlanders, and the political status of an unincorporated territory of the U.S. continued.

> Congressional rule for the islands means, in essence, at best a government by benevolent paternalism shared by the Interior Department and the appropriate congressional committees (Lewis 1972: 350).

Other deficiencies of the internal colonialism model include the non-incorporation of the West Indian influence, both in terms of immigrants and politics such as the Peoples National Party of Jamaica in the Bahamas or culture such as the Rastafarians in the Virgin Islands.

Thus, while all of the metaphors or models reveal interesting features about the Bahamas and Virgin Islands' societies, they do not address the unique economic function and sociospatial organization of the tourist industry in the West Indian islands. It is argued that in fact previous concepts obscure or reduce significant aspects of the tourist economy.

Consumption Platforms and Lindurbs: Two Manifestations of the Unequal Exchange of Populations

Two new concepts are proposed to adequately convey the situation in the tourism economies--"consumption platforms" that represent the economic function and "lindurbs" that represent the sociospatial organization of the tourist industry. Together they emphasize the defining features of a peripheral society reorganized by the transnational tourist industry and the structural effects of this variant of demographic imperialism.

The off-shore consumption platform has emerged as the Caribbean islands' central function in the capitalist world system. As a third type of disarticulated economy,

the off-shore consumption platform combines features of both export enclaves and import substitution economies, but possesses unique features as well. Tourism services, that comprise the broader leisure service industry of gambling and second home real estate development, are produced locally for "in situ consumption" by foreign non-residents.[8] In replacing its predecessors of plantation economies and labor reserves, the islands have become specialized recreational zones in the periphery.

These micro-state governments collaborate with the comprador and international bourgeoisie in providing infrastructure, maintaining a disciplined labor force, and other essential assistance to provide leisure services to primarily wealthy white foreigners from the center. The foreign exchange, profits and government revenues derived from this trade are in large part contingent upon the external demand for these services.

Due to the small land base and size of population (in part a result of considerable out-migration), and natural constraints on agriculture, the labor and land devoted to agriculture was converted to tourist services earlier than the other Caribbean Islands. One effect was


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[8]In the Bahamas perhaps the prototype of a service oriented export substitution model, financial and transhipment services are also off-shore services performed for capital accumulation in the center. Theoretically, tourism services contribute to the realization of profits while the other two are in the realm of circulation and actually increase the rate of surplus value.

that the surplus population was quickly absorbed and land taken out of production while the traditional sector including the small scale handicrafts and manufacturing soon was virtually obliterated. Figure 3 shows this process schematically.

Figure 3

OFF-SHORE SURPLUS POPULATION




Concomitantly, the internal market and the economies of scale preclude internal production of many items for the resident population while the tourism market for luxury goods and staples is supplied by the vertically and horizontally integrated privately owned enterprises of the capitalist world system as shown in Figure 4 below. The outcome is the consumption platform which literally is an

"export substitution" model of economic growth.[9] Like the more prevalent import substitution strategy, the consumption platform continues locked in a vicious cycle of dependent underdevelopment.

Figure 4

STRUCTURE OF DISARTICULATED EXPORT SUBSTITUTION ECONOMIES (OFF-SHORE CONSUMPTION PLATFORM IN PERIPHERY)



Source: Adopted from de Janvry and Garramon 1977: Figures 2 and 3, p. 33.

However, the lack of any substantive internal development is camouflaged by the glittering appearance of a modern service economy like Miami or New Orleans. Furthermore, maintaining a marketable image of a tropical paradise

[9]The traditional sector decline is related to the transfer of surplus population to the center. Instead of the import substitution model, the export substitution model was implemented to stimulate economic growth. Profits are collected and kept in or repatriated to the center.

is antithetical to industrialization; the proper tourism ambience thwarts efforts at diversification and encourages a narrowly based service sector economy.[10]

The loss of the traditional sector means that the cheap food supply and internal pressures to keep wages down are foregone as costly materials and cheap labor must be imported. The informal sector or underground economy may also be less a factor in these tourist economies than generally found in the Latin American economies (Cf. Portes and Walton 1981: 98-106).[11] The competition from other tourist destinations and the exploitation of illegal alien workers are countervailing tendencies to inflationary pressures.

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[10]Paradoxically, it should be noted that tourism development most frequently is advocated as a policy to diversify economies, and in fact was initially the case in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands. As will be demonstrated, the Bahamas and Virgin Islands now have monocultural tourist economies and have tried unsuccessfully to diversify away from tourism.

[11]Both in the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas the petty capitalists hawking a few oranges, Chickletts, lottery tickets, or other items were conspicuously absent in comparison to continental Latin American countries. In the Bahamas the gambling and tax haven activities institutionalized a large segment of the underground economy; drug smuggling was the largest illegal activity. As mentioned previously, the Virgin Islands' relatively small informal sector may be due to a relatively high level of U.S. social welfare benefits that help support the higher wage levels. Additionally, the microstates' limited production facilities and truncated manufacturing sector as well as emigration and deportation would act to curb the development of an informal sector.

Basically four factors account for the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands having two of the highest per capita incomes in the Western Hemisphere despite the centrality of a low wage industry like tourism. First was the extremely depressed conditions of even more peripheral economies which did not experience the tourism fostered growth. Second was the virtual absence of a peasant agricultural sector in the islands. Third, the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands were very tightly incorporated into the U. S. continental economy. And finally, the macro level economic indicator masked the inequitable distribution of incomes.

Free trade zones engage in off-shore production or assembly for export, hence their designation as off-shore export platforms. Unlike the free trade zones which comprise only a small portion of the national area, the tourist industry extends throughout the islands. The tourists are imported (and much of the food and other materials as well as additional labor) so that both the production and consumption of leisure services is performed offshore.

To summarize, as part of the international division of labor engaged in the provision of services, the tourist economy of the off-shore consumption platform is locked into unequal exchange in the following ways:

- predominately low wage jobs


- labor intensive low productivities
- immigrant labor and high unemployment depresses wage rates
- competition from other tourist destinations acts as brake on wages
- packaged tours keep most of tourist dollars in center
- repatriation of profits to the center
- high import coefficients offset foreign exchangeearnings
- tourist environment prerequisites inimical to growth of industry and manufacturing
- inhibits political change and favors the status quo
- transnational corporations' control of marketing networks at the point of origin

Not surprisingly, the tendency is to try to keep increasing the volume of tourist arrivals, and hence the economy becomes even more a nation of servants. Figure 5 shows the off-shore consumption platform in relation to the center and periphery.

To operate the off-shore consumption platform requires the creation of systems specifically designed for foreign tourists and residents--the emphasis on luxury necessitates higher quality of infrastructure and services than most Third World countries, or for that matter most center countries, can furnish to their own population. Broader, well paved streets, ubiquitous landscaping, fancier amenities, more and better services, utilities with much higher capacities to handle tourist consumption levels and expec-

Figure 5

THE OFF-SHORE CONSUMPTION PLATFORM IN THE WORLD SYSTEM



Note: The new triangular trade shows the principal flows and direction of the unequal exchange of populations as commodities and the function of consumption platforms in the capitalist world system.

tations are several discrepancies between tourist and indigenous population areas (Suttles 1977: 101).

Tourism development entails the conversion of agricultural land or coastal/beach front land into resort accomodations and is the spatial manifestation of the off-shore consumption center. This reorganization of rural space is transforming the islands' landscapes into a new urban form, the "leisure industry urban system" or the acronym, **lindurbs**. The urban topography associated with the lindurb consists of hotels, restaurants, marinas, preserved colonial architecture or ruins, and the ancillary services of tourism, such as gift shops, golf courses, tennis courts, and night clubs often in self contained resort complexes. As much as the facilities themselves, the attention paid to the landscaping and scenic beautification that enhances the esthetic image is a defining characteristic. Advertisements emphasize features like "amenities of gracious living," "picturesque sites," palm shaded beaches," and "waterfront views" to describe the utopian setting. These are not commuting suburbs, but are adult playground communities of people with enough money to pursue leisure in style. It is the workers who commute to the lindurbs to provide the services enabling the tourists and the more permanent visitors to consume the leisure commodities.[12]

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[12]The workers are forced to live in the decaying central cities or squatter settlements on the edge of the resort complexes, thus imbuing the lindurb with a quaint

Raymond Williams has noted that although qualitative differences exist between the forms of economic exploitation and the forms of settlements, the pursuit of profits has very similar effects on human settlements (Williams 1973: 293). One reason the effects of tourism development lead to urbanization as did industrialization is the selling of leisure as a commodity. Gortz refers to this as the industrialization of non-material or intangible goods and elaborates,

> Conglomerates and banks are in the process of buying up the last sites where you can still enjoy the sun, the sea, and a view for free. And on them they are building airports, apartment towers, hotels with swimming pools, decked out beaches, marinas and parking lots. So, if you want to stretch out in the sun, **you have got to use (and pay for) these industrial** facilities. Enjoyment of the sun, the beach, and relaxation is made dependent on renting them.
>
> Capitalism has accomplished the feat of **capitalizing** picturesque spots and scenery--that is, it has transformed them into capital--of managing, operating and renting them out to "users." To do this, all they had to do was **industrialize the means of access and use of these sites** (Gortz 1980: 87 emphasis original).

Due to the fact that tourism in the islands relies so heavily on the image of paradise and must deliver some semblance of an unspoiled tropical environment, the urban-

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look, or in zoned quarters specifically for employees which have been constructed to conform to the lindurbs' architectural style.

ization that occurs takes the form of lindurbs, the socio-spatial expression of the off-shore consumption platform's economic function. Lindurbs become the dominant urban form when a geographical area becomes economically specialized in the tourist industry.[13]

To a certain extent the geographic spread of lindurbs resembles the enclosure movements and urbanization related to the Industrial Revolution between the second quarter of the Eighteenth Century and the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century. Williams has admonished that the parliamentary enclosure acts could not be isolated from the long standing trend of concentration of land holding, the related stratification between owners and tenants, and the increase in the number of landless under the impetus of agrarian capitalism. The legalized seizure by representatives of the beneficiary class helped to realize the dominance of the capitalist social system in the most economically dynamic areas and were more visible because they were more public and more recorded (Williams 1973: 96-98).

Likewise, lindurbs are an integral phenomenon of the process of the capitalist penetration of the periphery's

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[13]According to Hymer, geographic specialization is characterized by a division of labor based on nationality. This geographic specialization reflects the hierarchy of corporate decision making and the occupational distribtution of labor in a city or region depends on its function in the international economic system (Hymer 1970: 3).

tourist/service sector and are not isolated incidents. The inflated land values caused by tourism development and real estate speculation have force small black landholders to sell out. Especially dramatic due to the scope were the land appropriated for the Virgin Islands National Park on St. John and Freeport, Grand Bahama Island--two case studies which will be presented later.

According to Castells, urbanization in the periphery is the spatial expression that results from the process of articulating the dependent social formation into the world system; the urban form that emerges is imbricated upon the pre-existing internal social structures of both the dominant and subordinate social formations (Castells 1972: 44).[14] McElroy and Albuquerque maintain that historically in the smaller Caribbean islands, the distinction between town and country has been nebulous and currently is not significant in socioeconomic terms (McElroy and Albuquerque 1981: 288-289).[15]

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[14]Castells predicates the urban question upon the social production of urban forms. He identifies four issues central to the political economy of urban space: 1) the global acceleration of the pace of urbanization; 2) the concentration of urban growth in the Third World; 3) the emergence of new urban forms; and 4) the relationship between urbanization and new forms emerging from the capitalist mode of production (Castells 1972: 15). Lindurbs are new urban forms that emerge in response to tourism.

[15]For example Bermuda, a densely populated island, reports it population as 100 percent urban while Barbados, another densely populated island confines its definition of urban to the central city of Bridgetownas, or only 3.7

Lindurbs is preferred over the term, resort city, used in the classification developed by International City Managers' Association, that was based solely on occupational distribution. A resort city, was defined as a city with a special economic function,

> where the employees in entertainment, recreation, and personal services, but not in private households, total more than the manufacturing or retailing employment (Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations 1968: 10).

Douglas, who differentiates between suburbs of production and consumption, poses resort and amusement suburbs as an extreme example of the latter and in contrast to industrial suburbs. In the resort suburb no work is done except as connected to the pleasure of others so that,

> any business is related to consumption, domestic work, rest, recreation, and refreshment (Douglas 1925: 77).

For Douglas, suburbs were part of the decentralizing tendency where wealth created in the central city was consumed. The extensive use of land, the dependency upon the city, and a social base narrower than the central city community were other distinguishing characteristics (Douglas 1925: 15, 33, 35). Recreational suburbs, usually surrounding a resort,

> reflect a specific socioeconomic specialization from which they largely take their character and from which

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percent of the total population. Urbanization measures do not correspond to demographic reality in the Caribbean.

> they get their reputations" (Douglas 1925: 113).

According to Douglas, the clientele and employees of the recreational facilities and the business and professional classes needed to service the resort were the inhabitants of the recreational suburbs. In general suburbs did not carry out many urban functions, but one of the common intangible assets was the pleasant esthetics where leisure activities could be pursued (Douglas 1925: 93, 245).

The concept of lindurbs more precisely captures the the simultaneous production of services and their consumption and the greater part of the lindurbs' population is transient. Lindurbs are not dependent upon a single central city, but in fact are compositely dependent upon the center's cities and suburbs. Therefore, lindurbs are not so much recreational suburbs, but a new species of urban form connected to the tourist industry.[16]

Sales lists real estate/construction and leisure industries (of which tourism is the principal component) as the fifth and sixth pillars of the Southern rim's economy (Sale 1975: 17-48). The Bahamas and Virgin Islands, whose post war growth was concentrated in these two sectors, also benefited from two of the three national trends in

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[16]See Viehe (1981) for a discussion of how the extractive industry was the primary factor in the suburbanization of Los Angeles. These suburbs of production were propelled by the dispersed location of oil fields and refinery sites.

the United States. The regional population migration from the Northeast and Midwest to the sunbelt states and the shift in employment patterns from manufacturing to private and public sector service work "spilled over" into the Caribbean islands most closely aligned with the United States.[17]

Having advocated that off-shore consumption platforms and lindurbs are the appropriate terms to represent the economic functions and sociospatial manifestations of tourist economies, the next section introduces the social dynamics of demographic imperialism. It is held that the tourist economies of the Bahamas and Virgin Islands through the dynamics of displacement and confinement are re-shaping social inequality.

Social Inequality and the Dynamics of Geosocial Displacement/Confinement

The "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" proclaimed on December 10, 1948 addresses the issue of geographic mobility in Article 13.

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[17]The third trend presented by Sale, the high technology manufacturing, has not been transferred to the Bahamas and Virgin Islands. Neither have the other pillars of growth of the sunbelt economy--agribusiness, defense, advanced technology, and oil and natural gas production (aside from two major refineries)--been extended to these islands. The emergence of a monocultural tourist industry and lindurbs has occurred at the expense of a diversified economy.

> (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country (United Nations 1948).

Obviously, not everyone with the volition to travel is able to, just as many who prefer to remain sedentary can not.

Two dialectically related mechanisms of geosocial displacement and confinement/exclusion operate at the structural level to determine the characteristics of demographic imperialism during a given historical phase. Hamilton discussed geosocial displacement as a,

> complex social process not just a physical movement. The movement of a people must be conceptualized as contributing to the definition of what people were, what they are, and what they will become (Hamilton 1982: 11).

Conversely, geosocial confinement refers to the complex of formal or informal barriers that impede movement whether spatially or in the more ample socioeconomic and political sense.

Tourism and the Changing Tiers of Inequality: Geopolitical Origin, Race, and Class[18]

The displacing and confining mechanisms of demographic imperialism operate in a world where the population is segmented by structural cleavages and thus the various groups experience displacement and confinement differentially. In the context of a world system stratified by geopolitical origin, race, and class, these mechanisms shape the composition, the magnitude, and the direction of population movements. The dynamics of displacement and confinement and the world hierarchy of social inequality inform us about the likely, relative position of a group at the destination.

Geopolitical origin refers to the superior/subordinate position conferred upon a population by the political economic location of their country in the world system usually expressed in terms of the center and periphery. Due to the asymmetrical economic and political power of countries, global inequality shapes the propensity of a given population for cross-national geographical mobility and the type of travel which occurs. According to Hamilton, the international flows of people of African descent are conditioned by two interrelated phenomena: structural forces,

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[18]This section draws heavily on Ruth Hamilton's paper, "A Conceptualization of the Transformation and Development of People as A Social Formation: A Global Approach to the African (Black) Diaspora" 1982.

such as labor procurement, and individual or group level action and strategies for survival and quest for decency, such as voluntary migration to find employment (Hamilton 1982: 12). On the other hand, a group or individual may have more options and move to elevate one's status, enhance his/her life style, or simply seek a tropical climate as a leisure time preference.

It is the failure to include the dimension of geo-political origin that most seriously impairs previous attempts to analyze West Indian stratification patterns.[19] In some respects geopolitical origin is similar to nationality, but it explicitly emphasizes the political element of world system inequality instead of cultural identity.

The significance of race in the West Indies can not be overstated. Hamilton lists three axioms about race as a factor in the global dominance system.

1. Race, in its structural and ideological dimensions, has operated as a central and persistent element at all levels of modern society with varying form and content over time and space.

2. Race prejudice and racial ideologies permeate all levels of the human/social interpersonal experience to the extent that it constitutes an outstanding feature of world cosmology and ideology.

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[19]This omission seems to be a result of the tendency to exclude foreigners, whether they be colonial administrators, permanent residents, illegal immigrants, or tourists from analyses of domestic socioracial structure. While tourists may be the most transient group, they have a tremendous cumulative impact.

> 3. Racial inequality, manifested in diverse socio-racial structures, operates within and across societies with direct implications for the black diaspora as a social formation and for the form and content of "peoplehood" (Hamilton 1982: 25-26).

Race is a socially defined category based upon cultural and biological heritage and distinctions, largely determined by self-definition, but also imposed by the dominant group within a specific historical context.

The third dimension that figures prominently in the global dominance system is that of class. Class as used in this analysis is compositely derived from elements of the Weberian definition of class, as well as social status and power. A class according to Weber is any group of persons occupying the same class status or situation.

> The term "class status" will be applied to the typical probability that a given state of (a) provision with goods, (b) external conditions of life, and (c) subjective satisfaction or frustration will be possessed by an individual or a group. These probabilities define class status in so far as they are dependent on the kind and extent of control or lack of it which the individual has over goods and services and existing possibilities of their exploitation for the attainment of income or receipts within a given economic order (Weber 1964: 424).

The "market determination" of class is modified by social standing or status.

> The term of "social status" will be applied to a typically effective claim to positive or negative privilege with respect to social prestige so far as it rests on one or more of the fol-

> lowing bases: (a) mode of living, (b) a formal process of education which may consist in empirical or rational training and the acquisition of the corresponding modes of life, or (c) on the prestige of birth, or of an occupation (Weber 1964: 429).

In Weber's theoretical framework, classes are "stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods," whereas status groups are "stratified according to the principles of the their **consumption** of goods as represented by special styles of life" (Weber 1967: 937, emphasis original). Also entering the composite concept of class is the notion of social power vested in the orientation of class and status strata to acquiring political control and/or influencing social action (Weber 1967: 938).

Specifically as used in this research, class is determined by the groups' access to and control over the wealth and resources of the islands and economic and political function in the islands' division of labor. Occupation/economic activity, income/earnings, education, and land/-business ownership are used as measures of a groups' class position. Also indicative of a group's class standing is the way it participates in the islands' political and social life and structure of domination.

Research Questions and Guiding Propositions

Based upon the preceding discussion, four central research questions are derived. First of all, how is the asymmetrical articulation of the islands' tourist economies expressed? Second, what relationship exists between tourism as a form of demographic imperialism and social inequality. Third, are there changes in the patterns of social inequality attributable to tourism? Fourth, does political status make a difference in the way the Bahamas and Virgin Islands are economically dependent? From these central questions a set of guiding propositions are posed. The guiding propositions are to be examined and verified in the analysis.

General Proposition I

Due to the cumulative historical practices of unequal exchange such as protective tariffs, differences in labor productivity, repressive colonial administration, and patents as well as present power relations, the population in the center has a clearly established economic advantage over the population in the periphery. Tourism thus serves to continue the historical process of asymmetrical economic integration of the West Indian peripheral economies into the world capitalist system.

Subpropositions

I-A. As with other dependency measures, the islands' statistics will show concentration of trade in terms of tourism in the national economic accounts and by country of origin.

I-B. The major benefits of tourism go to those in the periphery with the closest ties to the center and not to the majority of the islands' populations.

General Proposition II

The freedom to travel and the necessity to work underscore the point that tourism is more inimical in the impact it has on a Third World society. This accentuated impact is due to tourism's peculiar characteristics of the importation of the consumers, the generation of immigrant communities, the competition for land and other resources and goods, and the way the interaction is mediated between consumers and producers.

Subpropositions

II-A. The dynamics of displacement and confinement and the world hierarchy of social inequality should inform us about the likely position of a group at the destination. The objective location in the respective islands' social hierarchy may not be recognized by a group, but the means of economic livelihood and control of

its destiny are bound up in their strata's relative position.

II-B. The so called neutral tourist and labor markets and government policies actually reinforce the historical pattern of demographic imperialism, but on a scale that is unrivaled since the slave trade and in a form that is unprecedented. Both tourism and immigration are co-determined by the market and state intervention which perpetuates cumulative social inequality along the lines of geopolitical origin, race, and class.

General Proposition III

Geopolitical origin, race, and class represent the significant cleavages in the Virgin Islands and Bahamas; the global structural determinants of inequality and the relations of domination and subordination coalesce along these three dimensions. As a result of the tourist economies expansion since the 1950s, the Bahamas and Virgin Islands' social relations has undergone a profound transformation in its stratification pattern.

Subpropositions

III-A. The new types of entrepreneural, and public and private sector occupational positions created by tourism development have produced an upward shift in the relative position of the indigenous population.

III-B. However, peculiar to the off-shore consumption platform, the large scale influx of two groups of immigrants, one from the North American center and one from the West Indian periphery, has reestablished a tiered hierarchy in which the dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and class converge.

III-C. While geopolitical origin, race, and class membership could contradict or coincide with one another, in the new international division of labor based on tourism, as in the pre-tourist era stratification pattern, the immigrant groups characteristics converge so that inequality is intensified and made more rigid by the overlapping categories.

III-D. This inequality among the groups existed prior to their arrival in the islands, but tourism has spatially condensed the inequality on the consumption platforms, and this compaction of diverse groups magnifies the disparities.

III-E. Direct contact of diverse population groups fostered by tourism does not promote understanding, but exacerbates the conflict inherent in social change.

General Proposition IV

The Virgin Islands will be more directly economically dependent upon the United States while the Bahamas will

be more dependent upon the tourist industry and thus indirectly economically dependent upon the United States.

Subpropositions

IV-A. The independent Bahamas will display greater flexibility in their interaction with the United States and tourism policy than the Virgin Islands as a colony.

IV-B. The trading patterns of the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas will be similar due to the primacy of economic dependency and the constraints imposed by the United States and the tourist trade.

The next section begins the analysis of tourism in the political economy of the Bahamas and Virgin Islands. Special emphasis is placed upon the fact that despite the similar historical context of tourism and the patterns of trade, the differences in political status between the microstates accent the unique trajectories of the islands.

PART THREE

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE BAHAMAS AND VIRGIN ISLANDS

"The Beauties of Santa Cruz"

Betwixt old Cancer and the mid-way line
In happiest climate lies this envied isle,
Trees bloom throughout the year, streams ever flow,
And fragrant Flora wears a lasting smile.

Cool, woodland streams from shaded clifts descend;
The dripping rock no want of moisture knows,
Supply'd by springs that on the skies depend,
That fountain feeding as the current flows.

Such were the isles which happy Flaccus sung,
Where one tree blossoms while another bears,
Where spring forever gay, and ever young,
Walks her gay round through her unwearied years.

Such were the climes which youthful Eden saw
Ere crossing fates destroy'd her golden reign--
Reflect upon the loss, unhappy man,
And seek the vales of <u>Paradise</u> again.

Philip Morin Freneau, 1779 (Stanzas 10-13).

CHAPTER FIVE

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TOURISM IN THE BAHAMAS AND VIRGIN ISLANDS

Islands of Beautiful Landscapes and Salubrious Airs

The potential for tourism in the West Indies has long been recognized. Since Columbus, European and North American visitors have praised the exquisite scenery and therapeutic climate. As early as 1725 a British naturalist wrote that the Bahamas were healthier than most countries of the same latitude inducing many sickly persons from the Carolinas to recouperate there. A military engineer who arrived in Nassau in 1740 wrote that the,

> Bahama islands enjoy the most serene and temperate air in all America ... it is therefore no wonder that the sick and afflicted of those climates [other British colonies in North America] fly hither for relief, being sure to find a cure here (Peter Henry Bruce quoted by Albury 1975: 220).

By 1845 the need for a hotel was expressed by several prominent Bahamians and the Colonial assembly responded by allocating funds to build the Royal Victoria Hotel in 1859 to accomodate American convalescents and invalids. The connection to the North American continent was also conspicuous in that the land on which the hotel was built was sold by a Canadian businessman who doubled as the American consul in Nassau. After a government commission

operated the hotel it was leased to two Americans who ran the hotel; in 1873 the 500 visitors to the Bahamas set a record for the Nineteenth Century (Villard 1976: 10-11). Additional accolades for the Bahamas as health resort continued after the Civil War. By the end of the Nineteenth Century fashion had replaced health and Flagler's Royal Victoria and Colonial Hotels were catering to idle rich Americans during the four month winter season.

Powles, a British magistrate sympathetic to the wretched condition of the black community and at odds with the local white power structure chronicled the early degradation of Bahamian culture by the visitors. The imposition of tourists' expectations support Taylor's observations about the "welcoming society" in Jamaica. According to Powles, the outer archways of the Royal Victoria, by then under different American management, served as bazaar where the natives would congregate to sell and entertain the guests.

> Colored people of both sexes and all ages with fruit, shell work, baskets, canes and all sorts of other wares stand about waiting for chance customers...Coloured boys scramble for pennies upon the hard pavements and brick. Sometimes the crowd sings shouter hymns and dances for the amusement of the company (Powles 1888: 186).

When the American hotel guests grew tired of the diversions at the hotel or outside recreation like boating, fishing, duck hunting, picnicking, and polo matches, they

sought pleasure by making the natives perform in other settings.

> A favorite amusement is to go down to Rawson Square and make the younger darkies dive for coppers. They are very expert and never lose a copper by any chance (Powles 1888: 187).

It seems that the tourists found fun in staging "native shows" and playing "practical jokes" at the expense of black Bahamians.

Another incident demonstrates the extent to which the early tourists demeaned the culture and behavior of Afro-Bahamians. As reported by Powles, a New York Times' correspondent led a group of six to the Shouter (Methodist) Church. The newspaperman "contracted" through a ten dollar donation to attend an exceptionally spiritually moving service to "relieve the monotony of a Nassau Sunday." At the church the American visitors sat on reserved seats on the pulpit behind the minister and exchanged jestful comments during the service. As the story goes, William Drysdale, the correspondent, physically held the minister and denounced him as an imposter and refused to deliver the prearranged honorarium until the minister had worked the congregation into a more frenzied exhibition (Powles 1888: 188-191).

One last pitiful antidote concerns an episode of spontaneous cultural exploitation. The incident occurred at a small general store cum tavern where several tourists

had gone to observe the clientele. One customer was an elderly, "coal black, Congo woman" laden with bundles upon her head and under her arms. When she saw the Americans, she asked them for "a little something." Morley, the store proprietor who was called "Boss" by the customers, advised the woman that she should dance for the Americans if she expected anything. The foreign visitors were surprised to see,

> a woman of her age drawing her scant skirts together in preparation for a dance...and almost before we know what is going on, she is dancing in the small open space in the middle of of the floor--dancing to a strange tune she hums herself of which the short words come out in jerks. She throws herself about wildly, gives us one of the half graceful, half awkward Congo dances we have often seen before (Powles 1888: 174-175).

Rewarded with a quarter, she thanked and blessed her "benefactors" profusely, bought three cents worth of tobacco and left. Powles' account is based upon "An Evening at Morley's" by William Drysdale).[1]

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[1]Although basically sympathetic to the rude conditions of the Afro-Bahamian population, Powles' participation in the "accepted tourist practices" of making fun at local people and their customs shows not only the extent of Powles' racism, but the legitmacy afforded to tourists' demands of subverting indigenous culture. The tourists innately fit into the white supremacist power structure, and backed by the superiority conferred on them by class and geopolitical origin, reinforced the stratification patterns. The Americans by intensifying the racist character of white supremacy added a new dimension to social inequality. At the time Powles blamed the local poor white population instead of the Americans for the existence in the Bahamas of an "undercurrent of race hatred with which

The colonial government continued to attempt to stimulate the tourist trade by contracting with steamship lines. Three acts passed since 1851 to encourage steamship navigation from New York to Nassau had met with little success, but the burgeoning of Florida as a winter resort in the 1890's instilled new optimism in Bahamian officials. The fourth Hotel and Steamship Act was passed in 1898 and an agreement was signed with American businessman, Henry Flagler.

Flagler had been the treasurer of Standard Oil and had married a niece of John D. Rockefeller and the head of the oil empire had loaned Flagler $70,000 to help him finance his first business venture. Flagler prospered and soon became wealthy himself from his railroad and real estate development. After founding Miami and Palm Beach Florida and building luxury hotels like the Royal Poinciana, he pushed the railroad line to Key West and then turned to the Bahamas. In the deal he signed with Bahamian authorities to provide regular steamship service, Flagler also obtained the Royal Victoria Hotel. Determined to make Nassau into a fashionable winter resort like Palm Beach, the American entrepreneur renovated (including the installation of electricity) and enlarged the facilities of the hotel. Subsequently, he purchased the army barracks at

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the white conchs will have to reckon sooner or later (Powles 1888: 115).

Fort Nassau and built the Hotel Colonial, the second largest hotel in the Bahamas (Craton 1962: 258-259; Amory 1958: 334; and Villard 1976: 16).

The Virgin Islands, like the Bahamas, had early propagandists extolling the tropical delights of climate and scenery. "The Beauties of Santa Cruz" (St. Croix) was written in 1779 by the "poet of the American Revolution, Philip Morin Freneau. The poem (excerpts of which appear preceding this chapter), beckons the American reader sick of the northern gloom,frozen ground, and turmoil of the Revolutionary War, to the happiest climate and sweet verdant isle of trees blooming throughout the year, ever-flowing streams, and fragrant flora. References to the Garden of Eden and Paradise are found in this paean to St. Croix's virtues, and a rather lengthy inventory of the island's fruits, flora, and fishes is woven admiringly into the text. St. Croix's landscape is hailed as superior to its neighboring islands in the Eastern Caribbean. A word of caution about the fierce hurricanes and of denounciation of slavery, the slave trade, and sugar planters adds a realistic touch to the poem that otherwise outdoes Madison Avenue hyperbole (Freneau 1963: 68-72).[2]

One hundred thirty-four years later when Charlotte

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[2]Interestingly, Freneau predicts in the poem that free labor tilling the land would reap a more generous harvest than slave labor on the bountiful island.

Amalie was a coaling station, another visitor commented that St. Thomas,

> enjoys increasing favor with tourists because of its good roads, its clean beautiful capital of Charlotte Amalie, its glorious views of azure sea and distant islands and islets, its own pretty hill scenery and romantic ruined 'pirate castles' (Johnston 1969: 349).[3]

Additionally, based on a trip to the islands in 1916, the year before the Danes relinquished control, DeBooy and Faris wrote a book expressly about the conditions and possibilities awaiting the prospective tourist and businessman. The monograph about "America's newest possessions" contained the comments of an earlier traveler who professed that the view upon entering the Charlotte Amalie harbor was the most charming in the West Indies--combining the atmosphere of Algiers and the gorgeous colors of Venice (DeBooy and Faris 1918: 58-59).

DeBooy and Faris also revealed the tendency for tourist literature to portray the natives as mere objects for tourists' sightseeing agendas and as friendly and harmless. They commended the St. Thomian negroes, who were more polite than any other West Indian negroes, for not wanting equality with their white fellow citizens (attributed to the excellent training by the Danes). The

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[3]Johnston included the caveat that the pirate castles were really built by the Danish West Indian Company indicating that public relations' efforts were already underway to entice tourists by deceptive advertising.

men and women coal carriers who earned a penny a basket carrying eighty-five to ninety-five pound baskets of coal up and down the steep ramp to the ship were described as "picturesque" (DeBooy and Faris 1918: 72).[4]

St. Croix, while called the "garden of the Antilles," lacked the charming architectural style of old buildings which were destroyed by labor riots in 1878. Instead of magnificent seascapes and beautiful mountain panoramas, St. Croix was said to be appealing to the tourist because of its orderly appearance of vast cultivated cane fields dissected by a lattice of roadways (DeBooy and Faris 1918: 221). The contrast to the gentle St. Thomian population's temperment is noted; the St. Croix' atmosphere was allegedly charged with surliness.

> No pleasant greetings are given; indeed, the negroes one meets seem to scowl at the stranger and resent his presence.

However, the authors mindful that such hostility might discourage their audience, attempt to reassure the reader by adding that the Cruzan,

> is at heart good natured, and the discourtesy one meets with is due more to the resentment of the people because of their vile condition than any evil intentions toward the visitor (DeBooy and Faris 1918: 213).

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[4]A carrier could earn as much as $2.00 day which meant that he or she would have to carry about nine and one-half tons of coal.

The Underdevelopment of Plantation Economies

Unlike most of the other West Indian islands, the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands' plantation economies were already defunct or moribund and deforestation virtually completed by the end of World War II. Without a sufficiently large population to attempt "industrialization by invitation" and lacking any mineral wealth, by default tourism came to dominate the island economies and propel them into two of the leading tourist destinations in the Caribbean.

While experiencing the plantation regimen in varying intensities, the Bahamas and Virgin Islands' fortunes and poverty have more closely been tied to the sea and maritime patterns of trade. Perhaps no more erratic in economic performance than plantation or manufactured exports, offshore trade does not require internal production or consumption capacity. However, the lack of an agricultural and industrial base renders extraverted accumulation via commerce more vulnerable to complete collapse. St. Thomas owed its past prominence in commerce to its excellent natural harbor and early free port status becoming an entrepot for slaves and other commodities; a place where European vessels could circumvent protective mercantile trading

laws.[5] Abolition, the demise of the sailing ship, and abandonment of the mercantilist doctrine severely reduced the level of trade in St. Thomas. The decline was only partially and temporarily off-set by replacing the previous function with that of a coaling station; soon this trade became obsolete with the changes in navigational technology. By 1930 when President Herbert Hoover visited the islands and declared them to be an "American poorhouse," the Virgin Islands had lost much of its population which had peaked in 1835.

The Bahamas economy also waxed and waned on serendipitous ocean commerce. Bursts of economic activity accompanied blockade running during the Civil War and running rum during prohibition. The longest sustained activity was the sponging industry centered on Grand Bahama Banks from 1841 until 1938 when over-fishing and a devastating parasitical disease ended the export of sponges (Craton 1962: 252). Previously, in periods of stagnation, wrecking, the successor to privateering, and the export of labor kept the Bahamas from going completely under.

At times the wreckers would become desperate enough to prematurely wreck a vessel, but the salvaged merchandise did expand the trade of the Bahamas. The comments about the rapid expansion of wrecking between 1846 and 1856 in

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[5]Sugar cane production peaked in 1796; by 1851 sugar cane was no longer cultivated on St. Thomas or St. John (Orlins 1969: 76).

an article written in 1918 are just as valid today for the contribution tourism makes in augmenting the national accounts.

> It was a blind rush, but its folly was not patent. It did however, seriously hamper the course of internal economic development. The diverted energy was employed in an enterprise in which, no matter what the effort or the outlay, no enduring foundations were being laid for an abiding, communal economic life, and from which no cumulative results of long drawn-out processes could be expected. Once commerece became freed from the menace of wreck, not only the foundations, but every vestige of the salvage industry would vanish into thin air (Wright 1918: 641.

From the last part of the nineteenth Century until 1914 the Hamburg-American line would stop at Albert Town, Long Cay and take on crews. The town also served as a collecting point for Bahamians who went to Jamaica or Panama to find work and was described in 1888 as one of the most flourishing settlements of the out-islands (Evans and Young 1976: 60). Later on stevedores and contract workers were engaged at Matthew Town, Inagua. In 1942 over 140 steamships and 85 sailing vessels stopped and took on 2,880 workers for the Hamburg-American Line, the Royal Netherlands' Line, the Panama Canal, the Mexican Railroad, or lumber industries in Central America. Almost as large, another labor recruitment center operated on Fortune Island in the Crooked Island group. World War II ended this activity (Albury 1975: 198-199).

Even more numerous was the flow of Bahamians who went to work in the construction of Miami, the Florida East Coast Railroad, and South Florida farms beginning in the 1890's. The flow of workers to Florida differed from the parallel movement to the southeast in that during World War II the recruitment of temporary workers was institutionalized by the American and Bahamian governments as part of the war effort.

The magnitude of the continuing exodus of the population from several of the out-islands is impressive. Since 1901 when the population of Crooked Island peaked at 1,597, the de-population of the island resulted in a 1980 population of only 517 or about one-third of its previous high. Acklins and Cat Island also experienced a similar loss in population although the population of the Bahamas has climbed from 53,735 to 209,505 during the same time period (Commonwealth of the Bahamas nd: 6). Over the last two decades the major migration stream has been to Grand Bahama Island and New Providence.

The United States and the Periphery

Dependent Trading Patterns

The United States' early dominance in trade is evident for both the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas. In 1898 of

the Bahamas imports valued at 238,336 Pounds Sterling, the U.S. shipped 71.6 percent compared to the United Kingdom's 24.8 percent. Similarly, the U.S. received 60.0 percent of the British Colony's 174,860 Pounds Sterling worth of exports while Great Britain accounted for only 17.0 percent (Robinson 1900: 166-177). The last year Denmark controled its West Indian colony, 1916, the United States lead all other countries as a source of 45.2 percent of St. Thomas' total $734,680 worth of imports; Denmark's share was only 6.9 percent. Coal constituted one-fourth of the goods imported from the States and was used primarily to fuel the steamships and thus, re-exported. The year preceding the War, coal comprised 49.0 percent of all U.S. exports to the Danish West Indies with a volume three times that of 1916. The U.S. percentage of total Danish West Indian imports was 57.6 percent indicating the significance of the coal trade. Exports amounting to $278,437 were shipped to the United States in 1941. Ninety-five percent of this total was sugar, virtually all grown in St. Croix (DeBooy and Faris 1918: 236-261).

The United States had negotiated a treaty for the Danish West Indies in 1867, the same year Alaska was purchased, but the lack of Senate ratification abrogated the agreement. World War I and the possibility of German occupation of land under the Danish flag posed a security threat to the shipping lanes to the Panama Canal and promp-

ted the purchase in 1917 for $25 million. Thus political control consolidated the American economic dominance. DeBooy and Faris speculated about the next American acquisition,

> It is not inconceivable that Great Britain, may be induced to cede to the U.S. some of her islands in the Caribbean. The Bahamas, for instance, are today in very much the same position as were the Danish Islands during the twenty years before the transfer. They depend on the U.S. for the majority of their imports and for a market for their exports. The tourist resort of Nassau on the Island of New Providence is visited almost exclusively by Americans and would lose its only claim to importance if the revenue from this source were cut-off (DeBooy and Faris 1918: 30-31).

Trade dependency on the United States has exerted a centripetal force on both the Bahamas and Virgin Islands, but the Bahamas has resisted political incorporation into the United States.

Differential Policy Impact

The fact that the Bahamas remains outside the American political bailiwick means that general United States' domestic and foreign policies and deliberate intervention into the internal affairs have had a differential impact upon the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands. The past and present examples serve to disclose the differences between economic and political dependency.

The most concise example of an indirect policy with profound and obverse consequences is that of prohibition. The Volstead Act eliminated the rum industry in the Virgin Islands, the U.S. colony, and may have hastened the demise of sugar cane cultivation in St. Croix (Orlins 1969: 79). By contrast, the Eighteenth Amendment that was in effect from January 16, 1920 until its repeal on December 5, 1933 contributed to a period of relative prosperity in the Bahamas. Bootlegging or rum running and tourists coming to the islands to imbibe alcoholic beverages stimulated the economy as the earlier offshore industry of blockade running had done during the Civil War (Craton 1962: 264-268).

United States' immigration laws and policy also had a differential impact. Initially, when the Danish West Indies were acquired from Denmark, an act passed in 1917 continued the free exchange of population between the British Virgin Islands and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In 1927 another act was passed that conferred U.S. citizenship on the Virgin Islanders and extended naturalization laws to them. It was the 1927 act that halted the British immigration and facilitated the movement of Puerto Ricans from the islands of Vieques and Culebra to St. Croix (U.S. Congress 1975).[6] Additionally, it promoted the

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[6]Puerto Rican migration from Vieques was given a fillip when the U.S. Navy acquired seventy-six percent of the island for target practice and war games in the early

exodus of Virgin Islanders to New York. The late Congressman Adam Clayton Powell once stated that there were more islanders than mainlanders among his New York constituency. It was estimated that the population of Virgin Island ancestry living in the tri-state area of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut was 100,000 in 1980 or over three times the population born in the Virgin Islands and still residing there (Maduro 1982 and U.S. Department of Commerce 1982).

The U.S. immigration laws of 1917 (literacy tests), 1921 and 1924 (ceilings on total immigration and quotas based on national origin) affected the Bahamas in an opposite manner by ending Bahamian emigration to Florida. Prior to the these restrictive laws, Key West, established as a sponging center in the 1870's, attracted numerous Bahamians so that by 1892 approximately 8,000 Bahamians were counted among the total population of 25,000 (Craton 1962: 252). The construction of Miami, the Southern Railroad down the peninsula, and planting of citrus groves and vegetable farms in the 1890s had also drawn large numbers of Bahamians. Many Bahamians were imported to help in the harvest during the winter season and then were repatriated to the Bahamas while others stayed to become permanent (Thompson 1942). In July, 1918 some 2,500

1940's. Unemployment was forty-five percent among Vieques' 8,000 residents in 1979 (Miami Herald, December 12, 1979, p. 1A).

Bahamians were contracted to work on port installations at Charleston, South Carolina (Craton 1962: 261). One official estimate states that approximately 12,000 Bahamians left the Bahamas for the United States during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century. One Bahamian in every five emigrated; some islands lost up to thirty percent of their population (Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1976: 5). The census reported that between 1911 and 1921 the Bahamian population plunged from almost 56,000 to 53,000 (Commonwealth of the Bahamas nd: 6). Emigration that served as release valve for Bahamian surplus population and unemployment was terminated almost the same time access to the continental U.S. was streamlined for Virgin Islanders.[7]

As the depression persisted, the American war effort began to create jobs directly in the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas. In the former, the construction of naval air bases on St. Thomas, Bourne Field (later Harry S. Truman Airport), and St. Croix, Benedict Field (later Alexander Hamilton Airport), provided jobs to help off set the high level of unemployment. Similarly, in the Bahamas under

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[7]American buyers had acquired a lot of control over the Bahamian tomato industry by the 1920's by providing farmers with money for seeds and fertilizer and handling packing, shipping, and marketing expenses. In 1929 the U.S. Government levied an import duty of a penny and a half a pound to protect Florida growers (who employed Bahamians) that made it uneconomical to export the crop to the U.S. (Albury 1975: 187-188).

the Lend Lease Act signed with Great Britain, the United States expanded the Oakes Air Field (now Nassau International Airport) and constructed a new base at the western end of New Providence using 2,500 Bahamian workers between 1942 and 1943 (Richardson 1944: 3).[8] Subsequently, at the end of World War II these military bases were converted into civilian commercial airports, thereby providing these islands with the essential infrastructure for the post war air technology and allowing the tourist trade to "take--off."

A comparison of the Virgin Islands Company (VIC) and the U.S. agricultural labor contract program show how the United States' government attempted to deter Virgin Islanders who could enter and permanently stay in the mainland from leaving the islands, while it encouraged the importation of temporary Bahamian workers who were not eligible to remain in the U.S. The VIC created jobs in the islands while the agricultural labor program transferred workers to the jobs in the mainland.[9]

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[8]One difference was that Virgin Islanders were conscripted into the U.S. military while Bahamians served with the British forces. In June, 1942 British troops were deployed against Bahamian workers striking for higher wages at the U.S. construction project at Oakes Field (Richardson 1943: x).

[9]The success of detaining the Virgin Islanders in the Caribbean is questionable considering that there were an estimated 100,000 Virgin Islanders in the New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut tri-state area and about 2,500 in Washington, D.C. (Maduro 1983). Thus, in spite of attempts of confinement, the Virgin Island diaspora has established

The detrimental effects of prohibition in the Virgin Island were compounded by the depression. To alleviate the crisis of unemployment, the New Deal Administration created the Virgin Islands Company in 1934 (Virgin Islands Corporation after 1949) to undertake a massive rehabilitation scheme, thereby circumventing the constitutional restrictions on government enterprise. Among the five directors were D. Hamilton Jackson, black political leader and police judge on St. Croix and Lionel Roberts, black farmer and legislative leader in St. Thomas. Partially funded by a $1 million allocation from the Public Works Administration, the purpose was to carry out a joint United States-Virgin Island long range social, economic, and industrial development program (Evans 1935: 21). Its scope covered the production, harvesting, and refinement of sugar cane, and even the distilling, bottling, and marketing of Government House Rum.

Over the course of its life, VIC had a more comprehensive development program than the Tennessee Valley Authority and included the generation and distribution of electric power, operation of the St. Thomas Airport, land reform and a homesteading program (chiefly on St.

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a larger population in the continental U.S. than the entire population in 1980 of just over 96,000 and more than twice the number of native Virgin Islanders left in the islands (under 42,000). The proportional displacement of Virgin Islanders is much larger than the Puerto Ricans of whom "only" a third live in in the continental U.S.

Croix), and a sea water desalination plant. This state run development program ended in 1966 when its remaining land holdings were sold to Harviland, a subsidiary of Harvey (now Martin-Marietta) Aluminum (Creque 1968:2 and Dookhan 1972).[10]

Under the aegis of the VIC the New Deal program also used federal funds to construct the sixteen room Bluebeard Castle Hotel and develop other recreation facilities, as well as to build roads to encourage the tourist trade. The Washington caretakers believed that the tourist trade was the best chance to make St. Thomas self-sufficient (Evans 1935: 20-21).

However, Evans viewed the overall effect of United States' intervention negatively.

> The Virgin Islands are suffering from serious economic maladjustments apart from those which plunged the world into depression...During the eighteen years of American Sovereignty, the Virgin Islands have suffered deeply rooted and persistent economic and political problems. The present situation is so closely related to political struggles of the first magnitude that the public is likely to be confused concerning the real nature of the issues at stake. The problems of the Virgin Islands can be solved only if they are considered on their own merits, without reference to political feuds in Washington (Evans 1935: 14).

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[10] In the early months of 1985 Martin-Marietta was attempting to sell its Virgin Island aluminum facility.

Six detrimental effects were listed as follows:

1) Sale of the islands to the United States prompted the German owners of the Hamburg-American Steamship Company to move their West Indian headquarters to Curaçao resulting in loss of employment and shipping business.

2) Prohibition led to losses in rum sales and decline in tourist trade.

3) The cessation of importing cheap labor from the British West Indies to cultivate sugar cane in St. Croix accelerated the shift to cattle grazing.

4) When civil administration began, the closing of the American Naval Station in July, 1931 had disastrous effects on St. Thomas' economy.

5) The dry dock which sunk in the 1924 hurricane was not replaced and resulted in the loss of business and shipping.

6) The decline of agriculture on St. Croix and shipping on St. Thomas has boosted the volume of emigration of industrious workers to the United States.

Evans concluded that on the whole, the economy had deteriorated and the slight improvement in some economic accounts was largely due to the direct and indirect expenditures of the federal government (Evans 1935: 17).

In the Bahamas the completion of the air bases exacerbated the high rate of unemployment while in the United States the war induced shortage of agricultural workers became more severe. Gas rationing prevented the transportation of Mexican workers from the southwest. Thus, the Bahamians were "drafted" as substitute farm labor.

The agreement to use Bahamian labor, approved in 1943, was initially sanctioned under a section of the Immigration

Act of 1917 and administered by the War Food Administration of the Department of Agriculture. Many of the restrictions were waived regarding entry, but deportation clauses were maintained to enforce the temporary nature of the Bahamians' presence. In 1945 there were 5,387 Bahamians employed mostly in Florida in citrus fruit, sugarcane, and vegetable crops. The extent of the Bahamian labor force exported is better appreciated in comparison with the total active labor force in the Bahamas. Omitting the peasant farmers and seasonal casual labor, only 5,720 Bahamians were in the entire labor force in the Bahamas, which means that almost fifty percent of all employed Bahamians worked in the United States.

Not surprisingly, the program had noticeable effects on the Bahamas. One of the consequences was a decrease in criminal cases heard at the magistrate's court (Annual Report Bahama Islands 1947: 29). An unintended effect of the contract labor scheme was that recruitment of labor depleted New Providence of the greater number of its straw workers ("Straw Workers Gone To Florida" 1943: 2). At any rate, the program seems to have been successful at reducing the unemployment rate.

The temporary labor program was modified several times and was increased during the Korean War in the early 1950s. After 1956 the number of Bahamians admitted to the United States under the program began to decline when new

economic opportunities associated with tourism began to become available at home. The program was allowed to lapse in 1966, coincidentally, the same year the Virgin Islands Corporation went out of business.

Origins of the Contemporary Tourist Industry

The Bahamas government established a Development Board in 1914 to promote tourism. The governor of the Bahamas between 1932 and 1937 (after the bootlegging era and in the midst of the depression) recommended tourism as the only solution to the economic crisis, but felt an "all white" policy was essential (Dupuch 1967: 67).[11] The first Hotel Encouragement Act passed the House of Assembly in 1949 and has been amended several times to include a vast array of liberal tax exemptions and refunds of duties on imported items (See "Hotel Encouragement" Bahamas Handbook and Businessman's Annual 1982: 334-335 for the current concessions).

The pattern of an elite seasonal tourism prevailed until 1950 when Sir Stafford Sands took over the newly created Development Board.[12] Sands began efforts to

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[11] It is unclear whether the policy was intended to attract only white tourists, to keep the tourist facilities segregated for only white tourists' use or both.

[12] During an investigation of gambling and corruption in the Bahamas Sir Stafford was found to have disgracefully received large bribes in the form of million dollar legal

attract more tourists on a year round basis. Pan American Airways which had initiated sea plane service between Miami and Nassau in 1929 began landing on the ground in 1941. Emerald Beach, the first large hotel to open after the war in 1954 was air conditioned. The new international airport was opened in 1957 and a deepwater harbor permitting cruise passengers to disembark directly on to the Nassau dock was completed in 1964. Another step to encourage tourists came in 1965 when the Bahamas dropped the British Pound and instituted a currency system based on the American dollar. By then, the technology, infrastructure, and economic organization evolved to usher in the era of the mass tourist.

The Virgin Islands marshalled state support for the tourist industry later than the Bahamas. Although the twenty room Bluebeard Castle Hotel was built in 1935 by the government sponsored Federal Work Relief Program, the St. Thomas Development Board was not set up until 1948 and not put on equal footing with the other departments of local government until 1963. The same year a "quickie" divorce law was enacted to stimulate the tourist trade. In 1949 the first tax break law was passed to encourage construction of luxury hotels. The 200 room Virgin Isle Hotel was the first luxury hotel to be built, almost 100 years later than the Royal Victoria Hotel in Nassau.

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fees for arranging the exemption for the gambling casinos.

Financed by New York investor Sidney Kessler, and managed by Hilton Hotels, the 200 room air-conditioned hotel opened for the 1950-1951 winter season (Orlins 1969: 93).[13]

The year 1962 was pivotal in that Pan American initiated the first non-stop air service from New York to St. Croix thereby eliminating the necessity of first flying to Puerto Rico, then catching a connecting flight to St.-Croix. St. Thomas' harbor was dredged to accomodate larger cruise ships and the Harry S. Truman Airport runway was also extended during the year. In 1966 the first direct flight from New York to St. Thomas was inaugurated. Still most tourists flew to San Juan, Puerto Rico first and then took connecting flight to St. Thomas because of the cheaper airfares (Orlins 1969: 90). Anomalous to the Virgin Islands' modern tourist industry was the terminal at Harry S. Truman Airport on St. Thomas. The World War II aircraft hangar resembled a huge Quonset hut and remained an anachronistic relic.

Underlying the changes that have occurred was the tremendous expansion in both the number of tourist arrivals and the population of the islands. The next section discusses the absolute and relative magnitude of the contemporary tourist industry.

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[13]The small local handicraft industry, such as articles made of straw, needlecraft, and fruit preserves, which tourism proponents claim are stimulated by tourism development, actually disappeared by 1953 in the Virgin Islands (Orlins 1969: 208).

Contemporary Tourist Statistics

Turning to the relative dependency of the islands' economies upon tourism, the contribution of the tourist industry to the national accounts and the concentration of tourists by country of origin or residence are compared in Table 2 below. Lewis has labeled the Virgin Islands and Bahamas, along with Bermuda, "a subgroup of pure tourist economies" who are almost entirely dependent upon their ability to sell themselves to the affluent North American societies (Lewis 1972: 129). Indeed tourism is correctly called the "lifeblood" of the Bahamas and the "mainstay" of the Virgin Islands' economy. However, an inspection of Table 2 indicates that economy of the Bahamas rests more heavily on tourism than that of the Virgin Islands.

Whether comparing direct or indirect employment, the Bahamas' tourist sector proportionally employees twice as many in the labor force as the Virgin Islands. Tourism was estimated to account for one-half of all private sector employees in the Virgin Islands, but the government's 33.8 percent share of the total labor force represents the largest single industry (Pobicki 1981: 5). The higher proportion of government revenues generated by tourism and the Bahamas and the relatively low percentage for

TABLE 2

DEPENDENCY UPON THE TOURIST SECTOR
BAHAMAS AND VIRGIN ISLANDS

	BAHAMAS	VIRGIN ISLANDS
Employment	(1978)	(1980)
Tourism		
Direct	1/2	1/4
Indirect	2/3	1/3
Total	62,364	39,770
Government		
Revenues	(1978)	(1972)
Tourism	NA	$22.3m to $31.5m
%	60	13 to 19
Total	NA	$167m
Gross Domestic		
Product	(1978)	(1972)
Tourism	NA	$143.9m to $202.6m
%	77	35 to 50
Total	NA	$408m
Budget (1981)		
Tourism	$20.5m	$6.0m
%	6.7	2.7
Total	$306.0m	$223.8m
Visitor Expen-		
ditures (1980)		
Tourism	$304.3m	$641.0m
%	87.8	47.5
GNP	730.0m	640.0m
Visitor Origin (1980)	%	%
United States	74.8	94.0
Canada	11.0	1.7
Europe	9.7	3.5
Other	4.5	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0
Number	1.2m	0.5m

Source: Checchi and Company 1976: 26-27, 30, 65; Virgin Islands nd; Newbold and Rozynski 1981 21, 24; Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1981: 2, 19; Esannson 1982: 1, 12; Darville 1981: 1, 7; and "Tourism Again Ranking as Huge Money-Maker" 1978: 10B).

Note: Visitor origin figures are for stopover/overnight tourists only.

the Virgin Islands is expected because as a tax haven, the Bahamas has no income tax and the U.S. Virgin Islands' federal income taxes are paid locally. Orlins credited tourism as being largely responsible for the substantial increase in the Virgin Islands' revenues during the period of expanding tourist industry (Orlins 1969; 254-255).

Tourism also contributed a greater percentage to the Bahamian GDP (77 percent) than it did in the Virgin Islands (35 percent to 50 percent). The Bahamas, with purportedly the highest per capita tourism budget in the world, spent $20.5 million or $98 for every person enumerated in its 1980 census. The Virgin Islands allocated $6 million, the fifth largest budget in the Caribbean, or $62 per person. The Bahamas budget was more than three times the absolute size and two and one-half times the relative share of the Virgin Islands' budget. Visitor expenditures also confirms the greater influence in the Bahamas' economy; nevertheless, visitor expenditures contributed almost fifty percent of the Virgin Islands' GNP.

While tourism in the Virgin Islands was less influential than in the Bahamas, it is evident by most standards of industry importance that tourism was the dominant industry. If both did not qualify as "pure tourist economies," they certainly represent a radically different situation than in other Caribbean countries such as Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad where tourism was being

developed to diversify the economies dependent upon sugar cane and other extractive industries. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier tourism as an invisible export does not enter into the international trade statistics accounts, but by using these other indicators, concentration of economic activities under the commodity of tourism was sufficient to be considered highly dependent.

Having examined the concentration of the tourist industry in the national economies as measured by the relative share it contributes to various indicators, the other principal measure of dependency, concentration of trade by country is analyzed. The difference is that instead of of looking at the total volume of trade, only the origin of visitors is used. As can be seen in Table 2 above the composition of visitor origins shows that both the Bahamas and Virgin Islanders were heavily dependent upon the United States as a source of tourists. However, in this case, a greater proportion of the Virgin Islands' visitor arrivals were from a single country (the U.S) than those of the Bahamas.[14]

One reason for the relatively greater concentration of tourism in the Bahamas' economy is the composition of the visitor arrivals. As Table 3 shows, overnight tourists comprise the largest category of visitors in the Bahamas,

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[14]The reason for the variation is discussed in the following section comparing differences in the tourist economies and their political status.

but cruise ship passengers constitute the majority of Virgin Islands' visitors. The former normally requires lodging, meals while the latter confines purchases to the tourist shops in Bay Street and Main Street. In the Virgin Islands a survey showed that the average overnight visitor spent $592 per person (based on a 7.3 day stay) versus $84 per person for the average cruise ship passenger (usually in port for less than eight hours) (Newbold and Rozynski 1981: 28, 39). The Bahamas was able to accomodate more overnight visitors because the availability of hotel rooms was over twice that of the Virgin Islands, 11,427 to 4,752 in 1980; cruise ship calls numbered 744 and 894 respectively (Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1981: 25; and U.S. Virgin Islands nd).

TABLE 3
VISITOR COMPOSITION FOR THE BAHAMAS AND VIRGIN ISLANDS, 1980

TYPE	BAHAMAS	%	VIRGIN ISLANDS	%
STAYOVER	1,181,260	63.0	380,000	31.2
CRUISE SHIP	577,630	30.8	691,383	56.8
EXCURSIONIST	117,160	6.2	145,908	12.0
TOTAL	1,876,050	100.0	1,217,291	100.0

Source: Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1981: 19, 21; and U.S. Virgin Islands: nd.

Population Growth and Tourism Density

It was previously stated that the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas had the two fastest growing populations in the Western Hemisphere. In the Bahamas the population jumped from 68,846 in 1943 to 209,505 by 1980. The Virgin Islands' population increased even more rapidly going from 24,889 in 1940 to 96,569 by 1980. Although the population explosion slowed down between 1970 and 1980, the Virgin Islands' population increased by 54.6 percent or almost five times the percentage increase of the U.S mainland's 11.4 percent ("Growth in U.S. Territories 1980: 22). The Bahamas increased at 23.6 percent or just over double that of the United States (Commonwealth of the Bahamas nd). The population growth was concentrated in the Nassau/Freeport axis while in the Virgin Islands it was divided between St. Thomas and St. Croix; those out-islands experiencing tourism development and St. John also had net population gains.

Even more remarkable were the rates of growth in visitor (tourist) arrivals which surpassed the population rates of growth. Figure 6 shows the exponential increases in population and tourist arrivals.[15] Tourist arrivals in the Bahamas 1949 were 32,018, but by 1968 had already exceeded one million and in 1980 the number was the highest


[15](See Appendix 2 for Tables of Tourist Arrivals).

ever at 1.9 million arrivals. The Virgin Islands' tourist arrivals also underwent a phenomenal increase from 20,300 in 1949, topping the one million mark in 1972, and recorded over 1.2 million in 1980. While the semi-logarithmic curves for tourism arrivals resemble curves of a biological population reaching the carrying capacity of its ecosystem, the important point is that in addition to the stress of absorbing the enormous increases in population, Bahamians and Virgin Islanders had to cope with even a more rapid increase in tourists.

A journalistic account on the black power movement in the Caribbean observed that the anti-white sentiments were more pronounced in islands with the highest volume of tourists--Virgin Islands, the Bahamas, and Jamaica (Mapes 1970: 1,15). However, sheer volume fails to allow for differences in the population base. The conventional indicator for expressing the relationship between tourist arrivals and population is tourist density, the ratio between tourist arrivals and population. One economist concluded that a positive correlation existed between tourist density and degree of hostility toward foreign visitors (Gray 1979: 386). Table 4 below presents the tourist densities for the Bahamas and Virgin Islands from 1950 to 1980. These densities of 909 and 1,352 respectively were among the highest in the world. By comparison,

FIGURE 6

TOURIST ARRIVALS AND POPULATION GROWTH FOR THE U,S, VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS, 1950 - 1980



SOURCE: TABLE 4, p. 190; TABLES 21 and 22, pp. 477-478.

TABLE 4
TOURIST DENSITY FOR VIRGIN ISLANDS AND BAHAMAS, 1950-1980

YEAR	TOURISTS	POPULATION	DENSITY (RATIO)
		VIRGIN ISLANDS	
1950	42,400	26,665	159/100
1960	204,100	32,099	636/100
1970	910,900	62,468	1,458/100
1980	1,306,000	96,569	1,352/100
		BAHAMAS	
1953	99,667	84,841	118/100
1963	546,404	130,220	420/100
1970	1,298,444	168,534	770/100
1980	1,904,560	209,505	909/100

SOURCE: Tables 21 and 22 in Appendix 2.

1980 tourist densities for Puerto Rico and Barbados were 64 and 208 respectively.

Even as small as the islands are and the fact that the cumulative total for the year is spread over 365 days, tourist density actually belies the magnitude. New Providence and Grand Bahama Island received 81.6 percent of all the visitors to the Bahamas. On New Providence most of visitor arrivals are concentrated along the Nassau waterfront and Paradise Island.

Cruise ships particularly effect the everyday world of Nassau and Charlotte Amalie residents. The disembarking cruise ship passengers are mostly confined to the shopping districts along Bay Street and Main Street. The injection of up to 4,000 passengers simultaneously makes traffic congestion as bad in Charlotte Amalie as it is in much larger cities. In 1972 when the number of cruise ships stopping at St.Thomas was almost 400 less than in 1980, the facilities were overstrained. During the preceding year six cruise ships had docked at one time on forty-five days, seven ships on twelve days, eight ships on three days, and one day nine ships were in the harbor (Daily News October 4, 1972).

Main Street in Charlotte Amalie was so congested that that the author had to wait several minutes before an opening would appear in the bumper to bumper traffic only to find that one had to walk several blocks either way or

step across the bumpers of tightly parked cars.[16] The cruise ship passengers have been described as descending,

> like predators vying with one another for clerks' attention, taxis or walking space and jostling natives off the side walks (Lukas 1971: 110).

St. Thomians formerly stayed at home or used Back Street, a dingy thoroughfare of dingy shops and bars to avoid the crunch of mass tourism (O'Neill 1972: 80-81). Since the housing projects have relocated much of the population away from the central business district of Charlotte Amalie, many islanders avoid the crunch by going to the shopping centers which have sprung up on the outskirts of the city. Virtually, the entire core area of downtown Charlotte Amalie, Main Street and its side streets, have undergone change into tourist retail operations (Orlins 1969: 398). The residential shift in population and corresponding commercial services means that by five o'clock when the cruise ship passengers return to their ships, downtown Charlotte Amalie becomes almost lifeless.

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[16]Without mountains hemming it in, Nassau has more spacious streets and is less congested. The author did observe four paseengers with roller skates and headphones skate down the ramp from a ship and oblivious to taxi and trucks sounding their horns, proceded to block traffic along the water front as they skated straight up the street.

Concentration of Trade by Country and Commodity

The previous discussion demonstrated that the contemporary tourist statistics support the propositions that the islands' economies are disproportionally dependent upon tourism as a commodity and the United States as the source of that commodity. A comparison of the same two indicators measuring concentration of overall foreign trade by country and commodity reveals a strikingly similar pattern for the Bahamas and Virgin Islands.

As with tourism the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands were economically dependent upon the United States as a trading partner, but export/import figures of the international trade statistics were highly concentrated around one commodity--petroleum. Due to the standard accounting procedures, tourism, the "invisible export," did not enter the trade statistics. In 1978 ninety-two percent of the Bahamas' $3.2 billion import total and ninety-seven percent of its $1.3 billion export total fell under the label of "mineral fuels" reflecting the importance of the huge oil refinery and bunkering terminal at Freeport (Bahamas Handbook 1983: 341-342). The corresponding mineral oil figures for the Virgin Islands, eighty-seven percent of $3.1 billion in imports and ninety-five percent of $2.7 billion in exports, indicated the presence of Amerada Hess who ran the largest oil refinery in the world on St. Croix (U.S.

Virgin Islands nd). Ironically, for the most part, this enormous offshore oil trade did not enter into the Gross National Product of the economies which were $570 million (Bahamas) and $540 million (Virgin Islands) (World Bank 1979: 18).[17] With the exclusion of the offshore economic activities, tourism was the dominant activity.

The United States has steadily declined in prominence as a major source of Bahamian imports. In 1969 the United States and Puerto Rico shipped 68.3 percent of the Bahamian imports, but reached a low of 6.7 percent in 1975. The decline was attributed to the Bahamas Oil Refining Company (BORCO) refinery's coming "on line." During this time period the proportion of imports coming from oil exporting nations leaped from 1.1 percent to 84.2 percent (United Nations 1979: 239-242). Consequently, the Bahamas also felt the dislocations in the Middle East petroleum oil supplies. Saudi Arabia led all countries as a source of Bahamian imports supplying 44.6 percent of all imports.

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[17]Additionally, the Bahamian GNP concealed one of the world's largest off shore banking industries which in 1978 had Eurocurrency deposits of $100 billion, $84 billion of the amount held by U.S. branch banks. Although the financial sector is the second most important industry after tourism in the domestic economy, less than three percent of the labor force were employed in banking and related services compared to the sixty-seven percent engaged in tourism and related services. Most of funds originated in the petroleum industry and went to finance projects in Latin America (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, b: 107-108). The Bahamas specializes as an off shore service center processing people, petroleum, and "petro-dollars" mostly benefiting American tourists and companies.

When Libya, which had furnished as much as 16.0 percent of Bahamian imports, nationalized its oil resources, an impass between the BORCO partners, Standard Oil of California and New England Petroleum Company occurred that resulted in the bankruptcy of the latter.[18] As stated earlier the Bahamas had always been in the American economic orbit, and during the five years before Independence in 1973, the United Kingdom's share of imports ranged from 8.5 percent to 12.9 percent; for the five years following, the United Kingdom's percentage was reduced to a 1.1 percent to 2.4 percent range. However, the decrease stemmed more from the ascendance of petroleum than any economic rupture accompanying political change in the Bahamas. The American concentration in Virgin Islands' imports also experienced a similar decline. In 1974 the Virgin Islands received 15.9 percent of its total imports from the U.S., a figure that represented a drastically reduced share since the Amerada Hess petroleum refinery and the Martin Marietta alumina refinery commenced operations and began importing natural resources from foreign sources in the 1960's. Between 1970 and 1974 the percentage of imports from the petroleum producing nations climbed 39.4 percent to 75.3 percent (United Nations 1979: 1126-1130). Iran was the number one supplier ac-

[18]The Charter Company which took over the New England Petroleum Company also filed for protection in 1984.

counting for one-third of all imports before the Shah was overthrown. The output of the Hess refinery plunged with the loss of Iranian oil and illustrates the hazard of the combined dependency of one major export, one major firm, and one major source of the basic resource.[19]

The U.S. percentage of exports has been higher since the volume of oil has been the most influential commodity in international trade. The Bahamas exports were channeled into the U.S. ranging from 57.8 percent to 93.5 percent between 1967 and 1977 (United Nation 1979: 239-242). Exports in 1975 originating in the Virgin Islands also went overwhelmingly to the U.S., 96.4 percent; this figure has remained consistently above 90 percent since 1970 (United Nations 1979: 1126-1130). The Soviet Union has been the second leading recipient most frequently averaging about 1.2 percent. The large scale importation of oil from several countries and the re-export to the U.S. has been described as an "energy funnel" (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, b: 108).

Because most of the enormous offshore industry does not enter into the islands' GNP, the value of exports greatly exceeds that of the internal economies. In fact,

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[19]Amererada Hess, the largest private employer in the Virgin Islands, had cut back its refinery capacity and laid off workers and Martin Marietta, the second largest employer, was attempting to divest itself of the alumina refinery in the first quarter of 1985 as the petroleum glut and depressed aluminum market continued.

the total Bahamian GNP in 1975 was $570 million and the Virgin Island's GNP was $540 million compared to the islands' export totals of $2.5 billion and $1.9 billion respectively (World Bank n.d.: 18).[20] In the Bahamas the offshore banking industry dwarfed all other industries with Eurocurrency accounts valued at $100 billion in 1978; Citi-Bank's holdings alone were in excess of $1.7 billion (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, b: 108). The Bahamas' GNP was slightly more than one-half percent that of the Eurocurrency assets of foreign banks. Except for what energy needs were consumed locally, the employment and wages (the Bahamas banking sector employed no more than 2,000 persons or less than six percent of the labor force), supplies purchased locally, and the tax revenue generated (both islands had implemented substantial tax break programs), the offshore industry simply did not enter into the domestic economy commensurate with the colossal scale of operations. This explains why paradoxically, the "invis-

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[20]A comparison of the transnational companies revenues with the islands' Gross National Products demonstrates the descrepancy in size and the potential for a foreign firm to wield enormous influence in the micro-states' internal affairs. The Charter Company (which owned the giant oil refinery on Grand Bahama Island) reported $4.7 billion in revenues for 1981; the Amerada Hess Corporation (which owned and operated the largest oil refinery in the world on St. Croix) listed revenues of $9.4 billion. Even within the tourist sector, sales of business enterprises that "service" the islands, such as Eastern Airlines' revenues totaling $2.9 billion and Holiday Inn's $1.1 billion, overshadow the economy of the islands and reflect another facet of economic dependency.

ible export" of tourism was so much more influential in the islands' economies and why the industrial development that had occurred was not a success in diversifying them.

Political Status and Dependent Tourist Economies Compared

This section compares the differences the political status makes in the economic dependency on tourism in the Virgin Islands as a colony and the independent Bahamas. Does political status make a difference? The answer is an unqualified yes. Because of the absence of similar research, and because the difference in economic dependency due to political status was unexpected, this finding may be one of the most important contributions made by this study. Although it is impossible to differentiate exactly the effects of political versus economic dependency, several measures confirm quantitative as well as qualitative aspects of the effects in the tourist economies. This is accomplished by analyzing the political economic impact of 1) the U.S. federal government in the Virgin Islands, 2) the advantages and disadvantages of being included in American foreign policy versus American domestic policy, 3) the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 4) immigration policy, and 5) the latitude and trajectory of future policy options.

Well informed individuals frequently attest to the dominant position of the tourist industry in both economies. The governor of the Central Bank of the Bahamas stated,

> The Bahamian economy revolves around a vast tourism structure, an international financial complex, and a powerful and growing consumer preference for a very industrial advanced lifestyle. At the same time, domestic production which might have been expected to absorb much of the labor force, has been frustrated by the Bahamian preference for white collar jobs and the rapidity with which the Bahamas was transformed from a village economy to a major tourist and financial center (Kelly 1983: 12A).

Similarly, a leading social scientist in the Virgin Islands in analyzing the fiscal structure of the Virgin Islands wrote,

> Structurally, the economy is a mono-service, open dependent economy. Tourism is the single most important industry in the islands (Jones-Hendrickson 1977: 558).

As discussed previously in the section comparing the contemporary tourist statistics, tourism makes approximately twice the contribution to the economy of the Bahamas that it does to the Virgin Islands' economy for most indicators. Although the Virgin Islands may be less a "pure-tourist economy" than the Bahamas, the statement that the Virgin Islands economy revolves around tourism was valid.

U.S. Virgin Islands: Federal Govenment Impact

The specialization of the Virgin Islands' tourist economy was by itself extraordinary. Excluding agriculture, 25.7 percent of the of the Virgin Islands' labor force was directly employed in tourism. According to the classification system based upon economic function devised by the International City Managers' Association, a city is specialized as a resort city,

> where the employees in entertainment, recreation, and personal service, but not private households, totals more than the manufacturing or retailing employment (Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations 1968: 10).

Substituting islands for cities, with only 8.1 percent in manufacturing and 9.2 percent in the retail trades, the Virgin Islands was clearly specialized in tourist or resort services (Pobicki 1981: 17).[21]

However, government employees in the Virgin Islands accounted for an even higher share of the labor force, 33.8 percent. This was almost double the mainland percentage of the population of 17.8 percent, but less than the thirty-five percent for the city of Madison, Wisconsin (Pobicki

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[21]Of course, the Bahamas was even more specialized with two-thirds of the labor force in tourism, compared to 3.9 percent in manufacturing and 5.3 percent in sales work (Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1972: 192, 197). Detroit, which was considered to have one of the highest degrees of specialization of any U.S. city, only had 15.9 percent of all its non-agricultural employment in the manufacturing branch of transportation equipment (Sinclair 1972: 14-17).

1981: 5).[22] Orlins attributes the growth of government to the expansion of the tourist industry and it is true that Governor Paiewonsky's administration hired employees in the local government at a furious pace during the 1960's. Nevertheless, during the unsteady years of the 1970's the government absorbed many workers who did not find jobs in the private sector.

In fact, these public jobs were financed by a series of special tax provisions devolving from the original transfer agreement, and the Organic Acts of 1936 and 1954. One of the key components is that when federal income tax was extended to the islands in 1921 under the 1917 agreement, taxes levied by the U.S. Congress plus all locally collected customs duties and fees were to be retained in the Virgin Islands. Thus, while Virgin Islanders were taxed according to the U.S. Federal tax schedule, the taxes were paid to the Treasury of the Virgin Islands (Orlins 1969: 264-268). The Virgin Islands collected 35.6 percent of its operating budget from personal income taxes, and 18.7 percent from corporate income taxes. Another lucrative deal was the repatriation of the

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[22]A comparison with the Bahamas is only possible for 1970 when 25.7 percent of the Virgin Islands' and 12.8 percent of the Bahamas' labor forces were public sector employees (U.S. Virgin Islands 1982: 36-37; and Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1972: 146, 203). Direct state intervention in tourism the Bahamas since the 1970's would simultaneously increase the proportion of government employees in the labor force and number of employees in the tourism sector.

excise tax on rum bottled in the Virgin Islands and sold in the United States which amounted to over $36 million in 1980 or 18.7 percent of all government revenues (U.S. Virgin Islands 1981: 36-37).23

The third major source of revenue comes from federal appropriations and grant in aid allocations. The Virgin Islands has benefited from an infusion of federal funds under various provisions-earmarked funds, unrestricted loans and grants in the areas of social welfare and public assistance, health service, education, conservation, and environmental protection among others.24 Although the Revised Organic Act of 1954 required a balanced budget, the U.S. Federal Government, in continuing the practice of the Danish colonial government, fostered the impression that it would always come to the rescue and balance the budget. While gradually imposing stricter rules on spending by the territorial government, the Federal Treasury always resolved the fiscal crisis (Jones-Hendrickson

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[23]By contrast the Bahamas which had no personal or corporate income tax relied on import duties for 56.0 percent of all government revenues in 1980 (Bahamas Handbook 1982: 361). The tax haven status of the Bahams severly limited the options available to increase the tax burden; the mere mention of income tax provoked rumors of an imminent Marxist-Leninist takeover (See Ramsaran 1977). Both islands had low property taxes accounting for only 6.3 percent and 2.4 percent of the Virgin Islands and Bahamas budgets respectively.

[24]In fact of all the United States and its territories, only the District of Columbia received more federal assistance per capita than the Virgin Islands for the 1981 fiscal year (Wright 1982: 43).

1977: 559, 561, 582). In 1981 the federal grant program funds were estimated at $250 million, more than the total operating budget of $223.8 million (Lee 1981: 8; and U.S. Virgin Islands nd).

If tourism was the generator of the Virgin Islands' economy, the government apparatus was the flywheel in sustaining its operation. Political dependence served to reinforce economic dependence and vice versa. The economic well being of the islands was interlocked with that of the mainland U.S. indirectly through tourism and directly through budgetary allocations. Certainly, any reduction in tourism was correctly viewed as serious.

> The greatest possible threat to prosperity in the Virgin Islands would be serious recession on the U.S. mainland. Because much of the total population is dependent upon tourism for their living, it is easy to see that any major dislocation in the mainland economy could have disastrous consequences for the Islands (Federal Maritime Commission 1979: II-46).

However, equally grave is a reduction in the federal budget.

Under the auspices of the Reagan Administration's new federalism policy, David Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed a series of changes in the islands revenues and finances effective beginning October 1983. These included 1) severing the links to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and setting up the Virgin Islands own income tax system; 2) decreasing the overall

funding by disbursing one block grant at seventy-five percent of amount allocated for 1981; 3) terminating participation in categorical grant programs including food stamps, aid to families of dependent children, Medicaid, and subsidized housing; 4) eliminate the tax reimbursement arrangement; 5) giving the Interior Department broad fiscal control over islands through an Office of Territorial and International Affairs Administrator and Inspector General to monitor and audit all block grant funds to assure compliance with fiscal and accounting criteria and authorize to withhold funds if not met; 6) a one year moratorium on all new construction; and 7) eliminating the return of federal excise taxes on Virgin Islands rum (Lee 1981: 1, 8). The reaction in the islands was predictably one of great consternation and complaints about inviting bankruptcy and chaos, ruining the Virgin Islands, and returning to the days of colonialism. Officials vowed to fight to prevent the OMB, and enough pressure was applied to prevent the Stockman proposals in the 1983 budget (Akin 1981: 8).

The dismal prospect of cutbacks in federal aid were compounded by economic recession. Cruise ship traffic was down eighteen percent in 1982 and the passengers spent less per person than in the previous year. Unemployment at 8.1 percent in September, 1982 was better than the U.S. rate of 10.4 percent, but federal subsidies had

dropped from $128 million to $102 million. One fear was that the further delay in extending the Harry S. Truman Airport runway in order to accommodate wide-body jets would keep tourist arrivals down. With services already over-taxed and tourist arrivals down, a general concern prevailed that,

> the slump could exacerbate racial tensions and increase the potential for violent crime...'With our fragile economy all it will take is a killing' (Wright 1982: 10).

Benefits and Costs of U.S. Foreign Vs. Domestic Policy

While the Virgin Islands had been pragmatically pursuing policies that deepened its dependency on the United States, the Bahamas had deliberately been trying to diversify its economic dependency on tourists from the United States and on tourism. However, the 1973 energy crisis scuttled plans for developing a petrochemical complex on Freeport, and faced with economic contraction and an unemployment rate around thirty percent, in 1978 the government reverted back to tourism to stimulate the economy.

> After flirting unsuccessfully with various plans for industrial diversification, the government has thrown its full support behind tourism as the industry than can, within the shortest period of time, provide the thousands of jobs that will be needed to curb

> unemployment, especially among young people (Kelly 1978: 1B).[25]

The continuing economic problems also forced a policy shift in attempts to lesson dependency on the United States tourist market by stepping up promotional efforts in Europe.

> With global recession setting in during 1980, Bahamas tourist officials decided to concentrate on the U. S. which traditionally produces 70% of the country's arrivals (Knoles 1983: 10).

The decision was based on the belief that the disposable income of Americans would shrink less than that of Europeans and the pattern of short and medium-haul air traffic would decline less than longhaul air traffic. Four new tourist offices were opened bringing the number to twelve outlets in the United States, only two less than Mexico maintained.

The Bahamas was also implementing a ten year master plan for tourism development. Projected to cost $680 million with the twenty-three percent financed by the Bahamian government (not counting tax incentives or other infrastructure investments already financed), the goal was to construct an additional 3,400 hotel rooms. This would increase the room capacity by one-third. Additionally, a

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[25]Consequently, over the next five years the budget allocations for tourism incresased over twenty per cent each year and more than doubled from $11.7 million to $29.2 million for 1983 (Knoles 1983: 10).

concerted effort was made to build more hotels in the out islands that would cater to more exclusive tourists (Wessa 1983: 6). But inspite of a bolder and more flexible tourist policy, closer distances, and cheaper transportation costs, the Bahamas was at a disadvantage with the Virgin Islands when competing for American tourists.

One comparative advantage in the tourist trade held by the Virgin Islands was the special duty free allowance granted by the U.S. government. This exemption played a prominent role in making Charlotte Amalie the leading cruise ship stopover in the Caribbean as well as attracting "day trippers" who flew in from Puerto Rico. One propagandist called St. Thomas the "K-Mart of the Caribbean."

In 1961 when the United States was experiencing a growing balance of payments deficit, the government reduced the duty free allowance for visitors staying over forty-eight hours outside the mainland U.S.A. from $500 to $100. However, the Virgin Islands along with the Pacific U.S. colonies of Guam and American Somoa was granted double the limit and the forty-eight hour limit was waived.[26] Then in 1965 when the one gallon of duty free alcoholic beverages was reduced to one quart, the Virgin Islands quota was set at three quarts (Orlins 1969: 97). This decision

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[26]The Virgin Islands was not a duty free zone, that is it levied tariffs on imported items, but usually lower than the United States. During the prolonged economic recession the Virgin Islands legislature responded to local merchant pressure and repealed the tariffs on popular tourist shopping items such as crystal and jewlry (Thomas 1982: 1).

to grant the Virgin Islands greater exemptions than any other Caribbean destination including Puerto Rico was made at the federal level in response to the requests of island merchants. Because excursionists and cruise ship passengers could buy more duty free goods than anywhere else, it resulted in increasing the number of "day trippers" from San Juan and making the St. Thomas the most frequented cruise ship port in the Caribbean (Tinsley 1979: 307).

As the U.S. customs regulations have been periodically amended, the Virgin Islands has continued to receive exemptions twice that of any other Caribbean island which was $800 to $400 in January, 1983 ("Duty Free Ceiling Passed" 1983: 2D). It should be noted that the primary beneficiaries were the Main Street shop owners who were almost exclusively white continentals selling mostly imported merchandise.[27]

Tourist arrivals to the Caribbean have accounted for about three percent of the total international markets. The Caribbean region in general has tried to broaden its source of tourists and over the last decade U.S. tourist arrivals have shrunk from ninety to seventy percent of the region's total ("New Trends in Island Tourism" 1980: 7). The Bahamas lowered its percentage of American tourists

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[27]The five most common purchases by cruise ship passengers were liquor, perfume/cosmetics, jewelry, T-shirts, and cigarettes; during the winter season cruise passengers spend over $5 million per month (Newbold and Rozynski 1981: 19).

from ninety-three percent in 1967 to seventy-five in 1982 while the Virgin Islands constantly stayed above the ninety percent mark (Bahamas 1968: 13; Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1981: 19; and Newbold and Rozynski 1981: 24). From 1970 when the Bahamas and Virgin Islands attracted forty-six percent of all the Caribbean tourists, their share dropped to to twenty-four percent in 1981 (West and Augelli 1976: 91; and Devas 1982: 94). Lewis perceived that the increasing competitiveness among other Caribbean destinations would result in the Virgin Islands economy becoming more dependent upon the special privileges conferred by Washington (Lewis 1972: 147).

The entire Caribbean region benefited when President Johnson confronting a huge American balance of payments deficit urged U.S. citizens to limit their travel to the Western Hemisphere (Chernick 1978: 148). Another indirect effect of the shifting sphere of American influence was the serendipitous gain by both the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas when Cuba, the former leading destination in the Caribbean, was closed to American tourists. Certainly the Bahamas captured the lion's share due to the relocation of the gambling interests to Freeport and Paradise Island. Cuba started promoting tourism again and the Carter administration relaxed the travel conditions, but on April 19, 1982 the U.S. Treasury Department banned American tourists and businessmen from traveling to Cuba. Although

only forty percent of the 38,000 American travelers to Cuba during the preceding twelve months were tourists, the Reagan administration ostensibly sought to keep Cuba from earning American dollars (Ducassi 1982: 12A). This punitive action to halt tourism to Cuba would benefit the "friendly" Caribbean destinations.

A tourism dependency phenomena related to geopolitical factors is of major importance. This is the fact that many tourists visited the Bahamas as an extension of their Florida vacation (over half the European tourists arrived via the United States), while many of the tourists to the Virgin Islands arrived as an added excursion while in Puerto Rico. Consequently, when tourism slumps in South Florida or Puerto Rico, the potential pool of tourists to the Bahamas and Virgin Islands was automatically reduced. For example during the winter of 1980-81 Miami underwent a combination of unseasonably cold weather, urban riots, and a crime/drug epidemic all of which were widely reported in the national media. Coming on top of an already poor tourist year due the depressed economy, Miami's tourism fell by ten percent and the Bahamas declined by 10.8 percent (Merzer 1981: 1A, 23A and Devas 1982: 45). During the same time period Puerto Rico's tourist arrivals were off 9.7 percent while the Virgin Islands was down by 9.6 percent (Devas 1982: 78, 90).

The Caribbean Basin Initiative

The final example of the difference formal U.S. affiliation made concerns the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The Secretary of State argued for the passage of the CBI as vital to American interests and security in the region because,

> nearly half our trade, three-quarters of our import oil and over half of imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico (Chardy 1983: 2B).

However, another article noted that the way the United States deals with the potential explosive situation in its own Caribbean colonies may prove to be more important than anything else including the CBI (Deakin 1982: 27). The responses of the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas are indicative of the lack of unanimity among peripheral social formations who must compete against one another for the center's favors.

As originally proposed, the CBI would have resulted in the Virgin Islands, which as a U.S. dependency was not included, losing several of the key trade advantages Congress had conferred on its political dependency. The official political ties permitted the delegate to maneuver within the system and secure modifications protecting the Virgin Islands' economy vis-a-vis the beneficiary countries. Among the concessions achieved was an increase of

twenty percent in the maximum foreign content of goods assembled in the Virgin Islands and shipped to the U.S. duty free under headnote 3a of the U.S. tariff schedule; this primarily benefited the watch assembly industry.

The most important gain was the amended provision pertaining to the rum industry--the requiring of compensatory financial aid and withdrawal of duty free treatment of rum if taxes fall below the amount that would have been collected had the rum been shipped from the Virgin Islands instead of the CBI rum exporting countries; the waiver of three sections of the Federal Water Pollution Control regulation that would have entailed installing costly environmental safeguards by the bottling plants; and having the taxes collected on Caribbean rum divided by the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Additionally, the delegate obtained the financial support necessary for the $6 million modernization of Harry S. Truman Airport that still uses a World War II hangar as its main facility (de Lugo 1983 and U.S. Senate Bill S544).[28] Finally, the College of the Virgin Islands was designated as a research and training center for the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

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[28]During the controversy over Grenada's airport construction, the manager of the Holiday Inn in St. Thomas wrote that the U.S. had spent over $40 million in the preceding five years to modernize its airport which was still uncompleted and unable to accomodate the widebody jets crucial to the success of tourism in the future while the Cubans built one of the region's most modern international airports in less than three years (Pouizal 1983: 30).

Subsequently, the USVI supported the CBI. On the other hand the Bahamas still opposed the CBI because the one area in which it would gain, convention oriented tourism, was threatened by a stipulation requiring the financial and banking industry to reveal confidential information.

The provision in question was to amend subsection (h) of section 274 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by extending the designated North American Area for tax exemptions of business conventions to the CBI beneficiaries. The convention tax write-off was extremely important for tourist destinations like the Virgin Islands which was automatically eligible, as was Puerto Rico. When Congress passed the tax legislation removing exemptions on business exemptions held outside the U.S., as American territories they were included. Extending this benefit to the foreign islands in the region hurts the Virgin Islands.

> One reason for the increased level of tourism in the Virgin Islands is the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 which allows companies to get deductions for conventions held in the United States and excludes such deductions for some previously popular foreign convention spots...In fact since the passage of the Tax Reform Act, convention business has tripled and the territory is projecting approximately 30,000 visitors for 1979 (Federal Maritime Commission 1979: II-10).

In late 1980 congress extended the exemptions to Canada and Mexico and imposed taxes on conventions held in cruise-

ships sailing from U.S. ports. In 1981 President Reagan rewarded the election of Edward Seaga by a special act that conferred the exemption on Jamaica ("Pindling Cites Need for Tax Exemptions" 1981: 8).

The Bahamas viewed the Jamaican exemption and its own exclusion with hostility. The convention tax break has obvious advantages for countries, even if the big winners are the large hotels, principally U.S. chains with the spacious modern facilities that can handle conventions. The Bahamas as the closest Caribbean destination and already equipped with convention facilities, would certainly benefit although the competition will be greater with the addition of the CBI countries. However, the Bahamas as the leading tax haven in the region was not expected to participate.

In 1982 the Bahamas and U.S. relations were strained by the lack of an agreement on the conditions for leasing three military installations in the Bahamas and the omission of the Bahamas from being included as a recipient in the one time $350 million aid package in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (Bohning 1982: 7A). But other differences also interfered between Nassau and Washington. Toward the end of 1982 in a speech delivered to the Sixth Miami Conference on Caribbean Trade and Development, Prime Minister Pindling criticized the Reagan administration's Caribbean policy in general and relations with the Bahamas in parti-

cular. After challenging the U.S.'s willingness to commit the financial resources necessary to offset the Soviet Union's economic support of Cuba and regional insurrection, he reaffirmed a conclusion expressed by the Caribbean Summit meeting held earlier in Ocho Rios, Jamaica--that small open economies were exceptionally susceptible to disruption and pressure from the international economic system. Next, Pindling asserted that the CBI would have minimal benefit for the Bahamas. The chief potential, positive effect was the opportunity to boost trade as a result of the expansion of credit for financing trade projects with the United States; the financial assistance given to the private sector might assist in diversifying the Bahamian economy.

Singled out for special attack was the new convention provision of the U.S. tax code that prohibited convention groups from being able to deduct expenses outside the North American mainland with the exception of Jamaica. Since 1952 when the first convention group arrived, Americans had comprised about 75 percent of convention business and accounted for up to 50 percent of some hotels income ("Conventions": 146, 158-159). The Bahamas' exclusion had cost the islands an estimated $55 million in tourist expenditures. In a lesson on the dependency of the Bahamian economy on tourism and the benefits to the U.S. economy,

the Prime Minister said,

> The largest single sector of economy is tourism. The tourist industry in the Bahamas lost job opportunities, under utilized its existing facilities and reduced interest in capital expenditures and economic activity to expand. Because the Bahamas has the second highest level of imports from the US after the Dominican Republic of the nineteen territories, any decline in tourism adversely effects the US economy indirectly...In 1981, of the total income from tourism of 639 million dollars, some 473 million dollars (74.0 %) were expended in direct purchases in or to suppliers in the United States...Additionally, it should be born in mind that at least fifty percent of all hotel rooms in the Bahamas are owned by American companies or individuals. Hence at least fifty percent, and probably more of the 278 million dollar 1981 gross income of the hotel industry in the Bahamas accrued directly to United States interests (Pindling 1982: 6).

Another target of Pindling's displeasure was the linkage of the Caribbean initiative to signing tax treaties that conform to US specifications. It had become apparent that the Bahamas inclusion in the convention provision was contingent upon the Bahamas modifying its bank secrecy laws and tax haven status. According to Pindling this meddling could possibly negate the advantages of the other aspects of the CBI and was, "...attacking the foundation upon which the democratic traditions of our country rests." He also accused US agencies of,

> attempts to exert and extend extra-territoral jurisdiction, by means other than by due process of law in full

> hand open contravention of this principle (non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries)" (Pindling 1982: 8-9).

It was alleged that the Bahamas would remain intransigent on its banking secrecy laws (Bohning 1982: 7A).

Opposing Views on The Grenada Invasion

A very poignant example in which the Bahamas and Virgin Islands diverge concerns the the reaction to the U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983. The public pronouncements regarding the use of American military in the Caribbean were at odds with one another. Apparently drifting further away from the U.S. orbit, Reginald Wood, the Bahamas Ambassador to the United States and delegate to the Organization of American States' meeting of October 27th called the invasion,

> a cruel act of intervention" and accused the U.S. of exhibiting "a double standard of international morality" (Kurtz 1983: A9).

In contrast, the non-voting Virgin Islands' delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, Ron de Lugo (Democrat) initially approved, if obliquely, the U.S. military action. He justified the invasion in response to the request by the democratically elected leaders of the Eastern Caribbean because they were left without defensive capability when the British pulled out at the time of

independence.[29] De Lugo also endorsed an editorial from the Daily News, the leading Virgin Islands' paper.[30] The editorial parrotted the U.S. military version of events. Delegate de Lugo also forwarded to President Reagan a cable signed by 3,000 Virgin Islanders affirming support for the invasion and re-affirming the Virgin Islands ties to the U.S. as well as to fellow West Indians in the English speaking Eastern Caribbean. The Delegate expressed his elation that the same day (November 1st) Virgin Islanders were celebrating "Liberty Day" to commemorate D. Hamilton Jackson's establishing the first free press in the Virgin Islands to print the St. Croix Herald newspaper in 1915 (de Lugo 1983a).

This support for the invasion could have been anticipated from the day that de Lugo witnessed President Reagan sign the CBI legislation. Earlier, on October 5th Delegate de Lugo stated that the USVI were going to play an effective role and to be a major asset to the U.S. as a political bridge the U.S. must have to achieve it goals in the Caribbean (de Lugo 1983b: H8105-6). Unlike the Bahamas, the Virgin Islands thus fell into line with the ideological

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[29] De Lugo's Puerto Rican counterpart in Washington, Baltasar Corrada, the Resident Commissioner and a democrat, also supported the invasion.

[30] Since 1978 the Daily News has been owned by Gannett Company, Inc., of Rochester, New York, the largest newspaper chain in the U.S.

campaign waged by the United States to legitimate their intevention in Grenada.

Resolving Immigration Policy Disputes

Regarding immigration policy, the alien question has been called the most explosive contemporary problem in the Virgin Islands (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1982: 62). Because U.S. immigration laws are automatically extended to the Virgin Islands unless specifically excluded, between 20,000 and 30,000 spouses and children of temporary alien workers were admitted to the Virgin Islands as a result of Congress' enactment of Public Law 91-225 on April 7, 1970. This law was intended to amend the H-non-immigrant provision to facilitate family reunion in the United States. At the time the islands lacked even a non-voting delegate to Congress, and no one thought to exclude the Virgin Islands--the floodgates were opened. Subsequently, federal agencies were accused of almost totally ignoring the problem. The Department of the Interior claimed its role in the Virgin Islands was "advisory" and that it only took action when to requested to do so. Other agencies such as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Department of Labor also eschewed responsibility. Conversely, Virgin Islands agencies usually claimed the problem was "Federal" (U.S. House 1975: 30).

Inadvertently then, the political domination by the United States helped restore the movement of black population to the Virgin Islands and counter the "whitening" trend. This "mistake" was almost compounded by President Carter's 1978 proposal to grant citizenship to illegal aliens in the United States. If applied to the Virgin Islands, amnesty would have had an extremely magnified effect in that it was believed that West Indian aliens outnumbered Virgin Islanders. The political enfranchisement of a previously excluded group would mean they would have the voting potential to wrest control of local government away from Virgin Islanders. And even that political control of the local government was illusory because of the islands' colonial status,

> de facto power resides in Washington. It is based in regulations that permit--and can be withdrawn--duty-free provisions that make islands viable. It also exists in the committees of Congress, the Department of the Interior, the White House, the board rooms of major airlines, and in the offices of travel agents from Boston to San Diego (Nordheimer 1978: A18).

In 1982 Delegate De Lugo succeeding in having Congress pass his bill which finally terminated the temporary worker program in the Virgin Islands (de Lugo 1983).

In contradistinction to the Virgin Islands, the Bahamas were able to resolve the Haitian immigration problem without external political intervention. In the Bahamas the focus has shifted to controling land sales to

foreigners and again the problem was solved internally at the national level by parliamentary passage of the Immovable Property Act in mid-1981. When the United States does intervene, it must do so at a different level.

Foreign Aid - Conflict and Cooperation

The foreign aid leverage of the United States was viewed by some at work when the U.S. gave $10 million to finance agricultural research allegedly to secure the Bahamas vote against the recognition of Cuba at the time of Bahamian independence in 1973. Earlier the Atlantic Undersea Testing and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) constructed by the U.S. Navy at a cost of $98 million in 1968 was leased by the colonial government in exchange for eight million pounds to finance public works projects in addition to 150,000 pound annual rent (Hughes 1982: 172, 176).[31] AUTEC was designed to test torpedoes, underwater missiles, and other weapons for antisubmarine warfare including a network of listening devices on the sea bed 100 miles north

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[31]The importance of the military installations was actually brought up by an Owens-Illinois' lobbyist seeking a larger sugar quota for the Bahamas (Owens-Illinois was the only sugar grower in the Bahamas); the U.S. owed something in exchange for the Bahamian facilities, namely a larger sugar quota (U.S. Congress 1971: 576).

of Cuba.[32] When the announcement about the planned center was made public in 1960, the State Department issued a statement denying that it was in response to Cuban pressure to relinquish Guantanamo Naval Base (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, b: 38-39).

The U.S. State Department intervened in 1979 to squelch an IRS investigation of illegal payments by companies that use the Bahamas as tax shelters. The Justice Department attorneys argued that the disclosure of diplomatic communications that included discussion of Bahamian policies and illegal payoffs would have had a "bombshell effect" and might jeopardize the use of several military facilities in the Bahamas ("U.S.Fights Data Release on Bahamas Payments" 1979: sec. IV, p. 2). More recently, it was reported that many Bahamians believed that Washington was meddling in the Bahamian election of 1982 by supporting the opposition party, the Free National Movement. A Miami public relations agency was managing the FNM's campaign that advocated less state control, more free enterprise and foreign investment, and closer ties to Washington with most of the funds thought to be contributed by foreign investors with large holdings in the Bahamas. Despite previous close ties between Pindling and Washington, the

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[32]A ten year technical agreement providing for continued U.S. use of facilities on the Bahamas for weapon tests and other activities was quietly signed by the United States, the Bahamas, and Great Britian in April, 1984 ("Elsewhere" 1984: A4).

FNM reportedly had strong connections to the U.S. Embassy in Nassau. The reason for the Reagan administration's backing the opposition was believed to be the Pindling government's support for the rights of some Caribbean and Latin American countries in the United Nations and other diplomatic arenas (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, b: 192). The distancing of the Bahamas from the United States continued as the Bahamas attended the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations for the first time as an observer in New Delhi in March 1983.

Additionally, it has been argued that two incidents involving the United States strongly influenced Bahamian support for Independence. The first occurred in August of 1970 when the U.S. Navy dumped 468 large canisters of toxic nerve gas less than 150 miles off the coast of Abaco and which constituted a potential peril to Bahamian tourism. Premier Pindling could not persuade the British who then were representing the Bahamas in foreign affairs to file even a formal protest. The second incident was the incursion between 1969 and 1972 of Miami based Cuban-American fishing boats into the twelve mile Bahamian territorial waters. Once again the British failed to represent Bahamian national interests (Kearns 1974: 12). Subsequently, the Bahamas won independence in July, 1973 while the Virgin Islands continued as a U.S. colony unable to resolve the nagging political dilemma of status.

The Dilemma of Unincorporated Territory Status

The political limbo of the unincorporated territory is concisely summarized in the following statement.

> Unlike other offshore areas, there has been virtually no sentiment expressed in the Virgin islands for independence or statehood. Some political observers do not rule out such a movement in the next decade, given the winds of independence blowing in the Eastern Caribbean.
>
> What people here do seem to want is a continuation of the basic relationship with the U.S. but with less day-today control by Uncle Sam, greater representation in Congress, and more autonomy at home.
>
> They also want to be able to vote for the president of the United States, who continues to exercise greater control over their lives under the lingering vestiges of colonialism than over the lives of American citizens in the 50 states (Feurzeig 1979: D17).

Without a constitution, changes in the procedures by which the colony was governed had to be approved by Congress. On election day in November, 1981 a fourth attempt to establish a constitutional document to replace the Revised Organic Act of 1954 was defeated by a margin of three to two; only forty-seven percent of the registered voters went to the polls. The president of the constitutional convention that drafted the document cited the anxieties of the "community of minorities." A continental delegate to the convention who refused to even sign the

document referred to the islands' unique history and culture being overwhelmed by outsiders--Puerto Ricans, Down Islanders, and Continentals--creating a "schizophrenic atmosphere."

Dissatisfaction with the constitution included the omission of a requirement that the governor must be a native of the Virgin Islands (removed after the first draft). Another controversial provision was the defining of Virgin Islander as one who was born in the islands or at had at least one parent born there. Although no special privileges were to be reserved for Virgin Islanders, the definition became an emotionally charged issue. Ottley holds that it was the non-Virgin Islanders, comprising the majority of voters, who rejected the proposed constitution. Finally, the omission of any provision to address the control over immigration and customs, one of the most serious problems in the territory, was seen as making the document inadequate. The only apparent concensus was that the question of status would come under increasing pressure to change it ("Virgin Islanders Resoundingly Reject Fourth Draft of a Constitution" 1981: 19; and Ottley 1982: 423-424).

The fact that Congress at the time of transfer in 1917 chose not to admit the Virgin Islands under the same apprenticeship track of continental states who could graduate to statehood, but rather as an unincorporated

territory was due to the predominately black population. Racial composition, along with size, is still perceived to be the major obstruction preventing changes in the Virgin Islands bid for greater self-determination (Miller 1974: 297, 301).

The 1964-65 Constitutional Convention adopted a resolution opposing annexation of the Virgin Islands to any state of the union or to any commonwealth or other territory under U.S. jurisdiction. This was to discourage proponents of attaching the Virgin Islands as a county to Florida or annexed to Puerto Rico and seeking combined statehood. Other possibilites included an independent Greater Virgin Islands with the British Virgin Islands or independence and then federation with other Eastern Caribbean islands. It was pointed out that the residents of the French and Dutch Antilles did have political rights in the national elections (Miller 1974: 301-302).[33]

Lewis states that,

> The end result is that whereas in the period immediately after 1945 the Virgin Islands were in the Vanguard of

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[33]Political dependencies that have been incorporated into the metropolitan economic and social welfare systems show a markedly higher GNP per capita than the independent countries. The 1980 average for the five colonies of Martinique, Guadaloupe, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands was $4,436 while the fourteen independent nations' average was $1,564 (World Bank 1983: 24).

> movements toward self-government in the Caribbean area, today they are at the very rear (Lewis 1972: 354).

Consequently, the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples periodically passes resolutions urging that United States expedite the process of decolonization and of granting independence to the Virgin Islands. Size and population should not obstruct true expressions of self-determination (Miller 1974: 302; and Chardy 1982: 10A).

The possibility of merging the Bahamas with the United States was entertained as early as 1888 and in fact had a precedent when the Bahamas was part of the English Carolina Colony. Fifty years after emancipation in the Bahamas, calling the condition of the people of color a disgrace to the British flag, a British magistrate recommended that England persuade the U.S. to annex the colony so it could become the Bahamas County, Florida or South Carolina (Powles 1888: 117). In 1964 a group organized to consider the merger of of the British Crown Colony of Turks and Caicos, rejected annexation, but prepared a detailed proposal for an association that might ultimately lead to a merger ("Merger of Island Group with Bahamas Put Off" 1964: 27).

At this time, the prospects of some new consciously organized political rearrangement for either the Bahamas

or Virgin Islands looked like a dead issue. However, by continuing to pursue the current trajectories, through the lattice of economic dependency, political benefits of colonial patronage, and movement of expatriates to islands, the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas were being steady incorporated into the United States' hegemony. The Virgin Islands' gains some benefits from even the subordinate association with the United States such as income transfers and the ability to migrate to the mainland. Despite the rich legacy of progressive resistance, Virgin Islanders appeared unable or unwilling to formally change their current status. Since the Governor was Puerto Rican and the Delegate to Congress was a white Continental of Hispanic descent it may be possible that the Virgin Islanders as a minority within their own islands had already lost the short lived ability to control even their restricted political sphere.

The Bahamas had exercised much greater flexibiltiy in marshalling resources to maximize the return on tourism and to use tourism as a vehicle for development and had criticized some of the Reagan Administration's policies, but it still was operating within the confining parameters of the international tourist industry and U.S. economic and military hegemony in the Caribbean. As one U.S. government report stated,

> The United States is the trading partner of the Bahamas. United States

> consumer goods have the competitive edge because Bahamians are heavily exposed to Miami television, radio, and newspaper advertising. The quality, shorter delivery time, lower freight costs, ease of ordering, favorable exposure of United States products and better financing more than offset the slightly lower customs any advantage enjoyed by goods from the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries (U.S. Department of State 1975: 7).

The degree of dependence on the United States was also reflected in culture. One critic wrote that as American values were absorbed, Bahamian values were annihilated.

> Our entertainment, our news information through the media of TV, radio, magazines, and films are practically 100 percent US orientated (sic) (McCartney 1971: 58).

Substantiating the State Department's claim, he further elaborated that U.S. advertisements were subtly conditioning Bahamian needs and images. TV dinners were replacing grits and boiled fish. Bahamians dined on frozen, instant, and prepared food instead of guava duff and johnny cake. Imported American music was played and Detroit's chariots clogged the streets of Nassau (McCartney 1971: 58).

While tourism may have been better in the Bahamas than in the Virgin Islands, it does not mean that tourism was good for Bahamians. In both cases, the Virgin Islands' deepening dependency on the United States and the Bahamas' renewed reliance on tourism, the strategies were detri-

mental to the long term self-reliance of the people. For short term material gains, real development was sacrificed.

The next section examines the relationship between tourism and the changing socioracial division of labor in three distinct ways. A comparison of pretourist era stratification patterns with those of tourist era is followed by qualitative and quantitative analysis of the tourist trade as a form of demographic imperialism. Two case studies are then presented that further empirically substantiate the unequal exchange of populations.

Part IV

THE CHANGING SOCIORACIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

The Tourist Business

When tourism is introduced into a sizable economy and introduced slowly, the ripples are small. When, however, tourism replaces another economy within a few years, social, pyschological, and economic repercussions are inevitable and may be intense...

Even though tourism may bring economic well-being to nearly everyone, the relative rewards of tourism are usually experienced unequally. Land speculators, certain politicians, contractors, and merchants may acquire considerable wealth. The "man in the street," or more likely, the man and the woman in the field, may acquire a relatively cleaner, more desirable job and higher wages but may not be satisfied because of relative income and status. They remain at the bottom of the social ladder...

Few black Bahamians, who constitute 85 percent of the population, hold responsible positions in the tourist business...


Sociologically, the Virgin Islands represent a destination area which has, to some extent, been overwhelmed by tourism and the influx of "aliens" brought on by tourism.

Donald E. Lundberg 1980: 246, 258, 262).

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CHAPTER SIX

THE TRANSITION FROM PRETOURIST ERA TO TOURIST ERA SOCIORACIAL STRATIFICATION

Theories of West Indian Socioracial Stratification

A historical comparison of the previous socioracial stratification gives us a benchmark to compare the changes that have occurred since the tourist economy has prevailed. Analyses of individual social formations provide some measure of testing the adequacy of theoretical models of socioracial structures and reciprocally, the models can assist in the analysis of those social formations. Studies of the past patterns of stratification in the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas are few, and most of the theories of West Indian race and class relations have not been developed with either of these social formations as a central concern. Infact, they are seldom even included at all. The author contends that Beckford (1972) and Hoetink (1973) represent the most informative general explanations concerning the importance of race, color, and class, to earlier stratification patterns within West Indian societies.

Beckford's book, Persistent Poverty, superbly describes the ubiquitous and pernicious impact of the slave plantations' social organization upon the West Indian societies. The foundation of the slave plantation was the caste system,

> based on race, rigidly stratified social structure based on occupational status on the plantations and divided along race and color lines, and cultural plurality with integrative elements deriving from the common destiny to production of the crop for everyone in the plantation community (Beckford 1972: 63).

Hoetink argues that socioracial stratification is more important than socioeconomic stratification in multiracial societies. Based upon his comparison of societies in the Western Hemisphere, he asserts that with the exception of those societies where Asian immigration had complicated the socioracial structure, a classic three-tier hierarchy still exists and consists of,

> a small group of Creole Whites enjoying the highest social prestige, intermediated groups of coloreds (Mulattos) holding an intermediate position and the numerically largest group--Negroes--occupying the lowest social position" (Hoetink 1973: 97).

According to Hoetink the lone exception is the United States in which the somatic norm image has created a two-tier hierarchy. Additionally, a socioracial discontinuity occurs in those societies colonized by all non-Iberian European nations (including the United States) while a

socioracial continuum exist in those societies colonized by Spain and Portugal (Hoetink 1973: 195-196).

Beckford agrees with Hoetink's socioracial hierarchy and adds the dimension of class that overlaps fairly consistently with racial stratification. Describing the plantation economies' contemporary social structure that remained bascially in tact following emancipation, Beckford states that the White European planters and administrators along with a skilled White group were on top, and divided by the caste line beneath which a privileged group of racial and cultural half castes were followed by the mass of Black slaves, (Beckford 1972: 62). In a more recent work about Jamaica, Beckford's analysis is essentially the same. The post-emancipation Jamaican caste/class relations consisted of white European capitalists, next "socially white" Jewish, Lebanese, and Chinese merchants divided by the caste line under which came the brown/mulatto petite bourgeoisie and Black African peasants (Beckford and Witter 1982: 44-48). Within the preceding scheme, the Bahamas, a British colony until 1973 and the Virgin Islands, a Danish colony (formerly the Danish West Indies) until 1917 would be expected to exhibit a three tier, discontinuous socioracial structure. However, Lowenthal cautions that although there are certain resemblances and common characteristics among West Indian societies with respect to history and social structure, racial patterns and resource

use, among other factors, distinguish one island from another (Lowenthal 1972: 76). The task then is to determine how well the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands fit the Beckford/Hoetink model.

Previous Attempts to Analyze the Tourist Era Social Structure

The few previous attempts to specifically assess the tourist era social structure of the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands have tended to adhere to the three tier model at times modifying the three tiers, but still relying on it as a framework. Lowenthal is unusual in that he includes both the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas in his comprehensive, but brief summary of West Indian stratification patterns. Lowenthal classifies forty-five West Indian territories into five categories of stratification ranging from the simple to most complex.

The Bahamas

According to Lowenthal's classification, the Bahamas falls under the third category--a society stratified by both color and class. Lowenthal qualifies this assigment in a footnote acknowledging the existence of a significant homogenous metropolitan population lacking distinctions of color or class. The Bahamas receives no further elabora-

tion in the section explaining this third type of West Indian stratification. However, in discussing the next, more complex category of societies that lack a Creole elite, the Bahamas is mentioned as a case in which the Creole elites and colored elites share power with resident expatriate whites. Again in a later chapter on immigration, Lowenthal tangentially addresses the Bahamas by recognizing the sizeable Haitian population present in the Bahamas, but he does not discuss the Haitians with regard to stratification (Lowenthal 1972: 78, 81-85, 217).

It is difficult to ascertain exactly how the strata are arranged in Lowenthal's description because the Bahamas is only obliquely explained and one can only impute Lowenthal's vaguely defined criteria.[1] It seems paradoxical that a society without a creole elite is more complex than a society with a creole elite. Furthermore, the poor white Creole Bahamians are omitted as a group. Never-the-less, based upon his condensation of the Virgin Islands' six groups into three strata (explained below), the Bahamas hypothetically could fit into such a hierarchy.

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[1]Lowenthal does not present a theory of race relations or stratification in the West Indies and never explicity discusses the criteria for his typology. At one point he does state that, "most West Indian territories contain a hierarchy of classes corresponding to colour gradations from white through brown to black." He adds that blacks and "coloured" can now occupy the top ranks in public offices, but economic power still resides in white and "fairer" groups. Lowenthal uses income, education, and "influence" differentials to describe social structures (Lowenthal 1972: 81-83).

Lewis offers a different interpretation of Bahamian stratification, but also tries to remain within a three tier model. After differentiating between the social class interests of the colored bourgeois professionals (thwarted by political and social barriers), and the Negro working class majority (oppressed by economic discrimination), Lewis asserts that,

> Until, indeed, the ferment of the 1960's, Bahamian society was a three-tiered structure of the separate worlds of the expatriate residents and winter tourists, of the domestic White and near-White elite and of the Negro masses, ignorant and suspicious of each other (Lewis 1968: 322-323).

Commenting on the colonial power structure, Lewis states that, unlike the other West Indian societies, British rule was delegated to the powerful white Bahamian aristocracy who acted as a real ruling class, and not as a mere agent of the Imperial center in London (Lewis 1968: 323). This interpretation disagrees with that of Dupuch regarding the power of the British colonial officials.[2] Regardless,

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[2]The extent of a British colonial strata is debatable, but its formidable presence is not. Dupuch, who as a light skinned mulatto newspaper publisher and Member of the House of Assembly sponsored the 1956 resolution that banned racial discrimination in public places, was closer to the scene. If the colonial office permitted considerable autonomy in the Bahamas, the use of British troops to quell labor protests, the large number of British civil servants, the Royal Commissions of Inquiry, and the widespread resistance by British passport holders to relinquish British citizenship at the time of independence illustrate the importance of the British presence. Probably, the practice of the British colonial officials supporting the local white oligarchy arose from mutual interests and

of this dispute, even by Lewis' own text, his three tier classification does not fit Bahamian reality. Lewis is inconsistent about the caste line, first implying that it exists with regard to the black Bahamian bourgeoisie, then merges the domestic whites and the near white elites into the middle strata. He ignores the group of poor whites mentioned earlier,

> The racial ratios of the population revealed how, unlike neighboring Jamaica, there was a large "white settler" population for whose members trading and sailing were congenial occupations, and giving rise to the characteristic prototype of the Bahamian "poor whites" in the settlements of the lonely "Out islands", jealously maintaining their racial integrity well into the twentieth century ... (Lewis 1968: 310).

Additionally, Lewis ignores altogether, the existence of the swelling Haitian population which the Bahamian government had officially regularlized in 1968 by issuing 10,000 work permits, after deporting 5,000 "illegal" Haitians the year before (Hamilton and Dunkel 1983: 58-59). The Haitian community would have constituted approximately ten percent of the Bahamian population and an even larger percentage of the labor force. While Lewis does recognize the tourist and winter resident community, he does not elaborate on their position in Bahamian society.

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not outright capitulation as Lewis states. Dupuch's configuration is discussed in the section on pre-tourist era social relations.

Hughes more recently has attempted to apply a theoretical model of race relations to the Bahamas and contends that,

> the Bahamian experience [of race relations] is too deviant, even from the norm of the British Caribbean, to support any attempt to establish a new theory or even to go very far towards endorsing established theory (Hughes 1982: 20).

Nevertheless, he follows M. G. Smith's distinguishing among five contextural meanings of color--phenotypical, genealogical, associational, cultural or behavioral, and structural in which class is subsumed under the structural category (Smith 1965: 60-66). Class is determined by the distribution of power, authority, knowledge, and wealth; Hughes emphasizes that wealth has been particularly important in the Bahamas (Hughes 1982: 21).

Although Hughes acknowledges that the hierarchical race relations, forged within the legal and the social caste distinctions of slavery, outlived their legal abolition, he endorses Smith's position that individual achievement will result in cultural uniformity and a leveling of the differences that support the hierarchy.

> The period of sustained prosperity that began during the second World War and has continued for an unprecedented period encouraged tendencies already firmly implanted in Bahamian value systems to develop and thereby undermine the previously dominant

> hierarchy system surviving from the days of slavery (Hughes 1982: 22).[3]

Hughes claims that this view is supported by the high degree of vertical mobility and middle class expansion and the black Progressive Liberal Party's winning control of the government from the white oligarchy.

Yet Hughes contradictorily quotes from an ethnographic study of an out-island (LaFlamme 1972), and concurs with LaFlamme who concludes that acculturation of slaves produced a culturally similar population. However, Hughes also cites LaFlamme's evidence indicating that racism and socioeconomic stratification had resulted in physical isolation (segregated residences, work schedules, and social activities), and differential interaction had perpetuated or even intensified differences in culture (Hughes 1982: 28).[4] A final difference is that Hughes, in contrast

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[3]The argument is similar to Wilson's in The Declining Significance of Race that class has superceded race as the major factor in inequality in the United States during the same time period (Cf. Wilson 1978).

[4]Hoetink explains that in cultural deterministic models racial differences supposedly disappear through assimilation and in economic deterministic approaches caste differences of color are assumed to be superceded by class differences. The success of the two most prevalent theories stems from, "the disinclination to recognize the existence of racial differences and their sociological consequences as reality--in the philosophical sense ... and the long standing refusal to address the, °somatic factor' per se as an autonomous explanatory social element in the study of group relations in multi-racial societies..." (Hoetink 1974: 32).

to Lewis, states that foreign settlement in the Bahamas had minimal impact until the 1960's (Hughes 1982: 28).

The Virgin Islands

Lowenthal designates the Virgin Islands as a more complex social structure of the fourth category--stratified by color and class but with white creole elites absent or insignificant.[5] Appended to this classification are the significant groups of poor Whites and metropolitan whites. According to Lowenthal,

> American Virgin Islands society contains at least six distinct groups. The colored [mulatto] elite maintain political power through government handouts for the native Black majority. Both classes despise the St. Barthois [French Chachas] in St. Thomas as poor Whites and fear the Puerto Ricans in St. Croix as competitors. Some 16,000 Black West Indian immigrants from nearby British islands, who comprise more than half the working force, are excluded from local political participation and denied social and economic benefits...(Lowenthal 1972: 86).

The sixth group is the white mainland Americans who own most of the land, the banks, and the local industries.

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[5]Lowenthal's other three categories are as follows: 1) homogeneous societies without distinctions of color or class, e.g. Barbuda; 2) societies differentiated by color, but not stratified by class, e.g. Anguilla; and 5) societies stratified by color and class, and also containing sizeable ethnic groups in large measure outside the the color-class hierarchy with distinctive cultur, institutions, and values, e.g. Trindidad (Lowenthal 1972: 76).

These six groups are reduced to three strata as Lowenthal depicts the distribution of power, conforming closely to Hoetink's discontinuous three-tier socioracial structure for the West Indies. Thus, the colored elite maintains its control by walking,

> a tight rope between the demands and complaints of its rival clients--Black electorate and White capital--meanwhile remaining in the good graces of Congress and the federal agencies...(Lowenthal 1972: 86).

An additional observation of Lowenthal's is that the colored upper class, new American wealth, and the black lower class were culturally and socially isolated which was contrary to the West Indian norm (Lowenthal 1972: 87).

Lowenthal ignores the ethnic and class divisions among the whites and blacks already mentioned and does not consider the influential Jewish community, nor the small but growing group of black Americans known as "statesiders" as opposed to their white counterparts, the continentals. It appears that three strata over simplify the configuration presented by Lowenthal himself.

Orlins also employs a three tier model in discussing the immigration of diverse groups to meet the demand for labor because the rapid expansion of the tourist industry had exceeded the Virgin Islands's workforce in terms of numbers and skills.

> A particular "ethnic" division of employment appears to have taken place in that temporary alien workers perform

> most of the skilled and semi-skilled labor; continentals predominate strongly in entrepreneurial and high-level managerial employment; while Islanders form a large middle group involved in all levels of employment, but monopolizing professional and government work (Orlins 1969: 251).

However, Orlins is also guilty of over simplifying the strata and criteria in his three level "ethnic" division of employment.

Lewis in his monograph on the Virgin Islands takes a position similar to Lowenthal in identifying six discrete population groups, but differs in that he does not attempt to condense them into three tiers.

> The social structure of the Virgins constitutes what Porter, in his definitive Canadian study, has term a "vertical mosaic," that is, a series of ethnic layers crisscrossing the other traditional strata of income, class, and occupation, with the added complication of color. It is, then a socioracial structure characterized by a number of fairly well-defined cultural groups, separate categories of high social visibility: native Virgin Islanders, continentals, French Americans, Puerto Rican Americans, and British West Indian aliens (Lewis 1972: 154).

Lewis then proceeds to explain that due to the scarcity of statistical information, the absence of a "well-defined, sophisticated class structure," the tourist industry's playing havoc with the customary reference points of occupation, and the lack of automatic correlation between social class and residence owing to the West Indian fash-

ion, it is difficult to define the social structure in terms of the usual criteria.

Apparently for these reasons he analyses each group of this "pluralist matrix" separately; by focusing on socioeconomic characteristics (only the native group is both class stratified and multicolored) it is difficult to ascertain the overall relationships of the groups. Perhaps this explains his statement that a color problem exists but,

> it is not couched in the harsh, polarizing terms of the North American white-black confrontation. The trajectory of race relations took a different direction in the Virgins, as already noted, than in the continental society. The classification system of the the color spectrum, to begin with, was not the simplistic American one but the pluralistic West Indian one, a fact noted by the first of the American visiting correspondents after the transfer (Lewis 1972: 248).

Lewis also confuses his West Indian model with the American model when he states that,

> there is a belated recognition by native Virgin Islanders that the tourist-based economic development of the last fifteen years or so has had the end result of reproducing in the island economy the old, traditional closed racial composition of the West Indian business community. The lines drawn between employers and employees, or between big business and small business, increasingly coincide with

> the lines drawn between white and non-white (Lewis 172: 253).[6]

In general the analysis of the Bahamas' and Virgin Islands' social structure have suffered from the inability to address the complicating factors of the tourist industry, the diverse immigrant groups, and the American influence. One reason is that the conceptualization and terminology have failed to keep pace with the new international division of labor, the new economic functions, and the new sociospatial manifestations generated by the tourist industry. However, another reason is due to the lack of historical documentation and attention to pre-tourist era stratification analyses that revealed the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands to different from other West Indian societies.

Campbell's account of the Virgin Islands' social divisions on the eve of World War II (1943) and Dupuch's much sketchier description of early Twentieth Century

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[6]Lewis does discuss the dual influence of Americanization and tourism upon Virgin Islands' culture, but he restricts the analysis to the arts and folklore (Lewis 1972: 170-178). When he does get around to talking about the American influence, it is in reference to the transfer of the black power movement from the States to the Virgin Islands. "In the area of race relations, as in other areas, the native leadership is trapped within its American connection, for it seeks to maintain that connection and yet ot insulate its society from the explosive ideas raging within the metropolitan center" (Lewis 1972: 255). While he does not accept the ideology of multiracial harmony espoused by the islands' power structure, his refusal to acknowledge the transfer of the American two-tier socio-racial structure weakens his analysis.

stratification in the Bahamas (1967) are used to demonstrate that West Indian model of three tiered socioracial stratification was inapplicable prior to the ascendance of tourism.

Pre-tourist Era Stratification Patterns

The Bahamas

Dupuch initially presents a portrait of Bahamian society with three main groups. At the top were the British official class, in the middle were the Bahamian whites who consisted mostly of descendants of American Loyalists/-Tories that arrived between 1783 and 1786, and on the bottom were the Bahamian people of color. However, he elaborates that,

> The coloured people were split into groups, determined entirely by degree of colour, starting with Black at the bottom, through to off-black, dark brown, brown, light brown, °highyaller' and near White. Only °leopards'--people with spots in their character--attempted to cross these invisible barriers. The Bahamian Whites were split in two groups--the Government House crowd composed principally of people of Scottish extraction, members of the powerful St. Andrew's society who received invitations to Government house--and the **REST**. On top of this structure sat the Governor and his English officials, the Governor like a great silent Buddha (Dupuch 1967: 37, emphasis original).

In Dupuch's account not only do the three main strata differ, the divisions within each strata are also more complex. One addition is a stratifying dimension which this author terms "geopolitical origin." The result is that there are two white groups above the caste line and one non-white group below and the non-white strata is subdivided by color.

Class cleavages are not discussed. McCartney mentions the Greek and Chinese merchants or social whites who further complicate Bahamian stratification (McCartney 1974: 170). Another significant group omitted was the large number of poor Bahamian whites derisively known as "Conchy Joes" (after the principal staple of poor Bahamians, conch meat) who were looked down upon by nearly everyone. Compositely the pretourist era pattern of stratification is shown in Figure 7. Racial composition, recorded by the last census taken before World War II, is presented in Table 5 below.

The Virgin Islands

With respect to the Virgin Islands, Campbell offers a much more detailed explanation of social relations in

Figure 7

Pre-Tourist Era Socioracial Stratification
in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands

	Bahamas		Virgin Islands
1.	British Officials	1.	American Officials
2.	White Bahamians, (St. Andrew's Society)	2.	Upper Class Danes, Other Europeans
3.	Greeks/Chinese, (Social Whites)	3.	Other Danes, Jews, Puerto Ricans
	Caste Line		
4.	Near Whites	4.	Light Skinned Elite
5.	High Yellow	5.	Brown Middle Class, (Professionals/-Self-Employed)
6.	Mulattos	6.	Lower Class Pure Negro Type
7.	Blacks		
8.	Poor Whites (Conchy Joes)	7.	Poor Whites (French Chachas)

Source: Dupuch 1967; McCartney 1974; and Campbell 1943.

TABLE 5
POPULATION BY RACE FOR THE
BAHAMAS (1943) AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS (1940)

RACE	BAHAMAS NUMBER	%	VIRGIN ISLANDS NUMBER	%	
EUROPEAN	7,923	11.5	2,236	9.0	WHITE
MIXED	3,214	4.7	5,477	22.0	MIXED/OTHER
AFRICAN	57,346	83.3	17,176	69.0	NEGRO
OTHER	363	0.5	--	--	--
TOTAL	68,846	100.0	24,889	100.0	TOTAL[7]

SOURCE: Woods 1943: Table VII; and U.S. Department of Commerce 1943: Table 1.

[7]NOTE: Of the 2002 Puerto Ricans recorded in the Virgin Island census 4.2 percent were listed as white, 83.6 percent as mixed/other, and 12.2 percent as black (Senior 1947: 9).

St. Thomas.[8] Based on Campbell's discussion the stratification pattern for the Virgin Islands prior to the boom in tourism is presented in Figure 7 above. Real political power was wielded by the fifty continentals who administered the island. These civilian colonial officials occupied virtually all of the positions of responsibility and prestige--appointed governor, government secretary, municipal physicians, the Civilian Conservation Corps directors, government engineer, and other officials. Additional influential Americans were several ministers, businessmen (mostly representatives of American business firms, and retirees living on estates; the last two groups in particular were starting to exert a growing pressure on the island's political affairs. The American colonial administrators were backed by the presence of Marines, Naval Coast Guard officers and their crews and families numbering not more than 250 altogether.

> This small group of Americans tend to associate amongst themselves, with the officers from the barracks, and with the upper class St. Thomians and Europeans. Most of them bring to St. Thomas the characteristic attitudes toward race ... they make an effort to avoid all unnecessary contact with the colored natives, no matter what their intellectual or economic pretensions (Campbell 1943: 31-32).

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[8]This discussion of the stratification patterns in the Virgin Islands is based upon Albert A. Campbell, St.-Thomas Negroes: A Study in Personality and Culture. Evanston, Illinois: American Psychological Association (Psychological Monographs 55, No. 5) 1943, unless otherwise stated.

Other foreign born white residents included a few Danes who stayed on after the Danish occupation ended.[9] Most of their compatriots returned to Denmark at the time of the transfer. Those who stayed including some who became American citizens, kept control of some key offices: the head physician at the municipal hospital, the police judge, and the president of the local shipping company. Others were small shopkeepers, minor government official and few in lower class occupations.

Next came "social white" native born descendants of the Sephardic Jewish families originally from Spain and Portugal who had begun settling in St. Thomas during the mid-eighteenth century. They were subsequently joined by three or four Eastern European families. At its peak about 1870, the Jewish community had reached 400 persons. In the ensuing years, they, like many other white mer-

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[9]The Danes never as firmily imprinted the Virgin Islands with a Danish cultural legacy as most of the other European colonial rulers. One of the reasons was due to St.Thomas' being declared the first "freeport" in the West Indies and Danish neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars that produced the multinational character of the European inhabitants. "In the eightteenth century, the Europeans on the island [St.Thomas] were mainly Dutch, but in the nineteenth century other nationalities predominated. A census of 1837 lists 450 Creoles (native born whites), 400 Jews, 250 Danes and Germans, 250 British and Americans, and 132 others (Weinstein 1962: 39). Johnston states that the planters on St. Croix were chiefly French Huguenot protestants, Jews of various nationalities, English, Spaniards, and Swedes (Johnston 1969; 347). Danish may have been the official language, but the lingua franca for slaves and freedmen was Dutch Creole until the nineteenth century and English thereafter (Weinstein 1962: 43).

chants, left for the United States, Europe, or Venezuela and their number had been reduced to less than fifty. All could be considered middle class, mostly merchants, government officials, and salaried employees. They had more contact with persons of color than the upper class Danes or Americans and a Jewish man would occasionally marry a woman of color.

The Puerto Ricans were initially recruited for cutting sugar cane on St. Croix. American authorities had continued bringing in seasonal laborers from the British Virgin Islands until 1927 when U.S. immigration laws were enforced. Recruiters in Vieques were paid a six dollar bonus for each Puerto Rican worker sent to the sugar growers, cattle ranchers, or store owners. By 1940 the census reported 2,002 Puerto Ricans, but the number was probably closer to 5,000 at any given time. Forty-one percent of the Puerto Ricans arrived with $5.00 or less, but two-thirds of the nine most important merchants had over $1,000 when they came. The Puerto Ricans soon excelled in food merchandising, food importing, and liquor stores, and owned seventy-five percent of all retail groceries on the island (Senior 1947: 1, 8, 17-18).

Although 83.6 percent of the Puerto Ricans were classified as mixed, they tended to be stratified racially with the upper class Puerto Ricans closest to being phenotypically white, mulattos clerks and artisans, but farm

laborers and unskilled labor were white, and mixed as well as black. The Puerto Ricans as a group tried to use "white skin privilege" much to the anger of the Crucians. Stereotypes held by black Crucians toward Puerto Ricans included unsanitary habits, troublesome behavior, clannishness, attempted monopoly of livelihood sources, making fortunes that are spent back in Puerto Rico, and white superiority beliefs. There was a rumor that a Puerto Rican conspiracy existed to drive the Crucians from the island. The discrimination by Puerto Ricans was even more resented by black Crucians because they said the Puerto Ricans would be poor white trash in the United States (Senior 1947: 29-31).

By 1940 a steady stream of Puerto Ricans had begun to arrive on St. Thomas. A total of about 200 were mainly engaged in small enterprises, chiefly groceries and cafes. Distinguished by their language, appearance, and nativity, they regarded themselves as superior to the St. Thomians of color who reciprocally looked down upon the Puerto Ricans.

Even the lower class black masses,

> regarded themselves as superior to the French people, who in their estimation hold the undisputed bottom position in the islands' social hierarchy" (Campbell 1943: 29).[10]

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[10]Campbell later contradictorily states that a white lower class has never existed in St.Thomas. "The French colony, which would seem to constitute an exception to

The French people, actually comprising the largest segment of the total white population (2,236) with more than 1,000 persons, were the descendants of French (Breton) Catholic immigrants from the island of St. Barthelmy and other French Antillean possessions who arrived in the middle of the Nineteenth Century (Shaw 1934: 137). They were distinct from the Virgin Islanders of color in their language, race, customs, and occupations. Derisively called "Chachas," they remained poor and lived in two ghetto-like isolated settlements--a fishing colony at Carnage, a western suburb of Charlotte Amalie, and a farming community on the northside of St. Thomas.

The women and children of the first made woven baskets, mats, straw hats, and brooms to sell to tourists and local customers; those in the agricultural group tended the stony fields. The Chachas seldom married outside their group. A few managed to gain "economic security, but the great majority of this group live in the most depressed conditions" in small wooden sheds, "weakened by malnutrition, anaemia, and ascariasis." Their average height and weight was less than the other white and nonwhite groups, but they had already learned from the Americans

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this statement, has always been isolated from the colored inhabitants and is not regarded by them as belonging in the same racial category as the other white residents" (Campbell 1943: 51). Whether for reasons of ethnicity and/or class the Chachas were not considered to be in the same "racial category," they benefited from tourism as a "white" group.

that white skin held special significance and were beginning to develop feelings of superiority. Nevertheless, Campbell considered the French future to be problematical because they did not have the education to compete with the Virgin Islanders of color who had attended the local high school and U.S. colleges.

On the other side of the caste line were approximately eight-five percent of the St. Thomas population who were of African descent. The non-white population were also stratified economically, but the the hierarchy tended to correspond with skin color.[11] At the apex was an elite of no more than 100 persons--merchants, government officials, land owners, and professional men. Most of this group was light skinned and lived in luxury in hillside homes overlooking the squalor of the working class neighborhoods. They seldom married below their own color and even less below their own class. They scrupulously avoided any contact with the black masses. After the American takeover, they withdrew from government house social functions to avoid any "unpleasant situations." A small number of college educated dark skinned men had achieved upper class status since civilian rule and their contact with

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[11]The definition of social class used by Campbell, "refers to a segment of society, the members of which hold a similar economic position, associate on relatively equal terms with each other and share a common pattern of ethical values" (Campbell 1943: 33).

American Negro groups had influenced them to think about the larger racial issues.

Underneath the elite, the black middle class was also confined to a small group who represented approximately ten percent of the black population. School teachers, minor municipal and federal government employees, salaried workers, skilled craftsmen, grocers, tailors, and other small businessmen made up this stratum. They also were involved in church affairs and organized the community functions. "The average skin color of the middle class falls between that of the lower and upper class groups and has tended to become darker since the end of Danish administration (Campbell 1943: 35).

The vast majority or close to ninety percent of the black population was classified as lower class whose average earnings were no more than twenty-five dollars per month. Due to the lack of major industry and agriculture on St. Thomas, the United States government was the largest employer--Works Project Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps, and Public Works Administration. Most of this lower class and hence most of the black population lived in crude frame shacks which were crowded into the low lying areas of town or in comparable living conditions in the rural areas of the islands. Although almost all the "pure negro types" were found in this group, it also included a rather large number of mulattoes.

Reiterating the importance of American influence upon the race relations of the Virgin Islands, Campbell states,

> There is little doubt that the advent of American rule has made St. Thomians a great deal more aware of the importance of race as a basis of invidious distinction. Class distinction they have always understood, but under the Danish administration the line drawn between colored and non-colored was by no means as sharp as one observes in the United States. A certain diffusion of American attitudes is taking place, and St. Thomas whites tend to imitate their American visitors in this regard. They do not have sufficient strength in the community to introduce discriminatory laws or Jim Crow practices, but in their social contacts they have tended to withdraw within the limits of their own race (Campbell 1943: 33).

For the most part the pre-tourist era stratification patterns in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands appear to confirm Hoetink's observation that , "in multiracial societies the socioracial stratification °prevails' over the socioeconomic one" (Hoetink 1973: 194). However, like the Bahamas, the strata are more complex than the Beckford/Hoetink model can accommodate. Hoetink incorrectly claims that the only possible exception to the absence of a distinct mass of poor whites in the West Indies would be in Barbados where the poor whites of Irish descent known as "Redlegs" were particularly numerous (Hoetink 1973:

16).[12] The presence of a large inverted white strata apparently beneath the caste line suggests that class and race were not coterminous. Hoetink also misses the importance of the American influence in the Virgin Islands where the caste line appeared to be redrawn more rigidly by imposing the American two tier socioracial structure.

American Influence and American Tourism

It is worthwhile to sort out the specific influence of American tourism upon West Indian race relations from the more general influence of the American penetration of the Caribbean. While Hoetink failed to observe West Indian variants of the two tiered socioracial structure, those contemporary analyses which have acknowledged American influence have not incorporated that influence in their models. To determine whether tourism was a major or minor factor in the set of social practices constituting demographic imperialism, historical explanations of the

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[12]Poor whites in the West Indies generally came from one of three sources in Europe--indentured servants, convicts, and religious and political deportees (Williams 1970: 101). It is not known why these two white groups who apparently comprise an "undercaste" strata have not received greater attention. Lowenthal does mention the Germans in Jamaica and the bekes Goyaves and blanc Matigons in the French Antilles as poor white minorities who constitute exceptions to the class color hierarchy (Lowenthal 1972: 82).

divergent trajectories of the Bahamas and Virgin Islands' socioracial structure are examined.

The Bahamas, although included in the Caribbean Basin Initiative, actually is in the Atlantic Ocean. The British often referred to the Bahamas separately in their administrative reports (the Bahamas and the West Indies) and the Bahamas did not join the short lived British West Indian Federation. However, by virtue of Columbus' error and subsequent recognition of his "discovering" the West Indies, the Bahamas is considered to be a West Indian territory.[13] The Bahamas also shares the common history of a slave based economy, a majority population of African descent and African cultural influence, a white creole and European colonial population who control the administrative and commercial life of the islands, and a growing self-awareness of this common Afro-Caribbean identity (McCartney 1971: 57). On the other hand, differences have been noted that set the Bahamas apart from its West Indian neighbors.

For example, in contrast to most of the West Indian societies, the Bahamas economy has been more oriented to seafaring and fishing rather than a plantation agricultural system. Due to the islands' geographical proximity to the continental United States, the Bahamas has had closer commercial ties to the U.S. than the United Kingdom. Lewis

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[13]San Salvador was the first landfall of Columbus' expedition in the Western Hemisphere in 1492.

implies that the greater racial discrimination found in the Bahamas than in other West Indian societies may be partially attributed to this American influence that was associated with the repeated transplanting of socially repressive elements--anti-democratic Loyalists, Southern secessionists, and gangster-like bootleggers (Lewis 1968: 308-312).

Another interpretation supporting the more intense discrimination theme is offered by Hughes who states that in addition to the close cultural ties to the Southern U.S., the existence of a substantial poor White population in Nassau, Abaco, Eleuthera, and Long Island, (uncommon in most West Indian societies, but similar to the Southern United States), resulted in a "white supremacy norm" that stressed physical characteristics (Hughes 1982: 25-27). In other words the conditions that produced the "unique" racial stratification pattern in the United States were also present in the Bahamas with similar results. Apparently Hoetink overlooked this second two-tier variant (Cf. Hoetink 1973: 14).

Like the Bahamas, the Virgin Islands maritime trade surpassed agriculture relatively early, especially on St. Thomas which was declared a free port in 1766. If geographical proximity facilitated population exchange between the U.S. and the Bahamas, political proximity accomplished a similar effect with the Virgin Islands when the U.S.ac-

quired the Danish West Indies from Denmark in 1917. Momentously, the shift in colonial rulers brought American administrators and military personnel who carried their cultural accoutrements with them including their somatic norm image and the two-tier variant of the socioracial structure. The facts that until 1930 the American Navy, with its authoritarian chain-of-command and disproportional Southern representation, ruled the island, and the existence of a large poor white population tend to suggest circumstances similar to the Bahamas and divergent from the general West Indian experience.

Two historical commentaries written during the middle stages of World War II noted the adverse effect that the imposition of American norms of race relations was having in the Caribbean. They both independently mention that tourism, along with the military occupation, was the principle factor in implementing an Americanization of the islands' societies. Their insights are still valid today.

Eric Williams perceived the negative social impact that accompanied the American penetration of the Caribbean. Williams, like most other commentators on Caribbean race relations, held that the West Indian situation was radically different from that of the United States. He had observed that the white American southerners and South Africans working in the Trinidadian oil field had increased racial differences although the difference between capital and labor in the Caribbean had always been essentially that

between white and black (Williams 1942: 62). However, he anticipated the effects of World War II from the increased American military presence as well as the conflict between American tourists and West Indian peoples.

> The question on everyone's lips in the Caribbean today is what effect will the closer military ties with the United States have on the racial situation in the islands. Latin America, with its large mulatto or mestizo population, will watch closely the effect of this intrusion on the morale of already sensitive on questions of race. White American tourists in Havana show consternation on seeing the "racial democracy" of Cuba. Racial prejudice was always infinitesimal in the Spanish colonies, especially in Puerto Rico, which was more a military outpost than a plantation colony. But changes have occurred under American Rule and influence and American racial attitudes have begun to exercise their disruptive influence (Williams 1943: 67).

Williams stressed the implications of the lend lease program that would introduce the American view of race, a new brand of racial prejudice that would provoke serious social and political repercussions.

> There is a great uneasiness among British and French West Indians that closer ties with the United States will involve the introduction of American racial attitudes. God save the "local white" from a grandmother clause! But racial discrimination will fall heaviest on the black masses. "Incidents' are increasing and even the English press is getting restless. The American authorities in the new bases have protested against the system by which a white offender might be arrested by a black policeman and judged by

> a black magistrate. Hotels frequented by American tourists have generally in the past refused to serve people of color, and the American soldiers are today insisting that Negroes should be excluded from public bars where Americans are being served (Williams 1943: 68).

Campbell in a landmark study of St. Thomas also chronicled the change forged by American colonials and tourists in the Virgin Islands. There the US Navy had actually ruled the islands from 1917 until a civil governor was appointed in 1931. According to Campbell,

> The Navy also introduced a consciousness of race which had been latent under the Danes. While the Danes had drawn sharp distinctions between the different classes and shades of color within the native group, the Navy tended to lump all of the colored natives into one group (Campbell 1943: 77).

Campbell then asserts,

> The second recent development which has brought the problems of race in to the foreground is the growth of the tourist trade. Since 1935 there has been a pronounced increase in the number of tourist ships which have stopped over in St. Thomas; tourism is becoming an important part of the island's economy. This has introduced the problem of segregated accommodations for the American visitors and the first evidences of Jim Crow policy have begun to appear. During the past few years the large government owned tourist hotel has refused to take colored guests, despite a clause in the management's contract expressly forbidding racial discrimination. This policy was put into effect by a Continental manager and was widely approved by the white colony. The

> commercial hotel in the town has attempted in the recent past to exclude colored guests but desisted in the face of local protest. It is significant that at the time this exclusion was attempted the hotel was under the direction of one of the island's light-skinned upper class. The other smaller hotel is also managed by white Americans who contrive to keep their clientele exclusively white, at least during the rush season. One of the restaurants on the main street has a room labelled "For Tourists Only" which is usually, although not exclusively, used by white persons. This has aroused some resentment. These beginnings of a policy of segregation are not yet very important, but they indicate the influence of the growing tourist trade (Campbell 1943: 82).

The above quotation documented the changing contours of race relations in response to the embryonic tourist industry. In combination with first Naval, then civilian colonial rule, the American pattern of race relations was imposed. The challenge to the existing socioracial structure that resulted under the Danish administration thus created overt conflicts between the mulatto elite and middle class and the white community, but to a limited extent benefited the black majority through government services and recruitment into the civil service based at least partially on merit instead of position.

In the Bahamas the construction of two American Lend-Lease airbase projects and the opening of a new tourist airport precipitated the first two major rebellions of black Bahamians in the Twentieth Century. They illus-

trate that the struggle for positive change is another consequence of the dynamics of military occupation and tourism development.

On June 1, 1942 the 2,500 Bahamians who were employed on the airbase projects struck and marched from the Nassau ghetto to the Bay Street commercial district to protest the unequal pay between American civilian workers and Bahamians. The labor insurrection lasted three days during which three people were killed and twenty-five injured by the British troops brought in to suppress the movement. The agitation signaled a new beginning for mass protest and won wage increases, the right to form unions, and other labor benefits (Richardson 1943: 3).

Tourism has been even more directly responsible for promulgating institutional change. When Nassau International Airport opened in November 1957, taxi drivers had shut down it down for twenty-four hours to demonstrate against the attempted control of the lucrative tourist trade by Bay Street tour operators. Having failed to reach an agreement after an eight week cooling off period on January 13, 1958 the taxi drivers walked off their jobs and the Bahamas Federation of Labor called for a sympathy strike. The hotel workers, airport baggage haulers, garbage haulers and others succeeded in shutting down all sixteen hotels for nineteen days. The mass strike was successful in having the British Colonial Secretary inves-

tigate the political conditions, who then ordered progressive changes in voting laws and revisions in labor legislation (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, b: 136-140).

Resistance to American style segregation of public tourist facilities also figured prominently in the Bahamas. In November 1955 a Jamaican couple was refused hotel accommodations in Nassau when their British Airways (BOAC) flight was stranded. The incident happened soon after another episode of racial discrimination the previous year involving a distinguished Barbadian, and the acrimonious publicity about the Bahamian Jim Crow actions had circulated throughout the West Indies. The new incident resurrected the anti-discrimination movement and Sir Etienne Dupuch, MHA, introduced a resolution in the House of Assembly condemning discrimination in public places and calling for a Commission of Inquiry to investigate all matters of discrimination in the colony. In response to a column in a Nassau newspaper which justified the "whites only practice," a black Bahamian dentist wrote that that kind of Bahamian,

> will make you believe that the Bahamas attract a very special kind of tourist and is attracting more and more of this unique specimen year by year. He would make you believe that his brand--all 100,000 of them--would suddenly cease to come if some hotels, the Savoy Theatre, and some other places would adopt the policy of being fair and decent and intelligent in accepting as guests and patrons people of a darker race....He is that Baha-

> mian who will tell me to sacrifice everything that is principled on the altar of the tourist business. That I must creep and crawl and teach my children to creep and crawl in their own land so that we may attract tourists (Cleveland Eneas as quoted in Hughes 1982: 45).

In the House of Assembly the first part of Dupuch's resolution was passed unanimously on the 21st of February, 1956, but an influential Assemblyman, H.G. Christie, blocked the passage of the investigation. Nevertheless, the expanding middle class of black Bahamians as well as other persons of color who could afford to visit the Bahamas were now admitted to public facilities (Hughes 1982: 43-44).

Other conflicts originated over the displacement of local black farmers and the exclusion of the native population from the islands' beaches. The rising land values accompanying the post war tourism development had a direct negative impact upon the peasant farmers who used slash and burn agricultural techniques on small plots of land. The white controlled House of Assembly adopted a legal arrangement by which titles could be "quieted" by the courts after a claim was advertised for a period without any claimant coming forward able to prove ownership. As a consequence, heirs of white Bahamians who could trace their ancestors back to a Crown grant or proper deed conveyance, but had had no contact with the land could and did displace

the peasants who had farmed the land for several generations.

One specific case involved Sir Harold G. Christie, the founder of Bahamian Airways, real estate developer, and the member of the House of Assembly who blocked the inquiry. It was this same Christie who had been the first chairman of the Development Board and whose goal for the Bahamas,

> was nothing less than to turn this insignificant community into the new Mecca of the world's rich, a metropolis gorgeous enough to draw the international set away from the Riviera, and Biarritz, and Palm Beach (Craton 1962: 269).

Christie successfully challenged and evicted twenty-five Cat Island farmers who had been cultivating the land; Christie was the House of Assembly representative from Cat Island (Albury 1975: 103-104).

The adverse impact on agriculture in the Bahamas had much earlier, less deliberately malicious antecedents going back to the post world war I period. An official government publication noted that on Bimini,

> The building of a large hotel by an American company was commenced in August, giving regular employment at high wages to all who desired work with the result that agriculture has practically been abandoned (Colonial Reports: Bahamas, 1919-1920 1921: 14)

In the Virgin Islands developers scrambled to buy up the limited beaches.[14] According to one journalist,

> By the mid-1960s, the only beaches worth the name that remained for public use were Magen's Bay, three miles from Charlotte Amalie by tortuous roads, and Lindbergh Bay, adjoining the busy airport" (O'Neill 1972: 82).

The Citizens Committee on Beaches agitated to open up St. Thomas beaches for free and unrestricted access by all people of the islands. As in the Bahamas, tourist interests reacted by defending discrimination economically.

> Hotel owners and managers are resisting the committee's proposals, apparently fearful that widespread use of their beaches by black Virgin Islanders would scare away white tourists (Lukas 1971: 110).

The committee's petition with 2,500 signatures, "swim-ins" at private beaches, and calypoems did spur the Virgin Islands legislature to pass a bill that reaffirmed that public's right to the beaches. While designed more to placate both the public and private developers than guarantee access, it did induce more flexible public entry procedures by the owners (O'Neill 1972: 82-83).

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[14]On St. Thomas most of the forty beaches are located in bays and coves that are easily restricted from public access by building hotels and condominiums as well as fences. In the Bahamas beach access has not been as controversial supposedly because British common law guarantees public right of way. In a recent official publication, seventeen of thirty-six resorts advertised "private beach" in Eleuthera--an island given the Greek name for freedom.

The direct and massive contact of white American tourists has undoubtedly more than any other factor contributed to a reshaping of race relations in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands. Assisted by other forms of American presence, specifically the military, the Americanization of West Indian societies resulted in condensing three racial strata to two. However, the expansion of the tourist industry also launched an equally important counter tendency. The transient movement of tourists stimulated the influx of permanent tourists and immigrant workers who were responsible for reconstituting a more complex three tier stratification system.

A summary profile of the major immigrant groups who came to the islands during the expansion of the tourist industry is presented to assist in the analysis of the effects on the population and inequality. Although virtually all of these immigrant groups had established communities prior to the post war boom, the earlier immigrants were a much smaller contingency, were engaged in different functions in the political economy, and/or lived under different circumstances. The profile begins with the top of the hierarchy and alternates between the Bahamas and Virgin Islands by strata. The profiles of the tourist era population groups in the islands are summarized in Figure 8 at the end of this section.

Profile of Major Immigrant Groups in the Islands

First Tier

The Bahamas - British

The British colonial officials and civil servants ran the bureaucracy and were complemented by teachers, clerks, accountants, nurses, engineers, professionals and business men. Forty-four percent of all the British who were economically active held professional/technician positions, more than twice as high as any other immigrant group. All of the casino dealers were imported from the United Kingdom. Those from Great Britain whose stay was more or less permanent were given a special status of "Belonger." At the time of independence approximately 1,200 British subjects were classified as belongers before the Pindling government forced them to choose between British citizenship and Bahamian citizenship. From 1943 when there were 403 residents born in the United Kingdom the number continued to increase until 1970 when there were 4,585 persons comprising 14.7 percent of all immigrants. However, Bahamianization of the work force commencing in 1967 and independence in 1973 will probably show the greatest effect on reducing the size of this group when the 1980 census is published. Currently, the most influential Britisher is Jack Hayward, son of British conglomerate owner Sir Charles Hayward. In 1978 son Jack purchased all

of Wallace Groves' shares in the InterContinental Diversified Corporation, the Panamanian parent company that owns the Grand Bahama Port Authority (developers of Freeport).

The Bahamas - Americans

The American presence in the Bahamas has kept a higher profile due to the tourist stream and to persons of wealth and notoriety who captured the headlines, like Robert Vesco, Howard Hughes, and Huntington Hartford as well as Wallace Groves and various underworld figures linked to the casinos who surfaced occasionally during IRS probes. Harry Oakes, an American who made a fortune in Canadian mining ventures, was one of the first to seek financial asylum in the Bahamas tax haven before the war. This escape from the American tax and constitutional system had much earlier antecedents. Loyalist refugees and their slaves who left the United States following the American Revolution and settled in the Bahamas became the islands' most numerous inhabitants.

In 1943 there were 1,080 American born individuals comprising 40.3 percent of the immigrant population; by 1970 the number had climbed to 6,657, the most of any group, but the percentage had fallen to 21.5 of all immigrants. Executive/managerial/administrative positions constitute the largest proportion of any occupational

category held by Americans (26.1 percent) followed closely by professional/technicians (21.3 percent). American multinational companies with Bahamian subsidiaries dominated the financial and industrial sectors as well as the tourist industry. Undoubtedly, the biggest American presence will come in the future as subdivisions of condominiums and houses continued to attract the wealthy offshore residents from the States.

The Bahamas - Canadians

While smaller than the Yankee/British communities, the Canadians were arriving at a faster rate than any other major group. In 1943 only 95 Canadians were recorded in the census or 3.5 percent of the immigrants. By 1970 the number had reached 1,997 and made up 6.4 percent of all immigrants. One of the reasons was that Canada, unlike most other countries, levies taxes on the basis of residence and income. Therefore, Canadian residency in the Bahamas was an income tax shelter and the Bahamian government promoted this immigration with special provisions geared to Canadians. The two most prominent Canadians were E.P. Taylor, who owned a Canadian distillery before becoming a major real estate developer on New Providence, including Lyford Cay and the South Ocean Village and Louis Chessler, a "wheeler-dealer" from Toronto, who helped launch casino gambling in the Bahamas and was the impetus

behind the major real estate development of Freeport, Lucaya along with several other shakey real estate development projects.

The Virgin Islands - Continentals

White residents of the Virgin Island who were from the U.S. mainland were known as Continentals. Like the Colonial British in the Bahamas the Continentals followed the flag. In 1940 there were 792 Continentals or 3.2 percent of the population. Some of the earliest Continentals were retired Navy personnel, eccentric beach combers, and wealthy retirees. Herman Wouk's 1958 best seller, Don't Stop the Carnival, parodied the East Coast white-collar executive who was able to amass sufficient savings and become a small hotel or shop owner and live as an entrepreneur from the income. Lewis describes them as professionals who sought refuge from the "gray flannel suit" syndrome.

> Generally, Continentals must be seen as the Caribbean variant of the general theme of explosive flight to the suburbs that took place in American society during the 1950s" (Lewis 1972: 181).

The more recent arrivals were less imbued with the notion of romantic escapism than the profit motive and sun lust. They were highly skilled builders, stenographers, doctors, therapists, accountants, and managers, but because of the narrow occupational spectrum,

shifted into tourist derived service sector jobs. The high turnover in the American community and frequent commuting contribute the Continentals' self-image of Americans who were Caribbean residents and not "creolized Americans" in the Caribbean. Also the enclave syndrome bounded by the Anglo-Saxon superiority complex has created social ghettos.

> There are entire neighborhoods, like Water Island and Judith's Fancy (St. Croix), which, being in the main composed of well-to-do retired mainlanders, take on at least the appearance of white residential districts (Lewis 1972: 186).

By 1970 the Continentals numbered 5,906 or 12.9 percent of the population. Although they had lost the monopoly in political administration, the continentals were concentrated in the entrepreneurial sector. Continental interests owned or managed a majority of the retail trade--food stores, restaurants, bars, dress and apparel shops, gift and novelty shops, hotels, laundries, beauty shops and dominated the Chamber of Commerce. Lewis also notes that the trend even for those exceptions, enterprises owned by Virgin Island families, was to sell out to Continentals who, in turn, were merging with other businesses to form larger private partnerships or being acquired by corporations (Lewis 1972: 195-196).

The Virgin Islands - Statesiders

Statesider refers to the black Americans who moved to the Virgin Islands. In 1970 the census listed 1,792 persons as black who were born in the mainland. Doctors and lawyers were most frequently mentioned among the rising number of black American professionals who were moving to the islands. Poets Winnie Loving, "Oyoko" and Tram Combs had become residents and Singer Isaac Hayes headed a consortium organized to construct low income housing on St. Croix. The Harlem Commonwealth Council purchased the Windward Passage Hotel and a group of black American investors in Washington purchased the television station, WBNB (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, a: 46, 62-63).

Second Tier

The Bahamas - Jamaicans and Turks and Caicos Islanders

The second tier in the Bahamas was comprised of Jamaicans and Turks and Caicos Islanders. The Jamaicans with the fourth largest immigrant group at 3,526 and 11.3 percent of all foreign born were concentrated in Grand Bahama and New Providence. Just over forty percent of all economically active Jamaicans were in the craftsmen category; another twenty-two percent were in the services and were mostly women. Prime Minister Pindling's father was a Jamaican policeman who had come to the Bahamas. Keith

Gonsalves, a Jamaican, succeeded Groves as chairman of the influential InterContinental Diversified Corporation.

Like the Jamaicans, the 3,185 Turks and Caicos Islanders were predominately found in Grand Bahama and New Providence, but a third settlement existed on Inagua where they were imported to work in the salt extraction industry during the war. Also similar to the Jamaicans, the two top occupational categories were craftsmen and services and women outnumbered men. However, Jamaicans were more likely to have professional occupations than Turks and Caicos Islanders, while the latter displayed a greater representation in communications and transportation and sales than did the Jamaicans. The Turks and Caicos Islands, geologically part of the same archipelago as the Bahamas, were governed by the Bahamas between 1799 and 1848 at which time they were transferred to Jamaican jurisdiction. In 1962 at the time of Jamaican independence they became a crown colony. In 1970 there were almost as many Turks and Caicos Islanders living in the Bahamas as in their own islands, probably more if the children born in the Bahamas were included.

The Virgin Islands - Puerto Ricans

Puerto Ricans were recruited from Vieques to fill the void when U.S. Immigration laws were enforced prohibiting seasonal labor to be imported from the British

islands. Between 1927 and 1946 approximately 3,500 Puerto Ricans migrated to St. Croix and another 200 to St. Thomas. The 1970 census recorded 4,014 Puerto Ricans or about six percent of the Virgin Islands population, a figure that excluded the descendants born in the Virgin Islands.[15] Lewis states that the Puerto Ricans displayed more occupational diversity than the other groups--unskilled laborers, garbage haulers, cab drivers, carpenters, masons, plumbers, supermarket employees, clerical workers, police, teachers, government bureaucrats, nurses, artisans, small traders, some of the wealthiest merchants, and seventy-five percent of the employees of the watch assembly plants were Puerto Ricans (Lewis 1972:207-208). The biggest success of all was Juan Luis who became the third elected governor of the Virgin Islands in 1978.

Third Tier

The Bahamas - Haitians

The Haitian immigration to the Bahamas resulted from the rapid growth in the Bahamas tourist economy and concomitant political repression and economic impoverishment in Haiti. The importance of the Haitian community was

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[15]The 1980 census that focused special attention on persons of Hispanic origin enumerated 11,269 residents who were of Puerto Rican descent or 11.7 percent of the population (U.S. Department of Commerce 1983: 55-7).

recognized in 1948 when the Haitian government appointed a consul to handle the interests of its citizens. Some skilled masons were imported during the war to work in construction projects at the salt pans on the island of Inagua; later Haitians were recruited to work in agriculture and the lumber industry, but soon the Haitians began entering the Bahamas on their own. The Bahamian government by 1956 had announced the Haitians were "a problem" and the next year deported 250 of them. In 1963 the first time the census published information for the Haitians as a separate category when 4,106 were recorded, but reliable estimates placed the number closer to 20,000. The same year a massive roundup of illegals resulted in nearly 3,000 deportations. Efforts were made to keep the Haitians being deported from being seen by tourists at the airport. When the PLP came to power in 1967, a combination of a coffee crop failure and the impression that a black government would be more lenient produced a surge of Haitian arrivals. Nevertheless, the PLP launched a sweep for illegals that led to the repatriation of 5,000 Haitians. In 1969 police and immigration officials raided Haitian settlements on Grand Bahama Island that coincided with the government's efforts to regain control over Freeport.

By the 1970 census the official number was 6,151, but the chief immigration officer estimated the number to be 25,000. While the number of official work permits

issued to Haitians declined from 5,000 to 3,000 the estimates of Haitians in the Bahamas reached 40,000 at the time of independence in 1973. Other crackdowns on the Haitians have occurred in 1973, 1978, and 1980, but almost everyone admits that the Haitians were an indispensable segment of the workforce. It was estimated that ninety--five percent of all farm labor in Eleuthera was done by Haitians. The census reported that the largest occupational category of Haitians was in crafts (56.3 percent) consisting of carpenters, joiners, bricklayers, and tile setters; this surprisingly reveals a relatively high skilled group of Haitians concentrated in construction jobs.

On the other hand, a survey of a Haitian community outside of Nassau found gardeners, caretakers, and casual labor to be the principal occupations. The Haitians were widely perceived to hold the lowest paying, dirtiest, menial jobs and speaking French creole they were isolated from the rest of Bahamian society (Marshall 1979).

The Virgin Islands - Down Islanders

The Down Islanders came from the Leeward and Windward Islands of the British West Indies, principally Anguilla, Nevis, St. Kitts, Antigua, St. Lucia, and Dominica, that were even more underdeveloped than the Virgin Islands. Like their Haitian counterparts in the Bahamas, the Down

Islanders were plagued with the question of status.[16] However, the recruitment of labor in the neighboring West Indian Islands goes back much earlier. For example, sugar cane planters financed recruiters in Barbados and St. Eustatius who sent 1,700 workers to the plantations in St. Croix in 1864 (Albuquerque 1982: 63). The Danes and then the American authorities permitted the planters to bring in temporary labor from the British islands until 1927 when U.S. immigration code was applied and Spanish speaking Puerto Rican U.S. citizens replaced the English speaking aliens. During the war 250 illegal aliens from the British West Indies worked on construction of the naval and marine bases.

While the authorities permitted the aliens to work in the islands during the war, following its conclusion, roundups and deportations were carried out in 1946 and 1949. Due to the continuing dislocation of the Virgin Islands' labor force, in 1952 the Immigration and Naturalization Service sanctioned workers from the British Virgin Islands to fill vacancies in agriculture, hotels,

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[16]Due to the confusion of different policies followed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Virgin Islands Department of Labor for authenticating the temporary work program, in 1970 West Indian aliens were classified into permanment aliens of whom 6,313 held permanent visas, temporary aliens of whom 10,444 who had work permits, and an estimated 10,000 illegal aliens. Thus, less than one-fourth of this group had any type of secure future in the islands (U.S. Department of Commerce 1972: 55-17; and U.S. House 1975: 25).

and domestic jobs. Following intensive lobbying by tourist industry officials, a congressional subcommittee directed the INS to be more flexible in admitting H-2 non-immigrants in 1955. In 1959 allegedly due to misunderstanding of policy, permission to enter as temporary workers was extended to people from the British West Indies, French and Netherlands Antilles. The peak year for admissions was in 1969 when 16,841 aliens were admitted.

A study released the same year stated that the bonded aliens constituted forty-five percent of the labor force and over one-fourth of the population, but estimated there were 2,500 illegal aliens and 16,000 visitors who potentially could overstay their B-2 visitor permits. West Indian aliens comprised ninety to ninety-five percent of all domestic workers, seventy-five percent of all construction workers, and seventy-five percent of hotel and restaurant workers (Olrins 1969: 234). In February, 1970 more than 7,000 illegals were arrested and deported. One reason for the high number was if a H-2 worker was unemployed for more than sixty (until 1975 only five days to find another job) days he/she automatically became illegal and subject to deportation which was one of the principal reasons that the Virgin Islands had one of the lowest unemployment rates in the Caribbean and frequently less than the mainland.

The alien workers were at the very bottom of the Virgin Islands economic and social hierarchy and excluded from full political rights and social benefits (U.S. House 1975: 36). A survey of alien housing in 1965 on St. Croix found ninety-six percent had no indoor plumbing and ninety percent had faulty electrical wiring and were overcrowded (Lewis 1972: 222). Many of the aliens lived in squatter settlements where they lived in makeshift housing of packing crates, abandoned galvanized sheeting, tin scraps, wooden ramshackle huts or crowded into old urban areas of dilapidated housing. When aliens became eligible for public housing, due to their preference scores with low incomes, the projects became so highly concentrated with non-immigrant residents that "there now exists a polarization of various ethnic groups with resulting social problems (U.S. House 1975: 99). The projects also were constructed outside the city limits away from the airport in a sparsely populated area and "resulted in a sudden staggering shift of population from Charlotte Amalie to Tutu and contiguous eastern sections of St. Thomas" (Ottley 1982: 204).

Furthermore, the aliens, like the Haitians in the Bahamas, served as scapegoats. Blaming the Down Islander aliens for crime, diseases, overcrowding of public services, of rowdy and rude behavior had taken the place of the blaming the Puerto Ricans (Lewis 1972: 217-238).

"Garrot," a derogatory reference to a mythical bird that flies from island to island and eats everything in sight, had replaced Chacha as a derisive term for the lowest ethnic minority.

Profile of the Indigenous Population

The Bahamas

The coming to power of the Progressive Liberal Party, in 1967 was the concrete manifestation of the transfer of political power to the black majority population. The same year, Prime Minister Pindling implemented the policy of "Bahamianization" which opened up professional and managerial positions in the government, tourist, and financial sectors. As explained below, black political power created employment opportunities not only for an expanding black middle class, but for the former underclass of poor white Bahamians. For the most part, the white oligarchy known as the Bay Street Boys, politically relegated to the opposition party, continued to reap the economic benefits of the expanding tourist, real estate, and ancillary service industries. The Bahamian state apparatus' shift into publically owned hotels and airlines also opened up new employment positions for white and black Bahamians. In those out islands not swept up in the tourist industry's boom, a black surplus population con-

tinued to live on a subsistence farming and fishing level supplemented by money from family members who were active in the tourism labor force. Consequently, the caste line for the indigenous population was no longer a barrier, but the black Bahamian population remained sharply divided by class.

The Virgin Islands

Since 1970 the Virgin Islands have popularly elected a governor. Athough the first two winners were black, the death of Cyril King in office resulted in the accession of Juan Luis who was born in Vieques, Puerto Rico. Governor Luis then succeeded in twice winning reelection. While most of the Virgin Islands, legislature were black as were the heads of the various government departments, real political power remained with the U.S. federal bureaucy in Washington, D.C. With a few exceptions, the black elite was not represented in the higher echelons of the private economic sector. The indigenous group who retained their merchant class standing against the wave of Continental investors and benefited from the tourism generated prosperity were the Sephardic and Eastern European Jewish families. Another white group who took advantage of the tourist trade were the French chachas. They sold their land and worked in the shops or skilled construction jobs

moving up in the social strata. The majority of black Virgin Islanders benefited indirectly from tourism by accepting jobs in the federal and local government administration. The extremely high level of youth unemployment and welfare expenditures to the indigenous black population suggested that many of them had not benefited either directly or indirectly from tourism. They were only theoretically better off than the Down Islanders who often did not even have full access to the limited political rights and social services of Virgin Islanders and the surplus population in the Bahamas who did not have a welfare system.

As can be seen in Figure 8, the tourist era stratification pattern in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands consisted of three tiers. Like the pretourist era pattern, the dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and class were paramount. The major differences stemmed from the indigenous versus immigrant population status or geopolitical origin, the changes among the respective population groups who constituted each strata.

First, the author contends that among the indigenous population, class had become the major determinant of inequality, and only two tiers were represented. Second, the immigrant population was clearly divided into three tiers in which geopolitical origin, race, and class tended to overlap and to reinforce the stratification. Compo-

sitely, the prepondrance of the indigenous population was compressed between the foreign expatriates and representatives of international capital and the foreign aliens who actually comprised the islands' underclass. The new arrivals were compressing the islanders into the middle while simultaneously polarizing the society between population elements of the center and the periphery, white and black, the wealthy and the poor. The next section elaborates upon how the tourist industry contributed to these stratification patterns and discusses the concrete manifestations of demographic imperialism in the islands.

FIGURE 8

TOURIST-ERA SOCIO-RACIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE BAHAMAS AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

BAHAMAS

	INDIGENOUS POPULATION	IMMIGRANT POPULATION	FUNCTION
1st tier	"Bay Street Boys" (White) Black Political Elite	North Americans British Other Europeans	Economic and political control
2nd tier	Black Middle Class "Conchy Joes" (White)	Jamicans Turks and Caicos Islanders	Skilled labor, provision of services, and government operation
3rd tier	Surplus Population Unemployed, Subsistence Farming and Fishing on Out Islands	Haitians	Agricultural labor force, construction, and lower level services

VIRGIN ISLANDS

1st tier	Shephardic/Eastern European Jews Black Elite	"Continentals" (Mainland Whites) "State Siders" (Mainland Blacks)	Ownership, managerial decisions liaison to U.S. federal bureaucracy and TNC's and local political leaders
2nd tier	Black Middle Class "Chachas" (White)	Puerto Ricans	Distribution of goods (imported) and services consumed locally
3rd tier	Surplus Population Welfare Recipients	West Indian Aliens ("Down Islanders")	Production for the foreign consumer i.e. the tourists or export industry

Source: Hamilton and Dunkel, n.d., a and b

I did see wood carvings, but they were imported from Haiti to sell to tourists in the Bahamas. With the exception of the straw industry in which Bahamian women fashioned highly artistic designs of pocketbooks and baskets from straw, there was no handicraft activity of any consequence. It was tourism, so enormously successful over so many years, that had contaminated--diluted--debased--the shape of all things cultural in those islands, until there was no longer any real semblance of a Bahamian cultural identity. People even danced to Bahamian musicians playing other people's music--Jamaican music or American artificial calypso music; tunes from the American hit parade or the American "soul" top ten.

Sidney Poitier's reaction to his childhood home
<u>This Life</u> 1980, p. 320.

Few tourists ever reach Market Square, beyond which Main Street is strictly old Virgin Islands, with broken pavements, uncollected trash and garbage, inoperate traffic lights, and the stores where the natives shop. Here the goods are the necessities of life, not its luxuries--and unfortunately for the resident Virgin Islander, the necessities they shop for are very dear. No decent statistics are available on what it costs to live in "American Paradise," but since everything used or consumed except building sand, rock, and gravel has to be imported, everything costs more than it does on the mainland.

Edward A. O'Neill in <u>Rape of the American Virgins</u>
1972, p. 81.

Chapter Seven

THE TOURIST TRADE AND DEMOGRAPHIC IMPERIALISM

Tourism and Excessive Population Growth

Coping with high geographic mobility is a part of the social reality of the Twentieth Century. In the United States in both Nevada with seventy-nine percent and Florida with sixty-nine percent of the population born elsewhere, the natives constitute a smaller minority than in the Virgin Islands ("36 % of Americans Don't Live in Native States Report Says" 1982: A13). Not coincidentally, with respect to the value of tourism as a percentage of the total economy the these two states ranked first and second in the country and ignominiously, also were the top two states having the highest crime rates. Yet their population base was larger with more resources available and their service delivery system was more developed than in the Virgin Islands.

It would be extraordinarily difficult to for any society to absorb the magnitude of growth and it has been particularly stressful in the island microstates. The

facile explanation of course is that the rapid growth per se produces tension--bringing in new groups at a frenzied pace who are unable to adapt to the local society and inundating the islanders who feel overrun by foreigners.

During the 1960's, the Virgin Islands did experience a greater that twelve percent per year increase in tourism; a rate that was considered an excessive rate of tourism expansion by a consultant. This explosive growth resulted in shortages in water, power, and housing.

> The combination of rapid population growth in the 1960's forced up land values and also created a severe housing shortage. Land and housing purchase values became too high for most Virgin Islanders (Arthur D. Little 1974: x).

Approximately, seventeen percent of the population lived in low income public housing with 10,972 applicants on the waiting list--more than twice the total number of units and no additional construction was planned (U.S. Congress 1976: 99).

Furthermore, the terms of international trade put the population engaging in the tourist industry at a disadvantage. As the prices of the main exports of the Virgin Islands, hotel service, have been rising more slowly than prices of imports, particularly food, the Virgin Islanders have been suffering a decline in the terms of trade since 1970. Accordingly, the real income of the islanders has probably fallen (Arthur D. Little 74: xi). Because almost

everything had to be imported, the cost of living in the Virgin Islands was estimated to be seventeen to twenty-six percent higher than Washington, D.C. (Arthur D. Little 1974: 29).

A later report substantiated the adverse impact on the Virgin Islands. Inflation in the USVI as measured by a consumer price index increased from a base of 100 in 1970 to 183 in 1978. Therefore despite an increase in per capita income from $3,224 to $5,367 in 1978, consumers suffered an overall loss in purchasing power during the same period (United Nations 1980: 15). The equivalent index for the increase in the per capita income was 167 or the per capita income would have had to have reached $5,900 to keep pace with inflation (United Nations 1980: 15).

Another ramification of the rapid population growth fueled by immigration was the reduction of the Virgin Islanders to minority status in the territory giving rise to the complaint,

> we have been encroached on, invaded, engulfed; our beautiful islands are no longer ours; we are dispossessed in our own land (Lukas 1971: 102).

From 1940 to 1970 the Virgin Islanders fell from a majority of 75.1 percent to 46. 5 percent. Between 1960 and 1970 the population almost doubled (a 94.6 percent increase). For every additional native born person, two and one-half persons born off the islands arrived during this time

span. That is, while the native born population showed a gain of forty-three percent, the immigrant population increased by 185 percent during the 1960s.[1]

The extraordinary growth rates and high turnover in population would have strained any community's ability to adjust. It has long been realized that the high turnover in population of a community results in social disorganization and stress. In these microstates' tourist economies, not only is the turnover of tourists an integral facet of the daily lives, but the tourists, as strangers repeatedly infused into the society, are prevented from adapting to the situation. The official policy designating bonded alien laborers as temporary residents also prevents many West Indians from full participation in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands. Without the expectation of achieving permanent residence, "rootlessness" is institutionalized. Thus, the entire society during the high growth periods seemed to be in flux and thus highly volatile regardless of other factors. The incorporation of large numbers of West Indians and Continentals into the islands' society is

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[1]During the same period immigration to the Bahamas contributed 45.2 percent of the total population increase. Grand Bahama Island registered the greatest change after the signing of the Hawksbill Creek Agreement in 1955. From a total population of 2,333 mostly born on the island in 1943 the number of people enumerated on Grand Bahama Island soared to 25,859 by 1970. In the 230 square mile Freeport concession only 16.4 percent of the 15, 286 inhabitants were born on the island and foreigners made up 64.2 percent of the 1970 population. The case of Freeport is analyzed in detail in Chapter Nine.

analogous to neighborhoods in transition and conducive to instability. The peculiar characteristics of the tourist industry and the Americanization of extremely small West Indian islands with a colonial history of European dominance and African slavery colonial history make it an even more difficult task.

Although the most common explanation for the tensions and social conflict is the rapid population increase, a survey of the problems in these tropical paradises suggests that demographic imperialism is responsible. Just as extolling the charms of these islands concealed the misery and oppression in the previous era, the image of a tropical paradise for vacationing tourists contrasts sharply with the harsh living conditions of the working inhabitants.

Demographic Imperialism: Contradictions in Paradise

In an article, "Uneasy Paradise" the subtitle called attention to the serious social and political unrest that threatened to shatter the stability of the Bahamas. Among the problems enumerated were the following:

1) Resentment toward the 25,000 to 50,000 Haitians had fueled the efforts to amend the constitution to restrict citizenship.

2) Corruption among government officials and violation of human rights by police.

3) High unemployment even by government statistics at twelve to thirteen percent.

4) Series of strikes including public school teachers and civil service employees.

5) Rising resentment against foreign ownership of land.

6) Slump in tourism.

7) Negative publicity surrounding disappearance and probable death of American couple on their yacht and U.S. reports of uncontrolled drug traffic in Bahamian waters.

The article concluded that the "calm, friendly, island paradise" had become "a jittery spot where anything could happen" (Kelly 1981: 13).

In the Virgin Islands, even the automobile license plates display the slogan, "American Paradise." An article entitled "Trouble in Paradise" carried the subtitle, "The U.S. Virgin Islands are torn by racial and economic tensions that contradict their image as America's playland" (Payne 1981: 40). Later the same year an article appeared in the international editions of Newsweek about the "Stormy Seas in Paradise." Singled out as the cause were the federal budget cuts, slashes in federal taxes, the slump in tourism, rising crime and violence against whites, and rising racial tension (Smolowe 1981: 21).

Still other articles have discussed the crisis situations like the water emergency, the garbage emergency, the power emergencies, the road emergency, and the school emergency (Thomas 1981a: 6). These problems with services were attributed to the rapid population growth that oc-

curred when the "immigration floodgates" were opened with the tourist related building boom. Furthermore, the article warned that the native Virgin Islanders, already a demographic minority, were faced with the loss of political power if the aliens from the West Indies were all granted citizenship (Nordheimer 1978: A18).

In the travel section of the New York Times would-be tourists are advised how to avoid difficulties and travel in greater safety and comfort. Having certified that serenity had returned to Jamaica following the election year violence, the article admonished,

> On the other hand, travelers to the cruise ship stops of downtown Nassau in the Bahamas and Charlotte Amalie in the United States Virgin Islands will find that when night falls, bustling daytime shopping districts turn desolate and the same sort of caution that is necessary in some areas back home becomes advisable (Thomas 1981b: 15).

In the same vein, a leading business school textbook mentions "resentful natives" and "less predictable political control" now that white oligarchy in the Bahamas has been replaced by a black political administrator. A more detailed inventory of the Virgin Islands' includes the following: an untrained and unmotivated labor force, the inherited Danish status structure with an aversion to manual work and a preference for prestigious government positions, the locals greater concern for style than efficiency, a culture permeated by class hostility, the

influx of foreigners, the loss of beaches due to resort development, anti-white feelings stemming from inflated land values and servile occupations intrinsic to tourism, white tourists' misunderstanding of black islander behavior, and too rapid an expansion of tourist economy and population (Lundberg 1981: 260-264).

Given the dismal state of the world economy, social unrest might be expected. Thus, it is easy to blame the slump in the tourist trade, the fiscal crisis, and unemployment. However, it is worth remembering that the previous episodes of rising tension came during the boom years. In the Virgin Islands violence and crime directed at white tourists were cited as causing the downturn while in the Bahamas black nationalist policies and independence allegedly ended the economic expansion.

Tourism is indeed a sensitive industry to turmoil. While it is undisputed that the killing of eight people (seven whites, one black) at the luxurious Fountain Valley Golf Course on St. Croix in September, 1972 would not help the island's tourist business, it was certainly not the only factor and probably not the major one. Likewise, the case of the Bahamas where the news regarding the black nationalist policies of the Progressive Liberal Party was certainly sensationalized and exaggerated, has to be considered in context. The severe economic contraction in the United States, was followed by the petroleum crisis

in 1973, and soaring jet fuel costs, coupled with supplemental airlines like Freddie Laker's "Skytrain" and strong U.S. dollar made European destinations cheaper than the Caribbean for those Americans who could afford to travel. However, many news articles still blame the Black Power Movement as underlying the events of the 1970's and precipitating the end of the tourism expansion.

Two recent newspaper articles are typical of what has become the almost "official" tourist trade line. Regarding the Virgin Islands,

> After the widely publicized Fountain Valley massacre in 1972, when eight persons, including four tourists from the United States were shot to death on a golf course in St. Croix, the tourist business all but evaporated for three years (Wright 1982: 10).

With respect to the Bahamas, the litany of Bahamianizing the workforce, the application of national immigration laws to Freeport, the favoritism shown to blacks over whites and the crowning blow, independence, are described as problems from which the Bahamas is just now recovering (Whitefield 1982: 1F, 4F).

Partially, the popular explanation is derived from the media's reflection of the center's and periphery's power structure and race relations. In the Bahamas the white oligarchy, known as the Bay Street Boys, attempted to resist change by campaigning against the instability of first a black dominated government then independence. In

the Virgin Islands, white rule was perpetuated by the continentals who dominated the private sector tourist industry and public sector technocrats who fill the upper echelon colonial bureaucratic positions.

Another reason for the continued popularity of the Black Power explanation is the manner in which the state technocrats and the tourist industry entrepreneurs can use the example to discipline the labor force, and protect the status quo under the auspices of economic rationality. On the other hand, both groups want to downplay the existence of current racial conflict. The U.S. media were accused of hyping the racial aspect of the events and blowing them out of proportion.

Premier Pindling emphasized that his government was in control of a peaceful black nationalist movement, and unlike some of the other Caribbean islands, there was no mention of violence toward whites in the Bahamas (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, b: 149). A couple of years later Governor Melvin Evans went on the CBS-TV morning new program to charge that the media were overplaying the violence and racial angle of the violence on St. Croix. According to him those murders were isolated incidents and not a vendetta against whites. Furthermore, Governor Evans explained that not all of the assailants were black Virgin Islanders; one was an illegal West Indian alien, and another was a Puerto Rican (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, a: 42).

Mimicking the rest of the power structure, the media gave contradictory views. On the one hand, it gave ample and sympathetic coverage to tourists who had "suffered" from insolent waiters or maids, often emphasizing the new black militancy. Yet on the other hand, it tended to dismiss racial conflict as more an outgrowth of other problems.

One travel guide, purportedly the best researched in the Caribbean, explained the problem of racial incidents as follows:

> The problem in the Caribbean has seldom been one of black versus white, although the problems translated themselves into those terms when interpreted by reporters and others inexperienced in the ways of the Caribbean. The problem has been, and continues to be, between "haves" and "have nots" (Zellers 1980: 11).

The pressure of the travel industry to minimize the racial aspects of discontent was also evident in the episode concerning the negative Newsweek story mentioned earlier. In that article, Leona Bryant, the first black person to serve as director was quoted,

> The whites who own many of the tourist related businesses won't let the local blacks get a large enough piece of the pie...Then they call us lazy because we don't want to do menial labor (Smolowe 1981: 21).

Although conceding her statement to be accurate, the Main Street merchants were outraged and accused Bryant of disseminating negative publicity that discouraged visitors

and damaged tourism instead of doing her job to promote it (Esannason 1981: 1, 17).

In fact, McElroy has stated that changes in the ethnic contours were the most destabilizing dimension that accompanied the economic "modernization" of Virgin Islands' society. Given the Virgin Islands' pluralist nature, McElroy wrote that the ethnic changes disrupted the norms governing,

> group residential, occupational, etc. behavior ... in great measure predicated on the racial composition of the society (McElroy 1974: 46).

Additionally the strain and stress within the social system escalated as a result of ethnic group competition for jobs and public services escalated.

> The sheer volume of external immigration and concentrated pace of the influx drastically upset the traditional ethnic composition of Virgin Island society. It also suggests that the social absorptive capacity, especially vulnerable in small systems, has been overrun (McElroy 1974: 48).

A detailed examination of the problems resulting from tourism and immigration in Bahamas and Virgin Islands demonstrates how the tourist trade acts as a form of demographic imperialism. The contradictions between the growth of tourism and underdevelopment and the similar social impact of tourism in both the Bahamas and Virgin Islands are salient aspects of the ensuing sections.

The Bahamas

Overcoming the Crisis of Confidence

In the Bahamas the late 1960's and early 1970's were turbulent with the new black political awareness and struggle for power. After waging and winning the battle for majority rule, the Pindling government, now in charge of the islands' tourist industry, confronted three challenges to its rule: 1) Tourist complaints threatened to plunge the tourist industry into a tailspin; 2) Bahamianization of jobs induced many expatriate whites to leave and provoked even more rumors of investors fleeing; and 3) white Abaconians attempted to secede from the Bahamas.

Prime Minister Pindling strongly supported the Bahamianization of tourist sector jobs to give Bahamians a larger share of the economic benefits generated. The political mobilization of the black majority population also emboldened some tourist employees to assert their new found dignity by challenging the demeaning behavior imposed by the tourists.

Due to the tourist industry's obession for employees displaying abject servility, the government felt compelled to stifle tourist employees' expressions of black pride. Pindling responded to tourists' complaints of surly service

and rude behavior by initiating a "Friendship Campaign" in March, 1970 to ameliorate the "crisis" between the white visitors and black Bahamians. The Minister of Tourism charged that the lack of courtesy was sabotaging the national effort and teenagers with bad attitudes did not appreciate the dividends from tourists' expenditures of $235 million. Actor Sidney Poitier, who as a youth had worked in the Pindling family grocery store, returned to the Bahamas to read negative letters from tourists on the local radio station (Glass 1970: 1). There were Pindling supporters who disagreed that the major attitude problem in the tourist industry was Bahamian; they pointed to the white Americans who were upset when black Bahamian employees refused to be treated like inferior human beings (Hughes 1982: 148).

The Bahamianization of the work force was characterized as a euphemism for a black nationalist agenda, and the denial of work permits to white expatriates was decried by the opposition and the press. Reports of shakey investor confidence abounded. The backlash intensified as independence approached. "Expatriate Exodus: The Blacks Are Happy but Many Whites Aren't As the Bahamas Near Full Independence July 10" read the title over a Wall Street Journal article (Penn 1973: 28).

Pindling replied to critics of the Bahamianization oriented immigration policy: he called it "damned nonsense"

to suggest that restricting foreign workers was an excess of black nationalism. The Prime Minister pointed out that every major advanced industrial nation had similar laws. Additionally, he explained that **the first persons to benefit would be the fifteen percent of the Bahamian population who were white**; no longer would they be relegated to subordinate positions under foreign managers (Mueller 1972: 13, emphasis added).

More negative publicity appeared in the travel columns. It was reported that "natives" commonly greeted tourists with hostile stares as if they (the tourists) were the oppressors and exploiters. Fielding's Guide to the Caribbean was replete with tourist complaints. This time to cool down the militancy, the government produced a movie, "The World is Watching" to teach the importance of servile behavior to hotel staffs. It also included a basic economic lesson--a vacationer staying a month spends the equivalent of the cost of small school classroom, and the summer rent from a condominium covers the teacher's annual salary (Mueller 1973: sec. x, pp. 1, 9). Inadvertently, it demonstrated the great disparity in incomes between tourists and the tourist sector workers.

The third major challenge to the Pindling government at this time involved the threat of a secessionist movement on Abaco Island. The second largest island in land area, and fifth largest in population with 6,501 inhabitants in

1970, it had the highest proportion of white population, forty-eight percent, of any major island. When it became clear that the British government intended to transfer power to the black government, white islanders and British expatriates formed the Council for Free Abaco and commenced to agitate to remain a British colony. The Council spent over $20,000 to lobby Members of Parliament and rumors circulated about staging an armed revolt against Nassau. The racist and economic motives behind the secessionist bid were linked to tourism.

> Many Abaconians believed that, if allowed to remain British, they could attract tourist promoters uneasy over the rising Black nationalism on New Providence. They envisaged an exclusive resort, complete with "British charm" created through siphoning of Nassau's tourists (Kearns 1974: 1).

Britain rejected the petition to remain a colony, the armed insurrection failed to materialize, and the Bahamas became independent on July 10. 1973. At his first news conference Prime Minister Pindling emphasized that the new Independent Bahamas would be very similar to its colonial predecessor in policies to attract foreign investment, wealthy tourists, and businessmen.

Contradictions in Immigration Policy: Haitian Removal

As a result of the popular political support for change and the new government's acceptance of economic

dependency, contradictions have arisen. One of the greatest contradictions in Bahamian policies concerning tourism-generated economic growth in general and population movements in particular is in the periodic attempts to remove the Haitian workers.[2] While the Bahamian government constantly promoted ever more tourists to visit and consume luxuriously, it accused the hard working Haitian immigrants of being a drain on the economy. Frequently, "Haitian removal" was simply a smokescreen for the unsolved domestic problems of unemployment, economic stagnation, and inadequate services, but the disruption in the Haitian community was none the less severe. The actions taken against the Haitians underscored the dualist nature of a policy that encouraged rich white resident tourists or immigrant investors from the center, but rejected poor black immigrants from the periphery.

The year 1967 is still referred to as the "Big Trouble." Almost 5,000 Haitians were repatriated and over half were forcibly deported. Still after the sweep, an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 Haitians were left in the islands without permits. By 1970 the number of official permits issued to Haitians declined from 10,000 to 5,000. The 1970 census enumerated 6,151 Haitians, but the chief immigration officer estimated the number of Haitians to be

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[2]The discussion of Bahamian policy and the Haitian immigrants is based on Hamilton and Dunkel 1983: 55-75 unless otherwise noted.

25,000. Throughout the seventies the Haitians were repeatedly the victims of the government efforts to use them as scapegoats for unemployment and subjected to campaigns to rid the Bahamas of illegal aliens. The assault on the Haitians received national TV coverage when 108 Haitians marooned on Cay Lobos were viciously clubbed and teargassed by Bahamian police who forced the unarmed Haitians on to a ship to be taken back to Haiti in November, 1980.

Contradictions in Immigration Policy: Attracting Wealthy White Expatriate Residents

Less well publicized was the contradictory immigration policy that was implemented in 1978. In late June of that year another crackdown on illegal Haitians was carried out. The campaign to oust the Haitians was launched under the pretence that with an unemployment rate greater than 23 percent, unemployed Haitians were an unacceptable drain on the economy. More than 5,000 illegal Haitians signed up during a two-week amnesty period, but only several hundred actually were returned to Haiti. Presumably others went back on their own or more likely made the perilous trip to Florida. Opposition political leaders charged that the highly publicized deportations were used to deflect attention away from the failure of government economic policy.

In sharp contrast to the campaign to rid the Bahamas of Haitians was a new selective immigration policy announced later the same year to attract 500 new permanent residents annually. According to government officials, individual property investors would stimulate the ailing construction industry. The Bahamas sought two types of investors--visitors looking for a winter home and businessmen looking for income producing property. As the Home Affairs Minister, Darrell Rolle, explained the guidelines

> To qualify, an applicant must show that he has an annual net income sufficient to meet his living costs in the country. Those with an outside income of $25,000 will be "especially welcomed."
>
> Applicants should also be prepared within two years of approval to invest at least $50,000 in a house. They must also spend a further $100,000 in "approved investments" from funds transferred to the Bahamas ("Foreigners Again Seek Property Investments" 1978: 5B).

The disparity between expelling black labor and welcoming white capital is clearly evident.

Another form of discrimination against black people in the West Indies due to the lack of government intervention relates to real estate development. This spin-off of tourism involved real estate transactions such as the purchase of a lot, second home, or vacation condominium which was often a speculative financial investment. Real estate development was concentrated in New Providence and

Grand Bahama Islands, but was taking place to a lesser extent on Eleuthera, Abaco, Long, Exuma, and San Salvador islands. American, Canadian, British, German, French, and Danish development firms were subdividing the Bahamian archipelago into condominium complexes, vacation villages, and other resort accomodations ("Foreigners Again Seek Property Investments" 1978: 5B).[3]

The Bahamas under colonial rule established the tradition of attracting expatriate wealth and became a world renown tax haven. Using the Bahamas to shield their considerable assets from taxes and public scrutiny, the super rich have acquired huge chunks of real estate. One of the first tax dodgers who arrived was Harry Oakes. Sir Harry was an American born millionaire who made his fortune in gold mining in Canada, then emigrated to escape taxation just before World War II. Another was Edmund C. Lynch, the co-founder of the world's largest brokerage firm,

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[3]There was one small subdivision on Long Island undertaken by a German holding company in 1962. The resort development had displaced the old plantation society and the expatriate community was highly visible. The Stella Maris Inn was catered to transient tourists, but was used as sort of a country club during the day by the expatriate resident tourists. The Stella Maris Estates consisted of twenty-five American ranch style homes many used primarily for vacations and were seldom occupied. Most of the Afro-Bahamians lived in cemented wall houses with aluminum or shingle roofing with no plumbing, running water, or electricity. In 1975 barge service from Miami replaced one from Nassau for the provisioning of the island. While small, the foreign community serves as an example of how resort development can monopolize an small island (Ronald 1976: 18-48).

Merrill Lynch, who owned Hog Island, 685 acres on a sliver of land four miles long and three-quarters of a mile wide off the north shore of Nassau. Aside from Wallace Groves massive Freeport holdings and Little Whale Cay, other tycoons who one time or another owned private empires in the Bahamas are listed below.[4]

Mary Carstairs - Standard Oil heiress owned Whale Cay and Bird Cay in the Berry Islands chain.

Arthur Vining Davis - founder of Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) and Florida real estate magnate built the exclusive cotton Bay Club near Rock Sound Eleuthera on over eighty thousand acres.

Axel Wenner-Gren - also a pre-World War II fugitive, the late Swedish industrialist owned the posh Lighthouse Club and 90,000 acres (larger than the island of Grenada) on Andros and Hog Island. After Wenner-Gren died, his estate resold Hog Island to Huntington Hartford in 1959.

Huntington Hartford, Jr. - playboy scion of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A & P) founding family, renamed Hog Island, Paradise Island, in 1960, and built the lavish Ocean Club resort with terraced gardens modeled after Versailles, a twelfth century Spanish cloister, and a championship golfcourse. Opened in 1962, Hartford failed to win a gambling license and in 1966 he sold seventy-five percent of his Paradise holdings to the Mary Carter Paint Company, subsequently called Resorts International. Resorts built a $2 million private toll bridge linking the island with Nassau, won the gambling license, accelerated development and now owns the largest hotel/gambling complex in the Bahamas.

Howard Hughes - the Hughes Tool Company owned Seal Cay and the Summa Corporation, a Hughes holding

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[4]The sketches of the plutocrats with landholdings in the Bahamas are excerpted from Turner 1965: 18; Hannau nd: 55-56; "Tourist Is Our Bag" 1969: 146; and Mahon: 1980: 27.

company owned much more property. From November 26, 1970 until early 1972 Hughes was in seclusion at the Britannia Beach Hotel owned by Resorts International on Paradise Island. Then after a sojourn in London in 1974 Hughes returned to the Bahamas and bought the Xanadu Princess Hotel in Freeport from Daniel Ludwig.

Daniel K. Ludwig - head of the shipping line, National Bulk Carrier and the Jari project in the Brazilian Amazon, the wealthiest living American, owned several luxury hotels and real estate in Grand Bahama Island.

Clint Murchinson - Texas oil and gas millionaire who owned over 150 companies including the Dallas Cowboys football franchise and was dubbed a "one man conglomerate" also owned Spanish Cay.

Kenneth S. Parker - of the pen company, owned an 8,500 acre farm on northern Andros.

Willard F. Rockwell, Jr. - of Rockwell International, since 1973 the largest contractor to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and prime contractor for the space shuttle program and B-1 bomber, owned Cay Club near Bimini.

J. Louis Reynolds - member of the Reynolds Metals corporate dynasty purchased a 13,000 acre tract from the Wenner-Gren estate' extensive property holdings in Andros in the mid 1960s. Included in the Reynolds' private domain next to the AUTEC base are twenty-four miles of ocean front beach (Wenner-Gren's had thirty-five miles), and the 4,000 acre Twin Lakes Farm. On the Lighthouse Club property south of Fresh Creek, he built an 18-hole tournament caliber golfcourse and skeet shooting range. Although Reynolds originally planned to operate the company's aluminum submarine off-shore and raise lobsters, crabs, conch, shrimp, and turtles on underseas farms, neither the Twin Lakes Farm nor the aquaculture project was operating in late 1983.

E.P. Taylor - Canadian brewery czar, bought 4,000 acres New Providence and developed Lyford Cay, one of the most exclusive and luxurious residential areas in the world. Taylor's New Providence Development Company was also developing the South Ocean Beach Club, hailed as a new city with recreational, residential, convention, resort

hotels, shopping center, and golf course on over ten percent of New Providence's surface area between Coral Harbour and Clifton Pier.

Residential Segregation: White Expatriates in Lyford Cay Club and the Black Ghetto of Grantstown

The Lyford Cay Club, a private residential club on 1,000 acres seventeen miles from Nassau, is a marked case of segregation in a new leisure community. One business magazine referred to Lyford Cay as "one of the most exclusive richman's colonies in the world." Elite families like the Mellons, Fords, and Firestones frequently visited their homes there as did corporate executives like William S. Paley (CBS), Roy F. Larsen (Time, Inc.), and Rupert C. Thompson (Textron, Inc.) ("Executives Flock to Exotic Retreats" 1969: 118-124). An indication of the wealth required was the recent sale of one of the more scenic properties, Weatherside, the estate of Connie Mellon Burrell to an European buyer for between $2.5 and $3 million in 1981 ("The Property Market" 1982: 243).

As the domain of the ultra rich it was secluded from public view and access. Arrival by yacht at the Lyford Cay Marina was the preferred mode of transportation. The author attempted to drive into the Lyford Cay Club area while doing field research in June, 1981, but was forced to halt when a crossing beam was lowered by a guard at the entrance to this privately owned land. The private se-

curity guard on duty stated that in the six years that he had worked there, no black Bahamian, black American, or any other black nationality had owned property at Lyford Cay. Most of the black Bahamian employees are bussed in from Nassau, but numerous employees live with their white employers inside the restricted area. While hypothetically, the Bahamian police have jurisdiction over the area, the sentry said that he could not recall an instance of the police having been called in. Lyford Cay is thus but one example of an all white community, that defies Bahamianization.

Grants Town

Grants Town, popularly called Over-The Hill, is a predominately black residential area of Nassau that exemplifies segregation and the disparity between the black and white living conditions. In this neighborhood of 623 acres more than 23,000 people lived without adequate shelter and services. Grants Town, formerly called Headquarters, was a settlement that came into existence after the 1790s law that prohibited persons of color to live in Nassau. It was located immediately behind the military barracks and Mt. Fitzwilliam on land considered virtually worthless due to its swampy terrain. Africans, who were

liberated from the slave ships by the British and relocated to Grants Town, augmented the early population.

Many of the more affluent black Bahamians have moved out the of community, but they have been replaced by out island migrants and Haitian immigrants. Grants Town has provided the impetus for organizing the black community and progressive movements. Grants Town's population also furnished the core membership of the Baptist Church and organized the strikes and demonstrations in 1942 and 1958 which launched the modern Bahamian labor movement. Additionally, Grants Town served as the power base and the site of the Progressive Liberal Party's rallies (Hamilton and Dunkel nd, b: 49-51).

However, the prosperity from the tourism, real estate, and banking sectors' economic growth failed to reach the residents. Inspite of the PLP's plans that were prepared soon after it came to power to improve the urban conditions in Grants Town, the area has continued to deteriorate. Problems included accumulation of refuse, stagnant pools of water, vermin, the absence of sidewalks, pit latrines and faulty septic tanks. It was estimated that one half of all dwelling units were in such bad condition as to need complete replacement. A World Bank $5.8 million loan was part of $24.4 million project slated to improve the conditions in 1982. The strategy sought to avoid past urban renewal mistakes that displaced residents by rehabili-

tating existing housing whenever possible ("Grants Town, The Bahamas" 1982: 2).

Unequal Development and Racial Polarization

The political influence and concentration of power that the Lyford Cay plutocrats wielded by virtue of their wealth was considerable in the United States, let alone a micro-state like the Bahamas. The bias toward wealth in immigration policy has permitted such international political fugitives like the Shah of Iran, Anastasio Somoza, and Robert Vesco to be given refuge while the true refugee, the Haitian, was expulsed.

While immigration policy ostensibly was designed to foster Bahamianization of the labor force, the overall strategy of economic growth by courting foreign investments in resort development had the opposite effect. Due to the historical and structural mechanisms of racial discrimination and unequal development, the real estate market functioned to transfer land to wealthy white foreigners. The class-bound policy of market neutrality, by ignoring racial and geopolitical inequality, virtually guaranteed that the new investor residents would be white immigrants from the center countries. The traditional immigration stream of black workers from the Caribbean was for all practical purposes "legally" suspended curtailing the

West Indian regional diaspora. The earlier Bahamian diaspora to the United States had ebbed when economic conditions in the Bahamas improved sufficiently and Jamaicans replaced the Bahamian seasonal agricultural laborers.

As a result of Bahamianization of the workforce, expatriates and aliens work permits were reduced and Haitians deported. On the other hand land sales and selective recruitment of wealthy residents increased. In the long run, the nebulous presence of a sizable number of illegal Haitians, will not offset the the white immigration and the whitest country in the West Indies will become whiter. Although a breakdown for racial composition has not been available since 1953, certain inferences can be made from data based on geographical origins, official announcements concerning policy implementation, and observations by journalists and visitors.

An inspection of Table 6 below shows that since 1943 the foreign born population has constantly increased its share of the Bahamas population and reached 18.4 percent in 1970. The policy of Bahamianizing the workforce was implemented in 1967. Although both European/North American and West Indians were displaced by the government's refusing to renew and and issue new work permits, the contradictory immigration policy previously discussed was biased against the Haitians. Between 1963 and 1970 the population

TABLE 6
FOREIGN BORN POPULATION BAHAMAS, 1943-1970

Birthplace	1943		1953		1963		1970	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Europe/U.S.A. Canada	1,627	2.4	3,085	3.6	6,523	5.0	15,284	9.1
(Change)		-		89.6		111.4		134.3
West Indies	903	1.3	2,534	3.0	8,101	6.2	14,458	8.6
(Change)		-		108.6		219.7		78.5
Other	148	0.2	326	0.4	585	0.4	1,360	0.8
(Change)		-		120.3		79.4		132.5
Foreign (Total)	2,678	3.9	5,945	7.0	15,209	11.7	31,102	18.4
(Change)		-		122.0		155.8		104.5
Bahamas	66,168	96.1	78,896	93.0	115,011	88.3	137,710	81.6
(Change)		-		19.2		45.8		19.7
Total	68,846	100.0	84,841	100.0	130,220	100.0	168,812	100.0
(Change)		-		23.2		53.5		29.6

SOURCE: Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1976: Table 21, p. 41.

immigrating from the majority white countries increased at almost twice the rate as the immigrant population from the majority black countries. The composition of the immigration stream in terms of geographical origin has a profound impact upon the racial composition of the Bahamas.

Using 1970 census data, the author estimated the racial composition for the Bahamas which is presented in Table 7 below. It was assumed that the percentage of black Bahamian population was eighty-five (the figure most commonly cited) which is slightly below the 1953 census figure of 86.7 percent. Then, the population whose birthplace was the West Indies, West Africa, Belize, and Guyana was calculated to be 46.3 percent of foreign born population. This figure was used to estimate the black foreign born population and born in the Bahamas to foreign parents. The total black population was estimated at 130,381 or 77.2 percent of the total population compared to 88.0 percent in 1940. The estimate would confirm the U.S. Department of Commerce statement and the theoretical position of this research that the population of the Bahamas was becoming whiter due to the immigration.

The types of foreign settlement fostered by tourism whether directly or indirectly, deliberately or inadvertently, have disproportionally attracted white immigrants. In addition to the land sales to resident investors, two other immigration policies would tend to favor the white immigrant population. One was the Citizenship Act of 1973

TABLE 7
ESTIMATED RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE BAHAMAS' POPULATION BY NATIVITY, 1970[5]

Birthplace	Black	%	White	%	Other	%	TOTAL
Bahamas[6]	114,662	85.0	20,234	15.0	NA	--	134,658
Overseas[7]	15,719	46.3	17,150	50.6	1,047	3.1	33,946
Total	130,381	77.2	37,384	22.1	1,047	0.6	168,812

Source: Calculations based on Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1972: 320, 340-345.

Note: If the illegal Haitian population present in the Bahamas were 19,000 (based on the Immigration Minister's estimate that that 25,000 Haitians were present in the Bahamas in 1970), then the black population would be 79.5 percent and the white population 19.9 percent of the total population. The possibility that over half of the foreign born population who was black may have been in the islands illegally shows the overall tenuous position of black immigrants in comparison with the white immigrants.

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[5] The two assumptions underlying this estimation were as follows: 1) The population born in the Bahamas in 1970 was split into eighty-five percent black and fifteen percent white which were approximately the racial breakdowns when the last census enumerated race in 1953. 2) Following the procedure of the U.S. census of assigning race based on nationality, the foreign born population was divided into white for North America, Europe, Argentina, East and South Africa; black, for West Africa, non-Iberian West Indies, Belize, and Guyana; and other for Latin America, Asia, and Hispanic West Indies (Cf. U.S. Department of Commerce 1983: B-2 - B-3.) U.S. military personnel are excluded.

[6] Includes 1,155 born outside the Bahamas to Bahamian parents, 979 persons married to Bahamians, and 104 adopted by Bahamian parents.

[7] Includes 3,168 foreign born who did not declare country and were assigned racial categories proportionally to those who did.

that stipulated in order to obtain naturalization, one must have lived in the Bahamas nine out of the last twelve years, be of good character in the opinion of the Minister of Immigration, and have sufficient knowledge of the English language and the responsibilities of citizenship. These rather vague eligibility criteria could easily be used to discriminate against the Haitians in that of all the major immigrant groups, they alone were not an English speaking nationality. The Haitians had the additional stigma of being widely perceived as illegal. The relatively low educational levels would also be a handicap. The other policy giving an edge to whites from the center was the continued request for professional and technically skilled people in the fields of medicine, dentistry, nursing, teaching, engineering, and hotel trade to supplement the dearth of qualified specialists in the Bahamas (Bahamas Handbook 1983: 287, 339).

Bahamianization of the Tourist Industry

One of the first moves toward nationalization complementing the Bahamianization of jobs through control over immigration was the purchase in 1970 of Bahamas Air. This acquisition of a national air lines was to facilitate inter-island air travel and supplement air service between top destinations in the Sunbelt and the Bahamas. Then

after imposing much higher gaming taxes on the casinos in 1970, the government announced in late 1973 that it would nationalize the islands' three gambling casinos by 1976 ("Bahamas Declares It Will Nationalize Gambling Casinos" 1973: 46).[8]

The next step was the creation of the government owned Bahamas Hotel Corporation (BHC) in 1974. In August the same year, during the peak of the recession, the BHC acquired three hotels in the Cable Beach area of Nassau by borrowing $20 million to pay for them and averting their closing down. The takeover was defended as a move to retain a larger proportion of hotel profits in the Bahamas and to advance the government's commitment to Bahamianize the economy through participation and ownership (Hughes 1982: 172-173). At the same time the government revealed its intention to build a convention center complex and gambling casino. Soon afterwards, the BHC acquired three more hotels in Freeport. Instead of the BHC directly operating the hotels, it contracted two private firms,

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[8]In 1973 the Bahamas Development Corporation was established by the government to 1)assure orderly development of government owned lands and 2) stimulated economic growth. The latter contained the explicit goal of industrial diversification in order to lessen dependence on tourism because competition from other Caribbean destinations was intensifying and prepaid packaged tours were lessening hotel profits (Wilcke 1973: 62). The government also rescinded the $200 duty free allowance which had encouraged Bahamians to shop in Miami and contributed to the reverse flow of foreign exchange earned by tourism to the Bahamas (Hughes 1982: 176).

Canadian Pacific Hotels and the Dallas-based Jack Tar Hotel chain to manage their hotels ("Tourism Again Ranking as Huge Moneymaker" 1978: 10B).

In a move that had been promised the government nationalized the gambling casinos at the beginning of 1978. Here again the decision was made to contract Resorts International and Playboy International to manage the casinos. The government's share of the profits was projected to be $18 million and the terms of the agreement were generous to the private concessionaires.[9] In 1980 the government became even more directly involved when it began managing three of the hotels it owned ("Group Clarifies Operations at Three Properties" 1981: 22).

An action long overdue was taken in late November, 1979 when the Bahamas government ordered a moratorium in unrestricted land sales to foreigners. It also announced supporting legislation to regulate the ownership and operation of private airstrips and marinas. The government was concerned that many out island communities had been encircled by privately owned land and they could not afford to buy land to expand.

> In the early 1960s foreign businessmen, many from Florida, moved in, buying up large tracts cheaply

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[9]During an investigation of Resorts International by the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement, it was disclosed that Resorts International had contributed $376,000 to the PLP including $7,000 toward the purchase of Prime Minister Pindling's Rolls Royce (Kelly 1979: 21A).

> from local inhabitants and subdividing them for sale outside the country.
>
> Lured by the promise of fast returns, thousands of Americans, Canadians and Europeans bought land in the islands. When the market collapsed five years later, more than 100,000 lots had passed into foreign hands (Kelly 1979: 2-F).

The government had begun to correct the problem in 1976 when it imposed double the stamp tax on land sales to foreigners, then passed legislation requiring companies with more than sixty percent foreign ownership and foreign individuals to pay property taxes on their real estate holdings in the Bahamas. It was considering how to control speculation and land development when the discovery of a Columbian drug smuggling operation on privately owned Norman's Cay in the Exumas spurred the government to intervene (Kelly 1979: 2-F).[10]

Between 1970 and 1973 the percent of non-Bahamians in the labor force decreased from twenty-four to twelve percent. However, the goal to Bahamianize the economy has not been successful at all levels. In 1974 the Ministry of Development reported that only eighteen percent of the workforce in hotels (with restaurants), thirty-five percent in the land development business, and forty-three

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[10] In a related move the government proposed a constitutional change that would strip non-Bahamians of legal protection against discriminatory legislation. The amendment was deemed essential to permit the land control legislation, but the proposal had stirred so much opposition that it was postponed (Kelly 1980: 11).

percent of service and sport workers were expatriates. At the managerial level for the service industry, transportation, and banks, expatriates accounted for forty-six to forty-nine percent. Fifty percent of engineers, sixty-four percent of private school teachers, sixty-five percent of professional accountants and eighty-eight percent of casino employees were expatriates (Hughes 1982: 177-179).

In 1982 only 1,500 Haitian contract workers were legally admitted to the Bahamas. Estimates of the Haitian population ranged from 7,000 to as high as 40,000. According to the Minister of the External Affairs,

> "All immigration in the Bahamas is related to employment necessity and the Haitians provide a very necessary function in the Bahamian economy--they are our gardeners, domestics, and farm laborers (Paul L. Adderly as quoted by Benchley 1982: 375).

One resident commented that the Haitians were only a real problem in the sense that the government had no consistent policy toward them (Benchley 1982: 374). Another inconsistency in government immigration policy was allegedly due to the shortage of skilled workers. In April 1981 inspite of an unemployment rate estimated to be at least twelve percent and the teenage unemployment in the thirty percent range, the government suspended the immigration laws. The reason was to bring in hundreds of skilled workers from the Philippines, Jamaica, and West Germany to work on the government owned $66.5 million Cable Beach

hotel and entertainment project (Kelly 1981: 11). Thus, the government was pursuing Bahamianization of tourist facilities, but undermining the Bahamianization of labor.

It should be apparent by now that the tourism strategy pursued by the Bahamas was often at odds with the objective of Bahamianization. Still in comparison with the Virgin Islands since the PLP came to power to 1967 significant progress had been made in making the tourist economy more viable while remaining within the boundaries of economic dependency.[11] The Virgin Islands has neither had the equivalent of a Bahamianization policy nor won independence. The next section will analyze the manifestations of tourism and demographic imperialism in the Virgin Islands.

The Virgin Islands

Tourist Resorts and Subdivisions: Geosocial Displacement on St. Croix

Back in the mid-1930's a wealthy American, Ward Canaday, amassed a large land tract known as Estate Foun-

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[11]The PLP led government has consciously targeted black Americans for tourism promotion and an increasing number of black American tourists were staying at first class hotels. In spite of the Dupuch anti-discrmination ordinance, before the PLP came into office, black visitors had been largely restricted to small guest houses (Mueller 1973: 109).

tain Valley (Orlins 1969: 72). The estate covered 4,085 acres, one-tenth of the entire island of St. Croix, and possessed two and one-half miles of coast line. Previously used for sugar cane cultivation, in 1963 when the Estate Fountain River Company purchased the property, the chief land use was cattle grazing. The company, a partnership of David and Laurence Rockefeller, commissioned Robert Trent Jones to design the now infamous world class Fountain Valley Golf Course and planned real estate developments on the remaining land.[12]

Eleven years after the murder of eight persons at the golfcourse clubhouse, the estate was placed on the market for $10 million or $2,448 per acre. One of the largest blocks of land in the Caribbean, the property had not been sold three years later and continued under Rockresorts management.[13] The golf course employed thirty five people and as part of its community outreach program, held golf tournaments to raise money for local hospitals and the

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[12]Laurence Rockefeller happened to be the largest single shareholder in Eastern Airlines that had more flights to the Caribbean than any other airline including direct flights to St. Croix and St.Thomas.

[13]On September 6, 1972 five Virgin Island Black Muslims using automatic weapons shot and killed eight persons of whom seven were white (four were tourists). Defended by Willian Kunstler, the five assailants were convicted and received eight consective life sentences. This widely reported episode shattered the image of racial harmony and along with the homicides of other whites in the Virgin Islands became the symbolic turning point in Virgin Islands' tourism ("Five Get Life in 1972 Virgin Island Slayings 1973: 19).

Special Olympics. In addition, a youth program provided the opportunity for seventy-five local youth to learn how to play golf every year ("Rockefeller Land on St. Croix for Sale" 1979: 9; and Phillip Camp Associates, Inc. 1982).

St. Croix, which received fewer tourists than St. Thomas, still experienced many estates being converted into tourist hotels and subdivisions for condominiums and housing. Orlins observes that by 1965 forty-four of St. Croix's approximately 200 estates had been subdivided for non-agricultural use. These were concentrated around the urban areas of Christiansted and Frederiksted and along the more mountainous and picturesque north, west, and southeast shores. Of the over 5,000 acres for sale which were considered choice locations or particularly attractive to resident tourists, relatively few had been used for sugar cane cultivation; this indicates that an inverse relationship existed between the value of land used for agriculture and tourism (Orlins 1969: 401-404).

One of these estates was the multi-million dollar, 340 acre Queens Quarter estate of vacation homes for fifty-three Chicago area professionals and business executives. Robert Snyder, a Chicago physician, vacationed in St. Croix in 1962 and bought the small Queens Quarter Estate the following year. Enlisting the backing of several of his friends, he launched the Virgin Islands' Properties to develop the Queens Quarter complex. The company employed

120 construction workers and had expanded into the lumber, roofing, landscaping, interior decorating and auto rental business through a series of subsidiaries ("Executives Rush to Exotic Retreats" 1969: 118, 124).

The resident tourist subdivisions resulted in altering the racial composition of the island.

> The tourist industry changed St. Croix and made the Virgin Islands the focal point of urbanization in the Eastern Caribbean...First the tourist boom brought white investments and white managers, then white lawyers and other white professionals, and now white non-professional workers...On this island, once virtually all black, whites are estimated to be 20 percent of the population, aliens at 20 percent, and Puerto Ricans closed to 30 percent (Caldwell 1973: 19).

With access to American capital and West Indian labor the Virgin Islands' consumption platform compressed local blacks between the Continental managerial strata and the West Indian laborers (McElroy 1971: 48).

As noted previously, American racial tradition emphasizing a binary system, imposed a more rigid system of stratification. A Black Crucian speaking about the Continentals' attitudes said that,

> The white man has never really understood. Although this is a black community, he believes that at the top somewhere there must be a white man running it. He has gotten used to blacks running Africa, but here this is an American society and he feels that there must be a white man running it (Caldwell 1973: 19).

Many of the Continentals who moved to St. Croix over the last few decades experienced the sudden upward shift in mobility that occurs when a resident of the center can afford servants in the periphery. Not surprisingly the Continentals were apt to live like country squires (Weinstein 1962: 55). The tendency for the Continentals to be resident tourists, living in their St. Croix vacation homes only part time, deterred them from becoming "Creolized." Lewis implied that the white Crucian oligarchy was pursuing a deliberate strategy in selling land for white subdivisions to build up St. Croix with "new blood" and create a Bermuda-like situation (Lewis 1972: 169).

A New York Times article, whose title explicitly attributed violence in St. Croix to the rapid population growth, contained statements by Crucians revealing the racial conflict ostensibly rooted in economics. Young unemployed Crucians, many Viet Nam War veterans, who had not found jobs despite the booming tourist industry, were blamed for the killings and crime.

> What bothers the Crusans and sets the young against the whites is the tourist business itself. It is almost exclusively white-controlled and Crusans shun the thousands of service jobs in the hotels and restaurants...They see isolated new neighborhoods developing where all the residents are white and where fences keep others out...Prices have skyrocketed making it virtually impossible for young Blacks with limited capital to invest in the tourist industry... There is virtually no social contact

> between the whites and the Crusans (Caldwell 1973: 19).

An article published eight years later underscores the fact that little has changed.

> The cornerstone of the mounting problems is a dangerously widening gap between the black Virgin Island majority and the 10,000 white Americans who are buying up most of the commercial enterprises. As the influx and prosperity of the mainland whites has increased, so have the alienation and anger of the 80,000 black inhabitants. In the long run, unless diligent corrective measures are taken, almost everyone says that a racial explosion is inevitable (Payne 1981: 40-41).

A Black Enterprise article,"St. Croix for Fun and Profit," which attempted to feature black owned businesses, gave only two examples of black Crucian entrepreneurs. One was the de Chabert family whose Esperanza Development company owned the Sunny Isles Shopping Center with its U.S. franchise stores--Grand Union Supermarket, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Woolworths, and Wometco movie theater. The other was a caricature of a Crucian named Dan-Dan who charged a dollar (on his own initiative) to open the gate to go to Davis Beach (Jackson 1978: 114 and 116). There were other Crucian owned businesses like Ann Abramson's transportation company and several smaller shops, but virtually all of the Crucian tourist shops were owned by continentals, a couple of Puerto Ricans, and an Indian; only one six-room guest house in St. Croix was owned by a

black Crucian (Orlins 1969: 247). At a St. Croix Chamber of Commerce dinner dance in 1978, except for a scattering of black politicians and civil servants, the waiters, and the 18-member band, nearly everyone else who was there was white (Nordheimer 1978: A18).

Late in 1980 St. Croix witnessed yet another episode of racial tension when dozens of white Continentals sent telegrams to Washington, asking the Federal Government to protect them against the "systematic terrorizing of the white community" by local blacks. The national guard was partially mobilized and the U.S. Navy in Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico sent a detachment of eight marines to guard the small Naval signal facility and confined all personnel to the base area. The St. Croix Chamber of Commerce felt that Governor Luis was indifferent and did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation ("Whites Ask U.S. Protection from Virgin Islands Blacks" 1980: 28).[14]

A retired Virgin Islands' politician from St. Croix wrote ten years after the St. Croix golf course murders,

> There is a growing resentment among blacks who see whites monopolizing major business enterprises, controling

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[14]St. Croix has a rich historical tradition of resistance to white oppression. A slave insurrection on July 2, 1848 successfully abolished slavery and thirty years later another revolt of black labor culminated with the repeal of the contract labor act. An informant in St. Croix said that it was widely believed that crime directed against the white community was a deliberate strategy to harass them to leave and discourage additional white settlement (Field Notes 1981).

> the choicest real estate, and enjoying life in luxurious isolation. The relative affluence of white business entrepreneurs has naturally caused resentment among the black majority population, and if the gap between the wealthy and the poverty stricken continues to widen, it will spark serious confrontations in the years ahead (Ottley 1982: 426).

The pervasiveness of racial polarization is emphasized in Virgin Islands Attorney General Hodge's remarks in 1975 citing the establishment of white schools, de facto segregation in employment, monopolistic tendencies in business, segregated housing and interpersonal relations, and discrimination even in death due to the prevalent custom of Continentals being burried at sea (Harrigan and Varlack 1977: 406).

Alienation of Off-shore Islands and Cays

Alienation of land via private ownership of off-shore islands and cays resembles the experience of the Bahamas. A coastal zone inventory lists sixty such land forms of which twenty two or 36.6 percent are privately held including eight of ten of the largest islands after federally owned Water Island (discussed below), the fourth largest. In all 2,161 acres or 71.3 percent of these islands and cays' total surface area is owned by private land holders (U.S. Department of Commerce 1979: Appendix C).

All but fifteen acres of the seventh largest island, Hassel Island's 135 acres was recently sold back to the federal government by the brothers Ralph (the former governor) and Isidor Paiewonsky for $4 million or over $32,000 per acre in January, 1982. Used as a coaling station in the 19th century, the mostly undeveloped land will become a national park in the busy Charlotte Amalie harbor (Akin 1982: 1, 8). It remains to be seen who will be the primary users and thus the beneficiaries of the new national park. Several private landowners still resided on their fifteen acre inholding property including Paiewonsky relatives.[15]

Water Island: A Pure Tourist Economy and Lindurb

Water Island's recent conversion to a pure tourist economy is a case study of historical irony. McFerson mentions Water Island as the clearest example of an isolated white enclave, a virtual de facto apartheid that at the time of her research consisted of sixty-five usu-

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[15]Although Isidor Paiewonsky claimed that he had passed up considerably more lucrative offers from condominium developers in keeping with his reputation as a local conservation advocate, the $32,000 an acre cost was considerably more than the asking price for Norman Island in the adjacent British Virgin Islands. Norman Island was thought to have been the model for Robert Louis Stevenson's Treasure Island. The uninhabited 610 acre island was offered for sale at asking price of $5.5 million or just under $9,200 per acre, about one-fourth as much as that of Hassel Island (Treasure Island Put on the Block" 1981: 2B).

fructuary white property owners (McFerson 1976: 133-134). The fourth largest Virgin Island with 492 acres does indeed exemplify the segregating tendency of tourist developments originating in the center to create exclusive white enclaves in the periphery.

In the Eighteenth Century the northern half of the island was called Carolina's Lyst Estate and at one time belonged to Peter Tamaryn, the son of Mingo Tamaryn. The elder Tamaryn was the free Negro commander of the the Free Negro Corps who the Danish deployed to help crush the slave rebellion on St. John in 1733-1734 (Study of Water Island Development Option 1980: 15).

After changing owners several times the U.S. Department of Defense acquired the island in 1944 from the Danish West Indian Company. At the end of the war, the $1.5 million Fort Segarra coastal defense garrison was turned over to the Army's Chemical Warfare Division to conduct secret research on poisonous gases. Abandoned by the military in 1951, it was transferred to the Department of Interior via Public Law 511 and signed by President Truman (Study of Water Island Development Option 1980: 7, 17). The DOI subsequently leased the entire island to the private developer, Water Island, Inc., formed by a New York couple seeking to combine a retirement home and business venture. The lease stipulated that the island was to be developed into a tourist resort by converting the army

barracks into a hotel with a minimum of fifty rooms and included a provision for subleasing land for residential development. The Sprat Bay Club, Inc. subleased 156 acres or one-third of the island to develop an exclusive residential housing project (Study of Water Island Development Option 1980: 17, 20, 25).

However, in 1972 the master lease holder, by then the Water Isle Hotel and Beach Club (WIHBC) was challenged by a St. Thomas citizens' committee. As the study reports,

> Exclusive and discriminatory attitudes, policies, and actions by the WIHBC from 1965 onward enraged many Virgin Islanders who began to question a federal lease which reserved a substantial land mass of a white enclave community (Study of Water Island Development Option 1980: 32).

Inspite of local public and political opposition and an U.S. comptroller audit report challenging the emphasis on residential over tourist resort development contrary to the lease, the DOI renewed the lease without any changes for twenty years starting January 1, 1973. Among the total 153 property holders on Water Island whose average income was $44,000 per year, there were only three black leasees or under two percent (Study of Water Island Development Option 1980: 27, 34, 151-152).

Yet another example of a enterprise owned and managed by Continentals, using non-Virgin Islands' labor for the benefit of international tourists is Yachting Enterprises, Inc. based on Water Island. In 1979 after a New Jersey

couple had vacationed on a chartered yacht, the wife, Frances Stein, was able to line up $100,000 to buy a yacht and began booking cruises out of Water Island. Five years later with a fleet of sixteen boats and crews, a client could choose from a variety of cruise packages including bareboat-sail-it-yourself charters, scuba diving trips, honeymoon specials, executive getaways, and luxury voyages. Mrs. Stein prefered "non-American crews" and about ninety percent of her crew was from Britain, France, and other European countries. Most of her boats did not fly the American flag because she would have had to hire Americans [including Virgin Islanders]; she believed that Europeans were more willing to wait on people than Americans. Owner Stein air-freighted most of the food for her charters fresh from New York (Mullen 1984: sec. VI, p. 1).

This paragon of a successful tourist business then did not have much benefit for the Virgin Islanders who were excluded from the crews; the boats were too expensive for most to afford taking a charter trip, and the company imported most of the food. Affluent white folks from the center could travel in a closed system that merely needed the marina, climate, and scenery of the periphery for a stage to pursue profits and pleasure.

Alienation on Main Street in St. Thomas

St. Thomas' tourist shopping strip epitomizes Continental dominance and black Virgin Islander exclusion. In 1968 an Ebony article reported that all of the shops on Main Street and the businesses along the waterfront were owned by whites with the exception of one or two enterprises (Charles L. Saunders Ebony September 1968, pp. 35-40, quoted in McFerson 1976). Ten years later, the situation was unchanged.

> On St. Thomas, the jewelry, liquor, and crystal shops in the old Danish warehouses on Main Street are owned by whites except for those of the recent arrivals of Indian and East Indian [sic] merchants driven out of other Caribbean islands. **Only one shop along the stretch where tourists jam the sidewalk and street is owned by a black** (Nordheimer 1978: A18, emphasis added).[16]

Gilbert Sprauve, Vice President of the Virgin Islands Senate, issued a dire prediction for "disaster" at a meeting of the V.I. Retailers Association. Sprauve was reported as warning,

> Businesspeople who ignore the alienation of Virgin Islanders toward the tourism of Charlotte Amalie's Main Street are almost suicidal (Pearson 1981: 1).

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[16]This was confirmed by a black Crucian businessman to the author in the Virgin Islands in 1981. Even island whites owned only a couple of the large tourist shops on Main Street.

Continentals were viewed as essentially middle class persons who translated into the class-color stratification of the Virgin Islands assumed aristocratic pretentiousness (Lewis 1972: 257). Similarly, tourists were perceived to be middle class persons who were able to live out racist fantasies.

> North American ethnics from the great American middle class who had come up through the immigrant ranks and labour, who had made it partly at least on the suppression of blacks in America, were willing to indulge in ostentatious spending--to pay whatever was asked to enjoy the experience of having an army of blacks respond to their every whim (Harrigan 1974: 20).

The income distribution for winter tourists from the 1980 season indicates that they did have high income brackets sufficiently high to vacation in style. About eighteen percent of all stay over tourists (average stay of 7.3 nights) had incomes of less than $20,000 thirty-eight percent were in the $20,000 to $40,000 range, and forty-five percent made over $40,000. Cruise ship passengers' income distribution was only slightly lower (Newbold and Rozynski 1971: 27). Incomes of Continentals with recreational boats in Virgin Islands' marinas in 1978 averaged $21,087 compared to the $4,743 annual per capita income of all Virgin Islanders and the $13,500 of those with professional positions (Olsen 1979: 8).

The French Chachas, who had been on the lowest echelon of the stratification system, benefited from the tourism

boom. Their once almost worthless property on the steep Northern mountain slopes of St. Thomas and the waterfront acreage at Carnage was an important factor in their currently rising prosperity as real estate values soared. As the Continentals moved to St. Thomas, French landholders rented or sold to the American professionals and to real estate developers and speculators. They also took advantage of the new jobs to abandon subsistence farming and fishing. The unskilled and semiskilled went into the tourist stimulated building trades, while the better educated younger generation became sales clerks, secretaries, bookkeepers in private business and minor levels of the territorial and federal government (Weinstein 1962: 61; Lewis 1972: 202-203).

At the peak of the tourist expansion on St. Thomas, local blacks owned ten guest houses and small hotels with approximately twelve percent of the Island's total tourist rooms (Orlins 1969: 246). Taxi cab drivers were almost the only Virgin Islanders to have an almost exclusive preponderance of a tourist related entrepreneurial activity which was comparatively lucrative and high status. This was aided by the government limiting the number of badges to 819 in St. Thomas and 587 in St. Croix. Most of the Virgin Islanders worked for the government which also paid well and conferred high status (Weinstein 1962: 57). As Mario Moorhead put it,

> We all work for the government and the government works for the whites. As of today the whites are in the business of tourism so the government works for tourism (Moorhead 1981: 2).

Harrigan and Varlack also describe the socio-claustrophobic reaction of native Virgin Islanders to the flood of off-island population and alienation as,

> a dwindling audience in attendance at a perpetual drama being acted out by ever increasing players from the continent and Caribbean Islands--a drama written largely by expatriate profit makers and produced by forces over which they seemed to have no control (Harrigan and Varlack 1977: 405).

In addition to economic control by Continentals, Ottley warns,

> The threat of white control of our politics may exist in the future and many individuals are alarmed at the prospect...In recent years there have been signs of white blocvoting on St. Croix. The "white vote" against the constitution was also a resounding one and decisive. Unquestionably, the number of potential white voters in this territory is considerably higher than the whites' proportion of the population. What scares a few black leaders is the development of an issue the forces white to engage in a vigorous voter registration campaign and to vote as a block. In that event, they would have enough votes to drive a huge hole in the islands' black political fabric (Ottley 1982: 267).

Much has been written about the sharp divisions even with in the non-white population--that the Virgin Islanders rejected federation with Puerto Rico and the strong Puerto

Rican identity in St. Croix, non-participation in the West Indian Federation, Crucians' rivalry with St. Thomians, and the contempt Virgin Islanders have for British Down Islanders (Weinstein 1962: 52). This fragmentation was attributed to tendency the major ethnic groups to define issues in terms of their separate interests instead of a wider Virgin Islands' peoples (Lewis 1972: 263). Harrigan and Varlack state that while some contact occurs among the various black groups in social, political, and economic activities,

> blacks are divided into native Virgin Islanders, minority in terms of the total population; aliens, growing in numbers and power and demanding that their contribution to the islands be recognized for what its is; and "state-siders" bewailing the fact that they are regarded as culturally different by the other two groups...By and large the groups will factionalize on native, alien, or statesider issues whenever they appear (Harrigan and Varlack 1977: 408).

Furthermore the alien community was internally segmented by island of origin, citizenship status, and economic position (McFerson 1976: 147).

A letter to the legislature from the Virgin Island Voters Organization, a group representing local blacks, urged that the legislators should not permit aliens in the police force. The letter contended that aliens could not be trusted because private businesses employing private

security guards had been burglarized by other aliens. It further stated that

> The responsibilities and trust required of these persons, such as janitors, dishwashers, laundry workers, handymen, messengers, and other domestic helpers are completely different from those required of a police officer who is required to Protect Life and Property, Keep the Peace, and Apprehend Violators of the Law day and night (quoted in Lukas 1971: 30).

Moorhead has written that,

> Too many Crucians hold up America as a badge of distinction against his fellow black from an island 100 miles away (Moorhead 1981: 68).

However, he excoriates the whites' control of communications and use of labels to rule Crucians by "new tribal divisions" (Moorhead 1981: 74).

One who did not view the large number of aliens as a liability stated,

> The heavy alien importation in the 1960's provided the Virgin Islands with the population cushion some advocated to guarantee a black majority in the islands for many years to come (Ottley 1982: 425).

Another proposal by some Virgin Islanders to cope with the inundation of white continentals before the West Indians arrived in force was to annex the British Virgin Islands. This recommendation was tendered,

> not only because of the close family, cultural, and economic ties that existed between the two territories, but also to maintain black superiority in the territory (Ottley 1982: 424).

Resistance: A Separatist West Indian Black Nation

Given the massive invasion of white continentals and their rapacity for buying up Virgin Islands' real estate juxtaposed with the even larger influx of largely landless Down Islanders, it is not surprising that a Rastafarian group was attempting to organize their own enclave community. It is a tragic commentary on the islands that however utopian their 5,000 year plan may be, it just might be the brightest hope for the long term future survival of the Virgin Islands. Originally a Jamaican religious/cultural/political/social movement, in the early 1970's the Rastas formed two farming communities to help alleviate the lack of local food production--Ujama Village, St. Thomas and Kwadosh Leyak Project, St. Croix (Marsh 1980: 32-33, 50).

More recently, the United Rastafari Afro-Caribbean Union Socialist Democratic Nation (the Nation) has appeared to step up the Rasta community's program. In December 1981, the Nation's Foreign Minister, Jebedee I Zack, announced that the group had petitioned President Reagan to cede to the Nation all government owned cays in the Virgin Islands except those in strategic military areas. Minister Zack also stated that the Nation had requested observer status at the United Nations. The Nation had also applied for a ten acre tract of land in the West End

of St. Thomas. However, the application was still pending; approval was highly doubtful due to Governor Juan Luis' persistent refusal to communicate with the Rastafarians and the bitter events between Virgin Islands police and the Rastafarian community (Roach 1981a: 3, 24).

Claiming the Nation's membership to be fifty, the organization was seeking to recruit blacks in the islands who shared the organization's goals of alleviating poverty of black people. Toward this goal, the 5,000 year plan was devised with the first 1,000 years' priority on agricultural and economic development. Besides the lack of agriculture on St. Thomas, the Nation's leadership was critical of the wretched condition of housing projects and schools and the lack of Caribbean cultural activities. More immediate goals were to develop the financial capacity to support agricultural and home building programs by March, 1982.

One reason for creating the nation was the necessity of dealing with the bureaucracy at an institutional level. More importantly according to Minister Zack, membership in the Nation would demonstrate that an individual is, "...not just a black man, but belongs to a union of black people through the entire universe." Other principles of the Nation were democracy, socialism, nonviolence, and a pledge to full communication with Africa and the rest of the Caribbean (Roach 1981a: 3, 24; and Roach 1981b: 3, 24).

Commander in Chief of the Nation, Ras Ethiopia Tamana I, said that the Nation would attempt to raise money to buy land if President Reagan rejected its request for the transfer of the cays. With the exorbitant price of land in St. Thomas, that may prove to be extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the Rastafarian movement in the Virgin Islands represents a West Indian movement to counter the take over by white Americans.

The Caribbean Development Coalition was another organization committed to forging alliances among Virgin Islanders and West Indian immigrants. Formerly the Alien Interest Movement whose principal concern was securing the social and political rights for the West Indian alien community, it was launching a self-help cooperative movement for all Virgin Islanders to combat the impact of Reaganomics. The Coalition's general counsel said that,

> Virgin Islanders will have to disregard distinctions based on place of birth that have kept them and citizens of other Caribbean Islands from seeing their common heritage (Roach 1981: 3, 10).

Still another strategy, the territorial government's effort to persuade Virgin Islanders living in the states to return was interpreted as an "expression of this struggle for ethnic survival" (Lewis 1972: 169). According to the Community Relations officer in charge of the "Talent Bank Program," an estimated 100,000 Virgin Islanders resided in the tri-state area of New York, New Jersey, and

Connecticut and another 2,500 in the Washington, D.C. area (Maduro 1983).

This was how the tourist industry has redrawn the population parameters of the Virgin Islands. Tourism continued to confine the spectrum of jobs that conformed to a previous three tier strata while simultaneously displacing blacks numerically, spatially, and economically. One reporter described the Virgin Islands as a "tense, tripartite society" in which "each group believes itself caught in the middle" (Cannon 1973:A10).

Table 8 below shows how the foreign born population moving into the Virgin Island displaced the Virgin Islanders from having a majority population. The two largest immigrant groups were from the United States and the West Indies and their rates of growth vastly exceeded those for persons born in the Virgin Islands. The foreign born percentage was much higher than in the Bahamas. Inspite of the West Indians having the largest group, this demographic displacement was also altering the racial composition of the islands.

As evident in Table 9 below, the racial composition of the immigrant population has a much higher percentage of whites than the indigenous Virgin Islands population. The breakdowns by origin show that each of three different geographical areas were disproportionally of one racial category. Seventy-three per cent of the the 8,058 persons

TABLE 8
FOREIGN BORN POPULATION VIRGIN ISLANDS, 1940-1970

Birthplace	1940 Number	%	1950 Number	%	1960 Number	%	1970 Number	%
United States	792	3.2	1,034	3.9	2,574	8.0	8,058	12.9
(Change)		-		30.6		148.9		213.1
Europe	180	0.7	180	0.7	324	1.0	982	1.6
(Change)		-		0.0		80.0		203.1
Virgin Is.	18,703	75.1	19,616	73.6	20,338	63.4	29,068	46.5
(Change)		-		4.9		3.7		42.9
Puerto Rico	2,002	8.0	2,874	10.8	3,897	12.1	4,014	6.4
(Change)		-		43.6		35.6		3.0
West Indies	3,087	12.4	2,831	10.6	4,711	14.7	18,283	29.3
(Change)		-		- 8.3		66.4		288.1
Other	125	0.5	130	0.5	255	0.8	2,063	3.3
(Change)		-		4.0		96.1		709.0
Total	24,889	99.9	26,665	100.1	32,099	100.0	62,368	100.0
(Change)		-		7.1		20.4		94.6

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1943: 5; U.S. Department of Commerce 1952: 54-78; U.S. Department of Commerce 1961: 55-15; U.S. Department of Commerce 1972: 55-17.

born in the United States were recorded as white, ninety-seven percent of the 14,424 persons born in the British West Indies were recorded as black, and forty-four percent of the 4,014 persons born in Puerto Rico were recorded as other. Thus, these three immigrant groups, accounting for eighty-percent of the non-Virgin Islander population, were not only altering the racial composition, but were racially stratifying the population in a three tier structure according to their geopolitical origin as well. The Continentals made up fifty-two percent of the total white population in the islands, Down Islanders and Puerto Ricans contributed thirty-one percent to the total black and other populations respectively.

TABLE 9
COMPOSITION OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS' POPULATION BY RACE AND NATIVITY, 1970

Birthplace	Black	%	White	%	Other	%	Total
Virgin Is.	23,703	81.5	2,907	10.0	2,459	8.5	29,068
Overseas[17]	21,606	64.7	8,432	25.7	3,361	10.1	33,400
Total	45,309	72.5	11,339	18.2	5,820	9.3	62,468

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1972: 55-16.

The racial composition by island has also changed since 1940. Table 10 below reveals three significant changes. The first is that the white population on St.

[17]Includes the United States and Puerto Rico classified as native born by the Census Bureau as well as foreign born.

TABLE 10
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF VIRGIN ISLANDS BY ISLAND, 1940-1980

YEAR	BLACK %	OTHER %	WHITE %	TOTAL %	NUMBER
			Virgin Islands		
1940	69.0	22.0	9.0	100.0	24,889
1950	69.6	19.3	11.0	99.9	26,665
1960	64.3	19.0	16.7	100.0	32,099
1970	72.5	9.3	18.2	100.0	62,468
1980	79.7	5.5	14.8	100.0	96,569
			ST. THOMAS		
1940	64.3	19.8	15.8	99.0	11,265
1950	74.4	9.4	16.2	100.0	13,813
1960	74.0	7.9	18.0	99.9	16,201
1970	NA	NA	NA	NA	28,960
1980	80.3	3.2	16.5	100.0	44,372
			ST. CROIX		
1940	72.7	23.9	3.4	100.1	12,902
1950	62.6	31.8	5.6	100.2	12,103
1960	52.3	32.0	15.7	100.0	14,973
1970	NA	NA	20.0 (est.)	NA	31,779
1980	79.5	7.9	12.7	100.1	49,725
			ST. JOHN		
1940	76.2	22.0	1.8	100.0	722
1950	94.8	2.1	3.1	100.0	749
1960	88.0	1.5	10.5	100.0	925
1970	NA	NA	NA	NA	1,729
1980	72.6	1.1	26.3	100.0	2,472

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce 1943: 11; U.S. Department of Commerce 1953: 54-83 - 54-84; U.S. Department of Commerce 1961: 55-36 - 55-27; U.S. Department of Commerce 1972: 55-16; U.S. Department of Commerce Unpublished Summary Tape File/External File 1983; and Caldwell 1973: 19).

Croix was escalating dramatically through 1970 and despite the large numbers of Puerto Ricans and West Indians who moved there also. Because it was Continentals who were buying up the land it was they, more than the other two groups, who were perceived to be the invaders. The second noteworthy change was the sudden reversal of the black population in St. Croix which jumped to eighty percent after a trend of decline.

Three reasons underlie this turn around: 1) after the 1970 census a change in the immigration law permitted reunification of spouses and children of temporary West Indian aliens resulting in several thousand additional West Indians coming to St. Croix; 2) the violence and crime directed against the white community most sensationally carried out in the 1972 murders which apparently curbed the boom in resident tourism among the Continentals; and 3) whether due to intermarriage or a redefined racial consciousness as part of their living experience in St. Croix and more intimate contact with white Americans, in 1980 fifty-eight percent of the population of Puerto Rican descent was reported to be predominantly black.[18] The third statistic that attracts one's attention is that the trend of an increasing percentage of white population in

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[18]This is the first time that the persons of Puerto Rican descent were cross tabulated by race; previously the racial breakdowns were for those born in Puerto Rico, thus excluding the second and third generations born in the the Virgin Islands.

St. John was not interrupted by events in the 1970's. The Virgin Islands National Park apparently was successful as a buffer in protecting the white population from the turmoil on St. Croix. This park which displaced the black indigenous population and then confined it is discussed in a separate section below.

The next section analyzes the concentration in income distribution. The Gini coefficients disclose that the impact of tourism has not benefited all groups equally.

Income Distribution: The Bahamas

Due to the lack of income data for the Bahamas prior to 1970, it was impossible to determine the trend for income distribution. However, because of the differences in the various islands regarding the degree of tourist development it was posited that the individual islands could be compared and serve as an approximation of the effects of tourist development. Previous research had demonstrated that those islands reported experiencing tourist development were those which were gaining instead of losing population and were also the closest islands to the U.S. mainland (Hamilton and Dunkel 1983: 33-34). The limited existing literature concerning tourism development and dependent service sectors suggested, with little empirical evidence and thus rather ambiguous conclusions,

that although tourism did improve the general economic welfare of a population, it also fostered income polarization. Thus, it was initially expected that those islands undergoing tourist development would exhibit the highest incomes and highest inequality in incomes.

As shown in Table 11 below, with a couple of exceptions, there was a tendency for inequality to increase with incomes. In order to substantiate the dominant economic activity associated with each island and to explain the exceptions, information concerning occupational profiles, population growth, percentage of foreign population, and percentage black population in 1953 is provided in Tables 12 and 13 below.

The five islands with the lowest gini indices also ranked in the bottom five of per capita personal income. Their occupational structures ranged from 58.2 percent to 85.7 percent engaged in agricultural activities or unemployed. All five experienced a decline in population from 1953 to 1970 and in 1970 two percent or less of each islands' inhabitants were foreign immigrants. These islands were the driest and most poorly suited to agriculture, and have had little, if any, tourist development. In 1953 the percentage of black population ranged from 99.2 to 100.0 percent.

The Berry Islands and the Biminis seem to be exceptions in that they had moderate gini indices, but rela-

Table 11
INCOME CONCENTRATION IN THE BAHAMAS BY ISLAND, 1970
FOR POPULATION 15 YEARS AND OLDER

ISLAND	GINI	RANK	INCOME[19]	RANK
Cat	.380067	1	$ 404	2
Crooked	.399711	2	$ 452	4
Acklins	.400668	3	$ 404	2
Mayaguana	.402750	4	$ 367	1
Ragged	.426358	5	$ 514	5
Berry	.472005	6	$2,882	16
Long	.503100	7	$ 614	6
Bimini	.509256	8	$2,146	15
Harbour Island/ Spanish Wells	.521450	9	$ 851	9
Grand Bahama	.524566	10	$3,002	17
New Providence	.532608	11	$1,782	14
Eleuthera	.532948	12	$1,003	11
San Salvador	.540374	13	$ 646	7
Exuma	.551737	14	$ 840	8
Abaco	.551844	15	$1,485	13
Andros	.558933	16	$ 852	10
Inagua	.560764	17	$1,137	12
All Bahamas	.559022	NA	$1,770	NA

Source: Gini indices and per capita income calculated from Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1972: Tables 584-604, pp.294-314 using Harris/Jager Gini program 1983).

[19]Per capita personal income in U.S. dollars is based on total population.

TABLE 12
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY FOR BAHAMAS' POPULATION 14 YEARS AND OLDER BY SECTOR AND ISLAND, 1970[20]

Island	Percent	Island	Percent	Island	Percent
Bahamas	100.0	Berry	100.0	HI/Sp.Wls.	100.0
I	37.2	I	11.2	I	59.5
II	4.2	II	0.3	II	2.3
III	58.6	III	88.5	III	38.1
New Prov.	100.0	Bimini	99.9	Inagua	100.0
I	31.1	I	32.2	I	39.6
II	3.4	II	6.6	II	35.7
III	65.5	III	61.1	III	24.7
Gr. Bahama	100.0	Cat	100.0	Long	100.1
I	29.0	I	85.7	I	76.6
II	6.2	II	0.2	II	2.4
III	64.8	III	14.1	III	21.1
Abaco	100.1	Crooked	100.0	Mayaguana	100.0
I	48.3	I	78.1	I	70.8
II	12.9	II	0.0	II	7.3
III	38.9	III	21.9	III	21.9
Acklins	99.9	Eleuthera	100.0	Ragged	100.0
I	84.9	I	49.1	I	58.2
II	0.2	II	1.7	II	1.1
III	14.8	III	49.2	III	40.7
Andros	100.0	Exuma	100.0	San Salvdr.	100.0
I	70.1	I	58.6	I	42.0
II	0.8	II	3.2	II	1.3
III	29.1	III	38.2	III	42.0

Source: Tertullien 1972: Tables 350-370, pp.197-202.

[20]Sector I = Unemployed (Student, Housewife, Retired) + Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining; Sector II = Manufacturing; Sector III = Services (Utilities, Trade, Restaurants, Hotels, Storage, Transport, Communication, Financial/Business Services, Community/Personal Services, and Construction).

TABLE 13
BAHAMAS' POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS AND GINI INDEX RANK

Island	Gini Rank	White Population, 1953 (%)	Change in Pop. 1953-1970 (+)	Foreign Born (%)
Cat	1	0.4	-	2.0
Crooked	2	0.8	-	0.6
Acklins	3	0.0	-	0.6
Mayaguana	4	0.3	-	1.9
Ragged	5	0.0	-	1.9
Berry	6	5.8	+	18.5
Long	7	15.0	+	3.1
Bimini	8	11.1	+	9.9
Har.Is./ Sp.Wells	9	96.5	+	4.5
Gr.Bahama	10	7.4	+	50.1
N.Provid.	11	11.6	+	14.4
Eleuthera	12	11.0	+	9.1
S.Salvad.	13	6.6	+	4.9
Exuma	14	2.0	+	3.8
Abaco	15	33.6	+	17.9
Andros	16	1.1	+	9.6
Inagua	17	5.8	+	14.8
Bahamas	NA	12.6	+	18.4

Source: Table 11 above; Hughes 1953: Table XIII, p. 8; and Tertullien 1972: Table 3, p. 4, Tables 647-667, pp.341-370.

tively high incomes. The apparent exceptions are explained by a noticeable difference--the homogeneity of the occupational structure. Eighty-eight percent of the Berry Islands and sixty-one percent the Biminis' labor force held jobs in the service sector and correspondingly small percentages in the agricultural/unemployed category. Close to Florida Bimini was one of the earliest tourist destinations in the Bahamas. It was observed in 1920 that a resort hotel in Bimini had completely siphoned off all the agricultural labor. A 1976 publication stated that over eighty percent of the Biminis was employed in tourism or big game fishing. Large scale aragonite mining began only in 1970 and was not reflected in the 1970 census figures (Evans and Young 1976: 40). Thus, the low income subsistence agricultural and fishing strata no longer exists to skew the income distribution.

The Berry Islands have been developed more recently owing to their position on the trendy sailing route from Florida to Nassau. More recently they have the dubious distinction of being on the drug smuggling corridor and the yachting crowd was warned to be on the alert. Wealthy foreigners owned Frazer, Alder, Bond, Whale (Groves), Little Whale, and Bird Cays. Great Harbour Cay, the largest in the Berry Islands was also owned by private developers involved in Freeport's gambling casinos had sold off $20 million worth of property to 1,600 investors, but only

130 had built vacation homes when the development went into receiver ship in 1975 (Hamilton and Dunkel 1983: 104-105).

Chubb Cay was purchased in the late 1950's by a group of wealthy Americans to develop as a private marina and fishing resort. Sold in 1979 to group headed by Houston hotel and construction company owner, James Greer, the club marina on 940 acres with twenty motel rooms, nine privately owned vilas, and restaurant can only be used by the 200 members. Another motel and restaurant cater to the general yachting public. Previously there were no Bahamians living on Chubb Cay, but by 1984 forty to fifty natives from other islands were employed (Platero 1984: J16). Little Stirrup, Lignum Vitae, and Cistern Cays were also being developed for tourism (Evans and Young 1976: 41).[21] These newer developments were not reflected in the 1970 data. More importantly, the alienation of land to absentee foreign owners and intermittent residence by private owners or club members simply does not appear in the population statistics let alone the income figures thus obscuring the polarizing tendencies. Furthermore, the forty to fifty native employees and the few presumed

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[21]Little Stirrup Cay was up for sale in the fall of 1983 for $3.2 million; the buyer was a cruise ship company that now disembarks all its passengers for a picnic on their own little "private" tropical island.

white foreign managers would show an increase in the proportion of black Bahamians living in the Berry Islands.

Grand Bahama and New Providence also displayed lower ranking in inequality than in per capita personal income. Although tourism was considered the major industry of these islands, like the Berry and Bimini island chains, they have virtually no agricultural sector. However, they also have the most developed administrative, commercial, and industrial sectors giving a much fuller range of economic activities. The masking of the extent of inequality in Grand Bahama is analyzed in the case study of Freeport in Chapter Nine.

San Salvador, Exuma, and Andros, to the contrary had income levels lower than the Gini indices. Tourist development, US Airforce bases as part of the 1960's missile tracking range, and a sizeable agricultural sector all were experienced in common. It is the mixture of business enterprises that explain the higher than expected Gini indices.

San Salvador was unique in that it was the only south western island undergoing large scale tourism development. In 1969 when the join Air Force and Naval bases were closed, the Columbus Landing Real Estate Company of Jacksonville, Florida purchased fifty-five percent of the entire island including most of the prime coastal front, beach view real estate and had an option to acquire another thirty five

percent. Several thousand lots had already been sold to American and Canadian citizens who would overwhelm the 1980 population of 804 (Woodward 1982: 112). There were twenty-one British immigrants who accounted for 5.3 percent of the economically active population, but they reported 25.5 percent of the total income and over fifty percent of all persons earning over $4,000 annually. Land that was purchased from Bahamians for $200 was being offered to Americans for up to $25,000 an acre in January, 1979. The low level house keeper, gardener, restaurant workers, and laundresses types of jobs and the pace of development was not sufficient to keep the permanent population from declining to a Twentieth Century low in 1980. Nevertheless, developers project the population will attain 11,000 when completed (Hamilton and Dunkel 1983: 99-103).

Exuma was one of the most important tourist destinations among the out-islands and property developers have bought a large part of Great Exuma from local land owners for subdivisions (Evans and Young 1976: 49-50). Like San Salvador, the combination of the service sector, 38.2 percent of the economically active population, with 58.6 percent either in agriculture or unemployed seems to be factor accounting for a high Gini index and the low per capita income. This is due to the polarization between the moderate incomes of the service sector workers and the low or nonexistent incomes of the latter population. The pop-

ulation of Exuma was 98.0 percent of African descent in 1953 and the land sales will result in the displacement by white foreigners in the years to come.[22]

Andros had slightly fewer workers in the services, 29.1 per cent, and more in the unemployed/agricultural category, 70.1 per cent. Andros was at this time (between 1968-1970) the site of Owens-Illinois' subsidiary lumbering operations who employed approximately 400 Haitians among its workforce. The Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) a secret US Navy anti-submarine research station established in 1966 at Fresh Creek, Andros and employed some Bahamians. Andros was another island with an almost exclusively black population 98.9 percent in 1953 that will undergo a shift in racial composition with increasing tourist development.

Harbour Island/Spanish Wells, Eleuthera, and Abaco share a similar and consistent standing with gini indices about the same ranking as the income ranking. Harbour Island/Spanish Wells were previously all white islands lying off the coast of Eleuthera and even in 1953 they still had by far the highest proportion of white population 96.5 percent. These two islands had fewer in services

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[22]The privately owned Norman Cay in the Exumas was put up for sale in 1979 for $2.9 million following a raid by Bahamian police after reports that its Columbian owner had been using it as a center for drug smuggling. It was this incident that prompted the Bahamaian government to change its policy of unrestricted land sales to foreigners.

and more agricultural/unemployed proportionately than Eleuthera or Abaco. Additionally, Eleuthera had several large commercial farms that exported produce to the U.S. Abaco, with the second highest concentration of white population, 66.4 percent in 1970, also had the only sugar plantation and refinery in the Bahamas. The sugar operations were owned by an Owens-Illinois subsidiary that invested $30 million to raise and process sugar cane after clear cutting 25,000 acres of timber. Due to the inability to secure a sufficiently high quota from the U.S. government and poor soil conditions, the largest single employer in Abaco discontinue operations in 1974 and sold its holdings in 1978 to the Bahamian government.

Surprisingly, the island registering the highest gini index and a relatively high income was Inagua. Very few, if any, tourists visit the hottest and driest island with only 1.4 percent of the population engaged in agriculture plus another 38.2 percent unemployed. What makes Inagua unique is that virtually the entire economy consists of the Morton Salt Company's salt harvesting operations. Consequently, it has the highest proportion of any Bahamian Island enumerated in manufacturing at 35.7 percent. The relatively high wages of the salt industry employees juxtaposed with an extremely high rate of unemployment are expressed by the Gini index which reflects the skewed income distribution.

Inagua's case, as vividly as the tourist dominated islands, demonstrates the polarizing impact of enclave industries. The circumstances of the individual islands reveal an extremely important insight. Only when an industry prevails so completely and successfully so that it becomes a homogeneous labor force with little unemployment as in the Berry Islands, did the tourist economies show a equalizing influence on incomes. Otherwise even the relatively low wage level service sector jobs have attraction for persons existing by subsistence agricultural or fishing. This would be consistent with the observation that tourism drains off agricultural laborers and the common use of Haitian immigrants on the commercial farms. Equally significant, the data also suggest that tourism did raise income levels, and that the inequality measured by the gini indices was more a function of the enclave nature of the industry instead of economic growth per se.

However, the gini index does not reflect the illegal aliens at the bottom or the temporary expatriate residents at the top, two segments that would undoubtedly would increase income inequality. On the other hand, the census' using $1,000 for the first interval might have exaggerated inequality in the Bahamas.

Income Distribution - The Virgin Islands

Income data for the Virgin Islands was available for the 1950, 1960 and 1970 censuses. As shown in Table 14 below, allowing for the differences in the presentation of income data, there has been a reduction in the Gini indices. This suggests that during the years of most rapid tourist expansion there was a lessening of inequality of income distribution. Since the agricultural labor force had declined from 22.9 percent in 1940 of the economically active population to 1.4 percent in 1970, it can be surmised that, as in the Bahamas, the attrition of the extremely low wage agricultural workers contributed to diminish the level of inequality.

The Gini indices broken down by race in Table 15 below also show that for all three groups the Gini indices declined. However, for both 1960 and 1970, the total Gini index remained higher than any single group index, and although it declined, the magnitude of the composite Gini index reflects the continued polarization in income distribution by race.

By examining Table 16 showing the median income by race one can see that although the percentage gains in incomes was about the same for blacks and whites, in absolute terms, the gap had increased from $2,110 to $6,478. The median income for blacks in 1970 was less than $500

TABLE 14

INCOME CONCENTRATION IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, 1950-1970[23]

UNIT	YEAR	GINI
Families and Unrelated Individuals	1970	.505463
	1960	.560363
Persons	1960	.686128
	1950	.757548

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1961: Table 28, p. 55-36; 1972: Table 16, p.55-34.

Table 15

INCOME CONCENTRATION VIRGIN ISLANDS BY RACE, 1960-1970

RACE	GINI INDEX 1960	1970
ALL	.560363	.505463
BLACK	.529354	.497482
OTHER	.494250	.444701
WHITE	.501727	.404920

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1961: Table 27, p. 55-35; 1972: Table 16, p. 55-34.

[23]The 1950 census reported income for persons only; the 1960 census reported income for persons and for families and unrelated individuals, and the 1970 census reported income for only families and unrelated individuals. The dual figures for 1960 permits a comparison to be made.

more than the median income for whites had been in 1960. The "other" category maintained a higher median than blacks, but fell in relationship to whites.[24]

Table 16

MEDIAN INCOME VIRGIN ISLANDS BY RACE, 1960-1970

Race	Median Income 1960	1970	% Change
All	$1,621	$ 4,656	187.2
Black	$1,260	$ 3,821	203.3
Other	$1,969	$ 5,381	173.3
White	$3,370	$10,299	205.6

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1961: Table 26, p. 55-34; 1972: Table 16, p. 55-34.

Table 17 below indicates that while equality between racial groups was growing for the top five percent in incomes, blacks lost ground to both white and other groups, and others lost in relationship to whites among the lowest quartile. As stated in the methodology section the Gini index masks where changes in distributions are occurring and greater equality at the top can cover up greater inequality at the bottom. Such seems to be the case for the

[24]Cf. Silva who found that blacks and mulattos in Brazil had similar income levels that were consistently lower than white income levels (Silva 1980).

Virgin Islands between the racial groups. The extent of inequality measured is concealed in the data for families and unrelated individuals. The average number of persons for white households was 2.7, for black households 3.6 and for other households, 4.0. It must also be born in mind that the acknowledged considerable undercount of West Indian illegal aliens in the census would have resulted in even wider disparities in income among the lowest quartile by race and probably in a higher Gini index.

Table 17

SELECTED INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS VIRGIN ISLANDS BY RACE, 1960-1970

Income Category	1960 (%)	1970 (%)
Q1 Black Income/Q1 White Income	35.3	30.0
Q1 Black Income/Q1 Other Income	50.7	47.0
Q1 Other Income/Q1 White Income	69.6	63.0
P95 Black Income/P95 White Income	35.6	41.6
P95 Black Income/P95 Other Income	68.7	72.9
P95 Other Income/P95 White Income	51.9	57.0

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1961: Table 26, p.55-34; 1972: Table 16, p.55-34.

Note: Q1 = first or lowest quartile; P95 = ninety-fifth percentile or top five percent.

Inequality in incomes by race stems from discrimination in occupational structure as well as discrimination in pay for similarly classified jobs. Of the 5,505 whites who were in the active labor force in 1970, 48.5 percent (2,672) were listed in the categories of professional, technical, managerial, and administrative compared to 13.3 percent of blacks (2,277 of 17,079), and 21.1 percent for others (404 of 1,917). Among the "Professional, managerial, and kindred workers," the median earnings for whites was $12, 119, for blacks, $7,534, and for others, $8,024 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1972, pp.55-23, 55-34). The inequality in jobs, is due in part to the inequality due to education. While 78.9 percent of whites had completed high school or beyond, only 25.8 percent of blacks, and 33.2 percent of others had done so. With respect to a college degree and or graduate study, 29.0 percent of whites, but only 3.3 percent of blacks, and 7.3 percent of others were enumerated (U.S. Department of Commerce 1972: 55-21).

The West Indian immigrant workers show how the black population was further stratified. In 1970 of the 14,424 persons born in the British West Indies, 96.8 percent were black as were 83.1 percent of the 3,464 persons born elsewhere in the West Indies. Both groups together accounted for 37.2 percent of the total black population. In 1970 there 15,459 alien workers registered in the Virgin Islands or 44.9 percent of the total labor force, virtually all

from the West Indies. In 1973 only 1.3 percent of 11,200 certified aliens had professional or managerial jobs. Just over thirty-six percent had jobs in the construction industry, while almost fifty-eight percent were in employed in the service sector. It was estimated that West Indians then held,

> ninety percent of the construction jobs and sixty percent of the jobs in hotels, beach clubs, bars and restaurants. They were doing virtually all of the the household work ... (O'Neill 1972: 175).

Another statistic that underscores the differences between the West Indian population from the black Virgin Islander is that of government employment. Perhaps as many as seventy-five percent of native born adults in the labor force were government employees (O'Neill 1972: 72). In contrast only 2.2 percent of the aliens certified held government jobs (U.S. Congress 1975: 40).

Summary of the Trends in Income Distribution Associated with the Tourist Industry

In the Bahamas, those islands without tourism development tended to have the lowest income levels and experience declining populations, but they also had relatively little income inequality. Additionally their populations were all over ninety-five percent black. The introduction of tourist development apparently increases incomes, but results in

increasing inequality and white displacement of Afro-Bahamians. As tourism development eliminates the population subsisting on agriculture and fishing and lessens unemployment rates, the gini indices suggest a diminishing inequality, but qualitative measures such as property ownership depict continued polarization. Bahamianization has ameliorated some aspects of demographic imperialism without substantially altering the pernicious structural roots of inequality. The disparity in income levels is undoubtedly understated because of the wealthy expatriate residents who hid their true income or were not present during the the census enumeration and illegal aliens who hid themselves from the census takers.

In the Virgin Islands, the incomes have risen dramatically for all racial groups and income concentration declined between 1950 and 1970. Overall, while black islanders held their own against the proportional incomes of whites, the absolute difference in income levels has increased. Furthermore, a convergence among the highest income groups by race masked the increase in income inequality the lowest quartile. In terms of the kinds of jobs, average income for the same occupational classification, and education, wide spread inequality among racial groups existed in 1970. Journalistic accounts indicated that, at least with respect to ownership of tourist related businesses and in terms of public perception, the gap persists.

Case studies of Freeport, Grand Bahama Island, and Virgin Islands National Park, St. John reveal further evidence of demographic imperialism. While the Freeport was initially planned to promote industrialization and the National Park to assure conservation, the urbanization form has converged in the lindurb.

"A City-in-the-Making in the Bahamas"

Freeport, Grand Bahama Island--Five years agao, this city-in-the-making in the northwestern Bahamas was merely a name on a blueprint and on a bill (The Hawksbill Creek Act) that was being debated by Parliament in Nassau. Today, it ranks second only to Nassau as the largest city in the island chain...

Taxis meet the arriving visitor, who is driven through well-graded and partly landscaped roadways to Freeport Center. This is the focus of a community that confidently expects to attain a population of 60,000 and become the chief industrial center of the Bahamas.

E. John Long, The New York Times, December 4, 1960.

"Resort Hotels-Their Impact on Underdeveloped Areas"

Caneel [Bay] is a beautiful spot, possessing some of the finest beaches in the in the entire world, but back in 1952, it had its drawbacks. St. John had no electricity, no water system, and a nearly totally unskilled population. Everything for the new resort had to be brought in or developed from scratch...

The secret of Caneel Bay is, perhaps, that it continues to offer the visitor the same primitive charm and unspoiled beauty that St. John offered before the venture was started. This indicates that conservation can be not only good work, but profitable as well.

Richard E. Holtzman, President of Rockresorts, Inc., 1970

Chapter Eight

CASE STUDIES OF FREEPORT, GRAND BAHAMA ISLAND AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS NATIONAL PARK, ST. JOHN

Freeport--Company Town, Foreign Enclave, Canadian/American Outpost, a Country within a Country, or Playground for the Rich?

The case of Freeport, Grand Bahama Island is a vivid example of how the tourist industry and ancillary real estate development have contributed to black geosocial displacement. The changes in racial composition, geopolitical origin, and economic stratification reveal how demographic imperialism has increased inequality in the periphery. What makes Freeport's history so dramatic is not only its large economic scale and high visibility as a new boom town and gambling mecca, but that the Freeport development galvanized the black nationalist political movement that culminated in independence. Symbolically and concretely, Freeport crystallized the issues of immigration and national sovereignty and consequently became the target of the Bahamianization campaign. Furthermore, in terms of the consequences of its rapid population growth and the implications of the potential for an even greater

influx, Freeport was a preview and tocsin of the dangers of future tourism development.

Until the post World War II period, Grand Bahama was just another out island. The closest Bahamian island to Florida, 55 miles (100 miles from Miami and 125 miles from Nassau), and the fourth largest of the archipelago, the lack of a natural harbor impeded development. Like the other islands, Grand Bahama Islands experienced cyclical fluctuations linked to American off-shore economic activities--blockade running during the civil war and rum running during prohibition. Also the typical Bahamian livelihoods of wrecking and sponge fishing had formerly supported the island's inhabitants.

After the war British resort developer, Billy Butlin, invested $10 million to build a holiday camp at West End modeled after his successful ventures in the United Kingdom. Opened in 1950 it was hampered by a dearth of transportation connections and soon went bankrupt indicating that it was premature to tap the Florida vacation market. In 1950 the U.S. Air Force installed a missile tracking station at Gold Rock Creek that was part of the billion dollar telecommunications network that monitored the space shots and missile tests.

An earlier significant event happened in 1944 when the Abaco Lumber company moved its operations to Grand Bahama Island. Owned by Wallace Groves, a Virginian

who had been convicted of mail fraud in securities transactions, the Abaco Lumber Company by 1953 was the largest single employer in the Bahamas with 1,800 on its payroll. Pine Ridge, the center of logging operations, had 1,688 residents or three times the size of the next largest settlement of West End (Barratt 1972).


Undoubtedly the single most important event in the political economy of the Bahamas was the signing of the Hawksbill Creek Agreement in 1955. After selling the lumber rights to National Container Corporation Wallace Groves created the Grand Bahamas Port Authority, Ltd. (GBPA). Under the terms of the agreement the colonial government granted 50,000 acres to GBPA for 50,000 pounds sterling and GBPA's building a harbor and developing an industrial park on land occupied by a few fishing villages and scatter pine trees. It was Groves stated intention to create a sunbelt industrial city patterned after Florida. Later GBPA acquired additional land to raise their total holdings to 145,566 acres (230 square miles of the island's total 530 square miles) or 43.4 percent of the surface area. The entire area was designated the city of Freeport which is shown in Figure 9.

Much of the land was Crown land sold by the government at the give away price of $2.80 per acre.[1] The British

[1]The price of real estate has escalated to $70,000 to $75,000 per acre in the Fortune Bay subdivision.

FIGURE 9

FREEPORT, GRAND BAHAMA ISLAND



Colonial Government covenanted that until 1990 no real property taxes, no capital gains, no income taxes, no export or income taxes, or stamp taxes on repatriated profits. Exemptions were guaranteed from import duties, export taxes, excise taxes until the year 2054. Additionally, the covenant granted the right of the private port facility to license businesses and levy user fees (Groves charged up to ten percent of gross receipts for license fees), and control over roads and telecommunication systems. Even more importantly, the deal conferred upon the GBPA and its licensees the right to exclude undesirables as well as bring in and employ any key, trained and/or skilled, or manual labor perceived to be necessary for any business activity (Wooding et al 1971: 13-15).

These terms and the nature of the development earned Freeport labels such as "Company Town" and "Foreign Enclave." Even by GBPA officials' own admission, the Hawksbill Creek Agreement represented the most far-reaching concessions since the Hudson Bay Company and East India Company charters. Although the GBPA was certainly unencumbered from government interference, it was not exactly the virgin, barren land void of people as the developers claimed, in which free enterprise had the freedom to build Freeport as they saw fit (Palmer and Hayward 1970: 80). Sidney Poitier commenting on the Freeport concessions said that the Bay Street Boys [who controlled the colonial

government] governed the islands like a huge personal plantation rather than a colony (Davidson 1967: 28).

Inspite of the involvement by companies like US Steel, Gulf Oil, and the American industrial and shipping magnate, Daniel K. Ludwig, development in the industrial zone was faltering. Subsequently, in 1960 the Hawksbill Creek Agreement was amended to include the emphasis on resort development--tourist and residential. The next year the Grand Bahama Development Company (Devco), a partnership of Groves and Louis Chesler, a flambouyant Canadian real estate and motion picture executive, paid GBPA $12 million for 102,000 acres or over seventy percent of Freeport's total area.[2] This new real estate development project was called Lucaya after the indigenous peoples, the Luku-cairi or "island dwellers." Jan Roul, connected with the Pierpoint family and former project manager of the Oak Ridge Atomic Center in Tennessee was in charge of Lucaya. Still the progress was negligible and extremely generous promotional budgets were of no avail.

Then in 1963 Chesler and Groves teamed up to form the Bahamas Amusement Company, Ltd., and applied for an exemp-

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[2]"A big time promoter from Canada, Chesler was a guiding force in several giant companies including Canada's Lorado Uranium Mining, Ltd.; General Development Corporation, the huge Florida real estate operation; and Seven Arts Productions Ltd., the entertainment complex. He was a proven entrepreneur in housing promotion, the developer of Port St. Lucie and other large successful 'retirement towns' in Florida" (Oulahan and Lambert 1967: 70).

tion from the law prohibiting gambling on the same day the company was incorporated. With an urgency seldom seen, one week later the Colonial Government hastily approved the certificate of exemption granting Bahamas Amusements the exclusive right to operate casinos on the entire island of Grand Bahama.[3] The advent of legalized gambling casinos signaled the real start of the building boom in Freeport (Wooding et al 1970: 8-9). The gambling casinos and the Freeport concession later would result in a major political scandal and the loss of governmental control by the white oligarchy known as the Bay Street Boys. The year 1963 also marked the beginning of Mackey Airlines' regular air service from Florida to Freeport.

The Monte Carlo Casino opened for business on January 11, 1964 in rooms of the Lucayan Beach Hotel that had been

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[3]One of the primary reasons was the influece of the most powerful man in the Bahamas, Stafford L. Sands, Minister of Finance and Tourism, who was credited with engineering the successful development of the Bahamas' tourist industry and tax haven service. Knighted in 1964 for his contributions to Bahamian economic growth, it was later revealed that Sands had accepted a very generous bribe of $1.8 million as a "legal consultant" to Bahamas Amusement Company which came from Meyer Lansky, organized crime chief and silent partner Wallace Groves. Sir Stafford, also a member of the House of Assembly, had railroaded the gambling exemption through parliament (Oulahan and Lambert 1967: 73). Thoroughly discredited (although still revered by the Bay Street Street Boys' claque) Sands went into exile in Spain; journalistic investigations and a Royal Commission of Inquiry also discovered that many other Bahamians had been bought off including Sir Etienne Dupuch, the publisher of Nassau's leading newspaper, The Tribune, and sponsor of the anti-discrimination resolution. When the PLP won the 1967 elections, Dupuch moved to Miami.

designated on blueprints as "handball courts." The gambling profits were used to subsidize the cost of hotel construction. For example, the Holiday Inn received $5 million over a ten year period. Bahamas Airways received subsidies to schedule extra flights from South Florida. Cruise lines were encouraged to make Freeport a port of call and vast sums were channeled to the tourist and convention board for advertising, marketing, public relations, and entertainment. Furthermore, gambling revenues financed the International Bazaar with sixty shops and restaurants on ten acres.

However, the necessary prior event that made these promotional efforts likely to succeed was that following the revolution in Cuba, Prime Minister Castro had closed the Havana casinos and vanquished the syndicate. As a result, the lucrative gambling traffic was rerouted to Freeport as intended. Coupled with the real estate development and construction boom, tourism had a tremendous impact upon population movements to and within the Bahamas.

In 1943 with a population of 2,333 Grand Bahama ranked eighth among the islands, but by 1970 the island numbered 25,859 inhabitants placing it second behind New Providence. Between 1953 and 1963 Grand Bahama's population doubled and tripled again by 1970. In 1980 the population reached 33,102 and amounted to sixteen percent of the total Ba-

hamian population.[4] Freeport's share at the time of the first census after its inception was 36.6 percent and continued to climb to 67.4 percent of Grand Bahama Island, from 3,012 to 22,301 (Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1981: 10). The population growth paralleled the escalating number of tourist arrivals. Negligible in 1955, by 1960 approximately 40,000 tourists represented 11.7 percent of all visitors to the Bahamas. Tourist arrivals have fluctuated since 1969 when tourist arrivals reached the half million mark, but in 1980 the number of visitors was 381,980 or 32.3 percent of the Bahamian total (Barratt 1972: 158; and Bahamas Handbook 1981: 379, 446).

Freeport had indeed become a growth pole. Much of the population growth was due to the transfer of population within the islands. Of the net gain of 5,655 internal migrants Grand Bahama captured 95.4 percent between 1963 and 1970 (Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1976: 51). This reversed the historic flow of migrants from the out islands to New Providence; for the same time period New Providence recorded a net loss equal to about one-half of Grand Bahama's gain. This shift was due to the foreign investments and job availability, but it was the tremendous influx of foreigners under the Hawksbill Creek Agreement covenants that preoccupied officials.

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[4]The 1980 population was considerably less than the 150,000 population that was projected at the time of the boom in the mid-1960's.

The 1970 census revealed that not only was Freeport a foreign enclave by virtue of the autonomy ceded to the Grand Bahama Port Authority, but also by the fact that foreigners outnumbered Bahamians almost two to one. Of Freeport's 15,286 residents, 64.2 percent were foreign born--only 16.4 percent of the population was actually born on the island. Fully one-third of Freeport's population was born in the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom. Another seven percent was born in other European countries (Tertullien 1972: 353-356). Haitians, Turk Islanders, and Jamaicans comprised the other main foreign groups. An even more alarming prospect, the potential size of the foreign community was much larger because foreigners were purchasing most of Freeport's real estate. As the Freeport urban planner P.J.H. Barratt pointed out,

> Almost all the land sales [on Grand Bahama Island] have been made to "expatriates" who, if they were permitted to move to the Bahamas in the near future, would outnumber the native Bahamians in their entire country in a ratio of about four to one (Barratt 1972: 174).

With water resources estimated at supporting a half-million inhabitants or even the lower planning estimates of 200,000 the spectre of absorbing such a large increase was made

worse by the foreign invasion and the threat of a wholesale takeover.[5]

Even in 1970 the polarizing and displacing effects were evident. The Royal Commission investigating the Hawksbill Creek Agreement observed that of the 5,000 transactions already recorded that ninety-nine percent were to foreigners with different cultures, standards, economies, and loyalties. Furthermore, the resort and leisure class development catered to the seeker of tax havens, casinos, golf courses, country club amenities and care free vacations or retirement. Bahamian youths might try to imitate the free-spending tourists or they might respond with hostility and resentment, neither particularly desirable effects. The Commission questioned whether the aims of the expatriate community were compatible with those of an emergent people and the risk of becoming a foreign enclave (Wooding et al 1970: 27, 42).

The foreign immigration was having a profound effect upon the racial composition. One must keep in mind the Colonial Report for 1927 that stated there were,

> a larger proportion of whites in the Bahamas than any other West Indian colony (Colonial Reports-Bahamas, 1927, p. 4).

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[5]In a 1982 interview Groves said that Freeport would have been a city of 250,000 by then if the Bahamian government had not "tinkered" with the agreement (Whitefield 1982: 1F; cf. Barratt 1972: 146, 165).

An United States Department of Commerce publication reported in 1971 that the percentage of blacks in the Bahamian population was decreasing due to the increased immigration from the United States and elsewhere (Murphy 1971: 1). Most of the white population resided in New Providence and the out islands where the Loyalists refugees had settled. By contrast the 1943 Census showed that 98.6 percent of the 2,300 population on Grand Bahama was of African descent; only 23 persons of European descent were enumerated (Woods 1943: Table VII). In 1953 when the lumber industry was dominant and the tourist industry in its embryonic stage, the percentage of African descent had declined to 92.6 and the number of European descent was 305 among the 3,343 population (Hughes 1954: Table XIII).

In 1963 when the PLP was stepping up is challenge of white supremacy and rigged elections, race as a category was omitted from the census.[6] However, if one assumes that the population that was born in North America and Europe was white, then one-third of Freeport's population would have been white. This means that the percentage of black population would have declined to approximately sixty-seven percent. Since most of the land sales presumably were to white expatriates, already a national minority in Freeport,

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[6]According to the head of the Statistics Department and principal supervisor to the census, the decision to drop race was not politically motivated, but no reason was found (Gomez 1983).

the potential existed for Afro-Bahamians to soon become a racial minority. Thus, in a relative sense, black Bahamians were being displaced demographically by white foreigners.

Besides the disproportional numerical presence of immigrants their residential pattern exhibited uneven distribution between the Freeport enclave and the rest of Grand Bahama Island. Over ninety percent of all persons whose last country of residence was Canada, the United States, or the United Kingdom lived in Freeport. On the other hand, seventy-seven percent of those coming from Jamaica, fifty-one percent from Haiti, forty-two percent from the Bahamas and eighteen percent from the Turks and Caicos Islands resided within the Freeport area (Tertullien 1972: 353-356). The amenities of Freeport were mainly enjoyed by the expatriate whites.

> The Negroes, for the most part, live outside the enclave in wretched settlements like Eight Mile Rock, a shanty-town of 10,000 or more people, without running water, sanitation or telephones (Davidson 1967: 31).

This geographical segregation by national origin, race, and class lends credence to the label of an "American-Canandian outpost" (Cf. Whitefield 1982: 1F). One reason that so few Turk Islanders lived in Freeport was that most of them were recruited in the 1940's and early 1950's to work in the lumber industry prior to the creation of the new zone.

Furthermore, as shown in Table 18, the foreign born held a disproportional eighty-six percent of the professional and technical jobs and filled eighty-four percent of the administrative and managerial positions. The occupational breakdowns support the thesis that an hierarchical international division of labor exists even within a country and overlaps with race. The three white origin countries account for 67.0 percent of the top echelon occupations--professional, technical, administrative, executive and managerial--but comprise only 39.6 percent of Freeport's economically active population. In contrast the three West Indian countries representing 22.7 percent of the economically active population held but 6.5 percent of those positions. Bahamians who were 26.2 percent of the workforce had 14.9 percent of the upper level white collar jobs.

Another way of comparing is the percent of a national origin group who is economically active in professional/-technical and administrative/executive occupations. They are ranked as presented in Table 19 below. The disparity in the division of labor by geopolitical origin extended into other economic activities as classified by the Bahamian census. For example, the British and Americans' most common activity were community, social and personal services (includes education, medical, recreational, cultural, financial, and welfare services) and insurance,

Table 18
UPPER LEVEL WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYMENT FOR FREEPORT
BY BIRTHPLACE, 1970

BIRTHPLACE	PROFESSIONAL/ TECHNICAL	%	ADMINISTRATIVE/ EXECUTIVE	%
Bahamas	111	13.5	151	16.0
Canada	98	12.0	170	18.0
Haiti	12	1.5	3	0.3
Jamaica	69	8.4	23	2.4
Turks/Caicos	7	0.9	1	0.1
United Kingdom	232	28.3	115	12.2
United States	199	24.3	365	38.7
Other	91	11.1	114	12.1
Total	819	100.0	942	99.8

Source: Tertullien 1972: 262.

real estate and business services. Jamaicans and Haitians were most frequently found in the wholesale and retail trade, restaurant and hotel category and to a lesser extent in the construction sector. Turks Islanders were also most numerous in the trade and hospitality sector but just ahead of the transport, storage, and communication category (Tertullien 1972: Table 524, p. 271).

Table 19

PROPORTION OF NATIONALITY IN UPPER LEVEL WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF NATIONALITY'S TOTAL ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, FREEPORT, 1970

Birthplace	Upper Level White Collar	Total Economically Active	
United Kingdom	32.6%	1,066	100.0%
United States	26.6%	2,118	100.0%
Canada	25.5%	1,094	100.0%
Bahamas	9.2%	7,984	100.0%
Jamaica	7.1%	1,300	100.0%
Turks/Caicos	3.6%	220	100.0%
Haiti	1.6%	940	100.0%

(Source: Tertullien 1972: 262).

Level of educational attainment was similarly unequal. Almost forty percent of the Haitians in Freeport had six or fewer years of schooling. Fewer Turks Islanders (6.8 percent) and Jamaicans (4.9 percent) reported low educational levels, but the Canadians (2.5 percent, British (1.3 percent) and Americans (1.2 percent) were even less likely to have attended school six or fewer years. On the

other end of the educational spectrum, fifteen or more years of education, the three white origin countries ranged from 21.9 percent (Canada) to 29.0 percent (United States) of their population fourteen years or older. Those groups from the West Indies ranged from 2.0 percent (Haiti) to 8.9 percent (Jamaica) in upper level educational attainment (Tertullien 1972: Table 545, p. 279).

These occupational and educational differences are not as sharp as the disparity in incomes as shown in Table 20 below. The mean personal income for Americans, $8,249, was more than three times that of the lowest group, the Haitians, whose mean income was $2,669. Of the 100 individuals who earned $30,000 or more in 1970, fifty were Americans, nineteen British, seven Canadians, seven Bahamians, and the remainder from Germany, Italy, South Africa, and New Zealand. In the $1,001 to $2,000 income bracket (the lowest that would exclude unemployed workers and/or dependents over 14 years of age), Haitians make up 34.2 percent, followed by Bahamians at 27.6 percent, Jamaicans at 21.4 percent with the rest all under 3.5 percent (Tertullien 1972: Table 157, p. 73; Table 247, p. 114; and Table 650, pp.353-356).

It should be pointed out that the mean personal income for Freeport for the population fifteen and older was $5,607 while the rest of Grand Bahama Island was $3,002. The overall prosperity of Grand Bahama can be contrasted

TABLE 20
MEAN PERSONAL INCOME OF FREEPORT BY BIRTHPLACE, 1970

Birthplace	Mean Income[7]	Number	Mean Income[8]	Number
United States	$8,249	1,831	$5,872	2,572
United Kingdom	$7,403	1,173	$6,274	1,390
Canada	$6,148	782	$4,605	1,044
Bahamas	$4,405	2,610	$2,455	4,682
Turks/Caicos	$4,174	269	$3,760	298
Jamaica	$3,738	1,312	$3,246	1,511
Haiti	$2,669	961	$2,623	978
Total	$5,607	10,632	$3,900	15,286

Source: Constructed from Tertullien 1972: Table 157, p. 73; Table 247, p. 114; and Table 650, pp. 353-356.

[7]For the population 15 years and older thus reflecting the differences in salary/wages for the working population.

[8]For the total population thus reflecting the differences in average earnings resulting from the number of youthful dependents.

with the most populous island of New Providence, $1,782 and several of the out islands in the $400 range. (See the section on income distributions above.) Cumulatively, the data underscores that the explosive growth of Freeport was fraught with tension on the island and within the Bahamas. The Bahamians were caught in the middle of a Freeport society rapidly becoming segmented by geopolitical origin, race, and class and one over which they had very little control. Clearly, the Freeport trajectory was unsatisfactory to the majority of Bahamians.

A crisis was inevitable when the Progressive Labor Party finally won control of the parliament to form the first black Bahamian government in January, 1967. The main issues in the election had been the corruption of the white oligarchy over the Freeport concessions and the gambling casinos and majority rule. Although the margin of the government's power within the House of Assembly was slim, backed by the popular support for a black nationalist agenda, the prime Minister, Lynden Oscar Pindling, launched the "Bahamas for Bahamians" campaign known as Bahamianization.

Prior to the Hawksbill Creek Agreement the Immigration Act of 1928 was the sole legislation regulating entry of immigrants, but it contained no provision for work or residence permits. When a new immigration act was adopted in late 1963, the derogation or abridgement of the Hawksbill

Creek Agreement was explicitly prevented. When the PLP enacted a new Immigration Act in October, 1967, the admission, residence, occupation, and departure were subject to government approval as with the act of 1963.

Likewise, the latest act was not to abridge or derogate from the provisions of previous agreements governing entry. However, the PLP sponsored act required work permits to be issued for a specific occupation and time period uniformly throughout the Bahamas. What had earlier been a "pro forma" approval, became subject to a deliberate review. The GBPA and its licensees vociferously resisted their loss of autonomy charging that the government was committing a breach of contract by withdrawing rights that it had previously granted. The government's position was the it was merely a matter of interpretation (Wooding et al 1970).

Then in March, 1969 the government recalled all re-entry (work) permits and the Freeport licensees protested and threatened legal proceedings. Tension mounted when Prime Minister Pindling delivered a "Bend or Break" speech to a group of investment bankers gathered at an oil refinery opening in Freeport in July, 1969. While Pindling acknowledged the freewheeling economy of Freeport had benefited some Bahamians, he admonished that,

> Bahamians are nevertheless still the victims of an unbending social order which if it refuses to bend, must now be broken (Whitefield 1982: 1F).

Spearheaded by the Freeport Chamber of Commerce opposition continued, until March 6, 1970 when the government's special provisions bill nullified those provisions of the Hawksbill Creek Agreement that gave the GBPA the authority to act on behalf of the government with regards to immigration (Wooding et al 1970: 51-59). The reimposition of Bahamian immigration laws upon Freeport formally ended the dispute, but the controversy lingers to this day.

It is in the realm of immigration policy that the asymmetrical interaction and exchange of populations has had it most formidable and permanent consequences in terms of geosocial displacement. Here again the case of Freeport is the quintessence of demographic imperialism. It also exemplifies how the structure of the world system economic hierarchy articulated with the global division of labor and leisure functions to thwart the objectives of Bahamianization within the parameters of the tourist industry and the legacy of colonial rule.

Between 1967 when the PLP came to power and independence in 1973 Freeport's population plunged from 25,000 to 19,000. During the controversy surrounding the reimposition of government jurisdiction and the quest for independence the GBPA stopped reinvesting in Freeport in 1970, beginning again in 1976. Many of the businesses that existed largely on paper for the tax benefits available in Freeport transferred their operations to more

conservative territories like the Cayman Islands. However, it was the application of immigration policy that directly reversed the population growth.

Certainly,the foremost target was the large contingency of expatriate whites, British, Americans, and Canadians who filled the highest echelon in the occupational structure. More than 200 teachers and civil servants left when the new government refused to extend work permits and denial of new work permits curtailed replacements. Others joined the exodus of their own volition, but whatever their reason for leaving, the white expatriates were handled through administrative and legislative channels.

The same can not be said about the treatment of the Haitian aliens. Bahamianization directed against the Haitians was a two prong attack. As with the white expatriates, the government implemented its system of work permits and in 1968 the Ministry for Internal Affairs estimated that 10,000 Haitians throughout the Bahamas had been issued permits to remain for one year. However, unlike their white counterparts, most of the Haitians filled the dirtiest and lowest paying jobs. Frequently, their presence was irregular or clandestine. To eliminate these nonessential workers, the government initiated its second tactic--a massive sweep and deportation of Haitian illegal aliens.

The year 1967 is still referred to as the "Big Trouble." Almost 5,000 Haitians were repatriated and over half were forcibly deported. Still after the after the sweep, an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 Haitians were left in the islands without permits.

In Freeport while the government and GBPA wrangled over the interpretation of the Hawksbill Creek Agreement, the Immigration Department took action. At three o'clock in the morning, November 21, 1969, immigration agents and police apprehended 170 Haitians and over Jamaican overstays on Grand Bahama Island. Less than two weeks later, a second raid was staged in the poor neighborhoods adjacent to Freeport that yielded another 100 Haitian and Jamaican aliens. Allegations of brutality and discrimination appeared in the newspapers; few, if any, expatriates (white foreigners) were seized during these sweeps.

The Royal Commission Report asserted that the real complaint of the Freeport licensees was the protracted delay, the arbitrary refusal, and excessive documentation involved in the application process for work permits which were valid for such a brief time (six months) span. This bureaucratic nemesis coupled with antagonistic rhetoric attributed to the PLP government were sufficient to have a substantial adverse impact upon the economy and tourism concluded the Report. Shaken investor confidence was the "root cause" of the downturn in the economy (Wooding et al

1970: 61-66). To be sure, the Report acknowledged Freeport's economy was subjected to broader events.

Specifically, they listed the following: 1) Freeport could not escape the consequences of the American recession that had started in 1969 and was continuing in 1970; 2) During the building boom, over-construction of Freeport had occurred; and 3) Regarding the decline in tourism, while fewer business visitors and bad publicity contributed to the reduced volume,

> the critical adverse publicity was that relating to the civil unrest which erupted in 1970 from Bermuda southward to the Caribbean. This provoked social and racial tensions and gave rise to many fears (Wooding 1971:69).

Additionally, the economic recession and the collapse of trans-Atlantic airfares to Europe were cited as factors for tourism's poor performance.

Blaming the economic problems on the nationalist policies and civil unrest leading to independence in 1973 was characteristsic of the attack on Black Power movement by the white establishment. It became part of the official dogma of tourist literature explanations of "market contraction" and was used as an ideological weapon to curb any renaissance of black militancy in tourist economies or any change in the status quo. Just as in the Virgin Islands, where the 1972 murders in St.Croix have become the primary reason for the sharp decline in tourism, the Bahamian

tourist industry keeps referring to the problems of politics, not of the economy or the industry itself.

It is also interesting to observe the recent changes in Freeport. Following a moratorium in investments between 1970 and 1976 and shake-up in the GBPA's ownership, the GBPA sold off its non-Bahamian assets and launched a ambitious $22 million reinvestment program. Plans were made for a new $7 million development project, a "New Orleans Bourbon Street style" attraction to complement the International Bazaar tourist area.[9] When Hayward and St. George took charge, forty-six percent of the GBPA were expatriates.

> Today, under 10 per cent of the company's staff are expatriates, and most of them are technical people working in the power company. On the executive staff, there are under three per cent non-Bahamians (The Man Who Helped to Rebuild Freeport: Edward St. George" 1981: 410).

Bahamians now own restaurants, bars, food, clothing, discos, lumber and building supplies, service stations, automobile repair garage and scores of other shops and businesses in Freeport ("Freeport Gains a New Bahamian

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[9]The international bazaar is a shopping complex completed in 1967 on ten acres. Designed by a Hollywood motion picture special effects artist, it consists of eighty businesses selling merchandise and food of forty countries. Previously, there were at most a "handful" of Bahamian owned shops, but the "International Bazaar has changed from 98 per cent foreign ownership to 98 percent Bahamian ownership over the past five years" (Industry & Tourism Boom in Freeport/Lucaya" 1980:374).

Image" 1981: 413-416). Although GBPA has sold the airport and telecommunications systems and turned over the educational and policing functions to the government, sold most of its shops, restaurants, and offices to other private firms, GBPA still owned the power plant, sold residential and industrial sites, operated the water system, maintained the roads and licensed businesses, and continued as the largest employer in the Bahamas. In the words of the Grand Bahama Development Company (DEVCO) president, Freeport remained "... very much a company town" (Whitefield 1982: 4F).[10]

The two key men in charge, Jack Hayward, the largest single shareholder was from the family who owned the large British conglomerate, Variant Industries, Ltd. and Edward St. George, president and chief executive officer, was British, son of a wealthy Maltese landowner. Furthermore, they had been involved with Groves since 1968. As for the Bahamian owned businesses, one example used as proof casts doubt on how effective it is. Two white Bahamian contractors who had completed their eighteen unit luxury condominium complex were quoted as saying,

> This is all Bahamian money--it's Bahamian owned, Bahamian designed, and Bahamian built. The only thing foreign about the complex is the unit owners,

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[10]For example DEVCO owned seventy-six percent of the fifty subdivisions listed in the Bahamas Handbook and had 8,000 lots for sale in 1982.

> and we're happy to have them ("Freeport Gains A New Bahamian Image" 1981: 414).

The larger subdivisions in Freeport were being built by multinational businesses--Taino Beach Condominium Hotel and Tyne Bay Condos were being built by Danish investors, Silver Cove Villas was owned by an English company, La Residence Condominiums were developed by a Dutch firm, and a German owned Discovery Bay.[11]

Freeport, in contrast to the conservation oriented development of St. John into a national park, was hailed as a paragon of "free enterprise planning." According to the developers, Freeport was constructed on virgin land with nothing to interfere or limit planners--no government restrictions, people, or roads.[12] Given "complete freedom"

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[11]Subdivisions with names like Sherwood Forest, Fortune Bay, and Lincoln Green and the International Bazaar, designed by a Hollywood set designer provided an aura of utopian escapism of urban space. Freeport was promoted as a tax paradise where rich adults gamble and relax. Coincidentally, Disneyland, the children's fantasyland, was dedicated in 1955 the same year as the Hawksbill Creek Agreement was signed. However, Disneyland's 171 total acres pales in size to Freeport's 145,000 acres.

[12]It should be noted that the area had been settled, if thinly populated, and while "pine barrens" is the term applied to the vegetation, it refers to land originally covered by the Caribbean Yellow Pine and an undergrowth of flowering shrubs and bushes, not the clear cut landscape left over from Grove's lumbering operations. Additionally, drainage associated problems with the destruction of sand dunes and vegetation, some beach pollution by oil tankers and air pollution from the factories, and shoddy architectural design imcompatible with the Bahamian environment detract from the free enterprise version of a landscaped paradise (Barratt 1972: 152-153).

the planners proceeded to layout Freeport,

> in a way that would insure the optimum esthetic and financially beneficial use of land. The heavy and light industrial areas were plotted long the rocky coast line downwind of the sandy beach areas where the residential and resort areas were to be established, while the actual town of Freeport was developed inland in order to leave the beach areas free for resort and residential development (Palmer and Hayward 1970: 80).

Freeport may not have become the new Riviera or a tropical Venice as the GBPA public relations department predicted, but it did contribute to the proliferation of lindurbs in the Bahamas.

In addition to the immigrants who were buying land or other real estate in Freeport, the tourist themselves were another component of the white invasion. To underscore the magnitude of the tourist industry that revolved around Freeport's gambling casinos, in 1980 the 381,980 bonafide tourist arrivals (excluding excursionists and cruise ship passengers) to Grand Bahama Island alone rivaled that of Jamaica and exceeded the volume for other well known destinations like Barbados and the Dominican Republic. Of these stopover visitors, approximately ninety-six percent were from North America or Europe, most of whom were white. While there have been attempts to diversify the origin of tourists, principally Europe to lessen dependency on the American market, there was little flexibility to Bahamianize the tourists.

Although the islands were less accessible than the mainland to vacationing Americans, the Bahamas took advantage of its Caribbean "doorstep" location to the United States to transform its economy. From the early 1950's when less than 100,000 tourists arrived to the late 1960's when more than one million tourists visited the island, geographical location was crucial.

> The main reason is that Florida is a mere 100 miles away. Florida has become the great American playground, perhaps the fastest growing state in the United States, its population expanding by 4,000 a week and land values soaring to 750 Pounds per front foot of ocean-facing property. The Bahamas are getting the over spill; although it doesn't follow that their income will ever touch Florida's (Casement 1969: 66).

Freeport was also literally linked to Florida through cable television.

American tourists had an easier time getting to Freeport too. In 1981 Scandanavian Cruise Lines introduced cruise/car ferry service between New York, Freeport, and Miami. The two ships on the route had a combined capacity 2,600 passengers and 600 cars. The market was the estimated three million Americans who drove to Florida each year from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania ("Tourism Is Booming: It's Freeport/Lucaya's Backbone" 1981: 395-405).

Aside from having to deal with foreign tourists of the transient and resident varieties Bahamians will

have to worry about foreign industrial employees. The advantages of an off-shore, tax-free industrial park close to Florida has finally propelled Freeport into the manufacturing center of the Bahamas.[13]

> In addition to its pharmaceutical companies, refinery, and other industrial plants, Freeport also has a thriving light industrial and commerical section where lumber companies, bakeries, contractors, and a recording studio have opened their doors (Whitefield 1982: 4F).

There is a good chance that the gains made in the Bahamian control of Freeport will be eroded in the future as more and more foreigners move to the Bahamas. In the elections of 1982 the opposition party, the Free National Movement, won three out of four seats from Grand Bahama Island to the House of Assembly. The seat won by the PLP was in the West End outside the limits of Freeport. Although now with black membership, the FNM had its roots in the old Bay Street Boys' political machine. The FNM typically campaigned for less state intervention, more foreign investment, and closer ties to the United States.

The author contends that the private real estate and tourist development of Freeport for the benefit of expatriates was a preview of what is in store for the

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[13] In 1970 manufacturing, which was Groves original goal, only accounted for 6.6 percent of Freeport's labor force, but it had 25.8 percent of all manufacturing jobs in the Bahamas (Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1972: 197-198).


rest of the Bahamas. On the other hand, under the auspices of public conservation objectives, the Virgin Islands National Park, also has had a similar impact. Compared to Freeport's trajectory, the next case study of St. John presents conclusive evidence that suggests whether the center subordinates the periphery for purposes of recreational development or conservation, demographic imperialism leads to a white invasion.

The Virgin Islands National Park as a Cordon Sanitaire on St. John

More than three-fourths of St. John is or is destined to become part of the Virgin Islands National Park illustrated in Figure 10. While most visitors claimed that it was the only Virgin Island that still merited the tropical paradise appelation, the smallest of the three islands had not escaped the controversy surrounding tourism development. In fact, the establishment of an U.S. national park in the midst of its Caribbean colony represents both facets of demographic imperialism of geosocial displacement and confinement in the economic as well as the spatial sphere. It is emphasized that, not coincidentally, a parallel exists between the park effectively enhancing land values, controling land use, and physically isolating affluent whites from poor black masses on St. John and the park strategy pursued in planning New York City. The

FIGURE 10

VIRGIN ISLANDS NATIONAL PARK, ST. JOHN



chronology of the island and park development provide the background information for the analysis.

In 1917 when the U.S. Census Bureau conducted its survey of the new possession among the 959 residents enumerated four were white with the remaining 99.4 percent of population being of African descent (U.S. Department of Commerce 1918: 61). The peasant farmers earned their livelihood by collecting bay leaves, making charcoal, fishing, and raising livestock (DeBooy and Faris 1970). DeBooy and Faris even at the time of the transfer raised the possibility of erecting tourist hotels on St. John and predicted that it would be more popular than St. Thomas because its quiet natural scenery was of incomparable beauty in the Antilles and in addition the attractions of plantation ruins, seabathing, and hunting were available for the amusement of the tourist. Even then they encouraged the would be tourist to search "ramshackle negro cabins" for carved mahogany beds and other antiques that could be restored in St. Thomas so that they could later boast of their finds among their admiring friends (DeBooy and Faris 1970: 158, 170-171). This predatory behavior of the early tourists was a forewarning.

When the U.S. National Park Service (NPS) carried out a survey of the island in 1936, it did not feel that St. John was a suitable site for a national park due to its previous cultivation of sugar cane on plantations

during slavery. However, a follow-up study in 1939 recommended that the entire island be turned into a national park. In the interim, the (Danish) West Indies Company, that still owned and operated the dock in Charlotte Amalie harbor and in 1965 was St. Thomas' largest private employer with 600 employees, built several cottages for tourist rental at Caneel Bay (Orlins 1969: 211-212).

The war interrupted the NPS plans and by 1952 when Laurence S. Rockefeller became acquainted with St. John during one of his numerous Caribbean cruises, the Caneel Bay resort had grown to eight cottages and a hotel occupying 650 acres. Rockefeller found the scenic landscape so agreeable that he bought the Caneel Bay Plantation the same year. About the same time the NPS renewed its interest to establish a national park. In 1954 agents of Rockefeller and his family's Jackson Hole Reserve, Inc. began purchasing additional acreage around Caneel Bay until more than 5,000 acres had been acquired and turned over to the U.S. Government including all but 178 acres of Caneel Bay.[14] Constituting the nucleus of the park and more than forty percent of the entire island's surface area, this donation was hailed as a great conservation

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[14]Rockefeller spent $1 million to purchase the 5,000 acres, but spent $2 million to develop and landscape his Caneel Bay resort (Olwig 1977: 248). In 1958 he began to accumulate what eventually was a 142 acre tract of property at Little Dix Bay on Virgin Gorda of the adjacent British Virgin Islands and leased an additional 365 acres of Crown land on which he built another posh resort.

victory. President Eisenhower signed the law creating the Virgin Islands National Park in August, 1956 and shortly afterward the luxurious Caneel Bay Plantation opened under Rockresorts management (Rockresorts, Inc., nd).[15]

Most St. Johnians welcomed the creation of the national park, but it soon became apparent that they did not fully comprehend the NPS's philosophy nor its implications--managing the land back to a primitive wilderness. Neither did they realize that preserving the landscape and other conservation measures were not compatible with their agrarian and maritime activities. Although allowed to continue to cultivate plots in use at the time of the park's creation, their swidden technique of shifting plots was rendered obsolete; similarly the custom of permitting the cattle to forage in the bush during droughts was prohibited. Cutting trees to make charcoal was banned as was hunting. Then, ostensibly to keep spearfishing and aquarium collecting from depleting marine life, the NPS declared 6,000 acres of submerged coastal shelf part of the park, and thus off limits to the local fishing folk as well (Olwig 1977: 249-50).

Caneel Bay Plantation was the only hotel on St. John and except for the park campground, a small private camp-

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[15]Coincidentally, the same year the Bahamian House of Assembly approved the Hawksbill Creek Agreement, the Virgin Islands Legislature assented to the establishment of the National Park (O'Neill 1972: 140).

ground at Maho Bay, and rental of private homes, had a monopoly on the island's tourist trade. Caneel Bay was by far the largest employer on St. John.[16] By agreement with the NPS, Caneel Bay had the right of first refusal on concessions within the park and became the sole concessionaire at the Cinnamon Bay Campground; it also took over the operation of boat tours within the park's marine boundaries from a local business concern.

Much later, 1977-78, the NPS instructed the Caneel Bay management to sponsor fish fries. It seems that the fish fries, held by local civic clubs as fund raisers, which did not meet the NPS's "standard of excellence," were attracting many park visitors. Consequently, the concessionaire's fish fry directly competed with those of the civic clubs (Olwig 1980: 26, 28).

All three of these Caneel Bay new business undertakings blocked or limited opportunities for local entrepreneurs. A side effect of the conservation effort was the confinement or actual displacement of small scale St. Johnian businesses by the vaunted Rockefeller juggernaut; the anticipated chances of St. Johnians for economic gain through tourist development were not realized.

Certain places with unique historical or cultural value can be designated as "historical areas" and come

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[16] In fact, Caneel Bay Plantation, was the largest hotel employer in the Virgin Islands and the sixth largest overall private employer (Smith 1982: 22).

under the jurisdiction of the NPS. However, instead of conserving free holding peasant agriculture as it existed on St. John in the 1950's, the NPS selected the Annaberg Sugar plantation to restore and to feature life during the era of slavery. To its credit the NPS did respond to native Virgin Islander park staff requests to also present a historical program of their traditional crafts of charcoal burning and native cooking, but typically American park rangers and not St. Johnians narrated this interpretive event (Olwig 1977: 251).

The average price of $200 per acre paid by Rockefeller seemed high at the time; apparently no one knew about the plans for a park nor that Rockefeller was involved. The ex-land holders subsequently found out that the rapidly appreciating price of land left them without sufficient money to buy new land and homes. Prevented from following their traditional economic activities and relegated to jobs in the low paying hotel or park maintenance, virtually all of the former St. Johnian property owners regretted their decision to sell (Orlins 1969: 377).

Incredible as it may seem, another land grab by the NPS almost occurred. Until a Puerto Rican radio station happened to broadcast a news story in September, 1962, St. Johnians were unaware of an impending congressional decision to authorize the park to acquire additional land. The news heard in St. John was suddenly spread that

the U.S. Congress was on the verge of passing an act to extend the boundaries of the park by another 5,600 acres including condemnation as a last resort. Black St. Johnians and white Continentals rallied together in a frantic effort to prevent the legislation from passing. The U.S. Senate had already approved the measure and supported by the Department of Interior, Laurence Rockefeller was offering $1.25 million in matching funds for the land acquisition. The process might have already been completed had it not been interrupted by "accident." During a House committee hearing a representative from the State of Washington inquired if the people of St. John had been consulted and no one knew; the vote was postponed.

With only eighteen days until debate was scheduled, St. Johnians mounted a lobbying effort in Congress (then without a Virgin Islands' delegate); several islanders went to Washington, a representative and a Rockefeller lawyer flew to the islands, a barrage of telegrams were sent, and a large demonstration was held on Main Street in Charlotte Amalie under the slogan of "No Condemnation without Representation." The signal was clear that the majority of the islanders viewed the enlargement of the park as undesirable. The islanders were successful in their resistance. An amendment deleted the condemnation proceedings as a means of obtaining property. Although the bill authorizing additional land purchases was passed,

it contained no provision for government funding to implement the purchases. Perhaps most importantly of all, Rockefeller withdrew his financial support.

Since the victory, only a small additional amount of land has become part of the park. In 1980 the total owned by the park was approximately 7,000 acres or fifty-six percent of the islands 12,000 acres. The boundaries of the park encompassed some 9,510 acres or almost eighty percent of the island with the difference attributable to the inholdings of private property owners. Dissatisfied with lower echelon of jobs as maids, maintenance workers, food service employees, and groundskeepers that comprised the bulk of the occupations, most St. Johnians left Caneel Bay Plantation and a mere fifty of the over 400 employees (12.5 percent) were native Virgin Islanders. Eighty percent of the park service employees were St. Johnians (about seventy), but they were mostly in the lower occupational levels of maintenance and tour guides. Because of the NPS policy of rotation, there was little possibility of the two Virgin Islanders who were rangers to attain a supervisory role in the park. A couple of St. Johnians did run stores and restaurants but these catered mostly to local customers. Taxi driving, as on St. Thomas, was the only tourist related entrepreneural activity dominated by native islanders. Of the 128 licensed taxi drivers only thirty worked full time. Because taxis are independently

owned, only aliens with immigrant or permanent resident status would have been eligible to own their own businesses--bonded aliens had to be employed by citizens (Olwig 1980: 26).[17]

Down Islanders were recruited in the beginning for construction of Caneel Bay accomodations, and by the late 1970's accounted for about 350 of the hotel and concession staff. Between 1960 and 1970 the INS reported 513 legal immigrants had been admitted to St. John. Most of the hotel staff were originally hired as bonded alien laborers and forty were still certified laborers some with 15 years of employment (Olwig 1980: 26-27).

The positions of hotel managers and park administrators were filled by Continentals. Most of the new houses overlooking the scenic mountain and ocean panorama (whether occupied by the owner or rented as a vacation home), the agency that represents the owners, the stores that cater to the tourist trade, and the owners and staff of the Maho

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
[17]The author's impression on his visit during the off-season in 1981 was that insufficient business existed for even thirty full time drivers and that many of the down islanders had moved into the taxi trade. The taxi driver who guided the author around St. John had come from St. Lucia twenty years earlier as a master mason. In 1980 there was little construction activity and he could not find work. The St. Lucian was able to point out inholdings of black landowners within the park most of whom now were descendants the persons who refused to sell their land initially and living in the mainland U.S.; all of the dozen or so ranch style houses perched along the mountain ridge overlooking the parks beaches belonged to white continentals (Field notes 1981).

Bay campground involved Continentals. Less than twenty five percent of the land was available for development and at a price of $30,000 to $40,000 per acre was far beyond the means of most St. Johnians. Most of the National ParkCaneel Bay jobs held by St. Johnians were supervised by Continentals and the park/concession's monopoly severely restricted the possibility of local entrepreneurs of emerging in the future (Olwig 1980: 28).

The racial composition of St. John was also becoming increasingly white despite the sizeable number of Down Islanders who had arrived. This is apparent in Figure 11. In 1950 the percentage of whites had increased to 3.1 (23); by 1960 the white population had continued to climb to 10.5 percent (97) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960: 55-36 - 55-37). In 1970 the total population reached 1,729 surpassing the previous peak set in 1733. The latter date was the year that 1,087 slaves revolted and succeeded in killing or driving off the 208 whites from the island, the rebel slaves held the island for six months. The 1970 census did not report race by island (U.S. Department of Commerce 1972: 55-11). The preliminary census recorded 651 whites in residence or 26.3 percent of the 2,472 total population corroborating other examples of exclusive tourist resort development altering the racial composition by displacing blacks (U.S. Department of Commerce 1980: Summary tape file).

FIGURE 7

TREND IN RACIAL COMPOSITION, ST. JOHN
1940 - 1980 (PERCENT)



Source; TABLE 10, p. 350.

Robert Fitch's analysis of the strategy of urban planning in New York City provides a very close parallel to the land use scenario in St. John, "mutatis mutandis." i.e. peripheral social formation, mostly rural, black majority and tourism as the economic locus. His premise is that the early regional planners of New York were correct in assuming that by controling the pattern of land use they could determine to a large degree the urban political economy and overall development of the region. One element of their plan was to borrow the city beautiful idea from Chicago as a,

> technique of using parks and highways to transform the class character of neighborhoods in the interest of real estate values (Fitch 1976: 253).

Under the guise of recreational space for the people, park creation was a weapon in the establishment's arsenal against the working class by raising values of the surrounding land, creating large areas free of the working classes, and attracting middle class persons who could afford the higher rents and found the parks compatible with their sociological and esthetic values (Fitch 1976: 264, 273). According to Fitch, the strategy resulted in the particular victimization of Afro-Americans, who during the transition form a manufacturing to service oriented economy, were unable to follow whites into the suburbs and to find jobs other than in the low wage service sector (Fitch 1976: 265).

Like the Regional Planning Association's park scheme for Upper Manhattan that was shaped by the dual concern of the presence of a large black population in Harlem and the extensive Rockefeller holdings along the Hudson, the population of St. John was ninety-five percent black and Laurence Rockefeller owned the Caneel Bay property.[18] The key to the strategy in **"containing the black population"** in Harlem was the gift of the fifty-six acre Fort Tryon park by John D. Rockefeller (Fitch 1976: 274-275, emphasis added). In St. John, Laurence Rockefeller donated 5,000 acres for the Virgin Islands National Park and indeed O'Neill refers to the park as a, **"cordon sanitaire that separates caneel bay from the rest of raffish St. John"** (O'Neil 1972: 141, emphasis added).

If the Fort Tryon park suited the tactic of elevating land values and helping to overdevelop an area, the Virgin Islands park served a different urban function of elevating land values to further underdevelop an area. Both parks benefited Rockefeller investments by pre-empting competitive or less desirable land use and shifting the burden of infrastructural costs to the public while simul-

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[18]It is not known if it were a mere coincidence that the same winter that Laurence Rockefeller visited St. John for the first time, New York City planner Robert Moses was in the Virgin Islands to advise the Virgin Island government how to develop a plan to protect scenic areas and historical assets (Cf. Orlins 1969: 448)!

taneously enhancing Rockefeller's image as a conservationist and philanthropist (Cf. Fitch 1976: 249, 264).

Instead of a zoning commission to keep nuisances like manufacturing, crowding, or below standard fish fries from occurring, park regulations fulfill the same role and the Caribbean Sea eliminates the necessity of building highway corridors. Finally, while the black population of St. John was not a urban ghetto or inner city, but a sparsely inhabited rural environment, they have subsequently been confined to a much smaller urban space.[19] For most of them the primary benefit was the creation of low paying, dead end, service sector jobs.

Caneel Bay's 153 acres occupied only 1.5 percent of the island and hosted one-sixth of the visitor (days) spent on St. John, but as has been seen, exerted a much wider and profound influence upon island life. O'Neill acknowledges that in the areas unprotected by park development regulations, "The element of charm lent by unkempt appearance has given way to plastic seediness" of blighted sprawl found in depressed areas of the U.S. and developers (Continental) have blasted coral reefs and dredged sand to fill mangrove swamps with harmful effects on the marine habitat. Yet regardless of how worthy environmental and conservation aims may be, he questions the right of one

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[19]The park paradoxically as a wilderness area by virtue of its recreational function is defined as urban area.

person esconced in 30 Rockefeller Plaza to take away the islanders' homes (O'Neil 1972: 149).

Purportedly, another instance of Laurence Rockefeller intervening to protect his investment arose during the controversial proposed new jet airport to be built in St. Thomas' East End. The story was that he personally persuaded President Nixon to cancel the project because the location was on the side of St. Thomas closest to his Caneel Bay Plantation; he was afraid that the noise would interfere with the resort's tranquility and disturb his guests (Ottley 1982: 213).

Rockefeller may indeed qualify as a conservationist, but he is not a preservationist. The ruins at Caneel Bay were not restored and the hotel units were built in contemporary style instead of conforming to the Virgin Islands' traditional architectural style.

> The citizens who expected a restoration à la Williamsburg were sorely disappointed in the super-modern Florida--type installation which went up, and although the local planning board protested the design, their protests were ignored (Harman 1961: 55).

The question of who benefits is also central. An anthropologist who interviewed St. Johnians found that local residents agreed that the park's drastic doctrine of conservation was better than over-commercialization that spoiled St. Thomas and St. Croix, but that the park was managed without any regard for the islanders' in-

terests. According to NPS administrators, local advisory boards were considered too parochial and thus unacceptable to the NPS. The park philosophy of protecting the natural resources and wildlife was obviously able to accomodate the parochial interests of Caneel Bay and even to promote tourist attractions within the park itself (Olwig 1977: 252). The Virgin Islands Nation Park was designed to meet the needs of the advanced industrial society and not the Third World society. The imposition of the Yellowstone wilderness philosophy upon a small tropical island with an indigenous population was an act of "cultural imperialism" (Olwig 1977: 243 and Olwig 1980: 26).

Symbolically, Caneel Bay Plantation, Inc., as a white enclave shares a link in history to the legendary episode of the slave revolt of 1733-4. It was to exactly the same estate to which the group of fifty surviving whites fled for refuge then owned by Dutch planter, Peter Deurloo (O'Neil 1972: 144-145; DeBooy and Faris 1970: 128-131; and Ausherman 1981: 3-4).[20]

The promotional pamphlet for the Caneel Bay resort perpetuates the image of a white sanctuary; the only black shown among the sixteen color pictures is a musician in the background. Another brochure distributed by the NPS,

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[20]It was then called Estate Klein Caneel, Dutch for "Little Cinnamon." The resort overlooks Little Cinnamon Bay, also caleed K.C. Bay. Deurloo's estate was the only sanctuary for the white refugees among the 109 plantations.

"Annaberg Sugar Mill" (which is the best preserved ruins), omits any mention of the slave revolt of 1733-4. It explains that, "Freedom for the Danish West Indies' slaves in July 1848 caused sugar, molasses, and rum production, already marginal industries, to disappear from St. John by 1916." Typically it implicitly blames the slaves for the economic decline of the island.

St. John's experience then reflects the deformation of a West Indian island by implementing a conservation plan. The urbanization that is occurring, the displacement and confinement of black West Indians, the segregated residential pattern and segmented occupational structure compositely resemble Freeport's record. Wealthy white Continentals, in particular the Rockefellers, have reaped most of the benefits leaving the black Virgin Islanders and Down Islanders to scramble for the crumbs. While St. John is a low density lindurb compared to Freeport, the similarities are striking. The author's conclusion is that tourism development in the West Indies as a form of demographic imperialism will inexorably lead to re-constitution of a three tier socioracial structure that is stratified along the overlapping dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and class.

PART IV

ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

"WE'LL ALWAYS CHOOSE TO STAND UP"

We have characterised our approach to tourism as being the development of a "work tourism." By this we mean that the tourist sector will be integrated, through vertical and horizontal linkages, with the rest of the economy. Thus, we are planning to have our developing agricultural, agro-industrial, and fisheries sector supply the necessary food and processed items for the tourist industry. This will mean a greater saving on foreign exchange, more jobs for our people, better prices, and a guaranteed market for our farmers and fishermen. Additionally, our local handicrafts and furniture (areas in which much attention is being given this year) will increasingly replace the items traditionally imported from countries like Taiwan and Hong Kong.

By "work tourism" we also mean the development of a more sociologically relevant tourism. We believe this can be achieved through the organisation of package tours aimed at people who are interested in experiencing different aspects of our development process. Thus, people involved in education, say might wish to come to look at our literacy and adult education programs, our national in-service teacher training program, and our work-study and community school day program. In this way, while vacationing and enjoying all that our country has to offer, they are also able to be involved in something relevant to their own work interests. Similar possibilities exist for other areas, including sporting and cultural activities. A number of such tours have already been organised, some of them through friendship and solidarity committees abroad. We also believe that tourist travel can help in the pursuit of peace, as it gives people the opportunity of seeing how others live. Particularly in our situation, where we face such massive, negative imperialist propaganda, giving others the opportunity to come to see our developing process for themselves is one of the best ways to counter the aggressive, isolationist, and destabilising plans of imperialism.

Finally, I should mention on this subject that the state sector in tourism has been developing. The hotels and night clubs acquired by Gairy as part of his illgotten gains are now the property of the people, and we, of course, have plans for further expansion.

Maurice Bishop 1982: 34-35

Chapter Nine

DEMOGRAPHIC IMPERIALISM REEXAMINED

Phases of Underdevelopment/Forms of Demographic Imperialism

This section examines the phases of underdevelopment and the forms of demographic imperialism that have accompanied them. Previously Roberts delineated five phases of demographic policies in the British Caribbean from the beginning of the Colonial conquest to the conclusion of World War II as follows:

I. Reliance on immigration dominated by the slave trade (mortality exceeded fertility) to 1791.

II. Pronatalist policy for slaves (only time in West Indian history reproduction encouraged) until 1834.

lIII. Indentured immigration and inter-Caribbean migrations (largely to Trinidad and British Guiana) to 1884.

IV. Reversal of direction of migration resulting in net loss (to Central and South American and to the United States) ending in 1921.

V. Fall in the rate of mortality (also rural to urban shift and cessation of large scale emigration to foreign countries) until the termination of the war (Roberts 1957: 262-278).

Dunkel and Ntiri, by focusing on the mechanisms of population control from the conquest up to the present, redivided the historical record into three phases:

1) Involuntary labor recruitment from 1500 to the 1880's;

2) Exportation of the surplus population from the 1880's to the 1960's; and 3) Afro-Caribbean population containment and substitution from the 1960's and continuing through the present (Dunkel and Ntiri 1980: 23).

The thematic highlights for each of these three phases are outlined below:

1. Involuntary labor recruitment--encompasses the initial conquest and genocide of the Native American population, and the transportation and enslavement of African peoples which lasted in the region until Cuba abolished slavery in 1886. It also includes the transfer of liberated Africans, apprenticeship for the former slaves, Asian indenture, and various forms of debt peonage and share cropping the kept the peasantry strictly under the jurisdiction of the white propertied classes.

2. Exportation of the surplus population--covers the phenomenon in which a labor surplus existed mostly due to the stagnating plantation economy and less intensive articulation with world trade. The organized recruitment of West Indian contract labor to work on the construction of the Panama Canal, railroad construction in Central America and Florida acted as a safety valve for rising social tensions from mounting unemployment. A central theme was the American penetration of the Caribbean by capital, notably in the sugar industry, and by military occupation. The widespread labor riots in the English speaking Carib-

bean between 1935 and 1938 prompted a Royal Commission investigation and the official Moyne report which recommended implementing birth control policy.

3. Afro-Caribbean population containment and substitution--the latest phase is associated with the institutionalization of the independence movements. Fertility control campaigns were instigated by the center under the auspices of anti-poverty and economic development programs. Another method of containing the population was the restrictive legislation designed to limit immigration, passed in the center beginning with Great Britain in 1962, the same year it granted independence to Jamaica and Trinidad. As the legal channels were closed, illegal entry increased and the United States responded by authorizing the coast guard to interdict and turn back Haitian refugees. The American military response to progressive governments coming to power in effect means that the U.S. is simultaneously trying to shut off the safety valve and keep the lid on social rebellion.

On the other hand, falling back on the sullied model of economic growth, the Caribbean governments aided and abetted by American policy, are actually overseeing the process of the substitution of Afro-Caribbean population with white expatriates by encouraging mass tourism and resort real estate development. The policies to reduce Afro-Caribbean birth rates and to contain the surplus popu-

lation are in contrast to industry incentives to promote tourism expansion and marketing campaigns in North America and Europe to attract more tourists and immigrants (Excerpted from Dunkel and Ntiri 1980: 23-26).

In discussing the demographic and social crisis of the Caribbean--the high birth rates, the high population densities, the high consumption levels, and high unemployment--Segal observes that,

> The traditional response to the Caribbean to population problems has been spontaneous emigration both within the area and outside. Indeed, intra-Caribbean migration has been the most important form of contact between these societies otherwise tied to non-Caribbean states (Segal 1975: 9).

However, he states that

> Present movements within the Caribbean are confined to limited legal and substantial illegal migrants of Haitians to the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas; a small flow of Leeward Islanders to the U.S. Virgin Islands; Windward Islanders, especially from Grenada to Trinidad; and temporary migrant labor during harvests to Barbados, Guadeloupe, and Martinique from the neighboring islands (Segal 1975: 9-10).

The principal policy response to population pressure has been to export the young unemployed workers outside the Caribbean. Between 1947 and 1962 approximately ten percent of the population emigrated which had to have been one of the highest rates in the world. The mass emigration also exported potential disgruntlement and the remittances

helped the economies. The advent of political independence restricted outlets and the selective immigration policies in North America and Europe made the exodus of skilled labor or the brain drain most severe in the Caribbean (Segal 1975: 10-11).

The general trends in the Caribbean, with a couple of significant exceptions, closely parallel the events in the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands. During the first phase when the export plantation economy was dominant, the center encouraged settlement by whites and controlled the movement of blacks between the peripheries of Africa and the Caribbean and within the Caribbean. The Bahamas and Virgin Islands did engage in plantation export, but the thin soil in the Bahamas and topography of the Virgin Islands hindered agriculture. Phase two was a period of subsistence agriculture and fishing and widespread unemployment in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands. The islands actually experienced depopulation as many whites abandoned the islands and black Bahamians sought employment in Florida and Cuban agriculture and the Panama Canal; after 1917, Virgin Islanders were able to enter the United States freely and many left to go to New York. During the depression the U.S. institutionalized temporary agricultural work for Bahamians and attempted to discourage immigration of Virgin Islanders through one of the most

comprehensive public works programs of the New Deal, the Virgin Islands Company.

The tourist economy is the principle factor in shaping the demographic contours of the islands in Phase Three. After the war many of the larger islands attempted industrialization by import substitution, but in these two island territories, tourism or export substitution was implemented. The strategy was successful in turning around the outflow of surplus population to the United States and even in attracting immigrants.

> No Caribbean society (except the Bahamas and the U.S. Virgin Islands) since 1950 has had less than a five percent net emigration of its total population, for some the proportion is much higher...The Bahamas and U.S. Virgin Islands have alone escaped emigration because of their rapid economic growth, which had brought thousands of immigrants (Segal 1975: 17).

Highlights of the Investigation

Paradise Lost might be an appropriate title for the effects of tourism in the Bahamas and Virgin Islands. Whatever kind of life existed before the tourist trade has been irrevocably altered. Forever gone, except in the glossy advertisements, are the languid tropical, plantation, "backwater societies" with quaint ports and charming natives. They have been replaced with the hectic hustle and bustle of the Twentieth Century service industry and

masses of swarming tourists. Gone also are the crushing poverty of subsistence agriculture and fishing and the oppressive burden of white minority rule. Hustling for the tourists' dollars and satisfying the customer have now been institutionalized in their place.

Any change accompanying progress will be socially disruptive and painful, but tourism woefully misnamed the "invisible export" is particularly devastating. Economic growth was certainly accomplished. However, by the criteria of basic human development and dignity--improvement in the living and working conditions of the majority of population, greater local participation in, control over, and enjoyment of exploiting the resources, self-sufficiency, and sustained economic growth and security, the record of tourism is mediocre at best. The similarities of tourism organized by the center as a monopolistic economic activity to plantation economies have been demonstrated.

The independent Bahamas having tried to escape the dependence on tourism for fifteen years, has given up and begun to rely more heavily on tourism for generating economic growth and employment like the preceding colonial government under British rule. Tourism has not so much transformed the economy as deformed the society. The Virgin Islanders are obviously not happy with a tourist economy and the population problems that were compounded

by political dependency, but they have not yet devised an effective strategy of resistance as Virgin Islanders had done in the past.

Tourism and labor migration policy that supposedly regulate the exchange of people through space in a neutral manner are selectively modifying the composition of the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands. With respect to immigration policy that governs who may visit, settle, and/or work, the tendency is for stricter exclusion allowing only the wealthiest or most highly skilled to immigrate and favors the center countries. Tourism is also based on wealth criteria, the individual's ability to pay and is overwhelmingly from the center. In effect, both are allowing the market to determine who enters legally. Due to the inequalities of race, class, and geopolitical origin and in the absence of mitigating forces, the stratification patterns of the islands resulting from tourism induced immigration are thus overhauled. If there is eventually mobilization for local control, the possibility exists that the indigenous population will be a minority population such as the Virgin Islanders and Bahamians on Grand Bahama Island were already by 1970 (Dunkel and Ntiri 1980: 31).

One significant contribution of this study was to refute those who claim the growth of dependent service sectors in the Third World inexorably leads to greater

inequality. Contrary to the expectations of the research literature, the Gini coefficients for the Virgin Islands and Bahamas indicated that tourism, once it has eliminated agricultural labor and established itself as the dominant industry in an island, moderates income inequality for the general population. The inter-island migration of Bahamians to Nassau and Freeport and the influx of Haitians and Down Islanders to work in the tourist industry suggest that a low wage job in the tourist sector was preferable to a low wage or no wage job in agriculture or unemployment. The islands, as off-shore consumption platforms, were indeed more prosperous than they had been previously and more so than the surrounding Caribbean islands.

Equally important is the finding that the prosperity was not equally distributed. In particular, the large private domains encompassing entire islands or large chunks of real estate used for resort complexes or subdivisions were segregating residential population and displacing native black islanders. Freeport and Virgin Islands National Park are two examples of the urbanization form of lindurbs that accompanies tourism development. They vividly substantiate how demographic imperialism occurs whether the center encourages conservation or pro-growth policies.

The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the population by race, class, and geopolitical origin confirms

a new pattern of stratification. Rejected as inapplicable to the Bahamas and Virgin Islands was Hoetink and Beckford's West Indian model of a three tier socioracial structure of a white ruling class, a mulatto middle class, and black working class. While the indigenous population was no longer stratified by a class-color hierarchy, the immigrant population has reconstituted a three tier structure in which the dimensions of geopolitical origin, race, and class overlap. Thus, the white North American and European capitalists, who with the collaborating white and black comprador bourgeoisie, ran the tourist economies for profits and the pleasure of the tourists. In the middle, staffing the government bureaucracy, were the masses of the local majority black population. They were joined by immigrant West Indian workers who came from the closest islands in the geopolitical sense to engage in the distribution of goods and services in the private sector of the tourist industry. On the bottom were the black Haitian and Down Islander working classes along with the indigenous surplus population who were still excluded from full participation in the social benefits and political rights

Additionally, it is believed that the massive immigration and new tourist era stratification pattern has partially countered the American somatic norm image imposed by the pervasive, long term, American presence. However, the truncation of West Indian migration and the continua-

tion of North American and European migration to tourist resorts will ultimately lead to a situation in which race relations will resemble American practices of segregation and discrimination. An exception occurred in the Virgin Islands where, due to the pressure from local tourist industry interests, the U.S. Immigration Service and Department of Labor officials permitted relatively free admittance of temporary alien workers. Then actions taken by the U.S. Congress and judicial system greatly, if only momentarily, augmented the black population by converting the temporary status into permanent residents.

Bahamianization of the labor force did successfully reduce the number of foreigners holding jobs, but the government by encouraging wealthy settler investors and land development projects was actually replacing poor black West Indian immigrants and displacing Afro-Bahamians with wealthy white expatriates from the center.[1] Meanwhile, the bonded alien labor schemes have been halted, the round-ups and deportation of illegal West Indian aliens has had

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[1]This policy very much resembles the deliberate "whitening" policy of Brazil between 1889 and 1914. Brazil's goal of human progress was linked to their belief that white European civilization was innately superior, and the only way to achieve progress was to stimulate white European immigration to whiten the Latin American population with the largest number of people of African descent (See Skidmore 1974: 136-141). While perhaps inadvertent, the goal of modernizing the economy by tourist investments and real estate development is having exactly the same effect!

the effect of severely curtailing the African Diaspora in the Caribbean region.

Succinctly stated, tourism was neither as pernicious as many critics have alleged nor as beneficial as the industry interests would like us to believe. Many of the negative features that accompanied the growth of tourism were intrinsic to social change and the exceptionally rapid pace of economic and population growth. Tourism did stem the pattern of exporting unemployment prevalent in the West Indies and induce several progressive changes in the islands political and social spheres. However, the importation of thousands of transient and resident tourists has resulted in the American somatic norm image being transferred more pervasively to the West Indies while the importation of thousands of immigrant labor has created new socioracial stratification patterns. The juxtaposition of wealthy whites from the center and poor blacks from the periphery will continue to be a volatile situation and difficult to overcome.

The tourist era witnessed the launching of the bonded alien labor schemes and the influx of many well to do Euro-Americans. The percent of the population born in the Virgin Islands fell from 75.1 in 1940 to 46.5 by 1970. In the Bahamas the foreign population of Grand Bahama Island went from a handful before the Freeport development in 1955 to more than one-half by 1970. In the long run it will

be the accompanying real estate development and subdivision projects that prove to be most harmful, as possibly is already evident in the political representation of the Virgin Islands and Grand Bahama Island.[2]

Regarding the differences in political status, the Virgin Islanders have gained some economic benefits in exchange for colonialism (transfer payments and convention tax write-offs for example). However, the Virgin Islands seemed to be at a disadvantage in the tourist industry and the way the economy was run strengthened direct economic dependency on the United States. In the Virgin Islands the strategy has been to seek more resources from the U.S. government, while the Bahamas has tried to diversify in terms of both a wider economic base and less dependence on American tourists. In the international political arena the Bahamas has opposed American foreign policies like the invasion of Grenada and the terms of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

A general impression from reading various current research materials was that discontent in the Virgin Islands most frequently was spontaneously and individually expressed as crime or hostility to tourists, while in the

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[2]The Virgin Islanders as a minority may no longer be able to assert their political will in the islands; they now have a Puerto Rican for governor and a Continental of Hispanic descent who serves as a liason to Congress. Freeport, where foreigners also outnumbered Bahamians, continues to be represented exclusively by the opposition party.

Bahamas organized demonstrations and strikes collectively channeled the grievances to the government. The author's perception, also supported by other observers, was that it was more common to encounter blacks as owners and in the technocratic government positions in the Bahamas than in the Virgin Islands.

The Bahamian population at large displayed an outward demeanor of dignity and less prone to hostility. On the other hand, in the Virgin Islands resentment and irritation were salient which, given the wholesale takeover by white Continentals, and the entry of thousands of Down Islanders due to legislative action in Washington, D.C over which they had no say and no vote, was a milder reaction than the situation deserved. In the Bahamas too there was a strong labor representation in parliament,and an organized left opposition, the Socialist Vanguard Party. While the latter has been unable to win support at the polls, at least they again provide a vehicle for constructive change. In contrast, the Virgin Islands has had little participation by labor and the lack of organized radical party enables a black nationalist, militant like Mario Moorhead to be isolated and treated as a discontent or a deviant.

Summary of Evidence Supporting or Refuting the Propositions

General Proposition I

In both the Bahamas and Virgin Islands tourism has not only perpetuated the unequal economic articulation with the United States, but intensified it. While only a small percentage of American tourists went to these Caribbean destinations, the islands continued to be increasingly dependent upon the United States as a source of tourists. Journalistic accounts alledging increasing racial polarization and the alienation of low income black youth were substantiated by qualitative analyses of business and landowning patterns and quantitative analyses of income distribution broken down by race, class, geopolitical origin. This polarization was fostered by market forces and state policy.

General Proposition II

The contrast between the ease and comfort which the expatriates in the Bahamas and the Continentals in the Virgin Islands experience and the Haitians and the Down Islanders was vivid. Undoubtedly, the clearest proof was found in the case studies of Freeport and the Virgin Islands National Park. Additionally, it was amply demonstrated how the tourist and alien laborers, who have been viewed both theoretically and statistically as temporary

sojourners, generated permanent communities related to the tourist trade. The first group was imported to consume the leisure services and the second was recruited to provide those services. These respective population groups were selectively attracted to these destinations by their location in the world system's geosocial hierarchy, which in turn determined their location in the off-shore consumption platforms. The unequal exchange of populations reflects the more general asymmetrical interaction between the center and periphery. Using the concept of demographic imperialism as a structural variant shaped by the mechanisms of displacement and confinement represents an advance in addressing the population dynamics of tourism and migration in an unified theoretical framework.

General Proposition III

Tourism has raised the standard of living of the majority of the population of the islands. However, not everyone has benefited equally and those benefits were not distributed randomly. It was shown how the Bahamas and Virgin Islands socioracial structure was initially more complex and atypical in the West Indian context. Next, the influence of American tourists as a major factor in imposing the two tier variant of the socioracial structure was explained. Subsequently, the ascendance to power of black political leaders and parties opened up employment

opportunities and apparently eliminated the caste line. However, the prepondrance of evidence indicates that geopolitical origin, race, and class profoundly affected the stratification patterns among the new immigrant groups because of the tendency for each of the dimensions to overlap. Hence, the tourist era pattern conformed to a three tier social hierarchy as is illustrated in Figure 8 on page 289. The convergence of race, class, and geo-political origin means that inequality was not merely reproduced in the off-shore consumption platforms, but exacerbated.

General Proposition IV

The economic dependency of both the Bahamas and Virgin Islands on tourism and the United States was certainly proven. A significant accomplishment of this comparative study was to reveal how the question of political status differentially affects the independent country and the colony of the United States. Although constrained by the reality of being an off-shore microstate next to the continental U.S., the Bahamas repeatedly exhibited more political flexibility and a healthier tourist economy than the Virgin Islands. If centripetal economic forces were operating to integrate the Bahamas' more closely with the U.S. economy, similar forces were making the Virgin

Islands even more directly dependent upon special political benefits conferred upon the colony.

As a result tourism has had a more salubrious effect in the Bahamas than in the Virgin Islands. Neither micro-state has demonstrated that tourism will enable it to escape the dependent economic condition and to become a developed society. If tourism is a form of demographic imperialism, can tourism be a vehicle of development? Can tourism even be sufficiently modified to minimize the negative consequences and maximize the benefits? The concluding section discusses the possibilities of a socially relevant tourism.

Policy Recommendations

A common suggestion is to plan for alternative tourism--smaller hotels, guest houses, ecotourism, or elite tourism. The basic problem with these forms is that they are precisely the way mass tourism was started. The logic of capitalist accumulation and the organization of the tourist industry made them obsolete. With respect to government involvement, the Bahamas was becoming more involved as a state entrepreneur, but was losing money on its hotel operations. While government ownership will increase the benefits (for example by retaining rather than repatriating profits), the preponderance of the

tourism budget went for marketing and public relations expenses in the center countries and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, the government already closely alligned with the private sector tourism business, placed its political survival even more tightly linked to the success of tourism. Hence, the government was unlikely to do anything that would reduce the volume of tourists.

Another suggestion is to create domestic employment opportunities. Here again the Bahamas has implemented this policy and while certainly successful at the lower levels goes against the transnational companies "prerogatives of management". The structure of the industry itself determines that most of the jobs are menial, unskilled, low paying, and dead end. The availability of white collar jobs in government made it essential to import temporary workers to fill the tourist sector jobs.

Reduction of imports or localization of product is advocated as another way of attempting to boost the economic benefits of tourism. Food is the most logical commodity to be produced for the tourist market. Here again tourism already has depleted the agricultural labor force and inflated the price of land above any viable agricultural use. Moreover, the vertical integration, standardization, constant supply, quality control, and economies of scale of the tourist industry facilitate the

importation of food. Other products are even less likely to be available or competitive in the micro-states.

Education of the tourists would help ease some of the tension and conflict, but the majority of tourists are coming to escape and indulge their fantasies not to be educated or be culturally sensitive. Like all of the suggestions above, integration in the international capitalist tourist system dictates against changes in the organizational structure. Perturbations in that system prompts the center to shift its supply of tourists to another destination and in the Caribbean the tourist product is perceived to be essentially the same and interchangeable.

In order to make tourism a socially useful and developmental tool, it would require a drastic overhaul of the system. Grenada was an example of what happens to a country that tries to build socialism via the capitalist tourist system. The work tourism model advocated by Maurice Bishop as outlined in the quote preceding this chapter would only work on a limited scale. The pressures to generate either a higher volume of tourists or more upscale tourists are immense and the potential for subversion enormous. Nicaragua is actually operating a version of work tourism which is partially due to the necessity from being a political pariah. Work tourism can not succeed in the island micro-states where tourism

already dominates the economies. It might work on a limited scale as a policy of diversification in larger, predominately rural Third World societies. Nevertheless, here is an agenda for developing the Virgin Islands and Bahamas tourist economies.

Until the status of the Virgin Islands is changed, it will be virtually impossible even to pursue an efficient capitalist form of tourism. Independence, followed by an amphictyonic merger with Puerto Rico, the British Virgin Islands, and other Eastern Caribbean states would help overcome the colonial fragmentation and the pointless competition, redundant and wasteful use of scarce resources. This would allow for diversification of economies with the new confederation and the pooling of resources would assist in the quest for self-sufficiency.

A ban on cruise ships and other excursionists would be next. Aside from the taxi drivers, most of their expenditures go for imported commodities in shops owned by continentals. The congestion that they cause and the superficial contribution they make will not be missed. An elimination of all subsidies to the hotel industry and channeling of funds normally spent on the infrastructure and promotion of tourism into health, housing, education, and agriculture. That money will not be sufficient to eliminate the problems, but once the tourists stay away and the parasitic profit takers leave, it will put the

islanders in the position to address the problem squarely and begin to develop innovative solutions. The empty hotel rooms will significantly upgrade the quality of public housing. Instead of worrying whether some sugar cane plantations on St. Croix should be maintained for esthetic purposes, the issue of local food production can be tackled. They might even decide to experiment with work tourism as proposed by Maurice Bishop on a much smaller scale than now exists, but given their past experience, it is doubtful.

In the Bahamas an additional moratorium on land sales would be necessary to prevent the wholesale transfer of the islands' real estate to foreign owners. Simultaneously, closing the casinos and ending the tax haven status would rid the islands of the corrupting influence of underworld money, drugs, and personnel.

These policies of course would be considered suicidal by the current political leadership. Indeed they would end the false glitter and ersatz prosperity of the tourist economies abruptly. Yet they would ultimately provide the islands with a possibility of long term survival. It is the present path which is suicidal. The United States is gradually absorbing the islands economically and occupying them demographically. Tourism and immigration are polarizing the islands' societies in which soaring crime and drug trafficking become flashpoints. Whether

there is global economic expansion or the more likely contraction there is the likelihood that a crisis situation will materialize and ultimately force a change, hopefully for the better.

In the past, rivalry between Crucians and St. Thomians has been a divisive factor in the Virgin Islands. This was in part due to the differences in economies of the islands--St. Croix being principally a plantation economy and St. Thomas a major commercial port and administrative center. In the Bahamas, the distinction between Nassau and the out islands also reflected this economic specialization. The importance of an insular identity fused predictably along race, class, and geopolitical lines surfaced in 1973 when a group of wealthy white Abaconians and British expatriates on Abaco, the out island with the highest percentage of white inhabitants, attempted to secede just before independence.[3]

Caribbean islands with small population bases and limited natural resources do face bleak prospects for development without tourism. In fact, O'Loughlin's preference for tourism development from among the three alternatives of evacuation, amalgamation, and development to a point of viability--for those islands whose size could not

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[3]Cf. LaFlamme who contends that the tendency for centrifugal political action is a distinguishing characteristic of "archipelago states," ignores center/periphery connections and competition within the periphery as well socioracial cleavages (LaFlamme 1983:361-2).

sustain the financial burden of government administration and services--was vindicated to the extent that it stemmed the mass exodus from the Bahamas and Virgin Islands (Cf. O'Loughlin 1962: 2-3). However, tourism has not proved to be a panacea and has continued to be an obstacle to amalgamation. Direct jet flights from the metropolitan urban centers to Nassau and Freeport or St. Croix and St. Thomas integrate these tourist destinations more tightly than the weekly mailboat in the Bahamas out islands or commuter lines in the Virgin Islands. The past decisions of colonial administrations such as the Hawksbill Creek Agreement that created Freeport or the establishment of the Virgin Islands National Park on St. John have contributed to the centrifugal tendencies initiated by the colonial fragmentation of the Caribbean.

The contemporary movement of people and information which could have mitigated insularity originates within a world system stratified by race, class, and geopolitical origin. Consequently, the dominant tendency for white tourists and their spin-off residential investor compatriots, coming on top of the previous pattern of Caribbean emigration and cessation of intra-Caribbean migration, means that homogenization is occurring. The islands' are being incorporated into the United States economically, culturally, and demographically. The tourist industry has been accused of obliterating traditional cultural

distinction, but by its marketing attempts to differentiate Caribbean island societies frequently accentuates artificial differences and competition. Whether or not a genuine Afro-Caribbean resistance will be able to prevent tourism from completely "Americanizing" the Caribbean (during the period of American manifest destiny called the "American Mediterranean") remains to be seen. The recent invasion of Grenada indicates that it will require a formidable struggle to gain a regionally united, autonomous, and economically viable developmental trajectory.

The current level of tourism in the Virgin Islands cannot be maintained as competition from less developed islands and the Mexican Caribbean begins to escalate and offer more exotic and cheaper vacations. The Bahamas will be able to absorb a greater number of tourists and by opening up resorts in the out islands will keep expanding, at least in the short term. Maurice Bishop was not allowed to experiment with "work tourism" in Grenada and without other fundamental changes in the islands, the way the tourist industry is organized, and U.S. interventionist foreign policy, it is in the realm of utopian planning, almost on a par with the Rastafarian 5,000 year plan for the Virgin Islands, to contemplate radical alternatives.

Given the extent of land sales to primarily U.S. citizens before restrictions were imposed, it is not unlikely to speculate that at one time in the not too distant future

the Bahamas might be annexed to the U.S. as a county of Florida, as was advocated nearly a century ago by a British magistrate. In the Virgin Islands, freedom from U.S. colonialism and amalgamation with the British Virgin Islands and regional integration into still larger units is the only hope to avoid a similar fate. Whether the periphery can overcome the centrifugal tendencies of competition within the Caribbean region, and the centripetal forces of the tourist industry network in the center, will ultimately depend on the West Indian peoples' struggle for asserting their own destiny.

APPENDICES

The best available methods of sociological research are at present so liable to inaccuracies that the careful student discloses the results of individual research with diffidence; he knows that they are liable to error from the seemingly ineradicable faults of the statistical method; to even greater error from the methods of general observation; and, above all, he must ever tremble lest some personal bias, some moral conviction or some unconscious trend of thought due to previous training, has to a degree distorted the picture in his view. Convictions on all great matters of human interest one must have to a greater or less degree, and they will enter to some extent into the most cold-blooded scientific research as a disturbing factor.

Nevertheless, here are some social problems before us demanding careful study, questions awaiting satisfactory answers. We must study, we must investigate, we must attempt to solve; and the utmost that the world can demand is, not lack of human interest and moral conviction, but rather the heart-quality of fairness and an earnest desire for the truth despite its possible unpleasantness.

W.E.B DuBois on his methods of research
for The Philadelphia Negro 1975: 199-200.

Appendix 1

COMPARATIVE METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION

Refining the topic

This research represents the cumulative efforts of six years working on the African Diaspora Research Project, papers written for courses in comparative methods and documentary methods, a detailed proposal, a couple of papers presented at professional meetings, and three years writing specifically for the dissertation. The intellectual odyssey involved in formulating the problem has oscillated between following a systematic plan and spontaneous deviations, always with constant revision. Virtually at every step in the process the element of chance entered into the collecting and distilling of information.

The author has been fascinated by the pervasive influence of tourism in the West Indies since 1978 when the author was involved in studying Afro-Caribbean social formations in conjunction with the African Diaspora research. The decision to investigate tourism was made in April, 1980 after reading The Golden Hordes: International Tourism

and the Pleasure Periphery that suggested the profound sociological implications of the tourist industry.

The major change in the present document from the proposal is the focus on the relationship between tourism and social inequality. Because it became apparent that an evaluation of the social practices effecting environmental quality would be contingent upon understanding the dynamics of social inequality and population movements related to tourism, immigration was added and environmental effects omitted. This action was supported by the field research conducted in the Caribbean. It was not that the issues of environmental deterioration and appropriation of natural resources were insignificant; to the contrary the author's impression was that environmental questions are and will be crucial to the future of tourist industry and the islands' inhabitants.

While formal course work provided the political economy theoretical framework and the diaspora research much of the data, aside from auditing a course in "Tourism Planing and Development" in the School of Business, the specific study of tourism has been pursued independently. One major handicap in refining the topic was the lack of an adequate theory of tourism. Despite the tourist industry's historical antecedents and Thomas Cook's first organized tour in 1841, international tourism is basically a post World War II phenomenon. Consequently, tourism is

still an emerging field of study. In addition, the dependency syndrome combined with the micro-states' size restricts the generation of information which in turn hampers the research process.1

Comparative and Historical Research Methods

In the broadest sense, the objective of sociological research is to explain social phenomena in terms of general statements that have been formulated and confirmed through research. The choice of research methods is of paramount importance in the development of scientific social analysis. Mills persuasively argued that comparative and historical approaches be combined

> Comparisons are required in order to understand what may be the essential condition of whatever we are trying to understand, whether forms of slavery or specific meanings of crime, types of family or peasant communities or

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[1]The dependency syndrome adversely affects the availability of public information for a political dependency in comparison with the ruling country's own statistical reporting through a set of practices that include the following: the obscuration of a political dependency's statistics in the national accounts of the ruling country, delays in publishing data, publishing information but not in sufficient detail, or not publishing equivalent data for the dependency at all, and publishing irrelevant data. One advantage is that the ruling country may require certain types of data collection that would otherwise be unfeasible for a Third World country. Additionally, the small size of a territory hinders the historical record in a similar way.

> collective farms, we must observe whatever we are interested in under a variety of circumstances. Otherwise, it is limited to flat description (Mills 1959: 147).

Conversely, these comparisons are contingent upon their historical context.

> To understand and to explain the comparative facts as they lie before you today, you must know the historical phases and historical reasons for varying rates and varying directions of development and lack of development (Mills 1959: 151).

In accordance with Mills' advice, both comparative and historical or documentary methods were used in collecting and evaluating qualitative as well quantitative data. Documentary techniques, in addition to their ontological affinity to political economy, are cost efficient. Equally important is that documentary research tends to minimize the reactive effects associated with surveys and participant observation.

Moore contends that the most important changes for human beings are changes in the forms of social patterns which are not reducible to quantitative differences and are in fact, incommensurable (Moore 1966: 520-521). However, historical explanation based upon qualitative phenomena does not necessarily eliminate causal explanation which is the attempt to explain the occurrence of an event by reference to to some of those antecedents that rendered its occurrence probable. A historically generalized state-

ment differs from a universal law in that the former is a statistical statement that applies differentially through time within a closed temporal frame of reference (Fisher 1970: 129, 183). Historical comparative analysis, then, requires a sorting out the unique that takes place within a specific social setting and the patterns or regularities that display cross-cultural applicability (Sjoberg and Nett 1968: 229-230).

The data collection consisted of both primary and secondary sources. That is, this research was not designed to produce primary data, but to collect original materials that were created at the time that a historical event was taking place and ex post facto materials that were created after the event. The primary pay-off is in the assembly and interpretation of evidence.

Scope of Bibliography

The scope of the bibliography was delineated basically in four ways: 1) the publication Bibliographic Research Tools in the Social Sciences (Shapiro 1980)[2]; 2) Specialized bibliographies dealing with tourism (Jafari 1980) and the Caribbean (Comitas 1979); 3) locating public

[2]Shapiro provides an annotated list of sources for bibliographies, statistical data, biographical data, corporate data, and library, archives, manuscript and data file directories containing over 100 indices.

archives in the Caribbean; and 4) the cumulative reticulation of references acquired by previous research and reading. In retrospect, the bibliographic scope was a critical factor in determining the thoroughness of the search for literature and evidence. At the outset, the quality of the documentary research process depends on the scope.

The Bibliographic Search Process

During the last quarter of 1980 a systematic bibliographic search was conducted.[3] The following "bibliographic tools" were identified and based on the preliminary search were ranked according to the importance in the final search:

1. "Tourism and the Social Sciences: A Bibliography 1970-1978" (Jafari 1980).
2. The Complete Caribbeana 1900-1975: A Complete Guide to the Scholarly Literature (Comitas 1979).
3. The New York Times Index.

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[3]The following terms were experimentally used in the effort to arrive at a viable set of keywords: Tourism, Travel Industry, Leisure, Hospititality, Hotel Chains, Resorts, Seaside Resorts, Condominiums, Permanent Tourism, Vacations, Vacation/Second Homes, Recreation, Land Use, Cruises, Airlines, Travel Agencies, Charter Tours, West Indies, Caribbean, Virgin Islands, Bahama Islands, Ecology, Natural Resources, Environmental Impact, Ocean/Water Pollution, Oil Spills, and Conservation. The keywords fell under three categories--(a) The Tourist Industry, (b) Geographic Location, and (c) Environmental Aspects. Based upon the preliminary search, the keywords were reduced to essentially three: Tourism, Virgin Islands and Bahamas.

4. Congressional Information Service (CIS Index and Abstract).
5. Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications.
6. Funk and Scotts Index International.
7. The Christian Science Monitor Index.
8. Dissertation Abstracts.
9. The Library of Congress Catalogue, Books, Subjects.
10. Social Science Citation Index.
11. The Wall Street Journal Index.
12. Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS Bulletin).

References from the following (partial) list of primary sources were also consulted and are classified according to the way in which they were generated and the agency/organization responsible for their publication.[4]

Government Documents

Census Reports for the years 1943, 1953, 1963, 1970, and 1980 (Bahamas Department of Statistics).

Census of Population for the years 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980 (U.S. Bureau of the Census).

Royal Commissions of Inquiry.

Legislative Hearings.

Bahamas Annual Reports.

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[4]In addition, a computerized search of business sources proved to be unproductive.

Virgin Islands Annual Economic Reviews.

Annual Report on Tourism (Bahamas Ministry of Tourism).

Non-Governmental Documents

Caribbean Tourism Statistical Reports (Caribbean Tourism Research Center, Barbados).

World Travel Organization (Madrid).

West Indian and Caribbean Yearbook

United Nations Environment Programme (Trinidad).

Bahamas Handbook and Businessmen's Annual.

Newspapers

The Miami Herald.

Caribbean Contact (Barbados).

Nassau Guardian.

The Daily News (St. Thomas).

Other Sources

Travel Trade.

Most materials were accessible from the Michigan State University Library, Inter Library Loan, or personal acquisition.

West Indian/Caribbean Fieldwork

Between 26 May and 15 June, 1981 the following places were visited: St. Thomas/St. John, Virgin Islands; New Providence Island, Bahamas; Barbados; Trinidad; and Cancún,

Mexico. The two principal reasons for this fieldwork were to assist in the discovery and access of otherwise unavailable data and to gain a better appreciation of the Caribbean islands' setting. It also provided the opportunity to consult with tourism officials.

Offices/places visited

Virgin Islands
- Office of Policy, Planning and Research
- Department of Conservation and Cultural Affairs
- Island Resources Foundation
- Enid M. Baa Library
- Virgin Islands National Park

Bahamas
- Ministry of Tourism
- Division of Public Documents
- Bahamas National Trust

Barbados
- Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre
- Barbados Board of Tourism
- Caribbean Conservation Association

Trinidad
- Trinidad and Tobago Tourist Board
- United Nations Environment Programme
- United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America/Caribbean Documentation Centre

Mexico
- Cancún
- Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo
- Centro de Investigación Científica de Yucatán
- Instituto Tecnológico Regional de Mérida

Visits were made in each location to bookstores which were also very useful for secondary sources. Except for the Virgin Islands and Mexico, no contact was made with re-

search faculty at academic institutions which was an oversight.[5] The representatives of the governments to the United States in Washington, D.C. Bahamian Ambassador, Reginald Wood, and Virgin Islands Delegate to the U. S. House of Representatives, Ron de Lugo were also contacted on several occasions to supplement the data.

Organizing the data

After obtaining the sources, organization of the data proceeded in three steps. First, the titles of references on index cards were reviewed. A working division of cards was made on the basis of conceptual content and arranged into the following sub-categories:

Theory of Tourism
Tourism and Development/Underdevelopment/Third World
Social and Economic Effects
Environmental Effects
Industry Structure
Policy, Planning, and Forecasting
Caribbean Region

Bahamas/Virgin Islands (Separate but identical headings except where noted)

General History/Background
Social Conditions--Race, Culture, Immigration
Economy
Political Affairs

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[5]It is unclear how the research was affected by not meeting with academic faculty. It is believed that the absence of these meetings was partially corrected by having access to the publications of the University of the West Indies System and the Caribbean Tourism Research Centre which are the principal scholarly forums for the region.

Land Use/Environment
Statistical/Bibliographic Information

Once the materials were collected either by copying or taking notes on large index cards, they were filed again according to the above scheme. Several files were opened to accomodate special topics. For the Bahamas separate files were kept under tax havens, Cuban fishing conflicts, Freeport, gambling, and the out islands. Separate files were maintained for the Virgin Islands under Fountain Valley, and for each of the three main islands. The topical indices were not intended to match the analytical categories that were subsequently developed.

Sources pertaining to the general Caribbean area were included if they involved tourism or social conditions. Almost every reference was checked for the Virgin Islands or the Bahamas. One reason was that virtually any facet of life is influenced to some extent by these dominant tourist economies. The other major reason was relatively little material exists and it was feasible and necessary to consider otherwise tangential sources.

As a colony, the Virgin Islands' statistics are often submerged in the United States' national accounts or more frequently omitted altogether from publications. When it is published, whether by national or local agencies, data for the Virgin Islands often lags behind that of small independent nations in the periphery as well as the United

States.[6] This is particularly true for census (classified as an outlying area and lumped together with Puerto Rico, American Somoa, and Guam) and trade (including tourism) data. Review by U.S. agencies and Congress does generate some information that is not available for the Bahamas.

Because the Bahamas was formerly a British colony, until 1973 many of the documents were published in Great Britain. Prior to 1917 the Virgin Islands was governed by Denmark and afterwards by the United States. In spite of the colonial status obscuring some statistics or making their likely repository uncertain, both the Virgin Islands and the Bahamas were consistently recognized as separate geographical entities in the bibliographic sources consulted and most documents identified were acquired.

The independent Bahamas no longer publishes an annual report that summarizes the state of the islands and several of their statistics, unemployment for example, are published a year or more late. The quasi-official Bahamas Handbook, for which there is no equivalent in the Virgin Islands, does partially compensate for the discontinued annual report. The annual reports issued by the Ministry

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[6]At the Caribbean Tourism Research Centre, the World Tourism Organization consultant inquired of the author if the Virgin Islands' officials had indicated when their tourist statistics would be ready to release; all of the other member countries had already submitted their data. The consultant also complained about the inferior methods of reporting their tourism data. Only preliminary 1980 census data had been published for the Bahamas and Virgin Islands through September of 1984.

of Tourism are superior to those of the Virgin Islands. Neither island had published the final 1980 census figures as of March 1, 1984.

Limitation Decisions

The Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands of the United States were selected for comparison for several reasons. The major one is that, along with Cuba and Puerto Rico, they were two of the first Caribbean societies to engage in large scale tourism. Unlike Cuba and Puerto Rico, given the absence of a strong plantation economy or other competing industry, tourism emerged much sooner to dominate the islands' small economies. Consequently, they represent two of the "purest" tourism economies to be found any where. It was assumed that the effects of tourism would be more salient, easier to isolate, and more likely to be recorded.

Another factor was the advantage of familiarity with the islands and the opportunity to use the experience and data gained from working on the African Diaspora Research. Furthermore, the islands were remarkably similar in their economic trade dependency on the U.S., there rapid population growth, early abandonment of agriculture, the tendency to be isolated from the other English speaking islands, and other key characteristics presented in Table 1 of Chap-

ter One, page 17. However, a difference exists in their constitutional status. This difference permitted a comparison of the impact of tourist economies in a de jure colony (Virgin Islands) and a de facto colony.[7]

Periodization

The post-World War II delimitation is not merely one of convenience or a false chronological frame attained by chopping history into "Procrustean periods." The ascendancy of the international tourist industry can be traced to the cessation of hostilities. Following the restoration of peace, the development of jet air transportation, charter flights, lower fares, rising amounts of leisure time and disposable income, combined with the deliberate government policy of attracting investments in the hotel and investing in travel infrastructure, costly advertising campaigns, and ever more sophisticated communication networks and marketing systems, collectively facilitated

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[7]There were other dissimilarities which may also influence the development of tourism. The Bahamas features gambling, tax haven status, shorter distances/lower airfares, and a flatter topography in comparison with the Virgin Islands; these differences may act like a filter in the tourists self-selection process (McIntosh 1981). For an opposing view see Lundberg (1980: 233) who states that the entire Caribbean region is perceived by tourists and marketed by travel agents as a single undifferentiated destination. The Virgin Islands' tourist industry was weighted more to cruise ships and less to hotel chains than that of the Bahamas.

the rise of mass tourism. The annual number of tourists arriving in the Bahamas climbed from 32,018 in 1949 to over 1.5 million by 1973. Likewise, in the Virgin Islands the number of tourist arrivals soared from 20,300 in 1950 to 1.2 million by 1973 (See Figure 6 above).

Of course, the development of mass tourism had its antecedents in the winter resorts for the wealthy invalids who sought the therapeutic tropical climate beginning in the Nineteenth Century. The beginnings of the islands' tourist trade is presented in the dissertation to establish the context of the contemporary tourist trade. Thus in some instances it will be necessary to delve into data before 1945 to establish baselines. However, it is not intended to be a history of tourism in the islands, but rather a study of the changes in Bahamian and Virgin Island society during the era tourism became the dominant economic activity.

Language

Both societies have long been predominantly English speaking and therefore the search was restricted to English. Articles in Spanish and French were occasionally included.

Conceptual Equivalence and Equivalence of Measurement

According to Warwick and Osherson,

> The most basic theoretical question in comparative analysis is whether concepts under study have any meaning or equivalent meaning the social units considered (Warwick and Osherson 1973: 11).

Because of the data gathering technique was documentary methods, the problem of maintaining control over the comparison of data had to be confronted. This is a common problem of all historical research. A related problem is the bias of archival materials from selective generation, deposit, and survival. A possible advantage is that it avoids some of the reactive effects of an outsider although government and newspaper accounts certainly can be slanted as well. When possible, an effort was made to ascertain the reliability of the evidence and to advise the reader.

Concerning this research, there are at least six areas in which conceptual equivalence is/may be questionable. They are as follows: 1) Census enumeration of race; 2) Difference in census years; 3) Societal level data concealing heterogeneity among the islands; 4) Accounting procedures for computing tourist arrivals; 5) The ambiguity associated with transient populations; and 6) Income concentration trends.

Race and the Census

In the theoretical framework of Hoetink, most non-Iberian Caribbean societies developed a pattern of socio-racial stratification in which a three-tiered discontinuous structure was based on the somatic norm image (Hoetink 1973). This would apply to the racially pluralist societies under Danish and British rule. However, according to Hoetink the United States has a unique variant in which the socioracial pattern consists of a two-tier discontinuous structure. It has been observed that with the United States' presence in the Caribbean, the Americans imposed their own cultural norms of race. Although the U.S. census only replaced "mixed" with "other" as a category until 1970, it is uncertain whether the census instrument was recording equivalent norm images. It is doubtful because a minimum of one-third of those 5,280 persons classified as other in the 1970 census were Puerto Rican (forty-four percent of all persons born in Puerto Rico living in the Virgin Islands were recorded as "other." Nevertheless, it is assumed when calculating the percentages for racial composition that other in the Virgin Islands is the equivalent of mixed in the Bahamas.[8]

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[8]The 1940 Cenus in defining population terms stated that, "Three major race classifications are distinguished in the tabulation, namely white, Negro, and °mixed and other races,' the last comprising persons of mixed white and Negro blood and the small number of persons of other

Additionally, the 1980 census obtained information on race through self-identification; this was a modification of the 1970 census procedures in which the enumerator classified the person by observation (U.S. Department of Commerce 1983: B-2). Also the 1980 census included data on Spanish origin or descent for the first time providing the size of the Puerto Rican population much more accurately. The inclusion of Puerto Ricans born in the Virgin Islands and/or the change in racial classification resulted in the majority (57.6 percent) of all persons of Puerto Rican descent listed as black in 1980 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1983: 55-7).

Another drawback in comparing the two societies was the change in the Bahamian questionnaire eliminating race after the 1953 census.[9] Most estimates placed the current

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races [only forty in 1930]..." (U.S. Department of Commerce 1943: 1).

[9]Race was eliminated in 1963 when the black Progressive Liberal Party was actively challenging the white oligarchy for political power. The results would have dramatized the minority rule. A letter from the office of the Bahamian Director of Statistics, stated that "I could find no documented reference for eliminating that question [race] for the 1963 and subsequent censuses. I do know however, from participating in the planning of the 1980 Census, that in the Bahamian context a question on 'race' did not satisfy any justifiable need. The term, which is in itself rather nebulous have a number of different connotations, did not lend itself to meaningful investigation. It was felt that the national circumstances were adequately satisfied by the questions relating to nationality and country of birth. There are no social or economic programmes in this country based on ethnic origins" (Gomez 1983).

proportion of the black Bahamian population at eighty-five percent which was close to the 1953 figure of 86.8 percent. Following the U.S. Bureau of the Census' procedure to assign race when a respondent fails to provide the information, an estimate of the racial composition was made by imputing race to the immigrant population by geographical origin. Those from North America and Europe were counted as white, those from the West Indies were counted as black, and the Bahamian population was split into the 15/85 percentages. The number of illegal aliens in both countries is thought to be quite large and has led to acknowledged undercounts of the total populations. The undercounted population is mostly comprised of black/-mulatto West Indians.[10]

An additional vexing problem was the omission of race by island for the 1970 Virgin Island census and the omission again seems suspicious. Racial breakdowns were included by income, birthplace, rural/urban, education and almost every other category. At a time when black militants were talking about the white invasion of St. Croix,

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[10]About the time that the 1970 census was taken there was a massive roundup of illegal aliens in the Virgin Islands and the fear of being deported resulted in many people hiding from anyone looking like a government official. The Virgin Islands Department of Commerce estimated the population to be 75,151 instead of the Census figure of 62,468 (Little 1974: 39-41). In the Bahamas the years 1969 and 1970 witnessed increasing numbers of Haitians being deported also. The chief immigration officer estimated that there were 25,000 Haitians compared to the 6,151 reported by the 1970 census (Marshall 1979).

the 1970 data again might have vividly confirmed the Crucians' impressions.[11] Caldwell places the white population in St. Croix in 1973 at twenty percent which is not out of line with the past trends and supports the allegations of a white invasion. This estimate permits the graph showing the trends for racial composition to be interpolated for 1970.

Different Census Years

Given the fact that the Bahamian census was taken during the fourth year of the decade until 1970, the population size and distributions are for different years than those of the Virgin Islands. No serious errors of interpretation are thought to occur because of this anomaly.

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[11] In attempting to discover the missing data, the supervisor of outlying areas in Washington and the census advisor in the Virgin Islands were contacted. The former asserted that no summary tape was made because the Virgin Islands did not request one be made nor did the Virgin Islands request race by Island. The latter responded that the Virgin Islands did not provide the information because Washington deemed the undercount of illegal West Indian aliens made race unreliable. Since race was considered reliable enough for the other cross tabulations, it seems that it was only for the individual islands where the undercount of the black population was too "unreliable" to print. Repeated efforts to trace the information were always rebuffed by the reply that the information no longer exists.

Heterogeneity of Islands

The Virgin Islands comprises three main islands, while the Bahamas consists of seventeen major inhabited islands. New Providence and Grand Bahama Island account for eighty-one percent of the Bahamas' population and eighty-five percent of the tourists, the bulk concentrated in Nassau and Freeport. St. Thomas, like Nassau, is the port where the majority of cruise ships dock. St. Croix, like Freeport, has a small industrial enclave in which a huge petroleum refinery is the most significant enterprise, but still secondary to resort tourism. St. John's tourism is largely confined to the National Park that occupies two--thirds of the island. Population distribution in the Bahamian out-islands is extremely uneven. This heterogeneity approximately regional variation in continental societies and thus even with these micro-states, aggregate data can be misleading. To compensate for this heterogeneity, in the analysis a profile of each island was used.

Tourist Arrivals

According to the World Tourism Organization, tourists are classified in three separate categories as follows:

> Tourists: Temporary visitors staying less than twenty-four hours in the country visited and whose journey is for leisure (recreation, holi-

day, health, study, religion, sport) or business (family, mission, meeting) purposes.

Excursionists: Temporary visitors staying less than twenty-four hours in a country visited.

Cruise ship passengers: Usually separately classified as a special case of excursionists (Devas 1982: 3).

Most of the earlier published data did not make the distinction between excursionists and tourists while the Virgin Islands until 1981 did not differentiate between air arrivals and tourists. Furthermore, the Virgin Islands reported tourist arrivals fiscal year instead of calendar year through 1976. Consequently, in the first case, the numbers of true tourists (in the WTO sense) arriving were exaggerated, but apparently in a consistent manner; in the latter case, the two island territories' figures were not strictly comparable, but again the reporting and trends are thought to be consistent and not serious enough to discard the data.

Transient Populations

Tourists and temporary workers have not usually been considered part of the islands' population, yet by their volume and physical presence they play a significant role in shaping the communities' structure and behavioral patterns. The permanent settlement by investor/entrepreneurs (often former tourists) and by the temporary workers (in

conjunction with the tourist trade) were responsible for the rapid increases in population of the islands. The tendency toward ownership of second/vacations homes/condominiums by tourists also has made an impact. Even the day trippers and cruise ship passengers contribute to congestion and demand for services as well as employment on a daily basis as they are continually replaced.

Another ambiguity is associated with the paradoxical nature of tourism. Although consumption of tourist services occurs within a country, tourism is classified as an export activity that generates foreign exchange. It is a service sector activity that in the islands is based upon natural resources. Tourism is both capital intensive and labor intensive. Generally held to be an urban activity, the islands are typically marketed to largely urban populations as rural isolated landscapes. The objective of tourism development is to create a modern society, but the continued success depends upon maintaining an underdeveloped milieu and image.

Income concentration trends

To measure the impact of tourism generated economic growth upon inequality, the Gini coefficients were calcu-

lated as an index of income concentration over time.[12]

According to Girling,

> The main problems with the GINI coefficient are that it does not distinguish between differences in the location of inequality--the measure has a certain insensitivity to errors of measurement and to shifts in the locus of inequality and the fact that it cannot be expressed as an algebraic formula; it must be approximated geometrically with the result of under estimation of inequality. Despite these shortcomings the GINI coefficient probably remains the best single index of inequality, though in practice it is best to combine it with the detailed decile or quintile information...(Girling 1973: 100).

The Gini is derived from the Lorenz curve, a line drawn representing the cumulative value distribution that in this case is the total percentage of incomes held by increasingly larger percentages of the population starting with lowest incomes. A forty-five degree line, the line of complete equality, is the hypothetical distribution if each grouping possessed equal shares of the total income (Alker 1965: 36). The amount of deviation from this line indicates the degree of inequality.

Dividing the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality by its potential maximum size gives the Gini coefficient of inequality. That is, for each group

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[12]The Gini coefficients for this dissertation were computed according to an algorithm developed by Craig Harris and Dale Jager at the Population and Resources Center, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University. A copy of the program is available from the Center.

in the population the Gini index sums the difference between where the group is on the Lorenz curve and where it would expected to be in the case of complete equality. Because this sum is divided by its maximum possible value, the Gini coefficient ranges between 0 (complete equality) and 1 (complete inequality) (Alker 1965: 40-41).

An equalizing transfer between any group will lower the Gini index. Thus, a reduction in the inequality between the highest income groups would show a lessening of inequality although the income share of the majority remained unchanged (Tøivik 1977: 280).

A comparison of the trends in income concentration can not be made because 1970 was the first time the Bahamas collected income information. Additionally, because this was the first time to collect income data and since no system of direct personal taxation exist in the Bahamas, concern over the question may have resulted in an understatement of income (Commonwealth of the Bahamas 1972: iv). The omission of race in the Bahamian census also prevents comparison with the Virgin Islands. Calculating the Gini indices by island in the Bahamas is a proxy for time trend effects of tourism in that the extent of tourism development varies by island. The differences between incomes of different populations by national origins as measured by quintiles and percentiles is an

indirect way of estimating income concentration by race as well.

The Virgin Islands' data, while having recorded income over a longer time period, also was incomplete and inconsistent. Income by national origin was not available and income breakdowns changed from persons to families and unrelated individuals. Overlapping data was available for 1960 so comparisons between 1950 and 1960 and between 1960 and 1970 can be made. One other major drawback is that there was no direct way to isolate the effects of tourism and immigration or the mitigating effects of welfare programs. It is thought that inspite of these limitations, that the effort to evaluate income concentration was necessary to verify the various claims about tourism and inequality and is accurate in the context of these qualifications.

Appendix 2

TABLE 21

TOURIST ARRIVALS, BAHAMAS 1949 TO 1982[1]

YEAR	NUMBER(000s)	% CHANGE	YEAR	NUMBER(000s)	%CHANGE
1949	32.0	---	1966	822.3	14.1
1950	45.4	41.3	1967	915.3	11.3
1951	68.5	51.0	1968	1,072.2	17.1
1952	90.5	32.1	1969	1,332.4	24.3
1953	99.9	10.4	1970	1,298.3	-2.6
1954	118.5	18.6	1971	1,463.6	12.7
1955	142.7	20.4	1972	1,511.9	3.3
1956	175.7	23.2	1973	1,520.0	0.5
1957	210.2	19.6	1974	1,388.0	-8.7
1958	207.3	-1.4	1975	1,380.9	-0.5
1959	260.0	25.4	1976	1,403.6	1.6
1960	342.0	31.5	1977	1,381.1	-1.6
1961	368.2	7.7	1978	1,706.9	23.5
1962	444.9	20.8	1979	1,789.4	4.9
1963	546.4	22.8	1980	1,904.6	6.4
1964	605.2	10.8			
1965	720.4	19.0			

Source: Bahamas Colonial Reports: Review of the Years 1964-1965 1967: 8-9; Bahamas Handbook and Busiman's Annual 1970: 395; 1974: 343; 1978: 345; and 1979: 345; and 1980 Annual Report on Tourism 1981: 15.

[1]Tourist arrivals include the WTO categories of tourists, cruise ship passengers, and air excursionists.

Appendix 2

TABLE 22

TOURIST ARRIVALS VIRGIN ISLANDS 1949 TO 1980[2]

YEAR	NUMBER(000s)	%CHANGE	YEAR	NUMBER(000s)	%CHANGE
1949	20.3	---	1966	649.6	17.2
1950	42.4	108.9	1967	817.2	25.8
1951	46.0	8.5	1968	986.0	20.7
1952	56.4	22.6	1969	920.9	-6.6
1953	59.1	4.8	1970	910.9	-1.1
1954	70.9	20.0	1971	1,107.5	21.6
1955	81.5	15.0	1972	1,155.4	4.3
1956	98.2	20.5	1973	1,076.4	-7.1
1957	121.2	23.4	1974	981.5	-8.8
1958	144.3	19.1	1975 (FY)	981.5	-15.6
1959	180.0	24.7	1975 (CY)	907.3	---
1960	204.1	13.4	1976	956.6	5.4
1961	245.3	20.2	1977	1,039.4	8.7
1962	280.0	14.1	1978	1,139.6	9.6
1963	396.2	41.5	1979	1,222.2	7.2
1964	436.7	10.2	1980	1,217.3	-0.4
1965	554.4	20.7			

SOURCE: Creque and Goeggel 1964; Jones-Hendrickson 1977: 558; and Virgin Islands nd.

[2]The Virgin Islands recorded all air arrivals, residents and internal traffic as well as the WTO categories of tourists and excursionists, as visitors through the 1975-1976 fiscal year (FY). From 1975 on, tourist arrivals are for the calendar year (CY) and include only tourists, cruise ship passengers, and air excursionists.

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