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THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF INDIA'S POLICE: HISTORIC, ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES

By

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ABSTRACT

India's British patterned police bear the traces of Hindu and Moghul administrative systems. Police Act of 1861 laid down the structural foundations of India's modern policing and was an outcome of prolonged experimentation by British administrators. To them, Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) was the model to meet the challenges of a vast sub-continent like India, and to maintain order out of conflicting claims of a multi-layered, multi-lingual and multi-cultural plurality of India's caste-ridden society. Police had to face ethnic, religious, regional, local, socio-economic and political problems. Rationally and functionally, police served interests of the regime. Police performances were so spectacular that even after the independence no radical changes were effected in police structure, style or imagery.

Chapter I provides an analysis of historical background and development during Hindu, Muslim, British and post-independent periods. It discusses in detail how implantations of foreign institutions worked in India. Chapter II defines organizational environment and enumerates ecological factors that affect the police. Awareness of organizational dimensions that stretched and shrank with imperial designs, was interpreted in local, regional and national terms to explain indigenous impact. Theoretical and conceptual aspects have been deleneated with functional connections. Chapter III

outlines administrative structure, style and imagery of police in India. Problems posed by the police personnel and their responses have also been referred to. The special focus of Chapter IV is on dilemmas--both political and socio-economic, where police were caught in crossfires and over which there was no control. Chapter V deals with the stress of the present and concentrates on the complexity of the scenario that keeps on changing, with distress and disappointment in its fold. Chapter VI embodies summary, conclusion and future directions. It brings the dissertation to its destination and imparts insight into the entire body-politic of India's police.

Problems and dilemmas of India's police are partly due to British legacy and partly due to burgeoning complexity of a confused administrative response to muddled public outcry. This study has asked pertinent questions and has attempted to provide specific answers to those questions; which among others are:

1) To what extent diversity affects strategies and policies of the police.

2) How size and composition of socio-economic, religious and political factors pre supposes strength and style of police functioning.

3) How continuance of British legacy in India's police has shaped and sharpened class and caste cleavages.

4) Whether the degree of religious rigidity determines the perception of threat between police and community.

5) Do the inner constraints and conflicts reflect organizational crisis amplified by an ecological imbalance and political fluctuations.

6) How far centralization of police control has created a schism between locus of police control and loyalties of local constituents.

7) How far policing is a culturally based or culturally determined phenomenon.

A multi-pronged methodology was pursued by utilizing primary and secondary sources of information, personal first-hand insights, experiences of other police officers belonging to different ranks and detailed analysis of news monitored consistently and constantly through national and international press. The limitations of the study are that it has not generated its own data and there were constraints of time and money.

A centralized police administrative system with decentralized features continued even after independence. Though police did not remain unaffected but they adjusted well with the changing realities of times. Police were faced with uncertain environment and were very often made victims of a vindictive political vendetta. Somehow to protect themselves and to further their interests, police started playing games with politicians and with the public. Police corruption and police coercion thrived; chaos and criminality multiplied. Communal riots, socio-economic turbulence, bloodshed in Punjab and Assam, lawlessness in almost every State, are painful reminders of police ineffectiveness on one hand and contagiousness of disorder, on the other. Indian polity and traditional society seem to be disintegrating under multiplicity of divergent forces which police alone cannot contain or counteract. Police have, so far, successfully retained the facade of semblance of unity but days do not seem to be far off when age-old steel frame of administration of which police form the vanguard, would collapse under the advancing avalanche of motley forces.

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My family's contribution in fulfilling this dream is beyond measure. Silently they have suffered and cheerfully they have endured life's mundane musings for me. I know under what they went through. To my family in that distant remote tiny village in India and to my wife, Vimla, daughter Shivani, and son, Saurabh, I am greatly obliged. I appreciate and admire their tenacity to travel with me in this long journey. May God make me able and worthy to serve them all who helped me so much.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER I

Introduction 1

The Problem Focus 3
Importance of the Problem 4

Methodology 6

List of Selected Works 6
Definitions of Terms and Reference Words 9
Limitations of the Study 10

An Overview 10

General Scenario 11
Background of India's Police System 16
Remnants of Hindu System: (Antiquity to Twelfth Century 17
Muslim Period: Historical 21
12th Century to 18th Century 21
Muhtasib 25
Subahdar 26
Faujdar 27
Kotwal 27
Thanahdar or Thanedar 30
Intelligence-cum-Communication System 31
Rural Policing 33
Administrative Legacy of Mughal Empire 34
British Period: (1707-1947) 36

Summary 52

CHAPTER II 54

Overview 54

Page

Ecological Growth and Environment 56
Environs of History 59
Advent of Aryans 59
Hindu Period 61
Muslim Period 64
The British Period 69
Post Mutiny Era: 1857 to 1947 (Post Mutiny to end of the British Rule or Rule of the Crown) 72
Impact of History on Ecological Growth and Environment 78
Intermingling of Culture and Religion with Dominance of Hinduism 86
Caste Complexity 93
Language Problem 97

Bureaucratic Context 99

Theoretical and Conceptual Aspects 100
Indian Bureaucracy and Its Police Linkages 103
The Nature of the Bureaucrats 107
The Spirit of Imperialism, Racial Discrimination and Sense of Superiority 108
The Style of the British Administration and the Application of Law 110
The District Administration 112
Exclusiveness and Eliteness of the Bureaucracy 112
Present Bureaucracy - A Legacy of the Past 115
Bureaucracy in the Eighties 119
Organizational Nexus 123
Bureaucratic Context: Summary 130

Summary 131

CHAPTER III 133

Overview 133

Structure, Style and Imagery 135
Police Structure 136
Structure under Police Act V of 1861 138
Constitutional Position of Police in India 150
Police as a State Subject 153
Constitutional Provisions Regarding Police Personnel 155
The Government of India 156
Ministry of Home Affairs 157
Organization of the Home Ministry 158
Political Top of Police Structure 159
Bureaucratic Framework of Civil Service and Context of Police Administration 160

Page

Weberian Model and Crisis of Indian Bureaucracy 167
Paramilitary and Armed Police Forces 168
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) 170
Border Security Force (BSF) 171
The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) 172
The Assam Rifles 173
The Railway Protection Force (RPF) 173
State Armed Police 174
Intelligence Agencies under Central Government 176
The Research and Analysis Wing (known as RAW) 176
Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) 177
The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) 178

Specialized Agencies at State Level 179

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) 179
CID (Crime) 180
CID (Special Branch) 181
Traffic Police 184
Mounted Police 185
Style 186

Crime-Fighting Focus 186

Typicality of Indian Crime 187
Imagery 190
Police Image in Public 190
Adverse Effect on Police Image Due to Politics 192
Police Image Suffers Due to their Attitude and Action Towards Certain Groups/Individuals of Public 193
Adverse Effect on Police Image due to Publicity of Police Complicity in Crime and with Criminals 193
Adverse Effect on Police Image Due to Publicity of Police Circumventing Judicial Process 194
Deterioration in Organizational Affairs of Police Affects Police Image Negatively 194
Serious Crime and Sensational Incidents Negate Police Efficiency/Effectiveness and Adversely Reflects on Police Image 194
Police Self-Image 197
Public Image in Police Eyes 199

Summary 201

CHAPTER IV 203

Overview 203

Page

Political Context of Policing in India 203
Political Order and Change 204
Police Role in Politics 206
Police-Politics Interactions and Impacts 216
Student Unrest 225
Elections - Politics and Police 227
"High Politics" and Police Involvement 229
Political Effect on Crime 234
Extremist Politics 236
Socio-Economic Problems and Police 239
Lower Socio-Economic Strata and Police: A Case of Pavement Sellers, Hawkers and Slum-Dwellers 244
'Bride Burning' - A Social and Economic Dilemma 245
Crucial Causes and Critical Responses 247
Police and Press 249
Problem of Communal Conflicts and Communalism 250
Regional Police Problem In Assam 264
Regional Politics and Police Problem: A Case of Punjab/Sikhs 278
New Fundamentalism and Police in Punjab 286
Loss of Public Confidence in Police 299

Summary 307

CHAPTER V 309

Overview 309

Adjustment to Change 311
Police Strategies to Cope with Change 314
Forces for Change 315
Police and Organizational Change 317
Change - A Bureaucracy Game 319
Circumvention 321
Police Corruption 323
Police Policy/Personnel 328
Functional Fallability of Police and Emphasis on Peace-keeping or Maintenance of Public Order 339
Emphasis on Peace-keeping in India 342
Police Brutalities 344

Summary 349

CHAPTER VI 350

Summary 350

Page

Conclusion 352
Implications 360
Suggestions and Future Directions 361

APPENDICES 362

Appendix 1 362
Appendix 2 363
Appendix 3 364
Appendix 4 365
Appendix 5 366
Appendix 6 367
Appendix 7 368
Appendix 8 369
Appendix 9 370
Appendix 10 371
Appendix 11 372
Appendix 12 373
Appendix 13 374
Appendix 14 375
Appendix 15 376
Appendix 16 377
Appendix 17 379
Appendix 18 380
Appendix 19 381
Appendix 20 386

REFERENCES 392

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

India's police system is basically British, specifically Irish Constabulary model, superimposed on indigenous Mughal administrative functional mould with invisible remnants of Hindu policy. Sociologically and culturally, India is a mixed plurality but some of the religious, regional and social strands are so significantly marked that any sweeping generalizations are apt to misfit. A careful in-depth analysis is therefore warranted, if any meaningful conclusions are to be reached. This study will, therefore, undertaken an extensive and an intensive methodical probe into long years of India's history as well as its police background. It shall carefully scrutinize and catologue organizational, socio-economic and political influences. For police, there have been ups and downs, modifications and alterations in structural designs, tremendous growth in activities in the socio-economic arena, and astronomical addition strength and financial allocations. Still police face an uphill task in India. The bewildering range of problems jockeying at a high speed, spontaneous eruption of innocuous incidents, constant theme of police hostility; not only appalls elites in authority but also baffles an awry onlooker. Sometimes hectic activities and uncertainty of political realm leave India's police in exasperation. Police so far seem to have withstood the test of the times but it is not difficult

CENTRE'S AUTHORITY OVER STATE POLICE ADMINISTRATION



Source: P.D. Sharma, 1977:200.

to see open fissures and chinks in its armor. There are trends and tribulations that could be anticipated. This study has started from the very historical roots of the police, tried to trace the strength of the implant sapling, tracked down the difficulties to be overcome, and systematically measured the burgeoning growth. The challenges were figured out. Transitional trauma were grasped. The role police would play in future years of India's destiny has been estimated and chartered.

The Problem Focus

India's police have been caught in an organizational and political dilemma. In a democratic set-up for a centralized police system there does not seem to be very many choices. Police cannot be accountable to ruling political authority as well as to the constitutional mandate at the same time, if the two happened to differ either in role or in objective analysis. This enquiry focuses on dilemmas and strains on police. Police work is controversial. Organizational and political crises and influences naturally deserve sharp focus. But without explanations most of the contextual meanings are likely to get lost. This study has, therefore, asked and answered the following questions:

1. How much diversity of culture affects the strategies and policies of police organization in general and performance of the local units, in particular;

2. How the size and composition of socio-economic, religious, and political factors pre-supposes strength and style of police functioning.

3. How far the continuance of the British legacy in India's policing has shaped, sharpened and stymied class, regional and caste cleavages by affecting police development and dependency on political support.

4. Whether the degree of religious rigidity among the communities (called Communalism in India), determines the perception of threat between police and the community and vice versa?

5. Has the British legacy affected the police image and police perception negatively?

6. How far the problems of growing India are beyond the capacity and control of the police?

7. Are the inner constraints and conflicts the reflection of organizational crisis amplified by ecological imbalance and political fluctuations?

8. How far centralization of police control has created a schism between locus of police control and loyalties of local constituents?

9. How far the changes in the bureaucratic-organizational and political context affect changes in policing or vice versa?

10. How far policing is a culturally based phenomenon and should policing be culturally determined?

Importance of the Problem

India is a good case for studying the effects of police transplantation in an altogether different environment; and the experimentation in organizational and political growth in a complex value ridden society. India, in general, and India's police, in particular, have caught the fascination of many foreign writers, especially British and American. Many personal memoirs, diaries, accounts, correspondences, and transactions lay written in Indian, British and American libraries and archives. Bayley's "The Police and Political Development in India" (1969); Percival Griffith's "To Guard My People" (1971); "The World Police" by James Cramer (1969) and Shane's "Comparative Work on Policing" are special contributions in point. Much historical and socially interesting literature has been

dug out from countries like Greece, Portugal, France, Middle East, Iran, Egypt, Far East Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia, and of course from China, Afghanistan and Burma. Strategial location of India, richness of its historic culture, dominance of its role in the third world, population explosion, democratic viability, closeness to western and communist world and variety of other peculiarities, make this study uniquely significant.

Police dilemmas, political realities and forebodings of the future are as critically relevant as they might be to any other police system in any other country. This analytical floodlight could identify significant strands. Anglo-Saxon model of policing, a composite characterization of Irish Constabulary are the familiar aspects of police organization in most of the countries of the world. The changing milieu is not typical to India but a familiar sight of the third world. This study richly contributes to the police development in the seventies and eighties which none of the earlier studies had a chance to do. The developments in these two decades have been too dramatic and hardly the findings of those studies stand relevant any more. This study raised and answered those significant questions which did not even occur at earlier times.

Moreover, this study will contribute to the growing knowledge on Comparative Policing and would open gates wider for future researches on police in India. It may not only heighten the intensity of interest in India's police but would widen the knowledge base of academic community. It also throws enough light on centralization and decentralization aspects of police work in ethnic mixed society, It analyzes performance of 'martial race' concept in a 'minority-

majority' complexity. It is time to study such unique features in greater detail and this study would surely enhance the wealth of knowledge with greater chances of practical application, operationalization, and generalization.

METHODOLOGY

A multi-pronged method and technique has been utilized to grasp the subject in its totality, to sharpen the focii of the study.

1. Primary utilization of the firsthand knowledge of the writer whose personal background and experience in India as a Citizen and Officer in the police field for all these long years has been of immense value.

2. Secondary source has been the publications about India.

3. Specific publications about Indian police by officers of India's police.

4. Informal interviews and observations during the time of police service and also from the visiting police officers from India.

5. Daily detailed monitoring of the Press reports from India and abroad regarding India in general and police in particular.

6. Historical documents, literary writings, contemporary and modern sources.

7. Specific citations have been incorporated in the body of the text but a Bibliography provides the full range of relevant literature.

8. For instant focus and sharp understanding, a list of selected works has been furnished as a ready reference.

List of Selected Works

A History of India, Vol. 1, by Romila Thepar, Penguin Books, 1979. (It traces the evolution of India before contact with modern Europe and furnishes accounts of development of India's social and economic structure within a framework of the principal political and dynastic events.)

A History of India, Vol. II, by Percival Spear, Penguin Books, 1979. (It relates the history of the Indian people as a whole from the Mughal period to the present day. A book of illuminating insight on Mughal period.)

Historic India, by Lucille Schulberg and the Editors of Time-Like books, New York, 1968. (It is a pictorial history of india and brings out cultural heritage with its linkages and impact.)

Wonder That Was India, by A.L. Basham, Hawthorne Books, 1963. (Historical and cultural compendium on India, wonderfully described with master craftsmanship. An important reading on India.)

A New History of India (Second Edition) by Stanley Wolpert, oxford University Press, New York, 1982. (It is history up-to-date, an analytical account of political, social, economical and cultural events bringing India to current focus. A new enlightened American perspective on Indian history and today's India.)

India Britannica, by Geoffrey Moorhouse, Harvill Press, London, 1983. (It highlights British impact of India and interestingly focuses on the British Rule in India.)

Victorian India in Focus, by Ray Desmond, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1982. (It gives a fascinating picture of Victorian times in india, the circumstances, nature and the complexity of native culture with which the British, young and enthusiastic, were interacting with their western attitudes, fads and egotistic eliteness.)

The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders (Vol. 1).

The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians (Vol. 2), by Philip Woodruff, Schocken Books, New York, 1964. (These two volumes provide an exotic account of administrative world of the British in India. It is a must read book to get an administrative's perspective on India of bygone days.)

The Indian Civil Service, by O'Malley, London, 1965. (It is a story of Indian Civil Service by a civil servant. These Civil Servants were known as "heavenly born," "the competition wallah" and the "elites." An interesting book.)

KIM, by Rudyard Kipling. (It's a novel which was turned into a motion picture. Indian and the British society viewed by Kipling who knew both worlds and described the two passionately.)

The Far Pavillions, by M.M. Kaye, Bantam Books, New York, 1979. (A masterpiece novel from Kaye. An intimate and enigmatic plot so superbly illustrated by this writer who is part of her legendary generations passionately involved in intricate Indian drama of eighteenth century.)

Raj Quartet, by Paul Scott. (Another novel by an Englishman so marvelously done.)

Midnight Children, by Salman Rushdie, Avon Books, New York, 1980. (A novel set in India covering post- and pre-independence periods and vividly describing the pangs of partition. A novel written by an Indian raised in England, received Booker Prize.)

Freedom at Midnight, by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Avon Books, New York, 1975. (A factual narration written in a novel style mainly centers around Lord Mountbatten and Mahatma Gandhi. It is historical and its most fascinating part is the gripping scenerio in which murder of Mahatma was carried out. A must read book.)

A Great Mutiny: India 1857, by Christopher Hibbert, Penguin Books, 1978. (Indian mutiny has been controversial and suspenseful and this book treated the historic event with the care and candidness it deserved. A grim and enlightened account of Mutiny 1857.)

India: A World in Transition, by Beatrice Pitney Lamb, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975. (A historic account of India with focus on modernity. It explains cultural, class and caste settings, impinging on India politics and the problems that India faced historically as well as today.)

The Outsiders: The western experience in India and China, by Rhoades Murphey, Ann Arbor, 1977. (This explains how the British as outsiders shaped the destiny of India and where India and China stand in that perspective.)

Homo Hierarchicus, by Louis Dumont, Chicago, 1980. (It is a book about Caste system in India. A valuable piece of information from caste analysis point. Highly acclaimed book.)

Inside India Today, by Dilip Hiro, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979. (It is a contemporary account of India written by a progressive pen. Dilip is an Indian settled in England, analyzes India with an altogether different perspective.)

India: A Wounded Civilization, by V.S. Naipaul, Vintage Books, New York, 1977. (Naipaul belongs to an Indian family settled in Trinidad. He visited India to trace his roots, and wrote his impressions in a book form. Out of those experiences grew an incisive critical note running through this entire book.)

To Guard My People: The History of the India Police, by Percival Griffiths, London, 1971. (A history of India's police written by a seasoned British civil servant. It describes police development till 1947 and highlights the role played by the police. It is more appreciative rather than a critical evaluation.)

The Police and Political Development in India, by David H. Bayley, Princeton, 1969. (It is a valuable book on police in India. From historical developments it draws out an analytical portrayal of police till late sixties. Most of important political and police events took place after the book was written and hence its limitations.)

Definitions of Terms and Reference Words

There are no definitional dilemmas in this study. Most of the terms and words are used in commonly known usage and in well-understood meanings. There have been some of the historical and indigenous terms which being peculiar to a foreign reader might need some explanation. The term police poses definitional problems elsewhere but not in India. 'Police' is the one that is empowered or operates under the Police act of 1869 or under any enactment by Indian legislature. The term 'Central Government' has been used for national government, or which is known as Federal Government. The 'State Government' is synonymous with Provincial Government.

There is some ambiguity and confusion in the spelling of some of the historical words like 'Mughal' (also spelt as Moghul) because it has been spelled differently by different writers. So I have either used the most commonly used ones or the recent spellings of such terms. Same difficulty with other names has been similarly resolved.

Most of the words have been used in dictionary meanings and should not pose any definitional problems.

'India' has been used for India of all ages irrespective of its geographical limits at different periods under different rulers. Before 1947 India has been used for British India, Indian States and also to those parts which have become independent countries later. After 1947, India has been used only for India and does not include Pakistan, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka.

Commonly known party names and/or personal names have been used instead of official nomenclatures like instead of All India National Congress, only Congress has been used. Similarly instead of Mrs. Indira Nehru Gandhi, only Mrs. Gandhi or Indira Gandhi has been used wherever any special meaning has been denoted, it has been expressly mentioned so, otherwise commonly understood criterion works.

Limitations of the Study

This study depends on already available resources and has not generated its own data through field research. Most of its sources are secondary except where the writer could enrich by long standing personal experience and first-hand information. The time, space and resources have been limited for this kind of widespread study of a vast country and of a mammoth organization like police in India.

AN OVERVIEW

This first chapter will seek to illustrate an historical connection of policing between various periods viz, Hindu, Muslim, and British, and locate policy transformations to delineate the caterpillar-like character of police capable of turning into a

pretentious gadfly. Phases of transition, catalogued with reasons and results, would be documented. The chapter will identify implications of police as an imported institution into an entirely different environment and the extent of success of such a supplant. In a plural society with immense diversification and obstructions of all sorts, how police in India provided valuable support to the stability of political and administrative system would be specially specified. This chapter would not only put policing on historical pedestal, but also introduce its branches that would be discussed, in detail, in on-going chapters.

General Scenario

India's British-patterned police abounds in problems, faces tremendous challenges, and precariously pants under pressures, to put up with plaintive paradoxes. "Policing in western democracies is in crisis," (Alderson, 1979:1), therefore, the Indian version of the Irish Constabulary model of policing seems surely in critical condition. In India this crisis has multiplied many times due to increase in population, nonavailability of food stuffs and water, scarcity of dwellings, growing unemployment, deterioration in educational environments, conflicting claims of socio-religious components, fluctuations in political order, changing patterns of values, perceptions and attitudes, adament adherence to primitive procedures, practices, policies and prescriptions, rampant corruption, inefficient and insufficient resources, reckless profiteering of private enterprise, indiscriminate and ineffective nature of criminal justice systems, and an account of the tidal waves of influences from abroad interacting with the traditional culture and style.

The shifting sands of time have brought contemporary scenarios forming a contextual backdrop for policing in India. The following may be taken as a glimpse of scenes, or as a sample. The first scene encompasses early days of interaction between natives and English traders of the East India Company in the sixteenth century:

> An old engraving now hanging in the museum of Fort St. George in Madras depicts an early landing there of a group of British traders. The square riggers in which they have arrived are anchored far off the sandy beach, and the passengers have been transferred to row boats, two of which are having trouble with the surf. An Indian woman with a baby astride her hip gravely watches the landing. A group of Indian fishermen sit on their own tiny boats made of hollowed logs (like the boats of Madras fishermen still used skillfully in that same surf). From one row boat, several Britishers in waist coats, cut away coats, and high black silk hats were wading to the shore, unhappily lifting their trousers in the vain hope of keeping them dry. A lady in a long dress with ruffles, a feathered hat on her head and her parasol in her hand, is being carried over the waves by two collies, naked except for their loin cloths and the rich brown of their skins. Nothing could more vividly suggest how alien to the land were the newcomers--two cultures meeting in the midst of salt spray. (Lamb, 1975:55)

The Madras fishermen neither represented the great Modhuls nor the vast spectrum of Indian society, but symbolized a small portion of that society which for centuries have not shaken off the cast of its multilayered plurality. The scene signifies the end of an old (Moghul) period, the advent of a new (British) era, but a picture of peculiar contrast.

To encapsulate the seventeenth century, another scenerio provides a view of the interplay of contending forces clamouring for power in India:

> The French, the Arabs, the Dutch, and the Portuguese were also rivals for the golden prizes of Indian trade, and the British merchants, in order to protect their factories and their lives, had been forced to arm themselves and to hire mercenaries. They had in time succeeded in defeating their rivals and in establishing a monopoly of trade, but as

> their interests grew and expanded, and more and yet more factories and warehouses were built, the need for larger forces for their protection grew also; for the times were troublous ones, and India, a medieval medly of small and warring states riddled with corruption, trickery and intrique. The "company of merchants" made treaties with many of these pretty kings, and on behalf of their allies fought with others, while their arms of necessity kept pace with their profits. The Genie of Force had been let out of the bottle and it became impossible to replace it. Instead of reaping a harvest of gold as they had in early years, the Directors of the East India Company found themselves pouring out treasure upon what had become no less than a vast private army, and acquiring, in order to protect their trade, a hugh and ever-lasting empire. (Kaye, 1980:16)

The next scenario from the eighteenth century witnesses the end of the East India Company, as a consequence of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, and the beginning of crown rule--an age of reform, responsibility, and resurgence:

> The mutiny broke out in 1857, shocking the British into full realization of the responsibility of imperial domination in so vast a territory. It ushered in a period of agonizing reassessment, the results of which set the seal on administrative development for a hundred years. Reform that had been maturing for many years with pragmatic bureaucratic thoroughness were suddenly enshrined in law. The Government of India Act, passed in 1958, abolished the proud company and transferred governance of India to the Queen in Parliament. The great Indian legal codes were enacted: the Code of Civil Procedure in 1958, the Indian Penal Code in 1960, and the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1861. Finally a police commission was appointed in 1860 to study exhaustively the police needs of the country and government. The result of the commission's deliberations was the Police Act of 1861. (Bayley, 1969:44-45)

And then a recollection and a reflection of a Civil Servant who belonged to the generation of "Guardians" who ruled and relinquished:

> In the years between 1914 and 1940, India was a problem not yet solved that lay on England's conscience, now that one way or another, rightly or wrongly, it is India's problem not ours, we can begin to look back with detachment. And there are things, which should be set down before they are forgotten, the smell of dust thirstily drinking the first rain, the spicy peppery smell of a grain dealer's shop, the reek of mangoes, marigolds, and lush vegetation when the sun breaks through the clouds in August and the

> earth steams, things too that fade more quickly, such as the sound of men's voices in petition, the look on a man's face when he is found guilty, a peasant's emotion when a wrong has been put right. (Woodruff, 1964:11-12)

The last scene is the latest one. The year is 1980 and the writer, an Indian, a distinguished editor of a well-known English daily:

> Population explosion, deforestation, the party system in trouble, decline of public morality, a bloated and demoralized bureaucracy which is, in addition often corrupt and inefficient, slow economic progress, rising prices, growing unemployment, near-collapse of the education system, almost half the population below the poverty line, the largest number of beggars, the blind and the lepers in the world, among the lowest standards of nutrition and endemic violence. Name the problem and we have it. (Jain, 1980:8)

There is changing India, the eternal India, land of wide contrast, of inherent unity. Historically, the faded glory of Hindus was destroyed, charred and converted by the Muslim invaders and rulers. They brought with them their language, their institutions, and their religion. Twilight of Moghul rule and in-fighting among local principalities brought the ascendency of British traders as sole arbiters of power. British rule ended in 1947, but not the British institutions, not the English language, and not the status and style of those who filled seats of power.

The police current flows unintermittently in-spite of the clear-cut division of pre-independence and post-independence periods of Indian history. Paramountcy of imperial interests patented not only police parameters, but also defined the functional derivations of policing, in pre-independent India. Corps d'elite and kinship among the British rulers, like "Guardians.," mostly informally and sometimes formally, tackled operational dilemmas, but seldom addressed them as they did in England. In India, no need was felt for a Peel, for a

Rowan, or Mayne to reshape the police. Those organizational and operational dilemmas remained in oblivion, so long as, it was ensured that every adversary to British Raj (rule) lay suppressed or was siding with the "Sirkar" (government). Barrack-based, dogmatically disciplined, tunnel-visioned, legally and lethally armed, police, in spite of their recorded repudiations, was never subjected to any well-intentioned scrutiny or was researched for comprehensive reforms. Candid criticisms by administrators such as John Beames or well-documented findings of the Fraser Commission (1902-03) remained relevant to this day. However, the erstwhile accounts of those who served and retired lay romanticized in the memoirs, reminiscences, reflections, biographies, and correspondences. In the post independence period, the theme does not change. National government remained busy and believed in "continuity" rather than in "change." It essentially sermonized, blamed bureaucracy and left organizations to adjust according to the changed context. Again, the dilemmas were neither properly understood nor adequately addressed. The inquiries were either incident-related or blame-personified. The political arena did not permit enlightened discussion. Most of the literature regarding police was either written for police for public consumption and lacked conceptional base and insight. All kinds of suggestions, cliches, and ideal-looking recipes were set afloat which served no purpose. A rare breed of foreign writers such as David Bayley made an earnest attempt to analyze the problem, but perhaps the task was too stupendous for an outside researcher within a limited timeframe. Bayley has suggested that more research was needed. The works of Percival Griffiths, A.S. Gupta, B.N. Mullick, Trilok Nath, P.D.

Sharma, and others are of preliminary professional and historical interest and do not take us very far. The State Police Commissions, long back admitted their inability to measure up to the task and suggested the setting up of a National Police Commission. The National Police Commission was set up in 1977, worked with full sense of responsibility to reorganize India's police as Peel did in England in 1829, but Commission's recommendations were fatefully whittled down by the Central Government without publishing or discussing them. The Commission seems to have lost its pyrrhic victory.

Background of India's Police System

India is a colorful country with a rich culture and a checkered history of foreign invasions. Some invaders conquered, plundered, and left, while few stayed and ruled. It is out of these invasion accounts, diaries of foreign travellers, and court historians that most of the Indian history was resuscitated and written. Traces of foreign culture were either absorbed or rejected, except that of Islam which forcibly converted a large section of Hindus, forming the major minority community in India. The advent of Islam could be traced back as early as the eighth century. The last to leave were the British, but the British system of administration stayed. The administrative superstructure seems to be a three-tiered one--a thin layer of the Hindu system at the bottom, the Muslim system in between, and the British system, forming the major upper crust. To analyze growth and development of the police in India, it can safely be categorized into four periods: (1) Hindu, (2) Muslim, (3) British, and (4) post-independence. The transformation from the Hindu system to the British would amply explain and demonstrate the structure and style of Indian

police, in which missing all along are the core concept of culture, regional and religious reflections, assessment of class and caste conflicts, resolution of internal tensions, relationship of boundaries with ecological context, and finally, identification of constructs based on empirical research and logical understanding.

This thesis will attempt to pose these problems within a different perspective. Long-range impact of imposition and historical modifications will be contrasted by its rationale. Why the Royal Irish Constabulary model remained relevant till now, when it was long discarded at its place of origin? Alignment of various forces supporting and resisting reform is quite crucial to the problem. This dilemma is studied not only in structural terms of organizational framework, but in bureaucratic context and ecological interdependence. The diversity of culture, complexion of population, size and shape of terrain, legacy of yester years, racial, religious, regional, caste, and class conflicts permeate and impinge on the issue, as much as, the complexity of its cadre based hierarchy, constitutional mandate and sociological crisis. My efforts, therefore, are to examine what ails and why.

Remnants of Hindu System:
(Antiquity to Twelfth Century)

Not much is known about ancient India, but on the basis of what has been delineated through "Vedas," "Smritis," "Shastras" (Hindu religious texts) and Kautilya's "Arthshastra" (310 B.C.), it can be said that Hindus had a very elaborate system of law enforcement and dispensation of justice. Like any other system, codification of law was the first step to be followed by the creation of a judiciary.

Works of Hindu law and judicial system are reflections of their times. Mostly the powers flowed from the king or monarch to other functionaries, who ruled or carried the command of law to the length and breadth of their territory. The system had its own democratic or despotic characteristics, but examples of a people's republic were few and far between. This writer will touch only on the law enforcement aspect of the system over which was implemented forcibly an Islamic system of governance.

The contemporary literature including Hindu epics (Ramayana and Mahabharata) give an indication of the system governing crime and punishment. The Hindu system has two aspects: (1) religious and (2) temporal. According to the Hindu religion, the key concepts of a criminal justic system revolve around "Dharma," "Karma," "Paap," and "Punya." Proper observance of "Dharma" and "Karma" is to earn "punya" (religious beneficial act), while a violation, non-observance is sinful and punishable. Punishment is inescapable from spiritual authority, the God. In temporal terms, the king or the ruler was responsible for punishing the wrongdoers.

The righteousness is to live a life according to "Dharma" and it is both a duty and obligatory for everyone. Everyone from king to the common man has his/her own specific "Dharma." The violation of or non-adherence to or even abstinence from doing "Dharma" is "sin" and is punishable, if not by legal authority, by God. Without going into its religious aspect, only the mundane implications are described by leaving the areas of punishment, legal, and judicial mechanics and thus remaining only confined to "policing." Another landmark scripture, after "Vedas," "Ramayana," and "Mahabbarata" (sacred books

of Hindus) is Manu's law. Manu provides the guidelines to enforce law. Much of the light is thrown historically by Kautilya's Arthashastra (310 B.C.). In Arthashastra there is a detailed description of the functions and powers of various functionaries of law enforcement. Perusal of Kautilya's guidelines to "spies" and detectives reads like a modern-day manual (for details, see Sharma, 1977, and Griffiths, 1971). If the system, as a whole, was to be summarized, there emerges three basic aspects: (1) an all-pervading "spy" system for detecting and reporting law violation and unearthing illegal activities. It includes undercover jobs or the operation of a detective agency; (2) uniformed unit for apprehending law violators, maintaining peace, and suppressing turmoil. Perhaps it was done by army units, cavalry contingents, security guards, patrol parties; (3) magistracy or judicial authority for awarding punishment. There were also prisons for those undergoing punishments.

Arthasastra (Manual of Statecraft) written by Kautilya, around 310 B.C. "is a monumental work yielding systematic information about investigation patterns, punishment agencies and vice control devices." According to the Arthasastra, the administrative structure was hierarchical:

> The Chief Executive officer of the State, the Collector General, was responsible not only for the collection of revenue, but also for nearly all other departments of administration. Under him were three Commissioners of Divisions, and under them again were the Nagarikas--in later days known as Kotwals--in charge of cities, while in the rural areas a regular hierarchy also existed.

The name of "Nagarka" (City Chief) has been mentioned as the highest local functionary in a city. Nagarka combines the functions of a judge, revenue collector, army commander, police chief, sheriff,

mayor, or a governor. He had his subordinates who looked after the village system of policing which was peculiarly run by a village chief of a village headman known as a "Gramani" or by a village council known as "Punchayat."

Where there was a fort or seat of the government, the high ranking officers were called "Dandapala," "Durgapala," and "Antapala." These were military officers responsible for various police functions. "Antapala" looked after the internal security of the palace. "Durgapala" supervised the security of the fort, and "Dandapala" was the chief punishing authority for violators. The system stipulated in Kautilya's Arthashastra was practiced at the time of Chandragupta Maurya and thereafter. According to historical records, Chandragupta Maurya "kept his large realm under tight control with the help of a strong standing army, secret police, and the use of torture to extract confessions--in short, by police state methods." Ashoka, grandson of Chandragupta Maurya, introduced the element of kindness in the system after he embraced Buddhism.

The system declined when the Hindu kingdom was split up into small principalities and was at its lowest when Muslim invaders overran these Kingdoms, one after the other. The Hindu period of Indian history comes to an end sometime between 1000 and 1200 A.D. Except Maratha rule, the Hindu system did not totally collapse, but lost its chances of survival or revival due to the continuous domination by foreign powers. At this stage, it is worthwhile to switch over to the Muslim period.

Muslim Period: Historical

The first Muslim invaders of India were Arabs who entered Sind in the eighth century, but they had little permanent influence and of much greater importance were the invasions of Turks, Persians, and Afghans beginning in the eleventh century.

12th Century to 18th Century

When the Muslim Sultans established their rule in India, they tried to enforce the Muhammadan Law imported from Arabia on the Conquered people. Not only that the Muslim rulers were only Conversant with the Islamic Law, but that is they were religiously duty-bound to do so.

> "The Muslim king in an Islamic State is required to rule in accordance with the Quranic Law" because Islamic Law, religion and politics are regarded as inseparable by Muslim theologicans and jurists (Ulema and Faqih) because they have proceeded from the same source: viz, the Prophet himself, and so such they have been mixed up together."

This is a very significant aspect of administrative philosophy.

> The source of law was not in the legislation, but in revelation and therefore the sources were fixed in Islamic Law for all the times to come; only resting on "Quaran," "Hadis," "Qiyas-Analogy" and "Ijam--Universal Consent" is that order and "as the word of the Prophet could not be changed, no Muslim sovereign could change the religious aspect of Islam." (Jain, 1970:12)

It appears that is is not the state that regulates the religion, but it is the religion that rules the state.

> In Islam, the concept of religion emerged first, the state was an afterthought; therefore, according to Islamic law, it is the creed, as defined by the law of God, which circumscribes the sole aim and end of human existence and hence the duty of a Musalman, both as an individual and as a social being, is to fulfill this obligation of the law, and thus help to attain the aims and objects of the creed. (Day, 1970:1)

Furthermore,

> The state is only an instrument to serve the creed in the attainment of its objects or the ideal of Millat of Islam as revealed to it through the medium of Prophet Muhammed. (Day, 1970:1)

The justification of monarchy thus fits in very well under the Islamic order:

> They offered justification for the need for a monarch on the grounds of man's selfish and perverse nature as the chief obstacle in the preservation of order in the society and peace in the country, as a remedy for which God ordained that, from amongst the people, there should be one Hakim-i-Adil to direct the actions of the sons of Adam and the affairs of the world on the right path, and keep them safe and secure! (Day, 1970:2)

"Islam takes a comprehensive view of life and does not separate politics from religion." Qureshi, (1966:22)

The role of an Islamic Commander is well-established:

> The caliph was the highest executive and "the commander of the Faithful," but he was one of the believers. Hence he was as much under the authority of the shar as the other Faithful. He could not alter or overrule the shar; he could only enforce it. His limited authority of adding to the law was valid as the orders of the executive authority for such period as the authority did not discard them; but if they came into conflict with the shar, they were invalid and it was the duty of a muslim to disobey them. He also had a limited authority of choosing one interpretation in preference to another if the jurists happened to differ on any point, because the executive must enforce the law and if there is ambiguity on any issue, it must have the right to decide for itself. The legal position of the caliph thus came to be denied fairly early in the history of Islam. The duties assigned to the caliph by the Muslim jurists can be divided into certain broad categories. He was to defend the frontiers of the (terrorists) of Islam, maintain peace and order, enforce the shar, and thus act as the arbiter in disputes among the people, and take necessary steps to ensure the happiness and prosperity of his people. It is the duty of every Muslim to obey him in all matters which are lawful; in case he transcends the limits of shar, disobedience becomes a duty. (Qureshi, 1966:26)

Sarkar has rightly remarked that "The Muslim State was essentially a military state, and depended for its existence on the

absolute authority of the monarch, who was also its supreme general." There seems to be a problem for Muslim rulers in India from the very beginning of their rule. One is the theocratic nature of the state and second its militaristic generalship. Thirdly, there stands inevitably the concept of Muslim polity or importance of believers in such a state. Fourthly, the existence of non-believers who were in majority and to be ruled.

Qureshi goes as far as Medina to collect the traces of police institution during the advent of Islam and writes that, "The institution of police like so many administrative organs of Muslim politics can be traced to the days of the Prophet." Without disputing Qureshi, we concentrate our discussion on Mughal administration.

To get a complete picture of Mughal administration, it seems to be imperative to understand the hierarchy, powers and duties of some of the key functionaries who used to run the administrative machinery. The chief departments and their heads were:

1. The exchequer and Revenue (under the High Diwan)
2. The Imperial Household (under the Kham-i-saman or High Steward)
3. The military Pay and Accounts Office (under the imperial Bakshi)
4. Cannon Law, both civil and criminal (under the chief Qazi)
5. Religious endowments and charity (under the Chief Sader)
6. Censorship of Public morals (under the Muhtasib)
7. The Artillery (under the Mir Alish or Derogha-i-topkhana)
8. Intelligence and Posts (under the Darogha of Dak Chauki). (Sarkr, 1972:15)

Qureshi provides a background on police in the Muslim era. According to Qureshi, "In the earlier period the police were called 'asas'; but later it seems to be called 'Shurtah'." (Qureshi, 1966:205) Police were "subordinate to the qadi, because its main purpose was to execute the decrees of the qade and to bring criminals before him for trial." (Qureshi, 1966:205) Commenting on the Muslim administration in India, Qureshi observed that "the duties of the head of the police, the Sabib-i-Shurtah were performed by an officer known as Kotwal." (Qureshi, 1966:205) As Qureshi pointed out, perhaps correctly, that Kotwal is a "word of Hindu origin" meaning "keeper of the fort" which was adopted by the Turks. (Qureshi, 1966:205)

There seems to be some differences in the descriptions of Qureshi and other historians, not of fundamental nature, but of varying degrees of interpretation which does not prove to be very material so far as the aspects of administration are concerned. Most of the account on Mughal administration is available in writings and is not a matter of obscure past but some of its aspects were adopted by the British; therefore, accounts could be very well documented and a clear picture was not difficult to see.

Ain-e-Abkari (historical account of Akbar's administration) contains an elaborate description of the functions and responsibilities of Subedar, Faujdars, 'Kotwals,' Daroghas, etc. There are interesting accounts of these functionaries' operations in various chronicles. Apart from these higher authorities, Moguls also maintained an extensive system of espionage, informers and couriers known as 'waquinavis," "Sawanih-Nigars," "Khufia-navis" and "Harkarahs" who disseminated intelligence orally or in writing to

their superiors, namely, Daroghas of the Dak-Chawkis. The Justice was administered according to Mohammedan law. The key police officials were Kotwals and Daroghas under a Faujdar. Kotwal, somehow resembled "Nagarika" of Hindu period and survived in the form of Sub-Inspector, even in British period. (Sharma, 1977)

Muhtasib

Griffiths described the responsibilities of a Muhtasib:

> . . . the official mainly concerned with police administration was the Muhtasib. His duties were complex. He was an Inspector General of Police, a Chief Engineer of Public Works, as well as an Inspector of Morals. In his police capacity he was able to delegate his duties: as he carried out the administration in the province, with the aid of "Faujdars" and "Thanadars." Each "suba" was subdivided into "Sarkars." Faujdar was the head of each "Sarkar." Functions of Faujdar were the same as that of the Subadar but limited to his area of jurisdiction, that is, "Sarkar". "Faujdar" meant "commander of military." The Faujdar district was further subdivided into "thanas," a smaller unit under a "Thanedar." "Thanedars" were appointed by a Faujdar but paid by "Zamindar" a feudal functionary. City administration was run by "kotwal," the highest authority in a city. Kotwal enjoyed all civil, municipal, police, judicial, and revenue powers in the city, though serious criminal cases were tried by a "Qazi" (judge). Kotwal appears to be under a "Muhatsih (Inspector of Morals) for all intents and purposes" (Sharma, 1977; Ghosh, 1973; Griffiths, 1971).

To Sri Ram Sharma, "Muhtsib was both an ecclesiastical and a secular office because as a secular officer he examined weights and measures and saw to it that fair prices prevailed in the market." (Sharma, 1951:52-53) Among other duties, he "recovered debts and traced and handed over to their owners fugitive slaves, secured cleanliness in the cities, and preserved public streets or markets from being built upon, put down music, prevent lighting of lamps on Muslim tombs and shrines on Thursday, forbade the sale of toys, etc." (Sharma, 1951:53).

Subahdar

Subahdar was a provincial governor and also appointed by the king. "The essential duties were to maintain order, to help the smooth and successful collection of revenue, and to execute the royal decrees and regulations sent to him." (Sarkar, 1972:38) One of his main duties was to, "Chastise the refactory zamindars and the leaders of lawless men, so that others of the same class may take warning from it and pay revenue (without trouble)." (Sarkar, 1972:41) He was the chief executive officer, powerful and ruthless, having under his command a vast array of troops and officials of different class and categories. "He was not a judicial official like Qazi, not a revenue official like provincial Diwan and also not to control the flow of secret information through Daroga of Dak Chauki, but he was responsible for the general supervision, maintenance of law and order, economic prosperity and defense of the province, and thus being overall responsible he was allowed a good deal of initiative . . . not withstanding various checks and controlling agencies operating on them." (Day, 1970:74-75)

One of the strict instructions to Subedar was that "he should never release robbers by taking anything from them, because this practice amounts to 'sowing the seed of oppression,' as other rich men, knowing that they can secure impurity by giving bribes, will practice very great tyranny." (Sarkar, 1972:39)

Subahdar was assisted by Faujdars in discharging executive, military, and law and order functions.

Faujdar

"In the maintenance of peace and the discharge of executive functions in general, the subahdar's assistants were the Faujdars." (Sarkar, 1972:43) As the name Faujdar indicates, he was essentially a military commander and was advised to remain in readiness for any prompt action. Apart from his civil and revenue responsibilities, his duties included:

> Destroy the lords of lawless men and rebel chiefs as the [best] means of punishing them. Guard the roads, protect the revenue-payers. Assist and give [armed] support to the agents [gunashtahs] of the Jagirders [in the case of military fiefs] and the kroris [in the case of crownlands] at the time of collecting the revenue. (Sarkar, 1972:44)

He has to "dispense or arrest robber gangs, take cognizance of all violent crimes, and make demonstrations of force to overcome opposition to the revenue authorities or the criminal judge or the censor." (Sarkar, 1972:44)

In fact, Faujdar was an executive head of a subdivision of a province called "Sarkar." This military force was also used as an armed police force and he represented the might of the sovereign to enforce his will on the people and also as the executive functioning of Subardar. (Day, 1970:81)

Faujdars were assisted by Shiqdars who were in charge of a Parganah, a subdivision of a Sarkar. Shiqdar "combined the functions which were performed by the Faujdar and the Kotwal, i,e., in the Parganah he was in charge of law and order." (Day, 1970:88)

Kotwal

Kotwal in reality is a police officer and the word "kotwal" is derived out of the ideal Kowal--as a man who follows the regulations

in his outward actions and fears God inwardly." (Sarkar, 1972:45) Kotwal is "essentially an urban officer, being the Chief of the City Police." (Sarkar, 1972:45) Still in India, the downtown police station is popularly known as Kotwal, though his English nomenclature is the Inspector of Police. He is a supervisor of police functions in the city and its suburbs. His duties and responsibilities were the basic police functions of crime prevention, investigation, prosecution, and Control by following various strategies and adopting measures commonly pursued by urban police departments of today. A description of some of his important duties runs like this:

> On taking over charge, he should satisfy himself by a personal inspection that the horse and foot attached to his post are really up to the fixed strength and have their proper equipment, arms and stores, and that the appurtenances of his office--such as long rods, fetters and lashes,--are really of the number entered in the official list. He should check the number of the persons in the prison and ascertain (their) answers to the charges against them. Then he should report to his official superior the case of those prisoners whom he considers innocent and secure their liberation. In the case of the guilty persons who can pay, he should take orders for exacting suitable fines from penniless prisoners, the kotwal should report and take action as commanded. A statement of the cases of those deserving to be kept in prison should be sent to the officers of Canon Law, and the orders passed by the latter over their signatures should be carried out by the kotwal. In the case of those deserving death, the kotwal should, through proper officers, freely state their cases to the judge (in writing) on the day of trial, receive the qazi's signed sentence of death, and execute the sentence.
>
> Summoning the watchmen and sweepers, he should take bonds from them that they would daily report to him the occurrences of every mahalla (word of the city) without suppression or exaggeration. He should enlist a footman (piada) singly from each ward and post him there as a spy to report all news, so that he may compare the reports from these two sources and thus know the truth and do the needful in the case.
>
> Do justice that the people may liken you to a qazi in the power of arriving at the truth of a case. On the public streets of the cities, post careful men to act as watchmen from sunset to 9 p.m. and from 9 p.m. to dawn, to scrutinize

> the way-farers and arrest those whom they consider to be thieves and evil-doers, and bring them to you.
>
> At places of sale and purchase, at places of entertainment (Shadi) where spectators assemble, keep watchmen to seize the pickpockets and snatchers-up of things and bring them to you for punishment. (Sarkar, 1972: 45-46)

The most interesting part was that "there was a platform (Chabutra) in front of the kotwal's office and bordering the public road, where malefactors of their severed heads were often exhibited. (Sarkar, 1972:47)

This writer still recalls that the kotwals of British days and even thereafter meticulously observed a similar police pattern. The legal written police work underwent a change and so the rights and privileges of the accused persons but illegal police practices remained almost the same for Kotwali where transition of rulers meant little. Of course, there was an overall change in platform (Chabutra) functions but it contained to be a place for torture even during earlier days of British rule. It changed considerably thereafter. The platform became a place to display police power where kotwal or higher ranking officers could brief the uniformed assemblage ready for duties. During the quieter days, a moody kotwal would generally stroll there or regally relax in an armchair by accepting salutations from those who pass that way and attracted his attention as recognition of his august authority. The writer was fascinated by these displays of aura and authority and reestablishment of an age-old assertion as if saying "I am in charge here" as kings used to be in Mughal days of glory. Mughals were replaced by the new police Mughals during the British days of high imperialism. Most of the police glory as a public display has since disappeared but is replaced by subtle sense authority and seething corruption.

According to two writers Kotwal also wielded magisterial powers and his duties were miscellaneous:

> The kotwal of the Sarkar towns also acted as a Senior Criminal Magistrate over the Shigdar of a paragneh and if his headquarter town happened to be a post, he also acted as customs officer and a magistrate. (Day, 1970:87)

This shows that the kotwal wielded an independent authority and in some cases might be under a Subedar at the provincial capitals but may not be in case of the metropolis. The colorful office of the kotwal was obviously authoritarian in nature and being located in an urban setting was very important from the administrative point of view. Therefore, kotwals were bound to become legendary figures if they happen to stay for a considerable length of time. The writer remembers that even in the fifties and sixties, names of some well-known kotwals of bygone days were referred to during police customary conversation between officers of older generations and the new breed of officers. The practice is however disappearing as India is catching up fast with Westernization and much of the old-fashioned tales of history are getting out of fashion. Currently they talk more about videos, mod fashions, parties, movies and mob-culture during the relaxing hours of routine duties. The usefulness of kotwal's office did not, surprisingly, minimize with the passage of time, but became more and more pivotal, not for the reason that cities grew, but situational centrality of the downtown, the hub of city's life and its criticality of clashing interests of tradition and modernity.

Thanahdar or Thanedar

These were the "men in command of the outposts or smaller areas within a Faujdari and were appointed by the Faujdar." (Sarkar,

1972:44) A thanahder was the last managerial link in the chain of command of the executive offices who were responsible for maintaining law and order and control crime. Thanedars were "in charge of police units stationed at various places for guarding communications and maintaining peace." (Qureshi, 1966:239) These officers were part of the rural system of administration and had large geographical areas under their charge which they could hardly look after. "However, such units were like small islands in the midst of a vast countryside studded with villages and hamlets. Quite often the terrain was difficult or covered with deep forest, making it easy for robbers to ply their trade. In such areas the villagers themselves were not averse to waylaying travellers or banding themselves together to terrorize the countryside." (Qureshi, 1966:239) The duties of Thanedars seemed to be similar to those of Faujdars, except in a limited geographical area. Faujdars were instructed to supervise thanedars very closely as they were accustomed to misuse their powers.

The nomenclature Thanahder and thana survived not only during successive Mughal regimes, but also during the British rule. Even today a police station is designated in local vernacular as "thana" in whole of north India while a sub-inspector of police is also called a "Thanedar" or "Daroga." The institution has defied ups and downs of history.

Intelligence-cum-Communication System

"The agency by which the central government learned the news of the country consisted of (1) the Waqai-navis, (2) the sawanih-nigar, (3) the Khufianavis--all three of whom sent written reports--and (4) the Harkarah, literally meaning a courier of news, but really a spy,

who generally brought oral news, and at times also sent newsletters." (Sarkar, 1972:47) The difference between waqui-navis and Sawanih-nigar, as pointed out by Sarkar, was that "waqui-nabis was the more regular and public reporter while Sawanih-nigar "was the nature of a secret reporter on important cases only." (1972:48) They were employed at different places and were a kind of check against each other. The "khufianavis were employed to reside secretly in the subah." (Sarker, 1972:48) An illustrative arrangement of intelligence network has been described by Sarkar based on the records:

> The public intelligencer of a province (i.e., the waqui-navis) appointed agents in most of the small parganahs to report to him the occurrences of those places, out of which he selected what was fit for the Emperor's ears and incorporated it in the provincial news-letter. In the offices of the Subahdar, the diwan, the faujdar of the environs of the provincial capital, the court of justice, the kotwal's chabutra, he stationed his clerks, who brought to him every evening a record of what had occurred there during the day. In many of the important paraganahs, separate reporters were posted directly from the imperial Court, to send to the provincial diwan siaha (ledgers or receipts) of the escheated jagirs of mansabdars who were dead, absconding or absent (Mirat, Sup. 174-175).
>
> The waqui-navis attended when the provincial viceroy held public court, and he recorded the ocurrences then and there. The contents of the newsletter drafted by this reporter were communicated to the subahdar or, in the case of a field-army, to the general in command, before being dispatched to the Emperor. The sawanihnigar did not do so.
>
> In the Manual, the waqui-navis is charged to send his reports of occurrences once every week, and the sawanih-nigar eight times in a month. The language implies that the latter officer reported on the whole subah, while the former reported about a particular locality only.
>
> In the case of many of the provinces and all the minor armies, the posts of bakhshi and waquianvis were combined in the same person.
>
> The khufia-navis or "secret writer" was a most confidential agent. He reported secretly on events without any communication with the local authorities, who often did not even know his name. All people were in mortal dread of

> these secret intelligencers, and their office is, I understand, still maintained in some of our feudatory states (Alamgir-namah, 1081).
>
> The harkarahs posted in a province have to report the news of all sides and occurrences to the governor of the subah, and to send letters closed in envelopes for being dispatched to the Imperial Court with the provincial post. The harkarah also keeps his agents in the offices of the nazim and in other places, just like the waqai-nigar and sawanih-navis, and all these three men are called alike akhbar-navis (Mirat, O.P.L. MS. 691b; Sup. 175 differs).
>
> The news-letters were sent to an officer of the Court named the Darogha of Dak Chauki, i.e., Superintendent of Posts and Intelligence who handed them unopened to the wazir for submission to the Emperor. These four classes of public intelligencers acted under the orders of this Darogha who was their official superior and protector. Sometimes an irate governor would publicly insult or beat the local news-writer for a report against himself, and then the Darogha would take up the cause of his subordinate and get the offending governor punished. (Sarkar, 1972:48-49)

Rural Policing

Muslim rulers were not interested in policing rural areas. They would suppress any revolt and maintain internal order, but were more oriented toward urban life. They brought new life and culture to the cities:

> . . .no doubt, undertook to defend the country from foreign invasion and internal revolt, and to protect life and property in the cities by its own agents; but the policing of the vast rural areas was left to the locality; it was done by the local Chaukidars who were Servants of the Village Community and maintained by the Village themselves out of the village land or by a share of the crops, and who were not considered as officers paid and supervised by the state. (Sarkar, 1972:8)

The dilemma further pointed out by Sarkar was that "instead of the Mughal Government undertaking responsibility for rural peace and security, it made the villagers responsible for the safety of their own property and that of travellers in the neighboring roads." (Sarkar, 1972:8). The villagers were, in fact, left to the mercy of

marauders, plunderers, and organized gang of robbers. The unarmed villagers were too helpless against any such organized force and were exposed to torture both from legal forces of the State and from the hands of the outlaws.

Villages in India remained as desolate and poor as ever. For villagers it did not matter which government came and which was gone. Their lot did not change. To them all the governments were cruel, exploitative, and extortionists. No wonder villagers remained so cynical, resigned, and insensitive. Both man-made administration and God-made nature were unpredictable for them and they In India never understood these vagaries of the system. It was only during the later days of British administration that things started changing.

Administrative Legacy of Mughal Empire

In India a visible or invisible continuation of administrative system survives, somehow:

> No wonder then that Mughal administrative institutions and practices lingered on and some still linger on in howsoever mutilated a form. These institutions were not all of Mughal origin; many like the village Patwari and Kulkarni (Muqaddam) came from the hoary past . . . . Thus when we talk of the administrative legacy of the Mughals, we are thinking not alone of what the Mughals built nor of what they allowed to stand, but also what had continued to persist throughout the ages. (Sharma, 1951:274)

An important contribution of Mughals is their strong central administrative system and "an all India political authority and with it a unity and a single loyalty." (Sharma, 1951:274)

We again do not go in detail of financial, revenue, civil, political, and religious machinery of the administration, but would only focus on police and other administrative relevance of the system.

The British system borrowed a lot from the Mughals but tempered it into their own. It did not altogether lose its identity. The Mughal features still stand discernible.

> The police in India was long modelled after the Mughal fashion. The kotwal was long a terror to the evil doers and sometimes to the innocents as well. The methods of detection of crime continued to be based on the principle that confession, however obtained, is the best solvent of all troubles. Some of the records maintained can trace their origins to the instructions issued by the Mughal emperors. (Sharma, 1951:280)

Not only this "all the twenty Indian Subahs of the Mughal empire were governed by means of exactly the same administrative machinery with exactly the same procedure and official titles." (Sarkar, 1972:161) Moreover, the significant features could be recounted as:

a. Almost all the terms concerning the court's nomenclatures are the same as those of the Mughal period.

b. Judicial district administration as well as provincial and divisional administration remains almost the same.

c. Supreme Court and High Court possess the same hierarchy as was available during the British days and inherit the powers of "Sadr Diwani Adalat." (Jain, 1970:142-143)

It is often said that the British did not even change the boundaries of the geographical administrative divisions fixed by the Mughals.

In police terminology, Darogha, Kotwal, Sipahi, Dewan remained unchanged. Persian continued to be the court language along with English during the time of the British. The court etiquette, form, and formalities of procedure, customs, practices, rituals, and ranks remained mostly Mughal and adapted to overall British hierarchy. No wonder that the administrative transition was smooth and continuous. The writer remembers that till late fifties and early sixties, most of the police and courtwork at lower levels was done mostly in Vernacular with the same style and under similar structure which was under

Mughals. Most of the police during Mughal and then under the British were predominantly Muslim, at the subordinate level. The Communal complexion and introduction of martial races into police was an afterthought of the British administration in the beginning of the nineteenth century when they made "Divide and Rule" as an unwritten, but well understood, policy of the British imperialism in India.

British Period: (1707-1947)

Trade rivalry with Portuguese, Dutch, French, and Spanish brought the British to India and South-East Asia in and around the 16th century. "Five shillings increase in the price of a pound of pepper by the Dutch privateers" (Collins and Lapierre, 1975) triggered the issue, and "the time came and on the last day of the sixteenth century, the Queen gave the company their charter." (Woodruff, 1964:20) Hawkins, who was part of the third voyage, reached India in 1608 and the "factory was the first object of Hawkins diplomacy, already it was clear that the first of the company's servants in India must be a diplomat before he could be a trader." (Woodruff, 1966:23) Hawkins' story makes an interesting reading, who as resident ambassador was made a commander of four hundred in the court of Moghul Emperor Jehangir (1569-1627), married an Armenian Christian girl, rose and fell from the grace of the king. Another attempt to get signed a trade treaty with the Moghul king was made by King James' Ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe in 1615. Instead of getting a trade treaty, he had to be satisfied with the permission to trade in India. Warehouses, known as factories, were set up in "Port Cities" of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. The future that lay ahead was formidable:

> But what even fierce little battles they had to fight with the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf or at Surat, what even intrigues of their rivals they had to combat, the English had also to make their way with the Indian powers, and the servants of the company had to learn something of India . . . they began to administer and rule small numbers of Indians. Not because they like it or chose it, but because it was the only thing to do at the moment, they found themselves settling disputes, sometimes urging a peaceful settlement. (Woodruff, 1964:49)

Administration was an adjunt to the trade till the company found itself in the shoes of the Moghals:

> It was by no accident that later in most of India the English district officers were to be called collectors, nor was it entirely due to the company's commercial outlook. The title and the outlook it indicated came from Moghals. To collect the revenue was the first duty of the Moghul official; to keep order and distribute justice were secondary functions to be executed with just sufficient vigour to maintain prestige and prevent rebellion . . . . When there was no regular police system, anyone who employed servants or labour was still more certain to find himself an administrator in embryo. (Woodruff, 1964:51-52)

Thereafter, the important things that happened in those early days were setting of factories, collection of revenue and administration of justice:

> In 1690, the Marathas sold the English as much land as would fall within random shot of a cannon fired from a cuddlore, the largest cannon in the Presidency was fetched at once and Fort St. David founded. And in 1698 the Moghul, scared by an insurrection in Bengal, gave the English leave to fortify Calentta and granted them in three villages the right to collect the kings share of the produce and to administer justice. (Woodruff, 1969:78)

Robert Clives' victory at Arcot (capital of Carnatic in South India) in 1751, and at Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764) changed the course of India's history. In 1765, Clive was appointed Revenue Minister by the King for Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, and that was the beginning of the story of British ascendency to power, of expansionism, of consolidation, and centralization of administration,

year after year. There was a Secretary of State in England responsible to British Parliament. In India the top executive was called the Viceroy and Governor General. He was answerable to the Secretary of State. The British India was divided into states, each under a governor who combined the executive and judicial and legislative powers. The states were divided into commissioneries, each under a commissioner, but the important unit was the district--a part of the commissionary. It was headed by a District Magistrate, also called a Collector or a Deputy Commissioner. He was the executive head with judicial revenue and magisterial powers. The district police chief known as the Superintendent of Police was placed under him for administrative purposes. The districts were further subdivided into divisions called "Parganas," each under a subdivisional officer but from a police point of view it was under a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Each subdivision had police stations, each under the charge of the sub-Inspector popularly known as a "Thanedar," "Daroga," or "Kotwal." There were civil courts to adjudicate civil law and criminal courts to decide on the criminal cases. It was overall a British system.

The growth of police administration during the British period. -- "The story of the colonial police begins in Ireland." (Tobias, 1977:242) The colonial model is based on the Royal Irish Constabulary and not on Metropolitan Police though the latter existed and was well known to the colonial administrators. "The Irish Constabulary originated in 1836, it received its prefix 'Royal' in 1867 and existed till 1922." (Tobias, 1977, p. 249)

Before police in India adopted RIC model, it went under a period of experimentation (for details, see Griffiths). Sir Charles Jeffries found three steps in the development of the Colonial Police, the first being "the phase of improvisation," in which the original policing systems of the country were adapted and amended to suit the conditions of the nineteenth century, the second of "semi-military style introduced in the later part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century," the third was that of the "conversion into civil police forces on the lines familiar in Great Britain. (Tobias, 1977:249)

The Royal Irish Contabulary (RIC) "created in 1814, has been emulated throughout the British Commonwealth....," and was "designed to maintain order in a Colony," and "to maintain the State's order in an ethnically divided polity." (Enloe, 1980:102) The chief characteristics of the RIC was its central control, rank-order-stratification, with top officered by governing elite, and lowest and middle ranks, with a carefully graded native mix. This could be well illustrated with what was done in Ireland while constituting the RIC:

> The Royal Irish Constabulary was multi-ethnic in its ranks, including both Catholics and Protestants. But its senior posts were reserved for Protestants, and its authority and policy emanated from Protestant officials in Dublin and the Home Office in London. There was little promotion out of the ranks. The class coloration of the RIC officer corps was largely a consequence of its having to be, in Ireland's colonial setting, acceptable to the Irish landlords, most of whom were Protestants. Although the RIC exited mainly to preserve Protestant local hegemony and British colonial dominance, Catholic Irishmen in the ranks were not considered dangerous, just as they were not in the British army. There was an English ethno-sterotypic presumption that the ordinary Irish peasant was not a threat so long as he was kept out of the clutches of Irish clerics and 'demagogues,' and so long as he was officered by Englishmen or, the next best substitute, Anglo-Irishmen.

> The RIC earned an international reputation as an effective peace-keeping force. But during the Irish revolution of 1919-21, the RIC proved unable to cope with a full-scale popular rebellion. Prior to the revolution, RIC enlistments had fallen off as Irish police complained of poor pay compared to English police. The historian A.J.P. Taylor notes that, during the revolution, the RIC clustered in fortified barracks which isolated them. The army troops that were stationed in Ireland at the time were there on training tours and could not conduct a military campaign. The army units were also under authority separate from the RIC. As the RIC became increasingly frustrated, many police resorted to retaliatory actions, which only further alienated the citizenry and earned contempt from the military. (Enloe, 1980:105)

According to Napier's system which "was based on two principles - the police must be completely separated from the military, and they must be an entirely independent body there to assist the collectors in discharging their responsibility for law and order, but under their own officers." (Griffiths, 1971:69) Moreover the city and rural police had different classifications:

> Napier's system was based on two principles - the police must be completely separated from the military, and they must be an entirely independent body there to assist the collectors in discharging their responsibility for law and order, but under their own officers. The principle was thus laid down which was to be followed throughout India in due course.
>
> In each district the police consisted of three classes: mounted (regular or irregular) police, rural police and city police. The mounted police were the best paid and of superior status. Their duties were partly protective - providing guards and patrols - and partly detective. The rural police, which consisted only of infantry, were confined to providing guards for treasuries, gaols or headquarters, escorts for prisoners, and support for other branches where necessary. The city police were of two classes - nujjeebs who acted as watchmen, guards and patrols, and trackers 'selected from amongst the best puggies or trackers in Sind . . . among the most valuable and important members of the police force.' Although attached to the city police the trackers were, in fact, distributed throughout the province, one or more at each large thana. A little later it was found necessary to improve their status and prospects by enlisting them in the mounted police. All the police of the province were under

> the command of a Captain of Police, directly responsible to the Chief Commissioner, and under him in each district were a European Lieutenant of Police and an Adjutant, both Army officers. (Grittiths, 1971:69)

The first stage of improvisation was for finding an organizational solution:

> The first hundred year period was a time of groping for the most efficient solutions in the institutional problems of ruling an expanding colonial empire. As far as police were concerned, it was a time of experimentation in which the police sought the solution to two problems. First . . . what use should the ruling power make of the traditional rural police? Second, how should the imperial administration be organized with respect to its difficult and most important functional responsibilities, namely law and order and revenue collection? Neither of these problems was clearly perceived nor consistently articulared at the time, but gradually, by a process of trial and error, solutions to both were found. (Bayley, 1969:40-41)

The governor was the top executive; later it was Governor-General and then Viceroy of India. British did not tamper much with the hierarchy, but they did apply their own laws and established their own system.

At district level, the experiments in administration went on. Initially, powers were placed in the office of Judge, Magistrate, Collector, and a Registrar. At the time of Cornwallis, under the Act of 1793, the district administration judge dominated:

> The Judge, it will be noticed, is also the Magistrate, it is he who is district officer and head of the district and not the collector. Judge, Magistrate and Collector, now stand side by side, and it is the Judge-Magistrate who is senior. (Woodruff, 1964:166)

The change occurred in 1831 when it became Collector centered:

> . . . it was the collector who was also the Magistrate and who became the executive head of the district . . . . In his civil capacity, the judge administered Hindu or Mohammedan law, but he was the decision, both to fact and law . . . . (Woodruff, 1964:166)

The criminal law was administered through criminal courts. Only those offenses carrying a punishment up to six months could be decided by the District Magistrate, as he was entrusted with the powers exercised by Magistrate first class. There was appeal to this in the higher courts.

Cornwallis introduced the Darogha system and made village watchmen responsible to Darogha. A Darogha was in charge of a Thana, a part of the district, and was answerable to the Judge as well as to the District Magistrate to whom they must deliver a criminal within twenty-four hours of arrest. They did not have trained constables.

This was the period when the Metropolitan Police System was emerging in London and Irish Constabulary was yet to emerge. In all the three Presidency areas (Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras) the experiments in administration continued. Crime control was not satisfactory in spite of various reforms brought by Hastings, Cornwallis, and Lord William Bentinck. There was a long correspondence between the Court of Directors in England and the Governors of India regarding the increase in crime, setting, and toning up district administration.

It was Sir Charles Napier, whose conquest of Sind provided him an opportunity to try the Irish Constabulary model in India. Napier put the whole province of Sind under a captain of police, who was responsible to the chief commissioner (Head of the Province). In each district, he placed European lieutenants to look after the police force. The efficiency of the Sind police system caught the attention of other provinces. It was first adopted in Bombay and then in Punjab.

In 1843, Sir Charles Napier annexed Sind and became its first governor and told Lord Ellenborough that he would form his police, the pattern of which he was aware of to suit those conditions:

> Of Hourse and Foot, the latter being by far the most numerous. They should be stationed in small bodies in various parts of the country having reference to the collection of revenue. A European officer to be placed at the head of the establishment and denominated the captain of police. To him three lieutenants of police at Hyderebad, Kurrachee, and Sukkur should be subordinates. The other officers should be natives. This force should be charged with preserving the internal peace of the country and assisting the District Collectors in getting the revenue. These policemen, instead of being kept separate from the people (as I have proposed the Horse should be) would mix among them as much as they please. I would arm the Horse police with carbines and swords, and the Foot police with Carbines and bayonets. My motive of keeping the Scinde Horse distinct from the people and in large bodies are that they will be more faithful, more disciplined, and hold the peasantry more in awe of them, seeing them rarely. On the other hand, the police, by mixing with the people would acquire great knowledge, both of what was going on and of the country, which would make them specially useful in collecting the revenue, detecting conspiracies and as guides in case of war. In cases of disturbance they could rely on the Scinde Horse. (Lambrick, 1952:184)

This was the model of the Irish Constabulary, which provided the blueprint, later on, for creating armed and civil police. Its main features with modifications were incorporated in the Police Act V of 1861.

Transition 1857-1947--Prolonged continuance of Muslim and British rule for a long time left little traces of indigenous administrative systems. There is a strange irony in the situation of policing in rural India:

> Indian policy history can be seen then as the expansion and contraction of an imperial power always set upon an impermeable stratum of village institutions. Structures came and went, but there was no qualitative evolution from one imperial high point to another. (Bayley, 1969:39)

Too much deformation and too many transplantations took a heavy toll of the indigenous institutions which lay buried somewhere beneath the British set of systems. The curious fact of history is that Indians neither abolished nor created any new system of administration but only accepted, amended, and adapted the legacies to work them out. The concept of "continuity" has taken precedence over "change." Another interesting feature is that modern India does not begin from 1947 (year of India's independence) but with the advent of the British empire in India. It seems unbelievably surprising today that the English consciously modelled their administration system in India in seventeenth century (Roberts, 1952:20). The British molded the system based on their experiences:

> . . . The civil servants of the honorable East India Company, learning among their bolts of gingham and taffeta, that they must be diplomats, administrators and soldiers; thrown suddenly into positions where the opportunities for wealth and power were such as have been open to no man since the Roman Emperors . . . . (Woodruff, 1964:13)

In spite of their failings and frailities, Woodruff gave Platonic elevation to British civil servants, admitting that "despotism it was all the same, as any system must be in which people are given what is good for them instead of what they want." (Woodruff, 1969:17) Here is an account of the Platonic guardians by the same writer: "The rulers of India were men, quick with fleshy desire, lust of power, and the miraculous diversity of man, humorous, solemn and unpredictable, adventurous, soaked in routine, timid, and bold. (Woodruff, 1969:14) And it is not surprising that they were not always loved nor that in the end their "words outgrew their tutelage." (Woodruff, 1964:16) These young men from British public schools accepted the services at an early age for a variety of reasons. J. S. Mill noted, "India was a

vast system of outdoor relief for Britain's class." (Collins and Lapierre, 1975:24)

However, the uprising of 1857 against the British brought the administration altogether to a new focus. Company rule came to an end and the British Crown assumed direct responsibility. A Police Commission was appointed in 1869. On the basis of the Commission's report, a Bill was moved in British Parliament and Police Act V came into existence in 1961. Simultaneously, the code of criminal procedure was put into effect. The Police Act of 1861 laid down an elaborate structure of police organization which remains in force till today in India. In every province the police was headed by an Inspector-General who was assisted by a Deputy Inspector-General. The district police was headed by Superintendent of Police assisted by Assistant and Deputy Superintendents of Police. The District Superintendent of Police was subordinate to Deputy Inspector General of Police. He was also put under the general control of the District Magistrate. Police stations or Thanas were run by Inspector and Sub-Inspectors who were locally called Daroghas or Thanedars. There were trained Constables and Head Constables under the Sub-Inspectors. Watchmen continued to be responsible to the Darogha, the officer in charge of a police station.

The Police Act V of 1861 introduced a uniform system of police in British India. It brought organizational changes in police, but failed to change its nature and mode of functioning:

> The police force was to be a provincial army, subject to the civil government of the province, of course, but recruited and trained much as soldiers. To each district there was to be a superintendent of police, with a hierarchy of deputy superintendents and inspectors. The station house officer, the darogha, did not disappear, he became a

> sub-Inspector subject to regular training and frequent inspection. (Woodruff, 1964:52)

"In 1861, the District Magistrate handed over to the Superintendent of Police some of his old functions. But he remained responsible for everything that happened in his district and yet acquired a colleague not a subordinate." (Woodruff, 1969:53)

The comments by John Beames, who was district officer in Bihar when the new police system was introduced, were highly caustic (see Woodruff, 1964:53). By the end of the century there were so many complaints against the police corruption that Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, appointed a commission under Andrew Fraser in 1902, who submitted a detailed report in 1903, which was made public in 1905. The report was vehementaly critical:

> . . .police force is far from efficient, it is defective in training and organization, it is inadequately supervised, it is generally regarded as corrupt and oppressive, and it has utterly failed to secure the confidence and cordial cooperation of the people. (Gupta, 1979:201)

The commission not only exposed the reprehensible police practices, but also condemned the incompetence of superintendents of police:

> . . .they are often not well educated or intelligent men, that their training is defective, that their knowledge of the vernacular is not such as to enable them to have free intercourse with the people and to become acquainted with their feelings and circumstances, that they are too much in the hands of their subordinates, that they are not accessible or even courteous to natives, that their views are too narrow and their sense of responsibility too weak to allow them to pay due regard to complaints against their subordinates or structures on their work or to take due notice of misconduct, that they are too burdened with clerical work and too little helped by qualified assistants to be able to exercise effective supervision and control over the police. (Gupta, 1979:205)

The Indian Police Commission of 1902-03 is a significant landmark in police history. The Commission brought some organizational

changes--envisaging establishment of a criminal investigation department, railway police, enhancement of pay and the provision of armed reserve force at district headquarters.

There have been no significant changes in the police cadre or its operational activities thereafter. The same system was left by the British when India became independent. It was the same system during the two world wars. It was the same system that faced the independent movement against the British and controlled the civil and communal disorders. It is now facing the same tension and troubles at a much larger scale in a much complicated, regional, ethnic, and political milieu. The government, perhaps remained busy in more important events. Partition of Bengal (one of the provinces) in 1907 led to a wide-scale dissatisfaction and agitation. In 1914, World War I started. Terrorist activities erupted and remained till the late twenties. In the twenties, M. K. Gandhi launched the Civil Disobedience Movement. Then came World War II and British rule ended in 1947. In fact, the British were not interested in bringing around a new system, but wanted to maintain a status quo. Moreover, "the police was not the service in which the British took much pride. The subordinate throughout British rule were almost universally regarded as corrupt and oppressive. The British officers were recruited at a younger age than the I.C.S. and had no university education." (Seymonds, 1966:74) The British did not adopt the Metropolitan Police model for India, but were only satisfied by opening some of the "refresher courses" for overseas officers at its training school, Peel House. (See Tobias, p. 255)

In India police public relations were never cordial. The nationalist movement in India heightened the tension between the people and the police: "The divorce between public and police was accentuated as the nationalist agitators of the 1920s gathered way and the period between 1937 and 1947 was a stretching, testing time for the service." (Tinker, 1962:162)

British rule came to an abrupt close in 1947 and again police did not have a chance even to take stock of the situation:

> Independence brought revolutionary changes in the political structure of government, it brought none of any consequence to the structure of police administration. The three structural characteristics distinguishing the contemporary police system--control by state government, horizontal stratification functional specialization between armed and unarmed police--had been developed before independence. Independence required of the police only that they accommodate themselves to a new political context; it affected the manner in which they were held accountable and not the way they were organized to accomplish police purposes. (Bayley, 1969:51)

And thus started the era of policing in independent India.

Post-independent period (1947 till present).--The post-independence era starts after 1947. The constitution of India came into operation on January 26, 1950. (The constitutional development and its functioning are dealt with in another chapter of this dissertation.) There have been additions in police organization at a national level, after the independence, but no change in its structure or work patterns. The Central Bureau of Investigation was created in 1963, the Central Reserve Police in 1947, Border Security Force in 1965, and the Central Industrial Security Force in 1964. Except CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation) others are para-military, but police organizations. Again, except CBI, others have no investigative, or

detective functions and therefore no public service orientation. They help local police units in emergency situations and are pressed into service for arrangement and other functions which cannot solely be handled by civil police. Later-day achievement in some of the states was that the Office of Superintendent of Police was brought at par with the District Magistrate and Police Commission system was embraced by the bigger cities. More scientific and technological services were put at the disposal of police and training institutions were upgraded. Bayley's initial reaction about the Indian police was that "what is particularly striking about contemporary police structure is its permanence. Its fundamental principles of organization have remained fixed for over a century." (Bayley, 1969:57)

Constitutional basis.--The Constitution of India stipulates that:

> For all legal and constitutional purposes, the police continue to be a state subject and all policies, plans, and procedures pertaining to the administration of security, crime, and order fall within the jurisdiction of state governments, subject to certain safeguards and uniformities provided in the union and concurrent lists. (Sherina, 1977:196)

The Constitution of India laid down the broad principles of policy and has not spelled out the administrative or other organizational details. According to the Indian Constitution "police" is a state subject and the state government has complete control over the state police. The state legislature has no power to make organizational changes in police. All India service is the exclusive preserve of Central Government. Police budgets are a state responsibility. Central government aids the State for modernization or to increase training facilities, but that is a discretion rather than an obligation. Indian Constitution is said to be federal in form

and unitary in spirit; the same can be said about the Indian police. The centralized control of all India service personnel known as IPS (Indian Police Service) who occupy managerial positions constitute a powerful tool in the hands of the central government, to manipulate the state police system, through indirect or direct means. It mostly depends on center-state relationship and on how powerful the central government is. The Constitution has given such wide power to the Central Government that it can at any time transform the federation into a strong union. This has happened at times when a state legislature is dissolved, or a national emergency is promulgated. It has become more a matter of mechanics and manipulation, rather than a matter of constitutional politics. Political propriety is not a problem of principle, but a policy to serve party and personal objectives.

The constitutional provisions permit:

1. The Union government to condition the framework and working of the police administration in the states;

2. The Union government to influence policy formulations and their implementation as evolved by police administration in the states;

3. The Union government to interfere in the functional operations undertaken by the state police forces;

4. The Union government (if it so desires) to gradually nibble the concept of state autonomy in areas that vitally relate to police tasks; and

5. The Union government to override and take over the state police administration as a last resort during emergencies. (Sharma, 1977:199)

The Police Act of 1861 which is still in operation lays down the pattern of police organization throughout India both structurally and operationally. It governs most of the internal and external aspects

of organizational behavior of policing. The other substantive Acts, Central Acts, which state government has no power to legislate, but which govern the legal procedures, are the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Indian Evidence Act. Apart from these there are other Central Acts which extend or restrict or regulate the police powers in the States. In case of conflict between state and central legislation, it is the Central Act which would prevail. Realistically, except administrative control, there is very little that a state government can do to resist an interfering powerful center. The constitutional safeguards provided to all India services is another point of view. Their transfer from the state to center provides them an escape route not only to avoid state government control, but also to serve as an agent of the Center. The anomaly of police administration in State and Center relationship is hardly obvious; much is hidden beneath the surface. Police could be a unifying force, as well as a disrupting factor, depending on the political motives of those who rule.

At the institutional level, the police have constitutional limitations and responsibilities. It cannot violate the fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution of India. Its power of arrest are limited. It has to observe certain formalities. It has to produce an arrested person before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. It has to observe decency and religious moralities in accordance with the law.

Neither the administrative bureaucracy nor the police were raised or trained to serve in a democratic secular set up, but the transition was, however, smooth for the services and their continuity was never

disrupted. Services, especially police, did not suffer the pains and pangs of country's partition which were suffered by millions of people. Privileges and prosperity, descended on the politicians, the neo-rich enterpreneurs and the corrupt few.

The administrative style and the bureaucratic functioning of the new Indian Republic was a mere "carry over" from the past, because once the machinery was adopted as a Constitutional mandate, the rest flowed automatically through it, without any change or commitment. The nature and relationship of bureaucratic machine with other components of India's polity is the subject of the next chapter. The ecological affects of environment, the bureaucratic context, and organizational nexus will be fully explained. How the police mandate was accepted and adopted in India and how it worked with uniqueness, form the subject matter of the next chapter. Therefore, the discussion moves on to the second chapter.

Summary

In this chapter, growth and development of police in India has been depicted. Historically, police in ancient Hindu India was prevalent as a sort of administrative spy system which was to be enforced by state militia or an armed force commanded by the ruling satrap. In fact, it seems that Hindus were more apprehensive of committing social or temporal violations because of unavoidable punishment, invariably sustained due to moral, spiritual, and religious beliefs. Life of a Hindu was ritually regulated and socially disciplined and was based on an archaic cultural system. Successive waves of foreign invasions and wanton destruction by Muslim crusaders left little traces of Hindu administrative system. During

Muslim rule, they institutionalized their own criminal justice system and introduced their own language. British, the last to come, did the same by supplanting the Western system by replacing existing Muslim institutions and language by their own. Though the British kept the police system, adjusted to the needs of the Empire, but to cope with the administrative local challenges, they shaped police in India on Irish Constabulary model.

The Police Act of 1861 laid down the structure and style of police in India. Police of today continued to be based on the Police Act of 1861 with timely modifications, alterations, and expansions but with no substantial change. Structural, functional, and legal changes were rarely made, but administrative and operational efficiency of police was maintained by making suitable adjustments organizationally.

CHAPTER II

OVERVIEW

Complexity of Indian culture reminds me of Ganges waters with its amorphous glacial origin at a fading distance, passing through rough topography and dark periods, with rises and falls, large and small, broadening itself by absorption, taking historic turns at odd points, with purity, pollution and sanctity involved, maintaining a constant flow towards the vastness of the sea. Its fundamentals are difficult to define and esoteric for details, talking to eternity over the last remains of the dead submerged in it, unmindful of time-limits and colossal constrasts; Ganges presents a peculiar picture of India's murmurrings to those who have the patience to see and listen. Its calmness symbolizes prosperity; its floods enacted marshy lands and washed away myriad lives, indicating Nature's fury.

Imponderables of cultural variables are important, and so are the ecological and bureaucratic contexts of changing times. The question "Can India be reported?" (Journal of Asian Studies, 1979:11) raised by Professor Richard L. Park, is of continuous significance. Professor Park was justifiably referring to India on the basis of his experience and personal knowledge. He pointed out that "No one Indian or foreigner 'understands' India totally", but India is being reported every time, all the time, with urgency. Its "forty five centuries of

history, its infinite diversity, and its complex contemporary problems, defies any abbreviated treatment" (Lamb, 1975:3).

British were in India when the Mughal empire reached its zenith and also when it started collapsing. They were conversant with Mughal administration but introduced their own system which they thought best for India. It took about two centuries of experimentation to put up a coherent police system. Both the police and the Indian Civil Service were forged almost in the same period and thus became with the army the part of "The Great Bureaucracies". In post-independent India (after 1947) not much was altered either structurally or functionally. Few patchwork reforms were made to suit the changed political context and social setting.

There became, however, a perceptible change in the behavior of the police officials who started competing with the civilian officers to gain ruling politicians' favors by hook or by crook. It caused some sort of sedimentation, leading to group polarization, precipitating crisis at the organizational level.

Police has its own distinct subculture, partially a part of, but different from, that of the community. In India, like any other colonial country, police remained an imported supplant. During the course of time, it assumed its own hybrid personality, simultaneously interacting with that of the society at one end and that of the state on the other. This continuous fluidity within a constant time-frame causes police dilemma and the social rub. There is no denial of the fact that police universality is an overwhelming feature as is its local cast. This chapter will delineate how ecological growth and

bureaucratic context affected its overall development and shaped its organizational nexus.

This chapter will briefly survey the style and structure of policing in India. The development that was affected from time to time would be viewed in political and administrative context. The bureaucratic environment will be the highlight of the section meandering its way to the plains of organizational nexus. Organizational theory and their relevance, impact and interplay certainly is a reference point to review police organization. The cultural constraints as well as imponderables like caste-class, language and religious complexity, especially would form the spread that would entirely cover this chapter. The bureaucratic context and environment in which police as organization functions would help in understanding the structural designs, mode of operations, task and imagery, forming part of the next chapter.

Ecological Growth and Environment

For an institution, organization or individual, ecological growth or environment is like a water to a fish, where movements become possible, opportunities for development grow, health to body organisms bloom, relationship with others get settled and ultimately lines of limitations lay defined. India's societal environment and its ecological growth has been different obviously on account of its peculiar history, strategic geopolitical situation, complex inter-play and inter-related interactions of its internal factors, external implantations/influences, its capacity of absorption, strange sense of reaction; persistence of problems to which there was no immediate resolution and its unique process or reinforcing own identity. There

are things diversified and there are elements deep-rooted. It is so simple but still so puzzling.

No one defined India ever. Its geographical limits were nature-bound--three sides sea and Himalaya to the north. Its history--ancient, unrecorded and mostly reconstructed by the British. It is an international saga scribbled in Chronicles of other countries. Its races, a varying degree of mixture of negroids, the proto-Astroloids, the Mongoloids, the Mediterraneans, the Alpo-Dinarics, and the Nordics. To get an idea regarding distribution of races, Appendix 1 is enclosed.

Anything Indian, if it is to be explained, needs elaboration. Keeping that in mind, it becomes rather necessary to furnish at least some details necessary to make an explanation intelligible. Of all those factors that have affected or affects Indian environment as its parts are still hanging over its murky skies by deceptively lying low under subterranean surfaces. Those factors could be reckoned under the following simplified categories:

1. Environs of History
2. Geography and Social Ecology
3. Intermingling of Culture and Religion with the dominance of Hinduism
4. Population
5. Caste Complexity
6. Language Problem

Multi-layered society of India is loose-knit, there lies its strength and weakness. If explosions erupt in one corner, other areas or parts remain unaffected or isolated. Very rarely a strong wave survives to cause ripple-effect on all-India level but when it does, revolutionary changes occur. In ancient as well as in recent time, there were waves that brought sweeping effect throughout the country.

Buddhism was wiped out by such a wave. The National Freedom movement acquired such a nationwide awakening. Recently Congress government was dethroned and brought back again by such a wave effect.

Indian inhabitants, some resigned, some defiant, keep on struggling for their existence and identity from centuries, seeking some kind of consolation in enormous rituals. Ignorant and poor in substantial numbers, they are often subjected to powerful machinations of a local or non-local nature. Exploitation goes on without remorse because of the vulnerability of the system and hideousness of the enterpreneurial hunters.

Complexity of caste, religion, language and location, haunts India. To explain the dynamics of these factors and related elements, an elaborate discussion on each of them would clarify the admixture of problems faced by a bureaucratic organization like the police. Understanding of environment helps in understanding the action and reaction both of individuals and of organizations. How Indian environment functions and with what it is laden, is the subject of this chapter.

Altogether a new perspective is gained when Indian civilization is viewed in comparative world panorama of cultures. Comparison of the chart with the world chronology will enable the reader to relate India's historic culture to important cultural periods in other parts of the Far East and to western exploration and colonization. The chart is enclosed as Appendix 2. An unfolding of ancient history will at this stage provide background of cultural change that took place in India at different periods and the unity of strain that remains valid till today.

Environs of History

Historically, India lived with foreign invasions/aggressions. It is difficult to dismiss the facts of history especially when so pertinently impinging on the events of the present. Remains of a buried civilization of Mohenjodaro and Harappa (c. 2300 B.C.) excavated in 1922, provided clues of the existence of an unrecorded pre-historic civilization in India, which Aryans must have found when they came around 1500 B.C. Nothing is known about the well-developed civilization of Mohenjodaro and Harappa, known as Indus Valley Civilization which "fluorished mightily for a thousand years, from about 2500 to about 1500 B.C. and then mysteriously disappeared." (Schulberg, 1968:32)

Advent of Aryans

"The invaders called themselves Aryans - 'the noble ones', came from Central Asia, swept into India's northwest plains about the middle of the second millenium B.C., ravaged the country and introduced a pattern of life that was to persist for centuries." (Schulberg, 1968:34) Aryans brought their own culture, their own language, their own gods and their own institutions. "The Aryans left no cities and statues, no stone seals, no pots or bricks or cemeteries for scientists to dig up, classify and interpret, except a collection of religious writings, a set of scriptures." (Schulberg, 1968:35)

The routes followed by the invaders were through the supposedly impregnable passes of Himalayas and the Hindu Kush in the northwest.



HISTORIC ROUTES, *some followed for thousands of years, led waves of newcomers into India. By land, most immigrants entered through the mountain passes in the northwest and then fanned out. By water, foreigners approached India across the Arabian Sea and ranged along both the east and west coasts.*

Source: Historic India, by Lucille Schulberg, New York, 1968, 615.

Surprisingly, India became exposed to invasions once northern mountains - Himalayas and Hindu Kush, were declared vincible and plundering of India was worth taking an adventure by militant migrating people:

> But for India, always so strangely vulnerable to invasion, migrating people could come from anywhere and everywhere. From the north and from the west, Indo-Europeans, Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Huns, Arabs, Turks, Mongols and uncountable others flowed in. For thousands and thousands of years, migrants or marauders moved in through the northwest passes, wandered to the fertile plains and were trapped, so to speak. Once on the peninsula, they might be restless, but they would not leave. Their descendants stayed in India forever. (Lucille Schulberg and Editors of Time-Life Books, Historic India, New York, 1968, p. 16-17)

Hindu Period

Leaving pre-historic period, a mention of which has already been made in the beginning, we directly descend to 600 B.C. when northern India was specked with various republics and kingdoms. "The republics had merged from the vedic tribes and retained much more tribal tradition than did the monarchies" and were included in the republics of Shakyas, Koliyas, and Mallas, or a confederacy of tribes such as Vrijis and Yadavas. (Romila Thapar, 1979:50) Among the kingdoms, important ones were Kashi (Banares), Kosala, and Magadha.

The sixteen major states of Northern India in c. 600 B.C. are depicted in the map shown below:



Source: Romile Thapar, A History of India, vol. I, Penguin Books, 1979, p. 61.

On the heels came the Maurya Empire (321-185 B.C.) established by Chandragupta Maurya. During the time of Chandragupta Maurya, Indian civilization came in contact with Greek civilization, when he married Seleucus's (commander-in-chief of Alexander) daughter and "Seleucus's ambassador Megasthenes lived for many years in India." (Thapar, 1979:71) 'Arthashastra', a treatise on government and economics was wirtten by Kautilya, the teacher and chief advisor of Chandragupta. A reference to Arthashastra has already been made in Chapter One while describing the Hindu system of administration.

Ashoka (273-232 B.C.) was the grandson of Chandragupta Maurya, who conquered most of India and later on embraced Buddhism. It was during Ashoka's time that Buddhism went up to the Far East and it was Ashoka's insignia that India has adopted as State emblem after getting independence in 1947. After Ashoka came the fall of Maurya empire but during his time it covered most of the sub-continent, as is evidenced from the map in Appendix 3.

Then came people known as Shakas or Scythians from the same Oxus River region, and Parthians, or Pahlavas, who probably migrated from the Iranian plateau. Still later invaders were the Kushans, descendents of Central Asian nomads who had been forced from the native land to Bactria after building of the Great Wall of China.

Another landmark period known as the 'golden age' came during the time of Guptas, who ruled in the north, in the fourth century A.D. (about a century after the fall of the Kushan empire). Some historians "regarded its rule as a continuation of the glorious Maurya empire which had terminated over 500 years earlier because this dynasty centered around Magadha, the old capital of the Mauryas." (Lamber, 1975:30) Much has been written by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, Fa-Hsien, about Gupta's glory. Gupta's empire was also fairly extensive as is evident from the map in Appendix 4.

India has her peaceful periods - like the Mauryan Empire (322 B.C.) and Gupta Empire (320-467 A.D.) but to some western writers India had never enjoyed peace:

> India was not, and never had been, a sublimely peaceful land. Tribal wars had always flared up, banditry had long flourished, rulers of whatever denomination had been liable to quarrel. Two groups in particular had struggled for ascendency from the beginning of Hindu history; warrior kinds, the rajas for territorial and Brahmin priests for social advantage. (Moorehouse, 1983:40-41)

The Gupta empire disintegrated after the "death of Harsha in 647 A.D., when a new series of invasions and incursions from the northwest took place bringing into India more people of Central Asia, Turkish and Mongol blood." Before turning over to the Muslim period, we summarize Hindu India in the words of A. L. Basham:

> Our overall impression is that in no other part of the ancient world were the relations of man and man, and of man and the state, so fair and humane. In no other early civilization were slaves so few in number, and in no other ancient law book are their rights so well protected as in the Arthashastra . . . . In all her history of warfare, Hindu India has few tales to tell of cities put to the sword or of the massacre of noncombatants . . . . To us the most striking feature of ancient Indian civilization is its humanity . . . . Our second general impression of ancient India is that her people enjoyed life, passionately delighting both in the things of the senses and the things of the spirit . . . India was a cheerful land, whose people, each finding a niche in a complex and slowly evolving social system, reached a higher level of kindliness and gentleness in their mutual relations than any other nation of antiquity. For this, as well as for her great achievements in religion, literature, art, and mathematics, one European student at least would record his admiration of her ancient culture. (Lamb, 1975:35)

Gupta's golden period of Hindu history finally tapered off and the "dynasty was eventually overthrown by onslaughts by the white huns; but it was not until the 13th century, when Muslim rulers built a new empire in India, would this continuity be seriously threatened." (Schulberg, 1968:98) India was weakest when the Muslim invasion came in waves: "Followers of Muhammad came to India in three separate waves: Arabian in the eighth century, Turkish in the twelfth century and Turkish Afghan in the sixteenth century. (Schulberg, 1968:155)

Muslim Period

Trade between Hindus and Muslims existed before Islam invaded India as an imperial power.

> The Chief Muslim invaders and conquerors of north India were not Arabs, but Central Asian converts to Islam, and beginning in the eleventh century, these Central Asians - Turks, Afghans, Persians, Mongols - entered India in successive waves through the northwest passes, the traditional route of all invaders." (Lamb, 1975:39)

After getting sanction for a series of holy wars in India, Mahmud of Ghazni, "between 1000 and 1026 A.D. invaded India and his armies swept through north India . . ., destroying one temple after another, demolishing the hated idols, and assembling loot to be carried home to Ghazni on camels before the hot weather started." (Lamb, 1975:39) Another Afghan ruler Muhammad Ghuri "began another series of invasions after more than a century and a half after Mahmud's death." (Lamb, 1979:39) After Ghuri's death in 1206 A.D., "his General, Qutb-ud-din Aibak, detached the conquered areas within India from the parent kingdom and set up an independent Sultanate of Delhi with himself as the first Sultan." (Lamb, 1975:40) "Like Mahmud of Ghazni, he destroyed Hindu temples right and left; to build the Qutb Mosque, outside Delhi, he took material from twenty-seven Hindu temples." (Smith, 1975:40)

"The long reign of Hindu states had been broken at the end of the twelfth century by the foreign rule of Muslim Turks." (Spear, 1979:15) Thereafter Muslim invasions never ceased and Hindus went into a long reign of servitude. Except in Rajasthan where Rajput small kingdoms fought amongst each other over succession, honor, vanity, etc. and the Maraths in the south, there was no Hindu resistence to Muslim rule. "For two centuries, the Delhi empire or Sultanate controlled the north and at times the centre of the country, but their rule was essentially military, and their regime something of an armed camp, but they were open to cultural influences and got settled in the country." (Spear,

1979:15) Both Hindus and Muslims were in disarray when "Turkish Chief Babur appeared in the year 1517." (Spear, 1979:21) Babur (1483-1530) is the founder of Mughal or Mongol dynasty in India. Akbar (1542-1605) was the grandson of Babur, and it was during his time that "the Mughal empire became a political fact over half of India and a factor in the life of India which has influenced ever since." (Spear, 1979:30) Akbar's administrative machine was unique, a description of which has been made in the first chapter but a general outline of its framework lay in a division of executive and revenue authority:

> This class was spread over the country to work the administrative machine. Akbar divided the empire into twelve subahs or provinces, which later grew to eighteen. These in turn were subdivided into sarkars, the ancestor of the British district, and further into parganas, the ancestor of the sub-district. Throughout this system the principle of division of authority prevailed. From the subah downwards there were two sets of officers, the magisterial and the revenue. The former controlled the armed forces and were responsible for law and order, while the latter collected revenue and were responsible for the land assessment. The former had the greater dignity, but since the land was the main source of government revenue the latter was also indispensable. The fact of interdependency was clinched by the fact that the diwan or revenue officer sent his collections to Delhi which in turn supplied the subadar with cash for his followers. As long as the system was in working order the diwan could not revolt because he had supplies without troops while the subadar could not because he had troops without supplies. (Spear, 1979:42)

Akbar's son Jahangir (1569-1627) was on the throne when the British came for trade and in whose Court Hawkins and Thomas Roe seek for permission to conduct trade. Jahangir's son Shahjahan (1592-1666) was the great builder who got constructed most of the famous forts and buildings including the Taj Mahal. Shahjahan's son, Aurangzeb (1618-1717) was the last of the great Mughals, after whom started, decline, collapse and confusion of the Mughal empire.

It was during Aurangzeb's time that maratha leader Shivaji revolted against Mughal empire and carved out his own kingdom which assumed wider proportions, and one of the important factors responsible for the downfall of the Mughal empire. British factory was in Surat when Shivaji or Sivaji (died in 1680) ransacked Surat in 1664, but left it undisturbed. Shivaji became a Hindu hero and the one who employed guerilla tactics with success against mighty Mughal armies. "The defense of cow and country, of religion and the homeland, was the war cry." (Spear, 1979:60)

After Aurangzeb, the Mughal empire started tumbling down under its own internal pressure. Not that there were no successors to the Mughal empire but they were very weak in character and performance: In 1739, the weakened Mughal Empire failed to check a new invasion from across the northwest passes by Nadir Shah of Persia who plundered Delhi, and carried off crown jewels, the famous Peacock Throne, and all the transportable wealth on which Mughal glory had been based. (Lamb, 1975:53) There was another invasion when in 1756-57, Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Afghan Chief, sacked Delhi. Abdali also defeated Marathas in 1761 who were called by the Mughal king to protect him. Abdali could not hold to his victory and had to return, leaving a power vacuum in India at Delhi. In 1785 Marathas were called and that ended the independence of Mughal King Shah Alam. At this time, there arose Sikhs in Punjab who were lying subdued. Sikh leader Ranjit Singh secured Lahore in 1799, re-integrated Punjab, established his rule beyond frontiers and was not only accommodated but respected by the rising power of the British. Ranjit Singh died in 1839, after which the British annexed Punjab in 1848-1849.

The last Mughal king, Bahadur Shah Zafar, who was a British pensioner in 1857, was deported to Burma where he died and with him died the last vestige of Mughal empire. The vastness of Mughal empire could be gauged through the map provided as Appendix 5.

India got affected very deeply by Islam and its manifestation in Mughal empire. Hindu life as well as Indian culture as a whole, in the process of absorption, in which it failed, still bears marks of Persian, Arabic and other foreign cultures, to a point where confluence seems to be native rather than alien:

> Persian tastes, ideas, and attitudes are so imbedded in north India that they are often thought to be local products. Though Persian is no longer spoken, its daughter language of Urdu through Hindi continues its influence and is widely spoken in India as well as being one of the official languages of Pakistan. Hindustani, the everyday language of the north, is deeply indebted to it. But perhaps the most lasting of Persian influences was the administrative. Persia gave to - or revived in - India the imperial idea with a semi-sacred head and with it an imperial apparatus of government. Persian nomenclature and administrative concepts were so pervasive that they were found among the fighting Marathas when struggling to be free of the Mughals. The Mughals re-acclimatized in India the idea of an all-pervading ordered administration. The British could not have organized India as they did if the people had not already been, as it were, apprenticed to the idea of unity. Nor, in consequence, could independent India have grown so quickly in unity and strength. Mr. Nehru was sometimes called a great Mughal; he was their heir in a truer sense than perhaps he himself realized. The united India of today would not have been possible without them. (Spear, 1979:50-51)

Out of the twilight of Mughal India, out of the remnants of the Mogul Empire (Appendix 6) we move onto the British India which stands still as a testimony of its past, in the form of free India. Not that the "India was not left to herself but ... that conditions favoring intervention existed before it actually occurred and that these conditions were self-induced". (Spear, 1979:77) It was these

conditions as well as powerplay of the parties involved, national and international, that brought India to the British. Advent of the British power is a turning phase in India's history and in the life of its people.

The British Period

The British were in India, as traders, when Mughal empire was at its peak and glory. Before the British, there were other Europeans already carrying on their trade with India. In fact, European countries were taking a great deal of interest in the stories of India, that were reaching to them since the Greeks and others invaded India. With the emergence as sea power, these countries started exploring the world.

Vasco da Gama came to Calicut in 1498 and Alburquerque captured Goa in 1510. Portuguese were controlling the spice trade in the Far East. Dutch also took their trading interest in India but did not appear as a colonial power because their main interest was in Far East. The British got the permission to trade from Mughal in 1618 and adjusted with Portuguese first by showing maritime power and then by common relationship (Bombay was given by Portuguese to the British as a wedding gift). The French came to India in 1664 and became chief rival to the British both in matter of trade and power. So, "Mughal India was thus not unacquainted with Europeans." (Spear, 1979:69) When the British came, India's map was slightly unique.

It happened in Bengal, which at that time was the center of the British trade. "Since 1740 the ruler of Bengal had been virtually self-appointed Alivardi Khan because Mughals in Delhi were too weak to enforce their authority on their Subadar (Governor)." (Spear, 1979:81)

After Alivardi's death, his grandson Siraj-ad-daula succeeded the throne and events so moved that he collided with the British. To cut the knotty history short, it was Robert Clive (1725-1774) who after few battles laid the foundations of the British empire. The British and the French fought their battles in Europe as they fought in India and finally it was the British who came out as conquerors. With these victories, governors, officials and servants of East India Company became fabulously rich - and so rich - that they were derisively called Nabobs in England. "All over the British Isles, expensive property changed hands at an unprecedented rate as the Nabobs sailed home with their treasure." (Moorhouse, 1983:50) Not too surprisingly, "the most envied of the Nabobs was Clive himself, who by his own calculation," had accumulated 410,102, when on return he repaired the family home, bought another one a few miles away, purchased an Irish estate and a London house in Berkeley Square, and obtained a Parliamentary seat at Shrewbury." (Moorhouse, 1983:52) Another Governor-General, Warren Hastings (1732-1818) whose impeachment in British Parliament for corruption became very famous but was acquitted of all guilt. Later came Lord Cornwallis (1738-1805), who, "in effect, founded the Indian Civil Service, which was to be the greatest ornament of the British Raj, though it would not be known as the ICS for another half century; and it was he who set up a new method of collective revenue in Bengal." (Moorhouse, 1983:69) His reform is known as 'Permanent Settlement' which gave rise to a new kind of landlordism in India. During his time, the company started collecting revenue. Cornwallis introduced the 'Darogha system' in police and held that Indians were corrupt.

Lord Wellesley (1760-1842) was an imperialist Governor-General who came to India, along with his brother, Arthur Wellesley (Duke of Wellington), in 1798. "Wellesley's seven years of rule had completely changed the political picture of India and when he left the East India Company was unquestionably the strongest power in India." (Lamb, 1975:65) Wellesley was "decisive, strongwilled, vigorous, and energetic, he was a man thirsty for honor and scornful of his Indian subjects, whom he considered 'vulgar, ignorant, rude, familiar, and stupid.'" (Lamb, 1975:63) Wellesley was recalled.

Lord William Bentinck (1774-1839) remained Governor-General from 1828-35. He was a socio-administrative reformer. He reformed the judicial system, abolished Suttee (widow-burning) and introduced the English Educational system and suppressed Thuggee (banditry).

In the chain of Governor-Generals, Dalhousie was the last. He was an expansionist and by bringing the 'Doctrine of Lapse' he took over so many princely states. He laid down the Indian railway system, introduced telegraph and pushed reforms in education. He left India in 1856. Historians agree that Dalhousie's policies were responsible for formenting unrest in India and in 1857 the Indian Mutiny took place. Mutiny ended the rule of the East India Company and the British Crown started its reign in India; through British viceroys and Governor Generals. There were no geographical changes, no more annexations and no more interference in religious matters of Indians. There followed an avalanche of legislations enacted by British Parliament. The history of post-mutiny era has been discussed as it arose, touching the administrative and police system in India. India of post-mutiny remained virtually what Dalhousie left in 1856. Map of

India, attached as Appendix 7 could be compared with the one of 1947 (Appendix 8, when the British left.

Post Mutiny Era: 1857 to 1947 (Post Mutiny to end of the British Rule or Rule of the Crown)

It is almost the opinion of many of the writers that "the quarter of a century that preceded the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 saw a gradual easing of anarchy and violence that had become almost an accepted way of life to a majority of the denizens of India." (Kay, 1980:21)

To most of the Britishers and also to far-flung Indians, mutiny came as a shock. The relations between Indians and the British changed considerably. For one set of people on both sides, there was suspicion, bad blood and hatred. For the others, on both sides (Hindus and British), were a sort of mutual understanding, spirit of betterment and fairness in dealings. The two strands running together produced a kind of love-hate relationship between Indians and the British, to any casual observer.

After the storm came the calm. Vengence stopped but the bold Governor-General was derisively branded as 'Clemency Canning' for granting general amnesty to the people. There were fundamental and far-reaching changes in policy, attitude, organization and operation of the British government, commonly called as 'Raj', nostalgically by some, satirically by others and mystically almost by all). Major changes included:

1. "On August 2, 1858, the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act, transferring 'all rights' that the Company had hitherto enjoyed on Indian soil directly to the Crown." (Wolpert, 1982:239)

2. Among the policy changes, the most important was Queen Victoria's Proclamation of November 1, 1858. It "announced to India's 'Princes, Chiefs and People' the

momentous changes in governance and policy." (Wolpert, 1982:240) The only changes was that a British representative called a 'Resident' or 'Political Agent' was placed in each State to overlook princely states relationship with the British. Thus the loyalty of Indian princely states was fully assured. However, there were subtle checks on these princes to curb any ambitious adventurism against the British.

3. The Proclamation also declared "it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in anyways favoured, none molested or disquited, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall aslike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure." (Wolpert, 1980:240-41) This ensured religious non-interference and assured non-discrimination.

4. Indian army was re-organized to prevent recurrence of rebellion by reducing the ratio of Indian to British troops to two and three to one. "The British were, moreover, given exclusive control over artillery and other 'Scientific Branches' of the service." (Wolpert, 1982:241) Some of the Indian troops were mixed with others and recruitment was made from the loyalist class called 'martial races' like Gurkhas, Sikhs, Pathans, Rajputs, Jats, Garhwallis, who did not participate in the mutiny and stood on the British side.

5. Property Taluqdars (landlords) was restored and thus won over to the British side.

6. Zamindari (petty landlords) system was favored and another rural support was achieved.

7. Among the Sikhs, 'Sirdars' (nobles) were recognized. Similarly Malguzars (revenue collectors) were created in Madhya Pradesh.

8. After the mutiny of 1857, the police and army were reorganized. The Police Act of 1861 introduced a uniform system under which police became a provincial force exclusively under an Inspector-General of Police who was responsible to the Civilian government. Another important feature was the District Superintendent of Police as head of the district police, 'to recruit, train and discipline his men', but to remain under overall supervision of the District Magistrate. He was not a subordinate to the District Magistrate but not a hundred percent independent either. (The details of this system are described in detail in the third chapter.)

The government promised "measures for the material and moral improvement of the Indian people because in their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude, our best reward." (Roberts, 1952:384)

The British Empire soon reached its high noon in India. "Many of the chiefs and protected princes, who had proved faithful in the Mutiny, received honorary titles and gifts of money or lands." (Roberts, 1952:389)

There developed a strange process of socialization which was insular and transparent at the same time, distrustful and affable, aimultaneously. "The wall that insulated white Sahib society from the natives suddenly loomed impervious to any but a handful of princes and landed gentry, and even they complained of feeling mistrusted, eternally suspect, outsiders. New towns and suburbs, called civil lines and camps, were now built for British officials and their wives, with grand bungalows on wide, tree-lined streets and spacious roads through which a regiment of troops could gallop swiftly, if needed, to put down any 'trouble'. This kind of life style produced another side effect which turned out to be the main show of the system. "The post mutiny separation of 'races' brought a boom to the overseas market for British brides, now that fear of the treachery of Indian 'housekeepers' made most young servants of the Crown prefer the comfort and security of a British spouse to the availability of a native mistress." (Wolpert, 1982:245)

The social relationship never returned to pre-mutiny days and that warmth and cordiality was completely missing. There were no inter-marriages, no nautch (dancing girls) parties, and no informal

get-togethers. Any social again by the British was regulated by an order of Precedence which became more and more detailed and discriminatory as years passed by.

The opening of the Suez Canal facilitated the arrivals of the 'Fishing Fleet', known for carrying young girls looking for husbands and would be 'Mem Sahibs'. The interaction of 'Sahibs' and 'Mem Sahibs' remained mostly confined to Indian domestic servants, official clerks and aggrieved petitioners.

Most of their time passed in offices. The evenings became enigmatic by exclusive assemblage of clubs, where drinks, balls, fancy shows and games were common features. George Orwell was aware of these clubs: In any town in India the European Club is the spiritual citadel, the real seat of the British power, the Nirvana for which native officials and millionaires pine in vain. (Orwell, 1975:99)

"Kipling is the poet of their love-hate relationship with India and all the ambivalence it evoked in the British mind and heart." (Wolpert, 1982:244) India remains 'the Land of Regrets' as Alfred Lyall's poem depicted but still "'What far-reaching Nemesis steered him, From his home by the cool of the sea?' is the Curiosity." (Allen, 1977:5)

They knew India would be lost one day but their confidence in themselves and in India was never diminished. They felt that India was theirs though it was not their country. Their memories spoke volumes about their relationship with the country and the countrymen. It is no surprise that Europeans are either captivated or repelled by India; few remain indifferent. Its vastness alone encompassing every kind of geological formation from plain and deserts to hills and

mountains commends instant respect. Its tide of humanity and multiplicity of tongues can be overwhelming and the stark contrast between opulence and poverty disturbing. Flimsy huts or bustees are uneasy neighbours of magnificant palaces and temples. (Desmond, 1982:2)

After the mutiny the administration also underwent a change, as it was more oriented to keep the hold stranger as well as to train Indians to be adjuncts of the support system:

> As far as the Provincial and district governments were concerned, however, administration in the post-mutiny era became even more exclusively British, more despotic or paternalistic (depending on the character of individual officials) than it had previously been. No matter how well Indians spoke or wrote English, they were no longer trusted by British civil servants, who spent more time touring their districts, reporting on local conditions, and checking subordinates, than had been normal administration practice before the mutiny. (Wolpert, 1982:246)

An important aspect of post-mutiny era was the introduction of 'The Indian Civil Service (ICS) Examination' both in England and in India, by opening it for Indians.

The Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers, who were nicknamed as 'heavenborn', 'competition-wallah' and 'elite class' were a different breed of people. To some they were eccentric, egotistic and elite people and were main components of the British steel frame that ruled India. According to Ian Stephens, "Eccentricity was one of the pillars of the Empire as it was the lubricant that enabled the machine to work and it sprang from confidence..." (Mason, 1975:19)

Indian nationalism, on western lines, grew up during post-mutiny period. "Indian nationalism has always been a theme scored with religious, class, caste, and regional variations, and the emergence of national consciousness among Indians during the nineteenth century was

primarily the product of responses, both negative and positive, to the consolidation of British power." (Wolpert, 1982:250) Most of the Indian nationalists were not only English educated but belong to an elite cadre, of high castes and who invariably studied law in England and who were by profession lawyers, teachers, journalists, and students of British set Indian universities.

Indian National Congress was formed in 1885 by a retired English civil servant.

On the developmental side, telegraph and railroad that served the British at the time of rebellion, were rapidly expanded all over the country. It also helped in expanding trade of British companies who were the sole suppliers of these materials. Cotton, indigo, saltpeter, tea, coal provided fresh incentive to London mills.

Main historical events of post-mutiny era could be counted as Minto-Morley reforms or Indian Council Act of 1909, Government of India Act of 1919, Government of India Act of 1935, the two world wards (1914 and 1939), Civil Disobedience Movement (1922), Quit India Movement (1942), partition of the country and independence (1947).

The Indian Council Act of 1909 "increased the membership of the Central Legislative Council from sixteen to sixty, twenty seven of whom were to be elected mainly by special-interest groups" (Edwards, 1967:157), and thus is was the first enactment that brought elections, interest groups and the cleavage on religion basis. The Act provided separate communal representation for Muslims and the Council could only criticize and advise.

The Act of 1919, known as Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, came into force in 1921, introduced a system called "Dyarchy" according to which

departments were divided into 'reserved' and 'transformed', whereat the 'transferred' ones were put under the elected ministers while 'reserved' like police, etc., were under the charge of the governor.

The Act of 1935, came in force in 1937 provided responsible governments in States and Dyarchy at the Centre; where a federal structure was set up. In fact, this Act, after World War II, became the basis of India's free Constitution and laid down system of governance. The Enactment was modified, improvized, and expanded to suit needs and requirements of free India but never basically altered. No wonder the Constitution of India based on the Act of 1935 was amended more than forty five times in a short period of thirty five years; a record, perhaps, no Constitution enjoyed in the world.

Historical impact had a tremendous change on India's ecological growth and environment. Things have never been the same and India is still struggling under the impact. Both Muslim and the British rules are over but the changes of environment exist. A short review of historical impact of the environment, therefore, follows.

Impact of History on Ecological Growth and Environment

Ecological and environmental circumstances were somewhat similar when victorious Babur in 1517 laid down the foundations of Moghul empire, and Clive in 1757, carved out boundaries of empire for the British company; in the sense that they made available to their successors tremendous opportunities to plant their own institutions, language, law, thought and culture. And they did implant all those. What Akbar Shahjehan and Aurangzeb did for the Mughals; Hastings, Cornwallis, Wellesley and Bentinck and Dalhousie did for the British.

Similarities are hardly similar but some parallels could be drawn between the great Mughals and the British Governor-Generals and Viceroys. There are administrative and bureaucratic similarities between these two empires. Change in kingship or ruling style brought little change to the common people and most of India, except big cities, continued to exhibit a picture of pity, helplessness and self-effacing rural India. The huddled masses looked remote and withdrawn, poor, powerless and uncounted.

Traditional structures of villages were left untouched but their labor was overly exploited. Their existence provided an irony of fate and circumstances, but they were there till centuries in their own small communities with their own meagre resources. Whosoever became the ruler - Hindu, Muslim, English or some other; the fate of villagers did not change.

When Babur came to India, the socio-political scenery was full of confusion, lack of energy, despondency and desperation. After Babur's victory there was another sort of confusion; Muslim rulers trying to consolidate and expand while Hindus trying to recover and adjust. A similar chaotic situation emerged again in India when Mughals collapsed and English were still to hold their power. India lay prostrate only to be picked up by the most powerful contender. In the absence of a definite decision western intervention must have come in some form in the nineteenth century, because India was too valuable an economic prize to be left to herself in a rapidly shrinking world. (Spear, 1979:76-77)

The Mughal empire had far-reaching consequences on the Indian way of life and so had the British regime. Different writers have seen

these changes differently. Sometimes they blessed the British for the changes wrought in the political and social fabric of Indian life, of values transformed and of higher civilization transplanted, while others condemned westerners for being a "malevolent force that destroyed the moral and social basis of Indian life.

Why the country changes so little and mostly adopts, adapts, and accommodates without wiping out the vestiges of the past, are the questions which have deeper roots and need much wider explanations. There is a certain inertia and "it has come down from the past and tends to continue into the future, accepting changes reluctantly and only as they can somehow be fitted into existing pattern of thought. (Lamb, 1975:4) This "burden of the past, the burden of both good and ill acts as overpowering and sometimes suffocating." (Lamb, 1975:9)

The gap exists that divides the social categories but it adjusts and stays. "As long as 'the rich man in his castle, poor man at his gate' philosophy is generally accepted, these rampant and all-too-visible inequalities are quite compatible with political stability." (Manson, 1976:9) More often than not this scenario of co-existence in social and cultural milieu causes a 'cultural shock' and then the expression changes because "its beauties, its historic buildings, its turneresque mornings on the broad Ganges, its lush coconut palms over a kerala beach, are all tinged with sadness, even with despair." (Murray, 1967:163) There are other significant social indicators and ecological markers which gives meaning and shape to bureaucratic activity and police work. Those when lumped together could be put as, religious diversity, population problem, caste and class confrontation, regionalism, political crises, the dilemma of

direction and change and the growing chaos. There is a long history how Islam collided with Hinduism and what happened thereafter. Hinduism, before coming of Islam, did not appear to be a cohesive religion but used to be an 'agglomeration of various sects, cults and a combination of beliefs, faiths and teachings' by known and unknown preachers. But philosophy was the same and the common cultural thread of a way of life remained basically the same. They worshipped different gods, upheld innumerable deities, followed variety of ways of worship but the thought was the same, only the language, the mode, the style looked different, message being the same. Multiplicity was its beauty, in difference were its charms and variety led to its richness by giving personal freedom while social rituals connected the community and regional bonds. No one tried to unify the folds, perhaps the need did not occur or was not felt; and no one asked for the codification. The discussion, discourses, differences and divisions were many but never grew into a challenge threatening the survival of one by the other but all of it became known as Hinduism to those who heralded the advent of intolerant Islam. Islam came with a force to India and shook Hindus to their very core:

> Especially in its early days, Islam was a strenuous intolerant faith, each Muslim led the duty to convert infidels. War against nations or people who did not submit to the faith were holy. It was clear from the start that a cultural synthesis involving Hindus and Muslims would not be easy to achieve. As time went on, religious differences were reinforced by educational differences and political rivalries. (Lamb, 1975:38)

Akbar exceptionally attempted to minimize the gap between the two religions and pursued a policy of religious tolerance. It was completely reversed by Aurangzeb and after that it never became the same again. The only time when Hindus and Muslims joined together for

a common cause and stood up against a common force was the Mutiny of 1857. Britishers learned a serious lesson from it and never allowed the two to meet. Divide and rule became the policy feature of British government and they followed this style till last. Muslim league was created to safeguard the interests of Muslims in 1906 but was used as a counter-measure against the Hindus dominated Congress party. By Act of 1909, Muslim interests were constitutionally and politically recognized. Whatever the Congress did to project its secular image proved futile and the Muslim League continued to appeal to Muslim minds and created vested interests in reservations of their posts and constituencies. Except in 1916 when the Lucknow Pact was signed between the Muslim League and Congress leaders, there was no patching up ever. The agreement of cooperation fell apart when constitutional reforms were introduced by the Government of India Act of 1919. There were incidents of communal clashes and communal tensions increased with every political and social move of one or the other. British administration exploited the situation fully to their advantage and played a role of an arbitrator, of an expert ruler and competent policy maker. The Government of India Act of 1935 widened the politicizing of Hindu Muslim disunity. Communal conflagration of 1946-47, partitioning of the country, and creation of two nations on a religious basis was the culmination of the communal policy. But the story did not stop even after the partition of the country. Communal riots both In India and Pakistan continued to erupt. The efforts of the administration and thrust of government policies failed to assuage or reduce the recrudescence of religious riots involving loss of lives and property to an incalculable measure. The police, the bureaucracy,

the political parties and communal environment were blamed and held responsible. In spite of so many commissions and inevitable inquiries, the questions and the answers became elusive but were raised again and again at all such occasions.

After history, geography affected India's social ecology to a greater extent. The variety of cultural traits, dress difference, food habits and philosophical variations could be explained by taking geography as an important variable.

2) Geography and Social Ecology

India is surrounded on three sides by sea and in the north by massive Himalayas. It is a monsoon country. Monsoons are boon as well as calamity and so are the other physical features of its land-mass and sea:

> Physically, the huge subcontinent of India is not one land at all. From north to south it is sprawling mosaic of cloud-piercing mountains and rolling plains, blistering desert and placid lakes, tapering off between fertile shorelines beset by treacherous tides. In many sectors a cruel sun and monsoon rains take turns holding the land in sway - the sun drawing up every drop of moisture, the monsoon causing devastating floods. (Schulberg, 1968:19)

It's a country of highest rainfall in the world and that of minimum rainfall in the desert. It has a climatic contrast. Its boundaries with neighboring countries remained undemarcated and a cause of conflict. Socially, the geography of India has also had very important consequences. It is no wonder that "the north has been the main center of Indian power in historical times, because of its great expanse of fertile plain and its more vigorous inhabitants." (Spear, 1972:8)

India's location and geopolitical setting between the countries of Asia and Africa was important.

GEOPOLITICAL SETTING



Source: India: An Area Study, by S.N. Chopra, Vikas Publishing House New Delhi, 1977, p. 169.

It is always north India which is the center of focus. It faced each wave of invasion and foreign occupation. It forms the fertile Indo-Gangetic basin. It is called the land of Aryans and the seat of culture. It is a hub of politics, storehouse of history, place of population outburst, of green revolution in agriculture and vortex of power play. Anyone who rules north India rules entire India, is a common saying.

India is predominantly rural and agricultural. Almost 80% of the people live in villages though there is a growing influx of population towards cities. The cities are bursting out of their seams and there is expansive growth of urban slums. For agricultural regions and urbanization, see Appendix 9 and 10.

India is a land of mass poverty and appalling illiteracy. Half of the population lives below the poverty line. Hunger and diseases are the most menacing problems.

There are a large number of tribes in India. For tribal distribution in India, see Appendix 11. Each tribe has its own culture and own way of living. They don't mix with urban or rural population. There are schemes pursued by the government for tribal development. Some of the tribes are not for creating law and order problem or for their criminal tendencies or activities. During the British time, they were known as 'Criminal Tribes' but there is no such distinction now in independent India. Industrialization in India is growing with tremendous speed. Some planned and mostly haphazard growth of all kinds of industries has created pressure on agricultural land from where the villagers were ousted by taking over their fields. This increased rural unemployment on one hand and brought urban slums

closer to villages on the other hand, thus doubly jeopardizing the interests of large numbers of people. These sections of people are extensively exploited by politicians, rowdy demogogues and by criminals of all sorts. It is not possible for the government to work out any sort of arrangement for these kind of people and that leads to social tension. Industrialization is devouring cities by causing increased pollution, jamming traffic, crowding suburbs, upsetting developmental projects, disrupting city economies and growing unhealthy slums. One wonders what will happen to the cities after a few years if the trend continues and thousands of new emigrants keep on flocking to the cities. There breeds exploitation, intimidation and communal discord in such a situation.

Next in line that affected India's environment could be depicted as intermingling of culture and religion. There is a common strand of Hinduism that runs through the sub-continent but that dominence of Hinduism has been under challenge by other coexisting rivals. Therefore, the intermingling of culture and religion explains the pressures working on India's unity and disunity as a national trait.

Intermingling of Culture and Religion with Dominance of Hinduism

> India is beguiling, it is sometimes incomprehensible, and different. It is very old and so is its culture: Historic India is not a country. It is a culture, one of the oldest and most consistent on earth. That culture has been a contemporary to almost all civilizations. It existed, in nascent form, when the sun rose on Egypt's first kingdom in the Fourth Millennium B.C. Well developed, it was present when the sun sparkled on classical Greece in the Fifth Century B.C. and set on the British Empire in this century. The culture consists predominantly of a religion and a mode of living called Hinduism. (Schulberg, 1968:11)

In this land of old civilization, time has not much meaning for the thousands whose life style have not had any change for centuries. The time seems to stand still in the lives of people as in Hinduism itself. Time is eternal and in the history of India, it rolled from one extreme to another, without touching millions in the way:

> In western history, a thousand years is a long time. The rise, decline and fall of the Roman Empire all took place within that span of time; ancient Greece rose and fell in less than half of it. But it took a full millenium - the years between about 1500 and about 500 B.C. - merely to lay the foundations of Hinduism. (Schulberg, 1968:31)

> Indian civilization is wrapped around Hindu religion: the civilization's creative power was first seen in religion, in which the development of three great creeds - Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism - provides a record that no other culture has ever matched. (Schulberg, 1968:7)

> Hinduism altogether differs with Islam, even on truth: Hindus believe that there are many kinds of truth, truths that are different for every age, every occupation, every class of men. Indeed, one of Hinduism's objections to Judaism, Christianity and Islam is that they preach one truth for all men. (Schulberg, 1968:13)

Indian culture, and also Hinduism, is a mosaic of multi pieces but has a peculiar personality of its own in which parts, after losing their individuality, submerge in the integral whole. For Hindus, religion is ritual, a symbolism, an expression, an experience of unity with the eternal, a personal but spiritual effort of communion with one and all. It is a strange universe, a sublime thought, a complete devotion:

> For an Indian all action is ritual, all art is symbolic of religious ideas, all worship is an expression of life, all life is a facet of an Eternal. Underlying these identities is the Indian's sense of a spirit that pervades all things and the Indian's worship of this all pervading spirit . . . Through a combination of worship, ritual, religion, Indians have succeeded in synthesizing extraordinarily diverse forces and influences. (Schulberg, 1968:7)

Hinduism survived against all this barbarism, prolonged subjugation and forcible mass conversion. May be its philosophy, resilience, and self-adhesive tolerance had something to do with it:

> Historic India is not so brittle philosophically either. Indeed, hinduism's strength is its resiliency. It bends to fulfill the varying needs of the land's dissimilar peoples. For millenia traders and travellers - and invaders - have provided almost continuous contact between India and the world outside, and as a result India's intellectuals have been exposed to the philosophies of other cultures in many eras. Yet, through the ages, Indians who could brilliantly analyze other attitudes adhered to their own point of view. (Schulberg, 1968:18)

Hindu religion has accommodated every god in the pantheon and gave its own meaning or interpretation to every gospel; never prescribing to finality any of its basics. It is intertwined, it's continuous, centralized and self-contradictory at the same time. "Hindu popular religions is protean in its form and infinite in the diversity of its content." (Speare, 1972:49) Its laxity of the liberality and fastidiousness of the concrete baffles an awry onlooker. Hindu thought seems circuitous, its philosophy prosaic and devotion esoteric. Ideas of re-incarnation and transmigration of soul appears too far-fetched. Where is the scientific base of the religion? Logic is just one of the logistics. Hinduism is a way of living, an experience of life. Dharma, Karma, Maya and Moksha are all links of a doctrine which enchantedly offer union with soul divine:

> No merit is unrewarded, no sin unatoned in the long run. We are what and where we are because of what we were and did. It follows that everyone's position, the Brahmin in his pride, the raja in his palace, the untouchable in his squalor, is the result of his own past actions. Linked with this is the doctrine of dharma or moral duty. There is a duty appropriate to every station in life or caste status. Only by fulfilling it can anyone hope to rise in a future life. These ideas of karma, rebirth, and dharma are still widely held even by the Westernized classes that may interpret them in a way quite different from that of

> orthodox Brahminism. Then come the inner Hindu doctrines which have attracted many Westerners. There is the doctrine of maya or illusion which sees the sensible world as a veil of illusion, hiding the perception of the one all-pervading Spirit. Spiritual life is a discipline of release from attachment to desire and the things of sense. The goal is moksha or freedom from illusion and attachment to the wheel of life and rebirth, of final union with the Supreme. There are the three margas or paths of discipline, the way of knowledge, the way of action or works, and the way of loving devotion. There are the four stages of life: of studentship; of householding or family life; of service to the community; and of retirement with contemplation. (Spear, 1972:49)

There are no English equivalents of the word 'Karma', 'Dharma', 'Maya' and 'Moksha' but some explanation could be given. "'Karma' is literally 'action' and the concept may be described as the law of consequences." (Spear, 1972:19). Dharma is a kind of duty and Maya is illusion while Moksha seems to be a relief from rebirth:

> The nearest English equivalent of dharma is moral duty. But dharma is a unique kind of moral duty. Every caste, every group in society, has in traditional Hinduism its own dharma or moral duty. These moral obligations vary widely, so that a man might conform to the standards of one caste and at the same time be held to be failing to perform the duties of his own. Thus the moral law was cut up, as it were, into a number of competing fragments; there was no single set of rules applicable to all. Maya, the last of our trio, means illusion. It expresses the deep conviction of the Hindu mind that the material world is illusory. It is mind alone that exists; man is but a thought in the mind of the Creator, and the 'gorgeous palaces, the cloud capp'd towers' of his world but projections of his own imagination. The highest flights of Indian religion have pointed the way to release from this world of illusion; freedom's dream has not been liberation from earthly tyranny but escape from the wheel of life or the clogs of the world altogether. (Spear, 1972:19)

"In the sixth century B.C., there occurred two great movements of religious revolt directed particularly against . . . the orthodox Hinduism of the time - both originated in Bihar in the eastern valley of the Ganges, and were led by Mahavira, the great teacher of the Jain sect and Buddha, who lived probably from 563 to 483 B.C." (Lamb,

1975:25) Buddhism, in its sway, overshadowed Hinduism for 'almost a thousand years' and reached far and wide outside India but in later years, like a coup, Hinduism absorbed most of Buddhism and by the twelfth century A.D., the destruction of a few Buddhist monastaries in Bihar and Bengal by Muslim armies were enough to eliminate from India the remnants of Buddhism as a distinct religion, although its influence lived on within Hinduism." (Lamb, 1975:26-27)

These are cultural, philosophical and religious elements that lie in the background of Hindu psyche when thinking or acting. Gita, a religious text of Hinduism says that one should perform one's duty without getting swayed by the consequences, and that the soul is eternal and non-perishable. Scriptural guidelines are available for Hindus in all walks of life. One may or may not believe or follow in any of those but these are consciously or unconsciously part of Hindu psyche. To know it helps in understanding Hindu environment of India.

India had its great epochs, when its culture, literature and art were in bloom and that was when it attracted great attention and envy:

> The earliest and perhaps the greatest of all Indian fusions took place between the prehistoric Harappan Culture - one of the oldest civilizations known to archaeologists - and that of the Aryans, who invaded the sub-continent sometime after 1500 B.C. Later periods represent a great flowering of the Indian spirit. The first was that of the Mauryan Age of the third century, B.S., dominated by a patron of Buddhism, the Emperor Ashoka. A second occurred during the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., when art, literature, and science reached their highest points under the reigns of the Gupta emperors. Finally, . . . the 16th and 17th century age of the Mughals and Emperor Akbar, who among later Muslim monarchs most nearly approached the Hindu ideal of an all-India ruler. (Schulberg, 1968:7)

Keeping in view the dominance of Hindu religion and culture, the other religious and cultural groupings are prominently dispersed all over India. (see Appendix 12) This distribution of other religions

and culture as pockets within wider Hindu frame often create problems, involving vicious tension. Hindu-Muslim riots, riots between Sunni and Shiite muslims, clashes between Hindus and Sikhs, violent disturbances in north eastern states are frequent occurrences costing human lives and destruction of property. In India, religion and culture impinges on the environment. A detailed discussion on communal and religious problems is in Chapter IV.

There are some of the obvious and oft-repeated factors and variables - like population, caste complexity and language that invariably figure in national and international literature as deeply affecting India's changing ecology. A brief discussion on population, caste complexity, and language problems is therefore, appropriate at this stage.

Population

India is the second most populous country in the world (see Appendix). Its population has crossed seven hundred million. "If the Indian population continues to grow at its present rate of 2.5 percent per year, her total population will reach the billion mark in the year 1996." (Lamb, 1975:376) India is getting more crowded day by day and this puts an extra strain on her resources and facilities. "As the population continues to grow, the likelihood of famines grows also." (Lamb, 1975:377) Lack of nutrition reduced the population into sub-standard human beings.

Population control is again a religious and emotional issue in India. Family planning schemes have not been very successful. A large number of the Muslim population and those in rural India or in slums do not believe in family planning. When family planning was

rigorously and rather forcibly enforced during emergency years of 1976-1977, an almost revolt-like situation emerged. The ruling government of Mrs. Ghandhi was resented and overthrown for this potent reason. After that political upheaval, no politician touches the issue of family planning even with a pair of tongs.

There is another dimension to the problem. There is suspicion lurking among the minority groups that if their population gets reduced, their political pressure of leverage would automatically be reduced due to a small percentage of votes. Hindus are suspicious that if Muslim and Sikh populations keep on growing unproportionately, they might have to face another partition of the country. In an Indian setting this simple looking issue has wider and deeper meaning and far-reaching consequences for the people in the times to come. It cannot be ignored for long but its handling is also like touching so many hidden thorns simultaneously.

Compared with the United State of America, India is approximately one third in land size and almost three times in population. Most of the population is concentrated in the Ganges basin which comprises the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Statewide population and its density is given in Appendix 14. "Another characteristic of the Indian population picture is that its distribution over the country as a whole is strangely uneven." (Chopra, 1977:211) The growth rate also varies from state to state. There is imbalance in sex ratio, there is imbalance in urban and rural distribution of population and there is imbalance in growth of minorities.

"The principal focus of tensions in India in the eighties is likely to rest on the situation created by growing unemployment."

(Chopra, 1977:213) The writer is aware of the law and order problem that used to be so delicate just because the area was heavily overcrowded and there was just not enough space for the people to live, to move and to do anything without running into each other. It led to so many sociological problems, personal tensions, group classes, family feuds and insanitary situations which were very unhygienic. Population creates its own environmental problems.

Caste Complexity

The 'untouchables' of exterior castes number about a seventh of the Indian population. Caste is a peculiar feature of Hindu society:

> Caste is the living enactment of the Hindu ideas of difference - different truths, different lives through rebirth, different karmas and dharmas. In the Hindu Caste system, the unit of society has not been the individual, but the group he belonged to. All people were divided into hereditary groups that were socially isolated from the others by elaborate regulations and restrictions and by hierarchal position. Status was and is intrinsic to Hinduism ..., and every Caste has a social standing superior or inferior to that of every other Caste. (Schulberg, 1968:13)

Caste has its wider social and political ramifications from historical times to the present day. "In India, the horizontal divisions of religion were more important than those of race. Tribalism was important as with the Afghans but rarely deepened into anything like nationalism because of the two Indian factors of dispersion, owing to the lack of geographical barriers, and community separation, because of Caste." (Spear, 1979:110)

Caste also affected other socio-religious groupings in making physical and psychological communion and interpersonal interactions:

> The Rohillas of the Upper Ganges valley never became a nation because religion and Caste separated them from the local Hindu cultivators and landlords. Physical union

> across the psychic barriers only led to new social groups, often servile and usually disowned by both parental communities. The Rajputs, for all their common sentiments, remained an aristocracy divided by clan spirit because they could not unite physically or psychically with their immediate neighbors. Some Castes, like the Nairs and Brahmins of Malabar, had race as well as religion as an element in their composition, but it was the Caste feeling of separateness and superiority which prevented an organic union of sentiment. (Spear, 1979:110-111)

Two of the reformatory trends started by enthusiasts like Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) and Lord William Bentinck (1774-1839), the Governor General of India, against the institution of suttee and the abuses of Caste. Another reformist, Swami Dayananda Saraswati, a Gujrati Brahmin, founded Arya Samej in 1873 and rejected Caste along with idolatary, polygamy, child marriage, and the seclusion of widows. On similar lines, movements were launched by Ramakrishna (1834-1886) and other contemporaries including Sri Arabindo Ghose, Ramana Maharshi, Swami Vivekananda. The rivulet of reform became a stream and then a river when Congress politicians including Mahatma Gandhi led movements against the Caste system.

India's commitment to universal suffrage gave a severe blow to Caste superiority because "no Brahmin can receive election today without low caste votes but at the same time Caste groupings are in many areas being exploited as ready-made political machines sharpening the focus on Caste considerations and Caste cleavages." (Spear, 1979:248) Needless to say that the untouchability has been abolished and its practice made a serious crime heavily punished and the Constitution of India bars any discrimination on the basis of Caste, Color or Creed. But it would be too naive to think that the Caste system has been done to death. Caste still has changed its shape and complexion but is still strong. Behind the modern facade lay the

fabric of Hindu personal law still largely based on the age-old Laws of Manu, nearly as ancient and as deeply rooted as Caste itself.

Before the closure of this topic at this stage, it is relevant to draw the attention to Causes of Mutiny (1857) to acknowledge how explosive a mixture of Caste and religion could be under conflicting situations. The Bengal Army that spearheaded the revolt and was mainly bore its brunt was comprised of Hindu Muslim soldiers from Uttar Pradesh, a northern state, known for its religious orthodoxy. In the Bengal Army.

The "Sepoy" was the name given to a native Indian soldier in the service of the East India Company and that is how, perhaps, they made a distinction between an Indian and a British soldier. A British soldier was a soldier but an Indian soldier was a "Sepoy." After the mutiny of 1857, the word "Sepoy" was dropped but remained part of colloqial address and of folklore. The mutiny took place mainly in the Bengal army where the recruits belonged to Hindu high-caste and Muslims, coming from and around Oudh region known for religion orthodoxy. The religious aspect of mutiny is interested in its legend and explosive in its consequences. Thus runs the story of religious sparks flashed by Enfield rifle cartridges supplied to Indian "Sepoys" in those dry dreary days of 1857:

> The sepoy had, then, already sufficient causes for anxiety when the greased cartridge story began to spread. Cartridges for the new Lee-Enfield rifle had to be heavily greased; they had to be bitten to open the end and release the powder. The Company's army was now to be re-equipped with these rifles. it had all been arranged in England and India by specialists of the Ordinance Department, to whom it had naturally never occurred - why should it? - to think of the sepoy army. The grease was half of it tallow, which came from animals of all kinds including, no doubt, both pigs and cows. The grease was plentiful; the muzzle of the weapon was smeared with it after loading. On the lips of a

> Hindu, cow's fat would be an abomination for which there is no parallel in European ways of thinking; it was not merely disgusting, as excrement would be; it damned him as well; it was as bad as killing a cow or a Brahman. To a Muslim, pig's fat was almost as horrible. (Woodruff, 1964:352-53)

The entire episode of Mutiny hinges around Enfield rifle cartridges suspected to have been greased with cow's and pig's fat and were required to bite the ends off with their teeth which for both Hindu and Muslim soldiers was decidedly a defilement inexcuseable in their respective religious and Caste hierarchy. British learnt their lessons regarding Caste and religion seriously. There were no more attempts at policy or implementation level of the government to cause interference in religion or Caste rituals of India. Even in army and police, this policy was strictly adhered to. They played Caste and religion differences against Indians themselves and watched native reactions against the government very closely and seriously.

Most of the Western thinkers including Karl Marx thought that the advent of technological inventions, with increased mobility, industrialization and modernity, Caste system in India would die. It was also assumed that after India's independence process of social reorganization, economic equality and social justice would gain momentum declaring death-knell to the Caste system in a few years. Unfortunately, it is lingering on and seems to stay. Policies of reservation of seats and what Myron Weiner called 'preferential policies' did not cause much of a dent in social configuration. Rather social fluidity is solidifying under social tensions. "The early class system was not the Caste system of modern India; there were, for example, no restrctions on diet or dining practices, on marriage or on hereditary occupation." (Schulberg, 1968:37) A very

amazing situation is arising that the more the attack on Caste system is mounting, the deeper the roots of Caste-conflict are going.

Caste is so overbearing a social phenomenon in Indian society that so many other distinctions get blurred. Caste is so pervasive and ubiquitous in Hindu society that one is apt to overlook other important featues of Indian life. One of these is the joint family. Joint family plays an important role in interpersonal and inter-group conflict. A detail discussion on implication of Caste system vis-a-vis police would be taken up in the fourth chapter.

Language Problem

India is a multi-language country and that obviously creates a problem in communication, promoting unity and in enhancing administrative ability. It creates social and ethnic cleavages and India looks like a 'Tower of Babel'. (For details, see Lamb, 1975:183.) Languages promote political dilemma, especially when the languages of India are as various as its races and peoples are.

Those who invaded India naturally did not care for the native language or languages but instead enforced their own. Aryans promulgated Sanskrit, Muslims promoted Persian, introduced Arabic and settled with a mixture commonly known as "urdu" for ordinary use. Similarly, the British made English as the medium of education and examination and also as the official language. Even after independence, English remains associate national language and is preferred as official media, sought after by elite and is even fought for by Madras State. Hindi is otherwise the national language of India which is mainly spoken in populous states of north India. Hindi is related to Sanskrit. When opposition to Hindi grew, an Official

Languages Act was passed in 1963 which permitted the continued use of English as an official language for an indefinite period after 1965 which was the year to switch over to Hindi from English.

In the 1950's, language became an emotional issue. There were demands for states on the basis of language. With a view to satisfy agitating language groups, a State Reorganization Commission was set up which submitted its report in November 1955 and State boundaries were redrawn. It created another confusion and some tussle. Sikhs were especially dissatisfied and so were Marathi speaking people. In 1960, the State of bombay was further sub-divided into two, siz. State of Maharashtra and Gujrat State. The Sikh demand was resisted till 1966 when Punjab was divided into Punjab, Haryana and Himachel Pradesh. Still the Sikhs were not satisfied but their agitation was blunted.

Language loyalties flared up. Centrifugal forces and regionalism gained a fresh ground.

To temper the tenuous issue, regional languages were recognized State languages and enshrined into the Constitution of India. Language map of India stands as Appendix 15 . The Central Government encourages the use of Hindi but is not fanatical about it. Therefore the progress of Hindi as the national language is more neglected rather than promoted. Punjab is still in trouble on the basis of language and religion. The problem has not been solved and does not seem to be solved in the near future because non-Hindi speaking states make a frightful cry sending shivers of separation among the national leadership. No one is, therefore, is eager to touch this emotional can-of-worms. "Indian diversity runs through the categories of the

physical, the cultural and the linguistic. The mixture of the basic physical types has produced the distinct races of India, which in turn have developed the various languages now spoken." (Spear, 1972:11)

Indians are foreigners to each other when they visit states or places where different language is spoken and written. The only common link is, surprisingly, made by speaking English. Regional people take more pride in speaking their own language rather than Hindi or English as is the case with non-English speaking European countries. India remains, disunited on the basis of common link language, except, however, English. For the non-English speaking native, anything except his mother tongue is foreign. There are other factors that unite India but not the language.

The changing ecology and complexity of India's environment stirred and thus unfolded. Another side of this coin is the bureaucratic context. The environmental and bureaucratic sides interact with each other and form part of the Indian systems. Therefore, the discussion will now move to bureaucratic context.

BUREAUCRATIC CONTEXT

Bureaucracy emerges, functions and sustains itself as the contextual need of an environment which surrounds it and determines the nature of its service-delivery system. Interestingly enough, any bureaucracy in its interaction with the environment fashions its own internal environment and develops its own subculture quite different from the environment which determined earlier parameters of bureaucratic pyramid and still wants to hold that Caveat effectively or helplessly. Some bureaucracies like army, police, civil service, being close to the sources or center of power and aligning with the

existence of State, started wielding and sharing State power. As if that was not enough, so much interest and stake developed in State power by these bureaucracies that they started watching, guarding and promoting their organizational interests vigorously to eliminate new competitors and challengers.

Inter-organizational rivalry and jealousies naturally grew, shaping up a new alliance of checks and balances and defining their own effective essentiality for the survival of the so-called modern society itself. That was a big bait thrown to a democratic social order that was replacing monarchies, autocracies, and a decaying feudal support system during middle ages.

Police being an important bureaucracy after the army, have been studied very closely by recent researchers and academic focus on it is still rising dramatically, it seems logical here to discuss some of its theoretical and conceptual aspects and more on to its specific characteristics as Indian bureaucracy. Police being part of that overall Indian bureaucracy, work under larger domain of an elite civil service and as a domestic internal substitute to military. So the discussion now switches over to the theoretical and conceptual aspects.

Theoretical and Conceptual Aspects

Historically and rationally, bureaucracy emerged with a high degree of relevance. It had hierarchical relationship with prescribed action and authority through written rules based on rationality and dependent membership. It was an organizational revolution which provided relief from capricious and corrupt administration, by ensuring predictability in process and its outcome. It gave stability

to organizations and a sense of security to its members. Its weaknesses remained obscured on account of its early strength and later indispensability.

Bureaucracy suffers from conceptual and operation deficiencies which are getting visible as political conscious and technological growth achieves a new level of sophistication. It slides back easily into isolation on account of lack of feedback system. This leads to two consequences: (1) to counterbalance isolation, it takes shelter behind its masters when public threatens its posture or operation, or (2) it compromises its mandate with the public to either sabotage or to seek support against the boss. In either case it gets dislocated and its position needs to be corrected either through shock treatment or establishing new organizational linkages. Over-reliance or overuse of the rules crushes personal initiative and is ultimately counter-productive to human drive. Its members become dull, disinterested, dishonest and dogmatic, sooner or later. Misinterpretation and misapplication of rules occurs very often not in public interest, but either to beat the rules or circumvent it anyhow for various personal and sadistic reasons. To have permanency its goals are never to be clearcut and attainable. Ambiguity in goals helps it from proper evaluation and providing it an advantage to enjoy a leeway for future activities and sidesteppings.

Bureaucracy is good at single loop learning, which is an ordinary performance, and inhibits double loop learning, which is critical. As a public administration organization, bureaucracy generally suffers from majority of 'six deadly sins' enumerated by Peter Drucker; (For details, see PAR, Vol. 40, No. 2, March/April 1980:103) as 'lofty

objectives', 'does several things at once', 'fat is beautiful', 'don't experiment, be dogmatic', 'does not learn from experience' and 'inability to abandon'. The deadly sins generate non-performance for public administration.

Democracy and bureaucracy need not be operationally conflicting but they need adjustment, adaptation and specificity of domain and role. Political masters are transients and have competing claims. They are in a hurry to demonstrate their accomplishments and consolidate gains. They are flexible, fleshy, and favor distributors. These characteristics run counter to bureaucracy and hence either a clash or a compromise. Bureaucrats are themselves not free from weaknesses. They form small coteries of self-interests, exercise administrative discretion the way they want and are more system serving. It is difficult to get rid of the deadwood, monstrous growth of which afflicts modern bureaucracies then their predecessors.

The fact, however, remains that bureaucracy is everywhere affecting our lives more than any other social mechanism. Though it consumes more from the environment than it contributes, some of its aspects are pretty interesting especially the way it cushions, controls and camouflages concerted attacks and attempts to reform. Its alignment with the State against the people is highly perfidious while its role against the State is certainly a breach of trust. It stands targetted today. The technological gains and stressful life of tomorrow would either disintegrate this monolith or transform the deisgn with more responsive mechanism and cohesiveness of professional-participatory-structural system to achieve farsighted goals and clearcut objectives.

Indian Bureaucracy and its Police linkages

Indian bureaucracy today could trace back its history to the Mughal period. The Hindu administrative system was paralyzed and destroyed by the Muslim invaders from 12th century onwards. In 15th century, Sher Shah, an Afghan rule, set up a bureaucratic organization while continuing his campaigns established a vigorous center and provided an administrative blueprint from which Akbar and his ministers later profited. Actually it was Akbar who built the administrative edifice for later Mughals:

> Akbar's third achievement was the organization of a bureaucratic administration and an imperial service . . . . The system continued . . . until the Indian takeover in 1948. The officers were known as Mansabdars or holders of commands. They were arranged in thirty three grades from the Commander of ten to a Commander of 5,000 (in the first instance). A panch-hazari, or a commander of 5,000 was a great officer of state and noble combined. The title was not hereditary, appointment and promotion were by imperial favor, and rank did not in itself confer office. The members were essentially a service forming a pool of officers available for civil or military employment. Those holding titles of 500 upwards were known as amir or collectively 'umrah'. (Spear, 1972:)

The important feature of this service during Akbar's time was that they were paid in cash and the service was largely foreign, seventy percent were born outside India, while the remaining thirty were equally divided between Hindus and Muslims.

"The two common features of this service were later adopted by the British practice (1) a reliance on foreign personnel and, (2) practice of nomination. In those days the Mansabdar system provided a career open to talent to ambitious young noblemen, or, indeed, any young man of perts." (Spear, 1972:35)

The Mansabdars acted, as it were, the emperor's eyes and ears, the oil which caused the bureaucratic wheels to revolve. The emperor controlled them in a number of ways. Akbar paid them their large salaries in cash, so that they lacked a territorial basis for revolt. The system deteriorated later on. The mughal nobility was thus an official aristocracy which was hereditary as a class but not as individuals, which was landholding but not feudal. There was a system of checks and balances, as long as the system was in working order the Dewan (revenue officer) could not revolt because he had supplies without troops while the Subader could not because he had troops without supplies.

Akbar's system continued until the East India Company started introducing its own system at the time of Warren Hastings, Cornwallis and Bentinck. Stephen P. Blake categorized the mughal empire as 'Patrimonial-Bureaucratic'. There is no dispute with the logic and evidence advanced by Blake but the factors overlooked, ignored or did not give enough weightage were more potent to reveal the real nature of the Mughal empire. What Blake forgot to count was the palace conspiracies, overthrown of the ruler by the son, brother or a relative, lack of any affinity between ruler and his officials except that of fer or service, the atrocious nature of the king towards his own kith and kin and officials. I do not go much into details but there is more evidence to refute the model of 'Patrimonial-bureaucratic' empire during Moghul days. (For details see Blake, 1979:77).

The British bureaucracy has at the top the Governor-General in India, subject to the authority of the Directors and the President of

the Board of Control in London. He was supported by the Army and the service:

> The service was now Europeanized in the middle and upper cadres and divided into the revenue, judicial and commercial branches. The members were regularly paid and had begun to acquire standards of integrity and an esperit de corps of their own. Another feature was that the country was divided into twenty three districts in which a new police force maintained law and order, a judge administered the law, and a collector was responsible for revenue collection. (Spear, 1972:99)

There was some similarity and parallelism in the Mughal and British bureaucracy. "The Governor General's position resembled that of a Bengal Subader and the pattern of the State followed broadly Mughal lines down to the division of authority between the military and revenue branches, because both were essentially foreign, in personnel as well as in culture." (Spear, 1972:100)

The traders of the East India Company were not simply traders but belonged to a mercantile-imperialist combination on whom the British administration as a system did not evolve at the outset, but began when Heilybury was founded in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and "it was still growing and hardening when the process was interrupted by the Mutiny in 1857." (Woodruff, 1976:14). The Mutiny was sudden and shocking and the Britishers "took rather literally some of the warnings of the Mutiny." (Chamberlain, 1974:158)

> After the Mutiny the theme changes. The empire is complete and scarcely grows, the main threads of interest are now to be found in the steady increase of Indian unity, the steady development of natural resources, the steady adoption of modern conceptions and methods, enabling Indian to play her part among the great states of the world . . . .

The change from company rule to Crown-Control, was not motivated by an Indian considerations but to assure to the people in England that Indian did indeed now belong to the nation, and not just to a handful

of Englishmen. Lord Clive, who won the local battles, which eventually brought for the Company, the 'Diwani rights' (collector of revenue and administration of civil and criminal justice) in Bengal, which included at that time Bihar and Orissa. Burke credited Clive for leaving a bridge for his successors over which the lame might hobble and the blind might grope their way. No doubt that the bureaucrat successors, hobbled and groped over that bridge and kept passing the tradition in the form of ritualistic rules. In those days, the spirit of plunder and a passion for the rapid accumulation of wealth actuated all ranks." Warren Hastings came after Clive and laid the foundations of the system of civil administration over which the superstructure was raised by Cornwallis.

In fact the British administration started from warehouses and from Presidency town (Calcutta, Bombay and Madras) or 'Port cities' as called by Rhoads Murphey. How to conduct the administration and what type of administration, was the basic problem. It was not very clear and English ideas then were at root confused. Philip Woodruff, who give British bureaucracy in India a Platonic elevation, admitted that despotism was all the same, as any system must be in which people are given what is good for them instead of what they want. Though, there is ahigh average of ability among the servicemen in the upper posts,, but they seem rather wanting in imagination and sympathy, less inspired by the extraordinary and unprecedented phenomenon of the country than might have been expected.

It is interesting to have a feel of the class characteristics of these much eulogized bureaucrats. After going through the historic literature regarding the growth and development of bureaucracy in

India, I found some distinct moulds of class characteristics, exceptions excluded, to be analyzed hereafter.

The Nature of the Bureaucrats

"The rulers of India were men, quick with fleshy desire, lust for power, and the miraculous diversity of men, humorous, solemn and unpredictable, adventurous, soaked in routine, timid and bold." (Woodruff, 1964:14) These gentlemen officers of the East India Company were described as 'Founders' and 'Guardians' by Philip Woodruff. The nature of the 'Founders' have something paternalistic, but 'Guardians' seldom encourage charge and it is not surprising that they were not always loved nor that in the end their wards outgrew their tutelage. These young men from British public schools accepted the service of the East India Company for a variety of reasons including ambition to acquire wealth and status, and as J.S. Mill noted "India was a vast system of outdoor relief for Britain's upper class." (Collins and Lapierre, 1975:24). The young school graduates "by the time they were twenty four or twenty five, they often found themselves wit the sole responsibility for handing down justice and administering the lives of a million or more human beings in areas larger than Scotland Yard." (Collins and Lappierre, 1975:25) In those early days, they remained unmarried for a long time and were exponents of victorian virtues. "Absolutely alone, the only white man within hundreds of miles, with no connection except by message or horseback, and only by lawbooks to guide him, the youngster, three or four years out of Oxford, was a sovereign." (Collins and Lappierre, 1975:26) They developed a taste for outdoor sports, especially pig-sticking and polo, and has to keep body fit to survive in the India climate. They

were critical of the Indian climate. The comparison of climate might have confirmed the belief in their minds that the white race from a cold climate was naturally superior to India's hot climate. They tried to explain vices and virtues based on climatic theory:

> Alleged Indians languor, sensitivity, fatalism, constitutional feebleness, preference for despotic institutions, and sexuality, were all depicted at various times as necessary results of India's constant vapour battle. (Hutchins, 1967:61)

Hutchins also found that "the product of a victorian publicc school was likely to be well disposed towards the masculine society of British India but at the same time, the victorian Englishman in India, by his situation as well as temperament, was singularly ill-suited to gain a favourable impression of Indian character." (Hutchins, 1967:50-53) They "saw more immorality in Indian actions, and failed to perceive the comparability of many of their own vices because they assumed a somewhat different form." (Hutchins, 1967 :59)

The opening of the Suez Canal, steamship navigation, faster means of travel and communication, increase in the number of British women in British establishments in India, radically changed the social environment and some of the conceptions of the British bureaucrats. The setting up of exclusive British clubs and the discovery of 'hill-stations' brought relief to their lives. They were convinced that they were 'the birds of passage' but it was difficult for them to accept that the 'permanance' of the 'British Raj' was an illusion.

The Spirit of Imperialism, Racial Discrimination and Sense of Superiority

In bureaucracy, it started with imperialism and racial superiority but ended with class superiority and exclusiveness. The

British were conscious of their racial superiority from the very beginning and used condemnatory words to highlight the same in their conversations, writings and despatches. "Cornwallis used to hate Indians so much that he removed them from all positions of authority." (Edwards, 1967:52) The British Prime Minister Disraeli wrote to Lord Salisbury at that time, that "Nothing is more disgusting that the habit of our officers speaking always of the inhabitants of India - many of them descended from the great races - as 'Niggers'. It is ignorant and brutal and surely most mischievious." (Chamberlain, 1974:156). In response to this, Lord Mayo, the then Governor-General of India wrote to Sir Henry Durand, Lieutenant Governor of Punjab; "Teach your subordinates that we are all British gentlemen engaged in the magnificant work of governing an inferior race." (Chamberlain, 1974:157)

It was the general feeling among the British that:

> . . . as a second in command, a native is admirable, but as first, he is utterly deficient. The anti-democratic bias was related with anti-Indian prejudice. The British were in their right to feel that we have not been elected or placed in power by the people . . . and therefore . . . we are bound by our consience, and not by theirs. (Edwards, 1967:176)

By another argument:

> . . . the Europeanization of the service was based essentially on moral considerations, on the view that uprightness and honesty were more important to the success of British Indian government than the association with that government of Indians. (Hutchins, 1967:15)

The sense of superiority was expressed in so many ways and Indians were condemned to fit in those observations. Of course, there were few exceptions to the rule. There were a few who, out of curiosity, discovered the greatness of India's ancient civilization

but in spite of that, the majority of them were not impressed. Commenting on the English attitude of superiority towards Indians, G.O. Trevelyan wrote:

> Such was now the attitude which many Englishmen held toward the representatives of a civilization which has attained sophistication at a time when the ancestors of English dukes still paddled about in wicker canoes, when wild in woods the noble marquis rain. (Hutchins, 1967:73)

Much famous Sir Charles Napier, Governor of Sind, and the founder of Indian police on Irish constabulary model was of the view that the British officer class was not recruited among the ordinary British soldiers and considered the better sort of Indians absolutely on par with English officers. Trevalyan and Napier represented a very tiny minority of British bureaucracy in India and the majority was never devoid of its ego and superiority. Even when the Indians joined the coveted civil service, they were affected by the environment and touched by these feelings. Later on they developed a class brotherhood and a concept of class superiority which persists until today.

The Style of the British Administration and the Application of Law

The organization and the style of functioning of the British bureaucracy in India was amazingly intriguing. It was a three-tier system - Indians called natives were at the bottom, filling the ranks of inferior service. The second level was Provincial Services created at the recommendations of Aitchison Commission in 1889, and was also filled by Indians mostly by direct recruitment and some by promotion. The first class service was known as the 'Indian Civil Service' whose examinations were held in England only for quite some time and was

open to the British. Later examination were also held in India and services were thrown open to Indians. The variations in minimum age (19 to 22 years) and the maximum age (23 to 24 years) was also sometimes to net the British youth coming out of schools and sometimes to handicap Indians.

The services were organized to uphold the imperialist designs and not to provide equal share to Indians in the administration. The recommendations of Macauley imposed English language not only as the medium of education but also of administration. Same was the case with the law. The Britishers found the Indian law very primitive, unsystematic and oppressive. The British legal system was therefore implanted in India. The system devised and implemented was supposed to be efficient, honest and fairly less oppressive, but opposite was the result. "Instead of appearing as a tangible defense against justice, the law itself seemed to be and indeed, by default, acted as an engine of tyranny." (Edwards, 1967:107). The concept was that if laws were best devised by specialists so also were they best administered by specialists. The law itself as well as its application was alien, difficult to understand and continued to appear strange and arbitrary. It obviously led to inefficienc, arbitrariness and corruption in courts. Stephen, the Law Member of the Governor-General's Council, thought law to be "a compulsory Gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience." (Edwards, 1967:184)

It became a very time consuming and costly legal process. Robert L. Kidder reviewed the impact of western law in India and found its form and application most unsatisfactory.

The District Administration

The mainstay and the bulwark of the British bureaucracy is the district administration, which is considered to be unique. The district units were organized basically for revenue collection and to organize civil and criminal administration. After experimentation, the District Magistrate was made head of the district. He is also the Collector and the Deputy Commissioner. On account of their importance, these officrs used to be British and Indians were allowed to hold that charge much later. Being head of the general administration, the District Magistrate was given wide powers over the heads of other departments as district level, and also was the head of the police and the Chief Prosecutor. He also decided and committed cess as Magistrate first class and Magistrate with Special Powers.

Even after the independence, the old aura of the office was retained and his powers increased on account of new social, economic, local and special laws. The growth of his office, poers and responsibility have been so stupendous and onerous that he had little or no time to do justice with those responsibilities and duties.

Exclusiveness and Eliteness of the Bureaucracy

Being the sole in charge of the district and far removed from the control of the provincial capital, the office of te district magistrate was much fantasized and sought after. A bureaucrat in charge of the district, he is the lord of all he surveys, elite and exclusive, he commands the district under his control. At district headquarters, he lives in a kind of vacuum but comes to life when he is on tour. The exclusiveness was also the cause of estrangement

between the Indians and the Britis. Michael Edwards located the reasons of estrangement in growing numbers of the British women and in the growth of influence of Christian missionaries.

> The women tended to bring with them the English prejudices of their time. Their attitude, generally speaking, was Christian . . . . They brought, too, a new sense of family life, and their arrival resulted in the expulsion of native mistresses who had at least injected something of India into the world of British. (Edwards, 1967:34)

And,

> As the number of British men and women increased, they were able to construct a fortress into which to retire after the unavoidable engagements with the natives - in business, in the law, or in government. It also gave them something to defend and to justify.
>
> The women were not interested in Indians, only in the inefficiencies of their servants. They wanted to create for themselves and their menfolk an island in the vast sea of India - and to a large extent they were successful. (Edwards, 1967:34)

There existed a pervasive sense of hatred and arrogance against Indians. Cornwallis (1773) hated Indians and Lord Wellesly in 1798, brought with him a profound sense of racial arrogance. Wellesly was not alone, there were only very few exceptions. By 1810, a visitor to Calcutta was able to report that "every Briton appears to pride himself on being outrageously a John Bull." (Edwards, 1967:33)

By 1850s, the British in India had virtually institutionalized their contempt for things Indian and after the Mutiny of 1857, it was generally felt by the British officials in India that Indians were a pretty evil lot and that it was Britain's duty to civilize and christianize them.

The Britishers never attempted to synthesize Indian and English values or virtues but kept the aloofness alive. The principle of

'Divide and Rule' served them better and after 1857, administratively and politically they implemented that principle. By their support and assurance, they gained loyalty of Indian rulers, princes, nobles, and landlords. They also gained the collaboration of Indian businessmen and the services of English-educated Indian bureaucrats. Even the Indian nationalists were British collaborators. There was perhaps no need for them to follow a policy to produce synthetic heroes. Macauley did enough to westernize the Indians. This led both ways - to strengthen as well as to weaken the British Raj. The hero of 'Far Pavillion' could only by the product of novelist Kaye but not of British policy. The british used to become so different as soon as they came to India that Dilke wrote in 1869, "England in the East is not the England we know." (Hutchings, 1967:101) How greater was the exclusiveness and limited was the assimilation and experience of those who visited India. Take the example of Winston Churchill:

> Winston Churchill, for instance, coming to India as an army officer fresh from Sandhurst, found the way of life of a British officer to his liking, and proceeded to throw himself into it with all his enthusiasm. It was a life which consisted essentially of frontier expeditions, and garrison encampment, and garrison life consisted almost exclusively of polo . . . . Every day, Churchill played polo for hours on end . . . . Then there was whist, drinking at the Club, and dining with important officials to whom Churchill had introductions. The striking thing about Churchill's narrative of the way in which his Indian years were spent is his total absorption with the British community. Churchill - and he was typical of hundreds and thousands of them in this respect - spent three years in India without apparently meeting any Indian other than a menial. (Hutchins, 1967:102)

Of course there were few who left this isolation and captivity, went to the people and tried to understand the complexity of Indian life. This made their memoirs more lively, human and invigorating. Philip Woodruff wrote in this context that "it was from camp, not from

an Indian mistress, that some of the English learnt what then India was." (Woodruff, 1966:171)

The morning horseriding was another attempt to get away from this isolation. Lord Mountbatten, through these morning rides, was very successful in stirring the Indian imagination and utilizing the glamour of the office in creating a favourable public opinion, during the last days of the British empire in India. Reforms in India were implemented by bureaucracy. They minimally meddled with the personal laws and did not interfere with the social philosophy of Hindu life.

The bureaucracy in India was not in favor of the Britishers leaving India except in the last days when they knew that it cannot be avoided and that they would gain the posts vacated by the Britishers. They continued to think that it would never be necessary for Britain to leave, if Britain did leave it would not be because India no longer needed her, but because the English democracy wantonly disregarded its responsibilities.

Present Bureaucracy - A Legacy of the Past

The present bureaucracy in India is prolongation of the past. The Indian Administrative Service succeeded the Indian Civil Service in 1948. Except for a few modifications and shuffling of titles and terms, it is not a transition. The Indian Administrative Service is regarded as inferior by the members of the Indian Civil Service. There is nothing to refute this contention. The Indian Administrative Service is of urban origin and orientation and there is a perpetual inbreeding of the civil service, resulting in the continuance of the tendencies and the attitudes established long ago. As it was suring the British time, so is it now that a class of people or a specific

fraction of Society continue to comprise the Indian bureaucracy. In this context, "it is important to note that in an essentially agricultural and rural India, over seventy percent of the civil service, is drawn from ten percent of its population . . ." (Tummala, 1979:170) The Administrative Reforms Committee Study Team wrestled with this problem but had mild comments on the situation:

> We had to devise our recruitment system in such a way that without compromising quality, the service net the best available talent from the entire country and the field is not restricted, implicitly or explicitly, to a small stratum of society. (Tummala, 1979:170)

Then and now, the services were used as 'change agents'. The role of change agent, when played by the elite service, representing a small section of the spectrum, can be understood and imagined, in the context of complex situations and enormous problems the vast population is facing at one end and at the same time. Is it the 'hangover of the past' or the inertia of the present? Why the imbalance? Why is there no effort to correct the anamoly? Whose responsibility is it? What are the constraints on effecting reforms? What are the effects of this imbalance? All these questions have not been answered and are not the subject of this paper.

The attitude and approaches of today's bureaucracy are no different. They follow a safe line, mediate and perform a balancing act. There is no interest to be innovative as there is neither time nor the wish to bother. They were servile to the ruling politicians, bosses to their subordinates, and indifferent towards the people. There is a lot of confusion, ambivalence and double standard in services. An explanation by a top bureaucrat:

> We are in a twilight period; the past has not vanished and the future has not quite emerged. And, as of today, we

> do not know if the twilight is of the dusk or of a dawn. And so, old ideas, old habits, old thoughts, the old value system and traditions are in a constant tussle with new ideas, new values and new social relationships. (Tummala, 1979:195)

Is there really such a conflict? Is the conflict new to bureaucracy? Does it have the will and means to cope with it? What are the efforts made? So many more questions but no answers.

There is some exclusiveness, typical isolation for today's bureaucracy. Routine paperwork, attendance to politicians takes away their time. They become alive to public needs when there is confrontation. They are cut off from people not wit the nature of their work but due to their background also. The Indian Administrative Service is "too remote, too cut off by educational background and manners of living, from the reat majority of the community, to be fully effective either as a means of group-consultation or as a listening post." (Tummala, 1979:199) The dissenting opinion of one of the members of the Administrative Reforms Commission highlights this issue:

> The present system of recruitment . . . is such that even a very brilliant boy who has passed out of a small college hardly stands any chance of success against even a mediocre student who has had the benefit of a public school education or who has had the advantage of moving into higher society. This leads to boys belonging to higher income groups and urban centers monopolizing the all India competition examinations. My colleagues in the commission appear to have closed their eyes to this dangerous trend where western oriented young men are in a position to annex most positions in all India and Central services. (Tummala, 1979:199)

The Service itself has a strong lobby and it is difficult to bring changes resisted by it. There has developed a vested interest in the status quo. Those belonging to the Services reject the

arguments of change as being the traces of the old prejudices and echoes of the old slogans.

Those retired from the Service or still in the Service blame the politicians for demoralizing and pressuring the Service as well as for creating conditions creating all kinds of problems. The tendency is to plead for 'independence of bureaucracy' comparing the members of the Indian Civil Service was that of Indian Administrative Service, Tyabji complains that "the most successful are those who can best translate their political masters' wishes into decisions in a way that they can most plausibly sell to the public as being in their best national interest." (Tyabji, 1980:134)

Spangenberg made a detailed study of the bureaucracy in India and blasted the myth that it was an elite service and blamed the authors for romanticising the accounts of these members of the Indian Civil Service:

> The aura of romanticism often surrounding British bureaucracy in India has embraced at least three essential myths: the myth of the ICS's popularity as a profession: the myth of its efficiency in administering British India, and the myth of its self-sacrificial espirit de corps, that infused the government with a primary concern for the welfare of the Indian people. (Spangenberg, 1976:336)

There was not much focus on Indian bureaucracy after the independence as the country was passing through the agonizing crisis of partition and natural upheaval. The British left the bureaucracy to adjust and adapt itself to the new realities. It did try to adjust and in that effort entrenched itself. The changes in the country's national politics from 1975 to 1979 affected the bureaucracy too. By 1980, the situation again became grim. The focus fell on bureaucracy again. Some of the writers predicted that the 'bureaucratic collapse'

was imminently certain and suggested to organize a working Indian model.

The retired civil servants joined the debate, remembered their days, recalled some of the experiences and episodes to explain the point and supported the efforts of salvaging a noble legacy. They thought that the Service might survive the shocks.

A senior member of the Indian administrative service, reviewed the problem and blamed the Indian people for wastefully waiting when nothing works. He felt that they should be jolted out of the passivity and intellectual self-deception.

The blame appears to be placed at three quarters. Some blame goes to the politicians, some to bureaucrats and some to people as a whole or the general environment. Politicians are blamed for emasculating the bureaucracy and imperilling "the survial of an efficient and impartial administrative machinery." (Acharya, 1980:6)

A bitter criticism against the bureaucrats was levelled on the rounds that they were not doing their job, and cared more for rules rather than for results. Unlike Japan where civil servants act as broker the Indian civil servant behaves like a bureaucrat.

Bureaucracy in the Eighties

There was no dramatization of change either in the structure, style or nature of the bureaucracy in post independence period. The Indian bureaucracy acceted the new role as most of them got promotion and senior positions vacated by the Britishers and Muslim officers who opted for Pakistan. The challenge, tremendous amount of work and responsibilities kept the bureaucracy busy and in an uncertain environment they closed their ranks. The politicians, as the new

rulers of te country, were partially trained to work with bureaucracy and were a breed of good understanding and high quality men. Both politicians and bureaucrats worked with co-operation and were reluctant to rock the boat. This smooth sailing continued up to the late sixties when the ruling Congress party got split up and bureaucrats were compelled to take sides in an inter-party wrangling. The process of taking sides and victimization started gradually but became very much pronounced in the Seventies. There came a new crop of leadership and a new breed of bureaucrats. The stage was set when challenge from opposition parties gained momentum and the threat was potential by 1975. The clamping of emergency emboldened those who sided with the ruling group and those who hesitated or opposed were almost castigated. It was made clear to all and sundry that the salvation lies with power and the doom in denial. A trickle became a stram and a new wave of sycophany sweeped the stage. The backlash came in 1977 with the reversal of political fortunes in the general elections. The ruling arty became opposition and the oppostion, the new ruling party. This did not bring any fundamental change. One set of politicians replaced the other and the new set of politicians shifted their favorite bureaucrats to pivotal posts and victimized the earlier ones. This rise and fall continued for another two years. In 1980 political fortunes changed again to the status quo of 1975. There was another wave of transfers, postings and promotions of the bureaucrats. This is what happened as a new role, new dilemma and new change every time the tables were turned:

> In recent years, the role and function of the civil servant, and his position vis a vis his political masters, has been the subject of much confusion and controversy. Political pressures have led many bureaucrats to adopt defensive

> postures and to consciously turn a blind eye to malfunctions in the system. Others have deliberately sought and got political patronage as a way to survive and thrive. (Hindustan Times, 1981:1)

To what level the deterioration in relationship has gone down was revealed in a letter written by a senior bureaucrat to the Chief Minister of Bihar, a northern province, while refusing to accept his promotion:

> An honest and upright public servant finds himself largely irrelevant in the present set up. He becomes a meaningless blob in a system based on favouritism and geared to serve the interests of political functionaries and their near and dear ones alone. (Hindustan Times, 1981:1)

The Bihar IAS Association has endorsed these views with a hope that state government will 'stem the growing rot' and stop further 'demoralization'. The reply and stand taken by the Chief Minister explains the position of the politicians:

> Mr. Chatterji has sought to raise the old controversy as to who is important - the politician or the bureaucrat. In the parliamentary system, the bureaucrat has to play a subservient role, a second fiddle to the political bos, who is directly elected representative of the people. (Hindustan Times, 1981:1)

There are numerous examples of transfers and victimization of bureaucrats at the hands of whimsical incompetent and corrupt politicians which might fill heaps of pages. There are others who remain and will go to any extent to please politicians and even their friends and relatives. The experience had shown to them that there are not many ways of survival:

> For most bureaucrats, there are only two ways to survive in this political jungle. One is to become a 'meaningless blob' and merely push files hoping that they do not clash with political interests. They show little initiative, have no job satisfaction, and eagerly await retirement from service. (Hindustan Times, 1981:1)

These are the few examples of recent time but the trend was set out by the Chief Minister of Punjab around the mid-sixties known for according shock treatments to bureaucrats, few of them of course could not survive the humiliation. The same technique has become an accepted norm to a politician who wishes to display his political power. It has become so common that if one cannot humiliate a bureaucrat or his assistants, he is doomed to be taken as an incompetent failure or a harmless creature. In a foreseeable uture, it is idfficult to visualize any change or even an improvement unless some sort of confrontation or magical event takes place. Much of the cry may remain unheard of or simmer below the surface for the bureaucrat the stakes are high. To be a favorite is sure to get an important position, promotion or protection while falling from the grace may mean personal humiliation, abrupt transfer, indefinite leave, premature retirement if not dismissal, or even a trip to the jail. So the bureaucrats keep on constant watch to ensure where the power is shifting and which way the wind might blow.

This trend has affected police more than the civil service. Both at national and at state level, police are placed under a civilian bureaucrat. At district level, Superintendent of Police is not subordinate to the District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner but he cannot afford to run counter to the latter unless he has personal political ties at the top. This rat race for political favors is dubious in police for survival than in the civil. Police officers are more exposed and susceptible to pressures, punishments and punitive attitudes from political and civilian bosses alike. The new trend is either a political police alliance or political civil servant alliance

depending on personal equation and exigencies of the situation. When the race is on, it is the resourcefulness of the officer whether civil or police, to approach, appease and stoop to conquer the political powerfuls.

Bureaucratic context of policing is changing in India. The changes are organizational, functional and personnel; therefore far-reaching and significant. A new police personality is bound to emerge out of an old identity, which might be more independent of over-arching civil service, more confident, self-conscious and self-reliant. This is a new trend swiftly changing the horizon of India's police work. An intermediary generation that saw the transition of British India into Independent India seems to be leaving the scene gradually. The organizational reigns are being transferred to a new post-independent breed which does share the qualms, quibblings and quandaries of by-gone generations.

To know exactly where police today in India stands organizationally and what the altered aspects would be, it seems imperative to analyze situation stand of police in bureaucratic genre. In short, a discussion on police organizational nexus is warranted. The discussion on organizational nexus would not only provide a general overview but also specifically entail an examination of its organizational entity.

Organizational Nexus

Police organizational crisis emerged with the strengthening of the 'democratic ideal' and with the growing challenge to its domain from subsidiary State forces. Organizational analysis, in general,

came into the limelight through Max Weber and grew into a full-blown crescendo by the Eighties.

"Organizational analysis is now an exciting, turbulent and engaging field, and also, one of the most widely debated problems in the conceptualization of the relationship(s) between environment and organization." (Manning, 1980:1) Soon there came a cautionary note that "the study of complex organizations is entering a period of crisis because the established paradigm encountered serious boundary limits." (Benson, 1977:5) It is not only a problem of an 'established paradigm' but a problem that rolled into the historical agenda by its environmental interaction.

Organizations are sedentary and segmentary processes that exercise long-lasting effect/impact on environment, individuals and on itself. To stabilize, to adjust and to adapt, organizatios keep on changing their roles and stipulate their responses according to changes in the millieu.

Police, a highly bureaucratic model has been emphasized as a public service organization, by implication or by interpretation. Its weberian legal authority, somewhat tinged with tradition, is devoid of any charismatic appeal either from its professional membership or hierarchical leadership. When traditional and legal authority stands eroded or diffused, police start adjusting its keel to vicarious sources of State power.

Problems of environment are also problems of survival for the police. Any socio-political revolution, for that reason, threatens police. On similar grounds, police faces dilemma in a democracy because democracy presages political uncertainty:

> When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases, also the aristocratic forms, against which at the soutset they strugled so fiercely. Now new accusers arise to denounce the traitors; after an era of glorious combats and of inglorious power, they end by fusing with the old dominant class; whereupon once more they are in their turn attacked by fresh opponents who appeal to the name of democracy. It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end. (michels, 1981:54)

During twilight of State power, specially in the United States, emergence of powerful giants like multi-national corporations eclipsed organizational importance of police and subjugated its imperial authority. In India, it happened only to a very limited extent because police being a national centralized authority there manipulated its dominance through an incredible alliance with politics and by exploiting its situational strategy. Glaring examples of these observations are when Prime Ministers and Chief Ministers change in India, when parties transfer power and when interests of Stte are at stake.

"Organizations constitute important instruments of domination in the advanced industrial societies." (Benson, 1981:222) It is not at all surprising that police as an organization serves as an instrument of domination in developing countries, more so in India. There is another complexity. "Goals are put to many uses by organizational participants and individual participants bring their own private goals or motives with them into the organization." (Scott, 1981:289)

And the two goals rarely coincide. Another problem is determination of 'good' and 'bad' organizations or when one turns to be one, because, "there is no such thing as 'good organization' in any absolute sense. Police as an organization was continuously sold to

public opinion, as strategic hardware, though record of its performance °persistently remained gory. Police, pathologically, justified and glorified its organizational wares, with the same tenacity, at different times, without encountering any serious problems. "Pathologies in the operation of contemporary organizations afflict both individual participants and external publics." (Scott, 1981:315) Police was hailed, in the beginning, as a great innovation and it is still being acclaimed to be so.

Police is capable of and it does generate as an organization, static and kinetic energy. "Organizations generate power as a consequence of their functioning," (Scott, 1981:291) and police do that to greatest measure. Legitimacy of police functioning in India, either under East India Company or under Crown, was never challenged. That was the kind of acceptance of British rule in India. What was challenged was the power to rule and not the organizational instrumentality; therefore, when transfer of power took place, police was taken over as the most valued and desired possession. It still continues like that.

Police organizational modernization in India is on wheels. Central and State governments have been pumping in money in police organizations, for political reasons, of course. Police is serving as a pivot of central authority and politicians use it more for negative purposes than for positive consequences. Indian environment has, since, been changing and so was the need felt of a police change. Ithas been a very cautious goal. But, should the police learn himself, what, and why is the question.

Prime need of India's police is to 'learn and unlearn'. It shall learn how to interact with its new environment, how to meet the needs of its new clientele and how to manage best its whole hog house. It has to unlearn its colonial service model, techniques or torture and how to turn off the populace. "Organizations do quite frequently know less than their members but organizations do not drift passively with the members learning; organizations influence their members' learning: organizations influence their members' learning after the original learners have left." (Nystrom and Starbuck: 1981:6) For police there is the problem of learning and also of unlearning because it is more complex an organization and its environment changes fast. "Complex, fast moving industrial societies appear to afford bad conditions for learning and turbulent times demand more control capacity than organizations normally possess." (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1981:13). "Environmental benevolence of hostility is another property that affects organizational learning because benevolence may breed somnolence, hostility may lead to paralysis." (Nystrom and Starbuck, 14) Both learning and unlearning is part of a process whic requires lots of resources and resolute will. Those organizations that build walls around them, ignore the signals from the environment and grow defensive. "To learn, unlearn, and relearn is the organizational walk: development comes to an end when one of these legs is missing." (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1981:23) Higher echelon in police bring innovations in organization to make it adaptive and professionally efficient. Through the force of discipline and regulatory channels the system could be flushed by bringing new policy changes from above.

Police trade in good and bad politics. Politics in pluralistic

societies and multi-layered communities like in India, is complex but for a bureaucrat it is a side show that affects him directly. Divide and rule was the dictum during the British days and the same continues still with euphemistic application. Describing the Asian Societies as 'patrimonial' it was maintained that "bureaucrats usurp for themselves many of the symbols of high status, and they stress the upholding of prescribed styles of life as theirmajor contribution to the well being of the society." (Eisenstadt, 1981:312) The world is changing fast under the universal growth model, technological revolutions and global interaction, still life is slow in so many Asian and African countries. In societies which are relapsing in patrimonial contents, bureaucratic positions are preposterously powerful:

> Bureaucratic posts are conceived as sinecures and as semi-private, even hereditary, properties of their incumbents. Intensive, unrestricted and unregulated trading in posts leads to proliferations of personnel beyond the task necessities and to implementations of Parkinson's law. Proliferations of departments cause difficulties in coordination, which are met with ritualism in bureaucratic practices. (Eisenstadt, 1981:312)

Police are failing to do what they should always have done - updating themselves:

> Organizations must function as learning systems capable of designing their own evolution through interaction with changing environments. It is no longer appropriate for them to behave merely as problem solving systems seeking to maintain a steady state in stable environmental conditions. Increasingly, organizations must develop the capacity to redefine the problems they seek to solve, redesign their relations with their environments and, in the process, discard established structures. As adaptive learning systems, organizations must continually reconcile internal differences and cope with the diverse and conflicting expectations of a multiplicity of publics. (Metcalfe, 1981:526)

For police it is a difficult and dangerous proposition. Police could internally renovate, een for that the choices and avenues are

very limited. They have to function according to the legal requirement, political prescriptions and environmental constraints. There is always scope for operational flexibility and attitudinal change among its members but a constant remodelling would be self defeating and generate instability. Finally,

> . . . by legitimizing the exercise of power, social controls produce intrinsic motivations to take risks, improve performance, and guide the design of new frameworks for action because self regulation and self-design are distinct but complementary facets of the process of organizational learning. (Metcalfe, 1981:526)

Changes and turbulent times are not of one's seeking and hardly could be avoided. They are to be coped up by men, managers and organizations. "This means that in turbulent times, the fundamentals have to be managed, and managed well." (Drucker, 1980:9) But what changes and what does not change would be the questions. "Fundamentals do not change. But the specifics to manage them do change greatly with changes in internal and external conditions." (Drucker, 1980:9). Change is both an opportunity and a threat. It would be more and more apparent that "in turbulent times managers have to learn to operate in a political environment, in which the dynamics have shifted to small, singleminded confrontational minorities that can veto, and away from minorities that represent a consensus can act." (Drucker, 1980:221) Viewing Japan in organizational context, Peter Drucker raises altogether new management issues; "perception as against conception, design as against description, topology as against geometry, and configuration as against analysis." (Drucker, 1981:201) Will this define the shape of things to come, a direction for future or even a guideline for today's entrepreneurs? Will get met a master manager - master manager so perceptively portrayed by R.G.H. Siu or

the road will automatically merge into another, resulting in a self transformation - 'an organizational renewal'.

Bureaucratic Context: Summary

The ecological as well as the bureaucratic context of the police in India reveal that both of these factors have directly or indirectly affected the police growth and behavior. Its attitude, perspective, organizational procedures and service delivery system are legacy-bound but a new breed of officers and personnel are adjusting themselves to the existing reality.

The main dilemmas are how to purposely combine past with present so that it could be equally relevant in the future. The tripod of political, civil service and the police has to be tied in a newer frame with distinct demarcation of domain and defining new roles. How to bring around the change, adjusting social reality with political accountability and cultural constraints? The weak reform attempts add to these already existing dilemmas. In any police reform attempt, ruling political party is bound to assess its advantages and disadvantages. It will not be a hasty step. There are some other signs of organizational dilemma: possibility of greater unionization, seek more political favours and protection and in the process lower the moral and lose the discipline.

Officials can serve the public's true interests better than politicians when the public has an erroneous opinion of what its true interests are. More so, "it is deliverate police policies which have serious dysfunctional consequences for well acknowledged police objectives." (Jones, 1980:152).

The frustration, corruption and intransigence would take over in due course if police reform were not seriously attended to. Reform means change in organizational structure, style and image. The functions and tasks will need new delineation. Next chapter will analyze and integrate the structural and functional design of the police system. It will recast its role and reinterpret its imagery.

Summary

Culture and bureaucratic context are unescapable features of policing in India. After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the British took special care to blend their western style and structure of policing to suit the Indian soil. Without involving the community directly, they molded police to take care of community customs. A tradition was established not genrally to effect police entry into religious places of worship or the universities' campuses without permission unless and until it was emergency or circumstances so compelling. Legal safeguards were laid down to protect modesty and decency of Indian women while conducting searches or arresting a woman. Search of a woma cannot be legally affected by any male police personnel and even when conducted by a woman 'strict regard' for her modesty was to be ensured. Presence of another woman or her relative was imperative while questioning and she cannot be summoned to come alone to the police station, and then only during the day. Any woman if arrested had to be kept in the women's lock up separate from all men and had to be escorted by a higher ranking police officer and then not on a one to one basis.

Police was made legally bound to take community support in case of arrest, searches, seizure and evidence. Any confession before a

police officer was inadmissible and no conviction could be based merely on the evidence of a police officer if not corroborated by a public witness. At least two public witnesses are required by any and every police evidence to make it admissible and creditable in a court of law.

Police itself was a highly bureaucratized organization. It was controlled by a civilian and professional bureaucracy. After independence, the political top was hoisted at bureaucratic bandwagon.

Organizational nexus with its knitting with the political social system to provide overall police performance has been established. Police organization was shaped under the prevalent organizational theories of yesteryear but was not updated in the light of current theories. Some of the police stalwarts, are, however, talking of making use of a few concepts like MBO (Management by Objectives), communication grid, planning and research cells, etc. The difficulty is that there is very little in the hands of the police chief to alter police organization and overall interest to alter policing in political and civilian hierarchy is obviously cynically limited.

Cultural variables, organizational and other contextual factors are more relevant today than ever and had to be tackled in earnest. Some of these factors would come up for discussion in the next chapter which deals with structure, style and imagery of police in India.

CHAPTER III

OVERVIEW

This chapter elaborates on police structure, style, functions, tasks and imagery in Indian context. As maintained by Bayley "the features which are most central to the concerns of political scientists are (1) the structure of the national system, (2) the nature of primary operational units, and (3) the methods of political control." (Bayley, 1975:342) Elaborating this point, Bayley contemplated that the "explanation for characteristic differences could be provided by attributes of police systems: (1) nature of tasks, (2) structure of the national system, (3) nature of accountability, and (4) professional image and role behavior." (Bayley, 1973:361)

In India, police is a multi-levelled centralized bureaucracy and therefore its territorial as well as functional jurisdiction could be felt at national, provincial, and local level at the same time. The complex control operates at various levels of organizational hierarchy but most of the confusion is saved due to its centralized character. This chapter will scan police functional formulations with tasks and would adequately integrate that structure with imagery and role or function attributes. Tasks and functions cannot be viewed in isolation, nor imagery be tied entirely to ethereal realm.

David Bayley has provided an elaborate definition of police functions, which has been accepted here for brevity and greater precision:

> Studies of what they do have employed three very different measures of activity: (1) the formal assignments of personnel, (2) the nature of occasions for police action, and (3) the nature of outcomes from encounters. Assignments are what the police say they are undertaking, occasions are the situations police encounter when they are mobilized; and outcomes are the actions police take in any situation. To determine assignments, information must be collected about the amount of time devoted by police personnel to different functional specializations within the organization. To measure occasions, one must examine the nature of situations commanding attention regardless of the formal assignments of the personnel involved. (Bayley, 1970:113-114)

The structure has been specified both at different levels and also as an overall organization. Centralization is one of its obvious aspects but the decentralized features also serve some important functions and bring to focus the efforts made to harness diversity into unity as well as to cater to local hues to otherwise non-local organizations. Bayley has focused on "two aspects of the structure of policing - the pattern for covering territory and the location of command." (Bayley, 1970:123) Both of these aspects have been employed in this chapter to explain India's police structure.

Police world is mundane, police-work practically routine sprawled with thrilling and non-thrilling scenarios and full of symbolic imagery. Examination of each part and characteristic is not wholly feasible but desirable; therefore the best strategy seems to be to unravel and then knit together the structural, functional and imagery attributes into an organizational whole. Therefore, this chapter attempts to identify those subtle and subterranean substructures along with the sprawling body of police organization in general. Police

reflects its own personality through organizational panorama and accomplishes tasks through its functional rhythms but all of its structure and style sophistication recoils back to its images aboard and self-perception inside. There seems to be a cyclic variety. "Historical events shape police institutions, police organization and practice effect political life conditions future historical development. This system of interaction feeds back upon itself, though the system is by no means closed." (Bayley, 1970:379)

Structure, Style and Imagery

The structure, style and imagery of police are function-formulations of an organizational identity, that carries itself to qualifying salience of an institution-building. Police in India is one such institution. Its structure, style and imagery has defied not only the injunctions of time but also compulsions of cultural-social variance and political transience. Police in India never grew out of the social context, commonwealth or community womb but was forged out of military matrix by powerful ruling elite - foreign or national, to control civilian paradoxes, unmindful of mundane mutations of a complex customary life. Prolonged pressure of authoritarian administration set the social sedimentation and coaxially caused an alienation among the populace, increasing internal tensions in otherwise tenuously strained society. Police, in response, played permutational roles with chicanery skills to suit situational exigencies and became proxies in a power game. Police was in a way meant to substitute but not to rival or replace the army, therefore, the structure, style and imagery of policing bear the trappings of military but facade of a civilian administration. In its true self,

its rationalized ambivalence, camouflaged lethal force, legislated legal powers, ordained authority, paraphenalia of preponderance and enormous intrusion, provide unprecedented opportunities for mediation, suppression, and corruption, under the cover of protection and service. It offers a via media to legitimatize, systematize, and operationalize the force and the authority, without stigmatizing tentacles of state-power, or a priori for social control.

In India, Hindu policing along with Hindu polity lay buried and unidentified in societal norms and traditional rituals, as a remanent of an informal village 'Punchayat' system. Muslim rulers superimposed their institutions, language, courts, codes and customs which were eventually absorbed by the British system.

This chapter, while unraveling that process of assimilation, absorption and replacement; will delineate and describe police structure, style and imagery not only to provide historical continuity but also to account for the burgeoning growth of police proliferation.

Police Structure

A Police Commission, composed of 4 members of the civil service was appointed on August 17, 1860 and was given a Memorandum "setting out the Government's view as to the characteristics of a good police for India." (Griffiths, 1971:88) In the Memorandum, four important points were stressed:

> The duties of the police must be entirely civil, not military, though some degree of military organization and discipline would be necessary; the police must be completely divorced from the judicial functions; the organization of the police must be centralized in the hands of the provincial government (and this raised the much debated question as to what the link should be between the police and the magistracy); and the foot policeman must be paid 'something more than the highest rate of wages for unskilled

> labor . . . thus securing the best and most respectable of that class for the police.' It was implicit in the Memorandum that Superintendents of Police should be European, but it was laid down categorically that there were to be 'no European constables or non-commissioned officers . . . except at seaports and large military stations, where they required to deal with Europeans. (Griffiths, 1971:88-89)

The Commission proposed that in each province all existing bodies concerned with the civil administration including regular police, men employed in watch and ward duties from whatever public source they might be paid, the Cantonment police, the Thagi and Dakaiti Department, and the Detective Branches, should be consolidated into one civil police force under the control of an Inspector General respnsible to the Government and free from all duties other than the supervision of the police. The force would have no military duties and, on the other hand, the military arm would have no police functions.

The Commission suggested that "in each district there should be an European Superintendent of Police, departmentally subordinate to the Inspector-General, but bound to obey the orders of the District Officer in matters relating to the prevention and detection of crime and preservation of the peace." (Griffiths, 1971:89) There was a combination of powers at the level of the District Magistrate but not below it. The Commission classified: The Police - divorced from all judicial and penal functions - were to be 'an efficient instrument placed at his (i.e. the District Magistrate's) disposal for protection of life and property, for the suppression of crime and the repression of local disturbances. There should be no combination of police and judicial powers in any grade below District Officer.

Revising the system of village watchmen, the Commission thought it worthwhile for reliable information:

> In the existing condition of the interior of the country, stated the Commissioners, the organized Police cannot be informed of all that occurs of public consequence, unless they have some tolerably reliable agency with villages . . . . The village watchman is, of course, just such a person. He is a man of the village; not enough of an official to be alien from or obnoxious to the villagers and enough of an official to be amenable to the system and reliable for duty. (Griffiths, 1971:90)

The Bill based on the Commissioner's draft was enacted as Act V of 1861.

Structure under Police Act V of 1861

"The principles of the Police Act were neither revolutionary nor particularly novel but the significance of the act lay in the fact that it provided authoritative answers to the two questions implicit in British experimentation during the previous hundred years, namely, what should be the relations between imperial and rural police and how should imperial police administration be coordinated with other functions of imperial authority." (Bayley, 1967:45)

The Preamble declared the intention of the Act V as "to reorganize the police and make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crime." (Gupta, 1979:7) thus the Act laid down, in brief, the organizational structure of the police:

> Section 2 provided that the Constitution of the force, including its strength and the pay, etc. of the members, would be ordered by the Local Government, subject to the sanction of the Governor General; Section 3 vested its superintendence in the local Government, subject to the latter's 'general control'; and Section 4 provided that the administration of the police of a province be vested in an Inspector-General of Police and Deputy and Assistant Inspector General, and that of a district in a Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent, under the 'general control and direction' of the District Magistrate. (Gupta, 1979:7-8)

The Act gave police powers to the District Magistrate, rendered magisterical powers to Inspector General to Police, and made provisions for departmental andjudicial punishments. The I.G.P. was vested with the full powers of a magistrate by Section 5 and Section 6 provided that all of any magisterial powers be vested in D.I.$_s$G., A.I.$_s$G., S.$_s$P. and A.S$_s$P. Section 7 and 29 made provision for the infliction of departmental and judicial punishments respectively on police officers. Act V specified the requirements for the supply of additional police, appointment of 'Special Police' and punishment thereof:

> Section 13 and 14 provided for the supply of additional police at the cost of individuals and Section 15 provided for the quartering of additional 'punitive' police in any part of the province found to be in a 'disturbed or dangerous state or in which from the conduct of the inhabitants it may be deemed expedient to increase the number of police. The cost of such additional police was to be levied from the inhabitants of the part of the country concerned, on the basis of an assessment by distress warrants and sale of goods. In addition, Section 17 provided for the appointment of 'residents of the neighbourhood' as Special Police Officers 'when any unlawful assembly, or riot or disturbance has taken place or may be reasonably apprehended' with powers, privileges, protection, duties and liability to penalties identical to those of the regular police officers and Section 19 for the award of punishment to persons refusing to serve as Special Police Officers . . . . (Gupta, 1979:8)

There was a provision to grant license for assemblies and processions by Superindent and Assistant Superintendent of Police under Section 30; and under Section 33 for the general control of the magistrate. Section 23 of Act V prescribed duties for the police officers:

> It shall be the duty of every police officer promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to himby any competent authority; to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace; to prevent the commission of offenses and public nuisances, to detect and

> bring offenders to justice, and to apprehend all persons whom he is legally authorized to apprehend and for whose apprehension sufficient ground exists . . . . (Gupta, 1979:9)

Section 24 made it incumbent on police officers to lay information before a magistrate and judgement. Under Section 34 certain offenses which could be described as public nuisances were prescribed and police was authorized to arrest the offenders. Another important sectin of the Act was 44 according to which a General Diary was to be maintained wherein the officer in charge should record "all complaints and charges preferred, the names of all persons arrested, the names of complainants, the offense charged against them, the weapons or property that shall have been taken from their possession or otherwise, and the names of the witnesses who shall have been examined." (Gupta, 1979:9)

Police system in India, structurally, could hardly be categorized strictly as centralized or decentralized because it is both. Like the Indian constitution it combines and carries both the features of a centralized and decentralized police system. By decentralized structure, it does not come near at all to the pattern followed by United States and by centralized system, it does not become a direct instrument under Central Government, like authoritarian Communist governments. Bayley succinctly acknowledged this distinguishing feature of Indian police system:

> Although the central government has some police agencies under its authority, such as the Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.) and the police forces of centrally administered territories, these forces are in the nature of residuary police forces. They are not expected to bear the primary burden of police work in the country; they complement state agencies as well as providing enforcement muscle in the implementation of exclusively central government task . . . . India has managed to avoid both the

> fragmentation of police under a system of local control, such as in the United States with its forty thousand separate forces, and the rigidity of a national police force directed by a central government. (Bayley, 1967:35)

Police has borrowed its structural cadre-base and discipline rigidity from military. It is not completely a military structure though but a semblance of a paramilitary force. This military-model is another distinguishing feature of police in India:

> The Indian police system is horizontally stratified. Like military forces, the police are organized into cadres depending upon rank - commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, although these are not the precise terms used in India. Appointment to N.C.O. rank is partly by promotion from below and partly by lateral entry through direct recruitment. Promotion from N.C.O. rank to officer status is not impossible but it is rare. The principle of horizontal stratification affects more than the organization of ranks. It accounts also for the relations between the Central and State governments with respect to police administration and for the distribution of police powers and ranks. (Bayley, 1967:35)

Then there is the officer cadre, known as the Indian Police Service (I.P.S.), which is recruited, organized, trained, and disciplined according to national legislation. There exists a vertical division of police force into armed and civil police or unarmed police:

> The police in each state are divided vertically into an armed an an unarmed branch. This is a functional division. The unarmed police staff go on patrol duties, and prevent and investigate crime. The armed police are employed for those duties which require the presence of constituted physical force, such as guard duties at banks and the quelling of civil disturbances. The armed police are housed in barracks, trained in weapons handling and drill, and live a quasi-military life. But they are part of each state's police force and are officered by men of the I.P.S. . . . . The Indian arrangement recognizes the value of having policemen uncontaminated by arms but also recognizes that it is necessary to have ready at hand a well-trained body of police capable of responding with overwhelming force. (Bayley, 1967:36)

Apart from this, there is another partially hidden appendage of village police system which till today outlives its utility. "The rural police system is as old as recorded Indian history and has continued unchanged by the tides of conquest, consolidation, and anarchy that have swept over India in the past millennia." (Bayley, 1967:37) And then, "structures came and went, but there was no qualitative evolution from one imperical high point to another." (Bayley, 1967:39) The reason for survival and unaltered identity of village police was on account of its self-regulatory mechanism tied closely to the internal power structure of village society.

Quintessentially, the command structure of Indian police system has been graphically described by Bayley.



(Bayley, 1969:76)

The command structure has hardly changed except that most of the States in India have upgraded the rank of Inspector General to that of the Director General of Police to reduce the bottleneck at the top. Similar upgrading of senior police officers to the rank of Inspector

General of Police overseeing administration, crimes, specialized services, followed.

The rank structure carries with it the powers, privileges, responsibility and accountability of each rank.

> An Inspector-General will be assisted by Deputy Inspectors-General and assistant inspectors-general. The latter is not a rank but a position. In some states, there are also additional inspectors' general, but this is rare. The work of the police organization under the I.G.P. is organized according to geographical and functional criteria. States are first divided into territorial ranges . . .. Eac range is headed by a deputy inspector-general. Deputy inspectors-general also direct the statewide functional offices of the police, such as armed police, C.I.D., or railway police. The range Deputy Inspector-General serves primarily in a supervisory capacity, providing a link in the chain of command, but especially of coordination and information-gathering between the district superintendent and the I.G.P.

The State Police organization could also be put under a chart:



(Sharma, 1981:39)

The District Police is another key unit in police administration machinery in a State.

District Police Organization



(Sharma, 1981:35)

The structure and function of the District Superintendent of Police is almost similar all over. The district has been put under the charge of a Senior Superintendent of Police, which used to be in the past under a Superintendent of Police.

The Superintendents of Police now serve under the Senior Superintendent of Police. This has brought more senior and experienced officers to a district. A district police officer's duties and responsibilities are onerous:

> The Superintendent of Police, who presides over this organization is the key functionary through whom the State government operates and the police stations below look for command, guidance and action. Hierarchically speaking, the district police in most of the States stands organized into police sub-divisions and police circles, which comprise a cluster of police stations. The Additional or Deputy Superintendents of Police look after the work of police sub-divisions, while the Circle Inspectors deal with the supervisory work of police stations falling within their respective circles. A number of staff agencies, such as Crime Bureau, Special Branch, and Special Investigating Agency, etc. stand converged into the office of the District S.P., who in turn operates through a network of line units, such as police stations, special squads, Prosecuting Branch, Traffic Police and Reserve Police Lines. (Sharma, 1981:35)

Police sub-divisions and police circles in a district are supervisory sub-units under the Superintendent of Police but above the Station House Officer of a police station. These offices have no important functional role to play except overseeing the working of police stations under their supervision for the Superintendent of Police.

At the district level, there are specialized agencies. "The Special Branch which represents an extension of the State Special Branch collects political intelligence and attends to other secret work connected with foreigners, VIPs and national security as well as it submits periodical reports on political and communal movements,

labor and student activities, agitations by organized groups and other allied matters to the SP of the district." (Sharma, 1981:37) The Crime Bureau deals with the criminal gangs, disseminates criminal intelligence, while a Special Investigating Agency investigates cases of embezzlement, fraud, forgery and misappropriation.

The Police Public Prosecuting Branch employs attorneys as Public Prosecutors and also trains law graduate police officers to work as police prosecutors in lower courts. At present on account of separation of Executive and Judiciary, Prosecution Branch is being taken out of the police control. Still S.P. exercises supervisory control over the Branch through Public Prosecutor, an attorney.

The District Reserve Police Lines " . . . exist to meet contingencies such as leave, sickness and vacancies caused by resignations, suspensions and dismissals, have a special role to play in district police establishment." (Sharma, 1981:37) The police lines also serve as a training ground for police personnel at the district level.

A simpler version of district police organization could be provided under urban and rural categories:



A structural reorganization of Police Department Model for a State has been suggested by Sharma, obviously keeping in mind the upgradation of the Inspector-General's post to Director-General.



(Sharma: 1981:188)

The problem with the new model is that is offers nothing new except upgrading of rank structure. The distribution of portfolios between I.G. crimes, special services, training and planning, is confusing. I.G. crimes has DIG range and I.G. specialized service has S.P. crimes. I.G. Training and Planning has been created as an independent office while there is only one police training college, a training school and only one office for planning and welfare services. On the contrary, I.G. Crimes as usual carries heaviest load. I.G. Grievance, Vigilance and Public Relations has no DIG or AIG to assist but just district field officers whose ranks are unknown. There is no demarcation of categories between District Field Offices and Field Officers. The overlapping of functions between DIG Administrative and DIG Personnel is obvious. It is not known why these two offices were disjointed under two senior officers who wouldn't have much to do anyhow. DIG Finance has been provided no assistance though he has to provide an expert valuable service. It is also not known as to how village police fits in at Incharge of Outpost level.

The meaning of village police also defies comprehension. On the whole, the model is perfunctory in design and meaningless in conceptualization. It lacks theory and operationalization.

Another police organizational model has been framed by Sharma at national level:

Indian Police Organization



This model is neither a territorial nor a functional model though it appears to be both. Union police state and local police appears to be from a territorial standpoint. If that is the case, then there is duplication of specialized agencies and no provision for armed police at the state level and no civil police at union level. National Protection Force is an ambiguity. How these three divisions, union, state and local, work is far from imagination. Is it a vertical separatin and whether do they match or intersect each other anywhere? It seems to be a disjointed, unworkable model.

Constitutional Position of Police In India

The Constitution of India is a very unique institution; federal in form and unitary in spirit. It was framed to carry over the

continuity of the past into present and then to unforeseeable future. The strains of the past, present and future are so contradictory as the provisions of the constitutions itself. Perhaps it is the spirit of adjustment, co-existence or tolerance that could keep the scheme of constitution intact otherwise the ruthless supremacy of the Central government could overrun and overrule state units. A weak Center and stronger States, or weak States and a strong Center, are anathema to the Indian Constitution and this keeps the Constitution in constant conflict. India's constitution is a queer mixture of divergent provisions of other constitutions. The Constituent Assembly of India referred to this aspect as a positive force:

> One could discern in it the impact of several constitutions. As for instance, the Indian Federalism is influenced by the American, Canadian and Australian Federalism. Fundamental Rights in India owe a great deal to the American Bill of Rights; the process of constitutional amendment adopted in India is a modified version of the American system. The influence of the English constitutional law, theories and practices on the Indian Constitution is quite pervasive. As for example, the parliamentary form of government in India closely follows the British model in substance; parliamentary privileges have been left undefined in India and have been assimilated to those enjoyed by the House of Commons; the system of prerogative writs which plays a crucial role in protecting people's legal rights and ensuring judicial control over administrative action is England's contribution to India. Australia's experiences have been especially useful for ordering the Center-State financial relationship, and for promoting the concept of freedom of trade and commerce in the country. Inspiration has come from the Irish Constitution in the shaping of the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Government of India Act, 1935, which preceded the Indian Constitution, has furnished not only adminstrative details, but also the verbatim language of many provisions contained in the Constitution. (Jain, 1978:2)

Being the longest and most complex, the Constitution of India was amended seventeen times within 15 years from the commencement in 1950, 35 times within 25 years of commencement, and 44 times within 32 years

of its commencement. In spite of the well-reasoned argument that 'the Indian Constitution has detailed norms, while other constitutions have only skeletal provisions to remove mutual distrust among them, to promote the social welfare concept . . . the constitution includes Directive Principles of State Policy. M.P. Jain elaborated the historical aspect of the case and provided a situational review:

> The framers of the Indian Constitution however felt that unless these provisions were contained in the constitution, an infant democracy might find itself in difficulties, and the smooth and efficient working of the Constitution and the democratic process in the country might be jeopardized. The form of administration has a close relation with the form of the constitution, and the former must be appropriate to, and in the same sense, as the latter. It is quite possible to pervert the constitutional mechanism, without changing its form, by merely changing the form of administration and making it inconsistent with, and opposed to, the spirit of the Constitution. Since India was emerging as an independent country after a long spell of foreign rule, the country lacked democratic values. The Constitution-makers therefore thought it prudent not to take unnecessary risks, and to incorporate in the Constitution itself the form of administration as well, instead of leaving it to the legislature, so that the whole mechanism may become viable. (Jain, 1978:3)

The questions are: Whether all these arguments stand justified? Whether the Constitution has strengthened democratic values? Whether prudence of Constitution-makers had saved India from those 'unnecessary' risks? There are so many other constitutional questions that could be raised but this is not the place or purpose to do so. though in spite of its being elaborately written, it leaves enormous grounds for ambiguities, dubious interpretations and mischievous maneuverings which it envisioned to resist. The passage of time has proved that there is nothing in Indian Constitution that could resist any ambitious ruler or a powerful party machine at the Center. Even ordinary contrivances when actuated by a powerful Prime Minister or a

President could have the potentialities to alter the course. The police and the entire administrative machinery had to adjust to cope up with these constitutional dilemmas.

Police as a State Subject

The Constitution of India, in the Seventh Schedule, under Article 246, laid down ". . . various entries in the three lists not as powers of legislation, but fields oflegislation and these entries neither impose any implied restriction on the legislative power conferred by the Articles nor prescribe any duty to exercise that legislative power in any particular manner." (Jain, 1978:30). Regarding interpretation of these Entries, the guidelines said that " . . . in interpreting an Entry in the preceding manner, it would not be reasonable to import any limitation by comparing or contrasting that Entry with any other Entry in the same list." (BASU, 1978:30)

List II is a State List and its first Entry is regarding Public Order which says:

> "Public Order (but not) including the use of any Naval, Military or Air Force orAny other Armed Forces of the Union or of Any Other Force subject to the control of the Union or of any contingent or unit thereof in aid of the civil power." (BASU, 1979:59)

The Second Entry is regarding Police:

> "Police (including Railway and Village Police) subject to the Provision of Entry 2A of List 1." (Basu, 1979:60)

The Entry 2A in list 1 in the Union List was inserted along with Art. 257A by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, and is worded as under:

> Deployment of any armed force of the Union or any other force subject to the control of the Union or any contingent or unit thereof in any State in aid of the civil power, powers, jurisdiction, privileges and liabilities of the

members of such forces while on such deployment. (BASU, 1979:37, Schedule VII).

Entry 8 in List I (i.e. Union) pertains to Central Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation. Police officers belonging to State and Union Cadre are posted to these bureaus. Entry 9 in List I (Union) deals with Preventive Detention for Reasons Connected with Defense, Foreign Affairs, or the Security of India; Persons subjected to such Detention.

Preventive detention for reasons other than those mentioned in the present Entry are included in Entry 3 of List III, and that includes incidental powers. Subject to Art. 254, the Concurrent Power of the State Legislative, under Entry 3 of List III, is co-extensive with that of Parliament. Entry 5 of List I deals with Arms, Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives. Entry 65 of List I deals with Union Agencies and Institutions for:

a. Professional, vocational or technical training including the training of police officers, or

b. The promotion of Special Studies or Research, or

c. Scientific or Technical Assistance in the Investigation or Detection of Crime.

Entry 80 of List I deals with Extension of the Powers and Jurisdiction of Members of a Police Force belonging to any State to any area outside that State.

There is also List III called the Concurrent List. Entry 1 of List III deals with Criminal Law. Entry 2 of List III deals with Criminal Procedure. Entry 3 of List III deals with Preventive Detention for Reasons connected with the Security of a State, the Maintenance of Public Order, or the Maintenance of Supplies and

Services essential to the Community; Persons subject to such detention.

Entry 4 of List III deals with Removal from One State to Another State of Prisoners, Accused Persons and Persons subjected to Preventive Detention for Reasons specified in Entry 3 of this List.

Constitutional Provisions Regarding Police Personnel

Article 309, 310, and 311 govern the service conditions of police officers like any other government official but the fundamental rights of police personnel are but on different level. Police officers occupy a peculiar position under the Constitution. They are treated as holders of civil posts within the meaning of Art. 311 while at the same time they are brought under disciplinary rules like Defense Forces personnel:

> A police officer is governed not only by the Police Regulations framed under the Police Act, but also by the Rules made under Sec. 241 of the Government of India Act, in so far as they are not repealed, or are not inconsistent with the Constitution. Government has the option to proceed against a police officer under any of these Rules, provided that there is no substantial difference to the prejudice of the delinquent officer between the procedures under the two sets of Rules. (BASU, 1979:153)

The awful amount of power with the government at the center as opposed to state government which maintains the police, indicates how anamolous, ambiguous and tenuous the situation would be for members of the police force who had to serve competing interests of politicians not only at two different levels (State and Federal) but at various polarities, that co-exist to cater the needs of ruling individuals.

The Constitutional status of police provided continuity from colonial days. The Constitution neither changed the organizational form or behavior nor police powers or functional formulations, style

and modalities of role models. Virtually, it changed nothing in practice or in philosophy. Police, public and politicians were left alone to adjust themselves to the changed realities of the times. Lack of effective constitutional safeguards reduced police officials to the level of servility and humility. A new Police Act has yet to be drafted to redefine the police role under the changed circumstances. Under the existing Police Act, the police were working as a colonial instrument. The Constitution of India neither purified nor santified the colonial police model but left it to get congealed. The apparatus was made pliable by politicians by applying pressure unmindful of any long term or short term consequences.

To render the organizational, structural and functional picture more clear, a summary discussion on the Government of India in general, and the Ministry of Home Affairs in particular, is provided here and then police would be linked up again in the overall setup of this complex machinery.

The Government of India

The present Government of India is a historical continuity but changes in its structure and style have occurred at times. The latest structure was reorganized in 1950 when the Constitution of India started functioning. An organization chart of the Government of India, categorizing offices of various functionaries and mapping out various ministries and departments has been provided as Appendix * . This is the most important Ministry that runs internal administration, and is known as Ministry of Home Affairs. It is necessary to know its structural layout and functioning to understand the administrative character of various departments, locus of control, nature of respon-

sibility, orbit of operation, hierarchy of rank structure, and the overall situation of political leverage vis a vis bureaucratic power of civil servants and the specific role of police in that complex design. Police and all other services under the Government of India, except Armed Services (Army, Navy, Air Force) fall under the jurisdictional control of Home Ministry. Ministry possesses sole monopoly on Intelligence, which of course, has been truncated now, by putting a big chunk of foreign intelligence, known as Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) under the Cabinet Secretariat of the Prime Minister. The Ministry also holds sway on so many other departments whose roles indicate its predominance over other ministries.

The Ministry of Home Affairs is the key ministry that performs a number of functions assigned to it in the Constitution of India.

Ministry of Home Affairs

> "The Ministry of Home Affairs deals mainly with matters relating to maintenance of peace and public tranquility and the manning and administration of public services. In addition, the Ministry is also responsible for the administration of Union Territories (which are not States), matters relating to the appointment and conditions of service of the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme and High Courts, Bills passed by State legislatures and reserved for the President's assent, and the residuary work pertaining to erstwhile princely States are dealt with in the Ministry." (Ilpa, 1971:118)

It is interesting that the Ministry deals with the appointments of judges and not the Ministry of Law. A list of subjects allocated to the Ministry of Home Affairs is attached as Appendix 16. It not only deals with the appointments of Governors and Judges but also handles presidential powers under the guise of aid and advice of Council of Ministers to the President of India. All the Central Police organizations are under its direct control and so is Assam Rifles and Union Public Service Commission. It handles inter-state border disputes, matters relating to scheduled castes, Hindi (national language), fire-arms, citizenship and immigration, lotteries, training, census, Central Vigilance Commission, Atomic Energy, Medals and Awards, etc.

Organization of the Home Ministry

It is headed by the Minister of Cabinet rank who is generally No. 2 in precedence after the Prime Minister if there is no Deputy Prime Minister. The first Home Minister was also the Deputy Prime Minister and was a very powerful man. "The Ministry of Home Affairs consists of a Secretariat, seven attached offices and eleven subordinate offices. The bureaucratic rank order and the list of divisions is at Appendix 17. The Ministry had exclusive direct control over the following important offices:

1. Central Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi
2. Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi
3. National Academy of Administration
4. Secretariat Training School, New Delhi
5. Office of the Registrar-General, Census, New Delhi
6. Central Reserve Police
7. Border Security Force
8. National Police Academy

9. Directorate of Coordination (police wireless), New Delhi
10. National Fire Service College, Nagpur
11. National Civil Defense College, Nagpur
12. Indo-Tibetan Border Police, New Delhi
13. Regional Registration Offices
14. Mobile Civil Emergency Force, New Delhi
15. Regional Offices, Hindi Teaching Scheme
16. Central Vigilance Commission
17. Central Establishment Board
18. Emergency Relief Organization Central Advisory Committee

Political Top of Police Structure

The political structure at the top of administration both at State and Central (Federal) level is an interesting study in itself.

The Executive is headed by the President of India. After President comes the Vice-President and then the Prime Minister of India. The Prime Minister heads the Council of Ministers. A Minister forms the top of every ministry. This political crust is the topmost layer in three-tiered setup of higher Executive. The Ministry of Home Affairs deals with the Police and other allied services, excluding defense and foreign services. those who are familiar with the role of the Indian Civil Service knows that the tentacles of Home Minisry are quite pervasive on account of its control over the personnel belonging to Indian Administrative Service.

Indian Constitution in theory and in official communication, develops the powers and responsibilities of an executive head on the President of India. In practice, it is the Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister who enjoy these powers.

At State level, Governor of the State, as an appointee of President of India is the Executive head for all theoritical construction but in practice it is the Chief Minister and the Minister

for Home Affairs (at State level) who enjoys powers and responsibilities of running the Civilian Administration in the State. Where the political layer stops, the civil service starts to share top place in administration.

Bureaucratic Framework of Civil Service and Context of Police Administration

Civil Service officers form the second layer of top administration, just after the political crust. At State as well as at Central level, these senior high-ranking civil servants are called Secretaries. Every Seceretary is head of a Minsitry or a department and exercises the real administrative control. He runs the administration both for himself and for his poltical boss. Secretaries run the Government of India and are trained administrative experts. Chief of Police known as Inspector-General of Police or Director-General of Police is ranked equivalent to an additional Secretary. The top layer of police hierarchy is under a civilian who in turn is under a political authority. The control of civil administration used to run up to district level over the police ranks till the Superintendent of Police (the district in charge of the police) remained under administration control of the District Magistrate. The independence of the Superintendent of Police from the control of the District Magistrate is a recent development. Still in most of the law and order situations both the District Magistrate and the Superintendent or Senior Superintendent of Police are held responsible and treated as liable for any serious lapse. The boundary between them in law and ordr sphere stands not well-defined. In cities where Police Commissioner system prevails, this duality of administrative control

has been corrected but confusion still surrounds at district and other levels. "The Inspector-General reports to the Home Secretary and in turn to the Home Minister. To complicate the situation even more, the Collector belongs to the Indian Administration Service. And so too, does the Home Secretary. Thus the police establishment is accountable at two different levels to a civilian administrative official of the I.A.S. Cadre." (Bayley, 1969:350)

The controversial relationship between a District Collector and a Superintendent of Police as well as the rivalry between I.A.S. (Indian Administrative Service) and I.P.S. (Indian Police Service) cadre is well entrenched and more subtle.

The separation of executive and judiciary on one hand as well as police independence from civil service has dominated the official glamor of the District Officer (District Magistrate, Deputy Commissioner of District Collector). Still he occupies a pivotal position in a district administration. Puri has also shown that civil services in India, historically, developed as serving instrument to the ruling power and even in a democratic setup, political power remains the reckoning force for government services because " . . . it is for the political forces in a democratic set-up to balance administrative efficiency against administrative concessions, and that too for how long." (Puri, 1980:60) The rivalry between Civil Service, and the police service is just a part of a bigger crisis, a malaise of maladjustments which is not gripping any particular service but bureaucracy as a whole.

There is another dimension to this problem. The high level bureaucrat specially belonging to the All India Services are

constantly affected by politics at the top; the lower level officers (like clerks, office superintendents, assistants, various inspectors and other similar functionaries) are victims as well as the draculas of this administrative set-up:

> While the lower levels of bureaucracy have no role in policy formulations, they can pervert the whole process of implementation by their general negative orientations. The large number of government functionaries are involved in routine jobs which are performed in a mechanical manner without any positive philosophy or motivations or achievement . . . . For an ordinary citizen, a Railway Booking Clerk, or an Inspector in loan-giving agencies of the government, or a Sub-Inspector of Police is the real government; and in his dealings with these administrative functionaries, a citizen experiences inefficiency, harrassment and victimization. (Bhambhri, 1981:17)

It is almost a well-orchestrated opinion repeatedly being expressed that " . . . in our country it is a rare bureaucracy which has an unsound structure on its agenda of organizational ills, much less the problems arising from such a structure." (Nandy, 1981:8)

The causes for the bureaucratic rot are numerous. Lack of interest to carry on even the routine and lack of motivation are not less ominous ones in the long list:

> . . . the huge bureaucracy in India has become a hindrance to progress not because it is inefficient or lacks knowledge but simply because it is not well-motivated. The decades-long neglect of routine work has now reached a dangerous level. It is not that senior officers are not busy. They are. If the diaries of these seniors are scrutinized they will be full of entries, mostly concerned with the petty demands and concerns of their political bosses which they must attend to. (Saksena, 1981:8)

Sometimes it is difficult to understand that an expansive, archaic and unwieldy structure of bureaucracy in India would suffer from 'Paucity of Able Aids' as the shortage of experienced administrators is telling upon the quality of administration and preventing better deployment of talent to achieve quick results.

The performance of the Civil and Police services is perceived so low that there seems to be some digging was done to ascertain the reasons for the degradation. On one plane, a comparative analysis being made between Indian Civil Service of British days and the Indian Administrative Service of post-independent era. Some members of the Indian Civil Service as well as those of the Indian Administrative and Police Service started evaluating the performance of these services and expressed their deep concern over the falling standards of those manning these strategic services and the dilemmas thereof. Their disenchantment seems to be prolonged. An interesting aspect is that whoever retires or is relieved of the service starts providing the diagnosis and prescription for cure but while he was running the administration did nothing to prove his or her case which was so vehemently preached later. Their memoirs, their articles, their books, make a fascinating reading, give us an insight into the intricacy of the scene and the eventual helplessness and hoplessness of the actors in a melodramatic quandary. Members of the Indian Civil Service did almost the same during the British days as did the members of the Indian Administrative or Indian Police Service during the post-independence days. The members of the Indian Civil Service held all the key posts: they surrounded the viceroy, they dominated the provincial governments and they were ultimately responsible for overseeing all government activity in the two hundred and fifty districts that comprised British India. The scene has not changed much today; only it has become more ubiquitous, more amorphous, and more anomalous.

One prominent member of the Indian Administrative Service lamented the power, glory and glamor engulfing a Special Assistant to the Minister; which affected adversely the performance of the civil servants under the changed circumstances:

> What happened, in effect, was an undeclared transfer of power, and the immediate impact was on the internal work patterns of the Ministries we served. Every one woke up and took note of the changed circumstances. Word went round the entire South Block, the Bhawans were now ruled by the S.A.s. They were the ones who suggested Secretaries, hired and fired public sector chairmen, selected delegation members, and gave policy clearances, when they were not busy planning flight schedules, redecorating their rooms, or keeping hordes of favor-seekers hanging. Even the people's representatives accepted and acted in accordance with this apparent shift in authority. (Rudra, 1981:8)

There is an irony in the euphoria that everything is working well in the country. "The plight of an administration which even though it manages to keep the sub-continent functioning at a minimum level of credibility, is actually in the final stage of collapse. The political vendettas have had deadly effect. If civil servants are expected to bow the knee and agree, so are the police when they are not busy answering rape and assault charges. As for the armed forces, they cannot escape the culture of India." (Thapar, 1980:6) G. D. Khosla, a retired judge and a member of the Indian Civil Service, expressed disappointment with the 'Civil Servant's Dilemma' and suggested salvation of a 'noble legacy' by returning to earlier standards of integrity and dedication.

The change of politicians and the party in power is part of the process in a democracy but in India, it is an area of ambivalence. There seems to be much higher personal stakes in politics for political gains than ideals or means notwithstanding. Cliques and party considerations flow preceding national, regional and other

priorities. There is only one motto, 'how to be in power'. In this vicious process, "the whole exercise bred cynicism and sycophancy among time-servers; it tended to destroy the self confidence and self esteem of honest and upright officers, and it alienated thousands of clerks, school teachers, railwaymen, policemen, and other small cogs in the bureaucratic apparatus from the political leadership." (Khanna, 1980:8) There is a problem of personal loyalty to the politician: "The Union Home Ministry has even designed a 'loyalty' test to screen senior officials. Some 30 top men, most of them officers of proven ability, integrity, and experience, have been forced to cool their heels in consequence for four months or more. They drew their salaries from the public exchequer but have no job." (Khanna, 1980:8)

Large-scale transfers of civil servants by politicians in quick succession, have become potent service hazards and part of personal humiliation. In crisis of confidence and during political uncertainties, the better option exercised by bureaucrats is to remain close to the center of power and bide their time, but to get caught in a crossfire is sometimes certain. "For the bureaucracy pulled and prodded by contradictory forces and inching along without clear directions and unsure of what will happen next, the present dilemma is quite simple. They are damned if they do, and damned if they don't." (Louis, 1981:1)

The new breed of bureaucrats are employing a safe technique to go along with the progressively greater politicization of the civil service therefore ministerial egos are now nurtured and nurse-maided. It is true that there is a 'frustrated executive' or an 'inflated executive'. Frustrated are those who depend on their legitimate

wages, hit by inflation, abide by the rules, intelligently perceive the problem and impartially provide the solution, while 'inflated' are those who are happy to wield unlimited power by placating the power-center, amassed wealth without winking on the pay, whose only intelligent scheme is how to carry out wishes of the boss. Dissatisfaction breeds disenchantment in public bureaucracy: "There is growing impatience and disenchantment among the public towards the bureaucracy. Perhaps the time has come for us to storm their exclusive domain and shake the 'Sahibs' out of their smugness." (Singh, 1981:7)

If concluding observations of Ralph Braibanti are to summarized regarding the bureaucratic systems in India, there emerge an array of critical generalizations:

1. "That the apparatus and attitude left by the British has endured for nearly two decades after independence and has shown a remarkable quality of resilience." (Braibanti, 1966:643)

2. "The dominance of the generalist administrator still prevails despite some overtures to participation by specialists in all systems." (Braibanti, 1966:643)

3. "The prestige and popularity of government service generally, and of the elite cadre particularly, seems not to have changed very much since before independence, although there are no precisely comparable data to prove this." (Braibanti, 1966:644)

4. " . . . the elite cadres have been the dominant instrument of government . . . " (Braibanti, 1966:646)

5. "With the departure of British officers, those trained by the British constituted the principal matrix for diffusion of British values." (Braibanti, 1966:650)

6. "Members of the elite cadres have been in positions controlling administrative reform and have been understandably less interested in drastic structural revision than critics outside the system." (Braibanti, 1966:658)

7. "We find instead the same type of person, with the same type of education, from more or less the same background joining the elite cadres now as before independence." (Braibanti, 1966:661)

8. "Politicization is probably more advanced in India under the dominance of one man party." (Braibanti, 1966:671)

9. "In addition to structural and cultural change at home, the task of the Civil Service in India were changing as well. The administration of justice and the collection of land revenue continued to be important jobs, but many new skills and jobs were to be added." (Cohn, 1966:140)

10. "The power to control postings is an important one, however, for it can influence an individual officer's career expectations and other gratifications. We can suggest therefore, that elite cadre behavior in the central government today is influenced by others as well as elite cadre itself." (Potter, 1966:169)

Weberian Model and Crisis of Indian Bureaucracy

Taub's detailed and deep study into the bureaucratic system, especially the Indian Administrative Service, also identified the sources and symptoms of stress which were not cogently recorded before. Taub saw a relationship between a Secretary (a civil servant) and a Minister (a politician) as not always very cordial:

> The tensions arise both because of differences in the goals to which each group aspires, and differences in the means that each deems proper for reaching even the goals on which they agree. Moreover, a sense of degradation arises because officers - the subordinates - are better educated and come from more modern and higher status backgrounds than do their superiors, the elected officials. (Taub, 1969:192)

Taub felt that the IAS (Indian Administrative Service) structure was almost perfect fit with Max Weber's outline of the legal-rational model of bureaucratic Civil Service but it was not efficient and there were many tasks it cannot handle well.

Explaining the limitations of Weberian model when pressures might come from a powerful ideological commitment and/or from an autocratic

ruler (or ruling elite) which applied much stronger negative sanctions than the Weberian model explicitly calls for. The projection by Taub that bureaucracy's great accomplishments have historically taken place in an autocratic setting, and this was implicit in Weber's view could be well exemplified in the performance of Indian bureaucracy's role both before and after the independence.

Taub concluded that the IAS has performed remarkably well and explained its accomplishments and utility:

> In addition to providing basic administrative services, it has helped to maintain national integration, and consequently can take some credit for the fact that India has maintained her nationhood for twenty years. In several states, the Service has conducted the business of government when political leaders were so busy competing against each other that they had little time for government. The Service can collect information around which to build policy. And it may even be able to provide some of the social overhead needed to make modernization possible.
>
> Though, it is highly unlikely that the IAS is going to set limits for itself regarding those tasks it can perform and those it cannot and unless the bureaucratic organization can contract, emphasizing those tasks that it can do well, while creating independent sources of initiative to manage those it cannot there is more likelihood that the administrative apparatus of the state will one day collapse, prey to the rage of its hungry and frustrated people, who will turn to demogogues to accomplish what their present national leaders have so far failed to do. (Taub, 1969:203)

Paramilitary and Armed Police Forces

The creation and existence of State Armed Police as well as the Paramilitary and other Armed Police Forces under the control of the Central (Federal) government reminds the writer of the idea on which Sir Charles Napier in 1842 organized Sind Horse and Sir Robert Peel promoted the interests of Irish Constabulary in 1822. Reasons given by the government are different but the underlying principles and purposes are the same. The military model police is more mobile,

better armed with more lethal fire power and possess much greater striking capabilities than the civil police. Still the irony is that the armed police/forces are expanding almost every year and used more frequently against the people. The State Armed Police, known by their different provincial names, are hated more by the people than their Central counterparts. It is surprising that neither opposition parties nor regional political groups ever oppose the budget grants or operational rationale of the armed police. In fact the law and order continues to be in such a deteriorating condition that the presence of armed police is preferred than the chaotic violence erupting with unabated continuity in one part of the country or the other. Military police battalions were also raised before and after Mutiny (1857) to restore order but were disbanded from 1961 onwards or merged into regular army or police units. During the Second World War and thereafter specially at the time of the Quit India Movement, there was a remarkable increase in the strength of the police and the armed police.

In 1947, when the British left India and the country was partitioned, police strength depleted in some provinces considerably. The Indian police consisted on 30th June 1947 of 516 officers, including 323 Europeans, 63 Muslims and 130 Hindus and others. Almost all the Muslim officers opted for Pakistan and an overwhelming majority of the European officers opted for retirement.

The armed police consumed almost 50 percent of the State Police budget and hundreds of millions of rupees by the Central government, Tribok Nath, a retired I.P. and former Inspector-General of Bihar maintained that the expansion of armed police has " . . . enabled the

State authorities to have the assistance of small armies to keep their position and also lend to them an aura of pomp in which they have revelled." (Nath, 1978:118)

At the same time he added that: "The armed police are therefore provided for assisting the States, and also for possible support to the police in the centrally administered areas and special forces have to be deployed on the borders and in special sectors like the railways, which is the responsibility of the Cental government." (Nath, 1978:118)

A close look into the growth and modern role of these paramilitary organizations performing the job of armed police at the Central level (National level) would not only be interesting but might provide meaningful insight.

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)

As one of the oldest armed police forces of the country, the Central Reserve Police Force was born in the year 1939.

CRPF was employed for special projects with special targets like suppression of Hur menace in Sindh in its early days and combating feared dacoits (gang of robbers); while as a border security patrol it encountered Chinese in 1959 and Pakistan troops in 1965 and 1971.

Its present strength is 69 battalions and it also includes three battalions of the peace-keeping force which are specially trained and equipped for quelling communal riots/disturbances anywhere in the country. The specialty of these three battalions are that their men are drawn from all parts of the country and belong to all faiths and sections of the society in order to ensure safety and protection of minorities and weaker sections caught in a communal flareup.

It is extensively used inside the country and has 19 bases to operate from. It has an Academy at Mount Abu (Rajasthan) for training superior officers, two Central Training Colleges at Neemuch and Avadi and two Recruits Training Centers at Barwah (madhya Pradesh) and Avadi. Sethi has given an impressive account of the functions and performances of the CRPF:

> The Force has been performing the onerous tasks of dealing with communal troubles, employee strikes, agitations, anti-social elements, riots, insurgency in various parts of the country. During the last one year, the Force has dealt with the communal riots and police unrest in Hyderabad, communal strife in Bihar-Sharif and Jamshedpur, the mass gherao of legislators in Chandigarh, the workers' strike in Bangalore, the students' unrest in Aligarh and the communal trouble at Chomu (near Jaipur). (Sethi, 1981:17)

On account of its constant mobility, CRPF has been given a nickname 'Chalte Raho Piare' (which means keep on Moving Dear) and has been described as 'nomads in uniform'.

Due to harsh conditions of life and constant mobility all over the country and being exposed to grave dangers all the time, there was seething discontentment among the force. Military units were called in to suppress the CRP strike at Delhi where a short exchange of fire and large scale arrests followed.

Border Security Force (BSF)

As a result of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 and an earlier border conflict with China in 1962, there was increasing pressure on Indian borders stretching from north-east to north-west, vulnerable to a variety of infiltration; it was decided to set up a Border Security Force under unitary control of Central government. As a response to contingencies and considerations, a paramilitary organization, known as Border Security Force was set up. A senior and seasoned Inspector

General of Police was promoted to the rank of Director General and made in charge of the Border Security Force. Its disciplinary control, command structure, training and equipment was geared on military pattern but the manpower was specially recruited for the job. The Indian Police Service supplied the superior officer cadre for the BSF.

The Border Security Force is neither meant nor usually despatched to perform armed police functions inside the country apart from borders. It is surprising that the Border Security Force is more frequently withdrawn from the border to quell the internal disturbances. At the occasion of any serious communal riot or strike by provincial police or any other grave national emergency, BSF is put to service. Its presence is more frequently felt inside the country and perhaps this is the only force left which had no history of disaffection or strike. Its sharp shooters and special commando squad strolled the streets of Delhi at the time of communal flare-up in August 1980.

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)

The Central government sponsored undertakings and other establishments which needed protection at the time of workers strike. The need became critical when different party governments ran State administration and were reluctant to provide protection to the industries and establishments belonging to the Central government. At most occasions CRPF was deployed but that was only a temporary measure because it could not be stationed all the time at all the establishments. Moreover to deploy CRPF in a State, consent of State government was desirable. When relations between Central and State

governments were not cordial, stationing of CRPF was not a very smooth proposition. There were more industrial disturbances in 1964 and thereafter. To respond to this typical precarious situation, the Central government passed Industrial Security Force Act in 1966. Its lower cadre as usual was recruited and separately trained but the officer cadre was drawn from other police organizations under the control of officers belonging to Indian Police Service. The Force is divided into three zones and headed by an Inspector-General. It is again organized on paramilitary basis to perform security duties. Its control rests with the Home Ministry of India.

The Assam Rifles

The Assam Rifles were meant for local use in the north-east sector of India, comprising of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and other border areas. It was raised after the mutiny (1857), reorganized in 1941 during the Second World War to meet the border threat from Japanese forces. Its ultimate control rests with the Ministry of Home Affairs but it has not been utilized beyond its local jurisdiction. Its organization is paramilitary though its purpose is maintenance of law and order in tribal areas of Assam and to render assistance to the State Police of Assam in matters of internal security, especially during emergency.

The Railway Protection Force (RPF)

Previously known as Watch and Ward, the Railway Protection Force guards railway property and goods. It is different from the Railway Police known as the Government Railway Police (GRP). The Railway Protection Force does not investigate crime and therefore does not

possess police powers of arrest and searches. Its personnel generally perform security duties at railway yards, godowns and protect buildings, bridges and railway tracks but they do not accompany trains or provide passenger safety. They have been, however, given some police powers under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1969.

State Armed Police

Like Central government, every State has its own well equipped and strategically located armed constabulary. Every State has given it a different name, which is mostly a continuation of the historical name assigned by the British to the provincial armed unit. In Uttar Pradesh, it is called Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC); in Bihar, its name is Bihar Military Police (BMP); in Rajasthan, it is designated as Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC); and in Punjab, it is known as Punjab Armed Police (PAP). In every State, control, command, structure, staffing and functioning of the armed police is almost similar.

In Indian police system, Bayley " . . . recognizes the value of having policemen uncontaminated by arms but also recognzes that it is necessary to have ready at hand a well-trained body of police capable of responding with overwhelming force." (Bayley, 1969:36) The Special feature of armed police is that it is " . . . housed in barracks, trained in weapon handling and drill, and live a quasi-military life; and is employed for those duties which require the presence of constituted physical force such as guard duties at banks and the quelling of the civil disturbances." (Bayley, 1969:36)

The exclusiveness of armed police, their functioning in small platoons and their use as a striking force has not been in any way different from the British days. "They embody a clearly defined threat of physical force. It is very much as if a contingent of the national guard in the United States were permanently assigned to the police of each state." (Bayley, 1969:59)

David Bayley has pointed out a distinction between a district armed police and special armed police reserves. The district armed police (DAP in many states) is a force of armed policement quartered in each district usually at district headquarters, under the control of the District Superintendent; while the specialized forces are under the immediate command of the Inspector-General through a Deputy Inspector General, and are concentrated at one or two points in the State. This distinction, however, does not affect the overall picture of the armed police in the State except for specific terms or purposes.

The supervisory staff in armed police is drawn from the Indian Police Service cadre while the subordinate staff is directly recruited and separately trained and had no linkages with their unarmed counterparts except at the time of exigencies when they have to reinforce the civil police.

There has been significant growth in the strength and fire power of the armed police in a state. It is more frequently being employed in support of the civil police because many times situations go out of control.

Bayley has suggested the use of armed police to unarmed duties as it would solve manpower shortage in police to a greater extent without

burdening the State Exchequer. At the same time, he says that they are simply not fit for the task and suggests that if recruitment patterns could be changed this problem might be solved. Bayley discovered the irony that police authorities were not in favor of improving village policing at the expense of armed reserve and also the officials perhaps cannot imagining how the armed police can be dispensed with precisely because they have never been forced to and because ". . . potentialities for prevention are insufficiently studied because overawing force is so ready at hand." (Bayley, 1969:399)

In the Indian police system no officer, whatever his rank, would like to take responsibility or take a chance of dispensing with the armed police. The very idea seems so ridiculous to them on the very face of it. This attitudinal problem is the gift of colonial masters which would continue with the system. Police officers need more time to placate their political masters than devote their time and energy for mundane professional tasks bringing no rewards. They are afraid of exposures, originality and sincere experimentation.

Intelligence Agencies under Central Government

The Central government has powerful intelligence agencies dealing with internal and external matters.

The Research and Analysis Wing (known as RAW)

It collects information at the international level. Some of its middle level officers are directly recruited while othrs are taken from State Police units on deputation. The higher officer cadre is drawn from the Indian Police Service who control the organization. It

does not perform police functions except collection of vital information of interest. Its controls rests with the Prime Minister's Secretariat. The very virth of the organization in 1968 and the circumstances that led to its final shape, raised some controversies. It was regarded as the 'secret police wing' of Mrs. Gandhi. The organizational chart of structural components reflects its stremline character without any bureaucratic red-tape free from communication noise or operational locking.

Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB)

It is commonly known as Intelligence Bureau (IB) and used to handle internal as well as external intelligence collection operations. Its main interest was and still lies in political, subversive, and terrorist intelligence collection rather than criminal intelligence. It was in the late sixties that it bifurcated into two - the other part dealing with external matters became the Research and Analysis Wing. The Intelligence Bureau is also entrusted with the task of security of very important persons like the President, Prime Minister, and the visiting dignitaries. It is headed by a Director who used to be generally seniormost Inspector-General. That tradition is not strictly adhered and nowadays any senior Inspector-General could be chosen for the post. IB personnel are highly screened at the time of selection. Almost all the senior and controlling positions are manned by the selected officers of the Indian Police Service.

There is apparently some discontentment among the non-IPS staff generally those who are directly recruited at the middle level and not those who come from other State police units deputationists. Generally it is all kept under a tight lid and not much is known about

it. However, some of the interprising newsmen published news about the undiscipline and discontentment that perhaps became public due to the confrontation between the IB Employees Association and the management. The General Secretary of the Association was dismissed and other disciplinary steps followed. (For details see Times of India, Feb. 16, 1982:5; and Hindustan Times, June 12, 1983:6 and Dec. 5, 1980.) However, the Prime Minister reportedly ordered an overhaul and expansion of intelligence agencies and sanctioned a sum of 10,000,000,000 rupees for the purpose.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)

The Central Bureau of Investigation was created in 1963 to investigate cases of corruption, inter-state jurisdiction and international ramifications. The Special Police Establishment which was specifically designed to investigate cases of corruption was absorbed the CBI. It collects criminal intelligence and investigates cases. Its officers are drawn from different State police units and senior positions are invariably occupied by the members of the Indian Police Service. The CBI is assuming more and more investigative potential due to greater resources at its command put by the Central government and due to increasing demand to get controversial cases investigated by it. It has acquired credibility when investigating cases requiring high grade expertise, impartiality and coordination. Its fallibility was also exposed as to what could happen in those cases in which powerful political personalities holding important portfolios in Central government, were interested. To some extent, it is parallel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the United States.

There are also specialized agencies under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, whose functions are obviously clear by the names assigned to them. These are:

1. Central Forensic Institute
   a. Central Forensic Science Laboratory
   b. Serologist to Government of India
   c. The Central Fingerprint Bureau
   d. Central Detective Training Schools
2. Examiner of Questioned Documents
3. Inspector of Explosives
4. National Police Academy
5. The Directorate of Police Wireless

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AT STATE LEVEL

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID)

The specialized agencies were specifically created and designed for specific purposes and to achieve specific goals. The Criminal Investigation Department forms the core of such specialized agencies at the State level. Criminal Investigation Department, popularly called by its abbreviation, CID, has two parallel and independent wings: (1) CID (Crime) and (2) CID (Special Branch). These agencies neither work nor come in control at local, district, or regional level, but are centralized at State level and then branching off for local operations. An additional Inspector General of Police or a Senior Deputy Inspector-General of Police heads each of these organizations under the general control of the Inspector General. The supervisory cadre is supplied by the Indian Police Service while other personnel is taken on deputation from the civil police.

CID (Crime)

It is not an ordinary routine investigation agency. The regular investigation work is done at the police station level which is supervised by the District Superintendent of Police at the district level. But there are crimes which have inter-district, inter-region, and even inter-state ramifications. These cases could be referred to the CID (Crime) either by the Superintendent of Police or any other superior officer thereof. Some of the important cases requiring special and prolonged attention or where local police is being criticized for partiality on the very nature of controversy among the powerful parties involved in the case, the CID (Crime) is deemed to be a suitable agency to pursue such complicated and controversial cases.

The CID (Crime) plays the same role at the State level which the Central Bureau of Investigation does at the national evel except that cases of corruption are not handled by the CID.

The important functions of the CID (Crime) include " . . . assistance in the investigation of particularly important crimes anywhere in the State, investigation of crimes that cover a wide area such as dacoities, smuggling, counterfeiting, and collection of information about the nature, incidence and trend of crime." (Bayley, 1969:132) The big cities CID (Crime) has a scientific team which visits the scene and helps the local investigating officer to collect, preserve and evaluate physical evidence. In cities like Delhi, the Crime Branch is also used in nabbing criminals on the basis of modus operandi and those of organized crime whom local police could not reach due to their disguised operations and influential linkages. The Crime Branch also has resources to concentrate its operations which

local police lack. Moreover local police are more involved in law and order and other nitty gritty calls which is not the subject matter of the Crime Branch. The Crime Branch has no problem of police community relations because it is working away from police and public gaze.

Crime is the sole concern of the Crime Branch which is not the case with the civil police. The Crime Branch also has the privilege of retaining a specialized staff and does not have to contend with the general pool of average officers. The Crime Branch is also well placed to requisition special services of other agencies which are far away from the reach of civil police. Generally, the organization of CID (Crime) Branch is done in the form of sections dealing with specialized crime like the Homicide Section or Squad will be handling homicide investigations, Forgery Section covering forgery cases, and so on. These sections are generally headed by an Inspector or a Deputy Superintendent of Police.

Provincial Criminal Investigation Department in which the Special Branch was included was almost established by 1907 in each State, when the Government of India accepted Commissioner's proposals, in its resolution of March 1905. Later District Intelligence Branches were set up and the work was centrally coordinated.

CID (Special Branch)

The CID (Special Branch) is a political information collection agency of the police. At the State level, it has the same function at a small scale while the Intelligence Bureau has at national level on large scale. During the colonial days, it was the most important branch in the hands of the British. It used to be called the 'eyes and ears of the administration or the government'. The staff for this

agency was carefully and specially selected from the civil police and then trained by the Branch itself. Sometimes the selection to the Special Branch was done even at recruitment or training level. The specialty of these officers is that they do not wear a police uniform and mostly play the role of an undercover agent. Most often than not, the Special Branch officers are not known to the local police until they themselves reveal their own identity to help of get help from uniform police. The information and its analysis is a classified one which cannot be shared with anyone not authorized and generally it never comes below the rank of District Superintendent of Police whom it concerns. The Special Branch personnel attends public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, etc. organized by political parties or other groups.

Even political party meetings, activities of individuals and group discussions are within the knowledge of the Special Branch. There are individuals, groups and parties suspected to be involved in terrorist, subversive or covert activities which are a subject of surveillance for the CID (Special Branch).

During the British rule, an English Superintendent of Police used to be chief of the Special Branch and dossiers on individuals were never revealed to native politicians even when they were sharing power with the British during the Interim Government in 1935.

The Special Branch interestingly still covers the activities of the party in power, though not with the same vigor and intensity as it shows in covering the activities of opposition parties. It is a power game and CID (Special Branch) sides with the ruling politician to have the information needed by him or her about those who are contending

for power. This Branch was never disbanded nor even diminished. On the contrary, it was strengthened in its operations and scope to cater to the needs of the party in power. Bayley recorded that:

> Considering the number of politicians who felt the heavy hand of police detention during the independence struggle and the notoriety of the Special Branch's personal dossiers on leading politicians, the retention of the Branch is really quite remarkable, indicating perhaps the pragmatic cast of mind of the leaders of independence, even in the first full blush of freedom. (Bayley, 1969:134)

In spite of the omnipotent character of the Special Branch and its much feared apparatus, whenever there is a communal flare up of a large scale riot, serious violation of law involving conspiracy, a political lapse or a terrorist mishap, the Branch becomes a center of controversy for its failure as an intelligence agency. It is this political police which was much eulogized by Percival Griffiths in his book, To Guard My People, and it is this police wing which even reports on the loyalty of police officers and their attitude towards the government.

It is the Special Branch which keeps the government well informed about the discontentment in police and other services and helps in suppressing any kind of police strike, dissent and of course the rebellion. Its infiltration in dissidents' ranks is proverbial and it could deflate any political or unfavored movement. Its role in each State and IB's role nationwide, at the time of emergency (1975 to 77) during police strikes in various States in the late sixties and late seventies, could be recalled as a great success to the government. It is the same kind of memorable success which was achieved in 1942 during the 'Quit India' movement and during the civil disobedience movement in the twenties or in crushing the revolutionary activities

all along by the British. The Special Branch is still and will continue to be a valuable tool in the hands of the politician who not only controls it but knows how to handle it.

There is another aspect of the Special Branch. A number of police officers do not prefer their postings in the Special Branch. It does not carry attractive special pay and allowances which made it lucrative during British days. Moreover it is being stigmatized among fellow police officers as well as in public making its work unexciting, cynical and paradoxical. Its importance is minimal during unruffled times. During troubled times, it fails to cope with the intensity and abnormality of incidents, events and acts. It is not always imperative as it used to be during the British days that the staff of the Special Branch should be intelligent, resourceful and suitable for the task. More often than not, a police officer unwanted elsewhere is dumped into the Special Branch.

Traffic Police

Except urban and industrialized towns, India did not have traffic problems, necessitating a separate branch to regulate and control vehicular movements. Even in cities, a separate traffic branch is of recent origin. The local police or the police station staff takes care of traffic as well as of crime and law and order problems. Traffic Branch has expanded miraculously with the rowth of vehicular traffic in Indian cities especially after the Sixties. A Deputy Inspector-General or a Superintendent of Police is generally overall in charge of the Traffic police whose subordinate staffis drawn from the regular uniform police but not armed police. The branches enforce traffic laws, generate traffic awareness among public thorugh its

publicity campaigns, serves as escorts to VIPs and coordinates with road engineering, traffic signalling and transport authorities. It has a different uniform. As it handles transient population and traffic violations, its public relation image and reputation for integrity gets seriously affected adversely. In the police department a traffic enforcement posting is considered to be lucrative in spite of its monotony and road hazards.

In big city police departments, traffic is a separate branch. At district level, it carries a separate identity in the form of traffic squad but at the police station level, it is part of the routine police function. In rural India, there may be very few occasions to assign specific traffic duties for police officers, even temporarily.

Mounted Police

The mounted police is a dying breed. It is used only for ceremonial purposes or as an additional adjunct to mob control. Mounted police used to be in fashion once upon a time but its glory is gone because it became too expensive to maintain a horse. It became obsolte in an age of technology when automobile revolution just wiped out traditional transportation. Metropolitan cities like Delhi still have it. Generally, mounted police is a part of police lines, under a Superintendent of Police. The contingent is commanded by an Inspector or a Sub-Inspector. The constables are specially recruited for the Mounted Police and are not transferred to civil police or vice versa. In old days, police horsemen were drawn from cavalry units of Indian army. Every policeman used to get training in equestrian skills but this is being abandoned now in favor of training in driving skills. It is difficult to get and maintain good horses.

Women police, Home Guards and other supportive services are not being treated separately because their flow with the main branches of police is integrative and does not call for any elaborate dealing.

The Training Institutes like SVP Police Training Academy (Central level), Police Training Colleges and Police Recruit Training Centers at State level are obviously training institutions. Lower level police officers are trained at Recruit Training Centers, middle level officers at Colleges and Indian Police Service officers at Academy. The three training institutions differ in their method, content, material, style, approach and philosophy. There are more chances for a lower level officer to reach the middle level but there are very little chances of middle level to enter higher ranks starting from Superintendent of Police. A beginner Indian Police Service officer starts where middle level officers ends his or her career. That is perhaps the reason to have three kinds of training to three levels of officers from a management and operational standpoint. It is another part of British colonial innovation that is hard to get rid of.

Style

According to the American Heritage Dictionary (1981), style is 'the way in which something is said or done, as distinguished from its substances'. Police has its own style, its own mannerism and its own sub-culture.

CRIME-FIGHTING FOCUS

Crime fighting focus, for any police, is a primary focus. Whether police prevent crime or control crime or even fight crime, is not exactly known but they do investigate crime, patrol localities,

undertake undercover operations and adopt a number of other techniques to apprehend criminals, collect evidence for prosecution and attempt to reduce the opportunities for crime commission. Police seem to be fighting crime because in a paramilitary outfit, armed with legal and lethal powers, had attacking and defensive techniques as military use in fighting a foe in a warfare. Police like military shoots its adversary sometimes at first sight and exalts its victory over the dead. In spite of all these similarities, it is still debatable whether crime-fighting is the sole reason of police existence or it is 'prevention and dection of crime'. Police cannot fight the crime in the same way as doctors fight a disease or military fights an enemy but the term could be used to illustrate few techniques, some fighting style and an idea that permeates a heroic action. Police officers are as brave, bold and intrepid as any member of military's combat force; while facing any desperadoes or an encounter. Their aim of protecting society from external or internal enemy is more or less identical. Police do more than just fighting crime and therefore, the expression is being used here in a limited sense - just to explain impact of an idea, to point out the limitations of a philosophy, to expose claims of an organization's capabilities and to pursue vigorously police themes of social control.

To have an appraisal of crime conditions in India would be necessary to understand police practices, the style and the imagery.

Typicality of Indian Crime

Crime in India, with its typical characteristics, gets complex when it cuts across the caste, class and communal boundaries. Its ways particularly are indigenous, its rationale baffling and its

extent erratic. It is sinister, senseless and bewildering:

> Crime in India is bewildering in its variety; the police must cope with a range of crime as diverse as any in the world. While people are vicious to one another in India in much the same ways that they are in the West, what distinguishes the Indian scene is the enormous variety of circumstances within which crime becomes manifest. It is the richness of social and geographical conditions that gives to Indian crime its incredible and fascinating heterogeneity. Only in a country which, as some have remarked, is advancing in uneven stages from the first to the twentieth centuries could one have cattle thievery and insurance frauds, dacoity and stock swindles, murder for witchcraft and vehicular homicide. (Bayley, 1969:106)

Even in modern circumstances and modern times, India carries with it the burden of age-old centuries simultaneously. That is true for the crime world too. 'Thugee' and 'Pindaris' criminals of Sleeman days may be legendary now but the gangs of 'Sansis' and 'Bawarias' (which were declared as criminal tribes during British regime) whose modus operandi is passed from one generation to another, found operating in Delhi suburbs. Illicit distillation of liquor, burglaries and some typical robberies continues to be a family pasttime in spite of rehabilitative programs of the government and abolition of Habitual Offenders Act. On the other hand, 'chain-snatching' from the necks of walking women, 'eve-teasing' (molestation of women) in busses and busy thoroughfares, bank robberies, smuggling of contraband articles, blackmarketing (charging more money for a priced item without showing any sale) and hijacking are some of the modern day crimes. 'Bandit Queens' (women robbers) are not yet past glories, but very much visible in media stories. They outrank and outshine their male counterparts in mass murders, gun-trotting-horse riding scenarios. Challenging police with bravado survive through better planning and better intelligence operations,

though massive police armed battalions keep on combing the ravines with superior equipment to get these few feminine outlaws.

Bizarre are the rampant cases of 'gang-rape' in many states. Even crime by policemen is becoming common. Crime is stubborn, cynical and deeply entrenched in metropolitan big cities. 'Dowery deaths' (wife commits suicide failing to cope with the pressure of maltreatment meted out to her by her in-laws, and even her husband) of Delhi are a sham and sickening state of affairs. Killing of foreign diplomats in the capital, shooting of a guard at the house of a Cabinet Minister, conspiracy to sabotage the special aeroplane of the Prime Minister show the other end of the spectrum of crime in India. There are a number of crimes which become part of law and order category and are not mentioned at this place. Then, there are political, social and professional crimes.

Police response to these crime challenges has equally been typical. For dacoits and robbers, police launched its operations of surround and strike type. In pursuance of this policy there were several encounters and in each encounter, a large number of robbers were eliminated by shooting them down. Increasing police patrolling in affected areas was another routine and frequently adopted measure against a variety of crimes like 'eve-teasing', robberies, burglaries, vehicular thefts, pickpockets, etc. "Because of the wild and remote conditions of so much of India, murders may go undetected or be marked down as 'unnatural deaths' and proper post-mortems may be delayed for days, if performed at all, obliterating clues as to the true cause of death." (Bayley, 1969:107)

Some of the important aspects of police style are categorized and are described in Chapter IV wherever those fall in line of the political discussion on the present dilemmas of police. Image is important to police and public alike. Imagery is not a shadowy event but a reality that works in the background but becomes part of the obvious with subtlety. It is important to discuss this police imagery in India, somewhat in detail.

Imagery

"Political images count in politics and history." (Wright: 1976:1) Police and public images count in police work too. Manning (1979) provided delineation of police imagery with dramatic impact in public and police perceptions. The Police-Community Relations Movement evidently aimed at improving police image. A number of studies have been done regarding police perceptions of public, police self perception and public perception of police image. Koenig (1975) has examined in detail the issue of 'Police perceptions of public respect and extra-legal use of force'. The writer will discuss these three aspects of imagery, namely, police image in public, self-image, and public image in police.

Police Image in Public

For historical and a variety of other reasons, the police image in India was never positive, impartial, or honest. People dislike police and are not ready to accept the notion that police of free India carries a changed image and personality:

> The people, by and large, regard the police as agents of the party in power, who can let loose a reign of terror and do all sorts of unjust and undesirable deeds . . . . The people, in general, believe that members of the police

> force are incompetent, cruel, normless and even corrupt. They are bereft of moral values and mostly function for their personal and selfish ends. They create awe and terror and indulge in terrifying the innocent people. (Sharma, 1981:170-171)

Policemen have a number of conflicts in the personal as well as their public domain, which seek constant resolution. Image not only comes out of the decisions but the way a problem is approached, handled and resolved, the personal conduct and interaction. Political pressures and legal formalities sometimes do not permit to hold on to a good image and often execution of orders has much offensiveness inbuilt for which police faces blame. In India, there is more violence in the air due to socio-economic dilemmas. Industrial disputes, students' indiscipline, political clashes, communal conflicts, racial riots, rural unrest, urban upheaval, regional anarchy, social disruption, and economic disparities are not of police making but they are the ones who bear the brunt when things are worse. "A certain amount of violence is built in the process of modernization." (Ghosh, 1981:31) Traffic regulations and other socio-economic enactments when enforced bring bad memories of police prosecution. There is very little that police could associate with good things. It is a social service organization and there are efforts to project better police image by organizing youth clubs, public assistance booths, but none of these or any of these change the basic police orientation. So the image basically does not change completely by changing police community programs or outer-styles of police work.

Police work and the way it was done left a bad taste for too long. Media specially brought to the limelight reprehensible

techniques of crime control and police attitudes towards public. In the process the police image got tarnished. Impressive police achievements did not get the same amount of media appreciation as condemnation. Police is affected by this negative feedback and very soon the become used to their image. If someone could make a content analysis of police and crime related news, it would be soon obvious that there is more to discredit the police than to applaude them.

Adverse Effect on Police Image due to Politics

One of the major and potent reasons for a bad police image is politics. In democratic wranglings, police fail to please all the parties and in India, police are sure to offend one of the political party or the group in the fray. Generally, police in India take the side of the ruling party or politician and that would be resented by the opponent. Theoretically, police are supposed to be neutral but in practice police favors the ruling elite. When the party in power is replaced, it affects police. Here are a few of several such examples:

1. The Union Home Minister assured that "The government will screen the police administration to weed out those people who have sympathies to certain sections" and admitted that "there was political interference in the police force." (Hindustan Times, Aug. 21 1980, p. 3)

2. 'Rajiv Snubs Bajrang Lal'. In this report, Rajib, the son of the Prime Minister and also a member of Parliament and General Secretary of the ruling Congress party, while visiting a market where a fire took place due to an electrical short-circuit, found that the Commissioner of Polie (Bajrang Lal) came late, snubbed the Commissioner in public saying, "If you have come to know about the fire two hours after it began, then you ought to be sacked." (Hindustan Times, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 1). The news item was widely read and evoked a lot of public interest leading to the demoralization of the Commissioner and affected police image.

3. 'Sethi not in favor of police trade unions.' (Hindustan Times, Oct. 25, 1982, p. 3). In this news-item Sethi is

the Union Home Minister and he is not in favor of police taking part in politics as trade unions to get their demands accepted.

Police Image Suffers Due to their Attitude and Action Towards Certain Groups/Individuals of Public

Police actions and attitudes against certain groups and individuals impair impartial character of police in general:

1. 'Jain marchers lathi-charged.' (Hindustan Times, Sept. 30, 1980, p. 1) adversely reflects on police behavior against Jains who are known for their peaceful, nonviolent ways and creates a bad police image in public.

Another incident reflects police attitude towards poor, badly affecting police image:

2. 'A flying squad was called to pick up an unconscious man lying on the street. Police came, saw, and said, "It is not our business." Reason, "He was not dead or dying." According to the Head Constable, "We do not remove 'kanglas and garibs'." The leading daily newspaper published this news-item under the caption "They serve rich alone" resulting in a bad police image. (Hindustan Times, Nov. 4, 1980, p. 3)

Some of these captions in press are self-explanatory:

3. 'Rohtak V-C alleges cops "kicked, stripped him." (Hindustan Times, Sept. 23, 1981, p. 6)

4. 'Police beat up Tirupati staff, pilgrims.' (Hindustan Times, Oct. 9, 1981, p. 12)

5. 'Police demolish temple in Bhopal.' (Times of India, Oct. 12, 1981, p. 1)

Adverse Effect on Police Image due to Publicity of Police Complicity in Crime and with Criminals

The major factor of a bad police image in India is police complicity with crime and criminals. A series of news items prominently published would reveal the importance of this connection. Following are random samples:

1. 'Police bid to "hush up" dacoity.'
   (Hindustan Times, May 28, 1981, p. 1)

2. 'Man dies after drinks with cop.'
   (Hindustan Times, March 24, 1981, p. 3)

3. 'Wrong Pali tried to dacoity.'
   (Hindustan Times, May 13, 1981, p. 1)

4. 'Police dare not touch Baba Case Accused.'
   (Hindustan Times, June 15, 1981, p. 1)

5. 'Cops arrest for rape ordered.'
   (Hindustan Times, June 18, 1981, p. 5)

Adverse Effect On Police Image Due to Publicity of Police Circumventing Judicial Process

The police image has been adversely affected due to police's dubious ways to circumvent the judicial process to get convictions in criminal cases.

1. A person appeared in 2500 criminal cases as a police witness in the Delhi Courts over a period of 15 years, and when the witness "ultimately refused" to appear in more cases, eight cases were brought against him for his externment from Delhi. (Hindustan Times, Aug. 24, 1980, p. 1)

2. Police liquidated seven witnesses in a campaign code-named "Gangajal". (Times of India, Dec. 5, 1980, p. 1)

3. News-item that 'Escapee is "related" to escort-Constable asked questions in the wake of two recent incidents which highlighted the "incapacity" of the Constable on duty to meet the challenge of the situation regarding handling and supervising of undertrails. (Hindustan Times, Sept. 23, 1980, p. 3)

4. 'Death in Custody: Two SIs and 2 cops held.'
   (Hindustan Times, Aug. 14, 1981, p. 3)

Deterioration in Organizational Affairs of Police Affects Police Image Negatively

Internal affairs of police among themselves on a personal basis and inside the department are sources of publicity adversely affecting the police image. Some examples are given below:

1. 'BSF deployed; cops stir on.' (Hindustan Times, Oct. 11, 1981, p. 1)

2. 'A cruel joke' in which a constable kills another in a joke. (Hindustan Times, Oct. 11, 1981, p. 11)

3. 'Former D.I.G. of Assam gets parole.' (Hindustan Times, Oct. 15, 1981, p. 4)

4. 'All is in the well, Sir' reflects poor use of English language by a cop while reporting a situation to his senior. What he wanted to say was 'All was well, Sir.' (Hindustan Times, Nov. 21, 1981, p. 3)

5. 'Bungling by Delhi policemen.' (Hindustan Times, Dec. 20, 1981, p. 13)

Serious Crime and Sensational Incidents Negate Police Efficiency/Effectiveness and Adversely Reflects on Police Image

Nothing affects police image more than ineffectiveness of police to control crime. When serious and sensational crimes are reported in the news, police are invariably criticized. Published news-item gives an impression to the reader that the place is full of crime, unsafe and fearful. This conveys negative images of police performance. Few examples will illustrate:

1. 'Car-borne robbers strike again.' (Hindustan Times, Jan. 8, 1981, p. 3)

2. 'Senior Kuwait diplomat shot dead in South Delhi.' (Hindustan Times, Jan. 5, 1981, p. 1)

In a study regarding police image, the interesting findings were that the police behavior was rude and discourteous. The responses by different categories of people were equally interesting:

Students: 'They are power-drunk'

Businessmen: 'They are corrupt'

Intelligentsia: 'They are illiterate and unfortunately placed'

Political Leaders: 'They are agents of the ruling group'

Religious Leaders: 'They are immoral'

Civil Servants: 'They do not have professional ethics'
(Sharma, 1977:273)

The study also looked into the problem as to why the police image was like that and they found that 'Nature of the police job', 'History of the police', and 'Democratic change' were mainly responsible for bad police image.

The following factors were said to be responsible for unpopularity of police:

1. 'Legislation of a social nature is increasing both in volume and complexity.'
2. 'Cumbrous criminal law procedure.'
3. 'Legacy of Indian police as an instrument of an alien power.'
4. 'The sins of the Commissioner and omissions of governments are to be borne by the police.'
5. 'Failure of the political parties' to abide with the 'ground rules.'
6. 'Political parties . . . treat the police as their handmaid.'

(Reddy and Seshadri, 1972:57-67)

"Thus the police are widely believed to be (a) mentally ill-equipped, (b) unhelpful, (c) rude and overbearing in approach, (d) dishonest and in league with the underworld, and (e) addicted to third-degree methods and framing of cases." (Reddy and Seshadri, 1972:61) The study conducted by David Bayley revealed " . . . public distrust of the police, especially with respect to their honest and their impartiality." (Bayley, 1969:218) A bad police image is a well-known phenomenon and police image seems to be going from bad to worse. "The case for a new image, for the police in this country is incontrovertible." (Nath, 1978:190)

The media, especially the newspapers in India, are being criticized by the police for projecting poor image of policing and not focusing on the achievements of the police. The impact of negative reporting affects police image in the public mind, because, "As the newspapers expose police atrocities practically everyday, the image of the policeman as a robot with a penchant for violence is reinforced in the public mind." (Nair, 1981:5)

Referring to police brutalities, the Hindustan Times editorialized that, "It is sad that the attitude and the image of the policeman as an insensitive lathi-wielding tyrant should remain 35 years after the nation became the master of its own destiny." (Hindustan Times, March 4, 1981, p. 9)

When one thinks of police in India, one thinks of corruption and brutality because " . . . of the various factors responsible for the poor image of the police in the country, two stand out prominently: police corruption and police brutality. Surprisingly, an average policeman has a much poorer opinion of the society than the latter has of him." (Times of India, Aug. 1, 1981, p. 9)

Police Self-Image

The policeman's lot is full of woes: " . . . long hours of duty, no weekly rest-day, no national holiday, poor pay, lack of housing, absence or inadequate promotional opportunities, political interference by party functionaries and legislators, political victimization, harsh discipline . . ." (Ghosh, 1981:v) Police see themselves as a condemned people, despised by public and misused by the politicians. They get the beating most of the time and have no forum to complain. Even if their difficulties are well-understood,

they are seldom appreciated. Their problem multiply and resources shrink with the increase in their workload. Police personnel keep on coping, running, fumbling, fuming and surviving. As they have no new image to offer, they find some of the rudiments of the old image still useful. The image of authority feeds them better than the image of service. A police officer soon finds one that all those ideals and idioms do not take him very far in police work.

The police officer lives in a world of hediousness, of fraud, immorality and crime. He has to practice different sets of rules of the game. He has to protect himself when deserted by his own fellow-colleagues, and ditched by his own superiors. He carries with him a strange load of pressure, tension and tribulations. He is alone if he falls out of the sub-culture, he is with them if he contributes to the contamination. One very soon finds himself face to face with the reality of the police world which is a lot different from the one thought out before joining the police force. Some already know it and rush into it with effortless ease. Police work is to be learned, practiced and perfected. In India, it makes a tremendous change in a person after becoming a policeman. Ask the people who joined it. Unfortunately there has been no such studies done so far and this aspect stands hidden empirically.

"Policemen do not unduly concern themselves with analyzing their self-portrait, otherwise they could become unredeemable victimes of self-pity and misanthrope." (Reddy and Seshadri, 1972:61). "It is an unreasonable emotion that damns the police as a whole for the misconduct of a fraction", (Reddy and Seshadri, 1972:66) says a senior police officer and explains the policeman's predicament:

> They have a difficult task. They are constantly in active contact with the most disagreeable members of the community. And when they have to deal with the more agreeable members, it is generally upon very disagreeable occasions and when those usually agreeable members are in their most disagreeable moods. For years, we have over-worked them and habitually over-criticized them. (Reddy and Seshadri, 1972:66)

The self image of power and authority spawns over most of the police work and is reflected in police behavior and attitude while dealing with public. As guardians of law and as enforcers of order, they imbibe the feeling as if they themselves are above the law and are special class of ruling category which owes its existence unto itself. Under the pressure they try to close ranks and defend each other.

Police establishes power image at various occasions. Maintenance of order, regulation of traffic, checking of licenses, patrolling of areas, re-establish the police image of power. Police have the power to assert and no wonder they use it so frequently.

Public Image in Police Eyes

Police see people through their own eyes of experience. Like a medical doctor who sees every approaching person as a patient and wants to figure out the ailment even before the person explains himself, similarly police perceives an approaching individual trying to ascertain what's wrong. People come to police for service, for help, to ask for action and seek protection. Experience teaches police how to handle stereotype requests and how to handle the emergency calls.

For police, each individual complainant has a routine similarity but for each individual his problem is a pressing necessity. That's

the different in perception resulting from the two different platforms on which the individuals are standing. Calls regarding 'locking oneself out of a car or a house', 'locating a snake', or 'annoying unattended dog', party complaints, noise problems, breakdownof a car on the road, are real problems for persons concerned but irksome for the police. They sometimes laugh at other's stupidity and often feel annoyed. Social service is not a real policework and fail to thrill a policeman and does not bring any favourable peer-response to his performance. A call of robbery, murder, shoot-out, break-ins, spurs a policeman to action, is reported in the press, and is televized bringing police into the center of the social stage where personal satisfaction, peer glorification and media appeal are amply assured in spite of all the hazards of the games. That's known as police work, that's called crime investigation. That attracts the attention of superiors as well as of all concerned. The public image changes from puerile to potent reality. Police seek public cooperation to solve crime. It all amounts to police work. The image of public for police work and image of people for police service are two different realities and invoke different kinds of responses in police circles. These are the two different images sponsored all the time in literature, in dialogue, in public utterances, in lectures and sermons. The images sometimes co-exist, often overlap and occasionally become mutually exclusive.

Police do have a familiar image of a section of society where people commit all kinds of crime and lie. They know gamblers, prostitutes, drug-dealers and such other common professions which exist only because there is a clientele. Their awareness of those

social segments where people work eight hours at different timings in a variety of professions provides them a professional image. They have different profiles. Police work out these profiles repeatedly and rapidly to fix up that image in its professional folio.

SUMMARY

In spite of different police departments at the State and National levels, the pattern of organizational structure, mode of functioning, the style and problems are almost identical. Because of excessive centralization, all police forces, with some difference in civil and armed police, are alike.

Structurally, State police in India is a four entry level system - constable level, Sub-Inspector level, Deputy Superintendent level, and Assistant Superintendent level. The same is almost true regaridng provincial armed constabularies which are trained more on militaristic lines rather than civil police pattern. Assistant Superintendents are nationally selected by the Union Police Service Commission while Deputy Superintendents are selected at State level by the State Public Service Commission. Assistant or Sub-Inspectors are genrally recruited by a 'Police Board'. constables are enlisted by the District Superintendent of Police. The recruitment policy is undergoing a change.

National and State police organizations function at national and State levels though their powers, structure and discipline and functions are similar, depend on the objectives and operations of the specific department.

National level police organizations generally carry a better image than State-level police. For impartial investigations,

enquiries against State or important persons/cases, and in widespread cases or seeking protection against State-government machinery, national level police organizations are preferred. National level organizations are also used as a support system to State police. National police organizations are employed to suppress State police strikes and also in case of taking over of state administration by the Central government.

Both the State and National level police organizations are topped by nationally selected police officers who are controlled more by the national government through their service conditions. To avoid interference of national government, there is a trend among State governments to prefer State-level officers more for top positions, who are amenable to State political leaders. This trend has created a rift among competing State and National level officers but its impact is not yet well-known.

This kind of multi-layered but pivotal police system had brought political interplay at different levels. Local politicians and community leaders pressurize at police station level and go up to district headquarters where Superintendent of Police or District Magistrate holds his say. If it does not work, they reach State Capital, through their elected members. National police organizations are immune to direct local or State level pressure. The machinations and moorings of this political police interplay and interaction would be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

OVERVIEW

This chapter's main focus is the nature of India's politics and police role in that context. It has been described how shifts in politics affect police work. The chapter concentrated on police politics intereaction as an ongoing process, on socio-economic problems based on communal and caste dilemmas and regional thrusts. All these social, economic, regional and cultural realitiies mesh political web and pressurize the police network. Political crimes, extremism and solidification of societal cleavages threaten police effectiveness and affect organizational and individual police behavior. Polarization takes place in police and politics alienating targetted adversary forces.

It is not possible for police to resolve any political, social or economic crisis but it is pressed to hold back those who oppose governmental policies - rightly or wrongly. All these challenges and peculiarities of India's political social problems interact constantly with the police. This chapter provides focus of that interaction and locus of its accountability. It starts from political context of policing and blends into attempts of reconstruction and reform.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF POLICING IN INDIA

It seems to be a skillful somersault performed by the police when they adjusted to the changed realities in India after independence.

All of a sudden, police officers had to salute and stand in attention as sub-servients to those whom they ruled, to whom they arrested arm-twisted, and who were baton-charged, fired upon, hunted and hated. In fact, psychologically as well as professionally, it was a see-saw change. May be the compulsions of change brought the politicians and policemen together and they adjusted overnight, as there was no time for compunctions of conscience. The writer had heard so many stories of that changed relationship. Both were the gainers in new set of adjustment. Politicians got stability and a powerful tool in police, on the other hand, police got opportunities, political support and a road to promotion and prosperity. The relationship soon crystallized and boomed but people lost a historic chance of community control over policing. Alderson gave a glimpse of such a police dilemma:

> Fears and tensions stimulate reactionary sentiments which foreshadow backlash, causing further crime and public disorder. Progress by protest brings ideology and violence onto the streets. Industrial disputes cast their shadows of social conflict, sometimes spilling over into crime. And so the catalogue goes on. (Alderson, 1979:1)

To understand this sensitivity and predicament, one has to gain insight into political order and change.

Political Order and Change

Referring to U.S.A., U.K., and U.S.S.R., Samuel Huntington promotes the idea that, "Effective bureaucracy, well-organized political parties with high degree of political participation in public affairs, civilian control over military, reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict, provide stability and legitimacy to a country's government." (Huntington, 1968:1)

Moreover, the general formula of basing the government on free and fair elections is irrelevant because "the problem is not to hold elections but to create institutions." (Huntington, 1968:7) Huntington feels that the primary problem is not liberty but creation of a legitimate public order, and that men cannot have liberty without order. Elaborating this argument, Huntington feels that authority "is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels and rioting students." (Huntington, 1968:8) Huntington's emphasis is on political institionalization. He described political institutionalization as "adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures." (Huntington,1968&12) To him, rationalized authority, differentiated structure and mass participation thus distinguish modern politics from antecedent politics.

Confusion and complexity of social behavior, as well as of social control, are still beyond the reach of technical insight of any sophisticated computer. Data based research designs of a rigorous researcher still fail to isolate the impact of confounding variable. Undefined outcomes of pre-defined actions keep on confusing even a well-trained observer. Alderson has addressed the confusion succinctly, from a police perspective:

> Working as they do in the increasingly disorientating, sometimes neurotic and demented, sometimes violent and anarchical (or seemingly so) milieu of contemporary society, police officers (particularly of the junior ranks) are understandably confused by it all. Bravely trying to cope with problems of mass hooliganism, racial tension, drug addiction, distress and degradation . . ., the police are often perplexed by their inability to understand the apparent irrationality of the behavior which confronts them. To say that such behavior is an actual consequence of the

> brave new world and that is only happens at the edges is not enough consolation to people who work always on the edges. (Alderson, 1979:4)

Politics and police are for power, and therefore related to each other. "The police are related to power in two ways. By their very existence they deny unconstitutional power to others, while at the same time, they have legal power to do their constitutional duty." (Alderson, 1979:11) That is not all. Police form coercive arm of State power and also act as arbiter among the contenders of power specially when race for succession is not clear-cut and is contested cliquishly and unscrupulously.

India's police and politicis almost grew parallel from the same British source. "Instinct of survival is greater than instinct of freedom," (Alderson, 1979:185) and in India, survival remained at stake, most of the time. It was no irony if people in India favored British in comparison to their earlier foreign or Indian masters. Again, not surprisingly enough, people in India felt much safer during the British regime than in any other period of history. An interesting aspect of police-political relationship is that "Police are more comfortable in an authoritarian world." (Alderson, 1979:219) and it was alright so long as administrative grip was tighter but as democratic institutions were introduced, police started facing political problems of varying magnitude. To analyze police role in politics, we will focus on conceptual and functional aspects of that role.

Police Role in Politics

"Police are part of the politics of social control," (Alderson, 1979:57) wrote Alderson and at the same time emphasized for its

"apolitical objectivity so that, in the moments of its greatest stress, it can turn to a philosophy fashioned and honed through research, debate and a firm knowledge of enabling legal provisions and constitutional principles." (Alderson, 1979:63) Police neutrality in politics is a British phenomenon. This led to an administrative paradox which could neither be resolved philosophically nor functionally. An undefined 'golden mean' remained a good workable hypothesis and police rolled their stocks on those premises. The love and hate relationship between police and politics either produced a hand-in-glove policy or a sanguinary confrontation. Theoreticians and academicians tried to devise plans for disengagement. In a democratic state, conceptually police supremacy over politics was unthinkable. In the United States, where Mayor, Prosecuting Attorney, Sheriff and Judges are elected officials, police affect the outcomes of these offices. In other nations, police are not that fortunate and play politics more indirectly. In Asian and African countries, safest course for police had been to rally round the Camp of ruling politiians.

Police hobnobbing with politicians appears to be a necessity, a survival technique. Public impression of police being a tool of self serving elite, might not be an exaggeration. Such a phenomenon is well reflected in Bayley's analysis of India's police:

> Police have been known to become the tool of self serving elites. They have been given the job of preserving stability that might otherwise be achieved through willing popular participation in political life. In democratic countries partisanship and political "bossism" have on occasion destroyed the morale of police forces, rendering them ineffective, and making them objects of contempt in the public mind. (Bayley, 1969:364)

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Politicians dump all kinds of blame on police and also selectively favor them whenever it served their purpose. Suggestions and admonitions to police from politicians were never in short supply. Leaving politicians apart, police and public always had and continue to have adversarial relationship. Bayley provided a glimpse of this tenuous relationship:

> . . . ruling party and police are lumped together as conspirators in a vast plot against the freedom of political parties and of individual citizens. In true opposition style, faults of the police are laid at the door of the ruling party. . . . Indeed, except for the few supporters of the police, it would be difficult to distinguish between ruling party members and opposition simply by reading spoken remarks made in legislatures about the police . . . (Bayley, 1969:367)

Lower and middle levels of police officers who bear the brunt of field work are more exposed to public and political onslaught than their superior bosses who supervise from far distant places of district, range or provincial headquarters. Being least defensible politically they are open to more penalties:

> And they (subordinate staff) may be penalized more easily than an I.P.S. (Indian Police Service) officer. The threat of being transferred is particularly effective against them. IPS officers join service knowing they will probably serve in other states, they are used to shifting from post to post. Subordinate staff serve in their home districts, they are surrounded with familiar things and with friends and acquaintances of long standing. It is undoubtedly harder for them to be completely objective and impersonal in the line of duty. The thought of being wrenched from this familiar environment causes great anxiety. (Bayley, 1969:371)

In fact, everyday interactions between a policeman and a publicman depend on their respective rank, status and public activity. Sometimes, clash of personal ego between them overrides all other considerations, especially when they wish to be effective and powerful in public eye. Police and politicians are most exposed to public view

in a democracy, so they need to manage their selective disclosures. Sensitivity of police and politicians' perceptions heightens as their survival becomes more critical on public approval or acceptance. Local media devilishly fish on these uneasy waters. There has been more and more growing awareness among police and politicians to back up each other and save their exposed sides, as far as possible, by supporting each other and by serving their mutual interests. Where this happens public suffers due to such an alliance. People don't find any one to champion their cause and in turn get exploited both by the police and politicians. Police get protection from politicians and politicians get their interests served through police. This subtle alliance is kept hidden from the public view and never openly declared. Policemen, if they do not please politicians, are soon to find their hands in a hornet's nest. However, juggling with all kinds of politicians is not always easy and policemen are least trained to play politics.

This development in many states has given rise to a new kind of police entrepreneurship in politics. Talks about these enterprising police officers and unscrupulous politicians become a staple food for corridor gossips or informal innuendoes. A police politician clash sometimes becomes unavoidable and when it takes place, police wreckage keeps floating for quite some time until another collision eclipses the former. Rarely a police officer comes out as unscathed out of a political confrontation. In a Machiavellian politics, there are hardly any rules to guide and a pathetic police performance dwindles motivations for effectiveness:

> The pictures that emerges is of a police administration habitually temporizing, avoiding responsibility, and

> deferring to people of influence. Especially at lower levels of authority, like the station house officer, the ability to move vigorously seems to have become paralyzed in some areas of the country. Politicians can intrude, it would seem, with deadly effect if they choose. (Bayley, 1969:375)

Indian politics is a strange phenomenon; it builds itself on negative planks. "It thrives on charges of skulduggery; the police provide a convenient occasion." (Bayley, 1969:376) The State policy of police neutrality in politics is a facade, a duplicity, a double dealing and double talk. In India, police are for a person, for a party, or for a power.

Police officers of British days yielded to political pressure to a limited extent and even sometimes resisted it. The breed of police officers of post-independence period (after 1947) are more amenable to political pressure. Those who are joining now are in a hurry to play politics. They wanted to take sides and share power. They are competing for their promotions, postings and prestige. In competition for scarce opportunities, anything goes. Police officers like politicians are the product of their times. The younger officers "are more accustomed to the frenzy and fanaticism of political life and they perceive no loss of respect or prestige, no clippings of their wings, because a democratic environment is all they have known." (Bayley, 1969:377) The democracy seems to be taking roots as people, police and politicians are adjusting to each other. "Just as politicians seek to use police for their purposes, so policemen sometimes seek to use politicians for theirs." (Bayley, 1969:377)

There is another group of people or class of people that exist between police and politicians, the class of brokers. Due to historic reasons people are reluctant to approach authorities directly by

themselves. "Indians by and large are exceedingly unsure of themselves in approaching people in positions of formal authority. Maybe their world is a small one and manipulation of a non-village administrative structure is beyond their capacity; therefore, there is a need of intermediaries or brokers, local 'bosses', 'Dalals' and mediators." (Bayley, 1969:377-78)

Police in many ways regulate politics. Police possess the powers, under Police Rules, to give permission to hold public meetings, take out processions, and use of loud speakers. They monitor proceedings of such meetings, take notes of speeches made by politicians, shadow politicians and keep a record of political parties and groups. The Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) carries its operations of collecting information about political parties and their manipulations. The Special Branch is staffed through selecting intelligent police officers from the regular cadre and it maintains its linkagese with uniform police. Politicans are well aware of police intelligence operations like surveillence, infiltration, bugging, etc. against political parties.

Police becomes a party in harassing, instituting criminal cases and arresting the targeted politicians. It starts from the Home Ministry to which police belong. Home portfolio is retained himself by the most powerful politician or assigned to one of the most trusted confidante. Home Ministry uses its power not only against party opponents but against personal opponents inside the party itself. In short, Home Ministry possesses the power of coercion, the administrative clout and overall the power to regulate whatever the freedom people have:

> Home means power. Because, under the British, this was a police state, the Home Minister was supposed to be the next officer (after the Chief Minister). The most powerful officers in the district then and now are the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police. The SP is powerful because life and property are in his hands. (How is this important politically?) Every day your supporters are coercing my supporters - the only relief is through the police. Then, people can be falsely implicated in dacoities; similarly, home can give relief to people. Home has constitutional power over the District Magistrate. (Isn't the District Planning Officer as important now as the District Magistrate?) In the district, the District Planning Officer is not powerful because he has to function according to the wishes and desires of the people. He can only offer improvements to the people, but he cannot coerce them. In general, the development departments are not important because they don't have the capacity to force the coerce people. (Brass, 1965:213)

To remain in leadership role, perhaps it is perceived inevitable in India to promote one's group interests by arranging privileges and access to power while at the same time deprive the rivals to the extent that they could not challenge the leadership. That is the reason that "the ministers are not much interested in the problem of masses; but, on account of groupism, they discuss the position of their groups and generally they favor their own men." (Brass, 1965:218) The same style is adopted by the members of The Legislative Assembly (called MLAs) who nurse their constituencies by listening to the complaints from the public against local officers ranging from petty school teacher to policemen.

None of any program or policy gets any meaning till police are pressed into service for the success. When police were used to break the strike of railway workers n 1974, hundreds of employees were hunted like wild rabbits and their families forcibly thrown out of their government-allotted quarters, at odd hours of night, in inclement weather, without any notice. A mix of terror, torture and

forcible eviction broke the backbone of the strike within no time. Many strikes get called off when merciless police pressure is applied under a cluster of ill-defined laws that prohibit continuation of strike if prohibited by the government specially in essential services. Any service could be declared as an essential service.

In 1976, vasectomy operations were performed, en masse, by bringing the poor and the defenseless to the hospital, under the fears of police action. Police arrests, police brutalities and police coercion provided teeth to the otherwise failed program of family planning. Such a kind of torture and arbitrariness was even unthinkable during the British times who did not interfere in personal or family matters of citizens. For the first time, during independence people in north India, got the taste of police raw power. These kind of political pressures on police were horrible in nature because with the success of the program was tied their performance:

> Quotas were imposed on individual state and local government officials. 'There is hardly a school teacher, a civil servant, railwayman or police inspector in this sprawling state,' wrote one observer, 'whose pay, promotion, or confirmation was not held up pending the production by him or her of certificates to show that he or she had motivated a requisite number of persons to undergo sterilization. (Weiner, 1978:36)

When these forcible vasectomy operations were directed against Muslims in Delhi, it took a violent turn and a number of Muslims were killed on account of police firing.

Another inhuman act that constantly goes on in the capital is the slum-clearance under police protection. Polticians exploit and support slum dwellers for votes and at the same time get their dwellings demolished through municipal agencies. These demolitions

were ruthlessly done on a much wider scale in 1976-77 under massive police presence:

> The beautifician of Delhi was another of Sanjay Gandhi's pet projects. Sanjay persuaded the Delhi municipal corporation and the Delhi Development Authority (which has primary responsibility for urban planning) to improve the city by clearing shops and huts that had encroached on public spaces. The first structures to be leveled were the huts that had been built by Muslim squatters on the public spaces around Jama Masjid, the largest mosque in India. Subsequently, many of their inhabitants were transported to locations ten to fifteen miles from the city. Although eventually many of the slum dwellers were provided with new housing, there was widespread anger at the summary manner in which the government had bulldozed their dwellings and transported them to areas far from where most of them worked.
>
> As many as 150,000 structures were demolished in Delhi, 137,000 of them by the Delhi Development Authority, nearly 11,000 by the Delhi Corporation, and 1,400 by the New Delhi Municipal Committee. Demolitions took place initially at Jama Masjid and at Turkman. (Weiner, 1978:39)

Another account of the same situation has been given by Ved Mehta:

> Old men and Muslim priests now began running through the slum quarter shouting that Sanjay's troops had come to destroy the Muslims - raze their homes, take away their women, and trasport the men to prison camps. 'Throw the Hindu infidels back into the vans!' someone shouted. 'Guard your women and children in the name of Allah, and defend your religion!' While women and children barricaded themselves in their huts, the men poured out in a mob. The mob seethed and snaked through the slum, hurlng stones, bricks, and Molotov cocktails at the volunteers, their vans, their bulldozers, their clinic. The police quickly arrived, charged, and started firing into the crowd. But the rioting continued for many hours. Before the mob was dispersed, hundreds had been injured and at least fifty killed. (Mehta, 1978:119)

Not only at local or state level a politician could exploit the police; but even at the national level a leader, if he or she wanted, could easily turn out to be a virtual dictator, by circumventing

democracy through constitutional means and by using centralized police and intelligence network, as was done in 1976:

> On June 26, Mrs. Gandhi struck against her critics within the Congress party, the opposition parties, and the press with her proclamation of the national emergency. Thousands of members of the opposition parties, including some of the country's most prominent political figures, and many members of her own party were arrested, the right of habeas corpus was suspended and the press censored, twenty six political organizations of the left and right were banned, public meetings and strikes were declared illegal, and numerous foreign journalists were expelled. Parliament was subsequently called into session to ratify the declaration and to amend the electoral law retroactively so that the offenses commited by Mrs. Gandhi in her electoral campaign would no longer be illegal. (Weiner, 1978:5)

And a number of ordinances could be promulgated to legitimize any action:

> A number of ordinances were issued empowering officials to arrest individuals without disclosing the grounds for detention or arrest even to the judiciary. The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) was amended to provide the government with the power to detain political prisoners without charges even if the emergency were ended. The paramilitary Central Reserve Police and Border Security forces grew in importance, as did the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), an intelligence-gathering unit located in the prime minister's secretariat. The elections scheduled for March 1976, when Parliament would complete its five-year term, were postponed for a year. And in December 1976 the Constitution was amended to permit the government to prohibit 'antinational' activities and to strengthen the powers of the prime minister in relation to the legislature and the judiciary. (Weiner, 1978:5-6)

The role of police in politics was on the increase according to Ved Mehta:

> For another thing, the power of the Border Security Force and of the Central Intelligence Bureau within the government had been growing at an ominous rate. The Border Security Force had been established in 1962 after the India-China war, to patrol and guard the India-China border, but lately it had been used as a paramilitary force to maintain internal security. Similarly, the Central Intelligence Bureau had been used increasingly throughout the country as a political arm of the government, and surveillance - through telephone taps, mail checks, and house watches - of government officials and of politicians had become routine. (Mehta, 1978:84)

Police politician's relationship has been uneasy and unresolved in India:

> The relations between police and politicians are not easy in India today. Politiicans are critical of the police, not without justification, and the police are angry or cynical about the self seeking politicians. There is appreciable evidence of successful political intervention in police affairs, some of which has produced injustices and weakened the morale of the force . . . . The problem for modern India is to establish a state equilibrium between two imperfect forces so as to serve the public interest. (Bayley, 1969:384)

Most of the police politician problems are due to lack of understanding the police role, of any agreed definition of police work and due to exploitation of institutional malevolence for political purposes. "The police force affects politics: 1) by nature of its activity, 2) by the manner of its operation; 3) by the nature of the organization and 4) by the socialization of its members." (Bayley, 1969:410)

In India, police enforce not only criminal and local laws but also, social, industrial, economic and moral legislations. In 1977 change occurred in political leadership at the national level for the first time since independence. An official reshuffle and head-hunting followed at a large scale. Police officers suspected for active association with dethroned political party were discriminated; the noted few were arrested and prosecuted.

Police-Politics Interactions and Impacts

Political impact on police is reflected in many ways but police interactions with politicians are carefully contrived and conventionally spelled. Political impact dilutes or energizes investigation and debilitates or rehabilitates effectiveness. In

India, political machination is capable of demoralizing police just be effecting transfer of police officers from strategic posts. Transfers are no punishments but are regarded as such in police circles when one is shifted from important position to unimportant post, through of equal status. Political interactions are also capable of harrassing police officers by listening to parties unfriendly to police. Politics, on the other hand, protect police and arrange benefits for them. To counteract public outcry against police inefficiency, or rising crime or sense of insecurity, police manipulates statistics and politicians flash those figures to fend off any assault on administration from lurking rivals. Police, in many states did this to prove that they had control over armed robberies by feeding the press, public and legislatures with false statistics, based mainly on massive non-registration of crime." (Saksena, 1982:9) These are not exceptional instances because "crime statistics in India are quite unreliable." (Saksena, 1982:9) Manipulation of police record is an indirect impact of politics to smooth out the problem of accountability, which otherwise would be hard to escape:

> The root cause of this tragic situation is the rapid politicalization of the supervisory ranks of the police from the Inspector-General down to sub-inspectors. This trend started long ago but has snowballed in recent years, especially since April 1971 . . . .
>
> Today, at least half of the supervisory members of the force owe their postings, transfers and promotions to their political patrons. Their main job - investigation of crime - is being relegated to the background simply because most of their time is spenton keeping their political patrons happy by personal services and by sycophancy. (Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 1975:678)

Over a short period of time, it is impossible to arrest all the criminals or stop their activities or get them prosecuted in Courts

without observing legal formalities, therefore, "the only remedy left is physical liquidation through encounters - both genuine and fake." (Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 1975:678) Encounter shootings would not escalate without police-political understanding, though, "a politicalized pliant police leadership cannot solve the crime situation in U.P. or in Bihar, or in any other state." (Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 1975:678)

Another negative side effect of police politics collusion is that no one take sinterest in routine matters. An example will show the extent of negligence and its deadly implication. "In one year about 85 policemen in U.P. (Uttar Pradesh - name of a state in India), have lost their lives in encounters with dacoits because police in U.P. are poor marksmen in comparison to dacoits, the reason being that a large percentage of policemen have not taken their annual musketry courses for about five years because there is not enough ammunition!" (Saksena, 1982:8) Not that the fact is unknown to police hierarchy or political leadership but because "no one has the time to apply his mind to such routine matters." (Saksena, 1982:8)

The district administration, which is the backbone of Indian bureaucratic machine, has been run down under political pressure and interference. "Two factors damaging the district administration are now known - political pressures and frequent transfers." (Saksena, 1980:6) The district officers are generally inexperienced, politically linked up and mostly busy with non-administrative work. Significant increase after 1947 in the number of the districts (from 300 to 400), in the strength of Indian Administrative Service cadre (900 to 4500) and in Indian Police Service personnel (600 to 2500),

have not brought improvement in the performance of district administration. The deterioration is obvious result of politics. (Saksena, 1980:6) One of the basic controversial questions that assumed a lot of significance is 'to whom shall the police by loyal to and why?' In India, it has been pointed out that "police have three basic loyalties, which in order of importance are, first, to the Constitution and laws of the land, secondly, to the people whom they serve, and lastly, to the official hierarchy." (Saksena, 1981;8) In the real world where police officers operate and deal with people, there exists different layers of loyalties - loyalty to politicians, loyalty to official hierarchy, and to self.

Political protection as well as political protest both are damaging to the law and order situation that police supposedly are meant to uphold. "A state of general indiscipline and laxity - partly due to lack of political will and partly due to militant trade unionism - is primarily responsible for lawlessness and crime." (Saksena, 1980:8) Economic offenders or white collar criminals have political linkages:

> The situation is worse than before independence. In addition to the bureaucracy there is now a whole army of political workers whom the economic offenders have to bribe. Immediately after independence political workers at all levels, made peace with the profiteer and the hoarder. As a result several legally strong cases have been shelved over the years. (Saksena, 1980:8)

These economic offenders are on a better ground in a corrupt environment. "The wealthier the economic offender the easier it is for him to corrupt the political executive and the law enforcement machinery and to hire the best legal talent." (Saksena, 1980:8)

Another political scourge on administrative machinery is to collect or help indirectly in collecting party funds for the ruling party. The brief background will illustrate the point:

> In the sixties, the standards went down much further. Several ministers abandoned pretences and used notoriously corrupt officers to collect funds. The ministers and corrupt heads of departments always shielded their cronies . . . . In seventies, standards hit the rock bottom. (Saksena, 1982:9)

Since then the standards have never improved.

Politicians, instead of solving political problems, create the circumstances that police have to face. In Punjab, Assam, Kashmir and other states, it is the political turmoil caused by political forces that police had to bear. Police officers are being killed in Punjab because they symbolized a government headed by a political party and are perceived as guilty of carrying its mandate. Political protests while getting violent on any pretext, police suffer. "Bombs and bullets have been used in many 'peaceful protests', for example the Bengal Bandh of April 3, 1981, in Calcutta led to the loss of 22 lives and damage to 142 busses and trains." (Saksena, 1983:8)

Political patronage for subordinate police officers causes complications of discipline. "A relatively junior sub-inspector of police was given a lavish farewell from district headquarters from where he was transferred just because he claimed to be a relative of Chief Minister . . . ." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 16, 1982:8)

Sometimes local problems and incidents become statewide problem. In 1974, in Gujrat, a "student revolt against food prices in Engineering College hostels in Ahmedabad and Morvi snowballed into a citizen movement against Congress misrule and it was considered so alarming a development that the Central Reserve Police and the Border

Security Force were brought in to confront huge demonstrations . . ." (Sehgal, 1982:8)

Police situationally are sandwiched when an intermediary or interventionist role is performed. Such situations are an enormous drain on police resources and one way or another, impair police image. "Police are accused of spreading terror and arresting over 200 persons . . . to suppress the movement for grant of district status . . . and opening up of a degree college . . . ." (Hindustan Times, 1982:5, Feb. 4) In another instance, "many students of western orissa (an Eastern state) have been implicated in false cases because of their involvement in a movement against trader's exploitative practices." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 6, 1982:3)

When one political party rules at Central level and another party at state level, a precariously piquant situation very often develops for police. In such cases, two political parties confront each other resulting in the tension of state-centre relationship. This was what happened when Congress ruled at the union level and the Communists were ruling at state level:

> Thus when the Communist government in Kerala (extreme southern state) tried to suppress popular movements there with its police force, the opposition groups, including the Congress, criticized the police severely; and when the Congress government in some other state tried to suppress Communist or other opposition movements, the police got the criticism of such groups. This, unfortunately, is a handicap of the Indian police, from which it does not seem it will ever be possible for it to escape unless police function in this country is confined entirely to law enforcement in the field of social transgression alone or unless political methods are changed. (Mullick, 1969:39)

A high-ranking police officer wrote about such police-political predicament: "The sins of the commissions and omissions of Governments are to be borne by the police. Thus the police have

continued to remain a symbol of repression." (Rao, 1972:60) Police politics interaction also becomes an image problem for police and that is more true when policies of ruling political party are implemented which are opposed or disliked by others. The conflict between police and opposition politics become directly confrontational when the ruling party imposes a ban on other parties or groups by prohibiting their existence and operation. Sometimes these bans or restrictions are lifted when political compromises are reached but police image get invariably tarnished in the process. This kind of dualism has not been resolved in India's political process.

Police have to readjust and realign every time it interacts with a different kind of political reality. Police are supposed to obey, whosoever comes to power but often it was not easy for police especially when tables turn frequently. When power changes hands too often in quick succession police stand on slippery grounds:

> Thus the actions of the police under one political regime are likely to be set at nought when another party comes to power and the concerned police officers declared persona non-grata. From there it is only a short step and temptingly so, for the political parties to treat the police as their handmaid. This is a very serios danger which has to be excorcized before it is too late to do so. (Rao, 1972:60)

Neither political parties nor the police know how to resolve this ongoing crisis. One of the serious impact has been that organizational goals are very often subverted or displaced by personal goals. This has brought into play a new opportunism, cynicism and new dynamism of action and perception. Police either don't do anything or if it does, it does either with indifference or with abnormal behemence. It has been, sometimes, suggested that a buffer should be created between police and the politicians by putting a 'safety

commission' or 'Independent Board' to supervise police organization. The idea has been rejected by the government and there is no likelihood that such suggestions would be favored by ruling politicians.

There have been efforts in the past and will continue to be in the future to bring community participation in police work. Community participation in police programs is a very complex matter in India:

> Political elements of every conceivable shade from extreme conservatives to the Maoist reds religions, castes, communities, sects, sub-sects, by their hundreds and glairing economic disparities, all go to make a fertile breeding ground for conflicts. Instances are not wanting where an injured cow or a slogan on a mosque or disfiguring of an idol have led to large scale clashes. Similarly, quarrels at water taps or common wells, or at cinema queues have sometimes developed into major conflagration. A traffic accident an objectionable scene in a cinema, a quarrel between a student and a bus conductor have proved sufficient basis to build up mass violence resulting in looting or damaging public and private property, and assaults on innocent persons. The rise of Senas and local organizations with avowed intentions of playing up feelings of citizens on local issues projecting them completely out of focus has been a disturbing feature. Goonda elements with their vote-catching power have been becoming more and more active. We also see the gradual deterioration of the 'politis of opposition' and 'polities of agitation' into 'polities of mass violence.' Extreme political elements such as nexalites have started a campaign of terror in vulnerable areas.'" (Prabakar Rao, 1972:99-100)

In India, social tensions, social pressures and social problems become politically explosive and except suppression there is no other resolution that seems to be known to police so far. Indian society has been viewed as oppressive by many writers and there is a lot to support that impression in aggravating situations of today. There are big violent fights on water taps, at the line of cinema shows, at ration depots, in public transport busses, school admissions, land occupation, deforestations, etc., just to name a few. Industrial and

business complexes are rife with labor disputes, families are torn with internal pressures, newly-wed wives are dying out of social status greed. Humiliation and frustration writ large everywhere. All these problems exacerbate pernicious edge of police public interaction on one side and socio-political turmoil on the other. The dangers are to be faced every day. Socio-economic and political injustice already reached an intolerable level. People of India would like to avoid the police if they could but when they cannot, either they have to put up with the enforced obedience or to burst out their resentment in sporadic violence. There are very few choices left in between.

The law and order problems have been classified by the administration under the convenient categories of: 1) local affairs like affrays, brawls, and activities of street ruffians, 2) large congregations like festivals, meetings, labor gatherings, group rallies; 3) visits by important political persons, religious leaders and popular heroes; 4) large scale disturbances like organized political violence, communal clashes; 5) terrorist activities. (For details, see Rao, 1972:102) The general legal powers for the police to regulate and control political activities are vast and well known. Police powers to effectively curb disorderly behavior, riots and other kinds of subversive activities are very many in criminal procedure, Indian penal code and other enactments including local and special laws. Under the police commissioners system, Deputy and additional commissioners have magisterial and quasi-judicial powers of externment, licensing and declaration of prohibitory orders.

There are other minor but important areas of police political impact which are briefly referred under the sub-headings of Student

Unrest, elections, "High politics", and "Extremist politics."

Student Unrest

Students in India's universities are restive for a variety of reasons. There are no adequate facilities for those who get enrolled for higher education in the universities and colleges. Secondly, the political parties have their student-front organizations which keep on mobilizing students' for party programs. The University administration has also become politicalized and therefore its decisions are not accepted by adversary political groups on campus. Lack of any rationalistic admission or examination policy which could carry students' conviction; inadequacy of staff to regulate teaching and small indigeneous unsettled matters provide fuel to the students who are already worked up by job-frustration, social discrimination, economic difficulties, domestic problems and want of career goals and directions.

Student unrest gives rise to strikes, prolonged agitations, and ultimately to sporadic violence leading to closure of the institution. In Aligarh Muslim University which has a minority character, trouble erupts out every year. Police, paramilitary forces remain stationed on and around campus as occupied forces to keep a vigil on student activities. Instead of student demands, police presence becomes the main issue. Students criticize police for holding 'flag marches' and misbehaving with students, especially girls. The university eventually closed because a few students died and many got injured due to police firing. The students are evicted from their hostels while the packed off student crowd causes a problem for railways and the bus system. All this happened when thousands of students were busy

preparing for their annual examinations. To avoid police confrontation with students, it has been suggested that the universities should have their own police.

"The University decided to raise its own security force to tackle problems of law and order within its campus . . . . " (Hindustan Times, July 19, 1981:1) In New Delhi, "The Jawahar Lal Nehru University and Delhi University are terrorists' operational headquarters and the hard-core activities, mostly engineering and science students from strife-torn states, have developed improvied technological knowhow for making powerful bombs with easily available chemical explosives." (Hindustan Times, Oct. 13, 1981:1) Students give vent to their feelings of frustration and annoyance by causing some sort of disruption.

The Transport busses become the easy targets of students' indignation. Having some grievances against the D.T.C. (Delhi Transport Corporation), the students start stopping the busses and deflate the tires. When police arrive at the scene, the student hurl stones. Polie used tear gas and arrest the students. Student agitation drags on for a long time. An anti-reservation agitation in Gujrat lasted for six months. Duirng anti-reservation agitation, thirty four persons were killed and 59 seriously injured in police firing along and "for 4 months Gujrat was under a self-inflicted siege." (Khare, 1981:9) The agitation has a fall-out. It "forced all Harijans to understand once and for all the absolute necessity of uniting and challenging the Savarnas (upper caste people)." (Khare, 1981:9)

In Assam to retailiate against the students' agitation, "The Assam administration . . . took firm police measures by rounding up nearly 500 students from the Colten College hostel and seizing the office of the All-Assam Students' Union . . . in a flash move to curb growing trends of violence in Greater Gauhati." (Times of India, Nov. 29, 1980:1) It led to the students' strike, mounting tension prevailed and the government work was paralyzed. Student troubles still persist in many universities in India.

Elections - Politics and Police

Police are invariably caught in the crossfire of election politics. One party or the other is sure to criticize them for not obliging them. Use of the police for election duties is a necessity but that leads to various misuses. The politicians of ruling party look for police favors which they think might return when in power. The opposition look for some excuses to declare that the elections were not fair and that the government machinery includingpolice was misused by the ruling party to win the elections. It is not uncommon by the ruling party to place favorably-disposed police officers in their areas on election duty: "The transfer of Lt. Governor . . . and the imminent shakeup in the Delhi Administration and Police are indications that elections to the Delhi Metropolitan Council and the Municipal Corporation are around the corner." (Hindustan Times, March 27, 1981:3)

In one of the southern state of Karnataka, two writ petitions alleging state police interference in election process as agents of the ruling party were filed and heard in the High Court. (For details, see "Police Role in Karnataka Polls: Hearing Adjourned", the

Statesman, Dec. 25, 1982:9). On the other hand, "The Election Commission, which undertook an inquiry into the conduct of the police set-up in Karnataka during the current State Assembly elections there, has directed that the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Intelligence) should not be associated directly or indirectly with any kind of work connected with the elections . . . " (For details, see "Karnataka DIG can't do poll work", The Hindustan Times, Dec. 27, 1982:1)

Kashmir's elections held in June 1982, brought that sensitive state on the verge of communal and political conflagration. A heavy deployment of police force and paramilitary forces was undertaken by the union government to ensure safety because the state government administration was blamed for partiality. The clashes took place, shops and houses were burnt and law and order broke down. It happened in Kashmir at the time of elections and much worse happened in Assam during elections. Elections have ceased to be peaceful in India. The violence is increasing every year whether to hold elections or not to hold elections. Whatever be the fate of elections, before and after, police had to bear the brunt of mass violence. It is not known how poll violence could be avoided, specially when feelings run so high, politics is so fever pitched, rivalry so intense and environment so inflammatory.

As elections are necessary part of democratic form of government, violence has become an inevitable feature of an election contest in India. Each election guarantees painful stress for police. Local police rumbles around and massive help of Central police forces is now a routine feature. "Since the mid-term Loksabha (Lower House) poll in

February-March.1971, no election can be classified as peaceful, and according to the figures the total number of violent incidents was 2291, West Bengal topping the list with 1027 incidents, then came Tamilnadu (370), Bihar (158) and Andhra Pradesh (104). In booth-capturing, Bihar took the lead from the 1967 elections." (Saksena, 1983:8) An interestingly strange feature of pre-election and post-election period is large scale transfers of police officers and of civil servants.

"In the western U.P. practically all station officers belonging to certain castes were replaced by station officers belong to certain other castes." (Saksena, 1983:8) Police changes in Punjab police were equally dramatic. In Punjab, 'which was under the direct control of the home ministry changes involved nearly 70 percent of those in the ranks of Commissioners and DIGs (Deputy Inspector Generals), about 60 percent of them in the rank of district magistrates and superintendents of police and about 50 percent of persons in the rank of station house officers." (Saksena, 1983:8)

It is during the elections that political, economic and personal stakes are high and no stones are left unturned. Police were just pawns in that game and will continue to be so.

"High Politics" and Police Involvement

Politics deeply affects the police. In democracy, elections unleash tremendous stress on police with far-reaching consequences. There are party activities, protests, and political workers of various grades and category, impinging on administrative system, especially police.

Political conflict could assume any other dimension too. Caste complexion and ethnic relationship could alter the face of conflict altogether. Cynthia Enloe gave this conflict a conceptual basis: "Groups founded on ethnic allegiance compete with the nation state. Such competition is intolerable because the nation state is the principal vehicle for development." (Enloe, 1973:262)

Politics of pre-partition days was different because it was natinalistic and was not facional. After independence, politics became party politics, and group politics or intra and inter-party politics. Police was least involved in inner politics but later became part of the 'high politics'. 'High politics' crystallized polarization in administration and police started playing partisan roles. Principle of 'police neutrality' was debated but police remained no more apolitical.

In seventies, there has been "the rise of the new politicians, who were keen on power and prone to misuse it." (Bidwai, 1982:8) This breef of new politicians displayed distinct characteristics - quite different from their ancestors. "What explains the emergency and the spectacular rise over the past decade of the 'new politicians', the brass, aggressive young leaders who do not conceal their contempt for the liberal politics of concensus, for laws, rules and regulations, for democratic institutions and norms, for democracy itself?" (Bidwai, 1982:8) It was not difficult for any intellectual to see that "no limb of the Indian state is working well and that politicians as a class have become a byword for venality, corruption and incompetence." (Jain, 1982:8) Some researchers shifted the focus from political parties to the problem of leadership in India and it is perceived

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that, "By the late sixties the Congress system, the colonial bureaucracy, the rule enforcingand adjudicating machinery and the planning apparatus had all become too rigid and too conservative to permit new social formulations to emerge and produce a just and humane society in the face of massive demographic, social and psycho-cultural shifts." (Kothari, 1980:6) The national scene in India has not changed since the actors and the kingmakers, except for "the steady erosion of authority and a weakening of resistence against the deadly infection in the body politic." (Sham Lal, 1981:8)

The picture of current scene, however, runs on these lines:

> The unrest in Assam, the paranoia behindthe demand of Khalistan, the blatent abuse of political patronage, the washing of the dirty judicial linen in public, the new cult of political murder and the new virulence of the political hatreds which rule out any concensus on national issues all tell the same story. They have given a new urgency to the question whether the system is losing its capacity to cope with the virus which menaces its health. (Sham Lal, 1981:8)

What works under these circumstances perhaps no one knows. According to an expert, "only a concerted plan of action which radically adjust education, administrative ethos, work norms and political moves to the needs of both a faster rate of growth and a fairer distribution can check the growth." (Sham Lal, 1981:8) The ruling party which should have ostensibly followed rules of the democratic game is found often in league with local satraps, landlords and strong-arm enforcers, and the party has been implicated in scandals and corruption.

The problem of the system is the problem of the bureaucracy, problem of the politics. Moreover,

> . . . the systematic bashing of the bureaucracy of politicians in power and the cynical sacrifice of all norms of an impartial administration at the altar of highly personalized, partisan politics . . . has not only been responsible for the degradation but the enemy within the

> bureaucracy appears to have become a powerful ally of the enemy without, and emasculated it. Then the Mutual Trust is gone among services, there are rather warring coteries like castes among civil service at state and national level and the beheading by 'reckless' ruling 'politicos'. (Malhotra, 1983:3)

The union government moved in the Indian Parliament, 'The Disturbed Areas (Special Courts) Amendment Bill', to acquire more powers to interfere in State's jurisdiction if it felt that states were not taking desirable steps to maintain law and order. Law and order maintenance is a state subject but through this Bill the union government could spread its powerful tentacles of declaring an affected area of a state as 'Disturbed Area' (which used to be done by the State), and could also set up special courts to prosecute the law breakers. (For details, see the Hindustan Times, May 6, 1981:11). The union government in India keep on acquiring awesome powers.

Constitutionally, Governors are appointed by the President but it is actually the Central Government that wields its power through Governors and keeps its hold on state governments. In case of following personalistic politics, a Prime Minister, through the power of Central Government, reduces individuals and institutions into non-entities in order to increase its own power, which might be a good politics, but it is a bad administration.

The bane of administration in India is thought to be the political interference. The imperative demand that "In the Indian democratic setup, it is necessary to insulate the bureaucracy from too much interference from politicians and parties . . . . " (Hindustan Times, Aug. 25, 1981:9) What has demoralized the officials is the phenomenon of mass transfers when the government of one party changes and another takes over. Such transfers running into thousands of key

personnel are based on political whims and personal prejudices of the politicians in power.

The political problem with India is that they are running the British system with which they are somewhat familiar and have no idea how to solve a probem when they come across a hurdle. The Constitution has been amended so many times for petty purposes and the process of amendments go on without any sense of slowing down. "The politician in India is a by-product of the Raj; and the new breed of politicians give a damn to the propriety and parliamentary procedures if it serves their political interest." (Maheshwari, 1981:8) After 36 years of Indian freedom, "Indian democracy has inevitably lost its elitist character with increasing politicization of all sections of society" (Jain, 1981:6) and it is no wonder that India stands in the vortex of unrest.

Profile of an Indian politician is no less interesting than India's murky politics. A politician is:

> . . . the same man who begs for votes with folded hands, makes speeches about how all men are equal and denounces those who claim privileges for themselves but undergoes metamorphosis when he is elected because the same meek and humble man is instantly transformed . . . and expects obeisance from the people and regards the abuse of power as a part payment of his success. Instances of high-handedness of our politicians are legion - like a Minister of a State Government held up a train for an hour, a Central Cabinet Minister delayed an Air India flight to enable him to buy a transistor radio from a duty free shop. (Hindustan Times, April 22, 1981:9)

For police, very often the political manoeuvrings become macabre. "Under 'cloudy' circumstances, the Central Bureau of Investigation (a federal police agency like the FBI) dubiously unearthed 'a foreign hand' and 'a deep rooted conspiracy' in an attempt to kill 'very, very important persons'." (Times of India, May 2, 1981:1) The "four Air

India employees arrested in connection with the alleged sabotage of the airline's Boeing 'Makalu' were ordered to be released on bail . . . " (Hindustan Times, May 13, 1981:1) These kinds of political cases, with high melodramatic trappings, come to media spotlight, one wonders the extent to which Machiavellian politics could go to please their political masters.

Political Effect on Crime

Politics and crime seems to be establishing stronger linkages. Traditional value system appears to be collapsing and no new morality is replacing it. Corruption is rolling in between politics and crime. Politics and crime go together in a complex extremist combine of regional rebellions or communal conflagerations. The "nexus between politics and crime . . . has a vital bearing on the future of the Indian State. (Times of India, Dec. 24, 1981:8) Referring to the political crime and corruption, it was stated that "on one occasion a police official with a singularly unsavoury record was transferred back to the Bombay docks, at the instance of a senior member of the ruling party and such interventions are unfortunately far from uncommon." (Times of India, Dec. 19, 1981, p. 8)

There are numerous instances of political intervention and corruption bearing crime connection:

> The Dhanbad (Bihar) mafia now enjoys political patrons and can get official stransferred almost at will. A number of MLAs (Member of Legislative Assembly) in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh are believed to have taken the help of dacoits in winning their elections. Smugglers and bootleggers are acquiring highly prized real estate in Bombay and turning their illegal earnings into hotels, restaurants and the like. The invasion of the Bombay docks only highlights the spreading tentacles of crime in the country. (Times of India, Dec. 19, 1981:8)

This is a sad commentary on the political system of India. The trend is on the increase. Because, "in India the crime does pay and as more and more people are coming to believe this, the moral foundations of the State are beginning to crumble." (Times of India, Nov. 30, 1982:8)

The relationship between politics and crime is growing and "such a growing relationship between crime and politics that it would not be wrong to say that the two are simultaneously at work in the society." (Maheshwari, 1982:8) In such a situation crime not only grows but it leaps. "According to the Union Home Ministry, a total of 1,300,859 cognizable crimes were committed during 1979, against 845,167 in 1969 - a 53.9% increase against the decade's population growth of 24.6%." (Das, 1982:8) Not only the total crime but all the major categories of offenses showed a sharp increase:

> Murder was up by 35.3%, dacoity by 110.1%, and robbery by 117.7%. There were 19,947 murders, 12,714 dacoities, and 21,604 robberies in 1979 against 1969's corresponding figures of 14,732, 6,049 and 9,922. Four factors are generally responsible for this increasing lawlessness - population explosion, the nexus between crime and politics, a decline in the quality of police work, and the judiciary's less than adequate performance. (Das, 1982:8)

Strikes by industrial workers, labor disputes, work-to-rule tactics by government employees, fights between two rival unions, protests and marches by public sector undertakings constantly sap police resources. Very often these strikes turn violent, leaving scars of years to heal. For an example, "A Delhi Transport Corporation employee was killed and nearly 200 persons, including 150 policemen, were injured during today's day-long strike by DTC workers which seriously disrupted the city's transport service and led to burning of vehicles." (Hindustan Times, March 24, 1981:1) Commenting

on the alarming crime situation in the capital, the Hindustan Times expressed that "the top brass of the police has become so deeply embroiled in political controversies that professionalism is at a discount." (Hindustan Times, June 7, 1982:9) Not only the top brass but "even the middle level officials find themselves leaning more and more on this or that political patron", with the result that "undue political involvement in police operations has become the bane", and "it only strengthens the lords of the underworld because most of them have their own patrons." (Hindustan Times, June 7, 1982:9)

Extremist Politics

There were the extremist forces which wanted the change not through democratic or constitutional process but through violence. Mizo National Army and Mizo National Front were such an organization in Mizoram (one of the north eastern part of India). Both the organizations were banned by the Union government, under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, and hundred activists were arrested. (Hindustan Times, Jan. 21 and 22, 1982:1) Later in the month, the army was employed to check Mizo National Front activities and to prevent any "bid by the MNF to ambush public and private vehicles plying on the road." (Stateman, Jan. 29, 1982:1) Similar "urban insurgency, which continues to convulse the frontier state of Manipur, has apparently surfaced in Assam." (Times of India, May 2, 1981:1) Bombs were blased and attempts to attack people were made. Nagaland, the neighboring state of Assam, was also the scene of extremists' activities. "Seven army men, including a junior commissioned officer, were killed in a surprise attack by Naga Extremists." (Statesman, May 14, 1981:1) "The Union Government also declared as unlawful

associations the Peoples Liberation Army, Prepak and its offshoots like the Red Army for their secessionist activities and for organizing armed attacks on security forces . . . " (Times of India, Oct. 27, 1981:1)

A extreme communist group was called 'Naxalite', the name given to them on the basis of the village 'Naxalbari' in West Bengal, where they staged their first armed revolt. Paramilitary forces, stated armed battalions and provincial police launched a combined operation and hunted Naxalites. Naxalites operated in rural part of Assam-Bengal border, Punjab, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. They were kind of intellectual guerillas who wanted to organize peasantry against the established governmental order. They used to hold 'Peoples Court' and were more impressed by Mao's doctrine rather than Soviet communist party on ideological and operational aspect of communism. They used force and violence to annihilate class enemies. Police invariably came in clash with the Naxalites and in the process many Nazalites were killed.

"More than 100 Naxalites were arrested in an intensified drive by the kerala police against extremists." (Times of India, June 6, 1982:13) The Tamilnadu police decided to eliminate the Naxalites who killed three police officers in a bomb blast and a massive police force was set on the job. (For details, see Hindustan Times, Sept. 30, 1980:20) In Bihar, police had to fire several rounds when mob of extremists wanted to secure the release of one of their associate arrested by the police (Stateman, Oct. 15, 1981:1) Naxalites were said to be "running a parallel government" in Bihar, with their own 'People's Court', 'jails', and 'Red Army'." (Hindustan Times, Oct. 26,

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Nov. 13, 1981:1) The opposition party members specially the critics of the government criticized the government for committing atrocities under the cover of Naxalite activities. On the other hand, the Bihar government geared up its administrative apparatus to implement various socio-economic welfare programs in the 6 Naxalite infested blocks of Patna district." (Hindustan Times, Nov. 15, 1981:7)

Because of their claim to power through armed revolution on one hand and radical communism as ideology on other, the Naxalite became politically 'dangerous' to their rivals and rightwing-cum-religious adherents. Numbered as '30,000 strong and adversely publicized by Capitalist machinery, Naxalite became easy targets of public apathy and police assault Naxalites violent acts were described as on the increase.

	Year	Violent Incidents	Deaths
	1977	69	21
Naxalite	1978	163	40
Involve-	1979	233	62
ment	1980	305	84
until Aug.	1981	203	48

The cult of violence posed a threat to democracy because "as the infection creeps down, the worms of extremism, left or right, communal, sectional (Khalistan) or secessionist (the north-east), make bold to crawl out, hastening the onset of the rot on which they fatten." (Abraham, 1981:8)

In the communist government of Bengal, communism was not a scarecrow but a creed to follow. Though the extremists were not encouraged but the communist idology was allowed to permeate in work

ethos of government service. State police were given specific guidelines that suited the communist regime and the Union government of different hue could not do anything except to watch. Such circumstances posed grave dilemma for police. Police had to follow the dictates of the State government and to obey the politicians whom they frequently jailed. Police are very often caught in this dilemma.

Socio-Economic Problems and Police

Society in India is passing through a major change. In spite that it had adopted democratic process, the changes have taken their toll. Transformation from feudal stage to space age has not been easy. Indian society is still standing on all those phases of tribal style to update modernity. Sharpness of socio-economic focus has become brittle, on account of rapid change and complexity of culture in a plural society. Police has to adjust along with the society on this wide spectrum of change - ranging from abject poverty to fabulous richness.

In spite of religious spectre of tolerance, sensitive ideology and tradition of nobility, Indian society is everywhere under turmoil. Freedom, self-rule, developmental policies, democratic constitution, secularism, commitment to equality, fraternity, social justice and well-being, are high-sounding slogans that have failed to translate people's expectations into tangible reality. There is more clash, confusion and confict in socio-economic plane of Indian society.

One can paint a gloomy and glorious picture of India at the same time. From the police point of view, there is trouble all around. There is increasing crime, spreading violence, raging chaos and

disorder. Police are busy with problems of all sorts. There is trouble in rural India, urban-industrialized India, in suburbs, in far-off tribal places and regional recesses. Castes are constantly in conflict, class-cleavage tearing away Community fabric, landless and landlords fight bloody feuds and families bleed under exploitative economy.

Every state has its own typical problems too but patterns of conflict are somewhat similar nationwide. In southern most states of Tamilnadu (formerly Madras state) and Kerala, 'Brahmins' are being treated as "whipping boys" by majority lower castes. Then there is the problem of language - southern states resent the dominance of Hindi which they consider a northern language. Moreover, Kerala has the highest literacy rate, Christian and Muslim influence but with a unique distinction of having a first Communist Government. Agriculturally advanced and most affluent State of Punjab is tottering under Sikh extremism. Northern Kashmir is historically unstable. Northeastern regions of Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram are plagued by insurgency and problem of "foreigner" West Bengal is communist and defiant. Gangetic basin of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar--the heartland region, is in perpetual administrative and political chaos. It is over-populated, caste-oriented, poverty ridden, ethnically and religiously-torn. Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa are primitive, rich in resources but crime-infested. What is common in every state is political/communal clashes, agrarian and language disputes, corruption, economic exploitation, student unrest and class conflicts.

To fight for their interests organizationally, there mushroom militant and cadre-based outfits, colloquially called and named as "armies" like 'Bhumi Sena' (land army), "Lachit Sena" (Lachit army), "ShivaSena" (Shiva's army). Some other militants groups are "Dalit Panthers", "Mizo National Army", "Dal Khalsa". The fundamentalists among Hindus and Muslims, the communists, and Sectarian die-hards, by their ideology and temper are militants. Police perform state functions and in that process annihilates dissidents, protestors, extremists, rebels, panthers, militants, insurgents, secessionists and belligerents. On the other hand, police crack down on caste, class and communal conflicts, alienating groups of diversity. In one of such crackdowns (perculiar name for police punitive action) "against agitators demanding minimum agricultural wages in the rural areas, huge force of nineteen companies of the Central Reserve Police and the Bihar Military Police in a combing operation arrested 124 persons and in an encounter left 4 dead and 8 injured. (For details, see Times of India, Oct. 31, 1981:1).

Police actions in India's villages, precipitate hostile parties into longstanding feuds, sharpen violence and lead to chain killings. Police cases, arrests, testimony in court cases and land disputes, are constant reminders of societal friction. In a case when the victims "testified against" the two toughs, the "two petty criminals ruthlessly gunned down 24 persons, including seven women, in broad daylight . . . " (Hindustan Times, Nov. 20, 1981:1) In another gruesome killing, "a woman desperado massacred two dozen people, almost entire families, in a bid to revenge. Such murders kept on making headlines in India's leading national dailies. Police, on the

other hand, kept on improving their performance by killing more and more people in 'encounters'. It was widely publicized that over 300 'notorious Dacoits' had been killed and over 1000 arrested, while the year's impressive record stood at about 1500 dacoits dead and over 9000 behind bars." (Hindustan Times, Jan. 1, 1982:1)

However, those opposed to the government action claimed deterioration in the law and order situation, whenever such incidents occur, but the government invariably defended itself by declaring improvements in the law and order situation. To blunt the criticism, ministers visit the scenes, some police officers get transferred, police patrolling is intensified and more arrests are announced.

Unfortunately, most of these killings clearly had caste connections but such facts are often refuted by the government to save itself from embarassment of not being able to protect the weaker sections. It said that the killings were 'unlikely to be isolated from the general atmosphere of caste repression in a state in which three million out of 4.6 million scheduled caste families live below the poverty line." (Stateman, Jan. 5, 1982:6)

There was politics reported behind these killings. "Many politicians in the region are allegedly having links with dacoit gangs, which wield considerable influence in the communities to which they belong because what rules now (said a police officer) is the gun and growing Casteism." (Hindustan Times, Jan. 21, 1982:5) On police interrogation, it was revealed that the 'Deoli mass murders' were for 'avening the insults because the victims (scheduled caste) were flirting with 'Thakur" (upper class) girls. In another state, in the same month, 13 Harijans (untouchables) were killed. "Three women and

three children were burnt alive when a hut in which they (wanted persons) had taken refuge was set on fire; while six men and a woman were beheaded." (Hindustan Times, Jan. 28, 1982:1)

The Union Home Minister's idea to 'set up a village security force' and 'distribution of arms to the Harijans' was widely ridiculed by press and politicians. A depiction of the scene in which these killings take place might given an idea of the venom of hatred and the extent of behemence that exist. Robbers went to a village, their woman leader 'stayed at the well while her men went looting Thakurs' (upper class people) homes." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 14, 1982:1) Another part of the operation reflects the personal vengence. "She ordered all the young men to be brought before her. Almost 30 were dragged to her presence. She asked them again 'unless you tell me where those two sons of pigs are, I shall roast you alive'. The villagers continuously pleaded their ignorance. Visibly annoyed she ordered that they should be taken to an embankment, where they were halted and were finally asked once more. On replying ignorance, they were all shot down in a barrage of fire." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 14, 1982:1) The woman gangleader belonged to a caste of boatmen (lower caste), one of the poorest in the village, where Thakurs (upper caste) own most of the land; while boat-people ply boats, do fishing and distill liquor. The woman gangleader as a young girl was rejected and frustrated from married life, molested, raped and brutalized, suffered humiliations and insults, arrested by the police and later on released, joined the robber's gang after being kidnapped by them. A caste oriented revenge started:

> Mallah (Boatmen) used to come through Behmai (village where massacre took place) to take the ferry. Thakur (upper class

> landowners) boys used to tease their (Mallah) girls and beat up their men . . . . There were several incidents when they stripped their (Mallah) girls naked and forced them to dance. Mallah appealed to Phoolan Devi (woman leader of robber's gang) to teach these Thakurs a lesson. She has her own reasons as well. Her lover Bikram Singh was murdered by Thakurs . . . . And they had kept her imprisoned in this village for several weeks, raping and beating her. She managed to escape and rejoin her gang. She also suspected that these fellows have been informing the police of her movements. It was revenge pure and simple. (Hindustan Times, Feb. 19, 1982:1)

Senior police officers were very sore that a "common criminal" has got so much media and public attention at national level while none of the policemen combating these desperate outlaws had ever been mentioned.

Social-economic dilemma seems to have exhausted all social and individual tolerance and patience. A study of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences had revealed that "clashes between upper and lower castes and backward classes, which are taking a heavy toll in life and property are going to be a feature of the Indian rural scene for quite sometime . . ." (Hindustan Times, July 1, 1982:1)

Lower Socio-economic Strata and Police: A Case of Pavement Sellers, hawkers and slum-dwellers

In cities, there are pavement and slum dwellers who form lower socio-economic strata of society are are directly affected by police. Because everyone cannot own shops or kiosks or take on rent for a place to live or work. A large number of people earn their living as hawkers, vegetable peddlers, fruit sellers. they occupy pavements to display their goods for sale. This is an unlicensed business, according to city rules, as it obstructs traffic, and needs permission to operate. Police is supposed to keep the pavements clear for pedestrians, shoppers and also for behicular traffic and supposed to

penalize unlicensed business. Police take action against these petty hawkers who get organized in the process and fight the police by either corrupting them or bringing political pressure on them. Same is the case with slum and pavement dwellers. There is no place in the city for thousands of poor people who come to cities for employment and small earnings. Police take action against these illegal unauthorized residents, by demolishing temporary of semi-permanent hutments. The dwellers fight police when demolition of their hutments take place. Politics invariably get involved to catch the votes of hutment dwellers and police get condemnation on two counts viz firstly to permit the people to set up unauthorized structures; secondly for inhuman acts. These are some of the typical problems of police to keep the city clean and orderly.

The routine police problems of urban areas are: youth gangs who commit pickpocket, drug-peddling, small thefts and work for professional criminals; young women and girls in city's glamorous and guilty life working as "call-girls", prostitution; professional crimes like gambling, which police are supposed to stomp out but could not. These problems are not highlighted though these are part of socio-economic scene. The writer turns to other peculiar problems of 'Bride Burning'.

'Bride Burning' - A Social and Economic Dilemma

'Bride Burning' is a new socio-economic crime that had been added to Statute book. The 'bride burnings' or 'dowry deaths' as they are called in India, is a form of social evil partly due to economic reasons and partly due to cultural tradition. According to tradition, parents of a girl are supposed to give a dowry to the bridegroom for

the welfare of the newlywed. As the tradition deteriorated, family of a bridegroom or even a bridegroom started demanding price for marriage from the family of the girl. People do not marry their sons and daughters outside their caste; that marriages are arranged and that there is a wealthy class in India who can pay the money and 'buy' the boy of their choice for their daughters are some of the reasons for the malaise. The more the boy is educated and highly placed in job or have better family background, the higher the price. The social evil, in hard economic times, has crossed all limits. In spite of the education and awareness, this evil is more pervasive among the educated, urbane and middle class people. The new dimension to it is that even after the marriage, the demand for money or goods does not stop and when the girl's parents do not pay, the bride is harassed, tortured and put to death or compelled to commit suicide. A sad commentary on socio-economic state of affairs of Indian society.

> Sometimes a young wife continually harrassed by her husband's family to press her own to provide dowery additional to that given at marriage, resorts to suicide by burning to escape her circumstances. Suicide by burning is not uncommon in India. In other instances, husbands murder their wives by setting them on fire so they can marry again and receive another dowery from the new bride's family. In either case, the victim's in-laws are likely to insist that the victim's death was by accident, not by design. (Far Eastern Economic Review, Apr. 28, 1983:30)

Such cases appear in the press very frequently, almost daily. "Parliament was told that in New Delhi alone the number of women dying of burns jumped from 311 in 1977 to 610 last year." (Far Eastern Economic Review, Apr. 28, 1983:30) V. S. Naipaul called India a 'wounded civilization'. Indian Parliament has passed a legislation prescribing harsher sentences, restrictions on bail and wide powers for the police. For police, it's a dilemma to act between two

powerful parties and to sort out how much suicide was contrived or was natural.

Crucial Causes and Critical Responses

People's problems are invariably police problems too. Bombay Chawls "have a mixed population of Maharashtrian and Kathiawadi residents between whom petty quarrels often take place. By profession they are sweepers. Rioting, in which stones, acid bulbs are thrown, swords and bottles are used as weapons, spur out at any moment. These quarrels, turned riotings, result in getting police officers and others invariably injured, if not killed." (Times of India, Oct. 13, 1981:13)

To protest against the scarcity of drinking water in the city of Bombay, "irate demonstrators - paralyzed life in city . . . by halting rail and bus services and later on turning violent." (Times of India, Oct. 10, 1981;1) "One person was killed and seven wounded, three seriously, in police firing . . . as the Rasta Roko (Road Block) agitation by water-starved citizens took a violent turn . . . . Twenty eight constables were hurt in the riot. (Times of India, Oct. 11, 1981:1) Water supply was restored and the riot subsided.

During a Durga (Idol of Goddess) immersion procession, two groups of the same community started fighting and to quell the riot, police opened fire killing one person and injuring 30. Night curfew was imposed. On the police side, 20 police personnel sustained injuries.

An agitation was started in Bombay to frustrate the police move of introducing the one way traffic system on its two thoroughfares. People blocked the roads and police had to discontinue their

enforcement of one-way traffic, allowing the traffic to flow both ways." (Times of India, Dec. 30, 1981:1)

Social perception and social reality is far different than an administrative obligation or liability. Police had to do the duty as required by law even though it might not coincide with majority view of the population. Justice may not look same to the parties on opposite sides of the fence. Even efforts like police operations to rescue a 60 year old kidnapped landowner . . . led to a virtual mass uprising in the areas . . . because the lawndowner allegedly molested the young daughter of his maidservant." (For details, The Times of India, Oct. 5, 1981:1) It came to light that "the poor peasants' were led by some extremist elements or Naxalites active in the area . . . " (Times of India, Oct. 5, 1981:1) Police impartiality was questionable and its image was not above-board in the eyes of the people. "The maidservant's daughter and other villages told the policemen that they could not expect any justice from them and that they would deal with the landowner themselves." (Times of India, Oct. 5, 1981:1) The situation aggravated. "There was an exchange of fire between the two parties and ultimately the policemen fled, leaving the landowner in the fields." (Times of India, Oct. 5, 1981:1)

The Bureau of Police Research and Development held the view that "Mere policing, however effective, will not be able to prevent atrocities on Harijans and other weaker sections." (Hindustan Times, Aug. 11, 1980:1) It acknowledged that "the state of tension between the Harijans and upper castes is widespread and deeply rooted and is likely to get accentuated till effective measures are taken to secure socio-economic equilibrium through concerted social, economic,

political and administrative measures." (Hindustan Times, Aug. 11, 1980:1)

Some special cells are being set up in some police departments to handle socio-economic problems like 'dowry deaths.' Bombay CID has opened a Social Security Branch to handle domestic disputes, alcoholics, juvenile delinquency, etc.

Police and Press

Another privileged section to deal with almost everyy day is media people. Taking an exception to the Union Home Minister's remarks against the press, most of the newspapers reacted sharply describing the remarks as 'Needless Homilies'. Referring to the role of the media, specially the newspapers, the Hindustan Times maintained that the press "does not often enough expose official ineptitude, or the failure of our intelligence system, or the partiality and even communal prejudices of our police personnel." (Hindustan Times, Aug. 19, 1980:9)

Police not only necessarily rub against lower strata of society, but also incidentally collide with higher placed professions like 'Media publication'. Newspaper and other media people come in contact with police constantly. They often accommodate but sometime confront and collide with each other too. In India, police still possessing some of the colonial veneer, when granted political and legal powers against the Press, employ the same sort of ruthlessness which it does against criminals. Police almost controlled the Press, during the Emergency years (June 1975 to 1977) but exercised its influence before and after. Press also plays games with police, sometimes excessively

exposing police rudimentaries while keeping them under a rug with silence.

Police and press have a kind of love-hate relationship between each other. Love as usual is very shortlived. Police love to curb journalistic exposure of their bad spots and wants their own publicity. The press does not gain much by police praise but revelation of police misdeeds are newsworthy. Under the existing law police still watches press and maintain ambivalent relationship with journalists. Being a colonial country, British had a control on the press. That law still, in some form or other, hangs on. Under Emergency provisions press remains on the mercy of the government and police exercise authority over it. With this kind of jealous adversary relationship, police and press coexist in India. The government of Bihar passed a stringent bill against the press and it was opposed tooth and nail by the press. Police used tough tactics to subdue journalists. Finally the President of India did not give his assent and thus killed the Bill. (For details, see Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 2, 1983:E3)

Police response to these socio-economic problems generally has been crude, but keeping in mind the nature of police work in India, one keeps on asking oneself, "What else can this kind of Police do under these kinds of circumstances?"

Problem of Communal Conflicts and Communalism

communalism defies definition in Indian context but the word is widely used and commonly understood. Its connotation conveys the sense of caste or religious polarization and encompasses groups having

a set of beliefs, sects and special cultish way of life. communalism in India inevitably gets wrapped up in a regional and religious ramification. most often than not regionalism and communalism are indistinguishably intertwined like in Punjab, Assam, and Kashmir. Hindu-Muslim strife specifically referred as communal, otherwise, any relgious or caste conflict is commonly categorized as communal.

Communalism is deeply embedded historically in the psyche of the religious Communities in India and in spite of the Constitutional and secular provisions, communal riots are occurring with increasing intensity and ferocity. The frequency of communal riots hardly seeking respite, when it occurs at one place, it is sure to cause a chain reaction in different parts of the country, taking toll of hundreds of lives and worth millions of dollars of property. The sites get ghosly, scenes are ghastly and the sores are gory for any communal carnage. Table < will provide a scant view of the number of incidents taken place in states yearwise up to 1968.

TABLE I

COMMUNAL INCIDENTS IN INDIA (STATE-WISE-YEAR-WISE) FOR THE PERIOD 1954 TO 1968

State	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Andhra Pradesh	10	3	1	1	6	1	2	—	2	3	—	24	5	11	44
Assam	4	3	4	3	1	3	—	8	4	11	7	12	12	12	11
Bihar	7	9	8	6	8	12	8	22	5	16	379	53	32	110	98
Delhi	4	2	1	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	4	—	2	1
Gujarat	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	11	7	2	1	4
Haryana	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
J & K	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	4	—
Kerala	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	2	3	—	2	7	4	1	8
Madras	6	7	7	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	10	5	1	5	2
Madhya Pradesh	9	8	8	3	1	1	1	13	4	1	9	11	10	10	18
Maharashtra	5	3	3	6	4	1	—	4	6	4	16	495	3	15	39
Manipur	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	1	—
Mysore	1	1	—	3	3	3	1	4	—	2	—	13	2	2	7
Orissa	—	2	3	3	—	—	1	1	—	2	310	7	6	6	6
Punjab	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1	—	—
Rajasthan	6	7	2	4	2	2	—	—	1	—	—	2	3	5	10
Tripura	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Uttar Pradesh	18	9	23	12	10	13	4	16	14	5	4	15	11	20	83
West Bengal	13	16	14	12	3	2	7	18	19	9	317	20	10	15	31
NEFA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	83	72	74	55	41	42	26	92	60	61	1070*	676	132	220	346

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, *Bulletin for the National Integration Council*, 16 May 1969, p. 8.

*This high figure indicates the repercussion of the serious communal riots in Bangladesh (at that time East Pakistan). The riots started in Khulna because of the anger generated by the Pakistan press coverage regarding the theft of a precious Muslim relic, a hair of the Prophet's beard from the Hazratbal Mosque in Srinagar. From Khulna the riots spread to Calcutta (India), then to Dacca (in erstwhile East Pakistan) and later riots took place in Jamshedpur and Rourkela (in India). The refugees who fled from Khulna and Dacca (and were re-settled in West Bengal, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra) stirred the emotions of Hindus in India, who retaliated.

Source: Ratna Naidu, The Communal Edge to Plural Societies.

Since then the pernicious fury of communal riots have gone up instead of coming down.

Almost every state in India has a Muslim minority, but in Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Assam, West Bengal, Kerala, Karnetaka, Mahrashtra and Gujrat, the number is far greater than in other states. Communal composition is given statewide in Appendix 18.

Communal incidents, more or less, are occurring almost in every state but their increased frequency had already swamped Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujrat, Kerala, Kashmir, Maharashtra, Madhye Pradesh, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. "The evident virulence of communalism this year (1983) seems to be a continuation of last year's, which was the worst over a five-year period." (Abraham, 1983:8) Statistics of communal incidents are appalling:

> The Union Home Ministry's 1982-83 report gives the breakdown. There were more communal incidents (474) in 1982 than in any year since (and including) 1978. More people were injured (3025) than in any of the four earlier years. Compared to 1981, 1982 saw a marked increase in the number of incidents (319 in 1981), injuries (2613 in 1981) and deaths (238 in 1982 as against 196 in 1981). In 1982 the position seemed to have reverted to that obtained in 1980, over which 1981 had been a clear improvement. In fact in 1980, more people died (375) in communal incidents than in 1982, although the latter year had more incidents and injuries. (Abraham, 1983:8)

Intellectually, communal strife was perceived as an economic crisis created by the emergence of a new class challenging the traditional entrenchment of stagnant classes which assumed communal complexion. Once the traditional setup, especially the economic alignment of the major communities, begins to be shaken up with the onset of new developments, a fairly harmonious plurality gives way to hostile competitiveness.

As India's independence day was approaching (on the 15th of August), Eid prayers were being held by 15,000 Muslims in Moradabad, U.P. on August 13, 1980 when reportedly a pig entered near the compound, sparking off arguments between policemen on duty and the members of congregation. At the end a violent clash took place, on account of which more than hundred persons died, several hundred injured and lot of property damage was done. Curfew was imposed. Paramilitary forces rushed and army remained on standby. Police in particular was blamed for shooting and held responsible for maladroit handling of Moradabad riots:

> U.P.'s backwardness and its lack of a well-oiled administrative machinery have something to do with the grim seriousness of the Moradabad incident. The state constabulary, prone to be somewhat trigger-happy, appears clearly on this occasion to have run amok. . . .
>
> Whatever the provocation from the mob which admittedly subjected the police to heavy brick-batting--a fact evidenced by the number of casualties among its personnel--there could be no justification for it having gone beserk and resorting to a violent and uncontrolled spree of shooting. (Hindustan Times, Aug. 5, 1980:5)

Right on the Independence Day on August 15, 1980, communal clash took place in Delhi when protestors of Moradabad riots wanted to observe Independence Day as 'Black Day', by unfurling black flags instead of the national tri-color and were pinning black ribbons on people's shirts. The clash erupted into a widespread riot in the cpaital in spite of the heavy police arrangement. Politicians blamed each other but it was police that suffered for the riots especially the communal ones: " . . . no political party has made an honest effort to bring the Hindus and Muslims together. For the sake of votes, they all exploit the situation and have been following the

divide and rule policy taught by the British." (Hindustan Times, Aug. 17, 1980:3)

Curfew was imposed. "Two columns of the Army staged a flag march in the area and there was heavy deployment of local police, Central Reserve Police and Border Security Force in the labyrinth of lanes and bylanes. The area lay littered with stones, broken glass, dozen shops burnt and looted while snipers were fired from rooftops." (Hindustan Times, Aug. 17, 1980:1)

The riots spread to other towns of the state and the Chief Minister issued the warning that 'rioters will be shot'. In many towns examinations were postponed, areas were searched and other administrative steps followed. The Prime Minister said that, "the prevailing atmosphere of violence and crime had contributed to communal clashes in Moradabad, Delhi and other places, and . . . while anti-social elements might be behind them some political elements were trying to aggravate them." (Hindustan Times, Aug. 19, 1980:1)

Communal riots emerged in other parts of the state and also spread to other states. In Delhi, situation remained so tense that the police commissioner had to requisition special commando squad of the Border Security Force and pressed it into patrolling. "They have been detailed for the first time in the Capital in an effort to contain sniper fire which had become sine qua non of the recent communal riots. The Commanders were raised to combat terrorism and hijacking." (Hindustan Times, Aug. 20, 1980:3)

Another round of riots and violence erupted in other cities, leaving dozens dead and hundreds injured. "To assist the States in dealing with communal and caste riots" the Union government decided to

set up "a special peace keeping force, highly mobile and well-equipped and consisting mainly of members of the minority communities, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes from different parts of the country." (Hindustan Times, Sept. 13, 1980:1) It was decided to raise three battalions of the force to begin with, and directions were issued to raise the minority strength in regular state and central paramilitary forces so as to create a sense of confidence among minorities. The Central Government expressed its concern over the increase in militancy in communal incidents, resulting in more fatalities:

> The year 1980 recorded 421 incidents, in which 372 persons were killed and 2,691 injured. In 1979 there were 304 incidents in which 261 persons lost their lives and 2,379 were injured . . . . The total casualties per incident increased sharply from 0.19 in 1977 to 0.49 in 1978 and 0.86 in 1979. In 1980 the figure was as high as 0.89 due to large scale casualties in Moradabad in August. (Hindustan Times, June 5, 1980:1)

The property losses were heavy. There were "119 major riots between 1973 and 1980, and the highest number of communal riots, approximately 70 percent of the total, have taken place in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujrat, Mahareshtra and Andhra Pradesh . . . . " (Hindustan Times, June 5, 1980:1) Doubts were expressed - "Will Hindus and Muslims live in harmony?" The editorial of a national daily, Hindustan Times, criticized the inadequacy of administrative machinery specially its intelligence apparatus and suggested the 'introduction of flogging in public'. (Hindustan Times, July 16, 1980:9)

The "Union Home Minister . . . asked the country's top police and administrative officials to take proper action to remove any trace of communal bias in the police and administration machinery with

responsibility for communal disturbances." (Hindustan Times, July 18, 1980:1) The Prime Minister, on the other hand, accused the Jan Sangh and the RSS (Rashtrya Swayam Sewak Sangh), the predominantly Hindu parties, of creating dissension and spreading rumors in the country. She indicated that these two organizations were behind the recent communal riots in North India.

Communal riots among Hindus and Muslims broke out again in the summer of 1981 in Bihar. "At least four people were killed, half a dozen others injured and three shops set ablaze as rioting broke out in Bihar Sharif last night following a brawl at a country liquor shop involving members of the two communities." (Times of India, May 2, 1981:1) Later on it claimed "over 20 lives, injuries to about 50 people, provoked arson, looting and rioting at other different places." (Times of India, May 4, 1981:1) A senior official of the district administration said "why can't the government hand over the entire area to the army for a week or so to restore peace? and added that, "I don't think the present administration can handle the situation." (Times of India, May 4, 1981:1) "Allegations were made by many people of the partisan role played by the police in certain localities but the police authorities denied the allegations. Paramilitary forces patrolled the curfew clamped areas. An editorial of the Time of India described its riots as 'recurring nightmares' and highlighted the propensity of the conflagration." (Times of India, May 5, 1981:8) The Prime Minister airdashed to Bihar while riots kept on spreading to rural areas and the death toll mounted. "Almost all top civil and police authorities of Bihar have been camping in the town for the past four days, battalions were airlifted from Delhi and

curfew was reimposed. Some serious soul searching was made regarding the Bihar Sharif riots which reportedly claimed over 40 lives:

> It is an irony of fate that a fracas at a liquor shop should have flared up into widespread communal violence in Bihar Sharif, a town near Nalanda where Buddha's teachings of compassion and non-violence once attracted scholars . . . There must be something seriously amiss with our social ethos if even after more than 30 years of attempts at national integration, a small incident in certain parts of the country immediately takes on a communal here. (Hindustan Times, May 5, 1981:1)

It was alleged that the officials tried to play down the communal incidents in Bihar. The Jana Sangh and the RSS organizations denied their hands in communal riots. Invariably the crucial point is that the administrative set-up in Bihar has been rendered effete, thanks to continual political interference.

In the beginning of 1982, communal riots started from Maharashtra State. As a reaction to some of the lower caste Hindus who embraced Islam in one of the southern state, Vishwa Hindu Parishad started a public awakening program in February 1980. The Parishad (A Hindu's organization) took out a procession which turned violent and the riots started. Riots continued to rock Pune (Maharashtra) a city known for Hindu militancy for some time. With the growth of Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism, secular minded Hindus face a difficult dilemma. "On one hand, they take a dim view of the activities of those Muslims who are trying to convert the hapless Harijans and they fear that this would produce a serious backlash. On the other hand, they are afraid that protest action might aggravate Hindu Muslim differences." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 16, 17, 1982:1) The dilemma would continue to be unresolved.

The same Vishwa Hindu Parishad (Tamilnadu unit) started religious propaganda in one of the districts of Tamilnadu state to keep lower caste Harijans in Hindu fold. During the propagation, a clash took place between two groups and a riot spread. In spite of police intervention there was bloodshed on account of the killings. Communal incidents occurred at other places. The Union Home Ministry organized a meeting on caste and communal harmony and discussed certain formulations for a code of ethics for political parties. Bigger riots broke out in Meerut (Uttar Pradesh) in September-October 1982. "The crisis leading to the riots had been brewing since about six months ago when the Hindu Panchayat, a trust managing the affairs of a water kiosk at Shahghasa, a predominantly Muslim locality, decided to resuscitate the kiosk and construct a temple on the first floor." (Hindustan Times, Oct. 24, 1982:7) The site was contested by Hindus and Muslims but the administration could not take any decision for six months. On September 6, the priest of the temple was fatally stabbed. Several persons from both factions were arrested but were released by the next day. Curfew was clamped. On September 8, when curfew was lifted for 2 hours, another stabbing took place and the riot flared up. The next three days saw full scale arson, stabbing, exchange of gunshots and brickbatting. (Hindustan Times, Oct. 25, 1982:7) "On September 29, the police pickets and posts were attacked simultaneously at a dozen places and for the next four days bombs were hurled on official vehicles and intermittent gunshots rent the air punctuated by bomb explosions." (Hindustan Times, Oct. 25, 1982:7) The police and politicians were divided among themselves, and "with the recovery of the highly decomposed bodies to two municipal

corporation employees, at least 31 people have lost their lives in the communal frenzy which engulfed the prosperous town of western U.P. for over a month." (Hindustan Times, Oct. 29, 1982:7)

"The district administration in Meerut must be charged with total failure because in spite of substantial police reinforcements, incidents of stabbing kept taking place in localities under curfew." (Hindustan Times, Oct. 5, 1982:9) Police and intelligence were also accused along with political incompetence. The Prime Minister assured that the Meerut riots were being handled firmly. The Chief Minister saw political hand behind Meerut riots. The Union Government despatched the Union Home Secretary to Meerut. The police and civil administrators were transferred and more armed police was pumped in. The broad generalization was that the administration had become too weak to face the fury of rioters:

> The Meerut riots have again underlined the gravity of the problem posed by anti-social elements coming into possession of large quantities of firearms. In the riots in Moradebad, Aligarh and Delhi in the past two years, the police have found it hard to deal with such gangs. Another point needs to be emphasized. The district administration has been weakened all over the country partly as a result of political interference; it must be strengthened if the drift into anarchy symbolized by Meerut is to be stopped. (Times of India, Oct. 5, 1982:9)

The Army was called in Gujrat when communal riots broke out in October 1982 because police were not effective in controlling the lawless mob. An unusually interesting and peculiar aspect of a Baroda (Gujrat State) riots was that it occurred on account of the transfer of the city's Police Commissioner. "The communal riots in India were also seen as a part of general social strife because Muslims are gaining their economic and political clout by taking advantage of opportunities open to minorities and getting more assertive; posing a

kind of perceived threat by Hindus who are competing for economic betterment." (Times of India, Dec. 1, 1982:8) "The State of Secularism in India is a grim reminder to communal harmony gravely shaken by each successive wave of riots and the chilling terror of riots, followed by ghostly silence of curfews; and then the bitter aftermath of prejudices and ignorance that leaves thousands of people homeless and hundreds dead. This has been India's continuous nightmare since independence." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 26, 1982:1)

After communal riots at Moradabad and Meerut, there was pervasive criticism of state armed police for its partisan role, and there was persistent demand in political and journalistic assertions to secularize the police. The Union Home Ministry advised the States to "restructure the composition of the armed constabulary to ensure proper representation of all sections of the society" so as to deall more effectively with communal violence." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 1, 1982:1) The Home Minister also asked the State "to take a fresh look at the training program so that the police developed the right attitude in dealing with law and order problems." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 1:1) Highlighting the problem, the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) was criticized for communal bias. "The community wise toll in the firing indicated where the police sympathy lay and that those who are entrusted with the task of curbing violence cannot afford to be carried away by communal loyalties." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 2, 1982:9) Editorials suggested that "secularism should not be stretched to the absurd extentof evolving a recruitment policy on communal lines." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 2, 1982:9) It was also pointed out that "at times the rivalry between the police and PAC or between the PAC and

the BSF creates unpleasant situations in which the common man suffers." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 2, 1982:9) "In short, the more enlightened and secular our law and order machinery becomes, the safer and more secure, the people feel in times of communal disturbances." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 2, 1982:9) The States, on the other hand, promised to "follow the guidelines issued by the Union Home Ministry but were reluctant to undertake a drastic restructuring of their armed constabulary due to financial and legal reasons." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 4, 1982:1)

Muslim leaders were agitated at increasing communal violence and wanted to express their concern nationally. Forty four Muslim members of parliament submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister who declined to receive them on November 5, 1982. Criticizing the attempt of Muslim members of Parliament, as 'misguided' the English Daily, Statesman, added that, "Misguided attempts to convert religious unity into a political platform cannot augur well for the secular and democratic belief that underlies the unity and stability of such a vast and diverse nation and they may only be exacerbating the communal situation already bad enough in certain parts of the country." (Statesman, Dec. 19, 1982:8)

Communal riots started early in January 1983 but this time it was in the Southern States. As the year 1982 was coming to a close, communal violence erupted in Cochin (Kerala state) and the State Capital Trivandrum was "limping back to normal after arson, looting and violence." (Hindustan Times, Jan. 1, 1983:1) The temple, the main bazaar, was "smouldering, fire-raged from many textiles, jewelry shops, looting was widespread, city bus services remained suspended,

police and civilians suffered serious injuries and tension prevailed. Army was called and paramilitary units rushed in." (Hindustan Times, Jan. 1, 1983:1) Riots in Kerala sprang surprise:

> Apart from the Moplah rebellion of a long time ago, Kerala has been singularly free of communal violence. It is a thousand pities that the virus should have now raised its ugly head first in Alleppey and subsequently, as a chain reaction, in the State Capital of Trivandrum.
>
> It is, however, surprising that the spate of violence and arson that erupted in Trivandrum was not contained without having to call out the army . . . .
>
> There is a great deal of resentment among the police at what they considered the arbitrary suspension of a sub-inspector and two constables and the transfer of a circle inspector following the Alleppey incidents. (Hindustan Times, Jan. 1, 1983:9)

then there were political overtone and political opportunism to the situation. "The Indian Union Muslim League is a partner in the ruling coalition and with the Marxists and their allies waiting in the wings to exploit any maladroit move by the government . . . and there are limits to playing politically safe." (Hindustan Times, Jan. 1, 1983:9) After two months, communal riots rocked Sangli and Miraj in Maharashtra (See Times of India, Apr. 2, 1983:1)

During the communal, ethnic and religious riots, police was criticized for insensitivity, ruthlessness, excessive action, and for punitively punishing the minorities not represented in the police force. To counteract these allegations, the government set up a 'Special Police Force' by recruiting minorities in police force. It was decided to start with three battalions consisting of personnel drawn mainly from the minority communities (specially Muslims), scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Provision was made for battalions to be airlifted to any trouble spot. The question veers

around whether it is enough to organize this kind of special police to tackle most volatile riots? Probably this is just the beginning and a novel experiment with laudatory purpose, aimed at to pacify the minorities and certain sections of the society which have become vulnerable to majority madness. The government decided to recruit ex-servicement for the 'Special Force' and the new Force was placed "directly under the Prime Minister's Secretariat and not under the Union Home Ministry as usually should have been, and then to be headed by a person experienced in paramilitary operations." (Times of India, Sept. 28, 1981:1)

Taking a cue from the Special Police Force raised at the national level, the State Government of Bihar, proposed to raise three battalions of special police which would "exclusively deal with cases of tension arising from socio-economic problems." (Times of India, Aug. 9, 1981:9)

Regional Police Problem in Assam

Assam, forms the north-east frontier of India, from whose womb were born the states or centrally administered areas of Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Mizoram. It skirts independent Bangla Desh and borders with Burma. In the North stands China, and in the northeast, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal. With the rest of India, it is linked with a narrow neck stretched out by West Bengal. The robust river Brahmputra with its gypsy style freedom forms its valley in Assam among Himalayan and Arakan ranges. Always lush green and moist, its beauty might one day captivate the imagination of the world. Having one of the heaviest and highest rainfalls in the world, it provides an "expansive water surface

bordered by a forest-clad hill terrain causing excessive percipitation. It is so enervating that the saying goes 'when a dog chases a rabbit they both walk.'" (Barpujari, 1980:2) Assam is being referred here as earlier Assam comprising the newly carved out states and centrally administered areas. india's oil fields are here. "her mountains contain mines of coal, limestone and iron ore, her rivers around in gold-dust and her soil so well-adapted to all kinds of agricultural intelligentsia. Administrative machinery remained paralyzed, and paramilitary police forces ruled the street with rod and rifle. Universities, schools and colleges remained closed indefinitely. Employees of the government defy government orders if it runs contrary to the writ of student leaders. Ethnic conflicts took the toll and the picture is getting more and more confused by taking a communal and secessionist turn. Some say "Assam in the coils of a foreign python" and some say, "The Spectre of linguism haunts Assam." (Sarin, 1980:19-42)

And when change comes, sometimes it comes in torrents, bringing tremendous upheaval in traditional society: "The tribal society is undergong a cataclysmic upheaval. It is in the process of transition from a primitive community based on shifting cultivation to a society better equipped to grapple with twentieth century ideas, technologies and ways of life." (Sarin, 1980:viii)

The Assamese are against all aliens today. "The drive against 'aliens' has invariably turned violent claiming a heavy toll of life and property." (Sarin, 1980:viii) The awakened Assamese students have naturally wrested the lead from political parties who were playing power games which did not satisfy expectations of unemployed or

underemployed plight of Assamese but did their best to ameliorate their grievances and took adequate steps to let Assamese stand on their own feet to face their problem. (For details see Barpujari, 1980) No wonder that a native writer penned his dream of a better, unexploited Assam:

> When Assam will be converted from a forest into a flower garden, the canoes of the rivers will be converted into ships, bamboo cottages will be replaced by buildings of stone and bricks; when there will be thousands and thousands of schools, educational gatherings dispensaries, hospitals for the poor and destitute; and when people, instead of entertaining jealousy, will cherish love for one another, none will give false evidence for two tolas of opium and will rather throw aside lacs of rupees in such cases; when no one will do mischief to others being offered bribes of crores of rupees, prostitution, opium and wine will be unknown in the country, that time, O God, the Almight Father, bring about in worn-out patterns of society, produced economic changes of far-reaching consequences." (Barpujari, 1980:vi)

Even during the time of the British "almost all the Darogas (police in charge of a police station) of the Province were Bengalees who were by no means popular not from their being foreigners, but on account of their oppression and extortion." (Barpujari, 1980:217) Simple Assamese saw all these foreigners getting rich in front of their own eyes but "none ever follow their example and they appear to have no inclination to enter into competition with these foreigners." (Barpujari, 1980:269) It was British officers like Jenkins and Robinson who not only well-understood the purposes, that it might be converted into one continued garden of silk and cotton and coffee and sugar and tea over an extent of many hundred miles. It has a long history with ups and downs, which is of little concern because British rule gave it entirely a new personality. But one historic fact remains outstanding--the dominance of outsiders. "The influx of

outsiders, whether from motives of gain to be derived from a virgin soil as commercial speculators and industrial pioneers or from administrative demands of the foreign rulers, apart from shattering the already they call it 'politics of survival':

> While the enterprising Marwaris from Rajasthan control the entire trade and commerce, and tea, jute and plywood industries, the hardy Punjabis dominate in the field of government contracts and supplies transport, furniture and sports goods, and the Bengalis corner bulk of the white collar jobs and outshine the natives in various professions. Even in the traditional sector of the economy the outsiders occupy a vantage position. Practically the entire labor force and rickshaw and cart pullers are migrants from Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh; sweepers mostly Mandhari Sikhs from Punjab; majority of truck drivers are either Punjabis, Nepalese, Bengalis or Biharis; barbers by and larger are Bengalis and Biharis; and carpenters, masons and other skilled and semi-skilled workers are again either Punjabis or Biharis or Bengalis. Even in the field of agriculture, the Bengali Muslim immigrants from erstwhile East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, outdo the natives in most of the districts of the Brahmputra Valley. (Sarin, 1980:49-50)

Tribal societies of Nagas, Mizos and others were up in arms first than the Assamese. Even the army operation proved fruitless. Police were utterly useless and could do nothing. One could imagine the extent of insurgency that "on 13 January 1975, a gorup of MNF (Mizo National Front) desperadoes entered the police headquarters in the heart of Aizwal town, shot dead the Inspector-General of Police, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the Superintendent of Police (CID) and quietly drove off into a nearby jungle." (Sarin, 1980:157)

Myron Weiner saw the Indian situation in light of public pressures and political response calling it 'the politics of scarcity'. But in Assam this approach and analysis does not explain the crux of the gambit. In his other working papers, Weiner got the grasp of the matter. "Clashes between migrants and the indigenous population have been prominent feature of post-independence politics

within multi-ethnic developing countries." (Weiner, 1975:1) Approximately 11.4% of the State's population comes from outside the State, but in both the 1920's and 1930's the migrant population exceeds 20%" (Weiner, 1975:4) Weiner found Assamese "torn between two conflicting objectives. One has been to make Assam the land of the Assamese, in which Assamese language and culture would play the same dominant role that Bengali language and culture plays in West Bengal. The second objective was to retain control over all those territories which the British had historically annexed to Assam even though some of these are areas in which non-Asamese predominate." (Weiner, 1975:50-51) Therefore "it seems likely that the Assamese will continue to remain nativists in their politics and protectionists in their policies. Regional antagonism to the central government, Socialist attacks against the alien business community and aggressive cultural nationalism in relation to linguistic minorities are variant political orientations of a people who suffer from status deprivation, feel culturally threatened, and lack the skills and outlook to compete in the economic marketplace." (Weiner, 1975:68) The slogan 'sons of the soil' criterion is to thwart the dominant hold of the outsiders who have almost captured the opportunity avenues of the State.

"Nativism in India is a movement toward ethnic equality." (Weiner, 1975:39) "Nativism is thus one form of ethnic politics, and nativism is anti-migrant." (Weiner, 1975:41) Realizing that the political parties were more interested in the votes of migrants, Assamese became militant and then violent. The long drawn out agitation since 1979 was rendered fruitless by obstinacy of incompetent government. The rule by Central government under

proclamations was as oppressive and redundant as that of the State government. Students paralyzed the government for almost three yars without any resolution of the crisis. Taking an indefensible plea of constitutional amendment, the Prime Minister haughtily declared holding of state elections, calculating fully well the consequences and outcomes thereof. Other political parties boycotted the elections. Still the personal characteristic of adamancy dominated the national politics and it was announced that elections would not be postponed in any case. This open challenge was to show naked force to terrorize the agitationists and demoralize them completely. The elections were held and so was the carnage.

Curfew was clamped most of the year. Violent incidents were quelled by police firing and every firing resulted in injuries and deaths.

'Life paralyzed in Assam' on account of widespread agitation launched by the All Assam Student's Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) on the foreign nationals issues. A magistrate and 13 policement were injured, one was killed in firing, 400 persons were arrested, educational instutitions were closed, banking operations were at a standstill, Gauhati refinery was closed, post offices were closed, industrial and commercial activities were non-existent and the "troops kept in readiness to help maintain essential services and, if necessary, law and order, were pressed into service to relieve the morning shift . . . " (Times of India, Nov. 20, 1981:1)

It was Republic Day of India on January 26, 1982, when the All Assam Student's Union and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad gave the

call for the 'curfew' urging the people to stay indoors during the day, to protect against the misuse of power by the government. What was strange abut the curfew was that it was declared and imposed by the agitators and not by police or military. It was just the opposite, the agitators did not want the people to attend the Republic Day celebrations which the government, the police and army wanted them to attend. (See details in the Stateman, Jan. 25, 1982:1) "The leaders of the Assam agitation and government representatives reached an agreement . . . on the foreigners issue on securing the Assam-Bangladesh border against future infiltration and according to the agreement, physical barriers including masonry walls, barbed wire fencing and other obstacles will be erected all along the international border." (The Hindustan Times, Jan. 21, 1982:1)

The deterioration in law and order continued every year due to the continuous agitation on foreign nationals issue. The Assam and its neighbouring border states which once were its part, were engulfed by dissensions and turmoil. An official wrote to his "erstwhile colleague from Assam . . . that the first task of his office peon every morning was to lift the cushion of his chair to check that a bomb had not been secreted beneath." (Rustomji, 1982:8) The situation was so grim in other states that "In Mizoram, non-tribals, have been given notice to quit, under penalty of death - and the threat has been carried out; while "In Manipur, ministers and government officers can move only under heavy armed escort and have been warned that, unless they mend their ways and put an end to the corruption that is rampant in every department, they will be summarily eliminated." (Rustomji, 1982:8) 1983 was the year of the blood-bath, even though the

bloodshed was going on for a long time in that part of the country on one ground or the other. A dramatic development took place in early January, 1983, when the union government announced that "elections would be held next month in the troubled northeastern state of Assam" and "police arrested about 20 student leaders of a movement that has vowed to block all voting." (The New York Times, Jan. 7, 1983:2)

The students did not favor the elections as they were demanding the deportation from Assam of millions of immigrants, most of them from neighboring Bangladesh. The students say that the Assamese, who are primarily Hindu, might overwhelmed by the flood of immigrants, who are largely Moslem." (The New York Times, Jan. 7, 1983:2) In this age of voting, it is the number that counts. Officials place Assam's population at about 20 million, with ethnic Assamese said to number between 9 millon and 12 million. The rest of the population is said to consist of up to about 4 million Bangladeshis, hundreds of thousands of Nepalis, local tribal people and Bengalis and other Indians who have migrated from other states. The talks between the student leaders and the union government failed even after 21 rounds "when the students rejected a proposal to disenfranchise only some of the 800,000 people, Moslems and Hindus, who settled illegally in the State between 1961 and 1971. The Union Home Affairs Minister . . . told the students that the government could not agree to move the immigrants out of Assam because it would be 'inhuman'. The President of the All Assam Students Union threatened to block the Assam elections and accounts that "his followers would resort to general strikes, picketing of government offices and the staging of protests in defiance of official bans, as they have since they began the

anti-immigrant movement in Oct. 1979." (The New York Times, Jan. 7, 1983:2) The threat was not unreal or an exaggeration because "the students have demonstrated their strength in the past by blocking the holding of a state census in 1980 and paralyzing the Assamese State government to the point where the legislature was dissolved in March 1981." (The New York Times, Jan. 7, 1983:2)

Almost a fortnight before the elections, the situation in Assam was fraught with dangers and was described as risky:

> The State government employees, whose sympathies are with the agitationists, have refused to do election work.
>
> When the Assamese as a whole are by and large boycotting the polls; employees from other states will be reluctant to take a risk. In fact, the Assam poll is a risk affair - risky to the candidates and voters as well as to the elections itself. (Hindustan Times, Feb. 1, 1983:9)

There turned out to be a constitutional crisis as well:

> The constitutional machinery will break down if the elections are not held or President's rule is not extended. The time is limited to amend the Constitution in order to extend President's rule. The third alternative is extension of Presidential rule after imposing an Emergency in Assam. None of the three courses will ensure peace or restore the democratic process in the State. (Hindustan Times, Feb. 1, 1983:9)

The Prime Minister "ruled out postponement of the Assam elections and urged the people to vote without fear since the government had made all necessary arrangements for their security." (The Stateman, Feb. 11, 1983:1) The Prime Minister addressed election meetings and criticized the agitators on 'foreign issue' and declared that 'nobody could be thrown out of Assam illegally', because thousands belonging to the minority community had long been living in Assam and even their children had exercised their franchise. The Prime Minister maintained that "even the depotation of those who had come to Assam recently was

a complicated question and the humanitarian aspects of the issue could not be overlooked." (The Stateman, Feb. 11, 1983:1)

The kind of election speeches by the Prime Minister assumed the message of a policy statement and the agitators might have taken it as the stand of the government. These statements gave full assurance to the minority and was clearly a vote catching device. The Prime Minister clearly indicated to ignore the threat as there was enough army and police to hold elections which were boycotted by the Assamese agitationists. Thus came a point where neither the government nor those opposed to the elections could save the situation. A head on collision, irrespective of the consequences, became inevitable and both the government forces and opposing public plunged to prove their muscle. The violence erupted, killing after killing mounted and army was finally moved in. The media wondered and asked 'Is Assam burning' under the pressure of unprecedent violence. "While the army moved in to run oil facilities in Assam, the agitators cabled an SOS to Amnesty International and the Red Cross amidst a rising tide of violence which claimed 12 more lives . . . on the eve of the Prime Minister's Gauhati visit.

The second round of polling continued and so was killing. "The army and the Border Security Force were called out . . . following the killing of three Jawans of a paramilitary force, believed to be the Central Reserve Police, by an Assam Police contingent giving a new turn to the anti-poll agitation which claimed 20 more lives on the eve of the second round of polling." (The Statesman, Feb. 17, 1983:1)

It became obvious very soon that "polarization of the people on an ethnic basis was complete in Assam". (The Statesman, Feb. 17,

1983:1) No wonder that under this kind of prolonged condition "discontent had been simmering among policemen who felt insecure when set out on patrol duty in smaller numbers than the CRP men on similar detail." (Times of India, Feb. 17, 1983:1) The pressure and tension on native policemen was bound to be greater than on policemen belonging to paramilitary forces who had different ethnic and geographical background.

Final round of elections started with the mounting toll. "Two hundred and fifty people were massacred at Nellie, bringing the overnight toll in Assam to 321 on the eve of the final round of the bloodiest elections in the country." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 20, 1983:1) The Prime Minister spoke on the positive achievements obtained by the party in power, and on defense preparedness, as well as on external threats and foreign aid. The Prime Minister referred to all the sundry conceivable topics reminding that the "country was passing through a critical period." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 20, 1983:8) The Opposition parties described "Assam elections a mockery." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 20, 1983:8) Next day it was declared by the press that "Nellie carnage toll 1,000 and the polling for 11 seats put off." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 21, 1983:1) The Prime Minister decided to fly back to Gauhati (Assam). "Expressing the government's deep anguish at the Assam carnage, Home Minister . . . made an appeal in Parliament . . . for co-operation from all to promote harmony and amity among different communities and groups living in the State." (Hindustan Times, Feb. 22, 1983:1)

The Prime Minister and members of the ruling party blamed the agitators while the Opposition accused the Prime Minister. The Prime

Minister said that there were complaints from the riot-affected people about the local police aiding the attackers." (Stateman, Feb. 22, 1983:1) The Prime Minister "told reporters that reports of dead and injured were exaggerated." (Stateman, Feb. 22, 1983:1) There were more allegations of brutalities and recklessness against the police levelled by various politicians. The English Daily Times of India in its editorial categorically held the Union government responsible for precipitating carnage in Assam in spite of warnings:

> The Nellie tragedy is an outcome of the Union government's decision to impose elections on Assam. In all probabilities, it would not have taken place if the authorities had not pressed ahead with the ill conceived move even after daily clashes involving heavy losses of life had made it abundantly clear that the poll would not settle any issue, and, indeed, that it would greatly aggravate the situation. (Times of India, Feb. 22, 1983:8)

Even after the carnage, the government learned no lesson and kept on justifying its stand; which was assailed by the press:

> This makes it extremely difficult to believe that the government will see reason even at this late stage. But it must not pile folly upon folly and willfully assist the forces of chaos, anarchy and disintegration that are abroad in the whole of northeast. It must recognize that the 'elections' have been a farce, that a legislature 'elected' in this manner will lack legitimacy and that a 'government' produced by such a 'legislature' will be an insult to the Assamese speaking people. (Times of India, Feb. 22, 1983:8)

The Parliament asked Assamese to restore peace and the ruling Congress (I) party declared that it had won the elections in Assam. The army was deployed to quell large scale mob violence and arson . . . in Assam where a police sub-inspector was killed and four constables were injured apart from other people.

The aftermath of elections in Assam was equally frightening: "Thousands of frightened people are fleeing Assam as the killings and terrorism goes on and more villages are burnst and Assam officials

said . . . that 100,000 people had been made homeless, and 30,000 were trying to get out of the state." (The London Times, Feb. 25, 1983:1)

The attitude of the Union government was ironical: "Although violence that surged through Assam and the tension that still grips the troubled northeastern state have genuinely and profoundly shaken much of India, there has been no rush to judgement, no calls for enquiries, and few demands for the government . . . to resign." (New York Times, Feb. 25, 1983:6)

Insensitivity towards the whole episode is amazingly abysmal. Preparations for an international conference of non-aligned nations, were more important then the murderous fury in Assam, which has evoked expressions of bewildered detachment. Perhaps the guilty silence in Indian politics on Assam was because:

> . . . everyone had blood on their hands. Indian politicians seem to be holding their breath, hoping and expecting that the bloodletting in Assam will abate and that as in the case of the killings in Tripura three years ago, or the Muslim-Hindu riots in Moradabad two years ago or the Christian-Hindu conflicts in Tamilnadu last year, open violence will settle down to smoldering resentments and suspicion. (New York Times, Feb. 25, 1983:6)

The policemen operating in Assam and their families were said to be suffering from feelings of insecurity and it was suggested that enclosures should be set up in different localities to house families of policemen and that "the enclosures to be build should be complete with markets and shops . . . " (The Stateman, March 25, 1983:9)

"A new government was installed in Assam where violence related to state elections has claimed the lives of an estimated 2000 people over the last three weeks." (The New York Times, Feb. 28, 1983:2Y) The spectacle was sinful. "Hundreds of armed policemen and paramilitary troops ringed the governor's residence . . . as the Chief

Minister was sworn in, while student protestors called for a 24-hour general strike in the State." (The New York Times, Feb. 28, 1983:2Y) As soon as the Chief Minister was sworn in, "power failures plunged large parts of Gauhati into darkness." (The New York Times, Feb. 28, 1983:2Y) Even the newly elected members and sworn-in Ministers were so terrified and unsafe that armed bodyguards and paramilitary troops were provided to protect them. (New York Times, March 1983:6Y)

The violence did not stop, though the fury got spent up after the elections. "Indian Army troops were ordered to fan out in Assam to quell violence." (New York Times, March 4, 1983:6Y) The Chief Minister justified the action declaring that "we have to be ruthless." (New York Times, March 4, 1963:6Y) The government failed to curb the activities or influence of the All Assam Students Union. Students were running a parallel government and their writ ran all over not that of the government. People waited for their instructions and watched for their actions. There was tremendous appeal in the program of the All Assam Students Union:

> . . . The AASU (All Assam Students Union) has gained so much popularity because it has struck the right chord in the hearts of the people. There has always been a genuine fear among the Assamese that they are being dominated by outsiders . . . . Now they fear that they are being swamped by immigrants from the west.
>
> The Assamese prejudice against Bengali Hindus found expression in language riots which became common in Assam after independence. But never in the past, did any movement or agitation take such a violent form as is being witnessed since 1979. (The Statesman, March 13, 1983:16)

The problem of Assam remained still unresolved with no hope of any improvement in future. The stalement is silent but sinister and no one knows when the volcano would erupt. The problem of Punjab is attracting more attention, at the moment, than Assam. After so many

deaths and destruction, Assam is comparatively quiet. Punjab, was taking the lead in ferocity, fanaticism and terrorist extremism. Punjab or Assam in turn take their toll, in face of puerile politics and confused policing in India's diffused polity.

Regional Politics and Police Problem: A Case of Punjab/Sikhs

Punjab is a land of agriculture, aggression and army. Scrap its soil and there lay folds of battered history, wrapped memoirs of invading armies, tormented tales of toiling masses. In spite of the troubulous times, there is passionate romance in the air along with tumult and tragedy. Saga of Punjab is somewhat seditious, sometimes tame and often rambunctious. Without deeply involving in its history, geography or culture, a view has to be presented so as to understand the complications of order that police faces so perilously.

"The name Punjab is derived from two Persian words, punj (five) and ab (water) meaning five waters or rivers." (Singh, 1981:1) There were other historical namesin the past but since long an till now Punjab is the name of the province with east and west prefix in India and Pakistan. It is the East Punjab in India that would be referred to as Punjab though in historic references it would mean undivided Punjab though in historic references it would mean undivided Punjab of before 1947. In 1966, Punjab was trifurcated, therefore a current reference would mean the Punjab of today, excluding the States of haryana andHimachal Pradesh. "Thus, the newly created unilingual state of Punjab is only a small state, with an area of 19,404 square miles and an estimated population of 1.67 crores." Only three out of five rivers now washes its land. Himalaya, through the tortuous

passes of which came the invaders to India, still stands on its north and Kashmir hands over its head. Inimical Pakistan and Indian Punjab rub uneasily each others borders in northwest as the division under Redcliffe Award (August 1947) was more eccentric than rational.

At most of the occasions in history, Punjab was the battleground for India. Whosoever, won in Punjab was qualified to rule Delhi, and, by implication, to rule India. Freqently of foreign invasions and insurgent conditions affected the socio-political aspects and cultural characteristics of people in Punjab. Sikhs are the historic produce of tumultous Punjab and their religion (Sikhism) "was born out of a wedlock between Hinduism and Islam after they had known each other for a period of nearly nine hundred years." (Khushwant, 1963:17) Guru Nanak's "reform was in its immediate effect religious and moral only: believers were regarded as "Sikhs" or disciples, not as subjects; and it is neither probable nor is it necessary to suppose, that he possessed any clear and sagacious views of social amelioration or of political advancement." (Cunningham, 1955:41)

It was Guru Gobind Singh who "established the Khalsa, the theocracy of Singhs, in the midst of Hindu delusion and Mohammedan error, he had confounded Pirs and Mullas, Sadhs and Pandits . . . ." (Cunningham, 1955:66) Guru Gobind Singh brought tremendous changes in operationalization of Sikhism. "Notwithstanding these changes it has been usual to regard the Sikhs as essentially Hindu, and they doubtless are so in language and everyday customs, for Gobind did not fetter his disciples with political systems or codes of municipal laws; yet in religious faith and worldly aspirations, they are wholly different from other Indians, and they are bound together by a

community of inward sentiment and of outward object unknown elsewhere." (Cunningham, 1955:76) No wonder that "it was Gobind Singh who first conceived the idea of forming the Sikhs into a religious and military commonwealth . . . ." The backbone as well as the militancy of Sikhism was provided by "the Jat converts to the new religion and whose industry had built up the agricultural system of the Punjab, and who were as handy with the lance and sword as with the plough and the water-lift." (Trevaskis, 1928:168)

Guru Gobind Singh made Panj Piyare (five beloved ones) "nucleus of a new community" called the 'Khalsa', or the 'pure'. They were baptized differently, "their Hindu names were changed and were given one family name 'Singh', their father's name became Gobind Singh and their place of birth changed to Anandpur." (Khushwant Singh, 1963:83) They were given a new birth, a new family, a new creed, a new profession and five new 'emblems' - 1) unshorn hair and beard (kesh), 2) comb (kangha), 3) knee-length pair of breeches (kach), 4) a steel bracelet (kara) on their right wrist and "to be ever armed with a sabre (kirpan)." (Khushwant Singh, 1963:84) This all led to radicalization and "the rise of militant sikhism became the rise of Jat power in the Punjab." (Khushwant Singh, 1963:89)

Sikh fought dominant Muslim power both at Delhi and outside. They established their kingdom at the time of Ranjit Singh in 1977 at Lahore, consolidated and expanded it. After the death of Ranjit Singh on 27th June 1839, the kingdom started collapsing due to internal feuds for succession and later broke up due to collision with the British. Punjab subsided under the British to the extent that when national uprising took place in 1857, in the form of mutiny, just

after eight years of Punjab's annexation, Sikhs overwhelmingly sided with the British in suppressing their own countrymen. "The Sikhs were handsomely rewarded for their services: the princes with grants of territory and palatial residence; commoners with loot and employment opportunities." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:111) Social and religious reforms took place thereafter, 'Nirankaris' stressed the formlessness of God. 'Namdharis' emphasized the repeating of God's name. "The Nirankaris, Radha Soami, and Namdhari movements made a small impact on the Sikh masses." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:136) Sikhism faced a sort of decline and even the reforms could not abolish the evils: "Sikhs of lower castes continued to be discriminated against, the rich continued to indulge in drink and debauchery . . . " (Khushwant Singh, 1966:136) To revive the teachings of the gurus and as a counteracting force to Arya Samaj (A Hindu reformist/revivalist movement) Singh Sabhas (Sikh societies) were formed. "The most important aspects of the Singh Sabha movement were educational and literary." (Khushwant Singh, 1936:145) It "not only checked the relapse of the sikhs into Hinduism but retaliated by carrying proselytising activities into the Hindu camp." (Khushwant Singh, 1936:146) Later on, "The domination of the Indian National Congress by Arya Samajists gave the freedom movement an aspect of Hindu resurgence and was chiefly responsible for the aloofness of the Muslims and the Sikhs." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:147) Gurdwara (sikh temple) reform movement gave rise to Akalis (Immortals) the name which the devoted Sikhs acquired to fight for the cause of their Panth (religion). In the beginning, "there were no rules for the administration of SIkh shrines and over many of them priests (Mahants) who were Hindus as often as Sikh had asserted proprietary

rights." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:193) In 1920, a 'committee' known as the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (Central Gurdwara Management Committee) was set up "for the management of all Sikh shrines, but the more radical elements organized a semi-military corps of volunteers known as the Akal Dal (Army of Immortals)." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:198) On account of confrontation, violence erupted at Nankana and Guru Ka Bagh. The behavior of the police at Guru Ka Bagh induced some to organize an underground terrorist movement with the result 'Babbar Khalsa' was born. The British government institutionalized the Sikh reforms and curbed violence. It seems that Sikhs continued to oppose Muslims and Hindus, one way or the other, to secure a separate homeland for themselves. Partition of the country in 1947, sealed their fate to be with Hindus in India.

"The most significant effect of the migration was to create Sikh concentrations in certain districts of East Punjab." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:287) Without going into merits or demerits of the demand or its resolution, what is highlighted here is the problem and the predicament of the police in facing Sikh problem. Rightly or wrongly, the Sikh leaders as soon as they settled down in India after facing the trauma of partition renewed their demand for Sikh homeland. And despite their early loyalty towards the British, when home rule for India was first proposed, Sikh leaders began to say: "If the British have to go, it is only right that the Punjab should be restored to the Sikhs from whom it was wrongfully seized." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:289) Not only this historic fact but also the existing reality goaded them to assert for greater share in the country's autonomy. No wonder that they asked themselves: "The Muslims have Pakistan, the Hindus have

Hindustan; but what did we Sikhs get out of it?" (Khushwant Singh, 1966:292) It is true that the Government of India lacked perspective and bungled the issue by confusing the demand. The Sikhs were confused too and the country was not ready for another semblance of a tragedy like Pakistan. Sikh homerule, or homeland, or Sikhistan, was equated with Pakistan and therefore whole approach to Sikh demands got contaminated. Prejudices came in the way with full force and the gap between Hindus and Sikhs deepened. There were other socio-economic reasons too. "Post-partition conditions made many Sikhs doubt the wisdom of having throw their lot with the Hindus. The scramble for land and urban property left by Muslim evacuees created ill-will between them and Hindu refugees as well as the Hindus of Haryana who had taken possession of lands left by Muslims." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:291) The government's rehabilitation program of refugees was of course hard pressed but was also corrupt and careless. "The government showed little imagination in dealing with the Sikhs; and the chief of Sikh uneasiness in free india was the resurgence of Hinduism which threatened to engulf the minorities." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:293)

The cause was politically exploited by the Congress party to strengthen its own political power and it never sincerely dealt with Sikhs. Even when the India was reorganized on linguistic basis "the Punjab was declared a bilingual state with both Punjabi and Hindi as its languages." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:294) As is clear to every one that the Sikh demand for a unilingual state was "in fact one for a Sikh state; language was only the sugar coating." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:295) Sikhs had a grievance - real or fancied and they, in spite

of partial satisfaction, from time to time, raised the demand of Sikh homeland to win the political power. In 1960, "according to the Akali Dal, over 57,000 (according to the government, only 23,000) men were gaoled in the movement." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:299)

What was concerning the Sikh orthodoxy was the laxity of Sikh youths in observing religious rituals and symbols: "The relapse into Hinduism forms a recognizable pattern and is more evident among the rich and educated classes of Sikhs. In this class the younger generation has begun to give up the practice of wearing their hair and beards unshorn." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:303)

The perception of the threat that Hinduism might absorb Sikhism resulting in complete loss of identity, bothered most of the Sikh leadership who were staking their claims on identity itself. "There were strong indications that with passing of the present generation sikhism will also pass out of the people of Singh." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:303) Their fear was not altogether unreal. The experience had shown them the fallibility of Sikh religion in the future:

> First, wherever Sikhs are scattered among other people, the attachment to tradition declines and the rate of apostacy rises. This is most evident in the Sikh communities in foreign lands. Secondly, the abolition of communal considerations by the Indian government, e.g. separate electorates, weightage in services, and above all the non-enforcement of rules regarding pahul in the armed forces, have taken a heavy toll of the Khalsa. Thirdly, there is a close connection between the Punjabi language and Sikhism. Fourthly, with the resurgence of Hinduism, the official commitment to secularism is being reduced to a meaningless clause in the Constitution. The four conclusions listed above lead to the fifth: the only chance of survival of the Sikhs as a separate community is to create a state in which they form a compact group, where the teaching of Gurmukhi and the Sikh religion is compulsory, and where there is an atmosphere of respect for the traditions of their khalsa forehathers. (Khushwant Singh, 1966:305)

The only logical question that emerges out of the discussion seems to be "Is the Sikh struggle for survival as a separate community?" (Khushwant Singh, 1966:vii) As the view is widely shared among the Sikhs and the non-Sikhs that the struggle "started with the resistance to British expansionism, it was continued as resistance against Muslim domination, and after independence, it turned to resistance against absorption by renascent Hinduism." (Khushwant Singh, 1966:vii) And then by logical extension "The Sikhs cannot only hope for survival but for ascendency in every field. Already, the signs are writ large across the skies both at home and in the lands across the seas, where they have settled in sizeable numbers." (Gopal Singh, 1979:735) Gopal Singh has a realization regarding Hindu dominance and its relevance to Sikhs: Sikhs "already have, more or less, surrounded as they are by the great religion of the Hindus . . . are yet the best buy in this part of the world . . . . India is the largest home market for their produce; and Hindus are the only community to date to offer them the largest number of recruits to their faith." (Gopal Singh, 1979:734) Whatever might have happened to the Sikhs in the past, Hindus could hardly be blamed for that, but at present Sikhs hold bitter grievance against Hindus. Sikhs, comparing to others, are in the best situation. The irony is that the "land of plenty" says a survey of independent India today (March 16, 1979) exercises its anachronisms. While the Punjabis have the highest per capita consumption of milk in the country, they also consume the most liquor." (Gopal Singh, 1979:715)

"In the history of Sikhism, says Harbans Singh, "The hundred years beginning from 1873 are dominated by one single motivation -

that is, of search for identity and self assertion." (Harbans Singh, 1976:273) The process reached its culmination in the recent formulations for a Punjabi speaking state. In spite of attaining Punjabi speaking tate and prospeerity, Sikhs in Punjab are not only unhappy but anarchic. "When all is said and done, the undercurrents of Punjab politics which flow quietly beneath the surface are characterized by primordial loyalties in the name of caste, language, and religion." (Dalip Singh, 1981:289)

What is not understood is that why the Sikhs who were synonym for loyalty who fought campaigns in Europe, Africa, West Asia, Burma, Malaya and china who policed the outposts of the Empire from Shanghai to Mesopotamia, who were granted land in the newly opened Canal Colonies making them the richest agricultural community of Asia, within the short space of five years Sikh loyalty took a violent somersault.

New Fundmentalism and Police in Punjab

Punjab politics was familiar when Akalis lost power in early 1980 and Congress (I) ministry voted to power both at Center and State level. history of power-scramble started repeating. The force of fundamentalism, overshadowed the contenders of power. It is the 'killing' effect that had chilled the State politics in eighties. No one knew that a mediocre village youth with humble background and simple priesthood that descended on him by chance but in no way any significant characteristic - would occup central stage of turbulent politics within no time. It was only in 1978 that he rose from obscurity when followers of his sect clashed with the followers of rival sect, in holy city Amritsar, leading to the death of 13 people.

(For details, see Satinder Singh, 1982:88) Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale represented new wave of Sikh fundamentalism. He became famous overnight when his followers were suspected for gunning down the chief of Nirakaris (a rival sect) in Delhi, in 1980. For reasons only known to the police and ruling politicians, neither the suspected persons were arrested nor Bhindranwale was interrogated. Whever be the reasons, people took note of police weakness. Under pressure from Nirankaris, the case was transferred from Delhi Police to Central Bureau of Investigation. There was no significant progress in investigation but the case was moving from pillar to post. The law and order situation was described by an editorial captioned 'Defiance of the Law' in Hindustan Times:

> Every other day we read of the exploits of men and women who break the law with impunity. The worst example of the most brazen defiance of law and morality in recent times comes from the Punjab where the assassins of the Nirankari Baba are reported to be going about freely in the full knowledge of the police. The best efforts of the CBI, personal intervention of the Lt-Governor of Delhi, and the weight of public opinion have failed to persuade the Punjab Government to apprehend Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala, the prime suspect in the murder. Kabil Singh, against whom a warrant of arrest is pending in the same case, was seen marching in an anti-tobacco rally in Amritsar brandishing a carbine with 20,000 armed policemen looking on as if they were bystanders. Chief Minister Darbara Singh has reportedly justified his Government's inaction on the grounds that the arrest of Bhindranwala will lead to violence and bloodshed. If someone like the Sant can take the law into his own hands on the strength of an armed and fanatical following, surely what exists is not the rule of law, but the law of the jungle. (Hindustan Times, June 16, 1981:9)

In crisis ridden Punjab, anti-Hindu, anti-Nirankari, anti-Sikh and anti-police feelings rose at the same time. The vitiated atmosphere of communal disharmony, instead of defusing was critically surcharged. The complex Akah politis - from moderate to extremist,

equally injuriating Hindu reactions and irresponsible and incompetent Congress party in power did not take it too long to make law and order a major casualty. The demand of 'Khalistan', or an autonomous Sikh homeland was the most tangled knot of emotional politics, which gave rise to bizarre scenes. 'Khalistan' was described as "the politics of passion." (Satinder Singh, 1981:1) and it was suggested that the 'Real Problem in the Punjab' was of 'rolling back bigotry's tide.' (Malhorta, 1981:8) There are so many academic analysis and rational propositions but smoking gun of Sikh fury in defying all solutions of conceivable order. First the fury was against Nirankaris who were hunted down like animals, then it turned to Hindus who were sprayed with bullets indiscriminately and lastly, perhaps it is taking toll of policemen - some of them being on the hit list. Hindus are indiscriminately killed because of communal hatred and ideological differences. Policemen are killed because they form the counteracting force at the hands of the hostile government. Events from summer 1981 have taken a sharp turn. Some of the glimpses of these events would provide a feel of a violent tornado ravaging fertile land of Punjab.

Chain of Events:

1. Sikh fundamentalists under the leadership of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale pleaded for a ban on tobacco in any shape or form on the grounds that smoking and chewing of tobacco was against the religious susceptibilities of Sikhs. The ban was proposed for the holy city of Amritsar to begin with. Hindus opposed the suggestion and criticized the idea. To support their claims and counter-claims, Hindus and Sikhs took out their massive processions. Hindu procession "wielding

cigarette packets stuck on poles and swords", shouted slogans in favor of smoking. (For details see Satinder Singh, 1982:54)

20,000 Sikhs marched through the streets of Amritsar and "openly defied the ban on weapons imposed three days ago. Police were deployed in large numbers. All kinds of rowdyism erupted and police dispersed the processionalists by using teargas. (Hindustan Times, June 1, 1981:1)

2. On Sept. 9, 1981, noted Hindu editor of a widely circulated daily in Punjab, was shot dead. It sent a shock wave and Punjab was stunned for a while. Police accused Sant Jarnail Singh for the murder and obtained a warrant for his arrest from the Court. Police performance and the drama of the arrest would shed a lot of light on the state of affairs that developed in sensitive Punjab. Probably hearing about his arrest warrant, 'Bhindranwale fled from Haryana's Hissar district where he was on a preaching tour to the safety of his headquarters - which also house a gurudwara - in Mehta, 350 km away from Hissar." (Satinder Singh, 1982:87) A well known suspect of his stature was able to travel supposedly in a car for such a long distance without knowledge of the police or without being arrested, reflect not only police inefficiency but a gross negligence and culpability beyond measure. What might explain a little but this strange police behavior is thatHaryana police allowed the slip because it did not want to involve in Sant affair and make Haryana a center of Sikhs' vengence. Punjab police allowed the slip because other policemen considered it wiser to let those handle the matter who were responsible for arrest and should not jump into fire which could not do any good to them except making themselves targets of Sikh

extremists. In this way, Sant's camp at Mehta, the hideout, became the center of Sikh and police activity. The eight-acres, mini-fortress was surrounded by massive police force, fully armed, stayed at the outskirts waiting for the surrender of the Sant so that warrant for the arrest could be executed. Perhaps, they were restrained by an understanding not to enter the Camp. Police also knew by experience that in such grave religious matters even when they have constitutional and legal powers/obligations to enter any place, they consider it utmost wise to get clearance from all quarters, especially political high ups, before taking any action. It is wiser for a police officer of any rank not to take responsibility by himself in such matters. Sometimes, the clearance issue goes up to Union Home Minister and even the Prime Minister through official, semi-official and non-official channels, depending upon the gravity of the issue. This is one of the case of that magnitude. Anyhow political pressure grew up and Jarnail after consulting varius Sikh leaders and religious preachers decided to surrender to thepolice and announced the date and time of surrender. Police was skeptical about the surrender till the last moment and made massive arrangements for effecting the arrest, in case it was done. Sikhs started pouring into the camp in hundreds and there were more than 75,000 followers, giving the Sant their standing ovation. Almost all the prominent Sikh leaders were there and the addressed the congregation. Sikhs were in an overwhelming mood that day. "The gathering, consisting mostly of men, seemed like some army of long ago: most sported the traditional Kirpan (long sword), and many strutted about with spears and lathis in hand. The Nihangs, the military arm of the Sikhs were the most impressive: dressed in

luminous blue, they bore a frightening assortment of arms: swords, spears, poliaxes, shields and in some cases guns." (Satinder Singh, 1982:87)

> On the day of Sant's surrender, there was an estimated Sikh crowd of about 2,000,000. Police build up was equally impressive to face a formidable enemy. "Police and BSF (Border Security Force) battalions encircled the area completely; some of the squads took up positions among canal embankments almost as if they were readying for war. Nearly 5,000 men of the Punjab Armed Police were present at Mehta Chowk, apart from the BSF battalions . . . machine-gun posts had been set up on sandbags. Among the weapons used in the Sikh-police battle which took a toll of 13 lives, and the BSF, were, according to Bhindranwale Sources, Mark III, and Mark II sten-guns, and recently introduced 7.62 mm guns used by the army. In spite of this massive police buildup and advance arrangement, the police were overwhelmed by the multitude. (Satinder Singh, 1982:137)

It was not at all surprising but what was most astonishing was the way it happened. Sant was able to surrender himself peacefully and he also pleaded with the mob to maintain peace. What happened afterwards was that "a small group of sword brandishing militants who began to attack the nearby police tent and vehicles, started brickbatting, and set fire to a Matador van. Inside the van, apparently, there were several rounds of ammunition. As these burst within the van, crowd and the police began to panic. The police though that the explosions were from country-made revolvers, and the crowd thought that the police had begun firing in the air." (Satinder Sigh, 1982:137) Stunning silence prevailed after the explosion.

Pace of events moved fast. After recaptulating the events, it was described like this:

> The trouble started a few minutes later when a handful of Nihangs danced their way towards the police with unsheathed swords and spears. About 40 mounted policement galloped forward to stop them, lathi-wielding police following. They drove back the first wave but suddently another took up the assault. The policemen turned tail and

> ran hard for their lives. In this successful first attack, the Sikhs, many of the Nihangs, set fire to three police tents which were reduced to charred tatters in seconds. Thick black smoke billowed into the sky as a police pick-up van turned into an inferno. (Satinder Singh, 1982:139-140)

The burning of police vehicles and assault on policemen continued. Police morale without any leadership shattered. "They could only stand by helplessly . . . . The police were in utter disarray. The senior officers seemed to have vanished . . . . 'Where are our orders? Where are our officers?' An elderly inspector was heard to scream in the melee." (Satinder Singh, 1982:140)

After about half an hour, tear gas shells were fired which obviously had little effect on militant Sikhs who became more furious than ever. Finally, after half an hour came the order for firing. The gunment took up position, some laying prone while others crouched low. A few warning rounds and a minute later the air was filled with the sharp cracks of rifle-shots as the police let loose a volley into the swarm. The firing continued for eight minutes and the demonstrators retreated helter skelter. When the gunsmoke cleared, seven of them lay dead on the ground. Six more were to die in the hospital later.

There came another sten-gun squad but by that time the crowd was gone; leaving the dead and injured behind to be picked up by the police. Thus ended the day of arrest or surrender of Sant Bhindranwale. At distant capitals of the State and of the country, Chief Minister and the Prime Minister conferred with their colleagues and aides, reviewed the law and situation and despatched some more paramilitary battalions to communally torn Punjab. A grave episode seemed to be over for the time being. The press and the politicians

of various hues criticized the police and the Akalis in the same breath. Paramilitary forces continued to stage 'flag marches' to reassure people their safety.

Sant Jarnail Singh was kept in jail and was interrogated. The police case came out, surprisingly, so weak that it confirmed Sikh's belief that Sant was not involved in the murder. Those who thought that Sant would be maligned as a murderer and would spend his time in jail proved utterly wrong. Sant became a Sikh hero, a defender of the Sikh faith and a charismatic personality. He was a household name after the arrest. Police was ridiculously reported in the press.

An Indian Airlines plan was hijacked to Pakistan by extremist young sikhs; who were overpowered and arrested by Pakistan commandos at the airport while the passengers were returned back to India. (For details, see Satinder Singh, 1982) Opinions were bound to agree that "Never before has either challenge to authority or tension between the Hindus and the Sikhs in Punjab been so grave as it is today." (Times of India, Sept. 22, 1981:4) Naturally the caution was to handle the situation "with greater care than has been the evidence so far." (Times of India, Sept. 22, 1981:4) An editorial expressed surprise over the "strange manner in which law and order is being enforced in the sensitive state." (Times of India, Sept. 22, 1981:4)

Bhindranwale did not seek bail and neither the Punjab police nor the Central Bureau of Investigation could collect incriminating evidence against him to keep him in jail. In the meantime 'bomb blasts' continued to rock Punjab and innocent people died on account of sporadic and indiscriminate firings by Sikh extremists.

As a counterpoint in a melodramatic episode, the Prime Minister invited Sikh political leaders for talks. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale who was arrested on September 20 was released from central jail on October 15, 1981. "The Sant was accorded a rousing reception as he came out of the jail." (Times of India, Oct. 16, 1981:1) "Sant warned the Punjab government that if it did not "mend its ways" and ensure due justice to the Sikh within 15 days, he would be free to take any steps and the government will be responsible for the consequences." (Times of India, Oct. 16, 1981:1) Almost the next day, in a daring bid, three Sikh assailants 'rained bullets' on a senior high-ranking official of Punjab government when he came out of his car along with his younger brother and his bodyguard in a crowded Secretariat, at office time. The younger brother who was selected for police service died on the spot while the official along with his bodyguard got injured." (Hindustan Times, Oct. 17, 1981:1) Gunmen escaped leaving panic in the secretariat. The Prime Minister held the talks with Punjab Sikh leaders under the shadow of these grim murders and left for Cancun for international conference.

The next round of talks was held by the External Affairs Minister. In November, two police officers were shot dead by the extremists in a bold encounter and then they escaped as usual. An editorial of a national English daily reflected the public mood that "It is shocking beyond words that the Punjab police should have proved itself to be utterly incompetent in dealing with the extremist protagonists." (Times of India, November 23, 1983:8) Partly by failure of the police and partly by bold shootings by extremists, it was suspected that "some of the police and civilian officers of Punjab

were hand in glove with the extremists." (For details see the Hindustan Times, Jan. 17, 1982:7) Commenting on excuses by Punjab police, V. M. Tarkunde, Chairman of the People's Union for Civil Liberties alleged that "Law of the Jungle was reigning in Punjab." (For details see Times of India, Feb. 8, 1982:15)

In 1982, two hijack attempts were made by Sikh extremists out of which one hijacker was shot dead by Punjab police. Chief Minister of Punjab was attacked but the bomb missed him but injured 33 others. The Chief Minister directly accused Sant Bhindranwale for the attack. Police swooped on Akalis and arrested more than three hundred in a night. (For details see The Hindustan Times, Aug. 28, 1982:1) Sant took shelter in Golden Temple Amritsar, where a large number of police force was posted. Akalis launched an agitation around August 1982. by October 1982, 26,000 Sikhs were arrested and 106 were shot dead. (For details see The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 22, 1982:1) Another initiative was taken by the Prime Minister to resume talks with Akali leaders in October 1982. In the meantime, a bomb attack on Hindu religious procession killed few people and injured hundreds in Amritsar. (For details see the Hindustan Times, Oct. 27, 1982) Violence continued during 1982 and in 1983 in a revengeful way. In March 1983, the Union Home Minister announced another invitation for talks with Akali leaders.

Events started taking a dramatic turn from the end of April 1983. All of a sudden, "the Deputy Inspector-General of Police of the same range that include Amritsar, was shot dead at the threshold of the inviolate Golden Temple . . . . " (For details, see The Hindustan Times, April 26, 1983:1) It created panic among the hearts of people

and police was completely demoralized. "Units of the army were put on standby alert." (The Hindustan Times, April 26, 1983:1) Earlier 20 Akalis got killed during police firing when an eight-hour road blockade was launched by Sikhs on April 3, 1982. (For details, see Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 120, No. 17, April 28, 1983, p. 29) Akali Dal, "called for an army of 100,000 volunteers for the final phase of its struggle and at an awesome ceremony on April 14, the Chief Priest of the Sikhs administered a do-or-die pledge to 31,500 volunteers, many armed with spears and guns." (The Hindustan Times, April 26, 1983:1)

The law and order situation started worsening more by the end of September 1983 and it was almost clear that the Punjab government had lost control over Sikh extremists who committed killings at will, by shooting bus and train passengers. (For details see The Hindustan Times, Oct. 7, 1983:1) The ghastly murders shook the nation and 'President's rule' was proclaimed by suspending the Punjab Assembly. Motorcycles were banned, night bus services were suspended and administration was revamped. Next day, Governors were exchanged between Bengal and Punjab to bring a more effective and seasoned one to Punjab. "The police and paramilitary forces, under orders to shoot lawbreakers on sight and empowered to raid the sanctuaries of suspected Sikh terrorists at will, patrolled parts of Punjab . . ." (For details see The New York Times, Oct. 8, 1983:3) Punjab and the capital city of Chandigarh were declared as the 'disturbed areas' and Central government 'rushed paramilitary forces to Punjab' and armed them with widranging powers.

In spite of these government measures, killing attempts were made. Another attempt was made on the life of already injured Senior Superintendent of Police who was lying in the hospital, on account of gunshot injuries sustained during an extremist attack on Sept. 21, 1983.

The enfeeblement of Punjab Police was considered to be the outcome of direct political interference in the affairs of police and the largescale of transfers of senior officers by the Union Home Ministry. Sant continued to remain in the sanctuary of the Golden Temple under a heavily armed guard of his faithful followers. He himself wore two loaded revolvers and a bundoliar. Police was restrained by the government to enter Sikh religious places, especially the Golden Temple Amritsar, the highest religious seat of the Sikhs.

The killing spree shifted to the capital city of Delhi. Two bomb explosions at two movie-theaters and one at railway station at Delhi took a toll of innocent lives in the second week of Oct. 1983, indicating that Delhi was no immune from terrorist attack of Sikh extremists. Paramilitary forces were pressed into service in Punjab that the whole state became like a Cantonment and the Sikh temple at Amritsar like a fortress in a besieged campaign. In police technical terms, they launched a 'combing operation' by searching suspected villages and towns in the region, arresting narly 1500 'extremists'. The government had declared that police would not enter the Golden Temple to search and arrest the wanted Sikhs. There wre "inside the Golden Temple complex, at least 100 wanted men, whom the police have charged with murder, armed robbery, or other violent acts." (Weaver,

1983:11-12) On the roof of the Temple "machine-gun emplacements hug the limestone prapets and Nihang Singh warriors the temple's praetorian guard, wear traditional blue tunics and turbans, as they have worn them for centuries. But they carry automatic weapons, .45 calibre pistols, carbines, and metal spears." (Weaver, 1983:12) Outside the Temple, police and paramilitary forces are behind sandbags and intensively patrolled Amritsar streets.

These are the kinds of problems police faced in Punjab. They are not new but every time they emerge, they have the facade of new ones. Police had wide sweeping powers. They were reinforced by solid support of the administration and paramilitary forces. But they were suspected of divided loyalities and that some of them clandestinely helped terrorists. A complicated case. These were political problems but police got involved in them by the very nature of their work.

A 36-year calendar of communal conflict was produced in Ear Eastern and Economic Review of December 10, 1982, giving an account of the development of the agitation spearheaded by the Akali Sikhs of Punjab, starting from 1946 to 1982.

Sikh demand is neither new nor regional or communal but it has stirred all of these feelings simultaneously. It is regional in the sense that the Sikhs are not the only group nor is Punjab the only state that has diverged from the Center but Assam in the East and Tamilnadu in the south have displayed similar alienation. It is religious because overlaying the strains is religion. It is communal because its operational consequences are anti-Hindu.

Punjab's problem is a peculiar mix of political, communal and cultural problems. Akali-Sikh demands are couched in religious wraps

to provide it more potential power. The result turned out the same which was feared. Most people feared that these clashes might assume the proportion of Hindu Muslim riots of 1947 dimensions which led to the division of the country. Police had failed to contain this cleavage and to maintain semblance of order. Delhi, Haryana, Punjab and Kashmir, on account of these riots were turning into 'garrison states'. Till political answers are found, public chaos and police coercion would rule the roost. India's northern borders are on fire and most of India's army faces hostile Pakistan with dangerous implications. Similar explosive situations are faced by police in Assam which is getting critical day by day in the absence of any political resolution to the regional-communal problem.

Loss of Public Confidence in Police

Public confidence in police seems to be a matter of "public trust derived from the centrality of the police as representatives of moral and political order." (Manning, 1978:241) This public confidence emerging out of public faith or trust in police, is a strange variable. When police officer catches someone, an infraction of law is immediately applied and police get some initial public confidence that it would catch the law-breakers and thus safeguard the society (which impliedly is law-abiding). At the same time, it is also common knowledge and the impression that exists in public mind that "the police often rely on non-legal and sometimes illegal means of controlling the public, including lying, duplicity, and secrecy." (Manning, 1978:241) Whatever may be reasons including those described under the 'Cover your ass' perspective or the 'Asshole Control' and that referred to as 'internal' and 'external lies' by Peter K.

Manning, police credentiality suffers every time. Laying down the objectives of a police system in a free, permissive and participatory society, John Alderson prescribed to the police "to contribute towards the creation of reinforcement of trust in communities as one of the salient part." (Alderson, 1979:ix)

Tolerance of crime levels, whatever their variations be, are in different societies. Community outcry against criminality and police increases with the loss of public faith in police. Vigilantism surfaces with boldness, gangsterism grows and qualify of life goes down:

> In such circumstances one of three things may occur. First, criminality would go unchecked and the quality of life would deteriorate and the weakest go to the wall. Secondly, protection rackets would develop and rival gangs and other racketeers would fight each other for control thus adding to the total communal criminality, particularly the more serious crimes of homicide and extortion. Thirdly, vigilante groups of a more responsible nature would develop . . . . (Alderson, 1979:128-29)

Public participation in crime prevention, crime-detection and crime control is obviously useful but it has its own ominous pitfalls. "Nevertheless the growth of unofficial groups, even lawful ones, contains the seeds of sectarian strife, and they should be channelled into constitutional forms." (Alderson, 1979:85)

Sometimes, police have very little control over their functions as "The police, by the very nature of their function, are an anomaly in a free society." (Goldstein, 1977:1) And then looking at the future of police, Sir Robert Mark laid his assertion: "They key to survival is not to be found in the genius of a few individuals but in general confidence, misplaced or not, in system in which they flower. It is in that context that the police of Britain should be judged." (Mark, 1978:310)

The concepts of 'Preventive Policing' of 'community policing' and of 'police community relations' were emphasized with a view to elicit more public confidence in policing. The disadvantaged, the deviants, the alienated and those who were discriminated against or those who had the feeling against the authority stood on the opposite side of the police. "The 'sharp end' of policing developed an even greater cutting capacity as frustrations of this nature were nourished; it was the police themselves who were to be scarred however, since they were the visible control system of an unequal society." (Pope, 1981:23) There are some sections in the society who always reverberate with repulsion against police. On the contrary, police are also known to possess a distinctly cynical attitude toward some classes, groups of people and specific individuals. These negative responses each side affect adversely public faith in police and exacerbate hostility toward police. An experienced police commissioner of New York City, explained in his lecture how much a "police force is sensitive and responsive to public opinion." (Woods, 1971:176) "If the public seems to have the idea that policemen are all grafters, are all loafers, are all fat, impotent supporters of lampposts - that public will probably be fairly successful in moulding its police force according to its conception." (Woods, 1971:176)

It is another way of saying that we get the police we deserve. Whole focus and elaboration of this theme has been reflected in the book, "The Police We Deserve", edited by J. C. Alderson and Philip John Stead. The entire gambit of police political relationship impinge on the aspect of public faith in police but stands beyond the purview of this part of the chapter. Reliance on law enforcement or

faith in police may be two different things but there is a commonality at the far-edge of the spectrum at one point that , "Any society that needs increasingly to rely upon law enforcement for its public and private safety is a society in trouble." (Skolnick, 1975:273) When society does not rely too much on law enforcement for its safety, then it relies on itself.

Corruption, inefficiency, image, the manner and method of police operation and many other factors by their presence or absence decrease or increase public confidence in police. In the personal experience of author, public faith in police grows out of everyday interaction between police and people. Like ebb and tide, it either diminishes or grows with every police action and interaction. It might gain a consistency as presumably they claim in England for British Bobby, otherwise a responsible police officer had to watch constantly regarding its nursing, and in case of any sumptoms of malfunctioning, it is the police that immediately owes an explanation to restore the level of confidence which starts dipping with dismal acts of police personnel or policy.

In India, police handicapped by history, could not gain public faith even after independence. Police is an issue in India, seldom for appreciation, except by government spokesmen. On police public cooperation, there are basically two discernible stands taken by those who plead the necessity of police reform in this arena:

> Government admits many of the defects so dramatically charged. If specifics are given, it promises a prompt and thorough investigation. The skepticism with which this is greeted is monumental. But, government goes on, many of the defects found in the police are the result of a widespread lack of cooperation by the mass of the people. For example, if the public will not come forward with information, police have no choice but to deal with antisocial elements.

> Similarly, the uneducated policeman may be tempted to apply force to get a conviction if he cannot obtain cooperative independent witnesses. If the public in India would provide the ready cooperation of the English or Americans, thenthe Indian police would not need to stoop so low and the new habits would have an opportunity to take root. The opposition, says the government, would better serve the cause of police reform by helping to develop increased cooperation rather than by continually browbeating the police with malicious, intemperate, and unfounded charges. The opposition gives this argument short shrift. The prerequisite for willing cooperation, they say, is a police force that enlists respect and trust. How can the people be expected to volunteer when police are so demonstrably partial, venal, brutal, and stupid? The government must undertake to reform the police throughout; then it can expect cooperation. (Bayley, 1969:368-69)

There has always been a growing awareness of police public cooperation and that police must win a portion of public faith to be successful. An Inspector-General of Police writes about the importance of public cooperation, which is a typical sermon being repeated most of the time, in different words and in different contexts:

> In an independent country the police have to depend greatly on the attitude of the masses towards the law. The law should be acceptable to the largest majorit of the population and every individual must exercise restraints, short of treating himself as a policeman, in order to reduce the cost to the public exchequer to the minimum. The police should have a clearly defied field of work so that there is no wasteful overlap. Also the law needs to be made more objective. The involvement of the public at large, the youth, and other volunteer bodies in performane of police functions is a matter of great significance. We have to consider that the country's population is bursting at the seams, and therefore there are various items connected with their welfare which deserve higher priority than the police. (Nath, 1978:197)

Moreover, it is becoming clear that the changes are rapidly taking place both inside and outside the police:

> Many policemen are a long way short of achieving that self-respect which people ought to gain from their work, the conditions under which it is done and the way they are treated. A demoralized and diffident police administration

> cannot act as the bulwark of the law and order and social stability. Today the role of the police is changing and being questioned. The policemen have had a disturbing time; frequent changes of governments led to frequent changes in policies which run counter. Successive governments, sometimes, effected radical changes in the police hierarchy and these changes undermined established traditions and old loyalties. For all that, policemen feel that they have been, in recent years, mucked about a lot.
>
> The role of the police leadership is fast changig as new developments are taking place both inside the police organization and outside in its task environment. The volume of public complaints against the police and discontents within the force are increasing steadily. (Ghosh, 1981:126)

In a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious society coupled with the complexity of castes, classes and language variations, public faith in police is a complex variable. Relationship between police and weaker sections of society is not on the same footing:

> It is interesting to note comparative perspectives of weaker sections and policemen on the problems areas of criminal justice in India. It is also understandable that so long the police represnets the executive muscle arm of the State and the government has a class-character, the masses and especially the weaker sections of society will shudder to accept police as a guardian of the weak and defender of fundamental freedoms of the citizens. Even if police has genuine organizational difficulties and situational constraints, the members of weaker sections cannot change their glasses, which overwhelmingly reflect their own milieu. Theory apart, a police profession in a democratic society cannot be absolutely depoliticized. (Sharma, 1981:218)

To augment more faith in police by weaker sections of society, a scheme was devised to recruit more of their members in police services. Some typical cases narrated by Eric Sracey, Inspector-General of Police (Retired), in his book, "The Odd Man In (1981)", would provide a feel how negligible is public faith in police and how they work out their revenge process.

In India, faith in police is at discount even in the eyes of the government whom it serves. The Union Home Minister in a television interview told to the nation that "the government will screen the police administration to weed out those people who have sympathy for certain sections." (The Hindustan Times, Aug. 21, 1980:3) This is the kind of political distrust that the police get exposed to and for which police do not have the answer.

There was also an argument of "humanizing the police." It was observed by the press that "the statistical claims, generally suspect in the public eye are unlikely to help the Delhi police retrieve its lost credibility with the public and the press." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 20, 1981:1)

There were more cases on the increase in which the public will try to settle their own score without assignming them to police. In more volatile cases, police were even prevented, interfered and attacked resulting in widespread rioting. "A landowner was kidnapped after the has allegedly molested the young daughter of his maidservant. A clash broke out when a police party rescued the landowner, and a group of about 20 armed men who repeated their lack of faith in the police and urged them to leave the landowner, which lead to an exchange of fire between the two parties." (Times of India, 1981:1)

As the problem became more acute 'lynching' brought the 'wild west' to India, said Stevens in the New York Times. Referring to the rise of vigilante justice Stevens saw the increasing trend as "attributed to a growing inability of the police and courts to obtain justice. Indians appear increasingly to be taking the law into their

own hands." (New York Times, July 29, 1983:5) Drivers of vehicles involved in traffic accidents commonly flee in fear of their lives as the mob that collects there from neighbours damage or burn the vehicle involved and put the driver to grave danger. Stevens also refers to the Union Home Secretary's instruction to the police officers in Delhi regarding "government's concern over the inability or unwillingness of the police to catch criminals." (New York Times, July 29, 1983:5) "People's anger is directed not only at the criminals but also at the police, as a symbol of governmental authority against which many Indians have accumulated grievances and frustrations." (New York Times, July 29, 1983:5) The trend seems to be alarming because of its depth and dimension: "The police frequently look the other way either because they are paid to do so or because they are acting at the bequest of the politician or Government official whose interests or associates might be threatened." (New York Times, July 29, 1983:5)

Another serious side of the coin is when policemen themselves take the law into their own hands, and become perpetrators of crime, not as isolated instances but as gangsters under a wider canopy of general understanding of tacit approval or implied acceptance. Leaving aside the unreported or hidden extent of the malaise, "the press has been peppered in the last few months with reports of female prisoners having been raped by the police, of prisoners being beaten and maimed and of humiliation and mistreatment of people who wish to file complaints." (New York Times, July 29, 1983:5)

It is like a chain reaction. Reaosns may be very many--ranging from political, socio-economic, regional, organizational, individual or otherwise. But it does reflect loss of faith. It does recall

failure of the system and declare people's frustration, emerging disposition that would wreck anything that ever comes in their way. The social order in India seems to be sitting on a short-circuit, on an inflammable heap, unmindful of who gets burned or mutiliated because their own day-to-day existence is sadistic, demeaning and damning. Day by day social fabric is getting more and more brittle. Faith of public in police has been a major casualty.

SUMMARY

This chapter has surveyed a wide spectrum of police work, police dilemmas, police politics interaction, internal and external issues, affecting the law-enforcement in India. Most of the police problems did not critically surface till mid-nineteen-sixties because political stability and internal harmony was comparatively well-maintained. Thereafter, it started deteriorating. Internal strains in India took form of political turmoil and police were caught in a political dilemma. Police organization, performance of its personnel, on account of police-political-axis started reeling under the pressure. The socio-economic, regional, religious and caste conflicts grew intolerably sharper. Problems of Punjab and Assam turned bloodier and are still taking toll of police and people. Some problems are unique to India which add to the complexity of law and order situation in a vast and varied way. This chapter focuses on politics and police.

This chapter forms the core of police politics agenda and accountability. It has been amply demonstrated that police could not be the vehicle of social change but in that process, the system gets confounded and police get exposed to greater dangers of a political and public backlash. More reliance on police reflects weak political

governance; the weaker the politics, the more reliance on police.

Analysis, in this chapter, indicated that "some institutions in the historical environment of India which promoted democracy thereby had the potential of enhancing authoritarian political rule, including the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the police which upheld the responsibility for preserving progress and unity in the newly independent national society." (Darling, 1979:447) According to Huntington and Nelson (1976:25-26), "India fell in populist model which ultimately leads to less socio-economic development and less political stability." So long as Indian politics remain populist and institutions are under-rated, police would continue to face dilemmas.

CHAPTER V

OVERVIEW

Apart from politics, police in India, are under pressure at other fronts. This chapter focuses on these pressure areas. Crime is on the increase and peace gets more often disturbed. Police are blamed for their failures and had to work on a frantic pace to keep order and combat crime. To make police more responsive and serviceable, there is an outcry from all quarters to bring organizational change into the police. Old practices die hard and police must adjust according to new realities. There is a dilemma of change - both organizational and personnel. Police brutalities and police corruption are on the increase and would create problems of vast magnitude in the future. Police, for the time being, stand placated: more money as wage increases, allowances and perks, and also increase in powers. These doses of incentives will have to be given to police periodically otherwise the system would fall apart under its own strenuous pulls. All these topics form part of this chapter and portray the precariousness of police in India.

Old Order, Changing Realities: Problems of Police to Adjust

Old Practices

The colonial police organizational and legal structure survives. The existing functional practices, style and imagery do not differ

from earlier times in spite of marginal modifications in rewritten rules, modernization of transport, and technological innovations like computerization and satellite communications, westernization of uniforms, construction of multi-storied police buildings instead of barracks and the enormous increase in police strength and power. The constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights, federalization of functions and civil service brought no dramatic change in police practices. There was virtually no fundamental change in criminal codes and the Police Acts. A new breed of policemen has replaced the old generation changing some of the attitudes, approaches and aspirations but basically old carry-over lay still intact. Police handling of public grievances is still the same. There is absolutely no change in investigative techniques or procedures. Patrolling goes on as usual. Same perceptions, stereotype responses, ills and dilemmas of yesteryears are still part of the police fix, in India. Very little has changed in police training. In practical life, the trainee tows the same track which his colleagues earlier sounded him as safe and smart way of handling police work. Sub-culture of police seems to have no substitute.

"For India as a whole the results of investigation appear to have remained constant from the early 1950s to the present day." (Bayley, 1969:124) The picture has not much changed since then either. Both in police process and its philosophy, there seems to be considerable emphasis on continuity, status quo and pragmatism. Writing on generation-gap in society as well as in police, a retired Inspector-General of Police, an I.P. Officer gave words of wisdom and caution:

> The problem of generation gap has an obvious application to administrative cadres. While fresh recruitment keeps up the tempo of change and avoids any big gaps, it is also necessary that there are no abrupt changes in procedures. Such gaps would be indeed suicidal. (Nath, 1978:177)

Adjustment to Change

Change, especially the sudden change, seems very threatening to the establishment and to conservative policemen in general. The old practices, however inconvenient and obsolete possess the virtue of familiarity and certainty. One is already attuned to it and knows the consequences in advance.

Organizationally, "the police machine in India stands as a solid steel frame, designed as far back as 1861 and 1902, it is an inflexible organization, unresponsive to social change." (Sharma, 1977:182)

There have been very few changes in training and most of them have nothing new to offer. "The concepts and techniques of training have been too static." (Sharma, 1977:183) The State police training schools as well as colleges are not geared to adjust to the change. The major changes that took effect were just after a few years of partition. The only promising feature is the curriculum of the Central Detective Training School. The dilemma is that to whatever a police officer is exposed to at the Central Detective Training School, ran counter to the realities of life in the field and if one follows the idealistic message of C.D.T.S. very soon the officer would find in conflict with the prevailing process which would either push him out or crush him down. Survival meant succumbing to the system - not only to the formal but also to the informal one.

The drab continues in police life as old practices prevail over its lifeline:

> The odd hours of work, the strain of adventure, the irregularity of routine, the company of criminals and flatterers, the lack of leisure, the social stigma, and above all the constant pressure and panic of disciplined existence create a mental void and renders the policeman, especially at the lower levels a pitiable picture of timidity and insecurity, indulging in vulgar display or power . . .
>
> At the level of the Constable and the Sub-Inspector this neurosis is not only widely shared but evidently felt by the outsiders. (Sharma, 1977;184)

A time is soon coming when the socio-economic fabric of social order would bring tremendous change in police working in India. In all these years a new generation indiscriminately imitating a different culture which visibly wiping out the traces of traditional pattern. Anything old is becoming abominable. Reasons best known to those young claimants who are in a hurry to discredit traditional values by designating the same as 'old fashioned' is equivalent of saying that it was ready to be dumped in a garbage heap.

Old practices are dominant still in the field of patrolling, crowd control, techniques of undercover operations, prosecution and modes of public relations. The technological innovations are touching the police gradually and affecting its operationalization. It has still to go a long way before any radical change could be perceptible in its style of thinking and working.

Police strikes, political turmoils, failures of police establishment, extent of public expectations, international exposure of elite police officials as well as of critics/commentators compelled the police to change old practices. Society left police behind in its developmental planning. The increased criminality, political

necessity, and intellectual pressure motivates the government to allocate and spend more money on police modernization and welfare. Some of the state governments like Punjab and Haryana have taken lead in this matter. The central government yet to evolve a comprehensive plan which might take shape of guidelines and a package of suitable enactments.

Even at the very first flush of Independence, there was not much change brought in the police except nomenclatures, deletion of some subservient clauses, discontinuance of practices which were exclusively for the British and some of the additions to claim that the country was free. Police Rules were rewritten with some deletions and additions. Punjab Police Rules were written in 1934 and remained the same until the Sixties and early Seventies. When basic rules and regulations remained the same there was no chance of investigative, patrol or other techniques to change. They followed the same system, the same pattern and the same style of working. Old forms were to be filled up even though their relevance was reduced. Same paper format, same carbon copies, same way of filing and keeping records. Phones were answered the same way. Property room, Lock-up room regulations never changed.

I still remember that in Delhi one day an explosion took place outside a mosque and police patrollings were assigned. The same patrolling assignment remained in force for about a decade. The arrangements of festivals, their time of duty, nature of duty, did not change with time and looked very ridiculous.

Police uniform was changed after about two decades. The computer came to Delhi police in early seventies but did not affect the

attitude and approach of policemen in the field. Old habits die hard.

Pre-dawn arrests and house-to-house searches, all are the reminders of the British days. Censuring of the mails, watching the suspects, recording the activities, everything goes on the pattern that British left. Public complained against police attitudes but very little change was effected.

Rural India was still backward so the old practices worked. In urban India and specially in Metropolitan cities old practices were a hindrance in pursuing a vigorous law and order policy. It also affected the quality of investigation because culprits upgraded their techniques but not the police.

It was very late that the police was provided with motorcycles and scooters on loans from government quota in Delhi. Police wireless even after modernization looked primitive from western standards. The only development that took place was in the increase in the strength, in the use of the government motor vehicles, in promotion of senior officers and in creation of more and more supervisory posts. An out-moded system of police was a cause of concern to the press and people.

Police Strategies to Cope with Change

Change is inbuilt in any social order and police have to cope with change at societal level, change within itself at organizational and personnel level. Police cannot help the direction and dimension of change in the social order. It only allows or hinders the change, depending on the side it happened to be. Either way it aligns with the forces which accelerate or resist change in environment or within itself.

Police do not exhibit ideology of its own because it had none but the traditional conservative attitude brought it closer to non-radical institutions. Police opt for status quo and a sense of uncertainty threatens its level of performance. Indiscipline, incoherence and disorder erupts when police too often change sides or yield to the forces of change. That's the dilemma of change to which police had to address its strategies and policies from time to time. So far there is no self-adjusted mechanisms evolved to be set in police machinery which could take appropriate decisions. But police know the technique to survive after the change and also how to let the shock wave run out of the system. Police is pliable, malleable mechanism for those who know how to control but pose problematic inertia for those who get bogged down in administrative quagmire. That explains how police in India took a hundred and eighty degree turn after the British handed over power to national leaders and thereafter flowed with the tide of every ruling party. Police resorted to dualism in democracy because no one knows when opposition would become ruler and ruling party would lose authority. That bothers police and sometimes their confusion is worst confounded by the change. It is not very difficult to identify either the forces for change or those who resist change.

Forces for Change

Forces for change naturally include opposition politicians, intellectuals, press people, dissatisfied police employees and ideological committed people. Opposition politicians have vested interest in change. By change they mean change in ruling party. By demanding a change in police, the opposition parties tactically threaten police alignments. Opposition has nothing to gain with the

status quo which supports the sustenance of party in power. Most of opposition's activities are to voice dissatisfaction, protest against policies and practices of the government, unite the elements disenchanted with status quo and rally round against the government. The organization that stands in between the government and the opposition is police. It is interesting that the opposition would not support any change that strengthens police and brings it closer to the ruling party as that goes against their interests. Ironically, any opposition party that comes to power behaves like earlier ruling parties so far as police were concerned.

Intellectuals and press people are a class by themselves. To make news and let their point of view be heard, they suggest changes. To suggest changes police provide an opening for intellectual passion. Any police debate attracts attention and that is what is needed for a class of people who are looking for limelight. Both intellectuals and press stalwarts cater either to government councils or play for the sentiments of the people. Some of them take sides and display their candour and ideological markings.

Police look for more power and authority if change is going to provide them, they would support it. Any other change is fraught with negative consequences. Police cynicism for change undeniably seeks its justification on two grounds: 1) unpredictability of the consequences and 2) their vested interests in status quo. Any radicalism is anathema to the police because police feel comfortable in their coteric of sub-culture. Changes are like challenges and police would like to subdue a challenge as soon as possible. They like the changes they want; not which are wanted by others.

Police is a special target of die-hard ideological enthusiasts like Communists and Funamentalists. In West Bengal comunist government faces challenge from other radical forces. Committed ideological people are poles apart from each other and keep on hankering for change in police. Police are being perceived in the opposite camp by these radicals and rabblerousers.

Forces that resist change are obviously the ruling party politicians, police hierarchy, paramilitary and military forces and the factors that threaten stability. There is stake in stability for these forces and change, if at all, has to be planned by them, initiated and advocated by them. Change suggested by an outside agency would hardly be acceptable and appealing to the police. Any change could cost money and any investment on police would call for adverse criticism. Resources are needed more for welfare programs in a democracy where police have the weakest lobby.

Police hierarchy, paramilitary forces and military would suppress any demand, desire or attempt to change if that change is not approved or accepted by the group in power. Paramilitary forces suppress police strikes because they are ordered to do so and they obey. So does the army.

Internal and external threats serve against police change because police problems become secondary. First priority is to meet the external or internal threat. When survival becomes crucial, people clamour for stability rather than for change or vice versa.

Police and Organizational Change

"Organization is the enemy of change" wrote James Q. Wilson, "Because organizations are created in order to routinize and make more

predictable the cooperative efforts of individuals." (Wilson, 1980:129) To organizations, change is a dilemma. To police change is disturbing. Police, like a thermostat, work for status quo, for equilibrium, to bring back the deviance to normal. It was not designed as a self-adjusting mechanism toward changing goals nor like a heat seeking missile it would automatically track down the target and hit it. Police were equipped with high-tech gadgets to perform routinized role. It was suggested that "the police, however, may be able to help to reduce the cost if they can change fast enough in style to develop the arts and skills of policing change." (Alderson, 1979:151)

When we talk about change in police, what exactly are we referring to? Is it change in goals, policies, structures, procedures or philosophy of policing? To some, the whole societal system is in flux and there are possibility of the emergence of a new society:

> The institutionalization of a multi-centric society is now in process in multifarious and in chaotic terms. It may be aborted or on the other hand, it may gain momentum with our increasing awareness of the distortive externalities generated by the market-centered society. In any event the future will be shaped either through the mere passive coping of historical agents with circumstances, or through their creative exploration of unprecedented contemporary opportunities. Most likely, a new society will come about through both ways. (Ramos, 1981:164)

There is another foreboding of status-quo-type, greater in dimension but on similar lines:

> Impervious to the counterpoise to technological imperialism symbolized by the recent wave of cultism, sexual freedom, and a generalized anti-authority drift, typical upward-mobiles will probably remain happy prisoners in the iron cage. Indeed, their autonomy and preferential status may be enhanced as socialization and alienation (a sense of powerlessness) tend to broaden the acceptance of bureaucratic structure and values among ordinary people. (Prsthus, 1978:269)

A change in paradigm appears to be a logial necessity. A conceptual change would be eventual. We might not need police organization as such, because it draws sustenance out of its own foibles and failures. It enunciates its own process and defines its own clientele. Its servicing pattern provides diabolic satisfaction and its statistical image misleading. To get rid of the hideous complexity of police organization is wishful thinking. Society had to transform itself to secure police transference. Amorphous publics have to acquire conscious identity to lead rather than to be led. It does not seem to be a possible corollary but social changes are going to be spectacular anyway.

Change - A Bureaucracy Game

Nineteenth century changes in police are predominant features of bureaucratic game. Policy formulations, structural alterations, functional fluctuations, personnel management were more guided by practical needs and motivated by vested interests of ruling elites. Addition of specialized sections, merger or deletion of outlived bureaus, expansion of technical wings, alteration in performance techniques and adoption of new policies were carried out as adaptations to survival need. Expansion in strength, modernization and mechanization were responsive acts in a hostile environment of unpredictable nature. Police in India was basically laid out by British bureaucracy which brought reformatory changes in the system to serve their purposes better. Enactment of 1861, Police Commission of 1902-03, subsequent Indianization of police higher ranks were all made to suit the times. Overnight adaptation in 1947 and thereafter were the handiwork ofIndian bureaucracy. Police Commissions envisaged

organizational, functional and attitudinal changes. Political crisis of sixties, seventies, and eighties politicalized the police in India and in the process police secured liberation from civil bureaucracy.

Police politicalization lent speed to police reforms and led to suppression of radicalism. Again, there were no substantial changes in police system except expansion, modernization and more supervision. Bureaucratic game is a reactive action with political connivance and tactical deception. The system has to be serviceable and any deficiency or defect has to be repaired. There are always demands for equipment, enactments and personnel to replenish more and more power.

Permanent police or civil servants played temporary games so that they could pass their tenure without problems and leave successor the can of worms to play with. Tradition of passing the can to the other goes on both horizontally and vertically.

Why does bureaucracy play the game? Because by experience, maintenance of status quo is a better policy. Research and insight is needed to target a long range goal. Besides, formidable are the tasks of securing political approval, legal renewal, backing of the cadre, recognition from ranks, sufficient funds and inexhaustible energy, ability and leadership. Odds are too heavy to defeat any adventure, therefore no one has tried to tackle the bull by the horns when the purpose has been served by twisting its tail. Bureaucracy has its own congenital defect of not being able to transcend its own paradigm. It suffers from jaundiced perception and steotype ideation. Its decision making comes out of power bargaining.

India's police professionalism is westward looking. It has bounded rationality and innovation scars. A major limitation is its

complete dependency on political leadership and judiciary. The external and internal limitations are further exasperated by complex uncertain environment and bureaucratic logistics. Primarily change produces no win situation and brings laurels by chance. It is for extra-ordinary souls to scramble for a worthwhile change process. Any bureaucracy that changes conceptually does remake itself.

Police in India effected shrewd changes under its canopy. It empowered itself frantically, expanded its areas of operation effectively, and modernized technologically. Its informational network became far superior than any other organization. Its political linkages out-smarted even entrenched administrative service and outgunned rivals. Police get more politicalized than permitted or preferred. It possesses powerful personality in public; and clannish mentality in private. Its sub-culture assimilates fresh resources and captivates penetrating forages from alien quarters. It knows how to play bureaucratic game and plays it well. Sometimes it loses but its redeeming features are astonishing.

Circumvention

Police as an organization as well as police officers as individuals are being manipulated, used, abused, and circumvented most of the time. At least the experience dictates then that politicians exploit them the way they can, public wants to use them for vested interests and individuals manipulate them for favors. Policeman start learning this art in return. The nature of his duties bring police officer in close contact with a variety of people. To perform his job he needs people of all sorts and has to use them for legal and non-legal purposes. That is where these tactics count. Uncertainty

of environment and emergency settings of any call make a police officer more and more dependent on unknown persons on whom failure and success of his case would depend. Those are requirements of his fastidious and fast-moving, action-packed operations. Public relations, community support, client satisfaction are other foggy areas where there are no standardized solutions for salvation.

In India, police stand as a crucial resource to politicians. If a politician does not have any say with police he loses public command. Police could be used for a variety of purposes from social control to social service delivery. During freedom struggle, to gain police favour was a status. Whoever controls the police, controls the reign of power. The British always kept police and magistracy with them even when they set up native state governments. After independence, the most powerful politician was supposed to be the one who headed police. It was only in the seventies, specially during Mrs. Gandhi's time that the Union Home Minister was an emasculated man. During Janta party rule (1977-79), the home portfolio became important and a bone of contention. When Mrs. Gandhi regained power in 1980, she revamped the administration in her favor by putting a non-entity as Home Minister. During all these years, police was exploited by the party in power. Police was used to suppress dissent, deflate opposition movements, and jail people of doubtful loyalty. Police intelligence was used to topple the ruling State governments of different hues. Police was openly used by ruling faction to suppress internal party revolt in 1967. Thereafter the concept of "committed Bureaucracy" was floated around and was practiced behind the scenes. Since then, the police exploitation by

ruling politicians remained an open secret. One time in Madhya Pradesh, poers of transfer and postings of local police officers were unofficially given to elected members of Legislative Assembly who misused them invariably. Similar things happened in other States but in different form. A local Member of Legislative Assembly if belonged to ruling party has direct access to the Minister in charge of police and could always make or mar the career of local police officers. On the other hand, police officers also use local politicians to exercise influence with the ruling bosses to secure transfers, postings, promotions and awards.

Policemen also used local politics to avoid penalties in case of any wrong-doing frequently. If one does not carry favor with politics that policeman could not get important postings at favored positions, loses those stations, transferred to odd jobs and remain in obscurity as a non-entity. To have a rapport with politics is a great police virtue nowadays. It is a two way traffic. When the writer joined police in the fifties, those who occupied strategic posts talked ofmerit but just in ten years time, talks of political and personnel connections have become common. Now it's almost impossible to get anything worthwhile without proper linkages. Merit is not even a secondary choice. First place has taken by corruption and second by connection. What is left is routine - a merit by chance. There is no possibility in the foreseeable future that the trend would change and it might take some more time before the system stinks intolerably and a cleansing process starts suo motto.

Police Corruption

Police corruption is the main question and different people have answered it differently. The first Prime Minister of India thought

that people's loud talks of corruption causes the climate of corruption. B. K. Acharya, the former Central Vigilance Commissioner viewed the current procedure of fundraising for elections can, on the face of it, be the biggest single source of corruption. It is and will be one of the biggest single sources of political corruption and from political corruption flows a variety of other corruptions in a democratic country like India. The Prime Minister as late as 1981 acknowledged that "corruption and inflation, which were eating into the vitals of our Society, were matters of major concern." (Hindustan Times, March 24, 1981:1)

"In India, estimates of the amount of black-money in circulation vary from Rs 7500 crore i.e. 6.8 percent of the Gross National Income, to Rs 25,000 crore i.e. 22.7 percent of the Gross National Income." (Joshi, 1981:1) Prices soar high and inflation bites. Investment increases in commercial buildings, luxury apartments, film industry, and other such projects. To make India politically democratic, lots of black money is needed because "Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) elections need Rs 225 crores to oil the wheels of the parties and the candidates" (Joshi, 1981:1), certainly do not come from hungry millions, but from big businesses, corporate sectors, smugglers and those involved in shady deals under political protection.

Gambling is a source of police corruption. In India it is common everywhere. "Protected by political and police patronage, gambling kings divide the metropolitan cities into different spheres of influence--their customers are varied, from rickshaw pullers to prominent industrialists. . ." (Bose, 1981:1) The gambling operators

have "not only large sections of the police ranks in their pockets but also have many politicians on their payroll. In Delhi, the police themselves are often involved in actively encouraging organized gambling and have a well organized system of getting their own cuts from the business." (Bose, 1981:1) If police raid, they catch small operators and their touts, or take away the stake money without registering and case or registering it with less stake money.

D. Sen, former Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation, revealed that political "corruption always gives rise to new conficts." (Sen, 1981:9) In his experience, in the past, political corruption was tolerated and compromised. Sen suggested that "to fight political corruption, non-political and non-governmental institutions would have to be formed and should have independent investigating agencies." (Sen, 1981:9)

It is said that the corruption is more rampant in police and revenue services because "many of the Chief Ministers use them as milch-cows for election funds and even the senior officers often get used to the idea of keeping a percentage of the collection themselves." (Saksena, 1981:8) Political and police corruption were linked up to illicit arms that were used for violence during riots. Corruption accounts for so many political decisions taken regarding bannign or not banning particular items of essential commodities, granting or not granting licenses, awarding or not awarding permissions where needed. Similarly enforcement or non-enforcement of specific laws or providing protection to illegal activities are sure sources of police corruption.

It was suggested that creation of ombudsman might put a halt to corruption. Corruption builds up political issues. The campaign by Opposition parties against corruption was aimed at to malign the ruling party and ruling party was trading charges with the Opposition. Sometimes the whole exercise seemed funny, misplaced andmischievous. The Prime Minister characterized the campaign against corruption by the opposition parties as "a malicious and vicious move to deflect public attention from the achievements of the government and to create demoralization among the people." (Hindustan Times, 1981:1)

In Bombay, 'dock thefts' are big business; in railways, thefts are a means of living and profitable ventures; in forest, thefts of timber is a common form of profiteering. These thefts are done with connivance of police and other agencies. "Police connection helps gangs and rise of gangs is rise of crimes, especially the crimes that make profit." (Times of India, 1981:1)

Altogether a new generation has come to the front facing the corrupt environment. Who are they in the new generation? "What explains the emergence and the spectacular rise over the past decade of the 'new politicians', the brash aggressive young leaders who do not conceal their contempt for the liberal politics of consensus, for laws, rules and regulations, for democratic institutions and norms, for democracy itself." (Bidwai, 1982:8)

"The encouragement given to dishonest police officers . . . ws one of the causes of growing indiscipline in the police ranks." (Saksena, 1982:4) One has to pay Rs 10,000 to "become a rail-porter." (Times of India, Feb. 7, 1981:1) Even themost vocal intelligentsia has become so disillusioned. The collection of electoral funds, low

salaries, high standard of living, unenforceable laws, controlling of commercial activities by civil servants and vagueness of administrative powers. Corruption "has almost become a way of life in India." (Maheshwari, 1982:8) The politico-administrative corruption has just set the stage while in other aspects of life where cleanliness is not impossible, corruption has raised its head, virtually affecting every phase of Indian life as if "modern India is floating on it." (Maheshwari, 1982:8)

What has been done to stem the tide of corruption? A lot of talking, sermonizing, writing of ethical codes, enquiry commissions, vigilance commissions, and special cells. The result: corruption growing by leaps and bounds. "There have been no less than 18 commissionsof inquiry, set up by the Central and State governments since 1947 to examine charges of corruption against political leaders, and all of them have generally confirmed the veracity of such charges." (Maheshwari, 1982:8) Ministers were found guilty and so were the Civil Servants. But nothing happened except it cost them their jobs which they found elsewhere. Another solution suggested was simpliciation of rules and procedures and setting up of Special Boards:

> But a real impact can be made if Special Boards commanding wide respect, and also containing elements representing officers and staff are constituted to take the initiative and sift the considerable amount of information and opinion available. These Boards could come to very speedy conclusions. But such measures have to be simultaneous with similar steps to cleanse the state of affairs in political and business areas where the heart of the matter lies. (Bedi, 1983:8)

The main sources of corruption are already well known and well documented:

1. Prostitution
2. Gambling
3. Illicit distillation or liquor trade
4. Drug dealing
5. Smuggling
6. Receivers of Stolen Property
7. Professional Criminals

Police Policy/Personnel

> They needed the willing and active cooperation of Indians at all levels, and nowhere was that cooperation more striking or of greater importance than in the Indian Police Force. In the nineteenth century the superior ranks of the force were entirely British, and perhaps the most important feature of the period was the close and mutual confidence and, in many cases, affection, between British officers and Indians working under them. In the twentieth century, Indians began, slowly at first, to take their rightful place in the police hierarchy, and the same spirit of trust which had existed between the different ranks now extended itself to the relations between equals of different races united by a common purpose. Thus there came into being a strong, closely knit force fully equipped for its modern duties. At its head was the Indian Police. (Griffiths, 1971:3)

Thus culminated, in short, the story of police policy of personnel management in India. In 1947, British were gone, the rule ended but the nostalgia of that administration still lingers. There must be something beguilingly fascinating; a kind of intoxication of an aroma, which could not be easily defined or diluted but still be felt and might take a couple of more decades to disappear. When the writer joined the police in 1958, almost more than a decade after India became free, police policies laid down by the British were still intact, and police personnel, all of them of course Indian (though

there were very few Anglo-Indians and probably one or two British) were heaving as the replicas of the British. Blissfully, perhaps, the writer got a feel of the police, that was under British. One could very often hear the stories of British officers. Memories of Indian police officers of those times were replete with actions and encounters that took place under British officers and were fondly referred to during informal conversations. Police in India seemed to me the favorite preserve of the British. Even in those youthful and amateurish days of mine as young police officer, I was surprised with the police I saw and became a part of. I pensively thought that anyone would have ruled this country with such a powerful loyal police. No wonder that even a patriotic Home Minister of the country could not find any fault with the police services. So did the Chief Ministers of the States. To me, though short, but still wonderful are those glimpses of bygone days of a fading police era which had almost slid back into history. Today's breed of police officer is very different than that of yesterday, though it inherited a lot of common traits and practices of bygone years.

Police policy regarding police personnel is very comprehensive and lmost covers every concivable aspect of police life. There are rules and regulations, departmental stipulations, orders, memos, to direct the activities, conduct performance and handling of situations. There are rules for All India level police officers and rules for State level police officers. A different set of rules for Armed police of the state and Paramilitary police forces at national level. As will be evident from the titles, these rules regulate every aspect

of a police officer's work and existence. Some of them are cited for example:

Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules 1954

All India Services (Travelling Allowance) Rules 1954

" " " (Medical Attendance) Rules 1954

" " " (Compensatory Allowance) Rules 1954

" " " (Uniform) Rules 1954

" " " (Provident Fund) Rules 1955

" " " (Leave) Rules 1954

" " " (Special Disability Leave) Rules 1957

" " " (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules 1958

" " " (Commutation of Pension) Rules 1960

For discipline, there are 1) All India Services (Conduct) Rules 1968; and 2) All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969. Then there are rules to control police personnel from getting disaffected or participating in trade union type of activities. Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act 1922 still exists even when the fundamental rights of policemen are restricted under Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act 1966. Police Act of 1861 already covers disobedience, dismissals and suspension of subordinate police officers. Apart from this, every State has its own voluminous Rules and Regulations--generally called Police Rules, that lay down specific details how police work should be carried out. In addition to all this, every officer from the rank of District Superintendent and above, invariably issues his own orders known as standing orders, to regulate police activities in his area. Plethora of rules, regulations and orders become so stupendous that the writer, like

others, realize how difficult it is to remember and comply with. Those orders and rules are written in such an idealistic setting and frame of mind that they lose relevance to the reality. Supervisory officers frame rules to control the working of subordinate officers and subordinate officers, all the time, face a varied reality finding these rules insufficient and irrelevant. Because subordinate police officers have to obey those rules/orders, and are not supposed to disobey or disregard, they start learning at the very beginning how to bend them/twist them, stretch them and re-interpret them. It is in the light of these rules and legal enactments that police officers start the inevitable learning of how to 'cover their asses'. Almost everyone knows in the department about rules and how the work is done. Superior officers save themselves by hiding themselves under these rules or by demonstrating that dirtiness was below them and they would take action according to the rule that was violated. Not that all the rules are faulty or unreal and not that all superiors connive with their subordiantes but the point is that most of the departmental policies are so anachronistic that it becomes impossible for the subordinate to follow. Most of these policies allow a lot of discretion to the officers; sometimes these orders are vague, incomprehensible and overlapping.

There is another aspect of departmental policy which could be both the intended and unintended effecti - that is complete dependence of an officer on his/her superior for protection and promotion of his/her service career.

Then there are other aspects which are not covered by any clear-cut policy, like transfers, compulsory retirements, postings and

departmental process of evaluation. "Sometimes, transfers are effected as a measure of penalty." (Ghosh, 1973:80) Most of the time, transfers are part of favoritism. On policy of postings, transfers and promotions, no book could be more revealing, forthright and unbiased as the one written by Eric Stracey, (1981) who covered a period from 1942-78 which had been tumultuous in india's history. Stracey could feel two different eras - pre-independence and post-independence - of police life at district, state and national levels. Stracey's account vividly envisions the situations, reactions, police actions, police policies, politics, subordinate survices, superior class of officers and the entire dilemma of a policeman's existence in India.

Complaints againt the police officers, charges of corruption and brutality are other critical areas affecting police policy and personnel. Police corruption is generally handled by Anti Corruption department by internal section called Vigilence Branch, and also by the Central Bureau of Investigation. Brutality could be directly taken to criminal and/or civil courts or could be complained to higher authorities. Other complaints against police officers are enquired into by different departmental vigilance cells set up for the purpose. Apart from the cell, superior officers themselves or through their own officers could enquire into these complaints. Action is either taken or a report is forwarded to relevant authority for action. There are various ways to punish an officer. The least harmless way is considered to be the transfer to other place or unit. Suspension and departmental enquiry is a serious matter. Through a departmental enquiry, an officer could be terminated from service, demoted, or

increment witheld. The departmental enquiry can also lead to filing of criminal cases against the errant police officer. Penalty for disobedience could go to any extreme from simple warning to immediate suspension and arrest. Disobedience causes an embarassing situation, and takes many subtle forms of expression and action.

Police policies directly or indirectly affect morale, style and performance of personnel. Policies affect police image. In a fast changing time, police policies passed through a critical phase. From the late sixties to early eighties, police in India had a difficult time:

> The policement have had a disturbing time; frequent changes of governments led to frequent changes in policies which run counter. Successive governments, sometimes, effected radical changes in the police hierarchy and these changes undermined established traditions and old loyalties. For all that, policemen feel that they have been, in recent years, mucked about a lot. (Ghosh, 1981:126)

There are departmental policy dilemmas as illustrated by a Chief of Police, when facing mass disobedience practiced by police personnel:

> The question of what to do with all those who had struck work now faced us. It was decided to be generous to those among the rank and file who applied to return to duty and were certified by their immediate superiors to have been no more than mere followers. They would not lose their jobs but would be severely punished, besides, of course, losing their pay for the period of absence. But for those who had actively instigated the strike and kept it alive or who had indulged in gross insubordination or acts of violence, there had quite clearly to be a severing from the Force. They would also be prosecuted in really serious cases. (Stracey, 1981:316)

There is another problem that in spite of departmental policy, is looming large on police personnel and that being the product of the times might continue to grow: "The problem of subordinates canvassing their interests through politicians loomed larger and larger as time

went by. Faith in normal channels and procedure dwindled and hardly anyone believed that things could be accomplished without influence." (Stracey, 1981:151)

Then there stands an enigma of salutation:

> Despite my repeated injunctions in this regard I once came across two constables in a mofussil station loitering about in mufti. They turned tail and ran as soon as they saw me, whereupon I decided to make a joke of them. In a voice loud enough for them to hear I told the station writer that they could only be suspicious characters if they bolted at the sight of a police officer and that they should be arrested. He went through the motions, inclusive of locking them up for an hour, at the end of which I announced I was ready to question her. It was two very sheepish constables who emerged from the lock-up to assure me smilingly they would not be caught like that again! (Stracey, 1981:155)

An account of promotion and transfer, could not be more illustrating than the one given by Eric Stracey about himself. Its monetary implications to the State as well as to the officer concerned are no less interesting:

> It took three governments and assorted Accountants-General almost two years to sort out my claims arising from the misguided action of a couple of politicians, but in the end I got every paisa that was due to me. Madras had to create a post of DIG on paper, gazette me to it and pay me nearly Rs 9,000 for doing not a jot of work for four and a half months! (Stracey, 1981:165)

There are policy implications at recruitment level, training of various ranks and in achieving interface interaction. Every rank structure from recruitment to retirement has its own set of rules, though in the same police department. The rules for a constable and head constable has nothing in common with that of Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors. The Deputy Superintendents are hanging in the middle of the rank hierarchy. From Assistant Superintendent of Police starts a new world of superior service. These rules and ranks re-enact world of their own internally wide apart but externally cohesive. It was a

colonial style of setting up things. A rigorous discipline ensured a rank structure which in return ensured organizational stability:

> The absence of matching the jobs and the responsibilities with the merit and calibre of the personnel is perhaps one of the gravest weaknesses of the police personnel administration in India. A sub-inspector and a head constable, and for that matter even a petty constable have such wide discretions and responsibilities that these jobs should be entrusted to capable police officers of great tact, integrity and vision. The present system of position classification and the policies of placement and manpower planning have produced misfits. It is a paradox that when the technical problems of specialized police work are constantly on the increase, the police personnel administration in the state continues to be a generalist's paradise, where the same police officers are being used both for technical and non-technical jobs of the profession.
>
> The situation generates a vicious circle. As a result the recruitment system at the lower levels is neither merit-oriented nor does it involve the agency or the Public Service Commission of the state. Even in those states, where the SIs are recruited by competitive examinations, the composition of the selection boards and recruitment procedures leave much to be desired. (Sharma, 1977:170)

Similarly training for every rank is separate and serves an old order:

> In the field of training, the old legacies continue and teaching of laws and military parades overcrowd the syllabi. There is very little emphasis and weightage on the problems of attitude formation and adjustment with socio-economic changes violently going on in the country. The training facilities for the junior police officials are inadequate and unlike the army, the training programs are not related to the policies in service promotions and staff and line placements. Even at the IPS level, there is little awareness to catch up with the explosion of knowledge. The unsatisfactory conditions of service contribute to the sinking discipline of the force and especially that of the lower cadres, which threaten to unionize under the impact of democracy, and democratic rights of public servants. Frustration, low morale, inefficiency, corruption and indiscipline are by-products of poor service conditions, which do not permit a reasonable redressal of genuine grievances. (Sharma, 1977:171-172)

The disparity among personnel and policies regarding them would remind a reader about India's evergreen Caste-system. A change is

recognized and widely discussed but so poorly promoted. There is a need of wide ranging personnel reform:

> Similarly, the wide disparity between the members of the IPS and the non-IPS officials of the state police service needs to be bridged. The gap in calibre, status and functions has to be minimized and the lower ranks should get an opportunity to participate in policy planning to develop an 'espirit de corps' in the service. All this requires a basic personnel reform of all-India nature. It has to be further supported by research in new kinds of position classifications, rational conditions of service and above all, in revamping of the all-India and state cadres of police bureaucracy in to an integrated whole. This may even imply the establishment of an all-India police commission and a police personnel department at the state headquarters of police administration in every state. (Sharma, 1977:172)

Will the police cohesion survive against internal and external pressures? India's democracy is itself personalistic, authoritarian and unegalitarian. It is a democracy of vote-catching elections and unprincipled manipulations - corrupt and culpable. Police dissatisfaction is sometimes placated; often suppressed. Personnel preferences cancel out each other's groupism. Police are ridden with facionalism and group loyalties.

The system promotes incoherence, disparity and gap in internal communication. Class and status consciusness and rank snobbery are in-built in the system:

> The system of all-India service for manning the senior positions in police administration certainly attracts better kind of youngsters at the national level than the kind of freshers available to the state police service. The differences in the qualifications, calibre, merit and responsibilities in the IPS and the state police service of the same department are not only worlds apart, but seem like two different worlds with very little affinity and exchange between them. The positions of an IPS superintendent of police and that of a state police service Dy SP represent two opposite poles and the obvious gulf brings its consequential differences in the pay scales, working conditions and the rules of discipline. Naturally, the wide disparity breeds inter-cadre jealousies and professional frustrations. The senior-officers of the state police

> administration have bery poor chances of making entry into the IPS which is predominantly merit-oriented and directly recruited. The terms and conditions of service of the members of the IPS are reasonably attractive as compared to the relative situation that obtains in the cadres of the state police service. This renders the personnel administration somewhat disjointed and has a great demoralizing influence upon the cadres of police administration in the states. (Sharma, 1977:169)

How far these placatory and disciplinary tactics keep the bod personnel from bringing down the service edifice is to be seen. So many factors and variables are unpredictable. A powerful State apparatus has so many cards to play and politicians preclude to listen to chaotic tunes with ambivalent favor and disdain duality. Any solidarity among lower ranks is a threat to superior echelon and to the system itself. If rank struture is to be reordered, the system has to be redesigned, then it might need a wider political/judicial mandate for an overall readjustment of bureaucratic hierarchy and its functioning. Instead of reforms, the efforts are to tighten the grip on the ranks and establish firmer control on subordinates. The reforms in police service are aimed at to achieve disciplined organization in a disorganizing democracy. Every change brings more increases in the posts of supervisors, more facilities for managers and more equipment for technical skills. Upper cadre always takes away bigger and better chunk of the pie because it formulates and implements the policy.

Sheer strength of greater number of lower subordinate cadres cannot match with eliteness and resources of higher echelon. Mere trade union solidarity of subordinates would always be crushed by superior strength, intellect, maneuvrability and system approach of senior officers. Any strike or protest is doomed to failure, thought

it would bring its own rewards at a high cost. The middle ranks provide a potential buffer between higher and lower cadres. That balances out any shock wave or that could rip off the system. It is easy to wean away middle ranks from lower solidarity. Middle ranks have nothing to gain by aligning with lower cadre but they do derive a lot of advantage by heightening organizational crisis between lower staff and the elite establishment, by playing a dual role. Lower ranks only get verbal and indirect sympathies but open support of middle ranks goes to establishment when a crisis culminates. What a strange reality of the system, consciously and carefully devised and craftily woven around ranks to detect any anarchy or distrust among police ranks in India?

Most of the senior Indian police officers go to England for higher training, exchange of ideas and to update police systems. This knowledge or information does not percolate down. At no stage takes places an exchange of information, views, perceptions of problems. There is one sided flow: the orders, rules and discipline move from top to down below and performance, accountability, obedience and yes-manship rises from the bottom upwards. Introduction of a military type of 'Darbar' or a dinner 'Barakhana' where all ranks could assemble is a facade. 'Orderly Rooms' are still not popular. Some of the other techniques to hear lower-ranking police officers, during 'staff meetings' or 'welfare meetings' are used as fads. So far there has been no earnest move which would or could build bridges between the ranks. There are two different worlds - one of officers and the other of subordinates - one is ruled by the other. That is the way it was devised and that is the way it is supposed to function. If

changes are to be made as organizational and personnel level those are bound to be radical in Indian context.

Functional Fallability of Police and Emphasis on Peace-keeping or Maintenance of Public Order

Police work is ambivalent with uncertain outcomes in spite of certainty of inputs. The logic of functional fallibility of police is unbelievably becoming more and more obvious. Controversy of crime-focused policing versus order maintenance is fairly recent. The dilemma of fallibility in this area is well illustrated by Manning:

> It is often assumed, incorrectly, that the police in any community are independently capable of controlling crime and maintaining order, and that they should exclusively act to do so. Because these assumptions are made, the police are held responsible from time to time for events and actions largely beyond their control. The consequences to the police of publicly defining their role almost exclusively as 'crime fighter' is, on the whole, more deleterious than advantageous to their political and legal authority. (Manning, 1982:56)

Even specialization, technological superiority and professional expertise could neither resolve class or community conflict nor could bring safety to society from scourge of crime. Another kind of contradiction was created:

> Specialization of the police function, and the symbolic association of the police with crime in the twentieth century, has created a number of contradictions and dilemmas. They have been transformed into an organization that espouses eradication of crime more than an organization that engages in social regulation. This transformation of the police function is inherent in the democratic mosaic produced by an historical struggle between diverse ethnic groups and competing languages, the local tradition of policing and police financing, decentralization of the authority for law enforcement and the prosecution of crimes (with some exceptions in both countries), and the vigilante tradition of frontier law enforcement and the associated weapons culture. (Manning, 1982:67)

"Policing and Politics are inseparable." (Turk, 1982:90) Turk maintained, "There will always be occasions when the police (with the open, secret, or tacit approval of higher authorities, and much of the public) feel it is necessary to violate procedural rules in order to enforce sustantive rules - especially when the legal and political structure itself appears to be threatened." (Turk, 1982:90)

"The role of police in social change in democratic societies, (Reiss, 1982:132-150) is very complex and cumbersome. On the whole, "the role of the police in social change and in a democratic society depends very much upon the future of its governments." (Reiss, 1982:150) More the governments are in trouble or unstable, the more is the focus on police and more pressure on peace-keeping or order maintenance function of the police. It is not only the uncertainty of the environment which makes police job more difficult but also the inner conflicts and contraditions that renders police incapable of achieving avowed goals. Moreover, "since operational policies are developed separately by the autonomous components of the system, they are not always complementary," therefore, "shifting the onus for crime prevention back to the community is the logical conclusion to be drawn from a review of the police role in the criminal justice system." (Newman, 1983:15-16)

This brings us back to the concept of community policing. Community policing is very attractive and desirable idea but in its operationalization, there appears to be inbred confusion and ambiguity of onus.

David Bayley, specifically referring to accountability, suggested separation of police command with politics. Considering

'accountability as a balancing act between responsiveness to community opinion and 'The Rule of Law', Bayley suggested that "politics and police command need to be decoupled." (See Bayley, 1980) There comes a point where community policing means different things to different people yet almost, saying the same thing in different words. This is the problem with the term 'community policing'.

With community comes the classes, groups, minority and majority, sections and slices of society, completing a complex mosaic for the police to deal with, partially with consent and partially with own expertise. Brogden specified that "so far as there was a choice historically, it was made by the class of mercantile capitalists; and that increasingly since that day the police institution itself has made the creative choices about its own development, with the active consent of sections of the middle-class, and the passive consent of the rest - majority of us." (Brogden, 1982:250)

There seems to be negative and positive sides of the situation succinctly summarized by Manning and Van Maanen:

> The real dilemma of American policing . . . is that as the police become more and more constrained by the law they so frequently invoke in their pronouncements and actions, the public they serve is asking for more and ore police activities that affirm and maintain the social order of an area in the form of more foot patrols, community-based policing, and the like. It would appear, therefore, that more legalistic interventions under these conditions will exacerbate rather than reduce the very problems people presently face with the police. Conversely, the demand for crime control, as public defines it, is important, persistent, and salient. Should the police fail in this instrumental function they will be confronted with a significant proportion of the public that questions their every activity. Ironically, if the police decline their role as limited to crime control and if they fail in their role, they are likely to lose more support than if they had claimed that their interests, functions, and obligations were considerably broader. (Manning and Van Maanen, 1978:5)

It seems almost certain that any community based policing program cnnot be a political one. By the same corollary, "community based crime prevention programs, neighborhood foot patrol in particular, will succeed or fail depending on the extent to which they take account of the political realities and dynamics of the community." (Trojanowiez, 1982:4)

In community affairs, the police role is going to be all pervasive because of pivotal positions that police occupy, availability and powers to intervene.

Emphasis on Peace-keeping in India

A populous country like India with complex critical socio-economic and political problems, ought to have emphasis on peace-keeping by police. "The anti-authority bias of the citizen is a legacy of the past, to which the tensions of deveopment and erosion of autority in the democratic system have added fresh dimensions of political violence and politico-administrative corruption." (Sharma, 1975:423) This complex task of peace-keeping or order maintenance is not that easy as it seems. The most routine response is to put club-wielding and rifle-slinging members of armed police, or para-military force to patrol the streets, seal off the area and then conduct searches for hidden arms and wanted criminals. This exercise is so often repeated that there does not seem to be any substitute for it if the local police fail to restore order.

The contributing factors for breaking down of law and order could be categorized as: 1) Political agitations, 2) Communal riots, 3) Student unrest, 4) Radical politicalism like extremists, and 5) Armed gangs and criminals. India's law and order situation did not look

improved with the passage of time, though police forces increased tremendously. In the eighties, the picture of law and order is not emerging bright but dark and gloomy. There has been communal riots all over the country, bloody massacre in Assam and other north-eastern states, chaos and killings pervaded in Punjab.

In case any state fails to enforce law and order, Central government has enough constitutional authority to take over the administration, despatch para-military forces or take other steps to suit the situation. States as well as the Central government have armed themselves with greater constitutional/legal powers. It is still to be seen whether all this or more could bring restoration of peace and normalization of law and order situation. India goes on hosting international conferences for international peace and revel in other international activities like games, film festivals, etc. to promote international understanding and comity. The national police forces seems to be better trained and equipped to safeguard international interests but are incapable of maintaining internal peace and community goodwill. India lives simultaneously in two world - national and international.

There seems to be a lingering conviction among the political policy formulators that India was, is and would be crisis-ridden, therefore, the wiser thing to do is to increase the size of armed police forces to suppress unwanted disruptive forces. A sense of insecurity, lack of confidence in other agencies or institutions to resolve crisis, mutual distrust, weak political leadership, and growth of regional, class, caste and religious rivalries, led to more and more reliance on para-military forces and finally on military. The

Union Home Minister announced "that five more battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force were being raised to meet the law and order demands in the country", (The Statesman, 1983:9) There were already 66 battalions and this would raise the strength of the Central Reserve Force to 71. (See The Statesman, 1983:9) This was just regarding one para-military organization. There are three others, namely, Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, and Indo-Tibetan Border Force, with equally massive armed establishments as Central Reserve Police Force. Then each State has its own well-equipped, well-manned, and highly mobile armed police apart form the civil police. Any State could be reduced to a 'garrisoned state' with the presence of such a massive force, within no time. The irony is that with all these increased invesetments of money and manpower in police and in para-military forces, every year, the sense of security is diminishing continuously among the common people in India. Police resort to brutalities when they cannot control crime through legal means. They act in frustratin and want to improve their performance by taking recourse to extra-legal and questionable means.

Police Brutalities

Police brutality is exceptionally very high in rural India especially in the regions of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab. It is in these states that 'encounter killings' are very high. Bihar is proverbial. "blinding of several dozen under-trial prisoners by the Bhagalpur police, apparently with cynical deliberation one after the other, is one more grim reminder that Bihar is the worst administered state in the country." (Times of India, Nov. 27, 1980:8) The extent of torture was unprecedentedly barbaric

because "For the last ten months, policement in five different police stations in Bhagalpur have been systematically selecting their victims, forcibly puncturing the retinas of their eyes, and pouring strong acid to disfigure the face and cloe the eyelids permanently." (Times of India, Nov. 27, 1980:8) There are so many other ways of brutality invented by the policemen to give maximum torture and at the same time escaping penalties of law for their illegal acts. Attempts to whitewash the episode or to protect the police officers were manifestly ridiculous. It was typical for Bihar to render this kind of torture but . . . "third degree methods are routinely used by the police everywhere to extort confession from alleged criminals and that conditions in jails all over the country are deplorable." (Times of India, Nov. 27, 1980:8) Poverty enhances the curse and the legal process adds injustice to the injury:

> Evidence is often cooked up, unpleasant facts are put aside, stool pigeons and professional witnesses allowed to give 'evidence' to keep up a semblance of the legal process, and the accused usually with no legal services available to them, are punished for offenses they never committed. Poor men cannot go in to appeal. No wonder, after release, many of them adrift with their faith in justice impaired . . . " (Hindustan Times, Nov. 29, 1980:9)

The Chief Minister confirmed the blindings with great reluctance. The Indian Parliament 'shocked and anguished' 'severly condemned' the 'inhuman and barbaric acts of blinding.' (Times of India, Dec. 2, 1980:1) The Members of Parliament belonging to various opposition parties walked out, in protest against the blindings. The Prime Minister called it 'sickening barbarity'. With so much of hue and cry, "15 police officers were suspended for negligence." (Statesman, Dec. 2, 1980) It was surprising that to protest against the government action of suspending the police officers, suspension of

business was organized throughout the district. "Rail and road traffic was completely paralyzed and all business centers and establishments pulled their shutters." (Times of India, Dec. 5, 1980:1) Policemen started their agitation in sympathy of their colleagues and urged the government to rescind the suspension order. Bihar government requested the center to provide battalions of paramilitary forces. As a senior police officer (retired) revealed that the police in Bihar was consistently subjected to political pressure. "From January 1971 to 1981 Bihar has had 11 changes of Inspector-Generals and the crash of police morale came on Jan. 24, 1972, when the then Inspector-General found someone waiting to take over charge from him when he returned from lunch." (Saksena, Jan. 12, 1981:8)

Bihar police has no qualms about its inhuman tactics. "An orderly and peaceful procession of several hundred journalists protesting against a Bill to limit press freedom in the north Indian state of Bihar was attacked by police wilding bamboo staves . . . and consequently more than 30 were injured, some seriously." (Fishlock, 1982:5) The police beating was not simply. It was planned and punitive. "The police used a net to trap procession leaders and clubbed them to the ground with lathis (staff) but according to the press a magistrate and the police superintendent, ordered the police to "reduce them to pulp." (Fishlock, 1982:5)

Not only the press and public opinion indicted the police by Amnesty International criticized the political killings in India. "India has the dubious distinction of being counted among 20 countries in the world where evidence of illegal political killings by

government forces or officially sanctioned death squads was reported." (Malik, 1983:9) The report of Amnesty International "voiced concern over reports of torture in police custody, deaths in staged encounters and over the use of preventive detention measures to suppress the government's critics and that "1500 people were held under the NSA (National Security Act) . . . " (Statesman, Oct. 30, 1982:8)

Police brutalities are continuing in spite of nationwide condemnation in the press, in the Parliament, by the Prime Minister, Home Minister and other political leaders, by the Supreme Court of India and in various forums of public interest and authority. Police change patterns of brutalization: "In Banda district in U.P. the editor of a local Hindi daily was beaten to death by a gang of thugs employed allegedly by a police inspector in charge of a small town police station who has since been arrested. The murdered editor had earned the arrested police inspector's ire by publishing a report that an innocent shopkeeper had been killed in a fake encounter and by refusing to publish a denial on the grounds that the inspector's contradiction was false." (Malhotra, 1983:8)

Why these brutalities by the police? So many factors seem to contribute:

1. Prolonged stress and strain of police work on policemen.
2. Very little time is left for policemen to conduct investigation of cases and for detection because they are mostly busy in law and order, VIP duties, attendance in courts and senior police officers, etc.
3. Third degree methods are supposed to be a "short cut".
4. Political and official pressure.
5. Police corruption.

In my opinion the real pressure on a police officer is when his performance is evaluated on certain unmanageable tasks assigned to him or her to be performed within a limited time which is almost impossible to accomplish. If police officers are supposed to perform miracle then there is price for every miracle. In dacoity, robbery, and other such crimes, encounters are the price for miracles the same way as the third degree methods involving torture are for solving the property crimes. Another significant aspect is that Indian police have nothing to offer to a criminal or the criminal has nothing to gain if he becomes truthful. On the contrary, a criminal has chances of gaining if he could mislead the police. In this game of deception and smart misleadings, police officers feel tremendously inclined to third degree methods, specially when the time is short and pressure is great and higher ups feverishly looking for some results to please their bosses. Sometimes the complainant is influential and wants the pressure to be applied to the perpetrator. The possibility of committing brutality is more due to external factor. The internal factors are police ego, peer pressure, and corruption. Police ego is to estalbish the capability to solve the case. The peer pressure is also responsible because a soft genteel police officer is less respected, more derided. Lastly, the corruption motivates for torture. Why should anyone give money to the police? More the expectations of torture more are the offers of money. Those who do not have money to offer get tortured to show that police mercy is discretionary. Police brutalities apparently are part of the system - the system that brutalizes society and is damned by the society in return.

SUMMARY

Apart from politics, police suffer from kinetic and static pressures. Old practices and changing realities cause problems of adjustments for a traditional police in a challenging field. Change is a dilemma in itself for police. Police play dubious games and follow stategies of questionable nature to cope with internal and external change. Police corruption has linkages with political corruption and affects police performance in every sphere. Corruption exercizes demoralizing influence on upright/honest officers who get frustrated and are bypassed in the process.

Police policy regarding personnel management is part of British legacy and form one of the foremost areas of organizational problems. Rules, regulations, orders, and other stipulations regulate police life. Policy dilemmas and unpredictability of service conditions have generate groupism and personalistic politics among police ranks. Only a few thrive while most of them suffer in turns.

There is more emphasis on peace keeping in India. Seething discontentment and socio-economic turmoil coupled with political instability keep police always on alert. No long term planned policy is pursued but short term solutions are heralded as paneceas. Police brutalities prevail when illegal short cuts are followed to produce desired results.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

India lives and relives in an unreal world of its own fantasy, of escape and fatalism because the real world has been so tumultuously harsh, unjust and persistently precarious that one feels completely helpless and hopeless. "Things move slowly in a culture whose epic poetry, dance and music stretch three milleniums." (Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1983:1) In the same vein, writes Khushwant Singh, echoing the feelings of so many writers on Hinduism that "Hinduism is undefinable" and therefore "one may safely state that all Indians are Hindus except those who positively assert that they are not." (Hindustan Times, July 20, 1981:9) Both Hindus and non-Hindus do assert, often violently; and Communalism flares up. The reasons and causes for communal clashes are yet to be codified and catalogued by many Commissions and writers that get involved in the aftermath of the Catastrophe falling the year round on some parts of the country, for the last so many decades. No doubt that "India is ethnically and culturally the most diverse country on the face of the earth when all the elements of caste, tribe, language, religion, region. and other cultural markers are considered." (Brass, 1981:449)

India forges ahead though every decade had been calamitous for it. In the forties, India bore the brunt of World War II and the partition of the country in 1947, resulting in chaos and bloodshed.

In the fifties, it braced language riots and redemarcation of states on language basis. In the sixties, India endured two wars with its formidable neighbors and internal political infighting. Seventies witnessed another war with neighboring Pakistan, and a period of 'emergency' and political instability. The eighties are deeply enmeshed in regional disorders resulting in widespread carnage, and fraught with dangerously possibilities. India seems to be sitting on a simmering volcano, not in any immediate danger of annihilation but also not far away from a major outburst. Whether it would be an external aggression as witnessed in the past or an internal fragmentation, only future will tell. Here the concern is exclusively on internal environment vis a vis police role and performance toward political stability and instability. "The past decade has been a time of unprecedented stress for the Indian police" asserts David Bayley, because "they have become deeply involved in partisan politics: they are preoccupied with it, penetrated by it, and now participate individually and collectively in it." (Bayley, 1983:484)

Impact of politics on police could be imagined when "there is only one police force in India." (Bayley, 1983:484) It is not far to see that "safety and security are tinged by an atmosphere of desperation today that was not true twenty years ago." (Bayley, 1983:484) Now things are moving down the hill. Both police and politics are opportunistic, corrupt and culpable in India and "both public and police are caught in what seems to them to be an increasingly normless, unpredictable, and unjust environment." (Bayley, 1983:494) There stands a stark dilemma:

> Security, then has made government in India dominant but rendered it impotent; it has generated terrible needs but

> also undermined social cohesion and specially administrative impartiality. These debilities have not sprung unheralded upon India in the 1980s. They have existed since Independence, but now their slow corrosive effect on law enforcement can be seen clearly. A qualitative change has taken place. The rule of law is less evident in India's political life and the work-a-day world of its suffering citizens, while the morale, impartiality, and dedication of the police has become problematic. (Bayley, 1983:495-496)

The dilemma is political, organizational and historical. Its persistence is plaguing the present and tainting the future.

Conclusion

The questions that were raised in the first chapter have been answered in the text. We take them, one by one, for concluding remarks.

1. The diversity of India's composite culture was initially straightened out by centralized character of Mughal administration but it also added an extra element of Muslim culture in Hindu polity. Time, however, healed the transplant and the two were existing together when the British took ove the reign of administration. Another transplant of western education and institutions took place again and it sharpened the cleavage. This time it was not completely healed by the time and circumstances but a strong central administration was fully competent to cope with. After independence, the same system of administration did not have much difficulty in riding over the tide. But as the regional culture kept on gaining the strength, central administration had more difficulty in coping up. The police being a centralized as well as a provincial subject at the same time managed diverse interests, adroitly. Police sometimes accommodated regional and diverse cultural impacts but often suppressed them. Later, police found it difficult to use this

technique when there were more assaults, and anti-police outbursts. In Punjab and Assam, police became the target of cultural cleavage and had to be reinforced by heavy paramilitary forces all the time. The local units still play the same game. They try to accommodate and try to suppress, depending what suits them at that time under those circumstances. This is becoming a tension-ridden, problematically critical area for the police at local, regional and national level.

2. The size and composition of socio-economic, religious and political factors presupposes strength and style of policing. The statewide distribution of police displays support for this corrollary. Moreover, every State has armed police contingents in reserve at each district and range headquarters and are quickly dispatched to the place of trouble. Secondly, the central government also keeps its reserves of Central Reserve Police and Border Security Force at strategic places. It is a well-known fact that in case of Hindu-Muslim clashes at one place, police at all other places having Hindu-Muslim mix population are alerted and reinforced by supplying paramilitary forces. The patrolling by heavily armed contingents is invariably increased, pickets are posted at pre-determined points and special attention is focused on vulnerable areas. This deployment and style is very familiar to police and public alike. Another well-known technique is to make pre-emptive arrests of known criminals and suspected leaders under the preventive provisions of the law. In case of regional, caste and communal confrontations, those police and paramilitary units are employed which do not share those ethnic traits to ensure effectiveness and avoid conspiratorial collusion of sympathies.

3. The national or State governments have not been able to make any improvement on what they got as legacy from the British. India's police, through its policies, style and functioning, not only raised the doubts about its effectiveness but has to face increased public hostility. So many situations go out of control, become rowdy or violent because of traditional colonial approach of the police. In spite of enormous emphasis put in politician's sermons and in official communications, no difference occurred because the structure, style and imagery of police continued from British times to the present day in the same way. As police was more and more vulnerable and close to the conflict, its dependence on political support became critical and inevitable. Politicians use police and police use politicians. Surprisingly in this process, they both shape, sharpen and stymie the class, regional and caste cleavages.

4. In India, communalism was visualized as a threat to internal harmony and safety from the very beginning. Ironically, it has been on the increase. It is being perceived as a threat because all those forces of communalism got consolidated. The threat of police action solidifies the communal groupings to face the severity of police attack, which in return further promotes communalism. It is a vicious chain reaction. When police respond to such a threat they become more restive, more suppressive and more cruel. Communities, on the other hand, at occasions, distrust and perceive police as an occupational army. The degree of distrust between police and community has not waned. It reached such a high degree of mistrust that the government had to resort to special recruitment in police from regional and

minority groups to allay their fears of police partiality and brutality.

5. It has clearly become evident that the legacy of the British has left negative police image and negative perceptions both in police and in public. In spite of the efforts made there is no denying of the fact that imagery effects negatively public and police perceptions of each other.

6. Police has been overburdened with socio-economic legislation, day in and day out, in the vain hope that it would be able to do what other agencies could not. Police in India is supposed to control social evils like "Dowry Deaths" as it did in past with "Sati" and child marriages. It is empowered to regulate the supply of essential commodities, stop unauthorized construction of houses, clear roads from encrouchments, combat trade union activities by breaking strikes, enforce morality at public places. The writer remembers that it was the common knowledge and common saying in the police department that they take the action first and then look for the application of the law because one would always find a law empowering and legalizing police action under any situation. There are an avalanche of powers every year descending on police shoulders from various legislations, enactments, and executive ordinances. Even police fail to take account of the powers it had. All those powers come to police under the name of social legislation. It is a common complaint that police was being overburdened, that there was backlog piled up in courts. No one knows what to do. There is hustle and bustle, hue and cry, fuming and fretting for expediency and efficiency; but there is a tendency to avoid and evade responsibility. There is a tendency to rush to

conclusions without finding causes, acting without thinking, shifting onus, and confusing the issues by confounding the outcomes. It will take a long time for Indian public, politicians and the police to earnestly realize that police had a limited capacity to control the growing problems of modern India, which happens to be a socialist democratic republic.

7. Constraints, restrictions as the internal control of police organization are classically too tight. As a colonial instrument the British wanted a well-disciplined police. Rigidity of disciplinary rules in independent India brought inner crisis. The difference between a colonial administration and the agencies of a free country got heightened. The country became free and independent but administrative tools and style remained the same. The crisis grew as police organization could not control the conflicting claims. This crisis was amplified by ecological imbalance and political instability. Police indiscipline, strikes, and agitational attitude increased. No one before saw anything like a police strike and no one was used to such a spectaclar. As a result, the government repressed such actions and tightened its control all the more by suspending some of the constitutional and fundamental rights of the policemen.

8. In a federal democratic republic, centralization of police power with its provincial control created a paradox and a functional anomaly. The system worked very well so long as the same political party was in power both at the Center and in States but confrontation became obvious when two different political parties ruled at the national and provincial level. The problem was critical for police under such political environment. The schism between locus of control

and loyalties grew. Police have to keep three loyalties: at national level, State level, and organizational-local level. The national level police officers, known as Indian Police Service officers cared more for national loyalty, the State Service officers completely nursed their provincial loyalties while for all others, only organizational loyalty was deemed enough. Police is still disciplined but polarization of police officers' loyalties took place at different levels. It is now almost known who is favorite of whom or whose loyalty goes with whom. Cases of victimization and promotion more take on loyalty lines rather than on regular organizational lines. This has created a new internal chaos, a new problem and a new crisis. No effort of depoliticalization of so-called neutral police had been adopted to slow down the process of loyalty polarization.

9. The changes in the bureaucratic-organizational and political context affected changes in policing. The changes in policing affected the politics and the bureaucratic machinery. No such changes were visible during the British period but after India's freedom, political leadership exercised pressure at various levels to affect changes in policing. However, the status quo continued and was also favored. The scenerio changed when the new breed of politicians and new breed of police officers started interacting. The process accelerated in the late sixties and late seventies when dramatic changes in the country's political environment took place. Political changes directly affected bureaucracy and police. State Police Commissions appointed by the provincial governments failed to suggest any change in police as it was felt that any change in police had to come from the national level. When political changes took place at

the national level a National Police Commission was appointed in 1977. By the time the Commission submitted its eight reports suggesting organizational and functional changes in police, another political change took place and the recommendations of the Police Commission were shelved. Political/bureaucratic changes kept police pliable. The pliability of police, however, affected accountability. The rules of the games are to be changed for new roles but that did not occur.

10. India's police is not a cultural phenomenon and definitely not culturally based. Police regard culture as long as it suits police purposes. There is no such thing as culture binding on police in anyshape or form. The police do not enter into temples or other religious places because it is discretionary to do so. If police decide at any stage it could legally enter such places and it was done so many times. It becomes an issue always. Whenever police demolished a structure it waused as a temple, or when a shrine was declared illegal or unauthorized, people protest follows. Religious groups usually take protection under cultural pretext but it is not legally tenable. Police decision process is more often then not, affected by many considerations - political, social, moral and religious. Police entry into Sikh religious places made big news. It is natural that such police actions, though completely legal, injure the feelings of the community. There is sometimes very little police could do to avoid such an eventuality or so much hostility.

Another area of concern is police entry into university campuses. The same situation exists. POlice are legally empowered to enter but its entry is considered a violation of sanctity which educational institutions usually enjoy. This is again very confusing and sticky

situation for the police. They are damned if they act and they are damned if they do not. No solution has been found so far.

A similarly explosive situation exists if police act against minorities or against tribal communities. Police practices envisage no bindings in legally and professionally carrying out their duties but culturally police functions are often perceived as cultural transgressions to injure susceptibilities of minorities. There is nothing legally wrong but culturally police action is unacceptable to local communities. The British decided, long ago, that policing should not be culturally determined. However, in practice, they ensured not to injure religious and cultural feelings. The same practice, philosophy and thinking continues. It is posing problems for police practically as more and more communities are becoming conscoius of their identities and do not want their cultural boundaries to be run down by the police. This is emerging as anew sensitive area. Sikhs are enforcing their cultural claims even at gunpoint and precipitated a crisis in Punjab. like a Hindu-Muslim conflict, a Hindu-Sikh conflict has taken place. There might be more in the offing. Police stand demoralized in the crisis as the leadership at the top get grossly confused. Similar cultural crises had taken ugly turn in Assam. For police it has become very difficult to decide how to act in such cultural crises, whether to act or not to act and with what consequences. Police had been a victim more often of indecision and whenever any such situations arise they start looking to their bosses (political or hierarchial) for decisions. By that time things keep sliding and worsening.

No national or regional consensus has, however, emerged, so far, to assert whether policing should be culturally determined. There has been felt no need for a wide-ranging discussion on the topic. Most of the professionals, intellectuals and politicians feel that policing should remain a non-cultural issue, and only on functional basis police should use its own discretion to accommodate a local, or tribal culture.

Implications

This study implies that the organizational structure, style and imagery of police in India needs radical changes. These changes are to be determined on the basis of ecological and political realities and not on fictional, emotional axis. What would work and what would not work had to be tried, researched and experimented rather than to be debated for academic interest.

Another important implication is that neither police politics neutrality nor "committed police service" approach is working. Under two pulls, police confusion grows. The issue has to be decided, the earlier the better.

In India, police lack any base in the community and community has no say in police matters. Except occasional sermons by police "high-ups" and politicians, no mechanism has been devised to correct this situation. It has been a colonial legacy that police distrusted the community it policed, and public viewed police with distaste.

Internal organizational control of police are to be rationalized. Again, it is very colonial and tortuous. Police of a free country should feel like a police of a free country. In India this feeling remained subserviant and did not get a chance to grow with

responsibiltiy. Individual dignity and self-respect is not available for a subordinate police officer under the existing set-up and under prevailing sub-culture of organizational environment. An improvement will bring in job satisfaction, self-fulfillment and sense of self-worth which is important for initiative, dedication and performance.

Suggestions and Future Directions

1. As pointed out by Bayley, Indian police needs bold initiatives to conduct experimentation and research for its own development and progress.

2. Police Commissioner system in Metropolitan cities, Inspector-General and Director-General system in provinces should be rationalized rather than politicalized. No one knows why one system replaces the other or whether the replacement was good or bad and to what extent. Just to accommodate organizational or rank rivalries does not make the change effective or beneficial.

3. The armed police and civil police dichotomy is colonial and a better arrangement could be designed by forging them into one.

4. There is more rivalry and confusion among the National-level and State-level officers. If the trend allowed to continue, battle lines would be drawn between the two with a detrimental effect on police organization.

5. In a plural polity like India, police should open up to accommodate various interests and perspectives so that a consensual trust could replace the colonial distrust and hatred.

6. Rural policing should be reorganized on village level rather than at police station level.

7. Police are getting more and more unwieldy, insensitive and parochial organizations. The trend is to be arrested, in favor of streamlined, perceptive and progressive policing.

8. The Central Government does not need giant police organizations like CRPF, RPF and CBI if provincial police are efficient and could take care of their problems.

9. Lowest ranks of constable and Head Constables should be utilized in a more productive and better way as suggested in the First Report of the National Police Commission.

10. What ails Indian police? It should be researched on regular and continuous basis and those irritants, shortcomings and ills, to be removed in a planned thoughtful way. Adhoc patchwork reform to be substituted by a carefully devised mechanism.

Police, politics and people make an interesting tripod but do not work in that fashion. Their relationships are historically, geographically and culturally determined in each country. In view of technological revolutions and international interactions, the globe is shrinking and the three factors described above are losing ground rapidly. Still, future has not come out clearly but one thing is sure that the world of tomorrow would be so different that the assumptions and suggestions of today would be inappropriate and inadequate to satisfy the aspirations of tomorrows to come. But today's reponsibilities are to be discharged today. It is a thrill to look back what was done yesterday, and to decide what is to be done today and knowing fully well that it would be viewed with the same way as we are scrutinizing our past today. And the future? The future will remain as enigmatic and distantly alive as it is today. A hundred

precent prediction of future would not and should not be possible.

Police and India's police for that matter, would remain always, as it had been in the past, a conservative organization, a mix of different worlds and an agenda of no surprises. It is left with very few choices. Whatever be the fate of India's police but it will be decided either by politics of the day, or by some rough-hewn imperial unity, or by an authoritarianism (national or foreign) but in no case by police itself. A die has been though cast. India is not the country known for casting away its millenium-old-past so easily for an unwritten future. Police is a part of the passivity that reigns. There are, however, forebodings and warnings in the air. Frequent use of military to restore internal order is too serious a matter to ignore. India's borders are and were in the past, porous to any foreign infiltration. They are unsafe and prone to aggression. Internal instability and external threats go together in India. India's fate seems to be hinging not only on its political institutions but on success or failure of police. In case of continued failure, military take over is not a remote possibility. Police success in mediating and containing internal conflict in constantly friction-ridden Indian society would be the minimum surety that people need to uphold their freedom. India's health is deceptively well. Police would be a bad medicine to cure country's ills but could be a good surgical apparatus in the hands of a competent doctor. It would be very interesting to watch police performance in India in times to come; tackling present predicaments and then blending into precariousness of the future.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1



Source: INDIA: An Area Study, by S.N. Chopra, Vika Publishing House Ltd., New Delhi, 1977, p. 20.

APPENDIX 2

CROSSROAD CIVILIZATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

The chart at right is designed to show the duration of historic Indian civilization, and to relate it to others in the "Crossroad" group of cultures that are considered in one major group of volumes in this series. This chart is excerpted from a comprehensive world chronology that appears in the introductory booklet of the series. Comparison of the chart with the world chronology will enable the reader to relate India's historic culture to important cultural periods in other parts of the Far East and to Western exploration and colonization.

On the following pages is a chronological listing of important events that took place in the period covered by this book.



Source: Historic India, by Lucille Sehulberg and the Editors of Time-Life Books, New York, 1968, Appendix.

APPENDIX 3



Source: Historic India, by Lucille Schulberg and the Editors of Time-Life Books, New York, 1968, p. 75.

APPENDIX 4



Source: Historic India by Lucille Schulberg and the Editors of Time-Life Books, New York, 1968, p. 93

APPENDIX 5



Source: Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders, Schocken Books, New York, 1964, p. 25.

APPENDIX 6



Source: Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders, Schocken Books, New York, 1964, p. 80.

APPENDIX 7

Source: Philip Mason, The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders, Schocken Books, New York, 1964, p. 339.

APPENDIX 8

INDIA IN 1947

Source: British India, by Michael Edwards, Sidgwick and Jackson Publishers, London, 1967, Last cover page.

APPENDIX 9



Source: India: An Area Study, by S.N. Chopra, Vikes Publishing Houst, Ltd. 1977, p. 75.

APPENDIX 10



Source: INDIA: An Area Study, by S.N. Chopra, Vikes Publishing House, Ltd. New Delhi, 1977, p. 49.

APPENDIX 11



Source: INDIA: An Area Study, By S.N. Chopra, Vikes Publishing House Ltd., New Delhi, 1977, p. 37.

APPENDIX 12



Source: INDIA: An Area Study, by S.N. Chopra, Vikes Publishign House Ltd., New Delhi, 1977, p. 24.

APPENDIX 13



Source: INDIA: An Area Study, by S.N. Chopra, Vikas Publishing House, Ltd. New Delhi, 1977, p. 211.

APPENDIX 14

AREA AND DENSITY OF POPULATION

State/Union Territory	Area (sq km)[2]	Population[1] 1981	Density of[1] population per sq km
INDIA	**32,87,782[3]**	**68,38,10,861**	**221[3]**
States			
Andhra Pradesh	2,76,814	5,34,03,619	194
Assam[4]	78,523	1,99,02,826	254
Bihar	1,73,876	6,98,23,154	402
Gujarat	1,95,984	3,39,60,905	173
Haryana	44,222	1,28,50,902	291
Himachal Pradesh	55,673	42,37,569	76
Jammu and Kashmir[4]	2,22,236[5]	59,81,600	NA
Karnataka	1,91,773	3,70,43,451	193
Kerala	38,864	2,54,03,217	654
Madhya Pradesh	4,42,841	5,21,31,717	118
Maharashtra	3,07,762	6,26,93,898	204
Manipur	22,356	14,33,691	64
Meghalaya	22,489	13,27,874	59
Nagaland	16,527	7,73,281	47
Orissa	1,55,782	2,62,72,054	169
Punjab	50,362	1,66,69,755	331
Rajasthan	3,42,214	3,41,02,912	100
Sikkim	7,299	3,15,682	44
Tamil Nadu	1,30,069	4,82,97,456	371
Tripura	10,477	20,60,189	196
Uttar Pradesh	2,94,413	11,08,58,019	377
West Bengal	87,853	5,44,85,560	614
Union Territories			
Andaman and Nicobar Islands	8,293[6]	1,88,254	23
Arunachal Pradesh	83,578	6,28,050	7
Chandigarh	114	4,50,061	3,948
Dadra and Nagar Haveli	491	1,03,677	211
Delhi	1,485	61,96,414	4,178
Goa, Daman and Diu	3,813	10,82,117	284
Lakshadweep	32	40,237	1,257
Mizoram	21,087	4,87,774	23
Pondicherry	480	6,04,136	1,228

[1]Provisional.
[2]Provisional, as on 1 July 1971.
[3]While working out the density of population of India, Jammu & Kashmir has been excluded, as comparable figures of area and population are not available.
[4]Projected figures for 1981.
[5]Includes area under illegal occupation of Pakistan and China.
[6]As on January 1966.
N.A.—Not available.

The density of population and the percentage increase of population between 1921 and 1981 are as follows :

Year	Density per sq km	Decade	Percentage increase in population
1921	81		
1931	90	1921-31	11·0
1941	103	1931-41	14·2
1951	117	1941-51	13·3
1961	142	1951-61	21·5
1971	177	1961-71	24·8
1981[1]	221	1971-81	24.7

Note:—Density worked out after excluding the population and area figures of Jammu and Kashmir.
[1]Provisional.

APPENDIX 15



Source: INDIA: An Area Study, by S.N. Chopra, Vikas Publishing House Ltd., New Delhi, 1977, p. 206.

APPENDIX 16

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

III ORGANISATION

The Ministry of Home Affairs consists of a Secretariat, seven Attached Offices and eleven Subordinate Offices. It is in the charge of a Cabinet Minister, who is assisted by a Minister of State and a Deputy Minister.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary	2
Additional Secretary	1
Director-General, Civil Defence	1
Joint Secretary and Establishment Officer	1
Joint Secretary	11
Chief Welfare Officer	1
Director, Research & Policy	1
Chief Security Officer	1
Deputy Secretary	29
Deputy Director of Training	2
Deputy Director-General, Civil Defence	1
Deputy Director-General, Home Guards	1
Sr. Staff Officer	1
Fire Adviser	1
Secretary, Delhi Flood Control Committee	1
Under Secretary	34
Security Officer	1
O.S.D. (Parliament)	1
Secretary, Central Secretariat Sports Control Board	1
Assistant Director-General, Civil Defence	2
Assistant Director-General, Home Guards	1
Senior Research Officer	1

The work in the Ministry of Home Affairs is organised in the following Divisions:

1. Administration and O & M Division.
2. Administrative Vigilance Division.
3. All India Services Division.
4. Central Secretariat Services Division.
5. Establishment Division.
6. Establishment Officer's Division.
7. Emergency Relief Division.
8. Foreigners and Citizenship Division.
9. Judicial Division.
10. Police Division.

11. Political Division.
12. States Reorganisation Division.
13. States Reorganisation (Services) Division.
14. Union Territories Division. (Administration and Services, etc.)
15. Union Territories (Legislative) Division.
16. Official Language Division.
17. Kashmir Division.
18. Welfare Division.
19. Finance and Accounts Division.
20. Manpower Directorate.
21. Public Division.
22. Public Grievances Division.
23. Training Division.
24. Joint Consultation and Compulsory Arbitration Division.
25. Secretariat Security Organisation.
26. Research and Policy Division.

The detailed organisation of the Ministry of Home Affairs is indicated in the chart placed alongside.

The Department of Administrative Reforms also forms part of secretariat of the Ministry of Home Affairs. A short description of the Department of Administrative Reforms is given below.

Department of Administrative Reforms

The Department of Administrative Reforms was set up in the Ministry of Home Affairs in March, 1964, to deal with the problem of reform, reorganisation and modernisation of administration at all levels so as to make it efficient and sensitive instrument for carrying out the task of economic development and social welfare. For this purpose the Department takes up for examination the organisation and procedures of various organisations. The Department has already completed the examination of the organisation and structure, and methods of work and procedure of the offices of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Director-General of Technical Development, Director-General of Supplies and Disposal and the Central Public Works Department. The Department is, therefore, responsible for assisting the Government in effective implementation of measures for improvement of administration.

The Department is presently servicing some of the study teams of the Administrative Reforms Commission and also processing some of their reports.

The Organisation and Methods Division, which was set up in 1954 in the Cabinet Secretariat, now forms part of the Department of Administrative Reforms.

APPENDIX 17



Source: The Institute of Public Administration, The Organization of the Government of India, Second Revised Edition, Somaiya Publications Pub. Ltd., New Delhi, 1971.

APPENDIX 18



Source: The Communel Edge to Plural Socities - Retire Naidu HN 683N335

APPENDIX 19

Table 201—Number of Cognizable Crimes Reported

Year/State	Murder	Dacoity	Robbery	House breaking	Theft	Rioting	Others	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1952	10,343	7,301	9,571	150,809	251,816	(a)	182,170	6120,01
1956	10,025	5,397	7,618	134,556	236,214	24,700	166,707	585,217
1961	11,188	4,213	6,428	122,605	232,868	27,199	221,150	625,651
1966	12,631	4,817	8,585	150,180	298,701	34,696	285,123	794,733
1969	14,732	6,049	9,922	145,429	300,140	55,796	313,099	845,167
1970	15,708	9,837	16,958	166,339	337,211	68,331	341,038	955,422
1971	16,180	11,193	18,402	165,807	335,204	64,114	341,681	952,581
1972	15,475	10,411	17,054	167,062	346,382	65,781	362,608	984,773
1973	17,072	10,627	18,857	181,433	379,412	73,388	396,392	1,077,181
1974	18,649	13,697	22,206	199,878	436,918	80,547	420,302	1,192,277
1975	17,563	12,506	21,656	192,854	421,891	67,241	426,609	1,160,520
1975—								
State—								
Andhra Pradesh	1,122	156	227	6,570	16,553	2,345	30,132	57,105
Assam	465	286	441	7,076	10,372	3,784	13,653	36,077
Bihar	1,886	2,913	1,887	19,900	31,884	12,413	28,252	99,135
Gujarat	819	165	711	5,680	20,591	1,149	24,757	54,872
Haryana	182	15	27	1,626	2,619	55	5,072	9,596
Himachal Pradesh	54	3	26	610	560	140	2,057	3,450
Jammu & Kashmir	95	13	34	1,558	2,082	873	5,764	10,419
Karnataka	753	151	261	8,983	15,183	2,794	21,366	49,491
Kerala	398	31	140	4,705	5,222	3,587	21,939	36,022
Madhya Pradesh	1,879	569	1,824	26,605	44,709	3,364	48,261	127,211
Maharashtra	1,576	487	2,721	22,409	65,936	2,197	46,654	141,980
Manipur	46	30	40	330	898	193	1,566	3,102
Meghalaya	46	16	38	246	604	80	589	1,619
Nagaland	37	15	29	227	477	40	85	910
Orissa	444	235	466	7,728	13,270	1,571	10,797	34,511
Punjab	638	3	48	1,553	2,807	32	7,279	12,360
Rajasthan	710	141	1,237	8,852	12,897	5,841	21,306	50,984
Sikkim	8	1	5	39	151	4	128	336
Tamil Nadu	907	21	170	7,709	27,660	3,018	35,424	74,909
Tripura	36	76	35	655	968	159	97	2,026
Uttar Pradesh	4,499	6,117	9,868	47,315	92,088	12,360	58,654	230,901
West Bengal	715	1,032	1,086	8,001	34,642	10,925	30,113	86,514
Union Territory								
A. & N. Islands	10	—	8	74	129	15	305	541
Arunachal Pradesh	10	2	2	37	93	5	169	318
Chandigarh	7	—	—	86	634	8	467	1,202
D. & N. Haveli	7	—	1	29	31	5	80	153
Delhi	165	18	256	2,388	16,980	147	8,617	28,571
Goa, Daman & Diu	11	3	38	545	739	73	1,035	2,444
Lakshadweep	—	1	—	1	10	—	15	27
Mizoram	28	6	24	49	167	—	88	362
Pondicherry	11	—	6	268	935	64	2,088	3,372

(a) Included under 'Others'.

Source: Bureau of Police Research & Development; Ministry of Home Affairs.

Table 202—Total Cognizable Crime—Cases

Year	Total cases for trial during the year	Cases compounded or withdrawn	Cases in which trials were completed			Cases pending trial at the end of the year
			Total	Cases convicted	Cases acquitted or discharged	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1968	755,221	57,172	289,066	189,566	99,500	408,983
1969	805,984	59,000	288,668	184,867	103,801	458,316
1970	865,752	58,879	284,865	179,829	105,036	522,008
1971	943,394	67,300	301,869	187,072	114,797	574,225
1972	1,011,699	65,249	312,744	196,089	116,655	633,706
1973	1,147,318	66,751	330,688	205,044	125,644	749,879
1974	1,307,933	75,532	363,565	227,800	135,765	868,836
1975	1,456,781	81,280	395,869	253,319	142,550	979,632

Source: Bureau of Police Research & Development: Ministry of Home Affairs.

Table 203—Total Cognizable Crime—Persons

Year	Total number of persons under trial during the year	Persons against whom cases were compounded or withdrawn	Persons in custody or on bail during the stage at the end of the year	Persons whose cases trials were completed during the year		
				Total	Persons convicted	Persons acquitted
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1968	1,763,144	133,283	1,052,708	577,653	301,880	275,773
1969	2,462,522	143,646	1,202,026	1,116,850	826,906	289,944
1970	2,156,197	143,694	1,412,807	599,696	299,196	300,500
1971	2,379,064	154,698	1,590,010	634,350	311,780	322,576
1972	2,580,753	170,686	1,752,723	657,344	318,938	338,406
1973	2,931,037	185,283	2,068,696	727,058	375,413	351,645
1974	3,334,704	186,725	2,393,786	754,193	388,785	365,408
1975	3,755,951	197,598	2,633,139	826,214	423,271	402,943

Source: Bureau of Police Research & Development; Ministry of Home Affairs.

Table 204—Recidism—Total Cognizable Crime

Year	Number of new offenders arrested	Number of offenders who have been convicted in the past			Total (Cols. 2—5)
		Once	Twice	Three times or more	
1	2	3	4	5	6
1971	924,863	53,659	13,198	7,561	999,281
1972	995,309	60,323	15,695	8,666	1,079,993
1973	1,196,113	69,435	14,836	8,867	1,289,251
1974	1,360,902	81,509	21,894	9,912	1,474,217
1975	1,323,922	68,922	22,367	9,875	1,425,086

Source: Bureau of Police Research & Development; Ministry of Home Affairs.

Table 205—Property Stolen and Recovered (Value)

('000 Rupees)

Year	Dacoity		Robbery		Burglary		Theft	
	Stolen	Recovered	Stolen	Recovered	Stolen	Recovered	Stolen	Recovered
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1968 . .	24,811	1,408	5,921	1,630	106,265	21,654	113,107	35,858
1969 . .	37,213	1,510	5,335	1,552	217,027(a)	54,584(a)	..	..
1970 . .	24,802	2,794	9,965	2,006	240,220(a)	64,396(a)	..	..
1971 . .	33,357	3,972	11,057	2,295	101,440	13,821	162,690	48,937
1972 . .	23,417	2,359	10,077	2,911	317,984(a)	93,016(a)	..	..
1973 . .	27,041	4,293	16,463	4,005	137,759	20,921	214,244	72,641
1974 . .	23,566	7,723	26,203	5,457	183,606	32,788	347,716	120,807
1975 . .	37,126	9,405	23,715	6,808	207,139	36,406	447,639	154,979

Year	Criminal breach of trust		Other offences		Total	
	Stolen	Recovered	Stolen	Recovered	Stolen	Recovered
1	10	11	12	13	14	15
1968	30,167	5,736	15,510	2,810	295,781	69,096
1969	29,699	5,975	15,975	3,194	305,247	66,815
1970	54,348	5,251	32,062	5,529	361,397	79,976
1971	42,500	6,400	34,412	12,858	385,456	88,283
1972	74,044	7,694	28,676	12,923	454,198	118,903
1973	99,196	7,303	36,796	19,025	531,499	128,188
1974	75,894	10,809	33,987	8,278	690,972	195,842
1975	103,020	13,267	15,382	7,434	837,021	228,299

(a) Data relate to Burglary & Theft.

Source : Bureau of Police Research & Development : Ministry of Home Affairs.

Another disturbing feature in our society is the increasing criminality amongst women in recent years. Statistics of women arrested are given below:[2]

Sl.No.	*Crime heads*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*
1.	Murder	769	908	772	927	1053
2.	Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder	59	77	73	66	70
3.	Kidnapping and abduction	429	526	460	501	478
4.	Dacoity	103	131	211	144	133
5.	Robbery	83	65	177	125	124
6.	Burglary	972	872	1747	1468	1419
7.	Theft	4198	4177	5013	5144	5218
8.	Riots	2580	5977	7255	7065	4631
9.	Criminal breach of trust	65	61	100	91	119
10.	Cheating	85	124	168	130	213
11.	Counterfeiting	1	4	3	—	4
12.	Misc. IPC	6952	14922	14677	10070	10456
	Total IPC	16303	27891	30677	25766	23929

Source: S.K. Ghosh, Police in Ferment, Light and Life Publishing New Delhi, 1981, p. 38.

Sl. No.	*Heads of Crime*	*1966*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*
	Totol Cognisable Crimes	794733	952581	984773	1077181	1192277	1168520
1.	Murder	12631	16180	15475	17072	18649	17563
2.	Kidnapping and Abduction	7854	9647	9402	10223	10543	11139
3.	Dacoity	4817	11193	10411	10627	13697	12506
4.	Robbery	8585	18402	17054	18857	22286	21656
5.	Burglary	150180	165807	167062	181433	199878	192854
6.	Thefts	298701	335204	346382	379412	436918	421891
7.	Riots	34696	64114	65781	73388	80547	67241
8.	Criminal Breach of Trust	22353	20270	21064	21837	22274	23287
9.	Cheating	11606	11412	12646	14392	15380	17772
10.	Counterfeiting	655	641	670	582	718	951
11.	Other IPC Offences	242655	299711	318886	349358	371387	373668

Source: S.K. Ghosh, Police in Ferment, Light and Life Publishers New Delhi, 1981, p. 37.

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

APPENDIX 20

National Emblem

STATE EMBLEM

The State Emblem of India is an adaptation from the Sarnath Lion Capital of Asoka as preserved in the Sarnath museum. In the original, there are four lions, standing back to back, mounted on an abacus with a frieze carrying sculptures in high relief of an elephant, a galloping horse, a bull and a lion separated by intervening wheels (*Chakras*) over a bell-shaped lotus. Carved out of a single block of polished standstone the Capital is crowned by the Wheel of the Law (*Dharma Chakra*).

In the State Emblem adopted by the Government of India on 26 January 1950, only three lions are visible, the fourth being hidden from view. The wheel appears in relief in the centre of the abacus with a bull on the right and a horse on the left and the outlines of the other wheels on the extreme right and left. The bell-shaped lotus has been omitted. The words, *Satyameva jayate*, from the *Mundaka Upanishad* meaning 'Truth alone triumphs', are inscribed below the abacus in Devanagari script.

Source: INDIA: A Ference Manual, by Ministry of Information of Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, p 1981.

NATIONAL ANTHEM

Rabindranath Tagore's song *Jana-gana-mana* was adopted by the Constituent Assembly as the National Anthem of India on 24 January 1950. It was first sung on 27 December 1911 at the Calcutta session of the Indian National Congress. The complete song consists of five stanzas. The first stanza constitutes the full version of the National Anthem. It reads :

Jana-gana-mana-adhinayaka jaya he
Bharata-bhagya-vidhata.
Punjaba-Sindhu-Gujarata-Maratha-
Dravida-Utkala-Banga
Vindhya-Himachala-Yamuna-Ganga
Uchhala-jaladhi-taranga
Tava subha name jage,
Tava subha asisa mage,
Gahe tava jaya-gatha.
Jana-gana-mangala-dayaka jaya he
Bharata-bhagya-vidhata
Jaya he, jaya he, jaya he,
Jaya jaya jaya, jaya he.

Playing time of the full version of the National Anthem is approximately 52 seconds. A short version consisting of the first and last

lines of this stanza (playing time approximately 20 seconds) is also played on certain occasions. The following is Tagore's English rendering of the stanza :

Thou art the ruler of the minds of all people,
Dispenser of India's destiny.
Thy name rouses the hearts of Punjab, Sind, Gujarat and Maratha,
Or Dravida and Orissa and Bengal.
It echoes in the hills of Vindhyas and Himalayas,
mingles in the music of Jamuna and Ganges
and is chanted by the waves of the Indian Sea.
They pray for thy blessings and sing thy praise.
The saving of all people waits in thy hand,
Thou dispenser of India's destiny.
Victory, victory, victory to thee.

NATIONAL SONG

Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's *Vande Mataram*, which was a source of inspiration to the people in their struggle for freedom, has an equal status with *Jana-gana-mana*. The first political occasion on which was sung was the 1896 session of the Indian National Congress. The following is the text of its first stanza :

Vande Mataram !
Sujalam, suphalam, Malayaja-shitalam,
Shasyashyamalam, Mataram !
Shubhrajyotsna, pulakitayaminim,
Phullakusumita-drumadala-shobhinim,
Suhasinim sumadhura-bhashinim,
Sukhadam varadam, Mataram !

The English translation of the stanza rendered by Sri Aurobindo is :

I bow to thee, Mother,
richly-watered, richly-fruited,
cool with the winds of the south,
dark with the crop of the harvests,
the Mother !
Her nights rejoicing in the glory of the moonlight,
her lands clothed beautifully with her trees in flowering bloom,
sweet of laughter, sweet of speech,
the Mother, giver of boons, giver of bliss !

NATIONAL CALENDAR

A uniform National Calendar based on the Saka era with Chaitra as its first month and a normal year of 365 days was adopted from 22 March 1957 along with the Gregorian calendar for the following official purposes : (i) The Gazette of India, (ii) news broadcasts by All India Radio, (iii) calendars issued by the Government of India, and (iv) government communications addressed to members of the public.

The dates of the National Calendar have a permanent correspondence with the dates of the Gregorian calendar; 1 Chaitra falling on 22 March normally and on 21 March in a leap year.



THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

Source: Dilip Hiro, Inside India Today (revised edition), 1979, Monthly Review Press, New York



NOTE: (1) State areas in square kilometres are relevant to 1970-71. Since then, there have been minor changes in the area of individual states and Union territories due to improved survey operation and also minor adjustment of state boundaries, etc.

(2) Mysore has been renamed Karnataka.

(3) Sikkim (7,299) is now a state of the Indian Union.

(4) Lacadive have been renamed as Lakshadweep.

(5) ME stands for Meghalaya (22,489); MI, for Mizoram (21,087); T, for Tripura (10,477); G D & D, for Goa, Daman & Diu (3,813); D & NH, for Dadra & Nagar Havoli (491); HP, for Himachal Pradesh.

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