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Institutional Development in a New Democracy:

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Philip W. Alderfer

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INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW DEMOCRACY:

THE ZAMBIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 1964 TO 1996

VOLUME I

By

Philip Wendell Alderfer

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1997

ABSTRACT

Institutional Development in a New Democracy.

The Zambian National Assembly, 1964 to 1996

by

Philip W. Alderfer

This dissertation is a longitudinal and cross-national study of institutional

development in new a democracy. Using the Zambian National Assembly as a case, it

examines how legislative performance and legislators' behavior changed in response to

three political transitions across a 30-year period. Recent Zambian legislative

performance is then compared to legislative performance in ﬁfteen other sub-Saharan

African countries that also underwent democratic transitions between 1989 and 1994 to

place Zambia's experiences in a cross-national context.

A wide variety of original data is used to legislative performance in

Zambia. This includes a series of quantitative indicators generated speciﬁcally for this

study, detailed discussions of historic events across Zambia's 30-year political history,

and an in-depth survey of sitting Zambian Members of Parliament.

Three different theoretical perspectives are used to try and explain the

patterns of behavior found in this study. The ﬁrst is derived from the literature on

neo-institutionalism and examines the inﬂuence formal rules and procedures have on

legislative behavior. The second uses an administrative-organizational perspective to

explain parliamentary performance, and examines how access to resources, work culture,

and administrative hierarchies effect performance. The inﬂuence of personal

relationships and corruption are examined in the third perspective, derived from the

literature on political patronage.

This study presents three major ﬁndings. First, legislative institutional

development in Africa has not beneﬁted from the democratic transitions of 1989-1994.

Neither institutional nor individual measures of legislative performance have signiﬁcantly

increased in those countries that adopted a more democratic political regime. Second, no

single theoretical perspective can fully account for the patters of behavior described here,

either across time or country. Finally, legislative development in no way assures the

successful development of a consolidated democracy. Countries that established more

independent legislatures after their democratic transition were more likely to suffer from

democratic reversals than were those that had maintained a more authoritarian political

regime.

To my parents, Ron and Connie, and my wife, Julie

iv

ACKNOWLEDGIVIENTS

This study would not have been possible without the help of friends and

colleagues, both here and abroad. First, I am deeply indebted to Mike Bratton of

Michigan State University and James Polhemus of the US. Agency for International

Deve10pment in Lusaka, both of whom provided the ﬁnancial, academic, and personal

support that pr0pelled this study forward.l Thanks are also due to Ilse Mwanza and all

the staff at the University of Zambia's Institute for African Studies who provided me with

an academic home away from home (and a great cup of tea) while I conducted my

research.

Many people both in East Lansing and Lusaka helped arrange travel plans,

ship materials, and tame the hydra-headed bureaucracies of MSU and USAID, but special

credit goes to of Karen Battin, Rhonda Burns, Iris Dunn, and Elaine Eschtruth here at

Michigan State University and'Henry Kalwani, Mambepa Kalwani and Geoffrey

Miyanda at USAID/Lusaka.

Numerous Zambian government agencies and ofﬁcials provided access to

personnel and materials, without which this study would have been a drudgery, rather

than the great adventure that it was. Thanks are due to the members of Clerk and

Speaker's ofﬁces at the Zambian National Assembly, especially Fairchild Chibomba,

 

'

This study was funded in part by fellowships from the USAID Zambia Democracy/Governance

Project, Cooperative Agreement No. 623-0226-A-00-3024-00.

V

Irene Manda, and Tembi Mtine. Joel Sikazwe at the Zambian Electoral Commission, and

Chief Justice Matthew Ngulube of the Zambian Supreme Court also provided invaluable

assistance.

Most importantly, I am grateful to the Members of Zambia's Seventh

National Assembly for their willingness to let me into their lives in such a direct and

personal way. All deserve individual mention, but particular thanks are due to twelve

Members' who helped me learn how the assembly really works. They are Dr. Rodger

Chongwe and his wife, Gwenda, David Kambilumbilu, Akashambatwa

Mbikusita-Lewanika, Humphrey Mulemba, Lavu Mulimba, Zilole Mumba, Dean

Mung'omba, Patrick Mvunga, V.J. Mwaanga, Newton Ng'uni, Guy Scott, Rolf Shenton,

and the late Arthur Wina.

A tip of my hat goes to all our friends who allowed my wife and I to

house-sit during 18 months of research, especially Mac McLauren, Stephan and Beatte

Foster, and Helge and Marianne Wigand who were particularly accomodating. I just

hope we put all the furniture back in its place! Cheers to Danny & Brigitte, Rachel &

Andrew, Kim & Greg, Grant & Louise, Steve & Radika, and Lars & Erika. (I told you I

would ﬁnish.) Finally, thanks to Shelly Arenault, Lisa Cliggett, John Davis, Kathy

Dowley, Matt Kleiman, Sara McLaughlin, and Dan Posner for reading chapter drafts and

providing advice, friendship and encouragement throughout.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... x

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... xii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1

Legislatures and Institution Building ....................................................................... 3

Why the Zambian Legislature? ................................................................................ 6

Background: Birth of a New State .............................................................. 8

Zambia's First Republic:

UNIP, the ANC and the Challenges of Independence ............................... 12

Zambia's Second Republic: Development of UNIP's One-Party State ..... 15

Zambia's Third Republic: The MMD and the Return to Multi-partyism..22

Dependent Variables, Independent Variables,

and Theories of Legislative Performance .............................................................. 31

Deﬁnition of Terms ............................................................................................... 36

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 38

CHAPTER TWO

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PERFORMANCE, 1964-4991 .............................................. 39

Legislative Performance: Law-Making in the First and Second Republics .......... 43

Law-Making in the First Republic: More to Do and

Less Time to Do It In ................................................................................. 45

Law-Making in the Second Republic: Less to Do and

More Time to Do It In................................................................................ 57

Members' Performance in the First and Second Republics .................................... 68

Debate and Constituency Service in the First Republic ............................. 7O

Debate and Constituency Service in the Second Republic ........................ 86

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 97

CHAPTER THREE

IT'S LIKE DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

PERFORMANCE, 1991-1995 ......................................................................................... 100

Law-Making in the Third Republic ..................................................................... 104

Members' Performance in the Third Republic ..................................................... 116

Members' Participation in Budget Hearings ............................................ 127

vii

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 1 34

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSTITUTIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PERFORMANCE ................................................................ 137

Constitutions in Africa......................................................................................... 140

Constitutional Evolution in Zambia: 1964-1991 ................................................ 147

Key Provisions of the 1964 Constitution ................................................. 149

Evolution of the Independence Constitution ............................................ 151

The One-Party Constitution and Zambia's 1991 Return to Democracy... 155

The Mvunga Commission and the 1991 Constitution............................. 158

Inﬂuence of Constitutional Reforms on the National Assembly ......................... 163

Presidential Appointments ....................................................................... 166

Public Budgeting ...................................................................................... 169

Constitutional Constrains on Control of House Business ........................ 174

Inﬂuence on Constitutional Amendments on Members' Performance ................ 179

Constitutional Inﬂuences on House Size ................................................. 181

Constitutional Amendments and Parliamentary Candidates .................... 183

Constitutional Amendments and Members' Tenure ................................. 187

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 194

CHAPTER FIVE

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADMINISTRATION AND

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PERFORMANCE... ............................................................ 198

Organizational Capacity: Mr. Speaker and the Zambian National Assembly....203

Mr. Speaker's Barony: The Organizational Environment

in the National Assembly ......................................................................... 207

Organizational Capacity and Legislative Performance ........................................ 212

Parliamentary Committees and Legislative Behavior.............................. 213

Organizational Capacity and Private Members' Legislation .................... 220

Organizational Capacity and Members' Performance .......................................... 225

Organizational Structure and House Debates:

Efﬁciency vs. Democracy ........................................................................ 226

Organizational Capacity and Members' Participation

in Budget Hearings ................................................................................... 232

Organizational Capacity and Members' Performance:

An Attitudinal Survey .............................................................................. 235

Members of the Seventh Assembly: An Overview ................................. 239

Role Perceptions in the Seventh Assembly .............................................. 241

Realistic Accomplishments: Members' Perceptions of the Possible ....... 251

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 256

viii

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL PATRONAGE, POLITICAL PORK

AND PARLIAMENTARY PERFORMANCE ............................................................... 258

Patronage Deﬁned ................................................................................................ 259

Patronage and Aﬁican Legislators' ...................................................................... 264

Patronage and Legislators in Zambia................................................................... 266

Collective Responsibility, Patronage, and Front Bench Inﬂation ........................ 268

Front Bench Inﬂation in the Zambian National Assembly ...................... 271

Front Bench Inﬂation and Members' Performance in House Debates:

The First Republic. .................................................................................. 277

Patronage and House Debates in the Second Republic ............................ 281

Front Bench Inﬂation and House Debates in the Third Republic ............ 290

From Patronage to Pork: Corruption and Constituency Relations

in the 7th Assembly .............................................................................................. 296

Members' Wealth and Personal Experiences with Patronage .................. 299

Attitudes Towards Corruption and

Personal Use of Government Resources .................................................. 306

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 3 13

CHAPTER SEVEN

WHITHER LEGISLATURES? THE ZAMBIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ....................................................................... 316

General Trends in Legislative Development ........................................................ 319

Formal Rules and African Legislative Development ........................................... 337

Be Careﬁil What You Ask For:

The Consequences of Legislative Independence ................................................. 349

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 352

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 355

Transitions, Formal Rules, and the Struggle for Authority .................................. 357

Actors, Resources, and the Diﬁicult Task of Governing ..................................... 366

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 370

APPENDIX ...................................................................................................................... 376

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 378

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.0 -- Legislative Business in the First and Second Republics ................................ 44

Table 2.1 -- Distribution of Legislative Amendments in 1966 .......................................... 52

Table 2.2 -- Distribution of Legislative Amendments in 1971 .......................................... 55

Table 2.3 -- Government Bills and Session Days in the First & Second Republics .......... 59

Table 2.4 -- Ratio of Statutory Instruments to Acts

in the First and Second Republics .............................................................. 61

Table 2.5 -- Legislative Amendments in the Second Republic .......................................... 63

Table 2.6 -- Increasing Debate Participation, 1964 - 1991 ................................................ 88

Table 2.7 -- Percent of Back Bench Members Participating

in House Debates, 1964 - 1991 .................................................................. 89

Table 2.8 -- Comparison of Question Type in the First & Second Republics ................... 90

Table 3.0 -- Comparison of Legislative Activity Before

and After the 1991 Elections .................................................................... 102

Table 3.1 -- Average Annual Sitting Days in the Seven National Assemblies ................ 105

Table 3.2 -- Average Number of Sitting Days within the Seventh Assembly ................. 106

Table 3.3 -- Legislative Business Since Independence .................................................... 107

Table 3.4 -- Number of Bills Introduced in the Seventh Assembly ................................. 107

Table 3.5 -- Distribution of Legislative Amendments

in the Second and Third Republics .......................................................... 112

Table 3.6 -- Questions Asked During Parliamentary Question Time, 1964 - 1994 ......... 118

Table 3.7 -- Comments per Sitting by Back Bench and Opposition MP3, 1964 - 1994.122

Table 3.8 -- Average Number of Comments per Sitting Made by Back Bench

and Opposition Members, coded by Province ......................................... 123

Table 3.9 -- Back Bench and Opposition Members' Participation

in Budget Hearings, 1964 - 1994 ............................................................. 130

Table 3.10 -- Number of Comments per Member Made During Budget Hearings,

coded by Political Party ........................................................................... 132

Table 4.0 -- Constitutional Provisions Outlining Parliament's Budget Authority ........... 171

Table 4.1 -- Constitutional Provisions to Summon, Prorogue

and Dissolve Parliament .......................................................................... 175

Table 4.2 -- 1991 Constitutional Amendments to Presidential Authority to Prorogue

Sittings of the National Assembly ........................................................... 178

Table 4.3 -- Average Number of Back Bench Members in the National Assembly ........ 181

Table 4.4 -- Average Number of Back Bench Members

Participating in House Debates ................................................................ 182

Table 4.5 -- 1973 Constitutional Amendments to Establish Parliamentary

Primary Elections ..................................................................................... 184

X

Table 4.6 -- 1973 Constitutional Amendments Establishing Political Party

Control over Members' Tenure ................................................................ 190

Table 4.7 —- 1991 Constitutional Amendments Reﬁning Political Party

Control over Members' Tenure ................................................................ 192

Table 5.0 -- Members' Perceptions of Their Responsibilites ........................................... 243

Table 6.0 -- Debate Participation and Ministerial Appointments

in the First Republic ................................................................................. 279

Table 6.1 -- "My constituents expect me to use personal resources for

community development projects" .......................................................... 300

Table 6.2 -— "Have you used your own money for

constituency development projects?" ....................................................... 301

Table 6.3 -- "If Yes (to Table 6.2), how much did you spend?" ('000 Kwacha) ............ 302

Table 6.4 -- "Most government ofﬁcials are mainly concerned

with enriching themselves" ...................................................................... 307

Table 6.5 -- "Corruption was a worse problem under the old

UNIP government than it is these days" .................................................. 309

Table 7.0 -- Multi-Party Political Regimes in Africa,

November 1989 to December 1994 ......................................................... 318

Table 7.1 -- Comparison of Legislative Performance

after Democratic Transitions in Africa.................................................... 321

Table 7.2 -- Constitutional Separation of Powers in Five Independent Legislatures ...... 338

Table 7.3 -- Constitutional Separation of Powers in

Mixed Independence Legislatures ........................................................... 342

Table 7.4 -- Political Party Success in Founding Democratic Elections ......................... 345

Table 7.5 -- Opposition Parties' Shares of Seats in Founding

Democratic Legislatures .......................................................................... 347

Table 8.0 —- Formal Rules and Parliamentary Performance in Zambia........................... 364

Table 8.1 -- Assembly Administration and Parliamentary Performance

in Zambia................................................................................................. 368

Table 8.2 -- Political Patronage and Parliamentary Performance in Zambia ................... 369

xi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.0 -- Legislative Business and Session Days, 1964 - 1994 ................................... 47

Figure 2.1 -- Bills Introduced and Acts Approved, 1964 - 1994 ....................................... 48

Figure 2.2 -- Average Question Volume, 1964 - 1994 ...................................................... 72

Figure 2.3 -— Aggregated Back Bench and Opposition Participation

in House Debates, 1964 - 1985 .................................................................. 77

Figure 2.4 -- Questions per MP by Political Party, 1964 — 197 2 ....................................... 79

Figure 2.5 -- Comments per MP by Political Party, 1964 - 1972 ...................................... 80

Figure 2.6 -- Total Question Volume per Year by Issue Type .......................................... 83

Figure 6.0 -- Size of the Front Bench in the

Zambian National Assembly, 1964 - 1986 .............................................. 273

Figure 6.1 -- Debate Participation by Future Ministers in the Second Republic.

Comparison of Comments by New Ministers versus All MP5 ................ 284

Figure 6.2 -- Debate Participation by Future Ministers in the Second Republic.

Comparison of Questions Asked by New Ministers versus All MP5 ...... 286

Figure 8.0 -- Inﬂuence of Three Explanations of Parliamentary Performance

During the Post-Transition Period ........................................................... 371

Figure 8.1 -— Inﬂuence of Three Explanations of Parliamentary Performance

During the Consolidation Period ............................................................. 373

xii

Chapter One:

Introduction

If institutions are deﬁned as stable, valued recurring

patterns of behavior, can one say that there was an

institutionalization of roles in a legislature (such as

Zambia's), where not only the demands of two

environments, but also role behavior itself changed?

Samuel Huntington 1965

Institutionalization involves the congruence between

attitudes, responses, the environment, and expectations,

rather than stable, recurring patterns of behavior. Over

time the Zambian Parliament adopted attitudinal responses

to both its environments and its roles that allowed

institutional change without the sacriﬁce of autonomy,

coherence, or complexity. Institutionalization can proceed

with rapid change; patterns of behavior need recur only in

principle.

John Helgerson 1970, 118

This is a study of political institution building in the developing world.

Using the Zambian legislature as a case, this dissertation examines the process of

institutional development and contrasts Huntington's view that institutionalization

comprises "stable, recurring patterns of behavior," with Helgerson's opinion that

behavioral autonomy, coherence, and complexity can be maintained within a context of

rapid political change. It compares parliamentary performance across time, different

political regimes, and international boundaries and examines how the performance of the

Zambia National Assembly has changed and the role legislatures play in the consolidation

of nascent democratic political regimes.

Legislatures do not operate in a vacuum. The actions they take result from

the intersection of formal rules, the actors involved, and resources available to them.

Therefore, assembly performance is best understood if we fully account for these factors.

Rather than adopt a single theoretical approach, this study presents a scheme to

accomplish that task by comparing three different theoretical explanations of legislative

performance -- neo-institutionalism, organizational capacity, and political patronage. In

doing so this study contributes to ongoing debates about democratization and political

institution building by determining which of these theories best explain legislative

performance, whether those explanations remain equally salient across different political

regimes, and if those explanations are applicable across the new democracies in

sub-Saharan Africa.

Two general arguments will be presented here: No single theoretical

perspective can fully explain the performance of both parliaments and individual

parliamentarians and, more importantly, that the relative inﬂuence of these factors

changes over time. Legislative performance and legislative institution building can best

be understood by using an eclectic mix of different theoretical approaches and by

accounting for the dynamic explanatory power of each approach across periods of

political transition.

Legislatures and Institution Building

Why examine institution building in a legislature rather than in another,

potentially more powerful, political institution such as the presidency or judicial branch?

Moreover, why limit a study of political institution building to formal state structures?

Couldn't a study of political parties or civil society accomplish the same goals?

The answer to the second question is no; it would be possible to study

institution building in a political party, protest movement, lobbying group or any one of

the myriad of other organizations that dot the political landscape. Organizations do play

important roles in the democratic political process. However, organizations are groups of

individuals bound together by some common purpose or to achieve a common objective.

By contrast, "institutions are the frameworks in which (those) human interactions take

place" (North 1990, 1). Institutions are comprised of both formal and informal rules, both

those that are purposeﬁilly created as well as those that evolve over time. Political

institutions are more than political organizations. Organizations comprise the individuals

and issues that deﬁne the game of politics at any given moment. Institutions are the rules

that last beyond them.

Why, then, study institution building in a legislature? If, as is often

argued, the executive branch wields more political power than the legislative, especially

in Africa, why concentrate on parliament? Why examine the weaker partner in the

political process? The answer is three-fold. First, this is study not just a study of

institutions but of institutional development. There is no doubt that a study of executive

power in Zambia could yield interesting results. However, I am particularly interested in

whether legislatures develop to challenge strong executive presidencies. Are weak

legislatures able to develop greater autonomy over time, and if not, why not?

Second, legislatures are of central concern in most democratic theories.

As Robert Dahl, and others, have shown, responsive democratic regimes exist only if

"institutions exist for making government policies depend on popular votes and other

expressions of citizens' preferences" (Dahl 1971, 3. See also Almond and Verba 1965;

Dahl 1961; Inkeles 1991; Lijphart 1984). Legislatures, parliaments, and assemblies are

the institutions that have been created to aggregate, process, and codify those preferences.

The ability of a legislatures to perform those functions then provides insights into whether

democratization is occurring in a given country.

Finally, by concentrating on legislative development this study can build

on an existing intellectual heritage. Legislatures have recently become a focus of scholars

studying the politics of the developing world, though this was not always the case.

During the early and mid-19603, legislatures were often downplayed in studies of the

developing world. Many scholars viewed parliaments and assemblies as insigniﬁcant

participants in policy and decision-making, preferring instead to examine the growing

number of strong executives or the contestations of power in civil society. When they did

examine legislative performance, their analyses were often limited to legislatures' abilities

to make and amend laws (See, for example, Almond and Powell 1966).

This changed in the late 1960's and early 1970's when Gupta (1965),

Hopkins (1970), Mezey (1972), and others recognized that legislatures performed a wide

variety of tasks, even in authoritarian and single-party regimes. Comparative studies of

legislative performance were further enhanced by an edited volume compiled by

Kornberg and Musolf (1970) on legislative behavior in the developing world, and later a

series of "Publications of the Consortium for Comparative Legislative Studies" at Duke

University edited by GR. Boyton and Chong Lim Kim (1975). These volumes provided

an importantly outlet for the work of scholars such as Barkan (1979, 1984), Hopkins

(1970, 1975) Mezey (1972, 1983) and Packenham (1970) and contributed to the debates

on legislative behavior ﬁrst raised by Wahlke and Eulau (195 9).

No longer were legislatures solely viewed as law-making bodies, they

were recognized as essential elements in of political systems with a myriad of

responsibilities. Even when political transitions occurred in countries where these

scholars worked, legislatures were used to identify when political crises had passed. "In

democracies and dictatorships alike, the restoration of a legislature customarily signiﬁes a

return to political normalcy, evidence that a period of crisis or transition has passed"

(Weinbaum 1975, 3 1).

This sentiment is true today. Since the "Third Wave" of democracy

(Huntington 1991) swept much of the world scholars have once again returned to

questions of how democratic regimes are built and the role legislatures play in democratic

consolidation. "Merely creating democratic institutions and holding elections captures

only part of the process through which stable, viable democratic systems come into

being...Many debilitating ﬁghts have erupted among contending forces that accept the

electoral process but reject other key democratic institutions...This leads us to conclude

that the core representative and governmental institutions of the new regime must also be

institutionalized and legitimate in order of the regime to qualify as consolidated."

(Gunther et. al 1996, 155-158)

Why the Zambian legislature?

Zambian political history affords scholars an opporttmity to examine

legislative development across both time and different political regimes. The country has

maintained stable, civilian rule over more than three decades, always successfully

resisting military intervention. During this period it has experienced both multi-party and

one-party regimes, culminating in a historic shift to multi-party rule in October 1991 at

the leading edge of the Third Wave of democracy in Africa. Consequently, Zambia is an

excellent laboratory in which to test theories about legislative performance.

Zambia achieved political independence from Great Britain in 1964. At

that time it adopted a nominally Westminster-style parliamentary system in which MPs

were elected in competitive, multi-party elections, However, the balance of political

power vested in an independently elected national president. In 1973 political opposition

was banned, and for the next 18 years Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's president since

independence, ruled under his United National Independence Party (UNIP) banner.

In this "one-party participatory democracy" ofﬁcially vetted parliamentary

candidates were chosen through direct, popular elections. Parliament did, infrequently,

meet, but not in order to discuss policy, adjudicate disputes, or address issues

constituents' concerns. Instead, Parliament served as a rubber stamp for executive

decisions and an arm of UNIP charged with rallying support from the countryside.

However, after 15 years of political and economic stagnation, popular

dissent let loose. Food shortages, exacerbated by severe droughts and a crushing

international debt burden, brought protesters into the streets and forced President Kaunda

to release his grip on political power. Demands for meaningful political change grew

more ﬁ'equent, and the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) was created to

harness those challenges.

The MMD was an amalgamation of academicians, labor leaders and

political elite that was created solely to challenge UNIP's dominance. Little else in the

way of a unifying political ideology brought these divergent groups together. On October

31, 1991 the MMD exercised its new-found political muscle by ousting President Kaunda

and winning 125 of the 150 parliamentary seats in the ﬁrst multi-party elections to be

held since 1968. The MD and its new president, Frederick Chiluba, were hailed as

exemplars of the "second wind of change" blowing across Africa.

These three distinct political periods, the multi-party First Republic

(1964-1972), one-party Second Republic (1973-1991), and recent multi-party Third

Republic (1991-1994) provide rich comparisons by which to chart the process of

legislative institution building. They allow us to observe how Parliament responded to

changing electoral regimes, whether stable recurring patterns of performance were

developed, and if the legislatures ever developed the ability to challenge executive

actions. To set the scene for the analysis which follows, these three periods of

post-colonial political history are brieﬂy described below.

Background: Birth of a New State

Zambia is a landlocked state encompassing 290,000 square miles north of

the Zambezi River in the central portion of Africa's southern cone. It is bounded on the

east by Malawi, Zaire and Tanzania on the North, Angola on the west, and Zimbabwe on

the south. Zambia, formerly known as Northern Rhodesia, was a British colonial

protectorate for over 60 years. The British South Africa company ruled the country from

18903 until 1924, "when, mainly for economic reasons, it handed over its administrative

role to the British Colonial Ofﬁce" (Tordoff 1974, 3).

During the 1930's Zambia became one of the world's largest sources of

hi gh-grade copper ore and an important source of revenue for the British government.

Between 1930 and 1950 the colonial office retained political control over the region,

though it gradually allowed "local European settlers a progressively larger say in the

government, and eventually permitted the creation of the Central African Federation,

which united Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia (later, Zimbabwe) and

Nayasaland (later, Malawi) under the control of predominantly Southern Rhodesian

whites" (Tordoff 1974, 3).

Coincident with the rise of a European settlers political movement during

this period was the development of an "African national consciousness" (Mulford 1967,

13). The ﬁrst seeds of Aﬁican nationalism were sown in the early 19005 when "the

Territory developed and the two racial communities, distinctly separate and often

antagonistic, became increasingly interdependent" (Ibid. See also Rotberg 1965).

The organization that uniﬁed the nationalist movement during this period

was the African National Congress (ANC) headed by Harry Nkumbula. Nkumbula, a

member of the Tonga-speaking Ila group from Zambia's Southern Province became ANC

in president in 1951 and "was widely known amongst his countrymen as a fearless

advocate of African rights" (Mulford 1967, 20). Under Nkumbula's leadership the ANC

became the organization that most vocally opposed the Central African Federation as a

threat to indigenous' Aﬁicans interests. "With deeply held suspicions born of long

experience with white men and limited knowledge of his institutions, great numbers of

Aﬁicans, most of them with no detailed knowledge of federalism, opposed the Federation

with a fervor which shocked and confused government ofﬁcials" (Mulford 1967, 23).

The ANC's formation, and the difﬁculties Nkumbula had in maintaining it

as a viable political organization, foreshadowed what would become a consistent theme

in Zambian politics. Despite the nearly uniform condemnation of the Federation, the

nationalist struggle "was subject to repeated splits" among rival factions contesting for

political power (Tordoff 1974, 10). The most serious split came in October, 1958 when

future Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and his followers left the ANC to form the

Zambia African National Congress (ZANC).

Kaunda challenged Nkumbula's leadership of the ANC, not simply

because the latter had become more politically moderate but because "in the eyes of his

colleagues the requirements of nationalist leadership itself had changed" (Mulford 1967,

74). Kaunda and his supporters were deeply inﬂuenced by several visits to India and

believed that a successful nationalist struggle had to be led by men committed to both the

10

political cause, and a belief in the transcendence of a liberation movement. ZANC was

later banned by the colonial government, but by that time it had become the platform

upon which Kaunda built the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the party

which would lead Zambia through the Federation and on into the First Republic (Makasa

1990)

Between 1958 and 1964 frequent, often violent, clashes occurred between

supporters of UNIP and the AN C. As these conﬂicts intensiﬁed, the ANC was less able

to maintain itself as a political force. Only three months after Kaunda had defected

another "breakaway group", this one under the direction of Mainza Chona, left the ANC

and merged with UNIP (Tordoff 1974, 10). And again in 1963, less than one year before

the pre-independence parliamentary elections to be held in January, 1964 another senior

ANC ofﬁcial, Job Michello, temporarily broke away and formed his own party, the

People's Democratic Congress (PDC). By the end of 1963 Nkumbula had "nothing to

offer except the purely negative threat that in those constituencies with both ANC and

PDC candidates they would inevitably split the anti-UNIP vote" (Mulford 1967, 321).

Under the terms of a Zambia's independence agreement parliamentary

elections were to be held on January 20 and 21, 1964. These elections would pave the

way for full independence later that year. According to the new constitution, the

"Legislative Council, renamed the Legislative Assembly, was expanded to seventy-ﬁve

members, of whom sixty-ﬁve were elected in main roll constituencies by African voters

and ten in reserved roll constituencies by European voters" (Mulford 1967, 315).

11

The results of the January elections were never in doubt. The ANC and its

breakaway PDC were "highly disorganized and bordering on bankruptcy"l (Mulford

1967, 316). UNIP "was the only political party that organized a territory-wide

registration campaign in preparation for the elections" and had the ﬁnances necessary to

accomplish the task (Mulford 1967, 315). Despite widespread fears, the January polls

were conducted freely, fairly and without incident. UNIP captured 69.6 percent of the

total votes cast, winning 55 of the 65 main roll parliamentary seats. The remaining ten

main roll seats were won by the ANC, and the National Progress Party (NPP),

representing the interests of white settlers and "Euro-Aﬁicans" captured the ten reserved

roll seats (Mulford 1967, 325).

Immediately after the January elections "Northern Rhodesia's Governor

invited Kaunda, as the country's ﬁrst Prime Minister, to form his new government"

(Mulford 1964, 329). Between January and October, 1964 the ﬁnal status of Zambian

independence was negotiated and at midnight on October 24, 1964 the ﬂag of the

independent Zambian nation was ﬁrst unfurled. "The date symbolized Zambia's future as

well as its past, for it marked not only the nineteenth anniversary of the United Nations,

but also the date on which six years earlier Kaunda had led his followers from the ANC to

the Zambian African National Congress" (Mulford 1964, 331).

 

l

The PDC hastily merged with the ANC just prior to the elections. As a result, their split simply

weakened the UNIP opposition during the crucial period just prior to the elections.

12

Zambia's First Republic: UNIP, the ANC and the Challenges of Independence

Between 1964 and 1972 President Kaunda ruled Zambia under the terms

agreed to in the 1964 Independence Constitution. This included the establishment of a

Westminster-style parliament, but with an independently elected executive president.

Political parties were free to contest presidential and parliamentary elections, though

UNIP controlled the political landscape. "Between 1964 and 1972 UNIP's ascendancy

was so marked that, though an opposition party -- the ANC -- existed throughout this

period, there was never any prospect of power alternating between UNIP and its main

rival" (Tordoff and Scott 1974, 108).

UNIP's dominance, however, belied the fragmented nature of its regime.

"The unevenness of the nationalist impact, as well as the short duration of the

anti-colonial struggle within a culturally and linguistically fragmented society, meant that

the unity which UNIP established was fragile" (Tordoff 1974, 10). One consequence of

this fragility was Kaunda's invocation of extraordinary powers constitutionally guaranteed

him through the declaration of a 'state of emergency'.

A state of emergency was ﬁrst issued in July, 1964 when ﬁghting broke

out in Chinsali, the largest city in Zambia's Northern Province, between followers of

Alice Lenshina's Lumpa Church and "the surrounding pro-UNIP village population"

(Tordoff 1974, 12. See also Chisala 1994, 281-297; Mwanakatwe 1994, 142). The

Lumpa Church, like the Aﬁican Watch Tower church, was opposed to colonial rule and,

later, the Federation, but was also opposed to the developing political power of the

African nationalist movement. "The ﬁghting went on sporadically for several months and

13

some 700 lives were lost" (Ibid.). The Colonial governor issued a state of emergency

which give him the authority to detain citizens and limit public gatherings to control the

violence. Though the Lumpa conﬂict ended in August, 1964, the state of emergency (and

consequent presidential authority) was kept in place throughout the First and Second

Republics, and was oﬁen used to obstruct opposition politicians, as is shown below.

Kaunda was further reminded of UNIP's fragile position during the 1968

presidential and parliamentary elections, the ﬁrst national elections held after

independence. Between 1964 and 1968 the UNIP government beneﬁted from continuing

economic growth spurred, in part, by rising copper prices and copper outputs. Politically,

however, the context was much different. "The atmosphere was no longer the euphoria of

treading the ﬁnal steps on the road to independence" (Molteno and Scott 1974, 156).

UNIP was beset by internal struggles and factional conﬂicts among groups competing for

preferential access to state resources and the course of post-independece government

policies. "From the late 1960's on, (Kaunda) was confronted with fragmentation of his

support," as the ANC had been prior to independence (van Donge 1995, 195).

The ANC was also quite weak entering the 1968 elections, "a victim of its

own organizational, ﬁnancial, and leadership failures and of harassment from local-level

UNIP ofﬁcials" (Ibid.). Despite these problems, and its more limited regional support

base, the ANC claimed 23 of the now 105-seat National Assembly. UNIP captured 81

seats and the remaining seat went to a political independent, formerly a member of the

NPP. The ANC beneﬁted from growing regional splits within the ruling party. For

example, in 1966 two UNIP MPs and two ANC MPs left their respective parties to form

14

the United Party (UP) to represent the interests of Zambia's Western Province.2 Though

the were not ofﬁcially united as a political coalition, UP parliamentary candidates

campaigned under the ANC's umbrella in Western Province. This gave the ANC a

foothold in both Southern Province, their support base, as well as the politically

contentious Western Province.

UNIP's troubles continued when, in August, 1971 another splinter group

left the ruling party to join the opposition. This group, which called themselves the

United Progressive Party (UPP), was led by Simon Kapwepwe, a Bemba-speaking UNIP

MP from Zambia's Northern Province. Kapwepwe and Kaunda were friends prior to

independence, both having worked as teachers in Chinsali, and later as members of the

"Welfare Association" protesting the Federation. During that time, and throughout the

ﬁrst years of independence, Kapwepwe had been a close conﬁdent, supporter, and advisor

to Kaunda. In fact, Kapwepwe served as vice-president from 1964 until he resigned in

1970.

At UNIP's Central Committee elections in 1967, regional and ethnic splits

developed which laid the groundwork for the eventual Kaunda-Kapwepwe split. During

these elections a "Lozi-Nyanja speaking group proceeded rapidly to form a sectional

group which was called 'Unity in the East' because most of the inﬂuential ﬁgures in the

organization originated from the Eastern Province" (Mwanakatwe 1994, 54-55). The

ascendency of this group, however, meant the relative decline in political importance of

 

2

One of the UNIP MPs was Nalumino Mundia, "a prominent UNIP activist and Minister in

Kaunda's ﬁrst Cabinet" who had lost his cabinet position earlier that year. (Mwanakatwe 1994, 144)

15

other regional blocs within the party, especially the Bemba-speaking group from Northern

province of which Kapwepwe was a member.

In August, 1971 Kaunda found out that a group of Bemba-speaking

dissidents from Copperbelt province had formed their own political party. When four

sitting UNIP MPs were identiﬁed as supporters of this movement, they were sanctioned

by the party and dismissed from the house. "Kapwepwe then came out in the open and

supported the new political organization," the UPP (Ibid., 59).

In February, 1972 the UNIP government banned the UPP and detained its

leaders, including Kapwepwe. UNIP members "seized the opportunity...to demand the

introduction of a one-party state in Zambia," a goal Kaunda had long endorsed. On

December 13, 1972 those supporters got their wish. Zambia's ﬁrst republic ended with

Kaunda's ascent of Bill No. 29 of 1972, Constitutional Amendment No. 5, which

outlawed multi-partyism and declared UNIP Zambia's sole, legal political party.

Zambia's Second Republic: Development of UNIP's Qne Pa_rty State

The introduction of the one-party state "constituted a watershed in

Zambia's political history, since it brought to an end an intensely competitive multi-party

political system" (Gertzel et. al. 1984, 2). The 1972 constitution ensured UNIP's primacy

over political affairs. Party organizations, such as UNIP's Central Committee, were in a

privileged position vis-a—vis similar state bodies, such as Cabinet, and Kenneth Kaunda

sat atop the developing party-state as elected executive president and leader of the United

16

National Independence Party. Under his control, UNIP dominated political and economic

affairs in an ever more repressive regime.

The challenge that faced President Kaunda was his desire to balance

greater political control with his philosophy of "Humanism" which "put man at the center

of all activity...Neither should one man exploit another, nor should he simply become a

cog in a state machine" (Mwanakatwe 1994, 49). Consequently, the best way to

understand political development during the Second Republic is to look at the one-party

state as "a strategy employed by the regime to achieve an balance between (political)

participation and institutional control" (Gertzel et. a1 1984, 4. See also Mwanakatwe

1994,87)

Again, however, UNIP faced the same problems it had earlier. Though it

governed the Zambian political landscape, UNIP was not a uniﬁed political movement.

Political parties were outlawed by Constitutional Amendment No. 5 but political dissent

was not. As a result, UNIP was an amalgam of politicians sometimes more, and

sometimes less, tied to the aims of President Kaunda and senior party ofﬁcials. "The

most striking aspect of Kaunda's rule was his attempt to make his party a maximum

coalition" (van Donge 1995, 195). Factional conﬂicts that developed between political

parties in the First Republic were simply carried over into ethnic, regional or linguistic

conﬂicts in the one-party state.

This pattern was similar to what Zolberg (1966) described regarding the

emergence of "party states" in West Africa. Here, too, single party regimes evolved as a

response to the dangers of social fragmentation and loss of political control by

17

government ofﬁcials. UNIP, like other party states, was a coalition of interests, rather

than a monolithic, hierarchical organization. Factions arose in the struggle for power in

the "incompletely centralized state" in which "political leaders build up networks of

supporters, bound to them as individuals by mutual self-interest, and perhaps by moral

ties such as friendship, kinship, or ideological commitment" (Cited in Baylies and Szeﬁel

1982, 76). "Post-colonial politics were shaped by conﬂict and competition within UNIP,

and the nature of UNIP ensured that there was plenty of this kind of competition"

(Baylies and Szeftel 1992, 78).

One consequence of continuing factional conﬂicts was the development of

patronage relationships that linked individuals to big men and city centers with rural

power centers, usually along regional, ethnic or linguistic lines. "UNIP helped create a

myth of 'tribalism' in order to justify its methods of political control, viz., the introduction

of the one-party state and patronage, which UNIP called tribal balancing" (Cromwell

1995, 156). These personalized, clientelist relationships pervaded Zambian politics,

especially in the Second Republic. "Party and government positions had constantly to be

distributed among different groupings so as to produce the least possible dissatisfaction"

(Baylies and Szeftel 1992, 78).

Another problem Kaunda faced during the Second Republic was the

continued organizational weakness of UNIP. "The caliber of the majority of UNIP's

administrative cadres was poor. Most of the party official were not well educated and

equipped to perform their responsibilities efﬁciently" (Mwanakatwe 1994, 95). After

independence, and throughout the First Republic, leaders of the nationalist movement,

18

many of whom became local and regional UNIP ofﬁcials, were absorbed into more

lucrative positions in the civil service, private sector, or the number growing parastatal

organizations.

Consequently, the local party ofﬁcials that remained were " given

additional responsibilities (during) the Second Republic that were beyond their capacity

to perform" (Mwanakatwe 1994, 96). As UNIP organizations and state organizations

were merged under the one-party constitution, UNIP's weakness' became the state's

weakness'. Paraphrasing from Bratton (1989), the Zambian state was weak "by any

conventional measure of institutional capacity; yet it remained the most prominent

landmark on the institutional landscape" (410).

In response to continued institutional weakness President Kaunda

accelerated the process of centralizing control of "the party and its government" in his

hands. "By 1975 UNIP had been transformed from a party of participation to a party of

control" (Bratton 1980, 227). Some of the ways in which this was accomplished that are

particularly important for this study included the vetting of potential parliamentary

candidates, the continued use of emergency powers and ever increasing state control of

economy and distribution of state resources to political supporters.

President Kaunda was adept at using electoral procedures to manipulate

the selection of candidates for parliamentary ofﬁce. Electoral regulations in the Second

Republic gave UNIP party ofﬁcials in parliamentary constituencies the responsibility to

organize candidates and campaigns during local primary elections. After these elections,

however, the names of the three highest vote getters were sent to UNIP's Central

19

Committee for approval. Parliamentary candidates could be rejected if their candidature

was considered to be "inimical to the interest of the state." The main problem was "a

clear and satisfactory deﬁnition was never given regarding the activities of a candidate

that were considered" inappropriate (Mwanakatwe 1994, 98).

Nor was the government reticent to use these powers. In 1973 UNIP's

Central Committee disqualiﬁed 26 different parliamentary candidates, most of whom

were from Zambia's Eastern and Northern Provinces. In 1978, 30 different candidates

were vetted by the committee, including six sitting Members of Parliament. In 1988, the

last elections in the one-party regime, "more that 130 candidates for the legislature,

including seven incumbents, were disqualiﬁed ﬁ'om standing for elections"

(Mwanakatwe 1994, 100). Had these decisions been based on established, non-partisan

criteria it is likely that fewer people would have criticized Kaunda's actions. "However,

in a number of cases, and perhaps as regards sitting MPs disqualiﬁcation seemed to be

intended in part to prevent the return of parliamentarians who had been particularly

critical of the executive during the previous Parliament" (Baylies and Szeﬁel 1978, 87).

Another way in which Kaunda controlled political discourse was through

the continued use of detention powers given him as part of a state of emergency. Recall

that the British government granted the Colonial Governor emergency powers in July,

1964 to quell the violence that had erupted between followers of the Lumpa Church and

local villagers. However, President Kaunda pressed the National Assembly to renew the

state of emergency declaration throughout the First and Second Republics.3

 

3

Under the 1964 and 1972 Constitutions emergency declarations expired after six months unless

they were renewed by parliament. The claimed rationale for these extensions during this period included

the threats Zambia faced from military reprisals over its support for ZAPU and ANC exiles living in Zambia

20

Under the Emergency Powers Act (1964) and provisions contained in the

Public Security Regulations the President had the authority to detain individuals' without

trial during national emergencies, despite constitutional provisions designed to protect

individuals' rights. Though the government could hold citizens without justiﬁcation for

only 14 days, after this period "the authorities were only required to furnish the detainee

with the grounds for his detention" (Mwanakatwe 1994, 144). In practice, most detention

orders concluded that "the alleged activities of the detainee were regarded as prejudicial

to the public safety and that if left at large the detainee might continue to persist in the

alleged and unlawful activities" (Ibid.). These were usually sufﬁcient grounds to deﬂect

any legal challenges to their continued incarceration.

As with candidate vetting, the problem was not with emergency powers

per se, but with their application. Though designed to protect the country from crime and

preserve "public security," detention powers were more frequently used as a tool to stiﬂe

political dissent. Patrick Mvunga, a long-time UNIP MP and member of the Kaunda

government said: "Whether by design or coincidence, the victims of the state of

emergency (were) invariably political opponents" (Quoted in Mwanakatwe 1994, 144).

For example, President Kaunda exercised his authority to the fullest when

in February, 1972, he detained 125 suspected members of Simon Kapwepwe's

now-banned United Progress Party in Northern Province. In a statement justifying the

mass arrests Kaunda said: "The UPP had ample opportunity to declares its policies. It

never did so. On the other had, violence was threatened, and violence occurred. Every

week brought news of beatings and damage to property" (Quoted in Chisala 1994, 313).

 

during the period of South African destabilizaton and UDI in Southern Rhodesia.

21

However, these detentions, and others throughout the Second Republic, simply weakened

UNIP's organizational and administrative operations at the local level. "(Kaunda's) mass

detentions hit UNIP's leadership in the mining towns on the Copperbelt" especially hard.

"The party seemed to turn against itself“ (van Donge 1995, 195).

The Second Republic is also noted for the dramatic increase in state

involvement in economic affairs. At independence, the UNIP government inherited one

of the richest econonries in southern Aﬁica, and beneﬁted from a signiﬁcant increase in

copper prices in the late 19603 and early 19703 (Bratton 1994, 104). However, not even

increasing copper prices could keep up with the inefﬁciencies created by the distribution

of economic opportunities as rewards for the UNIP party faithful (Ibid.). Political ofﬁcers

became dependent on economic patronage provided by the executive branch -- "a strategy

exempliﬁed by the slogan 'It Pays to Belong to UNIP'" (Baylies and Szeﬁel 1992, 79).

In 1975 the copper boom from which the UNIP government had long

beneﬁted came to an end. Large-scale cutbacks in world consumption were exacerbated

by the OPEC oil crisis and the Vietnam War. In addition, high copper prices in 1973-74

had stimulated copper production and dramatically increased international copper

outputs. By 197 5 "world copper stocks were estimated at between 1.5 and 2.5 million

tons, three times the normal stockpile" (Hawkins 1991, 843). Without the revenues that

copper provided, the state-centered economic developmental model promoted by UNIP

could not be sustained. "UNIP's strategy of economic centralization was self-defeating in

that it produced economic stagnation, insufﬁcient goods to hand out as part of the

22

patronage system and, therefore, created dissent and hastened the collapse of the UNIP

govemmen " (Cromwell 1995, 156).

Zambia's Third Republic: The MMD and the Return to Multi-pa_r’gzism

The 1991 democratization process in Zambia was similar to that of other

sub-Saharan nations. In Zambia, as elsewhere, the transition "started with political

protests, evolved through liberalized reforms, culminated in competitive elections, and

ended with the installation of (a) new political regime" (Bratton and van de Walle 1997,

3). The ability of opposition political groups to unite, defeat an incumbent president, and

inaugurate a new, more democratic, constitution led some scholars to hail Zambia as "a

model for democratic change" in Africa (Joseph 1992, 199). As this study will show, that

was an optimistic view of events. Nonetheless, in 1991 Zambians, outside observers, and

the international donor community all trumpeted Zambia as a model democracy in

southern Africa.

Popular political protests erupted in June, 1990 (Bratton 1992). Zambia

had experienced two other signiﬁcant periods of civil unrest, in November, 1974 and

December, 1986, but these protests would be different. Pressure to institute some type of

economic and/or political reforms had begun in December, 1986 when "one round of

price increases produced food riots in which several people were killed by Zambian

security forces" (Baylies and Szeftel 1992, 80). A short-lived military coup attempt took

place in 1990 and in late 1990 and early 1991 there were calls to replace Kaunda with

businessmen Enoch Kavindele as President of UNIP.4 Parliamentary debates had also

 

4

One of the most contentious debates within UNIP prior to the reintroduction of multi-partyism

23

become increasingly critical of UNIP and its one-party regime. Many of those who were

later members of the MMD (and ministers in its ﬁrst government), such as Michael Sata,

Bennie Mwiinga, and Alfeo Harnbayi, were outspoken back bench parliamentarians in the

last years of the Second Republic.

The popular protests that took place in 1990 were a response to President

Kaunda's decision, under International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure, to remove the

state-sponsored subsidy on maize meal, Zambia's staple food. "This meant something on

the order of 100% to 140% price increases" that took place virtually overnight (Chan

1991, 9). The problem for President Kaunda was his government had "become so

dependent on international assistance that it could not easily back away from its

commitments to shrink government subsidies" (Bratton 1994, 113).

Under severe international and domestic pressure, President Kaunda had

also announced in May, 1990 that "there was going to be a referendum the following

August on the possibility of a multi-party state in Zambia" (Chan 1991, 9). This call,

combined with the sudden removal of price subsidies caused political opponents to

cohere into an opposition coalition and "develop a nascent political organization aimed at

ending the system of single-party rule" (Bratton 1994, 113).

The ﬁrst important meeting of the opposition occurred on July 20, when

two young members of the Econorrrics Association of Zambia, Akashambatwa

Mbikusita-Lewanika and Derrick Chitala, organized an Inaugural National Conference to

 

occurred at UNIP's "Fiﬁh National Convention" which took place in March, 1990. At this convention "a

few delegates for the ﬁrst time in more than sixteen years of the single-party system of government

questioned its continuation." (Mwanakatwe 1994, 196) Among those who spoke at this convention

included Sikota Wina, a founding member of UNIP and Vernon Mwaanga, Kaunda's long-time Minister of

Foreign Affairs and Zambian representative to the United Nations.

24

establish "the Alliance for Democracy and Development (AAD) as a political platform

for all citizens who aspire for democracy and development in Zambia and to create a

broad-based steering committee" to bring that movement into effect (Mbikusita-

Lewanika and Chitala 1990, vi). The AAD moniker was later replaced by the Movement

for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), and Zambia's ﬁrst viable opposition coalition was

born.

Lewanika and Chitala quickly recruited others to join the MD, including

Vernon Mwaanga and Arthur Wina, Zambia's ﬁrst Finance Minister. They also identiﬁed

trade unions as a potential base of political support and it was through meetings with

union officials that the Secretary-General of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

(ZCTU), Newstead Zimba, and its Chairman, Frederick Chiluba, joined the political ﬁght.

By the time the Inaugural Conference was held other prominent Zambians had joined the

movement, including Humphrey Mulemba, a former Prime Minister in UNIP, Sikota

Wina, Arthur Wina's brother and former Minister of Information and Broadcasting, and

Brigadier General Godfrey Miyanda, who had been detained by Kaunda in 1980 for

treason "The origins of the MMD were amongst academic circles, but this group had no

constituency and little political experience and, therefore, it quickly became dependent on

businessmen for money and on former politicians for political organization" (Cromwell

1 995 , 1 69).

The Inaugural Conference was chaired by Arthur Wina and resolved that

before a national referendum on multi-partyism take place the national state of emergency

should be rescinded, voters be re-registered, and that personal ﬁ'eedoms be increased.

25

"Although the pro-democracy activists undertook to mobilize the people for the

referendum itself, they also recorded that in the light of the economic difﬁculties

prevailing in the country at the time that the Referendum was a 'national ﬁnancial

disservice'... and urged the government to accept the reality that the One-Party system was

no longer acceptable to the people" (Mwanakatwe 1994, 199-200).

The UNIP government was woefully unprepared for the popularity of the

MMD's demands. "Kaunda tried to delay the referendum for a year, using his opponents

own argument for a national registration of voters prior to any election. But the President

was soon faced with huge urban crowds chanting the opposition slogan, The Hour has

Come! These peaceful rallies left Kaunda with little choice but to accede to the

opposition's main demand to move directly to multi-party elections" (Bratton 1994, 117).

In July, 1990 President Kaunda announced his decision to postpone the

referendum on multi-partyism. Later, in September, 1990 he declared that no referendum

would take place. In one year's time, he said, (October, 1991) multi-party elections would

be held for the presidency as well as seats in the National Assembly. In December, 1990

the National Assembly approved legislation which allowed the registration of political

parties and the MMD, which had until that time only been a political "movement" became

one of the ﬁrst ofﬁcial political parties in the Zambia's multi-party Third Republic.

The ﬁrst National Convention of the MMD was held in Lusaka from

February 27 to March 2, 1991. The main objective of the convention was to elect senior

ofﬁcers of the MMD and to approve the party's constitution. There were three main

contestants for the post of party president, Frederick Chiluba, Humphrey Mulemba, and

26

Arthur Wina. Though these internal elections were regarded as "free and fair," some

delegates accused the contestants of vote buying and election day dirty-tricks.

Nonetheless, Frederick Chiluba was chosen as the ﬁrst MMD president by an

overwhelming majority of the MMD delegates. "It was believed that Chiluba had an edge

over the other candidates (especially Mulemba and Wina) because of his record of

protests against Kaunda and UNIP during the Second Republic" (Mwanakatwe 1994,

203). Unlike the other candidates, Chiluba had never served in the UNIP government and

had, in fact, rejected an offer to bring the ZCTU under the wing of UNIP in the Second

Republic.5

After its ﬁrst National Conference the MMD began its electoral campaign

in earnest, beginning with demands for constitutional reform. Debates over the new

constitution began in October, 1990 when the Kaunda government appointed Professor

Patrick Mvunga chairman of the constitutional commission. Protesting what they

perceived to be the "pro-UNIP" nature of the commission, Arthur Wina and

Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika refused to take the seats offered them as MMD

representatives.6

The MMD vigorously protested the proposed separation of powers

between executive and legislative branches, believing the constitution "consolidated too

much power in the ofﬁce of the president. The MD particularly objected to the

provision conferring on the president the power to appoint members of the cabinet from

 

5

It was also widely rumored that Chiluba, along with other senior trade union ofﬁcials had been

poisoned by the UNIP government while staying in a Lusaka hotel on union business. Though some

consider this story apocryphal it only furthered Chiluba's stature as a committed opponent of the one-party

state and victim of UNIP abuse. (Chiluba 1994, Mwanakatwe 1994)

6

The process of constitutional negotiation is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four

27

outside the National Assembly, to unilaterally dissolve the National Assembly and to veto

acts of the National Assembly" (NDI 1992, 28). Instead, ofﬁcials of the MMD

"advocated the re-introduction of the old parliamentary constitution handed down by the

British government at Independence in 1964" (Mwanakatwe 1994, 207. See also van

Donge 1995, 201). The MMD also fought for the repeal of the state of emergency which

had been in place in July, 1964. At least one senior member of the MMD, Levy

Mwanawasa, announced that the MMD would boycott the October elections if these

disputes were not resolved, though that claim was later rejected by other party ofﬁcials

Constitutional disputes came to a head in July, 1991 when Chiluba

"refused to attend a meeting in State House with representatives of other opposition

parties" at which the new constitution was to be discussed (Mwanakatwe 1994, 218). On

July 19, students from the University of Zambia (UNZA) held a meeting to "promote

compromise over the new constitution" (Ibid.). Surprisingly, Kaunda took part in these

discussions though UNZA had been a locus of political dissent since the early 1970's.

Later that day Kaunda held meetings with Zambian national church leaders to further

promote a political compromise. Church leaders urged the government and opposition to

meet so as to reduce uncertainty, maintain peace and promote a wider discussion about

the nature of the new Zambia state7 (Mwanakatwe 1994, van Donge 1995).

Finally, on July 23, 1991 "Kaunda and Chiluba met one-on-one for the

ﬁrst time since Chiluba's election as leader of the MMD" (NDI 1992, 29). During these

 

7

Church leaders also protested the growing incidents of violence in campaign rallies. In particular,

they condemned an incident in which spectators through empty beer cans and "other similar missiles" at

President Kaunda while he was attending an international soccer match at Lusaka's Independence Stadium.

(Mwanakatwe 1994, 219)

28

negotiations, held at Lusaka's Anglican cathedral, Chiluba and Kaunda agreed that the

National Assembly would continue to consider the constitution, but more time would be

given for additional debate. Negotiations between UNIP and the MMD continued for

another week and an amended constitution was announced on July 31. Parliament

formally adopted the new constitution on August 24, 1991 and was dissolved soon after.

On September 4, 1991 President Kaunda ofﬁcially announced that multi-party elections

would be held on October 31, 1991.

To the MMD's dismay, President Kaunda also announced that the Attorney

General had advised him that "lifting the state of emergency required the concurrence of

the National Assembly, which had been dissolved several weeks earlier" (Bjorlund et. al

1992, 414). Many rejected Kaunda's claim that this was an "innocent mistake".

Ultimately, however, the MMD "decided not to make the lifting of the state of emergency

a litmus test for participation in the elections" (Ibid.). Other controversies arose over the

election rules, demarcation of constituency boundaries and voter's registration, though

none were sufﬁcient to postpone the scheduled elections (Bjorlund et. a1 1992,

Mwanakatwe 1994, van Donge 1995).

Nor would Kaunda's attempts to use state economic resources for electoral

beneﬁt slow the democratization process. Kaunda concentrated UNIP's campaign in the

rural areas, acknowledging that the opposition had gained its strongest footholds in the

urban centers. To promote UNIP as a friend of rural dwellers, 11 hereditary chiefs were

included as parliamentary candidates on UNIP tickets, increases were made in the

allowances given to traditional rulers and the government "distributed Toyota Land

29

Cruisers to several senior chiefs, notably in Eastern Province" (Bratton 1994, 119).

Kaunda also attempted to implement salary increases for military ofﬁcials and implement

several new capital projects, though both efforts were rejected by the country's creditors.

The MMD campaigned on a platform that promised both economic and

political reform. Their election campaigners and parliamentary candidates "warned the

electorate that a vote for the UNIP in the 1991 election would enable the same people to

continue mis-managing the economy thereby leaving the ordinary people to continue

suffering with inadequate schools, hospitals, homes, and jobs. They contended quite

effectively that while "peace and stability" brought about by the UNIP government was

appreciated, people's stomachs were empty" (Mwanakatwe 1994, 240). It was a

campaign message UNIP simply could not overcome.

Polling took place on October 31, 1991. Voter turnout was low, only

45.4% of those eligible participated, "but foreign observers pronounced the campaign and

the polling free and fair" (The Courier 1993, 32). "As early election results trickled in

from around the country, a clear trend emerged: Chiluba and the MMD were headed for a

landslide victory" (NDI 1992, 58). Chiluba captured 75.8% of the total votes cast in the

presidential elections and won at least 70% of the ballots cast in the eight provinces he

won. President Kaunda received a majority of votes only in his historical stronghold of

Eastern Province. MMD parliamentary candidates were equally successful, winning 125

out of the 150 elected parliamentary seats. UNIP was left a regional minority party, with

19 of its 25 seats in Eastern Province. As Kaunda predicted, the urban centers of Lusaka

and the Copperbelt were swept by the MMD.

30

No provisions had been made for an ofﬁcial hand-over of power and the

nation held its collective breath until November 1, 1991 when Kaunda, "in an act of great

statesmanship, humbly accepted defeat in a television and radio address" (ND1 1992, 59).

The next day, November 2, 1992 Frederick Chiluba was sworn in as the second President

of Zambia and the ﬁrst elected under a multi-party political systems since the 1968

general elections.

The opposition's victory in Zambia was a bellwether for those who sought

to develop multi-party democratic regimes in Africa. The creation of a united opposition

and peaceful transition of power was hailed as an example of the ways in which political

reforms could build on existing civic movements. "The call for multi-partyism should

not be seen as a sudden break with the past, but rather as a logical expression of

opposition which had always been there" (van Donge 1995 , 198).

However, the strength of the democratization movement in Zambia,

namely, the diversity of participants uniﬁed by the desire to defeat President Kaunda, also

became its most obvious weakness. Since 1991 the democratization movement has not

unfolded in such a picturesque manner (Aﬁica Conﬁdential 34(10); Aﬁica Watch 1993,

Simutanyi 1997). The MMD's overwhelming victory effectively replaced one single

party with another and organized political opposition, the hallmark of democratic

systems, has been weak and ineffective. Corruption has continued and the pace of

economic development has been slower than many had predicted. Increased political

participation and representation seems not to have had a meaningful inﬂuence on

legislative independence, as the next chapters will show.

31

This study examines the legislature's roles in the events outlined above.

For example, how did the legislature perform in the context of an active, albeit

contentious, multi-party political regime in the First Republic? Were the ANC and NPP

minorities able to inﬂuence policy making? Did their MP3 actively represent the interests

of their constituents in house debates? How did legislative performance change, if it

changed at all, after the introduction of the one-party state in 1972? Did the UNIP

government really create a one-party participatory democracy? Were parliamentary

debates structured and lifeless? Finally, how has legislative performance changed since

the reintroduction of multi-partyism in 1991. Have competitive elections rekindled

vibrant debates among legislators? Has the Assembly been able to exert itself as an

independent branch of government on par with the executive, or not?

Dependent Variables, Independent Variables & Theories of Legislative Performance

The focus of this study is legislative performance and legislative

development. Consequently, the dependent variables, described in detail in Chapters

Two and Three, capture various dimensions of legislative behavior over time. Early

legislative studies were often limited to macro-institutional measures of political

performance, such as the legislature's ability to make laws. If that law-making role was

minor, legislatures were often regarded as insigniﬁcant actors in the political process.

The ﬁrst signiﬁcant contribution this study makes is to differentiate

between legislatures' and legislators' performance. This distinction allows us to examine

the effects of time on both institutional performance, such as making laws, amending

32

bills, and scrutinizing national budgets, in contrast with the behavior of individual

parliamentarians, including their participation in house debates and relations with their

constituents. For example, Parliamentarians are called upon to perform a myriad of tasks.

They must be teachers, counselors, representatives, legislators, and ﬁnanciers, often

simultaneously. No macro-institutional measure of performance would adequately

capture how these behaviors were affected by the introduction, suspension, and

re-introduction of multi-partyism, for example.

At the same time, however, examining only individual-level behavior

would disregard the ways in which national legislatures, as whole, affect policy and

decision-making. De-emphasizing one dimension of legislative performance at the

expense of the other would be both improper and foolhardy. Dividing legislative

performance into its institutional and individual level components provides additional

insights and, hopefully, mitigates the problems of earlier studies.

The real challenge is to identify the factors (independent variables) that

affect legislative performance. Why did the Zambian legislature behave as it did? What

factors enhanced legislative development and what factors depressed it? Rarely in the

social sciences do single, over-arching theories fully explain the variety of observed

political outcomes. More often than not, debates exist between different, competing

theories and the conclusions they reach are eclectic and multi-variate in nature. Some

explanations matter more in one case, or over one time period, than they do in other cases

or other circumstances. Legislative performance in Zambia is no different. The three

theoretical approaches used here provide a way to look broadly at the universe of factors

33

that might inﬂuence legislative performance. They allow us to compare "structural"

explanations versus "agency" oriented ones, and to put those explanations in the context

of a given administrative and organizational environment. For example, overemphasizing

the inﬂuence of formal rules might cause us to ignore how individuals' actions are

effected by their loyalties to an important political patron. But, neither formal

explanations nor political patronage could anticipate the particular, and pernicious,

inﬂuence the Assembly Speaker has had on Zambian legislative development, as will be

discussed.

A more comprehensive review of the relevant literatures are presented in

Chapters Four, Five, and Six. For the moment, however, these approaches are brieﬂy

discussed below. The ﬁrst theoretical perspective is derived from one branch of the

neo-institutional literature and examines how legislative performance was shaped by

structural factors, namely, the formal rules embodied in Zambia's three national

constitutions.

Did constitutional engineering during Zambia's three political Republics

change the performance of parliaments or parliamentarians in Zambia, as Putnam (1989)

argued it did in Italy? If parliamentary performance is inﬂuenced by changes in formal

rules one would expect to see a shift in political power to the executive branch away from

the legislative after Zambia rescinded its multi-party constitution in 1972. One would

then expect political power to shift back to the legislative branch after the 1991

democratization re-introduced competition among political parties. Chapter Four

presents several tests of this general hypothesis. For example, assuming the National

34

Assembly holds its ratiﬁcation powers dear, we would predict that legislative hearings to

approve presidential nominees would be more elaborate and contentious during the

multi-party First and Third Republics than they would be in the one-party Second

Republic.

An organzational capacig; approach is next used to try and explain

legislative performance in Zambia. Because few cross-national studies of organizational

capacity have been conducted, especially in Africa, this study applies insights from the

literature on American state political systems to the issue of National Assembly

administration. The basic outline presented in Chapter Five mirrors Ronald Hedlund and

Patricia Freeman's (1981) work on the Wisconsin and Iowa state legislatures in which

they used an "organizational systems theory" to analyze the relationship between

institutional attributes ("capacity") and decisional processing, i.e., their ability to make

laws. "(Organization theory) is concerned with assessing how various organizational

features, such as people, access to resources, technology, and the organizations structure,

affect the operations of a state legislature" (Hedlund and Freeman 1981, 88).

One can easily hypothesize that if MPs lack the resources necessary to

communicate with their constituents, such as transportation to their districts, phones, and

mail service even the most knowledgeable and empathetic MP3 will be hard pressed to

facilitate understanding between the government and their constituents. Parliamentarians'

abilities is another important aspect of institutional capacity. If MP caliber is low,

constituents are less likely to recognize them as valuable or important sources of

information or to seek their support in an attempt to understand government policy.

35

Facing resource constraints for constituency visits, parliamentarians will be viewed as

"out of touch" or isolated in the capital without concern for their districts. Finally, these

problems will be exacerbated when MP3 are appointed to government ministries and as

Parliamentary sessions lengthen. The longer MP3 spend in the capital, the more negative

perception constituents will hold of them.

The ﬁnal theoretical perspective used here examines the inﬂuence that

personal, neo-patrimonial relationships had on legislative performance. Political power

and political efﬁcacy are often derived not ﬁ'om the formal rules or from one's abilities,

but from the relationships one has with other political ﬁgures. In the extreme,

"patrimonial" or "Boss politics" dominates. Patrirnonial relationships are purely

instrumental, in that they "ascribe authority to a person, rather than an oﬁice-holder, who

is ﬁrmly anchored in a social and political order" (Clapham 1985, 46). Political patrons

exchange their access to state resources for the support of their clients. Their client, in

turn, support the goals and ambitions of their political patron.

It has long been argued that patrimonial relationships pervade African

political systems. How, then, has legislative behavior in Zambia been shaped by these

personal connections between political patrons and their clients, and to what degree have

these relationships been affected by the re-introduction of multi-partyism? If the promise

of economic beneﬁts encourages members to support a particular political patron, one

would predict that legislators would voice their support during house debates as a way to

show the patron their loyalty. One might also expect that MP3 would follow the lead of

36

important patrons in the legislature and vote with them on even controversial issues that

confront the Assembly. Chapter Six explores these questions in greater detail.

These three theoretical lenses form a trio of elegant, yet powerful

explanations of legislative performance that contrasts strucutural and agency-oriented

explanations within the context of a given organizational environment. This study will

show that structural explanations (formal rules) can better account for the variance in

institutional-level behavior, especially after political transitions and that patronage

theories better account for individual-level behavior across time. The pernicious

inﬂuence of organizational capacity affects both instituional and individual-level

performance and is most noticeable as one moves away from the transition period.

Definition of Terms

Throughout this study the terms Parliament, National Assembly, and

Legislature will be used. Unless otherwise speciﬁed they all refer to the Zambian

parliament, ofﬁcially known as the "National Assembly". The legislators in these

assemblies (the MP3 or Parliamentarians) are all elected to serve a ﬁve-year term, unless

they were elected in a parliamentary "by-election" to replace a Member who resigned or

died while in ofﬁce.

Seven different Assemblies sat between 1964 and 1994, the period

examined here. Obviously not all seven Assemblies served their full ﬁve-year terms. The

ﬁrst Assembly sat from 1964-68, the second from 1968-73, the third from 1973-78, the

fourth from 1978-1983, and the last full assembly examined in this study served from

37

1983 until 1988. The sixth Assembly, elected in October of 1988, served only three years

before it was dissolved by President Kaunda to usher in new national elections as part of

the 1991 democratization movement. Finally, data was available only for the ﬁrst three

years of the seventh Assembly, though the full term lasted from October 1991 until

November, 1996. Data collections problems are discussed more fully in Chapter Two.

Each year in a ﬁve (or three) year Assembly term is known as a session.

For example, the data presented here describes performance from the ﬁrst session of the

ﬁrst Assembly (1964), through the third session of the seventh Assembly (1994), for a

total of 31 different Assembly sessions across Zambia's three Republics. Finally, within

each annual session the house may have been convened for three or four different sittings,

each of which lasts from two to twelve weeks. Four annual sittings were more common

in the First Republic, though three longer sittings have since become the norm. The

longest annual sitting takes place between January and March when the estimates of

expenditure and revenue are discussed. This is known as the annual "budget session".

Parliamentary debates are run by the Speaker of the Assembly (also known

as Mr. Speaker) and he is assisted by the Clerk of the Assembly (the Clerk). During

debates MP3 are free to speak whether they sit on the ﬁ'ont or back bench of the house.

Front bench Members are sitting MP3 who are members of the government. This

includes Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Under Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries.

Back bench MP3 are either Members of the ruling party who are not a member of

government or are "loyal members of the (political) opposition" (Standing Orders 1988).

Conclusion

38

This study will contribute to our understanding of both Zambian politics

and institutional development, especially in new democracies. Because legislatures'

behavior is not unidimensional, parliamentary performance is examined at institutional

(Assembly) and individual (MP) levels. Since no single theoretical perspective can

adequately explain 30 years of legislative behavior, three different theoretical

perspectives are used to explain them. Finally, by harnessing an diverse assortment of

data, this study should not depend on any particular result. Each perspective and each

dimension of behavior will be examined against data gathered from surveys, and

documentary sources. As a result this study should further our understanding of what

legislative performance is, why it changes, and the role legislatures play in new

democratic regimes.

The next two chapters articulate the dependent variables examined in this

study, namely, the different dimensions of Zambian parliamentary performance. Chapter

two describes parliamentary performance in the First and Second Republics, covering the

period between October, 1964 and October, 1991. Particular attention is given to

distinguishing institutional-level behavior from that of individual parliamentarians and to

charting how each dimension of performance changed over time. Chapter three examines

parliamentary performance in the ﬁrst three years of the Third Republic (1992-1994) and

contrasts it with performance baselines established in the multi-party First, and one-party

Second Republics. First, however, let us begin with a discussion of what constitutes

legislative performance.

Chapter Two:

National Assembly Performance, 1964 -- 1991

It must be clear to those that can read that Zambia's most

expensive rubber-stamp is our most worthy National

Assembly that costs the country and the taxpayers some

K3,000,000 annually.

And yesterday Parliament underlined one thing. It was the

fact that it no longer matters about saying anything in the

House for or against any bill, because if it is defeated it will

just be brought back until the Government wins.

Our 85 members on Government benches could surely have

found more justiﬁed methods of getting what they wanted

without the apparent denigration of the most important

institution in our country.

"Opinion." Times ofZambia, January 28, 1970.

The Times ofZambia newspaper has not been the only critic of Zambian

National Assembly performance. Observers and scholars alike have lamented the linrited

role the National Assembly plays in Zambian politics. Authors such as Bates (1976),

Baylies and Szeftel (1984), Bratton (1980), Chikulo (1986), and Tordoff (1974) have long

decried Assembly weakness, including the quality of house debates, the limited degree to

which members represented the interests of their constituents, methods by which laws are

approved, and the Assembly's inability to act as an effective counterweight to executive

authority. Only a few years after having gained political independence Hakes and

39

40

Helgerson (1973) found that the "most common aspects of parliamentary life, such as the

use of private members' bills, question time, ministerial statements, and the roles of the

selected and sessional committees (had) fallen into disuse." (339)

Despite these criticisms the Times newspaper passage cited above also

shows the degree to which Zambians respected the National Assembly, despite its

failings. Parliament wrestled with popular demands for economic development,

reconciled archaic and outdated colonial-era legislation, and laid the foundation for their

new, independent nation. The National Assembly was, in former president Kaunda's

words, "the peoples' house." For example, Gupta (1965) noted that "the debates of the

National Assembly generated great public interest and the publicity given its proceedings

in daily newspapers provided an opportunity to the people to know what goes on in the

higher echelons of national administration." (53)

This chapter explores these two conﬂicting viewpoints. Were Zambian

National Assemblies in the First and Second Republics mere "rubber stamps" on

executive actions or do those critiques unfairly condemn a more popular and independent

legislative body? Two aspects of National Assembly performance are examined here:

(1) how well the post-independence legislature fulﬁlled its responsibilities, and (2) how

Assembly performance changed between 1964 and 1991. Did the house fulﬁll its

law-making function? Did legislative performance vary between members of different

political parties? Did members participate in house debates? With what issues were

members especially concerned? Did members represent constituents' interests to

government?

41

These questions are addressed using a series of performance indicators

speciﬁcally collected for this study. Some of the sources used here include: Verbatim

Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates (commonly known as the Hansards), National

Assembly reports, and interviews with government ofﬁcials. This chapter presents data

from the First and Second Zambian Republics which lasted from 1964 to 1991. This

includes the introduction of multi-party politics at independence in 1964 and adoption of

one-party rule in 1973. Chapter Three compares these periods to National Assembly

performance since Zambia's 1991 return to multi-party politics and determines whether

assembly performance changed as a result of that important transition.

In many respects, the Times newspaper quoted above appropriately labeled

early Zambian Assemblies as rubber stamps for executive decisions. Data presented here

shows that the government (namely, the President and his Cabinet) dominated the

legislative process and that the Assembly never took an active role in proposing new

legislative initiatives. Furthermore, an examination of house debates will underscore the

limited role members played in the decision making process and the degree to which

participation was dominated by key groups and individuals.

However, this chapter will also show how the assembly, and its members,

inﬂuenced government decisions in other ways often ignored by Zambian parliamentary

critics. One example discussed here is the 1984 debate in which members prevented the

government from rushing parliamentary business and adjourrring the National Assembly,

a startling example of Members' independence in the one-party era.

42

All too often distinctions between responsibilities of the legislature versus

those of the legislator are overlooked, especially in the developing world. We blame

individual MP3 for their failure to approve the budget, and house for its failure to satisfy

members' constituents. In order to evaluate Zambian National Assembly performance

more fairly I distinguish between those responsibilities normally ascribed to parliaments

and assemblies and those ascribed to individual Members of Parliament.

For example, no individual MP can, alone, approve legislative proposals.

That is the responsibility of the entire house. By the same token, it is not the Assembly's

responsibility to establish ties with members' constituents; individual MP3 are

appropriately held accountable for this task. This distinction helps to clarify where

decisions are made within the legislature, identify the individuals or institutions

responsible for those decisions and better understand the contributions each makes to the

consolidation of a new democracy.

Law-making, an "institutional" responsibility, is discussed ﬁrst. Debate

and constituency service, a task for which individual members are held responsible, is

discussed second. While individuals analyze and debate legislative proposals, only the

house can approve new legislative proposals. Individual-level data is then used to explain

house debates and constituency service, though the Assembly is the arena in which these

debates are held.

The next two chapters analyze Zambian National Assembly performance

over time. They are intended as descriptions, rather than critiques of the legislature and

legislators. It would be easy to criticize the Zambian Assembly if the challenges of

43

building a legislature in a nation that was only a years old are ignored. However, it is also

unreasonable to excuse inadequate parliamentary performance because of inexperience,

history, or bad luck. Therefore, the performance analyses presented in the these two

chapters gauges assembly achievements against their legal responsibilities, Members'

wishes, Presidential demands, and Zambians' own expectations, rather than what

established parliamentary systems accomplish. This approach focuses on the trajectory of

institutional development in Zambia, in terms of local expectations, rather than critiquing

performance against an arbitrary and imaginary scale of ideal parliamentary performance.

Later chapters will compare Zambian parliamentary performance to other nations that

have undergone similar democratic transitions. First we will begin with a discussion of

law-making in the First and Second Republics, examining how the volume and type of

legislative business changed over time, as did the Assembly's ability to inﬂuence the

legislative process.

Legislative Performance: Law Making in the First and Second Republics

According to the Constitution, the primary function of the Zambian

National Assembly is to make and pass laws.

The legislative power of the Republic of Zambia shall vest

in Parliament which shall consist of the President and the

National Assembly. Subject to the provisions of this

Constitution, the legislative power of the Parliament shall

be exercised by bills passed by the National Assembly and

assented to by the President. (Constitution of Zambia Act,

(1991) Art. 62 and 78{1})

44

In this study Zambian National Assembly performance is ﬁrst assessed according to this

constitutional criterion, namely, its participation in the legislative process. Speciﬁc

attention is paid to how often legislation was introduced in the house, how well those

legislative proposals were considered, and the degree to which the house was willing and

able to amendments legislative initiatives.

Immediately after independence, the Assembly was extremely busy

debating new laws to replace those annulled and invalidated by the end of colonial rule.

Between 1964 and 1968 the ﬁrst National Assembly considered an average of 67 bills per

year. Never again would the average annual number of bills considered reach that level.

In the second Assembly, which lasted from 1969 though 1973, the house heard an

average of 49 bills per year. Between 1974 and 1978 the third Assembly heard 32 bills

per year. And by the fourth Assembly, which lasted from 1979 until 1983, the National

Assembly heard an average of only 28 bills per year, a decrease of over 58% in ﬁfteen

years. This pattern is shown in Table 2.0, below.

Table 2.0 -- Legislative Business in the First and Second Republics

 

Assembly

Years

Average Number of Bills

 

First Republic

First

1964-1968

67

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45

As Table 2.0 indicates, there was a moderate increase in the volume of

legislative business heard by the ﬁfth Assembly, which sat from 1984 until 1988. During

the four years for which data was available the house heard an average of 35 bills per

year, an increase of 25 percent over the previous Assembly. By the sixth Assembly, the

number of new legislative proposals increased to 38 per year, as the last row in column

four indicates.

It is important to note that data for 1987 and 1989 were unavailable.

Three different archives were used as sources of National Assembly documents: the

National Assembly Library, University of Zambia Library, and Zambian National

Archives. Data for several years, including those highlighted above, were unavailable

from any of these sources. Whether these gaps result from passive administrative

mismanagement, or active malfeasance, is unclear. Nonetheless, the following sections

explore the patterns of law-making in the First and Second Republics discussed above in

greater detail.

Law-Making in the First Republic: More to Do and Less Time to Do It In

The immediate post-independence period was a heady time in the National

Assembly. Buoyed by their newly won autonomy and optimistic of the future, the First

National Assembly was a hotbed of legislative activity. Parliament was busy enacting

laws to legalize Zambia's sovereign status, fund newly created government agencies, and

enact technical legislation needed to ﬁll the gaps created by the removal of colonial

authority.

46

However, it was also accused of being a rubber stamp on executive

actions. While Parliament was busy addressing new legislative issues, it sat in session for

fewer and fewer days each year after independence. Figure 2.0, below, shows how the

volume of legislative business increased in the First Republic, while the number of

session days fell. In addition, Parliamentary oversight of these legislative proposals was

hurried and narrow. As Figure 2.1 indicates, the house approved nearly all legislative

proposals introduced between 1964 and 1973, invariably during in the same session in

which they were introduced. On the rare occasions that bills were deferred most were

brought back, and approved, at the next session.I

 

'

Excluding 1964 and 1971 for which the data was incomplete and assuming that the indices of

National Assembly Transcripts and Laws of the Republic of Zambia from which these data were collected

were accurately prepared.

47

 

 

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Figure 2.0 -- Legislative Business and Session Days, 1964-1994

48

 
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p
A

s
t
c
A

i
C

d
e
c
u
d
o
r
t
n
i

s
l
l
i
B

l

 

 

0
0
1

.
_

0
8

—
o
4

 

-
0
2

 

Figure 2.1 -- Bills Introduced and Acts Approved, 1964-1991

49

Not only was Parliamentary oversight of new legislation limited, but new

bills were sponsored exclusively by government Ministers and Deputy Ministers. Never

did back bench or opposition members introduce their own legislative initiatives. In this

way the Zambian Parliament acted according to an extreme version of Westminster-style

parliamentary norms even thought it was not a true parliamentary regime. In Westminster

systems "(legislative) power operates through a cabinet consisting of the leaders of the

majority party in the House, so the ordinary member's job is mainly just to vote dutifully

for bills that come from them." (Shively, 133) Therefore, it might not be surprising that

back bench UNIP Members failed to bring forward any independent legislative initiatives.

However, even Westminster norms allow for private initiatives by both

opposition and ruling party MPs, including the introduction of their own legislative

proposals. Moreover, Shively's interpretation of Westminster norms is based on the

assumption that strong party loyalties operate in the house, loyalties that had not been

ﬁrmly cemented in the ﬁrst two Zambian Assemblies. Post-independence Zambian MPs

had the luxury of establishing their own legislative procedures in their new Assembly.

They were not duty-bound to march in lock-step with party platforms, especially given

the real and meaningful splits within the ruling United National Independence Party.

The Zambian National Assembly provides for the introduction of two

general types of legislation. The ﬁrst are "Public Bills" that "relate to matters of public

policy and are introduced directly by a member of the House who may be a Government

Minister or private member." (National Assembly Standing Orders 1986, 49) The

second are "Private bills" that are "intended to promote or beneﬁt the interests of some

50

particular person, association or corporate body as distinguished from a measure intended

for the general beneﬁt." (Ibid., 90) Private members' Public bills (i.e., private member 's

bills) are of primary concern here.

Between 1964 and 1973 only Public bills sponsored by Government

Ministers were introduced in the house. Noting the paucity of independent legislative

activity the speaker of the First Assembly, Wesley Nyirenda, speculated that there were

no private bills "because of the high printing costs and a deposit which is required by the

ofﬁce of the clerk."2 (Quoted in Helgerson 1970, 216)

Another explanation for the lack of initiative is political expediency.

Since no legislative proposal would pass the house without the support of the majority

party, i.e., the government, house members could bring their ideas to the attention of

government ofﬁcials. "If it is a good idea, a member can just come to the relevant

Minister." (Ibid.) It appears that most members chose to take this route. Therefore, is it

fair to say that the house failed to meet its constitutional responsibility to oversee the

legislative process? Not entirely.

Despite Members' unwillingness to put forward their own legislative

proposals, the house often amended the government bills that were introduced.

Consequently, amendment participation provides another interesting and important

method of measuring how the Assembly was in involved in the legislative process. The

1966 Assembly session show how parliament affected the legislative process without

being a signiﬁcant source of independent legislative initiatives.

 

2

Restrictions and difﬁculties placed on private members' bills by National Assembly administrators

is also discussed more fully in Chapter Five.

51

Data from the third year of each of the ﬁve-year Assembly session is used

to help illustrate how legislative performance changed across the seven

post-independence National Assemblies. Zambia, like other developing countries, has

done little to compile records on legislative behavior. Gathering data on legislative

amendments, for example, required the reading of approximately 2,000-3,000 pages of

Verbatim Transcripts for each calendar year, an extremely cumbersome task. This was

the ﬁrst-ever effort to compile legislative performance indicators in Zambia and should

be regarded as an initial ﬁnding rather than the ﬁnal word on legislative performance.

While an admittedly imperfect assessment, the third year of each session

was chosen for three reasons. First, the third year of other performance indicators, such

as debate participation, usually equaled calculated averages for the entire assembly

period. Therefore it was assumed that amendment data would follow a similar pattern.

Second, selection of the third year provides a measure of legislative performance after

newly elected, inexperienced MPs had participated in two full assembly sessions. This

helped limit biases caused by artiﬁcially low participation rates which may have been

attributable to new members' reticence to participate in house debates. Finally, selection

of the third year helped minimize the very real inﬂuence of electoral pressures on

members' performance. This was a special concern since electoral pressures are held

responsible for the cyclical reductions in other performance indicators, such as Members'

participation in house debates, discussed below.

During the four sittings that comprised the third session of 1966, the house

discussed 370 different amendments to government bills, formally amending 29 of the 72

52

bills brought before the them during that period (40.3%). Therefore, if we assume that

the third session reﬂects the annual average of all ﬁve sessions of the ﬁrst assembly, the

house amended approximately 40% of the of government bills brought to it during the

that ﬁrst ﬁve year period, i.e. 24 of the average 61 bills heard each years between 1964

and 1968. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 compare legislative amendments in 1966 and 1971, the

third year of the second Assembly. These tables also show who sponsored the

amendments, how many of these amendments passed, and how many failed or were

withdrawn.

Table 2.1 -- Distribution of Legislative Amendments in 1966

 

Sitting

Number of

Government

Back bench

Bills

Amendments Passed

Amendments Passed

 

Amended

(withdrawn or failed)

(withdrawn or failed)

1

8

73 (0)

0(0)

 

2

12

53 (0)

0(1)

 

3

4

34 (O)

0 (O)

 

 

  
 

346(0)

186 (0)

5

29

4 (19)

4 (20)

 

4

Total

 

 

Column two of Table 2.1 lists the total number of bills amended during

each of the three sittings held in 1966. Column three lists the total number of

government-sponsored amendments approved during each sitting. The number of

amendments that were rejected or withdrawn is indicated in parentheses. The ﬁnal

column lists the total number of back bench and opposition member-sponsored

amendments that were approved, with the number rejected or withdrawn again provided

in parentheses.

53

Like the sponsorship of government bills discussed earlier, these tables

indicate that most amendments to legislative proposals in 1966 were brought by

government ministers and deputy ministers, usually the minister who proposed the

original bill or one of their deputies. While Members' amendments were a small portion

of the total number of amendments approved in this ﬁrst Assembly, they were not without

inﬂuence.

For example, during the fourth sitting of the 1966 session only six of the

23 back bench and opposition-sponsored legislative amendments introduced were

defeated on ﬂoor votes. The remaining 13 were withdrawn by their sponsors because the

provisions of those amendments were adopted, addressed, or agreed to by the ruling

party. Therefore, though only four back bench sponsored amendments were approved the

house, the house had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the legislative process on 13 additional

occasions.

One example of this inﬂuence came during debates on the Industrial

Relations Bill (1971) that was designed to "give practical effect to the philosophy of

Zambian humanism by introducing participatory democracy in decision-making in

industry." (Hansards, vol. 28, 228) In his response to the introduction of this bill, H.R.E.

Mitchley, an independent MP from Gwembe, in Zambia's Southern Province said:

I must say, in all honesty, that Part VIII of the Bill that deals with Worker's

Councils as at present could very well lead to chaos in this country. When

one bears in mind that Workers' Councils have to be set up in any business

which has 25 or more persons, one realizes that management cannot carry

out its proper tasks. If that were to happen in this country chaos could

very well follow and, as the hon. Minister has said, that is the very thing

which he is trying to avoid. (Ibid., 239)

54

In his amendments to the bill, the Minister of Labor and Social Services,

W.M. Chakulya, made two changes that addressed Mitchley's concerns. First, he reduced

the number of businesses covered under this legislation by eliminating small scale,

primarily agricultural, enterprises. Rather than require businesses that had 25 or more

workers, Chakulya's amendment recommended the bill affect only business with 100 or

more employees. Second, the scope of issues these Workers' Councils could bring to

business owners was limited to "matters of policy." (Ibid., 307-308). In his remarks

Mitchley thanked the Hon. Minister for these clauses and said: "He will please all the

people who are concerned about this particular matter and in particular agriculturists from

all sides of the House." (Ibid.)

During the second Assembly parliament's inﬂuence on the legislative

process began to wane, despite the example presented above. One indicator is the

reduction in the number of amendments debated in the house. Table 2.2, shows this

ﬁend.

In 1966 the house amended 29 different government bills, 40.3% of the

total brought before it, and considered 370 different individual amendments. In 1971 the

house amended only 17 of the 46 bills brought before it, 37.0% of the total, and it

considered only 42 different amendment proposals. This represents only an eight percent

reduction in the number of bills amended between 1966 and 1971 but an 88.7 percent

reduction in the number of amendments considered. Most importantly, none of these 42

amendments were sponsored by opposition or back bench MPs.

55

Table 2.2 -- Distribution of Legislative Amendments in 1971

 

Sitting

Number of

Government

Back bench

Bills

Amendments Passed

Amendments Passed

 

Amended

(withdrawn or failed)

(withdrawn or failed)

1

6

9(0)

0 (O)

 

2

3

4 (O)

0 (O)

 

3

1

2 (0)

O (0)

 

  
  

42 (0)

27 (O)

7

17

0 (0)

0(0)

 

4

Total

 

 

One explanation for the decrease in legislative amendments heard between

1966 and 1971 is that the government got better at drafting legislation. As ofﬁcials

within cabinet and the line ministries gained experience they became more attentive to

detail which limited the number of minor grammatical amendments often brought to the

house ﬂoor.3

It is also likely that two additional factors help explain the reduction of

legislative amendments in the second Assembly. The ﬁrst was the dissolution of the

National Progress Party (N PP) and removal of reserved roll seats in the assembly. The

NPP was the party under whose banner the ten European "Reserve Roll" MPs were

elected. Though they sat in the house for only ﬁve years, Helgerson (1970) points out

 

’

It would be wrong to assume that the house caught all the mistakes made by sloppy legal draftsmen

during the early years. It too was learning how to approve legislation. One extraordinary example is the

Bankruptcy Bill (1966) which was recommitted to the house by the Clerk's Oﬂice on March 7, 1967 aﬁer it

had already been approved by the ﬁrll Assembly. This recommission was necessary because the house had

approved a version containing over ﬁfteen signiﬁcant typing, grammatical, and punctuation errors. As a

result, Mr. Speaker refused to send to the bill to president for his signature and adoption until the errors

were corrected. (Hansards, vol. 9, 4-25)

56

that this group was often able to inﬂuence government business in ways other opposition

parties were not.4

Their inﬂuence was a result of three factors: their temporary position in

the Assembly and reduced political threat to the ruling party; special skills and

backgrounds; and, primarily, the issues they put forward. "The style and content of NPP

motions made them more agreeable to government since they were decidedly less

political than those presented by the ANC, and oﬂen contained speciﬁc, technical

proposals.“ (Helgerson 1970, 239)

Another factor was UNIP's growing control over its members and its

desire to avoid using the house ﬂoor to debate differences within the party. While

Ministers were held accountable to government decisions through the doctrine of

collective responsibility, back bench party members were encouraged to express their

differences with government business at, increasingly infrequent, party caucuses. As then

 

‘

For example, while not directly assessing cross-party support for legislative amendments,

Helgerson (1970) notes that of the seventeen motions proposed by NPP/Independent members between

1964 and 1968, an average of thirty-nine (39%) percent of government ministers' speeches on these

motions were supportive of their aims. Moreover, an average sixty-seven (67%) percent of UNIP back

bench members' speeches on the same issues were supportive of these NPP-sponsored motions. On the

other hand, no UNIP member made a supportive speeches on any of the eight ANC-sponsored motions

coded during the same period. (Helgerson 1970, 236-238)

5

One example of the political nature of ANC motions was that introduced by Harry Nkumbula on

December 13, 1967 to "establish an independent electoral commission. While this motion eventually

passed the house, it did so only after signiﬁcant amendments from the front bench. The government was

able to propose, and successfully adopt, amendments such that the new text read: "This

house...congratulates the Government on the steps it has taken to ensure free and fair elections." The

question was put and agreed to and the original motion "(fell) away."

It should also be noted that all amendments to government bills are introduced by way of a formal

motion made to the house during debated that "a bill be amended so as to read..." However, not all motions

relate to amendments of government bills. Motions are the formal introduction of information or proposals

that relate to the business of the house. They may be used to propose amendments to legislation, but they

may also be used to make recommendations for government action, nominate ofﬁcials to government office,

suspend house business, and so forth.

57

Chief Government Whip Sikota Wina said: "We have got various levels at which

(government's) problems are sorted out and discussed. And by the time we come here we

have more or less sorted out our differences on our side (of the house)" (Hansards, ,

February 14, 1968, 269) These changes are explored more fully in the following section.

Law-making in the Second Republic: Less to Do and More Time to Do It In

After the 1973 one-party elections President Kaunda began to consolidate

his control over the governance process, utilizing his broad discretionary powers to shift

decision-making towards the executive branch and Central Committee of the United

National Independence Party. (Bratton 1980; Chikulo 1986; Momba 1992; Tordoff 1974,

198 8) One way in which he accomplished this was to reduce parliament's involvement in

shaping government policy.

For example, Tordoff notes that the 1980 Local Administration Bill

"aroused considerable hostility both inside and outside Parliament. Back bench MPs

believed that its effect would be to cause even greater concentration of political power in

the country." (Tordoff 1988, 21-22) However, that bill was "pushed through the

National Assembly unchanged, despite six months of vocal criticism from UNIP back

benchers." (Cromwell 1995, 162)

However, the president was constrained by public perceptions of

parliamentary responsibilities, like those described in the Times newspaper passage

introducing this chapter. The National Assembly's responsibilities were enshrined in the

58

constitution, including the responsibility to approve all legislative proposals prior to their

assent by the president.

President Kaunda recognized the symbolic authority held by the National

Assembly. It was, after all, the institution legally elected to represent the popular

demands to government ofﬁcials. But increased legislative independence would have

jeopardized his efforts to centralize his political authority under UNIP's banner. "The

goal of the (new UNIP) government was to gain absolute approval for its aims, and it was

very insensitive to non-cooperation or to delay on the part of parliament, for that

institution was symbolic to both the government and the public of stability, open

policy-making, and popular legitimacy." (Helgerson 1970, 277) Therefore, in order to

provide the facade of legislative independence and activity Members were called to the

house for longer annual sittings but were asked to wrestle with less substantive business

than they had previously.

Responsibility for setting the Assembly's agenda nominally rests with

house administrators, namely the Clerk and Speaker. However, there are frequent and

signiﬁcant consultations between parliament and government ofﬁcials and the house

never unilaterally determines the Assembly agenda. More importantly, while the agenda

is established by executive and legislative ofﬁcials in consultation with each other, the

Constitution allows the president alone to initiate parliamentary sitting dates. "Subject to

provisions if this Article, each session of Parliament shall be held at such place within

Zambia and shall commence at such time as the President may appoint." (Constitution of

the Republic of Zambia, 1973, Section 92 (1), 69)

59

Therefore, the President could use his constitutional authority to call the

Assembly into session, and de facto control over the agenda to capture the symbolic

beneﬁt of an effective National Assembly. Table 2.3 illustrates this trend.

Table 2.3 -- Government Bills and Session Days in the First and Second Republics

 

Assen'rbly

Years

Average

Average

Ratio of Bills

 

First

First

1964-1968

67

39

l .72

Annual

Annual

to Session

Number of

Number of

Days

Bills Debated

Session Days

Republic

  
   

1969-1973

Second

1.23

40

49

Second

Third

1974- 978

32

52

0.62

Republic

 

 

Fourth

1979-1983

Fifth

1984-1988

Sixth

1989-1991

 

 

28

35

38

 

52

58

50

 

0.53

0.6

0.76

 

 

 

 

 

Column ﬁve shows that the house was in session an average of 39 days per

year during the ﬁrst Assembly (1964-1968). Twenty years later the house sat an average

of 58 days per year, an increase of over 48 percent since independence.° While attending

house sessions in Lusaka, Members received handsome sitting allowances, had access to

the Parliamentary motel and lounge, and could relax among friends while occupied with

fewer substantive responsibilities.

 

'5

Omitting data from 1964, during which the house sat for only one week after the October 31

declaration of independence, the average number of sitting days in the ﬁrst assembly is 47. However, that

still yields a 23% increase in the number of sitting days between the ﬁrst and ﬁfth assemblies and has no

inﬂuence on the 45% increase in sitting days between the second and ﬁfth assemblies.

60

Simultaneously, the President reduced the number of bills brought to the

Assembly. Column four of Table 2.3 shows that during the ﬁve years aﬂer independence

Parliament heard an average of 67 bills per year. By the third assembly, the ﬁrst in the

one—party state, that ﬁgure had dropped to 32 bills per year. By the fourth assembly the

house heard an average of only 28 bills per year, a 58% reduction over the 1964-1968

assembly and nearly 20% less than the thirty-four bill average for the entire Second

Republic.

Another way Kaunda circumvented parliament's role in the legislative

process was to adopt more legislative responsibilities himself. As mentioned earlier, the

decrease in legislative business after independence in part resulted from a general

reduction in the volume of government business once the independent Zambian state was

created. However, the data show an increase in the volume of quasi-legislative business

initiated by the president during the same period.

According to article 53, subsections (1) and (2) the of 1973 Constitution,

the "executive power of the Republic shall vest in the President (and) in the exercise of

any function conferred upon him by this Constitution or any other law the President shall,

unless it is otherwise provided, act in this own deliberate judgment and shall not be

obliged to follow the advice tendered by any other person or authority."

Statutory instruments are one way in which the president's "deliberate

judgment" is enacted. These instruments are legal declarations made by the President, or

government minister, that deal with technical issues germane to a line ministry or speciﬁc

issue in question. Though not as comprehensive as new bills, statutory instruments are

61

another method through which government policies and programs are enacted.

Therefore, by comparing the number of legislative proposals to statutory instruments it is

possible to evaluate the relative contribution each branch was making to the legislative

process at any given moment.

Table 2.4 -- Ratio of Statutory Instruments to Acts in the First and Second Republics

 

Assembly

Years

Average

Average

Ratio of

Annual

Number of

Instruments

Number of

Acts Approved

Issued to Acts

Statutory

per Year

Approved

Instruments

 

First

 
  

1969-1973

Second

6.7: 1

329

49

1964-1968

70:1

443

63

Third

1974-1978

208

30

6.921

 

Fourth

1979-1983

186

24

78:]

 

Fifth

1984-1988

202

28

7221

 

 

 

Sixth

1989-1991

171

40

4.3:]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Column four of Table 2.4 shows that the number of government acts

approved by the house fell signiﬁcantly between the First and Second Republics, from a

high of 63 in the ﬁrst Assembly, to a low of 24 in the fourth Assembly. At the same time,

the ratio of statutory instruments to acts increased during the same periods, from a low of

67:1 in the Second Assembly to a hight of 7.8 to l in the Fourth, indicating a shift

towards greater presidential responsibility over policy making.7 This is shown in column

ﬁve. While the president was actively reducing the Assembly's role in the legislative

 

7

The ratio of statutory instruments to acts is provided, rather than a comparison between statutory

instruments and bills introduced, since the primary concern here is ﬁnal contributions to the legislative

process, rather than initial efforts.

 

62

process he and his conﬁdants were exerting ever more inﬂuence themselves, especially in

the fourth and ﬁfth Assemblies. By 1989, however, President Kaunda's position had

weakened considerably and he could no longer issue statutory instruments with impunity.

Conequently, the ratio of statutory instruments to Acts slipped to the lowest level seen

since independence.

It its important to note, however, that the Assembly's role in the legislative

process was not solely the result of presidential decisions. The Assembly itself was less

willing to initiate legislative proposals and to challenge the government business that was

introduced. And as was the case in the First Republic, no back bench UNIP member in

the Second Republic ever sponsored their own private member's bill to the Assembly and

no individual or organization brought their own private bills.8 The Assembly also

abdicated its responsibility to amend the government's initiatives that were brought

forward.9 Not only were there fewer govemment-sponsored amendments, but the number

of back bench amendments fell, basically, to zero. Table 2.5 shows the distribution of

legislative amendments during the Second Republic. Again, the third year of each

ﬁve-year session is used to illustrate how amendment sponsorship changed over time.

 

Recall that after the introduction of the one-party state in December 1973 the only opposition to

government activities in the house was provided by back bench members of the ruling UNIP party.

°

Reasons for this unwillingness are discussed in greater detail in Chapters Four through Six.

63

Table 2.5 -- Legislative Amendments in the Second Republic

 

Year

Sitting

Number of

Total

Government

Back bench

Amended

Number of

Amendments

Amendments

Bills

Amendments

Passed

Passed

(withdrawn or

(withdrawn or

failed)

failed)

 

1976

13 (0)

0 (0)

 

   

   
 

  
 

0 (0)

o (0)

4 (0)

- \rbiiﬁtia-ﬁ :il'lil'ﬁlf':"-'1T-:‘1.:1;;v';‘.;i:iv;"*>‘1.11:$f‘~.‘“1.\1:'.‘.‘3s.'l' :'

 

 

0 (0)

4 (0)

'

‘

‘.

-.'-f«'-fr

-

.

..

‘

‘

-

1

.

.

4 ‘u

v‘

-.

.

9.2

 

 

2 (0)

0 (0)

7 (0)

0 (0)

 

o I ~:- -C::-:- : :-:«;<-11'~t éf’x‘d-‘O‘::::

-
.
/

o
t
[

'

.
:

-
k

?
a

=
4
:
'
-

.
<

 

u

.

”
x

;
5
.

.

.
“
i

_
.
5
.

_

1985

»
,
.
1

<
.
/

)
:
'
.

-
.

r

f
.
-

:
'
u
.

:
v
:

:
.

.
;
,

}
U

 

 

r 0\»\

V,”?‘;\:r".:-§R2’ .'35‘fo$(‘_’2$3§'I:.§'.§)“~§:§'\'giﬁ‘19)? 4g ‘

'

‘ .:\\' 3:»: 33:523-114.; "$1.7fl$_-‘.:§\‘$">\"_;Nr\'.§';4X g\-_

 
    
 

 

M'”-’3<-5\‘-3.<:>‘3""?‘5‘:>~f~.\‘.“~;¥.e."«

" :v 2;

”:34" ..-. .7.

a -

1.:vl

y~<

..

~

.

y

i

v

7 (l- w d )

O

I

0 2 ' W dC

.

 

 

 

 

a
—
p

1 (0)

0 (0)

 

  

17(1)

9 (0)

1 (0)

1 (2)

10

21

w

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

Comparing the ﬁgures in Table 2.5 to those presented earlier in Table 2.0

and 2.1 shows that the house debated fewer than 10 percent of the amendments in the

one-party Second Republic than they did in the multi-party First Republic. In the First

Republic, the Assembly debated an average of 206 different amendments each year (3 70

amendments in 1966 and 42 amendments in 1971). Column three of Table 2.5 indicates

that average fell to 22 in the Second Republic, a decrease of nearly 90 percent.

  
   
 

 

 

64

Not only were there fewer legislative amendments, but fewer bills were

being amended. The First Republic Assemblies amended approximately 39 percent of all

bills introduced in the house (29 of 73 bills were amended in 1966 and 17 of 46 were

amended in 1971). However, the Second Republic Assemblies amended an averages of

only 30 percent of all bills introduced. Since the vast majority of legislative amendments

were brought by government Ministers, this reduction limited the opportunities back

bench members had to include their opinions in the legislative process.

However, President Kaunda's control over the National Assembly began to

wane in the early 1980's. Buffeted by increasing economic hardships, UNIP's

stranglehold on political power was weakened and the National Assembly and its

members began to reestablish their role in the legislative process. During the fifth and

sixth Assemblies the house debated an average of 35 and 38 bills per year, respectively,

and the ratio of statutory instruments to government bills fell from 5.2 to 4.6 during the

same period. At the same time President Kaunda reduced the number of days the house

sat in session from an average of 58 days per year in the ﬁﬁh Assembly, to an average of

50 days per year in the sixth Assembly in an attempt to limit the inﬂuence of an

increasingly belligerent National Assembly. Parliamentarians, upset by continued

economic downturns and increasing regulation under the one-party state, began to used

house debates to pressure the government for greater economic and political reforms.

At the same time, the number of front bench-sponsored legislative

amendments was decreasing. Consequently, the house once again took a more aggressive

stance on the legislative process, put forward its own legislative amendments, and more

65

actively controlled the pace of Assembly business.'0 The following case from 1984

highlights this point:

After having recessed for nearly eight months, parliament was called back

into session on November 20th, 1984. One week later, on November 28th, Hon.

Mumbuna, an MP from Nalikwanda, asked the Prime Minister: "(a) why the program of

the house as adopted by the House on 14th December, 1969, which stipulates, among

other things, that the post-Budget meeting of the House will be held in July or August,

was not followed this year; and (b) if it is the intention of the Government to run the

affairs of this country without the participation of the National Assembly?" In his

response, the Prime Ministers said:

Members are aware that our Constitution and a number of other

major laws which we are using at present were passed on to us by

Metropolitan Britain at our Independence. These laws contain certain

provisions, particularly on land and citizenship, which are not in the

long-term interests of the nation. Mr. Speaker, sir, it was the view of the

Government to bring amendments to the laws referred to above during the

1984 post-Budget sitting, that is during the July or August sitting. We

found out, however, that we had underestimated the complexity of the

work involved in amending laws relating to land and citizenship. In other

words, we found ourselves behind schedule...As usual, I consulted Mr.

Speaker, for assistance. Mr. Speaker advised me that the House could sit

in September only in an emergency.

As the Leader of the House, I thought that if the House sat as

though it was an emergency sitting, it would create panic and fear in the

country and there would be unfavorable speculation abroad. I decided,

therefore, to accept the guidance given by Mr. Speaker, which, in part,

 

'°

Two of the three amendments sponsored by back bench members of UNIP in 1985 (shown in

Table 2.4) came from legislators who would later become senior ministers in the MMD government. One

sponsored by Michael Sata was withdrawn during debate after the UNIP government formally agreed to

adopt the provisions contained in his motion. The other, sponsored by Alfeo Hambayi, passed a divided

house by the vote of 61 to 45 in favor and required government (i.e., the president) to nominate only those

individuals with "recognized professional qualiﬁcations" to positions within the Bank of Zambia.

(Hansards, vol. 69, 3551-3562) We see here the foundation of both increasing independence by the

National Assembly as the central government began to fail and the willingness of successful politicians to

take risks early in their political careers.

66

stated as follows...(quoting)...since up to now no meeting of Parliament

has been called for the post-Budget sitting, it means that Parliament can

only now be summoned to meet in cases of emergency for important

matters which the Government may wish the House to consider. An

ordinary sitting of the House merely to consider questions and motions

would now not fall under the description of emergency. I, therefore, under

the circumstances, advise that the best the Government can do is to wait

until November for the House to reconvene." (Hansards, vol. 66,

562-563)

Following up on the Minister's statement Hon. Hantuba, a back bench MP

from Pemba asked: "Does the right Honorable Prime Minister not agree that the business

of the House in not conﬁned to the Front Bench alone? We have Bills, private Members'

motions, Questions for Oral Answer, and so forth. Did he take into consideration all

these issues which Hon. Members of Parliament are entitled to discuss?" (Ibid.)

After having faced continued grilling about the government's handling of

the agenda, the Prime Minister brought a motion on November 30, 1984, that would have

forced the Assembly to complete all remaining business on the order paper, including

several new government bills, and rise sine die (without a date for the resumption of

debate) at the completion of that day's proceedings.ll

In his response to the PM's new motion, Hon. Mumbuna argued: "There

are so many questions which are still in the pipeline and there are some bills which we

would like discuss exhaustively. These bills should not be rushed through this House.

We run into problems in this country because we rush bills. After passing them we ﬁnd

that there are some loopholes and we cannot amend them again. So, the job of parliament

 

”

It was common for the house to take only three days to debate a bill. On the ﬁrst day the bill was

formally introduced and the title read to the house. Substantive debate on the bill was done on the second

day and amendments were made at this time. Debate on the third day was limited to any newly approved

amendments or clauses and the bill was considered "passed" alter this third reading was approved by the

house.

lllllf

1H0

hm

Sn

67

must be considered ﬁrst, and I am considering it. That is why I want to be here for

another week. [Hearl Hear!]" (Ibid., 564)

The government used loosely veiled threats in an attempt to convince

house members that a brief sitting was in their best interests, and cajoled them to accept

the government motion. For example, in his contribution to the motion the Minister of

State for Youth and Sport, Hon. P. Kasongo, said: "The time that (members) will be given

(away from the house) will enable them to go and supervise work on their farms. They

know very well that the emphasis of the Party and its Government has now shifted from

copper production to farming and if we are not going to participate in agricultural

production then, obviously, we are going to be a sad nation." (Ibid., 565)

However, these tactics did not intimidate back bench and opposition

Members. The government motion to complete all business that day failed by the vote of

62 to 45 and the house sat for another week, until December 7, 1984. This was the

second vote within 13 months to split along front bench/back bench lines (the first was

discussed in ﬁt. 10, above) and illustrated the growing backlash against the government's

control of the National Assembly in the Second Republic.12

 

'2

The backlash also represented growing animosity against UNIP govemment policies by back

bench MPs, especially over the management of the national economy. The 197 8 general elections resulted

in an inﬂux of parliamentarians with business interests and, as is noted below, these MPs were increasingly

frustrated with the slow pace of economic growth during this period.

Members' Performance in the First and Second Republics

68

It is instructive to note that the number of speeches

addressed to each bill or motion fell (between 1965 and

1968)...There is considerable evidence to suggest that

legislation was receiving less attention in parliament at the

end of the ﬁrst assembly than it was at the beginning, and

there is also evidence to suggest that the individual MP felt

less able or willing to speak in parliament in 1968 that he

had a decade earlier.

John Helgerson 1970, 122-123

So far we have discussed the changing role the house played in

law-making in the ﬁrst and second republics and explored how former President Kaunda

attempted to shiﬁ legislative authority away from the National Assembly during the

Second Republic. While these efforts appeared successful in the third and fourth

assemblies, later Assemblies began to participate more actively in the legislative process,

often cajoling the government for its attempts to reduce their autonomy. Law-making is

only one of many responsibilities legislatures and legislators are given. Another is

constituency service and representation. This section examines these issues in greater

detail

Debate in parliamentary systems is almost invariably divided along party

lines. Since Parliamentary governments are established by the party (or coalition) that

holds the majority of house seats, house debates might not considered an important

indicator of parliamentary performance. However, analyses of parliamentary debates are

a useful way to gauge members' performance. Since most parliamentary systems limit

parliamentn'ans involvement in the legislative process, debates are often the only outlet

:
t
r

69

for them to express their policy preferences and affect the governance process. As W.

Phillips Shively said in reference to the British Parliament:

Debate in the House of Commons commands more

attention than debate in the houses of the US. Congress. In

part this may be because there is nothing else but debate to

pay attention to since in its voting the Parliament usually

operates as something close to a rubber stamp for the

cabinet. But more likely, it is because the House of

Commons, in particular, has created partly through

pageantry and partly through a bit of a circus atmosphere,

something that people enjoy watching. By doing so, it has

increased its inﬂuence on policy. (134)

Though the Zambian Parliament has never created theater that "people

enjoy watching," analyses of several aspects of parliamentary debate are presented here

because they provide measures of the inﬂuence house debates had on the policy process.

Some of the different indicators discussed here include the number and distribution of

questions asked during parliamentary question time, the number of comments made

during regular house debates, and changes in these participation rates over time.

Helgerson's conclusion that debate participation in the early

post-independence assemblies was declining was not wrong, per se, but did not reﬂect the

more general trend of debate participation in the Zambian National Assembly. Unlike

Helgerson, I conclude that debate participation increased during the First and Second

Republics, and that Members attention shifted from national issues, to local ones, and

back again during this period. An analysis of debate and constituency service in the

post-independence First Republic is presented ﬁrst, and a comparison of debate between

the First and Second Republics will follow.

?
S
l

Debate and Constituency Service in the First Republic

7O

Just as the house's role in law-making changed over the First and Second

Republics, so too did members' participation in house debates. Unlike Helgerson's early

ﬁndings, what emerges from the data presented here is a pattern of increasing

participation in house debates by back bench and opposition members in the First

Republic and more attention to local, constituency-based issues, even as their

involvement in the legislative process waned. Helgerson had access to only four years of

data on debate performance in the newly independent assembly. Consequently, his data

indicated that participation fell, when compared to participation rates in the colonial

assemblies. While this conclusion is not inaccurate, it casts early debate performance in

an unfair light. While participation rates fell in the four years after independence, there

was a signiﬁcant increase in participation rates over time. Figure 2.2 shows how one

indicator of debate participation, the number of questions asked by members during

"question time," increased signiﬁcantly between 1964 and 1991.'3

Parliamentary question time is the formal opportunity back bench and

opposition members have to ask questions of the front bench about an issue they choose.

Question time is given to members an average of three days per week for approximately

30—60 minutes each day. Questions are presented to, and approved by, the Speaker prior

to their presentation and the given to Government Ministers in order to allow them to

prepare the statement they will present later in the House. Unlike true parliamentary

systems, the head of government in Zambia, the President, does not sit in the house and is

 

'3

This is a classic problem, espcecially in comparative political research, in which the conculsions

one reaches are based on the cases you study. For an excellent discussion of these issues see Geddes

(1990)

5V8

71

not, therefore, the person to whom questions are addressed. Usually the ministry

responsible for the issue in question prepares and presents responses during question

time. Important differences between parliamentary question time in Zambia and other

systems are discussed more ﬁrlly in Chapter Five on National Assembly Administration

 

 

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72

 

 

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Figure 2.2 -- Average Question Volume, 1964-1991

 

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73

The downward trend in participation Helgerson observed was part of the

cyclical pattern that is repeated every ﬁve years. This pattern revolves around the

occurrence of national parliamentary and presidential elections. This trend appears less

the result of some insidious factor that stiﬂes participation, and more the desire of

members, especially UNIP members, not to offend party leaders and patrons so close to

elections. Unlike elections in the United States, for example, Zambian MPs became

quietest when their political ﬁrtures were at stake.

As the Figure 2.2 shows, members asked the fewest number of questions

in the ﬁnal session of any ﬁve year Assembly just prior to the upcoming general

elections. These elections occurred in 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1991.

Immediately after the general elections members of the new assemblies were "free" to

speak out without the fear of affecting their chances of re-election. Few Members fully

utilized this opportunity, however. During the second and third annual sessions, reluctant

Members overcame their apprehensions and participated more actively and new members

grew accustomed to the conduct of parliamentary business. Figure 2.2 shows how the

number of questions increased as a result. Participation then declined in the fourth and

ﬁfth years as Members once again limited their comments in preparation for another

round of elections usually held in October of their ﬁfth year.

Rather than ask why participation rates in the ﬁrst assembly were so low

compared to the early legislative councils, a more appropriate question to ask is why the

initial participation rates in the ﬁrst Zambian National Assemblies were so low when

compared to those that came later. One hypothesis is that members in the early

74

assemblies lacked the conﬁdence and experience needed to participate more actively in

house debates. It would be easy to argue that assembly administrators were learning how

to administrate and assembly members were learning how to participate. This hypothesis

is partially borne out by the data, assuming incumbency offers the advantage of

experience.'4

However, fear and inexperience cannot be used as an excuse for all MP5,

especially opposition Members. Gupta (1965) argues that the ruling party was uneasy

about opposition MPs, especially the AN C, because of their "superior debating talents"

that "cause quite a lot of concern to the Ministers, some of whom are not yet sure about

their parliamentary performance." (51) This uncertainty was compounded by the "wide

public interest taken in Assembly debates" that made it all the more important for

"Government front bench Ministers to show off their (skills) or face a certain amount of

unpopularity." (Ibid.)

An alternative, and more sinister, hypothesis for these early, low-levels of

participation is that the UNIP government did not allow members adequate opportunities

to fully participate in house debates. Only after implementation of the one-party state in

1973 would the government allow the house to remain in session long enough to

adequately debate the issues. This hypotheses has empirical support. As was pointed out

earlier in this chapter, the ﬁrst assembly sat for an average of only 38 days each year, far

 

"

Helgerson points out that the ﬁrst assembly was younger and less educated than the previous

national councils had been. By the 1968 elections, however, people who classiﬁed their occupation as

"professional politicians" were in the majority, holding 24% of the house seats. (Helgerson 1970, 75-80)

And these professional politicians quickly entrenched themselves in the National Assembly. In the 1973

General Elections incumbent politicians retained on over 34% of the Assembly seats and in the 1978

elections they retained over 38% of the Assembly seats. (Baylies and Szeﬁel, 1983, 60-61)

75

less than the 50 days averaged in Second Republic assemblies. This might indicate the

governments unwillingness to fully open the house to its members.

However, this explanation does not hold. "The diminished use of the

prerogative to speak (in the 1964-1968 assembly) could be explained by the increased

number of MPs, under the supposition that there was less time available per member. In

reality, however, there was more time available than was ever used, even in the second

National Assembly (1968-1973), and the real problem was for the whip to induce

participation." (Helgerson 1970, 123) Figure 2.3 shows that, on average, less than half

the total number eligible back bench and opposition party members asked questions or

made comments during house debates in the ﬁrst two assemblies.

76

Figure 2.3 -- Aggregated Back Bench and Opposition Participation in

House Debates, 1964-1985

77

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House Debates, 1964-1985

78

Though inducing UNIP members to participate in house debates was a

problem for government whips, this was not the case for opposition leaders. The

opposition parties, especially the ANC frequently voiced rancorous protests at the

government and government policies.15 Figures 2.4 and 2.5 compare debate participation

among members of different political parties in the First and Second Republics.

 

'5

One example was the debate on a motion to suspend E.M. Liso, ANC Member of Parliament for

Mazabuka for "making false and unsubstantiated allegations concerning His Excellency the President. " In a

rousing defense of Liso's rights to criticize the president, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, the ANC leader, said:

"If we are not allowed to talk about the President when he makes statements and holds

public meetings...and talks about other people, are we (always) going to keep quite

because his is the President of the State? Is it not true that at one time in Lusaka he called

people all sorts of names to the point of calling them jackals and hyenas? Do we keep

quiet about that? Where is democracy? Where is freedom?"

Amidst shouts of "you are a child to him politically" Nkumbula continued:

"We criticize even God, do we not? But the president cannot be criticized when we even

criticize God...(this) is an attempt by Government or by certain Honorable Members who

wish to create in this country a one party sort of life, or State."

Nkumbula was ﬁnally shouted down by other government members who said; "Yes, it is

coming" and "We are eliminating you!"

79

 

 

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80

 

 

 

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81

These ﬁgures illustrate how opposition party and independent MPs

dominated house debates, especially in the ﬁrst Republic. For example, during this

period UNIP MPs made approximately four different comments per year during house

debates. At the same time, ANC MPs made nearly 10 different comments per year and

NPP/independent MPs made nearly 16 different comments per year, a four-fold increase.

(Fig. 2.5) However, opposition MPs held only 25% of the seats in the house. Therefore,

even though their participation rates were quite high compared to UNIP MPs, their

overall inﬂuence on government policy was limited.

Helgerson proposed that the nature of debate participation also underwent

a transformation during the First Republic. In the ﬁrst Assembly, elected immediately

after independence, members were primarily concerned with political and constitutional

issues relating to their parties' efforts to capture control of their new state. By the second

Assembly, however, "issues of economic development and internal order" took priority.

"While MPs remained representative of their party above all, they did begin to exhibit

signs that their attitudes on issues were beginning to be inﬂuenced by considerations

other than party affiliation." (Helgerson 1970, 115)

One of these new considerations was competitive electoral pressure and

members' desire to secure reelection. While members were adapting to their new

multi-party democracy they utilized house debates as a tool to bring their constituents'

demands to the attention of government policy makers. Helgerson noted that "candidates

in the 1968 elections were increasingly identiﬁed with their constituencies -- one would

82

expect that they would be more scrupulous in espousing constituency interests that was

the case previously." (130-131)

This hypothesis is borne out by examining the types of questions members

asked during parliamentary question time. A coding rule was created specifying whether

the question asked was "national" or "local" in nature. Questions that addressed a

speciﬁc region, locale, institution, or area within the members' constituency were coded

as 'local' questions. Those that dealt with broad issues, general government policies, and

cross-regional concerns were coded as having a 'national' character. For example, a

question asking government to explain the lack of medicines in Kaputa hospital was

coded as a local issue, while a question asking government to explain the lack of

medicines at teaching hospitals was coded a national issue.

Figure 2.6 shows how the focus changed from national questions to more

local questions over the ﬁrst republic.

83

 

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Figure 2.6 -- Total Question Volume per Year by Issue Type

 

 

84

During the ﬁrst assembly, members asked an average of only 17 questions

per year, 76% of which were national in character. Nor are these results surprising.

"During the ﬁrst Parliament many MPs rarely visited their constituents and received very

little mail from them. They were not, therefore, sufﬁciently informed about local needs

to voice those needs in the Assembly." (Tordoff 1974, 212)

By the second Assembly members asked an average of 78 questions per

year, only 35% of which were national in character. While the government was under no

obligation to do anything other than provide a response to the members’ questions, this

shiﬁ reﬂected members' growing concern for their constituencies and recognition that

efforts to inﬂuence national issues were increasingly futile.

Over time this transition was increasingly dominated by UNIP back bench

members, rather than opposition party MPs. One reason for this were increasing political

and personal differences among members of the opposition parties who were increasingly

unable to put forward a cohesive voice during house debates. Only one year after

independence Gupta noted that "the ANC is facing an acute leadership crisis and there

(was) every reason to believe that it will suffer a split in the near ﬁiture." (Gupta 1965,

54)

In fact, AN C MPs were often so divided that they failed even to rally

against government proposals: a failure on which the government capitalized. "Mr.

Speaker, it is great to have an Opposition which agrees with one, but it is better still to

have a party in Opposition one of whose Members disagrees with the other. It makes the

85

task of the Government much simpler.""’ (Attomey-General James Skinner, quoted in

Helgerson 1970, 210)

However, a lack of party unity was not limited to the AN C. Early in 1966,

NPP leaders took the decision to disband their party in order to let individual members

contest their seats as independent representatives. This was a political risk that would

have made the individual members more powerful, had they been re-elected. However,

the decision to disband was taken unilaterally by party leaders, without consulting the

individual members themselves! For this, and other, reasons, only ﬁve of the ten former

NPP members sat in the house by the end of their ﬁrst term. Hugh Mitchley was the only

former NPP Member returned to the house in the 1968 elections (as an Independent) and

his election was the direct result of ANC support in his Gwembe Valley constituency.l7

 

l6

ANC troubles began as early as 1964 when Job Michello, then a senior ANC official in Western

Province, resigned to form the Peoples' Democratic Congress party (PDC) and independently contest the

October elections. However, there was a PDC-ANC reconciliation just prior to elections and Michello's

resignation had little effect, except to "dilute what organizational ability and resources the group as a whole

possessed." (Helgerson 1970, 39-40) This scenario was replayed in 1969 when the short-lived Zambia

National Democratic Union was formed from former ANC and (now) banned UP members. "Like the PDC,

ZN DU proved to be a frail effort, and its organization was nearly non-existent." (Ibid.)

The ANC was also weakened by a constant barrage of UNIP-sponsored attacks throughout the

First Republic. For example, on July 16, 1969 Hon. Jonsai, a UNIP MP from Serenje, in Central Province,

successfully moved a motion that "this house deplores in the strongest possible terms the negative and

destructive role which Zambia's unofﬁcial opposition party (i.e., the ANC) has played in this Republic's

public affairs since independence." Continuing, he called for a "reconsideration" of the Government's

policy with regard to the so-called opposition" and recommended that "at this juncture, Mr. Speaker, I feel

that the opposition should be regarded as treachery, or an impediment, if not sabotage, to good

government...(the ANC) has, by false propaganda, brought about political crises where there was only

catharsis and they have wanted a palace revolution!" (Hansards, vol. 18, 218-278, 297-3 54, and 374-392)

By 1971 the wheels had really fallen off the ANC's cart when members began to publicly

announce their defection to the ruling party. Several ANC resignations caused signiﬁcant debate in the

house, including those of Hon. Mututwa and Silumezi on January 19, 1971 (Hansards, vol. 25). However,

the most disruptive ANC resignations came on October 5, 1971, when Harry Nkumbula, acting as

"unofficial leader of the opposition," publicly protested the legality of Hon. A. C. Chilirnboyi's "switch"

from the ANC to UNIP. In a heated exchange that followed, the Speaker said that "the Chair doesn't

recognize him (Nkumbula) as leader of the ANC" and declared him to be an "enemy of Parliament" for

"behaving in such a manner."

'7

Throughout its tenure in the house, however, the government was relatively unconcerned with the

UPP, and "even conceded that it play(ed) a constructive role in government. The reason for this attitude

may have been the fact that it (was) generally well-known that the reserved seats would be abolished sooner

86

Opposition party weakness has been a hallmark of Zambian politics. The

failure of the AN C and NPP to unify in the face of UNIP dominance typify these

struggles. Moreover, opposition party squabbles provided a tool with which President

Kaunda could press for implementation of a one-party state. "I sincerely believe in the

one-party state myself," Kaunda said. "But I have resisted pressure from the party to

legislate for it." (Discipline Comes First -- KK, Zambia News, June 15, 1969) Later,

however, at a 1969 meeting of UNIP's National Council, Kaunda highlighted the

"incapacity of the AN C" to act as a meaningful opposition and urged the MPs present to

"do their homework." If (UN IP members) did so, Kaunda argued, "they would be able to

constructively criticize the executive branch, contribute to house debate, question

government ministries, and voice constituency objectives and complaints," thereby

replacing the need for political opposition: an opposition that is "disruptive, dishonest,

and destructive." (Quoted in Helgerson 1970, 129)

Kaunda's desire to establish a one-party state was cemented on December

5th, 1973, with the ﬁrst assembly elections under the new constitution. Whether these

new members accomplished the tasks Kaunda laid out for them is a question addressed in

the following section.

Debate and Constituency Service in the Second Republic

One crucial change that resulted from the introduction of the one-party

state "was the extent to which it marked the emergence of a substantial number of MPs

 

or later, and as such there (was) no cause to bother about a group which, for all intents and purposes,

represents a minority community." (Gupta 1965, 51)

87

with business interests."

(Baylies and Szeﬁel 1984, 58) They note that between 42%

and 47% of all winning MPs in the 1973 elections and between 34% and 40% of all

winning MPs in the 1978 elections had business interests. "In contrast, well over half of '

UNIP's non-incumbent candidates in 1968 had been professional politicians, and 17 per

cent had been current regional (party) secretaries." (Ibid., 63). Unlike candidates in the

earlier multi-party era for whom "stature within the party and a record of loyalty and

service counted the most," these businessmen had local power bases (what Baylies and

Szeﬁel call local status) independent from UNIP, developed by living and working in the

areas they represented. (Ibid., 58)

This was a signiﬁcant change from what Hakes and Helgerson had found

in First Republic Assemblies in which "Members of Parliament, in a formal sense

represent geographic constituencies, but none could rely on political support from labor

movements, farmers, businesses, or teachers in the area, and none assumes a role as

spokesman for them." (Hakes and Helgerson 1973, 343)

After their election these new Members initially exercised a greater, and

more independent, voice in house debates than had Members in the post-independence

Assemblies. "Parliament became a center of opposition to the president and to his

government's socialist policies." (Bates and Weingast 1996, 6) One particular activity

with which these new members increasingly occupied themselves was Parliamentary

"question time." Table 2.6 shows the increase in both the average number of questions

asked per day, and per member, between the First and Second Republics.

88

Table 2.6 -- Increasing Debate Participation, 1964 -- 1991

 

Republic

Assembly

Average Questions

Average Questions

 

Asked per Day

asked per Member

First

1964-1968

0.6

0.5

 

 

1969-1973

1.7

 

1.4

 

 

Second

1974-1978

6

3.3

 

1979-1983

11.6

6.9

 

 

 

1984-1988

10.2

6

 

  
 
 

1989-1991

4.8

1.6

One might argue that increased debate participation was the artiﬁcial

consequence of an increasingly authoritarian state. However, since Members were

required write their own quesions and often petition for their inclusion on the Assembly

agenda, they provide an interesting and useful measure of Members' interest in house

debates. In the First Republic, Members asked the government one to two questions per

day during parliamentary question time and individual parliamentarians asked

approximately one question per year. In the Second Republic, the volume of questions

increased four-fold. During this period MPs asked an average of eight questions per day

during parliamentary question time and each MP asked an average of four different

questions per year.

Not only question volume increased, but debate participation of all types

increased and was more widely distributed among MPs that it had been in the First

Republic. In the First Republic one-half of the eligible back bench and opposition

members made some contribution during house debates; including asking a question

89

during parliamentary question time or commenting on other issues, such as the budget,

Bills, amendments, motions, or ministerial statements. Following the 1973 elections,

however, nearly 70% of eligible back bench members participated in house debates, and

this trend lasted through the fourth Assembly, as Table 2.7 indicates.

Table 2.7 -- Percent of Back Bench Members Participating

in House Debates, 1964-1991

 

Republic

Session

Average Number of

Percent of Total

Years

Members Participating

Eligible MPs

in Assembly debates

 

First

1964-1968

15

45.2%

  
  

1969-1973

47.4%

26

   

................

Second

1974-1978

63

68.1%

 

 

  

  
 

1984-1988

1989-1991

NA.

 

66.8%

54.5%

1979-1983

60

29

NA.

 

Despite the local power bases of many Second Republic MPs, however,

they did not exhibit a greater concern for their localities in house debates. Column Four

of Table 2.8 shows that Members became increasingly concerned with national issues,

especially national economic development, at the expense of local, constituency-based

issues.

 

 

90

Table 2.8 -- Comparison of Question Type in the First and Second Republics

 

Republic

Session

Average Number of Questions National Questions Local

«

Years

Questions per Year

in Character

in Character

 

First

1964-1968

17

76.3%

23.7%

 

 

1969-1973

78

34.6%

 

 
     

65.4%

‘1 ‘.’y

.4.

..

.

  

   

Second

1974-1978

305

38.8%

61.70

 

1979-1983

612

45.8%

54.2%

  

 

  

 
  

1984-1988

1989-1991

42.4%

42.4%

57.6%

57.6%

525

125

 

 

 

 

In the third Assembly, the ﬁrst in the one-party state, nearly 62% of all the

questions asked during question-time were local in character. This was a signiﬁcantly

higher proportion than had been seen in the ﬁrst Assembly. However, Members'

commitment to local issues had been even greater during the second Assembly, prior to

the infusion of independent businessmen into the National Assembly. In the fourth

Assembly Members' concerns for local questions ﬁrrther declined, foreshadowing a trend

that would last through the end of the one-party state.

Zambian parliarnentarians' behavior during this period runs contrary to the

argument that more localized representation is likely to result in one party political

systems. In his 1989 book about agricultural development in Kenya, for example, Bates

argues that "politicians see in the small farmers a...major bloc of votes, one to whose

needs and interests any politician would do well to attend...Members of Parliament seek

to defend their interests against the processors of their crops, and ﬁght for higher and

more prompt payments for crop deliveries and lower charges for farm inputs." (Bates

91

1989, 86-87) Zambian MPs, it seems, were unable or unwilling to articulate similar

concerns.

Writing about Kenyan Members of Parliament Joel Barkan argued that

"the role of a legislator in Sub-Saharan Africa is basically that of an entrepreneur whose

dual functions are to mobilize the resources of his constituency for community

development projects on the one hand, and to extract resources from the central

government for these projects on the other." (Barkan 1979, 270) In this context, MPs

who show themselves capable of delivering the goods beneﬁt from the electoral support

of their constituents, thus furthering their own political careers.

During the 1970's a "politically conscious and active indigenous owning

class" emerged in Zambia. (Baylies and Szeﬁel 1984, 60) Many of these individuals

were able to utilize their local status to secure seats in the one-party National Assembly.

Unlike previous representatives, these MPs possessed the "resources" to build both

"electoral machines...and provide constituency service" that other MPs lacked. (Bates

and Weingast 1996, 7). Despite their independence, however, these MPs were no more

willing or able to represent the interests of local constituents in the house than were those

MPs elected under the previous regime. MPs "largely abdicated their role as

communicators of demands from constituency to government (and) tended to become

agents in communicating government policies to the country." (Hakes and Helgerson

1973, 342) Why?

There are two primary explanations. The ﬁrst is Members' concern with

Zambia's growing national economic crisis. "For many years, the UNIP government was

92

able to maintain unusually high central government expenditure, equivalent to 40% of

annual Gross Domestic Product, on high earnings from Zambia's copper sales."

(Cromwell 1995, 154)

However, an economic crisis was precipitated when copper prices fell in

the mid-1970s. A steep decline in the revenues generated from copper sales forced the

government to resort to deﬁcit ﬁnancing of its programs in 1975. At the same time, the

government adopted a policy of suppressing agricultural producer prices to appease the

growing number of urban residents. As a result, manufacturing and agricultural outputs

declined, government revenues shrank, and "the shortage of foreign exchange led to a

drastic reduction in imports of essential raw materials, spare parts, and other intermediate

goods" necessary to maintain the productive capacity of the nation. (Mwanakatwe 1994,

115)

This economic decline coincides with Members' decreased attention to

their localities, as exhibited in Table 2.7. Between 1974 and 1988 export earnings from

copper sales declined by 23 per cent, but government expenditures did not. "In fact, the

UNIP government continued to implement expansionary ﬁscal measures right up to the

1991 multi-party elections." (Ibid.) In order to maintain these artiﬁcially high

expenditures the government embarked on a massive program of deﬁcit ﬁnancing. For

example, in 1980, the ratio of total debt to gross domestic product (GDP) was 84 to l, by

1985 that ﬁgure had jumped to 203 to 1, and by 1991 it had climbed even further, to 214

to one, an increase of over 150% in ten years. (World Bank 1994)

93

In response, the UNIP government "attempted, with only limited success,

to develop the agricultural sector to offset the collapse of mineral revenues." (Cromwell

1995, 154) Between 1980 and 1985, the agricultural sector grew an average of 2.1

percent per year. (World Bank 1994) However, between 1985 and 1993 agricultural

output fell an average of 0.2 percent per year. While industrial output increased

approximately 2.5 percent during the same time, from 1985 to 1993, it had to rebound

from the ﬁve previous years of structural decline that averaged 0.6 percent per year.

(Ibid.) At no period in the Second Republic did Zambia have sustained, multi-sectoral

economic growth.‘8 As a result, Zambia fell from a middle-income status country to a

low-income country with one of the highest per capita debt ratios on the African

continent. These problems were of obvious concern to most MPs and it is likely that they

made them more reticent to face their constituents and reduced the availability of

resources for constituency contact.

The second reason that Members became more focused on national issues

was the success of President Kaunda's efforts to concentrate political power and

decision-making authority in the hands of Lusaka-based policy makers. The salience of

constituency representation in house debates was negligible. By the fourth Assembly the

United National Independence Party dominated the political landscape, especially in large

population centers. "In seeking electoral victories, the governing party found it less costly

to organize the densely settled townships than the small homesteads scattered throughout

the countryside." (Bates and Weingast 1996, 6)

 

18

Simultaneously, Zambia's population grew an average of 3.4% (1980-85) and 3.1% (1985-93) per

year. (World Bank 1994)

94

The party went so far as to select, and impose, parliamentary candidates

for Assembly elections.l9 Intermediary party ofﬁcials adjudicated local disputes, pressed

central party ofﬁcials for local funding, and mobilized political support. (Chikulo 1986)

Properly vetted MPs were thus forced to turn their attentions to national issues and

political institutions in order to ﬁnd a legitimate role for themselves.20

However, UNIPs centralization of political power was not without cost. In

the "scattered homesteads," or in areas where "availability of patronage rewards for

constituency officials" was limited, so too was the party's ability to dominate the political

process. (Bratton 1980, 227) In these areas new, independent MPs could win a seat in

the Assembly. In the Kasama District of Zambia's Northern Province, for example,

"voters could clearly distinguish between candidates of the center," who had been

approved and appointed by UNIP officials and candidates of the locality who "accepted

 

'9

The elimination of local parliamentary primary elections before the 1978 General elections was a

signiﬁcant shift away ﬁ'om Helgerson's observation of the 1968 general elections in which "the wishes of

local and provincial party leaders weighed more heavily in the nomination process than had ever been the

case previously. This provided further evidence that MPs would be increasingly responsive to and

representative of their constituencies." (1970, 66-67) Sadly, quite the opposite had become true.

2°

An example of the degree to which Parliamentarians deferred to senior party and government

officials occurred came during the 1983 budget hearing debates. In his speech supporting increased

budgetary estimates for the so-called Ministry of National Guidance, a state-funded government propaganda

wing for UNIP, Reverend Ben Zulu, a back bench member from Kapoche, Eastern Province, said "it is

important we support the decentralization (and expansion into provincial ofﬁces) of the Ministry of

National Guidance. Why? It has to go to the people because the interpretation ofgovernment policy is

done through the activities of the Ministry ofNational Guidance." (Not the Members of Parliament, for

example) Continuing, he said "Sir, we should make sure that the people understand what the Ministry of

National Guidance is therefor. It is there make them understand government activities." (Hansards, vol.

62,1791)

Additional supporting comments were provided by Joshua Lumina, a back bench member from

Chikankata, who said "Sir, I take this ministry very seriously, because I think that in this country at present,

there is a lot of confusion not only among our people, but also among our leaders...We are looking forward

to this ministry to try and do serious work so that they can guide this nation and this Party, in particular, to

enable them to understand their role in the present economic situation. Sir, unless we know exactly what we

are supposed to do, we are likely to lose direction and we cannot hope to progress when we do not know

what we are supposed to do!" (my emphasis, Hansards, vol. 62, 1793)

95

the UNIP label as a matter of convenience (since) acceptance was the sole means of

gaining election to Parliament." (Ibid., 221) In the 1973 Parliamentary elections three

"relatively unknown" candidates of the locality were able to tap into residual support for

the since-banned UPP and capture all three Kasama district seats, defeating "important

national leaders, including two Cabinet Ministers," in the process. (Ibid.)

Members, too, began to chafe under increasingly stringent UNIP control

and used house debates to express their displeasure, as this passage from the March 18,

1982 debates shows: During Question Time, Hon. B. Namuchana, a back bench MP for

Liuwa in Western Province, asked the government "how many candidates for the 1978

Presidential and General elections were vetted by the Central Committee, province by

province?" While admonishing the MP for what he thought to be the "wrong notion, or

spirit, behind the question" (i.e., tribalism) the Minister said that 29 locally approved

parliamentary candidates had been vetted by the UNIP Central Committee, with the most

coming from Luapula (seven) and Northern Province (eleven). Continuing, the Minister

said that "the vetting of candidates with interests inimical to the states is a general

practice all over the world," though in a follow-up response he refused to answer what

constituted an "inimical interest." (Hansards, vol. 59, 3167-3169) These protests laid the

groundwork for later Assembly independence that would be exhibited during the run-up

to multi-party elections in 1991.

The record shows that debate participation in the Second Republic

increased when compared to that in the First Republic. However, this trend did not

coincide with increased attention to local issues as one might expect. National economic

96

difﬁculties diverted members' attention, as did the structure of incentives facing MPs in

President's Kaunda's increasingly centralized state apparatus.” The government's attitude

toward National Assembly Members in the Second Republic is typiﬁed by this passage

taken from the January 29, 1982 Verbatim Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates.

Increasingly frustrated by "government interference," and the fact that MPs

were not automatically approved under the Public Orders Act to address constituency

meetings, Hon. Ikacana, MP from Nalikwanda in Western Province, asked the Prime

Minister why MPs were "required to get clearance from the Party's regional ofﬁce each

time they visited places in their constituencies?" The government, via the Ministry of

Decentralization, said "We have regional ofﬁcials working full-time on party

organization...and development proj ects...(and) it is necessary that there is coordination

between them and the MP for that particular constituency. Should the MP wish to

address a meeting in the area it is a statutory requirement that he get a police permit. I

would therefore, Mr. Speaker, not use the word 'clearance,‘ but rather say that there must

be some coordination."

Hon. Pikiti from Malole in Northern Province then asked the Minister if he

was aware that "in some areas, District Governors prevent MP8 from addressing

meetings? This happened in Mbala." The Minister's response: "I am not aware, sir, but

ifany person is prepared to surrender his rights to other people, those people will be too

pleased to exercise them for him." (my emphasis)

 

2'

These explanations are discussed more fully in the following chapters.

Conclusion

97

Since independence, the Zambian National Assembly has been accused of

being a rubber stamp on executive branch actions. This criticism has come from both

outside observers and Members themselves who have lamented the Assembly's limited

involvement in legislation, poor quality of debate, and co-optation by the executive

branch. Many of these critiques have been accurate. No back bench or opposition

member-sponsored legislative proposal has been introduced in the house and most private

members' motions fail on ﬂoor votes.

However, many of these critiques have also been misplaced. First, in

many ways, the Zambian Assembly was doing what parliaments do the world over,

namely, ensure the passage of executive branch prOposals. For example, when British

parliaments fail to approve the Prime Ministers' proposals they are not praised for

exercising their independence but are criticized for voting against their party's platform

and causing the collapse of a fairly elected government.

Parliamentary systems offer the advantage of assuring that the ruling

party's (or coalition's) platform is approved and implemented by the legislature in power.

But the Zambian political systems is not truly parliamentary. Zambia's constitution blurs

what is, at its heart, a presidential regime, by forcing a strong, independent president to

form his government only from among the sitting Members of Parliament. In this hybrid,

primarily Presidential, "parliamentary" regime, strong executives have been able to use

their position to ensure the passage of govemment-sponsored policies and programs in a

way that mimics true Westrninister regimes.22

 

2’

These issues are discussed more fully in Chapter Four, Constitutional Change and Institutional

98

Nonetheless Zambian National Assemblies have been able to participate in

the governance process, voice the concerns of their constituents, and challenge the

government in other ways. "While real power did not reside in parliament, it was an

institution crucial to the appearance of participatory democracy, and this importance was

not lost on MP5, who used the government's need for legitimacy to their own ends in

affecting some measure of inﬂuence on policy." (Helgerson 1970, 280)

In the multi-party First Republic, Assemblies reacted to the government's

legislative agenda rather than create their own. However, they actively provided their

own amendments to these bills, as well as debating and approving amendments brought

by the government. Unfortunately, National Assembly involvement in the legislative

process diminished as the President consolidated those responsibilities in his own hands

after implementation of the one-party state in 1973. At the same time, Members asked

more questions during parliamentary question time, contributed more frequently to house

discussions, and the nature of house debates turned towards national at the expense of

local ones. Though several factors might account for this trend, such as the growing

economic crisis, it is likely that increased constraints on institutional-level behavior, such

as law-making and public budgeting, stimulated increased MPs efforts to participate at an

individual level during house debates.

By the end of the Sixth Assembly economic and political crises had

severely undermined UNIPs control over the political process. Back bench MPs such as

Bennie Mwiinga, Frederick Hapunda, Alfeo Hambayi, and Michael Sata routinely used

house debates to criticize the government over its economic policies, security concerns,

 

Consolidation.

99

and oppression of the single-party system. These individuals all became important actors

in the 1991 restoration of multi-party politics to Zambia and were later returned to the

National Assembly as Members of the new ruling party, the MMD. Their story, and how

the Assembly has performed since their election is discussed next.

Chapter Three:

Its Like Deja Vu All Over Again.

National Assembly Performance 1991 - 1995

An exit from dictatorship does not automatically result in

an entry into democracy. Exits can simply downslide into

breakdown and chaos. If so, the ensuing political structure

will primarily be a "counter-chaos form" dictated by

necessity, that is, by the sheer necessity of having a

structure. Will it be a democratic structure? In the long run

this is what the democratic Zeitgeist would predict. But in

the short term the entry into democracy is by no means a

certainty.

Giovanni Sartori 1991, 438

Zambia's 1991 exit from dictatorship did not result in political collapse. In

fact, one of the reasons that observers of Zambian politics were so hopeful about the

prospects of political development was that the transition from a single-party to

multi-party political system was ushered in by free, fair popular elections in which the

incumbent loser voluntarily and peacefully handed power to the victorious challenger.

Unlike Nigeria where incumbent rulers suspended the results of popular elections, there

were no major challenges to the results of the 1991 Zambian elections, save for individual

petitions from a few unsuccessful parliamentary candidates. Zambia had taken the last

step in its peaceful democratic transition.

100

101

After their October, 1991 election Members of the seventh National

Assembly poured into Lusaka and took their places as elected representatives in Zambia's

new democracy. Supported by these new MPs, the government quickly embarked on a

course of radical economic and political restructuring, including the removal of price

controls, privatization of state owned industries, and enhanced civil liberties. It was a

period of great optimism.

Observers assumed that Zambia's free, fair, popular electoral system would

alter the political incentives that had stymied legislative development in the one-party

state and encourage a more pro-active, independent National Assembly. Unlike the MPs

in the one-party state, representatives in this new system would ensure their political

survival through constituency service rather than loyalty to the President and his party.

No longer would the house he a rubber stamp on executive decisions but it would actively

counterbalance the actions of the executive branch. Members would be free to express

opposing views during house debates and would be more active in the decision-making

process, creating their own legislative proposals and directing the course of legislative

business more vigorously than they had in the past. Members who did not perform these

activities, the optimists argued, would be defeated during the next popular elections.

Regrettably, the post-transition period has not met these lofty expectations.

Table 3.0 compares several indicators of legislative performance before

and after the 1991 Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Column one lists the starting

and ending dates of each session. Column two lists the total number of questions asked

by back bench and opposition members during parliamentary question time. The number

102

of motions introduced by back bench and opposition members is provided in column

three. Column four lists the number of bills introduced in the House by the same group.

Table 3.0 -- Comparison of Legislative Activity Before and After the 1991 Elections

v ~ ion

Number of

Private Members'

Private Members'

 

Questions

Motions

Bills

 

anuary 15, 1988 to

352

-

-

uly 8, 1988

 

ovember 18, 1988 to

265

1 turned down

--

uly 21, 1989

 

ctober 27, 1989 to

373

3 turned down & 1

-

ugust 9, 1990

approved

 

ctober 26, 1990 to

226

..

..

ugust 15, 1991

 

"October 1991- Elections

 

ovember 22, 1991 to

464

2 w/drawn & 3 turned

--

ovember 4, 1992

down

 

 

anuary 15, 1993 to

ecember 3, 1993

anuary 19, 1994 to

‘u' st3l,1994

 

 

363

295

 

1 w/drawn; I adopted

& 1 turned down

-

1 adopted & 3 turned

down

2 w/drawn before

. resentation

 

|

I

l

l

t

l

l

l

I

Column two of Table 3.1 shows that the average annual number of

questions asked during parliamentary question time in the last three years of the one-party

state was 304. In the ﬁrst three years after the 1991 elections, the average annual number

of questions asked during question time increased to 374, an increase of 23% over

previous levels. However, this change is the result of increased National Assembly

membership in the Third Republic, rather than more active members. In the three years

prior to 1991 there were 125 elected Members in the house. Under terms agreed to in the

1991 Constitution, the number of elected members in the Third Republic was increased to

103

150. Therefore the average number of questions asked per elected member in the three

years prior to 1991 was 2.4 per year. In the three years after, that ﬁgure had barely

increased to 2.5 questions per elected member. It seems that these new MPs were not yet

signiﬁcantly motivated to participate more fully in question time.

Column three shows that in the last three years prior to 1991, ﬁve different

substantive motions were introduced by opposition and back bench Members during

house sittings, one of which was adopted by the full house. In the three years after the

1991 elections, the number of motions introduced more than doubled, to twelve, in the

same three year period. However, only two of those twelve were adopted. Members

appear no more successful at inﬂuencing National Assembly business now than they were

before.

Finally, the fourth column highlights back bench and opposition Members'

continued unwillingness and/or inability to initiate their own legislative proposals. Like

the previous two Republics, no Private Member's bill has been introduced in the Zambian

National Assembly since the democratic elections of 1991. Though drafts of two such

bills were written in 1994, they were never introduced to the house.

While these indicators do not assess the quality of participation, they seem

to indicate that little has changed regarding the quantity of participation since the

introduction of multi-party politics in 1991. The remainder of this chapter examines

these issues in more detail and compares National Assembly performance across

Zambia's three post-independence Republics.

104

The ﬁrst section in this chapter examines the seventh National Assembly's

role in issuing new legislative proposals, amending the government's legislative

proposals, and inﬂuencing the direction of policy-making through formal motions. Part

two examines Members' participation in house debates and focuses on parliamentarians'

willingness to ask questions, make comments (including the type of the comments they

make) and the distribution of debate participation across party and geographic region.

These results are compared to those presented in Chapter Two, allowing us to asses

whether the 1991 reintroduction of multi-party politics in Zambia had any signiﬁcant

affect on National Assembly performance.

Law-making in the Third Republic

One issue that inﬂuences parliamentary performance is the length of each

parliamentary session. Longer sessions give the house greater opportunities to analyze

and debate legislative proposals, ask questions, and attend committee meetings. As a

result, sitting days have long been an important variable in the comparative study of

legislatures. "To be sure, activity is not coextensive with inﬂuence, but activities do

constitute an indicator of inﬂuence." (Blondel 1973, 56) Former President Kaunda's

recognized the symbolic importance of longer parliamentary sessions and used them to

promote the "participatory nature of his single party regime. Simultaneously, however, he

worked to reduce parliamentarians' involvement in house affairs, as was discussed in the

previous chapter.

105

Unlike his predecessor, however, President Chiluba has not continued this

trend. In fact, the opposite has been the case. Table 3.1, shows how the average length of

parliamentary sessions has changed across Zambia's seven National Assemblies.

Table 3.1 -- Average Annual Sitting Days in the Seven National Assemblies

 

Assembly

Years

Average Sitting Days

 

First

1964-1968

37

 

per year

 

Second

 

1969-1973

 

Third

1974-1978

 

45

52

 

Fourth

1979-1983

52

 

Fifth

1984-1988

58

 

 

 

Sixth

1989-1991

 

 

50

48

Seventh

1 992- l 994

 

As the table indicates, the seventh National Assembly has sat in session

for the third fewest average number of days per year when compared to the six

Assemblies that preceded it. However, average ﬁgures can be deceiving. Though the

decline in sitting days is interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive, two-tailed, small-N

difference of means tests showed that average session length in the seventh Assembly is

not signiﬁcantly different from average annual session lengths in either the First or

Second Republics. Difference of means tests between First and Third Republic

Assemblies yielded a T-score = -l.l69 (9 d.f.). The same test between Second and Third

Republic Assemblies yielded a T-score = 0.214 (1 8 d.f.), neither of which was signiﬁcant

 

106

at the 95% level. However, these results obscure an interesting pattern of house sittings

since 1991 that is shown in Table 3.2

Table 3.2 -- Average Number of Sitting Days within the Seventh National Assembly

 

Assembly

Year

Average Sessional

 

Seventh

1992

55

 

Days per year

1993

53

 

 

 

 

1994

37

 

 

Though the seventh Assembly has sat in session an average of 48 days per

year since 1992, they have sat for fewer days each year since their election. This runs

counter to patterns ﬁrmly established in the previous six National Assemblies. Between

1992 and 1994 the number of annual session days fell from ﬁfty-ﬁve days to thirty-seven

days per year, a 33% reduction during that period. This is shown in column three of

Table 3.3. In previous assemblies the shortest session annual session occurred in the ﬁnal

year of each ﬁve year assembly, just prior to the annual general elections. However,

1994, the shortest so far, was only the third year of the seventh Assembly. It is possible

that the number of sitting days in the seventh Assembly will drop even further, however,

that seems unlikely to happen, if for the only reason that annual budget sessions last four

to ﬁve weeks. When additional data is available, we will be further able to determine

whether this is part of a long term shift towards shorter annual sessions.

Though the house has sat for fewer and fewer days each year, the amount

of new legislative business introduced in the house increased each year. As a result, per

107

day measures of legislative activity have increased signiﬁcantly in the seventh Assembly,

often surpassing ﬁgures established in the Second Republic. However, these activity

measures are far less than those established in the First Republic, which remains the

busiest legislative period in Assembly history, both in absolute (total number of bills) and

relative terms (bills per day and bills per member). Tables 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate these

comparisons.

Table 3.3 -- Legislative Business Since Independence

 

Assembly

Years

Average

Average

Average

 

Number of Bills Number of Bills Number of Bills

Introduced each

Heard per

Heard per

Year

Sitting Day

Member

First

1964-1968

67

 
  

1969-1973

Second

0.45

1.1

49

 

 

 

 

1.8

0.84

Third

1974-1978

32

0.6

0.24

 

Fourth

1979-1983

28

0.5

0.21

 

Fifth

1984-1988

35

0.6

0.26

 

 
          

1989-1991

Sixth

0.28

38

 

 

1

 

 

Seventh

1992-1994

 

Table 3.4 -- Number of Bills Introduced in the Seventh Assembly

 

Assembly

Year

Number of Bills

Bills Introduced

 

Seventh

1992

32

0.58

 

Introduced

per Day

1993

44

0.83

 
  

1994

1.32

49

 

 

 

 

108

Table 3.3 shows how per day and per member measures of legislative

business in the seventh Assembly compare to those recorded in earlier assemblies.

Column Three shows that the average of 42 bills heard per year in the seventh Assembly

is third highest total of any Assembly, only less than the two assemblies in Zambia's ﬁrst

multi-party period. However, since the number of sitting days has become shorter, the

average number of bills heard per day is less than the averages posted by Assemblies in

the post-independence ﬁrst Assembly. Moreover, since house membership has increased

the number of bills heard per member has also fallen ﬁom highs established in the ﬁrst

and second Assemblies.

Table 3.4 shows how measures of daily activity increased in the seventh

Assembly. For example, the number bills introduced in the house has increased nearly 53

percent, from a low of 32 in 1992 to 49 in 1994. Simultaneously, the number of sitting

days has fallen. As a result, the house debated an average of more than one new

legislative proposal each day between 1992 and 1994.

Again, small-N difference of means tests were used to test the signiﬁcance

of these levels of legislative activity across Zambia's three Republics. The results showed

that there is a statistically signiﬁcant difference between legislative activity levels in the

First Republic when compared to the Second and Third, though not between the Second

and Third themselves. Difference of means tests between the average annual number of

bills presented in the house in the First and Second Republics yielded a T-score = 4.983

(21 d.f.), which was signiﬁcant at the 95% level. The same test applied to the First and

Third Republics resulted in a T-score = 2.073 which was signiﬁcant at the 90% level.

109

The same test applied to the Second and Third Repblics was = -1.304 (16 d.f.), which was

not signiﬁcant at the 90 to 95% level, though is signiﬁcant at the 80% level. These tests

conﬁrm that the First Republic, comprising the multi-party ﬁrst and second Assemblies,

was a unique period of legislative activity in Zambian political history. As the immediate

demands of post-independence nation building subsided, the volume of legislative

business heard by the Assembly decreased to a more moderate level. That was not

signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by Zambia's 1991 democratic transition.

Nor have back bench and oppostion members been more willing to

introduce their own legislative proposals since the 1991 transition. All of the bills in

Table 3.4 were sponsored by the government. As mentioned earlier, this pattern has long

been part of normal parliamentary procedure, though the separation of powers in

Zambia's political regime has always been more presidential in character. "In Britian few

legislators propose bills because they know that alomst no bill opposed by the

Government has any prospect of passage." (Rasmussen 1993, 101) However, this should

not imply that MPs have no inﬂuence on the legislative process in parliamentary systems.

As Richard Rose points out approximately "one dozen" or so Private members' bills are

approved by the British Parliament every year, usually dealing with either

"noncontroversial measures" or "issues so controversial that no party will ofﬁcially take

responsibility." (Rose 1989, 112). The same has been true in Zambia. On at least two

occasions since 1991 Zambian MPs precipitated changes in government policy by making

clear their intent to issue their own legislative proposals.

110

In early 1994, long-time UNIP MP, Hon. Lavu Mulimba (Petauke) wrote a

bill to amend the Public Orders Act to make it easier for citizens (and politicians) to

obtain permission to hold public rallies. At the same time, an active MMD back bench

MP, Hon. Newton Ng'uni (Kanchibiya) wrote a proposal to force the government to make

direct payments to parliamentary constituencies for local development projects. Both

Members consulted with the parliamentary legal advisor on draft text of their bills,

though neither were ever formally reviewed by the house. (Personal interview. July 20,

1994)

Hon. Mulimba was concerned that his proposed repeal of the Public

Orders Act would leave a "legal void" in the penal code and he asked the Parliamentary

Legal Counsel to advise him on the appropriateness of his ideas. (Personal interview.

August 9, 1994) However, these delays invalidated his proposals since the government

crafted its own amendments to the Public Orders Act; a response that actually

strengthened the government's control over public meetings. In this case Hon. Mulimba's

actions helped precipitate a shift in government policy, thought not the one he intended.

However, not all ideas meet with such unfavorable outcomes. Hon. Ng'uni

also abandoned his own legislative proposal, but successfully moved a motion that "urged

the Government to include in its future budgetary allocations a provision of not less than

K500,000,000, in real terms, for development projects directly decided upon by the

people in each constituency and that such funds be disbursed through district councils."

(Hansards, vol. 97, 1053-1067 and personal interviews) This provision was unanimously

adopted by the house and included in the Government's 1995 budget.l In this case, the

 

'

Hon. Ng'uni was later appointed a Deputy Minister of Education and could, therefore, no longer

111

Member's own legislative proposal was adopted by government and the Member achieved

his desired policy outcome. These were two high-proﬁle, constituency-oriented policy

changes that took place in the seventh Assembly and were initiated by back bench and

opposition party MPs.

Though the seventh Assembly has not been a hotbed of independent

legislative activity, there have been more attempts to inﬂuence the government's

legislative proposals than in previous assemblies. This change is seen in the increased

number of amendments attached to government sponsored bills.

In the third session of the seventh Assembly, for example, the house

debated 119 different amendments attached to 19 different government bills, 28 of which

were written by back bench and opposition MP5 (24%). This was the most since the third

session of the ﬁrst National Assembly which sat in 1966-67. (Recall that during that the

1966-67 session the house debated 370 different amendments to 29 different government

bills, 24 of which were sponsored by opposition or back bench Members.) Table 3.5

compares how the distribution of legislative amendments has changed since that ﬁrst

Assembly.2

 

contest "government's unwillingness" to adopt his Constituency Development Fund. However, other back

bench MPs have continued to pressure government for greater local autonomy over expenditures.

House voting practices are discussed more fully in Chapter Five

2

Remember, a representative sample of amendment data has been taken from the third year of each

National Assembly for which data was available. As indicated in the previous chapter, data from the sixth

National Assembly, which would have sat from 1988 through 1993, was unavailable.

112

Table 3.5 -- Distribution of Legislative Amendments in the Second and Third Republics

 

Year

Sitting

Number of

Government

Back bench

Bills

Amendments Approved

Amendments Approved

Amended

(withdrawn or failed)

(withdrawn or failed)

 

1976

11

21 (0)

o (0)

 

1981

 

   

  
 

1 (2)

 

 

20(1)

1(1)

-:».-. .'_.A..;._\;.; ‘91- ;-.;:' y.A.:.;,;-_:;<_t, ‘gv~.;..xl.u~.;.'<

.j.,:

-_

V,

:.

'

. .

\. 9

‘ ,"

.- ..'." -' J-.. 53.113 .~

\ a,.>.-.\.,','.\_.,'~vl,~¢ -; ,-.

.-

,

-,“._.-.-‘a;.;r,»x.

.

- " .

.

‘

.

‘

ﬁ-

,-

. " '

.‘

-',. r? -;<

-.

‘

‘

'-'»'.'x

«'.‘~'

'.

.

.

.

’ " ,4

.'L:-:i:~.-:.‘v‘.r:1:,ézk’zét.:’4<:r:4tx>r<€‘-:~§ XII-7:29.42Qk'zliiik'ytsr italic-28:41:8133-3921139: 9,-9511‘:NY:5'§:7"‘}'lt"t‘r'l_\‘-:if.'if :‘;:'.:/,;-f.~,?-:‘< .,,

, ----- ,

'.

.

.

.

.

~

_-

4‘.- '  

»

.

.

.

'\ w,- ire-(1.. 1.. '-

J.

v

-

. ‘-T~’ 4“ 4.2-:3: Mm“:

   

.-

‘

'
.

‘

‘

.

'v,
,

  

  

61 (0)

1 (3 failed, 1 w/drawn)

 

 

12 (1 w/drawn)

17 (0)

0 (6 w/drawn)

4 (11 failed, 2 w/drawn)

  5 (14 failed, 9 w/drawn)

  
 

90 (1 w/drawn)

Total

 

 

 

 

Table 3.5 shows that the number of back bench and opposition sponsored

amendments increased dramatically between the Second and Third Republics, from a

high of three amendments in 1985 to 28 in 1994. Though only ﬁve of those 28

amendments were approved by the house, nine were withdrawn by their sponsors after the

government agreed to the provisions stipulated by their sponsor. This represents a

signiﬁcant change from previous levels of legislative activity in the previous assemblies.

Another type of legislative participation is members' willingness to

introduce substantive motions. Hon. Ng'uni's motion on constituency development funds

discussed earlier was one of the few private members' motions introduced in the Third

Republic. In fact, the number of back bench and opposition Member sponsored motions

has fallen since independence, from an average of 2.3 per year in the First Republic, to

 

 

 

113

1.9 per year in the Second Republic, and 1.7 per year in the Third. Members have

become increasingly unwilling to utilize formal motions to inﬂuence house proceedings.

One reason for this decline might be the recognition that house debates are

an opportunity to speak not to their constituents, but to senior party/ government ofﬁcials

and remind them of their loyalty to the goals and aims of the party platform.

Consequently, they are unlikely to make any formal or official statements that might

anger these senior party officials. The chilling inﬂuence of institutional rules and party

politics on MPs are discussed more fully in Chapter Four. Another possible reason for

this decline is the limited inﬂuence these motions usually have had on government policy.

The following case is one example:

In mid-1995 one of Zambia's largest banks, Meridian BIAO, was buffeted

by a series of ﬁnancial crises. Weak ﬁnancial regulations had spawned a wave of new

ﬁnancial services companies and Meridian was among them. Unfortunately, Meridian

was weakened by poor management and eventually seized by speculation. It held

insufﬁcient reserves to cover its expenditures and soon found its self in ﬁnancial trouble.

The government was a leading depositor in Meridian and the powerful Minister of

Defense, Ben Mwila, was an investor and member of the board. Not surprisingly, the

government publicly declared its support for Meridian and promised a capital infusion to

help the suffering institution.

In response to this declaration, Hon. Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika

("Aka"), a former government Minister who had resigned from the MMD to join the

opposition National Party, put forward a motion asking the government to "review its

114

policies regarding the ﬁnancial services sector." The motion was seconded by Hon. Ken

Ngondo from UNIP and after some 2 hours of debate, passed the Assembly unopposed.

This case is a useful illustration of both the best and worst of legislative development in

the third republic.

In this case an opposition member was able to present his own private

member's motion. Since the government, in consultation with the Speaker's ofﬁce,

establishes the parliamentary agenda it could have quashed the motion before it reached

the ﬂoor, but it did not. Second, the motion was seconded by a member from another (the

only other) opposition party. This was an important example of coalition building among

opposition parties and was taken as another sign of healthy legislative development.

In the end, however, the motion had little inﬂuence and was soon

forgotten. The reasons are two-fold. One is personal. Hon. Lewanika used his

introductory remarks as an opportunity to "soapbox" about economic reform in Zambia,

generally, and in the ﬁnancial markets, speciﬁcally. While intelligent and well-spoken,

his hour-long diatribe was viewed more as a ﬁlibuster than a policy debate and, in the

end, was not as useful as a more direct attack on government policies might have been.

Second, only after sitting through Aka's presentation were members

introduced to the real thrust of the sponsors' motion; a request to institute a parliamentary

select committee to investigate the government. After having been palled by Aka's

speech, members again had to sit through a presentation designed to enlist support for a

parliamentary investigation.

115

In the end, the ruling party outﬂanked the motions' sponsors. MMD MPs

had met earlier in a caucus meeting to discuss their response to Aka's motion.3 Rather

than let the opposition claim the high moral ground and risk public embarrassment by

opposing the motion, government decided to endorse and accept the motion, but reject the

unwritten, implied call for parliamentary investigations.4 They had decided not to "tie the

executive's hands in that way" and accepted the motion as a "non-controverial, straight

forwar " piece of legislation. (Personal interview with Hon. Frederick Hapunda) In

effect, they outsmarted the opposition.5

In sum, National Assembly inﬂuence on legislative affairs has changed

little since the 1991 democratic transition. As the number of parliamentary sitting days

has decreased, the number of government-sponsored legislative initiatives have increased.

This has given the assembly less and less time to review legislative proposals and

increased time constraints put upon them. An especially noticeable example of this

occurred in 1996, when the MD rushed several controversial constitutional

amendments through the Assembly in preparation for the November 16, 1991 presdiential

and parliamentary elections. These amendments, among other things, barred former

president Kaunda from contesting the elections. These provisions were approved, despite

the recommendation of the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review Commission that

 

'

All of my appointments for that day were canceled because members had been called to the

Assembly to discuss the motion. It was clear, as early as 09:00 that morning that something was about to

happen.

‘

And risk further allegations of being corrupt, practicing favoritism towards Ben Mwila because of

his partnership in ITZM, Meridian's holding company, etc.

’

In the end Meridian failed and depending on the rumors, the government lost between 25-50

billion Kwacha, i.e., 25-50 million US. dollars at 1995 exchange rates.

116

recommended constitutonal amendments should be adopted by constituent assembly. By

pushing these amendments through the Assembly, the MMD eliminated "UNIP's only

realistic chance of competing favorably in the coming elections." (Bratton and Posner,

12. See also Simutanyi, 1997)

Between 1992 and 1994 the seventh Assembly provided more legislative

amendments to government proposals than ever before. Though most of these

amendments failed on ﬂoor votes, several were approved and others were withdrawn after

the government adopted the provisions of the amendments as their own. Despite the

difﬁculties, the experiences of Hon. Mulimba and Ng'uni, highlight some back bench and

opposition members' willingness to act more independently in the legislative process,

especially when confronted with constituency-focused issues. The following section

examines this issue in greater detail. If legislative performance in the Third Republic was

unaffected by the 1991 transition, how has individual members' performance changed?

Are members effective constituency representatives in this new, multi-party era or not?

Members' Performance in the Third Republic

As in Chapter Two, this chapter distinguishes between responsibilities

normally ascribed to the National Assembly as a whole, such as law-making, and those

ascribed to individual Members of Parliament, such as debate and constituency service.

Many of the quantitative indicators of MPs debate performance shown here were taken

from the Ofﬁcial Verbatim Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates (Hansards). However,

I was fortunate enough to have been given unique access to the house chambers and its

117

members during the ﬁve parliamentary sessions that took place during my l6-month stay

in Zambia. In that time I was able to conduct conversations, in-depth interviews, and

surveys with a large number of MPs. Consequently, additional information, comments,

and personal observations resulting from my close contact with the members of the

seventh National Assembly are included.

As before, one indicator of debate participation is the number of questions

back bench and opposition MPs ask during parliamentary question time. Question time

gives back bench and opposition MPs an opportunity to ask front bench ministers about

issues of concern to them. This includes local, constituency-oriented requests such as the

schedule for paving a certain road, or more macro oriented issues such as the

government's plans to privatize the copper mines, raise or lower taxes, or initiate speciﬁc

legislative proposals. Members must present these questions to Mr. Speaker's office for

approval, prior to their inclusion on the daily agenda ("Order Paper") and government

ministers are allowed to present pre-written, formal statements in response to these

questions. Members are given an additional opportunity to ask follow up questions.

Though Mr. Speaker has discretionary authority to reject question proposals and curtail

follow-up debate, question time gives Members an opportunity to ask the government

about a wider range of issues unrelated to other items on the agenda.

During the First Republic, MPs asked an average of 48 questions per year

during parliamentary question time, or only one question per member per year. In the

Second Republic the average number of questions asked increased ten-fold, to 456

questions per year. Though the house increased in size between the First and Second

118

Republics the signiﬁcant increase in question volume resulted in a ﬁve-fold increase in

the number of questions asked per member, to over ﬁve questions per member per year.

In the ﬁrst three years of the Third Republic, both total and per member measures of

question volume have declined. Between 1992 and 1994 the house asked only 391

questions per year or approximately four questions per member. Table 3.6, below, shows

how the number of questions across Zambia's three Republics.

Table 3.6 -- Questions Asked During Parliamentary Question Time, 1964-1994

 

Average Number of

Percent "Local" in Character

 

1st Assembly 1964-68

17

23.7%

Questions per Year

2nd Assembly 1969-73

  
 
   

65.4%

78

 

 

3rd Assembly 1974-78

305

61.2%

 

4th Assembly 1979-83

612

54.2%

 

5th Assembly 1984-88

525

42.4%

 

6th Assembly 1989-91

 
 
W

42.4%

125

 

 

7th Assembly 1992-1994

391

45.3%

As this table shows, members of the seventh Assembly have asked more

questions per year than did Members of most previous assemblies, though members of

the fourth and ﬁfth Assemblies remain the most active participants in parliamentary

question time. Though the ﬁrst section of this chapter showed that these Members have

been somewhat reluctant to act aggressively on legislative issues, they have used

parliamentary question time to speak out on issues of concern. It remains to be seen

 

119

whether this dimension of debate participation will remain a priority for MPs in the

seventh Assembly.

It is also important to examine how the type of questions members ask has

changed. Measures of frequency allow a comparison of debate participation across time,

as column 2 of Table 3.6 indicates. Measures of question type allow us, in crude terms,

to assess how members' perceptions of important issues changed across time and whether

they are more attentive to constituents' needs in the context of a competitive, multi-party

political system. For example, if the democratization process introduces electoral

incentives for members to be more attentive to their constituents, one might hypothesize a

shift towards more locally oriented question during parliamentary question time.

However, the data presented above show that the questions asked by

member of the seventh Assembly are almost equally divided between "national" and

"local," constituency oriented issues, with national issues predominating. Column three

on Table 3.6 shows that the percentage of "locally" oriented questions asked during

parliamentary question time has fallen in the seventh Assembly to only 45.3 percent of

the total number of questions asked per year. This is a decline of 15.9 percent from the

high of 61.2 percent local questions asked in the third Assembly.

It is possible to argue that Members in the seventh Assembly are more

locally oriented than were Members in the ﬁfth and sixth Assemblies and that members'

concerns are not adequately exhibited in parliamentary question time. At a minimum,

however, Table 3.6 shows that there is no clear relationship between this dimension of

debate participation and the 1991 democratic transition. While seventh Assembly MPs

120

have utilized question time more aggressively than did previous parliamentarians, they

have not done so in a way that reﬂects a greater concern for their constituents then was

held by MPs in either the ﬁrst multi-party era or under the one-party regime.

Democratic theory would suggest that members would be increasingly

focused on their constituency since their reelection depends on appealing to the "median

voter" (Downs 1959). Why then might Members not focus on their constituencies as one

might expect? I believe this trend reﬂects the dual, and often competing, audiences to

which Zambian MPs must appeal in house debates.

In their work on the Korean National Assembly, Kim and Woo (1975)

argue that MPs "representative role orientations can be explored in terms of the style

(how) and the focus (who) of representation." (264) They use these distinctions to divide

representatives into three groups: "delegates" who act on constituents demands;

"trustees," who act on their own "mature and enlightened decisions;" and "politicos," who

"balance their own thinking with constituency inﬂuence." (ibid.)

Adapting these concepts to the this case, Zambian MPs can be thought of

as "politicos," using parliamentary question time to address two different audiences.

First, it affords them an opportunity to exhibit concern for local issues and accrue

whatever political beneﬁts result. However, most MPs know that performance in

parliamentary debates will only marginally affect their chances at reelection. Few

constituents ever attend house sessions since it is difﬁcult to get permission to do so, nor

do they have access to information about what their MPs' did while they were in Lusaka.‘5

 

6

The daily newspapers provide brief synopses of parliamentary sessions. However, those

summaries are limited, lack detail, and provide little information. Moreover, most Zambians do not have

regular access to these newspapers. (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1994)

121

Consequently, Members focus their attentions on the audience that is present; government

Ministers and party ofﬁcials. This was especially the case in the fourth and ﬁfth

Assemblies of the one party era, when UNIP had consolidated its authority over the

political process.

It is reasonable to suppose that members' concentration on national issues

reﬂects constituents' concern for national problems. In this sense, a national orientation

could reﬂect the local demands of Members' constituents. However, a 1993 survey of

popular political attitudes in Zambia showed that only 11.5% of the respondents thought

the national assembly was supposed to "discuss national affairs", instead seeing its main

responsibility as "making and amending laws".7 (Bratton and Katundu 1993) Members

recognize these popular percetions and couch their questions accordingly during house

debates. MPs know that must be seen by assembly administrators, namely the Speaker,

and party officials as "national" leaders, especially if they are interested in seeking

"promotion" to the front bench. Parliamentary question time affords them an opportunity

to do so.8

In addition to formal questions asked during parliamentary question time,

comments made during house debates are another criteria by which we can compare

debate performance across Zambia's three Republics. As in Chapter Two, these

comments are the total of all other contributions members made during house debates on

bills, motions, amendments, speeches, and proposals, excluding initial and supplementary

 

7

Twenty-four percent said Parliaments primary responsibility was to "make and amend laws" (24%)

though the next most common response was that they "did not know" what Parliament was supposed to do

(20%).

'

The extent of party control over individual MP5 is discussed more ﬁilly in both Chapter 4 and 6.

122

questions asked during parliamentary question time. Table 3.7, below, shows that when

debate participation is measured in this way, Members' performance has undergone an

interesting shift since the reintroduction of multi-party politics, unlike the measure of

question time presented above.

Table 3.7 -- Comments per Sitting by Back Bench and Opposition MPs, 1964-19949

 

 

First Republic

Second Republic

Third Republic

UNIP

3.83

3.84

9.81

 

MMD

"'

*

5.9

 

NP

*

*

12.04

 

ANC

9.56

 

  
 

Independents

1 5 .87

 

 

 

*

*

*

*

First, this table shows that opposition MPs in the seventh Assembly are no

more likely to make comments than were opposition party MPs in the ﬁrst multi-party

assemblies. Prior to 1973, opposition assembly seats were held by members of the ANC

and NPP. This table shows that in the First Republic, these parties' members made an

average of 10 and 16 comments per sitting or approximately 30 and 48 per year,

respectively. In the seventh Assembly, however, opposition MPs from UNIP and NP

have made an average of only 10 and 12 comments per sitting, or 30 and 36 per year,

respectively. It appears that multipartyism has not spurred opposition party activism in

other forms of house debates.

 

9

One methodological note: only initial comments made during debates were counted. Additional

and/or follow-up contributions to an original comment were excluded so as to prevent biases from repetitive

interjections on a single issue.

123

Interestingly, however, back bench MMD MPs appear more likely to make

comments during house debates that were back bench UNIP MPs in the First and Second

Republics. This table shows that the average number of comments made by UNIP MPs

was only 3.8 per sitting in each of these periods. However, that ﬁgure has increased to

5.9 comments per MMD member per sitting in the seventh Assembly. Though this ﬁgure

is not statistically signiﬁcant, it seems to represent an early shift towards greater debate

participation by back bench MPs in the new multi-party era.'0

It is also interesting to note how the reintroduction of multi-party politics

has shifted the distribution of debate between groups who represent different geographic

regions. The table shown below indicates how regional interests have expressed

themselves in Members' willingness to make comments during house debates.

Table 3.8 -- Average Number of Comments per Sitting Made by Back Bench

and Opposition Members, coded by Province

 

Province

First Republic Second Republic Third Republic

Average

 

Western

5.5

9.4

6.2

7

 

Northwestern

9

9.9

7.3

8.7

 

Copperbelt

1 1.3

7

4.9

7.7

 

Central

8.5

8.5

8.3

8.4

 

Lusaka

6.5

7.5

8.5

7.5

 

Southern

9.6

9.2

6.5

8.4

 

Luapula

18

 

 

Northern

  
   
 

Average

Eastern

3.4

2.4

9.6

4.9

6.8

6.7

6.6

4

4.6

10.4

6.74

8.24

7.96

 

 

 

'°

Small-N difference of means tests resulted in a T-score = -l .043 (33 d.f.), which was not

signiﬁcant at the 95% level.

 

124

One inﬂuence multipartyism has had on regional representation issues

can be seen in the last row of table 3.8 which shows debate participation among

parliamentarians who represent Zambia's Eastern province. Eastern province has long

supported Kenneth Kaunda and the (now) opposition United National Independence Party

and UNIP Members have dominated the parliamentary seats from this region.

In the ﬁrst two Republics, Eastern province parliamentarians were less

likely to participate in house debates than were MPs from other areas. The average of 2.4

comments per sitting from these MPs was far less than the average of 6.4 comments per

sitting made by MPs from all provinces. This means that these MPs commented on

approximately 12 fewer issues per year than their compatriots. After the 1991 elections

UNIP lost its parliamentary majority and UNIP MPs became more vocal than (1) they

were prior to 1991, and (2) MP5 from any other geographical region. This is shown in the

third column of Table 3.8.

At the same time, the opposite pattern is exhibited by Copperbelt

representatives who were outspoken, but marginalized, UPP/Independent MPs in the First

Republic; assuaged, though often dissatisﬁed UNIP back bench MPs in the Second; and

active government supporters members in the Third. As these regions' representatives

political stars grew brighter, the number of different issues on which they contributed to

parliamentary debates also fell over 50%, from a high of 11 comments per sitting (i.e., 33

per year) to only 5 comments per sitting, or 15 per year.

Despite provincial inﬂuences in house debates, MMD MPs were the

dominant actors in the seventh National Assembly. The MMD captured 125 of 150

125

parliamentary seats during the 1991 elections and maintained this strong parliamentary

majority despite defections from the party and signiﬁcant internal wrangles.ll

Consequently, parliamentary debate in the seventh Assembly was dominated by MMD

members' opinions and active opposition members' voices were all too often drowned out

by the sentiments of the ruling party.

Often, ruling party MPs debates in the seventh Assembly degenerated into

attacks against the former UNIP government. For some ruling party MPs, debates in the

seventh Assembly were less about policies than politics. They were forums in which they

were allowed pillory the former government, some members of which sat in the house as

"honorable members of the opposition."12 These members used house debates as an

opportunity to complain about the previous government's actions. A statement read by

Energy Minister Edith Nawakwi on November 30, 1994 is typical.

In this Ministerial Statement she addressed her comments to those who

had questioned the MMD government's commitment to a rural electriﬁcation fund created

shortly after their 1991 election. Firstly, she recommitted herself and her ministry to the

completion of rural electriﬁcation programs and reemphasized the MMD government's

goal of providing electricity to rural areas. However, in her comments she turned her

remarks against the former government and denounced them for projects left undone:

 

"

During the period I observed the Zambian Assembly the newspapers were ﬁlled with stories about

President Chiluba ending "the MMD bickering once and for all" (Daily Mail, July 2, 1994); MMD

National Executive Committee Members who complained of " intimidation and harassment from other

MMD leaders" (Times ofZambia, February 7, 1995); and the "mind-boggling fuss" over leaders in the

MMD who would "make heroes out of zeroes" in attempts to seize control of party ofﬁces. (Times of

Zambia, May 17, 1995)

'2

They are, of course, acting in the oldest and grandest Parliamentary tradition when they do so.

126

"Mr. Speaker, Sir, the MMD government is, unfortunately,

taking responsibility for the ills of the past done by the

previous administration. We had projects in Lukulu,

Namushakende, and Kacholola where you spend K3 00

million and only a clinic was electriﬁed!" "Hear, hear.."

(Hansards, vol. 99, 334)

Afterwards follow-up debate degenerated into an attack about other projects the former

government had initiated and demands for speciﬁc locations within members'

constituencies to be included on the Minister's updated list of projects. (ibid.)

However, not all attacks are directed against the former government.

Criticism of the MMD government by both outspoken back bench MPs and members of

the opposition is also an important part of house discourse. The third annual sitting,

usually held in November or December of each year, is the best opportunity for back

bench and opposition Members to air their views on government policies and programs.

They do so by including their remarks within comments directed at the reports of the nine

sessional committees presented during this ﬁnal sitting of the year. Since these

committees' reports are often quite broad in scope they provide members the unique

opportunity to speak out on a wider variety of subjects than they normally might and still

remain "in order," according to Mr. Speaker's interpretation of parliamentary rules.13

For example, during debate on the 1994 Report of the Committee on

Parastatal Bodies, Dr. Yusuf Badat, an outspoken MMD back bench member from Kafue,

in Lusaka province chastised the government over the "serious crisis of direction on the

whole privatization process." (Hansards, vol. 99, 352) In his remarks he accused the

Zambian Privatization agency of being unprepared to "address the mechanics of

 

'3

More detailed committee analyses are prevented by a number of factors discussed in Chapter 5 on

National Assembly administration.

127

privitization...its negative social impacts...and...the problem of asset stripping." (ibid.,

353-3 54) He further said that "this program is a Zambian one which should be

implemented by the Zambians for their beneﬁt" and he decried the government for its

hiring of foreign consultants. "Zambia," he said "should not serve as an external

employment agency! " (ibid.)

Members' Participation in Budget Hearings

Finally, it is also important to analyze Members' participation in house

debates during budget hearings. Not only do parliamentarians ask questions and make

comments on a wide variety of substantive issues, they also participate in the process of

allocating scarce government resources during the assembly's annual budget sessions. In

his study of rural development in the Kasama district of Zambia's Northern province,

Bratton argued that "leaders at the political center are well placed to determine the size

and availability of development resources but local leaders, acting as gatekeepers, are

well placed to have decisive inﬂuence over actual patterns of distribution." (Bratton

1980,8)

His observation on local resource distribution patterns is useful here for

two reasons. First, it reinforces the argument made in Chapter Two that members' ties to

their constituents were, and are, weakened by intermediary political actors often under the

authority of government or political party ofﬁcials. Though MPs are often blamed for the

absence of needed community resources or praised for their presence, they often have

little inﬂuence over either.”

 

H

The relationship between legislators and their districts is dicussed more fully in Chapter Six.

128

Second, it also reinforces the role of institutions at the political center. It

is clear that attention must be paid to local leaders and local issues in order to understand

how development resources are ﬁnally distributed. However, it would be a mistake to

ignore the actors and mechanisms that made the original decisions about the "size and

availability" of those resources. Bratton has clearly indicated that local leaders will

inﬂuence the ﬁnal distribution of resources in the manner they see ﬁt. But since local

leaders have little (or no) inﬂuence on the volume of resource they can distribute, it is

also important to understand how the original allocative decisions were made, by whom,

and why. In order to accomplish that task this section examines budgeting in the seventh

Assembly and explores how members' role in budgeting has changed since independence.

The ﬁrst sitting of each annual parliamentary session usually begins in

January and is primarily dedicated to the government's budget, formally known as the

"Annual Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure." (1995) This "budget session" begins

with the President's speech at the "Ceremonial State Opening" (1995) of the house and is

followed by members' contributions to the "motion of thanks" for the President's

comments.

Approximately two weeks after the President's address, the Minister of

Finance delivers his "Budget Address" (1995) in which he outlines that year's expected

sources of revenue and planned expenditures. Each budget is written by the Ministry of

Finance in the year prior to its presentation, based on requests from the line ministries,

and approved by the Cabinet before presentation to the house.15 Following the Minister's

 

IS

The Minister brings the address to the Assembly in a copper-sheathed briefcase bearing the

Zambian national seal, and a ribbon embroidered with the colors of the national ﬂag. After the Minister

concludes his address, the Assembly adjoums to the common areas located just outside parliament building

129

address, the house resolves into the Committee of Supply, to "look at the expenditure

proposals ministry by ministry." (Brief Parliamentary Notes on the Budgetary Process, 2)

During these debates Members ask the relevant ministries and ministers to provide

further information on proposed line item expenditures and debate the merits of the

Ministry's proposals. "At the same time, the House resolves into the Committee of Ways

and Means (to) approve the revenue proposals" necessary for funding the proposed

estimates of expenditures. (ibid.)

Despite the perceived importance of these committees, MPs never affect

any changes to proposed government revenues or expenditures. The primary reason is

that house is constitutionally barred from acting in any way that "would incur an expense

on the revenues of government." (Constitution Bill, 1991, Article 82 (a) & (b). Though

there are no provisions against moving motions to reduce estimated expenditures, the

house has done so only once.'6 Surprisingly, this action came at the height of one-party

dominance in 1980. During this session the house successfully moved a motion reducing

what they considered an inappropriate government expenditure on the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. This vote was a clear and direct response to what the Members' believed was an

inappropriate outlay of scare resources on Zambian missions abroad. No other Assembly

has never taken such an action.

Given members' limited involvement in the budget process, analysis of

funding patterns across the Republics would reveal very little about members' ﬁrnding

 

for an afternoon party and reception for Assembly Members and invited guests. It is always a moment of

high ceremony.

"’

The inﬂuence of these rules and procedures are discussed more fully in Chapter Four.

130

priorities. Therefore we must look to other forms of participation in order to analyze their

role in the budgetary process, one of which are the number and type comments made

during budget hearings.

First, who participates in budget hearings? How many back bench and

opposition MPs makes contributions? Table 3.9 shows how participation rates in budget

hearings have changed over time.

Table 3.9 -- Back Bench and Opposition Members' Participation in Budget Hearings

 

Average Number of Back

Percent of Total

 

lst Assembly, 1964-68

29

84.9%

Bench and Opposition

Members Making Comments

2nd Assembly, 1969-73

  
 
 

 

71.6%

39

3rd Assembly, 1974-78

84

90.4%

 

4th Assembly, 1979-83

78

88.9%

 

5th Assembly, 1984-88

82

93.7%

 

 

 

 

 

6th Assembly, 1989-91

NA.

NA.

 

 

7th Assembly, 1992-date

,

88

90.2%

As column two shows, more MP8 made comments during budget debates

in the seventh Assembly than ever before. However, this is the product of an ever

increased house size, rather than any speciﬁc result of the transition to multi-party

politics. Recall that the 1991 Constitution increased house size from 125 to 150 elected

Members. Therefore, while the number of different Members contributing to budget

hearing debates has risen to an all-time high of 88, the percentage of back bench and

 

131

opposition members participating in house debates in the Third Republic stayed steady,

with an average 90.5% in the Second Republic, compared to 90.2% of available members

today. However these participation rates are signiﬁcantly higher than those established in

the multi-party First Republic, when only 77% of back bench and opposition Members,

made comments during budget hearings.

Though the above table showed that over 90% of all back bench and

opposition MPs made at least one comment during budget debates how active were these

participants across the three-month budget session? In order to more fully answer this

question, the total number of different issues on which member made comments during

debates were also coded for each member across each annual session. The following

table shows the average number of different issues on average MPs made comments

during the these budget sessions. No claim is made here on the quality of their

comments, only their frequency.17 In order to better understand activity levels among back

bench and opposition party Members, responses have been categorized according to party

membership. This allows us to understand even more precisely who precisely who

participated in house budget sessions, and to what degree.

 

'7

Unfortunately, Members' comments were often "requests to explain line item number... located on

page..." and contained no substantial contributions themselves. As mentioned previously, no attempt was

made to distinguish "good" comments from "bad" ones. However, even these requests forced the

government to explain, in some greater detail, their rationale for funding decisions, an explanation that

further informed back bench and opposition MPs.

132

Table 3.10 -- Number of Comments per Member Made During Budget Hearings

coded by Political Party'8

 

 

lst Assembly. 1964-68

10.8

37.1

63.9

NA.

NA.

 

2nd Assembly. 1969-73

10.7

17.8

16.3

NA.

NA.

UNIP

ANC

Ind.

MMD

NP

3rd Assembly, 1974-78

21.2

*

*

*

*

 

4th Assembly, 1979-83

28.9

*

*

*

*

 

5th Assembly. 1984-88

  
 
 

6th Assembly. 1989-91

26.7

N.A.

*

*

 

*

*

*

*

 

 

*

*

 

7th Assembly, 1992-date

23.6

*

*

14.4

25.6

 

Table 3.10 shows that no Assembly has yet equaled budget debate

participation rates achieved by opposition MPs in the ﬁrst assembly of the First Republic.

During this period UPP/Independent MPs made approximately 64 different comments per

person per year during budget sessions alone, and ANC MPs averaged slightly more that

37 comments per person per year during the same period. As the UPP dissolved and

Independent members resigned from the house, their inﬂuence on budget proceedings

declined. Between the ﬁrst and second Assemblies, budget participation rates among

these MPs fell by nearly 75 percent and participation rates among ANC MPs fell by more

that 50 percent across the same period.

Simultaneously, the number of comments made by UNIP members

increased over time, especially in the period between 1964 and 1984. Back bench UNIP

MPs in the First Republic made an average of only 11 comments per budget session per

 

"

Debate participation was not coded by political party during the Second Republic, i.e., from 1973

until 1991, since only one party sat in the house, UNIP.

133

year. Sitting as in the house as members of the "loyal opposition," UNIP members made

approximately 24 different comments per budget session per year. Measured in

participation terms, Members' role in budget hearings in the Second Assembly increased,

rather than decreased as one might have expected in the one-party regime.19

Finally, this table shows that back bench MMD MPs participated more

actively in budget hearings than did their UNIP counterparts in the First Republic. On

average, MMD back bench MPs commented on almost ﬁfteen different issues during

annual budget sessions. This is four comments per session more than the average of

eleven comments made by UNIP back bench MPs prior to 1973. Opposition party

members of the ﬁrst National Assembly were more active participants in budget debates

than any group of MPs has been since. However, there has been a slight trend towards

increased budget debate participation across time among opposition and back bench

members in both the single-party and multi-party eras.

What consequences does this trend have for legislative development? One

conclusion is that the parliamentary model of debate is, in some sense, working

effectively. Opposition members are given opportunities to make comments and raise

issues for debate, and they have done so. While back bench members of the ruling party

remain more passive, they too exercise their chances to comment on budget issues.”

However, the parliamentary model of deliberation is not necessarily the

one most suited to the inclusion of alternative opinions. Therefore, the dominance of the

 

'9

This is not to say that back bench UNIP Members' inﬂuence over budget issues increased in the

Second Republic when compared to the First, they exercised their option to speak out more frequently than

they had done previously.

2°

The Second Republic was an exception to this rule for reasons discussed in the previous chapter.

134

MMD majority and weakness of parliamentary opposition has helped to erode Members'

already limited role in the budget process. Since opposition parties have held only 30

house seats since 1991, even active opposition members' voices have been drowned out

by the numerical dominance of the MMD. In Zambia, the government writes budgetary

proposals, presents them, and approves them, with primary oversight provided not by

political opposition, as is the case in more balanced two-party states, but by the

Permanent Secretaries, Deputies, and administrators that staff the government

bureaucracy.

Conclusion

This chapter examined Zambian National Assembly performance in the

ﬁrst three years after the 1991 democratic transition and compared it to levels achieved in

earlier Zambian Republics. The data presented here showed that some dimensions of

parliamentary behavior were positively affected by the return to multi-party politics. For

example, the number of bills debated by the Assembly increased, as did the number of

amendments initiated by back bench and opposition parliamentarians. Simultaneously,

the number of presidential statutory instruments declined, an indication that the assembly

was increasingly involved in the decision making process. Finally, two back bench

MMD parliamentarians wrote their own National Assembly Bills. Though neither was

introduced to the house, this was a positive step towards a more outspoken, independent

National Assembly.

135

Unfortunately, for every step forward on the path of legislative

development, there were two steps backwards. For example, though two members

initiated their own bills, the number of back bench and opposition sponsored motions

introduced to the house fell in the seventh Assembly. Though the house debated more

government bills, they were given less time to debate them and the quality of house

debates suffered as a result. Moreover, the length of parliamentary sittings in the Third

Republic continued to decline during each of the three years examined here. As members

became more familiar with the parliamentary process they were given fewer opportunities

to participate.

This trend also coincides with a decline in the number of questions

members asked during parliamentary question time. The average number of questions

asked fell by 14 percent, from a high of 455 questions per year in the Second Republic to

390 in the Third. In addition, seventh Assembly MPs were no more likely to utilize

house debates to address issues of concern to their constituents than were MPs in the

one-party state. Finally, opposition MPs in the seventh Assembly participate less

frequently than did their counterparts in the multi-party ﬁrst and second Assemblies. One

positive note is that back bench members of the ruling party are more likely to participate

in house debates than UNIP MPs in the First Republic. This, is a small, but encouraging

sign in the development of Zambia's National Assembly.

The next three chapters seet to explain these patterns of parliamentary

performance through different theoretical lenses. Why do Zambian legislatures and

legislators behave as they do? No single theory alone alone adequately accounts for the

136

patterns of legislative performance discussed here. When these different perspectives are

combined, however, they tell a compelling story about Zambian institutional development

and the failure of the 1991 democratic transition to affect the performance of Zambian

parliaments and parliamentarians.

Chapter Four:

Constitutions, Constitutional Change and

National Assembly Performance

"Rules, like ideas, have consequences."

James Q. Wilson 1989, 338

Chapters Two and Three showed that Zambian National Assembly

performance has been uneven since independence. For example, examination of

individual-level behavior would lead to different conclusions about legislators'

willingness and ability to participate in the political process, when compared to measures

taken at a more macro-institutional level. While Members' ability to introduce motions or

represent constituents' opinions in house debates declined over time, the number of

questions asked during parliamentary question time increased noticeably across Zambia's

three different Republics. The data also show that the 1991 reintroduction of a

multi-party political system has not resulted in an increasingly vibrant, active legislative

branch. Why might this be the case?

Three possible explanations for these changes in legislative performance

are discussed in the following chapters. The ﬁrst is the effect formal, constitutional rules

have had on legislative performance and behavior. Despite the introduction, prohibition,

137

138

and reintroduction of multi-partyism, Zambia's constitution remains biased in favor of the

president at the expense of the National Assembly. This chapter examines how this

might have inﬂuenced parliaments' and parliamentarians' performance.

The second possibility is that resource limitations and the administrative

structures within the National Assembly have stiﬂed legislative development. These

issues are discussed in Chapter Five. Finally, Chapter Six explores the inﬂuence of

poverty and political patronage on parliamentary behavior. While some Members are

ﬁnancially and professionally secure outside of Parliament, others are not and their

independence is compromised by their reliance on government largesse to augment

limited personal resources. The following chapters compare these three interpretations

and explore in greater detail how constitutional changes, Assembly administration, and

political patronage have inﬂuenced Zambian parliamentary performance.

The neo-institutional literature presents a wide ranging and diverse set of

explanations for the myriad of political outcomes studied by scholars working in this

sub-ﬁeld. For them, political "institutions" include the laws and statutes that attempt to

codify political behavior, as well as the precedents, expectations, and social conventions

that exist outside public law but are no less influential on political performance. This

chapter adopts one thread in the broader neo-institutional tapestry by examining the

effects that constitutional rules have had on National Assembly performance.

The influence of constitutional rules has often been ignored by scholars of

African politics. As Africa grapples with the difﬁculties of nation-building in the post

Third Wave period, this chapter resuscitates a debate on the relevance of formal,

139

constitutional rules in the African political context. Again, a distinction is made between

the effect of constitutional rules (and rule changes) on institutional-level parliamentary

performance, such as law-making, and individuals' behavior, including Members'

contributions to parliamentary debates.

This chapter will show that the formal rules contained in Zambia's three

constitutions can explain certain dimensions of legislative performance, especially

institutional-level behaviors, but that changes in performance cannot solely be attributed

to changes in formal rules. Formal rules inﬂuence political performance, but they do not

determine the behavior of either legislatures or legislators. For example,

institutional-level performance has long been affected by constitutional rules that limit

Assembly involvement in a number of policy areas, especially law-making and public

budgeting. The constitutional balance of political power is, and has been, weighted in

favor of the executive branch at the expense of the National Assembly and the 1991

democratic transition did little to affect that relationship, as this chapter will show.

Political institutionalization is often deﬁned in terms of political outputs.

Huntington's (1965) deﬁnition of institutionalization as "stable, recurring patterns of

behavior," is but one example. However, the constitutional continuity shown here

suggests that if institutionalization is deﬁned in terms of 'rules', i.e., political inputs, as

North (1990) proposes, then the National Assembly was an "institutionalized" piece of

the Zambian political process. These questions, and the consequences of

institutionalization on legislatures' and legislators' performance are discussed in turn.

However, we begin with a discussion of the role of constitutions in Aﬁica and a

discussion about the constitutional changes that took place in Zambia between 1964 and

140

1994.

Constitutions in Africa

For many years national constitutions were not considered an important

aspect of the Aﬁican political landscape. "In the decades of the 1970's and 1980, scholars

abandoned altogether, any attempt to examine African constitutions on the ground that

they bore but an obscure relation to governance and politics in the continent"

(Okoth-Ogendo 1991, 3. See also Ghai and McAuslan 1970). Political developments in

Africa "have demonstrated again and again that...constitutions have failed to regulate the

exercise of political power." (Okoth-Ogendo 1991, 4)

As constitutional analyses became less important, cultural and

society-centered studies moved to the forefront. However, these approaches ignored an

interesting and important source of information about political development, the process

of constitutional evolution. Elazar (1985) rightly noted that constitution-making is an

"eminently political act" and understanding how (and why) constitutions are created

allows precise explanations of political phenomenon.

This is one way in which the state was "brought back into" the study of

African politics. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) reminded scholars of the

roles that political institutions play in shaping social and economic change. Prior to this

" government itself was not taken very seriously as an independent actor, and in

comparative research, variations in governmental organizations were deemed less

141

signiﬁcant than the general functions shared by the political systems of all societies" (4).

Their discussion, and that of others such as Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Kohli (1986),

Krasner (1984), and Nettl (1968), reminded us of the need to examine the state as a

political variable in its own right. "Since politics inherently centers on the phenomenon

of power relationships, there must be a set of political institutions that provide some

structure to those relationships" (Jackman 1993, 40). They recognized that state

structures were not simply shells in which political events unfolded, but were dynamic

elements of the political process that could, and often did, shape political outcomes.

"(The neo-institutional) sub-ﬁeld places political, rather than social or

economic, or cultural, variables at the center of explanation for political outcomes"

(Shugart and Carey 1993, 1). However, deﬁning what constitutes political institutions is

a difficult task. Political institutions are "a mixture of informal norms, formal rules, and

enforcement characteristics that together deﬁne the choice set" faced by political actors

and that shape political outcomes (North 1990, 53).

If institutions are all the norms, codes, and mores that guide behavior,

even in the limited arena of politics, separating institutional inﬂuences from other,

non-institutional ones is perplexing task. Every event would, at some level, be

"institutionally" motivated. However, a common feature of many institutionalized

political relationships is the presence of a set of formal rules established in a written

constitution.I Through formal rules political institutions gain the effectiveness and

legitimacy of a "rational-legal order" espoused by Weber (1968).

 

'

English common law is, of course, the most obvious exception. It should be noted, however, that

within the third wave of democratization, no other countries have adopted this informal an approach to

institutional establishment and/or reformation. In order to escape the arbitrariness of informal rule, explicit,

 

142

For Weber, "the rational grounds of legitimate domination...rest on a belief

in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules

to issue commands." (Ibid., 215 & 945) If the consequences of any given action (or

actions) are sensitive to the rules that guide them, then "the rules can be said to determine

the outcomes as much as the individuals." (Knott and Miller 8, from Riker 1982).

Therefore, in order to build on an existing intellectual legacy and to impart deﬁnitional

precision to this study the neo-institutional explanation of legislative development in

Zambia is limited to the effects that formal rules, embodied in Zambia's three

post-independence constitutions, have had on Zambian parliaments and parliamentarians.

This argument should not imply that political interactions are

predetermined by rules. Far from it.

It is impossible to know, with any degree of

certainty, the results of contestations in the political arena prior to their occurrence,

despite knowing the rules of the game. Like chess, political interactions are temporary

partnerships between actors (or groups of actors) competing over scarce resources. While

the rules establish the range of moves each player is allowed at any given time, the

magnitude, direction, and sequence of the game depends on the players' application of

those rules to the pieces at hand.2

Bringing the State Back In created a cottage industry in the literature

centered around one of two key themes: bureaucratic studies emphasizing institutional

 

written procedures (like Parliamentary "Standing Orders," for example) and constitutions have been are the

preferred method of creating political institutions.

2

Note the idea of "strategic" interactions between two players inherent in this discussion.

Like

chess, political interactions cannot develop when there is only one player. One player's must respond to the

moves of another in order to prevent stagnation. This has led some scholars working in this genre, such as

Barbara Geddes (1991) to incorporate more formal, game theoretic concepts into their works. However,

that will not be done in this study.

143

inﬂuence and the ability of governments to govern (March and Olsen 1983; Geddes 1994;

Knott and Miller 1987; Wilson 1989; Weaver and Rockman 1993); and cross-national

studies that examined institutional inﬂuences on the outcomes of elections, governmental

transitions, and regime changes. (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Evans et al. 1985;

Lijpart 1990, 1992; Lijpart and Waisman 1996; Shugart and Carey 1993; Stepan and

Skach 1993;)

While many of these authors' perspectives (and conclusions) differ, they

all share three important assumptions adopted in this study. Each recognizes that: (1)

institutions help shape political outcomes; (2) institutional inﬂuence is not homogenous,

it varies across time and issue area; and (3) institutional inﬂuence results, in part, from

the set of rules which deﬁne them. Therefore, the people and procedures that established

these institutions (i.e., those who wrote the rules) are of great importance.

For example, Knott and Miller (1987) argued that "the orthodox rules

about how to organize a bureaucracy constitute a recognizable institution and that this

institution was chosen at various times and places because a decisive coalition of

involved individuals could reach agreement on that particular institution." (8) Therefore,

by examining the rules that changed across Zambia's three Republics and identifying the

actors who participated in the reform process this study provides: (1) an insight into the

creators' motivations, and (2) a point of comparison between the expected and observed

realities of political behavior within Zambia's new constitution.

This approach coincides with a constitutional renaissance among African

scholars and politicians. The importance of formal rules in shaping political outcomes,

144

especially national constitutions, has been actively debated since the "third wave" of

democracy swept the African continent in the late 19805. Commenting on Nigerian

politics, for example, Ben Nwabueze said: "From colonial autocracy and absolutism we

emerged, by slow stages, at the era of constitutionalism, of constitutional limitations upon

power....consisting of the recognition of the people as the source of all political power,

particularly including the power, by means of a constitution, to frame a system of

government for themselves...The lesson of the failure of military rule is that there is no

acceptable, viable alternative to a government freely elected by the people and limited in

its powers by a supreme constitution." (Nwabueze 1989, 10 & 21)

Not all Aﬁ'ican political scholars held constitutional rules in such high

regard, though. In order to explain the authoritarian nature of many African states, some

critics blamed the formal structures their nations inherited at independence. To this end

they cite the "repressive Rhodesian legacy" in Zimbabwe (Ncube 1991) or British

colonialism in Uganda that "wiped out (indigenous) principles and laws" and replaced

them with "alien values." (Essack 1992)

However, these critiques undervalued the frequent, often signiﬁcant, ways

in which African governments manipulated their own national constitutions to suit their

political needs. Modern African constitutions are not simply the products of inherited

colonial legacies, they are documents re-crafted and re-cast by African political leaders to

maintain their political authority. The current Zimbabwean constitution stands alone as

one of the few independence-era constitutions that has remained in force. "Unlike most

former Aﬁican colonies that inherited independence constitutions only to reject them

immediately...Zimbabwe has maintained a striking ﬁdelity to its independence

145

constitution, amending it only now and again and only in accordance with the terms

provided for in the constitution its self."3 (Ncube 1991, 156)

Elsewhere, for example, Uganda has undertaken four different

constitutional reviews since gaining political independence; ﬁrst in 1962, and again in

1966, 1976, and 1989. (Karrim 1992) Nwabueze cites Nigerian military rulers'

propensity to amend the constitution by "issuing decrees...128 of them between 1966 and

1985...(that) made the constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights inapplicable...

conferred unquestionably on the executive branch power to undertake acts under their

provisions...and...afﬁrmed the legislative supremacy of the military government and the

unquestionability of its enactments in legal proceedings." (Nwabeuze 1989, 12-13)

Finally, Zambia has twice rewritten its constitution since independence, once in 1972, and

again in 1991, excluding the signiﬁcant constitutional amendments approved in interim

periods. This is discussed in more detail, below.

Though these constitutional reviews offered African governments the

opportunities to democratize oppressive, colonial-era legal structures, they did not act

upon them. Ncube puts forward three different explanations for Zimbabwe's failure to

aggressively pursue democratic constitutional reforms that are equally applicable to many

other African regimes; the ﬁrst is cultural. "The repressive political and legal culture of

Rhodesia was so entrenched as to acquire a momentum of its own and thereby

independently impose itself upon the new leadership." (160)

 

'

When amendments were made, they were often signiﬁcant. For example, the decision to create the

office of an executive president was a major shift from the more parliamentary system inherited at

independence. However, Ncube's point is well taken.

146

Second, repressive legal structures beneﬁted individual politicians for

whom, "in the conditions of poverty and unfulﬁlled expectations, the beneﬁts of

independence, namely, state power, inevitably became a means of survival used to create

opportunities for private accumulation." (ibid.) Finally, state leaders recognized the

utility of repressive, authoritarian laws to eliminate political opposition. "In the absence

of a culture of democracy embracing tolerance of opposing views...(these) governments

frequently resorted to the detention of political opponents and hence has extensively used

the powers of preventative detention given it by (oppressive) regulations." (Ncube 1993,

165)

In Aﬁica today, "the idea and necessity of there being a constitution

appears fully established in the minds of state elite in at least two important senses: ﬁrst,

"the constitution is an act without which policy can have no legitimate or sovereign

existence;" and second, the constitution is the "basic law of the state." (Okoth-Ogendo

1991, 6) However, the importance of constitutions among African leaders does not also

carry with it the notion of constitutionalism, or, simply, a willingness to be constrained by

those "basic laws". Aﬁican leaders' search for a "socially relevan " basic law does not

merely involve the rejection of external institutions and constitutional devices: "(it)

involves, more emphatically, an abandonment of the classical notion that the purpose of

constitutions is not to facilitate the exercise of state power but to limit and control it."

(Okoth-Ogendo 1991, 7)

This chapter explores the constitutional distribution of political power in

Zambia and examines the degree to which constitutional rules have affected National

Assembly performance. It is argued that the president captured signiﬁcant authority at the

147

adoption of Zambia's independence constitution in 1964 and later used this authority to

expand the primacy of the executive branch at the expense of the National Assembly.

Zambia's commitment it constitutions has been strong, but its commitment to

constitutionalism has been eroded by executive actions designed to limit the power and

inﬂuence of the National Assembly.

Constitutional Evolution in Zambia: 1964-1991

The basic character of post-independence Zambian politics was

established between 195 7 and 1963 and reﬂected trends common to newly independent

countries in southern Africa. Some of the most important changes that took place during

this period included: the mushrooming of the African electorate; mobilization of a

national consciousness into organized political movements; rejection of white minority

rule; and the development and prominence of Zambian political leaders. (Mulford 1967,

332-341) To account for these changes the independence constitution of 1964 expanded

voting rights to all Zambian citizens, regardless of race, guaranteed fundamental personal

freedoms to indigenous Zambians, and adopted a multi-party political system based on a

Westrninster-style parliament, but with a politically powerful, independently elected

American-style President.

The process of constitutional negotiation prior to independence was a

hard-fought battle, initially between the British government and colonial settlers who

resented indigenous Zambians' increased political participation. "Like his African

148

opponents, Roy Welensky," leader of the settlers' United Freedom Party, adopted a

"rigidly uncompromising position" towards Zambian independence and attempted to

bolster Northern Rhodesia's European community for the "eventual showdown with the

British Government." (Mulford 1967, 302) Consequently, "constitutional progress was

as painfully slow as it was frustrating." (Ibid.) On numerous occasions UNIP and the

colonial ofﬁce in London failed to ﬁnd common ground for a constitutional arrangement

suitable to both parties. The negotiations were inﬂuenced by "the considerable pressure

that (British) settlers had on London, through Roy Welensky's UFP...The outcome was

tension and hard feelings against the British government." (Makasa 1990, 146)

In addition to these debates there were signiﬁcant differences among

indigenous Zambians over the nature of the Zambian state that further complicated the

development of an independence constitution. The most serious were over the political

independence that Barotse Province (now called Western Province) had gained under

colonial administrators. "While Barotseland had been opened to political parties before

the 1962 elections, the Litunga (traditional leader of the Barotse people) steadfastly

refused to compromise the Protectorate's special position in any way." (Mulford 1967,

esp. 312-315)

However, by May, 1964 leaders of UNIP and the two opposition parties,

the ANC and NPP (which had evolved from Welensky's UFP), "ﬂew to London to agree

on the ﬁnal details of the independence constitution. The result was the acceptance of

UNIP's demands for republican status, a unitary state (including Barotse province), and an

executive presidency, modiﬁed by elements of the British parliamentary system."

149

(Tordoff and Molteno, 1974, quoted in Bach 1994) Though these conﬂicts were

resolved, they foreshadowed later debates within newly independent Zambia over the

distribution of political power among opposition groups outside the ruling party and

nature of political representation. In the short run, "the Territory's political

metamorphosis had been phenomenal." (Mulford 1967, 301) But a metamorphosis into

what?

Key Provisions of the 1964 Constitution

Under the terms agreed to in May, 1964 Zambia adopted a hybrid

Presidential-Parliamentary constitution in which both the President and 75 members of

the National Assembly were elected by direct popular vote from among competing

political parties.4 Executive authority was vested in the President and legislative

authority was vested in the National Assembly, mimicking the presidential-style

separation of powers contained in the US. Constitution. (1964 Constitution, Articles

48(1) and 57).

However, the 1964 Constitution also contained uniquely parliamentary

provisions as well. For example, the President could appoint a vice-president, but only

from among sitting Members of the National Assembly (Article 41(1)). Moreover, by

virtue of their appointment, this nominee also became leader of government business in

the house (Article 50) similar in stature to a parliamentary prime minister.

 

‘

Cited passages in the 1964 Constitution are taken from the version printed in Constitutions of

African States, 1972, edited by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee Secretariat.

150

The President was free to nominate government Ministers to his Cabinet,

but again, only from among the sitting Members of Parliament. (Article 44(1) and (2))

The President himself was also a Member of the National Assembly (Article 57) and

could appear before it whenever he chose, though he was not elected to a Parliamentary

constituency like the British Prime Minister and enjoyed a national mandate distinct from

that of the National Assembly. The hybrid presidential-parliamentary nature of the

Zambian constitution and, more importantly, the distribution of power within it, has

frustrated the development of a true separation-of-powers system throughout the

post-independence period.‘

As Bach (1994) argues, "(parliarnent) included the President but the

National Assembly neither elected him nor controlled his government," as is the case in a

true parliamentary system. (16) The President could only form his cabinet from among

sitting Members of the National Assembly, but the Assembly had no role in their

selection or approval. Moreover, if the president wanted to appoint someone to his

cabinet who had not been elected to parliament, he could exercise generous presidential

powers to appoint additional MPs.

The assembly was also prevented from passing a vote of no conﬁdence in

the president's government. Parliament could dissolve the entire house, thus ushering in

new Presidential and Parliamentary elections, but so too could the President. Moreover,

the President had nearly unlimited authority to appoint members to the Electoral

Commission that established the rules and procedures for national elections, including the

 

’

For additional discussions about the political consequences of "presidential" versus

"parliamentary" regimes see: Laver and Shepsle (1994); Linz (1996); Linz and Valuenzuela (1994);

Lijphart (1992); Lijphart and Waisman (1996); O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986)

151

delimitation of Parliamentary constituencies.

Finally, the president had nearly unlimited

authority to declare a State of Emergency, initiate legislation, and control the expenditure

of government revenues with nominal Parliamentary oversight. "In sum, the 1964

constitution established a Parliament but not a parliamentary system." (ibid.) "Not only

was the President Head of State and Head of the Executive, but as Head of the Executive

he enjoyed the strengths of the British Prime Minister and the United States President

without the weakness' of either." (Morgan 1976, 42)

Evolution of the Indemndence Constitution

The transition from multi-party to single-party politics was initiated by the

adoption of a new constitution in December, 1972 that outlined the political supremacy of

the United National Independence Party and abolished opposition political parties.

However, this transition was not accompanied by other signiﬁcant constitutional

amendments. "The (1973) Constitution (did) not constitute a sudden swerve from what

went before." (Morgan 1976, 44) The reason was that the constitution had already been

amended in ways that further enhanced presidential authority over political affairs.

As it illustrated below, President Kaunda ably utilized UNIP majorities in

the ﬁrst two National Assemblies to promote constitutional amendments that further

centralized political authority in his hands. By 1972 the only step left to take was the

formal declaration of the one-party state. "The Independence Constitution was amended

over 30 times and the tenor of these changes was to remove fetters from the executive."

(ibid.)

152

The opposition parties elected to the Assembly in 1964 recognized this

eventuality. Despite their numerical, and constitutional, weakness opposition party

members expressed their fear that UNIP would attempt to ban their organizations and

implement a single-party regime as early as July, 1965. After criticizing the separation of

powers established in the independence constitution, Hon. E.M. Liso, an AN C MP from

Southern Province, was suspended from the house for "making false and unsubstantiated

allegations concerning the conduct of His Excellency the President." The motion for his

suspension passed the house by the vote of 46 to 17, after numerous contributions by

members of both parties. In his contribution on this debate Hon. Mumbuna, an ANC MP

 

from Mazabuka summarized the fears of the opposition when he said:

It appears to us, Mr. Speaker, that the ruling party is using His Excellency

the President . We do not want to argue that His Excellency, Dr. Kaunda

is not the head of state...but...this constitution is going to put us in a very

embarrassing position. We are in a very embarrassing position where you

have a...leader of the party as the head of state, because now the leader of

the state is the leader of a political party, whom we cannot criticize. I can

presume that this Constitution favors only the party which is headingfor a

one-party state. (Hansards, vol. 4, 207-208)

Despite these fears, few constitutional amendments were adopted between

1964 and 1968 that directly attacked opposition parliamentarians. Instead, President

Kaunda used his constitutional authority to recruit opposition party support for UNIP.

"UNIP relied heavily upon tactics of coercion and positive inducement to convince AN C

supporters that their political and economic interest could be better served though UNIP

-- hence the slogan: 'It pays to belong to UNIP'." (Chikulo, 202)

153

To maintain itself as an opposition movement the ANC relied on its strong

support among the Ila-Tonga peoples of the Southern and Central Provinces. ANC

supporters in these areas "believed that the party stood for the peasant, agrarian interest

and that UNIP for the predominantly urban and Bemba-speaking interest -- 'the Bemba,’

ANC propaganda alleged, 'will steal your cattle and your wives'." (Tordoff 1988, 10)

This dependable support base maintained the ANC, despite its weak organizational

structure and regional bias. (Tordoff and Scott 1974)

In response to the steady, though limited, support for opposition political

parties in the countryside, the UNIP government initiated a series of actions speciﬁcally

designed to weaken the opposition in the run-up to the 1968 general elections. Under

powers granted him in the continuing 'state of emergency', the government "banned the

United Party in August 1968 and prohibited the organization of the ANC in two of its

areas of strength" (Tordoff and Scott 1974, 108) These decisions were made despite

Kaunda's committrnent to "maintain an open political system." (Ibid.)

Nonetheless, the opposition ANC actually increased its share of Assembly

seats in the 1968 parliamentary elections. Though still unable to expand beyond their

Central and Southern Province base, the ANC captured 23 of the now 105 parliamentary

seats (22%) in 1968. This was a signiﬁcant increase in percentage terms from the 10

seats they held in the 75 member 1964 Assembly (13%). UNIP's "expectation that it

could convert its position of dominance within the political system into one of a legal

monopoly" through the ballot box was misplaced. (ibid.)

154

At the same time, increasing factionalism within UNIP led to conﬂicts

over the perceived strength of Northern Province, i.e., "Bemba" interests vis-a-vis UNIP

supporters in other regions of the country. (Bratton 1980, Tordoff 1974) "The

polarization of sectional forces in the country (after the 1968 elections) had serious,

divisive effects on both the party and the government." (Chikulo 1984, 8)

To help stem the perceived development of opposition political parties,

President Kaunda initiated a series of constitutional amendments designed to strengthen

executive power vis-a-vis the legislative branch. The ﬁrst action he took was to put a

referendum before the voters in June 1969 that removed the "referendum clause" from the

1964 constitution. Prior to this proposal, constitutional amendments did not "come into

operation unless the provisions contained in the Act effecting (the) alteration (had)...been

submitted to a referendum...and been supported by a majority of those voters." (Article

72 (3)) However after this clause was removed parliament gained sole authority to amend

the national constitution. And because the ANC did not capture one-third of Assembly

seats needed to block amendments in the house UNIP, in effect, gained sole authority to

further amend the constitution.

Kaunda then appointed Attomey-General Fitzpatrick Chuula to "head a

commission to examine the party's constitution with a view to reducing the sectional

competition within the party." (Tordoff 1988, 11) Unfortunately for President Kaunda,

the 'Chuula Commission' report released in early 1970 caused even more serious splits

within the party. On August 1, 1971 Copperbelt UNIP dissidents announced the

formation of a new political party, the United Progressive Party (UPP). "Two weeks later

155

the President disciplined four Bemba-speaking MP8 for their links with the new party.

This forced vice-president Simon Kapwepwe to admit the existence of the UPP and his

own role as its leader." (Tordoff 1974, 33)

By February 1972, President Kaunda had banned the new UPP, detained

its leaders, including the former vice-president, Simon Kapwepwe, and called on new

vice-president, Mainza Chona to "recommend what form a one-party participatory

democracy in Zambia should take." (Tordoff 1974, 34) The Chona Commission

submitted its report in October, 1972. "The most fundamental change resulting from

these steps -- and given legislative effect by the National Assembly in December, 1972 --

was that UNIP now enjoyed a legal monopoly of power." (Tordoff and Scott, 1974, 153)

The One-Pm Constitution and Zambia's 1991 Regal to Dempcracy

For the next 18 years, Kenneth Kaunda ruled Zambia under his one-party

constitution. However, severe economic stagnation weakened Kaunda's grip on political

power. Riots over increasing food prices took place in 1988, during which several

protesters were killed by Zambian army troops. Food riots again took place in early 1990

when Kaunda was forced to rescind food subsidies under pressure ﬁ'om the international

leding community. In June 1990, Kaunda announced that a referendum would be held to

determine whether or not Zambia should return to multi-party politics, an announcement

that directly contravened the "referendum clause" repealed by Kaunda 20 years earlier!

Not long after Kaunda made this announcement, a short-lived coup

attempt took place in which 30 year-old Army Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe

temporarily seized control of the Zambia National Broadcast Corporation radio studio. In

156

his early morning radio address Lt. Luchembe announced that the Zambia Army had

"decided to take over the government." (Chisala 1991, 54) The coup, which had been

precipitated by a squabble the previous night over the high cost of beer at the Arakan

army barracks ofﬁcers' club, was quickly quashed and the coup plotters were arrested.

However, "an inaccurate broadcast report of Kaunda's overthrow led thousands of

Zambians to celebrate in the streets of Lusaka." (NDI 1992, 26) Popular response to this

failed coup signaled the beginning of the end of Kaunda's one-party state.

Desperate to regain the political high-ground, President Kaunda

announced on September 24, 1990 that "he had decided" that the country should revert to

a multi-party political system and canceled the national referendum which was to have

been held. (1991 Government White Paper, 1) Irnportantly, this had been a key demand

of the MMD which had been organized only three months earlier, and was seen as a

victory for the opposition. In preparation for the 1991 elections Kaunda announced the

appointment of a "Constitutional Commission of Inquiry" headed by Professor Patrick

Mvunga, a long-time political supporter and UNIP leader, to "recommend the (new)

constitution for the Third Republic." (ibid.)

The Members of the "Mvunga Commission" traveled throughout Zambia,

"soliciting advice from business, community, and government leaders" on the shape of

Zambia's next multi-party constitution." (NDI 1992, 28) Their mission was to

recommend a new constitution that would ensure a government "strong enough to rule the

157

Zambian Nation and ensure the personal liberties of the people, but without prejudice to

the generality of this power. "6 (1991 Government White Paper, 2)

Two leaders of the MD were invited to join the Mvunga Commission

(Arthur Wina and Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika) but they refused. In their

response to the invitation they objected to the "strongly pro-UNIP character of the

Commission and the individuals consulted" and threatened to boycott review process.

(NDI 1992, 28) Zambia's efforts to re-write its national constitution were off to a shaky

start.

Between October 1990 and January 1991 the Mvunga Commission heard

586 oral submissions and collected 401 written submissions. (Mvunga Commission

Report 1991, 5-7) Three commissioners took constitutional "study tours" to Britain and

the United States, and another ﬁve took a similar tour to Sweden. (ibid.) The

Commission presented its ﬁnal report to President Kaunda on April 25, 1991. Despite

the partisan nature of the Mvunga commission, it made several recommendations that

would have dramatically shifted the balance of political power in Zambia. The following

section examines some of the key recommendations made by the Mvunga Commission

and the process of ﬁnal constitutional negotiation in 1991.

 

6

Their efforts followed a pattern that had become common in sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda, for

example, undertook an identical series of public meetings "aimed at seeking the opinions and views (of) a

wide cross section of people" between 1988 and 1990. The Ugandan Constitutional Reform Commission,

like the Mvunga Commission, argued that these popular meetings were held because "first, the

Constitutional Commission has to implement to the letter the terms of reference as contained in the statue,

and, secondly, it has to build a basis of legitimacy for whatever it comes outwith." (Essack 1992, v)

The Mvunga Commission and the 1991 Constitution

1 5 8

The Mvunga Commission heard testimony and made recommendations on

all aspects of the 1973 Constitution, including personal freedoms and the Bill of Rights,

separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, and so forth. This section, however,

will concentrate on proposed changes to the National Assembly and those

recommendations to the Executive Branch that would have effected National Assembly

operations. The most important of these recommendations were:7

1. Establish a bi-cameral legislature, comprised of the current National Assembly

and a 45 member "Chamber of Representatives" elected for a seven-year term.

Three representatives from each province would be elected by direct popular vote,

with the additional 18 representatives being chosen by the Provincial Council of

Chiefs, from among the traditional rulers, with two coming from each province

(146);

2. Grant Parliament the authority to dissolve itself by two-thirds vote (137);

3. Grant Parliament the right to consent to Presidential decisions on issues of

Defense policy, National Security, and Foreign Affairs (59);

4. Grant Parliament the right to ratify Presidential nominations for vice-president

(89), Solicitor-General (200), as well as Supreme and High Court Judges (263);

5. Provide for a President Cabinet selected from either inside or outside the

National Assembly, "provided that if such Cabinet is appointed from outside

Parliament, it should be subject to Parliamentary ratiﬁcation, and if a Member of

Parliament is appointed Minister he should retain his parliamentary sea ."

(241 -242);

6. Establish parliamentary committees that correspond to the various government

ministries that ensure that the Chairmen of these committees be accorded a status

"higher" than that of Cabinet Ministers (136 & 252);

7. Limit eligibility for Parliamentary office to individuals who have not been

involved in any "scandals" in the last 5 years (254); and

 

7

All numbers in the parentheses refer to the pages of the Report of the Constitution Commission of

Inquiry, April 1991 (the "Mvunga Commission Report") from which these recommendations were taken.

159

8. Require the President to be elected by an absolute majority of valid votes cast

(69), and that they be limited to serving two, ﬁve-year terms of ofﬁce

conterminous with the National Assembly. (64)

Had these recommendations been implemented, they would have done much to alter the

balance of power by creating a presidential democracy with increased legislative

oversight of executive actions.

However, the Commission also rejected petitioners' recommendations that

would have allowed even greater Parliamentary scrutiny of presidential appointees to

government office (134-135), created a mechanism for individuals to impeach their MP5

(134), and allowed the National Assembly to dissolve the Cabinet or pass a no conﬁdence

vote on the government. (104-105) In justifying their rejecting of these provisions, the

Commissioners said:

In an executive model of government, where the President is elected by

direct popular vote and has the sole prerogative of appointing Cabinet

Ministers, a provision on the vote of no conﬁdence would be of no

practical use. Such an Executive President derives his authority and

powers directly from the electorate and as such only the electorate has the

mandate to remove the President. (Mvunga Commission Report, 104)

Rather than adopt a pure presidential system, however, the Commission

also recommended that the 1973 provision limiting legislative control over the national

budget be maintained. This was a bitter blow to many supporters of the democratization

movement since budgetary authority is often the linchpin of legislative power in

executive systems. "Many petitioners expressed concern about the lack of ﬁnancial

discipline in the public sector...(and) in order to enhance Parliament's authority and

160

power, it should still approve the national budget, but it should not be allowed to alter the

total figure." (Mvunga Commission Report, 117 & 135)

After receiving the Commission's report, the government simply chose the

provisions it approved of, and rejected those it did not. The following list illustrates how

the Government responded to some of the recommendations made by the Commission.8

1. Recommendation to establish a bi-cameral legislature: Accepted (33)

2. Recommendation to let Parliament dissolve itself: Rejected (31)

No justiﬁcation was given for their response. The government simply said

"This (provision) is NOT ACCEPTED."

3. Recommendation to grant Parliament the right to consent to Presidential

decisions on defense, security, and foreign affairs: Rejected (1 7)

"It is contradictory in that it gives powers to the House to exercise a veto

on the President's veto."

4. Recommendation to let Parliament ratify Presidential nominations for

vice-president, Solicitor-General, as well as Supreme and High Court Judges:

Accepted (17)

However, so too was the Mvunga Commission recommendation that

"appointments to constitutional offices whose independence is guaranteed by the

Constitution should be subject to scrutiny and ratiﬁcation, but that ratification

should not be unreasonably withheld. (17)

5. Recommendation to let a Cabinet be formed from within the Assembly or

outside: Rejected (25)

"The Constitution for the Third Republic shall provide for a Cabinet

appointedﬁom outside Parliament and shall ﬁmction outside Parliament.

A member of Parliament who is appointed to Cabinet has to relinquish his

Parliamentary seat. The Members of the Cabinet so appointed shall not be

subject to Parliamentary ratiﬁcation."

 

All number listed in the parentheses refer to the pages of the Summary of the Main

Recommendations of the Constitution Commission ofInquiry together with he Government Reactions to the

Recommendations (the "White Paper") from which they were taken.

161

The President also rejected the Mvunga Commission's recommendation that the

President should have the power to create public offices as the need arises, subject

to parliamentary ratiﬁcation. This authority, the White Paper said, "is accepted,

but without Parliamentary ratiﬁcation." (25-26)

6. Recommendation to establish parliamentary committees that parallel

government Ministries and to accord Committee Chairmen a "higher" status than

Cabinet Ministers: The former was accepted, the latter rejected (30)

"Chairmen of parliamentary committees will be of the same status as

Cabinet Ministers."

7. Recommendation to bar parliamentary candidates who have been involved in

"scandalsz" Rejected (32)

"There should be no reference to 'involvement in a scandal'; A candidate

should not be disqualiﬁed on an issue of morality as the electorate should

be the ﬁnal arbiter."

8. Recommendation to limit Presidential tenure to two, ﬁve-year, terms:

Accepted (18)

It is clear that the government's responses were designed to maintain executive branch

control of the political process. Nonetheless they were incorporated into a draft

constitutional amendment that was to be presented to the National Assembly for ﬁnal

approval.

However, the opposition MMD threatened to boycott the upcoming

presidential and parliamentary elections if they were not allowed an opportunity to further

debate the new constitution. The key sticking points related to parliamentary ratiﬁcation

of the constitution, the president's cabinet and whether parliamentary approval was

needed to declare a state of emergency. The MMD feared that the ruling party would

simply use its control over the Assembly to approve the constitution proposed by the

President. The MMD accepted provisions designed to bring about a new, multi-party

political system through free and fair elections, but rejected the governments proposals on

the grounds that they still "consolidated too much power in the hands of the president."

162

(NDI 1992, 28)

In response to the MMD's threat to boycott the elections, students from the

University of Zambia organized a one-day "convention" in Lusaka on July 19, 1991

during which representatives of nine political parties, including UNIP and the MD, met

to discuss the government's proposed amendments. Four days later, on July 23, 1991

President Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba met at the Anglican Cathedral in Lusaka and

agreed that "while the National Assembly would continue to consider the Constitution,

more time would be allowed for consultations with other interested parties (i.e., the

MMD) about possible amendments." (NDI 1992, 29)

For approximately eight days following their meeting at the cathedral,

negotiations were held between top UNIP and MMD officials designed to reach a

consensus on some of the most contentious constitutional proposals. Finally, on July 31,

1991 the new Constitution was presented to the house and included provisions that

allowed:

1. The creation of a bi-cameral legislature;

2. Parliament to dissolve itself by a two-thirds vote of all members;

3. Limited Parliamentary scrutiny of Presidential appointees, including the

Auditor and Solitior-Generals, as well as Supreme and High Court Judges;

4. The President to choose a Cabinet only from among the elected Members of

Parliament; and

5. The President to serve only two, ﬁve-year, terms in ofﬁce.

163

On August 24, 1991 the National Assembly adopted the new 1991

Constitution, as well as electoral laws that allowed for competitive, multi-party elections

to be held later that year. The negotiations maintained the presidential nature of the

hybrid constitution. The Assembly was dissolved shortly thereafter and on September 4,

1991, Kaunda announced that multi-party elections would be held on October 31, 1991.

The following three sections examine the inﬂuence these constitutional

changes have had on National Assembly performance. To what degree can changes in

parliamentary performance highlighted in Chapters Two and Three be attributed to the

inﬂuence of Zambia's three different national constitutions? The ﬁrst section focuses on

the inﬂuence constitutional changes had on the powers and responsibilities of the

National Assembly as a legislative body, including its authority to enact and amend laws,

ratify presidential appointments, and examine government expenditures. Later sections

will examine the inﬂuence constitutional change had on individual legislators' behavior,

tenure in office, and constituency relations.

Inﬂuence of Constitutional Reforms on the National Assembly

Chapters Two and Three highlighted how the pattern of law-making

changed across the three Republics; from the heady, active days in the ﬁrst Assemblies,

through the period of decreased legislative activity in the early Second Republic, and

return to more stable levels of legislative business in the later part of the Second and early

part of the Third Republic. However, constitutional changes cannot adequately account

for these trends.

164

According to Article 57 of the 1964 Constitution "the legislative power of

the Republic shall vest in the Parliament of Zambia which shall consist of the President

and a National Assembly." Under the terms of this article parliament approved, or

rejected, legislative proposals submitted to them and then forwarded approved proposals

to the president for his signature. This article remained unchanged throughout all three

Zambian Republics.

There were several constitutional changes that might have affected the

legislative behavior of the National Assembly, though they seem not to have done so.

One such change was an increase in the number of parliamentarians needed to request a

special report on a bill or statutory instrument. Gupta (1965) said that "the most

important safeguard that the (1964) Constitution gives the opposition is enshrined in

section 27 under which any seven Members could prevent the passing of a bill demanding

that the bill be referred to a tribunal for reporting." (50) This provision, however, was

never used by the house in the First Republic.

In an attempt to prevent such a tribunal from ever being formed the

number of Members required to request such an examination increased was increased by

200% in the 1973 Constitution, to 21. Again, though, this amendment did not affect

performance since no bill was ever reported to a tribunal. Moreover, an even greater

proportion of bills introduced in the house were approved by First Republic Assemblies,

93.4 percent, than Assemblies in the Second Republic, 87.6 percent, after these stricter

regulations were implemented. (Approximately 98.0% of all bills introduced in the house

were approved between 1992 and 1995 after the number of MPs required to request a

165

report was increased to 30.) These examples suggest the irrelevance of formal rules in

shaping institutional behavior, beyond the articles that outline the basic separation of

powers between government branches.

Another often overlooked amendment to the 1973 Constitution that could

have affected legislative performance said: "the President may, by statutory instrument, at

any time within two years of the commencement of this Act, make such amendment to

any existing law that may appear to him to be necessary or expedient for bringing that law

in to conformity with the provisions of this Act or the Constitution or otherwise for

giving effect or enabling effect to be given to those provisions." (National Assembly Bill

30 of 1973, Section 6.2) Once again this amendment cannot be said to have affected

institutional performance since the number of statutory instruments introduced during

those next two years was not signiﬁcantly different from those came earlier. However,

this bill is representative of the gradual transfer of authority towards the executive branch.

The inﬂuence of constitutional change on the institutional behavior is

limited, though only a few amendments were made to the legislative authority of the

National Assembly. The amendments that were introduced, like the ones shown above,

gradually reduced Assembly authority over the legislative process, though they cannot

account for the steep decline in number of bills approved in the Second Republic. The

inﬂuence of National Assembly administrative procedures on Private Member's bills is

discussed in the next chapter.

Another area of National Assembly performance that has been affected by

changes in the formal rules, albeit moderately is parliament's authority to scrutinize

Presidential nominees to senior government offices. In this case, constitutional

166

amendments have increased the opportunites for legislative independence, though they

have not affected parliamentary behavior in a signiﬁcant way.

Presidential Appointments

Under the terms of the 1964 and 1973 Constitutions, several key

constitutional ofﬁces were ﬁlled with appointees who served at the pleasure of the

president and whose tenure was limited only by age. These officers included the

Secretary to the Cabinet, Attomey-General, Solicitor-General, Director of Public

Prosecutions, Auditor-General, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and other Supreme

and High Court judges. However, under terms agreed to in the 1991 Constitution the

National Assembly was granted the authority to approve presidential nominees to these

offices for the ﬁrst time. Unfortunately, the seventh National Assembly has showed little

interest in exercising this new found authority.

Between 1992 and 1994 few nominees to these posts underwent strict or

signiﬁcant parliamentary review. Their approval was almost always assured and

followed a pattern similar to the one I observed during my 18 months in National

Assembly: ﬁrst, the candidate's credentials are presented to the house in written form on

the morning of the day on which their nomination will be debated. At some point in the

daily business of the house, a member of the government's front-bench, usually the leader

of government business, ofﬁcially nominates the appointee for the post and makes a

speech endorsing the nomination. Following their comments, opposition and back-bench

167

members are given a chance to speak to the nomination, though they rarely do so, and the

candidate is approved by voice vote of all the members present. All but one of the more

than one dozen presidential appointments made between 1991 and 1994 followed this

pattern.

The lone confrontation over an appointee came at the very beginning of

the seventh Assembly, just after its 1991 election, when Rodger Chongwe, a prominent

Zambian human rights lawyer, was nominated by the president to serve as Attomey-

General. Unfortunately for Dr. Chongwe, he was also currently serving as Minister of

Legal Affairs. The house condemned his simultaneous nomination to both ofﬁces, even

though he was a popular, thoughtful, politically moderate member of the National

Assembly. Members' comments were summarized by then back-bench MP Bennie

Mwiinga (Mazabuka) who said: "I am very happy that Dr. Rodger Chongwe is a very

qualiﬁed man for the job, but the intricacy of one man, one job, which we believe in, and

the autonomy of that job to the performance of whatever job we have for the beneﬁt of

the whole country, has got to be separated...I thank this debate and this house because I

know that it is not going to ratify [Dr. Chongwe] for Attomey-General." (Hansard,

December 19, 1991, 757-758)

Rather than face an embarrassing vote against their new government, the

government withdrew Dr. Chongwe's nomination. Speaking for the government,

vice-president Miyanda said: "having listened to the sentiments expressed in this House,

I believe it is in our interests that the Government requests your indulgence, Mr. Speaker,

to withdraw the motion before the House in order to enable us to reexamine the position."

168

(ibid., 770) The next day, December 20, 1991 Ali Hamir's name was forwarded to the

House as a replacement for Dr. Chongwe. He was unanimously approved by voice vote

after a debate lasting less than 10 minutes. Not since then has the seventh National

Assembly provided any signiﬁcant review of presidential appointees, despite enhanced

constitutional provisions to do so. They provide little in the way of scrutiny, rarely

interview candidates to office, and rely heavily on the President's judgment to appoint

"qualiﬁed" candidates.

Moreover, the 1991 Constitution also affords the president an easy

opportunity to circumvent the National Assembly's authority. Under the terms of Article

44 of the 1991 Constitution, Parliament can reject only two nominees to any of the stated

ofﬁces. After that, the President is empowered to appoint a nominee without National

Assembly approval. As Bach (1994) said: "although this provision protects against an

office remaining vacant because of a political deadlock, it also requires Assembly

members to think carefully before rejecting a presidential nominee; a subsequent nominee

may be even less appealing." (40)

Parliamentary ratiﬁcation powers are further eroded by two additional

provisions of Article 44. First, Assembly review does not extend to the important ofﬁces

of vice-president or Cabinet Ministers. The President retains full authority to chose, and

dismiss, these ofﬁcials at his discretion, and often does so, though he may only choose

them from among the sitting Members of Parliament.9 This requirement is the most

"parliamentary" aspect of Zambia's hybrid presidential-parliamentary regime. Second, a

 

This unlimited authority is discussed more fully in Chapter Six.

169

signiﬁcant number of additional presidential appointments are considered civil service

positions and thus outside the review of the house: this includes, for example, nominees

as chairmen of the Drug Enforcement, Anti-Corruption, Constitutional Review, Elections,

and Human Rights Commissions.

Since 1991 the rules have changed to allow greater parliamentary scrutiny

of presidential nominees to senior government posts. However, the house has shown

little willingness to fully utilize the authority it has been granted. Moreover, key posts

within the executive branch and civil service, such as the vice-president, Cabinet

Ministers, and Commission Chairmen are outside of parliamentary scrutiny. Despite

recent constitutional amendments aimed at enhancing Assembly inﬂuence on executive

actions, the president continues to wield tremendous power to hire, and ﬁre, key

government personnel.

Public Budgeting

The Assembly's role in scrutinizing proposed government expenditures is

another area where constitutional inﬂuence on legislative performance are readily

observed. Here too the inﬂuence of formal rules on legislative performance is not

exempliﬁed by change over time, but continuity, and the continued limits the Zambian

constitution places on the National Assembly's role in allocating resources.

According to the 1991 Constitution, the Zambian National Assembly is

empowered to give ﬁnal approval to all proposed estimates of government revenue and

expenditure as it is with all other legislative proposals. However, long-standing

constitutional provisions prevent the house from acting as little more than a rubber stamp

170

on the government's estimates of expenditure and revenue. Since 1964, the Zambian

National Assembly has been barred from approving any legislation that "incurs an

expense" on the revenues of government without prior governmental (i.e., presidential)

approval. Consequently, in all but the rarest cases, the estimates of expenditures and

revenues proposed by the government are approved by the National Assembly without

making any changes. In this case the Assembly exhibits true "parliamentary"

characteristics. Since the budget is simply another part of the majority government's

legislative agenda "the opposition in the house...cannot expect to overturn (a) government

decision; by deﬁnition it lacks the votes to do so." (Rose 1989, 114)

The constitutional provisions that establish executive branch dominance

over public budgeting have remained unchanged since the adoption of the ﬁrst

independence constitution in 1964. Table 4.0, below, shows the passages of the 1964

Constitution that ﬁrst prevented the Zambian National Assembly from exercising any

signiﬁcant control over government expenditures.

171

Table 4.0 -- Constitutional Provisions Outlining Parliament's Budget Authority

 

[I

1964 Constitution. Articles 74 and 107 (b) & (d)

 

"'11:. Except upon the recommendation of the President signiﬁed by the vice-president or a

inister, the National Assembly shall not -

(a) proceed upon any bill (including any amendment to a bill) that, in the

opinion of the person presiding, makes provision for any of the following

purposes:

(1) for the imposition of taxation or the alteration of taxation otherwise

than by reduction;

(ii) for the imposition of any charge upon the general revenues of the

Republic or the alteration of any such charge otherwise than by

reduction;

(iii) for the payment, issue, or withdrawal ﬁ'om the general revenues of

the Republic of any moneys not charged thereon or any increase in the

amount of such payment, issue, or withdrawal;

(iv) for the composition or remission of any debt due to the

Government; or

(b) proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a motion) the effect

of which, in the opinion of the person presiding, would be to make provision for

any of those purposes.

 

107. (2) No warrant shall be issued by the President authorizing expenditure ﬁom the

general revenues of the Republic unless -

(b) the expenditure is necessary to carry on the services of the Government in

respect of any period (not exceeding four months) beginning at the

commencement of a ﬁnancial year during which the Appropriation Act for that

ﬁnancial year is not in force;

(d) no provision exists for the expenditure and the President considers that there

is such an urgent need to incur the expenditure that it would not be in the public

interest to delay the authorization of the expenditure until such time as a

supplementary can be laid before and approved by the National Assembly

 

 

Section 74 (a) indicates that Zambia's independence constitution was

designed to be "parliamentary" in its posture towards public budgeting. This meant being

responsive to the needs of a strong executive, rather than acting as an independent agent

in the budget process. Rasmussen's (1993) observations about the British Parliament

172

apply equally well to the Zambian case: " [The Assembly's] job (was) to react to and to

comment on the Government's policies and proposals for action, not to initiate them."

(121)

These provisions have been carried forward from 1964 to 1991, with

additional provisions that have allowed the Zambian president even greater discretion to

spend government funds than prime ministers in other parliamentary systems. For

example, "constitutional and statutory" line items in the Zambian budget were "off-limits"

to parliamentary review. This line item has included all government expenditures on the

military and national security apparatus and has meant that the President spends an

average of 30% to 35% of the annual budget in camera. (Hansards, 1980, 1985, 1990,

1995) In addition, the Ministry of Finance is authorized, under presidential warrant, to

spend money without parliamentary approval for up to four months as annual budget

plans are debated by incoming Assemblies. This is because the Zambian government's

ﬁscal year begins January 1 and the National Assembly rarely approves the budget before

the end of its ﬁrst sitting in late March or early April of each year.

Since the adoption of the 1964 Constitution, few changes were made to the

articles that deﬁned the Assembly's role in public budgeting. How then can the

increasing patterns of participation in house budget debates outlined in Chapter 3 be

explained? Examination of the formal rules provides little assistance. As Table 3.10

showed, the percent of back bench and opposition MP who participated in budget debates

rose from a low of 72% in the second assembly, to a high of 94% in the ﬁfth assembly,

despite the continuity in formal rules that establish executive dominance. At the same

173

time, however, there was a "reduction in the proportion of [budget items] that were

debated before being voted on, from 44% in 1980 to only 10% in 1991." (Cromwell

1995, 166) While more members were participating in debates, they were speaking to

fewer signiﬁcant items and were limited by constitutional provisions preventing them

from having any meaningful inﬂuence on ﬁnal budget allocations.

Following 1991, however, one signiﬁcant change was made to the

constitution did affect the Assembly's role in the budget process. As has already been

mentioned, the National Assembly had no authority to review the "constitutional and

statutory" line item of the government's budget prior to 1991. This heading created a pool

of funds under the president's control, separate from the ﬁmds allocated to the Office of

the President, and included expenditures on defense and debt-service as well as the

transfer of government resources to UNIP party organs. Cromwell (1995) notes that "the

continued prioritization of the (these) expenditures in the budgets (of the one-party state)

was logically the result of UNIP's concern to protest the resources available to it for

maintaining clientilist patronage networks." (177)

After their election in 1991 the MD government removed a portion of

the national defense budget from the this line item and, for the ﬁrst time, allowed the

Assembly to scrutinize Zambia's military expenditures. The new MMD government

made this decision as a show of commitment to separate party and state resources and

continued democratization of their government. In initiating debate on the Ministry of

Defense line item during the 1992 budget hearings Hon. Eric Silwamba, an MD back

bench MP from Ndola, said:

174

"Mr. Chairman, I must thank you for being so privileged to

be the ﬁrst person in the House in many years to debate the

defense budget...This is one area where the Mvunga

Commission deserves credit in removing Article 127 of the

Constitution to enable us to debate this very crucial

expenditure." (Hansards, vol. 90, March 11, 1992, 1687)

His comments led to an extensive, rancorous debate on the nature of

Zambia's defense and appropriateness of the proposed military expenditures, the ﬁrst of

its kind in nearly two decades. When debated concluded, the house was divided over

whether to approve the line item as the government proposed. Since they were unable to

resolve the item via voice vote, a division was called and Members individual votes were

recorded. The ﬁnal tally was split along party lines and the government's proposed

defense expenditures were approved 91 -20.

Though the government's proposals were approved as originally proposed,

amendment of Article 127 of the 1991 constitution allowed the Zambian National

Assembly to ﬁnally debate the merits of national defense expenditures. Since then,

Ministry of Defense expenditures have become a regularly debated item in budget

hearings, with members on both sides of the aisle expressing their opinions. No changes

are ever made to proposed expenditures, of course, but removing previous constitutional

barriers has made a contribution to the independence and authority of the National

Assembly.

Constimtional Constraints on Control of House Business

The ﬁnal area in which the formal rules have inﬂuenced National

Assembly performance have been amendments that control National Assembly business

175

and session length. This ﬁnal section examines how constitutional changes gave the

president control over National Assembly affairs and limited the ability of the National

Assembly to check the increasing power of the executive branch, including the ability to

declare a vote of no conﬁdence and call for new parliamentary elections.

Chapters two and three showed how parliamentary sessions grew in length

from an average of 37 days per year in the ﬁrst assembly to 58 per year in the ﬁfth. The

president was able to extend the duration of National Assembly sittings in the Second

Republic because of Article 82 of the 1964 Constitution that granted him sole authority to

call the house into session, a prerogative that has remained virtually unchanged since

independence. Both the 1964 and 1973 Constitutions gave the President sole authority to

summon, prorogue, and dissolve parliament. Table 4.1 highlights these provisions.

Table 4.1 -- Constitutional Provisions to Summon, Prorogue, and Dissolve Parliament

I

1964 Constitution. Articles 82 and 84

i

.; 2(1). Subject to the provisions of this section, each session of Parliament shall be held

at such place within Zambia and shall commence at such time at the President

         

may appoint.

.; 2(2). Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President may at any time

     

dissolve Parliament.

84(1). The President may at any time summon a meeting of the National Assembly.

     

(2). Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) of the section and section 36 (1) and 37

(2) (b) of this Constitution, the sittings of the National Assembly in any session

of Parliament after the commencement of that session shall be held at such times

and on such days as the Assembly shall appoint.

 

 

The National Assembly sat at the President's pleasure, bound only by the

terms of the constitution that mandated they hold at least one sitting every six months

 

176

after the annual session was opened by the President. Though the constitution gave the

President broad authority to determine National Assembly affairs, the Assembly itself

was not given equivalent control over the executive branch through, for example, the

ability to issue votes no conﬁdence. Moreover, the authority the Assembly had to remove

the President was limited and could easily have been subverted by the President himself.

Articles 36 and 37 of the 1964 Constitution stipulated that the Assembly

could remove the President only on the grounds that he had "violated the Constitution or

committed gross misconduct." However, the difficulty in initiating these proceedings

rendered even this limited authority moot. Under articles 36 and 37 written notice was to

be given to the Speaker stating the nature of the violation and signed by not less than

one-third of the Members of the Assembly. The Speaker would then initiate a motion

which, if passed by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the house, would force the Chief

Justice of the High Court to appoint a tribunal to investigate the allegations. If the

tribunal found the allegations true and stated so in its report to the National Assembly the

Assembly could then, on a vote supported by no less than three-quarters of all the

Members, resolve that the President has been guilty of such a violation and declare that

his continued tenure is "incompatible with the office of the President," after which the

President would "cease to hold office on the third day after the motion's passage" and the

vice-president would assume the office of the President. However, the President could

annul the Assembly's decision by exercising his authority to dissolve Parliament before

the passage of three days and thereby force new Presidential and Parliamentary elections.

177

National Assembly authority to remove the president was further limited

under the terms of the 1973 Constitution. Under the 1964 Constitution the vice-president

would assume the ofﬁce of the president if it became vacant because of death, illness, or

resignation. If there was no vice-president or if the vice-president was incapable of

assuming ofﬁce, a sitting government minister, chosen by the cabinet, would assume

presidential responsibilities for a period of seven days, after which a permanent

replacement would be elected, by secret ballot, by the National Assembly.

However, under the terms of Section 42(2) of the 1973 Constitution, the

secretary-general of UNIP assumed presidential authority when the office of the president

was vacant. If the secretary-general was incapable of assuming office, a member of the

central committee would "perform the functions of the office of the President until a

person elected as President in accordance with the provisions" assumed office.

Section 88 of the 1991 Constitution reversed this trend and expanded

potential Parliamentary authority over its affairs by allowing the Assembly to dissolve its

self and thereby initiate new parliamentary and presidential elections. Table 4.2 shows

how these provisions were changed in the 1991 constitution.

178

Table 4.2 -- 1991 Constitutional Amendments to Presidential Authority

to Prorogue Sittings of the National Assembly

 

II

1991 Constitution. Article 88

 

“88(6). Subject to clause (9) [allowing the President to temporarily reinstate Parliament

during a national emergency] the National Assembly -

(a) shall unless sooner dissolved, continue for ﬁve years item the date of its ﬁrst

sitting after the commencement of this Constitution or after any dissolution and

shall then stand dissolved;

(b) may, by a two-thirds majority vote of the members thereof dissolve itself;

 
  

(c) may be dissolved by the President at any time.

The seventh National Assembly did not exercise its authority to dissolve

its self, nor was their any reason to believe it would do so. The ruling MMD was ﬁrmly

in control of the assembly, having captured 125 out of 150 parliamentary seats in the

1991 elections. However, inclusion of this provision was an important step is returning a

small measure of constitutional authority back to the legislature. Obviously, electoral and

political party pressures would make casting a vote of dissolution a difficult one for any

Member of Parliament, but having the authority to do so gave the Assembly a measure of

control over its own affairs than it previously lacked.

This section has examined the inﬂuence of constitutional change and

continuity on four different dimensions of National Assembly performance: the house's

legislative authority; their ability to approve presidential appointments; control over the

budget; and powers to summon and prorogue house sitting. Three of the four areas

discussed here have undergone important constitutional revisions that have enhanced the

 

179

seventh National Assembly's constitutional authority vis-a-vis the executive when

compared to previous regimes. Only the Assembly's legislative authority has remained

unchanged since independence.

However, these constitutional amendments have not been associated with

enhanced legislative performance. Rarely has the assembly used its authority to

scrutinize presidential appointments, nor have they threatened to force new presidential

and parliamentary elections. Though national defense budget line items are now debated

during budget hearings, the quality of debate is low and the house is still barred from

initiating any changes to proposed government expenditures. It is likely that legislative

performance would have been different if the MMD had not captured as strong a

parliamentary majority, or if control of the executive and legislative branches had been

split between UNIP and the MMD. However, the affects of constitutional amendments

on Assembly performance have been mitigated, ﬁrst by UNIP and later by the MMD's

electoral dominance.

Inﬂuences of Constitutional Amendments on Members' Performance

Constitutional changes appear not to have signiﬁcantly affected the

dimensions of legislative performance discussed above. However, changes in the formal

rules have had signiﬁcant affects on individual Members of Parliament and on their

ability to act as constituency representatives, as is discussed in the following section.

Geddes (1994) argues that "legislators' interests center on reelection (and

that) their strategies for pursuing reelection depend on the party system and the electoral

laws that affect them." (37) As has been discussed elsewhere, constituency

180

representation is a positive consequence of free, fair, competitive elections in multi-party

regimes. (Downs 1957, Black 1958, Buchanan and Tullock 1962) Legislators use

constituency service activities to appeal to "median voters" and are rewarded with

reelection if they successfully do so: those who cannot are replaced by candidates who are

more able to meet those voters' demands.

But what about constituency service in the context of the one-party state?

Mezey (1979), and others, have argued that constituency service is a crucial part of

legislators' activity, regardless of party regime. Bates (1989) claims that constituency

service can become even more localized in one-party regimes since there are fewer

political, ideological differences to distinguish candidates contesting legislative elections.

However, an alternative hypothesis is that members' concern for constituents decreases in

the context of one-party regimes, since the "audience" to which candidates must primarily

appeal are party ofﬁcials rather than median voters. For example, data presented in

Chapters Two and Three showed that legislators concern for "local" issues fell during the

one-party regime and rebounded once a multi-party political regime was reinstated.

This section examines how these, and other, measures of members'

performance were inﬂuenced by constitutional amendments. It is argued that some

amendments, such as the increase in house membership over time, can account for the

increase in back bench debate participation and increasingly "localized" representation.lo

However, other changes, such as the introduction of party-based primary elections caused

 

'°

The increase in house membership is also considered in Chapter Six where the inﬂuence of

political patronage and Assembly performance is discussed in more detail. Increased house membership

does, after all, provide additional jobs for one's political supporters.

Zambian legislators to focus their attentions on party leaders and party ofﬁcials, at the

181

expense of their constituents.

Constitutional Inﬂuences on House Size

The most obvious inﬂuence constitutional amendments had on members'

performance was the dramatic increase in the number of different legislators that

participated in house debates. This has been the result of two important constitutional

changes; increased house size and quorum requirements.

As the Zambian population increased, so too did the size of the National

Assembly: from 80 Members in 1964 (75 elected Members and 5 Members appointed by

the President) to 158 Members today (150 elected and 8 appointed MPs). Consequently,

the average size of the parliamentary back bench has grown steadily, despite increases in

the number of MPs appointed to the govemments' front bench. Table 4.3 shows how the

number of back bench MPs has grown since 1964.

Table 4.3 -- Average Number of Back Bench Members in the National Assembly

 

Assembly

Back Bench Members

 

1964-1968

35

 

1969-1973

54

 

1974-1978

92

 

1979-1983

89

 

1984-1988

107

 

 

1989-1991

1992-1995

 

1 16

96

 

 

 

182

This increase has also coincided with increased debate participation

among these MPs. Table 4.4 shows how the number of back bench MPs who participate

in house debates increased across Zambia's three Republics.

Table 4.4 -- Average Number of Back Bench Members Participating in House Debates

 

Assembly

Number of Back Percent of Back

Bench Members

Bench MPs

Participating

Participating

 

1964-1968

15

45.2%

 

1969-1973

26

47.4%

 

1974-1978

63

68.1%

 

1979-1983

70

78.7%

 

 

1984-1988

1989-1991

70

32

79.7%

40.5%

 

1992-1995

74

76.8%

 

 

 

 

 

The inﬂux of new members, and increased participation rates among them, has meant that

more members' opinions are heard on the house ﬂoor. However, their contributions have

focused on national issues rather than local, constituency-oriented ones as the data in

chapters Two and Three indicated.

The increase in the size of the back bench was also accompanied by

amendments that increased the quorum required to legally conduct house business. The

result of this change was that more members were present to hear house debates, even if

they themselves did not contribute. In 1964, National Assembly quorum was only

one-quarter of the sitting members of the house. This meant that only 20 individuals

needed to be present to enact laws, approve the budget, and so forth. The quorum

requirement was raised to one-third of the sitting members of the house in the 1973

183

Constitution and maintained in Article 84(4) of the 1991 Constitution. Consequently, at

least 53 sitting members of the house must now be present for the house to legally

conduct business. The combined affect of these two changes have provided for increased

parliamentary scrutiny over house affairs and the inclusion of more Members' opinions in

parliamentary debates.

Constitutional Amendments and Parliamenm Candidates

The beneﬁts of increased parliamentary participation, however, assumes

that MPs accurately reﬂect their constituents' opinions during house debates. This has not

necessarily been the case in Zambia. While some constitutional amendments, like those

listed above, enhanced the representative nature of the National Assembly, others have

had the opposite affect.

Some of the most signiﬁcant examples of this were a series of

amendments that reduced the electoral importance of constituents in favor of political

parties and party functionaries in the Second Republic. The ﬁrst of these constitutional

changes was Article 75 of the 1973 Constitution establishing primary elections for

parliamentary candidates. Table 4.5 lists the key provisions of this article.

184

Table 4.5 -- 1973 Constitutional Amendments to Establish Parliamentary

Primary Elections

 

1973 Constitution. Article 75 (3) through (5)

it. At a primary election a poll shall be held at which the following persons resident

ithin the constituency of the National Assembly shall be entitled to vote:

(a) the Regional Secretaries, the Regional Women Secretaries, Regional Youth

and Publicity Secretaries and two Trustees of the Party;

(b) the Chairmen, the Vice-Charirnen, the Secretaries, the Vice-Secretaries, the

Treasurers, the Vice-Treasurers, the Publicity Secretaries and the Vice-Publicity

Secretaries of every constituency of the Party; and

(c) the Chairmen, the Vice-Charirnen, the Secretaries, the Vice-Secretaries, the

Treasurers, the Vice-Treasurers, the Publicity Secretaries and the Vice-Publicity

Secretaries of every Branch of the Party.

 4. At the conclusion of the poll the Electoral Commission shall declare the number of

otes received by each candidate and shall thereafter submit the names of all the

andidates to the Central Committee together with the number of votes received by each

andidate.

. In any constituency of the National Assembly, the three persons who have received the

eatest number of votes at the primary election shall be qualiﬁed for nomination as

andidates for election to the National Assembly from that constituency, unless the

entral Committee disapproves the nomination ofany such person on the ground that his

omination would be inimical to the interests of the State, in which event the person who

as received the next highest number of votes after the said three persons at the primary

lections shall become qualiﬁed for the nomination.

As these passages illustrate, the 1973 Constitution introduced a

party-based screening procedure for parliamentary candidates that limited the pool of

parliamentary candidates to those "approved" by local party officials. This provision

ensured that only parliamentary candidates acceptable to select group of party

functionaries within the constituency were put on the ballot at parliamentary elections.

Popular candidates who were not approved by these party officials were not allowed to

contest office.ll

 

"

A similar measure was the 1981 Local Government Act that limited the franchise in local

185

Moreover, section (5) gave central committee officials outside the

constituency the authority to remove even those candidates who had been approved by

local party functionaries. Not only could local functionaries screen parliamentary

candidates, so too could Lusaka-based senior party members.

Bratton (1980) points out that this tactic occasionally backﬁred against the

party in contentious regions and preferred parliamentary candidates were sometimes

rejected in general elections. After the 1978 general elections, for example, members

also expressed their concern over party dominance in the selection of parliamentary

candidates. During parliamentary question time on March 18, 1982, Hon. N. Namuchana

(Liuwa) asked the Prime Minister "how many candidates for the 1978 Presidential and

General Elections were vetted by the Central Committee, province by province." In his

response the Prime Minister said that 29 different candidates had been vetted by the party

following their victories in primary elections for taking unspeciﬁed actions that were

"inimical to the interests of the state". (Hansards, vol. 59, 3167-69)

Hon. S.C. Kalaba (Bahati) then asked how the Minister "under or

cherished philosophy of Humanism, feels about the idea of vetting a candidate who goes

through political primaries unopposed?" The Prime Minister was rescued by Mr.

Speaker, who said: "The (original) question (only) asks: 'How many'...Perhaps the Right

Honorable Prime Minister has some view to this Members question?" His response,

simply: "the vetting of candidates a general practice all over the world," though he

refused to provide any additional information. (Ibid.) Despite these occasional protests,

this amendment effectively limited voters' choice of parliamentary candidates and created

 

government elections to card-carrying members of UNIP.

a new class of political elite with strong ties to the ruling party and with interests outside

186

those of the average Zambian voter.

Surprisingly, these new Members of Parliament were primarily drawn

from among the emerging Zambian business class. As Baylies and Szeftel (1984) point

out: "one of the most important features of the 1973 election was the extent to which it

marked the emergence of a substantial number of MPs with business interests." (5 8)

They cite three primary reasons for this change. First, under the one-party state anyone

with the ﬁnancial means could register themselves as a candidate and could contest the

elections under a UNIP banner. Of course, their economic status did not ensure

nomination as a parliamentary candidate, but it created opportunities for political

outsiders that did not exist under the previous multi-party system. Second, to the extent

that businessmen had achieved status as a "local notable," this screening system favored

local party candidates over those imposed from outside. Third, the "competitive"

one-party regime still favored those who could afford to contest parliamentary elections,

despite the fact that UNIP provided campaign funding. Independently wealthy

parliamentary candidates were thought more likely to provide development resources and

electoral perks than were less-wealthy challengers. (Wheter or not they actually did so is

a matter of speculation.)

The inﬂux of independent businessmen into the National Assembly,

however, did not reﬂect a broader socio-economic trend. "The shift in class position of

parliamentarians was disproportionate to the growth of indigenous capital within the

economy" and further separated Members' of Parliament from their constituents at the

187

grassroots. (Baylies and Szeftel 1984, 68) With their election to public ofﬁce, the status

of the indigenous owning class was increased, as were their opportunities to inﬂuence

public policy at the expense of more popularly oriented, "socialist," economic objectives.

Baylies and Szeftel point to opposition within parliament to decisions to modify Zambia's

Leadership Code (outlining MPs ability to earn outside incomes), introduce "works

councils" in industrial facilities, and adhere to the economic boycott of Rhodesia as

examples of the business lobby's new found political strength.

Not only did this amendment reduce the electorate's potential choice of

parliamentary candidates, it also affected the type of candidates who contested

parliamentary elections. As a result of these constitutional provisions, parliamentarians

in the Second Republic were even less likely to reﬂect the opinions of Zambia 8 median

voters" than were those elected earlier.

Constitutional Amendments and Members' Tenure

One ﬁnal constitutional amendment affected Members' ability to represent

their constituents. A member was forced to resign his or her parliamentary seat if he or

she left or were expelled from the political party of which they were a member when ﬁrst

elected. This provision was introduced shortly after independence to stem the increaseing

tide of political discord within both UNIP and the ANC. This decision further enhanced

political parties' control over their Members of Parliament. Since its introduction, party

leaders have used the threat of expulsion to ensure Members' compliance with party

programs, often at the expense of constituency representation.

188

Prior to this amendment, Article 65 of the 1964 Constitution stipulated

that elected members of the National Assembly would vacate their seats only upon

dissolution of Parliament, or if they: ceased to be a citizen of Zambia; assumed the ofﬁce

of President; or "if any other circumstances (arose) such that, if he were not an elected

member of the Assembly, would cause him to be disqualiﬁed for election.'2 After this

amendment passed political parties gained greater control over elected representatives

since party leaders could expel sitting MPs, simultaneously forcing them to abdicate their

parliamentary seat and thus circumventing constituents' role in choosing their political

representatives. Interestingly, this amendment was the result of an historic, bipartisan

vote in the ﬁrst National Assembly.

In mid-1965 Hon. Dickson Chikulo resigned from UNIP over protests

with party leaders, ostensibly to sit in the Assembly as an independent Member of

Parliament. Shortly thereafter Hon. M. Mumbuna resigned from the ANC over debates

with his party's leaders to join UNIP. Both parties were embarrassed by the resignations

of these two high-proﬁle legislators. As a result, leaders of both UNIP and the ANC

expressed their support for a UNIP-sponsored constitutional amendment that ruled no MP

could leave the party of which they were a member when elected, without also resigning

their parliamentary seat, paving the way for a parliamentary by-election. "Chikulo and

Mumbuna both spoke against the amendment, but it was approved by the house and in so

 

'2

The latter provision included prohibitions against individuals who were under a "declaration of

allegiance to some country other than Zambia; otherwise declared to be of unsound mind; under sentence of

death...or a sentence of imprisonment; an undischarged bankrupt; held an office or committed a crime

involving responsibility for, or in connection with, the conduct of any National Assembly election or voters'

registration; or held a prescribed office, i.e., belonged to the armed forces or Zambia National Police.

189

doing provided an historic occasion when, in a division, the ANC voted with UNIP

against the United Party and three independent members." (Helgerson 1970, 211)

Institutional control over sitting MPs was ﬁrrther enhanced by the adoption

of Act 33 of 1969. Under the provisions of this Act, individuals whose "freedom of

movement is restricted, or who are detained under law" were also declared ineligible to

stand for parliamentary election and, consequently, hold seats in the National Assembly.

In his capacity as UNIP party president, President Kaunda could already remove UNIP

MP5 from the National Assembly. However, as a result of this amendment, Kaunda

could now also remove sitting members of opposition political parties from the Assembly

by detaining them under the auspices of the national "state of emergency which had

existed since before independence." (Tordoff 1974, 201) This was a unique evolution in

executive control over legislative affairs. Not only could the leader of the executive

branch remove a member of his own party from the legislature, as is often the case in

parliamentary regimes, but he could remove members of the political opposition from the

legislature as well.

The power to expel sitting Members of Parliament was consolidated in the

1973 Constitution. Table 4.6 shows how Article 65 of the 1964 Constitution was

amended to ensure party control over elected MPs in the one-party regime.

190

Table 4.6 -- 1973 Constitutional Amendments Establishing Political Party

Control over Members' Tenure

   

1973 Constitution. Sections 71 (l) & (2)

   

 

71 (1). Every member of the National Assembly (with the exception of the Speaker)

shall vacate his seat in the Assembly upon a dissolution of Parliament.

(2). A member of the National Assembly shall vacate his seat in the Assembly --

  

(b) if he ceases to be a member of the Party;

(c) in the circumstances set out in Article 34(2);

(e) "No person who holds, or is a validly nominated candidate in an election for,

  

  

the oﬂice of President shall be qualifiedfor election as a member of the

National Assembly "

The italicized portions of Table 4.6 are additional, amended restrictions on

Members' tenure that were added to the 1973 Constitution. Section (b) ensured the

party's ability to expel sitting MPs from the house. Section (e) prevented those who

would challenge President Kaunda for UNIP leadership from running for a seat in the

National Assembly should their efforts fail.

Most importantly, section (c) of Article 71 incorporated a "Leadership

Code" that restricted parliamentarians' ability to earn incomes outside their National

Assembly salaries. It was established by the ﬁve-member "Leadership Committee,"

whose members were appointed by the President. This committee had the authority, by

statutory instrument, to "make regulations applicable to the holders of speciﬁed offices"

to govern those ofﬁce-holders' personal ﬁnances. Though the Code was never strictly

enforced, it provided the President with yet another tool to ensure Members' reliance on

the resources and beneﬁcence his United National Independence Party.

 

191

The adoption of a multi-party constitution in 1991 did much to reduce

political party control over individuals and potential party candidates. Under this new

regime, individuals were now free to join independent political parties, and many did so.

Defections from the ruling UNIP party were common and many former UNIP MPs stood

as MMD candidates in the 1991 elections. For example, "no fewer than 20 MMD

candidates in the 1991 elections were former or sitting UNIP MPs and 12 had been

cabinet ministers or central committee members. Another six had been UNIP regional

secretaries or district governors and four were former army officers." (Baylies and Szeftel

1992, 83)

In the process of constitutional negotiation prior to the October 1991

elections, however, UNIP and the opposition MMD were careful to ensure that political

parties maintained constitutional control over MPs tenure in office, whichever party they

chose to join. Table 4.7 shows how Article 71 of the 1973 Constitution was amended to

suit the demands of political party leaders operating in the new multi-party era.

192

Table 4.7 -- 1991 Constitutional Amendments Reﬁning Political Party

Control over Members' Tenure

1991 Constitution. Sections 71 (1) & (2)

71 ( 1). Every member of the National Assembly, with the exception of the Speaker,

shall vacate his seat in the Assembly upon a dissolution of Parliament.

(2). A member of the National Assembly shall vacate his seat in the Assembly --

(b) if he acts contrary to the code of conduct prescribed by an Act of

Parliament;

 

(c) in the case of an elected member, if he becomes a members of a political

party other than the party of which he was an authorized candidate when he was

elected to the National Assembly or, if having been an independent candidate,

he joins a political party;

(0 same as 1973 71 .2(e); AND "No person holding or acting in any post, oﬂice,

or appointment

in... l 991 65.5 (b) the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Zambia

  

Appointments to the public service) ; or 65.5 (d) the Teaching Service.

ofsecurity in Zambia; 65.5 (c) the Public Service (including Presidential

Prison Service or in any other force or service establishedfor the preservation

The italicized portions of Table 4.7 list the amendments and additions to

provisions that outline political party control over Members' tenure in the National

Assembly. Section 2(b) was designed to replace the oft-maligned "Leadership Code"

discussed previously, though no provisions were made for an alternative "code of

conduct" at this constitution's adoption. Section 2(c), articulating the party's ability to

remove sitting MP8, was rewritten to close a potential loophole: the decision by a sitting

independent MP who opted to join a political party.'3 Finally, section (e) expanded the

number and type of government workers who were declared "ineligible" to contest

parliamentary ofﬁce. These amendments reﬂect a continued bias among political leaders

 

13

This provision worked against Hon. Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, the outspoken MP from

Mongu in Western Province who attempted to resign from the MMD but retain his seat as an independent

Member of Parliament. His petition to do so was rejected by the Supreme Court.

 

to ensure strong party control over their members, to the detriment of legislator-

193

constituency relations.

Between January 1992 and December 1995, approximately 25 new MPs

were sworn in to replace individuals who left the National Assembly. Many of them, like

Ebden Mulonga, an MMD MP from Chikankata, were elected to replace sitting

parliamentarians who had passed away while in office.” However, several others,

including Hon. Arthur Wina (Kalabo), Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika (Mongu),

and his sister, Inonge Mbikusita—Lewanika (Senanga) left the ruling party and were

re-elected on opposition party tickets.

Since 1991 defections have become a major problem for the MMD. For

example, the opposition National Party (NP) was born when Baldwin Nkumbula and

Humphrey Mulemba also left and joined Arthur Wina, Akashambatwa

Mbikusita-Lewanika and his sister Inonge in creating the ﬁrst large-scale opposition party

in the Third Republic. Though many had been intimately invovled with the MMD since

its formation, they all complained of "corruption, tribalism, and the authoritarian style of

Chiluba's politics.“5 (van Donge 1995, 211) Here again we saw the long-established

pattern of splits within Zambian ruling parties repeating itself on a national scale."5

 

"

Hon. Mulonga replaced Hon. Joshua Lumina, a former UNIP MP who left the party to help

organize the opposition MMD in Southern Province in 1990. Interestingly, Hon. Lumina was so ill during

the run-up to the October 1991 elections that he was unable to participate in his own campaign. Other

MMD leaders in the province spoke on his behalf throughout the entire period. Despite this, Hon. Lumina

captured approximately 83% of the 7,293 votes cast in his constituency.

It should also be noted that this number grew throughout the seventh Assembly. Nearly

one-quarter of the 150 member house elected in 1991 was replaced by new MPs before the regularly

scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections, eventually held in November, 1996.

"

It was also well known that Aka felt slighted by his appointment as Minister of Science,

Technology, and Vocational Education after having played such a prominent role in the formation of the

MMD. Aka, a Westemer, wanted the position of Finance Minister and was upset when that post went to

Conclusion

194

This chapter showed that formal, constitutional rules inﬂuenced Zambian

legislative perforrnace, but not consistently, nor equally over time. President Kaunda

used his authority to amend the constitution and enhance executive branch authority over

government affairs at the expense of the National Assembly, but these amendments had

little inﬂuence on the institutional performance of the National Assembly. On the other

hand, the continuity of Zambia's constitutions, and subordination of the legislature

vis-a-vis the executive branch, has prevented the Assembly from inﬂuencing

executive-sponsored legislative proposals or amending government budgets.

Constitutional changes had a more noticeable inﬂuence on legislators'

performance, though here too, the inﬂuce of formal rules was not consistent. The most

salient of these amendments affected legislator-constituency relations by increasing

political parties' control over parliamentary candidates and MPs tenure. In other areas,

however, the effect was more limited. For example, Members were reticent to use their

powers to more actively question presidential appointees. Nonetheless, their participation

in house budget hearings debates increased, often dramatically, across time despite rules

which limited their ability to inﬂuence actual expenditures.

Zambian constitutional evolution shows that the rules became a crucial

element of, and for, the appropriation of political power by the executive branch at the

expense of legislative independence. Zambian presidents, like others in Africa, have

 

Emmanuel Kasonde, a Bemba-speaker from Northern Province.

"’

In fairness, however, post-1991 defections from the MMD were somewhat more expected since it

was such a diverse coalition of political actors to begin with.

195

shaped the "formal means by which to preserve the integrity of their constituted policy

without being embroiled in a maze of constitutional law whose function, in classical

theory, is to control and supervise" their authority. (Okoth-Ogendo 1991, 7) We see in

Zambia a deference to constitutions, without adjoining constitutionality: the importance

of formal rules is emphasized, but leaders are loath to abide by rules that do not suit their

political purposes. Consequently, constitutional change is frequent, and sometimes

signiﬁcant.

Moreover, the MMD government has continued to manipulate the

constitutional rules to suit their own political purposes. Though beyond the time period

examined here, Zambia's most recent constitutional negotiations are worth mention.

During their 1991 campaign, the MMD pleged to implement a full and comprehensive

review of the constitution hastily agreed to at the Anglican Cathedral. After their

election, the MMD appointed John Mwanakatwe, a former senior UNIP official, to head a

Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) and prepare a new, more democratic,

constitution. Between 1992 and 1996 the CRC travelled throughout the country soliciting

popular inputs through a series of regional "town hall" meetings, similar to those

undertaken done by the Mvunga Commission in the Second Republic.

The CRC ﬁnalized its work in mid-1996 and presented a draft constitution

to the MMD government for its approval. The Mwanakatwe Commission recommended

that the basic, presidential character of the 1991 constitution be retained, but it also gave

parliament greater say in public budgeting and the ability to veto presidential nominees to

196

cabinet ofﬁces. Moreover, they recommended that that the next constitution be popularly

approved, either by national referendum or constituency convention

The MMD government rejected those proposals. In addition, it adopted a

provision (that the CRC had rejected) which constitutionally barred former President

Kaunda from contesting the upcoming presidential elections because his parents had not

been born in Zambia. The government also rejected a CRC recommendation that would

have required the Speaker to be an elected Member of Parliament, thus ensuring

Nabulyato's continued presence in the house. Rather than put these proposals before the

voters, the government put the 1996 Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill to a vote

of the National Assembly. Because the MMD controlled over 80 percent of the

Assembly seats, half of which were held by government government ministers, these

amendments were quickly approved, despite popular cries for greater input and a more

transparent approval process. Former President Kaunda was barred from contesting the

November, 1996 elections and the MMD government enhanced the presidential nature of

the Zambian political system at the expense of the National Assembly.

Other nations undergoing democratic transitions have also struggled with

constitutional reforms and distribution of constitutional authority. For example, Andrezj

Rapaczynski (1993) describes conﬂicts among members of the Solidarity movement

during Poland's' constitutional reform exercises of the 1980s and 1990's and their efforts

to manipulate the reform process to suit their particular political ambitions. He argues

that the most fundamental problem facing the constitution makers of Eastern Europe "(is)

the fact that the new constitutions must be prepared at a time of profound and rapid

197

changes in the political and economic structure of the country." (Rapaczynski 1993, 125)

Poland's efforts have revealed that "the broad consensus among the members of the

erstwhile opposition...tended to disintegrate rather quickly, once the enemy had been

defeated." (ibid.)

A solidarity of consensus around what Rapaczynski called the

"fundamental values" of personal liberty and political democracy has so far prevented the

return to a more authoritarian regime in Zambia. The danger is that Zambia, like Poland,

is "drifting into a new political structure without clear models or the experience needed to

design practical solutions to the basic problems of the polity." (ibid.)

Zambia's hybrid constitution is ill-suited to the demands of a

representative political democracy. While it retains a nominal parliamentary character,

the bulk of constitutional authority rests in the hands of the president with little

opportunities for legislative oversight. Moreover, the Zambian president has a national

electoral mandate which ﬁrrther strengthens his position in national affairs at the expense

of a divided and disempowered legislature.

However, "it would be a mistake to ascribe too much weight to the

relationship between constitutional arrangements and (politics) in Zambia." (Mulford

1967, 339) Formal rules clearly inﬂuenced institutional-level parliamentary performance,

especially after the periods of political transition; but so too have other factors, including

the Assembly's lack of resources and the inﬂuece of personal relationships on political

behavior. These issues are discussed next.

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INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW DEMOCRACY:

THE ZAMBIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 1964 TO 1996

VOLUME II

By

Philip Wendell Alderfer

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHEOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1997

Chapter Five:

National Assembly Administration and National Assembly Performance

More often than not, the reason why parliament was called

to approve the second reading of a bill without sufﬁcient

time for proper debate was simply that the government did

not get around to draﬁing the bill until the last minute.

John Helgerson 1970, 278

Constitutional rules can account for some aspects of parliamentary

performance across Zambia's three Republics. For example, the hybrid presidential-

parliamentary separation of powers has limited the Assembly's ability to inﬂuence the

legislative process and Members’ ability to inﬂuence government policy. In addition,

adoption of the one-party constitution in 1973 and of rules designed to increase political

party control over the selection of parliamentary candidates shifted Members' attention

towards national issues, at the expense of local, constituency-oriented ones.

However, constitutional rules cannot, and do not, tell the whole story.

Moves and counter moves in the game of politics are determined not only by formal rules,

but by the actors and resources involved. Rules establish the range of options ﬁ'om which

political actors may choose, just as the rules in a game of chess tell players how their

pieces may move across the board. However, the timing and sequence of any given play

198

199

is determined by the attitudes and abilities of the players, the pieces they possess, and

their goals at a given stage of the game. The same is true with parliament.

Legislatures can best complete their tasks when the resources available to

them match the mandates they are given. When they do not, legislatures are inefﬁcient

and ineffective. In other words, there must be "congruence" between "institutional

design" and organizational "capacity" in order for legislatures to work at their peak.

(Bach 1994) This chapter focuses on the design and capacity of the Zambian parliament

to determine whether or not they are conducive to the development of a viable,

independent legislative institution.

As was discussed in the previous chapter, much of the comparative

legislative literature focuses on the inﬂuence formal rules have on legislative

performance. In these studies, institutional capacity is measured in terms of the

separation of powers between government branches and ways in which parliamentarians

are elected. This is especially true of legislative studies in the developing world and

results from the relative difficulty of obtaining unbiased, ﬁrst-hand, empirical information

about the internal workings of these institutions. As a result, the conclusions they reach

are often unnecessarily slanted towards formalized explanations and ignore the particular

affects that access to resources, institutional management, and work culture have on

parliamentary performance.

However, during my research in Zambia I was fortunate enough to gain

unique access to parliamentary ofﬁces and personnel. This included permission use the

parliamentary library, attend house debates, and meet with dozens of assembly

200

administrators, none of which had been previously granted to scholars. This access

allowed me to use theoretical insights from the research on public administration in

American state political systems to better understand the inﬂuence assembly

administration has had on Zambian parliamentary performance. It should be noted that

most National Assembly personnel were quite open and forthcoming and I am deeply in

their debt. However, some staff members were unwilling to speak "on the record." As

this chapter will show, I understand their concerns and respect their wish to remain

anonymous.

Ronald Hedlund and Patricia Freeman's 1981 study comparing the

Wisconsin and Iowa state legislatures guided this chapter.1 Hedlund and Freeman

utilized "organizational systems" theory to analyze the relationship between institutional

attributes, described here as organizational capacity, and decisional processing, i.e., the

legislature's ability to make laws. "(Organization systems) theory is concerned with

assessing how various organizational features, such as task division and access to

resources, affect the operations of a state legislature." G-Iedlund and Freeman 1981 , 88)

In this chapter the organizational capacity framework is used to explain not only patterns

of decision making in the Zambian Assembly but also individual members' performance

and legislator-constituency relations.

Hedlund and Freeman derived three key arguments common to most

organizational capacity theories: (1) organizational performance can be conceptualized

along a number of dimensions; (2) a variety of factors -- both external and internal to the

 

'

They cite Campbell (1976); Cooper (1975, 1977); Davidson and Oleszek (1976); and Froman

(1968) as their primary sources.

201

organization -- affect performance; and (3) change in the organization or its environment

does not affect the various dimensions of organizational performance in a uniform

manner. To this end they identiﬁed ﬁve dimensions of organizational capacity that have

these differential affects. These dimensions were:

People - "characteristics of the legislators. (Such as) age, education, descriptions

of members feelings towards each other and towards their legislative job;"

(Hedlund and Freeman 1981, 90)

Technology and product use - "The use of computers and technical resources

available in the legislature. The amount of office space available, the use of

electronic data processing for a variety of tasks and the degree to which a science

and technology component exists in the legislature;" (ibid.)

Organizational structure - "The way in which the legislature is organized, its

anatomical features, e. g., the arrangement of positions, the relationship between

positions, and factors designed to produce certain types of behavior in positions."

Task division - "The way in which legislative work is organized" comprised of

two main dimensions "support work groups" (such as legislative staff and research

aids) and "primary work groups (committees), and;" (ibid.)

Organizational environment - This includes the legislature's budget, partisan

control of the legislature, and "demand level...in terms of the number of bills

introduced, passed, and vetoed." (ibid.)

Hedlund and Freeman concluded that the most important dimensions of

organizational capacity in US. state legislatures were leadership, inter-personal relations,

and the use of science and technology. "The nature of chamber personnel and of primary

task groups seems to have the greatest effect on the performance levels of processing

effectiveness. Next are variables representing the authority structure, technology and

product use, and the environment. Of considerable range are the formal organization,

rules and procedures, support task groups, and information systems." (107)

202

Some of their ﬁndings mirror contemporary problems in Zambia. For

example, the Zambian Legislative Performance Study Group (LPSG) and Bach (1994)

highlighted the Speaker's authority as a principal barrier to increased legislative

development. "The extent to which the Standing Orders give Mr. Speaker the tools to

concentrate effective control...in his own hands are signiﬁcant." (Bach 1994, 62)

"Unless meaningful reforms are made, Parliament, as it now works will not and never

will be able to effectively hold the executive (branch) to account when it is backed by all

the resources of the civil service." (LPSG, Report Two, 1992, 27)

The previous chapter showed how President Kaunda manipulated the

constitutional rules in the First and Second Republics to ensure the dominance of the

executive branch over governmental affairs. At the same time the Speaker and Clerk of

the Zambian National Assembly were also developing a rigid, hierarchical administrative

system that paralleled the centralized administration of the executive branch. Since 1991,

this hierarchical administration was at odds with the development of greater legislative

independence. This chapter will show that the administrative system, resources, and

personnel of the seventh National Assembly are well suited to the maintenance of a weak

and subservient legislature, but not to the development of an independent legislative

branch as was hoped for in 1991.

A 1983 report on parliamentary procedure prepared for a meeting of

Zambian civil servants explains that the National Assembly is guided by: "(a) the

Constitution of the Republic of Zambia; (b) Traditional practices of the National

Assembly; (c) Standing Orders; and (d) Parliamentary Case Law." (Report, 1983, 10)

203

The inﬂuence of constitutional rules on parliamentary performance was discussed in the

previous chapter. This chapter emphasizes the inﬂuence of "traditional practices" in the

National Assembly and the effect that the Assembly's Standing Orders have had on

parliamentary performance across the three Republics.2 The management structure of the

Assembly, namely, the Speaker and his inﬂuence on parliamentary performance, is

discussed ﬁrst.

Organizational Capacity: Mr. Speaker and the Zambian National Assembly

Like a medieval manor, the Zambian National Assembly sits atop Manda

Hill, the highest point in Zambia's capital city of Lusaka. Surrounding the National

Assembly is a decorative iron fence that protects the Assembly grounds, as well as the

private residence and gardens of the robed and be-wigged Speaker of the National

Assembly, Robinson Nabulyato. Proudly hailed as the "longest-serving speaker in the

Commonwealth," Nabulyato had already been in office six years when Tordoff (1974)

wrote:

Costing over one million Kwacha, the external copper walls

of Zambia's National Assembly reﬂect the scale and source

of the country's opulence. Yet the building is in use for

only a small part of the year. Its visitors' galleries are

seldom full. No throngs of constituents toil up the hill to

see their representatives. The very newness and quietness

of the building , and the polished sophistication of its

interior, symbolize the limited part which the National

Assembly plays on the Zambian political scene. (197)

 

2

The Standing Orders are the written procedures by which the Speaker of the Zambian Assembly

administers house business. The Standing Orders themselves are less important than the ways in which Mr.

Speaker interprets them, as this chapter will show.

204

Very little has changed since then. The buildings and grounds are the

same as they were when Tordoff saw them, though perhaps signiﬁcantly worse for wear,

and Nabulyato still serves as Speaker of the National Assembly. A copper, ivory and

amethyst mace still precedes the Speaker into the Assembly. His chair is still framed by

elephant tusks and guarded by a stuffed lion and leopard. Visitors are seldom seen on the

Assembly grounds, except for the occasional groups of children on a school trip or

Zambian army ofﬁcers for whom attending house debates is part of their continued

training. Tordoff saw in these grounds a reﬂection of the of limited role parliament plays

in Zambian politics, but they also symbolize the manner in which the National Assembly

was administered: emphasizing form and appearance over function.

The Speaker of the Zambian Parliament is elected by the Members of

Parliament at the ﬁrst meeting of each ﬁve-year assembly term. The Speaker is

nominated by the leader of government business in the house and must be a Zambian

citizen eligible to contest a parliamentary election. He cannot, however, be a sitting

Member of Parliament. The Speaker has wide latitude to interpret the Standing Orders

that guide parliamentary practice and is in a powerful position to affect the course of

Assembly business.3 Parliamentary speakerships are positions of "great authority and

(are) widely respected." (Rasmussen, 1993, 101) Internal Zambian documents simply

assert: "Mr. Speaker's authority and dignity are the authority and dignity of the house

 

’

This includes the ability to inﬂuence assembly debates. It is important to note the absence of

ethnicty in this discussion and the ways in which ethnic identiﬁcation might shape parliamentary behavior,

especially law-making and members' participation in house debates. The omission of an ethnic explanation

of legislative performance results from the Speaker’s determination that tribal or ethnic identiﬁcations are

"unparliamentary" and, therefore, not allowed in the house. Members' can indirectly address ethnic issues

when asking locally-oriented questions during question time, but the Speaker is quick to quash any direct

tn'bal or ethnic references. Ethnic identiﬁcation does play an important role during members' campaigns for

elected ofﬁce, but those activities are beyond the scope of this study. (See Posner, forthcoming)

itself and it is unparliamentary for a Member to show disrespect to the Chair." (Brief

205

Notes, 2)

In theory, these speakers are nonpartisan ofﬁcials who "ensure that all

Members are treated fairly." (ibid.) Occasionally, however, Nabulyato's guise of

impartiality has fallen. Since his appointment as Speaker, Nabulyato has ruled the

Assembly with strict adherence to 'Westminister—style' parliamentary practice. In

Westminster regimes, parliament "can do what it wants; no limits whatsoever exist."

(ibid.) Parliament is "supreme," and the majority party in parliament has the privilege of

forming a government. The speaker simply helps ensure the continuity and fairness of

parliamentary practice. However, Zambia's is not a true Westminster system. The

Zambian parliament is dominated by an even more powerful, independently elected

president who forms his own executive branch. This fact, coupled with the Speaker's

reliance on Westminster traditions, has resulted in a consistent bias in the Speakers'

rulings that favor the government's needs at the expense of the legislative independence.

For example, aﬁer the election of 23 ANC parliamentarians in the 1968

general elections, Hon. Nabulyato denied the ANC the status of "official opposition" in

the house. Had this status been granted, Harry Nkumbula, the leader of the opposition

ANC in parliament, would have been given access to a government funded ofﬁce to

conduct parliamentary business, a vehicle and driver, and the ANC could have formed its

own "shadow cabinet" of government ministers.

However, the Speaker denied the ANC opposition status as the ofﬁcial

opposition because it did not hold a sufficient number of parliamentary seats to form a

206

government if the current government resigned or was replaced.4 More importantly,

Nabulyato issued this denial even though the ANC had won more seats in the 1968

elections than they had in 1964, when official opposition status was granted to the ANC

by the previous Speaker. "That decision was taken without doubt by the president

himself, although it was happily announced by the newly elected speaker of the National

Assembly, Robinson Nabulyato." (Helgerson 1970, 144) The reason for Nabulyato's glee

was that he had been opposed in his January 1969 election to the chair by the ANC, and

especially its leader, Harry Nkumbula, "on the grounds that the government had not

consulted the opposition on the traditionally unanimous choice."5

Nearly 15 years later, after the 1983 general elections, Hon. Lameck

Goma, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was given the honor of re-nominating Nabulyato

for the Speakership. In his November 10 speech Goma said:

Hon. Members will recall that Mr. Nabulyato is an old and

honored Member of this House. (by all estimates, he was

over 60 at the time) He is a competent and experienced

parliamentarian. He has unique talents, a combination of

objectivity, impartiality, diligence and sufﬁciency with a

remarkable wealth of knowledge of parliamentary systems

and work. Moreover he is "Mr. Discipline." It is no

wonder that with such talents he has continuously, and in a

most eﬁ‘icient manner, handled the affairs of this House.

For his part, Nabulyato expressed gratitude to the members for electing

into him "into this Chair once again, for the fourth time." He then quoted from Erskine

 

‘

Ignore, for the moment, the fact that parliament could stay in power only if the president died or

became inﬁrm while in ofﬁce. If the government of the day had resigned both new presidential and

parliamentary elections would have been called.

’

It is also interesting to note that Nabulyato had previously lost the 1959 Legislative Council

election in Southern Province to Harry Nkumbula, the future leader of the ANC and erstwhile "leader of the

opposition" after the 1968 election.

207

May's book Parliamentary Practice and reminded the house that "the Speaker is a piece

of essential machinery, without him the House has no constitutional existence... Without

the support of the House a Speaker can do nothing" he said, but "with that support there is

little he cannot do." (Taken from the Speaker of the British House of Commons, Lord

Dennison, 1867) But what did Hon. Goma mean by "efﬁciency?" The following is an

example of the way Nabulyato, and his Clerk, Mwelwa Chibesekunda, have administered

internal National Assembly affairs since their appointment in 1969.

Mr. Speaker's Barony: The Organizational Environment in the National Assembly

As mentioned above, I was also able to gain unique access to assembly

administrators during my stay in Zambia. This included many meetings with department

heads, assembly staff, and administrative personnel and I am grateful for their help and

support. Fortunately, I was also able to meet with Dr. F.K.M. Sumaili, the former Deputy

Clerk of the National Assembly who was hired shortly after the 1991 multi-party

elections. Our discussion provided unique insights into the managerial and

administrative style of the Speaker and Clerk who were, themselves, unwilling and/or

unable to meet with me themselves during the eighteen months I spent in the Assembly.

My discussion with Dr. Sumaili centered around a USAID-funded

Legislative Performance Study Group that Sumaili was asked to shepherd through the

National Assembly. The LPSG was supposed to prepare a series of reports on

decision-making within the assembly, legislator-constituency relations, and

executive-legislative relationship. After these reports were complete, USAID was

208

scheduled to provide targeted material and ﬁnancial assistance to enhance legislative

performance in the new, multi-party seventh Assembly. However, these projects were

never completed.

USAID suspended the project because assembly administrators, namely

the Clerk and Speaker, were unwilling to give the LPSG latitude to investigate

administrative procedures within the National Assembly. The way the Speaker made this

decision highlights the hierarchical organizational structure within the assembly and the

chilling inﬂuence this environment has had on the creation of an independent, thoughtful

assembly staff.

Difficulties arose at the initial meeting of the LPSG when it became clear

that little concrete information was known about internal Assembly operations, even to

the assembly staff on the study group. "For 20 years so little information had been

available about the Operations and procedures of the National Assembly that even the

LPSG was in the dark." (Dr. F.K.M. Sumaili. Personal interview. June 6, 1995)

The study group decided that since this was the case within the assembly,

grassroots constituents were likely to know even less. Consequently, the LPSG proposed

to invite educated "experts," to deliver keynote addresses at provincial meetings about the

National Assembly, answer questions by meeting participants, and prepare papers for

distribution to legislative staff about assembly procedures. However, this proposal was

immediately criticized by the Clerk and Speaker.

Dr. Sumaili asked Mr. Yumba, a former Clerk Assistant under Mwelwa

Chibesekunda, to address two of these provincial seminars. Chibesekunda refused to sign

209

the letter granting authority to hire Yumba. Chibesekunda said to Sumaili, "if you want

him there, you can sign the letter." Sumaili responded, "if you don't want him, just tell

me so. But I don't want to 'go over your head' with the invitation." (ibid.) Apparently,

Chibesekunda felt betrayed by Yumba who had replaced him aﬁer Kaunda forced

Chibesekunda out of his position in the late 19803 over ﬁnancial improprieties. "He (the

Clerk) just refused to have any formal association with him." (ibid.) In the end, Dr.

Sumaili decided not to invite Mr. Yumba, the work of the LPSG stalled, and Sumaili

occupied himself with other activities.

A few months later, however, the Clerk sent a letter to Dr. Sumaili

informing him of his removal from the LPSG on the grounds that he would be "busy with

chamber matters" during the 1992 budget session. This letter came despite the fact that

the new chairman of the LPSG, Sikota Wina, was the Deputy Speaker of the house and

would be "even busier with chamber matters than (Sumaili)." (ibid.)

Shortly after being dismissed from the LPSG, Dr. Sumaili was dismissed

as a member of the Assembly staff. Sumaili was hired in April 1992. On March 31,

1993, the Clerk notiﬁed him that his post as Deputy Clerk was to be abolished and that

his job was simply going to "fall away." By April 3, 1993 the executive branch was

involved and discussed Sumaili's plight at a weekly Cabinet meeting. During that

meeting Cabinet was split over the Assembly's dismissal of a popular, well-educated,

out-spoken supporter of the MMD. One group pushed for Sumaili's return, while another

was uncomfortable with executive involvement in legislative affairs and was leery of

abandoning the "residual respect" that the Assembly maintained. In the end, the latter

210

won the day and Sumaili's dismissal was "upheld." (ibid.) One might argue that the

primary bottleneck was the Clerk, rather than the Speaker, since the it was the Clerk who

removed Sumaili from the LPSG and later dismissed him from the assembly. However,

that explanation misinterprets the way decisions are made in the assembly.

The LPSG, like other administrative units, wrote minutes of their meetings

and sent them to the Clerk for his approval. However, after the Clerk approve (or

disapproved) those reports, he passed them on to the Speaker for his approval. (Personal

interviews with assembly staff. July, 1994 through October, 1995) As Dr. Sumaili said:

"You see, you must understand the way things work over there. Everything you do is a

recommendation. No actions are taken unless and until one's superior approves them

ﬁrst." (Personal interview. July 6, 1995) Only the Speaker would have had ﬁnal

authority to authorize the Deputy Clerk's dismissal.

It is especially interesting to note what happened after Sumaili was

dismissed from his position. The Speaker later asked the government for a special

dispensation to re-appoint Chibesekunda to his position as Clerk of the National

Assembly, even though he was well past the mandatory age of civil service retirement.

The problem, explained the Speaker, was that there was "no one at the Assembly to

replace him." (ibid.)

This request raised an interesting problem for the government. The Clerk

had never faced a mandated parliamentary conﬁrmation hearing, nor would he do so if

the special dispensation was approved.6 According to Section (3) of the National

 

6

Several sitting parliamentarians told me that the reason Chibesekunda was never conﬁrmed by the

house was that the government knew he was "unconﬁrmable" as a result of corruption and ﬁnancial abuse

allegations that had earlier caused Kaunda to dismiss him. However, these rumors could not be

211

Assembly Staff Act (1991): "The Clerk shall vacate his ofﬁce when he attains the age of

ﬁfty-ﬁve years." In addition, "the Speaker shall appoint no person as Clerk, unless a

proposal for the appointment of that person has ﬁrst been submitted to the Assembly and

that Assembly has resolved that he should be so appointed." (359) Chibesekunda met

neither of these conditions, but was nominated by the Speaker nonetheless.

The MMD government was fully aware that Chibesekunda had never

been approved by Parliament, but feared that if the issue was raised retroactively,

parliamentary business conducted while Chibesekunda was Clerk could be declared null

and void by the courts. Eventually the Speaker's request was approved, and as of

December 1995, nearly four years after his initial appointment, Chibesekunda had still not

faced parliamentary conﬁrmation.

The combination of an administrative hierarchy and limited mechanisms

to appeal the Speaker's decisions has created an environment of constant self-censorship

on the part of assembly staff.7 As a result, administrative errors are either not caught or

ignored in fear of embarrassing a superior, with consequent personal and professional

risks. This has severely reduced assembly administrators' willingness to act

independently.

The Speaker also maintains a traditional perspective on the role of the

National Assembly, namely, that parliament's primary responsibility to approve

legislation brought to it by the government. Consequently, the combination of his

 

authenticated.

"

Another story commonly told by parliamentary staff describes a repairman who was dismissed for

drying a freshly painted desk in the sun on the parliamentary parking lot. The Speaker, who was walking

down the steps to his apartment at the time, appreciated neither the "look of the desk" nor the "smell of the

varnish." (Personal interviews)

212

administrative hierarchy and perspective on traditional, law-making responsibilities, has

created an administrative structure unsuited to support other non-traditional activities,

such as investigating government policies, examining estimated government

expenditures, or writing independent legislative initiatives. The next section examines

how this organizational environment has affected legislative behavior in Zambia's three

Republics.

Organizational Capacity and Legislative Performance

Chapter four showed that the changes in legislative behavior across

Zambia's three republics cannot be explained solely by changes in constitutional rules,

though these rules do inﬂuence parliamentary behavior. For example, the hybrid

presidential-parliamentary constitution establishes strong executive controls over

assembly behavior, but it cannot explain why back bench and opposition parliamentarians

do not exercise their right to introduce private member's bills. This section examines the

inﬂuence the organizational environment and organizational capacity of the assembly has

had on legislative performance, regardless of constitutional rules. It emphasizes the

particular affects that task division and organizational structure have had on parliament's

ability to review legislation and participate in the policy-making process.

Task division, especially the role of Zambia's nine standing parliamentary

committees, is examined ﬁrst.8 It is argued that Zambian parliamentary committee

 

'

These nine committees are: Agriculture, Social Services; Women, Youth & Child Development;

Local Administration; Government Assurances; Public Accounts; Foreign Affairs; Parastatal Bodies; and

Delegated Legislation.

weakness has signiﬁcantly hindered the development of effective parliamentary oversight

213

of legislative and policy proposals. Moreover, committee deﬁciencies have been

exacerbated by their limited access to resources necessary for research and data

processing. The second section examines how the assembly's hierarchical administrative

structure has hindered the development of independent legislative initiatives by back

bench and opposition MPs.

Parliam n

Committees an Le islative Behavior

The Zambian National Assembly is modeled on the British, Westminster-

style parliament in which the government of the day ensures the passage of its legislative

program through its parliamentary majority. However, one aspect of the British

parliamentary system is decidedly lacking in Zambia, an effective committee system.

Unlike equivalent assignments in the US. congress, committee work in

parliamentary systems is often considered "a drudgery, with few rewards" since the

outcomes of most legislative proposals are know well in advance. (Rasmussen 1993,

102) However, the "detailed examination of policies (and legislation) takes place in

parliamentary committees" and these committees offer parliamentarians an opportunity to

affect the course of government policies, albeit only marginally. (Rose 1989, 115)

The Zambian committee system is highly regarded, at least in theory. In

"Some Brief Notes on the Hon. Mr. Speaker's and Clerk's Ofﬁces," prepared by the

Clerk's office for newly elected MPs, the Zambian committee system is described as the

"watch-dog of public funds." (71) On behalf of the house, "committees have an effective

role in the surveillance of the activities of the Executive and have the added advantage of

214

scrutinizing matters in more detail than does the entire House." (ibid.) However, the

assembly's own practices work against committee development and independence.

For example, parliamentary committees have no authority to examine

government proposals before they are introduced in house debates. The National

Assembly, as a whole, is the only body that reviews legislative and policy proposals.

However, "the Zambian Parliament has neither the time nor the ﬂexibility to discuss the

details and technical aspects of bills and estimates of expenditure." (LPSG Two 1992,

25) The assembly is further frustrated by time limits on debates that are established by

government ministers in consultation with the Speaker. As a result, Parliament is asked,

in a matter of days, to "master what took the executive branch weeks, months, or years to

prepare." (LPSG Two, 26)

Not only do parliamentary committees lack prior legislative review, they

lack the substantive and material resources necessary to adequately complete their limited

tasks. The Speaker determines the membership of each committee prior to the ﬁrst

committee meeting and announces Members' assignments during the ﬁrst full house

sitting. Members' committee assignments change each year and have nothing to do with

the Members' interests, seniority, or expertise in any substantive area.9

The Speaker also determines when committees will meet and calls each

standing committee into session approximately twice per year.'0 These sessions take

 

°

This is another imitation of traditional parliamentary practice in a non-traditional parliamentary

system.

'°

Each committee has 10 members, and chooses a Chairman from among themselves who

administers committee business for the duration of that year.

215

place in between the three annual parliamentary sittings and each committee hearing lasts

a few hours each day during the course of 1-2 weeks. (Personal interviews with National

Assembly staff. August, 1994) During this time the committees meet in one of four

common "committee rooms" to discuss relevant issues, interview government ofﬁcials,

and work on preparing the committee's "Annual Report" which is presented to the house

during the ﬁnal sitting of each assembly session. (ibid.)

The National Assembly does have a permanent "committee secretariat" to

work with committee members, but the Speaker assigns only one member of the

secretariat to each standing committee. Members of the secretariat are responsible to

prepare minutes of committee meetings, conduct all the committee's requests for research,

and type (often, write) the committee's reports. (ibid.)

However, like the committee members themselves, members of the

committee secretariat have no substantive, technical expertise and are assigned to

different parliamentary committees each year. Finally, the committees have no dedicated

pool of data processing resources and must use shared physical facilities, including

phones, copiers, typewriters, and faxes to conduct their meetings.” (ibid.) As a result,

the parliamentary committees are "dependent on the government for information, and the

government decides whether, and how, they will answer the committees' questions."

(Hon. Lavu Mulimba. Personal interview. August 9, 1994)

This committee structure effectively prevents the creation of independent

sources of substantive expertise within the National Assembly that could scrutinize

 

"

Hearings that are held in camera, unlike the committee meetings of their British counterparts.

government's policy proposals.12 Committees "only serve as advisors to the government.

216

(Our) watchdogs have no 'teeth to bite' and because of that we have no opportunity to

make policy." (Hon. Ernest Mwansa. Personal interview. July 26, 1994)

Members have long recognized the weakness in Zambia's committee

system, as the above comments indicate, and some have even pushed the Speaker to

adopt committee reforms. However, these reforms have never been undertaken. Hon.

Lavu Mulimba's statement during parliamentary debates in 1982 suggests that back bench

parliamentarians were frustrated with this aspect of assembly administration even at the

height of the one-party state.

On November 10, 1982, the house debated an amendment to the Income

Tax Act that would make the government allowances paid to District Governors and

Provincial Party Secretaries free from the national income tax.13 The government was

already paying these tax-free allowances, but the legislation was necessary to formalize

the practice. In his comments introducing the amendment, Hon. Dingiswayo Banda said:

"I would like to pay my compliments to Parliament because had it not been for Parliament

reminding the Government that it was continuously paying these non-taxable allowances

without the necessary legislation, I am quite sure that the Government would not have

brought (it) up! (sic) All we are doing now is to regularize an abnormal situation by

 

'2

In "Some Brief Notes," Members of Parliament are referred to as "generalists, rather than

specialists." The library, therefore, is "well balanced in subject content" and MP5 are encouraged to call

upon library and research staffs to "prepare authoritative bibliographies" and "provide Members of

Parliament with oral or written information on the multifarious matter or subjects that come before the

House." (34-37) Unfortunately, these staff members are underutilized and often possess only equally

"general" knowledge about substantive issues.

'3

At least ﬁve of these ofﬁce-holders were sitting parliamentarians at the time. (Hansards, volume

61, 1982)

bringing it into line where we can go out and defend it properly because it is covered by

217

the law." (Hansards, vol. 61, 3925)

In his response, Hon. Mulimba said: "In the ﬁrst place, I would like to say

quite openly that I not only support the Bill, but I also congratulate government for

listening to Parliament. In the particular case of this Bill, I am slightly humbled as a

Member of your Committee on Delegated Legislation, who fought to keep this issue not

only alive by to see it brought to a very successful conclusion in the form of this Bill. Mr.

Speaker, Sir, perhaps this is an occasion when we are given impetus to look at how we

can strengthen the Committee system of this Parliament in such ways that Parliament can

be (more) eﬁ'ective is its role of overseeing the activities of the Executive." (ibid., 3935)

Unfortunately, that impetus was never acted upon.

The Mvunga Constitutional Review Commission noted as much when

they wrote: "there should be established parliamentary committees corresponding to the

various ministries" and that these committees should "monitor the activities of the

Ministries within their jurisdiction." (Mvunga Commission Report, 136) The Mvunga

commission also argued that "parliament should devise a system of electing committee

chairmen" and these chairmen should be "accorded a status higher than that of a Cabinet

Minister." (ibid.)

Members of the seventh Assembly elected in 1991 have also been

frustrated by the ﬂaccid nature of the Zambian parliamentary committee system and

consequent inability to inﬂuence the policy process. In his comments on the Foreign

Affairs' Committee report, the chairman, Dr. Syamukayumbu Syamujaye blasted the

218

MMD government for "wasting the time and resources of (his) committee" by sending it

such "low caliber witnesses" who were either "not prepared or poorly informed" and who

gave only "stereotypical responses to questions." (Hansards, vol. 99, 177)

Not only did this frustrate the committee members, but "it denied the

Committee the opportunity to learn about and be involved in the formulation of the

country's foreign policy" as required by law. Syamujaye then reminded the house that

"except for treaties of a security nature, all other treaties and agreements entered into by

the Government must be laid before (the) committee within a reasonable period after they

have been ratiﬁed, and this was not done." (ibid.)

Hon. Mulimba, who pressed for committee reforms 12 year earlier, used

this as an opportunity to again critique assembly administration and parliament's role in

the policy process. "It appears to me, Mr. Speaker, that your parliamentary watchdogs are

getting restless with their funding and the scope within which they are exercising the

scrutiny of Government. It is up to this Parliament, Sir, to ensure that we build a capacity

for research and collecting information that will be superior to (their own). If we do that,

then we will have sharpened our skills with which to scrutinize and probe the

Government." (ibid., 183) So far, they have not done so.

The assembly will remain a weak partner in the policy-making process

until legislative committees are provided with the freedom and resources to undertake a

more independent role. However, three conditions make these changes unlikely. First,

the Speaker is intent on maintaining traditional, i.e., weak, parliamentary committees,

even though the separation of powers in Zambia is not truly parliamentary. The rotating

219

pattern of committee assignments and lack of targeted resources, such as substantive

experts on the committee secretariat, highlight this intent.

Second, government ministers dominate the "housekeeping" committees

that would be the locus of committee reform. This includes the Standing Orders

committee, perpetually chaired by Mr. Speaker, as well as the committee on Tradition,

Procedure, and Customs. Only opposition and back bench MPs are chosen to sit on the

nine standing parliamentary committees. However, only a minority of back bench and

opposition MPs sit on the key administrative committees mentioned above. It is unlikely

that signiﬁcant reforms will be made as long as the these committees remain under the

control of government Ministers who would have the most to lose from enhanced

committee independence. Finally, limited committee resources, such as research staff and

data processing facilities, will continue to hamper parliament's ability to oversee the

executive branch. The next section examines how these practices have affected

back-bench and opposition members' willingness to put forward their own legislative

proposals.

Organizational Capacig and Private Member's Legislation

Earlier chapters showed that the bills debated throughout the ﬁrst seven

assemblies were sponsored solely by front-bench government Ministers. Since

independence, no back bench or opposition member sponsored bill has ever been

introduced in the house. Why has this been the case?

220

One possible hypothesis is that partisan politics have affected legislative

independence in the Zambian National Assembly. In all seven of Zambia's assemblies,

the party of the elected president has also captured a majority, sometimes a vast majority,

of seats in parliament. Consequently, majority-party legislators could simply take their

proposals directly to government ministers who could assure their passage in the house.

Since unpopular or opposition-sponsored bills would be defeated on ﬂoor votes, there

was simply no reason to pursue them in full house debates.

The lack of independent legislative initiative might also have resulted from

the separation of powers in Zambia's hybrid presidential—parliamentary system. In this

system legislative authority is granted to the National Assembly, but the executive branch

has effective primacy over assembly affairs. Why would legislators call attention to

themselves by introducing proposals independent of the government when the president

could remove them from ofﬁce? These issues are both likely to have reduced back bench

and Opposition members' initiatives to introduce their own legislative proposals.

However, these hypotheses cannot fully explain why independent

parliamentarians would not have sought the political attention that they would have

received in endorsing their own legislative proposals, even if they were guaranteed to fail.

Seligman (1975) helps explains this behavior by describing politics in non-Westem

countries, "especially single-party regimes," as an especially "risky" activity since "losers

may be exiled, thrown into preventive detention, or deprived of their livelihood. The

absence of cushions makes politics (in these contexts) a risky career." (92)

221

However, what about politics in Zambia's Third Republic? The 1991

constitution guarantees individual personal freedoms and, with a few exceptions, these

freedoms have been guaranteed by the government.” Why, then, have so few opposition

or back-bench sponsored legislative initiatives been brought to the house?

Two seventh Assembly MPs did draft their own bills, and even threatened

to introduce them in ﬂoor debates. (Personal interviews) These were Hon. Ng'uni's

proposal to create a "constituency development fund" and Hon. Mulimba's bill to amend

the Public Orders Act. Both were discussed previously. However, neither of these bills

ever reached the ﬂoor of the house. The primary reason for this was not partisan politics

or constitutional rules, but an administrative decision made by the Speaker and the Clerk

of the Assembly to actively block the development of independent legislative initiatives.

Recall that the National Assembly Standing Orders provide for two types

of legislation. The ﬁrst are "Public" bills that "relate to matters of public policy and are

introduced directly by a member of the House who may be a Government Minister or

private member." (Standing Orders, 1986, 49)'5 The second are "Private" bills that are

"intended to promote or beneﬁt the interests of some particular person, association or

corporate body as distinguished from a measure intended for general beneﬁt." (ibid., 90)

In order to introduce a Private bill, the sponsor, who need not be an MP,

must present the Clerk of the Assembly with a "petition to introduce the legislation; a true

 

14

The 1995 Human Rights Watch Report on Zambia points to some abuses of prisoners by the

Zambia National Police, but not to widespread or illegal human rights violations.

'5

The Standing Orders were amended after the 1991 elections, however processing delays and

assembly administrators' intransigence prevented me ﬁ'om getting an updated copy. I was told that since "so

few copies were printed," the Standing Orders would "only be given to Members of Parliament and Staff. "

(Personal interview National Assembly Journals Clerk.)

222

statement of the objects of the bill; a deposit to cover printing costs; a bond to pay for

excess expenses; and six copies of the draft bill." (91—92) After the petition is

"examined" by the Clerk, it is put on the Order Paper (i.e., the assembly's agenda),

introduced to the full assembly, reviewed by the house, and voted on. According to the

records, no private bill has ever been introduced. For potential sponsors of these private

bills, the signiﬁcant costs have apparently outweighed the beneﬁts that such bill might

offer. '6

However, no such cumbersome restrictions exist on Public bills sponsored

by back bench or opposition members. According to the Standing Orders (1986) and

National Assembly Members' Handbook (1988) "a public bill may be introduced by a

private member (and) it is clear that the nature of the bill is in no way affected by the

status of the person who introduces it." (Handbook, 74)

In practice, government ministries have provided the resources necessary

to prepare bills and make copies at the government printers. However, opposition and

back bench MPs do not have ministerial budgets at their disposal to pay for the drafting,

printing, advertising, and distribution of legislation. Who, then, is responsible for the

preparation of a private members' public bill? The Clerk and Speaker have decided that it

is the individual Member of Parliament, in direct contravention of the Standing Orders

shown above.

In effect they have ruled that private members' public bills are hybrid bills

covered by Standing Orders 117 and 118. According to these provisions, when a "public

 

'°

Especially since it was easier to accomplish personal and professional goals through direct contact

with government ofﬁcials. This is discussed in Chapter Six.

223

bill is ordered to be read a second time and Mr. Speaker determines that the bill may

affect the private interests of speciﬁc persons, the bill shall be referred to a group of

examiners, including any experts the Speaker deems competent to advise." If the

examiners are of the opinion that the bill contains a "private" beneﬁt, the bill "shall be

declared a hybrid bill (and) the examiners shall decide what notices and deposits would

have been required if the bill were a private bill." (Standing Orders, 1986, 61)

Prior to the 1991 elections, the Clerk and Speaker never had to address

this question, since no independent proposals ever reached their ofﬁce. However, after

Hon. Ng'uni's bill was certiﬁed by the Parliamentary Legal Council, the Speaker

apparently appointed himself, and the Clerk, as a committee of examiners to decide what

to do next. (Personal interview. July 20, 1994) This committee-of-two determined that

the publicity and recognition accruing to the sponsoring member (Ng'uni) was enough to

qualify as a "private beneﬁt" and determined that he, and others who would initiate

private members' public bills, would be responsible to bear the costs of preparation.‘7 No

such independent legislative initiatives have been discussed since.

This decision not only had a chilling affect on legislative independence,

but it signiﬁcantly degraded the responsibilities of the Parliamentary Legal Council, an

ofﬁce created in April 1992 to help facilitate the preparation of back bench and

opposition member sponsored legislation! In the opinion of one senior parliamentary

staff member who asked to remain anonymous, "its good that the (1991) elections

 

'7

When I asked a member of the assembly staff who would be responsible to print private members'

bills and how much they would cost, he said he "didn't know" because the "government printers," not the

assembly, would do the work and determine the price. (Personal interview. August 1995) The

indeterminacy of government printing costs, alone, would likely have been a sufficient deterrent to

legislative independence!

224

brought back (political) opposition, but they've been held back by the Speaker and Clerk

who exercise their authority over many areas whether they're supposed to or not. Take

private members' bills. The Speaker says they must pay, but the costs should be paid for

by the government." (Personal interview. July 20, 1994)

Institutional factors help explain legislative behavior across Zambia's First

two Republics. The First Republic was dominated by govemment-sponsored bills and

amendments needed to bring Zambia's independence constitution into affect. Executive

branch dominance and political party control over individual MPs then limited legislative

independence in the single-party Second Republic. However, the two cases shown above

illustrate how administrative and procedural decisions have stunted the development of

independent legislative initiatives, especially in the multi-party Third Republic.

It is impossible to know how legislative behavior in the Third Republic

would have changed if the Speaker had decided that the costs of private members' public

bills should be born by the National Assembly, or if parliamentary committees were

better funded and better administered. However, these sections show how the

organizational structure and organizational environment of the seventh assembly has

affected national assembly performance, well beyond the inﬂuence of the formal rules.

The next section examines how these factors affected Members' behavior,

speciﬁcally their participation in house debates and budget hearings. The ﬁnal section

examines how seventh Assembly MPs actually perceived themselves and the inﬂuence

these perceptions had on their behavior. Formal rules and administrative procedures have

stymied parliamentary performance, but so too have Members' own attitudes about

themselves and their responsibilities as elected parliamentarians. These issues are

225

discussed in turn.

Organizational Capacity and Members' Performance

The organizational structure of the National Assembly has signiﬁcantly

affected parliament's ability to participate in policy-making and oversee executive

actions. This was shown in the previous section. The Speaker's adherence to traditional

parliamentary practices in a non-traditional parliament has also prevented assembly

committees from fulﬁlling their role as government "watchdogs." This section examines

how organizational features within the National Assembly have inﬂuenced individual

members' performance, especially their willingness to participate in annual budget

hearings. A survey of seventh Assembly parliamentarians is used in the last section to

examine how the characteristics of the legislators themselves have affected members'

behavior and the inﬂuence of members' perceptions on debate participation and

constituency service.

Organizational Structure and House Debates: Efficiency versus Democracy

As in other parliaments, debate in the Zambian National Assembly is

controlled by the Speaker. Like British MPs, Zambian parliamentarians must "catch the

Speaker's eye" in order to be given permission to speak. (Rasmussen 1993, 106.) "The

226

average MP may sit through hours of speeches, popping up after each in hope of being

recognized, without being any more visible to the Speaker than a ghost would be." (ibid.)

In Zambia, however, the inﬂuence of Robinson Nabulyato's particular

administrative style on house debates is especially striking. The Speaker's concern for

parliamentary procedures over results that has consistently stiﬂed individual legislators'

performance and is exempliﬁed by the November 23, 1994 house sitting.

This was the shortest sitting on record and lasted approximately 25

minutes, including the introductory processional, anthem, and prayer.18 The day began

with "questions for oral answer," as was the norm, and these were completed in

approximately 15 minutes. Next the Speaker moved to the Report of the Committee on

Government Assurances as was written on the daily agenda.

The motion to introduce the report was made by the Committee Chair,

Hon. Ntondo Chindoloma, an MMD back-bench MP from Chipili. According to the

Order Paper, Hon. Akashambatvva Mbikusita-Lewanika was supposed to second the

motion, but he was not in the house. Rather than let another member of the committee

second the report, the Speaker determined that the motion had lapsed since its sponsors

were not present and went to the next item on the agenda.

It was subsequently discovered that Hon. Lewanika was inappropriately

listed as the seconder of the motion on the Speaker's agenda, and his absence from the

house had been previously approved by the Speaker's ofﬁce. The fault was not the

member's. Fortunately, Mr. Speaker "gave his permission" for the committee's report to

be reintroduced a few days later. (Hansards, vol. 99, 301)

 

"

Fortunately, I was present in the house and was able to observe how these events transpired.

227

Though this was an interesting occurrence, what happened after the

Committee's motion lapsed was even more telling. The next items on the Order Paper

were two "non-controversial" lands bills that were supposed to be introduced by the

Minister of Lands, Dr. Chuulu Kalima.l9 However, Dr. Kalima had left the chamber to

take a phone call, assuming that the above committee report would take time to complete.

(Personal interview. November 23, 1994) When the motion to introduce the committee's

report lapsed, the Minister was not present to initiate the motion introducing these two

new bills. As before, the Speaker then declared that these two motions had also lapsed

since their sponsor was not present in the house. As the Speaker made this

announcement, Dr. Kalima rushed back into the assembly chamber. However, the

Speaker refused to recognize his presence and ordered the government to adjourn

business for the day. (Hansards, vol. 99, 25 1 -25 8) Since there were no additional items

on the agenda, the house was adjourned and everyone went home for the day.

This was but one example of the Speaker's emphasis on house procedure

rather than house business. Rather than let MPs hear the report of one of their sessional

committees and comment accordingly, the Speaker ruled that because of an

administrative error the substance of the report could not be heard. Moreover, rather than

adjourn the house for a few minutes to ﬁnd the sponsor of two important bills, the

Speaker adjourned the house for the day and ordered everyone home.

At the other extreme are parliamentary debates that continue long into the

night and force MPs to complete items on the agenda. This practice began in the Second

 

'9

In fact, these lands bills were quite controversial and, many have argued, led to Dr. Kalima's

dismissal as Minister.

228

Republic as a tool to force parliamentarians to curb the lengths of their speeches. "I think

this will be sufﬁcient warning to members to be brief in their statements."

(Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe in the Times ofZambia, "MPs May Burn the Midnight

Oil to Pass Vital Estimates," February 26, 1970.)

These extended parliamentary debates do give Members' the opportunity

to speak to a wide number and variety of issues. However, since they are often carried

into the early morning hours debate is often rushed, lacking in forethought, and

ineffective. Members are mentally and physically exhausted by the end of these

proceedings. In Zambia, these marathon parliamentary sessions result from a government

unwilling to extend house debates and from an administrative structure that emphasizes

rules over outcomes.

The Assembly agenda is prepared by the Speaker, in close consultation

with the Leader of Government Business in the House. At the close of business each

Friday, the vice-president outlines the issues that the house will debate in the following

week and announces a date on which the current sitting will conclude.

On that last day of each sitting, the vice-president introduces a motion to

adjourn the house at "the completion of business today," regardless of the number or type

of items left on the agenda. If that motion is approved, as is always the case, Members

are forced to stay in session until the agenda items have all been approved. The

consequences of these marathon session are seen in the last day of the third sitting of

1994.

229

On December 1, 1994 Mr. Speaker forced the house to stay in session for

over 14 consecutive hours in order to complete the items remaining on the agenda. The

house session lasted from 1 PM. until 3 A.M., excluding a short dinner break and

stoppages for tea. This extraordinary sitting continued despite the fact that the house

could easily have reconvened the next day, Friday, at the normal 9 A.M. opening,

completed its business by noon, and still given most Members an opportunity to be in

their constituencies by the weekend.

Had these late hours simply been ﬁlled with members making their ﬁnal

comments "for the record," little would have been lost, except for a few hours of sleep.

However, whether through ignorance or malfeasance, several signiﬁcant agenda items

were left until this ﬁnal sitting. During this extraordinary session the house gave ﬁnal

approval to seven different government bills, including two important legislative

initiatives; one that established administrative autonomy for the Zambian court system

and another that introduced ownership and copyright laws for intellectual property.

(Hansards, vol. 99, 601-602) Though members were provided with breaks, presence in

the chamber was mandatory and many Members simply fell asleep in their seats.20

Members were not sanguine about these events and they widely criticized

the government for its actions, as thsi statement by Chongwe indicates:

"If the House is to express the wishes of the people who

elect us to the House, then it beholds the Leader of the

House that Members of Parliament are given sufﬁcient time

to read the material they are supposed to debate. We know

only too well that there have been Bills which have been

rushed in this House and we now regret that we ever did

 

2°

After falling asleep myself in the visitor‘s gallery, I left the Assembly at 1 A.M. and only learned of

the 3 A.M. closure from radio reports broadcast the next morning.

230

that...There is no justiﬁable reason why this House should

adjourn at the conclusion of its business tonight." (Hon.

R.M.A. Chongwe. Hansards, vol. 99, 487)

In his response to Chongwe's comments the vice-president argued that the

government had not intentionally stacked the order of business nor forced the house to

address these controversial items in such a hurry. The late sitting was not the

government's fault, argued Miyanda, but the members' because they had not used their

time "more effectively." (Hansards, vol. 99, 476-519) The Members, he said, simply

talked too much.21 Few members accepted that explanation, however, since the

government had introduced four of the seven bills that afternoon and only begun

substantive second readings on the other three earlier the same morning!

The vice president was probably correct that speciﬁc questions on cattle

dips in Chipata district, for example, often wasted valuable house time. However, recall

that Chapter Three indicated that nearly half of most members' concerns are local and

speciﬁc in nature. House debates provide MP5 with the access to resources and

decision-makers that they need to bring those demands to government officials. Most

members do not have administrative staff or constituency offices on whom they can rely

and house sittings offer most MPs their only opportunity to get answers constituents'

questions. Administrative decisions to stem debate reduce the salience of members'

opinions and thus reduce their opportunities to express constituents' opinions.

In addition to agenda manipulation, one other administrative procedure

further reduces members' efﬁcacy in house debates: the ﬂow of information between the

 

2'

Notice the important parallel to the comments of Second Republic vice-president Simon

Kapwepwe cited earlier.

speaker and the members. The Speaker is responsible to distribute copies of daily

231

agendas, motions, bills, amendments, and so forth. However, the Speaker usually does so

only aﬁer the sittings have begun. In fact, most members only receive their copy of the

daily agenda (along with the bills, amendments, and motions to be debated that day) when

they visit their parliamentary mailbox moments before entering the house chamber.

Sometimes these delays are the responsibility of a government minister who does not get

copies of the agenda items to the Speaker's ofﬁce in time for them to be distributed.

However, the Speaker rarely acts as an advocate for back-bench and opposition Members

whose performance is affected by these delays.

This section has shown that administrative and procedural decisions within

the assembly have inﬂuenced the quantity and quality of member's participation in house

debates. The following section examines how these issues have affected members'

participation in budget hearings, a particularly important aspect of participation in many

legislative systems.

Organization_al Capacig and Members' Participation in Budget Hearings

This section brieﬂy examines the inﬂuence organizational capacity has had

on members' involvement in National Assembly budget debates. Chapter Four showed

how formal restrictions on budget procedures signiﬁcantly reduced parliament's ability to

oversee government expenditures. Despite these rules, members' participation in budget

232

debates has actually increased over time.

Chapter three indicated that only 76.6 percent of opposition and back

bench parliamentarians participated in house budget debates in the First Republic.

During the Second Republic, 90.5 percent of sitting parliamentarians participated in

budget debates, and in the ﬁrst three years of the Third Republic, debate levels remained

steady, with 90.2 percent of all back bench and opposition MPs participating.

Organizational capacity theories cannot adequately explain why this increase occurred.

However, organizational capacity, especially committee weakness, can help explain the

limited quality of members' comments and their inability to oversee government

expenditures.

Helgerson (1970) concludes that the Public Accounts committee in the

First Republic was the only parliamentary committee that functioned effectively and

scrutinized government actions in more than a cursory manner. "A number of issues have

been raised by the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee which, I must say, have

been most welcome. They are quite good selections, helpful and, indeed, enlightening in

so far as government administration is concerned. All of us on this particular side of the

house believe that your committee on Public Accounts are doing a great service to the

nation as a whole." (Hon. Humphrey Mulemba. Hansards, vol. 16, 102. Quoted in

Helgerson, 1970)

However, Helgerson's assertion ignores two important aspects of the

Zambian Public Accounts Committee. First, in true parliamentary tradition, the Public

233

Accounts Committee is comprised of opposition and back bench MPs and meets only

after government expenditures have been made. "The Public Accounts committee

examines the Accounts of the Republic of Zambia based on the annual reports of the

Auditor-General and ensures that public funds are used prudently and for the purpose for

which they are voted by parliament." (The Committee System, 8) It does not, however,

have any real inﬂuence over the expenditure of government resources.

Second, since the government had no formal obligation to act upon those

recommendations it often ignored them. Only on rare occasions did the government

address problems raised in committee reports or correct imbalances the committees

uncovered, despite the "great service" Hon. Mulemba claimed these committees provided.

As Hon. H. J. E. Stanley, an NPP member from the Copperbelt said, "I don't think (the

government) gives a two-penny damn what parliament says or thinks." (Also quoted in

Helgerson 1970, 276)

Such was the case in all three Republics. For example, in their 1992

reports on assembly administration, the LPSG found that an important "weakness in the

committee system is the timing of the reports of the Auditor-General on the accounts of

the Republic of Zambia." (LPSG Two 1992, 22) The 1991 Constitution gives the

Auditor-General twelve months after the end of each ﬁscal year to present his ﬁnal report

to the president.22 After receiving the report, the president then has seven days after the

next opening of parliament to present a copy to the house. Rather than having access to

current information, the Public Accounts committee is thus forced to conduct "post

 

22

Article 107(4)

234

mortem" reviews of ministries' expenditures, usually months after the fact, and are "in

most cases, faced with afait accompli that they cannot rectify."23 (ibid.)

More problematic is that when the Public Accounts committee does meet

"(they) have virtually no resources to conduct in depth inquiries." (LPSG Two 1992, 22)

"There are only 4 shared committee rooms, only one of which "has air conditioning and

is properly furnished. As regards office equipment, Committees have at their disposal old

duplicating machines which make attractive materials, for a museum!" (LPSG Two

1992, 19) Since the Public Accounts committee does not have the resources they need to

conduct a proper review and they lack the authority to force a government response "they

must rely on the glare of publicity or on the presumed interest of the Executive in good

ﬁnancial management." (LPSG Two 1992, 22-23)

"During both the Second and Third Republics, the government of the day

has had channels for consulting groups over public expenditure strategy. However, the

groups most closely consulted have been those with the greatest inﬂuence on

government's hold on power." (Cromwell 1995, 176) This did not include parliament.

One consequence is that parliamentarians who want to direct resources to

their home districts are forced to do so outside parliamentary channels. Since back bench

and opposition members have little say in budget allocations, they must use personal

 

2’

The constitution is also quite generous in the time it gives to ﬁnance ministers to complete their

tasks. For example, Article 104 of the 1991 Constitution stipulates that the Minister of Finance is

responsible to present each year's "Financial Report" to the house within nine months of the end of each

year. In most cases, ministers of ﬁnance have used all the time available to them. Consequently, the full

house, which doesn't hold its frnal session until October or November of each year, has to wait nearly a year

before they hear about previous ﬁnancial expenditures.

Moreover, Article 103(5) of the 1991 Constitution

allows the Minister of Finance to introduce "supplementary appropriations bills" for "expenditures incurred

without the authorization of parliament" up to 30 months after the end of the ﬁscal year in which the excess

expenditures were made." For example, when I attended house debates in 1994 and 1995,I was present

when the house approved supplementary expenditure legislation for 1992.

235

relationships and personal contacts with decision makers within the government to

inﬂuence proposed expenditures. This does little to enhance the authority of the

legislative branch or contribute to the development of accountable governance. (Healey

and Tordoff, 1995) Moreover, it helps perpetuate a patronage system based on individual

loyalties rather than effective government institutions.“

An interesting question, though, is whether Zambian MPs consider

themselves responsible to provide resources to their home districts? Do they believe they

should inﬂuence government expenditures, or do they think they should occupy

themselves with things over which their responsibilities are more clear-cut, such as

making laws? The ﬁnal section of this chapter examines these issues and asks whether

the qualities and attitudes of legislator's themselves have affected parliamentary

performance.

Organizational Capacity and Members' Performance: An Attitudinal Survey

An implicit assumption in the comparison of legislative performance

across Zambia's three Republics is that performance should be different, especially

between the one-party and multi-party eras. Not only were the rules different, but the

members' themselves are assumed to be different from those who served previously.

Since MPs elected in the October 1991 election were part and parcel of a momentous

democratic transition it was assumed that they held more progressive, democratic

attitudes than those who had preceded them. But did they?

 

2‘

This is discussed more fully in the following chapter.

236

This section presents the results of a survey of 51 sitting seventh Assembly

MPs that attempts to answer that question. The MP5 interviewed here comprised a

stratiﬁed, random sample of approximately one-third the sitting Members from all three

political parties and provinces. (Additional information on survey design, methodology,

and questionnaire administration is contained in Appendix A)

Hedlund and Freeman pointed out that the nature of legislators themselves

is an important, but often overlooked, component of legislative performance. Simply put,

different individuals will respond to similar circumstances in different ways.

Consequently, it is useful to try and understand the interpersonal characteristics of

individual legislators and their responses to changing political circumstances, if at all

possible. Some of the various personnel-focused variables they measured were

legislators' inexperience, willingness to seek/avoid conﬂict, and members' degree of

interaction. This survey attempts to accomplish a similar task. How do Parliamentarians

elected in 1991 differ from those who served in previous Zambian Assemblies, if at all?

Were the MP5 elected in 1991 predisposed to accept a more active role in the Zambian

political system or not? How have Members' attitudes about their perceived role in the

Zambian political system inﬂuenced their ability to act as representatives of their

constituents, in other words, to bridge the gap between the rulers and the ruled?

Members' perceptions of their own responsibilities, and the consequences

those perceptions have on performance, have been a centerpiece of legislative studies.

Pioneered by the work of Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson (1962) scholars have

examined legislators' perceptions of their "purposive roles" and the relationship between

237

those roles and the "authoritative and legitimate nature of democratic regimes." (Eulau

and Wahlke, 1978, 111) Their studies, and others that followed, often focused on

American and Western European legislators and their behavior within the legislature

itself. They argued that the legislature was a "forum where we may measure the strength

of (popular) will" and that legislators were responsible to express that will "in

demonstrations of feeling and purpose, either by entering into agreements of mutual

concession or voting each other down." (Finer 1959, 281)

Later studies of legislative behavior in the developing world broadened the

focus to include legislators' roles outside central government institutions. This was

especially importance since many of the assemblies these scholars examined were

prevented from taking a more active role in the law-making process. For example,

Hopkins (1975) and Barkan (1979) showed that legislators in African legislatures often

faced more diverse and more challenging responsibilities outside parliament than within.

Mezey (1972) found that MPs in the Thai legislature certainly held themselves

responsible for "ritual" legislative activities within the assembly, including committee

work and approving legislation, but that "intervening with the bureaucracy on behalf of

constituents (and) coping with and requests for various political and personal services"

outside the legislature occupied most of their time and attention. (See also, Mezey 1983)

An especially interesting comparative survey of legislators in Kenya,

Korea, and Turkey, emphasized the ways in which "legislators in developing countries

work to create and maintain linkages on behalf of those on the periphery of the political

system to the (political) center." Legislators in these countries considered debate and

238

law-making important responsibilities, but the development and maintenance of links

between the political center and their rural constituents were of paramount importance.

(Kim et al., 1984, 11)

These studies mirror contemporary ﬁndings in Zambia. For example, the

LPSG argued that the primary responsibility of Zambian MPs was to address the needs of

their constituents. "They must have strong foresight in judging the expectations of their

constituents. They should be able to assess socio-economic requirements and know what

measures need to be taken in order to redress their major problems." (LPSG Four 1992,

11) Can current members accomplish these tasks? Do they have the education, skills,

and experience to act on those perceived constituency demands? This ﬁrst section

compares the socio-economic background of current MPs to those who served previously

to determine if they are any more, or less, likely to act on constituents' demands. The

second section examines members' perceptions of their roles to see what they think they

should be responsible for. Are members of the seventh National Assembly predisposed

to take a more active, independent role for themselves in the governance process or not?

Members of the Seventh Assembly: An Overview

The Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) was a diverse group of

political actors united around a common goal, the overthrow of Kenneth Kaunda and

reinstatement of multi-party politics in Zambia. (Bratton 1992, 1994, Chan 1991, Kibble

239

1992). Businessmen, labor leaders, and academicians all helped form the MMD and

representatives of these groups became members of the new MMD government. There

was little in the way of a unifying ideology, other than their desire to remove president

Kenneth Kaunda from power. In the words one former MMD minister: "it didn't matter

what we did or what we said, all that mattered was that we weren't Kaunda. And, it didn't

matter who we put up for president. We could have put a cabbage up there and he still

would have won." (Hon. Guy Scott. Personal interview. July 20, 1994)

This diversity is reﬂected in the socio-economic backgrounds of Members

of the seventh Assembly. According to this survey the median member of parliament was

born in 1944 and has 12 years of formal education.25 (Though this claim is difﬁcult to

assess, anecdotal evidence from MPs who served previously indicates that members of

the Seventh Zambian Assembly were better educated than past MPs.) Most respondents

claimed to be farmers or traders, though members represented over one dozen different

professions. Members reported earning median salaries of 200,000 to 250,000 Kwacha

per month (approximately $250 at 1995 exchange rates). Almost all respondents were

married and spouses who worked outside the home contributed an additional 60,000

Kwacha ($60) in monthly income.“

However these ﬁgures do not account for the wide variation in members'

responses. While the median MP was 51 year old, survey respondents ranged in age from

32 to 67. Though most have the equivalent of a high school education, nine members

 

2’

Median, rather than average, ﬁgures are used in order to avoid skewing the results with outlyers, as

discussed below.

2‘

Interestingly, the most recent World Bank estimate of GNP per capita (1989-94) was $350 per

year, indicating that most MPs at least claimed to have an income approximately equivalent to that of their

constituents.

240

said they had nine or fewer years of formal education, while 13 members reported to have

17 or more years of formal education. Thirteen (13) MP5 reported additional incomes of

US $120 or less, but another nine claimed to earn between $1100 and $5600 per month in

additional income. Finally, over 18 of Zambia's different ethnic groups were represented

in this survey, but no group was represented by more than nine respondents.

Members' responses also reﬂected their disparate political backgrounds as

well. Three-quarters of the members surveyed here sat in the house for only 3.5 years or

less, indicating that they were assembly "rookies" when elected in 1991. However, the

remaining one-quarter sat in house for between ﬁve and 27 years (indicating that at least

one has served continuously since independence). Approximately one-quarter (23

percent) of those interviewed had also held another previous political ofﬁce; either

Government Minister, District Governor, Local Councilor, or Member of the National

Executive Committee of their political party and 40 percent had served as a local or

district party ofﬁcer.

Despite these differences seventh Assembly parliamentarians do seem to

better reﬂect the Zambian population as a whole than did previous Assemblies. For

example, in their research on Second Republic MPs, Baylies and Szeftel reported that

none of the members elected in 1973 were farmers.27 (1984, 66) This was

unrepresentative of the population as a whole since a large percentage of Zambians are

small to mid-scale farmers and rely on farm incomes for their livelihood.

 

2’

Recall that because of changes in the rules determining eligibility for parliamentary elections, these

two contests were inﬂuenced by the increase in the number of candidates who were businessmen or who

had business interests.

241

According to the Zambia Central Statistical Ofﬁce, at least half of all

Zambian households are dependent on farm incomes. (Calculated from 1991 ﬁgures

contained in the government's Selected Socio-Economic Indicators, 1 994, 4-1 1) One

would, therefore, expect that at least some farmers would have been elected to the

National Assembly. Surprisingly this was not the case in the Second Republic.

The results of this survey showed that 29.8 percent (14 of 47) of seventh

Assembly members claimed "farming" as their primary occupation. These responses

represent a signiﬁcant change in the occupational background of current MPs compared

to those in the Second Republic; a change more representative of the Zambian population

Nonetheless, there was wide variation in the socio-economic background

of seventh Assembly MPs. Given their disparate backgrounds, the survey next examined

what MPs thought they were supposed to do. Is there unity among MPs about their

responsibilities as Members of Parliament or not? These results, and the relationships

between role perceptions and performance, are examined next.

Role Perceptions in the Seventh National Assembly

During this study it was clear that one important task for which Zambian

MPs held themselves responsible was to convey information to, and from, their

constituents. This perspective was widely shared, despite the socioeconomic differences

between the members. In the words of one Northern province MP:

Since there aren't newspapers, radios or TVs in the rural

areas the MP himself is often the most important source of

district or national information. Therefore, constituents

242

demand to see their MP all the time, and in person. (Hon.

Dean Mung'omba. Personal interview. September 6, 1994)

If Members performed this service, he argued, it allowed them to solicit information from

their constituents as well as provide information to their electorate; a crucial task in

developing the legitimate, authoritative nature of parliamentary democracy.

However, a 1993 survey of popular political attitudes showed that

constituents also hold their MPs responsible for more "traditional" responsibilities,

especially law-making.28 In order to put these, and other, competing demands into

perspective, members were asked to rank on a scale from one to ﬁve (1 -- most important

and 5 -- least important) a list of tasks that they might be asked to accomplish while in

ofﬁce.

Three responses were designed to test whether MPs focused on the

demands of their constituents or on the demands of the central government. These were

"soliciting development," "communicating constituents' demands to the government," and

"communicating government activities to constituents". This was an effort to test

whether members saw their primary role as a representative, carrying information ﬁom

their constituents, or do they see themselves as government agents, conveying

information to their constituents.

The fourth task Members were asked to rank was their traditional role as

legislators. Law-making has occupied a great deal of attention in studies of legislative

behavior, including this one, and it was appropriate to examine whether Members also

 

28

"Making and amending laws" ranked as the most important National Assembly responsibility

among 24.0 percent of the Zambians surveyed in 1993 (100 of 416). The second most popular response

was "Don't know," with 20.7 percent (86 of 416) of the responses.

243

considered legislating a high priority. Finally, Members were asked to assess how

important they thought the tasks of political recruitment and political leadership were by

prioritizing their role in "stimulating political opinions and/or encouraging political

participation." Members' responses are shown in Table 5.0, below.

Table 5.0 -- Members' Perceptions of Important Responsibilities

 

Most Important

Second

Third

Fourth

Fifth

(valid percent)

 

Solicit development

19 (37%)

6 (13%)

9 (20%)

6 (13%)

6 (13%)

funds for their district

 

Communicate

3 (6%)

19 (41%) 17 (20%)

5 (11%)

2 (4%)

government's

activities to their

constituents

 

Communicate

19 (37%)

17 (37%)

6 (13%)

4 (9%)

O (0%)

constituents interests

to government

 

Debate national laws

5 (10%)

2 (4%)

10 (22%) 22 (48%)

8 (17%)

 

1 (2%)

2 (4%)

4 (9%)

9 (20%)

31 (66%)

 

 

 

 

 

Stimulate political

opinions and/or

encourage political

participation

 

 

 

Number of responses

47

46

46

46

47

 

Two tasks tied as the "most important" responsibilities to members

surveyed here, each ranking ﬁrst with nineteen of forty-seven respondents (37 percent).

These were choices A and C: to "solicit development funds" and to "communicate

constituent's interests to government." Interestingly, both of these are

constituency-oriented responsibilities and supports the hypothesis that Zambian MPs

consider themselves to be "representatives" of their constituents. This is an important

development because traditional legislative theories would argue that this is the necessary

244

ﬁrst step to consolidate viable legislative institutions.”

Though Members ﬁrst interpreted their role as constituency

representatives, their responsibility as government representatives ranked highly among

many survey respondents. "Communicating government's activities to constituents"

received the most second and third place votes, with 19 respondents (41 percent)

choosing it as the second most important responsibility, and 17 (37 percent) choosing it

third. Members seem to balance their perceptions about their representative role with the

belief that they must also act as government proxies. Since access to independent media

is limited, transferring information from the government to their constituents also gives

MPs an opportunity to explain what has taken place since their last visit, in their own

terms and, thus, emphasize their role in government affairs.

Rounding out the rankings were the last two choices: "debating the laws of

the nation," which received the most fourth place votes, 22 (48 percent), and "stimulating

political opinions and/or encouraging political participation" which received the most

 

’9

Though soliciting development funds is a role Zambian MPs rank highly, their search for funds

was constrained by the government's budgetary woes. Since its election in 1991 the MD government has

attempted to cut back on both the number and size of government programs available to members. (In the

words of one Eastern Province MP said: "We (MP5) must encourage self-reliance and economic

independence. The government can (now) only supplement individuals' activities." As a result, Members

must lobby powerful individuals for constituency development funds. In the words of one MP from

Northwestern Province, himself a government Minister: "We rely on the mercy of individuals for those

things (development projects). Take Ministers, if they don't want to put a project in your area, they won't."

In addition to personal connections, however, MPs must now lobby government officials, bilateral

donor agencies, and non-govemmental organizations for development programs and new social services,

the yardstick by which their constituents measures their success. However, MPs are still held responsible

for issues outside their control and this creates new and difﬁcult incentives for them. In the words of a

Copperbelt MP: "People are still not very clearheaded. For example, if students don't do well at their

examinations, they want you to ﬁre the headmaster...its your responsibility as the Member of Parliament,

not the Ministry of Education's responsibility. Therefore you, personally, need to bring more books or

rehabilitate school desks to create a better environment so that the children do better."

245

ﬁfth place votes, 31 (66 percent). It is interesting that the only activity for which MPs are

formally responsible, making laws, was considered such a low priority by members.

An implicit assumption in the comparison of parliamentary performance

across Zambia's three Republics is that there should be a difference between the

performance and attitudes of MPs elected under different political regimes. Had these

questions been asked to First and Second Republic MPs that hypothesis could be directly

tested. Unfortunately that data does not exist.

It should be noted, however, that the seventh National Assembly was not

comprised solely of new representatives. An interesting, and perhaps unexpected,

consequence of the 1991 election was that a large number of former MPs were returned to

the house. Well over 20 percent of the Members elected to the assembly in 1991 had

served as MPs in either the First or Second Republics, sometimes both, and

approximately half of these had simply switched parties and retained the seats they held

in 1990.30 In fact, nine different former UNIP MPs who had joined the opposition MMD

were appointed as government ministers in the seventh Assembly, including those in the

high-proﬁle ministries of Home Affairs, Mines, and Local Government and Housing.

While there were certainly new faces in the seventh National Assembly,

there was also a strong contingent of political incumbents who had gained political

experience under one-party rule. Therefore, we can distinguish between political

neophytes and old stalwarts to indirectly test the hypothesis that members' role

perceptions were affected by the 1991 democratic transition. Simply stated, one

 

Over 25 percent of the Members I surveyed (13 of 5 1) had served in previous Assemblies

246

hypothesis is that former MPs' perceptions of their roles would be more state-centered

than those elected under the new, multi-party political regime.

This data, however, does not support that hypothesis. Fifteen (15) of the

51 members surveyed here had previously served as UNIP MPs in First or Second

Republic Assemblies. This was slightly higher than the percentage than whole house but

not signiﬁcantly so. The remaining 36 MP5 were elected during or after the 1991

transition. Cross-tabulations with ordinal measures of association showed that their was

no signiﬁcant relationship between members who had previously served in the Assembly

and those who were elected in 1991.“

I believe two general factors account for seventh Assembly Members'

perceptions of their roles and claimed disinterest in law-making. First, the general

weakness of state institutions and dominance of the legislative process by the executive

branch limits members' interest in the legislative process regardless of how long they

have served in the Assembly. Much has been written about the inability of state

institutions to "penetrate" the rural areas and the lack of inﬂuence state institutions have

on many citizens in the developing world. Though Zambian has a highly urbanized

population, members recognize that legislating is not an activity about which most of

their constituents' are concerned, especially those who represent rural areas or those off

the line of rail.

 

3‘

Kendall's Tau-b, Tau-c tests of association were used to test the hypothesis that election and task

orientation were independent. These tests yielded scores = 0.153. These results cannot dismiss the

hypothesis that election and task orientation are related, but the weak association does suggest that there are

different role perceptions among veteran and more inexperienced parliamentarians.

247

Second, the MMD government's numerical superiority erodes what

residual interest in legislating might remain. Back bench and opposition Members'

attitudes on legislative proposals are of little concern to a party and government that

controls the votes of 60 to 65 ministers who support all government proposals. As a

result, law-making has become a low priority for most Members of Parliament.32

Zambia is a poor, economically underdeveloped country and constituents

appraise highly those MPs who can be seen to provide information and access to

resources. As a result, all Members regard constituency service a high priority, often an

all-encompassing one. For example, during my interviews one responded said

"constituents expected me to be another "Father Christmas.

"33 This was a common

complaint among the Members surveyed here.

Next Members were asked who they though should be responsible to

provide basic social services. The type of services examined here included: the provision

of water and bore holes, roads and bridges, electriﬁcation programs, hospitals and rural

clinics, primary and secondary schools, and land. This question was designed to capture

Members' attitudes about Parliament's responsibilities and the relationship between state

and local governments in Zambia. Members were asked to choose the party (or parties)

most responsible for these services from among the following groups:

-

-

-

-

National Government

National Assembly

District Councils

Traditional rulers

 

’2

Of course, there are exceptions. The government's 1994 decision to introduce a series of

controversial land reform bills indicated MPs will voice their opinions loudly, on certain issues, though this

is a rarity.

’3

Personal interview -- UNIP MP from Eastern Province. Survey no. 104

248

-

-

-

-

Local communities

Non-Governmental Organizations

Private individuals or businesses, or

Other groups or agencies

In response Members held executive agencies, i.e., "local and national

governments," most responsible for providing social services, despite the importance they

placed on constituency service. For example, the National Government was most often

identiﬁed as the agency responsible for primary and secondary schools (29 out of 51

responses, 57 percent), hospitals (30 of 51 responses, 59 percent), and electriﬁcation

programs (31 of 51 responses, 61 percent)?" The National Assembly was never

mentioned. In their opinion, Members are responsible to reﬂect constituents' demands,

but should not be responsible to administer the distribution of those goods and services.

This question highlighted the uneasy relationship between the state and

local governments in the ﬁrst part of the Third Republic and Members' perceptions that

the devolution of power to local government agencies was a positive change. For

example, responsibility for roads/bridges as well as water/bore holes was evenly split

between the National Government and District Councils. In the survey, 18 of 51

respondents (35 percent) said that the National Government was responsible to provide

roads, while 20 of 51 (40 percent) said that District Councils were primarily responsible.

Elsewhere, 16 of 51 respondents (31 percent) said that the National Government was

 

3'

The bulk of the remaining respondents on these three questions divided responsibility between the

National Government and another agency, often the District Council, or local communities and individuals.

In our interviews members often said that the National Government should "provide the money" or "set

standards," but that the local districts and communities should be responsible for their administration. For

example, 12 respondents (24 percent) divided the responsibility for schools and hospitals between the

National Government and other agencies, while 10 additional respondents (20 percent) divided the

responsibility for electricity between the National Government and other agencies.

249

responsible to provide water and boreholes, while 19 of 51 (37 percent) said District

Councils were most responsible.” Despite members' belief that local councils should

bear greater responsibility, many respondents lamented councils' lack of ﬁnancial

independence, and reliance on the Ministry of Local Government and Housing.

The provision of land was the most sensitive, and most "politicized" issue,

and this was reﬂected in the wide variety of responses. Approximately 22 percent of the

Members said that either the National Government or District Councils was primarily

responsible to distribute land (11 of 51 responses in each category). However, another

nine respondents (18 percent) said that Traditional Rulers were primarily responsible,

while ﬁve each (10 percent) said either traditional rulers in consultation with the National

government or District Councils were responsible. Lastly, four members (8 percent) said

all three agencies should be involved.

Responses to these two question indicate that there is agreement, albeit

weak agreement, among respondents about their role as legislators. Respondents

surveyed here ranked soliciting development ﬁmds and communicating constituent's

interests to government as the two most important responsibilities they have as Members

of Parliament. Given constituents' expectations that they be seen as someone who can

"deliver the goods," other responsibilities such as legislating or enhancing political

participation, are given short shrift and limited attention in house debates. These

perceptions were the same whether or not a member had served in a previous Assembly.

 

’5

Like the questions discussed in fn. 21, many of the remaining respondents divided the

responsibility for water or roads among two different groups or agencies. However, since there was less

agreement on the "primary" agent responsible, there was also less agreement among the "secondary"

agencies tied to it. However, the National Government, District Councils, Local Communities, and Private

individuals or businesses dominated the responses, though in a variety of combinations.

250

Second, these responses also showed that while Members will likely play a

role in the distribution of goods and information, the source of these moneys, ideas, and

programs will continue to be local and national governments. Though constituents hold

their legislators responsible to solicit development funds, and members recognize those

demands, members do not believe the National Assembly should have greater

responsibility to provide these resources. Members see themselves as messengers of

constituents' requests, separate from the actual administration of government business.

Consequently, there is little motivation within the assembly to push for reforms that

would empower legislators in the budget process.

These perceptions appear to be carryovers from the earliest days of

independence in which the new government used citizens' choice of representative as a

litmus test for the distribution of government goods and services. In order to ensure that

citizens voted for the "right" candidate, i.e., the candidate on a UNIP ticket, party leaders

would threaten to withhold development funds from the constituency.“5 Under this

system the MP was the "gatekeeper" of resources within their constituency, but had little

actual control or involvement over their distribution. This issue is addressed more fully

in the ﬁnal section.

Realistje Aceemplishments: Members' Perceptions of the Possible

Members' perceptions of their roles is only half of the story. The other is

what Members believe they can accomplish, and how those perceptions inﬂuence their

behavior. One of the issues against which the MMD fought during the 1991 campaign

 

3"

Both the MMD and UNIP used this tactic during the 1991 election campaign. (N D1 1992)

was concentration of power in the hands of UNIP party officials during the Second

251

Republic. In the one-party state the Assembly, and its members, were marginalized as the

National Executive Committee of UNIP became the primary decision-making body. One

way the party marginalized elected MPs was to create multiple layers of political ofﬁcials

between constituents and their representatives. This insulated "rogue" MPs and provided

the party with greater inﬂuence at the grassroots.

Helgerson (1970) points out that by the middle of the second Assembly

UNIP had created at least the three signiﬁcant senior posts between members and their

constituents. These were District Governors, UNIP Regional Secretaries, and UNIP

District Secretaries, all of which had authority to process members requests and act on

behalf of constituents. (131) These offices were invariably ﬁlled by party loyalists, many

of whom had signiﬁcantly greater access to party resources than the local MPs. As Hakes

and Helgerson (1973) pointed out, "the major factor acting to limit the authority and

power of the national assembly members in their own constituencies (was) the

increasingly complex organization of government and party at the local levels." (341) In

addition to having greater access to government resources, these ofﬁcials were often

chosen from and lived within the districts they served, unlike many Lusaka-based MPs

elected on UNIP tickets. Consequently, these ofﬁcials became the prominent political

actors in local areas, reducing parliamentarians' roles in the lives of their constituents.

In this survey I attempted to assess whether Members felt that situation

had changed and whether they though their own inﬂuence in their constituencies had

increased since 1991. Members were ﬁrst asked to assess "how much responsibility

252

Members of Parliament have in planning and distributing development projects in their

constituencies: Too much responsibility, too little, or the right amount?" Nearly 70

percent of those surveyed (34 of 49) said they felt they had "too little" responsibility.

Seven respondents (14 percent) said they had the "right amount," and another six (12

percent) said they had "too much." (Two members said they "couldn't say.") Members

believe soliciting funds and communicating constituents demands for development

projects is one of their most important tasks. However, their responses to this question

seemed to indicate they are not responsible for completing those tasks. As a result many

members simply choose not to ﬁght for reforms that might enhance their ability to meet

constituents' demands.

However, the MMD government believes that sitting MPs are sufﬁciently

involved in planning and distributing development projects through their ex ofﬁcio

membership in the District Council that encompasses their parliamentary constituency.

For example, during a debate on rural electriﬁcation programs, Hon. Joseph Mbewe

(Milanzi) asked the Minister of Energy if "the Honorable Minister (saw) any need to

include Hon. Members in the planning process now that the emphasis in planning (rural

electriﬁcation schemes) was on the Civil Service?" In her response the Minister said,

"Sir, Hon. Members are, in fact, holding another portfolio outside this august House.

They are Councilors and that is the reason I though it ﬁt to say that it would not be

equitable, fair, and immediate for my Ministry to set in Lusaka and plan projects for a

country that is 750,000 square kilometers in size. I can only receive one or two projects

from each province; the councilors in each province should decide which projects are of

importance and priority. In that way, Hon. Members will also be included in the planning

253

process." (my emphasis, Hansards, vol. 99, 335)

This survey showed that many MPs believe their primary role is to convey

information to and from their constituencies. This study attempted to measure whether

the historical legacy of party interference and members' unwillingness to act

independently had also affected their ability to carry information to and from their

constituencies. Simply put, how well do MPs perform this limited constituency service

task? Respondents were ﬁrst asked, "in the last year, how many times did you visit your

constituency?" and next, "on average, how long was each trip?" These questions were

used in order to capture actual performance indicators rather than idealized responses.

According to their claims, Members took an average of 8-9 trips to their

constituencies in the previous year and each trip averaged between 8 and 9 days in

length.37 These responses were somewhat misleading, though, because they showed such

wide variation. The stated number of trips, for example, ranged from a low of l to a high

of 50 in a year and their duration ranged from 1 to 35 days at a time. This variation is the

result of the different strategies members employed to conduct their constituency visits.

Some members, especially those who live in or near the districts they

represent, make several short trips to their constituency each month. These trips range

from one to three day in length and are taken in order to visit speciﬁc people and areas, or

to hold public rallies on speciﬁc issues. Others, especially ministers, make fewer trips per

year, often only two, but will attempt to visit their entire constituency each time.38

 

’7

"Trips" variable: mean = 9.65, std. deviation = 10.5, median = 5.5, mode = 4. For the "Trip

duration" variable: mean = 8.53, std. deviation = 8.10, median = 5, mode = l.

254

Though it is difficult to assess the veracity of these constituency visits, and

the different strategies used to visit them, it is interesting to note the consistency in

members' explanations when describing what their trips were like.39 While those

members who live in or near their constituencies are more free to plan their own visits,

members' trips are often arranged by local party officials as were those of their First and

Second Republic counterparts. These local ofﬁcers plan the daily agenda in conjunction

with local notables and send the schedule to the Member just prior to their arrival. Daily

constituency tours begin with ceremonial visits to local traditional rulers, are followed by

a political party planning session, and ﬁnish with a public rally at which community

issues are discussed and constituents given an opportunity to ask questions or make

comments. This schedule is repeated, often 6 or 7 days a week, for approximately two

weeks until the member returns home.

It is also interesting to note that when members were asked "who in your

constituency are the people you most particularly try to see or who most often try to see

you," "party leaders" were usually the ﬁrst ones identiﬁed. Members said they made

numerous trips to their constituencies each year, as the survey indicates. However, these

 

’3

This pattern has recently changed, albeit only marginally. Since late April 1995, Ministers have

traveled to constituencies and provinces, other than the ones they represent, on a program designed to

"explain government policies to the people." These trips are the result of a presidential directive designed

to accomplish both policy objectives, such as securing passage of the land reform bills, and political

objectives in preparation for the 1996 national and presidential elections.

While most Ministers 1 spoke with recognized the political and personal beneﬁts this program,

some were frustrated at the way in which it was implemented. First, these trips often distracted Ministers

from their administrative responsibilities for which they were still held accountable. Second, travel funds

had to be supplied out of the Ministers own budgets, despite the political nature of their visits. Large,

well-funded Ministries such as Finance and Agriculture suffered little. But others, such as the Youth, Sport,

and Child Development Ministry faced severe ﬁnancial hardships before these trips were mandated, and

could ill-afford these extravagant expenditures.

’9

Much of the information contained here comes from a series of extended interviews conducted

with half of the members surveyed.

255

results, as well as my own visits to parliamentary constituencies, underscored the

important, intermediary role party officials play in planning these exercises. One

response was particularly telling. In answer to the above question one former minister

told me: "The most important people to see? Party ofﬁcials and ofﬁcers. You know, the

ones in touch with the grassroots of the constituency" (Personal interview: my

emphasis). The problem, however, is that these party ofﬁcials ﬁlter, and thereby reduce,

the direct contact members have with their electorate. As such, they have an inﬂuence on

MP-constituency relations similar to that of the intermediary party ofﬁcials appointed by

the former government discussed earlier.

Despite their divergent socio-economic backgrounds, most Seventh

Assembly MPs are united in the emphasis they place on constituency service and belief

that they do not have a sufﬁcient say in the distribution of government resources. Survey

questions designed to assess members' perceptions of their roles indicate that MPs rank

constituency-focused activities more highly than traditional parliamentary activities, such

as law-making and political recruitment.

However, they have not yet used their skills to promote a more active,

independent role for themselves in the political process. Most members believe that

executive agencies, especially the president and district councils bear the primary

responsibility to provide government services and do not believe the Assembly should

take a more prominent position in this process. Finally, most MPs appear willing to

continue to allow government political parties and government ofﬁcials to maintain their

256

positions as intermediaries between legislators and constituents. The 1991 elections did

not introduce a signiﬁcantly new type legislator into the political mix.

Conclusion

Formal rules cannot and should not be the sole explanation of Zambian

legislative performance. Institutional capacity, including the people, technology,

structure, tasks, and environment in which legislators operate inﬂuence political

outcomes as much as the formal rules. For example, the structure and authority of

parliamentary committees, organizational environment established by the Speaker,

resources available to MPs, and their willingness to use them all have important affects

on Zambian legislative and legislators' performance.

This chapter examined how these, and other, measures of institutional

capacity have affected the Assembly's ability to make laws, formulate public policy, and

Members' ability to represent their districts and direct resources back to their constituents.

The organizational structure of the Zambian committee system and lack of resources

available to MPs was shown to have a signiﬁcant impact on the assembly's ability to

oversee legislative policy proposals. Mr. Speaker's strict control of administrative

personnel and adherence to strict Westminster parliamentary practice has discouraged

legislative independence and diminished the efﬁcacy of Zambian parliamentary

committees.

Nonetheless, individual parliamentarians did not express a signiﬁcant

desire to exert their political authority or capture a more independent role for themselves.

257

Why might this be the case? The following chapter examines one possible explanation:

political patronage. How might parliamentary performance have been inﬂuenced by

preferential access to government resources for personal use?

Chapter Six:

Political Patronage, Political Pork and Parliamentary Performance

One way in which African rulers motivate bureaucrats to

implement laws and policies and citizens to act in

accordance with authoritative decisions is to purchase

instrumental allegiance from inﬂuential individuals and

groups. Yet, the greater the regime's dependence on

mercenary support, the greater it is to vulnerability and

disaffection in the event of an economic downturn.

Richard Sandbrook 1989, 83

Application of formal rules helps explain some of the changes in Zambian

parliamentary performance. For example, the Assembly's role in law-making and public

budgeting can best be understood by analyzing the separation of powers in Zambia's

hybrid presidential-parliamentary constitutions and the limits these constitutions have put

on parliamentary independence. Administrative procedures within the National

Assembly allow us to further understand other aspects of parliamentary performance at

the institutional level, such as the lack of bills sponsored by opposition MPs and the

continued weakness of Zambian parliamentary committees.

However, neither constitutional nor organizational theories adequately

explain the behavior of individual parliamentarians. This chapter presents a way to better

understand why individual Zambian parliamentarians' behaved as they did by examining

258

the inﬂuence of political patronage on Zambian MPs. It measures how political

259

patronage -- the exchange of political loyalties for preferential access to state resources --

inﬂuenced two speciﬁc types of individual-level activities; members' participation in

house debates and their relationships with their constituents.1

Patronage Defined

Politicians' effectiveness is not based solely on their own skills or abilities,

but depends, in part, on the relationships they have with other actors in the political

system. For example, good relationships with their fellow legislators help MPs generate

support for their policies and programs. Relationships with their constituents provide the

votes necessary to contest, and win, popular elections in a democratic system. How, then,

does a politician develop these support networks?

Sometimes they are built through organized political parties. In other

circumstances regional or ethnic loyalties might maintain politicians' quest for political

power in the absence of a formal party system. Max Weber addressed these issues in his

far reaching book, Economy and Society (1968). Here Weber argued that leaders

require "legitimate domination" over other citizens to maintain their position as leader in

a political regime. Weber wrote that leaders could claim this authority in one of three

ways. They could rely on: "rational grounds -- resting on formal rules; charismatic

 

'

Another literature that examines the relationship between individual agents and political

performance is centered on studies of US. congressmen. These works explore how political behavior is

shaped by the ambitions of the actors themselves, including their desire for advancement, re-election, and so

forth. See, for example, Schlesinger (1966) or Williams and Lascher (1993). I belive the neo-patrimonial

perspective subsumes many of the concepts identiﬁed by these scholars. However, if, in the words of Adam

Smith, politicans' behavior is shaped by both 'avarice and ambition,’ this study emphasizes the former at the

expense of the latter. (1948)

260

grounds -- resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or character of an

individual person; or, traditional grounds -- based on an established belief in the sanctity

of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them."

(Weber 1968, 215)

Scholars of African politics found Weber's third explanation -- traditional

claims to authority -- especially useful. They argued that political leaders in Africa often

applied traditional authority systems, such as chieftenships, to support their claim to the

the presidency, legislature, and so forth. This is described as a patrimonial or

neo-patrimonial system. (Clapham 1982, 1985; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Joseph 1987,

Sandbrook 1989, Bayart 1993, van de Walle 1994) "In contrast to rational-legal

relationships, (patrimony) ascribes authority to a person rather than an office-holder who

is ﬁrmly anchored in a social and political order." (Clapham 1985, 46-47)

In patrimonial systems, those "lower down the political hierarchy" are not

subordinants, but are more like "vassals or retainers whose position depends on the leader

to whom they owe allegiance." (Ibid.) Rather than give their loyalty to an administrative

office (such as the "minister," or "president,") clients in patrimonial systems are loyal to

the speciﬁc individual (patron) who holds that ofﬁce and will (presumeably) remain loyal

to that individual whatever ofﬁce they hold.

The longevity of these patrimonial relationships are based on the patron's

ability to provide his or her clients with the goods, services, or social status, expected in

exchange for loyalty. In fedual systems, for example, the medival lord provided

protection inside the castle's walls, in exchange for peasants' labor in his ﬁelds. In the

261

African context an authority ﬁgure, such as a local chief or headman, might control

valued economic goods, such as arable land or agricultural commodities like plows and

fertilizer. Individual villagers then support the patron's claim to be the legitimate leader

of the tribe or village because he or she distribute that land for the villagers to use for

growing cr0ps.

Sandbrook (1989) described the most egregious form of patrimonialism as

a "sultanist" model of politics. This form of patrimonialism arises "when rulers have no

constitutional, charismatic—revolutionary, or traditional legitimacy." (Sandbrook 1989,

89) In sultanist regimes such as Mobutu's Zaire, Bongo's Gabon, or Senghor's Senegal, a

"strongman" emerges and rules on the basis of "material incentives and personal control

of the administration and armed forces. Fear and personal loyalties are the mainstays of a

personalistic government untrammeled by traditional or modern constitutional

limitations." (Ibid.)

But not all Aﬁican patrimonial systems are this militant, nor are they the

only factor competing for politicians' loyalties. In Africa today patrimonial practices are

incorporated into an institutional structure, namely, the post-colonial state. In these

neo-patrimonial systems, relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political

and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines."

(Clapham 1985, 48)

In neo-patrimonial systems political patrons still control access to scarce

resources, but they are often jobs, bank loans, or political appointments, rather than arable

land or agricultural commodities. Clients, which now include government bureaucrats

262

and party functionaires in addition to regional or linguistic compatriots, exchange their

political loyalties for access to those resources under the patron's control, such as a

position in the civil service.

The neo-patrimonial model became especially important as economic

crises and experiments in "African socialism" expanded the state's control over economic

development resources. Escalating government control over national economies provided

political patrons with ever greater pools of patronage resources they could distribute to

loyal clients. Though many nations' economic crises have subsided, these personal ties of

loyalty and dependence between patrons and clients have remained a dominant feature of

the African political landscape. "While neo-patrimonial practices can be found in all

politics, they are a core feature of politics in Africa. " (Bratton and van de Walle 1994, 6)

For Francois Bayart (1983) the development of neo-patrimonialism and its

inﬂuence on political performance can best be understood by examining African social

systems before colonization. Bayart argues there were few pressures for political

centralization in Aﬁica. This was because extant African societies were agriculturally

based and technologically limited. In combination with relative land abundance, there

was little demographic pressure for socio-political consolidation. Social institutions to

mediate political conﬂicts, such as a formal "state," were unnecessary because these

conﬂicts were solved by groups exercising their ability to "exit" the political system.

(Hirschman 1970) "It could be said that 'the most distinctive contribution of Aﬁica to the

history of humanity has been the civilized art of living in a reasonably peaceful way

without a State." (Bayart 1993, 35)

263

Consequently, the primary inﬂuence of colonization was not the

suspension of an artiﬁcial state over existing Africa societies (Hyden 1980), but was the

penetration of rational-legal state structures by traditional social systems. This

intersection "loosened highly personal antagonisms within the institutions of the

post-colonial state." (Bayart 1993, 210) Formerly scattered into separate social units,

African political leaders "organized themselves into factions to win or conserve power at

the various echelons of the (new) social pyramid." (Bayart 1993, 211) As these factions

competed for the resources of the colonial and, later, post-colonial state, politics were

dominated by personal, or "prebendal" ambitions. (Joseph 1987) In these regimes, the

competition of political "ofﬁce" was the primary goal. Political positions were

respositories of patronage resources (jobs, information, status, and so forth), rather than a

means to administer government affairs.

The consequence of this competition is that the "daily reality of politics" in

Aﬁica is best understood as a "bad tempered froth of factional conﬂicts and their uneasy

resolution within the framework of the State according to the logic of the reciprocal

assimilation of elites. In the end, no institution, however massive or bureaucratic it might

be, escapes from the pernicious miasmas of personal rivalries." (Bayart 1993, 215)

These factional conﬂicts and the patronage mechanisms used to overcome them provide

the third, and ﬁnal, explanation of parliamentary performance in Zambia.

This chapter examines individual parliamentarians' performance across

Zambia's three Republics through the theoretical lens of neo-patrimonialism. The

patronage mechanism works in two directions, from political patrons to their supporters

264

outside the political system and upwards from those ofﬁcials to their patrons within the

regime. This chapter examines relationships of both types. First it examines how the

president has used patronage resources to inﬂuence Members' participation in house

debates. Next, the downward linkages between legislators and their constituents are

examined using data and observations collected about the behavior and attitudes of MPs

in Zambia's seventh National Assembly.

Patronage and African Legislators

Writing about Kenyan Members of Parliament, Joel Barkan said that

legislators in sub-Saharan Africa were entrepreneurs whose "dual functions are to

mobilize the resources of his constituency for community development projects (and)

extract resources from the central government for those projects." (Barkan 1979, 270)

MP8 who were able to deliver development resources beneﬁted from the political support

of their constituents. Consequently, political patrons who controlled access to needed

development resources used local parliamentarians as clients to expand their political

patronage networks.

Often these political patrons were political party ofﬁcials, and their

participation signiﬁcantly affected legislators' behavior and legislator-constituency

relations. Barkan appropriately pointed out that "where party organizations are well

developed, legislators are often restricted in their efforts because the party is

simultaneously an instrument of central control, as in Tanzania or Guinea, and an

instrument for broadening the base of political participation on the periphery." (ibid.)

265

Party strength had a similar inﬂuence on institutional development as well.

For example, Michael Mezey (1975) argued that party strength and legislative strength

were "interdependent." (170) When political parties are either very strong or very weak,

legislative institutions are likely to be ineffective. Only when political parties exercise

moderate inﬂuence over political affairs can legislators establish and protect the

"prerogatives of the legislature against executive domination." (ibid.) In one-party states,

Mezey said, the legislature may be "a benign appendage to the government." (108)

This was often the case in Africa. During the 19705 and 19803 strong

political parties, such as CCM in Tanzania, ZANU in Zimbabwe, and UNIP in Zambia

developed in response to continuing economic underdevelopment, political crises, and

social strife. These parties exercised ever greater control over elected ofﬁcials and

monopolized their positions as the sole, legal political parties in the country. (Barkan

1984, Helgerson 1970, Kibble 1991, Mulford 1967, Ollawa 1979, Szeftel, Baylies &

Gertzel 1984, Tordoff 1974, 1978, 1980) Socialist economic policies further increased

the state's role in national development and, consequently, the salience of political party

connections for access to economic resources. Political parties became the foundations

for vast neo-patrimonial networks.

Once in control of the state, state leaders often rewrote their legal codes to

further limit politicians' access to economic resources and dependence on the national

political party. The most common method was to introduce "Leadership Codes" that

prohibited elected ofﬁcials from owning or managing businesses while in ofﬁce.

Consequently, elected politicians were dependent on their government salaries, perks, and

266

resources. Political entrepreneurs who sought economic resources, either for themselves

or their constituents, were forced to adhere to, and seek redress from, political party

ofﬁcials. No where was this more true than in Zambia.

Patronage and Legislators in Zambia

Previous chapters showed how UNIP captured control of the political

process through constitutional amendments and administrative procedures designed to

weaken parliament and parliamentarians. However, the failure of Kaunda's

quasi-socialist philosophy of "Humanism" as path to political and economic development

reduced UNIP's institutional role in the political process and heightened the importance of

personal ties to individual party leaders, especially the party president, Kenneth Kaunda.

"UNIP policy rhetoric reﬂected Kaunda's ideology of Humanism. This was a rejection of

both capitalism and communism, based instead on a mixture of African traditional

community values and Christianity. However, its eclectic philosophical basis made its

economic and social prescriptions ambiguous." (Cromwell, 1995, 153)

Humanism "left UNIP with no speciﬁc role" to play in Zambian politics.

Only during elections did the party have a clearly deﬁned function," namely, mobilizing

voters. (Gertzel et. a1 1984, 10) Simultaneously, "institutional structures" within UNIP

emphasized individual administrators' control of economic and political decision making.

(Ibid., 11) After having led the ﬁght for political independence, UNIP was unable to

articulate a meaningful ideological vision in the post-colonial era. Consequently, "the

267

party was left as a vehicle for individual and group mobility rather than a national force

for development." (Ibid. See also, Baylies and Szeftel, 1992)

Simultaneously, party officials were controlling an ever larger pool of

economic resources. For example, Tordoff (1974) notes that after independence the

Zambian government "placed more emphasis on State participation in economic

development than on private foreign capital." (204) This trend continued throughout the

Second Republic when the government "increasingly turned to state participation in the

economy: By the late 1980's the state controlled 80 percent of the country's economic

resources and provided 50 percent of formal sector employment" in an attempt to offset

severe downturns in mineral revenues. (Cromwell, 1995, 154)

As the sole political party, UNIP could have been in a strong position to

inﬂuence the political process, but it was unable to do so. Individuals, unaffected by a

dominant political philosophy, controlled access to the ever increasing resources of the

state. Sitting atop the social, economic, and political pyramid President Kaunda could

now command personal political support in exchange for access to the economic

resources under his control: neo-patrimonial politics ﬂourished.

One of the resources President Kaunda could distribute were seats in the

National Assembly, especially as UNIP gained control of the process by which candidates

were selected. At independence, there were 80 eleted members of the National

Assembly, in 1968 that ﬁgure was increased to 110 and in 1972 to 135. This was an

increase of nearly 70 percent in less than ten years. It is difficult to attribute these

increases to population shifts that occurred during the same period. For example, the

268

Zambian Central Statistical ofﬁce reports a population increase of 39.6 percent between

1969 and 1980, the only years for which data are available.2 (C80 1990, 1) In other

words, the National Assembly grew at nearly twice the rate of the population during the

same period. Because UNIP was the dominant political force, even during the First

Republic, the beneﬁts of increases in house membership, such as parliamentary salaries,

access to low-interest vehicle loans, imprest and travel funds, prestige, and so forth,

primarily accrued to UNIP loyalists at the expense of their opposition counterparts.

Another, resource President Kaunda had at his disposal was the authority

to appoint sitting Members of Parliament as government Ministers or Deputy Ministers.

These appointments provided members' with additional political power, prestige, and

economic beneﬁts, beyond their status as Member of Parliament. In exchange, it assured

the president of these Members' support for his legislative and policy initiatives in the

National Assembly. The following section examines these ministerial appointments and

the inﬂuence they had on members' participation in house debates.

Collective Responsibility, Patronage, and Front Bench Inflation

Zambia's balance of political power has long favored the executive branch.

This is no more apparent than the way in which a government is formed. Unlike true

parliamentary systems, the head of the Zambian government, the President, is not an

elected member of Parliament. Rather, he or she is chosen by direct popular vote during

 

1

Surprisingly, however, house size remained stable throughout the Second Republic. One might

expect that in the context of the one-party regime patronage resources would become more valuable,

encouraging the President to further increase house membership. This did not happen. Perhaps the

simultaneous increase in the number of govemment-owned corporations provided more direct forms of

patromonial sinecure.

269

national elections held every 5 years. Following a Westminster model, however, the

president chooses his cabinet ministers from the elected Members of Parliament, and

there are no limits to the number of ministerial appointments he can make.

The 1964 constitution stipulated that the president could appoint only 16

different government ministers. (Article 44, section 1) However, that ﬁgure was

amended to 19 by Act No. 33 of 1969, and omitted entirely in the 1973 constitution.

President Kaunda was thus in a powerful position to draw back bench MPs onto the

government's front bench and cement their loyalty to the government of the day in two

ways: the provision of patronage resources and the doctrine of collective responsibility.

Collective responsibility is the unwritten rule that binds parliamentary

governments together and "symbolizes the emphasis of unity in government action."

(Rose 1989, 105) Though cabinets rarely "make decisions by collective weekly

deliberation, it is the practical expression" of the notion that all members of the

government's front bench, i.e., government ministers and their deputies, are "collectively

responsible for the actions taken by other Ministers outside the Cabinet." (Ibid.) For

example, when a government minister introduces a bill or makes a policy speech on the

assembly ﬂoor, the other ministers are expected to support that minister's arguments

regardless of whether or not they supported it. "Unless a member is so opposed to a

decision as to be willing to resign from the Cabinet, they become as responsible for (a

policy) as those who introduced it."3 (Rasmussen 1993, 81)

 

3

President Chiluba has shown little sympathy for ministers who have not abided by collective

responsibility. For example, in one telling weekend the Deputy Ministers of Mines (Mathias Mpande) and

Agriculture (Ackson Sejani) were dismissed for what the president termed "gross indiscipline and

impropriety" resulting from statements they made regarding the privatization of the state owned copper

mining company, ZCCM. (Daily Mail, October 17, 1994)

At an Economics Association of Zambia meeting two days before, Dr. Mpande, supported by

270

The practical effect of collective responsibility "is to transform any

challenge to a minister in Parliament on (their) department's policies, as an attack on the

entire government." (Ibid.) Unless opponents believe they have the votes to bring down

the entire government, policy critiques are withstood by the force of this united front.

However, collective responsibility is an effective tool only in the context

of a multi-party political system. When there are no opposition parties to challenge

government programs, the ruling party is usually assured that its initiatives will be

approved because of constitutional, administrative, or party guidelines that limit whether

policy alternatives can be brought forward. For example, earlier chapters showed how

infrequently Assemblies in the Second Republic rejected government sponsored motions,

amendments, or bills.

Moreover, electoral dominance can also erode the effect of collective

responsibility. In Zambia's multi-party First Republic opposition political parties held too

few parliamentary seats to challenge government sponsored programs in the National

Assembly. Nonetheless, President Kaunda consistently, and frequently, used his

authority to make ministerial appointments and ensure front bench dominance in the

National Assembly.

Between 1991 and 1995 MMD majorities have dominated house affairs in

a similar manner. The MMD government faced few signiﬁcant challenges to its political

 

Sejani, charged that a "clique of politicians and businessmen" were trying to "derail the breakup (and sale)

of ZCCM into small operating units" to "control Zambia's economy" for their own purposes. (ibid.)

Mpande said he would have "failed as a deputy minister if (he) had not shared with the public (his)

informed opinion on the modalities of privatizing ZCCM." The President, Mpande said, "can use his

discretion to hire and ﬁre, but he cannot stiﬂe debate on an important national agenda like this one."

Though alluring, their dismissal was short lived. After sitting on the back bench for only 1 1 months, both

were brought back in a 1995 cabinet reshuffle, though not to their original posts.

271

agenda in the seventh Assembly after its 1991 election. Nonetheless, President Chiluba,

like President Kaunda, capitalized on his authority to appoint MPs as government

ministers. The next three sections examine how Presidents Kaunda and Chiluba used

their control over Ministerial appointments as a patronage reward for sitting MPs and the

effects those appointments had on parliamentary debates.

Front Beneh Inﬂation in the Zambian National Assembly

At independence the UNIP government's front bench comprised 39

members of the 80 member house (49 percent of total house membership). This included

16 government ministers and 23 different "Under Ministers" and "Parliamentary

Secretaries" who were also "collectively responsible" to the government. By the end of

their term, just before the October 1968 elections, the front bench had grown to include

49 different government ministers and deputy ministers. At this point the front bench

alone comprised over 61 percent of total house membership! Therefore, even if every

opposition MP and every member of the ruling party's back bench voted against

government sponsored proposals, they still would have passed the house based solely on

the votes of the front bench.

To circumvent the regulations on the number of government ministers he

could appoint in the ﬁrst Assembly, President Kaunda included the Ambassadors to the

United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Ethiopia, China, Egypt, Tanzania, and West

Germany among the members of his front bench. Consequently, they were also tied to

government decisions by the doctrine of collective responsibility, even though they held

272

no ministerial post.

The same pattern of front bench inﬂation, and same tactic to circumvent

limits on ministerial appointments, was repeated in the second National Assembly which

lasted from 1969 until 1973. President Kaunda also began this period with a "small"

front bench, composed of only 46 members of the now 110 member parliament (42

percent of the total). But by the end of the Second Assembly the cabinet had grown to

over 55 percent of the total house, with 61 different members. Again, the president had

used his authority to distribute government appointments to ensure executive branch

dominance over National Assembly affairs. The following ﬁgure illustrates the pattern of

front bench inﬂation across Zambia's First and Second Republics.

273

 

 

  

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Figure 6.0 -- Size of the Front Bench in the Zambian National Assembly, 1964-1986

274

This ﬁgures shows that front bench inﬂation slowed in 1974 after the

introduction of the one-party state. Having established his "one party participatory

democracy" President Kaunda could now be assured that the Assembly would approve his

policy agenda without undue interference. There were no other political parties to which

Members' could defect and no one to whom MPs could "throw" their votes during

parliamentary debates as there was in the First Republic. Members were encouraged to

share their opinions on legislative issues, but the rampant cabinet stuffmg programs

undertaken during each of the two previous Assemblies could now be put aside.

However, Figure 6.0 shows that there was still a consistent, albeit more

moderate, increase in front bench size even in the Second Republic. For example, the

front bench grew from 38 members of the now 135 member house in 1974 (28 percent of

the total), to 43 members in 1978 (32 percent), and ﬁnally 47 members in 1983 (35

percent). Interestingly, back bench MPs became increasingly critical of the president's

decision to pack the front bench during this period and many believed that front bench

inﬂation was frustrating the legislative process.

Members were especially agitated that back bench MPs who were given

deputy ministerial posts were bound by the doctrine of collective responsibility, though

they were not members of the President's Cabinet and had no say in policy-making. For

example, during parliamentary debates in 1982 Hon. F .X. Nkoma asked the Speaker if "it

was in order that Hon. Deputy Ministers and District Governors, who are not members of

the Cabinet, should be bound by collective responsibility since 99.9 percent of them are

not consulted on most of the matters that are discussed there?" (Collective Responsibility

275

l982,2)

In the Speaker's 1982 report issued on the above member's point of order

Nabulyato attempted to clear some of the conﬁrsion that had developed in Zambia's

one-party regime. He warned that "the grth in the number of Ministers and

Parliamentary Secretaries needs to be watched" to ensure the "free functioning of

parliament." (Ibid., 16) However, he ruled that all "senior members of the Government,"

including Ministers and Deputy Ministers "must act collectively for the smooth

administration of Governmen ." (Ibid., 15) "This unquestionably destroyed whatever

division of labor and separation of powers may have existed." (Helgerson 1970, 286)

Why did this practice continue? Why did the president continually

increase the size of the government's front bench, even though he was virtually assured

that the policy agenda he put forward would be approved? The answer is two-fold. First,

it beneﬁted the nation as a whole. The merger of policy design and implementation in the

National Assembly "had a corresponding beneﬁt in an increasingly evident realization of

development goals. Role differentiation proved almost impossible in practice, and

evidence was growing that it was an undesirable goal as well." (Helgerson 1970, 286)

Second, it beneﬁted the President and the individual Members of

Parliament who secured a "promotion" to the front bench. Ministerial appointments are

perfect examples of the resources political patrons use to maintain the support of their

clients. Rather than provide diffuse support to the entire National Assembly, the

276

President could target speciﬁc individuals for preferential treatment based on their

support of his claim to legitimate authority.

Elected members of parliament received signiﬁcant ﬁnancial beneﬁts

while ofﬁce. First, they received their parliamentary salary. Unfortunatley, information

on the salaries of MPs and Minsiters during the First and Second Republics was

unavailable. Therefore it is difﬁcult to show how MPs salaries compared with average

Zambians' incomes. However, the Ministerial and Parliamentary Offices Act (1994)

showed that elected MPs received, on average 4.4 million Kwacha from their salaries and

so-called "special allowances", excluding any income earned on privately owned farms or

businesses. This ﬁgure was roughly 10 times the median annual household income of

average Zambians calculated from survey results collected by Bratton and Liatto-Katundu

(1994) during the same time period. In addition to their guaranteed parliamentary salary,

however, MPs received low-interest vehicle loans, had access to the facilities and

administrative resources of the National Assembly (albeit, limited), preferential access to

food coupons during maize-meal shortages, and, for some, loans from state-controlled

banks.

Government ministers received an even more generous beneﬁts package,

including: a government house, vehicle with driver, supplemental living allowances,

Ministerial ofﬁces, and access to government facilities that would otherwise be

unavailable to them as average members of parliament.4 In exchange for these beneﬁts,

 

‘

The perks of ofﬁce apparently grow with the importance of post, as well. In an interview with

Hon. Levy Mwanawasa, the former vice-president told me that as he was given a 10 bedroom house, 4

Toyota Land Cruisers, 4 Mercedes Benz cars, and a Toyota Corolla "to take the kids to school," in addition

to fuel and food allowances. (Personal interview. March 31, 1995)

277

they supported Kaunda's claim as leader of the party and government, despite limits on

popular political participation. In addition, they endorsed the policy agenda he put

forward in the National Assembly and could explain their support as a result of the

doctrine of collective responsibility.

Preferential access to government resources became especially important

as economic crises buffeted the one-party state. Besides the "ofﬁcial" resources of their

ofﬁce, government ministers were given preferential access to government jobs in

state-owned companies, commodities, and consumer goods that were becoming

increasingly rare. Even the Speaker of the National Assembly recognized this trend. In a

rousing defense of Members' freedom to criticize the government during house debates he

said: "The eccentric and the non-conformist must be allowed to exist within the party.

This is especially necessary in Zambia as keeping outside the Party is beginning to be

difﬁcult for one to survive since employment and other chances of livelihood are getting

centralized in State organizations like parastatals." (Hansards, vol. 48, 1102)

Front Bench Inﬂation and Members' Performance in House Debates: The First Republic

The competition for these patronage resources explains why debate

participation increased signiﬁcantly across Zambia's three Republics, especially in the

one-party state. Though the assembly's role in legislation and policy making was being

curtailed, members made comments or asked questions during parliamentary question

time to get the attention of senior party ofﬁcials and, hopefully, secure a ministerial post

for themselves. These activities also beneﬁted the government by distracting MP3 from

278

more policy-oriented forms of participation.

For example, the number of substantive private members' motions

introduced in house debates declined from an average of 2.3 per year in the First

Republic, to 1.9 in the Second, and only 1.7 in the Third. However, the number questions

MPs asked during parliamentary question time increased from a low of 1 per member per

year in the First Republic, to 5 in the Second, and 4 in the Third. In the context of general

economic decline, Members used parliamentary debates to help secure their promotion to

a government ministry and the preferential access to the resources it provided.

An important question is whether this was a successful strategy. Did

debate participation in one year increase the likelihood that a member would receive a

ministerial post the next? The following data indicate that the answer is yes. Table 6.0

compares the number of comments made during house debates by sitting Members of

Parliament who did, and did not, receive a ministerial appointment in the multi-party First

Republic.

279

Table 6.0 -- Debate Participation and Ministerial Appointments in the First Republic

 

Year

Number of New Average No. of

Average No. of

Ministers at

Comments Made

Comments

Opening Sitting by New Ministers Made by Back

in Previous year

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Table 6.0 shows that new government ministers in the First Republic were

more likely to have been active participants in house debates the previous year than were

other back bench MPs. Column one shows the year in which these new Ministers were

appointed. Column two shows the number of UNIP members that were listed as new

government ministers in the Hansard index of the ﬁrst sitting of each annual

parliamentary session. Column three shows the average number of comments each of

these new ministers made the previous year during parliamentary debates. Column four

shows how their participation compares to the average participation rates of all sitting

UNIP MPs the previous year.

 

 

280

With the exception of the ﬁrst full parliamentary sitting in 1965, this table

shows that new ministers made between two and four times the number of comments

than did other UNIP MPs in the First Republic. While it is unlikely that participation was

the sole cause of a members' promotion, this table indicates that future MPs were much

more likely to be active participants in house debates than were their back bench

counterparts.

An interesting hypothesis motivated by theories of neo-patrimonialism is

whether criticism or support of government programs is a more successful stragety to

secure a government post. Neo-patrimonial theories would infer that vocal support of

government leaders and programs would be a better way to ensure a promotion. Is this

necessarily the case? To test this hypothesis it is necessary to determine the types of

comments Members made during house debates. Unfortunately, this data is not available.

As was discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the Zambian government

keeps only meager records of debate proceedings. Collecting data on debate

participation, for example, required the author to transcribe Hansard indices for each

member across 3-4 annual sittings and 31 years of parliamentary debates. Coding

participation by quality would have involved the additional step of reading each indexed

passage and determining if the members' comments supported or criticized government

programs, an exceptionally difﬁcult task. Consequently, this data cannot tell us whether

outspoken MPs were brought onto the front bench as a reward for supporting government

proposals or if they were appointed to a low-level deputy ministry to silence their

criticisms of government activities.

281

However, Helgerson's 1970 study of the Zambian Assembly indicates that

back bench UNIP MPs invariably supported government-sponsored initiatives, at least in

the First Republic. For example, Helgerson showed that 100 percent of UNIP members'

debate contributions on govemment-sponsored motions made between 1964 and 1968

supported the government's initiatives. Only ANC and NP members criticized

government motions and, somewhat surprisingly, only 25 percent of the time. (Helgerson

1970, 286)

Therefore, assuming Helgerson's ﬁndings also held true in the second

Assembly, traditional neo-patrimonial relationships would appear to explain members'

participation in house debates, at least in the First Republic. Members recognized that

frequent contributions in house debates that supported government programs were a

useful way to demonstrate political loyalty. This loyalty was then rewarded with an

appointment as a government minister and MP8 could beneﬁt from the access to

economic and political resources those promotions provided. These appointments also

ensured President Kaunda of the majority he needed in the National Assembly to

guarantee the passage of his policy agenda, including legislation that outlawed political

competition and initiated the one-party regime.

Patronage and House Debates in the Second Republic

But what about debate participation in the Second Republic? Was it

equally inﬂuenced by neo—patrimonial considerations? The data presented shows that

Members' participation in house debates increased throughout the single-party Second

Republic. For example, Figure 6.1 illustrates that future ministers, especially those

282

appointed in the third and fourth Assemblies were signiﬁcantly more likely to have made

comments during parliamentary debates than were other UNIP MPs.’ Figure 6.2 shows

they were also more likely to ask questions during parliamentary question time, though

this relationship was less obvious than that between comments and ministerial

appointments.

 

’

Recall that data for the period from 1987 through 1990 is unavailable.

283

Figure 6.1 -- Debate Participation by Future Ministers the Second Republic.

Number of Comments Made by New Ministers Versus All MPs in Previous Year

284

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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285

Figure 6.2 -- Debate Participation by Future Ministers the Second Republic

Number of Questions Asked by New Ministers Versus All MPs in Previous Year

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Number of Questions Asked by New Ministers Versus All MPs in Previous Year

287

These ﬁgures show that new ministers in the Second Republic averaged 2

to 3 times the number of comments during the previous year's house debates than did

their back bench counterparts. In 1979, future ministers made more comments than their

back bench colleagues by a whopping factor of ﬁve to one. These ﬁgures also illustrate

that parliamentary question time was more evenly divided among future ministers and

back bench parliamentarians than were normal house debates, except during the fourth

National Assembly as will be discussed below.

Do these ﬁgures accord with the patterns of debate participation observed

earlier? Do neo-patrimonial explanations of political behavior hold true in the

single-party Second Republic as well as they did in the multi-party First Republic? In

this case the answer is mixed. Again, these data do not indicate whether members'

comments supported or criticized government activities. Many of the individuals

appointed as government ministers in the Second Republic were members of President

Kaunda's "inner circle" of supporters. Alex Chikwanda, Mainza Chona, Raj Kunda,

Daniel Lisulo, U.G. Mwila, Namulo Mundia, and others were shifting between UNIP

ofﬁces and different high level government ministries throughout this period. Their

comments, as well as many others, invariably promoted Kaunda's initiatives and would

support a neo-patrimonial explanation of legislators' behavior.

However, the 1980 budget hearings on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

discussed earlier and Hon. Nkoma's comments on the inﬂation of ministerial

appointments cited above show that Second Republic debates were also quite

contentious, especially in the fourth Assembly.6 For example, Figure 6.2 shows that

 

6

Recall that the 1980 Foreign Aﬁ'airs budget debates were the only time during which the Assembly

288

future ministers were not only more likely to have made comments than other back bench

MPs but they were also more likely to have asked questions during parliamentary

question time, especially in the fourth Assembly. Recall that parliamentary question time

affords members their only real opportunity to challenge government ofﬁcials and that

parliamentary question time can be quite contentious and embarrassing for government

ministers. Consequently, an increase in the number of questions asked by new ministers

would not support the traditional patronage hypotheses that these appointments were

given to active political supporters.

An interesting, and counterintuitive hypothesis motivated by this

observation is that MPs are more likely to criticize the government in the context of a

single party political regime to help maintain their political proﬁle. Under these

circumstances criticisms might be a more effective technique to distinguish oneself from

other back bench parliamentarians. Since political competition only takes place within

the party, members would make critical comments or speeches to identify themselves as a

member of a speciﬁc clique within the ruling regime. In response, leaders might

distribute political appointments as "hush money" rather than political patronage.

The Zambian case would seem to support that hypothesis. In the Second

Republic constitutional rules and administrative procedures limited back bench

involvement in legislative affairs and reduced the scope of policy alternatives that the

Assembly debated. Consequently, expressing support for government policies and

programs was unnecessary because they were invariably approved by the full house. The

 

voted to reject a proposed government expenditure.

only way to distinguish one's self from other UNIP back bench MPs was to play a

289

dangerous game of "chicken" with senior government officials by criticizing government

programs and initiatives. Savvy MPs knew when to "swerve" and received a promotion

to the front bench as a result, many others did not.

It is interesting to note that increasingly independent debate participation

occurred in the fourth Assembly, coincident both with the election of businessmen to

parliament and the country's economic crisis. As Baylies and Szeftel (1984) showed,

"The growth of indigenous capital (and) the number of indigenous capitalists was a

function of assistance given this class by the colonial as well as the post-colonial state."

(68) Nonetheless, these businessmen were active critics in house debates, especially of

Kaunda's quasi-socialist economic policy prescriptions, despite their close ties to the

UNIP government.7

Finally, these ﬁgures show that debate participation was not the sole

reason MPs were appointed as government ministers. For example, in 1981, and again in

1985, new ministers made zero comments during previous debates in years when overall

participation rates were quite high. One explanation is that ministerial appointments were

at least nominally based on substantive expertise. For example, the only MP appointed in

1981 was Dr. H.S. Meebelo an educated, articulate UNIP supporter who became the

Minister of Education and Culture. It is also likely that Kaunda's desire to balance tribal

representation in Cabinet inﬂuenced these appointments as well.8

 

7

Baylies and Szeftel (1984) do not estimate the percentage of MPs elected in 1978 who held

business interests but they note that these elections "indicted a continuing process of entry of indigenous

owners into Parliament" that began in 1973. (67)

‘

Tordoff (1974) notes the importance of tribal and ethnic considerations in Zambian politics this

way: "While it must be stressed that there is no evidence that the distribution of development funds

F rgnt Bench Inﬂation and House Debates in the Third Republic

290

The pattern of front bench inﬂation observed in the First and Second

Republics also continued into the ﬁrst four years of the Third Republic. After the 1991

multi-party elections the front bench comprised 57 members of the now 158 member

house (36 percent of the total). As of December 1994, the MMD front bench comprised

62 different members, a 9 percent increase over three years.9 Though signiﬁcant, this

increase did not give the MMD the guaranteed parliamentary majority that UNIP held at

the end of the multi-party ﬁrst and second Assemblies.lo

However, the gradual increase in house size has created a signiﬁcant pool

of ministerial appointments that the president can distribute as patronage resources

without increasing cabinet size as a percentage of the total house. For example, not since

the 1967/68 Assembly was there as many individual government Ministers sitting on the

front bench than there were at the end of the 1994 parliamentary session.

Chiluba's decision to appoint a large front bench after his election is not

surprising since the success of the 1991 transition required the support of individuals who

might not have otherwise come together as a political coalition.ll Many of these coalition

partners expected, and often received, signiﬁcant rewards for participating in the

 

between provinces was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by sectional considerations, for example, the Zambian

political elite has been partly divided along sectional lines." (94) Kaunda was conscious of these sectional

considerations and actively worked to "balance" tribal distribution in most of his governments. (See also

Bates 1976, Bratton 1980, Mulford 1967)

9

Even the Speaker noticed the increase. During house debates on July 14, l994 Mr. Speaker

apologized for giving Deputy Ministers back bench seating assignments, noting that the "number of Deputy

Ministers is now greater than the number of places on the Middle Benches."

'°

Recall that the front bench comprised 61 and 55 percent of the house, respectively, during those

periods.

”

Factional splits within the MMD since their election highlight this point.

291

transition that expelled President Kaunda from ofﬁce. For example, many sitting

members of parliament came into government with very few resources since they had

fallen out of favor with the one-party state. As a reward for their participation several

were given ministerial appointments in exchange for supporting Chiluba's candidacy in

the 1991 elections; a classic neo-patrimonial relationship.

However, observations of house debates in the seventh Assembly indicate

that ministerial appointments since 1991 have not been distributed along traditional

patronage lines. President Chiluba, like President Kaunda, has kept his clique of personal

supporters in key ministerial positions. However, Chiluba has also given several

ministerial posts to outspoken critics within the MMD's back bench, rather than to those

who actively supported government programs or brought with them the support of key

regional or ethnic constituencies in the 1991 elections.

Simultaneously, he has quickly dismissed many critics within his own

cabinet, such as Emmanuel Kasonde, Guy Scott, and Ludwig Sondashi. In fact, by

mid-1995, three and a half years after their election, only 10 of the original 23

Government Ministers were still in Cabinet. This helps conﬁrm the hypothesis put

forward earlier that political patronage is different in the context of weak multipartyism

or single party dominance.

Electoral dominance and the lack of viable opposition political parties

made the maintenance of Chiluba's political coalition aﬁer the 1991 elections

unnecessary. Once he gained control of the political and economic resources the

presidency provides, he had the political leverage to dismiss over 50 percent of his

292

original cabinet without any signiﬁcant cost to himself or his close supporters. To replace

those whom he ﬁred, Chiluba then manipulated the distribution of ministerial posts to

quiet back bench critics and limit embarrassing house debates within the National

Assembly. Moreover, his frequent dismissals of outspoken government ministers clearly

established the ground rules under which these new ministers received their

appointments: criticisms were to be left on the back bench. This is similar to what

President Kaunda did after the inﬂux of businessmen in the fourth Assembly.

I believe this affected the style of members' participation in house debates.

Rather than express support for government programs, back bench MPs learned the

delicate art of criticizing government programs to maintain a high political proﬁle and

secure a ministerial post. The MMD's control over political and economic affairs in the

house was already assured. Consequently, outspoken support of the MMD's political

agenda was unnecessary. Both sitting parliamentarians and the president recognized that

the primary threat to the Chiluba regime came from 'pretenders to the throne' within his

own party rather than outside political coalitions. Consequently Chiluba used ministerial

appointments to minimize back bench criticism and prevent the development of political

challengers from within the legislative branch.

One such appointment came in late 1995. In January, 1995 the motion

ofﬁcially thanking the president for opening the third session of the seventh Assembly

was moved by Hon. Ackim Nkole. Nkole, an MMD back bench MP from Mporokoso in

Zambia's Northern Province, was an active, articulate critic of government activities in

parliamentary debates. For example, in 1994, the year before Nkole's appointment, the

293

average Member of Parliament made only 9 comments and asked only 4 questions during

house sittings. In the same year, Nkole made 61 different comments and asked an

astounding 79 questions during parliamentary question time! His participation was

surpassed only by Rev. Ben Zulu, a long-time UNIP MP from Zambia's Eastern Province.

In mid-1995, in one of the last major cabinet reshufﬂes before the 1996 general elections,

Hon. Nkole was appointed the Deputy Minister of Mines and Mineral Development with

the important responsibility of licensing emerald mining operations on Zambia's

Copperbelt: a prime political appointment given his frequent criticisms of the

government, and one with considerable opportunties for rent-seeking.

Hon. Nkole represented no parliamentary constituency or ethnic group not

already under Chiluba's control, nor did he bring with him the support of an interest

group(s) unrepresented in the MMD government. For example, in the 1991 elections

President Chiluba captured 82.0 percent of all the valid votes cast in Northern Province,

the third highest total among Zambia's nine different regions. (Chanda 1993)

Consequently, President Chiluba did not need Nkole's support to promote himself as the

legitimate leader of the party or state. His goal was to limit further articulate criticisms of

government programs. Nkole represented a political threat within a multi-party National

Assembly that President Chiluba could not afford to live with. In exchange, Nkole

became a model Deputy Minister.

The same was true with other ministers appointed mid-way through the

seventh Assembly, such as Eric Silwamba, the Deputy Minister in the Office of the

President and Newton Ng'uni, the Deputy Minister of Education. Recall that Hon. Ng'uni

was the only back bench MP who ever attempted to introduce his own legislative

294

proposal on the house ﬂoor. Though his motion failed, it embarrassed the government

and forced them to include a "constituency development fund" as a line item in their next

budget. Though politically popular, this fund removed executive branch control over a

large pool of constituency development resources and placed them in the hands of local

political leaders, an act that won Hon. Ng'uni few friends within the Presidency.

Formal rules and administrative procedures can explain certain aspects of

parliamentary performance across Zambia's three Republics. However, these

explanations cannot adequately account for the patterns of members' participation in

house debates observed during the same period. Political patronage, the exchange of

political loyalties for preferential access to economic resources, provides many of the

missing answers.

Zambian presidents are in a powerful position to nominate sitting

parliamentarians as government ministers. These ministerial appointments provide MP3

with personal economic resources, such as cars, houses, and travel allowances they would

not otherwise have as a Member of Parliament. In addition, they provide MP8 with an

opportunity to further their political careers, possibly inﬂuence the course of government

policy in Cabinet, and direct resources to their home districts. In exchange for these

opportunities, members relinquish their right to criticize government programs.

Moreover, the doctrine of collective responsibility provides critics with justiﬁcation for

their sudden support of the same programs they once admonished.

295

To compete for these government ministries, Zambian MPs have used

parliamentary debates as an opportunity to capture the attention of government leaders

and help secure their promotion to the front bench. In the First Republic members

actively supported government programs during house debates and their appointment as

ministers helped ensure President Kaunda's dominance over a controversial legislative

agenda. In the Second Republic President Kaunda used ministerial appointments as a

reward for supporters of his political agenda. In response, members' participation in

house debates increased dramatically as they worked to capture the attention of senior

party leaders. However, Kaunda also used his broad appointment powers to deﬂect

criticisms of his political agenda in the context of increasingly harsh parliamentary

debates. In this case the president used his appointments as political bribes, rather than

political patronage.

This has also been true in the multi-party Third Republic. After President

Chiluba's 1991 election many ministerial appointments were given as patronage rewards

to individuals who helped him defeat President Kaunda. After these ministers were

weeded from the Cabinet, Chiluba used his authority to grant new ministerial

appointments to silence back bench critics within his own political party. Traditional

patronage appointments to political supporters were unnecessary because the political

opposition were weak and disorganized. President Chiluba needed to ensure his personal

dominance over internal party affairs rather than deﬂect external challenges to his

authority and used ministerial appointments to accomplish this task.

296

Political patronage in Zambia is not limited to presidents and

parliamentarians. Patronage mechanisms can work upwards, from legislators to their

political patrons, as this chapter has shown. However, patronage also works downwards,

from legislators to political clients in their constituencies. The following section explores

this issue in greater detail.

From Patronage to Pork: Corruption & Constituency Relations in the 7th Assembly

The survey of seventh Assembly MPs presented earlier indicated that most

members are keenly aware of their constituents' demands and the popular expectation that

they be seen as someone who can "deliver the goods." The following section examines

these issues and the inﬂuence neo-patrimonial politics have had on legislator-

constituency relationships in the Third Republic. It shows that legislators' continue to use

their access to economic resources, often relying on personal funds, to secure political

support in their constituencies. However, legislators are "sophisticated" in that they

stragetically distribute economic development resources for large-scale community

projects (i.e., "pork") rather than individualized gifts to speciﬁc consituents.

The 1991 re-introduction of competitive elections in Zambia has

reinvigorated legislator-constituency relations when compared to those that existed in the

one-party state. In the one-party regime, UNIP ofﬁcials replaced elected parliamentarians

as the primary link between constituents and the central government. Though MPs were

elected through direct, "popular" elections in the Second Republic, party politics and

administrative rules weakened the relationships between elected Members of Parliament

297

and their constituents. "MPs were bound to their constituents only by the most tenuous

links (and) the Assembly's role as a forum for the articulation of constituency interests is

(reduced) by the existence of alternative sources of redress for the voting public."

(Tordoff 1974, 212 & 214) In the one party regime, for example, erstwhile MPs could

secure their place on a parliamentary ballot by winning the support of key UNIP ofﬁcials

rather than by winning the support of constituency level voters.12

However, the weakening of screening procedures for parliamentary

candidates and legalization of political opposition has meant that politicians can no

longer secure political support solely by developing ties with political party elite.

Would-be legislators must now build ties between themselves and a broader range of

"median voters" to ensure electoral success.l3 (Downs, 1959) "Unlike the immediate

post independence days contenders (now) have to win the support of the electorate to

qualify for political jobs." (Editorial in the Daily Mail, February 9, 1995)

How can politicians rally the support of constituents? The answer is

economic development. "Zambia's economy suffers from severe and long-standing

distortions that will require a major structural adjustment effort over an extended period if

they are to be overcome." (World Bank, 1994, 190) Recent ﬁgures show that average

Zambians' life expectancy, per capita GNP, and education levels are all lower than

 

l2

showed.

Though this did not always translate into electoral success, as Bratton (1980) and Cromwell (1995)

‘3

Without doubt, Zambian voters are more likely to be wealthier, better educated, more urbanized

and more political astute than non-voters. However, both a 1993 and 1996 survey of Zambians' political

attitudes and participation conﬁrmed "that the 1991 general election marked the remobilization of many

Zambians into national politics for the ﬁrst time since independence." (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1993.

See also Alderfer, Bratton, and Temba, 1997)

 

298

citizens' in similar countries. (World Bank, 1996, 380) Simultaneously, the privatization

of formerly state-owned companies and social consequences of Zambia's economic

"structural adjustment program" dominate the news headlines.

In this environment, buying support through patronage mechanisms would

be a tempting way to help ensure one's political status. For example, an article in the

state-owned newspaper highlighted the extent to which mercenary tactics had been used

in parliamentary by-elections and decried most parliamentary candidates as "the

unemployed and the bounty hunters" whose efforts to purchase elections had "let down

the state of Zambian politics...Politics of conviction hardly exist, (only) the politics of

bread motivate party leaders." ("Politics of Bread Motivate Cadres." Times ofZambia,

July 30, 1995)

One problem is that "electoral patronage" is a principle-agent interaction

and contains the difficulties inherent in similar relationships, namely, "How to ensure that

one's (agents) do their job."” (Ostrom 1990, 17) Though patronage may appear to offer

the chance to enhance one's political status, attempting to buy votes in a multi-party

electoral system is an expensive and altogether uncertain proposition. Political

candidates cannot guarantee that any particular elector will vote on election day, nor can

they guarantee that that particular voter will vote the "right" way. Personal moods, ethnic

 

”

The principle-agent model has been used exhaustively to explain how, and why, principles

(Supervisors, government agencies, politicians) get their agents (employees, monitors, bureaucrats) to do

What they want. Two problems are inherent in principle-agent interactions. The ﬁrst is "adverse selection,"

the second is "moral hazard." Adverse selection describes the difficulty principles have in choosing agents

Who might on their behalf. Moral hazard describes the problems principles face in getting agents to do what

they are supposed to. (Kreps 1990, Rasmussen 1990)

loyalties, or real policy preferences might inﬂuence voters' decision when faced with the

299

chance to cast a ballot.”

How can these two competing factors be reconciled? How can

parliamentarians overcome the principle-agent problems that would attend the use of

patronage to buy political support? One way is to provide community-based development

resources, such as water wells, roads, bridges, and school equipment rather than

individual patrimony, such as government licenses, permits, jobs, or contracts.

The following sections present evidence to assess this proposition using

data collected from the survey of seventh Assembly parliamentarians to illustrate their

dependence on government resources and government contracts for their own economic

well being. It will show that parliamentarians in Zambia's Third Republic are focused on

providing diffuse political "pork," rather that individual political patronage.

Unfortunately, those pressures, and Zambia's severe economic decline, have encouraged

corruption and the abuse of political ofﬁce by many of those officials.

Members' Wealth and Personal Experiences with Patronage

The survey of seventh Assembly parliamentarians presented in Chapter

Three showed that Members rank constituency service as a high priority and that they see

 

"

An example of these concerns came from Arthur Wina, a longtime Zambian politician and, later,

leader of the opposition National Party who said: "I tell voters if they (the ruling MMD) offer you money,

take it! If they offer you mealie-meal (the staple food), take it...but remember to vote for the NP!"

(Personal interview)

It should also be noted that principle-agent problems exist in the behavior of legislators as well.

"It is widely observed that one cannot explain the voting behavior of legislators...The agent's (legislator's)

own utility functionuhis or here own sense of the way the world ought to be--appears to play a role in the

outcomes" in which he or she participates. (North 1990, 21)

300

themselves as an important link between national government institutions and their local

constituencies. Though most MPs do not believe the National Assembly should be

responsible to distribute economic development resources, they believe their constituents

expect them to provide those resources and are frustrated by their inabilityto do so.

Members were also asked a series of questions designed to assess whether they used

patronage resources to overcome these problems.

First, members were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement:

"My constituents expect me to use personal resources or make personal donations for

community development projects and/or social programs." The question was phrased this

way to solicit responses from both Ministers and non-Ministers who would not have

access to the government resources provided by an appointment to the front bench. The

goal was to separate upward patronage mechanisms from the relationships members had

with their constituents. Table 6.1, below, shows their responses.

Table 6.1 -- "My constituents expect me to use personal resources for community

development projects. "

 

Number of Valid

Percent

Responses

 

Strongly Disagree

5

10.4

 

Disagree

2

4.2

 

Agree

15

31.3

 

Strongly Agree

24

50

 

 

Can't Say

 
  

2

48

Total

 

 

4.2

100

301

Column two of table 6.1 shows that the vast majority of respondents, 39 of

48 (81 percent), "agreed" or "strongly agreed" with this statement. In Zambia

parliamentarians feel they are under signiﬁcant pressure to provide development goods

demanded by their constituents. In the words of a back bench MMD MP from Western

Province, "They expect me to pay for everything. They expect me not to say no!"

(Personal interview. Survey no. 112)

As important as members' perceptions, however, is whether they made

these contributions. Two additional items address this question. Respondents were asked

if they had used their own money for constituency development programs and, if they

said "yes," were asked to identify how much they had spent on these programs in the last

year. The results are presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.

Table 6.2 -- "Have you used your own money for constituency development projects?"

 

Number of Valid

Percent

Responses

 

No

l 5

32.6

 

Yes

3 1

67.4

 

46

100

 

 

 

Total

 

 

302

Table 6.3 -- "If Yes (to 6.2), how much did you spend?" ('000 Kwacha)

 

Number of Valid

Percent

Responses

 

Less than 500

8

25.8

 

Between 500 and 1000

9

29.1

 

Between 1000 and 5000

6

19.4

 

More than 5000

7

22.6

 

 

Can't say

 
  

1

3 1

Total

 

 

3.2

100

As these tables show, most members did use personal resources on

community development projects, and oﬁen spent signiﬁcant a portion of their income on

their constituents. According to the survey, two-thirds of the members interviewed here

(31 of 46, 67 percent) contributed personal ﬁnancial resources to community

development projects in the previous year. When asked this question one government

minister said "your constituents won't forgive you if you don't." (Personal interview.

Return no. 115)

Not only did MPs claim to have made these contributions, but they often

made contributions of signiﬁcant value. Approximately one-half of the respondents

claimed to have made contributions totaling less than 1 million Kwacha in the previous

year which is approximately equivalent to $1,000 at 1995 exchange rates. The mean

contribution was approximately 4.2 million Kwacha and the median contribution totaled

520,000 Kwacha ($520). Six other members said they made contributions totaling

between 1 million and 5 million Kwacha in the last year and 7 members said they made

contributions of more than 5 million Kwacha ($5,000). Finally, one respondent estimated

303

that his contributions totaled "somewhere between 40 and 50 million Kwacha," or

$40,000-50,000! (Personal interview. Return no. 103)

According to biographic information collected in the survey most

parliamentarians earn outside incomes beyond their annual 4.4 million Kwacha

parliamentary salary. This additional income is often farming or trading revenue, though

members represent over one dozen different professions. As reported by MPs these

outside salaries averaged between 200,000 and 250,000 Kwacha per month,

approximately $200 to $250. In addition, 90 percent of the respondents were married and

their spouses contributed an additional 60,000 Kwacha in average monthly income.

Therefore, these ﬁgures indicate that the median MP contributed nearly one month of

their family's total annual income to these community development programs! This is a

clear and signiﬁcant sign of the importance members' place on providing personal

resources to their constituencies.

How were these moneys spent? Did they use these resources for

community projects as hypothesized, or for more personalized patronage? Over

two-thirds of the MPs surveyed here said they contributed development funds to buy

construction supplies, such as concrete or rooﬁng sheets to refurbish community schools

and/or local health clinics."5 Another common form of donation was to use personal

money to buy sports equipment for community schools. When I asked one MMD MP

from North-Western Province he immediately stopped the interview, not to protest the

 

'6

Twenty-four of the 31 respondents who said they made personal contributions identiﬁed

community-based projects as the recipient(s) of their gifts. The others identiﬁed more speciﬁc, localized

projects or refused to answer.

304

line of inquiry, but to show a small, detailed diary he kept for recording the exact dates,

times, and values of soccer balls he had donated to commmrity schools in his district. He

said: "I have (approximately) 30 schools in my constituency and I have to remember to

give a football to each one before I leave ofﬁce." (Personal interview. Survey no. 117)

Respondents' comments were often corroborated by newspaper reports of

members' constituency tours. For example, a Copperbelt Province MMD

parliamentarian, Rev. Stan Kristafor, was on the front page of the national newspaper

three times in a six month period for donating "blocks and rooﬁng materials" to construct

a community preschool, "10 sewing machines and a hammer mill totaling 5 million

Kwacha" to a peri-urban community center, and a "20,000 Kwacha check" to support the

activities of "community arts agencies." (Times ofZambia, July 2, 1994; October 11,

1994; and December 27, 1994)

Another MP, Minister of Defense Ben Mwila, was reported to have "spent

more than 10 million Kwacha" to grade roads, "donated 60 footballs worth thousands of

Kwacha to all the schools and clubs in his constituency," and given "more than 100,000

to women's clubs and a community center for the blin " in one whirlwind tour of his

constituency. (Daily Mail, July 19, 1994)

Some members did say they made smaller, speciﬁc donations of salaula

(used clothes) or chitenge (fabric) to women's clubs or "provided transport" to villagers

walking to town. The majority, however, used their personal resources for high proﬁle

public projects. These results help conﬁrm the proposition that members would use

political patronage to maintain their political status, but that the nature of patronage

305

between legislators and their constituents in the context of multi-party elections would

center on the provision of diffuse, community support rather than particularized support

to given individuals. An analysis of constituency gifts and success in the 1996 elections

would determine whether this was a successful strategy, but that it is beyond the scope of

this study.

Zambian parliamentarians, like all democratically elected legislators,

recognize that their political success depends on gaining the electoral support of their

local constituents. For many MPs, the best way to develop that support is to provide the

goods and services their constituents need for economic development. In addition,

parliamentarians must be seen as someone "in touch" with their constituents. MPs were

widely criticized in the First and Second Republics for spending too much time in the

capital and not understanding the problems of their home districts. (Tordoff 1974)

Third Republic parliamentarians was sensitive to these critiques and

making personal contributions to development projects accomplishes both of these goals.

However, to maximize the political gain from these patronage giﬁs and overcome

principle-agent problems in competitive electoral systems politicians must provide

resources that beneﬁt large numbers of potential voters.

Where did these resources come from? Might constitutents' expectations

increase the likelihood that MPs would abuse their position as a political leaders to secure

access to government resources, both for themselves, and to distribute to their

constituents? This ﬁnal section examines these questions and explores how these

pressures may have increased the likelihood of political corruption in Zambia.

Zambian MPs Attitudes Towards Corruption and Personal Use of Government Resources

306

Corruption is a notoriously difficult concept to deﬁne. Some oft-cited

efforts have described it as an act taken by public officials that go against the public

interest (Friederich, 1966), public opinion (Senturia 1931, Heidenheimer 1978) or

otherwise "involves an exchange of political action for economic wealth...that deviates

from accepted norms." (Huntington 1968, 59 & 66)

However, these deﬁnitions were fraught with difficulties, as has been

repeatedly argued. Efforts to deﬁne the "public interest" or "public opinions," for

example, were as unstasiﬁying as attempts at deﬁning corruption its self: which "public,"

whose "opinion," and what "norm?" The problem is that most deﬁnitions of corruption

"depend upon the existence of a public domain that is reasonably separate from the

private one." (Theobold 1990, 2)

Nonetheless, this study assumed that a reasonable distinction could be

made between public and private goals and relied on LeVine's (1975) deﬁnition of

corruption as "the unsactioned, unscheduled use of public political resources and/or goods

for private, that is nonpublic ends." (2) Parliamentarians may have used resources

gained from corruption for "public" purposes, such as providing community-based

political patronage to their constituents, however their primary motivation was to ensure

their own personal political status, a clearly "private" goal.

Two survey questions were written to capture members' attitudes towards

politics and corruption in Zambia. First, members were asked if they agreed or disagreed

with the following statement: "Most government officials and politicians are mainly

307

concerned with enriching themselves."

Table 6.4 -- "Most government officials and politicians are mainly concerned with

enriching themselves"

 

Number of Valid

Percent

Responses

 

Strongly Disagree

10

20.4

 

Disagree

21

42.9

 

Agree

7

14.3

 

Strongly Agree

22.4

 

 

 

Total

 

11

49

 

 

Column two shows that well over half the respondents, 31 of 49 (63

percent) either "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed" with this statement. The other 18 (37

percent) "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that most government officials were mainly

concerned with enriching themselves.

While it is not surprising that most members would defend themselves and

their colleagues from allegations of corruption, it is interesting to note the signiﬁcant

difference between members' attitudes and the perceptions of their constituents. As

Bratton and Liatto-Katundu said, "we note the presence of deep cynicism in the Zambian

populace about the motivations of political leaders, with almost three out of four

respondents (72.5 percent, 48.9 percent "strongly") supporting the notion that 'most

government officials and politicians are mainly concerned with enriching themselves'

308

(24.4 percent opposed)" (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994, 6) Even if members believe

that most politicians are honest, it is clear that the electorate does not share that view.‘7

Next, members were asked to compare their perceptions about corruption

in the current government to that which took place in the one-party state. Members were

asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement; "Corruption was a worse

problem under the old UNIP government than it is these days.

 

'7

Nor do most members of the he press. Corruption allegations are a continual part of Zambian

newspapers‘ political commentaries. For example, an article in the independent Sun newspaper entitled "If

You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them" said: "Defections from the ruling (MMD) party are no uncommon but

equally common are politicians going back to the party after a few months of falling into oblivion.

Undoubtedly the drivingforce behind these rejoinings is economic beneﬁt. Leaving the party is costly to

businessmen cum politicians who depend on business ﬁom the state." (Sun, May 22-28, 1995, l 1, my

emphasis)

"

Corruption was a popular subject of discussion during National Assembly debates in the UNIP

regime, as the following passage shows. During the February 22, 1983 budget debate on funding the

Anti-Corruption Commission, Ludwig Sondashi, then Minister of State for Labor and Social Security (and

later Minister of Legal Affairs in the MD government) made the following argument:

"...We are very much aware, as a Government, of what its happening in certain countries,

which I cannot name, where corruption has been left unattended to. We cannot allow this

situation to continue in this country. Sir, having said that, my only worry is that when we

talk about corrupt practices, I think it is important that we distinguish a corrupt practice

from noncompliance with the Leadership Code and from other offenses under the criminal

law...For instance, reference was made here to issues like bringing in wine. Ifsomeone

brings is wine without an import license, but he does it nicely, through business channels,

that is not corruption."

(Hon. Chiwaya, interjecting: "Yes! That is corruption!")

"No, sir, it is not. It is an infringement, sir, of the foreign exchange regulations. It is not

corruption at all. So what I am saying is that we must distinguish between these because

there is a difference between a corrupt practice and what is not a corrupt practice."

(Hansard, Volume 62, 1776-77, my emphasis)

309

Table 6.5 -- "Corruption was a worse problem under the old UNIP government

than it is these days"

 

Number of Valid

Percent

Responses

 

Strongly Disagree

8

16.3

 

Disagree

10

20.4

 

Agree

1 1

22.4

 

Strongly Agree

12

24.5

 

 

Can't Say

 
  

Total

16.3

 

8

49

 

Of the 49 Members who responded to this question, 23 (47 percent) said

they "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that corruption was a worse problem under the old

UNIP government. However, another 19 disagreed that corruption was worse in the old

government, eight "strongly." Not surprisingly, these responses were highly correlated to

the party to which the respondent belonged, with members from each party defending the

voracity of their own government.19 The eight members who "couldn't say," often

commented that the primary difference was not the amount of corruption, but that you

now hear about it more than you did previously. "Its a thing everyone now talks about,

but no real information is given."20

Despite members' propensity to defend their respective party's

governments, it is interesting to note that ten of the 41 respondents from the ruling MMD

 

'9

Pearson's chi-square test was used to test the strength of correlation between members' responses

and the party to which they belonged. The score, 46.18 (10 d.f.) was signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.

2°

Personal interview. MMD back bench Member from Copperbelt Province. Survey no. 105

310

(24 percent) disagreed with the statement that corruption was worse under UNIP, three

"strongly". However, none of the UNIP respondents agreed that corruption was worse

before. The reintroduction of multipartyism may or may not have inﬂuenced members'

incentives to engage in corrupt behavior. However, most MPs seem to share the attitude

of an MMD back bench MP who said "there was corruption before, and there is

corruption, now. Not much has changed."21

It is difﬁcult to know whether the new regime is more corrupt that the one

it replaced. One certainty, however, is that the MMD government has been stung by

several high-proﬁle allegations of corruption. For example, after only a few months in

ofﬁce, the Parliamentary Committee on Parastatal Bodies held a series of hearings to

ascertain whether the Ministry of Works and Supply had illegally bought ﬁrrniture and

materials from South Africa to refurbish the President's home and offices at State House.

In their report they said that "the purchases of furniture, cutlery, etc. for State House

without following Tender Board Procedures were improper and irregular and the transfers

of monies...were highly questionable

Where investigations will reveal irregularities,

penalties as stipulated by the Zambia National Tender Board Regulations regarding

ﬂouting of tender procedures should be effected on erring officials (namely, the Minister)

regardless of their standing in society." (GRZ, Special Report, 5) This report was

quashed by government before it was formally introduced to the National Assembly and,

thus, never ofﬁcially made public. (See also Cromwell 1995)

 

2'

Personal interview. Survey no. 119. Zambians surveyed were also quite evenly divided on

whether corruption was worse under the old UNIP government, with 43.5 percent supporting this statement,

and 49.7 percent opposing it, and 6.7 percent of Zambians were undecided. "Nevertheless, incumbent

leaders cannot take comfort from this ﬁnding since it indicates that fully have the respondents think the new

regime is more corrupt than the one it replaced." (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1994, 6)

311

Despite the new government's unwillingness to discuss these charges,

allegations that members used their political offices for personal economic beneﬁt

continued. In an attempt to abate these accusations, the Government introduced a bill

designed to "promote transparency and accountability in the activities of leaders."

(Hansards, August 24, 1994, 299) The Parliamentary and Ministerial Code of Conduct

Bill (1994) required MPs who had, or planned to have, business dealings with

government to publicly declare the companies in which they held a ﬁnancial interest and

their intent to engage in ﬁnancial transactions. Unlike previous "leadership codes,"

members were not barred from having outside business dealings with government, nor

were provisions introduced to limit the amount, timing, or conduct of these arrangements.

Members were required to state their intention to do so.

The four examples presented below were taken from some of the

declarations ﬁled with the Zambian Supreme Court. In no way do these reports identify

MPs who engage in corrupt behavior. They highlight the close relationships between

election ofﬁcials and government agencies, and the dependence many government

ofﬁcials have on government contracts.

Example One: Dr. Guy Scott, President of Mano Consultancy

Services, an agricultural consulting ﬁrm, declared four (4) on-going

consulting contracts with government agencies, including two with his

former Ministry, Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries. Dr. Scott was no

longer serving as Minister when he made these declarations and

remained an outspoken back bench member of the ruling party.

312

Example Two: Rev. Dan Pule, Deputy Minister of Finance, declared

his interest in a contract to store over 500 tons of agricultural fertilizer

for the Government at a rural location under the auspices of his

Bangwela Development Company Ltd. This contract was a joint effort

of the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Commission for

Development Planning, and would have gone into effect while he was

still in office. Whether the contract was completed is unknown.

Example Three: Ben Mwila, Minister of Defense, declared his intent

to buy the largest government owned producer of consumer oils in the

country, Regional Oil Products (ROP) Ltd. which was being sold as

part of the government's on-going privatization program.22 Hon.

Mwila, the wealthiest Member of Parliament with over 5.8 billion

Kwacha in net worth, declared no current government contracts

between any of the 30+ companies he owns and the Government, but

conﬁrmed that he was "to be regarded as interested in any contract

which may be made, after the date of this declaration, with the GRZ by

the above mentioned body corporate or ﬁrm."

Example Four: Ronald Penza, Minister of Finance, declared that only

one of the 19 different businesses he owned, RDS Business Machines,

had contracts with the government. However, he listed 23 separate

government departments and agencies to which RDS Business

Machines sold photocopiers, computers, and technical supplies. These

contracts included all primary government ministries, including the

Ministry of Finance, as well as the Central Bank of Zambia. In his

statement he declared to have earned only an 3.9 million Kwacha

(approximately $3900) in income from these businesses in the 12

months before the completion of his declaration.

Again, these examples should not imply that these Members violated the

law. In fact, these ofﬁcials should be given credit for declaring their ﬁnancial assets and

interest in government contracts as requested in the government's code of conduct.

However, their reports highlight the degree to which individual members' personal

ﬁnancial status is often intimately linked to the central government. Moreover, while

 

’2

Walker (1996) does an excellent job of discussing how government privatization programs often

become avenues for rent-seeking by existing government officials.

313

these four leaders may have assiduously completed their declarations of assets, the

handwritten notes, scribbled declaration statements, and homemade lists of assets and

liabilities collected by the Court are signs that others, clearly, did not.

Despite recent reforms aimed at liberalizing Zambia's business

community, the government remains a key economic actor. As a result, economic

entrepreneurs have incentives to develop strong relationships with government agencies.

In addition, constituents' demands and the development of diffuse, community-based

patronage networks will pressure even non-entreprenurial MPs to develop their own

sources of economic wealth. Government connections can provide them an opportunity

to do so.

Conclusion

In traditional patrimonial relationships political patrons exchange their

access to economic resources for the political support of their clients. This understanding

has been frequently used to describe the nature of politics in Aﬁica. It has been argued

that the most important aspect of African politics is the incorporation of these traditional

patrimonial relationships into the post-colonial African state. In these relationships

political leaders exchange control over government jobs and contracts for the support of

political constituencies. This chapter has shown how Zambian legislators' behavior has

been affected by these neo-patrimonial relationships, and has offered a revision to the

traditional understanding of political patronage.

314

In the First Republic President Kaunda bought the support of the National

Assembly to initiate his legislative agenda, including the abolition of political opposition.

Members willingly offered their support in exchange for an appointment to the

government front bench and used house debates to convince party leaders of their

sincerity.

In the Second Republic house debates were also affected by

neo—patrimonial relationships, but not of the traditional type. Rather than exchange

government resources for expressed political support, President Kaunda used his

appointment powers to silence increasingly vocal back bench critics. "Hush money,"

rather than political patronage was often the order of the day.

After his 1991 election, President Chiluba returned to more typical

neo-patrimonial practices and appointed government ministers to reward those who had

supported his political challenge to President Kaunda. Slowly, however, these supporters

were removed from his cabinet and replaced with other, younger back bench MPs who

represented an internal challenge to Chiluba's control of the MMD. Again, economic

resources were used to buy political support from outspoken critics within the ruling

party -

Patronage also helps explain legislator-constituency relations, especially in

the Third Republic. The 1991 democratic transition took place in the context of severe

economic underdevelopment. When combined with MPs' former role as gatekeepers of

government projects in the UNIP era, this put severe pressures on MPs to provide scarce

315

development resources to their constituents. In this environment patronage mechanisms

were a powerful way for politicians to help maintain their political status.

However, legislators in multi-party political systems know that providing

speciﬁc beneﬁts to targeted political clients is not an effective technique to ensure

political support. Political patronage in a competitive, multi-party political system is a

principle-agent problem, in which the principle (politician) cannot be sure that their

client, the voter, will vote for them on election day. As a result, many Zambian Members

of Parliament have used signiﬁcant sums of personal resources on general,

community-based, development projects.

Given constituents' expectations, and the limited availability of

government development funds, it was also hypothesized that members would use their

political positions for personal ﬁnancial gain. The data presented here cannot alone

support the corruption allegations leveled at many elected officials. However, it did

highlight the degree to which many high-ranking parliamentarians beneﬁtted from

government contracts while holding elected ofﬁce.

Analysis of the 1996 parliamentary elections can conﬁrm whether officials

who exchanged their own resources for community development activities received any

political beneﬁts from their actions. However, only in the long term will we be able to

determine if these neo-patrimonial relationships have harmed the consolidation of

Zambia's democratic transition.

Chapter Seven:

Whither Legislatures? The Zambian National Assembly

in Cross-National Perspective

Aﬁica's third wave of democratization is now well into its

second half-decade. However uneven its progress,

democracy now sets the terms of political discourse in

Africa....Yet the euphoria that accompanied the arrival of

the third wave in Africa has long since evaporated; even the

most optimistic advocates of democratization would join

Larry Diamond in cautioning that democratization is bound

to gradual, messy, ﬁtful, and slow, with many

imperfections along the way.

Crawford Young 1996, 60

Earlier comparisons showed how Zambian National Assembly

performance changed over time. This chapter puts recent Zambian parliamentary

behavior in another context. It compares legislative development in Zambia to that of

other sub-Saharan Aﬁican nations that underwent similar democratic transitions in the

late 1980's and early 1990's. The primary question addressed in this chapter is whether

Zambian legislative development followed a pattern common to other democratizing

nations or is one variant in a more diverse set of outcomes. If, following democratic

transitions, legislative development is a variable outcome, where might the Zambian case

be situated in relations to other African countries? And how might the variance is

legislative development be explained?

316

317

This chapter compares legislative performance in Zambia's seventh

National Assembly, elected in October, 1991, to that of 16 other sub-Saharan countries

that possessed or installed a democratic political regime between November, 1989 and

October, 1994. This period corresponds to the years during which the seventh Zambian

Assembly was in session and for which previously discussed indicators of legislative

performance were available.

The other nations discussed here were selected from a seminal study of

political transitions in sub-Saharan Africa by Bratton and van de Walle (1997). In their

book Bratton and van de Walle compared political regime changes in 42 different

sub-Saharan African countries and identiﬁed four types of transitions based on whether

the nation had undertaken political liberalization and ~held free, fair, popular elections for

national political ofﬁce. (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, 9)

These four types are: precluded transitions, blocked transitions, ﬂawed

transitions and democratic transitions. Transitions were precluded in those countries

where "political conditions were not conducive to the construction of any kind of

functioning form of governance." (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, 18). Where political

reforms were "launched but never fully realized" political transitions were said to have

been blocked. These countries initiated political reforms, but never held democratic

elections. (Ibid.) Flawed transitions occurred in countries where political reforms were

initiated and popular elections were held, but where the elections were unfair or

imperfect. (Ibid.) These electoral imperfections often resulted from incumbent rulers

manipulating the democratization process to suit their own political purposes. Finally,

318

nations that initiated political reforms and held free, fair, popular elections were said to

have undergone a democratic transition. (19) Bratton and van de Walle identiﬁed 16

nations, of the 42 they studied, that met the conditions of a democratic transition during

this period. When this group is combined with the ﬁve "preexisting multi-party regimes,

some 45 percent of African countries can be said to have obtained the minimum

conditions for democracy by the end of 1994." These nations are listed in Table 7.0.

Table 7.0 -- Multi-party Political Regimes, November 1989 to December 1994

 

Existing

New Democracies

Multi-party Regimes

 

Botswana

Benin

Gambia

Senegal

Central Aﬁican

Republic

Zimbabwe

Congo

---

Guinea-Bissau

Mauritius

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mozambique

Namibia

Niger

South Africa

Zambia

  
 

Cape Verde

Lesotho

 

Sao Tome

Seychelles

For the purposes of creating a more valid sample against which the

Zambian case is compared the four island nations of Cape Verde, Sao Tome, Seychelles,

and Mauritius are excluded from this comparison. These nations are listed at the end of

319

each respective column in Table 7.0. Also excluded is the constitutional, hereditary

monarchy of Lesotho. These nations' socio-economic status, insular political regimes,

dependence on larger countries and distinctive political histories preclude them from the

more general comparison of legislative development discussed here.

As Table 7.0 shows, the democratization movement spread across the

length and breadth of sub-Saharan Africa and provides a rich laboratory of diverse cases

against which Zambia's experiences can be compared. South Aﬁica was perhaps the

most well-known transition that occurred during this period.l However, other important

changes also took place in Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Niger in francophone west

Africa, as well as the Congo and CAR in Africa's central plateau. Each are discussed in

turn.

General Trends in Legislative Development

Analysis of post-transition political behavior in these 17 new democracies

shows that they can be categorized into three groups based on the performance and

independence of their respective national legislatures. In some countries, such as Benin

and Niger, national legislatures became the locus for outspoken critiques of executive

authority after a democratic election, sometimes even passing votes of no conﬁdence in

the elected regime. These are described as independent national assemblies. Other

legislatures, such as Zambia's, experienced both advances and setbacks after their

 

'

Though interesting, the South African case is also somewhat problematic because the "transitional

government" elected in April, 1994 was established as an interim regime until the next round of free

elections are held. Consequently South African experiences will not play a predominant role in this chapter.

320

election. These comprise the majority of the regimes examined here and are described as

mixed assembliesz. In these countries national legislatures have been able to challenge

executive actions, though not consistently. House debates are sometimes vibrant and

critical of government, but these legislatures are unable to enact signiﬁcant changes to

government policies or programs. Opposition party weakness, factional disputes within

the ruling party, and limited constitutional authority are often a primary cause of these

assemblies' inability to exercise a more independent role in the political process. Finally,

in Gambia, the legislature was disbanded by military leaders unwilling to see the

democratization process continue. This is referred to as a subordinated assembly.

Chapters Two and Three measured Zambian legislative behavior along

both institutional and individual dimensions, illustrating how legislative performance

varied in a "mixed" assembly. For example, while parliament gained the authority to

debate proposed military expenditures as part of the 1991 constitution, they are unable to

inﬂuence overall government spending levels.

A simpler metric is put forward in this chapter, mainly because the wealth

of primary data that I collected on Zambian legislative performance is not available for

other countries. The data on Zambian parliamentary performance was the result of 18

months of in-country research and was often developed from sources unavailable outside

Zambia. In this chapter, performance is only measured at the institutional level and

describes the legislature's ability to act as an independent counterweight to executive

branch action's by issuing legislation, exposing executive abuses, and holding national

 

2

In some of these countries, such as Zimbabwe, de-facto one-party regimes remained in power,

augmented by the legitimacy of having participated in popular national elections.

321

governments accountable through public debate.3 How these activities helped the

consolidation of fragile democracies is discussed more fully in Chapter Eight.

Table 7.1 compares legislative performance in all 17 new national

legislatures according to this simpliﬁed criteria: namely, their ability to act as

independent counterweights to the executive branch.

Table 7.1 -- Comparison of Legislative Performance after Democratic Transitions

in Africa

 

Independent Assemblies

Mixed Assemblies

Subordinated

 

Benin

Guinea-Bissau

Gambia1

Assemblies

Central African Republic

Malawi

Congo

Mali

Madagascar

Mozambique

Niger

Namibia

 

South Aﬁica

Zambia

 

Botswana

Senegall

Zimbabwel

 

 

 

'

Had a multi-party political system prior to 1994.

Column one shows that ﬁve national legislatures were able to achieve

signiﬁcant independence after their respective democratic transitions. These nations were

Benin, Central African Republic, Congo, Madagascar, and Niger.

Benin's transition began, like many in francophone Africa, with a "national

reconciliation conference" that was precipitated by popular protests aimed at the

 

3

Much of the data used in this comparison came from a systematic search of Africa South of the

Sahara, a document of record from Europa Publications, London. Additional oft-used secondary sources

included Africa Conﬁdential and Africa Report, in addition to academic journal articles on more speciﬁc

issues.

322

entrenched national president, Mathieu Kerekou. Once this conference was convened

the delegates quickly took charge of the national political agenda, to the chagrin of ruling

officials. "The nine-day proceedings of the national conference turned into a devastating

personal indictment of Kerekou and his cronies for mismanaging the economy and

pillaging the public treasury." (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, 1)

Though President Kerekou tried to retain control of the conference

proceedings, "the evidence suggests that politicized groups (outside the ruling regime)

were able to prepare for the national conference and ensure its outcome." (Heilbrunn,

1993, 298) One issue with which the conference participants were concerned was

creating a clear separation of executive and legislative authority. "The political class (in

Benin) was wary of presidential initiatives and keen to assert the power of a revitalized

legislature." (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, 2)

The affect of this decision was that the Assemblee Nationale became a

source of vibrant debate and often led challenges against the president's legislative

proposals in the years following the transition. For example, "during the early part of

1992 deputies opposed the (previously agreed) sale to a French company of the

state-owned brewery, and delayed ratiﬁcation of budget proposals for the forthcoming

ﬁscal year." (Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 165) Again in 1994 "the government's

attempts to limit increases in spending obligations were threatened when the national

assembly approved amendments to the government's draft budget" for public service

wages and student grants. (Ibid., 166) These events stand in direct contrast to the

Zambian legislature's inability to inﬂuence government spending and are one example of

323

the diverse patterns of parliamentary performance in the legislatures examined here.

Another example of legislative independence occurred in the Central African Republic

after its August, 1993 democratic election. In this case the legislature exercised its

authority to force a peaceful change of government after the democratic elections had

taken place.

Central African Republic's 85 member Assemblee Nationale played only a

minor role in the political process prior to the installation of a democratically elected

regime. "At a referendum held in November, 1986, some 91.7 percent of voters granted a

mandate to (former army chief-of-staff) Gen. Andre' Kolingba as president and approved

a draft constitution which provided wide-ranging powers for the head of state." (Aﬁica

South of the Sahara, 1996, 263) According to the terms of this new constitution the

legislature "mainly occupied an advisory role." (Ibid.)

However, by the end of August, 1992 President Kolingba's authority was

overturned when the national assembly formally adopted decisions taken by participants

in a 'grand national debate' on the future of CAR politics. This included the approval of

constitutional amendments that "provided strict separation of executive, legislative, and

judicial powers and for direct multi-party presidential and legislative elections." (Africa

South of the Sahara, 1996, 264)

As in Benin, the national assembly elected after the democratic elections

became a hotbed of independent political activity. Most conspicuously was the

assembly's ability to force the adoption of a new Prime Minister. President Ange-Felix

Patasse' was swom-in on October 22, 1993 and quickly appointed Jean-Luc Mandaba as

324

Prime Minister with the responsibility of forming and maintaining the new CAR

government. By April, 1995, however, "allegations of corruption and incompetence"

resulted in a threatened parliamentary vote of no conﬁdence against the ruling PM. (Ibid.,

264-265) Surprisingly, the no conﬁdence vote was initiated by members of the

president's own party. Rather than face the vote in the house, Mandaba resigned on the

following day President Patasse appointed Gabriel Koyambounou as the new Prime

Minister.

Madagascar provides yet another example of a new legislature that

affected membership in a new government, though these particular circumstances were

somewhat different. In February, 1993 Albert Zafy defeated long-time Malagasy ruler,

Didier Ratsiraka in free, fair, democratic elections, capturing 67 percent of the popular

vote in the second round of elections. Somewhat surprisingly, the president's political

party, Cartel-HVR, was unable to secure a clear majority of seats in the June, 1993

elections for the 138-member National Assembly.

One of the new Assembly's ﬁrst responsibilities was to elect the Prime

Minister in whom executive power would be vested and who would appoint the new

Council of Ministers. Even before the National Assembly ﬁrst met, "intensive inter-party

negotiations" had taken place during which there was "shifting party support" for the

various Prime Ministerial candidates, one of whom who would be chosen at the

Assembly's August meeting." (Africa South of the Sahara, 1995, 556) The eventual

winner was Francisque Ravony "who was the favored candidate both of President Zafy

and the business community." (Ibid.) Rather than assaulting this new Prime Minister,

325

however, the National Assembly eventually fought to protect him against attacks by

Cartel-HVR legislators.

In July, 1995 the Assembly rejected a motion sponsored by Cartel-HVR

members to censure Prime Minister Ravony. These members had earlier supported Roger

Ralison in his bid for Prime Minister and were embarrassed by the President's support for

Ravony. After Zafy publicly criticized the PM for endorsing an IMF/World Bank

austerity program, they quickly adopted Zafy's recommendation that Ravony be censured

by the house. Unfortunately, they held only a minority of seats in the house and the

proposal was soundly defeated by a united coalition of opposition party MPs who

resented executive interference in legislative affairs. Again, this case stands in marked

contrast to the Zambian experience in which political leaders are thoroughly vetted by the

executive branch before they are ever put before the house for approval.

Finally, in Congo and Niger national legislatures actually passed

no-conﬁdence votes on elected governments and forced changes in the ruling regimes. In

Congo, for example, a no-confidence vote was precipitated by a dispute among coalition

partners over the number of cabinet seats given to the minority coalition partner only one

month after the government's election in August, 1992. Congo has one of the few truly

bi-cameral legislatures in sub-Saharan Aﬁica, comprised of a 125-member national

assembly and 60 member senate.4

Congolese president Pascal Lissouba was elected in August, 1992 after

capturing 61 percent of the votes cast in the second round of national elections. President

 

‘

Many sub-Saharan constitutions provide for bi-cameral legislatures. However, the vast majority of

second houses are similar to the British House of Lords and comprise solely of tribal officials or local

leaders with have no real say in the political process.

326

Lissouba was leader of the opposition UPADS party and, like President Zafy in

Madagascar, his party captured only a plurality of seats in both senate (23 of 60) and

assembly (39 of 125) elections. In order to develop support for his new regime he invited

members of the former ruling party, the Parti congolais du travail (PCT), to join his

government. At the beginning of September, 1992 he appointed Maurice-Stephane

Bongho-Nouarra as prime minister with a mandate to form a coalition government based

on a UPADS-PCT parliamentary alliance. (Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 312)

The PCT then formed an alliance with the URD, a coalition of opposition

parties that had captured seats in legislative elections. "The URD-PCT alliance, which

now had a majority of seats in parliament, demanded the right to form a new

administration and, at the end of October, won a vote of no conﬁdence in the

government" and forced Bongho-Nouarra's resignation in November, 1992. (Ibid.)

In Niger, the new government of President Maharnone Ousmane actually

faced two different no-conﬁdence votes within 18 months of his March, 1993 election.

Here, too, the president was unable to capture a majority of seats in national elections. In

this case, the MNSD-Nasarra party won the greatest number of seats in the new national

assembly (29 of 83), though the former ruling party "was prevented from retaining power

by the rapid formation or an alliance of parties which was able to form a parliamentary

majority" to support the president. (Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 689) However,

this coalition was to be short-lived.

Throughout the transition process Niger had been racked by large-scale

strikes by teachers, students, and civil servants over unpaid wages and grants. These

327

protests continued after the new regime had been elected and provided a vehicle for the

now opposition MNSD-Nassara to maintain its high political proﬁle. Concurrent with

national strikes, "President's Ousmane's administration was challenged by a campaign of

civil disobedience, orchestrated by the MN SD-Nassara and its allies, which were

demanding representation in government proportionate to the percentage of voted won by

Mamadou (their presidential candidate) at the second round of voting in 1993." (Africa

South of the Sahara, 1996, 690)

One particular action the MNSD-Nassara took was to boycott sittings of

the National Assembly. However, in May, 1994 MNSD-Nassara legislators retook their

seats in the legislature. This decision was made after the Supreme Court ruled that the

legislature's revocation of parliamentary immunity of all members whose parties

participated in the civil disobedience campaign was unconstitutional. In July, 1994,

MNSD-Nassara legislators prepared a motion "expressing no conﬁdence in the

government with regard to its conduct of labor relations." (Ibid.)

This motion never reached the house ﬂoor, however, because the

extraordinary session in which the ﬁrst vote was to be held was canceled by the speaker

of the legislature, a member of the president's Alliance des forces du changement (AFC).

This decision prompted the resignation of the deputy speaker, withdrawal from the AFC

of an important coalition partner, and eventual resignation of the prime minister, also a

member of president's alliance, though not from the president's party. The president

quickly appointed Souley Abdoulaye, a member of yet another coalition party, as the new

Prime Minister. "However, his new government did not command a majority in the

328

national assembly, and in mid-October a parliamentary motion expressing no conﬁdence

the new Abdoulaye administration was approved by the house." (Ibid.)

These ﬁve cases show how legislatures in some of the 17 new democracies

in sub-Saharan Africa acted quite independently after their transitions. The Benin

assembly exercised its authority to inﬂuence government spending. The Madagascar

assembly thwarted attacks against their preferred Prime Minister. And the CAR, Congo,

Niger assemblies brought about peaceful changes in national governments by using their

authority to issue no conﬁdence votes in governments appointed by elected presidents.

At no time in the record of Zambian parliamentary performance did the National

Assembly take actions that had such signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the ruling regimes.

However, not all sub-Saharan assemblies have been so assertive. Most, in fact, have

performed in ways that echo Zambia's experiences, in which signiﬁcant advances also

met with severe setbacks.

Column two of Table 7.1, shown earlier, listed the 10 nations whose

legislatures achieved mixed independence after their democratic transitions. Some have

challenged executive dominance or become forums for lively and contentious house

debate. However, none have been able to do so consistently or in ways that effectively

balance political power between executive and legislative branches. This list included

Zambia, whose experiences were exhaustively dealt with in earlier chapters.

Interestingly, three of these 10 mixed legislatures are in countries that had multi-party

political regimes prior to November, 1989 -- Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Senegal. They

are discussed ﬁrst.

329

Botswana is southern Africa's longest running parliamentary democracy.

Free, fair, and relatively competitive popular parliamentary elections have been held since

1969. (Danevad 1995, 382) As single-party states became the most common political

organization in newly independent nations, Botswana and the Gambia were true

multi-party exceptions. But even in these countries, as in Zimbabwe and Senegal,

national elections never resulted electoral turnovers. Prior to 1989, Mauritius' 1982

elections were the only ones that brought about a peaceful change of government in

sub-Saharan Africa.

Nonetheless, Botswana holds elections every ﬁve years and the Botswana

Democratic Party (BDP) has "carried a substantial majority each time, though it has

always faced a multi-party opposition able to win as much as a third of the vote." (Holm,

1988, 179) However, the Botswana parliament exercises little authority over national

policy making and parliamentary performance is similar to that seen in Zambia's seventh

Assembly. "Back benchers and opposition MPs ask questions about particular policies"

during parliamentary question time and "occasionally an uproar in Parliament can bring

down an important official." (Holm, 1988, 187) For the most part, however, parliament,

"serves as a forum wherein bureaucratically generated policies are publicized and

ratiﬁed." Serious policy debates only "occur in cabinet," where any important changes

are made. (Ibid.)

The BDP has maintained its control on political power through a variety of

tactics, including resistance to opposition party demands to adopt an independent

electoral commission and reduce the national voting age to 18. (Africa South of the

330

Sahara, 1996, 181) The ruling party is further advantaged by its access to state-owned

radio stations and newspapers. (Danevad 1995, 398) Finally, the pool of potential

parliamentary candidates is limited by legal constraints on government employees who

might wish to stand. "A large pr0portion of the better educated Batswana work in th

public sector, and they need to resign of secure leaves of absence prior to seeking the

support of voters." (Ibid.) Even in the context of relative economic development from

which Botswana has beneﬁted, abandoning the security of a government sinecure for the

uncertain world of politics is difﬁcult to choice for most potential politicians.

The story is much the same in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean independence

occurred in 1980, 14 years after prime minister Ian Smith carried out his threat of a

universal declaration of independence (UDI) from the Britain. "Retaining the unswerving

support of the majority of the whites, Smith maintained UDI until ﬁnally being brought

down by a combination of guerrilla war and international pressure." (Aﬁica South of the

Sahara, 1996, 1060). During UDI the Zimbabwean African nationalist opposition was

split into two camps aligned with different socio-linguistic regions of the country. The

two groups, the Zambia African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zambian African National

Union (ZANU) formed an uneasy alliance during the guerrilla war and fought under the

"Patriot Front" (PF) banner.

After independence, however, "the ZANU wing of the PF, conﬁdent of the

allegiance of the population in the large part of the country in which its guerrillas had

operated, decided to contest national elections as a separate party under the leadership of

Robert Mugabe." (Ibid., 1061) The concurrent national assembly elections of 1980 were

331

the high water mark of legislative opposition. Since then legislative opposition has been

diminished by the merger of ZANU and ZAPU party organizations and the creation of a

de facto one-party state under the control of an increasingly strong executive president.

Between 1980 and 1987 several constitutional amendments were adopted

by ZANU-PF dominated assemblies that shifted the balance of political power towards

the executive branch. Finally, on December 31, 1987, Mugabe was inaugurated as

Zimbabwe's ﬁrst "executive" president. This change gave Mugabe full executive powers,

similar to the Zambian presidency, disbanded the post of prime minister, and helped

consolidate Mugabe's control over political affairs at the expense of national assembly

independence.

Today opposition political parties are allowed limited freedoms in the

Zimbabwean political system, including the right to contest parliamentary elections.

However, the ruling party's dominance of the political landscape makes opposition party

candidates' election unlikely. For example, in April, 1995 the ZANU-PF party captured

118 of 120 elected parliamentary seats, 55 of them uncontested.’ (Africa South of the

Sahara, 1996, 1064) Moreover, recently initiated legislation provides state support for

political parties that win seats in legislative elections, but only if the party controls 15 or

more seats in the national assembly. Not since the general elections of June, 1985 has an

opposition party won 15 legislative seats. As a result, the Zimbabwean parliament is but

"a mechanism to funnel state resources to the ruling party." (Sithole, 1997, 127)

 

’

In August, 1995 President Robert Mugabe's regime suffered a setback when the High Court

"nulliﬁed the election result in the bitterly Harare South constituency, when it was established that more

votes had been cast than there were registered electors." The long-term inﬂuence of this decision on

Mugabe's political control has yet to be seen.

332

Political opposition in Senegal is signiﬁcantly more active than it Zambia

or Zimbabwe. For example, six different political parties captured seats in Senegal's

120-member Assemblee Nationale during the most recent legislative elections held in

May, 1993. (V illalon 1994, 188) The relative success of the opposition movement in

these elections raised the possibility that opposition MPs might use the relatively lenient

constitutional provisions that would allow them to initiate a vote of no conﬁdence in

President Abdou Diouf‘s coalition government.

However, the president's Parti socialiste captured 84 seats and, thus,

maintained its strong control over legislative affairs and rendered any signiﬁcant

parliamentary challenges unlikely.6 Since 1993 the national assembly has granted the

president even greater control over political and economic affairs. For example, in

January, 1994 the parliament granted Diouf "temporary powers" to manage the national

economy "by decree", though the opposition "held the president responsible for any

resultant hardships." (Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 789)

Executive dominance has also developed in many of sub-Saharan Aﬁica's

"third wave" democracies. In countries such as Malawi, presidents have used political

threats to ensure parliamentary compliance with their programs, despite the relative

success of opposition parties in national elections and consequent activism in the national

assembly.

 

°

Between 1966 and 1974 the PS was the sole legal political party in Senegal. In 1974 the

government "permitted the registration of a new political party, the Parti democratique senegalais," but

"until the mid-1980's the PS beneﬁted from persistent disunity" among these new opposition groups.

(Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 787) Today many Senegalese are skeptical about the voracity of

political of political opposition. Some believe that "campaign maneuvering and protests by the opposition

are little more that posturing to strengthen bargaining positions for the eventual distribution of the beneﬁts

of power." (V illalon 1994, 189)

333

Malawi President Bakili Muluzi's United Democratic Front (UDF)

captured only a plurality of seats (84 of 175) in the 1994 democratic elections.

Nonetheless, Muluzi has generally maintained control of Assembly affairs. One way he

does this is to use his position as a "bully pulpit" to induce parliamentary compliance. In

a 1996 interview President Bakili Muluzi was asked about his lack of a parliamentary

majority. His response shed light on his approach to governing, and attitude towards

political opposition: "Well, we would have been happier if we had a majority, but I don't

think (the opposition parties) will oppose things just for the sake of opposing them. If

they are just going to frustrate things that would be untenable. We are a very poor

country, not like the United States. People want to see not only political change, but also

development. Anybody who is going to stand in the way and block that will not be very

popular." (Ham and Hall, 1996, 61)

Malawi's democratization has been further set back by a divided and

distracted parliament. During the 1994 elections, popular votes were split along regional

and ethnic lines, with the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) winning all 33 of the 177

parliamentary seats in the Northern Region, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) capturing

55 seats in the Central Region, and President Mulizi's UDF winning 84 seats, mostly in

the South. (Africa South of the Sahara 1996, 574. See also, Kaspin 1995)

It was expected that the UDF and AFORD would form a parliamentary

coalition and give President Muluzi the legislative majority he needed to ensure passage

of his programs. Instead, AFORD's leader Chakufwa Chihana allied his party with the

334

MCP after "attempts to recruit AFORD members into a coalition administration with the

UDF failed, owing to disagreements regarding the allocation of senior portfolios." (Ibid.)

This created an interesting, though problematic 88-84 split in the National

Assembly, and a real political threat to Muluzi's ability to dominate the political process.

However, in January, 1995, AFORD announced an end to its co-operation with the MCP.

As an apparent reward for this decision, President Muluzi announced that Chihana would

be made a Second Vice-President. This announcement provoked howls of criticism from

MCP members in house debates, who later boycotted the vote that installed Chihana.

They were aided in their protests by the report of the government's own national

constitutional conference which had met in February and recommended that the post be

abolished. The government's failure to create a stable political coalition, "necessitated by

the country's political climate and ethnic separatism" has continued to stunt the

development of an independent national assembly and prevented it from addressing the

concerns of Malawi's citizens. (van Donge 1995b, 228)

The Malian legislature has also been subordinated by a strong executive

president. For example, President Alpha Oumar Konare' was widely hailed when he

appointed several opposition party members to his cabinet immediately after the April

1992 elections. At the same time, however, he also pushed through the election of a

ruling-party president of the Assemblee Nationale, despite the fact that "opposition

deputies boycotted the vote in protest of their lack of inﬂuence in the political system."

(Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 591)

335

The opposition's inability to inﬂuence the selection of the parliamentary

Speaker resulted from the strong majority his ADEMA party held in the National

Assembly (76 of 116 seats). Nonetheless, parliamentary debate in Mali has been lively.

"Cabinet Ministers are regularly confronted by serious questions, proposals, and

amendments raised by the opposition, groups within the ruling party, and members of the

government's coalition." Debates have been managed fairly and are often "quite

contentious, not least because nascent groupings are beginning to formulate serious

alternatives to government policy." (Vengroff 1993, 560)

Finally, in Gambia a military coup disbanded a democratically elected

legislature and then re-wrote the national constitution to advantage itself in consequent

presidential and parliamentary elections. (Aﬁica Conﬁdential July 5, 1996, 10) Gambia

adopted a parliamentary political system at independence in 1965. Political opposition

was allowed and opposition parties usually won seats in Garnbia's 36-member National

Assembly. However, political opposition was weak and the Gambian political process

was highly personalized in the hands of long-time leader Sir Dawda Jawara and his

People's Progressive Party (PPP).

However, Jawara's inability to tackle the problems of corruption and

accusations of ﬁnancial mismanagement resulted in a military coup on July 22, 1994,

under the direction of 29 year-old Captain Yahya Jarnmeh. Jawara ﬂed to Great Britain

and J ammeh's Armed Forces Provisional Council (AFPRC) assumed control, suspended

the 1970 Constitution, and declared that the presidency and legislature had been

336

dissolved, though he promised to reinstate civilian rule "before the year's end." (Africa

South of the Sahara 1996, 423)

Jammeh's AFPRC survived counter-coup attempts in November, 1994 and

January, 1995, the latter sponsored by former senior AFPRC ofﬁcers. Slightly more than

two years after the coup, Jarnmeh won presidential elections on September 26, 1996

under an AFPRC banner, now renamed the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and

Construction. Legislative elections were held on January 2, 1997 and the AFPRC won 52

percent of the popular vote, and claimed 33 of the now 45-member National Assembly.

However, "observers pulled out before the elections on the grounds that they would not

be free and fair." (Journal of Democracy April, 1997, 182)

The above cases have shown that legislative performance in sub-Saharan

Aﬁica has developed along several different trajectories. Some legislatures, such as

Benin and Niger, were able to act as independent participants in the political process and

actively challenged executive actions. Of the 17 nations compared in this chapter, 5 fall

into this ﬁrst category. Twice as many nations, however, have experienced difficulty in

establishing themselves as viable partners in the political process. Some of these nations,

Botswana, Senegal, and Zimbabwe, had functioning multi-party democracies prior to

1994. The remaining seven, including Zambia and Mali, introduced multi-party political

regimes between 1989 and 1994. The following section uses the three theoretical

perspectives used earlier to examine why these legislatures performed as they did.

Formal Rules and African Legislative Development

337

Why have some nations' been able to develop independent national

legislatures when other nations have not? This section examines legislative development

in 17 countries through one of the three different theoretical approaches used in Chapters

Four through Six. Namely, how has legislative performance in the new democracies

sub-Saharan Aﬁica been affected by institutional rules?

Unfortunately, reliable information (let alone quantitative, cross-national

measures) about administrators' inﬂuence and political patronage were unavailable for

this study. As mentioned earlier, the Zambian data was the unique result of 18 months of

in-country research and could not be easily replicated. However, anecdotal indicators of

these inﬂuences on legislative development will be made wherever possible.

At a minimum, however, two different, and interesting, institutional

comparisons can be made across Africa's new democracies. This allows us to compare

the relationship between institutional reform and legislative development and better place

Zambian legislative development in comparative context. Chapter Four identiﬁed how

Zambia's hybrid presidential-parliamentary separation of powers affected legislative

performance. An interesting question is whether nations with similar constitutional forms

experienced similar outcomes. Do the ﬁve nations that exhibited increased independence

more clearly deﬁne the separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial

branches of government?

Another comparison that can be made is between the number of political

parties that actively compete in the national political arena. The Zambian case showed

338

how political inﬂuence ﬂowed through political parties, and the ways in which strong

political parties reduced the independence of a legislators and the efficacy of

legislator-constituency relations. Do those ﬁndings mirror contemporary regimes in

sub-Saharan Africa? Do nations with a pluralistic multi-party political system experience

different patterns of legislative development than ones with multi-party regimes that

feature a dominant political party? First, however, Tables 7.2 and 7.3 compare the

relationship between constitutional separation of powers and legislative performance after

the democratic transition.

Table 7.2 -- Constitutional Separation of Powers in Five Independent Legislatures

 

Country

Regime Type

Speciﬁcations'

 

Benin

Presidential

"Constitution prohibits dual membership in executive and

legislative organs of the state" and legislature retains

authority to check legislative proposals introduced by the

executive branch.

 

CAR

Semi-Presidential

President appoints a Prime Minister (PM) who appoints

 

Congo

Semi-Presidential

President appoints a Prime Minister (PM) who appoints

cabinet ministers, but the house can remove the PM

through a vote of no confidence in the government.

 

Madagascar

Semi-Presidential

After the democratic transition, the Prime Minister( PM)

cabinet ministers, but the house can remove the PM

through a vote of no conﬁdence in the government.

was elected by the National Assembly. However, that

provision was repealed. Now, the President appoints a

Prime Minister (PM) who appoints cabinet ministers.

 

 

parliament.

Niger

Semi—Presidential

The President appoints the Prime Minister, who then

 
  

appoints the Ministers, but the council of Ministers is

"responsible to the National Assembly." President,

however, does retain the authority to dissolve the

 

'

Taken from Africa South of the Sahara. Volumes 19-25.

This table shows that each of the ﬁve strongly independent legislatures

were supported by formal rules that encouraged legislative independence. Column two

339

describes whether the constitutional separation of powers in these new democracies. In

presidential regimes, both presidents and legislators are directly elected through popular

vote. Executive authority in these regimes is vested in the president, and legislative

authority is vested in the assembly. In parliamentary regimes the executive is chosen

(either appointed or elected) by legislators whose party (or coalition) captured the

majority of seats in national parliamentary elections.

As column two shows, however, only one of the ﬁve nations listed above

has either a pure presidential or parliamentary regime. Benin's new democracy is one of

the few true presidential regimes in sub-Saharan Aﬁica. Benin's president is elected

independently of the national assembly and retains full executive powers. The national

assembly retains fully legislative authority and the constitution provides a clear and

distinct separation of powers between the two branches. In Benin the president can

appoint sitting legislators to his cabinet, the "Council of Ministers." However, if the

nominee chooses to join cabinet he or she is forced to vacate their seat in the parliament.

This prevents the president from using political and ﬁnancial inducements such as an

appointment to government ofﬁce, to inﬂuence legislative behavior as was shown to be

the case in Zambia.

The four remaining countries have semi-presidential regimes. The three

francophone regimes are modeled after the constitution of the French ﬁfth Republic in

which an independently elected president appoints a government minister with executive

authority. As a counterweight to this presidential authority the legislatures in CAR,

Congo, and Niger all have the ability to exercise no conﬁdence votes in the ruling

340

government (i.e., prime minister and cabinet). However, they lack the ability to dislodge

the sitting president. In each of these cases the national assemblies used their ability to

issue no conﬁdence votes, as the above discussion indicated.

In Madagascar, the separation of powers is somewhat different. After the

transition, the national assembly had the authority to elect the prime minister who then

chose his ruling cabinet. This was similar to a Westminster-style parliamentary regime,

though with the added twist of an independently elected President. However, after the

National Assembly refused to censure the sitting prime minister in July, 1995, President

Albert Zafy initiated, and won, a constitutional referendum that made the prime minister a

presidential appointment.7 This, and other examples of gradual legislative decline in

these new democracies is discussed below.

Table 7.2 showed that the ﬁve strongly independent were supported by

formal, constitutional rules that provided them with the opportunity for independent

action. In each case national legislatures were given the authority to check the executive

branch through votes of no conﬁdence or prohibitions on holding executive and

legislative positions. The following table lists the separation of powers among 11 of the

12 remaining new democracies in sub-Saharan Africa.’3

 

7

In an ironic twist, the legislature ultimately impeached President Zafy in 1996, but not before he

was able to shift the control of executive authority to the president.

'

The new South Aﬁican government is excluded because the constitutional separation of powers in

the transition government established after the April, 1994 elections was subject to change as constitutional

negotiations were complete.

341

Table 7.3 -- Constitutional Separation of Powers in

Mixed Independence Legislatures

342

Table 7.3 -- Constitutional Separation of Powers

in Mixed Independence Legislatures"

 

Country

Regime Type

Speciﬁcations

 

Botswana

Presdential

President is indirectly elected through popular votes given

 

Guinea-Bissau

Presidential

President appoints PM and ministers.

 

Malawi

Presidential

President, VPs, and MP5 are all members of national

to Members of Parliament, but parliament has no inﬂuence

on formation of president's cabinet.

assembly. The assembly approves vice-presidential

appointments made by president. President can summon

and prorogue assembly. Ministers appointed from among

MPs.

 

Mali

Presidential

President appoints a PM who appoints ministers.

 

Mozambique

Presidential

President appoints a PM and can dissolve parliament.

 

Namibia

Presidential

President appoints a PM and can dissolve parliament.

 

Senegal

Hybrid Presidential

President appoints a PM who appoints ministers. President

can rule by decree and draft laws into referendum after

consulting with President of National Assembly, PM, and

judiciary. National assembly can pass a vote of no

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Presidential

 

Presidential

conﬁdence in government

  
 

President is head of state and government, appoints cabinet,

President appoints Ministers from among the sitting

and has authority to appoint 20+ members of the

ISO-member National Assembly

Members of Parliament

 

 '

 

' ."xu’inuxv‘xfivluck.ini'ctln {ﬂu-sh x- .‘l‘ 42>» ,‘

. ,,,‘.;.<.._. 5.,.,. ..

.. “0,555.4

..

.x.

.

«ans/Lulu
‘55.‘...§.'._5,,5.,.‘._5.

4.-;.;";,>;‘,’\-;~, 49‘." ‘ " " vb.“ "v; 5'."
,. 5555,», .A
‘ a ,‘l

v a .5

I w

5

Parliamentary

 

 

Source: Africa South of the Sahara, l994-1996. See also Bratton and van de Walle (1997)

 

 

  
 

343

Column two of Table 7.3 shows how the formal separation of powers

differs in these 11 nations that did not experience signiﬁcant legislative independence

after their democratic transitions. At ﬁrst glance these nations appear to have established

different types of constitutional regimes. Eight of these 11 countries had presidential

systems, another one had a hybrid presidential system and the remaining two had some

form of parliamentary regime.

However, closer examination shows the separation of powers in these

countries was biased in favor of directly elected executive presidents, usually at the

expense of national legislatures. Only in Botswana is the president not chosen by direct

popular vote. Instead he or she is chosen indirectly through the election of

parliamentarians. Nonetheless, the president retains control over composition of his or

her cabinet and the course of government business. These regimes provide presidents

with strong mandates they often interpret as carte blanche authority to exercise executive

power. Moreover, it at least four of the countries for which the data was available

(Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zambia) the president has the authority to dissolve

elected national assemblies, without similar authorty granted to the legislatures. This

gives these president an even strong lever with which to affect government policies and

programs. On the other hand, assemblies that did act more independently were supported

by institutional rules that empowered the legislature vis-a—vis the executive branch.

In other words, formal rules matter. Countries with constitutional

guarantees of legislative independence saw those freedoms reﬂected in national

assemblies that challenged executive dominance of political affairs. In countries with

344

more moderate constitutional guarantees, legislatures were less active and less able to act

as an independent counterweight to executive actions.

But another aspect of these independent regimes should be noted.

Namely, the presence, or absence, of a viable legislative opposition political party(s) that

could to take advantage of the institutional opportunites afforded them. The following

table compares the relative activity, and success, of political parties in these new

democracies by examining the number of parties won seats in the national assembly ﬁrst

elected during the democratic transition.

345

Table 7.4 -- Political Party Success in Founding Democratic Elections'o

 

Country

Number of Parties that Won Seats in

the Legislature

 

Benin

16

 

CAR

1 3

 

Congo

8

 

Madagascar

  
 

Niger

23

9

   

..................................

....................

 

Botswana

 

Guinea-Bissau

 

Malawi

3

 

Mali

1 0

 

Mozambique

3

 

Namibia

7

 

Senegal

6

 

7

2

Zambia

 

South Africa

  
  
 

2

 

Rows two through six show of column two show that legislatures that

acted independently after their transition had members of far more political parties than

did those whose legislatures acted less independently. For example, the ﬁve independent

legislatures had an average of 13.8 different political parties that won seats after their

founding elections. In the ten legislatures that achieved only moderate independence the

 

10

This data is taken from Bratton and van de Walle (1997). It describes party activity during

founding democratic elections since a second round of elections have not yet been held in all countries.

Data on the four nations that already had multi-party regimes is taken from the most recently election listed

in Africa South of the Sahara, 1996.

 

346

data show that only 4.7 different parties won seats in the founding legislative elections.

Only two parties secured seats in Zambia's founding elections.”

Not only were there more political parties elected to the legislature in

strongly independent assemblies, but opposition parties in these regimes were able to

secure signiﬁcantly larger shares of the total number of seats than their counterparts in

other countries. Table 7.5 shows how the percentage of seats won by opposition parties

and coalitions varies between strongly independent legislatures and legislatures that

experienced mixed or decreasing independence after the founding election.

 

"

A small scale difference of means test using the Student - t distribution was used to determine

whether this difference was signiﬁcant. The resulting t-score = 4.365, 15 d.f., was signiﬁcant at the 99%

leveL

347

Table 7.5 -- Opposition Parties' Shares of Seats in Founding Democratic Legislatures”

 

Country

Opposition Party (or Coalition's) Share

of Seats in Legislature

 

Benin

59,8 %

 

CAR

45.7 %

 

Congo

48 %

 

Madagascar

  
 

 

   

65.1 %

44,8 %

Niger

~~~~~~~~~~~

.......

 

Guinea-Bissau

36 %

 

Malawi

52 %

 

Mali

34.5 %

 

Mozambique

48,4 %

 

Namibia

43,1 %

Senegal

 

 

South Africa

43.4 %

  
 
 

 

Zimbabwe

1,7 %

Zambia

374 %

16.7 %

   

 

 

Excluding the percentage of seats one by opposition parties in the de facto

one party regime in Zimbabwe, the mean share of seats won by opposition parties in the

mixed independence regimes was 37.1 percent. This is signiﬁcantly different from the

average 52.7 percent of seats won by opposition parties in strongly independent

legislatures and differs dramatically from the Zambian case in which only 16.7 percent of

the seats went to opposition party candidates.l3

 

'2

Source: Bratton and van de Walle (1997). Data on the Benin elections was taken from Africa

South of the Sahara, 1996, 176.

348

When opposition parties won majority control of their respective

assemblies, elected presidents in these regimes were often forced to "cohabitate" with

other parties to form coalition governments. For example, among group of ﬁve countries

with independent assemblies, President Zafy in Madagascar was the only president to

form a cabinet comprised solely of members of his ruling party. The four other countries,

Benin, CAR, Congo, and Niger, had coalition cabinets after their founding elections.

Only three of the 15 countries in the mixed independence group, Malawi, Senegal, and

South Africa had similar coalition governments.”

In strongly independent legislatures national assemblies were active,

sometimes contentious, bodies which challenged executive decisions on a range of policy

issues. The data presented above indicate that this was due to the presence of a dynamic,

effective opposition political party system, as well as an institutional fomat that allowed

those parties the opportunity to exercise a more independent voice. A favorable

institutional structure is likely a necesary condition for enhanced legislative

independence; perhaps a viable, sufficiently large political opposition is as well.

However, neither are sufficient conditions in and of themselves.

Was legislative independence a precursor for the consolidation of

democracy? Though this question is addressed more fully in the next chapter, the

following section examines how legislative performance evolved in the ﬁve independent

countries and whether it contributed to the development of a more democratic regime.

 

'3

A small-n difference of means test using the Student-t distribution was again used to determine the

signiﬁcance of this association. Here the resulting t-score = 2.721 with 13 d.f and was signiﬁcant at the

99% level.

"

It should be noted that Malawi has had an intermittent coalition government as UDF, MCP, and

AFORD have shifted their allegiances since 1994.

349

Be Careful What You Ask For: The Consequences of Legislative Independence

Five countries -- Benin, CAR, Congo, Madagascar, and Niger -- are

examples of countries where democratically elected legislatures achieved signiﬁcant

independence from the executive branch after their election. In these countries

constitutional rules favored a strong separation of powers between executive and

legislative branches, and provided for legislative controls over executive actions. These

countries also had active political party systems that encouraged political mobilization

and provided real challenges to ruling incumbents. This section examines how this

independence contributed to the development of a democratic regime.

Ironically, legislative independence in new African democracies has led to

political instability, rather than political consolidation. Four of the countries with

independent legislatures have suffered democratic reversals since their founding

elections. Benin, alone, has progressed towards a more stable democratic regime.

Despite their early successes, the remaining countries' legislatures contributed little to the

consolidation of an effective, multi-party democracy. This raises the question of whether

Africa is "ready" for vibrant, multi-party political regimes in which power is shared

between branches of government. Sadly, the answer seems to be "no".

In two countries, CAR and Niger, the democratic movement was stalled by

army mutirries and military coups. For example, in April and May, 1996, two military

uprisings occurred in the CAR which forced President Ange'-Felix Patasse' to rely on

French military support to maintain his government. This was a bitter blow to supporters

of his regime who encouraged his populist, anti-French rhetoric. These military

350

uprisings, and Patasse's call for help, were said to "have thoroughly destabilized the

government." (Africa Conﬁdential, 37(12) June 7, 1996)

In Niger, Lt. Col. Ibrahim Barre Mainassana led a January, 1996 military

coup that ousted elected president Ousmane in favor of a "temporary" ruling military

council. (Aﬁica Conﬁdential 37(3), February 2, 1996) In both countries the military had

a history of involvement in political affairs and was disturbed over the government's

failure to pay soldiers' salaries and the apparent "confusion" within the ruling

governments.15 (Ibid.) Rather than contributing to a democratic consolidation, legislative

independence has led to stand-offs and conﬂict over the distribution of political power

and the nature of executive-legislative relations.

In the Congo President Lissouba dissolved the national assembly after his

failure to create a ruling party coalition within the house. Recall that the opposition party

URD-PCT alliance was formed after the PCT rejected the cabinet seats offered to them in

a coalition cabinet with government officials. In response the URD-PCT demanded the

right to form a new government and, eventually, passed a vote of no conﬁdence in the

president's government.

Soon afterwards, however, President Pascal Lissouba "dissolved the

national assembly and announced that new legislative elections would be held in 1993."

(Aﬁica South of the Sahara, 1996, 312) These new elections were held and resulted in

parliament dominated by members of the president's ruling coalition. Though these

elections provided Lissouba with the majority control he required to initiate his policy

agenda, they brought no peace to Congolese politics. After these elections opposition

 

IS

Confusion precipitated, in part, by their inability to compete with independent legislatures.

351

groups and supporters of the coalition "Presidential Movement" were involved in violent,

repeated clashes that were said to have killed at least 80 people. (Aﬁica Report, 39(1),

Jan-Feb. 1994)

Even where elected legislators remained in ofﬁce, their inﬂuence on

popular opinion and government policy was short lived. The Madagascar Assembly was

earlier hailed as an example of legislative independence in sub-Saharan Africa.

Unfortunately this independence translated into little meaningful action on the part of

assembly members to develop support for their new regime. It was said that the new

Madagascar national assembly accomplished little in its ﬁrst session "except a lengthy

debate about its own salaries, the types of limousines members can use, and per diems

and beneﬁts for members who traveled overseas." (Aﬁica Report 38(6), Nov.-Dec. 1993)

Moreover, legislators ability to inﬂuence government actions was

circumscribed by President Zafy shortly after their election. Recall that the Madagascar

legislature was praised for rejecting a petition sponsored by members of the president's

party to censure the prime minister. After this failure President Zafy announced that a

national referendum would be held during which the constitution would be amended to

give the president the right to choose a prime minister, rather than the national assembly.

"Despite doubts regarding the president's right to call (the vote)" the referendum was held

in September, 1995 and "with more that 40 percent of the electorate abstaining 65 percent

of the votes cast were in favor of Zafy." (Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 557) Like

President Kaunda had done in Zambia, Zafy was able to manipulate the constitution to

remove the legislature's ability to affect his regime.

Conclusion

352

What does this all mean? First, this chapter shows that democracy is

possible in Africa. While many countries were unable to implement democratic reforms,

at least 17 of Africa 42 sub-Saharan countries possessed or implemented democratic

political regimes between 1989 and 1994. Second, however, this chapter shows that the

implementation of a regime transition through free, fair, popular elections does not

necessarily lead to the creation of democratic political institutions. For example, only

ﬁve of the 17 nations examined here -- Benin, CAR, Congo, Madagascar, and Niger --

achieved signiﬁcant separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches

after their founding election.

These legislatures showed an ability to challenge executive actions, hold

ruling parties accountable, and represent popular demands in house debates. However,

legislatures in 10 of the remaining 12 countries, including Zambia's, exhibited

signiﬁcantly less independence. In these regimes legislatures were able to challenge

executive actions only infrequently and their inﬂuence on decision-making was minimal.

Finally, two legislatures were subordinated by military coups shortly after their founding

election.

Finally, this chapter also demonstrates the irony of politics in Aﬁica.

Those countries that developed independent legislatures with clear separations of power

between executive and legislative branches were most likely to experience some sort of

democratic reversal. Three of the ﬁve countries to experience a military coup since their

democratic election -- Niger, CAR, and Congo -- had developed a strongly independent

353

legislative branch. Enhanced legislative independence lead to political instability, rather

than the reverse.

Why might this be the case? One argument is that Africa lacks other,

necessary cultural and/or institutional dimensions of democratic regimes. However, this

study showed that the constitutional rules and political party environment favored the

development of a more participatory democratic legislative branch. Presumably, this

combination would contribute to the long-term success of a new democracy. However,

they did not.

The outspoken nature of the legislatures in these countries was often

interpreted as a lack of political "order." The return of the military in Niger, for example,

was hastened by continued disputes between the president and national assembly, and

their perception that these disputes were unhealthy for the country. The willingness to

tolerate public dissent has been missing, even in regimes where the institutional

mechanisms to adjudicate those disputes were developed.

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, legislative independence has not

considered an important part of the consolidation process by scholars, either. For

example, Mali's democracy movement was hailed as an "exemplary transition" (Boyer,

1992, 41) and was said to be "surviving, and thriving," (AC 37(4), November 15, 1996)

despite the dominance of the ruling ADEMA party in the national assembly, splits with

the political opposition, and crackdowns on the independent media. (Africa South of the

Sahara, 1996, 592)

354

Moreover, the likelihood that countries that did not achieve strong

independence during this question will do so in the future is increasingly unlikely. In part

this is because the formal rules in the mixed independent regimes act to prevent

legislative independence. Chapter four outlined in great detail how the continuity of the

Zambian constitution has limited the Assembly's involvement in the legislative process.

Another reason, is that political parties and political coalitions that united in these

countries to replace entrenched leaders are splitting apart. In response, they have used

tactics from the transition, including electoral boycotts and civil protests, to maintain their

increasingly fragile support. Nowhere has this been a successful strategy. The ﬁnal

chapter returns to some of the broader questions asked earlier. What inﬂuences

legislative performance and what role does legislative development play in the

consolidation of a democratic regime?

Chapter 8:

Conclusion

The trends of increasing (or persisting) disorder, human

rights violations, legislative and judicial inefﬁcacy,

corruption, and military impunity and prerogatives have

been evident in third-wave democracies around the world --

not only in major countries such as Turkey and Pakistan but

in smaller ones such as Zambia and most of the electoral

regimes of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, in the former

Soviet Union, parts of Asia, and the Middle East, elections

themselves are increasingly hollow and uncompetitive, a

thin disguise for the authoritarian hegemony of despot and

ruling parties.

Larry Diamond 1996, 30

This passage presents a pessimistic, and increasingly common, attitude

towards the prospects of developing stable, consolidated political regimes in new

democracies. It was assumed that the wave of democracies established in the early 19905

would ebb and that some countries would revert to more authoritarian regimes. Now, as

these nascent democracies begin to fail, scholars are trying to understand how, and why,

some regimes survived while others did not. The reasons they present vary. Diamond

(1994, 1996) and Putnam (1996) point to weakness in civil society and the lack of social

capital and civic values necessary for the successful consolidation of a democratic

political system.

355

356

Gillespe (1993) and Sives (1993) argue that the failure of new democracies

results from an abuse of the democratization process by political leaders for their

economic beneﬁt. For example, Brazil "continues to be run by an elite few who have

used democratic reforms for their own personal gain" (Sives 1993, 549). Still others pin

the responsibility on fragmented political party systems (Ionescu 1993, Ozbudun 1996),

the attitudes of civil servants (Guy 1995), popular disillusionment and ethnic conﬂict

(Linz and Stepan 1996), or the lack of democratic education to promote "healthy politics

and (political) creativity". (Lamounier 1994, 72) Each of these arguments raises

important questions about the institutional and attitudinal prerequisites of a long-lived

democratic transition.

However, these approaches fail to account for two factors: the dynamic

nature of political development and the differential effects of the variables these scholars

study. In other words, some explanations matter more at one moment than another, while

others are more appropriate for macro-institutional rather than micro-individual analyses.

This chapter presents a scheme to examine these questions in greater detail.

Previous chapters examined the history of legislative development in

Zambia, compared Zambian parliamentary performance across time and contrasted recent

legislative developments in Africa's new democracies. These chapters showed that

legislative performance in Zambia was a mix of advances and setbacks, as Larry

Diamond noted in the passage above. For example, though Parliament gained the

authority to debate government military expenditures during house debates, they

exercised no real inﬂuence over the expenditure of public funds. While the Assembly

357

acquired the power to scrutinize, and even veto, presidential nominees to key government

offices, they rarely did so. In short, the National Assembly's contribution to the

development of a democratic separation of powers between government branches was

limited.

Three different theoretical perspectives were put forward to explain these,

and other, contradictions in parliamentary performance across Zambia's three republics.

Against the Zambian ﬁndings, this chapter examines the states of democratization --

transition, post-transition, and consolidation -- at which these perspectives are more

useful, and if they better account for institutional or individual-level political behavior.

Transitions, Formal Rules, and the Struggle for Authority

Two observations were commonly made regarding the nature of third

wave democratic transitions, especially in Aﬁica. The ﬁrst was that transitions could be

thought of as battles over access to state resources among, for example, ethnic,

ideological, generational, regional, or socio-linguistic groups within a given society.

"Democratic transitions are often generational struggles for access to political power,

with younger folk, usually university students, being the most vocal advocates for

change." (Bratton et. al, 1997, 18)

Second, it was often argued that individual political actors played crucial

roles in democratic transitions and were sometimes singularly responsible for their

success (or failure). In order to explain democratic transitions one must look at the

"strategies available to those who seek a democratic revolution." (Weiner 1987, 863) In

358

Zambia, for example, former President Kenneth Kaunda was widely hailed for accepting

the results of the 1991 democratic elections and peacefully acceding presidential authority

to his opponent, Frederick Chiluba. "Kenneth Kaunda is a hero of the transition because

he gracefully accepted the people's will and has allowed Zambia to set an example for the

continent and the world." (NDI 1992, 71)

Evidence clearly shows that people and the struggle for state resources

were at the center of many democratic transitions. However, these explanations cannot

fully explain the nature of the transition process. If personal political gain had been

challengers' only motivation, they could have displaced their opponents and seized the

resources of the state. However, they did not do so. Instead, they worked to establish a

system of formal rules to support their claims to authority. In fact, the very deﬁnition of a

democratic transition, as opposed to a change of rulers within an authoritarian regime,

requires that the political elite arrive at a "procedural consensus on the rules of the game."

(Rustow 1970, 337)

Consequently, political transitions can best be thought of as struggles over

rules and rule-making. Evidence presented earlier illustrates this point. For example,

Chapter Four detailed how Zambia's three constitutional transitions, in 1964, 1973 and

1991, were punctuated by contentious debates between the government and opposition

groups over the nature of the new regime. In 1973 the debates concerned the

establishment of a one-party state. In 1991, important discussions took place over

separation of powers between executive and legislative branches and presidential

authority to declare a state of emergency.

359

Constitutional reforms were also crucial elements of the transitions in the

ﬁve democracies that developed independent legislatures discussed in Chapter Seven. In

Congo, for example, the constitution resulted from a collaborative effort of disparate

political actors: the ﬁrst draft was ﬁrst prepared by 30 different representatives of the

government and political opposition; next, it was sent to all the political parties for their

review and comments; afterwards, it was revised by the government; and then, ﬁnally,

sent to the transitional legislature, the "High Council of Republic," for ratiﬁcation.

(Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 29:2)

In Madagascar the constitutional referendum to bring about multi-party

elections was twice delayed over debates between opposition party and government

ofﬁcials regarding two particularly contentious articles to the new constitution. The ﬁrst

would have "limited to two the number of terms that a person may be president," thereby

preventing sitting President Ratsiraka from contesting the election. The second would

have established a federal state and was widely seen as an attempt by sitting President

Ratsiraka to retain an element of political control. (Aﬁica Research Bulletin, Vols. 29:4

& 29:8)

Even in Ghana, where constitutional turnovers were frequent and which

had not established a democratic regime druing the period examined in this study, Kwesi

Jonah (1991) noted the inﬂuence of formal rules in shaping political behavior. "The way

a constitution is made can secure essential political compromises between opposed

political interests, eliminate mutual suspicions, and instill conﬁdence in the

360

(participants)." (Ninsin and Drah 1992, 77) This conﬁdence then allows further reforms

to take place within the context of a established government system.

The struggles over constitutions is not unique to Africa. Scholars of East

European politics noted how the democratization movements of the late 1980's centered

around constitutional rules and rule-making. For example, Zielonka (1994) argued that

new democracies in Eastern Europe will develop only if they follow a "clear model of

democracy, either presidential or parliamentary," in which there is an "equal distribution

of powers among the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary." (87) Mates (1992)

noted that the "unbalanced and eclectic" nature of the new Slovakian constitution

hindered the functioning of parliamentary democracy and "considerably undermined the

legislature in favor of the executive branch of the government and insufﬁciently protects

minority rights" (3 9). Similar observations were also made about Turkey, by Heper

(1992) and about Portugal, by Corkill (1993).

But struggles over rules takes different forms. These cases highlight three

different types of rues that are often the object of political disuputes during democratic

transitions. These three dimensions and the issues they encompass are:

 

The added beneﬁt of constitutional negotiation at the beginning of a transition process is that it provides

political leaders with the aura of legitimacy. But why to leaders care about legitimacy? If, as is often

argued, legitimacy is determined by international political actors, it is often linked to international donor

assistance, peaceful external relationships, and the ability to pursue public politics in a "normal" sphere of

political discourse.

Domestic political legitimacy allows rulers to propel the public policy agenda they endorse and the

prevent "defections" from the ruling regime or mass public that might prevent them from enacting those

policies or accumulating wealth, prestige, social status that they might accrue if they stayed in office.

Enlarging the "shadow of the future" provides political leaders with the opportunity to exploit resources of

personal gain, implement desired public policies or otherwise beneﬁt from time in office.

361

0

Structural rules (reforms to government structure) -- Articulating the separation of

powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government;

legislative and judicial branch independence from strong executive presidents; and

guaranteeing enhanced personal freedoms (speech, association, etc.)

0

Electoral rules (including campaigns, elections, etc.) -- This dimension is often

linked with constitution making and constitution breaking, though it should be put

in a separate category. Constitutional reform does not equate to electoral reform,

and vice versa. Some of the important issues include: who can vote in national

elections; who can contest these elections; who will count the votes (and how), and

who will determine if the elections were free and fair?

0 Enforcement procedures and the rule of law -- Some of the most common issues in

this category are: What role will the military have in political life (if any); Who

will keep the peace?; Who will ensure that the rules are enforced? What

mechanism will their be for the adjudication of disputes and how will those who

adjudicate disputes be chosen?

Not only are different types of rules debated during political transitions,

but their inﬂuence on political performance varies over time. One consequence of the

emphasis on rule-making during the transition process is that formal rules are especially

helpful in explaining parliamentary performance immediately after the transition. During

political transitions the rules of the game are in ﬂux. Immediately afterwards, however,

the inﬂuence of formal rules, especially structural rules, on political behavior is especially

362

noticeable. This post-transition period is the interregnum after the conduct of ﬁ'ee, fair

democratic elections and before the routinized acceptance of new rules and the

development of institutions to accomodate them (the latter constitutes the consolidation

phase). In other words, the common dichotomy between the transition and consolidation

phases of democraization is too crude to fully appreciate the inﬂuence of rules and

rule-making on political performance. Democratic transitions usually incorporate

changes to government structures. The inﬂuence these rules have on performance, in

this case legislative performance, is especially noticeable immediately after those rules

have been implemented.

However, as the new regime becomes routinized the relative inﬂuence of

formal rules on legislative behavior is reducedz. In Zambia, for example, the inﬂuence of

formal rules on legislators performance was most noticeable immediately after each of the

three transitions examined here. We saw that in 1991, the Assembly was quick to use its

newly won authority to to debate presidential nominees to government offices, and

rejected the nomination of Rodger Chongwe as Attomey-General. Since then, however,

the review process of presidential nominees has been degraded by Members' disinterest in

the review process. Though new rules inﬂuenced behavior immediatly after they were

implemented, the effect wore off as the review process became more routinized.

 

2

Recently, scholars have begun debating how, when and why consolidations occur. Rather than add

to what is quickly becoming an entangled and contentious debate, I prefer to use the deﬁnition of

consolidation put forward by Gunther, et. a1. (1996). A democratic regime should be considered

consolidated when "all political signiﬁcant groups regard its key political institutions as the only legitirnage

framework for political contestation, and adhere to democratic rules of the game. This deﬁnition thus

includes an attitudinal dimension, where in existing political institutions are regarded as acceptable and

without legitimate alternatives, as well as a behavioral criterion, according to which a speciﬁc set of nors is

respected and adhered to by all politically signiﬁcant groups." (1996, 152. See also Linz and Stepan,

1996)

363

One reason that the inﬂuence of rules wanes over time is the incremental

nature of constitutional changes made outside political transitions. The design of state

structures are rarely debated outside the context of a dramatic political transition. These

are usually the debates over which transitions occur. Consequently, their inﬂuence in

most noticeable in the post-transition phase, but is less able to explain behavioral changes

over time. In other words, the structural rules established during the transition process

have a long-term inﬂuence on the nature of the political behavior that follows in the

post-transition and consolidation phase.

For example, the myriad of constitutional amendments enacted by

President Kaunda after he took office in 1964 brought about no real shifts in the balance

of political power between executive, legislative and judicial branches. Instead, they are

better thought of as minor changes to administrative procedures within the context of a

powerful presidential regime. The 1964-1994 period was a period of structural continuity

in the Zambian constitution, punctuated by the introduction, revocation, and

re-introduction of a multi-party electoral system. How did this effect the performance of

the Zambian National Assembly? More speciﬁcally, were the institutional and individual

dimensions of parliamentary performance equally effected by this pattern of

constitutional reform? The answer is no.

Table 8.0 shows how formal rules affected the institutional and individual

dimensions of parliamentary performance in Zambia.

Table 8.0 -- Formal Rules and Parliamentary Performance in Zambia

 

Institutional Performance

Individual Performance

 

0 Presidential constitution ensures

0 Changes in house size increased the

executive branch control over

number of parliamentarians who

cabinet appointments and

participated in house debates.

government decision making.

Adopition of a one-party state

' Constitution limits Parliament's

brought more MP3 with business

authority to oversee executive

interests into the National Assembly

branch sponsored legislative

and, consequently, their

proposals.

performance in house debates.

9 Constitution limits Parliament's

Constitutional supremacy of

authority to amend annual budget

political parties in a

 

proposals, though 1991

amendments now allow debate on

military expenditures.

 

 

quasi-parliamentary regime allows

them to expel sitting MPs, forcing

them to relinquish their

parliamentary seats.

 

The ﬁrst column shows how structural rules shaped the macro-institutional

behavior of the Zambian National Assembly over time. The continuity in Zambia's

constitutional rules established a pattern of legislative performance that cut across all

seven Zambian legislatures. For example, Zambian constitutions have long prevented the

Assembly from scrutinizing presidential appointments, inﬂuencing the legislative

process, or effecting changes to annual government budgets. These procedures were

written in the independence constitution of 1964 and remained virtually unchanged across

the Second and Third Republics. When changes were introduced to these articles, their

inﬂuence on parliamentary performance was quick, but ﬂeeting.

Column two shows that structural rules had less inﬂuence on the behavior

of individual parliamentarians than did the second dimension of constitutional reform,

365

electoral rules. Electoral rules are more likely to affect parliamentarians' behavior, and

changes in electoral procedures better captured the dynamic nature of Zambian

parliamentarians' performance over time than did the structural rules. For example,

adoption of the one-party state favored UNIP candidates who were well known in their

locality. As a result, there was an inﬂux of MPs with business interests in the Assembly.

Their relative education and experience spurred an increase in Members' participation in

house debates that was previously unmatched.

Table 8.1 shows that formal rules effect institutional behavior. However,

the continuity in these formal rules makes neo-institutional explanations, especially

structural rules, ill-suited to explain changes in parliamentary performance over time.

Unlike the structural aspects of the Zambian constitution, there were more frequent

amendments to the electoral procedures by which political representatives were selected.

The most signiﬁcant such amendment was the President Kaunda's decision to suspend,

and later resurrect, a multi-party political system.

Even when structural changes were made to Zambian constitutions, they

had no appreciable inﬂuence on institutional performance. For example, Gupta (1965)

called the 1964 Assembly's authority to send legislative proposals to special tribunals for

additional review "the most important political safeguard given to the opposition." (50)

Unfortunately, this provision was never acted upon. The Assembly was equally unwilling

to scrutinize presidential nominees to government office after they were given the

authority to do so in 1991. Both of these examples suggest the irrelevance of formal rules

366

in shaping institutional behavior outside the broad, structural guidelines established in

founding constitutions.

Political transitions introduce uncertainty. F orrnal rules provide a

framework that reduces uncertainty and are, as a result, a key topic of debate during

political transitions. The neo-institutionalist perspective, however, often assumes that

institutional mechanisms affect all dimensions of performance equally, and at all times.

In other words, all varieties of political outcomes can be explained by careful attention to

the institutional arrangements. This is not necessarily the case.

Formal rules do inﬂuence some aspects of legislative performance, though

that inﬂuence is not universal. Structural rules are especially important during the

post-transition period, and are more helpful in explaining the institutional performance of

national legislatures rather than the behavior of individual legislators. Other institutional

rules, such as the electoral procedures by which representatives are elected, better explain

changes in individuals' performance, especially in the post-transition period.

Actors, Resources, and Difficult Tasks of Governing

However, an established constitutional framework does not ensure

politicians' willingness to be constrained by those rules. Formal rules guide political

behavior, within the context of existing administrative and political resources. Formal

rules can be ignored, subverted, overcome, dominated, or fail because the facilities,

physical capital, or social attitudes of the participants are not conducive to implementing

367

them. Neo-institutional theories can provide necessary, though not sufficient, explanation

of legislative performance. It is to those other issues that we now turn.

This study has shown that formal rules cannot fully account for the

variance in legislative performance either across time, as in Zambia, or across the new

democracies in sub-Saharan Aﬁica. Formal rules structured legislative performance,

especially in the post-transition period, but were unable to account for changes in

performance over time. As institutions are developed and behavior becomes routinized,

other factors better explain changing parliamentary behavior. Chapters Five and Six

examined the differential inﬂuence political actors and political resources had on

performance, especially the role of Assembly administrators and the inﬂuence of political

patronage.

Table 8.2 shows how National Assembly administration inﬂuenced

parliamentary performance in Zambia. Column one illustrates the ways in which

National Assembly administrative procedures, as interpreted by the Speaker of the

Assembly, inﬂuenced the performance of the assembly as a whole.

Neo-institutionalists might argue that the formal rules gave the Speaker

broad discretion to administer the assembly in the way he saw ﬁt. Technically, they

would be correct. However, the discretionary nature of the Speaker's decisions had the

most detrimental consequences on Zambian legislative behavior. Had the Speaker chose

to support the development of a more independent legislature he could have done so.

However, he did not.

368

For example, the Speaker was responsible for the decisions to: pass the

costs of preparing private members' Public Bills on individual back bench MPs;

determine the duration of parliamentary sittings; and underfund the work of parliamentary

committees. Each of these decisions were earlier shown to have prevented the Assembly

from establishing itself as an effective counterweight to executive authority.

Table 8.1 -- Assembly Administration and Parliamentary Performance in Zambia

 

Institutional Performance

Individual Performance

 

' Speaker prevents parliament from

0

Speaker's decisions limit

issuing private member's

parliamentarians' ability to

legislative proposals

participate in house debates

0 Speaker determines the duration

0

Speaker's office establishes the

and timing of parliamentary

parliamentary agenda, oversees

debates

the inclusion of members'

' Speaker prevents development of

proposals, motions, questions, and

independent research unit by

amendments

understaffing parliamentary

committees

0

Speaker's committee assignments

prevent the creation of viable

parliamentary system

 

 

 

 

Column two shows how assembly administrative decisions also limited the

performance of individual parliamentarians. The most pernicious inﬂuence the speaker

had on individuals' performance was in his control of house debates. By establishing the

agenda and manipulating parliamentary debate, the Speaker was able to control the

behavior of sitting MPs. Again, this authority is granted to the speaker by the constitution

and standing orders. Here too, however, the pernicious effect of this authority varied

based on the arbitrary and quixotic choices made by the Speaker.

369

Just as it is impossible to fully describe legislative performance in Zambia

without acknowledging the importance of assembly administration in shaping behavior,

the same argument must also be made for the inﬂuence of political patronage.

Table 8.3 -- Political Patronage and Parliamentary Performance in Zambia

 

Institutional Behavior

Individual Behavior

 

0 Patronage increases the size of the

0 Patronage increases members'

National Assembly

participation in house debates

0 Patronage limits Assemblies'

' Patronage induces opposition

willingness to issue independent

party MPs to "cross the ﬂoor" and

legislative proposals

join the ruling party.

 

' Patronage induces Members'

participation in house debates, but

the nature of their participation

changed from being supportive of

government programs in the First

Republic to more critical in the

Second.

 

 

 

Table 8.3 shows how political patronage affected the institutional and

individual dimensions of parliamentary performance. Unlike formal rules of

administrative organization, patronage theories are ill-suited to explain institutional

behavior within the National Assembly. Political patronage is, by deﬁnition, a

personalized relationship between political leaders and their clients. Consequently, it

should not be surprising that the relationship between political patronage and institutional

performance is limited. Patronage likely increased the size of the National Assembly.

However, connections between house size and institutional-performance, as opposed to

the behavior if individual MPs, are tenuous. The only evidence found in this study

370

between patronage and institutional-level behavior was a decreased propensity for the

house to challenge government's legislative proposals, though this could also have been

attributed to other factors, such as members' frustration with the Speaker, for example.

However, the full picture of individual parliamentarians' behavior cannot

be told without careful attention to the inﬂuence of political patronage. Earlier chapters

showed how members used house debates to compete for government ministries. Back

bench MPs who were given ministerial or deputy ministerial posts participated more

frequently in house debates, spoke to a greater number of issues, and asked more

questions before their promotion than did their counterparts. House debates provided

these MP3 with the chance maintain a high political proﬁle and attract the attention of

senior government ofﬁcials. Moreover, as a result of competition over these promotions,

the nature of the patronage relationship changed. Rather than distribute cabinet positions

to political loyalists, President Kaunda use these appointments to silence back bench

critics.

Conclusion

No one set of explanatory variables put forward here are sufficient to

account Zambian legislative performance over time. Some theories are more effective at

explaining what took place during the post-transition phase, while others are more useful

during the consolidation process. Some approaches can account for the performance of

individual legislators, while others cannot. In concert, however, these three theories tell

an interesting and compelling story of legislative development in a new democracy.

371

Formal rules are helpful in understanding institutional behavior, especially

immediatly after political transitions. However, these rules are unable to account for

changes in institutional behavior over time. The inﬂuence of National Assembly

administrative decisions goes far in shoring up those deﬁciencies. However, neither

theory can adequately explain the changing nature of individual parliamentarians'

behavior. For example, only through the lens of political patronage can the increased

participation and increasing controversy of Zambian National Assembly debates be

understood. Figures 8.1 and 8.2, presented below, summarize the arguments presented

here.

Figure 8.0 -- Inﬂuence of Three Explanations of Parliamentary Performance

During the Post-Transition Period

 

 

Institutional Performance

  
V ,

A

 

   

V

Formal rules

I

Assembly administration

Patronage

 

 

 

  

T

A

. 1

 

 

‘ A

v

L’ '

   
  

Individual performance

 

 

This ﬁgure compares the relative importance of formal rules,

administrative organization, and political patronage on legislative performance

 

372

immediately after a democratic political transition. As was discussed above, formal rules

are especially important after the transition when the patterns of institutional behavior are

being established after the democratic transition. The relative strength of this relationship

is highlighted in bold. The two other theoretical perspectives, administration and

patronage, still inﬂuence legislative performance, as the diagram shows. However, the

dashed lines illustrate the more limited effect they have on each dimension of

performance at the early stages of democratic consolidation.

Figure 8.1 illustrates how the importance of formal rules wane as the

consolidation phase progresses. Once the general rules have been established and the

political institutions have been created (revised) to accomodate them, other factors more

directly inﬂuence legislative performance, and are better able to explain changes in that

performance across time.

373

Figure 8.1 -- Inﬂuence of Three Explanations of Parliamentary Performance Performance

During the Consolidation Period

 

 

Institutional Performance

 
  

,1

I

r.

a

   

Formal rules

I

Assembly administration

liatronage

 

 

  

  
    

Individual performance

 

 

As the new democracy develops the relative inﬂuence of formal rules on

institutional behavior becomes less noticeable. Other variables, especially the

administrative procedures of the assembly administrators become dominant. The

inﬂuence of electoral rules still effects individual parliamentarians' behavior, though, here

too other explanations, such as patronage and assembly administration, better account for

changes over time.

This study has shown how political transitions inﬂuence legislative

performance and how legislative institutions develop in new democracies. Zambia's

adoption of a multi-party political regime in 1991 was used as a starting point. Zambian

political history encompasses three distinct periods: the multi-party First Republic

 

374

established at independence in 1964; the one-party Second Republic established in 1973;

and the multi-party Third Republic inaugurated by free, fair popular elections in 1991.

These changes provided a valuable laboratory in which to examine changes in legislative

performance across both time and political regime. Evidence showed that legislative

performance results from a mix of different inﬂuences: formal rules, administrative

procedures and patronage politics all shaped the behavior of Zambian National

Assemblies, though none alone encapsulates assembly performance.

This dissertation has also shown that scholars need to reﬁne their

understandings of the conditions under which our theories are applicable to different

dimensions of political behavior. For example, formal rules can explain continuity in

legislative performance, though they are ill-suited to explaining change. Administrative

organization helps us understand both institutional and individual-level legislative

performance, but is especially helpful after political transitions, during equilibrium

periods of "normal politics". Patronage theories provide important explanations of

individual-level behavior, especially in Aﬁica, though the Zambian case has shown that

.scholars need to reﬁne the concept of patronage, especially in the context of de facto or

de jure single-party regimes to take into account the use of criticism as a way to secure

the economic resources of political patrons.

Nor is Zambia alone in the process of legislative institution building.

Post-transition legislative developments in 17 other new democracies should serve as a

clarion call for scholars to reappraise the difﬁculties of political consolidation and the

contribution legislative development makes to establishing stable, long-lived democratic

375

regimes. Most African nations, it seems, are unprepared to develop governments with

clear and equal separations of power between executive, legislative, and judicial

branches. Seen in this light Africa must ﬁnd its own path to democracy, or risk being

stuck with quasi-democratic regimes led by authoritarian leaders ruling under the aegis of

participatory electoral systems.

APPENDIX

376

APPENDIX -- SURVEY METHODOLOGY

"‘

The survey simple contained responses from 51 sitting Members of Parliament

elected on or after the October 31, 1991 democratic elections. These responses were

collected from two sources. The ﬁrst source comprised 27 extended, in—depth interviews

with sitting MPs.

*

This group was a stratiﬁed random sample of the National Assembly as of the

date the survey was administered, March, 1225. Respondents were stratiﬁed by Me

grit—erg: political party afﬁliation, membership in the front or back bench, and the

rural/urban location of their constituency.

*

Members were grouped into these categories and individuals respondents were

randome chosen from among these criteria.

*

Members were contacted during National Assembly sittings in Qsakp and asked

to participate in the survey. I chose not to formally interview those members with whom

I had developed previous relationships or whom I had previously interviewed under less

formal circumstances. This was done in an attempt to avoid "interpreting" members

responses during these interviews.

*

The interviews were conducted in ﬁgLiLh (the "ofﬁcial language of the House")

during the Assembly's annual budget sitting at a location chosen by the Member. Most

often interviews were conducted at the Parliamentary Motel or at ministerial offices.

Interviews averaged between two and three hours in length and covered 140 different

question items. Three-quarters of the questions were pre-coded or Likert scale items, and

377

the other one-quarter were open ended. Since access to the Assembly is often difficult to

obtain, no additional survey enumerators were used to conduct the interviews. While

limiting the number of MPs which could be contacted, I believe this decision resulted in

more open responses than would have been generated had enumerators been used.

*

In order to increase the sample size of the survey, a shorter version of the

interview questionnaire was mailed to 75 members of the House immediately following

 

completion of the budget session in April, 1995.

*

*

This questionnaire was anonmous and Members were not obligated to respond.

This questionnaire was shorter and contained 55 of 140 items asked in the longer

 

version.

*

Members were asked to complete the questionnaire and return their responses in

pre-addressed, stamped envelopes. Approximately one-third of those contacted

completed the questionnaire and returned their responses.

*

Twenty-Four additional, valid responses that met the stratiﬁcation criteria were

collected from these returns.

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