

THE REGIMENTS: CULTURAL HISTORIES OF ZULU MASCULINITIES  
AND GENDER FORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1816-2018

By

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## ABSTRACT

### THE REGIMENTS: CULTURAL HISTORIES OF ZULU MASCULINITIES AND GENDER FORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1816-2018

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This dissertation reconstructs aspects of the history of Zulu martial heritage through the prism of the *amabutho* (regiments, age-grades) in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, from the era of Shaka Zulu (ca. 1816) to the present. Based on archival research and oral history interviews, this study argues that despite being outlawed by the British colonial regime in 1879, Zulu chiefs continued to form *amabutho*, but for different purposes. Regiments became youth structures for commercial labor recruitment and British military conscription; they enabled indigenous leaders to access martial discourse and metaphors for political mobilization; expressed cultural forms of resistance to state racism; and nurtured the sustenance of Zulu identities in a changing South Africa.

Exploring the *amabutho*'s links to the Zulu monarchy also helps to shed light on the evolving role and status of the Zulu Royal House. While both the white-run Natal and Union governments feared the influence that Shaka's successors held among Zulu-speaking Africans, the authorities also relied on Paramount Chief Solomon to recruit black volunteers from Natal and Zululand for World War I. In the apartheid era (1948-1994), the invocation of the Zulu nation's warrior legacy endured. As migrant laborers, Zulu men recreated their martial identities and manifestations of the *amabutho* became more abstract, emerging in society, culture, and politics in unexpected ways. As the struggle against apartheid intensified, the continued relevance of this martial heritage mobilized Zulu communities, bringing them in conflict with

first the African National Congress and later the United Democratic Front. In the post-apartheid period (1994-present), the rhetoric, symbolism, and practices of Zulu regiments continues to resonate and evolve. In the case of “high politics,” Zulu political leaders turn to martial metaphors to engender support, while, on the ground, local authorities throughout the province struggle to maintain the traditions that give these metaphors meaning. The historiographical significance of this dissertation is threefold. First, it extends earlier studies to consider Zulu martial masculinity over two centuries. Second, it uncovers how amabutho shaped, and have been shaped by, white anxieties about Zulu men’s “violent potential” as well as a need for cheap labor. Third, this dissertation reconsiders the shifting role of chiefs and kings in South Africa since 1800.

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In memory of Luyanda Ntshangase (1997-2018) and with respect and admiration for the young warriors of Izichwe Youth Football Club

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## KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
APC	Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army Military Veterans' Association
ARAT	Animal Rights Africa Trust
CNC	Chief Native Commissioner
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COGTA	Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
DNC	District Native Commissioner
GNLB	Government Native Labour Bureau
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Union yase Natal
ICWU	Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
KCAL	Killie Campbell Africana Library
KZLA	KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
MK	Umkhonto weSizwe (Spear of the Nation)
NAD	Native Affairs Department
NEAS	Non-European Army Services
NFP	National Freedom Party
NMC	Native Military Corps
NNC	Natal Native Contingent

NRC	Native Representative Council
PAR	Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defense Force
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SANLC	South African Native Labour Contingent
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SANT	South African Native Trust
SNA	Secretary for Native Affairs
TBD	Durban Archives Repository
TEBA	The Employment Bureau of Africa
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UAR	Ulundi Archives Repository
UDF	United Democratic Front
VMMC	Voluntary Medical Male Circumcisio




Figure 1: The KwaZulu-Natal Province

## Introduction

In July 2017, Zuma survived a vote of no-confidence by secret ballot in the South Africa's Parliament.<sup>1</sup> His days in office were numbered, however, as increasing splintering within the ANC, combined with a flailing economy and a lack of trust post-Marikana. In late February 2018, Jacob Zuma resigned from the Presidency following the selection of his Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, as the ANC's candidate for the 2019 Presidential Elections. Although Ramaphosa's selection did not necessitate his resignation, threats of a no-confidence vote in Parliament combined with looming criminal charges left the 75-year-old with few options. As his final televised address to the nation came to a close, Zuma signaled his reticence to come to this decision "to resign as president of the Republic with immediate effect, even though I disagree with the decision of the leadership of my organization."<sup>2</sup>

Zuma's decision to resign came after a tense period following the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as the President-Elect of the African National Congress.<sup>3</sup> Rumors also proliferated that Zuma planned to mobilize the *amabutho* to stage either a forceful takeover of the ANC from Ramaphosa and his supporters or to launch his own political party to threaten the dominant national party. For many, the threat of mobilizing the regiments brought to mind the horrific violence in Natal prior to the first democratic elections and the invocations of the *amabutho* by the IFP to keep ANC voters from the polls and ANC politicians from taking their seats in the

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<sup>1</sup> Simon Allison, "Jacob Zuma narrowly survives no-confidence vote in South African parliament," *The Guardian*, August 9, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/08/jacob-zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote-south-african-president> (accessed August 1, 2018).

<sup>2</sup> Norimitsu Onishi, "Jacob Zuma Resigns as South Africa's President," *New York Times*, February 14, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/world/africa/jacob-zuma-resigns-south-africa.html>, accessed April 11, 2018.

<sup>3</sup> Govan Whittles, "Hello Mr. President: Cyril Ramaphosa elected unopposed," *Mail & Guardian*, February 15, 2018, <https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-15-hello-mr-president-cyril-ramaphosa-elected-unopposed> (accessed August 1, 2018).



provincial government.<sup>4</sup> The South African Communist Party (SACP) condemned Zuma for this, accusing him of endorsing “tribalism” and “ethnic mobilization” in pursuit of “overstaying his welcome in office” in a February 2018 press release.<sup>5</sup>

The South African Communist Party condemns tribalism in the strongest terms possible and the ethnic mobilization, including that of *Amabutho* (Zulu regiments) that President Jacob Zuma has apparently engaged in as part of his plan to continue overstaying his welcome in office. The SACP reiterates its decision for President Zuma to resign and for the ANC to recall him if he remains intransigent by refusing to resign. The Constitution of our country requires the President to unite, and not to divide, our nation. President Zuma’s conduct is reckless and unacceptable. The SACP is calling on all South Africans to unite in defense of our country and not allow him to go down with our hard-won democracy.<sup>6</sup>

SACP urged all South Africans to “unite in defence of our country and not allow him to go down with our hard-won democracy.”<sup>7</sup> Zuma’s spokesperson, Bongani Ngqulanga, claimed that the SACP statement was preposterous and dismissed the organization’s claims. In addition to claims that Zuma planned to fire Ramaphosa and replace him with his ex-wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, “the allegations of ethnic mobilization by the president are equally without merit.”<sup>8</sup> Greg Nicholson writing for the *Daily Maverick* noted that while the threat of the mobilization of the *amabutho* was “outlandish,” he also urged readers to recognize that given his desperate situation, having been removed from office and facing considerable jail time if removed, “nothing is beyond question.”<sup>9</sup> A coalition comprised of the *Umbimbi Lwamabutho* (Coalition of the

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<sup>4</sup> Martin Plaut, “Jacob Zuma took South Africa to the precipice – and the ANC took it back,” *New Statesman*, February 15, 2018, <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/africa/2018/02/jacob-zuma-took-south-africa-precipice-and-anc-took-it-back>, accessed April 12, 2018.

<sup>5</sup> South African Communist Party, “SACP condemns ethnic mobilisation, challenges President Zuma to deny or confirm emerging information that, in pursuit of private interests, he is preparing to fire Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa,” February 6, 2018, <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=6530>, accessed April 12, 2018.

<sup>6</sup> SACP (2018).

<sup>7</sup> SACP (2018).

<sup>8</sup> Greg Nicholson, “SACP warns against Zuma’s last-ditch efforts to stay in power,” *Daily Maverick*, February 6, 2018, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-06-sacp-warns-against-zumas-last-ditch-efforts-to-stay-in-power/#.Ws-yA9Pwbft>, accessed April 12, 2018.

<sup>9</sup> Nicholson (2018).

Regiments), along with the Unemployed People's Trust and Black Land First, publicly voiced their support of Zuma and began arranging for a #HandsOffZuma march to counter the simultaneous #ZumaMustFall march. The participation of *Umbimbi Lwamabutho*, in particular, escalated concerns given their perceived connections to the regiments; in spite of this organization generally being recognized as nothing more than "an obscure Pietermaritzburg-based organization."<sup>10</sup>

For many, the threat of mobilizing the regiments brought to mind the ethnically motivated conflict that rocked South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. Martin Plaut writing for *The New Statesman* reflected on this connection in a piece published soon after Zuma's resignation.

It was a cry of desperation. Zuma has reveled in his Zulu roots. His supporters hailed him as '100 percent Zulu boy,' and he did nothing to dissuade them. But to mobilise the Zulu regiments would have taken matters to another level. Any South African who remembers the terrible events that surrounded the country's first non-racial election in 1994 will recall the slaughter that took place in KwaZulu-Natal. The Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party mobilised the regiments to try to keep the ANC from taking seats in the province. Thousands died in the clashes.<sup>11</sup>

This study of Zulu *amabutho* (age-grades, regiments) attempts to address why Zuma's threat of the regiments invoked both public fear and loyal support in early 2018. In a review essay on rebellious youth in colonial Africa, Richard Waller wrote that "traditions that emphasize continuity . . . conceal conflict and rebellion but also deny both the legitimacy of any youthful critique of gerontocracy and the existence of alternative theories of power."<sup>12</sup> Looking to the

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<sup>10</sup> Carien du Plessis, "ANC's 106th: Birthday cake approaching, it is still about unity – and KZN," *Daily Maverick*, January 7, 2018, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-07-ancs-106th-birthday-cake-approaching-it-is-still-about-unity-and-kzn/#.Ws-489Pwbfs>, accessed April 12, 2018.

<sup>11</sup> Martin Plaut, "Jacob Zuma took South Africa to the precipice – and the ANC took it back," *The New Statesman*, February 15, 2018, <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/africa/2018/02/jacob-zuma-took-south-africa-precipice-and-anc-took-it-back> (accessed December 1, 2018).

<sup>12</sup> Richard Waller, "Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa," *The Journal of African History* 47, 1 (2006), 90-91.

past, he argued, “reminds us that images of defiance have had their own generations of change”<sup>13</sup>

This dissertation examines Zulu regiments in this framework, tracking how the *amabutho* have, indeed, “had their own generations of change.”

By tracking permutations of Zulu martial heritage from the era of legendary Zulu founder Shaka Zulu (ca. 1787-1828) to the present-day through the prism of the *amabutho*, I argue against scholarship claiming that the Zulu regiments ceased to hold any relevance following their abolition by the British colonial state in 1789. And, indeed, while the *amabutho* were officially outlawed in 1879, Zulu chiefs continued to form *amabutho*, utilizing these youth structures for labor recruitment and military conscription, as well as accessing metaphors associated with *amabutho* to garner political support, vocalize resistance to state-sponsored racism, and express their identities as Zulu in a new South Africa.

This study builds on existing scholarship on Zulu identity formation, masculinity, and traditional authority. I make three arguments. First, my dissertation builds on other studies of martial masculinity throughout Africa which feature manifestations of these traditions in response to particular stimuli cross time.<sup>14</sup> This study builds on and goes beyond these studies by taking a more macro-approach in examining Zulu martial masculinity across the *longue durée*, showing the varied expressions of this tradition in different eras and illustrating the evolutions of Zulu martial identit(ies) in response to social, political, and economic pressures to the present day. Though a few studies have tracked the history of Zulu warriors during the precolonial era,

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<sup>13</sup> Waller (2006), 90-91.

<sup>14</sup> Ali A. Mazrui, “The Warrior Tradition and the Masculinity of War,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 12, 1 (1977), 69-81; Ali A. Mazrui (ed.), *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977); Ali A. Mazrui, “The Social Origins of Ugandan Presidents: From King to Peasant Warrior,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 8, 1 (1974), 3-23; Ali A. Mazrui, “The Resurrection of the Warrior Tradition in African Political Culture,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 13, 1(1975), 67-84; Dorothy Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Cultural Politics of Maasai Development* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

none of them have traced this institution beyond their abolition in 1879; instead, many studies have focused on uses of martial identity by different parties in different historical moments.<sup>15</sup> This dissertation links these approaches to reconstruct the evolution of a critical institution of social reproduction from its origins to the present-day. By taking this approach, this study not only complicates understandings of this institution in South Africa, but calls for attention to be held in similar contexts throughout the African continent.<sup>16</sup>

Second, my dissertation also explores the complicated relationship between white anxieties over the violent potential of young African men in Natal and Zululand and their need for access to this same demographic for labor and social control. By exposing these conflicting views of Africans as threatening but also essential to political and economic successes, this dissertation shows how the *amabutho* as an institution has been shaped as much by white anxieties as by any African proclivities to violence, a phenomenon extending to the present day. Furthermore, this dissertation builds on studies like Paul Ocobock's *An Uncertain Age* (2017),

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<sup>15</sup> John Laband, *Zulu Warriors: The Battle for the Southern African Frontier* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Ian Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army, from Shaka to Cetshwayo, 1818-1879* (London: Green Hill Books, 1995); Thembisa Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004); Gerhard Maré, *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992); Monique Marks, *Young Warriors: Youth Politics, Identity and Violence in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001).

<sup>16</sup> Other studies have investigated African age-sets, but have tended to focus on age-sets in East Africa and have been restricted to very limited chronological time-frames. E. Evans Pritchard, "The Nuer: Age Sets," *Sudan Notes and Records* 19, no. 2 (1936), 233-269; P.P. Howell, "The Age-Set System and the Institution of 'Nak' Among the Nuer," *Sudan Notes and Records* 29, no. 2 (1948), 172-182; S.N. Eisenstadt, "African Age Groups: A Comparative Study," *Africa* 24, no. 2 (1954), 100-113; Otto Bischofberger, *The Generation Classes of the Zanak* (Fribourg: University Press, 1972); R.F. Morton, "The Structure of East-African Age-Set Systems," *Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies* 1, no. 2 (1979), 77-102; Paul Spencer, *The Maasai of Matapato: A study of rituals of rebellion* (New York: Routledge, 1988); Toru Komma, "Peacemakers, Prophets, Chiefs & Warriors: Age-Set Antagonism as a Factor of Political Change among the Kipsigis of Kenya," in *Conflict, age & power in North East Africa: age systems in transition*, ed. Eisei Kurimoto and Simon Simonse (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998), 186-205; Meredith McKittrick, *To Dwell Secure: Generation, Christianity, and Colonialism in Ovamboland* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002); Paul Spencer, *Time, Space, and the Unknown: Maasai configurations of power and providence* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Susanne Eppe, *The Bashada of Southern Ethiopia: A Study of Age, Gender and Social Discourse* (Cologne: Rudiker Koppe Verlag, 2010); A. Adeyemi-Suenu, "Age Grade System and the Politics of Development and Social Cohesion in Ikoroduland," *International Journal of Research in Economics and Social Sciences* 6, no. 7 (2016), 166-172.

which illustrated how “the British found age and masculinity powerful cultural tools with which they communicated their power.”<sup>17</sup>

Finally, I argue that the *amabutho*’s linkages to the Zulu royal house also provide a window for tracking the changing role and status of traditional authorities in African politics and society. Given the *amabutho*’s connections to traditional authorities at the most basic level, a study of this institution necessitates a consideration of the shifting role of chiefs and kings in South Africa from the precolonial era to the present. While on a local level, the proliferation of martial masculinity among Zulu speakers reflects a shared heritage, it also reflects the insecurities felt by traditional authorities who turned to *amabutho* to display their ability to garner support and protect their status in rapidly changing circumstances. In particular, studying *amabutho* sheds light on the changing status of the Zulu Royal House. While state authorities feared the influence that Shaka’s successors held among Zulu speakers, they also recognized the potential for utilizing these figureheads as leverage for their own ends. By tracking each of these shifts over the *longue durée*, my research builds upon the growing literature on African militarism while simultaneously shedding new light on the socio-cultural dimensions of Zulu identities and their changing and contested nature.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Paul Ocobock, *An Uncertain Age: The Politics of Manhood in Kenya* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017): 6. Other studies illustrating how colonial projects utilized age and gender as tools of control: Lynn M. Thomas, *Politics of the Womb: Women, Reproduction, and the State in Kenya* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Abosede A. George, *Making Modern Girls: A History of Girlhood, Labor, and Social Development in Colonial Lagos* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014).

<sup>18</sup> Robert S. Smith, *Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1976); John K. Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa 1500-1800* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999); John Lamphear, *The Traditional History of the Jie of Uganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976); Amina Mama and Margo Okazawa-Rey, ‘Militarism, Conflict and Women’s Activism in the Global Era: Challenges and Prospects for Women in Three West African Contexts’, *Feminist Review*, 101 (2012), 97-123; Patricia McFadden, ‘Plunder as Statecraft: Militarism and Resistance in Neocolonial Africa’, in *Security Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race and Militarization*, ed. by Barbara Sutton, Sandra Morgen, and Julie Novkov (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008), pp.136-156; Alicia C. Decker, *In Idi Amin’s Shadow: Women, Gender, and Militarism in Uganda* (Athens Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014); Suad M. E. Musa, Hawks & Doves in Sudan’s Armed Conflict: *Al-Kakkamat Baggara Women in Darfur* (London: James Currey, 2018); Jacklyn Cock, *Colonels & Cadres: War & Gender in South Africa* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991).

From the birth of the discipline, African history has engaged with and questioned the notions of “tribe” and “ethnicity.” In the face of colonial (and then academic) attempts to force them into neat molds along ethnic lines, African peoples rejected, adopted, and adapted these definitions for their own purposes, showing great innovations and imaginations along the way. European colonial forces may have invented ethnic tradition, but Africans used it for their own purposes (and continue to up to this day). In the Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm’s *The Invention of Tradition*, the topic of “invented traditions” was first addressed as a concept; one defined by Hobsbawm defined as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”<sup>19</sup> The volume’s contributors explored this concept over a variety of geographic locations, including by noted Africanist historian, Terence Ranger. Ranger’s contribution to the volume, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” explored the ways in which “the invented traditions of African societies—whether invented by the Europeans or by Africans themselves in response—distorted the past but became in themselves realities through which a good deal of colonial encounter was expressed.”<sup>20</sup> One such invention, the primary one in fact, was ethnicity. Although colonial officials found it useful to group Africans into neat tribes for their own purposes, Ranger argued that:

...far from there being a single ‘tribal’ identity, most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities, defining themselves at one moment as subject to this chief, at another moment as a member of that cult, at another moment as part of this clan and at yet another moment as an initiate in that professional guild. These overlapping networks of association and exchange extend over wide areas. Thus

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<sup>19</sup> Erik Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Tradition,” in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. by T. Ranger and E. Hobsbawm (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 1.

<sup>20</sup> Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa” in *The Invention of Tradition*, (1983): 212.

the boundaries of the 'tribal' polity and the hierarchies of authority within them did *not* define conceptual horizons of Africans.<sup>21</sup>

Ranger argues that taking these complexities seriously is of central importance for historians, who are tasked with freeing "themselves from the illusion that the African custom recorded by officials or by many anthropologists is any sort of guide to the African past," while also appreciating "how much invented traditions of all kinds have to do with the history of Africa in the twentieth- century."<sup>22</sup>

The complexities of these histories, however, are not to be viewed as a hindrance, but rather as a signal of the importance of these concepts for understanding the African past and responses to colonial attempts at control. One of the works that Ranger used to bolster his argument was John Iliffe's *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (1979). Iliffe fell into a larger school of thought that connected ethnicity to understanding the nature of indirect rule. In his study of Tanganyika, Iliffe found that

The notion of the tribe lay at the heart of indirect rule in Tanganyika. Refining the racial thinking common in German times, administrators believed that every African belonged to a tribe, just as every European belonged to a nation. The idea doubtless owed much to the Old Testament, to Tacitus and Caesar, to academic distinctions between tribal societies based on status and modern societies based on contract, and to the post-war anthropologists who preferred 'tribal' to the more pejorative word 'savage'. Tribes were seen as cultural units 'possessing a common language, a single social system, and an established common law'. Their political and social systems rested on kinship. Tribal membership was hereditary. Different tribes were related genealogically...As unusually well-informed officials knew, this stereotype bore little relation to Tanganyika's kaleidoscopic history, but it was the shifting sand on which Cameron and his disciples erected indirect rule by 'taking the *tribal* unit'. They had the power and they created the political geography.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Ranger (1983), 248.

<sup>22</sup> Ranger (1983), 262.

<sup>23</sup> John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979): 323-324.

This conceptualization of tribalism by British officials in Tanganyika, Iliffe showed, bore little relation to reality. As recent studies of precolonial Buganda, by Elliott Green and Neil Kodesh, have shown, ethnic identities were the byproducts of local and regional affiliations, including spiritual communities, that coalesced into the “tribes” recognized by colonial officials.<sup>24</sup> However, Tanganyikans flipped this system on its head, using “tribes to function within the colonial framework...the new political geography” that “would have been transient had it not coincided with similar trends among Africans.”<sup>25</sup> The central error of Europeans, in this case, was that “Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes,” while, in reality, “Africans built tribes to belong.”<sup>26</sup> This very early statement on the nature of ethnicity as a tool to be used by Africans against colonizers would continue to be a central trope as the debates continued into the 1990s and beyond.

Ranger returned to these issues a decade later in an essay entitled, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa.” In this essay, Ranger explored the course of debates over tradition in African history since the publication of *The Invention of Tradition*, focusing especially on the impact of the discourse over “invented tradition” on ethno-history. Jan Vansina’s *Paths in the Rainforest* represented the school of “invention by tradition”; that is, Vansina argues that traditions exist only in the *longue durée*, even while the product of change and innovation.<sup>27</sup> Ranger places Steven Feierman’s study of the Shambaa in opposition to Vansina, noting long-term continuities are the result of change, not some mystic permanence of a cultural continuity:

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<sup>24</sup> Elliott Green, “Ethnicity and Nationhood in Precolonial Africa: The Case of Buganda.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 16, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 1-21; Neil Kodesh, *Beyond the Royal Gaze: Clanship and Public Healing in Buganda*. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010).

<sup>25</sup> Iliffe (1979), 324.

<sup>26</sup> Iliffe (1979), 324.

<sup>27</sup> Jan Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).



...a sense that the continuity of a cultural form is unexceptional and expected, that it is passively accepted by the people who use it. [Yet] when people select a particular form of discourse...this is by no means a passive act...Long-term continuities in political language are the outcome of radical social change and of struggle within peasant society.<sup>28</sup>

Ranger preferred Feierman's pluralistic approach, using it as a basis from which to conceive of "imagined traditions" as opposed to the "invention of tradition," an approach that recognized the ways in which "customary law and ethnicity and religion and language were *imagined*, by many different people and over a long time. These multiple imaginations were in tension with each other and in constant contestation to define the meaning of what had been imagined—to imagine it further."<sup>29</sup>

Imagining ethnicity, or rather creating it, was also the focus of Leroy Vail's *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (1991). In this volume, Vail argued for the recognition of ethnic consciousness as an ideology that was created over time. One particular impetus for the creation of this consciousness was disruption. "Rapid social and economic change eroded political relationships based on clientage," Vail explained, "This erosion in turn opened the way for new forms of consciousness throughout the region."<sup>30</sup> Through adopting this approach, Vail attempted to illustrate that this new ethnic consciousness had its roots in earlier forms of consciousness, since "ethnicity could co-exist with other types of consciousness without apparent unease because it was cultural and hence based on involuntary ascription, not on personal choice."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 3.

<sup>29</sup> Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa," in *Legitimacy and the Colonial State in 20<sup>th</sup> Century Africa*, ed. by T. Ranger and O. Vaughan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 81.

<sup>30</sup> Leroy Vail, "Preface" in *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*, ed. by L. Vail (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 11.

<sup>31</sup> Vail (1991), 11

Working from this new understanding, Ranger returned to the issue of ethnicity. In his work on the Ndebele of Zimbabwe, Ranger critiqued his own idea that Ndebele ethnicity was a colonial invention, arguing for the need to also acknowledge the adaptation of this ethnic identity by Ndebele for their own purposes. This represented a broader shift in the literature that explored the “rare instances” in which “there was no need to have colonial capitalism in order to invent, or imagine, ethnicity.”<sup>32</sup> In these cases, Ranger argued, “African intellectuals could privilege ethnic discourse over all others by a process which was entirely internal to their societies.”<sup>33</sup> Ranger pointed to the example of the Zulu people of South Africa as one of these “rare instances” of African intellectuals shaping ethnic discourse for their own interests.

In *War of Words, War of Stones* (2011), Jonathon Glassman argues against the common presumption that “ethnic conflict arose more or less automatically from social structures that had been bolstered or even created outright by colonial rule: its emphasis is not on indigenous thinkers but on European policy makers who defined and divided their subjects by race and ethnicity.”<sup>34</sup> Here, Glassman stands in stark contrast to Mahmood Mamdani who, in *When Victims Become Killers* (2001), used the manipulation of ethnicity by Europeans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century as the central explanation for the outbreak of violence in the Great Lakes region in the early 1990s.<sup>35</sup> Instead, for Glassman, the rise of racial thought was the result not of European intervention, but rather indigenous intellectual thought. “The rise of racial thought in colonial Zanzibar was largely the work of indigenous intellectuals, including those at the forefront of mainstream nationalism, who in their debates and disputations created a

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<sup>32</sup> Ranger (1993), 86.

<sup>33</sup> Ranger (1993), 86.

<sup>34</sup> Jonathon Glassman, *War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011): 7.

<sup>35</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001).

locally hegemonic discourse of racial difference,” Glassman contended, “Rather than obstacles standing in the way of nationalists’ efforts to build a civil order, in other words, the attachments of blood and tradition had been created in part by the nationalists’ own efforts.”<sup>36</sup> Joseph Miller echoed this understanding, arguing in a 1999 article for the *American Historical Review*, explaining, “African politicians and intellectuals created ethnicity itself by manipulating supple collective identities to meet historical circumstances.”<sup>37</sup> In the case of Glassman’s study, African intellectuals manipulated these identities to incite violence.

The Zulu have become a major focus of studies of ethnicity, not least because of the contemporary preeminence of “Zulu” as a political and gendered identity as much as an ethnic one. John Wright built his career on exploring the complexity of Zulu ethnic identity formation, leaving behind an opus of articles and monographs on this topic. In “Politics, Ideology, and the Invention of ‘Nguni’,” Wright argued that while Nguni once referred to a number of small chiefdoms in Zululand, Shaka claimed the label in order to establish a lineage for himself and to portray himself as legitimate, not “as the upstart head of a potentially unstable conquest state.”<sup>38</sup> Shaka also worked to establish cultural and linguistic uniformity, “with non-Zulu patterns of speech and behaviour being officially discouraged in favor of Zulu ones.”<sup>39</sup> Wright moved into new lines of thought with his student, Carolyn Hamilton, in a study of the amaLala ethnic identity in Zululand, an example of an identity that developed, in Ranger’s understanding, because “differentiation *within* political economies was required.”<sup>40</sup> As opposed to theories that emphasized the use of force by the Zulu state in incorporating other groups, “the *amalala*

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<sup>36</sup> Glassman (2011), 7.

<sup>37</sup> Joseph C. Miller, “History and Africa/Africa and History,” *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 1 (1999), 17.

<sup>38</sup> John Wright, “Politics, Ideology, and the Invention of the ‘Nguni’,” in *Resistance and Ideology in Settler Societies* ed. by Tom Lodge (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986).

<sup>39</sup> Wright (1986).

<sup>40</sup> Ranger (1993), 88

emerged in the 1820s as an ethnically-defined category of peripherally situated peoples who were incorporated into the Zulu kingdom on quite a different basis from the chiefdoms of the kingdom's heartland. In so far as they recognise its existence at all, previously developed theories of the kingdom's formation cannot adequately account for this differentiation."<sup>41</sup> The "lala" label came to be adopted for a variety of purposes, from different chiefdoms to distinguish themselves to Christian-educated elite to set themselves apart from the "savage" Zulu.

While none of these studies deny the role of outside parties, like colonial administrators and anthropologists, in solidifying these ethnic labels, their studies clearly show the role of Africans themselves in using identities for their own purposes.<sup>42</sup> Michael Mahoney's *The Other Zulus* (2012) explores the history of one group, the amaQwabe, whose history has been subsumed under the Zulu ethnic identifier, aiming to unearth their stories from those of the Zulu mega-ethnicity.<sup>43</sup> Other scholars are working on similar recoveries of histories beyond Zuluness, while a parallel school continues to work on Zulu history as a broader category. More recent work on Zuluness has focused on individual expressions of *ubuZulu bethu*. This idiom, literally meaning "Our Zuluness," reflects the constantly shifting meanings and practices of this ethnic identity; far from singular, scholars have shown, through historical, linguistic, and cultural analysis, the ways in which individuals and groups have constructed their own Zulu identities.

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<sup>41</sup> Carolyn Hamilton and John Wright, "The Making of the AmaLala: Ethnicity, Ideology and Relations of Subordination in a Precolonial Context," *South African Historical Journal* 22, no. 1 (1990), 3-23.

<sup>42</sup> Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998); James Stuart, Colin de B. Webb, and John B. Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, Manuscript Series - Killie Campbell Africana Library v.1-6 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1976); Dan Wylie, *Myth of Iron: Shaka in History* (Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006); Dan Wylie, *Savage Delight: White Myths of Shaka* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000).

<sup>43</sup> Michael R. Mahoney, *The Other Zulus: The Spread of Zulu Ethnicity in Colonial South Africa* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012).

This applies not only to ethnic identity as broadly defined, but also to gender identities rooted in ethnic nationalism and culture.

This dissertation builds from an understanding of Zuluness as a framework that “captures the shared narratives, hybrid expressions and contradictory meanings of ‘our Zuluness’ which different actors espouse or discard over time.”<sup>44</sup> The association of this concept with the time in which it is invoked is key. According to historian John Wright, ethnic identity “is never a fixed, primordial form of identity, but one which is always a product of historical processes.”<sup>45</sup> As explained by Gerhard Maré, Zuluness is “characterized by a sense of history and origin that gives coherence and legitimacy to the present existence of the group . . . it is backward-looking, seeking continuity for a confirmation of the present.”<sup>46</sup> In this way, Zulu identity connects “social identity and historical memory which changed in different eras in response to social, cultural, and political shifts.”<sup>47</sup> At the turn of the twentieth century, as the mineral revolution of the 1870s rocked the foundation of Zulu homestead life, young men turned to “resurrecting symbols of a legendary era when a formidable Zulu patriarchy, founded by Shaka Zulu, had slowed the pace of colonial encroachment,” symbols that Benedict Carton argues represents “the binding myths of the state itself, the cultural focus around which the community adhered.”<sup>48</sup> These myths, John Laband contends, closely linked Zuluness to “masculine virtue and honor . . . closely bound up with the process of military heroes . . . [representing] the binding myths of the

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<sup>44</sup> Benedict Carton, “Introduction: Zuluness in the Post- and Neo-worlds,” in Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (eds.), *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 4.

<sup>45</sup> John Wright, “Reflections on the Politics of Being ‘Zulu’,” in Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (eds.), *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 35.

<sup>46</sup> Maré (1992), 14.

<sup>47</sup> Scot A. French, “What Is Social Memory?,” *Southern Cultures* 2, 1 (1995), 9.

<sup>48</sup> Benedict Carton, *Blood from Your Children: The Colonial Origins of Generational Conflict in South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 151.

state itself, the cultural focus around which the community adhered.”<sup>49</sup> Those “binding myths” gained contemporary relevance in the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup>-century with the reign of Solomon kaDinuzulu and the crystallization of a new Zulu nationalism, symbolized in the formation of the short-lived Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe.<sup>50</sup>

This new era of Zuluness struck a delicate balance between traditional culture and new African nationalism, Shula Marks argues, rendering this ethnic identity as “the product of intense ideological labor by the black intelligentsia of Natal and the white ideologues of South Africa, designed to confront new and dangerous social conditions.”<sup>51</sup> Paul la Hausse takes this a step further in *Restless Identities* (2000), arguing that “African nationalism in Natal and Zululand emerged in a series of political negotiations between different sections of a regional elite and members of the Zulu rural and urban underclasses.”<sup>52</sup> These negotiations drew upon “a number of political models assimilable within a synthetic historicising consciousness.”<sup>53</sup> This model provided a strong foundation for the revival of Inkatha in the 1970s under the leadership of Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Buthelezi turned to tradition, especially genealogical history and praise poetry, to establish his own legitimacy and that of his organization, mobilize supporters, and working with and against Zwelithini.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Laband (2014), 12.

<sup>50</sup> Nicholas Cope, *To Bind the Nation: Solomon kaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993); Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>51</sup> Shula Marks, ‘Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness,’ in L. Vail, eds, *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 216.

<sup>52</sup> Paul la Hausse, *Restless Identities: Signatures of Nationalism, Zulu Ethnicity and History in the Lives of Petros Lamula (c. 1881–1948) and Lymon Maling (1889–c.1936)* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000), 261.

<sup>53</sup> la Hausse (2000), 261.

<sup>54</sup> Liz Gunner and Mafika Gwala (eds.), *Musho! Zulu Popular Praises* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1991); Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (London: Zed Books, 1988).

Just as Zuluness shifted in response to external stimuli in different epochs, so too did the invented traditions upon which this ethnic identity was founded. These seemingly unchanging “traditions” represented as much of a historical evolution as the Zulu identity inherently connected to these seemingly unchanging practices. Leroy Vail has shown that ethnicity is, after all, “a natural cultural residue but a carefully crafted ideological creation.”<sup>55</sup> So too are traditions which, according to Erik Hobsbawm, “seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition . . . automatically impl[ying] continuity with the past.”<sup>56</sup> These inventions allowed Africans in KwaZulu-Natal and beyond to inhabit “multiple identities,” while also blurring “the boundaries of the ‘tribal’ polity and the hierarchies of authority within them.”<sup>57</sup>

The revival and revitalization of certain cultural practices across time for various purposes could even be framed as ‘imagined tradition[s],’ a concept promoted by Terence Ranger referring to the ways in which ethnicity, in addition to language, religion, and customary law, “were *imagined*, by many different people and over a long time. These multiple imaginations were in tension with each other and in constant contestation to define the meaning of what had been imagined—to imagine it further.”<sup>58</sup> At the same time, history shows that there are limits to the inventions of historical actors. As Thomas Spear argues, “what gives tradition, custom and ethnicity their coherence and power is the fact that they lay deep in peoples’ popular consciousness, informing them of who they are and how they should act.”<sup>59</sup> Imagined or not,

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<sup>55</sup> Leroy Vail, “Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African History,” in Leroy Vail (ed), *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 7.

<sup>56</sup> Erik Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Tradition,” in Terence Ranger and Erik Hobsbawm (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.

<sup>57</sup> Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa,” in Terence Ranger and Erik Hobsbawm (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 248.

<sup>58</sup> Terence Ranger, “The invention of tradition revisited: the case of Africa,” in Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan (eds.), *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 81.

<sup>59</sup> Thomas Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa,” *The Journal of African History* 44, 1(2003), 26.

Zuluness continues to be an important concept, as Mbongiseni Buthelezi argues, since “the belief in being Zulu . . . constitutes part of post-apartheid society, which is why calls for greater national belonging should not simply dismiss Zulu cultural chauvinism as a tired relic of colonialism.”<sup>60</sup> This dissertation critically interrogates the changing nature of Zulu identity from the era of its crystallization under Shaka to its current expression under the reign of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu.

In the contemporary era, indigenous/ethnic identities maintain relevance, both in their meanings (as shown in the examples above), as well as their uses in contemporary politics and economics. As seen earlier in the discussion of Zulu ethnicity, Shaka adopted the Nguni framework to support his claims to legitimacy. In more recent times, Zulu nationalism has become both a political and gendered identity, as well as a consumer product. In *Ethnicity, Inc.* (2009), Jean and John Comaroff tracked the “ethnic incorporation” of the Zulu, a phenomenon that “rides on a process of homogenization and abstraction: *the Zulu...for all their internal divisions, become one; their ‘lifeways,’ withdrawn from time or history, congeal into object-form, all the better to conceive, communicate, and consume.*”<sup>61</sup> While ethnic identity, in their conceptualization, is still very much a real thing, “the stuff of existential passion, of the self-conscious fashioning of meaningful, morally anchored selfhood,” they argued that “ethnicity is *also* becoming more corporate, more commodified, more implicated than ever before in the economics of everyday life.”<sup>62</sup> The growth of a tourist industry predicated on selling Zulu identity in the KwaZulu-Natal province, in addition to the construction of theme parks selling

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<sup>60</sup> Mbongiseni Buthelezi, “The Empire Talks Back: Re-Examining the Legacies of Shaka and Zulu Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” in Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (eds.), *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 31.

<sup>61</sup> John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnicity, Inc.* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2009): 58.

<sup>62</sup> Comaroff and Comaroff (2009), 1.



Zulu-ness shows that ethnicity is, in fact, a business. In the case of the Maasai, there has been a similar commodification of ethnicity, one that benefits not only from tourist dollars, but also from the development politics of the neoliberal order, as Dorothy Hodgson showed in *Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous* (2011).<sup>63</sup> So, beyond, the realm of academia, perhaps ethnic labels endure because they continue to be meaningful to the people to whom they are attributed; the reasons why they are meaningful are not for us to judge, but rather for us to study and appreciate.

Not just intellectuals, but also leaders, used and, sometimes, discarded ethnicity for their own purposes. Chieftaincy has been another prism through which scholars have explored the uses of ethnicity by Africans for various purposes. In this literature, chiefs, not ethnic identities, operate as the primary impetus for collective identification and loyalty. Sara Berry, in her collection of essays on land in Ghana, found that in the midst of conflict over access to land, British officials attempted to reduce the legitimacy of chiefly authority and customary law to little effect, since “most land in Asante remains subject to multiple, overlapping claims and continued debate.”<sup>64</sup> Richard Rathbone also found that chieftaincy complicated understandings of ethnicity and identity in Ghana. Chiefs, he found, “always exemplified place and identity for many Ghanaians.” Ghanaians maintained strong ties to their places of origin, “attachments . . . not nearly explained by sledgehammer concepts such as primordial ties or slippery ideas like ethnicity.”<sup>65</sup> Given that chieftaincies were creations of the colonial state, the evolution of these

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<sup>63</sup> Dorothy L. Hodgson, *Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous: Postcolonial Politics in a Neoliberal World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).

<sup>64</sup> Sara Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996*. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2001), 145.

<sup>65</sup> Richard Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-60*, Western African Studies (Accra : Athens : Oxford: F. Reimmer ; Ohio University Press ; James Currey, 2000): 65.

institutions from colonial tools of control to beacons of identity for Ghanaians signals the fluid nature of these concept, open to reinterpretation and adaptation by those it was meant to control.

The revisionist history movement in response to the radicalization of South African society in the 1970s and the militarization of society in the 1980s resulted in a shift towards African perspectives and important studies on state-formation across South African chiefdoms.<sup>66</sup> The creation and manipulation of chieftaincies by colonial administrations has been demonstrated to illustrate the policy of indirect rule as empowering chiefs while simultaneously bringing their legitimacy into question.<sup>67</sup> Recent studies by Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama and Jill Kelly's on *ukukhonza* (to pay allegiance to) complicate these earlier studies, demonstrating the complicated relationships between chiefs, subjects and land beyond the purview of the colonial state and white authorities.<sup>68</sup>

Land occupies a central position in scholarship on chieftaincy and traditional authority in South Africa, particularly with the current land debate in South Africa. The institutionalization of the chieftaincies post-1994, Lungusile Ntsebeza argues in *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa* (2005), has been predicated on control over land

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<sup>66</sup> Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879- 1884* (University of Kwazulu Natal Press, 1979); Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (London: Longman, 1980); Peter Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Transvaal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); J. B Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of their Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Philip Bonner, *Kings, Commoners, and Concessionaires: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Kevin Shillington, *The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900* (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1985); J. B Peires, *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle- Killing Movement of 1856-7* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

<sup>67</sup> John Wright, *The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand-Natal: A History* (Ladysmith: Ladysmith Historical Society, 1983); Absolom Vilakazi, *Zulu Transformations: A Study of the Dynamics of Social Change* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1962); D. H Reader, *Zulu Tribe in Transition: The Makhanya of Southern Natal* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966).

<sup>68</sup> Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama, "Redefining Amakhosi Authority from 'Personal to Territorial': An Historical Analysis of the Limitations of Colonial Boundaries on African Socio-Political Relations in Natal's Maphumulo/Lower Thukela Region, 1890-1910" (M.A. thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012); Jill E. Kelly, "Only the Fourth Chief: Conflict, Land, and Chiefly Authority In 20th Century KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa" (PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University, 2012); Jill E. Kelly, *To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2018).

distribution. Though his study focuses on the chieftaincy in Xhalanga (Eastern Cape), his study stands as a critique of the generalization of traditional authority in South Africa, detailing how chiefs in certain times and places varied in their office and approach over time, especially post-1994.<sup>69</sup> The Constitution of 1996 recognized traditional leaders, although their rights remained ambiguous until the passing of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act and Communal Land Right Acts of 2003, based on pressure from the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa).<sup>70</sup> J. Michael Williams' work illustrates the divide between supporters of the chieftaincy who see it as a crucial component of democracy, while its detractors see it as essentially antagonistic to that idea.<sup>71</sup> The ten South African kings occupy a similar perilous position, with some viewing them as essential to the functioning of democracy and many others viewing kingships as an outdated institution full of corrupt tyrants. The Zulu kingship, in particular, highlights all of these concerns as Goodwill Zwelithini enjoys massive popular support and near constant critical oversight due to his hefty government salary and his lavish lifestyle. Little substantive scholarship has been done on the reign of the current Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, to this point, save for an authorized biography which reads more like hagiography than biography.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Lungusile Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

<sup>70</sup> Phathekile Holomisa, *According to Tradition: A Cultural Perspective on Current Affairs* (Somerset West: Essential Books, 2009); Phathekile Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword: A Quest for a Place in the African Sun: Archival Records on the Formation and Missions of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa* (Cape Town: Real African Publishers, 2011); Barbara Oomen, *Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era* (James Currey, 2005).

<sup>71</sup> J. Michael Williams, *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

<sup>72</sup> Otty Nxumalo, C.T. Msimang and I.S. Cooke, *King of Goodwill: The authorized biography of King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu* (Cape Town: Nasou Via Afrika, 2003). On critical scholarship on Goodwill Zwelithini, see: Gerhard Maré, "Kingship in a post-colonial republic: the politics of Goodwill Zwelithini, king of the Zulu," Unpublished paper presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting, November 2015; Liz Timbs, "An In(ter)vention of Tradition: Medical Male Circumcision in KwaZulu-Natal, 2009–2016." *Journal of Natal and Zulu History* 32, 1 (2018), 55-77.

In particular, the changing role of the Zulu king from the era of the Zulu kingdom from the present is deeply connected to the evolution of the *amabutho*. John Laband's *The Eight Zulu Kings* (2018) tracks the lives and reigns of each of the eight Zulu kings, including Goodwill Zwelithini ka Bhekuzulu, focusing on how "the Zulu monarchy has followed the trajectory it has from its robust beginnings to its present politically constrained (though lavishly cushioned) circumstances."<sup>73</sup> This is the first work of its kind, compiling the lives of each of the Zulu monarchs. More work exists on the individual kings, which have provided scholars with key points of focus to critically interrogate the relationships between these leaders and the apartheid government. Many studies of individual Zulu kings have focused on their attempts to serve two masters: the white state and the Zulu nation. Jeff Guy's work centered on the Zulu royal family as his studies often found him considering the lives of the family's greatest supporters, like Bishop John William Colenso and his daughter Harriette.<sup>74</sup>

Shula Marks' *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa* (1986) framed Solomon ka Dinuzulu's as constantly navigating the "politics of the tightrope."<sup>75</sup> Similarly, Anne Beverud's doctoral thesis on Solomon's son, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, focused on the two "honeybirds" driving the young Zulu monarch towards the formation of a KwaZulu Bantustan; namely, the apartheid state and the legacy of his father.<sup>76</sup> These two kings, in particular, have enjoyed the greatest attention in the scholarship given their overlapping reigns with critical periods in the implementation of white rule in South Africa. This dissertation builds on these important studies,

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<sup>73</sup> John Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings* (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2018), 7.

<sup>74</sup> Jeff Guy, *The Heretic: A Study of the Life of John William Colenso, 1814-1883* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983); Jeff Guy, *The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle against Imperialism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002).

<sup>75</sup> Marks (1986), 6.

<sup>76</sup> Anne Kolberg Buverud, "The King and the Honeybirds: Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon, Zulu Nationalism and the Implementation of the Bantu Authorities System in Zululand, 1948-1957" (PhD Dissertation, University of Oslo. 2007)

showing the shifting relationship between kings and their *amabutho*, as well as traditional authorities' evolution from the precolonial era to the present. In contemporary South Africa, King Goodwill Zwelithini has become a lightning rod for discussions of Zulu identity and defines public perceptions of this ethnic identity due to his continued presence in the political and social sphere.

In many studies, ethnicity and gender have defined each other. In her foundational article, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis" (1986), Joan Scott called for historians "to examine the ways in which gendered identities are substantively constructed and relate their findings to a range of activities, social organizations, and historically specific cultural representations."<sup>77</sup> Many early studies responding to Scott's call conflated with women, a problematic approach "given the fact that in many African societies social roles are not necessarily biological roles . . ."<sup>78</sup> The interdisciplinary turn in studies of women's history forced new debates in the literature, including recognition of the main purpose of gender research being "foundational assumptions undergirding hegemonic intellectual tools while at the same time recover local epistemologies."<sup>79</sup> In the mid-2000s, Nwando Achebe turned towards a study of African gender that operated from Igbo epistemologies, as opposed to Western constructs of male and female identity. In particular, Achebe's study of the female king, Ahebi Ugbabe, showed the fluid boundaries between male and female gendered identity; boundaries that were crossed for strategic purposes by this powerful female regent.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Joan Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *The American Historical Review* 91, 5 (1986), 1068.

<sup>78</sup> Oyeronke Oyewumi, ed., *African Gender Studies: A Reader* (New York: Palgrave, 2005), xiii.

<sup>79</sup> Oyewumi (2005).

<sup>80</sup> Nwando Achebe, *The Female King of Colonial Nigeria: Ahebi Ugbabe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); see also Nwando Achebe, *Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings: Female Power and Authority in Northern Igboland, 1900-1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005).

For nearly two decades, gender history was focused solely on the history of women, but, in the late 1990s, this discourse opened up to include investigations into the history of masculinity. Women's Studies scholars began to interrogate masculinity in their historical studies in the mid-1990s, including Luise White who studied constructions of gender during the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya and Belinda Bozzoli who explored notions of patriarchy in South Africa.<sup>81</sup> The publication of Robert Morrell's article, "Of Boys and Men" (1998), simultaneously situated African masculine histories both in terms of international gender histories and southern African historiography more generally. Linking the development of masculinity studies to Women's Studies scholarship and their treatments of patriarchy, Morrell argued that better understanding men and their role in the multiple gender regimes in South Africa held broader implications for understanding race, class, and the transient geographical boundaries in that country and beyond.<sup>82</sup> He also argued for the recognition of multiple masculinities existing simultaneously, informed by the historical context in which they were created.

Masculinity is a collective gender identity and not a natural attribute. It is socially constructed and fluid. There is not one universal masculinity, but many masculinities. These are not 'fixed character types but configurations of practice generated in particular situations in a changing structure of relationships.'<sup>83</sup>

A second foundational edited volume, *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa* (2003), compiled by Lisa Lindsay and Stephan Miescher, embodied the turn to histories of men and masculinity, with each essay being written by a junior scholar before their first book was published.<sup>84</sup> Stephan

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<sup>81</sup> Luise White, "Separating the Men from the Boys: Constructions of Gender, Sexuality, and Terrorism in Central Kenya, 1939-1959," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 23, 1 (January 1, 1990); Belinda Bozzoli, "Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 9, 2 (1983), 139-71.

<sup>82</sup> Robert Morrell, "Of Boys and Men: Masculinity and Gender in Southern African Studies," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, no. 4 (December 1, 1998), 605-30.

<sup>83</sup> Morell (1998), 607.

<sup>84</sup> Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephan Miescher (eds.), *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa*, Social History of Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003).

Miescher, who has come to be one of the foremost experts on masculinity in Africa, not only edited the volume, but also contributed an essay on the research that culminated in the publication of *Making Men in Ghana* (2003).<sup>85</sup> As in his monograph, respect functioned as a central tenet of this volume, both respect in interactions with research subjects but also in the ways in which men operated. Respect and honor were valued above all else, which was the focus of John Iliffe's *Honour in African History* (2005). This comprehensive study contributed new layers of understanding to the ways in which masculinity operated and functioned from the precolonial era to the present.<sup>86</sup> Since the early 2000s, studies have turned to integrating masculinity into more generalized studies of African pasts, viewing masculinity as a natural mode of analysis. Lessons from histories of masculinity, for example, have been integrated into a number of studies on queer history, challenging historical representations of gender as either male or female. These histories, by scholars like Marc Epprecht and Rudolph Gaudio, challenge historians, whether studying queer histories or not, to rethink our conceptualizations of gender as binaries.<sup>87</sup>

While Zulu masculinity has been interrogated in the literature, these studies have not traced the development of Zulu masculinity over time, instead focusing on specific epochs and isolated events as representative of a singular Zulu masculine identity. These, at times, ahistorical studies contrast with histories of masculinity elsewhere on the African continent that track development of gendered identities across multiple eras.<sup>88</sup> Though studies of Zulu

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<sup>85</sup> Miescher (2005).

<sup>86</sup> John Iliffe, *Honour in African History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>87</sup> For example, see: Marc Epprecht, *Heterosexual Africa?: The History of an Idea from the Age of Exploration to the Age of AIDS* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008); Marc Epprecht, *Hungochani: The History of a Dissident Sexuality in Southern Africa* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004); Rudolph Pell Gaudio, *Allah Made Us: Sexual Outlaws in an Islamic African City* (Chichester, U.K. ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

<sup>88</sup> Iliffe (2005); Lindsay and Miescher (2003); Miescher (2005).

masculinity have shed light on, in particular, the role of age and location in homosocial socialization, more remains to be done to expand the scope of our understanding of the pluralities of Zulu masculine identity.<sup>89</sup> Raewyn Connell's notion of plural masculinities, the idea that male identities are fluid, has begun to be applied to Zulu masculinity, but scholars are still working to integrate this understanding in further exploring gendered ethnic categories.<sup>90</sup> This dissertation aims to contribute to this avenue of inquiry, analyzing gender through ethnicity and vice versa to shed light on how "tradition" shapes contemporary ethnicity in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

The analysis in this dissertation emerges from evidence uncovered in local and national government archives, print media, and ethnographic accounts in multiple South African repositories. Oral sources recorded by other scholars, both published in secondary texts and contained in archives, complement these written sources. In addition to the archival record and the secondary literature, I also draw on interviews that I conducted with my research assistants, Thandeka Majola (KwaNyavu) and Lindelihle Mahaye (Ulundi, Mahlabathini, Nongoma). Having been trained in the methodology of history at Michigan State University, I understand the importance in explaining how I came to study the intersections of masculinity, militarism, and traditional authority in South Africa, and the ways in which I navigated the archive and oral history interviews.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Carton (2000); Benedict Carton, and Robert Morrell, "Zulu Masculinities, Warrior Culture and Stick Fighting: Reassessing Male Violence and Virtue in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 38, 1 (2012), 31-53; Maré (1992); Linda Richter and Robert Morrell (eds.), *Baba: Men and Fatherhood in South Africa* (Cape Town: Human Science Research Council Press, 2006); Waetjen (2006); Peter Alegi, "The Sport of Zuluness: Masculinity, Class and Cultural Identity in Twentieth-Century Black Soccer," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present*, eds., Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), 273-280; Peter Alegi, *Laduma! Soccer, Politics and Society in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZuluNatal Press, 2004).

<sup>90</sup> Raewyn Connell, *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics* (Palo Alta, California: University of California Press, 1987); Raewyn Connell and J.W. Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," *Gender & Society* 19, 6 (2005), 829-859.

<sup>91</sup> On the importance of placing the researcher within the research, see: Gracia Clark, *Onions Are My Husband: Survival and Accumulation by West African Market Women* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965*



My original interest in gender in southern Africa emerged while I pursued a Master's in Comparative World History at George Mason University. While I entered the program unsure of my geographic interests, I quickly zeroed in on South Africa, due to a course on the history of health and healing in Africa. With a burgeoning interest in health and healing, I produced a thesis entitled "Lethal, Incurable and Controversial: The Responses of American NGOs to the AIDS Epidemic in Southern Africa, 1987-1992." This project interrogated the gendered rhetoric underlying the first U.S.-government-funded project dedicated to slowing the spread of HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, linking global health imperatives in the fight against the epidemic along with on-the-ground strategies to help communities grappling with structural inequalities that fed the diseases' spread.

When I entered Michigan State University's top-ranked doctoral program in African history in 2012, I planned to write a history of HIV/AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal. Coursework with my advisor, Peter Alegi, as well as Laura Fair, Walter Hawthorne, and Pero Dagbovie expanded my interests into broader connections between ethnicity and health. I also began training in isiZulu with Galen Sibanda (and later Thokozani Langeni), gaining critical insight into how language informs culture and vice versa. At this point, I began to adjust my dissertation plans to reflect these new historiographical and methodological interests, conducting preliminary research into ethnic identity politics and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the province. In summer 2013, I traveled to South Africa for the first time, funded by a Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowship through the MSU African Studies Center, as part of the University of

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(Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997); Nwando Achebe, "Nwando Achebe—Daughter, Wife, and Guest—A Researcher at the Crossroads," *Journal of Women's History* 14, no. 3 (2002): 9-31; Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001); Achebe (2005); Kelly (2018)

Pennsylvania Summer isiZulu Immersion Program led by Nonhlanhla Mbjeje and Tholani Hlongwa.

This program combined intensive isiZulu language instruction with homestays in eMpangeni and Durban. Through this program, I started to understand how the past informed the present. While living in Durban, my host brother proposed to his girlfriend and we traveled to Swaziland so that he could negotiate *ilobolo* (bridewealth) with his future-in-laws. It was a once in a lifetime experience and being there with the Nene family showed me, even in a contemporary context, how much rituals and traditions defined people's lives. Following the conclusion of the program, I spent some additional time in South Africa conducting dissertation research in Durban's Killie Campbell Africana Library and the University of the Witwatersrand's Historical Papers in the William Cullen Library. Back in East Lansing, I also worked remotely, utilizing the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, Digital Innovation South Africa, and the Padraig O'Malley Archives digital collections.

Returning to South Africa in 2014 and 2015, I redirected my focus and initiated plans to write a dissertation on the history of Zulu circumcision (*ukusoka*) from the Shakan era to the time of King Goodwill Zwelithini's "revival" of the practice for HIV/AIDS prevention in 2009. When I initially told my colleagues and mentors about my plans to study Zulu circumcision, most people expressed their concern that no one would be willing to speak to me about either the history of circumcision or even their own experiences with the practice and that I would struggle to find an archival record to support a full study of *ukusoka*. Initial stints in the Killie Campbell Africana Library in Durban and the Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives in Pietermaritzburg suggested otherwise, and I began making plans to write a dissertation on this topic.

Funded by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship, I returned to KwaZulu-Natal in January 2016 for a year of fieldwork. I based myself in Pietermaritzburg and was formally affiliated with the Sinomlando Centre for Oral History and Memory Work in Africa. Working in the Pietermaritzburg Repository of the National Archive, I realized that the documentary record on male circumcision in KwaZulu-Natal was more limited than I expected. Having already begun to examine the files of the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) and Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), I found that many of the questions that I wanted to answer by writing a project on male circumcision — the intersections between gender and ethnicity, tools of social organization, factors driving Zulu-centered interventions in the HIV/AIDS epidemic — would apply to a history of Zulu *amabutho*. As I continued exploring the Pietermaritzburg Repository of the National Archive, I found additional files in local magistrate records, Natal Colonial Publications, and the Zulu Society Papers, to name only a few, that helped to build this project in its early stages. In Pietermaritzburg, I also spent time at the Alan Paton Centre & Struggle Archives, primarily exploring the vast Gerhard Maré Papers in the Natal Room Collection.

In addition to these important archives in Pietermaritzburg, I also traveled to other archives throughout South Africa. In Johannesburg, I mainly worked in the University of Johannesburg Special Collections with the Employment Bureau of Africa Native Recruiting Corporation Papers, while also re-visiting the Wits Historical Collection. In Durban, I read Durban Magistrate files at the Durban Archives Repository of the National Archive and returned to the Killie Campbell Africana Library where I consulted the papers of E. Braatvedt, Guy Vivian Essery, H.C. Lugg, Daniel McKinnon Malcolm, and Killie Campbell. I also worked in the James Stuart Archive, the source base for the important published oral history collection

compiled and edited by Colin Webb and John Wright and published in six volumes between 1976 and 2015.

It is not difficult to note a shift in the second half of this dissertation. This shift marks an important shift in the historical documentation available on Zulu male socialization. While the colonial government depended on knowledgeable local magistrates steeped in the cultural knowledge of the region in which they worked, in the Union era and beyond, the centralization of African administration resulted in drastically different government records. These documents focused less on recording the minutiae of daily life in the rural and urban areas and more on incidences that affected Union/apartheid policies. This administrative shift obfuscated the *amabutho* and shifted towards an emphasis on militancy. Of course, this shift revealed other important elements of the *amabutho*, though finding these signals requires attention to the hidden details and breadcrumbs in the documents. The second half of the dissertation therefore shifts from a focus on *amabutho* specifically to a focus on Zulu martial masculinity, due to this shift in the sources.

One of the downsides of conducting research on such a long chronological period is that all of the records necessary for the project are not available in one area. As a result of this reality, I moved throughout my year in South Africa, spending several months in Pietermaritzburg before moving to Johannesburg, coming back to Pietermaritzburg, living in Durban, traveling to Ulundi, and ending my time in South Africa. While these experiences helped me construct a rich dissertation with a diverse documentary source-base, I was unable to conduct the number of interviews that I wanted to. At the same time, however, the interviews that I pull from in this text (especially in the final chapter) enrich my research immensely.

As *amabutho* continue to operate in areas throughout the KwaZulu-Natal province, at first I was stumped as to how to proceed in finding a research site. Since I was already based in the Pietermaritzburg-area, home of the provincial archives, Jill Kelly suggested that I reach out to her former research assistant, Thandeka Majola, to secure her services and get her advice regarding where I might base my research. Thandeka immediately suggested that we work in KwaNyavu, a peri-urban area near Pietermaritzburg, where she had previously worked with Jill on her project. She knew several *izinduna zezinsizwa* (leaders of the *amabutho*) and felt that we would quite easily find the interviews that I needed.

It took more time than we expected to arrange for these interviews. Though Thandeka previously worked in this area, we could not simply arrive in the area and conduct interviews without the permission of the KwaNyavu chief. Chief Eric Sikhosiphi Mdluli met with us and agreed to let me speak with his *izinduna zezinsizwa*. The first person that I spoke to was Fihlizwe Zondi, the *umdidiyeli* (commander), of the *ibutho*. In addition to welcoming me into his home, sharing the generosity of his family with me, and providing critical insight into the quotidian duties and realities of the chief's regiment, Zondi also introduced me to several other men who helped paint a picture of this institution in transition. These initial introductions allowed me to explain my project and build trust with these men, combatting the justified skepticism that they had in letting a white female researcher ask them about the nature of manhood in KwaNyavu.<sup>92</sup>

The interviews conducted in 2016 and 2018 focus largely on the cultural and ceremonial function of the present-day *amabutho*; while this is certainly part of the story of today's regiments, many components of these men's functions are obscured. *Inkosi* Sikhosiphi Mdluli hesitated to give permission for interview questions to focus on the *udlame* era, so their silence

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<sup>92</sup> Robert R. Edgar, "The Ash Heap of History: Reflections on Historical Research in Southern Africa," *African Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (2007), 48.

makes sense. But this violent period left deep scars, physical and emotional, on this area and on these people. One of the most striking things about Fihlizwe Zondi (whose words form the basis for this chapter) upon first meeting him are the gruesome scars covering his head. He never commented on them, but in the interviews he made it clear that being part of the *amabutho* had resulted in many physical injuries. And these scars were not fresh; they were deep and seasoned and part of his identity. Observation and off-the-record conversations begin to fill in the blanks of these silences. In 2016, one *induna* from Maqongqo bragged about his involvement in a recent violent raid in KwaNyavu during a drive back to downtown Pietermaritzburg.<sup>93</sup> These silences loom large in the chapter that follows; in the way, this chapter is not only about the maintenance of identity in the face of massive structural changes but also about looking at this chiefdom apart from its violent past.

When I set out to conduct these interviews, I had thought that, in addition to the older men who comprised the leadership of the *ibutho*, I would also be speaking to younger men in the community who had joined the KwaNyavu regiment. In my final research trip in August 2018, I asked one of the older *ibutho* members if he could arrange for me to meet with some of the younger men. He and the other men who had assembled for the interview looked at me strangely and told me that there simply were no young men in the regiment. The youngest member that I spoke to was in his early-40s. The final chapter of this dissertation, in many ways, represents an attempt on my part to wrap my head around this idea.

Another difficult aspect of my oral history work in KwaNyavu centered on the fact that many things went unsaid in my interviews. When I secured my permission to interview people in his chiefdom, I did not realize how critical it would be more to secure permission to ask these

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<sup>93</sup> Field Notes, October 17, 2016.

men about their experiences during the violence that racked the Table Mountain area in the 1980s and 1990s. When it became clear that these *amabutho* not only served ceremonial purposes, but continued to come into conflict with *amabutho* in the neighboring Maphumulo chiefdom, I pressed Thandeka to ask these men more about these experiences. She reminded me that the chief had not allowed us to ask questions about these conflicts and I had to sit and let these moments pass me by. Similarly, more times than I care to admit, I had to turn off my recorder and respect the privacy of my interviewees. In casual conversations, I also frequently overheard things being said in isiZulu without knowledge of my facility with the language; I had to note these down but ultimately I had to omit them from the final text. Nevertheless, these insights shape my understanding of the *amabutho* as an institution and the *ibutho* in KwaNyavu in particular.

In the Ulundi area, I was very lucky to work with Lindelihle Mahaye, a local of the area who previously worked for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and who maintained close friendships with many influential politicians in the region. Without Lindelihle, I never would have connected with Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the now former president of the Inkatha Freedom Party and a member of the Zulu Royal Family. We also spoke to a few other royal family members and Lindelihle's own father. Although I did not get to spend as much time as I wanted to in the Ulundi-region, Lindelihle is an invaluable resource and we already have plans to work together on future research trips. Lindelihle also joined me at the Zulu bicentennial celebrations at Moses Mabhida Stadium in September 2016.

On this note, I was always mindful of my positionality in the field. It would not be an exaggeration to say that my presence as a female *umlungu* (white person) emboldened some of my interviewees, to the point that one individual, who I will not name here, offered to prove that

he had been circumcised by removing his pants! My ability to speak isiZulu also helped to break down some barriers, helping to illustrate the deep respect that I had for their insights and their ways of life. At the same time, I also recognized my unique position as a female historian undertaking research on an inarguably masculine topic. I have always viewed this as a strength, allowing me to critically interrogate practices and philosophies from a feminist standpoint. In an article for the *Journal of African Military History*, Alicia Decker reflected on her experience as a feminist scholar doing work on militarism. One insight, in particular, continues to stick with me: “As curious feminists, we must go looking for patriarchy, but we must be careful not to assume that it will always show up in the same places or in the same ways.”<sup>94</sup> As I hope is apparent in the text that follows, the *amabutho*, initially the epitome of the patriarchal nature of the Zulu kingdom, certainly did not show up in the same places or in the same ways; my perspective as an “outsider” in a variety of ways helps me to uncover these inconsistencies.

One of the many happy accidents of this project was that I was able to use both a male and a female research assistant. This provided an opportunity to judge the reactions of my interviewees to being asked explicitly gendered questions by research assistants with vastly different backgrounds. Thandeka is effervescent and friendly and could disarm anyone with one of her trademark laughs. She is young and lives in an urban area and, while holding to some customs for the benefit of her family, finds the “traditional” ways of life to be suffocating. On the other hand, Lindelihle is a teacher at a school in Mahlabathini, he maintains a homestead in the area, and, while he chooses to live in Durban and not follow the traditions that his father holds dear, he has a deep respect for custom and is known and respected by many in the area. Although I expected to have different reactions based on the gender of the research assistant at a

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<sup>94</sup> Alicia C. Decker, “What Does a Feminist Curiosity Bring to African Military History? An Analysis and an Intervention,” *Journal of African Military History* 1 (2017), 104.



given interview, in fact, I did not experience this. If there was any different whatsoever, it came from the fact that Thandeka was much more experienced with oral historical research and found ways to deviate from our research questions to tease out important findings.

The first narrative chapter introduces the institution of the *amabutho*, interrogating its origins and demonstrating that, far from a static institution, by the time of the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879, the *amabutho* as an institution had already gone through multiple shifts and changes. Even before Shaka's tenure as king, this institution had already evolved from age-grades for ritualized circumcision into pseudo-martial units for the protection of local chiefdoms. And while Shaka certainly revolutionized the *amabutho* and set into motion certain rituals and practices that continue to shape the form and function of Zulu martial masculinity, under subsequent kings the *amabutho* continued to shift and change in response to socioeconomic stimuli and the growing presence of colonists in Natal. When Cetshwayo mobilized his forces to take on the British in the first battles of the Anglo-Zulu War in January 1879, he was in the midst of a revitalization of the institution, struggling to regain control in the face of resistance from rival chiefdoms and the application of chiefly power by colonial authorities.

Chapter Two explores the aftermath of the abolition of the *amabutho* following the conclusion of the Anglo-Zulu War following the Battle of Ulundi in July 1879. In the wake of the official disbanding of the Zulu military system following the Anglo-Zulu War and the stripping of chiefly authority in Natal and Zululand, colonial authorities sought to define and restrict public expressions of masculinity, exposing the limitations of the colonial regime in legislating against these public symbols and functions. Growing colonial anxiety over the violent potential of young Zulu men resulted in severe restrictions on not only the regiments, but also on the carrying of weapons, chiefs' authority to hold beer drinks, and greater numbers of laborers

for public works projects. At the same time, when it served to benefit the colonial state, authorities turned to Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo to utilize men at his disposal for conflicts first against the Boers and, later, against Zulu rebels during the 1906 Rebellion.

Chapter Three builds on these concerns, examining the ways in which the *amabutho*, while continuing to represent a central tool of social organization, offered practical utility in managing the potential of African men in Natal and Zululand, particularly in the face of global military struggles that necessitated the use of African labor for British military success. At the same time, however, as the Zulu king's influence over men throughout Natal and Zululand was utilized to harness the potential of Zulu labor and loyalty for the success of the Union, white authorities also felt the need to exact more control over the role of the Zulu king for fear of another rebellion like the Bambatha Rebellion of 1906.

At the same time as these struggles over the roles of traditional authorities and the utilizations of the regimental structure for different purposes unfolded in Natal and Zululand, the use of the *amabutho* and its associated martial masculine expressions played out quite differently among migrant Zulu communities in Durban and the Witwatersrand. Chapter Four dives into the manifestations of the *amabutho* and connected martial metaphors in these urban settings, tracking their impact and new expressions in society and culture, as well as in the broader struggles for racial equality beginning as early as the 1920s. In particular, the growth and evolution of several sociocultural manifestations of Zulu ethnicity, including the proliferation of *ingoma* dancing, the development of the *maskanda* and *isicathamiya* musical genres, and gangs in both Durban and Johannesburg. Against the backdrop of heightened resistance to the apartheid state, these manifestations of Zulu martiality illustrated, simultaneously, migrants' deep connections to their homes and new identities promulgated in their working lives.

The rise of ethnic nationalism with the founding of the Inkatha Freedom Party in the KwaZulu Bantustan elevated these invocations of Zulu martial heritage to the national level, as cultural leaders turned to well-trodden language to solicit political support for their cause. At the same time, these metaphors also appeared in the pages of major newspapers, as the language surrounding *amabutho* became synonymous with a brand of dangerous, violent Zulu masculinity. Chapter Five tracks these connected phenomena, illustrating how the *amabutho* became symbolic of the disconnects between Inkatha and the rest of South Africa, especially the African National Congress. In the face of unprecedented violence, the regiments became, for all parties involved, easy metaphors to sum up larger fears about the growing wave of change coming to the nation, as well as the political and social stratifications rendered by nearly fifty years of apartheid rule.

With the end of apartheid and the waning of Zulu political nationalism, martial heritage became more central as cultural stakeholders turned to these traditions to find a new way forward in the post-apartheid dispensation. Facing legislation that challenged both the role of traditional authorities and the right to public performances of culture, martial masculine rhetoric provided a key platform for the crystallization of public sympathies in support of the Zulu king and his counterparts. At the same time, local *amabutho*, like that in KwaNyavu, experienced transitions of their own, as fewer and fewer young men choose to join their ranks. Chapter Six explores these concurrent phenomena, linking the struggles at the national and local levels through their similar deployment of the *amabutho* to grapple with these changing circumstances. Though some in KwaNyavu fear that the *amabutho* will cease to exist over the coming decades, however, this dissertation illustrates how Zulu regiments have waxed and waned, adapted and reacted, and

generally evolved since the time of Shaka; the future of the *amabutho* in present-day South Africa remains to be known.

## CHAPTER 1:

### **Before and After Shaka: The Development and Evolution of *Amabutho* in the Zulu Kingdom (circa 1816 to 1879)**

This chapter tracks the development and evolution of *amabutho* prior to the fall of the Zulu Kingdom with the defeat of Zulu forces at the Battle of Ulundi on July 4, 1879. In addition to considering the role and function of *amabutho* in the Shakan era, which solidified and crystallized Zulu dominance in the region now known as KwaZulu-Natal, this chapter considers the ways in which, even in the pre-colonial era, the *amabutho* were far from static; rather, they had undergone multiple evolutions and shifts in the centuries of their existence, contributing to their lingering meaning to the present day. This chapter explores the social, cultural, and political impact of *amabutho*, including the shifting political and socio-economic circumstances in the region.

Although focused on Africans living within the boundaries of contemporary Zuluness, these *amabutho*, however, were not the exclusive invention of Shaka; in fact, these age-sets emerged from age-grade units associated with circumcision schools, another institution tasked specifically with the conveyance of gender knowledge from one generation to the next. Shaka also built upon the inventions of other local leaders who found strength and influence through harnessing the energies of young men. In fact, John Wright argues that, by the 1810s, it was the Ndwandwe ruling house under Zwide which had succeeded in crystallizing its strength through “tighten[ing] its hold over men of fighting age through the system of enrolling them into state-controlled *amabutho*.”<sup>1</sup> After emerging in the late-18th century, the Ndwandwe found themselves facing increasing pressure from rival “expansionist neighbours” in the 1810s; pressure which

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<sup>1</sup> John Wright, "Rediscovering the Ndwandwe Kingdom" in Natalie Swanepoel, Amanda Esterhuysen, and Philip Bonner, eds., *Five Hundred Years Rediscovered: Southern African Precedents and Prospects* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008), 228.

found them “becoming better organised for warfare than were any of their neighbours.”<sup>2</sup> The Hlubi chiefdom also enrolled regiments during this period and shared similar traditions to denote progression through the stages of manhood.<sup>3</sup> These are just a few examples; as will be referenced in this chapter, many other local chiefs also enrolled *amabutho* throughout this period. The *amabutho* system had already adapted and changed to fit many different circumstances by the time of its abolition by Wolseley on the Ulundi battlefield.

Long before their use for military endeavors, *amabutho* served as the age-groups for the organization of young men for circumcision throughout southern Africa. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the genesis of male circumcision amongst Nguni speakers in southern Africa, Raevin Jimenez’s work roots male circumcision in practices of Proto-Nguni speakers at the end of the first millennium CE. Along with female initiation rituals and the implementation of practices designed to control the sexuality of young women, including *ukusoma* (non-penetrative sex), circumcision (*ukusoka*) formed a small part of a pantheon of social reproductive measures.<sup>4</sup>

. . . Proto-Nguni-speakers regarded masculinity as something to be managed, cultivated and shaped. In order to have access to social manhood, boys needed to be reproduced into social beings resembling older generations of men before them. Circumcision, as an aspect of initiation, offered Proto-Nguni-speakers the opportunity to sequester and discipline young men, using the liminal period offered by seclusion to instill shared values.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Wright, “Rediscovering the Ndwandwe Kingdom,” 228.

<sup>3</sup> For example, Hlubi men wore *iziyendane* as opposed to headrings, which consisted of twisting their hair into tassels which hung down around their face. *Iziyendane* also became a nickname for Hlubi people adopted by people living in Zululand. John Wright and Andrew Manson, *The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand-Natal: A History* (Ladysmith: Ladysmith Historical Society, 1983), 5.

<sup>4</sup> Raevin F. Jimenez, “Rites of Reproduction: Gender, Generation and Political Economic Transformation among Nguni-speakers of Southern Africa, 8<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> Century CE” (PhD Diss, University of Michigan, 2017), 164-172.

<sup>5</sup> Jimenez, “Rites of Reproduction,” 169.

James Stuart's informants confirm Jimenez's conclusions, reminiscing on *ukusoka* as an important rite of passage central to the transition to Zulu boys to manhood.<sup>6</sup> By undergoing circumcision, John Gama explained to James Stuart, a young man "enters manhood."<sup>7</sup> "He is given advice and instruction, and conducts himself according to the ways of an adult," Gama continued, "He has the mind of a man and casts aside the ways of youth which he formerly followed."<sup>8</sup> Jantshi kaNongila corroborated Gama's observation, stating quite plainly that, in this era, "circumcision was necessary before a man could take a wife."<sup>9</sup> This focus on the social reproductive qualities of the ritual appears to have been critical, with some testimonies declaring that men could not even take a wife unless they had received the cut. In this way, circumcision was essential not only for entry into manhood, but also for the reproduction of society as a whole; boys (*abafana*; sg. *umfana*) had to become men (*amadoda*; sg. *indoda*) before they could become proper husbands and, then, fathers. Henry Francis Fynn observed a similar sexual socialization component to the ritual in the early nineteenth-century, noting that following their completion of the initiation rites, "they are deemed to have arrived at the state of manhood, hence entitled to engage in courtship, become married, etc."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The James Stuart Archive remains one of the most important archives for precolonial Natal and Zululand. For more on the history of the archive, as well as some of the criticisms of its use, see Benedict Carton, "Fount of Deep Culture: Legacies of the *James Stuart Archive* in South African Historiography," *History in Africa* 30 (2003): 87-106; Julian Cobbing, "A Tainted Well: The Objectives, Historical Fantasies and Working Method of James Stuart," *Journal of Natal and Zulu History* 11 (1988): 115-154; Carolyn Hamilton, "Backstory, Biography, and the Life of the James Stuart Archive," *History in Africa* 38 (2011): 319-341; Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Intervention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); John Wright "Making the James Stuart Archive," *History in Africa* 23 (1996): 333-350.

<sup>7</sup> C.D.B. Webb and J.B. Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples, Vol. 1* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 1976-2001), 140.

<sup>8</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive, Vol. 1*, 140.

<sup>9</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive, Vol. 1*, 195.

<sup>10</sup> James Stuart and D. McK. Malcolm, eds., *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 1969), 115.

Foundational to *ukusoka*, notes Magma Fuze in *Abantu Abamnyama/The Black People* (1922), was the organization of young men who had recently reached puberty into “age groups for the purpose of circumcision, at their own particular places.”<sup>11</sup> The term for this process was *ukubutha*, literally “to gather/recruit.”<sup>12</sup> Each of these age groups, according to A.T. Bryant, “was known, among the Zulus, as an *ibut[h]o* [pl. *amabutho*] (a collection or gathering together).”<sup>13</sup> The *amabutho* functioned as fraternities of a sort, with these young men forging homosocial bonds through their shared experiences in both the physical act of circumcision and their confinement during the course of the initiation rite.<sup>14</sup> These young men lived together at the circumcision site for a period of one to six months, eating, sleeping, healing, and bonding together. These bonds formed the basis for broader age-based associations that allowed for the conveying of critical gender and sexual norms.

Once organized into their respective *amabutho*, the young men moved away from the main settlements into the mountains, where they would build temporary shelters (*amadikodo*, sg. *idikodo*). Here, they would be confined for the duration of the initiation, a seclusion that could last between one and six months, depending on how long wounds took to heal. Once the *amadikodo* were completed, the next step was to call for the *ingcibi*, “the man whose business it is to perform the operation,” to come to perform the ritual cut.<sup>15</sup> Accounts differ in regards to the

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<sup>11</sup> Magma M. Fuze, *The Black People and Whence They Came: A Zulu View* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 1979), 28.

<sup>12</sup> Fuze, *The Black People*, 28.

<sup>13</sup> A.T. Bryant, *The Zulu People: As They Were Before the White Man Came* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1949), 491. The modern spelling of the term *ibuto* is now commonly written as *ibutho*.

<sup>14</sup> At this point, the *amabutho* were male institutions, though this does not mean that circumcision was a practice confined to males. Several testimonies in the James Stuart Archive suggest that Zulu girls might have also undergone a circumcision and initiation similar to what the boys underwent. Ndukwana reported that the Basotho did practice female circumcision, but was unsure of the Zulus' adherence to this same practice. Jantshi echoed largely the same uncertainty. On the other hand, John Africa, in his conversation with Stuart, reportedly “pointed to circumcision, both of young men and girls, which used to go on in the old days under the Zulu kings, the latter being required to go to the hill for some three months, during which time they were instructed and admonished in preparation for womanhood by elderly women who stayed with them.”

<sup>15</sup> Fynn, *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, 114.



instrument used. In Fynn's account, the *ingcibi* used an *assegai* (a long spear mounted on a javelin-type pole), "which he sharpens on a rough stone. This is done that the blade may become more like a saw than otherwise, its roughness being supposed to accelerate the cure."<sup>16</sup> A.T. Bryant also reported that, "the foreskin was smartly snipped off by an expert with an assegai-blade."<sup>17</sup> There may have also been another type of knife used for the procedure, as John Khumalo mentioned that one of the "two things which natives most highly prize" was the "*ummese woku soka*, the knife used to circumcise with."<sup>18</sup> Regardless of the type of blade used, the *inhlonze* (foreskin, prepuce; alternatively, *ijwabu*) was cut, causing "a great deal of pain."<sup>19</sup> The type of circumcision that the Zulus adhered to is unclear; that is, the extent that the prepuce was excised, but we do know from Ndukwana kaMbengwana, one of Stuart's main informants, that "care was taken not to cut the small tendon in the lower part of the prepuce."<sup>20</sup>

Although not explicitly stated in the available sources on Zulu circumcision, we can assume that it was expected for boys not to react to the cut. Nelson Mandela, recounting his own experience in undergoing the equivalent Xhosa initiation rite, reflected in *Long Walk to Freedom* that he "was determined not to disgrace myself, the group or my guardian." "Circumcision is a trial of bravery and stoicism; no anesthetic is used; a man must suffer in silence," he continued.<sup>21</sup> Mandela went on to express his regret over his failure to maintain composure, writing that he

. . . felt ashamed because the other boys seemed much stronger and braver than I had been; they called out more promptly than I had. I was distressed that I had

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<sup>16</sup> Fynn, *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, 114-115.

<sup>17</sup> Bryant, *The Zulu People*, 490.

<sup>18</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 1, 257.

<sup>19</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 4, 265.

<sup>20</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 4, 265. For the different types of preputial excisions practiced, see D. Doyle, "Ritual Male Circumcision: A Brief History," *J R Coll Physicians Edinb* 35 (2005): 279-285.

<sup>21</sup> Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1994), 25.

been disabled, however briefly, by the pain, and I did my best to hide my agony.  
A boy may cry; a man conceals his pain.<sup>22</sup>

Though no records are readily available relating to the intricacies of the Zulu circumcision rite, based on many other similarities between the Xhosa and Zulu practices, we can assume that *amadoda* were held to similar standards. Initiates were expected not only to maintain their composure and dignity in the face of circumcision itself, but also in the face of death.

As continues to be the case with contemporary Xhosa circumcisions, Zulu circumcisions in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century could also result in deaths. Mkando kaDhloya recalled that although the “people who did the operation were experienced men, accidents occurred; people died from the effects.”<sup>23</sup> These deaths presented a challenge to the organizers of the circumcision schools, who attempted to keep these deaths secret for as long as possible. Mkanda observed that “no mention would be made of the people who had died to those being circumcised until after the circumcision was over. They would be kept from mourning.”<sup>24</sup> Following the completion of the circumcisions, however, “circumcised people would bury (them) themselves,” though they would not inform the parents of the deceased until after the entire process had been completed.<sup>25</sup> In this way, the boys were also expected to display stoicism not only under difficult physical conditions, but also within tragic emotional circumstances.

Following the procedure, the newly initiated would be marked by outward symbols of their new status as men. Fynn noted that following the completion of the circumcisions, the initiates were clothed in “a dress specially prepared for the occasion,” a garment “made of a kind of flaggy grass, tied in bunches and intended to cover nearly the whole body, the face being

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<sup>22</sup> Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, 25

<sup>23</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 160-161.

<sup>24</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 160-161.

<sup>25</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 160-161.

painted with clay.”<sup>26</sup> Circumcised youths were also marked by their adoption of the *isiziba* (pl. *iziziba*), a sheath to cover the circumcised organ. Different forms of *isiziba* were worn by different groups throughout subequatorial Africa for myriad purposes, ranging from, as anthropologist P. Ucko noted in 1969, “every day wear” to “special accoutrements which confine the *glans penis* during sexual intercourse.”<sup>27</sup> The *isiziba* could be made from a number of different materials, ranging from “a piece of ox-hide” to “the stalk of the wild-banana leaf (*inkamanga*)” or the “*ingceba* (plants growing like bananas in bushes).”<sup>28</sup> There are a few different theories as to the exact purpose of wearing this covering. A.T. Bryant stated that the covering worked as a “suitable substitute for the vanished foreskin, in the form of a tight cover of supple leather.”<sup>29</sup> Mkando differed from Bryant's interpretation, stating that the purpose of the penis cover was so that “if the front of the girdle parts, the penis should not be seen by women.”<sup>30</sup> Ndukwana's explanation was completely apposite to Mkando's, explaining that the purpose of the *isiziba* was visibility, saying that, “after circumcision, a long cover was worn over the penis and could be seen a long way off.”<sup>31</sup> So, whether the *isiziba* was worn as a protective covering or an outward symbol of the completion of a valued social initiation, it marked these young men as full members in their society.

But these outward symbols would not be witnessed by outsiders for months following the initiates' circumcisions. During the course of their healing, these newly circumcised youths were completely secluded from the outside world. Older men visited the youths, imparting valuable

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<sup>26</sup> Fynn, *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, 114-115. The painting of the initiates' body and face with white clay may or may not have had medicinal properties, with A.T. Bryant commenting on his “suspicion that there must have been something more than ‘white-wash’ on the bodies of the Zulu initiates.” See Bryant, *The Zulu People*, 490.

<sup>27</sup> Peter J. Ucko, “Penis Sheaths: A Comparative Study,” *Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* (1969): 29.

<sup>28</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 161.

<sup>29</sup> Bryant, *The Zulu People*, 490.

<sup>30</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 161.

<sup>31</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 4, 265.

knowledge to them regarding proper sexual behavior and hygiene. Women, however, were not allowed to interact with the young men at any point in their seclusion. The only women that they would see in the months that they spent at camp were “elderly female relatives already beyond their menopause.”<sup>32</sup> The fact that only post-menopausal women were allowed to interact with the initiates in the early days of their new existences as “men” is telling, hearkening to conceptualizations of menstruation women as purveyors of pollution. In her study of notions of bodily pollution in Zulu idioms, Suzanne Leclerc-Madlala has shown that women's sexuality is conceived of as not only inherently polluted, but also dangerous. “Both men and women,” Leclerc-Madlala argues, “hold views that reflect a symbiotic relationship between women's bodies and disease in general,” especially in conceptualizations of the vagina “as a place where disease-causing 'dirt' is especially likely to be 'hiding'.”<sup>33</sup> At the same time, just as the female reproductive capacity is seen as dangerous, it is also understood as inherently powerful; being the vessel through which all life emerges. This may explain why, according to Mkando, each night the initiates would return to their villages, “see where the womankind urinated, and then urinate there in order that their penises should heal.”<sup>34</sup> Since Mkando was the only of Stuart's informants to suggest that such an act was practiced, it is difficult to understand the full reason for why the initiates might have done this, but this too suggests that females were conceived of as powerful, for better or worse.

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<sup>32</sup> Bryant, *The Zulu People*, 490; also Fuze, *The Black People*, 28.

<sup>33</sup> Suzanne Leclerc-Madlala, “AIDS in Zulu Idiom: Etiological Configurations of Women, Pollution and Modernity,” in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu Past and Present* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), 557; Suzanne Leclerc-Madlala, “On the virgin-cleansing myth: gendered bodies, AIDS and ethnomedicine,” *African Journal of AIDS Research* 1 (2002): 87-95; Benedict Carton, “‘We Are Made Quiet By This Annihilation’: Historicizing Concepts of Bodily Pollution and Dangerous Sexuality in South Africa,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39, no. 1 (2006): 85-106.

<sup>34</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 161.

Upon their return to their communities, the initiates were allowed to marry, father children, and were considered full members of their communities. On the other hand, boys who failed to be circumcised were singled out and mocked for their failure to endure the painful rite of passage. Circumcision, Mkando explained, was meant so that boys “should be strong and be men, not be weak . . . for they are 'castrated' (*teniwe*)-made strong.”<sup>35</sup> Any male who failed to prove their strength “was not recognised as a man, he was addressed merely as 'boy' [*umfana*; pl. *abafana*] however old he might be, and regarded as a worthless woman and a coward who was afraid to face the spear.”<sup>36</sup> R.C.A. Samuelson echoed this same sentiment, noting that “an uncircumcised native is always considered to be a boy until he has been circumcised, when he is looked upon as a man.”<sup>37</sup> Similarly, boys could be called *inkwenkwe* (pl. *izinkwenkwe*) if they had not been circumcised, a term that has fallen out of use amongst the Zulus but continues to be used amongst Xhosa-speaking peoples to refer to uncircumcised men.<sup>38</sup> Mkando also remembered that an uncircumcised boy “would not wash in the presence of others for he would be afraid of being laughed at . . . 'look at the penis tip, all by itself.’”<sup>39</sup> Beyond the jabs that boys threw at one another, the completion of the circumcision ritual also made young men more appealing to young women. “Girls,” Ndukwana noted, “preferred those who had been circumcised to those who had not been.”<sup>40</sup> To fail to be circumcised represented a failure to transition from boyhood to manhood, alienating the uninitiated not only from the bonds of brotherhood, but also from entry into marriage and fatherhood.

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<sup>35</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 161.

<sup>36</sup> Fuze, *The Black People*, 28.

<sup>37</sup> R.C.A. Samuelson, *Long, Long Ago* (Durban: Knox Printing & Publishing Co., 1929): 307-308.

<sup>38</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 2, 125.

<sup>39</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 161.

<sup>40</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 4, 265.

In the early nineteenth-century, the institution of the *amabutho* replaced *ukusoka* as the primary tool for youth male socialization. Scholars disagree on the rationale for Shaka Zulu's "abolition" of circumcision and the rise of the "regimental" system, resulting in four main arguments for the dissolution of this practice: (1) questions of legitimacy; (2) personal insecurities; (3) military strategy; and (4) decline of the practice. Although it is unclear whether or not Shaka himself completed the initiation<sup>41</sup>, many oral histories confirm that Senzangakhona was not circumcised at the time of Shaka's conception.<sup>42</sup> Numerous informants referenced variations of the same idiom to describe Shaka's conception, explaining that Shaka had been *zalwa'd esihlahleni* (literally, "born in the bushes").<sup>43</sup> Shaka's supposed "illegitimacy," in this reading, stemmed directly from Senzangakhona's status as an *inkwenkwe*. At the same time, the proliferation of this illegitimacy story not only among James Stuart informants, but also among white onlookers such as Henry Francis Fynn, reaffirms an image of Shaka Zulu as a vengeful, prideful leader who reconfigured an entire social system to protect his pride.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Jantshi kaNongila told James Stuart that he did "not know if Tshaka was ever circumcised." Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 1, 198.

<sup>42</sup> Madikane kaMlomowetole explained that, "Tshaka was conceived by Nandi before Senzangakhona has been circumcised. When it was seen that N. had become pregnant, the order was given that S. should be circumcised. He was circumcised." Ngidi kaMcikaziswa echoed this story, explaining that "the story of Tshaka being hidden from Senzangakhona is very strong and fits in with the story of not being circumcised." Mklehlengana kaZulu stated, "Nandi became pregnant before Senzangakhona had been circumcised (*o wa se sihlahleni*)." Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 248; Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 5, 43; Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 218.

<sup>43</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 248.

<sup>44</sup> R.C.A. Samuelson wrote that Nandi came to Senzangakhona while he was at the sacred circumcision site, awaiting his transition to manhood, where they copulated and Shaka was conceived. Henry Francis Fynn presented a different variation of this same story, explaining that Nandi had been betrothed to Senzangakhona by her father, meaning that while they could not co-habitate, they could perform *ukusoma* or *ukuhlobonga*, a form of non-penetrative sex, "which was supposed to be followed until the chief had undergone the rite of circumcision." Donald Morris discusses *ukuhlobonga* in *Washing of the Spear*, noting that "sexual play among preadolescents, therefore, was open and permitted, and was only hedged with proper behavior standards in the dangerous period between puberty and marriage. Even then, however, a form of external intercourse known as *ukuHlobonga* was permitted under certain circumstances, and the technique was passed on to adolescents." This story is even meant to explain the origins of Shaka's name; as Nandi's pregnancy began to show, Senzangakhona attributed her growing belly to a "complaint called *itshaka* or looseness of the intestines." This explanation, Fynn contends, set the matter at rest until the time that Senzangakhona was circumcised and Nandi gave birth to a son, "who, owing to the circumstance, was called Shaka, an imitation of the word *itshaka*." Samuelson, *Long, Long Ago*, 234; Fynn, *The Diary of Henry*

Personal insecurities represent another major argument for his dissolution of *ukusoka* but again betray more about the opinions of writers and observers than the real socioeconomic and political factors at play. E.A. Ritter and Dan Wylie both recount incidences in Shaka's childhood when he was teased for "the marked stumpiness of his genital organ."<sup>45</sup> Fynn portrayed Shaka as a vain man obsessed with youth. He suggested that since circumcision was only performed on boys, this connection with youth induced Shaka to "attribute the real cause of the omissions to the wishes of Shaka to appear as young as possible."<sup>46</sup> Continuing, Fynn writes that Shaka "was always disgusted at old age, of which the reader may in some way judge from his anxiety to possess the Macassar oil to eradicate the few grey hairs which appeared on his chin. Furthermore, his massacre of old men shows the same trait."<sup>47</sup> This line of thought, however, stands in contradiction to statements about the youth-granting properties of circumcision recounted by some of Stuart's informants, like Jantshi who noted that circumcision was a good custom and "prevented people from ageing rapidly . . . it made them hardy."<sup>48</sup> Lunguza noted a similar rationale, stating that the excision "was done to prevent people getting old too quickly."<sup>49</sup>

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Francis Fynn, 139-140; Donald R. Morris, *The washing of the spears: a history of the rise of the Zulu nation under Shaka and its fall in the Zulu War of 1879* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 33. Interestingly, in the reign of Dingane (Shaka's brother), Mabonsa kaSidhlayi reported an incident in which the king had a man killed for implying that he was deficient due to his being uncircumcised; "Dingane killed Dhlomo at Mgungundhlovu. He also had Makata kaNdhlukazi, the *induna* of the Iziyendane, killed for insulting him. Makata had referred to Dingane as the 'good-for-nothing that has not been circumcised.'"; Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 2, 19-20.

<sup>45</sup> "The marked stumpiness of his genital organ [was] ever the source of persistent ridicule among Shaka's companions," Ritter writes; ridicule manifesting itself in one particular episode that seemed to stay with Shaka. "One day in particular," Ritter writes, "when he was about eleven years old, two older herd-boys flung the deadly insult at him: '*Ake ni-bone umtondo wake; ufana nom sundu nje!*' (Look at his penis; it is just like a little earth worm!)" With a yell of rage Shaka flung himself at the two much bigger boys, and so fierce was his attack that, although they were armed with similar sticks to his own, he beat them savagely and nearly killed them before the other herd-boys pulled him away." Dan Wylie in *Myth of Iron* similarly recounts that "Shaka himself is said to have been insulted about the paltry size of his penis cover; a slight on his manliness," though Wylie provides no citation for this piece of information. E.A. Ritter, *Shaka Zulu: The biography of the founder of the Zulu nation* (London: Longmans, 1955), 28; Dan Wylie, *Myth of Iron: Shaka in History* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 95.

<sup>46</sup> Fynn, *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, 268-269.

<sup>47</sup> Fynn, *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, 268-269.

<sup>48</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 1, 195.

<sup>49</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 1, 301.

Though this idea that Shaka avoided circumcision to maintain a facade of youth contradicts with the rationale that circumcision imparted a certain hardness and youth on its recipients, it is interesting to note the extremes Shaka was willing to go to maintain a certain image, whether in portraying a false youth or to mask the size of his manhood.

Ultimately, the centrality of Shaka's personal insecurities to any discussion of the disuse of circumcision by Zulu-speaking peoples represents an oversimplified narrative to account for the steady decline of a practice in the face of broader internal and external change, in addition to a concerted effort to present the famed Zulu founder in a less than flattering light. Inarguably, the most common explanation for Shaka's termination of the circumcision ritual is due to his martial objectives; that is, in attempting to consolidate the Zulu kingdom, Shaka could no longer afford to have young men be secluded for months at a time when they could be fighting for him. Melapi kaMagaye reported that circumcision "was discontinued because it was said people would not be able to fight."<sup>50</sup> Eileen Jensen Krige wrote that amongst those she spoke with in the early 1900s, "it is generally believed that Shaka was responsible for the abolition of circumcision, which appears to have been practised before his time, for it is thought that the long training in the circumcision lodge and the concentration of all the attention of the men on the 'school' would have been a serious hindrance to Shaka's military projects."<sup>51</sup> It is also important to note that this concern about his soldiers extended to their physical well-being as well as their seclusion, with Magidigidi reporting that Tshaka ended circumcision "because it was harmful; men should not be castrated like cattle."<sup>52</sup> In all of these instances, Shaka's concern with consolidating power

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<sup>50</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, 76.

<sup>51</sup> Eileen Jensen Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), 116-117.

<sup>52</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 2, 94; Similarly, Helen Epstein states that "when King Shaka united the Zulu tribes in the 1820s, he abolished the ritual after two of his comrades died from infections acquired during the operation", but fails to provide a citation for this incident. Helen Epstein, *The Invisible Cure: Africa, the West, and the Fight Against AIDS* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), 263.



under the Zulu kingdom seemingly outranked the continuation of this tradition, so he did away with it completely.

The most likely explanation for Shaka's elimination of this ritual, however, is decidedly more restrained, while still connected to his martial ambitions. Numerous sources point out that by the time Shaka ascended to the throne, the tradition had already fallen into disuse. At the time that Shaka supposedly abolished the ritual, Magama Fuze contends, "it was already dying out, if not obsolete."<sup>53</sup> A.T. Bryant proffers that the custom began to fall into disuse during the reign of Jama, Senzangakona's father, in the 1780s. "When precisely the custom went out of fashion among the Zulus, is not clearly discoverable," Bryant explains in *The Zulu People*, but "it would seem, then, that the circumcision custom commenced to fall into desuetude among the Zulu and neighbouring tribes already in the reign of Jama (Senzangakona's father, d. circa 1781); therefore about 1770-1780; that is flickered feebly on through the age of Senzangakona, and became finally extinct during that of his son, Shaka."<sup>54</sup>

The actions of Dingiswayo, Shaka's military mentor and chief of the Mtetwas, may also explain Shaka's decision. Dingiswayo, also known as Godongwana, had fled from Zululand after attempting to assassinate his father, Jobe. He fled to the Eastern Cape and found work with a white family and remained there for a number of years. It was during this time in the Cape that it is widely accepted that Dingiswayo observed European armies and developed the regimental system. "The chief thing that Gondogwana copied from the Europeans was the discipline of the

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<sup>53</sup> Fuze, *The Black People*, 161.

<sup>54</sup> Bryant, *The Zulu People*, 491-492. Bryant repeats this same rationale in *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, arguing that "circumcision had fallen into disuse among the Mtetwas already in Jobe's reign, perhaps even before then; for Sokwetshata of Mlandela, of Mmbiya, of Shangane (Jobe's brother), assured the present writer that his grandfather, Mmbiya, most certainly was not circumcised." A.T. Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal Containing Earlier Political History of the Eastern Nguni Clans* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929), 98.

armies,” G. Khoza wrote in an entry for the Zulu Tribal History Competition in 1942.<sup>55</sup> Abner Zikalala, in another entry for the 1942 competition, echoed Khoza’s observations.

Dingiswayo brought back with him from the Cape new modes of warfare. He kept a standing army and divided it into regiments each in the charge of an *induna*. Each regiment was distinguished by a different name and wore a distinctive badge.<sup>56</sup>

Although Dingiswayo may have been influenced by his experience among European military units in the Cape, the regiments, as proven above, were not a new invention; Dingiswayo’s innovation, upon his return following the death of his father, came from the militarization of this pre-existing social institution. Fynn rationalized that Dingiswayo “had omitted or deferred the custom [of circumcision] till he should have completed his wars, which day never arrived,” possibly inspiring Shaka to adopt the same position toward the practice.<sup>57</sup> Jantshi also reported that “Dingiswayo too might have stopped it on his own accord in the tribe.”<sup>58</sup> Krige echoes a similar narrative, noting that “as it is difficult . . . to believe that even Shaka would have had sufficient power to do away at one fell swoop with any custom with a strong hold on the people, it is probably more correct to say that Shaka was responsible for finally abolishing a custom that had long been falling into disuse for other reasons which we do not know.”<sup>59</sup> Whatever the reason for the abolition, by the 1820s, the ritual had retreated from the realm of public ritual and the *amabutho* came to prominence not only as a symbol of the Zulu military system, but also as a symbol of a state undergoing massive change.

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<sup>55</sup> Killie Campbell Africana Library (KCAL), Zulu Tribal History Competition 1942 (KCM) 97/8/14—History of the Zulus by G. Khoza, Roodepoort, Transvaal.

<sup>56</sup> KCAL, Zulu Tribal History Competition 1942 (KCM) 97/8/10. “History of the Zulu People” by Abner Zikalala.

<sup>57</sup> Fynn, *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, 268-269.

<sup>58</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive, Vol. 1*, 195.

<sup>59</sup> Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus*, 117.

Many of these changes were predicated on the same societal tool of organization credited to Dingiswayo.<sup>60</sup> Shaka took refuge with Dingiswayo and learned firsthand about the regiments through his own participation in this societal structure in his own regiment, *Izichwe* which he joined at age 23.<sup>61</sup> The exploits of the *Izichwe* regiment are captured in Mazisi Kunene's *Emperor Shaka the Great: A Zulu Epic* (1979): "The fame of Izichwe must resound throughout the earth/Even those who once boasted the sharpness of their weapons/Shall flee in terror from the fierceness of the Izichwe regiment."<sup>62</sup> Shaka moved up through the ranks, impressing Dingiswayo with his physical prowess and leadership skills. Following Dingiswayo's death at the hands of Zwide of the Ndwandwe in 1818, the Mthetwas named Shaka their chief who followed his mentor's lead and continued to organize young men and women according to *amabutho*. When Shaka returned to the Zulu chieftdom and assumed the monarchy in 1816, after killing his half-brother and his father's *inkosana* (successor) Sigujana, he faced significant resistance and implemented a process of *ukubulala* (excision) to remove dissenting voices from his ranks.<sup>63</sup> He also began to consolidate his power through implementing the military system he experienced among the Mthetwas, preparing for an eventual face-off with Zwide, chief of the Ndwandwe, who exercised considerable power in the region.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> KCAL, Daniel McKinnon Malcolm Papers KCM 99/15/2, National Council for School Broadcasting, The Bantu People, Bantu Leaders: (a) Shaka

<sup>61</sup> KCAL, Zulu Tribal History Competition 1942 (KCM) 97/8/18—The Zulu History by Abraham Ngcobo (York Mine, Krugersdorp, Transvaal); Maxwell Z. Shamase, "The royal women of the Zulu monarchy through the keyhole of oral history: Queens Nandi (c. 1764 – c.1827) and Monase (c. 1797 – 1880)," *Inkanyiso* 6, no. 1(2014): 4.

<sup>62</sup> Mazisi Kunene, *Emperor Shaka the Great: A Zulu Epic* (London: Heinemann, 1979), 60.

<sup>63</sup> Carolyn Hamilton, "Restructuring within the Zulu Royal House," *African Studies* 56, no. 2 (1997): 85-113; John Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings* (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2018), 26-27.

<sup>64</sup> On Zwide: Elizabeth Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom, 1815–1828: War, Shaka and the Consolidation of Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 87-90; Elizabeth Eldredge, *Kingdoms and Chiefdoms of Southeastern Africa: Oral Traditions and History, 1400-1830* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015), 198-204.

The rise of the *amabutho* before and after Shaka stemmed from a range of social and political factors in the region; scholarship on the emergence of this military and societal system in the early nineteenth century focuses on how this institution represented a reaction against broader socioeconomic and sociopolitical changes in early-nineteenth century Natal and Zululand. With this in mind, the historiography on the genesis of the *amabutho* cannot be disentangled from scholarly debates surrounding the *mfecane*. J.D. Omer-Cooper's *The Zulu Aftermath* (1966) popularized the *mfecane* theory, also known as the devastation stereotype, which refers to "the wars and disturbances which accompanied the rise of the Zulu."<sup>65</sup> For Cooper, the Zulu military state, embodied in the *amabutho*, occupied a central place in this theory as the dominant image of the *mfecane* centered on "crucial military innovations initiated by men of unusual ability, who created a succession of despotic states in which traditional kinship loyalties were replaced by the direct subordination of the individual to the ruler."<sup>66</sup> Omer-Cooper therefore saw the *amabutho* as a direct reaction to this new political climate, resulting in an analysis which propagated his "great-man" theory of the changes to the Zulu state in the early nineteenth-century. The proliferation of these ideas as a result of publication of *The Zulu Aftermath*, in the words of John Wright, granted "the devastation stereotype further academic respectability, and by presenting it as an integral part of the long-established and now revamped notion freshly packaged as the "*mfecane*," to publicize it more widely than ever. From this time on, the history of the stereotype was closely intertwined with that of *mfecane* theory."<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> J.D. Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa* (London: Longmans, 1974), 5.

<sup>66</sup> J.B. Peires (ed.), *Before and after Shaka: Papers in Nguni History* (Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1981), 1.

<sup>67</sup> John Wright, "Political Mythology and the Making of Natal's Mfecane," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 23, no. 2 (1989): 283-284.

It also became entwined with the theories regarding the evolution of the *amabutho* in present-day KwaZulu-Natal.

Julian Cobbing linked the *amabutho* to growing power of the chiefs, viewing the institution as “a revolutionary way of maximizing the production of capital through a new means of organizing people.”<sup>68</sup> This new method by which “capital is redistributed . . . must give rise to different forms of political structure which are inevitably stronger since they’ve got more to reallocate.”<sup>69</sup> By decentralizing Shaka from the changing status of the *amabutho*, Cobbing sought to challenge the *mfecane theory*, challenging a “myth of an internally-induced process of black-on-black destruction centering on Shaka Zulu” by illustrating how, post-1810, “the black peoples of southern Africa were caught between intensifying and converging imperialistic thrusts: one to supply the Cape Colony with labour . . . caught within the European neat, [black southern Africans] were transformed over a lengthy period in reaction to the attentions of external plunderer.”<sup>70</sup> John Wright agreed with Cobbing’s findings, applying this new perspective to the study of Natal’s own *mfecane*. The “propagation of the myth . . . served a clear material purpose” as “did the fostering of the image of Shaka as the cruel and despotic leader of a warlike Zulu nation,” Wright argued in a 1989 article for the *Journal of African Studies*.<sup>71</sup> “By depicting the Zulu and their king as a potential threat to the security of the Cape’s eastern frontier region, or alternatively as the potential allies of rival powers,” Wright contends, colonial authorities and observers “hoped to influence the British authorities into annexing Natal, and thereby paving the way for the extension of British trade and settlement.”<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Peires, *Before and After Shaka*, 11.

<sup>69</sup> Peires, *Before and After Shaka*, 11.

<sup>70</sup> Julian Cobbing, “The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on the Dithakong and Mbolombo,” *Journal of African History* 29, no. 3 (1988): 519.

<sup>71</sup> Wright, “Political Mythology and the Making of Natal’s Mfecane,” 275.

<sup>72</sup> Wright, “Political Mythology and the Making of Natal’s Mfecane,” 275.

In the 1970s and 1980s, other scholars looked to the development of the *amabutho* as part of the efforts by chief to secure labor for public works. Henry Slater connected the development of the *amabutho* with labor, citing a labor shortage in reaction to the increased trade in Delagoa Bay and Port Natal caused chiefs to expand production of commodities for trade and also to extend control over their subjects, resulting in the formation of *amabutho* as a means of social control.<sup>73</sup> David Hedges viewed the *amabutho* as a new division of labor motivated by the trade in Delagoa Bay; one first designed to organize hunting parties but later becoming focused on protection more than production.

What one sees here is the extension of the new division of labour with men being involved on a much larger scale, and associated with this, perhaps on the basis of these hunting parties, it appears one gets the embryonic emergence of the regimental system in the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>74</sup>

Jeff Guy posited the *amabutho* as a reaction to the sense of insecurity created by ecological crises in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries, culminating in the Madlathule famine, which caused groups in the region to band together to mobilize labor for production, allocate scarce resources, and defend against external enemies.<sup>75</sup> Once the crisis had passed, the basic idea behind these formations remained and the channeling of young male service to the state by means of the regimental system remained. The centralization of labor under state control combined with the restrictions over marriage placed not only production squarely in the hands of the chief but also the social reproductive functions of the chieftdom as well.

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<sup>73</sup> Henry Slater, "Transitions in the political economy of south-east Africa before 1840" (PhD Diss, University of Sussex, 1977).

<sup>74</sup> David Hedges, "Trade and Politics in Southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries" (PhD Diss., University of London, 1978).

<sup>75</sup> Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 1979), 9; Peires, *Before and After Shaka*, 10.

John Wright's study of the evolution of age-sets from circumcision schools also focuses on the social reproductive functions of the institution, especially the restructuring of inter-generational relationships to postpone the time at which men achieved social maturity through marriage. "It can be argued that in a time of social crisis, such as seems to have affected northern Nguniland by at least the later 18th century, the male elders, who almost certainly formed the dominant element in Nguni society, would have sought to tighten their control over the means by which their position of dominance was reproduced through time," Wright asserts, "This would have entailed their taking firmer control over the labour-power of the society's primary producers, that is, the women and the younger men, and also over the means by which that labour-power was reproduced, that is, over human reproduction."<sup>76</sup> Wright cited the abolition of circumcision specifically as a sign of this new attempt to gain control, explaining how "in conditions where elders were seeking to extend the scope of their authority over juniors, it would have been to their advantage to abolish circumcision and replace it with another custom, such as the putting on of headrings, which could be carried out at a later stage in a man's life and so prolong the period when he was still regarded as a youth."<sup>77</sup> Wright argues that it was in the best interest of elders to replace circumcision with another practice "such as the putting on of headrings [*ukuthunga*], which could be carried out at a later stage in a man's life and so prolong the period when he was still regarded as a youth."<sup>78</sup>

However, the *amabutho* system did not only serve to provide military service for the king but rather radically restructured society from birth to death. The Zulu military system integrated not only the labor of young men in the *amabutho* but also young men and women at a range of

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<sup>76</sup> John Wright, "Pre-Shakan age-group formation among the Northern Nguni," *Natalia* 8 (1978): 26-27.

<sup>77</sup> Wright, "Pre-Shakan age-group formation," 27.

<sup>78</sup> Wright, "Pre-Shakan age-group formation," 27.

ages in a variety of roles. At the *amakhanda*, future recruits to the *amabutho* between the ages of thirteen and sixteen served as *udibi*, which encompassed a variety of tasks including but not limited to carrying mats, collecting firewood, cleaning huts, gardening, carrying and cleaning chamber pots, and carrying supplies when the *amabutho* went into battle.<sup>79</sup> Although these tasks seem fairly minor, Ndukwana told James Stuart that, by serving as *udibi*, “boys become tough and wily in this constant carrying.”<sup>80</sup> At the same time, immersed in the *amakhanda* on a daily basis, *udibi* also absorbed the ethos of the military system.

They learnt the life of high quarters which had to conform to fashions, requirements and orders which emanated from the King’s royal kraal and these were very stringent and proper. They also heard the history of their ancestors, the sagas of the lands with respect to kings and heroes, war songs and regimental war songs, and imbibed with them, some better and some worse than others and were fired with the desire to emulate those heroes of yore and to do and die for their native land. They were thus built up to be brave and loyal citizens of their country.<sup>81</sup>

Over time, the *udibi* shifted from a precursor to military service to a strictly service position which no longer promised promotion into the higher ranks.<sup>82</sup> Following the *udibi*, the next stage in training was to *kleza* (lit., “to drink milk directly from the udders of cattle”), which typically happened between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. These future soldiers became known as *inkwebane*, denoting their status as young men old enough to *kleza* but not yet part of an *ibutho*, and built bonds of solidarity with their fellow cadets, laying the groundwork for the future *ibutho* that these young cadets would be gathered into.<sup>83</sup> Also, at this point, the young recruits trained in

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<sup>79</sup> Carolyn Hamilton, “Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power in the Early Zulu Kingdom” (MA Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1985), 341. John Dube’s first novel, *uJeqe*, told a story of Shaka’s own mat-carrier. John Langalibalele Dube (translated from Zulu by J. Boxwell), *Jeqe, the bodyservant of King Tshaka/Insila ka Tshaka* (Lovedale: Lovedale Press, 1951).

<sup>80</sup> Ian Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army From, from Shaka to Cetshwayo, 1818 to 1879* (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1995), 50.

<sup>81</sup> Samuelson, *Long, Long Ago*, 355-56.

<sup>82</sup> Hamilton, “Ideology, Oral Traditions, and the Struggle for Power,” 342.

<sup>83</sup> Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 59.



fighting tactics and weaponry, as well as joining loose factions of youths from their own areas and engaging in fights with other rival factions in loose factions known as *amaviyo* (companies). Those who had not already undergone *qhumbuza* (the ear-piercing ceremony) received the incisions so that their ears would be open to hear the commands from their king.<sup>84</sup> *Qhumbuza* typically took place at puberty and not only represented an outward sign of a young man's progression through society, but also incorporated the sharing of social rites and denoted a young man as one with increased responsibilities who could fully enter into military service for the king.<sup>85</sup> Although this represented a step up from the *udibi* stage, those who *kleza'd* also continued to do chores at the *amakhanda*, including milking the royal herds (hence the *kleza* title).<sup>86</sup>

After the *izinkwebane* lived together at the *amakhanda* for several years, the king formally joined them into an *ibutho* and gave them a regimental name, a process called *ukubuthwa*.<sup>87</sup> Following the creation of the new *ibutho*, the new recruits received orders to construct a new *ikhanda* (regimental barrack), where they resided and received military training. Under the Zulu kingdom, the *amakhanda* served multiple strategic purposes, not only being carefully placed around the kingdom in areas of potential vulnerability, but also serving as personal residences of the king complete with a steady pool of labor. Additionally, the *amakhanda* and the regimental system as a whole "effectively weakened the control of the local chiefs by taking the same resource (the labor of young men) out of their hands and vesting it

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<sup>84</sup> Krige, *Social System of the Zulus*, 82.

<sup>85</sup> On the history of Zulu ear-piercing: Frank Jolles, "Zulu earplugs: A study in transformation," *African Arts* 30, no. 2 (1997): 46-59; G.W.K. Mahlobo and Eileen Jensen Krige, "Transition from Childhood to Adulthood amongst the Zulus," *Bantu Studies* 8, no. 1 (1934): 158.

<sup>86</sup> Paul J. Bjerk, "They Poured Themselves Into the Milk: Zulu Political Philosophy Under Shaka," *Journal of African History* 47 (2006): 1-19.

<sup>87</sup> Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 62.

directly in the monarchy.”<sup>88</sup> Finally, the housing of members of *amabutho* together at one *ikhanda* fostered homosocial bonds between the recruits. “The common age of the young men in the *amabutho*, and their shared experiences, tended to foster close ties between them, to the extent that many came to refer to themselves by their regimental, rather than their clan, names,” Ian Knight explains.<sup>89</sup> With these strategic benefits in mind, Knight argues, the *amabutho* system served as “an extremely effective means both of centralizing power and instilling a sense of national, rather than local, community.”<sup>90</sup> These homosocial bonds varied, however, as rival *amabutho* and even rival sections within the same regiments clashed. Often times these conflicts came to blows, taking the form of stick-fighting.

A wry word or a crooked look sets the whole in a blaze like a spark among powder; and then the captains immediately commence to hammer away with sticks or “knob-kerries” till they cry “hold, enough!” The stick is the great disciplinarian and ‘argumentarian’ in the Zulu. The young men have a saying, “We can never hear, unless we first feel the stick!”<sup>91</sup>

And not all men in the kingdom joined the military system; although Shaka and his successors predicated the *amabutho* system on the concept of universal conscription, young men could opt-out of service, either through crossing over into Natal where chiefs only maintained local *amabutho* or by claiming to be called to divine healing as *izangoma* (diviners).

The young men conscripted into the *amabutho* did not remain at *amakhanda* indefinitely; in fact, most of the time only female royal family members and cadets resided at the regional headquarters. When there was a looming conflict or a national ceremony, the *amabutho* returned to their respective *amakhanda*. Although men returned to their local chiefdoms when given

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<sup>88</sup> Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 33.

<sup>89</sup> Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 33.

<sup>90</sup> Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 33.

<sup>91</sup> David Leslie (edited by W.H. Drummond), *Among the Zulus and Amatongas: With Sketches of the Natives, Their Language and Customs; and the Country, Products, Climate, Wild Animals, &c. Being Principally Contributions to Magazines and Newspapers* (Glasgow, 1875), 93; quoted in Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 87.

permission to marry, they remained part of the army, moving to active reserves and expected to serve if the king called on them in times of war, for major national ceremonies, or to provide labor for the king. This labor took many forms, including “building military kraals, planting, reaping, and making gardens for the king.”<sup>92</sup> To organize men for these tasks, the king appointed two *izinduna* (headmen) to command the *ibutho*. Although status became very important to Shaka, most *izinduna* came from the ranks of commoners, helping to bar any building of power by other members of the royal family. Additionally, just as the *izinkwebane* organized themselves into *amaviyo*, so too were the *amabutho* divided internally by the *amaviyo*. These *amaviyo* had their own commanders, known as *igoso*.

This system of service through the *amabutho* did not only benefit the king; in fact, John Laband argues, that “it only worked as it did because it was a reciprocal arrangement.”<sup>93</sup> In this period, the main indicator of wealth and status lay in cattle, and the *amabutho* served the king by going out in cattle-raiding parties to take cattle from neighboring chiefdoms. When the *amabutho* brought the cattle back to the king, the spoils were divided among the *amabutho* as signs of Shaka’s appreciation. Laband explains: “The captured cattle daily fed the *amabutho* with meat (which they rarely ate at home) when they served in the king’s *amakhanda*, and were redistributed to them – most lavishly to their officers – in token of the king’s appreciation.”<sup>94</sup> Shaka also rewarded certain *amabutho* members when they proved themselves in battle. Certain warriors ascended to the status of one of the king’s favorites and became known as the *izilomo*. These favorites could gain favor either by being friends with the king or distinguishing themselves in battle. As a reward for their favored status, the *izilomo* often became *izinduna* and

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<sup>92</sup> Colin de B. Webb, *A Zulu king speaks: statements made by Cetshwayo kaMpande on the history and custom of his people* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1987), 80.

<sup>93</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 34.

<sup>94</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 34.

sometimes consulted on military issues for the king.<sup>95</sup> Those denoted as heroes by Shaka also received *iziqu* (a neckace made from interlocking blocks of willow wood) which was worn on the body and served as a permanent marker of “warrior hero” status.<sup>96</sup> In this period, “masculine virtue and honour” became “closely bound up with the prowess of military heroes, and were the binding myths of the state itself, the cultural focus around which the community adhered.”<sup>97</sup> This period not only saw the permeation of the concept of *udumo* (military honor) into the Zulu elite, but the spread of this ethos throughout the society; the effects of this shift continue to impact KZN today.<sup>98</sup>

Although Shaka’s kingdom became inherently masculinized and wrapped up in a gendered ethnicity, Shaka also organized women into age-grades, though they typically did not reside in the *amakhanda* and rarely participated in military conflicts.<sup>99</sup> Shaka’s female regiments included Mvutwamini (“Wild fruit that ripens at midday”)<sup>100</sup>; Ntlabati (“Ground”)<sup>101</sup>; Conyane (“Nettle”)<sup>102</sup>; Ulusiba; and Inkisimana.<sup>103</sup> Female regiments’ primary function centered on marrying male regiments given permission to *ukuthunga*; often Shaka (and subsequent kings)

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<sup>95</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 82-83.

<sup>96</sup> Jeff Guy, “Imperial appropriations : Baden-Powell, the Wood Badge and the Zulu Iziqu,” in Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (eds.) *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 191-213.

<sup>97</sup> Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, 12.

<sup>98</sup> Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 140.

<sup>99</sup> Jennifer Weir, “Chiefly women and women’s leadership in pre-colonial South Africa,” in Nomboniso Gasa (ed.), *Women in South African History: They Remove Boulders and Cross Rivers* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 20017), 3-20.

<sup>100</sup> Formed of girls born circa 1796. KCAL, Killie Campbell Correspondence (File 35), Letter, Killie Campbell to Tings Robson, February 20, 1957.

<sup>101</sup> Formed of girls born circa 1798. KCAL, Killie Campbell Correspondence (File 35), Letter, Killie Campbell to Tings Robson, February 20, 1957.

<sup>102</sup> Formed of girls born circa 1800. KCAL, Killie Campbell Correspondence (File 35), Letter, Killie Campbell to Tings Robson, February 20, 1957.

<sup>103</sup> Details not provided for the years of enlistment of Ulusiba and Inkisimana. KCAL, Killie Campbell Correspondence (File 35), Letter, Killie Campbell to Tings Robson, February 20, 1957. Shaka’s father, Senzangakhona, also enlisted female regiments, including the Ntshuku ka Madango of girls born circa 1780; Usiba luka Mtshalekwana (“Long heron feathers or Mtshalekwana”) of girls born circa 1788; and Umcekeceke (“The prematurely cut off”) of girls born circa 1793. KCAL, Guy Vivian Essery Papers, KCM 98/58/6, A.T. Bryant’s list of regiments and girl guilds.

simply ordered male regiments to order members of a specific female regiment. The king also extracted service from young women in the kingdom through service in the *isigodlo* (the king's private quarters).<sup>104</sup> Although most of these young women's service did not extend beyond performing chores at their assigned *amakhanda* under the supervision of female members of the royal family, a select few were chosen to be *umdlunkulu* and resided in the black *isigodlo* and engaged in *ukusoma* with the king.<sup>105</sup> The *isigodlo* or *ethula* girls also enhanced the king's herds; when they married, their betrothed paid *ilobolo* to the king rather than the girls' family.<sup>106</sup> Girls also participated in herding cattle, as evidenced in a 1968 article in the *Natal Witness* recounting the story of Dodoyi Zuma of Impendle who remembered herding her father's cattle at the time of the Anglo-Zulu War.<sup>107</sup>

One of the final and most significant stages in the progression of a man through the *amabutho* system centered on the *isicoco* (headring; alternatively, ringkops). Made by hand, the base of the headrings consisted of a mix of latex, aloe sap, honey comb and ash, which was shaped and sewn into men's hair after the king gave permission for married men to take on this outward sign of their ascendancy to the height of Zulu society.<sup>108</sup> Under Shaka's state, the act of *ukuthunga* (sewing on the headring) became the "formal and public recognition . . . that now these men had attained their majority, as men, and conferred upon them a new dignity and superior status (that of *amakehla*, or 'ring men') . . ."<sup>109</sup> In the absence of the circumcision

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<sup>104</sup> The isigodlo girls had male counterparts, the *izinceku*, who were charged with attending to the king, serving as diplomats, and serving as advisers. Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 68.

<sup>105</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 55.

<sup>106</sup> H.C. Lugg, *Life Under a Zulu Shield* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1975), 34.

<sup>107</sup> KCAL, S.I.E. Borquin Papers (File 95-Zulu General, 1953-1986), "Proud old Zulu woman recalls herding cattle during 1879 war," *Natal Witness*, October 25, 1968.

<sup>108</sup> KCAL, Killie Campbell Correspondence (File 23), Letter, A.G. Marwick to Killie Campbell, July 2, 1952; Sandra Klopper, "'Zulu Dandies': The History and Significance of Extravagant Hairstyling among Young Men from Colonial Natal," *Journal of African Culture and Art: New Approaches* 1 (2010): 32; Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 27.

<sup>109</sup> Bryant, *The Zulu People*, 141.

practice, the taking of the headring (*isicoco*) became the primary marker for a man's status as a full member of the society. That being said, *ukuthunga* represented an outward symbol that could be revoked as opposed to the finality of the *ukusoka* practice; Carolyn Hamilton argues that this "revocability . . . was one of the factors underlying the replacement of circumcision with the rite of *thunga* 'ing.'" <sup>110</sup>

The kingdom divided *amabutho* based on their headring status; those *amabutho* allowed to *thunga* were known as the 'white' *amabutho*, while the 'black' *amabutho* were men without headrings. <sup>111</sup> "Battle accounts typically depicted the 'white' *amabutho* as the veterans and the great warriors, whilst the 'black' *amabutho* were described as being inexperienced, if lusty," Carolyn Hamilton explains, "This distinction was emphasized in the mainly white shields of the former, and the primarily black shields of the latter." <sup>112</sup> Following his father's death and his ascension the Zulu monarchy, Shaka inherited three *amabutho* from his father: the *amaWombe*, *isiPezi* and *inTontela*. To cement his authority over the chieftom that previously rejected him, Shaka made a show of exercising his control over these *amabutho*. To assert his authority, Shaka forced both the *isiPezi* and a section of the *inTontela* known as *Dubinhlangu* to remove their headrings, which could only be achieved by cutting the hair attaching the ring to the scalp, and thereby renounce the social status conveyed in this symbol, in addition to prohibiting them from marrying. <sup>113</sup> "Tshaka . . . ordered the Jibinqwanga to cut off their headrings because they were still so young and had not attained the age of dignity," A.T. Bryant wrote in *Olden Times in*

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<sup>110</sup> Hamilton, "Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power," 346.

<sup>111</sup> Hamilton, "Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power," 368-369.

<sup>112</sup> Hamilton, "Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power," 368-369.

<sup>113</sup> Carolyn Hamilton notes that although the *isiPezi* were not allowed to take wives, they were granted permission to form "liaisons with women (known as the *izingodosi*) whom it was intended they would one day marry. The *izingodosi* remained at the homes of their parents, and limited sexual relations were permitted in terms of the relationship." Hamilton, "Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power," 336.

*Zululand and Natal*, “He said they were to drink from the udders like boys.”<sup>114</sup> By ordering these units to remove the outward symbol of their masculinity, Shaka demoted the *isiPezi* and *Dubinhlangu* literally and figuratively, returning them to the status of *izinsizwa* and placing their lives squarely under control of the king. Insecurity marked the early years of Shaka’s reign over the Zulu people and he relied on military support from external forces to secure his position.

In addition to the organizational structure that Shaka introduced, he also revolutionized military training and the Zulu fighting style.

The Zulus, in spite of thorns, stones, et cetera have resigned themselves to giving up their sandals and walking barefoot. Chaka, who knew how to impose severe discipline, would have it so, being convinced that warriors without shoes are more active and ready. Before Chaka they wore sandals, and in their battles they hurled assegai. Above all, they charged in a mass, and without observing any orderly arrangement. Chaka formed regiments of a thousand men each. He did away with the sandal, and . . . every warrior . . . takes but one assegai, which was to be exhibited after a fight stained by the blood of an enemy. The struggle could then only be hand to hand. This new way of fighting, unknown to the neighbouring nations, and which seemed to speak of something desperate, facilitates Chaka’s conquest to such a degree that in the twelve years of his reign he succeeded in destroying more than a million men.<sup>115</sup>

Another tool in Shaka’s conquest resulting in “destroying a million men” came from the fighting tactic he developed: the horn formation. This tactic consisted of breaking his forces into three groups. One comprised the *isifuba* (“chest”) which approached the enemy directly. The other two units formed the *izimpondo* (“horns”) which encircled enemy forces and cut off their escape.

The fighting style developed under Shaka included the carrying of large *izihlangu* made from the hides of the royal herds.<sup>116</sup> Shaka also abandoned the throwing spear in favor of a large

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<sup>114</sup> Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, 642.

<sup>115</sup> Adulphe Delegorgue, “The Zulus” from *Voyage dans l’Afrique-Australe*, in J. Bird (ed.) *The Annals of Natal: 1495 to 1845, Volume 1* (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis & Sons, 1888), 470.

<sup>116</sup> In addition to the fighting shield, *ihawu* is the generic term for shields and also a name of a shield used for dancing, as well as the *igcokwe* and *ingugha igqoka*. The *hubelo* was used for hunting. KCAL, HC Lugg Papers, KCM 4160B, “Zulu Weapons, Implements and Domestic Articles” (1971).

stabbing spear called an *iklwa*, an onomatopoeiac term referring to the sound the spear made when leaving the body of an enemy.<sup>117</sup> Additionally, soldiers carried *amawisa* (fighting sticks with knobs on the end; alternatively, knobkerries) into battle, as a carryover from stick-fighting traditions. The great warriors have white shields with one or two black spots; the young warriors all have black shields; the middle warriors, or those that have wives, form distinct regiments, and are called *Umfaudas* [possibly *umfokazana* – inferior], and have red shields.<sup>118</sup> Sometimes warriors also adopted battle-axes (*isizenze*), using the lower portion of the blade to hook an enemy's shield and pull it aside.<sup>119</sup> Warriors wore a combination of *umutsha* (a thin strip of hide around the waist with covers of animal skin hanging front and back) and *ibheshu* (a loin covering the buttocks) into battle. These items typically came from the skins of the civet cat or the blue monkey, but could also be made of lamb or goat hide if necessary. Armbands made of cow tails (*amashoba*) and elaborate headdresses marked men's status as *amabutho* members.<sup>120</sup>

The nation also armed the warriors through purification of their bodies through the administering of emetics by *izinyanga* and the consumption of a black bull who had been ritually killed. In addition to the consumption of the meat of the *inkunzi* and the ritual vomiting, *izinyanga* also treated troops with *intelezi yempi* which often included flesh from soldiers of rival factions that, if administered properly, could render the enemy completely powerless.<sup>121</sup> The

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<sup>117</sup> John Guttman, "Zulu Iklwa," *Military History* 24, no. 4 (2007), 23.

<sup>118</sup> Nathaniel Isaacs, *Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa, Descriptive of the Zoolus, Their Manners, Customs, Etc. Etc. with a Sketch of Natal, Volume 1* (London: Edward Churton, 1836), 346-347.

<sup>119</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 114.

<sup>120</sup> Headdresses consisted of a number of components, including the *umqeke* (a headband of animal skin made of leopard for unmarried warriors and otter skin for older men), the *amabheqe* (square pieces of monkey skin sewn to the headband and hanging over the ears), elaborate clusters of feathers and porcupine quills for the unmarried *amabutho* and tail feathers of the blue crane (*indwe*) for older, married regiment members. Shaka also adopted the *indwe* feather as a sign of his authority. The feathers of the scarlet lourie (*iGwalaGwala*) have been adopted by current King Goodwill Zwelithini as a sign of his royal status. Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 115-116; 119; KCAL, S.I.E. Borquin Papers (File 166 – Zulu Shields, Weapons and Dress), Letter 1973.

<sup>121</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 170.



*izinyanga* gathered samples of the vomit for addition to the *inkatha yesizwa sakwaZulu*, the ceremonial coil embodied with the spirit and vitality of the Zulu nation.<sup>122</sup> These rituals not only purified the warriors' bodies for fighting, but also provided them with spiritual protection against *umnyama* (the dark spiritual forces which could be unleashed during the killing in the subsequent battle). Warriors could also achieve *ithonya* ("supernatural ascendancy in war") through similar ceremonies.<sup>123</sup> Following battle, to ward off evil spirits, the *amabutho* practiced many rituals to rid themselves of *umnyama*, including slitting open the belly of their enemies to release their spirit and undergoing four days of purification before returning to their homes.<sup>124</sup>

*Amabutho* served critical roles in the annual *Umkhosi Wokweshwama* celebrations, providing visual proof of the power and prestige of the king. The umkhosi actually consisted of two celebrations: the little *umkhosi* (which took place a month in advance of the large celebration and focused on the strengthening of the king through *imithi* (medicines) as well as the ceremonial eating of the first crops) and the great *umkhosi*.<sup>125</sup> The king mobilized the full strength of the *amabutho* for the great *umkhosi* and the hunt that corresponded. The *amabutho* were also ritually strengthened and purified through several days of festivities, including the ritual killing of a black bull by the *amabutho* (sans weapons). Additionally, during this festival, the king might announce the *amabutho* he planned to grant permission to marry. The festivities also served as part of the training regimen for the *amabutho* with the performance of *ukugiya* (dancing). "Dancing taught the warriors to move in formation with their regiments, to keep pace,

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<sup>122</sup> Ian Knight, *Companion to the Anglo-Zulu War* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2008): 105-107; Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 152-156;

<sup>123</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 163

<sup>124</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 38-39.

<sup>125</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 48. For more on *umkhosi*: H.C. Lugg, "Agricultural Ceremonies in Natal and Zululand," *Bantu Studies* 3, no. 1(1927): 357-383; Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 124-126; . John Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars* (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2009), 133-134; Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom*, 239.

to change front without confusion, and to perform particular tasks on a given command,” Ian Knight explains.<sup>126</sup>

Ceremonies like the *umkhosi* aided Shaka in crystallizing a nascent Zulu nationalism amongst his kingdom. But this nationalism came from defining his kingdom against those who fled from Zululand into Natal during his wars of conquest. The Shakan era also saw the rise of a new distinction between the *amatungwa* (those considering themselves to be true Zulus) and the outsiders (known by a variety of names, including *iziyendane* and *amalala*).<sup>127</sup> These outsiders consisted of former Zululand residents who Shaka and his *amabutho* drove out of the region during his wars of conquest. Although Shaka enjoyed huge military successes against the Chunu, Qwabe, and Ndwandwe, his forces were far from invincible. In 1824, Mdlaka kaNcidi, one of Shaka’s top commanders, led his forces into Mpondo territory, under the leadership of Daku kaNgqungqushu, to steal cattle and return to Zulu territory. Faku’s forces retaliated and drove the *amabutho* north along the coast.<sup>128</sup> Shaka also lost significant territory in 1824 to Henry Francis Fynn and Francis George Farewell who came to the Zulu king asking for territory; Shaka signed a document granting permission for these traders to occupy Port Natal.<sup>129</sup> Working through an interpreter, sources suggest Shaka did not understand what he had agreed to, but the die had been cast and Shaka initiated a period of massive settler expansion into the region. Not long after this, in 1825, Shaka evaded a failed assassination attempt, which he suspected was organized by two

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<sup>126</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 84.

<sup>127</sup> On the *amalala*, see: Carolyn Hamilton and John Wright, “The Making of the *AmaLala*: Ethnicity, Ideology and Relations of Subordination in a Precolonial Context,” *South African Historical Journal* 22, no. 1 (1990): 3-23. .

<sup>128</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 60-61.

<sup>129</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 62-63. It is unclear if Shaka understood what he agreed to, given that he could not communicate with Francis and Farewell and relied on an interpreter for their interactions.

of his half-brothers Dingane and Mhlangana.<sup>130</sup> In retaliation, he ordered his *amabutho* to seek out any and all Qwabe in the surrounding area and kill them.<sup>131</sup> The “genocide” of the Qwabe allowed Shaka to establish a new kraal, kwaBulawayo, in a strategic location in the heart of Qwabe country. He also began building a new kraal at KwaDukuza (present-day Stanger) which signaled a new concern on his part with keeping an eye with the European settlers at Port Natal.

In 1827, Shaka’s mother, Nandi, died. In addition to the standard mourning period and her ritual burial (*ihlambo impi*), Shaka also established an *ihlambo impi* (cleansing army) numbering 3,000 men and undertaking raids throughout the region.<sup>132</sup> During this period, European authorities expressed their anxiety over the dangerous potential of Shaka and wrote to their imperial connections to record the exploits of the Zulu king. This phenomena, combined with the diary kept by Henry Francis Fynn and the travel logs of Nathaniel Isaacs, cemented Shaka’s image in global imaginations. The figure of Shaka, Carolyn Hamilton argued in *Terrific Majesty: The Power of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Intervention* (1998), was created through “certain symbolic forms and forces [which] were constituted historically, often through the exercise of power and came to be the founding ideas of a Zulu society.”<sup>133</sup> With this approach, Hamilton finds herself delving into the ways in which works produced by pre-colonial and colonial observers shaped the legacy of Shaka.<sup>134</sup> Shaka’s image evolved over time as these

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<sup>130</sup> Cecil Skotnes and Stephen Gray, *Shaka’s assassination: The assassination of Shaka by Mhlangane Dingane and Mbopa on 22 September 1828 at Dukuza by which act the Zulu nation first lost its empire* (Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill, 1974); John Laband, *The Assassination of King Shaka: Zulu History’s Dramatic Moment* (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017).

<sup>131</sup> Dan Wylie, *Shaka* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2011): 72-73; John Wright, “Political Transformation in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” in Carolyn Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995), 177.

<sup>132</sup> Weir, “Chiefly women and women’s leadership in pre-colonial South Africa,” 14.

<sup>133</sup> Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*, 3.

<sup>134</sup> These works include: Fynn, *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*; Isaacs, *Travels and adventures in Eastern Africa*.

authors put forth their own versions of the past and the historical record constantly shifts “to take cognizance of the changing terrain of the struggle, and the subtle elaborations and shifts in the argument of the opposition.”<sup>135</sup>

Following in Hamilton’s footsteps, Dan Wylie, a literary scholar, has devoted himself to correcting the narrative of Shaka’s reign that proliferated through the use of the same problematic sources that Hamilton grappled with. In attempting to divert from studies that emphasize Shaka’s violent and destructive nature, Wylie’s work, first in *Savage Delight: White Myths of Shaka* (2000) and, later in *Myth of Iron* (2006), aimed to create an “anti-biography,” a project that involved “laying out, as far as possible, all the available evidence on Shaka’s reign and, deciding item by item, what we can make out of it.”<sup>136</sup> In addition to correcting the Shakan narrative, Wylie contends that Zulu identity was not “forged in absolute isolation” from colonial identities, but he fails to, as Hamilton acknowledges in *Terrific Majesty*, that the “exchanges of information” between colonial authorities and black intellectuals played a huge role in Zulu identity formation.<sup>137</sup>

In *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom, 1815-1828 : War, Shaka, and the Consolidation of Power* (2014), Elizabeth Eldredge circles around similar concerns as Wylie, but comes to drastically different conclusions, arguing that “the broad picture conveyed by biased European sources of Shaka’s use of violence in his foreign relations and his internal governance can be established and confirmed from indigenous AmaZulu historical sources.”<sup>138</sup> Through taking the available sources seriously, Eldredge’s work attempts to show that contemporary Zulu

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<sup>135</sup> Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*, 71.

<sup>136</sup> Wylie, *Myth of Iron*, 3.

<sup>137</sup> Dan Wylie, *Savage Delight: White Myths of Shaka* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2000), 4; 244.

<sup>138</sup> Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom*, 7.

nationalism has direct links to precolonial practices put in place under Shaka's reign. Eldredge explains, "the AmaZulu identity of the twentieth century has multicultural roots stemming from the political and social processes of consolidation that created the Zulu kingdom under Shaka in the early decades of the nineteenth century."<sup>139</sup>

This image proliferated following Shaka's death at the hands of assassins in 1828, ending the reign of the first king of the Zulu kingdom. Although it is unclear who thrust the spear into Shaka's body, once the dust settled, his half-brother Dingane emerged as his successor.<sup>140</sup> Dingane maintained many of Shaka's traditions and, by all accounts, "kept court with more splendor and pageantry than any other Zulu monarch."<sup>141</sup> This included traveling with a huge entourage, including throngs of his *amabutho* and an imbongi, as well as maintaining huge numbers of *isigodlo* (over 500) at his uMgungundlovu kraal.<sup>142</sup> Although he only reigned for twelve years (1828-1840), Dingane formed a number of *amabutho*: uKokoti (a kind of poisonous snake)<sup>143</sup>; uDlambedlu ("The Fierce Eaters-Up")<sup>144</sup> (also known as the iNtsewane ("The Sharp Insignificants/Youths"))<sup>145</sup>, uMdlenevu ("The Burnt Sides")<sup>146</sup>, and iNgwegwe ("The Rod with a Hook")<sup>147</sup> iziGulutshane ("Grass basket")<sup>148</sup> (also known as umKhulutshane<sup>149</sup>) and iHlaba ("Prickly aloe").<sup>150</sup> He also enrolled several women's regiments including Ulubeje, Nzawu ("ill-

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<sup>139</sup> Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom*, 3-4.

<sup>140</sup> Shaka's half-brothers Dingane, Mhlangana, and Mbopha all emerged as suspects following Shaka's death but it is unclear who killed him. Skotnes and Gray, *Shaka's assassination*; Laband, *The Assassination of King Shaka*.

<sup>141</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 102.

<sup>142</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 102.

<sup>143</sup> Formed circa 1838 of men born circa 1818. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 133.

<sup>144</sup> Formed circa 1829 of men born circa 1809. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 65.

<sup>145</sup> Carl Faye, *Zulu References for Interpreters and Students* (Pietermaritzburg: City Printing Works, 1923): 45.

<sup>146</sup> Faye, *Zulu References*, 45.

<sup>147</sup> Faye, *Zulu References*, 45.

<sup>148</sup> Formed 1833 of 1815 births. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 109.

<sup>149</sup> Formed circa 1833 of men born circa 1813. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 134.

<sup>150</sup> Formed circa 1837 of men born circa 1817. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 113.

tempered”) of girls born between 1804 and 1810, and Ikwani (“Bullrush”) of girls born between 1810 and 1813.<sup>151</sup> Although large numbers of men attempted to avoid military service under Dingane by feigning a calling to the *izangoma* practice, Dingane rounded up the new initiates and forced them to join pre-existing *amabutho*.<sup>152</sup> Dingane took a more liberal approach to the *amabutho* and to the social reproduction of the Zulu more broadly, loosening restrictions on premarital sex for his warriors, allowing several of the older units to marry, and generally relaxed the military discipline imposed under Shaka. Accordingly, in one of his *izibongo* King Dingane is portrayed as '*Owalamulela abafazi namadoda: walamulela izintombi namnasoka*' [saviour of wives and husbands, marriageable women and womanizers],” Acquirance V. Shongwe explains.<sup>153</sup> Sources also report that Dingane reintroduced the throwing spear to conflicts as a reaction to Europeans forces' use of firearms.<sup>154</sup>

In addition to the new *amabutho* Dingane formed, during times of struggle, local chiefdoms supplemented the national *amabutho* with their own soldiers. For example, during a series of attacks on Lourenco Marques launched between 1831-1844, Dingane utilized 2,000 to 3,000 auxiliary soldiers provided by local chiefs to supplement a few hundred of his own warriors.<sup>155</sup> Warriors continued to provide labor for the king under Dingane. Lunguza, a member of the Isiziba section of the uKhokothi regiment, recalled his service under Dingane.

The Isiziba did not live at Mgungundlovu but only came when specially summoned. We were called together for the special purpose of cutting wattles of

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<sup>151</sup> Details not provided for the dates of enrollment for Ulubeje. KCAL, Killie Campbell Correspondence (File 35), Letter, Killie Campbell to Tings Robson, February 20, 1957; KCAL, Guy Vivian Essery Papers, KCM 98/58/6, A.T. Bryant's list of regiments and girl guilds.

<sup>152</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 88.

<sup>153</sup> Acquirance Vusumuzi Shongwe, “King Dingane: A Treacherous Tyrant Or An African Nationalist?” (Ph.D. Diss, University of Zululand, 2004).

<sup>154</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 167.

<sup>155</sup> Gerhard Liesegang, “Dingane's Attack on Lourenco Marques in 1833,” *The Journal of African History* 10, no. 4 (1969): 565-579.

the *umnqandane* bush. After this work we were given cattle to eat and then told to disperse to our homes.<sup>156</sup>

This labor could also go to extremes, as witnessed by Alan Gardiner at Dingane's court when he ordered his regiments to capture a lion and bring it back alive.

Several men from a distant part of the country, and who had never yet seen a horse, were standing near, when [Dingane], in one of his frolicsome moods, suddenly turned round, and, pointing to my horse, quietly grazing at a distance, cried out, 'There's a lion – go and bring it alive.' Instantly the whole party were in pursuit. I did not witness the circumstance, but my interpreter informed me, that as they approached they extended themselves to surround him, one standing out in advance as though to tempt the attack, while those behind were prepared to seize and master the animal after he had, as they expected, sprung upon his victim. But they soon discovered their mistake, and on their return were ironically rebuked by their sovereign for not bringing in the lion. Had it been a lion, as [Dingane] himself asserted, it would have been brought, and from this specimen I have little doubt of the fact, notwithstanding the great loss of life that must have attended so unusual an enterprise.<sup>157</sup>

The continuation of this practice, Ian Knight contends, "served to remind both the king and his subjects of the extent of the obligations placed upon them."<sup>158</sup> He continues: "It was a common boast of the king . . . that the lives of ordinary people belonged to him. So powerful were the bonds of service that it was not without an element of truth."<sup>159</sup>

These stories about Dingane contributed with images of Dingane portrayed both in firsthand accounts by Europeans *and* subsequent historical studies that classify him as "blood-thirsty, capricious, treacherous, self-indulgent, an absolute despot, an ingrate and an inveterate liar."<sup>160</sup> These emerged from the observations of white settlers like John Cane who described

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<sup>156</sup> Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 63.

<sup>157</sup> Allen Gardiner, *Narrative of a Journey to the Zoolu Country in South Africa: Undertaken in 1835* (London: William Crofts, 1836), 53.

<sup>158</sup> Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 64.

<sup>159</sup> Knight, *Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 64.

<sup>160</sup> Felix N. Okoye, "Dingane: A Reappraisal," *The Journal of African History* 10, no. 2 (1969): 221. This image was not static, however; Sifiso Ndlovu's research shows how impressions of Dingane have shifted over time. Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, "The Changing African Perceptions of King Dingane in Historical Literature: A Case Study in the Construction of Historical Knowledge in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century South African History" (PhD Diss, University of the Witwatersrand, 2001); Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, *African Perspectives of King Dingane kaSenzangakhona: The*

Dingane to Cape authorities as “weak, cruel, indolent, capricious, and even more prone to bloodshed than the monster [Shaka] that has been put to death.”<sup>161</sup> Magma Fuze described him as “a greater torment than Shaka” and “truly like a poisonous snake.”<sup>162</sup> Peter Becker cemented this image with the publication of his 1964 biography, *Rule of Fear*.<sup>163</sup> Although this negative image took hold, other more positive stories of Dingane proliferate. Nathaniel Isaacs, the sensationalist author who contributed to so many negative stories of Shaka, even wrote of the huge differences between Dingane and Shaka. “Chaka and born and nurtured in war, which was his darling aim, but Dingane cultivates the repose of peace, and only wields his spear when necessity compels him,” Isaacs reflected, “He is no warrior – he is a man whose soul seems devoted to ease and pleasure.”<sup>164</sup> This does not suggest that Dingane avoided any of all acts of cruelty or vengeance; he had a huge temper and, of course, killed several of his brothers, including Shaka.<sup>165</sup> Nevertheless, Felix Okoye argues that the negative characterizations of Dingane fail to take into consideration the influence of refugees from chiefdoms in conflict with the Zulu kingdom in crafting this unflattering image. “These Zulu refugees naturally had no love for the king and were, to a large extent, responsible for the worsening of relations between Dingane and the white traders, for they repeatedly and maliciously spread the rumour that the Zulu monarch was contemplating exterminating the whites,” Okoye argues.<sup>166</sup>

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*Second Monarch of the Zulu Kingdom* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Sifiso Ndlovu, “‘He Did What Any Other Person in his Position Would Have Done to Fight the Forces of Invasion and Disruption’: Africans, the Land and Contending Images of King Dingane (‘the Patriot’) in the Twentieth Century, 1916–1950s,” *South African Historical Journal* 38, no. 1 (1998): 99-143.

<sup>161</sup> Quoted in Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 104.

<sup>162</sup> Fuze, *The Black People*, 83-84.

<sup>163</sup> Peter Becker, *Rule of Fear: The Life and Times of Dingane, King of the Zulus* (London: Longmans, 1964).

<sup>164</sup> Isaacs, *Travels and adventures in Eastern Africa* (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1970), 219.

<sup>165</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 105-108.

<sup>166</sup> Okoye, “Dingane: A Reappraisal,” 222-223.



Dingane's reaction to the movement of Afrikaners into Zululand from the Cape as part of the Great Trek contributed to the negative stereotypes about Dingane. In the 1830s, Dutch-speaking colonists set out from the Cape in search of land on which they could establish their own homeland, free of British rule.<sup>167</sup> In 1837, one group of these Voortrekkers crossed the Drakensberg Mountains in hopes of settling in the area. Piet Retief, the group's leader, sent a letter to Dingane by way of a missionary, Francis Owen, expressing his intention to live in peace with the Zulu people. Dingane set a test for the interlopers, claiming that if Retief and the other Voortrekkers could retrieve cattle he had lost to Chief Sekonyela, he would give them land and would live in peace with the Boers. When Retief and his men succeeded, Dingane became worried about the military prowess of the Voortrekkers and planned to murder Retief. On February 6, 1838, Dingane invited Retief and his men to come to his kraal, sans weapons, to celebrate the return of the cattle. Inside the kraal, Dingane ordered the murder of the Afrikaner leader and his party. He then sent the army to attack several Voortrekker encampments in the Drakensberg foothills. The massacre of the families living in these settlements resulted in a war involving not only the Zulu and the Afrikaners, but also British settle communities.

On December 16, 1838, Zulu forces attacked a Boer wagon-circle at the Ncome River and were mown down in the process. So many Zulus died that the incident became known as the "Battle of Blood River" because the river was said to run red with blood.<sup>168</sup> Following this crushing defeat, Dingane moved his principal homestead south, but in 1840 his brother, Mpande

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<sup>167</sup> Norman Etherington, *The Great Treks: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815-1854* (New York: Longman, 2001); Johannes Meintjes, *The Voortrekkers : the story of the Great Trek and the making of South Africa* (London: Cassell, 1973); Christopher Saunders, "Great Treks?," *South African Historical Journal* 46, no. 1 (2002): 300-307.

<sup>168</sup> A.J.P. Opperman, *The Battle of Blood River* (Roodeport: CUM, 1982); Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010): 165.

kaSenzangakhona, defected to the Boers.<sup>169</sup> Mpande recognized the opportunity to overthrow and drive out his brother, with the assistance of the Afrikaners, which he accomplished at the Battle of Maqongqo.<sup>170</sup> Dingane sought refuge in Swaziland, but was killed in the Hlatikhulu forest shortly after.<sup>171</sup> The assistance of the Boers in Mpande's ascendancy came at a huge cost to the kingdom, in the form of devastating concessions of land *and* cattle to the Boers. These concessions might ended the kingdom if not for the involvement of the British who drove the Boers out of Natal. In 1842, the British annexed the area south of the Thukela and renamed it Natal; in 1843, they recognized it as a colony.

Mpande, at his installation in 1840, became the first king subject to what Mahmood Mamdani refers to as Shepstone's system of "decentralized despotism."<sup>172</sup> An Ordinance 3 of 1849 recognized the rights of chiefs in the realm of customary law, but firmly established chiefs as agents of the colonial state, accountable to the Lieutenant Governor who became known as the Supreme Chief. The Lieutenant Governor became the Supreme Chief with the ability to appoint and remove chiefs and to amend "native" law. From 1850, magistrates began trying criminal cases, with chiefs retaining their rights to try issues of customary law. In 1863, chiefs began receiving salaries, cementing their status as government agents. This system of indirect rule, in which chiefs became agents of the colonial state, shaped British approaches to colonialism throughout the African continent.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Although Mpande and Dingane were half-brothers, Mpande was raised among the Cele by chief Dibandlela and not with Senzangakhona. Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 140.

<sup>170</sup> Kelly Bell, "The River Ran Red," *Military History* 34, no. 5 (2018): 62-69; Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 148-149; Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, 208.

<sup>171</sup> Philip Bonner, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 44.

<sup>172</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 25.

<sup>173</sup> N.A. Etherington, 'The Origins of "Indirect Rule" in 19th Century Natal', *Theoria*, 47 (Oct. 1976): 11-21; Mamdani *Citizen and Subject*; Jeff Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal: African Autonomy and Settler Colonialism in the Making of Traditional Authority* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013);

As agents of the colonial state, chiefs not only earned financial benefits but came under greater restrictions from their new British partners. Chiefs had to apply to the Supreme Chief for permission to hold the annual *umkhosi* ceremony, which had always stood as a symbol of chiefs' control and influence.<sup>174</sup> Colonists further impinged on the rights of chiefs, and the Zulu king, when, in 1848, the colony reintroduced the system of *isibhalo* (forced labor).<sup>175</sup> The colonial state required chiefs to provide the state with one laborer for every eleven huts in their chiefdom. Each man served six-month stints, working on public works crews on the colony's roads and working as postal runners, and were paid nominal salaries by the colonial administration. Authorities justified the implementation of this system, claiming its basis in the *amabutho* system. "The basis on which these explanations rested was that, just as the Zulu king had the authority to call up young men to work for him and provide him with military service, so the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, as Supreme Chief of the Africans in Natal, had the right to do the same," Ingrid Machin explains.<sup>176</sup>

Mpande followed along with colonial edicts, and further endeared himself "by permitting ever greater numbers of white traders and hunters to operate in his kingdom so long as they paid him for the privilege in firearms, kept to his rules, and did not contest his tight control of the external trade in ivory and other valuable animal commodities."<sup>177</sup> At the same time, Mpande retained his status as "a Zulu warrior-king," regularly enrolling new *amabutho* and sending them

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Jason Conrad Myers, *Indirect rule in South Africa: tradition, modernity, and the costuming of political power* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008).

<sup>174</sup> John Lambert, *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995), 29; Sinothi Dennis Thabethe, "Laws and Regulations Affecting the Powers of Chiefs in the Natal and Zululand Regions, 1875-1910: A Historical Examination" (MA Thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2000), 13.

<sup>175</sup> Lambert, *Betrayed Trust*.

<sup>176</sup> Ingrid Machin, "The Levying of Forced African Labour and Military Service by the Colonial State of Natal," (PhD Diss, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1995), 65-66.

<sup>177</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 161.

out on raids to not only maintain their experience in combat but also to claim resources that helped him maintain the loyalty of his men.<sup>178</sup> As the longest reigning Zulu king (1840-1872)<sup>179</sup>, Mpande formed more regiments than any other king, including: iNdabakawombe (“Ambush”)<sup>180</sup>; Ingwegwe (“Hook”)<sup>181</sup>; Ingulube (“Wild Hogs”)<sup>182</sup>; Isangqu (“The White Tails”)<sup>183</sup>; AmaShiShi (“The Dashing Huntsmen Warriors”)<sup>184</sup> Tulwana (“The Dust Raisers”)<sup>185</sup>; Indlondlo (“The hooded mamba”)<sup>186</sup>; uDhloko (“The young crested King Mamba”)<sup>187</sup>; Udududu (“The Contemptibles”)<sup>188</sup>; Umxapo (“The Mongrels”)<sup>189</sup>; uHlwayi (“The Shower of Shot”)<sup>190</sup>; uMpunga (“The Greyheads”)<sup>191</sup>; Umbonambi (“The Beholders of Sorrow”)<sup>192</sup>; Unokenke (“Long

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<sup>178</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 162.

<sup>179</sup> He retained the distinction of being the longest-reigning Zulu king until he was surpassed by King Goodwill Zwelithini, who has been king since 1971.

<sup>180</sup> Formed in 1841 of men born ca. 1821. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 186.

<sup>181</sup> Comprised of men born circa 1820. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 265.

<sup>182</sup> Formed circa 1844 of men born circa 1824. " Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 107-108; Faye, *Zulu References*, 45.

<sup>183</sup> Formed circa 1852 of men born circa 1832. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 250-251.

<sup>184</sup> Same as Isangqu. Faye, *Zulu References*, 46.

<sup>185</sup> Formed circa 1854 of men born circa 1834. Cetshwayo was a member of the uTulwana. Named after the father of Sikwata, a Basotho chief, whose name was Tulwana. Also known as the amaMboza (“The Coverers”). Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 286; Faye, *Zulu References*, 46; 51.

<sup>186</sup> Formed circa 1857 of men born circa 1837. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 189-190.

<sup>187</sup> Formed circa 1858 of men born circa 1838. “With this uDloko, the King meant to stir the sluggish (older) regiments.” Faye, *Zulu References*, 47; Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 66.

<sup>188</sup> Formed circa 1859 of men born circa 1839. Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 73; 26. Faye notes that the name may also be derived from “*isidududu*”, the sound of du-du-du, made e.g. by the tramping of many feet on hollow-sounding ground, or possibly from the iDududu stream in southern Natal, which had been crossed by Chaka’s warriors.” Faye, *Zulu References*, 47.

<sup>189</sup> Faye (1923): 47.

<sup>190</sup> Faye (1923): 47. This name came from when “King Mpande, had a shot gun, which loaded pebbles, the King then travelling in a wagon, and he thereupon hit on a plan of enrolling a regiment to be named after the Shower of Shot.”

<sup>191</sup> Same as the uHlwayi. Name earned at the Battle of Wombane “where, from lying down to dodge bullets, they were ‘apparently indestructible’ and prompted the inquiry afterwards from the British: ‘Who were those greyheads who could not be killed?’” Faye (1923): 48.

<sup>192</sup> KCAL, Borquin Papers (File 166-Zulu Shields, Weapons and Dress, 1961-1993, Borquin to Mrs. V. Tedder, September 15, 1975. Mpande named this regiment to express his sorrow at the death of his son, Mbuyazi. Faye (1923): 48.

Horns”)<sup>193</sup>; Indluyengwe (“The Leopard’s Beauty Spots”)<sup>194</sup>; Umcijo (“The Peacemakers”)<sup>195</sup>; and UKandempemvu (“The Ruddy Sharp Stake”).<sup>196</sup> He also enrolled numerous female regiments, including uMtuyisazwe, Amaqadase, Amakanyisa, Isihlabathi (“Sand”) of girls born from 1814 to 1820, Nkehlela (“Cause to wear headring”) of girls born from 1821 to 1827, Ngcosho (“The red fire lillies”) of girls born from 1828 to 1883, Gudludenga (“Hug the donga”) of girls born from 1834-1842, Isitimane (“A heap of things”) of girls born from 1843 to 1850, and Umtiyane (“The Ensnarers/Stop the way for the other one”) of girls born from 1858 to 1864.<sup>197</sup> This project of *amabutho* formation played a central role in a larger project designed to restore the prestige of the Zulu monarchy and to expanded Zulu territory by launching expeditions into Switzerland, both efforts designed to protect the Zulu Kingdom against the British and the Boers.<sup>198</sup>

Of course, when he launched these expeditions or declared war, as he did in 1852 when Swazi King Mswati attempted to break free of Zulu control, he had to consult with Theophilus Shepstone (known frequently by his Zulu name “Somtseu”), the Supreme Chief.<sup>199</sup> Shepstone had little control over the free will of Mpande’s subjects, or his sons who clashed violently in the mid-nineteenth century to secure their rights to the throne. In 1856, in a struggle that became known as the Second Zulu Civil War, two of Mpande’s sons, Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi, faced off;

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<sup>193</sup> Formed circa 1865 of men born circa 1845. Laband (2009): 200. This name refers to “the burden that the Zulu nation was supporting Cetshwayo in opposition to the will of King Mpande – Mpande favouring Mbuyazi – hence the name Nokenke.” Faye (1923): 48

<sup>194</sup> Formed circa 1866 of men born circa 1846. Laband (2009): 190.

<sup>195</sup> Formed circa 1867 of men born circa 1848. Laband (2009): 155. Faye (1923): 49.

<sup>196</sup> Same as Umcijo. Faye (1923): 48.

<sup>197</sup> Dates of enrollment not provided for uMtuyisazwe, Amaqadase, and Amakanyisa. KCAL, Killie Campbell Correspondence (File 35), Letter, Killie Campbell to Tings Robson, February 20, 1957; . KCAL, Guy Vivian Essery Papers, KCM 98/58/6, A.T. Bryant’s list of regiments and girl guilds; Cornelius Vijn (translated by J.W. Colenso), *Cetshwayo’s Dutchman: Being the Private Journal of a White Trader in Zululand during the British Invasion* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1880), 192.

<sup>198</sup> Bonner, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires*, 62-68.

<sup>199</sup> Bonner, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires*, 51-61.

Cetshwayo led a coalition of young men known as Usuthu and Mbuyazi led the Gqoza.<sup>200</sup>

Mbuyazi fled to the Natal border to gain support from the British, where Cetshwayo and his forces caught him due to the Thukela being in flood. On December 2, 1856, in the Battle of Ndongakusuka, Cetshwayo's forces mowed down Mbuyazi's men. Sources put the death toll as high as 20,000; their bodies washed down the river to sea for days afterward.<sup>201</sup>

In the wake of this victory, Cetshwayo partnered with his father beginning in 1857 to start playing a role in managing the kingdom, with Mpande remaining the ultimate authority. In practice, however, Cetshwayo pushed his own agenda forward and took the reins from Mpande as the king aged.<sup>202</sup> At the time of his death, however, Mpande had not officially designated Cetshwayo as his *inkosana*; the young warrior lashed out, attempting to track down and kill Mpande's 14-year-old son Mthonga, drawing in Shepstone into this family feud.<sup>203</sup> At a meeting held at Mpande's kwaNodwengu kraal in May 1861, but Cetshwayo appeared in full dress as the head of the uThulwana *ibutho* and stirred the other *amabutho* present to surround Shepstone, bringing to mind the murder of Piet Retief by Dingane's forces. Once tensions abated, Shepstone expressed how impressed he was by Cetshwayo and unequivocally named him as heir.<sup>204</sup> Cetshwayo's strong bond with John Dunn, a local trader, further endeared him to the colonial state and cemented his status as the rightful heir.<sup>205</sup>

Following Mpande's death in 1872, Shepstone officially acknowledged Cetshwayo as the new Zulu king with an extravagant coronation ceremony. This symbolized the new king's dual

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<sup>200</sup> Charles Ballard, *The house of Shaka: the Zulu monarchy illustrated* (Marine Parade: Emoyeni Books, 1988), 47.

<sup>201</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 40.

<sup>202</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 176-177.

<sup>203</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 180.

<sup>204</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 181-182.

<sup>205</sup> On Cetshwayo's relationship with John Dunn: Charles Ballard, "John Dunn and Cetshwayo: the Material Foundations of Political Power in the Zulu Kingdom, 1857-1878," *Journal of African History* 21, no. 1 (1980): 75-91; Charles Ballard, *John Dunn: the white chief of Zululand* (Cape Town: AD Donker, 1985).

identity, installed as king of the Zulus by a white Supreme Chief.<sup>206</sup> Although he faced challenges in managing the multiple expectations emanating from all of the parties invested in his rule, Cetshwayo continued his forefathers' efforts to restore the power of the Zulu monarchy following his installation. He constructed a massive homestead at Ondini.<sup>207</sup> Part of his plans centered on regaining control over *amabutho* during his reign. "It was quite clear by the early 1870s the system was beginning to gray, with many insubordinate *amabutho* increasingly reluctant to undergo all the hardships of service," John Laband explains, "Yet, more than that, it seems that some of the great *izikhulu* like Hamu and Zibhebhu were deliberately obstructing the system by keeping their young men in their own service rather than allowing them to fulfil their obligations to the king."<sup>208</sup> This project proved successful, as Cetshwayo managed to enroll three *amabutho* during his six years as king, including: iNgobamakosi ("The Humbler(s) of Kings")<sup>209</sup>; uVe ("The Uve Bird")<sup>210</sup> – also known as uLandandlovu ("The Bring of the Elephant")<sup>211</sup>; and uFalaza ("Clouds of the Heavens")<sup>212</sup> – also known as uMsizi ("Gunpowder").<sup>213</sup> He also enrolled two female regiments the Ngcugce ("Plundered") of girls born from 1851 to 1857 and Tiyane ("Stop the Way for One Another") of girls born from 1858 to 1864.<sup>214</sup> On two occasions,

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<sup>206</sup> Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*, 72-102; Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 250.

<sup>207</sup> J.J. Oberholster, *The Historical Monuments of South Africa* (Rembrandt van Rijn Foundation for Culture, 1972), 266-267.

<sup>208</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 196-197.

<sup>209</sup> Formed circa 1873 of men born circa 1850 or 1851. This regiment was "so named because Cetywayo was not favoured by Mpande; then he humbled – defeated and killed – Mbuyazi, and enrolled the Ngobamakosi regiment." Faye, *Zulu References*, 49; Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 195.

<sup>210</sup> Same as uLandandlovu. Formed circa 1875 of men born between 1854 and 1855. The uVe was "so named because the King was in the habit of wearing an uve plume on his head." Faye, *Zulu References*, 49; Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 296-297.

<sup>211</sup> Formed circa 1875 of men born between 1854 and 1855. uLandandlovu "was also the name of one of Cetywayo's roal kraals, which was located in what is now the Mahlabathini district of Zululand; also referred to as oLandandlovu." Faye, *Zulu References*, 49.

<sup>212</sup> Formed in 1877 of men born between 1856 and 1858. "Named thus because the Zulus were being tossed about hither and thither by their sentiments (as clouds are by the winds) for they were beginning to prefer the white people (to their own people)." Faye, *Zulu References*, 49; Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*, 84-85.

<sup>213</sup> Same as uFalaza. Formed in 1877 of men born between 1856 and 1858. Faye, *Zulu References*, 49.

<sup>214</sup> KCAL, Guy Vivian Essery Papers, KCM 98/58/6, A.T. Bryant's list of regiments and girl guilds.

Cetshwayo followed in Shaka's footsteps, stripping the *izanusis* of their status and forcing them to join the regiments.<sup>215</sup>

In other ways, Cetshwayo diverged from the traditions of his forefathers, based on changing socioeconomic circumstances. Cetshwayo introduced a new, smaller *isihlangu* during the civil war of the 1850s called the *umbumbuluzo*.<sup>216</sup> Under Cetshwayo, white and red shields became associated with married regiments: "soldiers that are married and have rings are called *amabandhla amhlope*, i.e. 'white assemblies' . . . they have white shields."<sup>217</sup> And by 1879, it seems that the use of specific colors to designate the status of *amabutho* seems to have disappeared. Mtshapi kaNoradu recalled to James Stuart that the shields of the uKhandempemvu *ibutho* (to which he belonged) "were black with white markings (*amalunga*), while others were brown with white markings (*marwanqa*) . . . Cetshwayo mixed our shields with white ones, *ncu* ones [meaning unclear], *hemu* ones [i.e. black or red or one side, white on the other], and *mtsheko* ones, i.e. black top and bottom, with large white patch running across."<sup>218</sup> One reason for this shift could be the drastic reduction in the Zulu kingdom's cattle reserves as a result of the thousands of heads of cattle Mpande paid the Boers for helping him overthrow Dingane, as well as the spread of bovine diseases by traders, including lung-sickness.<sup>219</sup> John Dunn reported that at Cetshwayo's installation in 1873, the royal herds totaled 100,000; within two years, half this number were dead.<sup>220</sup> Cetshwayo also introduced firearms into Zulu warfare in a way not

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<sup>215</sup> Norman Etherington, *Preachers, Peasants, and Politics in Southeast Africa, 1835-1880: African Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland, and Zululand* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 84.

<sup>216</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 101.

<sup>217</sup> Webb, *A Zulu King Speaks*, 105.

<sup>218</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 106.

<sup>219</sup> Karen Flint, *Healing Traditions: African Medicine, Cultural Exchange, and Competition in South Africa, 1820-1948* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 45; Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 106.

<sup>220</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 106.



accomplished by his predecessors, signaling a recognition on the changing nature of warfare and the need to defend the Zulu kingdom from the armed settlers.<sup>221</sup>

The diminishing of the royal herds posed only one of many challenges Cetshwayo grappled with during his time as king. Throughout his reign, Cetshwayo faced challenges from younger members of the Zulu royal family. The uThulwana *ibutho*, formed by Mpande around 1851, contained a number of royal princes and proved difficult to manage.<sup>222</sup> At the annual *Umkhosi Wokweshwama* in December 1877, the iNgobamakhosi clashed with the uThulwana. The uThulwana regiment had been a favorite of Mpande's, commanded by his son Hamu kaNzibe and populated by a number of the *abantwana* (royal princes). The iNgobamakhosi, on the other hand, represented the first *ibutho* formed by King Cetshwayo, populated by mostly young men in their mid-twenties and commanded by Sigcwelelgcwele kaMhlekeleke, a chief of the Thembu. These two *amabutho*, based on these differences, Ian Knight points out, "represented in microcosm the full range of the nation's generational and political rivalries."<sup>223</sup> These symbolic differences resulted in a massive stick fight during the *Umkhosi* resulting in the deaths of many.<sup>224</sup>

Cetshwayo not only faced challenges from young men within the *amabutho*, but also from chiefs who resented his expansion into their own realms of authority. When he formed the iNgomabakhosi and uVe before the Anglo-Zulu War, they were especially large. This drew the ire of local chiefs who had gotten used to keeping their young men back under Mpande's reign. Following the conclusion of the war and the ultimate defeat of the Zulu, Cetshwayo complained

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<sup>221</sup> John Laband, "'Fighting Stick of Thunder': Firearms and the Zulu Kingdom: The Cultural Ambiguities of Transferring Weapons Technology," *War & Society* 33, no. 4 (2014): 229-243; John Laband, *Kingdom in Crisis: The Zulu Response to the British Invasion of 1879* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 62-65;

<sup>222</sup> Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive, Vol. 4*, 294-295.

<sup>223</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 93.

<sup>224</sup> Estimates vary between seventy men according to Dunn and hundreds according to Zulu sources. Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 95; Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 197-198.

that “the many disorders that have existed in Zululand lately are the outcome of so many men pretending royalty, keeping assemblies, and now allowing my people to come and serve me as in the days of old.”<sup>225</sup> He also faced reactions from colonial authorities following a particularly violent incident in 1876, when Cetshwayo granted permission for the uDloko regiment to marry the Ingcugce female regiment.<sup>226</sup> The women, who were much younger than their betrothed, refused, declaring “*Ucu Alilingani!* (“The love necklace does not fit our necks!”).<sup>227</sup> The Ingcugce women ran away with their partners. Acts of resistance against this practice emerged under the rules of both Dingane and Mpande, but Cetshwayo’s response to this particular instance shocked outsiders. Cetshwayo ordered some of his men to track down the girls, instructing them to shoot the girls.<sup>228</sup> In response to this, the Natal Government sent word reminding Cetshwayo of the promises he had made Shepstone, especially regarding the unnecessary spilling of blood. Cetshwayo responded definitively.

Did I ever tell Mr. Shepstone I would not kill? Did he tell the White People I made such an arrangement? Because if he did he has deceived them. I do kill: but do not consider I have done anything yet in the way of killing ... I have yet to kill, it is the custom of our nation, and I shall not depart from it. Why does the Governor of Natal speak to me about my laws? Do I go to Natal and dictate to him about his laws? I shall not agree to any laws or rules from Natal and by doing so throw the large kraal which I govern into the water.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 88.

<sup>226</sup> Cetshwayo had another regiment named Ntinyane. KCAL, Killie Campbell Correspondence (File 35), Letter, Tings Robson to Killie Campbell, March 1, 1957.

<sup>227</sup> Sibusiso Ndebele, “Speech by KwaZulu-Natal Premier Sibusiso Ndebele during Pan African Women’s Day, Durban,” July 31, 2007, <https://www.gov.za/s-ndebele-pan-african-womens-day>.

<sup>228</sup> Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, 241. In 2007, the KZN government honored the women of the Ingcugce *ibutho*, resulting in a massive debate about the legacy of this revolutionary women’s unit. See: Myrtle Ryan, “Outcry over Zulu ‘heroines’,” *Sunday Tribune (South Africa)*, August 5, 2007, p. 21; Sibusiso Ndebele, “Speech by KwaZulu-Natal Premier Sibusiso Ndebele during Pan African Women’s Day, Durban,” July 31, 2007, <https://www.gov.za/s-ndebele-pan-african-womens-day>; Canaan Mdletshe, “Honour for defiant women called 'anti-Zulu',” July 26, 2007, *Sowetan Live*, <https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2007-07-26-honour-for-defiant-women-called-anti-zulu/>.

<sup>229</sup> C.T. Binns, *The Last Zulu King: the Life and Death of Cetshwayo* (London: Longmans, 1963), 87; Charles Ballard, “The Historical Image of King Cetshwayo of Zululand: A Centennial Comment,” *Natalia* 13 (1983): 33.

This incident contributed to the overall image of Cetshwayo as a bloodthirsty despot. T.J. Tallie argues that following the conclusion of the conflict, the public rhetoric around Cetshwayo fundamentally shifted from viewing him as a “threatening barbarian” to a man with “noble status and royal authority.”<sup>230</sup>

Following the close of the war, Cetshwayo ceased to be the threatening barbarian that stood ready to despoil Natal (at least to metropolitan eyes—for the majority of settlers in Natal, Cetshwayo represented ever-present threats of colonial ruin for the rest of his life). Rather, a new period of myth-making began in which Cetshwayo’s noble status and royal authority would be privileged, now that he was no longer perceived by many to present a military threat to British interests in southern Africa. This new, pro-Cetshwayo argument would instead advocate for the restoration of the monarch, offering a vision of colonialism in Natal and the British Empire more widely that rested upon notions of justice, fair play, and hierarchical order.<sup>231</sup>

As with Dingane before him, these images of Cetshwayo may have had less to do with his true character and more to do with the political and philosophical aims of the British at that point in time. R.L. Cope argues that Sir Bartle Frere, and the missionaries who testified to Cetshwayo’s cruelty, had something to gain by depicting Cetshwayo as a bloodthirsty monster; namely, land in the pending annexation.<sup>232</sup>

By depicting Cetshwayo as a tyrant, colonial authorities had greater leeway to pass laws with the intention of saving Africans from the savagery of the Zulu king. In 1865, the colony granted individuals the possibility of gaining exemption from native law and further restricted chiefs’ authority in 1869 by allowing women to opt out of customary marriage.<sup>233</sup> The

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<sup>230</sup> T.J. Tallie, “On Zulu King Cetshwayo kaMpande’s Visit to London, August 1882,” *BRANCH: Britain, Representation, and Nineteenth-Century History* (2015), [http://www.branchcollective.org/?ps\\_articles=t-j-tallie-on-zulu-king-cetshwayo-kampandes-visit-to-london-august-1882](http://www.branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=t-j-tallie-on-zulu-king-cetshwayo-kampandes-visit-to-london-august-1882).

<sup>231</sup> Tallie, “On Zulu King Cetshwayo kaMpande’s Visit to London.”

<sup>232</sup> R.L. Cope, “Written in Characters of Blood? The Reign of King Cetshwayo kaMpande,” *The Journal of African History* 36, no. 2 (1995): 247-269.

<sup>233</sup> Sheila Meintjes, “Family and gender in the Christian community at Edendale, Natal, in colonial times,” in Cheryl Walker (ed.), *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990), 128; Nafisa Essop Sheik, “Customs in Common: Marriage, Law and the Making of Difference in Colonial Natal,”

codification “native” law in 1875 served to limit the powers of the Supreme Chief, formally acknowledge the powers of chiefs, and to bring the Department of Native Affairs more fully under British control.<sup>234</sup> Greater control over “native affairs” emerged as a major source of concern following the Langalibalele Rebellion in 1873 which provoked colonists’ fears of African volatility *and* potential land dispossession.<sup>235</sup> Although these laws greatly reduced the authority of *amakhosi*, British authorities still feared the martial tendencies of Africans, especially the Zulus.

The Boer-Pedi War of 1876-1877 gave the British the excuse they needed to finally “break the military power of the remaining independent African kingdoms, disarm them, and impose some form of British supremacy over them to keep the peace.”<sup>236</sup> Following the British annexation of the ZAR on April 12, 1877, Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for Colonies, appointed Bartle Frere as High Commissioner in South Africa and tasked him with bringing the territory under confederation.<sup>237</sup> The British initiated their campaign to bring the independent African kingdoms under their control with what became known as the First Anglo-Pedi War in October 1878, withdrawing before ultimately defeating the Pedi and capturing their chief, Sekhukhune in November 1879 in the Second Anglo-Pedi War.<sup>238</sup> Convinced that the “Zulu kingdom was the political and military lynchpin of African resistance to British rule,” Frere sent

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*Gender & History* 29, no. 3 (2017): 589-604; Nafisa Essop Sheik, “African Marriage Regulation and the Remaking of Gendered Authority in Colonial Natal, 1843-1875,” *African Studies Review* 57, no. 2 (2014): 73-92.

<sup>234</sup> David Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845-1910* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 164.

<sup>235</sup> Norman Herd, *The bent pine: the trial of Chief Langalibalele* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1976); John William Colenso, *Langalibalele and the Amahlubi Tribe: Being remarks upon the official record of the trials of the chief, his sons and Induna, & other members of the Amahlubi Tribe* (London: Spotiswoode & Co., 1874); Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, 21-26.

<sup>236</sup> Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 204.

<sup>237</sup> Laband, *Kingdom in Crisis*, 6-7.

<sup>238</sup> Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, 266-77; Peter Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Transvaal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 181-216.

increasing numbers of chiefs to patrol Zululand's borders and, in response, Cetshwayo mobilized the *amabutho* in September/October 1878. Cornelius Vijn recorded a number of Cetshwayo's warriors making their loyalties quite plainly known: "When it came to fighting, they fought not for the King only, but for themselves, since they would rather die than live under the whites."<sup>239</sup>

Thie whites decided that they would rather died than live under fear of Zulu military mobilization. In December 1878, Frere sent an ultimatum to Cetshwayo demanding, along with other conditions, that Cetshwayo turn himself in *and* that the Zulu military be abolished.<sup>240</sup> The ultimatum expired in January 1879, when Lord Chelmsford's forces made their first moves into a conflict with the Zulu and Cetshwayo called his *amabutho* to Ondini for active duty.<sup>241</sup>

As mentioned above, in 1879 Cetshwayo still struggled to bring the *amabutho* system back to its former glory under Shaka. At the point when the king called them to active duty, the *amabutho* likely numbered, at most, 45,000 men (including 5,000 irregulars from throughout the kingdom).<sup>242</sup> This required a strategic approach given the size of the British army and the Africans from Natal and Zululand who served as part of the Natal Native Contingent (NNC). The British invasion force totaled 16,800 men; African soldiers totaled 9,000 of the total force (over 50 percent). These soldiers who comprised the Natal Native Contingent supported the British because they "brought peace to a land ravaged by warfare, the source of which had been Zulu expansion."<sup>243</sup> Although they were not given uniforms, the British gave the NNC members red strips of cloth to tie around their heads to distinguish them from the Zulu *impi*.<sup>244</sup> No matter the size of the army they faced, Cetshwayo determined early on that he would take on the British.

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<sup>239</sup> Vijn, *Cetshwayo's Dutchman*, 15; 24.

<sup>240</sup> Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, 200.

<sup>241</sup> John Laband and Ian Knight, *The Anglo-Zulu War, 1879* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1996), 23; 33.

<sup>242</sup> Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, 200.

<sup>243</sup> P.S. Thompson, *Black Soldiers of the Queen: The Natal Native Contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 1.

<sup>244</sup> Laband (2014), 201.

Based on intelligence gathered by his spies, Cetshwayo learned that the Centre Column stationed at Rorke's Drift represented the strongest section of the British force; he decided that his best course of action lay in defeating this stronghold.<sup>245</sup> As he sent his men out, Cetshwayo gathered the *amabutho* and posed the following question: "I have not gone over the seas to look for the white men, yet they have come into my country and I would not be surprised if they took away our wives and cattle and crops and land. What shall I do?"<sup>246</sup> The *amabutho* responded: "Give the matter to us . . . We shall go and eat up the white men and finish them off. They are not going to take you while we are here. They must take us first."<sup>247</sup>

On January 20, 1879, the main *impi* of 24,000 set out for Isandlwana, where Lord Chelmsford had set up camp with his forces. After spying on the British for several days, who had made a critical error in choosing the stark landscape near the hill at Isandlwana for their camp, the Zulu forces under Ntshingwayo kaMahole and Mavumengwana kaNdlela launched their attack. Although the British initially slowed the onslaught with gunfire, when the spirits of the *amabutho* started to wane, one of the commanders invoked King Cetshwayo's *isibongo*, calling out: "*Hlamvana bhula umlilo eNondakusuka ka shongo njalo* ("The little branch that quenched the first at nDondakusuka did not expect this of you")."<sup>248</sup> This invigorated the warriors and they made the final push that toppled the British forces. When locked into hand-to-hand combat with the *amabutho*, the redcoats fell quickly (the battle resulted in a 75 percent casualty rate on the British side, "an utter rout – the rarest of rare occurrences in a colonial campaign, all the more shocking for that."<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> John Laband, Paul Thompson and Bruno Martin, *A Field Guide to the War in Zululand and the Defence in Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1983), 21-24.

<sup>246</sup> Nzuzi, "Supplement," *Natal Mercury* January 22, 1929.

<sup>247</sup> Nzuzi, "Supplement," *Natal Mercury* January 22, 1929.

<sup>248</sup> Lugg, *Life Under a Zulu Shield*, 10.

<sup>249</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 221.

Simultaneously, another Zulu column, under the leadership of Cetshwayo's half-brother Dabulamanzi, led 4,000 Zulus to Rorke's Drift, a small mission station hosting less than 140 men. But these soldiers were prepared and this fight was quite different than Isandlwana, resulting in a Zulu withdrawal after an exhausting ten-hour fight.<sup>250</sup> Around the same time, another force under the leadership of Godide kaNdlela, a 70-year old commander leading those *amabutho* not considered skilled enough to fight the main column, attacked the right British column at Wombane, where the force of the Zulu army again failed.<sup>251</sup> Subsequent skirmishes confirmed the impossibility of a Zulu victory. In fact, John Laband argues, the Zulu victory at Isandlwana actually cemented this outcome.

The Zulu success in enveloping and breaking through the extended firing line at Isandlwana taught Chelmsford that the only way to concentrate fire effectively and stem the enemy's rush was – as at Rorke's drift – to place troops in prepared all-round defensive positions . . . The Zulu *amabutho*, by contrast, seemed to have remained too embedded in their established military culture and buoyed up by their victory at Isandlwana to envisage alternative tactics, and they would oblige the British by persisting in hurling themselves in mass attacks against prepared positions.<sup>252</sup>

Nevertheless, after Cetshwayo's regrouped and recovered from the devastating losses of the first engagements, in March 1879, the *amabutho* set out again but continued to face relentless defeats in the Battles of Khambula, Eshowe and Gingindlovu.<sup>253</sup> Returning to Cetshwayo following these defeats, apparently the king castigated his men: "He said we were born warriors, and yet allowed ourselves to be defeated in every battle."<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> Mike Snook, *Like Wolves on the Fold: The Defence of Rorke's Drift* (Chicago: Frontline Books, 2010); Ian Knight, *The sun turned black: Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift 1879* (South Africa: William Waterman, 1995).

<sup>251</sup> Laband, *Kingdom in Crisis*, 116-119.

<sup>252</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 223.

<sup>253</sup> Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, 242-243; Ian Castle and Ian Knight, *Fearful Hard Times: The Siege and Relief of Eshowe, 1879* (London: Greenhill Books, 1994).

<sup>254</sup> Bertram Mitford, *Through the Zulu Country: Its Battlefields and Its People* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1883), 279.

In May 1879, British imperial authorities removed Chelmsford from command and set Sir Garnet Wolseley in his stead. Fearing that Wolseley would take credit for the victory that he had secured, Chelmsford launched a two-pronged attack designed to “break the neck of the Zulu power,” launching campaigns against the *amabutho* and on ordinary citizens through the destruction of *amakhanda* and *imizi* throughout the region and the capture tens of thousands of cattle.<sup>255</sup> Cetshwayo decided, in July, to launch an attack from oNdini (near present-day Ulundi), finding it much more difficult to secure *amabutho* support given the length of the conflict and the huge losses of life and property. Nevertheless, between 15,000 and 20,000 *amabutho* amassed at Cetshwayo’s palace on July 4 to face Chelmsford’s force of 5,170 men.<sup>256</sup> Under unrelenting fire from the automatic Gatling gun, *amabutho* quickly withdrew, driven into the hills where African levies waited to finish the wounded and set the *amakhanda* on fire, including the *inkatha*. 1,500 Zulus died on that cold winter day; 13 British died.<sup>257</sup> The *amabutho* dispersed across Natal and Zululand and refused to reassemble when called by Cetshwayo.

On July 4, 1879, near Cetshwayo’s homestead, British forces defeated the Zulu army after months of struggle.<sup>258</sup> Two months later, Sir Garnet Wolseley, Lord Chelmsford’s replacement, introduced an agreement that divided Zululand into thirteen independent chiefdoms, established that men would be allowed to marry when they pleased, and prohibited the existence of any military organizations within the Zululand territory. The Zulu Kingdom and the Zulu military state was over. From a Zulu perspective, the Anglo-Zulu War, as A.T. Cope argues, “was not only somewhat insignificant . . . [but] also somewhat irrational.” “Like a bolt of lightning, it was not altogether unexpected (there were ominous clouds),” Cope continued, “it

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<sup>255</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 230-231.

<sup>256</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 233.

<sup>257</sup> Laband, *Eight Zulu Kings*, 233.

<sup>258</sup> John Laband, *The Battle of Ulundi* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1988).



was destructive to a certain extent (there was considerable loss of life and property), but it was a very brief irrational flash.”<sup>259</sup> All in all, he concludes, “to the Zulus, it was a war without reason.”<sup>260</sup> For the British, however, there was a clear reason for this war. Richard Cope, in *Ploughshare of War: The Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879* (1999), makes a compelling argument that “we may legitimately conclude that Zululand was invaded to facilitate the advance of civilization in the sense in which the term was used in the nineteenth century, a sense in which capitalist production constituted an integral part of the concept.”<sup>261</sup>

Although the Anglo-Zulu War resulted in the deaths of many Zulus and significant destruction of property, the biggest blows to the Zulu came in the form of this shift from service to the Zulu monarchy and the *amakhanda* to the local chiefdoms and their chiefs. “Since in their settlement of Zululand on 1 September the victorious British abolished both the Zulu monarchy and the *ibutho* system which sustained it, the *amakhanda* were not rebuilt,” John Laband explains, “Instead, political power was devolved once more to the great chiefs and British appointees, and the young men of Zululand, rather than serving the king in their *amabutho* as they had previously, fell under the chiefs’ localised authority.”<sup>262</sup> The Zulu nation already felt the effects of growing British colonialism and the agreement Wolseley brought to the thirteen chiefs following the Battle of Ulundi did little to change the lives of African civilians living in Zululand and Natal but rather “it was the political consequences of the British settlement of Zululand, which brought in their . . . devastating civil war and increasing colonial intervention, which

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<sup>259</sup> A.T. Cope, “The Zulu War in Zulu Perspective,” *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 56 (1981): 44.

<sup>260</sup> Cope, “The Zulu War in Zulu Perspective,” 44.

<sup>261</sup> Richard Cope, *Ploughshare of War: The Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1999), 261.

<sup>262</sup> John Laband, “‘War Can’t Be Made with Kid Gloves’: The Impact of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 on the Fabric of Zulu Society,” *South African Historical Journal* 43, no. 1 (2000): 196.

would ultimately transform the old Zulu order.”<sup>263</sup> The abolition of the *amabutho*, however, posed a unique challenge to the Zulu kingdom: what was their identity in the absence of the *amabutho* system? And how did the Zulu nation stand apart from other surrounding chiefdoms?

Cetshwayo became the last Zulu king to give permission to his men to *ukuthunga*; his Uve regiment were the last Zulu *amabutho* to wear the *isicoco*. At the time of his death, he had not yet given permission to either the *Falaza* or *Mzisi* regiments; Dinuzulu failed to ever take up the custom.<sup>264</sup> Following the Zulu war, a new component of the Zulu *amabutho* uniform emerged. The *umshokobezi*, a band made of the white bush from the tail of an ox, became a sign of loyalty to Cetshwayo as the Usuthu and Mandlakazi sections fought. This headband later became known as *umshokobezi*, in reference to the term used to denote members of the Usuthu section.<sup>265</sup> The evolution of this key marker of masculinity signaled a larger shift, from an independent Zulu kingdom to a fractured Zulu nation fully under colonial rule.

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<sup>263</sup> Laband, “‘War Can’t Be Made with Kid Gloves,’” 196.

<sup>264</sup> KCAL, Tyrell Papers (File 2-Correspondence with K. Campbell, 1948-1965), “The Life Story of Vulisango (Open the Gate) Ndwandwe, Told to Barbara Tyrell in 1946 when Vulisango Ndwandwe of the Falaza Regiment was around 86 years old.

<sup>265</sup> KCAL, S.I.E. Borquin Papers (File 166 – Zulu Shields, Weapons and Dress), Letter 1973.

## Chapter 2:

### ***Umcaba osele emasini/The crushed mealies left in the sour milk: The Changing Functions of Amabutho in Natal and Zululand, 1879-1913***

In *Zulu Proverbs and Popular Sayings* (1940), collected by James Stuart and later translated and compiled by Daniel McKinnon Malcolm, one entry conveys the change in status for regiments following the fall of the Zulu Kingdom. Malcolm translated this idiom “*umcaba osele emasini*” as “the crushed mealies that are left in the sour milk...referring to the young men who, since the Zulu power was broken, were not called up for military service.”<sup>1</sup> Stuart pulled this proverb from A.T. Bryant’s *Zulu-English Dictionary* (1905), where Bryant had provided a fuller explanation. “*Umcaba osele emasini*”, he explained, was “a term jocularly applied to those young people born since the break-up of the Zulu power and who have consequently not been called up for regular military service nor incorporated into regiments, except nominally.”<sup>2</sup> Over half a century later, C.L.S. Nyembezi provided an alternative translation of the expression, writing that the saying “is used of old spinsters and bachelors who were left behind in the race for marriage,” adding that *umcaba* could possibly be translated as “unlucky.”<sup>3</sup> No matter the translation, the intent of this expression is clear. The *umcaba* referred to here are the young men and the sour milk is the colonial state after the dissolution of the Zulu kingdom, left behind either, according to Nyembezi, because they could not find partners for marriage or because they were consumed within the social vacuum following the dissolution of the *amabutho* system. Their paths to manhood had been soured and new pathways had to be blazed.

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<sup>1</sup> James Stuart, ed. by Daniel McKinnon Malcolm, *Zulu Proverbs and Popular Sayings with translations* (Durban: T.W. Griggs & Co., 1940), 23.

<sup>2</sup> A.T. Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary with Notes on Pronunciation, A Revised Orthography and Derivations and Cognate Words from Many Languages; Including also a Vocabulary of Hlonipha Words, Tribal-Names, Etc., A Synopsis of Zulu Grammar and a Concise History of the Zulu People from the Most Ancient Times* (Pietermaritzburg and Durban: P. Davis & Sons, 1905), 64.

<sup>3</sup> C.L.S. Nyembezi, *Zulu Proverbs* (Johannesburg: Witswatersrand University Press, 1963), p. 157. Many thanks to John Wright for directing me to this reference and to Mbongiseni Buthelezi for additional analysis as to the meaning of this phrase.

This chapter explores further evidence of the constantly evolving nature of Zulu masculinity through the role of the regiments, an institution symbolizing the confluence of ethnic identity formation and a crisis of masculinity in an era of deep colonial anxiety. In examining these *amabutho* specifically and youth male socialization generally in this light, this chapter reconsiders the ways in which Zulus improvised and reconstructed this institution in the face of colonial challenges, finding new forms of expression to fit their changing reality. This rapidly changing reality drastically altered position of the chiefs (including that of the Zulu kings), mostly due to the redistribution of lands and the restriction of their inherited authorities. The period between 1879 and 1913, bookended by Wolseley's agreement and the death of Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo in 1913, highlights the connections between the changes in social organization and the massive restructuring of South Africa under, first, the colonial government and, later, the Union authorities. By positioning these changes in traditional authority side-by-side with the evolution of *amabutho*, the connections between masculinity and power become illuminated. African men in this period found themselves caught between two forms of power: civil laws promulgated by the colonial state and customary laws enforced by traditional authorities.<sup>4</sup>

The abolition of the Zulu military system represented not only a blow to the prestige and power of Cetshwayo (and his progeny) as king, but to the entire system of youth socialization among those who counted themselves as Zulus. Robert Morrell, John Wright and Sheila Meintjes argue that in the Zulu Kingdom "the *amabutho*, as long as they survived, were the major institutional mechanism for generating this form of masculinity. And even when the *amabutho* ceased to take in young men and regiment them as before, the practices which formed part of the training received there—for example, stick fighting and deference to authority—were entrenched

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<sup>4</sup> Mamdani (1996), 48-61.

at the level of the homestead.”<sup>5</sup> By the time the British “abolished” the military system in 1879, as argued in the previous chapter, the *amabutho* as an institution had already evolved a great deal from its original manifestation under Shaka. On the local level, chiefs echoed this royal military structure, with individual chiefdoms organizing their young men into regiments for similar purposes, not only conveying knowledge from generation to generation but serving in a military capacity to protect their chiefdoms as well as being organized to serve as labor for the colony. As much as the regimental system bolstered the power of the Zulu kings, the *amabutho* were as much a testament to the consolidation of Zulu power as to the influence of local chiefs, as John Laband notes in *Zulu Warriors* (2014). “It is impossible to say which particular grouping in what later became the Zulu kingdom invented the *amabutho*,” Laband explains, “but it is certain that by the eighteenth century they were increasingly being deployed as the chiefs’ instruments of coercion, and that to keep them fed and rewarded necessitated raids against neighbouring chiefdoms.”<sup>6</sup>

The use of regiments for colonial purposes also marked a new stage in the evolution of the system. While in the mid-1800s, a chief’s authority coincided with the “extent to which he was able to organize male age groups within his chiefdom into *amabutho*,” as John Lambert asserts in *Betrayed Trust* (1995), this authority was predicated upon collaboration with colonial authorities, as Shepstone only allowed regiments “to be assembled with the permission of the Supreme Chief,” usually only for the annual *umkhosi* ceremonies or when necessary to “assist the state against rebellious chiefs.”<sup>7</sup> Theophilus Shepstone had frequently utilized chiefs’ regiments to fight against “rebellious chiefs.” In 1848, Shepstone “used the persuasion provided by a two-thousand-man

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<sup>5</sup> Robert Morrell, John Wright, and Sheila Meintjes, “Colonialism and the Establishment of White Domination, 1840-1890,” in Robert Morrell, ed., *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu Natal: Historical and Social Perspectives* (Durban: Indicator Press, 1996), 57; Cited in Waetjen (2006), 40.

<sup>6</sup> Laband (2014), 209.

<sup>7</sup> Lambert (1995), 28-29.

regiment obtained from Phakade's powerful Chunu chiefdom and three other chiefdoms in the Thukela basin" to force Langalibalele to move out of Natal.<sup>8</sup> These kinds of collaboration between the colonial regime and chiefs continued up to the Anglo-Zulu War, which Lambert refers to as "the high-water mark of colonial/chiefly collaboration," as Africans in Natal and Zululand contributed levies to the colonial campaign against Cetshwayo and his army.<sup>9</sup>

On September 1, 1879, Sir Garnet Wolseley ushered in a new era in Natal and Zululand, announcing Cetshwayo's exile and the introduction of a new political system. Rather than being ruled by one Zulu sovereign, the British divided Zululand into thirteen independent chiefdoms, the leaders of each to be chosen by the British. At this meeting only four of these appointed chiefs were present, but their actions that day fundamentally changed the Zulu nation forever. "Only four of these appointed chiefs were present in person," Guy writes in *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom* (1979), "and they signed an agreement which bound them to respect their new boundaries, to abolish the Zulu military system, and not to obstruct any of their people who might wish to work in neighbouring territories."<sup>10</sup> This agreement specifically required that chiefs would "not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or the existence of any military system or organization whatsoever within my territory," but also specifically connected the existence of the military system with the chiefs' rights to controlling the social reproduction of the young men of their tribe.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Thomas V. McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords: Shepstone and the Colonial State in Natal, South Africa, 1845-1878* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2010), 33.

<sup>9</sup> Lambert (1995), 35.

<sup>10</sup> Guy (1993 (2nd ed.)), 69.

<sup>11</sup> Sir Edward Hertslet, *A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, and Reciprocal Regulations at Present Subsisting Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers: and of the Laws, Decrees, Orders in Council, &c., Concerning the Same; So Far as They Relate to Commerce and Navigation, the Slave Trade, Post-Office Communications, Copyright, &c.: and to the Privileges and Interests of the Subjects of the High Contracting Parties* (London: Butterworths, 1885), 865.

By agreeing to do away with any military organization, Wolseley's agreement also required that chiefs "make it a rule that all men shall be allowed to marry when they choose, and as they choose, according to the good and ancient customs of my people, known and followed in the days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the system known as the military system."<sup>12</sup> Finally, chiefs were required to not only allow, but also to "encourage all men living within my territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work in Natal, or the Transvaal, or elsewhere, for themselves or for hire."<sup>13</sup> The inclusion of the lifting of restrictions on labor and marriage highlight a recognition by the colonial authorities that the impact of *amabutho* extended far beyond military endeavors.

And chiefs were the main ones who bore the weight of the 1879 dissolution of the Zulu kingdom, facing drastic changes to their status and mounting limitations on their ability to govern their chiefdoms. Wolseley's agreement focused as much on limiting the power of chiefs and the Zulu royal house as it did on eliminating the military system. Part of the agreement signed following the Battle of Ulundi included the stripping of certain hereditary chiefs of their position and their replacement with colonially appointed leaders, often granting them rights to rule over large tracts of land crossing tribal boundaries and impinging on long-standing lineages. The tensions stemming from these provisions laid the groundwork for long-standing hostilities in the region, resulting in civil war later in the decade. The Natal Native Commission of 1881 acts as a public record of these frustrations, as well as the confusion felt by all parties about the new system they were acting within. In his testimony to the Commission, Walter MacFarlane, a Scotland-born speaker for the Legislative Council, expressed his desire to seeing the

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<sup>12</sup> Herstlet (1885), 865.

<sup>13</sup> Herstlet (1885), 865.

“Chieftainship . . . die out.”<sup>14</sup> MacFarlane responded showed a similar disdain for Zulu customs when asked about the “military forces of a tribe,” explaining that local *amabutho* acted as “a copy of the military organization in Zululand — old, middle-ages, and young men.”<sup>15</sup> He suspected that these regiments represented “more an ornamental appendage than anything else at present; but as they have all their officers appointed, they are ready to go out at once.”<sup>16</sup>

MacFarlane’s assessment differed from that of Umqawe, a chief from Inanda, who gave a quite different assessment of the role of regiments under the new structure. He explained that regiments still existed in his chieftdom and assembled when called up by the himself or his *izinduna* (headmen) and for the annual Feast of the First Fruits. The custom of assembling the men into regiments, he explained, “is a custom that has been in use a long time.”<sup>17</sup> Concerned about these responses, the commissioners launched into a string of questions about the actions of the men as these assemblages, asking specifically whether or not the regiments were armed and if the different regiments would fight. Umqawe attempted to ease their anxieties, responding that while, “there might be disputes as to the valour of each regiment,” the *izinduna* were always ready to step in and restrain “any section that gets cheeky.”<sup>18</sup> Madama, a Zulu working for a Mr. Otti in Umvoti County, painted a different picture, telling the Commission that the chief in his area, Mahoisa, not only did not call together regiments but no longer held the Feast of the First

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<sup>14</sup> NAB, Natal Colonial Publications (NCP) 8/3/20. Evidence Taken Before the Natal Native Commission, 1881 (Pietermaritzburg: Vause, Slatter & Co. Government Printers, 1882), 10.

<sup>15</sup> NAB, NCP 8/3/20. Evidence Taken Before the Natal Native Commission, 1881 (Pietermaritzburg: Vause, Slatter & Co. Government Printers, 1882), 13.

<sup>16</sup> NAB, NCP 8/3/20. Evidence Taken Before the Natal Native Commission, 1881 (Pietermaritzburg: Vause, Slatter & Co. Government Printers, 1882), 13.

<sup>17</sup> NAB, NCP 8/3/20. Evidence Taken Before the Natal Native Commission, 1881 (Pietermaritzburg: Vause, Slatter & Co. Government Printers, 1882), 230.

<sup>18</sup> NAB, NCP 8/3/20. Evidence Taken Before the Natal Native Commission, 1881 (Pietermaritzburg: Vause, Slatter & Co. Government Printers, 1882), 231.



Fruits.<sup>19</sup> These different accounts pop up throughout the evidence for this Commission, illustrating the vast differences in responses to the abolition of the military system throughout Natal and Zululand.

Whether or not the abolition of *amabutho* had been applied uniformly throughout Natal and Zululand, the restrictions against the organizing of young men into age-grades coincided with wider instability throughout the provinces. In his masterful study of South African warrior cultures, John Laband reflects on the dissolution of the Zulu military system. While admitting that “with conquest Africans did not immediately lose all their traditional institutions,” Laband also notes that “the erosion under colonial rule of the authority head by the male head of a household over the women and young men of the homesteads deeply offended men’s honour, as did the loss of respect due to rank and lineage.”<sup>20</sup> In this new atmosphere, he explains, “alternative routes to honour, and ways to salve their wounded warrior ethos, had to be explored.”<sup>21</sup> And, in the case of colonial Natal, this kind of rapid social change manifested itself in the rebellious actions of young men.

Chiefs frequently wrote into their local magistracies expressing their frustrations with the actions of the young men in their area. In late 1884, Ncapai, a chief in the Verulam area, recruited a local official to report the difficulty he faced in controlling the young men of his chiefdom to the local magistrate. The chief found himself, along with the kraal heads, “troubled by the young men’s malpractices in respect to the girls whom they drug with drugs and reduce in some instances to a state of ill health—hysteria, melancholy, etc.”<sup>22</sup> While this complaint had as

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<sup>19</sup> NAB, NCP 8/3/20. Evidence Taken Before the Natal Native Commission, 1881 (Pietermaritzburg: Vause, Slatter & Co. Government Printers, 1882), 252.

<sup>20</sup> Laband (2014), 287.

<sup>21</sup> Laband (2014), 287.

<sup>22</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/70, no. 13/1885. Complaints by Chiefs and Heads of Kraals to the Malpractices by Young Men, November 10, 1884.

much to do with the selling of these drugs to young men by witch doctors, Ncapai also insisted that chiefs and other authorities were losing their authority over the younger generation. When chiefs attended meetings and a disturbance broke out, Ncapai explained, “a word from them no longer ensures attention—and riots sometimes ensue because their work is no longer attended to.”<sup>23</sup> As opposed to asking for more authority to make arrests and solicit fines, he expressed the general feeling among traditional authorities of being “anxious to preserve the peace—and our proper status.”<sup>24</sup>

Preserving the peace became more of an immediate concern as the clashes between Zibhebhu of the Mandlakazi and the Zulu Royal House from 1883-1884 amplified these anxieties even more. Colonial authorities awarded Zibhebhu territory including the core of the Usuthu, the heart of the Zulu royal family. In the face of his uncertain position, Zibhebhu and Hamu (appointed chief of a large territory including the Ngenetsheni, Qulusi, and the Buthelezi – all fiercely royalist factions) scrambled to cement their role, resulting in a near state of anarchy in the region. The resulting frenzy in Zululand resulted in the reintroduction of Cetshwayo’s to calm tensions in 1883. In July 1883, Zibhebhu defeated Cetshwayo’s *amabutho* at the Ondini kraal, utilizing his own well-trained warriors. Cetshwayo fled to Eshowe, where he eventually died in February 1884, leaving his son, Dinuzulu, to take on not only the mantle of the Zulu kingship but also the weight of the fight with Zibhebhu. Dinuzulu had been born in 1866 and, originally, bore the name Mahelana-avela-o-Ndini. Following Mpande’s death, Cetshwayo changed Mahelana-avela-o-Ndini’s name to Dinuzulu (“The one the Zulu nation hates – *lo*

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<sup>23</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/70, no. 13/1885. Complaints by Chiefs and Heads of Kraals to the Malpractices by Young Men, November 10, 1884.

<sup>24</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/70, no. 13/1885. Complaints by Chiefs and Heads of Kraals to the Malpractices by Young Men, November 10, 1884.

*udinwa nguZulu*”).<sup>25</sup> Naming during Dinuzulu’s reign reflected the tenuous position of the Zulu kingship, not only in his own name but in his policy towards naming his homes, his regiments, his children, etc. Take, for example, the home Dinuzulu established in exile, kwaThengisangaye (“The place where the Zulu people sold him out”).<sup>26</sup> This same sense of humor transferred over to his naming of regiments.

Regiments and their destructive potential took center stage as the conflict escalated. In January 1888, R.H. Addison, then serving as Ndwandwe Magistrate, wrote the magistrate for Empangeni, informing him that “[four] companies (*amaviyo*) of the Falaza Regiment — belonging to His Umpungose tribe [of] Chief Somkele in your District — passed about [seven] miles from this camp for the purpose of joining Dinuzulu and attacking Sibebu.”<sup>27</sup> At the battle of Ivuna in June 1888, reports confirm that the iNyonemhlophe (white bird), and Banganomo amabutho joined him as he faced off against Dinuzulu’s uFalaza (chatterers), imBokodwebomvu (red grindstone), and inGobamakhosi (bender of kings).<sup>28</sup> Though historians credit the Boers with Dinuzulu’s eventual victory in what came to be known as the Zululand Civil War, this conflict showed that not only Dinuzulu but also Zibhebhu still wielded the power to call up and command regiments. This conflict also resulted in the trial and subsequent exile of Dinuzulu, who would be relegated to the island of St. Helena until allowed to return in 1898.<sup>29</sup>

This conflict brought to light concerns that had long been on the minds of colonial authorities who echoed Ncapai’s anxiety “to preserve the peace—and our proper status.”<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Moses M. Hadebe, “A contextualization and examination of the *impi yamakhanda* (1906 uprising) as reported by J. L. Dube in Ilanga Lase Natal, with special focus on Dube’s attitude to Dinuzulu as indicated in his reportage on the treason trial of Dinuzulu,” PhD Dissertation, University of Natal-Durban (2003), 81.

<sup>26</sup> Hadebe (2003), 82.

<sup>27</sup> Durban Archives Repository (TBD), Empangeni Magistrate (EPI) 3/2/1, no. M.D. 5/88. Letter, R.H. Addison (Magistrate Ndwandwe) to Magistrate, Lower Umfolozi District, January 11, 1888.

<sup>28</sup> John Laband, “The Battle of Ivuna (or Ndunu Hill),” *Natalia* 10 (1980), 16-22.

<sup>29</sup> Guy (1994), 238; Laband (1995), 426.

<sup>30</sup> Guy (1994), 238; Laband (1995), 426.

Increasing legislation intended to tame the unharnessed energies of young men newly free from the Zulu military system reflected these anxieties. The increase of beer-drinks throughout Natal and Zululand precipitated H.C. Shepstone, on behalf of the Governor, to release Circular No. 465 of 1884 on the subject to all resident magistrates and administrators of Native law, requesting their assistance in restoring “peace and order” to these gatherings.<sup>31</sup> At the very least, Shepstone believed, these gathering should be confined to “near neighbours” and “not made the occasion of inviting or giving the opportunity for the assembly of large numbers of people of different tribes or section of tribes between whom old animosities are likely to be aroused by the excitement which drinking creates.”<sup>32</sup>

However, in the responses received to this circular chiefs and headmen from throughout Natal and Zululand blamed neither “old animosities” nor youth lasciviousness for these clashes; in fact, these dignitaries viewed the encroachment of white authorities as much at fault for the increase in aggression at beer drinking gatherings as the presence of uninvited young men. Umzimba, a chief from the Umgeni Division, explained that more men were involved in these fights as of late because men “know that even if they did not do so [fight] and actually try to interfere they would be fined just as well as the combatants.”<sup>33</sup> Stephannes Mini, a headman from Edendale, echoed Umzimba, insisting that “the increase of these rows I attribute in a great measure to the Government for the Government have taken the power out of the hands of the Chiefs and have placed it in the hands of the Magistrates who say to the Chiefs you sit on one

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<sup>31</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/145, no. 1056/1886. H.C. Shepstone, Minute, Secretary for Native Affairs to resident magistrates and administrators of Native law, October 11, 1884.

<sup>32</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/145, no. 1056/1886. H.C. Shepstone, Minute, Secretary for Native Affairs to resident magistrates and administrators of Native law, October 11, 1884.

<sup>33</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/145, no. 1056/1886. Precis of answers sent by Resident Magistrates and Administrators of Native Law to Circular SNA 465/1884 re: Beer-Drinking Gatherings.

side and we will attend to this matter.”<sup>34</sup> Chief Faku of Lion’s River also connected the new tribal boundaries with the increase in fighting, explaining that these fights “are attributable to the way tribes are mixed up on the same ground.”<sup>35</sup>

The concerns regarding these fights connected public discourse regarding the consumption of alcohol by Africans with one of the main outward symbols of young African masculinity, the carrying of weapons. In particular, the carrying of sticks by Zulus in Natal proved to be more difficult to quell than the colonial administrators ever planned. While not singled out in the 1878 Natal Native Code, the carrying and use of sticks and other “dangerous weapons” were strictly forbidden under the terms of the 1891 Code of Native Law. Section 292 clearly stated, “any person, not being a constable on duty, or not otherwise empowered hereto, who shall carry assegais, axes, or other dangerous weapons to any feasts, dance, or other gathering shall be deemed guilty of an offense, and in addition to punishment, the weapons carried by him shall be confiscated.”<sup>36</sup> These punishments alluded to in this statute were by no means small, with “natives carrying assegais or other lethal weapons,” facing both arrest and steep fines, in addition to the confiscation of their weapons.<sup>37</sup> Local and provincial statutes restricted the crafting of these weapons, forcing craftsmen to apply to the local Magistrate for permission to make and sell any of these items.

As with many other statutes within the Code of Native Law, interpretation by local Magistrates made universal application of the Code nearly impossible. In 1907, E. Fitzgerald, the Chief Inspector for the Locations, wrote the acting Under Secretary for Native Affairs S.O.

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<sup>34</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/145, no. 1056/1886. Precis of answers sent by Resident Magistrates and Administrators of Native Law to Circular SNA 465/1884 re: Beer-Drinking Gatherings.

<sup>35</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/145, no. 1056/1886. Precis of answers sent by Resident Magistrates and Administrators of Native Law to Circular SNA 465/1884 re: Beer-Drinking Gatherings.

<sup>36</sup> “Chapter XXV: General Offences, Section 292,” in *Ordinances, Acts, and Laws of the Colony of Natal, Which Refer Specifically to Natives* (Natal: P. Davis & Sons, 1906).

<sup>37</sup> “Chapter XXV: General Offences, Section 292” (1906).

Samuelson, complaining of the lack of universality in controlling the carrying of sticks in the colony. “At present each Magistrate has a different interpretation of this particular section with the result that natives are punished in one division for carrying any more than one ordinary stick and in the adjoining division can carry as many ordinary sticks, including a small stick, as they wish,” Fitzgerald explained.<sup>38</sup> “This inconsistent interpretation of the Law naturally leads to a deal of uneasiness and misunderstanding with the natives,” he continued, “and is inclined to make them take other important Laws in a light way.”<sup>39</sup> For Fitzgerald, this represented a chance to actually loosen the restrictions on the carrying of sticks, as he entreated Samuelson to consider doing away with all legislation in this regard. Fitzgerald explained:

Personally, I do not know why a native should not be allowed to carry as many ordinary sticks as he wishes. They are his natural means of defence and one is just as death dealing as three or four. If you compel a native to carry only one stick, it places him at once at a disadvantage with any other native who wishes to quarrel with him who would of course come prepared with the usual number of sticks and maybe way-lay him.<sup>40</sup>

But harsher regulations rendered Fitzgerald’s practical perspective moot. For example, in 1915, Pietermaritzburg codified stricter restrictions, specifying that “no native shall carry or use any sword, assegai, dagger, sjambok, *iwisa*, *umtshiza*, or any loaded or heavy stick, or other dangerous weapon or missile within the Borough,” at least not without written permission of the Chief Constable.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/364, 738/1907, Letter, E. Fitzgerald (Chief Inspector Locations) to Under Secretary of Native Affairs, March 11, 1907.

<sup>39</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/364, 738/1907, Letter, E. Fitzgerald (Chief Inspector Locations) to Under Secretary of Native Affairs, March 11, 1907.

<sup>40</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/364, 738/1907, Letter, E. Fitzgerald (Chief Inspector Locations) to Under Secretary of Native Affairs, March 11, 1907.

<sup>41</sup> NAB, Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) 191, 20/1915, Letter from Chief Native Commissioner to Pietermaritzburg Mayor and Deputy Commissioner, re: Natives entering and leaving Pietermaritzburg carrying sticks, shields and other lethal weapons, January 1905.

But, as with many other laws restricting the public practice of culture, Zulu men did not passively accept these laws and lay down their weapons. Playing the colonial statutes in their favor, some men learned the codes and found legally acceptable ways to work around them, as pointed out in a 1903 article for the *Christian Express* newspaper. One such law exploited by Zulu men allowed for any African man to carry a knobkerrie/*iwisa* (a heavy stick with a rounded end) as long as the rounded end fit in their mouth. “As may be imagined,” the anonymous writer of the article explained, “the result of this ruling was that various-sized knobkerries were carried by Natives, each, of course, varying according to the size and capacity of the mouth of the owner of the stick.”<sup>42</sup> When approached by a constable and instructed of the illegality of his possession, the native man “would confidently apply the officially-recognized test and the knob would gradually disappear in a capacious mouth!”<sup>43</sup> Little did these lawmakers know that the size of the knobkerries mattered very little, as the size did little to counteract the weight and deadly potential of these sticks. Indeed, “many a Native has been killed or had his skull fractured by a single blow with such a weapon.”<sup>44</sup>

Authorities particularly highlighted the connection between the carrying of weapons by young men at public beer drinks. On August 6, 1891, responding to the Report of the Select Committee (No. 13 of 1891) on the Supply of Liquor to Natives, Henry Bale proposed that a major reason for the proliferation of faction fighting in connection with beer drinks stemmed from the inclusion of women and young people, especially young men, in the gatherings. “[. . .] In past times the drinking of Kafir beer was not permitted to young people or women; women not at all and young men occasionally as a special favour or privilege,” he explained, “It is said

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<sup>42</sup> “Natives and Knobkerries,” *The Christian Express* Vol. XXXIII (January 1, 1903), 13.

<sup>43</sup> “Natives and Knobkerries,” *The Christian Express* Vol. XXXIII (January 1, 1903), 13.

<sup>44</sup> “Natives and Knobkerries,” *The Christian Express* Vol. XXXIII (January 1, 1903), 13.

that at one time it was the custom to say the head of the kraal to call in a young man and allow him to drink, and he held the vessel containing the liquor in his hands and regulated the quantity which the young man was to drink. The young men were not even allowed to be present at these beer drinkings.”<sup>45</sup> Bale viewed this as a potential avenue to slow the spread of fighting at beer drinkings, as the drinking of beer “tends to stock thieving, the thieving of poultry, &c . . . it tends also to faction fights.”<sup>46</sup> The only solution? Prohibit young men from participating in beer drinks since the punishments for faction fight were, in his opinion, “in certain cases wholly inadequate.”<sup>47</sup> “The young men say, ‘a broken head is very cheap, it is only a pound,’ and so they go to the beer drinking with the distinct purpose of having a disturbance, knowing that the penalty will be wholly inadequate,” Bale concluded.<sup>48</sup>

Bale’s concerns are reflected in the 1891 Code of Native Law, which included new statutes requiring chiefs to obtain permission to hold *umkhosi* ceremonies and also making any authority present where a struggle broke out guilty of an offense.<sup>49</sup> H.D. Winter echoed Bale’s sentiments in 1897, speaking about these public beer gatherings and their tendency “. . . to bring about every evil under the face of the sun.”<sup>50</sup> Winter’s, like Bale before him, major concern centered on young men’s presence at these gatherings; however, he framed these concerns through the lens of labor. Winter explained: “Great complaints have for years past been made in regard to Native labour, and my contention is that to a certain extent these beer gatherings deprive the Colony of its labour supply, for so long as these beer gatherings continue so long will the idler go from one

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<sup>45</sup> Colony of Natal, *Debates of the Legislative Assembly of the Colony of Natal* XVI (1891), 650-651.

<sup>46</sup> Colony of Natal (1891), 650-651.

<sup>47</sup> Colony of Natal (1891), 650-651.

<sup>48</sup> Colony of Natal (1891), 650-651.

<sup>49</sup> Peter Paterson, *Ordinances, Acts, and Laws of the Colony of Natal, Which Refer Specifically to Natives* (Natal: P. Davis & Sons, 1906).

<sup>50</sup> Colony of Natal (1891), 134-139.



beer gathering to another.”<sup>51</sup> But these debates in the legislative assembly failed to consider the implications of their legislation on long-standing social practices.

In 1903, Mbojana, chief of the amaCele of the Lower Umzimkulu Division, wrote to the Secretary of Native Affairs, imploring him to rethink the proposed legislation that would prohibit women and boys from attending beer drinking gatherings.

Now this is a great hardship to the natives for this drinking of beer is an old, established custom amongst us. It is our best means of getting people together to help us in our work. Moreover, we do not look upon the drinking of beer upon such occasion in the ordinary light of a beer drink. The beer consumed at these gathering is more in the nature of a reward to the toilers for the labor done than anything else. If this new regulation is brought into force it will be a source of discomfort to us in that work of every description will be affected. How will the people get together labour sufficient to clear the ground of thorns in order to grow their food upon it? How will a man get together sufficient thatch to roof his hut if he cannot offer women the customary beer? in fact the effects of this new legislation will be far-reaching and cannot be realised but by experience.<sup>52</sup>

Of course, chiefs like Mbokana recognized the dangerous connections between beer drinks and faction fights (*izimpi zemibango*).<sup>53</sup> At the same time, alcohol represented only a small part of the cause of these conflicts, as studies of these conflicts show how increasing pressure from the colonial state drove these outbreaks of violence. These pressures took multiple forms, from land shortages connected to the 1896 Native Locations Act, natural disasters, and urbanization.<sup>54</sup> As

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<sup>51</sup> Colony of Natal (1891), 134-139.

<sup>52</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/302, no. 2108/1903. Chief Mbojana, Lower Umzimkulu Division, makes certain representations with regard to the present beer drinking restrictions under G.N. No. 32, 1903.

<sup>53</sup> Jabulani Sithole, in his important Master's thesis on "faction fights" in the Umlazi Location, makes the argument for the use of the term *izimpi zemibango* (wars originating from disputes) as opposed to "faction fights." "I prefer to use the label *izimpi zemibango* (wars originating from disputes) because it is open-ended, and enables the possibility of a variety of actors, issues and interests which should be considered when studying violence. D. Jabulani Sithole, "Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners in the *Izimpi Zemibango* in the Umlazi Location of the Pinetown District in the Context of Natal's Changing Political Economy, 1920 to 1936," M.A. Thesis (University of Natal Pietermaritzburg, 1998), i.

<sup>54</sup> Jonathan Clegg, "*Ukubuyisa Isidumbu* - Bringing Back the Body: An Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944," in *Working Papers in Southern African Studies*, ed. Philip Bonner, vol. 2 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981); William Beinart, "Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, 3 (1992), 455-486; Lambert (1995); Sithole (1998); Bhekuyise Isaac Mthembu, "Faction Fighting in Msinga District from 1874 to 1906," PhD Dissertation, University of Zululand, 1994.

discussed previously, fights regularly broke out at beer drinks, connecting acts of violence with another perceived threat to the colony: African inebriation. Colonial efforts (alongside traditional authorities who also sought solutions to these outbreaks of violence) to stem these conflicts included fines, imprisonment, hard labor on public work crews, corporal punishment and increased regulations over the consumption of alcohol and the carrying of weapons. Traditional authorities faced mounting legislation preventing their social customs from continuing, while facing challenges from their own people as they struggled to understand the rapidly changing social norms.

At the same time as these debates raged over the drinking habits of young men and their right to carry weapons, traditional or otherwise, a new form of youth social organization emerged. The official abolition of *amabutho*, Benedict Carton argues, “did not stop young men from continuing to gather into fighting bands, *amaviyo* (fighting bands, regimental formations).”<sup>55</sup> Under the Zulu kingdom, each *ibutho* consisted of numerous sections, usually with a shared regional identity, divided further into *amaviyo*. Each *iviyo* consisted of men of the same age group who *kleza*’d (to drink milk straight from a cow’s udders)<sup>56</sup> at one of the districts *amakhanda* (administrative centers).<sup>57</sup> Following the dissolution of the Zulu military system, although no longer associated with military service and technically forbidden from existing, young men, mainly in Zululand but also in Natal, continued to form independent *amaviyo*. These units served not only as informal youth socialization sites but also in organized forms for cattle-herding (*ukwalusa*) and stick-fighting (*ukudlalisa izinduku*).<sup>58</sup> In many ways, these sections were

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<sup>55</sup> Carton (2000), 74.

<sup>56</sup> Literally *ukukleza*, this expression means “to drink milk straight from a cow’s udders” but broadly signified the act of young men giving themselves up to the protection of the king and offering their service in return for the king’s provisions for them in the form of food and shelter. Knight (1995), 59; Bjerk (2006).

<sup>57</sup> Laband (2009), 23-24; 329.

<sup>58</sup> For more on Zulu cattle-herding: Marguerite Poland and David Hammond-Tooke, *The Abundant Herds: A Celebration of the Cattle of the Zulu People* (Vlaeberg: Fernwood, 2003). For more on stick-fighting: Benedict

better prepared to evade the surveillance of colonial authorities, enjoying no direct connections to the Zulu royal house and generally only appearing in official documentation when involved in uprisings, as became the case during the 1906 rebellion. *Amabutho* remained exponentially more visible to the administration, continuing to inspire fear and anxiety among white authorities when rumors of their formation or actions reached the ears of local magistrates.

On January 3, 1898, A.E. Harrington, Resident Magistrate of the Umsinga Division, telegraphed the Secretary of Native Affairs regarding the actions of Chief Kula, son of Ngoza and leader of the Qamu, the “largest colonially created chiefdom.”<sup>59</sup> Kula had gathered all young men who were born around the time of the Langalibalele Rebellion (ca. 1873) “for the purpose of forming a new wing to a regiment which was established in his father’s lifetime and called the[m] ‘Isandhlwana’.” Kula named the new wing ‘Ukufakwezi’ or ‘Tshibotshi’, which the magistrate translated as “sheep-wash.”<sup>60</sup> The significance of these names is threefold. Though the reporting official translated these names to mean “sheep-wash,” both names have their own unique meaning. Ukufakwezi should have been transcribed as Ukufakwezwe which translates as “the dying of the nation,” suggesting that the name referred, possibly, to the destruction of the Zulu nation, which perhaps this new regiment defended against. Tshibotshi is likely an old spelling for Shibhoshi which refers to a disinfectant, making this alternative regimental name refer to the ones who destroy that which threatens life. Tshibotshi might also be in reference to the colonial sheep-dipping tanks, either marking the time during which Africans in this area were

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Carton and Robert Morrell, “Zulu Masculinities, Warrior Culture and Stick Fighting: Reassessing Male Violence and Virtue in South Africa,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 38, 1 (2012), 31-53; Benedict Carton and Robert Morrell, “Competitive Combat, Warrior Bodies, and Zulu Sport: The Gender Relations of Stick Fighting in South Africa, 1800–1930,” in John Nauright, Alan Cobley, and David Wiggins (eds.) *Beyond C.L.R. James: Shifting Boundaries of Race and Ethnicity in Sport* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2014), 125-139.

<sup>59</sup> Guy (2013), 471.

<sup>60</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Letter, Magistrate Umsinga Division to Secretary for Native Affairs, January 5, 1898.

required to treat their sheep or perhaps suggesting that this regiment would remove parasites much in the way that the sheep-dip formula did.<sup>61</sup> No matter which translation Kula and his *izinduna* intended with the bestowing of these names, its formation represented a significant moment; within a generation, the naming of the Qamu regiments had shifted from celebrating the greatest Zulu military victory to bemoaning Africans' changing status.

While during the formation of this regiment, during which between 1300 to 1500 men were enrolled, the event proceeded smoothly save for "a minor breach of the peace by some girls on their way home", Kula's failure to request permission for the gathering proved a major cause of concern for colonial officials.<sup>62</sup> Kula explained that he had told Ukwali, an SNA induna and his own uncle, to inform the magistrate of the event.<sup>63</sup> The magistrate contradicted this, saying he had not received word from Ukwali, but had received an inappropriate visit from an inebriated Kula a few nights before the gathering. The magistrate sent Kula away but instructed him to return to speak during the day the following Monday. Kula refused, saying he could not leave the men who had begun to gather at his kraal. This oversight had a ripple effect on the neighborhood with the Magistrate even replacing all of the Constables from Kula's own chiefdom with officers from other local clans and Kula's men being moved to Dundee.<sup>64</sup>

Kula's actions (or lack thereof) earned him an in-person interview with both the Secretary and Under Secretary Native of Affairs on January 3, 1898. Also in attendance were a number of his indunas, including Masuku who also served as an induna for the SNA office.

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<sup>61</sup> Many thanks to Jill Kelly, Nonhlanhla Mbeje, and Thamy Sabela for their assistance in translating the meanings of these regimental names.

<sup>62</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Letter, Magistrate Umsinga Division to Secretary for Native Affairs, January 5, 1898.

<sup>63</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Letter, Magistrate Umsinga Division to Secretary for Native Affairs, January 5, 1898.

<sup>64</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Letter, Magistrate Umsinga Division to Secretary for Native Affairs, January 5, 1898.

Although this meeting focused on Kula's mistake in holding a gathering without permission, the SNA also explicitly expressed concern with reining in this young chief and protecting him from the influence of older, more influential men. This paternalism took center-stage in the SNA's opening comments. "If you had wanted to do anything of this sort," the Secretary of Native Affairs began, "it was for you to approach your father, the Government, and ask for permission to do so, and if the Government had considered it was unwise and improper they would have said do, and if not, they would have given you permission."<sup>65</sup> The SNA further emphasized Kula's childlike status by the referring to the influence that his older uncles had upon him. As a "young man", the Magistrate recognized that Kula had "been led astray by [his] advisers" and, with this knowledge, the SNA did not "want...to have at the beginning to be severe upon a young man who I trust was...led astray, but if I do not take some notice of it you would go away and say, 'Oh well, we have visited a weakling or old woman,' and say you did not care for that man."<sup>66</sup>

Acknowledging the inclination for disturbances throughout the colony, the SNA hoped to make it clear to Kula that while Africans showed "an inclination...to get a little out of hand, but we are determined that if there is any breach of the peace, there will be quick and sharp punishment."<sup>67</sup> Kula, however, did not feel the full weight of the Government's displeasure, since there had been no arms found at the gathering, but the SNA warned him to be more cautious about who he surrounded himself with, especially his uncle Mdhlewafa, who the SNA asked Kula to watch and give warning "if there is any suspicion on the part of the authorities that

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<sup>65</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Report of interview between the Secretary of Native Affairs and Chief Kula of the Umsinga Division, held on the 8th day of February 1898, relative to an alleged breach of Section 260 of the Code of Native Law, by the said Chief Kula, on or about the 3rd day of January 1898.

<sup>66</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Report of interview between the Secretary of Native Affairs and Chief Kula of the Umsinga Division, held on the 8th day of February 1898, relative to an alleged breach of Section 260 of the Code of Native Law, by the said Chief Kula, on or about the 3rd day of January 1898.

<sup>67</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Report of interview between the Secretary of Native Affairs and Chief Kula of the Umsinga Division, held on the 8th day of February 1898, relative to an alleged breach of Section 260 of the Code of Native Law, by the said Chief Kula, on or about the 3rd day of January 1898.

he is exercising any evil influence over the young men.”<sup>68</sup> For Kula, the one complaint he returned to throughout this ordeal centered on the difficulty he experienced recruiting young men for Public Road Party service. When he went to the Magistrate a few nights before the gathering in question, he had done so to speak about the young men of his chiefdom and his thought that recruiting young men would be best affected by “gather[ing] them all together at my kraal so that I might learn to know them.”<sup>69</sup> A number of chiefs shared Kula’s difficulty in recruiting members of his chiefdom for government-sanctioned public service.

In colonial Natal, chiefs had already been required for many years to provide labor for public works when required by the Supreme Chief. The potential of extending this *isibhalo* system into Zululand represented a topic of great interest for white authorities long before the partition of Zululand and the disbanding of the Zulu military system. Certainly, for Natal and Zululand chiefs, the utilization of regiments for the recruitment of labor provided, for some, an opportunity to reconsolidate their chiefly authority by traversing old pathways. In many ways, migrant labor resulted in organization along pre-existing frameworks, as Keletso Atkins explores in *The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money* (1993). Though Atkins explicitly states that the structure upon which the amawasha (washermen’s) guilds in particular, modelled itself less on Zulu regiments and more on the systems of labor built to support the *amabutho*, her works shows that, without any colonial interference, this new system of youth socialization predicated itself on the *amabutho* and subsequent manifestations of this tool of social organization.<sup>70</sup> Chiefs also

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<sup>68</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Report of interview between the Secretary of Native Affairs and Chief Kula of the Umsinga Division, held on the 8th day of February 1898, relative to an alleged breach of Section 260 of the Code of Native Law, by the said Chief Kula, on or about the 3rd day of January 1898.

<sup>69</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/279, no. 43/1898. Report of interview between the Secretary of Native Affairs and Chief Kula of the Umsinga Division, held on the 8th day of February 1898, relative to an alleged breach of Section 260 of the Code of Native Law, by the said Chief Kula, on or about the 3rd day of January 1898.

<sup>70</sup> Keletso E. Atkins, “Origins of the AmaWasha: The Zulu Washermen’s Guild in Natal, 1850-1910,” *The Journal of African History* 27, 1 (1986), 41-57; Keletso E. Atkins, *The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money! The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843-1900* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993).

invoked these systems to conscript men for public service. In 1892, Frank Foxon, the Umsinga magistrate, wrote to the Secretary of Native Affairs regarding the actions of Manyosi, a former induna of Ngoza and later appointed chief of the Qamu (which would later become known as the Gcumisa, adopting Manyosi's own surname, thereby differentiating this chiefdom from Kula's Msinga Qamu).<sup>71</sup> Manyosi, Foxon wrote, had ordered out the Ugobupahla regiment "for road work because they refused to wear *ringkops* (headrings)."<sup>72</sup> Those that refused were exempted "upon paying a fee."<sup>73</sup> Foxon asked for guidance upon the proper action to take, as he did "not know what power Manyosi had to order members of his tribe to wear ringkops."<sup>74</sup> Upon further investigation, including testimony from Manyosi and members of his chiefdom, suggesting to the SNA that he should forward the documents to the Attorney General to "commence a preliminary examination against Manyosi on the charge of extortion or fraud"; at the very least, Foxon urged that Manyosi be fined £25 or £50 since, if all chiefs acted in this manner, it would "have a most disastrous effect on the native population in general."<sup>75</sup>

When questioned by Foxon about his actions, Manyosi insisted that ordering the Upahla to *ukuthunga* (put on headrings) as his right in line with "the old power of the chiefs." When informed by Foxon that he had no right to do so, Manyosi explained that chiefs held the power to *phata* (command) men of their chiefdoms and that other *amakhosi* of his chiefdom "used to form

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<sup>71</sup> Kelly (2018), Chapter 2.

<sup>72</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892. Letter, Frank Foxon to SNA, November 14, 1892. Ringkops or *izicoco* (headrings) historically marked the transition of a man from military service to married life. The decision to allow men to take on the ringkops was the purview of either the local chief or king. To take on the headring was a marker not only of age but of honor for military service and meeting the qualifications necessary to earn the right to marry. See Hamilton (1985), 179; Rev. Fr. Mayr, "The Zulu Kafirs of Natal, V. Clothing and Ornaments (Continued)," *Anthropos* 2,4 (1907), 637; Wright (1978), 27.

<sup>73</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892. Letter, Frank Foxon to SNA, November 14, 1892.

<sup>74</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892. Letter, Frank Foxon to SNA, November 14, 1892.

<sup>75</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892. Letter, Frank Foxon to SNA, November 14, 1892; NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892. Letter, Frank Foxon to SNA, December 2, 1892.

regiments and order the people to *tunga*.”<sup>76</sup> Those that he ordered to *ukuthunga*, however, did not agree that Manyosi’s power coincided with rights to their bodily labor. Instead, they utilized their own power in the form of wealth to avoid being ordered out by Manyosi. Bubini, a member of the older Sijuqu regiment that had been ordered to *ukuthunga* previously, eventually took on the heading even though he did not want to since he knew that “Manyosi would again *bala* (enlist men for labor)” unless he again paid Manyosi £1 since he “had no boy to work for [him] and was working for white people.”<sup>77</sup> Kosi gifted Manyosi with one ewe goat to avoid impressed service on the roads.<sup>78</sup> While many records in the colonial archive deal with complaints by chiefs attempting to meet the labor conscription requirements set by the state, few reference the explicit use of regiments. Perhaps other chiefs utilized these same structures, but kept those institutions hidden from colonial authorities.

Nevertheless, in March 1898, the Prime Minister, Henry Binns, wrote of his intention to see “a definite instruction...be issued to Chiefs here to the effect that the enrolling of young men into regiments is prohibited.” He noted that while no official enrolling of regiments had been done since before the civil war in 1888, “some months ago” Dinuzulu’s mother, Oka Msweli, had “commenced to do the same with the young men who had grown up during Dinuzulu’s absence, naming the regiment ‘Indagwa’gu’sutu’”.<sup>79</sup> The reports reaching the Government House confirmed that Dinuzulu continued to enroll young men into this regiment. These reports coincided with Dinuzulu’s return to the Osutu Kraal in January 1898, at which time C.R. Saunders attempted to make “representations to the Government with a view to the Supreme

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<sup>76</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892, Statement of Manyosi, chief of the Amaqanga tribe-made before Tafamasi on December 2, 1892.

<sup>77</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892. Statement, Bubini before Frank Foxon, November 24, 1892. Mnyameni also paid Manyosi £1 to avoid being called out. NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892. Statement, Mnyameni before Frank Foxon, November 24, 1892.

<sup>78</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/136, no. 1250/1892. Statement, Bubini before Frank Foxon, November 24, 1892.

<sup>79</sup> NAB, Colonial Secretary’s Office (CSO) 1559. Minute, Prime Minister, March 3, 1898.



Chief issuing an order that young men or people from outside our borders wishing to do so, should obtain a pass from their Magistrates for the purpose.”<sup>80</sup> The government rejected this request.

At the same time, government officials continued to receive reports that young Zulu men were “being enlisted and enrolled into regiments and drilled.”<sup>81</sup> An April 1898 telegram from a Zululand magistrate informed the Secretary of Native Affairs that the decree in question had, in fact, done little to staunch the stream of young men traveling to join Dinuzulu. “Information has not reached me to the effect that the order issued on Saturday prohibiting the enrollment of young men into regiments has had the effect of checking young men from certain Districts going up to join Dinuzulu,” he reported.<sup>82</sup> In addition to concern over the possible drilling of companies of young men, authorities were also [concerned] about the fact that these young men, mostly from Tshanibezwe’s chiefdom, had left to join Dinuzulu “without any reference to their chief.” James Gibson had gone to these men and ordered them to return to their chief; however, the Chief Magistrate of Eshowe wrote to the Colonial Secretary a few days later that these men went to Dinuzulu “have...joined Dinuzulu in defiance of their chief and the magistrate’s instructions that they were not to do so.”<sup>83</sup>

Upon his return from exile on St. Helena in 1898, the government established Dinuzulu not as a king, but as a chief of the Usuthu and an *induna* under the authority of the government of Zululand, service for which he would be rewarded at a rate of £500 per year. The Natal and

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<sup>80</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/29, Correspondence on trial of Dinuzulu, 1907-1908, Memo, C.R. Saunders, April 6, 1908, p. 4.

<sup>81</sup> NAB, CSO 1559, Order, Government House, April 2, 1898.

<sup>82</sup> NAB, CSO 1559. Telegram, Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 1898. See also SNA 1/1/280, no. 705/1898, Order to prohibit the enrollment of young men into regiments in Zululand; NAB, Nongoma Magistrate (NGA) 3/2/3, no. ND593C/1898. Telegram re: Regiments being formed by Native Chiefs, 1898.

<sup>83</sup> NAB, CSO 1559. Telegram, Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 1898. See also SNA 1/1/280, no. 705/1898, Order to prohibit the enrollment of young men into regiments in Zululand; NAB, Nongoma Magistrate (NGA) 3/2/3, no. ND593C/1898. Telegram re: Regiments being formed by Native Chiefs, 1898.

Zululand governments both endeavored to ensure that Dinuzulu would not overstep his new rule upon his return. “He must clearly understand that he does not return to Zululand as Paramount Chief,” the terms of his return explicated, “He must respect, listen to, and obey those officers of the Government who are placed in authority over him.” Furthermore, Dinuzulu had to understand that “the position assigned to him by the Government, and the salary allotted to it, will be held during the pleasure of the Government, and will be strictly dependent on the manner in which he behaves and obeys the laws laid down for his guidance, but will not be withdrawn without the approval of the Secretary of State.”<sup>84</sup> Finally, knowing the possibility of large numbers of young men traveling to Dinuzulu’s kraal, possibly for enrollment in a regiment, C.R. Saunders “made representations to the Government with a view to the Supreme Chief issuing an order that young men or people from outside our borders wishing to do so, should obtain a pass from their Magistrates for the purpose.” Although this initiative ultimately proved too difficult to arrange, it clearly shows the correlation between Dinuzulu’s return and fears of rebellion.<sup>85</sup> For the most part, however, Dinuzulu acquiesced to the demands of the Natal and Zululand governments. It proved difficult, however, to limit Dinuzulu’s influence that he attracted due to his position in the Royal House.

Barely a year after his return, in April 1900, Dinuzulu wrote to the Mahlabathini Magistrate, requesting a number of men be sent to Usutu kraal to aid him in reaping crops and attending to other tasks at his homestead. The magistrate quickly wrote to the Chief Magistrate in Eshowe, explaining that he did “not like the idea of the men being allowed to go,” as it appeared “to be simply a means of evading the question that has already been decided that he has no

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<sup>84</sup> James Stuart, *A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906 and of Dinuzulu’s Arrest, Trial and Expatriation* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1913), 478-479.

<sup>85</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/29. Memorandum, C.R. Saunders (Commissioner of Native Affairs for Zululand), April 6, 1908.

authority over people of districts outside of his immediate jurisdiction.”<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, the magistrate suspected the request for assistance in reaping crops to be a ruse since not only did Dinuzulu have plenty of men at his kraal to reap his crops, but when men did attend to him “they spend most of their time in parading and dancing at the Usutu kraal and what work they may occasionally do it infinitesimal.”<sup>87</sup> He concluded by stating his very strong suspicion that while Dinuzulu might indeed want assistance at his kraal, “his main object is to cultivate and gradually propagate his authority over the people of this district which, if the district is to be carried on as at present administered, cannot be allowed.”<sup>88</sup> But, as a simple fact of his existence as the son of Cetshwayo, this influence proved nearly impossible to restrain and mediate.

These anxieties regarding Dinuzulu reached new heights when Colonel H. Bottomley recruited one of the Zulu sovereign’s regiments to defend the borders of Zululand and send scouts and cattle-raiding parties into the Transvaal. Under orders from General John French, Bottomley arrived in Zululand in late March 1901, delivering orders to the Resident Magistrate Nqutu that “natives are given authority to defend their Borders, and loot all Boer cattle they can, and Magistrates are to give all assistance in carrying out these orders.”<sup>89</sup> Local officials quickly reached out to the central government, attempting to ascertain Bottomley’s rights to make these demands. This especially concerned authorities since Bottomley had set out from Nqutu for Dinuzulu’s kraal in Nkandla. The protests of the colonists fell on deaf ears, however, since Lord Kitchener had placed the province of Zululand under martial law on March 25, 1901.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> NAB, Mahlabathini Magistrate (MBT) 3/2/1, no. M137/1900. Letter, Mahlabathini Magistrate to Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, Eshowe, April 1900.

<sup>87</sup> NAB, MBT 3/2/1, no. M137/1900. Letter, Mahlabathini Magistrate to Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, Eshowe, April 1900.

<sup>88</sup> NAB, MBT 3/2/1, no. M137/1900. Letter, Mahlabathini Magistrate to Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, Eshowe, April 1900.

<sup>89</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/25. Telegram, Magistrate Nqutu to Prime Minister, March 27, 1901.

<sup>90</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/25. Telegram, Magistrate Nqutu to Prime Minister, March 27, 1901.

Nevertheless, the Natal Government did approve the supplying of 250 men by Dinuzulu “on the distinct condition that they are kept under strict Military control and under no circumstances allowed to act on their own account and are only used for the purpose stated . . .”; namely, “driving cattle out of bush.”<sup>91</sup> Shortly after Bottomley’s arrival, reports of Africans looting cattle across the border began to flood into local magistracies, as local chiefs armed their men to follow Bottomley’s orders.

Bottomley’s actions went directly against the tacit agreement between the British and the Boers that African participation in the war would be limited. In fact, prior to the outbreak of war, white authorities had informed Zululand chiefs that while they were permitted to “protect themselves and their property against attack or seizure by the enemy,” they were to “remain within their own borders, as the war will be a White-man’s war.”<sup>92</sup> The Zululand Police were to provide protection for the Zululand Province, as the government raised their enrollment from 350 men to 500 and dispersed them to magistracies throughout Zululand.<sup>93</sup> As John Laband and Leonard Thompson have argued, the Boer recruitment of Zulus represents “one of the ironies of the so-called ‘white man’s war’ that the Boers had no compunction in taking blacks on campaign as servants and allowing them to perform more obviously military tasks like digging trenches and, on occasion, taking part in combat.”<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/25. Report of Evidence, given by C.R. Saunders, Esq., C.M.C. at Colonel Miles’ enquiry, held in the Court House, Eshowe, on November 15th, 1902, p. 4-5.

<sup>92</sup> NAB SNA 1/4/6, no. 48/1899. Circular minute from Prime Minister, Natal, to all Zululand Magistrates, September 9, 1899; Cited in John Laband and Paul Thompson, “African Levies in Natal and Zululand, 1836-1906,” in Stephen M. Miller, ed., *Soldiers and Settlers in Africa: 1850-1918*, (Boston: Brill, 2009), 68.

<sup>93</sup> NAB, Zululand Affairs (ZA) 32, no. CR49/1899. Sir Alfred Hime to Sir C.J.R. Saunders, September 9, 1899; NAB, ZA 32, no. CR49/1899, Saunders to Hime, September 13, 1899; Cited in Laband and Thompson (2009), 69.

<sup>94</sup> NAB, CSO 1559. Telegram, Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 1898. See also SNA 1/1/280, no. 705/1898, Order to prohibit the enrollment of young men into regiments in Zululand; NAB, Nongoma Magistrate (NGA) 3/2/3, no. ND593C/1898. Telegram re: Regiments being formed by Native Chiefs, 1898.

Why would Africans agree to aid the British colonists in their fight against the Boers? One incentive came in the form of Bottomley's promise "that as an inducement to the Zulus to arm and capture Boer stock Lieut. Col. Bottomley promised them a reward at a rate of 10% of the stock looted by them."<sup>95</sup> Secondly, for chiefs these orders by Bottomley presented an opportunity for these leaders to express their chiefly power by calling out "armed men to cross over into the Transvaal in defiance of the authority of the Civil Government," much as their forefathers had in the Zulu kingdom.<sup>96</sup> And, finally, this last point in particular, that they would be acting "in defiance of the authority of the Civil Government" had to provide some impetus for those who resented the increasing legislation restricting their power to act of their own accord.<sup>97</sup> Colonists feared this exact result; that Zulu chiefs, and Dinuzulu in particular, would expand their own power and wealth through this attempt to stem the success of the Boers.

In April 1901, reports emerged that not only had Bottomley met with Dinuzulu, but that the Zulu sovereign had agreed to "operate within his sphere of influence among his own people extending beyond Pongolo."<sup>98</sup> So great were the fears of Dinuzulu's influence and the men under his control that white authorities in Mahlabathini ordered Tshanibezwe to ready his men, under Mankulumana, to fight against Dinuzulu's regiment if the time came.<sup>99</sup> Part of this concern stemmed from the fact that Zibhebhu also gathered his men under orders from Bottomley. The

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<sup>95</sup> NAB, CSO 1559. Telegram, Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 1898. See also SNA 1/1/280, no. 705/1898, Order to prohibit the enrollment of young men into regiments in Zululand; NAB, Nongoma Magistrate (NGA) 3/2/3, no. ND593C/1898. Telegram re: Regiments being formed by Native Chiefs, 1898.

<sup>96</sup> NAB, CSO 1559. Telegram, Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 1898. See also SNA 1/1/280, no. 705/1898, Order to prohibit the enrollment of young men into regiments in Zululand; NAB, Nongoma Magistrate (NGA) 3/2/3, no. ND593C/1898. Telegram re: Regiments being formed by Native Chiefs, 1898.

<sup>97</sup> NAB, CSO 1559. Telegram, Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 1898. See also SNA 1/1/280, no. 705/1898, Order to prohibit the enrollment of young men into regiments in Zululand; NAB, Nongoma Magistrate (NGA) 3/2/3, no. ND593C/1898. Telegram re: Regiments being formed by Native Chiefs, 1898. This lack of government oversight, the statement of charges faced by Bottomley, might have resulted in the spread of lung sickness into Zululand, as infected cattle moved into the area without being checked by government agents.

<sup>98</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/25. Telegram to Prime Minister, April 3, 1901.

<sup>99</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/25. Telegram to Prime Minister, April 3, 1901.

chances for more armed clashes between Zibhebhu and Dinuzulu's men presented a significant threat to the public safety of Zululand.

Another major threat to public safety emerged when the Zululand government armed those 250 Africans selected to enact Bottomley's imperative. Saunders, presenting testimony in 1902 regarding Bottomley's actions, recalled that he felt it "unfair to turn them out with assegais against an enemy equipped with most modern weapons, and I thought it was only fair that they should be armed, and 100 rifles were sent to Nkandhla and 100 to Nqutu . . . Martini-Henris, same as issued to the Police."<sup>100</sup> Sir Henry McCallum, then serving as Governor of Newfoundland but who would soon become Governor of Natal, wrote to then Governor Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson in May 1901 of his "regrets" about the use of Zulus by Colonel Bottomley. "A perusal of all the telegrams which have passed on the same subject makes me regret that Military exigencies have rendered it necessary to call in the services of the Zulus," he explained, "Such a step appears to me to be a reversal of the general policy which has ruled from the commencement of hostilities, namely to disassociate the Native populations from warlike operations as much as possible and to leave it to the White races to fight it out."<sup>101</sup> Additionally, McCallum wrote of his remorse that "any instructions which was necessary to give the Zulus were not conveyed through the Resident Magistrates, seeing that our political relations with them are so delicate and that intertribal questions require that Chiefs should be handled by those who have so long been regarded as having absolute authority and who possess the necessary local knowledge."<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/25. Report of Evidence, given by C.R. Saunders, Esq., C.M.C. at Colonel Miles' enquiry, held in the Court House, Eshowe, on November 15, 1902, p. 9-10.

<sup>101</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/25. Letter, Sir Henry McCallum to Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, May 16, 1901.

<sup>102</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/25. Letter, Sir Henry McCallum to Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, May 16, 1901.

The final source of concern regarding Bottomley's partnership with Dinuzulu stemmed from the fact that the men recruited by Dinuzulu were organized into a regiment, named the Nkomindala. In *Reluctant Rebellion* (1970), Shula Marks considers the significance of the name for this particular unit. "Although Dinuzulu himself suggested the name, Nkomindala, came from the Afrikaans, 'Wie kom [in?] daar' ('Who comes [in] there?'), according to E.A. Ritter the title, which Shaka had bestowed on one of his regiments also, meant 'the toothless cattle'—or 'the Old Contemptibles'," Marks explains, "This was perhaps a better reflection of its military pretensions."<sup>103</sup> This regiment fell into a long line of idiomatically named regiments formed under Dinuzulu. In his *Zulu References for Zulu Interpreters and Students* (1923), Carl Faye credits Dinuzulu with the enrollment of nine regiments.<sup>104</sup>

While all of the Zulu kings gave their regiments unique, idiomatic names, Dinuzulu's stand out in particular for their subtle resistance to the conditions under which they were formed.<sup>105</sup> For example, while Faye translated "Ufelapakathi" as "repressed fury", R.C. Samuelson, a former Natal official and Zulu ethnographer, offered an alternative translation, "literally the dier within," which he noted "[was] so named to imply that the regiment was only a regiment in name, would not have the opportunity of fighting, and would be eaten up by remorse."<sup>106</sup> Faye also notes that uFelapakathi originally went by iNgubo-ka'Kundlase, the blanket of Kundlase (the mother of Zibhebhu)," but abandoned this name "at the request of the British authorities — so it is said — because of its opprobrious significance."<sup>107</sup> Cetshwayo had also named one of his regiments, the Ufalaza or "the rubbish talkers," in reference to their

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<sup>103</sup> Shula Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: the 1906-1908 disturbances in Natal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 112-113.

<sup>104</sup> Faye (1923), 50.

<sup>105</sup> For analysis of the regimental names of Dinuzulu's predecessors, see Faye (1923); Samuelson (1929); Adrian Koopman *Zulu Names* (Pietmaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002), 87-108; Krige (1936).

<sup>106</sup> Samuelson (1929), 244.

<sup>107</sup> Faye (1923), 50.

diminished status and inability to act following his exile. Prior to the Anglo-Zulu War, they had been known as the Izinhlantsi or “sparks,” but Cetshwayo renamed them following his return from captivity “because the Zulus had lost the ability of talking commonsense as they used to before he was taken captive.”<sup>108</sup> These regimental names reflected the increasing feeling of powerlessness under a colonial regime that increasingly reined in their masculinity, a reality that Dinuzulu knew too well.

C.R. Saunders eventually judged the recruitment of the Nkomindala as “a very dangerous experiment — a very dangerous measure.”<sup>109</sup> For Saunders, the decision by Bottomley to recruit Dinuzulu and his considerable influence to loot Boer cattle and police the border with the Transvaal “did more than anything to undermine the efforts which had been made to restrict his control to that of the people within his own District.”<sup>110</sup> In addition to extending Dinuzulu’s influence, Bottomley’s actions were ultimately viewed as a failure by the central government, since they “gave the Boers a pretext or opportunity for looting the cattle of natives which they had previously respected; and they succeeded in capturing and looting more cattle from Natives than the cattle captured under Lieut. Col. Bottomley’s orders.”<sup>111</sup> Further concern came when Dinuzulu failed to disband the Nkomindala following the end of the war. Instead, he retained the services of these men [and more men he added later] as his own personal bodyguard.

In 1904, Dinuzulu utilized their labor to build a “fort” about a mile from the Usutu kraal. James Stuart wrote that it “was freely talked about” that he retained “regiments of young men at Usutu, notably one known as his bodyguard and called ‘Nkomondala’.”<sup>112</sup> Not only did these

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<sup>108</sup> Faye (1923), 50.

<sup>109</sup> Faye (1923), 50.

<sup>110</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/29, Correspondence on trial of Dinuzulu, 1907-1908. Memo, C.R. Saunders, April 6, 1908, p. 6.

<sup>111</sup> NAB, SNA 1/6/29, Correspondence on trial of Dinuzulu, 1907-1908. Memo, C.R. Saunders, April 6, 1908, p. 6.

<sup>112</sup> Stuart (1913), 113.



young men serve as his bodyguard, but Dinuzulu also required them, according to Stuart, “to undergo military exercises.”<sup>113</sup> But Stuart posed one important question regarding Dinuzulu and the Nkomindala: “But what right had a Chief to erect fortifications and train warriors without the authority of the Government?”<sup>114</sup> This question emerged again in 1906 when, following the Bambatha Rebellion in 1906, several members of Dinuzulu’s “bodyguard”, Umpeta, Somkuku, Umfundisi, Menezwayo, and Sebeko, were charged with the murder of H.M. Stainbank, Magistrate for Mahlabathini.<sup>115</sup>

On April 12, 1904, during the gathering of evidence for the 1904-1905 South African Native Affairs Commission, the committee members asked H.C. Shepstone about the statutes on record regarding the legislation prohibiting chiefs from forming men into regiments. Responding that he had never had a chief apply to form a regiment during his time in office, he explained that the clause had been put in the law “to prevent anything of the kind, supposing it should arise. I do not know anything of the kind now.”<sup>116</sup> S.O. Samuelson, present and serving as one of the commissioners, interjected into Shepstone’s testimony, explaining the continuing presence of regiments in chiefdoms in Natal and Zululand. “It is done,” Samuelson explained, “They are allowed to assemble. The men of different ages in the tribe are classified, at any rate in the mind of the Chief, by specifying the names of such and such a regiment and so on. It is the case in several large tribes in the Colony now.”<sup>117</sup> Twenty-six years after its abolition, a Natal official plainly stated that the Zulu military system still existed, albeit in a different state and for

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<sup>113</sup> Stuart (1913), 113.

<sup>114</sup> Stuart (1913), 113.

<sup>115</sup> Letter, Governor to the Secretary of State in *Further Correspondence Relating to Native Affairs in Natal (in continuation of [Cd. 3247] and [Cd. 3563].)*, Presented to both House of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, January 1908 (London: Darling & Sons, 1908).

<sup>116</sup> South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905, *Vol. III, Minutes of Evidence Taken in the Colony of Natal, Presented to His Excellency the High Commissioner and the Governments of the Colonies and Territories in British South Africa* (Cape Town: Cape Times Limited Government Printers, 1904).

<sup>117</sup> South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905 (1904).

different purposes. And just a few years later, the role of the *amabutho* would shift again, as the imposition of an exorbitant Poll Tax in 1905 would push sections of the Zulu people into rebellion against the colonial state. J.W. Shepstone advocated for this increase in tax during the same session of the Commission where H.C. Shepstone provided his assessment of the Zulu military system. Stating his belief that Africans were “decidedly . . . undertaxed,” Shepstone explained that Africans were earning “a great deal of money” and should be “place[d] . . . in line with Europeans” and made to “hire their land or purchase it if they choose.”<sup>118</sup> Asked if this meant he believed Africans should be subjected to more struggle, he responded simply: “Let them struggle . . .”<sup>119</sup>

This struggle came sooner than expected as the imposition of the 1905 Poll Tax intensified already strained intergenerational relationships as young men railed against the limitations placed upon them by both “African and colonial patriarchies.”<sup>120</sup> “These rebels fought to protect gains earned while straddling two worlds, the African homestead and settler society,” Carton explains in *Blood from Your Children* (2000), “African sons confronted both a Natal government that took their wealth and their own male elders, many of whom detested white rule yet appeared to acquiesce in its creeping disruption of family life.”<sup>121</sup> Young men already contributed to the payment of hut taxes for their families. Homestead heads justified these expenses in terms of the cattle they provided for their sons’ bridewealth payment, as well as the promise of protection and shelter for the families that migrant laborers left behind. The devastating impact of cattle diseases in Zululand and Natal meant that fathers could no longer

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<sup>118</sup> South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905 (1904).

<sup>119</sup> South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905 (1904).

<sup>120</sup> Carton (2000), 2-3.

<sup>121</sup> Carton (2000), 2-3.

contribute to their sons' bridewealth payments.<sup>122</sup> At the same time, this additional economic burden meant that young men had to spend more time in wage labor positions to find ways to not only pay for bridewealth but to pay the new poll tax and the hut tax.<sup>123</sup> When colonial authorities proposed a poll tax in 1905, the system was already untenable given that "in many cases Hut Tax is earned by boys under the age of 18, and that the young men either waste the money on themselves or employ it in the purchase of cattle."<sup>124</sup> Even before promulgation of the poll tax officially, "the continual cry of the kraalheads is that they cannot get the young men to send money for taxes."<sup>125</sup>

The devastating potential of this tax to disrupt the status quo emerged in September 1905 at a meeting of chiefs and magistrates in the Nqutu Division during which the chiefs pled with the officials to understand how the tax would cause their chiefdoms to "scatter." Chief Faku (Ntombela District) explained that "our young men are the money earners and they also have to work at the call of Government, and now this fresh tax will also fall upon them."<sup>126</sup> This tax, he implored the authorities to understand, "threatens to 'scatter' our kraal system, and we ask that our cry against it may go before the Government."<sup>127</sup> Chief Gadaleneni of the Mangwe chiefdom

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<sup>122</sup> Benedict Carton, "'We Are Made Quiet by This Annihilation': Historicizing Concepts of Bodily Pollution and Dangerous Sexuality in South Africa," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39,1 (2006), 85-106; Benedict Carton, "The Forgotten Compass of Death: Apocalypse Then and Now in the Social History of South Africa," *Journal of Social History* 37,1 (2003), 199-218. Other areas of southern Africa faced similar devastation from cattle diseases in the nineteenth century: Peires (1989); Pule Phoofolo, "Face to Face with Famine: The BaSotho and the Rinderpest, 1897-1899," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29,2 (2003), 503-527; Charles van Onselen, "Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa 1896-97," *The Journal of African History* 13, 3 (1972), 473-488.

<sup>123</sup> Sean Redding, *Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880-1963* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 89-122.

<sup>124</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/327 (2567/1905), Points raised in regard to the promulgation of the Poll Tax Act (September 27, 1907).

<sup>125</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/327 (2567/1905), Points raised in regard to the promulgation of the Poll Tax Act (September 27, 1907).

<sup>126</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/327 (2576/1905), Statement made by Chief Faku of the Ntombela District, Nqutu District with reference to the Poll Tax Act (September 25, 1905).

<sup>127</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/327 (2576/1905), Statement made by Chief Faku of the Ntombela District, Nqutu District with reference to the Poll Tax Act (September 25, 1905).

echoed Faku's concerns, stating simply: "We are crying."<sup>128</sup> "The result of this new tax will be that we Fathers shall be in the hands of sons, who already work for us," he pleaded, "We ask that the matter may be reconsidered as we cannot say how we shall get the money to meet the tax."<sup>129</sup> Chief Nongamulana of the Zondi chiefdom similarly referred to "crying" in his own statement, explaining that chiefs "are crying over this new tax and we ask the Government to reconsider that law as we feel it to be too heavy a burden upon us and an obligation that we feel that we shall fail to meet."<sup>130</sup> If things continued in this manner, he predicted, "instead of controlling our kraals it will now be that we shall be controlled by our kraals."<sup>131</sup> For others, the threat these young men posed a significantly greater threat. Tim Ogle, another chief in the Nqutu area, warned Europeans at a February 1906 tax collection meeting to leave the area, reporting that the young men in his area "became recalcitrant and impudent: said they would not pay the tax but would bash in (*pohloza*) the head, first of all these headmen present at the promulgation of the Act."<sup>132</sup>

As tensions mounted, a string of animal-killings and growing rumors of Dinuzulu's desire to see a rebellion against the colonial state further heightened anxieties on both sides.<sup>133</sup> When the state sent out tax collectors in early 1906, they were met with direct resistance and, in February 1906, the murder of H.M. Stainbank, a tax collector, near Richmond marked the beginning of a conflict that would only continue for a few months but would leave deep scars in

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<sup>128</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/327 (2576/1905), Statement made by Chief Gadaleneni of the Mangwe Tribe, Nqutu District (September 25, 1905).

<sup>129</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/327 (2576/1905), Statement made by Chief Gadaleneni of the Mangwe Tribe, Nqutu District (September 25, 1905).

<sup>130</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/327 (2576/1905), Statement by Chief Nongamulana of the Zondi Tribe, Nqutu District with reference to the Poll Tax Act (September 25, 1905).

<sup>131</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/327 (2576/1905), Statement by Chief Nongamulana of the Zondi Tribe, Nqutu District with reference to the Poll Tax Act (September 25, 1905).

<sup>132</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/335 (486/06). Letter, Pinetown Magistrate to S.O. Samuelson (USNA), On conduct of young men of Chief Ogle's tribe, February 16, 1906.

<sup>133</sup> Marks (1970), 144-168.

Natal and Zululand. The state responded by imposing martial law and mobilizing the colonial militia, facing Colonel Duncan McKenzie, commander of the colonial militia, with a conundrum. While he recognized the need for using African conscripts, he suffered a fundamental distrust of them.

Part of this distrust stemmed from the public connections between the rebels and symbols related to the *amabutho* of the Zulu kingdom era. In particular, the use of Zulu martial symbols by various actors during the conflict played a key role in crystallizing Zulu identity among Africans in Natal and Zululand, especially through “professed allegiance to the Zulu king Dinuzulu; the use of Usuthu, the name of Dinuzulu’s faction in the Zulu Civil War and his royal salute; the use of *ubushokobezi* war badges and the name *umshokobezi*, both associated with the Usuthu faction; the use of *intelezi*, or medicine, obtained from Dinuzulu; and self-identification of Natal Africans as Zulus;” and the reforming of the Qwabe *inkatha*.<sup>134</sup> The association of *intelezi* and *ubushokobezi* with the “rebels” further cemented perceived connections between Zulu martiality and dangerous African masculinity. Furthermore, the involvement of *amaviyo* in the murder of H.M. Stainbank, one of the events that sparked the conflict, further embedded this fear among white populations.<sup>135</sup>

Authorities feared that accepting assistance from the king’s *amabutho* in particular would represent a tacit acceptance of their existence and would bolster the spirits of the rebels that they were attempting to hunt down. For example, Dinuzulu himself offered to gather troops to go to Nkandla and hunt down Bhambatha but the Native Commissioner rejected this officer, since he

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<sup>134</sup> Jeff Guy, *The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion* (Scottsville: University of KwaZuluNatal Press, 2005); Michael Mahoney, *The Other Zulus: The Spread of Zulu Ethnicity in Colonial South Africa* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 183; Michael Mahoney, “The Zulu kingdom as a genocidal and post- genocidal society, c. 1810 to the present,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 5,2 (2003), 261-262.

<sup>135</sup> NAB, Registrar, Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg (RSC) 1/1/97, 22/1907. Supreme Court Criminal Cases. Rex Versus Umpeta, Somkuku, Umfundisi, 1907

believed “that the levy would be misrepresented by the rebels as succor from the king in whose name they claimed to fight, and that the resulting confusion could only work to their advantage.”<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, other chiefs came forward with levies, although they were not able to muster the numbers that had been available in previous struggles. However, these chiefs, like Mfungelwa and Sitshitshili, personally accompanied their men to aid them in their task and, potentially, to ensure that they did not go over to the side of the rebels. But even in lower numbers, these levied troops made a huge difference for the colonists who needed their expertise to navigate the Nkandla forests, which it has been reported that even the great Shaka Zulu had difficulty in navigating. By mid-July, as the rebellion came to an end, 2,652 rebels lay dead and 4,368 others were convicted under martial law, including the imprisonment of Dinuzulu on twenty-three separate charges.<sup>137</sup>

At the same time, although white administrators and colonists feared the use of martial symbols in the conflict, they also relied on African support to secure victory over the “rebels.” For example, Chief Sibindi of the amaBomvu enjoyed particular support from the colonial regime for his role in leading the Umvoti Field Force on the Natal-Zululand Border and received personal thanks from Colonel Leuchars at the conclusion of the conflict at a ceremony in Greytown on April 11, 1906.<sup>138</sup> A reporter on the scene praised Sibindi, remarking that the chief truly represented “a stalwart warrior,” and recounted the martial appearance and performance on his followers.

Sibindi and his followers, garbed in all the oddities of Zulu war dress, and wearing a red head-band, significant of their loyalty to the whites . . . As they marched the whole contingent of 1,200 natives sung a war song to a weird tune . .

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<sup>136</sup> Laband and Thompson (2009), 78.

<sup>137</sup> Laband and Thompson (2009), 81.

<sup>138</sup> Laband and Thompson (2009), 81.

. All the while the mob of warriors kept up a storm of war shouts, one of which resembled steam escaping from a powerful engine.<sup>139</sup>

Captured in this brief excerpt lay two impulses on the part of this writer and the colony as a whole: deep awe of Zulu military performance and a desire to make a mockery of this same performance so as to decrease its violent potential. Following an address remarking on the bravery of Sibindi and his followers in securing victory over the rebels, Colonel Leuchars allowed Sibindi to offer some comments of his own. He explained how his actions in support of the white authorities had caused tension with nearby chiefdoms and although his men grew concerned for their safety, he had replied that the government “will be at your back and keep you.”<sup>140</sup> Leuchars assured Sibindi that the government would protect his chiefdom and “if anything happens to the few people of this country, thousands will pour in from the sea to support the authority of the King.”<sup>141</sup>

These fears, combined with the continued uncertainty over the causes and details of the rebellion, resulted in increased attention on these symbols and actors adopting them in the wake of the rebellion. In March 1907, reports emerged that groups of men were traveling to Dinuzulu’s kraal and forming into regiments.<sup>142</sup> This gathering compounded concerns about Dinuzulu’s attempts throughout 1907 to gather small gifts of money from men in local chiefdoms.<sup>143</sup> On August 13, 1907, Ntutu ka Malandela appeared before the Paulpietersburg

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<sup>139</sup> NAB, Prime Minister’s Office (PM) 69, 1387/1907. Prime Minister states that he thanks Sibindi and his impi for their services who states that they were always willing to assist the Government and that they relied on the Government for protection, April 11, 1906.

<sup>140</sup> NAB, Prime Minister’s Office (PM) 69, 1387/1907. Prime Minister states that he thanks Sibindi and his impi for their services who states that they were always willing to assist the Government and that they relied on the Government for protection, April 11, 1906.

<sup>141</sup> NAB, Prime Minister’s Office (PM) 69, 1387/1907. Prime Minister states that he thanks Sibindi and his impi for their services who states that they were always willing to assist the Government and that they relied on the Government for protection, April 11, 1906.

<sup>142</sup> NAB, Attorney General’s Office (AGO) 1/8/117 (1558/1907). Reports of Dinuzulu Calling Men to Reap His Crops,

<sup>143</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/375 (2380/1907). Deposition of Ntutu re: Dinuzulu requesting members of Chief Vusindhlu’s tribe to make presents to him, August 14, 1907.

Magistrate to provide testimony as to Dinuzulu's actions. Ntutu reported that "Vusindhlu received a message from Dinuzulu, on Saturday last, saying that locusts have played havoc with his, Dinuzulu's, crops, destroying nearly everything, so that he is now threatened with famine."<sup>144</sup> In the wake of this agricultural devastation, Ntutu reported that Dinuzulu requested that Vusindhlu arrange for his men to make presents to him."<sup>145</sup> By September, concerns over Dinuzulu's growing influence intensified when reports emerged that Dinuzulu held a large hunt at Usutu kraal, attended by approximately 4,000 of his followers.<sup>146</sup>

At this point, colonial authorities had near constant surveillance over Dinuzulu, both due to the ongoing investigation into his role in the 1906 uprising but also in response to rumors of his plans to amass a force of young men to expel all white residents from Zululand. A December 1907 report by an anonymous "intelligent native" to the Secretary of Native Affairs confirmed these fears. "He said that Dinuzulu would rise in rebellion at [Christmas] time, that if he had any success, many Natal natives would join in the rebellion . . . that they would kill the white people; they brought the cattle disease into the Country and shot them for being diseased, they could not do this is if the natives would combine . . . The natives said they were ready to rebel, that if Dinuzulu had any success in his rebellion, many young men would join him," the report read, "They said that Njengabantu, Sobuza's son, had gone to the Magistrate's Office and had summoned them to meet him on his return the next day' they did not know what it was about, but they meant to rebel. The white people are the cause of the cattle disease."<sup>147</sup> Dinuzulu found his

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<sup>144</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/375 (2380/1907). Deposition of Ntutu re: Dinuzulu requesting members of Chief Vusindhlu's tribe to make presents to him, August 14, 1907.

<sup>145</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/375 (2380/1907). Deposition of Ntutu re: Dinuzulu requesting members of Chief Vusindhlu's tribe to make presents to him, August 14, 1907.

<sup>146</sup> NAB, SNA 1/1/379 (2785/1907) "Extract from the *Times of Natal*, September 17, 1907.

<sup>147</sup> NAB, SNA 1/4/20A (6263/1907), Confidential statement from an 'intelligent' native, December 4, 1907.



ability to raise an “amabutho” for this purported “rebellion” hindered by the ongoing investigation into his participation in the 1906 uprising.

Dinuzulu, incarcerated in the Pietermaritzburg jail after being convicted of harboring Bhambatha’s family during the rebellion as well as owning unregistered firearms, found himself both deprived of his chieftainship *and* forced to serve time for harboring rebels at different stages of the rebellion.<sup>148</sup> The state also forbade both Mankulumana and Shingana, key advisers to Dinuzulu, from ever returning to Zululand. By depriving the Usuthu from their leadership, the government imposed a new version of the “divide and rule” philosophy which characterized earlier colonial tactics. In 1910, after the official institution of the 1909 [Union of] South Africa Act, R.H. Addison, then District Native Commissioner (DNC) of Zululand, officially abolished the Usuthu and placed four chiefs in control of sections of its populations; only one of these chiefs represented the royal family.

At the same time, shortly after the establishment of the new Union Cabinet of 1910, authorities released Dinuzulu from prison and sent him to a farm in Rietfontein, Transvaal, prohibiting him from ever returning to Zululand. Though Dinuzulu maintained strong ties in Zululand, even requesting permission for his amabutho to join him in Rietfontein, he never returned to Zululand, calling into question the future of his heir, Solomon, and whether he would face similar challenges to his hereditary claim to power. The Act of Union, Nicholas Cope argues, shifted policy towards the Zulu royal family in two distinct ways. First, Union invested “a completely new body with paramount authority in ‘native affairs’, with which it could – as it soon did— override Natal officials of the NAD in forging a new ‘settlement’ in Zululand.”<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Originally, Dinuzulu also faced charges related to participating in and encouraging the rebellion. He was cleared of these charges. Redding (2006), 93.

<sup>149</sup> Nicholas Cope, “The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government, 1910-1933: Solomon kaDinuzulu, Inkatha and Zulu Nationalism,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Natal, Durban, 1985), 27.

Additionally, the death of Dinuzulu on October 18, 1913 “provided this body with the opportunity to ‘wipe the slate clean’ and review official policy towards Dinuzulu’s heir.”<sup>150</sup>

Following Dinuzulu’s death, Mankulumana paid a visit to the Assistant Magistrate in Babanango, G.W. Kinsman. Responding to messages of condolence conveyed to the family by members of the government, Mankulumana requested that Kinsman pass on a more pointed response to their commiserations.

It is you who killed the one we have now buried; you killed his father and killed him. We did not invade your country, but you invaded ours. I fought for the dead man’s father, we were beaten, you took our King away, but the Queen sent him back to us, and we were happy. The one whom we now mourn did no wrong. There is no bone which will not decay. What we now ask is, as you have killed the father, to take care of the children.<sup>151</sup>

The main children Mankulumana invoked in this statement were Dinuzulu’s sons, Nkaiashana Solomon and David Nyawana, who faced a struggle not only over who would inherit their father’s position but over their position in the new South African state.

Aside from the royal family, the Zulu nation as a whole faced their own challenges, as many of the tensions that resulted in the 1906 Rebellion lingered. Following the abolition of the *isibhalo* system in 1910, Magistrates in Natal and Zululand struggled to find a replacement to control the energies of young Africans in their areas. Arthur J. Shepstone, acting CNC, circulated an announcement to all Magistrates in December 2011, proposing the introduction of a system of voluntary apprenticeship to fill the void left in the wake of the abolition of *isibhalo*. “Owing to the growing lack of control of parents and guardians over their sons and wards, and to the grave

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<sup>150</sup> Cope (1985), 27.

<sup>151</sup> Pretoria Archives, Native Affairs Department (Henceforth NA) 290/2151/F.727. Report G. W. Kinsman, Assistant Magistrate, Babanango, to Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) 28.10.13. There was some debate over the ‘inflammatory nature’ of this speech, and in particular over the somewhat obscure phrase ‘There is no bone which will not decay’. It was accepted in the end that the term ‘kill’ had a more general sense of ‘ruin’ and the phrase meant ‘Let revenge cease’; Cited in Shula Marks, “Natal, the Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation.” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4, 2 (April 1978), 172.

consequences which are already being felt from this cause, the Government urges upon all parents and guardians the advisability of apprenticing their young lads, between the ages of 15 and 19, to some trade or calling, for a specified period of not less than three years,” Shepstone proposed.<sup>152</sup> In speaking with parents and traditional authorities, Shepstone insisted, “stress should be laid upon the fact that the discipline to which Native youth was formerly subjected, has now practically ceased to exist, and that the children—the boys especially—not only think and act for themselves (generally to their detriment) but are more and more openly defying the constituted authority at home and elsewhere.”<sup>153</sup> Although the threats of the young men rebelling against the poll tax disappeared, the colonial state continued to face the challenge of unharnessed young masculine energies directed at their frustration of being unable to earn a living.

Following the 1879 defeat of the Zulu army by the British at Ulundi, a wealth of symbols associated with African masculinity were targeted by colonial authorities. The disbanding of the *amabutho* and the stripping of first Zulu king Cetshwayo’s (and later all of the Natal and Zululand chiefs’) authority represented the first in a series of laws passed by the Natal colonial authorities to control these dangerous masculinities that, from the colonists’ perspective, had resulted in the Anglo-Zulu War. A series of new laws and restrictions reflected attempts by the Natal colonial government to both define and restrict public expressions of masculinity. The implementation of Native Law in the colony of Natal and, later, Zululand, exposed the limitations of the colonial regime in legislating against these public symbols and functions. These laws betrayed deep fear and uncertainty not only in regard to public violence, but also

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<sup>152</sup> NAB, NK (Nkandla Magistrate) 995/11, Proposed introduction of system of voluntary apprenticeship of Native lads in Natal and Zululand; Acting CNC (Arthur J. Shepstone) to Magistrates, 20 December 1911, Circular CNC No. 34/1911, Vide CNC 2067/1911.

<sup>153</sup> NAB, NK (Nkandla Magistrate) 995/11, Proposed introduction of system of voluntary apprenticeship of Native lads in Natal and Zululand; Acting CNC (Arthur J. Shepstone) to Magistrates, 20 December 1911, Circular CNC No. 34/1911, Vide CNC 2067/1911.

alcohol consumption, unemployment, youth, and an era of masculinity in crisis. But some important symbols of the Zulu kingdom persisted, albeit “corrupted, reconfigured, and made compliant with the demands of the white state and capitalism,” in the words of Aran MacKinnon.<sup>154</sup> The Natal and Zululand *amabutho* were one of these “corrupted” and “reconfigured” symbols that persisted following the dissolution of the Zulu kingdom following the Anglo-Zulu War.

In the wake of the shifts following the abolition of the *amabutho*, the actions of young men triggered increasing anxiety from traditional authorities, chiefdoms, and the colonial state. The implementation of measures to control young men’s violent potential, through control of weapons, drinking, and labor, backfired as conflicts broke out within the former Zulu kingdom and among chiefdoms at beer drinks and other celebrations. Discontent with this situation manifested in a variety of forms, including the naming of regiments to reflect the changing times. And while the colonial state villainized young men and traditional authorities for their proclivities for violence, they also recognized the value of utilizing the supposedly outlawed *amabutho* to help fight their battles, first in the South African War and later in the Zulu Rebellion of 1906. This does not mean that *amabutho* became a tool of the colonial state; in fact, young African men in Natal and Zululand adapted and evolved the institution to suit their new circumstances, with reverberations that shaped the course of history for Zulu-speaking people.

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<sup>154</sup> Aran MacKinnon, *The Making of South Africa: Culture and Politics* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004), 146.

### Chapter 3:

#### He is like unto one who is surrounded by the shields of warriors: *Amabutho*, the Royal House, and Ambiguities of Dependence, 1913-1948

Our own eater-up from Zibindini  
The honeybird that drinks from deep pools  
If he drank from shallow pools his beak would be muddied  
Tuft of soft hair he speaks not, neither has heavy words,  
He is like unto one who is surrounded by the shields of warriors.  
-*Izibongo* of Solomon ka Dinuzulu<sup>1</sup>

In her study of Solomon's son, and successor, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, Anna K. Buverud notes that the reference to Solomon as a "honeybird" demonstrates the focus on tradition and history during his reign.<sup>2</sup> The final stanza of this *isibongo* (praise poem) similarly reflects the centrality of Zulu history and tradition to his reign as he indeed represented one "like unto one who is surrounded by the shields of warriors," even in the face of legislation that rendered his formation of *amabutho* illegal. Ian Knight connects Solomon's struggle to find relevance with his decision to enroll *amabutho* under this restrictive legislation. "King Solomon's career was characterized by a struggle to find a framework within the context of a rapidly industrializing economy in which the Zulu monarchy could function," Knight argues, "To that end, he formed a number of *amabutho* . . . by exerting his right to *buta* them Solomon asserted his claim to the traditional mechanics of the independent past."<sup>3</sup> The history of Zulu royal *amabutho* coincides directly with the history of the struggle for recognition of the Zulu chief as a Paramount Chief, most clearly illustrated in the reign of Solomon ka Dinuzulu (1891-1933) and his successors, first Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu and later Cyprian.

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<sup>1</sup> Unpublished collection of Zulu praise poems, *Izibongo zika okaNtuzwa uNina kaMpahumuzana and Izibongo zika uMaphumuzana kaDinuzulu*; Cited in Cope, "The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government," 69.

<sup>2</sup> Anne Kolberg Buverud, "The King and the Honeybirds: Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon, Zulu Nationalism and the Implementation of the Bantu Authorities System in Zululand, 1948-1957" (PhD Diss, University of Oslo, 2007), 9.

<sup>3</sup> Knight, *The Anatomy of the Zulu Army*, 255.

Debates and negotiations over the role of *amabutho* in early twentieth-century Zululand and Natal illustrate the ambiguities of dependence of both the conquered and the colonizer. Although the colonial state outlawed the formation of *amabutho* in 1879, it quickly became clear that this tool of social organization offered practical utility in managing the potential of African men in Natal and Zululand, particularly in the face of global military struggles that necessitated the use of African labor for British military success. At the same time, however, as authorities utilized Solomon's (and later Mshiyeni and Cyprian's) influence over men throughout Natal and Zululand to harness the potential of Zulu labor and loyalty for the success of the Union, the white state also felt the need to exact more control over the role of the Zulu king for fear of another rebellion like the one that had resulted in the diminishing of Dinuzulu's status following the revolt of 1906.

Dinuzulu's passing in October 1913 left his son, Nkaiashana Solomon, as both symbolic leader of the Zulu nation and also the foremost intermediary between his people and the white South African state. At only 22 years old, he inherited, after a dispute over his brother David Nyawana's rights to the position, both the responsibilities of the office and black and white expectations.<sup>4</sup> In a letter to R. H. Addison, B. Colenbrander, the Vryheid Magistrate, reported that Solomon is "a bright and intelligent youth of about 18 years of age, anxious for knowledge and education"; however, Colenbrander explained, "it has occurred to me to suggest for consideration the advisability for plans being made to make advantageous use of him elsewhere than allowing him to grow up in the undesirable environments w[h]ere his late misguided and indiscrete father failed so signally, and came to grief."<sup>5</sup> Solomon and his advisers, African and

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<sup>4</sup> Cope, "The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government," 61-65.

<sup>5</sup> NAB, Chief Native Commissioner Papers (CNC) 144, 1818/1913. Letter, B. Colenbrander to CNC R.H. Addison, Pietermaritzburg, November 12, 1913.

white alike, recognized this need to work with the government and attempted to alleviate the white authorities' concerns. Pixley K. Seme, Solomon's personal attorney, sent his assurances to Prime Minister Louis Botha that Solomon "[was] prepared to place whatever influence his father possessed at the absolute disposal at the Government."<sup>6</sup> By assuring white administrators of his willingness to work with them, Solomon and his advisers intended to separate the mistakes of the father from the reign of the son.

The Government required Solomon's influence more than ever as the increasing stratification of South African society in the 1910s combined with the decreased capacity of local administration following the transfer of the Native Affairs Department (NAD) to the central government, necessitated collaboration with the Zulu Royal House and local chiefs and headmen. The shifts in administration following the establishment of Union in 1910 rendered the NAD weak and operating with a meager budget, making up only 1 to 2 percent of total Union expenditures between 1912-1936.<sup>7</sup> This lack of political will combined with the lack of financial support from the central authorities resulted in the NAD's reputation as the 'Cinderella of the ministerial family.' The lack of support for local administrators knowledgeable about Zulu cultures and power structures weakened the position of the Zulus in South African government *and* society, especially after the passage of the Native Land Act (No. 27 of 1913) in June 1913. This Act placed a strict definition on the term "native," specifying that a "native . . . [was] any person, male or female, who is a member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa; and shall further include any company or other body of persons, corporate or unincorporate, if the persons

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<sup>6</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Letter, Pixley K. Seme to Prime Minister, August 6, 1914.

<sup>7</sup> *Cape Times* May 2, 1934, address by Sir James Rose Innes. Financial information from *Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa*, vol. 3 (1919), 798; vol. 7 (1924), 750; vol. 18 (1937), 584. Both cited in Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-36* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 77.

who have a controlling interest therein are natives,” in addition to limiting Africans to buying land only in specified areas; areas representing only about 7% of the entire land in South Africa.<sup>8</sup> Though this act did serve to reduce intermingling between white and black South Africans in the rural areas, in fact, this act reduced opportunities for African economic independence. This reduction in economic independence would, administrators hoped, force African men, in particular, to enter into labor contracts.<sup>9</sup> Since white authorities tasked Zululand and Natal chiefs, including the Paramount Chiefs, with utilizing youth socialization structures to secure labor recruitment, securing Solomon’s support remained essential to maintaining order in this rapidly changing political landscape.

Reports that the Usuthu section and its adherents already referred to Solomon as “their future King” complicated the Government’s optimism. Solomon’s official installation at Mahashini kraal represented a potential threat, as Addison reported to the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA), since that kraal lay “in the very centre of the late Dinuzulu’s former ward and is surrounded by his strongest adherents and supporters.”<sup>10</sup> Should Solomon choose to stay at this kraal, not only would it need to be expanded, but also “a large concourse of people would assemble for the purpose of making the necessary additions to the kraal, and it would become the

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<sup>8</sup> Natives Land Act, 1913 (subsequently renamed Bantu Land Act, 1913 and Black Land Act, 1913; Act No. 27 of 1913).

<sup>9</sup> Cope (1985): 34-35. For more analysis of the Natives Land Act of 1913, see: William Beinart and Peter Delius, “The Historical Context and Legacy of the Natives Land Act of 1913,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40, no. 4 (2014): 667-688; Harvey M Feinberg, “The 1913 Natives Land Act in South Africa: Politics, Race, and Segregation in Early 20th Century,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 26, no. 1 (1993): 65-109; Khumisho Moguerane, “Black Landlords, their Tenants, and the Natives Land Act of 1913,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 42, no. 2 (2016): 243-266; Edward Lahiff, “Land Reform in South Africa 100 Years after the Natives' Land Act,” *Journal of Agrarian Change* 14, no. 4 (2014): 586-592; Cherryl Walker, “Commemorating or celebrating? Reflections on the centenary of the Natives Land Act of 1913,” *Social Dynamics* 39, no. 2 (2013): 282-289.

<sup>10</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Letter, R.H. Addison to Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, November 29, 1913.



rendezvous for Usutu sympathizers from all parts...”<sup>11</sup> Additionally, Addison feared that Solomon might “follow a similar course to his late father” who had enrolled six regiments of young men during his reign.<sup>12</sup> To prevent similar actions on the part of Solomon, Addison recommended prohibiting him not only from expanding the Mahashini kraal, but also from allowing any residents at the kraal besides a few *izinduna* and his personal attendants. Though it went without saying, Addison also insisted that there be “no enlistment of men for the purpose of forming regiments as was done by his late father.”<sup>13</sup> If Solomon planned to coalesce the power exercised by his father, the Government intended to stifle it immediately.

Solomon’s desire to hold an *ihlambo* ceremony to honor Dinuzulu in late 1914 brought these fears back to the forefront. This cleansing ceremony symbolically freed the Zulu nation from the restrictions of mourning and of their allegiance to the departed chief, especially those members of regiments who had to be discharged from their obligation to Dinuzulu and transfer their loyalties to Solomon.<sup>14</sup> Seme wrote to Prime Minister Louis Botha’s office in August 1914 requesting that the Government “extend to him [Solomon] the courtesy and confidence of allowing all Zulus to attend the ceremony of ‘Self Purification’ even on the same manner as they attended the funeral ceremony of his father,” so that the Zulu Nation of paying its last respects to the dead and to enable the close relation of the late Chief to take part in Public Service.”<sup>15</sup> Just a

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<sup>11</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Letter, R.H. Addison to Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, November 29, 1913.

<sup>12</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Letter, R.H. Addison to Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, November 29, 1913. The regiments referenced by Addison were uFalaza, imBokodebomvu, uFelapakadi, uHayilwengwenya, uMavalana and uDakwakusuta.

<sup>13</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Letter, R.H. Addison to Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, November 29, 1913.

<sup>14</sup> “Zulu Nation at Dinuzulu's Grave,” *Ilanga lase Natal* January 18, 1915, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Letter, Pixley K. Seme to Prime Minister, August 6, 1914.

month later rumors spread that not only would Dinuzulu's *ihlambo* take place at Nobamba, but that "all the young men in Zululand are to be called out."<sup>16</sup>

In hopes of staunching the flow of young men into Zululand, the provincial government issued orders in late September 1914 declaring that "only relatives and immediate friends could attend, and that the main point of enlivenment among the solemnities of this leave-taking of their dead chief, viz: the wide-spread hunt in which all would join, and which would incidentally help to furnish material for the final feast—that this was forbidden."<sup>17</sup> Solomon and his advisers had a choice: to confirm Solomon's status through exercising his authority over Zulu youth or follow the instructions of the white authorities and risk the standing of the Zulu Royal House.

All eyes were on Nobamba kraal on November 16, 1914 as members of the Zulu Nation gathered for Dinuzulu's *ihlambo*. The festivities officially began when Mkosana ka Zangwana Zungu, an attendant of Cetshwayo who had been tasked with guiding the day's events, arrived at Ezibindi kraal. By this point, approximately 5,000 men "were formed into companies according to their regimental ages, the young men taking the lead and the oldest men bringing up the rear."<sup>18</sup> From Ezibindi, Mkosana marched the companies of men the 300 yards to Nobamba kraal, where they entered, circled around Dinuzulu's grave and exited the kraal once again. They then marched to the river for cleansing ceremonies, with Solomon and his brother David on horseback, "carrying the late Dinuzulu's firearms."<sup>19</sup> Following the ceremonies, the Resident Magistrate of Babanango, who attended the *ihlambo*, addressed Solomon and the "notables"

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<sup>16</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Letter, Magistrate Mtunzini Division to District Native Commissioner Eshowe, September 5, 1914.

<sup>17</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Editorial, Harriette Emily Colenso, "The Close of the Mourning Ceremonies for Dinuzulu ka Cetshwayo," November 14, 1914.

<sup>18</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Report by the Assistant Magistrate, Babanango, Vyrheid Division, November 16, 1914.

<sup>19</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Report by the Assistant Magistrate, Babanango, Vyrheid Division, November 16, 1914.

attending him, recounting his efforts to ensure Solomon that “this shows that those who have [the] management of your affairs in hand respect your customs and have your welfare and interest in heart.”<sup>20</sup> Addressing the government’s refusal to allow the hunt to coincide with the *ihlambo* ceremony, he explained that Solomon must “know what the rumours are,” as “many things are said which are not true and many things are said which cause uneasiness among the people and these the Government wish to avoid.”<sup>21</sup>

Nicholas Cope, in *To Bind the Nation* (1993), argued that the attention devoted to the *ihlambo* by Native Affairs Department officials demonstrated “much more about the Natal NAD and the local white population than about the intentions of the Zulu.”<sup>22</sup> In fact, he insisted, “the *ihlambo* did prove . . . that the NAD’s existing application of indirect rule was severely threatened.”<sup>23</sup> This argument lends greater significance to the Magistrate’s final comments, in which he thanked Solomon for the Zulus’ loyalty to the King; loyalty which, in his eyes, indicated their desire never “to be ruled by a sovereign other than a British sovereign.”<sup>24</sup> Solomon confirmed this loyalty, telling the Magistrate he wanted “no mediator between me and the Government,” Solomon declared, “I desire that the Government should know me personally and vice versa. There will be no misunderstandings or falsifications.”<sup>25</sup> This colonial confidence in Solomon reflected an understanding of the potential threat that the young Zulu sovereign’s influence over, in particular, young men of the Zulu Nation held.

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<sup>20</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Report by the Assistant Magistrate, Babanango, Vyrheid Division, November 16, 1914.

<sup>21</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Report by the Assistant Magistrate, Babanango, Vyrheid Division, November 16, 1914.

<sup>22</sup> Nicholas Cope, *To Bind the Nation: Solomon kaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993), 55.

<sup>23</sup> Cope, *To Bind the Nation*, 55.

<sup>24</sup> NAB, CNC 144, 1818/1913. Report by the Assistant Magistrate, Babanango Vyrheid Division, 16 November 1914.

<sup>25</sup> “Zulu Nation at Dinuzulu’s Grave,” *Ilanga lase Natal*, January 18, 1915, p. 3.

Though under British rule, Solomon's installation represented a major moment for Africans in Zululand and Natal. At the same time, this elevation of the Zulu king back to his former position tested the Zulu-speaking population's ability to simultaneously express their devotion to both the Union of South Africa and the Zulu Royal House. An unsigned article for *Ilanga lase Natal* attempted to address this ability for the Zulu nation to hold these two loyalties, expressing their hope that "our white friends and public may know the highest and most popular tradition that obtains among the Zulu people and their allied nations."<sup>26</sup> The Zulu nation's "implacable devotion in him (Solomon) and in fact his installation as the King of the Zulus," the author continued, "does not in any way whatsoever interfere with our allegiance and loyalty to the British Throne."<sup>27</sup> "He is first among the Zulus and he is the most important and indispensable link which connects us unto the British Throne," the author explained, "He is our national spokesman, the centre of gravity in all our national life."<sup>28</sup> While "his father Dinuzulu suffered so because the governing people of the country did not understand him," the Zulu nation hoped that Solomon would not similarly become "a lion which is tamed and held in check by one or two white-men in the whole of South Africa."<sup>29</sup> Although Zulu-speakers understood the necessity of working with white authorities, they also hoped that Solomon would be raised to the position enjoyed by former Zulu kings.

Although the writers of *Ilanga lase Natal* hoped that Solomon would not become "the lion which is tamed," the young Zulu leader continuously expressed his desire to work with colonial authorities in the early years of his reign. Solomon demonstrated this desire during a mid-April 1915 trip, along with his brother David and some other followers, to Pietermaritzburg

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<sup>26</sup> "Zulu Nation at Dinuzulu's Grave" (1915).

<sup>27</sup> "Zulu Nation at Dinuzulu's Grave" (1915).

<sup>28</sup> "Zulu Nation at Dinuzulu's Grave" (1915).

<sup>29</sup> "Zulu Nation at Dinuzulu's Grave" (1915).

to speak with R.H. Addison. This was the first time that the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) met with Solomon in person and, in his letter to the SNA, he expressed great hope in what he saw from the Zulu leader. “He appears to me to be a youth of an amiable disposition, but not of a strong character, judging from his face,” Addison commented, “He speaks in a clear and intelligent, straightforward manner, and in the hands of wise advisers could be guided, in my opinion, to a course friendly to the Government.”<sup>30</sup> Unfortunately, Addison noted, Dinuzulu’s heir seemed “surrounded . . . by the same advisers as his father had,” advisers who, he feared, would guide the course of his career.<sup>31</sup> Solomon’s choice to continue to depend on his father’s advisors, especially Mankulumana and Mnyaiza, illuminates the dual paternalism both white authorities and Zulu elders and cultural stakeholders subjected the young Zulu king to, as he endeavored to be recognized by the white authorities while at the same time finding himself accountable to Zulu elders and cultural stakeholders.<sup>32</sup> Not only white authorities but also Zulu elites feared the influence that Dinuzulu’s advisors would have over Solomon, reflected in an editorial published in the mission newspaper, *Izindaba Zabantu*, in January 1914.

If our hopes and other people’s hopes are to come true with this child, it will depend on how he is guided . . . It is up to the relatives to narrate the mistakes [of Dinuzulu] to this son who is taking up this high position . . . He must be taken away from foolish people . . . and brought up in a Westernized respectable manner which is correct for a king these days . . . We are aware that Mankulumana and Mnyaiza are men in high position in the Royal family, but even so they are still raw, they are still in a dark pit and they don’t want to go out of it so that they can see the light. If you want to see good from Solomon, these are not the people to lead him and teach him.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> NAB, CNC 204, 494/1915, Letter, R.H. Addison to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 21, 1915.

<sup>31</sup> NAB, CNC 204, 494/1915, Letter, R.H. Addison to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 21, 1915.

<sup>32</sup> The influence of Mnyaiza complicates things further as not only was he a valued member of Dinuzulu’s inner circle, but also acted as a recruiter of mine laborers for Col. Royston. Cope (1993): 12.

<sup>33</sup> “Editorial comment.” *Izindaba Zabantu*. January 15, 1914. Cited in Cope, “The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government,” 76.

This editorial reveals the multiple forces bearing on Solomon's potential to become Paramount Chief; not only did he have to convince white authorities that he would not follow the same path as his father but he also had to honor his father's trusted advisors while at the same time showing that he had his own mind, and was not in fact "a child," in order to gain the trust of his subjects.

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White administrators were not as sure of their faith in Solomon; in fact, in multiple communications they expressed their desires to avoid this potential course of action. "That Solomon is looked up to as the head of the Zulu nation by a large majority of Zulus . . . is without doubt and nothing will kill the sentiment attached to the Zulu House," R.H. Addison wrote to the SNA.<sup>35</sup> Instead of deciding right away, Addison proposed that "time should be allowed to enable the Government to judge from his conduct and behaviour whether it would be wise to elevate him to a position in which he could extend his influence in the country."<sup>36</sup> Carl Faye, Zulu interpreter to Addison, reported in his notes on the interview that Addison directed Solomon's advisers to not err in their guidance of Solomon as they had done with his predecessors. "Mr. Addison told the men present that they were the advisers of Dinuzulu's children, and should take care to bring them up wisely," Faye transcribed, "By way of warning, he quoted them to the fate of Dingana, of Cetywayo, and of Dinuzulu, each of whom had fought the white man."<sup>37</sup> The comparisons between Solomon and his father had been and would continue to be a trend in communication relating to the new symbolic leader of the Zulus.

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<sup>34</sup> "Editorial comment." *Izindaba Zabantu*. January 15, 1914. Cited in Cope "The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government," 76.

<sup>35</sup> NAB, CNC 204, 494/1915, Letter, R.H. Addison to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 21, 1915.

<sup>36</sup> NAB, CNC 204, 494/1915, Letter, R.H. Addison to Secretary for Native Affairs, April 21, 1915.

<sup>37</sup> NAB, CNC 204, 494/1915, Record of Proceedings, April 16-17, 1915, Recorded by Carl Faye.

Although he still had not received the title he desired, Solomon's influence in Zululand seemed to be increasing. A.D. Graham, the Mahlabathini Magistrate, wrote to the DNC in mid-December 1915, passing along messages from "kraal heads who appear to resent Solomon" that Solomon had sent messages to "various natives in this division asking for gifts, and that many natives residing under Chiefs Tshibilika and Muzimbi have sent him goats and money."<sup>38</sup> Other chiefs reported that Solomon traveled to kraals throughout the district "visit[ing] all kraals and mak[ing] no discretion." Chief Muzimbi Buthelezi told the Magistrate that he felt it "wrong for any man to do [this], especially a person of standing."<sup>39</sup> The Eshowe Magistrate echoed Buthelezi's concerns in a January 19, 1916, letter to the DNC, informing the commissioner that Solomon's "behaviour in general during the past few weeks in roaming about the district is undoubtedly having a disturbing effect on the natives. The Chiefs have complained that they . . . [are] losing control of the young men, who are declaring their allegiance to Solomon."<sup>40</sup> The fears and anxieties of these Chiefs seemed to overlap with those of white Native administrators and put the political power of the Zulu Royal House at risk.

Solomon tested white authorities' faith in him again in January 1916 as reports flooded his office regarding the possibility of Solomon holding a hunt. On January 17<sup>th</sup>, the CNC telegrammed the District Native Commissioner of Zululand informing him that "Solomon has called [for a] hunt Mahlabathini Division and invited Natives surrounding districts attend."<sup>41</sup> The

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<sup>38</sup> NAB, CNC 226B, CNC 25/1916. Letter, A.D. Graham, Magistrate Mahlabathini, to District Native Commissioner, December 24, 1915.

<sup>39</sup> NAB, CNC 226B, CNC 25/1916. Testimony of Muzimbi Buthelezi to A.D. Graham, Magistrate Mahlabathini, January 16, 1916. This testimony by Buthelezi was echoed by a number of other Zulus including Dumuka Mtshali (Chief Nqodi), Tom Mpisi (Chief Muzimbi), Mahagana Zulu (Chief Tshibilika), Nontusi Dhlamini (Chief Tshibilika), Court of Magistrate, Mahlabathini (A.D. Graham) — all testifying to Solomon's unsolicited visits and the killing of animals and providing of beer for his party.

<sup>40</sup> NAB, CNC 226B, CNC 25/1916. Letter, Magistrate Eshowe to District Native Commissioner, January 19, 1916.

<sup>41</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, CNC to District Native Commissioner, Zululand, January 17, 1916.

Vryheid Magistrate wrote to the CNC, emphasizing that “mild excitement—more curiosity than excitement—was created by Solomon calling up the hunt in the Ndwandwe District at a time when it is universally admitted it is difficult and dangerous to hold hunts in an overgrown, hot, snaky, thorn country.”<sup>42</sup> Authorities informed Solomon that he did not have permission to hold this event, however, he proceeded with preparations, with invitations being sent to chiefs and indunas in the Mahlabathini, Nongoma, Vryheid and Ngotshe districts. Native Affairs officials did everything they could to counter Solomon’s invitations, attempting, in particular, to prevent individuals from tribes under Chiefs Moya, Mpikanina, Muzimubi and Mciteki from attending the hunt.<sup>43</sup> In a letter to a colleague, Addison reacted to this news, deciding that unless they took firm action, “Solomon will soon be suffering from a swollen head, and the history which his father Dinuzulu made will repeat himself.”<sup>44</sup> This hunt crystallized concerns over the Zulu Royal House’s loyalties that stretched long before Solomon’s installation.

On the day of the hunt, Addison’s fears were realized when eyewitness reports confirmed that the hunt served as a thinly veiled cover for the enrollment of a new regiment. Mcutshiyana, a member of the police patrol sent to monitor the day’s events at Sikalenisenyoka kraal, reported the presence of sixty men at the kraal, ostensibly for the purpose of hoeing Solomon’s garden, in the absence of the planned hunt. The Ndwandwe Magistrate had been alerted to their presence in a message from Solomon himself. The Magistrate responded to Solomon, informing him that the group had to disperse.<sup>45</sup> Solomon received word that the men had to disperse but since the men had travelled for the purposes of a hunt, he asked them “if they would stay and weed his

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<sup>42</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Vryheid to CNC, February 9, 1916.

<sup>43</sup> Cope “The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government,” p. 95-96 (note 26 and 27).

<sup>44</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, R.H. Addison (CNC) to Unknown Recipient, January 1916 (partial letter).

<sup>45</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Ndwandwe Division to District Native Commissioner, Eshowe, January 19, 1916.



gardens.”<sup>46</sup> Native Constable Ngebeza Manqele reported back with a much different impression of the scenario he witnessed at the royal kraal. Upon witnessing the gathering of men at the royal kraal, Manqele thought it more likely “it was Solomon’s intention to form the regiments” than an actual hunt to occur.<sup>47</sup> This intention to form regiments, Manqele explained, linked to Solomon’s broader purposes to “introduc[e] himself and com[e] more in touch with the young men of the Country, with the ultimate object of being recognised as their Paramount Chief.”<sup>48</sup> A. Graham, the Mahlabathini Magistrate, agreed that he and other authorities should have realized “that there was no real intention to hold a drive, but that it was used as a means to call together the young men of this and the neighbouring divisions, for none purpose or purpose of which has so far remained a secret.”<sup>49</sup> The Ndwandwe Magistrate, writing to the DNC, echoed Graham’s suspicion of an ulterior motive, writing that Solomon seemed to be “rapidly gaining power,” as “being able to call up so many natives in so short a time is evidence”.<sup>50</sup> The next day, the secret emerged and Manqele’s suspicions proven true when another patrol arrived at the kraal where the officers witnessed Solomon with “200 men up in front of him all armed with assegais and they were *giya-ing* (*ukugiya* - “war dance”).”<sup>51</sup> Solomon’s ability to call up such a large number of men for the purpose of an *ukubuthwa* represented the realization of the white authorities’ worst fears.

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<sup>46</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Statement by Nqubeni Mtembu, Chief Mpikanina, January 17, 1916.

<sup>47</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Statement by Native Constable, Ngebeza Manqele, January 16, 1916.

<sup>48</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Statement by Sahlule Zulu, Magistrate’s Court, Mahlabathini, January 15, 1916.

<sup>49</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, A. Graham (Magistrate Mahlabathini) to District Native Commissioner, Eshowe, January 15, 1916.

<sup>50</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Ndwandwe Division to District Native Commissioner, Eshowe, January 17, 1916.

<sup>51</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Ndwandwe Division to District Native Commissioner, Eshowe, January 19, 1916.

Firsthand accounts of the day's events reveal the centrality of the regimental ceremonies and the crystallization of Solomon's authorities over young Zulu men. One Zululand police officer, Mcutshiyana, reported more of the culturally-specific details that had been lost on the white colonial officials on the scene. Arriving at the kraal, Mcutshiyana reported the same basic impressions as the Ndwandwe Magistrate. However, following a group moving from the gardens to the kraal, he "heard a native named Makolwane address the crowd, saying 'the Ivukayibambe is grown up now and I will now form the Nqabucatshiwabezizwe'."<sup>52</sup> Mcutshiyana confirmed that while Makolwane spoke, "the address came from Solomon; he told Makolwane what to say, I should say I did not actually hear Solomon tell him but he was with Solomon when he addressed them."<sup>53</sup> Mcutshiyana also reported that all of the men "were standing in their regimental parties," with the "Bekotembomvu and Falaza were standing together, then the Citshelimpi and Vukayibambe."<sup>54</sup> Those young men without regiments, he continued "were with the Vukayibambe but no attempt was made to form them up, but these young men were informed that they would belong to that Regiment, the *Nqababucatshwabezizwe*."<sup>55</sup> If it were not enough on its own that Solomon formed a regiment against explicit orders from the government, word of the name of the new regiment added insult to injury.

In his *Zulu References for Interpreters and Students* (1923), Carl Faye noted that this name, also known as *iNqab'ukucetyway-ngabezizwe*, translated most clearly as "The Will-Not-Be-Betrayed-By-Foreigners."<sup>56</sup> Though constrained by his diminished position under the colonial administration, this subtle expression of Solomon's discontent reflects the frustration he

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<sup>52</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Statement by Mcutshiyana, January 18, 1916.

<sup>53</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Statement by Mcutshiyana, January 18, 1916.

<sup>54</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Statement by Mcutshiyana, January 18, 1916.

<sup>55</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Statement by Mcutshiyana, January 18, 1916.

<sup>56</sup> Faye, *Zulu References*, 51.

felt under this constant supervision. Although they may not have realized the message inherent in the new regiment's name, news of its formation vexed white authorities. T.B. Carbutt, the Ngotshe Magistrate, wrote to CNC Addison, informing him that Solomon's actions showed that "he does not intend to remain quiescent as a consequence, and will therefore continue to agitate the country in the same way his father did."<sup>57</sup> J. Gibson, DNC of Zululand, found the event to hold great significance, admitting that "a great deal of harm has been done."<sup>58</sup> "The act amounted to an exercise of authority over tribes in various parts of Zululand and the Vryheid District," Gibson continued, "It amounted to the exercise of superior authority over Chiefs in charge of these tribes. The response has amounted to a recognition of such authority."<sup>59</sup>

Not only by white authorities from Vryheid, Ngotshe and Mahlabathini, but also chiefs from the surrounding areas and Solomon, flocked by about 200 followers (although he had been warned "not to be accompanied by a large body of Native, but . . . to be strictly limited to his principal adherents") attended an April 1916 meeting called at the office of B. Hodson, the Nongoma Magistrate.<sup>60</sup> Wheelwright, the newly appointed CNC, used this meeting to illustrate the dangerous nature of Solomon's actions in forming this new regiment. He could not discern the need for Zulus to form regiments since the "whole aspect" of Zululand had changed since.

We now have railways, mines, sugar industries and numerous other indications of a different aspect which formerly did not exist [. . .]. The object of the people today is to attend to work and to peaceful methods of living. They have to earn money to pay taxes, to buy clothing, to feed themselves [. . .]. And yet in the same breath we hear of the formation of a new regiment by Solomon. Who is this regiment to be used against? What is its purpose?<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, T.B. Carbutt (Magistrate Ngotshe) to R.H. Addison (CNC), April 14, 1916.

<sup>58</sup> Cope, "The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government," 96 (note 29).

<sup>59</sup> Cope, "The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government," 96 (note 29).

<sup>60</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, R.H. Addison (CNC) to Magistrate Vryheid, April 13, 1916.

<sup>61</sup> Cope, "The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government," 101 (note 39).

While Solomon insisted that he had not formed the regiment with the intent of aggressive action, explaining that he only intended to “gathering the men together,” the decision to form a regiment linked to broader queries about Solomon’s general attitude to the white minority government.<sup>62</sup> It also illustrated Solomon’s potential in fomenting rebellion against governmental structures, as the CNC reported that a number of “telegrams sent from different places [in] this Province by Natives recalling friends and relatives working [in] Johannesburg and other Transvaal labor centres on pretext of illness or death in family.”<sup>63</sup> Additionally, multiple men were arrested for traveling without passes (15 in total) in surrounding districts during this same time period.<sup>64</sup> All of these issues had inspired so much concern among government officials that this meeting served to “inform Solomon of the Government’s displeasure at the attitude which he has assumed, and to warn him that if his conduct does not show improvement Government will consider what means can be adopted—as it has the power to do—to keep him out of harm’s way, and prevent trouble among the people.”<sup>65</sup> But the seeds of trouble had already been sown as rumors began circulating throughout Zululand, according to Carbutt, that Solomon had recruited some of his followers to spread the word to “sleep on their assegais, as something extraordinary is expected to happen soon.”<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> For Solomon, Cope argued, the significance of calling together a regiment was much larger than extending his authority or agitating white authorities. Solomon, Cope writes, was made a member of the “*Vukayibambe ibutho*...by Dinuzulu, which established in him and his peers a sense of identity and common citizenship fired by the traditions of the amabutho in pre-conquest Zululand.” Cope, “The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government,” p. 73 (note 205).

<sup>63</sup> Cope, “The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government,” 98 (note 31).

<sup>64</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, CNC to SNA, January 17, 1916.

<sup>65</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, R.H. Addison (CNC) to Magistrate Vryheid, April 13, 1916.

<sup>66</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, T.B. Carbutt (Magistrate-Ngotshe) to R.H. Addison (CNC), July 25, 1916. This unsanctioned hunt (and connected *ukubuthwa*) became part of the collective memory of Solomon, recorded in an *isibongo* in his honor. “Tree-fern that overcame the judges at Nongoma/On the day the Royal One made them sit on one log/Like hadadaws contending for worms./Starer whose eyes are red,/Who looks at a person as if he is angry/Looking at the authorities in Nongoma/The buttocks of the authorities trembled/.../The Royal One armed as he betook himself to the forest/And the bowels of the judges were excited;/Mciteki's became excited,/He was born of Zibhebhu,/Whereas the Royal One/Had quarrelled with no-one,/He was going to hunt the game/On the hill where the lion lived,/Even the weather feared the storm./Black darkness of Phunga and Mageba/which was seen

These rumors built on pre-existing whispers circulating throughout Natal and Zululand. Earlier in December 1915, the Nkandla Magistrate had contacted the Chief Intelligence Officer, Colonel G. Leuchars, regarding the actions of “certain Europeans in Babanango District” who were engaging in “seditious talk with the Natives,” telling “them that Germany is sure to win, and when that day is in sight, the Natives must join with them to overthrow the British power.”<sup>67</sup> He also proposed that a “corps of fifty Zulus” be recruited to counter any efforts by the Germans to use scouts to spy for them. Such a movement, he argued, “would have a fine effect upon the native mind in Zululand and would make them feel they are being trusted and used by us.”<sup>68</sup>

Rumors of an actual German invasion of Zululand came via the Nkandla Magistrate in March 1916 who recounted the testimony of a woman from Melmoth who had said “she heard that the Germans had landed at St. Lucia Bay and were entrenching themselves there, but they were shortly advancing to conquer this country, and assist the Native by restoring the Royal House of Zululand.”<sup>69</sup> The woman felt that this action would be well-received by the Zulus, “as they feel that the English have killed Dinuzulu, and they are therefore tired of British rule, and will gladly welcome the change to German rule.”<sup>70</sup> This echoed earlier rumors that Dinuzulu never actually died, since “a pig was placed in his coffin and buried instead of him,” and “that is he is now coming down from the north at the head of a German force.”<sup>71</sup>

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by Mthusheyana who said “The Royal One is making an attack!”/Whereas he was merely going to hunt game. Cope, “The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government,” 103.

<sup>67</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Nkandla to Colonel Leuchars (Chief Intelligence Officer), December 22, 1915.

<sup>68</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Nkandla to Colonel Leuchars (Chief Intelligence Officer), December 22, 1915.

<sup>69</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Nkandla to District Native Commissioner, Zululand, March 23, 1916.

<sup>70</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Nkandla to District Native Commissioner, Zululand, March 23, 1916.

<sup>71</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Letter, Magistrate Nkandla, to District Native Commissioner, January 20, 1916.

As these rumors gained ground far beyond the borders of Natal and Zululand, increasing numbers of men began returning home from urban centers to protect their families. In a signed testimony, Mhlauli Mzobe, an African Sergeant in the South African Mounted Rifles, passed along word of the rumors causing many men to return home. “While on this duty I was in the train and a native who was returning from Durban told me that the Germans were now in occupation of Mahlabathini and that they were occupying Zululand and that all the natives were afraid that they would be all through this country,” Mzobe recounted, “I then asked to account for the fact that the English troops were still at home and had not gone out to meet the Germans, he replied I do not know why they have not gone.”<sup>72</sup> Nqwele, an African constable, echoed these rumors, adding that travelers speculated that “the Germans [have] entered the Union and were near Johannesburg and that many natives who served with the English were captured by the Germans who cut off their noses and ears, they tied their hands together and sent them into Johannesburg, telling them they had no right to join the English against them, they further said the Germans were killing off all the English soldiers.”<sup>73</sup>

In response to these rumors, another African policeman named Nyokana told the Court that Zulus in Durban had told him that not only had the Germans “entered Zululand and occupied some place the name of which I have now forgotten,” but also that these Germans “have with them a large force of natives consisting of Zulus who left Zululand many years ago.”<sup>74</sup> In response to this, Nyokana reported, these Zulus had heard that the Government planned to call on native chiefs throughout the country to “get together a force to meet the Germans,” but those

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<sup>72</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Testimony, Mhlauli Mzobe at Court of the Magistrate for the Division of Alexandra, February 2, 1916.

<sup>73</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Testimony, Nqwele at Court of the Magistrate for the Division of Alexandra, February 9, 1916.

<sup>74</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Testimony, Nyokana at Court of the Magistrate for the Division of Alexandra, February 2, 1916.

chiefs “replied that such a request should be directed to the son of Dinuzulu who possessed fighting men superior to theirs who were not fighting men.”<sup>75</sup> The rumors also included the possibility of Solomon being “appointed chief over all natives in the Union, and the present Chiefs . . . be[ing] made Indunas.”<sup>76</sup>

Solomon continued to contribute to these rumors, as he made more efforts to use his influence to consolidate his limited authority and to increase what little financial stability he had as well. In September 1916, Solomon applied to the Babanango Magistrate to travel to Rietfontein, Middleburg, to deal with some personal issues, including the possible *ilobolo* (bridewealth) payable for one of Dinuzulu’s widows and the sale of some livestock. Solomon also hoped, according to the Magistrate, “to pay a visit to Frans Zulu aka Dabulamanzi, at the Brakpan Mine, and whilst there to visit the compounds for the purpose of collecting money from Natives to enable him to pay his debts.”<sup>77</sup> The Vryheid Magistrate acknowledged his awareness of this and informed the CNC of his opinion that Solomon “should be distinctly informed that he cannot be allowed to visit Compounds on the Mines for the purpose of collecting funds for himself.”<sup>78</sup> Agreeing with the Vryheid Magistrate, Secretary for Native Affairs E. Barrett wrote the CNC himself, proposing that Solomon’s time would be better spent “in forwarding recruiting for the Labour Contingent—which he has offered to accompany—than in the projected begging expedition to the mines.”<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Testimony, Nyokana at Court of the Magistrate for the Division of Alexandra, February 2, 1916.

<sup>76</sup> NAB, CNC 219, 1488/1915. Testimony, Nyokana at Court of the Magistrate for the Division of Alexandra, February 2, 1916.

<sup>77</sup> NAB, CNC 254, 1557/1916. Letter, D.A. Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, September 21, 1916.

<sup>78</sup> NAB, CNC 254 1557/1916. Letter, Magistrate Vryheid to Chief Native Commissioner, PMB on September 25, 1916.

<sup>79</sup> NAB, CNC 254, 1557/1916. Letter, Secretary for Native Affairs Barrett to Chief Native Commissioner on October 12, 1916.

The Labour Contingent Barrett referred to was the newly formed South African Native Labour Contingent (SANLC). On October 13, 1916, *Ilanga lase Natal* published a circular from the Director of Native Labour in the Department of Native Affairs. The circular announced the arrangement “between this Government and the Imperial Government that a Native Labour Contingent of the strength of 10,000 Natives will be raised in the Union and sent overseas for dock work in France.”<sup>80</sup> South Africa and the British Government had reached a *modus vivendi* earlier in the summer of 1916, as the Battle of the Somme continued to claim British lives.<sup>81</sup> As General Haig, commander of British Forces in France, faced increasing pressures on and off the battlefield, labor loomed large as a critical element to British victory. “It is not possible for us to work the quarries and forests in this country until we get more Labour Battalions for this purpose,” Haig realized, “Labour is our great difficulty and it is an increasing one, owing to the very extended front recently taken over by me from the French.”<sup>82</sup>

Black South Africans would contribute to the war effort through labor rather than armed military service. The South African Defence Act, passed in 1912, made African men ineligible for military service, but allowed for the conscription of those same men for the provision of labor.<sup>83</sup> In hopes of relieving the pressure on Haig, the Imperial War Council in June 1916 created the SANLC.<sup>84</sup> The Government Native Labour Bureau (GNLB), part of the Native

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<sup>80</sup> “Overseas Native Labour Contingent (Circular Minute D. 7/16, D.N.L. 396/16/D. 98),” *Ilanga lase Natal*, October 13, 1916, p. 5.

<sup>81</sup> Norman Clothier, *Black Valour: The South African Native Labour Contingent, 1916-1918, and the sinking of the Mendi* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1987), 8.

<sup>82</sup> Louis Grundlingh, *Fighting Their Own War: South African Blacks and the First World War* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 41.

<sup>83</sup> Bill Nasson, “‘Give Him a Gun NOW’: Soldiers but Not Quite Soldiers in South Africa’s Second World War, 1939-1945,” in Karen Jones, Giacomo Macola, and David Welch, eds., *A Cultural History of Firearms in the Age of Empire* (Farnham: Ashgate: 2013), 194. For more on African experiences in World War I: Melvin E. Page, ed., *Africa and the First World War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987); Timothy Parsons, *The African Rank-and-file: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King’s African Rifles, 1902-1964* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).

<sup>84</sup> B.P. Willan, “The South African Native Labour Contingent, 1916-1918,” *The Journal of African History* 19, no. 1 (1978): 62-63.



Labour Sub-Department within the Native Affairs Department, directed the recruitment. The GNLB had been organized to regulate the supply of labor to the mines, and, as Albert Grundlingh explains in *Fighting Their Own War* (1987), officials at the GNLB understood that “more than official and semi-official white channels were needed to complete the recruiting network”; this realization informed the rationale behind meeting with the SANNC to garner support among the black elite.<sup>85</sup> GNLB officials fostered this relationship with the SANNC following the outbreak of war in 1915, as the government attempted to recruit Africans to serve in the South-West Africa and East Africa Campaigns. John Dube particularly appreciated this attention from S. M. Pritchard, the director of the GNLB, recognizing him as “the one official in the Government who was administering Native Affairs in the right direction—namely, by consulting the Natives in matters in which they were interested and for not hesitating to take them into their confidence.”<sup>86</sup>

Due to his own status as a descendant of the Qadi royal lineage, combined with his increasing standing in Natal society as a missionary educator and journalist, Dube enjoyed unprecedented access to the Zulu Royal House and developed a close relationship with Dinuzulu in the wake of the 1906 Bambatha Rebellion. This closeness can also be contributed to the fact that he and Dinuzulu came from the same age-grade, *Mbokodwebomvu*. In *The First President* (2012), Heather Hughes writes that the political context of the era heightened the significance of their shared *amabutho*. “It could be therefore, that membership of the same age-set helped to strengthen his sense of connection even then, but it probably grew in significance in these later, post-rebellion years when such relations were again in need of repair after another destructive

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<sup>85</sup> Grundlingh, *Fighting their Own War*, 57. For more on the formation of and actions of the GNLB, see Alan Jeeves. *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 1890-1920* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985).

<sup>86</sup> John L. Dube, “South African Native National Congress,” *Ilanga lase Natal*, January 22, 1915.

military conflict,” Hughes explains.<sup>87</sup> Dube also aided Dinuzulu in refuting claims of inciting the rebellion, turning to the readers of *Ilanga* to plead Dinuzulu’s case. Following Dinuzulu’s passing and the succession of Solomon, Dube continued to foster a relationship with the Zulu sovereign; a connection made more easily thanks to Dube’s support of Solomon in the 1913 succession dispute with his brother David. But Dube not only developed close ties with the Zulu Royal House. In his elevated position in Natal, Dube also fostered relationships with white authorities, especially with officials in the Native Affairs Department, including officers in the GNLB.<sup>88</sup>

The relationship fostered by the GNLB with Dube paid off in 1916 as the call for SANLC recruits went out. Dube turned to the pages of his paper, *Ilanga lase Natal*, to implore young Zulu men to join the contingent. “P[h]ap[h]amani Zulu! (Rise up, Zulus!),” he entreated the young male readers of his paper, “The King, he sent me to request others to let me go announce to you about our struggle, he wants young men so that they will go to help by cleaning and maintaining the equipment in France.”<sup>89</sup> The National Congress, along with the chiefs, Dube relayed, called out to the young men: “Yes, young men of Nyonyana, let’s go well!”<sup>90</sup> Invoking the call of the King, the SANNC, and the chiefs was not Dube’s only enticement. He also wrote of the impressions of the Zulus already held by Europeans. “All of you are famous overseas for the power of your body, do not humiliate us,” Dube declared, “All of you were chosen because I

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<sup>87</sup> Heather Hughes, *The First President: A life of John Dube, founding president of the ANC* (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2012), 134.

<sup>88</sup> For more on Dube’s “ambiguities of dependence,” see: Heather Hughes, “Doubly Elite: Exploring the Life of John Langa Libalele Dube,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 27, no. 3 (2001): 445-458; Shula Marks, “The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 1, no. 2 (April 1975): 162-180; Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>89</sup> John L. Dube, “Niyame-nywa Zinsizwa!,” *Ilanga lase Natal*, October 20, 1916, p. 2; Original: “UKing, enangituma kuye kanye namnxusa amanye nati mangiye kunibika ngohlupo lwenu, ufuna izinsizwa ukube ziye kwelekelela ngokusebenza imisebenzi yokwetula nokufaka impahla emikunjini eFrance.”

<sup>90</sup> Dube (1916). Original: “Yebo, izinsizwa zeNyonyana mazihambe kulungile.”

chose all of you for what suited you; I am pointing this out to you now.”<sup>91</sup> Here Dube invoked the martial race myth, utilizing it to inspire Zulu men to volunteer, playing to their martial pride.

Dube’s invocation of the Zulu martial tradition, however, had a different tenor and tone than similar pieces penned by British military officers who framed the Zulu as a “martial race.” Writing in *The English Review*, Major Darnley-Stuart-Stephens entreated his readers to recognize the potential of utilizing African soldiers in the impending conflict. Though based in West Africa at the time, Darnley-Stuart Stephens used this platform as a way to entreat the South African state to recruit Africans, particularly Zulu and Basutos, to aid them in the war effort. The specific focus on these two ethnic groups stemmed, from Darnley-Stuart-Stephens’ perspective, from their predisposition to all things bellicose. “The Zulus, the Natal Zulus, and the Basutos take the utmost pride in being soldiers and in acquiring any art or exercise connected with the management and handling of arms or the movements of armed bodies,” Darnley-Stuart-Stephens insisted, “There seems to be something in the disposition and genius of the common stock from which they come, *some hereditary bias in their brain*, in their very blood which fits the Zulus and Basutos for the easy acquisition of the fighting trade.”<sup>92</sup> At the same time, the Major made a point to insist that these forces only be used for the most basic military purposes, since he had “never known more than a few of Cetewayo’s braves who could be taught any mechanical handicraft; indeed, many can never learn to draw a straight line.”<sup>93</sup> These two opposing

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<sup>91</sup> Dube (1916). Original: “Nidumile napesheya ngamandhla omzimba, ningasihlazisi. Ngaketwa inina ukuba nginibonise okunifanele; ngiyanikombisa namhla. Nami ngiyanqinelwa umzimba, nginikulmnela nginibika emakosini uma enibize qede nasabela. Nanso intando pela ukupela kwokuhlabana kwenu nje okuyanvela amaqawe ngako.”

<sup>92</sup> Major Darnley-Stuart-Stephens. “Our Million Black Army.” *The English Review* XXIII (October 1916): 355.

<sup>93</sup> Darnley-Stuart-Stephens, “Our Million Black Army,” 355. A similar piece in *African Affairs* in 1918 by H.C. Sloley, detailing the work of the Committee for the Welfare of Africans in Europe, echoed this idea of the African predisposition for physical work. Sloley writes: “The South African Bantu races do not appear to produce many exceptionally big men, nor on the other hand are there many of them of dwarfish stature, or imperfect physical development. Weaklings are probably weeded out during infancy and only the bodily fit survive. The tribal

invocations of the Zulus' martial heritage illustrates the fundamental difference in white and African impressions of the Zulus' martial heritage: white authorities saw brutish, violent potential to protect their empire and Zulu elites saw a skilled fighting force who could further endear their people to the white state.

Recruitment efforts were operated through the Department of Native Affairs, which placed the onus for recruitment on the shoulders of chiefs and their *izinduna* who already had the necessary infrastructure in place after decades of labor recruitment for mines and plantations.<sup>94</sup> NAD hesitated to utilize Solomon, whose influence they were still concerned with mitigating in regard to large groups of young men. In fact, when word broke of the need for native recruits to labor in Europe for the British Empire in August 1916, Solomon, through Pixley ka Seme, had discussed with CNC Wheelwright the possibility of Zulu assistance. Wheelwright curtly told Seme that he had no intention of "discussing with Solomon the possibility of the Zulus assisting the Empire."<sup>95</sup> In a letter written to E. E. Dower on November 3, 1916, a Magistrate reported his regret that officials were expecting Africans in Natal and Zululand to "not come forward except in very negligible numbers," due to a widespread fear of crossing the sea, "coupled with a generally apathetic demeanour toward the scheme."<sup>96</sup> Utilizing Solomon's influence provided

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discipline teaches and fosters hardihood and stoical disregard of pain, hunger, fatigue, and other discomforts. The open-air life and occupations of boys and young men in pastoral and agricultural communities tend to promote growth and health, and the young native, as a rule, reaches manhood with his bodily powers in the vigorous state of development intended by Nature." H. C. Sloley, "The African Native Labour Contingent and The Welfare Committee," *African Affairs (London)* XVII (1918): 206.

<sup>94</sup> Clothier, *Black Valour*, 12; Officials would turn to chiefs, and these pre-existing networks, again in late 1916/early 1917 to provide walking sticks for wounded soldiers in South Africa and abroad. NAB, CNC 236, 569/1916, "Walking sticks for wounded soldiers; suggested that native chiefs be invited to assist in obtaining, October 1916-January 1917"; NAB, Pietermaritzburg Magistrate (PMB) 1/PMB 3/1/12/12, 1E/16, "Sticks for use by wounded soldiers, 1916."

<sup>95</sup> NAB, CNC 248, 1254/1916. "Solomon ka Dinuzulu and Seme wish to interview the CNC re. Zulus assisting the Empire."

<sup>96</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, Unknown to E.E. Dower, Secretary for Native Affairs, on November 3, 1916. Letter is not signed, but the tone and style suggest that it may have come from C.A. Wheelwright, Chief Native Commissioner for Natal.

one potential way to clear this hurdle, from the writer's perspective, though there were general fears from officials within both the NAD and the CNC office that he would use this opportunity to his own advantage. "I have now little doubt in my own mind that the failure to recruit Natives from the Zulus has been largely, if not entirely due to this . . . influence of Solomon," the author continued, "I think he genuinely wants the people to turn out, but at the same time he desires to build up himself and his own status in doing so."<sup>97</sup>

Regardless of his motives, Solomon did, in fact, express his desire to recruit workers for the contingent. In a telegram to Dower sent on November 7, 1916, Solomon agreed to "use my best influence [to] secure full number labourers required for Europe," by summoning "all leaders and Chiefs this side [of the] Mhlatuze [River] through their Magistrates to meet me at Ensindeni Royal kraal" at a meeting which would "last three days and [be] followed by [a] general gathering of all regimental divisions at Ulundi Royal kraal."<sup>98</sup> At this gathering, Solomon intended to "select Uncles and leaders for the expedition and their men will follow in full number required."<sup>99</sup> To allow Solomon to hold this kind of meeting posed a great risk to the government, leading one administrator to weigh the benefits of potentially "disturb[ing] the influence of many of the Chiefs and tribes in Zululand" as well as "build[ing] up his hopes and aspirations to become the paramount head of the Zulus."<sup>100</sup> For this official, however, the risk would be worth it, as it would be "a great pity if the Zulus cannot be got to go to Europe as their failure will redound very much to their discredit, and the educational influence of the trip would be lost."<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, Unknown to E.E. Dower, Secretary for Native Affairs, on November 3, 1916.

<sup>98</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Telegram, Solomon to E.E. Dower (via Magistrate Babanango), November 7, 1916.

<sup>99</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Telegram, Solomon to E.E. Dower (via Magistrate Babanango), November 7, 1916.

<sup>100</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, Unknown to E.E. Dower on November 3, 1916.

<sup>101</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, Unknown to E.E. Dower on November 3, 1916.

They concluded: “It might be worth risking a good deal to secure them at the risk of the influences mentioned.”<sup>102</sup> Just a few days later, however, the CNC wrote to the Vryheid Magistrate, agreeing that Solomon could “do much toward allying the present feeling of the Zulus without summoning Chiefs and Leaders to his kraal.”<sup>103</sup> Acknowledgement of Solomon’s potential to aid in recruitment, however, did not translate into transference of political will to the Zulu king.

Eventually, officials decided that their desire for more Zulu recruits could not compete with their need to control Solomon’s influence. In a telegram sent on November 14<sup>th</sup>, the SNA confirmed “it would not be fitting that he should strike a bargain with Solomon regarding what is really a matter of duty.”<sup>104</sup> Passing on sentiments from Prime Minister Louis Botha, Wheelwright felt that the decision to join the contingent “rests with the Zulus for sake of their own good name to make very much more generous and hearty response than heretofore, and thus remove reproach of being of all South African tribes the most deaf to [the] King’s call for labour overseas.”<sup>105</sup> While Solomon’s assistance would be appreciated, recruitment of Zulu workers for the war effort would not carry personal benefits for the monarch. In fact, “any assistance rendered by Solomon (apart from mere verbal assurances of support) in inducing Zulus to view matter in right light and to realize rare opportunity now offered them,” noted the CNC, “will naturally be placed to his credit but as already indicated Government is quite unprepared treat with him on basis of bargain.”<sup>106</sup> Maintaining Solomon’s diminished status necessitated risking

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<sup>102</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, Unknown to E.E. Dower on November 3, 1916.

<sup>103</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, CNC to Magistrate, Vryheid Division, November 13, 1916.

<sup>104</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, CNC to Officer Commanding 3rd Regiment, November 14, 1916.

<sup>105</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, CNC to Officer Commanding 3rd Regiment, November 14, 1916.

<sup>106</sup> NAB, CNC 261, 1887/1916. Letter, CNC to Officer Commanding 3rd Regiment, November 14, 1916.

the inability to recruit Zulu troops, although popular opposition to this premise challenged it's success.

Reluctance and opposition to the idea of sending this large group of Africans, and Zulus in particular, overseas to France emerged almost simultaneously with its announcement. John X. Merriman, former Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, wrote to Jan Smuts expressing his fear in allowing Zulus to be sent to Europe. Instead, Merriman wished that these Zulus “could be diverted” to Smuts’ in East Africa. Merriman felt sure he could not be the only one “who regard[s] the introduction of our Natives to the social conditions of Europe with the greatest alarm.”<sup>107</sup> In the pages of *Ilanga*, Dube expressed his belief that this opposition “lets the ‘cat out of the bag’ as to the why and wherefore of that opposition. It is in no way a complement to those who oppose the movement. It is evident that private greed, need and self-assertion cannot pull cheerily for the Imperial common good, and the only care for it is weeding out.”<sup>108</sup> These concerns were of lesser importance than the unwillingness of Zulus to volunteer for the contingent. Recruits from Natal and Zululand were substantially lower than those coming from the Cape Province and the Transvaal, boasting 7,000 and 13,500 recruits respectively.<sup>109</sup> When Botha called off recruitment in January 1918, 25,000 men had enlisted in the Contingent, with 21,000 of those men proceeding overseas. 1500 of these men were Zulus, according to statistics in Norman Clothier’s *Black Valour* (1987).<sup>110</sup>

Though Solomon’s involvement potentially can be linked to these low recruitment numbers, larger considerations contributed to the low enrollment of Zulus. In a short note published in *Ilanga lase Natal* on July 27, 1917, Dube listed three reasons for the slow uptake of

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<sup>107</sup> Clothier, *Black Valour*, 17.

<sup>108</sup> “General Notes,” *Ilanga lase Natal*, October 27, 1916, p. 5.

<sup>109</sup> Clothier, *Black Valour*, 149.

<sup>110</sup> Clothier, *Black Valour*, 149.

recruitment in Natal and Zululand. “There are several reasons for the seeming indifference,” in recruiting between the Cape and Natal, Dube explained; “These are among the most prominent: —the great distance, the sea, heavy taxation of the Natives and the Natives Land Act with the recent Administration Bill (Native).”<sup>111</sup> The Native Administration Bill of 1917 had been on Parliament’s docket prior to South Africa’s increasing involvement in World War I and authorities pushed it through in early 1917 amid great disapproval. The components of the proposed 1917 bill included the addition of land to the 1913 Act that would impact about thirteen million Africans in the Transvaal, Zululand and Natal; the restriction of Africans residing in non-Native areas; the ability of the Governor General to make, repeal or alter laws; and the creation of the office of the Special Justice of the Peace, who held powers relating to “the prevention or suppression of vagrancy, passes for Natives or coloured persons, or the taxation of coloured or Native persons.”<sup>112</sup> The Native Administration Bill of 1917 attempted to set into place the administrative segregation that became the foundation for Apartheid. However, this bill never passed into law since “native policy” in the wake of World War I had, according to Louis Botha, “come to a dead stop.”<sup>113</sup> Nevertheless, the 1917 Administration Bill loomed large in writings on the Contingent at the time, along with other significant burdens that hampered men’s desire to join the *Impumalanga* regiment.

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<sup>111</sup> John L. Dube, “General Notes,” *Ilanga lase Natal*, July 27, 1917: p. 5. The appointment of Sir George Leuchars, a main figure in the repression of the Bambatha Rebellion, also did little to encourage Zulus to turn out for service; The sinking of the S.S. Mendi on February 21, 1917 did little to bolster confidence in those considering volunteering for the SANLC. For more on the sinking of the Mendi, see: Albert Grundlingh, “Mutating Memories and the Making of a Myth: Remembering the SS Mendi Disaster, 1917–2007,” *South African Historical Journal* 63, no. 1 (2011): 20–37. For a fictional account, see Fred Khumalo, *Dancing the Death Drill* (Century City, South Africa: Umuzi, 2017).

<sup>112</sup> Theo L. Schreiner, “The Native Affairs Administration Bill; A Letter to the ‘Cape Times’,” *Ilanga lase Natal*, February 16, 1917. See also: Martin Chanock, *The Making of South African Legal Culture, 1902–1936: Fear, Favour, and Prejudice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Saul Dubow, “The Elaboration of Segregationist Ideology” in William Beinart and Saul Dubow, eds., *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 145–175.

<sup>113</sup> Dubow, “The Elaboration of Segregationist Ideology,” 162.



The burdens, both on the military front and at home, were heavy for those Africans who volunteered for the SANLC. These burdens were put most succinctly by Rev. Abraham Z. Twala in a letter to the editor of *Ilanga lase Natal* on April 6, 1917. “All honour to our brave Native people, who heard the call and obeyed even at this dismal hour for the Empire, leaving perhaps their families to be exploited by the Native Administration Bill 1917, conceived by the Natives’ Land Act, 1913. Their souls, the writer believes, are in God’s keeping for they died nobly,” Twala opined; “They died in an attempt to keep the terrible evils threatening the world at large.”<sup>114</sup> British leaders were also cognizant of the great contribution made by the SANLC Africans.

On July 10, 1917, King George V paid a visit to the SANLC at Abbeville in northern France. In his address to the black workers, the King drew on the martial heritage of the Zulu recruits, telling them that by providing food and munitions to the troops, they were “hurling your assegais at the enemy and hastening the destruction which awaits them.”<sup>115</sup> Following the completion of the sovereign’s address, Corporal Alfred Tshingane, nephew of Dinuzulu, allegedly instigated the royal salute, “*Bayete!*” which the crowd repeated later upon the King’s departure.<sup>116</sup> As World War I came to a close and Natal and Zululand Africans returned home from their times overseas, new threats loomed and more challenges awaited them at home.<sup>117</sup>

Though the white authorities had relied on the Zulu regent to secure war recruits, Solomon’s control and influence over Zulu-speaking peoples continued to be a source of concern for government officials as well as for Natal and Zululand chiefs worried about his influence

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<sup>114</sup> Abraham Z. Twala, “The Sinking of the Mendi,” *Ilanga lase Natal*, April 6, 1917.

<sup>115</sup> King George V was also reported to have presented members of SANLC with a white ox “in conformity with South African custom.” Clothier, *Black Valour*, 139-141.

<sup>116</sup> Clothier, *Black Valour*, 139-141.

<sup>117</sup> Neil Roos, “The Springbok and the Skunk: War Veterans and the Politics of Whiteness in South Africa during the 1940s and 1950s,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35, no. 3 (2009): 643-661.

over young men in their areas. The CNC, thanks to the near constant surveillance of Solomon by colonial authorities, learned that Solomon had attended a wedding at the kraal of Mlahleni, an induna to Chief Mathole Buthelezi. On September 19, 1918, the local Dipping Supervisor had spotted Solomon at the Ceza Store, noting that he “without a doubt [was] under the influence of liquor,” although “quite respectful and in no way misbehaved himself.”<sup>118</sup> Later that day, Solomon arrived unannounced at the aforementioned marriage ceremony during the wedding dance. After parading with his followers through the homestead, which immediately stopped the dance, a Lieutenant Colonel for the 3rd Regiment of South African Mounted Rifles reported, “about 150 of the young men joined up with Solomon and his party - all the young men of Chief Tshibilika’s tribe attached themselves to Solomon’s party, leaving about 100 of the elders and a few of the young men on the side of Mlahleni.”<sup>119</sup> Solomon, he reported, “appeared to be under the influence of liquor, and stayed at the kraal drinking beer until about midnight when he departed for the kraal of Chief Tshibilika where he stayed the night.”<sup>120</sup>

In 1918, Solomon also flouted the government once again when he finished the *ukubuthwa* that he began in 1916, gathering men of the proper age into a new regiment to complement the pre-existing *Nqababucatshwabezizwe*, naming them *Nqabakucasha* ('the- will-not-hide').<sup>121</sup> This flouting of the restrictions against the formation of regiments signaled a shift in Solomon’s approach to his dealings with the South African government. Rather than attempt to push against the white authorities’ assumptions about him, he would lean into his role and exercise the authority guaranteed to him as successor to Dinuzulu. Solomon’s decision to

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<sup>118</sup> NAB, CNC 341, 3268/1918. Statement of D. Shaw - Dipping Supervisor - Mahlabathini, October 16, 1918.

<sup>119</sup> NAB, CNC 341, 3268/1918. Report of No. 1607 N/C Gklegatsha - Mahlabathini, October 3, 1918.

<sup>120</sup> NAB, CNC 341, 3268/1918. Report of No. 1607 N/C Gklegatsha - Mahlabathini, October 3, 1918.

<sup>121</sup> Cope, “The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government,” 128.

continue enrolling regiments represented a decision on his part to ignore colonial restrictions and continue to exercise his authority as Zulu king, even if he could not undertake this action as Paramount Chief.

The possibility of Solomon ascending to his desired role became less and less feasible as South Africa entered in the 1920s. The passage of the 1920 Native Affairs Act further separated Africans from whites, creating a countrywide system of tribally based district councils, utilizing the model proposed in the Glen Grey Act of 1894. Another feature of the 1920 Native Affairs Act included the establishment of a Native Affairs Commission designed, on the surface, to advise the government of legislation to be passed throughout the Union. In reality, however, this Native Affairs Commission, Ivan Evans argues in *Bureaucracy and Race* (1997), served as a way to force more liberals out of Native Affairs and paved the way for the shift to Bantu Administration in 1960.<sup>122</sup> This increasingly segregationist legislation resulted in reactions from Africans throughout the country, especially those lead by the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), which had been founded in 1912 under the leadership of John Dube, Sol T. Plaatje and Pixley ka Seme. This resistance faced new challenges in 1924 when the Pact coalition between the National Party and Labour Party won the national election and General J.B.M. Hertzog became Prime Minister. The tides were turning for Africans in Natal and Zululand, as increasing segregationist legislation restricted their freedoms and political liberties.

Nevertheless, some authorities in Natal and Zululand still felt that the Zulus, and Solomon in particular, could still be redeemed and be integrated into the pre-existing government structures. In a 1925 article for the *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Natal administrator C.A. Wheelwright wrote of the great strides the Zulus had made in pursuit of “civilization”

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<sup>122</sup> Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 73.

thanks to the development of government structures amenable to their sensibilities. “The Zulus . . . are a people worthy of effort to raise them in the scale of civilisation,” Wheelwright entreated the readers to believe, “The institutions established for them, including that in Zululand, which has already been mentioned, have shown promising results, and the underlying force of character which as a nation they possess in a marked degree, leads one to hope that in the years to come the influence which they wielded in their warlike character will be equalled by their influence for good in the march towards civilisation.”<sup>123</sup> The Prince of Wales’ visit to South Africa in 1925 provided another opportune moment for Solomon to demonstrate his symbolic authority and for the administration to illustrate the success of indirect rule in Natal and Zululand to a royal representative.<sup>124</sup>

Solomon exercised his symbolic authority in Eshowe when, prior to the royals’ arrival, he called on “the large assembly of men who danced for the Prince” to meet at Entembeni, the head kraal of Chief Nkantini ka Siteku ka Mpande, a fraternal cousin of the king’s.<sup>125</sup> Once they had arrived, they proceeded to several key kraals that were typically visited during the annual *umkhosi* before catching up with Solomon at Nsindeni. Here, the young men who had not been organized into regiments in 1918 were brought together under the name *Upondolwendhlovu* (The Elephant Tusks), in honor of the elephant tusks that Solomon planned to present the Prince of Wales at Eshowe.<sup>126</sup> The next day, Solomon and 60,000 Zulu men proceeded to Eshowe to

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<sup>123</sup> C.A. Wheelwright, “Native Administration in Zululand,” *Journal of the Royal African Society* 24, no. 94 (January 1925): 99.

<sup>124</sup> For more on the Prince of Wales’ 1925 visit to South Africa see: Hilary Sapire, “Ambiguities of Loyalism: The Prince of Wales in India and Africa, 1921–2 and 25,” *History Workshop Journal* 73 (Spring 2012): 37–65; *His Royal Highness: a full, special and exclusive record of the life and activities of Edward, Prince of Wales / issued by the Natal Witness to commemorate the visit of the Prince to South Africa in 1925* (Pietermaritzburg: Natal Witness, 1925).

<sup>125</sup> Mahlobo and Krige, “Transition from Childhood to Adulthood Amongst the Zulus,” 181.

<sup>126</sup> Mahlobo and Krige, “Transition from Childhood to Adulthood Amongst the Zulus,” 189. In a Dec. 1983 speech on wildlife conservation, Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi explained that all Zulu kings gave elephant tusks as gifts to honored guests. He specifically referenced the *Upondolwendhlovu* regiment: “The Zulu regiment that was sent by

perform for the Prince. Following with tradition, a historic moment resulted in the formation of a new regiment whose actions reflected the significance of the Prince's trip to Zululand.

The Prince of Wales arrived in Eshowe, Zululand on June 6, 1925, after traveling through the Cape Province, the Free State and Natal. The celebrations surrounding his arrival delivered on the grandeur that such a diplomatic gathering demanded. Mary Moore, a seven-year-old whose mother taught at the Teacher Training College of the Umpumulo mission, recorded the Prince's procession to Eshowe. Approaching Eshowe, Moore recalled that she and her family "passed little knots of warriors, scantily clad in lush skins, and wearing magnificent head-dresses of *sakabula* feathers, on their way to the town. One warrior particularly stood out: he was wearing a python skin, carefully cured, and draped in descending spirals around him. It shone like silver."<sup>127</sup> Moore also remembered that the Prince's arrival "was totally eclipsed by Solomon of the Zulus, who arrived in an enormous blue open car with leopard skins hanging over the back."<sup>128</sup> Moore's accounts echoed those of other dignitaries attending the event, including John Dube. Their accounts provide an opportunity to recreate the historic meeting of Solomon and the Prince of Wales. In the morning, gifts were exchanged, with Solomon presenting the elephant tusks to Edward and the British monarch presenting a gold-top ceremonial stick to Solomon, as well as other prominent chiefs, including Langalake Ngcobo of Zwartkop.<sup>129</sup> The afternoon centered on dancing; a spectacle recorded for newspapers across the globe.

A reporter for the *Washington Post* wrote of the scene that Edward witnessed that day in Eshowe. "When the prince's party took their seats on the parade ground the great gathering of

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King Solomon ka Dinuzulu to Maputo to kill an elephant, in order to get tusks that were to be presented to HRH Prince Edward the Prince of Wales (who later became Edward VIII) who visited Eshowe in 1925, was named by King Solomon as UPHONDOLWENDLOVU Regiment - The Elephant Tusks Regiment. Some of them are still alive." Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Excerpts of Chief Minister's Policy Speech," *Clarion Call* (Dec. 1983): 5.

<sup>127</sup> W.H. Bizley, "Interview: A Trip to See the Prince of Wales," *Natalia* 25 (1995): 24.

<sup>128</sup> Bizley, "Interview," 24.

<sup>129</sup> Hughes, *The First President*, 222-223.

warrior braves stretched as far as the eye could see, which 5,000 picked warriors of the finest physical proportions, lithe and naked except for sporrans of leopard skins, were drawn up in the foreground for half a mile, six men deep,” they observed.<sup>130</sup> As the dance began, a *New York Times* reporter recalled that “the Prince was obviously delighted”; he even quoted the Prince as remarking, “I think that this is the best thing we have seen in Africa, don’t you?”<sup>131</sup> As the day concluded, Mary Moore once again provided a picturesque image of the retreating party of Zulus. “Eventually it was over,” she wrote, “In the company of many weary warriors, we gradually made our way out of Eshowe.”<sup>132</sup>

The gathering that day at Eshowe represented a major milestone especially since it represented “the first mass assembly permitted since the 1879 conquest.”<sup>133</sup> Liz Gunner and Mafika Gwala referred to this historic *izibongo* as Solomon’s “royal anthem [. . .] composed and first sung in 1925 when he went to Eshowe to meet the Prince of Wales who was on his tour of South Africa.”<sup>134</sup>

*Salani nonyoko;  
Inkosi bayibiz’ Eshowe.*

Cowards stay behind with your mothers;  
The king is being summoned to Eshowe.<sup>135</sup>

The significance of this *isibongo* is multi-faceted, due to its creation in reference to the Prince’s Eshowe visit, but also in connection to the mysterious death of King Cetshwayo in Eshowe while in exile.<sup>136</sup> This subtle form of counter-narrative shows the subtle ways in which Solomon exercised agency under colonial surveillance. The day also held an additional air of importance due to the equal attention paid to both Solomon and the Prince of Wales. Even young Moore

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<sup>130</sup> “Zulu Braves Dance in Frenzy for Prince,” *The Washington Post*, June 7, 1925.

<sup>131</sup> “Zulus Give Prince His Greatest Sight,” *New York Times*, June 7, 1925, p. 12.

<sup>132</sup> Bizley, “Interview,” 24.

<sup>133</sup> Hughes, *The First President*, 222-223.

<sup>134</sup> Liz Gunner and Mafika Gwala (eds). *Musho! Zulu Popular Praises* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1991): 234-235.

<sup>135</sup> Gunner and Gwala, *Musho!*, 234-235.

<sup>136</sup> Gunner and Gwala, *Musho!*, 234-235.

noted that “there was a sort of running ambiguity as to whether it was Edward, Prince of Wales, or Solomon, King of the Zulus, who was actually the drawcard.”<sup>137</sup> Hughes expanded on this observation, noting the existence of a rumor that Edward had privately conferred a higher status on Solomon. “Solomon, still not formally king, nevertheless bade farewell to Edward having secured unofficial recognition,” Hughes explained, “greatly helped by the rumour that the Prince had conferred this title on him on the train.”<sup>138</sup> The Prince’s visit, in addition to providing an opportunity for the regiments to assemble again, elevated Solomon in national and global consciousness, a shift in position that would result in a shift in Solomon’s approach to interacting with authorities (both white and African) in hopes of securing his position as Paramount Chief.

However, by the mid-1920s it became clear that, whether or not he had received this royal endorsement, Solomon would never be promoted to Paramount Chief.<sup>139</sup> In the wake of this realization, there a palpable shift appeared in Solomon’s attitude, one reflected in his changing behavior beginning in the 1930s. Though he had always asked for financial tribute from Zulu people in the form of money and cattle, reports of these demands in the 1930s increased exponentially. Solomon requested permission to visit the mining compounds in Johannesburg to collect tribute and received warning from the Nongoma Magistrate that he had to “rely more on his own efforts than on the aid of other people.”<sup>140</sup> E. N. Braatvedt similarly commented on Solomon’s continuing drain on his own people, following reports by Chief Mkombisi that Solomon in April 1931 had requested gifts of cattle from men in his chiefdom. Enumerating the times in recent years that Zulus had “been called upon to pay for Solomon’s

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<sup>137</sup> Bizley, “Interview,” 44.

<sup>138</sup> Hughes, *The First President*, 222-223.

<sup>139</sup> Buverud, “The King and the Honeybird,” 38.

<sup>140</sup> NAB, CNC 82A (N1/1/3 (32) 1. Letter, Magistrate Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, February 10, 1930.

indiscretions,” Braatvedt asked Lugg why “this continued drain on the Nation’s resources be allowed to continue,” since the money and cattle Solomon demanded “could be employed more usefully than to keep Solomon out of trouble.”<sup>141</sup> Braatvedt changed his tune by June 1931, writing Lugg again following a visit by Solomon to his office.

Upon hearing of Solomon’s mounting debts and the resulting pressure from creditors, Braatvedt suggested that while these collections “should be stopped, either by proclamation or by other means,” he could not see “any serious objection to a slight increase of his salary, on the distinct understanding that he must live within his means.”<sup>142</sup> Braatvedt also requested that the exact limits and powers of his role be clearly delineated to Solomon by the proper authorities. “He regards himself as the superior of any other chief in the country,” Braatvedt wrote, crediting part of this behavior to the fact that “his duties and the limitations of his powers and privileges have, apparently, never been explained to him.” Solomon had, in his view, “done nothing to indicate that he is a man who can safely be entrusted with wider powers.”<sup>143</sup> Although in the early years of his reign Solomon had worked hard to show that he could work with white authorities, his actions showed that he no longer viewed this as a possibility.

Solomon had displayed this dissident behavior most clearly during a July 24, 1930, visit by the Earl of Athlone, one documented extensively by historian Shula Marks in *Ambiguities of Dependence* (1986). Upon his arrival, Solomon turned to the local officials in attendance, insisting, “You are doing a bad thing here. What right have you to all these people? I am the king of this country [. . .]. What do you mean by turning the king of this country to a dog?.”<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> NAB, CNC 82A N1/1/3 (32) 1. Letter, E.N. Braatvedt, Magistrate Melmoth, to H.C. Lugg, Chief Native Commissioner, April 8, 1931.

<sup>142</sup> NAB, CNC 82A N1/1/3 (32) 1. Letter, E.N. Braatvedt, Magistrate Melmoth, to H.C. Lugg, Chief Native Commissioner, June 15, 1931.

<sup>143</sup> NAB, CNC 82A N1/1/3 (32) 1. Letter, E.N. Braatvedt, Magistrate Melmoth, to H.C. Lugg, Chief Native Commissioner, June 15, 1931.

<sup>144</sup> Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa*, 17.



Solomon's "insolence," as Marks refers to his behavior, continued to deteriorate later as he refused to rise while speaking to the CNC and injecting commentary during the governor-general's speech. When the governor-general told the crowd that "In your Chief Native Commissioner and in your Native Commissioners you have men to look after your welfare and to give you their best advice. Go to them with your troubles and difficulties," Solomon directly rejected these officials' authority.<sup>145</sup>

It is a pleasure for me to welcome you here for I am also a person of royal blood. The people at my back recognise me as a Chief of the Royal House of Zulus. Each country has its own King. We are loyal to the king of England, but he has many countries to rule and it is difficult to understand how he can administer them all. Some people think they can rule a country by their cleverness, but we know that only people of Royal Blood are fitted to rule. Things in this country will never be right until I am recognised as the head of the country. It is regretted that you visit us only at the close of your term of office. However, we wish you God-speed. We trust you will convey to the Royal Family in England the unsatisfactory treatment meted out to the Natives of this country. Farewell.'<sup>146</sup>

The final blow to the white authorities came when Solomon refused to lead the crowd in the "Bayete" salute to the governor-general. But instead of using the traditional "*Bayete*," Zulu people in attendance cried out "*Bayeza!*" (They come!), which Marks aptly described as "vaguely threatening," perhaps signaling the arrival of the regiments if Solomon continued to be treated poorly.<sup>147</sup> Then as Solomon left the venue, the crowd gave him the "Bayete" salute. Solomon's blatant hostility at this event, combined with the crowd's refusal to honor the governor-general in the prescribed manner, illustrated not only Solomon's influence but the multiple forms of resistance that were being brought against the colonial state and the constantly increasing segregationist laws impacting African lives.

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<sup>145</sup> Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa*, 17.

<sup>146</sup> Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa*, 17.

<sup>147</sup> Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa*, 18.

Solomon passed away on March 4, 1933. The *ihlambo* for Solomon, held on August 27-29, 1934, represented a convergence of traditional responsibility and opportunity to raise the position of the Zulu king. As one of the few mass meetings of the Zulu nation since 1879, Zulu men poured into Zululand to pay homage to their late king. A. W. Hoernle wrote in *The Star* newspaper of the huge numbers of people who came to pay their respects. "From every clan, from every chieftainship, from all large districts acknowledging the paramountcy of the Zulu chief," Hoernle wrote, "Old veterans belonging to Cetshwayo's regiments were there, men well over 80 years of age, and so were the youngsters who had just been formed into the last regiment before Solomon died, and who were kept in marvellous control and order by their induna from a much older regiment."<sup>148</sup> This assemblage of Zulu men, Hoernle noted, represented "the largest body of Zulu men who had come together for an *ihlambo* since Mpande's death"; those Europeans in attendance, he hypothesized, "had never seen so big a gathering of Zulu anywhere."<sup>149</sup> H. C. Lugg in a letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs in Pretoria, D.L. Smit, entreated his colleague to join him for the celebrations, since it would give him "an insight into a certain phase of Zulu life which will probably never occur to you again."<sup>150</sup> As a testament to the significance of the event, H.C. Lugg even enlisted the African Film Productions Company to capture the occasion.<sup>151</sup> Just as Dinuzulu's passing marked the beginning of a new era, so too did Solomon's death and subsequent ceremonies.

White and African dignitaries converged to put Solomon to rest, both physically and symbolically. The first two days of the ceremony consisted of the main cleansing rituals in which

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<sup>148</sup> NAB, CNC 82A (N1/1/3 (32) 1. A.W. Hoernle. "When Life Stands Still: Significance and Solemnity of the Ihlambo Ceremony, a Great Zulu Gathering." *The Star Johannesburg*, September 3, 1934.

<sup>149</sup> NAB, CNC 82A (N1/1/3 (32) 1. A.W. Hoernle. "When Life Stands Still: Significance and Solemnity of the Ihlambo Ceremony, a Great Zulu Gathering." *The Star Johannesburg*, September 3, 1934.

<sup>150</sup> NAB, CNC 82A N1/1/3 (32) 1. Letter, H.C. Lugg to D.L. Smit, July 30, 1934.

<sup>151</sup> NAB, CNC 82A N1/1/3 (32) 1. Letter, H.C. Lugg to African Film Productions, Ltd., August 14, 1934.

members of the royal family prepared Solomon's body for burial and *izinyanga* (traditional doctor; healer) purified his warriors in anticipation of the national hunt. On the last day, September 29, before a crowd of both white and African dignitaries and laypeople, Mshiyeni gathered the Zulu men in attendance into their respective regiments, who then stood in their units as dignitaries delivered speeches. In John Dube's address to the crowd, he paid tribute to Solomon while simultaneously entreating the white authorities in attendance to recognize the status of the Zulu king. "I speak now as a friend long associated with our Chief, Mshiyeni, and his late brother, Solomon, and take this opportunity to make an earnest appeal to the Government of our country to give our Chief a status that will place him on a firm foundation to undertake the responsibility of care of his people, and I make this appeal fervently to the Government on this great occasion through the Chief Native Commissioner who is with us to-day in the sincere hope that it will receive the most favourable consideration and sympathy of the Government," Dube entreated the authorities in attendance, "We want the head of the Zulu Nation to be Paramount Chief who is so recognised by the Government."<sup>152</sup> After these speeches, Mnyaiza, grandson of Mpande and senior male in the Royal Family, led the crowd in a salute to the "unknown heir," Solomon's son who would ascend to the "throne" once he came of age. At this point, the regiments took center stage. E. N. Braatvedt, the Native Commissioner in Nongoma, reported that those in attendance were the *Ntabayezulu* (or *Umbaniwezulu*); *Inqabayembube*; *Cijimpi*; *Felepakati*; *Dakukwesuta*; *Upondolwendhlovo*; *Vukayibambe*; *Imbhokodebomvu*; and "a mixed lot of old men."<sup>153</sup> While two *izinduna* joined each regiment, Mathole Buthelezi served as the unofficial "Prime Minister" of the ceremonies.<sup>154</sup> This massive turnout of the King's regiments

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<sup>152</sup> NAB, CNC 82A, (N1/1/3 (32) 1. John L Dube's Address at the Ihlambo.

<sup>153</sup> KCAL, E. Braatvedt (MS 1621), Ihlambo ceremony for Chief Solomon, 1934.

<sup>154</sup> KCAL, E. Braatvedt (MS 1621), Ihlambo ceremony for Chief Solomon, 1934.

reflected the respect that the Zulu nation held for their king and the success of Solomon's efforts to maintain the regimental tradition during his reign.

The atmosphere of the event stemmed from the reverence performed by the king's *amabutho*. "The regiments numbered 10,000 men [. . .]. As the regiments entered the gate leading into the yard, they broke into a run, leaping into the air and shouting their regimental songs," Braatvedt recalled.<sup>155</sup> Once inside the kraal, he continued, "they saluted the Native Chief Commissioner, and the spirit of Solomon, and formed into a huge semi-circle [. . .] clashing their sticks and thumping their shields."<sup>156</sup> Once the dignitaries present had made their speeches, the regiments proceeded to the Mahashini kraal. E. Braatvedt recounted the events that followed. "They filed into the cattle kraal and stood massed against the kraal fence leaving an open space in the centre. When there was no room inside the cattle kraal, other went into the outer kraal," Braatvedt related, "The day closed with dancing...The excellent behaviour of thousands of men who participated is deserving of compliment. There [were] no untoward or regrettable incidents. Their behaviour was exemplary [. . . ]."<sup>157</sup> With this display, the festivities concluded.<sup>158</sup> Hoernle's piece in *The Star* closed by quoting Mnyaiza: "White and Black formed that day one regiment."<sup>159</sup> This statement, though perhaps just a fleeting reflection in the midst of an emotional day, represents Mnyaiza's hopes that Africans and white authorities could come together, especially in joining to honor the rightful Zulu authority. As segregationist legislation resulted in increasing protests nationwide, finding ways to unify white authorities and Africans became essential.

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<sup>155</sup> KCAL, E. Braatvedt (MS 1621), Ihlambo ceremony for Chief Solomon, 1934.

<sup>156</sup> KCAL, E. Braatvedt (MS 1621), Ihlambo ceremony for Chief Solomon, 1934.

<sup>157</sup> KCAL, E. Braatvedt (MS 1621), Ihlambo ceremony for Chief Solomon, 1934.

<sup>158</sup> NAB, CNC 82A (N1/1/3 (32) 1. A.W. Hoernle. "When Life Stands Still: Significance and Solemnity of the Ihlambo Ceremony, a Great Zulu Gathering." *The Star Johannesburg*, September 3, 1934.

<sup>159</sup> NAB, CNC 82A (N1/1/3 (32) 1. A.W. Hoernle. "When Life Stands Still: Significance and Solemnity of the Ihlambo Ceremony, a Great Zulu Gathering." *The Star Johannesburg*, September 3, 1934.

In the wake of Solomon's *ihlambo*, members of the Zulu Royal Family named Mshiyeni *iBambabukhosi* (regent; ibamba for short) until one of his nephews came of age and could assume the office. Mshiyeni's appointment not only as regent for his brother's children, but also as Acting Paramount Chief, signaled a major step towards the recognition that had eluded Solomon throughout his reign.<sup>160</sup> While this decision might have represented a gesture of good faith by the authorities, more likely it reflected their deep distrust of Solomon, the son of the last Zulu king. While Solomon had been characterized as untrustworthy, prone to drunkenness, and of limited intelligence, Mshiyeni proved, in H. C. Lugg's words, "agreeable, . . . abstemious, particular about his appearance and polished in manner."<sup>161</sup> Lugg also praised Mshiyeni for the distance he placed between himself and Solomon by his actions. "As a man and as a Chief, his conduct has hitherto been entirely satisfactory," Lugg wrote, "as to his domestic affairs, may I perhaps mention that he has only two wives, as against his predecessor's forty-seven."<sup>162</sup> Others saw him as "most anxious to obtain the good opinion of the government and most amenable to the control of the Native Commissioner."<sup>163</sup> At the same time, Mshiyeni continued to promote certain "traditions" that frustrated previous administrators, namely forming a regiment in 1938 of men born between 1922-1924 referred to as *Manukelana* (named after one of Dinuzulu's regiments) or *Ingangakazane*.<sup>164</sup> Regardless, white authorities welcomed Mshiyeni as a radical change from Solomon. Writing to Lugg immediately after the *ihlambo*, he thanked him profusely "for all the trouble you have taken to come and the work you have during the *ihlambo*,"

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<sup>160</sup> Buverud, "The King and the Honeybirds," 27

<sup>161</sup> NTS 250 78/53/3, CNC to SNA, June 18, 1934; Cited in Buverud, "The King and the Honeybirds," 30.

<sup>162</sup> NTS 250 78/53/3, CNC to SNA, June 18, 1934; Cited in Buverud, "The King and the Honeybirds," 30.

<sup>163</sup> Heaton Nicholls Papers, KCM 3303 d, Carbon fragment, Folder 2, nd., quoted in Shula Marks, 'Natal, the Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation', in W. Beinart and S. Dubow (eds.), *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa*, Routledge, London (1995), 92.

<sup>164</sup> Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Interview with author and Lindelihle Mahaye, September 30, 2016.

requesting that he extend his “thanks, on behalf of all the Zulu Nation living in Natal and Zululand, in whatever was possible to all our white friends.”<sup>165</sup>

And Mshiyeni needed to secure the trust of his “white friends” as the hardening of segregation in the 1920s and 1930s placed additional pressure on him, as he attempted to maintain his position in the minds of the Zulu nation while simultaneously working to earn the confidence of white authorities. The passing of the Representation of Natives Act No 16 of 1936 stripped Africans of their voting rights and restricting their parliamentary representation. It also resulted in the creation of a Native Representative Council (NRC), designed to act as an advisory board representing the interests of South Africa’s black population to the Parliament or Provincial Councils.<sup>166</sup> Soon after, the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 further disenfranchised Africans, formalizing the segregation of whites and blacks in rural areas, placing all land not owned by the state in the reserves under the South African Native Trust (SANT), and putting a system in place to controlling the distribution of labor tenants and squatters. This act laid the groundwork for the solidification of the reserve system in the coming years.<sup>167</sup> In 1939, the state promoted Mshiyeni to Acting Paramount Chief of the Zulu People. Lugg had argued for this move, writing to the Secretary for Native Affairs in August 1939 regarding the necessity to “have a powerful weapon to counter the insidious propaganda which is being disseminated amongst our urban Natives, and this can best be secured by strengthening our tribal system in Natal.”<sup>168</sup> The “insidious propaganda” to which he referred emanated from the urban centers, especially Durban, where the rise of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICWU)

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<sup>165</sup> NAB, CNC 82A (N1/1/3 (32) 1. Letter, Mshiyeni kaDinuzlu to Chief Native Commissioner, September 2, 1934.

<sup>166</sup> Representation of Natives Act No. 16 of 1936.

<sup>167</sup> Native Trust and Land Act of 1936.

<sup>168</sup> NTS 250 78/53/3, CNC to SNA, August 5, 1939; Cited in Buverud (2007): 32; Antony Costa, “Custom and common sense,” *African Studies* 56, no. 1 (1997): 24.

posed a great threat to the status quo to which white authorities so tenuously held. And with the threat of war on the horizon, this grasp on control over African populations remained more important than ever.

The outbreak of war on September 3, 1939 resulted in a rift in Parliament. Prime Minister Hertzog advocated for neutrality, based on his belief that joining the Allied war effort would result in division. Jan Smuts, on the other hand, argued for supporting Britain, based on a fear that if Hitler turned to South West Africa, South Africa would require Allied assistance to hold the Germans off. Smuts' play toward fear of German invasion won the day, resulting in Hertzog abandoning his post as Prime Minister and Smuts stepping up.<sup>169</sup> As South Africa joined the imperial war effort, South African authorities turned to Africans to serve in non-combatant roles in the Union Defence Force (UDF) in June 1940, resulting in the creation of four battalions of Native Military Guards in July 1940.<sup>170</sup> These Native Military Guards would eventually become known as the Native Military Corps. Africans from Zululand comprised the first battalion. Africans from the Northern Transvaal, the Transkei, and Africans from urban areas, who made up the Witwatersrand Battalion, comprised the other battalions. On July 12, 1940, the Native Military Corps was brought under the auspices of the Non-European Army Services (NEAS), which took over recruiting, training and deploying these forces.<sup>171</sup> Instead of being sent overseas as had been the case in World War I, servicemen in the Native Military Corps were sent to East Africa, Abyssinia, Egypt, Libya and Italy.<sup>172</sup> Again, just as had been the case with the SANLC,

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<sup>169</sup> Suryakanthie Chetty, "'A White Man's War': Settler Masculinity in the Union Defense Force, 1939-1945," in *Africa and World War II*, ed. by Judith Byfield, Carolyn Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Sikainga (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 303-304

<sup>170</sup> K.W. Grundy, *Soldiers without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 75.

<sup>171</sup> Grundy, *Soldiers without Politics*, 75-76.

<sup>172</sup> J.S. Mohlamme, "Soldiers without Reward: Africans in South Africa's Wars," *Military History Journal* 10, no. 1 (June 1995).

Africans were recruited for their labor, but not in any military capacity. There were used in support roles as drivers, mechanics, carpenters, medical aids, clerks, and a variety of other roles. One exception to this rule was the short-lived Twenty-First Field Regiment of the South African Artillery. In this unit, two Zulu-speaking white NCOs served on each gun, with six Zulu men assisting him. However, before being sent to North Africa, all of the enlisted Zulu men were removed from this unit and replaced with white soldiers.<sup>173</sup>

The replacing of these Zulu soldiers with white soldiers indicated a broader policy during this campaign regarding the rights of Africans to bear arms in service of the Union. Before the NMC formed in 1940, authorities contested the issue of arming African servicemen. The ANC passed a resolution in 1939 stating their intention to only support the Union government on the condition that African soldiers were armed. Though Dr. A.B. Xuma later amended this resolution by suggesting that the country could only be defended if all parts of the populace entered service on the same footing as white servicemen. The resolution centered on one core tenet: Africans serving in the military expected to be armed.<sup>174</sup> Mshiyeni echoed Xuma's stance in a letter to H. C. Lugg, explaining that he would "urge the Government to see its way to arm the Native Soldiers fully with modern weapons." "A fully armed Native Army will always be an asset to the State as has been proved in days of old," the Paramount Chief reasoned.<sup>175</sup> The Minister of Defense, Jan Smuts, had different ideas, as made evident in a 1940 missive directed to the Cape Corps, Malay Pioneer Battalion, and Malay Corps Motor Transport officers. European officers must, Smuts implored, keep a careful eye on the non-white servicemen, especially when

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<sup>173</sup> Grundy, *Soldiers without Politics*, 79.

<sup>174</sup> Mohlamme, "Soldiers without Reward."

<sup>175</sup> NAB, Zulu Society Papers (A1381) II/5-2, Letters Received, Acting Paramount Chief. Letter, Mshiyeni to H.C. Lugg, undated.



transporting arms lest they might foster “an unwelcome familiarity with musketry.”<sup>176</sup> A few weeks later, Smuts reiterated this position, making it “clearly understood that natives will not, under any circumstances, be equipped with arms of precision.”<sup>177</sup>

Bill Nasson argues that this distinction between European and Non-European soldiers based on the right to bear arms presented a dilemma to the Union since they wanted to secure the full support of their Non-European servicemen but had to protect against any potential uprising; in short, they were to be treated like servicemen but expected to serve like soldiers. The Powers of Command Proclamation 15 of 1942 addressed this dilemma plainly, reminding European personnel that to achieve these goals, African support would only be secured “if their sacrifice and wish to serve are recognized and if they are treated as soldiers.”<sup>178</sup> While this did “not condone pandering and intermingling socially,” the proclamation plainly stated that it did “demand justice under all conditions, a sharing of whatever alleviation of hardship and abstention from manhandling, swearing at and addressing the Non-Europeans in a non-military manner, unbecoming of soldiers.”<sup>179</sup>

So, armed they were, though not with the same firearms as their white counterparts. At airfields, harbors, factories, and prisoner of war camps, NMC soldiers were, as the *Natal Witness* reported in July 1941, armed “in a fashion drawing upon the admirably strong traditions and customs of the natives,” bearing knobkerries, wooden clubs, and assegais. This idyllic characterization of the situation ran contrary to Xuma’s understanding. Xuma found the arming of NMC members with “traditional weapons” to be demeaning. The Corps, Xuma stated, were “expected to fight aeroplanes, tanks and artillery with *knobkerries* and *assegais*. What mockery!

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<sup>176</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 196.

<sup>177</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 197.

<sup>178</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 197.

<sup>179</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 197.

It is demeaning. How degrading for a soldier to be reduced in standing to that of some common tribesman.”<sup>180</sup> The decision to arm African soldiers in this way, Nasson argues, amounted to “another idiosyncratic South African lesson—how to combine clashing cultures of warfare or, rather more to the point, how to see to it that they would not clash.”<sup>181</sup>

White authorities used the Zulus’ martial heritage as justification for the choice to arm NMC members in this way, with some observers patronizingly arguing that African soldiers were used to making do with much less than whites. In the days of Shaka, one author wrote in *Libertas*, “[ . . . ] the *impi* that formed his front-line troops and his personal bodyguard, hand-picked by Chaka himself from strapping young volunteers, proved their valour and strength in a death struggle with lions trapped in the Zululand mountains; the young warriors employed no other weapons than their bare hands and *riempies* to overcome and truss up the savage, rending beasts. That same fearlessness is being turned today to an even finer purpose on the battlefields.”<sup>182</sup>

The idea that Africans, and Zulus in particular, held some advantage in returning to a precolonial warrior tradition served as a rationale that allowed Europeans to convince themselves that “by being true to their own implements of combat that African guards would form a most naturally strong barrier against the enemy.”<sup>183</sup> In Nasson’s words, “as UDF soldiers capable of spearing chests and cracking skulls, Africans were being granted the opportunity of returning to a more elemental and more authentic world of pre-colonial warrior habits and instincts.”<sup>184</sup> The Communist Party of South Africa did not share the same segregationist affection for the granting

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<sup>180</sup> Hermann Giliomee and Bernard Mbenga, eds., *New History of South Africa* (Cape Town, 2007) 295.

<sup>181</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 200.

<sup>182</sup> ‘Zulu Hero: Old Fighting Spirit Lives On’, *Libertas*, 4 no. 8 (1944), p. 58. Cited in Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 202.

<sup>183</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 203.

<sup>184</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 203-204.

of “traditional weapons” to NMC members. One SACP member who also served as a UDF officer disparaged the policy. He labeled it “a humiliation, the vanished brand of some savage warrior [. . .] For this class of disciplined Bantu men, drilled on parade grounds, it is lamentable.”<sup>185</sup> This position resulted in the “Give Him a Gun, Now” campaign, which simultaneously cast the spear-toting African NMC member in the imagery of a Red Army Soldier, while at the same time demanding that victory could only come if all patriots, including black patriots, were allowed to carry guns.<sup>186</sup>

At the same time as these debates were raging, recruitment for the NMC in Natal and Zululand stagnated. This had also been the case in recruiting servicemen for the SANLC, though the reasons for the slow uptake in NMC recruitment stemmed from different fears. Instead of fear of traveling overseas and the weight of familial responsibilities, racial discrimination (including the inability of an African serviceman to rise above the rank of Sergeant) and the withholding of weapons were among the many possible reasons for the slow rate of volunteers from Zululand and Natal.<sup>187</sup> As Louis Grundlingh recently showed, the classification of the Zulu as a martial race played a large role in the extra attention paid to their low enrollment numbers. “Poor response from the Zulu particularly disappointed and confounded the authorities,” Grundlingh explained; “In keeping with colonial thinking in the rest of Africa, the Zulu were regarded as an outstanding ‘martial race’ and likely to enlist.”<sup>188</sup> White assumptions about Zulus’ supposedly inherent martial inclinations were based on observations like this one by Sgt. B. G.

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<sup>185</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 204.

<sup>186</sup> Nasson, “Give Him a Gun NOW,” 208.

<sup>187</sup> NAB, Zulu Society Papers (ZSP) (A1381) IV/4/1. Papers re: Native Military Corps, 1941-1944. A Memorandum Presented by Africans Representing African Opinion in the Union of South Africa on a Select Committee of the House of Assembly, February 26, 1943.

<sup>188</sup> Louis Grundlingh, “The Military, Race, and Resistance: The Conundrums of Recruiting Black South African Men During the Second World War,” in Judith A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds.) *Africa and World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 83.

Tranchell: “the average raw Zulu . . . is full of martial ardor and takes naturally to soldiering, as anyone can testify who has witnessed tribal fights or attended large war dances in the Reserves.”<sup>189</sup> Even with this fiery martial spirit, Zulus only turned out in small numbers in the early months of the recruitment campaign, causing white authorities to look for other ways to encourage enlistment.

Whatever the reason for the low uptake in recruitment, to overcome these issues, some white authorities began to appoint chiefs and headmen to act as recruitment agents, due to the considerable influence most chiefs continued to hold over their people. One white official wrote of the decision to enlist traditional authorities, arguing that “tribal instincts are still strong among the Natives and if chiefs could be made to feel that they . . . were regarded as being responsible for producing recruits, such an increase in interest would possibly result.”<sup>190</sup> One Vryheid Magistrate even expressed concerns that the authority of chiefs could not guarantee recruits since “it is useless to ask a native whether he will kindly join the Forces, he should be compelled to do so by his Paramount Chief in the interest of their Country and not by the Government.”<sup>191</sup>

Mshiyeni proved very willing to aid in the recruiting process, though his own ideas about what his role should be differed at first from that of the South African government. Early in the war effort, Mshiyeni had written to Pretoria expressing his desire to establish “a Zulu Military Regiment trained in the manipulation of Big Guns, war tanks, armoured vehicles, motor cycles—all for combating the armed forces of the enemy. All necessary weapons and vehicles will be made available.”<sup>192</sup> The central government denied Mshiyeni’s request, but he still threw his

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<sup>189</sup> Grundlingh, “The Military, Race, and Resistance,” 83.

<sup>190</sup> OC 3rd Bn. NMC to DNEAS, June 15, 1942, NMC NAS 3/4/1 B 5, Box 2, ANMC, SANDFA, Pretoria. Cited in Grundlingh, “The Military, Race, and Resistance,” 76.

<sup>191</sup> Grundlingh, “The Military, Race, and Resistance,” 78.

<sup>192</sup> Louis Grundlingh, ‘The Recruitment of South African Blacks for Participation in the Second World War’, in D. Killingray and R. Rathbone (eds), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 191.

support behind NAD efforts to recruit Zulu laborers. Mshiyeni authored an article for *Ilanga lase Natal* on May 31, 1941, announcing two recruitment meetings to occur on June 7 and June 14, 1941, in Pietermaritzburg and Eshowe respectively. “I say all the young men of the nation entered this regiment for its announcement - IMPUMALANGA - those who arrived for the assembly will join before my regiment becomes another once for me,” Mshiyeni wrote, “The administrators of this regiment will be coming here with warriors of kwaZulu who have already been taught to use cannons and the many weapons there for their part in the war.”<sup>193</sup> Mshiyeni concluded the article with one final plea: “Join before it ends with the regiment of the sun - IMPUMALANGA.”<sup>194</sup>

Mshiyeni not only recruited Zulu men to join the Native Military Corps, but actually became a member himself.<sup>195</sup> At a recruiting meeting held in Pietermaritzburg on May 10, 1942, Mshiyeni explained his decision for supporting this effort. “I have come to you again to appeal to you young men to follow me in the work of supporting His Majesty, the King, in the mighty work of opposing our common enemies, against peace, goodwill, and freedom of the people of the Earth,” the Paramount Chief elucidated.<sup>196</sup> Commenting on the military display that preceded his speech, Mshiyeni implored the audience to recognize the benefits that came with military service. He thanked R.H. Addison “for this wonderful display that we have all enjoyed this

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<sup>193</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/7, Newspaper Cuttings. “Isimemezelo Sika Mshiyeni Ka Din’uzulu.” *Ilanga lase Natal* 31 May 1941. Personal translation. Original: “Ngithi zonke izintsizwa zezwe mazihlome zingene ebuthweni leli enginibikela lona—IMPUMALANGA—bafike bonke kulomhlangano bazojoyina phambi kwami babe yibutho linye kanye nami....Abaphathy baleli BUTHO bayoba khona beze namazotsha akwaZULU as’efundisiwe ukusebenzisa bona ombhaimbhai nezikhali eziningi zokulwa nayo yonke imidati yempi....Nojoyina kube kuphela ngalelolang ebuthweni lami—IMPUMALANGA.”

<sup>194</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/7, Newspaper Cuttings. “Isimemezelo Sika Mshiyeni Ka Din’uzulu.” *Ilanga lase Natal* 31 May 1941.

<sup>195</sup> University of Johannesburg Special Collections (UJSC), Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC), B132, Monthly Report - June 1941.

<sup>196</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/3/1, Documents re: Paramount Chief, The Words of Acting Paramount Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu to Chiefs and People at a Recruiting Meeting Held in Pietermaritzburg on Sunday May 10, 1941.

afternoon—an evidence of what our Native men can learn in military life.”<sup>197</sup> “The drill that we have seen has shown us why these young men that join the army look so fit and strong.”<sup>198</sup> Mshiyeni insisted, “Some join the army as weaklings, but in short time they turn out to be as strong as lions—thanks to camp training and discipline to which I am calling you young men.”<sup>199</sup> He also reminded those men in attendance of the famine threatening the country and the relief promised by enlistment. “Look at those boys in khaki, do they look hungry?,” Mshiyeni asked; “The boys in khaki don’t starve—they have money in their pockets, but you who roam about idle will starve, and your families will be broken and you will come running someday to join the army and live.”<sup>200</sup> Mshiyeni also played on the potential recruits’ pride, reminding them that he (and the white authorities) could easily force them to enlist, but that he wished “to see the manliness . . . in you.”<sup>201</sup> Using his own authority, combined with references to familial responsibility and gendered expectations, Mshiyeni attempted to recruit men for the NMC through his own frame of reference. This connection to the duty that men had to their families to harkened back to the community roots of the *amabutho* of the Zulu Kingdom, which explicitly linked social reproduction with conscripted military service.

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<sup>197</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/3/1, Documents re: Paramount Chief, The Words of Acting Paramount Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu to Chiefs and People at a Recruiting Meeting Held in Pietermaritzburg on Sunday May 10, 1941.

<sup>198</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/3/1, Documents re: Paramount Chief, The Words of Acting Paramount Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu to Chiefs and People at a Recruiting Meeting Held in Pietermaritzburg on Sunday May 10, 1941.

<sup>199</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/3/1, Documents re: Paramount Chief, The Words of Acting Paramount Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu to Chiefs and People at a Recruiting Meeting Held in Pietermaritzburg on Sunday May 10, 1941.

<sup>200</sup> NAB, A1381 (A1381) IV/3/1, Documents re: Paramount Chief. The Words of Acting Paramount Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu to Chiefs and People at a Recruiting Meeting Held in Pietermaritzburg on Sunday May 10, 1941.

<sup>201</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/3/1, Documents re: Paramount Chief, The Words of Acting Paramount Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu to Chiefs and People at a Recruiting Meeting Held in Pietermaritzburg on Sunday May 10, 1941.

The Zulu Society similarly turned to Zulu heritage to secure recruits for the NMC, utilizing propaganda and radio broadcasts as opposed to speeches and announcements. Originally founded as the as the Zulu Language and Cultural Society, an auxiliary to the Teachers' Association, this society existed, according to Albert Luthuli who helped establish the society while working as an instructor at Adams College in 1937, "to preserve what is valuable in our heritage while discarding the inappropriate and outmoded."<sup>202</sup> As the Society evolved, its focus shifted from "relating the past coherently to the present and the future" to "the preservation of Zulu tradition and custom at a time when they seemed to be disintegrating in the face of the pressures of proletarianization and urbanization."<sup>203</sup> By this time, Luthuli had left teaching, and therefore the Society, but in his autobiography, he reflected on the shifts to the Society as it became entwined with the Native Affairs Department thanks to a stipend in the amount of £250 per year.<sup>204</sup> By the time Luthuli had left Adams to take on the mantle of chief in Groutville, "the Zulu Language and Cultural Society . . . accepted a government grant, lost its independence, became involved in the Native Affairs Department and Zulu Royal House politics, went into decline, and (after withdrawal by the teachers) collapsed," he recalled.

The involvement of the Native Affairs Department along with the new emphasis on tradition and custom, along with a closer relationship with the Royal house, framed efforts to recruit African men from Natal and Zululand, particularly through references to Zulu regimental recruitment and responsibility to their king (in this case, to their regent Mshiyeni).<sup>205</sup> In other words, those who joined the Native Military Corps were also joining *Impumalanga* (the Rising

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<sup>202</sup> Albert Luthuli, *Let My People Go* (Cape Town: Mafube, 2006), 34-35; NAB A1381 IV/7, Newspaper Cuttings. "Society to Preserve Zulu Culture" *Natal Mercury* January 22, 1937.

<sup>203</sup> Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence*, 6.

<sup>204</sup> Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence*, 6.

<sup>205</sup> For more on the NAD's recruitment efforts through South Africa, see Fankie Lucas Monama, "Wartime Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939 – 1945" (Ph.D. Diss, Stellenbosch University, April 2014).

Sun), “the Paramount Chief’s personal regiment.”<sup>206</sup> Recruitment documents and news articles referenced to the Native Military Corps as *ibutho leNdlu eMnyama*, as seen in an announcement posted throughout Natal and Zululand.<sup>207</sup> Depicting the traditional Zulu chest-and-horn military formation with Mshiyeni in the front (*isifuba*) flanked by Matole Buthelezi, Mnyayiza, and Langalake (*izimpondo*), the flyer encouraged Zulu men to join the Corps by harkening back to their martial culture and identity.

The explicit link between service in the NMC and military enlistment as it had existed during the Zulu kingdom held the potential to bolster lagging recruitment rates. Another Zulu Society recruiting document entitled “Help to Win the War” referenced this martial heritage. In addition to citing the financial compensation promised to Corps members, as well as the responsibility for men to protect their country, the Society also linked service in the NMC to the legacy of the Zulu nation as a whole. “Now is the time to answer the call of our great leader. Let us by our deeds prove we are worthy citizens of this great land of ours,” the announcement read.<sup>208</sup> “Never let it be said that the Zulu would not answer this call, not only are we letting South Africa down, our countrymen, but we will collapse the tradition of our race built up by our forebears through the Centuries.”<sup>209</sup>

The Zulu Society also turned to the radio to reach more potential recruits and to fortify those men who had already enlisted. Each of these broadcasts began with an *isibongo* in honor of the Native Military Corps recited in Zulu by a Zulu Society poet (*imbongi*) named Nongejeni Zuma.

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<sup>206</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/1. Papers re: Native Military Corps, 1941-1944.

<sup>207</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/3. War Terms Used in Broadcasts; NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/1. Papers re: Native Military Corps, 1941-1944.

<sup>208</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/1. Help to Win the War in Papers re: Native Military Corps, 1941-1944.

<sup>209</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/1. Help to Win the War in Papers re: Native Military Corps, 1941-1944.



Let us greet you valiant men  
 Let us greet you hosts of His Majesty!  
 Let us greet you who clear the dark clouds  
 Before the rising sun,  
 Who plunge into a pond inhabited by a  
 crocodile  
 Which snarled its teeth  
 And resorted to its aboriginal home.

We greet you who stab and push the foes,  
 Chasing them towards the setting sun,  
 Until Tunisia's gates are passed  
 And the foes cleared off Africa's soil.

We greet you who have the enchantment of a  
 song  
 Blending the voices of the living and the dead  
 For you enjoy the admiration of  
 Sikhwishikhwishi<sup>210</sup>  
 Among the White people  
 And you enjoy the admiration and Bova<sup>211</sup>  
 Among those of Mjokwana, son of Ndaba.

We greet you destroyers of bodies sheltered in  
 hiding  
 For in Algeria you destroyed the foe—  
 In Somaliland, you destroyed the foe—  
 In Egypt, you destroyed the foe—  
 In Cyrenaica, you destroyed the foe—  
 In Abyssinia, you destroyed the foe—  
 And in Libya, you destroyed the foe.<sup>212</sup>

Mpanza recited dozens of *izibongo* on air between 1942-1994, including *izibongo* honoring the Native Military Corps (and other South African military units). In these *izibongo*, Mpanza aimed to inspire the Native Military Corps members, referring to them as “the men of *Sikhwishikhwishi*—the whirlwind—sons of brave men, our fathers.”<sup>213</sup>

The unquenchable Fire, (South African Army)  
 which envelopes all mountains,  
 to give relief to jaded warriors,  
 Warriors of Abyssinia—  
 who on seeing it sought their shields,  
 Amid the accumulation of their women folk,  
 Beholding the Fire of the Unquenchables—  
 the cockroach that penetrated  
 The ears of Mussolini.  
 And denied sleep to his warriors.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> Field Marshal J. C. Smuts.

<sup>211</sup> Mshiyeni, Acting Paramount Chief

<sup>212</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2, Broadcast to Native Military Corps, October 25, 1943. All *izibongo* in the Zulu Society Papers were broadcast in Zulu and later translated into English. These English transcripts are what these quotations are drawn from.

<sup>213</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to Native Soldiers, Record No. 8, June 13, 1944.

<sup>214</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to Native Soldiers, Record No. 8, June 13, 1944.

In a June 13, 1944, broadcast, a woman named Nomakhimbili joined Mpanza and requested that he sing the praises of the men of the Royal Air Force. He compared these airmen to “the swallow that flies through the clouds, with the descending swoop of a bird.”<sup>215</sup> “Irresistible assailant with the speed of a bee through the heavens,” Mpanza continued, “Barrier against the missiles of Germany, defying death in the face of their foes.”<sup>216</sup> In conclusion, Mpanza made one last comparison, juxtaposing the men of the Royal Air Force to the “mole whose sharp vision penetrates the sea, and outstanding, brilliant as the Sun.”<sup>217</sup> “Praise the warriors of the King!” Nomakhimbili and A. W. Dlamini (President of the Zulu Society) called out in response to his praises.<sup>218</sup>

Indeed, it seems that the guests who joined Mpanza’s broadcasts viewed them as “warriors of the King.” For example, Nongejeni Zuma joined Mpanza for multiple broadcasts. In fact, the *izibongo* that Mpanza read during each broadcast had actually been originally composed by Zuma.<sup>219</sup> At the time of the broadcasts, Zuma, brother of Chief Ndabayake Zuma of the Nxamalala of Nkandla, served as an *induna* to the CNC’s office. Prior to this posting, he had worked as a stable assistant for Theophilus Shepstone.<sup>220</sup> Zuma’s deep roots in both the administration *and* the Zulu heartland provided extra weight to Mpanza’s broadcasts. While Mpanza (via Nongejeni) recited *izibongo* written by Zulu Society authors, Zuma recounted tales

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<sup>215</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, Record No. 9, June 13, 1944.

<sup>216</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, Record No. 9, June 13, 1944.

<sup>217</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, Record No. 9, June 13, 1944.

<sup>218</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, Record No. 9, June 13, 1944.

<sup>219</sup> Zuma composed these *izibongo* but was illiterate, so Zulu Society translators recorded and transcribed them for the broadcasts. Lugg, *Life Under a Zulu Shield*, 80.

<sup>220</sup> In a recent biography of Pixley ka Seme, Bongani Ngqulunga asserts that Nongejeni had not only worked for the CNC but was working as a spy for the colonial administration. Bongani Ngqulunga. *The Man Who Founded the ANC: A Biography of Pixley ka Isaka Seme* (Johannesburg: Penguin Random House South Africa, 2017).

of bravery to inspire the servicemen, in addition to reminding the men of their warrior roots. In some of the broadcasts, fables were used to convey lessons to the men serving abroad.

Recounting a tale of a hunt for a lion devouring cattle, Mpanza and Zuma compared the Corps' efforts to defeat the Germans to the work of Zulu warriors hunting a lion "which has overcome countries' herds."<sup>221</sup> Zuma expected their "warriors" to have their tales to tell and morals to convey when they returned from their service. "It will be nice to review your experiences before authorities, as run the words of a Zulu warrior chant," Zuma reflected.<sup>222</sup> Zuma also expressed regret that he could not join these young warriors overseas.

I have listened quietly and attentively as you took the young men across the drifts of their brave doings. I only wish I could see them with my own eyes. Wow! Although this physical body of mine may grow feeble—yet the heart is young, and remains with its wailings. How can this be myself—remaining behind the roll up mats when men have taken up arms? Am I not born of a brave man?<sup>223</sup>

The vigor and vitality of these young men served as an inspiration for all men, especially those, like Zuma, who had aged past their ability to join such a unit. "For even when I see them in my old age, fresh blood runs through my veins," Zuma cried out in an October 1943 broadcast; "and I am moved to take my shield and *giya*."<sup>224</sup>

In other broadcasts, another Native Affairs darling, Pika Zulu kaSiteku kaMpande, partnered with Mpanza. On January 14, 1944, Mpanza opened the broadcast by entreating his Zulu listeners to "say a word in greeting [to] the young men of your great fathers—young men who set forth and joined His Majesty's armed hosts up north."<sup>225</sup> The "great fathers" to whom Mpanza referred to were Mpande and Siteku, Pika Zulu's grandfather and father respectively.

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<sup>221</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast to Native Military Corps, October 25, 1943.

<sup>222</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast to Native Military Corps, October 25, 1943.

<sup>223</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast to Native Military Corps, October 25, 1943.

<sup>224</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast to Native Military Corps, October 25, 1943.

<sup>225</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, Record No. 5, January 14, 1944.

Pika Zulu's appearance on the Zulu Society broadcasts provided another concrete connection between the Zulu Society, the Royal Family, and the NAD. By the time he appeared on the radio broadcast, Pika had worked for the Native Affairs Department since his mid-20s, including a long stint as John Sydney Marwick's chief induna beginning in 1916. Pika's loyalty to Durban's white authorities ran so deep that in 1917 he had reported John Dube to Marwick for slander.<sup>226</sup> Thus, Zulu's message to the servicemen carried double significance for white and African listeners as he congratulated the soldiers "for the honour [they] have accorded the Zulu prestige."<sup>227</sup> He insisted that their enrollment in Impumalanga represented a type of military service similar to that of young men during Shaka's time. "Your honour will be spoken of when the dust-raising battles of war have ended—when brave men will be reviewing their experiences round the fire-hearths at home," Zulu exhorted them; "Continue to be a source of pride to your officers, by your behaviour. And thus, you will help to uphold the prestige of the Zulu nation in the world."<sup>228</sup> Similarly to Zuma, Zulu's message on these broadcasts were clear: Zulu men were warriors and their service overseas served a testament to that legacy.

This martial legacy carried duty, as emphasized in many of the broadcasts; not only the duty of their soldiers in their military service but the duties of their families and the work to be done in Corps' members' absence. In a March 13, 1944, broadcast, A. H. Ngidi compared the *Impumalanga* regiment to other Zulu regiments as he explained the importance of cooperation. "It is not one man who goes out to attack the enemy. It is the cooperation of whole regiments that

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<sup>226</sup> Muziwandile Hadebe, "Prince Phikinkani kaSitheku Zulu." *Umlando* (Publication of Local History Museums - Durban) 1, 2 (December 2011): 18. For accounts of Marwick's distrust of John Dube, Durban Archives Repository (TBD), Durban Corporation (3/DBN), 4/1/2/1223, 467A. Marwick v. Dube, 1916; Ralph Callebert, *On Durban's Docks: Zulu Workers, Rural Households, Global Labor* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2017), 35-37; Hughes, *The First President*, 199-200.

<sup>227</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, Record No. 5, January 14, 1944.

<sup>228</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, Record No. 5, January 14, 1944..

drive away the foe,” Ngidi explained, “I am sure our brave men in the army are learning the value of co-operation, and that when they return they will use the learning thus obtained and co-operate to maintain the welfare of their families.”<sup>229</sup> The families were also expected to prepare the homeland for the soldiers’ return. Mpanza used that same broadcast to explicate the efforts being made at home for the men to enjoy after their safe return. Along with A. H. Ngidi, Z. A. Khumalo and Bafikile Sikakane, Mpanza hoped to use the broadcast “to point out to the young men that the people at home too are busy at work.”<sup>230</sup> In their absence, Mpanza emphasized, their family members were “engaged in field husbandry, home-building and national work . . . in order that after the storms of fighting have abated, and light comes forth, they may enjoy that light generally in their pastoral, education, cultural, and social pursuits.”<sup>231</sup>

After the war ended, the Director of Non-European Army Services, E. T. Stubbs, spoke about the honorable service of the Corps in a ceremony on October 5, 1945, during which N. J. de Wet also presented medals for outstanding service. “The purpose of His Excellency’s presence here today is to present awards gained by members of the Cape Corps and Native Military Corps on the various battlefields during the greatest war in human history, now happily ended with a glorious victory for the Allied armies,” Stubbs said; “Everywhere and in every sphere of activities, these units have according to high military authority given a good account of themselves.”<sup>232</sup> Zulu authorities offered thanks to the British Empire. Mshiyeni once again asked Lugg to convey a message to King George VI in honor of the war’s successful conclusion. “I write on behalf of my people the Zulus who, up to this day, cherish the memories of the Great

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<sup>229</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, March 13, 1944.

<sup>230</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, March 13, 1944.

<sup>231</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/4/2, CNC Natal 79/4/2. Broadcast in Zulu to African Soldiers, March 13, 1944.

<sup>232</sup> S. Horwitz. “The Non-European War Record in South Africa,” in E. Hellman (ed.) *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa* (1949): 537-538; cited in Mohlamme, *Soldiers without Reward*.

English Queen Victoria who was much respected by my grandfather Cetshwayo,” Mshiyeni wrote.<sup>233</sup> During the course of the war, Mshiyeni reminisced, “I spent many sleepless nights trying to see how I could get the Zulus to help,” deciding eventually “to join the army myself and my principal uncle Mnyayiza, son of Ndabuko who was next to Cetshwayo in rank, was good enough to come with me and join the army,” as well as “Chief Councillor Matole (Buthelezi), son of Mnyamana who was Prime Minister to my grandfather Cetshwayo.”<sup>234</sup> Mshiyeni’s personal sacrifice meant that the end of the war represented “a great pleasure to the Zulus and myself that the War and all its hostilities has come to an end in favour of our gracious King George and his allies.”<sup>235</sup> He thanked the King, the Government (and Field Marshal Smuts in particular), in addition to “pay[ing] tribute to the Department of Native Affairs that work so diligently to incorporate the services of the Zulus in fighting for the King.”<sup>236</sup>

Aran MacKinnon views the failure of Mshiyeni and other traditional authorities to link “an appeal to traditional martial values . . . to support of the white state’s cause” with a growing separation between the chiefs and both “disenchanted Zulu men” and the white state.<sup>237</sup> “Where such ‘tradition’ was called upon, chiefs had to ensure it served the direct interests of their people and this was not the case with recruitment,” MacKinnon explains, “The men could not justify warrior status by serving without guns, and in an army that was not their own.”<sup>238</sup> She concludes:

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<sup>233</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) II/5-2, Letters Received, Acting Para. Chief. Letter, Mshiyeni to King George VI, undated.

<sup>234</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) II/5-2, Letters Received, Acting Para. Chief. Letter, Mshiyeni to King George VI, undated.

<sup>235</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) II/5-2, Letters Received, Acting Para. Chief. Letter, Mshiyeni to King George VI, undated.

<sup>236</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) II/5-2, Letters Received, Acting Para. Chief. Letter, Mshiyeni to King George VI, undated.

<sup>237</sup> Aran S. Mackinnon, “Chiefly Authority, Leapfrogging Headmen and the Political Economy of Zululand, South Africa, ca. 1930-1950,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 27, no. 3 (2001): 582.

<sup>238</sup> MacKinnon, “Chiefly Authority, Leapfrogging Headmen and the Political Economy of Zululand, South Africa, ca. 1930-1950,” 582.

“The failure of war recruitment was an important indicator of chiefs’ inability to connect Zulu interests with the larger state. It was, moreover, evidence of a widening gap between chiefs’ interests in national affairs and the daily administration of the reserves.”<sup>239</sup> The difficulty in recruiting Zulu men for the Native Military Corps signaled a broader difficulty in traditional authorities’ ability to use their position not only to support their subjects, but also to maintain the status and well-being in the eyes of the South African state.

While war had raged overseas, Mshiyeni continued to serve as regent for Solomon’s underage sons. By 1945, however, the secession debates that had raged since Solomon’s death finally abated. The Minister of Native Affairs, Major P. V. G. van der Byl, announced in September 1945 at a gathering in Mtubatuba that Cyprian would inherit the position when he came of age and married. This concluded a long secession dispute which arose when Mshiyeni, Mnyaiza Nkantini and Mgixo reported to E. N. Braatvedt that Solomon had shown preference for his eldest son, Victory Pikowaziwayo; six years later this group requested a withdrawal of this nomination at Braatvedt’s office, instead putting forward Thandayipi, claiming they had been rushed when making their original choice. Authorities instructed Mshiyeni to hold a meeting of elders to inquire into the question of the heir, at which point the council decided on Thandayipi as the intended heir.<sup>240</sup>

Four years later, Cyprian Bhekuzulu came forward and laid his own claim to the “crown.” After gathering supporters for his causes, Cyprian went to Braatevedt, who appointed a board of Government officials, including Col. Martin (CNC), H.P. Braatvedt (Native Commissioner at Nongoma), and V. Addison (Native Commissioner in Msinga) who concluded

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<sup>239</sup> MacKinnon, “Chiefly Authority, Leapfrogging Headmen and the Political Economy of Zululand, South Africa, ca. 1930-1950,” 582.

<sup>240</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/3/2, Documents re: Succession Dispute.

that Thandayiphi's claim should be rejected and Cyprian be recognized as heir. Christina Sibiya, Cyprian's mother and Solomon's first wife, provided critical evidence in the form of a document signed by Solomon in March 1930 which read: "You are the one who was to bear the Chief, and I give this letter to you to keep it safely so that in case I die before putting my kraal in order you should produce it so that it should be known that my heir is Cyprian Bhekuzulu."<sup>241</sup> Like his father, Cyprian assumed the mantle of the Zulu nation at a very young age; in 1945, he was only 21 years old.

In 1947, the Zulu Nation again assembled, under the supervision of the Native Affairs Department, at Eshowe to celebrate the royal visit of King George VI, Queen Elizabeth, Princess Elizabeth, and Princess Margaret. In the lead up to the event, newspapers reported in particular how "the whole Zulu nation for weeks past had been re-forming their old-time regiments in age groups for the occasion."<sup>242</sup> Pika Zulu, the Zulu Society *induna*, served as the organizer and leader of the dancers for the event, an appointment which Daniel McKinnon Malcolm proclaimed on his Zulu Diary radio broadcast as being "greeted with universal approval."<sup>243</sup> In the lead up to the celebrations, Pika coordinated dancers composed of a number of royal regiments, including the oldest living regiment *Felapakati* ("Those Who Die Within") who Tracey noted "lead the Royal Dance in spite of their great age."<sup>244</sup> In addition to *Felapakati*, the event brought together the *Hayilengwenya* ("Replete with Drink"), *Mavalana* ("Those Who Stopped the Entrance"), *Cijimpi* ("Sharpen the army"), *Vukayibambe* ("Up and at Them"),

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<sup>241</sup> NAB, ZSP (A1381) IV/7, Newspaper Cuttings. "Chieftainship of Zulus Now Decided." September 17, 1945.

<sup>242</sup> "Painted Zulus Dance for 'Royal Black Elephant'." *Sydney Morning Herald*. 20 March 1947, p. 3.

<sup>243</sup> KCAL, Daniel McKinnon Malcolm Papers, File 13 Broadcast Transcripts. Zulu Diary XII (1946-1947)

<sup>244</sup> Hugh Tracey, *Souvenir Programme; Ngoma Umkosi - The Royal Dance* (Mtunzini: Rotapress Printer, 1947); KCAL, Daniel McKinnon Malcolm Papers, KCM 99/15/2, Zulu Diary XII Broadcast.



*Lupondowendhlovu* (“The Elephant’s Tusk”), *Ntabayezulu* (“The Hill of Heaven”), and *Ngangakazana* (“The Polecats”).<sup>245</sup>

*Life* covered this visit the pages of the April 7, 1947 issue, with in an article entitled “Zulus Dance for Their British King.” As the ground in Eshowe “trembled under the savage beat of a Zulu war dance.”<sup>246</sup> This would be the last time the regiments gathered to dance as subjects of the British king; the 1948 elections would turn the tides in South African politics, ushering it not only a new era of Afrikaner nationalism but also of black defiance to what would come to be known as apartheid. “For black South Africans, as for white English-speakers, however, this tour was both a highpoint and the swansong of this culture of ‘loyalism’,” Hilary Sapire explains, “Whereas English speakers turned inward after 1948, with a brief rallying to monarchy and Commonwealth during the 1960 republican referendum, black South Africans embraced a new politics of mass defiance in the following decades. The age of deference in African politics was finally over.”<sup>247</sup>

This final royal tour coincided with shifting tides in relation to the Zulu kings status as well. In his autobiography, Albert Luthuli, the first African to receive the Nobel Peace Prize and President-General of the African National Congress (ANC) between 1952 and 1967, reflected on the influence of the Zulu Royal House, even with Solomon and later Mshiyeni’s diminished status. “The relation of Zulu chiefs to the Paramount is a matter of sentiment, rather than of law. He has no legal authority over lesser chiefs or over their people, but the authority which he exerts by virtue of his place in the hearts of Zulus is great,” Luthuli explained, “Our loyalty is real and a

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<sup>245</sup> Tracey, *Souvenir Programme*.

<sup>246</sup> “Zulus Dance for their British King.” *Life* 22, 14 (April 7, 1947): 31-35.

<sup>247</sup> Hilary Sapire, “African Loyalism and Its Discontents: The Royal Tour of South Africa, 1947,” *The Historical Journal* 54, no. 1 (2011): 240; John Lambert, “‘Welcome Home’: White English-speaking South Africans and the Royal Visit of 1947,” *South African Historical Journal*, 69, no. 1 (2017): 101-120.

force to be reckoned with . . . It would take more than a few years of Nationalist rule to undermine it far enough to bring it tumbling down.”<sup>248</sup>

Although Nationalist rule did not, in fact, “undermine” the Zulu monarchy to the point of failure, it did place substantial pressures on the Zulu Royal House to maintain relevance to their people while simultaneously positioning themselves as indispensable to white authorities. The formation and actions of *amabutho* directly connected this struggle for recognition with larger debates regarding the exercise of Zulu ethnicity and the fear of rebellious African masculinity still lingering from the Bambatha Rebellion (and even the Anglo-Zulu War). At the same time, white authorities recognized the uses of both the Zulu king and his regiments for more practical purposes, especially in relation to labor. In the First and Second World Wars, both the structures of pre-existing regiments and the invocation of metaphors related to royal *amabutho* proved essential for recruiting labor for military camps, albeit in small numbers. Similarly, when representatives of the Imperial Government traveled to South Africa, authorities expected chiefs to organize their regiments for ceremonial purposes, regardless of the illegality of their existence.

These ambiguities expose the complicated nature of *amabutho* in this era, simultaneously restricted from existence while also necessary for South Africa’s ability to meet the needs of the Imperial authorities. The deep enmeshment of the *amabutho* and the Royal House meant that these same ambiguities impacted Solomon and later Mshiyeni. While they were deeply necessary for the success of the white administration, their position threatened the status quo and resulted in tension and pressures that shaped the course of history in Zululand and Natal and the urban areas to which Zulu men and women traveled in search of work.

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<sup>248</sup> Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, 62.

## Chapter 4:

### “The Warrior Is Now a Worker...”: Modernizing Martial Masculinity in Urban Migrant Communities, 1928 to 1971

The warrior's now a worker and his war is underground  
With cordite in the darkness he milks the bleeding veins of gold  
When the smoking rock face murmurs, he always thinks of you  
African sky blue, will you see him through?  
- “African Sky Blue” by Juluka

In the period from the 1920s to 1971, the *amabutho* and its connected material culture and metaphors took on new meaning as increasing numbers of Zulu-speaking men migrated to and from urban areas in Natal and the Witwatersrand to seek out new opportunities. While the regiments helped to organize men in the early days of this cycle for publicly mandated labor, as time went on, the manifestations of the *amabutho* became more abstract, emerging in society, culture, and politics in unexpected ways. The martial heritage embodied by the *amabutho* also provided a convenient scapegoat for the national government who pointed to the inherent qualities of the Zulu, along with other ethnic groups, and justified both the stratification of Africans in urban areas based on their ethnic background as well as their increasingly stringent policies based on the violent potential of men working in urban areas.

Many studies have tracked the impact of migrancy on particular communities in southern Africa.<sup>1</sup> William Beinart’s study of Pondoland illustrates “how dominated groups contributed to

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<sup>1</sup> Alan Jeeves, Jonathan Crush, and David Yudelman, *South Africa’s Labor Empire: A History of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Fiona Rankin-Smith, Laura Phillips, and Peter Delius (ed.), *A Long Way Home: Migrant Worker Worlds 1800-2014* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014); Mahoney (2012); William Beinart, “Joyini Inkomo: Cattle Advances and the Origins of Migrancy of Pondoland,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 5, no. 2 (1979), 199–219; William Beinart, *The Political Economy of Pondoland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); William Beinart, “Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism and Nationalism: The Experiences of a South African Migrant, 1930–1960,” in *The Politics of Race, Class, and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa*, ed. Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (London: Longman, 1987), 286–309; Patrick Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860 to 1910* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1994); Colin Murray, *Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); David B. Coplan, *In the Time of Cannibals: The Word Music of South Africa’s Basotho Migrants* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); P. McAllister, “Work, Homestead, and the Shades: The Ritual Interpretation of Labour Migration among the Gcaleka,” in *Black Villagers in an Industrial Society*, ed. Philip Mayer (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980); Peter

shaping not only their own local world but also the wider society of which they were becoming part.”<sup>2</sup> This wider society of which the Zulus were becoming part experienced massive social and political changes nationwide in the early twentieth century. The mineral revolution(s) of 1867 and 1886 profoundly shifted the course of South African history, drawing increasing numbers of young men from rural areas to work in the urban centers of Durban, Cape Town, and the Witwatersrand. The reverberations of this migration are innumerable, including intergenerational conflict, shifts in marriage and family-building, and an upsurge in political resistance in the late nineteenth century. Following the end of World War I, South Africa, as many other parts of the world, experienced a huge upsurge in radicalism, in reaction of increasing economic stressors connected to the national depression of 1904-1909, as well as the advent of institutionalized white nationalism. The ‘bucket boys’ strike of 1918 in Johannesburg, a series of wildcat strikes across the Witwatersrand in 1920, and the involvement of the Communist Party of South Africa in the 1922 color bar strikes all signaled changing tides in South African politics.<sup>3</sup> This new resistance signaled not only growing African political activism but the increasingly stringent policies of a government slowly transitioning from one based on the philosophy of indirect rule to an overtly white supremacist regime.

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Delius, “Migrant Labour and the Pedi, 1840-1880,” in *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa*, ed. Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone (London: Longman, 1981): 293-312; Colin Bundy and William Beinart, *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics and Popular Movements in the Transkei & Eastern Cape, 1890-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Zolani Ngwane, “‘Christmas Time’ and the Struggles for the Household in the Countryside: Rethinking the Cultural Geography of Migrant Labour in South Africa,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29, no. 3 (2003), 681-699; Dunbar Moodie and Vivienne Ndatshe, *Going for Gold: Men, Mines and Migration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Francis Wilson, *Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Peter Delius, *A Lion Amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1996); Frederick Cooper, *Struggle for the City: Migrant Labor, Capital, and the State in Urban Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).

<sup>2</sup> Beinart (1982), 7.

<sup>3</sup> H. Jack Simon, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1969); Alan Cobley, “‘Why Not All Go Up Higher?’: The Transvaal Native Mine Clerks' Association, 1920-1925,” *South African Historical Journal* 62,1 (2010), 143-161.

A distinct dividing line between urban migrant workers (especially those living and work in the Transvaal) and rural Zulus quickly developed. However, although these urban dwellers existed physically beyond the reach of their chiefs and the Zulu king, traditional authorities local colonial officials continued to feature in negotiations over urban workers. Young men saw opportunities to escape the oppressive policies of chiefs who wanted to control their labor, as well as older generations who railed against their resistance to falling in line.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, families and authorities struggled to grapple with their changing social circumstances. In the early 1900s, innumerable letters flowed into local Natal and Zululand magistrates' offices to request assistance in locating male relatives who had gone to Johannesburg for work and either never returned or returned significantly changed.<sup>5</sup> Africans living and working in urban areas fostered new communities and identities, though the development of shared racial consciousness and ethnic identities was hampered by "the delayed impact of colonialism, conflict with the Zulu kingdom, the colonizers' divide-and-rule tactics, the deep resonance of the chieftdom affiliation in Natal Africans' hearts and minds, and their lack of experience with cosmopolitan urban settings."<sup>6</sup> Even in new settings, the long-term impacts of colonialism and white supremacist authorities impacted Africans' daily lives.

While struggles over securing the position of the Zulu kings and preserving the rights to form regiments dominated popular discourse in Natal and Zululand, in urban areas in Natal and the Witwatersrand negotiations of Zulu identity took decidedly different forms. This chapter shifts the narrative from the more rural and local to the urban, examining the ways in which

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<sup>4</sup> William Beinart, "Transkeian Migrant Workers and Youth Labour on the Natal Sugar Estates, 1918-1948," *The Journal of African History* 32,1(1991), 41-63; Carton (2010).

<sup>5</sup> For example, see: NAB, CNC 125; NAB, CNC 858/1913; NAB, 1/IPD 3/1/2; NAB, 1/KRK, 3/1/9, 107D/1909; NAB, 1/KRK, 3/1/9; 1/KRK, 3/1/10; NAB, 1/KRK, 3/1/11; NAB, 1/KRK, 3/1/12; NAB 1/KRK, 3/1/13; NAB 1/KRK, 3/1/2; NAB 1/MBT, 3/2/1; NAB CNC 17, 1453/1911; NAB CNC 105, 77/1933; NAB CNC 189, 1797/1914; NAB, CNC 185, 1560-1561 and 1716-1717/1914.

<sup>6</sup> Mahoney (2012), 123.

broadier struggles for workers' rights and racial equality accessed martial language being utilized in other arenas of struggle to express their discontent and desires. As increasing numbers of Africans from Natal and Zululand migrated to find work, their martial traditions found new meaning in their interactions with diversifying peer networks, resulting in new manifestations of Zuluness springing from a synthesis of multiple cultural and artistic traditions and contemporary contexts.

The utilization of the regimental structure at the national and local level for the purposes of securing labor served as part of a longer historical pattern. Even before the mineral revolution of the 1870s, the colonial state in Natal and Zululand schemed to utilize this institution to mobilize men throughout the region for conscripted state labor (*isibhalo*) as early as 1848.<sup>7</sup> African workers organized themselves along similar structures for their own purposes. Following the disintegration of the Zulu military system, "wage labour," Benedict Carton argues, "as opposed to Zulu regimental service offered a means to a higher rank through individual initiative."<sup>8</sup> The structure of *amawasha* guilds exhibit clear connections between the military structure of the Zulu kingdom and the Durban guilds which "were remarkably well organized in 1856 in a 'combination' that punished young competitors attempting to enter the trade and lower the price of labour."<sup>9</sup> *These guilds* also demonstrated these connections in their monthly parades, in which men would organize into companies "under the command of its own chief, in more than one case an *induna* of rank and comparative wealth," and performed songs and dances and

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<sup>7</sup> Benedict Carton, "The Wages of Migrancy: Homestead Dynamics, Income Earning, and Colonial Law in Zululand, South Africa," *African Studies* 73,3 (2014), 365-386; Lambert (1995), 19; John Lambert, "Chiefship in Early Colonial Natal, 1843-1879," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21, 2 (1995), 269-285; Machin (2002).

<sup>8</sup> Carton (2014), 369.

<sup>9</sup> Atkins (1986), 44.

finished their marches with a salute of ‘Bayete!’”; although these guilds looked to the past for inspiration, they imbued these symbols of martial masculinity with new meaning.<sup>10</sup>

During the economic crisis of 1896-1898, drought and rinderpest pushed African workers into the Rand at the same time as a massive decline in the demand for domestic workers, resulting in “a general build-up in the level of black unemployment . . . much of it . . . ‘Zulu’ unemployment.”<sup>11</sup> This mass of unemployed Zulus moved into Klipriversberg and united under a new “regiment”, the “Regiment of the Hills” (*Umkhosi we Zintaba*) which offered protection and opportunity in the midst of economic uncertainty.<sup>12</sup> The Regiment of the Hills’ members “. . . who saw themselves as being in a state of rebellion against the government’s laws, lived largely by robbing passing migrant workers of their wages or from the proceeds of well-organised burglaries in the towns . . .”<sup>13</sup> The connection to the *amabutho* did not end at the name of the organization, but also the group’s hierarchy, as Note strived to emulate his hero, Shaka Zulu, and lead “a well-disciplined, tightly structured band of Nguni-speakers that ran along quasi-military lines.”<sup>14</sup> He achieved this by acting as *inkos’enkulu* (big chief), supported by the *amakhosi* with the rank-and-file members known as ‘*mkehla*’ as a nod to the head-ringed men of the Zulu kingdom.<sup>15</sup> And his followers honored the leader of this criminal underworld himself, Jan Note,

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<sup>10</sup> “The Wash Boy’s Parade,” *Standard and Diggers’ News*, July 2, 1985; Cited in Mahoney (2012), 138-139.

<sup>11</sup> Charles Van Onselen, *New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2001), 26.

<sup>12</sup> At different points, this gang was also known as “The Regiment of Gaolbirds” (*Umkhosi We Senene*). van Onselen (2001), 26.

<sup>13</sup> At different points, this gang was also known as “The Regiment of Gaolbirds” (*Umkhosi We Senene*). van Onselen (2001), 26.

<sup>14</sup> “Jan Note’s Life and Introduction to Crime,” in *South Africa, Department of Justice Annual Report 1912* (Pretoria, 1913), 238; Cited in: Charles van Onselen, “Crime and Total Institutions in the Making of Modern South Africa: The Life of

‘Nongoloza’ Mathebula, 1867-1948,” *History Workshop* 19 (1985), 66.

<sup>15</sup> Mahoney (2012), 138.

known commonly as Nongoloza, with the royal salute ‘Bayete!’.<sup>16</sup> Although certainly different than the regiments of the Zulu kingdom, this new “Regiment of the Hill” substantially changed the nature of migrant workers’ worlds.<sup>17</sup>

Gangs represented important institutions for the proliferation of martial metaphors and traditions in urban contexts. While unemployed Zulu workers joined the *Umkhosi we Zintaba* in the Witwatersrand, in Durban young migrant workers formed their own bonds of solidarity “on the basis of age-sets of migrants from particular areas.”<sup>18</sup> Pre-existing patterns of employment in Durban suburbs resulted in the association of domestic work in certain areas with “youths from the same rural districts (*abakhaya*).”<sup>19</sup> Additionally, the mobilization of these identities in certain neighborhoods “involved the utilization of accessible cultural repertoires and ritual forms to defend the integrity of the group in the face of competition from ‘outsiders’.”<sup>20</sup> These *amalaita* gang members “drew on fighting idioms rooted in older traditions of Zulu militarism,” wore *umshokobezi*, referred to their gangs as *ibutho* and named them according to older regimental naming structures, performed *ingoma* dances and carried *umshiza* as a result of their past participation in inter-district stick-fighting competitions (*umgangela*).<sup>21</sup> The *amalaita* also held close ties to the Jan Note’s *Umkhosi we Zintaba*. At the outbreak of the South African War in 1899, J.S. Marwick, future Native Affairs manager of Durban, accompanied a group of Zulu workers back to Durban which included *Umkhosi We Zintaba* members; these gang members

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<sup>16</sup> Charles van Onselen, “‘The Regiment of the Hills’: South Africa’s Lumpenproletarian Army 1890-1920,” *Past & Present* 80 (1978), 101. For more on Jan Note: Charles Van Onselen, *The Small Matter of a Horse: The Life of ‘Nongoloza’ Mathebula, 1867-1948* (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2008).

<sup>17</sup> Paul la Hausse, “‘The Cows of Nongoloza’: Youth, Crime and *Amalaita* Gangs in Durban, 1900-1936,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 16,1 (1990), 84; Mahoney (2012), 145-149.

<sup>18</sup> la Hausse (1990), 86-87.

<sup>19</sup> la Hausse (1990), 95.

<sup>20</sup> la Hausse (1990), 95.

<sup>21</sup> la Hausse (1990), 95; Paul la Hausse, “‘Mayihlome!’: Towards an Understandings of *Amalaita* Gangs in Durban, c. 1900-193,” African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, April 1987a.



infiltrated networks of Zulu domestic workers in Durban and played a major role in the formation of the *amalaita* gangs.<sup>22</sup>

These gangs also connected Zulu workers in Durban to longer-standing prejudices, especially linked to their carrying of “dangerous” and “traditional” weapons. During an August 1919 Peace Procession in Durban, a group of celebrators caused a disturbance “by assaulting Indians and natives and breaking windows on their way to the Point from the race-course.”<sup>23</sup> The use of heavy sticks in these attacks caused J.S. Marwick to suggest to the Chief Law Magistrate, Durban, the “desirability of preventing Natives from carrying bludgeons and heavy sticks in the Borough.” Authorities coupled this suggestion by Marwick with a request to revisit the existing by-law, “with a view to Natives being restricted from carrying any sticks other than a light walking stick or cane.”<sup>24</sup> The following year, the Native Affairs Department released a new General Bye-law No. 71 restricting the rights of “natives” to carry weapons, including “any sword, assegai, dagger, sjambok, knobkerry (*iwisa* or *isagila*), heavy fighting stick (*isikwili*), light fighting stick (*umshiza* or *umzaca*), cudgel or other loaded or heavy stick, or dangerous or lethal weapon or missile.”<sup>25</sup> These restrictions strictly constrained the liberties of Africans living and working in Durban.

A few years later, a string of stabbings caused Durban authorities to rethink the verbiage in the 1920 bylaw. The weapon used in these stabbings, “a locked clasp knife of German manufacture, with a four-inch blade, which is retailed by practically every Indian shopkeeper at

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<sup>22</sup> Elsabé Brink, *1899, the Long March Home: A Little-known Incident in the Anglo-Boer War* (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 1999); la Hausse (1987a).

<sup>23</sup> TBD, 3/DBN (Durban Magistrate) 4/1/2/1223, 467B. “Letter, J.S. Marwick to Chief Magistrate, Law Courts re: Bye-law re: Natives carrying sticks, 16 November 1919.”

<sup>24</sup> TBD, 3/DBN (Durban Magistrate) 4/1/2/1223, 467B. “Letter, J.S. Marwick to Chief Magistrate, Law Courts re: Bye-law re: Natives carrying sticks, 16 November 1919.”

<sup>25</sup> TBD, 3/DBN (Durban Magistrate) 4/1/2/1223, 467B. “Letter, Chief Constable to Durban Town Clerk re: Bye-law re: Natives carrying sticks, 21 February 1920.”

9d. each”, were prolific in the city as “nearly all male Natives are in possession” of these knives, but they fell beyond the constraints of the bylaw. The Town Clerk wrote to the Durban Ward 1 Secretary in June 1926, asking him how they might legislate against these weapons since “legally Natives may carry them with impunity as the law now stands.” The Council took their cues for altering the Bye-law from the Regulations as to the Sale and Possession of Dangerous Weapons in the Orange Free State Province of 1913 which, in addition to the restrictions against traditional weapons, specifically restricted the carrying of “knives with cutting edges of eight inches or more in length”; however, the Town Clerk felt that to change the law to restrict blades more than three inches in length would have limited impact since “in most cases the evidence of possession would not be available until after the mischief has been done.”<sup>26</sup> He continued by explaining that, given the difficulty in specifying these knives in the bylaws, the Durban Council had “reached the opinion that the only effective and legitimate solution of the question that that the Government should regard cases of this nature as ‘serious offences’ and this crime should be added to the schedule of serious offences, with suitable punishments....”<sup>27</sup> By classifying these offences connected with symbols of the Zulu kingdom’s regimental system, the Durban municipality displayed their intent to criminalize martial masculinity through code terminology.

Under the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923, the local authorities only had the power to regulate the carrying of “any knobkerries or dangerous weapons,” which these knives did not fall under. The town solicitor, writing to the Town Clerk, argued that these knives did not fall under this category since “the object of carrying such a knife is to use it for general utility purposes....it

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<sup>26</sup> <sup>26</sup> TBD, 3/DBN (Durban Magistrate) 4/1/2/1223, 467B. “Regulations as to the Sale and Possession of Dangerous Weapons, Orange Free State Province, published under Government Notice 1,674 of 10th December 1912, and amended by Government Notice 712 of 2nd May 1913.” (pdf p. 50).

<sup>27</sup> TBD, 3/DBN (Durban Magistrate) 4/1/2/1223, 467B. “Letter, Town Clerk to T.L. Sykes, Secretary and Treasurer of Durban Ward 1 Ratepayers’ Association, 10 June 1926.”

can hardly be described as being dangerous per se.”<sup>28</sup> In 1930, Captain Barnett Harris wrote in the pages of *The New York Times* about the new manifestations of the Zulu warrior spirit through the wielding of knobkerries. “Although the Zulus were once known as the most warlike tribe of South Africa, practically the only signs of this disposition we saw during our sojourn in their country were occasional fights between natives,” Harris reflected.<sup>29</sup> Harris’ firsthand observations connected the public expressions of frustrations by Africans living in the Durban area with the destructive potential of the weapons they carried, further linking the martial tradition and heritage of Zulu speakers with the cultural symbols they carried and utilized in their new urban settings.

*Ingoma* dancing also became synonymous with the *amalaita* in Durban and more generally linked to anti-white criminal gangs and riots and “represented a ... serious effort at appropriating the symbols of imperial warfare for the expression of Zulu workers' resistance.”<sup>30</sup> *Ingoma* encapsulates many forms of step dance, including *isikhuze*, *ukukomika*, *isiZulu*, *isiBhaca*, *umzansi* (alternatively, *indlamu*), *isishameni* and *isicathulo*. Linking these multiple forms are layered references to martial traditions, both in the style of the dance, predicated on the traditional stamping style of war dances in the precolonial era, as well as the structure of the teams. *Ingoma* emerged in the Natal midlands as an attempt to mitigate conflicts between districts involved in armed conflict as a result of *umgangela*.<sup>31</sup> Teams refer to themselves as *amasosha* (soldiers) and the hierarchy of the group reflects the *intanga* manifestation of the regiments. An *igoso* (captain; alternatively, *ukaputeni*) “are responsible for the training,

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<sup>28</sup> TBD, 3/DBN (Durban Magistrate) 4/1/2/1223, 467B. “Letter, Town Solicitor to Town Clerk, 1 December 1925.”

<sup>29</sup> Barnett Harris, “The Zulus Keep Alive Warrior Spirit of Old.” *New York Times* 19 January 1930, p. 131.

<sup>30</sup> Veit Erlmann, *African Stars: Studies in Black South African Performance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 101. See also: la Hausse (1990); Veit Erlmann, “‘Horses in the Race Course’: The Domestication of Ingoma Dancing in South Africa, 1929-39,” *Popular Music* 8, 3 (1989), 259-273.

<sup>31</sup> Clegg (1981).

discipline, song selection, choreography and leadership of the team.”<sup>32</sup> Additionally, elders in the community “advise the *igoso*. . . and give their blessings to the team at performances . . . if necessary, they admonish the members for poor performance or improper behavior.”<sup>33</sup> The integration of the elements of youth socialization in the nineteenth and early twentieth century signaled continued connections to a shared past.

These references extend to the names of the ngoma groups and nicknames of dancers: “Shoot the Sergeant, Two-Bullet, *Thu Thwalofu* (Two-Twelve), *Usuthu* (one of Shaka Zulu's crack regimental units), *Uyazizwa izinduku?* (Can you hear my sticks?), *Ungijikijela ngewisa* (You're lashing out at me with a knobkierie).”<sup>34</sup> The “military drum” forms the basis of the music for the *Umzansi* dance style; “the drum is a military drum and we have marching movements and sometimes saluting . . .”<sup>35</sup> Dancers adopt the garb of “Zulu warriors,” including the *umshokobezi* adopted by *amalaita*, the *ibheshu*, *amashoba*, and other satirical expressions of a martial past.<sup>36</sup> In reference to other martial traditions, both *isicathulo* and *ukukomika* mirror Western military traditions. While the *isicathulo* or gumboot style is said to have emerged among students at mission schools in southern Natal, the aesthetics of the dance, according to Carol Muller and Janet T. Fargion, “embod[y] the regimentation of military marching . . . the dancers are expected to respond quickly, without hesitation, regardless of what the leader

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<sup>32</sup> Louise Meintjes, “Shoot the Sergeant, Shatter the Mountain: The Production of Masculinity in Zulu Ngoma Song and Dance in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” *Ethnomusicology Forum* 13, 2 (2004), 178.

<sup>33</sup> Meintjes (2004), 178.

<sup>34</sup> Meintjes (2004), 188.

<sup>35</sup> Vusabantu Ngema, “Symbolism and Implications in the Zulu dance forms: Notions of composition, performance and appreciation of dance among the Zulu,” MA Thesis, University of Zululand, 2007; Johnny Clegg, “An Examination of Umzansi Dance Style,” in Hugh Tracey (ed.) *Papers Presented at the Third and Fourth Symposium on Ethnomusicology* (Grahamstown: International Library of African Music, 1984), 65.

<sup>36</sup> Louise Meintjes, “Military Aesthetics and the Politics of Reconciliation in Zulu Performance,” *Simpósio Brasileiro De Pós-Graduandos Em Música, Anais Do Ii Simpom* 2012.

commands.”<sup>37</sup> *Ukukomika* represented a more satirical dance style, consisting of “pantomime-like movements imitating and ridiculing Western army drill.”<sup>38</sup> These layered references to martial traditions from a range of influences illustrated the significance of martiality in establishing new cultural forms and embracing shared traditions.

White authorities not only pointed to the *amalaita* and *ingoma*, but also the Industrial and Commercial Union yase Natal (ICU) as the cause of this dangerous connection between *ingoma* and violent action. Formed in 1925, following the lead of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union formed in Cape Town in 1919, the ICU signaled a changing tide in South African politics and a growing realization of the threat that the black majority represented.<sup>39</sup> And although the ICU originated in urban areas, its true reach stretched across small towns throughout South Africa, as Africans in the reserves “attracted by its militant demands and its legal services . . . flocked to join.”<sup>40</sup> Very quickly, the ICU enjoyed mass popular support, including 27,000 paying members in Durban in 1927 and over 100,000 members throughout the

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<sup>37</sup> Hugh Tracey linked the development of *isicathulo* or gumboot dancing to step dances performed by students at mission schools in southern Natal which, when transported to the urban setting in Durban, became linked to Wellington boots (“gumboots”) “when, it is said, certain Zulu dock labourers at the port of Durban were given Wellington boots to protect their feet while handling cargoes of chemical fertilizer.” Carol Muller and Janet Topp Fargion link this to broader international musical trends including “minstrel performance; popular social dances such as those that accompanied jazz music performance in the 1930s and 40s – the jitterbug for example; and, most obviously, the tap dance popularized through the films of Fred Astaire and Gene Kelly . . . [as well as touring black tap dance groups.” Carol Muller and Janet Topp Fargion, “Gumboots, Bhaca Migrants, and Fred Astaire: South African Worker Dance and Musical Style,” *African Music* 7,4 (1999), 89-90; Hugh Tracey, *African Dances of the Witwatersrand Gold Mines* (Johannesburg: African Music Society, 1952), 7.

<sup>38</sup> Erlmann (1989), 262.

<sup>39</sup> The most comprehensive study of the ICU: Helen Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924–1930* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). The ICU grew out of, and merged with, the Industrial Workers of Africa, the first trade union to organize black workers, founded in 1917.

<sup>40</sup> Helen Bradford, “Lynch Law and Labourers: The ICU in Umvoti, 1927-1928,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11, 1 (1984), 135.

rural reserves.<sup>41</sup> This representation stemmed from the huge increases in the number of Africans in Durban between 1904 (18,929) and 1936 (64,023).<sup>42</sup>

The ICU utilized accessible metaphors to mobilize popular support, including the language of Zulu martial heritage and its associated traditions, including *ingoma*.<sup>43</sup> The organization's invocation of the "language of Zulu nationalism" further attracted adherents, as the ICU made clear to its membership that "they wanted us to be Zulu-like."<sup>44</sup> In the late 1920s and into the 1930s, in particular, radical African opposition shifted "at an ideological level . . . towards traditionalist language and idioms, expressive of a heroic Zulu past."<sup>45</sup> At the close of a meeting between traditional authorities and the ICU in response to the 1930 rickshaw strike, J.A. Duiker, part of the ICU leadership, "shouted '*Humu! Humu!*' (Regiments Disperse!)."<sup>46</sup> This moment demonstrated both "how the language and symbols of a pre-colonial past could be retrieved and mobilized for novel purposes," as well as the power of traditions to foster political support.<sup>47</sup>

*Ingoma* dancing provides a striking example of this phenomenon; a tradition endorsed by the ICU but also appropriated by white Durban administrators to exercise greater control over its African citizenry. Helen Bradford argues that, "in a dehumanizing environment largely lacking in venues for legal entertainment, the ICU's cultural events fostered cohesion, afforded collective

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<sup>41</sup> Paul la Hausse "The Message of the Warriors: the ICU, the Labouring Poor and the Making of a Popular Political Culture in Durban," University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop on "The Making of Class" (February 9-14, 1987b); Helen Bradford (1984), 128-149.

<sup>42</sup> Goolam Vahed, "Control of African Leisure Time in Durban in the 1930s," *Journal of Natal and Zulu History* 18,1(1998), 68.

<sup>43</sup> la Hausse (1987b)

<sup>44</sup> Bradford (1984), 136.

<sup>45</sup> Paul la Hausse, "The Dispersal of the Regiments: Radical African Opposition in Durban, 1930," African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand (March 1986), 12

<sup>46</sup> la Hausse (1986), 13-14. For more on the rickshaw strike of 1930: Ros Posel, "The Durban Ricksha Pullers' 'Strikes' of 1918 and 1930," *Journal of Natal and Zulu History* 8,1(1985), 85-106; Ros Posel, "Amahashi: Durban's Ricksha Pullers," *Journal of Natal and Zulu History* 13,1 (1990), 51-70.

<sup>47</sup> la Hausse (1986), 13-14.

enjoyment and reaffirmed blacks' right to shape the world for themselves."<sup>48</sup> *Ingoma* grew in popularity in Durban in the 1930s "out of the profound transformation of traditional rural Zulu culture through impoverishment, dispossession and labour migration around the first World War."<sup>49</sup> These pressures also resulted in an increase in faction fights in Durban area, driven by land shortages and an influx of evicted farm tenants forced from their homes due to agricultural commercialization in the 1920s and the Great Depression of 1929/1930.<sup>50</sup>

These fights also regularly occurred following *ingoma* dance competitions, leading white authorities to point to the dances, in addition to ICU agitation, as catalysts for the unrest symbolized by a 1929 clash between Africans and white vigilantes. The Durban municipal government banned *ingoma* dancing following this clash in 1929; they later lifted it in 1932, actually sponsoring dances held on Sundays at the Native Recreations Grounds on Somtseu Road and establishing a disciplinary committee and *Amagosa* association to formalize the dances in June 1932.<sup>51</sup> Each dancer registered with the Welfare Officer, logging both his name and the leader under whose jurisdiction he danced.<sup>52</sup> After a clash in 1934 over access to the dancing ground, "Regulations Governing Ingoma Dances" were formalized and further restricted the dances "including the prohibition of marching in formation, singing *amahubo* regimental song, and performing the challenging *giya* steps that mark the beginning of an attack in stick and faction fighting."<sup>53</sup> These restrictions represented the most blatant step in the process of what has

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<sup>48</sup> Bradford (1987), 207.

<sup>49</sup> Erlmann (1989), 259.

<sup>50</sup> Sithole (1998).

<sup>51</sup> Erlmann (1989), 259-273; Vahed (1998), 92.

<sup>52</sup> Vahed (1998), 92.

<sup>53</sup> Erlmann (1989), 267.

been termed the “domestication” of *ingoma* that sought to erase the martial connections to this form of expression.<sup>54</sup>

This domestication continued to proliferate when, in 1939, the first Natal Native Dancing Championship took place in Durban, with a brochure, featuring the *izihlangu* (war-shields) of four Zulu kingdom-era *amabutho* (including the Ngobamakosi, Nokenke, Unguakamatye, and Tulwana), promising spectators “no war dances [take place] today in Southern Africa” and “that to call an *ingoma* dance a war dance would be ‘the equivalent of calling football military training’.”<sup>55</sup> This connection to football built on a larger debate about appropriate activities for “tribalized natives” (dancing) and “detribalized natives” (football).<sup>56</sup> Authorities were quick to draw boundary lines between these different styles of military performance; in December 1930, crowds assembled at Cartwright’s Flats had gathered in the traditional ox horn formation and rallied behind the “*Usuthu!*” cry as they burned their passes in opposition to the white state.<sup>57</sup> Although the state struggled to use these symbols and traditions as tools of social control, as Paul la Hausse argues, “the line between using ‘traditional Zulu dancing as a means of social control and the potentially oppositional character of *ingoma* dancing was a fine one’.”<sup>58</sup> African agency proved difficult to control, even as Durban authorities sought to control expressions of Zulu martiality.

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<sup>54</sup> This period also saw the attempt to build a dedicated *ingoma* arena in Durban, spearheaded by Hugh Tracey. This construction ultimately stalled as white authorities feared the influence that a dedicated space for *ingoma* dancing and possible destructive activities, especially drinking, could result in. TBD, 3/DBN, 4/1/3/1560, 315J, “Files re: Ingoma dances and proposed native dance arena, 1938-1948.”

<sup>55</sup> TBD, 3/DBN, 315J Vol. 1 (1938-1948) Ingoma Dances and Proposed Native Dance Arena, Natal Native Dancing Championship, June 25<sup>th</sup>, July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, and 16<sup>th</sup>, 1939; Erlmann (1989), 260.

<sup>56</sup> Vahed (1998), 92.

<sup>57</sup> la Hausse (1986), 22-23.

<sup>58</sup> Paul la Hausse, “The Struggle for the City: Alcohol, the Ematsheni and Popular Culture in Durban, 1902-1936,” MA Thesis (University of Cape Town, 1984), 273; Cited in Erlmann (1989), 264.



In another urban setting, on the mines in the Johannesburg area, administrators sought to navigate this same fine line, adding an additional hindrance in the form of attempts to foster ethnic separations among the workforce. Ethnicity defined labor options in both Durban *and* the Witwatersrand, with certain positions drawing new laborers from specific rural areas. For example, the majority of rickshaw drivers in Durban came from Mahlabathini, while a large proportion of African police officers hailed from Maphumulo. These regional divisions not only aided administrators in controlling African populations, but also perpetuated tensions, such as those which emerged during the Point Riot of 1902, resulting from animosity from one of the rioting workers and a policeman who came from the same district and had been “rivals in sweetheart affairs.”<sup>59</sup> On the mines, similar ethnic divisions among classes of labor emerged, with Zulu migrants primarily working *outside* of the mines, as policemen and domestics in a range of positions, including houseboys and *amawasha*. This division of labor resulted in the proliferation of certain ethnic stereotypes, including preexisting ideas of Zulus as inherently martial, but also their excessive stubbornness connected to a refusal to work underground.<sup>60</sup>

In Johannesburg, similar solidarities based on group identities emerged not only based on workers’ home alliances, but also as the result of organization tools created by the mining industry to manufacture and manipulate these alliances. In particular, the compound system, established in 1885, provided a key conduit for the proliferation of ethnic consciousness on the mines, as well as an important tool for the paternalistic control which facilitated white domination. Authority structures in the rural areas, combined with the latent paternalism, provided easy models for developing new modes of control in mining compounds. In this new

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<sup>59</sup> Article from the *Natal Advertiser*, September 19, 1902, enc. in Durban Archives Repository, 3/DBN 5/2/5/3/6 Report, Durban Superintendent of Police, September 24, 1902; Cited in Mahoney (2012), 120.

<sup>60</sup> Jeff Guy and Motlatsi Thane, “Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the South African Gold Mines,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 14, 2 (1988), 260.

setting, “the compounds themselves became ‘tribes,’ with white managers as their ‘chiefs,’ and the leaders of different groups of Africans as their ‘headmen’.”<sup>61</sup> Through this system, mine recruiters and mining officials sought to ensure that “the chiefs have no legal status over the people: the legal authorities are White magistrates, local superintendents, police, compound managers and employers . . . the chiefs may voice protests, no more.”<sup>62</sup> At the same time, the mining industry remained dependent on chiefs and indunas to maintain the steady stream of migrant workers from Natal and Zululand to the Rand.

The records of the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA)<sup>63</sup> show a deep concern with maintaining detailed records for recruiting hubs, including not only economic information but also ethnographic and historical information.<sup>64</sup> This also aided the organization in maintaining strong ties with both traditional *and* colonial authorities essential to maintaining positive relationships with recruits from areas of Natal and Zululand. To reinforce connections to important traditional authority figures, mining companies employed Zulu princes as headmen and police, as well as, from the 1920s to the mid-1950s, regularly inviting local chiefs and magistrates to come tour the mines and witness the positive employment situations that their constituents had secured.<sup>65</sup> In the 1910s, Solomon himself served as primary conduit for

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<sup>61</sup> Mahoney (2012), 127.

<sup>62</sup> Max Gluckman, “Analysis of a social situation in modern Zululand,” *Bantu Studies* 14,1(1940), 16-17.

<sup>63</sup> Since 1896, labour recruitment operated through the Native Labour Supply Association, a loose coalition of mining industry leaders which sought to recruit workers primarily from Mozambique. When mining operations halted during the Anglo-Boer War, two new formalized organizations emerged with the shared aim of stimulating the migrant labor system: the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) and the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). WNLA’s efforts focused on recruiting foreign labor, under the misguided notion that black South Africans did not want to labor on the mines, while TEBA focused on recruitment within the Republic of South Africa. In 1912, the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) emerged and worked in collaboration with TEBA, working to recruit growing numbers of black South Africans for labor in the mines of the Witwatersrand. Jeeves (1985); Wilson (2011).

<sup>64</sup> The areas that these brochures were maintained for included: “Donnybrook, Durban, Eshowe, Harding, Ixopo, Ladysmith, Mahlabathini, Mokhotlong, Nongoma, Nqutu, Port Shepstone, Tugela Ferry, Umzimkulu, Vryheid and Pietermaritzburg.” UJ, TEBA NRC B545, Historical/Ethnographic Brochures.

<sup>65</sup> UJ, TEBA NRC 238, Visits of Natal Magistrates, 1928-1929, UJ TEBA NRC 574, Letters regarding visits to mines by Chiefs, 1947-1953; Gluckman (1940), 16-17.

complaints over labor conditions for Zulus on the mines.<sup>66</sup> Solomon also enjoyed, according to many reports, significant financial gains in the form of gifts from his subjects living and working on the Rand, as well as from the recruiting agencies themselves.<sup>67</sup> The state's reliance on these gendered forms recreated "the meaning of gender divisions of labor and forms of political power" and reproduced patriarchies on the mines.<sup>68</sup>

TEBA not only utilized pre-existing organizational structures and authority figures, but also tailored their recruitment materials to play to preconceived ideas about African masculinities. For example, the TEBA logo played on Africans' multiple martial heritages, taking the form of a shield with four images featured in their own quadrants on the shield. The first image represents a train leaving from the various provinces en route to the gold mines, followed by an image of a shaft head at a mine. Another depicts an African working underground. The final image depicts an African returning home, where he presents a handful of gold to "admiring women folk."<sup>69</sup> A TEBA representative wrote to a London-based printer regarding placing an order for envelopes featuring these shields. The most important consideration, he explained, "is reproduction of the colours, as the object of having the colours is to attract the attention of Natives . . . who are fond of vivid colours."<sup>70</sup> This recognition by the

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<sup>66</sup> In August 1919, the Director of Native Labour wrote to Natal's CNC regarding concerns held by Solomon kaDinuzulu following a recent visit to the mines. "I attach for your information a schedule setting forth certain matters than have been brought to my notice by Chief Solomon prior to his departure after his visit here and which he stated had been the subject of representations from his people employed on the mines concerned," he informed the CNC. NAB, CNC 359, 1558/1919, August 1919, Director of Native Labour to CNC Natal, 7 August 1919.

<sup>67</sup> Cope (1993), 304.

<sup>68</sup> Waetjen (2006), 36.

<sup>69</sup> UJSC, NRC 205 (Propaganda-Symbols (1925-1930), Letter, TEBA Representative to Gummed Paper Makers, London, April 4, 1929.

<sup>70</sup> UJSC, NRC 205 (Propaganda-Symbols (1925-1930), Letter, TEBA Representative to Gummed Paper Makers, London, April 4, 1929. Similar imagery is evident in a TEBA recruiting calendar, analyzed by Thembisa Waetjen in her study of masculinity and nationalism. Waetjen (2006), 30-32

mines of the need to integrate symbols of martial masculinity signaled a deep understanding of the continued appeal of these icons in the consciousness of Africans from Natal and Zululand.

Not only Zulu masculinity and martial heritages influenced new gendered identities on the mines, but also external images of idealized masculinity which inspired new expressions of male vitality in urban settings. In new urban contexts, combinations of cultural styles and approaches shaped migrant laborers understandings of themselves and their place in the world. Recruitment films produced by mining companies utilized tropes of African masculinity and the stresses of both South African society and the economy to entice young men to join the ranks of migrant workers from their areas.<sup>71</sup> In addition to these propaganda films, mine recruiters frequently showed Hollywood films, especially Westerns, both during promotional tours and at urban bioscopes to attract potential recruits to their firms, especially Westerns. The proliferation of these films and their role in the colonial project has been studied in the South African, Zambian, and Congolese context recently.<sup>72</sup> Not only did the showing of the films on the mines have a notable impact on costuming for *isicathulo* dances, but also on the style of dress and general iconography of *abagqafu* street gangs.<sup>73</sup>

Of course, these external gendered expressions represented only one of many influences on the masculinity of Zulu migrant workers. On the mines, multiple masculine traditions converged and collided, leading to exacerbation of presumed ethnic identities, often centering on

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<sup>71</sup> Glenn Reynolds, "'From Red Blanket to Civilization': Propaganda and Recruitment Films for South Africa's Gold Mines, 1920-1940," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 33, 1(2007), 133-152.

<sup>72</sup> Charles Ambler, "Mass Media and Leisure in Africa," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35, 1 (2002), 119-136; Charles Ambler, "Popular Films and Colonial Audiences: The Movies in Northern Rhodesia," *The American Historical Review* 106, 1 (2001), 81-105; James Burns, *Flickering Shadows: Cinema and Identity in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002); James Burns, "John Wayne on the Zambezi: Cinema, Empire, and the American Western in British Central Africa," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35,1 (2002), 103- 117; Ch. Didier Gondola, *Tropical Cowboys: Westerns, Violence and Masculinity in Kinshasa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016).

<sup>73</sup> Glenn Reynolds, "Playing cowboys and Africans: Hollywood and the cultural politics of African identity," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 25,3 (2005), 401; 415.

the ritualized initiations, i.e. circumcision, that characterized certain groups and separated others from presumed appropriate pathways into manhood.<sup>74</sup> These conflicting views highlighted the flipside of the mining companies efforts to cordon off workers from different ethnic backgrounds, simultaneously fostering a sense of ethnic solidarity while also leading to divisions often leading to violence; these fractures weakened African solidarity and feeding the capitalist system.<sup>75</sup>

Both the promises and perils of ethnic division on the mines manifested in the arena of “tribal” dancing. Zulu migrant workers found themselves frequently competing in dance competitions, as a result of management’s condoning of specific recreational activities for certain ethnic groups.<sup>76</sup> Beginning as early as 1890s, the Witswatersrand Native Labour Association organized dancing competitions which often resulted in violence associated with the competitions, much like the situation in Durban.<sup>77</sup> In May 1928, a competition at the State Mines ended in a confrontation between dance teams that left one dancer dead and 50 miners arrested.<sup>78</sup> Debate over the best way to navigate this centered on the violent potential in promoting competitions between rival teams as well as the martial connections driving the violence at dance competitions.

At this point, exhibition dances, rather than competitive events, occupied the primary space for recreational dancing on the mines, since “the organisers were concerned that the competitive nature of the dances could provide a catalyst for further violence and disruptions: hundreds of warriors leaping simultaneously into the air and clashing their spears loudly on their

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<sup>74</sup> T. Dunbar Moodie, “Ethnic Violence on South African Gold Mines,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18,3 (1992), 590.

<sup>75</sup> Guy and Thane (1988), 258-259.

<sup>76</sup> Moodie (1992), 588.

<sup>77</sup> Cecile Badenhorst and Charles Mather, “Tribal recreation and recreating tribalism: culture, leisure and social control on South Africa's gold mines, 1940–1950,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 23,3 (1997), 477-478.

<sup>78</sup> Erlmann (1989), 264.

shields unnerved many officials who felt that dancing was a touch too primitive.”<sup>79</sup> However, it is less likely that these conflicts stemmed from “tribal antagonisms” but rather originated in the system of segregation created by mine administration.<sup>80</sup> Fighting also served as a new manifestation of a tradition similar to not only the many African men who traveled to work in urban settings, but also their white counterparts who came from sporting traditions, like rugby, which emphasized not only violent physical confrontations, but also strength and physical courage.<sup>81</sup> Based on this shared heritage of violence, racist violence on the mines “formed a piece of a larger masculine ethic that valorised interpersonal violence underground . . . [which] served to reproduce the endless violence of mine work.”<sup>82</sup> Ethnicity and violence became conflated in ways that proved dangerous in the coming years.

The ethnic identities encouraged by mine management also backfired as “ethnic identifications, hypostatized by management housing and job assignment policies, were adopted by disparate home-friend groups of workers themselves both for wider mutual solidarity and to protect their occupational and recreational ‘territory’.”<sup>83</sup> These divisions served to produce violent encounters and furthering divisions, since “violence is almost always perceived as legitimate by the group committing it, whether as an expression of moral outrage or as retaliation for symbolic or physical violations of members of one's own group by ‘others’.”<sup>84</sup> The

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<sup>79</sup> Badenhorst and Mather (1997), 478.

<sup>80</sup> “The conflicts between dance teams, in ritualized competitive performance as well as during the violent clashes, were not the result of age-old clan and tribal antagonisms, but stemmed instead from the mobilization of networks of kin and regional solidarity under the highly competitive conditions of the urban labour market. Thus, the violent aspects of *ingoma* dancing which some nervous burghers attributed to the combined effects of liquor and ‘excitement’, to more perceptive observers of African leisure-time activities more accurately appeared as the result of the military and criminal aspects of urban forms of youth opposition and their cross-linkages with *ingoma* dancing.” Erlmann (1989), 264-265.

<sup>81</sup> Keith Breckenridge, “The allure of violence: men, race and masculinity on the South African goldmines, 1900–1950,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24,4 (1998), 692-693.

<sup>82</sup> Breckenridge (1998), 692-693.

<sup>83</sup> Moodie (1992), 589-590.

<sup>84</sup> Moodie (1992), 589-590.

development of criminal gangs and factions along these same “ethnic” lines represented both representation of the deepest fears of white administrators as well as the logical result of their tactic of ethnic separation.<sup>85</sup>

In addition to the dance forms that migrant workers transferred to the Witwatersrand, new musical forms emerged, incorporating martial heritage to give new form and voice to the experiences of Zulu migrants.<sup>86</sup> Dance and other musical forms, throughout the African continent and arguably the world, function as a “source of commentary and as an articulation of the varying levels of popular concern during the colonial period.”<sup>87</sup> The use of music for the promotion of Zulu identity, of course, extended beyond the migrant laborers who left Natal and Zululand in search of greater economic opportunities.<sup>88</sup> These musical genres, including but not limited to *isicathamiya* and *maskanda* were/are “deeply interwoven with the overall process of urbanization and labor migration in South Africa,” as well as the martial traditions that Zulu

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<sup>85</sup> Gary Kynoch, “‘A Man among Men’: Gender, Identity and Power in South Africa’s Marashea Gangs,” *Gender & History*, 13, 2 (2001), 249–272; Gary Kynoch, *We Are Fighting the World: a History of the Marashea Gangs in South Africa, 1947-1999* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005); Clive Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi: The Youth Gangs of Soweto, 1935-1976* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000); Keith Breckenridge, “Migrancy, Crime and Faction Fighting: The Role of the Isitshozi in the Development of Ethnic Organisations in the Compounds,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 16, 1 (1990), 55-78; van Onselen (2001).

<sup>86</sup> For studies that investigate this phenomenon among Basotho migrants, see: Coplan (1994).

<sup>87</sup> Terence O. Ranger, *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa, 1890-1970: The Beni Ngoma* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1975), 164. The use of cultural forms as sources “of commentary and as an articulation of the varying levels of popular concern during the colonial period” is well-documented in the literature on leisure history in Africa. J. Clyde Mitchell, *The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Social Relationships among Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956); Peter Alegi, “Playing to the Gallery? Sport, Cultural Performance, and Social Identity in South Africa, 1920s-1945,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35, no. 1 (2002), 17-38; Alegi (2004); Laura Fair, “Kickin’ It: Leisure, Politics and Football in Colonial Zanzibar, 1900s-1950s,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 67, no. 2 (1997), 224-251; Laura Fair, “Dressing Up: Clothing, Class and Gender in Post-Abolition Zanzibar,” *The Journal of African History* 39, no. 1 (1998): 63-94; Fair (2001); Phyllis Martin, “Contesting Clothes in Colonial Brazzaville,” *The Journal of African History* 35, no. 3 (1994): 401-426; Phyllis Martin, *Leisure and Society in Colonial Brazzaville* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Christopher Alan Waterman, *Jùjú: A Social History and Ethnography of an African Popular Music* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Marissa J. Moorman, *Intonations: A Social History of Music and Nation in Luanda, Angola, from 1945 to Recent Times* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2008).

<sup>88</sup> Erlmann (1991), 74.

migrant laborers pulled from to understand their new context.<sup>89</sup> *Maskanda* and *isicathamiya* also served as a forum for migrant laborers to “express . . . the concerns — patriarchal as they may be—of a great many migrant laborers and South African men who more than ever worry about domestic cohesion and parental authority.”<sup>90</sup> *Isicathamiya* provided migrants the ability “to define a space metaphorically in which their survival could best be organized.”<sup>91</sup> At the same time, these new musical genres provided an opportunity to celebrate an idealized Zulu masculinity, including the martial lineage that shaped this gendered identity. Other physical endeavors, especially the growing numbers of Zulu men playing football on the mines and elsewhere in the Rand and throughout Natal, also grew in popularity during this period and gave social meaning to bodily competition.<sup>92</sup>

*Isicathamiya* is linked not only to Zulu traditional music but also to American minstrel shows and vaudeville troops, especially the Minstrel, Vaudeville, and Concert Company which toured South Africa between 1890 and 1898 introducing jubilee songs and other aspects of the black minstrel tradition.<sup>93</sup> The influence of mission schools, Western cinema, the advent of radio, and church musical traditions all fed into the development of *isicathamiya*.<sup>94</sup> Additionally, South African performers like Madikane Cele, who included regimental anthems in his tour of the United States in the 1910s, performed *amahubo* for American audiences, resulting in a cultural

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<sup>89</sup> Veit Erlmann, “‘the past is far and the future is far’: power and performance among Zulu migrant workers,” *American Ethnologist* 19,4 (1992), 688.

<sup>90</sup> Veit Erlmann, *Nightsong: Performance, Power, and Practice in South Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), xxi; Kathryn Olsen, “‘Mina ngizokushaya ngengoma’/ ‘I Will Challenge You with a Song’: Constructions of Masculinity in *maskanda*,” *Agenda* 49 (2001), 51-60.

<sup>91</sup> Veit Erlmann, “Migration and Performance: Zulu Migrant Workers’ Isicathamiya Performance in South Africa, 1890-1950,” *Ethnomusicology* 34, 2 (1990), 218.

<sup>92</sup> Alegi (2004): 39-48.

<sup>93</sup> Erlmann (1990), 203; Christopher Ballantine, “Music and Emancipation: The Social Role of Black Jazz and Vaudeville in South Africa between the 1920s and the Early 1940s,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 17,1 (1991), 129–152; Robert Trent Vinson, *The Americans Are Coming!: Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012).

<sup>94</sup> David Rycroft, “Zulu Male Traditional Singing,” *African Music* 1, 4(1957), 35.



loop of sorts that fed songs of the regiments back into South African musical traditions.<sup>95</sup>

Maskanda emerged from similar influences, in addition to its roots lay in the Zulu bow music tradition, originally an inter-gender tradition preserved by women during the wars of the Zulu kingdom.<sup>96</sup> *Isicathamiya* is characterized by its deep ties to traditions with roots in the Zulu kingdom, including the incorporation of elements from *amahubo empi* (regimental war anthems) and “the social organization of *isicathamiya* choirs [as] metaphorically predicated on the world of precolonial Zulu military power.”<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, this connection with *amahubo empi* directly ties *isicathamiya* to the imagined masculinity associated with Zulu warriorhood.

Motifs focusing on stick-fighting, rural agriculture, and the transition from boyhood to manhood characterized *isicathamiya* lyrics, resulting in a musical genre which began “around the mining centers through honoring the Zulu prosodic and social demands [but] quickly adapted itself to the mainstream of Zulu culture.”<sup>98</sup> Specifically, “*isicathamiya* singers sing in texts which are highly reflective of their value for *ubunsizwa* and their admiration of the symbolic status of the Zulu warrior culture of the past.”<sup>99</sup> Robert Mkhize, leader of *isicathamiya* group *Colenso Abafana Benkokhelo*, explained these connections to warrior traditions in a 1990 interview: “When we sing, we really *giya*, which is our own Zulu custom. We *huba* and *giya* and our followers can say, ‘these are the people who know and respect our Zulu custom’.”<sup>100</sup> Similarly,

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<sup>95</sup> Erlmann (1991), 72; Natalie Curtis, *Songs and Tales from the Dark Continent: Recorded from the Singing and Sayings of C. Kamba Simango and Madikane Cele* (New York: G. Schirmer, 1920).

<sup>96</sup> Phindile Joe Nhlapo, “Maskanda: The Zulu Strolling Musicians,” PhD Dissertation (University of the Witwatersrand, 1998), 29-32. For more on Zulu bow music, see Dave Dargie, “‘*Umakhweyane*’: A Musical Bow and Its Contribution to Zulu Music,” *African Music* 8, 1(2007), 60–81; David Rycroft, “The Zulu Bow Songs of Princess Magogo,” *African Music*, 5, 4 (1975), 41–97; Rosemary M. F. Joseph, “Zulu Women’s Bow Songs: Ruminations on Love,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 50,1(1987), 90–119.

<sup>97</sup> Veit Erlmann, *Music, Modernity and the Global Imagination: South Africa and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 202.

<sup>98</sup> Musa Khulekani Xulu, “The Re-Emergence of Amahubo Song Styles and Ideas in Some Modern Zulu Musical Styles,” PhD Thesis (University of Natal, Durban, 1992), 401.

<sup>99</sup> Xulu (1992), 409.

<sup>100</sup> Xulu (1992), 409.

fighting is deeply tied to the *maskanda* style, with scholars frequently comparing *maskanda* competitions (“friendly fights”) with *umgangela* competitions.<sup>101</sup> Echoing Mkhize, Joseph Shabalala of Ladysmith Black Mambazo explained the ways in which *maskanda* is inseparable from its connections to Zulu masculinity. “To sing in Zulu music (including *maskanda*) is coupled with the ability to dance and to recite the praises which is a manifestation of social identity,” Shabalala explained, “It is in song where a Zulu individual is expected to assert his identity and leadership qualities in society.”<sup>102</sup> The assertion of both identity and leadership became increasingly important under the tense political circumstances throughout South Africa in the 1940s/1950s.<sup>103</sup>

In fact, the factors driving the tensions of the 1940s/1950s, in the Durban area in particular, included not only the increasingly tense political atmosphere following the National Party’s rise to power in 1948, but also difficult social circumstances.<sup>104</sup> Of the approximately 104,100 migrants living in Durban in 1946, around over 77,000 were migrants, with 26,000 permanently living in the city and the rest functioning as short-term migrants or commuters.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Nhlapo (1998), 21.

<sup>102</sup> Musa Xulu interview with Joseph Shabalala, April 22, 1990. Cited in Xulu (1992). In 1973, Shabalala’s group, Ladysmith Black Mambazo, released their first album, *Amabutho*, which would go on to become the first South African album recorded by black musicians to achieve gold status. Though Ladysmith Black Mambazo’s fame and fortune would come later, when they joined Paul Simon to record his *Graceland* album in 1985/86, this *Amabutho* album signaled an understanding of the deep roots of the musical form they were pulling from.

<sup>103</sup> *Isicathamiya* and *maskanda* both continue to hold important positions in South African and Zulu popular culture, still serving as arenas for public negotiations of gender and ethnic identity. See: Liz Gunner, “City Textualities: Isicathamiya, reciprocities and voices from the streets,” *Social Dynamics* 34, 2 (2008), 156-173; Liz Gunner, “Soft Masculinities, Isicathamiya and Radio,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40,2 (2014), 343-360; Kathryn Olsen, *Music and Social Change in South Africa: Maskanda Past and Present* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014); Olsen (2001), 51-60; Barbara Titus, ““Walking Like a Crab”: Analyzing Maskanda Music in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” *Ethnomusicology* 57, 2(2013), 286–310. Similarly, *ingoma* has undergone its own changes and continues as an important cultural form today. See: Louise Meintjes, *Dust of the Zulu: Ngoma Aesthetics after Apartheid* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

<sup>104</sup> On the unexpected victory of the National Party in 1948: Nancy Clark and William Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 27-34; Newell Maynard Stultz, *Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

<sup>105</sup> Paul Maylam, “The Changing Political Economy of the Region, c. 1920-c. 1950,” in Robert Morrell (ed.) *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal: Historical Perspectives* (Durban: Indicator, 1996), 99.

Overpopulation in the area, compounded by continued poverty and economic difficulties as a result of the Great Depression, resulted in tensions within the ranks of African workers, as well as interracial conflicts. For example, in January 1949, riots broke out in Durban resulting in 142 deaths and over 1,000 injuries, as large groups of Africans went through the city attacking Indians and looting or destroying Indian-owned property.<sup>106</sup> The tensions between African and Indian workers stretched from the 1870s, when Europeans began to privilege Indian immigrant labor over that of Natal Africans and generally placing them higher in the Durban racial hierarchy, resulting in a string of conflicts between African and Indian workers over the next seventy years.<sup>107</sup> David Hemson linked these attacks to an unsuccessful strike earlier that same year by African workers for higher wages. “The strategy of a general strike having been defeated, the African workers turned toward more nationalistic forms of action,” Hemson argues, “Instead of class action the African workers turned against Indian people.”<sup>108</sup> Iain Edwards and Tim Nuttall argue that the state drew “ideological ammunition” from these riots, who concluded in a commission of enquiry that the violence had been tantamount to “race riots,” providing

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<sup>106</sup> Callebert (2017); Ralph Callebert, “Working Class Action and Informal Trade on the Durban Docks, 1930s–1950s,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38,4 (2012), 847–861; David Hemson, “Dock Workers, Labour Circulation, and Class Struggles in Durban, 1940–59,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4, 1 (1977), 88–124; Jon Soske, *Internal Frontiers: African nationalism and the Indian diaspora in twentieth-century South Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2017); Maurice Webb and Kenneth Kirkwood, *The Durban Riots and After* (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1949).

<sup>107</sup> These conflicts include, but are not limited to, a fight between Indian and African workers at the barracks of the Natal Government Railways and an 1896 protest of Indian immigrants by African workers on the Durban waterfront. Surendra Bhana and Goolam Vahed, *The making of a political reformer: Gandhi in South Africa, 1893–1914* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), 26, 34; Heather Hughes, “‘The Coolies Will Elbow Us Out of the Country’: African Reactions to Indian Immigration in the Colony of Natal, South Africa,” *Labour History Review* 72,2(2007), 155–168; Mahoney (2012), 123.

<sup>108</sup> David Hemson, “Class Consciousness And Migrant Workers : Dock Workers of Durban,” PhD thesis (University of Warwick, 1979), 351.

necessary justification for the 1950 Groups Areas Act as a measure to prevent future interracial conflict.<sup>109</sup>

Although scholars Nuttall and Edwards have demonstrated that the violent 1949 riots resulted from the rapid social and economic change of the 1940s combined with increasingly racial politics from the apartheid state, the government-appointed commission of enquiry pointed to the inherent violence and martial heritage of the Zulu as a major cause of the conflict.

As on the whole the Native was the aggressor, we are more concerned with the traits which he exhibits. These characteristics, combined with the stage of development to which the Native has attained, induce in him certain states of mind . . . The Zulu is by tradition a warrior. The veneer of civilization which has come to him during his urban existence is nothing but a thin covering. When this breaks under the stress of emotion — especially the emotion of a mob — he again becomes one of the braves of Chaka. One Native witness bluntly admitted: ‘*When we go on the warpath it is our tradition to destroy the enemy root and branch; to kill, to loot and to ravish.*’ The practice of civilized nations is not much different, but it is sugared in nicer forms.<sup>110</sup>

Similarly, a reporter for *The Spectator* who witnessed the riots first hand, wondered “whether the volcanic possibilities of the African native will for long remain submerged, even if the Indian community ceased to exist as a separate problem.”<sup>111</sup> This focus on the martial heritage of the rioters continued into the Commission of Inquiry which recounted how “the mobs of Natives swelled into ‘*impis*’ [Zulu battalions] chanting the Zulu war-cry and indulged in bestial orgies . . . By indulging in barbarous chants and deeds, the Natives worked themselves into a frenzy.”<sup>112</sup> “The Zulu is, by tradition, a warrior,” the report read, “The veneer of civilization which has

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<sup>109</sup> Iain Edwards and Time Nuttall, “Seizing the moment: the January 1949 riots, proletarian populism and the structures of African urban life in Durban during the late 1940s,” History Workshop “Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid,” February 6-10, 1990: 1.

<sup>110</sup> *Report of the Commission of Enquiry Into Riots in Durban* (Cape Town: Cape Times, 1949), 12-13. Emphasis added.

<sup>111</sup> “The Durban Riots,” *The Spectator*, (January 21, 1949), 2.

<sup>112</sup> Van den Heever Commission (1949), p. 4-5, cited in E. Jeffrey Popke, “Modernity's abject space: the rise and fall of Durban's Cato Manor,” *Environment and Planning* 33 (2001), 748.

come to him during his urban existence is but a thin covering.”<sup>113</sup> By focusing on these “barbarous” acts performed by Africans, the Commission of Inquiry re-centered the debate from issues of poverty and horrific living conditions in Cato Manor to place blame on the Africans generally and their inherent martiality specifically.

The tensions on display in the 1949 riots emerged nationwide into the mid-1950s. Later that year, in December 1949, the ANC experienced a massive shift in leadership with the election of Walter Sisulu to secretary-general and the election of several Youth League members, including Oliver Tambo, to the national executive at the National Conference in Bloemfontein. This shift in leadership coincided with a shift in the ANC’s tactics, including more boycotts, strikes, and greater civil disobedience. This culminated in the launching of the Defiance Campaign in 1952. The passage of a string of new apartheid laws, including the Separate Representation of Voters Bill which aimed to remove non-white South Africans from voting rolls in 1956, increasingly demonstrated that the National Party not only wanted to separate whites from blacks but also sought to completely disenfranchise black South Africans. As black South Africans throughout the country launched a campaign of active defiance in June 1952, the administration responded by arresting and charging detractors under the Suppression of Communism Act. Others, including the Rivonia trialists, were charged with high treason.<sup>114</sup> Although rife with harsh retribution from the government, this period of defiance also resulted in the formation of the Congress Alliance in 1954, an multi-racial anti-apartheid coalition lead by the ANC and comprised of the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions,

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<sup>113</sup> Van den Heever Commission (1949), p. 4-5, cited in E. Jeffrey Popke, “Modernity's abject space: the rise and fall of Durban's Cato Manor,” *Environment and Planning* 33 (2001), 748.

<sup>114</sup> Kenneth S. Broun, *Saving Nelson Mandela: The Rivonia Trial and the Fate of South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Soske (2017).

and the Congress of Democrats.<sup>115</sup> At a meeting of this organizations in Kliptown, Johannesburg in June 1955, known as the Congress of the People, the Freedom Charter was written and ratified, pledging their commitment to non-racialism, equality, and solidarity.<sup>116</sup>

References to the Zulu marital heritage emerged in this period of revolt, though not in the same forms as in previous eras of upheaval. Women actively engaged in the culture of revolt and drew on their own martial identities to call for action. In June 1959, female beer brewers broke into the local municipal hall to protest their relocation to KwaMashu, a large township on the northern periphery of Durban. As they broke into the building, they cried out “‘We are the Zulu warriors!’ and ‘*Yinj’umlungu! Yinj’umlungu!*’ (Whites are dogs).”<sup>117</sup> Although this protest did not result in the abandonment of the policy of relocation, it did signal the intersectional appeal of martial heritage for civil disobedience, in addition to the growing intensity of the political climate in South Africa.<sup>118</sup> Struggles like these “over alcohol production and consumption and occasional violent confrontations between brewers and police were surface manifestations of a deep rejection of state interference and control in the arena of drink.”<sup>119</sup> The growing culture of resistance resulted in severe backlash from white authorities, culminating in the Sharpeville Massacre on March 21, 1960 when police opened fire on a crowd of black township residents, killing 69 and injuring over 100.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Gerhart (1978), 105.

<sup>116</sup> Wits Historical Papers, Federation of South African Women (AD1137), The Freedom Charter, 1955; Ismail Vadi, *The Congress of the People and Freedom Charter: A People’s History* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2015).

<sup>117</sup> Vivian Bickford-Smith, *The Emergence of the South African Metropolis: Cities and Identities in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 256.

<sup>118</sup> On forced relocations: Saleem Badat, *The Forgotten People: Political Banishment Under Apartheid* (Boston: BRILL, 2013), 142-153; Laurine Platzky and Cheryl Walker, *The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985).

<sup>119</sup> Jonathan Crush and Charles Ambler (eds.), *Liquor and Labor in Southern Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992), 3.

<sup>120</sup> Tom Lodge, *Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and Its Consequences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Philip Frankel, *An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

While this period saw continued focus on Zulu-speaking Africans as inherently violent due to their connections to the Zulu kingdom, it also resulted in a new batch of Zulu politicians who focused their attentions not on Zulu nationalism, but rather on the uplift of all black South Africans. Although he died suddenly in 1947, Anton Lembede, born on a farm near Pietermaritzburg in 1914, had a huge impact on the policy and approach of the ANC moving forward. Lembede embraced “Africanism” and is considered the early architect of African nationalism in South Africa. By valuing Africanism over separate ethnic identities, Lembede and his fellow Youth League colleagues, including A.P. Mda, saw the only path to black liberation in rising above the ethnic identities enforced by the white supremacist government and set the course of the organization’s politics going forward.<sup>121</sup> A dedicated member of the Communist Party of South Africa and a longtime trade unionist, Pietermaritzburg-based Moses Mabhida played a major role in the Congress of the People and served as president of the South African Congress of Trade Unions founded the same year. Mabhida also served as chairperson of the ANC working committee in Natal. Mabhida fled South Africa following the Sharpeville Massacre, eventually joining the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in 1962. Mabhida served as an important example of a politician maintaining multiple alliances, serving the ANC, SAPC, and SACTU throughout his political career.<sup>122</sup> Following a similar, connected trajectory to his student, Mabhida, Harry Gwala, a dedicated member of the ANC and the SAPC, worked tirelessly to organize workers in Natal. He worked underground until he was arrested in 1964 for recruiting members into the MK. Following his imprisonment on Robben Island, Gwala

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<sup>121</sup> Gail Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 45-84; Anton Muziwakhe Lembede, Robert R. Edgar, and Luyanda ka Msumza, *Freedom in Our Lifetime: The Collected Writings of Anton Muziwakhe Lembede* (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2015); Clive Glaser, *The ANC Youth League* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2013), 23-33; C.R.D. Halisi, *Black Political Thought in the Making of South African Democracy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 60-64.

<sup>122</sup> Tom Lodge, “Moses Mabhida 1923-1986,” *South African Labour Bulletin* 11, no. 6 (1986), 119-124; SACP Central Committee, “Hamba kahle, Moses Mabhida,” *The African Communist* 106 (1986): 27.

later became known as the “The Lion of the Natal Midlands” as he led the ANC in its ongoing struggle with Inkatha (detailed in the next chapter).<sup>123</sup>

On the backdrop of these massive changes and shifts throughout the Republic of South Africa, in Zululand, the office of the Zulu king underwent significant changes of its own. Nyangayezizwe Cyprian Bhhekuzulu ka Solomon was installed as Chief of the Usuthu Tribe in 1951, taking leadership over from Mshiyeni after an extended succession controversy.<sup>124</sup> Cyprian’s promotion came at a time of great change; not only did he become the first Paramount Chief inducted under the apartheid state but he also had to navigate a new system for traditional authorities and black South Africans as well. Following their election in 1948, the Nationalist Party introduced a string of laws designed to both limit the upward mobility of black South Africans as well as to maintain a clear dividing line between the races.<sup>125</sup> These laws represented the unfolding of *apartheid*; the promise of separate development that had resulted in the Afrikaner party’s success a few years prior. Even with these difficult circumstances, Cyprian still formed

The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 (No. 68 of 1951) sanctioned the unofficial government policy of separate development, establishing Regional and Territorial Authorities.<sup>126</sup> Though the Zulu Territorial Authority at Nongoma would only be established in June 1970, the new policy

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<sup>123</sup> Charles Nqakula, “Harry Gwala – Man of Steel,” *The African Communist* 142 (1995): 41; Jabulani Sithole, “The ANC Underground in Natal,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 [1970-1980]*, ed. South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 2006), 546-553; Mxolisi C. Dlamuka, “Connectedness and Disconnectedness in Thembeyakhe Harry Gwala’s Biography, 1920-1995: Rethinking Political Militancy, Mass Mobilisation and Grassroots Struggles in South Africa,” PhD Dissertation, University of the Western Cape, 2018;

<sup>124</sup> Buverud (2007), 31-37.

<sup>125</sup> These laws include the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949; Immorality Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1950; Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950; Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950.

<sup>126</sup> Jill E. Kelly, “Bantu Authorities and Betterment in Natal: The Ambiguous Responses of Chiefs and Regents, 1955–1970,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, 2 (2015), 273-297; Ashley Parcells, “Rural Development, Royal History, and the Struggle for Authority in Early Apartheid Zululand (1951–4),” *Journal of African History* 59, 2 (2018), 199-219.



underlining this Act held broad implications for the lives of all black South Africans.<sup>127</sup> The administration framed this Act in the truest terms of separate development, imploring black South Africans to understand its potential to benefit not only themselves, but also white South Africans. In 1950, D.F. Verwoerd, then Minister for Native Affairs, articulated this stance.

The more this intermixing develops [...] the stronger the conflict will become. [...] To avoid the above-mentioned unpleasant and dangerous future for both sections of the population, the present government adopts the attitude that it concedes and wishes to give to others precisely what it demands for itself. It believes in the supremacy of the European in his sphere, but, then, it also believes equally in the supremacy of the Bantu in his own sphere.<sup>128</sup>

Following Verwoerd's appointment as Prime Minister in 1958, De Wet Nel, his successor in the department now known as Bantu Administration rather than Native Affairs, connected the potential of the separate development notion to the inherent ethnic divisions among black South Africans. "The Zulu is proud to be a Zulu and the Xhosa is proud to be a Xhosa and the Venda is proud to be a Venda, just as proud as they were a hundred years ago," Nel insisted, "The lesson we have learnt from history during the past three hundred years is that these ethnic groups, the white as well as the Bantu, sought their greatest happiness and the best mutual relations on the basis of separate and individual development . . . the only basis on which peace, happiness and mutual confidence could be built up."<sup>129</sup> By fetishizing ethnic separation, Nel and his supporters hoped to justify apartheid separation through fostering the same ethnic identities that proliferated on the mines.

The Bantu Authorities Act also provided for the appointment of Chiefs and Headmen by the government; as government-sanctioned officials, chiefs and headmen were expected to act in

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<sup>127</sup> "Zulu Territorial Authority at Nongoma Officially Opens," *Bantu* (1970): 24; "Zulu Territorial Authority," *Bantu* (1970): 8.

<sup>128</sup> Quoted in Buvurud (2007), 46.

<sup>129</sup> Quoted in Mare (1992), 55.

accordance with the expectations of white authorities and those who did not were often removed from office, including Albert Luthuli who refused to resign from the ANC.<sup>130</sup> In 1951, Cyprian officially became Paramount Chief of the Zulus; a move recognized by many at the time as an attempt to shore up loyalty with the young Zulu regent and to reward his support of Bantu Authorities, though severely restricting his powers at the same time. Cyprian's general disinterest in shoring up trouble against the backdrop of increasing resistance to apartheid endeared him to the white authorities.<sup>131</sup> This stance taken by Cyprian represented an approach adopted by traditional authorities throughout South Africa, rather than choosing the path of resistance, negotiated and challenged apartheid through a bargaining position.<sup>132</sup> By the time of his death in 1968, Cyprian had borne witness to not only the implementation of apartheid, but also the first steps taken towards a separate Zulu state.

As the next chapter illustrates, the ethnic divisions fostered from the late 1880s to the 1960s fueled growing political ethnic divisions, resulting in outbreaks of violence in the early 1990s that threatened the democratic transition. "Being a 'Xhosa' or a 'Zulu' on a South African mine in 1994 did not rest simply on a commitment to a cultural tradition to a past," Donald Donham explained in his study of a 1994 riot on a mine in Johannesburg, "Rather, being Xhosa or Zulu was anchored in the present realities of work under a particular kind of capitalist regime . . ."<sup>133</sup> The marital heritage which found new life in urban industrial contexts also found new life

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<sup>130</sup> Vinson (2018).

<sup>131</sup> Cyprian's efforts to endear apartheid authorities to him are captured in the pages of *Bantu* magazine, a publication of the Bantu Affairs Department from 1960 to 1978. For examples of Cyprian's efforts, see: "Cyprian accepts Betterment Schemes," *Bantu* (1962), 124; "Chiefs Will Remain Axis of Bantu Nationhood," *Bantu* (1963), 3; "Cyprian at Ukukhanyakufikile Authority Celebrations," *Bantu* (1963), 11; "Paramount Chief Becomes Boy Scout," *Bantu* (1965), 43.

<sup>132</sup> William Beinart, "Chieftaincy and the Concept of Articulation: South Africa ca. 1900-1950," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 19, 1(1985), 91-98.

<sup>133</sup> Donald Donham, *Violence in a Time of Liberation: Murder and Ethnicity at a South African Gold Mine, 1994* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 67.

in the struggle against apartheid in the 1980s and 1990s. And the revival of Inkatha as a Zulu nationalist organization built its foundation on the shared heritage of military victory and ethnic consolidation under Shaka Zulu. *Amabutho*, as both an institution and a concept, rose to new national and global prominence as men both gathered and were collected under the banner of the regiments in the fight against apartheid.

## Chapter 5:

### “We fight because we are so plenty”: Zulu Martial Masculinity and the Fight Against Apartheid, 1971 to 1994

The musical traditions explored in the previous chapter found new meaning in the mid-1970s through the mid-1990s as the struggle against the apartheid government of the National Party reached a boiling point. In the context of the struggle, precolonial symbols and metaphors found new meaning as the embodiment of African liberations from white supremacist rule. One such song composed in the post-apartheid era, entitled “Emzabalazweni (“In the Struggle”),” explicitly invoked the *amabutho* as a key component in this struggle.

*Emzabalazweni*  
*Ayekhn’amabutho*  
*Ayekhon’ikomanda*  
*Emzabalazweni*

In the struggle  
There were regiments  
There was a commander  
In the struggle<sup>1</sup>

Janet Cherry explains that this song “was tailored by the *amabutho* . . . , the former informal youth militia, to remember that era and to claim their place in history.”<sup>2</sup> Additionally, the performance of this song in the post-struggle era, she argues, “can be interpreted as a scathing social critique of the kind of representative democracy that we have in South Africa, rather than just remembering the glory days of struggle.”<sup>3</sup> The dual nature of this song, especially in regards to the *amabutho*, reflects the many ways in which regiments became reimagined during the height of the struggle against apartheid and in the first years of the new democratic South Africa.

During this period (between 1971 and 1994), *amabutho* gained prominence in ways perhaps only challenged by the rise of the Zulu military complex under Shaka Zulu. Scholarship on the *amabutho* is particularly rich in this era because of the resurgence of *amabutho* as fighting

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<sup>1</sup> Janet Cherry, “Emzabalazweni: Singing the Language of Struggle,” in Mirjana N. Dedaic (ed.) *Singing, Speaking and Writing Politics: South African political discourses* (Philadelphia: John Benajmins Publishing Company, 2015), 222-223.

<sup>2</sup> Cherry, “Emzabalazweni,” 223.

<sup>3</sup> Cherry, “Emzabalazweni,” 223.

forces; in this case, not as Zulu warriors fighting the imposition of colonialism, but rather as warriors for Zulu nationalism and freedom from apartheid. Though, as in other eras, these public performances of martial heritage varied widely, in the popular press the narrative constructed surrounding them failed to take these subtleties into account. It is virtually impossible to separate the actions of vigilantes from the rhetoric surrounding *amabutho* in television broadcasts, newspapers, and magazines. In an attempt to correct this narrative, this chapter examines the multiple manifestations of *amabutho* and martial masculinit(ies) in this period.

Though vigilante units and local warlords exploited military metaphors to attract supporters and solidify their tenuous positions, for many people *amabutho* and their connected traditions functioned as refuges in the face of violence and insecurity. At the same time, Zulu cultural figureheads, especially King Goodwill Zwelithini and KwaZulu prime minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi, accessed these same metaphors to crystallize Zulu ethnic nationalism through these shared symbols and traditions. By exploring these competing narratives of Zulu martial masculinity, this chapter demonstrates the ways in which these different camps utilized this symbology for their own agendas. I argue that the conflation of *amabutho* with martial metaphors resulted in a new politicized militancy driven by the historical context of the struggle and rooted in the regimental tradition. This approach reveals less about a singular violent Zulu masculinity and more about diverse and sometimes competing invocations of Zuluness in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and also the simultaneous struggles going on within the anti-apartheid struggle.

On December 3, 1971, Goodwill Zwelithini ka Bhekuzulu was installed officially as Paramount Chief of the Zulus at Kethomthandayo kraal near Nongoma before nearly 30,000 Zulus and a number of white administrators, including P.W. Botha. While Zwelithini used the

opportunity to thank his uncle, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni, for protecting him and the Zulu nation during the interim between his father's death and his installation, M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and Bantu Education, used the gathering as a chance to remind the Zulu king (and the Zulu nation as a whole) of his tenuous status and role in maintaining peace and prosperity in South Africa. "Your status and distinction — although a portion of your predecessors' glory may have disappeared — is nevertheless important. The one who bears the title of *Ngonyama* is the binding force out of which the Zulu nation springs," Botha explained, "You are in this high position the living symbol of the Zulu nation. Under your rule the Zulu nation is expected to develop towards a fully-fledged modern, self-governing and independent nation — not by violence and spilling of blood but in a peaceful and constitutional way."<sup>4</sup> He concluded by reminding Zwelithini that "as Paramount Chief of the Zulus you can do much to further good relations between the Zulu people and the Government of the Republic."<sup>5</sup> This auspicious occasion not only saw the installation of a new chief, but a strong reminder of the limitations of the monarch's power under the apartheid state.

Botha's words reinforced the limits of Zwelithini's powers as Paramount Chief as laid out in the constitution of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KZLA), which relegated the kingship to a ceremonial role by making him answerable to Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi. It also reflected a commitment to supporting the preservation of Zulu culture both through the office of the Paramount Chief and through establishment of the Bureau for Zulu Language and Culture in Eshowe earlier in 1971.<sup>6</sup> These movements showed a simultaneous commitment by the white nationalist government to promote and preserve Zulu culture, while

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<sup>4</sup> "Zulu Paramount Chief Installed," *Bantu* XIX, 2 (February 1972), 11-12. Emphasis added.

<sup>5</sup> "Zulu Paramount Chief Installed," *Bantu* XIX, 2 (February 1972), 11-12. Emphasis added.

<sup>6</sup> "Bureau for Zulu Language and Culture," (*Bantu* 1971), 23.

also expecting the king and his partners to maintain the peaceful separation of the white and black populations.

This speech also reflected the new realities imposed by the apartheid state's policy of separate development. The KwaZulu Territorial Authority had been established in 1970, a legislative confirmation of the policy of separate development endorsed by the apartheid state.<sup>7</sup> In 1972, the KwaZulu Territorial Authority got its own parliament, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KZLA). Under the terms of the homeland's new parliament, as defined by the Zulu Territorial Authority constitution and negotiated while Zwelithini remained in exile, the young king's position remained ceremonial and the Zulu royal household remained alienated from the leadership of the new Bantustan. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, as chairman of the KZLA, emerged as the major authority and utilized his position to foster a Zulu nationalist movement. Buthelezi, who claimed familial ties to Zwelithini as well as a historical role for a member of his family (in this case, himself) as the king's "prime minister," named Zwelithini as the symbolic figurehead to promote his own agenda.

Separate development, however, did not immediately result in self-government. In fact, it would not be until February 1977 that the national government extended self-government status to KwaZulu with the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971. This Act allowed KwaZulu to form a cabinet and take over all affairs for the Bantustan, including levying taxes and making Zulu the official language in the bantustan. The delay in providing this designation largely stemmed from the anti-apartheid stances taken by key KwaZulu leaders, including King Goodwill, as well as delays in holding elections until Buthelezi and his supporters were certain they would enjoy nearly universal support. This need for control, Jabulani Sithole argues, "laid

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<sup>7</sup> Jeffrey Butler, Robert I. Rotberg, and John Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

the basis for the one-party system in KwaZulu.”<sup>8</sup> “When we view events in this light,” he argues, “it becomes evident that the political violence that erupted in Natal in the next decade was a consequence of the simmering political tensions caused by the suppression of political dissent and deepening political intolerance in the province throughout the 1970s.”<sup>9</sup> This one-party system rested solely on Buthelezi’s own political organization launched on March 21, 1975, a revival of the union-era *Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe* formed in 1928 by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu.

Mangosuthu Buthelezi was born in Mahlabathini on August 27, 1928, the son of Magogo ka Dinuzulu, the daughter of King Dinuzulu, and the grandson of Myamana Buthelezi, Prime Minister to King Cetshwayo.<sup>10</sup> As a member of the royal family, Mangosuthu was raised within the traditions, idioms, and customs that represented the Zulu Nation to the outside world. These included the martial heritage that Inkatha later pulled on to draw adherents; Buthelezi himself was a member of the *Manukelana/Ingangakazane amabutho* formed by Mshiyeni following Solomon’s death in March 1933.<sup>11</sup> First in line for the Buthelezi chieftainship, he studied at the finest schools, including Adams College in Amanzimtoti and the University of Fort Hare, where he joined the ANC Youth League but ultimately was expelled for participation in student boycotts.<sup>12</sup> After matriculating at the University of Natal, Buthelezi took a position in the Native Affairs Department in Durban in 1951 and stayed there until 1953, when he returned home to

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<sup>8</sup> Jabulani Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” in South African Democracy Education Trust, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 [1970-1980]* (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 2006), 807.

<sup>9</sup> Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs,” 807.

<sup>10</sup> The most popular biographical studies of Buthelezi include Ben Temkin’s hagiography of the Zulu nationalist leader, *Buthelezi: A Biography* (2003), and Jabulani “Mzala” Nxumalo’s critical study, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (1988). Ben Temkin, *Buthelezi: A Biography* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Mzala (1988).

<sup>11</sup> Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Interview with author and Lindelihle Mahaye, September 30, 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Halisi, *Black Political Thought in the Making of South African Democracy*, 60.



assume the Buthelezi chieftaincy. He became acting chief in 1953, but would not become recognized as chief by the apartheid state until 1957 when a contest to his claim to the throne from his half-brother Mceleli was settled.<sup>13</sup> Based on his deep roots in the region and his experience in Bantu Administration, the central government named Buthelezi Chief Executive Officer of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority in 1971. When the KZLA formed, he became its Chief Minister, occupying a central role not only in leading the Bantustan but also in presenting Zulu ethnicity to the rest of the world, especially following the formation of Inkatha.<sup>14</sup>

Following the banning of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress in 1960, Inkatha emerged alongside the Black Consciousness Movement to fill the gap for internal liberation movements.<sup>15</sup> Since many of the early leaders of Inkatha, including Buthelezi himself, were ANC members, Inkatha was viewed early on as a possible alternative option to the ANC. Quickly, however, Buthelezi proved too willing to bend to the desires of the apartheid government. When he publicly opposed international sanctions, Buthelezi along with Inkatha became generally regarded as government puppets. At the same time as he was acknowledged as a “puppet,” he still drew concerns from white South Africans due to his blustery personality and the impassioned speeches he delivered on Inkatha’s willingness to turn to violence if

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<sup>13</sup> Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 13-15, 27; Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi*, 66.

<sup>14</sup> Shelagh Gastrow, *Who’s Who in South African Politics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Revised Edition (New York: H. Zell Publishers, 1990), 28.

<sup>15</sup> On the Pan Africanist Congress: Ahmed Gora Ebrahim, “Pan Africanist Congress,” *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 4 (1990): 28-31; Benjamin Pogrand, *Robert Sobukwe: How Can Man Die Better* (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2006); Kwandiwe Kondlo, *In the Twilight of the Revolution: the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa), 1959-1994* (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2009). On the Black Consciousness Movement: Steve Biko, *I Write What I Like: Selected Writings* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978); Mbulelo V. Mzamane, Bavusile Maaba, and Nkosingithi Biko, “The Black Consciousness Movement,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 [1970-1980]*, ed. South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 2006), 99-159; Daniel Magaziner, *The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968-1977* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010); Leslie Anne Hadfield, *Liberation and Development: Black Consciousness Community Programs in South Africa* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2016).

circumstances demanded it. In June 1975, Buthelezi told reporter Anthony Lewis of *The Star* that he had not ruled out violence as a tool to achieve his desired ends.

It's not something we're going to get on a platter. I have no illusions about it. People may lose their lives . . . I am opposed to violence. But it's something you cannot rule out, or predict. Strikes and so forth have not led to violence so far. But in this explosive country it could easily happen. The Government complains that I seem to want violence because I talk about it so much. That's not true. I just try to warn them that their whole conduct must lead to it.<sup>16</sup>

In another interview with *The Daily Dispatch*, Buthelezi echoed these sentiments: "We are not going to plan a revolution, but we certainly intend revolutionizing our approach to our problems."<sup>17</sup> These public statements of his revolutionary obviously concerned authorities. But it was not only these strongly worded statements that drew the attentions of the apartheid state; the explicit connections Inkatha drew to the shared martial heritage of Zulu men further stoked tensions between Buthelezi and the white authorities.

These invocations of martial heritage helped Inkatha secure the loyalties of Zulu-speakers, especially Zulu men who were recruited "on the grounds that the legacy of kings and warriors had bequeathed to them the special destiny now championed by Inkatha."<sup>18</sup> Thembisa Waetjen argues that "by utilizing "a sophisticated narrative of Zuluness that referenced traditional gender systems and identities," Buthelezi professed put forth an ideology that signaled to men that "the blood of heroic Zulu ancestors infused in them the unique ethnic traits required to successfully pursue that destiny."<sup>19</sup> "With claims to a renowned martial history manifested in the legendary deeds of Zulu heroes, kings, and chiefs and in the incorporation of symbols and

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<sup>16</sup> SALDRU (Homelands KwaZulu General 1975), Anthony Lewis. "A moderate chief who has to talk of violence," *Star* June 16, 1975, p. 66.

<sup>17</sup> SALDRU (Homelands KwaZulu General 1975), "Revolutionary approach intended says Gatsha," *Daily Dispatch* July 19, 1975, p. 88.

<sup>18</sup> Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors*, 24.

<sup>19</sup> Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors*, 24.

artifacts (such as traditional weapons),” she continues, “Inkatha’s appeal emphasized masculinist tradition. The ‘idea of manhood permeate[d] the vision of the essence of Zuluness’.”<sup>20</sup> Inkatha also appealed to women through this same martial heritage, though from a different angle. While men were encouraged to join Inkatha based on a shared martial heritage, the organization appealed to women through their identity as the mothers of warriors.

Women are placed within the warrior tradition, but as the bearers of warriors. Women reproduce, but are never themselves within ‘the past’: ‘We the mothers of this part of South Africa have in our inner beings, in our deep wisdom and in our very blood, the lessons that history has taught us. We are the mothers of a great warrior nation . . .’<sup>21</sup>

Furthermore, Inkatha leadership fostered support by “describ[ing] the political subjugation of Zulu-speaking people as crystallized most poignantly in the transformation of the Zulu male from houseboy to warrior,” Waetjen argues, “In speeches at rallies and cultural events, the losses of cultural pride, dignity and identity were explained as a loss of the privilege and power that Zulu men once claimed unequivocally.”<sup>22</sup> Waetjen’s perspective on Inkatha emphasized the masculine discourse inherent in its philosophy and approach; based on Buthelezi’s deep roots in the Zulu royal family and its connected traditions, by default this masculine discourse was tied up in martiality.

Inkatha, by way of Buthelezi, called to the past to inspire loyalty in the contemporary context but, as Shula Marks argues, the resurgence of Inkatha in the 1970s to 1990s and the

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<sup>20</sup> Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors*, 24.

<sup>21</sup> Mare, *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood*, 68. Jill Kelly also shows that women during the *udlame* in the Natal Table Mountain region “not only promoted Zuluness, in particular material masculinity, through gendered performances but also utilized both martiality and a sense of moral ethnicity as resources to inform decision making and to create coping strategies in the midst of war.” Though wielding their religion as their weapons, these women illustrate the appeal of Zulu martial masculinity across gender binaries. Jill Kelly, “‘Women Were Not Supposed to Fight’: The Gendered Uses of Martial and Moral Zuluness during *Udlame*, 1990-1994” in Jan Bender Shetler (ed.) *Women in Africa and the Diaspora: Gendering Ethnicity in African Women’s Lives* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 180.

<sup>22</sup> Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors*, 26.

violence acted out in the interest of conflicts with the ANC/UDF differed fundamentally from the Zulu nationalist Inkatha of the 1920s. “Behind the violence lie not deep cultural or psychological traits but the intensification of rural poverty, migrancy, unemployment and urban overcrowding; that it takes on ethnic form is the result of the consistent working and reworking of ethnic divisions and the deliberate glorification of Zulu military ‘traditions’ by politicians and culture-brokers, both black and white,” Marks explained, “As everywhere, the ethnicizing of political conflict and its eruption into brutal killing is a product of present interests not of past culture.”<sup>23</sup> The ethnicization of politics in KwaZulu-Natal was predicated on the social memory of the legacy of the Zulu Kingdom. In particular, the association of Inkatha with *amabutho* explicitly linked the Zulu nationalist organization with the height of Zulu influence in the region. Carrying traditional weapons, utilizing the *Usuthu!* cry of former Zulu loyalists, and calling on Shaka’s legacy of rigorous training, the Inkatha *amabutho* followed in the regimental traditions of the Zulu kingdom. Patrick Harries refers to this use of the regiments as one of the “more menacing form(s) of imagery” the organization used to secure support.<sup>24</sup> At the same time, “while their image is traditional, the function of the *amabutho* is decidedly modern,” with Inkatha vigilante groups involved in near constant struggle with the ANC to regain territory and support.<sup>25</sup>

At the same time, however, Gerhard Maré points out that while this politicization of ethnicity also helped Inkatha flourish, the state also benefited from this phenomena. “The presence of the past in the Natal region owes much to a specific set of symbols and history of resistance,” he explains, “but it is also indebted to the manner in which apartheid policy froze

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<sup>23</sup> Shula Marks, ‘The Origins of Ethnic Violence in South Africa’, in N. Etherington (ed.), *Peace, Politics and Violence in the New South Africa* (African Discourse Series No. 5, Hans Zell Publishers, 1992), 44-45.

<sup>24</sup> Patrick Harries, “Imagery, Symbolism and Tradition in a South African Bantustan: Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha, and Zulu History,” *History and Theory* 32, no. 4 (Dec., 1993): 122

<sup>25</sup> Harries, “Imagery, Symbolism and Tradition in a South African Bantustan,” 122

and distorted the past.”<sup>26</sup> This freezing and distortion of the past enabled the “modern manipulators of an ethnic and regional past” to manipulate these perceived differences.<sup>27</sup> “In their ‘attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historical past’ and provide social cohesion through ‘conventions of behaviour’, Inkatha’s leaders are burdened with what the apartheid state has made of history,” he continued. “The state’s social cement is *politicized* ethnicity.”<sup>28</sup> And Inkatha, under the leadership of Buthelezi, helped to cement these divisions.

1979, declared the “Year of the Spear,” marked the centenary of the victory of the Zulu over the British at Isandlwana. In anticipation of this momentous event, the KwaZulu Government coordinated performances by 120 dancers from dancing groups at factories and mines near Newcastle. Alongside providing training for these dancers (with guidance from Buthelezi’s mother), the KZLA sponsored the construction of new regimental garb for the dancers (at a cost of R100 per dancer) under the supervision of Kingsley Holgate, the costume designer for the film *Zulu Dawn* (1979) as well as the crafting of new shields and spears by local craftsman, Joseph Ncube.<sup>29</sup> On the day of the centenary, Inkatha Youth League members marched in uniform (led by one of Buthelezi’s sons) alongside Royal Regiment of Wales members, representing a multicultural parade of martial traditions.<sup>30</sup> Among those watching these presentations was King Zwelithini and Mangosuthu Buthelezi, as well as a number of white administrators, including Administrator of Natal Ben Havemann who spoke of the important of reconciliation for peaceful coexistence, explaining that though both blacks and

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<sup>26</sup> Mare, *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood*, 104.

<sup>27</sup> Mare, *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood*, 104.

<sup>28</sup> Mare, *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood*, 104. Emphasis added.

<sup>29</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1975, Deanne Nel, “Warriors get ready for the celebrations,” *Natal Mercury*, April 25, 1979.

<sup>30</sup> PC 126/8/16 Press Cuttings, 1987, Tim Muil and Michael Derry. “Isandlwana: 10,000 on a battlefield of old turn to dedicate themselves to peace,” *Natal Mercury* May 26, 1979; PC 126/8/16 Press Cuttings: 1987, “Chief: Whites, Blacks in S.A. want new deal,” *Natal Mercury*, May 28, 1979.

whites “may value and cherish our separate cultural identities, our unique traditions and cultures, as it is indeed our duty to do . . . economically we are wholly interdependent.”<sup>31</sup>

Buthelezi’s message to the crowd struck a different chord than that of Havemann. Using the platform to comment on the political climate in South Africa, Buthelezi focused on the present-day violence, simultaneously expressing concern about the militarization of the youth as well as threatening retaliation if the white state continued to attack the Zulu people.

We do not want our children to die either in the defense of apartheid or to see them live through another generation in iniquity in our social, political and economic systems. We do not want to see a generation of our countrymen trained as animals of war. When youth, both black and white, have learned to solve the problems through violence the chances are that violence will continue. We must turn away from confrontation and towards sharing. Intelligence and courage will be needed as we struggle to find each other in a better future. I am saying that whites came and clobbered us because they had bigger sticks and unless there is change whites in turn will be clobbered because we in time will have bigger sticks and when we have done that we will choose our own friends.<sup>32</sup>

During the celebration, multiple South African news outlets published photos of Zwelithini and Buthelezi together smiling as the festivities proceeded. Later the same week, new reports emerged in the media about feuding between the King and the Prime Minister, based on the fact that Zwelithini had been excluded from making a speech during the centenary celebrations.<sup>33</sup> In fact, the feud between Buthelezi and Zwelithini stemmed from much larger allegations, mostly from the KwaZulu minister, claiming that Zwelithini disliked his collaboration with the white state, even going so far as to call he and his supporters “as lackeys of whites.”<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, Tim Muil and Michael Derry. “Isandlwana: 10,000 on a battlefield of old turn to dedicate themselves to peace,” *Natal Mercury* May 26, 1979.

<sup>32</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “Chief warns of war,” *Sunday Tribune* May 27, 1979.

<sup>33</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “Chief, Zulu King feud shows again,” *Natal Mercury* May 31, 1979.

<sup>34</sup> *Daily News*, June 6, 1979; Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs,” 833.

During this time, splinter parties emerged to challenge Buthelezi's stranglehold on KwaZulu and King Goodwill, coopting symbols and language invoked by Inkatha to garner their own support.<sup>35</sup> Part of Buthelezi's accusations against King Goodwill centered on rumors that he had, in recent weeks, attempted to form an opposition party alongside Maqongqo *Inkosi* Mhlabunzima Maphumulo. The Inala Party drew its name from Goodwill Zwelithini's *Inala* ("Plenty") regiment, the first regiment the current monarch formed of men of his age group.<sup>36</sup> This splinter party, formed along with several members of the Zulu royal family and KwaZulu businessmen, opposed several elements of the KZLA constitution, including the article requiring chiefs to be patrons of Inkatha and the encouragement of white investment through tripartite businesses.<sup>37</sup> Another party, Shaka's Spear (*Umkhonto kaShaka*) had been organized in 1973 to oppose Buthelezi with the support of several royal family members; although Zwelithini disowned the party in 1974, the threat of another splinter party with names connected to martial traditions, showed the weaknesses in Buthelezi's stronghold.<sup>38</sup>

By July 1974, the "feud," driven by presumed conspiracies like these splinter parties, had progressed so far that Buthelezi announced the distribution of a "protocol guide" with the intent to limit the King to his constitutionally-defined role. For example, based on this protocol guide, the King would have had to apply to the KZLA cabinet for permission to travel anywhere outside the Usuthu district. Charles Hlengwa defended the King against Buthelezi's proposed protocols, but Zwelithini's refusal to address the KZLA in relation to accusations that he had publicly critiqued Buthelezi by saying that the Zulus were "wasting time with the policy of non-

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<sup>35</sup> Maré, *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood*, 96.

<sup>36</sup> Gastrow, *Who's Who in South African Politics*, 176.

<sup>37</sup> Jill Kelly, "The 'Peace Chief' Mhlabunzima Maphumulo: Conflict over Land and Authority in Mbambangalo during the Udlame" (Unpublished paper, History and African Studies Seminar, University of KwaZulu-Natal, May 25, 2011); Maré and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 110; Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs," 830-833.

<sup>38</sup> Butler, Rotberg and Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, 86.

violence,” did little to ease the tensions with Buthelezi who viewed this comment as being “very dangerous” as it gave the impression that KwaZulu lawmakers were “lackeys of Pretoria.”<sup>39</sup> Zwelithini’s antagonistic relationship with Buthelezi represented a significant threat to his lifestyle as, by mid-1979, he was highly reliant on the KZLA, living on an annual salary of R18,000 and looking to the KZLA for additional funds for maintaining his residences and hiring bodyguards.<sup>40</sup> In the midst of his very public dispute with Buthelezi, combined with his refusal to appear before the KZLA on three separate occasions, the KZLA voted to reduce Zwelithini’s annual salary from R21,000 to R8,000.<sup>41</sup> In hopes of resolving this issue, Zwelithini finally made an appearance at the KZLA in August 1979, only to be publicly accused by Buthelezi of “unconstitutional” conduct.<sup>42</sup> Zwelithini stormed out of the session and later received treatment for stress at one of his royal residences in the wake of his appearance.<sup>43</sup>

In May 1980, news broke of the formation of a “Zulu” regional unit of the SADF. The 121 Battalion, referred to as the “Zulu Battalion,” had been formed in January 1979 following the recruitment of 100 soldiers who had been immediately sent to a 10-week orientation course in Lenz and then returned to their base of Jozini in Northern Natal where they underwent another year of training.<sup>44</sup> In addition to the “Zulu” Battalion, training continued for three other black

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<sup>39</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “Feud could split Zulus warns Chief,” *Natal Mercury* June 6, 1979.

<sup>40</sup> The KZLA advanced R27,000 to King for residence at kwaKangela in 1979 in addition to paying R8,000 a year for two drivers and bodyguards. See: SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “Zulu King ‘deeply in debt,’” *Natal Mercury* June 14, 1979.

<sup>41</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “King’s salary halved till he joins Assembly,” *Rand Daily Mail* June 27, 1979; SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “Zulu king still suffering from stress,” *Post* August 16, 1979.

<sup>42</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1975, “Zulu House in uproar as King bolts,” *Star* August 7, 1979; SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “Drama as Zulu King flees from Assembly,” *Natal Mercury* August 7, 1979; SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “Zulu king bolts and flees,” *Post* August 8, 1979; SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, Obed Kunene “Hau! The week a king’s ‘performance’ sparked a disbelieving cry from his people,” *Sunday Tribune* August 12, 1979.

<sup>43</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1979, “Zulu king still suffering from stress,” *Post* August 16, 1979.

<sup>44</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General, Daryl Balfour. “Impi,” *Sunday Tribune* May 25, 1980.



regional units: the 111 “Swazi” Battalion at Amsterdam in the Eastern Transvaal, the 112 “Venda” Battalion at Madimbo in the Northern Transvaal, and 113 “Shangaan” Battalion at Imapala near Phalaborwa in the Eastern Transvaal.<sup>45</sup> The SADF justified the ethnicization of the units, explaining that the recruits were simply drawn from regions with shared ethnic backgrounds.<sup>46</sup>

While perhaps not consciously formed along ethnic lines, Dr. M. Hough of the Institute of Strategic Studies, a Pretoria-based think-tank, viewed these battalions as “a logical extension of the homelands policy.”<sup>47</sup> Hough theorized that these units were part of an attempt by South Africa’s security forces to intercept insurgents crossing the border, but also to interfere with the insurgents’ “success in the psychological and propaganda domain by their strike which alerted the counter-insurgent forces of their presence.”<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, as confirmed by Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi, involvement in the regional units of the SADF also imposed on soldiers the idea that “equal fulfillment of blacks of military obligations implied a claim to equal rights with white South Africans.”<sup>49</sup> Regardless of the political implications of assembling a force of this kind, the South Africa government needed this support as the threat of insurgency threatened national security. In 1979, H.J. Coetzee, then Minister of Defence, predicted a surge in insurgent activity on the border that needed policing and the potential use of black soldiers in the SADF.

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<sup>45</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, “Zulu impi goes on the warpath,” *Sunday Times* May 25, 1980.

<sup>46</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, Patrick Laurence and Chris Marais, “Regional, not ethnic units, says SADF,” *Rand Daily Mail* May 27, 1980.

<sup>47</sup> APC PC 126/8/18 Press Cuttings - July - December 1988, Patrick Laurence and Chris Marais, “Units ‘extension of homeland policy’,” *Rand Daily Mail*, May 26, 1980. APC PC 126/8/18 Press Cuttings - July - December 1988.

<sup>48</sup> APC PC 126/8/18 Press Cuttings - July - December 1988, Patrick Laurence and Chris Marais, “Units ‘extension of homeland policy’,” *Rand Daily Mail*, May 26, 1980. APC PC 126/8/18 Press Cuttings - July - December 1988.

<sup>49</sup> APC PC 126/8/18 Press Cuttings - July - December 1988, Patrick Laurence and Chris Marais, “Units ‘extension of homeland policy’,” *Rand Daily Mail*, May 26, 1980. APC PC 126/8/18 Press Cuttings - July - December 1988.

We shall find their depredations increasing in our border areas . . . Their aim is to influence people and to try to win their hearts, their minds and their consciences, whether by intimidation, whether by a display of force or by kidnappings . . . We must therefore expect that this will spread in the rural areas. The black people of these regions will also become a target . . . The black people also have to look after themselves. They have to help us to spread a geographic presence and to maintain it. In this connection, we are developing a concept of regional companies for black soldiers in the South African Defence Force. (They) also fulfill the role of a military presence, the showing of the flag, in a specific region.<sup>50</sup>

P.W. Botha, at the announcement of the unit's formation, explicitly connected this unit's existence with Coetzee's anticipation of insurgent border activity. "The protection of our borders is the duty of everyone living in South Africa and the strong points and bases can only contribute to better protection of our national borders against insurgents," Botha declared in May 1980.<sup>51</sup>

While the practical benefits of utilizing black soldiers was purported by white administrators, the perceived military heritage and physical prowess of the Zulu featured strongly in public rhetoric surrounding the 121 Battalion. A *Sunday Times* reporter waxed poetic about the innate martiality of these Zulu soldiers, writing that with the formation of this unit "Zulu warriors are on the march again."<sup>52</sup>

The measured thumping of their feet is being heard once more in Northern Natal . . . this time clad in big, shiny army boots . . . But the war cry is the same – 'Bayete!' . . . For the Zulus, creation of the black units is a chance to recapture some of the tribe's military glory.<sup>53</sup>

In an article with Daryl Balfour for the *Sunday Tribune*, Colonel Heap, the Commanding Officer of the Unit, credited the success of the unit directly to Chaka Zulu who felt had instilled great discipline in Zulu men, a trait that "made them one of the best fighting forces ever," one that

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<sup>50</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, Patrick Laurence and Chris Marais. "Regional, not ethnic units, says SADF," *Rand Daily Mail* May 27, 1980. 7

<sup>51</sup> APC PC 126/8/18 Press Cuttings - July - December 1988, "Botha's Zulu troops in training," *Sunday Tribune* May 25, 1980.

<sup>52</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, "Zulu impi goes on the warpath," *Sunday Times* May 25, 1980.

<sup>53</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, "Zulu impi goes on the warpath," *Sunday Times* May 25, 1980.

would “have done Chaka proud.”<sup>54</sup> One *Sunday Express* journalist wrote of visiting the 121 Battalion compound at Jozini Dam, noting that inside communal spirit of the shared-living spaces in the leopard-head decorated compound<sup>55</sup> “there is the unmistakable snap-and-crackle atmosphere of a keen regiment.”<sup>56</sup> Amidst this “snap-and-crackle atmosphere,” one white officer speaking to the *Sunday Express* reporter commented on the innate physical endurance of the 121 Battalion soldiers, who seemed to never tire.<sup>57</sup>

While operating within the borders of KwaZulu, the Battalion did not enjoy the support of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly or its mouthpiece, Buthelezi. In a press statement given by Buthelezi in 1991, he recalled being approached not only by the SADF but also by then-ANC President after the Battalion’s founding to provide support. For the ANC, this meant using “his influence to ensure that this Battalion was not sent to the borders.”<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, the SADF wanted Buthelezi to lend his support in the role of “Honorary Commander-in-Chief,” which Buthelezi had to refuse “because I again feared that it would cause the same misunderstanding that is now being generated in the media about the SADF.”<sup>59</sup> The commanding officer then said he planned to approach the King about becoming the Honorary Commander-in-

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<sup>54</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, Daryl Balfour. “Impi,” *Sunday Tribune* May 25, 1980; PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), Daryl Balfour. “Impis march again,” *Sunday Tribune*..

<sup>55</sup> APC PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), “Zulu Battalion of 300 men is ready for war,” *Daily News* August 20, 1980.

<sup>56</sup> PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), “Modern Zulu warriors protect border,” *Sunday Express* May 25, 1980.

<sup>57</sup> On the other hand, Zulu recruits joined the Battalion not because of their “martial heritage” but due to the steady pay, physical activity, and hearty meals. In addition to their rigorous physical training, Col. Heap also noted that a number of the Battalion members were “also the local soccer champs.” APC PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), “Modern Zulu warriors protect border,” *Sunday Express* May 25, 1980; APC PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), “Zulu Battalion of 300 men is ready for war,” *Daily News* August 20, 1980; SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, Daryl Balfour. “Impi,” *Sunday Tribune* May 25, 1980.

<sup>58</sup> Wits Historical Papers Goldstone Commission (AK2672), Goldstone Commission BOIPATONG ENQUIRY Records (1990-1999), Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi. “Press Statement: The Training of 150 Zulus in V.I.P. Protection Services” August 13, 1991. Ulundi.

<sup>59</sup> Wits Historical Papers, Goldstone Commission (AK2672), Goldstone Commission BOIPATONG ENQUIRY Records (1990-1999), Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi. “Press Statement: The Training of 150 Zulus in V.I.P. Protection Services” August 13, 1991. Ulundi..

Chief, to which Buthelezi replied he would never receive the Cabinet's support. Zwelithini eventually did take the idea of joining the SADF to the KZLA Cabinet but was turned down.<sup>60</sup>

Buthelezi expounded on his reticence to support this Battalion in a June 1980 interview with the *Rand Daily Mail's* Patrick Laurence. "I cannot support the recruitment of blacks into the army while we have this apartheid country," he explained, "This is what I told the military authorities when they approached me and the (KwaZulu) Cabinet on the recruitment of Zulus."<sup>61</sup> He continued: "I have refused to visit them or to have any connections with them on principle even as their honorary commander-in-chief, as was suggested by one officer."<sup>62</sup> Buthelezi also told a *Natal Mercury* reporter that he would not indulge in any "sabre-rattling" by visiting the Battalion because not only would it give "the impression . . . that I am on the side of the Army," but also would give President Samora Machel of Mozambique the impression that he was endorsing the Battalion."<sup>63</sup> Buthelezi also refused to aid the SADF in recruiting students. "I said that no black politician could go to the Zulu people and say they had to join an army to defend an apartheid society," Buthelezi recalled, "They wanted to enter the schools to recruit young people at the end of last year. We refused."<sup>64</sup> While Buthelezi refused to aid the SADF by going into KwaZulu schools, he certainly needed to find another way to gain control over the violent potential of young KwaZulu students.

While Buthelezi refused to assist the SADF in recruiting and supporting the 121 Battalion, he seemed to take inspiration from the format of the unit as he considered how to control the spate of boycotts and outburst of school violence in mid-1980. During the sixth

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<sup>60</sup> "Making a mouse of the mighty lion" *Weekly Mail* 30 July to 5 August 1993, p. 11

<sup>61</sup> PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), Patrick Laurence. "Buthelezi spurns the Zulu Battalion," *Rand Daily Mail*, June 5, 1980.

<sup>62</sup> PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), Patrick Laurence. "Buthelezi spurns the Zulu Battalion," *Rand Daily Mail*, June 5, 1980.

<sup>63</sup> SALDRU Homelands Kwazulu, "Count me out of Zulu unit, says chief," *Natal Mercury* May 31, 1980.

<sup>64</sup> SALDRU Homelands Kwazulu, "Count me out of Zulu unit, says chief," *Natal Mercury* May 31, 1980.

annual Inkatha Congress, Buthelezi called for the establishment of training camps “in which *impis* will be trained to keep order among blacks,” to “create well-disciplined and regimented *impis* in every Inkatha region.”<sup>65</sup> “We need to tone up our muscles so that the dove of peace sits easily on the spear,” he explained to those in attendance.”<sup>66</sup> The main threat to this peaceful status quo came from the University of Zululand, which experienced periodic strikes throughout the late-1970s and early-1980s, following the pattern of many other institutions of higher learning following the Soweto Uprising, which found students nationwide rebelling against the Bantu Education Act which installed Afrikaans as the universal language of instruction.<sup>67</sup>

The Soweto Uprising sparked a growing militancy throughout South Africa.<sup>68</sup> One of the primary results of the Soweto Uprising came in increased numbers of young South Africans joining the MK.<sup>69</sup> Inside South Africa, the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, stemming from a loose coalition of trade unions, churches, students organizations, and sports associations in the 1970s, sparked increasing conflicts, especially with the IFP.<sup>70</sup> One of the first clashes between the UDF and Inkatha came in October 1983 as Buthelezi visited the University of Zululand to commemorate the death of King Cetshwayo and receive an honorary doctorate. Joined by “a guard of honour of about 40 traditionally-dressed Zulu warriors,”

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<sup>65</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, “Buthelezi wants riot control *impis*,” *Argus* June 21, 1980. SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu, “Buthelezi wants riot control *impis*,” *Sunday Tribune* June 22, 1980; PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings, July-December, 1988), “Buthelezi calls for *impi* camps,” *Daily News*, June 21, 1980.

<sup>66</sup> PC 126/3/19b: Court Action: Frontline Defamation Case (Chief Buthelezi v. Frontline), Examination of M.G. Buthelezi by D.A. Gordon (Attorney for the Plaintiff). Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi v. Denis Becket/Saga Press Limited. Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division, quoting speech at a prayer meeting in KwaMashu.

<sup>67</sup> Sifiso Ndlovu, *The Soweto Uprisings: Counter-memories of June 1976* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1998); Helena Pohlandt-McCormick and Raymond Tallis, *‘I Saw a Nightmare —’: Doing Violence to Memory: the Soweto Uprising, June 16, 1976* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

<sup>68</sup> Archie Mafeje, “Soweto and Its Aftermath,” *Review of African Political Economy* 11 (1978): 17-30; Håkan Thörn, *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

<sup>69</sup> Stephen Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>70</sup> Jeremy Seekings, *The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991* (Cape Town: David Philip, 2000); Ineke van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams: The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000).

Buthelezi arrived amid student taunts of “Vorster’s puppet” and fled when his car was stoned. Those “warriors” attending him pushed the students back and other “*amabutho*” entered the dormitories and retaliated for the attack against the IFP President, resulting in the deaths of five students associated with the UDF.<sup>71</sup> A pamphlet issued by the Azanian Students Organization (AZASO) labelled the incident “The Massacre at Ngoye.”<sup>72</sup> Firsthand accounts of the violence that night distinctly separate the actions of the *amabutho* from those of Youth Brigade members in attendance, squarely placing the blame for the violent actions inside the dormitories on the former.<sup>73</sup>

In addition to the charges of public violence leveled against six students and the damages to the university, totaling an estimated R1,000,000, the university’s management also suspended the Student Representative Council (SRC) for fear of student political mobilization.<sup>74</sup> Buthelezi particularly focused on the University of Zululand as it was meant to be an institution for Zulu-speakers, but he felt that the black faculty had been “manipulated by a clique of white academics.”<sup>75</sup> He threatened that if things did not change he would have “no hesitation in setting about the establishment of a true university of the people in KwaZulu if the current state of affairs in Ngoye is encouraged.”<sup>76</sup> During a statement to the KZLA just days after the attacks, he

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<sup>71</sup> Maré and Hamilton, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 196; Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs,” 835.

<sup>72</sup> PC 126/3/18, “Massacre at Ngoye,”

<sup>73</sup> PC 126/3/18, Siphiwe Nkosi Testimony; PC 126/3/18, Themba Mthethwa Testimony; PC 126/3/18, Humphrey Maphumulo Testimony; PC 126/3/18, Desmond Moloi Testimony.

<sup>74</sup> SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1976-1978, “Zululand students face violence charge,” *Rand Daily Mail* June 21, 1976; SALDRU Homelands KwaZulu General 1976-1978, “Future of university undecided,” *Natal Mercury* June 22, 1976; “The banning of the South African Students Organisation (SASO) and student politics in the 1980s,” *South African History Online*, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/banning-south-african-students-organisation-saso-and-student-politics-1980s> (accessed July 5, 2018).

<sup>75</sup> PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), “Buthelezi calls for impi camps,” *Daily News* June 21, 1980.

<sup>76</sup> PC 126/8/18 (Press Cuttings - July - December 1988), “Buthelezi calls for impi camps,” *Daily News* June 21, 1980.

invoked martial tradition to defend the actions of the young people who retaliated against the Ongoye students who protested his appearance at the university.

Our youths, our sons and daughters [are] of a warrior tradition and they had gone to the university to commemorate one of the greatest warriors in Zulu history, and the simple fact of the matter is that this violence so carefully plotted, so carefully orchestrated and so cunningly executed produced the inevitable counter-violence . . . On Saturday, our youth did no more than defend my honour and the honour of His Majesty the King.<sup>77</sup>

The incident at Ongoye, in some ways, represented the first major public incident where Inkatha supporters were labeled *amabutho* and singled out for their role in violent attacks. As the years went on, the frequency of such attacks increased exponentially as Inkatha simultaneously expanded its reach and grappled for space in the rapidly changing political space.

At the same time as Buthelezi condemned young South Africans rioting against the implementation of Bantu Education, he simultaneously set plans in motion to protect KwaZulu against attacks like those set off during the boycotts in the mid-1970s to early 1980s. The youth, embodied in the Inkatha Youth Brigade, formed two of the three pillars of Inkatha (along with the Central Committee and the Women's Brigade), contrary to reports from critics claiming that the majority of the support emanated from older Zulu-speakers.<sup>78</sup> In 1983, 44 percent of Inkatha's 750,000 paying members served in the Inkatha Youth Brigade, approximately 330,000 of its members, making the Youth Brigade, "the largest youth movement in the history of South Africa," according to Oscar Dhlomo in an article for the *Journal of Asian and African Studies*.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Nicholas Haysom, "Mabangalala: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa" (Unpublished paper, Occasional Paper No. 10, Centre for Applied Legal Studies (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 1986), 86.

<sup>78</sup> PC 126/3/9 (Inkatha), Suzanne Vos "Gatsha's Zulu Jeugbond" *Sunday Times*, February 19, 1978. For more on the Women's Brigade specifically, see: Shireen Hassim, "Reinforcing Conservatism: An Analysis of the Politics of the Inkatha Women's Brigade," *Agenda* 2 (1988): 3-16; Shireen Hassim, "Family, Motherhood and Zulu Nationalism: The Politics of the Inkatha Women's Brigade," *Feminist Review* 43 (1993): 1-25..

<sup>79</sup> Oscar Dhlomo, "The Strategy of Inkatha and its Critics," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18, no. 1 (1983): 58.

Harnessing the energy of young people held infinite potential for Inkatha, as Buthelezi recognized that “the impatience of youth, the courage of youth, the determination of youth, and the anger of youth are great assets and the youth must employ these by preparing the groundwork for self-help development in African communities.”<sup>80</sup> “The Youth Brigade is more active, energetic and angrier than their elders . . . more radical,” Youth Brigade member Ntwe Mafole told a *Weekly Mail* reporter, “We will not say our youth must fold their hands when they are being beaten and burned alive.”<sup>81</sup>

In an interview with Inkatha Youth Brigade Chairman Musa Zondi in 1990, Malcolm Draper asked the young leader if the Youth Brigade were involved in any “military or paramilitary activities.”<sup>82</sup> Zondi responded definitively: “There is no military activity persay . . . in Zulu society. There is some paramilitary activity like Boy Scouts, in the sense that we are running a youth training camp run along paramilitary lines.”<sup>83</sup> In 1980, Inkatha began to establish training camps to groom paramilitary forces of this type with the stated intent protect not only KwaZulu, but also Inkatha’s interests.<sup>84</sup> In 1981, the Emandleni-Matleng Youth Camp near Ulundi began to train members of the Youth Brigade as a “Youth Service Corps in paramilitary manouevres, agricultural development, and literacy programs” over a 10-month period.<sup>85</sup> Like the Malawi Young Pioneers program that inspired its creation, the Youth Service

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<sup>80</sup> Wessel de Kock, *Usuthu! Cry Peace!: The black liberation movement Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa* (Cape Town: The Open Hand Press, 1986), 145.

<sup>81</sup> PC 126/3/9 (Inkatha), “Let’s talk say the Inkatha youth (But not to the ANC),” *Weekly Mail* August 19 to August 25, 1988, p. 3.

<sup>82</sup> Malcolm Draper, “Interview with Musa Zondi, Chairman Inkatha Youth Brigade, Executive Director Foundation for Leadership Development,” (Unpublished paper, University of Natal, Department of Historical Studies, 1990), 12.

<sup>83</sup> Draper, “Interview with Musa Zondi,” 13. This response echoed that of Buthelezi who continues to insist that the Youth Brigade engaged in no militarism, save for training youth like the “Salvation Army.” Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Interview with author and Lindelihle Mahaye, September 30, 2016

<sup>84</sup> PC 126/3/9 (Inkatha), “Inkatha Camp Call For More Youth,” *Daily News*, December 17, 1981.

<sup>85</sup> PC 126/3/9 (Inkatha), “Let’s talk say the Inkatha youth (But not to the ANC),” *Weekly Mail* August 19 to August 25, 1988, p. 3.



Corps served two purposes: a community development organization and a paramilitary training unit.<sup>86</sup> Although Inkatha leadership insisted that the youths trained at Emandleni-Matleng simply represented a “Salvation Army” style organization dedicated to doing “something about the black man’s plight,” other reports claimed that the youths at Emandleni-Matleng received military training and were organized into *amabutho*.<sup>87</sup> The training at the camp included physical training, vocational training, and education according to the Inkatha syllabus.<sup>88</sup> Inkatha leadership insisted that the recruits at this camp did not receive military training. Musa Zondi expressed this in an interview with a *Natal Witness Echo* reporter in 1987.

They are not a military wing of Inkatha. In fact those who are saying so aim to derogate us. If Inkatha were to form a military wing that would be the biggest army in the black community. People should not talk about such a small entity as the Emandleni-Matleng youth as Inkatha’s military wing.<sup>89</sup>

The presence of large numbers of youth at the Mandleni-Matleng camp, however, exhibits as much about the ability of Inkatha to harness young people’s energies and as much about the camps present as “a refuge where . . . the vast numbers of unemployed and starving youth in the KwaZulu Bantustan . . . can obtain a free meal.”<sup>90</sup> At the same time, the units trained by Inkatha became some of the most deadly forces in the fighting that plagued South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. In September 1986, over 200 young men that Inkatha sent to the Caprivi Strip in Namibia (then South West Africa) to receive training from the South African Defence Force

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<sup>86</sup> A.W. Wood, “Training Malawi’s Youth: The Work of the Malawi Young Pioneers,” *Community Development Journal* 5, no. 3 (1970): 130-138.

<sup>87</sup> Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Interview with author and Lindelihle Mahaye, September 30, 2016; “From the Horse’s Mouth,” *Work in Progress* 46 (February 1987): 18; Shireen Hassim, “Family, Motherhood and Zulu Nationalism: The Politics of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade,” *Feminist Review* 43 (1993): 11.

<sup>88</sup> Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi*, 17

<sup>89</sup> IOL (Africans/Inkatha to 1987), Lakela Kaunda, “Inkatha Youth Brigade: What Does the Organisation Stand For?,” *Natal Witness Echo*, March 5, 1987

<sup>90</sup> Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi*, 17. Timothy Gibbs echoes this sentiment in a 2017 article in which he makes the point that longstanding structural inequalities in KwaZulu allowed Inkatha to pit Zulu youths against the ANC. Timothy Gibbs, “Inkatha’s Young Militants: reconsidering political violence in South Africa,” *Africa* 87, no. 2 (2017): 362-386.

(SADF) returned to KwaZulu-Natal, serving often times as KwaZulu Police officers, perpetuating some of the mostly deadly acts of violence in the Pietermaritzburg-area.<sup>91</sup>

However, it was not only youths trained at Inkatha's paramilitary facilities that perpetuated the conflicts in the region. Instead, the *amabutho* (referring here to Inkatha military groups and not regiments) became the brute force utilized by the organization to exercise their will. At the Shaka Day celebrations in Umlazi in September 1985, after, as residents reported, "three busloads of *amabutho* (warriors)—among them a top Inkatha official—in tribal dress and most of them armed," arrived mid-way through Buthelezi's speech. The subsequent fighting between Umlazi residents and these "*amabutho*" resulted in six deaths and twelve injuries, including two bullet wounds.<sup>92</sup> Attacks on large gatherings by *amabutho* had become standard in the late summer/early fall of 1985. In late August 1985, as 8 victims of the violence in Umlazi were being buried, it was reported that "a band of almost 300 Zulus carrying spears, shields, clubs and pangas chased away and beat some of the 8,000 black mourners."<sup>93</sup> Just a few months later, at the funeral of Victoria Mxenge, an activist who spoke at the funeral of the Cradock Four<sup>94</sup>, unknown assailants gunned her down in the driveway of her Umlazi home. Just days later, an unnamed observer told a reporter for *State of the Nation* that towards the end of the funeral proceedings, "about 300 Inkatha *impis*" entered the Umlazi Cinema, "shouting the Inkatha war

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<sup>91</sup> R Leslie & N Ramohlokoane, "Caprivi: The ghosts of Operation Marion still haunt South Africa," *The Daily Maverick*, September 8, 2015, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-09-08-caprivi-the-ghosts-of-operation-marion-still-haunt-south-africa/> (accessed October 1, 2018).

<sup>92</sup> PC 126/8/14 (Press Cuttings: 1985/Law, Order, Violence), Barney Mthombothi, "6 die in Shaka Day clashes," *Sunday Tribune*, September 29, 1985.

<sup>93</sup> PC 126/8/14 (Press Cuttings: 1985/Law, Order, Violence), "Zulu 'warriors' disrupt funeral," *Cape Times*, August 26, 1985.

<sup>94</sup> The Cradock Four (Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto and Sicelo Mhlauli) were four anti-apartheid activists who, on June 27, 1985, were stopped at a security police roadblock outside Port Elizabeth where they were abducted, killed and their bodies burned. South African History Archive, "Unveiling the mystery of the Cradock Four 25 years later," [http://www.saha.org.za/news/2010/June/commemorating\\_the\\_cradock\\_four\\_25\\_years\\_later.htm](http://www.saha.org.za/news/2010/June/commemorating_the_cradock_four_25_years_later.htm) (accessed December 1, 2018).

cry ‘Usuthu!’...attacking with knives and pangas.”<sup>95</sup> 19 were killed in this attack. Another Umlazi resident told *City Press* that the “impis” were led by “Mr. [Winnington] Sabelo and fellow Inkatha men G. Zulu and M. Nzuza.”<sup>96</sup> After this event, Nicholas Haysom argues, “a plainly tribalist tone — never far from the Zulu chauvinism which characterizes the *amabutho*” emerged, largely due to the involvement of actors like Nzuza, G. Zulu, and Sabelo.

Sabelo fell into a broader category of local Inkatha leaders labeled “warlords” by their critics. An Inkatha “warlord” in this context was defined as “a powerful local person who has *de facto* power in an area and owes only nominal allegiance to any higher authority.”<sup>97</sup> This includes the exercising of military power, which Thomas Shabalala confirmed in an interview with Pádraig O’Malley in July 1992. “In fact the residents of this area, everybody knows that when there’s violence or anybody trying to attack us, everybody is a soldier in this area,” he confirmed.<sup>98</sup> The actions of “warlords” like Sabelo and Shabalala were not officially sanctioned by Inkatha leadership who attempted to distance themselves from the Durban violence by “disowning” the *impis*, with Oscar Dhlomo denying any official sanction on the party of the

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<sup>95</sup> PC 126/8/14 (Press Cuttings: 1985/Law, Order, Violence), “Who is fuelling Natal’s fire?,” *State of the Nation* 8 (Oct/Nov 1985). For more on Victoria Mxenge see: “Victoria Nonyamezelo Mxenge,” South African History Online, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/victoria-nonyamezelo-mxenge> (accessed July 16, 2018).

<sup>96</sup> PC 126/8/14 (Press Cuttings: 1985/Law, Order, Violence), “Here’s the proof: Top Inkatha men are leading the notorious impis in their terror campaigns in Durban,” *City Press*, September 22, 1985; PC 126/8/14 (Press Cuttings: 1985/Law, Order, Violence), “Mourners harassed by ‘impi’ at Umlazi,” *Daily News*, August 26, 1985.

<sup>97</sup> A. de V. Minnaar, “Thomas Mandla Shabalala of Lindelani: Natal Warlord Supreme,” Paper presented to the 24th Annual Congress of the South African Sociological Association, UNISA, Pretoria. January 15-17, 1992.

<sup>98</sup> O’Malley Political Interviews, Thomas Mandla Shabalala, Interview with Pádraig O’Malley, July 21, 1992, <https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00344/05lv00607/06lv00648.htm> (accessed December 1, 2018).

party.<sup>99</sup> The popular press, in particular, persisted in referring to Shabalala as an “*amabutho* leader,” and claiming that he led *impis* on multiple occasions.<sup>100</sup>

Although these events certainly did happen and Shabalala certainly demanded respect (fealty even) from young men in the Lindelani township, a stark distinction existed between the youth organizations established by Shabalala as an *ibangalala* (vigilante leader) and the youth systems in place under local and national *amabutho*. Even Shabalala himself preferred to distinguish between the *impis* which the popular media reported as being under his command and the *abavikeli* (protectors) that he utilized in his own local struggle.<sup>101</sup> This increasing violence under the guise of the *amabutho* shook Inkatha and Zulu leadership who attempted to find ways to quell the violence acted out in the name of the warriors of the Zulu kingdom.

In February 1986, Nicholas Haysom explained the rise of the *amabangala* in an interview for the *Weekly Mail*. Responding to the recent rise in the *Mbhokoto* (A-Team) vigilante groups in the townships, Haysom defined vigilantes as “extra-legal, informal agencies who use violence against citizens,” especially those united by a “common victim—the popular township leaders opposed to community councils, and in the rural areas those opposed to ‘homeland’ rule . . . their strength lies in, at least, the passive support vigilantes enjoy from the police and, in some cases, the active support of other official bodies like community councillors, Inkatha, and the KwaNdebele government.”<sup>102</sup> This last comment incited a response by Oscar Dhlomo, who wrote a letter to the editor of the *Weekly Mail* insisting that Inkatha had no connection to these

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<sup>99</sup> PC 126/8/14 (Press Cuttings: 1985/Law, Order, Violence), “Here’s the proof: Top Inkatha men are leading the notorious impis in their terror campaigns in Durban,” *City Press*, September 22, 1985.

<sup>100</sup> PC 126/8/14 (Press Cuttings: 1985/Law, Order, Violence), “Here’s the proof: Top Inkatha men are leading the notorious impis in their terror campaigns in Durban,” *City Press*, September 22, 1985; de V. Minnaar, “Thomas Mandla Shabalala of Lindelani.”

<sup>101</sup> PC 126/8/15 (Press Cuttings: 1986), “War cries of an angry amabutho,” *City Press*, June 1, 1986, p. 2.

<sup>102</sup> PC 126/8/15 (Press Cuttings: 1986), Jo-Ann Becker, “Those Violent Men of Peace,” *Weekly Mail*, February 7, 1986- February 13, 1986.

vigilantes. “On behalf on Inkatha, I can state quite categorically that the movement has absolutely nothing to do with these groups,” he wrote, “Inkatha abhors black-on-black violence and has stated so publicly time and time again.” Public statements like those of Haysom, Dhlomo insisted, were part of “a vicious smear campaign [that] has been mounted to denigrate Inkatha and sow confusion about the movement.”<sup>103</sup>

While Dhlomo attempted to distance Inkatha from the violence carried out in its name, in May 1986, Buthelezi took a different tact, expressing his fond admiration for the local leaders who were playing important roles in “fighting against unrest.”<sup>104</sup> This kind of support from Buthelezi and Inkatha drove the proliferation of various vigilante groups across Natal, but especially in Durban. The rapid deterioration of political stability and the growing efforts by the apartheid state to control black areas throughout the region also drove the rise in vigilante groups. As popular protest throughout South Africa increased in the 1980s, so too did brutal and repressive responses by the apartheid government.<sup>105</sup> The growth of the UDF further fueled the violence that fed into these vigilante groups in the mid-1980s, unifying the resistance to apartheid and increasing the number of violent confrontations with the apartheid state exponentially.<sup>106</sup> A massive outbreak of violence in the Durban area between Zulus and Pondo migrant workers further exacerbated an exceedingly tense situation.<sup>107</sup> Buthelezi and Inkatha clashed not only with the ANC, but also with other anti-apartheid organizations, especially Black

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<sup>103</sup> PC 126/8/15 (Press Cuttings: 1986), Oscar Dhlomo, “Letter to the Editor: Inkatha Has Nothing to Do with the ‘Vigilantes’,” *Weekly Mail*, March 14, 1986 to March 20, 1986.

<sup>104</sup> PC 126/8/15 (Press Cuttings: 1986), “USabelo nabanye banconyiwe (Sabelo and Others Are Praised),” *Ilanga lase Natal* May 19-21, 1986, p. 3.

<sup>105</sup> Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson, *All, here and now: Black politics in South Africa in the 1980s* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1992).

<sup>106</sup> Seekings, *The UDF*; van Kessel, *Beyond our Wildest Dreams*.

<sup>107</sup> Finn Piers Christensen, “Pondo Migrant Workers in Natal: Rural and Urban Strains” (M.A. Thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1988); Ari Sitas “The Moving Black Forest of Africa: The Mpondo Rebellion, Migrancy and Black Worker Consciousness in KwaZulu-Natal,” in Thembele Kepe and Lungusile Ntsebeza (eds.), *Rural Resistance in South Africa: The Mpondo Revolts after 50 Years* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 164-187.

Consciousness organizations and student organizations.<sup>108</sup> These conflicts played a major role in a State of Emergency being declared on June 12, 1986.

In this chaotic atmosphere, young Zulu men found themselves with two choices, as one 13-year-old boy told reporter S’bu Mngadi of the *City Press*: “We have two choices—to flee or be killed.”<sup>109</sup> Tom Lodge called this generation of children the “lost generation,” as they increasingly found themselves on the frontlines of conflicts for both vigilantes and people’s defense units. Instead of toys, Lodge argued, they had taken up “weapons of war”.<sup>110</sup> Reports in newspapers like *City Press* and other throughout the country confirmed this fatalistic attitude taken up by members of various youth units. S’Bu Mngadi interviewed Themba, a 14-year-old member of the Scorpions, one of the people’s defense units in Dambuza. As second-in-command, Themba had nearly 3000 local youths under his direct command. When Mngadi asked him if he was afraid of dying, Themba said simply: “I don’t fear death because I don’t know what it’s like to die.” As to his feelings about inflicting violence on others, a popular idiom put his point quite beautifully. “*Iso ngeso* (an eye for an eye). If they attack our people, must we sit back and relax?,” he reasoned.<sup>111</sup> This motto extended far beyond Dambuza, with national Inkatha youth organizer Ntwe Mafole echoing Themba’s sentiments at a national conference. “If somebody takes my eye out, I will take out his,” he declared, “If someone stabbed me, I would

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<sup>108</sup> Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs,” 834-840.

<sup>109</sup> PC 126/8/16 (Press Cuttings: 1987), S’bu Mngadi, “Killer Kids on the Rampage,” *City Press*, October 25, 1987, p. 1.

<sup>110</sup> PC 126/8/16 (Press Cuttings: 1987), S’bu Mngadi, “Killer Kids on the Rampage,” *City Press*, October 25, 1987, p. 1.

<sup>111</sup> PC 126/8/16 (Press Cuttings: 1987), S’bu Mngadi, “Young Comrade Speaks,” *City Press*, October 25, 1987, p. 7.

stab back.”<sup>112</sup> The heightened political and social tension in South Africa manifested in a militarized youth that propagated a dangerous worldview.

This rhetoric permeated the political atmosphere on the national *and* local levels, providing an opportunity for organizations to capitalize on the energies of young people. With this in mind, in early November 1987, Inkatha began distributing leaflets entitled “*Yimani Isibinidi* (Be Courageous)” calling for the formation of local vigilante groups. While Herbert Luthuli, the principal of a local school, felt that this pamphlet was tantamount to a threat since it was distributed by “*amabutho*” who he defined as “local people who think that everybody should listen to what they are saying, even when it is foolish,” Musa Zondi, leader of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, viewed the pamphlet and its contents differently.<sup>113</sup> “It is the right of every person to defend himself,” Zondi insisted, “Parents must go into the schools, and must not leave their children at the mercy of those people” like Luthuli who were spreading lies.<sup>114</sup> This connected to the broader Inkatha project of reshaping the education in Natal and KwaZulu schools through the implementation of Inkatha’s own historical texts and textbooks.<sup>115</sup>

Buthelezi, and Inkatha more broadly, also yearned to regain control over the frequent use of the *impi* and *amabutho* terminology in reference to violence, given its strong insinuation of Inkatha involvement and violent action. In early November 1987, Buthelezi filed a defamation

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<sup>112</sup> PC 126/8/16 (Press Cuttings: 1987), “Inkatha youth chief calls for mass peace rallies,” *Natal Mercury*, November 13, 1987; PC 126/8/16 (Press Cuttings: 1987), “Inkatha youth leaders call for peace formula” *Daily News*, November 13, 1987.

<sup>113</sup> PC 126/8/16 (Press Cuttings, 1987), “Inkatha behind vigilante leaflets,” *Natal Mercury*, November 5, 1987.

<sup>114</sup> PC 126/8/16 (Press Cuttings, 1987), “Inkatha behind vigilante leaflets,” *Natal Mercury*, November 5, 1987.

<sup>115</sup> Jordan Ngubane, *Ushaba: The Challenge of Blood River* (Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1974); See also: Daphna Golan, “Inkatha and its Use of the Zulu Past,” *History in Africa* 18 (1991) 113-126; Praisley Mdluli, “Ubuntu-Botho: Inkatha's 'People's Education',” *Transformation* 5 (1987) 60-77. Jason Hickel also notes that often times students were even forced to wear Inkatha uniforms and join the Youth Brigade. Jason Hickel, *Democracy as Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 31.

lawsuit against Denis Becket and Saga Press for an article published earlier that year. Buthelezi previously sued the owners of *Pace Magazine* in July 1986 for defamation following publication of a February 1984 article claiming he used Inkatha as a “mafia.”<sup>116</sup> Central to Buthelezi’s argument against the article was his ire as being cast as being in command of “well-drilled *impi* regiments” who were “among the most thuggish operators in South Africa.”<sup>117</sup> In his testimony, Buthelezi was questioned about the existence of regiments in KwaZulu. When asked about the King’s *impis*, Buthelezi replied plainly: “The King hasn’t got *impis*.”<sup>118</sup> He connected this fact to the abolition of the military system under Cetshwayo, explaining that “when King Cetshwayo was conquered he was not allowed to have *impis* in the military system, but every King since King Cetshwayo has always had age groups of people, groupings of people according to a certain age and they are given a name, and they are still called regiments in Zulu . . . but they are not *impis* in the sense in which King Cetshwayo’s army was an army for instance.”<sup>119</sup> When pressed on his response, Buthelezi insisted that though these groupings were called regiments, that was only “what they are called, but in fact mostly used for ceremonial occasions when the King . . . or when we have cultural occasions these people come.”<sup>120</sup> Buthelezi again utilized history to justify his dangerous rhetoric, connecting major examples of martial masculinity with the martyred example of the Zulu kingdom.

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<sup>116</sup> SALDRU, *Black Politics Inkatha* (1986), “Buthelezi seeks R50,000 damages,” *DD* July 17, 1986.

<sup>117</sup> PC 126/3/19b: Court Action: Frontline Defamation Case (Chief Buthelezi v. Frontline), “Buthelezi denies thuggery claims” *Daily News*, November 5, 1987.

<sup>118</sup> PC 126/3/19b: Court Action: Frontline Defamation Case (Chief Buthelezi v. Frontline), Examination of M.G. Buthelezi by D.A. Gordon (Attorney for the Plaintiff). Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi v. Denis Becket/Saga Press Limited. Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division.

<sup>119</sup> PC 126/3/19b: Court Action: Frontline Defamation Case (Chief Buthelezi v. Frontline), Examination of M.G. Buthelezi by D.A. Gordon (Attorney for the Plaintiff). Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi v. Denis Becket/Saga Press Limited. Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division.

<sup>120</sup> PC 126/3/19b: Court Action: Frontline Defamation Case (Chief Buthelezi v. Frontline), Examination of M.G. Buthelezi by D.A. Gordon (Attorney for the Plaintiff). Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi v. Denis Becket/Saga Press Limited. Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division..



Though Buthelezi's legal team argued that this language was tantamount to defamation, Saga Press' defense pointed to the military language utilized by Buthelezi in many of his speeches.

Some speeches contain military overtones and are full of the imagery of battle, as for example an address to the Inkatha Youth Brigade on August 31, 1984 but, as respondent himself pointed out, the Zulu nation is 'a people steeped in the military tradition' and its members 'have warrior blood coursing through (their) veins'. Military allusions and metaphors would thus appeal to and be understood by such audiences and should not be taken too literally.<sup>121</sup>

Buthelezi denied the blatant military intent of his speeches, insisting that "what I say there about our background is known to anyone in Africa or anywhere about our people, and in fact here I was talking about, you know, the whole issue of violence, the whole issue of pushing young people in to be cannon fodder in battles that they cannot win."<sup>122</sup> Oscar Dhlomo sued another newspaper company, Natal Newspapers Limited, in 1988 for R20,000 in damages following the publication of a story in the *Sunday Times* in April 1986. In this article, published on March 30, 1986, a reporter had alleged that violence had been committed by an Inkatha "impi" at a conference, an action confirmed by police headquarters in Pretoria who said that the perpetrators were "backed by Inkatha." Dhlomo argued that this article, and this statement in particular, were "defamatory of Inkatha; that the reputation, dignity and esteem of Inkatha and its ability to promote and further its aims and objects had been impaired and injured by the defamatory article."<sup>123</sup> Though unclear at first whether or not Dhlomo could sue on behalf of Inkatha as a

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<sup>121</sup> PC 126/3/19b: Court Action: Frontline Defamation Case (Chief Buthelezi v. Frontline), Beckett/Saga Press v. Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. Supreme Court of South Africa (Appellate Division), February 15, 1990.

<sup>122</sup> PC 126/3/19b: Court Action: Frontline Defamation Case (Chief Buthelezi v. Frontline), Examination of M.G. Buthelezi by E. Cameron (Attorney for the Defendants), Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi v. Denis Beckett/Saga Press Limited. Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division.

<sup>123</sup> Dhlomo v Natal Newspaper (Pty) Ltd and Another (407/87) [1988] ZASCA 173; [1989] 2 All SA 136 (A) (December 1, 1988).

political organization, Justice M.S. Stegmann awarded Inkatha R7,000 in damages.<sup>124</sup> This victory marked an important one for Inkatha, which faced a key transition from a cultural organization to a political party during Dhlomo's trial.

Dhlomo's victory came at the perfect time as Inkatha had recently transitioned from a "national cultural liberation movement" to a political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), at its national conference in Ulundi in 1990. "Inkatha is another one of those South African leopards which will change its spots," Buthelezi told reporters at a press briefing prior to the conference.<sup>125</sup> At this press briefing, Buthelezi laid out four main tasks for the Inkatha political party. This new iteration, Buthelezi explained, had four main tasks: "to establish an open, free, non-racial, equality opportunity, reconciled society with democratic safeguards for all people; to harness the great resources of the country to fight the real enemies of the people—poverty, hunger, unemployment, disease, ignorance, insecurity, homelessness and moral decay; to re-distribute wealth for the benefit of all people, and to establish political and economic structures that encourage enterprise and create the wealth all governments of the future will need; to ensure the maintenance of a stable, peaceful society in which all people can pursue their happiness, and realise their potential."<sup>126</sup> The formalization of the Inkatha Freedom Party signaled a shift from solely socio-cultural militancy to the ethnicization of politics as well.

As this shift occurred, debates in the press heated up regarding the use of militant symbols and metaphors by IFP leaders. The struggle over the use of *amabutho* terminology leapt into the pages of South Africa's popular newspapers around the same time as Buthelezi and

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<sup>124</sup> SALDRU Clippings Collection, Black Politics, Inkatha, 1991, "Dhlomo gets R7,000 for defamation," *Sowetan*, July 11, 1990.

<sup>125</sup> SALDRU Clippings Collection, Black Politics, Inkatha, 1991, Anton Harber. "The 'new' Inkatha moves into politics. Officially," *Weekly Mail*, July 13 to July 16, 1990.

<sup>126</sup> SALDRU Clippings Collection, Black Politics, Inkatha, 1991, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Inkatha leopard will change its spots-Buthelezi," *The Argus*, July 14, 1990, p. 15.

Dhlomo's lawsuits. In an article for *The Independent on Sunday* in October 1990, R. W. Johnson reflected on the genesis of Zulu pride in their "warrior tradition."<sup>127</sup> "To this day young Zulu boys practise fighting—dealing terrible blows with knobkerries—rather as their British counterparts might practise football," Johnson explained, "Every workforce which includes Zulus sees 'faction fights' in which fatalities are common."<sup>128</sup> Johnson interviewed an "elderly Tswana man" about the Zulu propensity for conflict, who responded with what a Zulu friend had told him in the form of an explanation. "The interesting thing about his answer was that it wasn't an answer," the unnamed Tswana man told Johnson, "What he said was 'We fight because we are so plenty. We are never getting finished'."<sup>129</sup> Johnson's simplistic take on the complicated political situation spurred fiery responses in the pages of South Africa's popular presses.

Journalists and politicians were not the only figures to weigh in on these debates; historians of Natal and Zululand also spoke out on the exploitation of Zulu history. Historian Shula Marks responded to Johnson's article in a letter to the editor of *The Independent on Sunday*. Marks pointed out that in South Africa, "history is not simply a matter of polite debate between academics, but the subject of bitter political contestation."<sup>130</sup> She called out Johnson for being "ignorant of the most elementary facts of Zulu history," as well as being determined "to portray current struggles in South Africa as ethnic, the inevitable result of a Zulu military tradition stretching over many centuries and a 'traditional' and 'inevitable' enmity between the 'Zulu' and

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<sup>127</sup> PC 126/3/2, Inkatha, R.W. Johnson, "Spears of the Nation," *The Independent on Sunday*, October 14, 1990.

<sup>128</sup> PC 126/3/2, Inkatha, R.W. Johnson, "Spears of the Nation," *The Independent on Sunday*, October 14, 1990.

<sup>129</sup> PC 126/3/2, Inkatha, "Spears of the Nation," by R. W. Johnson, *The Independent on Sunday*, October 14, 1990.

<sup>130</sup> PC 126/3/2, Inkatha, "Ethnic approach shows a lack of sensitivity to the distortions of Zulu history," by Shula Marks, Letter to the Editor, *Independent on Sunday*, October 10, 1990.

the ‘Xhosa’.”<sup>131</sup> This “determination” flew in the face of evidence showing, Marks observed, that “by far the largest number of those killed have been Zulu by Zulu—and the majority of these, Zulu-speaking adherents of UDF/COSATU by Zulu-speaking Inkatha members.”<sup>132</sup> Marks implored the editor of *The Independent on Sunday* to exercise more care when publishing pieces related to ethnic violence in South Africa since “the conflict is so dangerously volatile not because of the presence of Xhosa in the townships, but because of the volatility of militant and unemployed youth, deprived of adequate education and even shelter, *the dragon’s teeth sown by apartheid*.”<sup>133</sup> By recognizing ethnic divides as the “dragon’s teeth sown by apartheid,” Marks highlighted the complicated nature of these contemporary manifestations of Zulu martiality and called for a more cautious approach to addressing these issues in the public sphere.

Of course, Buthelezi and the IFP did not remain on the sidelines as these debates took to the pages of South Africa’s newspapers. Buthelezi also penned an editorial for the *Natal Mercury* on June 19, 1989 responding to the use of the term *amabutho* in “a derogatory and offensive manner.”<sup>134</sup> Citing stories that conflated *amabutho* with vigilantes, Buthelezi charged the authors with “hav[ing] no understanding as to what the term *amabutho* means.”<sup>135</sup>

It is unfair to perpetuate the use of concepts in respect to both Inkatha members and the *amabutho*, who have a long-respected tradition, when such use is hurtful, insensitive and inaccurate. One would expect you to understand this. Inkatha has been in existence since 1975. On the other hand, the *amabutho* are regimental age group formations in Zulu society predating even King Shaka’s regime. They are a feature of Zulu society and it is therefore ridiculous to attach them to Inkatha by describing them in the context and manner in which you did . . . At any Zulu

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<sup>131</sup> PC 126/3/2, Inkatha, “Ethnic approach shows a lack of sensitivity to the distortions of Zulu history,” by Shula Marks, Letter to the Editor, *Independent on Sunday*, October 10, 1990.

<sup>132</sup> PC 126/3/2, Inkatha, “Ethnic approach shows a lack of sensitivity to the distortions of Zulu history,” by Shula Marks, Letter to the Editor, *Independent on Sunday*, October 10, 1990.

<sup>133</sup> PC 126/3/2, Inkatha, “Ethnic approach shows a lack of sensitivity to the distortions of Zulu history,” by Shula Marks, Letter to the Editor, *Independent on Sunday*, October 10, 1990.

<sup>134</sup> PC 126/3/12, Inkatha: History and Tradition, “Buthelezi puts term ‘amabutho’ in perspective,” *Natal Mercury* July 21, 1989.

<sup>135</sup> PC 126/3/12, Inkatha: History and Tradition, “Buthelezi puts term ‘amabutho’ in perspective,” *Natal Mercury* July 21, 1989.

wedding or any function in rural Natal/KwaZulu you will see our people in Amabutho formation. These observances are not Inkatha observances but are part of our well-known history and culture. I take umbrage to the suggestion made that any group described as 'vigilantes' in your newspaper consists necessarily of Inkatha members.<sup>136</sup>

In another interview, Buthelezi railed against the use of the term again, this time criticizing reporters for referring to any Zulu man carrying sticks as *amabutho*. "There is now an effort by the Press to call any Zulus who carry sticks in any circumstances *amabutho* and this is nothing but a deliberate and calculated distortion by people who supported the United Democratic Front in the media," he insisted.<sup>137</sup>

At the same time, Buthelezi and Inkatha, along with King Goodwill Zwelithini, leaned heavily on martial language, metaphors and invocations of a shared martial heritage to garner support. This is clearly illustrated in the speeches of both Buthelezi and the Zulu king in the 1980s and 1990s. As with his forbears, throughout this period Zwelithini played a pivotal role in the promotion and crafting of Zulu identity, especially a masculine identity reflected through the prism of warrior culture. In a May 1986 speech, Zwelithini addressed this directly, reflecting that the Zulu "come from a warrior-race."<sup>138</sup> He repeated this notion almost verbatim at a speech for workers at Mona Saleyards in June 1986. "We are a warrior nation and that warrior blood which beats in our veins, tampered as it is by a century and a half of history of knowing who we are, call on us now to demonstrate to the whole of South Africa and to the world that we retain the valour which has always been ours," he insisted.<sup>139</sup> This warrior identity served both as a

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<sup>136</sup> PC 126/3/12, Inkatha: History and Tradition, "Buthelezi puts term 'amabutho' in perspective," *Natal Mercury* July 21, 1989.

<sup>137</sup> PC 126/3/12, Inkatha: History and Tradition, Correspondent, "Chiefs object to 'amabutho' tag," *African Affairs* [date unknown].

<sup>138</sup> PC 126/2/2, Official Opening of the Zululand Anthracite Colliery, Speech by His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, King of the Zulus, Okhukho, May 23, 1986.

<sup>139</sup> PC 126/2/2, "Address to the Zulu Nation," by His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, King of the Zulus, Mona Saleyards, Nongoma, June 16, 1986.

warning that Zwelithini would not hesitate to lead his people towards this shared heritage if necessary, as well as a reminder of the centrality of history in crystallizing Zulu ethnic sentiments during this period.

Zwelithini linked this martial heritage directly to the Zulu Nation's role not only in the fight against apartheid at the Shaka Day celebrations in Stanger in September 1986. He also linked this identity directly to their role in confronting the ANC in the ongoing struggle between Inkatha and the party-in-exile. "I know that we as a proud warrior race, committed to bring about non-violent change, will employ the courage and valor of our warrior background to thrust ever forward until there is a new South Africa where there shall be freedom, and where there shall be equality and where all the people of South Africa work towards making our country a great prosperous nation for every one of its inhabitants," he reflected.<sup>140</sup>

We are a warrior people; war is not alien to us. We have the power to defend what we are doing and we will use that power whenever it is necessary. My father's people will never be made subservient to those who have lost their souls. If war is ever thrust on us as a reality which we cannot avoid, we will take up arms because there is nothing left to do . . . Now is the time for our valor as a warrior nation to strengthen us and to drive us forward to that democratic future which awaits us . . . We as a people have never wept our way through difficulties. We have struggled whenever necessary, but we have laughed and we have sung as we have struggled. We have fought whenever it has been necessary, but we have laughed and we have sung like we have fought. The indomitable spirit which is ours as Zulus never loses courage in the face of adversity . . . We do so because we are a people who were founded by a warrior King, King Shaka, son of Senzangakhona, who bequeathed all these qualities to us . . .<sup>141</sup>

These invocations of the Zulus' martial heritage escalated tensions as the apartheid state began to bow to the growing pressure within the nation and, specifically, from the ANC.

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<sup>140</sup> PC 126/2/2. "King Shaka Day", Address by His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, King of the Zulus. King Shaka's Monument, Stanger, September 24, 1986.

<sup>141</sup> PC 126/2/2, "King Shaka Day," Address by His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, King of the Zulus, King Shaka's Monument, Stanger, September 24, 1986.

In February 1990, F.W. de Klerk lifted the ban on the African National Congress and announced their intention to free Nelson Mandela.<sup>142</sup> On February 11, 1990, Mandela was freed from custody, providing a symbolic image of the pending democratic transition in South Africa. By May, ANC leadership and F.W. de Klerk had agreed to terms for the transition to democracy and signed the Groote Schuur minute, agreeing to the resolution of the current violence and a peaceful negotiation process.<sup>143</sup> As the ANC presence in the nation steadily increased, Inkatha transitioned in July 1990 from a cultural movement to a bona fide political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). This announcement came in the wake of one of the most violent attacks spearheaded by Inkatha since its formation in 1975, the March 1990 Seven Days' War in Pietermaritzburg which pitted Inkatha vigilantes against UDF combatants resulting in the deaths of eighty and the displacement of more than 20,000.<sup>144</sup>

The emergence of the IFP coincided with the a new outbreak of violence in the Witwatersrand.<sup>145</sup> The first sign of this new era in South African politics came on July 22, 1990 when 27 people died at Sebokeng during a clash between the Inkatha and the ANC.<sup>146</sup> On June

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<sup>142</sup> In addition to lifting the ban on the ANC and freeing Mandela, the South African government also allowed the South African Communist Party and the Pan-Africanist Congress to resume activities, lifted restrictions on a number of groups including the United Democratic Front, and announced the intention to free any persons freeing prison sentences for participation in any of these groups. Christopher S. Wren, "South Africa's New Era: South Africa's President Ends 30-Year Ban on Mandela Group; Says It Is Time for Negotiation," *New York Times*, February 3, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/03/world/south-africa-s-new-era-south-africa-s-president-ends-30-year-ban-mandela-group.html> (accessed Dec. 1, 2018).

<sup>143</sup> Lauren Segal and Sharon Cort, *One Law, One Nation: The Making of the South African Constitution* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2011), 64-67.

<sup>144</sup> Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and Thomas Cannell, *Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1993)* (Doornspuit: Cluster Publications, 2010), 6-7; John Aitchison (ed.), *The Seven Days War: 25-31 March 1991, The Victims' Narrative* (Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, 1991); Lou Levine (ed.), *Faith in turmoil: the Seven Days War* (PACSA: Pietermaritzburg, 1999); Christopher Merrett, "A small civil war: political conflict in the Pietermaritzburg region in the 1980s and early 1990s," *Natalia* 43 (2012): 19-36.

<sup>145</sup> Jeremy Seekings, "Hostel Hostilities: Township Wars on the Reef," *Indicator SA* 8, no. 3 (1991): 11-15.

<sup>146</sup> Gail M. Gerhart and Clive Glaser, *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990 – Challenge and Victory, 1980-1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 68-69.

17, 1992, hostel residents from KwaMadala in Sebokeng attacked the Joe Slovo informal settlement in nearby Boipatong, resulting in one of the most brutal moments of the transition era.<sup>147</sup> Although media portrayed these conflicts as “black-on-black violence,” multiple parties, including Nelson Mandela himself, blamed a “third force” for escalating tensions between the ANC and the IFP; the TRC confirmed these suspicions.<sup>148</sup> The ANC withdrew from CODESA II negotiations with the National Party as a result of these attacks, citing the apartheid government’s complicity in this violent event as their justification (Inkatha had already boycotted the event in support of the Zulu king). Subsequent violence in townships and at hostels throughout the Witwatersrand stemmed from the mobilization of Zulu-speaking hostel dwellers by Inkatha for their ongoing conflicts.<sup>149</sup> Though these ethnic divisions stemmed from the stratification imposed by mining companies since early in the twentieth century (discussed Chapter 4), public reports focused on the martial heritage of the Zulu-speaking members of the conflict. News articles and broadcasts described Zulu-speaking hostel dwellers “alternatively as ‘warriors’, ‘blood thirsty *impis*’, as killers who ‘proudly display the bodies of people they have battered to death’ or ‘wave the parts of dead Xhosas in victory dances’.”<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> James G.R. Simpson, “Boipatong: The Politics of a Massacre and the South African Transition,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38, no. 3 (2012): 623-647.

<sup>148</sup> Stephen Ellis, “The historical significance of South Africa’s Third Force,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, no. 2 (1998): 261-299; J.E.H. Grobler, “Standpoints on ‘Black-on-Black’ vs. ‘Third Force’ violence during South Africa’s transitional negotiations (1990-1994),” *Historia* 48, no. 2 (2003): 143-160; James Gump, “Unveiling the Third Force: Toward Transitional Justice in the USA and South Africa, 1973-1994,” *Safundi* 15, no. 1 (2014): 75-100.

<sup>149</sup> B.M. Xeketwane, “The War on the Reef: The Political Violence on the reef’s Black Townships since July 1990” (BA Honours thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 1991); B.M. Xeketwane, “The relation between hostels and the political violence on the reef from July 1990 to December 1993: A case study of Merafe and Meadowslands hostels in Soweto,” MA thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 1993; Franziska Rueedi, “‘*Siyayinyova!*’: Patterns of Violence in the African Townships of the Vaal Triangle, South Africa: 1980-86,” *Africa* 85, no. 3 (2015): 395-416; Ari Sitas, “The New Tribalism: Hostels and Violence,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22, no. 2 (1996): 235-248.

<sup>150</sup> Lauren Segal, “The Human Face of Violence: Hostel Dwellers Speak,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992): 191.



Another factor in the proliferation of violence in the early 1990s stemmed from the formation of “self-protection units” by the IFP and self-defense units by the ANC, both from radicalized youth called on to protect their communities. Although these units were incredibly volatile, by all accounts, ordinary citizens preferred the protection of their neighbors to that of the South African Police.<sup>151</sup> Much like hostel dwellers organized along political (and ethnic) lines, these units fought on many fronts and resulted in the militarization of a wide swatch of young men in communities throughout the Witwatersrand and KwaZulu/Natal.<sup>152</sup> Although the official fighting between Inkatha and the ANC ceased following the signing of Natal Peace Accords in 1991, the proliferation of these vigilante groups sustained the violence.<sup>153</sup>

In the wake of the CODESA negotiations, the National Party and the ANC worked together to reach agreements on the form that the post-apartheid government would take, culminating in the Multi-Party Negotiating Process of 1993.<sup>154</sup> Alienated from this process following Buthelezi’s boycott of CODESA II, Inkatha and their supporters attempted to protect themselves from any potential downfall of the ANC-National Party collaboration. On July 11, 1993, 60,000 flocked to Kings Park Stadium in Durban to hear Zwelithini speak on the threat to KwaZulu from the apartheid government and the ANC. “Whatever else takes place now in KwaZulu, we will see the rise of Zulu nationalism resting on the pride we have in being the children of our fathers and their ancestors and the pride of being descendants of warrior stock,”

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<sup>151</sup> Themba Shabangu, “The South African Police: From an Instrument of Terror to a Legitimate Modern Policing Agency,” in Mcebisi Ndletyana and David Maimela (eds.) *Essays on the Evolution of the Post-Apartheid State: Legacies, Reforms and Prospects* (Johannesburg: Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Research, 2014), 30.

<sup>152</sup> Pakiso Sylvester Rakgodi, *The Role of the Self-Defence Units (SDUs) in a Changing Political Context* (Research Report Written for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, January 1995).

<sup>153</sup> Anthony de V. Minnaar, *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Cape Town: Human Science Research Council, 1992), 30.

<sup>154</sup> Segal and Cort, *One Law, One Nation*, 110-111.

the King said to the crowds.<sup>155</sup> Central to the festivities at Kings Park were the *amabutho* who paraded on the field in traditional dress, wielding their weapons. And while Buthelezi continued to assure the press that the *amabutho* were neither violent nor connected to Inkatha, interviews given by IFP Central Committee member Albert Mncwango stoked fears of mobilization of the *amabutho*. As a member of Inala, the first regiment enrolled by Zwelithini and named after one of Shaka's *ibutho*, Mncwango told members of the press that "the Zulu regiments would really love to get involved in a full-scale war."<sup>156</sup> He further contradicted Buthelezi's long-standing portrayal of the *amabutho* in an interview for the *Weekly News*.

He said his regiment had half a million soldiers ranging in age from 25 to 45. Initially their duty was to participate in the traditional ceremonies of the Zulu nation, performing for the king. However, they were expected to perform military duties in case of war. '*Inala* is like a citizen force. The soldiers have received paramilitary training,' Mncwango said. 'Some of our members are in the South African Defence Force, kwaZulu Police and South African Police . . . A serious war is coming where no-one will sleep. The war will not be concentrated in Natal. What you see in the East Rand is part of a low-intensity war. The war will be spread all over the country. The exciting moment is around the corner.'<sup>157</sup>

He continued in another interview for the *Financial Times*: "The Inala regiment is ready for war. I am waiting for signals from the king and Buthelezi. ANC and the government should know that if they refute our demands (at the negotiating table), we will cross that bridge."<sup>158</sup>

On March 28, 1994, Transvaal-based IFP leaders Themba Khoza and Humphrey Ndlovu called for a rally to support King Goodwill Zwelithini's aims to restore the Zulu kingdom. IFP supporters from the Transvaal region and other regions in the country gathered at Library

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<sup>155</sup> PC 126/3/12: Inkatha: History and Tradition: July 12, 1993: "King calls on Zulus to defend their land," *The Natal Mercury* July 12, 1993.

<sup>156</sup> PC 126/3/12 Inkatha: History and Tradition "The history of bloodlust that stains the conference table," *Financial Times* (London), Weekend January 9/January 10 1993, Section II, Page I and Page XV.

<sup>157</sup> PC 126/3/12: Inkatha: History and Tradition: Enoch Mthembu, "Zulu king's regiment ready for war," *Weekly News* July 16, 1993.

<sup>158</sup> PC 126/3/12: Inkatha: History and Tradition: Enoch Mthembu, "Zulu king's regiment ready for war," *Weekly News* July 16, 1993.

Gardens in downtown Johannesburg to march to the ANC national headquarters at Shell House (now known as Luthuli House). At this point, Inkatha refused to participate in the pending national democratic elections and their presence in Johannesburg alarmed ANC security who, on the day in question, received a tip-off that the IFP marchers intended to attack the building. Gary Kruser, head of security at Shell House, challenged this in his testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission insisting that IFP supporters fired shots on Shell House, at which point he ordered his guards to fire warning shots and then open fire on the crowd. Other witnesses claimed that the marchers showed no aggression and merely chanted and sang outside the entrance, bearing their traditional weapons.<sup>159</sup> No matter the why or how, 19 IFP supporters died in Johannesburg that day. The images captured by photographer Greg Marinovich represent a stark commentary on this violence: “A man lay face down, the blood staining his cowhide shield – the symbol of a proud Zulu martial tradition useless against bullets.”<sup>160</sup>

In June 1995, Mandela spoke out in defense of the ANC’s actions during the Shell House Massacre, opening a parliamentary debate on the ANC’s actions during that fateful day. “Before the march on that day, the ANC had received information that some of the marchers were to be directed to attack Shell House, destroy information and kill members of the leadership,” Mandela explained, “The surging columns on Shell House, away from the routes to their destination, shots fired and the fact that the few policemen deployed decided to run away gave credence to the information we had gathered.” Mandela revealed that he instructed ANC guards to protect the

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<sup>159</sup> Marinovich "SA's ugly birthmark - the Shell House massacre" (2014)

<sup>160</sup> Marinovich "SA's ugly birthmark - the Shell House massacre" (2014)

national headquarters “even if they had to kill people.”<sup>161</sup> The Nugent Commission ultimately found the deadly force used by the ANC guards was unjustified.<sup>162</sup>

Similarly, the Goldstone Commission found that, since 1989, two top officials in the South Africa police operated a network that supplied migrant workers on the Rand *and* IFP supporters in KwaZulu-Natal with automatic rifles and homemade pistols, in addition to training Inkatha hit squads and participating in the assassination of ANC officials throughout the country. The report named Themba Khoza, IFP leader in the Transvaal and co-convener of the march in Johannesburg as the “Buthelezi henchman who leaves mass murder in his wake.”<sup>163</sup> When Greg Marinovich spoke to a former police sniper about the events of March 28, 1994, he confirmed that snipers had been posted along the route to Shell House but “they were not police.”<sup>164</sup> “That enigmatic answer was all he would say on the subject,” Marinovich regretted.<sup>165</sup> At the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, eleven ANC security guards applied for amnesty from the shootings in Johannesburg on March 28, 1994. The Amnesty Committee found the shooting of the marchers to be without justification since they had been shot after turning back. The Committee granted all eleven guards amnesty following their admission that they had shot the marchers as they were running away.<sup>166</sup>

On April 6, 1994, Goodwill Zwelithini spoke out against the violence done to his supporters at the Shell House, firmly situating the incident in terms of the ANC versus the Zulu

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<sup>161</sup> Brendan Boyle, “Mandela: why I gave shoot to kill order,” *The Independent*, June 8, 1995, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/mandela-why-i-gave-shoot-to-kill-order-1585387.html> (accessed October 15, 2018).

<sup>162</sup> Loren B. Landau and Tanya Pampalone (eds.), *I Want to Go Home Forever: Stories of Becoming and Belonging in South Africa's Great Metropolis* (New York: New York University Press, 2018), ebook.

<sup>163</sup> Elaine Windrich, “The Johannesburg Massacre: Media Images of the South African Transition,” *Africa Today* 43, no. 1 (1996): 78.

<sup>164</sup> Marinovich “The Truth Elusive: Shell House massacre, 20 years later” (2014)

<sup>165</sup> Marinovich “The Truth Elusive: Shell House massacre, 20 years later” (2014)

<sup>166</sup> Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *TRC Final Report, Volume 6, Section 3*. P. 301.

Nation and expressing his intention to not participate in the upcoming democratic elections. “As things now stand, I cannot encourage my father's people to vote on the 26th, 27th and 28th of April, and thereby lend legitimacy to what will be destructive of the very foundations on which the sovereignty of the Zulu Kingdom rests,” he announced. “After the Shell House massacre, the Zulu Nation carries an additional open wound: those who died because they were exercising their democratic right to oppose the election, shall be celebrated and remembered in various ways which we will announce soon.”<sup>167</sup> This represented one of the last attempts by Zwelithini and Buthelezi, via Inkatha, to discredit the ANC in advance of the democratic elections on April 26-28, 1994. The image of the Zulu, however, remained similar to the violent stereotypes that followed the nation since the times of Shaka.

Today the Zulus are the most scorned of African tribes. They are censured for exactly the qualities that once earned them respect — their warrior spirit and fierce independence . . . . The Zulus thus find themselves out of favor, losing their current propaganda war to the African National Congress . . . Whether the Zulus really are that tough is an open question. . . . Zulus leaders have played heavily on the image of themselves as fierce warriors, especially in recent months as they have felt themselves backed into a corner by the ANC.”<sup>168</sup>

And backed into a corner they were.

In the new KwaZulu-Natal Province, which incorporated the KwaZulu homeland, the IFP won the most votes (the election was marred by irregularities).<sup>169</sup> One of the new Provincial Assembly’s first pieces of business, was to pass a provincial House of Traditional Leaders Act, designed to establish an advisory council of Zulu chiefs which virtually stripped the King of his authority as leader of all Zulu chiefs. The royal house issued an ultimatum that the IFP should

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<sup>167</sup> Greg Marinovich “SA’s ugly birthmark – the Shell House massacre,” *Mail & Guardian* March 28, 2014, <https://mg.co.za/data/2014-03-27-sas-ugly-birthmark-the-shell-house-massacre>.

<sup>168</sup> David Brooks, “The Zulus: Victorian Warriors in the Modern Age,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 12, 1994, p. A18.

<sup>169</sup> Laurence Piper, “The Inkatha Freedom Party: Between the Impossible and the Ineffective,” in Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink (eds.), *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 160.

repeal the Act or face the consequences, sentiments echoed by the ANC. The IFP passed the Act anyway, which was considered a blatant attack against the king.<sup>170</sup> Though it was eventually repealed by presidential intervention, the die had been cast and a new era of South African politics began.

Mandela, as the newly elected South African President, Nelson Mandela, bypassed Buthelezi to foster a relationship with Zwelithini. Although Zwelithini's position remained largely ceremonial in the final version of the Constitution (passed in 1996), President Mandela regularly included the Zulu monarch in decisions, both to maintain goodwill with the Zulu nation but also to bypass Buthelezi whom he found difficult to work with (to say the least). In September 1994, Zwelithini extended an invitation for newly elected President Mandela to join him for the annual Shaka Day celebrations (honoring the founder of the Zulu nation) in Stanger. Buthelezi responded to this news by boycotting the annual Reed Dance and inciting his supporters to storm a meeting between himself, Mandela and the king at the eNyokeni Palace. Attempting to calm tensions, Mandela agreed to not attend the celebrations, but the king cancelled that year's Shaka Day festivities. Buthelezi and his supporters carried on with the events in the absence of the king. On the next day, Prince Sifiso Zulu, a member of the new advisory committee to the king, appeared on television to discuss the dispute and distance the royal family from Buthelezi. Buthelezi, in a nearby studio in the same facility, came on to the set and verbally attacked Zulu on camera before taking over the broadcast to present his version of events. After this outburst, the king's legal adviser, S.S. Mathe, publicly denounced the events of

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<sup>170</sup> Alexander Johnston, "Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal," in William Gutteridge and J.E. Spence (eds.) *Violence in Southern Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 96.

that day as an insult to the king's dignity and announced the severing of all ties between the Zwelithini and Buthelezi.<sup>171</sup>

This rift came at an opportune time for the king, who no longer had to rely on Buthelezi for his financial security. Just before the transition in 1994, negotiations between the then ruling National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party resulted in the formation of the Ingonyama Trust, a fund established to manage land owned by the KwaZulu government. These lands, representing approximately 2.8 million hectares of KwaZulu-Natal's 9 million-hectares, were vested under Zwelithini as a trustee.<sup>172</sup> As Carolyn Hamilton notes, "with this transfer, Zwelithini was, for the first time in his reign, freed from direct financial dependence on the local authority headed by Buthelezi or his predecessors."<sup>173</sup> His increased financial wealth resulted in increased popularity and visibility among his constituents; a vital connection necessary as, even in the aftermath of the election, the conflict throughout the nation failed to cease.

With his relationship with the king on the rocks, Buthelezi in October 1995, called another *imbizo* at King's Park, this time without the king, reading a "covenant" promising that all Zulus would fight for an autonomous Zulu kingdom.<sup>174</sup> But the wellspring of Zulu nationalism no longer held the same strength with the separation of two its primary figurehead: Buthelezi and Goodwill Zwelithini. At the same time, the inauguration of democracy symbolized by the first democratic elections in 1994 did not immediately result in peace *or* in the disappearance of volatile, politicized Zulu martiality. A May 1994 article in *The Independent* noted that the peace the ANC desired could only be maintained through collaboration with local "warlords" like

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<sup>171</sup> Bill Keller, "Zulu King Breaks Ties To Buthelezi," *New York Times*, September 21, 1994, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/21/world/zulu-king-breaks-ties-to-buthelezi.html>.

<sup>172</sup> Kwazulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act No. 3KZ of 1994

<sup>173</sup> Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*, 1.

<sup>174</sup> Laurence Piper, "The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South Africa" (PhD Dissertation, Wolfson College, 1998), 151.

Thomas Mandla Shabalala of Lindelani. “No activity can happen in this area without [Thomas] Shabalala's consent,” one anonymous Lindelani resident remarked to Karl Meier of *The Independent*, “His constituency are the illiterate squatters of Lindelani, and he runs the place like an old-style mafia boss.”<sup>175</sup> Similarly to the vigilante groups and “warlords” in Lindelani, other militarized youth and men struggled to come to grips with the sudden shift from conflict to democracy. Self-defense unit members in Kathorus (near Johannesburg) similarly expressed this frustration with being expected to suddenly change following the implementation of democracy. “Now it’s like we were in a war, now we have to change and start all over again ... fit into the social arenas,” one member complained.<sup>176</sup> Another expressed his difficulty in transitioning from fighting to returning to school.

I think [it] is [a]very frustrating moment; because we were fighting. In our heads we thought we are gonna die, but before I die I want to fight for my community. Suddenly there is change of heart now, there is a future, ANC has won the votes, and now the ANC is in the government. And now there are lots of challenges now, we have to go back to school ... many problems. And this time I used to have a gun every time ... but now I need to go to back to school to register.<sup>177</sup>

With the officially sanctioned violence halted, vigilantes, after years of struggle and the psychological and emotional consequences, “the liberators of yesterday have become today's rejects or social outcasts.”<sup>178</sup>

This period resulted in massive changes for the lives of young South Africans and for the nation as a whole. The intensive violence of the 1980s and 1990s left physical and psychological scars that many still struggle to recover from. The *amabutho* occupied a central role in these

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<sup>175</sup> Karl Meier, “South African Election: Warlords in Natal hold key to peace after the poll,” *The Independent*, May 3, 1994.

<sup>176</sup> Malose Langa and Gillian Eagle, “The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity: A Case Study of Former Self-Defence Unit Members in the Kathorus Area, South Africa,” *South African Journal of Psychology* 38, no. 1 (2008): 167.

<sup>177</sup> Langa and Eagle, “The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity,” 167.

<sup>178</sup> Rakgoadi, “The Role of the Self-Defence Units (SDUs) in a Changing Political Context.”



conflicts, but also formed part of a larger turn to militancy on multiple fronts that characterized this era. This militancy also helped cultural stakeholders crystallize a new Zulu ethnic identity, shaped by references to Zulu kingdom *amabutho*, martial metaphors, and physical symbols of this previous era of conflict. At the same time, this chapter illustrates that the conflation of *amabutho* with this new politicized ethnicity and militancy simultaneously rooted itself in the traditions of King Goodwill Zwelithini's predecessors, while also emerging from the particular context of the late apartheid era.

## Chapter 6:

### Post-Apartheid Zulu Nationalism, Martial Masculinity and the Changing Nature of the *Amabutho*, 1999 to 2018

On September 24, 2016, the Zulu Nation celebrated the bicentennial of its founding. In honor of this auspicious occasion, for the first time since the festivities began in the 1930s, the annual Shaka Day celebrations moved from Stanger to the 52,000-seat stadium constructed in advance of the 2010 World Cup.<sup>1</sup> Crowds circulated in and around the stadium beginning early in the morning. Those in attendance included Zulu-speakers from throughout South Africa, members of the Shembe Church who held their 9am worship on the soccer pitch, and both local *amabutho* as well as the official royal regiments. These men, ranging in age from teenagers to elderly men, swirled on the soccer pitch, garbed in both *ibheshu* and jeans, wielding their spears and knobkerries with pride, swelling in one voice as they performed *amahubo* in honor of the Zulu king. The entire event displayed a decidedly masculinist tone, with only male speakers, male regiments performing on the field, and an overwhelmingly disproportionate representation of men over women in the crowd.

During his own comments during the celebration, President Jacob Zuma applauded Zwelithini's 45-year reign, imploring those in attendance to take note of the momentous occasion to "look at what is valuable to the Zulu Nation" and "listen to the King."<sup>2</sup> Zuma also used the platform to comment on the violence against women plaguing the country, imploring those in attendance to remember the centrality of respect in Zulu culture. "We respect each other as

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Alegi, "A Nation to Be Reckoned With': The Politics of World Cup Stadium Construction in Cape Town and Durban, South Africa," *African Studies* 67, no. 3 (2008): 397-422; Sam Sole, "Durban's Moses Mabhida Stadium: Arch of Hope or Yoke of Debt?" in Colette Schulz-Herzenberg (ed.) *Player and Referee: Conflicting Interests and the 2010 FIFA World Cup* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 169-201; David Roberts and Orli Bass, "The World Cup Geography of Durban: What Will Endure?," in Peter Alegi and Chris Bolsmann (eds.), *Africa's World Cup: Critical Reflections on Play, Patriotism, Spectatorship, and Space* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 42-51.

<sup>2</sup> "King Zwelithini speaks at 200-year Zulu nation celebration," *eNCA*, September 24, 2016, <https://www.enca.com/south-africa/catch-it-live-sa%E2%80%99s-zulu-people-celebrate-their-bicentenary>.

members of the Zulu nation,” Zuma stated, “Let us go back to our roots.”<sup>3</sup> Zuma finalized his comments, concluding by turning to Zwelithini and speaking for the entire Zulu nation: “We congratulate you, we wish you many more years at the helm, especially as you preach peace, unity and love.”<sup>4</sup> Mangosuthu Buthelezi introduced Zwelithini, speaking briefly about the legacy of Shaka, especially marking that thanks to the legendary Zulu founder “the image of a Zulu warrior is today symbolic of courage, ferocity, and pride, not only in our culture, but in many cultures both African and Western.”<sup>5</sup> His comments centered on this legacy:

Yes, the Zulu nation is courageous and proud. Yes, we are from warrior stock. But we are also a people with deep respect for unity, social wellbeing, and personal contribution. This makes us great patriots and valuable citizens. That is the legacy of 200 years of Zulu history. It must be celebrated along with every other aspect of our past, from how we fought for freedom from oppression, to how we won at Isandlwana, to how we remain undefeated despite suffering loss.<sup>6</sup>

Zwelithini’s own comments focused on the contemporary issues plaguing the Zulu nation, especially higher education given the continuing #FeesMustFall protests occurring nationwide.<sup>7</sup>

The Zulu 200 celebrations represented a watershed moment for isiZulu-speaking people in South Africa as, over the past two decades, Jacob Zuma’s rise to the presidency and King Goodwill Zwelithini’s increased symbolic and financial wealth promoted Zuluness at the national *and* global level. At the same time, the Zulu nation found its status diminished from its status before the first democratic elections in April 1994, when Zwelithini and his counterparts faced challenges to their standing as new legislation challenged the role of traditional authorities

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<sup>3</sup> “King Zwelithini speaks at 200-year Zulu nation celebration” (2016).

<sup>4</sup> “King Zwelithini speaks at 200-year Zulu nation celebration” (2016).

<sup>5</sup> Mangosuthu Buthelezi, “In Celebration of King Shaka ka Senzangakhona Founder of The Zulu Nation,” September 24, 2016, <http://www.ifp.org.za/newsroom/celebration-king-shaka-ka-senzangakhona-founder-zulu-nation>.

<sup>6</sup> Buthelezi, “In Celebration of King Shaka.”

<sup>7</sup> Susan Booysen, ed., *Fees Must Fall: Student Revolt, Decolonisation And Governance In South Africa* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2016); Rekgotofetse Chikane, *Breaking a Rainbow, Building a Nation: The Politics Behind #mustfall Movements* (Johannesburg: Pan Macmillan, 2018).

and restricted their rights to practice their culture. At the same time, on a day-to-day basis, Zulu-speaking South Africans faced their own struggles, namely overwhelming poverty, violence and quotidian realities. In addition, Zulu traditionalists faced their own unique problem: how to preserve and promote their culture in the 21<sup>st</sup>-century.

This chapter illustrates how, in this moment of deep insecurity for the Zulu nation, the *amabutho* and its associated symbols became even more important as cultural stakeholders turned to tradition to promote Zulu ethnic nationalism without its political machinations. Laurence Piper argues that since 1994, the Zulu nation no longer exists and instead “a plurality of constructions of Zuluness, usually intertwined in complex ways with other identities such as African, black and South African, which complicated the invocation of any one sense of nationhood.”<sup>8</sup> Without the singular Zuluness promoted by the IFP, then, Piper asserted that “for the foreseeable future then, both Zulu nationalism and the Zulu nation are dead.”<sup>9</sup> This crisis of identity is coupled with a “crisis of masculinity” which challenges historically embedded models of manhood.<sup>10</sup>

This chapter charts how the struggles to maintain Zulu relevancy on the national stage corresponded with simultaneous shifts in culture and tradition in KwaNyavu, a small chiefdom near Pietermaritzburg. Focusing specifically on the changing forms and functions of *amabutho* in KwaNyavu, this article highlights the disparity between the national image of Zuluness and the micro-struggles to preserve cultural traditions on a daily basis. This chapter highlights the disparities between the performances of Zulu martial masculinity by two of the Zulu Nation’s

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<sup>8</sup> Laurence Piper, “Nationalism without a nation: the rise and fall of Zulu nationalism in South Africa’s transition to democracy, 1975-1999,” *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 1 (2002): 86.

<sup>9</sup> Piper, “Nationalism without a nation,” 90.

<sup>10</sup> Liz Walker, “Men behaving differently: South African men since 1994,” *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 7, no. 3 (2005): 227.

most prominent figures, former President Jacob Zuma and King Goodwill Zwelithini, and the quotidian struggles and popular support that allow these macro-level manifestations to have broader meaning and appeal.

The Mdluli chiefdom is located in KwaNyavu, part of the Mkhambathini Local Municipality along the south-eastern boundary of the larger uMgungundlovu District Municipality. KwaNyavu is divided into four *izigodi* (sg., *isigodi*; localities): Qweqwe, Bebhuzi, Ishoba-lenkunzi (Sinyameni) and uPhoko. Chief Sikhosiphi Mdluli acts as the *inkosi* (chief) of this area, following the footsteps of his forefathers dating back to Nomsimekwana in the nineteenth-century.<sup>11</sup> The Mdluli chiefdom has occupied these lands since this time, frequently coming into conflict with the neighboring Maphumulo chiefdom in *izimpi zemibango*. From this era, Jill Kelly's research illustrates, "the Nyavu chiefs . . . contested the initial boundary set down between them and their neighbors on the Inanda Location, the appointed Maphumulo chieftaincy, and repeatedly attempted to regain territory by claiming hereditary right to land during the segregationist and apartheid eras."<sup>12</sup> As the apartheid era ended, the Nyavu faced the spilling over of violence from the Pietermaritzburg area and the mobilization of local *amabutho* to protect the chiefdom from internal and external threats.

In the mid-1980s/early 1990s, the pre-existing struggles between the Mdluli and Maphumulo chiefdoms exploded against the larger conflict known as the *udlame*, spurred by Inkatha's insecurity in the face of the UDF's growing popularity and the threat of the Pietermaritzburg townships being brought under KwaZulu administration. As Inkatha embarked on a campaign to force support in the Pietermaritzburg region, ANC *amaqabane* and UDF

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<sup>11</sup> Kelly, *To Swim with Crocodiles*.

<sup>12</sup> Jill Kelly, "Only the Fourth Chief: Conflict, Land, and Chieftly Authority In 20th Century KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa" (PhD Diss, Michigan State University, 2012), 33.

youths conspired to make the country ungovernable for the apartheid state. Violence in the urban areas quickly spread to the rural areas, including Table Mountain where refugees turned to Inkosi Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo for protection in the face of increasing violence.<sup>13</sup> Inkatha-driven violence in both KwaNyavu and KwaSwayimane spread into the Maphumulo chiefdom and exacerbated long-existing tensions between these areas. Even after the *udlame* simmered following the arrival of democracy in 1994, the conflicts continued, fueled by the same party divisions that drove the violence in this crucial period.<sup>14</sup> Throughout this period, the *amabutho* continued to function as pseudo-militias and maintained this identity into the present.

*Amabutho* did not find new roles in the democratic dispensation easily; Zulu traditionalists, in general, struggled to find common ground with the Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki eras. Some Zulu traditions continued to be viewed with suspicion, especially the *amabutho*. Prior to February 2003 opening of the KwaZulu-Natal Parliament, media outlets quoted Lionel Mtshali, acting Premier, as calling for Zulu warriors to come and disrupt the opening of the legislature, coinciding with more reports that he asked for chiefs' assistance in organizing the *amabutho* to protest the move of the provincial legislature from Ulundi to Pietermaritzburg. Mtshali himself claimed that he had "been misunderstood and misrepresented in some quarters."<sup>15</sup> "I was encouraging *amabutho* to be present at the Pietermaritzburg opening of the legislature - as they always have been in Ulundi over the years - in a rich expression of patriotism and to (let them) see for themselves where the new legislature is located," Mtshali continued, "I would not encourage disruption at the opening of an event that I was personally

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<sup>13</sup> Jill Kelly, "'Peace chief' Maphumulo honoured," *The Witness* April 18, 2018, p. 1; 7; Kelly (2011).

<sup>14</sup> On similar outbreaks of violence in Vulindlela: Mxolisi Mchunu, "A History of Political Violence in KwaShange: Vulindlela district and of its effects on the memories of survivors (1987-2008)," (PhD Diss, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013).

<sup>15</sup> "Call of warriors was misunderstood - Mtshali." *IOL*, February 18, 2003, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/call-on-warriors-was-misunderstood---mtshali-101531> (accessed July 12, 2017).

presiding over and at which I would be unveiling the IFP-led government's program for the forthcoming year.”<sup>16</sup> For Blessed Gwala, the IFP’s primary spokesperson, this intervention symbolized a cultural amnesia amongst ANC officials, especially those from KwaZulu-Natal: “I wonder why the ANC is allergic to *amabutho*, especially because most of the party’s members are Zulus and they understand how *amabutho* behave.”<sup>17</sup> The association of the ANC-IFP divide with the *amabutho* further connected this institution of social organization with political tribalism; that is, “the use of ethnic identity in political competition with other groups.”<sup>18</sup> In 2004, these continuing divisions between the ANC and the IFP were solidified in the Table Mountain region as the Maphumulo chiefdom in Maqongqo installed Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, an ANC supporter, as *inkosi*, placing the Maphumulo and Mdluli chiefdoms at odds again, this time along party lines, given the long lineage of IFP supporters in Nyavu.

Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, deputy president under Thabo Mbeki, struggled to bridge these divides. Thabo Mbeki, Nelson Mandela’s successor, looked to Zuma, as a man with a rich background in Zulu tradition and a keen understanding of *amabutho*, to ameliorate relations between the ANC and the IFP.<sup>19</sup> Zuma’s adroit ability to bridge the gap between traditionalists and the ANC proved important as he helped convince King Goodwill Zwelithini that he did not have to be an IFP loyalist in order to protect Zulu traditions.<sup>20</sup> As Zuma continued to ascend in South African politics, his connections to Zulu martial masculinity continued to define his public

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<sup>16</sup> “Call of warriors was misunderstood - Mtshali.” (2003).

<sup>17</sup> Bheko Madlala, “Amabutho get weapons go-ahead at opening,” *IOL*, February 28, 2003, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/amabutho-get-weapons-go-ahead-at-opening-102021> (accessed July 12, 2017).

<sup>18</sup> Jon Lonsdale, “Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism,” in *Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed. P. Kaarsholm and J. Hultin (Roskilde: International Development Studies, Roskilde University, 1994), 144.

<sup>20</sup> William Mervin Gumede, *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC* (New York: Zed Books, 2007), 52.

image.<sup>21</sup> Fending off rape allegations in 2005, Zuma drew on Zulu idioms to both defend his sexual impropriety and to drum up public support in his favor, resulting in a populist movement culminating in his election as President of the Republic of South Africa in 2009.<sup>22</sup> Zuma's populism also connected to his refreshingly open attitude towards discussing HIV/AIDS publicly, a welcome departure from the policies of his predecessors.<sup>23</sup>

Zuma's approach represented a new era of HIV/AIDS responses in South Africa, characterized by a renewed focus on tradition as an ideal important tool in the fight to slow the spread of the epidemic. At the 2009 *Umkhosi Wokweshwama* (First Fruits Ceremony), King Goodwill Zwelithini announced plans for a revival of male circumcision to slow the spread of HIV/AIDS, following a pattern of turning to culture for solutions to contemporary problems that

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<sup>21</sup> In 2006, narrowly avoiding charges of fraud and corruption brought against him by the National Prosecuting Authority for his relationship with Durban-based businessman Schabir Shaik, Zuma spoke to the press, explaining that his experiences with the justice system had left him "a wounded warrior." Although he avoided criminal charges claiming *prima facie*, Zuma could not avoid the fallout from his connection to Shaik. On June 14, 2005, Thabo Mbeki released Zuma from his responsibilities as Deputy President of Member of the Cabinet at a Joint Sitting of Parliament. "Zuma: I am a wounded warrior." September 12, 2008. *Mail & Guardian Online*. <https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-12-zuma-i-am-a-wounded-warrior> (accessed December 1, 2017); Adriaan Basson and Pieter du Toit, *Enemy of the People: How Jacob Zuma Stole South Africa and How the People Fought Back* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017); Jacques Pauw, *The President's Keepers: Those Keeping Zuma in Power and Out of Prison* (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers, 2017).

<sup>22</sup> On the rape trial: Redi Thlabi, *Khwezi: The Remarkable Story of Fezekile Ntsukela Kuzwayo* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017); Benedict Carton, "Why is the '100% Zulu Boy' so popular?," *Concerned African Scholars*, Bulletin No. 84 (Winter 2010): 34-38; Liz Gunner, "Jacob Zuma, the Social Body and the Unruly Power of Song," *African Affairs* 108, no. 420 (2009): 42; Mmatshilo Motsei, *The Kanga and the Kangaroo Court: Reflections on the Rape Trial of Jacob Zuma* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2007), 60-61; Raymond Suttner, "The Jacob Zuma Rape Trial: Power and African National Congress (ANC) Masculinities," *NORA-Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research*, 17, no. 3 (2009): 229; Lisa Vetten, "Violence against women in South Africa," in: Sakhela Buhlungu, John Daniel, Roger Southall & Jessica Lutchman (eds.) *State of the Nation. South Africa 2007* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007): 439; Steven Robins, "Sexual rights and sexual cultures: reflections on 'the Zuma affair' and 'new masculinities' in the South Africa," *Horizontes Antropológicos* 12, no. 26 (2006): 149-183; Steven Robins, "Sexual Politics and the Zuma Rape Trial," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34, no. 2 (2008): 411-422; Elizabeth Skeen, "The Rape of a Trial: Jacob Zuma, AIDS, Conspiracy, and Tribalism in Neo-liberal Post-Apartheid South Africa," (Ph.D. Diss, Princeton University, 2007)..

<sup>23</sup> Celia Dugger, "Breaking with Past, South Africa Issues Broad AIDS Policy," *New York Times*, December 1, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/africa/02safrica.html>. On AIDS denialism during the Mbeki administration: Didier Fassin, *When Bodies Remember: Experiences and Politics of AIDS in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Niccoli Nattrass, *Mortal Combat: AIDS Denialism and the Struggle for Antiretrovirals in South Africa* (Scottsville: UKZN Press, 2007); Jonny Steinberg, *Sizwe's Test: A Young Man's Journey through Africa's AIDS Epidemic* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008).



defined his reign. “In the context of the fight against HIV and AIDS, I should announce my intention to revive the practice of circumcision (*ukusoka*) among young men,” he declared.<sup>24</sup> At the time of the king’s pronouncement, the KZN faced staggering rates of HIV infection; over 39 percent of women had tested positive for HIV in antenatal clinics in the province in 2008.<sup>25</sup> By 2010, approximately 1:6 people were HIV-positive, with around 350 new infections daily, according to a CNN report.<sup>26</sup> This pronouncement came on the heels of increasing scientific evidence of the effectiveness of male circumcision in lessening the risk of transmission of HIV during heterosexual sex.<sup>27</sup> Although some interpreted this move as representative of a broader shift towards political tribalism, a move away from the “Xhosa Nostra”<sup>28</sup>, others viewed this initiative as a welcome utilization of cultural traditions to fight the growing epidemic.<sup>29</sup>

Zwelithini and his partners in the voluntary medical male circumcision campaign (VMMC) turned to martial traditions to encourage participation. In 2010, Zwelithini formed a new *ibutho* of circumcised men which he named Izinyosi (bees) after one of the units enrolled by Shaka.<sup>30</sup> The initiates were encouraged by a chief from Mahlabathini to consider themselves “a

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<sup>24</sup> “South Africa Zulus to revive circumcision to fight Aids,” December 7, 2009, *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8399487.stm>.

<sup>25</sup> Mark Hunter, *Love in the Time of AIDS: Inequality, Gender, and Rights in South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 3.

<sup>26</sup> Xolani Gwala, “Zulu king promotes circumcision to fight HIV/AIDS,” *CNN*, July 1, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/07/01/circumcision.south.africa.aids> (accessed August 10, 2013).

<sup>27</sup> Maureen Malowany, Interview with author, December 6, 2016, Skype; Douglass Ross, Interview with author, November 22, 2016, Pietermaritzburg; Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, World Health Organization, *Male circumcision: global trends and determinants of prevalence, safety, and acceptability* (Geneva: World Health Organization; 2007): 27.

<sup>28</sup> Steven C. Dubin, *Spearheading Debate: Culture Wars and Uneasy Truces* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2012), 229; Helen Suzman, ‘The truth about the Xhosa Nostra,’ *Focus* 8 (1997), <http://hsf.404.co.za/publications/focus/issue-8-third-quarter-1997/the-truth-about-the-xhosa-nostra>.

<sup>29</sup> Zuma’s decision to reveal his own circumcision in a 2010 interview with *New York Times* reporter further enflamed these rumors. In the article, Zuma revealed that he had been circumcised “some time ago” and hoped that announcing his status “could help quite a few other people who, if I did not do it, they would be hesitant and not knowing what to do.” Celia Dugger, ‘In South Africa, an Unlikely Leader on AIDS’, *New York Times*, May 14, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/world/africa/15zuma.html>.

<sup>30</sup> “Presentation of a progress report on medical male circumcision to the King,” November 6, 2010, <http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/mediarelease/2010/circumcision6.11.htm>.

very lucky generation” to be included in this new *ibutho* and understand their new status as “the mirror of the Zulu nation.”<sup>31</sup> “It is in you that the King will derive pride in his regiments,” the chief reminded the new *ibutho*.<sup>32</sup> Jabulani Maphalala, a professor at the University of Zululand, pointed out that, by utilizing these martial traditions, Zwelithini found a way to “market [circumcision], linking it to a person’s tradition and people are proud that it is their own thing.”<sup>33</sup> Martial traditions served as this link between people’s health and their identity.

*Amabutho* also featured prominently in attempts to ameliorate the continued conflict between the ANC and IFP. In November 2010, Zuma and Zwelithini attended a cleansing ceremony organized by *Umbimbi Lwezinsizwa*, a Vulindlela-based coalition of *amabutho*, to calm these tensions.<sup>34</sup> Zuma applauded the *Umbimbi Lwezinsizwa* for their idea, explaining how “violence erupts now and again because there was no officially laying down of arms accompanied by cleaning of *intelezi yempi* (traditional war medicine).”<sup>35</sup> This local ceremony, however, did little to close the deep rifts between these two organizations; wounds worsened by the split of the IFP and the birth of the National Freedom Party (NFP) in 2010.<sup>36</sup> The reverberations of this split found their way to KwaNyavu, where NFP candidate Elias Dube was assassinated in March 2011.<sup>37</sup> The repercussions of the formation Commission on Traditional

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<sup>31</sup> “Male Circumcision camp proceeds without hassle,” June 12, 2010, <http://www.gov.za/male-circumcision-camp-proceeds-without-hassle>.

<sup>32</sup> “Male Circumcision camp proceeds without hassle.”

<sup>33</sup> Jabulani Maphalala, Interview with author, Durban, August 20, 2016.

<sup>34</sup> On the history of violence in Vulindlela see: Mxolisi R. Mchunu, “A history of political violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela district and of its effects on the memories of survivors (1987-2008)” (Ph.D. Diss, University of KwaZulu-Natal-Pietermaritzburg, 2013).

<sup>35</sup> “Zuma praises peace effort,” *The Witness*, November 8, 2010, p. 1-2.

<sup>36</sup> Since this split, the IFP has struggled to “transcend its Zulu ethnic power base,” experiencing a general decline in voter support since the late 2000s and a massive shift in leadership with the retirement of Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 2017. Ineke van Kessel and Barbara Oomen, “One Chief, One Vote: The Revival of Traditional Authorities in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” *African Affairs* 96, no. 385(1997): 585.

<sup>37</sup> At Dube’s funeral, Chief Mdluli, a known IFP-stalwart, revealed that Dube had been part of a conspiracy to assassinate him, although the two had reconciled prior to his death. “MEC Mchunu Condemns the Shooting of the NFP Candidate in KwaNyavu near Pietermaritzburg,” KZN Transport, March 14, 2011, [http://www.kzntransport.gov.za/media\\_releases/2011/lmec%20mchunu%20condemns%20the%20shooting%20of%20the%20NFP%20candid](http://www.kzntransport.gov.za/media_releases/2011/lmec%20mchunu%20condemns%20the%20shooting%20of%20the%20NFP%20candid)

Leadership Disputes and Claims (commonly referred to as the Nhlapo Commission) and the claims by numerous traditional leaders in KwaZulu-Natal, challenging Zwelithini's right to rule, weakened the monarchy and threatened his government-sponsored lifestyle.<sup>38</sup> The release of the Commissions' findings in 2007 ultimately solidified Zwelithini's position, but resulted in the stripping of five other kings' titles.<sup>39</sup>

This public questioning of his role resulted in numerous public displays of Zwelithini's growing insecurity. As this insecurity grew, so too did the prominence of *amabutho* in his public appearances, as Zwelithini bolstered his defensive position by bringing these units to his public engagements and leaning on them for support for his policies and opinions. He bolstered this defensive position by increasingly bringing *amabutho* to his public engagements and leaning on them for support for his policies and opinions. At a January 2015 event in Kokstad, Zwelithini called on the men in attendance to support him against those who aimed to "destroy African culture."<sup>40</sup> He continued, "There are some among the Nguni people who are hell-bent on undermining African culture because they have adopted Western culture. That is why I say my

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ate%20in%20kwaNyavu%20near%20PMB.pdf; Skhumbuzo Miya, "Calls for calm at Elias Dube funeral," *The Natal Witness*, April 25, 2011, <https://www.news24.com/Archives/Witness/Calls-for-calm-at-Elias-Dube-funeral-20150430>.

<sup>38</sup> The Nhlapo Commission further threatened Zulu supremacy in South Africa as competing claims from the Hlubi, Ngwane, Mngomezulu, Thonga, Nhlanguwinin, Nguni, Zizi, Madlala, and Msomi chiefdoms resulted in the formation of new heritage organizations launching campaigns to promote their own ethnic identities apart from the homogenous Zulu identity propagated by Inkatha. Jochen S. Arndt, "Struggles of Land, Language, and Identity in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The case of the Hlubi," *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 9, no. 1(2018): 1-26; Mbongiseni Buthelezi, "'Sifuna Umlando Wethu' (We are Looking for our History), Oral Literature and the Meanings of the Past in Post-Apartheid South Africa" (PhD Diss, Columbia University, 2012); Grant McNulty, "Custodianship on the Periphery: Archives, Power and Identity Politics in Post-Apartheid Umbumbulu, KwaZulu-Natal" (PhD Diss, University of Cape Town, 2013); Andrew Ainslie and Thembela Kepe, "Understanding the Resurgence of Traditional Authorities in Post-Apartheid South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 42, no. 1 (2016): 22-23; J. Michael Williams, "Legislating 'Tradition' in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35, no. 1(2009): 191-209; Williams, *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy*.

<sup>39</sup> These kings maintained their positions but at the conclusion of their royal lineage upon the occasion of their death, as their successors would only be recognized as traditional leaders of paramount chieftaincies. Anna Majavu, "Five kingdoms stripped of claim to royalty," *Sowetan Live*, July 30, 2010, <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2010/07/30/five-kingdoms-stripped-of-claim-to-royalty>.

<sup>40</sup> Bongani Hans, "Zulu king's 'call to arms'," *IOL*, January 15, 2015, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/southafrica/kwazulu-natal/zulu-kings-call-to-arms-1805077>.

regiment must be ready.”<sup>41</sup> These attempts to “undermin[e] African culture” stemmed from threats to Zwelithini’s position and represented broader efforts “to intimidate critics of recent laws and policies that cement colonial distortions which exaggerate chiefly power over land and people.”<sup>42</sup> The “recent laws and policies” included the 2014 Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act and the Nhlapo Commission. These initiatives called into question Zwelithini’s predetermined right to his office and the land and financial benefits guaranteed by his position.<sup>43</sup> Further public controversies cemented this sense of insecurity.<sup>44</sup> Following xenophobic comments made in 2015, Zwelithini called for an *imbizo* (meeting) against xenophobic violence, but this event did little to calm the tense atmosphere, as *amabutho* wielding weapons and singing songs with xenophobic sentiments caused onlookers to question his true intentions.<sup>45</sup> The tense atmosphere over the proceedings represented, to *City Press* columnist Mondli Makhanya, the desperate attempts by Zwelithini to maintain his rapidly diminishing status.

The biggest challenge for King Goodwill Zwelithini is to restore his place in the society ... his reputation and his standing. He has been attacked, lampooned and castigated. So, his moral authority has diminished greatly in the eyes of greater South Africa ... and he's going to have to do something quite major to restore that. I'm not sure he will ever be able to.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Hans, “Zulu king’s call to arms.”

<sup>42</sup> Nomboniso Gasa, “King’s culture call is all about land,” *Business Day*, February 27, 2015, <http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2015/02/27/kings-culture-call-is-all-about-land>.

<sup>43</sup> Jeff Peires, “History versus customary law: Commission on Traditional Leadership: Disputes and Claims,” *SA Crime Quarterly* 49 (September 2014): 6-20.

<sup>44</sup> Mpondo King Sigcau played on these insecurities in 2015, referring to Zwelithini and Zuma as *amakhwenkhwe* (boys/uncircumcised men) and challenging their legitimacy as men who never underwent traditional initiation rites. Andisiwe Makinana, “President’s men to probe amaMpondo king’s insult,” *City Press*, September 12, 2015, <http://city-press.news24.com/News/Presidents-men-to-probe-amaMpondo-kings-insult-20150912> (accessed January 24, 2018); Bongani Hans, “Royal Family Says Sorry to Zuma, Zwelithini,” *IOL*, August 5, 2015, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/royal-family-says-sorry-to-zuma-zwelithini-1895641>.

<sup>45</sup> Ofeybea Quist-Arcon, “South Africa’s Xenophobic Attacks ‘Vile,’ Says Zulu King Accused of Inciting Them,” *NPR*, April 26, 2015, <https://www.npr.org/2015/04/26/402400958/south-africas-xenophobic-attacks-vile-says-zulu-king-accused-of-inciting-them>; Amanda Khoza, “Crowd boos several speakers at Zwelithini’s imbizo,” *Mail & Guardian*, April 20, 2015, <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-04-20-imbizo-crowd-boos-non-zulu-speakers>; “Five Take-Home Messages from King Goodwill Zwelithini’s Imbizo,” *The Daily Vox*, April 23, 2015, <https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/five-take-home-messages-from-king-goodwill-zwelithinis-imbizo/>.

<sup>46</sup> Quist-Arcon, “South Africa’s Xenophobic Attacks ‘Vile.’”

The connection with public displays of Zwelithini's insecurity over the decline of his moral authority and the *amabutho* connected this critical institution to a growing desperation on the part of the most important Zulu figures in South African politics.

Zuma also faced diminishing status in the public sphere. The 2016 municipal elections marked the lowest performance of the ANC since the first democratic elections in 1994, with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the Democratic Alliance (SA) earning seats in major urban *and* rural areas previously dominated by the ANC.<sup>47</sup> Zuma also faced increasing public criticism as the full details of the investigation into the appropriation of R240-billion in public funds for upgrades on his personal estate in Nkandla emerged, in addition to a state capture investigation focused on his close ties with the Gupta family.<sup>48</sup> These public controversies lessened Zuma's popularity and also the status of Zulu politicians in the South African government, marking a noted shift in the nature of national politics.

Given these changes and public controversies, and the changes in South Africa more broadly, J. Michael Williams argues that traditional authorities will have to rethink how their

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<sup>47</sup> Norimitsu Onishi, "A.N.C. Suffers Major Election Setback in South Africa," *New York Times*, August 5, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/world/africa/south-africa-election-anc.html>.

<sup>48</sup> On "Nkandlagate": Mandy Rossouw, "Zuma's R65m Nkandla splurge," *Mail & Guardian*, December 4, 2009, <https://mg.co.za/article/2009-12-04-zumas-r65m-nkandla-splurge>; Thuli Madonsela, *Secure in Comfort: Report on investigation into allegations of impropriety and unethical conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of Public Works at and in respect of the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal province, Report No. 25 of 2013/14* (Pretoria: Office of the Public Protector, 2014); Norimitsu Onishi, "Jacob Zuma's Home Improvements Violated South Africa's Constitution, Court Finds," *New York Times*, March 31, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/world/africa/south-africa-court-president-jacob-zuma.html>; Susan Comrie, "'Hope is restored in the constitutional dream' – Thuli Madonsela," *City Press*, June 31, 2016, <https://citypress.news24.com/News/hope-is-restored-in-the-constitutional-dream-thuli-madonsela-on-nkandla-20160331>. On the State Capture Investigation: Pauw, *The President's Keepers*; Thuli Madonsela, *State of Capture: Report on an investigation into alleged improper and unethical conduct by the President and other state functionaries relating to alleged improper relationships and involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises resulting in improper and possibly corrupt award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta's family businesses, Report No. 6 of 2016/17* (Pretoria: Office of the Public Protector, 2016).

traditions, especially those maintaining the chieftaincy, can coexist with democratic “ideas and practices.”<sup>49</sup>

Chiefs rely more upon informal powers that reflect the ideas, rules, and institutions rooted in pre-existing community norms and practices, or so-called ‘traditions’. An analysis of democratic consolidation must take into account the political struggles between chiefs and local communities over how ‘democracy’ and ‘tradition’, both as ideas and practices, can coexist given the changing political circumstances.<sup>50</sup>

The Nyavu *ibutho*, as presented in interviews conducted between 2016 and 2018, is one of these “traditions” that is in the midst of massive change in relation not only to party politics and democratic ideals, but also increasing social and economic pressures.

Fihlizwe Zondi has been the *umdidiyeli* (general/commander of the regiments) of KwaNyavu since 2003. When there is a problem, each *induna yezinsizwa* reports directly to Zondi, who ultimately resolves the issue. For the selection of *umdidiyeli*, the tribe as a whole confers on this decision, deciding on individuals “who could be nominated as the *umdidiyeli* and take care of the tribe.”<sup>51</sup> After being nominated, the Chief’s Council considers the candidates and sets out to choose someone who exhibits the characteristics necessary to hold the position. “It has to be someone who is not eager to fight, someone who would be able to attend to [the] *izinduna* in a good manner,” Zondi remarks, “Even when he is talking to soldiers, he must have manners; not someone violent.”<sup>52</sup> This level-headedness is necessary for a job that is so multi-faceted and amorphous.

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<sup>49</sup> J. Michael Williams, “Leading from behind: Democratic Consolidation and the Chieftaincy in South Africa,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 1 (2004): 117.

<sup>50</sup> Williams, “Leading from behind,” 117.

<sup>51</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Umdidiyeli, kubonisana isizwe kuqala sihlengane sibheke ukuthi ubani umuntu okunguyena ongakhethwa ukuba abe ngumdidiyeli. Umdidiyeli ke umuntu ophethe zonke leziNduna okuyizona ezengamele izinsizwa.”

<sup>52</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Noma ekhuluma ngezinsizwa akwazi ukuthi akhulumisane nazo kahle. Hayi umuntu ozoba isidlova...”

Broadly defined, the job of the *umdidiyeli* is “to keep peace in the tribe, calm the situation when there is a problem and all that.”<sup>53</sup> This simple statement does little to capture the complexity of this position. The *umdidiyeli* acts as go-between between the *izinduna zezinsizwa* and the chief. When conflicts break out between soldiers, the *induna* in charge is charged with solving the situation. If they are unable to do so, the matter is reported to *umdidiyeli*, who either works to resolve the issue himself or, if he fails to do so, reports the issue to the chief. *Umdidiyeli* also acts as a spokesman for the *izinsizwa* of the various *izigodi*. “Even when soldiers are not satisfied by something, they would have to gather and talk to their *induna*,” Zondi explains, “Then they would ask [their] *induna* to pass the message to *umdidiyeli*.”<sup>54</sup> At that point, the *umdidiyeli* either finds a way to resolve the issue himself or takes the matter to the chief. In regard to the chief, *umdidiyeli* also acts as a spokesman of sorts. “The Chief, when he has to pass a message to his tribe,” Zondi explains, “he would first contact *umdidiyeli* that he has to contact *izinduna*, then *izinduna* would pass the message to their soldiers.”<sup>55</sup>

This places the *umdidiyeli* in the position of acting as a key conduit between the chief and the young men of the area. The *umdidiyeli* also acts as a cultural master-of-ceremonies, not only organizing young men for attending important ceremonies and functions but also instructing them on how to conduct themselves appropriately according to the traditions of the chieftdom.

When visiting the traditional leader’s place of residence, you don’t just go there empty handed, there is a traditional way that has to be followed. When visiting a traditional leader, you carry traditional weapons. It is not the commander’s responsibility to organize the regiments but that of the captains, the headmen. When organized, the regiments are then introduced to Zondi, the commander. It is

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<sup>53</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Ikakhulukazi nje umdidiyeli umele uxolo ngaphakathi kwesizwe, ukuba yena akhuze yonke into.”

<sup>54</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Noma kukhona izinsizwa ezikubonayo, ziyahlangana zikwazi ukuya eNduneni yazo. Ukuthi cha sicela nihambe nisdilulisele lokhu kumdidiyeli.”

<sup>55</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Akuhambi insizwa ivele iyobika udaba kumdidiyeli, kodwa zikhuluma neNduna yazo. Akuvumelekile ukuthi ujombe Induna yakho, kodwa kumele insizwa ibike kwiNduna bese Induna ibikela umdidiyeli.”

then that he, Zondi, gives instructions to them. He is the one who leads them all, and he is the one who is the first to appear to the traditional leader.<sup>56</sup>

The *umdidiyeli*, seen in this light, is not only the leader of the *ibutho* but also a major steward of culture and tradition for KwaNyavu as a whole.

Zondi is supported in the execution of his duties by *izinduna zezinsizwa* (leaders of the young men) from each *isigodi*. Each *isigodi* has its own *induna yezinsizwa*, ranging in number, depending on the number of young men in that area in need of leadership. Each *induna yezinsizwa* is nominated by the community and then confirmed by the *izinsizwa* of that area.<sup>57</sup>

There are specific characteristics desired in candidates for the position. “It has to be someone sincere, intelligent and compassion[ate],” explains Zondi.<sup>58</sup> Young men look for “someone who would be there for them as the leader and if every they have challenge, he would know what to do as the leader.”<sup>59</sup> The *izinduna zezinsizwa* field complaints from *izinsizwa* in their respective locations, working together to resolve complaints and aid the chief in maintaining the peace. The *umdidiyeli* and *izinduna zezinsizwa* also play important roles in the upbringing of young men in the area, guiding them through the transitions into different stages of manhood.

The path from childhood to adulthood is distinctly different in KwaNyavu than thirty years ago, according to the *izinduna zezinsizwa* of the chiefdom. Although families in

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<sup>56</sup> Thabo Motha, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: “Uma uya komkhulu awuyi uhamba barehanded kodwa nihamba ngendlela yakhona yesintu. Uma niya eNkosini niphatha izihlangu. Umdidiyeli lona ngakho akuwona umsebenzi wakhe ukuqoqa izinsizwa, kodwa yiziNduna eziqoqa izinsizwa. Uma seziqoqiwe bese zithulwa kuyena njengo khomanda, bese yena esho ke ukuthi zizohamba ngalendlela zize ziyofika koMkhulu. Uyena oziholayo, uyena oqhamuka kuqala eNkosini.”

<sup>57</sup> This structure is replicated in urban areas populated with Zulu speakers according to a study undertaken by Caroline White, Nkosana Dlodlo and Walter Segooa for the Centre for Policy Studies. Caroline White, Nkosana Dlodlo, and Walter Segooa, *Democratic Societies?: Voluntary Association and Democratic Culture in a South African Township* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Centre for Policy Studies, 1995).

<sup>58</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Kufuneka kube umuntu oqotho, ubuhlakani kanye nobubele.”

<sup>59</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Izinsizwa zikhetha lomholi wazo ukuthi abe Induna ukuba azibheke, ukuba uma zihamba ziya kwesinye isizwe noma zihamba ngaphakathi endaweni yeNkosi. Ziba nomuntu okuyokwaziwa ukuthi nangu umuntu ezihamba naye, okuyothi noma kungabe kunento eyenzekayo kwaziwe.”



KwaNyavu continue to raise Nguni cattle as part of their commitment to maintaining tradition, the use of young men for herding cattle is another practice that has changed over the past generation.

Young men of today, especially those born in the [19]70s, did not have the opportunity to herd cattle and they never had the opportunity to practice stick fighting. They did not grow up as we did. They attend schools and Sunday schools, something we did not do. Our lives are completely different.<sup>60</sup>

While most of the older men in the area grew up herding cattle and experiencing the kinds of youth socialization associated with that pursuit, including stick fighting, today the cattle roam KwaNyavu largely unchaperoned. When asked if boys still watched over his herd during the day, Zondi exclaimed: “*Hawu*, boys are no longer herding cattle!”<sup>61</sup>

Look, these are my cattle. We would herd cattle in order to protect the fields, making sure that cattle don’t go to our fields because they end up eating our food. But nowadays we no longer have fields. The only thing we have nowadays is only gardens, you would only plant your vegetables in a garden. The way we herd cattle nowadays, we only go to collect our livestock from the veld and bring them home. You wake in the morning, take the livestock outside and they would go around eating . . . My own group themselves, and for others they do the same and I know their colours because they are mine. But now there is a law that authorized us to make mark on our cattle, it actually a brand which is your registered number. So, it is easy that way. I also went to get a stamp. Herding cattle stopped after we couldn’t plough anymore, so we have put fence in our gardens so that cattle don’t go to our gardens.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Thabo Motha, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: “Uyabona izinsizwa zamanje iningi lazo, ake ngithi nje laba abama 70s abazange bayithole indaba yokushaya ngezinduku futhi abazange baluse. Isintu abasasazi, bona sebefunda ezikoleni nako Sunday school thina lento esingayenzanga. Manje impilo yethu ihluke kakhulu. Uyabona thina utshwala besiZulu siyabu enjoyer kodwa bona ababazi ngoba bakhule sekukhona ubhiya nogologo.”

<sup>61</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Hawu abasekho abafana abelusayo.”

<sup>62</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Buka nje nazi izinkomo zami. Kwakuluswa ngesizathu sokuthi kwakukade kulinywa emasimini, ukuze izinkomo zingeke ziye emasimini. Ngoba zizodla ukudla okutshaliwe, manje akusekho ukutshala. Amasimu akhona manje aseyabiyelwa abe yingadi. Sewuba nensimu nje eyingadi, ukwelusa kwethu sekuwukuya endle uyoziqoqa izinkomo uzilethe ekhaya. Uvuka ekuseni, izinkomo uzikhiphe zizihambe zizidlele nje.”

The herding of cattle began to fade from its previous status, similar to the *amabutho*, with the introduction of the migrant labor system, but sustained itself throughout the twentieth century until the 1990s when a shift in education policy made the tradition virtually illegal. Under the 1996 South African Schools Act, any school-age child who is habitually absent from school without valid excuse is not only guilty of truancy but also deemed at risk.<sup>63</sup> These laws virtually did away with the herding system, as boys (and girls!) could no longer spend their days in the fields; instead, they had to perform intellectual labor in South African classrooms. This shift not only affects the farming habits of the region but also disrupted the youth socialization rituals and procedures of the area.

Without the herding tradition in place, critical life lessons passed down to young men during their time with their age mates in the fields fail to be imparted; a practice referred to by Buthelezi as *ukuthakelana*.<sup>64</sup> Thabo Motha emphasized that respect represented a critical value conveyed during this socialization.

You would begin by herding the calves before you go to look after the cattle. During that process, you would be with those in your age group. Someone older than you would make you display stick fighting skills you had acquired. Respect is the value that was instilled. You were taught to respect anyone older than yourself.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> “South African Schools Act No. 84 of 1996,” <https://www.gdeadmissions.gov.za/Content/Files/SchoolsAct.pdf>.

<sup>64</sup> Jabulani Hlengwa KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, August 4, 2018. Original: “Kube khona ukuthakela . . . Lapho befundisana khona ukuthi kufanele wenzeni uma ukhula njengomfana.”

<sup>65</sup> Thabo Motha, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: “Wawuqala weluse amathole ngaphambi kokuya kolusa izinkomo, kodwa nakhona lapho nihlangana nontanga yenu. Kukhona ozonihatha omdadlana kunani. Uma nifundiswa lapha ekuqhathweni, wawazi ukuthi umuntu omdala kunami uyangehlula. Noma kungathiwa unenhliziy o encane kodwa ekwaluseni babekwazi ukuyinweba. Uma unoshiki, kukhona abanoshiki njengawe futhi uqhathwa njalo nje. Wawuze wazi nawe ukuthi hayi usibanibani ngiyamesaba ngoba uyasidedela isibhaxu. Manje sewuke ubone izingane zixabana nje nawe uze ubone ukuthi lona angeke alunge, kodwa manje abazi ukuthi ukushayana yinto enjani. Ekwaluseni wawushayana nomuntu noma ungasafuni...”

Zondi reflected on the traditions passed down during his time as a herdboy and the customs the youth of today miss out on. “While you [are] herding cattle, you learn stick-fighting and become a responsible young man,” he recalled.<sup>66</sup>

Young women also formerly participated in herding. In many ways, their participation in the maintenance of their family’s cattle mirrored the well-documented practices and experiences of young men who spent their days watching over their family’s cattle. Nomsinga Mdluli herded cattle alongside boys in her childhood. Although girls mainly practiced with other girls, they also fought with boys herding cattle in their area. This represented an important aspect of the process of learning to fight. “As a girl, you would be taught how to fight with a boy and how to protect yourself,” Mdluli explained, “because it [fighting with girls] is not the same way boys beat or hit you.”<sup>67</sup> And just as boys received critical knowledge from *amadoda*, girls received advice on proper behavior from *izalukazi* (old women). “We as girls, when we get home and take cows to the kraal, grandmother would say: ‘Come here!’,” Mdluli explained.<sup>68</sup>

She would tell us that as girl this is how we should behave, you cannot be a child and [a] full-grown girl. She would tell us that, as you grow up yearly, your body also [has] changes . . . Grandmother would be giving us instructions of life until maybe you have guys who [are] approaching you . . .<sup>69</sup>

Seen in this light, the shift away from herding drastically changed youth socialization across the board, for both boys and girls.

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<sup>66</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Nifundisane induku laphaya ekwaluseni, kungewekwa, ufunde ubunsizwa.”

<sup>67</sup> Nomsinga Miriam Mdluli, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 17, 2016. Original: “Wena ntombazane ufundiswa ukuthi uma ulwa nomfana uvika kanjani.”

<sup>68</sup> Nomsinga Miriam Mdluli, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 17, 2016. Original: “Baye bathi ke abantu abadala usuke ungakabonakali nokuthi uyini lapho, ugogo wami ke into wayeyisho njengoba injalo nje.”

<sup>69</sup> Nomsinga Miriam Mdluli, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 17, 2016. Original: “Kodwa ukukhula nangeminyaka, umzimba wakho nawo uyakhula futhi uyashintsha. Anifundise nokuthi uma uyintombi awubi uvanzi nabafana, awuhambi ebusuku.”

Although *amabutho* as an institution is not typically associated with women, young Nyavu women also consider themselves to belong to an *ibutho*. Just as the *izinduna zezinsizwa* have stepped up to ensure that young men in KwaNyavu receive proper socialization, so too have older women in the chiefdom risen to the challenge of guiding young women from childhood to adulthood. Nombuso Mdluli, the *inkosi*'s wife, expressed frustration that although the women expend a lot of energy educating the young women of the chiefdom, young men are not receiving the same kind of education.

We do educate the girls, but nobody talks to the boys. Men would always be a temptation, because even how stubborn girl you are but they have a way to soften you. So that is why we asked older men to have a chat with these boys, because the girls we are trying groom . . . these boys ruin them. We groom them on this side; on the other side the boys ruin them. You know what, the moment he ruins this innocent girl's life, he won't continue with her, but he would be looking for another victim, which actually means we are just wasting our time.<sup>70</sup>

Although young men experience little to no discrimination due to their participation in youth socialization measures, young women in Nyavu face discrimination from those who do not choose to follow certain traditions, particularly virginity testing (*ukuhlolwa kwezintombi*). Bongeka Chonco remembered classmates taunting her at school, saying "we must not be friends with them because they are virgins."<sup>71</sup> Nelisiwe Mdluli confirmed Chonco's observations: "They might discriminate [against] you because they don't even know how valuable it is to be a virgin."

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<sup>70</sup> Nombuso Mdluli, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: "Iyona ke into esike siyixoxe nobaba ukuthi, ngoba thina siyakwazi ukuqoqa izintombi, sicela nabo baqoqe abafana ngoba ibona abamosha lezingane. Kuyakhulunywa nalezingane kodwa kubafana akushiwo lutho. Umuntu wesilisa uhlezi engumlingi noma ingasiphi isikhathi. Ngoba noma kungathi uyintombi enenkani kangakanani kodwa yena uyakwazi ukukunqoba. Kungakho ke sike sicele obaba ukuthi bake bahlale phansi nabafana, ngoba thina lezingane esizizamayo zimoshwa ibona. Siyakhulisa ngapha, bona bayabuka ngala. Uyabona nje ngesikhathi eseyimoshile lengane, akabe esaqhubeka nayo, usezofuna ukuyomoshwa enye. Okusho ukuthi thina lento esiyenzayo ayikho."

<sup>71</sup> Bongeka Chonco, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 17, 2016. Original: "E kilasini bathi silokhu sithi siyahlolwa sibe sibheda, bathi asingalokhu sizimatanisa nabo ngoba siyahlolwa."

Maybe before she even started her menstrual period she lost it, and maybe she doesn't even know where she lost it."<sup>72</sup>

At the same time, many of the key markers and changing status for young men remain the same. Around age ten, the *izinduna zezinsizwa* gather the boys of the chiefdom together to begin the process of grooming them for adolescence. "As you grow up, you need to learn respect, study, [perform] humanity and how to preserve their culture also for the tribe or nation they [are] living in," Zondi provided as an example of the lessons imparted to the *abafana* (boys).<sup>73</sup> At the same time, the *izinduna* endeavor to teach them proper interactions with young women.<sup>74</sup>

As you are dating this lady, these are the things you should know. You shouldn't do things [that] shouldn't be done. We speak about how they should respect ladies, so we would always have respectful ladies so in future you get responsible wives . . . You should respect ladies until they reach a certain stage, so you can get married to that person and get your own child after marriage. Going around making babies is unacceptable because it kills the respect of the nation. But now we decided to open those groups whereas we would groom them.<sup>75</sup>

This need for systematic socialization of *abafana* is a recent development, as other traditions that formerly imparted these lessons have fallen away in the past few decades.

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<sup>72</sup> Nelisiwe Mdluli, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 17, 2016. Original: "Ngakho ke kuhle ukuvele uthule nje ngoba wena uyazazi ukuthi uyini, mhlawumbe ukugxeka nje ingoba akazi nokuthi ubuntombi buyinto enjani. Mhlawumbe wathi vele eqala ethomba bavele balahleka, mhlawumbe nokuthi balahleka kuphi akazi ngoba mhlawumbe wayephuzile wadakwa."

<sup>73</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: "Kufanele uma ukhula ube nenhlonipho, imfundo, ubuntu, ugcin' usiko lwakho lwesizwe ophila ngaphansi kwaso."

<sup>74</sup> On the changing nature of youth sexual socialization: Peter Delius and Clive Glaser, "Sexual Socialisation in South Africa: A Historical Perspective," *African Studies* 61, no. 1 (2002): 27-54; Louise Vincent, "'Boys Will Be Boys': Traditional Xhosa Male Circumcision, HIV and Sexual Socialisation in Contemporary South Africa," *Culture, Health and Sexuality* 10, no. 5 (2008): 431-446.

<sup>75</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: "Uma uphila nalomuntu, ilokhu nalokhu ofunakala mawukugade. Ungabi umuntu wena osezobona ukuthi sekumele wenze lokhu ngoba akwenziwa. Kuyakhulunywa ukuthi nihloniphe ubuntombi bentombi ukuze kuhlale kunezintombi, ukuze nani kuthi kusasa nikwazi ukuthola amakhosikazi. Ngoba uzofica manje intombi isinengane, naleya enye inengane nomunye umuntu kodwa lento yenziwe inina. Futhi ke awusayifuni lena ngoba isinengane kodwa uwena okwenzile lokho, usuyahamba manje sewuyofuna omunye, uzomthola kuphi ke ngoba inina enibulele isizwe. Akufuneki ke ukuthi nina uma nithandana namantombazane bese nifuna ukuba nezingane. Intombi iyahloniswa ukuze ize ifike esigabeni esithile, ukuze nize nishade nalowo muntu osuke umkhethile bese ekwazi ukuthola ingane. Ukuba nihambe nithola izingane endle nje kubulala isizwe. Kona ke sesizoba neziko labo abafana."

This stage of education formerly marked by the herding of cattle remains essential as *abafana* transition into *ibhungu* (a “lad, young male of about sixteen to eighteen years”) and begin to show greater interest in girls.<sup>76</sup> This era of sexual awakening marks a key phase not only in the transition from boyhood to manhood, but also in the movement of young men into the social reproductive functions of the clan. The *ibhungu* stage is significantly shorter than either the *umfana* or *insizwa* stage, lasting only until the young man’s first *ukushawa izibulo/insizwa uphupha isalukazi* (wet dream).<sup>77</sup> “Having a wet dream means you growing up and if you were busy playing hide and seek with the girls, all that needs to stop because there might be danger”: this danger, of course, is the risk of premarital sex.<sup>78</sup> Once a young man alerts older men that he has had a wet dream, he receives guidance related to proper sexual behavior, just as young women would receive guidance during *umhlonyane* (a ceremony performed when a girl has her first menstrual cycle). An *insizwa* is also marked by his new approach to relationships with men as an *ibhungu* “plays around” with women and an *insizwa* “would start looking for the wives.”<sup>79</sup> In this way, transitioning to *insizwa* marks not only a new age but the transition of a young man into “a fully grown man approaching manhood.”<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary*, 58.

<sup>77</sup> Herzog T. Zuma, Impendle, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 13, 2016. Original: “Ehhh...ubuze umbuzo onzinyana...thina ke sithi uma ungena ebunsizweni uphupha isalukazi. Uma uke waphupha isalukazi nje, sekufuna ukuthi usho ukuthi uphuphe isalukazi. Angithi umuntu wesifazane uma ekhula uyashintsha, thina uma sikhula siphupha silele nomuntu wesifazane bese kwenzeka lokho okufanele uma ulele nomuntu wesifazane. Noma ungathi ukushawa izibulo.”

<sup>78</sup> Herzog T. Zuma, Impendle, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 13, 2016. Original: “Lapho ke sewushintshile waphuma ebunganeni wangena esigabeni sokukhula, sekufuna manje uyeke ukudlala nezingane.”

<sup>79</sup> Herzog T. Zuma, Impendle, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 13, 2016. Original: “Bese uba yinsizwa manje, futhi kuyabonakala ukuthi sekuyinsizwa lena manje, seyiphumile ekubeni ibhungu wangena ebunsizweni. Bese ke ungena ebudodeni, lapho ke sewuthatha unkosikazi. Ufike ube umfana, ibhungu, insizwa...”

<sup>80</sup> Herzog T. Zuma, Impendle, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 13, 2016. Original: “Ufike ube umfana, ibhungu, insizwa...”

Part of this transition to manhood is the opportunity for young men to become “soldiers of the tribe, the tribe under that Chief’s authority.”<sup>81</sup> At eighteen years of age, young men have the option of joining the local *amabutho*. Fihlizwe Zondi, the *umdidiyeli* in KwaNyavu, explains the process of young men becoming warriors for the chief at this age.

A young man joins other young men at the age of 18; that person is matured enough to become the soldier. Then we decide to groom them to become a soldier. But it depends to them if they like to be part of the tribal soldiers, because some . . . would do as they please. You are not forced to be in this level; you decide if you want to be part of it by looking at things your tribe is going through.<sup>82</sup>

While the warrior roots of the *amabutho* as an institution emerged under drastically different circumstances than those facing young men in KwaNyavu today, fighting is still “the duty of the regiment.”<sup>83</sup> Xolani Buthelezi believes that part of his responsibility as an *ibutho* member is that “if there is a war, you are required to go prevent that war.”<sup>84</sup> Thabo Motha echoed this sentiment:

You see, next to us is a neighboring traditional leader. Should this leader decide to attack, it is on us to go and defend our area. In cases of emergency, we cannot wait for the *umdidiyeli* to arrive. It would be only when he arrives that he can then instruct us on what to do next, and he would also offer us some traditional herbs to make us strong for the encounter . . . he gives us something to lick. You get sprinkled . . . to be strong, and not be afraid of those you are in war with.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Lapho kuzoba lula khona ngoba izinsizwa zingamasosha esizwe, isizwe esinganyelwe Inkosi.”

<sup>82</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Insizwa ijoyina ebunsizweni uma seyine minyaka engu 18, lowountu usuke esekulungele ukuba insizwa. Ngakho ke siyamthatha simfake ekubeni abe ibutho. Kodwa ke kuba kuyena ukuthi uyathanda yini ukuba umbutho, ngoba abaningi bagcina bephuma eceleni. Ngoba usuke ungafosiwe ukuthi ungene ngenkani kulesigaba, kuba kuwena ukuthi uyathanda yini izenzeko zesizwe sakini obuka siphila ngayo. Kona noma kungabe ungaphansi kwalokho, siyazama ukubaqoqa ukuthi babe izinsizwa.”

<sup>83</sup> Jabulani Hlengwa, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: “Lowo umsebenzi wamabutho.”

<sup>84</sup> Xolani Buthelezi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, August 4, 2018. Original: “Uma kuqhamuka impi nawe uyaya kovimba.”

<sup>85</sup> Thabo Motha, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: “Lowo umsebenzi wamabutho. Uyabona nje la eduze kwethu kukhona enye Inkosi kodwa singomakhelwane. Uma leNkosi isihlasela, kufanele kusukume thina madoda sihambe siyovimba. Uma kuwukuthi futhi uMdidiyeli usebenza kude nasekhaya, uma sekukhona okonakele esizweni kufanele afike kodwa angeke silinde yena nathi sizobe siqhubeka. Yena usezofika esezo adder ukuthi yikuphi esekufanele kwenziwe, akhiphe nezibiba ke sikhothe.”

The use of *intelezi yempi* by the Nyavu *ibutho* before battles brings to mind the *intelezi* ceremonies of the Zulu Kingdom era which ritually strengthened the king's troops before a conflict; while on a much smaller scale here, this highlights the continuities of the *amabutho* from the early nineteenth century to the twenty-first. Although the conflicts that result in violent action happen far less frequently than in the past, this deep connection between service in the *ibutho* and the deep connections between Zulu ethnicity and martiality inform men's choice to serve. Thabo Motha insisted that "Zulu-speaking people lead in wars."<sup>86</sup> Jabulani Hlengwa echoed Motha's observation, stating proudly that "Zulu speaking people are able to fight in the war from dawn to dusk."<sup>87</sup>

Besides training the young men to act as soldiers, the *izinduna* aim to groom these young men into responsible men, building on the lessons they imparted to them as *abafana*. "We try to prevent them [from] becom[ing] hooligans who go around and murder people," Zondi detailed, "But it should be people who understand the Zulu principles, because young men are the ones who [have] the greater knowledge of respect in Zulu culture."<sup>88</sup> These young soldiers are also taught proper ways to act in the presence of traditional authorities. For example, young men are taught to remove their hats in the presence of the Chief as a way to show respect. To be a "good" young man is a multi-faceted definition. For Zondi, he sees a young man as attaining this distinction through "the way you do things in your tribe, your cleanliness and . . . avoid[ing] all

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<sup>86</sup> Thabo Motha, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: "Impela empini amaZulu ahamba phambili."

<sup>87</sup> Jabulani Hlengwa, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: "Uma iqale impi ekuseni, amaZulu angayibamba kushone ilanga akekho ohambayo athi usayodla yena ekhaya."

<sup>88</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: "Kodwa kumele kube abantu abazokwazi inhlonipho yesiZulu, ngoba izinsizwa ibona abantu abanenhlonipho yosiko lwesiZulu."



the negative things.”<sup>89</sup> Zondi and the other *izinduna* also transfer cultural knowledge to the young men of the chiefdom, grooming them to be full participants in the customs and rituals of the Mdluli people.

Participation in local ceremonies remains the key function of young men, not only as full members of the *amabutho* but also as engaged members of the chiefdom. Each weekend, the *induna* organizes the young men to dance at traditional weddings and other local functions as part of the *izinsizwa*’s “job.”<sup>90</sup> *Amabutho* also “dig graves to bury the deceased . . . in order to help the family of the deceased.”<sup>91</sup> In particular, the *amabutho* play pivotal roles in coming-of-age ceremonies for young women in KwaNyavu and surrounding areas. The main ceremonies that the *izinsizwa* gather to join in are the *umhlonyane* and *umemulo* ceremonies. *Umhlonyane* is celebrated when a young woman reaches puberty and, as Nomsinga Mdluli explains, “the family appreciates you as a virgin, and that no man has ever touched you.”<sup>92</sup> Often, the *umhlonyane* celebration is combined with the *umemulo* ceremony, although these two events used to be celebrated separately.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Izenzo zakho nje ezweni wawenza ukuthi ubonakale ukuthi uyinono, futhi uzitshela nje ngoba awuhlangani nento engasile.”

<sup>90</sup> *Izinduna* also arrange young men for any other events they might attend, including traveling with the Chief to Nyokeni (one of King Zwelithini’s palaces in Nongoma) for celebrations and ceremonies. Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Ngibona ukuthi bekungaba ngcono ukuthi siqale lapha ezinsizweni.”

<sup>91</sup> Thabo Motha, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: “Thina lapha emakhaya siyazimbela imigodi, siyasuka siye kongcwaba umuntu nalapho sisuke senza umsebenzi ozojabulelwa yiNkosi.”

<sup>92</sup> Nomsinga Miriam Mdluli, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 17, 2016. Original: “Ukuthi uyakhuliswa ekhaya, usayintombi nto! Awukaze uthintwe indoda.”

<sup>93</sup> In her study of rites of passage in contemporary KwaZulu-Natal, anthropologist Caroline White notes the tendency to celebrate these two milestones together, citing the work of Eileen Jensen Krige and personal communications with Fiona Scorgie to chart this phenomenon. Caroline White, “Plotting Ritual: Rites of Passage in Contemporary KwaZulu-Natal” (Unpublished paper, UKZN History and African Studies Seminar, November 18, 1999); Krige, *The social system of the Zulus*, 103-104.

*Umemulo* symbolizes the official recognition of a young woman's transition from childhood to a woman ready for marriage. Specifically, according to the Nombuso Mdluli, *umemulo* represents an act of "gratitude that she behaved well until she reached the stage she would be in."<sup>94</sup> This ceremony officially signals the transition of a young women from a daughter to a woman old enough for marriage, symbolically breaking ties with the male side of her family and receiving gifts that will be presented to her suitors as part of her bridewealth.<sup>95</sup> Although this ceremony focuses on young female members of the chiefdom, young men are important players in the day's festivities. When a family decides to hold an *umemulo*, they inform the local *induna* who reach out to *izinsizwa* to attend. The *izinduna* also invites regiments from surrounding areas.

Prior to the start of the ceremony, the young men gather at the designated site and form themselves into lines based on their area of origin. As kwaNyavu is composed of four valleys, the men organize themselves into four lines, each with its own leader called an *ifolosi*. One man is designated to play trumpet during the celebrations and the *umdidyeli* acts as master of ceremonies. During the ritual, the *izinsizwa* stay at some distance from the *isigcawu* (a clearing in the bush some distance from her family's homestead) until they are signaled to join by the sounds of dancing from the maidens. The *umzila wezinsizwa* (synonym for *amabutho*) then stand behind the male relatives awaiting the maidens. The maiden then enters the *isigcawu*, joining her age mates to dance in the clearing facing her father and a number of other male relatives, flanked by the *amabutho*. The maidens dance on the downward slope of the clearing facing her father and a number of male family members, flanked by the *amabutho*. During the celebrations,

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<sup>94</sup> Nombuso Mdluli, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: "Kusuke kubongwa nje ukuthi uziphathe kahle waze wafika kulesigaba osewukusona."

<sup>95</sup> Jason Hickel, *Democracy as Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 85.

*amabutho* from KwaNyavu join the family to celebrate inside the family kraal, while regiments from surrounding areas were prohibited to enter the kraal. Women take food outside to the regiments from other areas while members of the chiefdom feast within the kraal. The communal element of this ceremony not only reaffirms the young lady's position in her own family but centers the individual firmly within the community as a whole.<sup>96</sup>

In addition to participating in the *umhlonyane* and *umemulo*, the regiment plays a key role in marriage ceremonies in the area. Marriages take place regularly on weekends in the winter, when the threat of rain abates and plans can be made for the all-day outdoor events. The *amabutho* dance and serve as representatives of the chiefs at weddings in *KwaNyavu* and neighboring areas. When there is a marriage in the community, Zondi explains, “. . . it is soldier's duty to be there.”<sup>97</sup>

If the lady is getting married, the young men or soldiers of the tribe has to be there because this lady is always going to attend any event or ceremony with these young men. So, the lady would be stepping to another level because she is now getting married. So, the young men [have] to say goodbye to this lady because she is now getting to another level.<sup>98</sup>

Weddings also provide a place for young men to attract the attention of young ladies. Zondi explains that in the past and today, “when you [are] going to a wedding, you would come out dressing to kill, showing off to [the] ladies who would be there.”<sup>99</sup> In this way, weddings serve a

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<sup>96</sup> Eileen Jensen Krige, “Girls' Puberty Songs and their Relation to Fertility, Health, Morality, and Religion among the Zulu,” *Africa* 38 (1968), 173-198; Abigail Harris, “Hidden Love: Sexual ideologies and relationship ideals in rural South Africa,” in Peter Aggleton and Richard Parker (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Sexuality, Health and Rights* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 77-87; Deevia Bhana, *Love, Sex and Teenage Sexual Cultures in South Africa: 16 Turning 17* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

<sup>97</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Kodwa nje kuwumsebenzi wezinsizwa ukuthi kufanele zibe khona.”

<sup>98</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Ngoba ukushada kwentombi, intombi isuke ihamba nazo izinsizwa uma kuyiwa emidlalweni. Ngakho ke isuke seziyogcina ukuba sebangeni lezinsizwa intombi uma seyishada. Izinsizwa ke kufunakala ziye kovalalisa kuyona ngoba manje intombi seziyongena kwesinye isigaba.”

<sup>99</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Yaze yayenza into enhle insizwa. Noma niya odwendweni, niphuma niyaconsa, nigabisa ngobunsizwa benu

major social reproductive function, not only in marrying young women and men of the chiefdom to their partners, but serving as spaces for other potential couples to meet.

With emotions and expectations so high, the *izinduna zezinsizwa* work diligently to keep the peace during these celebrations. “As the headman, you are held responsible should fighting occur, and can even be charged,” Xoshabakubo explained.<sup>100</sup> Preventing conflicts of this nature and punishing young men who take part in them a major component of Xoshabakubo’s work (along with other *izinduna zezinsizwa*). He attributes many of the fights to alcohol (and pre-existing conflicts).

. . . the fight does not simply arise . . . it is usually two people who initiated it. Sometimes people quarrel when drinking liquor, and it ends up with many people fighting. At other times, the fight gets initiated as suitors compete for the love of the lady. As you leave home, you might not be aware of all this. The quarrel might have started in another many headmen’s area of jurisdiction because in any one area, there are three headmen. Because all of this, one has to leave home prepared (carrying) with sticks. One stick is for self – defense, another one is for separating the fighting parties. As a headman you can get hit too. With the information of a pending fight, I would have to inform other headmen so that we can prevent any fight arising. This is because should any fighting occur on our presence, we would be called to account how it all happened, and we might even be charged for that.<sup>101</sup>

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ezintombini ezikhona lapho noma nje kubantu abakhona. Ukuthi kuthiwe, hayi bezikade zihlobile leziyazi nsizwa, beziqhenya leziya zinsizwa. Kwakuyinto enhle kakhulu ubunsizwa.”

<sup>100</sup> Phetha Xoshabakubo, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 19, 2016. Original: “Ngoba uma abantu belwile, amaphoyisa uma efika, athatha iNduna yezinsizwa iye kovalelwa.”

<sup>101</sup> Phetha Xoshabakubo, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 19, 2016. Original: “Ake ngithi njengoba silapha nje thina. Kungenzeka ukuthi kunezindawo lapho kuphuzwa khona, uthole ukuthi kunezindawo ezinjengama joyinti lapho kuphuzwa khona. Uthole ukuthi abantu bazothi uma sebedakwe utshwala bese beqala bexabana. Manje thina njengeziNduna kuye kungabi lula ukuthi sikuzwe lokho ngoba sifihleliwe mhlawumbe. Kodwa ngesinye isikhathi sizwe ukuthi kwaxabana osibanibani ematshwaleni, manje njengoba kuzobe kunodwendwe kabanibani kungenzeka bafike balwe. Ngoba impi ayisuki nanoma kubani kodwa kuye kube abantu ababili abayiqalile. Kuyenzeka abantu baxabane etshwaleni kodwa kugcine sekulwe abantu abaningi. Kanti ke futhi kuyenzeka kube ukuthi impi isuke ngentombi ngoba kubangwa intombi. Manje wena awazi, uphuma nje ekhaya ungazi lutho futhi uthole ukuthi mhlawumbe izinsizwa zihlangene kwenye iNduna ngoba isigodi siba neziNduna ezintathu. Kulesosimo sokuthi uphume ungazi ekhaya, kodwa kuye kufuneke uphathe izinduku engizithembayo. Eyodwa kuba eyokuvika, enye eyokulamula ngoba kwayiwena uyiNduna usenkingeni ngoba uyashawa. Kuzokwenzeka uma sengifika kwezinye iziNduna bese ngithi, kunento engiyizwile engase ibange umsindo ngakho kumele siyivimbe leyonto ingenzeki. Ngoba uma sekushayana abantu sikhona, thina ziNduna singaboshwa ngoba kuzobuzakala ukuthi kwenzeke kanjani. Manje ke uyawubona umsebenzi wethu ubucayi kangakanani?”

This aspect of the job is undeniably dangerous and highlights the great burden shouldered by the traditional authorities in KwaNyavu tasked with looking over the young men of the chiefdom.

Although *izinduna* receive a government salary, *izinduna zezinsizwa* do not receive this same subsidy and have to balance their responsibilities to the community with full-time jobs. Phetha Xoshabakubo hesitated to take on the commitment, due to the major demands of the position, as he worked three month shifts at Meadowfields. Eventually, he agreed to become *induna yezinsizwa* after being tricked into coming to a community meeting in 2001 that served as a cover for a vote for the next *induna yezinsizwa*. “At the end of the meeting, all [of the] women were requested to leave as it was the time for the election of a headman,” he remembered, “I was told that I am the one they were looking for . . . because the Bebhuzi area had not had a headman for some time.”<sup>102</sup> Xoshabakubo accepted the unpaid position in service to his *isigodi*, but struggles to meet the demands of the position without proper compensation.

Instead of receiving a salary, the *izinduna zezinsizwa* usually only receive choice cuts of meat when attending ceremonies as compensation for their service. “Our salary is that, when someone invited us in his or her ceremony, they would give us part of a shoulder of the cow and say, you can share this meat with the young men,” Xoshabakubo explained. “We get food and that would be our wages or get beaten up by the young men we are leading.”<sup>103</sup> “The young men we are leading, they don’t mind hitting your head if you annoy them,” Xoshabakubo noted, “You die for positions even if [the government] is not paying [a salary].”<sup>104</sup> Xoshabakubo also felt that

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<sup>102</sup> Phetha Xoshabakubo, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 19, 2016. Original: “Ngenxa yokuthi isigodi salapha kuBebhuzi bese singenaso iziNduna kodwa kukhona amabamba.”

<sup>103</sup> Phetha Xoshabakubo, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 19, 2016. Original: “Thina owethu umholo ukuthi uma lowomuntu osuke esinisa enayo inyama. Afike asibekele umkhono wenkomo, bese ethi nayi inyama yezinsizwa, bese ebeka kithina ziNduna ukuthi sesizodla nalezinsizwa esizigadile.”

<sup>104</sup> Phetha Xoshabakubo, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 19, 2016. Original: “Yebo. Nazo lezi zinsizwa esiziphethe, uma unesidina nje azinqeni ukukushaya ikhanda nje. Ngoba isikhundla phela uyasifela noma kungabe awutholi mali.”

the *izinduna yezinsizwa* should receive back pay for their role in quelling the violence in the region during the late 1980s/early 1990s. “Violence started here years back,” he recalled, “We used to sit up here trying to protect our people . . . our country went through a terrible time . . . I think we really need to get paid for our services.”<sup>105</sup> Xoshabakubo’s frustration with the lack of compensation for the work of *izinduna zezinsizwa* echoed larger struggles over payment of *izinduna* throughout KwaZulu-Natal, who are owed back salaries dating back to 2006; this struggle continues even as the Zulu monarch’s annual budget increased from R58.8-million to R65.8-million for the 2018/19 financial year.<sup>106</sup>

While these men derive great pride in their role in aiding these young men, at the same time, Zondi and Xoshabakubo continue to hope that they will be compensated for their services. “We are actually not happy about that, indeed, as regiments who are protecting the tribe and stopping the spilling of blood . . . we get nothing,” Zondi lamented, “We would like that to be taken into consideration, though we are not sure where is the right place to lay our complaints.”<sup>107</sup> Although they did not hesitate to express their displeasure with Zwelithini and the lingering compensation problems, the *izinduna zezinsizwa* remain devoted to their chieftdom

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<sup>105</sup> Phetha Xoshabakubo, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 19, 2016. Original: “Base bekhathele nabo, ngoba uyakhumbula ngodlame kwakuliwa yonke indawo. Ngalesosikhathi sase sihlala le phezu nabo oZondi laba sivimbe impi, yonke lemizi oyibona igcwele la yayigadwe ithina. Ngoba lelizwe like lonakala, selilunge manje nje. Mina nje ngithi thina sifanele ngampela ukuthi sihole.”

<sup>106</sup> Complaints about the failure of provincial authorities to pay headmen’s salaries has been a major source of strife really since 2006, when the province guaranteed salaries for them. Mayibongwe Maqhina, “Headmen in salary hike row,” *Daily News*, June 24, 2015, <https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/headmen-in-salary-hike-row-1875649> (accessed July 26, 2018); Chris Ndaliso, “Headmen pay talks stoke anger,” *Daily News*, July 3, 2015, <https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/headmen-pay-talks-stoke-anger-1879989>; Chris Ndaliso, “Unpaid headmen threaten to disrupt elections,” *Daily News*, June 29, 2015, <https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/unpaid-headmen-threaten-to-disrupt-elections-1877665>; Bongani Mthethwa, “R300m headman headache: *Izinduna* salaries cause budgeting concerns for KZN,” *Sunday Times*, May 4, 2018, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05-04-salaries-for-headmen-causing-a-budgeting-headache-in-kzn/>.

<sup>107</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 19, 2016. Original: “Impela siyakhala ke lapho ukuthi thina mabutho esigade isizwe futhi esibhekene negazi asitholi lutho, kodwa iziNduna zamacala ziyahola. Kodwa siyathanda ukuthi kwaziwe lokho noma singazi ukuthi kungabikwa kuphi, ngoba thina ngampela asitholi lutho.”

and, more importantly, their *inkosi*. Fihlizwe Zondi, when asked about how he liked KwaNyavu, responded simply: “I love it with a passion.”<sup>108</sup> “Since I was born, I have not known another *inkosi*, I have been under Mdluli’s chieftainship,” he explained, “I am not willing to change for any circumstances; I am happy being under [Chief Sikhosiphi] Mdluli’s leadership in the Mdluli clan.”<sup>109</sup> While traditional authorities in KwaNyavu seem to be disillusioned with King Zwelithini, in large part to his extravagant spending in the face of their poverty, they reserve great respect for Jacob Zuma and his solid background in Zulu traditions. “Have you noticed Msholozi, the president, saying that he was involved in stick fighting and boxing brawls competition while herding cattle?” Xoshabakubo asked, “I think there is nothing Zuma does not know about being a Zulu man, as far as I am concerned.”<sup>110</sup> Xoshabakubo’s appraisal of Zuma’s fitness to lead in relation to his masculinity in 2016 came before Zuma came under increased scrutiny as new political scandals broke on the national scene.

As Zuma’s popularity waned in the face of this gross exploitation of public funds and increasing evidence of state capture, the distance between Zuma and the king grew. Zwelithini regularly criticized Zuma’s leadership and the shifts in South African politics under his administration. At the Reed Dance in September 2016, Zwelithini directed his comments at Zuma: “If you fail, step aside and allow us to lead the country. We can lead it very well. Anyway, God gave me powers to lead.”<sup>111</sup> Prior to the ANC’s National Conference in 2017,

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<sup>108</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Iyigugu elikhulu kimina, ukuphela nje ngishintsha izindawo ukuthi sengakha ngala.”

<sup>109</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Kodwa ngilokhu ngaba ngaphansi kwaleNkosi okungu Chief Mdluli kusuka kusewo mkhulu bakhe. Angifisi nokushintsha ukuthi ngiye kwelinye izwe, angifisi nokushintsha Inkosi yami uMdluli, ngaphansi kwesizwe sama Nyavu.”

<sup>110</sup> Phetha Xoshabakubo, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, November 19, 2016.

<sup>111</sup> Aislinn Laing, “Zulu king tells Zuma to stand aside and let him rule South Africa,” *The Telegraph*, September 6, 2016, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/06/zulu-king-tells-zuma-to-stand-aside-and-let-him-rule-south-afric/>.

Zwelithini courted the top ANC candidates. Zweli Mkhize, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and Cyril Ramaphosa all traveled to Nongoma to present King Zwelithini with gifts and pay their respects to the most powerful monarch in South Africa.<sup>112</sup>

After narrowly surviving a vote of no-confidence in Parliament in July 2017, Zuma faced the end of his term as president, as increased splintering within the ANC, combined with a flailing economy and a lack of trust following the massacre of mineworkers at the Lonmin Platinum Mines in Marikana.<sup>113</sup> When it became clear that Zuma's time as president was nearing its conclusion, Zwelithini invited Zuma to come to Nongoma where he asked Zuma to consider stepping down.<sup>114</sup> Following Zuma's resignation in late February 2018, Zwelithini praised the former president.<sup>115</sup> "Only a fool would not appreciate that what he did ensured that our country is not plunged into crisis as it sometimes happens in other African countries," he proclaimed during a keynote address at the Royal Showgrounds in Pietermaritzburg.<sup>116</sup> Following his victory at the ANC National Conference in December 2017, Cyril Ramaphosa presented the Zulu monarch with a number of his own prized Ankole cattle.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Amil Umraw, "The King and I: Why Politicians Cozy Up to the Monarchy," *Huffington Post* (South Africa), October 30, 2017, [https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/10/30/the-king-and-i-why-politicians-cozy-up-to-the-monarchy\\_a\\_23260539](https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/10/30/the-king-and-i-why-politicians-cozy-up-to-the-monarchy_a_23260539); Mxolisi Mngadi, "Dlamini-Zuma presented to King Zwelithini as a 'leader of leaders'," *news24*, October 27, 2017, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/dlamini-zuma-presented-to-king-zwelithini-as-a-leader-of-leaders-20171027>.

<sup>113</sup> On the Marikana Massacre: Dan Magaziner and Sean Jacobs, "Marikana and the end of South African exceptionalism," *Africa is a Country*, August 16, 2018, <https://africasacountry.com/2018/08/marikana-and-the-end-of-south-african-exceptionalism>; Greg Marinovich, *Murder at Small Koppie: The real story of the Marikana Massacre* (Johannesburg: Penguin Random House South Africa, 2016).

<sup>114</sup> Chris Makhaye and Nce Mkhize, "Inside the meeting between King Zwelithini and Jacob Zuma," *Times Live*, February 6, 2018, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-06-inside-the-meeting-between-king-zwelithini-and-jacob-zuma/>.

<sup>115</sup> Norimitsu Onishi, "Jacob Zuma Resigns as South Africa's President," *New York Times*, February 14, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/world/africa/jacob-zuma-resigns-south-africa.html>.

<sup>116</sup> "Zulu King praises Zuma, deems resignation an act of bravery," *IOL*, February 27, 2018, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zulu-king-praises-zuma-deems-resignation-an-act-of-bravery-13513985>.

<sup>117</sup> Jason Burke, "Cyril Ramaphosa chosen to lead South Africa's ruling party," *The Guardian*, December 18, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/cyril-ramaphosa-chosen-to-lead-south-africas-ruling-anc-party>; Mervyn Naidoo, "Ramaphosa's ankole cattle, a cut above the rest," *IOL*, July 22, 2018, <https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/ramaphosas-ankole-cattle-a-cut-above-the-rest-16177437>.



Although Zwelithini poised himself as a major political player, investigations into the Ingonyama Trust highlighted his tenuous position. In November 2017, former interim President Kgalema Motlanthe assembled an independent panel to investigate the Ingonyama Trust based on many of the financial abuses listed above, finding that the Trust should be dissolved and the law establishing it be struck from the Constitution. The Panel reported that “there is little evidence that the revenue generated by leases is used for the benefit of communities or their material well-being.” Motlanthe also saw in the land issue larger concerns over the actions of traditional authorities, especially Zwelithini.<sup>118</sup> “The approach which confronts us as the ANC, must really be to understand that the ANC enjoys support from the people, not traditional leaders,” Molanthe explained. “The majority of them are acting as village tin-pot dictators to the people there in the villages.”<sup>119</sup>

In response to this panel, Zwelithini threatened the secession of KwaZulu from South Africa. Traditional leaders threatened war if the ANC did not “condemn Molanthe before it’s too late.”<sup>120</sup> Following this reaction, the ANC distanced itself from Motlanthe, claiming that “Comrade Molanthe’s views are not the views of the ANC and if there is any apology that has to be offered to anybody, including the king, the ANC will do that of its own accord, led by its leadership,” the ANC’s head of elections Fikile Mbalula explained.<sup>121</sup> “Everyone must disabuse themselves [of the idea] that the ANC is anti-Zulu king, and it wants to annex [the Zulu

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<sup>118</sup> Tshidi Madia, “Traditional leaders act like village tin-pot dictators — Molanthe,” *news24*, May 19, 2018, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/traditional-leaders-act-like-village-tin-pot-dictators-motlanthe-20180519>.

<sup>119</sup> Madia, “Traditional leaders act like village tin-pot dictators.”

<sup>120</sup> Lungani Zungu, “Land Issue: Traditional leaders dare Molanthe,” *The Sunday Independent*, May 27, 2018, p. 5.

<sup>121</sup> Mahlatse Mahlase, “‘We have no views’: ANC on King Zwelithini’s stance on Ingonyama Trust,” *Mail & Guardian*, July 5, 2018, <https://mg.co.za/article/2018-07-05-we-have-no-views-anc-on-king-zwelithinis-stance-on-ingonyama-trust>.

kingdom] or do anything in relation to this question based on the recommendation of Molanthe's high-level panel."<sup>122</sup>

At the #ImbizoKaZulu in July 2018, Zwelithini railed against the intervention by the ANC into the Ingonyama Trust:

It is shameful that we live in a country and under a leadership who are activists for other people in other countries to have their land back, while here at home they want to take land that belongs to the Zulus ... The issue of land is a very sensitive one for the Zulu people as it is more than just about land... It is about food security, housing and political economy, among others, and it is for this reason that Zulus will not be pedestrians that will sit and watch while major decisions about their ancestral land are made... We must not be provoked... I warned Mr. Ramaphosa . . . as the governing party, they must not make the mistake of taking away the land of the Zulus because all hell will break loose.<sup>123</sup>

At the imbizo, Zwelithini announced the formation of a new *amabutho* named Inqaba to protect the Ingonyama Trust.<sup>124</sup> Following the Imbizo, Cyril Ramaphosa met privately with Zwelithini, assuring him "that [neither the] government nor the ANC has any intention whatsoever to take the land from the Ingonyama Trust."<sup>125</sup>

A few months later, during the Shaka Day celebrations in Durban, Zwelithini shocked audiences worldwide when he announced plans to partner with Afriforum, a white minority lobbying group recently brought to international attention by U.S. President Donald Trump.<sup>126</sup> The group has spent huge amounts of time and capital attempting to convince the world of the existence of a murderous campaign targeting white farmers in South Africa. Although framed in

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<sup>122</sup> Mahlase, "We have no views."

<sup>123</sup> "WATCH: Zulu king vows to fight for land as long as he's alive," *eNCA*, July 5, 2018, <https://www.enca.com/south-africa/watch-zulu-king-vows-to-fight-for-land-as-long-as-hes-still-alive>.

<sup>124</sup> SABC Digital News, "King Zwelithini Announces Inqaba regiment to defend Ingonyama Trust," Filmed July 4, 2018, 01:33, Posted July 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VpuLJXK85-c>.

<sup>125</sup> Mahlatse Mahlase, "Ramaphosa tells Zulu King Zwelithini that land in Ingonyama Trust is safe," *news24*, July 7, 2018, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-tells-zulu-king-zwelithini-that-land-in-ingonyama-trust-is-safe-20180707>.

<sup>126</sup> Colin Dwyer, "Here's the Story Behind that Trump Tweet on South Africa — And Why it Sparked Outrage," *NPR*, August 23, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/2018/08/23/641181345/heres-the-story-behind-that-trump-tweet-on-south-africa-and-why-it-sparked-outra>.

terms of food security, the partnership between these unlikely bedfellows cannot be disentangled from the struggles over land. At the Shaka Day celebrations, Zwelithini called on Afriforum to “come help us as they’ve introduced themselves to me that they are willing to work with me and my father’s people to uplift agriculture in our land in order to have food.”<sup>127</sup> With the upcoming 2019 elections in mind, Zwelithini addressed the crowd, insisting that “anyone who wants to be elected by us must come and kneel here and commit that [they] will never touch your land.”<sup>128</sup> This partnership with the Afriforum became very important for Zwelithini as the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution and the Rural Women’s Network sued the Zulu monarch, challenging the conversion of Ingonyama Trust residents’ informal land rights and the extortion of funds from these tenants.<sup>129</sup> Bongani Zikhali, a former policeman, told a *City Press* reporter that “*Isilo* is our father and if need be that we have to take care of him, we can. But not by paying rent, as if we are foreigners in the land of our ancestors.”<sup>130</sup> In the face of this pressure, in addition to forming the Inqaba *amabutho*, Zwelithini has called on his subjects to contribute donations to fight any potential threats to the Ingonyama Trust in court.<sup>131</sup>

Zuma took a similar tact in the months following his resignation, doing little to quell rumors that he intended to mobilize the *amabutho* to stage either a forceful takeover of the ANC back from Cyril Ramaphosa or to launch his own political party. For many, the threat of

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<sup>127</sup> “Zulu King announces partnership with Afriforum,” *eNCA*, October 9, 2018, <https://www.enca.com/news/zulu-king-announces-partnership-afriforum>.

<sup>128</sup> “Zulu King announces partnership with Afriforum” (2018).

<sup>129</sup> Bongani Mthetha, “Zulu king slapped with lawsuit over land in KZN,” *Times Live*, November 7, 2018, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-11-07-zulu-king-slapped-with-lawsuit-over-land-in-kzn/>; “Zwelithini must stop forcing his ‘subjects’ to pay rent — report,” *The Citizen*, November 7, 2018, <https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/2033667/zwelithini-must-stop-forcing-his-subjects-to-pay-rent-report/>.

<sup>130</sup> Sizwe sama Yende, “Zulu king is ‘exploiting’ us,” *City Press*, November 11, 2018, <https://citypress.news24.com/News/zulu-king-is-exploiting-us-20181111>.

<sup>131</sup> “King Goodwill Zwelithini: ‘Zulus Will Not Sit By’ While Their Land is Debated,” *Huffington Post South Africa*, July 2, 2018, [https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/07/02/king-goodwill-zwelithini-zulus-will-not-sit-by-while-their-land-is-debated\\_a\\_23472427/](https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/07/02/king-goodwill-zwelithini-zulus-will-not-sit-by-while-their-land-is-debated_a_23472427/).

mobilizing the regiments brought to mind the horrific violence in Natal prior to the first democratic elections and the invocations of the *amabutho* by the IFP to keep ANC voters from the polls and ANC politicians from taking their seats in the provincial government.<sup>132</sup> The *Umbimbi Lwamabutho* (Coalition of the Regiments) voiced their support of Zuma and began arranging for a #HandsOffZuma march to counter the simultaneous #ZumaMustFall march.<sup>133</sup>

This chapter charts two simultaneous phenomena: (1) the struggles of Jacob Zuma and Goodwill Zwelithini to maintain relevancy in rapidly changing circumstances through the use of martial metaphors and the *amabutho* and (2) the shifts in the nature and function of *amabutho* in KwaNyavu, South Africa. By highlighting these concurrent struggles, this chapter captures an institution in transition, as the *amabutho* shift and adjust in the face of these external pressures; pressures affecting all of those in KwaZulu-Natal who fight for their right to practice their valued cultural traditions. By taking both a macro and micro-approach, this chapter highlights the disparity between the national image of Zuluness and the micro-struggles to preserve cultural traditions on a daily basis. This approach divulges from the high-level performances of Zulu masculinity that tend to monopolize South African and international media and re-center the day-to-day struggles that underpin the popular support that allows these powerful figures to retain their centrality and significance.

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<sup>132</sup> Martin Plaut, "Jacob Zuma took South Africa to the precipice – and the ANC took it back," *New Statesman*, February 15, 2018, <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/africa/2018/02/jacob-zuma-took-south-africa-precipice-and-anc-took-it-back>.

<sup>133</sup> Umbimbi Lwamabutho was part of a larger coalition which also included the Unemployed People's Trust and Black Land First. Carien du Plessis, "ANC's 106th: Birthday cake approaching, it is still about unity – and KZN," *Daily Maverick*, January 7, 2018, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-07-ancs-106th-birthday-cake-approaching-it-is-still-about-unity-and-kzn/#.Ws-489Pwbfs>.

## Conclusion

When asked why young men no longer join the Nyavu *ibutho*, Thabo Motha responded: “They have lost the culture.”<sup>134</sup> In the context of the *amabutho*’s evolution from the time of Shaka to the present, this sentiment should sound familiar. From the colonial era to the present, intergenerational conflicts such as these pop up repeatedly, with older men bemoaning the loss of culture amongst their sons and neighbors. The cultural traditions that they treasure did not, in fact, wither away; instead, they were reimagined and reborn in new contexts with new meanings. On the other hand, perhaps Thabo Motha is right. The KwaNyavu *ibutho* may slip into the past, and other local *amabutho* could follow suit. The national or royal *amabutho* under the guidance of King Goodwill Zwelithini may suffer a similar fate, if the Zulu monarch’s powers are diminished by the multiple forces working to contain his material and symbolic wealth. These things all remain to be seen. But the *amabutho*, in their many forms, have changed before and will, most certainly, change again.

Even before the reign of Shaka, the *amabutho* through changes that caused some to doubt if the institution would continue. Growing conflicts between the Zulu chieftdom and their neighbors, along with subsequent conflicts with the Afrikaners and, later, the British, weakened Zulu kings’ control over the *amabutho* and weakened the Zulu kingdom’s ability to respond to external threats. Additionally, the growing colonial influence of the British over the productive labor of young men in Zululand and Natal not only diminished the kings’ military force, but set in motion long-term processes that both weakened traditional authority and Zulu traditions, as

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<sup>134</sup> Thabo Motha, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, July 28, 2018. Original: “Yabalahlekela i-culture.” Catherine Campbell reported similar conversations in her 1992 study of shifting generational understandings of masculinity in KZN. Catherine Campbell, “Learning to Kill? Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, 3(1992), 614-628.

well as resulted in new manifestations of martial masculinity that perpetuated the significance of the martial traditions initiated under Shaka.

Following the official abolition of the Zulu military system following the Battle of Ulundi in 1879, Africans in Natal and Zululand evolved and reconstituted the *amabutho* to fit their new social situations. While colonial law increasingly restricted the ability of Africans to express their culture, especially the symbols and institutions of Zulu martiality, white authorities also looked to the *amabutho* as a useful tool for their own purposes. While Dinuzulu's actions were increasingly surveilled and his authority diminished, the British also called on him to provide his Nkomindala *ibutho* for service during the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). This partnership unraveled in 1906 as a rebellion against a restrictive poll tax brought martial symbols and metaphors to the forefront with violent ends and further worsened relations between African traditional authorities and the colonial state. Throughout this period, however, the formation and naming of *amabutho* away from colonial control highlighted the agency of Africans to fight for their culture in the face of colonial subjugation.

Following the establishment of the Union in South Africa in 1910 and the centralization of Native Affairs, anxieties over the violent potential of *amabutho* and the dangerous popularity of the Zulu Royal House resulted in growing government oversight. With the events of 1906 still fresh in the nation's collective memory, the white state exacted more control over Solomon kaDinuzulu for fear of the influence he exercised over young men in Natal and Zululand. At the same time, authorities also recognized this influence as a useful tool for harnessing the potential of Solomon's popularity to recruit labor and loyalty for the success of the Union and the British Empire as a whole. During World War I, Solomon and other traditional authorities cooperated with recruitment for the South African Native Labour Contingent, a force sent to France to

provide labor to support British forces. Although the SANLC recruitment process proved difficult given the social circumstances of the 1910s in South Africa, Solomon's influence could not be argued as he continued to form regiments and shored up his influence through public performances of his right to rule. Following his death in 1933, his brother Mshiyeni served as regent, proving a more amenable figure to white authorities, especially in the recruitment of men for the Native Military Corps, a labor force to aid British efforts in World War II. White authorities also turned to Zulu intellectuals to utilize martial metaphors and symbolism in radio broadcasts to encourage enlistment. In this era, ambiguity defined the status of the *amabutho* as authorities continued to fear their violent potential, while finding utility in these institutions for the advancement of the Union.

Beneath the higher level negotiations of Zulu martiality throughout this period, *amabutho* and its connected martial metaphors took on new meanings as increasing numbers of men migrated to and from urban areas in Natal and the Witwatersrand to find employment. In this period, the *amabutho* became abstracted, as metaphors and symbolism associated with this institution emerged in society, culture, and politics in surprising new ways, including in new forms of scapegoatism by first the colonial and later the apartheid governments. Gangs and criminal networks in both the Transvaal and Durban drew on the legacies of the *amabutho* to define themselves and establish identities. New forms of dance deriving from the *ukugiya* of the Zulu kingdom and the *umgangela* stick-fighting competitions highlighted the pervasiveness of martial culture, while also alarming white authorities who wrote legislation to control these performances of violent masculinity. Similarly, new musical genres arose from the *amahubo yempi* of the *amabutho*, resulting in new sounds that continue to shape South African musical culture. These cultural phenomena provided both heads of industry and government with

grounds for both intensified restrictions over African lives and ethnicization of work forces. These strictures propagated violence that justified further white control over blacks throughout South Africa. In response to growing government oversight, African resistance politics pulled on these same metaphors to shape their identities and attract popular support. These metaphors found greater voice in the 1970s with the ethnicization of politics following the reformation of the Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, an organization founded by Solomon ka Dinuzulu during his reign.

From the 1970s to the 1990s, *amabutho* regained prominence in national politics and popular consciousness in ways not seen since the time of Shaka; these warriors formed not to fight the imposition of colonialism, but rather to fight for Zulu nationalism and freedom from apartheid. King Goodwill Zwelithini and Mangosuthu Buthelezi exploited this connection to martial masculinity to crystallize Zulu ethnic nationalism, while vigilante units and local warlords drew on these same metaphors to attract supporters and solidify their positions. The conflation of *amabutho* with martiality in this period resulted in a new politicized militancy driven by the historical context of the struggle against apartheid and rooted in the regimental tradition(s). At the same time, this militancy emerged in the pages of South Africa's popular press as synonymous with stereotypes about dangerous African masculinity and as shorthand for black-on-black violence, resulting in massive debates on the national stage regarding the true meaning of *amabutho* and rights to their invocation in contemporary South Africa. As South Africa transitioned to democracy in the 1990s, these conflicts turned from apartheid forces to the struggle for control in the new dispensation.

In contemporary South Africa, *amabutho* have reemerged as symbolic of political tribalism, as former President Jacob Zuma and current Zulu monarch Goodwill Zwelithini utilize



their martial connections to threaten those who would see both figures removed from politics completely. In response to numerous public controversies, both Zuma and Zwelithini leaned on the *amabutho* to shore up their authority and draw attention away from their questionable public actions. Simultaneously, *amabutho* in chiefdoms throughout Natal and Zululand struggled to maintain their institutions, as the men of KwaNyavu voice clearly. While the Nyavu *ibutho* struggles to continue in the face of growing pressures, the existence of local *amabutho* such as this one allow for public performances of martial masculinity to retain meaning and for figures like Zuma and Zwelithini to retain their appeal, even as they increasingly falter in their ability to provide support for their constituents.

Although this dissertation covers a long chronological period and touches on many manifestations of the *amabutho* throughout, more work remains to be done on the many histories of these institutions. In particular, more work needs to be done on the young women of KwaZulu-Natal who also identify themselves as members of *amabutho*. Although this dissertation mainly focuses on the frustration felt by men in not being able to practice their culture in the ways in which they and their forefathers had been able to in the past, girls felt these tensions more acutely as their desire to practice their culture compounded stigma and gendered assumptions which is foundational to a patriarchal system such as Zuluness. Nombuso Mdluli commented on the tension she felt between wanting to express pride in her culture and avoid the scorn of those in the area who choose not to follow traditional norms.

You need to be proud about your Zulu culture, even when you are dressing up you need to feel yourself, the way you walk you have to leave a mark. Because we end up with an inferiority complex about who we are. If you meet someone wearing beads, it like that person is out of place but it is our culture. People feel inferior about their things. We are no longer confident about our Zulu culture. If you would recall, we thought we are low lives because we are doing things according

to our own culture or you are not educated. If you are . . . performing Zulu culture you are just a low life person and you would be called by names.<sup>135</sup>

The many studies of Zulu masculinity and warrior tropes relegate women to the “mothers of warriors” or as their future conquests, but do little to interrogate how women internalize these ideologies. The *amabutho* provide a compelling touchstone from which to launch such an investigation, capturing how women in KwaZulu-Natal navigate a heavily gendered, patriarchal system while also fighting to maintain practices classified by many as backwards and anti-feminist.

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<sup>135</sup> Nombuso Mdluli, KwaNyavu, Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, September 12, 2016. Original: “Indlela abaziphatha ngayo, ukwenza izinto ngendlela yesiZulu. Njengoba ngichaza ukuthi uma umuntu sekukhona lapho ethande khona sekumele avezele abantu abadala. Kumele nje uziqhenye ngobuZulu bakho, noma ugqokile uzazi wena ukuthi ungubani, noma unyathela kucace ukuthi kunyathela bani. Ngoba sigcina sesizinyeza ngento yethu, uma nje uhlangana nomuntu ofake ubuhlalo kube sengathi wenza into e wrong kanti yinto yakho. Abantu bayazinyeza ngento yabo, bese sinakho ukuzenyeza ngezinto zesiZulu. Uma ukhumbula kahle, besizibona sengathi siphansi kakhulu ngoba senza isiko noma awufundile. Uma ufake...wenza izinto zesiZulu uphansi kakhulu futhi ubizwa ngegama nje elihlukile.”

## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX A: NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY AND ORTHOGRAPHY

Terms such as “tribe,” “bantú,” “native,” “non- European,” and “non-white” were deployed by segregation and apartheid laws and thus are used here only in historically specific contexts or when in quotes from oral and written sources. Similarly, the terms “African,” “white,” “Coloured,” and “Indian” are also problematic because they reflect these same biases; at the same time, these categories still hold meaning in contemporary South Africa. With that in mind, I utilize the term “African” to refer to Nguni and Sotho-Tswana speaking people while referring to all people of color with the term “black” in the Black Consciousness tradition.

Although this dissertation references the label “Zulu” frequently, I recognize that this identity is extremely contested. As is clear in chapters one through three, Africans from Natal and Zululand have not always embraced a shared Zulu identity. In the present-day, however, this identity is accepted as a real and shared identity, while others adopt their own local identities as opposed to the overarching identity associated with the precolonial Zulu kingdom and present-day Zulu nationalism. When it is appropriate in the chapters that follow, I specify the chiefdom under discussion that the Africans under discussion originate from; when that is not clear, I utilize the broader term “Zulu.”

Although the terms “*amabutho*” and “regiment” are frequently used interchangeably, the translation of *amabutho* as “regiment” is problematic as it reflects Eurocentric understandings of the complex nature of these institutions as relegated to military service. As I hope becomes clear in the pages of this dissertation, the *amabutho* sprang from complex origins far beyond simple military concerns and continue to evolve in the face of social pressure. On the other hand, I refer frequently to the Zulu monarch as “king” as opposed to using the more accurate “*iSilo*” or “*iNgonyama*” appellations. This again reflects the parlance utilized in sources; many in

KwaZulu-Natal are more likely to refer to Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu as “king” rather than “iNgonyama.” isiZulu titles for local traditional authorities (*induna*, *induna yezinsizwa*, etc.) are maintained as more precise terms for local leaders of the chiefdoms. Except when quoting a primary source, I use modern orthography for isiZulu words. Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations of oral history interviews in isiZulu are by Thandeka Majola. For those who speak isiZulu, the transcriptions in isiZulu are included in footnotes.

## APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

<i>isagila</i> (plural, <i>izagila</i> )	fighting stick
<i>ukwakha umuzi</i>	literally, to build a home
<i>isalukazi</i> (plural, <i>izalukazi</i> )	old woman
<i>ukubhala</i>	to enlist men for labor
<i>ibambabukhosi</i> ( <i>ibamba</i> for short)	regent
<i>isibaya sikababawakhe</i>	her father's kraal; idiom for female genitals
<i>Bayethe!</i>	“Hail Your Majesty!”; used exclusively for members of the Zulu Royal Family
<i>ibhungu</i> (plural, <i>amabhungu</i> )	young man
<i>Umbimbi Lwezinsizwa</i>	literally, an alliance of young men; name for a coalition of local amabutho in Vulindlela
<i>imbizo</i> (plural, <i>izimbizo</i> )	meeting
<i>isibonda</i> (plural, <i>izibonda</i> )	worker-elected hostel room representatives
<i>imbongi</i> (plural, <i>izimbongi</i> )	praise-singer; poet
<i>isibongo</i> (plural, <i>izibongo</i> )	praise poem
<i>ibutho</i> (plural, <i>amabutho</i> )	age-grades; regiments
<i>ukubuthwa</i>	gathering of young men to be enrolled in a regiment; literally, “to be gathered”
<i>umdidiyeli</i> (plural, <i>abadidiyeli</i> )	commander of the regiment
<i>ukudlalisa izinduku</i>	stick-fighting
<i>udlame</i>	violence; especially related to the conflict in Natal during the late 1980s and early 1990s
<i>induna</i> (plural, <i>izinduna</i> )	headman
<i>induna yezinsizwa</i>	leader of the young men

(plural, <i>izinduna yezinsizwa</i> )	
<i>umfana</i> (plural, <i>abafana</i> )	boy
<i>ifolosi</i>	line leader of regiments
<i>isifuba</i> (plural, <i>izifuba</i> )	literally, chest of the body; also used to refer to the main company of men in regimental formation
<i>umgangela</i>	inter-district stick-fighting competitions
<i>isigcawu</i>	a clearing in the bush some distance from a young woman's family homestead during the <i>umemulo</i> ceremony
<i>ukugiya</i>	to perform a "war-dance"
<i>isigodi</i> (plural, <i>izigodi</i> )	valley; district
<i>igoso</i> (plural, <i>amagoso</i> )	dance captain; also <i>ukaputeni</i>
<i>ukuhlolwa kwezintombi</i>	virginity testing; literally, "to inspect the girls"
<i>ukuhlonipha</i>	to honor; to respect
<i>umhlonyane</i>	a ceremony performed when a girl has her first menstrual cycle
<i>umhlwehlwe</i>	the fatty membrane that covered the bowels of the cow sacrificed for the ceremony symbolizing fertility
<i>ihubo</i> (plural, <i>amahubo</i> )	song
<i>amahubo empi</i>	regimental war-anthems
<i>ijazi kamkhwenyana</i>	literally, "the husband's coat"; idiom for condom
<i>ikhanda</i> (plural, <i>amakhanda</i> )	administrative centers/kraals
<i>abakhaya</i>	rural districts
<i>umkhosi wokweshwama</i>	First Fruits Ceremony
<i>umkhosi welembe</i>	Shaka Day

<i>inkhwenkwe</i> (plural, <i>amakwenkwe</i> )	boy; pejorative term used to describe men
<i>ukukleza</i>	the act of young men giving themselves to the protection of the king and offering their services in exchange for the king's provision of food and shelter; literally, to drink milk straight from a cow
<i>inkosi</i> (plural, <i>amakhosi</i> )	chief
<i>inkos'enkulu</i>	literally, "big chief"
<i>inkosi yenkantolo</i>	literally, "the chief of the court"; Zulu idiom for judge
<i>inkunzi</i>	black bull
<i>isikhwili</i> (plural, <i>izikhwili</i> )	fighting stick
<i>ilobolo</i>	bridewealth
<i>umemulo</i>	ceremony symbolizing the official recognition of a young woman's transition from childhood to a woman ready for marriage
<i>impi</i> (plural, <i>izimpi</i> )	war; army
<i>izimpi zemibango</i>	wars originating from disputes; also known as faction fights
<i>izimpondo</i> (singular, <i>isimpondo</i> )	horns
<i>ingoma</i>	a style of dance
<i>ingonyama</i>	literally, "lion"; praise name for the Zulu king
<i>insizwa</i> (plural, <i>izinsizwa</i> )	young man
<i>intanga</i> (plural, <i>izintanga</i> )	age group
<i>intombi</i> (plural, <i>izintombi</i> )	young girl
<i>inyosi</i> (plural, <i>izinyosi</i> )	bee; name of regiments of both Shaka and Zwelithini



<i>iqabane</i> (plural, <i>amaqabane</i> )	comrade
<i>ringkops</i>	headrings
<i>ukushawa izibulo</i>	wet dream; also <i>insizwa uphupha isalukazi</i>
<i>umshiza</i> (plural, <i>imishiza</i> )	fighting-stick
<i>isilo</i>	literally, “leopard”; praise name for the Zulu king
<i>ukusoka</i>	male circumcision
<i>isosha</i> (plural, <i>amasosha</i> )	soldier
<i>intelezi yempi</i>	traditional war medicine
<i>ukuthunga</i>	take on ringkops
<i>iviyo</i> (plural, <i>amaviyo</i> )	fighting band, regimental formation
<i>ukwalusa</i>	cattle-herding
<i>iwisa</i>	a heavy stick with a rounded end; also known as knobkerrie
<i>umzaca</i> (plural, <i>imizaca</i> )	fighting-stick
<i>umzila wezinsizwa</i>	body of young men

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