In this dissertation I construct and defend a moral framework for the care and medical treatment of companion canines that recognizes and accommodates the moral implications of the relationships among companion canines, their owners, the communities in which they live, and the veterinary clinicians who care for them. The goal is to bring into equilibrium our considered moral judgments concerning particular canine care practices, the moral principles we use to guide our judgments, the professional ethical standards for veterinary medicine, and the legal protections needed to ensure that obligations are met. I argue that humans have moral obligations to companion canines beyond those due to all sentient animals, because of the relationship they have with them. The specification of these obligations is explored using a modified capabilities approach. The result is a list of wellbeing-promoting interests of companion canines that delineates the scope of human responsibilities of care for these animals. Next, I discuss the professional ethical standards and legal protections necessary to ensure that human obligations to companion canines are met. An argument is offered for the establishment of a new category of property, custodial property, to include living things that have the morally significant feature of being created and owned in order to form strong, emotional bonds with their owners. Finally, several ethical problems are explored to show that the recognition of obligations generated by relationships, the list of wellbeing-promoting companion canine interests, and the new category of property combine to form a moral framework that can help dog owners, veterinary clinicians, and legislators in mixed-species communities make difficult decisions concerning the care and medical treatment of some of their most vulnerable members-companion canines.
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