"The question of how best to resolve constitutional indeterminacy has recently returned to prominence in American political philosophy. Jurgen Habermas's contribution to this debate, which takes the form of a qualified defense of strong judicial review, is interesting, but it has not been the subject of much scholarly attention. In this dissertation I provide a recapitulation of Habermas's account, locating it within the context of both Habermas's ambitious communication theory of society and the ongoing American debate. This accomplished, I next subject Habermas's defense of strong judicial review to critical scrutiny. Through this process I demonstrate that Habermas's defense of strong judicial review does not sit comfortably with certain main premises of his social theory. Most importantly, I show that Habermas's attempt to legitimate strong judicial review runs afoul of his contention that members of rationalized societies should be expected, on reflection, to endorse a communicative criterion for analysis of the legitimacy of legal institutions. Because history teaches that there are alternative practically realizable forms of constitutional interpretation which come closer to realizing a situation in which communicatively processed public opinion influences constitutional interpretation, Habermas's qualified defense of strong judicial review must ultimately be understood as in significant tension with his overall social theory. I conclude my account by engaging in some speculation about both why Habermas might not have noticed this and what further lines of research are suggested by this analysis."--Page ii.
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