

CULTURAL RELATIVITY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CROSS-CULTURAL AND
INTRA-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

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A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Psychology – Master of Arts

2020

ABSTRACT

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Although there is an extensive literature on the relationship between cultural values and conflict resolution preferences, there is less research on the role of cultural worldviews in predicting these values, and how cultural values interplay with ethical positions when resolving conflict. The purpose of this study was to examine the cross-cultural pattern of relationships among idealistic and relativistic thinking, cultural values, and conflict resolution preferences. Specifically, the current study examined Aristotelian, Hindu, and Confucian cultural subgroups to identify cross-cultural and intra-cultural differences. Results suggested that individuals' ethical positions predicted their cultural values, which in turn predicted their conflict resolution preferences. Moreover, results suggested that there was differential prediction between individualist and relational (i.e., Aristotelian vs. Hindu and Confucian) subgroups and within relational subgroups (i.e., Hindu vs Confucian).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I want to thank my partner Christina Qiu for keeping me sane during the entire thesis process. I would also like to thank Vignesh Murugavel for his encouragement, and my parents for pushing me this far – without their support my graduate school journey would never have even started. Finally, I would like to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Ann Marie Ryan and Dr. Christopher Nye for their comments and advice throughout the process, and my advisor Dr. Fredrick Leong for his mentorship and guidance during my thesis journey.

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Introduction

Workplace conflicts cost organizations \$359 billion dollars annually (CPP, 2008) and often lead to increased stress, anxiety, frustration, and exhaustion among employees (De Dreu, 2008). Consequently, effective conflict resolution (CR) is essential to maintain organizational and employee health. Indeed, research has shown that teams that were effective in handling conflict reported much higher satisfaction and positive relationships than those that are reactive (Behfar, Peterson, Mannix, & Trochim, 2008). However, as organizations become increasingly multinational, CR becomes harder to achieve, because individuals from different cultures often differ in their preferences for handling conflict (Triandis, 2000).

The goal of the current study is to address three specific gaps in the CR literature. First, although cross-cultural CR research often attributes group differences in CR preferences to cultural values (e.g., Croucher, et al., 2012; Ting-Toomey, 1991), there is little examination of where these values stem from. This is problematic because conflicts are often centered around perceptions of incongruent values (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Without understanding *why* individuals hold different values, there is often little room to move forward with an integrative solution. Second, although there is research showing that the ethicality of behaviors is culturally variable, (Rivers & Volkema, 2013), there is little research on how or why this affects cross-cultural differences to CR preferences (Barry & Robinson, 2002). The lack of research on ethical positions with respect to CR presents a problem, because CR is inhibited when individuals perceive the other party as unethical (Brett, Behfar, & Sanchez-Burks, 2014). In fact, when parties perceive each other as unethical during CR, conflicts may even exacerbate. Third, the literature on conflict resolution generally aggregates cultural sub-groups into dichotomies (e.g., East-West, high-low context; Lee & Rogan, 1991; Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010) without

examining intracultural differences. In the event that cultural sub-groups hold sufficiently different worldviews, this aggregation becomes inappropriate as the influence of the same cultural value will differ across cultures of different worldviews. Without a more nuanced understanding of intracultural differences, practitioners may implement ineffective CR techniques.

The primary contributions of this study lie in resolving the aforementioned gaps in research by advancing a cultural-ethical model of conflict and validating it across three distinct cultural sub-groups. Specifically, the proposed study extends the literature in three ways by (1) identifying the differential impacts of cultural values based upon their antecedent cultural worldview, (2) integrating findings from cross-cultural conflict management with literature from cross-cultural ethical behavior, and (3) examining intracultural differences to present a more useful cross-cultural CR model for researchers and practitioners. To achieve these goals, this study focused on three cultural sub-groups with distinct worldviews. To examine the impact of cross-cultural differences, one “Western” cultural subgroup and two “Eastern” cultural subgroups were selected. To examine intracultural differences, this study focused on two subgroups within the Eastern set that held different cultural worldviews. Subsequently, an Aristotelian cultural subgroup was examined from the Western set, and Hindu and Confucian cultural subgroups were examined from the Eastern set.

The study is organized into three parts. First the role of culture in the experience of conflict is discussed. Then, the role of cultural worldviews and values in influencing individuals’ resolution preferences are described. Finally, these are concepts are integrated with cross-cultural research on ethical behavior and an integrated model is proposed.

The Role of Culture in the Experience of Organizational Conflict

Organizational conflict occurs between parties due to perceptions of incongruent values and goals (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Extant literature offers three distinct conflict dimensions: task, process, and relationship conflict (Jehn 1995, 1997; Jehn & Chatman, 2000). Task conflict refers to opposing viewpoints about the content a task (e.g. the objectives and outcomes). Process conflicts refer to opposing viewpoints on the allocation of workers to tasks and the manner in which tasks get finished. Task conflict can be described as referring to conflict over *what* gets done and what is being done, while process conflict describes conflicts over *how* things get done and *who* gets to do them. Relationship conflict describes dislike towards the personal characteristics or mannerisms of the opposing party. In general, moderate task conflict is associated with improved performance, while relationship and process conflict negatively affect performance (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2011; O'Neill, Allen, & Hastings, 2013). Each conflict tends to occur in five stages: antecedent, perception, felt, manifest, and aftermath (Pondy, 1967). In this section, the role of culture is discussed as influencing the experience of each conflict type at each stage.

Types and Stages of Conflict

According to Pondy (1967), each conflict dimension occurs in five stages: latent, perceived, felt, manifest, and aftermath. The latent stage refers to the antecedents forming the basis of the conflict; i.e. the issue(s) of contention. In the perceived stage, parties notice that a conflict exists. In the felt stage, parties feel the effects of conflict, usually through some sort of emotional arousal. During the manifest stage, the conflict becomes apparent to all parties. Presence of the conflict can be signaled through either direct or indirect expressions (Weingart et

al., 2015). Finally, the aftermath stage describes the legacy of the conflict: its immediate and long-term consequences.

Stage 1: Antecedents to Conflict. There are a variety of antecedents to conflict including supervisory role, positionality in an employer-employee relationship, job stress, mistreatment, communication, etc. (Rahim & Bonoma, 1979; Wang, Jing, & Klossek, 2007). Cultural norms often define the extent to which an antecedent will result in conflict. For example, in an American context, subordinates are encouraged to openly challenge and contradict their superiors. The supervisor may gain respect for the subordinate for displaying initiative and courage. However, in the Chinese context, openly contradicting a supervisor would likely yield a very different outcome. Due to cultural and societal norms regarding face, the supervisor would likely take the open contradiction as disrespect, and in turn, lose respect for the subordinate. Acceptable behavior in one context may not directly translate to another (Brett, et al., 2014; Ting-Toomey, 1988). This can strain factors like employer-employee relationship, induce stress for both parties, and even encourage supervisor abuse (Friedman, Tidd, Currall, & Tsai, 2000; Tepper, Moss, & Duffy, 2011). Therefore, to maintain amicable relationships, individuals should utilize culturally-appropriate methods of communicating their disagreement.

Stage 2: Perception of Conflict Type. From the five stages theory (Pondy, 1967), individuals must first perceive conflicts before they become manifest. The type of conflict that emerges is conditional on the involved parties' cultural values which in turn influences perception of each other's actions. If Party 1 believes Party 2 is disagreeing due to a personal difference, it may not matter that Party 2 is truly only concerned with the facts or logic surrounding the issue. Here, cultural values inform individuals' perception of the type of conflict they are experiencing. Cultures with a relational orientation will perceive all disputes as

containing a component of relationship conflict (Brett et al., 2014) which may jeopardize relational harmony. On the other hand, cultures (e.g., Western) that try to separate professional from personal, may not perceive relationship conflicts with such sensitivity or choose to ignore them altogether (Sanchez-Burks et al., 2003, Sanchez-Burks, 2005) since relational harmony is not a priority. Therefore, perception plays a key role in whether or not the conflict is productive. Parties attuned to cultural orientations in terms of communication and motivation can reach integrative agreements, whereas those unaware of cross-cultural differences will suffer during conflict and negotiation (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Triandis, 2000).

Stages 3 and 4: Felt and Manifest Stages. In the felt and manifest stages, the existence and type of conflict become evident to both parties. While relationship conflict tends to universally hold negative consequences for the involved parties (i.e., higher anxiety, frustration, exhaustion etc.), moderate levels of task conflict has been purported to elicit positive results (e.g., innovation; De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu & West, 2001). Therefore, conflicts perceived to contain relationship components generally hold more negative outcomes than conflicts that do not contain such a component (de Wit et al., 2011). In the case that the dispute is about the task or process, discussions can facilitate shared understanding and encourage individuals to voice their behavior, which can avoid groupthink and other confirmatory biases (Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006; Nemeth, 1995). On the other hand, should parties perceive the conflict as resulting from different goals, values, or personal characteristics, the conflict will generally have adverse psychological effects. In this case, the self-concept of both parties is challenged as one side prioritizes a certain goal or has a certain characteristic that the other deems less important or maladaptive (de Wit et al., 2011). In reality, most conflicts contain a mixture of all components; however, parties' perception as to the root of the conflict

will drive their reactions (Brett et al., 2014). Considering the aforementioned differences in perception, conflict can have differential psychological effects across cultures. From this perspective, cultures with a higher relational component may seek to quickly smooth over situations where higher levels of interpersonal disagreement are expected or address all disagreements in a manner that prioritizes conserving the interpersonal relationship (Sanchez-Burks et al., 2008; Brett et al., 2014).

Stage 5: Aftermath. The aftermath stage refers to the short- and long-term effects of the conflict. The Dual Concern theory of conflict derived from Blake & Mouton's managerial grid (1964) suggests that there are two dimensions that affect resolution: concern for others and concern for self. Those who are high on both dimensions utilize integrating strategies, due to a desire to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. On the other hand, those who are low on both avoid resolution, indifferent to how the conflict affects them and others involved. High concern for self and low concern for others involves dominant or "forcing" strategies that promote individual gains at the expense of others (e.g., domineering, assertive behaviors); whereas, the reverse promotes obliging strategies out of concern for others and little regard for oneself (e.g., downplaying differences, making concessions). Intermediate concern on both dimensions leads to compromising behaviors (see also Rahim, 1983).

As culture frames every stage of a conflict episode, culture is directly related to individuals' resolution preferences. For instance, research has found that consideration of contextual factors has differentiated cultural preferences to conflict resolution. Cultures which strongly emphasize the role of context (i.e., high-context) are relationally based and tend to utilize more indirect cues to communicate disagreement; unsurprisingly, the literature has found that high-context cultures prefer non-confrontational tactics to resolve disputes (Hall, 1983; Lee

& Rogan, 1991; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). Non-confrontation is effective when prioritizing the relationship above all else, making it a natural strategy for relationally oriented groups that more sensitively perceive relationship differences at the root of the conflict. This perspective similarly leads to higher usages of obliging and compromising strategies (Ting-Toomey, 1998). On the other hand, cultures with little regard for context (i.e., low-context) rely on verbal cues and overt expressions of disagreement; subsequently, low-context cultures tend to utilize more direct and often forceful approaches to resolution (Buchan, Croson, & Johnson, 2004; Hall, 1976). The direct approach is an effort to reach a consensus about how to achieve optimal performance and efficiency related to task completion rather than repair perceived damages to the relationship (Sanchez-Burks et al., 2003).

Summary. In summary, extant research has provided substantial evidence showing that culture impacts individuals' preferred CR method. However, the bulk of this research attributes differences between individuals to group classification (e.g., nationality). This approach is problematic for two reasons. First, by attributing behavioral differences to stable causes like nationality, it is difficult for human resource practitioners to identify ways to change inappropriate or maladaptive behavior. Moreover, when differences are attributed to group membership, individuals consider differences to be mutually exclusive (i.e., one side has nothing in common with the other side, because they are of a different nationality), which inhibits the ability for parties to engage in reconciliatory practices such as perspective taking. In the following sections, the psychological causes of cross-cultural CR differences are examined. Specifically, the role of cultural worldviews in influencing cultural values is discussed. These concepts are then tied to the cultural variations in CR preferences described above.

Cultural Worldviews and Values

Cultural values often originate from the works of transformative philosophers that espouse specific ways of viewing and interpreting the world. The way that individuals view the world will influence the objects, actions, and/or traits that they value. Since these worldviews are often culture-specific, and the resulting values are often culturally-mediated as well. For instance, one of the most salient discrepancies between Western and Eastern cultures remains the difference between analytic and dialectic cognition. Epistemological differences in Aristotelian and Confucian philosophies have promoted analytic cognition in the West and dialectic cognition in the East (Nisbett, 2003). As a result, the process, perception, and discourse involved in conflict resolution are culturally variant. In the West, logic is linear. The analytical cognitive process has led to a perception of conflict and disagreement as natural and healthy, with a preference for open debates. In contrast, Eastern culture utilizes dialectics, which is more associative. Dialectics have created a system of resolution that is more unobtrusive. The following sections identify the different cultural worldviews of Confucian, Aristotelian, and Hindu cultures, their associated values, and resulting influence on conflict resolution preferences.

Eastern Worldview: Confucianism

Confucianism arose during a time of political turbulence, as the centralized Chou dynasty gave way to disparate kingdoms, with each seeking hegemony. Out of a desire to assuage the internal turmoil, Confucius sought to restore and maintain a social order within the region (Kaizuka, 1956; Creel, 1951). The core tenets of the philosophy emphasized the integrity of social relationships and respectful dialogue. Confucius' original intent to establish strong interpersonal relationships and foster trust between embattled kingdoms has yielded incredibly enduring effects on the thought patterns of the exposed populace (Nisbett et al., 2001).

Specifically, concepts of paternalism and inter-dependent (or collectivist) self-concept have led to the propagation of several cultural values such as collectivism and face across the East Asian region (Ting-Toomey, 1998; Xin & Pearce, 1996).

Individualism-Collectivism. The individualism-collectivism (IND-COL) values dichotomy from Hofstede's (2001) survey across (now) over 100 countries, is often the most common differentiator between Eastern and Western cultures. This dichotomy refers to diverging perspectives on the importance of the individual versus the group. Individualist cultures emphasize autonomy, while collectivist cultures stress interdependence. From the collectivist worldview, the integrity of the group, and by virtue, maintaining interpersonal relationships holds paramount importance for individuals within the culture. Cross-cultural research has provided substantial evidence regarding the validity of the IND-COL dimension as a differentiator between Eastern (Asian) and Western (Western Europe and American) cultures (Hofstede, 1991; Triandis, 1995). In a meta-analysis summarizing differences in individualism scores across 50 cross-cultural studies, Oyeserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) found that Hong Kong, People's Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwanese had large effect size differences with America and Canada. Korea and Japan had significant effect size differences with US and Canada as well, though these were smaller in magnitude.

The enduring collectivist tendencies of East Asian culture arguably originates from Confucius' impetus to unite the rival kingdoms in China under a stable, centralized structure (Kumar, 2000). To do so, he popularized a philosophical doctrine that stressed the importance of an interdependent self-concept, which emphasized social harmony. Historically, this practice held roots in stabilizing the tumultuous political structure of Chinese governments to create a benevolent autocracy. Ensuring the stability of the group resulted in values of harmonious

existence wherein the maintaining relationships required maintenance of the relationship structure.

Face. To avoid disrupting the integrity of their social networks, Eastern employees maintain respect and harmony with each other by preserving “face” (Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998; Hwang, 1997, 1998). “Face” refers to multiple aspects of intra- and inter-personal identity, describing one’s respect. *Mien-tzu* and *lien* describe two components of face: material and moral distinction. The concept of face is further separated into two components: self- and other-face; the former describes self-respect, while the latter describes respect for others (Leong, Byrne, Hardin, Zhang, & Chong, 2017).

Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1998) propose that individualists have higher sense of self-face, whereas collectivists have a greater sense of other-face. As a result, when individualists lose face, they utilize restorative face practices through justifications and situational excuses that attribute blame to external causes. In the context of conflict, this would result in blaming the other party. On the other hand, collectivists will attribute blame to internal factors, and would ascribe face loss to their own deficiencies. Conflict would be perceived as a rift in a relationship (i.e., conflict) resulting from their own inability to maintain the relationship. Thus, they work with or defer to the other party in order to proactively prevent loss of face.

In a study examining Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Taiwanese, and American respondents, Ting-Toomey et al. (1991) found that concern for other-face resulted in avoiding and obliging preferences for conflict resolution. This finding was further supported in Oeztel & Ting-Toomey (2003), which showed that collectivism related to concern for other-face, and subsequently promoted integrating and avoiding styles to resolution. In both studies, concern for self-face was related to a preference for dominating and forceful tactics. The cultural variation in face

orientation signifies the divergent perceptions of individualists and collectivists. In the individualist context, self- and other-face are disparate identities, while the collectivist context commingles the two (Ting-Toomey, 1988). In the context of an organizational conflict, this means that individualist culture seeks to divorce the personal from professional self during disagreements, while collectivists marry the two together. That is, collectivists cannot separate face loss in another from themselves; a corollary is that restoring face is mutually beneficial (Ting-Toomey, 1988). Therefore, Eastern collectivist employees are more sensitive to the relational aspect of disagreements and conflicts than their individualist Western counterparts (Brett, et al., 2014). However, conflicts in the Western context routinely contain a relationship component as well. The discrepancy in perception can be explained in terms of the differing value systems.

Western Worldview: Aristotelianism

Aristotelian values have been highly influential in guiding Western cognitive processes (Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett, 2003) and can be contrasted against the Eastern worldview of Confucianism. The cultural discrepancy over the validity of Aristotle's three fundamental laws of logic provides a clear representation of the broader differences in cognitive patterns (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). These are the law of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle. Respectively, the Aristotelian worldview posits that truth holds across situations (e.g., A is always A), truth is not contradictory (i.e., A is true, it cannot be false), and that statements in general are either true or false (i.e., if A is B is true, then A is not B is false). On the other hand, Confucian dialectics suggest that truth is changing (*bian yi lui*), truth is contradictory (*mao dun lu*), and that statements can be both true and false (*zheng he lu*).

The differences in cognitive patterns are emblematic of a broader difference between analytical and holistic cultures. Whereas analytic cultures utilize formal logic and are concerned with discerning universal truths, holistic (Confucian) cultures are more associative, consider the context of an argument, and are less concerned with formal rules (Nisbett, 2003; Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 2017). By including the context of the conflict in the resolution process, Confucian cultures generally seek to understand how the conflict occurs and affects the interpersonal dynamics of the involved parties. This approach inherently places a premium on the parties' relationship, and subsequently ensures that each party has a high concern for the other side.

These differences manifest in the nature of “fairness” and “justice” present in Aristotelian virtues. Aristotle's distributive justice lead to the notion of fairness as the appropriate allocation of resources based upon merit largely at an individual rather than group level (Aristotle, 2005). This fosters a sense of equity-based justice, wherein parties are equally compensated proportional to the work that they provide. However, in settings that prioritize group harmony (i.e., collectivist), distributive justice occurs when parties get equal shares even if this is inconsistent with the proportion of their input (Bond, Leung, & Kwok, 1982; Leung & Bond 1984).

In terms of conflict, Aristotelian logic would assign blame to the guilty party and gives assets to the winner of the conflict. On the other hand, Confucian dialectics would assign blame to all those involved and seek to restore the face all the involved parties as well (Brett et al., 2014). True to this paradigm, Chen, Meindl, and Hui (1998) found that when fairness was emphasized, Americans were more concerned with equity-based allocations while Hong Kong participants preferred equality-based practices. When asked to discuss a recent conflict,

American participants were more concerned with attaining justice, while Japanese participants were focused on maintaining the relationship (Ohbuchi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999).

Dignity. The emphasis of equity-based justice stems from the notion that every individual is inherently equal (Schwartz, 1994). Put differently, equity-based justice suggests that the group output is equal to the sum of each individual's contributions. By orienting the worldview around the individual, Aristotelianism fosters a culture of dignity. Whereas face is a measure of self-worth and status that ascribed onto an individual by others, dignity is intrinsic (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Specifically, dignity furthers a sense of autonomy and intrinsic self-worth (Yao, Ramirez-Martin, Brett, Aslani, & Azad, 2017; Leung & Cohen, 2011), which centers concerns around oneself (i.e., self-face; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). Both individualism and dignity seem to be related, but distinct values of the West (Yao et al., 2016; Triandis, 1995). Most measurement of values in relation to conflict resolution have focused on the former construct. Individualists tend to have a high concern for self, and therefore prefer forcing behaviors during conflict and competing styles during negotiation (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Brew & Cairns, 2004; Holt & DeVore, 2005). Seeking to summarize the literature, (Oyserman et al., 2002) performed a meta-analyzed 36 studies and found that individualist cultures did, in fact, choose forcing strategies more than collectivist cultures.

As dignity frames self-worth around the individual, it should also relate to forcing behaviors during resolution; Oetzel (1998) found that independent self-construals were associated with dominating styles of resolution. On the other hand, Yao et al. (2017) found that values of dignity mediated the relationship between culture and integrative negotiation strategies. This does not necessarily disagree with the cross-cultural literature on conflict management as

individuals can prefer more than one form of resolution (Putnam & Wilson, 1982). It is plausible that values of dignity will promote both forcing and integrating preferences.

Intra-Cultural Differences Within the East: Hindu Philosophy

Hinduism is the strongest influencer of Indian culture, playing much the same role that Confucianism does in East Asia (Kumar, 2000). The Hindu philosophy propagated through Hinduism have spread and incorporated with indigenous elements throughout South and Southeast Asia; however, there has not been body of literature that confirms whether the whole region shares sufficiently similar worldviews the same way research has done with Confucianism and East Asia. For that reason, the term Hindu worldview in this section almost exclusively refers to research conducted on Indian culture, rather than an aggregate South Asian culture.

Hindu cultures are collectivistic and relationally oriented, but they also contain an “individualist streak” (Panda & Gupta, 2012, p. 8). This is likely because the nature of salvation is both highly prevalent to Indian life and individualistic in nature. Using the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) values framework, Gopalan and Rivera (1997) noted that Indians’ activity orientation is a “being-in-becoming orientation focused on salvation as the primary goal and encouraging ascetic and non-material behaviors” (p. 166). Similarly, Singh, Chang Huang, & Thompson (1962) found that on a Ways to Live scale, Indians preferred living in a manner that “obeyed the cosmic purpose” (p. 131).

Though there are regional variations across India in terms of interpretation, three major philosophical tenets of Hindu philosophy remain invariant: *karma*, *mukti*, and the *atma*. The three are codified in the *Bhagvad Gita*, a text which founded a substantial part of the Hindu philosophy (Radhakrishnan, 1948). *Karma* refers to the effect of past actions on future well-being. Those with malicious intentions are reborn in poor conditions or forced to bear some form

of future suffering; alternatively, well-intentioned individuals experience joy either in the present or future lifetime. In this philosophy, humans are reincarnated endlessly. Breaking the cycle of birth and death requires attaining salvation or *mukti*. This occurs when the *atma* or true, inner self manifests as a result of self-actualization and freedom from material desires. The *Gita* suggests that through a selfless performance of one's duties, the *atma* manifests and *mukti* is achieved. These concepts are summarized in the notion of *karma-yoga* (performance of selfless duty; Mulla & Krishnan, 2007).

Kumar (2000, 2004) posits that the search for a true reality is displayed during negotiation through analytical debates seeking to arrive at the root of the divide between the involved parties. In this interpretation, the *karma yogic* duty of the individual is to find the true nature or root of the conflict. Given the strong sense of moral obligation and duty to fulfill one's duties (i.e., solve the conflict in an amenable manner), Kumar (2004) claims that this process results in an idealistic solution. In addition, since arriving at the heart of the conflict and solving the disagreement ties to existential notions of salvation, reaching a solution is a high aspiration and often involves challenging the logical and moral bases of the target's viewpoints. This process contrasts greatly with East Asian emphasis on indirect communication to save face and preserve relationships.

The definition of "self" is also a major source of cultural variation. Whereas Aristotelian and Confucian cultures respectively view the self as independent and inter-dependent, Indian culture views self as context-dependent. Roland (1998) categorizes three types of self: familial, spiritual, and individual. Within the context of family, the familial- and spiritual-self are more prevalent and facilitate traditionally collectivist behavior. In the organizational context, the individual-self prevades. Because Indian culture does not recognize the collective outside of the

familial structure, individualistic behaviors dominate outside of the familial context (Kumar, 2004). Subsequently, the importance of social networks and face maintenance are not as important within Indian culture (Kumar, 2000). The individual-self curbs an interdependent framework within organizations and there is no consideration of face loss when challenging another individual. Counter to findings in the individualist-collectivist paradigm, communication in Indian organizations is confrontational and direct. Even the family structures that maintain traditionally collectivist practices are not immune to the effects of organizational context as open disputes are widely documented in family-run Indian organizations (Das, 1998).

Honor. Research on honor culture parallels some of the propositions of the BI theory. Honor cultures have a unifying commonality of “willingness to retaliate against other people to defend one’s reputation, even if doing so is very risky or costly” (Nowak, Gelfand, Borkowski, Cohen, & Hernandez, 2015, p. 12). Distinct from dignity and face, honor carries both a relational and individualist orientation (Leung & Cohen, 2011). The conceptualization of Hindu culture as both relationally and individualistically oriented fits with other cultural categorizations of Indians (Joshi & Carter, 2013; Panda & Gupta, 2012).

Evolutionarily, honor cultures are adaptive in the presence of weak authority, especially when faced with hostile, aggressive cultures (Nowak et al., 2015). Historically, India has been faced with frequent invasions by Muslim invaders and endured sustained conquest through British colonization. In particular, the overthrow of the British could not have been achieved through reliance on authority figures alone, as they were often aligned with the British rulers or too weak to retaliate effectively. Thus, it is likely that a culture of honor developed. Indeed, studies have shown that South Asian individuals demonstrate higher preference for honor values than face or dignity (Yao et al., 2016).

Case studies of negotiation have noted the overuse of hardline negotiation tactics and moral grandstanding by Indian negotiators with Westerners (Cohen, 2001; Narlikar, 2013; Malone, 2011). In particular, Indians were reticent to enter trade deals with the United States following U.S. arms support of Pakistan (Cohen, 2011). From the honor culture perspective, India would have reduced honor by entering into an agreement with a nation (U.S.) that was actively funding their historical rival (Pakistan). This falls in line with the results of Yao et al. (2017), who showed that values of honor mediated the relationship between culture and distributive (i.e., zero-sum) strategies during negotiation. Consistent with the evolutionary theory behind honor culture, the decision to quickly walk away from deals that deviated from their ideal served to legitimize themselves as a sovereign and powerful global player (Narlikar, 2007). In addition, this tactic is also reflective of Kumar's (2004) BI theory of Indian negotiation. From a *karma-yogic* perspective, the ideal solution of the negotiation would not necessarily have been to reach the most integrative, or even most profitable solution, since optimal performance should occur without concern for rewards (Mulla & Krishnan, 2007).

Moving from negotiation to conflict resolution, studies testing Indian respondents have yielded more equivocal results. Croucher, et al. (2012) found that Indian and Thai respondents preferred the avoiding and obliging styles more than the American and Irish. However, one-third of the Indian sample in Croucher et al. (2012) identified as Sunni Muslim, which may explain the discrepancy from the Hinduism-based theory of Indian resolution preferences put forth in Kumar (2000, 2004). Indeed, an earlier study by Croucher, Holody, Hicks, Oomen, & Demaris (2011) found that Hindu Indians were most likely to prefer integrating and dominating styles as opposed to avoiding and obliging styles, while Muslim Indians most preferred the latter two avoidance-based styles.

Summary

In summary, cultural worldviews influence the manner by which individuals view and interpret the world. These interpretations influence the cultural values that individuals develop. In East Asia, Confucianism was instrumental to fostering values of face and collectivism. Similarly, in South Asia, Hinduism played a substantial role in cultivating values of honor, whereas in the West, Aristotelianism was influential in furthering values of dignity.

The Role of Ethical Positions in Organizational Conflict Resolution

Resolution of organizational conflicts is fraught with ethical considerations (Barry & Robinson, 2002). At some level the nature of resolution is self-serving; each party is trying to gain from the situation in some manner, within the ethical boundaries of the situation. The ethics and moral codes of an individual are often rooted in the epistemological foundations of their culture (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Nisbett et al., 2001; Forsyth et al., 2008). That is, since individuals are exposed to cultural norms before developing a code of ethics, their ethical positions are influenced by their cultural value systems. For example, in the Western context, an Aristotelian base leads to the appropriate method of resolution following a logistic discourse of claiming and justification (Brett, et al., 2014). However, in the Eastern context, the Aristotelian method would likely be considered unethical due to philosophical importance of Confucian-based dialectics. That is, because an Aristotelian method leads to blame attribution for one side and a binary verdict (guilty vs innocent party) without faulting both sides, it would have a low likelihood of reaching a resolution in a Confucian context.

Cultural Relativity in Ethical Behavior

Forsyth (1980) categorizes ethics into two components: relativism and idealism. Those high on both dimensions are called *situationists*. These individuals act in a context-dependent manner that produces positive outcomes for others, even if that involves violating traditional rules of right/wrong. Those high on relativism and low on idealism are *subjectivists*, who are purely pragmatic, and base their decisions on positive outcomes. Those who are high on idealism and low relativists are *absolutists*, following behaviors that result in positive outcomes insofar as they fall in line with strictly defined moral codes. Those low on both dimensions are

exceptionists: they recognize the existence of moral codes but will violate them in an effort to reach a positive outcome.

Moral philosophy is influenced by the larger cultural context in which the individual is embedded (Forsyth, 1980). That is, values and norms serve to shape and develop the ethical codes of the individuals embedded within the culture. In their meta-analysis of 81 studies, Forsyth et al. (2008) investigated the cultural variations in ethical positioning across 29 nations. The authors found that countries from Eastern regions (Asian and Pacific Rim samples) had higher relativist scores than Westerners (European countries, Russia, U.S., Canada, Australia, Israel, South Africa). In addition, four East Asian countries were classified as subjectivists (i.e., low idealism, high relativism): Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand, and China. These results fall in line with the epistemology of the region; since the nature of right and wrong are subject to change, what constitutes ethical behavior varies across situations (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

In contrast, the Western subgroup was more heterogeneous. The majority of Western countries fell into the exceptionist category (i.e., low idealism, low relativism), including the U.S., Israel, New Zealand, Belgium, Austria, Canada, Australia, and Russia. On the other hand, Britain, Ireland, and Spain were classified as situationists (i.e., high on idealism and relativism). For the most part this result is consistent with Western cultural values. Aristotelian principles establish a clear right and wrong dichotomy that pervades across situations (Nisbett, 2001; Brett et al., 2014). However, the notion of individualism prioritizes independence and autonomy over conformity (Hofstede, 2001). Taken together, the two values fall in line with the categorization of exceptionists as recognizing strong moral guidelines, but not following them uniformly (Forsyth, 1980).

Curiously, India was also classified as situationists. Specifically, Indians were more relativistic than Westerners, but more idealistic than East Asians (Forsyth et al., 2008). It should be noted that there was only one study for India, whereas subjectivist East Asian and exceptionist Western countries were comprised of 14 and 81 samples, respectively. Some later studies have found that Indian respondents fall into the situationist category (Bhattacharya, Neelam, & Murthy, 2018; Kour, 2017), while others suggest that Indians are more absolutist (Dhandra & Park, 2016).

Cross-cultural Differences in Ethical Behavior During Conflict

Cultural differences in ethical positions often result in culturally varying norms for appropriate behavior during negotiation (Rivers & Lytle, 2007). For example, gift exchanges that are viewed as corrupt and unethical in American culture are often considered pre-requisites for business relationships in other cultures (Rivers & Lytle, 2007). Since there is not much literature differentiating Indian from Western (Aristotelian culture) and East Asian (Confucian culture) ethical behavior during negotiation, the following review primarily focuses on the findings comparing East Asian and Western cultures.

Confucian Culture. Ma (2010) and Ma, Liang, and Chen (2013) found that during negotiation, Chinese respondents were most likely to prefer questionable negotiation tactics more so than Canadians and Americans. Specifically, Chinese respondents endorsed inappropriate information gathering tactics, whereas Americans preferred traditional competitive bargaining strategies (Ma et al., 2013). Rivers & Volkema (2013) similarly found that deception, misrepresenting information, and making false promises were endorsed more strongly by Chinese than Australian participants. These findings were related to the repeated exposure to

cultural artifacts such as *The Art of War* during adolescence, while individuals are still forming ethical positions.

Taken together, the literature show that the East Asian value system fosters relativist thinking. If truth is relative (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), then information and promises are a matter of context. Unsurprisingly, Chinese contracts (i.e., promises) are not final, but change with the relationship (Pitta, Fung, Isberg, 1999). As such, the focus of the negotiation moves from the letter of the contract to the relationship between the negotiators.

This is consistent with Confucian value system that centers discussions around relationships. Because relationships are the focus, ethics become relative; what is appropriate in a given situation depends on the relationship between parties (i.e., subjectivist practices; Forsyth et al., 2008). Translating this perspective to workplace conflict, the relational focus should promote relativist perspective that leads to compromising and collaborative behavior. In this conceptualization, identifying the right and wrong parties largely becomes irrelevant, because everyone is at fault to some extent; a higher priority is repairing the relationship (Brett et al., 2014).

Aristotelian Culture. Due to the epistemological differences, Aristotelian culture have different ethical positions than Confucian. The idea of a clear right and wrong seems to curb relativist tendencies and contribute to direct confrontation, which leaves little room to legitimize the other party's arguments (Brett et al., 2014). In this fashion, it seems resolution becomes a zero-sum scenario wherein each party must seek to maximize individual gains (i.e., natural self-interests; Rivers & Lytle, 2007). This is consistent with the exceptionist categorization of Western culture as "principled pragmatists" (Forsyth et al., 2008). From this point of view, unethical behavior is not unavoidable during negotiation (low idealism), but the involved parties

must be open and honest about their desire to seek maximal gains at the expense of the other (low relativism).

For instance, Australian negotiators are more accepting of negative emotions during negotiations than Chinese (Rivers & Volkema, 2013). Western negotiators also express anger in an effort to force concessions from the opposing party more so than Easterners (Denson & Fabiansson, 2011). These negative emotions serve to display the honesty of the Western negotiator, both in their intention to seek maximal gains and their displeasure when this intention is unrealized. In addition, Aristotelian cultures are often blunt about their intentions, which contrasts with the subtlety of Confucian cultures (Ford et al., 1997). Confrontation at the expense of the relationship is not a concern insofar as it results in concessions from the confronted (Kopelman & Olekalns, 1999; Rivers & Volkema, 2013). This viewpoint is still idealistic in that it assumes the nature of negotiation (i.e., zero-sum, clear right and wrong behavior) holds across contexts. The notion that truths are universal is a hallmark of ethical idealism (Forsyth, 1980).

Individuals with high values of dignity have an internal mechanism that regulates their moral behavior (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Conformity to these inner standards function largely irrespective of the situational context. Though standards themselves may be idiosyncratic, the standards should hold across situations for the individual – in contrast to a relative viewpoint of ethics. Consequently, dignity seems associated with idealistic ethical positions.

These results are not to suggest that Chinese or American negotiators endorse inappropriate tactics, but rather to illustrate that the concept of inappropriateness itself is culturally variable. In the Confucian context, ethicality is malleable and differs upon context (Forsyth et al., 2008). This fosters a relational orientation; gaining information on the other party by paying others or buying gifts are considered respectful, appropriate relationship-building

tactics, though Americans may view this behavior as bribery or corruption (Pitta et al., 1999). On the other hand, those from dignity cultures consider ethics to translate across situations. Put differently, dignity cultures would espouse a universal truth (Yao et al., 2017; Nisbett, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). For them, the ethical action to take is to be upfront about the self-serving nature of the negotiation. Thus, Westerners may be more likely to consider forcing behaviors used during traditional bargaining (e.g., undermining opponent's confidence, exaggerated opening demands) as consistent with ethical guidelines (Rivers & Volkema, 2013).

Hindu Culture. The lack of literature on Indians and broader Hindu culture in relation to ethical positioning during negotiation or conflict leads only to tentative, unsubstantiated propositions. From the BI framework, the concept of a hidden, universal truth resonates strongly with the Aristotelian conception of a clear dichotomy between right and wrong. In addition, honor can further notion that individuals must conduct themselves ethically and honorably during negotiation (Yao et al., 2017). This may promote ethical idealism. From *karma yoga*, the notion of duty may result in a desire to reach the best possible solution for the party that the negotiator is representing, rather than working with the other negotiator to reach a compromise. In addition, the absence of rewards facet of *karma yoga* can further promote this idealistic tendency by not prioritizing integrative gains from a cooperative outcome, as much as reaching an idealistic outcome. Here, cultural values might promote hardline tactics as documented by Narlikar (2007).

Summary

In summary, negotiation is fraught with ethical dilemmas (Barry & Robinson, 2002). Inappropriate and unethical behavior are not looked upon favorably during negotiation and CR; however, what constitutes inappropriate and unethical behavior varies across cultures (Rivers &

Lytle, 2007). Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that the ethical positions held by an individual are partly formed by their cultural values. These cultural values are transmitted early in life through cultural artifacts (e.g., books such as *The Art of War*) or influential individuals such as teachers and parents (Ma, 2010; Ma, et al., 2013), and serve to influence the ethical codes (e.g., relativistic thinking) that individuals develop as they mature.

Due to collectivism, East Asians employ a low idealist-high relativist outlook that considers the truth as contextual, which serves to promote collaborating and cooperating behaviors. Stemming from values of dignity, Westerners utilize a low idealist-low relativist perspective that emphasizes being upfront about self-serving interests and forcing strategies (Forsyth et al., 2008). Finally, there exists evidence to suggest Indians have a high idealist-high relativist perspective, though there is little theory or literature on how this orientation affects negotiation (Forsyth et al., 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2018; Kour, 2017).

Present Study

Much of the current cross-cultural research focuses on value-based differences (Gelfand et al., 2007). There exists a need to go beyond individualism-collectivism based approaches by identifying other cultural motivations that affect individuals' behavior in regard to conflict (Yao et al., 2017; Gelfand et al., 2011). In many respects the field has greatly progressed in this endeavor by identifying new cultural frameworks (e.g., honor, dignity, face); however, in relation to conflict resolution, some areas are still untapped (e.g., individual ethics).

The current study seeks to contribute to the literature by examining the interplay between these different perspectives. In this effort, a cross-cultural model of conflict resolution is built, which examines how cultural worldviews function as antecedents to values and how ethical ideologies can mediate the relationship between values and conflict resolution preferences.

Model Descriptions and Hypothesis Development

Culturally relevant philosophies have led to the development of culture-specific value systems (Wei, 1967; Nisbett, 2001). These cultural values inform the ethical positions of individuals, which then influence how the individuals handle the conflict (Forsyth et al., 2008; Banas & McLean Parks, 2002). For example, Confucian philosophy emphasizes face; prioritizing face leads to a more relativistic value system, which promotes compromising and obliging styles of conflict resolution (Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998; Oeztel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). In Indian culture, Hindu philosophy should result in more concern for spiritual enlightenment, leading to idealistic tendencies and a forcing resolution style (Kumar, 2000, 2004).

However, the relationship between cultural values and conflict management may not be completely explained by ethical values. Individuals resolve conflict not only according to their

personal ethics, but societal norms as well (Yao et al., 2017). Therefore, cultural values such as face and dignity may each directly impact an individual's conflict resolution style. East Asians may practice an obliging style of conflict resolution not only due to relativistic ethical values informed by face, but also because societal norms of face emphasize concern for all involved parties during conflict. Here, face would have a direct relationship on an individual's conflict resolution as well as impacting ethical values, because individuals tend to behave in a manner consistent with societal norms.

In this manner, cultural philosophies should predict cultural values, which in turn predict ethical values and conflict resolution styles. Put differently, there should exist direct relationships between cultural worldviews and cultural values, and cultural values on both conflict resolution style and ethical values. In addition, there should exist an indirect association of cultural values on conflict management style through ethical values. This general model is depicted in Figure 1.

Confucian Model. There is a large body of evidence to suggest that Confucian culture prioritizes face and collectivism (Ting-Toomey, 1998; Oyeserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995; Leong et al., 2017). Both values seek to prioritize the relationship with others over individual gains, and as such, have been associated positively with styles that are high on concern for others (i.e., compromising). In addition, due to the cultural values, truth is considered a more malleable construct resulting in less ideological rigidity – represented as a positive relationship with relativism (Nisbett et al., 2001). These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2. Specifically, the following hypotheses were tested:

H1a) Confucian worldview will relate positively to face and collectivism.

H1b) Collectivism and face will relate positively to relativism and compromising preferences.

H1c) Relativism will relate positively to compromising preferences.

H1d) Relativism will partially mediate the relationships between collectivism and compromising preferences.

H1e) Relativism will partially mediate the relationships between face and compromising preferences.

Aristotelian Model. Research suggests those from Aristotelian – traditionally “Western” – cultures emphasize values of dignity and are low on “Eastern” or Confucian values of face and collectivism (Yao et al., 2017; Hofstede, 2001). Dignity emphasizes individuality, concern for oneself, and a clear distinction between right and wrong (Leung & Cohen, 2011). In addition, dignity cultures promote conformity to their individual moral codes, which hold true regardless of context. Evidence exists for dignity also promoting integrative strategies during negotiation (Yao et al., 2017). Therefore, the following hypotheses were tested:

H2a) Aristotelian worldview will relate positively to dignity.

H2b) Dignity will relate positively to idealism, forcing preferences and integrating preferences.

H2c) Idealism will relate positively to forcing preferences.

H2d) Idealism will partially mediate the relationships between dignity and forcing preferences.

Hindu Model. Brahmanical Idealism suggests that Hinduism leads to an idealistic thinking that holds low concern for others (i.e., forcing style; Kumar, 2004). From the BI perspective, Hindu beliefs would result in values of honor, that would in turn, have positive associations with forcing style, through idealism (Figure 3). Therefore, the following hypotheses were tested:

H3a) Hindu worldview will relate positively to honor.

H3b) Honor will relate positively to idealism and forcing preferences.

H3c) Idealism will partially mediate the relationships between honor and forcing.

In addition, honor cultures have an external representation of self, such that honor is conferred and taken away from the individual by others (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Therefore, collectivism in the Hindu context should not have the same relationships as in the Confucian context.

H4). In Hindu cultures, collectivism will relate negatively to relativism and the use of compromising behaviors.

Culturally Integrated Model. Prior studies suggest that social interactions and experiences specific to living in a given nation will either reinforce or inhibit the extent to which cultural values relate to behavior (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Roccas & Sagiv, 2010). In other words, when individuals live in a country or region (e.g., China), they experience social interactions and situations that either support or discourage the expression of their personal values (e.g., face and collectivism). When values are supported by sources such as cultural artifacts (e.g., movies and books) or national norms and customs, values are more likely to influence behavior (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). However, these cultural patterns are not well specified or tested in the conflict literature. As a result, it is unclear whether individuals will differ in how they experience cultural values due to their nationality. As a research question, I examined whether the pattern of relationships for a given model (i.e., Confucian, Hindu, and Aristotelian) differed across individuals based on subgroup membership. Additionally, I explored whether the strength of these relationships differed across groups as well. It is important to

underscore that this research question examines *if* predictive relationships between values and CR styles differ across groups, rather than *why* these differences exist.

RQ1a). Does the valence of cultural value to behavior relationship differ across groups?

RQ1b). Does the magnitude of cultural value to behavior relationship differ across groups?

Methods

Sample Size and Participants

Currently there is no good method for performing power analysis for path modeling. The most commonly used calculator was developed by Preacher and Coffman (2006), which yielded untenable sample sizes (e.g., for achieving a power of .80 in the Confucian model, the calculator yielded a sample estimate of 759 individuals) that were inconsistent with sample sizes in the literature that contained enough power to demonstrate some of the hypothesized associations (e.g., Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Croucher et al., 2013). Therefore, based upon the recommendations of a psychometrician and common sample sizes found in the literature, data collection efforts targeted a sample size of 200 participants for the Aristotelian and Hindu cultural subgroups, and a sample of 150 participants for the Confucian subgroup.

To ensure a representative sample of Confucian, Hindu, and Aristotelian cultural subgroups, data were collected from Chinese (including both mainland and Taiwan), Asian Indian, and American participants as respective prototypes of these cultural values subgroups. American and Asian Indian participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk), whereas Chinese participants were recruited through Qualtrics Panel. Online data collection is increasingly common in psychological research (Conway & Peetz, 2012) and recent research has indicated that online workers can be just as, if not more attentive than subject pool participants (Hauser & Schwartz, 2016). Some research has also shown that data quality and psychometric properties of surveys are relatively unaffected by compensation amounts (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Each mTurk participant was compensated \$2 USD and each Qualtrics Panel participant was compensated \$6 USD.

Surveys were administered at a single time point across cultural subgroups after gaining informed consent from participants. After data collection, participants were debriefed with more information regarding the use of the surveys. In the initial American data collection, 206 participants completed surveys; after removing those who failed the majority of attention check items, a usable sample of 197 participants remained. Included participants were on average 39 years old ($SD = 11.93$), with 52.8% of participants identifying their sex as male. For the Indian data collection, an initial sample of 202 participants were surveyed, yielding a usable sample of 178 responses. Included participants in the Indian sample were on average 30 years old ($SD = 10.30$), with 74.7% of participants identifying their sex as male. Finally, in the Chinese sample, an initial sample of 158 responses were collected, with no responses dropped due to attention check failure. Chinese participants were on average 33 years of age ($SD = 8.25$), with 54.4% of participants identifying their sex as male.

Measures

Measures in the American and Indian data collection were administered in English. Previous studies (e.g., Viswesvaran, Deshpande, & Joseph, 1998; Viswesvaran & Deshpande, 1996) have noted that the majority of workers in India receive English education throughout their life and that due to the majority of dialects and local languages that dominate Indian society, English is commonly adopted as a unifying language of business. For the Chinese data collection effort, however, surveys were translated and back-translated (Brislin, 1980) by native speakers in simplified Mandarin for mainland participants, and traditional Mandarin for Taiwanese participants. Notably, Hong Kong was not included in the Chinese data collection effort and therefore surveys did not need to be translated into Cantonese dialects.

Cultural Worldviews

Confucian Ethos. The Chinese Value survey is a 40-item survey that taps into the cultural values of Chinese society. This instrument was developed from a non-Western perspective to ensure more accurate assessment of East Asian values. Consequently, Bond and colleagues (CCC, 1987) found four dimensions of Chinese culture that were omitted from Hofstede's original values paradigm (Hofstede, 1980): integration, Confucian work dynamism, human-heartedness, moral discipline. Though the initial study analyzed the dimensions at the national level, subsequent studies at the individual level found similar results. Matthew (2000) factor analyzed the survey at the individual level to correct for errors of aggregation bias and found four factors as well: integrity and tolerance, Confucian ethos, loyalty to ideals and humanity, and moderation and moral discipline. While the other factors measure Chinese culture in its entirety, the present study is only concerned with measuring Confucian values; therefore, the items pertaining to Confucian ethos are adopted (see Appendix C for all questionnaire items).

Sample items include evaluating the importance of “loyalty to superiors”, “benevolent authority”, and “respect for tradition”. The current study utilized a 5-point Likert scale that assesses the extent to which the individual values the qualities stated in the items.

Aristotelian Virtues. The leadership virtues questionnaire developed by Riggio, Zhu, Reina, & Maroosis (2010) contains 19 questions that target the four cardinal virtues espoused by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas: prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. Of interest to the current study is the justice virtue that examines individuals’ attitudes towards Aristotelian concepts of justice. This dimension is of interest because it evaluates what individuals believe is fair, which is a key component when deciding the appropriate resolution method. These six questions are measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = frequently); sample items include “treats others as he/she would like to be treated” and “gives credit to others when credit is due”.

Hindu Philosophy. The belief in Indian Philosophy questionnaire is a 5-item questionnaire developed by Mulla & Krishnan (2007) that examines the extent to which an individual believes in Hindu philosophy; this measure was selected because it is the only psychometrically validated measure of Indian values. Using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), sample items include “if I do good deeds, I will get good results either in this life or in the next” and “the goal of life is to be liberated from the cycle of birth and death”.

Cultural Values

Face. The construct of face is measured using a 5-point, 5-item Likert scale developed by Yao et al. (2017) measured on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Sample items include “people should be extremely careful not to embarrass others”, “it is important to

maintain harmony within one's group". It should be noted that measures of Face have had generally small correlation with COL (e.g., $r = .19, .06$; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003).

Dignity. Dignity is measured using a 5-point, 6-item Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; (Yao et al., 2017). Sample items include "people should speak their mind" and "people should be true to themselves regardless of what others think".

Honor. The value of honor is measured through a 5-point, 4-item Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) adapted from (Yao et al., 2017). Sample items include "do not allow others to insult your family" and "defend your family's reputation". As these measures have shown cross-cultural validity (Yao et al., 2017), they were adopted for the current study.

IND-COL. Individualism-collectivism (IND-COL) have been measured using a variety of different scales. Oyserman et al. (2002) content coded items from 27 IND-COL scales and identified eight COL items that were common across studies and accurately assessed the cultural components of collectivism. Two items were excluded because they were either unrelated to the organizational context of this study (i.e., "I would help, within my means, if a relative were in financial difficulty") or could predispose participants to respond in a certain manner to the conflict resolution measure (i.e., "I make an effort to avoid disagreements with my group members").

Ethical Values

EPQ. The Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) is a 20-item questionnaire that assesses individuals' ethical preferences via ratings of commonly held opinions (Forsyth, 1980). The measure uses a 5-point Likert scale (1 = completely disagree; 5 = completely agree) that captures individual ethical values of Idealism and Relativism. A sample item for Idealism is "risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be", while a sample

item for Relativism is “what is ethical varies from one situation and society to another”. This is one of the most commonly used measures of individual ethical positions and has performed well in cross-cultural samples (e.g., Forsyth et al., 2008).

Conflict Management

ROCI-II. The Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory-II is a 28-item questionnaire that measures individual preferences towards conflict resolution styles (Rahim, 1984). It is the most popular conflict instrument and has been used in a variety of cross-cultural samples (e.g., Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Croucher et al., 2013). Sixteen of those items designed to measure compromising, forcing, and integrating behaviors are adapted for the current study. There are 3 forms of inventory that assess the conflict resolution preferences of individuals during conflicts with peers, subordinates and supervisors. The current study assessed conflict resolution preferences in conflicts with peers. The scale uses a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). A sample item measuring an individual’s integrative style question is “I exchange accurate information with my peer to solve a problem together”. Questions relating to the forcing style include “I use my influence to get my ideas accepted” and “I use my authority to make a decision in my favor”. A compromising style item is “I try to find a middle course to resolve an impasse”.

Analytical Plan

Measurement Equivalence. Measurement equivalence tests were performed to ensure that measures functioned the same across the different cultural sub-groups. First, for a given measure, a configural model was estimated wherein the items from that measure will be regressed onto the latent factor (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Appropriate model fit was determined through the comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation

(RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Respectively, fit indices higher than .90, or lower than .08 and .07 indicated adequate model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).

Once configural equivalence was established, an appropriate referent indicator was identified through the free-baseline approach developed by Stark, Chernyshenko, and Drasgow (2006). First, a fully constrained model was estimated, in which all item loadings and intercepts to be equal across groups. Then, a single item was freed, and the fit of the partially constrained model was compared to the fully constrained model. If the partially constrained model did not fit better (i.e., $\Delta CFI < .002$; Meade, Johnson, & Braddy, 2008) than the constrained model, that item was taken to be the referent. If freeing the item did result in a better model fit, then the item was not taken to be the referent, and the procedure was performed for the next item. This process occurred sequentially across all items in the measure, until a suitable referent was identified. After a referent item was identified, measurement equivalence was tested by simultaneously constraining loadings and intercepts for each individual item in a scale to be equal across groups and comparing the constrained model fit to the configural model fit (Stark, et al., 2006). If at least one item held measurement equivalence for the scale (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, 1989), then the measure was used for further cross-group comparison analyses. Otherwise, analyses were conducted only within the specific cultural subgroup sample.

Path Analysis. To test Hypotheses 1 through 3, path analyses were conducted. For each cultural sub-group, the Confucian, Aristotelian, and Hindu models were estimated. To test partial mediation of ethical positions on values and resolution styles, the delta method with bootstrapped standard errors was performed to avoid issues of non-normality in the product term representing the indirect relationship (Bollen & Stine, 1990). Acceptable fit for each model (i.e., $CFI > .90$,

RMSEA < .08, SRMR < .07; Hu & Bentler, 1999), with relationships in the hypothesized directions across groups would indicate support for Hypotheses 1 through 3.

Structural Equivalence. Hypothesis 4 and Research Question 1a/b were concerned with cross-group comparisons of the previously estimated path models. Since Hypothesis 4 was only concerned with comparisons across Hindu and Confucian subgroups, a separate set of measurement equivalence analyses were conducted using the previously described free-baseline method across the Indian and Chinese sample. As Research Question 1a/b was concerned with cross-group comparisons across all subgroups, measurement equivalence across all three subgroups was considered before proceeding. Structural equivalence analyses (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) of the path models were performed if the measures used to estimate the model contained at least one item that was equivalent across the tested subgroups. Specifically, to test Hypothesis 4 the paths relating collectivism to relativism and comprising strategies (Figure 5) were constrained to be equal for the Hindu and Confucian samples. If the constrained model fit worse ($\Delta\text{CFI} > -.002$; Meade, et al., 2008) than the freely estimated path model, the magnitude and directionality of the relationship may differ across groups. If the Hindu sample showed negative relationships between collectivism and relativism and compromising preferences, and the Confucian sample showed positive relationships, then Hypothesis 4 was supported.

To evaluate the cultural relativity of these models (i.e., Research Question 1a and b), structural equivalence analyses were similarly planned for each of the three groups. For each model (i.e., Confucian, Aristotelian, and Hindu), regression paths were freely estimated and then constrained to be equal across groups. If the constrained model fit worse than the freely estimated model (i.e., ($\Delta\text{CFI} > -.002$; Meade, et al., 2008), the magnitude of the regression paths differed across groups. All analyses were performed using the Lavaan package in R (Rosseel,

2012) and missing data were handled using full information maximum likelihood estimation (Enders & Bandalos, 2001).

Results

Correlations

Tables 1, 2, and 3 contain descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and intercorrelations among the studied variables across the three cultural groups. All outcome measures showed significant and positive relationships with their associated predictors. Notably, reliabilities in the present study represent coefficient omega rather than the traditionally used coefficient alpha. McNeish (2018) has shown that when the assumptions of coefficient alpha (i.e., tau equivalence, normal distribution, uncorrelated errors) are violated, coefficient alpha can underestimate the reliability of a measure. Omega total is one form of composite reliability, which is more accurate than coefficient alpha when items are assumed to be congeneric (i.e., load onto a single latent factor), but vary in how strongly they reflect the construct (McDonald, 1970).

In the present study, reliabilities across scales in the American sample were acceptable ($\omega > .70$); however, the scales did not perform as well in the Indian and Chinese samples. In the Indian sample, Aristotelianism had poor reliability, along with Hindu beliefs, collectivism, and honor ($\omega < .70$). Similarly, in the Chinese sample, Aristotelianism and honor also had poor reliabilities. Although the reliabilities were poor in some cases, this should not have substantially affected results. Since reliabilities set the upper limit on validity estimates, and predictors were generally correlated with their respective outcomes, higher reliabilities would have likely led to higher validity estimates (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). However, the poor reliabilities do suggest that researchers should be cautious when using these scales to assess relationships. In particular, there have been relatively few cross-cultural studies using the Aristotelian justice and Hindu beliefs scales. Further research is needed to reconcile results from the present study with

the results of the original scale validation studies to determine whether these scales are actually internally consistent.

Measurement Equivalence

Configural Models. Initial configural models were generated using maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation method. Although the CFI and SRMR indices suggested good fit, the RMSEA value exceeded the cutoff (i.e., .08) for many of these models. When using ML estimation, RMSEA estimates are distorted if data are non-normal (Maydeu-Olivares, Shi, & Rosseel, 2018; Brousseau-Liard, 2013), especially when sample sizes are small (i.e., $N < 200$; Savalei, 2018). On the other hand, the CFI and SRMR are both generally robust to non-normal data when using ML estimation (Maydeu-Olivares, et al., 2018; Ainur, Sayang, Jannoo, & Yap, 2017). To test whether non-normality was a potential cause of the discrepancy between fit indices, Shapiro-Wilk (1965) tests were performed. The results from these tests (Table 4) show that the data are indeed non-normally distributed across almost all measures for all groups. As an alternative to ML estimation, diagonally weighted least squares (DWLS) estimation is preferred when data are non-normal (Nye & Drasgow, 2011). Essentially, DWLS scales the χ^2 test statistic to match the mean and variance of the reference χ^2 distribution (i.e., the assumed χ^2 distribution if the data were normal) and applies a correction to the model fit indices (Satorra & Bentler, 1994; Nye & Drasgow, 2011). When DWLS estimation was applied to the configural models, all indices indicated good fit. The results of both the ML and DWLS estimators for configural fit are presented in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. It is important note that the DWLS estimator can potentially distort the CFI and SRMR such that the indices will indicate the data fits perfectly to the model (Nye & Drasgow, 2011). Although this was a potential concern, since the CFI and SRMR generally suggested good fit for the configural models generated through ML estimation

(which does not distort CFI or SRMR), I proceeded to the next step in assessing measurement equivalence.

Free-Baseline Models. When item loadings and intercepts were simultaneously constrained, results suggested nonequivalence across groups on almost all measures (i.e., all $\Delta\text{CFI} > .002$). Therefore, cross-group comparisons across the three subgroups were inhibited (i.e., Research Question 1a was unable to be tested). However, when measurement equivalence was assessed across the measures used in Indian and Chinese samples to estimate the model depicted in Figure 5, almost all items across measures were equivalent between the two groups (only one item in the compromising measure was nonequivalent; Table 7). Since the majority of items were equivalent, this allowed for cross-group comparison tests between the two samples (i.e., Hypothesis 4) on those measures (Byrne, et al., 1989).

Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesized Models. Initially, hypothesized models were estimated using maximum-likelihood estimation. However, none of the hypothesized models fit the data well (i.e., $\text{CFI} < .90$, $\text{RMSEA} < .08$, or $\text{SRMR} < .07$), which indicated little support for Hypotheses 1 through 3 (Table 8). To assess whether non-normality potentially played a role in the poor model fit, DWLS estimation was employed, and models were re-estimated. However, four out of the nine models also did not show good fit, which again suggested little support for the hypothesized models. Fit estimates for all models are presented in Table 8.

Hypothesis 4, however, was testable since Indian and Chinese responses were equivalent. To test Hypothesis 4, two multi-group path models were estimated. First, a fully constrained model was specified, in which the paths depicted in Figure 5 were constrained to be equal across Indian and Chinese groups. This model yielded poor fit ($\text{CFI} = .96$, $\text{RMSEA} = .12$, $\text{SRMR} =$

.09). Next, an unconstrained model was estimated, in which the paths linking collectivism to relativism and relativism to compromise preferences were freed across groups. This model yielded a substantially better fit ($CFI = 1.00$, $RMSEA = 0.00$, $SRMR = .01$), indicating structural nonequivalence between the Hindu and Confucian cultural samples. While the direction of the path from collectivism to relativism were not different between the two groups as hypothesized, the results suggested that the magnitudes and pattern of these associations differed between the two cultural subgroups. For instance, the magnitudes of the path from collectivism to relativism was larger in the Indian sample ($b_{Hindu} = .76, p < .05$) than in the Chinese sample ($b_{Confucian} = .45, p < .05$). Additionally, while there was evidence in the Indian sample of relativism as a linking variable between collectivism to compromise ($b_{Hindu} = .25, CI [.13, .44]$); however, there was no such evidence in the Chinese sample ($b_{Confucian} = .05, CI [-.01, .15]$). Although these findings run counter to the hypothesized relationships, the results do provide evidence for a differential pattern of relationships between collectivism, relativism, and compromise between Hindu and Confucian cultures.

Alternate Analyses to Address Issues of Variable Ordering

The hypothesized models generally demonstrated poor fit, which precluded interpretations of model parameters since drawing conclusions from the parameters of ill-fitting models is likely to result in inappropriate inferences. There were two factors which were thought to have played a role in model misfit.

The first factor considered was the issue of causal ordering. While there exists some evidence for cultural values as an antecedent of ethical positions, most of this justification is conceptual (e.g., Ma, 2010; Ma, et al., 2013), with little longitudinal research to empirically validate such notions. In other words, most of the research in this area uses observational cross-

sectional prediction models that assess the extent to which cultural values such as collectivism predict ethical positions such as relativism; therefore, although most of the extant research uses cultural values as an explanation for ethical positions, there is little research that empirically justifies this causal ordering.

Second, model misspecification may have been due to the proximal nature of values and distal nature of ethics in relation to conflict resolution preferences. From a theory of reasoned action perspective (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Azjen, 1975), distal variables do not relate as strongly to behavioral intentions as proximal variables. In this study, the three variable sets (i.e., ethical beliefs, cultural values, and CR preferences) reflect increasingly narrower constructs. Ethical beliefs were measured broadly through items that referred to abstract moral codes and general beliefs about ethicality that were not targeted towards conflict resolution. On the other hand, cultural values were measured more narrowly, with the items capturing concepts related to conflict (e.g., respect, defense, criticism). Finally, CR preferences were assessed through questions regarding specific behavioral intentions. Therefore, the distal (broader) ethical beliefs variables might not directly relate with the narrow behavioral intentions (i.e., CR preferences). Conversely, cultural values measures may directly relate to behavioral intentions, because they are narrower variables that are more proximal to CR preferences.

On the basis of these two issues, a set of exploratory analyses were conducted in which the order of the predictor (values) and mediator (ethics) were reversed, and an alternate set of models were estimated. That is, the path in the alternate models follows from ethical positions to cultural values to resolution preferences (Figure 6). Note that the relationship between worldviews and cultural values remains as previously described, and that CR preferences remained the final dependent variable. As described below, the alternate set of models fit the

data substantially better than the hypothesized models. However, it is important to underscore that although these models fit well, the cross-sectional nature of my study design meant that temporal precedence could not be established and there was no way to truly confirm which whether ethics preceded values, or vice-versa.

Alternate Relativism Model. An alternate model was estimated in which relativism indirectly related to compromising preferences through dual mediators of collectivism and face (Figure 6a). Note that the two cultural values were correlated together given that cultural values are all conceptually linked together (Hofstede, 2001). These mediators were also predicted by Confucianist beliefs.

Alternate Idealism Model. An additional alternate model was specified that linked Aristotelian and Hindu worldviews to dignity and honor, respectively. Furthermore, this model specified a dual mediation linking idealism to forcing preferences through dignity and honor. Again, cultural values were correlated. Since the primary purpose of the previous analyses was to evaluate the linkages between dignity, honor, idealism, and forcing preferences, the path linking dignity to integrating preferences was not specified in this model. This approach was chosen because the path was not considered a focal relationship and model parsimony was prioritized.

Alternate Model Estimation. Initially, this third set of models was estimated using ML estimation; however, many of the models fit poorly (i.e., RMSEA > .08; Table 8). To address potential issues due to non-normality, these models were re-estimated using DWLS. The alternate relativism models estimated through DWLS showed good fit. On the other hand, though the alternate idealism models using DWLS estimation showed good fit in the Indian and American samples, they did not show good fit in the Chinese sample (RMSEA > .08). Therefore, modification indices were consulted to determine how to better specify the model. It should be

noted that modification indices are based on the χ^2 test statistic, which is highly reliant on sample size and normality assumptions (West, Taylor, & Wu, 2012). Given the non-normality present in the data, the generalizability of findings based on modification indices is questionable.

The modification indices suggested adding direct paths linking Hindu beliefs and Aristotelianism to forcing preferences. The addition of these paths made theoretical sense as it is likely that individuals' worldviews influences the way in which they choose to resolve a conflict. For instance, Peng and Nisbett (1999) have shown that individuals with Aristotelian worldviews are more likely to attribute "fault" during conflict to the other person and therefore use more direct forms of resolution. Similarly, Kumar (2000) has suggested that Brahmanical Idealism (drawn from Hindu beliefs) also leads individuals to behave more obstinately and engage in forcing behaviors. When this final idealism model was estimated (Figure 6b), model fit was acceptable for all three groups (Table 8). Notably, adding a similar direct path from Confucianism to compromise was not possible in the alternate relativism model because the model was just identified. Adding an additional path would have resulted in a fully saturated model and inhibited examinations of fit indices. Additionally, the alternate relativism models fit the data well across samples without the additional path; therefore, a link from Confucianism to compromise was not tested. The parameters of the well-fitting alternate relativism and idealism models are presented in Tables 9 and 10 and are discussed below. Again, it is important to note that the DWLS estimator could have potentially inflated the CFI and SRMR; however, since both indices suggested good fit for the ML estimated alternative models, I proceeded to interpret the model parameters.

Alternate Model Results. Across models and samples, there was a single similarity in that cultural worldviews related to their specific values. In other words, Confucianism related to

face and collectivism, Aristotelianism related to dignity, and Hindu beliefs related to Honor. However, the rest of the findings regarding relationships among ethics, values, and resolution preferences varied across cultural groups.

In the Chinese sample, relativism led to compromise through social face and collectivism. However, in the Indian sample, there were no significant relationships among social face, collectivism, and compromise. In the American sample, only social face was associated with compromise.

In Chinese samples, idealism was only linked to honor and neither variables were linked to forcing; however, in American samples, idealism was linked only to dignity, which mediated the relationship between idealism and forcing. In Indian samples, idealism was linked to both honor and dignity; similar to the Chinese sample, none of the three variables were linked to forcing. With respect to the direct paths linking Aristotelianism and Hindu beliefs to forcing, the former was negatively related to forcing in the American sample, whereas the latter was positively related to forcing in the Chinese sample. The implications of these results are discussed below.

Addressing Common Method Variance

Given that responses were all assessed through survey design and were gathered from single-source self-reports, one concern for analyses was overinflation or deflation of relationships due to common method variance (CMV). Generally, this type of method bias is most likely to occur when an optimal answer is unlikely and when participants have a low willingness or motivation to respond properly. MacKenzie and Podsakoff (2012) outline a number of remedies to the solution, two of which include using clear and concise language as well as motivating participants to respond properly. The first was accounted for by selecting

surveys with items that have clear and unambiguous meanings, as well as utilizing bilingual translators to ensure that the items were linguistically equivalent across collection efforts. The second was addressed by providing monetary incentives to participants that properly completed surveys (e.g., did not straightline answer, respond with gibberish, etc.), as well as explaining to the participant the goals of the study and its importance to research. However, it was still likely that CMV was introduced into the dataset due to the single-source, cross-sectional study design. Therefore, a separate set of path analyses were estimated in which paths were estimated while constructs were simultaneously regressed onto a marker variable. Therefore, a separate set of path analyses were estimated in which paths were estimated while constructs were simultaneously regressed onto a marker variable.

This marker variable was chosen based on recommendations by Podsakoff and colleagues (2003) as well as Williams, Hartman, and Cavazotte (2010), in that it was theoretically unrelated to any of the focal constructs but tapped one or more sources of bias that might have occurred during the survey process. Williams and colleagues (2010) further suggest using marker variables that reflect a substantive source of method bias (i.e., affective states, measurement context, and item context) rather than a marker variable that is purely selected due to a lack of a relationship with the focal construct (e.g., age, shoe size, etc.). It is difficult to discern what a substantive source of bias would be within the context of this study as there is not an overt reason for issues such as social desirability to occur, especially due to the anonymity of the survey design. Affective state was considered because online survey takers may experience a uniform affective reaction to survey items delivered in an online format. Additionally, a perceptual measure was considered because it would have the same measurement and item contexts as the other measures in the survey. Therefore, the marker variable used was a single

item measure of job satisfaction (Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997)¹. As an attitude that captures affective and evaluative components (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012; Judge, Hulin, & Dalal, 2011), and as a perceptual measure which was assessed through the same format as the focal constructs, job satisfaction was an ideal marker candidate. The item would be somewhat reflective of participants' transient affective states, and subject to the same method (e.g., same time point, same measurement) and item contexts (e.g., same scale intervals) as the other variables, while theoretically unrelated to the focal constructs.

Notably, CMV was only assessed in the alternate models – not the hypothesized models. This choice was made because the hypothesized models did not fit the data well and the structural parameters were likely inaccurate. Since the majority of the present study's conclusions were drawn from the alternate models, CMV was only assessed in the alternate model set. The separate set of path analyses were estimated for both the relativist and idealism models presented in Tables 8 and 9. In the relativism model for the American sample, the CMV model showed good fit (CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = .01), whereas in the Indian (CFI = .98, RMSEA = .15, SRMR = .12) and Chinese (CFI = .99, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .04) samples, the model showed poor fit. Inspecting the CMV model parameters in the American sample revealed little differences from the model without with the common method factor. The relationship between Confucianism to collectivism and face were significant ($bs = .56$ and $.67$, respectively; $ps < .05$). Additionally, the relationships between relativism to compromise remained nonsignificant ($b = .16, p > .05$), whereas the relationship between face and

¹ A single-item measure was used to address cost concerns related to the length of the survey. Wanous and colleagues' meta-analysis found that single-item measures were strongly correlated with scale length measures (CI [.45, .69]). They suggested that single-item measures may be appropriate to avoid issues of face validity when the purpose is to assess global job satisfaction (see also Scarpello & Campbell, 1983). Because this was a single-item measure, reliabilities and estimates of factor structure could not be computed.

compromise remained significant ($b = .42, p < .05$). Moreover, there was no indirect link between relativism to compromise through face ($b = .06, CI [.02, .12]$). Finally, there were no relationships between relativism to collectivism ($b = .07; p > .05$), collectivism to compromise ($b = -.12, p > .05$), or an indirect effect linking relativism to compromise through collectivism ($b = -.01, CI [-.04, .02]$). Compared with the results presented in Table 8, the pattern of relationships remained consistent, as did the magnitude of path coefficients.

When the constructs were regressed onto the common marker in the idealism path models, the results indicated poor model fit in the American ($CFI = .83, RMSEA = .18, SRMR = .10$), Indian ($CFI = .98, RMSEA = .12, SRMR = .15$), and Chinese ($CFI = .92, RMSEA = .20, SRMR = .14$) samples. Therefore, model parameters were not interpreted, and CMV was not considered an issue. Subsequently, the following discussion focuses on the results of the alternate path models without the CMV factor.

Summary of Results

To summarize the results of this study, measurement nonequivalence was found for most of the assessed measures, which inhibited the majority of cross-group comparisons. For the hypothesized set of models, the majority of the hypothesized models demonstrated poor fit, which indicated that the data did not fit the model specifications. Since any subsequent interpretation of the ill-fitting models might lend itself to inaccurate or spurious conclusions, one attempt to address this issue was made by revising the causal ordering of variables. A set of alternate models was estimated which specified ethics as indirect predictors of resolution preferences through cultural values. For all models, across all subgroups, the alternate models fit the data better than the hypothesized models. Moreover, the pattern of associations between

predictors and outcomes within the alternate model set varied across cultures. The implications of these findings are discussed in the next section.

Discussion

Since conflict is ubiquitous and inevitable, effective conflict resolution (CR) is necessary to maintain the health and functioning of any organization. As organizations become increasingly multinational, both in terms of the employees that they recruit, and the other organizations that they partner with, CR becomes more challenging. Cross-cultural differences in CR preferences have been widely documented and attributed to a number of mechanisms. However, what has been less examined is how worldviews and ethical preferences fit into CR. Although there has been quite a bit of work on the role that cultural values play in relation to an individual's CR preferences (Ting-Toomey, 1989; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Croucher, et al., 2013), there has been less research on how the cultural worldview of an individual predicts these values. Secondly, CR inherently involves balancing the concerns of oneself with the concerns of the other party, which presents an ethical dilemma in most cases. Currently, there is little literature on how ethics interplay with CR preferences, which is problematic given that an individual's perception of ethical issues will predict how they choose to negotiate and resolve differences (Ma, 2010; Ma, et al., 2013). For practitioners, understanding cultural worldviews and ethical differences provides additional information as to why an individual holds certain values, and the CR approach an individual would find morally appropriate. Subsequently, CR practitioners can reframe issues such that they align with those values and develop resolutions that align with the moral interests of the conflicted parties. Finally, the bulk of the research has focused on cultural differences between Eastern and Western cultures; however, as the population of foreign-born Indian and Chinese workers continues to grow within the American workforce (Zong & Batalova, 2016), and as companies increasingly turn to these two regions for

international growth, understanding the specific intracultural differences across these cultural subgroups will provide more nuanced heuristics for management and HR professionals.

The purpose of this study was to directly address these three issues, and the results of the study indicate support for a process model that indirectly links ethics to CR preferences through cultural values, rather than an indirect link between cultural values to CR preferences through ethics. Moreover, the results also indicate that individuals' cultural worldviews were predictive of their cultural values. Finally, the results showed distinct cultural patterns in the relationships between predictors and outcomes, suggesting that the experience of certain ethical positions and values differed across groups. In this section, the implications of these findings are discussed. First the issues of nonequivalence and variable ordering are discussed, then the findings are interpreted in relation to existing literature on cross-cultural differences, and finally a set of recommendations for practitioners is advanced.

Measurement Nonequivalence

The results suggested that data collected from these scales should not be generalized across different cultural groups. Although it is difficult to identify what caused nonequivalence, there are two potential reasons for this finding. First, studies have shown evidence for culturally varying response styles related to moderacy (Chen, Lee, & Stevenson, 1995; Hamamura, Heine, & Paulhus, 2008) and acquiescence (Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005; Cheung & Rensvold, 2000). Recently, Guo & Spina (2019) suggested specifically that values of harmony relate to individuals being less likely to rate items low. When cultural norms influence individuals' response patterns, nonequivalence can emerge. For instance, an individual who is high on harmony may not rate themselves low on an item of dignity, compared to an individual who is low on harmony. If the two individuals have the same latent dignity score, the measure is

nonequivalent. Additionally, if individuals generally rate items across all scales as high, scale scores may be artificially correlated, and these correlations may be artificially inflated. This was seen in the present study, as the results from the Indian and Chinese samples revealed a substantially greater number of intercorrelations compared to the American sample.

Another reason for the intercorrelation differences might be that Aristotelian and Confucian cultures have different norms in cognitive approaches. Although Aristotelian logic distinguishes between objects, Confucian dialectics treat concepts more holistically and view seemingly unrelated concepts as part of a unified whole (Nisbett, et al., 2001). Therefore, Aristotelian individuals may be better able to differentiate between unrelated items, whereas individuals who have dialectic modes of thinking may respond in the same fashion across scales (Hamamura, et al., 2008). Although similar research has not been conducted in Hindu cultures, due to the relational or group-focused aspect of Hindu culture, it seems likely that their perspective on each item may align more closely with Confucian cultures. Indeed, nonequivalence tests found that measurement functioning was equivalent between Indian and Chinese samples for items relating to collectivism, relativism, and compromise. Moreover, both samples showed a higher number of intercorrelations compared to Americans. Again, it is important to note that since these scales (e.g., analytic-holistic cognition, harmony, etc.) were not administered and the present study used a multi-group design, these sources of nonequivalence were not empirically tested.

Ethics to Values versus Values to Ethics

The results of the hypothesized models indicated generally poor fit, suggesting that cultural values did not predict CR preferences through ethics. Although previous research has suggested that values are antecedent to ethics, as values are transmitted to individuals early in

life while they are still forming ethical positions, most of the research in this area is conceptual (Ma, 2010; Ma, et al., 2013). That is, there has been no empirical study that directly tracks the causal order of these variables and there is no existing theory which definitively states which variable occurs first. One interpretation of the findings in the current study is that these variables might have reciprocal relationships over time, and that measurement timing may impact the causal order of these variables. Although cultural artifacts such as books, movies, and teaching may influence individuals' ethics at an early age, once these ethics are formed, they may in turn influence the extent to which individuals hold certain values. The current study sampled working age individuals who likely already had a developed ethical position (Forsyth, 1980). Kohlberg (1976) proposed a stage model of ethical development that supports this notion. In his stage model, Kohlberg suggests that individuals are first influenced by societal factors (e.g., teachers, government officials, entertainers, etc.), which help develop individuals' ethical codes. However, these codes crystallize as individuals age, and inform the behaviors that they take and the values that they hold.

In the context of the present study, the extent to which the assessed values were viewed as ethical or morally appropriate would likely have influenced their responses. Specifically, values that were perceived as more or less ethical may have been marked with higher or lower agreement, respectively. Therefore, in this study, ethical evaluations may have preceded cultural value judgments. However, this notion is tentative; due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is not possible to establish temporal precedence in the present study.

Alternatively, drawing from the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), ethical beliefs and cultural values could be conceptualized as distal and proximal predictors of behavioral intention due to the respective bandwidths of their scales.

Here, construal level theory (CLT) may explain why greater bandwidths could have caused ethical beliefs to be psychologically distal to CR preferences relative to cultural values. From a CLT perspective, abstract variables will generally relate to higher-order outcomes and more concrete variables will relate to lower-order outcomes (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009). In other words, values and beliefs are predictive of behavioral intentions in a situation when the situation matches the specificity of the values and beliefs.

In the current study, cultural values were assessed with items that tapped concepts directly associated with conflict. For instance, the measure of dignity was heavily concerned with self-respect (e.g., “People should stand up for what they believe in even when others disagree”), similarly, honor and face were respectively concerned with defending oneself and minimizing discord (e.g., “People should be concerned with defending their families’ reputation” and “It is important to maintain harmony within one’s group”, respectively). Since these scales reflected narrow values that fit greatly within the context of a conflict scenario, these cultural values are likely proximal predictors of conflict resolution preferences. On the other hand, ethical positions were assessed with items pertaining to abstract moral standards or general beliefs about the ethicality of certain actions (e.g., “The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained”; “What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another”) which were not necessarily related to conflict. Therefore, these ethical beliefs may apply to a wide array of situations, more directly influence the values that individuals hold, and only be distally associated with resolution preferences. Consequently, the more accurate model specification would reflect the alternate set, wherein the variables were ordered from Ethics → Values → CR preferences.

It is worth noting, however, that the alternative models were not hypothesized a priori to data analysis. Although the current study followed methodological precedent by re-specifying alternative models based upon theoretical and statistical (e.g., modification indices) considerations (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Sinkovics, Richter, Ringle, & Schlager, 2016), the results of the alternative models should be treated as exploratory rather than confirmatory. However, since most of the hypothesized models fit the data poorly, the discussion below focuses on interpretations of the final alternate model set (Figure 6), which fit the data well.

Implications for Theory and Practice

Worldviews. Across the samples and path models, there was consistent support for the association linking cultural worldviews to cultural values. Broadly, these worldviews emphasized different aspects of life, with Hindu beliefs reflecting a spirituality, Confucian beliefs reflecting lifestyle choices, and Aristotelian beliefs reflecting fairness. The findings of this study suggest that to some extent, these worldviews are present in all cultures and that the relationship between these worldviews and their respective cultural values is not culturally-bound. This finding suggests that practitioners should consider the worldviews of parties that are currently engaged in a conflict, to more effectively reach a resolution.

When two individuals are engaged in a conflict over discrepant values, perspective taking is often employed to resolve the dispute (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005). Galinsky, and colleagues (2005) suggest that understanding the motivations for an individual's behavior is an important step towards fostering social bonds and promoting perspective taking. The results of the study suggested that cultural worldviews were consistently predictive of cultural values. Therefore, an understanding of each party's worldview may provide insight as to why they hold their respective values (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). Since values are often motivating

factors for individuals' behaviors, reaching a mutual understanding of each other's values may make it easier for conflicted parties to engage in perspective taking exercises. Therefore, a discussion of the other party's worldview may serve to enhance perspective taking interventions.

Relativism. Perhaps the clearest case of intra-cultural differences occurred when examining the paths in the alternate relativism model. In the Chinese sample, relativism was linked to compromise through social face and collectivism. However, in American sample, only face was associated with compromise and in the Indian sample none of the variables were related with each other. The pattern of results suggests that the experience of social face is different across groups. Plainly put, social face refers to one's status based upon their actions to others (i.e., "how do I view myself, based upon my actions to you"), which represents an internal self-representation. For those in the Aristotelian and Confucian contexts, this internal self-representation seems to be associated with compromises; however, in the Confucian context an external self-representation (i.e., collectivism) is also associated with compromise. The results suggest that when working with those who are more flexible (i.e., relativists), culture-specific approaches may be warranted to achieve compromises. Specifically, by tapping values of social face (i.e., "can you please do this as a favor to me") with relativists from Aristotelian cultures, organizations may be better able to reach compromises, when compared to approaches emphasizing that the opposing party is part of a shared collective with the organization (i.e., "we're in this together" sentiments). Finally, the results suggest that cultural values are not predictive of generating compromises with relativists from Hindu cultures. This suggests that there perhaps external factors (e.g., time pressure, withholding resources) that will influence those in Hindu cultures to achieve resolution.

Idealism. Findings in the American sample suggested that idealism was linked to forcing preferences through notions of dignity. This suggests that individuals who have a rigid moral code would be more likely to have a self-centered focus, which is consistent with the notion of dignity as a sense of self-worth (plainly put, “how do I view myself in relation to my actions”). In turn, a self-centered focus would predict higher preference for using forcing strategies during CR. However, the same pattern of results did not emerge in the Indian or Chinese samples. In the Chinese sample, idealistic tendencies were associated with external representation of oneself in relational cultures, which is reflected by honor (i.e., “how do I view myself based upon your actions to me”). On the other hand, In the Indian sample, idealism was related to both self-centered and external representations (i.e., both honor and dignity); however, neither was associated with forcing behaviors. These findings emphasize the culture-specific pattern of relationships that can impact cross-cultural CR. There are two implications for research and practice here. The first is that when resolving differences with idealists in Aristotelian cultures, an emphasis on the self and restoring dignity is important. The second is that although idealism is related to honor and dignity in the Chinese and Indian samples, these values may not be associated with forcing preferences.

Limitations

As with any study there were several limitations in the research design and analyses. The primary issues in the current study reflected limitations due to data issues, common method bias, cross-sectionality, and the multi-group SEM approach. First, the small sample size and non-normal distribution of the data could have distorted results. A few of the models were based on modification indices which are based on chi-square test statistics that are distorted when data are non-normal (West, et al., 2012).

Second, this study relied on single-source, monomethod approach by using self-reports to assess individuals' values, ethical positions, and CR preferences. Although effort was taken to increase motivation and ensure that participants were able to complete the survey items, measurement effects due to gathering responses at a single time point and from the same individual across surveys may have resulted in CMV. To address this issue, path analyses were estimated using the CMV marker variable approach suggested by previous CMV researchers (Podsakoff, et al., 2003; Williams, et al., 2010). Since the focal constructs had no obvious substantive source of bias (e.g., socially desirable responding), the CMV marker variable that was chosen reflected less obtrusive forms of bias such as transient affective state, item context, and measurement context. With these factors in mind, a perceptual measure of job satisfaction was chosen that theoretically would reflect these factors as it was assessed in the same format as the focal constructs and would theoretically partly reflect an affective reaction by the participant. However, it is important to note that a single marker variable is not likely to capture the full range of measurement biases. While care was taken to ensure that the relevant measurement bias was accounted for in this study, there may have been other sources that were not assessed.

Third, due to the cross-sectional measurement in the current study, it was difficult to establish causal ordering in the mediation models. Maxwell and Cole have established a line of literature that shows that the results of mediation can be spurious in cross-sectional designs (e.g., Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Maxwell & Cole, 2007; Maxwell, Cole, & Mitchell, 2011). However, it is important to note that simply including multiple time points is not likely to have alleviated the issues of causal ordering. As noted by Spector (2019), establishing cause and effect relationship over time is difficult when there exists little research as to when variables will influence each other, or how long it will take for the influence to be felt. This is the case with the variables in the present study, as there has been little research as to when and for how long ethics and cultural values influence each other. Spector further posits that longitudinal designs may well lead to erroneous conclusions about the existence or nonexistence of relationships when arbitrary time points are used. In such cases, he suggests that it may actually be more beneficial to utilize a cross-sectional design in these instances, because cross-sectional designs are often more cost efficient and better for detecting covariation. Therefore, although the current study could not establish *confirmatory* explanations of causes, effects, and influences, it was possible to interpret *exploratory* descriptions of links, relationships, and associations.

Finally, the present study utilized a multi-group approach to identifying differences in the pattern of relationships among values, ethics, and behaviors. From the results, it is clear that national differences exist among groups; however, the multi-group approach is limited in terms of identifying the causes of these national differences. The present study advances the literature by identifying key predictors of CR preferences, rather than focusing on group differences in the mean levels of preferred resolution styles. However, it was difficult to achieve the same results for identifying key moderators of the Values → CR preferences relationship. Similarly, it was

easy to detect measurement nonequivalence across groups; however, due to the multi-group approach, it was impossible to determine the psychological mechanisms that were causing measurement nonequivalence. Harmony and cognitive styles (analytic-holistic) were posited as potential reasons for the cross-group differences in response patterns and interconstruct relationships, but neither of these variables were empirically tested.

Future Directions

The findings and limitations of this study point to four specific directions for future research. First, future researchers should establish more theory surrounding the causal order of ethics and cultural values. An understanding of the process by which each variable influences the other to dictate individuals' preferred mode of resolution will help practitioners identify best practices during resolution efforts. It might be that values and ethics have reciprocal relationships, with one having more impact than the other at a given point in time. In this case, longitudinal efforts are needed with data collection occurring at specific temporal intervals. Additionally, an understanding of the process by which values and ethics impact behavior may be further investigated through different study designs. Presenting participants with morally ambiguous vignettes or experimentally priming individuals to activate cultural values may be better methods to tap into the moral code of an individual and could lend insight into how individuals choose to resolve conflict across different types of conflict scenarios.

Secondly, researchers should consider whether the findings of the present study translate to higher levels. An investigation similar to this study that uses a higher level of analysis could examine how corporate ethics inform organizational values, and how these variables may both play a role in influencing an organization's preferred negotiation methods. Research in this area may provide insight for corporate strategy regarding conflict management.

Third, researchers should move away from simply testing mean differences to detect cultural differences in CR preferences. Rather than reducing culture to group classification (as was done in the present study), future research should examine the specific moderators of these variables to identify when certain values will not relate to behavior. Similarly, such research should extend to identifying specific mechanisms or response patterns that differ across cultures.

The present study found that response patterns do exist, but not why they exist. Identifying the underlying psychological differences between groups can lead to better measurement development. Indeed, certain variables in the current study (e.g., Aristotelianism) did not have good internal consistency across all cultural groups. Future research with better measures would help address the underlying question that could not be resolved due to poor measures.

Finally, the results of the present study also suggest that management scholars would be better served by distinguishing between intracultural differences. Throughout the study, there were distinct patterns of differences noted between Hindu and Confucian cultures. This was seen in particular in the experience of social face and interdependent self-concept. While there has been a great deal of work on East Asian ideology, cultural values, and the links between the two, similar progress has not been made for South Asian cultures. This is problematic given the increasing role of foreign-born South Asians in the American workforce (Zong & Batalova, 2017), and the growing economic partnerships between American and South Asian corporations. While this study presents some preliminary differences, more effort should be taken to understand why these differences emerge. It would seem that current explanations only account for some of these differences.

Conclusion

The present study sought to contribute to the cross-cultural conflict resolution (CR) literature by considering the understudied role of ethical positions in relation to cultural values and CR preferences. Exploratory results suggested that the process by which ethical values led to conflict resolution occurred through cultural values. Implications of these results were discussed, which provided directions for future research. In conclusion, cross-cultural differences are unlikely to go away. As societies and organizations become increasingly multicultural, understanding the nuances in the culturally varying thought patterns that drive cross-cultural interactions will provide greater insight into how to effectively resolve conflicts when they arise, and prevent future conflicts from occurring.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Tables

Table 1. *Means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities for American sample*

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Aristotelianism	4.30	0.69	(.81)											
2. Hindu	3.10	1.05	.11	(.88)										
3. Confucian	3.22	0.62	.32*	.50*	(.78)									
4. Collectivism	2.81	0.79	.00	.33*	.47*	(.72)								
5. Face	3.63	0.69	.34*	.34*	.61*	.47*	(.87)							
6. Honor	3.25	1.00	.07	.45*	.52*	.47*	.44*	(.90)						
7. Dignity	4.05	0.60	.44*	.15*	.18*	-.06	.26*	.08	(.87)					
8. Relativism	3.61	0.79	.18*	.06	-.01	.05	.19*	-.04	.32*	(.83)				
9. Idealism	3.89	0.87	.51*	.27*	.35*	.14	.50*	.18*	.44*	.18*	(.92)			

Table 1 (cont'd).

10. Forcing	3.23	0.95	-.02	.18*	.23*	.28*	.21*	.24*	.26*	.10	.09	(.91)	
11. Compromise	4.02	0.72	.49*	.16*	.28*	.09	.39*	.09	.34*	.27*	.47*	.11	(.84)
12. Integrating	3.99	0.82	.42*	.11	.33*	.20*	.38*	.22*	.24*	.16*	.43*	.25*	.66* (.95)

Note: *M* and *SD* represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. * $p < .05$. $N = 197$. Reliabilities (ω) presented in parentheses along the diagonal.

Table 2. Means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities for Indian Sample

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Aristotelianism	3.84	0.57	(.58)											
2. Hindu	3.90	0.54	.73*	(.68)										
3. Confucian	3.86	0.50	.79*	.79*	(.82)									
4. Collectivism	3.86	0.57	.64*	.67*	.70*	(.69)								
5. Face	3.93	0.55	.65*	.71*	.67*	.76*	(.83)							
6. Honor	3.92	0.57	.58*	.67*	.63*	.77*	.74*	(.69)						
7. Dignity	3.86	0.55	.68*	.71*	.76*	.75*	.76*	.77*	(.77)					
8. Relativism	3.86	0.61	.61*	.64*	.69*	.71*	.66*	.69*	.72*	(.76)				
9. Idealism	3.87	0.56	.63*	.69*	.68*	.75*	.69*	.73*	.69*	.71*	(.70)			
10. Forcing	3.94	0.62	.63*	.50*	.65*	.60*	.50*	.47*	.58*	.66*	.51*	(.79)		
11. Comp	3.84	0.62	.72*	.62*	.66*	.73*	.64*	.68*	.71*	.68*	.66*	.70*	(.74)	

Table 2 (cont'd).

12. Integrating	3.97	0.53	.70*	.73*	.74*	.78*	.75*	.75*	.70*	.74*	.80*	.57*	.70*	(.83)
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Note. *M* and *SD* mean and standard deviation, respectively. * $p < .05$. $N = 178$. Reliabilities (ω) presented in parentheses along the diagonal.

Table 3. Means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities for Chinese sample.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Aristotelianism	4.15	0.51	(.65)											
2. Hindu	3.80	0.74	.38*	(.84)										
3. Confucian	3.89	0.63	.35*	.43*	(.90)									
4. Collectivism	3.87	0.65	.38*	.59*	.49*	(.81)								
5. Face	4.05	0.54	.42*	.51*	.40*	.64*	(.83)							
6. Honor	4.21	0.55	.39*	.53*	.38*	.54*	.65*	(.44)						
7. Dignity	3.92	0.59	.43*	.39*	.27*	.46*	.47*	.42*	(.82)					
8. Relativism	3.98	0.63	.31*	.37*	.30*	.46*	.39*	.27*	.43*	(.79)				
9. Idealism	4.17	0.58	.45*	.41*	.47*	.59*	.62*	.58*	.36*	.32*	(.84)			
10. Forcing	3.91	0.66	.36*	.47*	.41*	.58*	.49*	.36*	.35*	.40*	.42*	(.82)		
11. Comp	4.08	0.55	.47*	.40*	.39*	.58*	.56*	.53*	.41*	.36*	.67*	.53*	(.76)	

Table 3 (cont'd).

12. Integrating	4.16	0.49	.56*	.49*	.42*	.62*	.49*	.44*	.40*	.46*	.59*	.49*	.64*	(.88)
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Note. *M* and *SD* represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. * $p < .05$. $N = 158$. Reliabilities (ω) presented in parentheses along the diagonal.

Table 4. *Shapiro-Wilk test for non-normality.*

	American	Indian	Chinese
Aristotelianism	0.86*	0.95*	0.96*
Hindu Belief	0.96*	0.96*	0.97*
Confucianism	0.99	0.98*	0.95*
Collectivism	0.98*	0.94*	0.97*
Face	0.98*	0.96*	0.97*
Honor	0.96*	0.93*	0.95*
Dignity	0.97*	0.95*	0.97*
Relativism	0.97*	0.93*	0.95*
Idealism	0.94*	0.97*	0.95*
Forcing	0.98*	0.91*	0.97*
Compromise	0.90*	0.93*	0.96*
Integrating	0.86*	0.95*	0.95*

Note: alternative hypothesis is non-normality. * $p < .05$

Table 5. *Configural models using ML estimation.*

Scale	American (<i>N</i> = 197)					Indian (<i>N</i> = 178)					Chinese (<i>N</i> = 158)				
	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR
Aristotelianism	7.88*	2	0.97	0.12	0.03	1.91	2	1.00	0.00	0.02	2.52	2	0.99	0.04	0.02
Hindu	17.21*	5	0.97	0.11	0.03	3.54	5	1.00	0.00	0.02	18.06*	5	0.94	0.13	0.05
Confucianism	85.27*	35	0.86	0.09	0.08	77.14*	35	0.86	0.08	0.06	95.57*	35	0.89	0.10	0.06
Collectivism	6.63	5	0.99	0.04	0.03	1.17	5	1.00	0.00	0.01	7.49	5	0.99	0.06	0.03
Face	32.40*	9	0.92	0.12	0.05	26.04*	9	0.90	0.10	0.04	24.32*	9	0.92	0.10	0.05
Honor	13.01*	2	0.97	0.17	0.03	8.45*	2	0.91	0.13	0.04	0.24	2	1.00	0.00	0.01
Dignity	35.47*	9	0.90	0.12	0.05	14.31	9	0.96	0.06	0.04	13.18	9	0.97	0.05	0.04
Relativism	18.91*	5	0.95	0.12	0.04	2.87	5	1.00	0.00	0.02	4.23	5	1.00	0.00	0.02
Idealism	7.02	5	1.00	0.05	0.01	13.21*	5	0.91	0.10	0.04	4.20	5	1.00	0.00	0.02
Forcing	13.85*	5	0.98	0.10	0.02	11.15*	5	0.96	0.08	0.04	2.48	5	1.00	0.00	0.02
Compromise	1.55	2	1.00	0.00	0.01	5.11	2	0.97	0.09	0.03	4.13	2	0.98	0.08	0.03
Integrating	27.44*	14	0.99	0.07	0.02	43.01*	14	0.87	0.11	0.05	51.42*	14	0.90	0.13	0.05

Note: * indicates $p < .05$. $N = 533$ for the CMV model.

Table 6. *Configural models using DWLS estimation.*

Scale	American ($N = 182$)					Indian ($N = 164$)					Chinese ($N = 158$)				
	χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR
Aristotelian	1.12	2	1.00	0.00	0.04	1.37	2	1.00	0.00	0.03	1.56	2	1.00	0.00	0.03
Hindu	3.57	5	1.00	0.00	0.04	1.46	5	1.00	0.00	0.03	4.05	5	1.00	0.00	0.05
Confucian	60.15	35	0.95	0.06	0.08	37.02	35	0.99	0.02	0.07	22.00	35	1.00	0.00	0.06
Collectivism	3.54	5	1.00	0.00	0.04	0.33	5	1.00	0.00	0.01	2.24	5	1.00	0.00	0.04
Face	7.57	9	1.00	0.00	0.05	6.01	9	1.00	0.00	0.05	11.12	9	0.99	0.04	0.06
Honor	1.58	2	1.00	0.00	3.00	3.42	2	0.97	0.06	0.05	0.11	2	1.00	0.00	0.01
Dignity	11.98	9	0.99	0.04	0.06	6.19	9	1.00	0.00	0.05	5.28	9	1.00	0.00	0.04
Relativism	4.40	5	1.00	0.00	0.05	0.80	5	1.00	0.00	0.02	0.97	5	1.00	0.00	0.03
Idealism	0.57	5	1.00	0.00	0.02	6.59	5	0.98	0.04	0.05	0.78	5	1.00	0.00	2.00
Forcing	2.07	5	1.00	0.00	0.03	2.53	5	1.00	0.00	0.04	0.55	5	1.00	0.00	0.02
Compromise	0.15	2	1.00	0.00	0.01	1.86	2	1.00	0.00	0.03	1.19	2	1.00	0.00	0.03
Integrating	0.99	14	1.00	0.00	0.03	14.08	14	0.99	0.01	0.06	8.82	14	1.00	0.00	0.07

Note: lavaan does not allow missing data when using DWLS estimator so only complete cases were used.

Table 7. *Measurement Equivalence Results.*

Scale	Item	Fit Statistics for 3 Group Comparison					Fit Statistics for 2 Group Comparison				
		χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR
Aristotelian	Overall	12.31*	6	0.977	0.077	0.026					
	1	56.94*	10	0.834	0.163	0.092					
	3	58.98*	10	0.827	0.166	0.098					
	4	27.77*	10	0.937	0.100	0.059					
Hindu	Overall	38.81*	15	0.964	0.095	0.033					
	2	101.63*	19	0.978	0.156	0.111					
	3	58.52*	19	0.941	0.108	0.065					
	4	158.96*	19	0.792	0.203	0.169					
	5	97.58*	19	0.884	0.153	0.109					
Confucian	Overall	257.98*	105	0.875	0.090	0.07					
	1	303.53*	109	0.841	0.100	0.088					
	3	310.61*	109	0.835	0.102	0.088					
	4	296.04*	109	0.847	0.098	0.081					
	5	354.02*	109	0.799	0.112	0.109					
	6	307.16*	109	0.838	0.101	0.086					
	7	308.39*	109	0.837	0.102	0.089					
	8	347.03*	109	0.805	0.111	0.100					
	9	371.02*	109	0.786	0.116	0.115					
	10	439.94*	109	0.732	0.128	0.118					
Collectivism	Overall	15.29*	15	0.999	0.010	0.025	8.66	10	1.000	0.000	0.020
	1	181.2*	19	0.595	0.219	0.191	15.02	12	0.990	0.039	0.044

Table 7 (cont'd).

Face	2	142.52*	19	0.692	0.191	0.152	11.86	12	1.000	0.000	0.033
	3	113.94*	19	0.763	0.168	0.118	17.81*	12	0.980	0.054	0.035
	4	45.21*	19	0.935	0.088	0.069	10.87	12	1.000	0.000	0.051
	Overall	82.76*	27	0.913	0.108	0.048					
	2	104.16*	31	0.885	0.115	0.069					
	3	87.52	31	0.911	0.101	0.053					
	4	122.68*	31	0.856	0.129	0.087					
	5	163.42*	31	0.792	0.155	0.117					
	6	142.84*	31	0.824	0.143	0.098					
	Overall	21.69*	6	0.972	0.121	0.027					
Honor	1	67.87*	10	0.896	0.181	0.107					
	2	133.67*	10	0.779	0.264	0.196					
	3	150.00*	10	0.75	0.281	0.225					
	Overall	62.96*	27	0.936	0.087	0.044					
	1	109.6*	31	0.96	0.119	0.084					
	2	75.39	31	0.921	0.089	0.058					
	3	80.79*	31	0.911	0.095	0.065					
	4	118.05*	31	0.945	0.126	0.092					
	6	91.29*	31	0.893	0.105	0.071					
	Overall	26.01*	15	0.981	0.064	0.028	7.099	10	1.000	0.000	0.021
Relativism	1	38.55	19	0.966	0.076	0.05	8.86	12	1.000	0.000	0.029
	2	26.96	19	0.986	0.049	0.032	7.86	12	1.000	0.000	0.025
	3	47.76*	19	0.950	0.092	0.064	9.09	12	1.000	0.000	0.030
	Overall										

Table 7 (cont'd).

	5	41.7*	19	0.960	0.082	0.055	14.23	12	0.990	0.030	0.046
Idealism											
	Overall	24.44	15	0.989	0.059	0.026					
	1	51.65*	19	0.964	0.098	0.069					
	2	47.31*	19	0.969	0.092	0.074					
	3	43.52*	19	0.973	0.085	0.056					
	5	38.64*	19	0.978	0.076	0.053					
Forcing											
	Overall	27.48*	15	0.986	0.069	0.025					
	1	93.06*	19	0.915	0.150	0.123					
	3	90.67*	19	0.918	0.147	0.122					
	4	59.48*	19	0.952	0.111	0.084					
	5	121.09*	19	0.883	0.178	0.166					
Compromise											
	Overall	10.79	6	0.989	0.068	0.022	9.24	4	0.976	0.089	0.029
	1	26.33*	10	0.965	0.096	0.055	23.56*	6	0.919	0.133	0.073
	2	23.79*	10	0.971	0.089	0.056	10.92	6	0.977	0.07	0.037
	4	18.3	10	0.982	0.069	0.041	15.88	6	0.954	0.099	0.053
Integrative											
	Overall	121.88	42	0.949	0.104	0.042					
	2	36.27*	46	0.943	0.106	0.063					
	3	129.7	46	0.947	0.102	0.051					
	4	126.58	46	0.949	0.100	0.047					
	5	143.65*	46	0.938	0.110	0.071					
	6	125.63	46	0.949	0.099	0.047					
	7	136.04*	46	0.942	0.106	0.056					

Note: * $p < .05$. Estimates reflect ML estimation.

Table 7 (cont'd).

Scale	Item	Fit Statistics for 3 Group Comparison					Fit Statistics for 2 Group Comparison				
		χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR
Aristotelian	Overall	4.05*	6	1	0	0.026					
	1	49.99*	10	0.818	0.151	0.078					
	3	52.56*	10	0.807	0.156	0.083					
	4	19.38*	10	0.957	0.073	0.052					
Hindu	Overall	9.08*	15	1	0	0.033					
	2	78.7*	19	0.923	0.133	0.0834					
	3	26.33*	19	0.991	0.047	0.05					
	4	152.96*	19	0.827	0.199	0.111					
	5	65.84*	19	0.939	0.118	0.077					
Confucian	Overall	119.17*	105	0.991	0.028	0.067					
	1	198*	109	0.943	0.068	0.84					
	3	180.02*	109	0.954	0.061	0.079					
	4	172.68*	109	0.959	0.058	0.078					
	5	227.17*	109	0.925	0.079	0.086					
	6	178.12*	109	0.956	0.06	0.081					
	7	198.46*	109	0.943	0.069	0.083					
	8	214.38*	109	0.933	0.074	0.084					
	9	255.54*	109	0.907	0.089	0.09					
	10	365.51*	109	0.839	0.114	0.102					
Collectivism	Overall	6.11*	15	1	0	0.025	2.57	10	1	0	0.021
	1	158.52*	19	0.67	0.205	0.115	4.77	12	1	0	0.031
	2	117.14*	19	0.77	0.172	0.098	6	12	1	0	0.033

Table 7 (cont'd).

Face	3	37.64*	19	0.96	0.075	0.059	9.65	12	1	0	0.041
	4	210.4*	19	0.55	0.24	0.129	9.47	12	1	0	0.039
	Overall	24.69*	27	1	0	0.048					
	2	46.33*	31	0.978	0.053	0.062					
	3	28.57*	31	1	0	0.051					
	4	61.09*	31	0.957	0.075	0.07					
	5	113.73*	31	0.884	0.123	0.091					
Honor	6	83.57*	31	0.927	0.099	0.079					
	Overall	5.11*	6	1	0	0.027					
	1	134.69*	10	0.761	0.267	0.129					
	2	155.82*	10	0.72	0.288	0.137					
	3	54.64*	10	0.915	0.159	0.082					
Dignity	Overall	23.46*	27	1	0	0.045					
	1	35.77*	31	0.992	0.029	0.055					
	2	40.16*	31	0.985	0.041	0.056					
	3	79.77*	31	0.022	0.095	0.075					
	4	78.13*	31	0.925	0.093	0.078					
	6	52.17*	31	0.966	0.062	0.063					
Relativism	Overall	6.18	15	1	0	0.028	1.78	10	1	0	0.021
	1	6.97	19	1	0	0.03	2.39	12	1	0	0.024
	2	29.12*	19	0.98	0.056	0.051	3.68	12	1	0	0.027
	3	18.41*	19	1	0	0.042	3.3	12	1	0	0.026
	5		19	0.994	0.03	0.046	8.32*	12	1	0	0.038
Idealism											

Table 7 (cont'd).

	Overall	7.93	15	1	0	0.026					
	1	28.71*	19	0.99	0.054	0.054					
	2	25.91*	19	0.993	0.045	0.046					
	3	35.36*	19	0.983	0.069	0.055					
	5	21.39*	19	0.998	0.027	0.044					
Forcing	Overall	5.15*	15	1	0	0.026					
	1	75.49*	19	0.945	0.131	0.81					
	3	73.16*	19	0.947	0.129	0.079					
	4	36.77*	19	0.983	0.074	0.061					
	5	113.41*	19	0.908	0.169	0.097					
Compromise	Overall	3.2	6	1	0.068	0.022	3.05	4	1	0	0.028
	1	11.67*	10	0.995	0.096	0.055	4.37	6	1	0	0.034
	2	18.67*	10	0.974	0.089	0.056	17.85*	6	0.941	0.109	0.063
	4	10.46	10	0.998	0.069	0.041	9.83	6	0.98	0.062	0.047
Integrative	Overall	23.89	42	1	0	0.045					
	2	36.09	46	1	0	0.055					
	3	32.08	46	1	0	0.051					
	4	30.88	46	1	0	0.048					
	5	44.04	46	1	0	0.058					
	6	26.04	46	1	0	0.049					
	7	37.8	46	1	0	0.053					

Note: * $p < .05$. Estimates reflect DWLS estimation.

Table 8. *Model fits for all estimated models.*

Model Set	Estimation Method	Models	Sample	Model Fit Indices			
Hypothesized	ML	Confucian		$\chi^2 (df)$	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR
			America	21.58(3)*	0.91	0.18	0.06
			India	86.28(3)*	0.86	0.40	0.10
			China	62.92(3)*	0.76	0.36	0.13
		Aristotelian	America	81.46(4)*	0.59	0.31	0.11
			India	136.63(4)*	0.76	0.43	0.11
			China	91.03(4)*	0.60	0.37	0.16
		Hindu	America	9.45(2)*	0.89	0.14	0.05
			India	34.52(2)*	0.90	0.30	0.07
			China	22.30(2)*	0.88	0.25	0.08
	DWLS	Confucian	America	4.47(3)	0.99	0.05	0.05
			India	1.96(3)	1.00	0.00	0.05
			China	10.57(3)*	0.97	0.13	0.12
		Aristotelian	America	19.50(4)*	0.89	0.15	0.10
			India	2.76(4)	1.00	0.00	0.06
			China	20.78(4)*	0.93	0.16	0.12
		Hindu	America	4.34(2)	0.96	0.08	0.05
			India	1.65(2)	1.00	0.00	0.05
			China	6.90(2)*	0.97	0.13	0.07

Table 8 (cont'd).

Alternate						
	ML					
		Relativism				
		America	2.61(1)	0.99	0.10	0.02
		India	10.50(1)*	0.99	0.16	0.02
		China	1.65(1)	0.99	0.08	0.02
		Idealism				
		America	5.93(3)	0.98	0.05	0.03
		India	9.56(3)*	0.91	0.23	0.06
		China	6.96(3)*	0.96	0.19	0.07
	DWLS					
		Relativism ⁺				
		America	0.52(1)	1.00	0.00	0.02
		India	0.50(1)	1.00	0.00	0.02
		China	0.40(1)	1.00	0.00	0.02
		Idealism				
		America	3.34(4)	1.00	0.00	0.03
		India	1.48(4)	1.00	0.00	0.03
		China	9.59(3)*	0.98	0.09	0.06
	DWLS + Mod. indices					
		Idealism ⁺				
		America	0.51(2)	1.00	0.00	0.01
		India	0.45(2)	1.00	0.00	0.02
		China	3.01(2)	1.00	0.06	0.03

Note: * $p < .05$. Models with superscript (+) are the final models.

Table 9. *Relativism model across cultural subgroups.*

Subgroup	Path Coefficients			Indirect Effects	
		To Collectivism	To Face	To Compromise	Estimate Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Interval
American	Confucianism	.58(.10)*	.70(.06)*		
	Collectivism			-.11(.07)	
	Face			.47(.15)*	
	Relativism	.08(.07)	.16(.09)	.16(.09)	
	Relativism → Face → Compromise				.08(.05) (-.02, .17)
	Relativism → Collectivism → Compromise				-.01(.01) (-.04, .01)
	Fit Statistics	$\chi^2 (df) = .52(1)$	CFI = 1.00	RMSEA = 0.00	SRMR = .02
Indian	Confucianism	.60(.15)*	.47(.17)*		
	Collectivism			.62(7.92)	
	Face			-.05(7.27)	
	Relativism	.26(.16)	.35(.18)	.37(.85)	
	Relativism → Face → Compromise				-.02(3.6) (-.80, .08)
	Relativism → Collectivism → Compromise				.16(4.43) (-.01, .62)
	Fit Statistics	$\chi^2 (df) = .50(1)$	CFI = 1.00	RMSEA = 0.00	SRMR = .02
Chinese	Confucianism	.41(.16)*	.28(.12)*		
	Collectivism			.31(.11)*	
	Face			.31(.11)*	
	Relativism	.34(.14)*	.25(.11)*	.06(.08)	

Table 9 (cont'd).

Relativism → Face → Compromise	.08(.05)*	(.01, .18)
Relativism → Collectivism → Compromise	.11(.05)*	(.02, .23)
Fit Statistics	$\chi^2 (df) = .40(1)$ CFI = 1.00 RMSEA = 0.00 SRMR = .02	

Note: models were estimated through DWLS. * $p < .05$.

Table 10. *Idealism model across cultural groups.*

Subgroup	Path Coefficients			Indirect Effects	
		To Dignity	To Honor	To Forcing	Estimate Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Interval
American	Aristotelian	.26(.08)*		-.25(.12)	
	Hinduism		.42(.08)*	.06(.09)	
	Dignity			.49(.13)*	
	Honor			.19(.09)*	
	Idealism	.22(.06)*	.07(.08)	-.02(.11)	
	Idealism → Dignity → Forcing				.11(.04)* (.03, .21)
	Idealism → Honor → Forcing				.02(.02) (-.02, .05)
	Fit Statistics	χ^2 (df) = .51(2)	CFI = 1.00	RMSEA = 0.00	SRMR = .011
Indian	Aristotelian	.39(.11)*		.48(.29)	
	Hinduism		.30(.11)*	-.04(.21)	
	Dignity			.30(.32)	
	Honor			-.05(.15)	
	Idealism	.49(.10)*	.60(.10)*	.10(.24)	
	Idealism → Dignity → Forcing				.15(.16) (-.23, .40)
	Idealism → Honor → Forcing				-.03(.09) (-.18, .17)
	Fit Statistics	χ^2 (df) = .45(2)	CFI = 1.00	RMSEA = 0.00	SRMR = .017
Chinese	Aristotelian	.43(.14)*		.06(.19)	
	Hinduism		.27(.06)*	.31(.09)*	
	Dignity			.19(.11)	
	Honor			-.05(.12)	
	Idealism	.24(.13)	.43(.09)*	.25(.14)	
	Idealism → Dignity → Forcing				.05(.37) (-.01, .13)

Table 10 (cont'd).

Idealism → Honor → Forcing					-.02(.05)	(-.14, .07)
Fit Statistics	χ^2 (df) = 3.01(2)	CFI = .996	RMSEA = .057	SRMR = .033		

Note: models were estimated through DWLS. * $p < .05$. * $p < .05$.

Appendix B: Figures

Figure 1. *General cultural model of conflict resolution*




Figure 2. *Confucian pathway of conflict resolution*




Figure 3. *Aristotelian pathway of conflict resolution*




Figure 4. *Hindu pathway of conflict resolution*




Figure 5. *Multi-group model of collectivist cultures.*




Figure 6. *Alternate model set.*




Figure 6a: Relativism Model




Figure 6b: Idealism Model

Note: the paths linking Confucianism to Face and Collectivism do not indicate causal order. The mediation estimated in Figure 6a is represented by the Relativism → Face and Collectivism → Compromise paths. Similarly, the paths linking Hindu Beliefs and Aristotelian Virtues to Honor and Dignity also do not indicate causal order. The mediation estimated in Figure 6b is represented by the Idealism → Dignity and Honor → Forcing paths.

Appendix C: Measures and Forms

Chinese Values Survey: Items measuring Confucian worldview (CCC, 1987)

Please indicate the extent to which you value the following statements on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).

- Tolerance
- Loyalty to superiors
- Benevolent authority
- Non-competitiveness
- Keeping oneself pure
- Thrift
- Contentedness
- Being conservative
- Protecting your 'face'
- Respect for tradition

1 = very low

2 = somewhat low

3 = neither low nor high

4 = high

5 = very high

Leadership Virtues Questionnaire: Items measuring Aristotelian justice (Riggio et al., 2010)

Please rate the extent to which you value the following statements on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high)

- Giving credit to others when credit is due
- Demonstrating respect for all people
- Not taking credit for the accomplishments of others
- Making promotion decisions based on merit
- Treating others how you want to be treated

1 = very low

2 = somewhat low

3 = neither low nor high

4 = high

5 = very high

Indian Beliefs survey: Items measuring Hindu worldview (Mulla & Krishnan, 2007)

Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements on a scale of 1 (highly disagree) to 5 (highly agree)

- If I do good deeds, I will get good results either in this life or in the next
- Joys and sorrows experienced by me are a result of my actions in this life or earlier lives
- There exists a permanent entity called a “soul” within me
- The goal of life is to be liberated from the cycle of birth and death
- It is possible to grow spiritually by performing one’s worldly duties selflessly

1 = highly disagree

2 = somewhat disagree

3 = neither agree nor disagree

4 = agree

5 = highly agree

Items measuring dignity (Yao et al., 2016)

Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

- People should speak their mind
- People should make decisions based on their own opinions and not based on what others think
- People should be true to themselves regardless of what others think
- People should stand up for what they believe in even when others disagree
- How much a person respects themselves is far more important than how much others respect them
- People should not care what others around them think

Items measuring face (Yao et al., 2016)

Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

- People should be very humble to maintain good relationships
- People should control their behavior in front of others
- People should be extremely careful not to embarrass others
- People should minimize conflict in social relationships at all costs
- It is important to maintain harmony within one’s group
- People should never criticize others in public

Items measuring honor (Yao et al., 2016)

Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

- People should be concerned about their family having a bad reputation
- People should not allow others to insult their family
- People should be concerned with defending their families' reputation
- People should be concerned with not damaging their families' reputation

Items measuring collectivism (Oyserman, et al., 2002)

Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

- To understand who I am, you must see me with members of my group
- I would rather do a group paper or lab than do one alone
- How I behave depends on who I am with

1 = highly disagree

2 = somewhat disagree

3 = neither agree nor disagree

4 = agree

5 = highly agree

Items measuring ethical positions (Forsyth, 1980)

Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Idealism items

- People should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree.
- Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be.
- The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained.
- One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
- One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare of another individual.
- If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
- Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
- The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most important concern in any society.
- It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
- Moral behaviors are actions that closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action.
- There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any code of ethics.

Relativism items

- What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another.
- Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person.
- Different types of morality cannot be compared as to “rightness.”
- Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or immoral is up to the individual.
- Moral standards are simply personal rules that indicate how a person should behave, and are not to be applied in making judgments of others.
- Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes.
- Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment.
- No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not permissible totally depends upon the situation.
- Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action.

1 = highly disagree

2 = somewhat disagree

3 = neither agree nor disagree

4 = agree

5 = highly agree

Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory-II Form C (Rahim, 1984)

Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) in the context of a conflict with a peer.

Items measuring integrating behaviors:

- I try to investigate an issue with my peers to find a solution acceptable to us.
- I try to integrate my ideas with those of my peers to come up with a decision jointly.
- I try to work with my peers to find solution to a problem that satisfies our expectations.
- I try to bring all our concerns out in the open so that the issues can be resolved in the best possible way.
- I collaborate with my peers to come up with decisions acceptable to us.
- I exchange accurate information with my peers to solve a problem together.
- I try to work with my peers for a proper understanding of a problem

Items measuring compromising behaviors:

- I try to find a middle course to resolve an impasse
- I usually propose a middle ground for breaking deadlocks.
- I negotiate with my peers so that a compromise can be reached.
- I use "give and take" so that a compromise can be made

Items measuring forcing behaviors:

- I use my expertise to make a decision in my favor
- I use my influence to get my ideas accepted.
- I use my authority to make a decision in my favor
- I am generally firm in pursuing my side of the issue.
- I sometimes use my power to win a competitive situation.

1 = highly disagree

2 = somewhat disagree

3 = neither agree nor disagree

4 = agree

5 = highly agree

Demographics Questionnaire

1. Please enter your age:
2. Please enter your sex:
 - Male
 - Female
3. Please enter your nationality:
 - Indian
 - American
 - Chinese
4. Attention Check items:
 - Please mark highly agree to this question
 - Please briefly (2-3 sentences AT MOST) describe an instance you had a conflict with a coworker and the actions you took to resolve this conflict (nonsensical responses will be discarded).

Informed Consent Form

The purpose of this research study is to understand how people of different cultures handle conflict within the workplace. In this study, you will be asked to fill out a few demographic questions, such as your age and nationality. Then, you will read and answer questions related to your worldviews, ethics, cultural values, and how you choose to handle conflict.

This research study will take approximately 20 minutes to complete, and you will receive a one-time payment of \$2.00 for your participation at the end of the session which will be delivered via the Amazon Mechanical Turk system. Your participation is voluntary and greatly appreciated. You may choose not to participate at all, or you may refuse to participate in certain procedures or answer certain questions or discontinue your participation at any time without consequences (e.g., will not affect treatment you will receive, will not affect your payment, etc.). Also, you have the right to request that your responses not be used in the data analyses.

Compensation Rules

The following are reasons why we would not be able to compensate you for your participation. By following these compensation rules, we hope to be as fair as possible to survey respondents who meet the study criteria, who access the survey only once, and who provide quality data for our study. Please note:

- **If you do not include your MTurk ID in the online survey** we cannot identify you and so you will not be compensated if you fail to correctly enter your Mturk ID in the online survey. If we have no record of your Mturk ID in our data, we cannot compensate you.
- **If you are not eligible to take this research survey based on the prescreening questions**, we cannot compensate you for your participation. The quality of our scientific study depends on participants meeting these criteria. If we find that you have re-entered the survey multiple times after initially failing the prescreening questions, we also cannot compensate you.
- **If your survey responses include poor qualitative (written) responses**, we cannot compensate you for your participation. Poor quality qualitative responses include, but are not limited to, nonsensical text or lines copied and pasted from other internet sources. The rigor of our scientific study depends on high quality data.
- **If you type the wrong survey code into the Mturk survey code box**, we cannot compensate you for your participation as we cannot ensure you are a human participant who is eligible for this research survey.
- **If you fail the CAPTCHA check**, we cannot compensate you for your participation as we cannot ensure you are a human participant who is eligible for this research survey.
- **If you do not correctly answer attention check items**, we cannot compensate you for your participation as we cannot be sure you have provided quality data.

Participation in this research study does not involve any foreseeable risks. The benefit of participating in this research study, however, is that you have the opportunity to learn more about the research process and also help contribute to scientific advancement.

This study is confidential. Your answers will only be associated with an anonymous ID. To help us protect your confidentiality, **please do not write or give your name or any other identifying information during the study.** Your confidentiality will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law. All data will be stored on the hard drive of a secure computer and will only be

accessed by trained experimenters. Data will be stored for five years after the publication of research stemming from this project---as specified by the American Psychological Association.

At the conclusion of this research, you will be provided with an explanation of the survey. It is our goal that you learn about the research you participated in today. Furthermore, the investigator will be happy to answer any questions you have about the research.

Ajay Somaraju, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology at Michigan State is conducting this scientific study under the advisement of Dr. Fredrick Leong, a professor in the Department of Psychology. If you have questions about the study, contact Dr. Fredrick Leong, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-9925, e-mail: fleong@msu.edu. If you have questions or concerns about your role and rights as a research participant, or would like to register a complaint about this study, you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Michigan State University's Human Research Protection Program at 517-355-2180, Fax 517-432-4503, or e-mail irb@msu.edu or regular mail at 4000 Collins Rd., Suite 136, Lansing, MI 48910.

Your continued participation in this survey indicates your consent to participate in this study.

Debriefing Form

Thank you for participating in our study. This form is designed to provide you with information about the purpose and importance of this study.

The purpose of this study was to learn more about how different worldviews and ethical preferences impacted conflict resolution preferences. Specifically, we hoped to identify how different worldviews led to the development of cultural values and ethical positions that then impacted resolution preferences.

The experimental design was relatively straightforward and is of the type often encountered in psychological research. Given the mild nature of the experimental design, we anticipate that there are and will be no risks involved for any of our participants. However, if you did recall an event that negatively impacted you, please contact the appropriate number below:

Office of Cultural and Academic Transitions (517-353-7745)

Office of Institutional Equity (517-353-3922)

National suicide hotline (phone: 1-800-273-8255)

Emergency number (phone: 911)

Additionally, if you have questions or concerns regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact the investigators. Additionally, if you would like more information about the study or have further questions about it, please feel free to contact:

Ajay Somaraju, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, e-mail: somaraju@msu.edu.

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