

DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

By

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of distributive policies in autocracies. Existing scholarship argues that democratic responsiveness affects distributive allocations, because voters are able to hold politicians accountable in elections. However, researchers have not sufficiently paid attention to why dictators spend significant resources on distributive policies in autocracies as well, where accountability for policy performance is relatively low or non-existent. This dissertation argues that distributive policies represent the vehicle that autocrats use to maintain political dominance and to pursue autocratic legitimation.

In the first essay, I focus on political budgetary cycles in autocratic redistribution. While political budgetary cycles in democracies have been rigorously studied in past decades, surprisingly little is known about the electorally motivated budgetary cycle in authoritarian regimes. This study analyzes how dictators strategically choose the timing of welfare expansion to cultivate electoral dominance even when election results are predetermined. I argue that dictators spend more on redistributive policy in election periods, and that citizens' evaluations of redistributive policy fluctuate according to the electoral cycle. Using budgetary spending data from 63 autocratic countries between 1972 and 2015 and Afrobarometer survey data in 18 African autocracies between 2008 and 2015, this paper finds cross-national evidence of the existence of an electoral cycle in autocratic redistribution. These findings contribute to the authoritarian politics literature by exploring macro- and micro-level mechanisms about how authoritarian elections contribute to regime durability.

The second essay analyzes how autocratic welfare programs affect support for dictators. This essay argues that autocratic welfare programs alleviate the adverse effects of poor economic performance on citizens' support for the dictator. Negative conditions in the national economy can undermine the performance-based legitimacy of autocratic rulers. Welfare benefits can compensate for citizens' loss of income, however, and can thus serve as a means of purchasing citizens' support. Consequently, the provision of welfare benefits contributes to building autocratic legitimation even under conditions of economic recession. Using Afrobarometer Survey data from 22 African autocracies from 1999 to 2015, I explore the micro-foundations of autocratic support with a focus on autocratic welfare programs and citizens' evaluations of the national economy.

While existing studies on authoritarian politics focus on the dictator-citizen relationship to examine the motivation of autocratic distribution, little attention has been paid to how dictators allocate government resources to manage relationships with the ruling elites. The last essay argues that dictators have an incentive to staff the legislature with the elites who have a close connection. Dictators deliver more targeted government transfers to localities where these legislators are elected. By doing this, dictators can legitimize their political dominance by improving loyal legislators' policy competence. Utilizing original data about legislators' attributes in South Korean military dictatorship between 1973 and 1987, I measure dictators' connection with legislators based upon legislators' military experience. I find that legislators' military experience significantly increases the distribution of targeted government transfers in their electoral districts. This paper highlights that military dictators strategically use authoritarian legislatures and distribute targeted government transfers to manage and control military forces.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Puzzles

This dissertation explores the determinants and consequences of distributive policy in authoritarian regimes. My dissertation answers three research questions: (1) Why do dictators spend significant resources on distributive policy?; (2) How do they strategically improvise distributive policy to maintain regimes' stability? More specifically, how do they cultivate popular support and reduce threats from other ruling elites through distributive policy?; and (3) How does the delivery of distributive benefits affect regime stability?

Economic policy distributes material benefits to “(1) many citizens, (2) narrow groups of citizens, and (3) virtually no citizens, but a specific group of politicians” (Persson and Tabellini 2003: 20). Existing studies find that democracies are more likely than autocracies to allocate government resources to broadly targeted economic policy (Avelino et al. 2005; Brown and Hunter 1999; Lake and Baum 2001). They argue that democratic responsiveness affects distributive allocations because voters are able to hold politicians accountable in free and competitive elections.

It is important to note, however, that authoritarian leaders often introduce generous welfare programs, even though accountability for policy performance is relatively low or even absent. For example, two-thirds of old age pension programs around the world have been implemented by autocratic governments. Interestingly, Bismarck in Germany and von Taaffe in Austria expanded social insurance programs despite operating under systems of limited suffrage (Mares and Carnes 2009). In addition, dictators allocate significant government funding to

deliver localized benefits (Magaloni 2006; Schady 2000). For instance, the autocratic government of South Korea spent significant government resources on expanding public infrastructure, such as a subway system (Cho, Lee, and Song 2019) and industrial complexes (Hong and Park 2014).

Why do autocratic leaders bother to spend government resources on distributive policy rather than pocketing those valuable resources themselves? Given that citizens have low policy influence in authoritarian regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003), autocrats may have a high incentive to distribute government resources to themselves rather than citizens. However, recent studies demonstrate that authoritarian leaders often attempt to show positive policy outcomes by delivering on citizens' demands for distributive policy (Blaydes 2011; Magaloni 2006; Miller 2005).

My dissertation addresses three major puzzles in authoritarian politics literature. All these puzzles lie on the linkage between distributive politics and regime survival strategy. While the first two puzzles discuss why dictators are incentivized to distribute material benefits to many citizens, the last puzzle discusses how dictators deliver targeted government transfers to a specific group of citizens. In other words, the first two puzzles are related to social welfare policies, whereas the last puzzle is related to local development policy.

The first puzzle is why dictators spend significant resources on distributive policy around election periods. Although electoral results are predetermined, studies have found that dictators spend significant government resources prior to elections (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Blaydes 2011; Magaloni 2006; Pepinsky 2007; Schady 2000). The political budgetary cycle (PBC) literature argues that elected officials are incentivized to manipulate positive policy outcomes in order to win elections (Brender and Drazen 2013; Drazen and Eslava 2010;

Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff 1990; Tufte 1978). Given that autocratic leaders are unlikely to be defeated by opposition candidates, the conventional view of PBC does not hold in authoritarian regimes. In addition, recent studies in authoritarian politics argue that competitive elections in authoritarian regimes consolidate regime durability by demonstrating positive policy outcomes (Magaloni 2006; Miller 2015). However, we still have restricted understanding about the detailed mechanisms behind how elections contribute to regime stability. Particularly, little attention has been paid to how dictators strategically choose the timing of distributive policy expansion.

This dissertation also explores how autocratic welfare programs contribute to regime stability. The authoritarian politics literature has not sufficiently provided a clear linkage between policy performances and autocratic support. More importantly, these studies have paid limited attention to the micro-foundation of autocratic support. We have limited understanding about how autocratic welfare policy shapes citizens' support for autocracy.

The last puzzle of this dissertation is how dictators use distributive policy to manage their relationship with political elites. Dictators strategically distribute policy influence to cultivate loyalty from the ruling elites (Williams and Magaloni 2020). However, existing studies on authoritarian distribution mostly focus on the dictator-citizen relationship to examine the motivation of distributive policy in authoritarian regimes (Blaydes 2011; Hong and Park 2014; Magaloni 2006). In addition, most studies on authoritarian politics have exclusively focused on party-based dictatorship to explore dictators' elite-management strategy (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008; Svobik 2012). We have only limited understanding about how dictators in non-party dictatorships are incentivized to deliver targeted government transfers to manage their relationship with the ruling elites.

1.2. Solutions

The fundamental concern of authoritarian leaders is how to maintain regime stability. To stay in power, dictators need to maintain political dominance over various political actors in their regimes, such as opposition parties, the ruling elites, and even citizens. The main argument of this dissertation is that autocratic rulers strategically use distributive policy to reduce threats posed by these various actors. More specifically, dictators strategically choose the timing of the redistributive policy expansion to maximize its positive impact on electoral dominance. In addition, welfare programs contribute to maintaining popular support by compensating for citizens' income loss even under economic recessions. Lastly, they also use targeted transfers to secure political dominance of the ruling elites. In short, distributive policy is a useful regime management strategy in authoritarian regimes.

My dissertation seeks to find the solutions to these puzzles by making a connection between authoritarian institutions and distributive politics. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that quasi-democratic institutions under autocratic regimes, such as elections and legislatures, contribute to regime durability (Gandhi 2008; Svoboda 2012). In addition, scholars have found that institutionalized autocracies produce better outcomes in various policy areas (Kim and Gandhi 2010; Miller 2015; Wright 2008). However, as recent studies begin to question the institutional perspective, the scope of conditions under which dictators improvise autocratic policies remain unclear.¹ In other words, existing studies overlook how dictators maximize the effectiveness of various policy instruments to stay in power. This dissertation attempts to find the key solution to

¹ For instance, Pepinsky (2013: 631) forcefully argues that "... authoritarian institutions are epiphenomenal on more fundamental political, social and/or economic relations"

my research puzzles by exploring how dictators cultivate regime durability by using distributive policy within the setting of institutionalized autocracy.

Chapter 2 explores PBCs in authoritarian redistribution. I argue that dictators are incentivized to expand redistributive policy in order to cultivate electoral dominance. By cultivating large margins of electoral victory, dictators can demonstrate the extent of political controls over the regimes. Therefore, electoral dominance reduces the likelihood of opposition coordination for collective actions and elite defection from the ruling party. In other words, the main institutional function of autocratic elections is not only to defeat the opposition but also to demonstrate regime dominance.

The redistributive policy expansion is more effective than other tactics, such as repression and electoral fraud. Electoral dominance gained through these two strategies does not credibly signal popular support for the regimes. Instead, they expose illegitimacy in autocracies. However, the expansion of redistributive policy is a safe strategy to obtain electoral support. The delivery of redistributive benefits improves citizens' disposable income and creates a positive image of dictators' policy competence. Therefore, autocratic leaders distribute more welfare benefits as elections approach.

Second, my dissertation explores the impact of redistributive policy on autocratic stability. Chapter 3 explores how autocratic welfare programs contribute to regime durability. In authoritarian regimes, dictators need to demonstrate positive policy outcomes to legitimize their repressive rules (Huntington 1991). However, negative economic outcomes dismantle the foundation of autocratic legitimacy through the adverse impact on citizens' material wellbeing. Therefore, dictators need to compensate citizens' material losses during economic recessions.

Welfare programs stabilize authoritarian regimes even under economic recessions. The delivery of redistributive benefits compensates for citizens' material losses by increasing their disposable income. Consequently, autocratic welfare programs alleviate the adverse impact of negative economic perceptions on citizens' support for the dictator.

Lastly, dictators strategically use distributive policy to legitimize the ruling elites' political dominance. Chapter 4 discusses how dictators strategically use targeted government transfers to secure the legislative seats of their trustful politicians. Dictators often need to cultivate the support from legislatures to push their policy preferences. Therefore, dictators are incentivized to fill legislative seats with trustful politicians. Dictators manage government coalition with these politicians through the distribution of policy influence.

Chapter 4 focuses on military dictatorship to examine why dictators have an incentive to deliver distributive benefits to specific localities. This chapter mainly argues that military dictators distribute more targeted government transfers to the electoral districts of military legislators. Since military education facilitates internal cohesion within the military forces (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster 2018), military dictators allocate a significant portion of legislative seats to military elites. Dictators strategically improvise targeted distribution to secure legislative seats for legislators who were former military officers. In addition, legislators with military experience have higher accessibility to government spoils than those without such experience. Dictators are also incentivized to demonstrate the ruling elites' policy competence by producing positive policy outcomes. Therefore, legislators' military experience is positively related to targeted local government transfers in their electoral districts.

1.3. Contributions

This dissertation explores causes and consequences of distributive politics in authoritarian regimes. My dissertation has three major contributions. First, this dissertation uncovers the scope conditions which facilitate dictators' incentives to invest more government resources on distributive policy. This dissertation improves our understanding of why institutionalized autocracies are more durable than non-institutionalized ones. Chapter 2 finds that dictators strategically select the timing of the redistributive policy expansion in order to stabilize their regimes. In addition, Chapter 4 explores how dictators use autocratic legislatures to manage their relationship with the ruling elites. While most studies focus on party-based dictatorship to the role of autocratic institutions, Chapter 4 extends the discussion to military dictatorship by highlighting military dictators' elite-management strategy.

Second, my dissertation extends the research scope of distributive politics by making a connection with authoritarian politics. Existing studies on distributive politics mostly focus on democratic contexts. Studies on distributive politics have rigorously tested how incumbents manipulate policy outcomes to improve their electoral fortune (Brender and Drazen 2005; Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff 1990; Shi and Svensson 2006; Tufte 1978), how welfare programs positively affect popular support (Pacek and Radcliff 1995, 2008), and how the characteristics of political elites shape policy outcomes (Bratton and Ray 2002; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2014; Franck and Rainer 2012; Pande 2003; Schwindt-Bayer 2006) with a focus on democracies. However, surprisingly little is known about the conditions that motivate dictators to distribute government transfers, and how distributive policy affects regime stability. This dissertation sheds light on authoritarian politics by exploring the causes and consequences of autocratic distribution.

Lastly, this dissertation explores the micro-foundation of autocratic support. Although individual-level survey data are increasingly available, they have rarely been used to study authoritarian politics. Instead, most studies have found supporting evidence for their theoretical predictions based upon country-level analysis. Using Afrobarometer survey data, Chapter 2 examines PBCs in distributive politics, and Chapter 3 discusses the impact of welfare programs on popular support for the dictator. In addition, Chapter 4 uses subnational data in South Korean autocracy to examine dictators' elite-management strategy.

1.4. Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores political budgetary cycles in authoritarian redistribution. Building upon the recent development of PBC theory, this chapter argues that dictators strategically re-allocate budgetary spending to the delivery of welfare benefits in order to cultivate electoral dominance. Low informational transparency offers a suitable condition for autocratic PBC by deterring citizens from weighing more dictators' recent policy performance. Dictators also need to deliver redistributive benefits even after elections to reward core supporters. Therefore, the expansion of redistributive policy around election periods help dictators shape positive perceptions of government redistribution as an election approaches.

I conduct country-level and multi-level analysis to test my hypotheses. In the former analysis, I use time-series cross-country data from 63 electoral authoritarian regimes between 1972 and 2015. In the latter, I use Afrobarometer survey data from 18 African autocracies between 2008 and 2015. I find that dictators expand redistributive policy as an election approaches; thus, citizens have more positive evaluations about redistributive policy around election periods.

Chapter 3 investigates how autocratic welfare programs contribute to regime stability. Negative economic outcomes encourage citizens to withdraw their support for the dictator. However, welfare programs mitigate the adverse impact of economic recessions on citizens' material wellbeing. The delivery of redistributive benefits help compensate for citizens' economic hardship. As a result, dictators can maintain autocratic legitimation even under economic recessions. Using Afrobarometer survey data from 22 African authoritarian regimes, I found that the provision of welfare benefits alleviates the adverse impact of negative economic perceptions on support for the dictator.

Chapter 4 examines the impact of legislators' military experience on targeted government transfers in South Korean military dictatorship. The central features of the military force (e.g. obedience and hierarchy) facilitate the patron-client relationship between a leader and military officers. Military dictators also use legislatures to manage factionalism in military forces by offering legislative seats. Dictators distribute more government spoils to legislators who are former military officers. Consequently, military legislators allocate more targeted government transfers to their electoral districts than legislators without military experience. Utilizing original data about the characteristics of South Korean legislators in the era of military autocracy, I found that legislators with military experience significantly increase the coverage of public piped water facilities in their electoral districts compared to those without such experience.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL BUDGETARY CYCLES IN AUTOCRATIC REDISTRIBUTION

2.1. Introduction

In July 1977, South Korean President Park Chung-hee introduced the country's first national health care program, which provided coverage to private firms with more than 500 employees. Park won the presidential election the following year in a landslide victory, sweeping the board with 2,577 of 2,581 deputy votes.² At the end of 1976, Taiwanese Premier Chiang Ching-kuo used the special supplementary budget to give a month's additional salary to all government bureaucrats, public teachers, and military personnel. In March 1978 Chiang was elected president, a post he held until his death in 1988. Park and Chiang are not the only two autocratic leaders who have reallocated government spending to cultivate political dominance in subsequent elections. Several studies have identified a similar pattern of increased budgetary spending during election periods in Egypt (Blaydes 2011), Malaysia (Pepinsky 2007), Mexico (Magaloni 2006), Peru (Schady 2000), and Russia (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004).

These illustrative cases suggest that political budgetary cycles (PBCs) might be present in autocracies as well as democracies. While the size and type of PBCs have been subject to rigorous research in recent decades, surprisingly little is known about whether and how they occur in authoritarian regimes. If PBCs are detected in autocracies, this represents a theoretical anomaly that the conventional PBC literature cannot fully explain. The conventional view holds that elected officials in democracies have incentives to manipulate economic outcomes or

² In the legislative election held later that year, the president's party defeated the main opposition, the New Democratic Party, and continued to hold a supermajority in the legislature.

government spending in order to win elections (Brender and Drazen 2013; Drazen and Eslava 2010; Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff 1990; Tufte 1978). However, since dictators rarely get voted out of office (Svolik 2012), it is quite puzzling why autocratic leaders bother to spend government funds on voters prior to elections rather than pocketing those valuable resources themselves. I argue that dictators strategically re-allocate budgetary spending to redistributive policies in order to influence electoral outcomes in the run-up to an election. They are incentivized to cultivate electoral dominance to demonstrate regime invincibility. Low informational transparency in autocracies deters citizens from weighing dictators' past performance and distinguish opportunistic policy manipulation from dictators' competence. In addition, the delivery of redistributive benefits is highly visible because it improves citizens' material wellbeing. Lastly, suppressing the opposition and intimidating citizens in election years cannot legitimize dictators' electoral victory (Higashijima 2020). Therefore, they are incentivized to spend more on redistribution to signal their competence to voters and to obtain large margins of electoral victory. In addition, dictators increase the delivery of redistributive benefits even after elections have taken place. They need to distribute material benefits to reward core-supporting groups and reduce political stability in post-election periods.

I run country-level and multi-level analyses to test my theoretical prediction. In the former, I use time-series cross-country data from 63 electoral autocracies between 1972 and 2015. In the latter, I use Afrobarometer survey data from 18 African autocracies between 2008 and 2015. I find that dictators spend more on redistribution as elections near; thus citizens have more positive perceptions of government redistribution around election time.

This study sheds light on the authoritarian politics literature by exploring the mechanism driving authoritarian elections' contribution to regime durability. Recent studies have shown that

quasi-democratic political institutions, such as competitive elections and binding legislatures, consolidate autocratic stability by producing better policy outcomes (Gandhi 2008; Kim and Gandhi 2010; Magaloni 2006; Svobik 2012; Miller 2015; Wright 2008). However, these studies have not sufficiently explored the scope conditions under which dictators improvise policy instruments to stabilize their regimes.

This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it improves our understanding of why electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes are more durable than non-EA regimes. This paper finds that dictators strategically choose the timing of policy shifts to stabilize their regimes. Second, it extends the existing PBC literature by demonstrating how dictators are motivated to divert more resources to redistributive spending even when the election results are predetermined. Unlike in democracies, opportunistic policy manipulation in autocracies does not simply aim to defeat the opposition; it mainly seeks to demonstrate regime dominance. This paper presents cross-national evidence of PBCs in autocratic redistribution. More importantly, it uses individual-level survey data to present the first evidence of PBCs in authoritarian regimes.

2.2. Political Budgetary Cycles and Autocracies

The PBC literature has examined opportunistic economic cycles in democracies, which incumbent politicians manipulate to win elections (Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff 1990; Tufte 1978). Following the recent development of PBC theory, given the restrictions of government budgets, incumbents strategically re-allocate budgetary spending around elections by increasing targeted spending at the expense of other budgetary categories to signal their competence and deliver voter preferences (Drazen and Eslava 2010; Brender and Drazen 2013).

While prior studies of advanced democracies suggest only weak, inconsistent evidence of

PBCs, those on developing democracies find more compelling evidence (Brender and Drazen 2005; Shi and Svensson 2006). These studies argue that low transparency in developing democracies deters voters from evaluating the cumulative performance of incumbent politicians; they instead use readily available information about their performance in election years (Healy and Lenz 2013).

We still know little about PBCs in autocracies. Some single-country studies show that the electoral cycle in expansionary policy manipulation exists even in autocracies. For example, Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party engaged in opportunistic policy manipulation around elections to win by a large margin (Magaloni 2006). Malaysia's ruling party (United Malays National Organisation) also manipulated fiscal policy around elections (Pepinsky 2007). In Mubark's regime in Egypt, calorie consumption systematically increased around elections (Blaydes 2011). These studies argue that dictators choose to manipulate economic policy around elections because electoral fraud and repression are politically costly. While democratic leaders attempt to produce positive economic outcomes in order to defeat opposition candidates (Brender and Drazen 2013; Drazen and Eslava 2010; Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff 1990; Tufte 1978), autocratic incumbents are motivated by not only cultivating electoral victory but also electoral dominance. Although dictators are very rarely defeated in elections, they still need to spend significant resources on policy manipulation around election periods.

Recently, a handful of studies have explored autocratic PBCs within a cross-national setting. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) provide the first cross-national evidence of autocratic PBCs, showing that dictators increase total government expenditures in election years. Higashijima (2020) finds that the magnitude of PBCs is higher in less fraudulent elections and in more competitive elections. He argues that electoral fraud is a riskier option than policy

maneuvering, because the former prevents incumbent dictators from credibly signaling their popularity and detecting popular support for opposition parties.

However, prior studies have at least three main limitations. First, little attention has been paid to shifting the budgetary composition according to the electoral calendar. Most previous research focuses on the electoral cycle in government deficits or total government expenditures. Yet voters tend to be more concerned about specific policy issues rather than a mere increase in overall government spending. It is also plausible that dictators increase total government expenditures to spend more to repress the opposition's mobilization in election years.

The second limitation is that these studies do not exactly differentiate between pre- and post-election effects on policy manipulation because they use a simple dummy variable of election years. However, this measure cannot exactly match their theoretical argument. For example, the election-year dummy is more likely to capture post-election effects if an election is held early in the year.

Third, we have a very limited understanding of the micro-foundations of autocratic PBC. Although previous studies have tested for the micro-foundations of PBCs in democracies (Suzuki 1992), it has been never tested using individual-level data in autocracies.

This study attempts to overcome these three limitations. The paper examines how dictators strategically time welfare policy expansion to cultivate regime support. They allocate significant government resources to welfare spending around elections to claim credit for improving citizens' material wellbeing. Welfare spending is more relevant to citizens' material wellbeing than other policy instruments because this budgetary category includes cash transfers from government to citizens, such as food assistance, unemployment benefits, and social insurance benefits. Therefore, redistributive spending more effectively captures the distribution

of material enticement during elections than other measures. In addition, I use a measure of electoral cycles based on Michelitch and Utych (2018) to capture the timing of elections more exactly by considering both pre- and post-election periods. Lastly, I use Afrobarometer survey data to conduct micro-level analysis to explore the election effect on citizens' evaluations of autocratic redistribution.

2.3. Elections and Autocratic Redistribution

In this section, I elaborate the theoretical framework used to explore how dictators strategically manipulate redistributive policy to cultivate electoral dominance. I argue that electoral incentives affect regime management strategies. Dictators spend more on government redistribution around elections to improve citizens' evaluations of redistributive policies.

Due to the political necessity of a landslide victory, dictators have strong incentives to enact popular policies in the run-up to elections. In electoral autocracies, regime legitimacy is validated by citizens' electoral participation and dominant support (Pepinsky 2007). Although dictators are rarely defeated in autocratic elections, they still have four primary incentives to win a landslide victory to signal regime strength. First, electoral dominance demonstrates the extent of a dictator's control over his or her regime, because electoral support in autocracies is related to dictators' organizational capacity for mass mobilization (Geddes et al. 2018). Second, a huge margin of electoral victory discourages coordination among opposition supporters (Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013), who are less inclined to risk punishment if opposition parties are unlikely to defeat the ruling party. Dictators' electoral dominance makes it harder for opposition forces to challenge autocracies, and decreases the opposition's bargaining power. Third, dictators protect their regimes from internal splits within the ruling elites by projecting an image of regime

invincibility in elections. By doing this, dictators signal to elites that they will face only political defeat if they defect from the ruling party (Magaloni 2006). Fourth, a landslide electoral victory mitigates the threat of coups (Geddes 2006). Popular dictators can trigger mass mobilization to marginalize the political influence of the coup plotters and thus defeat coup attempts (Esen and Gumuscu 2017).

The informational asymmetry in autocracies, which is due to low transparency and restricted media freedom, deters voters from evaluating dictators' past performance and facilitates opportunistic policy manipulation. Citizens weigh dictators' performance in recent years more heavily than in distant years. Thus, voters often cannot distinguish opportunistic policy manipulation from incumbent competence (Alt and Lassen 2006; Shi and Svensson 2006). Citizens also have only restricted (or even no) information about opposition parties' competence. It is impossible to assess whether opposition parties are more competent than ruling parties because they have never ruled (Magaloni 2006). Citizens also have no information about whether an opposition candidate would be more repressive or more generous than an incumbent dictator if the latter introduces generous policies (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). Dictators have an incentive to feign generosity by expanding redistributive policies as an election approaches.

Citizens can more easily observe the delivery of redistributive benefits than that of other policies because the provision of material benefits immediately increases their disposable income, which in turn indicates the dictator's competence (Schultz 1995). Dictators try to signal their policy competency by shifting the budgetary composition to deliver citizens' demands without significantly increasing the total government budget (Drazen and Eslava 2010; Rogoff

1990).³ Dictators also gain autocratic legitimation through redistributive policies and claim credit for improving citizens' material well-being.

The provision of welfare benefits also alleviates redistributive conflict, which is the main source of autocratic instability: the poor in an unequal society tend to demand democracy to gain more influence in policy-making processes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). In an unequal autocracy, the opposition can easily mobilize the poor's redistributive grievances (Haggard and Kaufman 2012). However, redistributive policies effectively purchase the support of the poor (Blaydes 2011; Magaloni 2006), who have higher utility of even small redistributive benefits at the expense of their political preferences than middle- and high-income voters (Dixit and Londregan 1996). Given a restricted government budget, transferring funds to the poor is an efficient tool to gain electoral dominance.

Redistributive policy is more effective than discretionary distribution at mobilizing electoral support. Due to ballot secrecy, dictators cannot monitor whether the recipients of one-shot benefits support the ruling party in elections. However, redistributive policy institutionalizes the monitoring process based on repeated transactions of material benefits and the codified rules of the coverage (Knutsen and Rasmussen 2018). Neither dictators nor beneficiaries can simply renege on the binding commitment implied in the exchange of redistributive benefits for votes. In addition, dictators can strategically use coercive threats to withdraw ongoing access to social benefits in order to mobilize welfare recipients if they vote for opposition candidates (Mares and

³ Expansionary budgetary policies in pre-election periods increase fiscal deficits in authoritarian governments. Such policies have an adverse impact on economic growth after elections and can even induce a recession in the long run (Magaloni 2006).

Young 2018). Since the provision of redistributive benefits targets those who cannot survive without such assistance, this negative pressure is effective at achieving electoral dominance.

Dictators can use other options to facilitate electoral mobilization: repression and electoral fraud. Repression stabilizes autocracies because it decreases the risk of collective action by increasing the mobilization costs for the opposition (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014), whereas blatant electoral fraud credibly increases the likelihood of overwhelming victory (Higashijima 2020). However, electoral dominance gained using these methods does not credibly signal regime invincibility, or allow dictators to gauge the opposition's popularity and their own mobilization capacity. In addition, electoral fraud and repression during elections create the ideal conditions for the opposition to receive domestic and international support. Domestic and international media attention is likely to make harsh repression around elections publicly visible, both domestically and internationally, which exposes illegitimacy in autocracies (Trejo 2014). Similarly, the opposition can easily mobilize citizens to stage mass demonstrations in election periods if they face widespread violations of electoral integrity (Tucker 2007). Lastly, low electoral integrity induces the opposition to boycott elections, and citizens to abstain from voting, which critically dismantles the foundation of electoral legitimacy.

Dictators also have incentives to expand redistributive benefits in post-election periods. First, they distribute material benefits to reward core-supporting groups after elections, which helps consolidate their support base for future elections (Schady 2000; Magaloni 2006). Voters' support for the autocracy may therefore be based not only on the retrospective performance of dictators before elections, but also on expected welfare benefits *after* elections. The PBC literature in democracies has found that incumbents also distribute more government transfers in post-election periods than non-election periods (Franzese 2002). This may be because material

benefits are distributed later than expected due to the complexity of policy procedures (Chang 2008). In other words, it takes a while from announcing a new policy to implementing it and distributing the benefits. Risk-averse dictators may focus more on rewarding supporters after elections than buying their votes beforehand. In this case, they try to mobilize votes by promising before the election to expand welfare benefits afterwards.⁴ Dictators who renege on delivering such promised benefits risk sparking popular protests (Blaydes 2011), which could snowball into widespread anti-regime demonstrations. In addition, dictators are incentivized to deliver redistributive benefits in order to reduce political instability in post-election periods. Autocratic elections reveal information about opposition popularity, which signals the probability of successful antiregime collective action. Therefore, post-election periods are a focal point for the opposition's collective actions (Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig 2017). A post-electoral popular uprising can also trigger a coup given that opposition mobilization signals the expected chance of a successful coup (Wig and Rød 2016).

Citizen's evaluations of redistributive policies also follow the electoral calendar. On the one hand, judgements about redistributive performance parallel the actual policy shift in government redistribution. Dictators distribute government transfers to buy citizens' support during pre-election periods and reward supporting groups after elections. Therefore, actual welfare policy shifts shape positive evaluations of government redistribution. On the other hand, citizens' preconceptions in election periods can drive the electoral cycle in their evaluations about redistributive policies. Following Suzuki (1992), citizens do not use objective policy outcomes to assess government policy performance. Rather, their anticipation mainly drives the

⁴ For example, President Park Chung-hee promised to increase government officials' salaries by 30% and raise the interest rate on public employee pensions from 10% to 20% before the 1967 presidential election.

electoral cycle in their policy evaluations. Similarly, they expect the increase in welfare benefits to come after the election, which causes them to overlook the actual policy performance. Thus citizens in authoritarian regimes who expect welfare benefits are more likely to positively evaluate government redistribution because they expect to receive material goods in exchange for their vote. In addition, the recipients of redistributive benefits have more positive perceptions of redistributive policies as an election approaches⁵ because they are more likely to continue receiving government transfers as an election approaches and the election result becomes clearer. Lastly, dictators disseminate positive propaganda about welfare policy through government-controlled media outlets. Citizens' redistributive perceptions thus become more positive as dictators try to mobilize voters by promising to deliver welfare benefits in the run-up to elections.

In short, the expansion of redistributive policies in election years is an effective tool for obtaining large margins of electoral victory. Dictators also spend more on delivering material benefits after elections to reward core supporters. These tactics help autocracies shape positive perceptions of government redistribution during election periods.

2.4. Electoral Cycle and Social Protection Spending

2.4.1. Data and Model

I conduct a country-level analysis to explore the impact of dictators' electoral incentives on redistributive spending. I define autocracy using the democracy measure from the updated version of Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013), which defines a country as an autocracy if it does not regularly hold free and fair elections. To test my theoretical prediction, I disaggregate EA

⁵ For a discussion of how electoral prospects shape policy prospects in democracies, see Ladner and Wlezien (2007).

regimes from other autocracies using the categorization in Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevičius (2015). This data contains information about the following circumstances: (1) legislative elections, (2) executive elections, (3) opposition parties in legislature, (4) male suffrage, (5) female suffrage, and (6) free and fair electoral competition. I define EA regimes as those that regularly hold legislative elections, allow opposition parties to have legislative seats, and allow all adult men and women to vote. The sample consists of 63 EA regimes from 1972 to 2015. In the sample, 72% of EA regimes held an election within 5 years. To check the robustness of the results, I also use the alternative measure of autocracy from Marshall and Jaggar 2014 and another measure of EA regime from Geddes et al. (2018).

The dependent variable is social protection spending (*Social Protection*) as a percentage of total government expenditures to measure redistributive policies in EA regimes. I use social protection expenditure data from the International Monetary Fund's Government Financial Statistics Yearbook. This budgetary data includes government transfers for social insurance and assistance, which provide material benefits to citizens. This measure more directly captures government policy priorities than social protection spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (Rudra and Haggard 2005), because governments allocate budgetary resources to specific categories within a given budgetary size and not the size of the national economy. Spending as a percentage of GDP may also fluctuate with economic downturns or growth.


The independent variable is proximity to the election (*Proximity*). Using a dummy variable for election years cannot capture the impact of the exact timing of elections since it would assume that an election held late in the year and one held early in the year would have the same impact on government budgetary manipulation. In addition, since the length of each country's electoral cycle differs, a dummy variable for election years would not effectively

capture the temporal proximity to elections across autocratic countries.⁶ Using a similar strategy as Michelitch and Utych (2018: 418), I operationalize the electoral cycle (*Proximity*) by measuring the temporal distance between the date of the last election (legislative or presidential) and the end of each year divided by the length of the electoral cycle. In other words, *Proximity* shows how far a previous election is from the last day of the year. A lower value indicates proximity to the previous election, whereas a higher value indicates proximity to the next election. For example, *Proximity* takes a value of 0 on the day after the last election, a value of 1 on the day of an election, and 0.5 in the midpoint between two elections. Dictators have the lowest incentive to manipulate redistributive policy when elections are furthest away (i.e., at the midpoint of the electoral cycle). In short, *Proximity* and social protection spending have a U-shaped relationship as Figure 2.1 demonstrates;⁷ therefore, I also add a quadratic form of *Proximity*, which is $Proximity^2$.

⁶ If multiple elections are held in the same year or are concurrently held, dictators have a greater incentive to manipulate government budgets. Unfortunately, *Proximity* does not capture the effect of multiple elections. In Table A2.2, I use *ELE* rather than *Proximity* based on the measure of election years from Franzese (2002; for detailed coding strategy, see Chang 2008: 1091). The main result remains robust even after considering the effect of multiple elections.

⁷ Figure A2.3 also shows a U-shaped relationship between *Proximity* and social protection spending.

Figure 2.1. Electoral cycle in social protection spending



I add four control variables that may affect the dependent variables. First, I include the proportion of the population that is aged 15–64 from World Bank data (*Age1564*) to control for the age composition of the population. Second, I add logged GDP per capita (*GDPpc*) from World Bank data because wealthier countries have a higher capacity to increase public spending. Third, I add total resource revenues from oil, gas, coal, and metals as a percentage of GDP (Haber and Menaldo 2011). Dictators in resource-abundant autocracies can provide higher levels of redistribution because greater resource rents decrease the marginal costs of redistribution even without increasing taxation (Morrison 2009). Fourth, I include GDP growth rate (*GDP growth*) from the World Bank because governments may increase redistributive spending in response to economic downturns.

I use times-series cross-sectional data, which would violate assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, such as contemporaneous correlations, heteroskedasticity, and unit heterogeneity. I use Prais-Winsten regressions to correct for first-order autocorrelation within

panels and panel-corrected standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity.⁸ I add country and year fixed effects to control for unobserved country- and year-specific characteristics that can affect redistributive spending (Beck and Katz 1995). Considering Nickell (1981) bias, I do not include the lagged dependent variable (LDV) because adding LDV in a fixed effect model can create an endogeneity problem between LDV and a fixed effect.⁹ The model specification is as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha X_{it} + \gamma Z_{it-1} + \vartheta_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where subscript i denotes countries and subscript t denotes time. The dependent variable (Y_{it}) is social protection spending. X_{it} is a set of independent variables (*Proximity* and *Proximity*²). Z_{it} is a set of control variables. ϑ_i represents country-fixed effects, δ_t is year-fixed effects, and ε_{it} is the error component.

2.4.2. Empirical Results

Table 2.1 estimates the effect of the electoral cycle (*Proximity*²) on social protection spending. Models 1 and 2 examine my theoretical prediction using only independent variables in Model 1 and after adding controls in Model 2.

⁸ My result also holds even without the Prais-Winsten transformation (Model 2 of Table A2.2).


⁹ Following the recommendation of Angrist and Pischke (2009), I run Model 3 in Table A2.2 with LDV but no fixed effects. I estimate an error-correction model in Model 4 of Table A2.2 to capture the inter-temporal dynamics with the first-difference terms and the lagged terms of control variables. My argument is still supported.

Table 2.1. Effect of Electoral Cycle on Social Protection Expenditures

| DV = Social Protection | Skanning et al. (2015) | | | Geddes et al. (2018) | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | EA Regimes | | | EA Regimes | |
| | (1) Boix et al. (2013) | (2) Boix et al. (2013) | (3) Polity 2 | (4) Boix et al. (2013) | (5) Polity 2 |
| Proximity | -3.481** (1.530) | -3.765** (1.534) | -4.196*** (1.622) | -3.787** (1.850) | -4.401** (1.936) |
| Proximity ² | 3.206** (1.510) | 3.592** (1.531) | 4.293*** (1.592) | 4.322** (1.796) | 5.118*** (1.881) |
| Age1564 | | 0.306** (0.143) | 0.258* (0.149) | 0.045 (0.239) | 0.154 (0.240) |
| GDPpc (logged) | | 2.566*** (0.876) | 1.810** (0.923) | 2.440** (1.033) | 3.092*** (1.084) |
| Resource Dependence | | -0.086* (0.051) | -0.059 (0.048) | -0.102** (0.051) | -0.100* (0.055) |
| GDP Growth | | -0.044* (0.023) | -0.023 (0.027) | -0.116*** (0.035) | -0.140*** (0.037) |
| Constant | 12.844** (5.059) | -18.759** (9.032) | -18.528** (7.743) | -10.000 (12.016) | -27.615** (10.808) |
| County FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Countries | 63 | 61 | 63 | 41 | 43 |
| N | 614 | 603 | 601 | 385 | 387 |
| R-sq | 0.918 | 0.914 | 0.916 | 0.903 | 0.898 |

Note: All models are estimates with Prais-Winsten regression; panel-corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on the level of social protection spending (% total government spending) in EA regimes. To define EA regimes, Models 1 to 3 use the measure of Skanning et al. (2015), and Models 4 and 5 use the measure of Geddes et al. (2018). Models 1, 2, and 4 use the democracy measure of Boix et al. (2013) to define autocracy, whereas Models 3 and 5 use Polity 2 (Marshall and Jagger 2014). Country and year fixed effects are included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Figure 2.2. Effect of Proximity on Social Protection Spending



Note: This figure shows the estimated effect of the electoral cycle ($Proximity^2$) on social protection spending (% total government spending) in Model 2 of Table 2.1. Dashed lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.

The coefficients of $Proximity^2$ indicate that social protection spending in electoral autocracies fluctuates during the electoral calendar (Figure 2.2).¹⁰ As hypothesized, the level of social protection spending creates a U-shaped curve. The predicted level of such spending is 9.07% and 8.90% at the start and end points of the electoral cycle, respectively, and drops to the minimum (8.09%) at the mid-point of the cycle. The absolute total change in social protection spending throughout the electoral cycle is 1.79 percentage points. Considering that the average

¹⁰ I conduct an F-test for $Proximity$ and $Proximity^2$ to make sure that the joint effect of these two variables is not zero. The result of the F-test rejects the null at the 99% confidence level.

annual change in social protection spending in the sample is 0.26 percentage points, the effect of the electoral cycle is quite substantial. This result indicates that dictators spend more on welfare policy in both pre- and post-election years. They distribute more material resources to cultivate electoral dominance before elections, and reward constituents by providing redistributive benefits afterwards. The main finding remains robust even after using alternative measures of autocracy (Marshall and Jagger 2014) and EA regimes (Geddes et al. 2018), as presented in Models 3, 4, and 5 (Table 2.1).

Among the controls, only *GDPpc* significantly affects social protection spending across the models in Table 2.1, which indicates that wealthier autocracies spend more on welfare policies. While the signs of the other controls are consistent across empirical models, they do not consistently produce a significant impact on social protection spending. *Age1564* positively affects social protection spending. The higher proportion of people in this age group is related to the high instability of autocracies, because people of this age may participate more actively in social movements than other age groups (Nordås and Davenport 2013). This result indicates that dictators use welfare policies to satisfy politically active people rather than to respond to the redistributive demands of dependents, such as the elderly. Contrary to my expectations, the level of resource dependence decreases redistributive spending. In resource-abundant autocracies, a low dependence on taxation from citizens reduces incentives to meet their redistributive demands (Ross 2001). GDP growth decreases social protection spending because an economic boom decreases citizens' demands for welfare policy.¹¹

¹¹ Geddes et al. (2018) argue that opportunistic policy manipulation occurs even in non-competitive elections because dictators still have incentives to maximize voter turnout. I estimate additional models with one-candidate

2.4.3. Robustness Check

To check the robustness of my results, I run three models that account for additional factors (Table A2.4). In Model 1, I control for the categories of autocratic regimes from Geddes et al. (2014). Second, to account for the possibility that redistributive pressure is the main driver of welfare policy expansion, I add the Gini coefficient (*Inequality*) from Solt (2016) in Model 2. Lastly, I add trade openness and foreign direct investment inflow to control for the impact of globalization in Model 3, since globalization restricts a government's capacity to increase social protection spending (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001). Each of the models presents results that are consistent with the main findings.

I also estimate two additional models in Table A2.5 to account for election characteristics. First, electoral integrity can affect redistributive policies. On the one hand, dictators may increase social protection spending to compensate for legitimacy failures if they resort to electoral fraud. On the other hand, electoral fraud may deter dictators from manipulating redistributive policy around elections. Electoral fraud more credibly maximizes electoral support than policy maneuvering (Higashijima 2020). Second, I estimate empirical models while considering opportunistic election timing (Kayser 2005): a dictator may move the election forward to maximize voter support right after expanding welfare policy, while a regime in difficulty may postpone scheduled elections (Geddes et al. 2018; Higashijima 2020). In the latter case, the autocracy lacks sufficient resources to manipulate redistributive policies. Using the NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012), I add a dummy variable for clean elections in Model

electoral regimes. Contrary to Geddes et al. (2018), social protection spending does not fluctuate significantly throughout the electoral cycle (Table A2.3). Dictators' incentive to maximize voter turnout may be relatively weaker than their motivation to demonstrate electoral dominance.

1 and irregular elections in Model 2 to moderate the relationship between the electoral cycle and social protection spending. The main finding holds, since neither dummy significantly moderates the impact of the electoral cycle on redistributive policies. However, the coefficient estimate of *Proximity*² is still significant after adding a moderator.

A potential confounding factor is that regime weakness leads dictators to both introduce electoral institutions and expand redistribution to co-opt with oppositions. To address this issue, I add several controls related to the consolidation of power and political instability in the models reported in Table A2.6. First, I control for the consolidation of power (*Consolidation*, Gandhi and Summer forthcoming) in Model 1 and regime personalization (*Personalization*, Geddes et al. 2018) in Model 2 to take into account the degree of power concentration exercised by individual dictators. Weak dictators establish institutionalized power sharing to reduce threats from their allies (Svolik 2012), and may seek to invest more resources in welfare policy to cultivate popular support and thus improve mass mobilization power against coups or rebellions. Second, I include additional controls about a recent experience (i.e., within the last 5 years) of transition to an EA regime (Model 3), regime breakdown (Model 4), the history of breakdown (Model 5), and the age of the autocracy (Model 6). If a country recently introduced electoral institutions and experienced a regime breakdown, it is likely to invest significant resources in redistributive policies in order to consolidate political stability by cultivating popular support. In addition, if a regime is relatively young or has frequently experienced regime breakdown, it will likely seek to enhance its legitimacy through welfare policy. Lastly, the threat from below is another source of autocratic instability. EA regimes can distribute more welfare benefits to reduce citizens' discontent if they frequently experience protest. In Model 7, I control for the logged number of protests from Clark and Regan (2016). The main finding is robust even after controlling for

various measures of political instability. Contrary to conventional wisdom, regime weakness does *not* facilitate welfare expansion. Interestingly, higher *Consolidation* decreases social protection spending, indicating that strong dictators invest more resources in redistributive policies. In addition, a recent experience of regime breakdown decreases social protection spending by 2.54 percentage points. Young autocracies may use other autocratic instruments (e.g., repression) to compensate for regime weakness.¹²

I theoretically assume that there may be a trade-off between repression and redistribution in election years. I estimate empirical models after using defense spending as a dependent variable in Table A2.8. As depicted in Figure A4, *Proximity* and defense spending have an inverted U-shape relationship. This indicates that dictators turn to repression in non-election periods by manipulating the budgetary composition.

2.5. Electoral Cycles and Perceptions of Redistributive Policies

2.5.1. Data and Model

Citizens' perceptions of government redistribution also fluctuate according to the electoral cycle. Using Afrobarometer survey data from 18 electoral autocracies in Africa between 2008 and 2015 as listed in Table A2.9, I estimate multi-level models to explore supporting evidence for my theory.

African autocracies provide a fertile ground for testing my argument for two main reasons. First, redistributive conflicts are highly influential in African politics: 31% of

¹² To deal with the issue relevant to outliers, I estimate additional models after excluding observations with too-short or too-long electoral cycles in Table A2.7. The empirical results (reported in Table A2.7) show that the main result remains robust.

nationwide protests in African autocracies between 1964 and 2017 were caused by economy- and subsistence-related issues (Salehyan et al. 2012). Following the notion of patrimonialism, African rulers use public resources to purchase citizen loyalty (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Given the high level of poverty in African autocracies, the distribution of government resources efficiently gains citizens' support by increasing their dependence on the incumbent regime. Second, weak state capacity encourages African dictators to strategically choose the timing of redistribution when policy changes can most effectively impact voters. Dictators enact changes in visible policy areas in which they can more effectively cultivate electoral support from citizens.

The dependent variable is *Perception of Government Redistribution*. I use the answers to three Afrobarometer questions to capture citizens' perceptions of government redistribution; these ask about improving the living standards of the poor, narrowing gaps between the rich and poor, and ensuring that everyone has enough to eat (Table A2.10). I create an index of *Perception of Redistribution*, which ranges from -1.873 to 4.139, by running a principal component analysis (PCA).¹³ Higher values indicate better perceptions of government redistributive policies.

The independent variable is *Proximity*. Following the strategy of Michelitch and Utych (2018), I operationalize the electoral cycle (*Proximity*) by measuring "a respondent's position in the electoral cycle between the last election and the next election as the percentage of time passed between the two" (418). *Proximity* is coded 0 if the survey interview was conducted on the day after an election was held, and 1 if it took place on election day. Since I expect a U-

¹³ In this index, the inter-item reliability is 0.752, factor loadings are between 0.551 and 0.591, and the eigenvalue is 2.046.

shaped form of the electoral cycle in redistributive perceptions,¹⁴ all models include a quadratic form of *Proximity*, which is $Proximity^2$.

I add several individual-level demographic controls that may affect the dependent variable: rural dweller (*Rural*), *Age*, *Female*, and level of education (*Education*). In addition, I control for the frequency of media consumption (*Radio News*). Government-controlled media may disseminate autocratic propaganda about redistributive policies to improve citizens' evaluations of its performance. Considering the level of economic development in Africa, the frequency with which citizens listen to radio news is the best way to capture their level of media consumption. I also include the level of poverty (*Poverty*) in empirical models. Economic grievance may lead the poor to have negative redistributive perceptions. I use the question about how often a respondent has gone without food because Afrobarometer survey data do not provide information about respondents' income levels.

I include citizens' evaluations of the national economy (*Sociotropic Economy*) and the household economy (*Egocentric Economy*). Positive economic evaluations shape positive evaluations of autocratic redistribution. I control for support for the ruling party (*Winner*) because this may generate a more positive policy evaluation. Respondents who perceive poverty to be the most important problem in their country have a more critical view of government redistribution than those who do not. Therefore, I add *MIP Poverty*, which is coded 1 if a respondent thinks poverty is the most important problem, and 0 otherwise. Empirical models also include two county-level variables: economic development (*GDPpc*) and GDP growth rate (*GDP Growth*).

¹⁴ Figure A2.7 also shows a U-shaped relationship between *Proximity* and *Perception of Redistribution*.

The dependent variable is continuous, and the units of analysis are individuals nested within countries. Therefore, I test my hypothesis using a mixed-effects multi-level model. I also allow varying slopes and intercepts because individuals within a country are likely to share similar characteristics with those in other countries, and the effect of electoral cycles on evaluations of government redistribution may vary across countries. The mixed-effect multilevel model is formulated as follows:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha_j + \beta_j X_{ij} + Z_{ij} \beta + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

$$\alpha_j = \gamma_0^\alpha + Z_j \gamma + u_j^\alpha$$


$$\beta_j = \gamma_0^\beta + u_j^\beta$$

where subscript i denotes individuals and subscript j denotes countries. Y is a measure of the dependent variables, *Perception of Government Redistribution*. X_i is a set of independent variables (*Proximity* and *Proximity*²). Z_i and Z_j are a set of individual-level controls and country-level controls respectively. α_j is a varying intercept for each country j and the slope β_j is a varying slope.

2.5.2. Empirical Results

The empirical findings in Table 2.2 support my hypothesis that perceptions of government redistribution follow the electoral cycle. Model 1 includes only independent variables, whereas Model 2 is estimated after adding controls. Using the alternative measure of autocracy based on a Polity score of less than 6 (Marshall and Jaggers 2014), I additionally estimate Model 3.

Figure 2.3. Effect of Proximity to Election on Perceptions of Government Redistribution



Note: This figure shows the estimated effect of the electoral cycle ($Proximity^2$) on the perception of government redistribution in Model 2 of Table 2.2. Dashed lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.

Table 2.2. Effect of Proximity to Election on Perceptions of Government Redistribution

| DV = Perception of Gov't Redistribution | Boix et al. (2013) | | Polity2 < 6 |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Proximity | -2.908*** (0.388) | -3.475*** (0.448) | -3.927*** (0.526) |
| Proximity ² | 2.335*** (0.182) | 2.988*** (0.187) | 3.392*** (0.232) |
| Rural | | 0.050*** (0.013) | 0.080*** (0.014) |
| Age | | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Female | | 0.030** (0.012) | 0.030** (0.012) |
| Education | | -0.030*** (0.003) | -0.030*** (0.003) |
| Poverty | | -0.086*** (0.005) | -0.089*** (0.005) |
| Radio News | | 0.019*** (0.004) | 0.020*** (0.004) |
| Sociotropic Economy | | 0.226*** (0.006) | 0.243*** (0.006) |
| Egocentric Economy | | 0.131*** (0.006) | 0.127*** (0.007) |
| Winner | | 0.413*** (0.013) | 0.437*** (0.013) |
| MIP Poverty | | -0.081*** (0.014) | -0.091*** (0.015) |
| GDPpc (logged) | | -0.970*** (0.069) | -0.990*** (0.099) |
| GDP Growth | | 0.029*** (0.005) | 0.028*** (0.007) |
| Constant | 0.736*** (0.229) | 2.250*** (0.378) | 2.247*** (0.454) |
| $\sigma_{proximity}^2$ | 1.553 | 2.223 | 2.779 |
| σ_j^2 | 0.764 | 1.529 | 1.592 |
| σ_e^2 | 1.900 | 1.658 | 1.644 |
| Countries | 18 | 18 | 16 |
| N | 57,382 | 51,651 | 45,590 |

Note: Multilevel mixed-effects models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on the perception of government redistribution, using the definition of autocracy from Boix et al. (2013) in Models 1, 2, and 3, and from the Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers 2014). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

The electoral cycle significantly affects perceptions of government redistribution across all models.¹⁵ Using the coefficient estimates from Model 2, Figure 2.3 depicts this relationship. As predicted, the relationship between *Proximity* and *Perception of Redistribution* is U-shaped. This indicates that *Perception of Redistribution* decreases toward the lowest value at the midpoint of *Proximity*. The predicted level of redistributive perception is 1.06 in the beginning, then decreases to the minimum (0.05) around the midpoint (i.e., *Proximity* equals 0.58), and increases to 0.57 at the end of the electoral cycle. Redistributive perception fluctuates by about 70% and 36% of its standard deviation in the first and last halves of the electoral cycle, respectively. This result shows that voters' evaluations of government redistribution also follow the electoral cycle in a similar way as social protection spending.

Rural dwellers (*Rural*) and female respondents have more positive perceptions of government redistribution. Previous studies have shown that rural dwellers are more responsive to patronage goods and tend to have stronger pro-regime attitudes than urban dwellers (Blaydes 2011; Lust-Okar 2006). In addition, the vulnerability of women's socioeconomic status in African autocracies may lead them to have stronger pro-regime attitudes toward redistributive policies. More educated people (*Education*) are less likely to perceive that their government demonstrates good redistributive policy performance. Less educated voters tend to have a stronger pro-regime attitude and are more easily mobilized by the provision of redistributive benefits (Blaydes 2011). Consistent with my expectation, more frequent media consumption (*Radio News*) makes positive redistributive perceptions more likely. Economic grievances negatively affect perceived government redistribution (*Poverty*). Positive economic perceptions (*Sociotropic Economy* and *Egocentric Economy*) and support for the ruling party (*Winner*) foster

¹⁵ The result of the F-test rejects the null at the 99% confidence level.

more positive evaluations of government redistribution. Respondents who think poverty is the country's most important problem have more negative redistributive perceptions than those who do not (*MIP Poverty*). If a country is more developed (*GDPpc*), citizens are likely to have more negative redistributive perceptions. In wealthier countries, citizens have higher education levels, and demand political liberalization (Lipset 1959). Their anti-autocratic attitudes may shape negative perceptions of redistributive policy performance. A higher economic growth rate (*GDP Growth*) leads to more positive evaluations of government redistribution. Positive economic performance in autocracies improves perceptions of redistributive policies. Unlike other variables, *Age* is not significant.

I run additional models in Table A2.11 to account for alternative explanations. Restrictions on civil liberties lead citizens to feign loyalty for autocratic regimes to avoid the risk of punishment. Respondents who believe a government agency is sponsoring the survey may report more positive perceptions of government redistribution. I estimate Model 1 after excluding such respondents and Model 2 after including only such respondents. Considering the trade-offs with policy maneuvering as mentioned in the previous section, opportunistic election timing and electoral fraud can also affect electoral cycles of perceived government redistribution. Using the NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012), I exclude cases where elections were delayed or held earlier than originally scheduled (Model 3), where they were held on the originally scheduled date (Model 4), where electoral fraud occurred (Model 5), and where a clean election was held (Model 6). The results remain robust even after considering these factors.

I re-run the empirical analysis using each question about government redistribution to make sure that the main finding is not driven by PCA. Table A2.12 predicts perceptions of government performance with respect to improving standards of living for the poor (Model 1),

narrowing income gaps between the rich and poor (Model 2), and ensuring there is enough to eat (Model 3). I also re-run Model 3 of Table 2 using an OLS regression model to check whether the main finding is dependent on the multi-level model specification (Model 4). The empirical results do not alter the main results.

2.6. Conclusion

I find that the provision of welfare benefits follows the electoral calendar in authoritarian regimes. Social protection spending fluctuates in a U-shaped pattern by 1.79 percentage points during the electoral cycle. Perceptions of government redistribution also follow the electoral calendar. The predicted level of redistributive perception decreases by 70% in the first half of the electoral cycle and increases by 36% of a standard deviation after the cycle's midpoint. This result indicates that dictators in EA regimes spend more on welfare policy and shape citizens' positive evaluations of government redistribution both before and after elections.

This paper finds that electoral cycles in redistributive policies generally exist across all electoral autocracies. While numerous studies have explored PBCs in democracies, little attention has been paid to autocratic PBCs. This paper provides suggestive evidence of autocratic PBCs in redistributive policy. More importantly, the study finds that dictators strategically time welfare policy shifts to bolster regime stability. These findings help us understand why EA regimes are more durable than others.

This study also speaks to previous studies on distributive politics in authoritarian regimes. Some prior studies argue that dictators implement distributive policies in order to satisfy popular preferences (e.g., Miller 2015), whereas others argue that they selectively provide distributive benefits to punish the opposition and reward supporters (e.g., Magaloni 2006). I find

that both mechanisms are at play in autocratic PBCs. Although more extensive future study may be required, this result shows that autocratic redistribution may be motivated not only by cultivating electoral dominance before elections, but also by rewarding constituents afterwards. Voters' support for the regime can be shaped by both the retrospective performance of dictators before elections and the expected welfare benefits after elections.

CHAPTER 3

AUTOCRATIC WELFARE PROGRAMS, ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS, AND SUPPORT FOR THE DICTATOR: EVIDENCE FROM AFRICAN AUTOCRACIES

3.1. Introduction

In January 2018, the Sudanese government eliminated wheat subsidies and devalued its currency in an attempt to alleviate its budget deficit. These actions induced a shortage of cash, and the prices of necessities skyrocketed. As inflation reached over 50%, bread prices doubled, and Sudanese citizens suffered from severe shortages of basic commodities (Abdelaziz, 2018). On 19 December 2018, public anger over hyperinflation triggered a wave of popular protests, which transformed into nationwide anti-regime demonstrations demanding the resignation of President Omar al-Bashir. Al-Bashir was ousted by the military on 11 April 2019, ending his 30-year grip on power.

Economic performance is a critical source of autocratic legitimacy and stability. During economic recessions, it is easier for the opposition to mobilize citizens' grievances and promote demonstrations in order to cause nationwide social unrest. Indeed, 389 of the 1,254 nationwide protests (31%) that occurred between 1964 and 2017 in African autocracies were triggered by economic and subsistence-related issues (Salehyan et al. 2012).¹⁶ Likewise, about 80% of third-wave democratizations were caused by a fiscal crisis or declining living standards (Ulfelder 2009). For example, economic recessions in the 1980s created an opportunity for democratization in several sub-Saharan African autocracies. A deep recession caused by a decline in cotton prices and neighboring Nigeria's economic downturn prompted

¹⁶ The next two largest drivers of nationwide protests are human rights and democracy (26%) and elections (10%).

democratization in Benin (Gisselquist 2008). After experiencing severe droughts, Madagascar held free democratic elections, while Mali held its first competitive presidential elections (Brückner and Ciccone 2011). In 2011, the Arab Spring democratization movement gathered momentum during a period of food crisis, triggering the collapse of several North African autocracies.

Previous studies on autocratic politics have explored the relationship between economic conditions and autocratic stability (Brückner and Ciccone 2011; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Huntington 1991; Ulfelder 2009). However, they have paid only limited attention to the micro-foundations of the effect of economic performance on support for dictators. They have not directly discussed how citizens' perceptions of the national economy affect popular support for autocracy.

This article explores this micro-foundation of autocratic support by highlighting how welfare programs mitigate the adverse impacts of negative economic perceptions. Autocracies often invest in social welfare policies and increase the provision of redistributive benefits – particularly during economic recessions – to maintain public support, and thus their legitimacy and stability. More importantly, autocratic welfare policy is a tool for reducing the adverse impact of economic recessions. Negative economic growth encourages citizens to withdraw their support for the dictator because it deteriorates their material wellbeing. However, autocratic welfare programs distribute to citizens material benefits in order to compensate for their economic insecurity. The provision of welfare benefits contributes to maintaining autocratic legitimation even during economic crises. Therefore, even if the national economic condition is perceived negative, the dictator can maintain citizens' support through the provision of welfare benefits. Evidence from Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 22 African autocracies between

1999 and 2015 is consistent with this theoretical expectation. The empirical results are robust to different model specifications that account for alternative explanations and alleviate concerns about the validity of surveys taken in autocratic countries.

The article is organized as follows. First, I review previous studies on the relationship between economic growth and autocratic stability and elaborate my argument by focusing on the impact of autocratic welfare policies. Second, I empirically test my argument before providing concluding remarks about the study's contributions.

3.2. Popular Support and Regime Stability

Popular support for the dictator is critical to a regime's stability. Despite the prevalence of electoral fraud and political violence, autocratic elections cannot completely eliminate the possibility of electoral turnover. Even autocratic ruling parties can be defeated in elections and experience regime breakdown. According to the autocratic regime data compiled by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), about 13% of autocratic breakdowns after World War II (28 out of 223) were caused by electoral defeats of the ruling parties. Popular uprisings collapsed 38 autocratic regimes (17%) during the same period. This evidence shows that the loss of citizens' support is an important cause of autocratic regime breakdown.

A loss of popular support unravels dictators' political dominance over the opposition and ruling elites for three reasons. First, unpopular dictators have less electoral support and thus reduced bargaining power over the opposition, so they are forced to make policy concessions (Miller 2015). Second, weakened support for the dictator facilitates the growth of an opposition-backed social protest movement. As the scale of protests increases, the demonstrations deliver

more reliable information about the citizens' dissatisfaction with the regime's performance (Lohmann 1993). In short, unpopular dictators face popular protests more frequently.

Third, in unpopular autocracies, elites are more likely to desert the ruling party (Magaloni 2006) and join or create an opposition party. As unpopular regimes face more public demonstrations, the cost of repressing the threats from below also causes internal splits within the ruling elites (Przeworski 1991). The risk of a coup also increases if dictators face a loss of citizen support.

3.3. Economic Performance and Support for The Dictator

National economic conditions determine the dictator's popularity. While economic booms legitimize repressive rule and improve citizens' material wellbeing, economic downturns increase the risk of popular protests and the possibility that citizens will remove the dictator by force.

The economic voting literature argues that good economic performance is the primary source of popular support for incumbent politicians in democracies. The rule of thumb in this literature is that citizens vote for the incumbent when the economy is strong, but vote against him or her if it is doing poorly (e.g. Lewis-Beck 1988). Economic issues thus more critically determine the fortunes of incumbent politicians compared to other issues, such as environment or foreign policy issues. Since economic policy outcomes are directly linked to citizens' material wellbeing, the national economic condition gives voters an informational short-cut about the incumbent's policy competence (Singer 2011).

Autocratic leaders can use repression to stabilize their regimes, but this will not alleviate citizens' discontent; dictators also need to deliver economic prosperity to maintain support.

Repression also has the drawback of increasing a dictator's dependence on the military, which empowers these agents and increases the risk of military intervention, such as a coup (Svolik 2012).

Due to the limitations of repressive tactics, dictators promise to improve the economy in order to maintain political order (Huntington 1991). If they fulfill this promise by delivering a robust economic outcome, citizens will prefer to support the incumbent dictator and maintain the status quo rather than face the uncertainty of a new leader. Indeed, opposition parties' competence is highly uncertain in autocracies because they have never been given the opportunity to exercise power (Magaloni 2006). Economic development in autocracies even allows dictators to further consolidate their personal control. For example, China's recent economic development legitimizes the personalization of Xi Jinping's regime. Despite criticism outside the ruling party, Xi removed term limits for presidents and consolidated his dominance of the communist dictatorship; he also increased repression in order to force the political acquiescence of the population. However, his regime has gained popular support by improving citizens' material wellbeing, which has been shown to be negatively correlated with support for a transition to democracy, especially among the middle class (Chen and Lu 2011). The population has accepted even more personalized rule in return for material wellbeing.

Economic downturns can jeopardize autocratic stability from both above and below. During an economic recession, dictators face top-down threats from ruling elites, who are more likely to defect from the ruling party when the regime is less able to buy their support with generous perquisites (Kailitz and Stockemer 2017). Defecting elites are also likely to criticize the dictator's poor economic performance in order to increase the opposition's chances of winning an election (Reuter and Gandhi 2010). Such criticism is likely to exacerbate the dictator's

bottom-up risks: citizens face a heightened risk of unemployment and loss of income when the economy is weak. This drop in material wellbeing is likely to encourage the population to rise up in protest and demand political liberalization and democracy – as occurred in the Arab Spring of 2011.

3.4. Welfare Programs in Economic Downturns

Dictators can respond to inevitable economic downturns using two broad approaches. First, they can increase repression. However, this approach can intensify a legitimacy crisis. Facing a nationwide economic recession, citizens may interpret greater repression as incompetence and increase their dissatisfaction with the autocrat's performance. Once unsatisfied citizens are fully mobilized, protests can cascade into massive anti-regime movements (Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni 2011). Hence, even severely repressive actions cannot completely decrease the risk of a regime's breakdown.

In a second approach, dictators can use social welfare programs to counteract the devastating consequences of economic downturns. Just as welfare systems in democracies decrease voters' sensitivity to the incumbent's economic performance and improve citizens' perceptions of life satisfaction and happiness (Pacek and Radcliff 1995, 2008), autocratic regimes can increase their provision of welfare benefits to compensate citizens for a loss of income during economic recessions and maintain their support.

Dictators have strong incentives to moderate the adverse impact of economic hardship on their citizens' personal wellbeing. Economically insecure citizens (i.e., the poor and the unemployed) are more likely to withdraw their support for the regime when faced with economic hardship. These citizens may demand greater democratic freedoms in order to gain more access

to the policy-making process (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). Indeed, Fossati (2014) argues that economically vulnerable citizens are more likely to base their voting decisions on the state of the national economy. Welfare programs institutionalize the process of distributing material resources in order to effectively buy citizens' support (Blaydes 2010; Magaloni 2006): recipients of welfare benefits are persuaded to overlook their political preferences and support the dictator. The provision of such benefits has a greater impact during a recession.

The provision of welfare benefits also helps strengthen autocratic legitimacy (Cassani, 2017) by improving the regime's image. Autocracies claim performance-based legitimacy by guaranteeing access to public goods or equal redistribution (von Soest and Grauvogel 2017). For instance, communist countries during the Cold War era sought to provide cost-free social services to create the image of a credible alternative to capitalism (Obinger and Schmitt 2011). Before the 1980s, North Korea disseminated propaganda about its free health care system to demonstrate the regime's superiority over that of South Korea.

However, a reduction in welfare benefits would intensify the adverse impact of economic downturns. Welfare programs institutionalize the distribution of material resources. Since dictators sit atop an informal structure based on unwritten rules, they can easily withdraw the benefits of discretionary distribution (i.e., patronage and clientelistic goods) from recipients. Yet the codified rules and repeated transactions in welfare programs institutionalize the monitoring process; dictators cannot simply renege on distributing these benefits (Knutsen and Rasmussen 2018). Even if it was possible, this would only increase the regime's legitimacy crisis during a recession.

The case of Sudan demonstrates how the retrenchment of institutionalized welfare benefits can threaten autocratic survival during economic downturns. It also indicates that

repression is not an effective tool to reduce threats from below during a recession. After its southern part became independent, Sudan lost 75% of its oil production fields, which was the source of half of its fiscal revenues and two-thirds of its foreign currency earnings. This accounted for an annual loss of 26.2% of its GDP (International Monetary Fund 2012). The loss of foreign currency sources resulted in a hike in the currency rate and hyperinflation. According to Afrobarometer surveys administered between 2013 and 2018, 67.5% of Sudanese respondents perceived their national economic condition as getting either worse or much worse; in 2018 this figure increased to 81.9%. However, the Sudanese government took no significant actions to alleviate its citizens' economic needs. Indeed, it worsened them in some ways.

The government was controlling the price of basic foodstuffs in order to reduce threats from urban areas. It also subsidized certain items, which provided a universal form of social protection by decreasing the cost of living. The abolition of subsidies on fuel in 2013 and wheat in 2018 intensified the people's economic hardship. The provision of wheat subsidies had helped maintain low bread prices in Khartoum and other cities (Jaspars 2018). The removal of wheat import subsidies, combined with the currency devaluation, resulted in soaring food prices. For example, in 2018 the prices of sorghum and millet increased by 100 to 250 percentage points compared to the previous year (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2019). The prices of meat, bread, and other basic commodities also doubled (Younes 2018). Due to the large proportion of their budgets that Sudanese households spent on food in 2013 – an average of 61%, and 57% for the highest-income group – the price shock intensified economic difficulties across income groups (International Monetary Fund 2013).

Although the International Monetary Fund recommended that the Sudanese government spend more on poverty reduction after removing the subsidies, the government still allocated

14% of its budget for 2018 to military and security and only 3% and 2% of total spending to education and health expenditures, respectively (Radio Dabanga 2017). However, the massive spending on repressive apparatus could not guard al-Bashir's regime from nation-wide anti-regime demonstrations. The removal of material benefits from government subsidies ultimately triggered civil protests in December 2018 that ousted al-Bashir.

In short, welfare programs contribute to regime stability during times of national economic adversity by institutionalizing the redistributive process and alleviating adversity. An autocratic regime can respond swiftly and convincingly to citizens' demands for redistributive benefits in order to avert a legitimacy crisis generated by the effects of an economic recession.

Hypothesis. Social welfare programs alleviate the adverse effects of perceived hardship in the national economy on citizens' support for the dictator.

3.5. Data and Method

I use Afrobarometer Survey data to explore how autocratic welfare programs reduce the adverse impacts of poor economic performance on support for dictators. Afrobarometer provides unique cross-national surveys in African autocracies, which – crucially for this study – ask questions about the approval of the president in all rounds. Given that political instability and poverty are critical issues in this region, African autocracies are an excellent sample to test how economic performance affects autocratic stability. The sample covers 22 autocratic countries in Africa between 1999 and 2015 (see Table A3.2). These countries are representative of the global sample of autocracies, as demonstrated by the sample's economic growth rate during the study period (5.47%, vs. 4.81% for global autocracies, World Bank, 2018) and welfare policies (0.45

vs. 0.49 for global autocracies, Coppedge et al. 2018). I use the updated version of Boix, Miller, and Rosato's democracy measure (2013): if a country does not regularly hold free and fair elections, it is considered an autocracy.


The dependent variable is *Support for the Dictator*, which is measured based on answers to the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: President or Prime Minister?" This variable directly captures whether citizens approve/strongly approve (coded 1) or disapprove of (coded 0) the dictator. Figure 4.1 illustrates the country-level averages of approval rates in the sample countries. The average approval rate, 67%, indicates that the majority of respondents supports their dictators. Additionally, the figure shows substantial cross-country variation in support for the dictator, ranging from a high of 89% in Namibia to a low of 41% in Tunisia.

The first key explanatory variable is *Sociotropic Perception*, which captures citizens' retrospective economic perceptions of the national economy to indicate their evaluations of the dictator's economic performance. Figure A3.1 presents the country-level averages of economic perceptions, which range from 54% of respondents in Lesotho who perceive their national economic conditions as getting worse or much worse, to 49% of respondents in Mozambique who report that their national economic conditions are getting better or much better.

Another key explanatory variable is the universal welfare policy index (*Universalism*), which I obtained from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem, Coppedge et al. 2018). This index measures how many welfare programs – including education, health, retirement, unemployment, and poverty programs – are provided to all citizens in each country in a given year. It is important to note that this index does not indicate the *size* of welfare programs, but

rather measures whether major social policies are provided as universal benefits. In short, this variable estimates the quality and structure of welfare programs (Rasmussen and Knutsen 2017).

Figure 3.1. The Approval Rate for the Dictator in African Autocracies



Note: The ‘disapprove’ category aggregates responses of ‘strongly disapprove’ and ‘disapprove,’ and the ‘approve’ category combines ‘strongly approve’ and ‘approve.’

The universal welfare program index is a good proxy for capturing the extensiveness of a country’s social welfare policy because it is significantly correlated with the social protection

program's coverage as a percentage of each country's total population (0.328, $p = 0.0319$) (International Labour Organization 2018).¹⁷ Although the index varies little across years within each country in Figure A3.2, it varies across countries. Nigeria in 2003 has the lowest value (-1.175), and Burkina Faso in 2012 has the highest (1.419). I take the average of *Universalism* if a survey was conducted in two consecutive years.

I add six controls that may affect support for the dictator. First, given Bratton and Mattes' (2001) finding that urban residents are more familiar with individual liberties than communal solidarity in Africa – which suggests they should support dictators less than their rural counterparts – I control for whether an individual lives in an urban area (*Urban*). Second, I control for the respondent's education level (*Education*) since higher levels of *Education* are related to higher political awareness because education increases critical scrutiny of political phenomena (Geddes and Zaller 1989). I use the Afrobarometer's aggregate measure of *Education* (1 = no formal schooling, 2 = primary schooling, 3 = secondary schooling, and 4 = tertiary schooling or above). I expect educated citizens to be less likely to support the dictator because they are more critical of dictatorships. Third, I control for gender (*Female*) because previous studies argue that women's social and political participation have a positive relationship with democratization (i.e., Ross 2008). I therefore expect women to be less likely than men to support dictators. Fourth, since younger people are more likely to actively participate in anti-regime social movements in autocracies (Nordås and Davenport 2013), I control for *Age* in the empirical models. I expect younger people to be less likely to support dictators than older people.

¹⁷ This data is available for only one year for each country during the study period. Another measure of size of the welfare state is social protection spending from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, this data is only available for seven countries in the sample.

Fifth, I control for *Poverty*. Since the Afrobarometer does not include information about income level, and because many Africans do not rely on cash income, I use the question about respondents' recent experiences without food (0 = never, 4 = always) to measure poverty levels. Considering that economic grievance is one of the critical drivers of autocratic breakdown, a higher level of poverty is expected to deter citizens from supporting the dictator. Finally, the empirical models also include citizens' satisfaction with their country's overall democratic governance (*Satisfaction with Democracy*). If citizens perceive that their autocratic ruler guarantees democratic values (i.e., political rights), the ruler is perceived as legitimate and gains more support even though the country is not actually a democracy.

I also add two country-level indicators: GDP per capita (*GDPpc*) and GDP growth rate (*GDP Growth*). I expect *GDPpc* to have two impacts. On the one hand, the level of economic development consolidates autocracies by legitimizing repressive rules (Huntington 1991). On the other hand, citizens in economically developed autocracies are less likely to support the dictator (Lipset 1959). Economic development contributes to increases in citizens' education levels and economic wealth; citizens in developed autocracies demand more political liberties to participate in politics. Second, I add *GDP Growth* to the empirical models to distinguish between the effects of an autocracy's general economic policy and a citizen's perception of the regime's policy performance. I expect a higher growth rate to increase support for the dictator. Like *Universalism*, I take the average if a survey was done in two consecutive years. *GDPpc* and *GDP Growth* are obtained from the World Bank (2018). To reduce the model convergence problem, I divide *Age* and *GDP Growth* by 10.

This article explores how social protection programs at the country level moderate the relationship between citizens' perceptions of the national economy and their support for the

dictator. As the units of analysis are individual respondents who are nested in a given country, and the dependent variable (*Support for Dictator*) is dichotomous, I estimate mixed-effects multilevel binomial probit models to test my hypothesis. My models include varying intercepts and varying slopes to account for the likelihood that respondents in the same country share similar characteristics, and the fact that perceptions of the national economy can have different effects across African autocracies. Therefore, empirical models contain country-fixed effects, country-random effects, and random coefficients to allow varying impacts of sociotropic economic perceptions across countries.

The main multilevel model in this paper is structured as follows:

$$Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \Phi(\alpha_{j[i]} + \beta_{j[i]}Sociotropic\ Perception_i + Z_i\beta),$$

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_j &= \gamma_0^\alpha + \gamma_1^\alpha Universalism_j + Z_j^\alpha \gamma + u_j^\alpha \\ \beta_j &= \gamma_0^\beta + \gamma_1^\beta Universalism_j + u_j^\beta\end{aligned}$$

In this model, i denotes individuals and j denotes countries. $\alpha_{j[i]}$ is a varying intercept, and the slope $\beta_{j[i]}$ is a varying slope for each country j . The varying slope $\beta_{j[i]}$ includes the interaction between the individual level and the country level. Z is the vector of control variables.

3.6. Empirical analysis

Table 3.1 presents the coefficient estimates for the effect of economic perceptions on support for the dictator. I run Model 1 without *Universalism* to test the economic voting argument in the autocratic context. The coefficient estimate of *Sociotropic Perception* is

significant and positive, which means that a more positive economic perception of the national economy increases the likelihood of support for the dictator. If a respondent has the most positive economic perception (*much better*), their predicted probability of support for the dictator is 74%; the most negative perception (*much worse*) decreases support to 49%. Even in autocracies, the incumbent's economic performance is critical to cultivating citizens' support. This finding is consistent with previous studies in the economic voting literature, which argue that economic downturns destabilize autocratic regimes (Brückner and Ciccone 2011; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Huntington 1991; Ulfelder 2009).


Model 2 includes the interaction term between *Sociotropic Perception* and *Universalism* to test how welfare programs condition the impact of negative economic perceptions on support for the dictator. Both variables significantly increase the likelihood of support for the dictator. More importantly, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between *Universalism* and *Sociotropic Perception* is negative and significant, indicating that the impact of economic perceptions on support for the dictator decreases as an autocracy provides more universalized welfare benefits, which is consistent with my theoretical argument. On the one hand, positive evaluations of the dictator's economic performance are more likely to increase the probability of support for the dictator if an autocracy provides less universalized welfare benefits. On the other hand, the provision of universalized welfare benefits has a stronger positive impact on the likelihood of support for the autocratic ruler if a citizen has more negative evaluations of the national economy. In short, more universalized welfare programs decrease the adverse effect of negative retrospective evaluations of the national economy on approval of the dictator. We can therefore conclude that autocratic welfare programs stabilize citizens' support for the dictator even under negative economic evaluations by offering redistributive benefits.

Table 3.1. Economic Perception, Welfare Programs, and Support for the Dictator

| | Support for the Dictator | |
|--|--------------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| <i>Sociotropic Perception</i> | 0.216*** (0.025) | 0.264*** (0.027) |
| <i>Universalism</i> | | 0.414*** (0.059) |
| <i>Universalism × Sociotropic Perception</i> | | -0.083*** (0.019) |
| <i>Urban</i> | -0.078*** (0.011) | -0.077*** (0.011) |
| <i>Education</i> | -0.079*** (0.006) | -0.080*** (0.006) |
| <i>Female</i> | 0.017 (0.010) | 0.016 (0.010) |
| <i>Age</i> | 0.021*** (0.004) | 0.021*** (0.004) |
| <i>Poverty</i> | -0.053*** (0.005) | -0.056*** (0.005) |
| <i>Satisfaction with Democracy</i> | 0.430*** (0.005) | 0.430*** (0.006) |
| <i>GDPpc (logged)</i> | 0.094*** (0.016) | 0.042* (0.017) |
| <i>GDP Growth</i> | 0.060*** (0.018) | 0.077*** (0.018) |
| <i>Intercept</i> | -1.294*** (0.129) | -1.411*** (0.123) |
| <i>Log-likelihood</i> | -39773.0 | -39737.5 |
| <i>Countries</i> | 22 | 22 |
| <i>N</i> | 76,526 | 76,526 |

Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 3.2. Effect of Economic Perceptions on Support for the Dictator as *Universalism* Changes



Note: These figures reflect respondents' economic perceptions of *Better* and *Worse*. Each plot is illustrated with 95% confidence intervals.


Based on Model 2 of Table 3.1, Figure 3.2 illustrates the effect of economic perceptions on support for the dictator as *Universalism* changes.¹⁸ If an autocracy provides a very low level of welfare programs (i.e., -1.17), a negative economic evaluation (*worse*) leads to a 0.42

¹⁸ In this paper, I utilize the observed value approach with the simulation based on the coefficient estimate of each empirical model to create all figures.

probability of support for the dictator, whereas a positive one (*better*) leads to a 0.65 probability of support. However, when *Universalism* is high (i.e., 1.42), the probability of supporting the dictator among those who believe the national economy is getting worse and better is 0.62 and 0.71, respectively (top panel). In the whole range of *Universalism*, positive economic perceptions lead to a higher probability of support for the dictator. However, the gap in the likelihood of support for the dictator between positive and negative perceptions decreases from 0.20 to 0.06. In addition, even citizens with a negative economic evaluation support the dictator at a 0.62 probability if a country provides a high level of coverage of welfare programs. Considering that the average approval rate for dictators is 67% in the sample, the effect of *Universalism* is quite substantial. This result indicates that citizens' economic evaluations are more critical when an autocracy provides fewer universal welfare benefits.

I also plot the predicted probabilities of support for the dictator by high (90th percentile, 1.21) and low (10th percentile, -0.40) levels of *Universalism* at all levels of *Sociotropic Perception* (Figure 3.3). The welfare programs more critically increase the likelihood of support for the dictator if a citizen perceives that the national economy is getting worse (top panel). As sociotropic economic perceptions improve, the first differences for the impact of welfare programs presented in the bottom panel decrease and then diminish if a respondent has the most positive economic perception (*much better*). A universalized welfare policy neither increases nor decreases the likelihood of support for the dictator if a respondent perceives that the economy is getting much better. This result shows that the impact of autocratic welfare programs is more pronounced when an individual citizen has a more negative perception of the dictator's economic performance. In short, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 both indicate that welfare programs help alleviate the impact of negative economic evaluations on support for the dictator.

Figure 3.3. Predicted Probabilities (Top Panel) and First Differences (Bottom Panel) of Support for the Dictator Based on High and Low Levels of *Universalism* as Perceptions of the National Economy (*Sociotropic Perception*) Change



Note: High (90th percentile) and low levels (10th percentile) of universalistic welfare program were indexed to create these figures. Each plot is illustrated with 95% confidence intervals.

Almost all individual-level controls exhibit the expected effects. Rural residents and the elderly are more likely to support the dictator, whereas more educated individuals are less likely to do so. We should note that the coefficient estimate of *Poverty* is negative, which indicates that those who have suffered from economic hardship are less likely to support the dictator. The respondent's gender does not significantly affect their approval of the dictator (*Female*). Greater satisfaction with democracy increases the probability that an individual approves of the dictator

(*Satisfaction with Democracy*). This result shows that perceived legitimacy is crucial to cultivating support for the dictator. Both *GDPpc* and *GDP Growth* significantly increase citizens' support of the dictator. Economic wealth and good economic performance legitimize autocratic rule. In addition, both objective and subjective economic conditions influence approval of the dictator.

3.7. Robustness Check

I estimate six additional models of Table A3.4 to check the robustness of the main finding. First, I use an alternative measure of the political regime to show that the main finding is not dependent on the democracy measure from Boix et al. (2013). I rerun the main model using the definition of autocracy based on each country's Polity score (Marshall and Jagger 2014). According to conventional practice, I define autocracy as a country that has a Polity score of less than 6 (Model 1).

Second, I add citizens' egocentric economic perceptions as a control variable. Redistributive policies compensate for individual citizens' economic hardship by distributing material benefits. Therefore, welfare programs may affect support for the dictator by improving egocentric economic perceptions. To address this issue, I estimate Model 2 after adding the variable of egocentric economic perceptions (*Egocentric Perception*).


Third, I estimate Model 3 after excluding those who feel close to any particular political party. Respondents' economic evaluations can be a product of their political partisanship. Ruling party supporters may tend to have positive economic perceptions, whereas opposition party supporters may tend to have negative economic perceptions. To address the concern that

endogenous economic perceptions may be affected by partisan loyalty, I re-estimate Model 3 on the subsample of respondents who are unaffiliated with any party.

Fourth, I re-estimate an empirical model on the sub-sample of those who do not perceive government agencies, politicians, or political parties as the survey sponsor (Model 4). The central concern about autocratic survey data is the validity of respondents' answers. Due to the risk of punishment, respondents may hide their negative opinion of autocracies if they believe government agencies or the ruling elites are sponsoring the survey. This robustness check was designed to more precisely capture the answers of citizens who are more likely to deliver unbiased answers.

Finally, I estimate two additional models that take respondents' economic insecurity into consideration. The goal of this model specification is to test if autocratic welfare programs in fact provide material benefits to economically insecure citizens. As Knutsen and Rasmussen (2018) argue, the dictator may distribute welfare benefits to maintain core supporting groups. Therefore, autocratic welfare programs may improve support for only a specific group rather than all economically insecure citizens. I therefore use employment status and poverty levels to take economic insecurity into account. I estimate Models 5 and 6 using the sample with economically insecure citizens. Model 5 is estimated with those who are not full-time employees (i.e. the sample excludes unemployed individuals who are not looking for a job, since they face less job insecurity). I estimate Model 6 after including citizens who have recently experienced a food shortage.

Figure 3.4. First Differences of Probabilities of Support for the Dictator Based on Positive and Negative Economic Perceptions as *Universalism* Changes



Note: These figures are created based on respondents' economic perceptions of *Better* and *Worse*. Each plot is illustrated with 95% confidence intervals

Table A3.4 shows the empirical results to check the robustness of the main findings. To enhance understanding of the empirical findings, Figure 3.4 illustrates the first differences of predicted probabilities of support for the dictator based on the empirical models reported in Table A3.4. All models consistently support my argument against even different model specifications. As an autocracy provides more universalized welfare benefits, the effect of negative evaluations of the national economy on support for the dictator decreases. In Model 1,

replacing the measure of democracy with the Polity score does not change the main finding. Model 2 shows that the interaction term between *Universalism* and *Sociotropic Perception* has the expected impact on support of the dictator even after considering the impact of *Egocentric Perception*. It is noteworthy that the interaction term between *Egocentric Perception* and *Universalism* is also significant and negative. This result indicates that welfare programs reduce the adversity of both negative sociotropic and egocentric economic perceptions. Panel b of Figure 3.4 shows that the finding from Model 2 still supports my theoretical prediction.

I estimate an additional model to identify a clearer mechanism in the relationship between objective economic conditions and economic perceptions of the national economy. The dictator's economic performance first runs through citizens' economic perceptions and then affects the approval of the dictator. Positive evaluations of the national economy can also be a product of welfare benefits rather than the dictator's economic performance. Using objective economic conditions rather than economic evaluations, I conduct additional test about whether welfare programs decrease citizens' sensitivity to the dictator's objective economic performance. The models include GDP growth rate (*Economic Growth*) and *Universalism* as independent variables and sociotropic economic perceptions as the dependent variable. In the variable of sociotropic perception, I code answers of *better* and *much better* as 1, and 0 otherwise.

Utilizing multilevel probit models, Table A3.5 presents the empirical results of this test. I do not allow varying slopes to estimate empirical models in Table A3.5. Since *GDP Growth* is measured in each survey round, this indicator does not vary enough in each country to add varying slopes. Model 1 is estimated without the interaction term between *Universalism* and *Economic Growth*. The coefficient estimate of *Economic Growth* indicates that a dictator's good economic performance is influential in shaping positive economic perceptions. *Universalism*

does not significantly influence economic perceptions. However, I do not expect that welfare programs unconditionally affect positive economic opinions. Rather, the impact of such programs likely moderates the adversity of economic downturns on citizens' perceptions of the national economy.

Model 2 includes the interaction term between *Universalism* and *Economic Growth* to estimate the moderating effect of welfare programs on the relationship between economic performance and citizens' sociotropic economic perceptions. The coefficient estimates of the interaction term and all constitutive terms become significant and have the expected signs. This result shows that autocratic welfare programs ease the negative impact of bad economic outcomes on citizens' perceptions of the national economy.

Figure A3.4 depicts the effect of high (90th percentile) and low (10th percentile) growth rates and the first differences of GDP growth rate on sociotropic perceptions at the full range of *Universalism*. As *Universalism* shifts up to the full range, the gap in the probability of having positive economic perceptions under high and low economic growth rates decreases from 0.09 to 0.03 (bottom panel). We can conclude that universalized welfare benefits reduce the negative impacts of a dictator's economic performance on economic perceptions.

3.8. Conclusion

This article has explored how autocratic welfare programs contribute to sustaining autocratic stability. Citizens' material wellbeing is critical to stabilizing autocratic rule. During economic booms, citizens have various opportunities to improve their wealth. Even the curtailing of civil liberties can be perceived as legitimate if autocracies demonstrate good economic performance. However, economic downturns dismantle the foundation of autocratic legitimacy

by reducing citizens' income and increasing the risk of unemployment. Citizens' grievances over negative economic outcomes can trigger anti-regime protests and destabilize autocracies.

Welfare programs stabilize autocracies even during recessions by distributing material benefits as compensation for economic adversity. The provision of welfare benefits maintains autocratic legitimacy by alleviating the adverse impact of decreased income.

This study suggests two main avenues for future research. First, future studies should discuss how dictators use different policy instruments to respond to economic conditions. Considering that welfare retrenchment is unpopular in democracies (Pierson 1996), dictators are unlikely to be able to take away redistributive benefits without recourse even in good economic conditions. In addition, even autocracies can prioritize welfare programs during economic recessions to reduce the legitimization crisis. However, an economic crisis can prompt a reduction of welfare benefits, as occurred in Sudan. Although an economic crisis undermines the material foundation of autocracies (Bratton and van de Walle 1997), it is also possible that resource-abundant autocracies can maintain or expand welfare benefits even during economic crises.

Second, future studies should explore how dictators use their welfare programs to legitimize their repressive regimes. As mentioned earlier, communist countries created their positive image based on free health care and the absence of unemployment. While the main role of welfare programs is to provide tangible material benefits, dictators can also create the illusion of utopia in their society by disseminating welfare propaganda via the state-controlled media.

This study contributes to the autocratic politics literature by initiating a discussion of economic voting and welfare politics. Consistent with prior studies, the article finds that autocratic economic performance is critical to maintaining popular support for dictators. It also provides new insights into the impact of welfare policy on autocratic stability. I find that welfare

programs stabilize autocracies by maintaining popular support even when citizens have negative perceptions of the dictator's economic performance. Based on individual-level survey data, this paper fills a gap in the literature on autocratic politics by linking the discussion of autocratic stability to the political behavior literature.

CHAPTER 4

AUTOCRATIC LEGISLATORS, MILITARY EXPERIENCE, AND TARGETED GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS: EVIDENCE FROM 1973-1987 SOUTH KOREA

4.1. Introduction

The authoritarian politics literature has discussed why dictators allocate targeted government transfers to specific localities (Hong and Park 2014; Magaloni 2006; Schady 2000). They mainly argue that dictators strategically choose the targeting of distributive benefits to boost electoral support. However, little attention has been paid to how the connection with autocratic politicians incentivize dictators to locate the delivery of targeted government transfers. This is a surprising omission given that governing coalitions in authoritarian regimes are sustained through the distribution of government spoils (Magaloni 2006).

This paper aims to explore how a dictator allocates government spoils and policy influence in order to manage relationships with ruling elites. This study highlights the role of authoritarian legislatures as a tool to manage the dictator-ruling elites relationship. I argue that a dictator has incentives to staff the legislature with the elites who have a close connection with them. Also, I show that dictators deliver more government transfers to localities where these legislators are elected. By doing this, dictators can secure legislative seats of loyal legislators to consolidate regime stability. Due to the close connection with the dictator, these legislators also enjoy a higher level of accessibility to government spoils and policy influence. In addition, dictators can legitimize their political dominance by improving trustful legislators' policy competence. Consequently, these legislators demonstrate better policy performances than others.

To test my theoretical predictions, I compiled the original data about legislators' attributes in South Korean military regime for the period ranging from 1973 to 1987. I used legislators' military experience to measure dictators' personal connection with legislators. Military dictators have an incentive to staff legislature with professional military officers and support them to maintain the military's political dominance over their regimes. More importantly, the professionalization process of military forces builds and consolidates cohesion among military elites (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster 2018). In addition, the central features of the military, such as obedience to superiors and discipline (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014; Finer 2002), solve the paradox of loyalty and competence. I found that legislators' military experience significantly induces higher growth in targeted government transfers in their electoral districts. This finding remains robust even against estimating different model specifications, alternative explanations, and endogeneity concerns.

This study contributes to the authoritarian politics literature in three significant ways. First, this paper explores how dictators distribute targeted government transfers outside of party-based regimes. Existing studies have found that dictators strategically distribute targeted government transfers to maintain electoral support within party-based regimes (Magaloni 2006; Schady 2000). However, it has been rarely discussed how dictators in non-party regimes improvise distributive politics to maintain regime stability. This paper finds legislators' military experience affects the delivery of targeted government transfers in South Korean military dictatorship. This study extends the research scope of distributive politics in authoritarian regimes to military dictatorship.

Second, this study discusses the elite management strategy in military dictatorship. Military regimes are ruled by "men who specialize in armed force and maintaining order more

than in political affairs” (Geddes et al. 2014: 148). After World War II, 27.96% of authoritarian regimes were governed by military officers (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). The fundamental concern in military regimes is how to manage conflicts among military personnel, because military elites can control their armed troops (Geddes 2010). Despite the credibility of threats from other military officers, existing studies have paid limited attention to dictators’ elite-management strategies to reduce such threats. This paper demonstrates that military dictators strategically use authoritarian legislatures to manage and control military forces.

Third, focusing on legislators’ military experience, this study also explores how politicians’ attributes in authoritarian regimes determine policy outcomes. Recent studies in democracies began to discuss how politicians’ characteristics condition varying policy outcomes (Bratton and Ray 2002; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2014; Franck and Rainer 2012; Pande 2003; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Using original data concerning legislators’ attributes in South Korea, this study finds that dictators strategically use targeted government transfers to build a good relationship with military legislators. By doing this, they can maintain legitimacy for military rule.

4.2. Targeted Government Transfers and Autocratic Legislators

A political conflict between a dictator and the ruling elites is a critical source of political instability in authoritarian regimes. Among 303 autocratic leaders who were lost in irregular manners after World War II, 205 dictators were removed by regime insiders, whereas only thirty-two were ousted by a popular uprising (Svolik 2012). Recently, scholars have discussed how dictators manage their relationship with the ruling elites to maintain regime stability (Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2012). They argue that authoritarian legislatures improve the

credibility of power-sharing commitments with the ruling elites. More specifically, the legislatures reduce miscommunication problems between the dictator and the elites (Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012).

Dictators need to allocate the significant portion of legislative seats to legislators who have a close connection with them. Recent literature has stressed that autocratic legislatures are not just “rubber stamps”. Instead, the legislatures play a politically significant role in consolidating regime stability (Gandhi 2008; Lü, Liu, and Li 2020; Noble 2020; Svolik 2012; Williams and Magaloni 2020). Dictators use autocratic legislatures to solve policy disputes within the executive branch (Noble 2020) and to create policy coalition with legislators to push policy agenda (Lü et al. 2020). Dictators often need the support of legislatures to push their policy.

Dictators are incentivized to deliver more targeted government transfers to electoral districts of loyal legislators to secure the legislative seats of close legislative members. In other words, the close ties with legislators shape dictators’ preferences for the delivery of government resources to localities. For example, in the Chinese Communist Party regime, the patron-client networks among party elites affect the allocation of targeted transfers (Jiang and Zhang 2020). Voters in authoritarian regimes usually pay little attention to political parties and politicians’ policy positions. Instead, legislators’ access to government resources is the important criterion for vote choice in authoritarian regimes (Lust-Okar 2006). Therefore, dictators need to improvise the delivery of government resources to improve the trustful legislators’ electoral fortunes.

Dictators also maintain the legislators’ loyalty by improving their access to government spoils, given that the distribution of policy influence is also a meaningful reward to maintain the ruling elites’ loyalty toward the dictator (Williams and Magaloni 2020). Based upon the close tie

with dictators, these legislators can also credibly promise the improvement of targeted goods and provisions (e.g. piped water and housing) during election campaigns. For instance, in the 1978 South Korean general election, the ruling party candidates were more likely to promise economic development in their electoral districts to cultivate popular support than opposition candidates did (Song 1978).

Dictators can legitimize the political dominance of loyal legislators in authoritarian legislatures by distributing targeted government transfers to their electoral districts. Dictators allocate leadership positions in their ruling parties to politicians with whom they have a close relationship. For example, Suharto, who was President of Indonesia between 1968 and 1998 and a military leader, filled the majority of important positions in his ruling party with military officers (Brooker 1995). However, dictators should legitimize the political dominance of politicians within their informal networks to reduce conflicts with other members in their ruling party. In authoritarian elections, the mobilizational capacity for electoral support is critically related to local politicians' competence (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). For this reason, dictators try to facilitate good electoral performances of loyal legislators by allocating significant government resources to their electoral districts. More importantly, the delivery of targeted government transfers also demonstrates these legislators' policy influence. By doing this, dictators legitimize the loyal legislators' political dominance over other members in the ruling party.

4.3. Military Experience and Ruling Party Legislators

Compared to other dictators, military dictators are more advantageous to deter opposition challenges. They have the capacity to mobilize the armed forces to maintain political order. The

capacity of military mobilization also sows the seeds of political instability. Military elites can deploy their own troops in order to oust a dictator, which is the main reason why military regimes are less durable than other dictatorships (Geddes 1999, 2010). Due to a risk of coups, military dictators introduce quasi-democratic institutions to maintain regime stability. The creation of the ruling party enhances dictators' capacity to mobilize citizens, thereby reducing the likelihood of a coup by other military officers (Geddes 2010). A military dictator also allocates leadership positions in the ruling party to maintain the military's political dominance over other societal actors.

However, dictators face a trade-off between competence and loyalty in recruiting military officers to fill positions in their parties and autocratic legislatures. While competent ruling party members are likely to be potential challengers against their regimes (Egorov and Sonin 2011), incompetent ones cannot effectively deliver voters' demands and mobilize electoral support. Military dictators solve the paradox of loyalty vs. competency by reserving legislative seats for military officers and supporting them to maintain the military's political dominance over their regimes.

Crucially, military forces in developing countries are a supplier of competent elites. In these countries, the military forces are one of the most modernized groups (Geddes et al. 2014; Khuri and Obermeyer 1974). In other words, military forces had highly educated manpower with advanced administrative skills. For this reason, military officers often believe that they represent national interests, which leads them to intervene in politics (Brooker 1995). For example, Suharto in Indonesia reserved one-fifth of the parliament's seats for military officers to maintain political dominance (Booker 1995). In Argentina, legislation should be reviewed under a deliberative process (*Proceso*) within the military forces (Fontana 1987).

Based upon networks within military forces, military dictators can staff trustworthy politicians to fill autocratic legislatures. Military education builds and consolidates internal cohesion in the military forces by developing shared preferences among military officers (Böhmelt et al. 2018). The specialized educational process develops the unique features of the military forces, such as centralized command, hierarchy, and discipline (Finer 2002). Therefore, military officers are more accustomed to obey superiors than other societal actors (Geddes et al. 2014). The relationship between superiors and subordinates facilitates the patron-client relationship between a military dictator and military officers. In addition, the professionalization process of military forces contributes to developing trustful networks among military personnel (Böhmelt et al. 2018). Utilizing networks within military forces, military dictators easily recruit legislators who have shared beliefs and values with their regimes.

The reservation of legislative seats for military officers reduces elite conflict around career promotions within the military, which is critical to maintain regime stability. The promotion bottleneck in the military often paves the way for a coup by resentful officers. The recruitment of military elites for legislative seats is an effective tool to control military forces by offering more positions for their career promotions, even after their retirement from military duty.

The key proposition in this study is that dictators strategically use targeted government transfers to support military legislators. First, dictators need to secure military officers' legislative seats by distributing more resources to their electoral districts, because the delivery of targeted government transfers contributes to increased support for the ruling party (Hong and Park 2014; Cho, Lee, and Song 2019). Second, because of strong ties with a military dictator, legislators with military experience can credibly promise the delivery of targeted government

transfers to their electoral districts during electoral campaigns. Lastly, dictators can legitimize the military's political dominance by demonstrating their competence. The delivery of targeted government transfers creates a positive image of the military elites.

4.4. Illustrative Case of South Korea

During 1961 and 1987, South Korea was ruled by two military dictators: Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. These two presidents maintained close relationships with the military and recruited military officers to fill various executive and legislative posts. During President Park's term, the military forces were a supplier of competent, loyal elites to pursue his industrialization project, which was the main source of regime legitimation (Kim 2011; Ha and Kang 2011). As the United States provided military aid to upgrade the military forces' fighting capacity as an ally, the military forces were the most modernized institution in South Korea. Military forces believed that they represented national interests, and their organizational capacity led them to intervene in the industrialization project of South Korean autocracy. Even educational curriculums in military academies had classes about social and economic policies (Yang 1994).

Park strategically distributed legislative seats to military officers in order to maintain their loyalty. He introduced a party-list proportional representation system to allocate legislative seats to his royalist officers from North Korea, who had no support base in South Korea (Kim 2011).¹⁹ President park also recruited military officers who were not involved in the 1961 May coup, indicating that he would manage factionalism within the military force by distributing legislative seats (Kim and Kang 2017). Following the record of individual meetings, Park maintained an intermediate relationship with the armed forces. Among Park's individual

¹⁹ 75% of South Korean legislators were still elected by the single-member district electoral system in this period.

meetings with government officials, 24.7% were meetings with officials in the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and the Ministry of National Defense (Kim and Lee 2010).²⁰

President Chun established tight control over the military forces based upon the patron-client relationship among the ruling elites. He was the leader of the inner circle for young officers within military forces, which was called *Hanahoe* (Circle for One). He built the patron-client relationship with Park after he attempted an unsuccessful coup to eliminate dominant cliques in the ruling party and consolidate Park's political dominance. These military elites came to power with Chun under politically unstable conditions after the assassination of President Park in 1979. Based upon the patron-client relationship, members of *Hanahoe* politically dominated in not only military forces but also legislative and executive branches.

Both presidents allocated a significant portion of legislative seats to military officers. They mobilized the military forces to guard their regimes from opposition movements. For example, martial law was often declared to guard their regimes whenever they faced large-scale popular protests and unrests (Yang 1994). The recruitment of military elites for legislative seats was an effective tool to manage military forces and maintain their loyalty. During Park's term, 30.2% of ruling party legislators were former military officers. 41% of policy committee chairs in the National Assembly were filled by former military officers between 1973 and 1979. In Chun's regime, the proportion of ruling party legislators with military experience dropped to 19.2%. However, 43.6% of the committee chairs in the National Assembly were taken by former

²⁰ As Park's regime became personalized, he was less likely to improvise a divide and rule strategy to manage his relationship with military elites. Instead, he became more dependent on a small number of people in his entourage to rule his regime, which intensified conflicts among different military factions, which induced the assassination for President Park in 1979.

military officers between 1981 and 1986, indicating that the military elites still tightly controlled the National Assembly.

In South Korea, government budgetary proposals needed to be approved by the National Assembly even during the authoritarian era. The proposals were often amended by legislators. Following the Bill Information System of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, it took 48.8 days on average for the budgetary proposals to be approved by the National Assembly after the government submitted them. Among 52 passed budgetary proposals during this autocratic period, only 10 proposals were passed without amendment. Therefore, legislators with military experience could have a larger influence on the review process of a budgetary proposal. Based upon support from the president, they tried to allocate more government grants and subsidies to their electoral districts.

4.5. Data and Variables

To examine the relationship between a ruling party legislator's military experience and targeted government transfers, I created an original dataset for legislators in the South Korean National Assembly between 1973 and 1987. Using the profiles of former legislators on the website of the Republic of Korea Parliamentarian Society, I built a dataset on ruling party legislators' attributes, such as occupational background, hometown, age, education, and reelection history.

Although military dictatorship in South Korea was introduced in 1961 and broke down in 1987, I restricted the data coverage to after 1973, the year of the promulgation of the Yushin constitution. That milestone led to a change in the electoral system from single-member districts to a multi-member district system. In addition, a competitive presidential election was abolished

in 1973. These institutional changes could shift dictators' motivation of distributive policy.²¹ Second, I could not match election data with the administrative unit-level public good provision data before 1973, because the administrative unit-level election data were only available as of 1973.

My data cover 225 towns (*Eup*) and 65 cities (*Si*).²² Since electoral districts during the autocratic era were not perfectly matched with administrative units and the South Korean government reported statistical data about only towns and cities in the research period, my data could not cover all administrative units. In addition, my data did not cover large cities which have two or more electoral districts. In this case, we cannot discern which legislator influenced public good provision.

The dependent variable was changes in the coverage of public piped water supply (% of total households, *Piped Water*) in each county.²³ This variable measures the distribution of targeted government transfers. The improvement of water supply was relevant to the modernization project of South Korea's military dictatorship. The expansion of public water facilities is critically related to agricultural and industrial developments. Moreover, the provision of piped water facilities affects the improvement of citizens' living condition. The development

²¹ In competitive elections, the distribution of public goods may be incentivized to signal regime strength (Rosenzweig 2015). In less competitive elections, dictators may try to monitor the leakage of government resources and legislators' policy competence (Geddes et al. 2018).

²² A county is promoted to city status if its population exceeds 50,000. A town if the population exceeds 20,000. In this paper, I use the term of county to indicate both cities and towns.

²³ Unfortunately, these data are unavailable between 1976 and 1978. To deal with this issue, I interpolated this variable. I also reported empirical findings using non-interpolated data to show that empirical results are not dependent on the interpolation of the independent variable.

of public water supply in South Korea was expanded in a highly centralized manner. In the first five-year National Economic Development Plan which was introduced in 1962, the government of South Korea planned to expand households' access to water system facilities from 10% to 22%. The Korea Water Resources Development Corporation, which was established in 1967 and run by Korean government, supported the development policy of water resources (Lim and Choi 2015). As rapid urbanization increased citizens' demands for access to piped water, the provision of piped water became an increasingly important issue in almost every election. In addition, South Korea's autocracy built several large-scale dams to improve water supply. Consequently, the coverage of public water facilities increased from 63.6% of the population in 1967 to 87.2% in 1986.²⁴

The independent variable is the ruling party legislators' military experience. This variable is coded into 1 if a legislator in the ruling party was a former-military officer, and 0 otherwise. The baseline category is ruling party legislators without military experience. I do not take into account opposition legislators' military experience to estimate main empirical models. It is implausible to assume that opposition legislators with military experience have a close tie with military dictators and enjoy high accessibility to government resources under authoritarian contexts.²⁵ In addition, my theoretical argument focuses on how dictators selectively distribute resources to legislators within the ruling party. In other words, I attempt to compare legislators

²⁴ The construction of roads may be used to measure targeted government transfers, but it was not very relevant to citizens' lives during the autocratic era in South Korea, given that the number of registered cars per 1,000 people was only 2.3 in 1975 and 13.7 in 1985 (Korean Statistical Information Service).

²⁵ Despite this, I estimate Model 1 of Table A4.5 after adding the dummy variable of opposition legislators' military experience. In the robustness check section, I will provide a detailed discussion about the empirical result of this model.

with military experience to those without such experience among the ruling party legislators. For this reason, I restrict the empirical analysis to counties where ruling party legislators are elected. Despite this restriction, my data still cover almost all electoral districts. Due to the multi-member district system, the ruling party legislators were elected in 95% of total electoral districts.

Figure 4.1. Proportion of Elected Legislators with Military Experience



Note: This figure shows the distribution of legislators with military experience between 1963 and 1985.

In my sample, 26.9% of legislators in the ruling party had military experience, whereas only 4% of legislators in the opposition parties had military experience. Military officer was the largest occupational category of legislators.²⁶ Figure 4.1 demonstrates how the proportion of

²⁶ The second and the third largest occupational categories are a public officer (16%) and a businessperson (9.6%).

legislators with military experience changed between 1973 and 1985. In 1973, 37.1% of legislators were former military officers. The proportion of legislators with military experience dropped to 17.8% in 1981, then slightly increased to 20.7%.

4.6. Confounding Factors and Empirical Strategy

There are several confounding factors that may affect targeted government transfers: legislators' hometown, seniority, and education, the electoral margins of the ruling party, and urban-rural cleavage.²⁷

First, I control legislators' regional favoritism to their hometown (*Hometown*). Legislators may distribute more government resources to their birth places than others. Based upon cross-national analysis, Hodler and Raschky (2014) found that political leaders distribute more government resources to their hometown. Do, Nguyen, and Tran (2017) also demonstrate the pervasiveness of hometown favoritism across all ranks of Vietnamese political elites. Native officials are expected by their hometown's residence to deliver more material benefits and channel favors. In addition, regional voting was rapidly developed as South Korea experienced economic development (Morris 1996). Park and Chun, who both originated from the southeastern region of South Korea, pushed development projects to reward loyal supporters in their home regions. Similarly, as regional voters' favorite sons, legislators may distribute more resources to their hometowns than they do to other regions in their electoral districts.

Second, I added legislators' age (*Age*) and number of terms (*Reelection*) to control the effect of their seniority on targeted government transfers. Senior legislators tend to sponsor

²⁷ Due to the non-existence of a female legislator in the ruling party, I do not include a dummy variable of gender in the empirical models.

important bills, whereas junior members are usually restricted to less important issues (Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Due to their legislator experience, senior legislators have a high likelihood of winning higher position within the ruling party. In addition, South Korean society had been dominated by the Confucian ethical system, which required young people's obedience to the elderly. For this reason, senior legislative members were more likely to provide targeted transfers to their electoral districts.

Third, I added the variable *Graduate* to control for legislators' education levels. This variable is coded into 1 if a legislator has a graduate school qualification, and 0 otherwise. I found that more educated legislators distributed more targeted transfers to their electoral districts. Existing studies link politicians' education levels with their policy competence. Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2011) argue that education levels increase leaders' capability to make sensible policy choices. Considering low university attendance rate during autocratic periods in South Korea (e.g., 27.2% in 1980), educational privilege can determine legislators' accessibility to government resources. I expect that more educated legislators may improve the provision of targeted government transfers than less educated ones.

Fourth, the ruling party vote share is also added to empirical models. I obtained these data from the Republic of Korea's National Election Commission. Electoral margins affect local public good provisions in two different ways. First, dictators can distribute more resources to supporting districts and withdraw distributive benefits from opposition districts (Magaloni 2006; Blaydes 2010). In this case, the main goal of autocratic distribution is to reward core-supporters. Second, authoritarian governments can target electoral districts with weak incumbent support. Following Hong and Park (2014), dictators in South Korea constructed new industrial complexes

in electoral districts with weaker regime support. Expected material gains from constructed infrastructure boosted regime support (Cho et al. 2019).

Lastly, I added the population of each county (*Population*) and urbanization (*Urban*) to account for urban-rural cleavage. I obtained the population data from the Korean Statistical Information Service. I coded the variable of *Urban* into 1 if an administrative unit was a city (*Si*). Dictators may increase the provision of public goods to reduce dissent from urban areas. Existing studies show that rural residents are more likely to have pro-regime attitudes than their urban counterparts (Blaydes 2010; Lust-Okar 2006). In addition, due to high population density, city dwellers more easily initiate popular protest than rural dwellers (Wallace 2013). Urban-rural cleavage also strongly affected electoral politics in South Korean autocracy. Rural voters were more likely to support the ruling parties, whereas urban voters were more supportive of opposition parties (Browne and Kim 2003). Lastly, rural employment in primary industries was highly dependent on government subsidies (Heo and Stockton 2005). Autocrats may distribute more targeted goods to urban areas to cultivate more support from urban voters.

My data are structured as times-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data. TSCS data would violate several assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. TSCS data have serial correlations and unit heterogeneity. To reduce this concern, I estimated empirical models with panel-corrected standard errors for correcting serial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995). I also added both county- and year- fixed effects to control county- and year-specific unobserved characteristics that may affect targeted government transfers. It is also necessary to include the previous level of access to piped water facilities because the pace of changing the accessibility to

piped water facilities may gradually decrease as the access increases.²⁸ The model specification is as follows:

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha Y_{it-1} + \beta X_{it-1} + \gamma Z_{it-1} + \vartheta_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where subscript i denotes counties, and t denotes year. ΔY_{it} is a measure of the dependent variables which is the change in *Piped Water*, and Y_{it-1} is a lagged level of *Piped Water*.²⁹ X_{it-1} is the independent variable (*Military Experience*). Z_{it-1} is a set of controls. ϑ_i are county-fixed effects, δ_t are year-fixed effects, and ε_{it} is the error component. Independent variable and all controls are lagged by one year to deal with endogeneity concerns.

4.7. Empirical Results

Table 4.1 shows the empirical results of the analysis of targeted government transfers in 244 counties between 1973 and 1987. While I estimated Model 1 without controls, Model 2 was estimated with controls. In addition, I ran Models 3 and 4 using the dependent variable without interpolation. The evidence consistently supports my theoretical prediction across all models: *Military Experience* is positive and statistically significant. This result shows that legislators' military experience increases the distribution of targeted transfers in their electoral districts.

The empirical finding based on Model 2 indicates that switching from a legislator without military experience to one with such experience induces a 2.75 percentage point increase in the

²⁸ Following Angrist and Pischke (2009), it can be problematic to include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) with two-way fixed effects. To address this concern, I estimated models without LDV. Table A4.2 shows that my theoretical predictions are still supported even after excluding LDV.

²⁹ I also estimated additional models with the level of *Piped Water* as a dependent variable. As presented in Table A4.3, my central hypothesis holds even when I use the level of *Piped Water* instead of the change in *Piped Water*.

coverage of public piped water supply in an electoral district. I suggest a specific case from the data set to improve an understanding about this empirical result. Oh Han-Gu was a legislator of *Yeongju-Si* during 1981 and 1987. He was a member of *Hanahoe* and a provincial representative of the ruling party (Democratic Republican Party) and a chair of the policy committee for economics and science in the National Assembly between 1985 and 1987. Model 2 predicts that he would increase households' access to piped water facilities by 2.62 percentage points in the 1985 legislative election. In a hypothetical case where he did not have military experience and all other factors remained the same, the predicted change in the coverage of piped water supply in *Yeongju-Si* would decrease 0.12 percentage points in the same year. In Model 4, the coefficient on *Military Experience* is also significant and positive even after excluding interpolated cases. Model 4 indicates that legislators' military experience increases the accessibility of piped water by 2.84 percentage points.

Among various controls, the coefficients on *Graduate* and *Ruling Party Vote Share* significantly affect the distribution of targeted transfers. Educated legislators are more likely to increase the coverage of piped water in their electoral district. More specifically, compared to a legislator without a graduate certification, one with such a certification increases access to piped water by 1.62 percentage points. In addition, public goods tend to be distributed to electoral districts with weaker regime support, which is consistent with findings of Hong and Park (2016). Autocratic rulers in South Korea strategically improvised a distributive policy tool to boost electoral support from swing voters rather than to reward core supporters.

Table 4.1. Effect of Military Experience on Public Good Provision

| DV = Δ Piped water | (1) | (2) | (3) Non- interpolated | (4) Non- interpolated |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Piped water (lagged) | -0.583*** (0.026) | -0.613*** (0.028) | -0.662*** (0.030) | -0.674*** (0.031) |
| Military experience | 1.422* (0.671) | 2.751*** (0.764) | 1.833* (0.802) | 2.840** (0.894) |
| Hometown | | 0.018 (0.880) | | -0.026 (0.997) |
| Age | | 0.097 (0.070) | | 0.062 (0.079) |
| Reelection | | -0.466 (0.289) | | -0.374 (0.328) |
| Graduate | | 1.619* (0.745) | | 2.066* (0.850) |
| Ruling party vote share | | -0.062* (0.026) | | -0.063* (0.030) |
| Population (logged) | | -1.010 (1.420) | | -1.161 (1.610) |
| Urban | | -1.044 (1.360) | | -1.190 (1.631) |
| Constant | 17.038*** (2.456) | 27.212 (14.487) | 23.080*** (3.021) | 31.057 (16.559) |
| County fixed | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Counties | 244 | 244 | 241 | 241 |
| Observations | 2228 | 2090 | 1843 | 1779 |
| R-squared | 0.379 | 0.399 | 0.425 | 0.433 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households). County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4.8. Robustness Check

I ran additional models after considering opposition legislators' military experience and ruling party legislators' other occupational backgrounds in Table A4.4. I added opposition legislators' military experience in Model 1. Regardless of party affiliation, military experience itself may be related to legislators' policy influence because military forces were the institution which provided educated human resources in autocratic periods of South Korea. In addition, I included additional occupational categories in Models from 2 to 5: lawyer, businessperson, and public officer.³⁰ The empirical results in Table A4.4 still support my theoretical prediction.

Electoral fraud may condition the relationship between *Military Experience* and *Piped Water*. Autocratic incumbents frequently engage in electoral fraud to credibly manufacture large electoral margins (Higashijima 2020). Dictators may distribute more resources to electoral districts to compensate for electoral fraud and thus reduce the risk of mass demonstration. In addition, electoral frauds may occur where legislators have a close tie with a dictator because the dictator needs to guard loyalists from electoral defeats. Therefore, electoral fraud can be closely related to both military experience and targeted transfers. Based upon the strategy of Hong and Park (2016), I measured electoral fraud by detecting abnormal vote counts at each electoral district. I coded the variable of electoral fraud (*Fraud*) to 1 if “the number of total votes is larger than the number of eligible voters” (Hong and Park 2016: 522).


³⁰ 39.9% of legislators had experience working in one of these three occupational categories.

Table 4.2. Electoral Fraud and Public Good Provision

| DV = Δ Piped water | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | No Fraud | Fraud | |
| Piped water (lagged) | -0.666*** (0.033) | -0.419*** (0.049) | -0.618*** (0.028) |
| Military experience | 2.313* (1.022) | 3.326** (1.271) | 1.970* (0.913) |
| Fraud | | | 2.380* (1.073) |
| Military \times Fraud | | | 2.569* (1.276) |
| Hometown | 0.249 (1.206) | -0.036 (1.087) | 0.041 (0.885) |
| Age | 0.094 (0.100) | 0.023 (0.104) | 0.091 (0.070) |
| Reelection | -0.437 (0.388) | -0.299 (0.485) | -0.473 (0.288) |
| Graduate | 2.224* (0.956) | -0.591 (1.188) | 1.636* (0.745) |
| Ruling party vote share | -0.069* (0.033) | -0.074 (0.042) | -0.067* (0.026) |
| Population (logged) | -1.374 (1.738) | 1.198 (1.841) | -0.889 (1.419) |
| Urban | -2.498 (1.423) | 4.258 (4.232) | -1.255 (1.349) |
| Constant | 23.128 (18.100) | 6.828 (17.083) | 22.337 (14.502) |
| County fixed | Y | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y | Y |
| Counties | 212 | 64 | 242 |
| Observations | 1542 | 548 | 2090 |
| R-squared | 0.433 | 0.308 | 0.402 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households). Model 1 is estimated including only districts where no electoral fraud occurs, whereas Model 2 is estimated including only districts where electoral fraud occurs. County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 4.2. Marginal Effect of Military Experience on Piped Water by Electoral Fraud



Note: This figure shows the marginal effect of military experience on the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households) by occurrence of electoral fraud. This plot is generated using coefficient estimates in Model 3 of Table 4.3 with 95% confidence intervals.

Table 4.2 displays empirical models accounting for electoral fraud. I included cases where electoral fraud does not occur in Model 1, whereas I included cases only where electoral districts experience electoral fraud in Model 2. Lastly, I estimated Model 3 after including the interaction term between *Fraud* and *Military Experience* to account for how the impact of legislators' military experience on targeted goods provision is moderated by electoral fraud. The coefficient on *Military Experience* is significant and positive in both Models 1 and 2, indicating that legislators' military experience improves targeted government transfers regardless of the occurrence of electoral fraud. However, according to the empirical result of Model 3, the interaction term is significant and positive, which indicates that the impact of *Military*

Experience is significantly moderated by *Fraud*. We should note that the coefficient on *Military Experience* is still significant even after including the interaction term, which indicates that legislators' military experience significantly increases the delivery of targeted government transfers even if electoral fraud does not occur. However, as depicted in Figure 4.2, legislators' military experience was more influential when electoral fraud occurred in the electoral districts than when it did not occur.

The selection of legislators with military experience can be endogenously affected by former legislators' policy performance. If an incumbent legislator does not distribute sufficient targeted resources, voters will elect a former military officer with the expectation that a personal tie with the president may improve the distribution of targeted local transfers. To deal with this issue, I ran Models from 1 to 4 of Table A4.5 after excluding cases where former legislators' performance was bad. I exclude observations where *Piped Water* was lower than 1st, 5th, 10th, and 25th respectively. My main hypothesis is still supported even after accounting for this potential endogeneity issue.

Counties which elect a legislator with military experience may be systematically different from other counties. In other words, unobserved changes within a county may simultaneously elect a military legislator and increase the coverage of public water facilities. Adopting the strategy of Hodler and Raschky (2014: 1014), I created the dummy variables to indicate a county that elected a former military officer in the previous year (*Past1*) or within the previous two years (*Past2*), as well as a county that elected such a legislator in the next year (*Post1*) or within the next two years (*Post2*). In the empirical models of Table 4.3, the coefficients on these dummy variables were not significant. However, *Military Experience* still positively affected

government transfers, indicating that the main finding was produced by the independent variable rather than unobserved changes within counties.

Table 4.3. Models Addressing Endogeneity Concerns

| DV = Δ Piped water | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Piped water (lagged) | -0.613*** (0.028) | -0.612*** (0.028) | -0.613*** (0.028) | -0.613*** (0.028) | -0.613*** (0.028) | -0.612*** (0.028) |
| Military experience | 2.702*** (0.793) | 2.464** (0.808) | 2.841*** (0.806) | 3.301*** (0.857) | 2.793*** (0.831) | 3.032*** (0.889) |
| Past1 | -0.444 (1.820) | | | | -0.429 (1.817) | |
| Past2 | | -1.536 (1.517) | | | | -1.283 (1.498) |
| Post1 | | | 0.609 (1.454) | | 0.603 (1.452) | |
| Post2 | | | | 1.895 (1.155) | | 1.796 (1.143) |
| Hometown | 0.014 (0.881) | 0.003 (0.881) | 0.019 (0.880) | -0.031 (0.880) | 0.014 (0.881) | -0.042 (0.881) |
| Age | 0.096 (0.070) | 0.093 (0.070) | 0.099 (0.070) | 0.108 (0.071) | 0.098 (0.070) | 0.103 (0.071) |
| Reelection | -0.469 (0.289) | -0.482 (0.289) | -0.472 (0.290) | -0.517 (0.293) | -0.475 (0.290) | -0.527 (0.293) |
| Graduate | 1.623* (0.745) | 1.664* (0.746) | 1.622* (0.746) | 1.621* (0.745) | 1.626* (0.745) | 1.658* (0.745) |
| Ruling party vote share | -0.062* (0.026) | -0.062* (0.026) | -0.062* (0.026) | -0.061* (0.026) | -0.062* (0.026) | -0.061* (0.026) |
| Population (logged) | -1.005 (1.419) | -0.981 (1.417) | -1.016 (1.421) | -1.092 (1.421) | -1.011 (1.419) | -1.063 (1.419) |
| Urban | -1.049 (1.359) | -1.044 (1.360) | -1.044 (1.360) | -1.070 (1.358) | -1.049 (1.359) | -1.069 (1.358) |
| Constant | 27.246 (14.498) | 27.356 (14.492) | 27.067 (14.482) | 26.880 (14.469) | 27.102 (14.493) | 27.017 (14.475) |
| County fixed | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Counties | 242 | 242 | 242 | 242 | 242 | 242 |
| Observations | 2090 | 2090 | 2090 | 2090 | 2090 | 2090 |
| R-squared | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.400 | 0.399 | 0.400 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households). County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 4.4. Regression Analysis of Public Good Provision Excluding *Yeongnam* Region

| DV = Δ Piped water | (1) Yeongnam excluded | (2) Yeongnam only |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| Piped water (lagged) | -0.604*** (0.035) | -0.605*** (0.049) |
| Military experience | 2.251** (0.770) | 5.103* (2.111) |
| Hometown | -0.775 (1.052) | 1.400 (1.588) |
| Age | 0.073 (0.080) | 0.164 (0.157) |
| Reelection | -0.424 (0.310) | -0.321 (0.660) |
| Graduate | 1.183 (0.849) | 3.114* (1.476) |
| Ruling party vote share | -0.042 (0.028) | -0.106 (0.058) |
| Population (logged) | -1.339 (1.588) | -1.837 (3.025) |
| Urban | -1.160 (1.485) | 0.112 (3.146) |
| Constant | 38.751* (16.839) | 35.270 (30.226) |
| County fixed | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y |
| Counties | 172 | 70 |
| Observations | 1481 | 609 |
| R-squared | 0.390 | 0.461 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households). Model 1 is estimated excluding *Yeongnam* (*Gyeongnam* and *Gyeongbuk*), whereas Model 2 is estimated including *Yeongnam* only. County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Another concern I need to address is regionalism in South Korea. Presidents Park and Chun mainly recruited the ruling elites from their regional bases. For example, President Park filled most of his positions in internal security agencies with the elites from his home region, *Yeongnam* (Greitens 2016). In Chun's term, most of the members of *Hanahoe* were also born in this region. In short, the regional favoritism shown toward *Yeongnam* may condition both the

recruitment of military officers for legislative seats and targeted transfers. The models of Table 4.4 attempt to address this concern. While I estimated Model 1 after excluding cases in home regions (*Yeongnam*), Model 2 was estimated with home regions only. In both models, the coefficient on *Military Experience* is significant, which supports my theoretical prediction. However, we should note that the coefficient on *Military Experience* in Model 2 is much larger than that found in Model 1, which indicates that the effect of *Military Experience* is stronger in *Yeongnam* than in other regions. Due to the regional connection, two presidents supported former military officers who were elected in *Yeongnam* more than they did those in other regions. However, *Military Experience* still significantly affected public goods provision across models of Table 4.4, which supports my hypothesis.

Due to the complexity of the policy making decision process, legislators' military experience may not immediately affect targeted transfers. I conducted term-level analysis in Table A4.6 by taking the average of all variables during each legislator's term. Models 1 and 2 of Table A4.6 predict that legislators with military experience increase households' accessibility to piped water by 5.09 percentage points and 5 percentage points, respectively.

Lastly, legislators with military experience may be electorally more successful than those without such experience. Due to close ties with a military dictator, voters expect that legislators who are former military officers deliver more targeted government transfers than other legislators. As we have discussed, these legislators perform better on the delivery of government resources to their electoral districts, which critically affect citizens' electoral support. In the empirical models of Table A4.7, I tested whether military experience significantly increases ruling party legislators' vote shares. In Model 2 of Table A4.7, compared to ruling party legislators without military experience, ruling party legislators with such an experience cultivate

higher vote shares by 8.06 percentage points. This result indicates that legislators' military experience contributes to increased electoral support.

4.9. Conclusion

This paper investigates the relationship between legislators' military experience and the distribution of targeted transfers in authoritarian regimes. Using original data from legislator profiles in South Korea, I examined how legislators' military experience affects the distribution of targeted government transfers. I found that legislators with military experience induced a higher growth rate in the access to public piped water facilities in their electoral districts by 2.75 percentage points when compared to those without such experience.

This paper contributes to the comparative politics literature in two significant ways. First, this study improves our understanding about distributive politics in military dictatorship. I found that military dictators strategically use distributive policy to manage their relationships with legislators who were former military officers. This result also indicates that military legislators have better access to policy influence than other elites. By doing this, dictators can maintain the military's political dominance in authoritarian legislatures.

Second, this study also speaks to the Korean politics literature by investigating the impact of legislators' backgrounds. Although Korean autocracy is classified to military regime (Geddes et al. 2018), existing studies had not systematically explored how military dictators maintain a close connection with military forces. The empirical finding of this paper shows that the delivery of targeted government transfers is in fact related to dictators' elite-management policy.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Table A2.1. Summary Statistics

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---------|--------|-----------|---------|---------|
| <i>Country-level Analysis</i> | | | | | |
| Social Protection (% government spending) | 627 | 8.149 | 8.016 | 0 | 46.300 |
| Proximity | 1,321 | 0.492 | 0.282 | 0.001 | 0.999 |
| ELE | 1,336 | 0.309 | 0.431 | 0 | 1.984 |
| Age1564 | 1,376 | 58.164 | 7.070 | 45.984 | 78.746 |
| GDPpc (logged) | 1,354 | 7.220 | 1.268 | 4.272 | 10.961 |
| Resource Dependence | 1,355 | 8.132 | 12.753 | 0 | 78.623 |
| GDP Growth | 1,337 | 4.680 | 7.349 | -41.8 | 149.973 |
| Regime Consolidation | 916 | 0.047 | 1.199 | -2.666 | 2.474 |
| Regime Personalism | 863 | 0.453 | 0.256 | 0 | 1 |
| Transition to EA | 1,387 | 0.276 | 0.447 | 0 | 1 |
| Regime Breakdown | 875 | 0.051 | 0.221 | 0 | 1 |
| Breakdown History | 875 | 0.585 | 0.917 | 0 | 6 |
| Regime History (logged) | 875 | 2.758 | 0.943 | 0 | 4.431 |
| Protest (logged) | 1,021 | 0.902 | 0.859 | 0 | 3.555 |
| Party Regime | 973 | 0.450 | 0.498 | 0 | 1 |
| Personalist Regime | 973 | 0.318 | 0.466 | 0 | 1 |
| Inequality | 940 | 45.593 | 6.918 | 30.1 | 71.6 |
| Trade Openness (% GDP) | 1,277 | 88.297 | 62.761 | 0.200 | 437.327 |
| FDI Inflow (% GDP) | 1,309 | 4.209 | 8.234 | -10.082 | 161.824 |
| Food Deficit (logged) | 861 | 4.565 | 1.060 | 1.386 | 6.29 |
| Defense (% government spending) | 647 | 11.727 | 7.553 | 0 | 45.900 |
| <i>Multi-level Analysis</i> | | | | | |
| Perception of Gov't Redistribution | 65,064 | 0.000 | 1.436 | -1.873 | 4.139 |
| Proximity | 85,116 | 0.531 | 0.269 | 0 | 0.963 |
| Rural | 108,074 | 1.623 | 0.485 | 1 | 2 |
| Age | 107,124 | 35.736 | 13.953 | 16 | 105 |
| Female | 108,363 | 1.501 | 0.500 | 1 | 2 |
| Education | 108,050 | 3.400 | 2.111 | 0 | 9 |
| Poverty | 105,835 | 1.048 | 1.199 | 0 | 4 |
| Radio News | 108,137 | 2.826 | 1.490 | 0 | 4 |
| Sociotropic Economy | 106,248 | 2.655 | 1.272 | 1 | 5 |
| Egocentric Economy | 93,066 | 2.761 | 1.169 | 1 | 5 |
| Winner | 103,430 | 0.349 | 0.477 | 0 | 1 |
| MIP Poverty | 90,329 | 0.253 | 0.435 | 0 | 1 |
| GDPpc | 108,417 | 2.260 | 0.887 | 0.898 | 4.302 |
| GDP Growth | 108,417 | 5.608 | 3.227 | -5.808 | 16.665 |
| Improving the Poor's Living | 67,601 | 1.969 | 0.866 | 1 | 4 |
| Narrowing Income Gap | 97,477 | 1.850 | 0.861 | 1 | 4 |
| Ensuring Enough to Eat | 89,334 | 2.060 | 0.899 | 1 | 4 |

Table A2.2. Different Model Specifications

| DV = Social Protection | (1) Alternative IVs | (2) PCSE (No Prais- Winsten) | (3) LDV added | (4) ECM |
|------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| ELE | 0.718*** (0.254) | | | |
| ELE (lagged) | 0.516** (0.256) | | | |
| Proximity | | -5.174** (2.383) | -4.488* (2.335) | -4.227** (1.719) |
| Proximity ² | | 5.082** (2.319) | 5.151** (2.326) | 4.624*** (1.685) |
| LDV | | | 0.870*** (0.036) | -0.662*** (0.058) |
| Age1564 | 0.306** (0.141) | 0.146 (0.106) | 0.052 (0.038) | 0.193* (0.104) |
| GDPpc (logged) | 2.514*** (0.860) | 3.526*** (0.715) | -0.165 (0.262) | 0.466 (0.709) |
| Resource Dependence | -0.088* (0.051) | -0.081 (0.056) | 0.032* (0.019) | -0.159*** (0.054) |
| GDP Growth | -0.046** (0.023) | -0.068** (0.034) | -0.046 (0.032) | -0.100** (0.043) |
| Δ Age1564 | | | | -0.877 (0.565) |
| Δ GDPpc (logged) | | | | -0.289 (1.147) |
| Δ Resource Dependence | | | | 0.000 (0.054) |
| Δ GDP Growth | | | | -0.050* (0.030) |
| Constant | -19.655** (8.855) | -15.809** (6.564) | 0.194 (1.148) | -2.292 (6.768) |
| Country-FEs | Y | Y | N | N |
| Year-FEs | Y | Y | N | N |
| Countries | 61 | 61 | 60 | 60 |
| N | 608 | 603 | 561 | 560 |
| R-sq | 0.913 | 0.764 | 0.857 | 0.505 |

Note: All models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on the level of social protection spending (% total government spending) in EA regimes. Model 1 includes the alternative election year measure (ELE) rather than *Proximity*. Model 2 is an OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors. Model 3 is estimated after adding the lagged dependent variable and Model 4 is the error-correction model. Country and year fixed effects are included in Models 1 and 2, whereas Models 3 and 4 are estimated without fixed effects. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A2.3. Models with Regimes Where Elections Are Regularly Held without Alternative Choices

| DV = Social Protection | (1) | (2) |
|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Proximity | -0.325 (1.773) | 0.778 (2.087) |
| Proximity ² | 1.693 (1.740) | 0.754 (1.990) |
| Age1564 | | -0.161 (0.156) |
| GDPpc (logged) | | -2.975*** (0.798) |
| Resource Dependence | | 0.118*** (0.045) |
| GDP Growth | | 0.023 (0.029) |
| Constant | 10.786*** (1.627) | 38.042*** (9.015) |
| County FEs | Y | Y |
| Year FEs | Y | Y |
| Countries | 40 | 31 |
| N | 342 | 236 |
| R-sq | 0.815 | 0.883 |

Note: All models are estimates with Prais-Winsten regression; panel-corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on the level of social protection spending (% total government spending) in authoritarian regimes where legislative elections are regularly held but without opposition candidates. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2.4. Robustness Checks Adding Extra Controls

| DV = Social Protection | (1) Regime Type | (2) Inequality | (3) International Factors |
|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| Proximity | -3.728** (1.710) | -3.814** (1.802) | -3.748** (1.615) |
| Proximity ² | 3.256* (1.672) | 3.557** (1.808) | 3.507** (1.605) |
| Age1564 | 0.367*** (0.141) | 0.212 (0.185) | 0.349** (0.151) |
| GDPpc (logged) | 2.573*** (0.950) | 2.173* (1.237) | 2.331** (0.954) |
| Resource Dependence | -0.080 (0.065) | -0.091 (0.064) | -0.136** (0.059) |
| GDP Growth | -0.033 (0.028) | -0.017 (0.029) | -0.038 (0.026) |
| Party Regime | -2.298** (0.922) | | |
| Personalist Regime | -1.482 (1.350) | | |
| Market Inequality | | 0.231 (0.318) | |
| Trade Openness | | | 0.004 (0.009) |
| FDI Inflow | | | -0.050 (0.040) |
| Constant | -19.399** (9.322) | -23.574 (19.310) | -19.024** (9.503) |
| Country-FEs | Y | Y | Y |
| Year-FEs | Y | Y | Y |
| Countries | 50 | 50 | 59 |
| N | 468 | 456 | 567 |
| R-sq | 0.911 | 0.912 | 0.915 |

Note: All models are estimates with Prais-Winsten regression; panel-corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on the level of social protection spending (% total government spending) in EA regimes. Country and year fixed effects are included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A2.5. Models Adding Election Characteristics

| DV = Social Protection | (1) | (2) |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|
| Proximity | -5.225*** (1.720) | -2.959* (1.685) |
| Proximity ² | 4.788*** (1.659) | 3.054* (1.623) |
| Clean Election | -1.786 (1.090) | |
| Proximity \times Clean Election | 7.570 (10.011) | |
| Proximity ² \times Clean Election | -2.017 (12.947) | |
| Irregular Election | | 0.684 (1.301) |
| Proximity \times Irregular Election | | 2.952 (11.330) |
| Proximity ² \times Irregular Election | | -3.114 (16.129) |
| Age1564 | 0.346** (0.139) | 0.314** (0.140) |
| GDPpc (logged) | 2.370*** (0.858) | 2.514*** (0.854) |
| Resource Dependence | -0.084* (0.050) | -0.083 (0.052) |
| GDP Growth | -0.046** (0.023) | -0.040* (0.023) |
| Constant | -18.994** (8.563) | -19.105** (9.049) |
| Country-FEs | Y | Y |
| Year-FEs | Y | Y |
| Countries | 61 | 61 |
| N | 603 | 603 |
| R-sq | 0.908 | 0.913 |

Note: All models are estimates with Prais-Winsten regression; panel-corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on the level of social protection spending (% total government spending) in EA regimes. Country and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2.6. Models Addressing Confounding Factors

| DV = Social Protection | (1) Consolidation (Gandhi and Summer forthcoming) | (2) Personalization (Geddes et al. 2018) | (3) Transition to EA (within 5 years) | (4) Regime Breakdown (within 5 years) | (5) Breakdown History | (6) Regime History | (7) Protest |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|-----------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| Proximity | -4.510** (1.834) | -4.696*** (1.781) | -3.681** (1.541) | -4.457** (1.870) | -4.470** (1.753) | -4.510*** (1.740) | -5.499** (2.442) |
| Proximity ² | 3.952** (1.720) | 3.892** (1.723) | 3.499** (1.538) | 3.780** (1.768) | 3.712** (1.704) | 3.743** (1.690) | 5.348** (2.547) |
| Age1564 | 0.317** (0.151) | 0.289* (0.159) | 0.333** (0.140) | 0.354** (0.147) | 0.315** (0.160) | 0.272* (0.163) | 0.377*** (0.146) |
| GDPpc (logged) | 3.165*** (0.887) | 2.712*** (0.955) | 2.482*** (0.898) | 2.864*** (0.942) | 2.544*** (0.962) | 2.609*** (0.936) | 3.009** (1.367) |
| Resource Dependence | -0.063 (0.067) | -0.091 (0.066) | -0.080 (0.051) | -0.064 (0.060) | -0.068 (0.058) | -0.079 (0.057) | -0.086 (0.055) |
| GDP Growth | -0.038 (0.026) | -0.030 (0.030) | -0.044* (0.023) | -0.030 (0.030) | -0.034 (0.029) | -0.037 (0.029) | -0.041 (0.041) |
| Consolidation | 1.735*** (0.522) | | | | | | |
| Personalization | | 0.045 (1.956) | | | | | |
| Transition to EA (5 yrs) | | | 0.387 (0.525) | | | | |
| Breakdown (5 yrs) | | | | -2.543** (1.049) | | | |
| Breakdown History | | | | | -0.483 (0.303) | | |
| Regime History | | | | | | 0.691 (0.592) | |
| Protest | | | | | | | 0.522 (0.329) |

Table A2.6 (cont'd)

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Constant | -21.332** (9.884) | -18.674* (9.887) | -19.635** (8.828) | -22.957** (10.126) | -19.037* (9.833) | -19.651** (9.739) | -44.814*** (14.279) |
| Country-FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year-FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| N | 441 | 422 | 603 | 413 | 429 | 429 | 398 |
| Countries | 50 | 47 | 61 | 46 | 48 | 48 | 49 |
| R-sq | 0.885 | 0.924 | 0.914 | 0.919 | 0.924 | 0.926 | 0.913 |

Note: All models are estimates with Prais-Winsten regression; panel-corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on the level of social protection spending (% total government spending) in EA regimes. Country and year fixed effects are included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A2.7. Models Excluding Cases with Short and Long Electoral Cycles

| DV = Social Protection | (1) > 1 st perc. < 99 th perc. | (2) > 5 th perc. < 95 th perc. | (3) > 10 th perc. < 90 th perc. |
|------------------------|--|--|---|
| Proximity | -3.891** (1.547) | -3.347** (1.634) | -3.813** (1.813) |
| Proximity ² | 3.909** (1.550) | 3.257** (1.637) | 3.724** (1.828) |
| Age1564 | 0.332** (0.140) | 0.475*** (0.139) | 0.427*** (0.162) |
| GDPpc (logged) | 2.366*** (0.904) | 1.518 (0.928) | 1.666 (1.134) |
| Resource Dependence | -0.076 (0.051) | -0.121** (0.058) | -0.124** (0.059) |
| GDP Growth | -0.056** (0.023) | -0.060** (0.025) | -0.053* (0.028) |
| Constant | -18.613** (9.303) | -20.277** (9.932) | -19.157* (11.331) |
| County FEs | Y | Y | Y |
| Year FEs | Y | Y | Y |
| Countries | 586 | 545 | 485 |
| N | 61 | 59 | 58 |
| R-sq | 0.921 | 0.872 | 0.881 |

Note: All models are estimates with Prais-Winsten regression; panel-corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on the level of social protection spending (% total government spending) in EA regimes. I include observations only with the length of the electoral cycle between the 1st and 99th percentiles (Model 1), 5th and 95th percentiles (Model 2), 10th and 90th percentiles (Model 3). Country and year fixed effects are included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A2.8. Models with Alternative DVs

| DV = Defense | (1) | (2) |
|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Proximity | 2.487** (1.231) | 2.445** (1.172) |
| Proximity ² | -2.867** (1.186) | -2.775** (1.135) |
| Age1564 | | -0.197 (0.136) |
| GDPpc (logged) | | -1.756** (0.729) |
| Resource Dependence | | -0.094* (0.053) |
| GDP Growth | | 0.030 (0.022) |
| Constant | 5.299*** (1.010) | 27.112*** (7.750) |
| County FEs | Y | Y |
| Year FEs | Y | Y |
| Countries | 62 | 60 |
| N | 634 | 623 |
| R-sq | 0.849 | 0.870 |

Note: All models are estimates with Prais-Winsten regression; panel-corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. All models estimate the impact of electoral cycle on the level of defense expenditure (% total government spending). Country and year fixed effects are included.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A2.9. List of Countries in the Individual-level Analysis

| Country | Years |
|---------------|------------------------|
| Algeria | 2013, 2015 |
| Burkina Faso | 2008, 2012, 2015 |
| Cameroon | 2013, 2015 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 2013, 2014 |
| Egypt | 2015 |
| Gabon | 2015 |
| Guinea | 2013, 2015 |
| Madagascar | 2013, 2014, 2015 |
| Mali | 2012, 2013, 2014 |
| Mozambique | 2008, 2012, 2015 |
| Namibia | 2008, 2012, 2014 |
| Nigeria | 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014 |
| Sudan | 2013 |
| Tanzania | 2008, 2012, 2014 |
| Togo | 2012, 2014 |
| Tunisia | 2013 |
| Uganda | 2008, 2011, 2012, 2015 |
| Zimbabwe | 2009, 2012, 2014 |

Note: I only include countries that regularly hold multiparty elections (Skaaning et al. 2015).

Table A2.10. List of Questions to Create the Index of *Perceptions of Government Redistribution*

| Variable | Question in Afrobarometer |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Improving the Poor's Living | <p>How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Improving the living standards of the poor</p> <p>[1] Very badly [2] Fairly badly [3] Fairly well [4] Very well</p> |
| Narrowing Income Gap | <p>How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?</p> <p>[1] Very badly [2] Fairly badly [3] Fairly well [4] Very well</p> |
| Ensuring Enough to Eat | <p>How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Ensuring everyone has enough to eat?</p> <p>[1] Very badly [2] Fairly badly [3] Fairly well [4] Very well</p> |

Table A2.11. Models Addressing Alternative Explanations

| DV= Perception of Government Redistribution | (1) Gov't Sponsor Excluded | (2) Gov't Sponsor Only | (3) Irregular Excluded | (4) Regular Excluded | (5) Fraud Excluded | (6) Clean Elections Excluded |
|---|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Proximity | -3.361*** (0.456) | -3.337*** (0.583) | -3.601*** (0.508) | -4.024*** (0.436) | -3.303*** (0.464) | -4.244*** (0.513) |
| Proximity ² | 3.205*** (0.351) | 2.688*** (0.254) | 2.992*** (0.189) | 3.600*** (0.231) | 3.023*** (0.187) | 3.552*** (0.232) |
| Rural | 0.047** (0.020) | 0.054*** (0.019) | 0.052*** (0.013) | 0.042*** (0.013) | 0.042*** (0.013) | 0.068*** (0.013) |
| Age | -0.000 (0.001) | -0.000 (0.001) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Female | 0.006 (0.019) | 0.038** (0.017) | 0.032*** (0.012) | 0.032*** (0.012) | 0.033*** (0.012) | 0.025** (0.012) |
| Education | -0.028*** (0.005) | -0.026*** (0.005) | -0.030*** (0.003) | -0.024*** (0.003) | -0.026*** (0.003) | -0.031*** (0.003) |
| Poverty | -0.083*** (0.009) | -0.083*** (0.007) | -0.087*** (0.005) | -0.083*** (0.005) | -0.075*** (0.005) | -0.089*** (0.005) |
| Radio News | 0.011 (0.007) | 0.034*** (0.006) | 0.019*** (0.004) | 0.016*** (0.004) | 0.017*** (0.004) | 0.019*** (0.004) |
| Sociotropic Economy | 0.227*** (0.010) | 0.219*** (0.008) | 0.230*** (0.006) | 0.226*** (0.006) | 0.227*** (0.006) | 0.236*** (0.006) |
| Egocentric Economy | 0.134*** (0.010) | 0.128*** (0.009) | 0.129*** (0.006) | 0.125*** (0.006) | 0.127*** (0.006) | 0.127*** (0.007) |
| Winner | 0.444*** (0.021) | 0.384*** (0.018) | 0.416*** (0.013) | 0.402*** (0.013) | 0.378*** (0.013) | 0.419*** (0.013) |
| MIP Poverty | -0.028 (0.024) | -0.099*** (0.020) | -0.085*** (0.015) | -0.082*** (0.015) | -0.082*** (0.014) | -0.089*** (0.015) |
| GDPpc (logged) | -0.936*** (0.111) | -0.936*** (0.095) | -0.975*** (0.070) | -0.601*** (0.096) | -0.962*** (0.069) | -0.631*** (0.101) |
| GDP Growth | 0.020** (0.008) | 0.032*** (0.007) | 0.029*** (0.005) | 0.059*** (0.007) | 0.029*** (0.005) | 0.058*** (0.008) |
| Constant | 1.980*** (0.427) | 2.221*** (0.476) | 2.290*** (0.384) | 1.156*** (0.400) | 2.135*** (0.382) | 1.310*** (0.433) |
| $\sigma_{proximity}^2$ | 0.753 | 3.692 | 2.636 | 1.690 | 2.133 | 2.608 |
| σ_j^2 | 0.881 | 2.121 | 1.525 | 0.959 | 1.464 | 1.289 |
| σ_e^2 | 1.567 | 1.692 | 1.678 | 1.641 | 1.639 | 1.666 |
| Countries | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| N | 18,581 | 25,647 | 49,814 | 47,951 | 48,552 | 46,987 |

Note: Multilevel mixed-effects models estimate the impact of the electoral cycle on perceptions of government redistribution. I exclude observations with those who believe a government agency sponsored the survey (Model 1) and who do not (Model 2), elections held earlier or later than originally scheduled (Model 3) elections held on the scheduled date (Model 4), and elections where international election monitors report electoral fraud (Model 5) and report a clean election (Model 6). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2.12. Proximity to Election and Perceptions of Each Government Redistribution Category, and OLS Regression Model

| | (1) Improving the Poor's Living | (2) Narrowing Income Gap | (3) Ensuring Enough to Eat | (4) OLS (Redistribution) |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Proximity | -2.049*** (0.233) | -0.380*** (0.097) | -0.866*** (0.197) | -1.186*** (0.325) |
| Proximity ² | 1.795*** (0.112) | 0.263*** (0.072) | 0.596*** (0.077) | 1.108*** (0.332) |
| Rural | 0.029*** (0.008) | 0.036*** (0.007) | 0.001 (0.007) | 0.052* (0.029) |
| Age | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.001** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.001) |
| Female | 0.009 (0.007) | 0.021*** (0.006) | 0.009 (0.007) | 0.030* (0.016) |
| Education | -0.013*** (0.002) | -0.020*** (0.002) | -0.013*** (0.002) | -0.029*** (0.006) |
| Poverty | -0.037*** (0.003) | -0.021*** (0.003) | -0.066*** (0.003) | -0.090*** (0.014) |
| Radio News | 0.009*** (0.002) | 0.008*** (0.002) | 0.017*** (0.002) | 0.020** (0.008) |
| Sociotropic Perception | 0.130*** (0.004) | 0.103*** (0.003) | 0.111*** (0.003) | 0.223*** (0.020) |
| Egocentric Perception | 0.076*** (0.004) | 0.064*** (0.003) | 0.070*** (0.004) | 0.130*** (0.024) |
| Winner | 0.233*** (0.008) | 0.178*** (0.007) | 0.180*** (0.007) | 0.404*** (0.064) |
| MIP Poverty | -0.049*** (0.009) | -0.045*** (0.008) | -0.036*** (0.008) | -0.079*** (0.020) |
| GDPpc (logged) | -0.577*** (0.041) | -0.069*** (0.011) | -0.131*** (0.012) | 0.082 (0.302) |
| GDP Growth | 0.016*** (0.003) | 0.014*** (0.001) | 0.014*** (0.001) | 0.023*** (0.005) |
| Constant | 3.263*** (0.214) | 1.515*** (0.062) | 2.129*** (0.134) | -0.995* (0.570) |
| $\sigma^2_{proximity}$ | 0.530 | 0.048 | 0.481 | |
| σ^2_j | 0.466 | 0.037 | 0.269 | |
| σ^2_e | 0.628 | 0.633 | 0.697 | |
| N | 18 | 19 | 19 | 18 |
| Countries | 53,336 | 65,645 | 66,197 | 51,651 |

Note: Multilevel mixed-effects models predict perceptions that the government is improving the living standard of the poor (Model 1), narrowing the income gap (Model 2), and ensuring there is enough to eat (Model 3). The OLS regression model with country- and year-fixed effects predicts perceptions of government redistribution in Model 4. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure A2.1. Distribution of Social Protection Spending (*Social Protection*)




Figure A2.2. Distribution of Proximity to Election (*Proximity*)






Figure A2.3. Distribtuion of Proximity to Election and Social Protection (Social Protection) Spending



Note: A dashed line predicts the relationship between proximity to election and social protection spending.

Figure A2.4. The Effect of Proximity on Defense Spending



Note: This figure shows the estimated effect of the electoral cycle ($Proximity^2$) on defense spending (% total government spending) in Model 2 of Table A8. Dashed lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A2.5. Distribution of the Perception of Redistribution




Figure A2.6. Distribution of Proximity to Election (*Proximity*, Individual Level Analysis)





Figure A2.7. Distribution of Proximity to Election and Perception of Redistribution



Note: A dashed line predicts the relationship between proximity to election and perception of redistribution.

Table A3.1. List Of Questions Used in Empirical Analysis

| Variable | Question in Afrobarometer |
|------------------------|--|
| Support for Dictator | <p>Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: President or Prime Minister?</p> <p>[1] Strongly disapprove [2] Disapprove [3] Approve [4] Strongly approve</p> |
| Sociotropic Perception | <p>Looking back, how do you rate economic conditions in this country compared to twelve months ago?</p> <p>[1] Much worse [2] Worse [3] Same [4] Better [5] Much better</p> |
| Urban | <p>Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit</p> <p>[1] Urban [2] Rural</p> |
| Education | <p>What is your highest level of education?</p> <p>[0] No formal schooling [1] Informal schooling only [2] Some primary schooling [3] Primary school completed [4] Intermediate school or some secondary school/high school [5] Secondary school/high school completed [6] Post-secondary qualifications, other than university [7] Some university [8] University completed [9] Post-graduate</p> |
| Female | <p>Gender of respondent</p> <p>[1] Male [2] Female</p> |

Table A3.1 (cont'd)

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Age | How old are you? |
| Poverty | Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough food to eat? [0] Never [1] Just once or twice [2] Several times [3] Many times [4] Always |
| Perceived Survey Sponsor | Just one more question: Who do you think sent us to do this interview? [0] No one [1] Afrobarometer or national partner [2] Research company/Organization/Programme [3] Non-government or religious organization [4] University/School/College [5] Private company [6] Media [7] Political party or politician [8] Government [9] International organization or another country [10] God |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [Country name]? [0] This country is not a democracy [1] Not at all satisfied [2] Not very satisfied [3] Fairly satisfied [4] Very satisfied |
| Egocentric Perception | In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions? [1] Very bad [2] Fairly bad [3] Neither good nor bad [4] Fairly good [5] Very good |

Table A3.2. List of Country-years in Sample

| Country | Years |
|---------------|--|
| Algeria | 2013, 2015 |
| Burkina Faso | 2008, 2012, 2015 |
| Cameroon | 2013, 2015 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 2013, 2014 |
| Egypt | 2013, 2015 |
| eSwatini | 2013, 2015 |
| Gabon | 2015 |
| Guinea | 2013, 2015 |
| Lesotho | 2000 |
| Madagascar | 2013, 2014, 2015 |
| Mali | 2012, 2013, 2014 |
| Morocco | 2013, 2015 |
| Mozambique | 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015 |
| Namibia | 1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014 |
| Nigeria | 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013 |
| Sudan | 2013, 2015 |
| Tanzania | 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014 |
| Togo | 2012, 2014 |
| Tunisia | 2013 |
| Uganda | 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2015 |
| Zambia | 1999, 2003, 2005 |
| Zimbabwe | 1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014 |

Table A3.3. Summary Statistics

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|-------|
| Support for Dictator | 89,232 | 0.672 | 0.469 | 0 | 1 |
| Universalism | 99,027 | 0.451 | 0.673 | -1.175 | 1.419 |
| Sociotropic Perception | 96,725 | 2.886 | 1.117 | 1 | 5 |
| Urban | 98,685 | 0.381 | 0.486 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 98,971 | 1.511 | 0.514 | 1 | 4 |
| Female | 98,976 | 1.502 | 0.500 | 1 | 2 |
| Age | 98,051 | 35.815 | 13.990 | 16 | 105 |
| Poverty | 98,051 | 3.582 | 1.399 | 1.6 | 10.5 |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | 96,482 | 1.061 | 1.201 | 0 | 4 |
| GDPpc (logged) | 99,027 | 2.297 | 0.870 | 0.898 | 4.302 |
| GDP Growth | 99,027 | 0.545 | 0.323 | -0.581 | 1.667 |
| Egocentric Perception | 97,107 | 2.640 | 1.263 | 1 | 5 |

Table A3.4. Robustness Checks Addressing Alternative Explanations

| <i>DV = Support for Dictator</i> | Polity < 6 | Egocentric Perception | The Unaffiliated Only | w/o Gov't & Party Sponsor | w/o Full-time | The Poor Only |
|--|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Universalism</i> | 0.203*** (0.053) | 0.496*** (0.074) | 0.453*** (0.071) | 0.294** (0.112) | 0.366*** (0.085) | 0.280*** (0.072) |
| <i>Sociotropic Perception</i> | 0.235*** (0.027) | 0.226*** (0.025) | 0.243*** (0.033) | 0.268*** (0.033) | 0.244*** (0.026) | 0.201*** (0.023) |
| <i>Universalism × Sociotropic Perception</i> | -0.042* (0.017) | -0.073*** (0.018) | -0.077** (0.025) | -0.074* (0.034) | -0.080** (0.026) | -0.043 (0.023) |
| <i>Urban</i> | -0.061*** (0.011) | -0.083*** (0.012) | -0.049** (0.018) | -0.047* (0.019) | -0.055** (0.018) | -0.081*** (0.016) |
| <i>Education</i> | -0.073*** (0.006) | -0.094*** (0.007) | -0.052*** (0.010) | -0.056*** (0.011) | -0.094*** (0.011) | -0.067*** (0.009) |
| <i>Female</i> | 0.023* (0.011) | 0.010 (0.011) | -0.025 (0.017) | -0.002 (0.018) | 0.022 (0.017) | 0.020 (0.014) |
| <i>Age</i> | 0.025*** (0.004) | 0.024*** (0.004) | 0.006 (0.007) | 0.020** (0.007) | 0.026*** (0.008) | 0.016** (0.005) |
| <i>Poverty</i> | -0.054*** (0.004) | -0.036*** (0.005) | -0.040*** (0.007) | -0.065*** (0.008) | -0.063*** (0.007) | -0.044*** (0.008) |
| <i>Satisfaction with Democracy</i> | 0.437*** (0.005) | 0.409*** (0.006) | 0.396*** (0.009) | 0.461*** (0.010) | 0.403*** (0.009) | 0.421*** (0.007) |
| <i>GDPpc (logged)</i> | 0.196 (0.176) | 0.087*** (0.019) | 0.050 (0.029) | 0.124*** (0.033) | 0.089 (0.028) | 0.021 (0.024) |
| <i>GDP Growth</i> | 0.008*** (0.002) | 0.039* (0.018) | 0.120*** (0.029) | 0.117*** (0.031) | 0.089** (0.028) | 0.092*** (0.022) |
| <i>Egocentric Perception</i> | | 0.146*** (0.018) | | | | |
| <i>Universalism × Egocentric Perception</i> | | -0.044** (0.015) | | | | |
| <i>Intercept</i> | -1.266*** (0.119) | -1.730*** (0.152) | -1.418*** (0.149) | -1.809*** (0.165) | -1.221*** (0.133) | -1.242*** (0.126) |
| <i>Log-likelihood</i> | -38755.3 | -37187.6 | -15889.5 | -13257.0 | -14882.5 | -21160.1 |
| <i>Countries</i> | 22 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 22 |
| <i>N</i> | 72,530 | 71,249 | 27,650 | 24,504 | 27,883 | 39,119 |


Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A3.5. Economic Growth Rate, Welfare Programs, and Economic Perceptions

| | <i>Sociotropic Perception</i> | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| <i>Universalism</i> | 0.036 (0.022) | 0.109*** (0.033) |
| <i>GDP Growth</i> | 0.031*** (0.002) | 0.031*** (0.002) |
| <i>Universalism × GDP Growth</i> | | -0.011** (0.004) |
| <i>Urban</i> | -0.009 (0.010) | -0.009 (0.010) |
| <i>Education</i> | -0.003 (0.006) | -0.003 (0.006) |
| <i>Female</i> | -0.036*** (0.009) | -0.036*** (0.009) |
| <i>Age</i> | -0.019*** (0.004) | -0.019*** (0.004) |
| <i>Poverty</i> | -0.080*** (0.004) | -0.086*** (0.004) |
| <i>Satisfaction with Democracy</i> | 0.215*** (0.005) | 0.215*** (0.005) |
| <i>GDPpc (logged)</i> | -0.341*** (0.016) | -0.351*** (0.016) |
| <i>Intercept</i> | -0.066 (0.095) | -0.050 (0.097) |
| <i>Log-likelihood</i> | -51419.2 | -51414.8 |
| <i>Countries</i> | 22 | 22 |
| <i>N</i> | 84,296 | 84,296 |


Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure A3.1. Economic Perceptions in African Autocracies




Note: This figure is constructed based on Afrobarometer Survey Data in 22 African autocracies between 1999 and 2015.

Figure A3.2. Universalistic Welfare Program Index in African Autocracies




Note: This figure is constructed using the universalization index of social welfare programs in V-Dem for 22 African autocracies between 1999 and 2015.

Figure A3.3. First Differences Measuring the Effect of *Universalism* at All Levels Of Sociotropic Economic Perceptions



Note: The 10th and 90th percentiles of the universalistic welfare program index were used to construct the figures. Each plot is illustrated with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A3.4. Effect of Economic Growth (GDP Growth Rate) on Sociotropic Economic Perception as *Universalism* Changes



Note: High (90th percentile) and low levels (10th percentile) of GDP growth rate were used to create these figures. Each plot is illustrated with 95% confidence intervals.

Table A4.1. Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Δ Piped water (interpolated) | 2,515 | 1.911 | 12.495 | -79.7 | 66.8 |
| Δ Piped water | 2,030 | 2.020 | 13.635 | -79.7 | 66.8 |
| Piped water (interpolated) | 2,677 | 58.110 | 24.664 | 0.26 | 100 |
| Piped water | 2,411 | 58.619 | 24.734 | 0.26 | 100 |
| Military experience | 3,467 | 0.276 | 0.447 | 0 | 1 |
| Military experience (opposition) | 3,495 | 0.043 | 0.203 | 0 | 1 |
| Lawyer | 3,467 | 0.046 | 0.210 | 0 | 1 |
| Public officer | 3,467 | 0.195 | 0.396 | 0 | 1 |
| Businessperson | 3,467 | 0.161 | 0.368 | 0 | 1 |
| Reelection | 3,540 | 2.119 | 1.140 | 1 | 6 |
| Age | 3,540 | 51.757 | 5.615 | 38 | 72 |
| Hometown | 3,441 | 0.322 | 0.467 | 0 | 1 |
| Graduate | 3,540 | 0.356 | 0.479 | 0 | 1 |
| Ruling party vote share (%) | 3,690 | 37.375 | 16.030 | 6.958 | 87.189 |
| Population (logged) | 2,990 | 10.414 | 1.152 | 7.644 | 16.118 |
| Urban | 3,778 | 0.190 | 0.392 | 0 | 1 |
| Fraud | 3,690 | 0.203 | 0.402 | 0 | 1 |
| Past1 | 3,467 | 0.019 | 0.137 | 0 | 1 |
| Past2 | 3,467 | 0.036 | 0.186 | 0 | 1 |
| Post1 | 3,467 | 0.029 | 0.167 | 0 | 1 |
| Post2 | 3,467 | 0.057 | 0.232 | 0 | 1 |

Table A4.2. Regression Analysis of Public Good Provision (No LDV)

| DV = Δ Piped water | (1) | (2) Non- interpolated |
|---------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Military experience | 2.533** (0.877) | 2.629* (1.052) |
| Hometown | -1.065 (1.107) | -1.241 (1.282) |
| Age | 0.087 (0.085) | 0.074 (0.100) |
| Reelection | -0.153 (0.350) | -0.049 (0.412) |
| Graduate | 3.337*** (0.882) | 3.746*** (1.034) |
| Ruling party vote share | -0.030 (0.032) | -0.036 (0.037) |
| Population (logged) | 7.840*** (1.711) | 8.557*** (1.980) |
| Urban | 0.540 (1.505) | 0.961 (1.823) |
| Constant | -78.043*** (17.124) | -84.427*** (20.082) |
| County fixed | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y |
| Counties | 244 | 241 |
| Observations | 2090 | 1779 |
| R-squared | 0.115 | 0.123 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities after excluding the lagged dependent variable (% total households). County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4.3. Regression Analysis of Public Good Provision (Level of Piped Water)

| DV = Piped water | (1) | (2) Non- interpolated |
|-------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Piped water (lagged) | 0.387*** (0.028) | 0.326*** (0.031) |
| Military experience | 2.751*** (0.764) | 2.840** (0.894) |
| Hometown | 0.018 (0.880) | -0.026 (0.997) |
| Age | 0.097 (0.070) | 0.062 (0.079) |
| Reelection | -0.466 (0.289) | -0.374 (0.328) |
| Graduate | 1.619* (0.745) | 2.066* (0.850) |
| Ruling party vote share | -0.062* (0.026) | -0.063* (0.030) |
| Population (logged) | -1.010 (1.420) | -1.161 (1.610) |
| Urban | -1.044 (1.360) | -1.190 (1.631) |
| Constant | 27.212 (14.487) | 31.057 (16.559) |
| County fixed | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y |
| Counties | 244 | 241 |
| Observations | 2090 | 1779 |
| R-squared | 0.820 | 0.804 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the level of the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households). County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A4.4. Models Adding Occupational Backgrounds and Opposition Legislators' Military Experience

| DV = Δ Piped water | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Piped water (lagged) | -0.617*** (0.029) | -0.613*** (0.028) | -0.614*** (0.029) | -0.622*** (0.029) | -0.621*** (0.029) |
| Military experience | 2.958*** (0.804) | 2.598*** (0.774) | 2.782*** (0.774) | 2.251** (0.814) | 1.895* (0.863) |
| Military experience (opposition) | -0.900 (1.411) | | | | |
| Lawyer | | -2.348 (1.451) | | | -2.707 (1.476) |
| Businessperson | | | 0.203 (0.965) | | -0.754 (1.011) |
| Public officer | | | | -1.994* (0.858) | -2.246* (0.904) |
| Hometown | 0.751 (0.903) | -0.089 (0.885) | 0.024 (0.880) | -0.126 (0.885) | -0.291 (0.892) |
| Age | 0.065 (0.073) | 0.094 (0.070) | 0.098 (0.070) | 0.121 (0.069) | 0.118 (0.069) |
| Reelection | -0.463 (0.296) | -0.467 (0.289) | -0.462 (0.292) | -0.503 (0.287) | -0.527 (0.290) |
| Graduate | 1.116 (0.774) | 1.553* (0.742) | 1.610* (0.746) | 1.689* (0.738) | 1.654* (0.733) |
| Ruling party vote share | -0.083** (0.027) | -0.061* (0.026) | -0.062* (0.026) | -0.054* (0.027) | -0.052 (0.027) |
| Population (logged) | -0.484 (1.385) | -1.047 (1.421) | -1.011 (1.420) | -1.071 (1.419) | -1.119 (1.420) |
| Urban | -1.094 (1.483) | -0.883 (1.376) | -1.045 (1.360) | -1.321 (1.370) | -1.167 (1.385) |
| Constant | 24.542 (14.250) | 27.811 (14.502) | 27.173 (14.492) | 27.107 (14.475) | 27.928 (14.498) |
| County fixed | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Counties | 240 | 242 | 242 | 242 | 242 |
| Observations | 1973 | 2090 | 2090 | 2090 | 2090 |
| R-squared | 0.408 | 0.400 | 0.399 | 0.401 | 0.402 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households). County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4.5. Models Excluding Bad Performances of Public Good Provision

| DV = Δ Piped water | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Δ Piped water > 1 perc. | Δ Piped water > 5 perc. | Δ Piped water > 10 perc. | Δ Piped water > 25 perc. |
| Piped water (lagged) | -0.614*** (0.028) | -0.613*** (0.028) | -0.619*** (0.028) | -0.631*** (0.030) |
| Military experience | 2.518*** (0.750) | 2.517*** (0.756) | 2.378** (0.764) | 2.430** (0.800) |
| Hometown | 0.150 (0.849) | 0.210 (0.862) | 0.108 (0.873) | -0.261 (0.915) |
| Age | 0.081 (0.069) | 0.079 (0.069) | 0.079 (0.070) | 0.074 (0.074) |
| Reelection | -0.464 (0.284) | -0.441 (0.287) | -0.456 (0.290) | -0.522 (0.307) |
| Graduate | 1.502* (0.742) | 1.518* (0.753) | 1.500* (0.758) | 1.396 (0.791) |
| Ruling party vote share | -0.064* (0.026) | -0.069** (0.026) | -0.063* (0.026) | -0.052 (0.028) |
| Population (logged) | -1.979 (1.397) | -2.030 (1.413) | -2.018 (1.425) | -2.056 (1.493) |
| Urban | -1.125 (1.355) | -1.050 (1.357) | -1.111 (1.377) | -0.742 (1.458) |
| Constant | 37.738** (14.227) | 38.406** (14.382) | 38.353** (14.556) | 38.627* (15.227) |
| County fixed | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Districts | 242 | 242 | 242 | 242 |
| Observations | 2070 | 2039 | 1996 | 1877 |
| R-squared | 0.408 | 0.409 | 0.415 | 0.424 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households). County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A4.6. Regression Analysis of Public Good Provision (Term Level Analysis)

| DV = Δ Piped water | (1) | (2) Non-interpolated |
|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Piped water (lagged) | -1.250*** (0.050) | -1.240*** (0.048) |
| Military experience | 5.087** (1.610) | 4.999** (1.617) |
| Hometown | -2.324 (1.714) | -2.095 (1.690) |
| Age | 0.531*** (0.141) | 0.627*** (0.128) |
| Reelection | -1.462* (0.646) | -1.779** (0.593) |
| Graduate | 7.299*** (1.770) | 7.844*** (1.843) |
| Ruling party vote share | -0.095 (0.064) | -0.054 (0.053) |
| Population (logged) | -3.461 (4.160) | 0.571 (3.368) |
| Urban | -3.457 (4.366) | -3.596 (4.397) |
| Constant | 42.643 (41.537) | -1.913 (33.176) |
| County fixed | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y |
| Counties | 187 | 182 |
| Observations | 382 | 372 |
| R-squared | 0.849 | 0.861 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the change in the proportion of households with the access to public piped water facilities (% total households). County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4.7. Military Experience and Electoral Performance

| DV = Vote share | (1) | (2) |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Military experience | 6.213*** (1.272) | 8.062*** (1.283) |
| Hometown | | 15.539*** (1.282) |
| Age | | -0.274* (0.106) |
| Reelection | | -0.652 (0.511) |
| Graduate | | 1.774 (1.121) |
| Population (logged) | | -1.877 (1.899) |
| Urban | | 4.947 (2.532) |
| Constant | 17.038*** (2.456) | 54.739** (20.354) |
| County fixed | Y | Y |
| Year fixed | Y | Y |
| Counties | 255 | 249 |
| Observations | 922 | 714 |
| R-squared | 0.455 | 0.644 |

Note: All models are estimates with OLS regression and panel corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models estimate the percentages of vote share of ruling party legislators. County and year fixed effects are included. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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