

STATE REPRESSION: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND ESCAPING PUNISHMENT

By

Nathaniel Charles Smith

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Political Science – Doctor of Philosophy

2020

ABSTRACT

STATE REPRESSION: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND ESCAPING PUNISHMENT

By

Nathaniel Charles Smith

The use of repression by governments around the world serves as a key strategy for regimes to maintain their power. When faced with a threat, states often choose to repress their citizens as a means of quelling dissent. Recently, the literature has shown that states will also use repression preemptively when facing a potential future threat. This dissertation provides insights into this use of preemptive repression and analyzes instances where states will likely use this strategy. Specifically, chapters two and three look at the economic conditions of the country as a way to explain state use of preemptive repression. Chapter two determines that the effect youth bulges have on increased repression can be moderated by the economic condition of the state in question. Specifically, economically better off states will fail to use preemptive repression in the presence of a large youth cohort. Chapter three similarly looks at the economic condition of the state and finds that countries experiencing negative economic shocks will increase their preemptive repression as a means to insulate themselves from the unrest these shocks often bring. Beyond the idea of preemptive repression, states also desire to avoid the negative consequences often attached to their abuse of human rights like economic sanctions and a possible withdrawal of foreign aid. Thus, the final empirical chapter of the dissertation explores how foreign states can use public relations (PR) firms based in Washington D.C. to avoid the negative consequences of their use of repression without having to modify their behavior. Taken together, this dissertation provides valuable insights into state behavior and the use of preemptive repression. In addition, this project explores an, as yet, underdeveloped way in which foreign states can escape being punished for their human rights abuses.

To my wife and daughters for motivating me and to my parents for their support and encouragement.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The dissertation serves as the culmination of the doctoral degree. Being such, I could not have succeeded in such an endeavor without the help of countless mentors, peers, colleagues, family, and friends. A true acknowledgement section must begin with those closest to me. First, my wife, who has put up with many more years of educational attainment than any wife should have to deal with. Throughout our twelve plus years of marriage, I have been actively pursuing one degree or another. Completion of this degree will mark the first time in our relationship that I will not be in school — and for that I am thankful. Next, my children. They too have ever known their father as a student. Their wholehearted belief that I am the smartest person in the world helped spur me on when challenges came. Finally to my family. First my siblings, who steadfastly acted as if my paper topics were interesting and thereby representing a true act of love. And, of course, my parents for believing that I could do this while simultaneously checking-in constantly to make sure I was. I truly could not have done this without all of you!

To my mentors — your care and kindness helped bring out the best in me. Dr. Andrew Long for suggesting I apply to Michigan State in an attempt to "get in on the way up". Dr. Jakana Thomas for listening to my half-formed ideas and offering feedback. Dr. Eric Juenke for inspiring me to be a better teacher. Dr. Benjamin Appel for consistently helping me become a better writer/researcher. Lastly, the Michigan State Political science department faculty broadly who helped me in so many ways.

To my fellow graduate students whose support and encouragement proved essential to my perseverance and (eventual) success. Alex Mardon for encouraging me to continue on and providing me with the opportunity to talk about things other than political science. Caleb Lucas for entertaining my methods questions with genuine interest. Jessica, Lora, Elizabeth, Jamil, Marty, and many others for passing down valuable wisdom. Steve and

Nick for providing me with a space at the end of the hall to come and chat. And to all my other colleagues, you all made the MSU political Science department a special place.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 State Repression	1
1.1.1 Contribution to the Literature	4
CHAPTER 2 THE CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF YOUTH BULGES AND STATE REPRESSION	9
2.1 Introduction	9
2.2 Youth Bulges and the Potential for Violence	12
2.3 Youth Bulges and State Repression	15
2.4 Youth, Repression, and Economic Opportunity	17
2.5 Data and Research Design	23
2.5.1 Dependent Variable	23
2.5.2 Independent Variables	25
2.5.3 Control Variables	26
2.5.4 Research Design	27
2.6 Empirical Results	28
2.7 Discussion	36
2.8 Conclusion	37
CHAPTER 3 ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND STATE REPRESSION	38
3.1 Introduction	38
3.2 Economic Conditions of the State and Repression	39
3.3 Economic Shocks, Violence, and State Repression	40
3.3.1 Example: Zimbabwe	44
3.4 Data	49
3.4.1 Dependent Variable	49
3.4.2 Independent Variables	49
3.4.3 Control Variables	52
3.5 Research Design	54
3.6 Results	55
3.6.1 Do Economic Shocks Have an Interactive Effect with Economic De- velopment and Dissent?	57
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion	64
CHAPTER 4 ESCAPING PUNISHMENT: PUBLIC RELATIONS FIRMS AND STATE REPRESSION	66
4.1 Introduction	66

4.2	Lobbying	69
4.3	Punishing Human Rights	74
4.3.1	Sanctions	75
4.3.2	The Allocation of Foreign Aid	77
4.4	Lobbying and the Decision to Punish	79
4.4.1	Examples: Azerbaijan and Egypt	84
4.5	Data and Research Design	87
4.5.1	Dependent Variables	87
4.5.2	Independent Variables	90
4.5.3	Control Variables	92
4.5.4	Research Design	95
4.6	Results	97
4.6.1	Lobbying, Human Rights, and Sanctions	97
4.6.2	Lobbying, Human Rights, and Foreign Aid	102
4.6.3	Lobbying, Human Rights, and Bypass Aid	109
4.7	Discussion	115
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION		117
APPENDICES		120
APPENDIX A	CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX	121
APPENDIX B	CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX	132
APPENDIX C	CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX	139
BIBLIOGRAPHY		147

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Dependent Variables and Explanatory Variables . . .	26
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Control Variables	27
Table 2.3: Moderating effect of GDP growth on the relationship between youth bulges and state repression	29
Table 2.4: Moderating effect of youth unemployment on the relationship between youth bulges and state repression	33
Table 3.1: Correlations Between economic shock measures	51
Table 3.2: Economic shock measures: Honduras - 1990	52
Table 3.3: Effect of economic shocks on repression	56
Table 3.4: Interactive effect of GDP on economic shocks and repression	58
Table 3.5: Interactive Effect of Dissent on Economic Shocks and Repression	61
Table 4.1: Top Ten Countries by Number Lobbying Contracts	70
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Sanctions Analysis Sample	93
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Foreign Aid Analysis	94
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Bypass Aid Analysis Sample	95
Table 4.5: Effect of lobbying and human rights on U.S. sanctions: 1978-2012	98
Table 4.6: Moderating effect of lobbying on human rights and the allocation of military aid	104
Table 4.7: Moderating effect of lobbying on human rights and the allocation of economic aid	107
Table 4.8: Effect of lobbying and human rights on bypass aid: 2005-2009	110
Table A.1: Effect of Youth Bulges on Repression by GDP Growth	124

Table A.2: Effect of Youth Bulges on Repression Controlling for Education Spending	128
Table B.1: Effect of Economic Shocks on Repression Using Currency Crises Measure	132
Table B.2: Effect of Economic Shocks on Repression Using Xpolity Measure	133
Table B.3: Effect of Economic Shocks on Repression Controlling for Education Spending	135
Table C.1: Effect of Lobbying and Human Rights on U.S. Sanctions: 1978-2012 . . .	142
Table C.2: Foreign Aid: Using Latent Repression and Empowerment Rights Indicators of Human Rights Abuses	144
Table C.3: Effect of Lobbying and Human Rights on U.S. Sanctions: 1978-2012 . . .	145

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Percent Youth by Year	13
Figure 2.2: Cameroon: Level of Repression by Year - Red Lines Indicate the Youth Unemployment Rate	23
Figure 2.3: Predicted level of repression by GDP growth across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.3, model 2. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	30
Figure 2.4: Predicted level of repression by GDP growth across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.3, model 4. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	31
Figure 2.5: Predicted level of repression by GDP growth across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.3, model 6. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	32
Figure 2.6: Predicted level of repression by youth unemployment across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.4, model 2. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	34
Figure 2.7: Predicted level of repression by youth unemployment across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.4, model 4. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	35
Figure 2.8: Predicted level of repression by youth unemployment across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.4, model 6. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	36
Figure 3.1: Level of repression by year: Zimbabwe. Shaded area represents period of hyper-inflation.	46
Figure 3.2: Number of economic shocks by year. <i>Note.</i> Economic shocks measured as a change in GDP growth of 5% or more.	53
Figure 3.3: Predicted level of repression by economic shock. Results from table 3.3, model 4. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	57
Figure 3.4: Conditional effect of economic shocks and GDP per capita across the range of development. Bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.	60

Figure 3.5: Predicted change in repression when experiencing an economic shock with and without the presence of overt dissent. Bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.	62
Figure 3.6: Predicted level of repression with and without dissent by size of economic shock. Bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.	63
Figure 4.1: FARA Report - Morocco: 2006	71
Figure 4.2: FARA Report - Equatorial Guinea: 2006	71
Figure 4.3: Number of US Sanctions by Year	88
Figure 4.4: Distribution of Economic and Military Aid	89
Figure 4.5: Proportion of Bypass Aid and the Logged Transformed	90
Figure 4.6: Number of Lobbying Contracts by Year	91
Figure 4.7: Predicted probability of U.S. sanctions across range of lobbying. Results from table 4.5, model 1.	99
Figure 4.8: Predicted probability of U.S. sanctions with high and low amounts of lobbying across values of repression. Results from table 4.5, model 2. . .	101
Figure 4.9: Predicted probability of severe sanctions across the range of lobbying. Results from table 4.5, model 3.	102
Figure 4.10: Predicted probability of receiving military aid with high and low levels of lobbying across the range of repression. Results from table 4.6	105
Figure 4.11: Predicted probability of receiving economic aid with high and low levels of lobbying across the range of repression. Results from table 4.7.	108
Figure 4.12: Predicted proportion of bypass aid by amount of lobbying. Results from table 4.8, model 3.	111
Figure 4.13: Effect of increased repression on the predicted change in proportion of bypass aid with low and high levels of lobbying. Results from table 4.8, model 4.	113
Figure 4.14: Predicted proportion of bypass aid by high and low amounts of lobbying for high repression states. Results from table 4.8, model 4.	114

Figure A.1: Marginal Effects Plot: Unemployment	122
Figure A.2: Marginal Effect of GDP Growth on Repression. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	123
Figure A.3: Marginal Effect of GDP Growth on Repression. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	125
Figure A.4: Marginal Effect of GDP Growth on Repression. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals	126
Figure A.5: Marginal Effect: From Model 2	129
Figure A.6: Marginal Effect: From Model 2	130
Figure A.7: Marginal Effect: From Model 2	131
Figure B.1: Component Plus Residual Graph for Price Shocks	136
Figure B.2: Component Plus Residual Graph for Price Shocks	137
Figure B.3: Predicted Level of Repression with Overt Dissent Present	138
Figure C.1: FARA Report - Bahrain: December 2012	139
Figure C.2: FARA Report - Mexico: 2012	140
Figure C.3: Coding Rules for Sanction Severity	140
Figure C.4: Predicted Probability of Severe Sanctions by Lobbying Across Values of Repression	141
Figure C.5: Predicted Probability of Severe Sanctions Across Range of Lobbying . . .	146

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Regimes around the world have often turned to repression when faced with a threat to their power (Davenport 2007c). Thus the repression literature has a long and robust history. This dissertation seeks to enter the literature on state repression by further analyzing the economic determinants of human rights abuses.¹ Chapter two finds that the effect youth bulges have on increased levels of repression can be moderated by the economic condition of the state in question. Specifically, economically better off states will fail to use preemptive repression in the presence of a large youth cohort. Chapter three similarly looks at the economic condition of the state and finds that countries experiencing negative economic shocks will increase their preemptive repression as a means to insulate themselves from the unrest these shocks often bring. Finally, chapter four of the dissertation explores how foreign states can use public relations (PR) firms based in Washington D.C. to avoid the negative consequences of their use of repression without having to modify their behavior. The dissertation proceeds as follows: first I present an overview of the literature on state repression followed by a discussion of how each chapter of the dissertation fits within this literature. I then present my three empirical chapters each analyzing a different aspect of state repression. I follow these chapters with some concluding remarks which serve to highlight the contribution of the dissertation. Finally, I provide an appendix for each chapter with additional information and analyses.

1.1 State Repression

Quantitative research on state repression came about due, in part, to the availability of data provided by outlets such as the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and

¹Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms repression and human rights abuses interchangeably.

Freedom house. These organizations provided annual, national reports on human rights conditions starting in the mid-1980's (Hill and Jones 2014). One of the earliest and most influential works to make use of this new data came from Poe and Tate (1994). Using reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department, Poe and Tate found that democracy and GDP per capita were both negatively related to repression. Conversely, they found that population size and civil wars were positively associated with state repression. These findings have remained consistent within the literature on state repression (Hill and Jones 2014). For the purpose of their study, Poe and Tate focused on human rights violations that dealt with the "integrity of the person" (Poe and Tate 1994). This includes political imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and summary executions. A broader definition of repression comes from Ritter and Conrad (2016) who say repression is "any realized or threatened limit or coercive action taken by state authorities to control or prevent challenges that could alter the status quo policy or distribution of power.". In a similar vein, Davenport and Inman (2012) argue that repression "deals with applications of state power that violate First Amendment-type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security." These broad and somewhat varied conceptions of state repression differ from the data most often used in empirical studies – the overwhelming majority of which follow Poe and Tate (1994) and use data on physical integrity rights.

The theoretical approach taken by Poe and Tate, and one that has been broadly adopted within the literature, is that of rational choice. This view states that regimes decide whether to use repression based upon a cost-benefit calculation. Due to this, a state will engage in repression when the benefits of using such actions outweigh the costs. This approach, and the resultant scholarly work, have led to a handful of conclusions that are consistent within the literature on state repression. First, research has consistently shown that there is a negative relationship between democracy and state repression (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Conrad 2010; Davenport 2007c). This finding holds across different democratic institutions

and across differing types of repressive behavior leading to it being called the "domestic democratic peace (Davenport and Moore 2012; Davenport 2007c). Democracy has a significant influence on repression with scholars finding that democracy can even diminish the effect violent dissent (which has been shown to significantly and consistently increase human rights abuses) has on repression (Carey 2010). However, some exceptions to the finding that democracy reduces repression include democracies conducting counterinsurgency operations, foreign military occupation, or when facing violent dissent (Carey 2006; Conrad and Moore 2010 cited in Chenoweth et al. 2017).² Additional scrutiny of democracy's influence on repression comes by way of measurement. Some argue that using the Polity IV measure creates issues as some of the components of the Polity index are correlated with repression (Hill and Jones 2014).

Second scholars have shown that when a state is faced with political challenges in the form of unrest and dissent, it often responds with some form of repressive action. Similar to the relationship between democracy and repression, the relationship between dissent and repression proves stable enough to be called the "Law of Coercive Responsiveness" (Davenport 2007a). However, within this relationship there exists some disagreement. Specifically, scholars disagree on how dissent and repression interact. Indeed, almost every possible relationship (positive, negative, u-shaped) between repression and dissent has been found (Davenport 1995; Moore 1998). Recent work has argued that this disagreement is largely due to modeling error (Ritter and Conrad 2016). These authors contend that governments use preemptive repression as a way to discourage dissent. Thus, the use of repression may reduce the likelihood of dissent being seen. Additionally, if overt dissent manifests despite the use of preemptive repression, the government's choice of how to respond is unclear. This is due to the fact that the overt dissent came about despite the use of preemptive repression. Therefore, the implementation of higher levels of repression may not work given that

²See also (Davenport 2007c) for a discussion of how the threat of violence can lead to the potential breakdown of the domestic democratic peace.

the dissent already overcame the preemptive repression. Ritter and Conrad (2016) solve this issue by using rainfall as an instrumental variable. So, while strides have been made within the repression-dissent literature, challenges remain. It would seem then that almost all scholars agree that repression influences dissent and vice versa, it is the exact nature of this relationship, however, that remains unclear.

More broadly, the literature also has shown that domestic factors such as democracy and dissent often outweigh international factors such as international human rights treaties, sanctions, or trade dependence (Davenport and Inman 2012). Other factors like GDP per capita (a measure of economic development) prove important but theoretically underdeveloped. The literature has failed, thus far, to adequately explain the mechanism through which economic development affects state repression. Some have argued that richer states can provide more social services and other means of pacifying the population and this leads to less of a need for repressive tactics. This explanation, though, is difficult to test as we do not know what exactly GDP per capita measures (Davenport and Inman 2012). Additional domestic factors that scholars have found to consistently be related to repression are youth bulges which increase the likelihood of repression and an independent judiciary which help reduce repression (Nordås and Davenport 2013; Linzer and Staton 2015). Despite the key findings above and the robust nature of the literature on state repression, gaps remain. Below I identify where the literature on state repression remains underdeveloped and show how this dissertation helps to fill those gaps.

1.1.1 Contribution to the Literature

One of the most consistent predictors of state repression proves to be large youth cohorts often labeled youth bulges (Nordås and Davenport 2013). These youth bulges create security issues for the state by increasing the probability that violence and unrest will be present (Urdal 2006). Due to this increased likelihood of violence, states will take action to protect

themselves and their hold on power. As the literature on state repression has routinely shown, states respond to potential or overt dissent with increased levels of repression (Davenport 2007c; Nordås and Davenport 2013; Danneman and Ritter 2014). Given this response, it is no surprise that states respond to youth bulges with increases in repression due to the violent potential they bring. Yet, these youth also bring with them an economic potential that, if harnessed, could bring growth for the country. Using this logic, chapter two of the dissertation argues that states will only increase their repression in the presence of youth bulges when the economic situation of the state is such that the economy cannot incorporate these youth within it. Without being able to incorporate these youth within the economy, the state will instead repress them out of fear for the unrest they could bring. But why would unemployed youth cause more fear to the regime than those with jobs? The answer comes from the mobilization literature which argues that the lack of employment lowers the cost of joining in violence because the potential recruit is giving up or risking far less by participating if they have no job to lose (Becker 1968; Popkin 1979; Berman et al. 2011). This situation of increased tension leads states to increase their level of unrest as a way to insulate themselves from the potential threat. Through my analysis, I find strong support for the proposed moderating relationship between the economic conditions of the state and the use of repression in the face of youth bulges. I measure the economic condition of the state by looking at GDP growth as a means of assessing the general state of the economy and the likelihood of new jobs being found. As a more specific measure of opportunity, I also include the unemployment rate for youth age 15-24. Both measures show that states who are better off economically use repression less in the face of youth bulges. This finding is very significant given the consistent relationship between youth bulges and state repression within the literature (Hill and Jones 2014). Beyond this, chapter two also provides insight to the policy and development community about how to improve human rights. If states are more likely to crackdown on their citizens in the presence of a youth bulge but that

reduction in respect for human rights can be attenuated by the availability of jobs, perhaps the international community can focus on employment initiatives and in this way improve the human rights condition of the state. This finding also contributes to the literature on state repression in general by bringing economic factors into the state repression literature but in a way that moves beyond an important control and instead as a theoretically important determinant.

Chapter three similarly looks at the impact the broader economy has on repression by introducing the idea of economic shocks.³ Until now, economic shocks had only been connected to increases in violence, protests, and coups (Miguel 2004; Hodler and Raschky 2014; Dube and Vargas 2013; Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000; Kim 2016). These studies argue that economic shocks create a situation where the population of a state has increased grievances and a decreased cost of joining in conflict. This leads to a very volatile situation and one ripe for unrest. I add to this literature by arguing that this situation of increased uncertainty and potential for unrest will be seen by the state as a threat to its' power and will therefore be met with preemptive repression. The idea being that regimes desire to maintain their power and meet threats to that power with repression. The atmosphere following an economic shock, as previous literature has made clear, is defined by an increased likelihood for conflict. Knowing this, states will take actions to protect themselves and their hold on power — i.e. preemptive repression. This use of preemptive repression is used as a means of insulating the state and lessening the chance the regime is threatened with unrest. I find strong support for this assertion using multiple measures of economic shocks. This chapter contributes directly to the state repression literature by providing a glimpse into how states wield their repressive apparatuses. It is not only when dissent is present that states will increase repression. As Ritter and Conrad (2016) point out, the use of state repression is made within the context of the strategic interaction between the regime and its opponents.

³For the purposes of this dissertation, economic shocks can broadly be thought of as a sudden and sharp economic decline.

This chapter shows that strategic calculus in action and details how states use repression preemptively to avoid a potential future challenge to their hold on power. Moreover, similar to chapter two, this chapter also highlights how the broader economy can affect the use of repression. Three of my four measures of economic shocks are broad measures of the economy and therefore show the importance of how economic factors can drive government's use of their repressive apparatus.

Finally, my fourth chapter sheds light on another under-developed thread of the state repression literature — the role lobbying plays in allowing states to avoid being punished for their human rights abuses. There exists a robust literature on punishing human rights violators. For instance, states impose sanctions, international non-governmental agencies use naming and shaming, and states reduce the amount of foreign aid governments receive all in an effort to coerce regimes into changing their behavior (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008; Peksen 2009; Murdie and Davis 2012). Yet, few have analyzed how states can avoid such punishment. Chapter four enters this void and argues that states can avoid being punished with sanctions or reductions in foreign aid through aggressive lobbying campaigns in Washington D.C. Foreign governments have long hired PR firms in Washington D.C. to lobby on their behalf. Yet the impact of this lobbying, especially with regards to human rights abusing states, has only recently come to light. Lobbyist can provide information and conduct media campaigns which help to mold public opinion and provide key information to policymakers. I show that this influence can impact the likelihood sanctions are imposed on states and can affect the allocation of foreign aid for human rights abusing states. Through these lobbying campaigns, repressive states can avoid the negative consequences of their actions and can effectively buy themselves out of being punished. This finding is important to both the scholarly literature on human rights as well as the policy realm which is tasked with punishing such states. This chapter contributes to the literature on human rights by providing a better understanding of the relationship between human rights abuses and

punishment for such actions. Understanding how regimes can use lobbying to effectively avoid being punished for their repressive actions sheds light on an important aspect of human rights. This insight also provides the policy realm with a clear summation of how repressive states are avoiding the mechanisms set up to punish them. This understanding can help scholars better model the relationship between human rights and punishment like sanctions and foreign aid. Additionally, policymakers can use this information to help limit the ability of such states to avoid the consequences of their actions.

Through these chapters, this dissertation provides important insights into both the economic determinants of state repression as well as how states can avoid being punished for their actions. In the following sections I present each empirical chapter in turn before providing a brief conclusion in which I again highlight the contribution and provide a summation of the findings.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF YOUTH BULGES AND STATE REPRESSION

2.1 Introduction

The study of how demographic changes affect state security has largely focused on the idea of large youth cohorts or "youth bulges". These youth bulges serve as one of the most important and consistent predictors of state repression (Hill and Jones 2014). Yet, the current literature fails to consider the economic situation in which these youth bulges exist. This paper seeks to address this issue and show that states see these large youth cohorts differently depending on the economic situation of the country. The paper proceeds as follows: first, I define youth bulges and lay out the basic logic of my argument – highlighting how the paper fits with previous conceptions of youth, violence, and repression. I then show how large youth cohorts have been linked to increases in political violence and how this link has led to youth bulges being met with preemptive repression. Following this discussion, I lay out the decision calculus of the state and show how the economic conditions of the country influence how the regime sees these youth bulges. I then empirically test my hypothesis and end with a discussion of the results.

A youth bulge is defined as the proportion of the population aged 15-24 to the total adult population (Urdal 2006). There remains some disagreement within the scholarly community about what causes a youth bulge but most believe it comes as a result of increased development. In most cases, this development decreases the infant mortality rate by increasing access to health care. Yet if birth rates remain high (as they often do in developing countries), a youth bulge can occur as the number of children and young adults increase at a faster rate than previous generations (Lin 2012). These increases in the younger generations then create large youth cohorts that rise together through childhood and eventually reach

the age in which they are characterized as a youth bulge (15-24). At this point, these large cohorts become an important factor in determining the future economic and security situation of the state. I argue that when the economic conditions of the state are such that incorporating the youth into the workforce seems likely, these large youth cohorts are not seen as a potential security threat and thus the state will not initiate preemptive repression. This scenario is contrasted by that in which a state has little ability to economically incorporate a large youth cohort into the economy and thus chooses to increase repression in order to preempt the possible violence and unrest that comes from a large amount of economically underprivileged youth.

Previous research points to the potential for violence these cohorts bring. And indeed this is often the case. Yet this body of research has overlooked an important factor that affects how the state interacts with and views these large youth cohorts. The economic opportunities available to these youth proves to be an important factor that helps shape the interaction between the youth and the state. When economic opportunity is low (a situation characterized by a slow economy and high unemployment), we may see a situation such as the Arab Spring. In this scenario, large youth cohorts are met with decreased economic opportunities and therefore take part in violence. John Bradley, in his book on the Arab Spring, describes protesters as young people who often "knew nothing of political ideology. They were brought into the streets, not by a burning desire for free and fair elections, but by the dire economic circumstances in which they lived" (Bradley 2012, p. 201).

Others have argued similarly that the lack of economic opportunities for the youth of Egypt, Tunisia, and the other states of the Arab Spring directly led to the violence and unrest witnessed (Mulderig 2013). Due to this increase in potential unrest, scholars have argued that the state is likely to increase repression in an attempt to curtail this potential before it surfaces using preemptive repression (Nordås and Davenport 2013). As previously mentioned, this argument is augmented by the finding that youth bulges are one of the most

important and consistent predictors of increases in repression (Hill and Jones 2014). Yet, the relationship between youth, violence, and repression does not have to be characterized by negative outcomes. In an important article on this topic, Wright and Moorthy (2018) argue that when faced with a similar threat as youth bulges (in their case refugees) states may decide to use preemptive repression as these groups often bring an increased likelihood of violence. However, Wright and Moorthy find that the effect of refugees on repression is moderated by the economic condition of the state. That is, when the state is more likely to be able to absorb these refugees into the economic system, repression is less likely. It is only when the economic condition of the state fails to allow for this integration that the regime will fear these refugees and therefor increase preemptive repression. As I outline below, the regime's decision calculus when facing large youth cohorts operates in much the same way.

The main factors that shape a large youth cohort's impact on the state have to do with the economic situation of the country as a whole (as pointed out above). If the economic situation of the state is one of opportunity and potential economic integration, then the state may be able to harness the economic potential of the youth and save itself from potential unrest (USAID 2013). The logic here is simple, as the number of working persons increases, the dependency ratio (or ratio of non-working age population to working age population) decreases. When this ratio declines, as it would if the majority of youth from the youth bulge were employed, then income per capita should rise (Lin 2012). In this scenario, the youth have a decreased likelihood to take part in unrest due to their ability to find work and make a living. This new workforce also provides potential benefits to the state in the form of increased taxation and economic growth. Many Asian economies have experienced the benefit of large youth cohorts and have seen a dramatic rise in economic growth due to a large (and employed) youth workforce (Lin 2012). It would follow then, that when economic opportunities are available to these youth in the form of an economy with the ability to incorporate the large number of new workers, the state would have little incentive

to increase repression as the threat of future violence is small.

These contrasting outcomes create the need to reexamine our expectations of how large youth cohorts can impact a state's economic and security situation. By taking economic opportunity and incorporation into account, I show that the economic condition of the state changes how states view large youth cohorts. When the probability of incorporating these youth into the economy is low, states will view these youth as a potential future threat and begin to increase repression preemptively. If, however, the state sees economic incorporation as likely, the regime will fail to see the youth as a threat and will correspondingly not see a need to increase repression preemptively.

2.2 Youth Bulges and the Potential for Violence

Large youth cohorts can have a detrimental impact on a state's security situation. Figure 2.1 below shows the level of youth over time in some of the countries contained in the sample. The average percent youth in a country at any given time is 29%. As the figure shows, states see varying levels of youth across time. Some, like Nigeria, have maintained a consistently above-average level of youth with values ranging from 32%-36% while others like Russia and Argentina have maintained historically below-average percentages of youth with values ranging from 17%-25%. Still others like Vietnam have seen their numbers go from far below-average to above-average and back down.

These youth cohorts can dramatically increase the likelihood of terrorism, armed conflict, riots, and violence generally (Urdal 2006; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). Beyond conflict, scholars have found large youth cohorts to also be associated with increased political crises and an increase in political activism (Goldstone 1991; Huntington 1996; Hart et al. 2004). The mechanisms behind these findings point to the nature of youth as well as their effect on the institutions and systems of the state when present in large numbers. For instance Hart et al. (2004) argues that it is an inherent distrust of the current political institutions that lead youth to take part in political activism. Goldstone (1991) highlights the stress large youth




Figure 2.1: Percent Youth by Year

populations put on existing institutions and systems which lead to institutional bottlenecks. Simply put, Goldstone argues that large numbers of youth overwhelm the system and create high unemployment and a lack of economic opportunity due to the inability of the system to incorporate such high numbers of youth. Collier (2000) and Urdal (2006) then extend this argument and tie large youth cohorts to motivations and opportunity for violence.

Collier (2000), for example, argues that a high number of youth lead to more available recruits for violence by lowering the barrier of entry into such activities. This comes as a result of the institutional crowding and economic hardship mentioned earlier. If the number of youth increases, causing institutional crowding, then things like wages and availability of jobs will be lower. This lowers the opportunity cost of joining violence and thus makes the number of recruits increase (Collier 2000). Based on this research, it is easy to see why these youth bring such potential for volatility. In these conditions, you effectively have a large

number of persons who distrust the current political order, are more likely to take part in political activism, and have increased incentives for doing so given the strain they put on the economic system which has a detrimental impact on their own economic situation. The latter part of this equation, the negative impact youth have on the economic situation in a state, proves vital to connecting youth to increases in potential for violence.

Urdal (2006), and his seminal work on this topic, relies heavily on the idea of youth bulges, coupled with a decrease in economic opportunity, as a significant factor in the reason for an increased potential for violence. The logic behind this view follows the "opportunity" argument discussed above but also draws on the "grievance" literature. Urdal argues that youth increase the opportunity for violence through lowering the costs of joining these groups. In order for this opportunity cost to be lowered, the opportunities offered by rebels must be greater than those offered by other legitimate avenues. The inability to find legitimate employment can be a factor that tips the scale in favor of violence (Gates 2002). Much of the literature on opportunity argues that violence will increase when the cost of joining in such activity decreases. Large youth cohorts can create an overabundance of labor which can lead to decreased wages. This then, lowers the cost of joining in violence because the wages you give up by joining in violent activity are lower due to the overabundance of labor (Collier 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Urdal (2006) cites Brett and Specht (2004) as finding that poverty and low income opportunities lead to an increased chance of joining a rebel group (610). Similarly, Korenman and Neumark (1997) find that large youth cohorts lead to a significant increase in youth unemployment rates. These findings show that large youth cohorts often face reduced costs to joining in violence due to the inability to find economic opportunities. There is, however, another side of the coin. While opportunity may play an important role in violence, motives must also be taken into account (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

The motive based literature, or "grievance", argues that violence happens as a result of

people being unhappy with the current system or their economic state. Similar to (and drawing upon) the relative deprivation literature, this theoretical tradition argues that conflict erupts as a rational response to economic or institutional discontent (Gurr 1970; Sambanis 2004). They argue that the motive for violence comes from grievances within the population. Large youth cohorts can create institutional bottlenecks and can lead to high unemployment. These increased grievances then lead to an increase in the potential for political violence (Goldstone 1991). It should be pointed out as well that Urdal argues that the motive argument can be augmented by the opportunity argument in that the likelihood that violence is used to redress grievances increases as the opportunity costs of joining in violence decreases (610). That is, the economic factors that increase grievances (unemployment, low wages, etc.) also reduce the opportunity costs of joining a violent movement such as lost wages. Therefore, factors such as high unemployment, created by a large youth cohort, increase the chance of violence by increasing the potential grievances of the population and decreasing the opportunity costs of joining in a violent movement. According to this logic then, it is necessary to couple grievances with the opportunity for violence discussed above in order for the likelihood of violence to increase.

2.3 Youth Bulges and State Repression

Violence and unrest have long been linked to increases in repression. Some have argued that the level of repression increases along with the level or nature of the threat (Gartner and Regan 1996; Davenport 1995). Others argue that governments respond to dissent with either repression or accommodation based upon previous interactions (Moore 2000). Davenport (2007a) and Davenport and Inman (2012) aggregate these findings and term the results the "Law of Coercive Responsiveness". This law states that when threatened, states will most likely respond to that threat with repression. This "law" proves to be strong enough to even overcome one of the other "laws" Davenport puts forward; the "Domestic Democratic Peace" (Davenport 2007a). The domestic democratic peace comes from a large body of literature

that argues democracies repress less than other regime types. These findings are compiled by Davenport and made into a “law”. However, as Davenport (2007b) finds, dissent, if severe enough, can even break down this domestic democratic peace. So it stands that, in the face of dissent, states will likely respond with repression. And this result holds even when looking at democracies.

Nordås and Davenport (2013) build upon this finding and argue that large youth cohorts and the potential for violence they bring can cause governments to use repression (often preemptively) in order to deter the possible unrest these youth could engage in. The logic behind this assumes that regimes want to stay in power, therefore states facing large youth cohorts will see them as a threat and will engage in policies to control that threat. As we know, a state facing an increased potential for unrest will likely respond with repression. Since large youth cohorts are known to have an increased likelihood of future violence, and states can identify large youth cohorts as they rise through the school systems; these states will engage in repression – even in the absence of dissent – in order to control and attempt to stem the increased potential for violence that accompanies these youth. Nordas and Davenport’s argument centers on the idea of repression having both costs and benefits. Repression can be costly in democracies where citizens can hold leaders accountable and punish them for their heavy-handed response. Repression can also have international ramifications such as naming and shaming and sanctions (928). Additionally, repression also comes with real financial and resource costs. Engaging in increased repression requires more people and resources to be provided by the state thus incurring real costs to a regime’s resources. However, potential benefits also exist, namely the ability to control a dissenting population, shield the regime from potential future challenges, and remain in power. Therefore, Nordas and Davenport argue that governments, when faced with large youth cohorts and the potential for future violence that they represent, will repress preemptively to extend the status quo.

This argument, however, assumes that the threat posed by these large youth cohorts

outweighs the costs of increased repression. As Nordas and Davenport point out, repression is not a cost-less action. Therefore, the threat posed to the regime must be one that outweighs the costs of increasing repression. Due to this, I argue that states will likely increase preemptive repression only when they deem large youth cohorts to be threatening enough to do so. How then do states deem a threat worthy of increased repression? By observing the economic opportunities available to the youth population and calculating the probability of future violence. When economic opportunity is high and the youth are likely to be incorporated into the economy, the state is less likely to respond with preemptive repression as the threat of future violent dissent is lessened. This reduced likelihood of violence will lead to the cost of increasing repression outweighing the potential threat posed to the regime. In such a situation, we should observe little to no increase in repression in the face of large youth cohorts. However, when the state deems economic incorporation of the youth into the economy as unlikely, the regime will see the youth as having an increased likelihood of participating in future unrest and will therefore begin to implement preemptive repression as a means to insulate the regime from this violent potential. Below, I develop this logic more fully and provide examples that highlight this decision calculus.

2.4 Youth, Repression, and Economic Opportunity

When should states fear large youth cohorts and in response to this fear increase levels of repression? Drawing from the motive and opportunity literature discussed above, I argue that states should fear large youth cohorts only when those youth pose a potential threat to the state. Large youth cohorts are most likely to threaten a state when the motive and opportunity for violence is at its highest. When these youth have less opportunities due to the reduced economic capacity of the state to incorporate them into the system, the youth populations have decreased costs of joining in violence yet have increased motives. Less economic opportunities can create hardships that make joining in dissent more likely. This rational draws upon the opportunity-cost approach first described by Becker (1968)

and further developed by Popkin (1979). This theory argues that potential participants in violence are rational actors and therefore respond to changes in the opportunity cost of participating. Berman et al. (2011) lay out the theoretical framework formally by pointing out that there exists some wage that actors would prefer to taking part in violence. This threshold is influenced by things like risk aversion, commitment to the cause, and other factors. Berman et al. (2011) goes on to point out that the number of potential participants is "a decreasing function of wages in the legitimate economy." (500) This logic points to a positive correlation between unemployment and the number of available participants to unrest. This finding is echoed by recent work linking unemployment to conflict. In their study of Indonesia, Barron et al. (2016) find that unemployment significantly increases the chance that violence will occur. Similarly, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008), citing Abdullah (1998), argue that "Unlettered, unemployed migrants formed the basis for Sierra Leone's insurgency in part because they were "cheap."

For our purposes, suppose that a large number of youth exist in State A and State B. State A is experiencing high economic growth and has a low unemployment rate while State B is experiencing the opposite (low growth and high unemployment). The opportunity-cost theory outlined above would say that the youth in State B pose a larger threat to the regime than those in State A due to their availability and lower threshold for engaging in unrest. Therefore, the government of State B is more likely to use preemptive repression as a way to shield itself from the potential unrest these disaffected youth bring. State B fears that future unrest is likely, due to the large availability of youth with a low threshold for participation. Ideally, the state would like to incorporate these youth into the economy and harness their economic potential but governments cannot simply grow the economy on command. Therefore, states resort to what they can do — increase repression in the hope that it will insulate the regime from a future threat.

This point is highlighted by Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf who pointed towards

unemployment as the cause of the violence within Liberia. She is quoted as saying “the level of unemployment and the idleness of our youth have a propensity for social disenchantment. *For us, employment is synonymous to peace* [emphasis added].” (Johnsson 2006, p. 3). Here, then, is the leader of a state arguing that economic opportunity can bring about a reduction in violence. This quote also shows that governments understand the relationship between economic opportunity and the probability of violence, thus lending support to the argument that they will try to preempt this violent potential by employing preemptive repression.

Additional anecdotal evidence for the relationship between economic opportunity and threats to the state comes from the Arab spring movement. Houle (2017) cites Malik and Awadallah (2013) as saying, "Arab revolutions were fueled by poverty, unemployment, and lack of economic opportunity" and those that participated were "the youth who see little hope for economic and social mobility" (p.296-297 cited in Houle (2017). Others have reiterated this point saying "rather than the Arab world's usual suspects — bearded Islamists or jaded leftists — it is young people, angry at the lack of *economic opportunity* available to them, who are risking their lives going up against police forces." [emphasis added] (Knickmeyer 2011) When economic opportunity is low, these youth cohorts are more likely to engage in violence and unrest due to both the increased opportunity and motive for doing so. As the case of Liberia shows, government leaders are aware of this as well which indicates that they will likely take steps to avoid the threat to their power.

The use of preemptive repression by the state in the face of a potential future threat has been established within the literature on state repression. As Rory Truex finds, the Chinese regime increases repression preemptively during days in which it believes unrest to be more likely such as national holidays. The regime purposely increases its' level of repression in order to insulate itself from the potential for unrest that come on these days regardless of whether or not dissent is present (Truex 2019). Beyond the example of China, Danneman and Ritter (2014) find that states with neighbors who are actively engaged in a civil war use

preemptive repression at home as a strategy to insulate their country from the possibility of conflict contagion. In both of these examples, states are deciding to use repression as a tool to decrease the negative effects of *potential* unrest without an increase in actual unrest.

This causal process is highlighted by the example of Liberia mentioned briefly before. Liberia in 1999 had a high youth population and had low economic opportunity. Liberia was also experiencing a large amount of violent unrest. This violence, I would argue, stemmed in part from having high numbers of youth without much economic opportunity. The inability of the youth to find jobs increased their grievances towards the state and decreased their cost of joining in violence. This argument is echoed by the World Bank who, in a 2011 World Development report, cite unemployment as the most frequent reason given to why one would join a rebel movement (World Bank 2011). So when asked to give their reason for joining in violence, the most common response stemmed from a lack of economic opportunity. Both the World Bank and the Liberian President are arguing that the level of economic opportunity directly impacts the likelihood of violence. The quote from the Liberian president citing the pacifying effect of employment shows that state leaders understand the impact economic opportunity can have on youth and their propensity for violence. It follows, then, that these same leaders can evaluate their own economic situations and gauge the potential threat posed by large youth cohorts. If the economic situation is one of abundance, then state leaders have little to fear and therefore little incentive to repress. If, however, the economic situation is less abundant, then leaders understand the violent potential posed by large youth cohorts and are therefore more likely to repress preemptively. The lack of economic opportunity however, details only one potential situation. There also exists states in which economic opportunity is abundant which leads to vastly different outcomes.

Economic abundance has a direct impact on violence and unrest. For instance, when economic opportunities are abundant, youth have an increased cost of joining in violence and a decreased motive for doing so. A scenario of economic abundance can increase wages

(and the likelihood of having a job more generally) as well as influence one's outlook on the potential for future economic gain thereby decreasing grievances and increasing the cost of joining in violence.¹ Due to this, the probability of violence decreases as economic opportunities increase. Drawing on this, I believe that economic opportunities can condition the likelihood of preemptive repression as youth bulges increase. In states with economic abundance, I expect the effect of youth bulges on repression to be minimal due to the reduced likelihood of violence. In states with economic scarcity, I expect the effect of youth bulges on repression to increase as youth bulges become larger and the threat of violence increases.

The case of Cameroon provides another example of how the economic situation of the state can influence repression in the face of large youth cohorts. From 1990 to 2010, Cameroon's youth population maintained above average levels. The average percentage of youth during this time was 36% with the yearly percentage never falling below 34.5% throughout this time-frame.² The president throughout this time period was Paul Biya who assumed the presidency in 1982 and remains in office today. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Cameroon saw a drastic change in its' economic situation with GDP growth switching from negative to positive in the mid 1990s and the youth unemployment rate dropping steadily in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s. The fact that the percentage of youth remained steady throughout this time period provides a helpful illustration of the impact economic opportunity has on repression in the face of a high percentage of youth. Below I provide a graph that shows the level of repression in Cameroon from 1990 - 2010. During this time, recall that youth percentages remained more or less unchanged while the economic situation steadily improved. To show this, I include snapshots of the youth unemployment rate at differing times. What becomes clear from the graph is the effect the economic opportunity has on the level of repression. While youth unemployment numbers remain high, we see

¹Again, see the opportunity-cost literature here Becker (1968); Popkin (1979); Blattman and Miguel (2010)

²Note that the average percent youth in the sample is 29%.

the state responding with higher levels of repression. However, as the economic situation improves, we see a drastic reduction in the level of repression. This trend continues as the economic situation continues to improve. This represents a major change in repression with Cameroon moving from being in the top 80th percentile of repression in the early parts of the 1990s to being in the bottom 45th percentile by the end of 2010.

Additionally, Cameroon shows that repression in the face of large youth cohorts relies more on the economic conditions of the state rather than on the realized level of dissent. The correlation between the number of protests and the level of repression in Cameroon from 1990-2010 is .24 while the correlation between repression and youth unemployment during the same time period is .84. Cameroon actually saw an increase in protests from 2005-2010³ while their level of repression and youth unemployment was steadily decreasing. This gives some support to the idea that governments fear the youth population when those youth do not have the ability to be integrated into the economy. When the youth can be integrated, the government reduces its' repression even in light of higher levels of protest indicating that it is not the level of dissent but the fear of youth driving the use of repression.

³Cameroon saw an average of just under one protest event a year from 1995-2004. That number increased to three from 2005-2010




Figure 2.2: Cameroon: Level of Repression by Year - Red Lines Indicate the Youth Unemployment Rate

The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: *States will increase repression more in contexts of low economic opportunity compared to situations of high economic opportunity, and this effect will be stronger the larger the youth bulge in that state.*

2.5 Data and Research Design

2.5.1 Dependent Variable

To test this hypothesis, I use cross-national data from 1960-2012. Country-year serves as the unit of analysis. To capture the level of state repression within a country I estimate models using three different dependent variables. The first two come from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Wood and Gibney 2010) and consist of categorical measures ranging from one to five with higher values referring to increased levels of repression. The Political

Terror Scale defines a repression level of "1" as "Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare." Similarly a "2" represents "There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare." Most consider a PTS score of "3" to be where repression begins (see Davenport and Appel (2014) for a discussion on repressive spells). The Political Terror Scale defines a "3" as "There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted." Finally, a "4" and a "5" are defined as "Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas." and "Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals." respectively. When using the PTS coding of the dependent variable, the data range is restricted due to missing values.

The PTS measure consists of two separate measures of repression based upon different reporting sources. The first measure makes use of reports from Amnesty International and codes the level of repression based upon the scale listed above. The second measure considers reports from the United States State Department and categorizes a state's level of repression based upon these reports (again according to the 5 point scale defined earlier).

The second measure of repression comes from Fariss (2014). This measure takes into account the changing standards of accountability within the human rights community and models this latent change into the coding of repression. Fariss (2014) argues that human rights standards have changed over time and these changes are incorporated into the current coding of human rights variables. Without modeling these changing standards, he argues,

our measures suffer from bias. Incorporating these changing standards, Fariss maintains, better reflects the human rights conditions across time. In the original coding of this latent repression variable, higher values correspond to less repression (more respect for human rights). In order to simplify interpretation of the coefficients and to maintain consistency with the PTS coding of repression, I invert this measure by multiplying by negative one so that higher values indicate higher levels of repression.

2.5.2 Independent Variables

My main independent variables are youth bulges and GDP growth. Both of these variables come from the World Bank. Youth bulges are measured by dividing the total adult population by the number of those who are 15-24. This coding is consistent with the literature on youth bulges and violence (Urdal 2006).

To proxy for the ability of a state to incorporate the youth into the economic system, I follow Urdal (2006) and use economic growth. In that study, Urdal uses economic growth to proxy economic opportunity or the ability of the state to economically handle these large youth cohorts. Economic growth speaks to the overall economic situation of the state and therefore provides a state-level proxy of the economic conditions of the country in regards to future employment, income, and overall economic strength. These economic conditions translate into how the regime views youth bulges. Economic growth itself, directly ties to the country's ability to incorporate new workers into the system. When economic growth is high, demand for labor tends to be higher than when economic growth is low. Therefore, economic growth should serve as a useful proxy for how well the system can absorb a youth bulge. Table 2.1 provides some descriptive statistics for my dependent variables as well as my variables of interest. As can be seen, GDP growth has some large outliers. To account for this, as I point out later, when predicting levels of repression by percent youth I set a profile that uses percentiles rather than predicting over the minimum and maximum values

found in the data.

To further test the mechanism discussed, I also use the youth unemployment level to capture the economic condition of the youth. This measure comes from the World Bank and measures the unemployment level for youth 15-24 (which is the same conception of youth used by Urdal 2006 and in this paper). Using the youth unemployment rate allows me to capture how many youth may be available and have a reason to challenge the government. The higher the level of unemployment amongst the youth population, the more likely governments are to view those youth as a potential threat. Therefore, this measure captures both the economic opportunities open to youth but also the likelihood the state could see them as posing a potential threat.

VARIABLES	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Latent Repression	-0.32	1.4	-4.71	3.11
PTS Amnesty	2.7	1.11	1	5
PTS State Department	2.39	1.16	1	5
Youth Bulge	0.29	0.07	0.11	0.42
GDP Growth	3.9	6.71	-64.05	179.2
Youth Unemployment	16.33	11.69	0.39	63.71

Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Dependent Variables and Explanatory Variables

2.5.3 Control Variables

To help isolate the effect of my conditioning factors, I also include control variables that the repression literature has proven to be important (Davenport 2007a; Hill and Jones 2014; Davenport and Appel 2014). To account for the amount of potential dissent as well as the ability of the state to repress I include a population measure (logged) as well as a measure of GDP per capita (logged). Both variables come from the World Bank. As the literature has shown, regime type can also be an important predictor of repression with democracies experiencing much lower levels of repression. Due to this, I include a measure of regime type into the model. I use the X-Polity data from Vreeland (2008). Additionally, I also control

for the amount of dissent within the state as well as the presence of a civil war. Both of these factors have been shown to increase the probability of repression and are particularly relevant given that they are also affected by the percent youth in a country. The data on dissent comes from the Cross-National Time-Series dataset (Banks and Wilson 2017). To create my dissent measure, I first sum the protest events within the CNTS data. I then create a dummy for whether or not dissent occurred within that state in a given year. The measure for civil war comes from UCDP conflict data and equals a 1 if there is a civil war and a 0 otherwise. Lastly, I control for the amount of judicial independence. An independent judiciary has been shown to dramatically reduce the amount of repression seen in a state, and thus proves to be an important control. Data for this measure comes from Linzer and Staton (2015). Table 2.2 provides a summary of the control variables contained in the analysis.

VARIABLES	Mean	SD	Min	Max
GDP (Per Capita)	8.37	1.25	4.9	13.36
Population (ln)	15.35	2.14	8.78	21
Civil War (Dummy)	0.16	0.36	0	1
Dissent (Dummy)	0.28	0.45	0	1
Independent Judiciary	0.46	0.32	0.01	0.99
X-Polity	-2.11	16.83	-88	7

Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Control Variables

2.5.4 Research Design

To test the conditional effect of economic opportunity on youth bulges and repression I run six sets of models interacting my independent variables (GDP growth and youth unemployment) with the measure for youth bulges. All models use the same list of covariates mentioned above in the control variable section and are regressed against each of my three measures for state repression. To account for auto-correlation that may be present due to the panel nature of my data, I then rerun each model with yearly time dummies. I also included a lagged dependent variable as some have shown that the lagged level of repression

is an important predictor of current repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Nordås and Davenport 2013). Lastly, I cluster my standard errors on country. For my models using the PTS coding of repression I estimate an ordered logit model as this coding of repression utilizes an ordered scale. For models utilizing Fariss' coding of repression I use OLS following Hill and Jones (2014). Given that my main theoretical interest lies in the interaction between GDP growth and youth unemployment with youth bulges, I include a visualization of this conditioning relationship.

2.6 Empirical Results

The results from table 2.3 give preliminary support for the hypothesis presented. Across the different models, we see that the control variables behave according to expectations lending confidence to the model. For instance, large populations, dissent, and civil wars are all positively correlated to increased repression while an independent judiciary as well as more democratic states are both negatively correlated to state repression. The testing of my theoretical concept however, lies in interacting GDP growth and youth unemployment with youth bulges. Interpreting such an interaction from a table such as this is of limited value however.⁴ To overcome this, I provide a visual representation of this relationship.

⁴See Brambor et al. (2006)

	(1) Latent	(2) Latent	(3) Amnesty	(4) Amnesty	(5) State Dept	(6) State Dept
Youth Bulge	0.29* (0.058)	0.28* (0.057)	5.08* (0.920)	5.25* (0.986)	2.88* (0.853)	4.66* (0.996)
GDP Growth	0.001 (0.003)	-0.0001 (0.003)	0.04 (0.034)	0.03 (0.035)	0.03 (0.039)	0.02 (0.038)
Youth * GDP Growth	-0.01 (0.009)	-0.01 (0.009)	-0.18 (0.114)	-0.16 (0.118)	-0.16 (0.125)	-0.14 (0.120)
GDP Per Capita (t-1)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.04 (0.053)	0.05 (0.054)	-0.15* (0.051)	-0.12* (0.059)
Log Population (t-1)	0.01* (0.002)	0.01* (0.002)	0.2* (0.044)	0.2* (0.044)	0.22* (0.039)	0.24* (0.044)
Dissent (t-1)	0.01† (0.005)	0.01 (0.005)	0.16* (0.07)	0.2* (0.073)	0.15† (0.083)	0.25* (0.089)
Civil War (t-1)	0.004 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	1.05* (0.153)	1.07* (0.154)	0.89* (0.159)	1.11* (0.172)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-0.06* (0.013)	-0.06* (0.013)	-1.58* (0.274)	-1.64* (0.279)	-1.66* (0.254)	-2.01* (0.294)
X-Polity (t-1)	0.001† (0.000)	0.001† (0.000)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Lagged DV	0.98* (0.003)	0.98* (0.003)	2.07* (0.086)	2.09* (0.086)	2.58* (0.084)	2.48* (0.088)
_cons	-0.2* (0.05)	-0.2* (0.05)				
Cut 1			6.12* (0.98)	6.14* (1.02)	5.44* (0.85)	7.17* (1.06)
Cut 2			9.57* (0.99)	9.63* (1.03)	9.02* (0.86)	10.88* (1.06)
Cut 3			12.72* (1.01)	12.81* (1.05)	12.70* (0.86)	14.67* (1.07)
Cut 4			15.60* (1.04)	15.72* (1.08)	16.02* (0.88)	18.05* (1.08)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	6107	6107	3844	3844	4613	4613
Log lik.			-3431.1	-3400.5	-3492.4	-3397.7

Standard errors clustered on country

† p<.1, * p<0.05

Table 2.3: Moderating effect of GDP growth on the relationship between youth bulges and state repression

Graphically, Figure 2.3 (based on model 2) shows that states with high values of GDP growth fail to see an increase in the level of repression as the number of youth increase. This is contrasted by those states with low GDP growth. To graph the conditioning effect shown in Figure 2.3, I predict values of repression using a profile that leaves continuous variables at their mean and the dummy variable for civil war set at zero. I set GDP growth at the first percentile (-13%) and the ninety-ninth percentile (21%) for low and high levels of GDP growth respectively. As the graph shows, those states that have a limited ability to incorporate the youth into the economic system see a dramatic *increase* in repression as the number of youth increase. This graph lends support for the theoretical expectation that the effect of youth bulges on repression differs across different values of GDP growth. Those states with high economic growth see very little change in repression while those with low growth see their use of repression significantly increase as the amount of youth increase.




Figure 2.3: Predicted level of repression by GDP growth across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.3, model 2. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals

We see this same relationship play out graphically when looking at the results from model four depicted in Figure 2.4. Again, when there is high economic growth which represents an economy that can accommodate large youth cohorts, we see very little change in the probability that the state will have a high level of repression. However, this relationship changes when a state has low values of economic growth. In these instances, the state cannot incorporate the large number of youth into the economy which leads to an increased chance of violence. Knowing this, the state increases its level of repression as the number of youth grow. Figure 2.5 from model six utilizes the state department coding of repression and again shows a consistent result with the probability of high repression only increasing when GDP growth in low and youth levels are high.




Figure 2.4: Predicted level of repression by GDP growth across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.3, model 4. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals




Figure 2.5: Predicted level of repression by GDP growth across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.3, model 6. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals

The results, as seen in Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4, and Figure 2.5 all support the hypothesis that the level of economic growth within a state matters in how that state reacts to high levels of youth. When there exists a high amount of economic opportunity, states have little reason to fear these large numbers of youth and therefore fail to increase the level of repression. However, when levels of economic opportunity are low, states have more reason to fear these youth and therefore we see a decrease in respect for human rights.

To further test this relationship, I run the same set of models this time interacting youth bulges with the youth unemployment rate. Table 2.4 presents the results and, as before, I provide marginal effects plots to interpret the interaction.

	(1) Latent	(2) Latent	(3) Amnesty	(4) Amnesty	(5) State Dept	(6) State Dept
Youth Bulge	-0.07 (0.115)	-0.07 (0.115)	2.30† (1.322)	2.36† (1.338)	1.56 (1.388)	1.59 (1.433)
Unemployment (Youth)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.02 (0.013)	-0.02 (0.014)	-0.01 (0.014)	-0.01 (0.015)
Youth * Unemployment	0.014* (0.004)	0.014* (0.004)	0.112* (0.049)	0.109* (0.050)	0.074 (0.048)	0.078 (0.049)
GDP Per Capita (t-1)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.04 (0.0684)	-0.04 (0.069)	-0.21* (0.076)	-0.23* (0.079)
Log Population (t-1)	0.013* (0.003)	0.013* (0.003)	0.24* (0.050)	0.24* (0.051)	0.30* (0.050)	0.30* (0.052)
Dissent (t-1)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.12 (0.085)	0.16† (0.087)	0.16 (0.103)	0.22* (0.106)
Civil War (t-1)	0.002 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)	1.15* (0.182)	1.18* (0.184)	0.97* (0.187)	0.10* (0.193)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-0.07* (0.019)	-0.06* (0.019)	-1.56* (0.300)	-1.59* (0.303)	-1.90* (0.316)	-1.95* (0.325)
X-Polity (t-1)	0.0004 (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Lagged DV	0.97* (0.006)	0.97* (0.006)	2.01* (0.104)	2.04* (0.104)	2.45* (0.105)	2.48* (0.108)
_cons	-0.19* (0.084)	-0.16† (0.088)				
Cut 1			5.56* (1.087)	5.73* (1.107)	5.33* (1.069)	5.52* (1.124)
Cut 2			8.92* (1.108)	9.13* (1.122)	9.05* (1.076)	9.31* (1.131)
Cut 3			12.05* (1.138)	12.30* (1.150)	12.77* (1.104)	13.09* (1.157)
Cut 4			15.04* (1.175)	15.32* (1.187)	16.18* (1.137)	16.52* (1.196)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	3292	3292	2775	2775	3224	3224
Log lik.			-2452.9	-2430.1	-2440.0	-2406.5

Standard errors clustered on country

† p<.1, * p<0.05

Table 2.4: Moderating effect of youth unemployment on the relationship between youth bulges and state repression

As with GDP growth, we again see that the unemployment level of youth conditions

the relationship between repression and youth bulges. Specifically, when the youth unemployment level is low, we see little to no change in the predicted level of repression across differing levels of youth. Conversely, when youth unemployment is high, the predicted level of repression increases in conjunction with the number of youth. This provides some support for the assertion that states with high levels of youth will only see those youth as a threat — and thereby increase repression — when the economic opportunities of those youth low. When the youth can be successfully incorporated into the economy (indicated by a low unemployment rate) states fail to see these youth as a threat which leads to no change in the level of repression.




Figure 2.6: Predicted level of repression by youth unemployment across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.4, model 2. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals




Figure 2.7: Predicted level of repression by youth unemployment across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.4, model 4. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals




Figure 2.8: Predicted level of repression by youth unemployment across the range of percent youth. Results from table 2.4, model 6. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals

Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 all show support for the theory that the economic opportunities available to youth can condition the effect these large youth cohorts have on state repression. In each case, states with low unemployment see very little to no change in their level of repression across varying levels of youth. This finding is contrasted by those states with high unemployment which see a dramatic rise in repression as the level of youth increases.

2.7 Discussion

The models and graphs above lend support for the hypothesis that the effect of youth bulges on repression can be conditioned by the level of economic opportunity within the state. It seems that states who find themselves in situations of economic abundance fail to increase repression in the face of large youth cohorts due to their ability to successfully incorporate these youth into the economic system. This incorporation changes the perception of the

youth causing the government to not see them as a potential future threat. Contrasting this, those states that are unable to provide this economic incorporation of the youth increase repression when facing these large populations of young people in an effort to prevent the likely increase in potential for violence that they bring. While these findings shed light on an overlooked part of repression, there remains work to be done. While this paper puts forward a state-centric approach to the issue, how do the youth in question view their situation? Perhaps survey data on youth perceptions of the government or perceptions of their own economic situation may shed more light on how these youth bulges interact with and affect the state and its actions. Future work could do more work to identify the motives and behaviors of the youth and thereby ascertain the motives and thinking behind their actions.

2.8 Conclusion

Research has shown that large youth cohorts serve as an important predictor of state repression.⁵ States can see these youth as a threat and increase their level of repression preemptively to avoid the negative consequences these youth have the potential to bring. However, as I have shown, the economic conditions of the state can serve as a conditioning factor on this use of repression. States with low levels of economic opportunity have more to fear from large youth cohorts and therefore are more likely to use preemptive repression. Conversely, states with high levels of economic opportunity have less of a reason to fear these large youth cohorts and are therefore less likely to use preemptive repression. Regimes calculate the cost of repression against the potential rewards it brings. When facing a large number of youth, the state must decide the likelihood of future unrest caused by these youth. To do this, the economic situation of the country must be taken into account. This decision calculus proves essential in understanding the relationship between youth bulges and state repression.

⁵See Nordås and Davenport (2013); Hill and Jones (2014)

CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND STATE REPRESSION

3.1 Introduction

How do economic shocks affect state repression? The literature on economic shocks has long connected sudden and severe economic downturns with increases in violence.¹ Yet, the relationship between economic shocks and state repression has failed to garner the same attention. This paper seeks to fill that gap by arguing that states understand the violent potential economic shocks can bring and therefore will seek to avoid this threat to their power by preemptively increasing repression. My argument draws on other scholarship on preemptive repression (Nordås and Davenport 2013; Truex 2019; and Danneman and Ritter 2014) and contends that states experiencing an economic shock will see a corresponding increase in repression as the government seeks to insulate itself from a future potential for violence. Additional analysis determines whether this effect could be moderated by the economic development of the state or the presence of overt dissent. The paper progresses as follows. I first discuss state repression and outline the incentives states have for using repressive measures and how the economic conditions of the state can impact this. I then present a theory of how economic shocks lead to an increase in state repression highlighting this logic with a short case study from Zimbabwe. Finally, I empirically test the mechanism put forward and discuss the results. In brief, I find strong support for the idea that states will increase their repression in the wake of an economic shock in an effort to avoid the potential violence that often accompanies such shocks.

Examining this relationship proves crucial to understanding how economic shocks affect the security situation of a state. The effect of economic shocks on a state's repressive

¹See Miguel (2004); Hodler and Raschky (2014); and Dube and Vargas (2013) among others.

actions represents a vital aspect of the relationship between the state and its citizens. This effect is important for both policymakers and human rights advocates as they both seek to better understand the strategic calculus used by states when deciding to employ repression. Economic shocks represent a key, and until now, overlooked aspect of human rights violations and can help further our understanding of state repression.

3.2 Economic Conditions of the State and Repression

The relationship between economic factors such as GDP and per capita income and repression remains understudied. While some have argued that economic development, measured as GNP per capita, decreases repression — the mechanism behind this relationship is unclear (Davenport and Inman 2012). Indeed, much of the repression literature treats GDP as an important control variable but not as an important predictor of state repression (Hill and Jones 2014). While the literature connecting economic conditions of the state and repression is limited, notable exceptions exist. A notable example of this comes from Davenport (1995). Here, Davenport includes the domestic economy within his analysis. He cites previous studies as arguing that when the domestic economy is running well, states are less likely to perceive dissent as a threat and are therefore less likely to use repression (Goldstein 1983). Indeed, the conditional effect of the economy is a growing theme within the repression literature. Recent work by Wright and Moorthy (2018) shows that state repression is sometimes conditional on the economic condition of the state. The authors examine how increased refugee flows within a country affect the level of state repression. They argue that refugees could be seen as a potential threat and therefore increase the level of repression as the state seeks to mitigate that threat. However, this expectation is conditional upon the economic condition of the state. In states with high economic capacity (measured as high GDP per capita) the threat posed by increased refugees is mitigated by the ability of the state to economically adsorb these new arrivals within the economy (Wright and Moorthy 2018). Here we see how the economic conditions of a state can influence how that state perceives

a threat and therefore how that state chooses to respond. Though the relationship between high GDP and repression seems clear, the question of how economic downturns affect repression remains less defined. Higher levels of GDP help to reduce levels of repression as states are better able to meet the needs of their citizens. This finding, as discussed earlier, proves to be a consistent conclusion within the literature on state repression. But what happens when the state is faced with an economic crisis? We know from the literature on conflict that economic downturns are often associated with increases in violence and unrest (Miguel 2004; Hodler and Raschky 2014; Dube and Vargas 2013). Yet it is unclear how these negative economic conditions affect the decision of states to apply repression. Economic downturns (shocks) create an environment where people have increased grievances and decreased costs in joining violent groups. This leads to an increase in the likelihood of violence and unrest. I argue that states understand this reality and will seek to apply preemptive repression as a way to mitigate the negative effects of economic shocks.

3.3 Economic Shocks, Violence, and State Repression

Within the literature on unrest, economic shocks have been consistently connected to increases in violence. States facing an economic shock understand that this can lead to instability. To help mitigate this negative outcome, states are likely to turn to increases in repression. While the literature on economic shocks has discussed the connection between shocks and instability, it has largely overlooked the relationship between shocks and repression. I connect negative economic shocks to increases in state repression and show how states use repression as a tool to insulate themselves from the negative effects of economic shocks.

The economic situation of the state often dictates the amount of unrest that particular state experiences. For instance, many civil wars begin due to the “greed” argument which states that rebels seek to capture some economic good that is currently under the control of the state (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Others have shown that economic shocks (defined as a decrease in economic growth of five percentage points) drastically increase the likelihood of

civil war in that state (Miguel et al. 2004). This finding holds when looking at the regional level in Africa with negative economic shocks (now measured as nighttime light intensity) leading to an increase in civil conflict (Hodler and Raschky 2014). Consistent with this literature, recent findings suggest that other forms of economic shocks (here measured as commodity price increases) also increase the risk of conflict (Dube and Vargas 2013)). Beyond civil conflict, economic shocks also impact leader survival. Many have shown that economic shocks (whether measuring it as decreases in GDP or decreases in per capita income) lead to an increase in the likelihood of a coup (Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000; Kim 2016). Economic shocks, therefore, have a detrimental impact on a country's overall stability and on regime survival. Economic shocks are also quite visible to both the regime and the population. Leaders are aware of economic shocks as they are happening and can take actions to try to preemptively reduce their negative impact economically. Beyond economic action, leaders can also take steps to limit the other, non-economic, negative outcomes that often accompany economic shocks.

One of the strategies most readily available to leaders looking to reduce the uncertainty of the future is to employ repression preemptively (Nordås and Davenport 2013; Danneman and Ritter 2014; Truex 2019). These studies show that when regimes are faced with perceived or future potential threats, they will engage in preemptive repression as a way to insulate themselves from this threat. Yet leaders do not simply employ repression without first weighing the costs and benefits. In order to use repression, a state must first identify a threat. Then, the benefit of using repression (increased control and likelihood of regime survival) must outweigh the cost. When faced with a threat and the belief that the benefits of using repression outweigh the cost, states will employ their repressive apparatus (Davenport 2007a). We see this in the repression literature with political dissent being a consistent predictor of increased state repression as states see this as a credible threat (Carey 2010). The finding that dissent leads to increased repression is strong enough within the literature

that Davenport calls it the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” (Davenport 2007a). Here, states see dissent as a large enough threat to justify using repression.

Beyond realized threats though, regimes also employ repression when faced with perceived threats or the potential for future unrest such as large youth cohorts or neighbors experiencing civil war (Nordås and Davenport 2013; Danneman and Ritter 2014). States also attempt to preempt unrest by increasing repression prior to events or dates likely to see increases in dissent (Truex 2019). These increases in repression come in the absence of overt dissent as the repression is taking place preemptively. The idea behind this use of preemptive repression is to reduce the ability or capacity of opponents to mount a coordinated movements against the regime (Tilly 1978). Additionally, preemptive repression seeks to lower opponents willingness to protest or take part in unrest by increasing the price of such actions with increased preemptive attacks against physical integrity rights (Galtung 1969).

Recent work in Zimbabwe shows the psychological effect this sort of action can have on potential dissidents. In her research, Young (2019) finds that the psychological fear created by physical integrity rights violations can severely restrict the likelihood a person takes part in unrest. She contends that this use of repression can greatly reduce the amount of overt dissent which in turn insulates the leader from possible regime change. Her findings show that the fear treatment given to those in the study reduced dissent by 14-23%. Similarly, participants who received the fear treatment reported a reduced likelihood of taking part in six different high-risk dissent acts. This shows the power of preemptive repression in stifling future dissent. It follows, then, that states will respond to economic shocks with repression in an attempt to mitigate their negative impact (i.e. the likelihood of seeing a challenge to their authority).

Economic shocks are known to increase the likelihood of dissent and violence by increasing the grievances of the population and decreasing the opportunity cost of joining in violence. States understand that shocks bring about this increased potential for unrest and will likely

deem it to be a large enough threat to their power to initiate preemptive repression. Because of this, we should see an increase in preemptive repression as a result of economic shocks as states attempt to insulate themselves from these negative outcomes. The use of preemptive repression allows states to limit the ability of opponents to dissent as well as the willingness of people to take part in such action by raising the cost of participation. This rise in the cost of participation promotes fear within the potential participants and thus reduces the likelihood of unrest. Thus, preemptive repression serves as a powerful tool for regimes facing an economic shock and the potential for violence that comes with it.

Indeed, within the literature on state repression we see some evidence of this relationship. Economic sanctions are often used as a way to punish regimes for their human rights abuses and as a way to encourage them to reduce this abuse. However, the literature shows that these actions often lead to increases in repression rather than decreases (Wood 2008; Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2009). In a way, these externally imposed economic challenges function in much the same way as economic shocks. External actors decide to create a negative economic situation within the state as a way to coerce that state into changing its behavior. This externally produced negative economic situation often creates an environment that threatens the stability of incumbents and increases the likelihood of political violence due to the negative economic conditions brought about by these external actors (Peksen 2009). Due to this increased instability and potential for unrest, states respond to economic sanctions by increasing repression in order to stabilize the regime and reduce the threat posed by potential challengers (Wood 2008). In this way, negative economic conditions brought about by externally imposed sanctions create an environment ripe for possible unrest. This potential for instability leads states to increase repression in order to mitigate the perceived threat. Economic shocks function in much the same way as they also lead to an increase in the likelihood of instability. Therefore, states increase their level of preemptive repression as a way to avoid the potential challenge to their regime that comes from negative economic

conditions.

3.3.1 Example: Zimbabwe

An example of such a sequence of events can be seen in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 under its leader Robert Mugabe. Mugabe began many different economic projects including land reform and also attempted to attract FDI. Following independence, the Zimbabwe economy enjoyed moderate success and was seen by many as the second strongest economy in southern Africa (Parsons 2002). However, this success ended quickly due mainly to Mugabe's corrupt and economically unsound policies (Dashwood 2000). The catalyst came in November of 1997 on a day known as "Black Friday" where the country's currency was decimated and lost 74% of its value in four hours (Bond 2007). On top of this economic collapse, the entire country lost power for eight hours furthering the unease of its population. This event led to a distinct increase in human rights abuses within the country as the government fought to maintain its control.

In 1997, Zimbabwe experienced a very low level of repression as figure 3.1 shows. Mugabe's desire to attract outside investment led to little state sponsored repression and created what many thought was a healthy economy. This is contrasted by the following year (1998) when Zimbabwe saw an increase in repression passing the threshold that some argue represents a repressive spell (Davenport and Appel 2014). We see, then, how the crisis of 1997 and "Black Friday" impacted the human rights situation of the state. An article in the New York Times in July of 1998 pointed out that riots were rare in Zimbabwe but since December (which was only a month after Black Friday), police and demonstrators had clashed numerous times. As the situation worsened, the government responded by imposing harsher policies. This pattern of deteriorating human rights continued as 1998 brought about high interest rates and increased inflation. In 1999, amid political disagreements, the World Bank and the IMF ended its aid to the country. This led to a continued economic downturn and

caused the regime to persist in increasing its repressive behavior. In 2000, following this steep downward economic spiral, Zimbabwe again saw their repression scores increase as the state continued its suppression of people's rights. The situation finally began to improve following the end of hyperinflation in 2008. Zimbabwe abandoned its currency and saw positive economic growth numbers for the first time in more than a decade. This change in economic fortune led to a corresponding decline in repression. Figure 3.1 below shows this relationship graphically. In the late 1970's, Zimbabwe saw high levels of repression as the guerilla war was in full force. The level of repression then started to decline as Mugabe took power and began his bid to attract foreign investment. This decline in repression came to an abrupt halt following the events of Black Friday in late 1997. This economic shock then led to a decade long increase in repression as the government clung to its grip on power. The economic downturn was finally reversed in 2008 following positive economic policies and as a result, Zimbabwe saw a reduction in its level of repression. While the economic shock that happened in 1997 is not the only causal factor that influenced Zimbabwe's use of repression, I do believe it served as a catalyst for increased levels of repression that were continually increased over the next decade due to a failure of the economy to right itself. It is only in 2008 when positive economic growth return to Zimbabwe that we see a change in levels of repression.




Figure 3.1: Level of repression by year: Zimbabwe. Shaded area represents period of hyper-inflation.

The economic and human rights situation in Zimbabwe details how economic shocks and downturns negatively affect human rights practices. As the Zimbabwean economy began to fall apart, the government of Zimbabwe responded with increasing levels of repressive behavior. Continued economic decline led to a corresponding increase in human rights violations as the government struggled to maintain control amid protests and unrest. This example leads to my hypothesis:

Hypothesis One: *Economic shocks are associated with an increase in state repression.*

The effect of economic shocks may be conditioned by the economic makeup of the state in question. Previous findings suggest that increased economic development is associated with lower levels of repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995). Poe and Tate (1994) argue that richer countries will have less grievances and therefore will have less of a need to

implement state repression. Similarly, Davenport (2007a) says that richer countries can offer alternative mechanisms of control like social services. He also cites Fearon and Laitin (2003) and points out that fewer resources may make repression less efficient which would further the need for state action. However, despite the above discussion, Davenport (2007a) argues that the mechanism through which economic development influences repression remains unclear. The idea of economic development and human rights has also been tied to the globalization literature with some arguing that globalization improves living standards which decreases the need for repression (Gelleny and McCoy 2001). But what happens when economic shocks come into the equation and disrupt the above mechanisms? I argue that in poor countries, economic shocks will have little effect. The population of these states likely already have numerous grievances against the government suggesting that a economic downturn will be viewed by the government as constituting only a minor increased threat. Similarly, even if an economic downturn is viewed as a threat, these governments will have limited capacity to increase their level of repression given the scarce resources at their disposal. Rich countries however, will likely see these economic downturns as a looming threat to their power and also have the resources to meet that threat with increased repression. The same mechanisms that reduce repression in rich countries will cause these governments to view economic shocks as a threat. In the midst of a crisis, living standards and the ability of the government to institute alternative avenues of control are severely reduced. This increases the likelihood of unrest. Knowing this, rich governments are likely to increase repression preemptively and, due to their resources, have the capacity to do so.

Hypothesis Two: *Rich states experiencing an economic shock will see higher levels of repression than poor states experiencing a shock.*

Overt dissent may also play a role in the relationship between economic shocks and repression. The literature on repression and dissent has long tried to pinpoint how protests and other forms of unrest influence government repression. There is, however, some theoretical

consensus within the literature. Most scholars agree that governments respond to dissent with increased levels of repression (Lichbach 1987; Davenport 1995; Moore 2000; Carey 2006; Nordås and Davenport 2013). However, despite the overwhelming theoretical agreement on the relationship between dissent and repression, Ritter and Conrad (2016) point out that the empirical evidence is lacking. They argue that this is due to the endogenous relationship between the two. It may be that people who fear repression will choose not to dissent (Fearon and Laitin 2003). There is also the issue of preemptive repression discussed in this paper. This sort of repression can stifle dissent before it happens (Nordås and Davenport 2013; Danneman and Ritter 2014; Truex 2019). These issues cause the response to realized dissent to be unclear (Ritter and Conrad 2016). Ritter and Conrad (2016) go on to find that dissent only leads to more repression when governments were not expected to use repression. Their logic is that if a state uses preemptive repression to quell a threat before it materializes the best course of action, given the preemptive repression failed, is unclear. More repression may end the dissent but it may also increase it. Following an economic shock however, governments are likely to be wary of any overt dissent as that dissent would occur within a period of increased tension and uncertainty making it all the more threatening. As argued above, governments are likely to increase repression preemptively in response to an economic shock due to the potential threat these shocks pose. The combination of overt dissent matched with an economic crisis forms the basis for an even more volatile situation — one in which the government will be increasingly trying to maintain its' control. Therefore, in the face of an economic shock we can expect governments to increase their level of preemptive repression in response to the increased threat posed to the regime. Additionally, if overt dissent materializes, the impact of shocks and dissent on repression will increase as governments struggle to maintain control. This logic leads to my final hypothesis:

Hypothesis Three: *The effect of economic shocks will be greater in situations where overt dissent is present.*

3.4 Data

3.4.1 Dependent Variable

To measure my dependent variable, state repression, I use a latent variable that combines information from different sources of human rights practices such as the Political Terror Scale (Wood and Gibney 2010) and Cingranelli-Richards scales (Cingranelli et al. 2010) and takes into account the increasing standards of accountability in human rights reporting (Fariss 2014). This measure tries to account for the latent amount of human rights in a country. The scale is normalized with a mean of zero and positive numbers signifying an increase in respect for human rights. To make the measure more comparable to other measures of human rights, I inverse the scale by multiplying scores by negative one. Therefore, the inverted measure now has higher numbers referring to an increase in repression.

3.4.2 Independent Variables

For my independent variable, I first measure economic shocks by looking at decreases in GDP growth. Following (Miguel et al. 2004) I construct a measure of economic shocks that takes the value of one if GDP growth decreases by five percentage points from the previous year. I then lag this variable and include it in the regression equation. GDP growth however, proves to be a rather broad measure of economic shocks. To help with this, I employ three other measures of economic shocks. Two of these measures look to proxy income shocks by using trade data while my final measure uses data on inflation to capture income changes.

The first of these come from (Bazzi and Blattman 2014). These authors use export price shocks to proxy for income shocks. The data range from 1957-2008 and cover all countries in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. A shock is calculated as the “annual difference in each country’s log commodity export price index.” (7). This number is then multiplied by the ratio of commodity export values to GDP in order to capture how

commodity dependent a nation is. Weighting the measure in this way helps to connect the export price shock to its effect on the economy. This measure is then normalized making it have a mean of zero with a maximum value of 9.68 and a minimum of -6.68. Higher scores here represent a positive economic shock. In other words, positive values represent a better economic situation for the state and its population. To better capture the phenomenon I am interested in, negative economic shocks, I also inverse this measure. With the inverted measure, positive numbers now refer to more serious economic shocks. This new measure maintains a mean of zero and reverses the minimum and maximum with -9.68 now the minimum and 6.68 now the maximum. I then lag this variable to better fit with my theory of how economic shocks affect state repression.

To further test how broad trade shocks influence repression, I also include a measure of economic shocks which is based on the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Commodity Terms of Trade (CTOT) data-set (Gruss and Kebhaj 2019). This data-set contains country specific indices for 182 countries from 1962-2018. The measure used in this analysis is an index created from the international price change of up to 45 commodities weighted using commodity-level trade data. These commodities cover all major industries from energy and metals to food and agricultural products. The weights come from net exports. Thus, the economic interpretation of variations in the commodity term of trade measure is the gains or losses that stem from international price shifts. Specifically the authors state that "a one percentage point change in the commodity terms-of-trade index can be interpreted as a change in aggregate disposable income equivalent to one percentage point of GDP." (Gruss and Kebhaj 2019). While similar to Bazzi and Blattman (2014)'s measure of economic shocks, the CTOT measure provides the benefit of not being geographically restricted. This measure of economic shocks ranges in value from -.65 - .31 with an average of 0 and a standard deviation of .04. Both of these broad trade measures provide insight into how the broader economy can affect the income levels of the population.

Finally, I include a measure of economic shocks that seeks to proxy the impact economic shocks can have on individual incomes. Following Houle et al. (2016) I use data from Reinhart et al. (2019), which measures whether a country experiences an inflation crisis in a given year.

² This measure takes the value of 1 when the annual inflation reaches 20%. The average inflation rate from 1914-2009 was about 5% making the 20% mark a reasonable threshold in defining a crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). The data cover 70 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania from 1962-2010.

Below I provide the correlations between these three measures of economic shocks. As table 3.1 shows the correlation between these measures is generally quite low with only the price shocks measure and the CTOT measure showing any real correlation at .23. This makes sense given that both measures seek to proxy the effect exports have on income changes.

	Δ GDP Growth	Price Shocks	CTOT	Inflation Crisis
Δ GDP Growth	1.00			
Price Shocks	.03	1.00		
CTOT	.03	.23	1.00	
Inflation	.09	.003	-.02	1.00

Table 3.1: Correlations Between economic shock measures

An example of how these different measures of shocks interact can be seen in the example of Honduras in 1990. Following the election of Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero in 1989, the Honduran economy began to deteriorate as the IMF and World Bank prescribed austerity measures began to be implemented. On top of this, the United States Agency for International Development ended disbursements of grants as a signal of its unhappiness regarding the former regime's economic policies. These events created the backdrop for a negative economic shock in 1990. Table 3.2 displays the values of each shock measure for Honduras in 1990. It also shows the average and standard deviation of each measure as a way to gauge how each measure quantifies the magnitude of the economic shock. Across

²In the appendix, I show that the results hold when using the measure for currency crisis as well. See table B.1

most of the measures, we see that 1990 represented a significant, negative economic event in Honduras.³ Though, this example does show the difference in how each measure captures the magnitude of an economic shock and provides some support for the incorporation of all four measures into the analysis.

Economic Shock Measure	Δ GDP Growth	Price Shock	CTOT	Inflation Crisis
Mean / SD	3.9% / 6.7%	0.0 / 1.0	0.0 / 0.04	NA
Honduras:	-4.23	1.99	0.015	Yes

Table 3.2: Economic shock measures: Honduras - 1990

The distribution of economic shocks can be seen in figure 3.2. At any given time, approximately 15-40 countries experience a shock.⁴ Not surprisingly, 2008 saw the largest percentage of economic shocks with 36.5% percent of observations experiencing an economic shock that year. 2010 experienced the lowest number of shocks with only 1.5% of observations registering an economic shock. Figure one shows the number of shocks experienced by year. As this shows, the number of economic shocks has remained fairly steady throughout years covered by the data with the exception of 2008 which saw an abnormally large number of shocks.

3.4.3 Control Variables

For control variables, I follow the literature on state repression and employ many of the same controls (Poe and Tate 1994). I first include a measure of civil war (taken from UCDP), GDP and population (taken from Penn World Tables). Civil war has been shown to drastically increase levels of repression and therefore serves an important control (Hill and Jones 2014). GDP and the population of a state have less predictive power when

³Note that the Δ GDP Growth measure just misses the 5% change cutoff for being categorized as an economic shock.

⁴Using the measure of change in GDP growth.




Figure 3.2: Number of economic shocks by year. *Note.* Economic shocks measured as a change in GDP growth of 5% or more.

looking at repression yet do prove important when understanding economic influences on state repression and therefore are included. I also control for the presence of protests and youth bulges as both of these factors tend to increase state repression (Nordås and Davenport 2013)). My measure of protests comes from the Banks Cross National Database. I sum all the different types of protest activities (protests, riots, etc) then create a dummy coded one if any of these were present within the state in year t (Banks and Wilson 2017). To measure the type of governance, I include a measure of democracy taken from Cheibub et al. (2010) which is a dichotomous variable coded as one if a state is a democracy. Another common measure of regime type comes from the Polity IV measure (Marshall et al. 2016). However, due to issues with the Polity IV measure and repression pointed out by Hill and Jones (2014) I chose to instead use the measure from Cheibub et al. (2010). As a robustness check,

I re-run the analysis using the Xpolity measure from (Vreeland 2008).⁵ Lastly, I include a measure for the amount of independence the judiciary enjoys as this has been shown to decrease the amount of repression within the state (Linzer and Staton 2015). It could also be that governments use other mechanisms of control besides increasing repression. To account for this, I include, as a robustness check, a measure of education spending taken from the World Bank. This measure records the amount of education spending as a percent of GDP. I provide the results of this analysis in table B.3 in the appendix.

3.5 Research Design

To model the relationship outlined by hypothesis one, I run OLS regressions with each of my four main independent variables measuring economic shocks being regressed upon my measure for state repression. Each model includes fixed effects to account for any country specific factors not captured in my control variables and reports standard errors clustered on country. I lag all four measures of economic shocks and my control variables.⁶ The data range from 1963-2008 for model one using the dichotomous variable drawn from change in GDP growth. When using the coding of economic shocks drawn from Bazzi and Blattman (2014) for model 2, the data range from 1960-2008. For model three, the time-frame is 1963-2008. And finally, using the inflation crises measure, the data range from 1962-2010. To account for the possible interactions mentioned in hypotheses two and three, I interact my measures of economic shocks with both overt dissent and regime type. This analysis is presented in tables and 3.5.⁷

⁵Results from using the Xpolity measure can be found in the appendix. Results remain largely unchanged with only the "change in GDP growth" measure of economic shocks just missing conventional levels of statistical significance. See table B.2 in the appendix.

⁶I lag all control variables except civil conflict following Wright and Moorthy (2018) who argue that civil war can suddenly change a regime's repressive output and therefore should not be lagged in the model.

⁷The relationship between economic shocks and repression could be nonlinear (with regards to the price shocks and CTOT measures. The logic here being that large *positive* shocks could cause unrest with due to people not feeling like they are receiving the bene-

3.6 Results

The results from table 3.3 show support for hypothesis one stating that economic shocks increase the level of repression within a state. Across the four models, the control variables behave largely as we would assume and are consistent across models. Civil war, dissent and youth bulges all significantly increase state repression as previous literature has found. An independent judiciary, as we would expect, significantly reduces the amount of state repression seen. Democracy varies in its significance but shows that more democratic states will have less repression. Similarly, economic development varies in its significance levels but shows that more developed states have lower levels of repression. Moving to my key independent variables measuring economic shocks we see support for the hypothesized relationship across all four measures. Model one shows that a state experiencing a decrease in GDP growth of 5% or more see a corresponding increase in repression. Similarly, when using Bazzi and Blattman (2014)'s coding of economic shocks, we see in model two that economic shocks (represented as positive numbers given the inverse nature of the coding) lead to an increase in state repression. This result again holds in models three and four when using the index measure from Gruss and Kebhaj (2019) and the inflation crises measure from Reinhart et al. (2019). Therefore, across all models, we see that all four measures of economic shocks produce similar results. States experiencing economic downturns increase their repression in an attempt to insulate themselves from the negative effects such shocks bring.

fits of an economic surplus. I test for this possibility but find no evidence of a nonlinear relationship. See figures B.1 and B.2 in the appendix.

	(Model 1) Δ GDP Growth	(Model 2) Price Shock	(Model 3) CTOT	(Model 4) Inflation Crisis
Economic Shock (t-1)	0.03* (0.018)	0.02** (0.006)	0.84** (0.199)	0.20** (0.072)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.20** (0.064)	-0.09 (0.064)	-0.17** (0.065)	-0.17 (0.107)
Log Population (t-1)	0.07 (0.097)	0.10 (0.086)	-0.07 (0.091)	0.19 (0.150)
Civil Conflict	0.66** (0.072)	0.73** (0.075)	0.70** (0.079)	0.73** (0.110)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.16** (0.077)	-0.14* (0.081)	-0.11 (0.079)	-0.08 (0.098)
Dissent (t-1)	0.11** (0.023)	0.12** (0.024)	0.11** (0.022)	0.08** (0.029)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-1.33** (0.263)	-1.31** (0.290)	-1.54** (0.268)	-1.63** (0.368)
Youth Bulge (t-1)	0.04** (0.009)	0.03** (0.010)	0.03** (0.009)	0.04** (0.013)
_cons	-0.20 (1.665)	-1.39 (1.512)	1.989 (1.681)	-2.30 (2.697)
<i>N</i>	5959	4793	6040	3038
Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered on country

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 3.3: Effect of economic shocks on repression

The substantive effects of an economic shock shows that this finding proves important. For instance drawing upon model two, when increasing from the 10th to 90th percentile in shock severity, the model predicts a 127% increase in the level of repression assuming no civil war or protests and the other variables held at their means. Similarly, I show the change in predicted level of repression (based on model 4) assuming there is no civil war or overt dissent (with all other variables at their means) in figure 3.3. For a state with no civil war or overt dissent that is also not experiencing an inflation crisis, the predicted level of repression is -.53. Assuming now that the same state is experiencing an inflation crisis,

the model predicts the level of repression to increase to -.33. This increase in the predicted level of repression lends support for the expectation that an economic shock will bring about increased repression as states look to insulate themselves from the dangers of such negative economic downturns.




Figure 3.3: Predicted level of repression by economic shock. Results from table 3.3, model 4. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals

3.6.1 Do Economic Shocks Have an Interactive Effect with Economic Development and Dissent?

Hypothesis two argues that states with higher levels of economic development will react to economic shocks differently than states with less economic development. Specifically, that rich states have a greater reason to fear unrest in the presence of an economic shock as well as have the resources to preempt this with repression. Therefore, we should see the effect of

economic shocks on repression be greater in more developed states. To test this, I interact my four measures of economic shocks with my measure of economic development (GDP per capita). All other control variables remain the same as the previous analysis and are lagged one year (with the exception of civil war). I again estimate OLS regression with fixed effects. Table 3.4 shows the results from this analysis.

	(Model 1) Δ GDP Growth	(Model 2) Price Shock	(Model 3) CTOT	(Model 4) Inflation Crisis
Economic Shock (t-1)	0.07 (0.156)	-0.04 (0.041)	-0.24 (1.522)	-0.12 (0.548)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.20** (0.064)	-0.09 (0.064)	-0.16** (0.066)	-0.18 (0.110)
Economic Shock * GDP per capita	-0.01 (0.019)	0.006 (0.010)	0.12 (0.171)	0.04 (0.067)
Log Population (t-1)	0.07 (0.097)	0.10 (0.086)	-0.08 (0.091)	0.19 (0.150)
Civil Conflict	0.66** (0.071)	0.73** (0.075)	0.70** (0.078)	0.73** (0.111)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.16** (0.077)	-0.14* (0.081)	-0.11 (0.079)	-0.09 (0.097)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-1.33** (0.263)	-1.31** (0.290)	-1.54** (0.268)	-1.63** (0.336)
Youth Bulge (t-1)	0.04** (0.009)	0.034** (0.010)	0.031** (0.009)	0.04** (0.014)
Dissent (t-1)	0.11** (0.023)	0.12** (0.024)	0.11** (0.022)	0.08** (0.029)
_cons	-0.15 (1.667)	-1.39 (1.511)	1.99 (1.681)	-1.81 (2.691)
<i>N</i>	5959	4793	6040	3038
Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered on country

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 3.4: Interactive effect of GDP on economic shocks and repression

The coefficient on the interaction term between economic shocks and GDP fails to reach significance across all four models. However, some support for hypothesis two can be found when looking at this relationship graphically which serves as a better investigation of the

results especially given all of the interactions have at least one continuous variable (Brambor et al. 2006). In figure 3.4 (from model two) we see the interactive effect of economic shocks by level of GDP. To graph this, I calculate the interactive effect (slope) of the coefficient for the interaction between economic shocks and GDP at differing levels of GDP to see the effect across the values of economic development. The point marks and confidence intervals on the graph represent the effect of the interaction term at differing levels of GDP per capita. Here, for below average levels of GDP (the average for the sample is just under 8) the effect on repression of the interaction between economic shocks and GDP is insignificant. This suggests that in lower developed countries, the effect of economic shocks on repression is low. However, at above average levels of GDP we see the interactive effect of shocks and GDP on repression as positive and significant. To quantify the effect of economic shocks at these high levels of development, I calculate the first differences of an economic shock. To get these first differences, I calculate the predicted level of repression with and without an economic shock in a state with a high level of economic development (represented as a 9 on the GDP per capita measure) that is not experiencing a civil war and has no overt dissent. The predicted level of repression for the above state without an economic shock is -.12. This is contrasted by the predicted level of repression for the same state that is experiencing a shock which is -.025. This .1 increase in the predicted level of repression is significant at the .05 level (p -value .006). Thus, the analysis lends support to the idea that rich states react to economic shocks by increasing their level of repression to insulate themselves from the potential threat these shocks represent.




Figure 3.4: Conditional effect of economic shocks and GDP per capita across the range of development. Bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

I turn now to hypothesis three which contends that the effect of economic shocks on repression is moderated by the presence of realized dissent. The hypothesis predicts that the effect of an economic shock on repression will be greater in the presence of overt dissent. The results for this interaction are shown in table 3.5. Here we see mixed support for the proposed relationship. Models one and three — which measure economic shocks as a 5% change in GDP growth or using the Commodity Terms of Trade index, respectively — show a significant interaction coefficient between economic shocks and dissent. The interaction term in models two and four — using the price shock measure from Bazzi and Blattman (2014) and data on inflation crises from Reinhart et al. (2019), respectively — fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. It should be noted that the coefficient on the interaction term in models one and three are statistically significant but have the opposite

sign. Given this, I show both interactions graphically and discuss the results.

	(Model 1) Δ GDP Growth	(Model 2) Price Shock	(Model 3) CTOT	(Model 4) Inflation Crisis
Economic Shock	0.05** (0.022)	0.02** (0.006)	0.74** (0.200)	0.18** (0.081)
Dissent (t-1)	0.12** (0.023)	0.12** (0.024)	0.11** (0.022)	0.07** (0.035)
Economic Shock * Dissent	-0.07* (0.044)	-0.003 (0.018)	1.56** (0.677)	0.05 (0.081)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.20** (0.064)	-0.09 (0.064)	-0.17** (0.065)	-0.17 (0.107)
Log Population (t-1)	0.07 (0.097)	0.10 (0.086)	-0.07 (0.091)	0.19 (0.151)
Civil Conflict	0.66** (0.072)	0.73** (0.075)	0.70** (0.078)	0.73** (0.110)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.16** (0.077)	-0.14* (0.081)	-0.11 (0.079)	-0.08 (0.098)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-1.34** (0.263)	-1.31** (0.290)	-1.54** (0.268)	-1.63** (0.368)
Youth Bulge (t-1)	0.04** (0.009)	0.03** (0.010)	0.03** (0.009)	0.04** (0.014)
_cons	-0.21 (1.665)	-1.39 (1.511)	1.95 (1.685)	-2.32 (2.703)
<i>N</i>	5959	4793	6040	3038
Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 3.5: Interactive Effect of Dissent on Economic Shocks and Repression

The substantive effect of this interaction is shown in figure 3.5. Here we see that the effect of an economic shock on repression is insignificant when overt dissent is present but the first difference is positive and significant when there is no overt dissent. This means that the interaction between economic shocks and dissent produces a positive and significant increase on repression when there is no overt dissent present. This gives some support to the idea that economic shocks lead to *preemptive* repression. The effect of economic shocks

on repression is only significant when no overt dissent is present. However, it seems that this interaction is muddled when overt dissent is present. When dissent is present, the relationship between economic shocks and dissent on repression is unclear as the dissent may be driving the repression or the repression driving the dissent similar to what Ritter and Conrad (2016) argue.




Figure 3.5: Predicted change in repression when experiencing an economic shock with and without the presence of overt dissent. Bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

The results from model three (shown in figure 3.6) display a slightly different outcome. In the table, model three shows the coefficient on the interaction between economic shocks and dissent is positive and significant. Here we see that the interactive effect of economic shocks on repression is positive with or without the presence of overt dissent. And that the amount of repression seen when overt dissent is present is higher than the level of repression with no dissent present. This gives some support to hypothesis one stating that economic shocks

will increase preemptive repression (i.e. when no overt dissent is present). It also gives some support to the hypothesis arguing that overt dissent will increase the amount of repression seen in the context of an economic shock. The first differences show that in both cases (with or without dissent) an economic shock increases the level of repression. When no overt dissent is present, an increase from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile of economic shock severity corresponds to a .024 increase in repression (p -value .00). Similarly, when dissent is present, an increase in economic shock corresponds to a .076 increase in repression (p -value .001). Thus, it seems that economic shocks trigger increases in repression as states move to avoid the potential unrest these economic downturns can bring and this relationship holds when no dissent is present. The presence of dissent increases the effect of an economic shock on repression.




Figure 3.6: Predicted level of repression with and without dissent by size of economic shock. Bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

3.7 Conclusion and Discussion

The literature connecting economic shocks to state repression is surprisingly underdeveloped. As the data show, economic shocks are fairly common across time and can often have quite negative outcomes on the security situation of the state. By connecting economic shocks to state repression, I help fill a gap in the literature and further our understanding of when states decide to impose increased levels of repression. Additionally, I connect two literatures that have, until now, developed separately from each other. Economic shocks have been connected to many different forms of unrest and states understand this connection. Therefore, it makes sense that they would want to avoid these challenges and often do so through the use of preemptive repression. I also find evidence that this relationship can be moderated by the level of economic development within the state. Countries with low levels of development are less likely to see economic shocks lead to increases in preemptive repression. This finding is contrasted with richer countries who see a significant increase in preemptive repression when faced with an economic shock. This finding shows the complex nature of the relationship between economic development and repression. As previously discussed, economic development has largely been found to reduce the amount of repression as these states are better able to use alternative mechanisms of control such as social spending. The, until now, unforeseen consequence of this however, is the negative effect economic shocks have on this relationship. Economic shocks directly effect the ability of governments to continue these alternative mechanisms of control causing them to fear potential unrest. This, in turn, causes these regimes to resort to increases in preemptive repression in the hope of solidifying their control. Finally, I show that overt dissent also impacts this relationship. The security situation of a state undergoing an economic shock is precarious as the literature on violence and unrest has shown. Given this, I find that economic shocks increase the level of preemptive repression in the absence of dissent and that this effect is amplified when faced with overt dissent. While the results summarizing the relationship between shocks, dissent,

and repression are somewhat mixed, the overall finding that economic shocks lead to an increase in preemptive repression prove to be robust and an important contribution to the literature.

The findings presented above provide an initial look into how economic factors can impact human rights but many questions yet remain. For one, what is the long-term effect of economic shocks on state repression? We know that once repression is initiated, it is often difficult to reverse (Davenport and Appel 2014). Therefore, is the effect of these economic shocks on state repression a long-term change in behavior or a short-term measure taken in response to a specific threat? This project takes a first step in connecting economic shocks and repression which, in turn, opens up many new avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 4

ESCAPING PUNISHMENT: PUBLIC RELATIONS FIRMS AND STATE REPRESSION

4.1 Introduction

Can human rights abusing states avoid being punished for their actions? We know that countries with poor human rights records often spend large amounts of money on public relations (PR) firms based in the United States to improve their image. A report by the Center for Public Integrity found that between 2010 and 2015, the 50 countries with the lowest scores on the Fragile States Index (and those with some of the worst human rights records) spent \$168 million on PR in the U.S. Additionally, the same report found that between 2013 and 2015, this spending increased by 40 percent (Quinn 2015). But does this strategy work?

The link between human rights violators and these PR firms can be clearly seen through the case of Bahrain. In 2011, just as a domestic protest movement began to take shape, the government of Bahrain signed a contract with Qorvis, a large PR firm in Washington D.C. The deal, worth over \$40,000 a month, led to Qorvis working to improve Bahrain's image including writing a pro-Bahrain column in the Huffington Post. Qorvis also organized a "youth delegation" to visit the United States. It said these youth represented the "silent majority that is very moderate but wants to see limited and stable reform" (Elliott 2012). While it was said that the delegation represented the pro-reform community, they spent most of their time criticizing the protests and arguing that the protesters were "a fringe group of rioters and vandals," according to Cole Bockenfeld an official with the Project on Middle East Democracy who met with the group. The youth delegation also attended a panel discussion on Bahrain at Freedom House. Here, they challenged the speakers arguing that the protesters were violent and that the panel was excluding their (the "silent majority")

voices. The contract with Qorvis outlines the PR firm's work as "facilitated and coordinated media and press activity" as well as drafting "opinion editorials" (FARA 2012).¹ These actions, designed to cover Bahrain's human rights abuses, illustrate how states can use PR firms to mitigate the negative consequences of these abuses.

This paper seeks to analyze whether this strategy works. Can governments avoid the negative consequences of abusing human rights by employing PR firms to lobby on their behalf? To answer this question, I first specify two ways in which human rights abusing states can be punished for their behavior: sanctions and the allocation of foreign aid. I argue that PR firms are employed to improve the image of the client country amongst the general population and directly lobby policymakers which can reduce the likelihood that these regimes will be held accountable for their abuses. To make this argument, I first give an overview of lobbying and how it can affect policy. I then connect lobbying to the literature on human rights abuses, sanctions, and foreign aid showing the utility of using a PR firm. In doing so, I describe how this can improve the image of the client country and directly influence policymakers thereby reducing the likelihood of sanctions or a reduction in foreign aid. Following this discussion, I present empirical evidence and end with a discussion of the results.

This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it brings an important player into the research on human rights and international punishment. Lobbying has already been shown to have a direct effect on the amount of foreign aid a country receives (Licht 2010; Montes-Rojas 2013). The literature argues that this aid can be used as a coercive measure to induce a change in human rights behavior by offending states. Therefore, understanding how lobbying can moderate this relationship and allow abusive states to escape punishment proves an important contribution. The idea here is that if states can avoid being punished for their actions by simply hiring a lobby firm, the usefulness of such

¹A copy of the "Nature of Services" disclosure given to the Department of Justice by Qorvis from this contract can be found in figure C.1 in the appendix.

tactics as tying aid to human rights fails to have as strong of an effect. Additionally, I show that lobbying can impact how aid is delivered. Governments either give foreign aid directly to the government or do so through other channels like NGOs and other local actors. This type of aid "bypasses" the government. Due to this, governments seek to limit the amount of bypass aid because it eliminates their control over the money. I show that lobbying can put pressure on lawmakers to reduce the amount of bypass aid and give the money directly to the recipient government. This is an important contribution to the aid literature and has a direct impact on policy as it exposes the power lobbying has on the allocation of foreign aid. Beyond this, the paper also casts light on another mechanism of punishment: sanctions. Like aid, sanctions are often used to coerce a change in behavior. However, if states are actively lobbying against the imposition of sanctions, the effect of human rights abuses in triggering such actions could be muted. Introducing lobbying to this relationship helps to identify the role human rights have on sanctions and how lobbying can affect this interaction. Lastly, this paper contributes directly to the growing literature on foreign lobbying. The American politics literature has long understood the power of domestic lobbying but the influence of international actors is just now coming to light. This paper engages with this idea and shows how international actors can directly influence the foreign policy of the United States for their own benefit.

It should be noted that while this chapter is specifically about lobbying and U.S. foreign policy, the results are by no means limited to the U.S. For instance, a recent report by the British media watchdog Spinwatch described a "highly sophisticated, aggressive and clandestine UAE political lobby has emerged to head off the threat of democracy in the Middle East."² The report goes on to show how the United Arab Emirates spent millions of dollars to influence UK policy. Similarly, the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), a research group based in Belgium, published a recent report highlighting foreign lobbying in

²<http://spinwatch.org/index.php/issues/lobbying/item/6003-the-uae-lobby-subverting-british-democracy>

the European Union. In their report, the CEO outline the lobbying practices and influence of 18 non-EU member states all of which have poor human rights records. The report argues that foreign lobbyist's work involves "laundering the reputations of dictators, seeking lucrative trade and investment deals, pushing back against sanctions"(2). Many of the countries mentioned in the report are the same ones outlined in this paper when discussing U.S. lobbying such as Azerbaijan, the UAE, and Ukraine. Uncovering the impact of this lobbying proves a difficult process in the EU though as they do not have strict lobbying laws like the U.S. For this reason, the report argues for the passing of such laws that will provide transparency to a shady corner of EU politics. Thus, the findings of this chapter go beyond the U.S. and are directly applicable to other countries like the UK and to broader organizations like the EU.

4.2 Lobbying

Lobbying in the United States by foreign governments is not a new phenomenon. Registering such activities came about in 1938 as a response to fears over possible German agents spreading propaganda in the U.S. in the lead up to WWII. This led to the Foreign Agents Registration Act which specified that anyone attempting to influence U.S. policy on behalf of a foreign client must register such activities with the Justice Department. It's important to note that lobbying for business interests need not be reported to the Department of Justice (Cushman 2018). Table 4.1 shows the top ten countries for each decade as measured by the number of lobbying contracts that year. As the table shows, many of the same countries show up in the list over time. For example, Canada, the UK, Thailand, and India all show up at least twice.

As a part of registering to the Justice Department, the U.S. based PR firm who is engaged in lobbying must disclose the contract details and disclose the nature of all political activity and any materials that may be distributed (Quinn 2015). This "Nature of Services" portion of the contract often lists services provided by the PR firm in very general terms. While

Rank	1990	2000	2010
1	Germany	Japan	Canada
2	UK	Mexico	Iraq
3	Australia	Saudi Arabia	Japan
4	France	Canada	UAE
5	Canada	UK	Mexico
6	Jamaica	Turkey	Georgia
7	Israel	Kazakhstan	South Korea
8	Austria	Singapore	Turkey
9	Thailand	Switzerland	India
10	India	Gabon	Thailand

Table 4.1: Top Ten Countries by Number Lobbying Contracts

some reports list specific targets or actions of their lobbying — such as a 2012 report by a firm representing Mexico which listed a proposed amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill as its' focus — most list the services provided in more general language.³ As an example, take the contract between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the lobbying firm Gabriel Company, LLC in 2006. As figure 4.1 shows, the firm was hired to contact government officials and members of Congress to discuss terrorism, migration, and human rights, amongst other things. The firm was paid \$100,000 for the six-month period of the report. This represents a rather generic reporting of activities with terms such as "government officials" encompassing a wide swath of potential connections which make discerning the exact nature of the lobbying difficult.

A similar example, shown in figure 4.2, displays the contract between the lobbying firm Cassidy & Associates, Inc. and the government of Equatorial Guinea. Here the lobbying firm provided information on U.S. assistance programs and advised U.S. government officials on the "progress that the government of Equatorial Guinea made on various key issues,". The firm was paid \$510,000 for the six-month period of this contract. Here we again see the generalized nature of the language with "various key issues" representing all sorts of possible talking points. These examples display the standard in regards to the amount of information

³The full text of this contract can be found in figure C.2 in the appendix.

Gabriel Company, LLC	#5523
1101 Vermont Avenue, NW Suite 411 Washington, DC 20005 Government of the Kingdom of Morocco	
Nature of Services: Public Relations/Consultant	
The registrant contacted U.S. Government officials and members of Congress to discuss anti-terrorism and migration issues, human rights concerns, and other general Middle East issues.	
\$100,000.00 for the six month period ending April 30, 2006	

Figure 4.1: FARA Report - Morocco: 2006

provided about the activities of the PR firm on behalf of the foreign principle within the FARA data. While providing important information, it should be noted that enforcement of reporting is often lax. A recent investigation by the Project on Government Oversight found that enforcement is generally lacking with only 4 criminal cases of non-compliance being brought forward from 2004-2014 (Freeman and Dennett 2014). Thus, the results of this analysis, if anything, underestimate the influence of lobbying.

Cassidy & Associates, Inc.	#5643
700 13th Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 Equatorial Guinea	
Nature of Services: Public Relations	
The registrant aided Equatorial Guinea in advancing its goals in Washington by advising the foreign principal of available U.S. assistance programs, advising U.S. policy makers of progress that the government of Equatorial Guinea made on various key issues, and by making information about Equatorial Guinea available to the general public through an official website.	
\$510,000.00 for the six month period ending March 31, 2006	

Figure 4.2: FARA Report - Equatorial Guinea: 2006

The results of such lobbying can be quite substantial. For example, Freeman (2009) finds that states who lobbied in the U.S. were able to secure more foreign aid as a result of this lobbying. Montes-Rojas (2013) find similar results and argues that lobbying can affect how

policymakers think about the United State's relationship with the lobbying country. They, in turn influence firms in an attempt to increase investment in these states. The result is more foreign direct investment in states who lobby. This re-framing of the relationship between a country and the U.S. proves to be a key aspect of the influence lobbyists have. Newhouse (2009) points out that lobbyists can work in a way that is different from traditional diplomats and can operate more effectively in Washington. The reason for this being that Washington is a town of insiders and often these lobbying firms can operate more successfully than traditional diplomats due to their connections and understanding of Washington politics. This is an important point that must not be missed. When a foreign country sends its' diplomatic corps to Washington, it is sending representatives from that country. For instance, the Nigerian representatives here in the U.S. are Nigerian. They may have broad contacts within Washington and may be well connected, but they are not the "insiders" that are available through PR firms. Take the PLM group (discussed in detail later). This group is made up of former members of Congress. These insiders have access to friends and associate networks that most (if not all) foreign diplomats lack. Thus, when you hire a lobbying firm, you are not hiring more diplomats, you are hiring the friends and former colleagues of the very people you are trying to influence.

Importantly, beyond influencing policymakers as just discussed, lobbying firms can also impact the general population of the United States. Lee (2007) finds that states with active lobbying contracts see a significant increase in media coverage.⁴ Carrying out media campaigns represents an important way in which PR firms can influence foreign policy. Through media campaigns and work with think-tanks, lobbyists can change the narrative and opinion surrounding a country and thereby influence the policy towards that state. This influence comes as the information provided through these media campaigns can help sway public opinion about certain issues. This public opinion can then help pressure policymakers into

⁴Lee looked at coverage from the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *ABC*, *NBC*, *CBS* and *CNN*.

making decisions beneficial to the foreign principal who hired the PR firm.

This influence becomes especially important to regimes who repress their citizens and generally ignore human rights. It is quite common for these states to hire lobbyist in Washington to help clean up their image. A 2015 report from the Center for Public Integrity shows that the 50 worst human rights abusing states spent \$168 million on lobbying since 2010 (Quinn 2015). And this trend is increasing with the number of PR contracts representing countries with poor human rights records increasing 40% from 2013-2015. According to the Sunlight Foundation's Bill Allison, lobbying firms serve "like renting a diplomatic corps" for the governments they represent (Itkowitz 2014).⁵

Who do these firms lobby? The audiences of these PR firms can be quite diverse. A FARA report from 2015 shows that Bangladesh hired two PR firms tasked with providing "public relations services on behalf of the foreign principal to academics, news outlets, and other individuals in the United States" (FARA 2015, 13). A similar contract between the Sri Lankan government and a PR firm dictates that the PR firm "will develop a strategic communications plan and conduct outreach to members of Congress and State Department officials with the purpose of raising awareness of Sri Lanka's strategic importance to the U.S." (FARA 2014, 186). Just with these two reports we can see the breadth of influence lobbying can have from the broad public through media campaigns to members of Congress and the State Department. Through this broad influence, lobbying can have a significant influence on U.S. policy. These channels also highlight the different avenues scholars have proposed for how lobbying influences policy: direct lobbying, indirect lobbying, coalition-building, and monitoring (Cushman 2018). Direct lobbying represents lobbyists meeting directly with (or setting up meetings for their foreign principals) members of Congress, State Department officials, federal agencies, or other policy-makers. Indirect lobbying seeks to influence through op-eds and other press releases as well as grassroots movements who will speak on behalf of

⁵The Sunlight Foundation is a national non-partisan nonprofit focused on government accountability.

the foreign government. Coalition-building seeks other, sympathetic nations or reaches out to industry that may have similar goals. Finally, lobbying firms can monitor policy-makers decisions and opinions on issues and report back to the foreign principal (Cushman 2018). Before connecting this influence to foreign policy decisions, its important to outline how states punish regimes with poor human rights records.

4.3 Punishing Human Rights

Scholars have long studied how states are punished for their human rights abuses. One consistent theory is the effect of international attention on behavior. Often, international advocacy networks can help bring attention to human rights abuses (Keck 1998). For example, international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have routinely criticized states for their human rights practices. Often called “naming and shaming” these organizations use public statements as a way to draw attention to a state’s human rights abuses (Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008).

NGOs and other international organizations use naming and shaming as a way to bring negative attention human rights abusers. This negative attention pressures other states to then bring about a behavioral change from the targeted state often through the use of sanctions or the allocation of foreign aid. We know that countries in general seek to maintain international and domestic legitimacy and want to reduce the pressure put on them by other states (Krain 2012). Therefore, by bringing attention to human rights abuses, these groups hope to pressure governments to act in a way that will cause the regime to improve its’ behavior. This literature highlights the importance of information and public opinion on policy formation. Here we see NGOs and others providing crucial information about human rights abuses which, in turn, can lead to increased pressure on policymakers to act to punish such behavior. However, if such information campaigns influence policy, it stands that similar campaigns carried out on behalf of foreign governments by high-powered PR firms could also impact policy, albeit in a way that directly opposes the outcome desired by human rights

organizations.

Similar to the work on NGO shaming, recent work has explored the effect media attention can have on punishing human rights violators. Peksen et al. (2014) find that media attention on human rights abuses can lead to sanctions being applied. They argue that the media can highlight human rights abuses causing the public to push for action. Leaders, fearful of the domestic cost on inaction, then employ sanctions to appease their domestic constituents and interest groups. Thus, lobbying can directly engage the key players by influencing both key players in the U.S. Congress, state department, and other U.S. agencies as well as the general public through media and other campaigns.

The punishment of human rights abuses begins with identifying those in need of punishment. The above discussion shows how NGOs and the media can shine the spotlight on human rights abusing states and use that negative attention to pressure governments into punishing these offenders. However, PR firms are hired to do the exact same strategy for their client states. The only difference is that these firms seek the exact opposite outcome than the shaming and negative media attention. These firms seek to bolster the image of their client state and reduce the pressure put on policymakers to punish these regimes. As the example of Bahrain in the introduction showed, actions by these PR firms can directly influence the ability of human rights groups to publicize human rights abuses as the PR firms work to counter such claims with an alternative narrative. Below, I outline two common ways governments punish other states for their human rights abuses and then show how lobbying can help foreign states avoid these punishments.

4.3.1 Sanctions

Economic sanctions are often implemented in an attempt to coerce states into changing their behavior. The onset of such sanctions have been explained by looking at economic interdependence (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009) and regime type (Goenner 2007) amongst other

factors. There exists a disagreement over how relations between the sender and receiver states impacts the onset of sanctions with some arguing that it lessens the likelihood of sanctions (Drury 2000; Drezner 1999) while others say it increases the likelihood sanctions will be employed (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). Given the relative frequency in the use of sanctions, it is surprising to find the literature on sanctions and human rights shows they are often of limited value in changing the behavior of abusive states (Wood 2008; Peksen 2009). However, sanctions do offer the sender state (especially the leader of the sender state) certain benefits even if they fail to alter the behavior of the human rights abusing regime. Specifically, sanctions can serve as a international or domestic symbol for the sender state, or can boost the domestic appeal of the sender state's leader and act as a display of "strong leadership" by threatening or imposing sanctions against human rights abusing countries (Lindsay 1986; Whang 2011). This research empirically tests what Galtung (1967) calls the "expressive function" of sanctions — that they help the sender nation send a clear signal of disapproval and allow the sender state to avoid seeming complacent even if not serving the instrumental purpose of changing behavior. Similar research has found that approval rates and level of unemployment can impact the use of presidential sanctions (Drury 2001). This shows that the domestic audience is an important player in deciding who is sanctioned for their behavior and who is not. Due to this, research has also found that the media can be a strong driver of economic sanctions.

The domestic nature of sanctions should not be missed as it forms the basis for how lobbying can affect this relationship. Expressive sanctions and those influenced by their domestic appeal are affected less by the actions of the offending state and more by the pressures and incentives of the policy-makers in the sending country. This opens the door for sanctions to be greatly influenced by lobbying on behalf of the offending state.

4.3.2 The Allocation of Foreign Aid

Past research has consistently connected U.S. foreign aid to human rights practices (Carleton and Stohl 1985; McKinlay and Little 1977). Though, the nature of this relationship has been debated. Some argue that foreign aid is determined by strategic or economic interests with human rights being of little influence (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003b). Others, however, argue that human rights do in fact influence aid allocation with states seeing their foreign aid cut due to human rights abuses (Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Nielsen 2013). Adding nuance to this line of research, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) argue that U.S. foreign aid should be separated into two separate choices which both provide alternate signals. First, the decision whether to provide aid to a country should be thought of as the first-stage of this process. Then, how much aid (assuming the first decision was to grant aid) should be allocated proves to be the second-stage. They find that economic development influences the first stage while human rights practices affects the second stage with improved human rights practices leading to more aid. Further studies found that human rights practices were indeed important in the allocation of aid but that political and strategic concerns often had more influence. This finding has largely been attributed with the Cold-War era as recent studies have found that in the post-Cold War time frame, human rights have become more influential while security and strategic concerns have lessened (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). However, research suggests that human rights considerations still prove less influential than economic and strategic influences (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Lebovic 1988; Neumayer 2003b). Recent research has begun to look at human rights and aid in more nuanced terms. For instance, Esarey and DeMeritt (2017) argue that the relationship between the donor and recipient state matters in how human rights abuses affect aid. When the donor state receives a direct political advantage from the aid (i.e. military advantage or perhaps some domestic audience benefit) the donor state will overlook human rights abuses. If, however, the aid is more symbolic and largely for humanitarian purposes, donor state are more likely

to punish recipient states for human rights abuses. Also important is the distinction made between economic and military aid. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. Congress passed a law linking U.S. foreign aid to the human rights practices of the recipient government (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe and Meernik 1995). This law, Boutton and Carter (2014) argue, had a greater effect on military aid rather than economic aid due to military aid's direct relationship with a state's repressive capabilities. Beyond this, Boutton and Carter (2014) actually find that human rights abusing states actually receive *more* economic aid. They argue that this is the case due to economic aid being used as more of a "carrot". This, coupled with the fact that it may be easier for the U.S. Congress to send economic aid to regimes for strategic reasons despite their human rights records, help to contextualize this result. Beyond this distinction, others have found that different types of aid are influenced by different types of human rights abuses. Neumayer (2003a) finds that military aid allocation is negatively affected by physical integrity rights violations while economic aid allocation is negatively affected by political and civil rights violations. The argument given by Neumayer (2003a) is that these political and civil rights are more difficult to discern with regards to the source of the behavior. That is, political and civil rights violations may come as a direct result of government strategy but may also be a more secondary result of poor governance tied to low GDP or other broader metrics. Physical integrity violations, on the other hand, are more easily tied to a coherent government strategy. Thus, since military aid is so closely tied to the repressive apparatus of a state, it makes sense that this type of aid is more affected by physical integrity rights violations. Similarly, economic aid is affected more by political and civil rights as donor states seek to use this aid to coerce states into improving their human rights practices.

There also exists, however, a domestic component to foreign aid. Many studies have shown that aid allocation is directly affected by the domestic politics of the donor state (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Fleck and Kilby 2001; Irwin 2000). Specifically, Milner and Tingley

(2009) find that policy-makers listen to both their constituents and interest-groups when deciding how to allocate foreign aid. It is important to note that lobbying done on behalf of foreign entities are not included within this idea of interest groups. Therefore, their influence on foreign aid has been largely unstudied. The one notable exception to this is Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019). Here, Pevehouse and Vabulas analyze the effect lobbying has on human rights scores. Specifically, they find that State Department scores are significantly lower than Amnesty scores when lobbying is involved. They find strong evidence that lobbying by foreign governments influences State Department officials causing these scores to be biased in a way that benefits the lobbying country. In drawing out the implications of this finding, Pevehouse and Vabulas argue that lobbying could also affect policy outcomes like foreign aid and sanctions. However, they do not provide a test of this empirically. Drawing on this insight, I argue that lobbying can affect the domestic audience of the donor state (in this study, the U.S.) as well as the policy views of government officials and thereby affect how human rights affects aid allocation and the likelihood of being sanctioned. Below, I outline my theoretical expectations.

4.4 Lobbying and the Decision to Punish

Foreign policy decisions within the U.S. government (in this case sanctions and foreign aid) are influenced by a number of government agencies, interest groups, and other actors. Sanctions, for instance, are issued by either the executive or legislative branches; are maintained and enforced by the State Department, and are most often implemented by the departments of Treasury and Commerce. Foreign aid is largely controlled by Congress, though, the Executive branch has some influence.⁶ The implementation of this aid however, is carried out through twenty different agencies. Therefore, we see how sanctions and foreign aid both represent a complex web of influence and implementation. It is into this web where the similarly complex networks of political connections found amongst lobbying firms can

⁶See a recent example of President Trump ending aid to Pakistan: (BBC News 2018)

function best. As Newhouse (2009) points out, lobbyists can function much differently than a traditional diplomat. They are often former government officials themselves. The title of a 2016 investigation by Politico says it all. The article, titled "Want to be a 'foreign agent'? Serve in Congress first" outlines how many former Senators and House members now work for powerful lobbying firms representing foreign countries. These high profile figures, such as former House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) and former CIA director and longtime House member Porter Goss (R-Fla.), provide foreign governments something they could not otherwise obtain — connections, insight, and influence. Those governments then use this to directly affect U.S. foreign policy.

The decision to sanction a country or to end its' foreign aid due to human rights abuses stems largely from the strategic calculus of policymakers from the donor state. I argue that lobbying can influence these policymakers through two primary channels — by influencing the general population who then pressure policymakers and by providing these policymakers with key information regarding their client states.

The public can influence policymakers and foreign policy in general by demanding action on certain issues. Due to their desire to be re-elected, these officials are likely to heed such calls for action from their domestic constituents. The research on the public's influence on foreign policy shows that over time, officials are becoming more sensitive to the public's opinion on foreign policy (Powlick 1991). Yet, the public's interest in foreign policy issues is often characterized by what is disseminated through the media. In this way the media has long been shown to have an effect on foreign policy (Gilboa 2005; Baum and Potter 2008; Robinson 2011). Dubbed the "CNN effect" this argument states that public opinion is often influenced by what the news highlights and that this drives people to pressure their governments into action (Sobel 2001; Jacobson 2007). This has largely increased as more people receive their news from social media platforms (Baum and Potter 2019). This effect highlights what Baum and Potter (2008) call the "foreign policy marketplace" where

the two actors (the public and the policy-makers) both are interested in creating policy that conforms to their interests and preferences. When these preferences are at odds, the literature argues that information proves key. Thus, the media acts as a "trader of information" and can provide the public with the resources they need to pressure their leaders (Baum and Potter 2008, 56). Additionally, this influence goes beyond simply disseminating information. Agenda-setting theory argues that the media can raise awareness of an issue and thereby bring about policy changes (Cohen 1963; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Scholars have also shown that international lobbying can influence a country's media coverage and public opinion in the United States (Lee 2007; Zhang and Cameron 2003). Lobbying can enter this equation by influencing the information people receive. Through these media campaigns, lobbyists, working on behalf of a foreign government, can disseminate information that paints their client country in a positive light and thereby deflect any adverse consequences that may come as a result of increased (negative) media attention.

Secondly, lobbying can influence foreign policy through providing information to Congressional staffers, think-tanks, and other interested parties who then, in turn, inform and influence policymakers and their decisions. As others have shown, policymakers often rely on lobbying to fill in information gaps on issues (Pevehouse and Vabulas 2019). Actors in both Congress and the State department are faced with time constraints which influences their ability to gather information. Due to this, research shows that these decision makers often rely on lobbying to fill in these information gaps (Austen-Smith 1993; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Hansen 1991). Indeed, large lobbying firms can employ experts and gather technical information and use this informational advantage to help inform policymakers (Lall 2012; Young 2012a; Helleiner 2011). These informational shortcuts allow lobbying firms to exert a large amount of influence over U.S. foreign policy. Their connections within Washington D.C., coupled with their ability to gather and disseminated large amounts of information, make lobbyists powerful figures in American foreign policy.

Through these two channels — pressure from the general public due to media campaigns and through providing information to policymakers — lobbyists are able to steer foreign policy objectives in a direction that favors their client state. It is with this influence that lobbying can help states escape punishment for their human rights abuses. By increasing positive media attention towards their client state, lobbying can help deflect possible calls for action from the general population (such as sanctions or a reduction in foreign aid). Similarly, lobbyists can use their informational advantage and general access to policymakers to sway the opinions of those in charge towards viewing their client states in a more positive (or perhaps more strategic) manner thus reducing the likelihood of punishment. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:

Sanctions Hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 *An increase in lobbying will be associated with a decrease in the probability of being sanctioned by the U.S.*

Hypothesis 1b *An increase in lobbying will moderate the effect human rights abuses have on the probability of being sanctioned.*

Hypothesis 2 *An increase in lobbying will be associated with a decrease in the severity of U.S. sanctions.*

Hypothesis 2b *An increase in lobbying will moderate the effect human rights abuses have on the severity of U.S. sanctions*

Foreign Aid Hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3 *An increase in lobbying will lead to a corresponding increase in the allocation of U.S. aid.*

Hypothesis 3b *An increase in lobbying will moderate the effect human rights abuses have on the allocation of U.S. aid.*

Some of the literature on foreign aid and human rights finds that the overall amount of aid is not influenced by human rights but that the type of aid is. This research shows that

when a country's human rights abuses are made known through shaming from an INGO, that country is more likely to see bypass aid than direct aid (Dietrich and Murdie 2017). This type of aid, "bypasses" the government in favor of local NGOs and other organizations. Donor states use this tactic to change the behavior of the recipient government in some way (Dietrich 2013). This coercive influence is due to the recipient state wanting the aid to flow through government channels rather than through local NGOs or other non-governmental avenues. This is due to the government wanting control over the (often) large sums of money sent to their countries through foreign aid. Lobbying can affect this relationship by influencing donor governments — in much the same way as outlined earlier — to limit bypass aid in favor of more direct aid. Bypass aid is often due to the donor country seeing the recipient state's government as being poorly governed or, as previously discussed, due to human rights abuses being made known (Dietrich 2013; Dietrich and Murdie 2017). Lobbyists working for the recipient state can provide information to U.S. policymakers and assure them that the recipient government is ready to receive direct aid and that it is in the interest of the U.S. to do so. Lobbying can also convince those in charge of foreign aid to overlook human rights abuses and focus on the strategic or other aspects of the donor-recipient relationship that proves more to the recipient state's advantage. Through this information and direct contact with policy-makers, lobbyist can increase the likelihood foreign aid is delivered through government to government channels rather than as bypass aid. This influence by lobbyists leads to my final hypothesis:

Bypass Aid Hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4 *Increased lobbying will lead to a decrease in the proportion of bypass aid a country receives.*

Hypothesis 4b *Increased lobbying will moderate the effect human rights abuses have on the proportion of bypass aid a country receives.*

4.4.1 Examples: Azerbaijan and Egypt

To show the influence lobbying has on foreign policy decisions, I briefly outline two examples. Both of these countries have long histories of lobbying within the U.S. and highlight how lobbying can influence the likelihood of punishment.

Azerbaijan has become increasingly invested in lobbying operations within the U.S. A report from the Sunlight Foundation found Azerbaijan to be in the top ten of foreign countries in terms of money spent on lobbying in 2013. But what does this money go towards? In February of 2015, Azerbaijan increased the monthly retainer for its' main lobbying firm, the Podesta Group, from \$50,000 to \$75,000 (Lozocsky 2015). Reports show this money was used to to interact with members of Congress, executive branch agencies, media members, and think tanks. This influence has led to many statements of support from members of Congress being delivered on the House and Senate floors. For example, Rep. Gene Green (D-Texas) called Azerbaijan a "beacon of democracy" while Rep. Ryan Zinke (R-Mont.) claimed Azerbaijan and the United States shared "the same commitment to freedom and liberty"(Lozocsky 2015). These statements came despite Azerbaijan being labeled as "not free" by Freedom House. In fact, in 2015, Azerbaijan was given a democracy score of 4.17/100. How do these efforts connect with human rights? David Kramer, the former president of Freedom House, argues that these public statements of goodwill can later be used by the regime to help fight against possible sanctions. If the possibility of sanctions increases, Kramer says that the regime can reach out through its' lobbying contacts and "can say [to friendly legislators]: You were with us back then; we hope we can count on you now."(Lozocsky 2015) Evidence of this influence can be seen in a 2015 incident involving the Podesta Group and Maran Turner, executive director of the human rights organization Freedom Now. Turner had organized a briefing for Capital Hill staffers on political prisoners in Azerbaijan. As the briefing neared, Turner reports that invitees told her the Podesta group called each office to convince them not to attend. The Podesta group also called the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, who was hosting the event, and asked them to cancel it (Lozocsky 2015).

Another example comes from Egypt which has a long history of lobbying in the United States. One of the main lobbying firms hired by Egypt is the PLM Group which is a joint venture between the Podesta Group, the Livingston Group, and the Moffett Group. These firms are led by powerful Washington insiders such as former House Republican Majority Leader Bob Livingston, Democratic campaign advisor Tony Podesta, and former Democratic congressman Toby Moffett (Blumenthal 2011). All three have long lists of powerful contacts and use those contacts to lobby directly for the Egyptian Government. For instance, in 2009, the PML group was hired to contact "media representatives, civic organizations, members of Congress, congressional staffers and various U.S. Government officials concerning the current status of U.S./Egyptian relations, the *proposed U.S. foreign aid program* for Fiscal Year 2009, *human rights* and religious freedom...[italics added]" (FARA 2009).

A specific example of the influence these lobbying firms have can be seen regarding the delivery of 20 Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighter Planes to Egypt in 2012. The government of President Hosni Mubarak agreed to purchase the planes in 2010. In the months leading up to the announcement of the deal, lobbyists working for the Egyptian government set up 46 meetings with government officials with nearly a dozen of those meetings being with Pentagon and State Department officials respectively including Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., and Nita Lowey, D-N.Y., who oversee foreign aid packages as a part of the Appropriations Committee. The deal would take \$213 million in aid given to Egypt by the United States and use that money to buy the planes from Lockheed Martin (who, coincidentally, was represented by the same lobbying group: PLM). The lobbying campaign preceding the Lockheed Martin deal is not unique however. In 2008 alone, lobbyist arranged over 1,000 contacts with government officials including Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla., who was the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and who also happened to oppose providing aid to Egypt (Young 2012b).

Similarly, in the lead-up to the F-16 deal, the PLM group made 366 contacts with government officials from January to July of 2010. This included contact with 61 members of Congress and 141 different Congressional staffers(Blumenthal 2011).

During this same time, Egypt not only lobbied for foreign aid, but also lobbied to oppose the passing of a pro-human rights and democracy resolution in the Senate (S. Res. 586 or the Feingold Resolution) that called for the United States to support human rights in Egypt and asked for an end to the emergency law in the wake of the deposing of Hosni Mubarak (Feingold 2010). The lobbying effort to oppose this resolution was intense with lobbyists organizing 77 lobbying contacts with Senators — 52 of which explicitly mention the Senate resolution. The Senator most contacted by the lobbyists was Roger Wicker (R-MS). Wicker was contacted twenty times with seventeen of those listing the Resolution as the reason for contact. In an article published by Foreign Policy, Wicker was designated as one of the main actors responsible for blocking the Feingold resolution (Rogin 2011). In the end, the resolution was blocked from passage.

Following the Arab Spring, Egypt cut its’ ties with the PLM Group in January of 2012. However, it was not long before Egypt again entered the Washington lobbying scene. Following the suspension of U.S. military aid in late 2013 (which included f-16 fighter jets, M1 Abrams tanks, and Apache attack helicopters), Egypt quickly hired the Glover Park Group to lobby on its behalf. As reported by The Hill, the Glover Park Group will facilitate communications “with U.S. government officials, business community, non-governmental audiences and the media” as well as help with “fostering and facilitating exchanges between the U.S. and Egypt.” (Bogardus 2013). Following an intense lobbying campaign, \$1.5 billion in economic and military aid was restored to Egypt in early 2014.

As we can see, foreign lobbying can influence how policymakers perceive a country and can impact actions towards the lobbying state. Additionally, lobbying can help change the narrative within the general population by increasing attention to a particular state. Thus,

lobbying proves a powerful tool of influence for states seeking to affect U.S. policy and behavior.

4.5 Data and Research Design

4.5.1 Dependent Variables

Data on U.S. sanctions comes from Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015). These data identify instances where a sanction was imposed upon a country by the United States. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) draw upon earlier data from Hufbauer et al. (2009) and extend this data to 2012. Within my sample, the percentage of states sanctioned by the U.S. is just under 12%. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) also code the severity of U.S. sanctions using data from Wood (2008). Severity is measured from 1-3 with a value of one representing mild sanctions and a value of three representing severe sanctions.⁷ Within the sample, there are 486 country-years with a U.S. sanction. Within these sanctions cases, the average severity of a sanction is .66 with a standard deviation of .78. To understand how U.S. sanctions are distributed across time, figure 4.3 shows the number of U.S. sanctions by year. Following the end of the Cold War, we see the U.S. dramatically increase its' number of sanctions. However, over the last 20 years, the number of sanctions per year have been quite low.

To measure U.S. aid, I rely on data from Boutton and Carter (2014). They gather aid data from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). I use both a dichotomous measure of aid as well as a continuous measure. The dichotomous measure is coded as a one if a country received aid from the U.S. in that year and zero otherwise. The continuous measure codes the amount of aid received that year by category. Specifically, it lists the amount of military and economic aid a country receives. This continuous measure represents the amount of aid in millions of 2009 constant dollars. The continuous measure of aid has a high amount of variance with some countries receiving low amounts of aid in the hundreds

⁷For a full discussion of the coding rules, see figure C.3 in the appendix.




Figure 4.3: Number of US Sanctions by Year

of thousands of dollars while others receive billions of dollars. To account for this, I follow previous literature (see de Mesquita and Smith 2007) and take the natural log of both types of aid. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the log transformed aid variables. As the figure shows, a large amount of countries receive no U.S. military aid. However, this figure is lower when looking at U.S. economic aid.

Hypotheses 4 and 4b predict that lobbying will reduce the proportion of bypass aid a country receives and that lobbying can moderate the effect repression has on bypass aid. To test this hypothesis, I use data on U.S aid from the OECD CRS aid activity database. Starting in 2004, the OECD began collecting data on the channel through which aid was being delivered (public or private). I create a measure of the proportion of bypass aid to total aid. Proportional dependent variables present some issues to normal estimation procedures as discussed by Dietrich (2013) — specifically that the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1 yet is more or less continuous within that bounded area. To account for this, Dietrich (2013) follows Aitchison (1986) and creates a (J-1) log aid ratio




Figure 4.4: Distribution of Economic and Military Aid

where J is the total number of delivery channels (government to government or non-state aid). I follow this approach and create a measure of bypass aid which equals the log of the proportion of bypass aid for country i at time t divided by one minus the amount of bypass aid for country i at time t . This creates a variable that is unconstrained and therefore able to be estimated through OLS. The coefficient on this variable displays how the log ratio of bypass aid changes in comparison to non-bypass aid. Hypothesis four would predict a negative coefficient for lobbying signifying that an increase in lobbying corresponds to a decrease in the proportion of bypass aid. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of both the bypass proportion measure as well the log transformed version. The proportional measure of bypass aid has a mean of .54 with a min and max of 0 and 1 respectively while the log transformed measure ranges from -8.2 to 9.4 with a mean of .15.




Figure 4.5: Proportion of Bypass Aid and the Logged Transformed

4.5.2 Independent Variables

Data on lobbying comes from the Foreign Agents Registration Act. As noted earlier, PR firms working for foreign governments are required to report such activities to the Justice Department. These data were collected by Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019). As a part of the data collection process, Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) record the number of lobbying contracts per year by country. Across the sample, the average number of lobbying contracts is 3.6. The measure of lobbying contracts, however, has a large amount of variance with some countries having no lobbying contracts in a given year while others have dozens.⁸ Therefore, I follow Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) and take the natural log of the number of lobbying

⁸Japan has the highest number of lobbying contracts at 105 in 1996. Throughout the sample, Japan averages 42 lobbying contracts per year — a significantly higher average than any other country.

contracts. Much of my theory focuses on the effect lobbying has for states with differing levels of human rights abuses. Yet, it should be noted that all states tend to lobby at a similar rate regardless of their human rights scores. For example, states with low levels of repression (25th percentile and below) average 5.6 lobbying contracts per year while states with high levels of repression (75th percentile and above) average 3.5 lobbying contracts per year. In general, most states see a large variation in the amount of lobbying they engage in across time. Figure 4.6 shows the number of lobbying contracts by year for six different countries.




Figure 4.6: Number of Lobbying Contracts by Year

My measure of repression comes from (Fariss 2014). I use this measure to connect human rights abuses with military aid. Fariss uses a latent approach to model human rights scores that takes into account the changing nature of accountability. This measure incorporates the evolving nature of views on human rights and how that affects human rights scores.

This approach allows for a more dynamic measure of repression. The data range in value from -3.1 to 4.7 with higher values signifying higher respect for human rights. For ease of interpretation, I invert this measure so higher values represent higher levels of repression. My inverted measure has a mean of -.2 and a standard deviation of 1.3.

To account for the effect human rights abuses have on the allocation of U.S. economic aid, I also include a measure of empowerment rights taken from Cingranelli et al. (2014).⁹ This measure is an additive index that draws upon the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 which represents no respect for these rights to 14 which represents full government respect for these rights with an average value of 8.3. Similar to the repression measure from Fariss (2014) I invert this measure so that higher values represent higher levels of human rights abuses.

4.5.3 Control Variables

When estimating the models predicting sanctions, I control for many other factors that may affect the likelihood of being threatened with sanctions or having them imposed. First, I control for the amount of human rights related media coverage for a given country. Peksen et al. (2014) show that the media can have a significant effect on the likelihood of U.S. sanctions being applied. To control for this, I include a count measure of the number of media mentions of human rights take from Nielsen (2013) for a given state.¹⁰ The type of government a state has can also effect the likelihood of sanctions (Cox and Drury 2006). Thus I control for this by including a measure from PolityIV (Marshall et al. 2016). The main effect of regime comes from distinguishing democracies from non-democracies, therefore, I

⁹Following Neumayer (2003a), I expect political and civil rights (measured here as empowerment rights) to negatively influence economic aid while the repression variable from Fariss (2014) I expect to affect military aid.

¹⁰Specifically, this data codes media mentions of human rights from the New York Times.

create a dummy variable called democracy which represents all countries with a polity score of six or above. I also control whether or not a country is allied with the U.S., the amount of economic development, and population of the state as each of these are likely to impact the likelihood of sanctions. Lastly, I control for the amount of trade between the country and the U.S. as countries without any trade ties to the U.S. are less likely to be sanctioned given there are no movement of goods to restrict.¹¹ Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for each control variable.

Controls:	Mean	SD	Min	Max
NYT Shaming	6.9	18.90	0	327
Democracy	0.39	0.49	0	1
GDP per capita	7.29	1.33	4.32	11.27
Population	16.13	1.4	13.25	21.06
Trade	3.93	0.57	1.9	6.894
Alliance	0.25	0.43	0	1

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Sanctions Analysis Sample

For my analysis on foreign aid it is important that other determinants of foreign aid be controlled for. It has been shown that the level of economic development of a state can impact the likelihood of receiving aid with less developed states more likely to receive aid (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). I control for this using the natural log of GDP per capita taken from Gleditsch (2002). It has also been shown that regime type matters in the allocation of aid with democracies receiving more aid from the U.S. (Wright 2009). To account for this, I include a variable for regime type taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2016). It could also be that the population size of a country matters. Therefore, I include the natural log of population taken from the World Bank. U.S allies and those countries that trade more with the U.S. may also be more likely to receive aid. Due to this, I control for the amount of trade (taken from Gleditsch 2002) and whether or not the country is an ally of the U.S.

¹¹For the trade variable, I follow the sanctions literature and take the total amount of trade divided by the country's GDP.

(Leeds et al. 2002). I also include dummy variables for the cold war period and the post 9/11 period as both of these could impact aid. Table 4.3 displays the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the foreign aid analysis.

Controls	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Population	15.93	1.515	12.11	20.99
U.S. Ally	0.414	0.493	0	1
Polity	0.583	7.382	-10	10
Trade	6.040	2.686	0	13.10
GDP per capita	7.994	1.206	4.600	11.09

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Foreign Aid Analysis

To estimate the effect lobbying and human rights have on bypass aid, I include other factors that the aid literature finds important. First, I include a measure of governance quality as some have found that donor countries deliver more bypass aid to countries with poor governance (Dietrich 2013). This data comes from Kaufmann et al. (2009). I also control for regime type by including a measure from Polity IV as some argue that democracies may have greater constraints on the ability of the government to capture aid (Marshall et al. 2016). Natural disasters may also influence the allocation of aid with more aid going to disaster relief agencies rather than the government following a crisis. Thus, I include the number of natural disasters in a country as recorded by the EM-DAT database. Related to this, civil conflict may also cause donors to give more bypass aid. Therefore, I use data from Gleditsch et al. (2002). I also include a measure of geographic distance (Scott Bennett and Stam 2000) and trade intensity which is the logged sum of imports and exports taken from the IMF-DOT (2009) database (Dietrich 2013). Security considerations could also play a role in aid delivery which leads me to include in the model a measure of whether or not the recipient state is a rotating member of the UN Security Council (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for each variable.

Controls:	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Governance	1.95	0.54	0.72	3.66
Civil War	0.24	0.70	0	1
Natural Disaster	0.8	1.46	-2.30	4.16
Distance	0.54	5.92	9.35	
Trade Intensity	8.5	1.85	4.58	13.08
Security Council	0.06	0.23	0	1
Polity	2.89	5.82	-10	10

Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Bypass Aid Analysis Sample

4.5.4 Research Design

The theory outlined above argues that states will use lobbying to avoid punishment for their human rights abuses. To test this, I estimate a logistic regression with sanctions as my dependent variable. The unit of analysis is country-year. I lag all time variant independent variables and cluster the standard errors by country. Given this specification, I run my analysis on 3407 country-year observations with my standard errors clustered over 111 countries. To test the severity hypothesis, I estimate an ordered logistic regression this time using severity variable as my dependent variable. Here, I again lag all time-variant controls and cluster the standard errors on country. For both dependent variables, I also estimate models interacting lobbying and repression. This allows me to test the hypothesized interactive effect.

To analyze the effect of lobbying and human rights on U.S. foreign aid, I follow previous literature which suggests economic aid differs from military aid and estimate separate models for each type of aid (Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Boutton and Carter 2014). My unit of analysis is the country-year. For the military aid equations, I have 4367 country-year observations. This number is reduced to 3356 country-year observations in the economic aid equations due to the use of the empowerment rights measure. Following the literature, I estimate a two-stage Heckman model first estimating the likelihood of receiving aid, then estimating

the amount of aid provided given that you received aid.¹² I also include country fixed-effects in the outcome equation to account for any unobserved country-specific attributes that may be affecting the relationship. Some have found that aid is influenced by what is called "bureaucratic inertia" where aid in time t is influenced by aid in time $t-1$ (Lai 2003). To account for this, I include in the selection equation a cubic time spline. I test the proposed hypothesis of lobbying conditioning the effect of human rights on aid by including within the model an interaction term between lobbying and human rights. I include this interaction in both the selection equation as well as the outcome equation as I believe lobbying can moderate the effect of human rights in the amount of aid received but also in the decision to receive any aid at all.

Finally, to test hypotheses four, I run a series of OLS regressions predicting the proportion of bypass aid a country receives based on the amount of lobbying contracts they have and their human rights. I then interact lobbying and human rights to test whether or not lobbying can moderate the relationship between human rights and bypass aid. Given the shorter temporal period, I run the analysis on 437 country-year observations. I include regional dummies and year dummies to account for any unobserved factors that may influence this relationship. I also include robust standard errors. Following Dietrich (2013) I log the measure of proportion of bypass aid as OLS assumes a continuous normal distribution. However, this causes my estimates to be difficult to interpret as they are the effect lobbying has on the log proportion of bypass aid. I could, of course, simply take the anti-log of the coefficient but this proves difficult when doing predictions as the standard errors are incorrect. To help with this, I draw on work by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) who use a fractional logit as a means of exploring proportional data. These authors put forward the use of a user-written fractional logit model however, canned options within STATA are available. Recent work by Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2012) shows that STATA's GLM command with the "link(logit)" function successfully replicates Papke and Wooldridge (1996)'s original results.

¹²Lai 2003; de Mesquita and Smith 2007; and Boutton and Carter 2014 use similar models

I therefore estimate two GLM models first estimating the effect of lobbying on the proportion of bypass aid then estimating the model with the interaction between lobbying and human rights. Using the GLM models allows me to predict the effect of lobbying on the proportion of bypass aid with the predictions being bounded between 0 and 1 just as the proportion of bypass aid is bounded by 0 and 1. Thus, the predicted probabilities serve as the predicted proportion of bypass aid making interpretation more straightforward. Given that the number of observations are limited, I also use the bootstrap option with the GLM model and draw 500 samples with replacement to better estimate my standard errors. As the analysis shows, there is no substantive difference between the OLS and GLM models.

4.6 Results

4.6.1 Lobbying, Human Rights, and Sanctions

We will begin by looking at the relationship between lobbying, human rights, and sanctions. The results are displayed in table 4.5. As displayed in models 1 and 3, the control variables confirm the previous literature on sanctions. We see that shaming by the New York Times increases both the probability and severity of sanctions. Conversely, being a democracy significantly decreases both the likelihood and severity of sanctions. The models vary some on the significance of the other control variables with the alliance variable increasing the probability of sanctions but not affecting their severity. Trade switches this order and increases the severity while not significantly impacting the probability of being sanctioned.¹³

¹³Note that models 3 and 4 were run on the full sample of observations and therefore compare no sanctions (0) to severe sanctions (3). I run the same analysis but this time only on those country-year observations with a U.S. sanction. I re-code the severity variable so a "0" now represents mild sanctions and a "2" represent severe. Some of the control variables change in significance but my main variables of interest remain unchanged. I present the results of this analysis in table C.3 in the appendix.

	Model 1 (Sanctions)	Model 2 (Sanctions)	Model 3 (Severity)	Model 4 (Severity)
Lobbying (t-1)	-0.11* (0.056)	-0.16** (0.067)	-0.14** (0.064)	-0.17** (0.080)
Repression (t-1)	1.44** (0.197)	1.54** (0.224)	1.47** (0.185)	1.54** (0.219)
Lobbying * Repression		0.06 (0.050)		0.04 (0.045)
NYT Shaming (t-1)	0.02* (0.010)	0.02* (0.010)	0.01** (0.005)	0.01** (0.005)
Democracy (t-1)	-1.61** (0.363)	-1.63** (0.367)	-1.52** (0.331)	-1.53** (0.337)
Alliance	0.80** (0.362)	0.78** (0.366)	0.41 (0.355)	0.38 (0.368)
GDP per capita (t-1)	0.25 (0.171)	0.25 (0.172)	0.31 (0.194)	0.32 (0.196)
Population	0.04 (0.128)	0.04 (0.129)	0.10 (0.129)	0.10 (0.130)
Trade (t-1)	0.00 (0.002)	0.00 (0.002)	0.00** (0.001)	0.00** (0.001)
Constant	-5.40** (2.609)	-5.43** (2.638)		
Cut 1			6.76** (2.799)	6.84** (2.863)
Cut 2			7.88** (2.768)	7.96** (2.832)
Cut 3			9.03** (2.647)	9.11** (2.706)
Log Likelihood	-981.35	-978.99	-1457.61	-1456.62
<i>N</i>	3407	3407	3407	3407

Standard errors clustered on country.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 4.5: Effect of lobbying and human rights on U.S. sanctions: 1978-2012

The effect of lobbying and repression remain consistent across models. As the table shows, higher levels of repression consistently lead to a higher likelihood of being sanctioned and higher levels of severity. Lobbying, however, shows the opposite effect with increases in lobbying leading to a reduction in the probability and severity of U.S. sanctions. This gives support to hypotheses one and two stating that lobbying will decrease the probability of being sanctioned and will decrease the severity. The substantive effect of this relationship can be seen in figure 4.7. Here we see the predicted probability of U.S. sanctions across the range of lobbying. The predicted probability of being sanctioned changes from 8.8% to 3.6% over the range of lobbying. This 5% change in probability of being sanctioned represents a statistically significant difference (p -value 0.062). Thus, this initial analysis provides support for hypothesis one and shows that lobbying can indeed help states avoid being punished with sanctions for their human rights abuses.




Figure 4.7: Predicted probability of U.S. sanctions across range of lobbying. Results from table 4.5, model 1.

Additionally, the analysis shows that lobbying can have a moderating effect on the influence of repression. Table 4.5 shows that the coefficient for the interaction between lobbying and repression is insignificant in both model two and model four. However, figure 4.8 shows that at certain levels of repression, lobbying can have a moderating effect on the probability of being sanctioned. Based on model three, figure 4.8 shows the predicted probability of sanctions for both high and low levels of lobbying.¹⁴ Overall, we see that increased lobbying leads to a lower predicted probability of being sanctioned. However, the confidence intervals for these predictions overlap — except at average and slightly above average levels of repression. Here we see that increased lobbying can significantly reduce the probability of sanctions. For example, at just above average levels of repression, the predicted probability of being sanctioned, given you have low levels of lobbying, is eleven and a half percent. A state with the same level of repression, but one who uses lobbyists, sees a reduction in the probability of being sanctioned of six percent (p -value 0.03). Intuitively, this result makes sense. At low levels of repression, states are unlikely to be sanctioned given the lack of reasons for sanctions to be imposed. Thus, while lobbying still leads to a reduced likelihood of being sanctioned, this finding fails to gain statistical significance. The effect of lobbying proves strongest at average and slightly above average levels of repression. Here, a state's human rights abuses may make them a target of U.S. sanctions but since the abuses are not egregious, lobbying can have a moderating effect. At very high levels of repression, this effect is lessened as the egregious human rights abuses begin to overcome the effect of lobbying. In these cases, the amount and severity of the human rights abuses cause the effect of lobbying to be lessened. Figure 4.8 shows this relationship in action. Across levels of repression, lobbying consistently reduces the likelihood of being sanctioned. However, it is only at moderate levels of repression where we see this effect gain statistical significance. At these moderate levels of repression, lobbying can help states avoid being punished for their

¹⁴For high level of lobbying, I use the 99th percentile while low lobbying represents the 25th percentile.

human rights abuses. Thus, hypothesis 1b also receives some support from the analysis. It seems that lobbying can indeed moderate the relationship between repression and sanctions, especially at average to above average levels of human rights abuses.




Figure 4.8: Predicted probability of U.S. sanctions with high and low amounts of lobbying across values of repression. Results from table 4.5, model 2.

The analysis of sanction severity shows similar results. Table 4.7 confirms the prediction made in hypothesis two that repression increases the severity of sanctions while lobbying reduces the severity. Figure 4.9 displays this relationship graphically showing that as the number of lobbying contracts increases, the probability of having severe sanctions decreases.¹⁵ The interaction between lobbying and repression again, like the results from

¹⁵Note the overall predicted probability of being severely sanctioned is quite low as this graph shows the results from the full sample. Figure C.5 in the appendix shows the results when using only those observations with a U.S. sanction. Here, as the graph shows, the initial probability is much higher.

model 1, is insignificant in model 4. Graphically, the relationship shows that across the range of repression, lobbying consistently reduces the probability of having severe sanctions. However, unlike figure 4.8 showing the results from model 2, the results from model 4 fail to gain significance at any values of repression.¹⁶ Thus, I fail to find a significant moderating effect of lobbying on the relationship between repression and sanction severity.




Figure 4.9: Predicted probability of severe sanctions across the range of lobbying. Results from table 4.5, model 3.

4.6.2 Lobbying, Human Rights, and Foreign Aid

Turning to the analysis of lobbying, human rights, and foreign aid. The results from table 4.6 show the effect lobbying has on the allocation of U.S. military aid for both the probability of receiving aid (the selection equation) as well as the amount of aid a state receives conditional on being a "1" in the selection equation. The control variables behave largely in the manner we would expect. In determining who receives military aid, the analysis

¹⁶These results are show in figure C.4 in the appendix.

shows that more democratic states see an increased likelihood of receiving U.S. aid. The model also shows that developed states are also less likely to receive military aid from the U.S. As for the outcome equation, we see that again, less developed states are more likely to receive military aid. In the outcome equation, we do see some changes in significance. For instance, the coefficient on polity is no longer significant meaning that democratic states, while more likely to receive aid, do not see a significant difference in the amount of aid they receive. The population of a state also changes in its significance. While larger states are no more likely to receive aid, larger states are allocated less aid should they receive it. The dummy variable for the cold war maintains a positive and significant effect both increasing the likelihood of military aid and increasing the amount allocated.

The main variables of interest also largely behave according to expectation. We see first that repression (here measured using Fariss 2014's measure) reduces the likelihood of receiving aid. Given that military aid is sent, increased level of repression actually increase the amount of military aid allocated. While seemingly counter to my expectations, this result actually fits within the theory presented. The fact that higher levels of repression actually increase the predicted amount of aid a country receives likely stems from the countries the U.S. provides military aid to. For instance, the countries receiving the most military aid from the U.S. over the time-frame of the sample are Israel, Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan. These states all receive large amounts of military aid from the U.S. and are likely driving the finding that higher levels of repression increase the amount of aid one receives conditional on being allocated military aid in the selection equation. Lobbying similarly shows the predicted effect with lobbying leading to an increase in the amount of aid a state receives. In the selection equation, the coefficient for lobbying is positive meaning more lobbying increases the probability of receiving military aid but just fails to reach significance with a p -value of .11. Thus, hypothesis 3 receives some support with lobbying increasing both the likelihood of receiving aid and the amount of aid a state receives. This finding also supports

past work that finds similar results (Montes-Rojas 2013).

Military Aid				
	Level of Aid	Selection	Level of Aid	Selection
Lobbying (t-1)	0.02*	0.02	0.02*	0.02
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Repression (t-1)	0.34**	-0.06*	0.36**	-0.04
	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.034)
Lobbying * Repression			0.02**	0.03**
			(0.009)	(0.008)
Polity (t-1)	0.01	0.01**	0.01	0.01**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Ln GDPPC (t-1)	-0.38**	-0.09**	-0.37**	-0.08**
	(0.070)	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.042)
Ln Population (t-1)	-0.38*	0.00	-0.39*	0.01
	(0.219)	(0.028)	(0.219)	(0.028)
Ln Trade (t-1)	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.00
	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.021)
US Ally (t-1)	0.38	-0.08	0.39	-0.07
	(0.240)	(0.075)	(0.240)	(0.075)
Cold War	0.42**	0.17**	0.41**	0.18**
	(0.081)	(0.071)	(0.081)	(0.071)
Post 9/11	0.40**	0.13	0.41**	0.13
	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.064)	(0.084)
t		-0.80**		-0.80**
		(0.029)		(0.029)
t-2		0.06**		0.06**
		(0.003)		(0.003)
t-3		-0.00**		-0.00**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	8.41**	2.02**	8.44**	1.79**
	(3.453)	(0.562)	(3.449)	(0.567)
λ		-0.35**		-0.35**
		(0.052)		(0.053)
Country Fixed Effects	YES	NO	YES	NO
N	4367	4367	4367	4367

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 4.6: Moderating effect of lobbying on human rights and the allocation of military aid

The interactive effect of lobbying and repression is also shown by table 4.6. For both the selection and outcomes equations, the coefficient for the interaction is positive and significant. However, as some have pointed out, interpreting the results of such interactions from a regression table can be difficult (Brambor et al. 2006). Thus, I also display the relationship graphically in figure 4.10. Looking at this figure, I find strong support for the moderating effect lobbying has on the relationship between human rights and the allocation of military aid.




Figure 4.10: Predicted probability of receiving military aid with high and low levels of lobbying across the range of repression. Results from table 4.6

As the figure shows, states with low amounts of lobbying (25th percentile) see a significant reduction in the probability of receiving military aid as their level of repression increases. However, states with high amounts of lobbying (75th percentile) see no change in the probability of receiving aid as their level of repression increases. By calculating the

first differences, we can ascertain the substantive effects of this relationship. For states with low levels of lobbying, an increase in repression from the min to the max leads to a 19% reduction in the probability of receiving U.S. military aid.¹⁷ For states with a high amount of lobbying, the predicted change in probability of receiving U.S. military aid as the level of repression increases is 0%. Thus, I find initial support for hypothesis 3b predicting that lobbying will moderate the relationship between human rights abuses and the allocation of U.S. foreign aid.

Table 4.7 displays the results when using economic aid as the dependent variable and empowerment rights as the measure of human rights abuses. The control variables are similar to the military aid equation but some notable differences exist. Specifically, we see a change in the polity variable with it now being significant only in the outcome equation with democratic countries receiving more aid. One explanation for this could be that the allocation of economic aid could be used as a "carrot" for states to become more democratic (Boutton and Carter 2014). This would cause economic aid to be given to those states with less democratic tendencies. The population variable also shows a change with larger states receiving more economic aid. This difference makes sense given that economic aid is likely more tied to helping with issues that are also affected by the population of a state like infrastructure, education, and social spending.

¹⁷When moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of repression, the predicted decrease in the probability of receiving U.S. military aid is 5% p -value .000.

Economic Aid				
	Level of Aid	Selection	Level of Aid	Selection
Lobbying (t-1)	0.01 (0.009)	0.03 (0.017)	0.06** (0.018)	0.11** (0.029)
Empowerment Rights (t-1)	-0.04** (0.010)	-0.02 (0.017)	-0.03** (0.010)	-0.01 (0.018)
Lobbying * Empowerment			0.01** (0.002)	0.01** (0.003)
Polity (t-1)	0.02** (0.006)	0.00 (0.010)	0.01** (0.006)	0.00 (0.010)
Ln GDPPC (t-1)	-0.38** (0.060)	-0.49** (0.065)	-0.37** (0.060)	-0.49** (0.065)
Ln Population (t-1)	0.59** (0.203)	-0.02 (0.039)	0.53** (0.202)	-0.00 (0.039)
Ln Trade (t-1)	-0.01 (0.025)	0.00 (0.029)	-0.01 (0.025)	-0.01 (0.030)
US Ally (t-1)	0.59** (0.184)	0.12 (0.109)	0.58** (0.183)	0.18 (0.112)
Cold War	0.37** (0.068)	-0.42** (0.098)	0.38** (0.068)	-0.40** (0.099)
Post 9/11	0.20** (0.053)	0.40** (0.110)	0.20** (0.053)	0.41** (0.111)
t		-0.64** (0.035)		-0.64** (0.035)
t-2		0.04** (0.003)		0.04** (0.003)
t-3		-0.00** (0.000)		-0.00** (0.000)
Constant	-4.14 (3.568)	5.97** (0.937)	-2.98 (3.569)	5.97** (0.939)
λ		-0.44** (0.071)		-0.44** (0.072)
Country Fixed Effects	YES	NO	YES	NO
N	3356	3356	3356	3356

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 4.7: Moderating effect of lobbying on human rights and the allocation of economic aid




Figure 4.11: Predicted probability of receiving economic aid with high and low levels of lobbying across the range of repression. Results from table 4.7.

The variables of interest, lobbying and empowerment rights, show mixed support for hypothesis 3. As the literature has previously shown, empowerment rights reduce the level of aid a country receives. Lobbying, however, fails to gain significance for both the outcome and selection equations. Thus, I fail to find support for hypothesis 3 when looking specifically at economic aid. Lobbying does however, have a moderating effect on human rights abuses when looking specifically at economic aid. Similar to the military aid analysis, figure 4.11 shows the interactive effect graphically. Again, states with low amounts of lobbying see a significant decrease in the probability of receiving economic aid as their level of abuse increases. For those states with high amounts of lobbying, we see no significant change in the probability of receiving economic aid. The first differences again show the magnitude of this effect. For states with a low amount of lobbying, an increase in repression from the

min to the max leads to a reduction in the predicted probability of receiving U.S. economic aid of 9%.¹⁸ This finding, combined with the analysis of the allocation of U.S. military aid, provides strong support for hypothesis 3b stating that lobbying can moderate the negative effect human rights abuses have on the probability of receiving U.S. foreign aid. Across both economic and military aid analyses, there exists a significant and consistent finding that lobbying can indeed overcome the negative consequences of human rights abuses when it comes to the allocation of U.S. foreign aid.

4.6.3 Lobbying, Human Rights, and Bypass Aid

Finally, I now turn to hypotheses 4 and 4b and the relationship between lobbying, human rights, and bypass aid. Table 4.8 provides the results from the analysis. The control variables in models one through four follow closely to previous studies on bypass aid. States experiencing a civil conflict see an increased amount of aid sent through bypass channels as donor states fear the chaos often brought about by civil war. These donor states are also likely to be responding to the crisis by sending more money to local NGOs for relief purposes and thus more aid is delivered as "bypass" aid. Polity increases the amount of bypass aid (though this effect is only statistically significant in models three and four). States are also more likely to send aid directly to governments that are well run therefore we see the "Governance" term as negative and statistically significant implying that the proportion of bypass aid decreases as the quality of governance increases. Finally, trade intensity reduces the amount of bypass aid as donor states provide more direct government aid to those states it shares a large amount of imports and exports with.

¹⁸A change in repression from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile leads to a 4% decrease in the probability of receiving U.S. economic aid (p -value .005).

	(Model 1) OLS	(Model 2) OLS	(Model 3) GLM	(Model 4) GLM
Lobbying (t-1)	-0.06* (0.031)	-0.07** (0.031)	-0.04* (0.021)	-0.05** (0.022)
Repression (t-1)	-0.04 (0.150)	-0.19 (0.168)	0.04 (0.107)	-0.08 (0.114)
Lobbying * Repression		-0.09** (0.033)		-0.08** (0.025)
Polity (t-1)	0.04* (0.022)	0.04* (0.022)	0.03** (0.013)	0.04** (0.013)
Civil Conflict (t-1)	0.33** (0.102)	0.41** (0.110)	0.25** (0.084)	0.33** (0.095)
Governance (t-1)	-1.56** (0.248)	-1.54** (0.247)	-1.04** (0.168)	-1.03** (0.164)
Natural Disaster (t-1)	0.15* (0.076)	0.15** (0.076)	0.06 (0.046)	0.07 (0.048)
Distance	-0.01 (0.171)	0.02 (0.168)	-0.02 (0.121)	-0.00 (0.120)
Trade Intensity (t-1)	-0.17** (0.067)	-0.16** (0.069)	-0.11** (0.044)	-0.10** (0.045)
Security Council (t-1)	-0.00 (0.313)	-0.14 (0.316)	-0.07 (0.235)	-0.19 (0.234)
Constant	4.40** (1.501)	4.00** (1.490)	2.98** (1.079)	2.73** (1.075)
<i>N</i>	437	437	437	437
<i>R</i> ²	0.278	0.29		

Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors for models 3 and 4.

NOTE: The coefficients for the regional and time dummies are not reported to conserve space.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 4.8: Effect of lobbying and human rights on bypass aid: 2005-2009

As for the different modeling strategy, we see the OLS models and the GLM models only differ in regards to the regime type variable with the coefficient on polity reaching statistical significance in the GLM models but not the OLS models. All other findings are mirrored. Looking specifically at model one we see the effect of lobbying on the proportion of bypass aid is negative and significant. This shows that as the number of lobbying contracts increases

in a given year, on average, the proportion of bypass aid decreases thus lending support to hypothesis four.




Figure 4.12: Predicted proportion of bypass aid by amount of lobbying. Results from table 4.8, model 3.

Figure 4.12 shows the predicted proportion of bypass aid a state receives across the values of lobbying based on model three. The figure clearly shows that lobbying leads to a decrease in the proportion of bypass aid a states receives with states at low levels of lobbying predicted to receive just under 55% of their aid as bypass aid while states with higher amounts of lobbying predicted to see that percentage drop by 9%. As an example of the substantive effect of this decrease in the proportion of bypass aid we can look at Lebanon in 2008. In 2008, Lebanon received just over \$45 million in bypass aid and had no lobbying contracts. If Lebanon would have moved from the minimum amount of lobbying to the 75th percentile of lobbying, it would see an expected decrease in the proportion of bypass aid of 6%. In actual dollar amounts, Lebanon would see their actual bypass aid go from \$45 million to \$40 million with the difference being transferred directly to government

aid channels. This means that the Lebanese government would have \$5 million more dollars under its control. This result lends support for the hypothesis that lobbying can decrease the proportion of bypass aid a state receives.

Further, the interaction term in models two and four are negative and significant. Graphically, figure 4.13 shows the moderating relationship lobbying has on the effect of human rights on proportion of bypass aid. Here I calculate the difference in the predicted proportion of bypass aid moving from the 25th percentile of repression to the 75th percentile. I calculate this change in bypass proportion for both high and low levels of lobbying.¹⁹ The graph depicts the predicted change in proportion of bypass aid due to changes in the amount of lobbying as the level of repression increases. I include the 90% confidence intervals for these predictions. For states with low amounts of lobbying, changes in the amount of repression has a significant and positive effect on the proportion of bypass aid they receive. However, in states with high levels of lobbying, an increase in repression fails to significantly change the proportion of bypass aid that a state receives.²⁰ The predicted amount of change in proportion of bypass aid equals .125 for states with low levels of lobbying as they move from low to high levels of repression. Conversely, states with a high amount of lobbying fail to see any increase in bypass aid as a result of their human rights abuses. Thus, the proposed hypothesis that lobbying can moderate the relationship between bypass aid and repression finds some support. The coefficients for lobbying from models one and three clearly show that states who hire lobbying firms receive less bypass aid. The effect of human rights on this relationship shows up clearly in figure 4.13. Here we see the change in predicted proportion of bypass aid by amount of lobbying in high repression states and low repression states. In these countries that have high amounts of repression, lobbying has a significant and negative effect on the change in proportion of bypass aid.

¹⁹I again use the 25th and 75th percentiles as "low" and "high".

²⁰The predicted change is actually negative as the graph shows but the confidence interval overlaps with zero thus making the predicted change indistinguishable from zero.

Again, as previously discussed, interpretation is often easier graphically. Thus, I present the findings from model 4 in another way in Figure 4.14. This graph shows the effect of lobbying on the proportion of bypass aid by repression. Here I calculate the predicted proportion of bypass aid when moving from the 25th percentile of lobbying to the 75th percentile.²¹ I calculate this change in lobbying for only high repression states (75th percentile) to see the difference in the predicted proportion of bypass aid at different levels of lobbying. As hypothesis four predicts, the effect of lobbying on bypass aid in high repression states shows that states with higher levels of lobbying will see a significant decrease in the predicted proportion of bypass aid they receive.



Figure 4.13: Effect of increased repression on the predicted change in proportion of bypass aid with low and high levels of lobbying. Results from table 4.8, model 4.

²¹Figure 4.14 lists the 25th and 75th percentiles as "Low Amount of Lobbying" and "High Amount of Lobbying" respectively as the number of lobbying contracts is logged and therefore difficult to interpret.

The difference in proportion of bypass aid due to lobbying depicted in figure 4.14 shows a decrease of 16.4 (p-value .000) in states with high repression. This serves as not only a statistically significant finding but proves substantive as well. This decrease marks a significant change in the amount of aid a government is able to control rather than an NGO. For instance, take the example of Haiti in 2009. The total aid for Haiti that year from the U.S. was just over \$253 million. The proportion of bypass aid was .67. Thus, Haiti received about \$170 million through bypass channels. A 16.4% reduction in the proportion of bypass aid would represent just under \$42 million dollars for the Haitian government in 2009. That means the Haitian government would have control over \$42 million more dollars than it would otherwise have had. As the example shows, this is a significant decrease in the proportion of bypass aid.




Figure 4.14: Predicted proportion of bypass aid by high and low amounts of lobbying for high repression states. Results from table 4.8, model 4.

4.7 Discussion

The analysis presented here seeks to investigate the relationship lobbying has with the likelihood of being punished for human rights abuses. The results show that lobbying can indeed shield states from the negative consequences of their actions. Specifically, I find that lobbying can reduce the likelihood that a state has sanctions implemented against it and reduces the severity of sanctions. Similarly, I find that lobbying can moderate the effect human rights abuses have on the allocation of U.S. foreign aid. Lastly, I show that lobbying can decrease the proportion of bypass aid a state receives and this effect is stronger in states with poor human rights records. The findings presented here are the first attempt, to my knowledge, to connect lobbying and punishment for human rights abuses. As noted earlier, some studies have made mention of this relationship (Pevehouse and Vabulas 2019) this study is the first to empirically test the effect lobbying has on punishment. Thus, this chapter provides a strong contribution to the scholarly literature on human rights. These findings are also incredibly important to the policy world. Understanding how states can avoid being punished for their human rights abuses can dramatically alter their ability to do so. A recent article in *Foreign Policy* magazine argues that increased attention towards foreign lobbying, coupled with the scandal surrounding Paul Manafort, has compelled the Justice Department to take enforcing FARA more seriously.²² Indeed, a report by the *Washington Post* reveals that since the Mueller probe, which prosecuted Tony Podesta of the aforementioned PLM lobbying firm, new and amended FARA registrations are at a 20-year high signifying that PR firms are aware of the increased scrutiny and are amending their reports accordingly (Zapotosky and Hamburger 2017). Beyond this policy relevance, this chapter also contributes to the literature on punishing human rights abuses. Specifically, the incorporation of lobbying into the discussion sheds new light on a powerful, yet, before

²²<https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/03/the-partys-over-for-washingtons-foreign-lobbyists/>

now under-studied, influence on how human rights influences sanctions and foreign aid. As the findings suggest, lobbying can drastically alter the nature of punishment for human rights abusing states.

Taken together, these findings paint a bleak picture of punishment for human rights abuses. It seems that states are able to use the advocacy power of Washington lobbying firms to champion their cause and thereby procure more favorable policies. Beyond this, these lobbying firms are also able to shield their clients from the negative consequences of their poor human rights records. These findings contribute both to the scholarly literature on the punishment of human rights abuses as well as our conceptions on the influence of lobbyists. As was pointed out earlier, the influence domestic lobbyists have has long been known in American politics but the effect of lobbying and foreign interests is far less developed. This study helps to bridge that gap, drawing heavily on the literature of domestic lobbying, to show that these same effects can be seen when looking at foreign lobbying. Holding states accountable for their human rights abuses is an important policy objective for the United States if the government contends that it holds such actors accountable. But the influence of Washington D.C lobbying firms greatly impacts this ability.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The study of why states decide to torture and abuse their citizens has a long history of scholarship. This dissertation contributes to that literature by showing the effect the broader economy has on decisions to repress. Chapter two provides insight into one of the most robust findings in the literature: youth bulges (Hill and Jones 2014). These large youth cohorts have been shown to drastically alter the security situation of the state and thereby lead to increases in repression as states move to insulate themselves from the potential threat (Nordås and Davenport 2013). However, this dissertation shows that the relationship between youth bulges and repression is moderated by the economic conditions of the state. Specifically, chapter two shows that economic growth and unemployment rates amongst the youth moderate the relationship between youth bulges and repression. The logic here is simply that countries with more economic opportunity (proxied by GDP growth and unemployment rate) can more easily incorporate the youth into the economic system. This incorporation makes unrest less likely which in turn reduces the need to preemptively repress citizens. While the logic is straightforward, the impact of this finding should not be understated. As mentioned, youth bulges serve as one of the most robust predictors of repression (behind only civil war) within the literature. Given this, to show that the economic makeup of the country can moderate this relationship proves to be a key finding and important development in the state repression literature. Beyond this, chapter two also contributes to the policy and international development realms as well. As developed states seek to promote human rights and economic growth within developing states, this finding shows that those two goals may be attained using the same tools. In some cases, particularly those states with high youth levels, it seems that economic development and increased respect for human rights, can be simultaneously attained given continued stimulation of the local economy. This point to

important overlap between the development and human rights related agencies.

Chapter three continues with the economic approach to state repression and considers another source of preemptive action: economic shocks. These sharp downturns in the economy, much like youth bulges, have the potential to cause mass unrest. This unrest proves to be a threat to the regime as citizens become unhappy with the situation. Given this, I show that states will employ preemptive repression as a way to shield themselves from the potential upheaval these economic shocks can bring. Additionally, my analysis displays a moderating relationship between economic shocks and level of development and realized dissent. Here, I show that more developed states are more likely to increase their levels of repression in the presence of an economic shock than democratic regimes. Similarly, I find that the marginal effect of shocks is positive when there is no actual dissent further suggesting that this repression is preemptive. This chapter provides another important contribution to the repression literature by identifying a key predictor of preemptive repression. It also identifies an important limitation to economic development in reducing human rights abuses. It seems that economic development, in general, reduces repression. Indeed, the previously discussed chapter made this exact argument. However, chapter three of this dissertation shows that these states, while generally less repressive, are vulnerable to increases in repression during sharp economic downturns. The combined contribution of identifying a previously unknown correlate of repression matched with linking that correlate to increased repression in developed states, proves an important contribution to the existing literature on state repression.

My final empirical chapter shifts the focus slightly and investigates how economic factors can be used to punish regimes for their human rights abuses. Importantly though, this chapter introduces the idea that foreign states can actually avoid these punishments by hiring hi-powered Washington D.C. lobbying firms to lobby on their behalf. Through my analysis I show that states can avoid having sanctions imposed and can reduce the severity

of sanctions through employing lobbyist. Beyond this, I also show that human rights abusing states can increase their probability of receiving aid if they hire a lobbying firm and that this lobbying can counteract the negative effect human rights abuses have on foreign aid. Further, these lobbyists can use their influence to make sure more of that the foreign aid is delivered directly to the government rather than through "bypass" channels and this effect is increased in poor human rights countries. Thus, I find that lobbying offers human rights abusing states a way to avoid being punished for their behavior. This is an important finding in many ways. First, it shows the power of lobbying and sheds light on an, until now, under-studied aspect of international human rights. It also provides important insight for policymakers as they advocate for action against human rights abusers. With the information provided in this dissertation, these policymakers can be more aware of the influence lobbying has and thereby take steps to counteract that influence. Lastly, this chapter can help in shining a light on an ugly corner of American foreign policy. By bringing to light the fact that American foreign policy can effectively be swayed by foreign governments, I hope to encourage action that would make this process more transparent and thus less influential.

Taken together, this dissertation provides valuable insights into the relationship between economics and state repression. This contribution not only helps to better understand the determinants of preemptive repression but also show how states can avoid being punished for using such tactics. While more work needs to be done, this dissertation provides unique insight into an important aspect of human rights.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX

A.0.1 Marginal Effects Plot

Below I provide a graph showing the conditional effect of youth unemployment across the range of youth. As with my other marginal effects plots, continuous variables were set at their mean and civil war was set to 0. The figure displays the effect of a one-unit increase in youth unemployment across increasing levels of youth. The figure clearly shows that states with high percentages of youth (the sample average is 29%) are likely to increase their repression as the youth unemployment rate increases. I display the results from interacting youth unemployment rather than GDP Growth due to my agreement with the early discussion that this better captures the economic situation of the youth. I have added this graph to the appendix of the paper.




Figure A.1: Marginal Effects Plot: Unemployment

A.0.2 Robustness Check with Alternative Dissent Data

Some have argued that the CNTS protest data used in this analysis under reports dissent (Salehyan et al. 2012). In order to check the robustness of my results, I also use dissent data from the Mass Mobilization Project collected by Clark and Regan (2016). Clark and Regan gather protest data from 162 countries for the years 1990-2014. To be considered a protest there must be at least 50 people attending the event. This is contrasted with CNTS which puts the cutoff at 100. I run the models in my analysis using the same interaction term and same controls variables (while using dissent data from Clark and Regan (2016) instead of from Banks) in order to show the robustness of my results. The results are contained in Table 3 and I graph the interaction based upon models one, three, and six below. The results again show that the inclusion of the alternative measure for dissent does little to change the

substantive findings of the paper.

The results from Table A.1 again show the statistically significant effect the interaction between youth bulges and GDP growth has on repression. This relationship is again captured in figures A.2, A.3, and A.4 which all show little to no change in repression when economic growth is high but a drastic increase in repression when economic growth levels are low. Thus lending support to the hypothesis that the effect youth bulges have on repression is conditioned by the economic state of the country.




Figure A.2: Marginal Effect of GDP Growth on Repression. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals

Table A.1: Effect of Youth Bulges on Repression by GDP Growth

	(1) Latent	(2) Latent	(3) Amnesty	(4) Amnesty	(5) State Dept	(6) State Dept
Youth Bulge	0.19* (0.092)	0.19* (0.093)	5.09* (1.118)	4.91* (1.130)	3.96* (1.094)	4.00* (1.150)
GDP Growth	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.07* (0.029)	0.06† (0.033)	0.04 (0.0357)	0.04 (0.039)
Youth * GDP Growth	-0.02* (0.008)	-0.02* (0.009)	-0.30* (0.101)	-0.30* (0.107)	-0.21† (0.110)	-0.20† (0.117)
GDP Per Cap (t-1)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.071)	0.006 (0.072)	-0.14† (0.074)	-0.16* (0.076)
Log Population (t-1)	0.01* (0.003)	0.01* (0.003)	0.30* (0.044)	0.30* (0.044)	0.30* (0.043)	0.31* (0.044)
Dissent (t-1)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.092)	0.01 (0.091)	0.20* (0.091)	0.18* (0.091)
Civil War (t-1)	-0.006 (0.0103)	-0.007 (0.0101)	0.98* (0.161)	0.99* (0.164)	0.90* (0.164)	0.87* (0.169)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-0.04 (0.028)	-0.03 (0.029)	-2.37* (0.478)	-2.43* (0.488)	-2.78* (0.487)	-2.71* (0.491)
Polity (t-1)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.03* (0.012)	0.03* (0.012)	0.03* (0.013)	0.02† (0.013)
Lagged DV	0.97* (0.005)	0.97* (0.005)	1.96* (0.102)	1.99* (0.103)	2.43* (0.109)	2.48* (0.112)
_cons	-0.25* (0.090)	-0.24* (0.090)				
Cut 1			6.77* (1.162)	6.97* (1.174)	6.02* (1.124)	6.48* (1.180)
Cut 2			10.19* (1.181)	10.43* (1.187)	9.829* (1.132)	10.37* (1.192)
Cut 3			13.31* (1.216)	13.59* (1.222)	13.59* (1.161)	14.22* (1.219)
Cut 4			16.28* (1.249)	16.60* (1.257)	17.03* (1.193)	17.70* (1.256)
Year Dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	3111	3111	2646	2646	3077	3077
Log lik.	1565.3	1569.8	-2355.9	-2331.2	-2330.9	-2290.9

Standard errors clustered on country

† p<.1, * p<0.05




Figure A.3: Marginal Effect of GDP Growth on Repression. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals




Figure A.4: Marginal Effect of GDP Growth on Repression. Bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals

A.0.3 Alternative Mechanisms of Control: Education Spending, State Capacity, and Civil Society

Economic development can be seen as an alternative to repression. It could be that governments face youth bulges by increasing spending on things like education as a way to buy off the potential threat. Indeed the literature points to a connection between education spending and general economic development.¹ To account for such a strategy, I include within the model spending on education taken from the World Bank. This measure is the total amount of spending on education as a percent of that country's GDP. Below I include the regression table and a graph. As both show, accounting for an increase in government spending on education does little to influence the increase in repression seen when the economic situation of the state is weak. The general trend holds that when the state is faced with a high number of youth and a poor economic outlook, the state chooses to repress as a way to insulate itself from the potential future threat.

¹See Hansson and Henrekson (1994)

	(1)	(2)
	Latent Repression	Latent Repression
Youth Bulge	0.27* (0.111)	-0.21 (0.149)
GDP Growth	0.01* (0.003)	
Youth * GDP Growth	-0.05* (0.012)	
Unemployment		-0.004* (0.001)
Youth * Unemployment		0.01* (0.005)
Education Spending (t-1)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)
GDP Per Capita (t-1)	-0.012† (0.006)	-0.013† (0.007)
Population (t-1)	0.02* (0.004)	0.01* (0.004)
Dissent (t-1)	0.001 (0.008)	0.005 (0.009)
Civil War (t-1)	-0.017 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.014)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-0.04 (0.023)	-0.04 (0.025)
XPolity (t-1)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.00008 (0.001)
Lagged DV	0.97* (0.006)	0.98* (0.007)
<i>N</i>	1646	1655
Year Dummies	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered on country

† $p < .1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.2: Effect of Youth Bulges on Repression Controlling for Education Spending




Figure A.5: Marginal Effect: From Model 2

Government spending on education no doubt signals a regime with a certain amount of capacity. As others have pointed out, state capacity is a multi-dimensional concept (Hendrix 2010). Following Hendrix (2010), one dimension of state capacity is already included in the model: GDP per capita. Going beyond this, I also include another measure of state capacity recommended by Hendrix (2010) – total taxes as a proportion of GDP. I use data compiled by Hendrix (2010) and re-run my models using this measure of state capacity in place of my former measure of GDP per capita. As the graph shows, the interactive effect between youth unemployment and youth bulges still moderates the relationship with repression. Those states with high unemployment increase repression as the number of youth increases even when controlling for the capacity of the state.




Figure A.6: Marginal Effect: From Model 2

To help account for institutions that could harness the youth bulge, I control for civil society in the state. I use data from VDEM, specifically the question asking "Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?" Higher numbers indicate higher levels of participation (Coppedge et al. 2020). The models include data from 1991-2012. As the graph below shows, the effect of GDP growth and youth bulges on repression remains unchanged when including civil society within the model.




Figure A.7: Marginal Effect: From Model 2

APPENDIX B

CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX

B.0.1 Currency Crisis Results

Table B.1 shows the regression results when using currency crises as a measure of economic shocks rather than inflation crises. This data, like the inflation data, was taken from Reinhart et al. (2019). The results hold with the coefficient on economic shocks positive and statistically significant meaning that countries experiencing a shock in time t-1 will, on average, experience higher levels of repression than those countries who fail to experience an economic shock, all else equal.

	Currency Crisis
Economic Shock	0.10* (0.053)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.18* (0.105)
Log Population (t-1)	0.21 (0.154)
Civil Conflict	0.75** (0.112)
L.democracy	-0.09 (0.094)
Dissent (t-1)	0.09** (0.029)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-1.64** (0.365)
Youth Bulge (t-1)	0.043** (0.013)
_cons	-2.61 (2.690)
<i>N</i>	3079
Fixed Effects	YES
Standard errors clustered on country	
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$	

Table B.1: Effect of Economic Shocks on Repression Using Currency Crises Measure

B.0.2 Results with XPolity

Below, table B.2 shows the results when using the Xpolity measure of regime type from (Vreeland 2008). The results remain largely unchanged with only model one showing a switch in significance. Here, we see that the coefficient on the measure of economic shock (a reduction in GDP growth of five percent or more) just misses significance with a p value of .19.

	(Model 1) Δ GDP Growth	(Model 2) Price Shock	(Model 3) CTOT	(Model 4) Inflation Crisis
Economic Shock (t-1)	0.02 (0.018)	0.02** (0.006)	0.65** (0.129)	0.22** (0.075)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.18** (0.061)	-0.09 (0.062)	-0.15** (0.064)	-0.14 (0.100)
Log Population (t-1)	0.04 (0.091)	0.03 (0.086)	-0.09 (0.087)	0.16 (0.149)
Civil Conflict	0.64** (0.067)	0.70** (0.071)	0.67** (0.071)	0.72** (0.102)
XPolity (t-1)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Dissent (t-1)	0.11** (0.023)	0.09** (0.024)	0.10** (0.023)	0.08** (.027)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-1.51** (0.264)	-1.33** (0.288)	-1.66** (0.262)	-1.75** (0.342)
Youth Bulge (t-1)	0.04** (0.009)	0.04** (0.010)	0.03** (0.009)	0.04** (0.013)
_cons	0.08 (1.607)	-0.37 (1.527)	2.14 (1.650)	-2.12 (2.710)
<i>N</i>	5859	4545	5861	3147
Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table B.2: Effect of Economic Shocks on Repression Using Xpolity Measure

B.0.3 Robustness Check: Education Spending

Below I provide the results when including education spending in the model. Due to the temporal range of the data, there are a significant amount of observations lost over the original analysis. Despite the incorporation of education spending, table B.3 shows that economic shocks increase the amount of repression within the state. The only shock variable that sees a change in significance is the change in GDP growth variable which becomes insignificant when including education spending. Given that this measure of economics shocks is a bit broad, I am not overly concerned that it loses significance. The effect of economic shocks can be clearly seen when looking at every other model.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	latent_r	latent_r	latent_r	latent_r
Economic Shock (t-1)	0.02 (0.028)	0.03** (0.011)	1.28** (0.280)	0.21** (0.095)
Education Spending (t-1)	-0.02 (0.014)	-0.02 (0.015)	-0.01 (0.015)	-0.02 (0.018)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.29** (0.079)	-0.24** (0.105)	-0.25** (0.083)	-0.16 (0.150)
Population (t-1)	-0.10 (0.200)	-0.11 (0.216)	-0.32* (0.166)	-0.07 (0.279)
Civil Conflict	0.48** (0.091)	0.57** (0.104)	0.49** (0.102)	0.50** (0.126)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.18* (0.101)	-0.09 (0.120)	-0.11 (0.096)	-0.19 (0.132)
Dissent (t-1)	0.11** (0.027)	0.16** (0.040)	0.10** (0.027)	0.07** (0.031)
Independent Judiciary (t-1)	-1.20** (0.312)	-1.66** (0.455)	-1.32** (0.328)	-1.56** (0.444)
Youth Bulge (t-1)	0.02* (0.013)	0.03 (0.017)	0.02 (0.013)	0.03* (0.019)
Constant	3.60 (3.375)	3.64 (3.783)	6.91** (2.974)	2.20 (4.746)
<i>N</i>	2391	1427	2285	1255

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table B.3: Effect of Economic Shocks on Repression Controlling for Education Spending

B.0.4 Tests of Non-Linearity

It could be that the relationship between economic shocks and repression is non-linear. To test for this possibility I regress repression on economic shocks and examine the component plus residual graph. As figures B.1 and B.2 show, there is no real evidence of a non-linear relationship.




Figure B.1: Component Plus Residual Graph for Price Shocks




Figure B.2: Component Plus Residual Graph for Price Shocks

B.0.4.1 Interactive Effect of Shocks and Dissent

Here I provide a graph of the predicted level of repression when overt dissent is present. As the graph shows, there is no significant difference in the predicted amount of repression.




Figure B.3: Predicted Level of Repression with Overt Dissent Present

APPENDIX C

CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX

C.0.1 Details of Lobbying Contracts with Foreign governments

Below, I provide a copy of the contract details between Qorvis and the Government of Bahrain as reported to the Department of Justice. The contract shown covers the time period when the youth delegation (highlighted in the introduction) was deployed to Washington D.C. As you can see, the contract covers things like coordinating meetings with the media, and NGOs as well as drafting opinion editorials and contacting members of Congress and the media.

Qorvis Communications, LLC #5483

1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Suite 500

Washington, DC 20036

Kingdom of Bahrain, Embassy

Nature of Services: Public Relations

The registrant facilitated and coordinated media and press activity, drafted opinion editorials, assisted in building relations with members of the media and non-government organizations, provided media monitoring and analysis and arranged meetings for visiting delegations. The registrant also disseminated informational materials on behalf of the foreign principal. In addition, the registrant contacted members of Congress and media representatives to discuss international terrorism, Middle Eastern studies, and security issues.

\$239,847.00 for the six month period ending September 30, 2012

Figure C.1: FARA Report - Bahrain: December 2012

Here I provide a copy of the 2012 contract between Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP and Mexico. As the report shows, the purpose of the lobbying is more specific in this example than in others where the nature of services are far more generic.

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP #5870 410 Seventeenth Street Suite 2200 Denver, CO 80802-4432 Embassy of Mexico through Kuykendall & Associates Nature of Services: U.S. Policy Consultant The registrant through Kuykendall & Associates communicated with members of Congress, congressional staffers, U.S. Government officials, attorneys, and media representatives regarding the implementation and enforcement of the International Court of Justice's decision in a case concerning Mexican Nationals, potential amendment in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, as well as other issues. The registrant also disseminated informational materials on behalf of the foreign principal. \$26,357.16 for the six month period ending December 31, 2012

Figure C.2: FARA Report - Mexico: 2012

Figure C.3 displays the coding rules used by Wood (2008) and Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) to code sanction severity.

Level	UN sanctions	US sanctions
1: Mild	Restrictions on arms and other military hardware; typically include travel restrictions on a nation's leadership or other diplomatic sanctions as well	Retractions of foreign aid, bans on grants, loans, or credits, or restrictions on the sale of specific products or technologies; not including primary commodities embargoes
2: Moderate	Moderate sanctions such as fuel embargoes, restrictions on trade in primary commodities, or the freezing of public and/or private assets	Import or export restrictions, bans on US investment, and other moderate restrictions on trade, finance, and investment between the US and target nation
3: Severe	Comprehensive economic sanctions such as embargoes on all or most economic activity between UN member states and the target	Comprehensive economic sanctions such as embargoes on all or most economic activity between the US and the target nation

Source: Wood (2008: 500).

Figure C.3: Coding Rules for Sanction Severity

C.0.2 Interactive Results from Model 4 Table 4.5 Showing the Effect of Lobbying and Repression on Probability of Severe Sanctions

Figure C.4 shows the interactive effect of lobbying and repression. We see that across the values of repression, lobbying has a consistently negative effect on the probability of severe sanctions, however, this finding fails to gain statistical significance.




Figure C.4: Predicted Probability of Severe Sanctions by Lobbying Across Values of Repression

C.0.3 Sanctions Analysis with Fixed Effects

Here I provide the results from the analysis of U.S. sanctions using a fixed effects logistic regression. As table C.1 shows, the results remain unchanged from the models presented in the body of the paper. The number of observations is less as those panels without any U.S. sanctions were dropped. Regardless, lobbying still reduces the probability that a state will be sanctioned by the U.S.

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)
Lobbying (t-1)	-0.08** (0.035)	-0.13** (0.048)
Repression (t-1)	1.89** (0.190)	1.98** (0.201)
Lobbying * Repression	0.06 (0.044)	0.07 (0.044)
NYT Shaming (t-1)	0.01** (0.004)	0.01** (0.004)
Democracy (t-1)	-1.12** (0.267)	-1.10** (0.268)
Alliance		
GDP per capita (t-1)	-1.32** (0.303)	-1.32** (0.303)
Population	0.22 (0.393)	0.20 (0.390)
Trade (t-1)	0.01** (0.004)	0.01** (0.004)
<i>N</i>	1580	1580
Fixed Effects	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table C.1: Effect of Lobbying and Human Rights on U.S. Sanctions: 1978-2012

C.0.4 Foreign Aid Analysis: Military and Economic Aid with Latent Repression and Empowerment Measure of Human Rights Abuses

The table below shows the results when using the measure of repression from Cingranelli et al. (2014) coupled with military aid. Additionally, the table displays the results when using the measure of repression from Fariss (2014) paired with economic aid. As the table shows, economic aid behaves quite differently than military aid when it comes to human rights abuses. We see that greater human rights abuses both increase the probability of receiving economic aid and increase the amount assuming you receive aid. This proves counter to how many thing about how human rights are connected to U.S. aid. Conversely, military aid acts as we would expect. Here, human rights abuses (higher empowerment rights values) lead to a reduced probability of receiving U.S. aid. It would seem then that while economic aid is sensitive to empowerment rights abuses, military aid is sensitive to both empowerment rights and physical integrity rights.

Type of Aid:	Economic	Economic	Military	Military
	Level of Aid	Selection	Level of Aid	Selection
Lobbying	0.02** (0.008)	0.03* (0.015)	0.01 (0.011)	0.00 (0.011)
Repression (t-1)	0.07** (0.034)	0.14** (0.039)		
Empowerment Rights (t-1)			-0.00 (0.015)	-0.10** (0.012)
Polity (t-1)	0.03** (0.005)	0.01** (0.006)	-0.00 (0.008)	-0.00 (0.007)
Ln GDPPC (t-1)	-0.44** (0.052)	-0.46** (0.053)	-0.30** (0.077)	-0.09** (0.039)
Ln Population	1.05** (0.157)	-0.09** (0.032)	-0.69** (0.256)	0.02 (0.026)
Ln Trade (t-1)	0.03 (0.022)	0.03 (0.023)	-0.02 (0.038)	0.04* (0.020)
US Ally	0.62** (0.162)	0.15 (0.092)	0.22 (0.265)	-0.21** (0.072)
Cold War	0.48** (0.065)	-0.51** (0.085)	0.37** (0.084)	0.15** (0.069)
Post 9/11	0.14** (0.052)	0.47** (0.110)	0.38** (0.066)	0.01 (0.066)
t		-0.67** (0.029)		-0.91** (0.075)
t-2		0.04** (0.003)		0.06** (0.007)
t-3		-0.00** (0.000)		-0.00** (0.000)
Constant	-11.30** (2.675)	6.71** (0.704)	13.73** (4.139)	0.11 (0.586)
λ		-0.43** (0.068)		-0.33** (0.130)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
N	4367	4367	3356	3356

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table C.2: Foreign Aid: Using Latent Repression and Empowerment Rights Indicators of Human Rights Abuses

C.0.5 Sanctions Analysis: Severity Models with Restricted Sample

	Model 3 (Severity)	Model 4 (Severity)
Lobbying (t-1)	-0.20** (0.102)	-0.16 (0.236)
Repression (t-1)	0.81** (0.381)	0.74 (0.586)
Lobbying * Repression		-0.03 (0.135)
NYT Shaming (t-1)	0.01 (0.006)	0.01 (0.006)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.86 (0.582)	-0.85 (0.603)
Alliance	-1.55** (0.697)	-1.54** (0.717)
GDP per capita (t-1)	0.54* (0.315)	0.55* (0.298)
Population	0.16 (0.225)	0.16 (0.228)
Trade (t-1)	0.01** (0.003)	0.01** (0.002)
Cut 1	7.67 (5.642)	7.57 (5.824)
Cut 2	9.48* (5.670)	9.38 (5.847)
<i>N</i>	486	486

Standard errors clustered on country.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table C.3: Effect of Lobbying and Human Rights on U.S. Sanctions: 1978-2012




Figure C.5: Predicted Probability of Severe Sanctions Across Range of Lobbying

Here I show the results when using the sanctions severity dependent variable on the restricted sample of only country-year observations with a U.S. sanction. We see that lobbying still has a negative effect on sanction severity when treating the variable as zero equalling mild sanctions and 2 equalling severe sanctions. Figure C.5 shows the predicted probability of severe sanctions over the values of lobbying. This clearly depicts the negative effect lobbying has on the probability of receiving severe sanctions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdullah, I. (1998). Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36(2), 203–235.
- Aitchison, J. J. (1986). *The statistical analysis of compositional data*. Chapman and Hall.
- Alesina, A. and D. Dollar (2000). Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? *Journal of Economic Growth* 5(1), 33–63.
- Apodaca, C. and M. Stohl (1999). United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(1), 185–198.
- Austen-Smith, D. (1993). Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes. *American Journal of Political Science* 37(3), 799.
- Austen-Smith, D. and J. R. Wright (1994). Counteractive Lobbying. *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1), 25.
- Banks, A. and K. Wilson (2017). Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. *Databanks International Jerusalem*,.
- Barron, P., K. Kaiser, and P. P. Menno (2016). Local Conflict in Indonesia: Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns by Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser, Menno Prasad Pradhan :: SSRN. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3384*.
- Baum, M. A. and P. B. Potter (2008). The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11(1), 39–65.
- Baum, M. A. and P. B. K. Potter (2019). Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy in the Age of Social Media. *The Journal of Politics* 81(2).
- Baumgartner, F. R. and B. D. Jones (1993). *Agendas and instability in American politics*. University of Chicago Press.
- Bazzi, S. and C. Blattman (2014). Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices †. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 6(4), 1–38.
- BBC News (2018, 1). Reality Check: How can a US president cut off foreign aid? - BBC News.
- Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach. *Journal of Political Economy* 76(2), 169–217.

- Berman, E., M. Callen, J. H. Felter, and J. N. Shapiro (2011). Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(4), 496–528.
- Blattman, C. and E. Miguel (2010). Civil war. *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1), 3–57.
- Blumenthal, P. (2011, 1). Lobbying Contacts By Egypt’s Washington Lobbyists : Sunlight Foundation.
- Bogardus, K. (2013, 10). Egypt turns to K Street after U.S. aid cut | TheHill.
- Bond, P. (2007). Competing Explanations of Zimbabwe’s Long Economic Crisis. *The Journal of South African and American Studies* 8(2), 149–181.
- Boutton, A. and D. B. Carter (2014). Fair-Weather Allies? Terrorism and the Allocation of US Foreign Aid. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(7), 1144–1173.
- Bradley, J. R. (2012). *After the Arab spring : how the Islamists hijacked the Middle East revolts*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brambor, T., W. R. Clark, M. Golder, N. Beck, F. Boehmke, M. Gilligan, S. N. Golder, and J. Nagler (2006). Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. *Political Analysis* 14, 63–82.
- Brett, R. and I. Specht (2004). *Young soldiers : why they choose to fight*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Carey, S. C. (2006). The Dynamic Relationship Between Protest and Repression. *Political Research Quarterly* 59(1), 1–11.
- Carey, S. C. (2010). The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent. *Political Studies* 58(1), 167–186.
- Carleton, D. and M. Stohl (1985). The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan. *Human Rights Quarterly* 7(2), 205.
- Cheibub, J. A., J. Gandhi, and J. R. Vreeland (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public Choice* 143(1-2), 67–101.
- Chenoweth, E., E. Perkoski, and S. Kang (2017). State Repression and Nonviolent Resistance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(9), 1950–1969.
- Cingranelli, D., D. Richards, and K. C. Clay (2014). The CIRI Human Rights Dataset.
- Cingranelli, D. L. and T. E. Pasquarello (1985). Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries. *American Journal of Political Science* 29(3), 539.

- Cingranelli, D. L., D. L. Richards, S. Human, R. Quarterly, and N. May (2010). The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. *Human Rights Quarterly* 32(2), 401–424.
- Clark, D. and P. Regan (2016). Mass Mobilization Protest Data. *Harvard Dataverse*.
- Cohen, B. C. (1963). *Press and foreign policy*. Princeton University Press.
- Collier, P. (2000). Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective. In M. Berdal and D. Malone (Eds.), *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Lynne Rienner.
- Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *International Affairs* 56(4), 757–777.
- Conrad, C. R. and W. H. Moore (2010). What Stops the Torture? *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2), 459–476.
- Conrad, Courtenay R Moore, W. H. (2010). What Stops the Torture ? *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2), 459–476.
- Coppedge, M., John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna Luhrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Steven Wilson, Agnes Cornell, Nazifa Alizada, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Laura Maxwell, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Johannes von Römer, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. (2020). V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10.
- Cox, D. G. and A. C. Drury (2006, 11). Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions. *Journal of Peace Research* 43(6), 709–722.
- Cushman, C. (2018). Foreign Government Efforts to Influence Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy. In J. A. Thurber, C. C. Campbell, and D. A. Dulio (Eds.), *Congress and Diaspora Politics : The Influence of Ethnic and Foreign Lobbying*, pp. 19–43. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Danneman, N. and E. H. Ritter (2014). Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(2), 254–79.
- Dashwood, H. S. (2000). *Zimbabwe : the political economy of transformation*. University of Toronto Press.
- Davenport, C. (1995, 8). Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(3), 683.
- Davenport, C. (2007a). State Repression and Political Order. *Annual Review of Political Science* 10(1), 1–23.

- Davenport, C. (2007b). *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davenport, C. (2007c). State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace. *Journal of Peace Research* 44(4), 485–504.
- Davenport, C. and B. Appel (2014). Stopping State Repression: An Examination of Spells, 1976-2004.
- Davenport, C. and D. A. Armstrong (2004, 7). Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996. *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3), 538–554.
- Davenport, C. and M. Inman (2012). The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24(4), 619–634.
- Davenport, C. and W. H. Moore (2012). The Arab Spring, Winter, and Back Again? (Re)Introducing the Dissent-Repression Nexus with a Twist. *International Interactions* 38(5).
- de Mesquita, B. B. and A. Smith (2007). Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(2), 251–284.
- Demirel-Pegg, T. and J. Moskowitz (2009). US Aid Allocation: The Nexus of Human Rights, Democracy, and Development. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(2), 181–198.
- Dietrich, S. (2013). Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation*. *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 698–712.
- Dietrich, S. and A. Murdie (2017). Human rights shaming through INGOs and foreign aid delivery. *Review of International Organizations* 12(1), 95–120.
- Drezner, D. W. (1999). *The sanctions paradox : economic statecraft and international relations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Drury, A. C. (2000). U.S. Presidents and the Use of Economic Sanctions.
- Drury, A. C. (2001). Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The U. S. President’s Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions. *Political Research Quarterly* 54(3), 485.
- Dube, O. and J. F. Vargas (2013). Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. *The Review of Economic Studies* 80(4), 1384–1421.
- Elbadawi, E. and N. Sambanis (2000). Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict. *Journal of African Economies* 9(3), 244–269.
- Elliott, J. (2012, 2). The American PR Firm Helping Out Bahrain’s Brutal Monarchy - The Atlantic.

- Esarey, J. and J. H. DeMeritt (2017). Political Context and the Consequences of Naming and Shaming for Human Rights Abuse. *International Interactions* 43(4), 589–618.
- FARA (2009). FARA Report. Technical report.
- FARA (2012). FARA. Technical report.
- FARA (2014). FARA Semi-Annual Report. Technical report, Department of Justice.
- FARA (2015). FARA Semi-Annual Report. Technical report, Department of Justice.
- Fariss, C. (2014). Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability. *American Political Science Review* 108(2), 297–318.
- Fearon, J. D. and D. D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(1), 75–90.
- Feingold, R. D. (2010, 7). S.Res.586 - 111th Congress (2009-2010): A resolution supporting democracy, human rights, and civil liberties in Egypt.
- Fleck, R. K. and C. Kilby (2001). Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts. *Southern Economic Journal* 67(3), 598.
- Franklin, J. C. (2008). Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly* 52(1), 187–211.
- Freeman, B. and L. Dennett (2014). Loopholes, Filing Failures, and Lax Enforcement: How the Foreign Agents Registration Act Falls Short. Technical report, Project on Government Oversight.
- Freeman, B. J. (2009). *The Best Foreign Policy Money Can Buy?: An Investigation of Foreign Lobbying and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Ph. D. thesis, Texas A&M.
- Galetovic, A. and R. Sanhueza (2000). Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups D’Etat. *Economics and Politics* 12(2), 183–204.
- Galtung, J. (1967). On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. *World Politics* 19(3), 378–416.
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3), 167–191.
- Gartner, S. S. and P. M. Regan (1996, 8). Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 33(3), 273–287.
- Gates, S. (2002). Recruitment and Allegiance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1), 111–130.

- Gelleny, R. D. and M. McCoy (2001, 9). Globalization and Government Policy Independence: The Issue of Taxation. *Political Research Quarterly* 54(3), 509–529.
- Gilboa, E. (2005). The CNN effect: The search for a communication theory of international relations. *Political Communication* 22(1), 27–44.
- Gleditsch, K. S. (2002). Expanded Trade and GDP Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(5), 712–724.
- Gleditsch, N. P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand (2002). Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5), 615–637.
- Goenner, C. F. (2007). Economic war and democratic peace. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(3), 171–182.
- Goldstein, R. J. (1983). *Political repression in 19th century europe*. Taylor & Francis.
- Goldstone, J. A. (1991). *Revolution and rebellion in the early modern world*. University of California Press.
- Gruss, B. and S. Kebhaj (2019). Commodity Terms of Trade : A New Database. *IMF Working Paper*.
- Gurr, T. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hafner-Burton, E. (2008). Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62(04).
- Hafner-Burton, E., M. Kahler, and A. Montgomery (2009). Network Analysis for International Relations. *International Organization* 63, 559–592.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. and A. H. Montgomery (2008). Power or Plenty How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2), 213–242.
- Hansen, J. M. (1991). *Gaining access : Congress and the farm lobby, 1919–1981*. University of Chicago Press.
- Hansson, P. and M. Henrekson (1994). A new framework for testing the effect of government spending on growth and productivity. *Public Choice* 81(3–4), 381–401.
- Hart, D., R. Atkins, P. Markey, and J. Youniss (2004). Youth Bulges in Communities. *Psychological Science* 15(9), 591–597.
- Helleiner, E. (2011, 6). Understanding the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy. *Annual Review of Political Science* 14(1), 67–87.
- Hendrix, C. S. (2010). Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(3), 273–285.

- Hill, D. W. and Z. M. Jones (2014). An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression. *The American Political Science Review* 108(3), 661–687.
- Hodler, R. and P. A. Raschky (2014). Economic shocks and civil conflict at the regional level. *Economics Letters* 124(3), 530–533.
- Houle, C. (2017). Social Mobility and Political Instability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1–27.
- Houle, C., M. Kayser, and J. Xiang (2016). Diffusion or Confusion? Clustered Shocks and the Conditional Diffusion of Democracy. *International Organization*.
- Hufbauer, G., J. Schott, K. Elliott, and B. Oegg (2009). *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition*. Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Humphreys, M. and J. M. Weinstein (2008). Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2), 436–455.
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster.
- Irwin, L. G. (2000). Dancing the Foreign Aid Appropriations Dance: Recurring Themes in the Modern Congresses. *Public Budgeting & Finance* 20(2), 30–48.
- Itkowitz, C. (2014, 5). Which foreign countries spent the most to influence U.S. politics? - The Washington Post.
- Iyengar, S. and D. Kinder (1987). *News That Matters: Television and American News that matters: Agenda-Setting and priming in a television age*. University of Chicago Press.
- Jacobson, G. C. (2007). *A divider, not a uniter : George W. Bush and the American people*. Pearson Longman.
- Johnsson, S. E. (2006). Speech at the 95th International Labor Conference. Geneva.
- Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and Mastruzzi. Massimo (2009). Governance Matters VIII Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators. *World Bank Working Paper*.
- Keck, Margaret E Sikkink, K. (1998). *Keck, Margaret E., and Sikkink, Kathryn. Activists beyond Borders : Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, US: Cornell University Press, 1998. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 10 November 2016. Copyright © 1998. Cornell University Press. All rights res.* Number November.
- Kim, N. K. (2016). Revisiting Economic Shocks and Coups. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60(1), 3–31.
- Knickmeyer, E. (2011). The Arab World’s Youth Army. *Foreign Policy*.

- Korenman, S. and D. Neumark (1997). Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets: A Cross-National Analysis.
- Krain, M. (2012). J'accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides? *International Studies Quarterly* 56(3), 574–589.
- Kuziemko, I. and E. Werker (2006). How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy* 114(5), 905–930.
- Lai, B. (2003). Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-cold War Period, 1991-96. *Journal of Peace Research* 40(1), 103–128.
- Lall, R. (2012, 10). From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation. *Review of International Political Economy* 19(4), 609–638.
- Lebovic, J. H. (1988). National Interests and US Foreign Aid: The Carter and Reagan Years. *Journal of Peace Research* 25(2), 115–135.
- Lebovic, J. H. and E. Voeten (2009). The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1), 79–97.
- Lee, S. (2007). International public relations as a predictor of prominence of US news coverage. *Public Relations Review* 33(2), 158–165.
- Leeds, B. A., J. M. Ritter, S. M. L. Mitchell, and A. G. Long (2002). Alliance treaty obligations and provisions, 1815-1944. *International Interactions* 28(3), 237–260.
- Lektzian, D. J. and C. M. Sprecher (2007). Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2), 415–431.
- Lichbach, M. I. (1987). from the SAGE Social Science Collections . All Rights Reserved . *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(2), 266–297.
- Licht, A. A. (2010). Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1), 58–87.
- Lin, J. Y. (2012). Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or a Demographic Bomb in Developing Countries? Technical report, The World Bank, Washington DC.
- Lindsay, J. M. (1986). Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination. *International Studies Quarterly* 30(2), 153.
- Linzer, D. A. and J. K. Staton (2015). A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948–2012. *Journal of Law and Courts* 3(2), 223–256.
- Lozocksky, I. (2015). How Azerbaijan and Its Lobbyists Spin Congress – Foreign Policy.

- Malik, A. and B. Awadallah (2013). The Economics of the Arab Spring. *World Development* 45, 296–313.
- Marshall, M. G., T. R. Gurr, and K. Jaggers (2016). POLITY IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015. *Center for Systemic Peace 1st ed.*
- McKinlay, R. D. and R. Little (1977). A Foreign Policy Model of U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocation. *World Politics* 30(1), 58–86.
- Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. *World Politics* 56(3), 327–362.
- Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004). Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. *Journal of Political Economy* 112(4), 725–753.
- Milner, H. V. and D. H. Tingley (2009). The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid. *Economics & Politics* 22(2), 200–232.
- Montes-Rojas, G. V. (2013). Can Poor Countries Lobby for More US Bilateral Aid? *World Development* 44, 77–87.
- Moore, W. H. (1998). Repression and Dissent : Substitution , Context , and Timing. *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3), 851–873.
- Moore, W. H. (2000). The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(1), 107–127.
- Mulderig, M. C. (2013). An Uncertain Future: Youth Frustration and the Arab Spring. Technical Report 16, Boston University.
- Murdie, A. and D. Davis (2012). Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1), 1–16.
- Neuenkirch, M. and F. Neumeier (2015). The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth. *European Journal of Political Economy* 40, 110–125.
- Neumayer, E. (2003a). Is respect for human rights rewarded? An analysis of total bilateral and multilateral aid flows. *Human Rights Quarterly* 25(2), 510–527.
- Neumayer, E. (2003b). *The pattern of aid giving : the impact of good governance on development assistance*. Routledge.
- Newhouse, J. (2009). Diplomacy, Inc.: The Influence of Lobbies on U.S. Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs* 88, 73–92.
- Nielsen, R. A. (2013). Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States. *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 791–803.
- Nordås, R. and C. Davenport (2013). Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4).

- Oberhofer, H. . and M. Pfaffermayr (2012). Fractional Response Models-A Replication Exercise of Papke and Wooldridge. *Journal of Applied Econometrics* 6(3), 619.
- Papke, L. E. and J. M. Wooldridge (1996, 11). Econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. *Journal of Applied Econometrics* 11(6), 619–632.
- Peksen, D. (2009). Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1), 59–77.
- Peksen, D. and A. C. Drury (2009). Economic Sanctions and Political Repression: Assessing the Impact of Coercive Diplomacy on Political Freedoms. *Human Rights Review* 10(3), 393–411.
- Peksen, D., T. M. Peterson, and A. C. Drury (2014). Media-driven Humanitarianism? News Media Coverage of Human Rights Abuses and the Use of Economic Sanctions. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(4), 855–866.
- Pevehouse, J. C. W. and F. Vabulas (2019). Nudging the Needle: Foreign Lobbies and US Human Rights Ratings. *International Studies Quarterly* 63(1), 85–98.
- Poe, S. C. and J. Meernik (1995). US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. *Journal of Peace Research* 32(4), 399–411.
- Poe, S. C. and C. N. Tate (1994). Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 88(4), 853–872.
- Popkin, S. L. (1979). *The rational peasant : the political economy of rural society in Vietnam*. University of California Press.
- Powlick, P. J. (1991). The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion among American Foreign Policy Officials. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(4), 611–641.
- Quinn, E. (2015, 12). U.S. lobbying, PR firms give human rights abusers a friendly face – Center for Public Integrity.
- Reinhart, C., K. Rogoff, C. Trebesch, and V. Reinhard (2019). Global Crises Data by Country.
- Reinhart, C. M. and K. S. Rogoff (2011, 8). From financial crash to debt crisis. *American Economic Review* 101(5), 1676–1706.
- Ritter, E. H. and C. R. Conrad (2016). Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression. *American Political Science Review* 110(1), 85–99.
- Robinson, P. (2011). The CNN effect reconsidered: mapping a research agenda for the future. *Media, War & Conflict* 4(1), 3–11.

- Rogin, J. (2011, 2). How the Senate resolution on Egyptian democracy died – Foreign Policy.
- Salehyan, I., C. S. Hendrix, J. Hamner, C. Case, C. Linebarger, E. Stull, and J. Williams (2012). Social Conflict in Africa: A New Database. *International Interactions* 38(4), 503–511.
- Sambanis, N. (2004). What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6), 814–858.
- Scott Bennett, D. and A. C. Stam (2000). EUGene: A conceptual manual. *International Interactions* 26(2), 179–204.
- Sobel, R. (2001). *The impact of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam : constraining the colossus*. Oxford University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution* . McGraw-Hill.
- Truex, R. (2019). Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(4), 1032–1052.
- Urdal, H. (2006). A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence. *International Studies Quarterly* 50, 607–629.
- USAID (2013). The Potential of Youth For a Demographic Dividend: Investing in Health, Education, and Job Creation. Technical report, USAID, Addis Ababa.
- Vreeland, J. R. (2008). Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *International Organization* 62(01), 65–101.
- Wang, T. (2011). Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States¹. *International Studies Quarterly* 55(3), 787–801.
- Wood, R. M. (2008). “A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976–2001. *International Studies Quarterly* 52, 489–513.
- Wood, R. M. and M. Gibney (2010). The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to CIRI. *Human Rights Quarterly* 32(2), 367–400.
- World Bank (2011). World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. Technical report, World Bank, Washington DC.
- Wright, J. (2009). How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Autocratic Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3), 552–571.
- Wright, T. and S. Moorthy (2018). Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression*. *International Interactions* 44(1), 132–155.

- Young, K. L. (2012a, 10). Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. *Review of International Political Economy* 19(4), 663–688.
- Young, L. (2012b, 12). Egyptian military aid still flying high : Sunlight Foundation.
- Young, L. E. (2019). The Psychology of State Repression: Fear and Dissent Decisions in Zimbabwe. *American Political Science Review* 113(1), 140–155.
- Zapotosky, M. and T. Hamburger (2017, 11). Mueller probe appears to be prompting lobbyists to register as foreign agents - ProQuest.
- Zhang, J. and G. T. Cameron (2003). China’s agenda building and image polishing in the US: Assessing an international public relations campaign. *Public Relations Review* 29(1), 13–28.