This dissertation identifies and addresses contemporary issues in political economy related to how private interests influence elections and government decision making. The three chapters focus on spending in elections by two distinct kinds of organizations and lobbying by firms. The chapters are fundamentally empirical investigations with rigorous theoretical foundations. Chapter 1: Campaign Finance in the Age of Super PACs. The United States Supreme Court 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission led to a major de-regulation of election campaign finance law. A new political action committee emerged from this case, known as the Super PAC, with a relatively unfettered ability to raise and spend money in elections. How were campaign spending and electoral outcomes affected? I characterize the influence of Super PACs on U.S. Congressional general and primary elections by estimating an election contest model. I exploit variation in donor finances, background information on candidates, and the dynamic model structure to deal with candidate unobservables. Results indicate that Super PACs do not have significant influence on voting outcomes but did increase election spending between 2010-2016. They affect behavior of other committees, with differences across political party and incumbency status. Finally, Super PACs have modest effects on candidate platforms and entry. Chapter 2: Dark Money in Congressional Elections. Nonprofits in the United States play a unique role in campaign finance. Their tax-exempt status and anonymous donations combined with their recently de-regulated political status allows them to engage in political advertising spending in an unprecedented manner. I study the rise of ``dark-money'' by 501(c)(4) nonprofits in US Congressional elections by studying the pattern of spending and the effects on election outcomes. Since 501(c)(4) nonprofits are not legally required to disclose spending to the Federal Election Commission, I exploit raw advertising data to measure their behavior. I find that they do not have significant effects on vote share when accounting for the spending of candidates, parties, PACs, and Super PACs. Chapter 3: Lobbying for Government Appropriations. This chapter investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small. Finally, I find that increasing competition in procurement generally results in less lobbying.
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