THE BANDIAGARA EMIRATE : WARFARE, SLAVERY AND COLONIZATION IN THE MIDDLE NIGER, 1863 – 1903

Between 1863 and 1903, the Middle Niger, a region under the arch of the Niger River in present day Mali and Burkina Faso, was colonized by two armies. The first army was a Futanke-led army commanded by the Sufi reformer al-Hajj Umar Tal and later led by his nephew, Tijani Tal. The Futanke-led army invaded the region after their war against the Bamana Kingdom of Segu, drew the Umarian Empire into a conflict with the Caliphate of Hamdullahi. The Futanke and the Masinanke of Hamdullahi shared a common faith, language and culture, and both had fought wars under the umbrella of ‘jihad’ against non-Muslims and Muslims whose practice they considered unorthodox. But despite the rhetoric of Futanke and Masinanke leaders, the instability of wars from 1861-90 necessitated the building of alliances that diminished the instrumental value of racial and religious exclusion. In 1893 a new French-led military regime established itself in the Middle Niger. The French, in turn, used warfare and enslavement as tools of empire, creating a military territory called the “French Sudan.” The French regime initially worked through Futanke proxies but soon demonstrated a clear preference for local chiefs and racial politics. As the French army conquered territory non-Futanke were placed directly under the administration of nearby posts. While my approach is drawn from instrumentalist theories of ethnicity, this study takes a broad view of social differentiation. Rather than centering my discussion around constructions of race, class or ethnicity, I examine how diverse categories of difference were tools of both African and European elites. I argue that military elites selectively emphasized and ignored longstanding practices of social differentiation to achieve their political and economic goals in the region. I further argue that political realism governed the strategies Futanke and French elites pursued as they conquered and ruled the diverse inhabitants of the Middle Niger in the latter half of the nineteenth century. I propose that historians of warfare in Africa should consider how elites ignored categories difference to form effective alliances, even though they may have emphasized the differences of their enemies.