This study aims to investigate the extent to which sectarianism impacts Iraqi Arab Sunnis' and Iraqi Arab Shiites' attitudes and behaviors. I use an explanatory sequential mixed methods design, which consists of conducting a quantitative analysis followed by a qualitative one. In the first phase of the study, I conducted secondary data analysis of the Arab Barometer data set (Wave II collected in 2012) to examine the association between sectarian discrimination and following political news, religion, and sect identity. I looked at factors such as following local political news generally, following local political news from sect-affiliated media, individuals' degree of religiosity, and the sect with which a person self-identifies. I use binary logistic regression and ordered logistic regression to test four hypotheses. I expected a positive association between the dependent variable and following political news generally, following local political news from partisan and sect-affiliated sources, and self-identifying with a sect. Further, I expected a statistically non-significant association between the dependent variable and religiosity. The findings reveal that the association between following local political news from sect-affiliated media sources and the three sectarian attitudes analyzed in this phase of the study (doubting patriotism of those of a different sect, intermarrying them, and being neighbors with them) was not statistically significant. The findings also reveal that religiosity may improve some sectarian attitudes. In the second phase of the study, I analyzed 21 semi-structured face-to-face interviews I conducted with Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites in the Iraqi Kurdistan region in 2020. The purpose of doing a follow-up qualitative analysis was to explore how certain views have changed since 2012. The findings reveal that as of 2020, Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites sectarian attitudes have ameliorated as compared to 2012. In addition to the positive shift in attitudes, these interviews also reveal that as of 2020, Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites are less likely to self-identify with a sect. One way to explain these changes is the fact that the country is now much more stable in terms of civil wars, counterterrorism, and sectarian tensions as compared to 2012. More importantly, over the past decade, Iraqis have developed what I call sectarian awareness that has potentially moderated sectarian attitudes. Finally, I cross-examined peoples' responses to close-ended and open-ended questions asked during the interviews and I found contradictions. While the close-ended questions on sectarian attitudes revealed glimmers of hope, follow-up probing questions showed that the reality on the ground was much more complex. Both groups complained about the discrimination they faced daily, and some of the respondents indulged in sectarian stereotypes. This cross-examination contributes to the line of research that suggests the necessity of using mixed methods to better capture the subtleties of sectarian attitudes and behaviors. Overall, the findings of this study contribute to constructivists' discussion on the ways in which sectarianism fluctuates depending on time and space. The findings of this study challenge scholars and practitioners in the field of transitional justice and peace-building to shift their attention to the micro-level processes through which people stereotype, discriminate, and prejudge based on sect.
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